The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: An Insider's Perspective 9781503625679

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the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty

keith a. hansen

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty An Insider’s Perspective

s t a n f o r d l aw a n d p o l i t i c s an imprint of stanford university press stanford, california 2006

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2006 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. Foreword © 2006 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hansen, Keith A. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty : an insider’s perspective / Keith A. Hansen. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8047-5303-2 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996) 2. Nuclear weapons— Testing—Law and legislation. I. Title. KZ5680.41996.H36 2006 341.7'34—dc22

2005033154

Original Printing 2006 Last figure below indicates year of this printing: 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 Typeset by Classic Typography in 10/14 Janson Special discounts for bulk quantities of Stanford Law and Politics are available to corporations, professional associations, and other organizations. For details and discount information, contact the special sales department of Stanford University Press. Tel: (650) 736-1783, Fax: (650) 736-1784

To my mother and father, and to my wife, Marji

Contents

Foreword Ambassador Thomas Graham

ix xiii

Acknowledgements

xv

Abbreviations and Acronyms

xvii

Preface Introduction

1

1.

Early Efforts to Limit Nuclear Testing

5

2.

Negotiations, Part 1



A Unique Historical Opportunity for the CTBT

14

3.

Negotiations, Part 2



Challenges Emerge

23

4.

Negotiations, Part 3



End Game—India Bolts

38

5.

Implementation, Part 1



Ratifications and Establishing the PrepCom

46

6.

Implementation, Part 2



Bumps in the Road

59

7.

Implementation, Part 3



Impact of Change in U.S. Policy

67

8. 9.

Implications of Alternative CTBT Futures for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

75

Conclusion

79

appendices a.

Chronology of Efforts to Ban the Testing of Nuclear Weapons

85

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contents

appendices, continued b. c.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Text

87

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) CTBT Resolution and Voting Record, September 10, 1996

180

Resolution Establishing the CTBT Preparatory Commission

182

Some Lessons Learned from CTBT Negotiations and Implementation

196

f.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Text

201

g.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document

209

Proliferation Security Initiative Fact Sheet

217

UN Security Council Resolution 1540

221

Bibliography

227

Index

231

About the Author

233

d. e.

h. i.

Foreword

Until the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and its entry into force in 1970, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state was an important achievement providing national esteem that nations were not willing to forgo. By referenda Switzerland twice voted to build nuclear weapons, Sweden had an active program, and the minority white regime of South Africa actually built six nuclear weapons. And a number of other countries explored the nuclear weapon option. As a result, there was serious concern in the 1960s that nuclear weapons would simply sweep all over the world with unimaginable security consequences. But the NPT changed all that; it converted what had been an act of national pride into an act contrary to international law. It became the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, which has served us well by severely limiting nuclear proliferation over the past 35 years. Only a few countries have actually crossed the nuclear weapon threshold. But the NPT was founded on a central bargain. Most of the world—now some 182 countries—agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons, while the five NPT-authorized nuclear weapon states (i.e., China, France, United Kingdom, United States, and the Soviet Union) agreed to share peaceful nuclear technology and engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations aimed at the eventual elimination of their arsenals. From the very beginning it was clear that the non-nuclear weapon states looked at a permanent ban on nuclear testing as the litmus test of whether the nuclear weapon states would live up to their side of that bargain, thereby upholding the political balance of the treaty. Unfortunately, despite the brilliant negotiating efforts by the United States and like-minded countries, which is so effectively described in Keith Hansen’s book, to this day no comprehensive test ban is in force.

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foreword

The attempts to bring a halt to nuclear weapon testing go far back into the nuclear age to the mid-1950s. Indeed, it was the first effort made to bring the nuclear arms race under control. A complete ban on nuclear testing was nearly achieved in the early 1960s, but it failed over the inability of the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on verification arrangements to monitor underground nuclear tests. So instead a more limited agreement was reached to prohibit tests under the sea, in outer space, and in the atmosphere, thereby solving the environmental problems of fission byproducts from nuclear tests’ finding their way into the food chain. But this limited ban did nothing to control the arms race. Having gone underground, nuclear weapon tests greatly increased in number, and for 30 years no progress on the testing issue was made, much to the strong objection of many of the NPT’s non-nuclear weapon states. However, in 1993 following the end of the Cold War, the five nuclear weapon states agreed to enter negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) in Geneva at the UN-affiliated Conference on Disarmament. In 1995, in order to achieve the permanent extension of the NPT, the nuclear weapon states pledged to achieve a CTBT by 1996. As a result of vigorous leadership by the United States, as well as important contributions by other countries, the negotiations were concluded in August 1996. The last-minute objections of India were circumvented, and the Treaty was signed at the United Nations by 156 countries, the United States being the first. Unfortunately, nearly 10 years later, the CTBT has not yet come into force, and its prospects for doing so are not bright. By the terms of the Treaty, 44 nations including the five nuclear weapon states must sign and ratify for it to enter into force. Thirty-three of the 44 have ratified it, including Britain, France and Russia. However, after a cursory review and in a partisan action, the U.S. Senate rejected the Treaty in 1999. China appears to be waiting for the United States to take the first step; and India, North Korea and Pakistan, which are also included in the list of 44 countries essential for entry into force, show no willingness to join the Treaty. The current U.S. Administration continues to support the existing worldwide nuclear test moratorium and the establishment of the CTBT’s International Monitoring System, but it has stated that it does not intend to support ratification of the Treaty.

foreword

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That the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is very much in the national security interest of the United States is without question. The United States leads the world in nuclear weapon technology by a considerable margin having conducted more nuclear weapon tests than the rest of the world combined. With its advanced technology as well as the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program—a large-scale U.S. Government program designed to maintain the integrity of the nuclear stockpile—the U.S. nuclear stockpile will remain safe and reliable for the indefinite future without testing. A permanent worldwide ban on nuclear testing would inhibit the ability of so-called rogue states to develop types of nuclear weapons that could be mated to long-range ballistic missiles thereby threatening the United States. And it would prevent Russia and China from developing new types of more sophisticated weapons and thereby catching up to the United States in capability. The Treaty is effectively verifiable with the vast International Monitoring System being built pursuant to the Treaty working in conjunction with the national technical monitoring systems of individual countries. Of course, in verifying a zero yield ban there will always be uncertainties, but the redundancies being built into the worldwide network will give sufficient assurance of effective verification and will inhibit cheating. By adhering to the test moratorium but not supporting entry into force of the Treaty, the United States is forgoing the considerable verification advantages of the CTBT’s worldwide monitoring system, which can function fully only after the Treaty enters into force. Moreover, the test ban is essential to the political balance of the NPT and the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. This important regime may simply come apart at some point in the future to the detriment of everyone, unless all available nonproliferation tools—including the test ban—are supported and utilized. Keith Hansen was a man on the inside. We have worked together in various negotiations during the past 30 years, and he has contributed to U.S. and international efforts to strengthen nuclear test monitoring capabilities for the past decade. He served as a key member of the U.S. Delegation in Geneva and in Vienna in both the CTBT negotiation and early implementation phase. As a result, he knows the issues better than almost anyone and effectively takes us through all the key events and issues in his book. In addition,

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Mr. Hansen explores alternative futures for the nuclear test ban in a comprehensive fashion and analyzes their implications for the future of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. All those who are interested in nuclear nonproliferation issues and the future security of the United States will find this excellent book of value. ambassador thomas graham

Acknowledgements

The opportunity to serve on several U.S. arms control delegations over the past 30 years has been one of the privileges of my professional career. While serving on the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in the mid 1990s and subsequently on the U.S. Mission to the CTBT Preparatory Commission, I strove to contribute to U.S. and international capabilities to monitor for nuclear explosions as one aspect of the effort to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although the story of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a mixed one, I salute those with whom I served, including the many fine professionals and colleagues on other delegations and on the Secretariat staffs who facilitated our negotiations. The decision to write this book was in response to requests by several colleagues, friends, and relatives who wanted to know more about how an international arms control negotiation is conducted and specifically how the CTBT ended up in its current situation. It is not possible to tell all, but I have tried to include the highlights of the negotiation and implementation activities as I witnessed and participated in them. It necessarily represents only the time that I was personally involved, although I have tried to ensure that any generalizations remain current. There is always some risk of being overtaken by events when characterizing a situation that is dynamic and subject to unexpected twists and turns of national and international politics. My objective has been to write an account that is informative to the general public, instructive to students of international relations, and helpful to those charged with formulating and executing U.S. nuclear counter-proliferation policies. I dedicate this book to my mother and late father in gratitude for their lifelong encouragement and support; and to my wife, whose faithful love,

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acknowledgements

support, and flexibility over the last four decades has made it possible for me to participate in several important negotiations. In addition, I want to thank one of my aunts, Glenna Pickford, for her encouragement and careful editing of my prose. And I am deeply grateful to Amb George Bunn, MG William Burns (USA, Ret.), Dr. Sidney Drell, Amb Thomas Graham, and Dr. Norman Naimark for their collegial review of the manuscript and encouragement to seek its publication. Tom Graham, who served in the 1990s as Special Assistant to the President for Arms Control and has authored three books on arms control, graciously provided the Foreword for the manuscript. Finally, I thank Amanda Moran, Jared Smith, Mariana Raykov, and their colleagues at Stanford University Press for patiently and cheerfully guiding me through the publication process.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

The following are the terms most commonly used when talking about CTBT issues that appear in the text: ABM Treaty

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

ACDA

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

AFTAC

U.S. Air Force Tactical Applications Center

BWC

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

CD

Conference on Disarmament

CTBT

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

CTBTO

CTBT Organization

CWC

Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

EIF

Entry into force

FMCT

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

G–21

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members of the CD

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IDC

International Data Center

IMS

International Monitoring System

INF

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

LTBT

Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

NAM

Non-Aligned Movement

NNWS

Non-Nuclear Weapon States

NPT

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NTM

National Technical Means of Verification

xvi

abbreviations and acronyms

NTS

Nevada Test Site

NWFZ

Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone

NWS

Nuclear Weapon States

OSI

On-Site Inspections

P–5

Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council

PNET

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty

PSI

Proliferation Security Initiative

PTS

Provisional Technical Secretariat

PrepCom

Preparatory Commission

SALT

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SORT

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

START

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

State Party

A country that has both signed and ratified the Treaty

State Signatory

A country that has signed but not ratified the Treaty

TTBT

Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

UNSYG

United Nations Secretary General

USAEDS

United States Atomic Energy Detection System

Preface

The nuclear nonproliferation regime, undergirded by the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) and a host of other international agreements and initiatives, has been generally effective over the past three-plus decades in slowing, and in some cases halting, the spread of nuclear weapons. Although a small number of countries have chosen during this period to acquire nuclear weapons, the number is smaller than many feared would be the case forty years ago. And while a few countries have refused to commit to the regime and several others have clandestinely attempted to circumvent the constraints to which they had agreed, a greater number of countries have halted their nuclear weapons programs. Indeed, several countries (i.e., Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine) have voluntarily given up their stockpiles of nuclear weapons (Stumpf 1995/1996). And in some regions, countries have created nuclear-weapon-free zones to further inhibit the spread of, and therefore the danger from, nuclear weapons. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is designed to ban any type of nuclear explosion in any environment in any location, was negotiated both as a nuclear disarmament effort and as a contribution to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It represents one of the longest-sought and hardest fought prizes in the history of arms control. But problems encountered during its negotiation and implementation demonstrate how international and domestic political and security considerations can undermine what would seem to most people to be an important and useful contribution to international security. Although there are risks in writing before the full CTBT episode has been played out, the ironies of the Treaty’s history to date are worthy of examination. Despite consistent calls over the decades by non-nuclear weapon states

xviii

preface

(NNWS) for a ban on nuclear testing, the actions of India—one of the most vocal NNWS on this issue—almost prevented the successful conclusion of the negotiation. And despite the forceful and critical leadership of the United States in pushing the international community toward a consensus on the CTBT, subsequent actions by the United States along with those of other countries are impeding the Treaty’s entry into force and, thus, its hoped-for contribution to the nuclear nonproliferation regime and to nuclear disarmament. Politicians and experts, especially in the United States, continue to debate the pros and cons of the CTBT and differ on its potential contribution to international security. After all, the Treaty is quite limited in its scope; unlike the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it does not prevent countries from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons, expanding their arsenals, or using such weapons. It simply bans nuclear explosions (i.e. the “bang” not the “bomb”). However modest its potential contribution, it is difficult to deny that the absence of the Treaty, especially when accompanied by actions of several countries that are inconsistent with it, undermines the increasingly fragile international norm against the spread of nuclear weapons (Bunn 2003). At a time when there appears to be general adherence to a series of national moratoria on nuclear explosive testing, it is important to understand why the Treaty has experienced such difficulties and continues to travel such a bumpy road. The issues involved are complex; regional tensions, rivalries, and insecurities lead some countries to pursue nuclear weapons. Moreover, domestic politics can at times override efforts to support international norms and agreements, such as a ban on nuclear testing, that at least to some would appear to increase national security. Clearly, there are differences of view regarding the value of the CTBT. It is useful, therefore, to look ahead and explore alternative future prospects for the CTBT and their implications for the nuclear nonproliferation regime in order to gain a better understanding and to have more realistic expectations regarding the Treaty’s potential contribution to international security. The author hopes that some useful lessons can be drawn from the CTBT episode by both skeptics of the Treaty and by those who favor a permanent ban on nuclear testing. In an effort to shed light on this exploration, this analysis provides perspectives on the following four questions: (1) how and why did the CTBT evolve the way it did; (2) what are the future prospects for the CTBT; (3) how much influence are future U.S. actions and policies likely to have on the

preface

xix

CTBT’s future; and, (4) how important is the CTBT to the nuclear nonproliferation regime? The answers to these questions should be of interest to responsible citizens and serious students of proliferation and disarmament issues. The answers to the last two questions are intended to inform those who are privileged to have influence on or who have the responsibility for making U.S. nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation policy.

the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty

Introduction

From the first explosion of what eventually numbered just over two thousand nuclear weapon tests around the world, there arose mixed feelings ranging from awe to fear about what man’s scientific prowess had accomplished. While proponents of nuclear power optimistically anticipated a variety of peaceful uses, more cautious observers focused on the destructive power that was now available and the potential for an unconstrained arms race that could lead ultimately to a nuclear Armageddon. It took almost a decade of testing ever more powerful devices in a variety of locations and environments by a growing number of countries before fears also focused on the environmental and health hazards associated with such testing. Since 1945, nuclear tests have been conducted worldwide (see exhibit “Summary of Nuclear Weapons Tests” for a breakout of the total number of tests). Most of these tests were underground explosions, due in large measure to the negotiation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in the early 1960s (see Chapter 1, “Early Efforts to Limit Nuclear Testing”, p. 6 below, 1

2

introduction

SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS

United States 1,030 USSR/Russia 715 France 210 China 45 Total nuclear weapons tests

United Kingdom India Pakistan Israel/S. Africa

44 6 ? ? 2,050*

*Excludes the undetermined number of tests conducted by Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa.

for details on the LTBT). However, during the peak years of testing (immediately before and after the 1959–1960 U.S.–USSR testing moratorium), the United States and the Soviet Union conducted a large number of atmospheric tests. Each of the five original nuclear weapon states began its testing program with atmospheric explosions before shifting exclusively to underground tests (Koplow 1990). With the likely exception of Israel and South Africa, the other countries that have tested have done so underground. The United States was first to test in July 1945, before exploding two nuclear weapons over Japan to end World War II in the Pacific. Through the 1950s, U.S. tests were largely atmospheric with a few underwater. The United States tested the largest number of devices in any given year—96 (39 above ground and 57 underground) in 1962, one year after the end of the moratorium. After signature of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, all U.S. testing took place underground. The United States tested the most of any country; total U.S. tests reached 1,030 before the United States initiated a unilateral moratorium on testing in 1992. The Soviet Union tested its first nuclear device in 1949. Like the United States, most of its early tests were aboveground, but it restricted all testing to underground following signature of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Its highest number of tests was 51 in 1961 following the end of the 1959– 1960 test moratorium. However, the Soviet Union exploded the largest device of any country—50 megatons on October 30, 1962 (Seaborg 1983). By the early 1990s, when it agreed to initiate a unilateral moratorium on testing, the Soviet Union had exploded 715 devices.

introduction

3

The United Kingdom was the third country to test; its first nuclear explosion was in 1952. Its maximum number of tests per year reached seven in 1957. It, too, observed the Limited Test Ban Treaty and restricted all testing to underground after the early 1960s. Because the United Kingdom used the U.S. Nevada Test Site exclusively for its later tests, it was forced to observe the test moratorium declared by the United States in 1992. UK nuclear tests totaled 44. France joined the small but growing group of nuclear weapon states with its first test in 1960. After initially testing in Algeria, France conducted all remaining tests at its site in the Mururoa Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. France conducted atmospheric tests until the mid-1970s, when it finally signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and all subsequent tests were underground. During the CTBT negotiations, France announced that it was necessary to conduct a few more tests in order to be able to sign the indefinite, comprehensive ban. By early 1996, when it announced a unilateral moratorium, French tests totaled 210. China was the last of the original five declared nuclear weapon states and first tested in 1964. All of China’s tests have been conducted at its test site at Lop Nur in Western China. Like France, China did not restrict its testing to underground until the mid-1970s. And like France, China announced during the CTBT negotiations that it also had to conduct some additional tests before signing the Treaty. China’s tests, which ended with a unilateral moratorium in July 1996, totaled 45. India first tested a nuclear device in 1974, declaring it to be a peaceful nuclear explosion. India did not conduct any further tests until May 1998, when it announced that it had tested five nuclear devices in the Pokharan Range. In response, Pakistan later that month conducted several nuclear explosions of its own in the Chagai Hills of Western Pakistan. Islamabad has never divulged the total number of its nuclear explosions. India and Pakistan have been honoring parallel unilateral moratoria in testing since early 1999. Israel and South Africa, as discussed on pp. 55–56, are believed by many to have conducted at least one joint nuclear explosion in 1979. If true, these are the only other countries known to have conducted nuclear explosions (Cirincione 2002). The growing number of countries conducting tests and the increased size of the early detonations led to international concerns and various efforts to

4

introduction

limit, and if possible, ban all nuclear testing. This effort has had some significant measure of success, but a permanent total ban on testing still eludes the international community. Ten years ago many believed that negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) had achieved that objective and would finally serve as the capstone for international efforts to ban nuclear testing forever. This book describes the ups and downs of that effort to negotiate and implement the CTBT.

chapter one

Early Efforts to Limit Nuclear Testing

As early Cold War confrontations intensified, the Soviet Union and United States began testing increasingly powerful weapons, and fears of a possible exchange of devastating nuclear strikes increased. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), those countries refusing to align themselves with either the West or the East during the Cold War, began calling for a halt to nuclear weapons testing. In the UN in 1954, Indian Prime Minister Nehru, an early leader of the NAM, made one of the earliest and most notable public calls for the cessation of all nuclear testing (Bunn 1992). However, the intensity of the Cold War prevented the nuclear weapon states for several more decades from heeding the call. Former President Eisenhower noted his disappointment that reaching a general disarmament accord, including a ban on nuclear testing, had not been possible during his presidency (Eisenhower 1965). The level of suspicion between the primary adversaries of the Cold War and the lack of means for acceptable verification made meaningful arms control agreements, including a ban on nuclear testing, unattainable at that time. 5

6

chapter one

Limited Test Ban Treaty As knowledge of the nature and effects of fallout from the atmospheric tests of the 1950s increased, international pressure grew to take some steps to reduce the potential environmental and health hazards associated with such testing. It became apparent that no region was untouched by radioactive contamination, and the issue of continued nuclear tests drew widened and intensified international attention. Efforts to negotiate an international agreement to end nuclear tests began in the UN Disarmament Commission in May 1955, but verification and other issues prevented an agreement. In the early 1960s the negotiations switched venue to the newly formed Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. The United Kingdom, United States, and USSR took the lead and finally were able to achieve agreement in 1963 on the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which bans all subsequent testing anywhere except underground. The three countries signed the Treaty and opened it to all states for signature. Over 100 countries have signed the Treaty (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1996). Although a comprehensive ban proved to be out of reach, the LTBT prohibits a nuclear weapon test “or any other nuclear explosion” in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It also prohibits such tests or explosions underground, if they cause “radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control” the explosions are conducted. This Treaty went a considerable distance toward relieving international concerns about hazards of nuclear testing. However, the Treaty had only a limited impact on the nuclear weapon states, which continued developing and expanding their nuclear weapon capabilities and arsenals through increased underground testing. Although the nuclear weapon states never matched their pre-LTBT single-year high of over 140 tests, annual testing maintained a high rate of over 50 tests after the LTBT was signed. This rate of testing subsided only in the late 1980s (Koplow 1990). Threshold Test Ban Treaty A decade later, in 1974, the Soviet Union and United States once again bowed to international pressure and negotiated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which further restricted nuclear testing by limiting the yield

efforts to limit nuclear testing

7

of underground nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons—considerably less than the multi-megaton tests permitted under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Equally important were the initial steps taken to introduce on-site monitoring of test ranges (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1996). The TTBT took the international community one step closer to a comprehensive ban. The 150 kiloton limit prevented the full-yield testing of larger megaton-sized nuclear warheads and provided a significant limitation on the development of new large weapons. And for the first time, the United States and USSR agreed to exchange data on nuclear tests as part of the verification regime. However, neither side ratified the Treaty until 1990, following signature in 1976 of a separate agreement to govern underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (referred to in Article III of the TTBT) and agreement in 1990 on additional bilateral verification provisions that provided for limited on-site monitoring of nuclear testing. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty In preparing the TTBT, the United States and Soviet Union recognized the need to establish an appropriate agreement to govern underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, given that there is essentially no distinction between a nuclear explosive device used as a weapon and one used for peaceful purposes. Such a treaty was negotiated and signed in April 1976. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) governs all nuclear explosions carried out at locations outside the weapons test sites specified under the TTBT and restricts such explosions to the same yield limitations as under the TTBT. Such peaceful explosions are to be carried out in accordance with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty restrictions and in a way that ensures that no weapons-related benefits precluded by the TTBT are derived. The United States ratified both the TTBT and PNET in December 1990. Trilateral Comprehensive Test Ban In the late 1970s, the Carter Administration made another U.S. attempt to negotiate a trilateral comprehensive ban with the Soviet Union and United Kingdom. However, continuing suspicions among the Cold War adversaries prevented agreement, especially on the intrusive verification measures that would be required to monitor activities under a comprehensive ban. Eventually, other actions, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in

8

chapter one

late 1979, scuttled any chance of achieving the trust required to negotiate such an agreement.

Post-Cold War Euphoria No additional steps toward a comprehensive nuclear test ban were taken during the 1980s, except for the negotiation of the additional verification provisions in support of the TTBT mentioned above. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dramatic end to the Cold War brought forth renewed international calls for the end of nuclear testing along with the total elimination of existing nuclear arsenals. In the United States, such calls began to resonate in Congress, which was eager to realize a “peace dividend” from the end of the Cold War rivalry with the former Soviet Union. Unilateral Moratoria On a couple of occasions during the Cold War, the United States an/or the USSR had unilaterally declared and observed brief moratoria on testing in an effort to influence the actions of each other and the attitudes of the international community. In 1958, President Eisenhower announced a U.S. moratorium on testing, which the Soviet Union joined until it resumed testing in 1961. In 1985, General Secretary Gorbachev announced a Soviet moratorium on testing, but the United States rejected the moratorium and continued testing. The Soviets then resumed testing in early 1987 (Bunn 1992). In 1992 following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Congress passed the Exxon-Mitchell-Hatfield legislation, which required a unilateral U.S. moratorium on testing, except for safety purposes, along with a commitment to seek an international treaty banning all nuclear testing by 1996 (Lockwood 1992). Even though his Administration opposed such a moratorium, President George H. W. Bush signed the legislation and began to seek the means for maintaining the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in the absence of testing. At the time, Russia and France were already observing unilateral moratoria, and the United Kingdom could not test without U.S. permission, because the British used the Nevada Test Site for their test explosions. Of the five nuclear weapon states, only China was uncommitted to a moratorium on testing.

efforts to limit nuclear testing

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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Pursuing a permanent ban had not been a policy of either the Reagan or Bush administrations. However, with the election of the first Democratic administration in 12 years, calls for a permanent ban on testing regained senior-level policy attention, and the new Administration began seriously to explore whether the United States could live with a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. The Clinton Administration’s policy review in 1993 led to a large boost in spending for research to maintain the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in exchange for negotiating a permanent ban (Graham 2002). The new U.S. Administration, along with the leadership of the other nuclear weapon states, also had its eyes on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference scheduled for the spring of 1995. Having decided that the indefinite extension of the NPT would be the best outcome for the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the nuclear weapon states launched an uphill fight to achieve this objective. It was clear that additional promises to the non-nuclear weapon states, such as the negotiation of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), would be required. Working with like-minded countries, in 1994 the United States was able to get the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) to begin the active negotiation of such a Treaty. (See exhibit “Conference on Disarmament” for more details on this UN-affiliated international negotiating forum.) By early 1996, in response to intense international pressure, every declared nuclear weapon state had announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, except China, which announced a unilateral moratorium only after completing its test program in July of that year. Due in great measure to U.S. leadership and pressure, along with significant hard work and intense negotiations by key international players, these efforts culminated in the successful negotiation of the CTBT, which was opened for signature in late September 1996. However, as would soon be clear, decisions made and positions taken during the “end game” of the negotiations, along with subsequent actions taken by several key countries, have delayed the Treaty’s implementation and make uncertain whether the CTBT will ever enter into force. In turn, this has negatively affected the nuclear nonproliferation regime. (See exhibit “Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime” for more details on international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation.)

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chapter one

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

The CD is the single, multilateral negotiating forum for the international community to address arms control and disarmament issues. Its members may discuss or negotiate any agreement upon which they can achieve consensus. It, or one of its predecessor organizations (mentioned below), has negotiated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). During the Cold War, those countries most involved in arms control efforts sought to negotiate international agreements through small groups of nations. Initially, this involved only some of the nuclear weapon states, but later all five of the nuclear weapon states and a growing number of non-nuclear weapon states joined in. Those non-nuclear weapon states that were also part of the Non-Aligned Movement were known in the CD as the Group of 21 (G-21) countries. Although the G-21 later expanded its membership to 29 countries, it retained its original “G-21” designation. The CD, which began functioning in 1979, had an initial membership of 40 countries providing broad geographical representation. In 1996, the membership was expanded to 66 by including many of those countries that previously had been observers (UN Member States may request to participate as observers.) As of June 1996, the membership of the CD included Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe. The CD is the successor to earlier Geneva-based negotiating fora, including the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962–68—the first multinational forum to include nonaligned countries), and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969–78).

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, CONTINUED

The CD has a special relationship with the United Nations: it reports annually to the General Assembly and is supported by the UN budget and Geneva-based staff. However, it adopts its own Rules of Procedure and its own agenda. The CD conducts its work by consensus, which makes agreement on meaningful issues challenging, but it gives participating countries confidence that they can protect their interests. It also better ensures the commitment of member states to any agreements negotiated by consensus. Any treaties that are negotiated by the CD are passed to the UN General Assembly and then opened for signature.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

The nuclear nonproliferation regime came into being during the Cold War as the result of global and regional efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The “regime” represents the establishment of an international norm against the possession, testing, and proliferation of nuclear weapons and their components, such as weapons-grade fissile material. The heart of this regime has been the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was signed in 1968. Now subscribed to by 186* countries, the NPT recognizes two categories of countries: nuclear weapon states (i.e., those that had developed and exploded a nuclear weapon as of January 1, 1967), and non-nuclear weapon states (i.e., those which had not). It requires the nuclear weapon states to (1) refrain from transferring such weapons “to any recipient whatsoever,” (2) share nuclear technology with non-nuclear weapon states for peaceful purposes, and (3) reduce and eventually eliminate their weapons. In return, the non-nuclear weapon states are to refrain from developing or obtaining nuclear weapons, but they may pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such as reactors for research or for generating power. The NPT followed earlier treaties, which ban nuclear weapons in the Antarctic, Outer Space, and in Latin America. Subsequently, the NPT has been joined by other treaties codifying nuclear weapon-free zones in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific. The monitoring of nuclear

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facilities under the NPT was turned over to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which routinely inspects nuclear facilities declared by member states. The NPT calls for review conferences every five years to examine the status of implementation. These conferences have been used by the nonnuclear weapon states in large measure to hold the nuclear weapon states accountable for their obligations to share technology and to disarm. The Treaty also allowed for a one-time opportunity after 25 years to extend its duration without an amendment. The NPT would have expired in 1995; but the nuclear weapon states promised, among other things, to negotiate a CTBT in order to secure the NPT’s indefinite extension. Most countries believed that the negotiation of a CTBT would be a major contribution to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. (See Appendix G, “1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document,” Decision 2, “Principles and Objectives”, par. 4(a).) The history of the NPT has been mixed, and questions are being raised about the viability of its future. On the positive side, the international norm against nuclear proliferation has limited the number of countries that currently have nuclear weapons. However, three countries (India, Israel, and Pakistan) have never signed the NPT and have or are believed to have nuclear weapons. Because India and Pakistan developed and tested nuclear weapons only after the NPT was completed and entered into force, they are not recognized formally under the NPT as nuclear weapon states. Most observers believe that Israel also possesses nuclear weapons, but Israel has never confirmed this. Moreover, North Korea withdrew from the Treaty in early 2003, and it claims to have developed nuclear weapons. Some other countries, such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya, have clandestinely conducted nuclear weapons development activities in non-declared facilities, thus exposing a significant weakness in the Treaty. Moreover, there is no sign that the nuclear weapons states, despite considerable efforts to reduce their stockpiles, are ready to give up their nuclear weapons. Thus, the fate of the NPT remains unclear. Given the inherent limits of the NPT to prevent all nuclear proliferation, some countries have undertaken new efforts outside the NPT to prevent

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NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME, CONTINUED

or halt proliferation. The U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative is credited with having contributed to the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear weapons program (Bush 2004). And the UN Security Council recently passed Resolution 1540 calling on all states to take measures to prevent proliferation to terrorists. (See Appendix I, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540,” p. 221.) *A total of 187 countries have signed the NPT, but North Korea withdrew from the Treaty in January 2003, and Taiwan’s position was taken over by the People’s Republic of China in 1979. Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan are the only states that have never signed the Treaty.

chapter two

Negotiations, Part 1 A Unique Historical Opportunity for the CTBT

By the mid-1990s, all significant political obstacles to the negotiation of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing seemed to have dissipated. The more relaxed international security environment following the end of the Cold War made possible the collaboration between the new Russian Federation and the United States on nuclear issues. The dominant focus now was on the consolidation of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal under the control of the Russian Federation and ensuring the safety and security of Russia’s nuclear stockpile. The international community, along with many on the domestic front, wanted to pull as many teeth out of the post-Cold War “nuclear tiger” as possible. The non-nuclear weapon states, and especially the former “nonaligned” community of nations, now saw a new opportunity to pressure the five nuclear weapon states (China, France, United Kingdom, United States, and Russia) to cease testing permanently and to take more significant steps toward total nuclear disarmament.

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Momentum from the Chemical Weapons Convention One of the first international agreements to be concluded after the Cold War was the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC). Although not associated with nuclear issues, the Convention banned chemical weapons and included extensive provisions for on-site inspections—a first for the international community. Its negotiation by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) was concluded in 1992 and contributed to a general optimism that real disarmament, including nuclear, was at last possible in the new post-Cold War world. Despite many years of debate on a nuclear test ban with little to show for it, members of the CD now hoped that the Conference would prove to be an effective forum for the negotiation of a CTBT and other multilateral disarmament treaties. Pressure from Non-Nuclear Weapon States Given the momentum felt by the international community following the successful negotiation of the CWC, there was increased optimism that at long last the time was right to negotiate a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. The non-nuclear weapon states increased their collective pressure on the nuclear weapon states to cease all testing and to eliminate their nuclear weapon stockpiles. This grew in intensity as the 1995 review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came closer (Graham 2002). Article X of the NPT provided for a one-time opportunity to extend the duration of the Treaty indefinitely without requiring an amendment to the Treaty. The NPT called for review conferences every five years. But only after 25 years (i.e., 1995) after entry-into-force of the Treaty would a review conference have the authority to modify the duration of the Treaty, including the possibility of an indefinite extension. Thus, the intensity of debate over the NPT’s future increased dramatically in the few years preceding the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as countries considered the merits of extending the Treaty indefinitely as well as what leverage they might need to use or possibly might gain through such deliberations. The Clinton Administration’s 1993 decision to pursue CTBT negotiations was a major boost to those countries favoring indefinite extension of the NPT. The belief was that indefinite extension would be the best foundation for further progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament. Ironically,

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those who opposed indefinite extension (principally from the NAM faction of the non-nuclear weapon states) feared that such an extension, despite its nonproliferation benefits, would lock them into non-nuclear status forever without any guarantee of a nuclear-free world. They feared it would significantly reduce their ability to hold the nuclear weapon states accountable for their obligations under the NPT both to share their nuclear technology and to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Although other alternative extension scenarios were explored, a package agreement was proposed and finally adopted containing the following: (1) the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely; (2) a Statement of Principles and Objectives on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, which among other things called for a CTBT in 1996; and, (3) a decision to strengthen the review process (i.e., a means for the non-nuclear weapon states to hold the nuclear weapon states accountable to their Article VI disarmament obligations). The package was adopted in May 1995 by consensus. (See Appendix G, “1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document,” p. 209.) Such pressure from the non-nuclear weapon states was the outgrowth of the “grand bargain” that had been reached during the negotiation of the NPT in the late 1960s whereby the non-nuclear weapon states agreed to give up any nuclear weapon capabilities in return for a commitment by the five nuclear weapon states to refrain from transferring such weapons to any other countries, to provide expertise and technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to non-nuclear weapon states, and to eventually eliminate their nuclear arsenals. China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia, the five nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT and also known as the “P–5” (i.e., the five permanent members of the UN Security Council), began to feel the heat of their obligations under the NPT, especially the commitment under Article VI, which calls for the eventual elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. Article VI of the NPT requires each of the Parties to pursue negotiations to stop the nuclear arms race (see Appendix F, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Text,” p. 206). This Article is targeted primarily at the five nuclear weapon states (China, France, United Kingdom, United States, and Soviet Union/Russia). It was negotiated as part of the “grand bargain” with the non-nuclear weapon states, which were asked to give up the right to have

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nuclear weapon programs. This Article calls on the nuclear weapon states to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” In other articles of the Treaty, the nuclear weapon states are also called upon to assist the non-nuclear weapon states with technology and expertise to realize the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In response to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, the nonaligned members of the NPT intensified their calls for the nuclear weapon states to commit themselves to nuclear disarmament in a “time-bound framework” in an effort to regain some of the leverage they perceived they had lost by agreeing to an indefinite extension. (Note: Given that the NPT formally recognized only two classes of countries—the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states—it makes no arrangement for others, such as India and Pakistan, which have subsequently demonstrated that they possess nuclear weapons and declared themselves to be “nuclear weapon states.” These two countries, along with Israel, have never been willing to sign the NPT, most likely because of their nuclear weapon ambitions. Although all three have a limited association with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors provisions of the NPT, they have never committed their nuclear programs to the full safeguard inspection regime required by the IAEA. More recently, North Korea pulled out of the IAEA and NPT, making it the fourth “nuclear capable” country outside the NPT.) Nuclear Weapon States Circle the Wagons During the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the NAM countries, which make up the largest percentage of the non-nuclear weapon states, demanded additional steps by the P–5 toward nuclear disarmament. Although the United States and USSR/Russia had taken significant steps to reduce their arsenals during the previous 25 years, the NAM gave them little credit for their accomplishments. Following the end of the Cold War, France and the United Kingdom also began reducing their nuclear strike forces. (See exhibit “U.S.–Russian Strategic Nuclear Reductions” for more details regarding what these two countries have accomplished in nuclear disarmament over the past 35 years.)

