The Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh: On the Difficult Road to Peace 9781685853389

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THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS,

BANGLADESH

INTERNATIONAL PEACE A C A D E M Y OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS, BANGLADESH On the Difficult Road to Peace

Amena Mohsin

LYN N E RIENNER PUBLISHERS

BOULDER L O N D O N

Published in the United States of America in 2003 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2003 by the International Peace Academy, Inc. All rights reserved by the publisher

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mohsin, Amena. The Chittagong hill tracts, Bangladesh : on the difficult road to peace / Amena Mohsin. p. cm.—(International Peace Academy occasional paper series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58826-138-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Chittagong Hill Tracts District (Bangladesh)—Politics and government. 2. Insurgency—Bangladesh—Chittagong Hill Tracts District. 3. Dispute resolution (Law)—Bangladesh—Chittagong Hill Tracts District. 4. Conflict management— Bangladesh—Chittagong Hill Tracts District. I. Title. II. Series. DS396.8.C45 M62 2003 320.95492'3—dc 21 2002031837 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

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The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5

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To the people of Chittagong Hill Tracts, who taught me never to give up

Contents

Foreword, David M. Malone Map of Bangladesh

9 11

1 Introduction

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2 The Politics of Identity Formation

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3 The Peace Accord and Its Problematic

39

4 Postaccord Chittagong Hill Tracts

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5 In Search of Peace: Policy Recommendations

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6 Lessons and Conclusions

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7 Postscript

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Appendixes 1 Survey Questionnaire, May 2001 2 Jana Samhati Samiti: The Chittagong Hill Tracts Guidelines 3 The Peace Accord of 1997 4 The Rangamati Declaration

125 127 129 141

List of Acronyms Bibliography Index About This Publication The International Peace Academy International Peace Academy Publications

149 151 155 163 164 165

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Foreword DAVID M . M A L O N E PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL PEACE A C A D E M Y

This occasional paper was developed as part of the International Peace Academy (IPA) research project Peacebuilding: Issues and Responses, which examined regional and national approaches to peace implementation and conflict resolution. It offers not only important perspectives on prospects for stability in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh, but also important lessons for peace implementation more broadly. The Chittagong Hill Tracts negotiations were unusual in that they were largely generated domestically. They were broadly successful, and the landmark agreement in 1997 ended two decades of armed insurgency. The negotiations demonstrated that conflict prevention and resolution initiatives by governments and aggrieved communities can succeed. While donor governments did support the process, not least by promising to assist financially with implementation of an agreement, the CHT accord was not, as so many peace agreements have been, driven by international mediators, the UN, or regional or subregional organizations. However, implementation of the accord has been incomplete, as several thorny issues were left out of the accord or formulated in an ambiguous fashion. This was the case for the vexing issue of the presence of settlers in the tracts. Key aspects of the accord, such as military withdrawal, devolution of authority, and property rights, have not been implemented. The author makes several helpful recommendations for steps that could be taken by local, national, and international actors to ensure implementation of the accord and a lasting resolution to the conflict in the area. This study dovetails with other research undertaken by the IPA, including a significant comparative project carried out jointly with the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. That project, the findings of which are collected in the book Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, edited by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, examines the chal-

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lenges of peace implementation, with emphasis on the role of international actors in supporting it. The study of the difficulties in implementing the CHT agreement in the absence of strong external involvement reinforces one key finding of that broader comparative project: the need to address spoilers to peace processes. This book also bolsters the recent findings of the IPA project on conflict prevention. The comparative casework of the prevention project highlights the difficulties in securing implementation of agreements that are ambiguous toward key provisions or do not engage all potential spoilers. These cases are collected in a book, edited by Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester, entitled From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. This occasional paper was made possible through the generous contributions of the Ford and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundations to the Peacebuilding: Issues and Responses research project. It is such funding that enables the IPA to support innovative field research, often on topics off the beaten track, by leading scholars from the regions involved. I am deeply grateful to Amena Mohsin, one of the leading scholars from Bangladesh, for undertaking the research and for writing this occasional paper. We have learned much from her and hope that publication of this work may encourage the new government of Bangladesh to consider carefully her recommendations for a more complete implementation of this historic agreement. I am also grateful to my IPA colleagues Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karen Ballentine for coordinating within the IPA the planning and preparation of this exciting volume.

Source: Reprinted from Monique Mekenkamp, Paul van Tongeren, and Hans van de Veen, Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 305.

1 Introduction

This book is an inquiry into the processes and politics of conflict and peacebuilding in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), Bangladesh. On December 2, 1997, a peace accord was signed between the government of Bangladesh (GOB) and the Parbattya Chattagram Janashonghoti Samity (PCJSS, or United People's Party of the CHT), the political front that has waged an armed struggle for the autonomy of the CHT since the mid1970s. Although the accord has been hailed internationally as a successful case of conflict resolution, it involved no third-party mediations or direct interventions by international actors, nor was civil society incorporated within the peace process. While the CHT Peace Accord was meant to resolve the armed conflict between the insurgents of the CHT and the government of Bangladesh, it did not address the underlying complaints of the Hill people and is thus unlikely to establish peace until the GOB seriously addresses these grievances. The situation in the CHT is in flux and has acquired complex dimensions following the accord, with one faction of the Hill people committed to pursuing full autonomy. The state's slow pace of implementing the accord has only exacerbated the situation. Still, the accord provides a framework for establishing a viable and sustainable peace in the CHT, a peace that must necessarily envision the empowerment and autonomy of the people. The CHT Peace Accord is the outcome of a long process primarily initiated by the GOB in the 1980s. In 1975, following a military coup and political upset, PCJSS leader Manobendra Narayan Larma fled to India. The Indian government gave its full support to the PCJSS and allowed it to establish headquarters in the Indian state of Tripura. The Shanti Bahini (SB, or Peace Force), the military wing of the PCJSS, was given training and assistance by the Indian military and was allowed to operate from bases within the country, giving India considerable leverage in its relations with Bangladesh. Further straining relations between the two countries and a 13

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source of international embarrassment for the GOB, about 54,000 Hill people were registered as refugees in Tripura, having fled the CHT to escape military atrocities committed during the counterinsurgency. By the 1980s, international donors began to exert pressure on the government to reach a political settlement. Amnesty International published regular news of human rights violations in the CHT, and the Denmarkbased CHT Commission published annual reports on the situation in the CHT, providing information to Bangladesh's aid donors, such as Japan, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, France, Germany, Switzerland, the European Commission (EC), and the United States. 1 By the 1990s, the demise of the Cold War had brought about a qualitative change in international politics, and donors were emphasizing good governance, transparency, accountability, and democratization of administrative systems. The GOB itself realized after a decade of military operations that the CHT problem required a political solution. In 1991, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), a civilian regime, had come to power after almost nine years of military and quasi-military rule. 2 Under Begum Khaleda Zia, the BNP established a parliamentary committee to conduct negotiations with the PCJSS. Because the Bangladeshi military had been given extensive powers to put down the CHT insurgency and control the region, it was in the political interest of the civilian regime to seek a political solution in order to firmly establish civilian control over the military. Apart from this domestic political compulsion, the government realized that its international credibility as a democracy, and therefore its external aid and assistance, were at stake. An end to the armed insurgency was imperative to ensure political and economic stability. The PCJSS responded positively to the government's gestures. The stated objectives of the party were to secure political and economic autonomy within the state of Bangladesh. Secession was not considered an option (see Appendix 2), perhaps partly because the economic viability of the region as an independent entity was questionable, but more importantly because India would not have lent its support for an independent CHT given that the insurgency within its own borders, in northeastern India, was adjacent to the CHT. An independent CHT would have weakened India's leverage over the Bangladeshi government, which it alleged was aiding the insurgents of northeast India. Despite several rounds of negotiations, an agreement could not be reached, as differences existed between the GOB and the PCJSS on the questions of political autonomy for the CHT and Bengali settlers. The situation changed in 1996 when the Awami League came to power in Bangladesh, reversing India's attitude toward Bangladesh as well as the CHT. Historically, India has had good relations with the Awami League. Bangladesh won its independence under the political leadership of the

INTRODUCTION

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Awami League, to which India had lent its full support. The Awami League was also viewed by India as a secular force, as opposed to the pro-Islamic posture of the BNP. The Awami League continued the CHT negotiations, this time backed by the Indian government, which withdrew its support from the PCJSS. Pressed to reach a settlement and fatigued by two decades of armed insurgency, the PCJSS signed the peace accord with the GOB, compromising many of its key demands (see Chapter 3). Although the pressure of donors and international human rights organizations and the support or lack of support of India were critical external variables, at no stage during negotiations of the CHT Peace Accord was there any direct involvement of a third party. At the national level as well, the process remained confined between the GOB and the PCJSS, never incorporating Bengali civil society. A government-imposed news blackout and localization of the conflict within the CHT kept the Bengali population outside the region unaffected and largely unaware of the issue. The PCJSS also made no attempt to incorporate civil society members from among the Hill people. The Pahari Chatra Parishad (PCP, or Hill Student's Forum), the Pahari Gono Parishad (PGP, or Hill People's Council), and the Hill Women's Federation (HWF) had carried on the movement for the CHT cause in a democratic manner both within the CHT and in other parts of Bangladesh. By networking with Bengali women's organizations and student forums, they had attempted to sensitize Bengali civil society on the CHT issue. Yet at no point during the peace negotiations were these forums involved, nor were women represented on either side. Many of the weaknesses of the accord, such as the issues of compensation, justice, and repatriation, perhaps could have been avoided had the process been participatory. Peacebuilding, like peace negotiations, is a protracted process. It must holistically address the structural and conceptual causes that initially led to the rupture, with interventions at the local, national, and international levels (see Chapter 5). At the national as well as local levels, trust- and confidence-building measures need to be adopted between and among the people, by opening up academic and ethnic channels of dialogue and giving recognition to the plurality of cultures in civil society. Economic development strategies must be culturally sensitive and participatory. To ensure sustainable peace and justice, participation of the people in the political structures as well as decentralization of power are imperative. International organizations like the United Nations, through its various agencies such as the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) can play a vital role in peacebuilding, as can donors, by exerting pressure for reforms and good governance. Most importantly, the UN and donors need to emphasize the full implementation of a peace accord. Peace

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is not difficult to achieve if the political will to bring about change and transformation is created. And social mobilization from within and sustained international pressure for reforms in consonance with the aspirations of the people can indeed create this political will.

BACKGROUND

The CHT problem is a majority/minority conflict revolving around the politics of nation and state building, wherein hegemony and centralization inherently alienate the minority populations. The minorities themselves inevitably adopt the politics of identity formation as a strategy of counterhegemony. Their objectives may vary from autonomy to secession. South Asia is replete with such conflicts, including those in Sri Lanka and northeastern India. A brief background of the CHT and its people is provided here to d i s t i n g u i s h the Hill p e o p l e f r o m the B e n g a l i p o p u l a t i o n of Bangladesh, who constitute the dominant and majority community. Situated in southeastern Bangladesh, the CHT occupies a physical area of 5,093 square miles, constituting 10 percent of the total land area of Bangladesh. The region comprises three districts: Rangamati, Khagrachari, and Banderban. The area is important to the policy planners of Bangladesh for strategic and economic reasons. It is surrounded by the Indian states of Tripura on the north and Mizoram on the east, by Myanmar (formerly Burma) on the south and east, and by Chittagong district on the west. The ongoing insurgency in the Indian northeast and Myanmar increases the CHT's importance for the military planners of Bangladesh. The region is also rich in natural resources. Gas, coal, and copper deposits have been found in the Miani Reserve Forest. The Jogigofa Union (local administrative unit) located in the Khagrachari district and the Rangamati district are presumed to hold oil deposits. The state, however, had not been able to exploit the resources due to insurgency. In 1991, according to the last census held, the CHT had a population of 0.97 million, of which the Hill people constituted 0.50 million and the Bengalis 0.47 million. 3 Eleven ethnic groups populate the CHT: B a w m , Chak, Chakma, Khami, Kheyang, Lushai, Marma, Mrung, Pankho, Tanchangya, and Tripura (see Table 1.1). They closely resemble the people of northeastern India, Myanmar, and Thailand, rather than the predominantly Bengali population of Bangladesh. Brought under the direct administration of British colonial power in the nineteenth century, the CHT has a political history unique to Bengal. First acquired by the British East India Company in 1760, the region that would come to be known as the CHT maintained an autonomous status under the Moghals and their semi-independent governor, Nawab Mir Qasim Ali Khan. It continued to function autonomously under the company, which did not establish any administrative structure in the region. In 1860, by Act

INTRODUCTION

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Hill w o m e n at a cultural event in Rangamati Hill District

XXII of the C o m m o n w e a l t h , the hill and forest tracts to the east of Chittagong district were withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the civil, criminal, and revenue courts and offices of the Regulation district of Chittagong and made into a separate district, known as the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and placed under the administration of a superintendent. In 1881, the government of Bengal divided the CHT into three circles—Chakma, Bohmang, and Mong—each of which was placed under the administration of a government-appointed chief. In 1900, the government promulgated the CHT Manual, which detailed rules and regulations for administration of the CHT, and placed the region under the administration of a deputy commissioner, who presided over all civil, criminal, and jurisdictional matters. The circle chiefs retained power over customary matters but were formed into an advisory council primarily to assist the deputy commissioner. The Hill people remained largely unaffected by these developments, since their local structures were not altered. The CHT remained initially immune from the turmoil of the antiBritish nationalist movement on the Indian subcontinent. This anticolonial movement soon acquired communal dimensions, however, with the growing divide between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress, the latter viewed by Muslims as representing Hindu interests, despite its secular posture. Unable to identify with the politics of the Muslim League, the Hill people—95 percent non-Muslim—sought assistance from the secular C o n g r e s s . C h a k m a elites a p p r o a c h e d c o n g r e s s i o n a l leaders and

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Table 1.1

Ethnic Groups of CHT (in order of size and socioeconomic power)

Ethnic Group Chakma

Language Spoken

Khami

Variant of Bengali, Indo-Aryan group Mixture of Burmese and Rakhaine, Tibeto-Burman group Cockborok, Bodo group Similar to Chakma, Indo-Aryan group Kuki-chin group

Mrung Bawm Kheyang Pankho Chak Lushai

Tibeto-Burman group Kuki-chin group Kuki-chin group Kuki-chin group Tibeto-Burman group Kuki-chin group

Marma Tripura Tanchangya

Religion Buddhism Buddhism Hinduism Buddhism Buddhism, but with some rites and beliefs of animism Animism Christianity Buddhism Christianity Buddhism Christianity/animism

Sources: T. H. Lewin, The Hill Tracts of Chittagong and the Dwellers Therein, with Comparative Vocabularies of the Hill Dialects (Calcutta: Bengal Printing Company, 1869); G. A. Grierson, Linguistic Survey of India: Bengal (Lower Provinces) (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing India, 1898); Herbert Risley, Tribes and Castes of Bengal: Ethnographic Glossary, vol. 1 (Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Press, 1891); W. W. Hunter, A Statistical Account of Bengal, vol. 6, CHT, Chittagong, Noakhali, Tipperah, Hill Tipperah (London: Trubner, 1876); E. T. Dalton, Tribal History of Eastern India (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing India, 1872); R. H. S. Hutchinson, Eastern Bengal and Assam District Gazetteers, CHT (Allahabad: Pioneer Press, 1909); Robert Shafer, "Classification of the Sino-Tibetan Languages," Word: Journal of the Linguistic Circle of New York, 11 (1955): 94-111; Clarence T. Maloney, "Tribes of Bangladesh and Synthesis of Bengali Culture," in Mahmud Shah Qureshi, ed., Tribal Cultures in Bangladesh (Rajshahi: Institute of Bangladesh Studies, Rajshahi University, 1984), pp. 5-52; Lucien Bernot, "Ethnic Groups of CHT," in Pierre Bessaignet, ed., Social Research in East Pakistan (Dacca: Asiatic Society of Pakistan, 1964), pp. 137-171; Shugata Chakma, Parbattya Chattagramer Upajati o Sanskriti [The tribes and culture of CHT] (Rangamati: Dhira Khisa Chakma, 1993); Abdus Sattar, In the Sylvan Shadows (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1983).

appealed for the merger of the CHT with the Indian Union. 4 The three circle chiefs demanded that the British, the Congress, and the Muslim League recognize their regions as native states. They later demanded a confederation with the Indian states of Tripura, Kuch Bihar, and Khasia. The Marma chief, by contrast, suggested a union with Burma. 5 Ultimately, the Bengal Boundary Commission, headed by Cyril Radcliffe, awarded the CHT to Pakistan. According to Mountbatten, The whole economic life of the people of Hill Tracts depends upon East Bengal. . . . There are only one or two indifferent tracts through the jungle into Assam, and it would be disastrous for the people themselves to be cut off from East Bengal. . . . In a sense Chittagong the only port of East Bengal also depends upon the Hill Tracts. 6

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INTRODUCTION

The CHT was thus apportioned as part of the hinterland of the port city of Chittagong. A second motivation behind Radcliffe's award was to compensate Pakistan for its losses in the partitioning of Punjab. The latter, however, was a geographical anomaly. With religion the only commonality between East and West Pakistan, separated by India and a distance of 1,000 miles, differences soon emerged between the two linguistically and culturally distinct regions. In 1949, contention over the question of state language started the language movement of the East Bengalis, who refused to accept the imposition of Urdu by the West Pakistani ruling elite. The movement for autonomy did not stop there, however, as Bengalis alleged discrimination in all aspects of life—economic, political, and military.7 This movement for autonomy ultimately culminated in the nine-month war for the liberation of Bangladesh, which gained independence on December 16, 1971. Politically and economically marginalized within the state of Bangladesh, the Hill people resorted to the politics of identity building to attain autonomy.

METHODOLOGY

This book is an attempt to understand the politics and processes of conflict and peacebuilding in the CHT. Chapter 2 examines the marginalization of the Hill people within the state of Bangladesh and their construction of an identity as well as a set of demands in order to attain autonomy for themselves. Chapter 3 analyzes the state's position on the question of autonomy for the Hill people by examining the peace accord and its problematic. Chapter 4 discusses the postaccord situation in the CHT. It examines the roles and functions of the new civil society organizations that have evolved in the CHT since the signing of the accord, as well as the roles and interests of the state institutions and the new exogenous actors in the region. The objective, however, is to assess the overall impact of these actors on the lives of the Hill people and on the peace process in the CHT. Chapter 5 presents policy recommendations for local, national, and international actors in support of a viable peace system in the CHT. Finally, Chapter 6 extends the lessons learned from the CHT peace process to other areas of insurgency. Given the lack of relevant secondary materials on the CHT, this work depends heavily on personal interviews and observations. Here too, information is lacking, as government officials either refused to be interviewed or reiterated the official government position. Even politicians were unwilling to express their opinions. Surprisingly, the military, though on conditions of anonymity, was quite open on the issue, both within and outside the CHT. Two major newspapers, the Daily Star (an English daily) and

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Sangbad (a Bengali daily) have been scrutinized to assess the situation in the CHT and to examine the nature of politics and the sentiments of the general Bengali population in the postaccord as well as the immediate préaccord periods. I undertook a field trip between May 14-30, 2001, to the districts of Rangamati and Khagrachari in the CHT to observe the situation and to distribute a questionnaire among 500 people across both districts, 346 of whom responded—57 Bengali settlers and 289 Hill people (see Appendix 1). Among the latter, 96 were women and 193 were men. None of the Bengali women responded to the questionnaire, although some did agree to be interviewed. Due to the highly sensitive and controversial nature of the work, the questionnaire was deliberately limited to a few essential questions. 8 I conducted in-depth interviews with fifty people, including both Hill people and Bengali settlers. The interviewees included housewives, academicians, day laborers, nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers, political activists, and policymakers from within the CHT. The interviews were open-ended and unstructured to allow the respondents to express their opinions on the issues they considered most pertinent. Finally, I have used my own observations and long association with the subject matter to draw conclusions and analyses from the research work.

NOTES

1. Author interview with Jenneke Arens, member of the Organizing Committee CHT Campaign, a human rights organization based in Amsterdam (April 14, 2001). 2. In March 1982, military chief General H. M. Ershad usurped power from the BNP in a bloodless military coup. 3. B a n g l a d e s h Bureau of Statistics ( B B S ) , Statistical Pocketbook of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, Statistics Division, 1993), p. 33. 4. Kamini Mohan Dewan, Parbattya Chattagramer Eik Deen Shevoker Jiban Kahini [The autobiography of a humble servant of CHT] (Rangamati: Dewan, 1970), pp. 146-148. 5. Siddharta Chakma, Proshongo Parbattya Chattagram [The context of CHT] (Calcutta: Nath, 1986), pp. 3-13. 6. H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide (London: Hutchinson & Co. Publishers, 1969), p. 350. 7. For a detailed exposition, see Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (Dacca: University Press, 1972). 8. I received a phone call from the military cantonment in Khagrachari, from an officer whose name is confidential for security reasons; he requested that I come to the headquarters the next morning. At that meeting, the officer asked me to explain the objectives of my visit to the area. I also found copies of my questionnaires on the officer's tables.

2 The Politics of Identity Formation

The process of alienation and identity formation for the Hill people of Bangladesh is rooted in the political and economic policies adopted by the state. While constitutional and political measures taken in the name of Bengali/Bangladeshi nationalism eroded the civil rights of the Hill, economic and development policies violated their traditional rights and alienated them from the resources they considered to be their community property. To counter these moves, the Hill people formed the PCJSS, a political body, in March 1972. In January 1973, they added the SB, a military wing. By the mid-1980s the PCJSS began referring to the Hill people as Jumma, an identity they had formed to unite the different communities of the Hill to counter the dominance of Bengali/Bangladeshi nationalism. This chapter discusses the political and economic marginalization of the Hill people and their identity response.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Bangladesh attained independence from Pakistan on December 16, 1971, after a nine-month war of liberation. The war was intensely nationalistic and had its genesis in the culture and language of the Bengalis within the state of Pakistan. The Bangladeshi nationalist movement and liberation war were both predicated on the ideals of Bengali nationalism, as conceived in the language movement of 1948-1952. In 1948, the Pakistani ruling elite sought to impose Urdu, spoken in West Pakistan, as the state language of Pakistan. The Bengalis, who constituted the majority, rejected the proposal and demanded that Bengali be given recognition as a state language alongside Urdu. The language movement acquired an emotional and politicized content on February 21, 1952, when Pakistani authorities opened fire on students in Dhaka who were protesting the state move. The four students 21

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killed instantly became national heroes of the Bengalis, and February 21 became a day of Bengali national glory. From linguistic autonomy the Bengalis moved to demands for economic and political autonomy. The Awami League became the main champion and mouthpiece of the Bengalis, on whose deprivations and demands the entire movement was based.1 The Chittagong Hill Tracts, though constituting part of East Pakistan at the time, was never incorporated within the equation. While the Awami League may not have considered that the CHT merited separate attention, the Hill people were nevertheless politically, culturally, and linguistically distinct and could not identify with the Bengali movement for autonomy and later for independence. Because the resources of the CHT had been exploited for the development of East Pakistan, the demands and expectations of the Hill people would have been quite different from those of the Bengalis. The Awami League did not have any representation from the CHT, nor did its leadership ever visit the CHT during its political campaigns. During the course of the liberation war, some CHT youths did join the armed movement, but there are allegations that they were discouraged from doing so.2 Moreover, the chief of the Chakma tribe had sided with the Pakistani army during the war, an act the Bengalis viewed with suspicion. Following the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the Mukti Bahini (Bengali Liberation Forces) raided the houses and jungles of the CHT in search of Pakistani soldiers and collaborators alleged to be hiding in the area. Alarmed at these developments, the Hill people sought constitutional safeguards for their protection and recognition as a separate community within the new state. As Bangladesh proceeded with the framing of its constitution, a Hill people's delegation, led by Manobendra Narayan Larma, called on Sheikh Mujibur (Mujib) Rahman, the prime minister and father of the nation, and made the following demands: • • • •

Autonomy for the CHT with its own legislature. Retention of the 1900 CHT Manual. 3 Continuation of the offices of tribal chiefs. Provisions restricting the amendment of the CHT Manual and imposing a ban on the influx of nontribal people into the CHT.4

Mujib rejected the demands, advising the Hill people to assimilate the new, nationalist Bengali identity. Mujib backed his advice with a threat to effectively marginalize the Hill people by sending Bengalis into the region. 5 The constitution of Bangladesh, adopted on November 4, 1972, incorporated the ideals of Bengali nationalism to the exclusion of the state's non-Bengali population. In its preamble, and reiterated in Article 8, the constitution accepted "nationalism," "socialism," "democracy," and "secu-

THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY FORMATION

23

larism" as state principles. Article 9 defined the basis of state nationalism as Bengali nationalism: The unity and solidarity of the Bengali nation, which deriving its identity from its language and culture, attained sovereign and independent Bangladesh through a united and determined struggle in the war of independence, shall be the basis of Bengali nationalism. 6

Larma refused to endorse the constitution and argued against it in Parliament: You cannot impose your national identity on others. I am a Chakma not a Bengali. I am a citizen of Bangladesh, Bangladeshi. You are also Bangladeshi but your national identity is Bengali. . . . They [Hill people] can never become Bengali. 7

Larma's contentions failed to make any impact on the Bengali policymakers. As a state, Bangladesh was the outcome of an intensely nationalist movement, and Bengali nationalism was seen by policymakers as allencompassing. 8 Having successfully led the country to independence, the Awami League could perceive the dangers of secession inherent within such demands for autonomy. Article 1 of the constitution declared Bangladesh to be a unitary state, ruling out any possibility of a separate legislature or autonomy for the CHT. Article 3 specified Bengali as the state language, and Article 6 declared that the citizens of Bangladesh were to be known as "Bengalis." These provisions aggrieved the minority communities and were seen as clear acts of the state's identification and patronization of the dominant community at the cost of minorities. On August 15, 1975, Sheikh Mujib was assassinated along with other family members in a coup engineered by a group of disgruntled army officers. From 1975 to 1991, the country was under military and quasi-military rule (military generals turned civilians). During this period, fundamental changes were made to the constitution. Secularism, one of the state planks, was replaced with Islamism: The principle of absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah, nationalism, democracy and socialism meaning economic and social justice together with the principles derived from them . . . shall constitute the fundamental principles of state policy. 9

Article 9, which stressed the linguistic and cultural unity of "Bengali" nationalism, was reworded to stress "Bangladeshi" nationalism. Through changes to Article 6, the citizens of Bangladesh were to be known as

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"Bangladeshis" rather than "Bengalis." Bangladeshi nationalism, while retaining the linguistic and cultural connotations of the Bengali people, was to incorporate Islamic ideals. It was a political strategy of Ziaur Rahman to win the confidence and support of the Muslim majority, since Mujib was often accused by the people of being too close to India, a predominantly Hindu state. It was also intended to differentiate between the Bengalis of West Bengal in India and those of Bangladesh, thereby distancing Bangladesh from India and bringing it closer to the Muslim world. 10 The Hill people could not identify with this formulation. Larma had contended that being Bangladeshi meant being a citizen of a secular Bangladesh. But the new construction of nationalism had equated being Bangladeshi not only with being Bengali, but also with being Islamic, neither of which included the cultural identities of the Hill people.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT State economic policies undertaken in the CHT have led to wide-scale displacement of the Hill people and disruption of their lives. The policies have alienated the local population from resources they traditionally consider common property. Today the Hill people are suspicious of any development endeavors of the state, the first of which was undertaken by the former Pakistani government in the early 1960s.

Kaptai Dam To accelerate the process of industrialization in what was then East Pakistan, the government undertook to harness the water resources of the C H T by constructing a hydroelectric plant on the Karnafuli River in Rangamati. Between 1957 and 1962, with U.S. financial and technical assistance, a huge lake was created to the north and east of a barrage at Kaptai village. N o social impact study of the project was made prior to the dam's construction, which would have far-reaching consequences for the Hill people. The dam submerged 400 square miles of ground—40 percent of the district's total area—including not only 54,000 acres of cultivable land but also the Chakma raj bari (royal palace). One hundred thousand people were made homeless, half of whom migrated to India as refugees; of these, many are still living in India as stateless persons. The Hill people did not benefit vocationally from the construction, as employment opportunities created by the project were taken up by Bengalis. While the Hill people claim that they were promised free electricity, today few areas in the Hills have electricity. Kaptai was expected to produce 120,000 kilowatts of electricity for the eastern grid of East Pakistan, but it was able to supply only

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0.5 percent of East Bengal's total energy needs and only 3 percent of its commercial and industrial energy needs. The eastern electricity zone, in which the Kaptai Dam is located, has major alternative sources of energy, including both natural gas and oil deposits. 11 The Hill people still regard Kaptai, an attractive tourist spot and a source of revenue for the state, as their "teardrop." Their experiences with the state of Bangladesh regarding forest and land resources have been similarly negative. Forests The Hill people's interaction with forests is rooted within their economic, cultural, and often religious mores and constitutes an integral and vital part of their lives. Traditionally, forest resources were put to domestic use, with the forest environment itself providing living habitats. The Hill people considered these sites not only common property but also the locus of ancestral spirits, and utmost care was taken for their conservation and renewal, including jhurn (slash-and-burn, or swidden) cultivation. The first attack on the Hill people's customary rights over the forests and forest resources came during the British colonial period, when the notion of social forestry changed to commercial forestry. In 1865, the Indian Forest Reserve Act, which was passed ostensibly to protect the forests, barred local people from entering them and using their resources. But it was to meet the requirements of the imperial railway companies that forest resources needed protection—to ensure a steady supply of wood for making railway sleepers or ties. As T. H. Lewin, deputy commissioner of the CHT, noted: Throughout the whole [CHT] district are found large tracts of valuable forest trees. . . . A large trade in railway-sleepers has lately sprung up from the port of Chittagong; the Port Conservator estimates that upwards of 30,000 sleepers have been exported during the last two years. 12

In 1875, the British introduced two types of forests: reserve forests (RFs) and district forests (DFs). The RFs were put entirely under the management of the forest department; jhum cultivation and any use of forest resources were prohibited. The DFs were put under the direct control of the deputy commissioner; jhum cultivation and the use of forest produce for domestic purposes were allowed, with certain restrictions that the deputy commissioner might impose from time to time. 1 3 The state also granted high-quality forest land to European entrepreneurs for plantation. Tea, coffee, and orange plantations were established in the 1860s and teak plantations in the 1870s. In the mid-1860s, 50,000 cubic feet of timber was extracted annually from the CHT. The government estimated an average

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annual surplus of Rs 70,000 (70,000 rupees) from the timber and teak plantations in the RF.14 The state's forest policy was thus informed by its profit motive. The Hill people, however, were marginalized, as the state did not provide them with any alternative livelihood opportunity. This exclusion of the local population from the forest resources continued in the postcolonial state of Pakistan as well. Forest resources were used for the production of paper and pulp in the Karnafuli paper mill, built in Rangamati in 1953. Establishment of the paper mill created job opportunities, but Hill people composed only 1 percent of the workforce and occupied lower-skilled positions. Although the Hill people lacked the necessary skills to occupy top positions, the state took no measures to build capacity among the local population. The state also appropriated more RFs for plantation. In Bangladesh today, there are three categories of forests in the CHT: the RFs, the protected forests (PFs, formerly DFs), and the unclassed state forests (USFs), the latter being village common forests. According to a 1976 report on the forestry sector, forests in the CHT are categorized as 24 percent RF, 1 percent PF, and 75 percent USF.15 The process of declaring a tract of forest as RF begins with a notification served under Section 4 of the Forest Act of 1927. A forest settlement officer (FSO) is then appointed, who must proclaim the notification in the Bengali language in every town and village in the locality. The notification must specify the area of the land to be reserved and the consequences of the reservation. The affected people have three months to submit their claims— in writing—including claims relating to jhum cultivation, claims to rights of pasture or to forest produce, and claims for compensation to the FSO. The FSO may accept or reject the claims. An appeal against the FSO's orders may be made to the divisional commissioner within three months of the date of the order, and the government may revise the commissioner's order. After the inquiry process, all or part of the forest tract is constituted as RF by a second notification under Section 20 of the Forest Act. The Hill people allege that these provisions are often neglected and that the announcements are not made properly.16 The local people in many instances do not understand the Bengali language and, more importantly, are unaware of the legal procedures, which are often not part of their cultural mores. 17 The appropriation of land as RF has marginalized the Hill people in various ways—through displacement, loss of rights, criminalization, disempowerment of women, and environmental degradation. Displacement. The declaration of a forest as RF effectively displaces the indigenous population. In practice, the government does not provide alternative land area to this displaced population. Consequently, they live as

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internally displaced persons (IDPs) with all the traumas and hazards associated with homelessness. Loss of rights. The Hill people are not allowed to access the resources of the RF, though these resources constitute a major source of their livelihood. Successive regimes have alienated the Hill people and shown no consideration for their traditional customary rights, which are protected under Regulation 1 of the 1900 CHT Manual (currently still in effect). The government has provided neither alternative sustainable means of employment nor compensation for lands and resources appropriated. Criminalization. With the loss of lands and rights to resources traditionally available to them, and with no alternative means of livelihood, the Hill people are forced to enter the RF illegally as "thieves." For instance, most of the lands of the Kheyang nation have been taken over as RF. The remaining 4,000 Kheyangs live as a displaced people in the Banderban district of the CHT, and many of the men have arrest warrants for allegedly "encroaching" upon the RF. Consequently, a shift is taking place in the traditional gender roles of Kheyang society. The women now go to the marketplace, traditionally a man's domain, as the men stay at home for fear of being arrested. 18

