The China Problem in Postwar Japan: Japanese National Identity and Sino-Japanese Relations 9781472575463, 9781474219853, 9781472575487

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The China Problem in Postwar Japan

SOAS Studies in Modern and Contemporary Japan Series Editor: Christopher Gerteis, SOAS, University of London (UK) Series Editorial Board: Steve Dodd, SOAS, University of London (UK) Andrew Gerstle, SOAS, University of London (UK) Janet Hunter, London School of Economics and Political Science (UK) Helen Macnaughtan, SOAS, University of London (UK) Timon Screech, SOAS, University of London (UK) Naoko Shimazu, Birkbeck, University of London (UK) Published in association with the Japan Research Centre at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK. SOAS Studies in Modern and Contemporary Japan features scholarly books on modern and contemporary Japan, showcasing new research monographs as well as translations of scholarship not previously available in English. Its goal is to ensure that current, high quality research on Japan, its history, politics and culture, is made available to an English speaking audience. The series is made possible in part by generous grants from the Nippon Foundation and the Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation. Published: Women and Democracy in Cold War Japan, Jan Bardsley Christianity and Imperialism in Modern Japan, Emily Anderson Forthcoming: The Self-Defense Forces and Civil Society in Postwar Japan, Tomoyuki Sasaki (2015) Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations on Screen, Griseldis Kirsch (2015) Media, Propaganda and Politics in 20th Century Japan, The Asahi Shimbun Company (translated by Barak Kushner) (2015) Japanese Taiwan, Andrew Morris (2015) Politics and Power in 20th Century Japan, Mikuriya Takashi and Nakamura Takafusa (translated by Timothy S. George) (2015) Japan as a Maritime Power, Masataka Kousaka (translated by Paul Midford) (2015)

The China Problem in Postwar Japan Japanese National Identity and Sino-Japanese Relations Robert Hoppens

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

LON DON • OX F O R D • N E W YO R K • N E W D E L H I • SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2015 Paperback edition first published 2016 © Robert Hoppens, 2015 Robert Hoppens has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 978-1-4725-7546-3 PB: 978-1-4742-9864-3 ePDF: 978-1-4725-7548-7 ePub: 978-1-4725-7547-0 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hoppens, Robert James. The China problem in postwar Japan : Japanese national identity and Sino-Japanese relations / Robert Hoppens. pages cm. – (SOAS studies in modern and contemporary Japan) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Japan–Foreign relations–China. 2. China–Foreign relations–Japan. 3. Japan–Foreign relations–1945–1989. 4. Nationalism–Japan–History–20th century. 5. Japan–Politics and government–1945–1989. I. Title. DS849.C6H556 2015 327.5205109’045–dc23 2014029203 Series: SOAS Studies in Modern and Contemporary Japan Typeset by RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk Printed and bound in Great Britain

For Li Ailing

Contents Acknowledgements Note on Convention Introduction

ix xi 1

Part I  The China Problem in Postwar Japan, 1945–70

1 2

The China Problem in Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy The China Problem in the Japanese Discourse on National Identity

19 39

Part II  The Nixon Shock and the Normalization of Relations, 1971–72

3 4

Diplomacy from the Nixon Shock through the Normalization of Relations The China Problem in a New Era

73 99

Part III  Anti-­hegemony, 1973–76

5 6

Anti-­hegemony: Japan and the Sino-Soviet Cold War Japan’s China Problem in a Time of Crisis

129 147

Part IV  Peace and Cooperation, 1977–79

7 8

From the Peace Treaty to Economic Cooperation Triumphalism and Alienation: The China Problem Transformed

Epilogue and Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index

171 199 229 239 267 289

Acknowledgements This book would never have been possible without the aid and support of a great many people and organizations in the United States, Japan, and China. My greatest debt is to Professor Kenneth B. Pyle, without whose enthusiasm, patient advice, and generous encouragement this project would never have come to fruition. Professors Marie Anchordoguy and Donald Hellmann offered stimulating feedback and advice. In Japan, Professor Tanaka Akihiko’s support and guidance opened numerous doors and research paths. Professor Okabe Tatsumi and the late Professor Etō Shinkichi were kind enough to make the time to share their valuable insight on the history of Sino-Japanese relations as well as the history of the China studies profession in Japan. Professor Amako Satoshi allowed me to participate in his graduate seminar and offered important advice. Konrad Mitchell Lawson, Etō Naoko, Lim Jaehwan, and Xu Xianfen of the IIDS were important sources of challenging questions, feedback, and recommendations for sources. Professor Okuma Hiroshi of Seijō University and his family have long shared with me their hospitality and provided aid in case of minor emergencies. Professor Jin Xide aided me at crucial junctures in both Tokyo and Beijing. He was kind enough to introduce me to Professor Wang Xinsheng at Beijing University, who generously allowed me to participate in his study group on Sino-Japanese relations, an opportunity for stimulating discussion, helpful contacts, and advice. In Beijing I also benefitted from the insight and companionship of colleagues too numerous to list here, including Brian James DeMare, Matthew David Johnson, Bradley Jensen Murg, and Matt Ferchen, among many others. I never could have realized these intellectual opportunities without generous financial support. The Japan Foundation and the Blakemore Foundation provided financial support for Japanese and Chinese language study at the InterUniversity Center for Japanese Language Studies and the Inter-University Program for Chinese Language Studies. The Fulbright Foundation supported research in Tokyo and Beijing. My research in Beijing was also supported by a China studies grant from the University of Hawaii, Harvard University and Beijing University, and by a David L. Boren Fellowship.

x

Acknowledgements

SOAS Studies in Modern and Contemporary Japan series editor Professor Christopher Gerteis provided helpful feedback on the manuscript as well as patience and encouragement that made this a much more readable book. I also thank several anonymous reviewers for their suggestions and advice. At Bloomsbury, Claire Lipscomb and Emma Goode displayed admirable patience in helping guide me through the publication process. There are many others not included here who have helped and supported me throughout this project and to whom I owe my thanks. Any mistakes that remain despite the efforts of all these people are mine alone. Finally, I never could have completed the project without the love and support of Li Ailing, my parents, friends, and family.

Note on Convention All Chinese and Japanese names are presented with family name first, except for those authors publishing in English. Macrons indicating long vowels are included for all Japanese names and terms except for those authors publishing in English and those terms more familiar without macrons, such as Tokyo and Kyoto. Chinese names and terms are transliterated using the Pinyin system, except for those names and places more familiar in other spellings, such as Chiang Kai-­shek and Taipei.

Introduction This book is a history of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s, a pivotal decade during which the two nations overcame Cold War estrangement to establish a relationship characterized by friendship and cooperation. It is partly a diplomatic history analyzing changing Japanese policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the context of the evolving Cold War in East Asia. The Japanese relationship with China was about more than just the formulation of effective policy, however. The state of relations with China was widely considered to be revealing of important aspects of Japanese national identity or national character. As a result, the ways in which Japanese perceived and reacted to the changing diplomatic relationship were inseparable from Japanese discourse on national identity. This study, therefore, is also a history of what I will call a larger “China problem”—the problem of how China policy debate was shaped by an ongoing struggle to define the Japanese nation and its role in international society, a struggle in which relations with China were interpreted and appropriated in support of contending narratives of national identity. From this point of view, the China problem in postwar Japan was as much a nationalist discourse as it was a foreign policy discourse. What was perceived to be at stake in relations with China was not only the material interests of the Japanese state but also, and perhaps more importantly, the nature and health of Japanese national identity. Japanese from across the political spectrum were drawn to the China problem discourse by the opportunity to use the changing relationship with China to support their definitions of national identity and, in so doing, they developed narratives of Japan-China relations and championed policies toward China that gratified their own conceptions of national identity.

2

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

The problem of nationalism and national identity in postwar Japan One major impediment to this approach to the China problem is the problematic nature of the very concepts of nationalism and national identity in postwar Japan. I will examine this issue in more detail in Chapter 2 but, briefly, it is often assumed that postwar Japan, as a result of defeat and occupation, was a society peculiarly bereft of national identity or national consciousness, that nationalism in Japan “was vaporized by the nuclear blasts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”1 In fact, this very assumption—that Japanese lack or have lost a normal or healthy national identity—itself forms the foundation of postwar Japanese nationalist discourse. Across the political spectrum in postwar Japan, it was assumed that Japanese lacked a normal, healthy, or truly independent national identity and postwar Japanese nationalist discourse has revolved around the question of how to construct or regain such an identity. Right and left in postwar Japan, however, disagreed vehemently over how to define Japanese national identity. The relationship between the nation and state has been especially problematic and treatment of the symbols of state, including the imperial institution, the national flag, and national anthem has been the object of intense political conflict in postwar Japan.2 Leftist and progressive politicians, scholars and other opinion leaders and commentators (hyōronka) located the cause of wartime aggression and ultimate defeat in the failure to develop a truly modern national identity rooted in popular political participation. Instead, Japanese nationalism had been co-­opted by the state and turned into a support for imperialism and overseas expansion. They saw postwar patriotic campaigns promoted by the conservative Japanese government as repeating this dangerous precedent. They tended to set the Japanese nation (conceived in ethnic, cultural, or class terms) in opposition to the state and sought to articulate a “healthy” sense of national identity rooted in the cultural practices of the Japanese people rather than the symbols of the state. As Ishibashi Masashi, a Japan Socialist Party (JSP) politician put it, whereas in the West patriotism (aikokushugi) has generally had a positive connotation and nationalism (minzokushugi) a negative connotation, the reverse was true for postwar Japanese progressives. For them, patriotism was negatively associated with loyalty to the wartime and postwar state, while nationalism was positively associated with anti-­imperialist Asian national liberation movements including the Chinese Revolution.3 Their conservative counterparts, on the other hand, chafed at what they saw as an unnatural rift between state and nation, evidenced by the conflict over the

Introduction

3

symbols of the state, and lamented the lack of patriotism among postwar Japanese. For example, one conservative critic in 1963 decried the fact that postwar Japanese, are not conscious of any duties or responsibilities to either their country or society at large. In fact, they have very little consciousness or real understanding of Japan as a state. I feel uneasy at the prospect of leaving the responsibility for maintaining the nation to a generation with no national consciousness or an awareness of their country and state. Despite the fact that discussions concerning nationalism flourish in Japan, there is no nationalism.4

Conservatives sought the reunification of state and nation. Symbols of the state would be rehabilitated and the state once again made the object of national identification in order to re-­establish what they considered a normal, patriotic national identity that had been lost in defeat and foreign occupation. Thus, there was a common understanding between left and right that one of the defining characteristics of postwar Japanese politics was a contest to define Japanese national identity. Another problem in the study of nationalism and national identity in postwar Japan stems from the nebulous nature of the concepts themselves. Nationalism has been called “one of the most ambiguous concepts in the present-­day vocabulary of political and analytical thought,” and the literature on nationalism a “terminological jungle.”5 It is, however, a jungle into which we will have to venture. I will attempt less a definition (and certainly not a theory) of nationalism than an explanation of my use of the term for the purposes of this study. Nationalism is most commonly conceived of as a form of identification, an imagined community of people who believe they share certain common attributes, a common territory, and a common history that sets them apart from others and implies that individual interests and sense of self are intimately tied to, if not identical to, the interests of the nation and its place in the international community.6 Nationalism, however, is something more than simple identification. It is also often conceived of as an ideology in the sense of a conscious political program, or a discourse that asserts some claim to truth about the national community. Nationalist ideology or discourse consists of “assertions about contentious aspects of the solidarity being urged . . . assertions about the nation’s claim to historical uniqueness, to the territory that the nation-­state ought to occupy, and to the kinds of relations that should prevail between one’s nation and others.”7 These two conceptions of nationalism—as identity and discourse—coexist somewhat uneasily. Nationalism conceived of as group identification usually assumes various common attributes (language and history, among others) and

4

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

common interests. Nationalism as an effort to assert one’s own definition of these attributes and interests, however, suggests diversity, contention and competition. Thus, despite ideals of unity and consensus, nations are not ruled by a single nationalist ideology but rather are formed by competing narratives of national identity that define the nation, its interests, history, and relations with other nations. Nationalism is a “tradition of argument,” rather than a hegemonic consensus, about national identity, national interests and the place of the nation in the international community.8 While the contest to define the nation and its interests is carried out in a domestic political context, it cannot be separated from concepts of international society. If the nation is an imagined community, its imagination requires a concurrent imagination of a world of nations. Just as nationalists rarely imagine the nation as coterminous with all of human society, so they do not imagine the nation in isolation.9 The nation is from the beginning imagined embedded within a global society of nations in which the legitimate form of political representation is the nation-­state. Nationalism is thus constitutive and ubiquitous, a “generative order” of the international political system, and not simply a problem that arises at times to complicate otherwise normal international relations.10 Nationalism is not only the “common sense of a particular nation, but this common sense is international, to be found across the globe in the nations of the so-­called world order.”11 In light of this view of nationalism as both contentious and ubiquitous—as an argument about national identity common to international society—the fact that Japanese in the postwar period have not been able to arrive at a satisfying consensus definition of national identity is not unusual or abnormal. The intense disagreement on questions of national identity does not mean that there is no nationalism in Japan, or that the Japanese lack national identity. Rather, this disagreement itself is the essence of Japanese nationalism and the intensity of the disagreement testifies to the continued strength of concern for national identity in the postwar period. Advancing from this conception of nationalism we can also reject some other common uses of the term. One of these is a normative definition of nationalism. The fact that nationalist sentiment can be an obstacle to international understanding and a driver of international conflict gives nationalism an overwhelmingly negative connotation in international political discourse. This sort of normative conception of nationalism, however, makes it less an analytical term than a term of opprobrium. In analyses of the Japan-China relationship this creates a tendency to find the cause of conflict in the rise of a dangerous and monolithic “Japanese” or “Chinese” nationalism. In the case of Japan, especially, a normative conception of

Introduction

5

nationalism associates it with wartime ultra-­nationalism and leads to an assumption that nationalism is a peculiar disorder of the political right. In this study, I will be examining competing nationalist narratives from across the political spectrum (and across national boundaries), rather than making normative assessments about who deserves (for good or ill) to be identified as a nationalist. Treating individual authors as participants in a nationalist discourse is not meant to disparage them or to associate them with a dangerous national chauvinism. Rather, it is to recognize that participation in the China problem discourse impelled authors to take positions on questions of national identity. The overwhelmingly negative connotation of the term nationalism in international politics also supports a wave metaphor understanding of nationalism in which nationalism “rises” in pernicious waves to bedevil relations between states only to recede in more temperate times. This study is more concerned with what Michael Billig called “banal nationalism,” those everyday common-­sense assumptions about national identity that inform conversations about the national interest. Following Billig I will assume that “nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established relations, is the endemic condition.”12 Thus, nationalism did not suddenly rise in Japan or China in the 1980s or 1990s to undermine the friendship of the 1970s. The concern for Japanese national identity was as salient to friendly relations in the 1970s as it is to the tension and animosity of today. As I use the terms in this study, nationalist discourse or the discourse on national identity refer to the broad argument about national identity—the conscious political, intellectual, and rhetorical contest to convince others of the truth of one’s definition or narrative of national identity. Nationalist narratives or narratives of national identity are the specific definitions of or stories about the nation, its history and place in the international community. Likewise, the China problem discourse refers to the contest to interpret Japan’s relations with China and make policy recommendations for dealing with China. A narrative of SinoJapanese relations refers to a specific interpretation or analysis of Japan’s relations with China and the attendant assertion of what the state of relations reveals about Japanese national identity.

The transformation of the China problem in postwar Japan The China problem arises from the fact that China policy, like the treatment of state symbols, became a major front in the battle to define Japanese national

6

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

identity as Japanese on both left and right interpreted the state of relations with China to support their own narratives of national identity. As Japan’s relations with China evolved, the changing international political and diplomatic environment affected the discursive context of the China problem, privileging some narratives of the Sino-Japanese relationship over others and lending support to related constructions of Japanese national identity. Over the course of the 1970s, changes in the international political environment and Japan-China relations transformed the China problem from a powerful support for leftist and progressive constructions of national identity into a support for the postwar conservative political order and the nationalist narratives that supported it. In the early postwar period, leftists and progressives developed popular narratives of a Japanese struggle for national liberation from subjugation at the hands of the conservative Japanese state backed by the United States. Lack of relations with the PRC was an important example of the Japanese government’s submission to American Cold War policy and revealed the Japanese nation as less than fully independent. Many on the left saw their own struggle as part of the national liberation movements sweeping postwar Asia, including the revolution in China. Reviving Asianist notions of Japanese national identity, they promoted relations with the PRC, seen as the culmination of the Chinese Revolution, as a way to resist the Japanese state and its cooperation with the United States and to nurture a healthy, independent Japanese national identity. After 1971, however, as the Chinese leadership pursued a policy of closer cooperation with the Japanese and American governments, the promotion of relations with the PRC became less politically and ideologically useful for leftists and progressives. Leftists and progressives correspondingly began to distance themselves from their earlier identification with China. Chinese policy and rhetoric instead was increasingly used to support a triumphalist conservative nationalist narrative of Japanese success and a more positive interpretation of modern Japanese history. By the end of the decade, mainstream conservatives associated with the Japanese government were the main champions of closer relations with the PRC. At the same time, the most vocal criticism of mainstream conservative positions on the China problem increasingly came from the right wing of the conservative movement itself. Echoing earlier leftist criticism of Japanese policy toward the United States, they condemned the Japanese government’s China policy as submissive and detrimental to the cultivation of a truly independent national identity. For the right wing, the “abandonment” of Taiwan—that is, the decision to break diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) in 1972—was emblematic of a lack of national subjectivity that

Introduction

7

made it impossible for Japanese to resist Chinese demands and follow an autonomous foreign policy. This narrative challenges some common interpretations of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s. For example, what might be called the official Chinese histories of the period cast the improvement of relations as a morality tale in which PRC leaders insisted on consistent moral principles and accommodation in the 1970s was made possible by Japanese rectifying their mistakes, abandoning “anti-China” policies and accepting Chinese positions on issues like the legality of the PRC government and the status of Taiwan.13 Early Japanese treatments of the period tended to echo this normative interpretation, portraying the normalization of relations as the result of a struggle by reflective, principled, progressive forces in Japan against the government’s immoral and submissive policies of cooperation with American containment of the PRC.14 While not impugning the motivations or belittling the achievements of those in both countries who worked to improve relations throughout the postwar period, there is not much in the historical record to support a normative explanation for the transformation of relations in the 1970s. While the normative explanation may accurately reflect the commitment, and at times the courage, of those involved in the effort to improve relations, it cannot very well explain policy change in the 1970s. In fact, the story of the 1970s is almost the opposite of the normative interpretation. Improvement in relations in the 1970s is explained primarily by changes in PRC policy that made relations more amenable to conservative Japanese policy positions and nationalist narratives. There is very little evidence of change in attitude on the part of the conservative Japanese leadership. Quite the contrary, Japanese conservatives generally interpreted changes in the relationship as evidence of the correctness of their own policy positions and nationalist narratives. The normative account also allows little room for the influence of the national identity concerns so central to the China problem in Japan. For example, Gao Zengjie of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), in reviewing the motivations of pro-PRC forces in postwar Japan, cites historical and cultural affinity for China, “nostalgia from the time [Japanese] spent in China in their youth,” and a “ ‘sense of contrition’ for the aggressive acts of the Japanese military during World War II.”15 Gao also stresses the importance of Japanese pacifism and notes economic incentives, but nationalist sentiment is conspicuously absent. In this account, Japanese supporters of Sino-Japanese friendship are motivated purely by moral rectitude and pacifism, cleansed of any taint of nationalist sentiment, which is associated

