The Concordat of 1801: a Study of the Problem of Nationalism in the Relations of Church and State 9780231892735

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THE CONCORDAT OF 1801 : A STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALISM IN THE RELATIONS OF CHURCH AND STATE

BY

HENRY H. WALSH, PH.D.

NEW

YORK

COLUMBIA U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS LONDON : P. S. K I N G & SON, L T D .

1933

COPYRIGHT,

1933

BY COLUMBIA U N I V E R S I T Y

PRESS

P R I N T E D IN T H E U N I T E D STATES OF A M E R I C A

So A. P. W.

PREFACE

ONE of the most outstanding characteristics of the doctrine of nationalism has been its success in winning converts. Christianity has been justly famed for having conquered the Graeco-Roman World in the brief space of three hundred years, but the doctrine of nationalism has conquered even a greater area in less than half that time. The inherent antagonism between these two systems is at once evident. The universal ethics of the ,Church is nullified by an exclusive ethics of a nation. If both institutions are true to their fundamental doctrine there would seem to be no possibility of peace between them; either the Church or nationalism, as we know it today, must abandon the field. The latter, according to its most recent exponents in Italy and Germany, leads logically to a completely integrated state ; the former may not survive in such a state. This is the portentous struggle that is taking place between Church and state today, and it is of vital significance to the welfare of civilization. The Concordat of 1801 was for all intents and purposes the beginning of the Church's considered attempt to deal with the new problem that had been forced upon it by the French Revolution. This book is an endeavor to make clear the fundamental issues that were involved in the negotiations of 1801 between the Papacy and the French Republic. It does not profess to be a study of the substance and operation of the Concordat itself, but rather of the opinions of contemporary leaders of various schools of thought that were in vogue during the Napoleonic régime. In this regard the especial interest of the book is centered 5

6

PREFACE

on the important influence that nationalism exerted on the minds of leading French statesmen and churchmen as they took their stands on the one side or the other in the neverceasing struggle between church and state. For my interest in the subject of nationalism I am deeply indebted to Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes, whose classes on that subject have been a source of inspiration to many. I also wish to express to him my heartfelt thanks for the painstaking care with which he read the manuscript. My thanks are also due to Professors Hazen and Maclver for valuable suggestions and criticisms and to Professor G. T . Robinson who has assisted me in reading the proof. Above all I wish to express my gratitude to my wife for never failing encouragement and assistance. H. H. W . PROVIDENCE, R . I . , M A S C H ,

1933.

CONTENTS ráüi INTRODUCTION ι. 3. 3. 4. 5.

T h e Problem Stated Nationalism as a Faith Internationalism of the Church T h e Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy Summary C H A P T E R ON

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

THE E V E OF THE

I CONCORDAT

Religious Parties in France in 1800 Semi-Religious Groups · · T h e Worship of L a Patrie Philosophic Sects Catholicism Regaining Popular Favor in 1800 T h e Pope's Attitude Toward the Suggested C o n c o r d a t . . . . The Policy of the First Consul Toward the Church C H A P T E R THE

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

11 11 14 15 21

N E G O T I A T I O N S FOR

23 25 26 27 28 30 33

II THE

CONCORDAT

Martiniana's Letter to the Pope Circumstances Surrounding the Negotiations Officials Connected with the Negotiations Preliminary Stipulations by the French Government A n Ultimatum from the First Consul T h e Papal Secretary Negotiates in Paris T h e Domestic Situation in France Becomes an Obstacle . . . T h e Final D a y s of the Negotiations Difficulties Preceding the Proclamation of the C o n c o r d a t . . . Summary of the Concordat . . . . · • T h e Organic Articles Ratification Services in Paris and Rome . . Apparent Subjection of the Church to the State 7

39 40 41 43 46 47 4g 51 53 54 56 58 60

8

CONTENTS C H A P T E R

III

CHATEAUBRIAND

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. g.

The Young Intellectuals Chateaubriand's Conversion Influence of Rousseau upon Chateaubriand . Chateaubriand's Apology for Christianity His Contribution to a Romantic Nationalism His Approach to a Traditional and Liberal Nationalism. . . . A n Imperialistic Tinge in His Nationalism His Views on Internationalism The Genius of Christianity Aroused Nationalistic Fervor C H A P T E R JEAN-ETIENNE

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

C H A P T E R

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

C H A P T E R

76 77 7g 88 94 97

V MAURY

The Divine Right Ecclesiastics Biographical . . Maury's Political Views His Influence at Rome Adviser to Louis Bourbon in Ecclesiastical Affairs His Desertion from the Bourbon Cause Blanchardists and Legitimists

HENRI

1. 2. 3. 4.

IV

PORTALIS

The Legislative Bodies Biographical Portalis' Reasons for the Reestablishment of the Church . . . Limitations to be Placed upon the Pope's Sovereignty . . . . A National Catechism and the Feast of St. Napoleon Napoleonic Nationalism . . . .

JEAN SIFFRKIN

62 63 64 66 67 70 73 74 74

100 102 103 106 108 114 117

VI

GRÉGOIRE

The Spirit of Jansenism Grégoire's Republicanism Grégoire Opposed Negotiating with the Pope The Constitutional Councils Attempted to Create a Veritably National Church 5. Grégoire's Interpretation of Gallican Privileges. . . 6. His Reconciliation of the Sovereignties of Church and State. . 7. His Conclusions on the Results of the Concordat in France. .

123 126 129 132 136 140 143

CONTENTS CHAPTER

VII

JACQUES-ANDRÉ

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

9

EVERY

Partly Biographical E m e r y ' s Attitude Toward the Revolution The Era of D i s e s t a b l i s h m e n t A f t e r the 18th B r u m a i r e T h e Part P l a y e d by E m e r y in R e e s t a b l i s h i n g the C h u r c h . . . D i v i n e R i g h t C l a i m s of N a p o l e o n . . . . Emery Becomes Ultramontane E m e r y F o r e s e e s D a n g e r in N a t i o n a l l y Controlled S e m i n a r i e s . T h e Q u e s t i o n of C a n o n i c a l Institution D e c l i n e of Gallicanism C H A P T E R

146 148 155 159 161 162 166 168 169 176

VIII

PAUL-THERÈSE-DAVID

D'ASTROS

1 . F u r t h e r Consideration on N a p o l e o n ' s P o l i c y T o w a r d the Church 2. D ' A s t r o s ' Y o u t h 3. D ' A s t r o s ' Cooperation w i t h P o r t a l i s 4. H i s O p p o s i t i o n to the E m p e r o r 5. H i s C o n t r o v e r s y w i t h M a u r y 6. I m p r i s o n m e n t of d ' A s t r o s and the Intimidation of the C h a p t e r . 7. D ' A s t r o s ' Interpretation of the E m p e r o r ' s P o l i c y T o w a r d t h e Church

194

8. D ' A s t r o s A b a n d o n s Gallican P r i v i l e g e s

197

C H A P T E R JOSEPH D E

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

IX

MAISTRE

L i b e r a l i s m and A b s o l u t i s m D e M a i s t r e ' s A d m i r a t i o n for F r a n c e D e M a i s t r e ' s Speculative S y s t e m H i s C r i t i c i s m s of E i g h t e e n t h C e n t u r y P h i l o s o p h y H i s V i e w s on the Mission of F r a n c e O n the Infallibility of the P o p e O n the D i v i n e R i g h t of K i n g s .

8. O n Gallicanism

178 181 182 184 187 190

199 203 205 207 211 215 219 225

CONTENTS

IO

PAG«

C H A P T E R

X

CONCLUSION

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

A Résumé The Liberal Catholic Movement Church and State Always an Issue The Law of Separation, 1905 The Concordat of 1929

233 235 239 241 243

BIBLIOGRAPHY

247

INDEX

251

INTRODUCTION

ω THE problem of Church and state as it unfolded itself during the negotiations for the Concordat of 1801 between the Pope and the French state was surprisingly novel to European diplomacy. It revealed a cleavage of opinion practically unknown in former attempts to reconcile things temporal and spiritual. Although there was much talk among the associates of the First Consul about the dangerous Canossa precedent,1 the circumstances in 1801 were very different from those which gave rise to the Hildebrandine controversy. A new element had been intruded into this latest attempt to bring Church and state into harmonious relationship, making former endeavors to divide the fields of sovereignty seem almost simplicity itself. This new phenomenon was nationalism, a revolutionary force, impatient of all traditional and venerable ideas of the essential unity of European thought and culture. It gloried in variety and assailed with unusual harshness the Catholic and imperial traditions of the Church of Rome. (2)

A n exhaustive definition of nationalism is hardly called for here. Enough research has been done, the results of which are pretty generally known, to enable us to use the term without too much ambiguity. Unfortunately for our purposes, 1 Boulay de la Meurthe, Histoire de ¡a Négociation du Concordat de 1801 ( T o u r s , 1920), ch. i ; a good account of prejudices adverse to the Concordat.