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U.S.–RUSSIAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

After much posturing and various proposals to eliminate their nuclear arsenals in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States and USSR finally were able to begin serious discussions about limiting their strategic nuclear forces in 1969. It proved to be a slow process. Each side had to size up the other and determine how much risk to take in terms of limiting its own forces in the absence of high confidence that the other side would respond in kind. Both independently had come to the general conclusion that higher levels of deployment failed to translate into more security, but neither was willing initially to make significant concessions. Advances in remote monitoring, which became known as National Technical Means of Verification, finally gave them greater confidence that they could monitor large numbers of large weapon systems. Their early negotiating efforts capped the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defenses and intercontinental-range offensive forces through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) agreements. It was not until the 1980s, however, that actual reductions were negotiated. In 1987, the United States and USSR agreed to incorporate on-site inspections as part of their verification activities and signed the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. They gave up their entire inventories of intermediate-range and some shorter-range missiles—the first time that an entire class of weapon system had been eliminated. And by 1991, the two sides through the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I) Treaty agreed to significant reductions of about 50 percent in their deployed strategic nuclear warheads (i.e., those carried by operational intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and intercontinental-range bombers). In 1993, soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the two sides negotiated the START II Treaty, which committed

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U.S.–RUSSIAN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS, CONTINUED

them to reduce these forces further by about 40%. However, START II has never entered into force because of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty (Russia had made its ratification of this Treaty contingent upon the ABM Treaty remaining in force). The most recent treaty, Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) negotiated in 2002, sets the START II Treaty aside and commits both sides to even deeper deactivations (i.e., down to around 2,000 operationally deployed warheads by the end of this decade, although it does not require their elimination). In addition, beginning in the early 1990s both sides have unilaterally taken out of active service thousands of tactical nuclear warheads that had been deployed in Europe and Asia. Despite these remarkable reductions from the height of Cold War deployments when each side had over 10,000 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, for critics the accomplishments have not been enough. Some of the criticism from NAM countries and others is that none of these treaties has required the two sides to actually eliminate nuclear warheads along with their delivery vehicles (i.e., missiles and bombers) and missile launchers. This is true, but both sides are indeed eliminating warheads and bombs, which is a slow, costly, and tedious process. With the assistance of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Russia has deactivated some 6,000 warheads. And the Department of Energy has disassembled tens of thousands of U.S. nuclear warheads. Meanwhile, China, France, and the UK have modest numbers (only hundreds) of deployed strategic nuclear forces. The latter two countries have reduced the size of their deployed nuclear strategic forces since the end of the Cold War. China, however, continues a modest buildup of its nuclear forces and refuses to participate in any multilateral efforts to reduce such weapons until the U.S. and Russia have reduced to its level.

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To sweeten the pot, the P–5 agreed during the NPT Review and Extension Conference in May 1995 to pursue the negotiation of a CTBT and a fissile material cutoff treaty, which would ban the production of weaponsgrade fissile material. The P–5 clearly recognized the short-term utility of engaging in the negotiation of such treaties to bolster the chances of achieving the indefinite extension of the NPT. However, they struggled individually and collectively with the question of how to maintain the safety and reliability of their stockpiles under a CTBT. The United States, for example, announced following the negotiation of the CTBT that it planned to take a number of steps to bolster its stockpile stewardship program. Negotiations in the CD After nibbling at the bait in 1993, the CD finally agreed to begin serious consideration of a CTBT in 1994. It established the Ad Hoc Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban to conduct the negotiations. The first year was spent largely on technical discussions in an effort to discern how to characterize a total ban and how to create a reasonable (i.e., effective and affordable) verification regime. The negotiations became more political and intense in 1995 as the NPT Review and Extension Conference drew near. Both the P–5 and the G–21 (i.e., the Non-Aligned Movement faction of the non-nuclear weapon state members of the CD) groups of countries were advocating clearer but more divergent positions on a number of core issues. After achieving the indefinite extension of the NPT, France and China soon threw a wrench into the works by announcing the resumption of nuclear testing, which evoked international condemnation. Paris and Beijing argued that a small number of additional tests were needed for them to be able to agree to a permanent ban on testing in 1996. In June 1995, President Chirac had announced that France would need to conduct up to eight additional tests, but would be ready to sign a CTBT in the fall of 1996. The French ended their testing in January 1996 (Graham 2002). China conducted its last test on July 29, 1996, and announced that it would begin a moratorium on testing the following day (Cirincione 2002). Despite the uproar from the international community and sharp criticism of both France and China in the CD, this setback did not seriously derail the CTBT negotiations. As described in Chapter 4, “Negotiations, Part 3: End Game—India Bolts,” pp. 38–45, the CTBT negotiations reached their climax in the sum-

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mer of 1996. However, the compromises made have contributed to the inability of the Treaty to enter into force for almost a decade. Moreover, despite the promises made during the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the CD after 10 years has not yet been able to initiate the negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty. (See exhibit “Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty” for more details on this stalemate.)

FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY

Even while negotiating the CTBT in the mid-1990s, some members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) proposed a parallel negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Most envisioned that such a treaty would ban all future production of fissile material of the type appropriate for nuclear weapons. P–5 countries saw this as a useful additional tool to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and such a negotiation was one of the items they had promised in return for the indefinite extension of the NPT in the spring of 1995. (See Appendix G, “1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document,” Decision 2, “Principle and Objectives,” par. 4(b).) Some non-nuclear weapon states agreed that such a treaty would be a useful counter-proliferation tool, but they also saw it as another means of restraining the arsenals of the nuclear weapon states. Unfortunately, some non-nuclear weapon states in the CD blocked the initiative. India in particular saw an FMCT as yet another international effort, along with the CTBT, to constrain its nuclear option. India’s fear was subsequently compounded in 1996 when its efforts to block the CTBT were circumvented by test-ban supporters who were able to send the Treaty to the UN General Assembly in New York over New Delhi’s objection. Moreover, Pakistan insisted that as a prerequisite for negotiations, an FMCT negotiation would necessarily also need to cover current stockpiles of weapons-grade fissile material—an obvious effort to cap the advantage that it believed India had in its nuclear stockpile. Pakistan’s position effectively blocked any process on the issue. Some 10 years later, the CD has yet to initiate the negotiation of an FMCT. Following the negotiation of the CTBT, P–5 unity broke down in the CD. When the United States began again to push for the negotiation

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FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY, CONTINUED

of a FMCT, the Chinese linked this to the negotiation of a ban on weapons in space. This seemed to be Beijing’s way of trying to undercut U.S. efforts to deploy its missile defense program. Subsequently, both Russia and China insisted that an FMCT should not be negotiated in isolation from other issues. In 2004, the CD tried to formulate a compromise package of issues, including an FMCT, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and nuclear disarmament. When in July the United States announced that it no longer believed that an FMCT can be “effectively verifiable,” the compromise effort broke down (Boese 2004).

chapter three

Negotiations, Part 2 Challenges Emerge

The successful negotiation of the CTBT by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) was never a sure thing; it required overcoming a host of issues— procedural, political, and substantive. Given the diverse and global membership of the CD, it was not always possible to separate regional tensions from the positions countries took on substantive issues. Thus, it was unavoidable that efforts to resolve differences over substantive CTBT issues were often overshadowed by regional security considerations. More so than during the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, members of the CD saw their national security directly tied to the nuclear testing issue. Countries in the Middle East brought to the table years of distrust over Arab-Israeli territorial disputes, which were compounded by Israel’s alleged nuclear arsenal and consequent nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. Iran argued during the negotiation that Israel posed a nuclear threat to the Muslim world and had no legitimate place in the Treaty regime. Indeed, thus far Iran’s objection has prevented the group of countries listed 23

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in the Treaty as the Middle East/South Asia Group, which includes Israel, from meeting (see Chapter 5, “Implementation, Part 1: Ratification and Establishing the PrepCom,” page 48, for details). Meanwhile, the two South Asian rivals, India and Pakistan, never missed an opportunity to exchange barbs and to claim injustice at the hand of the other over tensions in Kashmir. There was a general belief that either or both might go nuclear at any time of their choosing. This latter fear was realized finally when both tested in May 1998. Such regional controversies made agreement on substance difficult. The most difficult substantive issues of the negotiation included the basic obligations of the Treaty, the requirements for the Treaty’s entry into force, and specific aspects of its verification regime, especially on-site inspections. Basic Obligations Achieving agreement on what was actually to be banned proved to be more difficult than one might think. For the P–5 countries, maintaining the reliability and safety of their stockpiles in the context of a permanent ban on testing became the issue of the day. They argued that for the benefit of all mankind some testing activities were required. Although these activities were never spelled out, unilateral statements by some of the P–5 indicated that socalled “subcritical” testing of non-nuclear components of the weapons (i.e., resulting in no sustained, chain reaction) was what they had in mind (Graham 2002). However, some non-nuclear weapon states suspected that the members of the P–5 might try to conduct low-yield tests, possibly as a means to develop new weapons in order to perpetuate their monopoly of nuclear weapons. Within the CD there were rumors regarding what the P–5 countries were discussing in their private consultations. Reports indicated that the P–5 wanted to conduct hydrodynamic tests, which do not produce any nuclear yield, while others wanted to conduct hydronuclear tests, which result in very small yield but no full-scale nuclear explosions. Some of the P–5 countries were reportedly calling for a limit of several pounds of yield while others wanted hundreds of tons of yield to ensure the safety and reliability of their stockpiles. In any case, international experts advised delegations of the CD that zero-yield verification would be impossible because of limits in test monitoring technology. This caused further concern on the part of G–21

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(Non-Aligned Movement) countries, which in stark contrast to the P–5, consistently called for a complete shutdown of nuclear test ranges and any activities that might support or improve current arsenals. In the middle of this debate in the CD, the findings of a classified 1995 JASON Report on U.S. nuclear testing were leaked. In short, the Report by a group of distinguished scientists concluded that at present the United States can have high confidence that its stockpile is safe and reliable. However, the JASON experts studied a range of activities that would be required to maintain that high confidence into the future. They recommended continuous support for a focused, multifaceted stockpile stewardship program, which would include subcritical testing. In examining the potential contribution of low-yield testing, they concluded that to maintain this level of confidence over the longer term “testing of nuclear weapons under a 500 ton yield limit would have to be done on a continuing basis, which is tantamount to remaking a CTBT into a threshold treaty.” However, the Report added that low-yield testing “does not have the same priority as the essential stockpile stewardship program” because of its limited utility for the United States. (See exhibit “1995 JASON Report on Nuclear Testing” for more details.) The conclusions of the JASON Report provided additional ammunition for the debate between those in the United States who were either “for” or “against” the CTBT. Ultimately, the conclusions were used by those who opposed low-yield testing to justify the negotiation of a true “zero-yield” CTBT (i.e., subcritical tests would be permitted but no low-yield testing). In an effort to clarify this situation and to win the support of the non-nuclear weapon states, in August 1995 the Clinton Administration announced that it favored a true “zero-yield” CTBT, meaning that all nuclear explosions of any yield would be banned and that subcritical tests would be permitted, since they do not lead to a sustained nuclear chain reaction (The White House 1995). Such a statement seemed to confirm suspicions among observers and non-nuclear weapon states that one or more of the P–5 participants must have been pushing for at least some level of low-yield testing as part of their reliability and safety programs. When it passed the Treaty to the Senate in September 1997, the Clinton White House issued a Fact Sheet describing the conditions under which the Administration would support a “zero-yield” CTBT. These safeguards included adoption of a Stockpile

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1995 JASON REPORT ON NUCLEAR TESTING

JASON is a group of distinguished academic scientists who consult for the U.S. Government on issues of national importance. In their “1995 Report on Nuclear Testing,” they concluded the following: ■

The United States can, today, have high confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance margins of the nuclear weapons that are designated to remain in the enduring stockpile. In order to maintain this high confidence for several decades under a CTBT, the United States must provide continuing and steady support for a focused, multifaceted program to increase understanding of the enduring stockpile; to detect, anticipate and evaluate potential aging problems; and to plan for refurbishment and manufacture, as required.

■

In order to contribute to long-term confidence in the U.S. stockpile, testing of nuclear weapons under a 500 ton yield limit would have to be done on a continuing basis, which is tantamount to remaking a CTBT into a threshold test ban treaty. Testing at any yield below that required to initiate boosting is of limited value to the United States, but experiments involving high explosives and fission-able material that do not reach criticality (i.e., subcritical testing) are useful.

■

The United States should affirm its readiness to invoke the supreme national interest clause should the need arise as a result of unanticipated technical problems in the enduring stockpile (Drell et al. 1995).

Stewardship Program, maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities, and the willingness, if necessary, to withdraw from the Treaty under the standard “supreme national interests” clause in order to conduct such tests (The White House 1997). In the end, recognizing that it would be impossible to achieve consensus on a definition of “nuclear explosion” or to verify low-yield testing, negotiators omitted from the final Treaty text any description of what constitutes a nuclear explosion. Article I of the CTBT states simply that “Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, …”. This language is nearly identical to that included in the LTBT; in neither Treaty is the phrase “nuclear explosion” de-

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fined (see Appendix B, “CTBT Text,” Article I, par. 1, p. 88). This lack of precision was the best that could be negotiated, but at the end of the negotiations it gave India more ammunition to criticize the Treaty as “a threshold treaty,” arguing that it provided a loophole for the P–5 to continue developing their stockpiles through subcritical testing. As part of the discussion of basic obligations, the Chinese pushed until the end of the negotiations for the possibility of conducting peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) under the CTBT. The Chinese argued that they had major construction projects for which such explosions would be useful, and they pointed to the U.S.-USSR Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976 as a precedent. That Treaty had permitted peaceful nuclear explosions within narrow restrictions. However, both the United States and USSR argued that such explosions had not proven to be useful or safe, and all other members of the CD were opposed to such an exemption to a total ban. Moreover, some in the CD feared that China and others would use PNEs as a loophole to continue developing nuclear weapons. Being totally isolated, the Chinese had to settle for a phrase in Article VIII “Review of the Treaty” that permits States Parties to hold a Review Conference ten years after entry into force of the Treaty to examine this or any other issue raised by a State Party (see Appendix B, “CTBT Text,” Article VIII, par. 1, p. 121). Entry into Force (EIF) Provision As in all treaties, the drafters of the CTBT outlined the specific conditions under which the Treaty would enter into force. Entry-into-force requirements often specify the number of countries that must sign and ratify, along with a time frame for these activities to be accomplished. For example, the NPT required that the three depositary countries (UK, United States, and USSR) and forty other states that had signed the Treaty were required to deposit their instruments of ratification for the Treaty to enter into force. For most countries, the ratification process involves the signature of the head of state, head of government, or foreign minister, which is followed by a review of the treaty by the national legislative body. For the United States, the Senate must provide its advice and consent to any treaty before U.S. ratification can be given. Once that consent is given, the United States provides its instrument of ratification to a Depositary, which in the case of the CTBT is the UN Secretary General.

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The question that drew emotional controversy up to the very end of the CTBT negotiation was which countries would be required to sign and ratify the Treaty for it to enter into force. For most of the non-nuclear weapon states, the main purpose of the CTBT was to halt continued testing by the nuclear weapon states. It was hoped that a ban on testing would both prevent the development of newer nuclear warheads and eventually lead to the obsolescence and elimination of the existing nuclear arsenals. Thus, the signature and ratification of all members of the P–5 was an absolute minimum requirement. Many countries, including most of the P–5, also considered the Treaty valueless unless the so-called “threshold” countries (i.e., India, Israel, and Pakistan) were also required to sign and ratify it. Thus, the entryinto-force challenge became one of finding a formula to ensure that these eight countries would be “captured” by the Treaty without naming them alone, a distinction which they would perceive as discriminatory. After a number of attempts to devise an acceptable formula, it was finally decided (with a dissent from India) that mentioning the key eight countries would not be discriminatory, if they were part of a larger list of countries. The drafters created a list of 44 countries, which (1) were included on two IAEA lists of countries which have nuclear research and/or power reactors, (2) were members of the CD, and (3) had participated in the CTBT negotiations in June 1996. This list, which appears in Annex 2 of the Treaty, includes the critical eight as well as countries such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea.* There was criticism from some that such a large number of countries would make the entry-into-force too difficult, but no one could come up with another solution that would achieve consensus (minus India). It was the EIF issue, among others, that India pointed to when ultimately announcing its refusal to go along with CD consensus on the Treaty text and its refusal to sign it (see discussion of India in Chapter 4, “Negotiations, Part 3: End Game— India Bolts,” for more details). Having resisted being caught by the NPT, it

*Annex 2, List of States Pursuant to Article XIV: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam, and Zaire.

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was obvious to most that India viewed the CTBT as another discriminatory, international effort to constrain its nuclear ambitions (Perkovich 1996). Location of the Future CTBT Organization As the complexity of the future treaty verification regime became more evident, the negotiators realized that a permanent CTBT organization (CTBTO) would be required to manage the construction and operation of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and International Data Center (IDC), two key components of the Treaty’s verification regime, as well as to prepare for any on-site inspections requested after entry into force of the Treaty. Two obvious questions arose: (1) what type of organization would be required and (2) where it should be located. In response to the first, negotiators looked to the establishment of the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) under the Chemical Weapons Convention as a general model. Such an organization would in its preliminary form total some 250–300 people and manage implementation activities during the preparatory phase. In its final form after entry into force, the organization would manage all Treaty activities. Those selected to fill positions in the organization would come from states party to the Treaty, and the organization would be funded and monitored by those same states. As is the case with other treaty organizations, it would be independent of, but affiliated with, the UN and other relevant international organizations. The more difficult question was where to locate the new organization. Some negotiators thought that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was a logical place, given the Agency’s extensive history in on-site monitoring of nuclear programs of countries around the world under the NPT. Representatives from both the IAEA and the UN Center in Vienna, which houses the IAEA, visited the CD in Geneva to make their pitches. However, there was an obvious political impediment to this idea. India, Israel, and Pakistan, which are not signatories to the NPT and have only a limited affiliation with the IAEA, were concerned about information collected for CTBT purposes “leaking” over into other areas of the IAEA. Although the IAEA claimed that it could build a “firewall” to prevent such a migration of data, these countries became adamant that the IAEA should not serve both treaties. (See exhibit “International Atomic Energy Agency” for more details.)

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INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

The IAEA was created in 1957, following President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address to the UN General Assembly in 1953, to address three issues—nuclear verification, security and safety, and technology transfer. With the negotiation of the NPT in 1968, the international community turned to the IAEA to be the primary monitor of nuclear activities around the world. The “safeguards” included in the IAEA’s Statute were designed chiefly to cover individual nuclear facilities and stockpiles of fissile material declared by member states. However, the discovery in 1991 of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapon program demonstrated the inadequacy of IAEA safeguards to deter proliferation. Thus, IAEA members agreed to take steps to enhance the safeguards to deal with the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities (Hooper 1995). India, Israel, and Pakistan, not being signatories to the NPT, have not accepted full-scope safeguards under the IAEA, and in 2003 North Korea pulled out of both the NPT and the IAEA.

Moreover, from a practical standpoint, it was recognized that the IAEA’s experience in inspecting nuclear programs was quite different from the task of monitoring and inspecting for nuclear explosions; the IAEA had no relevant expertise or experience in building, maintaining, and operating a large international, remote, technical monitoring system like the IMS and IDC envisioned for the CTBT. Thus, the IAEA would necessarily be forced to create a new division and hire the relevant expertise to handle the new CTBTunique responsibilities. In addition to the political problem, the negotiators judged that there likely would be little savings in administrative costs by trying to add this new function to the IAEA, rather than creating a wholly new international organization. The UN Center in Vienna, nevertheless, had space sufficient for the new CTBT organization, and no other city offered accommodations. Thus, there was no opposition to locating the new organization in Vienna. It was hoped that this would lead to some sharing of experience, at least administratively, between the new organization and the IAEA without compromising monitoring or inspections data. In practice, the IAEA was able to give some helpful suggestions and assistance to the provisional CTBT organiza-

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tion as it began to function, but the substantive interchange has been minimal, given the political sensitivities involved.

Verification Issues Most of the other contentious issues during the negotiation involved verification. Consistent themes included the purpose and cost of verification as well as the confidentiality of non-CTBT related activities. For some countries, a robust and capable verification regime was desired both to inhibit and to detect potential cheating as a supplement to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As stated above, most of the G–21 countries, along with some others, desired to halt all testing by P–5 countries in an effort to achieve nuclear disarmament more quickly. Moreover, these G–21 countries asserted that the P–5 should bear all of the verification costs, arguing that the CTBT was needed mainly to verify a halt to testing by the nuclear weapon states. The general lack of trust among nations and the demand ultimately for equal transparency led to an effort to design a verification regime that would be global in scope, multifaceted, and inhibit potential cheating as well as provide a reasonable chance of detection. At the same time, there was (and continues to be) concern about the level of intrusiveness and the need to protect sensitive, national non-nuclear activities. Based on the advice of various groups of international experts, it was agreed that the verification regime needed to include both remote technical monitoring and on-site inspections. These activities would be augmented by consultations and confidence building measures, such as voluntary exchanges of information on mining explosion activities, designed to enhance transparency and reduce suspicions of nuclear explosions. International Monitoring System (IMS) International experts explored both well-established and new types of technologies that could be used to monitor remotely for nuclear explosions at a degree of sensitivity and cost that the CD could accept. Some countries pushed for specific approaches that promised parochial gain, usually against an adversary, or they resisted those techniques that they deemed to be a threat to their own national security, real or perceived. For example, the Chinese pushed for a space-based electromagnetic pulse detection system,

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arguing that this would be an effective monitoring technology. Not having such a system themselves, they appeared to want those countries that did (primarily the United States) to contribute their capabilities to the international system. While acknowledging that this technology has some merit, international experts concluded that it would be too expensive and redundant. The Chinese, joined by the Indians, also fought against the inclusion of noble gas collection as part of radionuclide monitoring—a technology advocated by the United States and several other countries. It was never quite clear whether the Chinese opposition was to protect their own nuclear activities or whether they were trying to use it as a bargaining chip in return for something they wanted, such as space-based sensors. The CD (minus India) finally accepted a limited and delayed noble-gas sensor deployment (see Chapter 6, “Implementation, Part 2: Bumps in the Road,” for details). Finally, the Russians urged the CD to maintain aircraft, which they were willing to lease or sell, to monitor for radionuclide particulate and gases in the atmosphere. This was also judged by experts to be too expensive. Ultimately, based on political, cost, and practical considerations, the CD agreed to include four basic technologies (seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and ground-based radionuclide sensors) for remote monitoring. There would be 321 sensors deployed in different locations around the world. The international experts gave their best estimates of what such a system would cost. They also estimated that the system when fully operational would have the capability to detect nuclear explosions anywhere in the world down to a yield of about one kiloton, if the weapons were non-evasively tested. While far from perfect, this was deemed to be sufficient to meet the basic requirement of inhibiting and detecting potential cheating (Marshall 1996). The 321 IMS sensors in roughly 250 locations (some sensors are collocated to reduce operating costs) in about 90 countries provide roughly equal global coverage. Sensors from the four technologies are being deployed as follows: ■

■

■

seismic—50 primary sensors (i.e., continuously operating) and 120 auxiliary sensors (i.e., intermittent/on demand operations) to detect shock waves through the Earth; hydroacoustic—6 hydrophone sensors located underwater and 5 T-phase sensors located on islands to detect shock waves through the oceans; infrasound—60 sensors to detect shock waves through the atmosphere;

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radionuclide—80 particulate sensors, 40 of which are initially to be collocated with sensors for collecting noble gas, to collect particulate samples carried by prevailing winds. The radionuclide stations are to be supported by certified laboratories capable of analyzing samples upon request. (See Appendix B, “CTBT Text,” Protocol, Part I, A–E, p. 128, for details.)

Because many countries have long-established national monitoring systems with sensors of these types (mostly seismic) in various locations around the world, a large number of sensors were already in existence when the CTBT was negotiated and were incorporated into the IMS. However, many of those stations needed significant upgrading to meet the new operating and communications specifications established by the Preparatory Commission. In addition, a large number of stations (i.e., almost all of the infrasound and radionuclide) needed to be built from scratch. Some estimate that completing the IMS will require approximately ten years (i.e., 1997–2007) costing around $500 million, but others believe the total cost will be substantially higher. Thereafter, the estimated annual operations and maintenance cost will be close to $80 million (Mines 2004). (See “Chapter 6, “Implementation, Part 2: Bumps in the Road,” for a discussion of some problems encountered in building the IMS.) International Data Center (IDC) It was recognized that data picked up by IMS stations would need to be processed and to some degree analyzed so that member countries would be able to benefit from them. Thus, a single International Data Center (IDC) would need to be established, although it was recognized that some of the more advanced countries would do parallel processing on their own. Appropriate and reliable communications would also need to be established for connectivity between IMS stations and the IDC, and between the IDC and the national data centers of individual countries. The main issue of debate in the CD regarding the IDC was the extent to which it would analyze IMS data. Because the Treaty allows only states party to the Treaty (referred to as “States Parties” in the Treaty) to call for on-site inspections, some of them wanted to make sure that the IDC would not attempt to provide independent judgments about the nature of ambiguous events and thereby potentially bias any debate among the member states.

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However, most countries have little analytic capability and thus hoped that international experts in the IDC would analyze and tell them what they need to know about suspicious events. Some countries were also concerned that the more advanced countries would have the advantage of unilateral analytic expertise, if all analysis was left to individual countries. After much debate, the CD reached a compromise by which the IDC would do a first-level analysis to provide basic parameters of an event, such as location, magnitude, and depth. However, only states party to the Treaty would be permitted to make judgments about the nature of an ambiguous event (i.e., the probability of its being a nuclear explosion). (See Appendix B, “CTBT Text,” Protocol, Part I, F, pp. 131–34.) On-Site Inspections (OSI) Based on its experience a few years earlier in negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the CD agreed that on-site inspections (OSI) needed to be a component of the verification regime. Unlike the CWC, which has both routine and challenge inspections, negotiators agreed that the CTBT on-site inspections would function only when there was some indication that a nuclear explosion might have taken place in violation of the Treaty. Thus, from the beginning, the CTBT OSI issue was charged with political sensitivity. A number of countries were concerned that challenge inspections would be used as intelligence gathering opportunities by their adversaries. They also saw that such accusations would be politically embarrassing if not damaging. It was decided that the singular purpose of any OSI would be only to determine whether a nuclear explosion had occurred. No other activity would be the legitimate focus of an inspection, and inspectors would not be permitted to report on any unrelated activity they might observe (see Appendix B, “CTBT Text,” Article IV, Part D, pp. 110–17). Because of these sensitivities, members of the CD tended to delay coming to grips with the details of the OSI regime. Only when it became clear in early 1996 that a Treaty was within reach did countries begin to make hard decisions associated with their national security concerns. Nevertheless, by the time the negotiations were completed in the summer of 1996, the OSI provisions of the Treaty were less developed than the IMS and IDC provisions. This would make subsequent efforts to implement the Treaty more difficult, because considerable negotiation was still required to operational-

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ize the details of the OSI regime (see Chapter 6, “Implementation, Part 2: Bumps in the Road,” p. 65, for more details). The two OSI issues that created the most controversy during the negotiations in Geneva involved (1) the type of information that a country would be permitted to use as the basis for an OSI request, and (2) the type and number of votes required by members of the to-be-established Executive Council so that an inspection could go forward. The first issue involved whether information derived from national technical means of verification (NTM), in addition to data from the IMS stations, should play a role in the verification regime, especially as the basis for an OSI request. (See exhibit “Role of National Technical Means of Verification” for more details.) The countries (led by the United States) that wanted inspections to be an effective deterrent to cheating favored the use of NTM data. However, many countries were concerned that countries with more advanced NTM capabilities, especially their adversaries, would have an unfair advantage in using intelligence information to request inspections. At the end of the day and after much debate and various compromises on related issues, all agreed that information from NTM could be used alone or in conjunction with data from the IMS as the basis for an OSI request (see Appendix B, “CTBT Text,” Article IV, D, par. 37, p. 110). This was a significant victory for those countries wanting the CTBT to be an aggressive tool to prevent or detect testing, but it made those on the defensive side take harder positions on the number of votes required to launch an inspection. Resolution of the NTM issue, therefore, had a direct bearing on the outcome of the second key OSI issue—the debate between those countries that wanted an inspection to go forward unless stopped by the Executive Council, and those which insisted on an affirmative vote by the Executive Council before an inspection could begin. This became known as the “red light/green light” debate. Countries (principally France, the United Kingdom and the United States), which wanted to ensure that the shortlived physical phenomena associated with any nuclear explosion would be detected on the ground by inspectors, argued that time was critical and inspections should go forward without delay. Thus, they advocated that any requested inspection would proceed, unless the Executive Council stopped it (i.e., voted for a “red” light). In an effort to meet concerns about potential abuse, they agreed that any country found to have requested an inspection

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ROLE OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

The dramatic progress that the Soviet Union and United States made in their bilateral negotiations on strategic nuclear arsenals, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, was made possible largely by the use of national technical means (NTM) of verification (i.e., remote technical monitoring). President Carter announced in the late 1970s (what almost everyone already knew or at least assumed) that the United States was using sophisticated satellites to monitor Soviet military forces under various treaties (and, of course, the reverse was true). Beginning with the SALT I negotiations in the early 1970s, the two sides agreed to specify that they would use NTM to verify their bilateral treaties. Even when in the late 1980s they had achieved sufficient trust to add on-site inspections to the verification regimes of subsequent treaties, they insisted on using NTM for independent verification. Examples of NTM systems mentioned included reconnaissance satellites, ships, aircraft, and land-based radars. However, in the mid-1990s the international community did not have the same experience base as the United States and Russia. There was considerable suspicion from many quarters that proposals to use NTM to augment international monitoring of the CTBT would put the rest of the world at a significant disadvantage. Moreover, the Chinese and others argued that the United States in particular had used its NTM data to make unjust accusations against other countries (e.g. China) of misbehavior in other arenas. This concern about potential abuse was reinforced by the fact that the CD had not included NTM as part of the CWC’s verification regime, having judged that NTM could contribute very little to monitoring chemical weapons.

on false or frivolous pretenses would be subject to penalties, such as having to pay for the inspection, temporarily losing the right to request an inspection, etc. Those countries taking a defensive posture (including Israel, India, Pakistan, China, and Russia) feared that under such a “red light” system, adversaries would use the OSI provision to harass them or to attempt illegal intelligence collection. Thus, they wanted any request for an inspection to require an affirmative vote by the Executive Council (i.e., requiring a “green” light)

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ROLE OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, CONTINUED

Those opposed to including NTM as part of the CTBT verification regime were most concerned about such “national” information being used as the basis for an OSI request. However, NTM advocates argued that CD members needed to take a long view of the NTM issue. Admitting that at one time NTM capabilities had been the sole province of the superpowers, they argued that commercial satellite imagery, for example, was now becoming available to all countries which wished to purchase it. Thus, over time in the context of a treaty designed to be in force indefinitely, the playing field would eventually even out. Moreover, data from NTM would help raise the barrier to cheating, because most potential cheaters would not know, in contrast to the IMS, how good NTM capabilities of individual countries really are and, therefore, what cheating scenarios might actually succeed. The U.S. sought to placate such suspicions by explaining that in the context of the CTBT national technical means of verification is meant to include a broad range of systems for collecting relevant information such as, but not limited to, IMS-type sensors that are nationally owned and operated along with other national means of collecting information such as reconnaissance satellites, ships, aircraft, and ground stations equipped with non-IMS-type sensors. Nevertheless, the harder the NTM issue was pushed by some countries, the more other countries wanted to make it difficult for an inspection to go forward. Thus, a linkage developed between the use of NTM data and the hurdles that a country would face in getting its OSI request approved.

before it could go forward. This issue was the last of the Treaty text to be resolved; it was decided that 30 of the 51 members of the Executive Council would have to vote in favor of a request for the inspection to go forward. This was a significant victory for those countries focused on “defense” rather than “offense” in terms of monitoring and would lead some to conclude that the barrier to launching an inspection had been set so high as to make the inspection regime ineffective as a deterrent to cheating (see Chapter 4, “Negotiations, Part 3: End Game—India Bolts,” p. 41, for details).

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Negotiations, Part 3 End Game—India Bolts

In view of the promises made by the nuclear weapon states during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, along with calls for the negotiation of a CTBT by the UN General Assembly (UNGA), most members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) wanted to reach agreement on a text of the Treaty in 1996. The CD’s negotiating year normally ends in early September, which would permit the inclusion of the Treaty text in its annual report to the UNGA. The normal procedure would be for the General Assembly to adopt a resolution opening the Treaty for signature. By early 1996, however, it was far from certain that a CTBT could be successfully negotiated that year. Not only were many of the problems described above still unresolved, but India began to voice opposition to the text being negotiated. As is the case in most negotiations, at a certain point the negotiators are clearly in the “end game”—that is when they must put their final positions on the line, and final compromises and deals are made. The CTBT negotiation was no different. During the early months of 1996, India began com38

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plaining that the text as drafted was not comprehensive but only a “threshold” ban, because it did not preclude subcritical testing by the nuclear weapon states. India argued that because of the limits of the verification regime, such a loophole could mask low-yield nuclear testing and would be inconsistent with historical international calls for a “comprehensive” ban. Thus, India claimed, the treaty being negotiated would not contribute to nuclear disarmament. Moreover, New Delhi warned that any entry-intoforce (EIF) provision that required India’s signature and ratification would be discriminatory and unacceptable (Perkovich 1996). At the same time, Indian diplomats continued to negotiate vigorously on the Treaty text in an apparent effort to influence the outcome. India also pushed hard for giving the International Data Center as much latitude as possible to analyze ambiguous events, and it vigorously opposed the use of national technical means (NTM) data, especially as justification for an on-site inspection (OSI). Finally, it opposed the use of noble gas sensors as part of the International Monitoring System. Only slightly less vocal, Pakistan sided with India on most of these issues. Pakistan seemed most concerned about the use of NTM data as justification for an on-site inspection, and it pushed hard to make the initiation of on-site inspections as difficult to achieve as possible. Both positions probably reflected fear of abuse by India. Pakistan also argued against the unfair advantages that sub-critical testing would give to the nuclear weapon states. Pakistan never threatened to oppose the treaty, but Islamabad made clear that it would be difficult to sign the Treaty, if India did not. Pakistan also appeared to be doing some of China’s bidding, most likely as a result of their close historical cooperation on nuclear issues. Although a member of the P–5, China was never comfortable being thrown into the same camp as the other nuclear weapon states, particularly the United States.* It tried to ingratiate itself with the G–21 (NAM) countries in the CD by claiming that it too was an underdeveloped country and needed protection from the “big guys.” Like India and Pakistan, China argued vigorously against *The author refers interested readers to China and the CTBT Negotiations, a monograph published by Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and written by a Chinese research fellow and participant in the CTBT negotiations, Senior Colonel Zou Yunhua. Published in December 1998, the monograph gives China’s perspective on the CTBT negotiation, including its positions on various issues discussed in this book.