8

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

only with the Japanese right wing. It will be a central contention of this study, however, that progressive, pro-China Japanese were as motivated by a concern for the health and strength of Japanese national identity as were their conservative and right-­wing opponents. Another common interpretation of relations in the 1970s, often formulated in direct response to normative interpretations and arguably the dominant interpretation among contemporary Japanese observers, likewise holds that the change in relations was driven by Japanese acceptance of Chinese principles but sees this as evidence that Japanese policy was compromised and excessively accommodating of Chinese positions. While most Japanese, at the time and since, welcomed the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations, many have also been critical of the manner in which the establishment of relations was undertaken and the pattern that this set for subsequent relations. There is a widespread sense among Japanese observers that the Japanese government, for domestic political reasons, rushed to establish relations in 1972 on Chinese terms without adequately considering the strategic import of their policies. Many Japanese also find that for a variety of reasons—including, among others, war guilt, cultural affinity, a cultural predisposition to avoid confrontation, and a lack of strategic thinking in Japanese political culture—Japanese policy toward China has been based on emotion rather than reason. This has led Japanese to habitually adopt a “nonconfrontational and conciliatory approach” toward the PRC that has left the Japanese vulnerable to manipulation by a calculating Chinese leadership.16 For some Japanese observers, policy since 1972 even smacks of appeasement.17 The challenge today, in this view, is to overcome these limitations on Japanese foreign policy in order to forge a more normal JapanChina relationship in which Japanese are free to be less deferential and more assertive in the pursuit of national interest. Reflecting upon postwar SinoJapanese relations near the end of his career, Etō Shinkichi, the doyen of China studies in Japan, concluded, “Honestly speaking, I think that in the second half of the twentieth century Japanese have been too reserved. In the twenty-­first century we should increase the instances in which we can freely engage in discussion without becoming emotional.”18 For some Japanese observers, the timid and non-­confrontational approach that they believe characterizes Japanese policy toward China is the result of the lack of a normal national identity in postwar Japan. For example, Okabe Tatusmi, a scholar of Chinese foreign policy who has written carefully on issues of national identity in contemporary Sino-Japanese relations, sees as one of the problems in relations with China,“the weakness of collectivism and the absence of nationalism

Introduction

9

in postwar Japanese society.”19 In Okabe’s view, this lack of nationalism on the part of the Japanese makes it difficult to understand and deal effectively with countries like China, where nationalism is still powerful, “For a long time after the war Japanese had no knowledge of nationalism and therefore couldn’t understand the nationalism of others.”20 When the phenomenon of Japanese nationalism is acknowledged, it is often seen as a normal, healthy response to a presumed suppression of national identity in the postwar period. Kitaoka Shin’ichi, one of Japan’s most respected academics, argues that “the recent mounting evidence of nationalism in Japan is merely a backlash against the excessive oppression of these feelings since the country’s defeat in World War II.”21 The findings of this study directly counter this interpretation. Japanese policy toward the PRC in the 1970s was not a policy of appeasement or easy submission to Chinese positions. Nor were Japan’s relations with China handicapped by the lack of a normal national identity that constrained the pursuit of national interests. First, there is little evidence in the diplomatic record that Japanese policymakers easily submitted to Chinese demands or that they were constrained by irrational, pro-China sentiment, either their own or the Japanese public’s. Quite the contrary, if Japanese leaders were at all constrained by Japanese public sentiment, it was due to the need to avoid looking soft on China and to resist committing to Chinese positions that would provoke nationalist opposition at home. If anything, Japanese policymakers in the 1970s were constrained by the strength of Japanese national sentiment, not its weakness. Second, the Japanese approach to the China problem was not masochistic. Japanese did not submerge their national identity or sacrifice national pride as the price for improved relations. Far from being passive or reticent to discuss national identity, Japanese involved in the China problem discourse—whether progressives championing closer relations with the PRC or conservatives defending the ROC—actively appropriated relations with China in support of their own nationalist narratives. Thus, contrary to popular assumptions, Japanese of all political persuasions championed China policies and narratives of Japan-China relations that gratified rather than challenged their own sense of national identity.

War guilt, war responsibility, and the China problem One of the most important factors assumed to militate against the development of a healthy Japanese national identity and a normal relationship with China is a sense of war guilt or war responsibility. It is commonly asserted that a sense of

10

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

guilt or contrition was a primary motivation for concern with the China problem, very often with the implication that these feelings were a source of Japanese weakness in dealing with China. For example, Ijiri Hidenori saw postwar SinoJapanese relations characterized by an “asymmetrical pattern of attitudes between the two countries: China often criticizing Japan bitterly by raising the question of ‘the revival of Japanese militarism,’ and Japan always adopting a low posture because the China problem is something ‘special’ to the Japanese, and because they retain their sense of guilt in relation to China for misdeeds during the Sino-Japanese War.”22 It is not my intention here to argue that feelings of guilt, remorse, or contrition did not exist in postwar Japan. Nor will I enter into a debate regarding whether Japanese have or have not fulfilled some assumed war responsibility. I will contend, however, that the argument that Japanese approaches to the China problem have been determined by war guilt or the war responsibility issue is oversimplified. In the end, assertions of war guilt or war responsibility have been rhetorical resources used to support positions in postwar Japanese political and nationalist discourse, including the China problem discourse, rather than determinative of those positions. The first problem with the war guilt argument is the implicit assumption that the psychological effects of guilt are manifest in sympathy, compromise, or deferment to the object of those feelings, in this case China. This reaction is certainly possible, but there is ample evidence that guilt does not necessarily result in deference to victims by perpetrators. In his classic study of the psychology of colonialism, Albert Memmi argued that the sense of guilt that derives from the colonizer’s knowledge of the illegitimacy of his position leads him not to defer to or sympathize with the colonized, but rather to resent and avoid them as the source of his uncomfortable feelings of guilt.23 Theories of cognitive dissonance likewise suggest that when presented with evidence of their own victimization of others, evidence which challenges their self-­image as moral beings, people tend to react with efforts at self-­justification and are more likely to justify victimization than to atone for it.24 Applied to the Japanese sense of guilt toward China, we might as well expect war guilt in postwar Japan to be expressed in oft-­cited “historical amnesia” or historical revisionism as regards Japan’s war in China as in submission to Chinese positions. Again, this is not to argue that Japanese on the whole have not confronted or have sought to justify Japan’s wartime conduct, but to point out that Japanese war guilt need not necessarily lead to compromise, weakness, or submission in relations with China. There is also a distinction to be made between war guilt and war responsibility. War guilt has typically been assigned to the Japanese state and to Japan’s wartime

Introduction

11

leadership. The Japanese nation, on the other hand, has been assumed to bear a particular war responsibility, usually interpreted as the responsibility to avoid another war and contribute peacefully to the international community. There is no denying the importance of the war responsibility debate in postwar Japanese political and nationalist discourse. Yet, as in the case of war guilt, it cannot be assumed that the implications of this responsibility are obvious either for Japanese policy toward China or for the domestic discourse on China. It should be pointed out immediately that engagement with the issue of war responsibility in postwar Japan did not necessarily involve the suppression of national sentiment. The discourse on war responsibility was not oriented exclusively, or even primarily, toward an examination of guilt for past deeds either individually or nationally. Rather, as Rikki Kersten has shown, for progressives like Maruyama Masao the war responsibility discourse was positive, future-­oriented, and focused on individual and national responsibility to avoid another disastrous war, a responsibility that demanded individual and national subjectivity.25 For Maruyama, confronting the issue of war responsibility was integral to the cultivation of a “healthy” Japanese nationalism. Thus, the war responsibility issue and the cultivation of national identity were not incompatible. The China problem and the war responsibility issue were both aspects of the larger discourse on national identity in the postwar period and were commonly conceived to be closely related. China being the primary victim of wartime Japanese aggression, staking out a position on China policy was taken to be integral in coming to terms with the Japanese past and war responsibility. Yet, the issue of war responsibility did not dictate positions on the China problem. Writers advocating a wide variety of positions on China policy all claimed to be contributing to the goal of fulfilling Japan’s war responsibility. For example, many leftists did indeed argue that a pro-PRC position was indispensable both to fulfilling Japan’s war responsibility and to the nationalist project of liberating the Japanese nation from American domination. On the other hand, many leading figures in the war responsibility debate, such as Maruyama and Oda Makoto argued that exactly how to go about preventing war was primarily a domestic issue for Japanese to solve free of foreign interference and warned that a sense of guilt which led to uncritical acceptance of Chinese political positions could actually undermine peace in East Asia.26 Nor was the engagement with the issue of war responsibility in the China problem discourse limited to leftists and progressives. The conservative China

12

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

scholar Nakajima Mineo acknowledged his responsibility to do all within his power to prevent another war. Nakajima argued, however, that this responsibility could not be fulfilled through what he saw as submission to the dictates of an authoritarian Chinese government.27 We will also see repeatedly that while progressives like Maruyama and Oda tended to avoid justifying their positions on China by appealing to war guilt or war responsibility, pro-Taiwan conservatives were unabashed in arguing that Japanese had a moral obligation to support Chiang Kai-­shek and the nationalist government on Taiwan in order to make amends for their wartime conduct. Thus, it cannot be argued that issues of war guilt or war responsibility determined positions on China. The war responsibility issue was an important subtext to the China problem discourse but war responsibility did not operate as an independent variable determining positions on relations with China. Instead, war responsibility tended to be mobilized as a rhetorical tool, justifying one’s position on the China problem by claiming that it contributed to fulfilling the war responsibility of the Japanese nation. Finally, as will become clear, the diplomatic record offers precious little evidence that issues of war guilt or war responsibility ever influenced Japanese policy toward China. There is, in fact, almost no evidence in the diplomatic record that a sense of guilt or responsibility on the part of Japanese leaders or widespread feelings of remorse among the Japanese populace led those leaders to be more compromising or accommodating of Chinese positions. Quite the contrary, the diplomatic record shows that when these issues did impact Japanese diplomacy, it was usually when leaders worked to avoid the appearance of acceding to Chinese positions on sensitive issues like reparations or apologies out of consideration of the past.

The Chinese leadership, the China problem, and the history problem While the China problem was essentially a function of Japanese domestic politics, it was never carried out in a vacuum. The Japanese discourse on national identity and the related discourse on China were both subject to the influence of international events. In addition, the strategic position of Japan in the Cold War created incentives for American and Chinese leaders (on both the mainland and Taiwan) to support Japanese nationalist narratives conducive to their own interests and identities.28

Introduction

13

The PRC leadership was an active, if indirect, participant in the Japanese China problem discourse. Given the history of Japanese aggression in China, it might be assumed that the PRC leadership has been vigilantly guarding against the development of Japanese nationalism and might consider the expression of powerful nationalist sentiment threatening. The PRC leadership did indeed remain attentive to the changing currents of Japanese nationalist discourse. Rather than fearing expressions of Japanese nationalist sentiment, however, PRC leaders actively supported Japanese nationalist narratives that served their interests and gratified their own self-­images. In the early postwar period, the PRC leadership was vocal in its support of leftist and progressive nationalist narratives premised on identification with the PRC and Asian nationalist liberation movements in resistance to the American presence in Japan. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were effusive in their praise for the Japanese people’s patriotic struggle for “national independence” and “national rights.” They emphasized to their Japanese guests (leftists and conservatives alike) the compatibility of Chinese and Japanese nationalism and the common struggle of the Japanese and Chinese nations against American domination.29 Over the course of the 1970s, however, as the clash with the Soviet Union led Chinese leaders to seek greater cooperation with American and Japanese conservatives, they became much more supportive not only of Japanese conservative foreign policies, but also conservative nationalist narratives that together undermined the domestic position of the Japanese progressives. In so doing, ironically, Chinese policy also encouraged revisionist conservative historical narratives that contributed to the later “history problem”—the increasingly acrimonious clash over the interpretation of modern history that arose in the 1980s. This is not a study of the origins of the history problem, but as national history is one of the most important building blocks of national identity, international developments that favored the emergence of one narrative of national identity over another also privileged an associated historical narrative. At several points in this study I will attempt to draw connections between changing Japanese nationalist narratives and the emergence of historical narratives that would contribute to the later history problem. Pointing out the ironies in PRC policy toward Japan, it should be made clear, is not to blame the Chinese leadership for the emergence of the history problem in the 1980s, but it does point to the intersubjective nature of national identity formation. It also suggests that attempts at persuasion, the exercise of soft power, or the winning of hearts and minds is subject to unintended consequences like any other political action.

14

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

A note on political nomenclature Some readers may find the use of political labels like conservative and progressive, and especially left and right, problematic—an imposition of Western, or more specifically American, political conventions on the Japanese situation. The use of these terms is not meant to imply that positions the Japanese identified as “left” or “right” conform to similarly defined positions in the West or the United States. I have used these terms for two reasons. First, the Japanese sources themselves use these terms to describe different positions on the China problem. Second, the Japanese use of these terms reveals that Japanese commentators were conscious that the China problem was part of a broader political conflict between two camps that occupied opposing positions on a series of salient political issues including constitutional revision and the US-Japan Security Treaty, as well as policy toward China. There was a sense that those who supported closer relations with the PRC tended also generally to support a broader leftist political agenda. Those who were “cautious” (shinchōha) in their approach to improving relations with the PRC or sympathetic to the ROC likewise generally adopted the opposite positions on important political issues. Of course, not everyone fitted neatly into one or another group, nor was either group homogeneous. Even seemingly incongruous groups like the pro-China members of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), however, tended to constitute what was referred to as a “left wing” or “dove” faction within the ruling party. The terms progressive and conservative are similar to but broader than left and right. Progressives would include people like Maruyama Masao who were not leftist in the sense of being orthodox Marxists or socialists but shared many of the same critical positions on Japanese political issues. Likewise, conservatives would include not only those who supported the positions of the Japanese conservative government (a position I usually refer to as mainstream conservative), but also right-­wing critics of the government. The existence of two Chinese governments also complicates talking about different positions on the China problem. I will generally follow the contemporary Japanese usage in which pro-China (shin-Chū) nearly always referred to supporters of closer relations with the People’s Republic of China and will use pro-China and pro-PRC interchangeably. Similarly, pro-Taiwan and pro-ROC will both be used to refer to those who supported relations with or were sympathetic to the ROC on Taiwan. Finally, none of these labels should be taken as expressing the author’s normative assessment of any position on the China problem.

Introduction

15

Structure of the study and a note on sources The book is composed of four parts, each organized around an event or controversy that brought China policy into open, public debate and energized the China problem discourse in Japan. Part I introduces the China problem in postwar Japan before the 1970s. Parts II, III, and IV comprise the core of the study. Part II focuses on the normalization of relations beginning with the Nixon shock (President Nixon’s surprise announcement of his intention to visit China), in July 1971 and ending with the establishment of diplomatic relations in September 1972. Part III takes up the opening of peace treaty talks and focuses on the controversy surrounding inclusion in the treaty of an anti-­hegemony clause. Part IV details the conclusion of the peace treaty and the origins of the Japanese economic aid program to the PRC. Each part of the study is composed of two chapters. The first chapter of each section relates the diplomatic history of the relationship in the context of the changing Cold War. In these chapters I have made use of documentary evidence available in Japanese and Chinese. On the Japanese side, thanks to the efforts of Japanese scholars and the Japanese Freedom of Information Act, much of the diplomatic record, including the records of negotiations for normalization in 1972 and the 1978 peace treaty, has been published, making these documents widely available to the public.30 Chinese sources have also become much more numerous in recent years and include the collected foreign policy papers of Chinese leaders, published documentary collections, the memoirs of Chinese participants, as well as “official and semiofficial” publications produced using still-­classified documents.31 In these chapters I have also drawn heavily on the work of Japanese and Chinese scholars.32 The second chapter of each part is a discursive study of the China problem in Japan. In these chapters, I examine how Japanese observers attempted to make sense of changes in the political relationship and what they meant for Japan. These chapters are organized around mainstream conservatives—those conservative politicians, bureaucrats, and scholars who sought to explain and defend Japanese government policy toward China. Especially important in this regard are the writings and speeches of Ōhira Masayoshi, who as foreign minister at the time of normalization and as prime minister at the end of the decade was instrumental in making and implementing policy toward China. Ōhira was not simply interested in China policy, however. He was also an active participant in the China problem discourse, interpreting the changes in Sino-Japanese relations and their importance for Japanese national identity. Each chapter then turns to

16

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

an examination of the China problem discourse among those critical of government China policy on both the left and the right and their competing interpretations of the importance of relations with China for Japanese national identity. A study of the China problem in this broader sense, as an aspect of Japanese nationalist discourse, requires a more eclectic approach to sources than in the case of the diplomatic history. To get a glimpse into the intellectual culture of Japan’s foreign policy public, we need to move beyond the archives to the media in which Japanese argued about relations with China. One of the most important media in which Japanese commentators communicated were the monthly general interest magazines (sōgō zasshi) like Sekai, Chūō kōron, and Bungei shunjū. These monthlies are non-­technical and written to appeal to a large, educated, general audience and “ ‘usually contain semiacademic articles, reports, interviews, round table discussions, travel accounts, and translations of foreign articles,’ on political and social topics.”33 With circulations over 100,000 for the largest of them, these monthlies were a popular and effective way for commentators on the China problem to propagate their ideas. In addition to the monthlies, I cast a wide net to incorporate memoirs, published speeches, political party publications, scholarly books, and journal articles as well as the published records of academic conferences. The following two chapters set the stage for the rest of the study by exploring the origins of the China problem in postwar Japan. Chapter  1 details the diplomatic settlements of the occupation and early Cold War that decisively shaped Japan’s postwar China policy and institutionalized the China problem in Japanese domestic politics. Chapter 2 will place the issue of Japan’s relations with China in the context of postwar Japanese nationalist discourse.

Part I

The China Problem in Postwar Japan, 1945–70

1

The China Problem in Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy The China problem in postwar Japan did not suddenly erupt in the 1970s. The basic concerns and positions regarding relations with China were defined in the early postwar period as Japanese dealt with defeat, the Allied occupation, and the task of formulating a policy toward China in the context of the developing Cold War in East Asia. Japan had no China policy to speak of during the occupation. By the time the occupation ended in 1952, the Cold War order had been firmly established in East Asia and Japan was incorporated into the American alliance system, forgoing relations with the PRC. This Cold War settlement, however, was hotly contested in Japan. The diplomatic aspect of the China problem was institutionalized within this domestic political contest with important implications for how Japanese responded to the events that underpinned Nixon’s shocking shift toward the PRC in 1971.

The Yoshida Doctrine and its China corollary Nominally an allied affair, the occupation was dominated by the United States and as a result Japan’s postwar foreign policy almost unavoidably came to accord with American Cold War policy, including American policy toward China. This is not to say, however, that postwar Japanese foreign policy represented simple capitulation to American dictates. The Japanese foreign policy that emerged in the negotiations to end the Allied occupation reflected not only US Cold War concerns but also Japanese interests as defined primarily by the prime minister who dominated Japan’s political scene in the early postwar period, Yoshida Shigeru. Yoshida’s plan for postwar Japanese recovery and the supporting political and diplomatic settlements he negotiated shaped Japanese foreign policy throughout the postwar period and have come to be referred to as the Yoshida Doctrine. In broad strokes, the Yoshida Doctrine sought to capitalize on

20

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

Japan’s importance in US Cold War strategy in order to rebuild Japanese power and prestige by focusing on economic growth while relying on the United States for defense. The decisions Yoshida made regarding relations with China corollary to the Yoshida Doctrine likewise defined Japan’s China policy until 1971. As both the dominant government policy line and the object of intense opposition, the China corollary to the Yoshida Doctrine drove the debate on China policy and set the terms of the postwar China problem discourse.