Kheyangs in the Rangamati Hill District

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Impact on women. Under the jhum system, women enjoyed a more or less equal position with men in terms of work distribution, which was a source of their empowerment. Women used forest resources for cooking, fuel, and traditional medicines made from roots and leaves. With the loss of access to traditional resources, women in some Hill societies, such as the Kheyangs, must perform both private and public chores to sustain their families. 1 9 Whether this shrinking of the private-public divide is leading to empowerment or disempowerment of women in the CHT is yet to be assessed; evidence suggests a correlation between increased i m p o v e r i z a t i o n and increased violence against women. 2 0 Environmental degradation. Protection and conservation of forests and their resources are the stated objectives of the government in appropriating tracts as RF. But these objectives have been violated through recourse to commercial forestry by the forest department, the principal agent of the state. Plantation and logging have not only marginalized the population who depend on these resources, but have also degraded the environment and undermined the soil quality of the forests. The replacement of natural forests with commercial or industrial plantations has caused much damage to the environment. The objective is not to create natural forest cover but short rotation crops that yield revenue for the state. The plantations of teak, rubber, and pulpwood are of particular concern. Further, exotic species such as acacia, eucalyptus, and pine have now replaced much of the native forests in the CHT and have led to the complete extinction of a variety of indigenous plants and animal species as well as to severe erosion of the forest cover and soil. While the state has barred the local population from using forest resources in these areas, huge tracts of forest lands have been given to Bengalis as plantation plots. Between 1980 and 1986, sixty-four plots were allotted in four mouzas (revenue units) of Banderban. Only one of these plots belonged to a Hill person. The government blames the lack of interest and capability of the Hill people for this situation. The Hill people do not deny this allegation but point out that the government has not taken any measures to encourage them or to protect their interests vis-à-vis the Bengalis, with whom the Hill people at present cannot compete on an equal footing due to their lack of past experience in monetized commercial activities. 21 The Hill people have been suffering from the devastating effects of logging by the state and private enterprises, often illegal, for years. Forest products are used for industrial production; and timber, bamboo, and firewood are extracted from the forests of the CHT. The logging has resulted in the removal of natural forest cover and caused irreparable damage to the soil and environment. The Hill people claim that private individuals and gangs, often in collusion with forest department officials and the military,

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have carried out illegal logging in the CHT. 22 A flourishing business of furniture manufacturing has cropped up in the CHT today. 23 Land The Hill people have been alienated from their land and its resources through various state interventions. The process started with the British colonial state, which claimed ownership of all lands in the CHT in 1868. The Hill people traditionally considered land to be communal property. According to their belief system, the village community, kinship groups, and sometimes ancestral spirits were considered the ultimate owners of land; individual families had the right to usufruct only. Two types of land tenure were introduced into the CHT by the British: private rights and usufruct. Beginning in 1868, private rights were given to people who took up plough cultivation, though their land was subject to appropriation by the government on payment of monetary compensation. Usufruct tenure was the right to use land over which the state retained proprietary rights; this right belonged to anyone who cleared a forest, occupied it, and then registered the land with the local headman. These tenure systems were based on customs and usages that had been practiced for centuries. 24 The colonial administration thus took the ownership of land away from the community and vested it with and for the benefit of the state, an institution in which the Hill people had no representation or participation. The deputy commissioner was given absolute powers over land matters. The Hill people also lost their land as the state opened up the CHT for commercial exploitation. Though Rule 34 of the CHT Manual had imposed a ban on the possession of land by outsiders in the CHT, certain exceptions were made. Land could be acquired for plantations of industrial purpose, residential purpose, or commercial purpose. The Hill people were also deprived of the resources of land as the colonial state imposed restrictions on jhum cultivation. Within this mode of cultivation, farmers migrate from one piece of land to another, alternating periods of cultivation with periods of fallowness. The colonial state asserted that this mode of cultivation was primitive and that the long fallow periods were a waste of resources. The CHT Manual (Chapter 5, Section 18, Clause 2) explicitly prohibited, restricted, and regulated the migration of cultivating farmers from one circle to another. The British attempted to replace it with plough cultivation, which entailed no fallow periods, to increase their revenues from the CHT. It also helped them to consolidate and enhance their political position. In the jhum system, jhumias (farmers) were tied to their chiefs and paid the jhum tax to them through the headmen. Thus, the government was dependent on these indigenous functionaries to collect the revenue, as it was difficult for the former to locate the jhumias given their migratory cultivation system. The introduction of plough

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cultivation reduced the dependence of the state on the local functionaries, since in this system the farmers are tied to the land. The Hill people were not attuned to plough cultivation, nor was the land in the ridges of the region suitable for ploughing. Compounded by the loss to the state of many forest lands classified as RF, people living in the ridgetops (Mrung, Bawm, Pankho, Khami, and others) suffered, while people living in the valleys (Chakma and Marma), who could adapt to plough cultivation, fared better. With the adoption and expansion of plough cultivation replacing the subsistence agriculture of jhum cultivation, food production increased. Increased food production created the need for markets; consequently, urban centers and permanent markets were set up in these areas. Soon the valley-living people emerged as the dominant groups in the CHT, shifting the political dynamics of the region. This power shift has been reflected in the CHT Peace Accord as well (see Chapter 3). Land alienation of the Hill people accelerated during the Bangladesh period due to state-sponsored Bengali settlement programs. By the mid1970s, a full-blown insurgency had erupted in the CHT under the leadership of the PCJSS, with its military wing, the SB, actively aided by the Indian government. The CHT is important to Bangladesh for both strategic and economic reasons. The three Hill districts are bounded on the north by the Indian state of Tripura, on the south by Myanmar, and on the east by the Arakan Hill Tracts and the Lushai Hills. Bangladesh has a long-standing unresolved refugee problem with Myanmar. According to Bangladesh official reports, there are currently 21,000 Rohingya refugees from Myanmar in Bangladesh. 25 This has soured relations between the two countries. Further, the CHT overlooks the district and port of Chittagong from the east and can be utilized as a military base for operations into Shubhapur, the region connecting Chittagong to the rest of the country northward, hence inflating the region's importance for the defense planners of Bangladesh. Economically, the CHT is considered rich in natural resources like gas and oil. As a counterinsurgency strategy, the Bangladeshi government planned to dilute the ethnic composition of the region through a Bengali settlement program. In 1979, through an amendment to Rule 34 of the CHT Manual, the government rescinded restrictions against settling nonresidents in CHT lands. According to one estimate, approximately 400,000 Bengalis were settled in the CHT between 1980 and 1984.26 There are at present two groups of Bengalis in the CHT. The Hill people call them Adivashis (indigenous) and "settlers." Adivashis are people who migrated to the CHT in search of jobs, or as farmers and traders. This migration, initiated in the precolonial period, continued under the state of Pakistan. The Hill people accepted these migrants peacefully, and there is no record of ethnic violence. It is thus evident that the Hill people are not averse to Bengalis as such. They did not oppose the natural migration of

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Bengalis, who in this capacity had not come to usurp land and did not pose any threat to the Hill people's survival. In fact, the district of CHT had the highest rate of migration in the whole of Bangladesh between 1964 and 1974.27 The intercensual reports for the period 1951-1974 reveal that the local population (Hill people) in the CHT rose by 71 percent, while that of Bengalis rose by 125 percent. 28 The Hill people became averse to the influx of Bengalis when they migrated to the region under the Bangladeshi government's settlement plans. Given that per capita land ownership in Bangladesh was 0.35 acres in the early 1980s, the CHT settlements were bound to be popular with the Bengalis. Though adopted as a counterinsurgency strategy, the Bengali settlement program resulted in large-scale land alienation of the Hill people, with far-reaching implications not only for the Hill people themselves, but also for relations between the Hill people and Bengalis. Displacement and pauperization of the Hill people. The government position during the Bengali settlement program was that Bangladesh is an overpopulated land. The population density in the plains in 1980 was 1,400 persons per square mile, whereas vast tracts of land in the CHT were lying empty. The much-publicized notion of "emptiness" in the CHT, however, is a myth, as the area of cultivable land is very small. Soil research on CHT land in the 1960s revealed that only 3.2 percent, or 104,305 acres, of CHT land was suitable for all-purpose agriculture; 15 percent, or 505,223 acres, was suitable for fruit gardens and forestry; and 77 percent, or 2,509,830 acres, was suitable solely for afforestation. 29 In consideration of the lifesupporting capacity of CHT land, even as early as 1918 when the CHT population was 200,000, it was found necessary to restrict the migration of plains people into the CHT to protect the economy of the region. Even before the construction of the Kaptai Dam (completed in 1960), available cultivable lands were insufficient for the CHT population, which in 1961 was 385,079. The situation was aggravated by the construction of the reservoir, and to date a large number of IDPs have not been properly rehabilitated, mainly due to scarcity of land. In view of the land situation, the government imposed a ceiling of 5 acres on private landownership for the Hill people in the CHT. This ceiling, however, does not apply to Bengalis residing in the CHT, nor is there any such rigid moratorium in other parts of Bangladesh. The land ceiling on private ownership in the plains is 33.3 acres. 30 By the early 1970s, most of the land in the CHT was occupied. The population of the CHT in 1974 stood at 508,199, or 80,000-100,000 families. Thus, theoretically each CHT family had 3.7 to 4.6 acres of land, less than the government-assessed ceiling of 5 acres. 31 These data beg the question of how the government intended to make available enough land for settling 400,000 Bengalis. A

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few thousand acres of RF containing both mixed and hilly lands were released for settlement, but this amounted to only one-tenth of the land required. The settlement policy that was ultimately effected has rendered 100,000 indigenous Hill people homeless. About half of them became refugees in the Indian state of Tripura; the rest scattered throughout the CHT. The Hill people thus have been turned into international as well as internal refugees. The internal refugees either have become dependent on their relatives or have moved into the forests and practice jhum cultivation on already fragile land. Violation of the traditional rights of the Hill people. The government maintained that Rule 34 of the CHT Manual is inconsistent with the constitution of Bangladesh since it violates Article 36, which guarantees freedom of movement of citizens. This argument, however, is not valid, as the article stipulates that "subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest, every citizen shall have the right to move freely throughout Bangladesh, to reside and settle in any place therein." 32 It is evident that according to the provisions of this article, the state has the right to impose restrictions on the movement and settlement of its citizens in any part of Bangladesh, which could have been applied in the context of the CHT had the state so desired. Apart from this, Article 28 stipulates that "nothing . . . shall prevent the state from making special provision in favour of women or children or for the advancement of any backward section of citizens." 33 It thus appears that the government chose to overlook those constitutional provisions that could have protected the rights and interests of the Hill people. Instead, it relied on those provisions that protected and furthered the interests of the Bengali community. In doing so, I argue, the government violated a fundamental principle of state policy: "The state would endeavour to adopt measures to conserve the cultural tradition and heritage of the people." 34 This policy explicitly enshrines the protection of private rights and traditions from all forms of exploitation and interference. The settlement program clearly violated the traditional land rights of the Hill people, as the Bengalis were settled on lands traditionally farmed by the indigenous people. It also violated the letter and spirit of the CHT Manual. Specifically violated was Rule 39, according to which the government representative (i.e., the deputy commissioner) was obliged to consult the chiefs on important matters affecting the administration of the CHT. Indeed, the settlement of 400,000 Bengalis within the CHT was an important CHT administrative matter, and the deputy commissioner was obliged to consult the chiefs prior to the program. Furthermore, it is a well-established convention that settlement or transfers of lands within the mouzas are not made without prior consultation with the mouza headmen. The settlement program clearly violated this convention as well.

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The state also does not recognize the indigenous view of land and claims that Bengalis have been settled on khas (government-owned) land. This is indeed subject to interpretation, as differences exist in the conception of khas land between the Hill people and the Bengali elite. What the government regards as khas land is essentially the Hill people's traditional jhum and forest land. For the Hill people, this land is common property, and they consider the government's disregard as a gross violation of their inalienable rights. Bengalization of the CHT. The Hill people believe that through Bengali settlement the government aims to "colonize" the CHT by bringing about a demographic shift in the region. A demographic shift has indeed taken place in the CHT. In 1947, the Hill people constituted more than 98 percent of the CHT population. Bengali population in the region rose to 9 percent in 1956, 12 percent in 1961, 40 percent in 1981, and 50 percent in 1991.35 This change in the region's demographic composition is viewed with alarm by the local people and considered part of a government policy of ethnocide. The local leaders constantly refer to the fate of Native Americans in the United States and fear that a similar fate awaits them. This perception heightens their solidarity and deepens their alienation from the state.36

THE

J U M M A S

The refusal of the state of Bangladesh to recognize the cultural distinctiveness of the Hill people and the subsequent political and economic policies it adopted gave rise to a subnationalist movement in the CHT. On March 7, 1972, the PCJSS, a political body through which the Hill people could voice their grievances, was formed by Manobendra Narayan Larma. On January 7, 1973, the SB was added. The PCJSS started its major activities only after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib on August 15, 1975. Prior to the killing of Mujib and the military takeover that followed, Larma had hoped for success in bargaining at the political level with Mujib. Apart from domestic changes, external factors were also critical in the transformation of the Hill people's political movement into a military one. Many subnationalist movements depend on an external safe haven or sanctuary for political and, more importantly, military support to carry on their struggles. Prior to 1975, Larma had sought Indian help, but owing to close relations between the Mujib regime and the Indian government his requests were denied. However, with Mujib's assassination the equation changed. Initially there had been within Bangladesh an element of gratitude toward India because of its supportive role for the Bangladeshi liberation movement, but the economic crisis facing the country in the postindependence

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period was largely blamed on India. Mujib was accused of being too friendly toward India, and during the later part of his life, Mujib sought closer ties with Muslim countries for economic and political reasons. The Bangladeshi military also bore much resentment against India. 37 It is therefore not surprising that the coup of August 1975 was declared in the name of the Islamic Republic of Bangladesh. But Khondokar Mushtaque Ahmed, a cabinet member of the Mujib regime who was appointed president by the coup leaders, tried to balance the situation. His first public address, on August 15, was made in the name of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The speech, however, was punctuated with Islamic expressions; it evidenced the course that the Bangladeshi polity was about to take. Against this backdrop, India made its own calculations and decided to support the Hill people's movement. On August 16, the day after Mujib's assassination, the Indian intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), contacted Larma, who fled to India. SB headquarters was established in Tripura, and SB personnel were trained and armed by the Indian military.38 India was indirectly involved as well, through the flow of refugees from the CHT into Tripura. The externalization of the CHT issue made India party to the escalation as well as deescalation of the conflict. By the mid-1970s, the SB had started a full-scale insurgency in the Hills. It first attacked a convoy of the Bangladeshi military in the CHT in 1977. The brazen nature of the attack, coupled with the fact that the SB was operating with Indian assistance, greatly alarmed the Bangladeshi military.39 From 1978 to 1989, the SB conducted major offensives within the CHT, targeting not only the Bangladeshi military but also the Bengali settlers' villages, which were repeatedly set on fire. 40 According to government sources, between 1980 to 1991, 1,180 people were killed by the SB, including 182 Hill people; 582 were kidnapped, 181 of whom were Hill people. In total, about 4,000 persons residing in the CHT, which included the Bengali settlers as well as the Hill people, were injured by SB-initiated bomb blasts, gunfire, or arson.41 The government responded by undertaking a full-scale militarization of the CHT. The general commanding officer of the Chittagong division was charged with administration of the CHT. During this period, the military controlled the political and economic lives of the Hill people, and massive violations of human rights took place, including the deliberate use of rape to collectively demoralize the Hill people. Both men and women were tortured and abducted. The Hill people were evicted from their homesteads, put in cluster villages near the military camps, and kept under constant surveillance. During the period of insurgency, which lasted until 1997, eleven major massacres of the Hill people took place. The military also allegedly

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used the settler Bengali community to carry out its operations, further intensifying the anti-Bengali sentiment among the Hill people. 42 Resorting to divide-and-rule strategies, the military coopted certain Hill people and established various indigenous organizations, thereby polarizing the community. Forests were cleared in the name of counterinsurgency, compounding the degradation of an already fragile environment. The military activities resulted in the eviction of Hill people; about 54,000 of them fled to India, and 50,000 became IDPs. 43 The refugees provided the main source for recruits into the SB. Apart from its military activities, the PCJSS, by the mid-1980s, attempted to unify the different nationalities of the CHT under the banner of Jumma nationalism. The assertion of a separate nationhood, however, was not equated with statehood (see Appendix 2). Jumma nationalism, having its genesis in the jhum mode of cultivation, emphasized the cultural, linguistic, religious, and historical distinctiveness of the Hill people. While recognizing the differences within the different Hill groups, the party maintained that their common historical experiences of oppression and marginalization and a common administrative system had bonded them collectively. The movement suffered not only from ideological weaknesses, however. It was dependent on India for its base of operation and material support. At the same time, the party knew that India would not support an independent CHT state, given the separatist movements afoot in India's northeastern states. The objective of the Indian state was to keep pressure on the Bangladeshi state to dissuade it from supporting India's northeastern insurgents. 44 Ideologically, Jumma nationalism remained a middle-class movement, as the PCJSS wanted to retain the CHT Manual of 1900, which had created a chieftain-based administrative system for the CHT. The movement also remained dominated by the Chakma. Consequently, the smaller groups, though supporting the PCJSS cause, preferred to be identified with their own generic names rather than with Jumma. Even within the Chakma, the educated professional group thought that jhum was an occupational category that could not be the basis of a people's identity.45 The state, however, attempted to bring the PCJSS to the negotiating table. By 1986 negotiations had been opened up by the Ershad regime. The PCJSS responded positively. After more than a decade of negotiations by two subsequent regimes, a peace accord was signed.

NOTES

1. Under founder-president Maulana Bhashani, the Awami Muslim League was formed in 1949 by the political leaders of East Pakistan to counter the Muslim League, the dominant political party of Pakistan, which was perceived by the

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Bengalis to be serving the interests of West Pakistan. In 1955, the Awami Muslim League dropped the word Muslim from its name to establish the secular credentials of the party. 2. Author interview in 1993 with Rono Bikram Tripura, a CHT freedom fighter in 1971. This practice was later substantiated by local Bengali commanders, who requested anonymity. Discouraging enlistees, however, was not the policy of the Awami League high command; rather it was done more by the youths who sat at the recruitment screening tables. Recruitment in the Mukti Bahini was carried out by youths belonging to the Awami League. The Hill people nevertheless regarded this practice as discriminatory. 3. For details of the CHT Manual, see Amena Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press, 1997). 4. Selina Haq and Ehsanul Haque, Disintegration Process in Action: The Case of South Asia (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs 1990), pp. 44-46. 5. Author interview, on October 10, 1993, with Ananta Bihari Khisha, a member of the Hill delegation who was present when Mujib made this statement. 6. Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1972 (Dacca: Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law, 1972), p. 5. 7. Parliament Debates (Dacca: Government of Bangladesh, October 31, 1972), p. 452. 8. Author interview, on May 19, 1993, with Kamal Hussein, the main architect of the Bangladesh constitution. Hussein argued that ethnicity was not in currency at the time of Bangladeshi independence and that policymakers could not foresee its consequences. 9. Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, as modified to June 30, 1994 (Dhaka: Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, 1994), p. 10. 10. Bangladesh has had civilian regimes since 1991. Since 1996, the Awami League, the main proponent of Bengali nationalism, has been in power under Sheikh Mujib's daughter, Sheikh Hasina. The regime could not change the Islamic ideals of the constitution for fear of alienating the majority Muslim population of the state. 11. Anti-Slavery Society, The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Militarization, Oppression, and the Tribes, ser. 2, Indigenous Peoples and Development (London: Indigenous Peoples and Development, 1984), p. 36. 12. T. H. Lewin, Wild Races of South Eastern India (London: Allen, 1870), p. 25. 13. Selections from the Correspondence on the Revenue Administration of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, 1862-1927 (Calcutta: Government of Bengal Press, 1929), pp. 202-204. 14. J. M. Cowan, Working Plan for the Forests of Chittagong Hill Tracts Division (Calcutta: Bengal Government Press, 1923), p. 36. 15. Cited in Rajkumari Chandra Roy, Land Rights of the Indigenous Peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2000), p. 89. 16. The allegations were made to the author by a cross section of Hill people in May 2001, in Kharachari and Rangamati. 17. For details, see Earth Touch (Dhaka: Society for Environment and Human Development, October 1999).

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18. This was stated by a Kheyang person in a seminar, "Land and Forest Rights of the Indigenous Peoples of Bangladesh," organized by the Society for Environment and Human Development, Taungya, Committee for the Protection of the Forest and Land Rights of the Hill People, Dhaka, June 9, 2001. 19. Ibid. 20. Latifa Akanda and Ishrat Shamim, Women and Violence: A Comparative Study of Rural and Urban Violence Against Women in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Women for Women, 1985). 21. Barter was the common mode of exchange between the Hill people, because it was a subsistence economy. 22. Military officials preferring anonymity conceded that there might have been some cases of illegal logging, but they alleged that the local population is also involved. Author interviews, June 2001. 23. Author observation during a visit to the CHT in May 2001. 24. The Hill people cannot recall the time period, since they do not have a written history. This was stated to the author by Raja Devasish Roy, the Chakma chief, in a personal interview on April 23, 2001. 25. See Imtiaz Ahmed, "Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations and the Stateless Rohingyas," Peace Initiatives 7, nos. 1 - 3 (January-June 2001): 186-191. 26. The Guardian (London), March 6, 1984. 27. Asian Development Bank (ADB), Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Project (Dacca: ADB, 1978), p. 16. 28. R. I. Chowdhury, Mizanur Rahman Miah, Musharraf Hussein, A. F. Hasan, and Golam Quddus, Tribal Leadership and Political Integration: A Case Study of Chakma and Mong of Chittagong Hill Tracts (Chittagong: Chittagong University, Faculty of Social Sciences, 1979), p. 135. 29. Raja Devasish Roy, "The Erosion of Legal and Constitutional Safeguards of the Hill Peoples of the CHT in Bangladesh: An Historical Account," paper presented at a seminar, "The Chittagong Hill Tracts Problem in Bangladesh," organized by the Manoghar Shishu Sadan, Rangamati, April 20-22, 1992, p. 9. 30. Kamal Siddiqui, "Land Reforms Since 1950," in Sirajul Islam, ed., History of Bangladesh, 1704-1971: Economic History, vol. 2 (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1992), p. 674. 31. Raja Devashis Roy, "Key Features of the Land Crisis in the Chittagong Hill Tracts," manuscript, 1992, pp. 2-6. 32. Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, as modified to April 30, 1994 (Dhaka: Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, 1996), p. 24. 33. Ibid., p. 18. 34. Courier (Dhaka), August 20, 1993, p. 90. 35. Mohammad Nurul Amin, "Bangladesher Jatishottar Shomossha 'o Shangbidhanik Shomadhaner Onushandhan" [Problems of national identity in Bangladesh and the quest for a constitutional solution], in Emajuddin Ahamed, ed., Bangladesher Shongshodiya Gonotantra: Prashangik Chinta Bhabna [Parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh: Some reflections and thoughts] (Dhaka: Karim, 1992), p. 118. 36. As suggested earlier, the Bengali settlement program was a counterinsurgency strategy. For security reasons, the defense planners of Bangladesh considered this necessary, given that the insurgency in the CHT had started with Indian assistance in the mid-1970s. The Hill people and their leaders, however, took no measures to assuage the security fears of the government.

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37. See Amena Mohsin, "Bangladesh-India Relations: Limitations and Options in an Evolving Relationship," in Emajuddin Ahamed and Abul Kalam, eds., Bangladesh, South Asia, and the World (Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1992), pp. 59-73. 38. For details of Indian involvement and assistance, see Subir Bhaumik, Insurgent Crossfire: North-East India (Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1996). 39. Author interview with Brigadier Farooque A. Chowdhury (ret.), September 1993. Chowdhury served in the CHT as a brigade commander. 40. Details of the SB operations are not available, as the government had imposed a news blackout about the CHT, and the Hill people do not talk of these operations. The Bengali settlers, however, do talk of the killings and arson. Still, the international human rights commissions have detailed the military atrocities committed against the Hill people. 41. S. M. Ibrahim, Parbattya Chattagram Shanti Prokria 'o PoribeshPoristhitir Mullayan [The peace process of CHT and an evaluation of its situation] (Dhaka: Mawla, 2001), p. 118. 42. Bangladesh military officials denied these allegations during author interviews. However, they acknowledged that a few human rights violations may have occurred, which they argued was characteristic of an insurgency situation. 43. For details of military activities in the CHT, see Mohsin, Politics of Nationalism, pp. 178-188. 44. See Bhaumik, Insurgent Crossfire. 45. Author interview with Chakma blue-collar workers during visits to the CHT in 1993-1994.

3 The Peace Accord and Its Problematic

The Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord, like most peace accords, is the outcome of a protracted negotiations process.1 The initiative for a negotiated settlement primarily came from the government of Bangladesh. The first attempt to bring the insurgents to the negotiating table was in 1977, during the regime of President Ziaur (Zia) Rahman through the creation of a tribal convention. The Hill people were represented by their local leaders, who attempted to bring the SB to the negotiations process. The tribal convention held four rounds of talks with the PCJSS during July 1977 and December 1978 with the objective of preparing a ground for political dialogue between the GOB and the PCJSS. The initiative failed, however, due to lack of trust between and within the parties. Zia identified the problem of the CHT as an economic one and established the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board (CHTDB) in 1976 for the economic development of the region. But for the Hill people, the question was their identity, not economic development alone, and hence they did not respond positively to the board. Instead, they alleged that since the board was under the direction of the general commanding officer of the Chittagong division, it catered to the interests of the military and the Bengali settlers. Since the region is rich in mineral resources, the regime may have intended to establish a peaceful and stable environment in order to exploit the CHT for the overall development of the country. Zia's attempts at peacemaking thus may be attributed primarily to economic reasons. The process of peacemaking was reopened during the regime of President H. M. Ershad in the early 1980s. By then the government had come under pressure from donor countries and international human rights agencies to correct the situation in the CHT. Apart from the external pressure, Ershad, having come to power through a military coup, may have viewed the crisis as an opportunity to build support for his regime. A peace accord in the CHT might have given him the political legitimacy and recog39

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nition that he was seeking from the people of Bangladesh. In fact, in 1985 a dissident faction of the S B , the Priti group, surrendered as a result of Ershad's initiatives. 2 There was, however, no agreement on substantive administrative changes in the CHT, although the government agreed to return the illegally dispossessed lands to the affected Hill people. The Ershad regime undertook another initiative in 1988. This time the negotiations were more formal and detailed, with the government recognizing and acknowledging that since the PCJSS was pursuing the movement on behalf of the Hill people, it would need to deal directly and primarily with the PCJSS to attain peace in the region. Formally inducted into the negotiations process, the PCJSS for the first time since the outbreak of the insurgency put forward its minimum acceptable demands to the government: (1) autonomy for the CHT, including establishment of its own legislature, renaming of the region as Jummaland, and constitutional recognition of the Jumma nation's right to self-determination; (2) removal of Bengali settlers who had entered the CHT after August 1947 (i.e., after the independence of Pakistan); (3) withdrawal of Bangladeshi security forces from the CHT; (4) retention of the CHT Manual of 1900 and a constitutional provision restricting any amendments to it; and (5) deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. But the government rejected these demands on the grounds that they lay outside the framework of the Bangladeshi constitution. The PCJSS refused to alter its position and withdrew from the talks. The government, however, carried on negotiations with a number of indigenous leaders from within the CHT, which resulted in the formation of districtlevel councils following the pattern of autonomous district councils in northeastern India, although these were rejected by both the PCJSS and the Hill people. The compulsions for Ershad in initiating and sustaining the peace process were thus both internal and external. The BNP, under Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, reopened the negotiations in the 1990s. By that time it had become evident that the CHT issue would be settled politically. The civilian regime of Khaleda Zia, in order to firmly consolidate the supremacy of the civil over the military, wanted to wrest the CHT from military control in terms of decisionmaking and administration, though this did not imply the total withdrawal of the military from the region. Moreover, international pressures to tie aid to reforms and good governance were increasing. On July 10, 1992, the government formed a nine-member parliamentary committee to conduct negotiations with the PCJSS on behalf of the government. Colonel Oli Ahmed (ret.), the communications minister, was made convener of the parliamentary committee, which was formed to carry on the negotiations. The committee included members from opposition parties in Parliament. The S B responded to the peace offer by unilaterally declaring a ceasefire from August 1, 1992, which was extended routinely every three months

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(about thirty-five times) until December 1997. The regime also formed a parliamentary subcommittee for the talks. In December 1992, the PCJSS revised its charter and modified its demands: (1) regional autonomy for the CHT with a regional council recognized by the constitution; (2) restoration of land rights to the tribal people with a ban on allocation of land to the Bengalis from the plains; (3) withdrawal of military from the CHT; (4) constitutional recognition of ethnic minorities and a guarantee that their rights would not be altered without their consent; and (5) withdrawal of Bengalis settled in the Hills since August 17, 1947. The government did not accept the demand, but the negotiations continued in the spirit of compromise. 3 By 1995, substantial progress had been made, but two major stumbling blocks remained: the issues of autonomy and Bengali settlements. But the process came to a halt, as the government had to channel its concentration to a countrywide noncooperation movement launched by the opposition that ultimately forced it to resign. The Awami League, which came to power in 1996, reopened the negotiations. A twelve-member national committee on CHT affairs was formed. After seven rounds of negotiations, a peace accord was finally signed. While the 1997 accord had built and consolidated on the earlier attempts at peacemaking in the CHT, it had failed to address the major demands and concerns of the Hill people. The form and extent of political autonomy, demilitarization of the CHT, and withdrawal of Bengali settlers were the key demands of the PCJSS, and the negotiations during the previous regimes had come to a halt due to the divergent positions of the GOB and the PCJSS on these issues. Yet in 1997, the PCJSS acceded to the position of the GOB, though the latter also compromised on the question of autonomy and allowed the Hill people to establish an autonomous regional council. Several factors were responsible for the timing of the accord and the shift of position by the PCJSS. First, by the late 1980s war fatigue had set in among the rank and file of the SB, the people in the CHT had become weary of the conflict, and there was a genuine interest in peace. Second, through its negotiations with various regimes of Bangladesh, the PCJSS had come to realize the limit to which it could push the Bangladeshi government. 4 The Awami League had come to power in 1996 with an election pledge of resolving the CHT problem, which had raised the expectations of both the Hill people and the PCJSS. The external milieu had also changed for the PCJSS. For historical reasons, the Awami League had cordial and close relations with India, which wholly supported the regime in the negotiations. 5 Over the years, the refugee problem had become a dominant issue in relations between Bangladesh and India. India had given assistance to the PCJSS, the SB, and the refugees based on its own strategic assessments and needs, having con-

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sistently claimed that the Pakistani and, later, the military governments of Bangladesh were training India's northeastern insurgents. The CHT's jungles and its close proximity to India's northeastern region made it a safe haven for the insurgents. India used the SB to flush out Mizo insurgents of northeastern India from the Sajek Valley in the CHT. 6 New Delhi also wanted communications facilities through Bangladesh as a quid pro quo for resolving the refugee problem, an important concession for India in containing the insurgency and encouraging economic development in its northeastern region. The opposition alleged that the Awami League signed the Farakka Water Agreement with India in return for its cooperation in resolving the CHT issue. The water agreement, according to the opposition, has failed to safeguard Bangladesh's interests. Providing transit to India via Bangladeshi territory also became an issue of deep controversy in Bangladeshi politics during the Awami League regime, with the latter supporting it and the opposition rejecting it on the grounds that it would hamper the security and economy of Bangladesh. Ultimately, the issue remained unresolved. By playing the refugee card, the Indian government was able to put the PCJSS under tremendous pressure. It stopped food supplies to the refugees, who were forced to survive on salt and rice alone. It did not allow the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to visit the refugee camps. 7 Finally, the Indian government asked the PCJSS and the refugees to leave. Consequently, the PCJSS had little option but to sign the accord. Apart from overlooking some of the key demands of the PCJSS, seeds of discontent, inequality, and polarization are inherent in the accord. The remainder of this chapter examines the demands originally put forward by the PCJSS, 8 gaps between PCJSS demands and accord provisions (see Appendix 3 for the full text of the accord), and finally the problematic and ramifications associated with the accord that have led to polarization within the Hill people.