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the use of NTM data and tried to make it as difficult as possible for inspections to be launched. All three of these countries (along with Russia, at least on the issue of required votes to initiate inspections) were playing “defensive ball”; they were more concerned about protecting national security secrets than ensuring an aggressive verification regime against potential cheating. Meanwhile, the G–21 countries as a group continued to hit hard on the sub-critical testing issue and accused the nuclear weapons states, especially Russia and the United States, of failing to live up to their disarmament commitments under Article VI of the NPT. The tone of such criticisms was noticeably more shrill following the indefinite extension of the NPT in May of 1995. It was clear that the non-nuclear weapon states perceived that by agreeing to the indefinite extension they had lost significant leverage on the P–5, and they tried to use their positions on various CTBT issues to extract more disarmament commitments out of the P–5. However, one of the P–5 promises at the NPT Review and Extension Conference had been the commitment to negotiate a CTBT, so the G–21 countries had to be wary of making impossible the achievement of a Treaty they wanted (Graham 2002). Chairman’s Text During the course of the negotiations, several delegations (Australia, Sweden, and Iran) had tabled nationally drafted treaty texts in an effort to influence the outcome and show a way forward on the various issues. However, none of these efforts was able to command consensus. It became apparent to the Dutch Ambassador to the CD, who had become the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Nuclear Test Ban for the year 1996, that left to its own the CD would not be able to reach consensus on the remaining unresolved issues, some of which (e.g., NTM and OSI) were linked. Thus, he decided to use a technique that others have found to be successful in international negotiations when consensus is not otherwise achievable: encourage the debate, ensuring that all participants in the negotiations have the opportunity to voice their opinions and arguments on all issues; pursue intense consultations with individual delegations; and then produce a Chairman’s “compromise text.” The aim is to come up with a text that represents the Chairman’s best effort to achieve compromise across all issues. In the late spring, following intense consultations with those countries holding the strongest views, and once he was sure he knew the bottom lines

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of each of the key players, the Chairman issued a text that he believed balanced concessions and compromises by all major participants. He hoped that if all parties were equally unhappy, the right balance had been achieved. When tabling his text, the Chairman announced that this was the best compromise that could be achieved, and he challenged all parties to resist further efforts to change the provisions, warning that any one change could lead to the unraveling of the entire package. A number of delegations, and the G–21 as a whole, objected to the Chairman’s method and text, claiming that their key positions had been lost. They asserted that it could not serve as the basis for the final negotiations. However, they were not able to come up with a better solution, and the Chairman warned that time was running out ( Johnson 1996). Ultimately, the Chairman’s text won the day, but not without significant residual difficulties. It was fortuitous that a member of the CD’s Western Group was Chairman of this Ad Hoc Committee in 1996. Such positions rotate among the CD’s geographic groups each year, and it happened to be the Western Group’s turn to chair. If there had been an ambassador with less skill or one from a hard-line G–21 country, for example, it is questionable whether there would have been the ability or will to produce such a balanced consensus text. China, seemingly as a matter of principle, nevertheless insisted on one final change. Having been forced in the Chairman’s text to compromise on the noble gas and peaceful nuclear explosions issues, and having lost totally on the NTM issue, China was adamant that the barrier to a potentially frivolous request for an OSI be higher. The Chairman’s compromise proposed a simple majority of positive votes (26 out of 51 Members of the Executive Council) before an OSI could be launched. The United States, United Kingdom, and other countries that wanted a credible and fast-paced OSI regime had already lost considerable ground from their “red light” position, while those, such as Russia, China, Pakistan, and India, favoring a “green light” had been made to compromise somewhat less: lowering a three-quarters or two-thirds majority to a simple majority of positive votes. China, however, insisted that the requirement be increased from “26” to “30” affirmative votes (i.e., about half way between a simple and two-thirds majority). Although some believed that China would eventually drop this final demand in response to enormous international pressure to conclude the Treaty, “red-light” supporters decided to give China (and the other “green light” advocates) the additional four affirmative

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votes. The rationale was that there was insufficient time to let this play out before the Treaty text needed to be submitted to the General Assembly in New York (Smith 1996). (See Appendix E, “Some Lessons Learned from CTBT Negotiations and Implementation,” p. 199, for more details.) India and Iran Try to Block the Treaty In late June, even before the Chairman could announce that consensus on the text appeared to be possible, India proclaimed that it would not support the “compromise” Treaty text as written and demanded that the three IMS stations it was slated to host be withdrawn from the text of the Treaty’s Protocol. Moreover, later in the summer, on August 20, using the rule of consensus as its final weapon, India announced its refusal to consent to the inclusion of the negotiated Treaty text in the CD’s annual report to the UN General Assembly. Thus, New Delhi effectively blocked the CD from doing anything with the Treaty text that it had labored over for three years (Cerniello 1996). It seemed clear to most that India’s objections to the Treaty were a sign that, despite its protestations to the contrary, it was resisting being “captured” by the CTBT after avoiding for decades being constrained by the NPT. On August 22, Foreign Minister Gujral seemed to confirm suspicions when he stated that the EIF provision denied India its sovereign right to exercise its consent to the treaty through implied coercion. Moreover, he claimed that India’s security concerns require it to maintain the nuclear option. While some speculated that India wanted to retain the option to test, only when India overtly tested several nuclear devices in May of 1998 was the truth of that suspicion substantiated. (See exhibit “India’s Nuclear Weapons Program” for more details.) Meanwhile, Iran objected strongly to the inclusion of Israel as part of a new Middle East/South Asian Group in the Treaty along with Arab countries and Iran. The Chairman responded that this was necessary to ensure that all members of the regional groups would have the opportunity to serve on the Executive Council. At this juncture, Iran joined India in refusing to allow the CD to include the Treaty text in its annual report to the UN General Assembly. Because of the lack of consensus due to India’s and Iran’s objections to the Treaty, the CD’s report to the UN included only a statement by the Chairman on what had transpired and national statements by a number of

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INDIA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

India’s desire to be a nuclear weapon state appears to go back to the early 1960s, perhaps in reaction to China’s first nuclear weapon test in 1964. Based on technology provided to it through the “Atoms for Peace” initiative of the 1950s, India was able covertly to acquire a nuclear weapon capability. After having refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970, India conducted what it declared to be a “peaceful” nuclear explosion in 1974. India’s test led to renewed international efforts to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime. Nevertheless, India continued to evidence the desire to become a nuclear weapon state and refused to sign the NPT. In 1989, the Director of Central Intelligence, William Webster, testified that India had resumed research on thermonuclear weapons. In December 1995, even as the CTBT negotiations were in high gear with India declaring its commitment to negotiate a permanent ban on testing, there were reports that India was preparing to test another nuclear device. Unexplained activities were observed at the Pokran test site, which the Indians claimed were army exercises. Moreover, there appeared to be increasing pressure in India to demonstrate its nuclear capability (Weiner 1995). The Indian tests in May 1998 ended all pretenses and showed that India, as had been declared by Foreign Minister Gujral in 1996, had indeed maintained its nuclear option. India appears to have wanted to demonstrate once and for all that it should be considered a member of the nuclear club. Predictably, its actions led within days to nuclear tests by Pakistan, which also now appeared to want to be considered a nuclear weapon state. India’s testing led to intense efforts, particularly on the part of the United States, to get India to commit to the CTBT now that it had tested. However, the efforts by the Clinton Administration were undermined by its own failure to secure the consent of the U.S. Senate for the ratification of the Treaty. To date India has shown no willingness to make such a commitment to the CTBT or NPT and insists that it be recognized by the international community as a nuclear weapon state.

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countries, in which they outlined their positions either “pro” or “con” on the Treaty. These countries included Belgium, China, India, Iran, and Pakistan (NTB Ad Hoc Committee Report to the Conference on Disarmament 1996). As a result of India’s position, Pakistan announced that it would not be able to sign the Treaty. However, it did not join India’s effort to prevent the Treaty from going to New York, nor did it pull its two designated IMS stations out of the Treaty text. However, it has delayed giving the Provisional Technical Secretariat permission to upgrade the stations. (See Chapter 5, “Implementation, Part 1: Ratifications and Establishing the PrepCom,” below for details on how this issue has played out during implementation of the Treaty.) To circumvent the procedural block by India and Iran in the CD, countries favoring the Treaty devised a plan to get it to UN General Assembly in New York. Belgium submitted the final Treaty text to the CD as a “national paper,” thereby making it an official CD document for that year. As such, the CD was able to forward it to the UN General Assembly as part of its annual report (Belgium letter to the Conference on Disarmament 1996). Other countries, led by Australia, then pushed to get a resolution containing the Belgian paper on the agenda for the General Assembly and called for a vote in early September. There was nothing that India and Iran could do other than to complain that the Treaty had been “hijacked” out of Geneva and to try to defeat the Treaty in the General Assembly in New York, where only a majority of positive votes was required to adopt a resolution supporting the Treaty. Action by UN General Assembly At the request of the group of like-minded countries, a special session of the UN General Assembly was called to consider the CTBT resolution. On September 10, 1996, the General Assembly voted 158 in favor of the resolution, with only three countries (India, Libya, and Bhutan) voting in the negative; five other countries (Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria, and Tanzania) abstained. It is interesting to note that Iran, unlike India, voted in favor of the resolution. However, North Korea did not vote and then announced that it would join India in refusing to sign the Treaty. (See Appendix C, “UNGA CTBT Resolution and Voting Record,” p. 181.) Nevertheless, the

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way was now open for the Treaty to move forward, and the UN Secretary General, who was specified in the Treaty as the Depositary, formally opened it for signature on September 26, 1996.* The legacy of the negotiations and UNGA vote, however, would prove to be a significant block to Treaty implementation efforts, especially when combined with subsequent events. *General Assembly sessions run from mid-September to mid-September. During the early months of its session the previous fall of 1995, the new 50th General Assembly had called upon the CD to produce a Treaty by September 1996—i.e., before the end of its session in September 1996. The vote on the CTBT resolution took place on September 10, just before the beginning of the 51st General Assembly.

chapter five

Implementation, Part 1 Ratifications and Establishing the PrepCom

Despite the refusal of India, Pakistan, and North Korea to sign the Treaty, scores of countries did during the opening signature festivities at the UN on 26 September 1996. As of midyear 2005, 175 countries had signed, and 122 had ratified the Treaty. Of the 44 countries whose signatures and ratifications are required by Article XIV for the Treaty to enter into force, 41 had signed; 33 had signed and ratified. Of these countries, only India, North Korea, and Pakistan had not signed; China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, United States, and Viet Nam had signed but not yet ratified (CTBTO Website 2005). According to the Treaty’s entry-into-force provisions (see Appendix B, “CTBT Text,” Article XIV, paragraph 1), the earliest date that the Treaty could have entered into force was September 1998. With this in mind, the United States took the lead in early 1997 in pressing India and Pakistan to get on board. This effort suffered a setback in May 1998, when first India, and then Pakistan in response, exploded multiple nuclear devices. The Clinton 46

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Administration nevertheless expressed hope that with these tests behind them, the two countries might be at long last ready to sign the Treaty. Given the vigorous participation of both countries in the negotiation of the Treaty, most countries wanted to get them into Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) deliberations sooner rather than later so that they would not come in at the last minute and reopen issues that had already been resolved by participating countries. Experts differ on how close New Delhi came to signing, but the intense effort to persuade them to do so lasted only until the fall of 1999, when the U.S. Senate failed to provide sufficient votes (i.e., two-thirds majority) to support U.S. ratification of the Treaty. This event, which caught most of the international community by surprise because of the Clinton Administration’s strong support for the Treaty, deflated the pressure on India and Pakistan. Meanwhile, North Korea posed a different challenge. Despite being an observer and then a full member of the CD during the period of the negotiations, North Korea did not actively engage in the CTBT deliberations. Many assumed that Pyongyang would eventually sign, if offered sufficient financial inducements. North Korea had never voiced any substantive opposition to Treaty provisions, so it was not unreasonable to assume that its signature and ratification could be induced for a price, once India and Pakistan were on board. However, the unsuccessful attempt to get India and Pakistan on board, the U.S. Senate’s vote against the Treaty, along with recent setbacks in efforts to deal with North Korea’s nuclear weapons program including its withdrawal from the NPT, seem to have made Pyongyang’s signature of the CTBT at best a remote possibility. Preparatory Commission During the spring of 1996, anticipating a successful Treaty negotiation, CD negotiators in Geneva drafted a document to establish the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom). As with selected other treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the concept is to set up a provisional organization to handle administrative and operational aspects of treaty implementation. The document, which outlines the structure of the PrepCom and its functions, was adopted by Treaty Signatories on November 19, 1996 (see Appendix D, “Resolution Establishing the CTBT Preparatory Commission,” p. 182). The PrepCom consists of two basic components: the Commission, which is made up of all states signatory to the Treaty and is chaired on a rotating

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basis for six-month periods by a representative of the regional groupings of countries listed in Annex 1 of the Treaty; and the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS), which is made up of international experts hired for fixed, multiple-year periods to staff the new organization and build the Treaty’s verification regime. The PTS is now staffed by about 275 people from 70 countries. The plan is for the PTS to assume increased responsibilities and to evolve into the permanent Technical Secretariat of the CTBT Organization (CTBTO), which is described in Article II of the Treaty, after the Treaty enters into force. The first meeting of the Signatories to the Treaty took place in New York in November 1996, to take advantage of the fact that many senior diplomats were already at the UN for the 51st UNGA session, which had begun in mid-September. Only those countries that had signed the Treaty were accredited to the PrepCom; others could request observer status. The first order of business after adopting the PrepCom Document was to select individuals to fill the most senior positions in the Commission and the PTS. It was a bit amusing to observe many of the same senior diplomats, who had several months earlier fought in Geneva over substantive provisions of the Treaty, now competing in New York for senior PTS positions, either for themselves or for their countries. The top Provisional Technical Secretariat positions went to Germany (Executive Secretary) as well as to Mexico, Japan, Russia, Egypt, and the United States (heads of the five PTS divisions). Thus, every regional group included in the Treaty was represented at the top. There was speculation that the Executive Secretary made promises to other important countries, such as China and France, and that eventually they would get a senior position after the tours of the initial incumbents were up. Iran, however, was not content in being left out of the first running and delayed deliberations with its demand for a senior position. In the end, it did not receive one, but the new Executive Secretary-designate gave Iran an “influential” adviser position in his front office. Regional tensions, like those during the negotiations and described above, periodically interfered with early implementation work. Most notably, Iran continued to object to the inclusion of Israel in the Middle East/South Asia (MESA) Group of countries established by the Treaty (see Appendix B, “CTBT Text,” Annex 1, p. 125). Such groupings of countries were needed

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in order to ensure equitable geographical representation both for leadership positions and staffing during the PrepCom and eventually in the Executive Council after entry into force. Having warned the CD, prior to the conclusion of the Treaty, that the composition of the MESA Group would be a problem, Iran continues to prevent this Group from meeting and assuming its rightful rotation in the PrepCom’s leadership. Iran refuses to attend any Group meeting in which Israel is present, and the other countries in the Group have not been willing to override Iran’s objection. After all PrepCom activities moved to Vienna in March 1997, the Commission began meeting in one-week sessions about three times per year to make critical policy decisions. Its two key working groups (“WGA” = Administration/Legal and “WGB” = Verification) began meeting in multipleweek sessions about three or four times per year to work out the detailed issues and to develop policy recommendations to the Commission. It is the Commission’s function to establish policy and standards for its working groups and the PTS, including annual budgets, personnel rules, rules of procedure, etc. Equipped with PrepCom guidance and a budget, the PTS began to hire staff and establish itself, eventually handling all of the administrative, legal, public relations, external affairs, and technical verification issues. To ensure accountability, the PTS is obligated to work closely with the two Working Groups and to report back to them periodically on its activities and progress. The biggest share of the budget and most of the people hired by the PTS are devoted to building up the International Monitoring System and International Data Center divisions. The On-site Inspection Division has remained relatively small; prior to entry into force, planning and training for potential inspections are about the only activities that can be accomplished by the PTS. In view of the political sensitivities previously described, it is up to the Working Group on verification to establish the detailed guidelines for such inspections. Article XIV Conferences The PrepCom began its work with a full-court press to get established and create the conditions for early entry into force of the Treaty. The entry-intoforce (EIF) provision (Article XIV) gives those countries that have both signed and ratified the Treaty the option to hold periodic conferences to determine

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how to advance the EIF process. Because some of the 44 countries whose signatures and ratifications are required for entry into force had not yet signed and/or ratified the Treaty, the first such conference was held in October 1999 in Vienna. Subsequent conferences have been held in 2001 in New York and in 2003 in Vienna. Coincidentally, the first conference convened just as the U.S. Senate was about to take its historic vote against the Treaty. While the uncertainty of that vote overshadowed Conference proceedings, there remained optimism that the Clinton Administration, which had provided leadership in both the negotiation and implementation of the Treaty up to that point, would surely succeed in its quest for U.S. ratification, thereby giving the Treaty’s EIF prospects a major boost.

Implications of Treaty Rejection by U.S. Senate On October 13, 1999, immediately following the first Article XIV Conference and much to the surprise and disappointment of most of the international community, the U.S. Senate rejected the Treaty by a majority of votes.* The details and political reasons for the Treaty’s defeat have been told by others (Deibel 2002). In short, some senators were in principle opposed to the CTBT, while others saw the Treaty vote as an opportunity to damage the Clinton presidency. After failing in their attempt the previous year to impeach President Clinton for his handling of an affair with a White House intern, a vote on the Treaty provided an opportunity to hand him a political defeat. However, it also became clear that the White House and the Senate Democrats misplayed their hand; with overconfidence, they walked into a trap set by some of the Senate Republicans (Broder 1999). What was most disappointing to many observers was that because of domestic political intrigue, the Treaty was not given the substantive vetting that an international agreement should receive from the Senate. Important substantive issues were raised, but only a few experts, along with some current and former officials, were able to testify. The truncated hearings only scratched the surface of the verification and other issues that should have been explored in depth to determine the relative merits of the Treaty. In the *A two-thirds majority of positive votes is required for the Senate to give its advice and consent to any treaty.

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SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE CTBT

Having achieved the successful negotiation of the CTBT in 1996, the Clinton Administration proceeded to prepare for Senate consideration of the Treaty. By the fall of 1997, the Administration’s ratification package was delivered to the Foreign Relations Committee. However, the Committee Chairman, Senator Jesse Helms, was opposed to the Treaty and refused to hold hearings on it until the Clinton Administration first presented the Kyoto Protocol on environmental measures and the amendments negotiated with Russia on the ABM Treaty to make possible the limited testing of a missile defense system. Knowing that he was also opposed to these agreements, the White House was reluctant to send them forward to face defeat. This stalemate on Senate treaty consideration blocked any action on the CTBT until late summer of 1999, when the Senate Democrats pushed for and achieved agreement by the Republican leadership in the Senate to schedule a vote on the CTBT. The conditions for those hearings, however, sealed the Treaty’s fate, for the Republicans had already made sure before agreeing that they had the votes to kill the CTBT. During the truncated two-week period allocated to consideration of the CTBT, a number of issues arose in hearings held by both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees, especially with regard to verification. Essentially, the argument made by Treaty opponents was that the Treaty is unverifiable because it is not possible to monitor nuclear testing activity down to the zero-yield advocated by the Clinton Administration. In addition, questions were raised about the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile without periodic testing. Some doubted the U.S. technical ability to certify the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile beyond about ten years, due to uncertainties associated with the new Stockpile Stewardship Program. The Administration found itself unable to counter the arguments against the Treaty, and the Senate Democrats soon realized that they did not have enough votes for the two-thirds majority required for the Senate’s consent. The Administration tried to stop the vote, but the anti-CTBT Republicans had set a procedural trap, from which the Democrats were unable to escape, and the Senate voted 52 to 48 against the Treaty. Not only did the Administration fail to get the two-thirds majority of votes required for Treaty ratification, it did not achieve even a simple majority

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SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE CTBT, CONTINUED

in favor of the Treaty. This was a significant setback to the Clinton Administration and to those favoring a permanent ban on nuclear testing. The Treaty ratification package remains dormant with the Foreign Relations Committee until the Senate either sends it back to the White House or decides to reconsider it. Thus far, probably due to a lack of consensus, there has been no move by the Senate to do either; and the current U.S. Administration announced that it has no plans to push for ratification.

end, the Clinton Administration was unprepared for the battle and failed to make the case that the United States would be better off “with” the Treaty than “without” it. While some opponents of the Treaty pointed to India as proof that the CTBT would never enter into force, the President’s political enemies and the opponents of the Treaty used concerns about verification and nuclear stockpile issues as ammunition in their arguments against ratification. (See exhibit “Senate Consideration of the CTBT” for more details.) Following the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty, the Clinton Administration was never able to get the CTBT ratification process back on track. In a belated defense, it commissioned retired General John Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to lead a team to study the merits of the Treaty in an effort to blunt criticisms made during the Senate’s truncated review process. The Shalikashvili Report, issued in early 2001, concluded that the United States could ensure the safety and reliability of its stockpile under the terms of the Treaty, and that the Treaty would be essentially verifiable, consistent with U.S. security needs. Although it acknowledged that it is impossible to verify a “zero-yield” ban, it argued that no significant cheating would be possible as a result of this gap in verification (Shalikashvili 2001). In addition, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, a nongovernmental organization of prominent U.S. scientists, issued a report in 2002 that essentially confirmed the findings of the Shalikashvili Report, adding more technical details to support the verifiability of the Treaty. Nevertheless, lingering concerns persist about the nuclear weapon programs of certain countries and the capability of the CTBT’s verification regime to monitor nuclear weapons testing by them (U.S. National Academy of Sciences 2002).

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Continuing Verification Concerns One of the primary verification concerns under the CTBT, voiced during the brief U.S. Senate review in 1999, is the general inability to monitor nuclear explosions at low levels of yield (i.e., in the tens or even hundreds of tons). In Geneva toward the end of the CTBT negotiation, international experts estimated, on the basis of past experience, that the International Monitoring System (IMS), as designed, would likely provide detection of nuclear explosions around the globe on average down to about one kiloton of yield, non-evasively tested. In some areas the capability might be better, but in some areas worse. Experts recognized that attempts at evasive testing, such as decoupling (i.e., masking tests by conducting them in deep, underground caverns), would have the potential to increase the yields at which cheating would be possible without risking detection. Thus, some of the P–5 countries wanted to make sure that their respective test sites were equally transparent in order to avoid ambiguous events that would lead to unwarranted suspicions. The French decided to eliminate their test range, which left Russia’s Novaya Zemlya, the U.S. Nevada Test Site, and China’s Lop Nur as the test sites of primary concern. Because the United Kingdom used the Nevada Test Site, it did not have a separate location to declare. Of course, the 1998 Indian and Pakistani tests subsequently made the two South Asian test ranges a primary concern as well. Novaya Zemlya The United States, United Kingdom, France, Norway, and Australia voiced concern about ongoing Russian testing activities at Novaya Zemlya, because Russia (along with China) had traditionally been more secretive and less willing to make its testing activities transparent. In response to repeated demarches and requests that it be more forthcoming in announcing its testing activity, Moscow would say only that it was conducting sub-critical tests in a manner consistent with the Treaty. Nevada Test Site Toward the end of the negotiation, perhaps in retaliation, the Russians complained and argued that their test site was more transparent than those

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of the United States or China. None of the rest of the P–5 acknowledged any merit to the Russian argument; but the United States volunteered to move one of the IMS seismic monitoring stations closer to the Nevada Test Site in order to enhance the transparency of the subcritical testing the United States planned to conduct there. The data from that station seemed to satisfy the Russians that the U.S. test site would be as transparent as their test site on Novaya Zemlya. Lop Nur The Chinese refused to say anything more about activities at their test site other than that they were abiding by the terms of the CTBT. However, the Russians insisted that an IMS monitoring station be located closer to Lop Nur to increase its transparency as well. China put up strong resistance, but it was totally isolated by the other members of the P–5. The Chinese finally agreed to the addition of a new seismic station in eastern Kazakhstan, which satisfied the Russians. India and Pakistan Because both India and Pakistan failed to sign the CTBT, they have not been participants in PrepCom deliberations. However, both India and Pakistan maintain missions to the IAEA in Vienna, and there have been periodic discussions between Pakistan and the PTS about the possibility of moving forward on the establishment of the Pakistani station. Because India withdrew its IMS stations in 1996, the verification Protocol to the CTBT would have to be modified to reinsert the Indian stations, should New Delhi ever decide to sign the Treaty. Meanwhile, the International Data Center (IDC) claims that it had good detection data on the May 1998 tests from both India and Pakistan. Because the two countries had announced the fact of their respective tests, it was relatively easy for the infant IMS and IDC, along with several countries, to identify the seismic data associated with the tests. Iran As was described in the main text, Iran was an active player during the negotiations and has remained so during implementation. Moreover, progress has been made on establishing the IMS stations hosted by Iran. It remains to be seen whether the current problems between Iran and the IAEA over

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Iran’s nuclear activities under the NPT will affect Teheran’s relations with the CTBT PrepCom. Meanwhile, most experts believe that Iran has not advanced its nuclear weapons program to the extent that a nuclear explosion would be feasible anytime soon. Libya Tripoli’s turnabout over the past two years in both signing and ratifying the CTBT has been dramatic and positive for the Treaty and the nuclear nonproliferation regime as a whole. In addition to being one of the three countries that voted against the Treaty during the UN General Assembly session in 1996, several years ago Libya had actually asked that the PrepCom remove its IMS station from the Treaty list. Fortunately, cool heads in the PrepCom decided to ignore the request in the hope that at some point the situation in Tripoli would turn around. That has happened! No one ever had credited Libya with having progressed far enough along in its nuclear weapons program to be at the point where a test would have been feasible. North Korea North Korea remains a difficult and perplexing problem. It has never voiced any substantive objections to the Treaty, and it did not join India in voting against the Treaty in 1996. However, its refusal to sign the CTBT and subsequent pullout from the IAEA and NPT does not bode well for its joining the CTBT regime anytime soon. It appears that Pyongyang’s position on the CTBT will change only if its more fundamental security situation is resolved. Although there have been periodic reports of possible nuclear explosions in North Korea, there has yet to be any definitive evidence. Given the amount of tunneling in North Korea, it may be possible for Pyongyang to conduct a decoupled test in an attempt to hide the fact from the international community. Israel For several decades Israel has maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity” with regard to its nuclear program. It has nuclear power facilities and a limited association with the IAEA. However, it has never joined the NPT, and most observers believe that Israel has nuclear weapons in its inventory and the capability to produce more. Some experts speculate that Israel exploded a nuclear device in the South Atlantic in 1979. There were numerous

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reports about a powerful “flash” in that region, but available technical collection systems could not confirm the nature of the event. However, in 1997 after the change in South African governments, a South African official stated that the 1979 incident was a joint South African-Israeli test despite what the previous government had said. The credibility of the official’s statement, which has never been acknowledged by Israel, is bolstered by reports of Israeli-South African cooperation on nuclear issues and by the fact that the previous white-minority South African government confirmed that it had assembled six nuclear weapons. It invited IAEA observers to witness their destruction prior to turning power over to the black-majority government in the early 1990s (Melmen 1997).

Continued U.S. Funding for the Preparatory Commission It appears that a number of the senators who voted against the Treaty were not fundamentally opposed to it, although they had serious questions and reservations. Their main concerns seemed to be a combination of substance (i.e., verification and stockpile stewardship) and timing. In any case, nearterm political imperatives took precedence over longer-term national security considerations. The fact that many of the same senators have continued to vote in favor of U.S. funding each year to support the PrepCom demonstrates that they want to keep the option open for possible future reconsideration of the Treaty. The continued commitment on the part of the United States to honor its financial commitment to the PrepCom has been significant.* In accordance with UN guidelines, which the CTBT PrepCom follows, the United States contributes nearly a quarter of the annual budget. It is also important to note that under the Clinton Administration the United States agreed to include in the IMS a large number of stations belonging to its own national monitoring system, the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS). (See exhibit “U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS)” for more details

*Through 2003, state signatories have allocated a total of about $500 million, of which the United States has paid roughly $100 million (Mines 2004). In addition, the United States has voluntarily contributed expertise and facilities totaling tens of millions of dollars in value.

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U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY DETECTION SYSTEM (USAEDS)

Beginning in the late 1940s, the United States began to monitor for nuclear tests by other countries. This effort, which includes various types of technical sensors located in the air, ground, and under water, evolved into the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS). The System is operated by the U.S. Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), located at Patrick Air Force Base in Florida. It operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year (Oliveri 1997). As agreements to limit nuclear testing have been negotiated over the years, AFTAC has been charged with monitoring the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty. In the case of the CTBT, AFTAC sent experts to advise the U.S. Delegation during the negotiation in Geneva. This was due in part to the fact that the United States agreed to contribute some of its USAEDS monitoring stations to the CTBT International Monitoring System. Despite the lack of U.S. ratification, AFTAC experts have remained deeply involved in supporting the IMS implementation efforts of the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS), both by operating and maintaining those USAEDS stations that are also part of the International Monitoring System, and as a resource of expertise for the PTS. AFTAC has hosted PTS officials over the years in an attempt to ensure a smooth buildup of the IMS.

on U.S. efforts to monitor nuclear test activities and to assist the buildup of the IMS.) Because of this continued U.S. funding and participation, most members of the PrepCom continue to have hope that the United States will eventually resume its full support for the Treaty, and the PTS has been striving to maintain its momentum in building up the IMS and the IDC. However, any reduction in U.S. financial or technical support in the future will slow the pace of implementation. However, the U.S. Senate’s vote in 1999 cast a cold chill over the PrepCom and tended to undermine the credibility and authority of the United States to continue leadership of the implementation process. In particular, it undermined the earlier efforts by the United States and others to persuade India and Pakistan to sign the Treaty. India, at least, now felt free to turn its

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back on international calls for its adherence to both the CTBT and NPT. Other countries involved in the PrepCom subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s vote to pull back on their own support for the Treaty and to question the size of annual budgets. Even though France and the United Kingdom had already ratified the Treaty and Russia ratified it in 2000, China put its ratification efforts on hold. Despite claims that all was moving along normally, Beijing seemed now to peg its ratification efforts to U.S. actions. Other countries, such as Russia, have argued in Vienna that the PrepCom should reduce its annual budget and slow down the pace of its IMS buildup, now that entry into force of the Treaty does not even appear to be on the horizon. Thus, as long as the United States and other key countries withhold their ratifications, some countries are questioning their own continued support for Treaty implementation, at least at the current pace and level of funding. Such reservations are likely to grow, if there appears to be little payback for their investments, such as the receipt of IMS data and analysis from the IDC.

chapter six

Implementation, Part 2 Bumps in the Road

Independent of the political and financial challenges to implementation described in the previous chapter, the effort to implement the Treaty, especially establishment of the verification regime, encountered from the outset a number of obstacles—some practical, some political, and others legal—which have led to delays. It took some time before all participants understood the complexity and enormity of this unique international engineering undertaking, especially the construction of the global International Monitoring System (IMS) and the International Data Center (IDC). In addition, there was always suspicion that during implementation some countries would try to regain some of the ground on issues that they had lost during the endgame of the negotiation. This concern became more acute as time went on and new country representatives appeared on the scene who had not participated in either the negotiations or the initial implementation efforts. Once or twice during PrepCom deliberations an effort was made to revise the intent of the agreement reached in Geneva. In one case, where the Chairman’s text had 59

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introduced into the Treaty ambiguous language in an effort to craft a compromise, the PrepCom found itself locked in a stalemate over differing interpretations as to what was intended. Some of the verification issues that have complicated Treaty implementation are the following: Noble Gas Stations An issue arose quite early from ambiguous compromise language dealing with the number of IMS noble gas stations that would be established at entry into force of the Treaty. (See exhibit “Noble Gas Collection” for more details on this type of radionuclide sensor.) Those who had been involved during the negotiations and now were implementing the Treaty in Vienna knew what had been intended in Geneva. Nevertheless, the Chinese who had opposed the inclusion of noble gas sensors chose to use the ambiguity to their advantage during implementation. They argued that the Chinese text of the Treaty, which is considered official along with those in the other recognized UN languages, made it clear that no noble gas sensors could be installed prior to entry into force of the Treaty. This interpretation ran counter to what most believed had been intended—that 40 noble gas stations would be initially in place at entry into force. Paragraph 10 of the Radionuclide monitoring section of the Protocol to the Treaty states in one sentence that “Forty of these [radionuclide] stations shall also be capable of monitoring for the presence of relevant noble gases upon entry into force of this Treaty.” Unfortunately, in the very next sentence the Treaty states “For this purpose the Conference [of States Parties], at its initial session, shall approve a recommendation by the Preparatory Commission as to which 40 stations from Table 2–A of Annex 1 to this Protocol shall be capable of noble gas monitoring.” (See Appendix B, “CTBT Text,” Protocol, Part I, C, p. 130.) During initial PrepCom meetings, the Chinese immediately claimed this ambiguity means that no stations may be capable of noble gas monitoring at the time that the Treaty enters into force because the Conference can only meet after the Treaty enters into force to approve the list. This seeming contradiction in the Protocol language is a result of the compromise that the Chairman had tried to reach during the endgame negotiations in Geneva between those favoring and those (mainly China and India) opposing the inclusion of noble gas monitoring in the International Monitoring System.

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NOBLE GAS COLLECTION

Certain gases (known as noble gases, such as xenon), along with particulate matter (e.g., soil that is dispersed with the blast) that has been eradiated by a nuclear explosion, are the elements that are collected by radionuclide monitoring systems. The detection of specific radionuclides uniquely identifies the source of the gas or particulates as a nuclear explosion, rather than as coming from a nuclear power plant, etc. Therefore, the inclusion of such a monitoring technique in the International Monitoring System increases the chances of detecting, if not deterring, cheating. Radionuclide detection is considered the only “smoking gun” in terms of evidence of a nuclear explosion; the other IMS collection techniques (i.e., seismic, hydroacoustic, and infrasound) can indicate only that some type of an explosion has occurred. There were relatively few noble gas collectors around the world at the time of the negotiations, so many delegations in the Conference on Disarmament were concerned that it was an unproven technology and might lead to false indications of nuclear explosions. Those countries with the most experience convinced most of the others that the technique is reliable and should be included in the IMS. From their position taken during PrepCom deliberations, it appears that the Chinese have yet to be convinced. Similarly, given their position in Geneva, the Indians would likely also be causing problems over this issue, if they were to sign the Treaty and participate in the PrepCom.

The best that could be done in this situation was to acknowledge differing interpretations and to try to move forward in a businesslike fashion without forcing it to become a major issue. Because the rule of consensus governs the work of the PrepCom, as it had the negotiations in Geneva, one country can block all progress. Thus it was deemed wiser to concentrate on the technical aspects of preparing for installing such sensors without forcing a crisis over the issue. Station Ownership The issue of who actually owns the IMS stations and the equipment involved arose early on as well (see Appendix B, “CTBT Text,” Article IV, B, par. 17, p. 105). The Treaty states that countries hosting IMS stations will in

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fact be considered the owners of the stations, even if they do not build or pay for them. This became an issue for some countries because prior to the CTBT, a number of monitoring stations had been built by third parties that retained ownership of the installed equipment. As host countries became signatories to the Treaty, they began to insist on owning all of the equipment in the IMS stations, whether or not they had owned any of the equipment prior to the CTBT. For some countries, particularly the United States, laws under which the equipment had been originally provided to other countries prohibited the transfer of title. The United States was eventually able to get its law modified, but it took several years. Meanwhile, some of the countries, due to impatience or political maneuver, asked the United States to remove its equipment and instead invited the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) to install new equipment. While the PTS was obliged to respond, the more rational experts in the PTS saw this swap of equipment as a waste of time and money. Moreover, they appreciated that the United States and some other countries, such as France, had installed and were already operating equipment in a number of locations. In some instances, only minor upgrades were necessary to meet the new CTBT specifications. Thus, at times the PTS found itself forced to balance practical decisions vs. the political demands of host countries. Many of the host countries increasingly stated their preference to work with the PTS alone, because of the political and legal problems that can complicate bilateral arrangements with other countries. Land Use/Rights Another complication for the PTS has been gaining access to all of the locations where IMS stations are to be built. Even though during the negotiation the CD contacted each of the prospective host countries identified by the draft Treaty, not all were willing to cooperate and allow the PTS to upgrade or install new stations. Even when countries are in principle willing to cooperate, their domestic laws, environmental restrictions, and regional security issues have at times caused complications and unanticipated costs and delays. Cost of IMS Stations During the negotiations, the IMS experts in the CD tried to estimate what the cost would be to upgrade and install new stations of each technol-

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ogy type. It turns out that most of these estimates were low, which subsequently raised some hackles during PrepCom discussions of the budget. Some countries did not (or chose not to) understand that the estimates were faithfully made but based on the very limited information available at the time. Other events, such as those mentioned above, also have tended to slow down the pace of station installation and increase costs, so that the cost issue has added fuel to the arguments being made by some that the PrepCom needs to slow down the pace of its activities and reduce annual budgets commensurate with prospects for entry into force. As of 2004, most experts expressed the hope that at the PrepCom’s current annual funding level of about $85 million, it will be possible to complete construction of the IMS by 2007. Significant reductions to annual budgets would, of course, prolong the time required to complete the system (Mines 2004). IMS Equipment Specifications, Operations, and Maintenance Another challenge to implementation arose early on: there is a diversity of equipment in existing stations around the world. Understandably, the PrepCom desired to establish uniform standards to ensure that the entire system would function and provide consistent and reliable data. At times this became a source of tension between the PTS and the national providers of the equipment, who had installed equipment prior to such specifications being adopted. Moreover, at times there were “nationalistic” attitudes at play, which complicated the PTS effort to standardize the equipment it had to operate and maintain. Some host nations have insisted that only their own indigenously produced equipment be used in the IMS stations located on their soil or under their jurisdiction. After initial efforts to purchase and install equipment, the PTS began to realize that the operation and maintenance of equipment would eventually be its biggest long-term task and cost. Not only was it faced with operating and maintaining four different kinds of technologies for IMS stations, but within each technology it was forced to operate and maintain a variety of systems from different manufacturers and countries of origin. This necessarily has led to inefficiencies and higher costs of maintaining the IMS stations already built. But at least for the life of the initial equipment, there is little that can be done. At the same time, the PTS did not have, or plan to have, the expertise and cadre necessary to do all maintenance. It became necessary to

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negotiate and fund numerous contracts to operate and maintain the diverse equipment in the field. Contracting also became a major challenge for the PrepCom, given the PTS obligation to the Commission to ensure that it is using its allocated resources to the best advantage and is not being forced to pay unreasonable rates or costs for equipment and services. Legal contract experts in the PTS thus became a source of delay in efforts to build and certify stations. Moreover, the certification process had to be established with care, given concerns that substandard equipment would creep into the system. Finally, the PrepCom decided that host countries would not be permitted to receive allowances for operating and maintaining their stations until certification was completed, which led to pressure to certify some stations more quickly than the PTS believed to be prudent. Communications The need to connect the 321 IMS stations with the International Data Center (IDC) in Vienna, and in turn the IDC with States Signatories wanting the IMS data, became another significant challenge and expense. Once again, domestic laws and security concerns at times caused complications and delays in construction, which was already burdened by the high costs of establishing appropriate data and communication connections. Negotiating multiyear contracts to obtain the best price at times ran afoul of reality, such as the unpredictable pace of establishing IMS facilities that were sometimes delayed by political or technical difficulties. Data Availability and Confidentiality Providing data from IMS stations to States Signatories to the Treaty became an issue as more stations came on-line and began to provide data to the IDC prior to entry into force (EIF). The problem was exacerbated by the U.S. Senate’s vote against ratification and the Bush Administration’s subsequent change in U.S. policy toward the CTBT (see Chapter 7, “Implementation, Part 3: Impact of Change in U.S. Policy”). In response to U.S. actions, China took the position that no IMS data should be given as a matter of routine to States Signatories prior to EIF. Backed by a few others such as Iran, China argued that there is no legal basis for making their countries transparent to the rest of the world prior to EIF. The Chinese understand

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that some data must flow to check out the IDC and overall system connectivities, and for the certification of stations. However, they have asserted that U.S. monitoring capabilities should not benefit from IMS data, if the United States is not willing to ratify the Treaty. A corollary to this issue is that of confidentiality. A number of countries expressed legitimate concern during both the negotiations and implementation that certain data (collected by the IMS or during an on-site inspection) that is not relevant to the Treaty’s purpose should be considered “confidential” and not shared with other countries. In paragraph 7 of Article IV, Part A, the Treaty states that “Each State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to this Treaty” (see Appendix B, “CTBT Text,” p. 102). The details of this issue continue to defy resolution, because of suspicions that some countries will try to declare potentially incriminating data as “confidential” to keep others from requesting inspections. On-Site Inspections (OSI) As mentioned earlier, the OSI provisions of the Treaty text were less well developed at the conclusion of the Geneva negotiations than those covering the International Monitoring System and International Data Center. As was explained, the OSI element of the verification regime remains the most politically sensitive. Any request for an inspection under the CTBT would be in essence a challenge to the compliance of the country involved and, thereby, politically charged. Predictably, the same countries which during the negotiation tried to make it as difficult as possible to launch an inspection have made the process of developing an Operational Manual to govern inspections a painfully slow process.* It has not helped that as a result of its change in policy in 2001 regarding ratification of the Treaty, the United States pulled out of the OSI deliberations, where previously it had provided much leadership and expertise. The rationale was that because inspections could only take place after entry into *Despite entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, there had been no request for a challenge inspection during the first four years of its operation, which some observers believed was due to political sensitivities (Tucker 2001). This gives ammunition to those who claim that CTBT’s on-site inspection provision not only makes launching an inspection too slow to be useful, but it also lacks credibility as a deterrent against cheating.

