The Conduct of Intelligence in Democracies: Processes, Practices, Cultures 9781626378216

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The Conduct of Intelligence in Democracies

The Conduct OF

Intelligence IN

Democracies Processes, Practices, Cultures edited by

Florina Cristiana Matei and Carolyn Halladay

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2019 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Gray’s Inn House, 127 Clerkenwell Road, London EC1 5DB

„ 2019 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Matei, Florina Cristiana, editor. | Halladay, Carolyn. Title: The conduct of intelligence in democracies : processes, practices, cultures / edited by Florina Cristiana Matei & Carolyn Halladay. Description: Boulder, Colorado : Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019001583 (print) | LCCN 2019003874 (ebook) | ISBN 9781626378216 (e-book) | ISBN 9781626377691 (hardcover : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Intelligence service. | Intelligence service—Political aspects. | Democracy. Classification: LCC JF1525.I6 (ebook) | LCC JF1525.I6 C654 2019 (print) | DDC 327.12—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019001583

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Foreword, Mark Phythian Preface

1

vii ix

The Role and Purpose of Intelligence in a Democracy, Florina Cristiana Matei and Carolyn Halladay

Part 1 The Intelligence Process 2 3 4 5

The Intelligence Cycle, Antonio M. Díaz Fernández

27

Collection Policy and Planning, Mike Fowler

41

Counterintelligence, Joanisval Brito Gonçalves

77

Developing Analytic Capabilities, John Tullius

Part 2 Roles and Missions in Today’s Security Context 6

1

Covert Operations, Rubén Arcos

v

59

97

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7 8 9 10 11

Contents

The Nexus of Law Enforcement and Intelligence, Lisa I. Carroll

107

Counterinsurgency, Eduardo E. Estévez

139

The Public vs. Private Distinction, Damien Van Puyvelde

167

Intelligence Sharing, Lynda Peters

121

The United Nations Intelligence Function, Benjamin Oudet

153

Part 3 Accountability and Culture 12 13 14

Oversight of Intelligence, Thomas C. Bruneau

183

National Intelligence Cultures, Irena Chiru

213

Classified Information and the News Media, Tristan Mabry

Part 4 Conclusion 15

The Future of Intelligence in Democracies, James J. Wirtz

List of Acronyms Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

197

229 237 241 267 269 278

Foreword

This welcome and wide-ranging volume provides us with one of the most international approaches to the study of intelligence to date. Originally, the academic study of intelligence was very much located in and focused on the Anglosphere and was dominated by the considerable efforts of relatively small bands of academics working in, and on, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Although it is possible to view the study of intelligence as being rooted in a conscious effort by US intelligence professionals to develop a literature on the best intelligence practices, the study of intelligence has to be about more than improving professional practice. This is because it raises fundamental questions about the relationships between state and citizen, openness and secrecy, accountability and deniability, inward and outward focus, and the legitimate aims and limits of intelligence in a democratic context. Such issues inspired academic writing about intelligence in the United States in the wake of the revelations from the Church Committee investigations of the mid-1970s, whence the academic study of intelligence spread. Prominent among these pioneering efforts was the work of Harry Howe Ransom, who established the importance of developing a social science agenda for studying what he termed the “perhaps unresolvable normative problem of balancing the requirements of American democracy with the presumed need for intelligence agency secrecy.”* He was followed by the likes of Loch K. Johnson on the vital role of oversight in a democracy and Gregory F. Treverton on the question of covert action and democracy. At the same time this initial literature expanded to embrace other Anglosphere countries then extended to parts of Western Europe, two *Harry Howe Ransom, “Being Intelligent About Secret Intelligence Agencies,” American Political Science Review 74, no. 1 (1980), 141.

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Foreword

waves of democratization in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s gave rise to additional questions about the role of intelligence in new democracies and the intelligence challenges (regarding both accountability and efficacy) that faced states transitioning from authoritarian to democratic systems of governance. These considerations also injected a sense of urgency into the development of the comparative study of intelligence and provided a more reliable base from which inferences could be drawn about the operation of intelligence in democratic (and transitional) contexts. Perhaps inevitably, a base of literature considering the relationship between intelligence and democracy that goes beyond the established democracies of the Anglosphere has taken time to develop. Nevertheless, for several years now a growing number of academics from a range of national backgrounds have been working on questions of democracy and intelligence in terms of country cases that take us beyond the traditional focus in explicitly comparative terms. Across a range of international conferences, numerous panels have been convened—several of which I have had the pleasure to serve on—with a view to advancing the international study of the intelligence-democracy problematic. The present volume represents a significant step forward in this process while also following in the tradition of those who first sought to develop the social science study of intelligence in terms of the relationship between state and citizen, openness and secrecy, accountability and deniability. The editors have done a great job in bringing together an international cast of leading figures in the academic study of intelligence to offer thematic and comparative analyses of a series of key issues that embrace a range of national experiences across old and new democracies. Collectively, these provide a framework for approaching the comparative study of the intelligence-democracy dynamic, as well as a stateof-the-art account of developments to date. The editors and contributors have succeeded in providing the kind of conceptually informed comparative analysis and reflection that has long been advocated as the next significant step in the development of the academic study of intelligence. As a result, this book marks an important stage in the internationalization of the academic study of intelligence, demonstrating what can be achieved through the comparative study of intelligence and providing a model for those who follow. It is testimony to the depth and vibrancy of contemporary intelligence studies. On this basis, the future of this discipline looks bright. —Mark Phythian University of Leicester

Preface

We were inspired to coedit this volume by our US and international military and civilian students at the US Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.* Often, those students lamented that the available books on intelligence typically lack worldwide perspectives on intelligence and democracy, despite the fact that the transnational nature of the current security context calls for global viewpoints on the role and function of intelligence in a democracy. In response, we designed this book to present authors and examples from around the world. This study provides a global, comprehensive overview of intelligence, security, policy, and democracy insights, discussing key theoretical concepts and incorporating examples of intelligence and democracy issues experienced by developing and established democracies. We seek to provide readers with international views on the role and place of (effective) intelligence in a democratic milieu. Our ultimate goal is to contribute to a better understanding of the contemporary significance of democracy and democratic consolidation of the relationship between elected leaders and intelligence agencies. To this end, we would like to keep the debate on intelligence and democracy going: we invite readers to use this text as a springboard for future volumes on global perspectives on intelligence and democracies. * * *

There are many people who helped bring this book to fruition, and we are grateful to all of them. First and foremost, our deep appreciation goes to our students, military officers, and civilians from all over the world *The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Department of Defense, the US Navy, or the US government.

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Preface

whose expertise and experience in the fields of civil-military relations and intelligence helped us to understand the challenges of and opportunities for operating effective intelligence agencies in a democratic milieu. While we cannot thank you by name, you know who you are; all of you have made a tremendous contribution to the completion of this book. We are very grateful to the Naval Postgraduate School’s School of International Graduate Studies (SIGS), the National Security Affairs Department, and the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) for providing an environment that heeds academic and curriculum development. A special note of appreciation goes to the International Studies Association (ISA) Intelligence Section and the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence team. We express our gratitude to Marie-Claire Antoine, who has been outstanding in guiding, coaching, and supporting us throughout the publication process. Chère Marie-Claire, nous vous remercions beaucoup pour votre confiance! We must acknowledge with thanks the technical and editorial assistance of Aileen Houston, often on very short notice. We really could not have done it without you! We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers who took the time to read our manuscript and provide invaluable comments and suggestions. Our families deserve tremendous appreciation and gratitude for their support and encouragement throughout this process. Cris would like to thank her husband, Eugen C. Matei; her mother, Victoria Vajdea; her father, Nicolae Vajdea; and her children, Claire and Albert. Carolyn would like to thank her husband, Jim, and twenty-odd rescued felines, some of whom, after so many drafts, have developed elaborate opinions about intelligence in democracies. Finally, this accomplishment would have been impossible without the unrelenting support of the late director of CCMR at the Naval Postgraduate School, Richard J. Hoffman. Rich’s caring and inspiring leadership—to say nothing of his emphasis on academic growth via research and publications—motivated us to start and finish this book. We hope that this book, with its international focus, ably demonstrates the global view and understanding that Rich sought to encourage in his people. As two of his many people, we dedicate this book to his memory.

1 The Role and Purpose of Intelligence in a Democracy Florina Cristiana Matei and Carolyn Halladay

The very word “secrecy” is repugnant in a free and open society. —John Fitzgerald Kennedy1

At the writing of this volume in early 2019, there are 146 democracies around the world—out of 195 states.2 These countries have held free and fair elections, instituted market economies, and fostered the creation of civil societies. Some have endeavored to overhaul their intelligence agencies,3 converting repressive state security systems into democratic intelligence communities. Even the most successful democracies face a conundrum in regard to the intelligence function, however: whereas democracy calls for political neutrality, transparency, and accountability, effective intelligence agencies must operate in secrecy.

Democratic Systems In general, the literature on democracy divides democratic systems into two ideal types: electoral democracies, which are characterized by free and fair elections, and liberal democracies, which involve free and fair elections as well as the protection of individual, civil, and political rights and freedoms of the citizenry.4 Moving from electoral to liberal democracies equates to achieving democratic consolidation, 1

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whereas moving from liberal to electoral democracy status equates to democratic deconsolidation or erosion.5 One of the most comprehensive conceptual frameworks of democratic consolidation was advanced by scholars Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan.6 In their view, democratic consolidation requires developing five complementary and interacting arenas, operating within a functioning state: (1) a free and lively civil society where citizens, groups, and movements, generally independent of the state, associate to convey shared ideas, concepts, interests, and values; (2) a relatively autonomous and valued political society, whereby the polity arranges itself to dispute the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and state apparatus, and which includes political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, interparty alliances, and legislatures; (3) rule of law, namely, a sense of constitutionalism and a clear hierarchy of laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system and supported by a strong legal culture in civil society; (4) a functioning state bureaucracy in which the democratically elected government wields its claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory (command, regulate, extract) effectively to enforce law in order to protect citizens’ rights and deliver other goods; and (5) institutionalized economic society, whereby sociopolitically crafted and sociopolitically agreed-on norms, institutions, and regulations exist to mediate between state and market.7 Countries that have successfully developed these arenas are called consolidated democracies. Examples include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Australia, Germany, and Japan, to name a few. Countries that have started creating these institutions and ideas but have not been able to develop them fully are called consolidating democracies. Examples include Romania, Chile, South Africa, and Indonesia, among others. This volume discusses both consolidated and consolidating democracies in the context of democratic societies.

The Intelligence-and-Democracy Dilemma Democratic societies seek liberty and security for their citizens. To achieve these goals, they heed freedoms, rights, diversity, transparency, accountability, and so on.8 They also craft intelligence agencies to protect their national security and, ultimately, to maintain their democratic trajectory.9

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3

Paradoxically, however, to serve democracies, intelligence agencies must engage in clandestine activities or exploit secret sources and methods—measures that, on their face, do not comport with the open, free society that democracies seek to sustain. Indeed, such activities can pose a great danger to the democracy itself. Secrecy, for instance, may accommodate abuse and insulate the agencies from scrutiny, intrinsic or extrinsic. Problems of this sort have arisen in the United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, or Romania, to name a few—states where intelligence agencies operated without a legal framework for decades.10 Secrecy and clandestine activities augment the intelligence agencies’ power; they may refuse to serve policy in favor of pursuing their own objectives. In one example, Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (the Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BND) provided the United States with intelligence during the war in Iraq in 2003, per existing agency-to-agency agreements, despite German policymakers’ resolutely antiwar stance.11 Conversely, secrecy and clandestine activities may encourage the politicization of the intelligence apparatus, which leads to misuse of intelligence agencies and their special privileges by the executive branch for its own political ends.12 There is abundant literature on the politicization of intelligence in the United States and the United Kingdom, in particular with regard to the intelligence leading up to the second invasion of Iraq.13 An extreme case of politicization involves intelligence agencies acting as political police for the government du jour.14 There have been scattered instances of long-established democracies using intelligence agencies as political police, in particular in the 1970s—including the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) monitoring American citizens, abuses by Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) against the local population in Quebec, the United Kingdom’s MI5 surveillance of British citizens during the Thatcher government, and India’s intelligence agencies’ arrest of tens of thousands of political opponents and minorities without due process.15 Such measures are regularly employed by developing democracies. In Indonesia, South Korea, Mongolia, Romania, Croatia, and Albania, for example, the domestic intelligence agencies (and sometimes the foreign or military intelligence agencies) have regularly conducted surveillance of members of the opposition and journalists—most frequently during elections—as directed by the respective ruling elites or intelligence leadership. 16 In Albania in 1997,

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National Intelligence Service (NIS) personnel even suppressed civilian demonstrations against corruption in the government.17 In Colombia, the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) (1953–2011) leadership and rank and file were involved in assassinations, improper bargains with paramilitary and guerrilla groups, and electronic surveillance of political opposition and media representatives, which ultimately led to the dismantling of the agency in 2011.18 In Argentina, political police practices, which occurred virtually under each democratically elected administration but more so under the government led by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the Secretariat of Intelligence (SI) in 2015, after allegations of involvement in the assassination of a prosecutor who was investigating terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994.19 Finally, in virtually all developing African democracies, the primary role of intelligence agencies is regime protection. Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Sudan are a few examples.20

The Role of Intelligence Intelligence is crucial to the survival of the state. For this reason, all democracies have created at least one intelligence agency, albeit with different structures, sizes, capabilities, and competences depending on the state, its needs, and its history. Although there is no universally accepted definition of intelligence,21 in a democracy, the main function of intelligence is to help fulfill the legitimate tasks of government. Specifically, the purpose of intelligence is to serve, inform, assist, and support policymakers/decisionmakers in their work, and to provide support to security or military operations and organizations.22 In this context, the role of intelligence in a democracy is threefold: First, it is a process. Intelligence involves an enterprise by which certain types of information (e.g., security threats, strategic threat estimates, future capabilities projections, indication and warning, etc.) are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated to decisionmakers/policymakers. It also is how certain types of covert action are conceived and conducted. Second, it is an organization. Intelligence consists of units that execute the intelligence functions (process and product). Such institutions are

The Role and Purpose of Intelligence in a Democracy

5

• civilian domestic, with no law enforcement authorities (MI5 in the United Kingdom, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service [CSIS] in Canada, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation [ASIO] in Australia, the Internal Security Organization [ISO] in Uganda, the BND in Germany, the National Intelligence Service in Albania, the Intelligence Agency [AR] in Macedonia); • civilian foreign with no law-enforcement powers (the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] in the United States, MI6 in the United Kingdom, the National Assessment Bureau [NAB] in New Zealand, the Foreign Intelligence Service [SIE] in Romania); • civilian intelligence with law-enforcement powers (the FBI in the United States; the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Canada, the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police [DCPJ] in France, the Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection [DIPI] in Romania); • domestic and foreign hybrid (the Brazilian Intelligence Agency [ABIN], the Federal Intelligence Agency [AFI] in Argentina, Indonesia State Intelligence Agency [BIN] in Indonesia, the National Intelligence Service [NIS] in Kenya); strategic foreigndomestic law-enforcement hybrid intelligence located under the military (the State Intelligence Service [SIS] in Sri Lanka, the Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI] in Pakistan); • military (the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] or the National Security Agency [NSA] in the United States, the Government Communications Headquarters [GCHQ] in the United Kingdom, the General Directorate for External Security [DGSE] in France, and, respectively, in Mali, the General Directorate of the Armed Forces’ Intelligence [DGIA] in Romania).

Such institutions also include interagency arrangements such as fusion centers—domestically (all seventy-eight centers in the United States, Spain’s CITCO [Intelligence Center Against Terrorism and Organized Crime]) and/or internationally (INTCEN, the EU [European Union] Intelligence and Situation Centre). However, these units can be strategic (long-term intelligence in support of policymaking and military plans), operational (used by the armed forces, at either the battalion or expeditionary level), or tactical (near- or short-term intelligence, used by military units on the ground).23 Finally, intelligence is a product. The end result of the roles, processes, and organizations is the intelligence product—a forecast

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of short- and long-term national-security issues—which is distributed to policymakers in various forms (paper, video, PowerPoint, or a combination of all these, depending on the preferences of the policymakers/decisionmakers). In the United States, the product includes the President’s Daily Brief or a National Intelligence Estimate; in Romania, the product is the Daily Security Intelligence Bulletin, a ten-page document. Although intelligence involves information—simplistically put, raw data—information does not equate to intelligence. Intelligence entails both information and response. Intelligence is information collected from a variety of sources, which undergoes elaborate examination and a thorough reasoning process by the analyst, who transforms it into a timely, tailored, useful, and digestible product for policymakers, decisionmakers, and operators, as well as—if needed— sharable reports to non-policymaking/decisionmaking entities (such as the private sector). A comprehensive presentation of the place and role of intelligence agencies in safeguarding national security in a democracy includes, inter alia, the following efforts: identifying potential risks and threats to democratic security (state, citizens), as well as their motivation, objectives, and strategies; self-evaluating their readiness to neutralize potential risks and threats; consolidating their own capabilities of managing crises and crises’ consequences; rigorously and professionally selecting the most effective ways, means, and methods of preventing future security threats; identifying those nations/organizations with similar security interests that are instrumental in preventing and countering security threats; and identifying courses of action that secure the support of potential allies.24 The function of intelligence involves two processes that may be separate or intertwined: inductively solving a puzzle, understood as a mosaic, the shape of which is by and large known and which could be solved with certainty through accessing a specific type of data or information (mostly classified, but generally easy to spot and most of the time, available); 25 and providing deductive intelligence—or mystery intelligence—which, unlike the puzzle intelligence, cannot be totally decoded, regardless of the available intelligence, as it entails relations, data, and references about people, attitudes, thinking, concepts, actions, non-actions, vulnerabilities, and so on, and not concrete things or objects.26 All types of intelligence have at least seven main roles,27 which include providing information to policymakers and operations on

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1. fighting potential conflicts/international wars in which the state is involved 2. fighting potential conflicts/domestic wars 3. fighting terrorism 4. fighting crime, including organized crime 5. contributing to international coalition operations 6. ensuring support to humanitarian assistance efforts 7. contributing to security-related research and development

Challenges to the Intelligence Function There are three categories of challenges to the intelligence function in a democracy; each category “intentionally or accidentally, through action or inaction” leads to failures of intelligence, in the words of Richard Betts.28 The first category includes external challenges to intelligence, for instance, state and nonstate enemies that threaten a state’s national security. This category also includes political leadership within a state that intentionally denies and obstructs intelligence. Policymakers may discount or dismiss intelligence products that do not confirm the politicians’ pet policies—even (or especially) if the reports have the intelligence right. The response, alarmingly often, is the creation of new intelligence agencies that use their information only to support the priorities of the partisan political leadership. French politicians, for instance, have occasionally created intelligence units to provide them with acceptable intelligence.29 Against the background of the war in Iraq, then US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, unhappy with the intelligence provided by the intelligence community, ordered the creation of a separate office in the Pentagon in 2002—the Office of Special Plans, which lasted one year—to supply George W. Bush senior administration officials with raw intelligence (not previously vetted by the rest of the intelligence community) that supported their Iraq invasion policy.30 The second category includes challenges that are not planned or expressly authored but inhibit the function of intelligence unintentionally. These types of challenges include: organizational constraints that lawfully prevent cooperation and sharing of intelligence among various agencies (democracies drawing various types of boundaries between intelligence and law enforcement, between domestic and foreign intelligence, and between public and private

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intelligence), which makes cooperation difficult and results in failures of intelligence; examples include the failure of the intelligence agencies in the United States to prevent the terrorist attacks in Washington, DC, and New York City in September 2001, or of intelligence failures in Mumbai, India, in 2008, due to “walls” between various agencies); 31 individual intelligence employees failing for medical or personal reasons; myopic leadership of intelligence agencies, which disrupts the intelligence cycle for bureaucratic or political reasons (the 2001 Phoenix memo that never reached the FBI headquarters, let alone the CIA);32 and intelligence outsiders who attempt to curb intelligence powers on the grounds of incompatibility with democratic norms (politicians or human-rights defenders in most democracies). The third category consists of inherent challenges—defects in organizational design less manifest to external observers. This category includes an array of psychological limitations and constraints that affect the cognitive and deductive capabilities of intelligence professionals, as well as dichotomous intelligence priorities (averting crime versus fighting terrorism, timeliness of the intelligence product versus accuracy), interests (objectivity versus policy influence and persuasion), and needs (the need to know versus the need to share, centralization versus decentralization of agencies)—which impair proper judgment. Such challenges cannot be entirely eliminated; they will exist as long as states exist. There is no panacea for them. Rather, democracies have to try to manage them as best they can. Ultimately, the very nature of the intelligence-and-democracy dilemma perpetuates them. In a democracy, intelligence agencies are bureaucracies, staffed with human beings who can make mistakes, and they operate in secret, within bigger bureaucracies, which are—paradoxically— required to be transparent and accountable.

Democratic Reform of Intelligence Finding a suitable trade-off between intelligence and democracy translates into democratic reform of intelligence—or intelligence democratization. Democratic reform of intelligence is a combination of two requirements: democratic civilian control over and, respectively, effectiveness of the intelligence agencies.33

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Democratic civilian control of intelligence is conceptualized in terms of authority over institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and the inculcation of professional norms (although professional norms can also contribute to effectiveness). Institutional control mechanisms involve providing direction and guidance for the intelligence agencies, exercised through institutions that range from organic laws and other regulations that empower the civilian leadership to civilian-led organizations with professional staffs. These latter groups can include a ministry of defense for the military intelligence, a ministry of the interior for national police or local intelligence, and a civilian-led intelligence agency; one or more committees in the legislature that deal with policies and budgets; and a well-defined chain of authority for civilians to determine roles and missions, such as a National Security Council–type organization. Oversight is exercised on a regular legal basis by the civilian leadership to keep track of what the intelligence agencies do and to ensure they are, in fact, following the direction and guidance they have received from the civilian elites. As such, the legal framework should clearly define the responsibilities and powers of the intelligence agencies as well as the types and mechanisms of control and oversight, including delineating what the intelligence agencies can and cannot do and who is in charge of intelligence, and who controls and oversees its activities, personnel, and funding; stipulating the circumstances for interagency coordination or international cooperation; and ensuring the intelligence personnel are responsible before the law in case of abuses, and/or benefit from legal protection if they observe legal guidance and directions. The legislation should also include regulations that allow openness and access to government information by a process that protects ongoing operations but also accommodates the maximum possible transparency. Oversight is exercised not only by formal agencies within the executive, legislative, and judicial branches but also by the independent media, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, and even such international organizations as courts of human rights. Professional norms are institutionalized through legally approved and transparent policies for recruitment, education, training, and promotion, in accordance with the goals of the democratically elected civilian leadership, thus internalizing the previous two control mechanisms. Effectiveness in fulfilling roles and missions involves three necessary, yet perhaps not sufficient, requirements. 34 First, there must

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be a plan in place, which may take the form of a strategy or even a doctrine. Examples include national-security strategies, national military strategies, white papers on security and defense, strategies for disaster relief, strategies on organized crime, doctrines on intelligence, counterterrorism doctrines, and the like. Second, there must be structures and processes to both formulate the plans and implement them. These include ministries of defense, ministries of interior, national security councils, or other means that facilitate interagency coordination and sharing, as well as international cooperation. Third, a democracy must commit resources, in the form of political capital, money, and personnel, to ensure it has sufficient equipment, trained intelligence personnel, and other assets needed to implement the assigned roles and missions. Lacking any one of these three components, it is difficult to imagine how any state would effectively implement any of these roles and missions.35

Challenges to Democratic Reform of Intelligence In its essence, democratic reform of intelligence entails striking a reasonable balance between effective intelligence and transparency and accountability. There is more to this process, however, than swapping out a few intelligence leaders and declaring the intelligence agencies democratized. Several factors, both internal and external to the intelligence community—some of them inherent in the process of reform itself—can impede the progress of democratic reform of intelligence. The Multifariousness of Reform

A first factor that hinders progress is the intricacy of intelligence reform itself. The democratization of intelligence is a complex process, integrated in a more comprehensive democratic transformation of the entire security sector, along with an overall economic, political, and societal reform. Such reforms often puzzle the civilian elites—particularly in new democracies, where freshly minted leaders often come with excellent dissident credentials but without experience in running a democratic state. In most cases, new democracies must develop new structures and processes that establish intelligence agencies and oversight. Even with institutions in place,

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“authoritarianism and military politics may continue behind the formalities of civilian and democratic governance.”36 The new institutions must establish sufficient legitimacy to be able to undertake a rigorous democratic reform of the intelligence services or execute a robust democratic control and oversight. And even if the legitimacy issue is resolved, such pressing issues as economic development, health care, and education get higher priority on government agendas—and receive more resources and time, to the detriment of security/intelligence. Empirical evidence reveals that it takes new democracies throughout the world more than a decade to institute security and intelligence reforms, and there are still areas requiring improvement, either in terms of transparency and accountability (all new democracies) or effectiveness (Indonesia, South Africa, Kenya, Albania, Argentina, Brazil, the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, Peru).37 If democracies are incapable of providing basic human rights, freedoms, and liberties for their citizens, or if they fall short in attaining political freedom and pluralism, lack free-market economies, have no vigorous civil societies, and fail to institute effective defense and security governance, they, by definition, fail to democratize— even if they still hold elections. 38 As these countries remain moderately or strongly authoritarian, it is more likely that intelligence agencies remain unreformed and nondemocratic. Recent examples include Russia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus (early 1990s–present), Turkey (2016–present), Mali (2012–2013), the Maldives (2012–present) and Venezuela (2017–present), among others.39 Resistance to Reform: The Intelligence Agencies

Resistance or reluctance to reform is another challenge. Intelligence agencies oppose democratic reform for a variety of bureaucratic, ideological, or political reasons. Intelligence agencies are bureaucracies, and bureaucracies are hard to reform even in a democratic country. 40 Amy Zegart’s account of the FBI’s opposition, before 9/11, to information technology—which was one of the many factors (along with other interagency and policy-related dynamics) that contributed to the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks—is a case in point.41 Intelligence agencies challenge democratic reform—particularly, democratic control—because they generally lack confidence in the political decisionmakers’ expertise in intelligence,

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doubt that national security is a high priority on the politicians’ agenda, and believe that too much transparency or democratic scrutiny will undermine their effectiveness.42 Robert Johnson’s assessment of Pakistan’s ISI, that the agency “regards civilian politicians with suspicion, if not contempt,”43 applies to long-established and developing democracies equally.44 In new democracies, this resistance to reform is even more unsettling. Because, under nondemocratic regimes, intelligence agencies serve a restricted and highly privileged political class and enjoy special benefits—including better remuneration and possibility to travel abroad—they are suspicious of any political change that would do away with these powers. Under democratic reform, intelligence agencies must lose these prerogatives, refrain from abusive practices and illegalities, and accept downsizing, vetting, and retrospective investigation of their past practices and actions—all of which they, not surprisingly, try to resist. In Chile, during the early years of transition, the armed forces torpedoed any civilian effort to reform the military intelligence services that had lingered since Augusto Pinochet’s administration—most especially any suggestion of forming a civilian intelligence agency. What is more, after the creation of a civilian service—the National Intelligence Agency (ANI)—in 2004, the military regularly used its influence to obstruct any attempts to grant ANI collection powers.45 Intelligence agencies in emerging democracies sometimes use their special powers and access to files or records to stall or influence the reform by blackmailing or coercing decisionmakers. The literature is rife with examples from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Asia.46 Reluctance to Reform: The Civilian Elites

Not only intelligence agencies but also elected officials avoid or initially oppose reforming intelligence. One explanation is that intelligence does not bring in votes. In virtually all democracies, especially new ones, politicians have other reforms as top priority, which may bring in more votes—health, education, development—even if the democracy faces serious security threats. Trinidad and Tobago has been a democracy for decades, yet it lacks an intelligence agency that can tackle the increasing terrorist and organized crime threat in the country effectively; health, education, and the economy have been priorities instead.47

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Another explanation is that the civilian elites fear intelligence personnel have information that could be used against them. For instance, congressional investigations of allegations of intelligence wrongdoing in the United States in the early 1970s—and the ulterior reforms of the intelligence community—were possible, among other reasons, only after the death of J. Edgar Hoover, who had run the FBI for almost fifty years and whom many government officials had feared.48 One additional explanation for the civilians’ hands-off attitude toward intelligence in general and intelligence reform in particular stems from the limited trust in intelligence. This distrust is due to secrecy, on the one hand, and past abuses and transgressions, on the other. Not surprisingly, Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch note that “despite the nod towards oversight, Britain remains one of the most secretive states.”49 In addition, some of the most ignominious intelligence activities have involved encroachments on individual liberties, sometimes without a real national-security reason. Essentially, then, in a democracy, what citizens know about intelligence usually emphasizes failures or scandals. Successes tend to stay secret—paradoxically, partly because intelligence agencies themselves want it that way, as a means to protect their sources and methods. As a result, intelligence becomes easily vilified or, as Philip Davies notes, “turned into a folk devil” and dreaded extremely or “subjected to media and political moral panic,” no matter how well they serve democracies.50 In Canada, the intelligence community lost credibility because the RCMP failed to prevent the deportation to Syria by the US government in 2002—and the subsequent torturing by the Syrian government—of an innocent Canadian and Syrian citizen (Maher Arar), suspected by the United States of involvement in terrorism.51 In France, because, as one expert notes, the “intelligence culture has been marked by a preference for action, widespread secrecy, and political distance,” it has led to “disdain toward intelligence.”52 As such, the politicians have organized the intelligence community in France “so that there were in every Ministry at least two organizations performing similar tasks, and thus challenging the mission and legitimacy of each other.”53 Additionally, very often in democracies, civilian elites deny knowledge of illegal operations in order to avoid any possible suspicion that they tolerate illegal activities and practices. In 2009, Nancy Pelosi, then Speaker of the House in the United States, denied that the CIA informed her in 2002 that it had used enhanced interrogation techniques on terrorist Abu Zubaydah.54

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Civilians’ reluctance to engage democratic intelligence reform is even more prevalent in new democracies, because they fear either past exposure with the nondemocratic regimes’ intelligence agencies or blackmail. 55 For the general public, then, the legacy agencies are the bêtes noires of the government. Indeed, as Stuart Farson et al. highlight, “In many transition regimes there is such a deep well of mistrust of security agencies that anyone dealing with them may find themselves under suspicion of being a ‘spook’ or an informer.” 56 Citizens and political elites typically oppose creating new intelligence systems for fear of a return to a nondemocratic regime. Hence, in the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, citizens actually favored “the destruction of intelligence apparatuses, not their reform,” as Larry Watts notes.57 In some new democracies, former guerrillas become the government; because they harbor deep antipathy toward their former enemies—intelligence rank and file— who had until recently persecuted them, they have minimal incentive to invest in actual intelligence and intelligence reform (Brazil, El Salvador).58 Intelligence agencies in transition regimes lack—at least initially—both the organization and the expertise to develop the robust public relations and outreach needed to cleanse their image and gain popular support. In addition, in many transitional states, the media, which might theoretically have the means to promote the image of the intelligence agencies, fail to do so. More often than not, the newly liberated media in a young democracy prefer to discredit intelligence agencies as vestiges of the old regime.59 Mistrust in intelligence has serious consequences for the effectiveness of intelligence agencies. Ultimately, lack of trust translates into decreasing the budget, personnel, equipment, education, and training, which in turn affects the capabilities of the agencies to perform their roles. In Belgium, for instance, from 1990 to 2015, the civilian elites kept decreasing the budget and personnel of the Sûreté de I’État one of Belgium’s main intelligence services charged with antiterrorism—despite decades-long threats of terrorism and organized crime. In January 2015, Stéphane Lefebvre notes, the agency “was short not only of lawyers to work on the authorization of intrusive investigative measures, but also surveillance officers, strategic analysts with Middle East expertise, translators of foreign languages, terrorism and radicalization researchers, and operations managers.”60 Not surprisingly, then, Belgian intelligence was taken by surprise in

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2015 and 2016 when both France and Belgium were the targets of successful terrorist attacks. The Legacy of the Past in New Democracies

In virtually all newer democracies, the intelligence agencies bear a stigma of their nondemocratic past and misconduct. New democratic states typically build their post-authoritarian agencies on the ruins of the nondemocratic regime’s ones, more or less of necessity.61 They either preserve—and expand as needed—the monolithic intelligence structure inherited from the nondemocratic regimes (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Uruguay) or divide the past intelligence services into multiple agencies—a few civilian, police, border guard, military, foreign, and domestic agencies (Romania, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Indonesia, South Korea, South Africa).62 Most of the time they retain personnel from the nondemocratic period in the new agencies and keep the buildings and other assets of the intelligence apparatuses of the nondemocratic institutions. These practices perpetuate mistrust—and even hatred—of intelligence among citizens and policymakers alike,63 with negative effects on the reform. On the one hand, hiring new personnel is rather difficult; the population’s loathing of the intelligence agencies means that the best and the brightest likely will not apply for jobs in this sector, even if they have the requisite expertise. On the other hand, the recycled intelligence agency members may continue to operate as in the past for their own personal benefit or that of their political party—disregarding democratic principles of rule of law and respect for citizens’ rights, freedoms, and private life. They may obstruct employment possibilities for a new generation of intelligence personnel or convey their best practices to the new agents. And if the legal framework and democratic control mechanisms are not robust enough to effectively question and reprimand intelligence officers, they can, essentially, do whatever they want. The literature is rife with examples of such incidents, which have occurred periodically in Romania, Albania, Serbia, South Africa, Indonesia, Argentina, Colombia, and Peru.64 Frank Church’s characterization of such agencies as “rogue elephants” in the early 1970s remains relevant today.65 As a corrective, some developing democracies seek to balance their citizens’ dual demands for accountability of past transgressions and reconciliation. The avenues or mechanisms of such balancing are

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known as transitional justice, which generally involves the following: prosecution of the perpetrators (Argentina); exposure of past abusers by opening the archives of the old regimes (Central and Eastern Europe); lustration, that is, banning past abusers from government positions (Central and Eastern Europe); and establishing committees of truth and reconciliation (South Africa, Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras). The formal vetting (lustration) process, in particular, aims at cleansing the new services of the personnel compromised either by their actual contribution to repressive activities or by their membership in specific divisions of the past repressive intelligence agencies (Romania, former Czechoslovakia, Poland) paralleled by new personnel recruitment and professionalization procedures. By now, all third-wave democracies have gradually replaced their legacy personnel with younger generations. In some democracies, nonetheless, the younger generations are still seized with secrecy. In Moldova, for one, the intelligence agency within the Ministry of Defense still does not make public any information on current defense- and security-related meetings organized by the service. Nevertheless, empirical evidence reveals that purging former nondemocratic intelligence personnel has a negative impact on the democratic consolidation. In some new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, former intelligence officials were often rehired by other institutions, with no vetting requirements, which allowed them to continue their old, dirty practices in the new institutions; they also opened their own private businesses, thus competing with the state agencies—as they had greater resources to procure modern equipment—or became involved in serious corruption and organized crime activities. At the same time, lustration was highly politicized. Statistics reveal that archives of the intelligence agencies in central and Eastern Europe become tools for humiliation, blackmail, revenge, and disgrace.66

Incentives for the Democratic Reform of Intelligence Despite these enormous challenges, there are a few catalysts for intelligence reform in a democracy, which incentivize elected or appointed officials to undertake intelligence democratization. The first incentive is personal prestige and recognition. Policymakers may seek to go down in history as pioneers of successful intelligence

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reforms.67 George Cristian Maior, in Romania, for one, remains associated with the successful transformation of the Romanian Domestic Intelligence Agency (SRI) in the 2000s.68 A second possible incentive is awareness and understanding of the threats, as well as the importance of the role of policymakers in the cycle for successful security policies. For instance, politicians in Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda have always understood the need for effective intelligence because of the surrounding threats.69 Other civilian elites may learn their role in intelligence in the context of an emerging or past security crisis or disaster. For example, the United States, France, Belgium, and India in the aftermath of the successful terrorist attacks of 2001, 2015, 2016, and 2008, respectively, have sought to strengthen intelligence capabilities to fight terrorism more effectively.70 A third possible incentive is receiving financial support and assistance, to include education and training, from other countries. Colombia, for example, has augmented its intelligence capabilities to fight the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC), while also safeguarding human rights, as an effect of US security assistance. Nigeria, Uganda, and Kenya have also strengthened their intelligence effectiveness, thanks to financial support from the United States.71 Related are the carrots and sticks of the membership requirements of various regional security cooperation agencies, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU in Europe, and/or pressure by domestic and international media and public opinion. Although intelligence and democracy may seem incompatible, they can reach a trade-off, or compromise, via democratic institution building. This compromise, however, is never definitive. It must be debated, reassessed, and readjusted constantly, in line with altering security and democracy demands. This process requires public education and outreach—a consistent attention to transparency and scrupulous accountability—from the intelligence sector; it also assumes a fairly constant conversation with and among the civilian political leadership. Ultimately, as several chapters in this book reveal, numerous democracies have developed institutions to deal with this dilemma; the Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States), France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Romania, and to a lesser extent India, South Africa, Chile, and Kenya, have been success stories. Nevertheless, balancing security with transparency remains a work in progress.

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Structure of the Book This book is organized into three sections, in which the authors―an array of intelligence practitioners and outsiders from all over the world―illustrate in great detail the dilemmas and trade-offs of intelligence in a democracy. Section 1 focuses on the intelligence process in a democracy. The authors assiduously examine the main components of this process―the intelligence cycle, collection, analysis, and counterintelligence―and illustrate how they interact to help policymakers devise policies and craft decisions. The authors in Section 2 explore the broader roles and missions of intelligence agencies and communities in the current security context. The authors explore covert operations, law enforcement and intelligence, intelligence sharing and intelligence fusion, intelligence and counterinsurgency, intelligence and peace operations, and publicversus-private issues―and their relationship with democracy. Section 3 focuses on intelligence accountability and culture in a democracy. These authors address such vital topics as oversight and the relationship between the media and intelligence, as well as the challenges and opportunities for institutionalizing an intelligence culture in a democracy.

Notes 1. John F. Kennedy, “The President and the Press,” address before the American Newspaper Publishers Association, April 27, 1961, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f -kennedy-speeches/american-newspaper-publishers-association-19610427. 2. According to Freedom House, of the 146, eighty-eight are fully free; fiftyeight are electoral democracies that have free elections but weak institutions. See Freedom House, “Freedom in the World, 2018” (report, Freedom House, 2018), https:// freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2018_Final_SinglePage.pdf. 3. In general, American scholars of intelligence use the word agency when referring to an institution that carries out intelligence roles, whereas academics from other parts of the world prefer to use the word service. We use both in this volume. 4. See Andreas Schedler, “What Is Democratic Consolidation?” in The Global Divergence of Democracies, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 149–164 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). Schedler notes that the liberal democracy includes an ideal subtype—the advanced democracy. 5. See ibid. 6. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 7. Ibid., 1–60. 8. Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000). 9. Democratic societies are not insulated from dangers. Traditional conflicts, weak institutions, political extremism, specific ideologies, and religious convictions

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are but a few dangers to democracies today. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Crown, 2018). 10. For more information, see: Stuart Farson et al., eds., PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008); Loch K. Johnson, ed., The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 11. Farson et al., PSI Handbook. 12. Politicization can happen two ways: “down” (i.e., policymakers dictate to the intelligence professionals what product they want) and “up” (i.e., intelligence professionals willingly provide policymakers with the product they know the decisionmakers want). Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 24, no. 4 (December 2011): 656–691. 13. Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, eds., Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007); Johnson, Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence; Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson, and Ian Leigh, eds., Who’s Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005); Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark, eds., Secret Intelligence: A Reader (London: Routledge, 2009). 14. In a nondemocratic regime, intelligence agencies (which may be either political police or independent security states) are created to preserve the status quo of the governing regime. These intelligence agencies are characterized by extreme secrecy, deep penetration of society, no accountability, frequent violation of fundamental rights and liberties, and abuses against real and imaginary opponents of the regimes. Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress,” Democratization 18, no. 3 (2011): 602–630; Matei and Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform.” When intelligence agencies act as political police in democracies, they either seek to intimidate political opponents of the existing government or to keep the government of the day in power sine die. Linz and Stepan introduce four different types of nondemocratic regimes: authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, and sultanistic. In their typology, authoritarian is a category of nondemocracies. Nonetheless, most academics use the term authoritarian to describe a nondemocratic regime in general, not necessarily to depict Linz and Stepan’s specific regime. Unless the authors in this volume specify that they refer to Linz and Stepan’s typology when they use the term authoritarian, this textbook uses authoritarian as a generic term for nondemocratic regimes. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition. 15. Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence; Johnson., Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence; Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Ryan Shaffer, “Centralizing India’s Intelligence: The National Intelligence Grid’s Purpose, Status, and Problems,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 31, no. 1 (2018): 159–168. 16. For details, see Florina Cristiana Matei, Mimoza Xharo, and Eduart Bala, “Albania’s Intelligence After Hoxha: The Cat’s Grin and Hidden Claws,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 29, no. 2 (2016): 299–327; Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Jargalsaikhan Mendee and Adiya Tuvshintugs, “Consolidating Democracy: The Reform of Mongolian Intelligence,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 26, no. 2 (2013): 241–259; Peter Gill and Michael A. Andregg, eds., Democratization of Intelligence (London: Routledge, 2015); Shaffer, “Centralizing India’s Intelligence”; Stéphane Lefebvre, “Croatia and the Development of a Democratic Intelligence System (1990–2010),” Democracy and Security 8, no. 2 (2012): 115–163. 17. Matei, Xharo, and Bala, “Albania’s Intelligence After Hoxha.”

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18. Carlos Maldonado Prieto, “Ethics and Intelligence: Review of European and North American Experience and Its Application in Latin America,” in Intelligence Management in the Americas, edited by Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane (Washington, DC: National Intelligence University, 2015), 95–96. 19. Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, Andrés de Castro García, and Darren Henfield, “Balancing Civilian Control with Intelligence Effectiveness in Latin America and the Caribbean: Current Trends and Lessons Learned,” Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence 7, no. 1 (June 2016): 7–28. 20. See: Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, eds., Intelligence: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013); Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Peter Gill, Intelligence Governance and Democratisation: A Comparative Analysis of the Limits of Reform (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016); Lauren Hutton, “Secrets, Spies and Security: An Overview of the Issues,” in To Spy or Not to Spy? Intelligence and Democracy in South Africa, edited by Lauren Hutton (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 1–9; Sandy Africa and Johnny Kwadijo, eds., Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa (Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2009). 21. For various definitions of intelligence, see the following: Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2016); Carl J. Jensen III, David H. McElreath, and Melissa Graves, eds., Introduction to Intelligence Studies (Boca Raton, FL: CRS Press, 2013); Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark, Secret Intelligence. It should be noted that some democracies use information agencies for their intelligence institutions because of the legacy of the past and/or linguistic barriers. In Romania, as in France and many of the francophone countries, the word intelligence strictly refers to cleverness, and intelligence agencies have always been called “information agencies” or “secret services.” Romanian intelligence practitioners and policymakers are currently endeavoring to introduce intelligence into the vocabulary. In Brazil, intelligence replaced information immediately after the transition to democracy. In Portugal, however, the term during the nondemocratic regime was intelligence, so that the current acceptable term is information. Matei and Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform”; Matei and Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies.” 22. Policymakers/decisionmakers include a wider range of political and military leaders, police and public-order institution managers, ministry directors, and even managers of private companies—especially from the infrastructure field. See Gregory F. Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell, eds., National Intelligence Systems. Current Research and Future Prospects (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Loch K. Johnson, Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); Loch K. Johnson, Security Intelligence, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Polity, 2017). Another way to describe intelligence is to consider it a cycle of various functions on behalf of national-security policymakers, reflecting their needs, requirements, and benefits. Antonio M. Díaz Fernández explores the intelligence cycle in Chapter 2 of this book. 23. Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies. 24. Robert Kennedy, Of Knowledge and Power: The Complexities of National Intelligence (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008); Cristian Troncotă, Neliniştile insecurităţii (Bucharest, Romania: Tritonic, 2005). 25. If unavailable at a certain stage of the intelligence activity, the missing information was often welcomed even after some time had passed. 26. Treverton and Agrell, National Intelligence Systems; Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror.

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27. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 15, no. 5 (2008): 909–929. 28. We use Betts’s typology as a starting point for our discussion on challenges in the next paragraphs. Betts uses the term enemy of intelligence; we prefer to use challenge. We also acknowledge that sometimes it is not entirely the fault of intelligence agencies for failures to anticipate and avert threats to national security. Richard Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 29. Douglas Porch, class presentation, NS3155, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014; Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence. 30. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 31. Treverton and Agrell, National Intelligence System; Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror; Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Shaffer, “Centralizing India’s Intelligence.” 32. Zegart, Spying Blind. 33. We use the framework of civil-military relations introduced by Matei and Bruneau in 2012. This framework also includes efficiency. Because of the peculiar characteristics of intelligence (including the secrecy that inevitably envelops intelligence activities and budgets and which prevents us from ensuring a credible costbenefit analysis), our analysis does not include efficiency. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Civil–Military Relations (London: Routledge, 2012). 34. Ibid. 35. Although it is rather difficult to assess effectiveness, it is important to have such institutions as a ministry of defense and a national security council. 36. Timothy Edmunds, “Intelligence Agencies and Democratisation: Continuity and Change in Serbia After Miloševic,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 1 (2008): 25–48. 37. For details, see Gill and Andregg, Democratization of Intelligence; Davies and Gustafson, Intelligence: Spies and Espionage; Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Gill, Intelligence Governance and Democratization; Hutton, “Secrets, Spies and Security”; Africa and Kwadijo, Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa; Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence; Gregory Weeks, “A Preference for Deference: Reforming the Military’s Intelligence Role in Argentina, Chile and Peru,” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2008): 45–61; Kevin Ginter, “Latin American Intelligence Services and the Transition to Democracy,” Journal of Intelligence History 8, no. 1 (2008): 69–93; Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence 7, no. 1 (June 2016); Larry L. Watts, “Intelligence Reform in Europe’s Emerging Democracies,” Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 1 (2004): 11–25. 38. In these types of regimes—which scholars call electoral democracies, or illiberal democracies, or competitive authoritarian regimes—elections are free but not fair. The incumbent government usually prevents the opposition parties from campaigning. Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004); Fathali Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2013). 39. Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die. 40. See, for example, Zegart, Spying Blind. 41. Ibid. 42. For details, see: Gill and Andregg, Democratization of Intelligence; Davies and Gustafson, Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage; Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence 7, no. 1 (June 2016); Watts, “Intelligence Reform in Europe’s Emerging Democracies.”

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43. Robert Johnson, “Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence,” in Intelligence: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere, edited by Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 122. 44. See: Gill and Andregg, Democratization of Intelligence; Davies and Gustafson, Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage; Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence 7, no. 1 (June 2016); Watts, “Intelligence Reform in Europe’s Emerging Democracies.” 45. Florina Cristiana Matei and Andrés de Castro García, “Chilean Intelligence After Pinochet: Painstaking Reform of an Inauspicious Legacy,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 30, no. 2 (2017): 340–367. 46. Gill and Andregg, Democratization of Intelligence; Davies and Gustafson, Intelligence: Spies and Espionage; Farson et al., PSI Handbook. 47. Information provided by Trinidad and Tobago officers during class discussion, Naval Postgraduate School, July 2016. 48. F. A. O. Schwarz Jr., “The Church Committee and a New Era of Intelligence Oversight,” Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 2 (2007): 270–297. Hoover kept files on US presidents, legislators, and representatives of the judicial branch, human rights activists, as well as FBI and other intelligence community components’ rank and file. 49. Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch, Global Intelligence: The World’s Secret Services Today (London: Zed Books, 2003), 102. 50. Philip H. J. Davies, “Britain’s Machinery of Intelligence Accountability: Realistic Oversight in the Absence of Moral Panic,” in Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services, edited by Daniel Baldino, 133–157 (Annandale, NSW: Federation Press, 2010). 51. Arar was detained in New York on terrorism grounds in 2002 and sent to Syria, where he was tortured. Official investigations later revealed RCMP improprieties: RCMP gave the US counterparts sensitive information on Arar, with no enclosed provisos about how to use the information; the RCMP liaison officer with the Department of Foreign Affairs was aware that Arar was sent to Syria but did not inform his leadership. Arar was exonerated in 2004. The Canadian government issued a formal apology and committed to pay damages. Davies and Gustafson, Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage; Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Daniel Baldino, ed., Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services (Annandale, NSW: Federation Press, 2010); Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Background, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006). 52. Damien Van Puyvelde, “Intelligence, Democratic Accountability, and the Media in France,” Democracy and Security 10, no. 3 (2014): 287–305. 53. Olivier Chopin, “Intelligence Reform and the Transformation of the State: The End of a French Exception,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 4 (2017): 532–553. 54. James Kirchick, “Is Pelosi a Liar or a Hypocrite?” Politico, May 19, 2009. 55. For details, see Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence; Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence 7, no.1 (June 2006); Davies and Gustafson, Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage; Marina Caparini and Hans Born, eds., Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants (London: Routledge, 2007). 56. Farson et al., PSI Handbook. 57. Watts, “Intelligence Reform in Europe’s Emerging Democracies.” 58. Thomas C. Bruneau, “Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 14, no. 3 (2001): 323–341. 59. Florina Cristiana Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 1 (2014): 73–108.

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60. Stéphane Lefebvre, “‘The Belgians Just Aren’t Up to It:’ Belgian Intelligence and Contemporary Terrorism,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 30, no. 1 (2017): 1–29. 61. Exceptions are those new democracies that have fortuitous geographic surroundings and/or enjoy outside security guarantees and, hence, can afford to completely overhaul the legacy agencies and remove all personnel from the past. Czechoslovakia is a suitable example. Watts, “Intelligence Reform in Europe’s Emerging Democracies.” 62. To avoid the monopolization of power by one single agency, as in the past. 63. Joanisval Brito Gonçalves, “The Spies Who Came from the Tropics: Intelligence Services and Democracy in Brazil,” Intelligence and National Security 29, no. 4 (2014): 581–599. 64. For more information, see: Gill and Andregg, Democratization of Intelligence; Davies and Gustafson, Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage; Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence 7, no. 1 (June 2016); Hutton, “Secrets, Spies and Security”; Africa and Kwadijo, Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa; Matei, Xharo, and Bala, “Albania’s Intelligence After Hoxha.” 65. See Gerald K. Haines, “The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA: Looking for a Rogue Elephant,” https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of -intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art07.html#rft0, April 14, 2007. 66. Florina Cristiana Matei and Andrés de Castro García, “Transitional Justice and Intelligence Democratization,” paper presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) Convention 2017, under review for publication by the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. 67. It is difficult to find acknowledged successes in the field of intelligence; studies on intelligence failures, misperception, and military misfortunes are, however, common. A possible exception is the very telling memoir of the head of Israeli civilian intelligence. See Efraim Halevy, Man in the Shadows: Inside the Middle East Crisis with a Man Who Led the Mossad (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006). 68. See George Cristian Maior, “Managing Change: The Romanian Intelligence Service in the 21st Century,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 25, no. 2 (2012): 217–239. 69. Alex Bwoma Tumushabe, “The Dilemma of Combating Terrorism in Democratizing States: A Case Study of the Republic of Uganda” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2015); Henry Isoke, “The Dilemma of Porous Borders: Uganda’s Experience in Combating Terrorism” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2015); Muhammad Nura Inuwa, “Oil Politics and National Security in Nigeria” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2010). 70. John Coyne and Peter Bell, eds., The Role of Strategic Intelligence in Law Enforcement: Policing Transnational Organized Crime in Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Lefebvre, “The Belgians Just Aren’t Up to It”; Shaffer, “Centralizing India’s Intelligence,” 159–168. 71. Tumushabe, “The Dilemma of Combating Terrorism in Democratizing States”; Isoke, “The Dilemma of Porous Borders”; Inuwa, “Oil Politics and National Security in Nigeria.”

Part 1 The Intelligence Process

2 The Intelligence Cycle Antonio M. Díaz Fernández

The old Intelligence Cycle is overdue for an overhaul. —Julian Richards1

The intelligence cycle has become the central component of intelligence as a discipline and, together with Sherman Kent’s trinity (organization, product, and process), it has monopolized the most basic approaches to the intelligence field. Few analyses of political decisions, intelligence failures, or reform of intelligence agencies fail to refer to the “magic cycle.” Its unquestionable power is due to its simplicity—though it also speaks to the assumptions and ideas on which intelligence in democracy are based. In my opinion, analysis of the intelligence cycle must begin with exploring its function within the democratic political and security system, as well as the criticisms of it, to determine whether it meets the needs of the whole range of decisionmakers in contemporary democratic systems. There is no doubt that the cycle is a military creation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) described it as “a logical system of thought and action for providing the intelligence required by a commander . . . All intelligence work should be based on the commander’s intelligence requirements . . . if it is to be effective and should have a specific aim, and the aim is to provide the commander with what he needs.”2 At the same time, at the start of the Cold War, when the role of intelligence became the generation of strategic intelligence, the cycle 27

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became part of the decisionmaking within the state’s foreign policy (as in the US National Security Act of 1947) as the main, and probably only, field of action, as security moved away from military needs. But the role of the intelligence cycle has significantly changed over the last decades. In the future, we can expect that rapid movement between the stages of the cycle will be so high that connections or transitions will blur together; scholars and practitioners will be forced to talk about a single process that no longer breaks down into stages. The magic cycle will give way to an intelligence matrix. My aim in this chapter is to establish the main elements of the intelligence cycle and its present—and future—validity for understanding the production of intelligence, within the context of democratic settings. I also question the primacy of the cycle in any of its forms and challenge the feasibility of its current descriptive focus in the future, especially considering the extension of the intelligence requirements from long-term foreign intelligence to such current needs as counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and economic intelligence. With a few notable exceptions, information on counterintelligence in democracies around the world other than the United States is rather scarce.3 Instead, the prevailing literature provides plenty of examples pertaining to US counterintelligence—so I do not repeat them.4 Rather, I seek to provide a theoretical review of the roles and tradecraft of counterintelligence in democracy.

Phases of the Intelligence Cycle The intelligence cycle conventionally comprises five phases: requirements, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination. The work is cyclical in the sense that informing decisionmakers requires fairly constant exchange and refinement so that the intelligence produced is as complete and effective as possible—and is taken into the decisionmaking process at the appropriate time and level. A well-functioning intelligence apparatus will, then, revisit each of these phases again and again, according to the proponents of the cycle. Requirements

The key point in intelligence production is a clear direction by the policymaker (or intelligence consumer) of the consumer’s needs and pri-

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29

orities. Without an adequate definition of these needs, the result of the cycle will be erratic; ultimately, any intelligence generated may fail to serve its mission: to assist the decisionmaker. Ideally, a clear statement by the commander/decisionmaker leads to the collection plan, with intelligence personnel then selecting the appropriate source for a particular task to eliminate duplication. But, in reality, intelligence requirements often reflect what intelligence managers think the consumers need—a consequence of its military genesis—and what they think their organizations can provide. In other words, requirements are more commonly a matter of “push” than “pull.” Policymakers in many new democracies in particular may not know they have a key role in the intelligence cycle;5 established democracies may have politicians with no experience with the intelligence product or process. Collection

The next phase is information gathering, in which specialized units within the intelligence agency exploit the different types of information sources available to them in order to access the necessary information for further analysis. Each source provides information from different environments, areas, and regions, so more sources usually are better.6 Processing and Exploitation

In the third phase, information is converted into intelligence through a series of substages. The first of these substages is assessment or evaluation, which consists of knowing which part of the information received should be rejected as incomplete or unreliable. Each service has its own code and methodology for this task, although there is a tendency toward standardization following, for example, the NATO methodology. Integration is the next subphase, during which the information available from different sources is collated for validation, which increases its reliability. Finally, an analysis involving the systematic examination of the information that sheds light on the complexity of the matter presents it in a contextualized way, giving responses to the following questions: What happened? Why? and What comes next? The Lord Butler Report, a British House of Commons report on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), draws a relevant distinction between analysis and assessment. Analysis examines the “factual material inside the raw intelligence report”7 partially by placing the raw intelligence in a wider context, but also as “the process required

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to convert complex technical evidence into descriptions of real-world objects or events.”8 In contrast, assessment seeks to identify patterns and provide a picture by taking the available information under analysis and forming balanced judgments on the conclusions it supports, marshaling alternative interpretations against accumulations of reporting.9 As such, assessment shifts the focus of the intelligence production from the conceptualization of intelligence as a shield against strategic surprise (as suggested by Sherman Kent) to a providing and understanding of the trends in the political environment (as suggested by Willmoore Kendall).10 Dissemination

The final phase of the cycle is necessarily the delivery of the finished product to the consumer so that it can be incorporated into the decisionmaking process. Over the years, agreement about certain characteristics that configure an ideal intelligence product has emerged, which William Brei,11 among others, summarizes as follows:

• Accuracy—all sources and data must be checked to ensure that they contain no mistakes; they must be verified not to be denial and deception attempts by enemies. • Objectivity—all reporting must be free of personal biases and preferences. • Usability—all intelligence communications must be informative and clear so that the consumer can make direct and expedient use of the material. • Relevance—intelligence must speak to the consumer’s requirements and needs. • Timeliness—intelligence must be delivered in due time to the consumer.