The occupation, the Cold War, and the China problem Changing occupation policy had a formative impact on postwar Japanese politics and foreign policy. The occupation began with a zeal for reform that was supportive of a progressive political agenda. Accordingly, the drive for the demilitarization and democratization of Japan’s political, economic, and social institutions, symbolized by the new constitution and its renunciation of war in Article  9, was widely welcomed by progressive forces as a liberating, even revolutionary opportunity to forge a new, democratic national identity.1 As relations between the United States and Soviet Union deteriorated, however, US policymakers became less interested in reforming than in rehabilitating and rearming Japan so that it might become a dependable American ally in the Cold War. American occupation authorities correspondingly became less supportive of progressive causes and more interested in working with the conservative establishment. The reverse course in occupation policy cemented a fundamental rift in postwar Japanese politics. Leftists and progressives committed themselves to protecting what they saw as the gains of the early occupation from revision and rollback at the hands of the United States and the conservative Japanese government. Conservatives, who dominated the Japanese government and bureaucracy, dedicated themselves to undoing what they saw as the excesses of American occupation reforms.2 This Cold War left-­right division dominated postwar Japanese politics, including the country’s approach to China, where events were increasingly impinging on Japanese consciousness. At the same time that leftists and progressives in Japan were becoming estranged from the policies and ideology of the American occupation authorities, the Chinese Civil War was sweeping the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to power on the mainland. The establishment of the PRC in October 1949 on one hand added impetus to the occupation’s reverse course and, on the other, inspired those in Japan opposed to American policy. To many in Japan, the conclusion of

The China Problem in Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy

21

the Chinese Revolution in the establishment of an independent, socialist state provided a powerfully attractive alternative to the vision of Japan’s future developing under the occupation and the conservative Japanese leadership. A China that had “stood up” after a century of humiliation seemed a stark contrast to a Japan occupied by a foreign power that was increasingly hostile to the progressive cause. Progressives thus early on had powerful ideological and nationalist motives to support expanded relations with the PRC. Hopes for close relations with the new China, however, were dashed by the war in Korea. The Korean War brought the full force of the Cold War to East Asia with decisive results for Japan’s relations with China. The war brought the United States and the PRC into direct armed conflict, entrenching the American commitment to the containment of Chinese communism. The war in Korea also led the United States to intervene in the Chinese Civil War, sending the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, becoming the protector of the exiled Nationalist Party (GMD) and preserving a Chinese regime to rival the PRC on the mainland. The war also immediately increased American interest in enlisting Japan in its military strategy in Asia. Assuming that the North Korean attack was aimed ultimately “at getting control of Japan,” the United States intensified its pressure on the Japanese government to rearm, join a regional collective defense arrangement, and make a more active contribution to the defense of East Asia.3 American hostility toward the PRC, support for Chiang Kai-­shek and the Nationalists on Taiwan, and commitment to maintaining an anti-­communist Japan set the basic constraints under which Japanese leaders would have to formulate their China policy. The war also accelerated US moves to end the occupation. President Truman dispatched John Foster Dulles as a special ambassador on an East Asian tour “to secure the adherence of the Japanese nation to the free nations of the world, and to assure that it will play its full part in resisting the further expansion of Communist imperialism.”4 To achieve this, Dulles wanted a generous peace agreement, one that placed no restrictions on Japanese rearmament or economic development, and a defense pact that committed Japan to the American side in the Cold War. It is in the negotiations to end the occupation that the Yoshida Doctrine and its China corollary were cast. In January of 1951, Dulles arrived in Tokyo to begin negotiations for a peace treaty and a defense settlement. Prime Minister Yoshida, for his part, strenuously resisted American demands for a greater Japanese defense contribution, citing the economic costs and domestic political risks involved in Japanese rearmament. In response to Dulles’ demands for the formation of a Japanese army on the

22

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

order of 350,000 troops, Yoshida pledged to create a 110,000-man force after the peace treaty came into effect; a modest concession which avoided the creation of a force that might be suitable for deployment to the war in Korea.5 Yoshida and Dulles also came to basic agreement on the contents of a security agreement. According to the draft security treaty, the Japanese government would request that the United States maintain military forces in the Japanese home islands on bases provided by the Japanese government (Okinawa and its bases would remain under American occupation). These forces were not, however, explicitly committed to the defense of Japan, could be used to quell domestic disturbances, and would enjoy extraterritorial protection from Japanese law. Yoshida thus managed to avoid the economic and political costs of precipitous rearmament and participation in the Korean War or any regional defense scheme, but at the price of a security pact with provisions redolent of a nineteenth-­century unequal treaty.6 The US-Japan Security Treaty would become one of the main targets of progressive and leftist criticism as a symbol of Japanese national subjugation. Another was Yoshida’s emerging policy on China.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the China problem During the occupation, China policy had not been a pressing issue for the Japanese government since, formally, the government had no foreign policy or China policy to speak of. The two main problems related to China during the occupation were repatriation and reparations. Military repatriation was carried out by the occupation authorities and civilian repatriation was undertaken largely by private organizations such as the Red Cross and the China-Japan Friendship Association. Most Japanese in China returned to Japan before the outbreak of the Korean War, although war criminals held in the PRC returned to Japan only in 1956.7 The reparations issue was handled directly by the occupation authorities. The original plan for reparations envisioned the transfer of Japanese industrial capital directly to occupied territories. Various technical and political problems soon made the original plan infeasible however. Moreover, as the goals of the occupation moved to rehabilitation of the Japanese economy, the United States sought to limit the potential burden that reparations might impose upon the Japanese economy, and after some early transfers American authorities blocked any further reparations payments.8 Thus, the Japanese government was largely freed from having to deal with China during the occupation. Preparations for the San Francisco peace conference, however, threatened to force the Japanese government to confront the potentially divisive China issue.

The China Problem in Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy

23

Yoshida himself initially hoped to put off the problem of choosing between Beijing and Taipei as long as possible, preferably until such time as the problem could be resolved multilaterally.9 In this he was aided by disagreement between the British and American governments. The British government, out of concern for their position in Hong Kong, had recognized the PRC government in January of 1950 and subsequently refused to participate in a conference with the Nationalist government. Fear of Japanese economic competition in Asia also motivated the British position. The British government hoped that if Japan were to establish relations with the mainland, the Japanese would concentrate their economic activities on the China market, avoiding competition with British business interests in former colonial areas in South and Southeast Asia. In the United States, on the other hand, the outbreak of the Korean War solidified American support for the Nationalists on Taiwan. Dulles was under pressure from Republican lawmakers to guarantee that the Chinese Communists would not participate in the conference and that the position of the Nationalists on Taiwan would not be compromised by any peace settlement. As preparations for the peace conference advanced, the problem of Chinese representation brought these conflicting American and British positions to a head. In the end, Dulles and British Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison agreed in London in June 1951 that neither Chinese regime would be invited to the conference. As a result, China—the country had which had borne the brunt of Japanese aggression in Asia—was not represented at the peace conference and the Japanese government was able to avoid the recognition issue, at least for the time being. According to this agreement, Japan was to be free to conclude a separate peace with whichever Chinese government it chose, although Dulles expressed confidence that circumstances “would almost inevitably lead Japan to align herself with United States policy.”10 When the San Francisco peace conference convened in September 1951, fifty-­ two countries attended to deliberate on an American draft treaty. Reparations remained one of the most contentious issues in the treaty. The clause on reparations, Article 14, deferred reparations settlements to bilateral negotiations to be conducted after the conclusion of the treaty. Article  14 also called for reparations to be paid in kind, through the provision of Japanese goods and services, in order to avoid undue strain on the Japanese economy. In the end, on September 8, 1951, forty-­nine of those nations in attendance signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland refused to sign the treaty. Other countries, such as Indonesia, signed the treaty but withheld ratification pending the conclusion of reparations negotiations. On the same day

24

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

the San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded, the United States-Japan Security Treaty, concluded earlier by Dulles and Yoshida, came into effect. The PRC government, not surprisingly, criticized the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty in the strongest terms possible, “because the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan was prepared, drafted and signed without the participation of the People’s Republic of China, the government considers it illegal, invalid and absolutely cannot recognize it.” The PRC government declared that the peace treaty and the security treaty were being used by the United States to rearm Japan in “preparation for a new war of aggression” and posed “a grave threat to the security of the People’s Republic of China and other Asian countries.”11 In his statement condemning the treaties on September 18, Zhou Enlai also emphasized the threat they posed to Japanese security and national independence and had no qualms about appealing to Japanese nationalist sentiment in support of his positions. Zhou said that the PRC leadership understood that the peace and security treaties had been forced upon Japan by the United States in cooperation with a “traitorous” group of reactionaries in the Japanese government who had put the Japanese in the “unprecedented national danger (minzoku kiki)” of being involved in another war of aggression by “shamelessly selling out the state’s independence and sovereignty.” Zhou expressed his confidence that the Japanese people would oppose the “aggression of American imperialist policy and traitorous forces in Japan,” and pledged the support of the Chinese people for the “Japanese people’s patriotic struggle against the traitorous San Francisco treaty.”12 Zhou’s criticism reflects more than the boilerplate of Chinese Communist propaganda. Zhou’s appeal to Japanese nationalist sentiment was a carefully targeted rhetorical strategy, one we will see repeated throughout this study (although the target audience for this strategy will change over time). As detailed in the following chapter, PRC criticism of Japanese foreign policy as “traitorous” resonated with opposition to the peace and security treaties in Japan. For the opposition, the “partial peace” of the San Francisco treaty constituted a dangerous constraint on the development of an independent Japanese foreign policy. They called for a comprehensive peace settlement that included all of Japan’s former enemies, including the Soviet Union and the PRC, and for some form of neutrality (either unarmed or lightly armed), in the Cold War. The security treaty seemed to many critics a continuation of the American occupation and included the danger of involving the Japanese in another self-­destructive war. In addition to the general mood of pacifism that pervaded postwar Japanese political discourse, opposition to the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the security treaty

The China Problem in Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy

25

was also motivated by a powerful nationalist sentiment. This was true for opposition to the Japanese government’s China policy as well.

Yoshida and the China problem Having avoided the issue in San Francisco, settlement of the war with China awaited a separate peace treaty. Contrary to Dulles’ expectations regarding the inevitable alignment of American and Japanese approaches to China, Yoshida’s thinking on China did not necessarily accord with US policy. Yoshida was a staunch anti-­communist and today is remembered as the architect of Japan’s postwar alliance with the United States. His prewar reputation was that of an Anglophile, committed to a policy of cooperative imperialism with the British.13 Yet, upbringing and experience planted within Yoshida a conservative Asianist predilection which colored his interpretation of postwar developments on the continent. It was a view not uncommon among Japanese conservatives, but one that contrasted markedly with American Cold War attitudes toward China. Yoshida had received an education in the traditional Japanese curriculum heavy on training in the Confucian classics and at the elite Peers School (Gakushūin) had studied under the great patron of modern Japanese Asianism, Konoe Atsumarō. As a prewar diplomat, Yoshida’s most notable post was his three years of service in London as ambassador to the United Kingdom. In his early career, however, Yoshida had served more than twenty years in China and Korea. As John Welfield has pointed out, Yoshida by training was a China specialist, and “even at the height of the occupation . . . did not abandon his conviction that Japan’s long-­term future lay not with North America but with the Asian continent, above all China.”14 Consistent with this conviction and the overwhelming emphasis on economic reconstruction that formed the core of the Yoshida Doctrine, Yoshida put great importance on trade with mainland China. The mainland had been an important prewar market, especially as a source of raw materials, providing Japan with “50 percent of its coal, 25 percent of its iron ore, and 75 percent of its soybean imports” in 1941.15 Given this history, Yoshida was not alone in seeing China as a natural market for Japanese industry. Indeed, for Americans these facts were a particular worry, as they constituted a potential source of Japanese vulnerability to Chinese Communist pressure that made them wary of trade between Japan and China. American policy makers hoped to find substitutes for Japan’s former markets on the mainland, lest the Japanese be “tempted to seize opportunities for closer economic and political relations with the [Communist] Bloc.”16 American policymakers were therefore disturbed by Yoshida’s manifest desire to increase

26

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

trade with the PRC, especially when combined with a decidedly cavalier attitude about the threat of Chinese communism. Japan would pursue trade with China, Yoshida declared, “whether China is red or green.”17 In addition to being committed to trade with the mainland, Yoshida saw American policy toward China as generally misinformed. Americans, Yoshida felt, were ignorant concerning the realities of China. The British and Japanese, as the main prewar powers on the mainland, had much more experience dealing with Chinese and were thus much more knowledgeable about Chinese conditions and national character. Like many Japanese, Yoshida saw the PRC leadership as motivated primarily by nationalism rather than communist ideology. Communism may be a temporary phase in the Chinese Revolution, but Yoshida thought Chinese national character ill-­suited to communism.18 Thus, Yoshida was not overly troubled by the foundation of the PRC or the alliance with the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet alliance was bound to fail, he maintained, and rather than containing the alliance, the West should seek to hasten its demise. As it happened, increased Sino-Japanese trade would be not only profitable but also helpful in driving a wedge in the Sino-Soviet alliance. Japanese businessmen, Yoshida argued, would be the West’s “fifth column for democracy” in China.19 Yoshida, therefore, sought to preserve room for relations with the PRC within the US-Japan alliance. To American consternation, in October of 1951, when the peace and security treaties came up for Diet ratification, Yoshida defended the peace treaty by arguing that it did not preclude Japan’s establishing relations with either the Soviet Union or the PRC and said he hoped to eventually conclude a separate treaty with the mainland. He also called for opening trade relations with the PRC, including the establishment of a Japanese trade office in Shanghai.20 Yoshida’s pragmatism was unwelcome in Washington. In December 1951, Dulles was in Tokyo once again to bring the Japanese into line on China policy. Dulles pressured Yoshida to commit to a China policy compatible with US strategy in Asia by explaining that Japanese ambiguity on China threatened Senate ratification of the peace and security treaties. Without some guarantee of Japanese intentions to recognize the Nationalist government on Taiwan, he warned, Senate ratification of the treaties was unlikely if not impossible. On December 24, 1951, Yoshida signed a letter addressed to, and by most accounts drafted by, Dulles which laid out the Japanese government’s position on the China issue. The Yoshida Letter, as it came to be known, promised that the Japanese government would conclude a treaty and establish relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan as soon as legally possible. Yoshida also assured the Americans that the Japanese government would cooperate with

The China Problem in Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy

27

UN sanctions on the PRC and had no intention of concluding a bilateral agreement with the Chinese Communists so long as the Sino-Soviet treaty was directed against Japan and the CCP supported Japan Communist Party activities aimed at overthrowing the Japanese political system.21

The Japan-China Peace Treaty of 1952 In February 1952 the Japanese government somewhat reluctantly entered into negotiations for a peace treaty with the Republic of China. In these negotiations, the Japanese side sought to limit as much as possible the negative impact of the treaty on future relations with the mainland, early on resisting even referring to the treaty as a peace treaty. In addition to what to call the treaty, the main issues of contention were reparations and the scope of applicability of the treaty (that is, whether the treaty would apply to Japan’s relations with all of China or just those areas under the control of the ROC government). The Nationalist government’s draft treaty, which became the basis for negotiations, was nearly identical to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, including Article  12 which was a virtual copy of the reparations clause in the earlier peace treaty. The Japanese government, proceeding from its position that the treaty should apply only to those areas under effective GMD control, argued that compensation for losses on the mainland would be beyond the scope of the treaty and resisted the inclusion of any reparations clause. Negotiations dragged on through twelve rounds of talks over nearly three months. The Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China, finally signed on April 28, 1952, formally ended the state of war between Japan and the Republic of China. Japan also renounced all claim to Taiwan and the Pescadores; without, however, commenting on their final legal disposition. The two most contentious issues were dealt with in appendices to the treaty. In an attached protocol, the ROC, “as an expression of generosity and goodwill,” voluntarily dropped its claim to reparations, renouncing its “interest in the compensation Japan ought to offer based on Article 14 (a) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.”22 In an additional exchange of notes, it was understood that the terms of the treaty only “applied to those areas which are now, or may hereafter come under the rule of the government of the Republic of China.”23 Limiting the geographical applicability of the treaty, it was hoped, would leave room for the Japanese government to pursue relations, especially trade and economic relations, with the PRC. In Diet questioning after the signing of the treaty, Yoshida maintained that the treaty with the government on Taiwan would

28

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

not constrain Japan’s relations with the PRC. Thus, Yoshida envisioned what amounted to a “two-China” policy that sought relations with both Chinese regimes. Chen Zhaobin has argued that this preference for a two-China solution was widely shared within conservative circles.24 Unfortunately for Yoshida, the two-China position was as unpopular in Beijing as it was in Taipei and Washington.25 Whatever Yoshida’s intentions, the PRC leadership interpreted the clause limiting the treaty to “territories which are now, or which may hereafter come” under Nationalist control as Japanese support for a Nationalist counter attack on the mainland rather than an opening for relations. The PRC government denounced the treaty as “a most serious, most unabashed action meant to provoke war with the People’s Republic.”26 Zhou Enlai set the conclusion of the treaty in the context of the release and rehabilitation of war criminals in Japan and warned of the possibility of cooperation between newly released Japanese militarists and the GMD military (a number of former Japanese army officers did, in fact, go on to serve as military advisors to Chiang Kai-­shek and the GMD army).27 It is also clear, however, that the PRC leadership’s main concern was the relationship of the Japanese and Nationalist governments to the United States. The PRC leadership always stressed US initiative in pressuring the Japanese government to conclude the treaty with the Nationalists. For example, on May 5, 1952, Zhou denounced the Japan-ROC treaty as a “mad plot” of the American and Japanese reactionaries to arm Chiang Kai-­shek for an attack on the mainland as a step toward the establishment of American imperialist rule in Asia. Again playing to nationalist opposition in Japan, Zhou denounced Yoshida’s “cowardly” submission to the United States as a violation of the wishes of patriotic Japanese.28 This overriding concern with the US-Japan alliance also meant that some room existed for improved relations with Japan as part of a Chinese strategy to undermine the alliance. The PRC leadership, therefore, was not averse to expanding informal contacts or trade relations with Japan. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the PRC followed a policy of encouraging trade with Japan as part of an incremental or “accumulative” approach (tsumiage hōshiki) to the establishment of political relations. As Zhou explained to a JSP delegation in 1957, the two nations should first concentrate on advancing private relations through “people’s diplomacy” and on that basis develop semi-­governmental contacts, which would eventually break US control of Japanese foreign policy and lead to the normalization of diplomatic relations.29 Since the main objective of the 1952 treaty for Chiang Kai-­shek was to preclude relations between Japan and the PRC, the Nationalist leadership may not have been terribly troubled by the clause limiting the applicability of the

The China Problem in Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy

29

treaty.30 So long as the United States remained hostile to the Chinese Communists and the PRC leadership remained firmly committed to an exclusive one-China policy, dramatic improvement in Japan’s relations with the mainland was unlikely. The Nationalist leadership, however, had other worries regarding the Japanese position on China. These had to do with Japanese intentions toward the island of Taiwan as opposed to the ROC. Given the history of Japanese colonization and the unpopularity of early Nationalist rule, the ROC leadership feared Japanese interference in the island’s politics, especially the possibility of Japanese support for Taiwanese independence movements.31 Because of these concerns, during the peace treaty negotiations, while the ROC leadership acquiesced in the geographical limitation of the treaty’s applicability, the Chinese representatives opposed inclusion of a clause guaranteeing free travel and movement of citizens and even resisted the treaty’s commercial clauses or mutual most-­favored nation treatment.32 On the Japanese side, just as Yoshida’s flexibility on expanding trade with the mainland did not imply sympathy for PRC policy, so the successful conclusion of the 1952 treaty should not be taken as an indication of widespread enthusiasm, even among Japanese conservatives, for the policies of the Nationalist government, especially regarding the ultimate goal of the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. Even if we do not go as far as Chen Zhaobin in ascribing the Japanese conservatives’ two-China preference to a hidden desire for the “reunification” (saitōgō) of Japan and Taiwan, it is clear that reluctance to recognize the ROC as the legitimate government of China was not only a manifestation of concern for relations with the mainland or the legal problems of Chiang’s claim to represent all of China. It was also the result of the fact that many in the Japanese conservative establishment did not support Chiang Kai-­ shek’s one-China vision. The strong commitment to Chiang Kai-­shek among conservatives developed only later and always existed somewhat uneasily with a sentimental or nostalgic attachment to the island manifest in a preference for an independent Taiwan.