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force, they will never happen. Some in the United States have argued that the final Treaty text makes it so difficult to launch an inspection that the OSI provision is essentially worthless in any case. Given the U.S. position, most countries now are in no hurry to work out the details of the OSI issue, which ultimately will require difficult compromises in order to reach consensus on an Operational Manual. At least one country (Israel) has stated that its willingness to ratify the Treaty is dependent on the outcome of PrepCom deliberations on the Manual.

chapter seven

Implementation, Part 3 Impact of Change in U.S. Policy

Second only to India’s refusal to join consensus on the Treaty text in the CD in 1996 and its subsequent refusal to sign the Treaty, U.S. decisions and actions since 1999 have set back prospects for the CTBT’s entry into force and, therefore, its potential contribution to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. After leading the CTBT charge for nearly six years, the United States now finds itself pushed to the margins and being used as a convenient scapegoat for all that ails the Treaty and its implementation. The Republican victory in the U.S. presidential election of 2000 caused supporters of the CTBT to hold their breath, because some Republicans during the election campaign had declared the Treaty not to be in the U.S. national interest. Everyone expected that the new Administration’s policy review would not bode well for the Treaty. However, the results of the interagency debates and policy considerations actually led to a policy that was less negative than many had feared. To be sure, in July 2001, the new Administration dealt the Treaty a serious blow by deciding not to seek its ratification 67

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(Shanker and Sanger 2001). Nevertheless, the Administration agreed to remain engaged in most PrepCom activities (principally building up the International Monitoring System), but it stopped supporting those dealing with entry-intoforce (EIF) or post-EIF issues, such as preparing for on-site inspections. This meant that the United States would continue paying over 90 percent of its annual assessment to the PrepCom and would continue cooperating with the Provisional Technical Secretariat in the installation, operation and maintenance of key IMS stations in which the United States had been involved. However, as mentioned above, the change in policy meant that the United States withdrew from all involvement in the deliberations of on-site inspections, which denied the PrepCom key expertise and leadership in that arena. Preparatory Commission Reactions Responses to the change in U.S. policy were mixed. As mentioned earlier, some were relieved that the announced change was not more severe than it might have been. But when viewed along with the U.S. decisions to pull out of the ABM Treaty and not to support the Kyoto Protocol, many saw dark clouds on the horizon for U.S. support of international arms control efforts. Several months later after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, others voiced disappointment that, in spite of the international support for the United States following these attacks, the U.S. continued to pursue arms control policies counter to the desires of most of the international community. As long as the United States continued to pay most of its assessment, however, the PrepCom in general was relieved that CTBT implementation activities could continue, albeit at a reduced pace. Many in the world community expressed the hope that U.S. policy would revert to its pre-2001 position, especially if the Bush Administration lost its bid for reelection in 2004. However, some delegations appeared elated at the change in U.S. policy. For example, one Israeli representative was heard to declare that the United States had just let Israel “off the hook” (presumably meaning not having to face the prospect of intrusive on-site inspections under the CTBT). The Chinese delegates also seemed relieved that China would not any time soon be subject to international monitoring or inspections. The Chinese made it clear in subsequent statements that they would make it difficult for the United States (or any other state) to benefit from the provision of IMS data for monitoring without ratifying the Treaty. Various other delegations stepped up

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their opposition to the annual budget increases required to build and maintain the IMS and IDC, arguing that the pace of implementation should slow down to match the poorer prospects for entry into force of the Treaty resulting from the change in U.S. policy. For U.S. delegates on the ground in Vienna, the impact was significant. They had to shift from a position of leadership on issues to one of reacting to what others did. No longer were U.S. representatives and experts seen as reliable in the effort to move implementation forward. To be sure, the United States remained engaged in most of the debates (except for on-site inspections and any entry-into-force deliberations), but the U.S. voice no longer was seen as authoritative. Indeed, the United States became the “whipping boy” for those delegates who wanted to blame the United States for all ills encountered by the PrepCom. China increasingly hardened its position against the provision of IMS data prior to entry into force. For the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS), the impact was more complicated and potentially disruptive. Although the United States remained fully engaged in working with the PTS on IMS and IDC issues, the lack of prospects for entry into force began to create concerns that the considerable international investment and effort might be for naught. After five years of intense work, there was fear that Treaty implementation might slow to a pace that would barely maintain what had already been accomplished, much less move ahead to complete the considerable work yet to be done. The now remote prospects for entry into force made it harder for the PTS, which had meanwhile become more mature and competent in its technical work, to argue for increased funding to meet its ambitious goals of completing the IMS and IDC. Apprehension grew that such a slowdown would weaken the will of international experts serving on the PTS to remain committed and engaged. And in the on-site inspection arena, delegations realized that their efforts now had no particular urgency. Moreover, they feared that the United States might eventually come back into the deliberations at some point and want to revisit issues already settled, at least provisionally, by those countries that had remained engaged. Ratifications and Entry-into-Force Thus far, the PrepCom has been able to maintain reasonable momentum, despite the setback from the change in U.S. policy; additional countries

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continue to sign and ratify the Treaty. Since the summer of 2001, a total of 13 countries have signed (for a total of 175) and 37 (for a total of 122) have ratified the Treaty (CTBTO Web site 2005). Of the 44 countries specifically required by Article XIV, Annex 2, for entry into force, three still have not signed (India, Pakistan, and North Korea), and eight of those who have signed still have not ratified (China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, United States, and Viet Nam). As the situation stands, it is important not to leave the reader with a misconception regarding the importance of U.S. policy to the future of the CTBT. Without question, U.S. leadership prior to the summer of 2001 was critical, and its ratification remains essential to the Treaty’s future. Without it, the Treaty cannot enter into force. Moreover, the longer the United States refuses to move toward ratification, the more the implementation effort is likely to suffer and stagnate. However, the importance of U.S. action or inaction should not mask the fact that other countries, whose signatures and ratifications are likewise essential for entry into force of the Treaty, do not appear to be enthusiastic about the Treaty and are most likely hiding behind current U.S. policy. Thus, U.S. ratification, while essential, would not guarantee that the Treaty will ever enter into force. India (and as a result Pakistan) certainly shows no inclination to sign the CTBT, despite what it claims to have been successful tests in 1998. India perceives its main potential strategic threat to be China, so it is safe to assume that India will not be open to a permanent ban on testing until China is firmly committed—and perhaps not even then. If China feels behind in its nuclear testing program, this is certainly even more true for India! Thus, even if the United States and then China were to ratify the CTBT, there is no guarantee that India would follow, at least not immediately. The only bright spot in terms of nuclear testing is the fact that in February 1999, India and Pakistan agreed to abide by parallel but unilateral moratoria on testing (Lahore Agreements 1999). And then there is North Korea, which at the moment appears to be the most difficult holdout. Pyongyang clearly states that its security is pegged directly to U.S. military power in the region, and many suspect that North Korea’s nuclear weapon program is viewed internally as its only defense against the United States. How the North Korean situation plays out is beyond the scope of this analysis. One cannot exclude the optimistic possibil-

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ity, however remote it may appear at this juncture, that Pyongyang eventually will follow a path similar to the one taken by Tripoli. Libya appears to have concluded that its national security and economic well-being will be better served by giving up its nuclear weapon program and other weapons of mass destruction. If there is a formula that can bring North Korea into the community of nations and give it a sufficient sense of security to make its possession of nuclear weapons unnecessary, then perhaps this obstacle to the CTBT’s entry into force will eventually disappear. Iran is posing an increasingly difficult problem for the international community. It appears to be pursuing a nuclear weapon program behind its legitimate uranium enrichment activities permitted under the NPT. Iran is a signatory to the CTBT and continues to actively participate in its implementation activities. However, this could change quickly, if Teheran concluded that being a self-declared nuclear weapon state was essential to its national security. Learning a lesson from India and Pakistan, Iran might make such a declaration credible through nuclear testing, once it is able to do so. At a minimum, its ratification of the CTBT is likely to be contingent upon that of the United States and Israel, if not also that of India and Pakistan. Finally, it should be clear from this discussion that China’s commitment to the CTBT has been at best reluctant. During the negotiations, China evidenced unhappiness at being put in the same camp as Russia and the United States (i.e., declared nuclear weapon states having to fight off the calls by the non-nuclear weapon states for total disarmament). With considerable justification, China claims that it is the least developed of the P–5, although it fails to acknowledge that it is the only one of the five that continues to build up its strategic nuclear arsenal. Moreover, the total number of its nuclear test explosions is considerably smaller than most of the other P–5 members, so China believes it is behind and should not bear as much responsibility for nuclear disarmament as the others. Given such attitudes, it is possible that China would be happier without than with the CTBT. Therefore, it is not surprising that Beijing appears to have conditioned its ratification on what the United States does. And China appears willing to block the provision of IMS data to participating States Signatories, especially to the United States, prior to entry into force, putting the blame on the United States for its lack of commitment to the Treaty. If in the absence of its entry into force the Treaty is going to make any contribution, countries will need to devise a way

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to capitalize on the investment already made in the Treaty’s extensive technical monitoring system. However, to do so they will need to figure out how to get around those countries, such as China, that are determined to block efforts to enhance international monitoring of nuclear testing activities without the Treaty legally being in force. Impact of Possible Alternative U.S. Moves Even accepting the proposition that other countries are content to let the United States bear the blame for the CTBT stalemate, the United States still appears to be the catalyst to any hope of turning around the other holdouts. It is useful, therefore, to explore what the implications of possible alternative future U.S. actions would be for the Treaty. The following four options appear to bracket the most likely alternative directions for U.S. policy over the next half dozen years: (1) United States continues its current policy. If we assume that U.S. policy toward the CTBT does not change for at least another four years and the United States continues to pay most of its assessment to the PrepCom, the other holdouts are likely to maintain their current positions as well, which would perpetuate the current implementation stalemate. The other key holdouts would have little or no motivation for making the first move toward signature and/or ratification. The impact on the PrepCom would be increasingly negative, because a growing number of countries would question the utility of funding, at least at current levels, a treaty regime that appears to have no future before the end of the decade. Although blaming the United States, China’s refusal to allow IMS data to flow to participating countries for monitoring purposes would prevent any return on the significant international investment in the technical verification system. Moreover, it would become increasingly hard for the PTS to attract and retain the high-quality international talent needed to keep the IMS and IDC functioning. If the United States were to move beyond the research stage of developing an earth-penetrating nuclear warhead, some countries would likely use this as an excuse to resume their own warhead development programs. Any of these programs might lead to a requirement for testing. Except perhaps for North Korea and Iran, however, it is unlikely that any of these countries would test before the United States. Rather, they would prefer to let the United States take the brunt of international recriminations for any resumption of testing.

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(2) United States stops its funding and support for the PrepCom. If we assume that the United States pulls back from the PrepCom in both expertise and funding, then the situation would quickly turn negative and would likely lead to a heated debate about the future of the Prepcom. Other holdouts would likely perceive such a change in policy as indication of eventual resumption of testing by the United States. China, Russia, and perhaps India and Pakistan would probably make preparations for additional nuclear explosive testing, although they probably would not test unless the United States did so first. Unless North Korea had already agreed to give up its nuclear program, it would likely continue to increase its stockpile and threaten further WMD proliferation. Similarly, Iran would probably feel emboldened to pursue its nuclear weapon development program and might withdraw from the CTBT. Indeed, it would not be surprising to some if Iran followed North Korea’s example in pulling out of the IAEA and NPT. All of this would further weaken the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and thereby risk the advent of additional self-declared nuclear weapon states. (3) United States resumes nuclear testing. Should the United States decide to resume nuclear explosive testing, however limited in duration, the impact on the international community would be dramatic. Most observers believe that this “worst-case scenario” would lead to the unraveling of the CTBT PrepCom. Some countries would probably halt their financial contributions altogether, figuring that further investment in the enterprise would be pointless. The PTS would likely be forced to scramble to maintain as much of the IMS and IDC capabilities as possible with dwindling resources and political support. Such a breach in what has become a non-testing international norm through unilateral moratoria, even in the absence of the CTBT’s entry into force, would certainly further weaken the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It is likely that some other countries, both those that have tested in the past and perhaps some that have not, would view a resumption of U.S. testing as a green light to unleash whatever nuclear weapon development and testing programs their technical or political leaders deem necessary for their national security. In any case, the impact on the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and the NPT in particular, would be dramatic. Many of the non-nuclear weapon states would cry “foul” and accuse the nuclear weapon states of reneging on their Article VI commitments and their promise of a permanent ban on testing which they made in return for the indefinite extension of the NPT in

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1995. Most devastating would be additional threats to withdraw, or actual withdrawals, from the NPT. As was the case with North Korea, the United States would bear the blame for these withdrawals and the resulting disintegration of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. (4) United States once again promotes ratification and entry into force of the Treaty. If the United States were to return to its pre-2001 policy (i.e., it embraces the CTBT as a useful part of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and once again gives leadership to its implementation), many countries would give a great sigh of relief. There would be renewed optimism that the CTBT will eventually enter into force. U.S. ratification would put the remaining holdouts in the crosshairs of the pro-CTBT international community, and pressure would increase to get them on board. All this would be a positive boost for international efforts to halt the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, U.S. ratification of the CTBT could not be assumed, even with a change in administrations. Given the history of the Treaty in the U.S. Senate, getting the Senate’s advice and consent for the Treaty would be a major challenge for almost any administration and far from a sure thing, even in this most optimistic scenario. Unfortunately, positive U.S. moves would not necessarily be reciprocated by all of the other key holdouts. In particular, India (and therefore Pakistan) and North Korea might not be willing to join a parade of countries signing and ratifying the Treaty. Iran would likely wait to see what Israel would do. It is not clear that the international community, even with U.S. support, could put enough pressure on these countries or offer them sufficient inducements to give up testing forever. Having witnessed the flip-flop in U.S. policy as a result of changing administrations, some in the international community would likely be skeptical that any stated policy by the United States on nuclear testing, especially on the CTBT, could be trusted over the long term. Finally, any continued U.S. research on a new nuclear earth-penetrating weapon designed to strike underground WMD facilities would foster suspicion that eventually the United States would resume nuclear testing.

chapter eight

Implications of Alternative CTBT Futures for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

Prospects for the CTBT do not appear to be bright. Several of those countries whose signature and ratification are required for entry into force show no sign of interest in doing so, and no one has yet come up with a viable scheme for provisionally making effective use of the CTBT’s technical capabilities for monitoring nuclear tests. To some extent, the IMS and IDC are currently operating in a provisional mode as part of the effort to test overall system capabilities as additional monitoring stations become operational. Perhaps this acts somewhat as a deterrent to further testing. However, this is not the comprehensive monitoring envisioned by the negotiators of the Treaty. The PrepCom has not been able to achieve consensus on what international monitoring should be permitted prior to entry into force of the Treaty. This is likely to remain the case until key Treaty holdouts, especially China, India, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, and the United States, make significant moves toward signature and ratification, thereby making entry into force much more probable than it is today. 75

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The foregoing discussion has suggested how U.S. ratification would reinvigorate the international community and the PrepCom’s work in particular, and it likely would lead to considerable renewed international pressure on the other Treaty holdouts. However, the preceding discussion also cautioned that U.S. ratification would not necessarily guarantee that other countries, which are critical for the Treaty’s entry into force, would move toward signature or ratification. Until the United States ratifies, China’s ratification appears to be on hold. Beijing’s ratification would probably depend on its assessment of the likelihood that the United States would stay the course and not once again change its mind about the merits of a permanent ban on nuclear testing. In addition to concerns about U.S. efforts under both Republican and Democratic administrations to develop a national missile defense capability, Beijing also is keeping its eye on current U.S. interest in concepts for a low-yield nuclear, earth-penetrating warhead, which it suspects would probably lead to a resumption of nuclear testing. India—the next critical country—would not necessarily follow the lead of the United States and China toward treaty signature and ratification. India’s calculations appear to be driven by regional security concerns (including the actions of China) and a desire to be seen as a major international player. It is important to remember that in the case of the NPT, India has demonstrated its willingness to rebuff the international community and ignore calls for compliance with international nuclear nonproliferation norms for 35 years. And North Korea cannot be expected to sign the CTBT until, at a minimum, the United States, China, and India sign and ratify the Treaty, and maybe not even then, if its security concerns are not met. Thus, at the present time the future of the CTBT at best remains uncertain. Even the most optimistic scenario regarding U.S. policy is no guarantee that the Treaty will enter into force and make the contribution to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and nuclear disarmament its authors and promoters had hoped. Realistically, there are at least three ways that the Treaty’s future can unfold: ■

Scenario #1. The implementation process continues to drift along as it is today until some significant event nudges the process in a more positive or negative direction (e.g., by a change in U.S. policy that again supports the CTBT or alternatively resumes testing to support the development of a new, low-yield

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earth-penetrating warhead). The Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) would continue building and certifying IMS stations, albeit at a slower and slower pace. The PrepCom would likely continue debating over how and under what circumstances IMS data may be shared with states signatory to the Treaty for the purposes of monitoring testing activity, rather than monitoring earthquakes and other natural phenomena. It would be increasingly hard without any good prospect for entry into force to maintain the commitment of States Signatories to the Treaty: and it would become more difficult to motivate PTS personnel to continue building and maintaining the Treaty’s organization and verification capabilities. This is the most likely scenario. ■

■

Scenario #2. The implementation process stagnates, due to lack of adequate funding or lack of political support resulting from actions that further dampen the prospects for entry into force of the Treaty. Were the U.S. or other countries to decide to reduce or eliminate their funding for the PrepCom, efforts to complete and maintain IMS stations and the International Data Center—the core of the Treaty’s verification regime—would be undermined. This would make the hiring and retention of key experts harder for the PTS, and countries would begin to lose interest in the entire enterprise. It is likely that some countries and PTS personnel would try to conceive of a way to use IMS data and IDC capabilities on a provisional basis. But without the legal obligations of the Treaty being in force, some other countries (such as China and Iran) would likely strive to prevent actual international monitoring. They would likely argue that there is no requirement for any country to make itself transparent to other countries, unless that activity falls within the purview of a country’s obligations under another international treaty. Scenario #3. A positive turnaround in support for the CTBT infuses new life into the PrepCom and implementation process, thereby reviving hope that entry into force of the Treaty is a real possibility. It would be possible essentially to complete and fully test the IMS and IDC, and serious development of the on-site inspection regime could move forward. International commitment to the permanent test ban and support for CTBT implementation would be renewed. This is the scenario that most countries are still hoping for. However, because of the reasons given earlier, it seems to be the least likely outcome.

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As remote as it appears, a reinvigorated CTBT implementation process with brighter prospects for eventual entry into force of the Treaty would certainly be considered by most observers to be a significant boost for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This would put maximum focus on the remaining CTBT holdouts and perhaps inspire creative ways to help them feel secure enough to take the risk of signing and ratifying the Treaty. It would also reduce the concerns on the part of the non-nuclear weapon states that the nuclear weapon states, and the United States in particular, are ignoring their Article VI nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT. Finally, it might help to create an atmosphere in which the Conference on Disarmament could seriously consider the negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), which, along with the CTBT, was requested by the non-nuclear weapon states in return for the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 (Graham 2002). On balance, the national and international impediments to the CTBT’s entry into force are formidable, and there is little reason to believe that this stalemate will change in the foreseeable future. This situation is in stark contrast to the period of optimism that characterized the international community ten years ago. The euphoria of the early post-Cold War period has given way to a more realistic understanding of what is possible given the regional tensions and international security issues that subsequently have surfaced. India’s bolt at the end of the negotiations began a downward spiral for the CTBT that has yet to be reversed. The Treaty, therefore, may forever remain a legacy of that brief period when the world seemed headed in a more positive direction, particularly in terms of nuclear nonproliferation initiatives and nuclear disarmament undergirded by a permanent ban on nuclear testing.

chapter nine

Conclusion

Efforts to establish international norms, particularly in the arena of arms control and nonproliferation, tend to be long and tedious. As the CTBT episode has shown, even when the time appears to be ripe for agreement, regional tensions and national insecurities make such negotiations difficult. And we must recognize that the challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime are much larger than the future of this one Treaty. After all, the CTBT only bans the “bang” (i.e., the testing of nuclear explosive devices), not the “bomb”; unlike the NPT, it neither bans the development nor the possession of such weapons by non-nuclear weapon states. The NPT, more than the CTBT, is central to a solid international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and it too is under strain. Despite significant setbacks to its implementation, however, the CTBT story is not over. There remains significant international desire to establish a permanent halt to all nuclear explosive testing. As became apparent during the negotiation of the indefinite extension of the NPT, a permanent test ban 79

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plays a role in bolstering the confidence of the non-nuclear weapon states which need reassurance that the NPT’s “grand bargain” is being upheld by the nuclear weapon states. Non-nuclear weapon states have been calling for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing since the negotiation of the NPT in the late 1960s. Thus, despite its relatively minor potential contribution to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the CTBT is a symbol of a good faith commitment to the NPT on the part of the nuclear weapon states. In that sense, the test ban’s fate will influence the future effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Perhaps most important is the fact that the motivations for some countries to develop nuclear arsenals are in large measure independent of what the United States does or what happens to the CTBT. This has certainly been true in the case of India, which has resisted international constraints on its nuclear program for 35 years. It may also be true in the case of Iran, which appears to be most concerned about Israel and the possibility of being left behind in the achievement of “greatness,” if it does not possess its own nuclear arsenal. And North Korea’s actions appear to be a direct reflection of its weakness and isolation from the world community, despite efforts thus far by the United States, UN, IAEA, and others. Thus, the international community must do more to deal with the “demand” side of the nuclear nonproliferation equation by developing more effective strategies to reduce the fear, tension, and hostility among nations that motivate nuclear proliferation. The future effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime depends, therefore, on multiple factors that go beyond any single treaty. But it is safe to say that the regime’s chances of remaining viable and effective would be strengthened by the entry into force of the CTBT. This would give efforts to prevent further nuclear proliferation a much-needed boost, and it would once again be possible to isolate and bring international pressure on the remaining CTBT and NPT holdouts, especially India and North Korea. However, as discussed earlier, there are significant impediments to the CTBT’s entry into force. As yet there is no indication that the second administration of President George W. Bush will reverse course on the Treaty. As long as there remains some debate about the possibility of resuming testing to perfect a new type of warhead to destroy deep underground bunkers, other countries are likely to be cautious about future U.S. intentions. Even if the United States halted all research on a new warhead and moved toward ratification of the

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CTBT, which would give new life to a stagnant situation, several other countries are likely to continue to block the Treaty’s entry into force because their perceptions of national security require that they preserve the nuclear option. Setting politics aside, some honest and important reservations regarding verification were raised during the truncated review by the U.S. Senate in 1999 and must be addressed. Questions regarding the ability of any one country (including the United States), much less the Treaty’s International Monitoring System, to verify a zero ban have yet to be fully vetted. Negotiators understood that the CTBT’s verification regime would not be foolproof, but they hoped that it would provide a significant deterrent to cheating. Experts have argued the case from both sides of the verification issue, but ultimately each government must make a political decision regarding how much uncertainly and risk it is willing to assume. Furthermore, the nuclear activities of certain countries continue to plague the international community and raise concerns not only about the verifiability of the CTBT but also the viability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime itself. The CTBT experience demonstrates once again the inherent difficulty that accompanies the negotiation of a treaty that establishes a meaningful international norm. By definition, compromises are essential to the success of negotiations, but in time those compromises can also undermine the effectiveness of a treaty. As is evidenced by the difficulties in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty itself contains a significant weakness that is the result of a compromise between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” And the negotiation of the CTBT required numerous compromises. While essential to obtain consensus, these compromises have created obstacles and weaknesses in the Treaty. In addition to the requirement to verify what most experts believe is an unverifiable “zero-yield” ban, the requirement that 44 countries must both sign and ratify the Treaty put the entry-into-force bar higher than appears to be attainable. Many negotiators at the time warned that this political compromise would likely plague those who push for entry into force. There are other lessons that can be learned from the CTBT episode. First, U.S. leadership is critical to the success of many international negotiations, as was evidenced by Washington’s forceful initiatives during the negotiations and early years of Treaty implementation. And those initiatives bore fruit for the most part as a result of consistent senior policy-level focus

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and direction. Second, close cooperation and coordination with allies and like-minded countries proved essential to U.S. efforts to push forward on CTBT issues. At times, it was more productive for the U.S. to relinquish the lead to others in order to win the support of those countries that were skeptical of U.S. motives. Third, involvement by the U.S. Congress, particularly the Senate, is essential for a successful ratification process. The fact that the Clinton Administration failed to include Senate observers in the negotiating process, as had been successfully done in previous negotiations, was a fatal mistake. Finally, the artificial deadline for concluding the negotiation, which was imposed in part for domestic political reasons in the United States, led to further compromises that have added to the subsequent difficulty of gaining political support for the Treaty. (See Appendix E, “Some Lessons Learned From CTBT Negotiations and Implementation,” p. 196, for more details.) The foregoing discussion has shown that it will take much more than the CTBT and U.S. support for it to ensure that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is effective and accepted as the international standard, for both inhibiting and preventing future nuclear proliferation. As Drell and Goodby have persuasively argued, in the end it will be a sense of national security on the part of each state from perceived or actual threats that will best deter proliferation efforts (Drell and Goodby 2003). Most countries accept the importance of global adherence to treaties, such as the NPT and CTBT, but these conventions are at best imperfect answers to conditions of insecurity and distrust that result from regional conflicts. The nuclear weapon states must do their part by continuing efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals, including the destruction of warheads, to be sure. But, collective efforts also must continue to enlarge the search for bilateral and international arrangements that will help allay the anxieties that drive individual countries to acquire nuclear weapons to ensure their security. The success in persuading Libya to relinquish its nuclear option has given hope that other countries will follow suit. North Korea and Iran need immediate attention and may ultimately respond to regional solutions backed by the international community. Unfortunately, countries such as India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran witnessed the success of the United States and NATO in using nuclear deterrence to hold the Soviet Union at bay for almost forty years. The challenge now is to convince these countries, whose adversaries are

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generally neighbors, that traditional deterrence theory does not necessarily apply to their situations; their use of nuclear weapons would likely have as much devastating effect on their own country as on the adversary. Thus, their reliance on nuclear weapons can be a liability rather than a military advantage. Moreover, nuclear weapons offer no defense against terrorists who have no large troop concentrations or facilities to target, yet terrorists in principle can use crude nuclear devices with impunity (Burns 2003). From the CTBT experience it should be obvious that domestic politics, national aspirations and policy objectives often conflict with, override, and at times undermine efforts to establish international norms. Ultimately, countries look inward or to their close friends and allies for security rather than to international organizations or agreements that are difficult to influence or control, and which at times are too slow to act. One exception to this tendency has been the negotiation of regional nuclear-weapon free zones (NWFZs), which have been adopted by the countries in Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific. Another NWFZ is nearing adoption by the countries in Central Asia. Such treaties create “de facto nuclear test bans” in their regions and appear to be a positive boon to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Unfortunately, the regions where such treaties would provide the greatest contribution are precisely where insecurities have already bred or are breeding efforts toward nuclear proliferation. Calls have been made for years for the establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones in the Middle East and South Asia, but deep-seated regional tensions and suspicions make such agreements thus far unattainable. It was only when countries, such as South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina, voluntarily gave up their nuclear weapon development programs or arsenals that some of the current NWFZ treaties became possible and viable. It appears evident, therefore, that a variety of approaches are needed, depending on the situation, to prevent and, where necessary, roll back nuclear proliferation. The contribution, which large multilateral efforts, such as through the NPT, IAEA, UN, NWFZs, and CTBT, can make to international stability continues to be appreciated by most countries despite their limitations. But international efforts can take various forms. This was demonstrated by the UN Security Council’s adoption in April 2004 of Resolution 1540, which requires all states to take certain measures and pass laws to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to terrorist groups.

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This initiative was pushed by the United States and is a clear recognition that no one nation can meet this challenge alone. Implementation of the resolution may be difficult, but the results are potentially significant (see Appendix I, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540,” p. 221). In addition, the Director-General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, and others are advocating the multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle available to non-nuclear weapon states to better control the ability to produce fissile material suitable for use in weapons. As part of the NPT “grand bargain,” non-nuclear weapon states required that the NPT provide for the sharing of nuclear technology and expertise for peaceful purposes. However, some of that technology, particularly that used for reprocessing and enrichment of fuel, can also be used to produce fissile material for military purposes. Thus, the NPT as negotiated essentially creates a “break-out” potential for the development of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon states. ElBaradei’s proposal is an effort to eliminate this proliferation loophole (ElBaradei 2003). There is also a trend toward other multilateral approaches, where likeminded countries band together to do what they believe is required for their security. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which was announced by President Bush in 2003, is just such an approach (see Appendix H, “Proliferation Security Initiative Fact Sheet,” p. 217). The Administration claims that over a dozen countries are now formal participants, and dozens more are facilitating worldwide counter-proliferation efforts. The PSI has already contributed to the disarmament of Libya and to the unraveling of the A.Q. Khan black-market, nuclear proliferation network. The U.S. Administration has characterized the PSI as “an activity, not an organization” and has described the initiative as focusing on enhancing states’ operational capabilities in the intelligence, military, and law enforcement arenas (Bolton 2004). Perhaps some effort along these lines will help bear fruit in the most pressing cases of North Korea and Iran. In the end, however, the most effective measures to ensure the viability and utility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, perhaps including a permanent ban on nuclear testing, will be those that creatively resolve issues of insecurity that otherwise lead countries to believe that nuclear weapons are the best guarantee of their national security.

appendix a

Chronology of Efforts to Ban the Testing of Nuclear Weapons

The following are the most significant historical events in the effort to ban nuclear testing: 1946

Baruch Plan (the U.S. would give up its arsenal in return for no further proliferation)

1953

President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech calling for international control

1954

Prime Minister Nehru’s call in the UN for a ban on nuclear testing

1957

International Atomic Energy Agency is established

1959

The Antarctic Treaty (bans military activities, including nuclear testing)

1963

Limited Test Ban Treaty (bans nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water)

1967

Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone, Treaty of Tlateloco

1968

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

1974

Threshold Test Ban Treaty (limits yield of underground testing to 150 kilotons)

1976

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (allows limited nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes)

1977–80 Comprehensive Test Ban Negotiations (unsuccessful negotiations by the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States) 1986

South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, Treaty of Raratonga

1990

Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties enter into force 85

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1992

United States begins unilateral moratorium on testing; Congress pushes for the negotiation of a CTBT by 1996

1994

Conference on Disarmament begins negotiating a CTBT

1995

NPT is extended indefinitely; includes commitment to negotiate a CTBT

1995

UN General Assembly calls for the negotiation of a CTBT by September 1996

1996

African Nuclear-Free Zone, Treaty of Pelindaba

1996

Southeast Asia Nuclear-Free Zone, Treaty of Bangkok

1996

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is opened for signature

1997

Clinton Administration submits CTBT to Senate for advice and consent

1999

U.S. Senate fails to give advice and consent

2001

Bush Administration announces no intention to seek ratification of CTBT

appendix b

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT) Text

Preamble The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as “the States Parties”), welcoming the international agreements and other positive measures of recent years in the field of nuclear disarmament, including reductions in arsenals of nuclear weapons, as well as in the field of the prevention of nuclear proliferation in all its aspects, underlining the importance of the full and prompt implementation of such agreements and measures, convinced that the present international situation provides an opportunity to take further effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and declaring their intention to take such measures, stressing therefore the need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced

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new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, further recognizing that an end to all such nuclear explosions will thus constitute a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament, convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, which has long been one of the highest priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, noting the aspirations expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, noting also the views expressed that this Treaty could contribute to the protection of the environment, affirming the purpose of attracting the adherence of all States to this Treaty and its objective to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security, have agreed as follows:

Article I. Basic Obligations 1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

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2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

Article II. The Organization A. General Provisions

1. The States Parties hereby establish the Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to as “the Organization”) to achieve the object and purpose of this Treaty, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties. 2. All States Parties shall be members of the Organization. A State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization. 3. The seat of the Organization shall be Vienna, Republic of Austria. 4. There are hereby established as organs of the Organization: the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, which shall include the International Data Centre. 5. Each State Party shall cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Treaty. States Parties shall consult, directly among themselves, or through the Organization or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the object and purpose, or the implementation of the provisions, of this Treaty. 6. The Organization shall conduct its verification activities provided for under this Treaty in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfil its responsibilities under this Treaty. It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Treaty and, in particular, shall abide by the confidentiality provisions set forth in this Treaty.

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7. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to information and data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in connection with the implementation of this Treaty. It shall treat such information and data exclusively in connection with its rights and obligations under this Treaty. 8. The Organization, as an independent body, shall seek to utilize existing expertise and facilities, as appropriate, and to maximize cost efficiencies, through cooperative arrangements with other international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Such arrangements, excluding those of a minor and normal commercial and contractual nature, shall be set out in agreements to be submitted to the Conference of the States Parties for approval. 9. The costs of the activities of the Organization shall be met annually by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the Organization. 10. Financial contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission shall be deducted in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular budget. 11. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payment of its assessed contribution to the Organization shall have no vote in the Organization if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full years. The Conference of the States Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member. B. The Conference of the States Parties

Composition, Procedures and Decision-making 12. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as “the Conference”) shall be composed of all States Parties. Each State Party shall have one representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. 13. The initial session of the Conference shall be convened by the Depositary no later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Treaty.

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14. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions, which shall be held annually, unless it decides otherwise. 15. A special session of the Conference shall be convened: (a) When decided by the Conference; (b) When requested by the Executive Council; or (c) When requested by any State Party and supported by a majority of the States Parties. The special session shall be convened no later than 30 days after the decision of the Conference, the request of the Executive Council, or the attainment of the necessary support, unless specified otherwise in the decision or request. 16. The Conference may also be convened in the form of an Amendment Conference, in accordance with Article VII. 17. The Conference may also be convened in the form of a Review Conference in accordance with Article VIII. 18. Sessions shall take place at the seat of the Organization unless the Conference decides otherwise. 19. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each session, it shall elect its President and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new President and other officers are elected at the next session. 20. A majority of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum. 21. Each State Party shall have one vote. 22. The Conference shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance shall be taken as far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the President of the Conference shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take a decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this Treaty. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance. 23. When exercising its function under paragraph 26 (k), the Conference shall take a decision to add any State to the list of States contained in Annex

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1 to this Treaty in accordance with the procedure for decisions on matters of substance set out in paragraph 22. Notwithstanding paragraph 22, the Conference shall take decisions on any other change to Annex 1 to this Treaty by consensus. Powers and Functions 24. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty, including those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, in accordance with this Treaty. It may make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. 25. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of, and review compliance with, this Treaty and act in order to promote its object and purpose. It shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines to either of them for the exercise of their functions. 26. The Conference shall: (a) Consider and adopt the report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty and the annual programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive Council, as well as consider other reports; (b) Decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in accordance with paragraph 9; (c) Elect the members of the Executive Council; (d) Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as “the Director-General”); (e) Consider and approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter; (f) Consider and review scientific and technological developments that could affect the operation of this Treaty. In this context, the Conference may direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him or her, in the performance of his or her functions, to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Treaty to the Conference, to the Executive Council or to States Parties. In that case,

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(g)

(h)

(i)

(j) (k)

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the Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts serving in their individual capacity and appointed, in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference, on the basis of their expertise and experience in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Treaty; Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation that contravenes the provisions of this Treaty, in accordance with Article V; Consider and approve at its initial session any draft agreements, arrangements, provisions, procedures, operational manuals, guidelines and any other documents developed and recommended by the Preparatory Commission; Consider and approve agreements or arrangements negotiated by the Technical Secretariat with States Parties, other States and international organizations to be concluded by the Executive Council on behalf of the Organization in accordance with paragraph 38 (h); Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Treaty; and Update Annex 1 to this Treaty, as appropriate, in accordance with paragraph 23.

C. The Executive Council

Composition, Procedures and Decision-making 27. The Executive Council shall consist of 51 members. Each State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, to serve on the Executive Council. 28. Taking into account the need for equitable geographical distribution, the Executive Council shall comprise: (a) Ten States Parties from Africa; (b) Seven States Parties from Eastern Europe; (c) Nine States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean; (d) Seven States Parties from the Middle East and South Asia; (e) Ten States Parties from North America and Western Europe; and (f) Eight States Parties from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East.