Effective communication depends on the presentation of the right content in the right form, at the right time and place. Getting any of these elements wrong can negate the value of the intelligence project, a situation more plausible in a security and political scenario where the intervals between crises have been dramatically shortened and, therefore, the intelligence consumption as well. To be sure, there are other approaches to the configuration of the intelligence cycle. The NATO-inflected military intelligence cycle has four phases: direction, collection, processing, and dissemina-

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tion.12 The intelligence-led policing (ILP) model that emerged in the Anglo-Saxon world in the 1990s comprises six steps: identification of priorities; data collection, storage, and analysis; definition of priority areas; researching criminal networks; “recycling” the intelligence of investigations and, finally, the establishment of priorities.13 Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei and Thomas Bruneau contemplate an additional step: the evaluation of and feedback on the product, so that the consumer points out to the intelligence service which part of the product was most useful (and to what degree).14 This step makes it possible for the service to adapt to the needs of the intelligence consumer, to learn from mistakes, and even to adjust the intelligence cycle to optimize the process. Despite the obvious differences between the various intelligence cycles, there are some similarities that make the cycle recognizable beyond any specific field and consumer. It is beyond doubt that the requirements and priorities of the consumers, as well as feedback on reporting, are cardinal. In the words of Walter Laqueur: “According to the textbooks, the first stage in the intelligence cycle is an indication by its consumers of the kind of information needed. These needs are conveyed to senior intelligence officials, who in turn inform the collectors. The collectors obtain information, then the ‘raw’ intelligence is turned into ’finished’ intelligence which is eventually supplied to consumers.”15 Policymakers are not just the beginning and the end of the whole process—the alpha but also the omega of the intelligence function, in the words of Matei and Bruneau.16 They start the cycle through requirements and guidance, then keep it working by providing feedback; policymakers also end the cycle by taking relevant nationalsecurity decisions and proposing policies.17 They must convey any new guidance or adjustments to the intelligence cycle (including pointers on how to improve intelligence collection and to analyze it to better suit requirements).18 Feedback is therefore crucial. Policymakers must let the intelligence professionals know how accurate and useful the product is, and the extent to which it is customized to their needs and requirements, clearly one of the most remarkable weaknesses of the intelligence production in nearly all countries. At the same time, the cycle—and the intelligence it generates— may not go far enough to satisfy the contemporary needs of complex democracies. Although intelligence does not involve crystal ball readings of the future, scholars suggest prediction should become an additional phase in the intelligence cycle.19 Thus, David Omand

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The Intelligence Process

asserts: “Strategic notice will be needed in many different areas . . . potential developments in some foreign areas and the possible development of new violent ideologies or prospective shifts in public and international attitudes towards security and security matters.”20 Nevertheless, though a robust feedback stage may make the cycle more complete, it does not address the inherent reductionism of the cycle or the maladies that arise from it. Consolidating democracies must develop the intelligence cycle from scratch when undertaking democratic reform of their intelligence agencies; the cycle is virtually nonexistent in nondemocratic regimes. On the one hand, civilian elites in these types of regimes are mostly directing intelligence agencies to collect on the citizens for political reasons. On the other hand, they are mostly consumers of raw information collected by the operatives. Developing a functioning cycle in developing democracies involves concerted efforts and actions of both the intelligence agencies and the policymakers to change not only practices but also mentalities.

The Intelligence Cycle and Democracy The intelligence cycle is one of the main tools in the hands of politicians steering the state. Making appropriate decisions for the common welfare of citizens and pursuing democratic values requires reliable, consistent, and permanent tools—including an intelligence apparatus that is firmly grounded in the democratic ethos of state and society. As Michael Herman notes, intelligence agencies in a democracy cannot do whatever they choose; precise user needs are a major element.21 He cites as examples: commanders using air power in wartime requesting intelligence on targets of their choice, such as Iraqi Scud batteries in the Gulf War, and policymakers requesting specific assessments in times of both war and peace.22 Thus, the role of the intelligence sector during the Cold War was “to produce the best ‘technical’ evaluation it [could]; to deposit this on the policymaker’s desk; and then to wash its hands of what [happened].”23 In Herman’s opinion, the user of the conventional military cycle is the control unit, constantly adapting its stated needs to optimize its intelligence inputs.24 An effective production unit is constantly exploring new subjects and experimenting with its forms of output in the search for what could be called “tailored intelligence,” cus-

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tomized for particular needs. The intelligence objective in this constant modification is to maximize user satisfaction with the product that is received. Consumers’ requirements may be less than perfectly clear, but they remain all-important. Intelligence consumers know whether a product meets their needs. In this connection, Herman concludes, “The remark attributed to [Henry] Kissinger, that he did not know what intelligence he needed, but recognized it when he saw it, sums up the position of the user.”25 At the same time, if intelligence producers and consumers are not in more or less direct—and even daily— contact, this process can become challenging, as the guesswork increases with unfamiliarity.26 The relationship between policymakers and the agencies (as structures) in a democracy has never been easy. As Omand states, “endusers may not appreciate what intelligence, if commissioned, might be able to deliver.”27 But, although there is no onus on governments to follow the advice of the intelligence community, they have to accept it. Analysts and their customers becoming too comfortable in their relationships has been a source of concern since we started devoting attention to how the intelligence cycle works. On one side, as it was stated by the National Performance Review in 1993, the intelligence community in the United States felt extremely comfortable producing “irrelevant” intelligence away from the consumer’s needs.28 On the side of the consumers, the politicization of intelligence—defined by Olav Riste as “a process that fabricates or distorts information to serve policy preferences or vested interests”29—is also deleterious to the intelligence-and-democracy trade-off. In this connection, I find John Gannon’s point valid when he emphasizes that all actors who politicize intelligence play a role in “the wilful distortion of analysis to satisfy the demands of intelligence bosses or policymakers.”30 This long-lasting tension was characterized in 2007 by Richard Russell, who defined the two major schools in intelligence–policy relations of the last decades.31 As Russell sees them, the Sherman Kent school upholds the importance of maintaining a distance between policymakers and intelligence analysts to strive for objectivity. The Robert Gates school, in contrast, argues the importance of analysts getting to know policymakers, in order to make intelligence truly effective. Arthur Hulnick has pointed out that elected policymakers tend to be personalities whose confidence in what they are doing is high and who are usually acting out the predetermined policy of their party or caucus. 32 Thus, the elected or appointed officials take

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up their policymaking jobs with their minds already set on specific strategic plans, as well as how to achieve them. But there is another reality: policymakers do not believe in the cycle’s output.33 Years before, Loch Johnson included the “disregard of objective intelligence” by policymakers as one of his “seven sins of strategic intelligence.”34 He went on to note that “no shortcoming of strategic intelligence is more often cited than the self-delusion of policymakers who brush aside—or bend—facts that fail to conform to their world view.” The habit of disregarding or deemphasizing intelligence that does not support the politicians’ desired course persists in democracies, even when it clearly results in poorer policy.35 In this context, Stephen Marrin highlights, “Be that as it may, a policymaker’s potential lack of receptivity to intelligence analysis is an important point to keep in mind when assessing past failures and attributing responsibility.”36

Criticism of the Cycle Not all authors defend the same concept of the cycle. Bahadir Aydın and Zafer Özleblebici point out that though the cycle proposed by Treverton “is short and distinct,” he omits analysis, skipping over a fairly important piece of intelligence work.37 Herman describes the intelligence cycle as “a metaphor of a cybernetic system, in which a control unit senses feedback and is, programmed to make constant small adjustments of output, hunting for the maximum desired feedback semi-automatically, without high-level decisions.” 38 He further points out: “Rather than simply responding to requirements, effective intelligence actively seeks user reactions to current services, adjusts coverage and forms of output accordingly, and plans its own strategy for the future.”39 This proposal by Herman could have been relevant in the past to adjust the intelligence cycle to the consumers’ needs, but it is insufficient in the current security context, not least because the intelligence process no longer unfolds in such a sequential fashion. For this reason, most versions of the intelligence cycle include numerous short-circuits and feedback loops,40 further emphasizing a nonlinear flow of intelligence.41 In the target-centric version of the cycle articulated by Robert Clark, the components of the cycle can be connected in a network, with the participants collaborating to produce a shared picture of the target.42 Other authors, such as Richards,

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have criticized the compartmentalization of the different steps in the cycle.43 Mark Lowenthal created the multilayered intelligence cycle; and Geraint Evans, the hub-and-spoke cycle.44 Subsequently, Aydın and Özleblebici went further, criticizing the interrelations between and among the phases that, in their opinion, have been ignored. Besides general statements on the need to moderate the interconnections between the different phases, they also offer analyses of how to achieve this moderation.45 The answer to this reflection could be sharp and direct: these are unnatural elements of the intelligence cycle, actions conducted beyond the wise advice given to the decisionmakers. The problem is that in the modern world, the boundaries between all these activities have blurred. For all these reasons, the cycle has been increasingly criticized on several counts. First, the tempo of demand for intelligence has increased such that the ordered, step-by-step process is neither possible nor practical. Second, the increased number of intelligence consumers—from traditional civilian policymakers and military commanders to the private-sector managers and cybersecurity analysts— challenges the intelligence cycle, in particular its direction and prioritization phase. In addition, the surfeit of information and data from open sources imperils the effectiveness of the cycle, in that the sheer volume of it bogs down the collection, processes and exploitation, and analysis stages of the cycle. Moreover, the post-9/11 security context has added new challenges to the intelligence cycle, caused by an increased need for intelligence related to foreign policy, counterterrorism, and cybersecurity; a proliferation of actors (public and private) who are able to collect and analyze information; and a muddling or overlap among certain phases of the cycle, notably, collection and analysis, because of the speed of some crises. Omand notes that the conventional interstate intelligence continues to exist, despite the post-9/11 increased need for intelligence for immediate action, “whether to protect deployed military forces or to identify and to locate terrorists, as well as other current priorities to thwart embargo breaking and proliferation activities.”46 As suggested, the cyclic representation probably emerged in intelligence education institutions that initially relied on military faculty. As such, virtually all intelligence training manuals, as well as the literature on intelligence, include a discussion or representation of the cycle.47 But for all the reasons mentioned above, a simple linear vision of the cycle fails to portray the aggregated value of the

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assessed intelligence in a realistic manner. Alan Breakspear contends that “this representation is, out of necessity, simplistic, ignoring or omitting the pragmatic necessity to move back and forth among these stages as a project unfolds. It also keeps the discipline of intelligence at bay, at least intellectually.” Worse, as he claims, “it hinders efforts to improve intelligence analysis and the role of intelligence analysis in the decision-making process.”48 The most prominent proponent of the end of the classic intelligence cycle is Hulnick, who, in 2006, declared that the intelligence cycle “is not a particularly good model, since the cyclical pattern does not describe what really happens. Policy officials rarely give collection guidance. Collection and analysis, which are supposed to work in tandem, in fact work more properly in parallel. Finally, the idea that decision-makers wait for the delivery of intelligence before making policy decisions is equally incorrect.” Indeed, as Mark Phythian maintains, “modern digital communications also enable intelligence products to be available on demand, changing the relationship between the intelligence analyst and the military staff or policy consumer.”49 On the other hand, more policymaker involvement in the setting of requirements has not registered as a success with such authors as Tuomo Kuosa.50 In this regard, policymakers want the intelligence community to tell them what they should be worried about and leave the requirements part of the process to be determined by the intelligence system itself. In a way, this circumstance confirms Hulnick, who claims that any gaps in the requirements will most likely be filled by collection.51

Conclusion As Omand makes clear, “The cycle creates a narrative that links the different steps in the production of intelligence, starting with the collection of raw material from agents, signals interception, imaging satellites and so on, and leading after processing (validation, collation, analysis and assessment) to some form of intelligence report to an end user.”52 But this narrative may no longer make much sense. Alan Dupont notes that “the traditional intelligence cycle clearly has less explanatory and organizational utility in the post–Cold War world.”53 In his opinion, “The discrete functionality implied in the separation of the intelligence process into collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination reflects the concepts, practice, and organizational dynamics

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of an earlier era.”54 Kuosa concurs, noting the signal difference today of “the notion of continuous intelligence support to policy-makers.”55 The core of the problem with the intelligence cycle is that even with a clear democratic philosophy behind it, it fails to meet the needs of the present—not only security and defense—scenario. For this reason, the success of the intelligence cycle—its simplicity—is exactly the reason it fails to explain the bureaucratic complexity that is behind the cycle and, therefore, complicates its transformation. It is a linear representation, but on close inspection, it reveals itself as hundreds of interwoven lines. Although the cycle is relevant as a theoretical and practical construction, it has become a space crowded by variously expert (or inexpert) stakeholders—policymakers, practitioners, academics—and for this reason, nobody dares to criticize it. The hesitancy to confront its problems stems from the complexity of the challenges. Each of three dimensions proposed by Kent (process, organization, product) plays a role, which alters the place of the intelligence in the decisionmaking process. To begin with, the post-9/11 environment has led to a shift in the pace and rhythm of strategic intelligence—historically, foreign intelligence. For example, in the recent past, crises took place every ten years, but nowadays the interval between crises is being dramatically shortened. In the meantime, the military intelligence cycle has picked up its pace to meet these fast-coming needs more quickly. The strategic intelligence cycle has not. Second, the number of actors that can collect, provide, and analyze information has increased enormously, bringing new players into the cycle. Private actors today, for example, have assets and capabilities that rival those of some medium-sized intelligence services in democracies. For these reasons, some countries are abandoning the production of strategic intelligence, as they cannot compete in the global intelligence market. The result is that most services and their intelligence cycles will then be served with secondhand products—perhaps produced by monopolistic private interests that generate intelligence products for other states, even rivals. Third, there is now a need for intelligence that is focused on action—essentially on the fight against terror, which will affect collection. For example, police forces will gather and produce intelligence—though the effective use of this data for intelligence-led policing requires significant expenditures and expertise in technology as well. On the side of counterterrorism, an expansion of surveillance

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policy in most countries and the potential to connect all the available dots will provide more immediate early warnings. Fourth, the gap between two important phases of the cycle— collection and analysis—has been reduced. If intelligence agencies during the Cold War had two very well-defined areas of competency with discrete personnel, at present the role of the compiler-analyst is not uncommon. In the very near future, artificial intelligence will provide its own analysis, learning from a sort of collective capability accumulated from the experiences, knowledge, and know-how of every single analyst in the intelligence sector. The cycle will no longer be a cycle. Rather, it will become a matrix where every single datum will be at the same time a requirement and a response. The cycle will be a continuous iteration in which it will be difficult to differentiate between requirements and outputs. On the upside, the new intelligence matrix will require more from the decisionmakers. Every scenario must be sketched out, every potential analysis made, every piece of information available translated and processed. The responsibility will clearly be on the policymakers to visualize possible perspectives for their policies and decide the most appropriate policies for the country. All these innovations will lead to a reworking of the intelligence cycle and to the inevitable conclusion that the intelligence services are close to losing their monopoly on the generation of intelligence.

Notes 1. Julian Richards, “Pedaling Hard: Further Questions About the Intelligence Cycle in the Contemporary Era,” in Understanding the Intelligence Cycle, edited by Mark Phythian (London: Routledge, 2013), 43. 2. Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 286. 3. The Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies provides information on various components of the intelligence cycle in some democracies, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and France. Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman, and Claudia Hillebrand, eds., Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies (London: Routledge, 2014). Romania’s Domestic Intelligence Agency published a volume on intelligence, which also refers to counterintelligence. George Cristian Maior, ed., Mind War (Bucharest: RAO, 2011). Nevertheless, these literary works do not include detailed information on the topic. 4. For comprehensive discussions on the intelligence cycle in the United States, see Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy; Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, eds., Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Loch K. Johnson, ed., Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism: Defending the

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Nation Against Hostile Forces: Strategic Intelligence, vol. 4 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); Jeffrey T. Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 7th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2016); Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies; Kaveh Moravej and Gustavo Díaz, “Critical Issues in Contemporary Counter-Intelligence” (UNISCI Discussion Paper No. 13, January 2007), 61–62; Johnson, Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence; Loch K. Johnson, ed., Essentials of Strategic Intelligence (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2015); Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark, Secret Intelligence; Hank Prunckun, Intelligence and Private Investigation: Developing Sophisticated Methods for Conducting Inquiries (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 2013); Philip H. J. Davies, Kristian Gustafson, and Ian Rigden, “The Intelligence Cycle Is Dead, Long Live the Intelligence Cycle: Rethinking Intelligence Fundamentals for a New Intelligence Doctrine,” in Understanding the Intelligence Cycle, edited by Mark Phythian, 56–75 (London: Routledge, 2013). 5. Amit Steinhart and Kiril Avramov, “Is Everything Personal? Political Leaders and Intelligence Organizations: A Typology,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 26, no. 3 (2013): 530–549. 6. Collection methods include human intelligence (HUMINT), signal (SIGINT), and image intelligence (IMINT). The increase of areas and technological means has generated growth—not always recognized as such—in the number of intelligences. Nowadays, for example, we speak of social network intelligence (SOCINT) and cultural intelligence (CULINT). 7. House of Commons, Review of Intelligence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: TSO, 2014): 10. http://www.butlerreview.org.uk/report/report.pdf. 8. Ibid. 9. Davies, Gustafson, and Rigden, “The Intelligence Cycle Is Dead,” 59. 10. Willmoore Kendall, “The Function of Intelligence: Strategic Intelligence by Sherman Kent Review,” World Politics 1, no. 4 (1949): 542–552. 11. William S. Brei, “Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure” (Occasional Paper Number Two, Joint Military Intelligence College, 1996). 12. For more details about NATO and the military intelligence cycle, see Davies, Gustafson, and Rigden, “The Intelligence Cycle Is Dead.” 13. Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2016). 14. Matei and Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform.” 15. Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (London: Routledge, 2017), 21. 16. Matei and Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies,” 659. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. David Omand, “Is It Time to Move Beyond the Intelligence Cycle? A UK Practitioner Perspective,” in Understanding the Intelligence Cycle, edited by Mark Phythian (London: Routledge, 2013), 146. 20. Ibid. 21. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War. 22. Ibid. 23. From Burke Trend to Harold Wilson, March 13, 1967, cited in John Yong, “The Wilson Government’s Reform of Intelligence Co-ordination, 1967–68,” Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 2 (2001): 133–151. 24. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 293. 25. Ibid., 142. 26. Alan Breakspear, “A New Definition of Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 28, no. 5 (2013): 678–693. 27. Omand, “Beyond the Intelligence Cycle,” 139. 28. Al Gore, “National Performance Review Report: From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less,” National Partnership for

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Reinventing Government, September 7, 1994, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr /library/nprrpt/annrpt/redtpe93/index.html. 29. Olav Riste, “The Intelligence–Policy Maker Relationship and the Politicization of Intelligence,” in National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects, edited by Gregory F. Treverton and Wilhelm Agrell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 180. 30. John C. Gannon, “Managing Analysis in the Information Age,” in Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles and Innovations, edited by Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 221. 31. Richard E. Russell, “Achieving All-Source Fusion in the Intelligence Community,” in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, edited by Loch K. Johnson: 189–198 (New York: Routledge, 2007). 32. Arthur S. Hulnick, “Intelligence Producer-Consumer Relations in the Electronic Era,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 24, no. 4 (2011): 747–756. 33. Arthur S. Hulnick, “What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle?” Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 6 (2006): 963–965. 34. Loch K. Johnson, “The Seven Sins of Strategic Intelligence,” World Affairs 146, no. 2 (1983): 176–204. 35. Ibid. 36. Stephen Marrin, “Preventing Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 17, no. 4 (2004): 655–672. 37. Steinhart and Avramov, “Is Everything Personal?” 38. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 293. 39. Ibid. 40. Rob Johnston, Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005). 41. Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence in an Age of Information (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 42. Robert M. Clark, Intelligence Analysis. A Target Centric Approach (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007). 43. Julian Richards, The Art and Science of Intelligence Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 44. Geraint Evans, “Rethinking Military Intelligence Failure—Putting the Wheels Back on the Intelligence Cycle,” Defense Studies 9, no. 1 (2009): 22–46. 45. Bahadir Aydın and Zafer Özleblebici, “Should We Rely on Intelligence Cycle?” Journal of Military and Information Science 3, no. 3 (2015): 93–99. 46. Omand, “Beyond the Intelligence Cycle,” 139. 47. Michael Warner, “The Past and Future of Intelligence Cycle,” in Understanding the Intelligence Cycle, edited by Mark Phythian: 9–20 (London: Routledge, 2013). 48. Breakspear, “A New Definition of Intelligence.” 49. Omand, “Beyond the Intelligence Cycle.” 50. Tuomo Kuosa, Towards Strategic Intelligence: Foresight, Intelligence, and Policy Making (Helsinki: Dynamic Futures, 2014). 51. Ibid. 52. Omand, “Beyond the Intelligence Cycle,” 134. 53. Alan Dupont, “Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century,” Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 4 (2003), 34. 54. Ibid. 55. Kuosa, Towards Strategic Intelligence.

3 Collection Policy and Planning Mike Fowler

A nation cannot use intelligence it does not have. —Robert Kennedy1

The movie industry glamorizes collection as the lone spy or the unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, fixating on the tangible parts of the intelligence process. Collection is far more complex than commonly understood. In this chapter, I address two aspects of collection: policy and planning. Collection policy is the long-term scheme to provide funding to research, design, acquire, and sustain collection capabilities. The essence of collection planning is resource management—aligning assets with appropriate tasks, with an eye to both effectiveness and efficiency. Building a collection plan involves much more than assigning platforms and sensors. Although those are certainly an important part of the puzzle, there are many other challenges to work through to create an effective collection enterprise.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the US Air Force Academy, the US Air Force, or the US Department of Defense.

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The Intelligence Process

Collection Policy An effective collection policy evolves from a country’s nationalsecurity strategy. The type, quantity, and geographic spread of threats shape the information required for the national-security decisionmakers. Planners can then derive the most appropriate intelligence discipline and relevant intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) asset for collection. The most tangible result of policy decisions is funding. In the case of ISR capabilities, this funding can be for organizations, programs, and/or assets. Funding ISR capabilities is not just covering the cost of the asset but involves the overhead to sustain the capability, including personnel, maintenance, training, and facilities. A successful policy must address each of these aspects to provide intelligence to the decisionmaker and war fighter effectively and efficiently. In practice, a combination of threat perception, domestic politics, and bureaucratic politics shapes collection-policy choices. Although threats and national-security interests are linked, the factors that drive threat perception and interest identification are complex.2 Major changes in threat perception could be external, but they can also be internal. A democratic transition can be a significant inflexion point for a country’s intelligence system. Many authoritarian regimes place a significant emphasis on domestic surveillance to stay in power; therefore, new democracies usually have to shift their collection priorities from political to national-security purposes.3 For most democracies, an internal threat to the regime is not the highest national-security threat. In the 1990s, democratizing police states dismantled their domestic surveillance programs under pressure from domestic politics. Across the national-security spectrum, domestic politics has a significant role in defining and prioritizing national interests.4 Collection policy is also shaped by bureaucratic politics. The internal bargaining and positioning between and among agencies, departments, and commands can result in a set of collection capabilities that does not necessarily align with national-security priorities. Bureaucratic battles are waged over organizational structure, ownership, and funding. The organizational and personal promotion stakes can be high, leading some to exaggerate threats to get more funding.5 When successful, these funding changes lead to a distortion between the ISR capabilities available and the prioritized requirements for the various national-security challenges.

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This friction in policymaking inevitably results in collection gaps. These gaps are further widened by a country’s self-constrained, legal limitations on collecting intelligence. Legal authorities vary by the maturity of democratic consolidation, threat perception, intelligence history, and domestic politics. For example, the Brazilian constitution forbids the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) from wiretapping, in an attempt to prevent a return to the political police practices used by intelligence agencies during Brazil’s nondemocratic past.6 Kenya’s Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2012 significantly rolled back the powers granted to authorities under the Suppression of Terrorism Bill of 2003, which had elicited a great deal of concern about civil liberties, particularly when the bill seemed to apply to domestic groups and the political opposition.7 Although it varies among countries, legal authority for collection can typically be sorted from least to most restrictive based on the use: • Collection in a combat zone • Collection against potential adversary during peacetime • Collection with partner approval (e.g., collection against Boko Haram to assist Nigeria) • Collection against a partner country • Domestic collection against foreigners • Collection against a state’s own citizens

Strategy and Collection Planning Like the intelligence cycle, collection strategy starts with planning. In an ends-ways-means analysis, the planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination (PCPAD) define the ends. For the collector, the end is not a security objective; ends are decisions. Planning frames the problem, the domain, the geographic area or interest, and the information required to facilitate a decision. For example, the stability of the Yemeni government might be a national priority. At the other extreme, for a tactical unit conducting combat operations or airstrikes in Yemen, there is a high demand for timely data and precise locations, both to ensure the desired target is hit and to minimize the potential for collateral damage or friendly fire.

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Matching Intelligence Requirements to ISR Capabilities For each indicator, the collection strategist can assess which intelligence disciplines (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] capabilities) are best suited to support the requirement. The assessment is a combination of sensor fit, timeliness, quality, coverage, risk, and cost. Each criterion is assessed in a subjective, comparative, and abstract sense. Sensor fit is not simply about matching the requirement to the best discipline. Each discipline includes a variety of sensors, each with its own best fit to meet requirements. Timeliness refers to how long it takes to complete the intelligence process from identification of the intelligence requirement to delivery of a product to the decisionmaker. For instance, a commander or a state civil defense force might need warning of a ballistic missile launch within a few minutes of its occurrence. Quality of intelligence is the level of precision accuracy in the information and the reliability of the source and its potential for bias. Even high-quality intelligence can be misunderstood.8 Misunderstanding may be the result of the adversary’s attempts at camouflage, concealment, or deception. In some cases, advanced sensors can mitigate these anticollection measures. In other cases, decreased distance between sensor and target is necessary to ensure a high quality collection. Misunderstandings can also come from an inadequate understanding of culture differences, nuances, and symbols or cognitive biases. Cost represents the financial burden to acquire and execute the full intelligence cycle for this asset. Costs include the personnel and their training as well as the facilities and materials necessary to employ and sustain the asset as well as processing the data it provides. If the platform moves, someone must drive it, fly it, or sustain its orbit. Every collection capability requires some type of facility as well as some kind of support, refueling, spare parts, and so forth.

Types of Collection All democracies have the capability to perform some aspects of intelligence collection.9 Wealthy states still have an advantage in the quality and quantity of collection capabilities. Smaller states must be more selective in funding their intelligence capabilities.

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HUMINT

Used since ancient times, every government and organization can afford some level of human intelligence (HUMINT). The common thread of HUMINT is that humans are the source of the intelligence. It involves either a human’s direct observation of an event or place or human-to-human conversation (regardless of whether technology is used to facilitate that conversation). Table 3.1 provides a comparative look at the timeliness, quality, risk, and cost of various types of HUMINT. The most reliable and accurate HUMINT comes from direct observation conducted by trained collectors, who can be government officials stationed abroad, military special forces, diplomats, or intelligence services. Table 3.1 Comparative HUMINT Assets HUMINT Asset Collector direct observation

Best Fit public events

Special enemy reconnaissance activity; target acquisition Government policy information changes; exchange political instability; coup potential Recruited plans; intent; Insider leader perceptions Recruited local enemy observer activity Travelers public events

Defector

Prisoners

Walk-ins

Timelines Quality low

high

moderate high

Coverage

Risk

Cost

may be low limited by host government denied area high

low

high

low

high

senior very government low officials

low

low

high

moderate

low

groupinternals

moderate public areas

not taskable plans; intent; not capabilities taskable plans; intent; not capabilities taskable plans; activity; not capabilities taskable

low

high

low

very low

very high high

public areas, low industry not taskable low

not taskable

low

low

low

low

low

low

low

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Romania is one of the few North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to have an integrated multisource collection capability (IMCC), which receives information from theaters of operation as well as from operational and strategic sources, and uses HUMINT, imagery intelligence (IMINT), measures and signature intelligence (MASINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT).10 The Romanian intelligence agencies’ effectiveness in HUMINT prompted the Atlantic Alliance to create a NATO Center for Excellence in HUMINT in Oradea, Romania, in 2009.11 Overt HUMINT involves very low risk, both politically for the country and physically for the collector. Overt HUMINT is an efficient use of assets because they are already tasked with diplomatic and administrative duties. The additional overhead cost of having them conduct HUMINT is marginal. Special reconnaissance is conducted either clandestinely or covertly; typically, it is conducted without host government permission, violates the target government’s laws, or is within enemy territory. These missions are characteristically sensitive: monitoring enemy activity or locating and monitoring high-value targets. If caught, the collector risks expulsion, imprisonment, or death. In addition, there is political embarrassment for the country of the collector. To minimize the potential for political blowback, an operation could be conducted covertly. Not only is the operation conducted in secrecy but the individual’s identity and affiliation are protected to provide the country or organization a means of plausible deniability. To mitigate the high risk of these missions, most countries employ specially trained military forces or specialized civilian services. It is common for democracies with larger militaries, including Brazil, India, Israel, and much of NATO, to have multiple special forces units trained in reconnaissance. Even some smaller militaries, like those of Albania, Algeria, Kenya, Serbia, and Sri Lanka have some capability. Examples of civilian intelligence services include France’s General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), Israel’s Mossad, the United Kingdom’s MI6, the Romanian Domestic Intelligence Agency (SRI) and its Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States. Interviews with travelers, defectors, prisoners, and walk-ins are limited in their potential because they are not taskable. Of the four categories, only the traveler category represents a source that the collector can proactively seek out and interview. At the tactical level, the collector can talk to local travelers—the shoe shiner, the local grocer,

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the taxicab driver, or the restaurant owner. For a broader view, the collector may talk to nongovernment organizations (NGOs), migrants, refugees, or traveling businesspeople about conditions in denied or rarely traveled areas. The HUMINT collector should make a judgment call on the reliability and accuracy of secondhand reporting. This type of hearsay is susceptible to gossip, rumors, and the telephone game (multiple layers of hearsay that distort the original message). Some reporting may be false or stylized to suit the collector’s expectations. It could be fictitious reporting seeking a monetary reward, the establishment of a relationship, or to satisfy the provider’s own ego. It could be malicious reporting intended to shape actions a certain way (e.g., take out a business competitor or settle a personal vendetta). Of all the types of HUMINT sources, walk-ins tend to be the most difficult to judge for reliability. Although they can provide important intelligence, the lack of a track record makes a onetime walk-in source problematic. For most HUMINT sources, the tasking to collection process is very slow. Even at the local level, it takes time for a source to get access once an information requirement is identified. At the strategic and operational level, HUMINT collectors tend to be country or region specific. Unless the collector is a native, developing collectors requires a long lead time to learn the language and local culture, then establish a network of contacts. This lead time limits the flexibility to redirect HUMINT collectors from one collection requirement to another. Even if HUMINT can be as quick as a few phone calls, planners should assume that the source may need some time to gain the specific access required. OSINT

Depending on the source, open-source intelligence (OSINT) is best suited to monitor general details about current events, estimate public perceptions, and conduct background research. OSINT is, however, unlikely to turn up sensitive operational details. OSINT sources can be plotted along a spectrum between timeliness and quality, as shown in Table 3.2. OSINT has the potential to be extremely timely. The number of journalists and social-media posts across the globe provide sources that no organization can replicate. These sources are particularly good for monitoring big-picture current events such as “who controls

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Table 3.2 Comparative OSINT Assets OSINT Asset

Local broadcast TV or radio Internet news or blogs Social media

Best Fit

current events current events perceptions; intent Traditional background newspaper, flyers research Internet databases; background org. website research Academia books background and articles research

Timelines Quality high

low

local receiver global

moderate low

HUMINT

high high low low

low

Coverage

Risk

negligible

Cost low

very low global

high high

global global

the city of Raqqa?” Like HUMINT, these OSINT sources can provide a sense of the “word on the street”—aggregating perceptions about and attitudes toward past, present, and future events; security; support for the government or nonstate actors. Even with limited precision on details, the speed of the reporting can make these sources extremely useful. For example, during the 2011 Libya crisis, Al Jazeera news often provided the first indications that a city had been captured by one side or the other. Even though the exact timing of the event and number of troops involved was not particularly accurate, the videos showing troops celebrating in the recognizable city square was invaluable in confirming which side controlled the city. OSINT can provide good background information on the operational environment in the areas of: politics, sociocultural and economic conditions, history, and civil infrastructure. A wide variety of research websites provide useful insights into potential or actual conflicts (see Table 3.3). Location-based demographic data can help characterize identitybased fault lines such as ethnic, linguistic, tribal, or religious. Such other open-source information as a youth bulge, population density, migration and urbanization trends, education and literacy levels, the size of the middle class, income inequality, resource exploitation (e.g., desertification), employment, and inflation can be used as indicators for economic-driven conflict.

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Table 3.3 Examples of Open-Source Research Conflict or Potential Conflict Factors

Governance

Brookings Carnegie Endowment Center for New American Security Center for Strategic and International Studies Crisis Group Economist Intelligence Unit Genocide Watch Hoover Institute for the Study of War Institute of Strategic Studies Small Wars Journal Stockholm International Peace Research Uppsala Conflict Data

Amnesty International Cato Institute Transparency International Corruption Perception Index Freedom House political instability polity state failure Bertelsmann

Center for International Development Displacement World Bank World Development Indicators World Trade Organization

Bern Project on Internal Human Rights Watch relief web Red Cross Refugees International Social Conflict Database US Institute of Peace

Economic

Social

Cultural understanding is vital in predicting likely courses of action or prescribing the impacts of an action, as groups may have different relative values regarding time, money, leisure activities, and family. Ideally, this type of information is collected pre-crisis so that it is readily available when required. Despite its breadth of coverage, OSINT is limited to passive collection. It is passive in the sense that it requires someone else to create data and distribute it via some medium—television, radio, internet, or print—before an OSINT collector can retrieve it. Transmission could be limited by a repressive government (e.g., North Korea) or by a rudimentary communications infrastructure (e.g., Somalia). In these cases, the OSINT collector may have to rely on sources from neighboring countries. Like HUMINT, OSINT sources have the potential for bias and misperceptions. Just because someone said a thing does not make it true. The internet and social media are full of misinformation. Even

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untampered videos that show “what really happened” may not exhibit the before and after that could provide more context to the event. The author may intend to mislead or shape actions. The OSINT analyst must be able to dissect the difference between facts, estimates, opinions, and emotional arguments. OSINT has the lowest cost of entry and entails the least risk if exposed. Access is relatively cheap, requiring only a television, a radio, a library system, or a computer with internet access. The collection structure becomes slightly more complicated if the need exists to intercept local TV and radio signals and retransmit them to a processing station. In the case of hard-copy print materials, an individual must collect the items and re-transmit all or part of the material. Technology is often the cheapest component of the OSINT collection system. For these reasons, OSINT is the first and largest collection method, accounting for some 75 percent of all collected intelligence, among virtually all democracies in the twenty-first century. SIGINT

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is made of three subfields: communications intelligence (COMINT), foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT), and electronic intelligence (ELINT). COMINT is the interception, decryption, and translation of electronic communications. FISINT is the interception, decryption, and translation of telemetry data. ELINT primarily collects radar emissions. Theoretically, every type of electronic communication can be intercepted. For example, a commercial radio scanner from a local electronics store can monitor high frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), and ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio signals. Of course, data can be transmitted through a variety of frequencies and media. Governments and organizations often attempt to protect their communications through codes and encryption. To counter these measures, interceptors employ code-breaking techniques. The collection planner must first identify which type of signal must be intercepted. The type of signal dictates the type of sensor and the required proximity to the target (see Table 3.4). For example, HF communications can often be detected at vast (i.e., intercontinental) distances because of skywave propagation, which can send these transmissions far and wide. Very low frequency (VLF) is used to communicate with submarines because

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Collection Policy and Planning Table 3.4 Comparative SIGINT Assets SIGINT Asset

Best Fit

HF intent; orders; communications activity levels; link analysis; unit identity; unit location and movement; telemetry data VHF/UHF intent; orders; communications activity levels; link analysis; unit identity; unit location and movement; telemetry data SHF/EHF satellite uplinks datalinks and downlinks Radar air defense emissions activity; locations; tactical warning Listening senior officials’ devices conversations Computer network emails; exploitation databases; data (CNE) transmissions

Timelines Quality Coverage Risk

Cost

high

high

global

platform platform dependent dependent

high

high

line of sight

platform platform dependent dependent

high

high

line of sight line of sight

platform dependent platform dependent

platform dependent platform dependent

low

high

limited

high

high

high

low

high

high

complex

moderate

moderate

the wave can penetrate water and earth. On the other hand, most signal intercepts require the sensor to be within the line of sight of the transmitter. Most government and military communications worth intercepting occur in the VHF–UHF range, which requires the use of some type of air, ground, maritime, or space platform to detect the transmission. Intercepting and decoding communications can provide critical insights into the adversary’s plans, intentions, and activities. If the intercepted communication is unable to be decoded, it can still provide useful intelligence. Through direction-finding techniques and traffic analysis, SIGINT collectors can piece together the location of the transmitter as well as links between communication nodes. Also, the frequency, duration, and number of nodes involved can provide a pattern of activity—or indicate when there is a significant deviation from the normal pattern.

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For domestic surveillance, listening devices can be a low-cost method for monitoring internal dissent. If proper legal channels are used, it can also be low risk. ELINT, another subset of SIGINT, is especially useful for monitoring radar activity. In peacetime, ELINT is used to monitor airdefense activity and radar capabilities. In wartime, ELINT can provide locations of air-defense radars. In some cases, ELINT can differentiate between a radar-search mode and missile-guidance mode, providing tactical warning of an enemy missile launch.12 SIGINT capabilities tend to be costly. Even though a commercial off-the-shelf scanner is cheap, valuable communications tend to be encrypted, which greatly increases the complexity and cost of SIGINT operations. HF intercepts and computer network exploitation (CNE) can be done anywhere, but many SIGINT sensors need to be in proximity to the transmitter. Although risk can vary by platform and situation, the use of a sensor platform drives up the cost of collection. Both CNE and communications intercepts require technical training. In some cases, advanced language training will be necessary. SIGINT typically results in accurate and reliable intelligence. But, just because it comes from a sensitive source does not necessarily make the information more reliable. The individual might be lying. The target of the lie could be internal. The individual could be attempting to deceive coworkers or a superior to make himself or herself look good or to avoid punishment.13 The individual may be misinformed. Perhaps he or she is incompetent or passing on unsubstantiated rumors. GEOINT

Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) includes imagery intelligence (IMINT) and geospatial information. From the collection planner’s perspective, GEOINT and IMINT are largely synonymous. Geospatial information is the study of human geography and physical terrain. Examples include digital terrain elevation data (DTED) and two- and three-dimensional maps (topographic and hydrographic). Geospatial information relies heavily on IMINT and, to a lesser extent, OSINT and HUMINT to shape its products. For example, a type of IMINT called light detection and ranging (LiDAR) is a niche capability particularly useful for terrain mapping and elevation data. IMINT is perhaps best known for the electro-optical (EO) image—the classic photograph. EO imagery is a key part of the target-

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ing process. It is used to keep track of the physical location of the enemy order of battle and to identify and locate other potential targets. Infrared (IR) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery can be a useful supplement to EO imagery. IR imagery is particularly useful at night, whereas SAR imagery is useful during poor weather conditions that might degrade EO and IR imagery. Regardless of the type, imagery is extremely useful for change detection. Imagery includes keeping track of the number of vehicles or aircraft at a particular location. Or, it can be used to assess damage caused by combat operations or natural disasters. The disadvantage of imagery is that it provides a snapshot in time. Full-motion video (FMV) provides the capability to track moving targets and monitor patterns. FMV is more expensive, as streaming video requires a lot of bandwidth, particularly if it requires a satellite relay. The familiarity of EO imagery and FMV can give untrained customers overconfidence in their ability to interpret. The trade-offs between the various IMINT assets are depicted in Table 3.5. From a national-security perspective, GEOINT is the most flexible of all the disciplines. The language of the local country is largely irrelevant. Cultural nuances, though still important, are the least relevant in GEOINT. Normally, IMINT requires some type of platform. In rare cases, IMINT can be derived from a HUMINT, OSINT, or SIGINT mission. A HUMINT collector or agent may employ a camera. OSINT collectors may find videos or images posted to social media by the public. A SIGINT computer network exploitation could uncover valuable images or video collected and stored by the adversary. But the majority of IMINT comes from air or space platforms. Conceptually, every democracy has access to satellite imagery. Canada, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States have their own satellite networks. However, having your own network is no longer required. Commercial imagery provides EO, IR, SAR, and multispectral options. MASINT

Measures and signature intelligence (MASINT) can be perceived as a confusing bucket of leftovers that do not fit into the other disciplines. Part of this confusion comes from the two distinct hemispheres of MASINT. On the one hand, MASINT is the in-depth exploitation

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Table 3.5 Comparative IMINT Assets IMINT Asset EO imagery

IR imagery

SAR imagery all-weather LiDAR

Best Fit

targeting; change IR signatures

change detection terrain mapping

Full motion movement; video (FMV) patterns

Timelines

Quality

high

moderate

low

moderate

high

high high

high

Coverage

line of sight

Risk/Cost

platform dependent

low

high

of data often derived from IMINT or SIGINT. This detailed process often involves vast amounts of data over time to identify patterns or anomalies. On the other side of the MASINT hemisphere, MASINTunique sensors provide dynamic warning of impending strategic or tactical attacks. Basic radar and sonar capabilities are sufficient to provide a capability to detect and track potential air, ground, and maritime targets. But the ability to precisely identify a target with MASINT capabilities requires much more research. MASINT assets primarily differ based upon their domain and specific exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum (see Table 3.6). For many readers, the most familiar MASINT signature will be that of passive sonar. Conceptually, this type of signature can be extrapolated to other types of scientific phenomenology such that a potential target could be identified using one of many different unique signatures. For example, missile signatures would help differentiate between the launch of a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) versus an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). A facility signature might assist in differentiating a chemical weapons plant from a fertilizer factory. In some cases, the signature is used not only to detect and identify the threat but also to facilitate tracking to enable targeting or defensive countermeasures. Contemporary weapons developers do what they can to minimize their signatures. The newest submarines have extremely quiet propellers and engines. Fighters, bombers, and ships are manufactured to limit their radar and infrared signature. Facilities can use camouflage and concealment to mask the nature of the facility.

Collection Policy and Planning Table 3.6 Comparative MASINT Assets MASINT Asset

Best Fit

SIGINT signatures Radar

unintentional radiation track moving objects; missile warning; monitor missile tests; locate artillery missile warning ID and track subs; vehicle, ship, aircraft traffic foot or vehicle traffic; nuclear detonation maritime awareness underwater detection WMD detection

GEO signatures

OPIRa Acoustic Seismic Sonar Magnetic Sampling and analysis

indications of desertification, deforestation

Timelines/Quality

after in-depth exploitation creates a unique signature, processing can be extremely fast, reliable, and accurate

55

Coverage, Risk, and Cost platform dependent

Note: a. The Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) mission area is supported by organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD) and intelligence community (IC) to ensure that missile threats are detected and reported to decision makers.

Collection and Democracy In a democracy, intelligence collection requires states to attempt to identify their preferred balance between control and effectiveness.14 Authorities for intelligence collection can be consolidated into a single entity or distributed across many agencies. Distribution dissipates power but reduces the efficiency of the intelligence community by increasing the probability of duplication of effort and the likelihood of intelligence-sharing challenges resulting from physical, technical, and policy issues. Control often comes in the form of hierarchies and organizational charts. In practice, the organization that controls the budget has far more influence over the collection

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agency. This situation can create interesting dilemmas when the supervising organization does not align with the budget authority. A second aspect of the democracy dilemma is the trade-off between internal security and privacy. Democracies have used spies to monitor domestic security threats for centuries. Technological advancements increased the potential methods of government monitoring. The widespread adoption of the internet, social media, and cell phone applications has exponentially increased both the amount of data available to monitor and the ethical and legal complexities in gathering it. To some extent, publicly available information can be used to track a single individual’s whereabouts without that person’s specific acknowledged consent. The problem arises when collection is used for political and personal gain versus national-security reasons, which transform intelligence into political police.15 In addition, the ambiguity of sovereignty in cyberspace places cyber intelligence into an ethical gray area. Country A can leverage servers in Country B to conduct cyberattacks on Country C. Is it ethical, then, for country C to conduct cyber intelligence against friendly Country B in order to prevent possible attacks from Country A? A third dilemma for democratic intelligence systems is the tradeoff between transparent accountability and secrecy. Intelligence organizations are inherently secretive and would prefer to be opaque and keep their operations secret. When their operations are publicized, the collection target can take steps to prevent or complicate future collection. Yet, within a democracy, there is an expectation that the government is being held accountable by the people. Without transparency, accountability is near impossible. Transparency can come at many levels. The Edward Snowden and WikiLeaks events indicate that some believe that intelligence agencies should be fully transparent to the public. However, transparency can come in small venues: select oversight committees, the legislature, or the judiciary. There is no single correct way for a democracy to handle intelligence collection. Ideally, each democracy makes a deliberate decision on what its desired balance is between control over the collection process and the effectiveness and efficiency of that collection.

Conclusion Collection is not just about having a plane with a sensor. Done correctly, a good collection strategy includes both a deliberate collec-

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tion policy and an efficient, effective, and holistic collection plan. Using an ends-ways-means approach, both the policy and the plan array intelligence capabilities and sensors to monitor prioritized strategic challenges. The collection policy establishes the long-term design that organizes and equips collection capabilities in alignment with projected national-security interests. The policy goes beyond the collection asset to fund all of the necessary support mechanisms, including trained aircrew and maintenance, facilities and related infrastructure, the communications network, and processing capability. The processing capability has its own set of requirements for trained personnel, facilities, infrastructure, and communications. Collection planning leverages the collection assets available from the policy process. If the collection policy process is dysfunctional or nonexistent, the available collection assets are unlikely to be wellsuited to deliver the information required for national-security or military decisionmaking. Ideally, the policy provides the optimum complement of HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT sensors and platforms necessary to monitor the top national-security priorities. Doing so requires tough trade-offs on costs, flexibility, access, timeliness, and each asset’s “best fit” intelligence-collection capability.

Notes 1. Kennedy, Of Knowledge and Power, 5. 2. David L. Rousseau, Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). 3. Bruneau, “Controlling Intelligence in Democracies.” 4. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997); Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988): 427–460; Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” World Politics (July 1991), 480. 5. Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 195–199, 235; for an intelligence community example, see: Glenn Hastedt, “Public Intelligence,” in Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies, edited by Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 6. Gonçalves, “The Spies Who Came from the Tropics.” 7. Charles Lenjo Mwazighe, “Legal Responses to Terrorism: Case Study of the Republic of Kenya” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2012), 71. 8. Robert Jervis, “Understanding Beliefs,” Political Psychology 27, no. 5 (October 2006): 641–663. 9. Michael Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 74.

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10. Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, “Romania’s Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 20, no. 4 (2007): 629–660. 11. Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, “Balancing Democratic Civilian Control with Effectiveness of Intelligence in Romania: Lessons Learned and Best/Worst Practices Before and After NATO and EU Integration,” Intelligence and National Security 29, no. 4 (2014): 619–637. 12. Mark M. Lowenthal and Robert M. Clark, The Five Disciplines of Intelligence Collection (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2016), 98. 13. Ibid., 104. 14. Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence: 331–342. 15. See Chapter 1.

4 Developing Analytic Capabilites John Tullius

Intelligence analysis starts when we stop reporting on events and start explaining them. —Martin Petersen1

The goal for this chapter, drawing on my twenty-plus years as an analyst, is to share some of the foundational, procedural, and bureaucratic factors that facilitate the crafting of value-added, sophisticated analysis that provides the most utility for policymakers. My intent is not to provide an exhaustive list of components of such work, and I am sure other practitioners would have additional thoughts. It is also not intended to be a primer on analytic tradecraft, as there are plenty of existing works on that topic.2 After briefly discussing what I mean by “all-source analysis,” and the goals of analysis—including identifying the distinguishing criteria for sophisticated analytic work— the rest of the chapter focuses on a range of enabling factors for the production of such work. With a few notable exceptions,3 information on intelligence analysis in democracies around the world, other than the United States, is rather scarce, hence the preponderance of examples from the United States. However, during the course of my career, I have had ample opportunities to work with multiple liaison services, which experience has provided me with insights into some of the 59

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unique challenges newer intelligence organizations face as they strive to develop analytic capabilities. When feasible, I will highlight those issues and provide possible mitigation strategies to overcome them.

Analysts and “All-Source Analysis” Intelligence is the subset of information that addresses policymaker priorities, a process that includes the collection of information and its subsequent distillation into all-source analysis.4 Lowenthal emphasizes that “intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of policymakers and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs.”5 In the United States, policymaker needs, or requirements, are formally reviewed and conveyed to the intelligence community (IC) through the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, as well as through regular, more ad hoc taskings, and exchanges with policymakers. In the United Kingdom, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) maintains oversight of the intelligence agencies’ analytical capability and liaises with the Commonwealth and foreign intelligence agencies (including considering how much of its product can be disseminated to these agencies).6 In Germany, the results of the integrated analysis of all collected information are combined in the reports that the Federal Intelligence Service (the Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BND) produces. The various types of reports differ in terms of scope, level of detail, recipient, and frequency of reporting. The BND also answers specific requests posed by the Federal Chancellery, other federal ministries, and the German Bundestag.7 In Romania, the National Security Council prioritizes intelligence, and the National Intelligence Community—an analytical fusion center situated in the National Security Council—provides policymakers (the president, the prime minister, and lawmakers) tailored analytical products, in line with the policymakers’ needs and requirements. El Salvador is currently developing a similar fusion center. This clear articulation of requirements enables intelligence agencies to prioritize and focus production on the most essential issues. The end product or “deliverable” for policymakers comes in the form of all-source analysis, which includes both longer estimates and strategic papers that delve deeply into issues, as well as shorter, more immediate current pieces that tend to run one or two pages in the

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United States and longer (ten pages) in other democracies. In almost all cases, analysts working on priority issues rarely have the full picture; in fact, dealing with collection gaps and uncertainties is the norm. Recognizing this reality, Lowenthal notes that intelligence is not about providing the “truth” or a set of known facts: “If something were known to be true, states would not need intel agencies to collect the info and analyze it.”8 Similarly, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Mike Hayden said that “when the facts speak for themselves, intelligence has done its job and there is no need for analysis.9 Consequently, all-source analysis is the process of “filling in the gaps” for policymakers by providing assessments of what the known facts likely mean, a task made more daunting if collection is sparse. Thus, analysts not only convey the new facts (the “what”), they also clearly articulate the significance (the “so what”) on key issues. Former secretary of state Colin Powell succinctly boiled down good analysis to: “Tell me what you know. Tell me what you don’t know. And then, based on what you really know and what you really don’t know, tell me what you think is most likely to happen.”10 Analysts often do not have the luxury to wait for new or better collection on a topic; they must provide assessments based on their expertise and understanding of the reporting on that issue. Emerging democracies must create analytic capabilities from scratch, which raises various bureaucratic challenges to the development of analysis as a de facto intelligence profession. In new democracies, intelligence reform most often is not a priority to begin with.11 Developing an analytical function is even less of a priority for policymakers, because in nondemocratic regimes, collection is usually the preferred function of intelligence—both by the elites in charge (who are mostly interested in raw information) and intelligence agencies.12 As such, the personnel working in collection will try to block any attempts to create, let alone give priority to, analysis.13 Indeed, Mihaela Matei and Ionel Nitu call intelligence analysis in new democracies the “Cinderella” of intelligence.14

Goals of Sophisticated Analysis With this description of analysis in mind, what are the goals of analysis? Scott Hatch notes that the goals should be to have impact in informing policymaker decisionmaking.15 Similarly, the Intelligence

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Community Assessment (ICA) report on Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US elections, produced by the CIA, the FBI, and the National Security Agency (NSA), states that analysis should “provide assessments to decision-makers that are intellectually rigorous, objective, timely, and useful, and that adhere to analytic tradecraft standards.” 16 These criteria, echoed by other authors, 17 provide a solid set of guidelines, but they remain somewhat vague and could include analysis that may only be of marginal utility to policymakers. Indeed, Lowenthal argues that “a certain amount of intel analysis may be no more sophisticated than current conventional wisdom on any given issue.”18 In my experience, “sophisticated” analytic pieces—those of most value for busy policymakers—usually have several defining characteristics. First, beyond simply conveying a basic “what/so what?” that explains what happened and why it matters, sophisticated pieces anticipate and address the second- and third-order questions that policymakers might raise—as well as those that the decisionmakers may not have thought to ask yet. Second, the best analysis tends to be actionable, meaning that it directly feeds into an ongoing policy decision or prompts policymaker action. For example, if US negotiators are meeting with foreign counterparts to hammer out new political, military, or economic agreements, analytic pieces that provide insights into the other sides’ negotiating positions, bottom lines, and so on will be actionable and provide them with a decision advantage. Richard Haass notes that intelligence that does not “‘assist action’ remains lifeless.”19 And third, when feasible, analysts should strive to provide opportunity analysis, which former director of national intelligence (DNI) Dennis Blair described as helping policymakers “find the levers . . . which will enable us to advance our interests.”20 This is not to say that pieces should be policy prescriptive; rather, they can provide insights on possible inducements or pressure points to influence a country’s behavior to achieve the desired outcome.

Enabling Factors While the production of sophisticated analysis has been a long-standing benchmark for the intelligence agencies in developed democracies, it is a daunting task that relies on a number of enabling factors.

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Foundational Factors

There are a handful of foundational factors, or essential building blocks, that are requisites for sophisticated analysis: solid training for analysts; deep, substantive expertise (including language proficiency and overseas experience); understanding policymaker priorities and requirements; and having full awareness of the existing collection posture on any given issue (i.e., available sourcing and its reliability, collection gaps, and ongoing efforts to fill those requirements). For newer intelligence services, some of these requirements will present significant challenges for a range of reasons, including more limited resources, having intelligence officers who frequently had an internal focus (rather than an external view) under previous governments, and fewer analysts on any given issue. Indeed, for many newer services, an analyst may be responsible for multiple countries, or even an entire region. Consequently, the factors identified below most likely will require resources and extensive time to fully develop. Training. Robust training programs for new analysts, provided early

in their careers, are critical because most new analysts’ previous academic and professional experiences have not provided the requisite critical thinking and analytic writing skills. Analytic tradecraft is an extremely difficult set of skills to master, especially given the unique analytic and writing style of the intelligence sector. When I started in the late 1990s, we learned on the job with our colleagues and supervisors—to be sure, some exceptionally talented officers— providing mentoring, but formal training was extremely limited. I worked for the agency for more than a year before I took my first formal analysis class—not an uncommon lag at the time. Former principal deputy director of national intelligence Robert Cardillo sums up the state of training for intelligence writ large during that era thus: “We learned our skills from mentors—most training was on the job—in a guild-like mentality.”21 In new democracies, this “artisanal” training approach is even more challenging, because of the stigma associated with intelligence analysis, which prevents recruitment (at least at the beginning of the transition) and hinders intelligence transformation. New democracies typically use the residual personnel to educate and train the new recruits, with the additional challenges of the old personnel teaching the new personnel political police practices.22 In this context, Matei

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and Nitu note of Romania: “Old habits die hard. With a relevant number of its personnel inherited from the former Securitate, the Romanian Domestic Intelligence Service’s analytical branch was illustrative of some types of politicization of intelligence defined by Gregory Treverton as ‘house-line’ and ‘shared mindset.’”23 The upshot is a syndromic lack of institutional knowledge about analysis. Romania is not alone in this; Spain, South Africa, and Argentina, to name a few, have also faced these types of challenges.24 Largely in response to the 9/11 and Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) debacles and an ensuing surge of new analyst hires, the CIA developed a rigorous four-month course that every new analyst starts within several months of entering duty. 25 This course provides instruction on critical thinking skills and analytic writing skills, as well as providing exposure to more advanced structured analytic techniques to generate and test hypotheses, challenge assumptions, and promote more creative thinking about potential scenarios.26 While in the course, analysts also learn more about the broader intelligence community and the various elements within the CIA. 27 The agency has also developed a much more robust set of courses for both mid- and senior-level analysts. Romania, too, has developed similar analysis-related education and training for the intelligence community.28 Expertise. Simply put, there is no substitute for deep expertise

when it comes to crafting sophisticated analysis, as only such knowledge “enables analysts to provide perspective and context” for decisionmakers.29 Although this point may seem fairly obvious, there have been long-standing tensions within the CIA between the need to have a cadre of analysts who spend years on an account developing detailed and specific knowledge and the bureaucratic imperatives of having readily assignable officers who can surge onto priority issues. To be sure, not every analyst working an issue has to be seasoned on the account, but there must be a solid core that understands the history and complexities of an issue, the collection posture, and the broader policy domain. To encourage expertise building, the CIA created the Senior Analytic Service, which allows analysts to remain experts on their accounts indefinitely, while having the same promotion potential as managers. 30 This measure has fostered the development of experts who can craft sophisticated pieces, while also allowing those

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experts to mentor new hires and analysts who have come more recently to accounts. It is essential for an analytic unit to have the right mix of senior experts who can provide the institutional knowledge on an issue and newer analysts who can provide fresh insights, and challenge long-standing assumptions. Richard Kerr et al. warn of “the myth of ‘total resident knowledge’”31 or the “paradox of expertise” that can prevent experts from discerning important changes over time on their accounts.32 For newly emerging democracies seeking to create robust analytic capabilities, the training and expertise factors may be the most troublesome and take the most time to overcome. In such cases, an intelligence service might seek external training opportunities from academic institutions or from friendly intelligence services that provide liaison training to enhance partner capabilities. Language proficiency. Language proficiency is a critical expertise

building block, and the CIA has instated programs to increase significantly overall language capability, particularly on priority mission areas, through a variety of recruiting, training, and incentive programs.33 The agency has also set ambitious metrics for language proficiency. As recently as the 1990s, the CIA placed much less emphasis on language proficiency for analysts, who normally only received training in preparation for an overseas assignment. In other cases, many analysts attempted to learn difficult languages through parttime instruction, with the expected middling results. Language-proficient analysts have a competitive advantage, as they can read online versions of their target country’s media sources, maintain much greater situational awareness, and not have to wait for translations to be disseminated. Also, with the explosion of socialmedia content, strong language skills enable analysts to track content in real time. In contrast, analysts lacking in these skills are dependent on open-source monitors to translate and disseminate content, and even then, they are relying on the selection decisions of others. Information on how newer intelligence services are faring in this regard is somewhat limited, but the working assumption is that most services will struggle to develop language expertise across the range of potential areas of interest. In my experience, intelligence officers from many of these countries often speak multiple languages, but frequently only languages of countries in their region rather than the potential list of new policymaker priorities. Nevertheless, there are

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indications that at least some services are similarly prioritizing language skills. For example, Romania requires new intelligence recruits to demonstrate proficiency (or advanced education) in at least two foreign languages and cultures.34

Overseas experience. Similarly, overseas travel is essential to build expertise, as time on target allows analysts to immerse themselves in a country’s language and culture, mingle with locals, and gain ground truth that will subsequently inform their judgments—whereas analysts who remain cloistered within their offices and only read intelligence reports are at a decided disadvantage. Unfortunately, this latter situation tended to be the norm when I first joined the agency; during my eight years working on a priority country, I only had one weeklong trip that was limited to the capital city. However, as with language proficiency, the CIA has emphasized increasing analysts’ overseas experiences, both for shorter- and longer-term assignments working in our field stations, supporting the military and other organizations, attending conferences, and doing language immersion.35 As a result, analysts are getting a broad variety of overseas opportunities, including working much more closely with collectors in the field to help focus their efforts, supporting policymakers, and writing analysis from the field that is enhanced by their personal observations. Similarly, the European Union’s intelligence function brings analysts from various member states together— a kind of molecular-level collaboration among analysts. Policymaker relationships. From the CIA’s inception in 1947, ana-

lysts have cautioned that getting too close to policymakers could compromise objectivity and potentially lead to the cardinal sin of politicizing intelligence.36 Although these concerns are certainly valid, they can ultimately be mitigated through effective management practices that ensure the integrity of the work.37 Conversely, a number of recent articles note that the bigger peril is for intelligence officers to remain overly detached from policymakers, which significantly undermines their ability to produce sophisticated analysis, while advocating for the necessity of maintaining closer ties to policymakers.38 Frequent interactions with policymakers provide opportunities for them to request products tailored to address pressing policy priorities, upcoming meetings, or other ad hoc requirements. Moreover, this regular interaction also

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leads to better feedback on products and follow-on taskings, further enhancing the relevance of the analytic work. As such, these interactions significantly increase the potential to hit on all three criteria for sophisticated analysis: addressing the second- and third-order questions, being actionable, and providing opportunities for policymaker consideration.39 As a new analyst, one of my first manager’s handling of policymaker relationships was exemplary and illustrative of the overall benefits of maintaining regular, direct contact. Most mornings, this officer spoke with senior policy counterparts at the Department of State, the National Security Council, and other agencies to discuss their agendas and priorities, refine their requirements, and identify opportunities for analytic production to support their efforts. This information, in turn, was shared with the rest of the group. Moreover, many of these senior policymakers were substantive experts with unique information based on meetings with foreign interlocutors, information they may have shared, and other useful insights that helped deepen analysts’ expertise.