II

INTRODUCTION

12

nationalism does not always assume the same form at different epochs of history. Therefore, it is necessary to try to fix its definite content in the year 1 8 0 1 . This has been well done by Professor Hayes, who has made a critical analysis of the elements that go to make up the perfervid patriotism which swept so suddenly over the French people during the fateful years of the Revolution. 2 He points out that the eighteenth-century intellectuals, by their " speculating on the similarities and contrasts between peoples " (the object of these speculations, to a large extent being primitive tribes) had invoked " a revival of tribalism." 4 The eighteenthcentury humanitarians expected great things from this revival which was going to give the disinherited masses a new standing and the distressed a new hope. Incidentally, Rousseau, the most lucid preacher of this new evangel, turned against the founder of Christianity because apparently of the latter's lack of appreciation of tribal solidarity. Tribalism had never made any distinction between the nation and its religion; they were inextricably one. Rousseau charged our Lord with the crime of " separating the religious from the political system, and thereby destroying the unity of the state and causing the intestine divisions which have never ceased to agitate Christian nations." 4 Furthermore, he declared that " whatever destroys social unity is good for nothing and that all institutions which put a man in contradiction with himself are worthless." δ Be2

Hayes, C. J . H., Essays

3

Hayes, The Historical

on Nationalism

Evolution

( N e w York, 1926),

of Modern Nationalism

passim.

( N e w York,

1 9 3 1 ) , p. 10. 1 5

Rousseau, Contrat Social, bk. iv, ch. viii.

Ibid. J . H . Rose writes, " The influence exerted by Rousseau on the development of the national idea has not, I think, been sufficiently emphasized. E v e r y student knows that Le Contrat Social is the source of the French democratic nation ; but that work is equally the fountain head of modern nationalism. Montesquieu, writing only some fourteen years

INTRODUCTION

13

sides encouraging nationalists to be very wary of the Church, he, by his low opinions of Christianity, early put the ecclesiastics on the defensive against the new faith that was to make men free and equal. It was this faith which turned the men of the French Revolution from sobfcr statesmen into unreasonable fanatics and colored all their relations with the Church. It was this faith which still, after all the disillusionment of the Terror and many futile forms of democratic government, made the intimate advisers of the First Consul unceasing critics of the concordat he was endeavoring to bring about with the Pope of Rome. The cause of the dispute was the doctrine which Rousseau had so firmly inculcated into the minds of the French people, the absolute unity of the state in all its aspects. Undoubtedly, Frenchmen had had a consciousness of nationality long before Rousseau instructed them in the complete sovereignty of the secular state. But it was expressed through loyalty to the king, rather than an exaltation of the people, a fact well illustrated in a political catechism drawn up for the training of the grandson of Louis X I V , in which the heir to the throne was taught that he alone would represent " the entire nation which had no corporate existence apart from him." 8 Rousseau's task, then, was the transference of loyalty from the kingly symbol to the people themselves, who alone could constitute a nation. As Aulard says, this was an idea which was held by the leaders of French thought in the eighteenth century, even in the days of Louis X I V , and he quotes La Bruyère as saying that " under a despotism there is no true before Rousseau, scarcely mentions the nation. . . . It was reserved for Rousseau to set forth the national idea with a force and cogency which opened up a new era both in thought and deed." Nationality in Modern History ( N e w York, 1916), lect. ii, p. 22. 6

Ibid., p. ig, footnote.

14

INTRODUCTION

country." Nevertheless, there seems little doubt that it was the eloquent pleading of Rousseau which brought to the people themselves the realization that they were the nation, or, in the words of Aulard, the belief that " there is no true country save where all are free, equal and brethren, where the people is self-governing and forms one family among the other families of the nations." 7 That, Aulard calls " revolutionary patriotism." On the 14th of July 1790, on the Champ de Mars, it blossomed forth as a religion. Such is the only name that Aulard can find for this striking " movement of union " where oaths were taken to the Fatherland with the deepest fervency and piety. " It was the worship of France, the Fatherland, as one, free and equal." In the hands of the Jacobins it also included excommunication from the Fatherland for all those who dared to impugn the unity of France or the equality of citizens. It is with this revolutionary nationalism, after it has passed through the " fires of the French Revolution " and taken on the intolerant features added by the Jacobins, that we are particularly concerned in our study of the Concordat."

(3) Jacobin nationalism could not tolerate any international organization like the Catholic Church, which claimed sovereignty of its own within the state of France. A conflict of the national sovereignty of the nation with the international sovereignty of the Church was, in the nature of the case, inevitable, even though the internationalism of the Church 'Aulard, Α., Christianity and the French Revolution Fraser, London, 1927), p. 64. 8

(trans, by Lady

On this development, G. P. Gooch writes, " In the fulness of time the doctrine of nationalism issued from the volcanic fires of the French Revolution, carrying its virile message of emancipation and defiance to the uttermost parts of the earth, and filling the nineteenth century with the insistent clamor of its demands." Nationalism (London, 1921), p. 5.

INTRODUCTION

15

in the eighteenth century was far different from that defined by Hildebrand and Boniface V I I I . This, if for ho other reason than that Europe was no longer politically the field upon which Hildebrand played his daring rôle. The rise of self-conscious nationalities during the thirteenth century had compelled the Church to face the realities of a new situation and to adapt its international outlook accordingly. This new internationalism, which came into conflict with French nationalism during the Revolution, calls for some explanation. With the imprisonment of Boniface at the opening of the fourteenth century, the Church was forcibly brought to the realization that Europe was no longer one sovereignty, but that the Empire, which it had tried to rule, had broken into fragments in its hands. Internationalism, in the sense that Europe was one in thought and culture with a common center of law and morals, was gone. It was Grotius who, at a much later date, set down in precise terms what this new outlook involved. He regarded it as axiomatic that a state must hold its own existence and preservation as paramount to all other considerations, and follow the law of nature in its relation to other states.® He was, for the first time, making it clear to his contemporaries that the old form of unity, the ideal of the ancient Roman Empire, perpetuated during the Middle Ages by the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church, had failed.

(4) The Holy Roman Empire had always been a rather shadowy affair, but it helped to keep alive the illusion that there was a supreme tribunal of appeal in Europe. " Not till the days of the Reformation," says Bryce, " was the illusion • Grotius, H., The Rights of Peace and War (trans, by A . C. Campbell, London, 1910), vol. i, bk. ii.

INTRODUCTION

ι6

dispelled." 10 It was this demand for a final court of appeal that made possible the coronation of Charlemagne in the ninth century. Although his coronation may be explained on the grounds of expediency, it had back of it, as Creighton has put it, " the aspiration of men's hearts, an ideal which was partly a memory of the world wide organization of the old Roman Empire, and partly a yearning for the universal brotherhood which Christianity had taught mankind." 11 In the ensuing controversies between Church and state, the latter strove to make real the world-wide organization, while the former tried to give the cultural and moral tone to the Empire. The conflict arose out of the fact that, in order to realize their ideals, both parties resolved to assume the supreme leadership. The Papacy at first made good its claim. Canossa caught the imagination of Europe. However, as Creighton says, the " drama of Canossa " is to be balanced with the " drama of Anagni." 1 2 But the counterblow, significantly enough, was not struck by the Empire, but by a feudal state which had at last become conscious of its distinction of being French. Philip I V , by his imprisonment of Boniface V I I I , caused the Church to lose caste, as Dante's De Monorchia strikingly illustrates. The Italian poet had not yet lost the ideal of European unity; rather he holds that, since " the whole human race is ordered for one end," it is necessary that " the leader and lord be one." " Yet not to the Church, but to the Empire, he turns for the fulfillment of his ideal. But he was singing 1 0 Bryce, J., The Holy edition), vol. i, p. 87.