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All States in each of the above geographical regions are listed in Annex 1 to this Treaty. Annex 1 to this Treaty shall be updated, as appropriate, by the Conference in accordance with paragraphs 23 and 26 (k). It shall not be subject to amendments or changes under the procedures contained in Article VII. 29. The members of the Executive Council shall be elected by the Conference. In this connection, each geographical region shall designate States Parties from that region for election as members of the Executive Council as follows: (a) At least one-third of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled, taking into account political and security interests by States Parties in that region designated on the basis of the nuclear capabilities relevant to the Treaty as determined by international data as well as all or any of the following indicative criteria in the order of priority determined by each region: (i) Number of monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System; (ii) Expertise and experience in monitoring technology; and (iii) Contribution to the annual budget of the Organization; (b) One of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled on a rotational basis by the State Party that is first in the English alphabetical order among the States Parties in that region that have not served as members of the Executive Council for the longest period of time since becoming States Parties or since their last term, whichever is shorter. A State Party designated on this basis may decide to forgo its seat. In that case, such a State Party shall submit a letter of renunciation to the DirectorGeneral, and the seat shall be filled by the State Party following next-in-order according to this sub-paragraph; and (c) The remaining seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled by States Parties designated from among all the States Parties in that region by rotation or elections. 30. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one representative on the Executive Council, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. 31. Each member of the Executive Council shall hold office from the end of the session of the Conference at which that member is elected until the end of the second regular annual session of the Conference thereafter, ex-

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cept that for the first election of the Executive Council, 26 members shall be elected to hold office until the end of the third regular annual session of the Conference, due regard being paid to the established numerical proportions as described in paragraph 28. 32. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit them to the Conference for approval. 33. The Executive Council shall elect its Chairman from among its members. 34. The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. Between regular sessions it shall meet as may be required for the fulfilment of its powers and functions. 35. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote. 36. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of all its members. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority of all its members unless specified otherwise in this Treaty. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance. Powers and Functions 37. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Organization. It shall be responsible to the Conference. It shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it in accordance with this Treaty. In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and ensure their continuous and proper implementation. 38. The Executive Council shall: (a) Promote effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Treaty; (b) Supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat; (c) Make recommendations as necessary to the Conference for consideration of further proposals for promoting the object and purpose of this Treaty; (d) Cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party; (e) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft annual programme and budget of the Organization, the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty, the report

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on the performance of its own activities and such other reports as it deems necessary or that the Conference may request; (f) Make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference, including the preparation of the draft agenda; (g) Examine proposals for changes, on matters of an administrative or technical nature, to the Protocol or the Annexes thereto, pursuant to Article VII, and make recommendations to the States Parties regarding their adoption; (h) Conclude, subject to prior approval of the Conference, agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations on behalf of the Organization and supervise their implementation, with the exception of agreements or arrangements referred to in sub-paragraph (i); (i) Approve and supervise the operation of agreements or arrangements relating to the implementation of verification activities with States Parties and other States; and (j) Approve any new operational manuals and any changes to the existing operational manuals that may be proposed by the Technical Secretariat. 39. The Executive Council may request a special session of the Conference. 40. The Executive Council shall: (a) Facilitate cooperation among States Parties, and between States Parties and the Technical Secretariat, relating to the implementation of this Treaty through information exchanges; (b) Facilitate consultation and clarification among States Parties in accordance with Article IV; and (c) Receive, consider and take action on requests for, and reports on, on-site inspections in accordance with Article IV. 41. The Executive Council shall consider any concern raised by a State Party about possible non-compliance with this Treaty and abuse of the rights established by this Treaty. In doing so, the Executive Council shall consult with the States Parties involved and, as appropriate, request a State Party to take measures to redress the situation within a specified time. To the extent that the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures: (a) Notify all States Parties of the issue or matter;

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(b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference; (c) Make recommendations to the Conference or take action, as appropriate, regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance in accordance with Article V. D. The Technical Secretariat

42. The Technical Secretariat shall assist States Parties in the implementation of this Treaty. The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical Secretariat shall carry out the verification and other functions entrusted to it by this Treaty, as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference or the Executive Council in accordance with this Treaty. The Technical Secretariat shall include, as an integral part, the International Data Centre. 43. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with regard to verification of compliance with this Treaty shall, in accordance with Article IV and the Protocol, include inter alia: (a) Being responsible for supervising and coordinating the operation of the International Monitoring System; (b) Operating the International Data Centre; (c) Routinely receiving, processing, analysing and reporting on International Monitoring System data; (d) Providing technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of monitoring stations; (e) Assisting the Executive Council in facilitating consultation and clarification among States Parties; (f) Receiving requests for on-site inspections and processing them, facilitating Executive Council consideration of such requests, carrying out the preparations for, and providing technical support during, the conduct of on-site inspections, and reporting to the Executive Council; (g) Negotiating agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations and concluding, subject to prior approval by the Executive Council, any such agreements or arrangements relating to verification activities with States Parties or other States; and

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(h) Assisting the States Parties through their National Authorities on other issues of verification under this Treaty. 44. The Technical Secretariat shall develop and maintain, subject to approval by the Executive Council, operational manuals to guide the operation of the various components of the verification regime, in accordance with Article IV and the Protocol. These manuals shall not constitute integral parts of this Treaty or the Protocol and may be changed by the Technical Secretariat subject to approval by the Executive Council. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the States Parties of any changes in the operational manuals. 45. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with respect to administrative matters shall include: (a) Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization; (b) Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty and such other reports as the Conference or the Executive Council may request; (c) Providing administrative and technical support to the Conference, the Executive Council and other subsidiary organs; (d) Addressing and receiving communications on behalf of the Organization relating to the implementation of this Treaty; and (e) Carrying out the administrative responsibilities related to any agreements between the Organization and other international organizations. 46. All requests and notifications by States Parties to the Organization shall be transmitted through their National Authorities to the DirectorGeneral. Requests and notifications shall be in one of the official languages of this Treaty. In response the Director-General shall use the language of the transmitted request or notification. 47. With respect to the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat for preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization, the Technical Secretariat shall determine and maintain a clear accounting of all costs for each facility established as part of the International Monitoring System. Similar treatment in the draft programme and budget shall be accorded to all other activities of the Organization.

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48. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the Executive Council of any problems that have arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions that have come to its notice in the performance of its activities and that it has been unable to resolve through consultations with the State Party concerned. 49. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be its head and chief administrative officer, and such scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required. The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon the recommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four years, renewable for one further term, but not thereafter. The first Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference at its initial session upon the recommendation of the Preparatory Commission. 50. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and the Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and for the organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of professional expertise, experience, efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Director-General, as inspectors or as members of the professional and clerical staff. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper discharge of the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat. 51. The Director-General may, as appropriate, after consultation with the Executive Council, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific issues. 52. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other source external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action that might reflect adversely on their positions as international officers responsible only to the Organization. The Director-General shall assume responsibility for the activities of an inspection team. 53. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection

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assistants and the members of the staff and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. E. Privileges and Immunities

54. The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions. 55. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers, representatives of members elected to the Executive Council, together with their alternates and advisers, the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff of the Organization shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization. 56. The legal capacity, privileges and immunities referred to in this Article shall be defined in agreements between the Organization and the State Parties as well as in an agreement between the Organization and the State in which the Organization is seated. Such agreements shall be considered and approved in accordance with paragraph 26 (h) and (i). 57. Notwithstanding paragraphs 54 and 55, the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff of the Technical Secretariat during the conduct of verification activities shall be those set forth in the Protocol.

Article III. National Implementation Measures 1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty. In particular, it shall take any necessary measures: (a) To prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty; (b) To prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any such activity anywhere under its control; and

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(c) To prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons possessing its nationality from undertaking any such activity anywhere. 2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations under paragraph 1. 3. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the measures taken pursuant to this Article. 4. In order to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty, each State Party shall designate or set up a National Authority and shall so inform the Organization upon entry into force of the Treaty for it. The National Authority shall serve as the national focal point for liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties.

Article IV. Verification A. General Provisions

1. In order to verify compliance with this Treaty, a verification regime shall be established consisting of the following elements: (a) An International Monitoring System; (b) Consultation and clarification; (c) On-site inspections; and (d) Confidence-building measures. At entry into force of this Treaty, the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of this Treaty. 2. Verification activities shall be based on objective information, shall be limited to the subject matter of this Treaty, and shall be carried out on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of States Parties and in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of their objectives. Each State Party shall refrain from any abuse of the right of verification. 3. Each State Party undertakes in accordance with this Treaty to cooperate through its National Authority established pursuant to Article III, paragraph 4, with the Organization and with other States Parties to facilitate the verification of compliance with this Treaty by, inter alia:

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(a) Establishing the necessary facilities to participate in these verification measures and establishing the necessary communication; (b) Providing data obtained from national stations that are part of the International Monitoring System; (c) Participating, as appropriate, in a consultation and clarification process; (d) Permitting the conduct of on-site inspections; and (e) Participating, as appropriate, in confidence-building measures. 4. All States Parties, irrespective of their technical and financial capabilities, shall enjoy the equal right of verification and assume the equal obligation to accept verification. 5. For the purposes of this Treaty, no State Party shall be precluded from using information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, including that of respect for the sovereignty of States. 6. Without prejudice to the right of States Parties to protect sensitive installations, activities or locations not related to this Treaty, States Parties shall not interfere with elements of the verification regime of this Treaty or with national technical means of verification operating in accordance with paragraph 5. 7. Each State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to this Treaty. 8. Moreover, all necessary measures shall be taken to protect the confidentiality of any information related to civil and military activities and facilities obtained during verification activities. 9. Subject to paragraph 8, information obtained by the Organization through the verification regime established by this Treaty shall be made available to all States Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. 10. The provisions of this Treaty shall not be interpreted as restricting the international exchange of data for scientific purposes. 11. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization and with other States Parties in the improvement of the verification regime, and in the examination of the verification potential of additional monitoring technologies such as electromagnetic pulse monitoring or satellite monitor-

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ing, with a view to developing, when appropriate, specific measures to enhance the efficient and cost-effective verification of this Treaty. Such measures shall, when agreed, be incorporated in existing provisions in this Treaty, the Protocol or as additional sections of the Protocol, in accordance with Article VII, or, if appropriate, be reflected in the operational manuals in accordance with Article II, paragraph 44. 12. The States Parties undertake to promote cooperation among themselves to facilitate and participate in the fullest possible exchange relating to technologies used in the verification of this Treaty in order to enable all States Parties to strengthen their national implementation of verification measures and to benefit from the application of such technologies for peaceful purposes. 13. The provisions of this Treaty shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the economic and technological development of the States Parties for further development of the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Verification Responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat 14. In discharging its responsibilities in the area of verification specified in this Treaty and the Protocol, in cooperation with the State Parties the Technical Secretariat shall, for the purpose of this Treaty: (a) Make arrangements to receive and distribute data and reporting products relevant to the verification of this Treaty in accordance with its provisions, and to maintain a global communications infrastructure appropriate to this task; (b) Routinely through its International Data Centre, which shall in principle be the focal point within the Technical Secretariat for data storage and data processing: (i) Receive and initiate requests for data from the International Monitoring System; (ii) Receive data, as appropriate, resulting from the process of consultation and clarification, from on-site inspections, and from confidence-building measures; and (iii) Receive other relevant data from States Parties and international organizations in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol;

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(c) Supervise, coordinate and ensure the operation of the International Monitoring System and its component elements, and of the International Data Centre, in accordance with the relevant operational manuals; (d) Routinely process, analyse and report on International Monitoring System data according to agreed procedures so as to permit the effective international verification of this Treaty and to contribute to the early resolution of compliance concerns; (e) Make available all data, both raw and processed, and any reporting products, to all States Parties, each State Party taking responsibility for the use of International Monitoring System data in accordance with Article II, paragraph 7, and with paragraphs 8 and 13 of this Article; (f) Provide to all States Parties equal, open, convenient and timely access to all stored data; (g) Store all data, both raw and processed, and reporting products; (h) Coordinate and facilitate requests for additional data from the International Monitoring System; (i) Coordinate requests for additional data from one State Party to another State Party; (j) Provide technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of monitoring facilities and respective communication means, where such assistance and support are required by the State concerned; (k) Make available to any State Party, upon its request, techniques utilized by the Technical Secretariat and its International Data Centre in compiling, storing, processing, analysing and reporting on data from the verification regime; and (l) Monitor, assess and report on the overall performance of the International Monitoring System and of the International Data Centre. 15. The agreed procedures to be used by the Technical Secretariat in discharging the verification responsibilities referred to in paragraph 14 and detailed in the Protocol shall be elaborated in the relevant operational manuals.

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B. The International Monitoring System

16. The International Monitoring System shall comprise facilities for seismological monitoring, radionuclide monitoring including certified laboratories, hydroacoustic monitoring, infrasound monitoring, and respective means of communication, and shall be supported by the International Data Centre of the Technical Secretariat. 17. The International Monitoring System shall be placed under the authority of the Technical Secretariat. All monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be owned and operated by the States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for them in accordance with the Protocol. 18. Each State Party shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of data and to have access to all data made available to the International Data Centre. Each State Party shall cooperate with the International Data Centre through its National Authority. Funding the International Monitoring System 19. For facilities incorporated into the International Monitoring System and specified in Tables 1–A, 2–A, 3 and 4 of Annex 1 to the Protocol, and for their functioning, to the extent that such facilities are agreed by the relevant State and the Organization to provide data to the International Data Centre in accordance with the technical requirements of the Protocol and relevant operational manuals, the Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant to Part I, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, shall meet the costs of: (a) Establishing any new facilities and upgrading existing facilities unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself; (b) Operating and maintaining International Monitoring System facilities, including facility physical security if appropriate, and application of agreed data authentication procedures; (c) Transmitting International Monitoring System data (raw or processed) to the International Data Centre by the most direct and cost effective means available, including, if necessary, via appropriate communications nodes, from monitoring stations, laboratories, analytical facilities or from national data centres; or

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such data (including samples where appropriate) to laboratory and analytical facilities from monitoring stations; and (d) Analysing samples on behalf of the Organization. 20. For auxiliary network seismic stations specified in Table 1–B of Annex 1 to the Protocol the Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant to Part I, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, shall meet the costs only of: (a) Transmitting data to the International Data Centre; (b) Authenticating data from such stations; (c) Upgrading stations to the required technical standard, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself; (d) If necessary, establishing new stations for the purposes of this Treaty where no appropriate facilities currently exist, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself; and (e) Any other costs related to the provision of data required by the Organization as specified in the relevant operational manuals. 21. The Organization shall also meet the cost of provision to each State Party of its requested selection from the standard range of International Data Centre reporting products and services, as specified in Part I, Section F of the Protocol. The cost of preparation and transmission of any additional data or products shall be met by the requesting State Party. 22. The agreements or, if appropriate, arrangements concluded with States Parties or States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for facilities of the International Monitoring System shall contain provisions for meeting these costs. Such provisions may include modalities whereby a State Party meets any of the costs referred to in paragraphs 19 (a) and 20 (c) and (d) for facilities which it hosts or for which it is responsible, and is compensated by an appropriate reduction in its assessed financial contribution to the Organization. Such a reduction shall not exceed 50 percent of the annual assessed financial contribution of a State Party, but may be spread over successive years. A State Party may share such a reduction with another State Party by agreement or arrangement between themselves and with the concurrence of the Executive Council. The agreements or arrangements referred to in this paragraph shall be approved in accordance with Article II, paragraphs 26 (h) and 38 (i).

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Changes to the International Monitoring System 23. Any measures referred to in paragraph 11 affecting the International Monitoring System by means of addition or deletion of a monitoring technology shall, when agreed, be incorporated into this Treaty and the Protocol pursuant to Article VII, paragraphs 1 to 6. 24. The following changes to the International Monitoring System, subject to the agreement of those States directly affected, shall be regarded as matters of an administrative or technical nature pursuant to Article VII, paragraphs 7 and 8: (a) Changes to the number of facilities specified in the Protocol for a given monitoring technology; and (b) Changes to other details for particular facilities as reflected in the Tables of Annex 1 to the Protocol (including, inter alia, State responsible for the facility; location; name of facility; type of facility; and attribution of a facility between the primary and auxiliary seismic networks). If the Executive Council recommends, pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 8 (d) that such changes be adopted, it shall as a rule also recommend pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 8 (g) that such changes enter into force upon notification by the Director-General of their approval. 25. The Director-General, in submitting to the Executive Council and States Parties information and evaluation in accordance with Article VII, paragraph 8 (b), shall include in the case of any proposal made pursuant to paragraph 24: (a) A technical evaluation of the proposal; (b) A statement on the administrative and financial impact of the proposal; and (c) A report on consultations with States directly affected by the proposal, including indication of their agreement. Temporary Arrangements 26. In cases of significant or irretrievable breakdown of a monitoring facility specified in the Tables of Annex 1 to the Protocol, or in order to cover other temporary reductions of monitoring coverage, the Director-General shall, in consultation and agreement with those States directly affected, and

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with the approval of the Executive Council, initiate temporary arrangements of no more than one year’s duration, renewable if necessary by agreement of the Executive Council and of the States directly affected for another year. Such arrangements shall not cause the number of operational facilities of the International Monitoring System to exceed the number specified for the relevant network; shall meet as far as possible the technical and operational requirements specified in the operational manual for the relevant network; and shall be conducted within the budget of the Organization. The DirectorGeneral shall furthermore take steps to rectify the situation and make proposals for its permanent resolution. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties of any decision taken pursuant to this paragraph. Cooperating National Facilities 27. States Parties may also separately establish cooperative arrangements with the Organization, in order to make available to the International Data Centre supplementary data from national monitoring stations that are not formally part of the International Monitoring System. 28. Such cooperative arrangements may be established as follows: (a) Upon request by a State Party, and at the expense of that State, the Technical Secretariat shall take the steps required to certify that a given monitoring facility meets the technical and operational requirements specified in the relevant operational manuals for an International Monitoring System facility, and make arrangements for the authentication of its data. Subject to the agreement of the Executive Council, the Technical Secretariat shall then formally designate such a facility as a cooperating national facility. The Technical Secretariat shall take the steps required to revalidate its certification as appropriate; (b) The Technical Secretariat shall maintain a current list of cooperating national facilities and shall distribute it to all States Parties and; (c) The International Data Centre shall call upon data from cooperating national facilities, if so requested by a State Party, for the purposes of facilitating consultation and clarification and the consideration of on-site inspection requests, data transmission costs being borne by that State Party.

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The conditions under which supplementary data from such facilities are made available, and under which the International Data Centre may request further or expedited reporting, or clarifications, shall be elaborated in the operational manual for the respective monitoring network. C. Consultation and Clarification

29. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request an on-site inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, among themselves or with or through the Organization, any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty. 30. A State Party that receives a request pursuant to paragraph 29 directly from another State Party shall provide the clarification to the requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48 hours after the request. The requesting and requested States Parties may keep the Executive Council and the Director-General informed of the request and the response. 31. A State Party shall have the right to request the Director-General to assist in clarifying any matter which may cause concern about possible noncompliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty. The Director-General shall provide appropriate information in the possession of the Technical Secretariat relevant to such a concern. The Director-General shall inform the Executive Council of the request and of the information provided in response, if so requested by the requesting State Party. 32. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty. In such a case, the following shall apply: (a) The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the requested State Party through the Director-General no later than 24 hours after its receipt; (b) The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48 hour after receipt of the request;

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(c) The Executive Council shall take note of the clarification and forward it to the requesting State Party no later than 24 hours after its receipt; (d) If the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain further clarification from the requested State Party. The Executive Council shall inform without delay all other States Parties about any request for clarification pursuant to this paragraph as well as any response provided by the requested State Party. 33. If the requesting State Party considers the clarification obtained under paragraph 32 (d) to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to request a meeting of the Executive Council in which States Parties involved that are not members of the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part. At such a meeting, the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure in accordance with Article V. D. On-Site Inspections

Request for an On-Site Inspection 34. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site inspection in accordance with the provisions of this Article and Part II of the Protocol in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any State Party, or in any area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State. 35. The sole Purpose of an on-site inspection shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I and, to the extent possible, to gather any facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator. 36. The requesting State Party shall be under the obligation to keep the on-site inspection request within the scope of this Treaty and to provide in the request information in accordance with paragraph 37. The requesting State Party shall refrain from unfounded or abusive inspection requests. 37. The on-site inspection request shall be based on information collected by the International Monitoring System, on any relevant technical information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, or on a

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combination thereof. The request shall contain information pursuant to Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol. 38. The requesting State Party shall present the on-site inspection request to the Executive Council and at the same time to the Director-General for the latter to begin immediate processing. Follow-up After Submission of an On-Site Inspection Request 39. The Executive Council shall begin its consideration immediately upon receipt of the on-site inspection request. 40. The Director-General, after receiving the on-site inspection request, shall acknowledge receipt of the request to the requesting State Party within two hours and communicate the request to the State Party sought to be inspected within six hours. The Director-General shall ascertain that the request meets the requirements specified in Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol, and, if necessary, shall assist the requesting State Party in filing the request accordingly, and shall communicate the request to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties within 24 hours. 41. When the on-site inspection request fulfils the requirements, the Technical Secretariat shall begin preparations for the on-site inspection without delay. 42. The Director-General, upon receipt of an on-site inspection request referring to an inspection area under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, shall immediately seek clarification from the State Party sought to be inspected in order to clarify and resolve the concern raised in the request. 43. A State Party that receives a request for clarification pursuant to paragraph 42 shall provide the Director-General with explanations and with other relevant information available as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after receipt of the request for clarification. 44. The Director-General, before the Executive Council takes a decision on the on-site inspection request, shall transmit immediately to the Executive Council any additional information available from the International Monitoring System or provided by any State Party on the event specified in the request, including any clarification provided pursuant to paragraphs 42 and 43, as well as any other information from within the Technical Secretariat that the Director-General deems relevant or that is requested by the Executive Council.

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45. Unless the requesting State Party considers the concern raised in the on-site inspection request to be resolved and withdraws the request, the Executive Council shall take a decision on the request in accordance with paragraph 46. Executive Council Decisions 46. The Executive Council shall take a decision on the on-site inspection request no later than 96 hours after receipt of the request from the requesting State Party. The decision to approve the on-site inspection shall be made by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the Executive Council. If the Executive Council does not approve the inspection, preparations shall be stopped and no further action on the request shall be taken. 47. No later than 25 days after the approval of the on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 46, the inspection team shall transmit to the Executive Council, through the Director-General, a progress inspection report. The continuation of the inspection shall be considered approved unless the Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the progress inspection report, decides by a majority of all its members not to continue the inspection. If the Executive Council decides not to continue the inspection, the inspection shall be terminated, and the inspection team shall leave the inspection area and the territory of the inspected State Party as soon as possible in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol. 48. In the course of the on-site inspection, the inspection team may submit to the Executive Council, through the Director-General, a proposal to conduct drilling. The Executive Council shall take a decision on such a proposal no later than 72 hours after receipt of the proposal. The decision to approve drilling shall be made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council. 49. The inspection team may request the Executive Council, through the Director-General, to extend the inspection duration by a maximum of 70 days beyond the 60-day time-frame specified in Part II, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, if the inspection team considers such an extension essential to enable it to fulfil its mandate. The inspection team shall indicate in its request which of the activities and techniques listed in Part II, paragraph 6 of the Protocol it intends to carry out during the extension period. The Executive Council shall take a decision on the extension request no later than 72 hours

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after receipt of the request. The decision to approve an extension of the inspection duration shall be made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council. 50. Any time following the approval of the continuation of the on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 47, the inspection team may submit to the Executive Council, through the Director-General, a recommendation to terminate the inspection. Such a recommendation shall be considered approved unless the Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the recommendation, decides by a two-thirds majority of all its members not to approve the termination of the inspection. In case of termination of the inspection, the inspection team shall leave the inspection area and the territory of the inspected State Party as soon as possible in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol. 51. The requesting State Party and the State Party sought to be inspected may participate in the deliberations of the Executive Council on the on-site inspection request without voting. The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party may also participate without voting in any subsequent deliberations of the Executive Council related to the inspection. 52. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties within 24 hours about any decision by and reports, proposals, requests and recommendations to the Executive Council pursuant to paragraphs 46 to 50. Follow-up after Executive Council Approval of an On-Site Inspection 53. An on-site inspection approved by the Executive Council shall be conducted without delay by an inspection team designated by the DirectorGeneral and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. The inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry no later than six days following the receipt by the Executive Council of the on-site inspection request from the requesting State Party. 54. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of the on-site inspection. The inspection mandate shall contain the information specified in Part II, paragraph 42 of the Protocol. 55. The Director-General shall notify the inspected State Party of the inspection no less than 24 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, in accordance with Part II, paragraph 43 of the Protocol.

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The Conduct of an On-Site Inspection 56. Each State Party shall permit the Organization to conduct an on-site inspection on its territory or at places under its jurisdiction or control in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. However, no State Party shall have to accept simultaneous on-site inspections on its territory or at places under its jurisdiction or control. 57. In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol, the inspected State Party shall have: (a) The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with this Treaty and, to this end, to enable the inspection team to fulfil its mandate; (b) The right to take measures it deems necessary to protect national security interests and to prevent disclosure of confidential information not related to the purpose of the inspection; (c) The obligation to provide access within the inspection area for the sole purpose of determining facts relevant to the purpose of the inspection, taking into account sub-paragraph (b) and any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures; (d) The obligation not to invoke this paragraph or Part II, paragraph 88 of the Protocol to conceal any violation of its obligations under Article I; and (e) The obligation not to impede the ability of the inspection team to move within the inspection area and to carry out inspection activities in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol. Access, in the context of an on-site inspection, means both the physical access of the inspection team and the inspection equipment to, and the conduct of inspection activities within, the inspection area. 58. The on-site inspection shall be conducted in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the efficient and timely accomplishment of the inspection mandate, and in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol. Wherever possible, the inspection team shall begin with the least intrusive procedures and then proceed to more intrusive procedures only as it deems necessary to collect sufficient information to clarify the concern about

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possible non-compliance with this Treaty. The inspectors shall seek only the information and data necessary for the purpose of the inspection and shall seek to minimize interference with normal operations of the inspected State Party. 59. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the on-site inspection and facilitate its task. 60. If the inspected State Party, acting in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 86 to 96 of the Protocol, restricts access within the inspection area, it shall make every reasonable effort in consultations with the inspection team to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Treaty. Observer 61. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply: (a) The requesting State Party, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party, may send a representative, who shall be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to observe the conduct of the on-site inspection; (b) The inspected State Party shall notify its acceptance or non-acceptance of the proposed observer to the Director-General within 12 hours after approval of the on-site inspection by the Executive Council; (c) In case of acceptance, the inspected State Party shall grant access to the observer in accordance with the Protocol; (d) The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be recorded in the inspection report. There shall be no more than three observers from an aggregate of requesting States Parties. Reports of an On-Site Inspection 62. Inspection reports shall contain: (a) A description of the activities conducted by the inspection team; (b) The factual findings of the inspection team relevant to the purpose of the inspection, (c) An account of the cooperation granted during the on-site inspection;

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(d) A factual description of the extent of the access granted, including the alternative means provided to the team, during the onsite inspection; and (e) Any other details relevant to the purpose of the inspection. Differing observations made by inspectors may be attached to the report. 63. The Director-General shall make draft inspection reports available to the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide the Director-General within 48 hours with its comments and explanations, and to identify any information and data which, in its view, are not related to the purpose of the inspection and should not be circulated outside the Technical Secretariat. The Director-General shall consider the proposals for changes to the draft inspection report made by the inspected State Party and shall wherever possible incorporate them. The Director-General shall also annex the comments and explanations provided by the inspected State Party to the inspection report. 64. The Director-General shall promptly transmit the inspection report to the requesting State Party, the inspected State Party, the Executive Council and to all other States Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit promptly to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties any results of sample analysis in designated laboratories in accordance with Part II, paragraph 104 of the Protocol, relevant data from the International Monitoring System, the assessments of the requesting and inspected States Parties, as well as any other information that the Director-General deems relevant. In the case of the progress inspection report referred to in paragraph 47, the Director-General shall transmit the report to the Executive Council within the time-frame specified in that paragraph. 65. The Executive Council, in accordance with its powers and functions, shall review the inspection report and any material provided pursuant to paragraph 64, and shall address any concerns as to: (a) Whether any non-compliance with this Treaty has occurred; and (b) Whether the right to request an on-site inspection has been abused. 66. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and functions, that further action may be necessary with regard to paragraph 65, it shall take the appropriate measures in accordance with Article V.

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Frivolous or Abusive On-Site Inspection Requests 67. If the Executive Council does not approve the on-site inspection on the basis that the on-site inspection request is frivolous or abusive, or if the inspection is terminated for the same reasons, the Executive Council shall consider and decide on whether to implement appropriate measures to redress the situation, including the following: (a) Requiring the requesting State Party to pay for the cost of any preparations made by the Technical Secretariat; (b) Suspending the right of the requesting State Party to request an on-site inspection for a period of time, as determined by the Executive Council; and (c) Suspending the right of the requesting State Party to serve on the Executive Council for a period of time. E. Confidence-Building Measures

68. In order to: (a) Contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising from possible misinterpretation of verification data relating to chemical explosions, and (b) Assist in the calibration of the stations that are part of the component networks of the International Monitoring System, each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization and with other States Parties in implementing relevant measures as set out in Part III of the Protocol.

Article V. Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions 1. The Conference, taking into account, inter alia, the recommendations of the Executive Council, shall take the necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3, to ensure compliance with this Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Treaty.

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2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or the Executive Council to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance and fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, decide to restrict or suspend the State Party from the exercise of its rights and privileges under this Treaty until the Conference decides otherwise. 3. In cases where damage to the object and purpose of this Treaty may result from non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty, the Conference may recommend to States Parties collective measures which are in conformity with international law. 4. The Conference, or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Executive Council, may bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions to the attention of the United Nations.

Article VI. Settlement of Disputes 1. Disputes that may arise concerning the application or the interpretation of this Treaty shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 2. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or more States Parties and the Organization, relating to the application or interpretation of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties’ choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this Treaty and, by mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court. The parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions being taken. 3. The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of a dispute that may arise concerning the application or interpretation of this Treaty by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties to a dispute to seek a settlement through a process of their own choice, bringing the matter to the attention of the Conference and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

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4. The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States Parties or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. The Conference shall, as it finds necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to the settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article II, paragraph 26 (j). 5. The Conference and the Executive Council are separately empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the activities of the Organization. An agreement between the Organization and the United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with Article II, paragraph 38 (h). 6. This Article is without prejudice to Articles IV and V.

Article VII. Amendments 1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the Protocol. Any State Party may also propose changes, in accordance with paragraph 7, to the Protocol or the Annexes thereto. Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures in paragraphs 2 to 6. Proposals for changes, in accordance with paragraph 7, shall be subject to the procedures in paragraph 8. 2. The proposed amendment shall be considered and adopted only by an Amendment Conference. 3. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the DirectorGeneral, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and the Depositary and seek the views of the States Parties on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Director-General no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Director-General shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited. 4. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a regular session of the Conference unless all States Parties that support the

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convening of an Amendment Conference request that it be held earlier. In no case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days after the circulation of the proposed amendment. 5. Amendments shall be adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a majority of the States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote. 6. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification or acceptance by all those States Parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference. 7. In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, Parts I and III of the Protocol and Annexes 1 and 2 to the Protocol shall be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 8, if the proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or technical nature. All other provisions of the Protocol and the Annexes thereto shall not be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 8. 8. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 7 shall be made in accordance with the following procedures: (a) The text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted together with the necessary information to the Director-General. Additional information for the evaluation of the proposal may be provided by any State Party and the Director-General. The Director-General shall promptly communicate any such proposals and information to all States Parties, the Executive Council and the Depositary; (b) No later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director-General shall evaluate the proposal to determine all its possible consequences for the provisions of this Treaty and its implementation and shall communicate any such information to all States Parties and the Executive Council; (c) The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of all information available to it, including whether the proposal fulfils the requirements of paragraph 7. No later than 90 days after its receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its recommendation, with appropriate explanations, to all States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days;

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(d) If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it shall be considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation; (e) If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with the acceptance required under sub-paragraph (d), a decision on the proposal, including whether it fulfils the requirements of paragraph 7, shall be taken as a matter of substance by the Conference at its next session; (f) The Director-General shall notify all States Parties and the Depositary of any decision under this paragraph; (g) Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all States Parties 180 days after the date of notification by the Director-General of their approval unless another time period is recommended by the Executive Council or decided by the Conference.

Article VIII. Review of the Treaty 1. Unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States Parties, ten years after the entry into force of this Treaty a Conference of the States Parties shall be held to review the operation and effectiveness of this Treaty, with a view to assuring itself that the objectives and purposes in the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Treaty. On the basis of a request by any State Party, the Review Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review Conference decides by consensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted, it shall commence work without delay, with a view to recommending to States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude any military benefits

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of such nuclear explosions. Any such proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General by any State Party and shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Article VII. 2. At intervals of ten years thereafter, further Review Conferences may be convened with the same objective, if the Conference so decides as a matter of procedure in the preceding year. Such Conferences may be convened after an interval of less than ten years if so decided by the Conference as a matter of substance. 3. Normally, any Review Conference shall be held immediately following the regular annual session of the Conference provided for in Article II.

Article IX. Duration and Withdrawal 1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. 3. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice six months in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security Council. Notice of withdrawal shall include a statement of the extraordinary event or events which a State Party regards as jeopardizing its supreme interests.

Article X. Status of the Protocol and the Annexes The Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol, and the Annexes to the Protocol form an integral part of the Treaty. Any reference to this Treaty includes the Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol and the Annexes to the Protocol.

Article XI. Signature This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature before its entry into force.

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Article XII. Ratification This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States according to their respective constitutional processes.

Article XIII. Accession Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter.

Article XIV. Entry into Force 1. This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature. 2. If this Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature, the Depositary shall convene a Conference of the States that have already deposited their instruments of ratification on the request of a majority of those States. That Conference shall examine the extent to which the requirement set out in paragraph 1 has been met and shall consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty. 3. Unless otherwise decided by the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 or other such conferences, this process shall be repeated at subsequent anniversaries of the opening for signature of this Treaty, until its entry into force. 4. All States Signatories shall be invited to attend the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 and any subsequent conferences as referred to in paragraph 3, as observers. 5. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

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Article XV. Reservations The Articles of and the Annexes to this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. The provisions of the Protocol to this Treaty and the Annexes to the Protocol shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of this Treaty.

Article XVI. Depositary 1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Treaty and shall receive signatures, instruments of ratification and instruments of accession. 2. The Depositary shall promptly inform all States Signatories and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and of any amendments and changes thereto, and the receipt of other notices. 3. The Depositary shall send duly certified copies of this Treaty to the Governments of the States Signatories and acceding States. 4. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XVII. Authentic Texts This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.

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Annex 1 to the Treaty

List of States Pursuant to Article II, Paragraph 28 Africa

Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Eastern Europe

Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia. Latin America and the Caribbean

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.

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Middle East and South Asia

Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Maldives, Oman, Nepal, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen. North America and Western Europe

Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. South East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East

Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam.

Annex 2 to the Treaty

List of States Pursuant to Article XIV List of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s April 1996 edition of “Nuclear Power Reactors in the World”, and

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of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s December 1995 edition of “Nuclear Research Reactors in the World”: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam, Zaire.

Protocol to the COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

Part I. The International Monitoring System and International Data Centre Functions A. General Provisions

1. The International Monitoring System shall comprise monitoring facilities as set out in Article IV, paragraph 16, and respective means of communication. 2. The monitoring facilities incorporated into the International Monitoring System shall consist of those facilities specified in Annex 1 to this Protocol. The International Monitoring System shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the relevant operational manuals. 3. The Organization, in accordance with Article II, shall, in cooperation and consultation with the States Parties, with other States, and with international organizations as appropriate, establish and coordinate the operation and maintenance, and any future agreed modification or development of the International Monitoring System. 4. In accordance with appropriate agreements or arrangements and procedures, a State Party or other State hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for International Monitoring System facilities and the Technical Secretariat shall agree and cooperate in establishing, operating, upgrading, financing, and maintaining monitoring facilities, related certified laboratories and respective means of communication within areas under its jurisdiction or control or elsewhere in conformity with international law. Such cooperation shall be in accordance with the security and authentication requirements and technical specifications contained in the relevant operational manuals.

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Such a State shall give the Technical Secretariat authority to access a monitoring facility for checking equipment and communication links, and shall agree to make the necessary changes in the equipment and the operational procedures to meet agreed requirements. The Technical Secretariat shall provide to such States appropriate technical assistance as is deemed by the Executive Council to be required for the proper functioning of the facility as part of the International Monitoring System. 5. Modalities for such cooperation between the Organization and States Parties or States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be set out in agreements or arrangements as appropriate in each case. B. Seismological Monitoring

6. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of seismological data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of primary and auxiliary seismological monitoring stations. These stations shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre. 7. The network of primary stations shall consist of the 50 stations specified in Table 1–A of Annex 1 to this Protocol. These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Seismological Monitoring and the International Exchange of Seismological Data. Uninterrupted data from the primary stations shall be transmitted, directly or through a national data centre, on-line to the International Data Centre. 8. To supplement the primary network, an auxiliary network of 120 stations shall provide information, directly or through a national data centre, to the International Data Centre upon request. The auxiliary stations to be used are listed in Table 1–B of Annex 1 to this Protocol. The auxiliary stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Seismological Monitoring and the International Exchange of Seismological Data. Data from the auxiliary stations may at any time be requested by the International Data Centre and shall be immediately available through on-line computer connections.