Driving collection. CIA analysts have always been instructed to “drive collection” on their accounts, meaning engaging collectors to refine requirements and provide feedback. If anything, since the fall of the Soviet Union and related state-focused collection efforts, collection challenges have increased, not diminished, given the subsequent emergence of new threats—counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and cyber—that are transnational in nature and more difficult to collect on, given their diffusion across multiple countries. Adversaries, moreover, have become more sophisticated and have enhanced their security practices to evade detection, making it essential for analysts to engage more closely with collectors. After the Iraq WMD fiasco, caused in part by analysts’ reliance on dubious reporting streams (e.g. “Curveball”), much more attention has been focused on analysts driving collection, understanding information gaps, and ensuring the reliability of reporting. 40 Policymakers, as a general rule, have pressed harder about the reliability of reports, and analytic pieces have increasingly addressed the intelligence community’s collection capabilities, gaps, and uncertainties. Analysts must also know what collectors (open-source, signals intelligence, human intelligence) are best positioned to go after the information, which requires much closer collaboration.

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Closer working relationships with collectors can also result in the dissemination of sourcing material that may otherwise have been deemed too low a threshold to produce. For example, on multiple occasions working a particularly challenging counterproliferation account, my direct contacts with a key collector revealed that there were a number of useful pieces of information that had been omitted as lower-priority material; however, much of this information was extremely useful and was subsequently used in reports for senior policymakers. In new democracies, this culture is nonexistent. At the minimum, though, the scholarly literature on intelligence and democracy acknowledges the need for a close relationships with collection.41 Procedural Factors

There are several key procedural factors, “process-oriented” steps that enhance analytic quality, including analyst collaboration and coordination, practices for determining key intelligence questions, and the potentially nettlesome review process.

Collaboration and coordination. Analytic products, especially those dealing with transnational issues, most often require coordination among several offices, a necessary process to ensure the overall quality of the piece, glean other expert opinions, and work through dissenting opinions. This process has also been one of the more vexing and aggravating for analysts. When I first started, coordination was usually something that commenced after an analyst had drafted a piece and then submitted it to colleagues in other offices for comment. This process was often extremely acrimonious because the analyst providing feedback may not have been consulted in advance, resulting in much harsher feedback than might otherwise have occurred. This experience, in turn, often left the author more resistant to criticisms because he or she had become vested in the piece. To improve this process, coordination, or more appropriately, collaboration, from the outset is vital. Analysts with equities in the topic should meet before the writing begins to brainstorm, identify the key intelligence questions, determine the analytic line of march, and address dissenting views. This meeting is also the time to discuss sourcing, confidence in the reporting reliability, and collection gaps. This process provides a more open, collegial discussion, resulting in an agreed framework on the piece, clarifying analysts’ responsibilities for

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drafting sections, and setting timelines for submissions. Ultimately, in my estimation, it also results in the production of better pieces.

Determining key intelligence questions. Many analysts, even those well versed on their accounts, often have trouble articulating the most relevant policy questions to be addressed in their products, especially the angles that enhance their sophistication and utility. As a corrective, it helps to have analysts write the three to five top policymaker questions that the piece should cover, including potential opportunities to tackle the issue. Once the most salient questions are identified, analysts can then write analytic topic sentences that address them. Although the source material, or data, is important, it is not brought to bear until the critical thinking and refining of the core message has been completed. As an example, analysts covering proliferation issues might have enough new reporting on a potential transfer of dual-use equipment to a country of concern that meets the threshold for a piece. To determine the key intelligence questions, analysts would collaboratively identify the key questions that policymakers are likely to ask, which might include: Do the leaders of the supplier country know about the transfer, and do they have sufficient export controls and enforcement mechanisms to halt it? Does the transfer abrogate any of their international commitments or agreements with the United States? What is the significance of the technology? Is it dual-use, and what type of weapon program does it enable? How would the recipient country use it, and how does that affect US interests? Do we have options to halt or disrupt the shipment? Once agreement is reached on the questions and their most logical ordering, analysts then craft analytic topic sentences that answer them. The analytic review process. Because CIA products are corporate,

pieces undergo extensive review to ensure that they meet the threshold for publication and that analytic writing standards are upheld. I recall one senior manager saying that review is the process whereby the analyst’s name is slowly erased from a product and replaced with the agency stamp, a process that almost always improves the overall quality of pieces. Former senior analytic manager Martin Petersen notes, “A rigorous, focused review process is the best guarantee that the style, message, and tradecraft of every piece of finished intelligence meet the standards that the mission requires.”42 Similarly, Jack

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Davis assesses that “as a rule, even CIA’s often labyrinthine review processes increase the overall quality of assessments, especially by improving poorly argued drafts.”43 Most analysts view this anonymizing transformation as a necessary evil, with frequent complaints about the onerous review process, including the multiple layers of review, editorial changes, questions about the underlying assumptions, sourcing, and so on. Because the process is often arduous, frustrating, and time-consuming, analysts may feel inclined to disengage from their pieces and let the review process run its course, without tracking changes or seemingly benign edits that can subtly change the meaning or even infuse errors into the work. Petersen, while offering up a number of useful changes in the review process, also emphasizes that analysts have the responsibility to seek clarification if they do not understand the reviewer’s approach and suggest alternative language or approaches if they disagree with the revisions, a point that cannot be overemphasized.44 Bureaucratic, Organizational, and Management Factors

A final set of enabling factors includes several important bureaucratic considerations: How are the activities of a myriad of mostly independently operating agencies within a system coordinated? Does the way an intelligence service is structured matter? And how can management issues impact the production of sophisticated analysis? The role of the interagency coordinator: value-added or bureaucratic burden? Since the inception of the Office of the Director of

National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2004, its role in promoting better analytic products has been both contentious and controversial, with some arguing that the ODNI’s top-down initiatives have produced significant improvements across the intelligence sector, whereas others question the efficacy of these measures. Of note, the ODNI created the Analytic and Integrity and Standards Group and promulgated IC Directive 203 “Analytic Standards” (2007), which codified core tradecraft principles.45 The ODNI also set up an the Analytic Standard Evaluation Action Group to evaluate community products, interview consumers, conduct annual surveys of analysts, and promote exchanges on best practices.46 The ODNI also sought to foster better information sharing throughout the intelligence community.

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Ultimately, though the ODNI’s efforts have most likely had little effect on CIA analysis, many of the more basic initiatives have probably helped bolster analytic capabilities for other agencies, which had been very limited prior to ODNI’s creation. In turn, it appears that many of these agencies have become better partners for the CIA, either providing better drafts of their own work or enhancing their ability to constructively comment on CIA pieces. Moreover, the ODNI’s effort to have pieces that more clearly highlight dissenting analytic views among various intelligence agencies has tended to provide a better cross-check on the CIA’s work and more granularity (deeper detail) for policymakers on potential differences of opinion. For newly emerging democratic countries, many of which had much more centralized intelligence operations under their previous regimes, the DNI analog most likely is a more natural concept; indeed, there are indications that other countries may be looking to emulate this approach. For example, Ghana’s Joint Intelligence Committee, chaired by the National Security Coordinator, oversees the operations of multiple intelligence and law-enforcement agencies.47 The CIA’s modernization: mission centers fusing operations and analysis. The CIA’s recent “Modernization” effort (initiated in

March 2015) has great potential to improve both CIA collection and analytic efforts by more closely aligning CIA collectors (“case officers”) and analysts into new “mission centers,” which replicate, on a larger scale, the way CIA field stations and centers (formed to combat terrorism, proliferation, and narcotics issues) have operated for years—with analysts and collectors working side by side. 48 From my personal experience, this alignment allows analysts to provide real-time collection requirements and feedback to case officers, including helping them tailor their asset meetings by providing suggested questions to fill key collection gaps. This interaction provides analysts with a much clearer understanding of the collection posture, including where the gaps are, and the potential to actively drive collection. The jury is still out on the overall impact that modernization has had on analytic quality. Steve Slick raises some potential problems arising from the new structure—namely, that analytic objectivity could be compromised by the alignment of analysts and collectors.49 My personal view is that it is too early to gauge modernization’s impact on analytic quality. Such large bureaucratic changes can often

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take several years to realize their potential, but my guess is that it will ultimately prove beneficial. Furthermore, the creation of the new Directorate for Digital Innovation (DDI) may also help enable better exploitation of bigdata/social-media content that will enhance analytic quality.50 The Arab Spring started in December 2010 in several Middle Eastern countries—including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen—with numerous antigovernment demonstrations against repressive dictatorships. Since the Arab Spring, the intelligence sector has scrambled to develop new tools and methodologies to automate the collection, processing, and analysis of this information. Cardillo notes that once developed, these tools “will be able to ingest and filter enormous quantities of data . . . and perform multiple structured techniques to array, evaluate, and display information.”51 Such tools have the potential to improve collection and analytic efforts, but efforts heretofore to develop them have produced mixed results. The creation of the DDI, which brought together previously disparate agency groups, should provide focus and unity of effort toward this goal, potentially providing a better suite of tools for analysts. For most services, this concept of merging operational and analytic capabilities may be a moot point, as many are already structured and function in this manner. In Romania, for example, a comprehensive reform of the Romanian Domestic Intelligence Agency (SRI)— titled “Strategic Vision”— has occurred in three stages since 2007, resulting in de-bureaucratization, better flexibility and horizontal cooperation among SRI structures, and most important, improved analytical capabilities.52 In addition, the analytical transformation of the SRI has also involved rotating analysts from time to time (hence changing the specific analysts’ areas of expertise) in order to avoid routine and monotony and encourage creativity.53 The key role of management. A final consideration: one cannot

overstate the importance of good management for the production of sophisticated analysis, including more esoteric things such as setting high expectations and creating an esprit de corps within the analytic unit.54 Managers must ensure that analysts have development plans that provide the right mix of training, language, and overseas opportunities while also allowing analysts the space to deepen their substantive expertise by having the proper mix of current and long-term papers. Relatedly, they must provide top cover for analysts, protect-

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ing them from superfluous taskings that can detract from work on higher-value projects. Managers must also support innovative thinking, including backing potentially unwelcome analytic lines that challenge prevailing assumptions, and remain open to new methodologies and approaches that can enrich analytic quality, such as structured analytic techniques, social-network analysis, and geospatial techniques. Finally, managers play a critical role during the review process, ensuring that the piece addresses the right intelligence questions, is well-sourced, and adheres to rigorous tradecraft standards.

Conclusion

Sophisticated analytic work remains the benchmark for the intelligence agencies, but the consistent production of such pieces requires the coalescing of mutually reinforcing foundational, procedural, and bureaucratic factors. Based on my experiences, the foundational aspects—deep expertise, driving collection, and engaging with policymakers—are requisites for success, and the procedural factors of collaboration and review are key enablers. The bureaucratic considerations, and how an analytic unit is configured, may ultimately be much less relevant, so long as the foundation and enabling procedures are solid. For newer intelligence services, developing a robust analytic capability requires commitment and fairly significant resources, and it should also be viewed as a longer-term effort that can be accelerated through the effective use of academic, liaison, and other outside resources.

Notes 1. Martin Petersen, “What I Learned in 40 Years of Doing Intelligence Analysis for US Foreign Policymakers: In the First Person,” Studies in Intelligence 55, no. 1 (March 2011). 2. See, for example, Hank Prunckun, Handbook of Scientific Methods of Inquiry for Intelligence Analysis (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010); Jerome Clauser, Intelligence Research and Analysis (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2008); and for an excellent primer on the cognitive challenges and mitigating strategies, see Richards J. Heuer Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Langley, VA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1999). 3. The Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies provides information on intelligence analysis in some democracies, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and France; Dover, Goodman, and Hillebrand, Routledge Companion.

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Romania’s Domestic Intelligence Agency published a volume on the relevance of intelligence analysis to the intelligence cycle, aimed to both intelligence insiders and outsiders; George Cristian Maior and Ionel Nitu, eds., Ars analytica: Provocari si tendinte in analiza de intelligence (Bucharest: RAO, 2013). Nevertheless, these literary works do not include detailed information on the topic. 4. See Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 95, for a good discussion, and definition, of all-source intelligence, which he describes as “intelligence based on as many collection sources as possible to compensate for the shortcomings of each and to profit from their combined strength.” 5. Ibid., 1; see also Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Definition of ‘Intelligence,’” Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002). 6. Dover, Goodman, and Hillebrand, Routledge Companion. 7. See the Bundesnachrichtendienst website at http://www.bnd.bund.de /EN/_Home/home_node.html; Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Johnson, Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence. 8. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 8. 9. Jack Davis, “Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts,” Studies in Intelligence 60, no. 3 (September 2016), 15. 10. See Secretary Colin L. Powell’s written remarks before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, September 13, 2004. 11. See Chapter 1 for details. 12. Even if some sort of an analytical offices exist in intelligence agencies of nondemocratic regimes, they do mostly a synthesis of raw information on current events. Mihaela Matei and Ionel Nitu, “Intelligence Analysis in Romania’s SRI: The Critical ‘Ps’—People, Processes, Products,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 25, no. 4 (2012): 700–726. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Scott J. Hatch, “Managing the ‘Reliability Cycle’: An Alternative Approach to Thinking About Intelligence Failure,” Studies in Intelligence 57, no. 2 (June 2013), 30. 16. See “Background to ‘Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections’: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution,” Director of National Intelligence, January 6, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017 _01.pdf. 17. See, for example, Steven Rieber and Neil Thomason, “Creation of a National Institute for Analytic Methods: Toward Improving Intelligence Analysis,” Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 4 (2005): 71–80. 18. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 9. 19. Richard N. Haass, “Supporting US Foreign Policy in the Post-9/11 World: Policymakers and the Intelligence Community,” Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002). 20. As cited in Dennis C. Wilder, “Improving Policymaker Understanding of Intelligence: An Educated Customer Is Our Best Customer,” Studies in Intelligence 55, no. 2 (June 2011), 30. 21. Robert Cardillo, “Intelligence Community Reform: A Cultural Evolution,” Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 3 (2010): 1–7. 22. See Chapter 1 for additional information. 23. Matei and Nitu, “Intelligence Analysis in Romania’s SRI.” 24. Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Matei and Nitu, “Intelligence Analysis in Romania’s SRI”; Gill and Andregg, Democratization of Intelligence; Russell G. Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane, eds., Intelligence Management in the Americas (Washington, DC: National Intelligence University, 2015); Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence 7, no. 1 (June 2016); Davies and Gustafson, Intelligence Else-

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where: Spies and Espionage; Africa and Kwadijo, Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa; Weeks, “A Preference for Deference”; Ginter, “Latin American Intelligence Services”; Watts, “Intelligence Reform in Europe’s Emerging Democracies”; Caparini and Born, Democratic Control of Intelligence Services. 25. A more detailed description is available on the CIA web page, https:// www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/careers-1. 26. For a good discussion of structured analytic techniques, see US Government, “A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis,” CIA, March 2009, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of -intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/Tradecraft%20Primer-apr09 .pdf; see also Sarah Beebe and Randolph Pherson, Cases in Intelligence Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques in Action (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012). 27. See Cardillo, “Intelligence Community Reform,” 1–7, for a discussion on efforts to bolster analytic training. 28. Maior, Mind War; Eduard Hellvig, coordinator, The SRI at 25: 1990–2015 (Bucharest: RAO, 2015); Maior and Nitu, Ars analytica. 29. Richard Kerr et al., “A Holistic Vision for the Analytic Unit,” Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 2 (2006). 30. Vernon Loeb, “CIA Goes Deep into Analysis,” Washington Post, May 4, 2000. 31. Kerr et al., “A Holistic Vision for the Analytic Unit.” 32. Davis, “Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts,” 16. 33. For example, see “Careers and Internships: Language Positions,” CIA, https:// www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/foreign-languages/index.html; “Careers and Internships: Foreign Language,” CIA, https://www.cia.gov/careers/foreign-language. 34. Matei, “Balancing Democratic Civilian Control”; Matei, “Romania’s Intelligence Community”; Maior, Mind War; Hellvig, The SRI at 25. 35. Greg Miller, “CIA to Station More Analysts Overseas as Part of Its Strategy,” Washington Post, April 30, 2010. 36. Jack Davis, “The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949,” Studies in Intelligence 35, no. 2 (1992). 37. See former Director of Central Intellingence Robert M. Gates’s “A Message to Analysts” for a good discussion on the potential perils of politicization, the rationale for maintaining closer ties to policymakers, and the role that analysts and managers alike play in preserving the integrity of the work. Robert M. Gates, “A Message to Analysts: Guarding Against Politicization,” Politicization 36, no. 1 (2010), remarks made in CIA Auditorium, March 16, 1992, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the -study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/volume-36-number-1/pdf/v36i1a01p.pdf. 38. See, for example, Josh Kerbel and Anthony Olcott, “The Intelligence-Policy Nexus: Synthesizing with Clients, Not Analyzing for Customers,” Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 4 (2010); Kerr et al., “A Holistic Vision for the Analytic Unit,” 21; Hatch, “Managing the ‘Reliability Cycle,’” 37. 39. Wilder, while arguing that the intelligence community must educate consumers on the community’s capabilities (and limitations), makes the compelling point that such closer ties will enable the production of more opportunity analysis. 40. For details, see Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 41. Matei and Nitu, “Intelligence Analysis in Romania’s SRI”; Maior, Mind War; Hellvig, The SRI at 25; Maior and Nitu, Ars analytica. 42. Martin Petersen, “Toward a Stronger Intelligence Product: Making the Analytic Review Process Work,” Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 1 (2005), 55. 43. Davis, “Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts,” 18. 44. Petersen, “Toward a Stronger Intelligence Product,” 61. 45. John A. Gentry, “Has the ODNI Improved Intelligence Analysis?” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 28, no. 4 (2015): 637–661.

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46. Ibid. 47. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, Emma Birikorang, and Ernest Ansah Lartey, “The Processes and Mechanisms of Developing a Democratic Intelligence Culture in Ghana,” in Intelligence: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere, edited by Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 211. 48. See the CIA’s press release for more information on the modernization plan and goals: “CIA Achieves Key Milestone in Agency-Wide Modernization Initative,” CIA, October 1, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements /2015-press-releases-statements/cia-achieves-key-milestone-in-agency-wide-modern ization-initiative.html. 49. Stephen Slick, “Measuring Change at the CIA,” Foreign Policy, May 4, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/04/measuring-change-at-the-cia. 50. For more information on the DDI, see “Digital Innovation,” CIA, https:// www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/digital-innovation. 51. Cardillo, “Intelligence Community Reform,” 1–7. 52. Matei, “Balancing Democratic Civilian Control.” 53. Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, “The Legal Framework for Intelligence in PostCommunist Romania,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 22, no. 4 (2009): 667–698. 54. The important role of management is specifically cited in Hatch, “Managing the ‘Reliability Cycle,’” 36.

5 Counterintelligence Joanisval Brito Gonçalves

If there were ever to be a mascot for . . . counterintelligence, it should be the pit bull. —James Olson1

A good understanding of the meaning of intelligence requires an equally clear perception of counterintelligence (CI). One cannot be dissociated from the other. To be sure, CI has its particularities, and it must be viewed from a defensive or protective perspective, as it is essential to the safeguarding of people, organizations, and governments. In this chapter, I discuss counterintelligence and its relationship with intelligence activities in a democracy. With a few notable exceptions, information on counterintelligence in democracies around the world other than the United States is rather scarce.2 Instead, the prevailing literature provides plenty of examples pertaining to US counterintelligence—so this chapter does not repeat them.3 Rather, it seeks to provide a theoretical review of the roles and tradecraft of counterintelligence in democracy.

Defining Counterintelligence As with intelligence, there are several definitions of counterintelligence, based on legal, operational, structural, political, or even historical 77

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perspectives. The US National Security Council Intelligence Directive 5 (1958) defines counterintelligence as “intelligence activity, with its resultant product, devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and undertaken to protect the security of the nation and its personnel, information, and installations against espionage, sabotage, and subversion.”4 Specifically, CI is a “process of procuring, developing, recording, and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting such activity.”5 The United States National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 1947) defines CI as “information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.”6 Similarly, US Executive Order 12333, as amended in 2008, defines CI as “information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or their agents or other terrorist organizations or activities.” 7 This legal perspective is more detailed than that of the NSA 1947 and includes “information gathered” as well as “activities conducted” to thwart foreign intelligence threats.8 In this connection, Lowenthal observes: It is both analytical and operational. Counterintelligence is not a separate step in the intelligence process. CI should pervade all aspects of intelligence, but it is often pigeon-holed as a security issue. CI does not fit neatly with human intelligence, although CI is, in part, a collection issue. Nor does it fit with covert action. It is also more than security—that is, defending against or identifying breaches—because successful CI can also lead to analytical and operational opportunities. It is also much more than a law enforcement issue. In sum, CI is one of the most difficult topics to discuss.9

The Chilean Law 19974 defines CI as “that part of the intelligence activity which has as purpose to detect, locate and neutralize the intelligence actions developed by other States or by foreign individuals, organizations or groups, or by their local agents, directed against the security of the State and the national defense.”10 The

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Argentinian National Intelligence Law has a similar definition: “It is the activity on the field of intelligence that is carried out with the purpose of avoiding intelligence activities of actors that represent threats or risks to the security of the State or the Nation.”11 The Mexican National Security Law defines counterintelligence as “the measures to protect the instances against the injurious acts, as well as the actions oriented to deter or counteract its commission.”12 As a consequence, “the strategies, actions and politics in regard to counterintelligence have the goal to protect the capability of the State to undertake actions to allow to safeguard National Security from hostile actions that intend to infiltrate the institutions, manipulate the process in decision-making and subtract information of the strategies, methodologies and actions oriented to preserve National Security.”13 The perception of counterintelligence according to the Spanish legislation is very interesting. Law 11/2002 stipulates that counterintelligence encompasses those actions aimed “to prevent, detect and to enable the neutralization of foreign service activities, groups or persons that put at risk, threaten or violate the constitutional order, the rights and freedoms of Spanish citizens, the sovereignty, integrity and security of the State, the stability of its institutions, the national economic interests and the welfare of the population.”14 The Brazilian National Intelligence Policy defines CI as “the activity that aims to prevent, detect, obstruct and neutralize the adverse Intelligence and the actions that constitute a threat to the safeguarding of data, knowledge, people, areas and facilities of interest to the society and the State.”15 The Brazilian Law nº 9.883 (1999) terms CI as “the activity that aims to neutralize an adverse Intelligence.”16 In the sum of all these definitions, CI is a process and organization: of “intelligence gathered about an adversary’s intelligence activities and capabilities to unmask and inhibit adversarial intelligence operations and capabilities,”17 by an intelligence service (or specifically its counterintelligence sector) to prevent, detect, obstruct, and neutralize an adversary’s intelligence;18 it is also the organizations that carry out these CI measures (which can be preventive or active measures).

The Scope and Purpose of Counterintelligence Frederick Wettering highlights the three essential functions of counterintelligence: protecting secrets, frustrating an adversary’s

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intelligence attempts (he makes reference to “foreign intelligence services”) to acquire those secrets, and catching people who spy for the adversary’s intelligence.”19 Kaveh Moravej and Gustavo Díaz highlight that counterintelligence “can involve various types of action to prevent or neutralize hostile intelligence successes against national interests, such as the production of knowledge concerning the plans, operations, and capabilities of those organizations intent upon subversive activities”20 (for example, espionage, sabotage, propaganda). These two researchers take Kent’s perspective21 to explain the goals of CI: [Counterintelligence] provides information upon which military commanders and civilian agency managers should base their decisions . . . regarding security measures. Beyond this authority, which effectively is to protect intelligence, not to provide general security to outside organizations, Intelligence Community officials have only the power of persuasion when it comes to security measures in non-intelligence organizations. One should emphasize though that it may sound a bit illogical to call counter-intelligence a type of intelligence, particularly if we think of intelligence as knowledge, and counterintelligence as an activity or organization (or part of an organization) acting against forces seeking knowledge. Indeed, the first thing we must do is to differentiate between counterintelligence information (knowledge) and counter-intelligence measures (activity) and the allocation of personnel to these duties (organization). In this sense, the activity of counterintelligence is the production of knowledge, and as with all the intelligence, this knowledge is not produced for the counter-intelligence organization alone, but ultimately for other elements of the state.22

As such, CI’s objectives are identifying, penetrating, and then controlling or neutralizing the adversary,23 countering hostile intelligence activities,24 and protecting a nation’s sensitive data, information, and assets against adversaries and their intelligence services.

Types of Counterintelligence

At least three types of CI can be identified:25

• Counterintelligence collection gathers and analyzes information on an opponent’s capabilities, including “its intelligence collection requirements, efforts, operations, structures, personalities and methods of operation.”26

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• Defensive counterintelligence is primarily protective; it seeks to foil attempts by hostile intelligence agencies to penetrate other agencies.27 Measures related to internal safeguards—for example, the use of the polygraph, the establishment of physical and electronic barriers against access, counterespionage, countersabotage, counter-HUMINT (human intelligence) operations—must be considered. Additionally, the defensive CI within an agency is primarily responsible for detecting, identifying, countering, and neutralizing an adversary intelligence’s operations against the respective agency. Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt distinguish passive and active measures on the defense against an adversary’s intelligence collection. Passive measures are those that seek “to deny the adversary the information he is seeking simply by blocking his access to it by, as it were, building a wall around it,”28 and such measures are usually referred to as “security,” understood as “the steps taken to obstruct a hostile intelligence service’s ability to collect intelligence,” to include personnel security, physical security, data and communication security, and so on.29 Active actions involve collecting intelligence from targets related to the adversary’s intelligence services. • Offensive counterintelligence takes offensive measures to influence the opponent when officials detect measures by a foreign government against the intelligence system of a state. For example, it carries out active measures to “manipulate these attacks either by turning the opponent’s agents into double agents or by feeding them false information that they report home.”30

The same organization may carry out different types of CI, depending on its plans, processes, and missions—collection, defense, or offensive measures vary with the mission of the organization and its objectives, and also with the level of response against an opponent’s initiative. Active counterintelligence measures are described by Shulsky and Schmitt as those that “try to understand how a hostile intelligence service works in order to frustrate or disrupt its activities and ultimately to turn those activities to one’s own advantage.” 31 The most important and well-known of these measures is called counterespionage. Traditionally associated with intelligence in a general aspect, espionage can be defined as “intelligence activity directed toward the

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acquisition of intelligence through clandestine methods.”32 Counterespionage is understood as “that aspect of counterintelligence designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, exploit, or prevent espionage activities through identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting espionage activities.”33 These activities involve, for example, surveillance operations, intelligence collection, infiltration in an adversary organization, and operations with defectors and double agents. Allen Dulles, the first civilian director of the CIA, notes that “although the purpose of counterespionage is defensive, its methods are essentially offensive. Its ideal goal is to discover hostile intel plans in their earliest stages rather than after they have begun to do their damage.”34 The primary field for CI operations is domestic. However, active CI operations can be conducted abroad, where CI will be present to protect one’s own sensitive information and strategic assets (as embassies or personalities), to support intelligence operations, and also to collect CI information. Preventive or offensive, for collection or for protection, CI uses some techniques, practices, and procedures that are common to distinct CI operations in different environments. In the next section I review some of the techniques, practices, and procedures that are necessary to allow CI to perform its primary functions.35

Counterintelligence Components There are six components of counterintelligence activity: (1) investigation; (2) collection of information on the adversary; (3) evaluation of defectors and prospective agents; (4) research, analysis, and production of intelligence about the adversaries’ capabilities; (5) disruption and neutralization of the opponent service; (6) support to other intelligence or operational activities.36 Investigation, aimed at detecting its nationals or people from other countries who operate on behalf of a foreign intelligence or criminal or terrorist organizations, is an essential component of CI. The US Department of Defense defines counterintelligence investigations as “formal investigative activities undertaken to determine whether a particular person is acting for or on behalf of, or an event is related to, a foreign power engaged in spying or committing espi-

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onage, sabotage, treason, sedition, subversion, assassinations, or international terrorist activities, and to determine actions required to neutralize such acts.”37 Several factors may trigger CI investigations: the arrest or disappearance of human sources, changes in the behavior of collaborators, the failure of intelligence operations, or even information given by a defector. In fact, CI investigations seek to identify “individuals with access to the information compromised, . . . gather data on the foreign travel or local movements, look for changes in their finances, explore their possible vulnerabilities, and then move on monitoring or entrapping primary suspects.”38 Obviously, if there is a leak in security, a CI investigation must be carried out. One should not conflate intelligence investigation with criminal investigation. Law enforcement (LE) is related to a police effort against crime, whereas CI is part of a national-security effort against foreign clandestine and covert threats. LE is thus focused on investigating, arresting, and prosecuting those who violate criminal laws (the criminal investigation has an evidence-prosecution effort). Furthermore, their targets and timing are different. Another important component of CI is “collection of information, employing open and clandestine sources, on foreign (including terrorist) intelligence and security services and their activities.”39 The core of this component is the collection conducted by both intelligence and counterintelligence branches, but with distinct purposes. In a broader sense, CI organization collects information about foreign intelligence and security services, subversive or other hostile groups, and terrorist and criminal organizations with the aim of gathering the maximum data about them that will be used to neutralize their hostile activities.40 Although Jeffrey Richelson restricts CI collection to foreign entities (particularly foreign intelligence services), counterintelligence may include domestic targets, such as criminal organizations or subversive groups.41 In countries such as Brazil, a significant threat faced by the government is the use, by organized crime, of infiltration in public institutions (for instance, the police force, the judicial and the political systems). CI has an important role to identify and neutralize these threats, as well as collecting information about the criminal organizations and their methods, plans, and goals. Evaluation and debriefing of defectors and prospective agents are understood as additional responsibilities of a counterintelligence

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organization. On debriefings, CI officers will seek information on personnel, leadership, structure, policies, capabilities, and activities of whichever government component or nongovernmental organization employed the defector, particularly those entities that conduct intelligence activities. Additional information about the defector can also be useful (his or her private interests, former jobs, relationships, etc.). Along with eliciting information comes an essential role of the debriefers: to determine the reliability of the information offered. Research, analysis, and production involves deciphering, understanding, and reporting “on the personalities, structure, facilities, tradecraft, and past and current operations of other nations’ intelligence and security services.” 42 Disruption and neutralization of hostile intelligence and security services or activities are two other essential functions of CI. According to Richelson, methods for thwarting foreign intelligence include penetration of a hostile service to gather information as well as damage its operations; passing information to a third entity (such as a third country’s intelligence service) that will lead the latter to take action against the personnel of the hostile service; or even passing information to a hostile country or organization itself.43 Double agents represent another approach to neutralization.44 According to Shulsky and Schmitt: They are agents who, while pretending to spy for a hostile service, are actually under the control of the country on which they are supposed to be spying. Such agents may have originally been real spies who upon being detected were “turned,” or converted into agents of the country that caught them. Or they may be “dangles,” agents who pretended to volunteer to spy for the hostile intelligence service but in fact remain loyal to their country. In between would be individuals who, having been approached by a hostile intelligence service, report the recruitment to their own countries’ authorities and are encouraged by them to play along.45

As defectors, double agents can be useful to an intelligence service in different ways. They may provide information about the adversary service, its personnel, and its methods, particularly the way their handlers operate. In addition, double agents will contribute the knowledge about communication procedures of the other, as well as “the adversary’s tradecraft and the general pattern of his intelligence

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officers’ activities.”46 Finally, developing knowledge about the hostile organization’s collection proprieties can result from an effective handling of double agents.47 A last component of counterintelligence is supporting other intelligence or operational activities. This realm of activity is what Richelson calls “CI functional services,” which include “technical surveillance countermeasures, polygraphs and credibility assessments, behavioral sciences, and cyber services.”48

Counterintelligence How-To There are “several techniques, practices, and procedures” required by the counterintelligence function.49 First, a system of classification for information should exist, associated with specific access regulations (compartmentalization). From the government to the private sector, at industry, universities, and research centers, the need to protect sensitive information and knowledge is a main concern: “A classification system categorizes information according to its sensitivity, that is to say, the amount of damage its revelation to a hostile foreign power could cause and, hence, the importance of protecting.”50 At the governmental level, it is necessary to classify any information that might reveal sensitive national-security secrets or that could compromise national interests in unauthorized release. This classification involves three aspects: sensitivity, the right to know, and the need to know.51 In terms of sensitivity, information will be classified at different levels that vary from country to country, according to counterintelligence doctrines. In all cases, however, for this classification one must consider the degree of harm to the national security that its unauthorized release would cause: “the more sensitive the information the more carefully it is to be protected and the fewer the people who are ‘cleared’ for it (authorized to have access to it).”52 The “right to know” refers to the level of security clearance a person acquires—for example, secret or top secret. 53 The “need-toknow” restricts access to classified information only to those who “need to know and no others.”54 Theoretically, the more sensitive the information, the fewer people will have permission to access it. To have access to a specific document, information, databank, or facility, someone must have a security clearance.

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Naturally, there are problems related to classification and to clearance. In 2000, Wettering noted: In 1995, 50,000 firms were working as United States government contractors, conducting classified research or production, and 3.2 million secret or above security clearances had been issued. The Defense Department recently admitted that it currently has a huge backlog of new clearance investigations and reinvestigations. The Pentagon also disclosed that over 2.4 million military, civilian, and contractor employees hold defense security clearances (the government-wide figure is over 3 million). Of that total, about 524,000 hold “top secret” clearances and 1.8 million hold “secret” clearances. Many of these employees have been given “temporary” access, pending the completion of the background investigation.55

Background checks (also known as background investigations or vetting) are another key technique of counterintelligence work. From biographical information to interviews with people who have known the employee (if this technique is used for existing personnel), or potential employee (if this technique is used for new recruits), including the use of the polygraph, these counterintelligence practices are part of the background investigation carried out before a security clearance is granted.56 Both pre-employment and in-service personnel security measures are conducted by counterintelligence, as well as practices related to foreign employees (who are natural targets to their home intelligence services) and also to visitors to the public and private facilities in sensitive or classified areas.57 Depending on the sensitivity, a periodic reinvestigation may be carried out. There are critics who say that this kind of background investigation has not been very effective “in asserting the loyalty and character of personnel to be granted access to classified information.”58 These measures may also lead to identification of any “insider threat.” A useful benchmark definition of this term is provided by the US National Counterintelligence and Security Center of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; its National Insider Threat Policy (2012) essentially defines anyone who discloses unauthorized information in this way: “‘Insider Threat’ means the threat that an insider will use his or her authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of the United States. This threat can include damage to the United States through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities.”59

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Physical security, or facility security, involves mechanical measures, for example, barriers, safes, passwords, identification badges, alarms, camera and other electronic surveillance systems, security guards, and the like. In fact, the successful counterintelligence activity will be seriously compromised if facilities where secrets are produced or stored are not secure. It is recommended to every organization, in the public or the private sector, including universities and research centers, which deals with sensitive information to have a plan for protecting its facilities against intrusion or nonauthorized access conducted by a foreign intelligence service or an illegal entity.60 Ensuring physical security has been increasingly cumbersome because of the increase in the number of contractors that work for intelligence agencies, as well as the diversity of communications mediums.61 The same principle of protection of facilities is valid for communications, computer, and digital systems. As a result of the complexity of cyberspace, many vulnerabilities are associated with communications and bad use of computers by employees or even decisionmakers. Encryption is also an important counterintelligence tool. Nevertheless, the advent of the internet has made protecting secrets even more difficult to CI. It requires reengineering several counterintelligence structures and practices.62 Technical security countermeasures (TSCM), also called technical surveillance countermeasures, are a set of “techniques to detect, neutralize, and exploit technical surveillance technologies and hazards that permit the unauthorized access to or removal of information.”63 They are usually employed to detect the technical penetration or another kind of intrusion into facilities by an adversary organization—such as a foreign intelligence service—to collect intelligence.64 In order to frustrate the efforts of hostile operatives (foreign intelligence services or criminal organizations) to steal one’s secrets, counterintelligence can employ several techniques: expelling them or denying them entry, controlling their movements and access, surveilling them by physical and/or electronic observation, infiltrating agents, recruiting others, or using double agents.65 All these practices permit CI to accomplish its mission and have as a premise the fact that CI has collected sufficient information about these enemies and knows them relatively well. Prosecuting traitors is another technique employed by CI.66 Concerning counterintelligence measures against foreign intelligence services, denying of entry of suspect intelligence officers or

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expelling them are among the most effective practices to suppress foreign spying. In many cases, however, these foreign spies are protected by diplomatic status, their official cover.67 If the counterintelligence official cannot or refuses to take the former measures, surveillance on these spies may be an attractive alternative. Actually, one of the most prominent and common techniques of CI is surveillance, used by every counterintelligence organization around the world. It normally involves very intensive and boring labor with few positive results, compared to the efforts of surveillance operations. Nevertheless, it would be impossible to counterintelligence to exist without surveillance.68 This essential “cat and mouse game” has three aspects: static surveillance, mobile surveillance, and electronic surveillance.69 Static surveillance serves to notify a mobile surveillance team when a target moves so that team may pick the target up; register the movements of the target or associates; and attempt to identify would-be spies or their agents in an operation.70 Mobile surveillance has different objectives: to intimidate or discourage a target from undertaking nondesirable action (for example, espionage); and to catch the spy carrying out some espionage activity.71 Finally, electronic surveillance—by means of telephone and other communications taps, listening devices (bugs), mail interception, and other techniques— has several goals, among them to frustrate the adversary’s initiatives, to control his or her movements and actions, and to discover his or her contacts, aims, and operational procedures.72

Counterintelligence and Democracy In modern democracies, there are several criticisms of the effectiveness of CI, including (1) ethical and human-rights issues; (2) problems related to law; 3) the counterintelligence bureaucracy itself and its behavior.73 The friction between ethics and counterintelligence arises from two perspectives, in Iztok Podbregar and Teodora Ivanusa’s view: “the individual perspective, i.e., the ethics of people working in counterintelligence, and the perspective of the ethics of the methods involved.”74 That is because, as these authors further maintain, “Counterintelligence is part of the game of manipulation, lies, intrigue, and deception.”75 There are national cultural traits that morally condemn

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some CI principles and practices because they infringe on human rights and liberties, as well as individual privacy. On the other hand, the underlying ethical position of intelligence today—and therefore of counterintelligence—is that the function is amoral, in the sense that intelligence or CI, by itself, does not articulate any particular morality. Every operation is subject to its own moral or ethical assessment. National and international norms may be helpful in these evaluations—but not necessarily dispositive, particularly if the overarching mode and justification is raison d’état. There is also tension between the legal constraints and the dayto-day work of counterintelligence. Without a legal apparatus to support counterintelligence actions, it is very difficult for the services to carry out their work in a democracy. Yet in several democracies, the task of actually prosecuting someone for espionage is very complex. A suspicion of espionage may not always be proven, and it is not unusual that, in the United States or in Brazil, investigations on this issue remain inconclusive.76 Additionally, some legal limitations can turn CI work into a very difficult task to accomplish. In Brazil, for example, the constitution prohibits the intelligence services from intercepting telephone communications—only criminal investigation or criminal-procedural fact-finding can justify such a tap.77 Bureaucracy may represent a serious obstacle to the effectiveness of CI. On this issue, Wettering highlights that “bureaucracies never give up ‘turf’ or authority” and that “the common bureaucratic response to a shortcoming is to ask for more money and create new bureaucratic entities.”78 In many cases, as with leaks and espionage carried out by a double agent, it is difficult for the bureaucracy to recognize the problem and also to neutralize it: “Counterintelligence officers are unlikely to come across initially to compelling evidence about successful hostile penetration.”79 Additionally, like any other organization, intelligence services tend to protect their own people and resist admitting that their security has been broken and that there are traitors among their employees: “The tendency within any intelligence organization (or any organization, for that matter) is to trust its own people, who have been vetted and cleared. They work with one another every day. Familiarity can lead to lowering one’s guard or being unwilling to believe that one’s own people may have gone bad.”80 In parallel, counterintelligence personnel must be offered an attractive career path to incentivize them to accept and stay in the job, especially

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today, when the private sector successfully lures intelligence personnel with better salaries and prospects.

Conclusion Undoubtedly, counterintelligence is the most difficult intelligence work.81 However, a well-established counterintelligence apparatus is essential to guarantee the protection of the intelligence community and, additionally, to safeguard organizations, governments, and national interests, as well as to protect the state and society itself. In this brave new world, counterintelligence has an extremely important role in the protection of a nation’s most important values. As Loch Johnson asserts, “Counterintelligence personnel need to be well-trained . . . and counterintelligence needs to be done in the field as well as at the home office.”82 Otherwise, he warns: “It is a thankless task where practitioners are in a ‘lose-lose’ situation. If spies are found . . . , it is called a counterintelligence failure. If they are not found, it may also be called a counterintelligence failure.”83

Notes 1. James M. Olson, “The Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence,” Studies in Intelligence 45, no. 5 (2001): 81–87. 2. The Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies provides information on counterintelligence in some democracies, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and France; see Dover, Goodman, and Hillebrand, Routledge Companion. Romania’s Domestic Intelligence Agency published a volume on intelligence, which also refers to counterintelligence (CI); see Maior, Mind War. Nevertheless, these literary works do not include detailed information on the topic. There is a volume on European perspectives on counterintelligence, which provides details on the tradecraft of counterintelligence yet relies on examples from the Five Eyes countries; see Iztok Podbregar and Teodora Ivanusa, The Anatomy of Counterintelligence: European Perspectives (Sharjah, UAE: Betham, 2016). 3. For comprehensive discussions and analyses of counterintelligence in the United States, see: Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy; Johnson and Wirtz, Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies; Johnson, Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism; Richelson, The US Intelligence Community; Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies; Moravej and Díaz, “Critical Issues in Contemporary Counter-Intelligence,” 61–62; Johnson, Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence; Johnson, Essentials of Strategic Intelligence; Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark, Secret Intelligence; Prunckun, Intelligence and Private Investigation. 4. NSCID 5 was subsequently updated in 1961 and 1972; both updates retained the same CI definition. See US National Security Council, “U.S. Espi-

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onage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad,” National Security Council Directive No. 5, CIA, April 21, 1958, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs /CIA-RDP85S00362R000600160001-7.pdf. 5. Ibid. 6. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. 235, 61 Stat. 496, July 26, 1947. 7. “Executive Order 12333—United States Intelligence Activities,” National Archives, https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333 .html. 8. Michelle Van Cleave, “Strategic Counterintelligence: What Is It and What Should We Do About It?” Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 2 (2008). 9. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 163. See also: Stan A. Taylor, “Definitions and Theories of Counterintelligence,” in Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism: Defending the Nation Against Hostile Forces: Strategic Intelligence, vol. 4, edited by Loch K. Johnson (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); “Counterintelligence Awareness Glossary,” Center for Development of Security Excellence, https://www.cdse.edu/index.html. 10. Chile, 2004: “Ley 19.974, del 27 Septiembre 2004, sobre el Sistema de Inteligencia del Estado y crea la Agencia Nacional de Inteligencia,” VLEX Chile, https:// legislacion-oficial.vlex.cl/vid/sistema-inteligencia-agencia-242052898. 11. Argentina, 2001: “Ley de inteligencia nacional: Ley 25.520,” InfoLEG Argentina, accessed September 25, 2017, http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos /70000-74999/70496/norma.htm. 12. Mexico, 2005: “Ley de seguridad nacional,” artículo 32, Cámara de Diputados, accessed July 12, 2017, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LSegNac .pdf. 13. Mexico: “Counter-Intelligence,” Centro de Invesigación y Seguridad Nacional, https://www.gob.mx/cni. 14. Spain, 2002: “Ley 11/2002, de 6 de mayo, reguladora del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia,” Agencia Estatal Boletín Oficial del Estado, https://www.boe.es /buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2002-8628. 15. Brazil, 2016: “Decreto nº 8793, de 29 de junho de 2016: Fixa a Política Nacional de Inteligência,” Presidência da República Casa Civil, accessed September 12, 2017, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2016/decreto/D8793.htm. 16. Brazil, 1999: “Lei nº 9.883, de 7 de dezembro de 1999,” Presidência da República Casa Civil, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L9883.htm. 17. William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), cited in Moravej and Díaz, “Critical Issues in Contemporary Counter-Intelligence,” 54. 18. An interesting definition of CI was found in a School of the Americas Watch: “the activity or activities collectively organized by an intelligence service dedicated to obstruct the enemy’s source of information by means of concealment, codes, crypto, censorship and other measures to deceive the enemy by using disinformation, trickery, etc.” See “Counter Intelligence,” Study Manual LN324-91, Derechos Human Rights, http://www.derechos.net/soaw/manuals/ci-toc.html. 19. Frederick L. Wettering, “Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 13, no. 3 (2000), 265. 20. Moravej and Díaz, “Critical Issues in Contemporary Counter-Intelligence,” 54. 21. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949). 22. Moravej and Díaz, “Critical Issues in Contemporary Counter-Intelligence,” 54–55. 23. Nigel West, “Cold War Intelligence Defectors,” in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, edited by Loch K. Johnson, 229–236 (London: Routledge, 2007).

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24. Stan A. Taylor, “Counterintelligence Failures in the United States,” in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, edited by Loch K. Johnson, 237–252 (London: Routledge, 2007). 25. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 26. US Department of Defense, Counterintelligence Collection Activities (UCCA), DoD Instruction S-5240.17 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 12, 2009). 27. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 28. Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2002), 99. 29. “Intell Test #3,” Quizlet, posted by babypands, https://quizlet.com/246065657 /intell-test-3-flash-cards; Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, 99. 30. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Double agents are spies who are willing to spy against their own agencies or countries. It should be noted that double agents cannot always be successfully flipped, so they continue to be under surveillance; Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies. 31. Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, 108. 32. US National Security Council, NSCID No. 5. 33. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 8, 2010), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf. 34. Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence: America’s Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence Gathering for a Free World (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2006), 19. 35. According to Stan Taylor, the best available list of all counterintelligence techniques is found in Wettering, “Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad”; Taylor, “Definitions and Theories of Counterintelligence.” 36. Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 438. 37. US Department of Defense, Counterintelligence (CI) Investigations, DoD Instruction 5240.04, Incorporating Change 1 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 15, 2013). 38. Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 443. 39. Ibid., 438. 40. Ibid., 443. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid., 453. 43. Ibid., 443. 44. Moravej and Díaz, “Critical Issues in Contemporary Counter-Intelligence”; see also Johnson and Wirtz, Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies. 45. Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, 110. 46. Ibid., 111. 47. For examples, see: Johnson and Wirtz, Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies; Richelson, The US Intelligence Community; Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies; Moravej and Díaz, “Critical Issues in Contemporary Counter-Intelligence,” 61–62; Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy; Johnson, Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence; Johnson, Essentials of Strategic Intelligence. 48. Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, 459. 49. Johnson, Essentials of Strategic Intelligence; Johnson and Wirtz, Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies. 50. Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, p. 99. 51. Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies. 52. Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, 100. 53. Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies.

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54. Wettering, “Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad,” 274. 55. Ibid., 271. 56. Moravej and Díaz, “Critical Issues in Contemporary Counter-Intelligence,” 61–62; Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy; Johnson, Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence; Johnson, Essentials of Strategic Intelligence; Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies. 57. Security measures are not CI; they are one of the many techniques, however, that counterintelligence uses to fulfill its role effectively. Kent stresses, “One should . . . distinguish between counterintelligence activities and security measures, as security measures are defensive in nature, applied as protection against the elements which counterintelligence seeks knowledge of”; Moravej and Díaz, “Critical Issues in Contemporary Counter-Intelligence,” 54–55. 58. Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, 104. 59. “National Insider Threat Policy,” Director of National Intelligence, https:// www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/nittf/National_Insider_Threat_Policy.pdf. 60. Moravej and Díaz, “Critical Issues in Contemporary Counter-Intelligence,” 61–62; Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy; Johnson, Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence; Johnson, Essentials of Strategic Intelligence; Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies. 61. Johnson, Essentials of Strategic Intelligence. 62. Wettering, “Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad,” 279. 63. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02. 64. Ibid. 65. Wettering, “Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad,” 279. 66. Johnson, Essentials of Strategic Intelligence. 67. Wettering, “Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad,” 279. 68. Ibid. 69. Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark, Secret Intelligence; Prunckun, Intelligence and Private Investigation; Moravej and Díaz, “Critical Issues in Contemporary CounterIntelligence.” 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid. 72. Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark, Secret Intelligence; Prunckun, Intelligence and Private Investigation. 73. Adapted from Wettering, “Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad,” 289. 74. Podbregar and Ivanusa, The Anatomy of Counterintelligence, 136. 75. Ibid. 76. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 172–173. 77. According to article 5, XII, of the Brazilian Constitution (1988): “The secrecy of correspondence and of telegraphic, data and telephone communications is inviolable, except, in the latter case, by court order, in the cases and in the manner prescribed by law for the purposes of criminal investigation or criminal procedural finding of facts.” Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil: Constitutional Text of October 5, 1988, with the Alterations Introduced by Constitutional Amendments No. 1/1992 Through 64/2010 and by Revision Constitutional Amendments No. 1/1994 Through 6/1994, 3rd ed. (Brasília: Chamber of Deputies, Documentation and Information Center, 2010). 78. Wettering, “Counterintelligence: The Broken Triad,” 292. 79. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 170. 80. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 81. Taylor, “Definitions and Theories of Counterintelligence,” 12. 82. Johnson, Essentials of Strategic Intelligence. 83. Ibid.

Part 2 Roles and Missions in Today’s Security Context

6 Covert Operations Rubén Arcos

A prospective covert action operator is a . . . : Macro thinker (as opposed to micro). Innovative. Juxtapositional. Multi-cultured. Pioneering. Crosses borders. Out of the box. Original. No copycats. Dependable under pressure. Recognises that if you dance with the devil, you may have to factor the fiddler . . . multilingual. I speak nine languages. —Former MI6 officer1

Covert operations, or covert actions, probably constitute the most controversial and misunderstood of all intelligence disciplines. Some countries, including Germany, still lack a covert-action mandate for their national intelligence services, let alone a covert-action doctrine. 2 Covert operations are not part of the intelligence production process, although they are supported by intelligence collection and analysis. Covert operations have been employed historically by democracies as well as by authoritarian or totalitarian regimes to influence political outcomes in other countries. Explaining that a democratic government might be making use of covert-influence activities as a foreign-policy instrument—while still denying it or publicly acknowledging such a circumstance—is challenging. In this chapter, I investigate whether covert operations are a necessary evil in a democracy. Are covert operations misunderstood and, perhaps, therefore misused practices? Information on covert operations conducted by democracies around the world, other than the United States, is rather scarce. On the one 97

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hand, smaller democracies do not have substantial resources to conduct covert actions that go beyond propaganda. On the other hand, if they do, open-source information is not available to academic researchers.3 In this context, the examples used here are from the United States, which are available, to illustrate the main theoretical points, as well as the stigma associated with covert operations in democracies. However, I do not go into exhaustive detail on each operation because other scholars have already covered them thoroughly.4

Role and Significance

Covert actions—known as “special political actions” in Great Britain or “active measures” in some Eastern European democracies—are considered to be the third discipline of the intelligence profession, together with intelligence production (including information collection and analysis) and counterintelligence.5 They have a different role and methodology than intelligence collection/analysis and counterintelligence. Covert operations are regarded “as a ‘civilian’ activity and special operations as a ‘uniformed’ activity,” although there are actually numerous cases of civilian ops including military involvement.6 Covert operations are, according to Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz, “actions intended to influence another state by means that are not identified with the state behind the actions.”7 In Bruce Berkovitz and Allan Goodman’s view, “The use of such operations is an outgrowth of policymakers’ need for so-called ‘quiet’ and ‘middle’ options (that is, tools that are more powerful than diplomacy but short of using military forces) to counter dangerous adversaries.” 8 They are also termed the “third option,” because such operations are a compromise between a first option—do nothing—and a second option of military force.9 Conducting covert action ops internally is banned by western democracies. The US Code, for example, prohibits covert actions “intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media.”10

Types of Covert Operations

Covert operations include propaganda, political and economic activities, coups, and paramilitary actions—as well as a combination of any or all of these actions aimed at influencing “foreign governments, organizations, persons or events” in support of the foreign policy

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interest of the sponsor.11 Scholars of intelligence categorize them in terms of level of violence and degree of plausible deniability.12 Most recently, covert actions include information warfare, which can in turn apply to any of the previous types. The first type, propaganda, involves the use of the media in another country to convey a certain message. It is considered the least violent type of covert operation, with the highest degree of plausible deniability. The CIA, for example, produced and distributed undercover, or black, propaganda against the Axis powers during World War II. The agency also financed a broad range of activities, including propaganda materials aimed at the Chilean media,13 in particular the daily paper El Mercurio.14 The Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BND) in Germany conducted similar disinformation operations during the Cold War against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).15 The British intelligence services, too, have engaged in propaganda, both gray and black.16 The second type, political and economic activities, involves financing government leaders, political parties, unions, religious groups, the military, and so on, in another country, as well as destroying crops, influencing markets, and circulating counterfeit currency, aimed at destabilizing a regime or compelling it to act in a direction or manner preferred by the initiator of the covert action. In the 1970s, the CIA covertly funded Chilean labor unions to undermine Chile’s president, Salvador Allende, who was a socialist and friend of Cuba’s Fidel Castro.17 The BND in Germany conducted similar operations in the 1970s, whereby it funded pro-democracy political movements in Spain and Portugal during the dictatorships of Francisco Franco and António Salazar.18 The British intelligence community has also conducted politico-economic covert actions.19 Operation Condor is another example in this category. According to Carlos Osorio, Operation Condor “was an infamous secret alliance between South American dictatorships in the mid and late 1970s—a rendition and repression program in the region—formed to track down and eliminate enemies of their military regimes.”20 Operation Condor was an intelligence-sharing arrangement among Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia that was established in 1975 and later added Peru and Ecuador.21 In the words of Patrice McSherry: Condor enabled the Latin American military states to share intelligence and to hunt down, seize, and execute political opponents in combined operations across borders. Refugees fleeing military coups and repression in their own countries who sought safe havens in neighboring countries were “disappeared” in combined

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transnational operations . . . Condor made use of parallel prisons, secret transport operations, routine assassination and torture, extensive psychological warfare (PSYWAR, or use of black propaganda, deception, and disinformation to conquer the “hearts and minds” of the population, often by making crimes seem as though they were committed by the other side), and sophisticated technology (such as computerized lists of suspects).22

The third type, coups, involves supporting or directly conducting operations aimed at overthrowing the regime or the leader of an enemy government. It is more violent and more difficult to deny than the previous two types. Coup operations include Operation TPAJAX/BOOT, by the CIA and MI6 in 1953, which overthrew Iran’s prime minister, Mohammed Mossadeq.23 The operations by the British intelligence agencies in 1970 to overthrow the government in Oman is another example.24 India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) conducted a similar operation in Bangladesh in 1992, when RAW successfully made peace between the two political rivals— Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia—which set into motion a prodemocracy movement that finally led to the overthrow of Lieutenant General H. M. Ershad, who was in power at that time.25 The fourth type, paramilitary operations, is the most violent covert operation and involves assassination, or the use of force— mostly using indigenous armed groups—to launch a direct attack on the government of another country (such as the Contra insurgency in Nicaragua during the 1980s supported by the CIA; or the training by the CIA of Cubans before the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. The larger the paramilitary operation is, the less the plausible deniability is for the state that conducts the covert action.26 Examples include Operation Wrath of God—also called Operation Bayonet— by Israel’s Mossad, which involved decades-long activities and resulted in the assassination of numerous people suspected of involvement in the terrorist attack against the Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games.27 Also, the “disruption operations,” as Rory Cormac calls them, currently conducted by British intelligence agencies against terrorist organizations or arms-trafficking groups, are examples of this particular type of covert operation.28

Covert Operations in the Digital Era

Internet and social-media channels have changed the game for covert operations, providing a fertile context for the massive dissemination of

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overt and covert propaganda by states and nongovernmental groups.29 As noted by Peter Gill, old intelligence tactics have been updated for the digital era, “so that, for example, GCHQ’s [Government Communications Headquarters] Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group oversees online covert operations such as discrediting targets through manipulating social media networks and posting negative information on blogs with the overall aim to deny/disrupt/degrade/deceive.”30 A March 2017 paper by researchers at Indiana University and the University of Southern California estimated that between 9 percent and 15 percent of Twitter accounts were bots.31 In Spain, after the 2017 secession crisis in Catalonia, concerns over covert digital operations led to the inclusion of references in the latest 2017 Spanish National Security Strategy to “hostile actions that include activities of disinformation and interference in electoral processes represent today a challenge of great dimensions.”32 A November 2015 briefing paper of the European Parliamentary Research Service stated that “the March 2015 conclusions of the European Council ‘stressed the need to challenge Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns,’ and called for an action plan on strategic communication.”33 Accordingly, a communications team, the East StratCom Task Force, was established in April 2015 within the European External Action Service (EEAS) to draw up and implement the plan in cooperation with the member states and European Union (EU) institutions.34 The EU set up the EUvsDisinfo website as “part of a campaign to better forecast, address and respond to pro-Kremlin disinformation” run by the EEAS East StratCom Task Force.35 The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of the UK Parliament has recently acknowledged the covert-action operations role of the intelligence community in countering terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.36 Cormac notes: “It’s more about frustrating terrorists (for example, by bombarding their mobile phones with messages every ten seconds to prevent communications).”37

Covert Operations and Democracy Covert operations authored by democracies raise a few legitimacy, accountability, and human rights–related concerns. The democratic challenge of covert operations entails the dispossession of the legitimate right of those citizens in targeted countries to decide and take action on their own, or at least be able to know what others plan to

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do on their behalf or for their own interests. In this connection, Jan Goldman stresses, “Knowing that a covert operation coincides with the interests of particular foreign nationals is not sufficient to justify it ethically since covert operations may involve the violation of rights that ought to override those interests.”38 Jennifer Kibbe raises the same concern but also provides a potential response: “If the goal of a covert operation is to protect a democratic state from a nondemocracy or to spread democratic values such as pluralism and individual rights to new arenas, then it cannot be said to be inimical to democracy.”39 On the other hand, at the domestic level, the misunderstanding or misperceptions of intelligence services by citizens in democracies are driven in many cases by the involvement of intelligence agencies in past covert operations, mainly political assassinations and paramilitary covert action, as noted above. These widely spread views—also evident in popular-culture representations of intelligence services— tend to equate all intelligence activities to espionage and covert action. Consequently, public confidence and support for intelligence is lukewarm. As such, the public is less willing to support a robust intelligence community if it thinks that all their intelligence does is covert operations—which aggravates the vicious cycle between intelligence and democracy.40 In addition, plausible deniability can become an important source of distrust for the common citizen toward national governments and foreign allied countries. If the covert operations are compromised, foreign adversaries and other hostile stakeholders can use those cases to attack the reputation of the covert sponsor-state and to project a shadow of doubt on every new international development, actively promoting mistrust toward those countries. On the other hand, the typical rationale for covert operations is to allow policymakers a third option in between passiveness and high-cost (in human, political, and economic terms) military interventions when there is a severe risk or a significant threat to vital interests.41 Another problem emerging from covert operations in democracies is an inevitable politicization of intelligence. In a democracy, intelligence agencies must not influence—or, worse, become—policy.42 Yet, more often than not, intelligence agencies become politicized, which negatively affects the intelligence-and-democracy trade-off.43 When intelligence agencies conduct covert operations, they implement the policies of the executive branch without engaging oversight mechanisms outside of the executive. Indeed, as noted by Berkowitz and Goodman, “nothing brings the intelligence community as close to the making of policy as covert action.”44

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Ultimately, even in cases in which covert action is authorized, regulated, and subject to oversight, there are still some basic underlying ethical questions to consider. Charles Beitz highlighted the problem posed by the “interventionary character” of covert action: Covert action is interventionary in a broad sense: in almost every case, it aims at influencing the course of political life in the target state by inducing or preventing a change in government or policy. Interference typically risks several kinds of harm, which are reflected in the three most prominent general arguments against intervention: that it offends the political sovereignty of the state being interfered in; that it disrupts a people’s common life; and that it upsets the international order.45

Conclusion

If the option of covert action becomes available and promising, democracies are likely to take it to pursue their strategic interests. If covert operations are combined with a just cause and disclosed to the public over time—as in the case of the CIA’s Operation Argo in the 1970s, designed to rescue the US embassy staff in Teheran, sheltered by the Canadian ambassador in Iran—the citizenry may actually understand and support them. Table 6.1 shows other factors that influence the success—also in terms of later publicity—of covert operations in democracies. At least two additional principles or criteria can be added to James Barry’s framework for covert action: (1) Public opinion test: Table 6.1 Influential Factors in Covert Operations Principles Just cause Just intention

Proper authority

Last resort Probability of success Proportionality

Discrimination and control

What are the relevant questions before authorization? What are the objectives of the operation? What is the likely result in the target country and for the international community? Who decides? Have the legitimate and relevant stakeholders been informed? Have overt options been considered? What is the probability that the action will succeed? Why are the proposed methods necessary? Are they the same as those being used by the adversary? What steps will be taken to safeguard the innocent and political institutions from harm and damage? What controls will be exercised over the agents to be employed?