DEMANDS OF THE PCJSS Cultural Demands The PCJSS demanded that the constitution of Bangladesh give recognition to the Hill people as a nation distinct from the Bengalis. To attain this goal, it formed the identity of Jumma to denote the Hill people's distinctiveness from the Bengalis on the one hand, and to unite the different communities of the CHT on the other. Nonrecognition of the cultural distinctiveness of the Hill people by the state of Bangladesh has been a major grievance of the Hill people (see Chapter 2). Manobendra Narayan Larma, the Hill people's

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representative in the National Parliament, strongly protested the constitutional provision that imposed Bengali nationality on the entire population of Bangladesh and rejected the constitution itself when it was adopted in 1972. The adoption of Bangladeshi nationalism at the constitutional level also failed to redress the Hill people's concerns, since it was formulated around the cultural and religious identity of the majority community. Their concerns were aggravated by the Bengali settlement programs of the state in the 1980s, which the Hill people perceived as an attempt at ethnocide. Consequently, the PCJSS adopted the nomenclature of Jumma nationalism to unify the Hill people under one banner and counter the hegemony of the majority. More importantly, it was an assertion of their equality and an attempt to shed the negativism associated with tribalism. Political Demands To attain political autonomy, the PCJSS demanded that the constitution recognize the CHT as a special administrative unit with regional autonomy. Specifically, it demanded that the three districts of the CHT—Rangamati, Khagrachari, and Banderban—be merged into one unit and that the region be called Jummaland. An autonomous regional council would administer Jummaland and be elected directly by the people on the basis of adult franchise. It would be responsible for the following thirty areas: general administration and law and order; local government institutions; police; land; agriculture; education; forestry; health; judiciary; animal husbandry; trade and commerce; small and cottage industries; roads and communications; tourism; fisheries; land revenue and taxes; water resources and power supply; markets; cooperatives; social welfare; finance; cultural affairs, information, and statistics; youth development and sports; population control and family planning; country liquor; religious institutions; graveyard and cremation grounds; jhum cultivation; environment; and jails. The council was to be called the Jummaland Regional Council (JRC), be headed by a chair, and comprise forty-eight members: thirty-five general seats for the Jumma people; seven seats for the Jumma minorities, thus excluding the Chakma, Marma, and Tripura, who are the numerical majority; three seats for Bengalis; and three seats for women, who would be elected by other members of the council. The JRC was to have an executive council, whose membership number would be decided by the JRC chair. The majority party would constitute the executive council for a term of five years. These arrangements were to be constitutionally guaranteed, with the provision that no change could be brought about in the administrative structure of the CHT without holding a referendum on the issue within the region itself.

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The PCJSS also demanded that three seats be reserved in the National Parliament for Hill people from the CHT constituency. This demand was made against the backdrop of the demographic shift that had taken place in the CHT due to the Bengali settlement program.

Economic Demands Alienation of the land and forest resources of the Hill people through the various development endeavors of the state and also through the Bengali settlement programs has been a major grievance of the Hill people (see Chapter 2). Land is regarded as the crux of the problem in the CHT, and control over the land and its natural resources is considered vital for the Hill people to retain their autonomy. The PCJSS demanded that all lands in the CHT—except the Kaptai power station, the Betbunia satellite station, state-owned industrial areas, and state-acquired land—be placed under the jurisdiction of the regional council. A constitutional ban on the purchase of land in the CHT by outsiders was to be effected. Deeds made to lease land to Bengalis for rubber plantation and forestry projects were to be canceled, with said lands to be placed under the jurisdiction of the council. Since the state-sponsored Bengali settlement is considered by the Hill people to be the most important factor behind their land alienation, the PCJSS demanded that the constitution ban Bengali settlements in the region. It further demanded that all outsiders who had settled in the area since August 17, 1947, be withdrawn from the region.

Security The Hill people perceive the Bangladeshi military to be a hostile force that is largely responsible for their insecurity (see Chapter 4). Consequently, the PCJSS demanded that the CHT be demilitarized, although they conceded that the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), a paramilitary force, could be deployed along the borders of the CHT to ensure external security. For the purposes of maintaining internal security in the CHT, the PCJSS suggested that an autonomous indigenous police force, composed solely of Hill people, be formed. Finally, quotas for the Hill people were to be reserved in the defense services.

Refugees The insurgency created 54,000 refugees, who had taken refuge in the Indian state of Tripura, as well as an equivalent number of IDPs. The PCJSS demanded that all international and internal Jumma refugees be

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properly rehabilitated. Their lands were to be returned to them and they were to be financially supported for a period of one year. Further, the returnee refugees were to regain the jobs they had held prior to the insurgency. Finally, the academic certificates given to the Jumma refugee students by the Tripura education board were to be recognized by the Bangladeshi government.

GAPS BETWEEN PCJSS DEMANDS AND ACCORD PROVISIONS Culture The accord recognized the CHT as a "tribal" inhabited region and did not give recognition to the Hill people as a distinct nation to be known as Jummas. Successive governments in Bangladesh remained uncompromising on the issue, maintaining that there could be only one nation within the state. The PCJSS acceded to government pressure on this count for the sake of reaching an accord. 9 The accord denied the Hill people the equality they had been fighting for; and, more importantly, the accord's constructions of categories like "tribal" and "nation" determined the dominant and the subordinate positions of different communities living within a nationstate. Politics The accord provides for the political autonomy of the Hill people through the creation of a three-tiered administrative system: Hill district councils, a regional council, and the Ministry of CHT Affairs (MOCHTA). The accord did not merge the three districts of the CHT into one administrative unit, nor did it rename the region Jummaland. Compromises of political autonomy have been made by the GOB, as well as by the PCJSS. The PCJSS moved away from its demand of renaming the region Jummaland but adhered to its demand for regional autonomy through the creation of a regional council. This demand was rejected by the regimes of Ershad and Khaleda Zia. Instead, Ershad created three district councils for the three Hill districts. In this context, the regime of Khaleda Zia also pointed to the Ershad regime's creation of three district councils for the three Hill districts. The Ershad regime, through the passage of a parliamentary act on February 18, 1989, established three local government councils for the districts of Rangamati, Khagrachari, and Banderban. Each of these councils is headed by an indigenous chair and is composed of thir-

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ty members, of whom two-thirds are indigenous and one-third Bengali. The indigenous seats are proportionately divided on the basis of population among the various groups of the districts. The district council is elected directly on the basis of adult franchise and is responsible for the following twenty-two areas: law and order; coordination of development works; primary and secondary education; health; public health (nutrition, sanitation, immunization, etc.); fisheries; agriculture and forestry; livestock; cooperatives; small and cottage industries; social welfare; art and culture; nonreserved roads and bridges; recreations, games, and parks; rest-houses; ferries; implementation of government-sponsored development projects; communication facilities; water supply and sewerage; local multipurpose development; religious and moral affairs; and local control over sale, settlement, and leases of land. The district council is also responsible for formulating its own budget. The district councils were rejected by the PCJSS on the grounds that the parliamentary act that had created them had no constitutional basis. But the regime of Khaleda Zia maintained that the creation of the above institutions conferred autonomy as well as special administrative status to the region. The Awami League, however, acceded to the demand for regional autonomy through the three-tiered administrative system. The powers, functions, and composition of the three administrative bodies, as provided in the accord, are detailed in the following sections. Hill District Councils. The composition and electoral process of these councils remain as before, but their powers and functions have been expanded in the following areas through an amendment: • • • • •

•

•

The number of areas that are to be transferred to the councils is increased. Administrative powers over the functions of the council areas is increased. Powers of taxation are increased. Councils have the power to secure royalties from extraction and exploration of forest and mineral resources. All development projects in the CHT are to be implemented and funded through the councils, including those initiated at the national level. The councils can independently formulate and adopt administrative regulations, and the GOB is to consult the councils prior to adopting any rules under the Hill District Councils Act. No land in the CHT, including khas (government-owned) land, can be transferred, purchased, sold, or leased without council permis-

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sion. Reserve forests, the Kaptai hydroelectric project, and other state-owned lands and properties are excluded. 10 Regional Council. In accordance with the demand of the PCJSS, a regional council has been formed, though its composition, powers, and functions are much revised. The council is to consist of twenty-two members: a tribal chair, twelve tribal males, two tribal females, six nontribal males, and one nontribal female. Among the twelve male tribal members, five are to be elected from the Chakma, three from the Marma, two from the Tripura, and one each from the Mrung and the Tanchangya. Among the two female tribal members, one is to be elected from the Chakma and one from any other tribe. The accord does not specify how the category of any other tribe would be decided. Among the six male nontribal members, two persons are to be elected from each district. The accord does not specify from where the nontribal female member is to be elected. The members of the regional council are to be elected indirectly, for a period of five years, by the members of the three district councils. Chairs of the three district councils are to be the ex-officio members of the regional council and will have the right to vote. The members of the regional council will elect its chair. The council will coordinate and supervise the general administration, law and order, and development activities of the three district councils, as well as the administration of tribal law and the dispensation of social justice. It will coordinate disaster management and relief activities with nongovernmental organizations and give licenses for heavy industries. The government will enact laws relating to the CHT in consultation with the council. Ministry of CHT Affairs. This ministry is to be headed by a tribal person and is to function as an apex body with supervisory and executive authority over the CHT's system of self-government. The ministry will also coordinate the activities of CHT affairs at the central level. Its major powers include the residual jurisdiction of the government to legislate on matters relating to the CHT; revisional authority over the functions of the district councils, the district administration headed by the deputy commissioners, and the regional council; and allocation of funds for the district councils and the regional council. The PCJSS demand for three reserved seats in the National Parliament for Hill people of the CHT constituency was rejected on the grounds that three seats are already reserved for the CHT region. These seats, however, are reserved for the geographical constituency of the CHT and not for the Hill people alone. Any Bengali from the CHT may thus be elected. With the present demographic composition of the CHT, where

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Bengalis constitute 50 percent of the population, this is not an impossible scenario. Economy Under the accord, the district councils have been given significant powers over land issue, and the government cannot acquire or transfer any lands, hills, or forests under the jurisdiction of the district councils without prior discussion and approval of the regional council. The accord also provides for the formation of a land commission to settle disputes. The commission is to be headed by a retired judge of the Bangladesh High Court, and its members are to include the chairs of the district councils, a representative of the regional council's chair, the three traditional chiefs, and the commissioner of the Chittagong division. The commission is to take its decisions and give judgments on the bases of ownership of deeds to lands, customary rights, and usages and practices of the Hill people. Its decisions cannot be challenged in a court of law. The accord also stipulates that a land survey be undertaken in the CHT to ascertain ownership rights. The resolution of the land question, however, is inextricably linked to the issue of Bengali settlers. The accord makes no reference to the question of withdrawal of Bengalis f r o m the CHT. Subsequent regimes have remained uncompromising on the issue. The PCJSS, however, insists that there was a verbal commitment by the government for the withdrawal of Bengalis. 11 The PCJSS had also demanded that the natural resources of the Hills and the right to their exploitation be placed under jurisdiction of the regional council. This demand has not been met. The state has retained control over the exploitation of natural resources, although the district councils are to receive a percentage of derived income as royalty (the accord does not specify the percentage). Security The accord does not declare the CHT a demilitarized zone. The military is to remain in the CHT, though it will be withdrawn to permanent cantonments. The temporary camps of the army, Ansar (a paramilitary force), and the village defense forces, excepting the BDR, will be gradually withdrawn. Armed forces can be deployed in the region under state rules and procedures in case of deterioration of law and order, in times of natural calamities, and, like in other parts of the country, under the control of civil authority. The regional council may ask the appropriate authorities for help and assistance if required. The state remained uncompromising on the issue of demilitarization.

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Its position is that Bangladesh is neither a demilitarized state nor a neutral state and that the CHT cannot be demilitarized given its economic and strategic importance. The demand for an indigenous police force for the CHT has not been addressed in the accord, but the regional council has been given the power to give job appointments to third- and fourth-class employees of the police forces. Refugees The previous regime of the BNP had promised that a grant of Tk 10,000 (10,000 taka) would be given to each returning family. The government also promised that land belonging to the returnees would be restored to them. A general amnesty was given to the members of the PCJSS, and the returnees were assured educational and employment facilities and opportunities. The present package signed separately between the GOB and the Jumma Refugees Welfare Association (JRWA) on March 9, 1997, is not much different from the earlier agreement, though the amount of money has been increased from Tk 10,000 to Tk 15,000. Each PCJSS returnee is also to be given Tk 50,000. 12 It is evident that the key demands of the PCJSS regarding recognition as a nation and demilitarization of the CHT have not been met in the accord. Similarly, the crucial question of Bengali settlers has not been addressed. However, the GOB has yielded on the questions of political and economic autonomy. Despite the unitary character of the state, the Hill people are to have a fairly autonomous local administrative system through the formation of the district councils and the regional council. The state, however, has retained its control over the administration of the region through the MOCHTA. Chapter 4 reveals that the state has also retained control over substantive economic issues. There are also major flaws and contradictions within the accord, partly because of gaps between PCJSS demands and accord provisions, and partly because the issues did not surface, either for the sake of reaching the accord or due to a lack of appreciation or sensitivity. Both the provisions and the omissions have important implications for the sustainability of peace and stability in the region.

PROBLEMATIC A N D RAMIFICATIONS OF THE A C C O R D The CHT Peace Accord was successful to the extent that it put an end to more than two decades of armed insurgency in the CHT. But it failed to establish a lasting peace. With the accord, a second, more protracted phase of conflict has started in the region, this time between and within the com-

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munities—the Hill people as well as the Bengalis. Major factors contributing to this conflict are the flawed nature of the accord and the slow pace of its implementation. The latter is addressed in Chapter 4.

Discord Within the Accord Political and economic autonomy were two major demands of the Hill people. Politically, the Hill people had demanded their own legislative bodies. Economically, the Hill people had demanded the right and authority to control their resources as well as the return of their land, which they maintain has been illegally occupied by the Bengali settlers. Resolution of the land question is therefore inextricably linked to the issue of Bengali settlers. I argue that by creating the MOCHTA, the state has strengthened government control over the administration of the CHT. The composition of the regional council is also problematic from the perspective of genuine autonomy and representation of the smaller communities in the CHT. The existence of several bodies of administration for the CHT has the potential to create conflicts and discord, unless rules and regulations are clearly laid out and there is proper coordination among the various individuals and institutions. Otherwise, there is a very real danger of administrative stalemate, as has actually happened (see Chapter 4). On the positive side, if a truly democratic spirit evolves at the national and local levels, one may argue that the various bodies have the potential of ensuring a system of checks and balances. The current political atmosphere of deep polarization and intolerance, however, makes this a remote possibility. Loss of rights over land has been one of the major grievances of the Hill people. To any observer of the CHT issue, it is clear that peace in the CHT largely depends on the resolution of the land question. Much has been made of the district councils' authority over land issues. However, the actual area under the control of the councils constitutes only 10 percent of the total land area of the CHT. The accord stipulates that land be returned to its owners once the land commission ascertains rights to ownership. True, many of the Hill people have deeds to their land. But it is equally true that in the CHT in areas where the Hill people practice jhum cultivation, there is no conception of private property. In these areas, land is communally held and individuals have rights to usufruct only. Under such circumstances it is difficult to envisage how the Hill people could produce documents of landownership. On the other hand, the government has provided documents of land ownership to the Bengali settlers, and many Bengalis have been settled in lands left behind by the Hill people when they took refuge in India. The accord also stipulates that in settling land disputes, the land com-

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mission will take into account the customary rights and usages of the people. If that is the case, the land appropriated by the state as khas land is in fact the land that the Hill people regard as their communal property based on customs and usages. Much of this land is in the possession of Bengali settlers. Although the return of this land to the Hill people would presuppose the removal of Bengalis from those lands, the accord makes no reference to the question of withdrawal of Bengali settlers. The PCJSS claims that there was an unwritten understanding about the withdrawal of the Bengali settlers. 13 The government, however, insisted on implementation of the written provisions only. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to understand how the government can return land to the Hill people and yet keep the Bengalis there. Raja Devasish Roy, chief of the Chakma circle, raises the point that, while customary rights and usages are to be taken into account, the accord does not specify that the usages and customary rights override the land deeds provided to the settlers, which he argues are illegal within the context of the land question in the CHT. He further points out that in taking decisions on the land issue, the accord has given absolute powers to the chair of the land commission (the three circle chiefs are members of this commission) rather than establishing a system of majority decision. 14 A cadastral survey was proposed by the BNP regime in 1992 but opposed by the PCJSS and the Hill people on the grounds that the Hill people do not have land documents. Further, the land records office in Khagrachari district had been burned down, and the Hill people were unable to prove their ownership rights. Although the situation has not changed, the accord provides for a land survey. It stipulates that when the survey is conducted, the local and customary rights of the Hill people are to be respected. If this happens, it is difficult to understand how the government can accommodate the Bengalis, most of whom have been settled on khas land, which the Hill people regard as their communal land. The land issue might turn out to be the Achilles' heel for the government as well as for the PCJSS. Another major anomaly of the accord centers on the exploitation and use of the CHT's natural resources. The district councils are to receive a percentage of derived income as royalty, but the amount has not been fixed. It is also not clear who or which parties will determine the amount. This omission might well give rise to misgivings and conflicts in future. Governmentalization of CHT Administration The accord provides for the establishment of a Ministry of CHT Affairs, an important concession in that political and economic autonomy has always been the major demand of the Hill people. They had demanded a separate

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legislature of their own in 1972; the Dabeenama (Charter of Demands) put forward by the PCJSS in its negotiations with the GOB also had autonomy as its main agenda. The Hill people had further demanded their own regional council with legislative powers and full authority to administer the region. At no point, however, was there any demand for a separate ministry for the administration of the CHT. It therefore appears that the government, not the people of the CHT, felt the need for such a body. I argue that the ministry has been created to enhance and strengthen government control over the CHT. As the analysis in Chapter 4 shows, creation of the MOCHTA has led to the governmentalization of the CHT and considerable erosion of Hill people's autonomy.15 Though a creation of the peace accord, the ministry has its genesis in the government's special affairs division, which was formed during the military regime of H. M. Ershad and continued through the civilian regimes of Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina. The special affairs division was composed of the chiefs of the three services of the armed forces—the army, air force, and navy; the general commanding officer of the Chittagong division; the brigade commanders of the CHT; and representatives from the ministries of home, finance, and foreign affairs. It was directly under the control of the chief executive—that is, the president and later the prime minister (in 1991, Bangladesh shifted from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government). There was no transparency or accountability of the special affairs division to the National Parliament. It operated like a high-priority national security cell of the government, occasionally conducting dubious propaganda activities on its behalf. Books on the CHT were published with funding from this division, whose objective was to counter allegations of human rights violations in the CHT brought against the GOB by international human rights agencies. A large section of the Hill people believe that the ministry will only increase government interference and control in the region, since the ministership is a government office. This perception by the Hill people needs to be viewed within a context of deep-seated mistrust toward the Bengali regimes because of deprivations and marginalization the Hill people have suffered.

Hegemonic Peace As the basis for sustainable peace in the region, the accord lacks the principles and vision necessary to create a nonhegemonic society. Hegemony is evident in the accord at various levels and in various forms and cuts across national and gender lines. Through recognizing the CHT as a "tribal" inhabited area, not as the land of a Jumma nation, the state has only reaffirmed the dominance and hegemony of the Bengali "nation" within the

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state of Bangladesh. These constructions, based on power equations, have important policy implications in a nation-state. In the context of a modern state, the "nation" is the core or dominant group. The PCJSS demand for recognition as a nation was a demand for and assertion of equality of the Hill people vis-à-vis the Bengalis. This provision has negative implications for the other minority, indigenous communities of Bangladesh, as well. These are the plains-living indigenous people residing alongside the Bengalis and struggling for state recognition of their customary rights over their land and also for recognition as indigenous people. The accord has recognized the CHT as a "tribal" inhabited area, since it has traditionally been the abode of the Hill people alone and since they continue to live there in concentrated form. This recognition brings in its wake certain rights and privileges for the Hill people alone, as none of the other minority communities can claim such a geographical space for themselves, living as they do alongside the Bengalis throughout Bangladesh. The other communities therefore remain deprived of any special rights. Ironically, the land, not the people, has become the locus of this matrix. 16 The accord has also established the hegemony of the Chakma, who are the numerical majority and the dominant community in the CHT. This hegemonism was latent in the construction of Jumma nationalism itself, a conception that was negative and problematic. First, it sought to impose an artificial homogeneity on the Hill people. Second, many of the smaller communities preferred to be identified by their own generic names rather than by a collective name that would be inherently associated with the majority community. 17 The category of a "Jumma nation" as invoked by the PCJSS lacked the vision and spirit of creating a truly nonhomogeneous and nonhegemonic society. Chakma hegemony is most evident in the composition of the regional council. Eleven communities inhabit the CHT, but only four are represented in this body: Chakma, Marma, Tripura, and Mrung/Tangchangya (the Mrung and Tangchangya together have one representative). The other, smaller communities point out that the regional council should be representative of all communities in the CHT, not just the larger ones, and that the council is a selective body, not a directly elected one. A Bengali cannot represent a Chakma, and likewise the latter cannot represent a Kheyang or Tangchangya. In its present form, the regional council is replicating the hegemony that it had been purporting to fight. 18 At a national conference held December 18-20, 1997, to discuss the Adivashis (indigenous) problems in Bangladesh, the smaller communities of the CHT criticized the proposed composition of the regional council. The accord is also a gendered agreement. Based on majority/minority equations, it only strengthens the masculine values of politics. 19 The com-

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position of the regional council, with only three seats for women in a body of twenty-two, reflects this gender imbalance and male hegemonism and disregards women's active role in the Hill people's struggle for autonomy. Not only did the women cook for and nurse the SB men, but they also acted as their informers and faced tremendous pressures and risks. The women's wing of the PCJSS established itself even in remote Hill villages, where it organized the local women, educated them on PCJSS objectives, and garnered support for the movement. Although women suffered most during the conflict, many overcame their victimhood and acted as agents of change. Through its democratic movement within and outside the CHT, the HWF, formed in 1990, succeeded in creating a general awareness of human rights violations, especially against women, committed in the CHT by the state military. It became active as well on the issue of rape as an instrument of counterinsurgency.20 During two decades of negotiations, no woman from the CHT was involved in effecting the accord, which makes no provision for the rights of women. A specific case is women's right to land. Except for the Marma, women in the Hill communities do not inherit their parental property. The PCJSS has remained silent on this issue, despite waging a struggle that had land as its core agenda. A common argument is that land rights for women might result in land alienation, as in the case of a woman marrying outside the community, especially a Bengali. The question of women is thereby subsumed under the question of nationality.

Peace Without Justice During the insurgency period, the CHT underwent total militarization, administratively as well as regionally. The military divided the entire area of the CHT into three zones: white, green, and red. The white zones, considered neutral, covered an area of two miles adjacent to army headquarters and were jointly populated by Bengali settlers and Hill people. Bengali settlement areas were identified as green zones. Areas in the interiors of forests and areas populated by the Hill people alone constituted the red zones and were the bases of the military's counterinsurgency operations. During the insurgency period, massive violations of human rights were committed by the military, including forced religious conversion and religious persecution, forced eviction, arrests, tortures, and kidnapping. There were also eleven massacres of Hill people, and rape was used as a counterinsurgency tactic. Between 1991 and 1993, over 94 percent of reported rapes of Hill women were committed by security personnel. Over 40 percent of the victims were women under eighteen years of age.21 The HWF alleges that there were many more cases of rape but that these went unreported, as women often remained silent due to social pressures. Among the

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cases of abduction, the kidnapping of Kalpana Chakma, general secretary of the HWF, is the most publicized. Kalpana was abducted on the eve of the general elections of 1996 from her hometown while campaigning for the area's PCJSS-backed candidate, allegedly by an army officer. The whereabouts and fate of Kalpana is still unknown, despite repeated promises by the government to probe into the matter. 22 The accord makes no reference to the human rights violations committed in the CHT. There is no provision for compensating the victims of violence, nor is there any mention of rehabilitation or counseling for the rape victims. The insertion of a clause on reparations for the victims would likely have expedited the process of healing and reconciliation between the two communities. Moreover, Bangladesh, a signatory to the International Criminal Court (ICC) convention that declares rape a crime against humanity, has also officially demanded an apology from Pakistan for the human rights violations and, more specifically, for the rapes committed by the Pakistani military on Bengali women during the liberation war of 1971. 23 Thus, the total absence of any justice clause for the Hill people speaks not only of the hegemonic position of the Bengali nation over the Hill people, but more s i g n i f i c a n t l y of the w e a k n e s s of d e m o c r a t i c practices in Bangladesh as well as the power position of the military in Bangladeshi politics. 24 The accord was signed by a democratically elected regime, yet this regime failed to do justice to a segment of its population for excesses committed by its military. Absence of Constitutional Safeguards A constitutional guarantee to recognize the cultural distinctiveness of the Hill people, and their rights and privileges, was a long-standing demand of the PCJSS. Before the constitution of Bangladesh had even been framed, a Hill people's delegation led by Manobendra Narayan Larma met in 1972 with Shaikh Mujibur Rahman, father of the nation, to demand a constitutional guarantee of the Hill people's special rights and status. This suggests that the Hill people's concerns are deep-seated and have their roots in exploitation by the state. The Hill people have based their demand on the presumption that once constitutionally enshrined and guaranteed, rules and regulations concerning the CHT cannot be altered by a regime without amendment to the constitution, which would require a two-thirds majority in Parliament, nor can the state neglect its mandatory obligation to enforce them. The CHT Peace Accord indeed is a testament to the distinctiveness of the Hill people. Its various provisions, particularly the administrative and economic provisions, do make reference to the special rights of the Hill people. But the accord is not constitutionally guaranteed, and theoretically a new regime could effect changes to its provisions.

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Absence of a Time Frame The accord does not specify a time frame for its implementation, only for two of its provisions: the surrender of arms by the SB and the return of refugees from India. This is indicative of the unequal position of the parties during negotiations, as these two provisions were important for the GOB. The refugees were not only an embarrassment for the government but also evidence of the continued conflict in the region, and allowing the SB to remain armed meant at least theoretically that it would be capable of resuming its insurgency. The current stalemate in the CHT perhaps could have been avoided had a time frame been fixed for the accord's implementation. Absence of an Independent/Neutral Monitoring Team The accord does not provide for the creation of an independent/neutral monitoring team to assess the progress of implementation. There is, however, a provision for the creation of an implementation committee to review the progress of the peace process. This three-member committee is composed of (1) the chief whip to Parliament, who is a nominee of the prime minister and member of the ruling party; (2) an Awami League member of Parliament from the CHT; and (3) Shantu Larma, the leader of the PCJSS. The partisan nature of the committee is evident, and it is not surprising that the government representatives and the PCJSS leader could never agree on the pace of implementation. In early 2001, the government maintained that 95 percent of the accord had been implemented, while the PCJSS maintained just the reverse. The postaccord situation in the CHT bears out the latter position. Since the October 2001 elections, the committee has been inactive and no new committee has been formed.

NOTES Chattagram 1. For details of the process, see S. M. Ibrahim, Parbattya Shanti Prokria 'o Poribesh-Poristhitir Mullayan [The peace process of CHT and an evaluation of its situation] (Dhaka: Mawla, 2001), pp. 176-290. 2. In the early 1980s, there was dissension within the PCJSS on ideological grounds regarding the strategy of war. One group was led by Manobendra Narayan Larma, while the minority dissident group was under the command of Priti Kumar Chakma, hence the term "Priti group." 3. P. Sahadevan, Coping with Disorder: Strategies to End Internal Wars in South Asia, Regional Center for Strategic Studies (RCSS) Policy Studies No. 17 (Colombo: RCSS 2000), pp. 165-168. 4. Author interviews with several former members of the SB, April-July 2001. Some even suggested that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a significant setback to their movement, as it was inspired by the socialist ideology.

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5. The Bangladeshi liberation war of 1971 was fought under the political leadership of the Awami League, and victory was achieved with political and military assistance from India. The postindependence Awami League regime adopted secularism among its party principles, which was later adopted as a state principle. India felt more comfortable with the Awami League and its secular intonations than with the post-Awami League regimes that adopted Bangladeshi nationalism, which held religion as a major plank. The Jatiyo Party (JP) under Ershad, and the BNP under Zia and Khaleda Zia, adhere to Bangladeshi nationalism, while the Awami League under Sheikh Hasina (daughter of Sheikh Mujib) adheres to Bengali (secular) nationalism. 6. See Syed Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State: Power, People, and Internal War in South Asia (London: Zed Books, 1993); and Subir Bhaumik, Insurgent Crossfire: North-East India (Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1996). 7. Author interview with Upendra Lai Chakma, president of the Jumma Refugees Welfare Association, May 14, 2001. 8. For details of the demands, see Dabeenama (Chittagong: Janashoghoti Samity Publications, 1992, 1993, 1996). 9. Author interview with Rupayan Dewan, member of the PCJSS and the Regional Council, in a workshop, "The CHT: Problems and Prospects," organized by the Research and Development Collective, Dhaka, May 22-23, 1999. 10. Rajkumari Chandra Roy, Land Rights of the Indigenous Peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2000), pp. 166-167. 11. Author interview with Shantu Larma, leader of the PCJSS and chair of the regional council, April 4, 2001. 12. U.S.$1 is equivalent to Tk 57 under current government rates. 13. Author interview with Shantu Larma, April 4, 2001. 14. Author interview with Raja Devasish Roy, April 23, 2001. 15. Author interview with Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed, professor, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, August 8, 2001. 16. Amena Mohsin, "The State of Minority Rights in Bangladesh," Nethra 4, nos. 3-4 (2000), pp. 56-100. 17. Author interview with members of the Tripura, Mong, and Mrung communities, November 1993 and September 1994. 18. Author interview with members of the smaller communities during a visit to the CHT in May 2001. The same was reiterated in an author interview with Sudattya Bikash Tangchangya, member secretary of the Committee for the Protection of Forest and Land Rights, June 9, 2001. 19. For a detailed exposition, see Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, eds., Gender and International Relations (Milton Keynes, England: Open University Press, 1991). 20. See Meghna Guhathakurta, "Women's Narratives from the Chittagong Hill Tracts," in Rita Manchanda, ed., Women, War, and Peace in South Asia: Beyond Victimhood to Agency (New Delhi: Sage, 2001), pp. 252-293. 21. Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Commission, Life Is Not Ours: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1997), p. 9. See also Amena Mohsin, "Military Hegemony and the CHT," in Subir Bhaumik, Meghna Guhathakurta, and Sabyasachi Basu Ray Chaudhury, eds., Living on the Edge: Essays on the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Kathmandu: South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Calcutta Research Group, 1997), pp. 17^44.

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22. See Hill Women's Federation, ed., Kalpana Chakmar Diary (Dhaka: Hill Women's Federation, 2001). 23. See Amena Mohsin, "Women, War, and Nation," paper presented at a regional conference, "Conceptualizing Women: A Making of Meaning," organized by the ASR Resource Center/Institute of Women's Studies, Lahore, Pakistan, March 24-28, 2001. 24. The military has ruled Bangladesh for more than ten years of its threedecade existence, establishing itself as an important factor in Bangladeshi politics. Until 1991, all regime changes in Bangladesh were the result of either military action or military inaction. Because civilian regimes consider military support extremely important, military budgets have remained consistently high during those regimes. Appointments of chiefs to the military services have been politically motivated, and the civilian regimes have chosen chiefs who are considered proregime.

4 Postaccord Chittagong Hill Tracts

The Awami League had signed the Accord on an impulse—now they can neither throw us nor swallow us. There is a total stalemate and this is ruining us; if this situation continues there will not be a single Hill person left in ten years time.

—Hangsa Dhwaj Chakma, convener of the Liaison Committee for CHT Affairs 1 The course of the implementation of our programs for the Hill people, whether it is constitutional or unconstitutional depends on reality and situation. If the government forces us, then like before we will take up arms again.

—Shantu Larma, president of the PCJSS 2

Frustration, resentment, anger, and, to a certain extent, feelings of helplessness and entrapment are pervasive among the Hill people in the postaccord CHT. Although weak, the accord nonetheless raised the hopes of establishing peace and stability in a region and among a people marred by violence for over two decades. The postaccord situation in the CHT, however, belies the general expectations of the Hill people. They widely believe that the government is not sincere about implementing the accord. High-ranking military officials serving in the CHT share similar views and see the chances of peace in the CHT to be nonexistent in the near future. 3 It is unlikely that any Bengali regime has ever sincerely wanted to relinquish powers to the Hill people, given the lack of trust between the two communities. Bengali mistrust lies in the Hill people's desire to be merged with India in 1947 and, later, Chakma chief Raja Tri Dev Roy's controversial role in 1971, when he opted to side with the Pakistani regime. The insurgency only widened the gap between the two communities. Due to ambiguities inherent within the accord, the slow pace of implementation, and the state's attempt to keep the political, administrative, and development 59

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processes in the CHT within the centralized structure, the situation in the CHT is far from stable and peaceful. This chapter is divided into three sections, according to the key demands of the Hill people: political autonomy, security, and economic autonomy.

POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT Political empowerment through political autonomy has been one of the major demands of the Hill people. Its roots lie in the erosion of the Hill people's political and economic rights within the state of Bangladesh. The Hill people had demanded an autonomous regional council for the CHT with f u l l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r s . The accord e s t a b l i s h e d such an autonomous council but added to it two more administrative bodies: the district councils and the MOCHTA. These bodies are not able to function effectively due to the lack of proper guidelines and clearly defined roles and functions. The administrative situation therefore has become complex, cumbersome, and politicized, negatively impacting law and order—and thereby the security and stability of the people and the region—and seriously impeding the process and objectives of political empowerment. Three factors prevail: (1) parallel administration and lack of coordination, (2) governmentalization and lack of democratic practices and values, and (3) electoral politics. Parallel Administration and Lack of Coordination By creating the regional council and strengthening the three district councils and the MOCHTA, the accord apparently sought to devolve political and economic powers to the Hill people and thereby empower them. Apart from these institutions, the CHT has a four-layer administrative system, which dates from the British colonial period. On September 1, 1881, the Bengal government divided the CHT into three circles: the Chakma circle, 1,658 square miles (excluding government reserve forests of 763 square miles); the Bohmang circle, 1,444 square miles (excluding government reserve forests of 620 square miles); and the Mong circle, 653 square miles. These circles were divided into 373 mouzas (clusters of villages, or revenue units), and each mouza was again divided into paras, or individual villages. Each circle was placed under a government-appointed chief; each mouza was placed under a dewan, or headman, who was appointed by the chief; and each para was placed under a karbari, or manager. The karbaris were appointed by the mouza headman with the concurrence of the circle chief. The offices of chief and headman were usually hereditary. On May 1, 1900, the British promulgated a manual, often known as the CHT Manual or the

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1900 Manual, for the administration of the CHT. It laid down detailed rules and regulations for the administration of the CHT. Under Section 18 of the manual, rules and regulations applicable in other parts of Bengal were no longer applicable in the context of the CHT. Article 7 of Chapter 3 placed the CHT under the administration of a deputy commissioner (DC), who was given special powers by the governor of Bengal. These powers were not enjoyed by the DCs of the other districts of Bengal. The CHT Regulation district maintained the traditional institutions of the circles, chiefs, and headmen. But all powers—executive, judiciary, and financial—were vested in the deputy commissioner. The powers of circle chiefs were limited to the collection of taxes and the dispensation of justice in the traditional courts. The circle chiefs were to form an advisory council and assist the deputy commissioner in the administration of their respective circles (Article 38, Chapter 4). The mouza headmen were responsible for for collection of taxes and the adjudication of disputes within their mouzas (Article 40, Chapter 4). They passed the tax to the circle chief, who passed it to the deputy commissioner. Chiefs and headmen were exempted from paying taxes. This system remained in force during the postcolonial period and, apart from the three new administrative bodies established by the accord, continues unaltered today. The existence of so many parallel bodies and layers of administration in the region has created a chaotic situation, with confusion as to who or which body is in control. There is not only lack of coordination among the different structures, but also personality clashes among the heads of the different bodies. The Chakma chief, Raja Devasish Roy, believes that the more layers the better, as this will prevent any one body from becoming too powerful and will ensure a system of checks and balances within the administration. 4 This is indeed true in an ideal situation, where there are clear-cut divisions of powers and responsibilities; but within the arithmetic of Bangladeshi national politics vis-à-vis the CHT, the system has created more problems than solutions. Administrative stalemate exists in the region because the government has neither laid out rules and regulations for the new bodies nor devolved full powers to them as provided for in the accord, despite the elapse of three years since its signing. This augurs ill for the new bodies established by the accord, especially the regional council, and for the PCJSS leadership, in which the people are gradually losing confidence. Shantu Larma, leader of the PCJSS and chair of the regional council, pointed this out and saw it as a government ploy to deliberately destabilize the region and undermine the PCJSS leadership. 5 He further claimed that the Bangladeshi government wants to turn the CHT into a Bengali Muslim-dominated region. These allegations need to be understood within the context of the state's attempts to Bengalize the region through state-sponsored Bengali settlement programs and the poli-

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tics of Bengali and Bangladeshi nationalism. This perception prevails among the Hill people as well. But while they recognize that the regional council is not able to work to its full potential, as Table 4.1 reveals, they also question the ability of the PCJSS leadership to negotiate and bargain with the Bangladeshi government. This questioning of the regional council's ability may indicate a gradual erosion of the Hill people's faith in the PCJSS leadership, which will adversely affect the chances for peace. The political polarization taking place in the CHT will only strengthen the position of the government and weaken the aspirations of the Hill people for political autonomy. This in turn might lead to the creation of another armed movement in the CHT. Moreover, following the accord, a faction of the Hill people formed a political party, the United People's Democratic Front (UPDF), which has opposed the accord and pledged to carry forward the movement for full autonomy of the CHT. As for the perceptions and allegations made by the PCJSS and the Hill people, several factors can be identified. First, the Hill people have seen their land appropriated through the state-sponsored Bengali settlement program. The Bengalis today constitute the largest ethnic group in the CHT, which has important implications for the numerics of electoral politics. The PCJSS and the national mainstream political parties are only too aware of this arithmetic. Given their demographic position, Bengalis in the CHT have all the potential and inclination to control and dominate the politics of the region. The state administration has consistently backed them in this endeavor. Since their arrival in the 1970s, Bengali settlers have been living on free rations provided by the state. The military and the Bengali civil administrations in the CHT have also backed the settlers, not only in their settlement programs but also in their disputes with the Hill people. It is therefore not surprising that the Hill people regard the military and the

Table 4.1

Survey Question: " D o you think the regional council has been able to w o r k properly?" Yes

Hill people Men Women Bengalis

6(3.1%) 6 (6.3%) 26 (45.6%)

No

185 (95.9%) 86 (89.6%) 26 (45.6%)

Other3

2(1.0%) 4(4.1%) 4 (7.0%)

Don't know

0 0 1 (1.8%)

Source: Author survey in Rangamati and Khagrachari, May 2001, conducted among 346 persons, of whom 289 were Hill people and 57 were Bengali settlers. Note: a. "Other" refers to respondents who either were not sure about the functions or capacity of the RC, or suggested that perhaps the council could work if power were transferred, or that in certain cases the council has been able to work and in others it has failed.

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Bengali civil administration as government instruments working against their interests. There appears to be a total alienation between the Bengali administration, both civil and military, and the Hill people. The Hill people also witnessed the Bengalization of the CHT when the state imposed Bengali/Bangladeshi models of nationhood on them. Forced religious conversion was also considered a mode of assimilation during the period of insurgency in the CHT. The Dhaka Courier reported in 1994 that in the military-controlled areas, young Muslim women were being married to local youths after the latter had converted to Islam. 6 Similarly, Hill women, after being converted, were being married to Bengali youths and even to security personnel. Al-Rabita, a Saudi government-backed NGO, was the main missionary organization in the region. Backed by the military, it was entrusted with the task of Islamization of the region. It had offices in Rangamati and Longudu, where it also maintained a hospital. In Alikadam, this organization had an Islamic missionary center. Jamaat-i-Islam (a fundamentalist political party) also worked actively with the military. In the 1989 CHT local council elections, the Jamaat backed Bengali candidates with the f u l l support of the military. The n u m b e r of m o s q u e s and madrasahs (Islamic religious schools) also increased steadily, as Table 4.2 shows.

Governmentalization and Lack of Democratic Practices and Values Since the accord, the CHT has witnessed an increased governmentalization of its administration instead of the specified decentralization. The traditional administrative structure has only contributed to this increase. The powers given to the deputy commissioner through the CHT Manual are absolute and sweeping. Although the local traditional leaders have some capacity in advisory roles, the deputy commissioner is not obliged to take their advice or heed their decisions. As a government employee, the deputy commissioner is bound to carry out decisions of the state. The Hill people likely

Table 4.2

Number of CHT Mosques and Madrasahs, 1961-1981 Mosques 1961 1974 1981

40

200 592

Madrasahs 2 20 35

Source: EMAIL, "Religious Persecution and Islamization of the Chittagong Hill Tracts," Jumma Sangbad Bulletin, no. 14 (JSS Publications, 1993): 33.

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perceive a conflict of interest in this situation and regard it as being opposed to their interests and as catering to those of the Bengali community. The accord makes no reference to the powers and privileges of the deputy commissioner. The 1990 CHT Manual, since it contains many clauses protective of the economic interests of the Hill people, has import as well. Any amendment to the manual might have had a negative impact on the peace process. But it is equally true that the state has repeatedly amended the manual to relax the restrictions on Bengali migration and settlement in the CHT and on the acquisition of land by outsiders in the CHT. The state amended these provisions without consulting the CHT chiefs and to the detriment of the Hill people on the grounds that the CHT, being a part of Bangladesh and subject to the constitutional provisions of freedom of movement and right to property, cannot be retained as the exclusive property of the Hill people. But the state never compromised the powers and functions of the deputy commissioner as provided in the CHT Manual. Although deputy commissioners in other districts do not enjoy such sweeping powers, no uniformity was sought in this regard. In the postaccord situation, the office of the deputy commissioner has often come into conflict with the new administrative bodies. Political empowerment of the Hill people through decentralization of power makes it imperative that the CHT Manual be amended to curtail the powers and functions of the deputy commissioner. Political empowerment is a process that requires a culture of democratic practices and nurturance of democratic values. Above all, it requires a culture of tolerance and accommodation. These conditions are lacking in the CHT, where many years of insurgency have turned the region into a military-controlled zone. The accord provided hope for the resumption of democratic practices in the CHT, as the three district councils are supposed to be elected bodies, which in turn are supposed to elect the regional council. But elections to the district council have not been held to date; rather, the former Awami League appointed its own followers as chairs of the councils, despite protests by the PCJSS. These chairs are looked upon by the PCJSS as well as the Hill people as government agents promoting and furthering government interests in the region. Following the change of regime in October 2001, the BNP government appointed two of its men in Khagrachari and Banderban, while a neutral person was appointed in Rangamati. Though the district councils were formed on January 25, 1998, they have not yet been given full powers. As well, the Awami League nominated three of its members as the regional council's Bengali component. This too was opposed by the PCJSS but was later accepted for the sake of peace in the CHT. Shantu Larma took over as chair of the regional council on May 13, 1999, and the council was formally installed in Rangamati on May 27, 1999. Because

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the Awami League during its tenure did not frame the rules that would have determined the council's relationship with the other local administrative bodies, the council remained ineffective. Local-level bodies such as unions refused to follow the council's directives, as they had not received any such directive from the government. The district councils and the head of police, the two most important functionaries in the CHT, also carried on their work independently of the regional council, though maintaining law and order is within its jurisdiction. Shantu Larma says that he has repeatedly pointed out to the government the problems the regional council faces due to the state's reluctance to implement the accord and that he has also reminded the government of its obligations under the accord to frame the rules of the council and devolve its powers. But the government refused to pay any heed, instead only emphasizing the coordinating roles of the council, not its supervisory functions. 7 The government's reluctance to implement the accord in full may be explained by the arithmetic of electoral politics and by the regime's lack of trust toward the Hill people. Despite the regime change, no change has taken place in the composition of the Regional Council, though there has been some progress toward the framing of rules that would determine the relationship between the Regional Council and the local bodies. The Ministry of CHT Affairs is part of the government machinery. Kalparanjan Chakma, the Awami League member of Parliament from the CHT's Khagrachari district, was appointed affairs minister. The MOCHTA is to oversee and coordinate the work of the various government ministries regarding the CHT. Yet the government has not framed any rules or given the necessary directives to the ministries. Consequently, the district- and local-level administrations do not follow the directives of the MOCHTA. Many of the powers and functions of the regional council and the MOCHTA regarding development activities also overlap, which has created a power contest between the two bodies over who has control. There were also widespread allegations of corruption against the minister. Representatives of local NGOs have complained that the accord requires them to gain clearance from the MOCHTA before applying to the NGO Bureau Affairs for registration, but that the ministry gives clearance only to friends of the affairs minister, who otherwise demands a bribe.8 This situation is largely the by-product of the government's failure to frame rules and regulations for the functioning of the various administrative bodies and its failure to devolve powers and responsibilities to the newly created bodies. There is constant conflict and tension among these bodies regarding their roles and jurisdiction, compounded by personality clashes among their administrative heads. The PCJSS, having spearheaded the movement for autonomy, sees itself as the rightful leader of the Hill

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people. Several eminent professionals in the CHT who have no political affiliations contend that the PCJSS has the same character as the Awami League. Both are attempting to fill administrative positions in the CHT with their own party members. In the regional council in particular, the PCJSS has not inducted a single outside member. These professionals also alleged that the PCJSS, like the Awami League, is intolerant of any opposition to its proposed programs. 9 At present, Prime Minister Khaleda Zia is in charge of the Ministry of CHT Affairs and Moni Swapan Dewan of the BNP and member of Parliament from Rangamati is deputy minister. This has further strengthened the government's control over the region. Electoral Politics The policies of the Awami League in the CHT were largely formulated with an eye on electoral politics. It sought to install its party members at important levels of administration. Having signed the accord and being at the helm of power, the Awami League also considered that it had the right to a powerful voice in the affairs of the CHT. On the other hand, the PCJSS leaders allege that the Awami League leaders expected the PCJSS to dissolve itself and merge with the Awami League. 10 But the PCJSS is a party that is predicated on Jumma nationalism, itself a creation of Bengali/ Bangladeshi nationalism, while the Awami League has pursued the politics of Bengali nationalism. The PCJSS not only refused to merge with the Awami League but also subsequently emerged as a regional political party on December 2, 1999. Thus, the PCJSS and the Awami League are now rivals for political seats in the CHT, which previously was dominated by the Awami League alone. The political situation in the CHT has been further complicated by the question of how to draft the national electoral roll in the region. In September 2000, the National Parliament, through the addition of Article 17, Clause 2 to the CHT district council laws, empowered the election commission to formulate a voter list for local elections within the CHT. According to Article 17, an individual is entitled to vote for the council elections if he or she is a citizen of Bangladesh, is over eighteen years of age, has not been declared mentally ill by any competent court, and is a permanent resident of the CHT. The PCJSS had demanded that the national electoral roll for the CHT also be formulated according to this law and that only permanent residents of the CHT be registered as CHT voters for the October 1, 2001, national elections. The government, however, refused to entertain this demand. The refusal is based on Article 122 of the state constitution, which declares a person to be registered as a voter from a con-

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stituency if he or she is a resident of the area. For the October 1, 2001, elections, the cutoff period for residency was January 1, 2001. 11 The PCJSS's demand is based on the argument that if all the residents of the region were included in the CHT voter list, the Bengali settler community would be legalized as residents of the CHT, a matter unacceptable to the PCJSS and the Hill people in general. Second, the PCJSS also believes that given the demographic position of Bengalis in the CHT, and taking into account the military and civil administration personnel in the CHT who would be included in the national electoral roll, Bengalis would outnumber the Hill people. This suggests that candidates nominated by the mainstream Bengali political parties would likely win the elections, a possibility the PCJSS would regard as a serious setback to its aspirations for political p o w e r as well as political autonomy f o r the Hill people. Consequently, the PCJSS called upon the Hill people to resist the national elections in the CHT. The PCJSS boycotted the elections and, out of the three constituencies in the CHT, the BNP won two seats and the Awami League won one.

SECURITY The security situation in the CHT has become complicated since the accord. Local people blame the military for many of their problems, which not only adversely affects the region's stability but also widens the gap between the state and the Hill people. The following will make this clear. Arms, Drugs, and Uniforms Since the accord, the political and security situation in the CHT has been complicated by the emergence of unidentified armed groups. These groups are involved in collecting tolls from transport vehicles plying the roads, and evidence of their activities is rampant in Langadu, Juraichhari, Barkal, Shuvolong, Kaokhali, Mahalchhari, Nanirachar, Kutubchhari, Bagaichhari, and Dighinala. 12 Though the identity of these groups is not known, sources say that M y a n m a r rebels have j o i n e d f o r c e s with these groups in Banderban, providing them guns in exchange for shelter. There are also unconfirmed reports of the return of a long-dormant faction of the former SB, led by Priti Kumar Chakma. The Priti faction broke away from the Larma section of the SB and killed the founder of the PCJSS, Manobendra Narayan Larma, on November 10, 1983. This faction is now reportedly active in Dighinala and Baghaichhari, although there is no official confirmation of their presence. 13 Sources close to Priti Kumar Chakma, however,

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suggest that he is opposed to the accord and its implications for the Hill people. 14 The postaccord revival of previously dormant groups cannot be ruled out. It is too early to assess if their motives are political or criminal, extorting money from the general public and creating a situation of panic and terror. None of the above possibilities can be ruled out, though to draw reliable conclusions one needs to wait and observe how the situation develops in the CHT. The use of drugs and small arms is also on the rise in the region. After more than two decades of armed violence, unstable political and social conditions in the CHT have created a violence-prone society and a safe haven for trafficking arms and drugs, particularly given the CHT's close proximity to Myanmar, which is alleged to be involved in the trafficking of small arms and drugs. 15 The effects of trafficking on the CHT situation and its youth could be disastrous. The youth in the CHT have already been affected by the two-decade-long insurgency in the CHT. Apart from SB and PCJSS activists, not all of whom have been rehabilitated, the phenomenon of the child soldier was not unknown in the CHT. Many of today's CHT youths have grown up witnessing and experiencing violence. Many of them are frustrated by the state's reluctance to implement the accord, or by the very nature of the accord itself. The Hill people argue that during the autonomy movement, despite the violence, the youths had some hope and a sense of direction, which they now have lost. Gripped by an acute sense of frustration, drugs provide them with a refuge, and the use of arms gives them the sense of power they once enjoyed in the movement. Lack of employment opportunities in the CHT has also turned many youths toward drugs and arms. The Hill people charge that the state is deliberately if unofficially sanctioning the trafficking of drugs and small arms as a tool of "ethnic cleansing." They point to the heavy presence of the military and military checkpoints throughout the CHT and question how the military cannot know about the presence of drugs and arms, alleging that the military in fact is deliberately turning a blind eye to the problem to justify its continued presence and interference in the administration of the region. 16 The military denies these allegations and argues that its presence is necessary to check and stop the flow of arms and drugs in the region. 17 Nevertheless, the movement of arms and drugs into the region has not stopped, and the suspicions of the Hill people have only intensified. As a possible option to win the confidence of the people, the military might consider involving the local youth, through the regional council, in this operation. According to the provisions of the accord, the council is responsible for law and order in the CHT, and such a participatory approach would go a long way toward bridging the gaps between the military and the Hill people in particular, and between the Hill people and the state in general.

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Regarding the withdrawal of temporary military camps from the region, only thirty-one such camps so far have been withdrawn, according to the PCJSS. The Awami League puts the figure at seventy-five, though Shantu Larma contested this reckoning. He pointed out that the government provides a list to the PCJSS of the number of camps withdrawn from the CHT, and maintained that he and the PCJSS base their figures on that list.18 Since October 2001 no military camp has been withdrawn from the CHT. A related matter of practical logistics concerns where army personnel will be redeployed or stationed once withdrawn from the CHT. According to military sources, the state had deployed one-third of its army in the CHT. 19 The military arguably has developed a political and economic stake in the region, as an unstable CHT provides it considerable leverage with the civilian government of the state and strengthens its case for a high budget. On the other hand, through an alliance between the military and Bengali civil administration in the region, the government of Bangladesh can retain its hegemony over the Hill people. It is therefore no surprise that the security enforcement agencies in the CHT are completely staffed by Bengali personnel. Since the accord, 571 former SB personnel have been absorbed into the Bangladeshi state police force, but all of them have been transferred to the northern districts of Bangladesh. Though the accord empowers the regional council to give jobs to third- and fourthclass employees of the police forces in the region, this power has not yet been devolved. Polarization The polarization that took place within the CHT following the accord is also responsible for the loss of human security. The PCP, the HWF, and the PGP rejected the CHT Peace Accord as a "compromise accord" and declared that they would continue the movement for full autonomy—the implication being that, excepting the issues of taxation, currency, foreign policy, defense, and heavy industries, all CHT matters were to remain under the total control of the CHT administration.20 In theory, much power has been devolved to the local administration, but the caveats are the Ministry of CHT Affairs, which is an organ of the government and is responsible for all activities of the CHT; and the district councils, whose powers and functions were curtailed by those of the newly formed local administrative bodies. On December 26, 1998, the antiaccord groups announced the formation of a political party, the United People's Democratic Front. In its manifesto, the UPDF stated: Speaking for the establishment of people's rights, the PCJSS led the resistance movement for around two decades through legal as well as ille-

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gal means, and initially it was able to muster overwhelming support from the peoples. But of late, the agreement with the ruling Awami League (2 December 1997) and the "surrender" (10 February 1998), have clearly demonstrated the political bankruptcy of the PCJSS. . . . It would not have been necessary for us to launch a new party had there existed any other political party in the CHT truly representing the people in terms of giving leadership to the struggle for establishing the rights of the downtrodden masses. The democratic forces of the Hill People's Council, Hill Student's Council and Hill Women's Federation, which emerged through the students' upsurge in 1989, would have joined such a party and played their due role in the struggle. Unfortunately, no such party exists in the CHT. 21

The stated objectives of the party are: To ensure the existence of all nationalities in the CHT through the establishment of full autonomy, and to establish a democratic society free from oppression and exploitation. Equality of nations, equality of both sexes and non-communal and democratic ideals shall constitute the basis of all activities of the party; it shall show respect for the freedom, sovereignty and integrity of the country. 22

Conflicts of interest and violence erupted between the proaccord and antiaccord groups, with both groups vying for the support of the Hill people. The PCJSS regards the UPDF as a terrorist group, while the latter accuses the PCJSS of being an agent of the government. From December 1997 to January 2000, forty activists from both groups were killed, with each side accusing the other of the murders. Many Hill people have been abducted; between April and May 2001 there were twenty kidnappings, mostly from the two rival groups, and five murders. 23 Caught amid violence and extortion, the general population is afraid to express their opinions—being branded either proaccordist or antiaccordist might cost them their lives. Shopkeepers, NGO workers, transport owners, and even the general population are forced to pay tolls to activists from both sides. 24 Table 4.3 shows the general population's perception of the postaccord situation in the CHT. While the majority of the Hill people think that the situation has either worsened or has remained as before, most Bengalis think that it has improved. The silence of the accord on the question of Bengali settlers is widely taken by the latter as recognition by the PCJSS of their position in the CHT and might be a factor behind their positive response. Moreover, the continued presence of the military ensures their security. Despite the Bengalis' perceptions, however, the failure of the accord to address the issue of settlers has added to the insecurity of the Bengalis and the region as a whole.

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Table 4.3

Survey Question: "What is the postaccord situation like?" Better

Hill people Men Women Bengalis

41 (21.3%) 18 (18.8%) 35 (61.4%)

Worse

74 (38.3%) 44 (45.8%) 13 (22.8%)

As before

63 (32.6%) 29 (30.2%) 6 (10.5%)

Other 2

15 (7.8%) 5 (5.2%) 3 (5.3%)

Source: Author survey in Rangamati and Khagrachari, May 2001, conducted among 346 persons, of whom 289 were Hill people and 57 were Bengali settlers. Note: a. "Other" refers to respondents who stated that either more time is required to assess the situation or the situation cannot be improved and therefore the accord is immaterial.

Intercommunity Violence Polarization between the Hill people and the settlers has deepened following the accord. There have been several incidents of violence between the two communities, ranging from cases of land-grabbing to rape. Prior to the accord, the Hill people's expected that the settlers would be withdrawn from the region as this was a primary demand of the PCJSS. The accord's silence on this issue has compounded the Hill people's hostility toward the settlers, whom they perceive as a major cause of their plight, brought in by the government to force them from their land and eventually eliminate them. They further claim that the state's development programs have benefited only the Bengali community. The settlers, on the other hand, see themselves as victims of poverty and natural calamities. Many stated that they had been moved into the CHT by the government after they lost their lands to river erosion, floods, and cyclones. Some stated that they had possessed no land prior to settlement in the CHT. Since their arrival in the 1980s, they have been living on rations supplied by the government. Many say that they do not have ration cards, which are controlled and distributed by the local Bengali leaders. The local leaders have affiliations with the ruling political parties and often give the ration cards to their own people or party followers. There appears little respite for the poor among the settlers. That for over two decades the settlers have been living on rations or charity raises questions not only about the economic viability of this settlement project, but also about the government's sincerity in addressing the Bengalis' long-term settlement needs. Living a life of extended dependency is harmful for any people and impacts their identity as well as the prospects for their posterity. It appears that the settlers too have become victims of the power politics of the ruling elite of Bangladesh, who now look upon them as regional vote banks.

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Refugees, IDPs, and Rehabilitation The issue of settlers is inextricably linked to the question of proper rehabilitation of the refugees and the IDPs, since the former in many instances have been settled on land once occupied or belonging to the returnee refugees and the IDPs. It was insecurity that drove the Hill people to seek refuge, both within and outside state boundaries, and it is indeed questionable whether circumstances in the CHT have improved. According to a human rights activist and refugee scholar in India, Chakma refugee women were most reluctant to come back, for security reasons. 25 Since their return, there have been several cases of violence, ranging from harassment to murder, due to disputes with Bengali settlers over land. 26 In a survey of 100 returnee refugees in Khagrachari in August 1999, 96 percent of respondents stated that they had fled to India due to military atrocities, with the remaining 4 percent attributing their flight to the war between the state military and the SB. Moreover, 92 percent felt that the situation was still uncertain and unstable; 8 percent felt that it had worsened. 27 None felt that the situation had improved. The government formed a task force under the direction of Dipankar Talukdar, the Awami League member of Parliament from Rangamati, to supervise the rehabilitation process. Though the government claims that refugees have been rehabilitated, the perception of the Hill people is quite the opposite, as shown in Table 4.4. The Hill people argue that many of the refugees have not had their lands returned to them and are staying with relatives, but that they are regarded as having been rehabilitated since they are not staying in the refugee centers established by the government during the initial stage of refugee repatriation. Upendra Lai Chakma, president of the JRWA, maintains that about 90 percent of the refugees have been settled (i.e., have been able to build houses). He draws a line between rehabilitation and settlement. The former, he argues, is a protracted process, since the people had

Table 4.4

Survey Question: "Have the refugees been properly rehabilitated?" Yes

Hill people Men Women Bengalis

6(3.1%)

0

30 (52.6%)

No

187 (96.9%) 95 (98.9%) 24(42.1%)

Don't know

0

1 (1.1%)

3 (5.3%)

Source: Author survey in Rangamati and Khagrachari, May 2001, conducted among 346 persons, of whom 289 were Hill people and 57 were Bengali settlers.

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been uprooted for over a decade. Nor have some of the most affected people been settled. There are still about seventeen families in Dighinala Residential Model School and four to five families in Poakhali Primary School. These schools were initially established as refugee centers. 28 The accord made no provision for the households of refugees headed by women. Without financial support from the state or NGOs, women have little scope for self-employment or income generation. Neither the state nor the PCJSS leadership think that these returnee refugees require special consideration; they both consider the question of nationality to be more important than the question of women. 29 While the refugees received some benefits and rations from the government during the first year and a half after their return, the IDPs did not. During the insurgency period, some took refuge with their relatives within CHT, while others went deep inside the jungles, where they practiced jhum cultivation on already fragile land. In the CHT, the land these people left behind was occupied mostly by Bengali settlers. The IDPs do not have any sustained and viable sources of income and many of them are living in starvation conditions. In 1998, Taungya, a local NGO, reported on malnutrition and starvation conditions of the IDPs in Longadu and Baghachhari in Rangamati district, citing five cases of death in Longadu and thirty-five in Baghaichhari due to malnutrition and lack of medical facilities. 30 The rehabilitation issue has become more complicated due to the government's decision to include Bengali settlers within the IDP package. The task force prepared a list of 128,364 families, comprising 500,000 individuals, as IDPs to be rehabilitated. Of the families, 90,208 were Hill people and 38,156 were Bengali settlers. 31 The PCJSS vehemently opposes the inclusion of Bengali settlers in the IDP package, as it would legalize the Bengali settlements in the region and entitle them to land rights in the CHT. This move also raises the fundamental question of how the Hill people will regain their land, which they regard as central to their existence, if Bengalis are also given land within the package. A major objective of the government including the Bengalis was likely to enlist the support of Bengali settlers for the national elections of October 2001. The settlers are considered the vote banks of the BNP, since the late Ziaur Rahman, founder of the BNP, initiated the Bengali settlement program in the CHT in postindependence Bangladesh. Moreover, the BNP in its criticisms of the CHT Peace Accord pointed out that the accord had turned the Bengali settlers into second-class citizens in the Hills, given that the chairs of the new administrative bodies must be "tribal" persons. This move by the Awami League may be regarded as a political strategy to win over its rivals' constituency. It is also understandable that Bengalis in general, throughout Bangladesh, will not accept any forced withdrawal of Bengali settlers from

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the region. Besides the military, the Bengali business community—with its interests in the region's forest resources and development activities—and even the national NGOs have developed a vested interest in the region and view the Bengali settlers as important support groups. The situation has not changed for the refugees and IDPs because the new regime did not create a task force to assist in their rehabilitation.

ECONOMIC

EMPOWERMENT

Economic autonomy had been a major demand of the Hill people. While the accord has given substantive economic powers to the local bodies, full powers have not been devolved to the local administrative bodies according to the provisions of the accord. The Hill people's aspirations for economic autonomy and empowerment have remained unfulfilled, and development in the CHT has yet to evolve into a coherent and comprehensive process. The Hill people are apprehensive of state-sponsored development endeavors, all of which—from construction of dams to forest conservation and infrastructure development—have been conducted to their total exclusion and have threatened to alienate them from their lands. As Raja Devasish Roy has pointed out, "You cannot protect a culture unless the whole economy is taken care of." 32 The Hill people want to take control of their economy. The government, national and local NGOs, and some international agencies are at present involved in developing the region. The Hill people, however, complain that many of the development programs are politically motivated and are oriented toward the settlement of Bengalis in the region. This they believe is hampering their cause and will not lead toward their economic empowerment. Instead, they suggest that the local NGOs, despite their present limitations and differences among themselves, should be encouraged and empowered. The international development agencies are also preferred by the Hill people over the national NGOs. It is too early, however, to make a comprehensive assessment of the development activities in the region by the various actors. The slow pace of accord implementation, as well as complications created by the flaws in the accord, have created a situation of administrative stalemate in the region. Law and order has deteriorated. Consequently, the pace of economic activities in the region has slowed. Donors have also suspended their aid into the region and have made renewal of aid conditional on implementation of the accord and improvement in law and order. This has created a self-perpetuating cycle of violence and underdevelopment for the Hill people. On the one hand, the Hill people themselves want the donors to withhold assistance until the accord is implemented in full so that the state cannot use donor money to marginalize them.