Roman Empire

(New

York,

1886, revised

1 1 Creighton, M., A History of the Papacy (London, 1892, new edition), vol. i, p. II. 12

Ibid., vol. i, p. 28.

Dante, The De Monarchia New York, 1904), P· 21. 13

(trans, by Aurelia Henry, Boston and

INTRODUCTION

17

the swan song of European unity. In the course of time another Italian formulated the philosophy of a new ideal which was to furnish Grotius with his problem of the Rights of Peace and War. Since Europe, by its division, had fallen into a state of nature, it was Machiavelli's high task to elucidate to princes the law of the jungle. 14 It was too late by several centuries to revive the Empire. The Papacy had helped to destroy it, but in turn was powerless to control the rising nationalities, which were gradually assuming more and more sovereignty to themselves. Men no longer could be influenced by the old ideal, and the Papacy had no army worth calling upon to enforce its admonitions. Disintegration was setting in ; it was now necessary that each national state look out for its own integrity. Machiavelli's teaching was well assimilated; ruthlessness, chicanery and sharp practice were regarded as legitimate weapons in the serious business of national survival. During the era of Councils, it is true, valiant attempts were made to find some binding link to hold together a Europe not yet reconciled to falling apart. The Council of Constance (1414) was for a time the center of European politics. It may properly be regarded as a congress of European powers, a congress similar to those that followed upon the break-up of the Napoleonic Empire in 1814." The fact that it organized itself into nations and that the Battle of Agincourt was fought while it was in session shows that as a peace-maker it was hardly a success. The Council of Basle ( 1431-1437) resolved to profit by 1 4 " Princes ought, therefore, to make war their sole study and occupation, for it is peculiarly the science of those that govern.... I repeat, therefore, that by a neglect of this art states are lost, and by cultivating it they are acquired." Machiavelli, The Prince, ch. xiv. 1 5 " The Council... was looked upon as a congress rather than a synod. . . . Europe was hopeless, distracted and longed to realize its unity in some worthy work." Creighton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 267.

INTRODUCTION

ι8

the mistakes of Constance. Its leaders were now acutely conscious of the menace of national jealousies, and they opposed any division of the Council into nations. Some of the aims of Basle, as set forth by its able president, Cesarmi, sound very much like a program for the League of Nations. Writing to Eugenius I V , in order to dissuade him from dissolving the Council, he says that "ambassadors have been sent to make peace between England and France, between Poland and the Teutonic knights," and he warns Eugenius that " the dissolution of the Council will stop their valuable labors." 1 4 N o sooner was the Council dissolved by the Pope than national states began to debate just how many of its decrees they would accept—clear evidence of the weakness of the Church as an international sovereignty. This weakness is borne out in the remark of the French king when some German princes agitated for a new General Council in 1444. H e said, " It would be better to drop the name of a council and bring about an assembly of secular princes ; where were the princes, there was also the Church." 1T With the advent of the Protestant revolt, all hope of holding Europe together was finally shattered. Despite the failure of the Councils to give political unity to the continent, the religious bond still had some semblance of reality. But, in the sixteenth century, that too disappeared. Internationalism from now on was compelled to take a new form, a recognition of the differences between the states of Europe in religion, customs and government, and an attempt to ease the tension to which the continent was subjected by so many various systems. The old cosmopolitanism of loyalty and subjection to a common European center was gone. However, even now, in the sixteenth century, the hope 18

Quoted by Creighton, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 66-67.

17

Ibid., vol. ii, p. 224.

INTRODUCTION

19

to get back to the former conditions was not entirely abandoned. Ranke, in his History of the Popes, points out that there was " one propitious moment for the reconciliation of Protestant and Catholic " that " would have given an unaccustomed unity to all Germany and would have greatly extended the power of the Emperor." 1 8 The Conference of Ratisbon, he thinks, did not come to nought through theo* logical disputes, but because of political events, which need not have prevented a reconciliation. Charles V, he feels, would have been quick to seize the opportunity for compromise and " as chief of the moderate party would inevitably have obtained predominant influence throughout Europe, more especially in the event of a General Council." " Such speculation, however, seems fruitless. Even if there had been a genuine reconciliation at Ratisbon, it was hardly possible that Europe would long have submitted to a common lordship. The only real center, even in the better days of the Holy Roman Empire, was Rome; and the Papacy itself had abandoned the ideal of a political union to the extent of making alliances with Protestants in order to curb the threatening dominance of Charles V. 20 At the Council of Trent, the Church clearly accepted the realities of the new situation. The Popes now frankly recognized that, whatever the Church might be in theory, it was no longer in fact the final arbitrator in both spiritual and temporal matters; and Pius I V admitted that the only way in which the spiritual government of the Papacy could be carried on was with the aid of the sovereigns of Europe. In consequence, Cardinal Morone, the president of the Council (1563), proceeded to bring about a rapprochement 18

Ranke, L. voo, The History London, 1847), vol. i, p. 124. Ibid., 20

p. 125.

Ibid., p. 195.

of the Popes

(trans, by E. Foster,

20

INTRODUCTION

between the Pope and the various European monarchs who still recognized the Catholic Church as established in their dominions.11 It was this new arrangement, a somewhat vague and ambiguous division of sovereignty, which prevailed in France down to the Revolution. The Church still claimed most vigorously an international field of her own, and even Louis X I V , in his famous Four Articles, dared not deny it. Though the first article stated that " kings and princes are not by the law of God subject to any ecclesiastical power," this declaration of independence was carefully balanced by the addition " nor to the keys of the Church with respect to their temporal p o w e r . " " Nor can this statement be regarded as anything more than a working arrangement Not all the Popes nor the Jesuits accepted it. Indeed, one Pope again acquired an influence in Europe which, Ranke asserts, was " but little inferior to that which the Pope possessed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries." 28 The theoretical position of the Papacy was probably best stated by Bellarmine, that since the Pope is endowed with the fulness of spiritual power, " there accrues to him a large amount of secular authority." " This, however, was not urged with any great vigor. Though the Jesuits in the seventeenth century worked valiantly to restore the prestige of the Church in all departments of life by counseling kings, instructing the people in their political duties, and controlling education and literature, yet their methods on the whole were not in accord with the old internationalism of the Middle Ages. Rather, one might say, their policy had a divisive tendency, since the Jesuits 21

Ibid., p. 256. On the Four Articles, vide Jervis, W. H., A History of the Church in France, 1516-1789 (London, 1872). 23 Ranke, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 1. 24 Ibid., vol. ii, p. 4. 22

INTRODUCTION

21

wherever they went earnestly sought to adapt themselves to local customs. In Spain, they became partisans for Spain ; in France, they made themselves French." Thus, whatever binding force was to be found in the religious and educational work of the Jesuits was lost in the remarkable religious apathy that accompanied the mercantile spirit which overran the world in the eighteenth century, invading even the Society of Jesus itself." (5) It is not surprising, then, that, in the negotiations of 1801, the Church found itself struggling not only to preserve its spiritual independence, but to ensure the devotion and loyalty of its own members. Other interests than that of religion had been to the fore in the eighteenth century, above all, trade and commerce. Among certain classes anything that came into conflict with the new god was quietly suppressed, especially religious fervor. Such a faith could hardly answer the deeper emotional needs of the spiritual life of the people. The lack of the Church, however, was made up to a certain extent by the preachings of the humanitarians. When Rousseau added the proper emotional fervor to those new spiritual philosophies, he provided a gospel for the French Revolution. Out of it came the spontaneous formation of federations all over France, which finally culminated in the national federation at Paris. Altars were quickly raised to the new deity, and a new religion was ready to take its place in the vineyard which the Church had long sought to monopolize. The success of the new religion in winning converts was 25 26

Ibid., vol. ii, p. 2.

" In place of that infallible decision hitherto awaited from the supreme spiritual pastor, there now ruled commerce and the interests of the great powers." Ranke, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 2.

22

INTRODUCTION

at first tremendous, but a reaction was bound to follow. It was this reaction which gave the Church an opportunity to try to regain its lost prestige and which brought about the negotiations of 1801. By this time, however, the problem had to do not so much with a contest between two sovereignties, as with a struggle between two religions — the Catholic faith, and the gospel of Jean Jacques Rousseau as interpreted by nationalist Jacobins.