Source: James A Barry, “Covert Actions Can Be Just,” Orbis 37, no. 3 (1993). Adapted by the author.

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What will be the likely reaction to the proposed covert operation if it were to be made public (in the covert sponsor country as well as in the targeted country)? and (2) Time test: Will the decision stand the test of time? The answers to these questions matter. For some leaders, practitioners, and scholars, covert actions may remain a necessary evil in a democracy, as ill-fitting as they may seem in states that value transparency, accountability, and civil and human rights. The challenge for leaders in government and intelligence is to manage the ongoing tensions that inhere in the practice and to keep the democratic limits firmly in view.

Notes

1. “We Spoke to a Former MI6 Spy About the Murky World of Covert Killings,” Shortlist, September 22, 2016, https://www.shortlist.com/news/we-spoke-to-a-former -mi6-spy-about-the-murky-world-of-state-sponsored-killings/56131. 2. Wolfgang Krieger, “The German Bundesnach-Richtendienst (BND): Evolution and Current Policy Issues,” in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, edited by Loch K. Johnson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 3. Scholarly literature mentions occasionally that British intelligence agencies, or Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, engage in covert operations, but the scholars do not offer details. See Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy; Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies; Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark, Secret Intelligence; Davies and Gustafson, Intelligence: Spies and Espionage; Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Gill, Intelligence Governance and Democratisation. 4. There are numerous sources listed in the Bibliography of this volume that cover specific cases. 5. William J. Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 9. 6. J. Ransom Clark, American Covert Operations: A Guide to the Issues (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015), 2. 7. Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence, 10. 8. Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 124–155. 9. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy; Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies; Berkowitz and Goodman, Best Truth, 124–155. 10. See US Code, Title 50, Chapter 44, §3093, at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys /granule/USCODE-2013-title50/USCODE-2013-title50-chap44-subchapIII-sec3093. 11. See US Senate, “Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 1975–76 (Church Committee): Final Report,” S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976), 141, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/resources /intelligence-related-commissions; US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Covert Action (the Forgery Offensive): Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, H.R., 96 Cong. 2 (February 6–19, 1980), http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/gdoc/hearings /8/80603647/80603647_1.pdf; US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Active Measures: Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on

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Intelligence, H.R., 97 Cong. 2 (July 13–14, 1982); http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections /gdoc/hearings/8/82603795/82603795_1.pdf; Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 12. The ensuing discussion on the types of covert actions is inspired by the following works: Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy; Berkowitz and Goodman, Best Truth, 124–155; Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies; Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark, Secret Intelligence; Johnson and Wirtz, Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies. 13. “CIA Activities in Chile,” CIA, September 18, 2000, https://www.cia.gov /library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/index.html#1; Directorate of Intelligence, Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Alert, DI WAMPA 87-001, declassified in part and sanitized (Langley, VA: CIA, February 1987), https://www.cia.gov/library /readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88T00986R000100010001-2.pdf; Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Calendar, GI 87-10076, declassified in part (Langley, VA: CIA, October 1987), https://www.cia.gov/library /readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88T00706R000500420004-0.pdf. 14. US Senate, “Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations,” 8. 15. Krieger, “The German Bundesnach-Richtendienst,” 791. 16. Cormac, “Disruption and Deniable Interventionism”; Seymour, “The Secret Intelligence Service,” 19. Black propaganda is false information initiated by state or nonstate actors to denigrate, humiliate, or misrepresent their rivals. The recipients of the black propaganda do not know the actual source of this type of propaganda. In the case of gray propaganda, the source is not identified. In the case of white propaganda, the real source is made public. Although some disinformation still occurs in white propaganda, this type of propaganda usually spreads more accurate information. For details, see Leonard Doob, “Goebbels’ Principles of Nazi Propaganda,” Public Opinion Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1950): 419–442; Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare; Thomas Allen and Norman Polmar, Spy Book (New York: Random House, 2004). 17. Berkowitz and Goodman, Best Truth, 124–155. 18. Krieger, “The German Bundesnach-Richtendienst,” 792–798. 19. Cormac, “Disruption and Deniable Interventionism”; Seymour, “The Secret Intelligence Service,” 19. 20. Carlos Osorio, “Operation Condor Trial: US-Backed Conspiracy to ‘Kidnap, Disappear, Torture and Kill’ Latin American Opponents of Dictatorships,” declassified documentation during historical trial, Global Research, May 7, 2015, https:// www.globalresearch.ca/operation-condor-trial-us-backed-conspiracy-to-kidnap -disappear-torture-and-kill-latin-american-opponents-of-dictatorships/5447901. 21. CIA, “CIA Activities in Chile”; Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Alert; Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Calendar. 22. J. Patrice McSherry, “Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-American System,” Social Justice 26, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 144–174; also see CIA, “CIA Activities in Chile”; Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Alert; Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Active Measures and Propaganda Calendar. 23. Wilber, “Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran,” v; McMurdo, “The Economics of Overthrow.” 24. Rory Cormac, “Britain’s Approach to Covert Action Between 1945 and 1968,” interview, Arts and Humanities Research Council, http://www.ahrc.ac.uk /research/readwatchlisten/features/covert-action-interview. 25. Chandan Nandy, “India’s Covert Action Capabilities Stymied by CIA, MI6 Pressure,” Quint, January 4, 2016, https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/indias -covert-action-capabilities-stymied-by-cia-mi6-pressure.

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26. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy; Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies; Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark, Secret Intelligence. 27. Alexander B. Calahan, “Countering Terrorism: The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic Massacre and the Development of Independent Covert Action Teams” (master’s thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1995); Ephraim Kahana, “Covert Action: The Israeli Experience,” in Strategic Intelligence, vol. 3, edited by Loch K. Johnson, 61–82 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007). 28. Cormac, “Britain’s Approach to Covert Action.” 29. Adam Bienkov, “Astroturfing: What Is It and Why Does It Matter?” Guardian, February 8, 2012. 30. Gill, Intelligence Governance and Democratization. 31. Onur Varol et al., “Online Human-Bot Interactions: Detection, Estimation, and Characterization,” Proceedings of the Eleventh International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media (2017): 280–289. 32. Presidency of the Government, National Security Strategy, 2017 (Madrid: Presidencia de Gobierno, December 2017), 34, http://www.dsn.gob.es/sites/dsn/files /2017_Spanish_National_Security_Strategy_0.pdf. 33. Naya Bentzen and Martin Russell, “Russia’s Disinformation on Ukraine and the EU’s Response,” Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/571339/EPRS_BRI(2015) 571339_EN.pdf. 34. Ibid. 35. “We and our partners have identified and debunked over 3,500 disinformation cases since September 2015 (figure from November 2017),” EU vs. Disinfo, https:// euvsdisinfo.eu/about; see also https://euvsdisinfo.eu. 36. On the latter, the following excerpt from the UK Parliament is clear: “Whilst the Government continues to apply pressure and sanctions, and to engage diplomatically, the intelligence community has a distinct role to play in tackling the proliferation of these weapons both through intelligence-gathering to keep the Government informed about the state of WMD programmes and covert operations to disrupt those programmes,” Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, “Annual Report 2012–2013” (report, UK Parliament, 2013), 23, http://isc.independent .gov.uk/committee-reports/annual-reports; Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, “Annual Report 2004–2005” (report, UK Parliament, 2005), 11, http://isc .independent.gov.uk/committee-reports/annual-reports. 37. Cormac, “Britain’s Approach to Covert Action.” 38. Jan Goldman, Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence Professional (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2005). 39. Jennifer D. Kibbe, “Covert Action,” Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 40. See the intelligence and democracy dilemma section in Chapter 1. 41. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 42. Ibid.; Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies; Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark, Secret Intelligence; Davies and Gustafson, Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage; Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Gill, Intelligence Governance and Democratization. 43. See Chapter 1. 44. Berkowitz and Goodman, Best Truth, 22. 45. Beitz, “Covert Intervention as a Moral Problem,” 12.

7 The Nexus of Law Enforcement and Intelligence Lisa I. Carroll

Until recently, it was unusual for most local law enforcement agencies to employ intelligence units to assist in nationalsecurity matters. —Carl J. Jensen III, David H. McElreath, and Melissa Graves1

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a broad analysis of some of the fundamental theoretical concepts of the nexus of law enforcement and intelligence and the challenges they present to democracies. The chapter concludes with a discussion of fusion centers, including real-world examples.

Crime Analysis Versus Criminal Intelligence Although there was some coordination between law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the United States before 9/11, until relatively recently, law-enforcement operations were largely separated from intelligence operations. The need for intelligence within law enforcement came with the systematic efforts against organized crime and gathered momentum further when terrorism—global and domestic— became more prevalent. As asymmetric warfare and terrorism present 107

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a constant threat to countries, many democracies continue to refine the nexus of law enforcement and intelligence while struggling to maintain a balance between civil liberties and national security. The organization and legal framework of law enforcement and intelligence agencies differ vastly among democracies. In the theoretical world of law-enforcement–intelligence activities, there are two defined pathways: crime analysis and criminal intelligence. It is imperative to keep in mind that not all nations acknowledge these concepts as two separate approaches,2 and some organizations interchangeably use a variety of terms to describe these two concepts, such as intelligence-led policing, intelligence analysis, criminal intelligence analysis, and so on. Crime Analysis

Crime analysis is largely self-explanatory: it means analyzing crimes. The trends and data gathered from statistics are used as a model to project future crime and help solve current crime. According to the International Association of Crime Analysts, crime analysis is conducted by professionals who can enable law-enforcement agencies to be “more effective with better information.”3 Brazil (as Eduardo Estévez notes) defines crime analysis “as a set of systematic processes aimed at the provision of timely and relevant information on the patterns of crime and its correlations of trends, to support the operational and administrative areas in the planning and distribution of resources for the prevention and repression of criminal activities.”4 Four subcomponents make up crime analysis: crime mapping, tactical crime analysis, criminal investigative analysis, and geographic profiling.5 Crime mapping allows officials to allocate resources to high-crime areas. Not only are officers better placed to respond to crime but their mere presence acts as deterrence. An example showing the effectiveness of crime mapping, especially in the post-computer era, is the drop in New York City’s crime by 77 percent in 2010 compared to the 1980s.6 Tactical crime analysis helps law-enforcement officers determine the best way to catch criminals who commit a particular type of crime. For example, financial records may reveal suspicious transactions indicative of drug trafficking.7 Criminal investigative analysis is a much more complex type of crime analysis that identifies criminals and crimes and links unique identifiers; as Amber Scherer and John Jarvis reveal, “Criminal investigative analysis encompasses a

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variety of services—including construction of an unknown offender profile, behavioral investigative strategies, interviewing techniques, media strategies, prosecutorial advice, and expert testimony—to aid law enforcement officers with investigations.”8 Criminal investigative analysis recognizes that people’s actions are behavior driven, and such crimes as serial homicides and sexual assaults often reveal subtle profile indicators that are unique to the perpetrator.9 Lastly, geographic profiling attempts to link the locations of serious offenses to the location of the suspect, although this process has yet to prove successful and reliable.10 Although crime analysis is still a major component of municipal law-enforcement departments, its benefits extrapolate across local and federal agencies as well, an advantage attributed primarily to technology. One example of the evolution of crime analysis is the Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (ViCAP) system used by many lawenforcement agencies in the United States. This system is a webbased program that allows law-enforcement personnel, at all levels, to enter the specifics of a crime, such as victim demographics, weapons used, vehicle information, and so on.11 Another ViCAP user can then put in data for another crime and run a search, which will bring up similar crimes.12 If enough information is there for a user to suspect that two or more crimes were committed by the same perpetrator, then law-enforcement personnel can make contact with each other and coordinate investigation efforts. Romania developed a similar platform, called the Integrated Information System (SII), in 2003 within the Romanian Domestic Intelligence Agency (SRI), a common electronic database—with restricted access—used by all border-security institutions, intelligence services, and law-enforcement agencies, to share intelligence related to crime and terrorism in due time.13 Criminal Intelligence

Crime analysis has proven itself successful in reducing crime, and criminal intelligence is another law-enforcement–intelligence approach that seeks the same results. According to the National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center, the definition of criminal intelligence is “information compiled, analyzed and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity.”14 Although the ultimate goal, as with crime analysis, is to prevent crime, criminal intelligence differs in that it is processed information about a particular criminal group and/or activity.15 Criminal intelligence involves concerted

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actions by the public security agencies, intelligence services, and criminal-justice institutions.16 Criminal intelligence has become increasingly prevalent in Latin American democracies. In Argentina, for example, the agency responsible for criminal intelligence is the National Directorate for Criminal Intelligence, within the Ministry of Security. It is tasked with “the functional management and coordination of the intelligence activities of the national police effort, including the intelligence elements of the federal police, the security forces—National Gendarmerie and Naval Prefecture—the police for airport security, and provincial police forces.”17 In addition, Argentina’s main intelligence agency—the Federal Intelligence Agency (AFI), created in 2015 by reshuffling the former Secretariat of Intelligence (SI) amid a highlevel political scandal—is now carrying out criminal-intelligence roles “on complex federal crimes related to terrorism, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, trafficking in persons, cybercrime, offences against the financial and economic order, as well as offences against the public authorities and the constitutional order, through its own means of obtaining and gathering of information.”18

Intelligence-Led Policing Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is a subdiscipline of criminal intelligence and crime analysis. It developed as an operational tactic used by the Kent Police in Great Britain in the 1990s, in the endeavor to cut back criminal activities.19 Pascal Ghobeira notes, “Instead of the reactive and investigative approach, proactive police units relied on greater information collection followed by analysis to guide tactical operations.”20 Or as Mariëlle den Hengst and Jan ter Mors maintain, “Intelligence-led policing is the use of analyzed information by decision-makers to decide on police resources.”21 In summary, as Jerry Ratcliffe points out, “intelligence-led policing is the application of criminal intelligence analysis as an objective decisionmaking tool in order to facilitate crime reduction and prevention through effective policing strategies and external partnership projects drawn from an evidential base.”22 By now, virtually all democracies around the world—Canada, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, Mexico, Honduras, and Romania, to name a few—have adopted ILP in their efforts to reduce crime and avert terrorist threats. Of these, it is worth mentioning Honduras’s recent use of ILP against gang violence.23

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The partnership of law enforcement and intelligence undoubtedly provides a government with a potentially powerful and effective tool in fighting both domestic crime and national-security threats, foreign and domestic. It is, however, only as good as the communication and information sharing. For this purpose, fusion centers emerged in the United States after 9/11, specifically to bridge the gaps that many believed allowed the attacks to go undetected.24 These fusion centers were created as a “collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.”25 With the fusion centers, federal agencies are able to disseminate threat information down to local law enforcement, and local law enforcement can in turn provide information on potential leads. 26 Instead of relying on each agency to carry out its mission independently, fusion centers lead to an overall consolidation of resources, which can minimize gaps in intelligence and also reduce redundant information.27 Although fusion centers involve information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence functions and emphasize intelligence-led policing, other critical stakeholders have a place in fusion centers as well, such as public-safety and even private-sector representatives. Other democracies have developed fusion centers (or interagency arrangements to link intelligence with law enforcement). Romania, for one, created the Operational Coordination Center (CCOA) in the SRI as a permanent technical coordinator of the interacting agencies within the National System on Preventing and Combating Terrorism (SNPCT)—an integrated structure focusing on the prevention and countering of terrorist threats. The CCOA is charged with collection, analysis, and field intervention.28 Spain created the Intelligence Center Against Terrorism and Organized Crime (CITCO) in 2014 by Royal Decree 873/2014. 29 CITCO is a purely analytical organization, bringing together intelligence officers from the National Intelligence Centre (CNI), the Civil Guard, and the National Police, aimed at sharing intelligence related to organized crime and terrorism.30 Since its creation, CITCO has been quite effective at averting terrorist and criminal activities in Spain and abroad.31 Colombia, too, has a fusion center, within the National Police, which became operational in 2013. Estévez notes: “This technologydriven center contributes to the strengthening of new capabilities

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and development of technological innovation applied to strategic and operational intelligence, police management and public security, based on an integrative concept and specialized handling of information and situational analysis that privileges anticipation.”32 Argentina features a Regional Center for Integrated Criminal Intelligence (CICRE) within AFI, comprising seven centers across the country.33 CICRE “integrates in a same joint and coordinated working sphere, the four federal law enforcement forces, the Federal Intelligence Agency, the penitentiary service, local police, and justice.” 34 Some Central American countries, most notably El Salvador and Honduras, are exploring the idea of institutionalizing fusion centers to link up the intelligence agencies with law enforcement as a way to fight crime. Although Honduras has not yet created a fusion center, El Salvador is developing an analytical fusion center at the Office of the President.

Crime Analysis and Criminal Intelligence and Democracies When intelligence and law-enforcement capability merge, the combination of knowledge and force “multiplies both their threat and their value.”35 The combination of law enforcement and intelligence becomes especially hazardous to democracy when a foreign threat, such as terrorism, becomes a domestic one. In a democracy, the extensive measures taken to prevent a foreign attack cannot be used on a country’s own citizens because of vital civil liberties that make a nation democratic. Bias-Based Profiling: An Unreasonable Suspicion

Targeting an individual for search, seizure, or information collection solely based on a particular demographic, regardless of criminal trends, is a discriminatory action called bias-based profiling, or biasbased policing, not to be confused with criminal profiling. Criminal profiling involves demographics attributed to a particular criminal; however, bias-based profiling “is the selection of individuals based solely on a common trait of a group. This includes, but is not limited to, race, ethnic background, gender, sexual orientation, religion, economic status, age or culture.”36

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For a better understanding of the challenges of bias-based policing, one can look at the recent string of terrorist attacks in France and how they have affected law and policing at the local level. The first major attack that started this series is the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, followed by several other relatively large attacks, including the mass shootings and suicide bombings in Paris of November 2015, and the Nice attack on Bastille Day in July 2016. The French Administrative Court, which, only three years before 9/11, ruled that Muslim girls could remain in school and wear their headscarves, changed its rulings and banned all “ostentatious” displays of religion.37 The ban was not limited to schools. Police in Nice, just one short month after the terrorist attacks on Bastille Day, ordered a woman to remove her “burkini,” as the press labeled modestyminded beachwear principally for observant Muslim women. The media posted a photograph of armed law-enforcement officers standing around a woman sitting in the sand as she reluctantly removes her clothing. The image horrified many. Although some still supported the ban and the police that enforced it, others shamed the police.38 Prior to 1993, French law-enforcement officers were allowed to conduct identity checks only when there was reasonable suspicion of a crime.39 However, the law was changed, allowing police to conduct random identity checks in an effort to minimize illegal immigration.40 As such, “young blacks and Arabs living in economically disadvantaged areas are particularly frequent targets for such stops, suggesting that police engage in ethnic profiling.”41 Moreover, the French Intelligence Act of 2015, akin to the Patriot Act of the United States, which ties the intelligence piece into the law-enforcement–intelligence nexus, allows that victims of biasbased profiling are not just targets of routine police activities such as “random” identity checks, but they are also often subjects of unwarranted surveillance for intelligence purposes.42 France is the prime example of this, with its large Muslim population and recent barrage of terrorist attacks since 2015. Although France’s intelligence agencies are separate from its law-enforcement agencies, both are responsible for foiling terrorism on the foreign and domestic level and are so intertwined that national security is in the hands of local law enforcement just as much as it is with foreign intelligence agencies and the French military.43 In addition, the oversight of the intelligence sector in France is weak, which permits the services to be as intrusive as they want in citizens’ lives.

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Sting Operations, Entrapment, and Undercover Policing

Without the legal framework regulating the domestic use of intelligence, law enforcement could become an abusive power tool of the government, arresting people based on unwarranted searches, seizures, surveillance, and so on. Even so, law enforcement continues to walk this inherently fine line through controversial sting and surveillance operations, which can present a number of challenges to democratic society. In the United States, in February 2017, the FBI claimed to have foiled its first terrorist plot under the Trump administration, although sources say otherwise. Twenty-five-year-old Robert Hester was arrested in Missouri after allegedly engaging in a plan to carry out a terrorist attack.44 According to one media source, Hester was involved primarily with two undercover FBI agents, one of whom allegedly threatened Hester and his family if Hester backed out of the planning. Hester complained about the threats to the other undercover agent. Hester was initially targeted based on his social-media posts, expressing his discontent with the United States and the FBI—hinting at violence, yet not making explicit threats. Throughout the entire government-orchestrated sting, Hester agreed to participate in the planning stage of the terrorist attack but never initiated his own plans; undercover agents told Hester what items needed to be purchased for the attack, and Hester agreed to get them. The agents provided Hester with the money to buy the items, which he did immediately prior to his arrest.45 The thin line that separates legal sting operations from illegal entrapment is that the offense must be one that the person was likely to commit without coercion or encouragement from undercover law enforcement.46 In Hester’s case, the line is blurred. Canada has perhaps the most controversial undercover police operations, which would certainly be deemed illegal in many democratic societies. Called “Mr. Big” techniques, the ultimate goal is to obtain confessions from suspects in serious cases in which there is otherwise a lack of evidence.47 The suspect is befriended by an undercover agent and ultimately lured into committing relatively small crimes on behalf of a criminal organization. The suspects are paid for their criminal achievements and eventually work their way up to meeting the head of the organization (“Mr. Big”). Mr. Big will inform the suspect that law enforcement is investigating (or reinvestigating) a crime (the crime for which law enforcement is seeking a confession). Mr. Big convinces the suspect to disclose all details of the crime so

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that the organization can exonerate the suspect in one way or another. Sometimes the suspect is threatened if he or she backs out of the organization, and sometimes the suspect is offered money throughout the sting.48 The end result is a confession from the suspect. At best, this confession is questionable, given that the suspects are provided with incentive to truthfully or falsely admit to the crime in question. Like intelligence, undercover police operations require secrecy. The growing relationship between intelligence and law enforcement, along with the secrecy of both, stages serious threats to the transparency required in democracies. Furthermore, undercover operations may pose an ethical question about whether law-enforcement officials should engage in illegal activity to catch criminals. A true democracy must have checks and balances to prevent corruption. Although secrecy is of utmost importance to both intelligence and undercover law-enforcement operations, the agencies engaging in these activities must have stringent standards to limit civil-liberty and constitutional violations. Catching Criminals While Tracking Terrorists

The rules of foreign intelligence are undoubtedly different from those for domestic intelligence within most democracies, simply because methods of collection against foreign threats pose unconstitutional invasions of privacy if used on citizens of a democracy. Threats like terrorism, however, are not as easily compartmentalized into foreign and domestic categories. Terrorism, and the radicalization that often goes with it, is an intangible enemy. Today’s technologized, globalized world provides opportunities for individuals to become radicalized without any real human interaction. This reality highlights the ever-growing importance of digital surveillance, but it also presents unique challenges from metadata collection. For example, after 9/11, the US Congress quickly passed the Patriot Act, which allowed law enforcement “to use surveillance against more crimes of terror.”49 Most important, the Patriot Act lowers, if not demolishes, the vaunted “wall” between law enforcement and intelligence activities so that a surveillance operation initiated under the lower standards of a terrorism investigation might turn up evidence for criminal prosecution without all of the civil-liberties protections of, say, a search warrant. To be sure, segregating law enforcement and intelligence capabilities among agencies does not completely prevent the unconstitutional

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use of national-security intelligence for small-crime prosecution. In Romania, for example, through aggressive laws and action, efforts to drive corrupt individuals from government have pushed the envelope of civil liberties. In February 2016, eleven corruption cases went to Romania’s constitutional court, where the law and evidence making the cases were determined unconstitutional.50 Specifically, the SRI, Romania’s domestic intelligence agency, had communications interceptions used as evidence against individuals for corruption. Advocates for prosecution argued that the law (Article 142, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code) states “prosecutor sets into practice the technical supervision or may order it to be carried out by the criminal investigation body or expert staff of the police or other specialized bodies of the state,”51 with the SRI being “other specialized bodies of the state.” The constitutional court, however, did not agree, determining that because of the intrusive nature of surveillance, the agency conducting such operations should operate under a clear and defined legislative framework.52 The SRI, with its need to maintain secrecy for the sake of national defense, does not fall into this framework. Although the SRI is not the prosecuting or arresting agency for these matters, its liberally obtained intelligence for national-security purposes cannot constitutionally have any use in criminal investigations.53 SRI director Eduard Hellvig argues that national security is hindered by this prohibition on SRI wiretaps in criminal investigations,54 an argument not unlike the position of top intelligence officials in the United States in the wake of 9/11. Fusion Centers and Democracies

There are concerns that fusion centers pose a risk to civil liberties and privacy. With so many agencies involved, officials may be tempted to pick and choose which laws to follow (called “policy shopping”) because no one agency oversees the fusion centers. 55 Furthermore, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is concerned that fusion centers skirt the normal oversight that comes with various agencies, so that federal agencies especially reap the benefits of loosely legislated local agencies without being held accountable for the manner in which information is obtained.56 These concerns occur in other democracies, not just the United States.57 Participation of the private sector in fusion centers also poses several concerns. First of all, there is concern that members of the private

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sector have access to classified information through fusion centers, and likewise, privacy information that companies have can be passed to the government, which violates privacy.58 Additionally, individuals in the private sector are not bound by oath to protect certain information, so the potential for private companies to abuse information exists in multiple ways. Companies can use information for business advantage over competitors. Similarly, with military participation in fusion centers, there is a basic question about what business active-duty officials have in fusion centers, when the mission of the active-duty member exclusively involves military affairs, not homeland security.59 The government’s access to private metadata is another concern, in that it leads to data mining, which is essentially the process of identifying patterns or indicators within large amounts of data.60 Data mining in itself poses a number of civil-liberty concerns, specifically when conducted at the hands of the government. Daniel Solove outlines several concerns about government data mining, with two concerns in particular that are unique to data mining and affect civil liberties: violations of the First Amendment and due process.61 Citizens, he argues, should not have to explain or justify their reasons for something that may flag them during data mining. An example is someone searching the internet on how to make the poison ricin, including where to buy supplies, lethal amounts, and so on. Of course, this search looks suspicious at first glance; however, Solove points out that this particular situation could merely be an author writing a murder mystery with a character who uses ricin poisoning.62 In this hypothetical situation, the author may very well be subject to further surveillance and searches.

Conclusion Each democracy has its unique way of organizing law-enforcement and intelligence agencies to ensure effectiveness, yet limit power so mighty that civil liberties are at risk. Paradoxically—concerned with these democracy and security tensions—South American democracies have actually developed ILP mechanisms “as a way to overcome the autonomy of police forces, and in particular of its intelligence elements—a characteristic of many Latin American countries,” as Estévez contends.63 Regardless of how a government organizes its law-enforcement and intelligence capabilities, challenges to democracy will always be present, simply because the concepts of secrecy and security inherently

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clash with transparency and privacy. It is necessary to establish a stringent legislative and legal framework, necessary along with robust oversight. Realistically, as the threat of terrorism ebbs and floods, so too does public support for privacy versus security, respectively. When the secrecy of intelligence pairs with the power of law enforcement, the stage is set for severe civil-liberty violations, if agency activities are not carefully regulated with a robust legal framework and involved oversight. With precautions in place, however, the authority and effectiveness of the law-enforcement–intelligence nexus can fortify the delicate balance of privacy and security for which all democracies strive.

Notes

1. Carl J. Jensen III, David H. McElreath, and Melissa Graves, “Criminal Intelligence and Crime Analysis,” in Encyclopedia of U.S. Intelligence, edited by Greg Moore (Boca Raton, FL: Auerbach Publications, 2015), 203. 2. Deborah Osborne, Out of Bounds: Innovation and Change in Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysis (self-pub., CreateSpace, 2006), 6. 3. “What Is Crime Analysis?” International Association of Crime Analysts, https://www.iaca.net/dc_about_ca.asp. 4. Eduardo E. Estévez, “Criminal Intelligence and the Challenge of Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America,” Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence 9, no. 1 (June 2017), 89. 5. Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, “Criminal Intelligence,” 208–210. 6. Ibid., 208. 7. Ibid., 209. 8. J. Amber Scherer and John P. Jarvis, “Criminal Investigative Analysis: Skills Expertise and Training (Part Two of Four),” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, July 8, 2014, https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/criminal-investigative-analysis-skills -expertise-and-training-part-two-of-four. 9. Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, “Criminal Intelligence,” 211. 10. Ibid. 11. “ViCAP: Fighting Violent Crime for 25 Years,” FBI, August 26, 2010, https:// archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2010/august/vicap-anniversary. 12. Ibid. 13. Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, “The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania,” Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 4 (2009): 574–585. 14. International Association of Chiefs of Police, “Criminal Intelligence: Model Policy,” US Department of Justice, 2003, https://www.ncirc.gov/documents/public /criminal_intelligence_model_policy.pdf. 15. Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, “Criminal Intelligence,” 203. 16. Estévez, “Criminal Intelligence and the Challenge of Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America,” 89. 17. Ibid., 98. 18. Ibid. 19. Pascal Ghobeira, “Counterterrorism Using Intelligence-Led Policing,” Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence 9, no. 1 (June 2017), 24. 20. Ibid. 21. Mariëlle den Hengst and Jan ter Mors, “Community of Intelligence: The Secret Behind Intelligence-Led Policing,” Proceedings of the European Intelligence and Security

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Informatics Conference (August 2012): 22–29, http://pubs.iids.org/index.php/publications /show/1879, as cited in Clifford Aims, “Chapter 15: The Hitchhiker’s Guide to IntelligenceLed Policing,” PRISM, May 24, 2016, http://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/780293/chapter -15-the-hitchhikers-guide-to-intelligence-led-policing/#footnote-140. 22. Jerry H. Ratcliffe, “Intelligence-Led Policing,” Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, no. 248 (April 2003), 3, cited in Aims, “Hitchhiker’s Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing.” 23. Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Evan T. Sorg, James W. Rose, “Intelligence-Led Policing in Honduras: Applying Sleipnir and Social Psychology to Understand Gang Proliferation,” Journal of Police Criminal Psychology 30, no. 2 (June 2015): 112–123. 24. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 25. “Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era,” US Department of Justice, August 2016, https://it.ojp.gov/documents /d/fusion_center_guidelines.pdf. 26. “National Network of Fusion Centers Fact Sheet,” US Department of Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet. 27. US Department of Justice, “Fusion Center Guidelines.” 28. Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, “Romania’s Anti-Terrorism Capabilities: Transformation, Cooperation, Effectiveness,” Journal of Defense Resources Management 3, no. 1 (2012): 37–54. 29. Cristóbal Montoro Romero, “Disposiciones generales,” Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 249, October 14, 2014, http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2014/10/14/pdfs/BOE -A-2014-10398.pdf. 30. Andrés de Castro García, Florina Cristiana Matei, and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Combatting Terrorism Through Fusion Centers: Useful Lessons from Other Experiences?” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 30, no. 4 (2017): 723–742. 31. For more information, see ibid. The recent Barcelona attack in August 2017, however, reveals failure of intelligence sharing in Spain, between the local police in Barcelona, and the federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies because of bureaucratic challenges, but also perhaps from clashing political views (Catalonia wants independence from Spain). Lauren Frayer, “Criticism Builds for Catalonia Police After Last Week’s Terror Attack in Spain,” Morning Edition, NPR, August 25, 2017, http://www.npr.org/2017/08/25/545998832/criticism-builds-for-catalonia-police -after-last-weeks-terror-attack-in-spain. 32. Estévez, “Criminal Intelligence in Latin America,” 96. 33. Only five have been operational so far; ibid., 99. 34. Ibid. 35. Robert Jervis, “Foreword,” in Reforming Intelligence, edited by Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz (Austin: University of Texas, 2007), viii. 36. “Clermont Police Department Bias Based Profiling Policy,” City of Clermont, Florida, Police Department, https://www.clermontfl.gov/core/fileparse.php/106619 /urlt/CF0151C5-037D-4BFB-820D-92FFFA923B02.PDF. 37. Robert Zaretsky, “How French Secularism Became Fundamentalism,” Foreign Policy, April 7, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/07/the-battle-for-the -french-secular-soul-laicite-charlie-hebdo. 38. Ibid. 39. Alan Riding, “New Law in France Allows Random Identity Checks,” New York Times, June 12, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/12/world/new-law-in -france-allows-random-identity-checks.html. 40. Ibid. 41. Judith Sunderland, “The Root of Humiliation: Abusive Identity Checks in France,” Human Rights Watch, January 26, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/01 /26/root-humiliation/abusive-identity-checks-france; “Police et minorités visibles: les

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contrôles d’identité à Paris,” National Center for Scientific Research, http://www.cnrs.fr /inshs/recherche/docs-actualites/rapport-facies.pdf; United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of France,” CCPR/C/FRA/CO/5, United Nations, August 17, 2015, http://docstore.ohchr .org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsmtlAMSU VPZr5NwSxcDwgKKo26EvxxEe4g%2F1ZtZQqip0I2B%2F0ihUcnG8Hok4ag8yPwIF aJ3uZjEU41IMjoWALzUeCks4UhSN%2BCKwFDJh1Q%2B6. 42. “Foreign Intelligence Gathering Laws: France,” Library of Congress, https:// www.loc.gov/law/help/intelligence-activities/france.php. 43. Douglas Porch, “Cultural Legacies of French Intelligence,” in Reforming Intelligence, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 142. 44. Murtaza Hussein, “Trump’s First Terror Arrest: A Broke Stoner the FBI Threatened at Knifepoint,” The Intercept, February 22, 2017, https://theintercept.com /2017/02/22/trumps-first-terror-arrest-a-broke-stoner-the-fbi-threatened-at-knifepoint. 45. Ibid. 46. Natasha Lennard, “The Line Between FBI Stings and Entrapment Has Not Blurred, It’s Gone,” Vice News, July 22, 2014, https://news.vice.com/article/the-line -between-fbi-stings-and-entrapment-has-not-blurred-its-gone. 47. Susan Glazebrook, “Mr. Big Operations: Innovative Investigative Technique or Threat to Justice?” Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, http://www.hkcfa.hk /filemanager/speech/en/upload/152/Mr%20Big%20Operations%20-%20Innovative %20Investigative%20Technique%20or%20Threat%20to%20Justice.pdf. 48. Ibid. 49. “The USA Patriot Act: Preserving Life and Liberty,” US Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm. 50. “Wiretaps Deemed Unconstitutional in 11 Corruption Cases in Romania,” Romania-Insider, March 11, 2016, https://www.romania-insider.com/wiretaps-deemed -unconstitutional-in-11-corruption-cases-in-romania/166698. 51. “CCR Decision to Forbid Tapping Conducted by SRI Sparks Immediate Reactions of Instructions with Prerogatives in Anticorruption Fight,” Nine O’Clock, March 10, 2016, http://www.nineoclock.ro/ccr-decision-to-forbid-tapping-conducted -by-sri-sparks-immediate-reactions-of-institutions-with-prerogatives-in-anticorruption -fight-intelligence-service-head-says-court-decision-ruling-impacts-secu. 52. Ibid. 53. Romania-Insider, “Wiretaps Deemed Unconstitutional.” 54. Ibid. 55. Michael German and Jay Stanley, “What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?” ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf. 56. Ibid. 57. Estévez, “Criminal Intelligence in Latin America”; Vasiliki Sergianni, “The Intelligence-Law Enforcement Nexus—Europol’s Tools in the Hands of National Law Enforcement Authorities,” Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence 9, no. 1 (June 2017). 58. German and Stanley, “What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers.” 59. Ibid. 60. Christopher Clifton, Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Data Mining,” https://www .britannica.com/technology/data-mining. 61. Daniel J. Solove, Nothing to Hide (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 189–190. 62. Ibid. 63. Estévez, “Criminal Intelligence in Latin America,” 90.

8 Intelligence Sharing Lynda Peters

There is no such thing as “friendly” intelligence agencies. There are only the intelligence agencies of friendly powers. —Mark Lowenthal1

The threat of transnational terrorism—exemplified by such events following 9/11 as the 2004 Madrid train bombings, the 2005 London commuter train and bus bombings, and, most recently, attacks around the globe by adherents of the Islamic State (IS)—has rapidly altered the nature of intelligence sharing, the need for cooperation and coordination among international security agencies, and the formation of terrorism-fighting coalitions.2 In short, many scholars agree that even a large and established democracy can no longer handle its security threats on its own. In this chapter, I review the various reasons intelligence-sharing relationships are formed, the types of problems that can inhibit effective intelligence sharing, and the challenges inherent in creating mutually acceptable agreements.

How Agreements Are Made and Overseen At a basic level, a sharing agreement can involve a two-way exchange or a one-sided push of intelligence. As James Walsh explains, “Some sharing arrangements are reciprocal in that each of the participants 121

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shares intelligence with the others. In other sharing arrangements one participant is principally a sender and the other principally a recipient. Senders participate in such relationships in exchange for concessions by the recipient on other issues, such as diplomatic support or foreign or military aid.”3 Regardless of its purpose, an intelligence-sharing relationship may be reached informally or through negotiation, like a contract with defined terms, explicit performance duties, and enforcement mechanisms. Jelle van Buuren describes the informal process as occurring organically, from the ground up and in a self-organizing manner when intelligence cooperation is perceived to be constrained.4 This happened with the European Union’s Club of Berne when the national-security interests of the individual nations did not always transcend the borders between them.5 It may also occur as a result of a perception by practitioners that security interests demand immediate action, that there is an inability to wait for political figures to hash out the details of a formal sharing arrangement.6 Intelligence entrepreneurs can foster cooperation between practitioners when there is the “potential to influence or change practices, cultures, discourses, operations, policies and even institutions” by coming up with their own way of handling things.7 The logic of practicality, the how things are, guides entrepreneurs despite what van Buuren terms “the normative assumptions about the primacy of politics, the rule of law, and good-governance issues like transparency and accountability,” the elements of how things should be that are negotiated into the explicit terms of a written agreement.8 One reason for negotiating a formal intelligence-sharing agreement may simply be to reduce mistrust between the parties. Whether mutual trust is a necessary precursor to the formation of a partnership is in debate. Walsh explains: There is much evidence that mutual trust facilitates the reliable exchange of information. But we know, too, that high levels of trust are not a necessary condition for intelligence sharing . . . Lefebvre’s conclusion that trust is an “essential ingredient” for intelligence sharing, and Clough’s that it is the “most important factor” driving sharing, suggest that trust must be present for sharing to occur.9

Anna-Katherine McGill and David Gray deem mutual trust as “fundamental in international relations and critical in intelligence

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sharing.”10 In contrast, Walsh observes that mistrust can also lead to the crafting of an intelligence-sharing arrangement that is mutually acceptable to all parties. For example, West Germany entered into an arrangement with the United States during the Cold War, to provide otherwise unobtainable and highly valued intelligence regarding the Soviets in exchange for an infusion of money to build and improve the necessary gathering apparatus.11 Mistrust, driven by conflicting political orientations, divergent security goals, and worries about defection—that intelligence would not be fully shared if some agency personnel were susceptible to blackmail—motivated the United States to carefully structure the terms of the sharing agreement. The United States provided financial support along with strict accounting measures and monitoring designed to track West Germany’s true intelligence activities in order to ensure they were in alignment with US interests. The United States reserved the authority to direct West Germany’s intelligence priorities, for the same reason. In exchange, West Germany retained partial autonomy and was able to expand its intelligence capabilities. The desire for minimizing distrust may drive the terms of a formal intelligence-sharing agreement, but each party’s constitutional and/or statutory requirements may dictate the terms. Many countries have sought to foster trust in the work performed by their own intelligence agencies by imposing mechanisms for oversight and transparency. In this context, South Africa provides an example that occurred during the Mandela administration: “a new Constitution enshrined democratic values and enjoined the intelligence services to respect the rights of individuals, to subject themselves to civilian oversight, and to observe humanitarian international law.”12 Ecuador included a similar temporary clause in its new constitution, which was later enacted into law.13 Peru passed legislation in 2005 to create a national-intelligence system, complete with a blueprint for the structure of the involved agencies, avenues to ensure sharing and coordination between agencies, the stipulation that intelligence be focused on current and potential nationalsecurity threats and risks, and the formation of a congressional oversight committee.14 Japan created a version of a national director of intelligence office but did not imbue it with the fiscal and personnel authority necessary to ensure intelligence sharing and analytical cooperation by the country’s participating intelligence agencies.15 Belgium went so far as to legislate intelligence sharing by subjecting to punishment (a jail term of no more than six months and/or

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a fine in the range of 25 to 500 euros) any civil servant who intentionally fails to provide intelligence to the Threat Assessment Coordination Unit, the body charged with producing the country’s terrorism and extremism threat assessments. 16 The obligation, however, is antithetical to the third-party rule included in the sharing agreements some of Belgium’s agencies have with other nations, a provision designed to preclude release of intelligence to a nonparty to the arrangement. Threats of expulsion from the Club of Berne and concerns among other nations’ intelligence services were allayed when Belgium began requiring that shared foreign intelligence be marked “For Belgian Eyes Only,” as opposed to being for use by the particular receiving agency.17 Legally mandated oversight of intelligence collection and analysis can occur in different ways, in the form of civilian or government bodies. New Zealand uses an inspector general (IG) to oversee its intelligence-centric warrant process to ensure compliance with statutory requirements, though the independence of the IG has been debated. 18 New Zealand’s legislation removes the necessity for a judicially approved warrant when the situation is an emergency. 19 South Africa also uses an IG. 20 Albania, Belgium, Chile, and Peru, among others, use legislative committees to watch their intelligence agencies; however, none have much authority to actually monitor their effectiveness or compliance with legal requirements.21 Illegal practices may instead come to light, such as in Albania, Romania, South Korea, and Spain, to name a few, revealed through investigative journalism.22 Legislation may also mandate information retention and release in an effort to address the privacy intrusion that occurs when individuals’ information is gathered and stored for future use. The conflict between nations’ approaches to addressing this issue is illustrated in the different approaches used by states in the European Union (EU) and the United States. McGill and Gray frame it in the following manner: Personal data is critical to counterterrorism efforts because it “often provide[s] the only evidence of connections between members of terrorist groups and the types of activities that they are conducting.” However, Europe has shown resistance to freely sharing this type of information with its American counterparts since many of the US’s European allies have much more stringent views on the protection of personal data.23

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A few examples illustrate the disparity in approach to the handling of personal data obtained by intelligence agencies. Australia has a provision that mandates the destruction of information gathered pursuant to a warrant once it is no longer needed to detect nationalsecurity threats through domestic surveillance; the United Kingdom requires destruction once the purposes authorized by the language of the warrant under which it was gathered have been satisfied.24 Canada allows the retention of information about activities that may reasonably constitute a continuing security threat, making it challenging to determine when destruction should occur. Once information is retained, it may be subject to public disclosure under legislation designed to promote transparency, despite objections from the security sector. Ephraim Kahana and Daphna Sharfman summarize the threat that the release of multiple, seemingly innocuous pieces of information can pose: “Disparate items of information, though individually of limited or no utility to their possessor, can take on added significance when combined with other items of information. Combining the items illuminates their interrelationships and breeds analytic synergies, so that the resulting mosaic of information is bigger than the sum of its parts.”25 This “mosaic theory” explains the challenge that public disclosure laws can present in the intelligence context. The dizzying array of legal requirements makes clear that a formal agreement must acknowledge the varied and even conflicting rules of law controlling each party’s intelligence activities while specifying which party’s laws will control the arrangement. In terms of monitoring the parties for defection, Walsh proposes the agreement designate an independent third party, perhaps an international organization, to serve that function. It is debatable whether such an option is realistic. Even Walsh acknowledges that the advantage to using an independent monitor, should one be found to exist, is unlikely due to nations’ desire to “secure and keep secret their intelligence activities, since [monitoring] requires that intelligence agencies divulge detailed information about their actions.”26 The solution, as with the quandary presented by each party’s multiple and potentially conflicting laws, may be to place the role of monitor upon one of the parties to the agreement. The effectiveness of such an arrangement, though, will face the same resistance to reveal details about sources and methods, as well as specifics about the analysis process, as using an independent monitor does.27

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Why Intelligence-Sharing Arrangements Are Made The ubiquitous analysis of costs and benefits, states Walsh, may well serve as the starting point for understanding what an intelligencesharing arrangement can achieve.28 Recognition of resource constraints that limit the ability of intelligence activity to address national-security priorities can lead to the formation of one or more intelligence-sharing endeavors to compensate for capability deficits.29 Walsh identifies the following concrete examples of how collaboration can provide a country access to intelligence that is not otherwise obtainable at an acceptable cost: Shared intelligence from other governments’ signals intercept stations, reconnaissance aircraft, or satellites that cover areas of the world not monitored by the recipient’s intelligence agencies, pooling manpower to analyze an intelligence target that is of interest to both governments, coordinating networks of agents providing human intelligence, or joint investments in the development of new technologies useful for intelligence collection or in expensive intelligence assets such as satellites or listening posts.30

Accordingly, a country may determine it is more cost effective to leverage intelligence developed by an ally, as opposed to investing in the resources, personnel, and training necessary to create the expertise to develop its own. The need for intelligence sharing among democracies also arises from the fact that security and intelligence are no longer the exclusive purview of the national-level government.31 Local law-enforcement agencies and private security providers have entered the intelligencecollection business, eroding the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign efforts and blurring the internal-external division between various intelligence services and security professionals. Thus, intelligencesharing today also poses the potential of collaboration with nongovernmental partners. Adam Svendsen provides an illustration of this trend in the form of the growing reliance on open-source intelligence (OSINT) since 9/11: The “flourishing of private sector and non-state actor intelligence enterprises” began with a focus on business intelligence but has since morphed into providing privatized assessments and global-risk analyses that transcend international boundaries.32 The decision whether to engage in intelligence sharing may also be influenced by a desire for foreign aid or to repair or create diplomatic ties with another country.33 An intelligence-sharing arrange-

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ment may be seen as a way to influence the foreign policy of and military action taken by another country.34 The intelligence liaison between the United States and Pakistan is one illustration: Pakistan has enhanced its military ties with the United States while the two countries’ mutual interests of combating terrorism and seeking stability in regions contiguous to Pakistan, such as Afghanistan, have been served.35 Alternatively, entering an agreement may merely be a means to formalize a patchwork of preexisting ad hoc and bilateral intelligence-sharing arrangements that were created as the need to address particular issues arose.36 Walsh explains that intelligencesharing institutions, such as the Berne group in the European Union, “serve the useful functions of creating technical mechanisms for the diffusion of intelligence between national authorities, including organizing regular meetings of ministers and officials, creating common intelligence databases and sharing information on security practices such as counter-terrorism.”37 This singular institution replaced numerous arrangements reached between various sets of EU member states, thereby benefiting the whole as opposed to just those who were party to the previous multitude of agreements. The nature of the arrangement, according to LeFebvre, depends on the entities involved “sharing a common perception of a threat or sets of interests.”38 The transnational nature of personal and business relationships, facilitated by advancements that permit round-the-clock interconnectivity and international travel, have transformed the nature of border security for all nations. The McKinsey Global Institute, a private-sector think tank, identifies four phenomena as forces affecting various interests of democracies around the world, in particular those of an economic nature: emerging markets such as China and India, evolving technology, the changing demographics of the world’s population, and the interconnectivity of trade and the movements of people, capital, and information. These forces are each identified as impacting economies around the world.39 Threats to the progression of one or more of these phenomena may affect multiple nations, thereby providing a shared interest and common ground for intelligence cooperation. Svendsen describes another type of shared interest that motivates intelligence sharing: countries and states are experiencing transnational, networked, and asymmetric threats in the form of “terrorism, proliferation, narcotics, human trafficking and other forms of organized crime, together with the demands of stabilization (peace) and humanitarian operations, as well as tackling anti-globalization movements.”40 He argues that these shared concerns motivate the globalization of

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intelligence. Similarly, van Buuren refers to modern intelligencecooperation arrangements as internationalized or globalized intelligence.41 As a consequence, intelligence has evolved so specialists in different locations can band together to share strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence concerning a variety of security concerns, much like military coalitions.42 One outlier to the influence of a common security goal on intelligence sharing is Brazil, which is, as Bruneau maintains, “considered a ‘geopolitically satisfied’ country with no major border disputes with its neighbors.”43 Brazil has no perceived enemies to incentivize a commitment of political capital and financial resources to intelligence, both in terms of forming an alliance with another nation and working to improve the underdeveloped apparatus that exists within its borders. Another anomaly is India. Matthew Crosston explains that India’s intelligence strategies are informed by the common security threats of international terrorism and nuclear proliferation as well as what he terms to be “human or non-traditional security” threats.44 He further argues: For India these issues (energy, food, water, cyber, maritime and migration) are inextricably linked, putting great domestic pressure on the state in terms of social welfare, and clearly and directly impacting the country’s present and future international relationships. . . . Food and water, depending upon the context, can easily be seen at times by India as greater national security priorities than nuclear proliferation.

The challenge for India becomes finding nations that are willing to commit intelligence resources to address what some might term to be domestic, not national, security concerns. In other words, India’s ability to enter intelligence-sharing arrangements with other nations is limited because the arrangement does not satisfy LeFebvre’s observation that “sharing a common perception of a threat or sets of interests” is a precursor to collaboration.45

Examples of Intelligence-Sharing Arrangements Between Democracies Intelligence sharing may occur in various forms and formats. One of the most frequent types of intelligence cooperation occurs between a pair of countries (bilateral) or between several countries (multilat-

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eral). The nature of contemporary global threats also fuels the need for intelligence alliances on a regional level to serve multicountry partnerships, such as the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Regionalized intelligence sharing can also operate within a country, such as Algeria, in North Africa, where it is necessary to address burgeoning terrorism and related attacks.46 In this connection, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), which operates under the African Union, is an example of a regional alliance that strives to facilitate intelligence sharing and counterintelligence efforts by providing a secure channel for participating member states to coordinate threat response and address capacity needs.47 A well-known example of what started as a two-country partnership but transformed over time into a global coalition is the signals intelligence arrangement that Britain and the United States formed during World War II. Jeffrey Dailey describes how a mutually beneficial signals intelligence (SIGINT) relationship (“Britain had cracked Germany’s Enigma cipher and the United States had cracked Japan’s Purple cipher”) was later memorialized into the UK-US agreement and has since expanded to include peacetime operations with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 48 Formally known as Five Eyes, the current version of the agreement was created by treaty and permits its members to spread the burden of marshaling intelligence to counter global-security threats. Each of the five, when operating within the context of the formal agreement, is responsible for gathering and analyzing intelligence involving specific regions of the world on issues in the strategic maritime domain and the “aerospace domain,” which encompasses “ballistic missile tests, foreign satellite deployments and the military activities of relevant air forces.”49 At times, the agreement expands to allow cooperation with Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Norway (the Nine Eyes) and additionally Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden (the Fourteen Eyes, officially “SIGINT Seniors Europe,” with the objective of coordinating the exchange of military signals between members).50 The core five members share common security goals, similar cultures, and harmonious democratic values, all of which foster the ability for the multiple nations to coalesce. 51 And, the final product is generally recognized to exceed what any one of the members could produce individually.