Sino-Japanese relations after Yoshida Just as the Yoshida Doctrine came to define Japanese diplomacy in general, its China corollary—recognition of the ROC, while maintaining the possibility of relations, especially trade relations, with the PRC to the extent these did not threaten the alliance with the United States—was institutionalized as the

30

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

government policy on China. This basic position characterized the policies even of those administrations which sought to challenge the larger Yoshida Doctrine. Yoshida stepped down in December of 1954 and the succeeding three prime ministers, Hatoyama Ichirō, Ishibashi Tanzan, and Kishi Nobusuke all sought to challenge important aspects of the Yoshida Doctrine. Yet, they were unsuccessful in reorienting either Japanese foreign policy in general or China policy in particular. By 1960, policy toward the PRC had settled into a familiar pattern of “separating politics and economics” (seikei bunri), under which Japanese governments sought expanded economic and trade relations with the mainland but rebuffed any political overtures that might provoke the Chinese Nationalist or American governments.

Conservative challenges to the Yoshida Doctrine Yoshida was succeeded as prime minister in December 1954 by Hatoyama Ichirō, his most powerful rival in the conservative camp. Hatoyama came to office committed to an “autonomous” foreign policy that sought greater freedom of action for Japan within the US-Japan alliance. Hatoyama hoped to undo the more blatantly submissive aspects of the Yoshida Doctrine that rankled conservatives and provided powerful political ammunition to the opposition. Key elements of this strategy included improving relations with the Soviet Union and China. Hatoyama’s approach to the Soviet Union was a qualified success, culminating in October 1956 in the normalization of relations, though not a peace treaty or resolution of competing sovereignty claims over the Kurile Islands, what the Japanese call the Northern Territories, seized by the Soviets at the end of World War II. Due to a combination of opposition from the United States and ROC governments, as well as Hatoyama’s own sympathy for a twoChina policy, however, his approach to the PRC foundered. In April 1955 the Hatoyama government sent a delegation under Takasaki Tatsunosuke and including Fujiyama Aiichirō (both of whom who went on to play important roles in trade relations with the PRC), to the Bandung Conference where they met with Zhou Enlai. At roughly the same time a Chinese trade delegation visited Japan and in May 1955 concluded a private trade agreement. Hatoyama initially promised government support for the agreement, including provisions for the exchange of permanent trade representatives. Under pressure from the United States and the ROC, however, Hatoyama was forced to distance himself from the delegation’s activities, cancel a personal meeting with their representatives, and restrict their travel within Japan. In the end, the government

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31

did not endorse the trade deal and did not allow any exchange of trade representatives.33 Hatoyama also undermined his own efforts with public statements in support of a two-China position. For example, in a radio address just five days after taking office, Hatoyama asserted that “both Communist China and Nationalist China are great independent countries.”34 Later Hatoyama described the goal of his China policy as “eliminating the opposition between the ‘two regimes’ of Zhou Enlai and Chiang Kai-­shek,” which was characterized in the press as “mediating between the two Chinas.”35 Hatoyama’s comments drew harsh criticism from Beijing as well as Washington and Taipei. Ishibashi Tanzan, who became prime minister in December 1956, was also a critic of the Yoshida Doctrine, especially policy toward China. Ishibashi was a prewar liberal journalist who had consistently opposed Japanese expansion on the continent. As a postwar conservative politician Ishibashi did not necessarily oppose cooperation with the United States but believed, like Yoshida, that economic reality required close relations with China. And like Hatoyama, he was committed to normalizing relations with the PRC in order to demonstrate Japanese autonomy. Ishibashi, however, was more sympathetic than Yoshida or Hatoyama to PRC positions including the PRC’s claim to be the legitimate government representing the Chinese nation.36 Ishibashi’s rise to the post of prime minister was thus greeted with great hope by the PRC leadership and proBeijing forces in Japan. Ishibashi, however, was forced by illness to resign his position after just a few months without making any significant progress toward the normalization of relations with the PRC. After leaving office, Ishibashi continued to work for improved relations with the PRC. His visit to Beijing in 1958 established a direct connection between the pro-China faction in the conservative party and the PRC leadership and laid the groundwork for the visit the following summer by Matsumura Kenzō which eventually led to the first in a series of private trade agreements. Even Kishi Nobusuke, who led the most sustained attack on the Yoshida Doctrine and who became the arch-­enemy of progressive and pro-Beijing forces in Japan, came to office in 1957 hoping to improve relations with the PRC. Kishi had been a powerful ally of Hatoyama and had served as foreign minister in the Ishibashi cabinet. Kishi had defended moves to improve relations with the PRC mainly as a utilitarian strategy aimed at co-­opting opposition positions and defusing anti-American public sentiment. As prime minister, Kishi hoped that improving relations with the PRC might lessen domestic and Chinese opposition to his planned renegotiation of the US-Japan Security Treaty. In describing his

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The China Problem in Postwar Japan

own personal feelings toward the PRC, Kishi explained that though they were both communist countries, he was more favorably disposed toward the PRC than the Soviet Union. The Chinese, he noted, had never been a threat to Japan the way that the Soviet Union or the earlier Russian empire had been.37 In January 1957, a meeting of Japanese diplomatic personnel for the AsiaPacific region adopted a three-­point policy platform on China policy: 1) the government will not recognize the PRC or promote expansion of political relations; 2) the government will continue to promote the development of economic and trade relations, but without direct government involvement; and 3) the China problem will be handled in line with developments in the United Nations.38 This formalized the separation of politics and economics in relations with China and became the basic China policy of the subsequent Ikeda and Satō cabinets. Thus, on China policy Kishi was very much in the conservative mainstream. Whatever Kishi’s intentions toward the PRC, however, the ultimate goal of his administration, the one on which he staked his political legacy, was the renegotiation of the US-Japan Security Treaty to make it a more equal bilateral defense pact. In his drive to revise the treaty, Kishi would forge close ties with the ROC leadership and alienate the PRC. Kishi today is remembered in the PRC (as he often is in Japan) as the most reactionary and anti-Chinese of postwar Japanese prime ministers. Kishi was scheduled to visit the United States in June 1957 when, it was hoped, negotiations for revision of the security treaty would begin. In the run-­up to his visit, Kishi made a point of playing up his anti-­communist commitments. In May, Kishi made a tour of Southeast Asia, which included a stop in Taiwan on June 2, making him the first postwar prime minister to visit the island. Kishi stressed the importance of a united non-­communist Asia in maintaining freedom in the region, and expressed his support for Chiang’s aim to retake the mainland.39 The PRC registered its disapproval of this milestone in Japanese diplomacy, and expressed its disappointment in Kishi’s abandonment of the more agreeable policies of the Hatoyama and Ishibashi cabinets. Over the course of the following year, as Kishi’s renegotiation of the US-Japan treaty and the radicalization of Chinese politics associated with the Great Leap Forward progressed in tandem, PRC criticism of the Kishi government became increasingly strident. In May 1958 the Nagasaki flag incident, in which a young Japanese demonstrator tore down the PRC flag at a Chinese products fair in Nagasaki, led to the total breakdown of relations.40 Kishi’s strong-­arm tactics in getting the renegotiated US-Japan treaty through the Japanese Diet ultimately

The China Problem in Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy

33

led to his resignation in 1960 amid the largest popular protests of the postwar period.

Ikeda, Satō, and the separation of politics and economics Ikeda Hayato became prime minister in July 1960 determined to restore calm after the upheaval provoked by Kishi’s revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Ikeda, a “star pupil” of the Yoshida School of the conservative political mainstream, adopted a “low posture” in domestic and international politics aimed at avoiding divisive political issues. Ikeda also returned to the economics-­ first policy preferences of his erstwhile political sponsor, unveiling a plan to double national income in a decade. The renewed emphasis on economics and trade also made the new administration open to expanded economic relations with the PRC. At the same time, the Chinese Communist leadership emerged from the Sino-Soviet split and the disaster of the Great Leap Forward with a focus on economic reconstruction and a renewed interest in trade with Japan. Ikeda gave his support in 1962 to a visit by Matsumura Kenzō, leader of the proPRC faction of the Liberal Democratic Party, to Beijing which paved the way for the conclusion of a trade agreement in November of 1962. The trade agreement of November 1962, signed by Liao Chengzhi and Takasaki Tatsunosuke (the trade conducted under this agreement became known thereafter as LT trade), covered the years 1963–67 and restarted trade that had been suspended since the 1958 Nagasaki flag incident. Japanese exports to the PRC were concentrated heavily in products necessary for rebuilding Chinese agriculture like chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and agricultural machinery, while Chinese exports were to be made up mostly of natural resources (coal and iron ore) and agricultural products (soy beans and corn). The agreement also included a clause providing for extended payments for Chinese imports of Japanese industrial plant. To facilitate these payments, the Ikeda cabinet approved the use of Japan Export-Import Bank credits. The decision to use government funds to facilitate trade with the PRC provoked protest from both the United States and the ROC governments. Relations with Taipei were further strained in December 1963 by the Zhou Hongqing incident, in which the Japanese government allowed a would-­be defector from the mainland to return to Beijing after he had a change of heart. In response, in January 1964, the ROC recalled its ambassador to Tokyo. To quell these protests Ikeda’s foreign minister, Ōhira Masayoshi, enlisted the aid of Yoshida Shigeru. Yoshida visited Taipei in February 1964 to deliver a

34

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

personal letter. This “second Yoshida Letter” promised that any trade with the mainland would be carried out on a private basis and that the Japanese government would not offer any economic support for such trade. The letter further asserted that the Japanese government was opposed to a two-China policy and would offer “spiritual and moral support” for Chiang’s efforts to retake the mainland.41 Ikeda resigned in late 1964 and was soon hospitalized, passing away in August 1965, leaving his successor, Satō Eisaku, to deal with the fallout from the second Yoshida Letter. Today Satō is often listed in PRC historiography along with Kishi Nobusuke as one of the most anti-Chinese of postwar Japanese prime ministers. Satō, however, came to office amid great expectations on both sides for continued improvement in relations with the PRC. Satō was after all, like Ikeda, a protégé of Yoshida Shigeru and might have been expected to carry on Ikeda’s policies of expanded trade with the PRC. Before becoming prime minister, Satō made several moves to prepare the ground for an improvement in relations. In May 1964, Satō secretly met with Nan Hanchen, first governor of the People’s Bank of China, and professed his commitment to improving relations with the PRC. Satō even expressed his willingness to reconsider the Japanese government’s long-­standing policy of separating politics and economics, intimating that he might consider expanded political as well as economic relations. Satō also managed to arrange a meeting with Zhou Enlai to take place in Rangoon in 1965. Though this meeting ultimately had to be cancelled due to Ikeda’s illness, expectations were quite high on both sides for an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations under Satō.42 Once in office, however, Satō announced that he would honor the terms of the second Yoshida Letter and would not approve the use of Export-Import Bank credits to fund exports to the PRC. This decision, combined with Chinese nuclear tests, the Cultural Revolution, and Satō’s support for the US war in Vietnam, all worked by the end of the decade to bring relations with the PRC to their lowest point since the Kishi cabinet. Yet trade relations were never completely suspended as they had been in 1958, and after 1965 Japan was consistently the PRC’s largest trade partner. Although trade continued, the negotiation of trade agreements became much more difficult and politically contentious. In 1968 the long-­term LT trade agreement expired. Thereafter, trade agreements were concluded annually, carried out according to memorandums negotiated in Beijing (hence trade after 1968 is generally referred to as Memorandum Trade or MT Trade), negotiations that provided a platform for strident PRC criticism of Satō and the Japanese government.

The China Problem in Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy

35

Institutionalization of the China problem in Japanese politics Despite challenges from the domestic political opposition, both Chinese governments, and even from within the conservative party itself, by 1960 the Yoshida Doctrine and its China corollary had come to define Japanese China policy. Yet, the fundamental political rift that characterized Japanese domestic politics continued, as did the contest between the Nationalist and Chinese Communist governments. These fundamental Cold War divisions were institutionalized in the domestic Japanese political struggle over China policy as a split between pro-China (that is, pro-PRC), and pro-Taiwan (pro-ROC), political organizations that came to play important roles in the formation of Japanese China policy and in the China problem discourse. Before the 1970s, the most important and sustained opposition to the government’s China policy came from the progressive and leftist forces that dominated the opposition parties, the media, and academia. They were joined by a small group of pro-PRC politicians within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. While some on the left had powerful ideological attachments to the PRC, members of the pro-PRC faction from across the political spectrum were also animated by a concern for Japanese national independence. They saw relations with China as a site where they could assert some measure of Japanese autonomy in foreign affairs as part of their effort to recover an independent Japanese national identity.43 The institutionalization of the China problem in Japanese domestic politics began as the Chinese Communists neared victory on the mainland with the establishment of several key organizations dedicated to improving relations with the new China. The Japan-China Trade Promotion Association (Nit-Chū bōeki sokushinkai), and the Diet League for the Promotion of Japan-China Trade (NitChū bōeki sokushin giin renmei), were established in mid-1949 to promote trade with the mainland. The Japan-China Friendship Association (Nit-Chū yūkō kyōkai), held a preparatory meeting on October 1, 1949 and was officially established one year later. This organization was headed by Uchiyama Kanzō, renowned in both Japan and China for his prewar contributions to Sino-Japanese cultural exchange as the proprietor of the Uchiyama bookstore in Shanghai. His shop had been famous as a salon for the Chinese and Japanese literati, visited by the likes of Lu Xun and Tanizaki Jun’ichirō. Other organizations followed, such as the quasi-­governmental Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (Nihon kokusai bōeki sokushinkai), established in 1954 under the auspices of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and whose

36

The China Problem in Postwar Japan

membership included Ishibashi Tanzan as well as prominent business leaders. As the heavy emphasis on the promotion of trade suggests, these organizations sought to capitalize on the government’s separation of politics and economics to improve economic relations with the PRC. Indeed, the most conspicuous achievements of the pro-China faction’s so-­called people’s diplomacy were the trade agreements concluded in the 1950s and 1960s. The pro-Taiwan organizations arose in response to the achievements of the pro-PRC faction. Motivated by a combination of anti-­communism and a practical political desire to counter popular support for the pro-PRC position of the opposition, they forged a new commitment to the ROC and Chiang Kai-­ shek. The first organization to promote policy coordination between Japan and the ROC, the Japan-China Cooperation Committee (Nik-Ka kyōryoku iinkai), was formed in 1956 on the heels of the 1955 Bandung Conference and the conclusion of the third private trade agreement with the PRC. Initially headed by the influential LDP politician Ishii Mitsujirō, the committee organized semiannual conferences, held alternately in Taipei and Tokyo. It seems that there was initially considerable mutual suspicion between the Nationalists and the Japanese conservatives and the first four meetings of the Japan-China Cooperation Committee held in 1957 and 1958 were reportedly quite tense.44 Relations improved with Kishi’s visit to Taiwan and the breakdown of Japanese relations with the PRC after the Nagasaki flag incident of May 1958. After the fifth meeting of the committee in 1959, major LDP politicians and business leaders began to participate more actively. Thereafter, the Japan-China Cooperation Committee thrived under the patronage of LDP elders like Kishi Nobusuke, Ishii Mistujirō, and Ōno Banboku who acted as advisors to the group. Leading LDP participants in the committee included future prime minister Fukuda Takeo, future foreign minister Aichi Kiichi, Conservative politicians Kaya Okinori and Funada Naka as well as Kitazawa Naokichi, Yoshida Shigeru’s long-­time private secretary. The committee thus provided the ROC leadership with direct access to many of the LDP’s most powerful politicians, in contrast to the PRC leadership’s contacts with less powerful opposition party politicians and anti-­mainstream members of the LDP. Pressure from the ROC leadership exercised through the committee is said to have been key to Ikeda’s decision to send Yoshida Shigeru to Taiwan and Satō’s subsequent decision to abide by the second Yoshida Letter.45 It should be pointed out that most of the pro-Taiwan faction in the LDP did not oppose trade with the PRC as a matter of principle. Most, like their proChina counterparts, had extensive prewar experience on the mainland, had

The China Problem in Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy

37

imbibed the rhetoric of the importance of the mainland for the Japanese economy and shared the assumption that trade with China could contribute to Japanese economic development. As Kaya Okinori explained his position on trade, “We should carry out trade with all countries no matter what type. Japan must be able to import raw materials through trade and to export. Based on this outlook, peaceful trade is absolutely necessary for Japan and Communist countries are no exception to this principle.”46 Their enthusiasm for trade, however, was tempered by distrust of Chinese Communist intentions and worries about what they saw as the willingness of pro-China politicians to submit to PRC demands in order to garner trade privileges. The second major pro-Taiwan organization, the Asian Problems Study Group (Ajia mondai kenkyūkai, or A-ken), was formed within the ruling LDP and brought together the party’s pro-Taiwan wing in order to hold the line on China policy against the efforts of the pro-PRC faction. The group was formed on December 16, 1964, just after the formation of the Satō government. Relations with the PRC had seen significant improvement during the preceding Ikeda cabinet. Thus, like the Japan-China Cooperation Committee, the Asian Problems Study Group was a reaction to the successes of the pro-China faction and was perhaps also an effort to head off Satō’s early enthusiasm for improved relations with the PRC.47 The Asian Problems Study Group originally consisted of ninety-­eight LDP Diet members, the majority drawn from the Satō, Kishi, Ishii, Kawashima, and Miki factions. In addition to former prime minister Kishi, the group was closely associated with Kaya Okinori, finance minister in the Tōjō cabinet and convicted war criminal with an impressive network of conservative and right-­wing associations cultivated during a long career as a finance ministry bureaucrat, postwar LDP politician, minister of justice, chairman of the Japan Bereaved Families Association and CIA operative.48 On December 25, 1964, the group issued its interim report on foreign policy which laid out their position on relations with the PRC. Asserting the importance of Taiwan to Japanese security, the report argued that Japan should support US policy toward China, including protection of the ROC seat in the UN. PRC membership in the UN should be opposed so long as the PRC remained classified an aggressor as a result of its intervention in the Korean War. Trade with the PRC was condoned, but any PRC efforts to use such trade to “communize” Japan were to be strenuously resisted.49 In response to the organization of the Asian Problems Study Group, on January 28, 1965, the pro-China faction of the LDP founded the Asian-African Problems Study Group (Ajia Afurika mondai kenkyūkai, or AA-ken) with

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The China Problem in Postwar Japan

sixty-­nine members under the patronage of leaders like Matsumura Kenzō and Fujiyama Aiichirō. The group’s policy platform called for official government contacts between Japan and the PRC, government support for trade agreements and Japanese government support for PRC representation in the UN.50 In terms of party influence, throughout the Satō cabinet, the pro-Taiwan Asian Problems Study Group enjoyed an increasing numerical superiority. The group’s platform remained close to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs position on most questions and the group generally supported government policy while seeking to limit the influence of the pro-PRC Asian-African Problems Study Group. The Asian-African Problems Study Group remained numerically smaller and was represented by politicians from non-­mainstream factions, essentially forming an opposition party within the LDP. It is important to note, however, that while the institutionalization of the China problem tended to polarize LDP opinion on China policy, close to half of LDP Diet members did not belong to either group and that the uncommitted included the majority of the LDP’s most powerful politicians such as Satō Eisaku, Kōno Ichirō, Shiina Etsusaburō, Ōhira Masayoshi, and Tanaka Kakuei.