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On the other hand, lack of development entails continued poverty, unemployment, and its accompanying vices, such as gambling, drinking, extortion, and extreme insecurity and instability, which gives the state a pretext to keep its security and political machineries in total control of the region. The State's Development Agency The state-sponsored CHTDB is a major development body of the CHT. Early in 1973, the GOB established a separate board for the development of the CHT, which was given formal and institutional shape in January 1976 as the CHTDB. The Bangladeshi government had formed the board on the basis of recommendations made in a 1964 report on the forestry sector, which had been commissioned by the Pakistani government after the construction of the Kaptai Dam to suggest measures for the development of the region. The government had further sought the opinion and assistance of such international development agencies as the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) and the Australian Development Assistance Bureau. No opinion had been sought from the local people or their leaders, despite the fact that one of the board's stated objectives is to "encourage the local participation and decentralization of decision-making in the preparation and implementation of development programs throughout the CHT." 33 Further, international agencies are often guided by notions of development and progress not attuned to local customs and values. Their recommendations and opinions might not necessarily reflect those of the local people, for whose benefit the CHT development bodies are professed to be constituted. The composition of the CHTDB is also not of a decentralized nature. It consists of a chair, vice chair, and four members. The commissioner of Chittagong division was the original chair, and the deputy commissioner of the CHT is its vice chair. Following 1982, when martial law was imposed upon the country, the general commanding officer of Chittagong division took over as the chair of the CHTDB. There is provision for a consultative committee, which comprises twenty-two local representatives and thirtyfive representatives of local state institutions and eminent persons. The committee is headed by the board chair, who also is responsible for the appointment of these members. Because the decisions of the committee are not binding on the board, the body has little administrative significance. The board also depends on the central government for the approval of any project involving a cost of more than Tk 1,000,000 (U.S.$17,543; US$1 is equivalent to Tk 57 under current rates); thus, the board can independently undertake only small projects. This centralization was perhaps necessary for the Bengali elite given the insurgency in the CHT, as the CHTDB is the main body entrusted with development of the region. The Hill people claim

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that the board's activities during the insurgency period, being under the total control of a Bengali general, benefited the Bengali settlers and the military in its counterinsurgency programs. The accord stipulates that the CHTDB will discharge its functions under the general and overall supervision of the regional council and that preference will be given to a tribal person in appointing the board chair. Following the accord, the government appointed Bir Bahadur, the Awami League member of Parliament from Banderban, as the chair. The PCJSS objected to this appointment of a party member, and the appointment has raised suspicions among the Hill people about the sincerity of the government in decentralizing and ensuring effective participation of the local population in developing the CHT. The present BNP regime also appointed Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, its member of Parliament from Khagrachari, as chair of the board. The appointment of a party candidate would arguably ensure government control over centralization of the development process. Since the regional council has not been devolved powers to discharge its responsibilities, the CHTDB currently is not under its supervision. It appears that despite the accord provisions, the government aims to undertake development in the region on its own terms, based on its own interests and calculations. Development entails large economic and political spinoffs, in which the business community, the contractors, and the military have an extensive vested interest, and the party in power has free reign to allocate these contracts to its present and prospective supporters. As the CHTDB is the main development body for the CHT, it is unlikely that any regime in Bangladesh will relinquish its control over the institution. Nor is it likely that any regime will devolve power to the regional council unless it can ensure itself full support from the council, which arguably could also adopt the same calculations once given economic authority. It is therefore imperative to make these institutions as participatory and transparent as possible by inducting civil society members into their top echelons. National NGOs The role of NGOs as development agencies and partners is well known and recognized today. In view of the Hill people's apprehensions about government-sponsored development plans, one may make a strong case for NGO activities in the region. Following the accord, major national NGOs, such as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), Proshika, the Bangladesh Nari Progoti Shangha (BNPS, or Bangladesh Women's Advancement Front), and the Integrated Development Fund (IDF), have ventured into the CHT. Although these NGOs state that their objectives are aimed purely at the social and economic advancement of the region, the Hill

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people view their activities with much skepticism and allege that their objectives are political rather than developmental. There are two major reasons for this skepticism. First, the Hill people point out that the national NGOs are not sensitive to local needs and culture and are replicating in the CHT their programs of the plains, a region with entirely different socioeconomic characteristics. The NGOs have introduced microcredit programs in the CHT, targeting poor women in particular. Loans are provided to them without collateral, and they are expected to invest the money and return loans with interest on an installment basis. The Hill people allege that under the present circumstances there is little scope for income-generating activities in the CHT. It is not possible for Hill women to achieve returns on their investments at such short intervals, particularly in the face of NGO interest rates, which are allegedly very high. Consequently, many Hill women take loans from local moneylenders at very high interest rates to pay back their NGO loan installments, entrapping themselves in a crippling cycle of debt. Many women have taken to the lucrative winemaking trade, which has caused the Hill people to express the fear of losing their entire nation to alcoholism. These NGOs also have an urban bias, working in and around cities. The villagers in the interiors and the remote areas require the most help, but the larger national NGOs have not ventured there. Second, the activities of these NGOs also include the Bengali settlers. While the Hill people are dissatisfied with the nature of work undertaken by the national NGOs in the CHT, the settlers look favorably on the microcredit program. Many Bengali women said that they have started smallscale poultry businesses and have bought rickshaws with the loans provided by the IDF and that their situation has improved substantially due to NGO activities. Although the microcredit program is said to target the poorest of the poor (i.e., landless people), many recipients own televisions. Asked how they came to acquire such a luxury, these individuals said that they were now in a position to buy such amenities, which were unthinkable for them prior to the microcredit program. 34 The Hill people allege that the NGOs are in fact state organizations helping to consolidate the Bengali settlements in the region. While the Hill people are not averse to national NGOs working in the region, they want programs to be implemented on their own terms and with the full participation of the local population. After protests from local people and harassment of a few NGO workers by the Hill people, the government halted all NGO activities in the CHT. The government decided to frame a code of conduct for the national and international agencies working in the CHT, for which a board was constituted to prepare an NGO manual, which has not yet been finalized. Although the regional council is the coordinating body for all NGO activities in the CHT, the board did not include

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any representatives from the PCJSS. Even many Bengali NGO activists have objected to the board's nonparticipatory nature and approach. It is perhaps understandable that by excluding the PCJSS, the government seeks to impose its notions of development on the Hill people through the NGOs, since the latter have more credibility with donors in terms of efficiency. The unstable situation in the CHT also provides the NGOs an opportunity and field to attract funds on the grounds that development would facilitate the process of achieving stability. While it is true that NGOs have considerable experience in the plains, have fortified their capacities, and are in a position to contribute positively to the socioeconomic development of the region, the activities and strategies in the CHT must be assessed objectively. The microcredit program has adversely impacted Hill women, which suggests that the NGOs have inadequately considered the cultural mores of the Hill people. It is only appropriate that the NGOs should evolve income-generating programs for the Hill people before embarking on microcredit programs, lest recipients be unable to pay back their loans. Failure to adopt new strategies for the Hill people will result in a situation imbalance, with the Bengali settlers benefiting from the programs and the Hill people remaining disadvantaged. This will have ramifications at the economic as well as political levels. At present the civil administration and the military favor the Bengali settlers over the Hill people. The programs of the national NGOs also appear to be benefiting the settlers. This will only widen the existing polarizations and impact negatively on the peace process. For the sake of development, it is imperative that the national NGOs work in close concert with the newly formed local administrative bodies, local NGOs, and civil society members. They should develop an NGO framework at the local level to clearly spell out codes of conduct and to specify the nature of the activities to be undertaken in the CHT. The donors should be explicit in this respect and insist that the national NGOs work in coordination with the local people. NGO programs should be monitored and evaluated, with reports made available to the public. While the national NGOs maintain that they are working through a participatory approach and that their undertakings are being constantly evaluated, the extent and level of participation have been questioned and the evaluation reports are not made public. Moreover, donors as well as their consultants have their own agendas and interests. It is therefore not surprising that a thriving consultancy market has opened up in the CHT following the accord, with many consultants having little understanding of the uniqueness of the region and its people. One way donors might take these considerations into account is by integrating into these initiatives civil society groups as well as members from both the national and local levels.

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Local NGOs Since the accord, many local NGOs have ventured into the CHT. Their stated objective is to work toward peacebuilding through socioeconomic empowerment of the people. For security as well as political reasons, the state requires these NGOs to be registered with the Bureau of NGO Affairs, a requirement applicable to national NGOs as well. But in the case of the CHT there are further requirements. Local NGOs also need to be given clearance from the director-general of military intelligence. Largely due to the past insurgency in the region, the state is highly cautious about the roles and activities of local NGOs. As well, before registration, local NGOs must obtain clearance from the Ministry of CHT Affairs. The Hill people, however, allege wide-scale corruption and nepotism in the ministry. Many NGOs claim that their organizations have been promised funds from donors but that the moneys lapsed due to either delay in the ministry or the NGOs' failure to obtain clearance from the ministry. To simplify and expedite the process, the Hill people as well as local NGO workers suggest that the regional council, as coordinating body, be authorized to give clearance to local NGOs and that funds for the local NGOs be channeled through the council. The governmentalization, however, is a serious impediment to the Hill people's aspirations for economic autonomy. It appears that the government controls all NGO activities in the region through the ministry, which defeats the objective of decentralization of power. The Hill people strongly believe that if they are to be empowered it is imperative that the regional council, in conformity with the logic and principle of decentralization, be vested with the authority to give clearance to local NGOs. Empowerment of the regional council, however, appears to be a remote possibility. Given the past experience of insurgency, the state wants to retain its control over the activities of the NGOs in the CHT. The government alleges that in the name of NGO activities some local NGOs are organizing the local people on an antiaccord platform and are fueling interracial conflicts. At a meeting held by the Ministry of Home in April 2001, six local NGOs were identified as such: Taungya, the Indigenous Multiplex Development Organization (IMDO), Jabarang, Trinamul, the Center for Indigenous Peoples Development (CIPD), and the Parbattya Chattagram NGO Forum. The Ministry of CHT Affairs was asked to monitor these NGOs. The NGOs denied the allegations and protested the government action. 35 In fact, Trinamul works among the Hill people as well as among the Bengalis. The government action was also protested by the Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB), a body that monitors NGO activities in Bangladesh.

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Currently, there are fifty-two registered local NGOs in the region. Their programs focus mainly on health, water, and sanitation; they also work in agriculture, horticulture, forestation, fisheries, poultry farms, microcredit, education, women in development, environment, income generation, training, and development. While the Hill people express a need for developmental programs in the region, they want these to be conducted by local NGOs. Local NGO workers also feel that they should be allowed to participate, as this will create employment opportunities for the CHT population. Local workers are also better placed to communicate with their own people and are familiar with the difficult terrain of the area. They are, however, conscious of their limitations and seek the help of national NGOs for capacity building and training. Such cooperation provides an opportunity for building trust and confidence among the Bengalis and the Hill people. The national NGOs can learn from the local NGOs about the expectations, traditions, and cultural mores of the local people, and this knowledge will help them conduct their activities more effectively. Collaboration between the national and local NGOs will also enable the national NGOs to win the confidence of the Hill people. The question of extending programs to the Bengali settlers, however, is a contentious issue that defies easy resolution, given the standoff between the state and the Hill people. But there appears to be some softening of the position on the part of the local NGOs, since some, such as Trinamul, are working with the Bengali community as well. Collaboration between the local and national NGOs would perhaps pave the way for effecting a workable and functional relationship between the two communities. The creation of income-generating activities will reduce the dependence of the Hill people on land resources alone. And with the development of economic and education opportunities, the Bengali settler community will be more equipped to leave the region to seek better economic opportunities, since they too are living in a difficult and insecure situation. This is a protracted process, however, and requires careful planning and strategizing. While there are divisions, differences, and disparate politicking within and among the local as well as the national NGOs, these organizations must take it upon themselves to work out an agreed framework and start the process of collaboration.

Foreign Aid and International Agencies On February 22, 1998, the GOB submitted a U.S.$255 million development plan for the CHT to its donors. The plan emphasized mainly the infrastructural development of the region, such as the construction of roads and buildings. The donors, however, rejected the plan for two main reasons: it was not an integrated approach, and the plan was formulated without the

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participation of the PCJSS and other representatives of the Hill people. 36 Nonetheless, some of the international agencies and donor countries allocated funding for the development of the region. UN Development Programme The Bangladeshi government requested that the UNDP conduct a needs assessment mission in the CHT. This mission was conducted in April 1998, and the commission identified a number of sectors for intervention by the donor agencies, including agriculture, primary education, technical and vocational education, health, infrastructure, and communication. The UNDP is also working toward the compilation of a national environmental protection plan for Bangladesh, of which the CHT is an important component. United Nations Children's Fund UNICEF has been involved in community development programs in the cluster villages for many years and is continuing these programs. The Integrated Community Development Program (ICDP) was launched in 1980 and works within the framework of the CHTDB. It provides preschool facilities for children four to five years of age, promotes knowledge of health practices and nutrition, and seeks to improve water supply and sanitation facilities. Initially, the ICDP was headed by a military general, and the Hill people argued that its programs were benefiting the Bengali settler community. Although still conducted within the framework of the CHTDB, the ICDP is now under the direction of a ruling-party member of Parliament, so the Hill people remain skeptical of its activities. World Food Programme The Australian and Canadian governments committed funds to a World Food Programme (WFP) intervention of Expanded Food Assistance (EFA) in the CHT to support the region's vulnerable population. Figure 4.1 indicates the amounts and distribution of the U.S.$5.097 million in funds. The activities and strategies of the EFA were based on the findings reported by the GOB/WFP implementation mission to the CHT in June-July 1998. The intervention involved the WFP; three government departments (the Directorate of Relief and Rehabilitation [DRR], the Department of Local Government and Engineering [LGED], and the Department of Fisheries [DOF]); the traditional leadership structures in the CHT (the headmen at the union level and the karbaris (managers) at the village level); and representatives of local indigenous NGOs. Food assistance

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Figure 4.1

EFA Allocation of Resources (in millions of U.S.$)

Canada

committees (FACs) were also formed. The intervention concentrated on three activities: employment on access roads, livelihood support intervention, and fisheries intervention. Apart from helping the vulnerable population and building capacity for the local NGOs, a major objective of the EFA is to build trust among the communities, as this is considered a precondition for stabilizing the peace process in the region. The beneficiaries of the program are the Hill people as well as the Bengali settler community. The inclusion of the latter has raised concerns among the Hill people, who believe that such interventions, though benefiting the Hill people, will also help to consolidate the Bengali position in the CHT. The Hill people regard the Bengali settlements as illegal and a threat to their existence.

European Union The European Union (EU) has been monitoring the situation in the CHT since the 1980s. It has pressured the regimes in Bangladesh to seek a political solution to the problem. Between 1999 and 2000, the the EU had committed funds of U.S.$40 million-60 million for development projects in the CHT. The projects were to be identified later on. But the funds could not be utilized due to the unstable situation in the CHT. The EU has made it a pre-

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condition for disbursement that the Bangladesh government create a congenial environment for fund disbursements. 37 Asian Development Bank The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been involved in the CHT since the early 1980s. Prior to the accord, it invested in road construction, forestation programs, and cluster villages—programs regarded at the time as being part of the military's counterinsurgency. In 2000, the ADB proposed to undertake a major forestry program in the region, Social Forestry Rules. The program was rejected by the Committee for the Protection of Forest and Land Rights in the CHT and other local NGOs of the CHT as "anti-people, anti-environment and anti-national interest." To administer the Social Forestry (SF) Program, the government passed the Forest Amendment Act in 2000. The following provisions of the act have important implications for forest-dwelling people: • • • •

•

•

The prohibition of "land cultivation" and "attempted land cultivation" in RF and PF backed by penal sanctions. The penalization of activities that may cause damage to SF programs. The appointment of special magistrates to try Forest Act-related offenses. The vesting of further powers on Forest Development Officers (FDOs) to take possession of seized forest produce and take custody of alleged offenders. The vesting of authority on FDOs to prohibit certain activities within privately owned lands or other lands for the protection of publicly owned forests or for the protection of "property" and the environment. The strengthening of indemnity of government officials (essentially FDOs) from criminal prosecution action against them in performing their responsibilities under the Forest Act and ancillary (and delegated) legislation. 38

The criminalization of land cultivation within the reserved and protected forests will marginalize the poorer section of the Hill people, as many of them still cultivate wet rice and upland rice in these regions. The Hill people regard themselves as the traditional custodians of forests and forest environments. They allege that vesting forest development officers with increased authority and indemnity from criminal prosecution will increase the harassment of the local population at the hands of government officials. The drafts of the 2000 legislation were prepared by expatriate consultants

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who have little or no knowledge or understanding of the dysfunctional problems within the existing forest administration, nor of the needs and wants of indigenous and forest-dependent peoples. There was no local participation in the drafting of the legislation, though the ADB emphasizes the participatory approach. Danish International Development Association and Department for International Development Through the Danish International Development Assocaition (DANIDA), the Danish government in 1998 allotted U.S.$30 million to build a road connecting the three district headquarters. DANIDA also worked in the field of water and sanitation. It carried out its activities through Green Hill, a local NGO, in collaboration with the Department of Public Health Engineering. Water Aid, an organization funded by the Department of International Development (DFID), also works with Green Hill. The initiatives of individual and bilateral donors, like the Danish government's project and the World Food Programme's EFA, which received financial support from the Canadian and Australian governments, have been halted due to deteriorating law and order and the failure to implement the accord. On February 16, 2001, three foreign workers on the road construction project, two Danish and one British, were abducted near Kalapahar, on the Rangamati Khagrachari highway. Their release was obtained only through the payment of a ransom. The PCJSS blamed the UPDF for the abduction, while various sources, including the UPDF, believed that the government and military had staged the kidnapping to justify the continued military presence in the region. Military activities, including checkpoints and patrols, indeed increased in the region following the abduction. Economic activities in the CHT have all but halted due to ambiguities and flaws inherent in the accord, the slow pace of implementation of the accord, and deterioration in law and order. The state has failed to create confidence among the Hill people, as long years of insurgency and the strategic and economic importance of the region propel the state toward maintaining strong control of the CHT. The Hill people's aspirations for autonomy, on the other hand, are equally genuine. The establishment of peace, trust, and confidence would provide a way out for the Hill people as well as the state. The CHT Peace Accord, despite its limitations and contradictions, has provided a framework and platform for negotiations and dialogue between the Hill people and the state. Implementation of the accord could have provided a congenial environment for building trust and seeking a resolution of the outstanding problems through negotiations. State institutions and processes, such as constitutionality and majori-

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tarian democracy, appear to be the major stumbling blocks. The situation has been further aggravated by the continued presence and perceived role of the military in the region. With the creation of the Jummas, various stakeholders have emerged in the CHT. The state must address the frustrations and resentments developing among the Hill people in the postaccord situation, lest another armed movement arise. Mere implementation of the accord will not necessarily bring about peace, especially given the polarization that has emerged within the CHT. The mainstream national political parties are also polarized on the accord, suggesting that a culture of peace and democracy has to be nurtured and sustained, not just in the CHT but throughout Bangladesh. The conflict has an external dimension as well, so regional and international actors have a significant role to play. Given the emergence of armed groups in the region—whose whereabouts, identities, and objectives are still unknown— the Indian and Myanmar states should take care that these groups do not seek safe haven in their countries, a matter of long-term interest to Bangladesh as well. Globalization and international terrorism following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States have made explicit the interdependence and interconnectivity of security and insecurity between people and states. The UN, as the world's apex body, also has an important role to play in this respect. It must encourage its member states to bring the minority agenda to the fore and also form independent monitoring bodies for the conflict and postconflict areas. The UN agenda on human security needs to incorporate minority security into its core programs. Donors too must make the protection of minorities' human rights a condition for aid disbursement. A lasting resolution to the CHT problem therefore requires interventions at various levels—local, national, regional, and international—as well as a minimum level of consensus and a framework around which to construct strategies for building peace and confidence.

NOTES

1. Author interview with Hangsa Dhwaj Chakma, May 15, 2001. 2. Interview published in Jugantar (Dhaka) November 13, 2000. 3. Author interviews, anonymous. One of these officials stated, "We have signed an accord but we don't trust them. How can there be peace? It is impossible." 4. Author interview with Chakma chief Raja Devasish Roy, April 23, 2001. 5. Author interview with Shantu Larma, April 4, 2001. 6. Courier (Dhaka), July 8, 1994, p. 20. 7. Author interview with Shantu Larma, April 4, 2001. 8. Author interview with Upendra Lai Chakma, president of the JRWA, May 14, 2001. He stated that he had to seek the intervention of the prime minister to gain

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clearance for his NGO. He rhetorically questioned how many people in the CHT actually have access to the prime minister. These allegations of corruption were also made by the Hill people in general. 9. Author interview with physicians, lawyers, and teachers in the CHT, who preferred to remain anonymous, May 2001. 10. Author interview with top-ranking PCJSS leaders, who preferred to remain anonymous, June 2000. 11. For the constitutional and legal implications, see advocate protim Roy Pampu, Parbattya Ain: Totte 'o Proyoge [Hill laws: In theory and practice] (Rangamati: Rangamati Prokashani, 2001), pp. 23-26. 12. On my way to Rangamati from Khagrachari in May 2001, the public bus I was travelling on was stopped at Juraichhari, and persons wearing uniforms came down from the mountains and demanded a toll from the bus driver. The driver showed them a token indicating that the tolls had already been paid. The unidentified soldiers asked the driver if there were any businessmen aboard the bus, to which he replied in the negative and after which the bus was allowed to leave. Before stopping the bus, the driver and bus conductor had asked us not to look out our windows. More strikingly, within a distance of 1 kilometer, the bus was stopped again, this time by the military for a security check. 13. Daily Star (Dhaka) June 13, 2001. 14. Author interview with persons close to Priti Kumar Chakma, who preferred to remain anonymous, October 19, 2001. 15. Neila Husain, "Problems of Proliferation of Small Arms in Bangladesh," in Dipankar Banerjee, ed., South Asia at Gunpoint: Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation (Colombo: Regional Center for Strategic Studies, 2000), p. 4. 16. Author interviews with a cross section of Hill people, May 14-30, 2001.1 too noted the strong and too visible presence of the military in the CHT. On my way to Rangamati from Khagrachari, on May 16, 2001, my bus was stopped four times by the military for security checks. The entire region has the look of a heavily guarded military cantonment. 17. Author interviews with high-ranking military officials in the CHT, May 14-15 2001. The officers preferred to remain anonymous. 18. Author interview with Shantu Larma, April 4, 2001. 19. Author interviews with high-ranking military officials, on condition of anonymity, 1993-1994. 20. Author interview with Proshit Khisha, president of the UPDF, May 6, 2001. 21. CHT Commission, Life Is Not Ours: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, 4th update (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2000), p. 31. 22. Ibid. 23. Daily Star (Dhaka), June 13,2001. 24. The PCJSS and the UPDF accuse each other of toll collection, with both denying their involvement. 25. Author interview with Asha Hans of India, who had visited the Chakma refugee camps after the CHT Peace Accord was signed, March 20, 1998. 26. CHT Commission, Life Is Not Ours, p. 50. 27. Author survey of 100 returnee refugees in Khagrachari, August 1999. 28. Author interview with Upendra Lai Chakma, president of the JRWA, May 14, 2001. 29. Ibid. Upendra Lai Chakma said that the issue of women refugees was

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never raised during negotiations for the refugee package. Shantu Larma, in an interview with the author on April 4, 2001, said that he does not believe in women's empowerment, adding that they will be empowered when the society (i.e., the Hill people) are empowered. 30. Raja Devasish Roy, "The Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord: Looking Ahead," paper presented at a workshop, "Sources of Conflict in South Asia: Ethnicity, Refugees, Environment," organized by the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka, at Godavari Village Resort, Lalitpur, Nepal, March 7, 1999. 31. CHT Commission, Life Is Not Ours, p. 48. 32. Author interview with Raja Devasish Roy, April 23, 2001. 33. Asian Development Bank, Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Project (Dhaka: ADB, 1978), p. xx. 34. Author interviews with Bengali women of the CHT, May 14-30, 2001. 35. Sangbad (Dhaka), April 24, 2001. 36. CHT Commission, Life Is Not Ours. 37. Author interview with Ambassador Antonio B. de Souza Menezes of the European Union Commission, Dhaka, April 24, 2001. 38. Raja Devasish Roy and Sadeka Halim, "A Critique to the Forest (Amendment) Act of 2000 and the (draft) Social Forestry Rules of 2000," in Critique: The Forest (Amendment) Act, 2000 and the Social Forestry Rules, 2000 (Dhaka: Society for Environment and Human Development, 2001), pp. 12-13.

5 In Search of Peace: Policy Recommendations

The present situation in the CHT and the predicament of the Hill people are consequences of the state's failure to accommodate the political and economic aspirations of the indigenous population, who still feel a deep sense of alienation. The CHT Peace Accord has ended the armed insurgency, but not its source. The policies pursued by the state in the postaccord CHT did little to accommodate the Hill people. Peace in the CHT will remain a chimera unless participatory democratic structures are built, to which the state, the nongovernmental sector, and the international community must contribute. All insurgencies have an external dimension, with both state and nonstate actors playing a role. The state actor that provides arms and training to the insurgents and a haven to the refugees that follow may also facilitate the peace process as changes occur in the strategic and political environment. In the case of the CHT, India has played an influential role in bringing about the signing of the accord. As pointed out in Chapter 2, following political changes in Bangladesh in 1975, the Indian government reversed its attitude toward the CHT, deciding to help the insurgency movement. The reasons for this were political as well as strategic. Politically, India was dismayed at the overthrow of its perceived ally, the Awami League, by a military coup. The coup's leaders as well as the regime they installed were perceived in New Delhi as anti-Indian. Strategically, the CHT is important to India for fighting its own insurgency in its northeastern region. The Mizo National Front, the Meitei rebels of Manipur, and the Tripuri rebels of Tripura were well entrenched in the CHT during the days of Pakistani supremacy. But during the ascendancy of the Awami League, the Indian government was assured that a friendly regime in Dhaka would not allow its territory to be used for insurgency purposes against India. With the fall of that regime and the appearance of a military regime in Dhaka, New Delhi reassessed its strategic needs and undertook a policy of active support for the CHT insurgents. The Indian external intelligence agency, RAW,

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established close relations with the PCJSS and for a decade armed, trained, and funded rebel activity in the CHT. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Bangladeshi military opened negotiations with the PCJSS in 1985. The process continued through the 1990s as civilian regimes took power in 1991 in Bangladesh. The election of the Awami League in 1996 changed the political and strategic climate for India, which pressed the PCJSS to come to a negotiated settlement and issued ultimatums to the refugees to return to the CHT. The opening of negotiations by the regimes in Bangladesh in the mid-1980s and the installation of civilian regimes by the 1990s were viewed by India as positive developments. The regimes in Bangladesh also committed themselves not to harbor any insurgents in the jungles of the CHT. By that time, the PCJSS was suffering war fatigue. In view of Indian pressures and the overtures of the Bangladeshi government, the PCJSS thought it only prudent to move toward an accord. The Hill people also, while generally appreciative of Indian assistance in the beginning, had by the 1990s come to accept the limits of external assistance and sought instead a cessation of armed hostilities. There was a deep realization that the issue required a political, not military, solution. The expatriate population of the Hill people also plays an important role by networking with international human rights and minority rights groups in various forums to raise international awareness. The revolution in information technology is also a considerable factor in raising international awareness, as information about human rights violations is available on websites maintained by the various indigenous groups. International human rights organizations have played a crucial role in pressuring national governments to move toward a political settlement of the conflict. From the 1990s onward, the conflict in the CHT became a source of embarrassment for the national government as it sought aid from donors. The CHT is conspicuous as a conflict area given the total absence of UN involvement in conflict resolution at every stage of the affair. A major factor perhaps is a mutual unwritten consensus between India and Bangladesh not to internationalize the issue. It was not a high-intensity conflict, but rather a low-intensity guerrilla war, with fighting flaring up from time to time over a period of two decades. India had its strategic and political interests to keep the movement within its control, in particular to bring pressure on the Bangladeshi government regarding the latter's policy on the insurgents of northeastern India. Despite repeated attempts by the Hill refugees, the Indian government did not allow the UNHCR to become involved in the refugee issue. UNICEF conducted some of its health and education projects through the ICDP during the insurgency period, but, as suggested in Chapter 4, these were not viewed favorably by the Hill people, since the ICDP was administered by the CHTDB, which was then headed

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by a military general. The CHTDB's programs also included Bengali settlers, so it was seen as favoring the Bengali cause. These actions thus cannot be seen as attempts at conflict management or conflict resolution. A crucial factor behind the lack of UN involvement is perhaps the configuration of forces at the international level. The UN in the 1970s and 1980s was preoccupied with the agendas of the two superpowers. It would not be wrong to say that the demise of the Cold War has brought the issues of minority rights and human security to the fore and that the UN is emerging as a truly global forum. Because of this, the UN can play a constructive role in the postaccord situation. By voicing the concerns of marginalized people and intervening creatively toward conflict prevention and conflict management, it can contribute to the cause of peace. While international pressure can bear positively on the resolution of such conflicts, it has a negative side as well. International aid, if not disbursed and utilized properly, can in fact help states strengthen their positions vis-à-vis indigenous groups. In the name of development in conflict areas, states have often undertaken development projects that led to the displacement and marginalization of indigenous people. The same may take place in postconflict scenarios. Any attempt at building a sustainable peace system in the CHT (or anywhere else) requires multilayered interventions and changes at the local, national, and international levels. The interventions must aim at effective participation and empowerment of the people and focus not only on what is politically feasible and realistic under the circumstances but, more importantly, on what is desirable in order to "transcend" the negative present and move toward the vision of a positive future. 1 The challenge is to bridge the gap between the feasible and the desirable. Suggestions for building a sustainable peace in the CHT follow. While these interventions and changes are multilayered and multidimensional, they are indeed interlinked and apply to all levels of involvement. 2

NATIONAL INTERVENTIONS Democratizing the Constitution The constitution of Bangladesh does not recognize the country's plurality of cultures and nationalities. Apart from the Bengalis, there are about fortyfive different communities in Bangladesh. To unite them under a single system of governance, it is imperative that the constitution give due recognition to their cultures and languages. This requires an amendment, which requires a two-thirds consensus of Parliament. The Bangladeshi constitution has already been amended thirteen times, and as a political document it

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must be allowed to continue to evolve. The political context of the new millennium is different from that of the 1970s. Kamal Hussein, the main architect of the 1972 constitution, stated that were he to write the constitution again, he would incorporate the minority question. 3 Because the CHT Peace Accord does not have any constitutional validity, its provisions cannot be taken as testimony of state recognition of the cultural and linguistic distinctiveness of the Hill people. Moreover, the accord is an agreement between the Hill people and the GOB alone and does not address the other nationalities of Bangladesh. It has created an imbalance not only between the Hill people and the other communities, but also between the Bengalis and the other communities. The major obstacle is the polarized nature of Bangladeshi politics, which makes a two-thirds parliamentary consensus on any vital issue extremely difficult. 4 Here the civil society and NGOs can play a major role in mobilizing social awareness about the importance of democratization; the community can then act as a pressure group on the political parties. Donors can also play an active role in democratization by funding NGOs, civil society groups, research organizations, and centers involved in the endeavors of democratization and democratic education. Political Representation Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy. The electoral system is based on the one-person, one-vote principle. The principle of majority rule makes it almost impossible for effective representation of indigenous groups in the political process. Until the April 2001 expiration of its reservation clause, Parliament was a 330-member body, with 300 representatives directly elected and thirty seats reserved for women, who were nominated by the elected representatives. Because the opposition party was boycotting Parliament when the clause came up for renewal, the provision lapsed and Parliament became a 300-member body. In the last Parliament (June 1996June 2001) there were only three elected representatives from the indigenous people. They belonged to the Awami League and were elected from the three constituencies of the CHT. A Rakhaine woman was nominated by the Awami League to fill one of the seats reserved for women. Lack of internal democracy within the political parties makes it almost impossible for the elected members of Parliament to voice their dissent on substantial issues without the threat of losing party support and, consequently, their parliamentary seats. Not surprisingly, the members from the CHT simply went along with the directives of the party during their term in power between June 1996 and June 2001. Once the Awami League was in power (June 1996-June 2001), and after the signing of the accord in

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December 1997, the three elected representatives, through their appointments to crucial positions in the CHT, were used by the regime to strengthen its hold in the CHT. Much of the discord in the CHT following the accord has occurred due to these appointments, because it has ensured centralization instead of decentralization. To ensure effective participation and representation of the indigenous communities, the election commission must make it mandatory that the political parties nominate a certain percentage of candidates from among the indigenous people. In this respect, the Bengali civil society can play a major role as a pressure group. The Hill people as well as the plains-living indigenous people (who prefer to be identified as Adivashis)—through organizations such as the Hill People's Council, the Hill Women's Federation, and the Adivashis Rights Council—can establish networks and alliances with Bengali civil society forums to urge a national demand for equality in political representation. An example of such cooperation is the case of Kalpana Chakma's abduction, in protest of which the Sammilita Nari Samaj (United Women's Front, a predominantly Bengali women's organization), the Hill Women's Federation, and the Adivashis united. Decentralizing the Government Political and economic autonomy has been the major demand of the Hill people. The district councils and the regional council, despite being local administrative bodies, cannot function effectively for two reasons: the government has failed to frame rules and devolve power to the bodies, and the MOCHTA works against the principle of decentralization. Though the minister is supposed to be a tribal person, the regime in power can appoint a person of its own choice and preference to the post, allowing the government to retain full control over the region. Establishment of the MOCHTA, although never a demand of the Hill people, has created resentment among the Adivashis, who believe that the Hill people have achieved a privileged position. To redress the situation, strong elected local government bodies with substantial legislative and financial powers in all divisions, representing the indigenous as well as the Bengali population, should be formed. 5 These divisional councils, with initial support from donors, could initiate activities to generate their own funds through income-generating activities for the local population. The services and expertise of the Grameen Bank, which carried out laudable work through its microcredit program, and national NGOs like the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee can be utilized to generate employment. Good governance has become a major

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agenda of donors, and because decentralization is a significant step toward this goal, donors should emphasize the allocation of substantial funds for strengthening local government bodies. Sensitizing the Media Many in the indigenous CHT communities believe that the mainstream media are not sensitive to their plight. They allege that violations of their human rights are not reported in the press unless a major protest is organized. 6 The Hill people also allege that the media, for their own commercial motives, often play a damaging role by unnecessarily sensationalizing news that can incite communal violence and hatred. A major factor behind the silence of the media on indigenous issues as well as on the CHT problem is their commercial interests. Since most media advertisements come from government sources, the media are reluctant to publish news that might be considered too sensitive or damaging to the government, lest they lose advertising revenue. Moreover, most journalists are Bengalis who are not sensitized to minority perspectives. In the age of information technology, information is power, and it is only ethical that the media play a positive role in confidence and trust building between communities by highlighting the plight of the indigenous people. Dissemination of such information will not only sensitize the Bengali civil society about the predicament of the indigenous people, but will also pressure the government to fulfill its constitutional and international obligations toward the indigenous people. The mass communication and journalism departments of Bangladesh's universities might organize sensitization programs for journalists that would include minority issues. National NGOs like the Society for Environment and Human Development (SEHD) have often organized workshops for journalists to sensitize them on environmental issues. National women's NGOs also organize workshops for journalists on gender sensitization. NGOs working on communications, like Mass Media Line, could organize workshops for journalists to sensitize them on minority issues. Countrywide lectures might be given by academicians and activists working for minority causes and also by the indigenous people. Seminars and discussions on conflict issues might also be organized to disseminate information and also sensitize the general population on minority issues. The state's constitutional obligations must be emphasized: Article 27 of the Bangladeshi constitution clearly stipulates the equality of all citizens in their entitlement to protection of law. Article 28(1) further guarantees that the state shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. The Hill people also believe that the electronic media's depictions of

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their cultures, values, and ethos are insensitive and often insulting, as media programs are typically organized to attract tourists and visitors to the CHT region. Televised performances of CHT bamboo dances are an apt example. The bamboo dance is performed as a death ritual when a pregnant woman dies. Although this is indeed a sad occasion, televised performers are seen performing the dance with smiling faces. Such insensitive programs can be easily avoided by including members from the indigenous community in the production process. Recently the government has begun issuing licenses for private television channels, a project in which the CHT might participate and gain a degree of media autonomy. A CHT television channel could be funded by a bilateral donor, or perhaps by UNESCO or UNICEF to undertake information and education development programs in the CHT. Academic Curriculum Much of the insensitivity and ignorance of the Bengali civil society toward the indigenous community can be attributed to what is being taught in the schools. At present, there is a national curriculum for government schools and colleges in which history and social studies texts document (and often glorify) only the Bengali people. At the university level, syllabi become more inclusive, but only to meet a narrow student mindset. Thus, national curricula at the formative levels must begin to speak of the different cultures, histories, and forms of knowledge throughout Bangladesh. Here a judicious balance should be maintained so that children grow up learning about and respecting each other's cultures. The languages of the indigenous communities might also be taught—a program that could be implemented by the education boards responsible for preparing curricula. Bengali civil society as well as indigenous people can campaign for ethnic sensitivity, and the media might arrange debates, discussions, and other forums where students and teachers could express their opinions. There are several NGOs, such as the Education Campaign, that already conduct mass literacy programs; their expertise and facilities could be utilized for conducting sensitivity campaigns as well. Changing Mindsets and Building Peace Constituencies A major stumbling block to peace in the CHT is the fixed attitude of the Hill people toward the Bengalis, and vice versa. These perceptions are based on experience as well as prejudice, and state institutions, academic curricula, and media all play a role in constructing such mindsets. Most Bengali people believe that Bangladesh is a homogeneous country and that the indigenous people are but a backward minority who need to be main-

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streamed and developed. The indigenous people, on the other hand, are extremely sensitive and protective of their values and traditions, since they perceive the state to be hostile and hegemonic. Peace constituencies need to be built within the two communities. Networks between CHT civil society organizations and Bengali NGOs already exist, involving especially CHT women's organizations and student forums active both before and after the accord. These networks can be utilized to initiate peace discussions and hold workshops, dialogues, and seminars, regionally as well as nationally. Dissemination of information through networking would be an important step toward changing the Hill and Bengali mindsets. Peace constituencies have been successfully established in the Philippines, and such results are just as possible in Bangladesh.