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SIGINT sharing also drives a relationship between North Korea’s intelligence agencies, the Russian military intelligence operation known as the GRU (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye) and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).52 The arrangement enhances North Korea’s electronic intelligence capability, to boot. North Korea more typically collaborates with subintelligence entities such as information brokers, private intelligence and security businesses, and organized crime, using middlemen as opposed to overt relationships as a consequence of economic constraints and the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc.53 A most recent example of multilateral intelligence-sharing arrangements includes the trilateral cooperation in the Sulu-Sulawesi Sea between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, initiated in 2017. 54 The Club of Berne is an example of a regional intelligence collaboration born out of an economic and political alliance of multiple nations, the EU.55 It serves as a forum for the head of each nation’s security services to meet and to share information using a dedicated communications system. According to Björn Müller-Wille, the Club of Berne “can act as an interface between the EU and the heads of Member States’ security and intelligence services on terrorist matters, (although) this has never been its primary purpose.”56 Rather, as Walsh explains, “The Club has established working groups on terrorism and organized crime and in 2001 created the Counterterrorist Group (CTG) in which the Member States, as well as the United States, produce common threat assessments that are shared between the membership and with some [European] Union committees.”57 These activities are not based upon a formal agreement, meaning there appears to be no commitment or supposition that members will share all pertinent intelligence. Several intelligence collaborations exist in Central Asia, resulting from shared security goals as well as geographic proximity. They include the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), initially begun in 1992 as the Russian-run Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 58 The CSTO is an arrangement designed to support investigations and operations targeting internal and external threats, including Islamic militants, drug trafficking, the protection of classified government data, and illegal migration, but it does not foster a coordinated foreign policy between its members. 59 The CSTO is presently composed of a mix of democracies and nondemocracies, including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

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Russia, and Tajikistan. It has been described as a NATO-like multilateral security organization. CSTO officials, however, have been unsuccessful in their efforts to be recognized by NATO as an equal regional alliance.60 Richard Weitz explains that this is primarily because NATO, as an organization, and its individual members perceive the CSTO “to be a Moscow-dominated institution and mechanism to reinforce Russian hegemony in Central Asia.” In Asia, on January 25, 2018, six Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN members)—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines—initiated a new intelligence-sharing agreement, in Indonesia, dubbed “Our Eyes” Initiative (OEI), with a view to strengthening their capabilities to fight current transnational security threats more effectively.61

Challenges and Limitations to Intelligence-Sharing Arrangements Partners to an intelligence-sharing arrangement typically possess the mutual goal of enhancing their own overall capabilities, though the reality is that one partner’s intelligence resources may far exceed the other’s in terms of tradecraft, technical ability (including interoperability), and expertise. A power inequity can even exist because of the advantage that comes from geographic proximity to and sociocultural familiarity with a target.62 As such, as Chris Clough explains, the quid pro quo that is used by intelligence agencies to describe sharing arrangements implies that the exchanges of sources, raw product, or analyzed intelligence “are rarely even or equitable but that mutual benefit will be gained over the length of a liaison.”63 Politicians and policymakers can heavily influence intelligence sharing, both by identifying potential partners with whom they will reach agreements and the means by which exchanges can occur. Interestingly, nations may become allies through intelligence collaboration on one security issue (such as countering transnational terrorism or the international narcotics trade) while remaining adversaries on another, as a result of vastly different foreign-policy objectives (such as policies on war in Iraq).64 Van Buuren argues that there is the potential for a disconnect between those negotiating intelligence arrangements and those who are engaged in the actual exchange of information and analysis.

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Diplomats and lawyers negotiating international treaties or policymakers debating options operate from different interests, insights and bodies of knowledge than specialists who have to design practical forms of international cooperation. It is one thing to design a treaty, institutional arrangement or policy paving the way for international intelligence and security cooperation; it is however quite another to put these policies in practice while acknowledging the particularities of the intelligence cultures involved.65

Practitioners engaged in gathering and developing intelligence and advising those who develop policy will work with others whether or not there is a formal sharing arrangement. Van Buuren proffers that the need to obtain intelligence to address common security goals will result in the formation of ad hoc “intelligence assemblages” by entrepreneurs, and those assemblages “cannot be primarily understood as the conscious and rational result of political-administrative decisionmaking, institutional changes or policies (although institutions and policies of course have their effect on these practices).”66 When diplomats and policymakers are involved, differences in threat perception and foreign-policy objectives between nations may prevent intelligence alliances from forming. It would be problematic on a fundamental level, for example, for Western nations to work with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, given the accusations that Assad has committed war crimes against his own people.67 A hurdle to sharing can exist if one partner is a nation that is known to engage in extraordinary rendition, torture, and other human-rights violations as a means of extracting information from human sources and those methods are contrary to the other partner’s ethos and rule of law. A hurdle may also exist if one party has an aversion to capital punishment, whereas the other views the death penalty as an appropriate sentence.68 As Svendsen observes, “ethical behavior is inextricably linked to operational effectiveness, especially for those seeking to lead coalitions and alliances.”69 The ability to engage in intelligence sharing may be challenged simply by various notions of what intelligence is, and the definition may be influenced by “the different institutional set up of intelligence, security and police services in various states.”70 Müller-Wille explains that certain countries, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, “strictly separate police authorities with executive powers from intelligence services,” whereas many other countries, such as France and Sweden, comingle police and intelligence functions.71 As

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intelligence is tailored to support the work of decisionmakers, it matters whether it is being supplied to enable an arrest by law enforcement (tactical) or to inform policy decisionmakers (strategic). Mistrust is another challenge. Mistrust can be created by the fear of defection (when one party to an intelligence-sharing agreement intentionally or inadvertently discloses information to an unauthorized third party, shares bogus intelligence, overstates the veracity of its intelligence, or withholds intelligence, in whole or in part) and is a strong motivator in that regard.72 Defection may result in the revelation of sources and methods, the means of intelligence gathering most agencies hold sacrosanct. It may sway the creation of inappropriate policy by decisionmakers and allow military action to be taken in error. It may result in embarrassment to world leaders, negatively influence diplomatic relations, and damage future intelligence-sharing opportunities (the extent of these outcomes from WikiLeaks in 2010 is still unknown).73 The challenge in preventing such dire consequences is how to effectively discover and address defection when it occurs. Consequently, Svendsen posits that the intelligence cooperation process can become akin to a business relationship where “intelligence is not always regarded as a common good but instead as a commodity or product that is carefully negotiated and traded.”74 Defection may be minimized and trust between the parties improved when the exchange of intelligence is limited to specific topics that are related to the aligned security interests among the parties.75 Additionally, Walsh proposes using a hierarchical arrangement in which one party, the dominant power, holds the authority to interpret the agreement in an effort to reduce the opportunity for the subordinate party to exploit ambiguities.76 Along with that comes the authority to oversee compliance and impose punishment (monetary or in the form of termination of the agreement, without fear of reprisal), should defection occur. In theory, revelation of a party’s defection will harm its reputation and ability to enter into sharing arrangements in the future. In reality, exposing defection may necessitate the associated exposure of one’s own secret sources and methods, as when disclosure of intelligence to an unauthorized third party can only be demonstrated by revealing details that also demonstrate the offended party’s gathering and analysis processes.77 Additional challenges include dissimilar resources, capabilities, methods, and equipment. In this connection, differences in capabilities, Matei notes, “may result in unfair and unequal distribution of

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power, and even unfair burden-sharing, among partner agencies, especially if there is a ‘dominant partner.’”78 European leaders therefore complain that the intelligence sharing between the United States and Europe is virtually a one-way street, because the United States expects intelligence from the European democracies, yet more often than not does not share with them.79 Another limitation—particularly concerning international intelligence cooperation and sharing—arises from language barriers and cultural gaps. One limitation to forming intelligence sharing arrangements arises in the realm of cyberespionage. As Mark Galeotti argues, “a few smart hackers, decent hardware, and access to the net” are all that is needed; “no language training institutes, no months spent cultivating a potential source, no ‘legends’—carefully constructed fake identities—and no special communications means to get the information back home.”80 This is an example of the need for resources as motivation for collaboration in reverse. In short, the shared interest of having cyberespionage capabilities will not drive a collaboration, as obtaining the tools needed to accomplish the job is not dependent upon entering into an agreement with another entity. Obstacles to intelligence cooperation and sharing also occur for individual, rather than institutional, reasons, such as personal interests of certain intelligence agents. For example, some intelligence personnel refuse to share information as a means to allow them to advance themselves. Or, intelligence personnel use the information shared by their counterparts from within their organization, as well as from other organizations, or abroad, without giving any credit to the originating agency. 81 Chase Boardman notes that “this sort of behavior leads to interagency distrust and the refusal, later on, of other organizations to assist that agency in both large and small things. Information is withheld or shared only grudgingly, especially as it becomes clear that sharing has become a one-way process and that credit is not going to be given where it is due.”82 One particular challenge stems from the need for intelligence agencies in democracies to cooperate and share intelligence counterparts from nondemocratic regimes—hostile or friendly—whose raison d’être is to help authoritarian regimes stay in power, via corruption, abuses, and crimes against their own citizens. Examples include intelligence agencies in the United States working with counterparts from countries such as Sudan and Uzbekistan, in order to track AlQaeda, despite the abuses and brutalities carried out by intelligence

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agencies in these countries against their citizenry. As Daniel Byman notes, “The same security services that disrupt terrorists are the ones that spy on peaceful opposition and put down demonstrations.”83 Such cooperation results in the intelligence agencies’ either directly or indirectly contributing to or supporting human rights abuses.84

Conclusion

In sum, the majority of “intelligence agencies recognize that the gaps in their coverage, access, or expertise to do certain things, periodically compel them to rely on allied intelligence services to fill the void.”85 Nevertheless, intelligence sharing among democracies still follows Ronald Reagan’s “trust but verify” advice.86

Notes

1. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 2. Jelle van Buuren, “Analyzing International Intelligence Cooperation: Institutions or Intelligence Assemblages?” in The Future of Intelligence: Challenges in the 21st Century, edited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Ben de Jong, and Joop van Reijn (London: Routledge, 2014), 80; Anna-Katherine Staser McGill and David H. Gray, “Challenges to International Counterterrorism Intelligence Sharing,” Global Security Studies 3, no. 3 (Summer 2012), 76; Stéphane Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 16, no. 4 (2003), 527; Adam D. M. Svendsen, “Developing International Intelligence Liaison Against Islamic State: Approaching ‘One for All and All for One’?” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 29, no. 2 (2016), 262. 3. James Igoe Walsh, “Defection and Hierarchy in International Intelligence Sharing,” Journal of Public Policy 27, no. 2 (2007), 158. 4. van Buuren, “Analyzing International Intelligence Cooperation,” 85. 5. Ibid., 85. Detailed information on the Club de Berne is provided later in this chapter. 6. Ibid., 90. 7. Ibid., 88. 8. Ibid., 89. 9. James Igoe Walsh, “Intelligence Sharing,” in Routledge Companion Intelligence Studies, edited by Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman, and Claudia Hillebrand (Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge, 2014), 293. 10. McGill and Gray, “Challenges to International Counterterrorism Intelligence Sharing,” 83. 11. Walsh, “Defection and Hierarchy,” 176–177. 12. Sandy Africa, “The Policy Evolution of the South African Civilian Intelligence Services: 1994 to 2009 and Beyond,” Strategic Review for Southern Africa 34, no. 1 (May 2012), 123; see also Laurie Nathan, “Intelligence Bound: The South African Constitution and Intelligence Services,” International Affairs 86, no. 1 (January 2010): 195–210.

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13. Eduardo E. Estévez, “Comparing Intelligence Democratization in Latin America,” Intelligence and National Security 29, no. 4 (2014): 570–571. 14. Ibid., 563–564. 15. Yoshiki Kobayashi, “Assessing Reform of the Japanese Intelligence Community,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 28, no. 4 (2015), 721. 16. Kenneth L. Lasoen, “For Belgian Eyes Only: Intelligence Cooperation in Belgium,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 30, no. 3 (2017), 474; Lefebvre, “The Belgians Just Aren’t Up to It,” 8. 17. Lasoen, “For Belgian Eyes Only,” 475. 18. Katharine Briar Guilford, “Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Warrantless Surveillance Powers of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service,” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 47 (June 2016), 100, 104. 19. Ibid., 96. 20. Africa, “South African Civilian Intelligence Services,” 98. 21. Matei, Xharo, and Bala. “Albania’s Intelligence After Hoxha,” 306, 311, 313. 22. See ibid.; Born, Johnson, and Leigh, eds., Who’s Watching the Spies?; Farson et al., PSI Handbook. 23. McGill and Gray, “Challenges to International Counterterrorism Intelligence Sharing,” 78. 24. Guilford, “Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” 16. 25. Ephraim Kahana and Daphna Sharfman, “Misuse of Power in Israeli Intelligence,” Israel Affairs 20, no. 1 (2014), 71. 26. Walsh, “Intelligence Sharing,” 294. 27. James I. Walsh, “Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not Enough,” Journal of Common Market Studies 44, no. 3 (September 2006), 630. 28. Walsh, “Defection and Hierarchy,” 155. 29. Johnson and Wirtz, Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies, 518. 30. Walsh, “Defection and Hierarchy,” 157. 31. van Buuren, “Analyzing International Intelligence Cooperation,” 81. 32. Adam Svendsen, “The Globalization of Intelligence Since 9/11: Frameworks and Operational Parameters,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21, no. 1 (2008), 139. 33. Walsh, “Intelligence Sharing,” 534. 34. LeFebvre, “Difficulties and Dilemmas,” 534. 35. P. C. Dheeraj, “U.S.-Pakistan Intelligence Liaison in South Asia’s Age of Terror: A Realist Analysis,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 12, no. 2 (2017), 150–151. 36. Walsh, “Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union,” 626. 37. Ibid., 626. 38. LeFebvre, “Difficulties and Dilemmas,” 529. 39. Richard Dobbs, James Manyika, and Jonathan Woetzel, No Ordinary Disruption: The Four Global Forces Breaking All the Trends (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 4–8, 17. 40. Svendsen, “Globalization of Intelligence Since 9/11,” 132. 41. van Buuren, “Analyzing International Intelligence Cooperation,” 81. 42. Svendsen, “Globalization of Intelligence Since 9/11,” 134. 43. Thomas C. Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in Brazil: A Long, Drawn-Out Process,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 28, no. 3 (2015), 505–506, 513. 44. Matthew Crosston, “Bringing Non-Western Cultures and Conditions into Comparative Intelligence Perspectives: India, Russia and China,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 29, no. 1 (2016), 115–116. 45. LeFebvre, “Difficulties and Dilemmas,” 529.

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46. Lawrence E. Cline, “African Regional Intelligence Cooperation: Problems and Prospects,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 29, no. 3 (2016), 447. 47. Ibid., 449. 48. Jeffrey Dailey, “The Intelligence Club: A Comparative Look at Five Eyes,” Journal of Political Sciences and Public Affairs 5, no. 2 (2017), 1. 49. J. Vitor Tossini, “The Five Eyes—The Intelligence Alliance of the Anglosphere,” UK Defense Journal, November 14, 2017, 1–2. 50. Ibid., 2. 51. Ibid., 2–3. 52. Stephan Blancke, “North Korean Intelligence Structures,” North Korean Review 5, no. 2 (Fall 2009), 9. 53. Ibid., 11. 54. Prashanth Parameswaran, “What’s Next for the New ASEAN ‘Our Eyes’ Intelligence Initiative? A Closer Look at a Subregional Counterterrorism Mechanism Launched This Week in Indonesia,” Diplomat, January 27, 2018. 55. LeFebvre, “Difficulties and Dilemmas,” 530. 56. Björn Müller-Wille, “The Effect of International Terrorism on EU Intelligence Co-Operation,” Journal of Common Market Studies 46, no. 1 (2008), 55. 57. Walsh, “Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union,” 631. 58. Stéphane Lefebvre and Roger N. McDermott, “Russia and the Intelligence Services of Central Asia,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21, no. 2 (2008), 258–259. 59. Elia Bescotti, “The Collective Security Treaty Organisation and Its Limits on Integration,” Analytical Media Eurasian Studies, February 1, 2018, 2, 21. 60. Richard Weitz, “The Collective Security Treaty Organization: Past Struggles and Future Prospects,” Russian Analytical Digest 152 (July 21, 2014), 3. 61. Parameswaran, “What’s Next for ‘Our Eyes’ Intelligence Initiative.” 62. Martin Rudner, “Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 17, no. 2 (2004), 216; Svendsen, “Globalization of Intelligence Since 9/11,” 12. 63. Chris Clough, “Quid Pro Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 17, no. 4 (2004), 601. 64. Stephen Lander, “International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no. 3 (October 2004), 482. 65. van Buuren, “Analyzing International Intelligence Cooperation,” 83. 66. Ibid., 88. 67. Svendsen, “Developing International Intelligence Liaison,” 264; McGill and Gray, “Challenges to International Counterterrorism Intelligence Sharing,” 79. 68. McGill and Gray, “Challenges to International Counterterrorism Intelligence Sharing.” 69. Svendsen, “Globalization of Intelligence Since 9/11,” 138; see also: van Buuren, “Analyzing International Intelligence Cooperation,” 90; Walsh, “Intelligence Sharing,” 291. 70. Müller-Wille, “Effect of International Terrorism,” 51. 71. Ibid., 52. 72. Walsh, “Defection and Hierarchy,” 152, 159; LeFebvre, “Difficulties and Dilemmas,” 536. 73. McGill and Gray, “Challenges to International Counterterrorism Intelligence Sharing,” 83. 74. Svendsen, “Globalization of Intelligence Since 9/11,” 138. 75. Walsh, “Defection and Hierarchy,” 162.

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76. Ibid., 152, 161. 77. Walsh, “Intelligence Sharing,” 294. 78. Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, “Obstacles to Intelligence Cooperation in Countering Terrorism,” in Intelligence and Combating Terrorism. New Paradigm and Future Challenges, edited by Denis Caleta and Paul Shemella, 75–91 (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Institute for Comparative Studies, 2014). 79. Ibid. 80. Mark Galeotti, “Size Doesn’t Matter for Spies Anymore,” Foreign Policy, January 31, 2018. 81. Matei, “Obstacles to Intelligence Cooperation.” 82. Chase H. Boardman, “Organizational Culture Challenges to Interagency and Intelligence Community Communication and Interaction” (master’s thesis, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2006). 83. Daniel Byman, “The Intelligence War on Terrorism,” Intelligence and National Security 28 (2013): 1–27. 84. Elizabeth Sepper, “Democracy, Human Rights, and Intelligence Sharing,” Texas International Law Journal 46 (2010): 151–207; Byman, “The Intelligence War on Terrorism.” 85. Erik J. Dahl, “Intelligence and Terrorism,” paper prepared for the International Studies Association (ISA) Compendium Project and for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, February 2009. 86. See: Bob Whipple, “Trust but Verify,” Leadergrow, https://www.leadergrow .com/articles/443-trust-but-verify.

9 Counterinsurgency Eduardo E. Estévez

Effective intelligence for counterinsurgency has . . . been a great challenge . . . Even with the modern gamut of collection and analytic capabilities, successful intelligence against insurgents remains difficult. —Seth Milstein1

Insurgency is a term subject to different interpretations and that, as Scott Moore points out, “continues to be used interchangeably, and imprecisely, with irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, revolutionary warfare, guerrilla warfare and even terrorism.”2 According to US Army Field Manual 3-24, counterinsurgency is “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.”3 Acknowledging the multidimensionality of the concept and the need to adjust it to the present century, Moore proposes an expanded definition of insurgency as a “protracted violent conflict in which one or more groups seek to overthrow or fundamentally change the political or social order in a state or region through the use of sustained violence, subversion, social disruption, and political action.”4 This definition of insurgency informs the understanding of counterinsurgency, as used in this chapter. The views expressed here are those of the author alone.

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During the twentieth century, counterinsurgency developed through diverse contexts, including colonial wars, low-intensity conflicts, and the so-called small wars, waging irregular warfare.5 With the end of the Cold War, US national security began to focus on strategic asymmetries.6 Counterinsurgency, perhaps most prominently but not exclusively represented by the American acronym of COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan during the so-called Global War on Terrorism, has become a fixture of the early twenty-first century. It remains a misunderstood and sometimes misused term. The US Government Counterinsurgency Guide defines Counterinsurgency (COIN) as “the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes. Unlike conventional warfare, non-military means are often the most effective elements, with military forces playing an enabling role.”7 Nevertheless, though counterinsurgency is controversial,8 particularly for its connection to US COIN tactics, counterinsurgency is inextricably linked with intelligence.9 That is to say, counterinsurgency cannot succeed without intelligence. In this chapter, I explore this connection.

Defining Counterinsurgency A handbook of intelligence and security published by known scholars of intelligence and democracy from Latin America, Portugal, and Spain defines counterinsurgency as a state response—mainly of military, police, and intelligence character—which aims to combat those groups or violent organizations perceived as relevant challengers to the established political order.”10 The editors of the dictionary note that there is some controversy about the use of the term because of the difficulties posed by its definition as deliberately applied to contexts of low-intensity violence against the state. Douglas Porch locates some of this controversy in the history of counterinsurgency tactics: “COIN gradually emerged as a separate category of warfare . . . linked to two historic factors: the professionalization of European warfare in the nineteenth century, and the emergence of a coherent doctrine of subversion in the twentieth.”11 Neither practice was particularly democratically minded. Arguably, neither practice especially sustained or nurtured democracy or civil rights in its wake, as Porch’s examples—from the British experience

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in Northern Ireland to the Vietnam War for the United States— demonstrate. There is recognition that “counter-insurgency campaigns can be a particularly brutal form of warfare because of the difficulties of distinguishing insurgents from civilians.”12 In the hands of nondemocratic leaders, “counterinsurgency” can be an alibi for quelling dissent or sidelining legitimate opposition. Daniel Byman describes techniques chosen by authoritarian regimes to confront insurgencies as: repression; intelligence penetration and information operations; population transfers and ethnic cleansing; mass indoctrination and limiting war weariness; limited reforms and co-optation.13 Such new democracies as Nigeria have opted for similarly repressive techniques, as well, evidenced by the disproportionate use of force by the military, in charge of internal security and counterinsurgency: “The brutal nature of [Joint Task Forces’] counterinsurgency operations has exacerbated the level of violence perpetrated against civilians—civilians are often trapped in the cycle of retaliatory violence perpetrated by both the [Joint Task Forces] and insurgents.”14 Again, the trouble began in the time before democracy or civil liberties had much traction in Africa, specifically stemming “from the colonial and post-colonial experience of Nigeria which created a repressive state that is constantly battling with legitimacy.”15 Moreover, corruption and insurgency “undermined democracy, good governance, human and capital development, [and] political stability and have done great havoc to the image of Nigeria globally.”16 Although counterinsurgency has military origins and uses military tactics, each one has a clear civilian aspect, especially today. A revised version of FM 3-24 US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual defines counterinsurgency as the “comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.”17 These root causes are where the often touted “hearts and minds” campaign comes into play, much of which requires civilian—in the sense of nonmilitary—participation. The further from the battlefield that counterinsurgency gets, however, the more it may come to look like population control by dominant actors—state and nonstate entities—who, as Alexander Dunlap describes it, “seek to colonize and incorporate the people and natural resources into the projects of dominant actors.” 18 A wellillustrated case study are the wind-energy projects in the Isthmus of

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Tehuantepec region of Oaxaca, Mexico, showing “how counterinsurgency is applied—to support climate change mitigation and green economy projects— . . . [and] how the military and other dominant actors use the green economy as a legitimizing device to push through wider projects of control.”19 In an attempt to de-conflict the various definitions available in the scholarly literature, Scott Moore offers a prescriptive definition for counterinsurgency, which is the most comprehensive for these types of operations: “an integrated set of political, economic, social, and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic, and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency in order to establish and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability.”20

Counterinsurgency and Intelligence Counterinsurgency has changed in part because insurgencies are evolving as well. In Moore’s view, “Tightly controlled insurgencies based on rural unrest are giving way to loosely organized networks of extremists hiding in ethnic and religious enclaves.”21 The action is also shifting to the cities, a fact that has significance for intelligence analysis. Moore highlights, “As insurgencies increasingly are conducted in urban areas, the potential for spectacular violence also increases. In the past three decades, insurgency violence increasingly targeted populated areas rather than security forces.”22 In addition, urban social mobilization may lead to insurgency in environments where there are political constraints on the use of force.23 As a matter of fact, “Counterinsurgency initiatives have led governments as well as resource extraction companies to view civil dissent, non-violent social movements and organized opposition as insurgent or protoinsurgent, where they apply various mixtures of consent and coercion to defuse group formations or their militancy.”24 Effective counterinsurgency operations against these types of insurgencies call for concerted actions by domestic and international actors—involving government and nongovernmental institutions.25 The role of intelligence in their success remains cardinal .26 Moore describes two basic strategic approaches, one predominantly military and the other aimed in establishing lasting stability, focusing on the resolution of all dimensions of the conflict.27 Exam-

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ples of the first approach are from the 1970s, the cases of Argentina and Guatemala, authoritarian regimes that involved their armed forces in continuously suppressing real and perceived enemies of the state. Moore argues that “the British in Malaya in the 1950s and the U.S.-supported counterinsurgency in El Salvador in the 1980s” represent the second type.28 In both types of counterinsurgency, enemycentric, population-centric intelligence,29 as well as environmentalcentric intelligence,30 are considered relevant. Martin Thomas, for example, highlights the role played by military intelligence in the French Arab territories, such as the Moroccan protectorate, while confronting tribal insurgency at the beginning of the twentieth century.31 His study on Middle East and North African intelligence formations under British and French colonial states defined as intelligence states highlights the significance of past precedents for intelligence-gathering and policing strategies related to, for example, ethnographic data.32 Disorder, Thomas asserts, “always exposed the extent of colonial reliance on locally recruited auxiliaries to do much of the dirty work of intelligence collection and counterinsurgency operations.”33 Regarding military intelligence in counterinsurgency settings, it is assumed that the process of mechanization of the militaries that evolved after World War I, limiting the interaction with local populations, affected intelligence-gathering capabilities, which “suffer a kind of ‘information starvation’ that inhibits their ability to solve the identification problem.”34 A more recent experience is the wellknown secret CIA counterinsurgency campaign, the Phoenix program, “an operation conducted during the Vietnam War between 1967 and 1971 to infiltrate, identify, and neutralize the Vietcong infrastructure in rural villages [that] is recognized as having been an exceptionally effective counterinsurgency measure based on Britishinspired countergang principles, dependent on defectors denouncing their former comrades.”35 Given the proliferation of asymmetric conflicts today, military control over the territory has lost strategic significance. Rather, the human factor has acquired heightened relevance, and military intelligence has taken note of this development. The cases of Afghanistan and Iraq give accounts of anthropologists being integrated into a project to understand the human dimension of the conflict through the lens of social science, an effort called the Human Terrain System.36 As a tool for success, cultural intelligence (CULINT) appears

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as a key element in counterinsurgency operations in order to avoid pitfalls in cultural awareness.37 Support to counterinsurgency strategies performed by local security forces or proxies on behalf of global powers—described as second-party counterinsurgency—is typical in the current era, but its theory and practice still lack sound foundations.38 Western rationales for counterinsurgency shifted toward more indirect forms of intervention, intervention at a distance aimed to promote “responsible” self-governance, a formula, as stated, that may fail and even exacerbate violence and coercion.39 This development is related to a trend in contemporary international relations and military affairs affecting proxy wars, “the emergence of a contemporary ‘Vietnam Syndrome,’ which has decreased public and political appetite in the West for large-scale counterinsurgency ‘quagmires’ against a backdrop of a global recession,” in the words of Andrew Mumford. 40 Africa provides an example of regional powers engaging in proxy wars moved by inter- and intrastate struggles for power and resources.41 This shift also has implications for intelligence. Cross-border violence, insurgencies, and drugs are matters affecting regional security and South-South intelligence cooperation, of which little is known at present.42 Police and intelligence usually work together in the field of counterinsurgency.43 The role of police in understanding cultural values of minority groups has been highlighted.44 In the case of Indonesia, “in a well-meaning effort to civilianize counterinsurgency, responsibility was shifted in 2000 from the military to the police—specifically to its paramilitary unit, Brimob—but for various reasons, including inadequate training.” 45 As noted by William Rosenau, “Certainly, ‘de-militarizing’ counterinsurgency by encouraging a greater police role makes sense. It is no doubt true that in internal conflict environments, the civilian police, relative to the army or national intelligence services, are likely to have more access to civilian populations.” 46 For the case of Brazil, a recent report draws a parallel between “Rio’s pacification strategy and ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere.”47 It is noteworthy that while assessing police performance in counterinsurgency campaigns, it was observed that in some cases the police itself may be part of the problem.48 To sum up, on disputed foundations of counterinsurgency, some authors relativize the role played by cultural awareness, hearts-and-

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minds approaches, or intelligence. These authors think these factors are not necessarily the most important ingredients for success,49 and beyond that, other authors point out “the downside of COIN for a variety of reasons, beginning with the fact that the ‘liberal peace’ justification for intervention is becoming less attractive to Western populations [and] that predictions for success of COIN doctrines anchored in mythologized history and selective memory are perilous propositions.”50 Paul Dixon, who observes substantial differences in British and US counterinsurgency, stresses that the “‘hearts and minds’ description of the British approach to counterinsurgency may be useful in public relations terms but it undermines the theory as a guide to operations because it can be interpreted in such divergent ways.”51

The Future of Counterinsurgency South Asia has seen the rise of Al-Qaeda and, more recently, the Islamic State as violent actors. Nevertheless, “Beyond violent radical Islamist upheaval, there are insurgencies with secular political demands ranging from secession to varying levels of autonomy,” which calls for study of the changing character of intrastate insurgent movements operating in such environments.52 Of relevance is the notion that counterinsurgency, intelligence, counterterrorism, and policing are all subject to changes caused by “big data and predictive analytics to uncover unexpected patterns and pinpoint potentially suspect ‘needles.’”53 On the evolution of insurgency, a RAND report suggests that because of a changing environment, postindustrial insurgents “swiftly adapted to the Internet’s characteristics and used it to harness the violent energy that arose from ‘global’ communities that were held together by common grievances and ideologies.”54 As stated, “in Syria, for example, insurgents have begun using Google Map Maker, a crowd-sourcing program, to wipe names of the ruling regime´s family members off streets and bridges.”55 Intelligence agencies of the future, states Bob de Graaff, will develop as “sense-makers,” that is, “intelligence analysts will become sense-makers defining opponents for government and the public at large as terrorists, insurgents, a social movement, religious fanatics.”56 And for sure, the evolving shift to digital resources implies that “technological developments [affect] not only the intelligence services,

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they also impact the environment in which intelligence operates,” in George Dimitriu and Isabelle Duyvesteyn’s view.57 In sum, effective counterinsurgency actions require effective strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence. 58 Indeed, the revised version of FM 3-24 US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual explains that “effective counterinsurgency operations are shaped by timely, relevant, tailored, predictive, accurate, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the force. Without accurate and predictive intelligence, it is often better to not act rather than to act.” 59 At the strategic level, Andrew Albers et al. stress, “collection and analysis . . . focus on identifying the motives of the insurgent groups, obtaining information from a cross section of the population, reevaluating the COIN strategy, and coordinating intelligence gathering and sharing,” while at the operation level such efforts should be decentralized.60 At the operational and tactical levels, detecting insurgents, Rizwaan Sabir maintains, “is dependent upon understanding who the insurgent . . . is and where [he or she] may be hiding,” and for such purpose, two types of information are needed: background information of an overt character, and contact information obtained through covert intelligence.61 Nevertheless, even with the best intelligence, as David Clark underscores: “Due to the inherent precariousness of their situation, even counterinsurgent forces in possession of good intelligence can be defeated; but alternatively, they have no hope whatsoever without it.”62 He further points out: Modern liberal democracies have never successfully turned back an insurgency using military force alone, though many have tried to do so unsuccessfully. While military operations are an essential component in counterinsurgency operations, experience has shown that political, economic, and informational/diplomatic efforts ultimately comprise the preponderance of the nation’s overall effort in successfully quelling an insurgency. In the end, the government or the occupier must delegitimize the insurgency, assure the security of the population, and offer hope for a better future than that proposed by the insurgents.63

An integrative framework for designing and evaluating counterinsurgency strategies comprising governance, identity, and legitimacy dimensions is considered indispensable; in Michael Fitzsim-

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mons’s words, “policymakers might consider adopting a new version of the classic metaphor of counterinsurgency: much may depend in the coming years on finer discrimination between the ‘hard hearts’ of insurgents who fight for their identities and the ‘open minds’ of insurgents who fight for better governance.”64

Conclusion Essentially, the relationship between counterinsurgency, intelligence, and democracies involves tensions stemming from human-rights abuses by intelligence—and the counterinsurgency groups they serve—and the subsequent lack of accountability.65 The link between security, intelligence, and counterinsurgency is particularly sensitive. As a contested strategy, for some countries, counterinsurgency may imply dangers of wrongdoings and human-rights abuses by their security and intelligence sectors, in particular in the case of new democracies conducting COIN. The use of the legacy personnel in support of such operations perpetuates human-rights abuses. In this context, Beatrice Jauregui, while analyzing the creation of the Maldivian national police force, warns about deviations on behalf of the counterinsurgency fight: “what was framed as a project of liberal democratic reform was clearly, to a large extent, driven by an objective to quell internal political instability or potential citizen insurgency.”66 In the case of Colombia, “while the diverse security services of Colombia have made significant improvements in recent years in countering insurgents and paramilitaries, the country’s premier intelligence agency has faced considerable problems.”67 Nevertheless, a recent study revealed that president Alvaro Uribe’s (2002–2010) “tough counterinsurgency policies were effective in decreasing the average attack intensity values for both the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army] and ELN [National Liberation Army].”68 The counterbalance of the effective observance of human rights, alongside the transparency or visibility of the intelligence services performance, marks a change of scenery. In addition, “intelligence collection efforts are often concentrated on the wrong individuals and groups in counterinsurgency campaigns”—often on friendly sources, a tendency that may not offer a complete picture, as Albers et al. acknowledge, based on experience in the Philippines.69 Linked to all this is a suggestion to pay attention

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when conducting research to the use of irregulars in counterinsurgency campaigns and to human-rights abuses.70 Worthy of special note is that volunteer vigilantes involved in counterinsurgency operations in the North East region of Nigeria “assisted the military in identifying and overriding important structures of the insurgents through local intelligence and reconnaissance.”71 Another tension between intelligence, counterinsurgency, and democracies is caused by outsourcing—the hiring of private military contractors to perform counterinsurgency operations, a controversial tool that in some cases has involved incidents and abuses that, as Peter Singer puts it, “appears to have harmed, rather than helped the counterinsurgency efforts.”72 It is noteworthy that such contractors engage in intelligence activities.73 In summary, to a certain extent, a warning about the scope of counterinsurgency intelligence carried out in a democratic setting will always be appropriate.

Notes

1. Seth Milstein, “21st Century Counterinsurgency Intelligence,” Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/21st-century-counterinsurgency-intelligence. 2. R. Scott Moore, “The Basics of Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/moorecoinpaper.pdf. 3. US Army, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2014), 1–2. 4. Moore, “Basics of Counterinsurgency,” 3. 5. Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 6. See Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2001). 7. “US Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative,” January 2009, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf, 2. 8. David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” Marine Corps Gazette 90, no. 7 (2006), 33. 9. For an example of this, see David A. Charters, “Counter-Insurgency Intelligence: The Evolution of British Theory and Practice,” Journal of Conflict Studies 29 (2009): 55–74. For a comparison of military intelligence in US involvement in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, see Laini Soszynski, “The Evolving Role of Intelligence in Counter-Insurgency Tactics: A Comparison of Past and Present Strategy” (unpublished paper, American Military University, 2015), http://www.academia.edu/15419119/The _Evolving_Role_of_Intelligence_in_Counter-Insurgency_Tactics_A_Comparison _of_Past_and_Present_Strategy. Also see: Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles,” 30; Eliot Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” Military Review 86, no. 2 (March–April 2006): 49–53. 10. Antonio M. Díaz Fernández, ed., Diccionario LID inteligencia y seguridad (Madrid: LID Editorial, 2013). Translation of Spanish entries are the author’s own.

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LID acknowledges that intelligence plays a fundamental role in the definition and implementation of counterinsurgency. 11. Douglas Porch, “The Dangerous Myths and Dubious Promise of COIN,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 22, no. 2 (2011), 239. 12. Paul Dixon, “‘Hearts and Minds’? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 3 (2009), 356. 13. Daniel Byman, “‘Death Solves All Problems’: The Authoritarian Model of Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 39, no. 1 (2016): 62–93; for cases on other authoritarian regimes, see: Yuri M. Zhukov, “Counterinsurgency in a NonDemocratic State: The Russian Example,” in The Routledge Companion to Insurgency and Counter Insurgency, edited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Paul Rich (London: Routledge, 2010); Monica Duffy Toft and Yuri M. Zhukov, “Islamists and Nationalists: Rebel Motivation and Counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus,” American Political Science Review 109, no. 2 (2015): 222–238. 14. Afeno Super Odomovo, “Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria,” Age of Human Rights Journal 3 (2014), 57; for more on Nigeria, see Caitriona Dowd and Adam Drury, “Marginalisation, Insurgency and Civilian Insecurity: Boko Haram and the Lord’s Resistance Army,” Peacebuilding 5, no. 2 (2017): 136–152. 15. Ngboawaji Daniel Nte, “The Use and ‘Ab-use’ of Intelligence in a Transitional Democracy: Evidence from Nigeria,” Journal of Human Sciences 8, no. 1 (2011), 1009. 16. Joseph O. Nkwede, Ahmed O. Moliki, and Kazeem O. Dauda, “Corruption, Insurgency and Nigeria’s Developmental Challenges,” African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies 10, no. 1 (2017), 50. 17. US Army, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. 18. Alexander Dunlap, “Counterinsurgency for Wind Energy: The Bíi Hioxo Wind Park in Juchitán, Mexico,” Journal of Peasant Studies 45, no. 3 (2017), 636. 19. Ibid., 19–20. 20. Moore, “Basics of Counterinsurgency,” 13–14. 21. Ibid., 4. 22. Ibid., 11. 23. Paul Staniland, “Cities on Fire: Social Mobilization, State Policy, and Urban Insurgency,” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 12 (2010): 1623–1649. 24. Dunlap, “Counterinsurgency for Wind Energy,” 6. 25. Robin Luckham, “Whose Violence, Whose Security? Can Violence Reduction and Security Work for Poor, Excluded and Vulnerable People?” Peacebuilding 5, no. 2 (2017), 209; Andrew J. Gawthorpe, “All Counterinsurgency Is Local: Counterinsurgency and Rebel Legitimacy,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 28, no. 4–5 (2017), 841. 26. Roles 2 through 6, per list introduced in Chapter 1. 27. Moore, “Basics of Counterinsurgency,” 14–15. 28. Ibid. 29. For more on these two schools, see Vince Tumminello, “A Primer on Counterinsurgent Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, August 5, 2016, http://smallwarsjournal .com/jrnl/art/a-primer-on-counterinsurgent-warfare. 30. Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles,” 34. 31. Martin Thomas, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder After 1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 145–150. 32. Ibid., 20. 33. Ibid., 42. 34. Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63 (2009), 73. 35. Nigel West, Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), 270.

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36. On this subject, see, for example: Maja Zehfuss, “Culturally Sensitive War? The Human Terrain System and the Seduction of Ethics,” Security Dialogue 43, no. 2 (2012), 175–190; Roberto J. González, “Human Terrain: Past, Present and Future Applications,” Anthropology Today 24, no. 1 (2008): 21–26; Nicola Perugini, “Anthropologists at War: Ethnographic Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan,” International Political Anthropology 1, no. 2 (2008): 213–227. For a critical perspective, see David Miller and Tom Mills, “Counterinsurgency and Terror Expertise: The Integration of Social Scientists into the War Effort,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 23, no. 2 (2010): 203–221. 37. Alexandros Kassidiaris, “What Are the Pros and Cons of Cultural Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations?” (Research Institute for European and American Studies, 2016), http://www.rieas.gr/images/rieasnews/trasatlantic/cultureintel16.pdf. 38. The author’s hypothesis states as follows: “The principles of counter violence, counter organisation, counter subversion and pre-emption, supported by the enabling concepts of intelligence and adaptation, provide a new and more appropriate theoretical framework to inform the successful conduct of second-party counterinsurgency.” Mark O’Neill, “Second-Party Counterinsurgency” (PhD diss., University of New South Wales, 2013). 39. See Markus Kienscherf, “Producing ‘Responsible’ Self-Governance: Counterinsurgency and the Violence of Neoliberal Rule,” Critical Military Studies 2, no. 3 (2016): 173–192. For Kienscherf, “Western counterinsurgency can be understood as a form of neoliberal police targeting the problematized autonomy of foreign populations and states, that is to say their problematized capacity for responsible selfgovernance.” 40. Andrew Mumford, “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict,” RUSI Journal 158, no. 2 (2013), 42. For a discussion on this theme and its increasing relevance, see special issue titled, “Proxy Actors, Militias and Irregular Forces: The New Frontier of War?” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27 (2016); Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay, Soldiers, War, Knowledge and Citizenship: German-American Essays on CivilMilitary Relations (Berlin: Miles Verlag, 2017), 132–135. 41. Mumford, “Proxy Warfare,” 45. 42. Zakia Shiraz, “Drugs and Dirty Wars: Intelligence Cooperation in the Global South,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 10 (2013), 1753. 43. See Rizwaan Sabir, “Blurred Lines and False Dichotomies: Integrating Counterinsurgency into the UK’s Domestic ‘War on Terror,’” Critical Social Policy 37, no. 2 (2017): 202–224; David J. Clark, “The Vital Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations” (strategy research project, US Army War College, 2006); David H. Bayley and Robert M. Perito, The Police in War: Fighting, Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010); also US Army, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. 44. See Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “Hearts and Minds, Cultural Awareness and Good Intelligence: The Blueprint for Successful Counter-Insurgency?” Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 4 (2011): 445–459. 45. Peter Gill and Lee Wilson, “Intelligence and Security-Sector Reform in Indonesia,” in Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere, edited by Phillip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 168. 46. William Rosenau, “Low-Cost Trigger-Pullers”: The Politics of Policing in the Context of Contemporary ‘State Building’ and Counterinsurgency, WR-620-USC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 7. 47. Robert Muggah and Albert Souza Mulli, “Rio Tries Counterinsurgency,” Current History 111, no. 742 (2012): 62–66. The police pacification initiative (Unidades

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de Policía Pacificadora, UPP) started in December 2008 as a police reform in the city of Rio de Janeiro; for an analysis of this program, see Graham Denyer Willis and Mariana Mota Prado, “Process and Pattern in Institutional Reforms: A Case Study of the Police Pacifying Units (UPPs) in Brazil,” World Development 64 (2014): 232–242. 48. See C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, “The Police in Counterinsurgency Operations,” in Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents, edited by C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, 1–18 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 49. See Duyvesteyn, “Hearts and Minds,” 445–459. 50. Porch, “The Dangerous Myths and Dubious Promise of COIN,” 257. 51. Dixon, “Hearts and Minds?” 353. 52. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, “Countering Insurgencies, Terrorism and Violent Extremism in South Asia,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 28, no. 1 (2017), 1. 53. Claudia Aradau and Tobias Blanke, “Politics of Prediction. Security and the Time/Space of Governmentality in the Age of Big Data,” European Journal of Social Theory 20, no. 3 (2017), 374. 54. John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy, Rethinking Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 7. 55. Jennifer Sims, “The Future of Counter-intelligence,” in The Future of Intelligence: Challenges in the 21st Century, edited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Ben De Jong, and Joop Van Reijn (New York: Routledge, 2014), 58. 56. Bob de Graaff, “By Way of Introduction: A Systemic Way of Looking at the Future of Intelligence,” in The Future of Intelligence: Challenges in the 21st Century, edited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Ben De Jong, and Joop Van Reijn (New York: Routledge, 2014), 7. 57. George Dimitriu and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “Conclusions: It May Be September 10, 2001, Today,” in The Future of Intelligence: Challenges in the 21st Century, edited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Ben De Jong, and Joop Van Reijn (New York: Routledge, 2014), 153. 58. Nevertheless, because counterinsurgency is mostly a “political phenomenon,” it “blurs the lines between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict”; “21st Century Counterinsurgency Intelligence,” AFCEA, https://www.afcea.org/mission /intel/documents/Milstein.pdf. 59. Fernando Estrada, Fernando Fabio Moscoso Duran, and Nelson A. Andrade Valbuena, “Políticas de seguridad contra el narcotráfico: México, Brasil y Colombia,” Análisis Político 29, no. 86 (2016): 1–19. 60. Andrew C. Albers et al., “Effective Intelligence Operations During Counterinsurgency Campaigns—Intelligence Community in Counterinsurgency: Historical Lessons and Best Practices” (report, Bush School of Government and Public Service, 2009), 2, http://bush.tamu.edu/inta/capstones/Castillo_Spring2009.pdf. 61. Sabir, “Blurred Lines and False Dichotomies,” 9. 62. Clark, “The Vital Role of Intelligence,” 2. 63. Ibid. 64. Michael Fitzsimmons, “Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity and the Intellectual Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 3 (2008), 362. 65. Dimitriu and Duyvesteyn, “Conclusions,” 159. 66. Beatrice Jauregui, “Bluing Green in the Maldives: Countering Citizen Insurgency by ‘Civil’-izing National Security,” in Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency, edited by John D. Kelly, Beatrice Jauregui, Sean T. Mitchell, and Jeremy Walton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 34. 67. Shiraz, “Drugs and Dirty Wars,” 1758.

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68. Zachary Toll, “Terrorism in Colombia: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN),” Journal of Mason Graduate Research 4, no. 1 (2017), 22. 69. Albers et al., “Effective Intelligence Operations,” 47. 70. See Jon Moran, “State Crime, Irregulars and Counter-Insurgency,” State Crime Journal 4, no. 2 (2015): 154–174. 71. Okoli Al Chukwuma, “Nigeria: Volunteer Vigilantism and Counter-Insurgency in the North-East,” Conflict Studies Quarterly 20 (2017), 42. 72. Peter Warren Singer, “Can’t Win with ’Em, Can’t Go to War Without ’Em: Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency” (Policy Paper No. 4, The Brookings Institution, September 2007), 2; this article explores the use of private military contractors by the US military. Also see Thomas Bruneau, Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in US National Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). 73. See Ori Swed and Thomas Crosbie, “Private Security and Military Contractors: A Troubling Oversight,” Sociology Compass 11, no. 11 (November 2017).

10 The United Nations Intelligence Function Benjamin Oudet

Five or six years ago, the mere use of the term would have me . . . shot in the moat of the United Nations the following dawn. —Hervé Ladsous1

July 2017 was a pivotal moment in the history of United Nations (UN) intelligence. Indeed, for the first time, the Department of Field Support (DFS) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) released a doctrine on the purposes of intelligence in peace operations: support a common operational picture, provide early warning of imminent threats, and identify risks and opportunities.2 The publication of the “Peacekeeping Intelligence” policy is important for several reasons. First, the very word “intelligence” is employed. It marks the acceptance of an intelligence function in the United Nations, which marks a fundamental change from even the fairly recent past, when intelligence was regarded with suspicion. Second, the definition of peacekeeping intelligence plainly rejects the elements considered as problematic for a democratic entity: the use of secret means and covert operations. At the same time, structural reforms are under way for the centralization of intelligence during peace operations. The end of the Cold War and the “robust turn” of peace operations at the beginning of the 2000s3 ushered in a new era of intelligence-led peace operations that integrate civilian and military information and actors.4 Comprehensive intelligence has become a key requirement in 153

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peace operations because these operations deal with complex security challenges. The recognition of the function of intelligence as an indispensable dimension of contemporary operations led to creation of such new structures as the Joint Missions Analysis Centre (JMAC) in 20055 and the All Sources Intelligence Fusion Unit (ASIFU) in 2014 for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).6 Intelligence reforms within integrated missions are part of the ongoing process aimed at improving the mission’s “situational awareness.”7 The development, normalization, centralization, and modernization of an intelligence apparatus in integrated UN peace operations faces many of the challenges that other democratic states have experienced. The UN is managing its intelligence dilemma through doctrinal production, structural reforms, and high-tech assets acquisition. Therefore, the UN’s implementation of formal procedures of information management is a challenging case study for further reflection on the uncomfortable relationship between democracy and intelligence. In this chapter, I examine the UN’s doctrinal frameworks to illustrate how, in practice, intelligence can be made compatible with UN democracy and transparency.

UN Intelligence

Since its operation in the Congo (1960–1963), the UN has been performing some kind of intelligence activities without actually naming the beast. As Walter Dorn argues: “The fact that the UN possessed an advanced intelligence component in the Congo is not known, even to many who have studied the operation in detail.”8 The UN is often portrayed as wary or even “downright paranoid”9 about intelligence, which may be jeopardizing the “holy trinity” of peace operations based on Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter, namely, the consent of parties, the nonuse of force, and neutrality. Equilibrium is needed among four categories: effectiveness, legitimacy, openness, transparency—particularly in light of the UN’s mission and focus on human rights. Thus, intelligence within UN headquarters has long sounded like an oxymoron: “Not that the United Nations is ‘unintelligent’ but it is widely believed that the organization and its peacekeepers in the field should not dabble in the murky practice of ‘intelligence-gathering’ or deal in the trade of secret information; it should only use information from direct observation and open (overt) sources.”10

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Indeed, the very term intelligence was taboo in the UN’s corridors, where more innocuous-sounding words and phrases prevailed, such as “information gathering,” “management,” “collection,” “observation,” “reporting,” “monitoring,” and “fact finding.” Significant impediments shape the UN’s ability to develop intelligence capabilities among certain states and to “name the beast,” a situation often referred to as the intelligence dilemma of the UN that can be summarized as follows: the ultimate purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security through, among others things, peacekeeping operations that require intelligence capabilities. At the same time, intelligence is traditionally regarded as an activity that is morally dangerous to democratic principles, especially in an international organization such as the United Nations that is not supposed to have an enemy and, thus, should not develop espionage capabilities.11 Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld articulated the organization’s founding reluctance to engage or even seem to be engaged in intelligence when he insisted that the “UN must have clean hands.”12 He meant that the UN must not compromise its moral foundations by the sort of things familiar to intelligence services: lies, bribery, blackmail, theft, and so on.13 Secrecy, clandestine activities, covert actions, and murky methods that some regard as defining features of intelligence do not coincide with the UN appeal for neutrality and openness; they hamper peacekeepers in building the kind of trust necessary for successful operations. 14 Moreover, weaknesses in UN intelligence reflect political tensions between developed countries, especially the members of the Security Council, and other nations gathered under the umbrella of the Nonaligned Movement.15 Still, it is no longer a question whether the United Nations conducts any form of intelligence; the 2017 policy document declares peacekeeping intelligence “a critical enabler” of safe and effective missions.16 Thus, the issue at play is no longer, as Simon Chesterman asks, “Does the UN have intelligence?”17 Rather, the issue is which kinds of intelligence activities the UN can perform; under which conditions, definitions, and limits; and how the peacekeeping intelligence function fits its new mission mandates.

The Role of UN Peace Operations Intelligence

Notwithstanding its internal intelligence dilemmas, “The United Nations has become a player, albeit a reluctant one, in the global intelligence game.”18 The UN’s multifunctional peace operations are

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becoming more involved and complex,19 entailing an increasing sphere of action that includes prevention of violent extremism (PVE) and counterterrorism efforts. Thus, the UN is at pains to prove its ability to receive intelligence, which means to be able to keep secrets and use that information effectively by securitized communications procedures. The publication of the Brahimi report in 2000 was a turning point in the UN’s calls for “sharper tools to gather and analyse relevant information” in the name of maximizing the gains of peacekeeping.20 As a consequence, some authors described the emergence of “intelligence-led” and “intelligence-driven” peacekeeping missions.21 As contemporary history makes clear, no UN force can operate effectively in darkness. A blind peacekeeping force will not only be ineffective in its mission, but eventually it will place even its own members’ lives at risk.22 As Paul Johnston remarks, “In fact, an examination of the UN’s own definitions and vocabulary reveals that not only does the UN conduct ‘intelligence’ by any other name, but most of what UN forces actually do is ‘collecting intelligence,’ whether they want to admit it or not.”23 Ultimately, the UN needs intelligence because the lack of “intelligence” contributed to such failures in the history of UN field operations as the Korean War (1950), the Iraqi attack on Kuwait (1990), the genocide in Rwanda (1994), and the civil war in Angola (1995).24

Developing the UN Intelligence Function In 2009 with Resolution 1894, the Security Council called on the Secretariat to give “priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources, including information and intelligence resources, in the implementation of mandates” for the protection of civilians and UN personnel.25 In October 2014, during the Fourth Committee on Peacekeeping, Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous identified “improved intelligence and situational awareness” as the fourth critical priority to strengthen peacekeeping through the collection and analysis of a range of intelligence sources.26 Intelligence improvement is recognized as highly critical in the field of civil-military cooperation. It is already a standard feature of UN peacekeeping missions through liaison officers in civilian units and intelligence units in the field. Although some recognize the increase of intelligence gathering through advanced technologies like drones, radar, planes, and infrared viewers, some stress the lack of analysis capability for leaders in the field.27

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Information management has emerged as a top priority following the report from the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) released in June 2015. In order to strengthen the “protection of civilians”28 and UN personnel, peacekeeping missions need “assessment and planning capabilities, timely information, and communication.”29 To be sure, the HIPPO Report stated in its section “CounterTerrorism and Enforcement Tasks” that: “The Panel believes that UN peacekeeping missions, due to their composition and character, are not suited to engage in military counterterrorism operation. They lack the specific equipment, intelligence, logistics, capabilities and specialized military preparation required, among other aspects. Such operations should be undertaken by the host government or by a capable regional force or an ad hoc authorized by the Security Council.”30 What is remarkable here is that the UN uses the term “intelligence” only when it deals with tasks or policies that cannot be performed by the organization. Conversely, for missions that fall within the scope of the UN mandate, official documents refer to the term information. Then in September 2015, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated, “An effective system for the acquisition, analysis and operationalization of information for peace operations in complex environments is lacking. I have tasked the Secretariat with developing parameters for any information and intelligence that can support field missions in operating effectively and safely. I welcome further discussions with Member States on that urgent capability gap.”31 Strikingly, Ban’s statement invokes “intelligence” explicitly—the beast was officially named.

From Principles to Practice

In May 2016, following a “Lessons Learned Report” on new intelligence capabilities implemented in the MINUSMA intelligence architecture, the discussion paper “Toward a Policy Framework for Intelligence in Support of UN Peacekeeping Operations” states that the 2016 report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations acknowledges the need to improve the situational awareness, and to enhance the safety and security of peacekeepers, including through the use of modern technology as a complement to traditional ways such as human information gathering . . . and encourages the Secretariat to develop a more cohesive and integrated United Nations system for situational awareness . . . [as well as ensuring that] capabilities are integrated effectively into mission operations and the confidentiality of all data gathered by such assets is preserved.32

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First of all there is the plurality of critical roles within any peacekeeping operation today: “The technical issues managed by those gathered in the room today—ranging from intelligence to ordinance disposal to command and control—were not only crucial to the effectiveness of United Nations missions, but could also mean the difference between life and death for their personnel.”33 These new capabilities should be based on an intelligence cycle applicable to and appropriate for the United Nations peacekeeping context, structured by the basic defining features of the intelligence cycle model: Decisions/Requirements/Tasking/Direction–Acquisition– Examination/Collation–Analysis–Dissemination.34 In terms of process, the framework should answer questions related to capabilities (what tools, people, and resources are needed?), coordination (how can information requirements and tasking be coordinated across a mission?), and regulation (what process and protocols must be put in place to regulate acquisition, validation, and analysis?)35 The peace operation in Mali (2013–) marks a major step toward the realization of the project, particularly in terms of intelligence sharing and the implementation of the All Sources Intelligence Fusion Unit.36 The ASIFU is a military-intelligence concept with its origins in the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. In 2012, for the first time in the history of peacekeeping, the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) Military Planning Service identified the need for a similar function in Mali and attempted to adapt the ASIFU military concept to the UN context. The ASIFU brings together a variety of capabilities and sensors under a single command to fuse information from a range of sources that are analyzed and turned into intelligence products in a centralized facility.37 In December 2015, a lessons-learned exercise was undertaken within DPKO to examine the enhanced role for military intelligence in MINUSMA, and particularly the deployment and operations of the first ASIFU to be deployed in the UN peacekeeping context. The exercise found that this enhanced intelligence architecture offers significant new capabilities to peacekeeping operations like open-source intelligence or drones that are essential if the mission is to operate safely and efficiently in a high-tempo threat environment. For example, information sharing between the MINUSMA mission and the French Operation Barkhane occurs in a regular forum for security stakeholders, hosted by the Embassy of France in Bamako, which is attended by representatives of the U-2 (Force HQ Military Intelligence Function) and ASIFU. Nevertheless, because of

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the large size of that forum, sensitive information is regularly shared through more informal exchanges between elements of the mission and Operation Barkhane. At the sector level, MINUSMA’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (ISR) in Gao and Timbuktu reported that they regularly share information on their activities with Operation Barkhane, particularly on unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight plans, in order to de-conflict activities in the area of operations.38 When information of a substantive nature is requested by Barkhane, the request is routed through ASIFU headquarters in Bamako, which makes the decision as to whether to share information. One of the main factors taken into account in this decision is which actions Barkhane might take as a result of the sharing of information. For example, the ASIFU would consider whether the sharing of information on the location of individuals might result in direct action as part of Barkhane’s counterterrorism operations such as the neutralization of terrorist cells or groups by military means. It might be considered as an override of the mission’s mandate. In such cases, the ASIFU might decide not to share the information out of such considerations as the mission’s mandate and national legal, policy, or political guidance, again out of concern that outside organizations, not bound by this same framework, might undertake actions at odds with the spirit or the letter of the mission. Although the sharing of information between MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane appears to fall within the boundaries of the DPKO-France technical agreement, it raises two important questions regarding the relationship between UN peacekeeping missions and parallel operations. First, the existing guidance does not specify the parameters for decisionmaking on information sharing, which may expose the mission to political and ethical risk. Given the plausible outcomes of sharing sensitive information with Operation Barkhane, this gap seems critical. Second, given that the sharing of information with the national operation may have political implications, the UN clarifies its position that decisions on whether to share information should be taken at the political level—by senior mission leadership and informed by UN policy—rather than by ASIFU commanders.

Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy In July 2017, after years of intense internal discussions, the DPKO and the DFS issued the policy document on peacekeeping intelligence.39

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The document indicates that the framework will be subject to review in May 2019, suggesting a normalization of intelligence issues in the United Nations. The term intelligence is explicitly employed. The paper establishes five guiding principles for peacekeeping intelligence, with an eye toward squaring the intelligence dilemma. It states that intelligence activities must be carried out under the mandate of the Security Council, the Charter of the United Nations and the legal principles governing peacekeeping operations. In keeping with its inability to embrace traditional state-centered intelligence based on secrecy and clandestine means of information gathering, peacekeeping intelligence is defined as “the non-clandestine acquisition and processing of information by a mission within a directed mission intelligence cycle to meet requirements for decisionmaking and to inform operations related to the safe and effective implementation of the Security Council mandate.”40 The policy specifically excludes clandestine or secret work. Thus, the UN manages to embrace the necessary implementation of intelligence processes without the ethical hazards traditionally associated with it. In sum, the UN’s definition appears to be closer to an information-management process than an extension of secret intelligence in the conventional sense. With “early warning” and “analysis and assessment,” intelligence reforms are at the heart of the UN’s current undertakings to improve the “situational awareness” of its missions.41 In order to resolve the intelligence dilemma, the intelligence framework summarizes the five “overarching principles” that must guide the peacekeeping intelligence process: within the rules; within the mandates; with independence; with accountability, capability, and authority; with security and confidentiality. Worth noting is the UN’s willingness to reduce reliance on national sources and to pledge that its operations will be “fully autonomous from and independent in all aspects of any national intelligence systems or other operations and will maintain their exclusively international character.”42 The peacekeeping intelligence cycle mimics the traditional intelligence cycle and its five phases: 1. “Decisions on intelligence activities shall be taken under the authority and accountability of the Head of Mission or within the delegated authority he or she designates.”43 2. Acquisition of data and information through mission assets and by Member States or other non-mission entities. 3. Examination, evaluation and collation of data acquired by the mission entities “recorded and stored in a manner that permits

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convenient comparison evaluation, assessment, retrieval analysis and reporting.”44 4. Analysis “that makes full use of all resources available to the mission according to the comparative advantages, including expertise in the local situation, languages and cultures; military and police intelligence analysis capabilities; and security threat information analysis techniques.”45 5. Dissemination to “mission decision-makers or other relevant mission personnel.”46

The peacekeeping intelligence cycle is managed as follows: “In addition to participating mission entities responsible for peacekeeping intelligence acquisition, collation and analysis, missions shall establish a mission intelligence coordination structure to direct and oversee the peacekeeping intelligence cycle within the mission.”47 This structure includes participating mission entities as well as the JMAC, relevant functions in the force and police components, UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), and Joint Operations Centres (JOC). In a nutshell, the three pillars of the peacekeeping intelligence-cycle management are “central control and direction,” “close connection” between intelligence collection by participating mission entities, and “appropriate oversight and accountability.”48 The three pillars in turn facilitate the normalization and centralization of intelligence within peacekeeping missions. It is worth noting that the collection phase—the most sensitive phase of secrecy and espionage for state intelligence—must be “effective, responsible, and ethical.”49 Furthermore, it is asserted that any information collected in the course of a mission belongs to the mission and must be handled following the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Information Sensitivity, Classification, and Handling, particularly classifying information as “confidential,” “strictly confidential,” and “unclassified.”50 The 2017 peacekeeping intelligence framework states explicitly: “Data and information acquired, stored, and shared as part of the peacekeeping cycle is considered property of the Organization and is to be handled in strict compliance with the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Information Sensitivity.”51 The three levels of classification must be chosen under the supervision of the chain of command and management. If necessary, additional measures can be implemented by the Head of Mission or components in consultation with DPKO/DFS and member states’ contributing units, to ensure security, confidentiality, and traceability of information gathered and shared.

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Thus, the document formalizes the securitization and the handling of intelligence by two mechanisms: (1) a registry systematically records the receipt and dissemination of confidential peacekeeping intelligence products, and (2) the Head of Mission authorizes intelligence sharing after having consulted with UN Headquarters. The sharing of information can only be carried out in the context of the mandate, UN procedures, and an agreement signed between the parties to control the subsequent use of the information transmitted. The core of the intelligence activity is information sharing and the “peacekeeping intelligence” framework explains the conditions under which liaison arrangements can be developed between the UN mission and nonmission entities. The policy promotes mission independence by ensuring that peacekeeping intelligence is fully autonomous “in all aspects of any national intelligence system or other operations and will maintain [its] exclusively international character.”52 In addition, cooperation mechanisms and liaison arrangements on specific intelligence with nonmission entities are mentioned. These sharing agreements are particularly critical because of the ban on clandestine collection activities. Anne Daugherty Miles notes that US intelligence “agencies are sometimes referred to as ‘stovepipes’ (and/or ‘silos of excellence’) in that each offers depth of expertise and specialized skill sets, but also meaning that information tends to flow vertically—up and down the management hierarchy—often with little coordination and/or collaboration between them.”53 Formal secrecy and stovepipes are legitimate through the dissemination phase of the peacekeeping intelligence cycle. In sum, first of all, the cardinal principles driving intelligence activities and sharing with nonmission entities are their compliance with the UN mandate. Second, the liaison arrangements “shall include cases in which peacekeeping intelligence relates to the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel, premises and assets and is therefore relevant to the broader United Nations system operating within the mission area.”54 Third, intelligence sharing with nonmission and non-UN entities must be framed by the mission’s mandate and fall within UN rules, regulations, policies, and procedures. Intelligence sharing is performed through written arrangements (kept classified, as with all intelligence-sharing agreements) “ensuring originator control over any subsequent use or application.”55 Therefore, in order to keep the UN’s hands “clean” from potential abuses in the use of intelligence, information collected by UN missions belong to the UN and cannot be employed outside the scope of any mission’s mandate.

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Conclusion UN intelligence is now experiencing a process of modernization through the acquisition of cutting-edge technological assets, such as the unarmed unmanned aerial vehicle (UUAV). In 2013, and for the first time in its history, a UN peacekeeping mission (the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [MONUSCO]) deployed a UUAV, operated directly under the control of the mission rather than one of its contributing countries. The implementation of intelligence capabilities through highly sophisticated tools is rendered inevitable by the security environment where peacekeepers are deployed, involving “a mixture of insurgents, rebel groups, criminal networks and terrorists in various missions.”56 This sea change is at the crux of doctrinal evolution and field requirements. Learning from MONUSCO, the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation recommended in 2014 to sustain and expand UUAV engagement to broaden intelligence capabilities. Dorn concludes, “It seems that the UN is finally on the road toward a technology-enabled future for its peacekeeping missions, overcoming earlier resistance to both intelligence-gathering and technology”.57 For Dorn, “it marks a new era in peacekeeping missions.”58 Although some authors recognize the increase of intelligence gathering through advanced technologies such as drone, radar, planes, and infrared viewers, others stress the lack of analysis capability for leaders in the field. The ongoing attempts made by the UN to make intelligence compliant with its founding principles entails a fundamental shift inside the traditional features of intelligence, emphasizing opensource intelligence (OSINT). OSINT may be “especially relevant in UN peacekeeping operations where location and capability of belligerents are often known through ‘observations’ and ‘overt surveillance.’ But the crucial information on ‘personalities,’ ‘motives’ and ‘intent’ can only be obtained through traditional HUMINT means.”59 Finally, the implementation of new intelligence structures will rise or fall with the successful introduction of intelligence culture within the UN entities involved in peacekeeping operations. A comparison with national intelligence communities shows that, despite the existence of national intelligence services working for the same country, the nature and raison d’être of intelligence naturally fosters internal struggle and can make a national system far from effective, hence the critical requirements for coordination and intelligence-sharing

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mechanisms. This tendency can be overcome through the development of a common culture of intelligence in terms of structures, missions, analytical craft, and willingness to cooperate. This intelligence culture, in turn, will require rationalization of structures and the development of common training and analysis to enable civilian, police, and military components to create a mutual understanding of their mission. More than a revolution in its collection capabilities, the effectiveness of UN intelligence will depend on the “improvements in the management and analysis of information”60 at strategic and operational levels. Breaking the tyranny of silos in intelligence cooperation within missions and the negative mindset regarding intelligence are the two main challenges in instilling a culture of intelligence at all levels of the UN. In this sense, keeping peacekeeping intelligence away from the most intrusive collection capabilities (such as overt espionage that carries moral hazards) is the only way for the UN to resolve the intelligence dilemma between effectiveness and legitimacy.

Notes 1. Hervé Ladsous, former head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, speech, Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale, IHEDN, Paris, June 2017. 2. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “Policy: Peacekeeping Intelligence” (policy document, United Nations, July 2017), http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/400647. 3. Charles T. Hunt, “All Necessary Means to What Ends? The Unintended Consequences of the ‘Robust Turn’ in UN Peace Operations,” International Peacekeeping 24, no. 1 (January 2017): 108–131. 4. A. Walter Dorn, “Intelligence-Led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006–07,” Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 6 (December 2009): 805–835; A. Walter Dorn, “The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 12, no. 4 (December 1999): 414–447; Giovanna Kuele and Marco Cepik, “Intelligence Support to MONUSCO: Challenges to Peacekeeping and Security,” International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs 19, no. 1 (January 2017): 44–68. 5. Philip Shetler-Jones, “Intelligence in Integrated UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Joint Mission Analysis Centre,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 4 (August 2008): 517–527; Melanie Ramjoué, “Improving UN Intelligence Through Civil– Military Collaboration: Lessons from the Joint Mission Analysis Centres,” International Peacekeeping 18, no. 4 (August 2011): 468–484. 6. Sebastiaan Rietjens and Erik de Waard, “UN Peacekeeping Intelligence: The ASIFU Experiment,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 30, no. 3 (July 2017): 532–556; David Nordlie and Morten Lindboe, Intelligence in United Nations Peace Operations: A Case Study of the All Sources Information Fusion Unit in MINUSMA (Kjeller/Oslow, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and the Norwegian Defence International Centre, 2017).

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7. Haidi Willmot, Improving U.N. Situational Awareness (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2017). 8. A. Walter Dorn and David J. H. Bell, “Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN Operation in the Congo, 1960–64,” International Peacekeeping 2, no. 1 (March 1995): 11–33. 9. William C. Spracher, “The New Intelligence Transparency and Implications for Intelligence Education,” roundtable presented at the International Studies Association, Baltimore, February 2017. 10. A. Walter Dorn, “Intelligence at UN Headquarters? The Information and Research Unit and the Intervention in Eastern Zaire 1996,” Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 3 (September 2005): 440–465. 11. Conor Cruise O’Brien, To Katanga and Back: A UN Case History (London: Faber and Faber, 2015). 12. Ibid., 76. 13. As quoted in ibid., 76. 14. Paul Johnston, “No Cloak and Dagger Required: Intelligence Support to UN Peacekeeping,” Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 4 (October 1997): 102–112. 15. Jaïr van der Lijn et al., Peacekeeping Operations in a Changing World (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2015). 16. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “Policy: Peacekeeping Intelligence,” 2. 17. Simon Chesterman, “Does the UN Have Intelligence?” Survival 48, no. 3 (October 2006): 149–164; Simon Chesterman, “This Time, Too, the UN Has No Intelligence,” New York Times, April 21, 2006. 18. A. Walter Dorn, “United Nations Peacekeeping Intelligence,” in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, edited by Loch K. Johnson, 275–295 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 19. André Moine, “L’état de droit, un instrument international au service de la paix: Abstract,” Civitas Europa, no. 37 (December 2016): 65–93. 20. United Nations General Assembly Security Council, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” (UN General Assembly, session 55, 2000), 12. 21. Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen and Jacob Aasland Ravndal, “Towards Intelligence-Driven Peace Operations? The Evolution of UN and EU Intelligence Structures,” International Peacekeeping 18, no. 4 (2011): 454–467. 22. Johnston, “No Cloak and Dagger Required.” 23. Ibid. 24. Dorn, “The Cloak and the Blue Beret.” 25. UN Security Council, Resolution 1894, S/RES/1894 (2009), 5. 26. Debate Fourth Committee on Peacekeeping (statement of Under-SecretaryGeneral for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous, October 28, 2014). 27. For more information, see: Loch K. Johnson et al., “An INS Special Forum: Intelligence and Drones/Eyes in the Sky for Peacekeeping: The Emergence of UAVs in UN Operations/The Democratic Deficit on Drones/The German Approach to Drone Warfare/Pursuing Peace: The Strategic Limits of Drone Warfare/Seeing but Unseen: Intelligence Drones in Israel/Drone Paramilitary Operations Against Suspected Global Terrorists: US and Australian Perspectives/The ‘Terminator Conundrum’ and the Future of Drone Warfare,” Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 4 (June 2017): 411–440; Dorn, “The Cloak and the Blue Beret.” 28. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “Policy: Peacekeeping Intelligence,” 2. 29. United Nations, “Uniting Our Strengths for Peace Politics, Partnership and People: Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” (report, United Nations, 2015), ix. 30. Ibid., 31.

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31. Emphasis added; United Nations Secretary-General, “The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations” (report, United Nations, 2015). 32. United Nations, “Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations” (UN General Assembly, session 77, 2016), 15. 33. United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, “Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, “Frank Dialogue Due on Peacekeeping’s Future amid Evolving Threats, Growing Pressure, Top Officials Tell Special Committee as General Debate Begins” (UN General Assembly, 254th and 255th meetings, February 12, 2018). 34. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “Policy: Peacekeeping Intelligence,” 5. 35. Ibid. 36. Sebastiaan Rietjens and A. Walter Dorn, “The Evolution of Peacekeeping Intelligence: The UN’s Laboratory in Mali,” in Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to Mali (Between Learning and Law), edited by Floribert Baudet, Eleni Braat, Jeoffrey van Woensel, and Aad Wever (The Hague: Asser Press and Springer, 2017). 37. Confidential lessons learned report, March 2016. 38. Alan Taylor, “Operation Barkhane: France’s Counterterrorism Forces in Africa,” Atlantic, October 24, 2017. 39. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “Policy: Peacekeeping Intelligence.” 40. Ibid., 1. 41. Willmot, Improving U.N. Situational Awareness. 42. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, “Policy: Peacekeeping Intelligence,” 5. 43. Ibid., 6. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid., 9. 48. Ibid., 10. 49. Ibid., 5. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid., 7. 52. Ibid., 4. 53. Anne Daugherty Miles, “The U.S. Intelligence Community: Selected CrossCutting Issues,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R44455, April 12, 2016, 1. 54. Ibid., 7. 55. Ibid., 9 56. Johnson et al., “An INS Special Forum.” 57. A. Walter Dorn and Stewart Webb, “Eyes in the Sky for Peacekeeping: The Emergence of UAVs in UN Operations Originally,” in Loch K. Johnson, “An INS Special Forum,” Intelligence and National Security, 32, no. 4 (2017): 413–417. 58. Ibid. 59. United Nations Association in Canada, Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Lessons from the Past, Building for the Future: The Report on the UNA-Canada 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping International Panel Series 2006–2007 (Ottawa: United Nations Association in Canada, 2007). 60. Olga Abilova and Alexandra Novosseloff, Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations: Toward an Organizational Doctrine (New York: International Peace Institute, July 2016), 22.

11 The Public vs. Private Distinction Damien Van Puyvelde

We can’t spy . . . if we can’t buy!

—Office of the Director of National Intelligence official1

The study of intelligence largely focuses on how government agencies conduct the core intelligence activities. Private actors—ranging from individuals to companies and associations—have long contributed to these government activities and have even developed their own intelligence capabilities. Thus, there is a clear need to study how public and private institutions affect intelligence practices. In turn, studying intelligence through the prism of the public-private divide can inform contemporary debates about the reconfiguration of public authority in modern liberal democracies.2 Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, the privatization of US intelligence has attracted much media attention. Most of this coverage has been negative; journalists have decried “a hidden world growing out of control” and appealed: “Don’t Privatize Our Spies.”3 Commentators have similarly focused on the negative consequences of privatization, including contractors’ involvement in human-rights abuses at the Abu Ghraib detention center in Iraq and the involvement of the private sector in the expansion of the socalled surveillance state.4 From this perspective, privatization allows the government to operate beyond the system of checks and balances at the center of democratic systems of intelligence accountability. 167

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In this chapter, I attempt to develop a more balanced approach to the study of intelligence and the public-private divide, one that does not solely focus on the dark side of privatization but seeks to understand this phenomenon in the broader context of contemporary democracies.5 I begin by examining the multiple forms of privatization, with specific references to intelligence activities whenever possible. The second section identifies the role of public and private intelligence actors and the multiple types of interests that drive their activities. The third and final section addresses accountability concerns with the conduct of intelligence activities.

The Many Faces of Privatization Privatization entails a much broader set of policies and practices than outsourcing. E. S. Savas defines privatization as “the act of reducing the role of government or increasing the role of the private institutions of society in satisfying people’s needs; it means relying more on the private sector and less on government.”6 At the most general level, privatization can follow three methods. The government can delegate the delivery of a service or the production of a good (privatization by delegation) or relinquish its responsibility (privatization by divestment); and the private sector can expand its activities to the point that it displaces a government activity (privatization by displacement).7 (Contracting out or outsourcing is a form of privatization by delegation.) Some of these goods and services are commercial, such as food and catering, janitorial, grounds and facilities maintenance; others, such as intelligence analysis, are more essential to the conduct of intelligence and, as a result, their outsourcing has generated more concern.8 In 2007, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) revealed that 27 percent of the US intelligence community’s workforce, approximately 37,000 contractors to whom work was outsourced, was engaged in such “core” intelligence tasks as intelligence collection, operations, and analysis.9 That same year, an Inventory of Core Contract Personnel showed that intelligence collection and operations, intelligence analysis and production, and research and technology accounted for most of the expenses devoted to core contractors in the National Intelligence Program (a part of the overall intelligence budget).

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Although no country seems to have pushed the outsourcing of intelligence as far as the United States, other democracies do outsource intelligence. The number of contractors working at the French General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) rose from 17.5 percent in 2008 to 25 percent in 2015, for instance.10 The British intelligence services also rely on contractors. Although figures on the overall numbers of intelligence contractors in the United Kingdom are not available, the 2011–2012 annual report of the Intelligence and Security committee of the UK Parliament notes that “the agencies spend hundreds of millions of pounds of public money every year with the industry.” This sum represents a significant portion of the British intelligence budget, which is currently estimated at around £2.5 billion. Beyond these figures, little information is publicly available on intelligence outsourcing in other democracies. This lack of evidence is common in the study of intelligence and limits scholarly research on the subject. In addition, corporate secrecy adds to the intelligence and democracy dilemma by further complicating outsiders’ access to key information. Although necessary, this secrecy is a significant obstacle to the development of a truly global study of intelligence.11 Privatization by delegation also includes the use of grants, through which the government expresses general requirements to solicit research and development projects. The US intelligence community and French Ministry of the Armies have both solicited projects to encourage the development of university programs supporting their need for intelligence human capital, namely, the Intelligence Community Centres for Academic Excellence and the French Center of Excellence in Defense and Strategy.12 In recent years, the expression public-private partnerships has also gained much momentum, particularly in debates on critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. This expression generally refers to arrangements in which a government and a private entity jointly undertake a traditionally public activity, such as building and protecting critical infrastructure.13 Some see partnership as a degree of mutual commitment between public and private actors that goes over and above that implied in a contract.14 For instance, the multiplication of fusion centers in the United States, to help improve information sharing among state, local, tribal, federal, and private-sector entities under the auspices of the US Department of Homeland Security, could be considered as a prime example of public-private intelligence partnership.15

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Privatization through divestment refers to the transfer of enterprise ownership, in whole or in part, from the state to the private sector. This practice is common in some spheres of governmental activity, such as the transportation and energy sectors, in countries that have historically had many state-owned enterprises or a strong tradition of socialism. However, such divestment is rare, not to say nonexistent, in the realm of intelligence, which has remained strongly tied to the exercise of public authority. Since the early twentieth century, the more developed nation-states have established themselves as the key provider of national-security intelligence. None of these states has sought to directly sell or donate its intelligence services to a company. Privatization by displacement, a more indirect process, is more common. In this case, the role of the government is gradually being diminished as markets develop to satisfy the societal demand for intelligence and security. Savas notes that displacement can occur by default when the private sector recognizes and satisfies an unmet demand. One example is the growth of the market for cyber intelligence and security services.16 Displacement can also occur by withdrawal when the government shrinks its size and leaves gaps to be filled by the private sector, and by deregulation when the government favors market discipline to facilitate the emergence of demand-driven arrangements.17 In the 1990s, the administration of US President Bill Clinton pursued both strategies and launched an ambitious program of deregulation, as well as budget cuts that significantly downsized the intelligence and defense communities. This displacement created ideal conditions for the development of a market for government intelligence at the turn of the twentieth century and partly explains the boom in US intelligence contracting during the Global War on Terrorism. In most democracies, the privatization of intelligence is also visible through the prism of displacement. Frédéric Ocqueteau details how private intelligence companies and security departments attached to existing companies have become more common in the last two decades. For him, the revolving door between the French government intelligence services and the world of business intelligence facilitated the growth of a market for business intelligence in which corporate spies are sympathetic to the public interest. The ties between French government and corporate intelligence professionals are particularly close in those sectors the government deems critical, such as nuclear energy and cybersecurity.18 Similar interactions are visible in other countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States through the development of public-private partnerships, for example, in the cybersecurity sector.19

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In sum, the privatization of intelligence is a complex and diverse phenomenon that takes multiple forms in different contexts.

Dissociating Public and Private Intelligence Actors and Interests In privatization theory, the nature of the goods and services under consideration determine the preferred mode of public-private engagement.20 The conduct of intelligence entails a number of goods and services, all of which contribute to inform decisionmakers about their environment and sometimes influence this environment more directly. At the broadest level, scholars often identify three types of intelligence: national security, law enforcement, and business intelligence. Throughout the twentieth century, most great powers professionalized and institutionalized their intelligence and security services.21 In contemporary democracies, this institutionalization has been accompanied by rising public expectations about the role of the government institutions in the provision of intelligence and security. Various government agencies collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence to inform decisionmaking from the local to the national level, and they uphold the public interest in security. Business or competitive intelligence involves commercial entities that gather, analyze, and distribute information about their competitors to serve their own (private) interest.22 Reading these definitions, students of intelligence might conclude that there is a clear distinction between public agencies supporting national security and law-enforcement intelligence and business-intelligence companies supporting private-sector interests. No such distinction exists. Table 11.1 uses the public-private dichotomy to distinguish between different types of actors and interests at play in the realm of intelligence. The table shows that there is no necessary correlation between the status of an actor and its interests. Government agencies do not have a monopoly on the public interest in security and intelligence. Private actors, such as contractors and not-for-profit associations, also provide intelligence services and products that serve the public interest. This is the case with individual contractors working for the CIA’s National Clandestine Service, companies developing satellites for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) or the French armed forces, but also surveillance technologies used by the police in countries ranging from Israel to Canada. In the United States, associations such

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Table 11.1 Public and Private Interests and Actors in the Intelligence Field Interest Public

Actor

Public

Private

Private

Government agencies Corrupt or misguided • Foreign intelligence agencies: government official Central Intelligence Agency, Direction • Corrupt government Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, official, rogue Secret Intelligence Service intelligence officer • Domestic intelligence and security • Misguided government agencies: Federal Bureau of Investigation, policy Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure, Secret Service • Police agencies: New York Police Department, Gendarmerie Nationale and Police Nationale, Metropolitan Police Individual, for-profit, or not-for-profit organization • Private-sector associations: Business Executive for National Security, Intelligence and National Security Alliance, etc. • Public interest groups: American Civil Liberties Union, Federation of American Scientists, etc. • Government contractors: ◦ Companies: Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems, Thales, etc. ◦ Individual contractors

Individual, for-profit, or not-for-profit organization • Associations: Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP), Syndicat Français de l’Intelligence Economique (SYNFIE), etc. • Business and competitive intelligence companies: Amarante, CEIS, Control • Intelligence and security component of a larger company

as the Intelligence and National Security Alliance provide a pool of private-sector expertise and networking opportunities to support the government’s national-security effort.23 Conversely, public officials and entities do not always serve the public interest in security. In some instances, government officials have abused the trust their fellow citizens vested in them. For example, Representative Randy Cunningham and the executive director of the CIA, Kyle Foggo, received bribes from intelligence contractors— respectively, in 2004 and 2005—in exchange for government contracts.24 Beyond cases of corruption, commentators have debated the degree to which government policies and agencies serve the public interest. Some scholars have questioned whether the use of enhanced interrogation techniques by the CIA has really served the United States in its Global War on Terrorism.25 In France, commentators

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have questioned the public utility of the covert action that sank the Rainbow Warrior, a Greenpeace ship that the organization planned to use to protest against and possibly disrupt a French nuclear test in the Pacific Ocean in 1986.26 In other and less controversial instances, private actors more clearly serve private interests. For example, a number of business-intelligence companies collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on competitors for other companies. The public interest in security creates a need for government officials to determine objectives and manage related intelligence efforts. Officials can decide that an intelligence good or service is best provided in-house, or that it would be best produced by another institution of society, in which case privatization will occur. The policies and regulations that apply to contractors working for a government are generally stricter than those that apply to intelligence professionals serving in the private sector. These rules seem to assume that public and private employees are driven by different motives or that they tend to behave differently. For Morten Hansen, public and private employees working in the government intelligence sector are intrinsically driven by their national-security mission. Hansen adds that security-clearance requirements make it difficult “to conceal interests and loyalties that run counter to the national-security objective.”27 At the organizational level, intelligence contractors often have previous government experience and tend to work in government buildings, where they are surrounded by government employees.28 Yet when the government outsources intelligence, officials cannot assume that contractors will automatically serve the public interest. If a contractor fails to deliver a service or misbehaves, that is to say, if a contractor serves a private instead of the public interest, the government will hold him or her to account and reaffirm the primacy of the public interest. However, the extent to which government officials have been able to maintain control over intelligence contractors is not clear, mostly because the matter has not been studied thoroughly. Besides the role of contractors, the public-private dichotomy also sheds light on the range of actors and interests at play in modern systems of democratic intelligence accountability.

Public and Private Intelligence Accountability Scholars have largely overlooked how broader society, specifically the private sector, fits in this general framework for intelligence

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accountability.29 The remainder of this section seeks to fill this gap in the literature and identifies how traditional accountability channels allow the three branches of government to hold contractors to account, but also how the private sector can contribute to intelligence accountability in contemporary democracies. Executive Control of Contractors

Regulations and policies delimit the role of intelligence contractors. Just like their government counterparts, contractors must get a security clearance to access sensitive government information. They are also required to respect the same information-security policies and procedures as their government colleagues. In the United States, government policies regulate the reasons for which managers can outsource core intelligence activities. Some of these rationales include surge requirements related to urgent missions, discrete nonrecurring tasks, unique or specialized expertise that cannot be found in the government workforce, and the delivery of more efficient and effective services.30 When current regulations do not prohibit outsourcing, a legal concurrence is provided to a contracting officer who, in coordination with his or her subordinates, conducts market research, develops requirements documents, determines the scope of the project to be outsourced, provides cost estimates, and assesses related risks. When a contract vehicle has been decided, the vendors’ proposals are evaluated, and government officials select a source. A contract is awarded and subsequently managed by a contracting officer and his or her technical representative, who provides oversight and technical direction. Policies further require government agencies to provide a greater degree of scrutiny when contracting services can affect the government’s decisionmaking authority—which might be the case with the outsourcing of core functions such as intelligence analysis and management.31 When private providers default on a contract or violate regulations, government agencies can rely on a host of sanctions to punish them. Standard US government contracts include such measures as termination for default, withholding of award, and incentive fees.32 When contractors blatantly violate rules and regulations, inspectors general investigate their behavior and can, when necessary, refer a case to the courts. Declassified reports from the CIA inspector general (IG) reveal continuous scrutiny of intelligence contractors between 2001 and 2008. Besides procurement fraud, government investigations, audits,

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and reviews dwelled on many other aspects of behavior, including the mischarging and overpayment of contracts, wasteful or improper contract practices, ethics improprieties—such as the acceptance of gratuities from agency contractors or an improper relationship between a contracting officer’s technical representative and an agency contractor.33 Thus, the impact of outsourcing on democratic accountability largely depends on the administrative system of control in place. Judicial Review of Public and Private Intelligence Activities

Studying intelligence outsourcing opens up a different and underresearched set of issues—such as waste, fraud, and abuse—which other federal courts adjudicate. When intelligence officials have a reasonable belief that violations of federal law have been committed, matters are normally referred to the Department of Justice, which can then decide to prosecute government officials and contractors for their wrongdoings. For example, a series of staff investigations by the CIA IG resulted in contractors’ guilty pleas and monetary restitutions to the agency. In one case, an agency employee was “convicted of conspiracy to accept gratuities in exchange for giving preferential treatment to an Agency contractor.”34 Contractors can protest against the formation or award of government contracts and can dispute issues arising during the performance of a contract. In one case, the Armed Services Board of Contracts Appeal (ABSCA) examined a dispute from Cubic Defense Applications, Inc. The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command had awarded a contract to this company in 2003 to design, develop, manufacture, and test a communication system allowing navy ships to exchange intelligence with military aircraft. Following the award of this contract, Cubic Defense Applications requested an increase in the contract price and appealed to contest the absence of timely decision on this request by its contracting officer. In its decision, ABSCA dismissed the company’s appeal as premature and used this opportunity to clarify the deadline for the contracting officer’s decision.35 This case is interesting because it suggests that contractors can, in some circumstances, also contribute to intelligence accountability by pressing government officials to adhere to existing policies and regulations. Indeed, public officials are not the only guarantors of the public interest. Other private actors, such as individuals and associations, can

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also use the courts for similar purposes. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), for example, successfully sued under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to gather and publicize a series of government documents on rendition, detention, and interrogation during the presidency of George W. Bush.36 Although the ACLU directly challenged the government’s position on the trade-off between national security and transparency, the judiciary had the final word and decided that releasing some of the requested documents was acceptable.37 Parliamentary Concerns over the Privatization of Intelligence

In France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, legislative oversight committees have demonstrated an interest in the role of contractors and have pressured the executive branch to share information on their intelligence activities.38 The US Congress has provided the most visible efforts to oversee intelligence contracting. These efforts have focused on three core issues that are also likely to surface in other democracies. First, American lawmakers have been concerned that the intelligence community might lose some core capabilities if it becomes overreliant on contractors. A second, related, concern pertains to the definition of a number of intelligence activities that should never be outsourced to the private sector. Following pressure from Congress and support from the administration of Barack Obama, the US government clarified what it considers to be “inherently governmental functions.” These functions entail the exercise of sovereign power and those that commit the government to new courses of action, requiring the exercise of discretion in applying federal authority or the making of value judgments.39 In practice, a diverse array of tasks can be considered as “inherently governmental,” including the direction and control of intelligence and counterintelligence operations; the conduct of foreign relations and the determination of foreign policy; the direction and control of federal employees; the determination of agency policy; the determination of federal program priorities for budget requests; awarding, administering, and terminating prime contracts; the selection of individuals for federal government employment; and the drafting of congressional testimony and correspondence.40 A third and final concern that has drawn attention from multiple intelligence accountability holders is the waste of taxpayers’ money. Given the private sector’s financial interest, parliaments and com-

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mentators have been concerned that the administration might not get enough bang for the buck when it outsources intelligence. This concern was clearly expressed in the United States when a series of media reports described the failure of a multimillion-dollar acquisition program supposed to modernize the information technology capabilities of the National Security Agency (NSA). 41 Similar problems emerged at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) when it relied on the private sector to modernize its virtual case-file system.42 Civil Society

Broader society also has an important role to play in the democratic oversight of public and private intelligence. Citizens, think tanks, academia, the media, interest groups, and companies that do not directly work for the intelligence community also contribute to intelligence accountability. Public opinion can be expected to affect intelligence affairs by persuading representatives to take a more critical stance toward controversial intelligence programs.43 The news media also have a role to play in democratic intelligence oversight.44 Societal scrutiny of private intelligence activities remains limited, due to lack of institutional assets and authorities to exert immediate and systematic effects on intelligence policies and activities, imbalance, sensationalism, and even inaccuracy.45

Conclusion

Taking into account the roles of the public and the private sectors forces us to reconsider some of the basic assumptions about intelligence practices. First, the privatization of intelligence takes multiple forms. Second, there is no necessary correlation between the public status of an actor and its ability to serve the public interest. Individuals, companies, and associations—all defined as private entities— can serve the public interest in security. These two central points are essential to approach the study of contemporary intelligence practices in a more neutral and, increasingly, a more global manner.

Notes

1. Quoted in Simon Chesterman, “‘We Can’t Spy … If We Can’t Buy!’: The Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing ‘Inherently Governmental Functions,’” European Journal of International Law 19, no. 5 (2008), 1055.

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2. Jacqueline Best and Alexandra Gheciu, The Return of the Public in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 3–37. 3. Patrick Radden Keefe, “Don’t Privatize Our Spies,” New York Times, June 25, 2007; Dana Priest and William Arkin, “A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control,” Washington Post, July 19, 2010. 4. Robert O’Harrow Jr., “Post-9/11 Outsourcing of U.S. Intelligence Raises Risks,” Washington Post, June 10, 2013; Tim Shorrock, Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008); Dana Priest and William Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State (New York: Little, Brown, 2011). 5. This chapter engages with intelligence in three democracies: France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This effort to consider public-private intelligence beyond the United States is limited by the paucity of publicly available information on the subject in other countries. 6. E. S. Savas, Privatization in the City: Successes, Failures, Lessons (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2005), 16. 7. E. S. Savas, Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships (New York: Chatham House, 2000), 126–138. 8. James Hopper, Core Contract Personnel, Intelligence Community Directive 612 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, August 2015). 9. This number is based on L. Elaine Halchin, The Intelligence Community and Its Use of Contractors: Congressional Oversight Issues, CRS Report No. R44157 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel /R44157.pdf; US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Questions and Answers on the Intelligence Community Post 9/11,” Atlantic, 4, https://cdn.theatlantic .com/static/mt/assets/politics/question_and_answer_ic.pdf; Ronald Sanders, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, media conference call, January 14, 2010. 10. André Trillard and Jeanny Lorgeoux, “Au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées projet de loi de finances pour 2016: Défense: environnement et prospective de la politique de défense,” Avis n° 166 (2015–2016). 11. For a survey of diversity in intelligence studies scholarship, see Damien Van Puyvelde and Sean Curtis, “‘Standing on the Shoulders of Giants’: Diversity and Scholarship in Intelligence Studies,” Intelligence and National Security 31, no. 7 (2016): 1040–1054. 12. “IC Centers for Academic Excellence,” Defense Intelligence Agency, http:// www.dia.mil/Training/IC-Centers-for-Academic-Excellence; “Pacte enseignement supérieur,” Ministère des Armées, Direction Générale des Relations Internationales et de la Stratégie, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/recherche-et-prospective/pacte -enseignement-superieur/pacte-enseignement-superieur. 13. Savas, Privatization in the City, 15. 14. Tony Bovaird, “Public-Private Partnerships: From Contested Concepts to Prevalent Practice,” International Review of Administrative Sciences 70, no. 2 (2004), 192. 15. On US fusion centers, see: David L. Carter and Jeremy G. Carter, “The Intelligence Fusion Process for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement,” Criminal Justice and Behavior 36, no. 12 (2009), 1323–1339; US Government Accountability Office, Information Sharing: DHS Is Assessing Fusion Center Capabilities and Results, but Needs to More Accurately Account for Federal Funding Provided to Centers, GAO-15-155 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2014). 16. Martin C. Libicki, David Senty, and Julia Pollak, Hackers Wanted: An Examination of the Cybersecurity Labor Market (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014). 17. Savas, Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 132–139.

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18. Frédéric Ocqueteau, “La privatisation du renseignement en questions: Convergence européennes et singularités française,” in Transformations et réformes de la sécurité et du renseignement en Europe, edited by Sébastien Laurent and Bertrand Warusfel, 287–293 (Pessac: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2016). 19. Madeline Carr, “Public-Private Partnerships in National Cyber-Security Strategies,” International Affairs 92, no. 1 (2016): 43–62; Kristan Stoddart, “UK Cyber Security and Critical National Infrastructure Protection,” International Affairs 92, no. 5 (2016): 1079–1105. On corporate espionage in the Western world, see Eamon Javers, Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy: Inside the Secret World of Corporate Espionage (New York: Harper, 2010). 20. Savas, Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 44–45. 21. Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Perennial, 1995); Sébastien Laurent, Politiques de l’ombre: État, renseignement et surveillance en France (Paris: Fayard, 2009); Richard Aldrich and Rory Cormac, The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime Ministers (London: William Collins, 2017). 22. On business intelligence, see: Breakspear, “A New Definition of Intelligence”; Javers, Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy. 23. “About Us,” Intelligence and National Security Alliance, http://www .insaonline.org/index.php?id=79; “About BENS,” Business Executives for National Security, https://www.bens.org/about-bens/our-mission. 24. Randal C. Archibold, “Ex-Congressman Gets 8-Year Term in Bribery Case,” New York Times, March 4, 2006; Matthew Barakat, “Kyle ‘Dusty’ Foggo, Former CIA#3 Gets More Than 3 Years in Prison,” Huffington Post, February 26, 2009. 25. Brice Dickson, “Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights in Northern Ireland,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 3 (2009): 475–493; Misty Duke and Damien Van Puyvelde, “The Science of Interrogation: What Research Tells Us about ‘Enhanced Interrogation,’” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 30, no. 2 (2017): 310–339. 26. Laurie Buso and Guillaume Choux, “Les rouages de l’affaire Greenpeace: Du secret d’état à la publicité internationale,” Perspective Internationales 1 (2012): 34– 69; Hans Born and Thorsten Wetzling, “Checks and Imbalances? Intelligence Governance in Contemporary France,” in Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants, edited by Hans Born and Marina Caparini (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 138–139. 27. Morten Hansen, “Intelligence Contracting: On the Motivations, Interests, and Capabilities of Core Personnel Contractors in the US Intelligence Community,” Intelligence and National Security 29, no. 1 (2013), 74. 28. Ronald Sanders, associate director of national intelligence for human capital, Office of the Director for National Intelligence, “Conference Call with Dr. Ronald Sanders, Associate Director of National Intelligence for Human Capital, Results of the Fiscal Year 2007 US Intelligence Community Inventory of Core Contractor Personnel,” August 27, 2008, 4. 29. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry; Sébastien Laurent, “Les parlementaires face à l’état secret et au renseignement sous les IVe et Ve républiques: De l’ignorance à la politisation,” Cahiers de la Sécurité 13 (2010): 134–144; Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only; Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door; Genevieve Lester, When Should State Secrets Stay Secret? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 29–73; Premier Ministre, Décret n° 2014-833 du 24 juillet 2014 relatif à l’inspection des services de renseignement, Journal Officiel, July 25, 2014. 30. Hopper, Core Contract Personnel. 31. The French system provides similar protections for so-called regalian powers. See Pierre Delvolvé, “La privatisation du service de l’état,” Pouvoirs 117 (2006): 107–120.

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32. Kate M. Manuel and Rodney M. Perry, Selected Legal Mechanisms Whereby the Government Can Hold Contractors Accountable for Failure to Perform or Other Misconduct, CRS Report No. R44202 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 2. 33. Reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General, were obtained from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, https://www.eff.org /agency/central-intelligence-agency. 34. Central Intelligence Agency, “Semiannual Report to the Director of Central Intelligence, July–December 2002,” 3, https://www.eff.org/document/ciapart037pdf; Central Intelligence Agency, “Semiannual Report, January–June 2005,” 60, https:// www.eff.org/document/ciapart015pdf; Central Intelligence Agency, “Semiannual Report, July–December 2005,” 2, https://www.eff.org/document/ciapart023pdf. 35. Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, Appeal of Cubic Defense Applications, Inc., Contract No. N00039-03-C-0024, ABSCA No. 56097, October 2, 2007. 36. “The Torture Report,” American Civil Liberties Union, https://www.aclu.org /video/torture-report. 37. Damien Van Puyvelde, “Intelligence Accountability and the Role of Public Interest Groups in the United States,” Intelligence and National Security 28, no. 2 (2013), 152. 38. See, for example, US House of Representatives, Conference Report on Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Rep. 110-478, 110 Cong., 1 (December 6, 2007); Are We Striking the Right Balance? 112 Cong. 1 (September 20, 2011); UK Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2011–2012 (Norwich: The Stationary Office, 2012), 68–69. 39. This definition is based on the FAIR Act, Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-270, 105 Cong., 2 (October 19, 1998), section 5. 40. Policy, 48 CFR 7.503 (2017). 41. Alice Lipowicz, “Trailblazer Loses Its Way,” Washington Technology, September 10, 2005, https://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2005/09/10/trailblazer-loses -its-way.aspx; Siobhan Gorman, “System Error,” Baltimore Sun, January 29, 2006. 42. Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the US Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary (February 3, 2005), https://www.fbi.gov/news /testimony/fbis-virtual-case-file-system; US Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, USAF, to Be Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, 109 Cong., 1 (April 14, 2005), 69. 43. For a similar point on public opinion and foreign policy, see: Stuart Soroka, “Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy,” International Journal of Press/Politics 8, no. 11 (2003): 27–48; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy,” American Political Science Review 77, no. 1 (1983): 175–190. 44. For comprehensive analyses on the media’s role in oversight of intelligence, see Claudia Hillebrand, “The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight,” Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 5 (2012): 689–706; Mark Hosenball and Evan Thomas, “Hold the Phone: Big Brother Knows Whom You Call,” Newsweek, May 22, 2006; Ellen Nakashima and Dan Eggen, “Former CEO Says U.S. Punished Phone Firm,” Washington Post, October 13, 2007; Damien Van Puyvelde, “Médias, responsabilité gouvernementale et secret d’état: L’affaire Wikileaks,” Le Temps des Médias 16, no. 1 (2011): 161–172; “The Black Budget,” Washington Post, August 29, 2013; Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization.” 45. Van Puyvelde, “Médias, responsabilité”; Washington Post, “The Black Budget.”

Part 3 Accountability and Culture

12 Oversight of Intelligence Thomas C. Bruneau

Oversight is not easy: some civilian leaders do not want to know what unpleasant methods are being used on their behalf, while many intelligence services resist sharing this information, whether for legitimate security concerns or because of the desire to retain autonomy. —Robert Jervis1

The oversight of intelligence agencies and processes is meant to square the circle posed by the need for secrecy by the agencies in a democracy that is based on accountability, thus requiring transparency. In this chapter, I review the democratic oversight mechanisms for the intelligence agencies in a democracy.

Caveats Before beginning the substantive discussion, three caveats or clarifications are necessary. First, oversight is not the same as control. Because in every country intelligence agencies are under the executive, either directly or through the armed forces, control is exercised most directly The opinions expressed in this chapter are the author’s alone and do not necessarily represent either the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense.

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by the executive.2 Oversight, at least as used here, is not from within the agency itself but comes from other sectors of democratic government, primarily the legislature. The issue of external control, involving the media, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, and the like, is relevant only if they can influence the legislature. I share the conclusion of Van Puyvelde—and would extend it globally—when he states that “interest groups do not provide a definite solution to one of the most central challenges for intelligence oversight: political willingness. . . . At the end of the day, although public interest groups have ways to circumvent government control of information, the US government remains the most powerful actor since it decides on the legal constraints placed on these actors and guarantees their access to channels of accountability thanks to the rule of law.3 Second, there is the significance of the term intelligence, which really is “secret intelligence,” as some proponents of so-called opensource intelligence rightly point out: more than 90 percent of intelligence may be obtained from open (unclassified) sources. At some level, information obtained from clandestine, or secret, sources such as signals intelligence, which includes intercepts, and human intelligence, which includes agents, is necessary to determine which of the many pieces of information are most accurate. In short, at some point in the process of analysis, the information obtained secretly must be included in a product, which results in the whole product becoming secret. Third, there is the challenge of methodology regarding the study of organizations that work in secret, with secret sources and methods, and producing documents that are also secret. The first impediment is limited data on crucial issues of budgets and personnel. The second is the dearth of public opinion data on issues involving intelligence. How can the public have an opinion on something about which people have only partial knowledge, at best? Additionally, the topic of secret intelligence, and its oversight, is highly prone to polemics. Insiders generally cannot defend themselves, for to do so would provide information to real and potential enemies, but outsiders can always demand more in the way of oversight.

Democratic Oversight of Intelligence in Theory In theory, democratic oversight of intelligence is clear enough. Much is made of the guiding legal framework for the intelligence

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function, and particular mechanisms are meant to make regular practice of oversight. Legal Framework

Intelligence oversight necessarily begins with the development of a legal basis for intelligence. This endeavor includes organic laws, rules, and regulations, which should clearly define the responsibilities and powers of the intelligence agencies as well as the types and mechanisms of control and oversight. More specifically, the legal framework should encompass the types of intelligence agencies and their roles and missions; types of control and oversight of intelligence activities, personnel, and funding; direction regarding interagency coordination and/or international cooperation; ethical and legal constraints for the intelligence personnel and activity; guidelines of protection of classified information; and transparency and access to government information.4 By and large, numerous democracies have gradually developed legal frameworks for their newly created intelligence agencies. Besides the Five Eyes, Germany, Argentina, Brazil, Romania, the Czech Republic, and South Africa have established rules and regulations for their intelligence agencies, providing for new intelligence mandates, accountability, and transparency. Other democracies are currently revisiting their legal bases for intelligence, including Indonesia, Uganda, Kenya, Uruguay, the Bahamas, and Trinidad and Tobago, to name a few.5 Mechanisms of Oversight

Legal bases alone do not ensure that the intelligence agencies will work within the specific limits of the legal framework. Democracies must also establish oversight mechanisms to check on the intelligence agencies’ personnel, organizations, and activities. Executive oversight is carried out by inspectors general and legal counsels established at the government level. In the United States, these include the National Intelligence Council, Office of Management and Budget, and the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board. In Germany, for example, these bodies include Directorate 6 of the Federal Chancellery, the Federal Audit Office, and the office of the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of

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Information (BfDI).6 In Brazil and Romania, such oversight is carried out by the Public Ministry.7 Legislative oversight (also known as congressional or parliamentary control and oversight) acts as a balance to executive control and generally encompasses the establishment of the legal framework for intelligence, as well as control and review of the intelligence agencies’ activities, budgets, and personnel. Responsible bodies are typically standing committees within the legislature, as well as their staff. The committees enact legislation, review budgetary and staffing decisions, vet nominees, open inquiries regarding abuses or other intelligence problems, and liaise with the citizenry.8 Such committees exist in virtually all democracies. Legislative oversight of intelligence can also be carried out by ad hoc (or temporary) committees, established—either within the exiting committees or separately—to investigate specific issues or allegations of wrongdoing by the intelligence agencies.9 For example, ad hoc parliamentary committees were established throughout Europe in the mid-2000s to investigate allegations of setting up illegal prisons (or black sites) to support the CIA to interrogate terrorist suspects.10 Additional independent institutions may function in support of the parliaments to assist with budget reviews and/or protect citizens’ rights against intelligence intrusion—courts of audits (United States, Romania, Brazil, Chile) or Canada’s Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC)—as well as offices of the advocate of the people, or ombudsmen (most European democracies).11 Judicial review ensures that the agencies use their special powers according to the law and protects citizens’ rights from the agencies’ intrusive collection and searches. Responsible bodies in general include courts of justice.12 Whereas the judicial branch in most countries avoids dealing with current issues of national security, including intelligence, there are, for example, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act courts in the United States; the G10 Commission in Germany (named for the provision of the constitution that guarantees the right to privacy vis-à-vis government surveillance); and the Public Ministry in Brazil that conduct oversight on some aspects of intelligence. Other external control consists of the review of the intelligence organizations by “outsiders” (free press, independent lobbies and think tanks, NGOs, and international organizations). Everywhere, elements of civil society are involved in some aspect of oversight. The media, which may or may not know anything about intelligence, are always ready to highlight scandals and examples of “intelligence fail-

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ures.” Nongovernmental organizations, many of which are international, are heavily involved in identifying and denouncing scandals, as are think tanks and academic programs. International organizations, with the EU, and specifically the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), or the Latin American Court of Human Rights, are also involved in oversight. Finally, as highlighted in Global Intelligence Oversight, edited by Zachary Goldman and Samuel Rascoff, central elements of the globalized world—Facebook, Google, Amazon, and the like—all provide means to develop and implement oversight. Not all oversight is exogenous to the intelligence sector; indeed self-regulation, including internal oversight of standards and practices, forms part of the professionalization of intelligence.13 Internal oversight consists of legal-accountability mechanisms functioning within intelligence organizations themselves (e.g., counsels, IGs, as well as agencies’ intrinsic professional codes of ethics and institutional norms). The inspectors general identify problems and seek to remedy them, normally from above. The general counsels provide ongoing legal advice to individuals and units within the intelligence agencies.14

Democratic Oversight of Intelligence in Practice Among intelligence scholars and practitioners, there is agreement that oversight of intelligence has been less than perfect. 15 To begin with, not all democracies bind their intelligence agencies under a legal basis when they create these services. In Canada and the United Kingdom, for instance, though the agencies (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, in Canada; and respectively, MI5, MI6, and the Government Communications Headquarters in Great Britain) were founded in the early 1900s, their peacetime existence was only formally acknowledged in the late 1980s and early 1990s.16 No formal legal structure developed in the meantime. A similar situation occurred in Romania: virtually all the current intelligence units were set up in 1990, but they operated without a statutory legal basis for nearly a decade, which fueled rivalries and redundancy among the agencies’ activities.17 Next, formal oversight mechanisms may exist but they may not function adequately, part of the challenges of democratic reform of intelligence.18 This is further aggravated by the fact that decisionmakers, who come to power through popular elections, have scant

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incentive to become involved in, or to take seriously, the responsibilities of providing oversight of intelligence agencies. On the electoral system and congressional committee turf, Zegart concludes, “Congress is not designed to oversee intelligence agencies well. Since their establishment in the 1970s, the congressional intelligence committees have been conducting oversight with limited expertise and weak budgetary authority.”19 In addition to electoral incentive, oversight would require such things as informed intelligence oversight committee members supported by informed staffs; facilities for retaining classified information, and a system for determining who has access to this information; and confidence or trust on the part of the agencies that those tasked with oversight can keep secrets. These requirements are in short supply in newer democracies, in particular; such capacity takes time to foster.20 And practically speaking, secrecy impedes oversight. Despite transparency and public-access legislation in many democracies, and even with an engaged civil society and media, intelligence agencies continue to overclassify information, which hinders access by oversight bodies. Therefore, more often than not, the overseers do not know which questions to ask because everything is so secret.21 Beyond that, some intelligence oversight bodies in some democracies operate in a culture of self-censorship, a result of party discipline and favors.22 In Ghana, for one, despite great authority granted by law to the intelligence oversight committee in the legislature, the “parliamentarians are unwilling to challenge members of government from their own party,” as Emmanuel Aning, Emma Birikorang, and Ernest Lartey observe.23 Other Challenges to Oversight

One other weakness of the oversight mechanisms is lack of de facto authority over the intelligence budget. Except for the United States, where the Congress actually has the power of the purse,24 in all other democracies, this function exists only on paper. This situation obtains in the following countries and their oversight bodies: in Mongolia, with the Special Inspection Sub-Committee of the State Great Hural, or parliament; in Argentina, with the Joint Committee for the Oversight of Internal Security and Intelligence Activities and Agencies, created in 1992; in Peru, with the Congressional Intelligence Committee, created in December 2005, which does

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not control the intelligence budget; in Ecuador, with the Congressional Intelligence Committee, in which the law does not provide for congressional control of intelligence budgets or military intelligence; in Spain, where, according to Antonio Díaz, the oversight committee in the Cortez receives a report twice a year by the director of the National Intelligence Center (CNI) on use of secret funds. Brazil is probably typical in that the Joint Commission for the Control of Intelligence Activities (CCAI), established in 2000, only received a legal status in 2013 (Resolution 2/2013), has limited staffing support, and meets infrequently, because politicians in Brazil do not consider intelligence a priority, resulting from lack of trust in the agencies.25 Whereas in all of the newer democracies, except Romania and Spain, the decisionmakers do not admit to having enemies (Mongolia might, but because of its location, and the size, population, and possession of huge militaries and nuclear weapons by its two neighbors, it cannot reasonably be expected to do much about them), both Romania and Spain belong to a whole myriad of organizations, the most important being the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Romania joined in 2004 and Spain in 1986; all these bodies encourage an awareness of enemies. The context, therefore, is defined not only by democratic consolidation but also by membership in NATO and in other, including the European Union (EU), security networks and institutions with extensive guidance, and substantial resources, in security, including intelligence. As a consequence, both Romania and Spain take intelligence seriously, create and adapt institutions for increased effectiveness, and cooperate with other countries and institutions to enhance effectiveness.26 In addition, in terms of incentives, Romania is not currently included in the Schengen Agreement—a treaty that led most of the European countries toward abolishment of their national borders— but aspiring to join; with a border on the Black Sea, which also borders on several countries characterized by corruption and illegal trade in everything imaginable, it has a heightened sense of threat, as does Spain, with not only a history of the Basque separatist movement Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) terrorism but an Al-Qaeda terror attack in Madrid in March 2004, an attack by Islamic State affiliates in Barcelona in August 2017, and an attack in the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla in the Maghreb. 27 Elsewhere among the newer democracies, the primary emphasis is on control, often to the detriment of effectiveness.28 The situation

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of intelligence in Brazil applies to most other newer democracies in this connection.29 What gave me a strong hint of the weakness of intelligence in Brazil was a meeting I had in February 2011 with Celso Amorim, who had been foreign minister during the entire administration of President Lula (2002–2010), when I asked about what prior intelligence the Foreign Ministry had received regarding Honduran president Manuel Zelaya taking up residence in the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, after he was overthrown in a coup and sent abroad on June 29, 2009. Ambassador Amorim emphasized that the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) had not provided any advance information on Zelaya’s post-exile return to Tegucigalpa and his moving into the Brazilian embassy. He expressed minimal expectations of ABIN and also stated that ABIN, like its predecessor the National Intelligence Service (SNI), focuses mainly on internal Brazilian issues. Yet ABIN is supposed to be the center organization of the Brazilian intelligence system, and its mandate is not exclusively domestic issues. Oversight and Effectiveness

Other Brazilian experts on intelligence have also expressed dismay at the lack of effectiveness of ABIN. First, no mention is made of the intelligence function in the extremely long and detailed Brazilian Constitution of 1988. To give a sense of that detail, Colégio Pedro II, located in Rio de Janeiro, is specifically guaranteed government support in Article 242, no. 2. While efforts have been made since at least 2011 to pass in the Congress a constitutional amendment to define and legitimate Brazil’s intelligence function, none of them has carried. Second, one serious implication—of many—of the lack of legislative definition and legitimacy is the fact that ABIN’s personnel have no legal protection for their activities, overt or covert. Second, according to the 1988 Constitution, Section XII of Article 5, ‘‘the secrecy of correspondence and of telegraphic data and telephone communications is inviolable, except, in the latter case, by court order, in the cases and in the manner prescribed by law for the purposes of criminal investigation or criminal procedural finding of facts.’’ And, as further defined in law No. 9296 of July 24, 1996, ABIN cannot conduct intercepts. Therefore, ABIN has to rely on the Federal Police for intercepts. This involvement has been the source

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of the main scandals involving ABIN during the past decade. These scandals associate ABIN in the public mind with the bad old days of the SNI. They keep the stigma alive. Third, consistent with Brazilian government requirements in general, entry into ABIN is by public competition rather than selective recruitment, with the result that ABIN’s employees are regulated by the same public-service rules as all other civil-service sectors. Once enrolled in the public service, ABIN employees can sign up for other competitions and, if successful, move on to other, better-paying, more prestigious positions. This fluidity does little for the institution’s stability and the competence of its analytical functions. Fourth, no specific provision in law is available to punish a person who releases or leaks classified information. Only the standard criminal laws that relate to theft apply. In the absence of a law and because a normal, open court process would be unacceptable in the context of releasing secret information, I was informed that, in fact, no penalty is incurred for releasing classified information in Brazil. Fifth, minimal funding is allocated to ABIN. Its 2014 budget was 528 million reals, the equivalent of about $206 million. For a sense of scale, the budget for Colégio Pedro II was 469 million, the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte was 1,187 million, and the Ministry of Sport was 3,256 million. Finally, though ABIN has a director general, the agency is not responsible directly to the president of the republic but rather to the Institutional Security Cabinet of the Presidency. The Gabinete de Segurança Institucional (GSI), the former Military Household, is headed by the only active-duty military officer in the expanded cabinet. ABIN, in short, does not have direct access to the president. I suspect that one or more of these factors pertain to other new democracies, which, in comparison to the Five Eyes, for example, result in the intelligence system being very weak. Other Arrangements

In the European Union context, there is oversight above the national, parliamentary level, with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), part of the Council of Europe that deals with intelligence accountability. This factor has led to increased intelligence oversight in the two countries, notably in the United Kingdom and Romania. 30 Of great importance is the ECHR—and the individual

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basis for bringing suit against a member-state in it—which has been incorporated in the national law of all member-states through legislation “requiring national courts and administrative agencies to apply it, and to take account of the case law of the ECHR. In other words, the court with the final authority on interpreting what is national law is not the national supreme or constitutional court, but the ECHR. Thus, incorporation of the ECHR creates a ‘pluralist’ legal order capable of affecting the distribution of power, not only between the national legislature and the courts but also between the national lower and higher courts.”31 In short, though the ECHR has the responsibility to enforce, it is not the same as parliamentary oversight; it is, as Iain Cameron concludes, “not a direct source of oversight. Instead, it is a mechanism for encouraging and pressuring states to achieve better-functioning national systems of oversight.”32 In this regard it is similar to other EU institutions. That is, although the EU does not have competence in national-security matters, including intelligence, which remain national responsibilities, it does provide a standard for all member states of the EU, and an institution, the ECHR, to which citizens in European democracies can appeal. Indeed, as Omand states with regard to the United Kingdom, in Europe’s democracies, “the historical trend . . . has been inexorably toward more openness, driven I suspect by three sets of forces.” These three are the growth of the intelligence bureaucracy, the increasingly intrusive media, and the impact of the ECHR.33 Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has occasionally provided successful external oversight over Latin American intelligence agencies. In Chile, for example, in 1993, the retired navy officer Humberto Palamara, who attempted to publish a book, had all his copies seized by the navy, which also put him on trial. When he appealed to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the court found in his favor. In 2006, the court ruled that Chile had violated the rights of the officer, as Russell Swenson and Carolina Sancho Hirane explained, “by having applied prior restraint, having violated the guarantee of due process upon illegitimately subjecting Palamara to military jurisdiction, and having violated the right to private property by denying him the use and enjoyment of his intellectual creation. Beyond paying compensation and allowing the publication of the confiscated book, Chile had to bring its military justice up to international standards.”34

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Conclusion Notwithstanding its flaws, oversight is cardinal in democracies—old and new alike—and should be taken seriously. It is part and parcel of the checks and balances that are critical in the democratic institutionbuilding process. It is one of the many catalysts for maintaining a suitable trade-off between secrecy and transparency in a democracy.