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C. Radionuclide Monitoring

9. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of data on radionuclides in the atmosphere to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of radionuclide monitoring stations and certified laboratories. The network shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre. 10. The network of stations to measure radionuclides in the atmosphere shall comprise an overall network of 80 stations, as specified in Table 2–A of Annex 1 to this Protocol. All stations shall be capable of monitoring for the presence of relevant particulate matter in the atmosphere. Forty of these stations shall also be capable of monitoring for the presence of relevant noble gases upon the entry into force of this Treaty. For this purpose the Conference, at its initial session, shall approve a recommendation by the Preparatory Commission as to which 40 stations from Table 2–A of Annex 1 to this Protocol shall be capable of noble gas monitoring. At its first regular annual session, the Conference shall consider and decide on a plan for implementing noble gas monitoring capability throughout the network. The DirectorGeneral shall prepare a report to the Conference on the modalities for such implementation. All monitoring stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Radionuclide Monitoring and the International Exchange of Radionuclide Data. 11. The network of radionuclide monitoring stations shall be supported by laboratories, which shall be certified by the Technical Secretariat in accordance with the relevant operational manual for the performance, on contract to the Organization and on a fee-for-service basis, of the analysis of samples from radionuclide monitoring stations. Laboratories specified in Table 2–B of Annex 1 to this Protocol, and appropriately equipped, shall, as required, also be drawn upon by the Technical Secretariat to perform additional analysis of samples from radionuclide monitoring stations. With the agreement of the Executive Council, further laboratories may be certified by the Technical Secretariat to perform the routine analysis of samples from manual monitoring stations where necessary. All certified laboratories shall provide the results of such analysis to the International Data Centre, and in so doing shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified

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in the Operational Manual on Radionuclide Monitoring and the International Exchange of Radionuclide Data. D. Hydroacoustic Monitoring

12. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of hydroacoustic data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of hydroacoustic monitoring stations. These stations shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre. 13. The network of hydroacoustic stations shall consist of the stations specified in Table 3 of Annex 1 to this Protocol, and shall comprise an overall network of six hydrophone and five T- phase stations. These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Hydroacoustic Monitoring and the International Exchange of Hydroacoustic Data. E. Infrasound Monitoring

14. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of infrasound data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of infrasound monitoring stations. These stations shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre. 15. The network of infrasound stations shall consist of the stations specified in Table 4 of Annex 1 to this Protocol, and shall comprise an overall network of 60 stations. These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Infrasound Monitoring and the International Exchange of Infrasound Data. F. International Data Centre Functions

16. The International Data Centre shall receive, collect, process, analyse, report on and archive data from International Monitoring System facilities, including the results of analysis conducted at certified laboratories.

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17. The procedures and standard event screening criteria to be used by the International Data Centre in carrying out its agreed functions, in particular for the production of standard reporting products and for the performance of standard range of services for States Parties, shall be elaborated in the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre and shall be progressively developed. The procedures and criteria developed initially by the Preparatory Commission shall be approved by the Conference at its initial session. International Data Centre Standard Products 18. The International Data Centre shall apply on a routine basis automatic processing methods and interactive human analysis to raw International Monitoring System data in order to produce and archive standard International Data Centre products on behalf of all States Parties. These products shall be provided at no cost to States Parties and shall be without prejudice to final judgements with regard to the nature of any event, which shall remain the responsibility of States Parties, and shall include: (a) Integrated lists of all signals detected by the International Monitoring System, as well as standard event lists and bulletins, including the values and associated uncertainties calculated for each event located by the International Data Centre, based on a set of standard parameters; (b) Standard screened event bulletins that result from the application to each event by the International Data Centre of standard event screening criteria, making use of the characterization parameters specified in Annex 2 to this Protocol, with the objective of characterizing, highlighting in the standard event bulletin, and thereby screening out, events considered to be consistent with natural phenomena or non-nuclear, man-made phenomena. The standard event bulletin shall indicate numerically for each event the degree to which that event meets or does not meet the event screening criteria. In applying standard event screening, the International Data Centre shall use both global and supplementary screening criteria to take account of regional variations where applicable. The International Data Centre shall progressively enhance its technical capabilities as experience is gained in the operation of the International Monitoring System;

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(c) Executive summaries, which summarize the data acquired and archived by the International Data Centre, the products of the International Data Centre, and the performance and operational status of the International Monitoring System and International Data Centre; and (d) Extracts or subsets of the standard International Data Centre products specified in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c), selected according to the request of an individual State Party. 19. The International Data Centre shall carry out, at no cost to States Parties, special studies to provide in-depth, technical review by expert analysis of data from the International Monitoring System, if requested by the Organization or by a State Party, to improve the estimated values for the standard signal and event parameters. International Data Centre Services to States Parties 20. The International Data Centre shall provide States Parties with open, equal, timely and convenient access to all International Monitoring System data, raw or processed, all International Data Centre products, and all other International Monitoring System data in the archive of the International Data Centre or, through the International Data Centre, of International Monitoring System facilities. The methods for supporting data access and the provision of data shall include the following services: (a) Automatic and regular forwarding to a State Party of the products of the International Data Centre or the selection by the State Party thereof, and, as requested, the selection by the State Party of International Monitoring System data; (b) The provision of the data or products generated in response to ad hoc requests by States Parties for the retrieval from the International Data Centre and International Monitoring System facility archives of data and products, including interactive electronic access to the International Data Centre database; and (c) Assisting individual States Parties, at their request and at no cost for reasonable efforts, with expert technical analysis of International Monitoring System data and other relevant data provided by the requesting State Party, in order to help the State Party concerned to identify the source of specific events. The output

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of any such technical analysis shall be considered a product of the requesting State Party, but shall be available to all States Parties. The International Data Centre services specified in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be made available at no cost to each State Party. The volumes and formats of data shall be set out in the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre. National Event Screening 21. The International Data Centre shall, if requested by a State Party, apply to any of its standard products, on a regular and automatic basis, national event screening criteria established by that State Party, and provide the results of such analysis to that State Party. This service shall be undertaken at no cost to the requesting State Party. The output of such national event screening processes shall be considered a product of the requesting State Party. Technical Assistance 22. The International Data Centre shall, where required, provide technical assistance to individual States Parties: (a) In formulating their requirements for selection and screening of data and products; (b) By installing at the International Data Centre, at no cost to a requesting State Party for reasonable efforts, computer algorithms or software provided by that State Party to compute new signal and event parameters that are not included in the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre, the output being considered products of the requesting State Party; and (c) By assisting States Parties to develop the capability to receive, process and analyse International Monitoring System data at a national data centre. 23. The International Data Centre shall continuously monitor and report on the operational status of the International Monitoring System facilities, of communications links, and of its own processing systems. It shall provide immediate notification to those responsible should the operational performance of any component fail to meet agreed levels set out in the relevant operational manual.

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Part II. On-Site Inspections A. General Provisions

1. The procedures in this Part shall be implemented pursuant to the provisions for on-site inspections set out in Article IV. 2. The on-site inspection shall be carried out in the area where the event that triggered the on-site inspection request occurred. 3. The area of an on-site inspection shall be continuous and its size shall not exceed 1,000 square kilometres. There shall be no linear distance greater than 50 kilometres in any direction. 4. The duration of an on-site inspection shall not exceed 60 days from the date of the approval of the on-site inspection request in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 46, but may be extended by a maximum of 70 days in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 49. 5. If the inspection area specified in the inspection mandate extends to the territory or other place under the jurisdiction or control of more than one State Party, the provisions on on-site inspections shall, as appropriate, apply to each of the States Parties to which the inspection area extends. 6. In cases where the inspection area is under the jurisdiction or control of the inspected State Party but is located on the territory of another State Party or where the access from the point of entry to the inspection area requires transit through the territory of a State Party other than the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations concerning such inspections in accordance with this Protocol. In such a case, the State Party on whose territory the inspection area is located shall facilitate the inspection and shall provide for the necessary support to enable the inspection team to carry out its tasks in a timely and effective manner. States Parties through whose territory transit is required to reach the inspection area shall facilitate such transit. 7. In cases where the inspection area is under the jurisdiction or control of the inspected State Party but is located on the territory of a State not Party to this Treaty, the inspected State Party shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the inspection can be carried out in accordance with this Protocol. A State Party that has under its jurisdiction or control one or more areas on the territory of a State not Party to this Treaty shall take all necessary measures to ensure acceptance by the State on whose territory the inspection area

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is located of inspectors and inspection assistants designated to that State Party. If an inspected State Party is unable to ensure access, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access. 8. In cases where the inspection area is located on the territory of a State Party but is under the jurisdiction or control of a State not Party to this Treaty, the State Party shall take all necessary measures required of an inspected State Party and a State Party on whose territory the inspection area is located, without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law, to ensure that the on-site inspection can be carried out in accordance with this Protocol. If the State Party is unable to ensure access to the inspection area, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access, without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law. 9. The size of the inspection team shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper fulfilment of the inspection mandate. The total number of members of the inspection team present on the territory of the inspected State Party at any given time, except during the conduct of drilling, shall not exceed 40 persons. No national of the requesting State Party or the inspected State Party shall be a member of the inspection team. 10. The Director-General shall determine the size of the inspection team and select its members from the list of inspectors and inspection assistants, taking into account the circumstances of a particular request. 11. The inspected State Party shall provide for or arrange the amenities necessary for the inspection team, such as communication means, interpretation services, transportation, working space, lodging, meals, and medical care. 12. The inspected State Party shall be reimbursed by the Organization, in reasonably short period of time after conclusion of the inspection, for all expenses, including those mentioned in paragraphs 11 and 49, related to the stay and functional activities of the inspection team on the territory of the inspected State Party. 13. Procedures for the implementation of on-site inspections shall be detailed in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections. B. Standing Arrangements

Designation of Inspectors and Inspection Assistants 14. An inspection team may consist of inspectors and inspection assistants. An on-site inspection shall only be carried out by qualified inspectors

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specially designated for this function. They may be assisted by specially designated inspection assistants, such as technical and administrative personnel, aircrew and interpreters. 15. Inspectors and inspection assistants shall be nominated for designation by the States Parties or, in case of staff of the Technical Secretariat, by the Director-General, on the basis of their expertise and experience relevant to the purpose and functions of on-site inspections. The nominees shall be approved in advance by the States Parties in accordance with paragraph 18. 16. Each State Party, no later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall notify the Director-General of the names, dates of birth, sex, ranks, qualifications and professional experience of the persons proposed by the State Party for designation as inspectors and inspection assistants. 17. No later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty, the Technical Secretariat shall communicate in writing to all States Parties an initial list of the names, nationalities, dates of birth, sex and ranks of the inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for designation by the DirectorGeneral and the States Parties, as well as a description of their qualifications and professional experience. 18. Each State Party shall immediately acknowledge receipt of the initial list of inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for designation. Any inspector or inspection assistant included in this list shall be regarded as accepted unless a State Party, no later than 30 days after acknowledgment of receipt of the list, declares its non-acceptance in writing. The State Party may include the reason for the objection. In the case of non-acceptance, the proposed inspector or inspection assistant shall not undertake or participate in on-site inspection activities on the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party that has declared its non-acceptance. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately confirm receipt of the notification of objection. 19. Whenever additions or changes to the list of inspectors and inspection assistants are proposed by the Director-General or a State Party, replacement inspectors and inspection assistants shall be designated in the same manner as set forth with respect to the initial list. Each State Party shall promptly notify the Technical Secretariat if an inspector or inspection assistant nominated by it can no longer fulfil the duties of an inspector or inspection assistant.

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20. The Technical Secretariat shall keep the list of inspectors and inspection assistants up to date and notify all States Parties of additions or changes to the list. 21. A State Party requesting an on-site inspection may propose that an inspector from the list of inspectors and inspection assistants serve as its observer in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 61. 22. Subject to paragraph 23, a State Party shall have the right at any time to object to an inspector or inspection assistant who has already been accepted. It shall notify the Technical Secretariat of its objection in writing and may include the reason for the objection. Such objection shall come into effect 30 days after receipt of the notification by the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately confirm receipt of the notification of the objection and inform the objecting and nominating States Parties of the date on which the inspector or inspection assistant shall cease to be designated for that State Party. 23. A State Party that has been notified of an inspection shall not seek the removal from the inspection team of any of the inspectors or inspection assistants named in the inspection mandate. 24. The number of inspectors and inspection assistants accepted by a State Party must be sufficient to allow for availability of appropriate numbers of inspectors and inspection assistants. If, in the opinion of the Director-General, the non-acceptance by a State Party of proposed inspectors or inspection assistants impedes the designation of a sufficient number of inspectors and inspection assistants or otherwise hampers the effective fulfilment of the purposes of an on-site inspection, the Director-General shall refer the issue to the Executive Council. 25. Each inspector included in the list of inspectors and inspection assistants shall receive relevant training. Such training shall be provided by the Technical Secretariat pursuant to the procedures specified in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections. The Technical Secretariat shall coordinate, in agreement with the States Parties, a schedule of training for the inspectors. Privileges and Immunities 26. Following acceptance of the initial list of inspectors and inspection assistants as provided for in paragraph 18 or as subsequently altered in ac-

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cordance with paragraph 19, each State Party shall be obliged to issue, in accordance with its national procedures and upon application by an inspector or inspection assistant, multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas and other relevant documents to enable each inspector and inspection assistant to enter and to remain on the territory of that State Party for the sole purpose of carrying out inspection activities. Each State Party shall issue the necessary visa or travel documents for this purpose no later than 48 hours after receipt of the application or immediately upon arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry on the territory of the State Party. Such documents shall be valid for as long as is necessary to enable the inspector or inspection assistant to remain on the territory of the inspected State Party for the sole purpose of carrying out the inspection activities. 27. To exercise their functions effectively, members of the inspection team shall be accorded privileges and immunities as set forth in sub-paragraphs (a) to (i). Privileges and immunities shall be granted to members of the inspection team for the sake of this Treaty and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. Such privileges and immunities shall be accorded to them for the entire period between arrival on and departure from the territory of the inspected State Party, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions. (a) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961; (b) The living quarters and office premises occupied by the inspection team carrying out inspection activities pursuant to this Treaty shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded to the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; (c) The papers and correspondence, including records, of the inspection team shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to all papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The inspection team shall have the right to use codes for their communications with the Technical Secretariat;

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(d) Samples and approved equipment carried by members of the inspection team shall be inviolable subject to provisions contained in this Treaty and exempt from all customs duties. Hazardous samples shall be transported in accordance with relevant regulations; (e) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the immunities accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; (f) The members of the inspection team carrying out prescribed activities pursuant to this Treaty shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; (g) The members of the inspection team shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the inspected State Party, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations; (h) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the same currency and exchange facilities as are accorded to representatives of foreign Governments on temporary official missions; and (i) The members of the inspection team shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected State Party. 28. When transiting the territory of States Parties other than the inspected State Party, the members of the inspection team shall be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Papers and correspondence, including records, and samples and approved equipment carried by them, shall be accorded the privileges and immunities set forth in paragraph 27 (c) and (d). 29. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities the members of the inspection team shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected State Party and, to the extent that is consistent with the inspection mandate, shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. If the inspected State Party considers that there has been an abuse

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of privileges and immunities specified in this Protocol, consultations shall be held between the State Party and the Director-General to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse. 30. The immunity from jurisdiction of members of the inspection team may be waived by the Director-General in those cases when the DirectorGeneral is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty. Waiver must always be express. 31. Observers shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities accorded to members of the inspection team pursuant to this section, except for those accorded pursuant to paragraph 27 (d). Points of Entry 32. Each State Party shall designate its points of entry and shall supply the required information to the Technical Secretariat no later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for it. These points of entry shall be such that the inspection team can reach any inspection area from at least one point of entry within 24 hours. Locations of points of entry shall be provided to all States Parties by the Technical Secretariat. Points of entry may also serve as points of exit. 33. Each State Party may change the points of entry by giving notice of such change to the Technical Secretariat. Changes shall become effective 30 days after the Technical Secretariat receives such notification, to allow appropriate notification to all States Parties. 34. If the Technical Secretariat considers that there are insufficient points of entry for the timely conduct of inspections or that changes to the points of entry proposed by a State Party would hamper such timely conduct of inspections, it shall enter into consultations with the State Party concerned to resolve the problem. Arrangements for Use of Non-Scheduled Aircraft 35. Where timely travel to the point of entry is not feasible using scheduled commercial flights, an inspection team may utilize non-scheduled aircraft. No later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for it, each State Party shall inform the Technical Secretariat of the standing diplomatic

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clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft transporting an inspection team and equipment necessary for inspection. Aircraft routings shall be along established international airways that are agreed upon between the State Party and the Technical Secretariat as the basis for such diplomatic clearance. Approved Inspection Equipment 36. The Conference, at its initial session, shall consider and approve a list of equipment for use during on-site inspections. Each State Party may submit proposals for the inclusion of equipment in the list. Specifications for the use of the equipment, as detailed in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections, shall take account of safety and confidentiality considerations where such equipment is likely to be used. 37. The equipment for use during on-site inspections shall consist of core equipment for the inspection activities and techniques specified in paragraph 69 and auxiliary equipment necessary for the effective and timely conduct of on-site inspections. 38. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure that all types of approved equipment are available for on-site inspections when required. When required for an on-site inspection, the Technical Secretariat shall duly certify that the equipment has been calibrated, maintained and protected. To facilitate the checking of the equipment at the point of entry by the inspected State Party, the Technical Secretariat shall provide documentation and attach seals to authenticate the certification. 39. Any permanently held equipment shall be in the custody of the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall be responsible for the maintenance and calibration of such equipment. 40. As appropriate, the Technical Secretariat shall make arrangements with States Parties to provide equipment mentioned in the list. Such States Parties shall be responsible for the maintenance and calibration of such equipment. C. On-Site Inspection Request, Inspection Mandate and Notification of Inspection

On-Site Inspection Request 41. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 37, the on-site inspection request shall contain at least the following information:

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(a) The estimated geographical and vertical coordinates of the location of the event that triggered the request with an indication of the possible margin of error; (b) The proposed boundaries of the area to be inspected, specified on a map and in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3; (c) The State Party or States Parties to be inspected or an indication that the area to be inspected or part thereof is beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State; (d) The probable environment of the event that triggered the request; (e) The estimated time of the event that triggered the request with indication of the possible margin of error; (f) All data upon which the request is based; (g) The personal details of the proposed observer, if any; and (h) The results of a consultation and clarification process in accordance with Article IV, or an explanation, if relevant, of the reasons why such a consultation and clarification process has not been carried out. Inspection Mandate 42. The mandate for an on-site inspection shall contain: (a) The decision of the Executive Council on the on-site inspection request; (b) The name of the State Party or States Parties to be inspected or an indication that the inspection area or part thereof is beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State; (c) The location and boundaries of the inspection area specified on a map, taking into account all information on which the request was based and all other available technical information, in consultation with the requesting State Party; (d) The planned types of activity of the inspection team in the inspection area; (e) The point of entry to be used by the inspection team; (f) Any transit or basing points, as appropriate; (g) The name of the head of the inspection team; (h) The names of members of the inspection team; (i) The name of the proposed observer, if any; and (j) The list of equipment to be used in the inspection area.

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If a decision by the Executive Council pursuant to Article IV, paragraphs 46 to 49 necessitates a modification of the inspection mandate, the DirectorGeneral may update the mandate with respect to sub-paragraphs (d), (h) and (j), as appropriate. The Director-General shall immediately notify the inspected State Party of any such modification. Notification of Inspection 43. The notification made by the Director-General pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 55 shall include the following information: (a) The inspection mandate; (b) The date and estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry; (c) The means of arrival at the point of entry; (d) If appropriate, the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft; and (e) A list of any equipment which the Director-General requests the inspected State Party to make available to the inspection team for use in the inspection area. 44. The inspected State Party shall acknowledge receipt of the notification by the Director-General no later than 12 hours after having received the notification. D. Pre-Inspection Activities

Entry Into the Territory of the Inspected State Party, Activities at the Point of Entry and Transfer to the Inspection Area 45. The inspected State Party that has been notified of the arrival of the inspection team shall ensure the immediate entry of the inspection team into its territory. 46. When a non-scheduled aircraft is used for travel to the point of entry, the Technical Secretariat shall provide the inspected State Party with a flight plan, through the National Authority, for the flight of the aircraft from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of that State Party to the point of entry, no less than six hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. The

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Technical Secretariat shall include in the remarks section of the flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the appropriate notation identifying the aircraft as an inspection aircraft. If a military aircraft is used, the Technical Secretariat shall request prior authorization from the inspected State Party to enter its airspace. 47. No less than three hours before the scheduled departure of the inspection team from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with paragraph 46 is approved, so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time. 48. Where necessary, the head of the inspection team and the representative of the inspected State Party shall agree on a basing point and a flight plan from the point of entry to the basing point and, if necessary, to the inspection area. 49. The inspected State Party shall provide for or arrange parking, security protection, servicing and fuel as required by the Technical Secretariat for the aircraft of the inspection team at the point of entry and, where necessary, at the basing point and at the inspection area. Such aircraft shall not be liable for landing fees, departure tax, and similar charges. This paragraph shall also apply to aircraft used for overflight during the on-site inspection. 50. Subject to paragraph 51, there shall be no restriction by the inspected State Party on the inspection team bringing approved equipment that is in conformity with the inspection mandate into the territory of that State Party, or on its use in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol. 51. The inspected State Party shall have the right, without prejudice to the time-frame specified in paragraph 54, to check in the presence of inspection team members at the point of entry that the equipment has been approved and certified in accordance with paragraph 38. The inspected State Party may exclude equipment that is not in conformity with the inspection mandate or that has not been approved and certified in accordance with paragraph 38. 52. Immediately upon arrival at the point of entry and without prejudice to the time-frame specified in paragraph 54, the head of the inspection team shall present to the representative of the inspected State Party the inspection mandate and an initial inspection plan prepared by the inspection team specifying

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the activities to be carried out by it. The inspection team shall be briefed by representatives of the inspected State Party with aid of maps and other documentation as appropriate. The briefing shall include relevant natural terrain features, safety and confidentiality issues, and logistical arrangements for the inspection. The inspected State Party may indicate locations within the inspection area that, in its view, are not related to the purpose of the inspection. 53. After the pre-inspection briefing, the inspection team shall, as appropriate, modify the initial inspection plan, taking into account any comments by the inspected State Party. The modified inspection plan shall be made available to the representative of the inspected State Party. 54. The inspected State Party shall do everything in its power to provide assistance and to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team, the approved equipment specified in paragraphs 50 and 51 and baggage from the point of entry to the inspection area no later than 36 hours after arrival at the point of entry, if no other timing has been agreed upon within the timeframe specified in paragraph 57. 55. To confirm that the area to which the inspection team has been transported corresponds to the inspection area specified in the inspection mandate, the inspection team shall have the right to use approved locationfinding equipment. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team in this task. E. Conduct of Inspections

General Rules 56. The inspection team shall discharge its functions in accordance with the provisions for the Treaty and this Protocol. 57. The inspection team shall begin its inspection activities in the inspection area as soon as possible, but in no case later than 72 hours after arrival at the point of entry. 58. The activities of the inspection team shall be so arranged as to ensure the timely and effective discharge of its functions and the least possible inconvenience to the inspected State Party and disturbance to the inspection area. 59. In cases where the inspected State Party has been requested, pursuant to paragraph 43 (e) or in the course of the inspection, to make available any

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equipment for use by the inspection team in the inspection area, the inspected State Party shall comply with the request to the extent it can. 60. During the on-site inspection the inspection team shall have, inter alia: (a) The right to determine how the inspection will proceed, consistent with the inspection mandate and taking into account any steps taken by the inspected State Party consistent with the provisions on managed access; b) The right to modify the inspection plan, as necessary, to ensure the effective execution of the inspection; (c) The obligation to take into account the recommendations and suggested modifications by the inspected State Party to the inspection plan; (d) The right to request clarifications in connection with ambiguities that may arise during the inspection; (e) The obligation to use only those techniques specified in paragraph 69 and to refrain from activities that are not relevant to the purpose of the inspection. The team shall collect and document such facts as are related to the purpose of the inspection, but shall neither seek nor document information that is clearly unrelated thereto. Any material collected and subsequently found not to be relevant shall be returned to the inspected State Party; (f) The obligation to take into account and include in its report date and explanations on the nature of the event that triggered the request, provided by the inspected State Party from the national monitoring networks of the inspected State Party and from other sources; (g) The obligation to provide the inspected State Party, at its request, with copies of the information and data collected in the inspection area; and (h) The obligation to respect the confidentiality and the safety and health regulations of the inspected State Party. 61. During the on-site inspection the inspected State Party shall have, inter alia: (a) The right to make recommendations at any time to the inspection team regarding possible modification of the inspection plan;

148

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(b) The right and the obligation to provide a representative to liaise with the inspection team; (c) The right to have representatives accompany the inspection team during the performance of its duties and observe all inspection activities carried out by the inspection team. This shall not delay or otherwise hinder the inspection team in the exercise of its functions; (d) The right to provide additional information and to request the collection and documentation of additional facts it believes are relevant to the inspection; (e) The right to examine all photographic and measurement products as well as samples and to retain any photographs or parts thereof showing sensitive sites not related to the purpose of the inspection. The inspected State Party shall have the right to receive duplicate copies of all photographic and measurement products. The inspected State Party shall have the right to retain photographic originals and first-generation photographic products and to put photographs or parts thereof under joint seal within its territory. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide its own camera operator to take still/video photographs as requested by the inspection team. Otherwise, these functions shall be performed by members of the inspection team; (f) The right to provide the inspection team, from its national monitoring networks and from other sources, with data and explanations on the nature of the event that triggered the request; and (g) The obligation to provide the inspection team with such clarification as may be necessary to resolve any ambiguities that arise during the inspection. Communications 62. The members of the inspection team shall have the right at all times during the on-site inspection to communicate with each other and with the Technical Secretariat. For this purpose they may use their own duly approved and certified equipment with the consent of the inspected State Party to the extent that the inspected State Party does not provide them with access to other telecommunication.

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Observer 63. In accordance with Article IV, paragraph 61, the requesting State Party shall liaise with the Technical Secretariat to coordinate the arrival of the observer at the same point of entry or basing point as the inspection team within a reasonable period of the arrival of the inspection team. 64. The observer shall have the right throughout the inspection to be in communication with the embassy of the requesting State Party located in the inspected State Party or, in the case of absence of an embassy, with the requesting State Party itself. 65. The observer shall have the right to arrive at the inspection area and to have access to and within the inspection area as granted by the inspected State Party. 66. The observer shall have the right to make recommendations to the inspection team throughout the inspection. 67. Throughout the inspection, the inspection team shall keep the observer informed about the conduct of the inspection and the findings. 68. Throughout the inspection, the inspected State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the observer similar to those enjoyed by the inspection team as described in paragraph 11. All costs in connection with the stay of the observer on the territory of the inspected State Party shall be borne by the requesting State Party. Inspection Activities and Techniques 69. The following inspection activities may be conducted and techniques used, in accordance with the provisions on managed access, on collection, handling and analysis of samples, and on overflights: (a) Position finding from the air and at the surface to confirm the boundaries of the inspection area and establish coordinates of locations therein, in support of the inspection activities; (b) Visual observation, video and still photography and multi-spectral imaging, including infrared measurements, at and below the surface, and from the air, to search for anomalies or artifacts; (c) Measurement of levels of radioactivity above, at and below the surface, using gamma radiation monitoring and energy resolution analysis from the air, and at or under the surface, to search for and identify radiation anomalies;

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(d) Environmental sampling and analysis of solids, liquids and gases from above, at and below the surface to detect anomalies; (e) Passive seismological monitoring for aftershocks to localize the search area and facilitate determination of the nature of an event; (f) Resonance seismometry and active seismic surveys to search for and locate underground anomalies, including cavities and rubble zones; (g) Magnetic and gravitational field mapping, ground penetrating radar and electrical conductivity measurements at the surface and from the air, as appropriate, to detect anomalies or artifacts; and (h) Drilling to obtain radioactive samples. 70. Up to 25 days after the approval of the on-site inspection in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 46, the inspection team shall have the right to conduct any of the activities and use any of the techniques listed in paragraph 69 (a) to (e). Following the approval of the continuation of the inspection in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 47, the inspection team shall have the right to conduct any of the activities and use any of the techniques listed in paragraph 69 (a) to (g). The inspection team shall only conduct drilling after the approval of the Executive Council in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 48. If the inspection team requests an extension of the inspection duration in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 49, it shall indicate in its request which of the activities and techniques listed in paragraph 69 it intends to carry out in order to be able to fulfil its mandate. Overflights 71. The inspection team shall have the right to conduct an overflight over the inspection area during the on-site inspection for the purposes of providing the inspection team with a general orientation of the inspection area, narrowing down and optimizing the locations for ground-based inspection and facilitating the collection of factual evidence, using equipment specified in paragraph 79. 72. The overflight shall be conducted as soon as practically possible. The total duration of the overflight over the inspection area shall be no more than 12 hours. 73. Additional overflights using equipment specified in paragraphs 79 and 80 may be conducted subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party.

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74. The area to be covered by overflights shall not extend beyond the inspection area. 75. The inspected State Party shall have the right to impose restrictions or, in exceptional cases and with reasonable justification, prohibitions on the overflight of sensitive sites not related to the purpose of the inspection. Restrictions may relate to the flight altitude, the number of passes and circling, the duration of hovering, the type of aircraft, the number of inspectors on board, and the type of measurements or observations. If the inspection team considers that the restrictions or prohibitions on the overflight of sensitive sites may impede the fulfilment of its mandate, the inspected State Party shall make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means of inspection. 76. Overflights shall be conducted according to a flight plan duly filed and approved in accordance with aviation rules and regulations of the inspected State Party. Flight safety regulations of the inspected State Party shall be strictly observed throughout all flying operations. 77. During overflights landing should normally be authorized only for purposes of staging or refuelling. 78. Overflights shall be conducted at altitudes as requested by the inspection team consistent with the activities to be conducted, visibility conditions, as well as the aviation and the safety regulations of the inspected State Party and its right to protect sensitive information not related to the purposes of the inspection. Overflights shall be conducted up to a maximum altitude of 1,500 metres above the surface. 79. For the overflight conducted pursuant to paragraphs 71 and 72, the following equipment may be used on board the aircraft: (a) Field glasses; (b) Passive location-finding equipment; (c) Video cameras; and (d) Hand-held still cameras. 80. For any additional overflights conducted pursuant to paragraph 73, inspectors on board the aircraft may also use portable, easily installed equipment for: (a) Multi-spectral (including infrared) imagery; (b) Gamma spectroscopy; and (c) Magnetic field mapping.

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81. Overflights shall be conducted with a relatively slow fixed or rotary wing aircraft. The aircraft shall afford a broad, unobstructed view of the surface below. 82. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide its own aircraft, pre-equipped as appropriate in accordance with the technical requirements of the relevant operational manual, and crew. Otherwise, the aircraft shall be provided or rented by the Technical Secretariat. 83. If the aircraft is provided or rented by the Technical Secretariat, the inspected State Party shall have the right to check the aircraft to ensure that it is equipped with approved inspection equipment. Such checking shall be completed within the time-frame specified in paragraph 57. 84. Personnel on board the aircraft shall consist of: (a) The minimum number of flight crew consistent with the safe operation of the aircraft; (b) Up to four members of the inspection team; (c) Up to two representatives of the inspected State Party; (d) An observer, if any, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party; and (e) An interpreter, if necessary. 85. Procedures for the implementation of overflights shall be detailed in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections. Managed Access 86. The inspection team shall have the right to access the inspection area in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol. 87. The inspected State Party shall provide access within the inspection area in accordance with the time-frame specified in paragraph 57. 88. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 57 and paragraph 86 above, the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party shall include: (a) The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and locations in accordance with this Protocol; (b) The obligation, when access is restricted within the inspection area, to make every reasonable effort to satisfy the requirements of the inspection mandate through alternative means. Resolving any questions regarding one or more aspects of the inspection shall not delay or interfere with the conduct of the inspection team of other aspects of the inspection; and

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(c) The right to make the final decision regarding any access of the inspection team, taking into account its obligations under this Treaty and the provisions on managed access. 89. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 57 (b) and paragraph 88 (a) above, the inspected State Party shall have the right throughout the inspection area to take measures to protect sensitive installations and locations and to prevent disclosure of confidential information not related to the purpose of the inspection. Such measures may include, inter alia: (a) Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment; (b) Restricting measurements of radionuclide activity and nuclear radiation to determining the presence or absence of those types and energies of radiation relevant to the purpose of the inspection; (c) Restricting the taking of or analysing of samples to determining the presence or absence of radioactive or other products relevant to the purpose of the inspection; (d) Managing access to buildings and other structures in accordance with paragraphs 90 and 91; and (e) Declaring restricted-access sites in accordance with paragraphs 92 to 96. 90. Access to buildings and other structures shall be deferred until after the approval of the continuation of the on-site inspection in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 47, except for access to buildings and other structures housing the entrance to a mine, other excavations, or caverns of large volume not otherwise accessible. For such buildings and structures, the inspection team shall have the right only of transit, as directed by the inspected State Party, in order to enter such mines, caverns or other excavations. 91. If, following the approval of the continuation of the inspection in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 47, the inspection team demonstrates credibly to the inspected State Party that access to buildings and other structures is necessary to fulfil the inspection mandate and that the necessary activities authorized in the mandate could not be carried out from the outside, the inspection team shall have the right to gain access to such buildings or other structures. The head of the inspection team shall request access to a specific building or structure indicating the purpose of such access, the specific number of inspectors, as well as the intended activities. The modalities for access shall be subject to negotiation between the inspection team and the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall have the right to

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impose restrictions or, in exceptional cases and with reasonable justification, prohibitions, on the access to buildings and other structures. 92. When restricted-access sites are declared pursuant to paragraph 89 (e), each such site shall be no larger than 4 square kilometres. The inspected State Party has the right to declare up to 50 square kilometres of restricted-access sites. If more than one restricted-access site is declared, each such site shall be separated from any other such site by a minimum distance of 20 metres. Each restricted-access site shall have clearly defined and accessible boundaries. 93. The size, location, and boundaries of restricted-access sites shall be presented to the head of the inspection team no later than the time that the inspection team seeks access to a location that contains all or part of such a site. 94. The inspection team shall have the right to place equipment and take other steps necessary to conduct its inspection up to the boundary of a restricted-access site. 95. The inspection team shall be permitted to observe visually all open places within the restricted-access site from the boundary of the site. 96. The inspection team shall make every reasonable effort to fulfil the inspection mandate outside the declared restricted-access sites prior to requesting access to such sites. If at any time the inspection team demonstrates credibly to the inspected State Party that the necessary activities authorized in the mandate could not be carried out from the outside and that access to a restricted-access site is necessary to fulfil the mandate, some members of the inspection team shall be granted access to accomplish specific tasks within the site. The inspected State Party shall have the right to shroud or otherwise protect sensitive equipment, objects and materials not related to the purpose of the inspection. The number of inspectors shall be kept to the minimum necessary to complete the tasks related to the inspection. The modalities for such access shall be subject to negotiation between the inspection team and the inspected State Party. Collection, Handling and Analysis of Samples 97. Subject to paragraphs 86 to 96 and 98 to 100, the inspection team shall have the right to collect and remove relevant samples from the inspection area. 98. Whenever possible, the inspection team shall analyse samples on-site. Representatives of the inspected State Party shall have the right to be present when samples are analysed on-site. At the request of the inspection team, the inspected State Party shall, in accordance with agreed procedures, provide

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assistance for the analysis of samples on-site. The inspection team shall have the right to transfer samples for off-site analysis at laboratories designated by the Organization only if it demonstrates that the necessary sample analysis cannot be performed on-site. 99. The inspected State Party shall have the right to retain portions of all samples collected when these samples are analysed and may take duplicate samples. 100. The inspected State Party shall have the right to request that any unused samples or portions thereof be returned. 101. The designated laboratories shall conduct chemical and physical analysis of the samples transferred for off-site analysis. Details of such analysis shall be elaborated in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections. 102. The Director-General shall have the primary responsibility for the security, integrity and preservation of samples and for ensuring that the confidentiality of samples transferred for off-site analysis is protected. The DirectorGeneral shall do so in accordance with procedures contained in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections. The Director-General shall in any case: (a) Establish a stringent regime governing the collection, handling, transport and analysis of samples; (b) Certify the laboratories designated to perform different types of analysis; (c) Oversee the standardization of equipment and procedures at these designated laboratories and of mobile analytical equipment and procedures; (d) Monitor quality control and overall standards in relation to the certification of these laboratories and in relation to mobile equipment and procedures; and (e) Select from among the designated laboratories those which shall perform analytical or other functions in relation to specific investigations. 103. When off-site analysis is to be performed, samples shall be analysed in at least two designated laboratories. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure the expeditious processing of the analysis. The samples shall be accounted for by the Technical Secretariat and any unused samples or portions thereof shall be returned to the Technical Secretariat. 104. The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the laboratory analysis of samples relevant to the purpose of the inspection. Pursuant to

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Article IV, paragraph 63, the Director-General shall transmit any such results promptly to the inspected State Party for comments and thereafter to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties and shall include detailed information concerning the equipment and methodology employed by the designated laboratories. Conduct of Inspections in Areas beyond the Jurisdiction or Control of any State 105. In case of an on-site inspection in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State, the Director-General shall consult with the appropriate States Parties and agree on any transit or basing points to facilitate a speedy arrival of the inspection team in the inspection area. 106. The States Parties on whose territory transit or basing points are located shall, as far as possible, assist in facilitating the inspection, including transporting the inspection team, its baggage and equipment to the inspection area, as well as providing the relevant amenities specified in paragraph 11. The Organization shall reimburse assisting States Parties for all costs incurred. 107. Subject to the approval of the Executive Council, the Director-General may negotiate standing arrangements with States Parties to facilitate assistance in the event of an on-site inspection in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State. 108. In cases where one or more States Parties have conducted an investigation of an ambiguous event in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State before a request is made for an on-site inspection in that area, any results of such investigation may be taken into account by the Executive Council in its deliberations pursuant to Article IV. Post-Inspection Procedures 109. Upon conclusion of the inspection, the inspection team shall meet with the representative of the inspected State Party to review the preliminary findings of the inspection team and to clarify any ambiguities. The inspection team shall provide the representative of the inspected State Party with its preliminary findings in written form according to a standardized format, together with a list of any samples and other material taken from the inspection area pursuant to paragraph 98. The document shall be signed by

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the head of the inspection team. In order to indicate that he or she has taken notice of the contents of the document, the representative of the inspected State Party shall countersign the document. The meeting shall be completed no later than 24 hours after the conclusion of the inspection. Departure 110. Upon completion of the post-inspection procedures, the inspection team and the observer shall leave, as soon as possible, the territory of the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall do everything in its power to provide assistance and to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team, equipment and baggage to the point of exit. Unless agreed otherwise by the inspected State Party and the inspection team, the point of exit used shall be the same as the point of entry.