Transparency of the Military Following two successive military coups (1975 and 1981)—which killed two heads of state—and the failure of political institutions and processes to take a stable and democratic root in the country, the military has established itself as an important factor in Bangladeshi politics. The civilian regimes are acutely conscious of the power position of the military, though the chances of another military coup in Bangladesh are remote due to the politicized nature of Bangladeshi civil society. 7 The international scenario has also changed: good governance, human security, and human development have emerged at the top of donor agendas. More importantly, the military also does not see itself benefiting from political adventurism. Yet the civilian regimes do consider military support to be crucial and have consistently kept the military budget high. The military also enjoys benefits and privileges not granted to civilians. In the CHT, the military was given virtually free reign in the name of counterinsurgency. Human rights violations committed by the military in the region is a sore point for the Hill people, and the military's presence and continued role (though not officially acknowledged) in the district administration is a major impediment to building confidence and peace in the region. Not only should the temporary military camps be withdrawn from the region, as provided for in the accord, but also their activities and the accusations of human rights violations against them should be investigated. Left-leaning political parties and student forums of Bengali society have been particularly vocal in making this demand. Bengali women's organizations have also condemned the rapes committed in the CHT. Such networks can be strengthened along with the participation of organizations from the CHT. Given the sensitivity of the issue, it may not be possible to start the investigations immediately, but pressure should nevertheless continue to be exerted. Because the military has consistently denied the accu-

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sations of human rights violations brought against them by the Hill people, it is imperative not only for the sake of justice but also for the benefit and image of the military itself that investigations go forward and reparations be made to the victims. Since the onset of civilian rule in 1991, the Bengali intelligentsia and media in particular have questioned the justification of high budget allocations for the military instead of for human development, suggesting that human security issues are achieving greater prominence. International and regional research organizations can strengthen these voices by undertaking research projects that highlight the role of civil society, peacebuilding, human security, and the like, so that a culture of peace can be built through the dissemination of such knowledge. The Bangladeshi military has integrated peace studies, gender issues, and human security into its academic curriculum at the Military Staff College and the National Defence College, where mid- to senior-level military officers hear lectures by bureaucrats, constitutional experts, N G O activists, and university teachers. 8 A major factor behind this openness has been the consistent pressure exerted by civil society to sensitize the military to human development.

LOCAL INTERVENTIONS Democratization of Political Processes The C H T has witnessed more than two decades of violence in an insurgency fought against the total control of the state military. The exigencies of protracted guerrilla warfare demanded a strong central leadership, a role the PCJSS assumed on signing the peace accord. Having waged the insurgency against the Bangladeshi military, the PCJSS considers itself to be the sole voice of the Hill people. The antiaccord UPDF, which the PCJSS regards as a terrorist group, has c h a l l e n g e d this claim and r e f u s e d to acknowledge the PCJSS as a political party. The right to dissent is indeed a democratic right, and the PCJSS needs to acknowledge the existence of the UPDF. For the sake of healthy democracy in the region, the two parties must shun their a c r i m o n y and violent attitudes toward each other and accept their role as political rivals, not enemies. The national press and the civil society can play a positive role in this respect. At present, the print media are guilty of maintaining a double standard, constantly e s p o u s i n g the need f o r dialogue and a c c o m m o d a t i o n between the major political parties for the sake of democracy at the national level, but keeping silence on such needs in the CHT. The national press highlights only the differences between the PCJSS and the U P D F and the accusations they make against each another, increasing their mutual acri-

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mony. Sensitizing the media about this issue would be a step toward correcting this kind of reporting.

Land and Income-Generating Activities Land is the most critical issue for the Hill people. To resolve the question, the land commission formed by the accord should start its activities immediately and recognize that land ownership in the CHT is complicated. Many of the Hill people do not have ownership deeds, and some cannot even conceive of private property, since they have long considered land to be communal property. Among these communities, land is not considered an economic commodity but rather is imbued with cultural and religious significance. Therefore, a legal resolution to the issue appears unreasonable and unrealistic, as sociocultural factors must be contextualized. Complete dependence on land resources and agriculture will not resolve the economic problems of the Hill people; economic activities themselves must be diversified. The Hill people in fact have taken up various kinds of employment alongside agriculture. There is a growing middle class in the CHT who are increasingly taking blue-collar jobs. Some Hill women are employed in garment factories in the neighboring city of Chittagong. The Hill people also work as wage laborers, with some having taken up petty trading and business. Following the accord, many local NGOs have been established, which can be important sources of employment for local youth, provided the organizations receive financial support and are able to function properly. The Hill people have not only a rich traditional handloom industry—women used to weave clothes, bedsheets, and blankets for the household—but also a traditional, holistic, herbal medicine system. Both of these sectors can be revived and developed. There is no shortage of potential for creating new sources of income-generating activities, as even the consolidation and revival of traditional arts, crafts, and medicines would greatly increase the Hill people's self-reliance. There is a need to create markets and storage facilities for these products, which local NGOs should be encouraged to undertake and national NGOs should be encouraged to coordinate.9

Development The development process in the CHT must be sensitive to local heritages, cultures, and physical environments. Moreover, tradition must not be equated with stagnation or the freezing of cultures. The Hill people, in the name of tradition, cannot remain isolated from market forces. A judicious balance must be attained between the two, but the onus of attaining this balance lies with the Hill people. The development agencies—local, national, and inter-

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national—also need to be sensitive to gender issues. Women's roles and perspectives have not been addressed in the peace accord, and this gap must be bridged. The regional council is viewed by local NGOs and the Hill people in general as the most appropriate body for development endeavors in the region. They also want donors to disburse development funds through the council, primarily because they lack confidence in the Ministry of CHT Affairs. However, the regional council, in order to be an effective and credible body for development and other purposes, needs to democratize itself. Apart from representation from the PCJSS, it should also bring nonpolitical, eminent social workers, intellectuals, and professionals into its ranks. 10 There is also a need to take dissident voices into account. Development strategies for the CHT should be based on the principles of transparency and participation and on the needs of the different communities. Such needs assessments have been conducted by major national NGOs like the BRAC and by international organizations like the UNDP and the WFP. 11 The Hill people have reservations about the strategies adopted by the major national NGOs, however, given the organizations' inclusion of Bengali settlers within the development process and their insensitivity to local cultures. These organizations and agencies also have an urban bias and fail to target the most needy groups. Since there are a number of local NGOs in the CHT today, such a survey on needs assessment can be conducted internally, with assistance from national NGOs as required. Members of local NGOs are familiar with the local cultures, languages, and terrains and engender confidence among survey respondents, particularly given the long history of mistrust between Bengalis and the Hill people. Through the involvement of local agencies and organizations, indigenous knowledge can be incorporated into the development discourse. Bengali Settlers The issue of Bengali settlers is a major impediment to the peace process in the region. Bengalis were settled by the state as a counterinsurgency strategy with the avowed intention of changing the demography of the region and appropriating lands the Hill people considered communal property. Today, resolving the land question and formulating effective development strategies for the CHT are inextricably linked to the issue of settlers. Successive governments of Bangladesh as well as the PCJSS have viewed the issue purely from a political perspective. The human implications of the settlement program are not often discussed openly. The GOB has never categorically acknowledged that the issue is a source of tension, and the accord is conspicuously silent as well. For the sake of sustainable

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peace, the issue must be brought to the fore. The Hill people have demanded the gradual but complete withdrawal of settlers. Moreover, the parliament of the European Union has pledged to provide funds to the GOB for the resettlement and rehabilitation of the settlers elsewhere in Bangladesh. Dialogues between the major political parties and representatives of both the Hill people and the Bengalis should be undertaken through civil society initiatives to discuss avenues of resolution. To date no such dialogue or discussion has taken place. The settlers strongly feel that the government has not kept its promises, and many are prepared to leave the region should the government take the initiative to settle them elsewhere. However, the Bengalis consider the Hill people as hostile and reject their role in resolving the issue. 12 Similar feelings and perceptions persist among the Hill people toward the Bengalis. For the sake of sustainable peace, the issue must be addressed immediately from a humanitarian perspective.

Environment State-sponsored development strategies as well as jhum cultivation on fragile land have done much damage to the environment of the CHT. The Kaptai Dam and the state's forestry plantation programs are examples (see Chapters 3 and 4). The state, however, puts all the blame on jhum cultivation. This is a legacy of the colonial period, when the colonial power, in its drive to colonize the "natives," negated everything indigenous. The postcolonial state, it appears, has not only inherited the colonial institutions, but has also internalized the values and ethos of the colonial power. The Hill people consider themselves custodians of their environment. Agenda 21 adopted at the UN C o n f e r e n c e on E n v i r o n m e n t and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, recognizes that indigenous peoples have developed a holistic traditional scientific knowledge of their lands, natural resources, and environments over many generations. Bangladesh, a signatory to this convention, should propose development strategies that incorporate indigenous knowledge of managing the environment.

Empowerment of Women The question of empowering women needs to be addressed. Although women are increasingly taking to education, resulting in somewhat increased social and economic empowerment, the trend is confined to the urban-area communities of Chakma, Tanchangya, Marma, and Tripura. Moreover, socioeconomic empowerment does not necessarily translate into political empowerment. Women have been excluded from the peace

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process, and local leadership structures at the village level are restricted to men. Except for the Marma community, women in the CHT do not have rights to the immovable property of their parents unless a father or brother makes special arrangement for it.13 Hill people are generally aware of this discrimination and favor the granting of property rights to women, as suggested in Table 5.1. Local bodies and donors should encourage NGOs to undertake projects to build women's capacity in leadership and decisionmaking. Inheritance laws should be changed to make women equal partners. The regional political parties—the PCJSS and the UPDF—should bring the issue of women to the fore and include substantial numbers of women in their decisionmaking bodies. Local NGOs should target women from marginalized CHT communities and develop programs for their formal and informal education and training. Because empowerment of women cannot take place unless there is a change of attitude in the society at large, men as well must be educated in reassessing traditional roles. All interventions in the CHT, be they developmental, environmental, or academic, must be gender sensitive.

Education The peace accord provides for encouraging local communities to teach, at least at primary levels, in local languages—an important provisions that needs to be implemented. Because many of the Hill people's languages exist only in oral form, local authorities and academicians should undertake to give them written form. However, because the Hill people will have to enter the market economy, their skills in Bengali and English also need to be developed to enable them to compete. The state academic curriculum should emphasize local as well as national realities, and academic as well as vocational training projects need to be undertaken.

Table 5.1

Survey Question: "Should women be given property rights?" Yes

Hill people Men Women Bengalis

149 (77.2%) 96 (100%) 45 (78.9%)

No

40 (20.7%) 0 7 (12.3%)

Other 3

4(2.1%) 0 4 (7.0%)

Don't know

0 0 1 (1.8%)

Source: Author survey in Rangamati and Khagrachari, May 2001, conducted among 346 persons, of whom 289 were indigenous Hill people and 57 were Bengali settlers. Note: a. "Other" refers to responses that were either hesitant, undecided, or uncertain as to how property rights for women could be implemented.

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Information and Research Centers Lack of information is a major obstacle to policy formulation in the CHT. At present, there are three tribal institutes, one in each of the three district headquarters. Although these are government bodies, they might be converted into autonomous research and information centers staffed by local youth. As the forces of development increasingly pressure the Hill people to enter the market economy, their rich traditions of oral history, holistic medicine, and customary law must be recorded and preserved, lest the culture lose its heritage to globalization. Such information would be beneficial not only for academicians, but also for policy planners.

Local Newspapers The Hill people should undertake to publish their own newspapers. At present, the UPDF publishes occasional newspapers and leaflets. During the insurgency, the PCJSS published occasional news bulletins highlighting the human rights violations committed by security personnel. The present publications of the UPDF that highlight the violations committed by the military and the PCJSS are distributed among sympathizers and supporters of the party. The PCJSS also occasionally publishes news bulletins countering the allegations of the UPDF and accusing the government and the military of violations of the peace accord. Many people do not take these publications seriously, however. In the CHT, the district councils, the regional council, and civil society organizations all need to develop their own forums to disseminate information to their constituents, as well as to each other. These local newspapers might also network with national newspapers to expand their coverage. Editorials, interviews, and open letters from the community can act as a barometer of local perceptions for the government, donors, and policymakers.

Security Law and order has deteriorated sharply in the CHT in the postaccord period. The Hill people and their representatives blame the civil administration and military, while the government uses the situation as a pretext for the continued and empowered military presence in the CHT, the only region in Bangladesh where the military is involved in the daily maintenance of law and order despite the protests of the local population. While this was understandable during the insurgency period, now that a peace accord has been signed, the military should be reassigned to its regular duties. The Hill people themselves are capable of initiating local security management or neighborhood watch programs to maintain law and order.

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REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS Regional Interventions The smuggling of small arms and drugs into the CHT has caused a national as well as human security problem. Bangladesh alleges that northeastern India and Myanmar are the sources of this contraband. Myanmar denies the accusation, while India alleges that Bangladesh is the source of small arms entry into its own northeastern region. Given the insurgency prevalent in both India and Bangladesh, the matter should be taken seriously. For the sake of stability and peace in the insurgency-prone areas as well as congenial bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh, and Bangladesh and Myanmar, these issues should be resolved through negotiations. Bangladesh should either approach India directly or avail itself of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a regional forum. With Myanmar, Bangladesh can also either adopt the bilateral approach or make use of the Bangladesh India Myanmar Sri Lanka Thailand Economic Forum (BIMSTEC), of which both Bangladesh and Myanmar are members. There is further need for these developing states to address the issue globally through the UN. The arms production industry has its own dynamics and operates for profit at the expense of human security. The hazards posed by such arms need to be highlighted by the national powers at regional and international forums, and the international civil society should give the issue the same consideration it gives to such major threats as disease and hunger. The UN Conference on Small Arms held in New York in 2000 is a major step toward recognition of the problem. Donors Accord implementation. Donor countries can play a positive and influential role in the accord implementation process by putting pressure on the GOB, just as donor pressure was an important factor in motivating the state to seek a political solution to the CHT issue. Although international agencies and organizations have stopped development aid and activities in the CHT due to the deterioration of law and order, freezing all development activities in the CHT may harm the people more than the government. Along with freezing their activities in the CHT, donors should make their aid to the Bangladeshi government conditional on full implementation of the accord in the CHT. The donors should be wary of the government's appraisal of the situation, which holds that 98 percent of the accord has been implemented, and should form their own independent teams for evaluating the situation—teams that would include civil society members from both Bengali and Hill communities.

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Human rights. Donors have increasingly pressured the government to improve its human rights records. The pressure should continue, with special emphasis on minority rights. Amnesty International recently pointed out that the state has provided no compensation to the victims of the CHT insurgency. Such reports need to be highlighted and disseminated in wider forums. The donors should take note of the civil society initiatives on sensitizing and creating general awareness about the plights of minorities. The Dhaka-based Ain-o-Shalish Kendra (ASK), a legal aid body, publishes yearly reports on the human rights situation in Bangladesh with a separate section on ethnic and religious minorities. The Dhaka University-based Center for Alternatives (CA), a research organization in association with the International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES) in Colombo, along with other like-minded institutes in South Asia, conducts diagnostic studies on minority situations and publishes journals on minority issues. Such civil society initiatives should be encouraged, and such institutions should be accessed by the donors while preparing their funding policies. Income-generating activities. Unemployment is a major problem in the CHT. It is leading to social decay as young people take to gambling and drinking. They also become easy prey to terrorists and join these groups in search of power and money as a substitute for meaning in their lives. Development funds should focus on long-term income-generating activities and skills development like computer, language, and vocational training, instead of short-term programs like the road construction activities undertaken by DANIDA and the WFP. These ad hoc programs, while providing short-term relief, do not increase the skills and capacities of the local people. Long-term skills development programs undertaken by bilateral and multilateral donors would help the Hill people obtain employment. Democratization of political processes. The lack of democratic values, institutions, and practices has been identified as a major cause of the CHT conflict. The failure to ensure minority representation in the political process only exacerbates the situation. Organizations like the Unrepresented Nation and Peoples Organization (UNPO) can pressure the state as well as the UN to in turn pressure the national governments to ensure minority representation and protection. By emphasizing that the political parties include credible minority representation in their decisionmaking structures and also nominate an appropriate percentage of minorities as electoral candidates, participation of minorities in the democratic process can be initiated as a matter of policy. There is an urgent need to reorient politics from a game of numbers and power to a process of democracy.

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Peace education and dialogues. The CHT Peace Accord makes no attempt to achieve the psychological, social, and moral reconstruction of the Hill society. Donors can initiate this process by encouraging local NGOs and members of the civil society, such as academicians and political and social activists, to undertake peace dialogues within and between the Hill communities. Peace educators like Johan Galtung can also be commissioned to undertake peace education programs in the conflict and postconflict zones. The Commonwealth Secretariat undertook such a program, conducted by Galtung, in London on March 18-21, 2002. It was attended by activists from Sierra Leone, Fiji, India, Bangladesh, and other conflict-affected zones of the Commonwealth. The participants were united by the commonalities of problems and traumas their societies face and emphasized the need to achieve peace and transcend conflicts. Such education programs organized within the conflict zones of the CHT, with the participation of the affected people, could help to forge a culture of peace and to reconstruct lives and communities. Mothers' associations. In Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and Nagaland, mothers of missing soldiers and children have played a critical role in raising awareness for peace. 14 In the CHT, where a whole generation has grown up witnessing, participating in, and internalizing violence, no study has been made on how the conflict has impacted children. This is true for the Hill people as well as the Bengali settlers. Donors should encourage the formation of mothers' associations in which mothers from both communities can share their grief and develop strategies for reorienting their children and for achieving accommodation and reconciliation. In the postaccord CHT, women from both communities have expressed their concerns for their children and have been sympathetic toward each other. Many Hill women have said, "The Bengali mothers are also suffering like us because they are also unsettled and their children like ours do not have any future under such unstable conditions." Bengali women expressed similar feelings about the Hill children. 15 In Nagaland, mothers across the different communities have come together to declare a cease-fire for the sake of their children. Such forums can be replicated in the CHT to prevent intercommunity violence. A caveat, however, is whether the men will allow the women to undertake such an initiative, a gender issue that must also be addressed. Here the NGOs can play a critical role in raising awareness and mobilizing women for the cause of peace. Healing and reconciliation centers. Donors can encourage the establishment of centers for reconciliation dialogues and healing in the CHT. Such centers have been established in India, where victims from Kashmir, both

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Muslims and Pundits, meet to share their experiences and bring about reconciliation. By patiently and calmly listening, attendees examine and acknowledge their mistakes and misfortunes. In the CHT, such centers could be established at the intercommunity level, although the challenges to such an initiative are indeed immense given the animosity between the Hill people and the Bengalis, and the Hill people's resistance to initiatives by donors and NGOs involving the Bengali community. Still, local NGOs like Trinamul, which works with the Bengali community as well as the Hill people, may be able to succeed. Healing and reconciliation centers might also be initiated by involving civil society members and citizen groups from both communities. Since the women's organizations from both communities have networked at the national level, their resources and services might also be tapped. Children's centers. Women and children suffer the worst in conflict situations. During the insurgency period in the CHT, children grew up witnessing violence inflicted on their parents and families. Their fathers and elder brothers were tortured in front of them. Their sisters and mothers were driven into hiding and often were raped and tortured. These children have now grown up and are suffering enormous stress, guilt, and anger. Should the accord fail to achieve a lasting peace, it is these children who will likely provide the leadership for the next movement. Professionally staffed children's centers could provide counseling and healing, reopen communication, and reorient damaged minds toward productive activities. There children would be allowed to share their experiences of the horrors of war and create within themselves the vision of a better world. Donors as well might arrange regional workshops for affected children. This is a crucial step toward sustainable peace, since the future of the region will be shaped by the children of today. Multicultural centers. In the CHT tribal cultural, institutes have been established by the government. These rarely see any genuine participation from the people, as there is no cultural exchange between the Hill people and the Bengali community. Donors should encourage the establishment of cultural centers in the CHT (as well as in other parts of Bangladesh) that represent the country's ethnic diversity; this will not only help the Hill people and the Bengali community to understand each other, but also help create a culture of understanding and peace.

THE

UN

The UN was not involved in the conflict management or peacemaking process in the CHT. While the UN is not a supranational body and does

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not override the sovereignty of its member states, it is a global forum that can facilitate peace processes in conflict-torn regions through its various agencies. UN resolutions, by affirming the values of peace and respect for human rights, have contributed immensely to the cause of peace. UN interventions can create an environment conducive to peacemaking and can exert moral, political, and economic pressures on recalcitrant states. In the postaccord CHT, the UN can contribute to conflict prevention as well as conflict resolution. It can play a vital role in the reconstruction of lives. International Obligations Bangladesh is signatory to a number of international human rights instruments that recognize nondiscrimination as a cardinal principle. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities obliges states to encourage conditions for the promotion of communitarian identity. The International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, adopted in 1989, calls for the recognition of collective land rights, rights concerning natural resources, and rights regarding the r e m o v a l and r e l o c a t i o n of i n d i g e n o u s and tribal p e o p l e s . The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) categorically addresses the issue of racial and religious discrimination. The UN can exert pressure on its member states to honor their international treaty obligations. Rehabilitation Special consideration is required for the rehabilitation of refugees, displaced persons, and victims of rape. Households headed by women deserve special attention, a list of which has not yet been prepared for the CHT. Owing to their gender, women face special problems in the socioeconomic and cultural contexts of their societies. A BRAC study has shown that food insecurity in the CHT was most endemic in h o u s e h o l d s headed by women. 16 The availability of food, of course, is a factor that can be measured; other, less tangible, factors—like the absence of a sense of direction after long periods of suffering, the lack of training, and the inability to undertake income-generating activities—compound the insecurities of these households. The UN Volunteers (UNV) can play a positive role in this respect. Utilizing their experiences from working in Southeast Asia and Africa, they can network with national and local women's organizations to address technical and functional issues such as helping women in capacitybuilding and income-generating activities. The UNV should refrain from political involvement, however, and focus on local agencies.

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Education Curriculum development, language development, teacher training, and the establishment of media, research, and information centers all fall under the category of education. The Hill people must develop their human resources, and participation from the local population must be ensured. Organizations such as UNICEF and UNESCO can play a major role in this respect, and UN-sponsored workshops and training programs can be organized in the various localities of the CHT to ensure maximum participation at the community level. Environment and Health Environmental degradation has led to the loss of many of the Hill people's traditional support systems. Their indigenous knowledge of environment and health management should be incorporated into the mainstream policy mechanisms. 17 Taungya, a local NGO, is working to preserve the traditional medicines of the CHT. Such initiatives should be consolidated and funds provided for their further development. A survey undertaken by BRAC on health-related issues has shown that compared to the national average, the Hill people have little access to and make little use of safe water and sanitation and immunization practices. Lack of access to resources (i.e., physical distance) and poverty were identified as major factors for the present situation, with sociocultural inhibitions also contributing. 18 Raising awareness about these issues and taking preventive measures are effective ways of motivating people; the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNESCO can play important roles in this regard. The Hill people have been able to adapt to their environment, moving from one pattern of agriculture to another, such as swidden (slash-and-burn) to plough. Shortage of plains land and the state ban on swidden cultivation forced them to adopt new and innovative agricultural practices. The ghona farming system developed by the Marma of Rangamati district is one such innovation. A ghona is a natural occurance formed in the foothills, between spurs and ridges, where it fills with runoff water from the hilltops. The soil in the ghona is replenished every year by the accumulation of topsoil eroded from the hilltops, thus maintaining the ghona's fertility. 19 This is indeed a remarkable use of the environment by indigenous peoples. The UNDP, currently involved in projects on environment management in the CHT, should incorporate such traditional knowledge and innovations. Bringing Women into the Peacebuilding Process The UN Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security, passed on October 31, 2000, is a crucial step forward in peacemaking. It

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urges member states to ensure increased representation of women at all decisionmaking levels in national, regional, and international institutions for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. It also urges states to increase their financial contributions for gender-sensitive training efforts and to adopt gender perspectives while negotiating and implementing peace accords. Article 11 of the resolution is extremely significant because it emphasizes the responsibility of all states to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, including those relating to sexual violence against women and girls. 20 While full implementation of the resolution would indeed strengthen the process of peace and contribute to reconstructing a democratic, participatory, and just society, sustained pressure by the UN on its member states is required. It is therefore important to monitor the execution of such UN declarations by forming international commissions and monitoring teams. Encouraging Regional Organizations The UN Charter encourages the establishment of regional organizations among its members. Many of the insurgencies in South Asia have cross-border ramifications. Despite the existence of the SAARC, the region is marred by conflicts, with countries commonly supporting insurgents in neighboring countries. But the SAARC does provide a platform through which the regional states can move toward peace and stability in the region, with conventions aimed at preventing the smuggling of arms and drugs, terrorism, and trafficking in women and children. These are important steps toward building a peaceful community, provided the states abide by them. Significant, nonetheless, are identification and acknowledgment of the issues themselves. The UN can encourage its member states to strengthen the process of regionalism by honoring their obligations under various UN regional conventions. The General Assembly might undertake an agenda wherein the successes and failures of regional organizations can be evaluated and discussed. Such an agenda would create pressure for regional actors to honor their obligations and perhaps also move toward genuine regionalism, resolving many regionally dimensioned national problems in the process. Peace Education The UN's manual for peace education in conflict zones should be used as extensively as possible, even in cases like the CHT, which saw no UN involvement during any stage of the conflict or the peace process. Through its agencies such as UNICEF, UNESCO, and the UNDP, which are involved in developmental activities in the region, the UN can support

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peace education programs by organizing workshops, seminars, and dialogues. By including peacemakers, peace educators, victims, and perpetrators, these programs can foster the processes of healing and reconciliation and contribute toward the change of mindsets necessary for building sustainable peace constituencies.

Small Arms and Drug Trafficking The UN has been quite active on the issue of drug trafficking. By the 1990s, the issue of trafficking in illegal small arms also came to the fore of UN concerns. In 2001, the UN organized a conference on small arms in New York. Despite disagreements among its members, the UN declaration agreed in principle that the issue of trafficking in small arms is a problem. It has called for more transparency in the movement of legal arms. A major weakness of the UN declaration is that it lacks any punitive measures. Nonetheless, identifying and recognizing the problem at the global level is a positive step toward peace. In this context, the UN encourages a regional approach to the problem and, through regional forums, has sponsored conferences and workshops on the issue in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. South Asia is the only region where no such initiative has been undertaken by the UN. Differences among the regional countries, especially India and Pakistan, on the sources of such trafficking is the major obstacle. The UN can attempt to circumvent these obstacles through its mediators or by approaching the smaller countries of the region and sponsoring conferences for them. In the CHT, the smuggling of arms and drugs has increased instability in the region. Bangladesh should use the regional as well the UN forum to combat this menace. Any measure in this regard by the UN will have a positive impact on peace in the CHT.

UN Monitoring Body The UN should establish an independent international team to monitor the minority rights situation among its member states. At present, various international human rights organizations do this monitoring. Such a cell or body in the UN could help in conflict prevention by pressuring states to democratize themselves in the genuine sense. Such a monitoring body should also have the mandate to monitor postconflict situations and, in the case of peace accords, to monitor peace processes; it could also exert tremendous political and moral pressure on states that violate or fail to implement accords. In cases of extreme violations, economic sanctions could be imposed on the states concerned.

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CONCLUSION These recommendations are made with a view to attaining sustainable peace and may be regarded as conflict prevention mechanisms. I am acutely aware of the problematic nature of many of the suggested recommendations, particularly those relating to the democratization of political processes and institutions, which is not easy to achieve in the short term. But it is imperative that an initiative be made in these areas, which have been diagnosed as the major causes of conflict. Such democratization will provide the climate for tensions and conflicts to be resolved through dialogue. Conflict resolution, however, requires change at the societal and psychological levels, and therefore a massive overhauling of the academic curriculum and mass media is urgently needed. Channels of communication between and within the communities should remain open. Conflicts after all begin in the mind, and it is in the mind that constituencies of peace need to be built. Economic development can lay the basis for conflict prevention as well as conflict resolution, but sustenance of peace requires a culture of peace and democracy that can only be sustained through the participation of governmental, nongovernmental, and civil society sectors. Human problems need human solutions—reconciliation, the restoration of trust and confidence—especially when the fabric of the society has been torn by violence. Because economics is too narrow a field to provide this option, I have suggested a multisectoral and multidimensional approach to sustainable peace. I am also only too conscious of the limits of external assistance and interventions, as these might foster dependency instead of interdependency. I have therefore suggested the involvement and nurturance of the civil society by external actors at each level of intervention. Ultimately, however, peace will depend on the political will of national as well as local actors. There is no better guarantee of peace than a conscious people tutored in and imbued with the values of democracy and tolerance.

NOTES 1. The concept of transcendence has been borrowed from Johan Galtung's program of peace education. Details are available at www.transcend.org. 2. A conference held in Rangamati in December 1998 on conflict resolution in the CHT also suggested a multilayered intervention for the region (see Appendix 4). 3. Author interview with Kamal Hussein, May 19, 1993. 4. Bangladeshi politics is consistently marred by the polarization of the two major parties (the BNP and the Awami League). Since 1991, the major opposition party, whether the BNP or the Awami League, has regularly boycotted Parliament and made the streets the focal point of agitational politics. Further, the practice of

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hartal (total shutdown of all normal activities, like the closure of academic institutions, shops, private offices, banks, etc.) by the opposition party is a common political strategy. 5. Bangladesh is a unitary state that for administrative purposes is divided into eight divisions. For details on the idea of a divisional parliament, see Imtiaz Ahmed, "Electoral Process in Bangladesh: Rationales for Reforms," in Devendra R a j Panday, Anand Aditya, and Dev R a j Dahal, eds., Comparative Electoral Process in South Asia (Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Centre, 1999), pp. 28-29. 6. Bhorer Kagoj (Dhaka), January 16, 2000. 7. General H. M. Ershad usurped power in 1982. Until 1991, he ruled in the face of stiff opposition. The Bangladeshi civil society refused to accept him, and ultimately he resigned under pressure. Seeing the mood of the people, the military, his only bastion of support, also withdrew from him. 8. I am a regular lecturer at these institutes. Opinions are freely expressed, and heated debates on the CHT issue often take place. This free exchange of ideas and views is welcomed by the military and has helped it to change or modify its views on many issues. 9. For a detailed discussion of the diversifying patterns of the Hill people's e c o n o m i c activities, see R a j a D e v a s i s h Roy, " O c c u p a t i o n s and E c o n o m y in Transition: A Case Study of the Chittagong Hill Tracts," in International Labour Organization (ILO), Traditional Occupations of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: Emerging Trends (Geneva : ILO, 2000), pp. 73-122. 10. Author interview with eminent members of the Hill people's civil society in Khagrachari and Rangamati, May 2001. They resent the fact that the regional council is composed solely of government nominees and PCJSS members. 11. R e g a r d i n g the B R A C , see M o h a m m a d R a f i , A. M u s h t a q u e , and R. Chowdhury, eds., Counting the Hills: Assessing Development in Chittagong Hill Tracts (Dhaka: University Press, 2001). 12. Author interview with members of the Bengali settler communities in Paschim Shalbon, a Bengali cluster village in Khagrachari, May 2001. Women feel that they cannot raise their children properly in this hostile environment. 13. See Roy, "Occupations and Economy," p. 108. 14. See Manchanda, Women, War, and Peace in South Asia. 15. A u t h o r interview with Hill and Bengali w o m e n in Khagrachari and Rangamati, May 14-30, 2001. 16. Rafi, Mushtaque, and Chowdhury, Counting the Hills, p. 118. 17. See Mahfuzul Haque, "Indigenous Knowledge and Practices of the People of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh," in Niaz Ahmed Khan, ed., Of Popular Wisdom: Indigenous Knowledge and Practices in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Bangladesh Resource Centre for Indigenous Knowledge, 2000), pp. 129-134. 18. Rafi, Mushtaque, and Chowdhury, Counting the Hills, pp. 127-167. 19. Mossabber Ahmed Siddiqui, M. Millat-e-Mustafa, Niaz Ahmed, and Muhammad Manirul Islam, "A Probe into the Ghona Farming System of the Marma Tribe in Rangamati Hill District of Bangladesh," in Niaz Ahmed Khan, Of Popular Wisdom, pp. 97-102. Ghona is a local term for which there is no English equivalent. 20. Cited from "Conflict and Peacemaking in the Pacific: Social and Gender Perspectives," Development Bulletin (Australian National University) 53 (October 2000), pp. 94-95.