Notes 1. Robert Jervis, “Foreword,” in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), vii. 2. We have dealt with this issue in Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence; see also ibid., Table 13.1, p. 332. 3. Van Puyvelde, “Intelligence Accountability,” 156. 4. Johnson, The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence. 5. Tumushabe, “The Dilemma of Combating Terrorism”; Isoke, “The Dilemma of Porous Borders”; “The Strategic Services Agency (Amendment) Bill, 2016,” Parliament Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, http://www.ttparliament.org/publications .php?mid=28&id=737; Clint Chan Tack, “AG: Invitations Warmly Received,” Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, May 9, 2016, http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,227539.html; Journal of Mediterranean and Balkan Intelligence 7, no. 1 (June 2016). 6. “Supervision and Control,” Bundesnachrichtendienst, http://www.bnd.bund.de /EN/Scope_of_Work/Supervision_and_Control/Supervision_and_Control_node.html. 7. Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in Brazil”; Matei, “Legal Framework for Intelligence in Post-Communist Romania.” 8. For detailed information on the legislative oversight committees’ authorities in general, as well as in certain democracies, see Caparini and Born, Democratic Control of Intelligence Services; Born, Johnson, and Leigh, Who’s Watching the Spies?; Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark, Secret Intelligence; Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence; Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy; Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies. 9. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, “Intelligence in the Developing Democracies: The Quest for Transparency and Effectiveness,” in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, edited by Loch K. Johnson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Matei, “Legal Framework for Intelligence in Post-Communist Romania”; Matei, “Balancing Democratic Civilian Control”; Matei “Romania’s Intelligence Community.” 10. Bruneau and Matei, “Intelligence in the Developing Democracies”; Matei, “Legal Framework for Intelligence in Post-Communist Romania”; Matei, “Balancing Democratic Civilian Control”; Matei, “Romania’s Intelligence Community.” 11. Johnson, Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence; Zachary K. Goldman and Samuel J. Rascoff, eds., Global Intelligence Oversight: Governing Security in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Patrick F. Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis (New York: Routledge, 2011). The cases are limited to the Five Eyes. On the general issue of discrepancy in the magnum opus, see Johnson, Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence.

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12. For detailed information on judicial oversight, see Caparini and Born, Democratic Control of Intelligence Services; Born, Johnson, and Leigh, Who’s Watching the Spies?; Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark, Secret Intelligence; Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence; Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy; Jensen, McElreath, and Graves, Introduction to Intelligence Studies. 13. We rely on the concept of profession as developed by Webber and Huntington, and further improved by Larson and Jackson. A profession consists of “expertise,” “ethos,” and “corporateness.” Expertise involves a career path, developed via education and experience. Ethics involve either conduct that “can be oriented to an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ or to an ‘ethic of responsibility.’” Corporateness involves a “sense of organic unity and consciousness,” edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958); Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981). A broader conceptual framework for profession involves “professional association, cognitive base, institutionalized training, licensing, work autonomy . . . code of ethics,” as well as “high standards of professional and intellectual excellence.” Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 208, 221. Another broad definition of profession includes “a special type of occupation . . . [possessing] corporate solidarity . . . prolonged specialized training in a body of abstract knowledge, and a collectivity or service orientation . . . a vocational subculture which comprises implicit codes of behavior, generates an esprit de corps among members of the same profession, and ensures them certain occupational advantages . . . [also] bureaucratic structures and monopolistic privileges to perform certain types of work . . . professional literature, legislation, etc.” J. A. Jackson, Professions and Professionalization: Vol. 3, Sociological Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 23–24. 14. Johnson, Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence; Goldman and Rascoff, Global Intelligence Oversight. 15. The “Parliamentary Oversight of the Executive Branch” document provides information on the mechanisms of oversight in Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, Sweden, the UK, and the United States. The extent of oversight in the United States, even in comparison to these other democracies, is amazing. Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center, “Parliamentary Oversight of the Executive Branch” (report, Law Library of Congress, August 2017). 16. Mark Phythian, “The British Experience with Intelligence Accountability,” Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 1 (2007), 75; Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Johnson, Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence. 17. Matei, “Legal Framework for Intelligence in Post-Communist Romania.” 18. See Chapter 1 for more information. 19. Amy B. Zegart, “The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence Oversight,” Political Science Quarterly 126, no. 1 (2011), 25; see also Amy B. Zegart, Eyes on Spies: Congress and the United States Intelligence Community (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2011). 20. See Chapter 1 for details; Born, Johnson, and Leigh, Who’s Watching the Spies?; Bruneau and Boraz, Reforming Intelligence. 21. Anne Daugherty Miles, Intelligence Community Spending: Trends and Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 1; William Bendix and Paul. J. Quirk, “Secrecy and Negligence: How Congress Lost Control of Domestic Surveillance,” Issues in Governance Studies (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 2015). 22. Aning, Birikorang, and Lartey, “Developing a Democratic Intelligence Culture in Ghana,” 211.

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23. Ibid. 24. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy; Alissa M. Dolan et al., Congressional Oversight Manual (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014). 25. This section draws on the following articles, as well as email communications with their authors: Mendee and Tuvshintugs, “Consolidating Democracy”; Estévez, “Intelligence Democratization in Latin America”; Antonio M. Díaz Fernández, “The Spanish Intelligence Community: A Diffuse Reality,” Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 2 (2010): 223–244; Rubén Arcos, “Co-ordinated Strike: Spain Acts to Cut Intelligence Duplication,” HMS Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 2017; Matei, “Balancing Democratic Civilian Control.” 26. It is not accidental that the only article I have found on developing an intelligence culture is on Romania: Irena Dumitru, “Building an Intelligence Culture from Within: The SRI and Romanian Society,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27 (2014): 569–589. 27. Matei, “Balancing Democratic Civilian Control”; Antonio M. Díaz Fernández, “Spain,” in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence, vol. 1, edited by Stuart Farson et al. (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008); Gustavo Díaz, “The Development of Intelligence Studies in Spain,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 23, no. 4 (2010): 748–765; Gustavo Diaz Matey, “Conceptions of Intelligence: Intelligence as a Democratic Indicator” (Research Paper No. 165, Research Institute for European and American Studies, April 2014); Rubén Arcos, “Academics as Strategic Stakeholders of Intelligence Organizations: A View from Spain,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 26, no. 2 (2013): 332–346; Fernando Velasco, Estudios en inteligencia: Respuestas para la gobernanza democrática (Madrid: Plaza y Valdés, 2014); Fernando Velasco and Rubén Arcos, eds., Cultura de inteligencia: Un elemento para la reflexión y la colaboración internacional (Madrid: Plaza y Valdés, 2012); Diego Navarro and Rubén Arcos, La Inteligencia como disciplina científica (Madrid: Plaza y Valdés, 2010). 28. We have dealt with this issue in terms of civil-military relations, but it also applies to intelligence. See Florina Cristiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, 26–38 (New York: Routledge, 2013). 29. Adapted from Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in Brazil.” 30. Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Johnson, he Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence; Matei, “Balancing Democratic Civilian Control.” 31. Iain Cameron, “Oversight of Intelligence Agencies: The European Dimension,” in Goldman and Rascoff, Global Intelligence Oversight, 77. 32. Ibid., 89. 33. Farson et al., PSI Handbook; Johnson, The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence; Matei, “Balancing Democratic Civilian Control.” 34. Military justice should act in response only to crimes committed by activeduty armed forces personnel; it now has no jurisdiction over civilians. Swenson and Hirane, Intelligence Management in the Americas, 98–99; Matei and García, “Chilean Intelligence After Pinochet.”

13 Classified Information and the News Media Tristan Mabry

Democracies live uneasily with secrecy, and governments keep too many secrets. —Michael Waltzer1

Relative levels of state transparency have changed over time and, for the latter half of the twentieth century, the trend in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere had been toward more openness and declassification of erstwhile secrets. A milestone in this development was the signing of the US Freedom of Information Act by President Lyndon Johnson in 1966. The act was further strengthened in the wake of the Watergate scandal by President Jimmy Carter in 1976. This trend was clearly not limited to the United States: “Over time, the result of the Freedom of Information Act has been a growing cascade of government openness, with approximately sixty countries around the world emulating the United States and adopting some form of ‘right to information’ legislation.”2 The intelligence community was subject to even greater public exposure in the early 1990s following the end of the Cold War, when many Western governments wrongly believed that the intelligence services were suddenly “unimportant enough to be made more transparent and to be opened up to increased media coverage.”3 Of course, this trend halted abruptly after the terrorist attacks of 197

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9/11 as many—certainly not just in the United States—opted to tighten secrecy laws, expand the operations of intelligence services, and prosecute whistleblowers and leakers of unauthorized information with new zeal.4 The question of whether a reporter’s source qualifies as a brave whistleblower uncovering nefarious activity or simply a selfinterested traitor, leaking information that irreparably harms national security, is essential to understanding this relationship. More often than not, the answer depends on the individual being asked, and whether or not that person is a member of the intelligence community or the media. Hence, it is conventional (though much oversimplified) to view the news media and the intelligence community as existential opposites, with the former determined to release information about the state—even classified information— to the public at all costs and the latter determined to keep classified information “safe” from public view, as well as to prevent the publication of “information that government agencies would rather they did not.”5 Brokering the relationship between the communities is a broad task, and it requires the contributions of legislators, policymakers, and the courts. In this chapter, I discuss the relationship between intelligence agencies and the press in a democracy.

Freedom of the Press A free press is arguably the backbone of a healthy civil society, and a healthy civil society is in turn a core component of a functioning democracy.6 Media and journalism play at least five roles in the context of intelligence and democracy: “informing the public; liaising government with the citizens; helping boost government legitimacy; exercising informal external oversight of the government; and providing a ‘learning’ environment for elected officials and the public.” 7 What then can be made of states that are backsliding from liberal democracy into autocracy? The erosion of democratic norms frequently—if not invariably—parallels a tightening of press controls, restrictions on freedom of speech, and criminal prosecutions of journalists.8 Under these conditions, whistleblowers, leakers, and reporters alike are at heightened risk of persecution, and the possibility of monitoring the intelligence community is moot.

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In this regard, it is useful to first consider current relative levels of press freedom globally. This task is possible in part thanks to Freedom House and its Freedom of the Press Index, which scores countries according to variables covering legal, political, and economic environments across news outlets, including print, broadcast, and (more recently) digital media.9 After decades of liberalization (over the past thirty-eight years of data collected), a retrograde trend has clearly emerged. In 2016, press freedom globally slipped to its lowest level in thirteen years, caused not only by more draconian controls of the press in autocratic states such as Russia and China but also by increasing threats in some erstwhile democracies, including Turkey, Venezuela, Hungary, the Philippines, and Thailand. Among authoritarian states, the most controlled media environment is in North Korea, followed by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and a few other unsurprising cases, such as Syria and Iran. In general, a free press is very much the exception, not the rule. Worldwide, out of 199 countries examined in 2016, 31 percent enjoy a free press, with 36 percent ranked as partly free and 33 percent as not free. But this is a ranking of states, not populations. When accounting for China and India and the rest of the 7.4 billion people on earth, only 13 percent live with a free press, 42 percent partly free, and 45 percent not free. The World Press Freedom Index (2017) by Reporters Without Borders (RSF)—a Paris-based free press and journalist advocacy nongovernmental organization (NGO)—parallels the Freedom House data. Since 2013, its “global indicator” has slipped annually—in both democracies and authoritarian countries—and now stands at its lowest point on record.10 Examples of democracies where media freedom has considerably declined include the United States and the United Kingdom, Serbia, Chile, Niger, Namibia, and India.11 The decline is attributable to increasing politicization of the media, political pressures on media owners, government spying on sources and whistleblowers, closing newspapers and TV channels, arrests and legal proceedings, and targeted violence. 12 In addition, the New York–based Committee to Protect Journalists tabulated a record number of journalists (262) jailed worldwide for their reporting in 2017, with only three states accounting for more than half the imprisoned: Turkey is the leading jailer, followed by China and Egypt.13 Following the coup led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Egypt gained notoriety in 2013 for the arrest of three Al Jazeera English journalists who were charged with fabricating stories “damaging to national

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security.” Despite a lack of any evidence, all three were sentenced to a prison term of seven to ten years, though after an extended international outcry, in 2015, one (Peter Greste) was deported to his native Australia, while the other two (Mohamed Fahmy and Baher Mohamed) were pardoned by President el-Sisi. No reason was given for the pardon. Note that in many cases, however, journalists are held for extended periods without ever being formally charged. Again, in Egypt, for example, an Al Jazeera Arabic reporter, Mahmoud Hussein, was imprisoned in 2016 and accused of “incitement against state institutions and broadcasting false news with the aim of spreading chaos.” At the time of writing, he has yet to be arraigned in court but remains in prison.14 Nearly all the other jailers of journalists are in states ranked “partly free” or “not free” by Freedom House, with the exception of Israel (four reporters) and India (two). In democracies, new threats to journalists who report on classified information are typically statutory. For example, in Australia, the administration of Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull proposed an overall review of the country’s secrecy laws whereby government whistleblowers and journalists who report on leaked information could face twenty years in jail. The proposed legislation criminalizes the communication of information deemed “inherently harmful” to Australia’s interests, defined as any information produced by a security agency.15 In another example, in Britain, a governmentappointed Law Commission reviewed the country’s Official Secrets Act and also recommended that individuals who release classified information to the media and the journalists who report on such information should be subject to prison sentences, in this case up to fourteen years behind bars. The proposals were broadly viewed as an attempt to prevent the publication of classified material in Britain, such as when London’s Guardian newspaper published material furnished by Edward Snowden in 2013. 16 In Mali—once hailed for freedom of the media by Freedom House, the post-2012 coup governments have constantly targeted the press, in particular when the media attempts to report on security matters.17 The Maldives enacted a law in August 2016 “criminalizing defamation and allowing the authorities to close media outlets for ‘defamatory’ content.”18 In Indonesia, moreover, criticism goes beyond verbal and legal actions. The Jakarta-based Alliance for Independent Journalists notes that the state uses the

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military to intimidate and even physically attack journalists who attempt to expose abuses against the population by the armed forces.19

Whistleblowers and Leaks An immediate objection may be raised in any discussion of unauthorized disclosures that the distinction between a whistleblower and a leaker is false in that anyone who leaks classified information—for any reason—has committed a crime and deserves punishment for treason. However, for the purposes of discussion, it is reasonable to suggest that there are, in fact, significant differences between whistleblowers and leakers. For Seumas Miller, the distinction is an ethical judgment more than a legal finding: “The whistleblower is a member of an organization, and he or she deliberately places information about non-trivial wrongdoing on the public record, doing so for the purpose of having the wrongdoing stopped, and in the expectation that he or she may suffer some form of unwarranted interference and/or real or threatened reprisal.”20 There is a key distinction, then, with a leak of classified information: “information leaked is not necessarily of a wrongful or unlawful nature, for example leaking of embarrassing information,”21 and the leaker typically opts to remain anonymous. On the other hand, it may be argued that there is no significant difference between the two as both qualify as insider threats. Insiders working for an antagonist can be tremendously dangerous to any organization. In terms of national security, the leak of classified or sensitive information can jeopardize national interests. Nonetheless, when applied to individual cases, the question of whether all unauthorized disclosures by insiders are, on balance, damaging to the state depends on whether releasing the information is viewed as a public good. A case in point is Edward Snowden. A former employee of the CIA and onetime contractor for the National Security Agency (NSA), Snowden acknowledges downloading and releasing thousands of classified documents with the stated goal of revealing an NSA data-collection program that clandestinely amassed private information (metadata) on hundreds of millions of people in the United States and in other countries. From the perspective of some in the media, Snowden was to be celebrated as a whistleblower who provided the public with information it has a

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right to know22 and therefore—in the United States—a patriot.23 On the other hand, the Obama administration was unequivocal in describing Snowden as a traitor of the very worst kind who threatened national security and put lives at risk. Thus, for Miller, the Snowden case remains an ethical “dilemma.”24 If Snowden returned to the United States, he would face charges of violating the Espionage Act of 1917. The act was initially used to level charges at antiwar protesters; the first time the act was used to indict a source for providing classified information to a journalist was in 1971, when Daniel Ellsberg (with the assistance of former RAND colleague Anthony Russo Jr.) famously collected and released the Pentagon Papers. This collection of classified documents detailed a secret history of US involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967, showing that the United States had not only expanded its operations in the war by bombing Cambodia and Laos but also that prospects for a clear victory were dim. In 1971, articles that included selections from the Pentagon Papers were published in the New York Times. The reaction from the press was unequivocal as the papers “demonstrated, among other things, that the Johnson Administration had systematically lied, not only to the public but also to Congress, about a subject of transcendent national interest and significance.”25 The administration sought and won a court order preventing further publication, but ultimately the Supreme Court ruled that publication could resume. As for Ellsberg (and Russo), in 1973, citing prosecutorial misconduct and illegal evidence gathering, the presiding judge dismissed the charges and declared a mistrial. Decades later, prosecutions of leakers spiked dramatically under the Obama administration,26 when the Department of Justice ultimately charged eight people with providing classified information to journalists—more than all previous administrations combined— including Thomas Drake, Shamai Leibowitz, Stephen Kim, Donald Sachtleben, Jeffrey Sterling, John Kiriakou, and Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning. (Manning was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison—a record punishment for any leaker—though President Obama commuted her sentence to seven years, including time served, and she was released in 2017.) The eighth person charged under the Espionage Act, most notoriously, was Edward Snowden. As for the Trump administration, in February 2017, the president allegedly instructed FBI director James Comey to consider jailing journalists who publish any classified information, though this has

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not yet come to pass.27 In regard to whistleblowers and leakers, the first person to be charged under the Espionage Act during the Trump administration was an NSA contractor, Reality Winner, who allegedly released a classified document to a national-security news site, The Intercept. (The document addressed Russian efforts to hack the online accounts of employees of a voting-machine-software company.)28 By the end of 2017, the Department of Justice, under Attorney General Jeff Sessions, had opened a record twenty-seven leak (or whistleblower?) investigations and inaugurated a new FBI unit devoted to finding and stopping leaks of classified information.29 As is the case in the United States, when journalists are prosecuted for disclosing unauthorized information in other countries, a most common charge is the criminal act of espionage. In Israel, for example, Haaretz reporter Uri Blau published a number of articles in 2008 based on classified military documents provided to him by a former soldier—Anat Kamm—in the Israeli Defense Force (IDF).30 The articles alleged that the IDF had violated a supreme court ruling by the extrajudicial killing of two Islamic Jihad militants in the West Bank in 2007. Kamm was sentenced to four-and-a-half years in prison. Blau was charged under Article 4: Espionage, Section 113(c) of the Israeli Penal Code, for the illegal possession of classified government documents. In 2011, he ultimately pled guilty in a plea bargain and the sentence was light—four months of community service. Still, a precedent was set: Blau was the first journalist to be convicted of possessing classified information in Israel, an outcome that other journalists in the country called “chilling.”31 Another democracy that has recently seen a slide in press freedoms vis-à-vis unauthorized disclosures is Japan. Particularly since 2012, and the (second) election of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, efforts by his administration to curb the publication of classified information quickly culminated in “a sweeping, vague and hastily drafted secrets protection bill” in 2013.32 Despite street protests in the thousands and visceral opposition efforts, the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS) was “railroaded” through the Diet in a “shocking display of brute force.”33 According to its many critics, the SDS was drafted at the insistence of the Obama administration and the US military to enable sharing of classified information about Japan’s regional threats, including China and North Korea.34 According to Shinzo Abe, the law was drafted to prevent and punish the unauthorized release or publication of state

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secrets, to include “intelligence leaks that threatened national security, diplomacy, public safety and anti-terrorism measures.” 35 Civil servants who release classified material can face up to a decade in prison, and journalists can be jailed for up to five years. As a result of the SDS and the concomitant spread of self-censorship, Japan’s ranking on the RSF global press-freedom index slid from 11th place in 2010 to 72nd place in 2017.36 Note that despite Japan’s example of a security law that threatens journalists with jail time, it is, of course, still entirely possible to maintain a secrecy law(s) in a democracy while maintaining freedom of the press. A number of countries in the EU illustrate this point. Sweden and the Netherlands, for example, both have “extensive provisions for national security secrecy”37 yet are ranked as two of the most transparent media environments in the world (second and fifth place on the RSF index, respectively). In addition, throughout the EU, the protection of sources is generally backed by a 1996 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights—Goodwin v. the United Kingdom—which recognized that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society . . . Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom . . . Without such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result the vital public-watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected.38

Nonetheless, despite this ruling, protection of national security has trumped the protection of journalistic sources in the EU.39 An important case is that of Spain, where the Law of Official Secrets basically forbids declassification of documents.40 In 1995, an intelligence officer, Juan Alberto Perote, head of the operations department in the Spanish intelligence agency Centro Superior de Información de la Defensa (CESID), illegally removed 1,200 CESID documents from the service and leaked information to the press, which revealed the socialist government’s “dirty war” on ETA, as well as the agency’s spying on businessmen, journalists, and other civilian elites, including the king.41 This incident, dubbed the Caso Perote, stirred up a firestorm in the media as well as within the Spanish government and led to the resignation of the vice president, the

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minister of defense, and the director of CESID. Perote was arrested in 1997 and convicted for illegal disclosure of classified documents.42 (By contrast, Brazil has no specific provision in existing law to reprimand those who release or leak classified information. Bruneau notes that “only the standard criminal laws which relate to theft apply. There being no specific laws regarding classified information, and since a normal court process would be unacceptable in the context of releasing secret information . . . no penalty is incurred for releasing classified information.”)43 Note also that the 1996 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights has not dissuaded some member states from occasionally prosecuting journalists for refusal to reveal their confidential sources in routine criminal or financial investigations. Such was the case in 2004 when a Portuguese journalist, José Luis Manso Preto, was given an eleven-month suspended sentence for refusing to reveal a source during testimony in a drug case. Other European cases have surfaced in relation to financial transgressions. In a 2014 case in Luxembourg, a pair of employees from auditor and consultancy PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) released documents showing how the firm helped multinational corporations evade millions of dollars in taxes from 2002 to 2010 (the so-called LuxLeaks affair). The information was released to a French journalist, Edouard Perrin, who was initially charged with a number of offenses, including the disclosure of confidential information and trade secrets, though he was ultimately acquitted.

National Security and Its Discontents Far beyond the EU, in the world’s largest democracy, press freedoms are in a state of flux. In India, classified government information is protected by the Official Secrets Act (OSA) of 1923. Modeled on a colonial British law of the same name, the OSA has been leveled against journalists in the past, though without success. In 1999, journalist Santanu Saikia was charged with violating the OSA for reporting on a Cabinet note on divestment policy that had been labeled “secret” by the administration. Ten years later, after the case had wound its way through India’s legal system, the judge ruled that a document “dealing with day-to-day routine affairs and one containing information on the sensitive issue of national security” are entirely distinct from one another.44 The case was dismissed.45

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More recently, however, the spread of an intolerant Hindu nationalism under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has put journalists critical of the government at risk of physical persecution and legal prosecution. The criminal act of “sedition”—however defined—is punishable by life in prison. Although no journalist has been convicted of sedition to date, prosecutors have threatened to bring the charge against journalists in the past, which is widely viewed in the press as a means to encourage self-censorship. In neighboring Pakistan, the relationship between the media and the state is even more fraught, with direct personal threats originating from the robust intelligence community, especially those from one of the strongest institutions of the government of Pakistan, the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI). Although the covert activities of the ISI are difficult to document, the overt legal environment for journalists is clearly onerous. As in India, Pakistan enacted an Official Secrets Act, which in this case legally empowers the government to restrict reporting on a number of subjects, including the armed forces, the courts, and religion generally. A 2014 Protection of Pakistan Act also provided state security forces with broad powers to pursue, prosecute, and punish alleged terrorists who may have committed “internet offenses and other offenses related to information technology.”46 Most recently, in 2016, Pakistan also passed the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Bill (PECB), which also empowers the state to censor publications online. Violation of the law carries a penalty of up to three years in prison for releasing information with “dishonest” intent.47 The overall effect of these legal provisions is often weak reporting: “Fear of reprisals has caused some journalists to self-censor, particularly on military or intelligence operations, sensitive social or religious issues, and certain militant groups and political parties.”48 One form of “reprisal” is murder, though the perpetrators typically escape punishment. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, between 2006 and 2016, twenty-four journalists were murdered in Pakistan; of these, twenty-two cases have never been prosecuted. 49 Media outlets expanded dramatically in recent years, especially during the administration of President Pervez Musharraf (2001–2008). Between 2002 and 2010, eighty-nine domestic television stations started broadcasting and twenty-six foreign channels were granted broadcasting rights. According to Pakistani author Ayesha Siddiqa, this development was actually promoted by the

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government (including the ISI) as part of a “‘media war’ against India,” seeking to bolster support for the military at home and improve the profile of Pakistan internationally.50 However, broadcasting content criticizing the government or the military was infrequent at best—let alone reporting based on an unauthorized disclosure—as there remains a “thick layer of fear that dominates the media”51 that has worsened in recent years. In Pakistan, the overwhelming source of that fear is the ISI, as “human rights investigators frequently accuse the military’s spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, of being behind attacks or threats against journalists. Often, especially in cases of intimidation, the security officers make no attempt to hide who they are.”52

Conclusion A current review of the relationship between the news media and intelligence communities reveals a number of trends. The first is a worldwide weakening of press freedoms and increasing attacks (legal and physical) on journalists. This is evident not only in autocratic states but also in some democracies that have recently fallen short of international norms concerning freedom of the press. One of the most important of these freedoms is the protection of confidential sources. When confidential sources provide information obtained through an unauthorized disclosure to journalists, the government and the public may find themselves at odds. Increasingly, such disclosures are characterized by the state as a criminal act perpetrated by an insider threat. The suggestion that such a disclosure may be in the interest of the public—as when, for example, a journalist is given evidence that a government is illegally spying on its own citizens—is not contemplated. Thus, it is increasingly rare for politicians, even in established democracies (for example, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan), to acknowledge the possibility that the unauthorized disclosure to a journalist is not a leak by a traitorous malcontent but rather the act of a patriotic whistleblower. Another trend, confusingly, is that many countries have, in recent years, enacted “whistleblower protection” laws (or policies) promoting the release of confidential information. But confidential is not the same as classified, in that confidential is a denotation that may be applied by all sorts of entities, from hospitals and public schools to

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publically traded corporations. More often than not, it is the latter that receives the most attention from politicians and government regulators. Many democratic states now have whistleblower-protection statutes for unauthorized release of information otherwise kept private by corporations. In such a case, whistleblowers typically notify some sort of financial regulator of illegal trading or fraudulent accounting. In Australia, for example, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) offers some protections for corporate whistleblowers, including protections against litigation and from victimization by their employer, though in this case the information disclosed must be kept confidential by ASIC. The unauthorized release of confidential corporate information directly to the press disqualifies the whistleblower from any legal protections. In the EU, each member state has its own rules regarding the protection or prosecution of private-sector whistleblowers.53 In the case of public entities, a whistleblower may be protected for notifying an anticorruption office (or inspector general) of waste, fraud, or abuse of government funds. But in the case of classified information related to national security, such protections are rarely afforded by the state, as the unauthorized release of such information—regardless of its content—is considered a leak most often characterized as espionage. This position would seem to dissuade insider threats from leaking classified material to the press, but in the age of WikiLeaks, it is increasingly simple to release potentially damaging information to a worldwide audience with ease. In this case, the leaker (or perhaps a self-described whistleblower) cannot claim to be a confidential informant for a domestic journalist who is protecting a source. Rather, the leaker is providing information to a platform with a global reach and questionable motives, which may or may not be in the public interest of the source’s own country. Yet the determination of what is or is not in the public interest remains an ethical dilemma for democracies. However, the fact that press freedoms are in decline worldwide is increasingly a dilemma decided by criminal statute and legal prosecution, and not the court of public opinion.

Notes

1. Michael Walzer, “Just and Unjust Leaks: When to Spill Secrets,” Foreign Affairs, 97, no. 2 (March–April 2018), 59. 2. Richard J. Aldrich, “Regulation by Revelation? Intelligence, the Media and Transparency,” in Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the

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Media Needs Intelligence, edited by Michael S. Goodman and Robert Dover (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 15. 3. Ibid. 4. In addition, it has been argued that the need for greater latitude to conduct classified and clandestine operations depends on the sustained perception of a security threat, keeping the public in a state of perpetual insecurity, whereby the intelligence community sets a news agenda dependent on fear. Steve Hewitt and Scott Lucas, “All the Secrets That Are Fit to Print: The Media and US Intelligence Services Before and After 9/11,” in Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence, edited by Michael S. Goodman and Robert Dover (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 5. Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman, “Introduction: Intelligence in the Information Age,” in Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence, edited by Michael S. Goodman and Robert Dover (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 4. 6. However, creating a free press in a democratizing country is no mean feat; in regard to coverage of the state, its elites, and its intelligence community, early efforts of newly independent journalists often come up short: “In new democracies, the lack of professionalism in journalism, coupled with a lack of expertise in intelligence, negatively impacts the media’s capacity to inform, frame discussions and debates, contribute to the development of an intelligence and security culture, and conduct informal oversight.” Matei, “The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratization,” 95. 7. Ibid., 95. 8. Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die. 9. Freedom House, Freedom of the Press: Press Freedom’s Dark Horizon (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2017). 10. “2017 World Press Freedom Index,” Reporters Without Borders, https://rsf .org/en/ranking. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. “Global Impunity Index 2017,” Committee to Protect Journalists, https://cpj.org. 14. Mohamed Hashem, “Al Jazeera’s Mahmoud Hussein Detained for One Year,” Al Jazeera, December 20, 2017. 15. Kieran Pender, “‘Creeping Stalinism’: Secrecy Law Could Imprison Whistleblowers and Journalists,” Guardian, January 10, 2018. 16. However, Prime Minister Theresa May has not yet publicly supported the commission’s recommendations. Rather, when May considers media policy she is more likely to raise concerns with foreign propaganda, social media, and electoral interference. In its fight against foreign fake news, Britain—plagued by waves of “misinformation spread by state actors” during the Brexit debate—took the formal step of creating a National Security Communications Unit (NSCU) to rapidly respond to disinformation campaigns. Based in the Cabinet Office, its mandate is to monitor digital communications generally and social media in particular. This followed the establishment of a parliamentary inquiry into the spread of fake news during the Brexit referendum under an already existing Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee. Pavlena Todorova, “Prime Minister Announces Rapid Response Unit to Tackle ‘Fake News,’” Press Gazette, January 23, 2018. 17. Reporters Without Borders, “2017 World Press Freedom Index.” 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Seumas Miller, “The Ethics of Whistleblowing, Leaking and Disclosure,” in The Palgrave Handbook of Security, Risk and Intelligence, edited by Robert Dover, Huw Dylan, and Michael S. Goodman (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 483.

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21. Ibid., 482. 22. Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the Surveillance State (London: Penguin, 2014). 23. “Edward Snowden, Whistle-Blower,” New York Times, January 1, 2014. 24. Miller, “The Ethics of Whistleblowing, Leaking and Disclosure,” 492. 25. R. W. Apple Jr., “25 Years Later; Lessons from the Pentagon Papers,” New York Times, June 23, 1996. 26. However, although the Obama administration broke new ground with repeated use of the Espionage Act, in 2013 it also supported a bill—the Free Flow of Information Act—that would have served as a federal media-shield law (this would be in addition to most US states that already had similar laws). It passed in the House of Representatives but not the Senate. Critics noted reporters would generally be protected and their sources kept confidential in civil and criminal cases, but for national-security cases, a court could subpoena a journalist to testify, rendering its utility moot. 27. Michael S. Schmidt, “Comey Memo Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation,” New York Times, May 16, 2017. Note, however, journalists in the United States have gone to jail for protecting the identity of confidential sources, most famously the journalist Judith Miller: it was her role in the Valerie Plame affair that cemented her place in journalism history. In July 2003, conservative Washington Post columnist Robert Novak reported that two senior Bush administration officials had leaked the name of a CIA operative, Valerie Plame, who was married to former career diplomat Joe Wilson, a vocal critic of the intelligence used to justify the invasion of Iraq four months earlier. Novak’s column sparked an investigation by a federal grand jury to determine the source of the leak. Although Miller did not write about the subject and had not named Plame as an intelligence agent, she was nonetheless subpoenaed by the jury as prosecutors claimed she had information relevant to their investigation. Miller refused to testify, and federal judge Thomas Hogan found her guilty of contempt of court, sentencing her to eighteen months in jail. It was later revealed that Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, had leaked Plame’s name to Miller one week before the publication of Novak’s column. Libby was sentenced to thirty months in prison, but his sentence was commuted by President Bush in July 2007. As for Miller, she ultimately spent twelve weeks in jail. Libby came forward and urged Miller to testify; she was released and then testified twice. 28. Charlie Savage, “Intelligence Contractor Is Charged in First Leak Case Under Trump,” New York Times, June 5, 2017. 29. In addition to the Espionage Act (and the Intelligence Identities Protection Act), leakers and whistleblowers can be (and have been) charged with a number of other federal offenses, some of which deal with the nature of the information and some of which deal with how the classified information was obtained. In the opinion of the Congressional Research Service, these include (1) disclosure of national defense information (18 U.S.C. §793[d],[e]), regarding “all matters that directly or may reasonably be connected with the defense of the United States against any of its enemies” that are not publicly known; (2) theft of federal property (18 U.S.C. §641), including government secrets; (3) disclosure of classified information relating to communications activities (18 U.S.C. §798), including classified information relating to US or foreign communications intelligence activities (one of the charges leveled at Edward Snowden); and (4) computer security (18 U.S.C. §1030[a]), which includes the acquisition of information “by means of computer access without authorization or in excess of authorization.” See Congressional Research Service, “The Law and Leaks to the Press” (legal sidebar, Congressional Research Service, 2017). With such an arsenal at the disposal of federal prosecutors to pursue those who leak classified information, it remains an open question whether journalists will ultimately find themselves charged for possession or dissemination of unauthorized information.

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30. Dimi Reider, “In Israel, Press Freedom Is Under Attack,” New York Times, October 31, 2011. 31. Ibid. 32. Lucy Craft, “Japan’s State Secrets Law: Hailed by U.S., Denounced by Japanese,” All Things Considered, NPR, December 31, 2013. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Justin McCurry, “Abe Defends Japan’s Secrets Law That Could Jail Whistleblowers for 10 Years,” Guardian, December 20, 2014. 36. Note that the legal precedents for the protection for journalists were already shaky, as “Japanese courts have never ruled in favor of the press in cases of journalistic freedom,” and the one time a journalist stood trial for the release of classified material, in 1978, his conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court. Craft, “Japan’s State Secrets Law.” 37. Michael P. Colaresi, Democracy Declassified: The Secrecy Dilemma in National Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 14. 38. Search results, European Court of Human Rights, https://hudoc.echr .coe.int/eng#. 39. For details, see Didier Bigo et al., National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation and Before the Courts: Exploring the Challenges (Brussels: European Union, 2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/509991/IPOL _STU(2014)509991_EN.pdf. 40. Andrea Gimenez-Salinas, “The Spanish Intelligence Services,” in Democracy, Law and Security: Internal Security Services in Contemporary Europe, edited by Jean-Paul Brodeur, Peter Gill, and Dennis Tollborg (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2003), 75–78. 41. CESID reportedly spied on the king for ten years; see Barry James, “Spain Orders Inquiry on Alleged Blackmail of King,” New York Times, November 11, 1995; Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) is a Basque separatist organization that operated in Spain between 1959 and 2018. ETA conducted terrorist attacks, mostly targeting the military and the Civil Guard, which led to the deaths of more than 800 people, and injuries of additional several thousands; see Antonio M. Dıaz Fernandez in Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Pythian, and Shlomo Shpiro, eds., PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008); Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. 42. Perote reportedly intended to use these documents to blackmail the government; see Antonio M. Díaz Fernández, “Halfway down the Road to Supervision of the Spanish Intelligence Services,” Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 3 (2006): 440–456; “Spanish Intelligence Chief Arrested,” Independent, June 18, 1997; “Trial Starts for Boss of Spain’s Dirty War,” Independent, June 9, 1997; “In Brief,” Guardian, May 26, 1999. 43. Bruneau, “Intelligence Reform in Brazil.” 44. Abhinav Garg, “Court Redefines ‘Official Secret’, Relief to Scribe,” Times of India, February 26, 2009. 45. Ibid. 46. “Freedom of the Press 2017: Pakistan Profile,” Freedom House, https:// freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/pakistan. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Global Impunity Index 2017.” 50. Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (London: Pluto Press, 2017), 324.

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51. Ibid., 326. 52. Mehreen Zahra-Malik, “‘The New Normal’ in Pakistan: A Journalist on the Run from Gunmen,” New York Times, January 11, 2018. 53. Mark Worth, Whistleblowing in Europe: Legal Protections for Whistleblowers in the EU (Berlin: Transparency International, 2013).

14 National Intelligence Cultures Irena Chiru

All strategic behaviour is affected by humans who cannot help but be cultural agents. —Colin S. Gray1

In this chapter, I aim to shed new light on the various and sometimes competing perspectives on intelligence culture in order to provide a structured alternative for understanding it as part of the larger puzzle of intelligence studies. Cultural variables are perceived as significant factors in understanding, explaining, and predicting the way intelligence is organized, performed, and perceived. Analysis of intelligence and strategic culture can provide a different analytical framework, useful in discussing and explaining the role and impact of myths, symbols, social norms, history, nature of organizations, narratives, perceptions, and the (political) psychology of social actors. In addition, it can demonstrate its particular relevance, especially “when it comes to understanding intelligence failure.”2 Given the current lack of consistent academic knowledge and structured investigation of the particular features of national intelligence cultures, my aim is to advance a possible model for the scientific evaluation of the different components that make a culture of intelligence. My research builds on the experience of several countries that share a democratic present and an authoritarian or totalitarian past. 213

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The Concept of Intelligence Culture The need for a consistent academic grounding in the study of national intelligence culture is even more acute today, when intelligence cultures in general are being placed under analytic lenses so we can better understand national intelligence organizations’ processes, actors, and products.3 In the absence of a solid anchor, these examinations often lead to invalidated scientific results. One of the milestones used to define an intelligence culture is its convergence with political culture, a notion advanced by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in the late 1950s, in referring to the cultural beliefs and values shaping a given society’s orientations toward politics.4 Several significant studies applying political culture as an analytical tool appeared in the late 1950s, adding psychological and anthropological insights to political-studies surveys. The concept of political culture was defined as an environment that included those attitudes and practices that shape people’s political behaviors, but also the myths, moral judgments, beliefs, and ideas about what makes “a good society.” From this perspective, political culture can be defined as: • “composed of the attitudes, beliefs, emotions and values of society that relate to a political system and political issues” —Alan Ball5

• “the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations towards politics among the members of a political system” —Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell6 • “commonly shared goals and commonly accepted rules” —Roy Macridis7

• “certain aspects of the general culture of society especially concerned with how government ought to be conducted and what [it] shall try to do” —Samuel Beer and Adam Ulam8

In brief, political culture studies focus on the deep-rooted, built-in variables characteristic of a society or group, those features that filter perceptions, impact attitudes, and determine decisions and behaviors. It is important to emphasize that political cultures are, in their turn, subsets of the larger social culture(s) that make up various social orientations toward given social objects. More recently, scholars have started to refer to intelligence culture as being in substance linked to “strategic culture.” At the crossroads of

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history, capabilities, geopolitics, and values, strategic culture was first introduced by Jack Snyder in 1977. He defines it as “the total sum of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and that they share with each other with regard to [nuclear] strategy.”9 Colin Gray conceptualizes strategic culture more broadly as “modes of thought and action with respect to [force], derived from perception of national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterization, and from state-distinctive experiences.”10 Intelligence and strategic cultures, thus, appear to be intrinsically connected and linked to the debate on organizational cultures and different understandings of what “intelligence” means.11 For example, Isabelle Duyvesteyn discusses the two terms convergently (as “intelligence and strategic culture”) as labels for two important research domains that have only recently been linked. 12 Mark Phythian notes that an intelligence culture involves “ideas, responses and behaviors acquired by intelligence communities.”13 Philip Davies analyzes the “intelligence culture and intelligence failure in Britain and the United States.”14 He argues that a theory of “intelligence culture” may help us understand how national intelligence systems work, and why or how they fail. More specifically, Davies argues that the investigation of intelligence culture helps identify and assess the specific orientations and preferences of various intelligence communities. In other words, intelligence culture seems to include those distinctive features, strategic orientations, and interests that characterize different intelligence communities (an “inside (from outside) intelligence community” perspective). Stephen Welch sees intelligence culture as “an application of the idea of political culture in the specific field of intelligence studies.” 15 Given this particular conceptual affiliation to the field of political culture, the notion of intelligence culture is intrinsically marked by the long-standing debates and polemics that cultural analysis bears. Hence, for one to be able to provide answers to the question “What is the object of analysis when using the lenses of intelligence culture?” one needs to look at a very well-contained field of activity and to the special features of intelligence: the organizational design, the mission statements and explicit rules, the operating procedures, the official public statements, habits, and routines. In addition, Welch advances two other statements that help define an intelligence culture: (1) it is the secrecy as an embedded feature of intelligence organizations that inherently limits the study; (2) the overall premise that feeds the

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interest for the study of intelligence culture seems to lie in the “frictions” between different sets of practices, and the availability of legal and practical procedures that can serve the public interest through transparency and accountability.16

A Multilevel Model of Analysis of Intelligence Culture To cite Davies, “If intelligence culture is to be a useful idea, it needs to be applied in ways and to problems that have a concrete ‘valueadded’ impact on understanding intelligence.” 17 Figure 14.1, below, proposes an integrated model: The starting point of this model is the definition of intelligence culture as a mix of information, values, perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors related to intelligence, from within both intelligence insiders and outsiders, shaped by historical context, the geopolitics, and the collective mentality of the imagined community of the nation. In addition, the model illustrates the special attention owed to the alternative perspectives on intelligence. One of the dimensions that Figure 14.1 Integrated Model for the Analysis of Intelligence Culture

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must be investigated is the way in which the actions of the intelligence community find a place in the public sphere, especially through cultural productions—in addition to the academic narratives of historians (as archive research or memories). The investigation of mass media and popular culture’s productions, representations, artifacts, and trends has the potential to reveal and explain the deviated perceptions that often mark our understanding of intelligence and intelligence services. Myths are commonly repeated stories about the past that are the central mechanism of what can be defined as “cultural memory.” Given its intrinsic characteristics, intelligence is a conceptual category shrouded in secrecy, easily translatable in cultural representations such as myths and stories with a greater or lesser degree of accuracy on past events. Cultural productions are useful in exploring the ways in which ideas propagate, reproduce, contest, and reflect the issue of security and its related topics. They play a vital role in imagining the universe and in shaping the vocabulary, in establishing the mental maps, mindsets, and emotional lenses through which we think about ourselves, and our country and the national security. And especially in the case of new democracies, they can also be considered forms of expressing society’s own social organization, ethical structure, and view of the past, whether forgotten or revived though collective memory. In other words, investigating intelligence culture also means investigating society’s collective view of the past—an endeavor that has the potential to define the identity, values, and boundaries of the nation.

Context-Driven National Intelligence Cultures

In states with a nondemocratic past, the notion of an intelligence culture (sometimes called the “security culture”) is ambivalent: on the one hand, the new democracy demands transparency, accountability, and citizen involvement; on the other, the intelligence sector remains at least notionally connected to its repressive past. For example, in Italy, Portugal, Romania, and Spain, albeit with diverse histories and geopolitical contexts, intelligence culture is linked to the need to understand public perceptions and attitudes toward intelligence in three aspects:18 1. The pressure exercised on the intelligence services for transparency and openness, a global trend, which, in the case of new democracies, is even greater. 2. A more nuanced understanding by the public and the civilian leadership of security also as a topic of social relevance.

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3. An awareness of the ramifications of the nondemocratic past on the collective mentality, the cultural models, and the social norms.

Intelligence services have increasingly acknowledged that in order to carry out their oxymoronic mission “to know the unknown,” they need a greater capacity to evaluate vague situations and immeasurable quantities. One ready source of external expertise and specialist knowledge is the academic and scientific sector. This opening of intelligence agencies to the academic sphere manifests today as academic intelligence, outsourcing, outreach, and trusted information networks. At a more practical level, this partnership generates coproduction of analytic evaluations, (including here virtual co-production, through wiki- or blog-type technologies); consulting experts; joint working groups; continuous and detailed collaboration in establishing methods and desired products; publications targeting experts outside the intelligence community; informing through websites and academic dialogue (conferences, workshops, etc.).19 In sum, the ability of intelligence services to manage a culture of openness, transparency, and accountability proved to be as important as the traditional ability of intelligence to manage the culture of secrecy. Additionally, in some of the recent attempts to redefine security, the concept has been increasingly related to individual and societal ethical and philosophical systems of values.20 Hence, security has come to be defined by its social relevance; each social actor perceives security according to his or her own system of reference and grants it very different meanings. In this context, national security involves more than a complex network of legislative, military, intelligence, and decisionmaking institutions; it involves a subjective dimension, as well. According to Arnold Wolfers,21 “security” refers to the absence of objective dangers (for instance, threats, vulnerabilities, and risks) as well as to the absence of subjective fears and concerns. Additionally, security integrates a social imaginary of security that can be described as the sum of perceptions and representations of “ordinary people” who come to “imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.”22 Unlike France, the nations of Italy, Romania, and Spain all experienced dictatorships for significant periods in the twentieth century. In all these regimes, the intelligence services functioned as political police forces. For example, in Italy, Benito Mussolini’s dictatorship

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in the 1930s and 1940s, the complicated political life of Italy in the 1950s, and actions carried out against the leftist terrorist Red Brigades in the 1970s and 1980s all played out with the secret services directly involved in the decisionmaking process. In Romania, the most drastic intellectual elites’ purging program and reeducation has served similar ends.23 And in Spain, the fight against the Basque separatist organization ETA required enhanced prerogatives and extended activity of the secret services in Spanish society over the last six decades. Although today all these countries are consolidated democracies, effects of their historical experience persist in the broad sense that the security sector never really abandoned intrusive measures meant to influence public opinion.24 France

Eric Denécé and Gérald Arboit view intelligence culture as “the relationship between the national community and intelligence work in general.”25 The authors specifically mean the academic environment in France and the presumed connection between intelligence culture and the educational programs dedicated to intelligence (scarce and insufficient as it may seem in the given case). The intelligence culture in France is marked by the relative disinterest in intelligence studies in France and therefore by “the inherent reticence of the French people and their political leaders” toward a profession that is still perceived and commented on in a rather denigrating and deprecating manner.26 Italy

Italy in the last two decades has seen the advent of a serious preoccupation with “security culture.” At the state level, the Dipartimento delle Informazioni per la Sicurezza (DIS) has embraced initiatives aimed at raising public awareness of major national themes: “defending security in a globalized world in which transnational threats attack the system of the state and place under threat its integrity and industrial capital, its competitiveness, the security of critical infrastructure and IT systems.”27 This objective can be reached “by opening toward academia, by cooperating with research centers, and by making the effort to enhance transparency in communicating with citizens.”28 The main interface is the Internal Training School,29 which ensures permanent contact with similar institutions of public administration,

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universities, research centers, and think tanks, both in Italy and abroad. The resulting national network of experts is seen as a factor of success in generating knowledge and disseminating topics of strategic interest.30 With support from the school, Italian intelligence services carry out information and outreach—lectures, conferences, workshops, information campaigns—in secondary schools and universities throughout Italy, disseminating knowledge on security and intelligence in general and about the threats against Italian national security in particular. DIS also organizes competitions in accordance with age and form of education of the participants. Through these contests, children and youth contribute to debates and reflection on national security. Starting with an intelligence glossary and an introductory lesson, filtering information through their own critical thinking, pupils are invited to create an artistic representation of intelligence services and intelligence activities. Winners are granted the status of “agent for one day” and are invited to visit the training school and attend an intelligence lecture. At the university level, DIS has also set up a yearly prize for best research related to a topic of interest for intelligence. At the same time, DIS has developed a network of universities that partner with intelligence services to support the explication of security culture and the development of intelligence programs at universities.31 These initiatives are complemented by a series of publications edited by the intelligence community: the Gnosis journal, open for contributions from both academia and practitioners; or an intelligence and security dictionary published for the general public. These endeavors are meant to offer a framework of dialogue and the optimal foundations to create “national channels” to disseminate security culture. In sum, the Italian experience shows three major lines of action: initiatives aimed at creating an intelligence awareness among the larger public, promoting research, and teaching intelligence at the academic level. By capitalizing on the synergies of all the relevant stakeholders (whether governmental or private), these measures have the potential to shape public perception of intelligence, and at the same time, they may provide solid ground for the creation of public policies that can turn intelligence agencies into effective and efficient twenty-first-century institutions.32 Romania

In Romania, the democratic interpretations of intelligence culture have been aimed at answering such questions as how to deal with

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the trauma of the communist past and how to implement a process of de-communization of perceptions. Similar to other states of Central and Eastern Europe, in the immediate years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, Romania was faced with the demand to reform its political and social structures. These initiatives played a central role in the construction of the newly independent state, which began the long and difficult journey toward creating a strong democratic system. Wholesale reform of the intelligence apparatus formed part of this program and this journey. The difficulty, in terms of the social perceptions of security and the general understanding of intelligence, begins with the synonymy between security and Securitate (the Romanian translation for security) as a label used colloquially to refer to the security service (that is, the secret police) during communist times. Securitate was and still is a pejorative label, wielded like a cudgel against all the old state institutions in charge of security. A good example is the period immediately following the December 1989 revolution, when a new legislative package was designed to reflect the architecture of the democratic state. At that time, some policymakers even requested that the new law that would regulate all aspects of national security should not contain the word securitate because of the direct and immediate correlation with the (former) repressive institutions. The law consequently became the National Safety Law, which over time generated conceptual difficulties and miscommunication with international partners, based on the significant divergence in meaning between “safety” and “security.” Scholars also perceived the word and its connotations as impediments to establishing security studies as an academic field. These contemporary legends are reflected and augmented by popular culture, as well as in artistic and media productions about the Securitate. Hence, the first stage in the democratic history of the country was prone to becoming a highly “mythologized” one. The fall of communism led to a discursive vacuum, which needed to be filled with language able to replace a defunct vocabulary; old precommunist myths have been reactivated (as the myth of the Western savior) and new ones—true urban legends issued from the context itself—are still circulated (such as the myth of the “Arab terrorists” who shot people during the revolution to protect the dictator). Similar narrative plots were those of the “Bucharest underground”—as withdrawal tunnels for Nicolae Ceauşescu and his family, or the “water poisoning” by the Securitate in Bucharest.

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In this context, intelligence culture emerged in the early 2000s as a shared space of intervention, less theoretical and more practice-oriented. In Romania, in fact, this project has become the singular task of the intelligence services, aimed at turning intelligence into an academic discipline, including scholarly contributions from other related disciplines (notably sociology, philosophy, mathematics). In the twenty-five years since the first legal framework was created for the National Intelligence Institute in 1992, the intelligence community has mounted a series of projects dedicated to academia and the general audience.33 These projects facilitated the development of academic entities dedicated to intelligence studies with a transparent institutional profile, journals published for both the general public and academia, 34 the inclusion of the term intelligence in the dictionary of the Romanian language, and the opening of channels for transfer of expertise with academia. Other recent initiatives are meant to emphasize the existence of a national intelligence culture in Romania as compared to other democracies in the region. One such a project35 started with the premise that the reconciliation with a traumatic past is a complex process.36 It distinguished between history and memory, stressing the importance of investigating the way that past events have shaped the collective memory. At the same time, the scholarly investigation of social perceptions has allowed experts to temper the myths since 1989 in Romania—about an all-powerful intelligence apparatus that probably was not to be trusted. Another example is the attempt to advance intelligence as an object of study that can be approached interdisciplinarily at the postgraduate (doctoral) level. Starting in 2016, such “topics as governance of intelligence agencies, forensics in intelligence collection and analysis, social and legal challenges associated to law enforcement and intelligence activities, citizens’ perceptions on intelligence and security, reconciling open-source collection with fundamental rights of citizens, and rethinking national legislative frameworks for intelligence agencies have started to be investigated by an international team of young researchers in the ESSENTIAL project.”37 However, research is just beginning and it will be years before we have any conclusions. The Romanian example shows that approaches to postcommunist intelligence culture were motivated in part by a desire to understand the effects of the twentieth-century totalitarian regime on the collective mentality. An investigation of the perceptions that influence attitudes and of attitudes that shape security behaviors has

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become a significant point of focus. Embracing intelligence culture as a strategic umbrella has permanently and constantly accompanied reform and democratic development of Romania’s intelligence services since the early 2000s when it started. Spain

Spain is a more advanced example of intelligence culture. Thus, beyond information provided by governmental institutions referring to their own intelligence culture programs, an entire field of literature is also available.38 The intelligence culture endeavor in Spain is a space of collaboration of intelligence services, academia, and business sectors, as well as a subfield within intelligence studies. The initiator of intelligence culture as a national project in Spain was the National Intelligence Center (CNI), functioning under both the Ministry of Defense and the presidency, as a concrete demonstration that intelligence activities are “an integral part of society, since they insure security, freedom and defense of its interests.”39 The institutions of state and government have shouldered this task, rather than leaving it to the intelligence sector alone. Spain has also taken important steps in transforming intelligence into an academic discipline by including intelligence topics in university curricula, developing academic programs that teach and research intelligence.40 The shift is recent but quite clear; in 2000, the scholarly literature was almost nonexistent, and what little work was done in the field came from journalists.41 Then at the end of 2005, a series of agreements between CNI and Spanish universities resulted in the creation of academic research teams in the field of intelligence and the formation of a network of programs and researchers at universities in Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Zaragoza, Granada, Alicante, Santiago de Compostela, and Malaga. Spanish intelligence culture is notable for the debate on the declassification of the Franco-era secret archives. This debate exposes the dissonance between the necessity to apply the principles of transparency stipulated in the law to transparency, access to public information, and good governance that entered into practice in 2013, and the legislative framework that regulates official secrets in Spain. 42 (Spain has no time limits, and the meager mechanisms for declassification are very strict.) At the end of 2016, the Congress of Deputies43 explored introducing a time limit for the declassification of classified documents.44 The delayed start45 intensified the debate:

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Spanish and foreign historians of intelligence pleaded with authorities not to block reform on the law of classified documents.46 Seen through the lens provided by democratic principles and values, the Spanish secrecy law remains a rarity, with unreasonable consequences for the public profile of intelligence services as socially responsible actors and also for the consistency and continuity in the development of security and intelligence studies. Paradoxically, however, Spanish national intelligence culture presents an outstanding example of good practice. There is an evident convergence and sharing, a common space for conceptual and action-oriented debate between those in intelligence studies and those who are practitioners, be they governmental entities, private stakeholders, or academics. The organization that was established as the Spanish Chapter of Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professionals in 2013, aimed at providing training and networking opportunities for business professionals working in the field of competitive intelligence, represents a good example.

Conclusion

Although inherently shrouded in mystery, the intelligence services cannot remain a castle under siege in the twenty-first century even—or especially—in newer democracies emerging from an authoritarian past. As the case studies discussed in this chapter have shown, intelligence culture is a useful tool for understanding history and its impact on the current state of the art—overcoming in the process old prejudices about intelligence as a function and a discipline and embedding the citizen in his or her own national security as an active contributor.

Notes

1. Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,” Review of International Studies 25, no. 1 (January 1999): 49–69. 2. Joop van Reijn, “Intelligence and Strategic Culture: Essays on American and British Praxis Since the Second World War,” in Intelligence and Strategic Culture, edited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn (London: Routledge, 2012). 3. See Bob de Graaff and James N. Nyce, Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016). 4. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 1963). 5. Allan R. Ball, Modern Politics and Government (London: Macmillan Education, 1988). 6. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell Jr., Comparative Politics: A Theoretical Framework (New York: HarperCollins, 1993).