Conclusion Postwar Japanese China policy was significantly constrained by the Cold War international environment, as well as the political division the Cold War engendered within Japan. Japan’s China policy emerged as a strategic corollary to, and cannot be understood apart from, the broader Yoshida Doctrine of alliance with the United States and concentration on economic reconstruction. Just as the Yoshida Doctrine came to define postwar Japanese foreign policy in general, the China corollary came to define Japanese China policy until 1972. The next chapter will show how positions on China policy were inseparable from notions of Japanese national identity as part of the larger China problem.

2

The China Problem in the Japanese Discourse on National Identity The formulation of government policy toward China detailed in the previous chapter was only one part of the China problem in postwar Japan. The China problem also engaged deeper issues of Japanese national identity. The state of relations with China was imagined to be revealing of the Japanese nation’s place in international society and reflective even of essential traits of Japanese national character. In addition to the importance of China to Japanese security and prosperity, it was this intellectual or psychological concern that drove much of the popular and academic interest in relations with China in postwar Japan. Understanding this discursive aspect of the China problem requires examining the way in which narratives of Sino-Japanese relations were deployed rhetorically as part of a struggle to define the Japanese nation, its relationship to the postwar state, and its place in international society. In the early postwar period, progressive and leftist narratives of national identity defined the Japanese nation in opposition to the Japanese state and called for the liberation of the Japanese nation from its domination by the United States and the conservative Japanese political establishment. In this narrative, Japan and China occupied similar positions in international society as victims of American imperialism and promotion of relations with the PRC was imagined as an act of national resistance to both the Japanese state and its American sponsor that constituted an important step on the path to true national independence. This narrative never went unchallenged, however, and by the mid-1960s a conservative counter-­narrative of national identity which sought to overcome the opposition of nation and state was becoming increasingly salient. In this counter-­narrative, the recovery of a true national identity was to be achieved through the resistance of the unified Japanese nation-­state to the policies and ideology of the PRC.

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The China Problem in Postwar Japan

Postwar discourse on Japanese national identity To understand why the China problem became so polarizing in postwar Japan, it needs to be understood in the context of postwar Japanese nationalist discourse. It is worth examining this discourse in some detail, because not only did it substantially affect positions on the China problem, but also because a central tenet of postwar Japanese nationalist discourse was that the Japanese in the postwar period had no national identity. It has been tempting to see the war as the culmination of nationalism run amok, and to view defeat, therefore, as the defeat of nationalism. It has been easy to assume that, “Japanese nationalism—if defined as a sense of national identity and purpose—died a victim of World War II.”1 The idea that defeat made nationalist sentiment taboo is reinforced by the widespread postwar commitment to pacifist and democratic ideals. The early postwar enthusiasm for and tenacious defense of occupation-­imposed reforms have suggested to some a lack of national identity on the part of postwar Japanese, manifest in a complete rejection of Japanese national history, culture, and traditions, a condition that some have called “national nihilism.”2 This national nihilism is often assumed to have been exacerbated by the Cold War. Bereft of an independent national identity, the Japanese became susceptible to the influence of the foreign ideologies of capitalism and communism. The Japanese “internalized” the Cold War and recreated it in domestic politics, unnaturally dividing the nation between left and right and making any discussion of national identity politically divisive and therefore taboo. There’s no denying the challenge that defeat posed for the nationalist symbols and nationalist rhetoric that legitimated Japanese war aims and mobilized the Japanese populace in their pursuit. But the further assertion that defeat in war led to a taboo against nationalist discourse is much more difficult to maintain. As Kevin Doak has pointed out: It is often assumed that the devastation of Japan’s cities in the final years of the war and the humiliation of defeat and occupation cleansed the Japanese people of any attraction to nationalism . . . Nothing could be further from the truth. There was a wide ranging and very public expression of nationalism from the immediate postwar days throughout and beyond the period of occupation, and it came from all points on the political spectrum: right, left and center.3

In fact, far from representing the death of Japanese national identity, defeat and the embrace of postwar democracy breathed new life into Japanese nationalist

Japanese Discourse on National Identity

41

discourse. Defeat inspired postwar Japanese to rehabilitate national identity, to cleanse it of its association with war and defeat, and to articulate a normal or healthy Japanese national identity. In addition, by discreditng official government nationalist narratives, defeat could be seen as liberating Japanese nationalism from domination by the Japanese state, and democracy as opening space for the profusion of popular nationalist narratives. Maruyama Masao in 1947 observed that, “now for the first time it is possible rationally to criticize the very hub of state power,” and “the complicated process of forming the national will . . . has been opened to the public.”4 Neither defeat nor democratization sounded the death knell for Japanese nationalism. Defeat and democracy, “. . . marked a new lease on life for nationalism, a discourse that foregrounded the Japanese people themselves as agents of their common fate.”5 In the end, disastrous defeat and foreign-­imposed democracy probably only strengthened national consciousness and injected new energy into the project to define national identity. This is not to deny the peculiar challenges that defeat and the postwar domestic and international political environment posed for the articulation of a postwar Japanese national identity. Especially problematic in this regard was reconciling the relationship between the Japanese state and the Japanese nation. Kevin Doak has identified a sharp conceptual distinction between the nation (minzoku or kokumin) and the state (kokka) as a central theme that has run throughout the history of modern Japanese nationalism.6 The problem of defining the relationship between the Japanese state and nation not only continued in the postwar period but was made even more pressing for several reasons. First, the American occupation had preserved the imperial institution and had ruled Japan indirectly through the Japanese government. Thus, despite the purge and other occupation reforms, important institutions (like the bureaucracy), and symbols (like the emperor, national flag, and national anthem) of the wartime state persisted very visibly in the postwar period. Moreover, with the reverse course and the end of the occupation, many of those purged for their participation in the wartime government returned to public life (including Hatoyama Ichirō and Kishi Nobusuke who both served as prime minister), which only increased the association between the postwar Japanese state and its discredited prewar predecessor. Second, the relationship with the United States made identification with the postwar Japanese state even more problematic. The US-Japan alliance, along with the partial peace, placed severe constraints on Japanese foreign policy options and for many was seen as precluding a truly independent foreign policy.

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The China Problem in Postwar Japan

Many came to see the relationship with the United States as one of permanent dependency. The taint of foreign domination combined with continuity with the prewar state made patriotism (aikokushugi)—national identity in the form of allegiance to the state and its symbols—highly controversial in postwar Japan. Another important theme of Japanese nationalist discourse pointed out by Doak has been “a belief that the nation was both immanent and transcendent, that it actually existed in the present but also had potential that was yet unrealized . . . that national aspirations were never fulfilled in any given moment.”7 Defeat only heightened this sense that the nation was an ideal yet to be achieved. It was axiomatic that national recovery and independence depended upon the articulation of a normal, healthy, national identity to replace the discredited nationalist rhetoric that had led the Japanese to war. Taking these themes together we can say that postwar Japanese nationalist discourse has been concerned with explicating the proper, normal, or healthy relationship between the Japanese nation and state. At the same time it has been nearly universally assumed that this relationship between the two has yet to be achieved. In essence, Japanese national identity is characterized by a sense of the lack or loss of a proper relationship between the nation and the state, whether it was assumed that the Japanese nation was opposed to and suppressed by an illegitimate, unrepresentative state (as in the case of most leftists) or that state and nation have been unnaturally rent asunder (as in the case of their conservative opponents). Postwar Japanese nationalist discourse, across the political spectrum, has revolved around the question of how best to recover a lost national identity. The China problem, when it intruded upon postwar Japanese politics, would necessarily be integrated into this discourse on national identity. The China problem in postwar Japanese nationalist discourse concerned how Japan’s relations with China contributed to, or hindered, the recovery of a lost national identity. Relations with China would be judged according to whether they aided the creation of a united, truly independent Japan with a healthy relationship between the state and nation. Those on the left, who tended to see the postwar Japanese state as unrepresentative and in the service of a foreign power, also tended to see relations with the PRC as an act of resistance to both the domestic Japanese political order and the American Cold War order that supported it. In addition, the Chinese Revolution served as an inspiration or even a model of true national independence. For those on the right, this very identification with the PRC, like the lack of respect for state symbols, was emblematic of the unnatural separation between nation and state and constituted a major impediment to the recovery of national identity. Conservatives stressed

Japanese Discourse on National Identity

43

the foreign-­ness and otherness of China and relations with the PRC were seen as a site for the recovery of a independent national identity through the unification of the nation and state in the protection of state interests and resistance to Chinese policies and rhetoric. The left-­right split over the legitimacy of the postwar state was mirrored in the left-­right split on the China problem. I will next look at the central tenets of progressive and leftist nationalist narratives in early postwar Japan before turning to how the China problem was incorporated into these narratives. I will then take up conservative challenges to progressive and leftist narratives of Japanese national identity and the China problem.

Progressive and leftist narratives of national identity Maruyama Masao is often taken as representative of the postwar “progressive men of culture,” considered emblematic of the postwar rejection of nationalism in favor of pacifism and postwar democracy. Indeed, Maruyama famously located the source of Japanese militarism in wartime ultra-­nationalism (chōkokkashugi).8 This has often led observers to conclude that Maruyama “saw nationalism as a terrible thing and devoted his entire oeuvre to preventing a recurrence of it in postwar Japan.”9 As Doak pointed out, however, what Maruyama called ultra-­nationalism should not be understood to mean an excess of nationalism, or a “hyper-­intense” nationalist sentiment. Rather, Maruyama’s ultra-­nationalism referred to a nationalism that focused exclusively on the state, or had been co-­opted by the state. Maruyama sought to replace wartime state-­ centered ultra-­nationalism with a “healthy,” liberal or civic sense of nationalism based on free individual participation in national political life. He advocated a national identity based on a form of civic nationalism (kokuminshugi) that distinguished it from ethnic nationalism (minzokushugi) or patriotism (aikokushugi) focused on the state. For Maruyama and the progressives, the problem to be battled was not nationalism but the domination of the Japanese nation by the Japanese state. Individual civic participation in a liberal democracy would allow the Japanese people themselves to recover a healthy Japanese national identity from the ashes of defeat. As Oguma Eiji points out, Maruyama did not see nationalism as incompatible with democracy, but rather sought the “integration of nationalism and democracy.”10 With the reverse course, the intensification of the Cold War, and deepening political division in Japan, however, many on the Marxist left came to negatively

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The China Problem in Postwar Japan

associate Maruyama’s conscious referencing of Western liberal notions of civic nationalism with the American domination of Japan. For leftists, the end of the occupation did not end this domination. Instead, the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty made Japan a junior partner in American imperialism and “signaled a deepening of Japan’s ‘colonization’ under the postwar system of capitalism and American hegemony, or imperialism.”11 In contrast to Maruyama’s civic nationalism, leftists constructed an ethnic nationalism (minzokushugi) that grounded national identity in national history and national culture—which in this case referred to the historical experience and cultural practices of the masses as opposed to the history and symbols of the modern state centered on the emperor. Where Maruyama looked to Western liberal democracy to reconcile the state and nation, leftists looked to Asian national liberation movements as inspiration for the liberation of the Japanese nation from the postwar state and its American sponsor. This leftist narrative of national identity was exemplified by a movement for national awakening (minzoku jikaku) led by a group of Marxist historians active in the Historical Science Society (Rekishigaku kenkyūkai) that included Fujiwara Akira, Inoue Kiyoshi, Ishimoda Shō, and Tōma Seita, among others. These scholars traced the failures of modern Japan, culminating in defeat and occupation, to the failure to develop a truly modern national identity and argued that unless postwar Japanese at last achieved national unity and a real national identity grounded in the history and culture of the ethnic nation (minzoku), they were in danger of repeating their past mistakes by not resisting the subjugation of the Japanese nation by the postwar state and the US-Japan alliance. It was their self-­appointed task to awaken the Japanese people to this national peril.12 For example, Inoue Kiyoshi defined modern nationalism as a process of overcoming the divisions among the people fostered by a feudal ruling class in order to achieve “internal unification and the establishment of subjectivity toward the outside world.”13 The struggle to forge a modern nation, however, had failed in the prewar period because Japanese nationalism had been captured by state elites and put in the service of the imperial state, or Emperor System. Japan had established a powerful state without creating a real nation. Without real national unity, Japanese nationalism had become nothing more than a prop for the Emperor System and was easily channeled into a sense of national superiority and outward aggression rather than a healthy national identity based on democracy at home and solidarity with the other nations of Asia.14 As Ishimoda put it in his History and the Discovery of the Nation, people tended to think that wartime Japanese had a strong national consciousness, but prewar nationalism

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was not a real nationalism that developed from within the Japanese nation itself. Rather it had been imposed by the ruling class after the Meiji Restoration. Because of this, Japanese lacked the national consciousness necessary to resist the ruling class as it led Japan down the path of imperialism and war. The Japanese nation (including its intellectuals) lacked the “backbone” to resist imperialist aggression.15 For leftists, then, the war was not the result of run-­away nationalism, but of the lack of a national identity among the Japanese people powerful enough to overcome domestic class divisions and form the basis for resistance to fascism at home and imperialism abroad. The scholars of the national awakening movement were determined not to fail in similar circumstances in the postwar period. After democratic reform was thwarted by the occupation’s reverse course, the Japanese nation again faced the danger of being oppressed by fascism at home and led into imperialist aggression in Asia, this time at the behest of the United States. At the 1954 conference of the Historical Science Society, Fujiwara Akira described the postwar Japanese political condition as one of “comprador fascism.” Where prewar fascism had been a domestic manifestation of a conscious Japanese policy of imperialist aggression, postwar fascism was characterized by its submission to American imperialism in Asia. Rather than colonizing Japan outright, the United States exercised control by indirect means, preserving the Emperor System and the Japanese state which served as “an agent for the exercise of American power,” and “a tool for the subjugation of Japan.”16 The real fascism of the prewar period, bad as it was, had at least been autonomous, unlike the comprador fascism of postwar Japan that was dependent upon the political and cultural domination of the United States. In addition to nurturing a comprador fascist political system at home, the USJapan alliance was leading Japan into a condition of “dependent imperialism” in Asia. Comparing the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty to the unequal treaties of the late nineteenth century, Inoue Kiyoshi warned that if the Japanese did not fight these treaties they risked becoming junior partners in American imperialism and embroiled in another destructive war of aggression in Asia.17 The struggle against comprador fascism and dependent imperialism encouraged a strong identification with Asian anti-­colonial movements. The Japanese struggle against the conservative postwar state and the USJapan alliance was explicitly linked to Asian national liberation movements, including the Chinese Revolution. Leftists argued that postwar Japanese were in essentially the same position as other Asians as victims of American imperialism. Defeat and occupation also destroyed any previous Marxist notions of Asian stagnation that had supported prewar notions of Japanese leadership in Asia. In

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The China Problem in Postwar Japan

fact, as national liberation movements progressed in Asia, prewar assumptions of a modern, advanced Japan and a stagnant Asia were reversed as Japanese argued that Japan needed to catch up to the other nations of Asia, especially China, in the struggle for true national independence. As Inoue Kiyoshi put it: “Today the various Asian nations, led by the People’s Republic of China have already completely liberated themselves from the long period of oppression and exploitation by the imperialist powers including, for a time, Japan. Among the Asian nations we Japanese are the furthest behind.”18 In essence, the Asianist element of modern Japanese national identity that imagined Japan in solidarity with the nations of Asia in a common struggle against Western imperialism survived into the postwar period, though Japan was no longer assumed to be the leading nation in Asia. In the early Cold War period this role was increasingly ascribed to the PRC. This provided the basis for the progressive and leftist position on the China problem. Many of the ideas of the national awakening movement remained influential across the political spectrum well after the movement had run its course in the 1950s. Despite their ideological differences, Marxists and progressives like Maruyama came to very similar conclusions about the lack of a true national identity as the cause of war and the need to cultivate such an identity in postwar Japan. For example, Uehara Senroku, who with Shimizu Ikutarō and Ienaga Saburō, founded the progressive Security Treaty Problem Study Group (Ampo mondai kenkyūkai), argued that prewar Japanese national consciousness had been nothing but state consciousness and there had not been a national identity that could transcend or oppose the state.19 Maruyama lamented the lack of nationalist sentiment among postwar Japanese who displayed the “apathetic spirit of a pan-­pan girl” (mukiryoku na panpan konjō—pan-­pan being slang for prostitutes who served foreign soldiers during the occupation), in comparison to neighboring Asian nations “overflowing with national fervor.”20 In fact, without the Marxist jargon, the notion that the Japanese lacked a healthy, normal, or real national consciousness was a sort of master narrative for postwar Japanese nationalist discourse and would be taken up and advanced successively by progressives, leftists, and conservatives. Like the idea of national awakening, the identification with Asia was not limited to leftists but was widely shared among postwar intellectuals. The early postwar progressive author Shimizu Ikutarō saw the postwar period as one in which Japan would “return to Asia” and declared that, with defeat, “once again, the Japanese are Asians.” Among the factors that Shimizu cited as making Japan Asian were, “that Japanese society was extremely poor in comparison with the

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47

United States and that the United States harbored deeply-­rooted racial prejudice toward the Japanese. Moreover . . . Japan was being forced to rearm while at the same time Japanese land was being stolen for American military bases.”21 Yanaihara Tadao, a Tokyo University economist and Japan’s foremost expert on colonial policy, compared the US occupation of Japan to Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan and Korea.22 For many intellectuals, occupation and the poverty and chaos that obtained after defeat made Japan seem much more like the nations of Asia struggling for national independence and development than one of the major powers that had waged war. Despite the fact that, as Andrew Barshay points out, many postwar Japanese made such analogies without much reflection on how this situation had come to pass, in the early postwar period the idea that Japan occupied a position in international society analogous to that of other Asian nations was indispensable to the leftist and progressive nationalist identification with Asia, and especially China.23

The China problem in progressive nationalist discourse Just as it might be tempting to see defeat as the death of Japanese nationalism, so it is easy to assume that defeat, occupation, and the alliance with the United States meant the abandonment of the Japanese identification with Asia and Asianist formulations of Japanese nationalism. If the war had been justified with slogans for securing “Asia for the Asians” one might see the postwar period, in contrast, as the quintessence of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s famous call for the Japanese to “escape from Asia.”24 As Zhuge Weidong has pointed out, however, in the wake of defeat, Japanese contemplating the causes of the national disaster and models for reconstruction turned not only to Western models of liberal democracy, but also to the Chinese Revolution.25

Takeuchi Yoshimi and the China problem No one in Japan is more associated with the postwar reevaluation of the Chinese Revolution than Takeuchi Yoshimi. Takeuchi is difficult to characterize as to left or right, and was often highly critical of Japanese Marxists. Takeuchi, however, shared many of the leftists’ concerns regarding the lack of a real Japanese national identity. He articulated these concerns in a rewriting of the comparative history of Japanese and Chinese modernity that influenced the progressive view of China through the early 1970s.