C H A P T E R

I

O N T H E E V E OF T H E C O N C O R D A T

(O FOR an understanding of the circumstances in which the Concordat of 1801 was negotiated, it will be unnecessary here to pause upon the ecclesiastical legislation of the first democratic assemblies in France which had divided the Gallican Church into warring camps. Suffice it to say that when the First Consul began negotiating with the Pope, there were several religious parties in France claiming allegiance in some form or other to the Roman Catholic Church. There were, roughly, the Constitutionals, those who had acknowledged the Civil Constitution of the clergy as legal and binding upon the French Church; and there were the non-jurors, those who refused to regard the Constitution of 1790 as valid. But those two rough divisions do not begin to indicate the many conflicting views that had rent asunder the ancient Gallican Communion which Bonaparte was anxious to piece together again. In the ranks of those who had set themselves in opposition to the government's ecclesiastical policy in 1790, namely, the non-jurors, there was no great show of unity. This party early divided on the question as to what lengths they ought to go in their opposition to the tactics of the Revolution. The oath demanded of the clergy on July 14, 1790, was not at first opposed by them all.1 This oath read, " I swear to be faithful to the nation and to the law, and to maintain to the utmost of my power the Constitution decreed by the 1

Pisani, P., L'Église de Paris et la Révolution (Paris, 1908, 2nd ed.),

toni, i, pp. 176-184.

23

THE CONCORDAT OF 1801

24

Assembly and accepted by the k i n g . "

A n influential clergy-

man, A b b é E m e r y , head of the Seminary of

St. Sulpice

in Paris, did not regard this oath as objectionable, since it did not involve accepting the Civil Constitution.

There was

considerable dispute on this point, but E m e r y felt that as the Civil Constitution of the clergy still lacked the king's signature, it could not rightly be included in the oath. 2 There is little doubt that its framers intended the oath to cover the recent legislation of the Assembly on the Church, and, as a consequence, the more conservative clergy would have nothing to do with it.

F r o m the beginning of the

Revolution, then, there were t w o schools o f thought in the non-juring p a r t y — a division which split their ranks beyond repair during the negotiations

for the Concordat.

The

rigorists still refused to compromise with the Revolution, even at the command of the Pope, and finally found themselves a disowned group known as the Petite

Église

N o r were the Constitutionals a homogeneous party.

The

Convention had shown itself favorable to priests w h o were legally married, with the hope, as A u l a r d thinks, of discrediting-all religion. 4

M a n y of the Constitutionals grasped this

opportunity to take unto themselves wives, but 2

Gosselin, J. Ε . Α . , Vie de M. Emery

married

( P a r i s , 1861), torn, i, p. 230.

A good description of " the deepening of discord " between church and state even during the famous federation of July 14, 1790 is found in H a z en, C. D., The French Revolution ( N e w Y o r k , 1932), vol. i, ch. xviii. 3 A sympathetic account of this sect can be found in a little volume by Latreille, C., L'Opposition religieuse au Concordat ( P a r i s , 1910). Vide also Mathiez, Α . , Rome et le Clergé Français sous la Constituante ( P a r i s , 1 9 1 1 ) , pp. 113-115.

* " In fact, the Convention set up a condition of privilege f o r married priests. T h e y numbered more than t w o thousand, says their historian, the Constitutional Grégoire, w h o himself w a s unmarried." Aulard, Α . , Christianity and the French Revolution (trans, by L a d y Fraser, London, 1927), p. 102.

ON THE EVE OF THE

CONCORDAT

25

priests were not only abhorrent to that great Constitutional, A b b é Grégoire, but to a large class of people professedly indifferent to religion and were a hardly tolerated party within the Constitutional framework. 1 1 (2) Besides the above mentioned parties, there were other sects in France in the year 1800, professing to be religious and claiming to be more truly universal than the Church itself.

T h e y were, f o r the most part, societies f o r patriotic

propaganda, w h o regarded all churchmen as lamentably lacking in love f o r la Patrie. It has been the habit sometimes to ascribe the g r o w t h of these patriotic sects to the teaching of the eighteenth-century philosophers.

A u l a r d dissents f r o m this view, as he holds

that the men of the Enlightenment,

unlike them, did not

really wish to destroy the Church.

T h e i r policy, he says,

was rather to unite the C h u r c h and state more closely together, in order that the state might be able to give good laws to the Church.

T h e y were of the opinion that religion was

a necessary thing f o r the people, but they held that it was a state affair, and so their quarrel was with the Roman hierarchy and not with the Gallican Church itself.®

T h e Civil

Constitution of the clergy seems to give a clear support to this view, since it was written by men much under the influence of eighteenth-century philosophy.

Furthermore, in the

federation fêtes of 1790, there was much mingling of Gallican religion and patriotic fervor and little indication at this time of any movement to replace the Catholic religion in France. 7

N o r had the National Assembly, in its defiance

of the Pope, any thought of injuring the Gallican Com5

Pisani, op. cit., torn, i, pp. 231-232.

β

A u l a r d , op. cit., p. 39.

' Ibid., p. 65.

26

THE

CONCORDAT

OF 1801

munion, and there was considerable amazement at the actual result of its ecclesiastical legislation. It is upon the uprising in La Vendee that Aulard lays the blame for the intense unpopularity that overwhelmed Catholicism in France and almost destroyed it during the Reign of Terror. The Civil War was regarded by patriotic Frenchmen as a stab in the back of the much loved new Republic at the most critical moment of its existence. Papal partisans had committed "a crime against the Fatherland, that young Fatherland, so religiously adored—a crime which seemed horrible and inexplicable." 8 From now on good patriots regarded all forms of Catholicism as dangerous to the Republic and there were continual attempts to raise up a new religion to take its place. Mathiez, in an informing work, La Théophilanthropie et le Culte Décadaire β gives an exhaustive list of these substitute faiths. For the most part they were thinly veiled patriotic societies, and their weird ritual and bizarre fêtes were designed with the hope of making la Patrie as real to the outward senses as Catholicism had become through its appealing rites and ceremonies. Most of them, including the cult of Reason and the worship of the Supreme Being, had very brief periods of popularity. (3) There were many attempts to make la Patrie itself a direct object of worship. The Convention toyed with this idea and applauded with enthusiasm a speech by Marie-Joseph Chénier, the burden of which was that it would be perfectly feasible to substitute the worship of the Fatherland for that of the Catholic religion. This speech so appealed to the Con» Ibid., pp. 97-98· » Mathiez, Α . , La Théophilanthropie

(Paris, 1904), p. 18 (especially introd.).

et le Culte Décadaire

1796-1801

ON THE EVE OF THE CONCORDAT

27

vention that they ordered it to be printed and distributed widely among the people. T h e following is illustrative of much of the eloquence that burst forth at the altars of

la Patrie: Wrench the sons of the Republic from the yoke of theocracy which now weighs upon them . . . then, free from prejudice and worthy to represent the French nation, you will be able on the ruin of fallen superstition to found the one universal religion which has neither secrets nor mysteries, whose one dogma is equality, whose orators are the laws, whose pontiffs are the magistrates, which asks no incense from the great human family to burn, save before the altar of our country, our mother and our deity. 10 Despite the optimistic predictions of such patriotic orators, congregations were difficult to lure to the altar of la Patrie in 1800.

(4) T h e Theophilanthropist Church, which embraced more than patriotic devotion, almost became a dangerous rival to Catholicism. The way f o r it had been prepared by sects of a similar nature bearing such suggestive names as la Religion

Naturelle, le Culte Social, and le Culte des Adorateurs.

The

first of these was a Jacobin community, devoted to the realization of égalité in society ; 1 1 the object of the Culte Social was to consolidate the Republic, 12 while the Culte des Adorateurs produced a messiah determined to regenerate his fellow citizens." All these sects were supposed to abhor dogma ; nevertheless, they multiplied on acount of philosophic divergencies. 10

Aulard, op. cit., p. 104.

11

Mathiez, op. cit., p. 40.

" Ibid., p. 46. 13

Ibid., p. 48.