6 Lessons and Conclusions

The end of the Cold War has unleashed new forces in international politics. Nonstate actors have come to occupy an important place in the world arena. This is not to suggest, however, that the state has taken a back seat, but only to make the point that there is greater pressure on the state today to democratize itself. Intrastate ethnic and religious conflicts throughout the world have shown that the nation-state system can face very strong challenges from within the state itself. This suggests that there is something seriously flawed and lacking in the way we have conceptualized and operationalized the state system. Consequently, states have felt pressure from within and from outside to democratize themselves. Peacebuilding in conflict and postconflict situations has also emerged as an important mechanism of democratization and conflict resolution. While no two conflicts are the same, certain lessons and conclusions can be drawn from the CHT conflict that have relevance and may help in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding in other areas of the world, specifically in South Asia. • Democratization and accommodation. The CHT conflict has demonstrated the major role the state has played in creating a politicized ethnicity. The state institutions as well as policies in the pre- and postaccord periods have largely failed to accommodate the aspirations of the Hill people. Electoral politics is a major factor behind this. The political parties aspiring for power do not want to alienate the majority. Genuine democratic governance with explicit constitutional recognition for the minorities and their representation can allay this situation. All the major South Asian states, including Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and India, are today rife with communal and ethnic conflicts, a situation largely created by intractable state institutions and practices. Democratization and accommodation can indeed help in conflict prevention and resolution, and the UN can play an important role in 113

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this process by addressing the minority question. It can form an international committee to proactively rather than retroactively monitor the minority situation and urge its member states to respect their human rights commitments provided under the UN Charter. • Importance of political settlements. Since ethnic conflicts are essentially political in nature, so too their resolution ought to seek political paths. States often seek to use the military to overthrow armed insurgencies. But experience has shown that armed insurgencies that have popular support can only be contained, not defeated, by military means. The use of the military, if necessary at all, ought to be effected under civilian control and be accompanied by policies of reconciliation at the political level. In the context of the CHT, Bengali settlement was adopted as a counterinsurgency strategy. The CHTDB, the main development body of the CHT, was placed under the military. These moves had serious implications for the Hill people and only intensified the conflict. Another serious possibility is that militaries might develop their own stakes in conflicts. The CHT conflict provided the Bangladeshi military with substantial increases in weapons and personnel, which were considered essential for containing the insurgency. The military's influence in state politics also grew, as it became an important partner in policy issues regarding the CHT and was involved in peace negotiations. To date, the military has not been withdrawn and continues to play an important role in CHT affairs. As the CHT experience has shown, the conflict could only be resolved through political bargaining and negotiations; a political settlement ought to have been pursued right from the beginning. Northeastern India is another example where the state, despite using the military, ultimately had to seek political solutions and options. In Nagaland, cease-fires are sustaining the peace process, and both the Naga insurgents and the government of India are continuing their search for a political settlement. The Mizo Peace Accord of 1986 ended the insurgency in Mizoram in northeastern India, and in the Sri Lankan situation, the state as well as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) adopted a ceasefire agreement, on February 22, 2002, in order to seek a political settlement to the protracted conflict. • Importance of external actors. External actors can play an important role in conflict situations, both positively and negatively. In the case of the CHT, India's support of the PCJSS at the initial stages helped the latter to carry on and sustain the movement. This external support contributed to the intransigency of the insurgents' position. So, despite the ongoing peace negotiations, a peace accord could not be signed. The attitude of India changed during the regime of Sheikh Hasina, becoming favorable to the Bangladeshi government. India also asked the Chakma refugees to leave and curtailed their rations. The PCJSS was consequently put under tremen-

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dous pressure and had no other option but to sign the accord. Notwithstanding the ethics of India's position vis-à-vis the PCJSS during the initial and later stages, it is indeed true that India's involvement did play an important part in the signing of the peace accord. This suggests that third countries used as safe havens by insurgents can play an important role just by their action and nonaction, without getting formally involved as mediators in the negotiations. Since most of the countries of South Asia are aid dependent and the aid is often channeled by the state to fight the insurgents, it is important that donors monitor where their funds are going. In the case of the CHT and also Sri Lanka, international human rights organizations have played a positive role in this respect by sensitizing and informing the donor countries about human rights violations against minorities in the recipient countries. International pressure was an important factor in bringing the state to the negotiating table. The pressure put on the Bangladeshi government by international donor countries and international human rights agencies played a significant role in persuading it to seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict. However, the involvement of international agencies or third parties without any vested interest in the conflict perhaps could have extracted a fairer and more just accord for the Hill people, though indeed the inclusion and pressure of civil society are also important in this respect. In Sierra Leone, where the UN and other international actors were involved, the issues of human rights violations, special funds for war victims, and child combatants were addressed. Special attention was given to women victims, and the objective of the peace agreement was the moral, social, and physical reconstruction of Sierra Leone. 1 The cease-fire agreement in Sri Lanka is mediated by the Norwegian government. There, women's groups (e.g., Mothers and Daughters of Lanka) have petitioned for the inclusion of women's concerns in the peace process. Women's groups have urged that the peace negotiations include women in the formal peace process and address the special needs of women, especially single mothers and households headed by women, as well as the issue of child soldiers. The issues of reparations, compensation, child soldiers, and women have remained unaddressed in the CHT Peace Accord. Third-party mediations (especially by parties having no vested interests in the issue, unlike India) and involvement of international and human rights institutions with experience in peace negotiations and postconflict situations perhaps could have brought these issues into the CHT Peace Accord. The agreement signed between the JRWA and the GOB made no provisions for households headed by women, and although the JRWA repeatedly called for UNHCR involvement in the CHT's refugee issue, neither the government of India nor the government of Bangladesh allowed it.

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• Importance of sustained negotiations and communications. Negotiated settlements, as the CHT case has demonstrated, are normally the outcome of sustained efforts at maintaining communications and negotiations. Collapse of a negotiations effort must not be treated as a failure but rather a lesson to guide further strategies and avenues of accommodating each other's position and views. Cease-fires and general amnesties are also important, as they indicate the willingness of the parties concerned to come to a political settlement of the problem. Unilateral cease-fires by the insurgents and general amnesties by the government may therefore be regarded as significant modes of communication, even in the absence of formal dialogue. The Sri Lankan case demonstrates this, as a cease-fire has paved the way for a renewal of dialogue. In northeast India as well, sustained negotiations and cease-fires have kept the peace process going between the Nagas and the Indian government. The Mizo Peace Accord also is the outcome of a sustained peace process that began in 1975 and lasted until 1986, when the accord was signed. • Importance of an agreed framework. It is extremely important for the parties to the negotiations to have an agreed framework on which to negotiate. In the case of the CHT, there was complete agreement between the parties that the negotiations would be conducted within the framework of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state, but there were divergences on the nature and degree of autonomy sought by the Hill people. The issues of land and cultural recognition were also subjects of contention. However, these were sorted out through the various rounds of negotiations conducted by successive regimes. In the process, both sides had to make compromises, but an accord was finally signed, albeit deficient on various counts. The accord at least has provided a framework on which peace can be built and further changes can be made if agreed to by the parties. The absence of an agreed framework leaves parties with no room to maneuver and negotiate. Thus, the stalemate in Sri Lanka was largely a consequence of extremely divergent positions, with the LTTE demanding nothing less than an independent state and the Sri Lankan government refusing to negotiate on these terms. However, the LTTE has recently moved toward negotiating for a confederation, which has paved the way for a renewal of peace talks. In the case of Nagaland, the divergent positions by the parties have frustrated the reaching of a settlement. The insurgents are not ready to renounce their secessionist goal and accept a solution within the framework of the Indian constitution. At the same time, the government is unwilling to accept any discussion on independence for Nagaland or the "Greater Nagaland" demand. 2 • Importance of clear objectives. The provisions of the accord ought to be spelled out clearly and explicitly. Political exigencies and at times the euphoria surrounding an accord sometimes result in agreements that either leave contentious issues written in ambiguous terms or leave them out, sup-

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posedly with an unwritten understanding. Their implementation is left to the good faith of the parties concerned. But once the reality sets in, these issues become the sorest points and may turn out to be major obstacles to the peacebuilding process. The accord may also be jeopardized due to ambiguities and omissions, such as the issue of the electoral roll for the CHT and the Bengali settlers. The absence of clearly written provisions subjects the issues to various interpretations, which more often than not are bound to differ since it was the contentious nature of the issues that resulted in implicit rather than explicit provisions. • Importance of negotiations within parties and involvement of civil society. There ought to be negotiations within parties as well as between them. The Hill people, for instance, are not a monolithic group. The Bengalis are also divided along party lines. The PCP, the HWF, and the PGP had pursued a democratic movement on behalf of the PCJSS, and these organizations had to face many challenges since they were working openly. When the accord was being negotiated, however, the PCJSS never consulted these groups, even when compromises were being made on substantial issues. Likewise, the Awami League never acknowledged the contributions of the previous regimes in the peace process. Before the accord was signed, no discussion took place in Parliament; even the date and timing of the signing was kept secret. There was a need for negotiations and discussions among the major political parties on the accord provisions. Consequently, the major opposition parties rejected the accord. An important section of the PCP, the HWF, and the PGP also rejected it as a compromise accord. Later these three bodies floated a political party, the UPDF, which is currently challenging the PCJSS leadership in the CHT and is also alleged to be involved in activities disruptive to peace and stability. The rejection of the accord by the major opposition parties also hardened the position of the Awami League on contentious issues like the withdrawal of Bengali settlers and the military, since it did not want to antagonize the Bengali majority to appease the minority. These polarizations and divisions following the accord have slowed the pace and process of accord implementation and have created misgivings among the Hill people. Civil society involvement in the negotiations process perhaps could have addressed some of the important issues left out of the accord, like justice, reconciliation, and moral and social reconstruction. The accord emphasizes only physical reconstruction, whereas peacebuilding is a protracted process that involves reconciliation, healing, and forgiving predicated on acknowledgment of the violations committed. These issues are absent from the CHT Peace Accord. The current negotiations taking place in Sri Lanka, on the other hand, are marked by a keen awareness and involvement on the part of civil society members of the Tamil as well as the Sinhala community. The women's movement is taking a special interest in the nature of the peace being negotiated and has petitioned for the inclusion of

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women in the formal peace process and the inclusion of women's and children's concerns within the peace talks. Such involvement is important for the sake of a just peace and was again absent in the case of the CHT peace process. In Nagaland, the women's movement is playing a critical role in maintaining the cease-fires and thus the peace process itself. • Importance of accord implementation. The Hill people's lack of confidence in the system's ability to address their aspirations and needs, and their continued marginalization due to state policies, gave rise to the insurgency in the CHT. It is therefore important that confidence be established among the Hill people; full implementation of the accord would go a long way toward accomplishing this. The unnecessary delay in implementing the accord has made the Hill people suspicious about the intent and sincerity of the state. Such suspicions only strengthen the perceptions of deprivation and deepen the feelings of alienation—and augur ill for the CHT peace process. The provision of an independent monitoring team or fact-finding mission to report on accord implementation is needed to sustain peace. • Importance of sustained international pressure. International pressure can play a positive role in bringing about negotiated settlements of conflicts. This pressure ought to be sustained throughout the implementation of the accord as well. International human rights groups, through their own observation teams and networks of local human rights and civil society groups, can monitor the postaccord situation. The donors must also emphasize, through their effective participation in decisionmaking as well as implementation, that development aid be utilized for the reconstruction of lives and societies in the affected communities. States embroiled in conflict or postconflict reconstruction situations can draw important lessons from the CHT case. Despite the uniqueness of every situation, the relevance of one for the other cannot be overstated. Policy planners and civil society members can learn from each other's efforts, successes, and failures at peacebuilding, and such learning only broadens the chances of peace. The CHT conflict, like many conflicts throughout the world, only brings home the necessity of a just peace and the primacy of the political over the military for the survival of humanity.

NOTES

1. John L. Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, International Peace Academy (IPA) Occasional Paper Series (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), pp. 148-150. 2. See B. G. Verghese, India's Northeast Resurgent: Ethnicity, Insurgency, Governance, Development (New Delhi: Konark, 1996).

7 Postscript

General elections were held in Bangladesh on October 1, 2001, after the writing of these chapters. Although the PCJSS called for a boycott of the elections by the Hill people and had threatened a boycott unless the electoral rolls for the CHT were revised, it subsequently moderated its position. The PCJSS leadership claimed to have changed its position for two reasons: first, it realized that the government was determined to hold the elections at any cost and, second, that any resistance could lead to bloodshed. 1 Despite the initial call for a boycott, 52 percent of eligible voters cast ballots in the three districts of the CHT.2 International and national observers found the elections to be free and fair. The BNP candidates, Moni Swapan Dewan and Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, won in the Rangamati and Khagrachari districts respectively; Bir Bahadur, the Awami League candidate, won in the Banderban district. The election results are significant on two counts. First, the CHT had long been considered a stronghold of the Awami League, so its electoral defeat showed the erosion of the Hill people's confidence in the party. This is due mainly to the Awami League's slowness in implementing the accord. Second, it represents the first time that a Bengali person has been elected by a CHT constituency. This illustrates the changing dynamics of demography and power politics in the region. The BNP, despite its earlier strong antiaccord position, moderated its stand. The BNP election manifesto stated that if elected, the party would remove the inconsistencies in the accord rather than annul it. The manifesto, however, did not elaborate on what those inconsistencies were—and did not do so following the installation of the new government. The new regime has clearly failed to implement key aspects of the accord.

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POLITICAL ISSUES

The accord clearly stipulates that only a tribal person shall head the Ministry of CHT Affairs. However, the prime minister, Begum Khaleda Zia, was named as the minister, and Moni Swapan Dewan as the deputy minister for CHT affairs. This is in violation of the accord. These appointments are, nonetheless, consistent with the constitution, which grants the prime minister the power to allocate portfolios; the peace accord is not constitutionally guaranteed. This move increases the centralization of control over the CHT, in direct opposition to the demands of the Hill people. The deputy minister for CHT affairs, Moni Swapan Dewan, has not been given the authority to answer questions regarding the CHT in Parliament; for reasons that are unclear, this power has been granted to the shipping minister, M. K. Anwar. Dewan has requested that the prime minister correct the situation.3 In the meantime, the Hill people view this move with resentment and suspicion. There is a need at this juncture for the government to actively engage in confidence building with the Hill people, in particular to reassure them that their elected representative will have a voice in Parliament.

DEVELOPMENT

ISSUES

The PCJSS had earlier insisted on the linkage of development assistance to accord implementation. However, with the PCJSS losing much of its public support and the perceived need for urgent development activities increasing, this position seems to have been modified. Many donors are now seeking to restore assistance, in part because they believe that the restoration of aid would assist implementation. 4 In May 2002, the UNDP coordinated a CHT Government of Bangladesh-Donor Joint Risk Assessment Mission in an effort to reopen aid flows that had been suspended following the kidnapping of three foreign nationals in October 2001. The objective of the mission was to assess the risk factors for donors undertaking development activities in the region. The mission recommended the resumption of development work in the CHT as soon as possible, as this is seen to be a key precondition to restoring peace and stability. The UNDP has approved a new fund of U.S.$3.5 million for the area; this is in addition to on-going environmental protection projects worth U.S.$800,000. The mission emphasized the need for projects that promote poverty alleviation, agro-based economic development, small enterprises, social services, health and education, skills devel-

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opment, and improved rural infrastructure development. The mission also identified community participation in development projects as essential to the restoration of peace and normalcy in the region. 5

THE L A N D ISSUE A N D B E N G A L I

INFILTRATION

The accord calls for the creation of a land commission to consider the central dispute over land and government-backed Bengali settlements in the CHT. The commission has not been constituted, but negotiations are ongoing between the government and the PCJSS. According to Dewan, of the nineteen recommendations made by the PCJSS, eighteen points have been settled and talks are continuing on the remaining issue. This concerns land in sensitive areas and land acquired by the military. The issue in contention is whether a land commission will be able to make determinations in relation to such land.6 Dewan has confirmed that Bengali infiltration and settlement is continuing, especially in the Khagrachari district. He suggests, however, that they are the result of larger socioeconomic difficulties in the nation and that migration will be difficult to stem if these are not addressed.7

REFUGEES A N D INTERNALLY DISPLACED

PERSONS

The government is yet to establish a task force for the rehabilitation of refugees and IDPs, and, as a consequence, these matters remain unresolved. However, the issue of IDPs and refugees is inextricably linked to the question of land settlement and cannot be resolved in the absence of a functioning land commission.

LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE

BODIES

Local administrative power is to devolve to the Hill District Councils, but council elections have not been held. In the absence of such elections, members of the Regional Council claim that an administrative stalemate has been created, leaving the military as the most important player in the administration of the CHT.8 As a result, centralization remains a problem, and local autonomy has yet to be achieved. However, progress has been made on the issue of framing rules that will determine the relationship of the Regional Council with the local administrative bodies. These rules are still to be approved by the law ministry.

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MILITARY C A M P S

The accord provided for the closure of military camps, but this has yet to take place. Because the military is the primary administrative actor in the area, Dewan contends that its withdrawal depends on the capacity of local administrative bodies to administer the region effectively. He suggests that the capacity of these local bodies be strengthened immediately and that donors monitor and coordinate activities of the Regional Council and the Hill District Councils. 9

CONCLUSION

Regime change has resulted in some improvements in the CHT but much remains the same. The government has further strengthened its control over the administration of the CHT, in particular by appointing the prime minister as head of the Ministry for CHT Affairs. The administrative stalemate means that local control has yet to be instituted, and the military remains the key administrative actor in the CHT. On a positive note, development activities appear likely to resume and will hopefully promote peace and stability in the region. While the new land commission has not yet been constituted, some progress has been made on this front. However, the issues of refugees and IDPs remain unresolved, and new Bengali infiltration and settlements pose additional challenges. This study has suggested that the problems of the CHT cannot be resolved in isolation, and systematic changes ought to be effected at both the local and national levels. Donors have a key role to play in encouraging peace and development in the CHT, but only in the larger national political context. As Shantu Larma, chair of the Regional Council and leader of the PCJSS, observed, "Unless people can take control of their lives and have the freedom and capacity of taking decisions, there cannot be any sustainable peace or development; the latter indeed does not imply construction of roads and buildings." 10 It is toward this end that the local, national, and international communities must strive.

NOTES 1. Author interview with a member of the PCJSS leadership, on the condition of anonymity, Dhaka, July 24, 2002. 2. Daily Star (Dhaka), October 4, 2001. 3. Author interview with Moni Swapan Dewan, Dhaka, July 25, 2002. 4. Author interview with members of the PCJSS and the European Union, on the condition of anonymity, Dhaka, July 24-25, 2002. 5. The Independent (Dhaka), June 14, 2002.

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6. Author interview with Dewan. 7. Ibid. 8. Author interview with the Regional Council leadership, on condition of anonymity, Dhaka, July 24, 2002. 9. Author interview with Dewan. 10. Author interview with Shantu Larma, Dhaka, July 24, 2002.

Appendix 1 Survey Questionnaire, M a y 2001

Name: Age: Gender: Occupation: National Background: 1. Do you think the regional council has been able to work properly? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Other (d) Don't know 2. What is the postaccord situation like? (a) Better (b) Worse (c) As before (d) Other 3. Have the refugees been properly rehabilitated? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don't know 4. Should women be given property rights? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Other (d) Don't know 5. Is there any separate ministry for CHT affairs? (a) Yes (b) No (c) Don't know

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Appendix 2 Jana Samhati Samiti:The Chittagong Hill Tracts Guidelines

Ideology: Humanitarianism is the ideology of Jana Samhati Samiti. Principles: Nationalism, Democracy, Secularism are the main principles of Jana Samhati Samity. Aims and Objectives: For the achievement of the right of self-determination of the various small nationalities, such as the Chakma, Marma (Mogh), Tripura, Bom, Mrung, Pankho, Khumi, Chak, Kheyangang and Lusai, is the main aim and object of the party, that is: 1. In order to be free from Islamic fanaticism, expansionism, exploitation, oppression, deprivation and perpetual rule of Bangladesh and to safeguard the national entity and homeland for the various multilingual nationalities—(a) to ensure the separate entity status of CHT with a constitutional guarantee, (b) to establish regional autonomy with a legislative assembly; 2. CHT is the homeland of various multilingual small nationalities. Therefore—(a) to do away with difference, oppression, exploitation and deprivation among the various multilingual small nationalities; (b) to develop culture and language of the various small nationalities. Associate Organizations: The associate organizations of Jana Samhati Samiti are: (1) Shanti Bahini (peace army)—armed wing; (2) Militia (auxiliary force)—armed wing; (3) Gram Panchayet—village council; (4) Juba Samiti—youth forum; (5) Mahila Samiti—women's association. Strategy and Tactics on External Help: Jana Samhiti Samiti, irrespective of caste, creed and religion, would welcome and be ready to accept unconditionally every help extended from any nation, humanitarian society, UNO, humanitarian and political organizations which are sympathetic to

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our cause and believe that would accelerate the movement for the right of self-determination. Especially PCJSS expects help and cooperation from world humanitarian and democratic states in preserving the national entity and homeland of the Jumma people. It also expects every kind of help from the UNO along with other world humanitarian organizations, namely— Amnesty International, IFOR, Survival International and Anti-Slavery etc. Source: C H T C o n f e r e n c e , The Genocide Charge: Human Rights in the CHT of Bangladesh: Papers for the Conference on the CHT (Amsterdam: Research Institute of Oppressed Peoples, 1986), pp. 129-130.

Appendix 3 The Peace Accord of 1997

Agreement Between the National Committee on CHT Affairs Formed by the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti A: Under the framework of the constitution of Bangladesh and having fullest and firm confidence in the sovereignty and integrity of Bangladesh, the National Committee on CHT Affairs on behalf of the government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, and the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, on behalf of the inhabitants of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, with an objective to elevate political, social, cultural, educational and financial rights and to expedite socio-economic development process of all citizens in CHT, arrived on an agreement described in four parts below: 1. Both sides, considering CHT as Tribal Populated Region, recognized the necessity for protection of the character of this region and for overall development of it. 2. Both sides, in accordance with the decisions and responsibilities stated in these paragraphs under this agreement, determined to make, change, amend and add concerned rules and procedures as per laws/ rules. 3. With an aim to observe the implementation process of this agreement an Implementation Committee shall be formed with the persons stated below: (a) A member to be nominated by the Prime Minister—Convener (b) Chairman of the Task Force formed under this agreement— Member (c) President of the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti— Member 4. This agreement shall be in force from the date of signing the agree-

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ment. This agreement shall remain in force until both sides complete all steps and measures according to this agreement. B: Hill District Local Government Council/Hill District Councils Both sides agreed to change, amend, add and repeal the Hill District Local Government Council Acts, 1939 (Rangamati Hill District Local Government Council Act, 1989, Bandarban Hill District Local Government Council Act, 1989 and Khagrachari Hill District Local Government Council Act, 1989) and its various sections as described below: 1. The term "Upajati" shall be in force. 2. The name of the Hill District Local Government Council shall be Hill District Council. 3. Who is not a tribal and possesses land legally in the Hill District and generally lives at a certain address in the Hill District shall be meant "nontribal permanent resident." 4. (a) There shall be 3 (three) seats for women in every Hill District Council. There shall be one-third of the said seats for non-tribal women. (b) Sub-sections (1), (2), (3) and (4) of section 4 of the original rule shall exist. (c) The words "Deputy Commissioner" and "of the Deputy Commissioner" placed in the second line of sub-section (5) of section 4 shall be replaced with the words "Circle Chief' and "of the Circle Chief' respectively. (d) Following sub-section shall be added in section 4: Whether a person is a non-tribal shall be determined, along with the identity of non-tribal to which he belongs, by the concerned Circle Chief on the provision of submission of certificate from concerned Headman/Pourasabha chairman/Union Parishad chairman and no person can be a candidate for the office of the non-tribal member without a certificate from the concerned Circle Chief in this behalf. 5. It is narrated in section 7 that a person elected chairman and member shall make an oath or announce confirmation before the Divisional Commissioner of Chittagong. By amendment of it there shall be added the portion that the members shall make oath or announce confirmation before "Justice of High Court Division" in lieu of "Divisional Commissioner of Chittagong." In lieu of the words "Divisional Commissioner of Chittagong" shall be placed the words "as per election procedure" in the fourth line of section 8 . . . . 7. The words "three years" placed in the second line of section 10 shall be replaced with the words "five years." 8. There shall be a provision in section 14 that— If the office of the Chairman falls vacant and in absence of the

Chairman, a tribal member elected by other members of the Council shall preside and perform other responsibilities. 9. The existing section 17 shall be replaced with the sentences as mentioned below: A person shall, under the Act, be eligible to be enrolled in the electoral roll, if (a) He is a citizen of Bangladesh; (b) His age is not less than 18 years; (c) He is not declared mentally unsound by any competent court; (d) He is a permanent resident of Hill District. 10. The words "determination of electoral constituency" shall be added in the sub-section (2) of section 20. 11. There shall be a provision in sub-section (2) of section 25: The Chairman and in his absence a tribal member elected by other members shall preside over all the meetings of the Council. 12. As all the area of Khagrachari District is not included in the Mong Circle, so the words "Mong Circle Chief and Chakma Circle Chief' shall be placed in lieu of the words "Mong Chief of Khagrachari" in section 26 of the Khagrachari Hill District Council Act. Similarly facility of attending the meetings of the Rangamati Hill District Council by Bohmong Circle Chief also shall be maintained. In the same way, there shall be a provision of attending the meetings of the Bandarban Hill District Council by Bohmong Circle Chief. 13. There shall be a provision in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 31 that, There shall be a Chief Executive Officer as secretary in the Council. Tribal Officers shall be given priority in this post. 14. (a) There shall be a provision in sub-section (1) of section 32 that, For the proper conduct of its affairs the Council may, with the approval of the government, create posts of various categories of officers and employees. (b) Sub-section (2) of section 32 shall, by amendment, be made as follows: The Council may, in accordance with regulations, appoint, transfer, suspend, dismiss, remove class three and class four employees and inflict any other punishment on them. Provided that, priority to the tribals is maintained in the matter of the said appointment. (c) There shall be provision in the sub-section (3) of section 32 that— The government, in consultation with the Council may, as per regulation, appoint, transfer, suspend, dismiss, remove or inflict any other punishment on other officers of the Council.

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15. In sub-section (3) of section 33 shall be mentioned "as per regulation." 16. The words "or any other way determined by the government" placed in the third line of sub-section (1) of section 36 shall be omitted. 17. The original rule shall be in force in the fourth of sub-section (1) of section 37. 18. Sub-section (3) of section 38 shall be repealed and by amendment the sub-section (4) shall be framed as follows: At any time before the expiry of the financial year, if deemed necessary, budget may be framed and sanctioned. 19. In section 42 the following sub-section shall be added: The Council with the fund received from the government shall formulate, initiate and implement development projects on the subjects transferred and all the development works initiated at the national level shall be implemented by the concerned ministry/department through the Council. 20. The word "government" placed in the second line of sub-section (2) of section 45 shall be replaced with the word "Council." 21. By amendment of rules of sections 50, 51 and 52 the following section shall be made: "The government, if deemed necessary, may advice [j/c] or order the Council, in order to ensure conformity with the purpose of the Act. If the government is satisfied that anything done or intended to be done by the Council or on behalf of the council is not in conformity with law or contrary to public interest the government may seek information and clarification and give advice or instruction to the Council on concerned matters in writing." 22. The words "if the period of supersession is completed" shall be repealed and in lieu of them shall be added "within ninety days of supersession" before the words "this Act." 23. The words "of the government" in the third and fourth lines of section 61 shall be replaced with the words "of the ministry." 24. (a) By amendment of sub-section (1) of section 62—this section shall be made as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any Act for the time being in force, all members of the rank of Sub-Inspector and below of Hill District Police shall be appointed by the Council in manner laid down by regulations, and the Council may transfer and take disciplinary action against them as per procedure laid down by regulations: provided that in the manner of such appointment tribals shall be given priority." (b) By repealment of the words "on the provision of all other laws for the time being in force" placed in the second line of sub-section (3) of section 62 shall be placed the words "as per rule and regulation."

25. The words "giving assistance" placed in the third line of section 63 shall be in force. 26. By amendment of section 64 the following sub-sections shall be made: (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no land within the boundaries of Hill District shall be given in settlement, purchased, sold and transferred including giving lease without prior approval of the Council: provided that this provision shall not be applicable in case of areas within the reserved forests, Kaptai Hydroelectricity Project, Bethbunia Earth Satellite Station, State-owned industries and factories and lands recorded in the name of government. (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no lands, hills and forests within the boundaries of the Hill District shall be acquired and transferred by the government without consultation and consent of the Hill District Council. (c) The Council may supervise and control functions of Headman, Chairman, Amin, Surveyor, Kanugo and Assistant Commissioner (land). d) Fringe land in Kaptai Lake shall be given settlement on priority basis to original owners. 27. By amendment of section 65 this section shall be framed as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, responsibility of collecting land development tax shall be entrusted in the Council and the said tax collected in the District shall be credited to the Council Fund. 28. By amendment of section 67 it shall be made as follows: "If deemed necessary for coordination of activities between the Council and government authorities, government or the Council shall put proposal on certain matter(s)." 29. By amendment of sub-section (1) it shall be made as follows: "The government having discussion with the Council may, by notification in the official gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act and even after having rules made the Council shall have special right to file petition for reconsideration of the said rules." 30. (a) By omission of the words "with the prior approval of the government" placed in the first and second lines of sub-section (1) of section 69 and to add the following portion after the words "may"—"provided that if the government differs with any part of the regulation made by the Hill District Council then the government shall give advice or instruction for amendment of the said regulation." (b) The words mentioned in the (h) of sub-section (2) of section 69 "transfer of power of Chairman to any officer" shall be omitted.

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31. Section 70 shall be omitted. 32. Amendment of section 79 shall made as follows: If any law by the Jatiyo Sangsad or any other authority, applicable to Hill District, is found to be hurtful to the district or objectionable to the tribal people in the opinion of the Council, it may file a petition in writing to the government stating the reasons of its being hurtful or objectionable for the purpose of amending or relaxing its application and the government shall in the light of the petition, adopt necessary measures." 33. (a) The word "supervision" shall be added after the word "order" in the No. 1 of the function of the Council of the first schedule. (b) The following subjects shall be added in the No. 3 of the function of the Council: 1. Vocational training; 2. Primary education in mother tongue; 3. Secondary education. (c) The words "or protected" placed in sub-section 6 (b) of the function of the Council in the first schedule shall be omitted. 34. The following subjects shall be added in the functions and responsibilities of the Hill District Council: (a) Land and land management (b) Police (local) (c) Tribal law and social justice (d) Youth welfare (e) Environment preservation and development (f) Local tourism (g) Improvement trust and other local government organizations except Pourasabha and Union Councils (h) Licensing for local trade and business (i) Proper utilization of water resources of rivulets, canals, ponds except Kaptai Lake and irrigation (j) Preservation of death and birth and other statistics (k) Money lending and trade (1) Jhum cultivation. 35. The following sectors and sources shall be included in the taxes, rates, tolls and fees to be imposed by the Council as stated in the second schedule: (a) Registration fee from non-mechanical transports (b) Tax on sale and purchase of goods (c) Holding tax from land and buildings (d) Tax from sale of domestic animals (e) Fees from cases of social justice (f) Holding tax on government and non-government industries

(g) Part of royalty from forest resources (h) Supplementary tax from cinema, theatre and circus etc. (i) Part of royalty from license or lease for exploration and extraction of mineral resources given by the government (j) Tax from business (k) Tax from lottery (1) Tax from fishing. C. Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council 1. A Regional Council shall be formed in coordination with the 3 Hill District Local Government Councils provided that various sections of the Hill District Local Government Council Act, 1989 (Act No. 19, 20 and 21 of 1989) shall be amended with an aim to make the 3 Hill District Local Government Councils more powerful and effective. 2. Chairman of this Council shall be elected indirectly by the elected members of the Hill District Councils whose status shall be equivalent to a State Minister and he must be a Jumma. 3. The Council shall be formed with 22 (twenty-two) members including the Chairman. Two-thirds of the members shall be elected from among the tribals. The Council shall determine its procedure of functioning. Composition of the Council shall be as follows: Chairman 1 Members Tribal (men) 12 Members Tribal (women) 2 Members non-tribal (men) 6 Members non-tribal (women) 1 Among the tribal men members 5 persons shall be elected from among the Chakma tribe, 3 persons from the Marina tribe, 2 persons from the Tripura tribe, 1 person from the Mrung and Tanchongya tribes and 1 person from the Lusai, Bawm, Pankho, Khumi, Chak and Kheyang tribes. Among the non-tribal men members 2 persons shall be elected from each district. Among the tribal women members 1 woman shall be elected from the Chakma tribe and 1 woman from other tribes. 4. Three (3) seats shall be reserved for women in the Council. Onethird shall be non-tribals. 5. The members of the Council shall be elected indirectly by the elected members of the Hill District Councils. Chairman [s/c] of three Hill District Councils shall be an ex-officio member of the Council and they shall have voting rights. Eligibility and non-eligibility of the members of the Council shall be similar to that of the Hill District Council. 6. The term of the Council shall be five (5) years.