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The China Problem in Postwar Japan

Takeuchi Yoshimi was born in Nagano Prefecture and grew up in difficult economic circumstances in Tokyo, but in 1931 succeeded in entering the Department of Chinese Literature at Tokyo Imperial University. Takeuchi later explained that he had chosen Chinese literature mostly because it he thought it would be easy. Despite these accidental beginnings, a summer trip to China during his sophomore year, at the age of twenty-­two, instilled in him a real interest in contemporary Chinese literature and culture. On his return to Tokyo Imperial University, Takeuchi helped to organize the Chinese Literature Study Group (Chūgoku bungaku kenkyūkai), putting out a small journal of translations and essays with a circle of fellow students, including the novelist Takeda Taijun, who would be a confidant of Takeuchi for the rest of his life and an important commentator on contemporary China in his own right. After graduating, Takeuchi spent two years in Beijing from 1937 to 1939. In 1943 he was drafted and sent to the China front where he served until the end of the war.26 Before 1945 Takeuchi had made a name for himself as an Asianist intellectual, especially after his December 1941 article, “The Greater East Asia War and Our Determination” (Daitōa sensō to warera no ketsui), in which he celebrated the attack on Pearl Harbor as finally giving some legitimacy to Japan’s war effort and its Asianist slogans. The argument that Japan’s war became legitimate only after Pearl Harbor was reflective of the fact that, despite his support for the war against the United States, Takeuchi was a consistent critic of the war in China and was troubled by the way Imperial Japan’s use of Asianist slogans to justify the war betrayed his own ideals. While he had long been critical of wartime Japanese policy and ideology, in the wake of defeat Takeuchi shared with many other Japanese the fear that the wholesale rejection of wartime nationalist rhetoric threatened to undermine national consciousness in general and was concerned with establishing a new, healthy Japanese national identity. Like many other leftists and progressives, he found the proper focus of national identity in an organic ethnic nation rather than the symbols of the Japanese state.27 Unlike Maruyama, however, Takeuchi found the ideal of a healthy national identity not in Western liberal democracy but in the Chinese Revolution and especially the works of Lu Xun, the subject of his first book and a source of inspiration to which he returned throughout his career. Takeuchi’s position as the intellectual leader of the movement to make Chinese nationalism meaningful for postwar Japan was secured by his 1948 article “Chinese and Japanese Modernity” (Chūgoku no kindai to Nihon no kindai). In this and other articles, Takeuchi argued that defeat and occupation proved that Japanese

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modernization had failed. For Takeuchi, what had been celebrated as Japan’s success in becoming a modern world power represented not true modernization, but only superficial Westernization. Real modernization, in his view, was rooted in national resistance to Western imperialism and foreign ideologies, a resistance that produced an indigenous form of modernity. Japan, by contrast, had simply capitulated to Westernization as the Japanese adopted one Western ideology after another in what he called an effort to become the “star pupils” of Western modernity. This failure, Takeuchi explained, was the result of the lack of an independent Japanese national identity. In fact, Japanese possessed no indigenous national consciousness, only a “slave mentality” that eschewed national resistance in favor of diligent accommodation to a series of foreign ideologies.28 Takeuchi contrasted this Japanese failure with what he argued was the success of Chinese modernization rooted in a thorough-­going resistance to Westernization. Just as he attributed Japanese failure to resist the West to a lack of national identity, so Takeuchi discovered in the Chinese Revolution a national identity rooted in resistance which endured even when modernization-­asresistance led to the wholesale rejection of Chinese tradition, as happened during the May Fourth movement. With this comparison, Takeuchi stood accepted historical narratives on their heads. The success and rapidity of prewar Japanese industrialization and imperial expansion was proof, not of resistance to Western imperialism, but rather of capitulation, while the strife and chaos of Chinese modern history was evidence not of failure, but was in fact proof of Chinese national resistance and therefore the mark of true modernity. Takeuchi thus shared the concerns of Japanese leftist nationalists about the lack of an independent Japanese identity and found in the Chinese Revolution an ideal of a truly independent national identity rooted in national resistance. Yet Takeuchi himself was not a communist or a Marxist and, in fact, was often critical of Marxist views of China. He saw calls for a Chinese-­style revolution in Japan as simply another example of the Japanese “star pupil” mentality and the penchant for the passive adoption of foreign ideologies. For Takeuchi, the Chinese Revolution was an inspiration, an ideal of an Asian spirit of national resistance to the West, but he argued that Chinese Communist ideology could not be imported as the basis of postwar Japanese nationalism. For Takeuchi, real nationalism was an organic “national sentiment” (kokumin kanjō) that grew out of the everyday experience of national life, rather than an ideological or theoretical construct that could be imported from abroad.29 Importantly, a powerful, independent Japanese national identity was also crucial for improving relations with China. For Takeuchi, both prewar Japanese

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The China Problem in Postwar Japan

contempt for China and the uncritical admiration for China of the postwar Marxists were the result of the lack of an independent Japanese identity. Japanese needed to cultivate a national consciousness that was truly indigenous, independent not only of the West, but also of China. Takeuchi argued that the “fundamental condition for eliminating Japanese feelings of contempt for China is the creation of a Japanese culture that is independent of Chinese culture.”30 Japanese nationalism was not incompatible with stable Sino-Japanese relations. In fact, the key to peaceful, friendly Sino-Japanese relations was the cultivation of Japanese national consciousness. Takeuchi’s ideas influenced progressive views of China. In place of an earlier historical narrative of Japan as the only successful case of Asian modernization, after 1949 perceived Japanese failure was increasingly contrasted with Chinese success in establishing an independent, united China as the culmination of China’s modern revolution. Japanese progressives saw in the Chinese Revolution an example of indigenous revolutionary change. Many progressives had traced the failure of Japanese modernization to the lack of an indigenous democratic revolution in Japan and worried about the imposed nature of postwar democracy. After 1949 it seemed that, “Mao’s success represented the victory of indigenous, internally-­generated change, which made postwar Japan’s foreign-­tutored democratic ‘revolution’ seem like a sacrifice of identity and cultural integrity.”31 The influence of Takeuchi is clear in Maruyama Masao’s changing view of China. Maruyama and Takeuchi were close acquaintances, having first met at Tokyo University after the war. Both lived in Tokyo’s Kichijōji neighborhood and participated in many of the same progressive political and academic groups, such as the Constitution Problems Study Group (Kempō mondai kenkyūkai), the Lectures on the History of Modern Japanese Thought (Kindai Nihon shisōshi kōza), and the China Lectures (Kōza Chūgoku).32 In later writings Maruyama sometimes referred to Takeuchi as “Hao-­san” (using the Chinese reading of Takeuchi’s first name), and credited Takeuchi for influencing his thinking on China, including convincing Maruyama to use the term Chūgoku rather than the prewar term Shina to refer to China.33 Before the war, Maruyama’s writings were based on the assumption that Japan had been the only Asian country to successfully modernize and that China was a case of failed modernization. Maruyama had explained China’s failure to modernize with reference to the differing cultural impact of Sino-­centric ideology (ka’i shisō). Maruyama argued that the overwhelming importance of this ideology in traditional Chinese political thought had hindered the adoption of the modern state ideal in China, whereas in Japan the Sino-­centric ideology

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was a foreign import and much less central to Japanese political thought. Hence resistance to Western modernity was weaker, facilitating the adoption of the modern state ideal in Japan.34 In a 1949 article in the progressive journal Tenbō, Takeuchi criticized Maruyama’s evaluation of Chinese modernization: “I feel that, even for a scholar like Maruyama, an unconscious traditional Japanese contempt for China hinders correct understanding.”35 He argued that Maruyama confused a difference in the timing of modernization in China and Japan with the qualitative success of modernization. Maruyama assumed that because Japan had modernized earlier and more quickly, Japanese modernization had been more successful. Takeuchi, of course, drew the exact opposite conclusion. For Takeuchi, the weight of traditional culture in China, which made modernization so much more difficult, also provoked stronger cultural resistance to Westernization and necessitated a more prolonged and thorough-­going internal cultural reform which became the basis for an indigenous Chinese modernity. In contrast to Maruyama, Takeuchi interpreted the rapidity and relative ease of Japanese modernization as evidence that it was superficial and less complete than Chinese modernization. Maruyama, in the epilogue to the 1952 edition of his Studies in the History of Japanese Political Thought (Nihon seiji shisōshi kenkyū), publicly admitted that his earlier views of China had to be corrected.36 Faced with what he perceived to be the failure of Japanese modernization (as evidenced by defeat), and the successful completion of the Chinese Revolution, China could no longer be seen as backward in comparison to a modern Japan. The position associated with Takeuchi and accepted by Maruyama, that a revolutionary socialist, independent China was more successful, advanced and more modern than Japan, was widely accepted in the early postwar period. Other of Takeuchi’s concerns also came to be widely shared in the discourses on national identity and China. The criticism of Japanese modernization as Westernization; the privileging of resistance as the mark of national independence; and the contrast between a Japan bereft of national consciousness and a China possessing a powerful, independent national identity (a comparison that often involved constructing China as somehow “pure” as opposed to a “corrupted” Japan), will all be encountered again in this study.

Leftists and the China problem Leftists shared most of Takeuchi’s concerns, bolstered by ideological affinity with the Chinese Communist movement. They disciplined Takeuchi’s emotional

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The China Problem in Postwar Japan

identification with China with Marxist theory. The application of Marxist theory to Takeuchi’s romantic nationalism and Asianist sentiment gave them a theoretical and “scientific” basis, lent them the prestige Marxism enjoyed in the early postwar period, and helped to cleanse Asianism of its association with imperialist and wartime rhetoric. In one sense, the postwar Marxist view of China was a rehabilitation of wartime Asianist narratives of national identity, now with the PRC rather than Japan as the most advanced, vanguard nation leading the Asian revolt against the West. Ishimoda Shō concluded that Japanese Marxists had to recognize that the PRC was now at a more advanced historical stage than Japan, that the prewar relationship between the two nations had been reversed, and that Japanese would have to learn from China. Ishimoda likened the contemporary situation to Japanese cultural borrowing in the Nara period (710–794 ce): “Our ancestors studied many aspects of Chinese institutions, culture and thought and a young, backward nation developed quickly.” Unlike in the past, however, when Chinese institutions were imported to legitimize the ruling elite, in the postwar period, learning from China was pertinent for the entire nation and was linked directly to a Japanese struggle for national liberation: Today the Japanese people are not simply absorbing given institutions or literary works but are studying the people’s way of life and the path to liberation from China. Just as the Chinese masses had great expectations for studying the path of national liberation from the Russian nation after the revolution, so the Japanese nation is prepared to study from liberated China, from Mao and Lu Xun.37

If Japanese academia was to follow the Chinese example and become a useful “weapon” in the struggle for national liberation, however, intellectuals would need to make a “thorough-­going self-­criticism” and abandon ideas about Chinese backwardness as expressed in the theory of the Asian mode of production. Ishimoda’s call for self-­criticism was not, however, an exercise in self-­ flagellation. In his analysis of Japanese intellectuals’ war responsibility, Ishimoda argued that Japanese intellectuals had been corrupted by the inordinate affluence accorded by imperialism and had lost their “backbone” (sebone), “grit” (kikotsu), and “uncompromising spirit of struggle” (hi-­dakyōtekina sentō seishin). The Chinese, in contrast, in their century-­long struggle against imperialism, had developed precisely such an uncompromising spirit of national resistance. This was what the Japanese were to study from the Chinese.38 Once again, the cause of Japanese imperialism and war was found in the weakness of Japanese national

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identity, a weakness that had prevented the Japanese from resisting participation in the imperialist system in Asia. Like Takeuchi, Ishimoda found in the Chinese the uncompromising national identity Japan lacked. The Marxist view of Sino-Japanese relations also rested on the assumption noted earlier that the Chinese and Japanese nations occupied analogous positions in the postwar world system as victims of American imperialism. When combined with the penchant to locate the site of national identification in an ethnic nation opposed to the Japanese state, relations with the PRC came to be perceived primarily as relations between the Japanese and Chinese nations which were bound together in common resistance to both American imperialism and the conservative Japanese government. The 1949 annual report of the Historical Science Society took up the topic of Sino-Japanese relations as part of the problem of the “Japanese ethnic nation in East Asia,” and concluded that the Chinese Communist Revolution was a “battleplan” for Japanese national liberation that must be studied in order to bridge the gap in historical development between China and Japan so that the two might forge a united front for the sake of common resistance to imperialism.39 The ideal of common resistance to US imperialism received its most famous expression in the Asanuma statement. In a 1959 speech in Beijing, the Japan Socialist Party politician Asanuma Inejirō declared that American imperialism was the common enemy of the Japanese and Chinese peoples.40 The Asanuma statement became an important plank in the JSP foreign policy platform, endorsed by the PRC leadership and reiterated in subsequent interparty summits and statements. Progressive and leftist Japanese in the postwar period were drawn to the PRC not because they had renounced their national identity in favor of radical cosmopolitanism or a masochistic guilt complex. Rather, they were attracted to the PRC precisely because the identification with the PRC offered the opportunity to rescue Japanese national identity from association with the war and defeat. They saw in the Chinese Revolution what they had hoped for in modern Japan and which seemed denied them still in the postwar period: national independence. At the same time, it seemed that the Chinese Revolution might rescue treasured notions of Asian resistance to the West from association with wartime aggression. Leftists and progressives did not need to renounce the aim of Japanese and Asian resistance to the West, they needed only to renounce the means of imperialist expansion. The implication for Sino-Japanese relations of the identification with China was that improving relations with the PRC in and of itself could be seen as an act of resistance to American imperialism and a move toward liberation from Japan’s subjugation in the American Cold War order. This nationalist

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The China Problem in Postwar Japan

project helped to support Japanese involvement in people’s diplomacy with the PRC in the 1950s and 1960s.

The PRC leadership and the Japanese discourse on national identity In the early postwar period, the PRC leadership was only too happy to encourage Japanese leftist and progressive nationalist narratives, finding them not only conducive to their own national interests but also complimentary to their own conceptions of Chinese national identity. The PRC leadership encouraged what they called anti-American patriotism as part of their effort to build a united front in opposition to the US-Japan alliance. In this effort, Chinese leaders maintained a rhetorical distinction between the Japanese state (ally of their principle enemy), and the Japanese people (who were important partners in an Asian struggle against American imperialism), that echoed progressive and leftist narratives of national identity. For example, Mao explained to visiting Japanese that neither the Japanese nor Chinese nations were fully independent because both were still subject to American imperialist pressure. Both nations, however, were struggling along the same path toward national independence and democracy, a struggle they shared with other Asian nations suffering under American domination like South Korea and the Philippines. The PRC leadership, therefore, pursued a united front with all anti-American forces in Asia. In Japan, the Chinese were joined in a “direct alliance” with the Japanese people and an “indirect alliance” with the pro-China, anti-­mainstream forces within the ruling LDP against their common enemy.41 Echoing their counterparts on the Japanese left, the Chinese leadership saw the cultivation of Japanese national consciousness as key to such an alliance and stressed the applicability of the Chinese revolutionary experience to the Japanese struggle against the United States. Mao defined the Japanese people’s struggle against the United States and the US-Japan security relationship as a struggle for national awakening (juewu) analogous to the Chinese nation’s awakening in the struggle against imperialism and Japanese aggression. The PRC leadership, therefore, gave its support to efforts to strengthen Japanese national identity and unity. Mao encouraged the Japanese people’s “struggle to increase Japanese national independence (minzu duli) and national rights (minzu quanli),” and appreciated it as part of the Chinese nation’s own struggle: “the Chinese people owe the Japanese their thanks for the Japanese people’s struggle for national

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independence.”42 As part of these efforts, the PRC leadership also supported Japanese nationalist positions on specific issues like the return of Okinawa (which in 1961 Mao compared to the Taiwan problem) and, after the Sino-Soviet split, the return of the Northern Territories. Chinese leaders were also inclined toward progressive narratives of Japanese identity because they reinforced Chinese self-­images of the PRC as the leader of world revolution. Chinese leaders saw the PRC as the “revolutionary homeland” and as the representative of the first successful Asian national liberation movement. A June 1951 article in the magazine Shijie zhishi entitled “The World Significance of the Chinese Revolution,” argued that the Russian Revolution was the classic example of revolution in imperialist countries, but that the Chinese Revolution was the model for revolution and national liberation movements in colonial and semi-­colonial countries, including the movement in Japan against the US-Japan alliance.43 The Japanese progressive nationalist narrative was also attractive to the Chinese leadership for the way it supported Chinese self-­images of the PRC as politically advanced. Mao on several occasions noted that the PRC was economically backward in comparison with Japan and had much to study from Japan in the fields of industry and economy. Politically, however, the Chinese Revolution as a model for Japan implied that, even if the Japanese and Chinese were in the same boat in terms of their opposition to US imperialism, the Chinese had advanced much further on the road toward socialism and national independence. For example, at the time of the security treaty crisis in Japan, Mao declared that he “could not believe that a nation as great as Japan could for long be controlled by others,” and expressed his optimism that the Japanese nation would be awakened, as the Chinese had, to the need to resist the United States.44 There was also a natural resonance between the Asianist tendencies of the pro-China forces in Japan and the PRC leadership’s self-­image of the PRC as the vanguard of national liberation in the Third World. Mao himself encouraged the Japanese to identify themselves with Asian national liberation movements. In October of 1955, just after the Bandung Conference, in a meeting with a Japanese Diet delegation Mao asserted the common interests of the Japanese and Chinese as “colored races.”45 During a visit by Matsumura Kenzō in 1962, Zhou Enlai argued that the “East is East, and for the sake of the development of the East, the countries of the East have to join in mutual cooperation.” Matsumura echoed Zhou in his farewell address, “East is East, and Asians have to change [the course of] world history . . . We belong to one body, and we should strengthen our relations between countries of the same race and culture.”46

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The China Problem in Postwar Japan

The assumed complementarity of Chinese and Japanese national interests and identity and the rhetorical separation of the Japanese nation from the state also supported a reading of the history of Japanese aggression in China that downplayed Japanese war guilt and focused instead on improving relations in the present. For example, in 1955 Mao told a visiting Japanese legislative delegation that he was puzzled by Japanese who felt compelled to apologize for the war. Mao argued the Japanese owed no one any apologies for acts in the past, “old debts can’t do us any harm, present differences in political systems can’t do us any harm either. The past is past, what’s important are the problems of the future.” Mao explained that Japanese who felt shame or a loss of face because of the war and defeat failed to distinguish clearly between the Japanese people and Japanese capitalists and militarists. “The Japanese people do not bear war responsibility,” Mao argued, “war responsibility lies with the monopoly capitalists and the militarists who deceived the Japanese people and forced them into war.” Postwar Japanese had been absolved of responsibility for the war (meiyou fudan le) because after defeat Japan had been shorn of its colonial possessions and had itself become a semi-­colony occupied by US troops: “Japanese now owe no debt to anyone,” Mao said, “in fact, others—the United States, Britain and France—owe a debt to Japan.”47 Mao’s position accorded well not only with Marxist nationalist narratives, but also with a noted tendency in Japan toward victim consciousness, ascribing culpability for the war to a few militarists, while focusing on the Japanese people as victims of both Japanese militarism and American bombing. At times Mao went beyond merely playing down the negative aspects of the war. On several occasions he argued that Japanese aggression had been a necessary catalyst for the development of Chinese national consciousness. Although aggression is obviously bad, Mao argued, national awakening required an external threat: “if Japanese had not occupied large portions of China, the Chinese nation would not have awakened.” In a 1961 meeting with a JSP delegation, Mao suggested that one should not concentrate solely on the negative aspects of the Japanese invasion: “if it hadn’t been for Japanese aggression the Chinese people would not have been awakened . . . Therefore, Japanese militarists and monopoly capital had been good for a few things, you might even use the word ‘thanks’(gan xie).”48 In sum, conceptions of national interest and identity between the PRC leadership and Japanese progressives were largely compatible. Both drew clear normative distinctions between the Japanese nation and the Japanese state. Both saw the Japanese nation as less than fully independent, as oppressed by the United States and the conservative Japanese government. Both were comfortable

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with a progressive narrative that conceived of the PRC as more advanced politically (if not economically), than Japan, offering a model for Japanese emulation in the struggle for national independence. Given this compatibility, the Chinese leadership was more than willing to support leftist nationalist narratives, to see the development and expression of Japanese nationalist sentiment as in PRC interests, and to downplay issues of Japanese war guilt. It is also clear, however, that for the PRC leadership this view of Japan always depended upon the Japanese government’s relationship with the United States. As Mao put it in 1961, “It is American imperialism that forces the Japanese and Chinese people to unite.”49 This suggested that should the relationship between the PRC and the United States change, so might the PRC’s relationship with the Japanese state and Japanese nation, with implications for which nationalist narratives the Chinese leadership supported. Just such a change is a large part the story of the China problem in Japan in the 1970s.