28

THE CONCORDAT

OF 1801

The Theophilanthropist, being more flexible than its rival faiths, made a wider philosophic appeal. Aulard describes it as a natural religion, not at all like the Rousseau-Robespierre types (purged and primitive sorts of Christianity), for it had as its basis the philosophic outlook of Voltaire and the English freethinkers. 14 This famous cult was for five years a cause of grave concern to anxious Catholics, especially because of the wise measures it took to perpetuate itself. Its educational activities were extensive and it persuaded many families to entrust the religious education of their children to its priests. Theophilanthropist baptisms and marriages became quite the mode in some circles." But despite all its activities, there was really no chance for such a cult to become broadly popular because of the intellectual demands it made upon its devotees. Besides the ever present Culte Décadaire, which only claimed to be a supplementary religion, there is one other semi-religious body that ought not to be overlooked in any review of religions in France previous to the Concordat. It was an anti-Christian group which advocated simply free thought, but with no official organization ; yet it had a place, as Aulard puts it, " in the heart of the National Institute ",1β where it still continues to thrive. (5) It was no pleasing religious scene that Bonaparte looked upon when he brusquely took over the control of affairs in France. But out of the welter of conflicting religious sects, only two groups, from the point of view of numbers (and numbers weighed heavily with the First Consul), were worthy of his consideration. He could make a national 14

Aulard, op. cit., p. 155.

15

Mathiez, op. cit., p. 244.

16

Aulard, op. cit., p. 156.

ON THE EVE OF THE

CONCORDAT

29

church out of the Constitutional or he could reestablish Roman Catholic Christianity in France. The latter alternative was, for many compelling reasons, the only practical way to dispel the discord. A f t e r the proclamation of religious freedom in the law of the 3rd Ventose of the Year III, there had been a remarkable growth of Catholic worship. Aulard has demonstrated from communion lists that congregations at Church services were much larger at this time than they were previous to the Revolution. 17 Jurors and non-jurors were now practically on an equal footing. Grégoire, with his usual energy, led in the reorganization of his Constitutional Church, while Abbé Emery worked diligently for the reestablishment of a Catholicism loyal to the Papacy. Popular sympathy was, according to most observers, on the side of the latter, especially in the country districts. During the seven years of disestablishment, as Aulard facetiously puts it, " the people bubbled over with religion, and philosophy flourished among the elect." " It is the opinion of one critical observer of the passing scene, the Baroness de Staël, that the great majority of churchmen were quite content with the state of affairs as they existed during this era of disestablishment. She asserts in her Memoirs that " the most sincere partisans of the Church only aspired to a perfect religious liberty, and the general view of the nation was that all persecutions against the priests should cease." From this she drew the rather hasty conclusion that " the Consular government could have 17

Ibid., p. 148.

18

Ibid., p. 146.

A n interesting account of the years of disestablishment is found in Sloane, M . S., The

French

Y o r k , 1901), pp. 203-242.

Revolution

and Religious

Reform

(New

THE CONCORDAT OF 1801

3o

satisfied public opinion by maintaining in France toleration such as existed in A m e r i c a . "

18

H e r assertion, however, is not borne out by a close analysis of the literature of this period.

Latreille, w h o has made a

careful study of the situation which the F i r s t Consul faced in 1800, dissents f r o m any such view, and thinks that the opinion of Madame de Staël, formulated towards the end of her life, was based upon the consequences of the Concordat rather than the events that brought it about.

H e says sig-

nificantly " that a society which w a s about to make a feast to the Génie du Christianisme ripe f o r tolerance."

of Chateaubriand was hardly

20

(6) T h e r e were serious and weighty reasons w h y both the F i r s t Consul and the Pope should have felt that a religious accord was necessary in France in 1800.

But considering

the fact that the Papal party w a s gaining ground, the question not unnaturally arises : W h y did the Pope attempt to negotiate upon the very unequal terms he was compelled to accept at the hands of the First Consul ? T h e answer seems obvious.

T h e Revolution may have

failed in its first direct effort to destroy Catholicism in France, but its later tactics were much more dangerous than that of open and violent persecution.

T h e Directory, for

example, had placed public instruction on a purely nationalistic basis.

In the Y e a r V I I I a circular to teachers of central

schools ordered them to remove f r o m instruction " everything that pertained to the doctrines and rites of all religions 1 9 Staël, T h e Baroness de, Considerations on the Principal Events the French Revolution (trans, into English, 1818), vol. ii, p. 3. 20

of

Latreille, op. cit., p. 128.

A similar opinion is expressed by Baudrillart, Α . , Quatre de Concordat ( P a r i s , 1905), ch. iv. Vide also Champion, E., La Séparation ( P a r i s , 1903), ch. x x i i i .

de l'Église

Cents

Ans

et de l'État en 1794

ON THE EVE OF THE

CONCORDAT

and sects whatever they might be." taught but universal morality.

31

Nothing must be

21

A l l free schools that were

discovered not teaching the nationalist principles of

the

French Revolution were to be closed. It is true that a f t e r the 18th Brumaire, the Directory had disappeared, but those w h o had given it support were still prominent in the public l i f e o f the nation.

T h e r e were the

ever present Jacobins, propagating their new-found faith, and they regarded the C h u r c h as the eternal enemy of democratic nationalism.

Besides

these

philosophic

opponents,

there

were b y now a host o f self-interested ones, created by the confiscation of Church property. A g a i n s t these p o w e r f u l enemies, it was dangerous f o r the Papacy to place too great confidence in the revival of Catholic practices during the period of separation of Church and state.

A s Boulay de la Meurthe points out, this religious

zeal was very much dependent on social situations. 22

The

T h i r d Estate, f o r example, had, in days gone by, aped the men of the Enlightenment

to lift itself out of the vulgar

strata, and w a s prone to shun all connection with Christian dogmas.

T h i s it was still inclined to do.

T h e nobility while

in exile had professed great affection f o r the Roman See in the hope of political gain, but there was yet grave doubt if it had abandoned its old-time scepticism.

N o r were the

mass of laborers in both city and country going to forget that the Revolution, despite all its excesses, had released them f r o m many a burdensome Church tithe and feudal due. A l l these interests were serious menaces to the continuing popularity of the Catholic religion, of which the Pope w a s by no means unaware, and he felt that the time had arrived to consolidate the gains made in the previous seven years. 24 21

Aulard, op. cit., p. 157.

22

Boulay de la Meurthe, Histoire

J8OI ( T o u r s , 1920), pp. 3-5.

de la Négociation

du Concordat

de

32

THE CONCORDAT

OF 1801

Pius VII had never been in any sense a rigorist in his opposition to the Revolution; he was hardly even a royalist. While he was bishop of Imola he had published a homily in which he asserted that the democratic principles of the French Revolution were not in opposition to the maxims of the Gospel.14 Indeed, he had gone as far as to proclaim that the new democracy required of its subjects, virtues, which, if practiced, would make them better disciples of Jesus Christ. For this speech Pius VII was sometimes called a Jacobin." Since he had no conscientious scruples against the political constitution of France, and as he knew well the serious divisions in the ranks of the Papal party, the Pope considered he was well advised for one compelling reason to make an agreement with Bonaparte. When the first overture was made to him, Pius VII had just returned to Rome under the very dubious protection of Austria. The French victory at Marengo had greatly shaken the ability of Austria to continue her support and it looked as if he must return to exile. The notes of the startling Te Deum at the Cathedral of Milan, after the battle of Marengo, accompanied by the First Consul's dramatic outburst, " I have spoken to the patriots, let your priests say 23 On the religious situation in France in 1799 vide Mourret, F., Histoire Générale de l'Église (Paris, 1919, 2nd ed.), torn, vii, pp. 282-294 24

Artaud, M. Le Chevalier, Histoire du Pape Pie VII (Paris, 1837. 2nd ed.), torn, i, p. 69. The following extract is taken from the famous homily, " La forme du gouvernement démocratique adoptée parmi vous, ô très-cher s frères, non, n'est pas en opposition avec les maximes exposées ci-dessus, et ne repugne pas à l'Evangile ; elle exige au contraire toutes les vertus sublimes qui ne s'apprennent qu'à l'école de J. C. et Pratiquées par vous, formeront votre felicité, la gloire et l'esprit de votre république " 25 Nielsen quotes Ruffo as calling Chiaramonti a Jacobin like himself and thought he would be the right man for Pope. The History of the Papacy in the XIX Century (trans, under the direction of A. J . Mason. London, 1906), vol. i, p. 206.