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7. Roy C. Macridis, “Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis,” Journal of Politics 23, no. 1 (February 1961). 8. Samuel H. Beer and Adam Bruno Ulam, Patterns of Government (New York: Random House, 1973), 32. 9. Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Options (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1977). 10. Colin Gray, “National Styles in Strategy: The American Example,” International Security 6, no. 2 (1981): 21–47. 11. Philip H. J. Davies, “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States,” Review of International Affairs 17, no. 3 (2004): 495–520. 12. Isabelle Duyvesteyn, ed., Intelligence and Strategic Culture (London: Routledge, 2012). 13. Mark Phythian, “Cultures of National Intelligence,” in Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited by Robert Dover, Michael S. Goodman, and Claudia Hillebrand (London: Routledge, 2013), 34. 14. Davies, “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure.” 15. Stephen Welch, “Political Culture: Approaches and Prospects,” in Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere, edited by Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013). 16. Ibid. 17. Davies, “Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure.” 18. The current analysis focuses on Italy, Romania, and Spain, given the availability of information. 19. Gregory Treverton, Approaches to “Outreach” for Intelligence (Vällingby, Sweden: Elanders, 2009). 20. See Hans Günter Brauch, “Security and Environment Linkages in the Mediterranean: Three Phases of Research on Human and Environmental Security and Peace,” in Security and Environment in the Mediterranean. Conceptualising Security and Environmental Conflicts, edited by Hans Günter Brauch et al., 35–143 (Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer 2003). 21. Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly 67, no. 4 (1952): 481–502. 22. Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 23. The Ceauşescu regime initiated these programs, which involved decreasing the number of intellectuals in Romania and continuous Marxist-Leninist indoctrination— of the intellectuals as well as (other) opponents of the regime. 24. For more information on how past legacies influence public perception of intelligence agencies in these countries, see Freedom House, freedomhouse.org. 25. Eric Denécé and Gérald Arboit, “The Development of Intelligence Studies in France,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 23, no. 4 (2010): 725–747. 26. Ibid. 27. “Cultura della sicurezza,” Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/cultura-della-sicurezza.html. 28. Ibid. 29. The training school is the core of the partnership with academia and was created by Law 124/2007. 30. “La Scuola di formazione,” Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/cultura-della-sicurezza/formazione.html. 31. The University of Florence hosts a course titled “Intelligence and National Security.” The University Sapienzza in Rome signed a memorandum of cooperation with DIS, creating two master programs: “Information Security and Strategic Intelligence” and “Security of Information Systems and Networks for Companies and Government.” The research center for security and cyberintelligence was also created. Tor

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Vergata University organizes a master’s program dedicated to economic intelligence. The University of Rome’s Bio-Medica implemented a postgraduate program dedicated to the concept of homeland security. 32. For example: scientific research investigating the emergence of extreme opinion trends in society, or joint endeavors (NGOs and intelligence services) for advancing alternative/positive narratives in fighting violent extremism, radicalization, and social polarization. 33. For more on this topic, see Dumitru, “Building an Intelligence Culture from Within.” 34. Such as the Intelligence Review and the Romanian Intelligence Studies Journal. 35. See the project Social Perceptions and Communicational Strategies in Risk Prevention: A National Security Perspective (2015–2017), supported by a grant from the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research and Innovation, CNCSUEFISCDI, project number PN-II-RU-TE-2014-4-1669. 36. It distinguished between history and memory, stressing the importance of investigating the way that past events have shaped the collective memory. The Romanian project addressed both. 37. ESSENTIAL (Evolving Security SciencE through Networked Technologies, Information policy And Law). See www.essentialresearch.eu. 38. See Rubén Arcos, “Comunicación, cultura y reservas de inteligencia,” in Inteligencia, edited by José Luis González Cussac, 411–462 (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2012); Fernando Velasco, Rubén Arcos, and Diego Navarro, “La cultura de inteligencia en España: Una exigencia estratégica en desarrollo,” in Democratización de la Función de Inteligencia: El nexo entre la cultura nacional y la inteligencia estratégica, edited by Russell G. Swenson, and Susan C. Lemozy, 351–364 (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2009); Arcos, “Academics as Strategic Stakeholders.” 39. Centro Nacional de Inteligencia, www.cni.es. 40. For a detailed analysis of this development, see Arcos, “Academics as Strategic Stakeholders.” 41. Juan R. Goberna Falque, Inteligencia, espionaje y servicios secretos en España (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2007); Matei, Florina Cristiana, Andrés de Castro García, and Carolyn Halladay. “On Balance: Intelligence Democratization in Post-Francoist Spain,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 31, no. 4 (2018): 769–804. 42. Law 19/2013, December 9, on transparency, access to public information, and good governance. 43. Congreso de los Diputados. 44. Based on the proposed law, no classified information can be kept away from public opinion for more than thirty-five years, secret archives will be classified for a period of up to twenty-five years, and, following a statement by the Council of Ministers, the period can be prolonged for another ten years. In the case of reserved/strictly secret documents, the classification period is limited to ten years, without being prolonged. See Jesús Escudero, “España, un país de secretos oficiales: La impresión es que hay mucho que ocultar aún,” El Confidencial, October 12, 2016; M. E. Alonso, “Un candado bien cerrado sobre los secretos de estado,” La Voz de la Galicia, June 26, 2017. 45. The proposed reform of Law 9/1968 on Official Secrets was presented on September 7, 2016, by the EAJ-PNV Parliamentary Group and was qualified on September 12, 2016 (Congreso de los Diputados). PP, PSOE, and Ciudadanos have requested twenty-one successive prorogations, starting with February 14, 2017 (the last postponement is recorded as September 19, 2017), after the deadline for tabling amendments (June 2, 2017). PP justifies its actions by the need to reach a compromise that is in line with the demands of the majority of parliamentary groups. 46. The petition was signed by 160 historians and the main associations dedicated to the investigation of contemporary Spanish history.

Part 4 Conclusion

15 The Future of Intelligence in Democracies James J. Wirtz

If we are going to conduct espionage in the future, we are going to have to make some changes in the relationship between the intelligence community and the public it serves.” -Michael Hayden1

As the previous chapters demonstrate, there is a sophisticated and lively literature concerning the role of secret intelligence organizations in democratic governance and democratic oversight of intelligence agencies. Despite their commitment in principle and practice to the transparency necessary to permit public participation in politics and policymaking, democracies also benefit from secret processes, organizations, and products to safeguard their polities and to secure their national interests. The paradox and tensions created by the presence of secrecy in democracy can never be resolved or fully mitigated; indeed, the proper balance between secrecy and openness changes constantly and is based on perceptions of threat and necessity at any given time. As so often happens, however, revelations of past activities undertaken in periods of high threat are often revealed in less stressful times, leading to charges of intelligence abuses and calls for more stringent public or legislative oversight of intelligence activities.2 There is no way to break this cycle of alternating support for and revulsion about intelligence activities, although scholars and politicians alike often endeavor to advance some set of reforms to “make intelligence safe for democracy.”3 229

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Will the rapidly approaching future resemble the slowly receding past in terms of the role, oversight, and contribution of intelligence agencies in democracy? In some respects, the answer is yes: there is no way to eliminate the paradox created by the presence of secret organizations in democracy or the cycle of concern or support created by changing political perceptions of (past) actions undertaken to safeguard national interests. Nevertheless, several important trends are already manifest that promise to complicate the role of secret agencies in open societies. The first is “acceleration,” to borrow Thomas Friedman’s apt term for the increase in the scope and rate of change encountered by people, communities, and governments alike.4 The second is the next round of technological innovation spawned by the information revolution that will place intelligence organizations in a new type of competition to exploit the exploding universe of digital data. Although it is not certain how these trends will influence the relationship between intelligence and democracy, it is clear that intelligence professionals will face some significant challenges when it comes to finetuning policies and achieving their objectives while protecting democratic sensibilities. Issues are already starting to accumulate when it comes to the future role of secret organizations in democracies. In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore these issues with an eye toward how they might shape intelligence organizations in the future. It also is possible to suggest how these issues might shape democratic governance in general and oversight of intelligence agencies in particular.

Accelerated Intelligence? The notion that the pace of change is “accelerating” is actually commonplace today. Some observers identify the information revolution, specifically Moore’s law, as the force propelling acceleration as it shapes virtually every sector of a diversifying global economy.5 This trickle-down effect is itself in its early stages and is likely to produce waves of innovation as increasingly powerful and networked microprocessors are utilized in new applications. By contrast, Friedman’s notion of acceleration points to the convergence of abrupt environmental, societal, and technological changes that produce profound challenges to individuals, communities, and governments. The scope and significance of these changes cannot be underestimated. Today we live in both virtual and physical realities, a situation that was the stuff

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of science fiction only a few short decades ago, and real and virtual events have a way of interacting in unanticipated ways.6 Change comes so rapidly that it is becoming increasingly difficult for adaptation to occur before things shift again. “Getting ahead” of issues by adopting appropriate policies before events unfold completely is difficult in this environment. Profound changes occur frequently and emerge rapidly. It is difficult to cope with the rapid onset of change. For intelligence agencies, acceleration creates external and internal challenges that are not easily accommodated. External challenges are created by the fact that developments can occur at a “viral” pace as events in the physical environment create a reaction in virtual reality, and vice versa. There is a growing list of events that materialized quickly and challenged existing judgments and analytical schemata. The so-called Arab Spring emerged unexpectedly in 2011 and spread rapidly as the locus of action jumped between physical and virtual reality. Traditional collection methods—intelligence liaison, diplomacy, clandestine reporting—could not keep pace with events swirling in the virtual-physical mix.7 Intelligence officials, however, learned from this experience. In hindsight, it was apparent that the situation could have been better understood and monitored by closely following social media. Similarly, the transformation of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) into the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013 and early 2014 outpaced the ability of the US intelligence community to get ahead of developments on the ground. Intelligence agencies were able to monitor the increase in combat capability and the threat of violence as ISIS emerged,8 but they failed to recognize that ISIS was a multifaceted enterprise that was more than AQI on steroids. For instance, ISIS used social media to launch a worldwide campaign to attract youth to its cause, a technique and recruitment target that was never attempted by AQI.9 For that matter, officials in Washington, DC, leadership in Silicon Valley, and the rest of the world alike continue to struggle to respond to Moscow’s use of social media to shape the international political landscape and to meddle in the 2016 US presidential election. The fact that the significant events listed in the previous paragraph occurred at about two-year intervals highlights the pace of the external manifestation of acceleration. This pace, however, places intelligence agencies in continuous internal turmoil because intelligence concepts, dominant analytical schemata, and general routines face rapid obsolescence because of the changing external environment. It takes time to develop, assess, and share concepts across intelligence and policy communities. It is within this shared intellectual space, as Paul Maddrell

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recently noted, that intelligence agencies have their greatest impact on policy.10 In a sense, intelligence analysts have to spend more time recognizing issues as problems, with less time remaining to offer estimates that can influence current or future policy. This phenomenon is not new; what is new is the rapid onset and frequency of significant change. For instance, officials were slow to grasp the fact that the Holocaust was unfolding because it was difficult to accept the idea that civilized people would industrialize mass murder and to comprehend the full dimensions of the atrocity.11 Unlike many significant developments today, however, the Holocaust unfolded over a long decade, which gave officials time to incorporate key concepts such as “gas chamber” and “concentration camp” into their thinking. By contrast, the transformation of AQI into ISIS unfolded over about thirteen months. Old schemata tend to linger not only in the minds of analysts and policymakers but also in organizational culture. This fact is not particularly damaging to intelligence estimates if the issues of interest are stable and long-lived. In this case, analysts can focus on estimates involving known entities, estimates that policymakers also happen to believe are important. Analysts are always in a race to catch up to the target because they have to base estimates of future behavior on historical evidence. Despite the fact that this is not an easy task, they sometimes manage to win that race, especially when they face a stable list of collection and analytical requirements. Nevertheless, when phenomena of interest change rapidly and are not understood or fully recognized, it is difficult to offer useful estimates to policymakers, especially in the absence of a shared appreciation of the problem under consideration. Acceleration, especially when it is produced by unique mixes of social, environmental, and technological issues, will continue to create critical challenges for intelligence agencies. In the future, intelligence analysts will find themselves working to identify the nature of new actors, new issues, or new forms of social interaction and estimating how these new phenomena will effect national interests. They will not only be in a race to offer predictions about known targets, they will also be in a race to identify the significance of new and perplexing phenomena in time to shape events in both physical and virtual reality.

The Big-Data Conundrum The price of entry into the information revolution is the digitization of information—over time this has led to the emergence of “big

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data.” In an analytical sense, big data allows observers to gain insights into collective reality by identifying patterns and trends that are not apparent to individuals or to organizations utilizing more limited, conventional databases. Big data creates a host of opportunities, especially in terms of new applications for indications and warning intelligence and to aid efforts to detect denial and deception. Nevertheless, observers have long noted the threat big data and associated analytical techniques pose to privacy and civil liberties, highlighting the possibility that intelligence and police agencies might exploit this data to monitor citizens in real time. Indeed, there is nothing technically difficult about engaging in this type of activity; with a little bit of software engineering and political will, it would be possible to develop detailed profiles of just about everybody’s minute-by-minute activities. Those who take deliberate actions to “stay off the grid” would not escape scrutiny; investigators could be sent to discern the reasons behind their digital silence. In any event, digital surveillance is a reality: the CIA recently revealed that about thirty countries are tracing its agents by using digital technologies.12 Another issue created by digitization is information overload. Once again, observers have long noted that this information deluge might actually impede intelligence analysts. Moreover, the fact that the physical and virtual worlds interact only complicates matters, forcing analysts to monitor events in both worlds to appreciate a developing situation. “Fake news” might in fact be a relatively new term in the political lexicon, but validating information available to analysts and purging erroneous data or incorrect analysis from even highly classified databases is an increasingly demanding task. Because analysts can never hope to sift through all available information, they are increasingly forced to rely on algorithms to select data for scrutiny, while intelligence managers scan sourcing to make sure valid and appropriate data is used in estimates. Regardless of good intentions and greater efforts, however, it might not be possible to sift through the deluge of information to concentrate on important signals rather than superfluous noise. There is always risk that bad data might drown out accurate information. Artificial intelligence (AI), which is emerging simultaneously with big data, offers a solution to the information overload problem by exploiting efficiently the information made available by digitization. In one sense, AI is already probably more capable than its human counterparts in identifying important patterns in big data. AI can not

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only look for known patterns in the data, but it can also identify heretofore unknown indicators and phenomena for consideration by analysts. In terms of information overload, AI can also assist in validating data by checking information to make sure that it accurately reflects a given manifestation or facet of some phenomenon or event. Critics scoff at the idea that AI might soon be able to undertake these sorts of unbounded activities without human direction, but more narrow applications of AI that address bounded problems are well within current technical capabilities.13 Given the fact that humans tend to overestimate the sophistication and thoroughness of their cognitive processes, there probably are a surprisingly large number of intelligence tasks that could be turned over to narrow AI to good effect. Indeed, the intelligence agency that most rapidly and fully exploits the opportunities created by AI and big data will enjoy a significant advantage over its targets by vastly improving its ability to offer signal event predictions, indications, and warnings, and cutting through denial and deception. Clearly, AI and big data offer opportunities that can and will be exploited, but where some see promise in these developments, others see little more than distraction and turmoil. Robert Mandel, for instance, has offered the critical observation that regardless of improved software and computational power, AI and big data still cannot overcome the fundamental problem plaguing the intelligence community: the limits of human cognition. In Mandel’s view, regardless of the insights produced by AI and big data, the information and “analysis” presented still has to overcome the cognitive, organizational, and idiosyncratic biases and pathologies that hamper intelligence communities.14 A recent study on how personality shapes policymakers’ response to warning supports this conclusion—even when they are told what is about to happen, policymakers often take counterproductive measures or often take no action at all. 15 The problem is not with our machines or with the quality or quantity of the information we possess; the problem lies with us and our organizations.

Conclusion On February 15, 2014, nearly fifty years after its inception, the director of national intelligence printed the last paper version of the President’s Daily Brief—an iPad, with improved graphics and embedded

The Future of Intelligence in Democracies

235

links to supporting documentation, would be used to deliver the highly classified briefing to President Barak Obama and a few senior officials.16 This nod to the information revolution seems like a rather weak response to things like acceleration, big data, and AI, but it does suggests that the world intelligence agencies are working to provide policymakers with user-friendly ways to access important elements of the information deluge. The iPad also eliminates a real liability of a printed brief—that it will be scooped by late-night developments that can be reported by morning media broadcasts. Nevertheless, the challenges faced by intelligence agencies cannot be solved by the distribution of iPads. Acceleration creates a situation where international developments generate rapid challenges to conventional wisdom and prevailing analytical themes, forcing analysts and policymakers alike to reassess key concepts and cognitive schemata. Instead of monitoring known threats, analysts are confronted with a rapidly changing international setting that presents them with what often appears to be unique and unprecedented developments and challenges. As a result, both the analytical and the policy settings are increasingly chaotic and murky, making it difficult to build a shared intelligence-policy consensus about the important issues currently in play. Big data holds out the possibility of being able to identify trends and new social and political phenomena, especially with the assistance of AI, but human frailty might still prevent cognitive adjustments at the pace demanded by acceleration. Lurking in the background is the same issue that currently animates debates about drone warfare: drones, enabled by what amounts to something less than broad AI, may have to operate autonomously to achieve their full potential.17 In other words, big data and AI might actually be able to get ahead of acceleration, but only if the humans are also taken out of the loop, so to speak. Intelligence analysts might come to increasingly rely on estimates developed by AI without knowing fully how the systems reached those judgments. Under these circumstances, oversight of intelligence would not just entail legislative and legal control and scrutiny of intelligence activities but the efforts of intelligence agencies to maintain control and awareness of the intelligence production process itself. Intelligence agencies shape events and, in turn, have been themselves shaped by those same events.18 That dialectic will continue in the future as acceleration creates rapid change, forcing the intelligence community to adjust or face failure, or even worse, irrelevance. It is anyone’s guess how democracy will cope with secret

236

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organizations that are shaped by this dialectic, but the general outlines of this process can be discerned.

Notes

1. George Packer, “Can You Keep a Secret? The former C.I.A. chief Michael Hayden on torture and transparency.” New Yorker, March 07, 2016. 2. James J. Wirtz, “Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension,” Defense Analysis 8, no. 3 (1993): 247–259. 3. John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 2006). 4. Thomas Friedman, Thank You for Being Late: An Optimist’s Guide to Thriving in an Age of Acceleration (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016). Moore’s law is predicated on shrinking the critical features of the planar process. The smaller these features, the more bits that can be packed into a given area. The most critical feature size is the physical gate length; shrinking it makes the transistor not only smaller, but faster. 5. G. D. Hutcheson, “The Economic Implications of Moore’s Law,” in Into the Nano Era, edited by H. R. Huff, Springer Series in Materials Science, vol. 106 (Berlin: Springer, 2009). 6. Douglas Rushkoff, Present Shock: When Everything Happens Now (New York: Penguin, 2013). 7. Ken Dilanian, “U.S. Intelligence Official Acknowledges Missed Arab Spring Signs,” Los Angeles Times, July 19, 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now /2012/07/us-intelligence-official-acknowledges-missed-signs-ahead-of-arab-spring.html. 8. Erik J. Dahl, “Not Your Father’s Intelligence Failure: Why the Intelligence Community Failed to Anticipate the Rise of ISIS,” in The Future of ISIS: Regional and International Implications, edited by Feisal al-Istrabadi and Sumit Ganguly, 41– 66 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2018). 9. James J. Wirtz, “When Do You Give It a Name? Theoretical Observations About the ISIS Intelligence Failure,” in The Future of ISIS Regional and International Implications, edited by Feisal al-Istrabadi and Sumit Ganguly, 67–85 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2018). 10. Paul Maddrell, The Image of the Enemy: Intelligence Analysis of Adversaries Since 1945 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015). 11. Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret: Suppression of the Truth About Hitler’s Final Solution (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 1998). 12. Jenna McLaughlin, “CIA Agents in ‘About 30 Countries’ Being Tracked by Technology, Top Official Says,” CNN, April 22, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018 /04/22/politics/cia-technology-tracking/index.html. 13. On distinctions between general and narrow AI, see James Barrat, Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the End of the Human Era (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2013). 14. Robert Mandel, Global Data Shock: Strategic Ambiguity, Deception, and Surprise in an Age of Information Overload (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019). 15. Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott, Intelligence Success and Failure: The Human Factor (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). 16. David Priess, The President’s Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America’s Presidents (New York: Public Affairs, 2016). 17. James J. Wirtz, “The ‘Terminator Conundrum’ and the Future of Drone Warfare,” Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 4 (2017): 411–440. 18. Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence.

Acronyms

ABIN ABSCA ACLU ACSRT

AFI AI ANI AQI AR ASEAN ASIC ASIFU ASIO BfDI

BIN BND

CCAI

CCMR

Brazilian Intelligence Agency Armed Services Board of Contracts Appeal American Civil Liberties Union African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism Federal Intelligence Agency (Argentina) artificial intelligence National Intelligence Agency (Chile) Al-Qaeda in Iraq Intelligence Agency (Macedonia) Association of Southeast Asian Nations Australian Securities and Investment Commission All Sources Intelligence Fusion Unit Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information Indonesia State Intelligence Agency Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service) (Germany) Joint Commission for the Control of Intelligence Activities Center for Civil-Military Relations (Naval Postgraduate School) 237

238

CCOA CESID CI CIA CICRE CIS CITCO

Acronyms

CNE CNI COIN COMINT CSIS CSTO CTG CULINT DAS DCPJ DDI DFS DGSE DIPI

DIS DNI DPKO DTED ECHR EEAS ELINT ELN EO ETA EU FARC

FBI FISINT FMV FOIA

Operational Coordination Center Centro Superior de Información de la Defensa counterintelligence Central Intelligence Agency (United States) Regional Center for Integrated Criminal Intelligence Commonwealth of Independent States Intelligence Center Against Terrorism and Organized Crime (Spain) computer network exploitation National Intelligence Center (Spain) counterinsurgency communications intelligence Canadian Security Intelligence Service Collective Security Treaty Organization Counterterrorist Group cultural intelligence Administrative Department of Security (Colombia) Central Directorate of the Judicial Police (France) Directorate for Digital Innovation Department of Field Support General Directorate for External Security Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection (Romania) Dipartimento delle Informazioni per la Sicurezza director of national intelligence Department of Peacekeeping Operations digital terrain elevation data European Court of Human Rights European External Action Service electronic intelligence National Liberation Army electro-optical Euskadi Ta Askatasuna European Union Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States) foreign instrumentation signals intelligence full-motion video Freedom of Information Act

Acronyms

GCHQ

GEOINT GRU GSI HF HIPPO HUMINT IC ICA ICBM IDF IG ILP IMCC IMINT INTCEN IR IS ISAF ISC ISI ISIS ISO ISR JIC JMAC JOC LE LiDAR MASINT MINUSMA

MONUSCO

NAB NATO NGO NIS NIS

239

Government Communications Headquarters (United Kingdom) geospatial intelligence Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye Gabinete de Segurança Institucional high frequency High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations human intelligence intelligence community Intelligence Community Assessment intercontinental ballistic missile Israeli Defense Force inspector general intelligence-led policing integrated multisource collection capability imagery intelligence Intelligence and Situation Centre (European Union) infrared Islamic State NATO International Security Assistance Force Intelligence and Security Committee Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan) Islamic State in Iraq and Syria Internal Security Organization (Uganda) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Joint Intelligence Committee Joint Missions Analysis Centre Joint Operations Centres law enforcement light detection and ranging measures and signature intelligence UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo National Assessment Bureau (New Zealand) North Atlantic Treaty Organization nongovernmental organization National Intelligence Service (Albania) National Intelligence Service (Kenya)

240

Acronyms

NRO NSA NSA 1947 ODNI OEI OMA OSA OSINT PCPAD PECB PLA PSYWAR PVE RCMP RSF SAR SDS SI SIE SIGINT SII SIRC SIS SNPCT

SRBM SRI TSCM UAV UHF UNDSS USSR UUAV VHF ViCAP VLF WMD

National Reconnaissance Office National Security Agency United States National Security Act of 1947 Office of the Director of National Intelligence “Our Eyes” Initiative Office of Military Affairs Official Secrets Act open-source intelligence planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination Prevention of Electronic Crimes Bill People’s Liberation Army psychological warfare prevention of violent extremism Royal Canadian Mounted Police Reporters Without Borders synthetic aperture radar Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets Secretariat of Intelligence (Argentina) Foreign Intelligence Service (Romania) signals intelligence Integrated Information System Security Intelligence Review Committee State Intelligence Service (Sri Lanka) National System on Preventing and Combating Terrorism short-range ballistic missile Romanian Domestic Intelligence Agency technical security countermeasures unmanned aerial vehicle ultra-high frequency UN Department of Safety and Security Union of Soviet Socialist Republics unarmed unmanned aerial vehicle very high frequency Violent Criminal Apprehension Program very low frequency weapons of mass destruction

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The Contributors

Rubén Arcos is professor of communication sciences, deputy director of the Centre for Intelligence Services and Democratic Systems, and coordinating director of the Inter-University Master’s Program in Intelligence Analysis at Rey Juan Carlos University, Spain. Rubén Arcos is the founder and chapter chair of Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professionals for Spain.

Joanisval Brito-Gonçalves is a former intelligence officer and a staffer at the Brazilian Congress’s Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight.

Thomas Bruneau is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. He has served as chairman of the department and as director of the Center for Civil Military Relations. Lisa I. Carroll is an adult protective investigator for the Florida state government.

Irena Chiru is director of Academic and Research Programs at the National Institute for Intelligence Studies in Bucharest, Romania. Eduardo E. Estévez is a criminal intelligence practitioner in Argentina. He is also an independent consultant specializing in intelligence and security.

Antonio M. Díaz Fernández is professor of criminal law and criminology and coordinator of the Master’s Degree in Criminal Systems and Criminality at the University of Cádiz, Spain.

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Fowler is an assistant professor of military and strategic studies at the United States Air Force Academy and an intelligence practitioner.

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268

The Contributors

Carolyn Halladay is a senior lecturer at the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School who serves in the same capacity in the National Security Affairs Department. She also lectures at the NPS Center for Homeland Defense and Security.

Tristan Mabry is senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs, School of International Graduate Studies, at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei joined the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the United States Naval Postgraduate School in 2003. She has researched, published, and lectured on a wide range of issues concerning civil-military relations, democratization, security sector reform, intelligence, and countering/combating terrorism, organized crime, and street gangs. She is co-editor (with Matthew Crosston) of the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, and serves as program cochair (with Damien Van Puyvelde) of the International Studies Association Intelligence Studies Section. Benjamin Oudet is a PhD candidate at the Université de Poitiers, France.

Lynda Peters is lecturer in law at the University of Chicago. She previously served as the chief prosecutor for the City of Chicago. Mark Phythian is professor of politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Leicester, United Kingdom. John Tullius is the CIA representative to the Naval Postgraduate School.

Damien Van Puyvelde is a lecturer in intelligence and international security at the University of Glasgow, Scotland. He also serves as program cochair (with Cris Matei) of the International Studies Association Intelligence Studies Section. James J. Wirtz joined the Naval Postgraduate School in 1990 as a professor for the department of National Security Affairs. He served as chair of the National Security Affairs Department from 2000 to 2005. He also served between 2009 and 2014 as the director of the Global Center for Security Cooperation, Defense Security Cooperation Agency. In 2016, he was honored as a Distinguished Scholar by the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association.

Index

Abe, Shinzo, 203–204 Accountability, 15–16, 17, 56, 167, 173– 177, 183 ACLU. See American Civil Liberties Union Afghanistan, 140, 143–144 Africa, 129 Agents: for CIA, 61; collaboration for, 68– 69, 123; culture for, 66; discrimination for, 103tab; double agents, 84–85, 92n30; ethics of, 172–173; globalization for, 78–79; language proficiency for, 65–66; mistrust for, 134–135; pre-employment for, 86; professionalism for, 64–65, 68, 194n13; prospective agents, 83–84; psychology of, 81–82; risk for, 46; scholarship for, 72–73; services for, 63; social media for, 100–101; training for, 219–220 AI. See Artificial intelligence Albania, 3–4 Almond, Gabriel, 214 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 116–117 Amorim, Celso, 190 Analysis, 59, 154; all-source analysis, 60– 61; in CI, 84; collection and, 97, 161; crime analysis, 107–109, 112–117; for DNI, 75n37; enabling factors for, 62– 68; expertise in, 68; in IC, 235–236; of intelligence culture, 216–217, 216fig; management factors, 70–73; procedural factors for, 68–70; research and, 82–84; review process in, 69–70; sophisticated analysis, 61–62 Argentina, 78–79, 143

Artificial intelligence (AI), 233–234 Asia, 129–131 Australia, 125, 208 Authority, 9–10, 19n14, 21n38, 144, 225n23; in collaboration, 131; dictatorships, 218–219; in dissemination, 161; ethics of, 133–134, 201; executive control, 174–175; in free states, 185–186; in globalization, 11, 150n39, 156–157; of government, 167; history of, 15–16; in intelligence, 31; for military, 32–33; in nondemocracies, 12, 16, 141; oversight compared to, 192; policy and, 33, 43, 132; reform for, 14, 187–188; risk and, 124, 201–202; in Spain, 189

Background checks, 47, 86 Backsliding, 198, 203–204, 230 Ball, Alan, 214 Ban Ki-Moon, 157 Bay of Pigs invasion, 100 Beer, Samuel, 214 Belgium, 14–15, 123–124 Bias-based profiling, 112–113 Big-data, 232–234 Black propaganda, 105n16 Blair, Dennis, 62 Blau, Uri, 203 Boko Haram, 43 Brazil, 5, 79, 83, 89, 144, 189–191; law enforcement in, 108; policy in, 93n77, 128 Britain. See United Kingdom Bureaucratic factors, 59–60, 70–73, 85

269

270

Index

Cambodia, 202 Canada, 5, 13, 103, 114–115, 125 Carter, Jimmy, 197 Catalonia, 101, 119n31 Ceauşescu, Nicolae, 221, 225n23 Central Intelligence Agency, US (CIA): agents for, 61; bureaucratic factors for, 70–73; in Cold War, 67, 143; Cuba and, 100; FBI and, 8; history of, 66–67; language proficiency for, 65– 66; modernization of, 71–72; ODNI and, 70–71; Operation Argo, 103; public opinion of, 99; secrecy for, 5, 13; technology for, 233; terrorism for, 172–173, 186 Cheney, Dick, 210n27 Chile, 12, 78–79, 99 China, 130 CI. See Counterintelligence CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency, US Civil liberties, 112, 115, 116–117, 125, 185–186, 232–234 Civilians, 15, 21n33, 156, 170–177, 172tab, 195n28, 221 Classified information. See Secrecy Clearance, in security, 85–86, 161 COIN. See Counterinsurgency Cold War, 54, 67, 123, 130–131, 143; policy after, 36–37, 140, 153–154; politics of, 32, 38, 220–223; terrorism and, 197–198 Collaboration, 66–69, 73, 123, 126, 130–131 Collection, 67–68, 74n4, 80–81, 97, 161; democracy and, 44, 55–56; of GEOINT, 52–53; of HUMINT, 45–47, 45tab; of MASINT, 53–55, 54tab– 55tab; for OSINT, 47–50, 48tab–49tab; policy for, 28–29, 41–43; of SIGINT, 50–52, 51tab; strategy for, 43, 56–57 Colombia, 111–112, 147 Colonization, 141–142 Columbia, 4 Comey, James, 202–203, 210n27 Communication, 30–31, 36, 50–52, 51tab, 101 Communications intelligence. See Signals intelligence Community, 216–217, 216fig Compartmentalization, 85 Congo, 154, 163 Consolidated democracies, 2, 32 Contractors, 174–175 Coordination, 68–69, 121–122, 158. See also Sharing Corporations, 69–70

Counterinsurgency (COIN), 139–148, 148n10, 150n38, 150n39 Counterintelligence (CI), 28, 90n2, 91n18, 93n57; collection of, 80–81; democracy and, 88–90; disruption in, 84–85; evaluation in, 83–84; history of, 77–79; investigation in, 82–83; policy for, 81– 82; secrecy in, 79–80, 85–88 Counterterrorism, 10, 18, 37–38, 130–131 Coup operations, 100, 199–200 Covert operations, 97–104, 103tab Crime, 93n77, 107–117, 207 Cuba, 100 Culture, 49–50, 66, 143, 164, 214; psychology of, 144–145, 213; public opinion and, 177, 216. See also Intelligence culture Cybersecurity, 169 Cycles, for intelligence. See Intelligence

Data, 52, 160–161, 185–186, 201–202, 232–234; demographic data, 48, 49tab; for free states, 124–125 DDI. See Directorate for Digital Innovation Debriefing, 83–84 Defensive counterintelligence, 77, 81 Deliverables, 60–61, 66–67, 69–70, 168 Democracy, 22n61, 46, 61–62, 88–90, 101– 103, 203–204; collection and, 44, 55– 56; developing democracies, 3–4, 62; electoral democracies, 1–2, 18n2; globalization of, 1, 110; history of, 140– 141, 220–221; intelligence in, 1–4, 7–8, 10–16, 20n21, 32–34, 126, 229–236; law enforcement in, 112–117; leaks for, 208; liberal democracies, 1–2; new democracies, 63–64, 141, 147; organization in, 117–118; oversight in, 184–192, 194n15; in Pakistan, 206– 207; policy in, 33–34, 183–184; politics of, 8–10, 18, 29; scholarship on, 68, 167; secrecy in, 8, 193, 198–201, 205– 207; sharing in, 128–131; in US, 97–98 Demographic data, 48, 49tab Department of Defense, US (DOD), 82–83 Department of Field Support (DFS), 153, 159–160, 162 Department of Justice, US (DOJ), 202 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 153, 158–160, 162 Developing democracies, 3–4, 62 DFS. See Department of Field Support DGSE. See French General Directorate for External Security

Index Dictatorships, 218–219, 225n23 Digital surveillance, 115 Digital terrain elevation data (DTED), 52 Diplomats, 45, 45tab, 131–132, 133 Director of national intelligence (DNI), 62, 70–71, 75n37 Directorate for Digital Innovation (DDI), 72 Discrimination, 103tab Disinformation, 105n16 Disruption, 84–85 Dissemination, 28, 30–32, 161 DNI. See Director of national intelligence DOD. See Department of Defense, US DOJ. See Department of Justice Double agents, 84–85, 92n30 DPKO. See Department of Peacekeeping Operations Driving collection, 67–68 Drug trafficking, 108–109 DTED. See Digital terrain elevation data Dulles, Allen, 82

ECHR. See European Court of Human Rights Economics, 17, 52, 110–111, 126–127, 170; of intelligence, 44, 126, 133– 134, 191; of military, 37–38, 141–142 Ecuador, 123 Education, 64, 66, 190–191, 220, 223–224, 226n31 Egypt, 199–200 El Salvador, 112 Elections, 62 Electoral democracies, 1–2, 18n2 Electronic intelligence (ELINT), 50, 52 Electronic surveillance, 88 Electro-optical (EO) imaging, 52–53 ELINT. See Electronic intelligence Elitism, 12–15 Ellsberg, Daniel, 202 Emerging democracies, 61 Employment, 89–90, 99 Enabling factors, 62, 64–68 Entrapment, 114–115 EO imaging. See Electro-optical imaging Ershad, H. M., 100 Espionage, 81–82, 92n30, 155, 199–200 ETA. See Euskadi Ta Askatasuna Ethics, 112–115, 195n34, 209n4, 214– 216, 226n46; of agents, 172–173; of authority, 133–134, 201; for government, 32; human rights and, 88–89; of intelligence, 132–133, 157–

271

158; of judicial review, 186; for NGOs, 199; in policy, 160, 229; risk and, 232; in scholarship, 104; technology and, 56 EU. See European Union Europe, 14–15, 101, 130, 176–177, 187, 204 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 191–192 European Union (EU), 17, 66, 101, 122, 127, 130, 189 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), 189, 204– 205, 218–219 Evaluation, 83–84 Executive control, 174–175 Executive orders, 78 Expertise, 64–65, 68, 194n13 Exploitation, 28, 29–30, 54–55, 72

Facility security, 87 Fahmy, Mohamed, 199–200 Fake news, 209n16, 233 Federal Bureau of Investigation, US (FBI), 3, 8, 11–12, 114, 203 Feedback, 31–32, 66–67 FISINT. See Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence FMV. See Full motion video Foreign aid, 126–127 Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT), 50 Foreign policy, 98–100, 131 Foundational factors, 62 France, 14–15, 113, 171–173, 172tab, 205, 219 Free speech. See Media; Secrecy Free states, 46, 60, 64, 150n39, 204; authority in, 185–186; backsliding by, 198; covert operations by, 99; data for, 124–125; globalization for, 38, 170–171; intelligence for, 3, 217–224; military for, 142–143; nondemocracies for, 102, 134–135; policy in, 4, 129, 185; strategy for, 142–143; terrorism for, 17, 231 Freedom of Information Act (US), 197 French General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), 169 Friendly fire, 43 Full motion video (FMV), 53 Fusion centers, 5, 111–112, 116–117 Gates, Robert M., 75n37 Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), 52–53 Germany, 97, 132–133, 185–186

272

Index

Ghana, 188 Globalization: ACSRT, 129; for agents, 78–79; of alliances, 2; authority in, 11, 150n39, 156–157; COIN in, 145–147; coordination in, 158; coup operations, 100; of democracy, 1, 110; drug trafficking, 108–109; economics of, 17, 127; espionage in, 155; EU, 17; of foreign aid, 126–127; for free states, 38, 170–171; government in, 16; history of, 145–146; human rights in, 11, 206–207; ICBM in, 54; intelligence culture in, 217–224; intelligence in, 36, 159–160; judicial review, 175–176; NATO, 17; new democracies in, 141; NGOs in, 9, 142, 184; 9/11 attacks and, 37; OSINT in, 163; policy in, 12, 154, 177, 224; politics of, 151n58; for public opinion, 47; sharing in, 126– 128; of SIGINT, 129; technology and, 230–231; of terrorism, 4, 28, 111–112, 115–116, 140, 231–232; transnational terrorism, 121; trust in, 122–123; UN in, 155–156; for US, 22n51, 162; of war, 156; WMD and, 29–30, 106n36 Government: accountability for, 17; authority of, 167; collaboration for, 126; communication in, 30–31; deliverables for, 168; economics of, 170; ethics for, 32; executive orders, 78; exploitation for, 28; in globalization, 16; media for, 48, 49tab; misinformation for, 49–50; organization for, 7–8; oversight for, 9, 56, 124; performance reviews in, 33; policy and, 6–7, 115, 146–147; politics for, 42; public opinion and, 14, 85, 231; risk for, 6; in UK, 169; in US, 86; whistleblowers for, 210n29 Graves, Melissa, 107 Gray, Colin S., 213 Gray propaganda, 105n16 Greenpeace, 172–173 Greste, Peter, 199–200 Guatemala, 143

Hammarskjöld, Dag, 155 Hayden, Michael, 61, 229 Hester, Robert, 114 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), 157 History, 226n46; of authority, 15–16; of CI, 77–79; of CIA, 66–67; of community, 216–217, 216fig; of democracy, 140–141, 220–221; of globalization, 145–146; of intelligence,

20n21, 23n67; of intelligence quality, 71–72; of NSA, 27–28; of policy, 16– 17; of UN, 153, 156–157 Hogan, Thomas, 210n27 Honduras, 112 Hoover, J. Edgar, 13, 22n48 Human intelligence (HUMINT), 45–47, 45tab, 81 Human rights, 11, 88–89, 147, 187, 191– 192, 204–207 HUMINT. See Human intelligence Hussein, Mahmoud, 200

IC. See Intelligence community ICBM. See Intercontinental ballistic missile Illiberal democracies. See Regimes ILP. See Intelligence-led policing Imagery intelligence (IMINT), 46 IMCC. See Integrated multisource collection capability IMINT. See Imagery intelligence India, 100, 128, 205 Information. See Intelligence Infrared (IR) radar, 53 Innovation, 72 In-service personnel security measures, 86 Insurgency, 139. See also Counterinsurgency Integrated multisource collection capability (IMCC), 46 Intelligence, 49–50; accountability in, 173– 177; analysis of, 59–62, 73; in Argentina, 78–79; authority in, 31; in Brazil, 5; bureaucratic factors in, 59– 60, 70–73; civil liberties and, 115; for civilians, 170; COIN and, 139–140, 142–145, 147–148, 148n10; coordination of, 68–69; covert operations in, 97–98, 103–104, 103tab; criminal intelligence, 107–110, 112– 117; criminal investigations and, 93n77; data for, 160–161; debriefing in, 83–84; in democracy, 1–4, 7–8, 10–16, 20n21, 32–34, 126, 229–236; demographic data for, 48, 49tab; diplomats and, 131–132; dissemination of, 28, 30–32; economics of, 44, 126, 133–134, 191; education for, 220, 223– 224, 226n31; employment in, 89–90; ethics of, 132–133, 157–158; for EU, 127, 189; for free states, 3, 217–224; fusion centers for, 5, 111–112; in globalization, 36, 159–160; history of, 20n21, 23n67; IMINT, 46; intelligence-

Index led policing, 110; interagency coordinators, 70–71; judicial review of, 175–176; key questions in, 69; law enforcement and, 107, 111–112, 117– 118, 144; legal framework for, 185; management factors in, 70–73; media for, 47–48, 48tab; for military, 80, 146; mobile surveillance, 88; Mossad, 100; for NATO, 131; neutralization in, 84– 85; NGOs in, 46–47; in nondemocracies, 19n14, 74n12; officers, 87–88; organization of, 36–37, 42, 122; organizational factors in, 70–73; outsourcing of, 168–169, 173; oversight of, 183–184, 193; passive measures, 81; phases of, 28–32; policy for, 18, 56–57, 69; policymaker relationships in, 66–67; politics of, 4–7, 19n12, 21n28, 36–38, 61, 75n37, 78, 102–103; for private sector, 116–117; private sector for, 167–168; procedural factors for, 68–70, 125; processing of, 28–30, 29–30; quality of, 44, 71–72; reform of, 8–10, 16–17; research, 82– 84; review process for, 69–70; risk of, 147–148; in Romania, 17; scholarship on, 18n3, 27, 33–36, 171, 184–192; sharing of, 121, 135; static surveillance, 88; technology for, 39n6, 49–52, 51tab, 57, 111–112, 163; TSCM in, 87; in UK, 98; for UN, 153–155, 163–164; in US, 162. See also Central Intelligence Agency, US; Collection; Counterintelligence; Geospatial intelligence; Human intelligence; Intelligence culture; Measures and signature intelligence; National Security Agency, US; Open-source intelligence; Signals intelligence Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 42, 44, 159 Intelligence community (IC), 60, 62, 64– 67, 77–79, 207–208, 235–236 Intelligence culture, 218–224; analysis of, 216–217, 216fig; scholarship on, 213– 216 Intelligence-led policing (ILP), 30–31 Interagency coordinators, 70–71 Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), 54 IR radar. See Infrared radar Iran, 103 Iraq, 67, 140, 143–144, 231 Ireland, 140–141 IS. See Islamic State

273

Islam, 113 Islamic State (IS), 121, 145, 231 ISR. See Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Israel, 100, 203 Italy, 218–220, 219–220

Japan, 129, 203–204, 211n36 Jensen, Carl J., III, 107 Jervis, Robert, 183 JIC. See Joint Intelligence Committee JMAC. See Joint Missions Analysis Centre JOC. See Joint Operations Centers Johnson, Lyndon, 197 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 60 Joint Missions Analysis Centre (JMAC), 154, 161 Joint Operations Centers (JOC), 161 Journalism. See Media Judicial review, 175–176, 186 Kamm, Anat, 203 Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, 1 Kennedy, Robert, 41 Kent, Sherman, 27, 30, 37, 80 Kenya, 43 Key questions, 69 Kirchner, Cristina Fernández de, 4 Kissinger, Henry, 33

Ladsous, Hervé, 153, 156 Language proficiency, 65–66 Laos, 202 Latin America, 99–100, 110, 188–189. See also specific countries Law enforcement: authority for, 19n14; in Brazil, 108; in Canada, 5; in democracy, 112–117; economics for, 110–111; entrapment in, 114–115; ILP, 30–31; intelligence and, 107, 111–112, 117–118, 144; intelligenceled policing, 110; policy for, 5, 83; politics of, 191; scholarship on, 107 Leadership, 10, 13, 37–38, 43, 234–235 Leaks, 201–205, 208, 210n27, 210n29 Legal framework, 185–187, 207 Libby, Lewis (“Scooter”), 210n27 Liberal democracies, 1–2 Libya, 48 Light detection and ranging (LiDAR), 52 Lowenthal, Mark, 121 Macridis, Roy, 214 Mali, 154, 157–159 Management factors, 70–73

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Manning, Chelsea (Bradley), 202 MASINT. See Measures and signature intelligence May, Theresa, 209n16 McElreath, David H., 107 McSherry, Patrice, 99–100 Measures and signature intelligence (MASINT), 53–55, 54tab–55tab Media: foreign policy in, 99; for government, 48, 49tab; IC and, 66–67, 207–208; for intelligence, 47–48, 48tab; in Japan, 211n36; national security and, 205–207, 210n26; politics of, 198–201; professionalism for, 209n6; public opinion and, 50, 209n4; secrecy and, 197–198, 207–208; social media, 47– 48, 48tab, 100–101; terrorism in, 107– 108; whistleblowers for, 201–205 Memory, 226n32 Metadata, 201–202 Methodology, 29, 184, 185–187 Mexico, 79, 141–142 Middle East, 121, 143, 145 Military: authority for, 32–33; for civilians, 21n33, 156, 195n28; economics of, 37–38, 141–142; ethics for, 195n34; for free states, 142–143; intelligence for, 80, 146; NATO as, 30–31; NRO, 171–172, 172tab; policy for, 11, 20n22; politics of, 27–28; psychology of, 144, 147–148; secrecy for, 51; SRBM for, 54; in US, 127 Miller, Judith, 210n27 Milstein, Seth, 139 MINUSMA. See Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali Misinformation, 49–50 Mistrust, 133–135 Mitigation strategies, 60 Mobile surveillance, 88 Modernization, 71–72 Modi, Narendra, 206 Mohamed, Baher, 199–200 Moldova, 16 Mongolia, 188–189 Morocco, 143 Mossad, 100 Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), 154, 157–159 Musharraf, Pervez, 206–207 Mussolini, Benito, 218–219 National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), 171–172, 172tab

National security, 205–207, 209n16, 210n26 National Security Act (1947), 78 National Security Agency, US (NSA), 5, 27–28, 62, 86, 201–202 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Neutralization, 84–85 New democracies, 63–64, 141, 147, 189–190 New York City, 108 New Zealand, 124 News. See Media Nigeria, 43, 141 9/11 attacks, 11–12, 35–37, 64, 107–111, 115–116, 197–198 Non-democracies, 11–12, 16, 19n14, 74n12, 102, 134–135, 141. See also Regimes Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 9, 46–47, 142, 184–187, 199, 226n32 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 17, 27–31, 46, 131, 158, 189 North Korea, 130 Novak, Robert, 210n27 NRO. See National Reconnaissance Office NSA. See National Security Agency, US

Obama, Barack, 202, 210n26, 234–235 Objectivity, 30 ODNI. See Office of the Director of National Intelligence OEI. See Our Eyes Initiative Offensive counterintelligence, 81 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 62, 70–71, 75n37, 86, 168 Officers, 87–88 Olson, James, 77 Open-source intelligence (OSINT), 47–50, 48tab–49tab, 163 Operation Argo, 103 Operation Condor, 99–100 Organization: in democracy, 117–118; for government, 7–8; of intelligence, 36– 37, 42, 122; of national security, 217; organizational factors, 70–73; oversight of, 10–11, 55; politics of, 4– 5; of terrorism, 142 OSINT. See Open-source intelligence Our Eyes Initiative (OEI), 131 Outsourcing, of intelligence, 168–169, 173 Overseas experience, 66 Oversight: authority compared to, 192; for backsliding, 230; in democracy, 184– 192, 194n15; for government, 9, 56, 124; of intelligence, 183–184, 193; of organization, 10–11, 55. See also Reform

Index Pakistan, 12, 127, 206–207 Palamara, Humberto, 192 Partisanship, 7 Passive measures, 81 Peacekeeping. See United Nations Pelosi, Nancy, 13 Performance reviews, 33 Perote, Juan Alberto, 204–205, 211n42 Perrin, Edouard, 205 Peru, 123 Petersen, Martin, 59 Philippines, 147–148 Physical security, 87 Pinochet, Augusto, 12 Planning. See Strategy Plausible deniability, 99, 102 Plume, Valerie, 210n27 Police. See Law enforcement Policy: authority and, 33, 43, 132; for background checks, 47; bias-based profiling, 112–113; in Brazil, 93n77, 128; in Canada, 13; for CI, 81–82; COIN as, 140–142; after Cold War, 36– 37, 140, 153–154; for collection, 28– 29, 41–43; for counterterrorism, 10; deliverables for, 60–61; in democracy, 33–34, 183–184; for diplomats, 45, 45tab; for disinformation, 105n16; for espionage, 81–82; ethics in, 160, 229; for FBI, 203; feedback for, 31–32; foreign policy, 98–100; in free states, 4, 129, 185; in Germany, 185–186; in globalization, 12, 154, 177, 224; goals for, 61–62; government and, 6–7, 115, 146–147; history of, 16–17; for intelligence, 18, 56–57, 69; for ISR, 42; judicial review, 175–176; for law enforcement, 5, 83; leadership and, 43; in Middle East, 143; for military, 11, 20n22; for NATO, 27–28, 46; after 9/11 attacks, 35; for ODNI, 168; policymaker relationships, 66–67, 234; psychology of, 163–164; for public opinion, 15; in Romania, 63–64; scholarship on, 30; secrecy and, 2–3, 28–29, 39n6, 155, 184; for security, 162, 218; for stakeholders, 37; strategy and, 44; for terrorism, 13, 22n51; for traitors, 198; in UK, 29–30, 187, 209n16; for UN, 157–162; in US, 5–6, 140, 145, 170, 186; for war, 3, 7, 32–33 Politics: of accountability, 15–16, 167; of authority, 9; of big-data, 232–234; of COIN, 150n38; of Cold War, 32, 38, 220–223; of collection, 56–57; of

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colonization, 141–142; in Columbia, 4; of covert operations, 98; of democracy, 8–10, 18, 29; of espionage, 199–200; of ethics, 215–216; of EU, 122; in Europe, 176–177; of exploitation, 29– 30; of foreign policy, 131; of globalization, 151n58; for government, 42; of intelligence, 4–7, 19n12, 21n28, 36–38, 61, 75n37, 78, 102–103; in Latin America, 99–100; of law enforcement, 191; of media, 198–201; of military, 27–28; of national security, 209n16; of new democracies, 189–190; of NGOs, 186–187; of organization, 4– 5; partisanship in, 7; of private sector, 168–171; of propaganda, 98; of PVE, 155–156; of reform, 10–16; of religion, 113; in research, 213; of risk, 42, 146– 147; scholarship on, 214–215; of secrecy, 1, 117–118, 223–224, 229; of sharing, 121–125, 131–135; in UK, 106n36; in US, 188 Portugal, 205 Powell, Colin, 61 Powell, G. Bingham, 214 Pre-employment, 86 Preto, José Luis Manso, 205 Prevention of violent extremism (PVE), 155–156 Privacy. See Civil liberties Private sector, 116–117, 167–171, 172tab, 173–177 Procedural factors, 59–60, 68–70, 125 Professionalism, 64–65, 68, 194n13, 209n6 Propaganda, 98, 100–101, 105n16 Prosecution, 87–88 Prospective agents, 83–84 Psychology: of agents, 81–82; of civilians, 171–173, 172tab; of coordination, 121–122; of culture, 144–145, 213; of double agents, 84– 85; of memory, 226n32; of military, 144, 147–148; mistrust, 133; of plausible deniability, 99; of policy, 163–164; psychological warfare, 99– 100; of risk, 37–38; of secrecy, 222– 223; of training, 63–64 Public opinion: in Belgium, 14–15; of CIA, 99; communication and, 36; culture and, 177, 216; of FBI, 114; in France, 172–173; globalization for, 47; government and, 14, 85, 231; media and, 50, 209n4; of private sector, 171–173, 172tab; risk and, 17, 32–33; secrecy and, 56, 226n45;

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whistleblowers and, 208. See also Civilians PVE. See Prevention of violent extremism Al-Qaeda, 145, 189, 231 Quality, of intelligence, 44, 71–72

Reagan, Ronald, 135 Reform, 8–17, 22n61, 187–188 Regimes, 21n38. See also Dictatorships Relevance, 30 Religion, 113 Reporters Without Borders (RSF), 199 Research, 82–84, 101, 145, 156, 213, 226n32 Review process, 69–70, 73 Richards, Julian, 27 Risk: for agents, 46; authority and, 124, 201–202; in CI, 90; of collaboration, 134; collection and, 74n4; for democracy, 18n9; for diplomats, 133; ethics and, 232; for free states, 64; friendly fire, 43; globalization of, 127– 128; for government, 6; of intelligence, 147–148; politics of, 42, 146–147; psychology of, 37–38; public opinion and, 17, 32–33; security and, 21n35 Romania, 17, 46, 63–64, 73n3, 90n2, 189, 220–223 RSF. See Reporters Without Borders Rumsfeld, Donald, 7 Russia, 62, 130–131 Russo, Anthony, Jr., 202

Saikia, Santanu, 205 SAR. See Synthetic aperture radar Scholarship: for agents, 72–73; criticism and, 34–36; on democracy, 68, 167; ethics in, 104; expertise for, 194n13; on intelligence, 18n3, 27, 33–36, 171, 184–192; on intelligence culture, 213–216; on law enforcement, 107; on methodology, 184; on policy, 30; on politics, 214–215; on private sector, 173–174; research and, 82–84, 156; from Romania, 73n3; on strategy, 31–32; on traitors, 79–80; UK in, 104n3; on war, 139 School of the Americas Watch, 91n18 SDS. See Specially Designated Secrets Secrecy, 3, 209n4, 226n44; accountability and, 56, 183; in CI, 79–80, 85–88; for CIA, 5, 13; in democracy, 8, 193, 198–201, 205–207; in free states, 17; in Latin America, 188–189; leaks,

201–205; media and, 197–198, 207– 208; for military, 51; policy and, 2–3, 28–29, 39n6, 155, 184; politics of, 1, 117–118, 223–224, 229; psychology of, 222–223; public opinion and, 56, 226n45; technology and, 218; in UK, 17, 200; in US, 22n48, 210n26 Security: in CI, 93n57; for civilians, 221; clearance in, 85–86, 161; cybersecurity, 169; DGSE, 169; facility security, 87; in-service personnel security measures, 86; policy for, 162, 218; risk and, 21n35; technology and, 220. See also specific topics Sedition, 206 Sensitivity, of information, 85 Sessions, Jeff, 203 Sharing, 122–127, 132–134; in democracy, 128–131; of intelligence, 121, 135 Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), 54 Siddiqa, Ayesha, 206–207 Signals intelligence (SIGINT), 50–52, 51tab, 129, 130 el-Sisi, Abdel Fattah, 199–200 Snowden, Edward, 56, 200–202 Social media, 47–48, 48tab, 100–101 Society. See Culture Sophisticated analysis, 61–62 South Africa, 123–124 Spain, 101, 111, 189, 218–219, 223–224, 226n44; media in, 204–205; terrorism in, 119n31, 121 Special political actions. See Covert operations Specially Designated Secrets (SDS), 203–204 Spies, 92n30 SRBM. See Short-range ballistic missile Stakeholders, 37, 102 Static surveillance, 88 Sting operations, 114–115 Strategy, 31–32, 43–44, 56–57, 60, 142–143 Surveillance, 88, 115; ISR, 42, 44, 159. See also Intelligence Synthetic aperture radar (SAR), 53 Syria, 145, 231

Tactical crime, 108–109 Technical security countermeasures (TSCM), 87 Technology, 56, 87–88; AI, 233–234; for CIA, 233; covert operations and, 100– 101; crime and, 109–110; cybersecurity, 169; DDI, 72; digital surveillance, 115; EO imaging, 52–53;

Index globalization and, 230–231; in IC, 65– 66; for intelligence, 39n6, 49–52, 51tab, 57, 111–112, 163; for leadership, 234–235; misinformation and, 49–50; modernization and, 71–72; for propaganda, 100–101; secrecy and, 218; security and, 220; UUAC, 163 Terrorism: for CIA, 172–173, 186; Cold War and, 197–198; criminals and, 115–116; education on, 190–191; ETA, 189, 204–205, 218–219; in Europe, 14–15; for FBI, 11–12, 114; for free states, 17, 231; globalization of, 4, 28, 111–112, 115–116, 140, 231–232; HIPPO on, 157; IS, 121, 145, 231; for Kenya, 43; in media, 107–108; organization of, 142; policy for, 13, 22n51; Al-Qaeda, 145, 189, 231; social media and, 47–48, 48tab; in Spain, 119n31, 121; transnational terrorism, 121; in US, 7–8; WMD and, 29–30. See also Counterterrorism Threat. See Risk Timeliness, 30 Tobago, 12 Training, 63–64, 65, 219–220 Traitors, 79–80, 87–88, 198, 202 Transnational terrorism, 121 Transparency. See Secrecy Trinidad, 12 Trump, Donald, 202–203, 210n27 Trust, 122–123, 133–135 TSCM. See Technical security countermeasures Turnbull, Malcolm, 200 UK. See United Kingdom Ulam, Adam, 214 UN. See United Nations Unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles (UUAV), 163 Undercover policing, 114–115 United Kingdom (UK): Germany and, 132–133; government in, 169; intelligence in, 98; JIC, 60; policy in, 29–30, 187, 209n16; politics in, 106n36; in scholarship, 104n3; secrecy

277

in, 17, 200; terrorism in, 121; US and, 215; war for, 129; WMD for, 101 United Nations (UN): in globalization, 155–156; history of, 153, 156–157; intelligence for, 153–155, 163–164; MINUSMA, 154, 157–159; policy for, 157–162 United States (US): ACLU in, 116–117; Brazil and, 89; CI for, 28; Cold War for, 123; democracy in, 97–98; DNI in, 62; Freedom of Information Act, 197; globalization for, 22n51, 162; government in, 86; intelligence in, 162; Japan and, 129; leadership in, 13; leaks in, 210n29; military in, 127; national Security Act (1947), 78; New York City, 108; 9/11 attacks for, 11– 12, 107–108, 111, 115–116, 197–198; Operation Condor by, 99–100; policy in, 5–6, 140, 145, 170, 186; politics in, 188; procedural factors in, 59–60; secrecy in, 22n48, 210n26; terrorism in, 7–8; Traitors in, 202; UK and, 215; war for, 143 Usability, 30 UUAV. See Unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles Vetting, 86 ViCAP. See Violent Criminal Apprehension Program Vietnam, 140–141, 143, 202 Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (ViCAP), 109

Waltzer, Michael, 197 War, 18, 129, 139, 143, 156; policy for, 3, 7, 32–33; psychological warfare, 99–100. See also Cold War Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 29–30, 54, 55tab, 64, 67, 101, 106n36 Whistleblowers, 201–205, 208, 210n29 WikiLeaks. See Snowden WMD. See Weapons of Mass Destruction Zelaya, Manuel, 190 Zubaydah, Abu, 13

About the Book

What are the role and place of secret services and covert operations in democratic settings? How do states balance the need for both secrecy and openness? What are the challenges to creating effective intelligence practices? Focusing on these crucial questions, the authors of The Conduct of Intelligence in Democracies examine the purposes and processes of intelligence communities in today's security environment.

Florina Cristiana Matei is lecturer in the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Carolyn Halladay is senior lecturer in the National Security Affairs Department at NPS.

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