Resurgent conservative narratives of national identity Progressive narratives of national identity and Sino-Japanese relations never went unchallenged. By the mid-1960s, Japanese economic development, generational change, and changed international circumstances energized conservative nationalist narratives that prescribed pride in the recognized success of the postwar state as a panacea for the alienation of the Japanese nation and state. Conservative identification with the state necessarily had implications for perceptions of the PRC which, rather than an ally in a struggle for national liberation, was seen as a competitor and threat to the Japanese state.

Japanese economic development Rapid economic development and the attendant growth of the middle class was the backdrop for this conservative resurgence. The well-­publicized role of government initiative and bureaucratic planning in Japan’s economic success may well have worked to make the state seem less a foreign-­backed oppressor than the benign manager of postwar economic recovery. Foreign recognition of Japanese accomplishments was also important in rehabilitating the image of the Japanese state. In 1964, Japan gained recognition as a developed country through admission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and The Economist devoted a special issue to what would come to be

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called the Japanese economic miracle.50 In October 1964, the world came to Japan for the Tokyo Olympics, a symbol of postwar Japanese accomplishments and the rehabilitation of Japan in the international community. In addition to stoking national pride, the expressions of patriotism that accompanied the Olympic Games also served as an graphic illustration of the ubiquity of national pride and national symbols in international society. Thus, the Olympics was not only a prop to Japanese pride, it was also an exhibition of what was considered normal patriotism, which contrasted with the problematic relationship between the state and nation and the ambiguous status of state symbols in Japan. Economic development also affected the intellectual environment as scholars and commentators turned to the task of explaining Japanese economic success. The modernization paradigm associated with W. W. Rostow was popularized in Japanese historiography and the social sciences after the Hakone conference of 1960 and the arrival of Edwin Reischauer as US ambassador to Japan in 1961. Modernization theory encouraged a more positive assessment of modern Japanese history and Japanese political and economic institutions as conducive to successful modernization.51 The re-­evaluation of Japanese history, tradition, and institutions in light of postwar Japan’s economic growth was itself closely related to a tendency to attribute the success of Japanese modernization to peculiar historical-­cultural factors, a tendency at the heart of the subsequent popularity of the Nihonjinron or Nihon bunkaron literary genre. One of the founding texts of this genre, Umesao Tadao’s Introduction to an Ecological History of Civilization (Bunmei no seitai shikan josetsu) was originally published in 1957, but gained widespread popular attention when it was included in a 1964 special issue of the monthly Chūō kōron, dedicated to the most important articles of the postwar period (a collection that also included Takeuchi Yoshimi’s 1948 article “Chinese and Japanese Modernity”). Umesao was motivated by what he perceived to be an inferiority complex in postwar Japan and his dissatisfaction with theories of civilization that relegated Japan to the position of a satellite civilization of either pre-­modern China or the modern West. Umesao argued that Japan constituted a civilization unto itself, distinct from the rest of Asia and on a par with Europe or China. Umesao stressed the parallel development of Japanese and European civilizations and the importance of indigenous Japanese institutions in accounting for the success of Japan’s modernization. Umesao’s argument was a challenge to those like Maruyama Masao and the Marxists who held that Japanese modernization had been a failure, as well as those like Takeuchi Yoshimi who held that Japanese modernization had been a process of mindless Westernization. In Umesao’s

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formulation, Japanese modernization was both successful and indigenous. Ueyama Shunpei, in his introduction to Umesao’s article, found the importance of Umesao’s work in the way it overcame the progressives’ “negation of Japan” (Nihon hiteiron) by providing an “affirmation of Japan” (Nihon kōteiren) as the basis for a new, positive Japanese national identity.52 Umesao’s positive re-­evaluation of Japanese modernity and the unique cultural traits that supported it also undermined Asianist sentiment that supported identification with China: We Japanese consider ourselves to be an Asian people. Moreover, we often think of ourselves as representative Asians. Thus, when we hear Westerners speak about Asia or the Orient, we assume they are talking about us. But this is a dangerous misconception. If one perceives Asia or the Orient as a monolithic whole, one is embracing an Occidental bias. From a truly Asian perspective, we should see that it is not that simple. Each Asian country has its own unique characteristics, none more so than Japan. Thus the problems we face are very different from those faced by other Asian nations.53

Echoing Fukuzawa Yukichi’s call to “escape from Asia,” Umesao argued that national identity was to be achieved not through identification with Asian struggles against the West but rather through resistance to being identified with an Asia that was itself a Western construct. Contrary to the assertions of Japanese leftists, Japan and China were not in the same position internationally and had different interests. Umesao warned that common Japanese assumptions about shared history and cultural affinity masked important differences between Japan and China and that Japanese actually understood very little about China. In the introduction to a later Chinese translation of his work, Umesao explained that real Sino-Japanese understanding had to be based on an appreciation of the differences between Japan and China.54 Identification with China, therefore, could not be the basis for an independent Japanese national identity. Postwar Japanese economic development and the new narratives of national identity that accompanied it thus worked to undermine identification with the PRC. Postwar Japanese economic success (especially when compared with the vagaries of the Chinese economy in the 1960s) meant that the PRC became much less pertinent as a model or a vision of Japan’s future. If, as Shimizu Ikutarō had declared in 1950, Japan had returned to Asia after defeat by dint of being a destitute, occupied nation, then postwar Japanese economic development and its increasing international recognition led many Japanese back to a greater appreciation of the fundamental differences between Japan and Asia, including China.55

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Generational change The discourse on national identity and the China problem in the late 1960s and 1970s was also influenced by the rise to prominence of a new generation in the literary, academic, and political worlds. Notable figures of this postwar faction (sengo ha), who were born in the 1930s, became influential in the 1960s and 1970s, and will be important for this study include: Honda Katsuichi (born 1931), Etō Jun (1932), Ishihara Shintarō (1932), Oda Makoto (1932), Kōsaka Masataka (1934), Ōe Kenzaburō (1935), and China scholars like Okabe Tatsumi (1932) and Nakajima Mineo (1936). Oguma Eiji has pointed out that despite their later political differences many of this generation shared some common concerns which would have implications for the development of the China problem in the 1970s. Having memory of wartime discourse and values, but having generally been too young to have been mobilized, many in this generation experienced the end of the war not only, or primarily, as liberation, but also as the destruction of their values and sense of community. As the conservative writer Etō Jun later explained, on August 15, he had “. . . felt a liberation from death” but at the same time, “I felt that I had to go on having lost something . . . as though my values had been destroyed.” His counterpart on the left, Ōe Kenzaburō, expressed a similar sentiment in 1959: “What do we die for? What do we live for? There was a time when there was a firm answer to this question—‘for the country,’ ‘for the country’ (kuni no tame ni). I think that this sense of purpose, of living and dying for the country gave the Japanese something like hope.”56 There was a common sense that postwar society, and postwar democracy, devoid of values save those of economic development and consumerism, was empty or false (kyoko) and they were concerned to regain a lost sense of community and a shared identity. Hence, their experience of the end of the war and a sense of dissatisfaction with postwar society enhanced a sense of loss and a desire to recover a sense of national identity. Progressives would continue to seek alternatives to the state as sites of national identification. For example, Ōe visited Hiroshima and Okinawa and found there “an active symbol of a new Japanese nationalism” based on pacifism, protection of the constitution, and opposition to US military bases.57 Conservatives like Etō Jun and Ishihara Shintarō, in contrast, would seek to recover lost national identity in a romantic unity of individual, state and nation which, by the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, would emerge as a powerful counter-­narrative to progressive and leftist nationalism.

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The American cultural influence on the postwar generation was also much more pervasive than had been the case for a previous generation. Many in the prewar generation had extensive experience in China. The Cold War separation of Japan from the continent and the new relationship with the United States, however, meant that national identity for the postwar generation was going to be defined much more with reference to an American other. For example, in 1962 Etō Jun traveled to the United States for two years of study at Princeton University where he was impressed by the power and depth of American patriotism. He was especially moved by the outpouring of patriotism occasioned by the 1963 state funeral for President Kennedy. Etō was moved not only by the “beauty” of the lionization of the fallen president as a national hero, but also by the comparison between this patriotic reverence for Kennedy and the inability of Japanese prime ministers to command the respect of the Japanese people. Ishihara Shintarō, at the time a popular young author, likewise had an important encounter with the power of American patriotism; in his case during a 1966 visit to South Vietnam. On his return to Japan, in an article entitled “On the Motherland” (Sokoku ni tsuite), Ishihara explained how moved he was by American soldiers who were willing to die for the sake of the state and bemoaned the lack of such sentiment in contemporary Japan.58 For many conservative Japanese, American patriotism provided a model of a normal national identity, one in which the individual identification with the state was taken for granted and one more appropriate to an advanced, industrialized Japan that was an increasingly powerful member of the Western Cold War alliance than identification with the Chinese Revolution or Asian national liberation movements.

War responsibility and the China problem The rise to prominence of the postwar generation added new impetus to the war responsibility debate as it related to the China problem. The postwar generation had come of age during the war but had not been in positions of social or political responsibility. They often chafed at a war responsibility debate that was dominated by the prewar generation and resented what they saw as an older generation discussing the collective responsibility of the Japanese nation for a war in which they themselves had not participated. For example, Ishihara Shintarō castigated the prewar generation for not dealing forthrightly with their war responsibility and leaving the postwar generation saddled with problems of war guilt and responsibility that hindered the development of a healthy national identity.59 For the postwar generation, war responsibility would be much less

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about making amends for past crimes than about avoiding the mistakes of their elders. The work of Honda Katsuichi was important in provoking renewed discussion of war responsibility and its connection to the China problem. Honda’s work also reflects the powerful influence of the United States on Japanese discourse, especially the American war in Vietnam. Honda, a reporter for Japan’s largest daily, the Asahi shimbun, began covering the war in 1967. Like Ishihara, Honda was deeply affected by his experience in Vietnam but with very different political implications. Honda filed dispatches that often focused on the effects of American military operations, especially aerial bombing, on ordinary Vietnamese villages. The effects of American bombing on Vietnamese farmers and villages that were evocative of the traditional Japanese way of life resonated with readers and recalled Japanese suffering at the end of the war. It was not difficult for Japanese to see themselves in the plight of the Vietnamese people.60 For Honda and others, opposition to the American war in Vietnam reinvigorated a progressive Asianist narrative of national identity in the face of challenges from conservatives. Honda’s reporting, however, also exposed Japanese complicity in the American war and soon led him into territory that was much less comfortable for many Japanese. Honda’s witness to what he considered American war crimes in Vietnam led him to the PRC in an investigation of Japanese war crimes committed during the war in China. Honda spent forty days touring China in 1971, conducting interviews with surviving victims of Japanese aggression. These were published in the Asahi shimbun in August and September 1971, just as media coverage of China was exploding as a result of Nixon’s surprise announcement that he would visit China, and came out in book form in 1972 as Journey to China (Chūgoku no tabi), which became a best-­seller in Japan and was translated into Chinese the same year. Honda’s work made the connection between the war responsibility issue and the China problem explicit. For Honda, American actions in Vietnam were a repeat of Japanese atrocities in China, and Japanese had a responsibility to resist contemporary American aggression and to oppose Japanese cooperation with US policy. War responsibility for his postwar generation was not about atoning for past sins but was a very real obligation to oppose war in the present. For example, on his return from China, Honda was queried on how Japanese were to fulfill their responsibility for the actions he detailed in his work. Specifically, he was asked if he had apologized to the Chinese he met. Honda answered that he had no reason to apologize for the Nanjing Massacre or other Japanese atrocities in China: “At the time that the Nanjing Massacre was committed, I was still a

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child. . . . Therefore, even though I am Japanese, I don’t think I myself should apologize . . . ‘Apology’ (owabi) for past militarism is meaningless. Resisting the danger of present-­day militarism is a real apology (shazai).”61 Honda himself bore no guilt for having perpetrated any wartime atrocities. The only way for Japanese to meaningfully make up for past aggression was to take concrete action to oppose militarism and war in the present. On the question of what this notion of war responsibility meant for relations with China, Honda held that to fulfill Japan’s responsibility the Japanese people had to oppose the Emperor System at home and unite with the Chinese in support of the Vietnamese people’s struggle against American imperialism: if the Japanese truly undertook antiwar activities against American imperialism, they would be standing up for Japan itself. This very action would in the end really benefit Vietnam. I think we can say exactly the same thing about China. . . . Once we awaken to an anger toward that which has led us astray and deceived us [the Emperor System], then that anger will be manifest in concrete action. This would be a true apology to the Chinese masses. At that moment, in addition to the Chinese “separation of Japanese militarism and the Japanese people,” the Chinese would be able to further say that “the time has come when we can truly unite with the Japanese people.”62

Honda’s investigation into Japanese war responsibility in the context of the American war in Vietnam reinvigorated the leftist and progressive Asianist nationalist narratives for a new generation. Japanese could fulfill their war responsibility and avoid the failure of their elders by liberating themselves from oppression by the Japanese state at home and joining with the Chinese to oppose the contemporary American war in Vietnam. Nakajima Mineo, a one-­time leftist who became a prominent conservative China scholar, made an argument about the nature of Japanese war responsibility similar to Honda’s, but took a diametrically opposed position on relations with the PRC. Nakajima visited the PRC in the fall of 1966 and, like Honda, met survivors of Japanese aggression. In one case, in a village in southern Guangdong Province, Nakajima met an elderly woman who had lost an arm and her husband in the Japanese invasion. Nakajima later explained that at the time he felt an inexpressible, “heavy, dark feeling.” Since he had not participated in the war, however, he found his feelings complicated, “I certainly felt sorry (sumanai kanji), but at the same time I felt a sort of feeling of liberation or relief that I had not had such an experience [of participating in Japanese aggression]. I also felt a

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kind of alienation in that I had not been able to participate in the decisive original experience of Chinese and Japanese interaction.”63 For Nakajima, as for Honda, national responsibility (minzoku sekinin) for postwar Japanese was less about atoning for actions in the past than promoting peace in the present. Unlike Honda, however, Nakajima did not see cooperation with the PRC as necessarily conducive to this effort: “For a person like me, who has come of age with a strong China, I get the feeling that the way Japan now deals with China is inappropriate. Indeed, I doubt that unilaterally bowing to every Chinese assertion can fulfill our real national responsibility.”64 Nakajima shared Honda’s notion of war responsibility as a responsibility to avoid war and promote peace in the present. He also shared with Honda an “alienation” from both the war and China that distinguished their generation from the prewar generation. Finally, the key to fulfilling this war responsibility for both was Japanese national independence. For Nakajima, however, such independence may have to be asserted in opposition to PRC policy rather than in cooperation with the PRC. Even some of Honda’s fellow progressives and allies in the anti-­war movement, like Oda Makoto, expressed unease with a close identification with the PRC. Oda was among the most notable of the new generation of Japanese progressives. He first came to public prominence with his 1961 best-­selling book, Let’s See Everything (Nandemo mite yarō), an account of his around-­the-world journey as a student returning from study in the United States. His account of his adventures thrilled a Japanese audience for whom international travel was still rare. He also claimed that in his travels he had come to know another side of the West (ura seiyō); the West of poverty, discrimination, and injustice. He came to see that the key to international justice was to sympathize with and support the small and the weak against the powerful. He went on to champion causes like that of the burakumin minority in Japan, but was especially inspired by the Vietnamese people’s struggle against the United States and came to be best known as the leader of Beheiren (Citizens’ League for Peace in Veitnam), an anti-­war group he founded with the philosopher Tsurumi Shunsuke. Like Honda, Oda was also inspired by the Vietnam War to interrogate the history of Japan as an aggressor (kagaisha) in Asia. Oda, however, arrived at a more complicated position on the China problem, one that challenged a close identification with the PRC. In 1967 Oda participated in a symposium on the history of Sino-Japanese relations as part of a lecture series on China organized by Takeuchi Yoshimi. In the course of the discussion, Oda took exception to his elder colleagues’ tendency to privilege China in the construction of Japanese national identity. Oda (who, despite his extensive international travel, shared his generation’s lack of contact

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with Chinese), maintained the progressive identification with national liberation movements, but the Chinese Revolution was no longer necessarily the most important of these movements and he resisted a special identification with China: “India, Ghana, Greece, America and China all exist at the same distance from me. I think of myself as a member of the Asians and Africans, so if pressed, I would say that I have a greater affinity for the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, which includes China.”65 In addition, Oda shared Nakajima’s worries about the political implications of Japanese affinity for China. Oda felt that sentimental attachment to and identification with China made older Japanese “irresponsible” in their admiration for the contemporary Chinese leadership, and led to uncritical acceptance of objectionable and unreasonable Chinese positions on issues like nuclear weapons or the Cultural Revolution. Like others, Oda worried that the identification with China could easily be transformed into disappointment and resentment should Chinese fail to live up to Japanese expectations. For Oda, the relationship with China was just another bilateral international relationship. It should not be romanticized or treated as a special case in which fundamental principles are suspended. As Oda put it, there was no “transcendental truth” in relations with China.66 Like Honda and Nakajima, Oda also explicitly rejected guilt as an acceptable motivation for accommodation with China. In the 1967 symposium on JapanChina relations, the author and former Communist Party member Sugiura Minpei argued that, for those of his generation who had served in the military, war guilt was an important motivation for establishing good relations with China: “They had killed people in China and returned home. They committed terrible violence. For this reason, when they hear ‘China’ their guilty conscience goes into operation.” Maruyama Masao, who also participated, attempted to acknowledge feelings of guilt while avoiding the implication that guilt led to irresponsible submission to PRC positions: “as a Japanese I have a guilty conscience toward China. This is different from affinity. Also, I think we need to awaken to the fact that war guilt is a Japanese problem; one of avoiding a repetition of modern Japanese diplomacy. Thus, it is completely different than making one’s views conform to another’s.”67 Oda retorted that young people had no such guilty conscience, nor should they. Of course, Japanese youth must learn the history of Japanese aggression in China but, he argued, such education should not simply enumerate past crimes. History education should prepare young people to resist war and aggression in the present day by teaching them to see the similarities between what Japan did during World War II and what the

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US was doing in Vietnam. Moving on to his most challenging point, Oda proclaimed, “I don’t really trust those who talk about a guilty conscience toward China but don’t actively participate in the anti-Vietnam War movement,” challenging ideas that war responsibility implied a special responsibility toward China or that improving relations with the PRC was synonymous with fulfilling one’s war responsibility.68 In fact, Oda contended that treating the PRC as a special case could hinder fulfillment of one’s war responsibility, suggesting the possibility that the war responsibility issue (as opposition to power politics and support for the weak against the strong), could be turned against the PRC itself.

The China problem in the China studies discipline All of these changes also impacted Japanese academia in ways that would influence the scholarly production of commentary on the China problem. In the early postwar period, the Japanese academy and scholarly commentary on international politics was dominated by the progressives, organized in the Peace Problems Discussion Council (Heiwa mondai danwakai). Though not universally opposed to the US-Japan Security Treaty, most were generally critical of the postwar international political settlement and the government’s policy of close cooperation with US Cold War policy. A series of declarations by scholars associated with the Peace Problems Discussion Council and published in the progressive journal Sekai in 1949 and 1950, called for a comprehensive peace that included the USSR and PRC and a policy of non-­alignment in the Cold War. The Peace Problems Discussion Group went on to become the academic fountainhead of the pacifist unarmed neutrality doctrine of the Japanese opposition parties.69 From the mid-1960s, however, as a new generation of scholars moved into academia, a group of self-­consciously realist scholars like Kōsaka Masataka, Nagai Yōnosuke, Kamiya Fuji, and Wakaizumi Kei came to challenge the pacifist dominance of the international relations field. Many of the new generation in both camps were influenced by trends in the American social sciences as scholars representing positions across the political spectrum pursued study in the United States supported by new funding institutions like the Fulbright and Ford Foundations. For example, the “realist” scholar of international relations Kōsaka Masataka studied at Harvard; his ideological opponent, the “idealist” Sakamoto Yoshikazu, at the University of Chicago.70 The very fact that the debate was framed as one between realists and idealists attests to the influence of American intellectual fashions on the Japanese academic community (even as it proves that American influence did not necessarily result in support for US policies).