ON THE

EVE

OF THE

CONCORDAT

33

the Mass was a clear challenge for a change of Papal policy toward the French Revolution. Since those upon whom the Papacy depended for protection were proving frail supports, was it not possible that France might be made to assume again her proud title, the eldest daughter of the Church, and " cease from repudiating her past " ? 27 Other motives of a more doubtful nature have been imputed to Pius V I I . Debidour, a rather harsh critic of the Roman See, puts forward the idea that the Papacy saw an excellent opportunity to inflict a mortal wound upon its old enemy, Gallican liberty. It is his opinion that Pius V I I really desired that his hand be forced, and for obvious reasons : " that the First Consul in recognizing the Papal authority to depose bishops without canonical faults should imprudently destroy one of the last guarantees of episcopal freedom against the disciplinary absolutism of the Papacy." 24 But it is quite evident that this is merely a conjecture as to the unrevealed thoughts in the Pope's head, since, publicly at least, he made a firm show of resisting the First Consul's demand that all the bishops of France should be compelled to resign their sees.2'

(7) The objectives of the Pope, on the whole, seem quite clear, but the policy of the First Consul was not so transparent at the opening of the negotiations. His old Jacobin friends were shocked that he should consider making any terms, however advantageous, with what they considered the arch28 Boulay de la Meurthe, Documents sur la Négociation du Concordat et sur les outres Rapports de la France avec le Saint-Siège en 1800 et iSoi (Paris, 1891-1897), tom. i, p. 21.

"Ibid., introd., pp. v-vi. 28 Debidour, Α., Histoire des Rapports de l'Église et de l'État en France de 1789 à 1870 (Paris, 1911, 2nd ed.), p. 199.

^ Vide infra, ch. ii, p. 43.

THE

34

CONCORDAT

OF 1801

enemy of democratic nationalism. Undoubtedly Bonaparte, if he had followed his own personal preferences, would have chosen the Constitutional Church. But this ill-starred body had never from the beginning been able to secure any large following in France. The Reign of Terror, which had visited relentless persecution upon Catholic priests, had proven an even greater scourge to the new ecclesiastical organization. The latter, but for a few notable exceptions, had not shown itself the stuff that martyrs are made o f , and many of its members abjured their faith. A f t e r the more violent days of the Revolution, a goodly number of its priests repented of their schism from the Catholic communion, and deserted to their old faith. Boulay de la Meurthe estimates that by 1796 the Constitutionals numbered no more than seven thousand members; in some Departments there were only two hundred adherents, in others, only ten.40 Furthermore, those who persevered with the new organization were a difficult flock to manage, since they were a proud remnant in whom " the spirit of presbyterianism and democracy would brook no interference " 81 from episcopal overseers. Much to his dismay, Grégoire found that the Jansenist spirit was the chief obstacle to his practical desire to centralize and strengthen the Church of his dreams. Boulay de la Meurthe thinks that he would have shown the qualities of " the chief of a sect" a2 if but given a chance. The opportunity, however, was never to present itself. He made an attempt to gain a strategical advantage over the non-jurors in the early days of the Consulate by summoning a Constitutional Council at Paris, which was to meet annually. This Council was in session during the negotiations for the Con30

Boulay, Histoire, pp. 6-7.

S1

Ibid., p. 8.

« Ibid., p. 15.

ON THE EVE OF THE

CONCORDAT

35

cordat, and was continually urging all true Catholics to unite with it as the only legitimate church of France. Bonaparte, for purposes of his own, permitted the Constitutional Council to proceed with its labors unmolested, even while he was closeted with representatives of the Pope. He knew well that when this so-called Church was no longer useful to him as a cause of embarrassment and a standing threat to the Pope, he could easily make an end of it ; for the very basis of its foundation was that religion and church government were state matters. When the state saw fit to repudiate it, there was no other alternative for it but to make as graceful an exit as possible. T h e principles of this Church were admittedly satisfactory to Bonaparte; he frankly stated that " they had good maxims, but no reputation." Moreover, according to him, " they had a great many priests" but " f e w of the faithful." 33 O n these grounds, because of lack of numbers and popularity, he could only cast toward them a regretful sidelong glance and then turn to the more hopeful task of attempting to mould those who still adhered to the See of Rome into a subservient national church. T h o u g h this remnant of the old Gallican Church was but a pale shadow of the proud body which had once been unquestionably acknowledged as the First Estate of the realm, it had regained an influence in France which the First Consul was quick to perceive. Boulay de la Meurthe, who has furnished some interesting statistics on its strength at this time, estimates that exiles for the Church amounted to about twenty-five thousand souls. O f the eighty-eight surviving bishops of the ancient regime, three had been lost by desertion to the Revolution, twelve continued in France, and seventy-three others were dispersed throughout Europe, 33

Boulay, Documents,

torn, i, p. 269.

36

THE

CONCORDAT

OF 1801

especially in England and the Empire.84 However, neither those bishops nor their congregations were united in their opposition to the new regime in France.45 There were moderates and rigorists, and the oath of fidelity demanded by the government in 1800, in the words of Latreille, had set " bishop against bishop, priest against priest, faithful against faithful," and created a division which " extended from the summit of the hierarchy down to the lowest step of the ladder." " One would have expected Bonaparte to have been loath to reestablish a body so badly rent asunder, but he probably welcomed a division which gave him a commanding position as a peacemaker and an opportunity, by the very fact of the internecine strife, to create out of the fragments a church according to his heart's desire. In France the moderates were in the majority, and to them the devout of France were turning for spiritual nourishment. It is Boulay de la Meurthe's estimate that the number of faithful at the debut of the Consulate was about triple that of the Constitutionals."7 If Bonaparte could gain the loyalty of this group he would then have a strong moderate nucleus which would become imbued with his own national views and about which he would endeavor to build up a Gallican communion to serve as the chief bulwark and adornment to a Napoleonic dynasty, as the old Gallican Church had formerly served the Bourbons. Moreover, the First Consul seems to have been sincerely convinced that any well organized state must have a reputable religion, in order to explain or soften the injustices and 84

Boulay, Histoire, p. 17. A clear and brief account of the conflicting points of view within the party loyal to the Pope is found in Desdevises du Dezert, G., L'Église et l'État en France (Paris, 1907), tom. i, pp. 328-346. 85

" Latreille, op. cit., p. 75. 17

Boulay, Histoire, p. 22.

ON THE EVE OF THE

CONCORDAT

37

inequalities which he regarded as innate in any f o r m of social organization.

I n a conversation at Malmaison in A u g u s t ,

1800, he makes clear to some philosophic friends their error in t r y i n g to conceive a society without religion.

H e asks

them, " H o w can there be any order in the state without r e l i g i o n ? " " S o c i e t y , " he says, " c a n n o t exist without inequalities of fortune and the inequality of fortune is not able to be maintained without religion."

T o make this

assertion clear to mentally confused metaphysicians, he gives them a graphic example of the rôle that religion plays in society : When a man dies of hunger alongside another who is glutting himself, it is impossible to explain to him this difference if there is not present an authority who can say to the dying man, " God has willed it so ; it is necessary that there be both poor and rich in the world, but afterwards in eternity the sharing shall be otherwise. . . . In the same conversation he asserted that, since religion is absolutely necessary, any wise government will see that it is master of its priests. fear f r o m them.

If not, he held that it has much to

T o leave them " to one side and not be

interested in them when they are tranquil and arrest them when they become agitators " seemed about as sensible to the First Consul as " saying there are some men with lighted torches about the house, leave them alone ; if they set it on fire, arrest them." " In all this Bonaparte did not have a very high opinion of the integrity of the priests w h o were to be so useful to him in his avowed object of getting France back into a conventional frame of mind.

H e w a s quite frank as to the means

by which he hoped to bind the leaders of the Church to hims e l f — t h r o u g h their pecuniary interest. 38

Boulay, Documents,

torn, i, p. 77.

A state-paid Church,

38

THE CONCORDAT

OF 1801

he felt, would do the bidding of the government and avoid any fear of intractable clergy. The Concordat of 1801 was to be, in the eyes of the First Consul, a substantial contribution to the social tranquility of France. It was probably designed also to aid in a far-reaching scheme of world domination. But this is a topic that can be more fully dealt with in a later chapter.