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7. There shall be a chief executive officer in the Council equivalent to a Joint Secretary and priority to a tribal candidate shall be given in appointment to this post. 8. (a) If the office of the Chairman of the Council falls vacant then the members of Hill District Councils shall elect a Chairman from among the tribal members for an interim period. (b) If any office of a member of the Council falls vacant for any reason then that shall be filled through by election. 9. (a) The Council shall supervise and coordinate the subjects vested under the Hill District Councils including coordination of all development activities conducted under the three Hill District Councils. Besides these, if there is found any lack of coordination and inconsistency among the Hill District Councils in discharging their responsibilities the decision of the Regional Council shall be taken as final. (b) The Council shall supervise and coordinate local councils including the municipalities. (c) Regional Council may coordinate and supervise in the matters of general administration, law and order and development of the three Hill Districts. (d) The Council may coordinate the activities of the NGOs along with conducting of management of calamities and relief works. (e) Tribal laws and social justice shall be under the control of the Council. (f) The Council may issue license for heavy industry. 10. The CHT Development Board shall discharge its responsibilities under general and overall supervision of the Council. In case of appointment of Chairman of the Development Board, competent tribal candidate shall be given priority. 11. If the Regional Council finds any rule of the 1900 CHT Regulations and other related laws, rules and ordinances contradictory to the 1989 Hill District Council Acts then the government shall remove that inconsistency by law according to recommendation of and in consultation with the Regional Council. 12. Until and unless Regional Council is constituted through direct and indirect election the government may, by constituting an interim Regional Council, entrust the responsibilities of the Council. 13. If the government makes any law on CHT it shall be in having discussion and in consultation with the Regional Council. If there arises the necessity to amend any such law or to make any new law, which may be harmful for development of the 3 Hill Districts or the welfare of the tribals, the Council may file a petition or put recommendation to the government. 14. The fund of the Council shall be created from the following sources:

(a) Fund received from the Hill District Councils' fund; (b) Money or profits from all properties vested in and managed by the Regional Council; (c) Grant and loan from the government or any other authority; (d) Grant from any institution or individual; (e) Profit accruing from investment by the Regional Council; (f) Any other money received by the Regional Council; (g) Money received from such sources of incomes as the government may direct to be placed at the disposal of the Regional Council. D. Rehabilitation, General Amnesty and Other Matters 1. An agreement has been signed between the government and the refugee leaders on March 9, 1997 with an aim to take back the tribal refugees from India's Tripura State based on the 20-Point Facilities Package. In accordance with the said agreement repatriation of the refugees started since March 28, 1997. This process shall continue and with this in view, the JSS shall provide all kinds of possible cooperation. The Task Force shall, after determination, rehabilitate the internal tribal evacuees of 3 districts. 2. After signing the agreement between the government and the JSS and implementation of it as well as after rehabilitation of the tribal refugees and internal tribal evacuees the government shall start survey of land in CHT as soon as possible and after proper inquires [sic], ownership of land shall be recorded and ensured. 3. The government shall ensure providing two acres of land to each landless family and the family who possesses less than 2 acres of land, provided lands was [sic] available in the local areas. If requisite lands are not available then grove land shall be provided. 4. A commission (land commission) headed by a retired justice shall be formed for settling land disputes. This commission, in addition to settling disputes of lands of the rehabilitated tribal refugees, shall have fullest power for cancellation of ownership of those lands and hills which have been so far illegally settled and occupied. No appeal can be made against the judgment of this commission and decision of this commission shall be final. This (arrangement) shall also be applicable in case of fringe land. 5. This commission shall be set up with the following members: (a) Retired justice; (b) Circle chief (concerned); (c) Chairman of the Regional Council/representative; (d) Divisional Commissioner/Additional Commissioner; (e) Hill District Council Chairman (concerned). 6. (a) The term of the commission shall be three years. But its term can be extended in consultation with the Regional Council.

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(b) Commission shall settle disputes according to the existing rules, customs and usages of Chittagong Hill Tracts. 7. The tribal refugees who received loans from the government but could not use them properly due to conflicting situation shall be exempted from the interests. 8. Allotment of lands for rubber plantation and other purposes: For all the non-tribals and non-locals who were given settlement of lands for rubber plantation and other purposes but had not implemented any projects within the past 10 years or had not utilized their lands properly, settlement of these lands shall be cancelled. 9. The government shall allot additional fund on priority basis, with an aim to implement more number of projects in CHT. New projects formulated with an aim of making necessary superstructures for development in the area shall be implemented on priority basis and the government shall provide fund [sic] for these purposes. The government shall, having consideration about the environment in the region, encourage developing tourism for tourists from the country and abroad. 10. Quota reservation and scholarships: Until development equals that of other regions of the country the government shall continue reservation of quota system in government services and educational institutions for the tribals. With an aim to this purpose, the government shall grant more scholarships for the tribal students in the educational institution. The government shall provide necessary scholarships for research works and higher education abroad. 11. The government and elected representatives shall make efforts to maintain separate cultures and traditions of the tribals. The government in order to develop the tribal cultural activities at the national level shall provide necessary patronization and assistance. 12. Jana Samhati Samiti shall submit to the government the lists of all its members including the armed ones and the arms and ammunition under its possession and control within 45 days of signing this agreement. 13. The government and the Jana Samhati Samiti jointly shall determine the date and place for depositing arms within the 45 days of signing this agreement. After determination of date and place for depositing arms by the members included in the list of the Jana Samhati Samiti the government shall ensure security for return of JSS members and their family members to normal life. 14. The government shall declare amnesty for the members who shall deposit their arms and ammunition on the scheduled date. The government shall withdraw the cases against whom cases have been lodged. 15. If anyone fails to deposit arms on the scheduled date the government shall take lawful measures against him. 16. After the return of all JSS members to normal life general amnesty

shall be given to them and the permanent residents who were involved in the activities of the JSS. (a) In order to provide rehabilitation to all returnee JSS members a lump sum of Taka 50,000 shall be given to each family. (b) All the JSS members including the armed ones against whom cases have been lodged, warrant of arrest and police circular for apprehension issued, and punishment inflicted in their absence, after surrendering of arms and return to normal life all the cases, warrants of arrest, police circulars and punishments against them shall be exempted as soon as possible. If JSS members are detained in the jails they also shall be released. (c) Similarly after surrendering of arms and return to normal life no cases can be lodged, warrant issued and punishment inflicted against anyone only for the reason that he was a JSS member. (d) All the members of JSS who took loans from various banks and organizations of the government but could not utilize them properly shall be exempted from those loans including the interests. (e) The JSS members who were posted in the services of the government or government institutions shall be reinstated in their own posts and services and the JSS members and their family members shall be given appointment in accordance with their competence. In this case, the rule of the government for relaxation of age shall be followed. (f) The JSS members shall be provided bank loans on easier terms and conditions to give assistance for cottage industry, horticulture etc., selfemployed activities. (g) The children of JSS members shall be provided educational facilities and their certificates received from foreign educational boards and institutions shall be taken as valid. 17. After signing the agreement between the government and the Jana Samhati Samiti and immediately after the return of the JSS members to normal life all the temporary camps of military, Ansar and Village Defense Party shall be taken back to permanent installations except the Border Security Force (BDR) and permanent cantonments (3) at the 3 District HQs. and Alikadam, Ruma and Dighinala) by phases and with this in view, time limit shall be determined. In case of deterioration of the law and order situation, natural calamity and such other works the army can be deployed under the civil administration like all other parts in the country as per necessary laws and rules. In this case, Regional Council may, according to necessity or time, request the proper authority for the purpose of getting assistance. 18. Permanent residents of CHT, on priority basis from the tribals, shall be appointed to all posts of officers and employees at all levels of government, semi-government, council offices and autonomous bodies in CHT.

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Provided that in case of non-availability of qualified candidates among the permanent residents of CHT for a particular post, appointment in that post may be made on deputation from the government for a term of a certain period. 19. A ministry on Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs shall be established by appointing a Minister from among the tribals. An Advisory Council shall be formed to assist this ministry with the persons stated below: (a) Minister on CHT Affairs; (b) Chairman/representative, Regional Council; (c) Chairman/representative, Rangamati Hill District Council; (d) Chairman/representative, Bandarban Hill District Council; (e) Chairman/representative, Khagrachari Hill District Council; (f) Member of Parliament, Rangamati; (g) Member of Parliament, Khagrachari; (h) Member of Parliament, Bandarban; (i) Chakma Raja; (j) Bohmong Raja; (k) Mong Raja; (1) Three members from non-tribal permanent residents of hilly areas nominated by the government from three Hill Districts. This Agreement is framed as above in Bengali language and is done and signed in Dhaka on the date of 02 December, 1997 as per 18 Agrahayan, 1404 Bengali year. On behalf of the inhabitants of Chittagong Hill Tracts SD/ (Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma) President Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti On behalf of the government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh SD/ (Abul Hasanat Abdullah) Convener National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh Affairs, Government of the People's Republic Bangladesh Source: Tebtebba Foundation, The Chittagong Hill Tracts: The Road to a Lasting Peace (Baguio City, Philippines: Tebtebba Foundation, 2000), pp. 15-29.

Appendix 4 The Rangamati Declaration

On December 18-19, 1998, more than a hundred participants and observers attended the Conference on Development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts held in Rangamati, one of three districts in the CHT. The participants included leaders and members of the Parbattya Chattagram Janashonghoti Samiti, Awami League, BNP, Communist Party of Bangladesh, Pahari Chatra Parishad, and Hill Women's Federation; headmen; chairpersons of union councils; and representatives of local nongovernment organizations, including women's rights activists and leaders of organizations of the Bawm, Mru, Tripura, Tanchangya, and ethnic Bengali peoples. The conference resulted in the Rangamati Declaration, a framework for development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

RANGAMATI, CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS, 19 DECEMBER 1998 Welcoming the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997 between the Government of Bangladesh and the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti and congratulating the parties to the accord, Concerned at the slow pace of implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord, Bearing in mind the Rio Conference on Environment and Development, Reiterating our support to the aims and objectives of Agenda 21, Recalling that the right to development is a basic human right, Recognizing that human rights, peace, sustainable development and the protection of the environment are interdependent and indivisible, Recognizing that the protection of land and resource rights is closely related to the achievement of sustainable development,

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Recognizing that the forest [s/c] of the Chittagong Hill Tracts are the natural habitats of humans as well as animals, plants and other life forms, Encouraged that rural communities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts have continued to play an important role in the development of the region without governmental and external assistance, We, the representatives of different peoples, communities and organizations meeting in Rangamati at the Conference on Development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts on 18 and 19 December, 1998, unanimously proclaim this declaration, to be called the Rangamati Declaration, and recommend that: The Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997 1. Measures be undertaken to achieve speedy implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997; Development Institutions, Policies and Processes 2. All development programmes for the Chittagong Hill Tracts be implemented in consultation with the future Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council; 3. The development budgets for the Chittagong Hill Tracts be formulated in consultation with the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council; 4. No development programme be undertaken in the region without assessing the likely cultural and environmental impacts in the region or if it is contrary to the provisions of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997; 5. No development programmes be undertaken in the region except on the basis of proposals by, or with the full, prior and informed consent of, the people of the area concerned; 6. All development programmes, projects and processes be transparent and open to public scrutiny; 7. A development trust be established and placed under the control of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council; 8. The agreed transfer of subjects to the Hill district councils be affected expeditiously; 9. The agreed transfer of authority to the Hill district councils on the subjects already transferred, and to be transferred, to these councils, be affected expeditiously; 10. The Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board Ordinance of 1976 be amended to make the structure and process of the Board more democratic and transparent and the Board directly responsible to the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council;

Land 11. No development projects related to land use on disputed lands be undertaken before the disputes are resolved by the future commission on land; 12. The land leases of those non-resident individuals and companies who have illegally left their lands unutilized be cancelled and vested in the concerned hill district council; Rehabilitation 13. Those of the returned international refugees who have not already been properly rehabilitated, and all the internally displaced indigenous people, be returned their lands and otherwise properly rehabilitated; Water Bodies, Their Natural Resources and Biodiversity 14. No water bodies, including the Karnaphuli reservoir (Kaptai Lake), be leased out or settled in the name of private individuals and companies without the prior consent of, and consultations with, the concerned Hill district council and the people of the area concerned; 15. In the event that any part of water bodies, including the Karnaphuli reservoir (Kaptai Lake), is leased out, priority be given to the permanent residents of the area concerned; 16. The water level of the Karnaphuli reservoir (Kaptai Lake) be regulated in consultation with the Rangamati Hill District Council for the interest of the "fringe-land" farmer. The periodical water level chart so agreed upon (the "rule curve") be followed and the concerned farmers be provided due information about it; 17. The control and management of all water bodies and their natural resources, including the Karnaphuli reservoir (Kaptai Lake) and its resources, be vested in the concerned Hill district council; 18. The introduction of non-local species of fish and other marine life that are harmful to the local environment or biodiversity be prevented; Forests, Forestry and Biodiversity 19. The Forest Act of 1927, in its application to the CHT, be amended in consultation with the regional and Hill councils, the circle chiefs and the headmen; 20. Logging in the natural forests and their conversion into agricultural lands or plantations be totally prohibited. Similarly, the killing of, and trading in endangered species of wildlife be totally prohibited;

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21. The inhabitants of the areas living in the reserved forests be allowed a just share of the income from the utilization of the resources of these forests; 22. The Hill district councils be involved in the management and administration of the reserved forests; 23. The local residents be involved in the protection and management of the government-owned forests and plantations; 24. The extraction, transit and export of the produce of privately owned forests and plantations outside of the reserved forests be excluded from the permit process; 25. The village forests ("service" or "mouza reserved" forests) situated outside the reserved forests be recorded as the common and collective property of the village community concerned; 26. No parts of the reserved forests be de-categorized as reserved forests without the consent of the regional council and the concerned Hill district council; 27. The gazetted notifications of the 1980s and 1990s concerning the creation of new reserved forests be revoked and other measures be undertaken in consultation with the Hill district councils to undertake community forestry and participatory forestry programmes; 28. The raising of industry-oriented plantations under the ownership and management of permanent residents of the region be assisted with softterm credit on a long-term basis and no lands be compulsorily acquired for the raising of industry-oriented plantations; 29. The introduction of species of non-local trees and plants that are harmful to the local environment and biodiversity be prevented; 30. The customary rights and privileges of indigenous peoples and their communities over lands and territories in the forest areas be recognized in accordance with the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations (Convention 107) of 1957 and the Convention on Biological Diversity; Horticulture 31. A horticulture development project in the manner of horticulture projects undertaken previously by the Bangladesh Agriculture Development Corporation (BADC) be started and the local farmers be provided with land grants, soft-term credit and technical and other assistance; Mineral Resources 32. Mining activities be carried out only in consultation with the concerned Hill district council and the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council

APPENDIX 4

145

and in such a manner that they are not harmful to the natural environment or otherwise detrimental to the physical and material well being of the residents of the areas concerned; 33. All CHT residents being adversely affected by mining activities be adequately compensated with land grants and monetary compensation and otherwise rehabilitated in the event that they have to be relocated; 34. The terms and conditions of the compensation agreements between the concerned mining company and the affected people be determined in consultation with the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council; 35. Priority be given to local residents in employing people in connection with the survey and extraction work of mining companies;

Environment 36. Logging, farming, tourism and other activities that are or are likely to be harmful to the environment be stopped and prohibited; 37. Urgent measures be undertaken in the Chittagong Hill Tracts to prevent deforestation and soil erosion in the lands and forests of the region; 38. Urgent measures be undertaken to protect the environment of the rivers, lakes, streams and other water bodies of the Chittagong Hill Tracts;

Human Development and Capacity Building 39. Special measures be undertaken for human development in the Chittagong Hill Tracts; 40. Special measures be undertaken to enhance the administrative and technical capacities of the local voluntary organizations (NGOs), traditional institutions, local government bodies and the regional and district councils;

Disabled People and Destitute Women 41. Priority be given for the education and employment of disabled people; 42. Special measures be undertaken for providing employment to and in rehabilitating destitute women;

Women 43. All forms of social, cultural, economic and political discrimination against women be prevented; 44. Inheritance laws discriminating against women be amended with the consent of the people/community concerned;

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45. Educational curriculums include subjects regarding the rights of women;

Health 46. Programmes for the control and eradication of malaria be reintroduced in the Chittagong Hill Tracts; 47. All hospitals and other medical centers in the Chittagong Hill Tracts be provided with the requisite personnel and equipment; 48. All medical practitioners who are permanent residents of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and are now serving outside the Chittagong Hill Tracts in government institutions be transferred to the Chittagong Hill Tracts; 49. Indigenous students who qualify for entry into the medical colleges in the general entrance examinations be not included within the "tribal" quota system; 50. Medical colleges be established in the Chittagong Hill Tracts with a quota for indigenous peoples and other permanent residents of the region; 51. At least one trained paramedic and at least one trained midwife be appointed in each mouza for the welfare of mothers and infant children; 52. Indigenous and other herbal medical systems be recognized;

Education 53. Primary education be imparted in the mother tongue of the indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts; 54. Teachers of primary schools be employed from among the local people who speak the same language as the majority of the students of the area on a priority basis by relaxing the necessary qualifications and prerequisites; 55. A Board of Secondary and Primary Education for the Chittagong Hill Tracts be established under the supervision of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council; 56. Free education be provided to all students up to class X; 57. Schools be established on a priority basis in areas inhabited by the more disadvantaged indigenous peoples; 58. Preference be given to the members of the more disadvantaged indigenous peoples in gaining admission into institutions of higher learning; 59. Adequate funds and other assistance be provided to non-formal schools run by village communities; 60. The chairperson of registered non-government colleges and registered non-government secondary schools be nominated by the regional and districts councils, respectively;

61. Women be appointed as teachers on a priority basis; 62. Colleges offering Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.) courses be established in the Chittagong Hill Tracts; 63. Honors and Master's courses be fully introduced in the Rangamati Government University College and university colleges be established in the district headquarters of Bandarban and Khagrachari; 64. The involvement of the military in connection with the admission of indigenous students through the reserved quota basis in the medical colleges, engineering colleges and the Agricultural University be stopped so that these institutions may carry out their admission procedures in an independent manner; 65. The existing quota of reserved seats for indigenous students in the institutions of higher education, including those for medicine, engineering and agriculture, be increased and a special quota of reserved seats be maintained for the ethnic Bengali permanent residents of the Chittagong Hill Tracts; 66. The residential hostels for indigenous students that were previously running in the district headquarters of the Chittagong Hill Tracts be revived and new hostels for indigenous men and women be established as required; 67. Training institutes for primary teachers (P.T.I.) be established in the district headquarters of Bardarban and Khagrachari; Culture and Languages 68. The educational curriculum in the Chittagong Hill Tracts includes courses on the languages and cultures of the indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts; 69. The languages of the indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts be included as a subject of study in the secondary schools of the region; 70. The existing inaccurate and disrespectful references to the languages and cultures of the indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the national education curriculums be corrected in consultation with the leaders and representatives of the peoples concerned; Data and Information 71. Necessary steps be taken so that the general public have free and easy access to relevant information about the programmes and activities of the government, semi-government institutions and non-governmental organizations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Similarly, measures be also undertaken to ensure that relevant information about the social, cultural, economic and environmental conditions of the less developed areas is

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available to the government, semi-government and non-governmental organizations and institutions operating in the Chittagong Hill Tracts; Sports 72. The administration and management of the district sports associations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts be handed over to the concerned Hill district councils; 73. A regional sports association be established to manage the district sports associations of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and placed under the control and supervision of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council; 74. All NGO activities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts be supervised and coordinated by the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council; 75. Credit programmes by the NGOs be conducted in the Chittagong Hill Tracts only in consultation with the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council; 76. NGOs operating in the Chittagong Hill Tracts be prohibited from charging interest and service charges in excess of the rates allowed by the laws applicable in the region; 77. No programmes of NGOs that are contrary to the culture and traditions of the peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts be allowed; 78. Local N G O s be given p r e f e r e n c e in the f o r m u l a t i o n and implementation of development programmes in the Chittagong Hill Tracts; 79. The NGOs operating in the Chittagong Hill Tracts give permanent residents of the Chittagong Hill Tracts preference in employment. Source: Tebtebba Foundation, The Chittagong Hill Tracts: The Road to a Lasting (Baguio City, Philippines: Tebtebba Foundation, 2000), pp. 73-82.

Peace

Acronyms

ADAB ADB ASK BDR BIMSTEC BNP BNPS BRAC CA CERD CHT CHTDB CIPD CISAC DANIDA DC DF DFID DOF DRR EC EFA EU FAC FSO GOB

Australian Development Assistance Bureau Asian Development Bank Ain-o-Shalish Kendra Bangladesh Rifles Bangladesh India Myanmar Sri Lanka Thailand Economic Forum Bangladesh Nationalist Party Bangladesh Nari Progoti Shangha (Bangladesh Women's Advancement Front) Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee Center for Alternatives Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Chittagong Hill Tracts Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board Center for Indigenous Peoples Development Center for International Security and Cooperation Danish International Development Association deputy commissioner district forest Department of International Development Department of Fisheries Directorate of Relief and Rehabilitation European Commission Expanded Food Assistance European Union Food Assistance Committee forest settlement officer Government of Bangladesh 149

150 HWF ICC ICDP ICES IDF IDP ILO IMDO IPA JRC JRWA LGED LTTE MOCHTA NGO PCJSS PCP PF PGP RAW RC RF SAARC SB SEHD SF SIDA UNDP UNESCO UNHCR UNICEF UNPO UNV UPDF USF WFP WHO

ACRONYMS

Hill Women's Federation International Criminal Court Integrated Community Development Program International Center for Ethnic Studies Integrated Development Fund internally displaced person International Labour Organization Indigenous Multiplex Development Organization International Peace Academy Jummaland Regional Council Jumma Refugees Welfare Association Local Government and Engineering Department Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Ministry of CHT Affairs nongovernmental organization Parbattya Chattagram Janashonghoti Samity (United People's Party of the CHT) Pahari Gono Parishad (Hill People's Council) protected forest Pahari Gono Parishad Research and Analysis Wing regional council reserve forest South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Shanti Bahini (Peace Force) Society for Environment and Human Development Social Forestry Program Swedish International Development Authority United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children's Fund Unrepresented Nation and Peoples Organization United Nations Volunteers United People's Democratic Front unclassed state forest World Food Programme World Health Organization

Bibliography

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Index

Adivashis Rights Council, 93 Agriculture, subsistence, 30. See also Cultivation Ain-o-shalish Kendra, 104 Al-Rabita, 63 Amnesty International, 14, 104, 128 Ansar, 48 Arakan Hill Tracts, 30 Asian Development Bank, 83-84 Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh, 79 Australian Development Assistance Bureau, 75 Autonomy: economic, 14, 22, 49, 50, 51-52, 74, 93; erosion of, 52; linguistic, 22; political, 14, 22, 41, 43, 45, 49, 50, 51-52, 60, 93; regional, 43, 45, 46 Awami League, 14, 36nlO, 41, 42, 46, 57n5, 64, 65, 76, 89, 90, 119; formation of, 35nl; independence and, 23; intolerance of opposition, 66; secular position of, 15 Bahadur, Bir, 76, 119 Banderban, 16, 28, 43, 76 Bangladesh: civilian regimes in, 14, 36nl0, 40, 52; constitution, 22; elections in, 119; European Union in, 82-83; independence, 19, 21, 22; international credibility of, 14; international pressures on, 40; Islamism in, 23, 24, 34, 36nlO, 63; liberation

movement in, 19, 21, 51n5; military regimes in, 52; parliamentary form of government in, 52; relations with India, 13-14, 51n5; relations with Myanmar, 30; secularism in, 23, 57n5; settlement in Chittagong Hill Tracts, 44; special affairs division in, 52; as unitary state, 23; weakness of democratic practice in, 55 Bangladesh India Myanmar Sri Lanka Thailand Economic Forum, 103 Bangladesh Nari Progoti Shangha, 76 Bangladesh Nationalist Party, 14, 20n2; pro-Islamic posture of, 15 Bangladesh Rifles, 44 Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, 76, 93, 99 Bangladesh Women's Advancement Front, 76 Bawm peoples, 16, 18tab, 30 Bengali Liberation Forces, 22 Bengalis: Adivashis, 30; civilian regimes in, 96; employment opportunities, 24; inclusion in displacement package, 73; land allocations to, 28, 41; land ownership documents of, 50; legislative seats for, 43; linguistic unity of, 23; nationalism and, 21; nongovernmental organizations and, 80; perception of postaccord situation, 70, l\tab; settlement in Chittagong Hill Tracts, 30, 31, 32,

155

156 37n36, 41, 48, 50, 51, 62, 71, 99-100,121 Bhuiyan, Abdul Wadud, 76, 119 Bom peoples, 127 British East India Company, 16 Burma. See Myanmar Center for Alternatives, 104 Center for Indigenous Peoples Development, 79 Chakma, Kalpana, 55, 93 Chakma, Priti Kumar, 56n2, 67 Chakma, Upendra Lai, 72, 85n8, 86 n29 Chakma peoples, 16, 17-18, 18tab, 30, 43, 53, 72, 127 Chak peoples, 16, 18 tab, 127 Chittagong Hill people: alienation from land of, 29-33; anti-Bengali sentiment among, 35; ceiling on land ownership for, 31; conservation of cultural traditions of, 32; criminalization of forest access and, 26, 27; deprived of land rights, 29; displacement of, 24, 26-27, 31-32, 35, 44—45; distinctiveness of, 35; expectations of accord, 41; handloom industry, 98; involvement in military movement, 33-35; lack of employment opportunities for, 24, 26; marginalization of, 26; military atrocities against, 38n40; pauperization of, 31-32; perception of postaccord situation, 70, l\tab; rape and torture of, 34, 54-55, 71; representation in peace accords, 39; skepticism of national NGOs, 77; traditional medicine of, 98, 108; violation of traditional rights of, 32-33 Chittagong Hill Tracts: alienation of, 21; autonomy for, 13, 40, 41; Bengali settlement in, 16, 30, 31, 32, 37n36, 41, 44, 48, 50, 51, 62, 71, 99-100, 121; Bengalization of, 33, 61-62, 63; cease-fire in, 40; colonialism and, 16, 17, 60, 61; common property in, 24, 25, 29; counterinsurgency in, 14; demands for demilitarization, 44, 48; displacement in, 24, 72-74; district councils in, 16, 60,

INDEX

69, 121; economic empowerment in, 74—85; electoral politics in, 66-67; ethnic groups in, 16; exploitation of natural resources in, 51; forced religious conversion in, 54; forests in, 25; governmentalization of administration of, 51-52, 63-66; hegemonic peace in, 52-54; Hill District Councils in, 46-47; historical background, 16-19; homelessness in, 24, 32; identity formation in, 21-35; international donor agencies and, 80-81; Jumma identity in, 21; lack of employment opportunities, 68, 77; lack of identification with Bengalis, 22; land in, 29-33, 41; languages in, 18tab; logging in, 28, 37n22; marginalization of, 19, 21; massacres in, 34, 54; militarization of, 54-55, 122; mosques/madrasahs in, 63; natural resources in, 16; nongovernmental organizations in, 76-80; peace without justice in, 54—55; polarization in, 69-70; postaccord, 59-85; postaccord administration in, 60; postaccord political empowerment in, 60-67; postaccord security situation, 67-74; regional councils in, 47, 50, 60, 61, 62, 66, 121; religions in, 18tab; removal of land ownership from, 29; representation in regional councils, 53; restriction of migration into, 31; right of free movement in, 32; self-determination and, 40; state control of economic issues in, 49; subnationalist movement in, 33-35; technical assistance to, 24; as "tribal" area, 53; withdrawal of military from, 4 8 ^ 9 , 69 Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board, 39, 75-76, 90, 91; Integrated Community Development Program in, 81 CHT Commission (Denmark), 14 CHT Manual, 17, 22, 27, 29, 30, 32, 40, 64 CHT Regulation district, 61 Civil society: initiatives on sensitizing awareness of minority plights, 104; involvement in peace accords,

INDEX

117-118; lack of input into accord, 15; mobilization of social awareness by, 92; nongovernmental organizations and, 77 Committee for the Protection of Forest and Land Rights, 83 Commonwealth Acts (1860), 16-17 Commonwealth Secretariat, 105 Communist Party of Bangladesh, 141 Confidence building, 15 Conflict: agreed framework in resolution, 116; ethnic, 114; external actors in solutions to, 114-115; political, 114; prevention, 113; resolution, 13, 113; sustained negotiations in resolving, 116 Corruption, 65, 79 Cultivation: jhum, 25, 29, 30, 50, 100; plough, 29, 30; slash-and-burn, 25 Cultural: distinctiveness, 35; mores, 25, 26; plurality, 91; sensitivity, 15; tradition, 32 Dabeenama, 52 Danish International Development Association, 84-85, 104 Democracy: in constitution, 22; emphasis on by donors, 14; importance of, 92; parliamentary, 92; political empowerment and, 64 Denmark, 14, 84, 104; aid to Bangladesh, 14 Development: assistance, 120-121; Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board and, 75-76; economic, 15, 24-33, 39; infrastructural, 74, 80; international agencies, 74, 75; international notions of, 75; national NGOs in, 76-78; political, 21-24; politically motivated, 74; state-sponsored, 74, 100; strategies, 99 Dewan, Moni Swapan, 66, 119, 120 Dighinala Residential Model School, 73 Donors, international, 80-81; accord implementation and, 103; Asian Development Bank, 83-84; cessation of aid, 74; children's centers and, 106; Danish International Development Association, 84-85; democratization of political process

157 and, 104; emphasis on democratization, 14; European Union, 82-83; Expanded Food Assistance, 81-82; healing/reconciliation centers and, 105-106; human rights and, 104; importance of funding nongovernmental organizations, 92; incomegenerating activities and, 104; interest in law and order, 74, 84; intervention sectors for, 81; monitoring use of funds, 115; mothers associations and, 105; multicultural centers and, 106; peace education and, 105; pressure for settlement by, 14, 39; restoration of aid by, 120-121; World Food Programme, 81-82 Drugs, 67-69; ignored by military, 68; intrusion of, 103; rise in use of, 68; trafficking in, 68,110 Economic: autonomy, 14, 22, 49, 50, 51-52, 74, 93; development, 15, 24-33, 39; empowerment, 74-85; marginalization, 19; mores, 25; policy, 21, 24; rights, 60 Education: academic curriculum, 95; peace, 105, 109-110; in peace accord, 146-147; policy recommendations, 101; preschool, 81 Education Campaign, 95 Ershad, H. M„ 20n2, 35, 39, 40, 45, 52, 51n5, 112n7 Ethnocide, 43 European Union, 82-83, 100; aid to Bangladesh, 14 Expanded Food Assistance, 81-82; allocation of resources, 82fig; objectives of, 82 Farakka Water Agreement, 42 Forest Act (1927), 26, 143 Forest Amendment Act (2000), 83 Forests: Chittagong Hill people's customary rights over, 25; commercial forestry in, 28; as common property, 25, 26, 83; displacement of populations and, 26-27; district, 25; environmental degradation and, 28-29; exclusion of local populations from, 26; granted to plantations, 25-26,

158

INDEX

28, 100; imperial railway companies and, 25; in peace accord, 143-144; protected, 26; reserve, 25; settlement officers and, 26, 83; unclassed state, 26 France: aid to Bangladesh, 14

International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 104 International Criminal Court, 55 International Labour Organization, 107, 144 . Islamism, 23, 24, 34, 36n70, 63, 127

Galtung, Johan, 105, l l l « i Germany: aid to Bangladesh, 14 Grameen Bank, 93 Gram Panchayet, 127 Green Hill, 84

Jabarang, 79 Jamaat-i-Islam, 63 Jana Samhati Samiti, 127-128 Japan: aid to Bangladesh, 14 Jogigofa Union, 16 Juba Samiti, 127 Jummaland, 45; Regional Council, 43 Jumma Refugees Welfare Association, 49, 85«