Part III. Confidence-Building Measures 1. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 68, each State Party shall, on a voluntary basis, provide the Technical Secretariat with notification of any chemical explosion using 300 tonnes or greater of TNT-equivalent blasting material detonated as a single explosion anywhere on its territory, or at any place under its jurisdiction or control. If possible, such notification shall be provided in advance. Such notification shall include details on location, time, quantity and type of explosive used, as well as on the configuration and intended purpose of the blast. 2. Each State Party shall, on a voluntary basis, as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Treaty provide to the Technical Secretariat, and at annual intervals thereafter update, information related to its national use of all other chemical explosions greater than 300 tonnes TNT-equivalent. In particular, the State Party shall seek to advise: (a) The geographic locations of sites where the explosions originate; (b) The nature of activities producing them and the general profile and frequency of such explosions; (c) Any other relevant detail, if available; and to assist the Technical Secretariat in clarifying the origins of any such event detected by the International Monitoring System.

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3. A State Party may, on a voluntary and mutually acceptable basis, invite representatives of the Technical Secretariat or of other States Parties to visit sites within its territory referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. 4. For the purpose of calibrating the International Monitoring System, States Parties may liaise with the Technical Secretariat to carry out chemical calibration explosions or to provide relevant information on chemical explosions planned for other purposes.

Annex 1 to the Protocol table 1–a List of seismological stations comprising the primary network #

State responsible for station

1

Argentina

2

Location

Latitude

Longitude

Type

PLCA Paso Flores

40.7 S

70.6 W

3–C

Australia

WRA Warramunga, NT

19.9 S

134.3 E

array

3

Australia

ASAR Alice Springs, NT

23.7 S

133.9 E

array

4

Australia

STKA Stephens Creek, SA

31.9 S

141.6 E

3–C

5

Australia

MAW Mawson, Antarctica

67.6 S

62.9 E

3–C

6

Bolivia

LPAZ La Paz

16.3 S

68.1 W

3–C

7

Brazil

BDFB Brasilia

15.6 S

48.0 W

3–C

8

Canada

ULMC Lac du Bonnet, Man.

50.2 N

95.9 W

3–C

9

Canada

YKAC Yellowknife, N.W.T.

62.5 N

114.6 W

array

table 1–a (continued) #

State responsible for station

Location

Latitude

Longitude

Type

10

Canada

SCH Schefferville, Quebec

54.8 N

66.8 W

3–C

11

Central African Republic

BGCA Bangui

05.2 N

18.4 E

3–C

12

China

HAI Hailar

49.3 N

119.7 E

3–C > array

13

China

LZH Lanzhou

36.1 N

103.8 E

3–C > array

14

Colombia

XSA El Rosal

04.9 N

74.3 W

3–C

15

Côte d’Ivoire

DBIC Dimbroko

06.7 N

04.9 W

3–C

16

Egypt

LXEG Luxor

26.0 N

33.0 E

array

17

Finland

FINES Lahti

61.4 N

28.1 E

array

18

France

PPT Tahiti

17.6 S

149.6 W

3–C

19

Germany

GEC2 Freyung

48.9 N

13.7 E

array

20

To be determined

To be determined

21

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

THR Tehran

35.8 N

51.4 E

3–C

22

Japan

MJAR Matsushiro

36.5 N

138.2 E

array

23

Kazakstan

MAK Makanchi

46.8 N

82.0 E

array

24

Kenya

KMBO Kilimambogo

01.1 S

37.2 E

3–C

25

Mongolia

JAVM Javhlant

48.0 N

106.8 E

3–C > array

To be determined

To be determined

To be determined

table 1–a (continued) State responsible for station

Location

26

Niger

New Site

27

Norway

NAO Hamar

60.8 N

10.8 E

array

28

Norway

ARAO Karasjok

69.5 N

25.5 E

array

29

Pakistan

PRPK Pari

33.7 N

73.3 E

array

30

Paraguay

CPUP Villa Florida

26.3 S

57.3 W

3–C

31

Republic of Korea

KSRS Wonju

37.5 N

127.9 E

array

32

Russian Federation

KBZ Khabaz

43.7 N

42.9 E

3–C

33

Russian Federation

ZAL Zalesovo

53.9 N

84.8 E

3–C > array

34

Russian Federation

NRI Norilsk

69.0 N

88.0 E

3–C

35

Russian Federation

PDY Peleduy

59.6 N

112.6 E

3–C > array

36

Russian Federation

PET PetropavlovskKamchatskiy

53.1 N

157.8 E

3–C > array

37

Russian Federation

USK Ussuriysk

44.2 N

132.0 E

3–C > array

38

Saudi Arabia

New Site

To be determined

array

39

South Africa

BOSA Boshof

28.6 S

25.6 E

3–C

40

Spain

ESDC Sonseca

39.7 N

04.0 W

array

41

Thailand

CMTO Chiang Mai

18.8 N

99.0 E

array

42

Tunisia

THA Thala

35.6 N

08.7 E

3–C

#

Latitude

To be determined

To be determined

Longitude

To be determined

Type

3–C > array

table 1–a (continued) #

State responsible for station

Location

Latitude

Longitude

Type

43

Turkey

BRTR 39.9 N 32.8 E Belbashi The array is subject to relocation at Keskin

array

44

Turkmenistan

GEYT Alibeck

37.9 N

58.1 E

array

45

Ukraine

AKASG Malin

50.4 N

29.1 E

array

46

United States of America

LJTX Lajitas, TX

29.3 N

103.7 W

array

47

United States of America

MNV Mina, NV

38.4 N

118.2 W

array

48

United States of America

PIWY Pinedale, WY

42.8 N

109.6 W

array

49

United States of America

ELAK Eielson, AK

64.8 N

146.9 W

array

50

United States of America

VNDA Vanda, Antarctica

77.5 S

161.9 E

3–C

Key: 3–C > array: indicates that the site could start operations in the International Monitoring System as a three-component station and be upgraded to an array at a later time.

table 1–b List of seismological stations comprising the auxiliary network #

State responsible for station

1

Location

Latitude

Longitude

Type

Argentina

CFA Coronel Fontana

31.6 S

68.2 W

3–C

2

Argentina

USHA Ushuaia

55.0 S

68.0 W

3–C

3

Armenia

GNI Garni

40.1 N

44.7 E

3–C

4

Australia

CTA Charters Towers, QLD

20.1 S

146.3 E

3–C

5

Australia

FITZ Fitzroy Crossing, WA

18.1 S

125.6 E

3–C

table 1–b (continued) #

State responsible for station

6

Australia

7

Location

Latitude

Longitude

Type

NWAO Narrogin, WA

32.9 S

117.2 E

3–C

Bangladesh

CHT Chittagong

22.4 N

91.8 E

3–C

8

Bolivia

SIV San Ignacio

16.0 S

61.1 W

3–C

9

Botswana

LBTB Lobatse

25.0 S

25.6 E

3–C

10

Brazil

PTGA Pitinga

0.7 S

60.0 W

3–C

11

Brazil

RGNB Rio Grande do Norte

6.9 S

37.0 W

3–C

12

Canada

FRB Iqaluit, N.W.T.

63.7 N

68.5 W

3–C

13

Canada

DLBC Dease Lake, B.C.

58.4 N

130.0 W

3–C

14

Canada

SADO Sadowa, Ont.

44.8 N

79.1 W

3–C

15

Canada

BBB Bella Bella, B.C.

52.2 N

128.1 W

3–C

16

Canada

MBC Mould Bay, N.W.T.

76.2 N

119.4 W

3–C

17

Canada

INK Inuvik, N.W.T.

68.3 N

133.5 W

3–C

18

Chile

RPN Easter Island

27.2 S

109.4 W

3–C

19

Chile

LVC Limón Verde

22.6 S

68.9 W

3–C

20

China

BJT Baijiatuan

40.0 N

116.2 E

3–C

table 1–b (continued) #

State responsible for station

Location

Latitude

Longitude

Type

21

China

KMI Kunming

25.2 N

102.8 E

3–C

22

China

SSE Sheshan

31.1 N

121.2 E

3–C

23

China

XAN Xi’an

34.0 N

108.9 E

3–C

24

Cook Islands

RAR Rarotonga

21.2 S

159.8 W

3–C

25

Costa Rica

JTS Las Juntas de Abangares

10.3 N

85.0 W

3–C

26

Czech Republic

VRAC Vranov

49.3 N

16.6 E

3–C

27

Denmark

SFJ Søndre Strømfjord, Greenland

67.0 N

50.6 W

3–C

28

Djibouti

ATD Arta Tunnel

11.5 N

42.9 E

3–C

29

Egypt

KEG Kottamya

29.9 N

31.8 E

3–C

30

Ethiopia

FURI Furi

8.9 N

38.7 E

3–C

31

Fiji

MSVF Monasavu, Viti Levu

17.8 S

178.1 E

3–C

32

France

NOUC Port Laguerre, New Caledonia

22.1 S

166.3 E

3–C

33

France

KOG Kourou, French Guiana

5.2 N

52.7 W

3–C

34

Gabon

BAMB Bambay

1.7 S

13.6 E

3–C

35

Germany/South Africa

SANAE Station, Antarctica

71.7 S

2.9 W

3–C

table 1–b (continued) #

State responsible for station

Location

Latitude

Longitude

Type

36

Greece

IDI Anogia, Crete

35.3 N

24.9 E

3–C

37

Guatemala

RDG Rabir

15.0 N

90.5 W

3–C

38

Iceland

BORG Borgames

64.8 N

21.3 W

3–C

39

To be determined

To be determined

40

Indonesia

PACI Cibinong, Jawa Barat

6.5 S

107.0 E

3–C

41

Indonesia

JAY Jayapura, Irian Jaya

2.5 S

140.7 E

3–C

42

Indonesia

SWI Sorong, Irian Jaya

0.9 S

131.3 E

3–C

43

Indonesia

PSI Parapat, Sumatera

2.7 N

98.9 E

3–C

44

Indonesia

KAPI Kappang, Sulawesi Selatan

5.0 S

119.8 E

3–C

45

Indonesia

KUG Kupang, Nusatenggara Timur

10.2 S

123.6 E

3–C

46

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

KRM Kerman

30.3 N

57.1 E

3–C

47

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

MSN Masjed-eSoleyman

31.9 N

49.3 E

3–C

48

Israel

MBH Eilath

29.8 N

34.9 E

3–C

49

Israel

PARD Parod

32.6 N

35.3 E

array

To be determined

To be determined

To be determined

table 1–b (continued) #

State responsible for station

Location

Latitude

Longitude

Type

50

Italy

ENAS Enna, Sicily

37.5 N

14.3 E

3–C

51

Japan

JNU Ohita, Kyushu

33.1 N

130.9 E

3–C

52

Japan

JOW Kunigami, Okinawa

26.8 N

128.3 E

3–C

53

Japan

JHJ Hachijojima, Izu Islands

33.1 N

139.8 E

3–C

54

Japan

JKA Kamikawa-asahi, Hokkaido

44.1 N

142.6 E

3–C

55

Japan

JCJ Chichijima, Ogasawara

27.1 N

142.2 E

3–C

56

Jordan

— Ashqof

32.5 N

37.6 E

3–C

57

Kazakstan

BRVK Borovoye

53.1 N

70.3 E

array

58

Kazakstan

KURK Kurchatov

50.7 N

78.6 E

array

59

Kazakstan

AKTO Aktyubinsk

50.4 N

58.0 E

3–C

60

Kyrgyzstan

AAK Ala-Archa

42.6 N

74.5 E

3–C

61

Madagascar

TAN Antananarivo

18.9 S

47.6 E

3–C

62

Mali

KOWA Kowa

14.5 N

4.0 W

3–C

63

Mexico

TEYM Tepich, Yucatan

20.2 N

88.3 W

3–C

64

Mexico

TUVM Tuzandepeti, Veracruz

18.0 N

94.4 W

3–C

table 1–b (continued) #

State responsible for station

Location

Latitude

Longitude

Type

65

Mexico

LPBM La Paz, Baja California Sur

24.2 N

110.2 W

3–C

66

Morocco

MDT Midelt

32.8 N

4.6 W

3–C

67

Namibia

TSUM Tsumeb

19.1 S

17.4 E

3–C

68

Nepal

EVN Everest

28.0 N

86.8 E

3–C

69

New Zealand

EWZ Erewhon, South Island

43.5 S

170.9 E

3–C

70

New Zealand

RAO Raoul Island

29.2 S

177.9 W

3–C

71

New Zealand

UPZ Urewera, North Island

38.3 S

177.1 E

3–C

72

Norway

SPITS Spitsbergen

78.2 N

16.4 E

array

73

Norway

JMI Jan Mayen

70.9 N

8.7 W

3–C

74

Oman

WSAR Wadi Sarin

23.0 N

58.0 E

3–C

75

Papua New Guinea

PMG Port Moresby

9.4 S

147.2 E

3–C

76

Papua New Guinea

BIAL Bialla

5.3 S

151.1 E

3–C

77

Peru

CAJP Cajamarca

7.0 S

78.0 W

3–C

78

Peru

NNA Nana

12.0 S

76.8 W

3–C

79

Philippines

DAV Davao, Mindanao

7.1 N

125.6 E

3–C

80

Philippines

TGY Tagaytay, Luzon

14.1 N

120.9 E

3–C

table 1–b (continued) #

State responsible for station

Location

Latitude

Longitude

Type

81

Romania

MLR Muntele Rosu

45.5 N

25.9 E

3–C

82

Russian Federation

KIRV Kirov

58.6 N

49.4 E

3–C

83

Russian Federation

KIVO Kislovodsk

44.0 N

42.7 E

array

84

Russian Federation

OBN Obninsk

55.1 N

36.6 E

3–C

85

Russian Federation

ARU Arti

56.4 N

58.6 E

3–C

86

Russian Federation

SEY Seymchan

62.9 N

152.4 E

3–C

87

Russian Federation

TLY Talaya

51.7 N

103.6 E

3–C

88

Russian Federation

YAK Yakutsk

62.0 N

129.7 E

3–C

89

Russian Federation

URG Urgal

51.1 N

132.3 E

3–C

90

Russian Federation

BIL Bilibino

68.0 N

166.4 E

3–C

91

Russia Federation

TIXI Tiksi

71.6 N

128.9 E

3–C

92

Russian Federation

YSS YuzhnoSakhalinsk

47.0 N

142.8 E

3–C

93

Russian Federation

MA2 Magadan

59.6 N

150.8 E

3–C

94

Russian Federation

ZIL Zilim

53.9 N

57.0 E

3–C

95

Samoa

AFI Afiamalu

13.9 S

171.8 W

3–C

96

Saudi Arabia

RAYN Ar Rayn

23.6 N

45.6 E

3–C

97

Senegal

MBO Mbour

14.4 N

17.0 W

3–C

table 1–b (continued) #

State responsible for station

Location

Latitude

Longitude

Type

98

Solomon Islands

HNR Honiara, Guadalcanal

9.4 S

160.0 E

3–C

99

South Africa

SUR Sutherland

32.4 S

20.8 E

3–C

100

Sri Lanka

COC Colombo

6.9 N

79.9 E

3–C

101

Sweden

HPS Hagfors

60.1 N

13.7 E

array

102

Switzerland

DAVOS Davos

46.8 N

9.8 E

3–C

103

Uganda

MBRU Mbarara

0.4 S

30.4 E

3–C

104

United Kingdom

EKA Eskdalemuir

55.3 N

3.2 W

array

105

United States of America

GUMO Guam, Marianas Islands

13.6 N

144.9 E

3–C

106

United States of America

PMSA Palmer Station, Antarctica

64.8 S

64.1 W

3–C

107

United States of America

TKL Tuckaleechee Caverns, TN

35.7 N

83.8 W

3–C

108

United States of America

PFCA Piñon Flat, CA

33.6 N

116.5 W

3–C

109

United States of America

YBH Yreka, CA

41.7 N

122.7 W

3–C

110

United States of America

KDC Kodiak Island, AK

57.8 N

152.5 W

3–C

111

United States of America

ALQ Albuquerque, NM

35.0 N

106.5 W

3–C

112

United States of America

ATTU Attu Island, AK

52.8 N

172.7 E

3–C

table 1–b (continued) State responsible for station

Location

Latitude

Longitude

Type

113

United States of America

ELK Elko, NV

40.7 N

115.2 W

3–C

114

United States of America

SPA South Pole, Antarctica

90.0 S

--

3–C

115

United States of America

NEW Newport, WA

48.3 N

117.1 W

3–C

116

United States of America

SJG San Juan, PR

18.1 N

66.2 W

3–C

117

Venezuela

SDV Santo Domingo

8.9 N

70.6 W

3–C

118

Venezuela

PCRV Puerto la Cruz

10.2 N

64.6 W

3–C

119

Zambia

LSZ Lusaka

15.3 S

28.2 E

3–C

120

Zimbabwe

BUL Bulawayo

#

to be advised

to be advised

3–C

table 2–a List of radionuclide stations #

State responsible for station

Location

1

Argentina

2

Latitude

Longitude

Buenos Aires

34.0 S

58.0 W

Argentina

Salta

24.0 S

65.0 W

3

Argentina

Bariloche

41.1 S

71.3 W

4

Australia

Melbourne, VIC

37.5 S

144.6 E

5

Australia

Mawson, Antarctica

67.6 S

62.5 E

6

Australia

Townsville, QLD

19.2 S

146.8 E

7

Australia

Macquarie Island

54.0 S

159.0 E

8

Australia

Cocos Islands

12.0 S

97.0 E

9

Australia

Darwin, NT

12.4 S

130.7 E

table 2–a (continued) State responsible for station

Location

10

Australia

11

#

Latitude

Longitude

Perth, WA

31.9 S

116.0 E

Brazil

Rio de Janeiro

22.5 S

43.1 W

12

Brazil

Recife

8.0 S

35.0 W

13

Cameroon

Douala

4.2 N

9.9 E

14

Canada

Vancouver, B.C.

49.3 N

123.2 W

15

Canada

Resolute, N.W.T.

74.7 N

94.9 W

16

Canada

Yellowknife, N.W.T.

62.5 N

114.5 W

17

Canada

St. John’s, N.L.

47.0 N

53.0 W

18

Chile

Punta Arenas

53.1 S

70.6 W

19

Chile

Hanga Roa, Easter Island

27.1 S

108.4 W

20

China

Beijing

39.8 N

116.2 E

21

China

Lanzhou

35.8 N

103.3 E

22

China

Guangzhou

23.0 N

113.3 E

23

Cook Islands

Rarotonga

21.2 S

159.8 W

24

Ecuador

Isla San Cristóbal, Galápagos Islands

1.0 S

89.2 W

25

Ethiopia

Filtu

5.5 N

42.7 E

26

Fiji

Nadi

18.0 S

177.5 E

27

France

Papeete, Tahiti

17.0 S

150.0 W

28

France

Pointe-à-Pitre, Guadeloupe

17.0 N

62.0 W

29

France

Réunion

21.1 S

55.6 E

30

France

Port-aux-Français, Kerguelen

49.0 S

70.0 E

31

France

Cayenne, French Guiana

5.0 N

52.0 W

32

France

Dumont d’Urville, Antarctica

66.0 S

140.0 E

table 2–a (continued) State responsible for station

Location

Latitude

Longitude

33

Germany

Schauinsland/Freiburg

47.9 N

7.9 E

34

Iceland

Reykjavik

64.4 N

21.9 W

35

To be determined

To be determined

To be determined

To be determined

36

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Tehran

35.0 N

52.0 E

37

Japan

Okinawa

26.5 N

127.9 E

38

Japan

Takasaki, Gunma

36.3 N

139.0 E

39

Kiribati

Kiritimati

2.0 N

157.0 W

40

Kuwait

Kuwait City

29.0 N

48.0 E

41

Libya

Misratah

32.5 N

15.0 E

42

Malaysia

Kuala Lumpur

2.6 N

101.5 E

43

Mauritania

Nouakchott

18.0 N

17.0 W

44

Mexico

Baja California

28.0 N

113.0 W

45

Mongolia

Ulaanbaatar

47.5 N

107.0 E

46

New Zealand

Chatham Island

44.0 S

176.5 W

47

New Zealand

Kaitaia

35.1 S

173.3 E

48

Niger

Bilma

18.0 N

13.0 E

49

Norway

Spitsbergen

78.2 N

16.4 E

50

Panama

Panama City

8.9 N

79.6 W

51

Papua New Guinea

New Hanover

3.0 S

150.0 E

52

Philippines

Quezon City

14.5 N

121.0 E

53

Portugal

Ponta Delgada, São Miguel, Azores

37.4 N

25.4 W

54

Russian Federation

Kirvov

58.6 N

49.4 E

#

table 2–a (continued) #

State responsible for station

Location

Latitude

Longitude

55

Russian Federation

Norilsk

69.0 N

88.0 E

56

Russian Federation

Peleduy

59.6 N

112.6 E

57

Russian Federation

Bilibino

68.0 N

166.4 E

58

Russian Federation

Ussuriysk

43.7 N

131.9 E

59

Russian Federation

Zalesovo

53.9 N

84.8 E

60

Russian Federation

PetropavlovskKamchatskiy

53.1 N

158.8 E

61

Russian Federation

Dubna

56.7 N

37.3 E

62

South Africa

Marion Island

46.5 S

37.0 E

63

Sweden

Stockholm

59.4 N

18.0 E

64

Tanzania

Dar es Salaam

6.0 S

39.0 E

65

Thailand

Bangkok

13.8 N

100.5 E

66

United Kingdom

BIOT/Chagos Archipelago

7.0 S

72.0 E

67

United Kingdom

St. Helena

16.0 S

6.0 W

68

United Kingdom

Tristan da Cunha

37.0 S

12.3 W

69

United Kingdom

Halley, Antarctica

76.0 S

28.0 W

70

United States of America

Sacramento, CA

38.7 N

121.4 W

71

United States of America

Sand Point, AK

55.0 N

160.0 W

72

United States of America

Melbourne, FL

28.3 N

80.6 W

73

United States of America

Palmer Station, Antarctica

64.5 S

64.0 W

table 2–a (continued) State responsible for station

#

Location

Latitude

Longitude

74

United States of America

Ashland, KS

37.2 N

99.8 W

75

United States of America

Charlottesville, VA

38.0 N

78.0 W

76

United States of America

Salchaket, AK

64.4 N

147.1 W

77

United States of America

Wake Island

19.3 N

166.6 E

78

United States of America

Midway Islands

28.0 N

177.0 W

79

United States of America

Oahu, HI

21.5 N

158.0 W

80

United States of America

Upi, Guam

13.7 N

144.9 E

table 2–b List of radionuclide laboratories #

State responsible for laboratory

1

Argentina

National Board of Nuclear Regulation Buenos Aires

2

Australia

Australian Radiation Laboratory Melbourne, VIC

3

Austria

Austrian Research Center Seibersdorf

4

Brazil

Institute of Radiation Protection and Dosimetry Rio de Janeiro

5

Canada

Health Canada Ottawa, Ont.

6

China

Beijing

7

Finland

Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety Helsinki

8

France

Atomic Energy Commission Montlhéry

Name and place of laboratory

table 2–b (continued) #

State responsible for laboratory

9

Israel

Soreq Nuclear Research Centre Yavne

10

Italy

Laboratory of the National Agency for the Protection of the Environment Rome

11

Japan

Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute Tokai, Ibaraki

12

New Zealand

National Radiation Laboratory Christchurch

13

Russian Federation

Central Radiation Control Laboratory, Ministry of Defense Special Verification Service Moscow

14

South Africa

Atomic Energy Corporation Pelindaba

15

United Kingdom

AWE Blacknest Chilton

16

United States of America

McClellan Central Laboratories Sacramento, CA

Name and place of laboratory

table 3 List of hydroacoustic stations #

State responsible for station

Location

1

Australia

2

Latitude

Longitude

Type

Cape Lecuwin, WA

34.4 S

115.1 E

Hydrophone

Canada

Queen Charlotte Islands, B.C.

53.3 N

132.5 W

T-phase

3

Chile

Juan Fernández Island

33.7 S

78.8 W

Hydrophone

4

France

Crozet Islands

46.5 S

52.2 E

Hydrophone

5

France

Guadeloupe

16.3 N

61.1 W

T-phase

6

Mexico

Clarión Island

18.2 N

114.6 W

T-phase

7

Portugal

Flores

39.3 N

31.3 W

T-phase

8

United Kingdom

BIOT/Chagos Archipelago

7.3 S

72.4 E

Hydrophone

table 3 (continued) #

State responsible for station

Location

Latitude

Longitude

Type

9

United Kingdom

Tristan da Cunha

37.2 S

12.5 W

T-phase

10

United States of America

Ascension

8.0 S

14.4 W

Hydrophone

11

United States of America

Wake Island

19.3 N

166.6 E

Hydrophone

table 4 List of Infrasound Stations #

State responsible for station

Location

1

Argentina

2

Latitude

Longitude

Paso Flores

40.7 S

70.6 W

Argentina

Ushuaia

55.0 S

68.0 W

3

Australia

Davis Base, Antarctica

68.4 S

77.6 E

4

Australia

Narrogin, WA

32.9 S

117.2 E

5

Australia

Hobart, TAS

42.1 S

147.2 E

6

Australia

Cocos Islands

12.3 S

97.0 E

7

Australia

Warramunga, NT

19.9 S

134.3 E

8

Bolivia

La Paz

16.3 S

68.1 W

9

Brazil

Brasilia

15.6 S

48.0 W

10

Canada

Lac du Bonnet, Man.

50.2 N

95.9 W

11

Cape Verde

Cape Verde Islands

16.0 N

24.0 W

12

Central African Republic

Bangui

5.2 N

18.4 E

13

Chile

Easter Island

27.0 S

109.2 W

14

Chile

Juan Fernández Island

33.8 S

80.7 W

15

China

Beijing

40.0 N

116.0 E

16

China

Kunming

25.0 N

102.8 E

17

Côte d’Ivoire

Dimbokro

6.7 N

4.9 W

table 4 (continued) State responsible for station

Location

Latitude

Longitude

18

Denmark

Dundas, Greenland

76.5 N

68.7 W

19

Djibouti

Djibouti

11.3 N

43.5 E

20

Ecuador

Galápagos Islands

0.0 N

91.7 W

21

France

Marquesas Islands

10.0 N

140.0 W

22

France

Port LaGuerre, New Caledonia

22.1 S

166.3 E

23

France

Kerguelen

49.2 S

69.1 E

24

France

Tahiti

17.6 S

149.6 W

25

France

Kourou, French Guiana

5.2 N

52.7 W

26

Germany

Freyung

48.9 N

13.7 E

27

Germany

Georg von Neumayer, Antarctica

70.6 S

8.4 W

28

To be determined

To be determined

To be determined

To be determined

29

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Tehran

35.7 N

51.4 E

30

Japan

Tsukuba

36.0 N

140.1 E

31

Kazakstan

Aktyubinsk

50.4 N

58.0 E

32

Kenya

Kilmanbogo

1.3 S

36.8 E

33

Madagascar

Antananarivo

18.8 S

47.5 E

34

Mongolia

Javhlant

48.0 N

106.8 E

35

Namibia

Tsumeb

19.1 S

17.4 E

36

New Zealand

Chatham Island

44.0 S

176.5 W

37

Norway

Karasjok

69.5 N

25.5 E

38

Pakistan

Rahimyar Khan

28.2 N

70.3 E

39

Palau

Palau

7.5 N

134.5 E

40

Papua New Guinea

Rabaul

4.1 S

152.1 E

41

Paraguay

Villa Florida

26.3 S

57.3 W

42

Portugal

Azores

37.8 N

25.5 W

#

table 4 (continued) #

State responsible for station

Location

Latitude

Longitude

43

Russian Federation

Dubna

56.7 N

37.3 E

44

Russian Federation

PetropavlovskKamchatskiy

53.1 N

158.8 E

45

Russian Federation

Ussuriysk

43.7 N

131.9 E

46

Russian Federation

Zalesovo

53.9 N

84.8 E

47

South Africa

Boshof

28.6 S

25.4 E

48

Tunisia

Thala

35.6 N

8.7 E

49

United Kingdom

Tristan da Cunha

37.0 S

12.3 W

50

United Kingdom

Ascension

8.0 S

14.3 W

51

United Kingdom

Bermuda

32.0 N

64.5 W

52

United Kingdom

BIOT/Chagos Archipelago

5.0 S

72.0 E

53

United States of America

Eielson, AK

64.8 N

146.9 W

54

United States of America

Siple Station, Antarctica

75.5 S

83.6 W

55

United States of America

Windless Bight, Antarctica

77.5 S

161.8 E

56

United States of America

Newport, WA

48.3 N

117.1 W

57

United States of America

Piñon Flat, CA

33.6 N

116.5 W

58

United States of America

Midway Islands

28.1 N

177.2 W

59

United States of America

Hawaii, HI

19.6 N

155.3 W

60

United States of America

Wake Island

19.3 N

166.6 E

178

appendix b

Annex 2 to the Protocol

List of Characterisation Parameters for International Data Centre Standard Event Screening 1. The International Data Centre standard event screening criteria shall be based on the standard event characterisation parameters determined during the combined processing of data from all the monitoring technologies in the International Monitoring System. Standard event screening shall make use of both global and supplementary screening criteria to take account of regional variations where applicable. 2. For events detected by the International Monitoring System seismic component, the following parameters, inter alia, may be used: —location of the event; —depth of the event; —ratio of the magnitude of surface waves to body waves; —signal frequency content; —spectral ratios of phases; —spectral scalloping; —first motion of the P-wave; —focal mechanism; —relative excitation of seismic phases; —comparative measures to other events and groups of events; and —regional discriminants where applicable. 3. For events detected by the International Monitoring System hydroacoustic component, the following parameters, inter alia, may be used: —signal frequency content including corner frequency, wide-band energy and mean centre frequency and bandwidth; —frequency-dependent duration of signals; —spectral ratio; and —indications of bubble-pulse signals and bubble-pulse delay.

appendix b

179

4. For events detected by the International Monitoring System infrasound component, the following parameters, inter alia, may be used: —signal frequency content and dispersion; —signal duration; and —peak amplitude. 5. For events detected by the International Monitoring System radionuclide component, the following parameters, inter alia, may be used: —concentration of background natural and man-made radionuclides; —concentration of specific fission and activation products outside normal observations; and —ratios of one specific fission and activation product to another. CTBT Text drawn from version provided on www.ctbto.org.

appendix c

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) CTBT Resolution and Voting Record, September 10, 1996

United Nations

A/RES/50/245

General Assembly Distr. GENERAL 10 September 1996 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH A/RES/50/245 125th plenary meeting 10 September 1996 50/245. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 50/65 of 12 December 1995, in which the Assembly declared its readiness to resume consideration of the item “Comprehensive test-ban treaty”, as necessary, before its fifty-first session in order to endorse the text of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, 1. Adopts the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as contained in document A/50/1027; 2. Requests the Secretary-General, as depositary of the Treaty, to open it for signature, at United Nations Headquarters, at the earliest possible date; 3. Calls upon all States to sign and, thereafter, according to their respective constitutional processes, to become parties to the Treaty at the earliest possible date; 4. Also requests the Secretary-General, as depositary of the Treaty, to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-second session on the status of signature and ratifications of the Treaty.

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SER. NO: 41 ITEM: 65 SYMBOL: A/50/L. 78 DRAFT RESOLUTION

GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIFTIETH PLENARY MEETING #125 RECORDED VOTE ADOPTED RESOLUTION 50/245

DATE: 10 SEP 96 TIME: 4:00 PM VOTE: 1 YES: 158 NO: 3

ABSTAIN: 5

SUBJECT: COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y

AFGHANISTAN ALBANIA ALGERIA ANDORRA ANGOLA ANTIGUA-BARBUDA ARGENTINA ARMENIA AUSTRALIA AUSTRIA AZERBAIJAN BAHAMAS BAHRAIN BANGLADESH BARBADOS BELARUS BELGIUM BELIZE BENIN BHUTAN BOLIVIA BOSNIA/HERZEG BOTSWANA BRAZIL BRUNEI DAR-SALAMY BULGARIA BURKINA FASO BURUNDI CAMBODIA CAMEROON CANADA CAPE VERDE CENTRAL AFR REP CHAD CHILE CHINA COLOMBIA COMOROS CONGO COSTA RICA COTE D’IVOIRE CROATIA CUBA CYPRUS CZECH REPUBLIC DEM PR OF KOREA DENMARK

Y DJIBOUTI Y DOMINICA DOMINICAN REP Y ECUADOR Y EGYPT Y EL SALVADOR EQUAT GUINEA ERITREA Y ESTONIA Y ETHIOPIA Y FIJI Y FINLAND Y FRANCE Y GABON GAMBIA Y GEORGIA Y GERMANY Y GHANA Y GREECE Y GRENADA Y GUATEMALA Y GUINEA Y GUINEA-BISSAU Y GUYANA HAITI Y HONDURAS Y HUNGARY Y ICELAND N INDIA Y INDONESIA Y IRAN (ISLAMIC R) IRAQ Y IRELAND Y ISRAEL Y ITALY Y JAMAICA Y JAPAN Y JORDAN Y KAZAKSTAN Y KENYA Y KUWAIT Y KYRGYZSTAN Y LAO PDR Y LATVIA A LEBANON LESOTHO

Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

LIBERIA LIBYAN AJ LIECHTENSTEIN LITHUANIA LUXEMBOURG MADAGASCAR MALAWI MALAYSIA MALDIVES MALI MALTA MARSHALL ISD MAURITANIA MAURITIUS MEXICO MICRONESIA (FS) MONACO MONGOLIA MOROCCO MOZAMBIQUE MYANMAR NAMIBIA NEPAL NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NICARAGUA NIGER NIGERIA NORWAY OMAN PAKISTAN PALAU PANAMA PAPUA N GUINEA PARAGUAY PERU PHILIPPINES POLAND PORTUGAL QATAR REP OF KOREA REP OF MOLDOVA ROMANIA RUSSIAN FED RWANDA ST KITTS-NEVIS

The United Nations is the author of the original material.

Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y

SAINT LUCIA ST VINCENT-GREN SAMOA SAN MARINO SAO TOME PRINC SAUDI ARABIA SENEGAL SEYCHELLES SIERRA LEONE SINGAPORE SLOVAKIA SLOVENIA SOLOMON ISD SOMALIA SOUTH AFRICA SPAIN SRI LANKA SUDAN SURINAME SWAZILAND SWEDEN SYRIAN AR TAJIKISTAN THAILAND THE FYR MACEDONIA TOGO TRINIDAD-TOBAGO TUNISIA TURKEY TURKMENISTAN UGANDA UKRAINE U A EMIRATES UNITED KINGDOM U R TANZANIA UNITED STATES URUGUAY UZBEKISTAN VANUATU VENEZUELA VIET NAM YEMEN YUGOSLAVIA ZAIRE ZAMBIA ZIMBABWE

appendix d

Resolution Establishing the CTBT Preparatory Commission Adopted by the States Signatories, November 19, 1996

The States Signatories of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, adopted by the General Assembly at New York on 10 September 1996, having decided to take all necessary measures to ensure the rapid and effective establishment of the future Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, having decided to this end to establish a Preparatory Commission, 1. approve the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, as annexed to the present resolution; 2. request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 50/245, of 10 September 1996, on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, to provide the services required to initiate the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, including the Meeting of States Signatories and the First Session of the Preparatory Commission.