C H A P T E R II T H E NEGOTIATIONS FOR T H E CONCORDAT

(0 AN old yellow letter recently discovered in the archives of the Vatican is probably the earliest record extant on the overtures for the Concordat of 1801. It is addressed to Pius V I I and signed by Cardinal Martiniana. Boulay de la Meurthe was unable to find this letter when making his exhaustive collection of documents, but Mathieu, with the aid of Rinieri of the Civiltà Cattolica, discovered several official papers connected with the Concordat that had escaped the notice of Boulay de la Meurthe. Among them was the letter of Cardinal Martiniana which appeared, translated into French, for the first time in 1903. 1 It was written from Verceil, dated June 26, 1800, and gave the gist of a conversation that the cardinal had had with Bonaparte, who stopped off at Verceil on his way to Paris after the battle of Marengo. Beginning with a eulogy of the famous warrior, Martiniana unburdens himself of the remarkable ideas that Bonaparte had in view for the future of the Church in France. The First Consul revealed to him that he would like at this time to be completely rid of the old Gallican Church and with the aid of the Pope make a new start in France. Bonaparte gave as his reason for this drastic act the fact that the émigré bishops who remained in exile were " for the most part animated not by pure zeal for religion but by temporal interests and views," while Constitutionals, on the other hand, would not even bear discussion. Therefore, it will be necessary to 1

Mathieu, Cardinal, Le Concordat de 1801 (Paris, 1904, 2nd ed.), p. 2. 39

THE CONCORDAT

4°

OF 1801

choose new bishops by " the power which exercises the sovereignty in the nation the Pope f r o m whom " they shall receive their mission and their bulls, reserving to himself the right of canonical institution." The First Consul was of the opinion that the lands which had been alienated from the Church during the Revolution could not be touched because of the confusion and anger that would result in the attempt to take them from their present owners several times removed from the first confiscation. But, in compensation, he thought that the national treasury could finance the Church, if the number of bishoprics were sufficiently reduced. 1 Such, in brief, were the contents of Martiniana's letter, which Pius V I I must have read with the keenest interest and joy. It is important, since it embodied almost completely a rough outline of the reconciliation between the French government and the Holy See which finally became official in the Concordat of 1801. (2)

It is well to keep in mind the circumstances prevailing at the Papal Court during the whole period of the negotiations. French soldiers were stationed just beyond the limits, and sometimes on the possessions of the Holy See. T h e army was a standing threat to the Pope and put him in the embarrassing position of seeming to yield to physical pressure. Boulay de la Meurthe repudiates the charge that the First Consul presumed to any great extent on his military advantage (Talleyrand he considers the villain of the piece), but he admits that it is true that Bonaparte took many liberties with private despatches between the Roman See and its envoys. The latter, therefore, worked in an atmosphere of suspicion and delay, since they could not trust the French 2

Ibid., pp. 3-5.

THE NEGOTIATIONS

FOR THE

CONCORDAT

post, and the impoverished state of the Pontifical exchequer forbade the expense of private couriers and compelled the Pope's advisers to rely upon friends who were traveling between Rome and Paris, to carry back and forth their most confidential messages.® The spirit of the courts at both Rome and Paris was openly hostile to any accommodation between them. The advisory body which should naturally have assisted the Pope and his secretary of state in their very delicate and unprecedented task was the old Congregation created in September, 1790, to examine the Civil Constitution of the clergy decreed by the National Assembly. It was not a hopeful body to turn to for unprejudiced advice, since it was inclined to brood upon past grievances, and was, at the same time, too large and unwieldly to consult in a negotiation in which hasty and vital decisions were not unlikely to be the order of the day.4 The Papal secretary, Consalvi, decided that it would be necessary to have on hand a smaller and picked company which could be summoned together at a moment's notice; and so, on July 28, he obtained from the Pope a Pontifical decree, nominating five cardinals, five bishops and an equal number of trained theologians or advisers on special questions. This new advisory group was known as the Little Congregation.® (3) Upon Monsignor Spina, archbishop of Corinth, fell the task of representing the Roman See in Paris. He was regarded as particularly well informed on French political affairs, having lived for a time in Paris and being personally known to Bonaparte. His chief instructions for negotiating 3

Boulay, Documents, introd., pp. xxii-xxiii.

4

Boulay, Histoire, p. 104.

5

Ibid·, p. 105.

THE

42

CONCORDAT

OF 1801

were to remember " the privileges indispensable to the carrying on of the Catholic cult " and to secure a true recognition of the jurisdiction of the Church in France.* In other words, to make clear to his French colleagues that the Church " should constitute and maintain itself a society, in such a manner as to accomplish freely and fully here below its spiritual mission." 7 When Spina arrived in the French capital, it did not take him long to discover that the First Consul was about the only official connected with the government there who really desired a concordat. The latter had considerable difficulty in finding a satisfactory negotiator who would carry on with anything resembling an open mind. Talleyrand, the secretary of state, was secretly hostile, and he hoped to wear out Bonaparte's patience by overwhelming him with the intricacies of the Roman doctrine.8 Bonaparte had first turned to Grégoire as a probable plenipotentiary, but Port Royal still rankled in the latter's mind and the First Consul was compelled to listen to a long harangue on ecclesiastical government from a Jansenist point of view.' It was soon clear to Bonaparte that Grégoire's principles were too rigidly fixed for him to be helpful in the delicate task of reconciling the French nation with the Holy See. At last he hit upon Bernier, a refractory priest, who had played a prominent part in the royalist uprising in La Vendée. This priest was a man of great personal ambition who had perceived an opening for advancement by early attaching himself to the rising star of France. The First Consul asked Talleyrand to estimate Bernier's qualities. The latter's estimate was favorable 8

Ibid., p. 125-

T

Ibid., pp. 125-126.

8

Boulay, Documents,

9

introd., p. xxii.

Grégoire gives his own account of the conversation in his Essai Historique sur les Libertés de l'Église Gallicane (Paris, 1820), pp. 212-227.

THE NEGOTIATIONS

FOR THE

CONCORDAT

and Bernier became the diplomatic agent of the French government to treat with the representatives of the Holy See.1®

(4) It was Bernier, then, who greeted Spina when he first arrived in Paris, and began with him to round out a tentative Concordat. The French representatives were, from the outset, insistent that the bishops of the old régime be forced to resign their sees. This was no small demand to make of the Pope, since these bishops had suffered persecution because of their unswerving loyalty to the Holy See. Nor could the French government have been unaware that in asking the Pope to exercise such drastic powers it was helping the Papacy to undermine the keystone of Gallican liberty. As already observed, it has been supposed that the Pope was secretly pleased with the French insistence on this stipulation." However, Spina's eloquent plea on behalf of the old episcopate fails to give any support to such a conjecture. In a letter on the subject to Bernier, he wrote, " It would be strange indeed to hoist anew in the provinces the standard of our Holy Religion on the ruins of eighty columns of faith, overthrown and destroyed by the same arm of Peter which ought to sustain and protect them." 12 Bernier's reply to this impassioned plea sounds more like that of a good Jacobin nationalist than a Vendean rebel. He wrote with patriotic fervor : The immensity of the sacrifices that France has made during the Revolution is known to all Europe. It is not one class, not a portion of the citizens who have suffered; all have undergone 10

Boulay, Histoire, pp. 165-166. is found in Sèche, L., Les Origines pp. 60-65.

A bitter characterization of Bernier du Concordat (Paris, 1894), torn, ii,

11

Vide supra, ch. ii, p. 33, note 29.

12

Boulay, Documents,

torn, i, p. 119.

44

THE CONCORDAT OF 1801

the necessity, often fatal, which makes the welfare of the state the first of all laws ; all have made to la Patrie the indispensable sacrifice of their arms and faculties.1" Whether the Pope really desired to accede to Bonaparte's demand or not is beside the point. On no other terms could the negotiations have proceeded. Bernier wrote directly to Pius V I I himself, and frankly informed him that " if this question is the most painful to your Holiness, it is, in the eyes of the government, the most important ", 14 and added that no treaty of peace or union could be considered until the question was settled in accordance with the wishes of Bonaparte. The second consideration that Bernier brought forth as a sine qua non, without which no profitable discussion could take place, was the abandonment by the Church of all claim to her alienated property in France. Any suggestion of its return, Bernier warned the Pope, " would arm half the nation against the Concordat." 15 Neither of these two contentious subjects was to prove, in the long run, a real impediment to an agreement. However, the next issue was less easily disposed of. It concerned the Constitutional bishops whom the Church regarded as in schism. The suggestion of Bernier that they might be automatically received into the Catholic fold by " adhering to the act or treaty of union " 16 was too simple by far. The Pope remained rigidly opposed to any reception into the Church of schismatical bishops without some show of repentance for their errors ; while Bonaparte, on the other hand, was equally firm in preventing any humiliation of his former revolutionary colleagues. This was a problem that was never satisfactorily solved. Bernier used all his ingenuity to break the 13

i, p. 1 2 1 .

14

i, p. 309.

Ibid., torn, Ibid., torn, li Ibid., torn, 18 Ibid., torn,

i, p. 3 1 3 . i, p. 3 1 5 .

THE NEGOTIATIONS

FOR THE

CONCORDAT

impasse, but, after he had proclaimed that he had secured an abjuration of errors from the Constitutionals, which he was delegated to deliver to the Pope, some of them denied ever having agreed to it." It has been suggested by Debidour that the desire for a cardinal's hat had something to do with the suspicious circumstances surrounding this dubious act on the part of Bernier.18 After much sparring between the Roman and French representatives, a concordat, called the Fifth Project, was finally agreed upon and sent to Rome. It had really been dictated by the First Consul and embraced the general ideas he had formerly confided to Cardinal Martiniana.1® The draft was found unacceptable at Rome for many reasons. The French government was informed that the Pope could not, in any way, seem to approve of laws relating to divorce; the marriage of priests must be denounced; the Church did not wish to legalize the sale of effects of the clergy; nor would the Pope confirm the appointment of bishops and priests who had been consecrated without his consent. The Sacred College also would not hear of the organization of a French national ecclesiastical council whose decisions in the affairs of the Church in France were to be supreme and independent of the Pope. Bonaparte had assumed that his project would be immediately accepted by the Roman See. He was much taken aback when the Fifth Project was returned to him, a drastically altered document.10 Talleyrand was directed to inform Cacault, the French agent at Rome, that the gov17

On this transaction vide d'Haussonville, Comte, L'Église Romaine et le Premier Empire (Paris, 1868), torn, i, pp. 201-205. 18 Debidour, op. cit., p. 225. 19 The Fifth Project is given in full in Boulay, Documents, torn, i, p. 351· 20 The Contre-Projet is listed as Doc. No. 400 in Boulay, Documents, torn, ii, p. 268. It was sent to Paris, May 12, 1801.

46

THE

CONCORDAT

OF 1801

ernment was in no mood for dilatory methods, and that this should be made clear to the Court of Rome. 21 In the letter which Talleyrand sent off, he made the protest more emphatic by pointing out that the only alternative for the Pope, failing an alliance with France, was to put his faith in the military support of two heretical nations, England and Russia. 22

(5) However, Cacault's effort to speed up the Roman diplomats was entirely unsuccessful, and it was decided that a time limit had to be set to their parleys. Bernier was called upon to inform Consalvi that the First Consul's patience was utterly exhausted. " He has charged me," wrote Bernier, " to say to your Eminence that all unnecessary delay shall be imputed to the Holy See; that he will regard it as an overt rupture, and will therefore occupy the estates of the Holy See under title of conquest." And while making this military threat, the letter reaffirmed in no uncertain terms the points to which the Papacy had taken exception in Bonaparte's project ; namely, that the First Consul was determined to have a " clergy submissive and faithful to the government ", and that those who had accumulated Church lands must have no reason to fear for their titles. Most emphatic of all these reiterations was that the article on the nomination to the new bishoprics was to be expressed in the following words: " H i s Holiness shall not recognize any titularies of bishoprics retained in France other than those who shall be designated such by the First Consul." 23 Having given this frank warning to Consalvi, Bernier sent some fresh interpretations of the Fifth Project to Cacault, who was to deliver them to the Papal secretary along with the 21

Ibid., torn, ii, p. 400.

22

Ibid., torn, ii, p. 401.

23

Ibid., torn, ii, p. 402.

THE NEGOTIATIONS

FOR THE

CONCORDAT

f o l l o w i n g ultimatum : " that i f , a f t e r the delay of five days, the Pope has not adopted, without modification, the t w o aforesaid projects, m y presence at R o m e becomes useless in the chief object of m y mission and I shall be obliged in virtue of m y orders to retire to Florence."

24

T h e arrival of this ultimatum threw the R o m a n C o u r t into despair.

It w a s considered impossible f o r the Church

to yield to Bonaparte's threats.

Five days was too short a

time f o r a courier to reach Paris and return to Rome. Cacault would have been compelled to leave in the interval and thus would have automatically brought the negotiations to an end. It w a s the French representative w h o finally found a w a y out of the difficulty.

H e suggested, upon his o w n responsi-

bility, that Consalvi should leave Rome in an open carriage with himself, thus avoiding the appearance of a final rupture, and then the cardinal secretary should proceed to Paris to endeavor there to make Bonaparte see wherein his requests were in conflict with fundamental ecclesiastical government. 2 8 T h i s plan was successfully carried out.

(6) Cardinal Consalvi reached Paris on the night of June 20, and f r o m then on strenuous efforts were put forth to find formulae which would dissipate the fears of partisans of both Church and state f o r what they considered inalienable rights and liberties. B e f o r e Consalvi arrived in Paris, the Roman CounterP r o j e c t had been the subject of among the French diplomats.

considerable

discussion

Bernier had reported on it

rather favorably to the First Consul, admitting, however, that the Pope's objections to the divorce clauses in the F i f t h 24

Ibid.,

torn, ii, p. 459.

25

Ibid.,

torn, ii, p. 478.

THE

48

CONCORDAT

OF 1801

Project must somehow be overcome. " One must," he wrote to Bonaparte, " even now with the reestablishment of religion allow the continuance of this law, which I as a priest am far from approving; but its suppression at this moment would not be politically expedient." 26 He thought that his Holiness might be made to drop his rigid attitude if it were impressed upon him that the Emperor Justinian and Joseph I I of Austria were Catholics and both of them had permitted divorce. The friendly attitude of Bernier toward the Counter-Project was not shared by Talleyrand. He was quite emphatic in his objection to the demand of the Holy Father, that " the government declare itself Catholic and promise to conserve the purity of the dogmas of religion." The request on dogmas, he held, " appertains to the ecclesiastical minister and it is ridiculous that the civil power declare publicly its consent to this responsibility." Furthermore, he would listen to no complaints about the spoliation of Church property, cynically remarking that " the Church has been despoiled in all ages and the spoliators have only been punished when they were weak." 27 Nevertheless, when Consalvi entered upon his duties in Paris, the French government had sufficiently relented to give him a revised project 2 8 to work upon, but he was allowed only five days to accept or reject it. Despite all the hints for speed, the undaunted secretary began to make many changes in the Sixth Project. After the words, " The Catholic religion is the religion of the great majority of the French citizens," he suggested adding, " Its cult shall be free and public; and every act of government contrary to these dispositions is annulled or regarded as null." Nor did he 2e

Ibid., torn, iii, p. 7.

27

Ibid., torn, iii, pp. 25-27.

se

Listed as Doc. No. 564 Boulay, op. cit., torn, iii, p. 59.

THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE CONCORDAT

approve of designating the sees held by non-resigning bishops as réputés vacants. He was meticulous about such phrases as " with the approbation of the government," for which he substituted " in concert with the government." Furthermore, he was insistent that the First Consul, who was going to nominate the new bishops, must declare himself a Catholic." Out of these suggestions, and counter-suggestions put forth by the French representatives, was evolved a Seventh Project.*0 But this one also proved unacceptable to Consalvi, and he again drew up a counter memorial which Bernier thought was reasonable ; in which opinion, surprisingly enough, Talleyrand concurred. (7) It looked as if the arduous struggle for an agreement was about over, but domestic circumstances in Paris suddenly created a new state of affairs. Grégoire and his Constitutional brethren had called together a second National Council at Paris ; they were urging great caution upon Bonaparte, and especially warned him that he must not barter away Gallican liberties, which, they asserted, it was their duty to guard. They loudly proclaimed that they taught " as an incontestable verity that faithfulness, submission and obeisance to established powers is a duty based on natural and divine rights." In this same declaration of July 4, 1801 they laid it down that " the commandment to honor one's father and mother encloses the obligation to love the Fatherland and to defend it against its enemies; to obey its laws and to contribute to public expenses." 11 This was clearly an open bid for the favor of the First Consul and it must have ™ Ibid., torn, iii, pp. 118-120. s