182

appendix d

183

Annex

Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization 1. There is hereby established the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”) for the purpose of carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and for preparing for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties to that Treaty. 2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the Commission for its first session as soon as possible, but not later than 60 days after the Treaty has been signed by 50 States. 3. The seat of the Commission shall be at the seat of the future Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization. 4. The Commission shall be composed of all States which sign the Treaty. Each State Signatory shall have one representative in the Commission, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. 5. (a) The costs of the Commission and its activities, including those of the provisional Technical Secretariat, shall be met annually by all States Signatories, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into account differences between the United Nations membership and States Signatories and timing of signature. The Commission and the provisional Technical Secretariat may also benefit from voluntary contributions; (b) A State Signatory which has not discharged in full its financial obligations to the Commission within 365 days of receipt of the request for payment shall have no vote in the Commission, until such payment is received. The Commission may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member; (c) The Commission shall, between the time the Treaty is opened for signature and the conclusion of the initial session of the Conference of the States Parties, use funds provided by the States Signatories

184

appendix d

to meet the necessary costs arising from its functions and purposes, including the capital investments and operating and maintenance costs to establish and, pending their formal commissioning, to operate provisionally as necessary the International Data Centre and the International Monitoring System networks provided for in the Treaty. The funding by the Commission shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, adjusted to take into account the organizational differences between the Comprehensive Nuclear TestBan Treaty Organization and the Commission. The Preparatory Commission shall develop the funding procedures in cases not covered by the Treaty. 6. All decisions of the Commission should be taken by consensus. If, notwithstanding the efforts of representatives to achieve consensus, an issue comes up for voting, the Chairman of the Commission shall defer the vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Commission before the end of the period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Commission shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a simple majority of the members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the commission by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance. 7. The Commission shall have standing as an international organization, authority to negotiate and enter into agreements, and such other legal capacity as necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes. 8. The Commission shall: (a) Elect its Chairman and other officers, adopt its rules of procedure, meet as often as necessary and establish such committees as it deems useful; (b) Appoint its Executive Secretary; (c) Establish a provisional Technical Secretariat to assist the Commission in its activity and to exercise such functions as the

appendix d

185

Commission may determine, and appoint the necessary staff in accordance with the principles established for the staff of the Technical Secretariat pursuant to Article II, paragraph 50, of the Treaty. Only nationals of States Signatories shall be appointed to the provisional Technical Secretariat; (d) Establish administrative and financial regulations in respect of its own expenditure and accounts, providing for, inter alia: (i) Proper financial control and accounting by the Commission; (ii) Preparation and approval of periodic financial statements by the Commission; (iii) Independent audit of the Commission’s financial statements; (iv) Annual presentation of the audited financial statements to a regular session of the plenary of the States Signatories for formal acceptance. 9. The Commission shall make arrangements for the initial session of the Conference of the States Parties, including the preparation of a draft agenda and draft rules of procedure. 10. The Commission shall undertake, inter alia, the following tasks concerning the organization and work of the Technical Secretariat and requiring immediate attention after the entry into force of the Treaty: (a) Elaboration of a detailed staffing pattern of the Technical Secretariat, including delegation of authority and the process of decision-making; (b) Assessments of personnel requirements; (c) Development of staff rules for recruitment and service conditions; (d) Recruitment and training of technical personnel and support staff; (e) Organization of office and administrative services. 11. The Commission shall undertake, inter alia, the following tasks on matters of the Organization requiring immediate attention after the entry into force of the Treaty: (a) Preparation of program of work and budget of the first year of activities of the Organization; (b) Preparation of detailed budgetary provisions for the Organization; (c) Preparation of the scale of financial contributions to the Organization;

186

appendix d

(d) Preparation of administrative and financial regulations for the Organization providing for, inter alia: (i) Proper financial control and accounting by the Organization; (ii) Preparation and approval of periodic financial statements by the Organization; (iii) Independent audit of the Organization’s financial statements; (iv) Annual presentation of the audited financial statements to a regular session of the Conference of the States Parties for formal acceptance; (e) Development of arrangements to facilitate the designation and election in accordance with Article II, paragraph 29 of the Treaty for the first election of the Executive Council. 12. The Commission shall develop, inter alia, the following draft agreements, arrangements and guidelines for approval by the Conference of the States Parties in accordance with the Treaty and Protocol: (a) Standard model agreements or arrangements, where relevant, to be concluded by the future Organization with States Parties, other States and international organizations; (b) Agreements or arrangements negotiated in accordance with the above models by the provisional Technical Secretariat with relevant States, in particular with those prospectively hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for International Monitoring System facilities; (c) The Headquarters Agreement with the Host Country pursuant to Article II, paragraph 56, of the Treaty. 13. The Commission shall undertake all necessary preparations to ensure the operationalization of the Treaty’s verification regime at entry into force, pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 1, and shall develop appropriate procedures for its operation, presenting a report on the operational readiness of the regime, together with any relevant recommendations, to the initial session of the Conference of the States Parties. 14. The Commission shall supervise and coordinate, in fulfilling the requirements of the Treaty and its Protocol, the development, preparation, technical testing and, pending their formal commissioning, provisional operation as necessary of the International Data Centre and the International Monitoring System, together with assuring appropriate support of the Sys-

appendix d

187

tem by certified laboratory facilities and by respective means of communication. Inter alia, the Commission shall: (a) At its second plenary session, taking into consideration all relevant reports, including those prepared in the course of the CTBT negotiation and by the Conference on Disarmament’s Group of Scientific Experts: (i) Establish an initial plan for the progressive commissioning of the International Data Centre and the International Monitoring System, and for the implementation of related responsibilities; (ii) Assume responsibility for relevant technical tests, including the work begun under the Group of Scientific Experts’ Technical Test 3, and for the development and management of any arrangements required to provide an uninterrupted transition from such technical tests to the future International Monitoring System; (iii) Constitute appropriate structures for the regular provision to the Commission of expert and integrated technical advice on monitoring, data communications and analysis issues, and for technical supervision of International Monitoring System and International Data Centre implementation; (b) Develop in accordance with the Treaty and Protocol, and prepare for adoption by the initial session of the Conference of the States Parties, operational manuals for: (i) Seismological Monitoring; (ii) Radionuclide Monitoring; (iii) Hydroacoustic Monitoring; (iv) Infrasound Monitoring; and (v) The International Data Centre. 15. The Commission shall make all necessary preparations, in fulfilling the requirements of the Treaty and its Protocol, for the support of on-site inspections from the entry into force of the Treaty. It shall, inter alia: (a) Develop and prepare for the approval of the initial session of the Conference of the States Parties: (i) An operational manual containing all appropriate legal, technical and administrative procedures; and

188

appendix d

(ii) A list of equipment for use during on-site inspections; (b) Develop a programme for the training of inspectors; and (c) Acquire or otherwise make provision for the availability of relevant inspection equipment, including communications equipment, and conduct technical tests of such equipment as necessary. 16. The Commission shall develop guidelines and reporting formats for the implementation of confidence-building measures. 17. An indicative list of verification tasks to be carried out by the Preparatory Commission, as specified in paragraphs 12 to 16, is attached as the appendix to the present text. 18. The Commission shall: (a) Facilitate the exchange of information between States Signatories concerning legal and administrative measures for the implementation of the Treaty and, if requested by States Signatories, give advice and assistance to them on these matters; (b) Follow the ratification process and, if requested by States Signatories, provide them with legal and technical information and advice about the Treaty in order to facilitate its ratification process; and (c) Prepare such studies, reports and records as it deems necessary. 19. The Commission shall prepare a final report on all matters within its mandate for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties. 20. Rights and assets, financial and other obligations and functions of the Commission shall be transferred to the Organization at the first session of the Conference of the States Parties. The Commission shall make recommendations to the Conference of the States Parties on this matter, including on effecting a smooth transition. 21. The Commission shall remain in existence until the conclusion of the first session of the Conference of the States Parties. 22. The Commission as an international organization, its staff, as well as the delegates of the States Signatories shall be accorded by the Host Country such legal status, privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Commission and the fulfillment of its object and purpose.

appendix d

189

Appendix

Indicative List of Verification Tasks of the Preparatory Commission The following indicative list is illustrative of the verification-related tasks the Preparatory Commission might need to undertake in implementing the relevant provisions of the Treaty and of the resolution establishing the Commission.

Preparatory Commission Text paragraph 12: Draft agreements, arrangements and guidelines In addition to those items mentioned in the illustrative and explicitly nonexhaustive listing contained in paragraph 12, the following tasks might also be necessary: —Procedures for the conduct of consultation and clarification including for use of data from cooperating national facilities if agreed (Article IV, paragraphs 27 and 28, and paragraphs 29 to 33 of the Treaty); —Procedures for the Technical Secretariat’s monitoring, assessment and reporting on the overall performance of the IMS and the IDC (Article IV, paragraph 14 (1) of the Treaty); —Guidelines for CTBT Organization funding of IMS and OSI activities including for funding of IMS operational and maintenance costs, and for recognition of credit against assessed contributions if agreed (Article IV, paragraphs 19 to 22 of the Treaty); —Confidentiality procedures (Article II, paragraph 7 and Article IV, paragraph 8 of the Treaty). For those items already specifically listed under paragraph 12, it is envisaged that verification agreements or arrangements (either generic model agreements or arrangements, or the draft agreements or arrangements negotiated with States in accordance with these models) would include, pursuant to Part I, Section A of the Protocol to the Treaty: —Procedures for specifying a particular State’s acceptance pursuant to the CTBT of responsibility for particular monitoring facilities;

190

appendix d

—Responsibilities for operation, maintenance and upgrading in accordance with the Operational Manuals; —Procedures to be followed in establishment of new or upgrading of existing facilities, or for more substantive changes to IMS facilities; —Procedures for temporary arrangements which might apply (Article IV, paragraph 26 of the Treaty); —Provisions for funding IMS activities and data transmission (Article IV, paragraph 22 of the Treaty); —Assistance to the Organization in inspecting an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State (Part II, paragraph 107 of the Protocol to the Treaty); or, —Availability of OSI equipment from a State Party, and for the maintenance and calibration of such equipment (Part II, paragraph 40 of the Protocol to the Treaty).

Preparatory Commission Text paragraph 13: Preparatory Commission verification regime responsibilities The report referred to in this paragraph reflects a negotiating understanding that the task of compiling such a report—implicit in Article II, paragraph 26 (h) of the Treaty—would be explicitly mentioned in the resolution establishing the Preparatory Commission. The report and associated recommendations from the Commission will be essential prerequisites for the initial Conference of States Parties to take the steps necessary to formalize the establishment of the IMS and other elements of the Treaty’s verification regime. The Preparatory Commission would as a consequence need, inter alia, to: —Develop recommendations for any changes to the IMS facility lists which experience during the Preparatory Commission may dictate be put to the initial Conference of the States Parties; and —Agree on related recommendations, including where relevant recommendations relating to the deployment of particular technologies and aspects thereof such as noble gas (Part I, paragraph 10 of the Protocol to the Treaty).

appendix d

191

Preparatory Commission Text paragraph 14: Preparatory Commission IMS preparation responsibilities This chapeau includes, inter alia, references to the responsibility of the Preparatory Commission for families of tasks related to: —The establishment of international communications channels for the transmission and receipt of IMS data and reporting products (Article IV, paragraph 14 (a) of the Treaty); and —Developing procedures and a formal basis for the provisional operation and funding of the provisional IMS.

Preparatory Commission Text paragraph 14 (b): development of Operational Manuals Drafts of all Operational Manuals, approved by the Preparatory Commission, are required to be adopted by the initial Conference of the States Parties (Article II, paragraph 26 (h) of the Treaty). The compilation of the Operational Manual for each monitoring technology will require the Preparatory Commission to develop, spell out and approve all necessary technical and operational detail required to ensure the effective operation of the International Monitoring System, inter alia; —The technical specifications and operational requirements for the relevant facilities in each global monitoring network (Part I, paragraphs 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13 and 15, of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for the provision of data to the IDC, including transmission formats and modalities (Part I, paragraphs 6, 8, 9, 12 and 14 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for facility security and for data authentication (Part I, paragraph 4 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for checking of monitoring facility equipment and communications links by the Technical Secretariat, and for facility certification (including for cooperating national facilities and for their designation as such) (Article IV, paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Treaty and Part I, paragraph 4 of the Protocol to the Treaty).

192

appendix d

Preparatory Commission Text paragraph 14 (b) (ii): Operational Manual for Radionuclide Monitoring In addition to the generic points listed above, the Operational Manual for Radionuclide Monitoring will require the Preparatory Commission to develop: —Procedures for the processing and handling of samples of associated data flowing from monitoring facilities (Part I, paragraph 11 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Specifications and procedures for the certification and ongoing calibration of laboratories used by the CTBTO in support of the radionuclide monitoring network (Part I, paragraph 11 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Special procedures for the transmission of samples to certified laboratories, for additional analysis, and for their storage or archiving as appropriate (Part I, paragraph 11 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for the integration of relevant meteorological data if appropriate (Part I, paragraph 9 of the Protocol to the Treaty); and, —Guidelines for the striking of contracts with specific certified laboratories to provide for fee-for-service analysis of samples (Part I, paragraph 11 of the Protocol to the Treaty).

Preparatory Commission Text paragraph 14 (b) (iii): Operational Manual for Hydroacoustic Monitoring In addition to generic points listed above, in order to prepare the Operational Manual for Hydroacoustic Monitoring, the Preparatory Commission will need to: —Develop the different technical specifications and operational requirements for the two different types of facilities envisaged (hydrophone stations and T-phase stations) (Part I, paragraph 13 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Develop procedures for the storage or archiving IMS data at the monitoring station if so decided.

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193

Preparatory Commission Text paragraph 14 (b) (v): Operational Manual for the International Data Centre In developing the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre and producing its content, the Preparatory Commission will need to: —Develop the procedures to be used by the IDC in receiving, collecting, processing, analyzing, reporting on and archiving data from the IMS, and for carrying out its agreed functions, in particular for the production of standard reporting products and for the performance of the standard range of services to be offered to States Parties (Part I, paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Protocol to the Treaty and passim); —In this context, it will need to give special attention to developing: —Agreed standard event screening criteria and related operational procedures and formats in accordance with Protocol provisions (Part I, paragraphs 17 and 18 (b) of, and Annex 2 to the Protocol to the Treaty); —Agreed formats and procedures for assisting States Parties with expert technical analysis (Part I, paragraph 20 (c) of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Specification of the volumes and formats of data services to be provided by the IDC to States Parties at no cost (Part I, paragraph 20 of the Protocol to the Treaty), and procedures for the recovery of costs from States Parties requesting products or services in excess of these specifications; —Guidelines for the establishment of national event screening procedures (Part I, paragraph 21 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for the provision of technical assistance to individual States Parties (Part I, paragraph 22 of the Protocol to the Treaty); and —Procedures for monitoring and reporting on the operational status of the International Monitoring System (Part I, paragraph 23 of the Protocol to the Treaty).

Preparatory Commission Text paragraph 15: On-Site Inspection The Treaty and Protocol text are separately explicit that the Operational Manual for OSI and the list of approved inspection equipment must be approved by the Conference of States Parties at its initial session (Part II, paragraph 13 of

194

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the Protocol to the Treaty, Article II, paragraph 26 (h) of the Treaty and Part II, paragraph 36 of the Protocol to the Treaty). In order to compile the Operational Manual for OSI, the Preparatory Commission will in all likelihood need to develop or consider, inter alia: —Procedures and formats for the nomination and designation of inspectors and inspection assistants (Part II, paragraphs 14 to 25 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for the training and qualification of inspectors; —Procedures and formats for designating, recording and consulting on points of entry (Part II, paragraphs 32 to 34 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for use of non-scheduled aircraft and agreement on routings (part II, paragraph 35 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —A list of core and auxiliary inspection equipment and detailed specifications therefor; procedures for documentation, and sealing to authenticate certification of inspection equipment; and procedures to calibrate, maintain, protect and retain custody over the approved inspection equipment (Part II, paragraphs 36 to 40 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Formats and communications procedures for OSI requests, mandates and notifications, and procedures for drawing up the inspection mandate (Part II, paragraphs 35 and 41 to 43 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for the reimbursement of inspected State Party costs associated with OSI (including for the itemization of expenses and of payments) and for other administrative arrangements (Part II, paragraphs 11 to 13 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for the checking, and if necessary, storing of inspection equipment at point of entry (Part II, paragraph 51 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures covering OSI team safety and health, and confidentiality issues (Part II, paragraph 60 (h) of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures related to the implementation of the inspected States Parties’ rights during the OSI (Part II, paragraph 61 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for communications by the inspection team, including for the due approval and certification of communications equipment (Part II, paragraph 62 of the Protocol to the Treaty);

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195

—Procedures for participation of observers (nomination, acceptance, nonacceptance, and notifications) (Article IV, paragraph 61 of the Treaty and Part II, paragraphs 63 to 68 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for implementation of inspection activities and techniques in the conduct of an OSI (Part II, paragraphs 69 and 70 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for overflights and the use of inspection equipment during overflights (Part II, paragraphs 71 to 85 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for the collection, handling and analysis of samples as per the requirements of the Treaty, including relevant scientific criteria and guidelines (Part II, paragraphs 97 to 104 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for the certification of laboratories designated to perform different types of OSI-related analysis (Part II, paragraph 102 of the Protocol to the Treaty); —Procedures for inspection of areas beyond the jurisdiction or control of any state (Part II, paragraphs 105 to 108 of the Protocol to the Treaty); and —Formats for OSI team’s preliminary findings report (Part II, paragraph 109 of the Protocol to the Treaty) and formats and procedures for handling the inspection report (Article IV, paragraphs 62 to 64 of the Treaty). —Procedures for storing and handling the OSI data and samples after the completion of the inspection. The United Nations is the author of the original material.

appendix e

Some Lessons Learned from CTBT Negotiations and Implementation

A number of lessons can be drawn from the CTBT experience thus far, although participants and observers may differ on what they are and their significance. From this author’s perspective, the following are particularly noteworthy: U.S. Senior-Level Policy Leadership One rarely sees interagency battles in Washington as severe as those that involved arms control issues during the Cold War, and U.S. deliberations on CTBT issues were no exception. Any initiative to limit U.S. strategic nuclear power was a hard sell, even with the prospect of restraining the actions and capabilities of other nuclear powers. Nevertheless, this bit of “hard ball” is healthy in forcing senior policymakers to confront the tough national security tradeoffs head-on. The intense “in-house” deliberations also better inform key interagency players about the capabilities of the other potential parties to a treaty and the stakes involved. While on occasion the acrimony unfortunately turns ad hominem and some participants play loose with sensitive policy or intelligence information to gain advantage in the policy debates through leaks to the media, for the most part the system tends eventually to end up about at the right spot in terms of doing what is best for U.S. national security. The deliberations at least allow all voices and opinions to be heard. The Clinton Administration made the CTBT a priority and gave sufficient senior-level attention to what was happening during the negotiations in Geneva. Among other things, it was important for the U.S. delegation to communicate to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) U.S. “red lines” on 196

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issues, such as the use of NTM data, that the United States required in order to support the Treaty text. However, following the vote by the Senate in 1999 and the change of U.S. policy in 2001, there has been less Washington interest in and focus on implementation activities, with the exception of the International Monitoring System. The key lesson here is that it takes the authority of the President, and the leadership of his National Security Adviser, to clearly articulate the national security goals involved in any such negotiation, to get the interagency experts on task, and to drive the deliberative and negotiation processes to a successful conclusion. While it is vitally important that all views of agencies and policy considerations be aired and vetted, at some point a decision is needed. Rarely can the interagency process reach a consensus on such divisive issues without the White House forcing closure. Thus, it is critical for the President to clearly articulate the objectives, to get the National Security Council principals on board, and to empower the National Security Advisor to make it happen. Otherwise, interagency battles lead to ambiguous, lowest-common-denominator decisions and guidance that create confusion in the field. Once U.S. negotiating partners sense internal discord, they make every effort to take advantage of it. U.S. Congressional Oversight and Politics The Senate’s Constitutional responsibility to give its advice and consent to treaties offers a check and balance on the administration’s role in determining national security policy and seeking corresponding agreements. Congress can play a very proactive role to the benefit of both the negotiating and ratification processes. In a number of bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union and Russia on strategic nuclear forces, Senate Observers from the appropriate oversight committees often visited U.S. delegations to get firsthand information on how things were progressing. This also gave them opportunities to pass along congressional sentiments and, at times, to influence the outcome of the negotiation. Congressional oversight generally has had a positive impact on the success of negotiations from the U.S. perspective. For example, during the INF Treaty negotiations visiting senators were fully briefed on the status of the negotiations by the U.S. Delegation, and then they were invited to meet with Soviet negotiators to personally probe and conjole. During the summer

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of 1986, the Soviets were refusing to include their Asian-based SS–20 missiles in the negotiation, but these missiles had sufficient range to strike targets in Alaska. After Senator Ted Stevens (Alaska-R) informed them that there was no way that the Senate would ever ratify an INF Treaty that did not eliminate all SS–20 ballistic missiles facing both Europe and Asia, the Soviets eventually agreed the following year to eliminate all such missiles. However, unleashing senators in the process of negotiations also carried some risk. During the SALT II negotiations, for example, one senator mentioned to the Soviets the importance to the United States of monitoring Soviet telemetry signals from the test flights of their missiles, which they had begun to encrypt. Up to that point, the U.S. Delegation had protected the importance of this monitoring capability to the United States because of its sensitivity, and this revelation caused both security and tactical concerns (Talbott 1979). On balance, it is wise for any Administration pursuing arms control initiatives to include key senators in the process of the negotiation so that they understand the areas of difficulty and can be given the opportunity to influence the other side. Significantly, this was not done during the CTBT negotiations, which surely contributed to the lack of solid support for the Treaty when it eventually came up for consideration by the Senate. The Clinton Administration hesitated to engage the Senate in the policy deliberations and negotiation, probably due in part to the antipathy of the then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms (South Carolina-R). Helms opposed not only the CTBT negotiations, but he also objected to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which had the lead for the United States in the negotiations. He eventually forced the abolishment of ACDA. The Clinton Administration would have been wise to invite more sympathetic senators to visit the delegation for firsthand information so that they could have taken some ownership of the outcome. When looking back over the history of U.S. efforts to negotiate and ratify nuclear arms control treaties, it is instructive to note that politics has always played a role. Most of the treaties (SALT I, NPT, TTBT, INF, START I, and SORT) were ratified under Republican administrations. It appears that Republican presidents are best able to convince conservative critics that U.S. national security will not suffer as a result of such treaties. In contrast, conservative Republicans appear suspicious of a Democratic president who is

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pushing for an arms control treaty. While there were other factors involved, the two attempts by Democratic administrations to win Senate approval of significant treaties (i.e., SALT II—Carter and CTBT—Clinton) were unsuccessful. The sole exception to this was the LTBT under the Kennedy Administration. History seems to demonstrate that the prospects for treaty ratification are least favorable when there is a Democratic White House and a Republican-controlled Senate. Artificial Deadlines on Negotiations One of the most ironic aspects of the CTBT negotiations was the artificial deadline thrust on the Conference on Disarmament (CD), both by the UN General Assembly and individual countries, especially the United States. Certainly it was important to show progress in these negotiations in order to influence the outcome of the May 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and the September 1996 deadline pushed the CD to conclude the negotiations, which otherwise might have dragged out for some additional years. Nevertheless, the deadline caused the United States and other countries in the CD to make a final concession to the Chinese on the on-site inspection voting issue because these countries had become the demandeurs of the Treaty. The Chinese calculated correctly that the others would concede for the sake of completing the Treaty by September 1996— a date that might not have been important to China. This outcome demonstrated the consequence of losing effective bargaining leverage because of the pressure to meet an arbitrary deadline, and it led some to argue subsequently that the Treaty’s inspection regime is less effective than it had to be. Cooperation with Allies and Like-Minded Countries The United States has a wide range of relationships with various entities in many countries, which gives it significant leverage and opportunities to influence how other countries address issues. This certainly has been the case during the negotiation and implementation of the CTBT, when military and civilian, technical and political relationships with foreign governments are at play simultaneously. It became quite apparent that pushing the PrepCom in a direction the United States desired depended more often than not on established personal relations or on encouraging other delegations to carry the weight of the effort. Often because of the status of political relations or some

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other complication, third parties are more effective and seen as more credible advocates on particular issues than the United States. For example, it was at times counterproductive for the U.S. Delegation to be seen pushing for a particular outcome on an issue, even when the PrepCom was favorably disposed. This was especially true when some countries were trying to punish the United States for its “IMS-only” policy after the Bush Administration’s decision in 2001 to downplay the importance of the Treaty. In certain situations it was more effective, and certainly less acrimonious, when another country took the lead on pressing for an outcome that was favored by the United States. Thus, it is often critical to coordinate with like-minded delegations on issues before they come to the floor for debate. Equally important is the effort to establish a constructive working relationship with more difficult negotiating opponents in order to avoid inadvertently making them dig even deeper in their opposition. At times it is even prudent to meet with them and share latest policy guidance from capitals to give opponents an opportunity to ask questions in an effort to reduce suspicions about motives. Such overtures create opportunities to influence their reactions before engaging in a public debate that may become acrimonious and make finding a solution more difficult. A corollary to this type of cooperation is recognizing when it is necessary to weigh in with the senior-level decision-makers in foreign capitals, rather than trying to work all issues at the scene of the negotiations. Especially when another country’s representative is uncooperative and uncompromising, this approach can register the importance of what is happening and influence the decision making in the foreign capital, which can result in guidance being passed back to the counterpart delegation to seek a more reasonable solution.

appendix f

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 Ratification advised by U.S. Senate March 13, 1969 Ratified by U.S. President November 24, 1969 U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow March 5, 1970 Proclaimed by U.S. President March 5, 1970 Entered into force March 5, 1970

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the “Parties to the Treaty”, considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war, in conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic

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Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points, affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon States, convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective, recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end, desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of

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force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, have agreed as follows:

Article I Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards

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system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article. 3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty. 4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

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Article IV 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty. 2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

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Article VI Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII 1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclearweapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

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3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967. 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

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Article X 1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. in witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. done in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight. The United Nations is the author of the original material.

appendix g

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Final Document New York, 1995

note: The Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consists of three parts: I. Organization and Work of the Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)) II. Documents issued at the Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part II)) III. Summary Records and Verbatim Records (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part III))

Annex

Decisions and Resolution Adopted by the Conference —Decision 1: Strengthening the review process for the Treaty —Decision 2: Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

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—Decision 3: Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons —Resolution on the Middle East Decision 1: Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty

1. The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons examined the implementation of article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. 2. The States party to the Treaty participating in the Conference decided, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, that Review Conferences should continue to be held every five years and that, accordingly, the next Review Conference should be held in the year 2000. 3. The Conference decided that, beginning in 1997, the Preparatory Committee should hold, normally for a duration of 10 working days, a meeting in each of the three years prior to the Review Conference. If necessary, a fourth preparatory meeting may be held in the year of the Conference. 4. The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. These include those identified in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted on 11 May 1995. These meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference. 5. The Conference also concluded that the present structure of three Main Committees should continue and the question of an overlap of issues being discussed in more than one Committee should be resolved in the General Committee, which would coordinate the work of the Committees so that the substantive responsibility for the preparation of the report with respect to each specific issue is undertaken in only one Committee. 6. It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could be established within the respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide for a focused consideration of such issues. The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Commit-

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tee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference. 7. The Conference further agreed that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality. Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, reaffirming the preamble and articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, welcoming the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, desiring a set of principles and objectives in accordance with which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued and progress, achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically within the review process provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, the enhancement and strengthening of which is welcomed, reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the conference affirms the need to continue to move with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and accordingly adopts the following principles and objectives:

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Universality 1. Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective. Non-proliferation 2. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. Nuclear Disarmament 3. Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. 4. The achievement of the following measures is important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI, including the programme of action as reflected below: (a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint; (b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons

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or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein; (c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones 5. The conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security is reaffirmed. 6. The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome. 7. The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their respect and support for the relevant protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant protocols. Security Assurances 8. Noting United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which was adopted unanimously on 11 April 1995, as well as the declarations of the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument. Safeguards 9. The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority responsible to verify and assure, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements

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with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. 10. All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not yet done so should do so without delay. 11. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards should be regularly assessed and evaluated. Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards should be supported and implemented and the Agency’s capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities should be increased. Also, States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. 12. New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclearweapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency’s full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 13. Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under Agency safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 14. Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II as well as III of the Treaty.

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15. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented. 16. In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries particularly into account. 17. Transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty. 18. All States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in waste management, and observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials. 19. Every effort should be made to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources. 20. Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. the conference requests that the President of the Conference bring the present decision, the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to the attention of the heads of State or Government of all States and seek their full cooperation on these documents and in the furtherance of the goals of the Treaty.

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Decision 3: Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, having convened in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, and article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, having reviewed the operation of the Treaty and affirming that there is a need for full compliance with the Treaty, its extension and its universal adherence, which are essential to international peace and security and the attainment of the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, having reaffirmed article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty and the need for its continued implementation in a strengthened manner and, to this end, emphasizing the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, also adopted by the Conference, having established that the Conference is quorate in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, decides that, as a majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely. The United Nations is the author of the original material.

appendix h

Proliferation Security Initiative Fact Sheet The White House, Office of the Press Secretary Washington, DC September 4, 2003

Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and regimes. It is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is also consistent with recent statements of the G8 and the European Union, establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI participants are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that these items could fall into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and non-state actors of 217

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proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing nonproliferation norms, and to profit from such trade, requires new and stronger actions by the international community. We look forward to working with all concerned states on measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the following set of “Interdiction Principles.”

Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in similarly committing to: 1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. “States or non-state actors of proliferation concern” generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials. 2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.

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3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments. 4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include: (a) Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so. (b) At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified. (c) To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states. (d) To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry. (e) At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace

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to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights. (f) If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.

appendix i

UN Security Council Resolution 1540

United Nations

S/Res/1540 (2004)

Security Council

Distr.: General 28 April 2004

Resolution 1540 (2004) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 April 2004 the security council, affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery,* constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

* Definitions for the purpose of this resolution only: Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use. Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution. Related materials: materials, equipment, and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.

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reaffirming in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction, recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability, affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter, affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to promote international stability, welcoming efforts in this context by multilateral arrangements which contribute to non-proliferation, affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as a cover for proliferation, gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors* such as those identified in the United Nations list established and maintained by the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267 and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery,

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gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials,* which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to international peace and security, recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security, recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials, such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and those recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, encouraging all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties and agreements to which they are party, reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, determined to facilitate henceforth an effective response to global threats in the area of non-proliferation, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;

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2. decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them; 3. decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall: (a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport; (b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures; (c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law; (d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations; 4. decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which

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will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution to the Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this resolution; 5. decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 6. recognizes the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the earliest opportunity the development of such lists; 7. recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions; 8. calls upon all States: (a) To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons; (b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral nonproliferation treaties; (c) To renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy

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Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes; (d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws; 9. calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on nonproliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery; 10. Further to counter that threat, calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials; 11. expresses its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end; 12. decides to remain seized of the matter. The United Nations is the author of the original material.

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Index

Air Force Tactical Applications Center (AFTAC), 57 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), 18f, 68 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 198 Belgium, 10, 28, 44 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), 10 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 10, 15, 23, 29, 36, 47; and challenge inspections, 34, 65 China, 10, 19, 44, 48, 73–77 passim; and testing, 2f, 8f, 22; and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, 21; and peaceful nuclear explosions, 27; and ratification, 28, 46, 70f; and International Monitoring System issues, 31f, 54, 60, 62; and national technical means of verification, 36, 39; and on-site inspections, 41, 199; and availability of International Monitoring System data, 64, 68–72 passim Conference on Disarmament (CD), 10f, 38, 42, 44, 62, 196, 199; and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 9, 20f, 23, 28, 34; and Chemical Weapons Convention, 15; and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, 21f Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 4, 9, 15, 23, 38–43 passim, 80–82; and nuclear nonproliferation regime, 12; and Conference on Disarmament, 20; and basic obligations,

24–28; organization, 29f, 48; verification, 31, 37, 53, 81; and on-site inspections, 34–41 passim; and entry into force, 46–51 passim, 58, 75 Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), 20–22, 78 France, 14–19 passim, 35, 48, 58; and testing, 2f, 22, 53 India, 2f, 12f, 20, 24, 28–29, 57; and testing, 2, 43, 54, 73; and International Monitoring System issues, 32, 36; and basic obligations, 38f; and opposition to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 42–47 passim, 70, 74–76, 80 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), 18, 197 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 17, 28ff, 54 International Data Center (IDC), 29–34 passim, 49, 54–59 passim, 64, 72, 77 International Monitoring System (IMS), 29–34, 49, 53, 57ff, 63f, 72, 77; and noble gas, 60f, 68 Iran, 10, 28, 40, 44, 70, 74–84 passim; and nuclear weapons program, 12, 54, 71–73; and opposition to Israel, 23, 42, 48f Israel, 10, 13, 23f, 36, 66, 68, 75; and nuclear weapons program, 2f, 12, 28, 55f JASON Report, see United States Libya, 12, 28, 44, 55, 71, 82

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index

Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), 1f, 6f, 26 National Academy of Sciences, see United States National Technical Means of Verification (NTM), 35–41 passim, 197 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 5, 16, 19; and G–21 states, 10, 21, 25, 31, 39–41 Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), 9–11, 15–17, 78 North Korea, 10, 28, 44–47 passim, 55, 70–76 passim, 80–84 passim; and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 12f, 17 Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, 9–12 passim, 73, 81 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 10f, 27–30, 43, 55, 79–84 passim, 198; and 1995 Review and Extension Conference, 9, 12, 15–22 passim, 38; and Article IV obligations, 16f, 40, 78 Nuclear Test Sites, 1; and Algeria, 3; and Mururoa, 3; and Nevada, 8, 53; and Lop Nur, 53; and Novaya Zemlya, 53 Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ), 83 Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), 9–17 passim, 28, 39f, 80, 82 On-Site Inspections (OSI), 34f, 65 P–5 States, 16f, 20, 24–31 passim, 39f, 53f Pakistan, 10, 13, 24, 28, 46, 57, 73; and testing, 2f, 12, 54, 73; and on-site inspections, 36; and national technical means of verification, 39; IMS stations, 44; and signature and ratification, 70, 74f Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), 7 Preparatory Commission (PrepCom), 47, 49, 60, 75, 77, 200; and Provisional Technical Secretariat, 48, 62f, 69, 77; and working groups, 49; and funding, 56f, 63 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 84 Russia/Soviet Union, 6–10 passim, 14, 16, 21, 32, 48, 82; and testing, 2, 53, 73;

and arms control, 17–19, 27, 36; and onsite inspections, 36; and ratification, 58 South Africa, 2f, 56 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 18, 36, 198 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), 18f, 198f Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), 19, 198 Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), 6f, 198 United Kingdom, 10, 14–19 passim, 27, 35, 41; and testing, 2f, 8, 53; and arms control, 6f; and ratification, 58 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 11, 21, 30, 38, 42, 48, 199; and Special Session of the 50th UNGA, 44f United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 16; and Resolution 1540, 13, 83f United Nations Secretary General (UNSYG) and Depositary for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 45 United States, 14, 17, 21, 27, 32, 48, 53f, 62, 72ff, 81, 196–199; and testing, 2, 8, 25f; and Eisenhower Administration, 5; and arms control, 6–10 passim, 16–19 passim, 36; and George H.W. Bush Administration, 8; and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty negotiations, 9, 15, 35, 41, 82; and JASON Report, 25f; and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 46–49 passim, 65, 70, 75; and Senate vote, 50–52, 56f; and Senator Helms, 51, 198; and Shalikashvili Report, 52; and National Academy of Sciences Report, 52; funding of the Preparatory Commission, 56f; George W. Bush Administration policy change, 67, 80, 197, 200; and Senate Observers, 197 United States Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS), 56f

About the Author

Keith Hansen, a Consulting Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, was intimately involved in the CTBT negotiations and implementation activities for eight years. This analysis, based on his personal involvement as a member of the U.S. negotiating team, provides one insider’s view of how the critical events unfolded. He is neither a defender nor a critic of the CTBT, but rather he provides a historical and analytical understanding regarding the context for the events that have surrounded the successful negotiation but unsuccessful implementation of this Treaty. His perspective is that of one who was “in the field.” Those who were primarily involved in Washington, or other capitals, are likely have a somewhat different perspective on the same events. The author leaves it to other experts to describe the technical details associated with critical issues, such as the verifiability of the Treaty and the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile under a CTBT. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect official positions or views of any U.S. government agency or department. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

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