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A similar situation prevailed in the subfield of China studies. The earliest postwar organization for the China studies field was the China Studies Association (Chūgoku kenkyūjo), established in January 1946 with funds left over from a wartime organization created to explore peace efforts with the Nationalist government. Founding members included Iwamura Michio, Ubukata Naokichi, and Hirano Yoshitarō. The China Studies Association published the journal China Studies (Chūgoku kenkyū) and was the main China studies organ in the early postwar years. It was dominated by scholars who were sympathetic to the Chinese Communist movement and the PRC leadership and generally supportive of opposition political positions. Important pro-China intellectuals associated with the China Studies Association we will encounter later included Andō Hikotarō, Niijima Atsuyoshi, and Nomura Kōichi. The pro-China scholars of the China Studies Association were challenged by a group of researchers who became influential beginning in the 1960s. Leaders of this group included Etō Shinkichi of Tokyo University and Ishikawa Tadao at Keiō University, many of whose students, including Okabe Tatsumi, went on to become among the most influential scholars in the field. These scholars resented the dominance of Marxist theory in Japanese academia and the China Studies Association scholars’ ideological bias. If the American influence on the China studies field was less direct than in international relations in general, China scholars also looked to contemporary American social science as a source of what they called “non-­ideological” theory. Looking back from 1988, Etō claimed that what he sought to bring to China studies in Japan was “modern objectivism,” and resented being labeled anti-Chinese for trying to carry out what he considered impartial analysis of Chinese conditions.71 Academia, therefore, was not insulated from the political debates of postwar Japan, including the concern for Japanese national identity at the heart of the China problem. For example, Nakajima Mineo, a one-­time student of Etō, wrote extensively and critically on the China problem in academia. Nakajima saw the earlier generation of China scholars as motivated by war guilt. While respecting their desire to make amends, Nakajima saw a danger in atonement being transformed into adulation and justification that obstructed rational study of China. By the early 1970s this had resulted in embarrassing reversals of position on a series of issues like the Sino-Soviet alliance, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution. Over time, he argued, in order to preserve their positive image of the PRC, Japanese scholars had come to simply avoid learning too much about China. This was manifest, he felt, in the progressive intellectuals’ admiration for Chinese nationalism, seeking “their own subjectivity in a powerful

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China,” but fundamentally misunderstanding it. Chinese nationalism had lost its revolutionary character and had become instead an ethnic nationalism that served as a prop for the Communist Party. Chinese nationalism, therefore, was not a “people’s nationalism” (kokumin nashonarizumu) that would support a joint struggle for Japanese national independence, but a “state nationalism” (kokka nashonarizumu) that only served the interests of the PRC. Because their identity was invested in an idealized, glorified China (mezamashii Chūgoku), the real China would inevitably let them down and Nakajima predicted that when that happened pro-China scholars would abandon identification with the PRC. In the meantime, however, their apologies for the PRC and their own “unclear nationality” (kokuseki fumei) would produce a backlash in Japan against both the PRC and pro-China intellectuals among a generation that did not share their sense of war guilt.72 Nakajima thus predicted the collapse of the progressive identification with China, a prediction that in some ways was borne out over the course of the decade.

Conclusion By 1970 there had emerged in popular Japanese consciousness a contest over the definition of national identity, pitting a progressive narrative of the ethnic nation arrayed in opposition to the state against an emerging conservative narrative that sought to overcome this opposition through the recovery of a lost unity of nation and state. At times this conservative narrative of national identity was referred to as patriotism (aikokushugi) to distinguish it from the civic nationalism (kokuminshugi) of the progressives like Maruyama or the ethnic nationalism (minzokushugi) of Takeuchi and the left, although terminological indeterminacy still reigned in Japan as elsewhere. Despite the differences, however, there was considerable similarity between the contending narratives. There was a common assumption that the Japanese faced a national crisis due to the lack of an independent national identity. At the root of all Japan’s problems, from wartime aggression, to defeat, to Japan’s subjugation by the United States, to Japan’s relations with China, was a lack of national consciousness. The common solution was then obvious: the Japanese nation had to awaken or recover a national identity that had been lost or repressed. Japanese were motivated to participate in the China problem discourse primarily by this desire to recover national identity. Across the political spectrum Japan’s relations with China were analyzed according to how they contributed to

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the recovery of national identity and national independence. For progressives, the lack of relations with the PRC was evidence of Japan’s subjugation to the United States and improvement of relations with the PRC amounted to a step toward independence. For conservatives, the deference paid the PRC by proChina forces in Japan was prime evidence of the lack of national independence which could only be recovered by resisting PRC policy and the identification with China. In the summer of 1971, China policy was dramatically interjected into this highly charged atmosphere.

Part II

The Nixon Shock and the Normalization of Relations, 1971–72

3

Diplomacy from the Nixon Shock through the Normalization of Relations The Nixon shock On July 16, 1971, just before 11:30 a.m., the Japanese prime minister, Satō Eisaku, was wrapping up a cabinet meeting when his secretary, Kusuda Minoru, informed him that US President Richard Nixon would be going on live TV within minutes to make an important announcement. Satō watched as Nixon explained that his assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, had secretly visited Beijing for talks with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and that the president himself would visit the PRC sometime before May 1972. After years of pressuring the Japanese government to eschew relations with its most important neighbor, the United States had bypassed the Japanese to reach an accommodation with the PRC without warning, consultation or, indeed, any seeming concern for the interests of its ally. The first victim of what the Japanese came to call the “Nixon shock” was Satō himself. As part of his drive to secure the return of Okinawa from the United States, Satō had for years faithfully supported unpopular American positions on China, Taiwan, and the Vietnam War, incurring the wrath of the Japanese media and opposition parties. That support now seemed to have been betrayed. Postwar Japan’s longest-­serving prime minister, who had just succeeded in negotiating the return of Okinawa and had led his party to a dominating electoral victory in 1969, would survive less than a year in office. Although he kept up a stoic public façade, for Satō the sense of betrayal was personal. “I have done everything they have asked,” he told the Australian Labour leader Gough Whitlam, “They have let me down.”1 Satō was not alone in being kept in the dark or feeling betrayed. Kissinger’s visit had been planned and conducted with the utmost secrecy, the details of his mission hidden even from most of the Nixon administration, including the Secretary of State, William Rogers. Nixon and Kissinger always explained the

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secrecy as being necessary to avoid leaks that might have been used to sabotage the new policy. In the effort to control information, Nixon and Kissinger, with the cooperation of the Chinese Communist government, withheld all news of the trip until the July 15 broadcast. Even the Nationalist government in Taipei, the ally most directly affected by the opening to China, received the news only twenty minutes before Nixon’s televised announcement.2 Yet, for all the secrecy there had been signs of change in the US-PRC relationship. There were strategic imperatives pushing the leaders of the two countries toward accommodation. For the Americans, an improvement in relations with the PRC could put pressure on the USSR to be more accommodating in the pursuit of détente and might push the North Vietnamese leadership to a negotiated settlement of the American war in Vietnam. For the Chinese, an opening to the United States could help secure the PRC against the Soviet Union, which was threatening open war with China after a series of military clashes along their common border. In 1969 the United States eased travel and trade restrictions on the PRC. Early the next year stalled SinoAmerican talks resumed in Warsaw. In October, Mao Zedong very publicly hosted the American reporter Edgar Snow, author of Red Star Over China, in Tiananmen Square during National Day celebrations. Though leaders in Washington largely missed the import of Mao’s gesture, that same month President Nixon publicly referred to the People’s Republic of China by its official name for the first time and said he hoped to for dialogue with the PRC. Most famously, in April 1971 the US table tennis team was invited to visit the PRC. The press generated by “ping-­pong diplomacy” fueled speculation regarding the possibility of imminent change in American China policy.3 These developments had not gone unnoticed in Japan and Prime Minister Satō had been making his own cautious moves to reach out to the PRC. Satō repeatedly stated that the China problem was one of the most important topics for Japanese diplomacy in the 1970s and stressed the need for Sino-Japanese friendship, even conceding that the Japanese side might need to make the first move to improve relations. Satō also sought closer cooperation with the United States on China policy. During the Nixon-Satō summit in October 1970 the two leaders formally agreed to maintain close consultation and coordination on China policy. In June of the following year Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi met Secretary of State William Rogers in Paris and the two reaffirmed their commitment to close consultation on China. At an earlier summit in 1969 Nixon and Satō had even agreed to the establishment of a hotline between the two capitals that Nixon might have used to personally inform Satō of his decision

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and thus avoid leaks. Instead, Secretary of State Rogers was given a list of governments (with Japan at the top), that he was to begin informing of Nixon’s announcement one hour before the scheduled television broadcast.4 Thus, the essence of the Nixon shock for the Japanese leadership was less the change in US policy than the fact that such a dramatic shift had been carried out without any consultation and seemingly with no regard for the Japanese government by its most important ally. In fact, Japanese Foreign Ministry bureaucrats had long worried about just such an eventuality. They had come to refer to it as “Asakai’s nightmare” after former ambassador to the United States Asakai Kōichirō who told anyone who would listen about a recurring nightmare in which he woke up one day to find that the US had recognized Communist China without warning. Asakai’s nightmare was also well known among US diplomats who dealt with Japan. U. Alexis Johnson (ambassador to Japan from 1966 to 1969) was aware that “few thoughts aroused more trepidation in the Japanese government over the years than the possibility that the United States would suddenly reverse policy toward Beijing.”5 The potency of the nightmare derived from some of the deepest anxieties in modern Japanese foreign policy thought. While many Japanese had long hoped for some improvement in Sino-American relations, too-­close relations recalled the wartime alliance of the United States and China and the isolation of Japan. The Nixon shock also highlighted the dangers inherent in Japan’s postwar dependence upon the United States. The Nixon shock, therefore, seemed almost perfectly designed to pique Japanese concerns about a lack of national independence. In terms of national identity and the Japanese nation’s place in the world, the Nixon shock made it plain that the Japanese nation was not an independent international actor determining relations with the Asian country that was most indispensable to Japanese national security and self-­image. Instead, the Japanese leadership was forced to react to Chinese and American initiatives.

From the Nixon shock to normalization As embarrassing as Nixon’s announcement had been to Prime Minister Satō, in the aftershock he continued to work gamely, but ultimately unsuccessfully, to improve relations with the PRC. As we have seen, Satō came to office hopeful for a breakthrough in relations with China. Satō’s early approaches to the PRC, however, had been constrained by his decision to make the return of Okinawa

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the signature policy goal of his administration. In negotiating the return of Okinawa, Satō faced demands to take a position of more active public support for US policy and the ROC in order to assure the American government that the return of Okinawa would not jeopardize the defense of Taiwan. For example, in the joint communiqué issued at the end of the 1969 Nixon-Satō summit, during which the two sides agreed to the return of Okinawa, Satō also affirmed that “the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan,” publicly asserting Japan’s interest in Taiwan and provoking predictable PRC criticism.6 Satō’s own domestic political position also handicapped him in moves to improve relations with the PRC, specifically the makeup of his own faction within the LDP. Satō, like Ikeda before him, was considered a “star pupil” of the Yoshida School, but in his factional support base he inherited much of the right wing of the LDP that had misgivings about the Yoshida Doctrine generally, and Ikeda’s “low posture” in foreign affairs in particular. In fact, Satō’s election to party president and prime minister depended at least partly on the expectation that, as the younger brother of Kishi Nobusuke, he could mollify the party’s right wing. Satō’s faction also included many of the most pro-Taiwan elements in the party. For example, many members of his faction, including his heir apparent Fukuda Takeo, were active in the Japan-China Cooperation Committee dedicated to strengthening relations with the ROC leadership, and the pro-Taiwan Asian Problems Study Group drew a majority of its members from factions that supported Satō.7 Finally, whatever Satō’s intentions, the radicalism of PRC foreign policy and increasingly strident condemnations of Satō during the Cultural Revolution largely precluded any major diplomatic initiatives. By the early 1970s, even as the most radical period of the Cultural Revolution came to an end, the PRC leadership showed little willingness to deal with Satō. For example, speaking in Pyongyang in April of 1970, Zhou Enlai called the Satō government the “most reactionary and most aggressive cabinet that Japan has had since the end of World War II.”8 Despite all this, as signs of a thaw Sino-American relations became apparent Satō redoubled efforts for an opening to the PRC. In January 1971, in his policy speech for the New Year, Satō declared that the Japanese government was prepared to increase contacts with the PRC at various levels, and he was the first Japanese prime minister to refer publicly to the People’s Republic of China by its full, official name. He set his foreign policy brain trust, the International Relations Consultative Committee (Kokusai kankei kondankai) to work reviewing policy

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toward the PRC. In April of 1971, Satō even made an unsuccessful attempt to arrange a visit to Beijing through Noda Takeo of the newly established LDP China Problem Research Council (Chūgoku mondai chōsakai).9

The UN representation problem Satō’s moves to improve relations after the Nixon shock ultimately foundered upon the issue of Chinese representation in the UN. The problem of which government would represent China in the UN was not new. A resolution that would transfer China’s seat in the UN (including China’s permanent membership and veto power in the Security Council), from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic had been introduced every year since 1961. Each year, however, the United States had been successful in passing a resolution making the issue an “important question” that required a two-­thirds majority in the General Assembly for passage, and had thereby defended the ROC’s position in the UN. In 1970 an unsuccessful Albanian resolution to seat the PRC for the first time received a simple majority of votes in the General Assembly. Over the next year several countries, including Italy and Canada, recognized the PRC. Finally, Nixon’s stunning announcement made blocking the Albanian resolution seem a lost cause in the 1971 General Assembly. Yet the United States government was not ready to give up support for the ROC in the UN. While no longer opposing the accession of the PRC, the United States focused on blocking the expulsion of the ROC. The immediate problem for the Japanese government in 1971 was whether to co-­sponsor what became known as the “reverse important question” resolution that made the expulsion of Taiwan an important question requiring a two-­thirds majority but allowing the PRC to be seated by a simple majority vote. There is evidence that the American administration fully expected this effort to fail. Henry Kissinger had explained the US position on UN representation to Zhou Enlai during his secret visit in July: “this is temporarily one China, one Taiwan . . . we may not propose this resolution ourselves, but might support it if someone else puts it forward . . . That may be a good way to end the issue.”10 In Japan, the idea of acting as an American proxy in this seemingly hopeless endeavor was highly unpopular. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the LDP’s China Problem Research Council opposed co-­sponsoring the resolution.11 A familiar set of concerns, however, led Satō on a “kamikaze effort” to support the US position in 1971.12 Most importantly, the agreement on the return of Okinawa was up for ratification in both the United States Senate and the Japanese

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Diet. Satō was, therefore, under pressure to appease pro-Taiwan sentiment in both the United States and his own party. In addition to the overwhelming priority given to the Okinawa reversion, it is also quite likely that, at this late date, after years of being a lightning rod for Chinese criticism and after numerous rebuffed efforts to approach the PRC, Satō had very little to lose in risking further ire from the Chinese leadership. Satō confided to his secretary that it might be best for him to bear the brunt of criticism for supporting the ROC in the UN in order to save the next prime minister any trouble, suggesting that Satō had largely resigned himself to leaving the normalization of relations to his successor.13 Accordingly, in September of 1971, the Satō government announced its intention to support the United States position on the expulsion of Taiwan. The next month, the “reverse important question” resolution, co-­sponsored by Japan, failed in the General Assembly and the ROC walked out of the United Nations. Yet Satō made one final attempt at a breakthrough with the PRC. The effort was led by Satō’s political ally and LDP general secretary, Hori Shigeru. In November 1971 Hori entrusted the progressive governor of Tokyo, Minobe Ryōkichi, who was to visit Beijing, with a personal letter for Zhou Enlai. The letter itself was written by the young China scholar Nakajima Mineo who served on Satō’s International Relations Consultative Committee. On the key issue of Taiwan, the Hori Letter, as it came to be called, said that Japan recognized that “Taiwan was the territory of all the Chinese people.”14 Attempting to avoid comment on the question of final political control of Taiwan, the Hori Letter left open the possibility that Taiwan could be the common territory of Chinese people, who may be divided in more than one state. Zhou rejected the letter as a formula for Taiwanese independence and declared that the PRC would not engage in talks to improve relations as long as Satō was prime minister.15 The task of normalization fell to Satō’s successor.

The 1972 LDP presidential election Elections for a new LDP president, who would then become prime minister, were called for 1972. With the failure of Satō’s moves toward the PRC, and the PRC leadership looking to Satō’s successor to normalize relations, China policy for the first time became a key issue in the LDP presidential election. While China policy had always been contentious within the LDP, disagreements on China policy had rarely served to separate rival candidates for the party presidency. In the wake of the Nixon shock, however, candidates staked out

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positions on China as the most pressing foreign policy issue facing the next prime minister.16 The main contenders for the party presidency were Fukuda Takeo, Ōhira Masayoshi, Miki Takeo, and Tanaka Kakuei. Fukuda, Satō’s chosen successor and the putative frontrunner, inherited the most conservative and pro-Taiwan elements of the Satō faction, which still constituted the largest single faction in the party, and maintained a cautious, pro-ROC stance on China policy. Ōhira Masayoshi, leader of the former Ikeda faction of the party, epitomized the pragmatic tradition of the Yoshida School on the China problem. As Ikeda’s foreign minister he had presided over the expansion of Sino-Japanese trade, yet he had stuck firmly to the party line of separating politics and economics in relations with the PRC and had opposed any precipitous improvement in SinoJapanese relations that might cause friction with the United States. After the Nixon shock, however, Ōhira came out publicly against Japanese support for the US position on Chinese representation in the UN and in favor of a more proactive China policy. The most “progressive” candidate on the China question was Miki Takeo, long considered one of the more pro-Chinese of the LDP leaders. Miki was eager to capitalize on his relationship with the Chinese leadership in his bid to succeed Satō. In April 1972, Miki visited Beijing and told Zhou Enlai that if he ever formed a cabinet he would move aggressively on normalization.17 Tanaka Kakuei, who would in the end emerge victorious and carry out the normalization of relations with China, had been a pillar of the Satō faction who defected after Satō chose Fukuda as his successor. Tanaka had never expressed much interest in the China question before the election. In fact, according to a close Tanaka ally, “Tanaka didn’t want to normalize relations, because he didn’t like the Communist Party. But the opportunity presented itself during the presidential election.”18 Fukuda’s vulnerability on an issue of such popular attention made Tanaka open to the idea of the normalization of relations with the PRC as a political tactic and he moved to make contact with the PRC leadership. Tanaka met with Furui Yoshimi, a senior member of the LDP with connections to the PRC leadership, in April 1972 and told him he was determined to normalize relations should he become prime minister. Furui communicated this position to Zhou Enlai during a visit to Beijing in May. The PRC leadership, while continuing attacks on Satō in the media, made it clear that they would welcome normalization under his successor. The same month Zhou met with a visiting Kōmeitō (Clean Government Party) delegation and indicated that the next

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prime minister would be welcome in Beijing if he were committed to realizing normalization on the basis of the three principles of normalization: 1) that the PRC is the sole legal government of China; 2) that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China; and 3) that the peace treaty between Japan and the ROC is illegal, null and void.19 The next month Liao Chengzhi further explained that the new prime minister would need to agree to cut diplomatic relations with Taiwan as a prerequisite for normalization.20 In early July 1972, Ōhira and Miki agreed to support Tanaka against Fukuda. As part of this agreement Miki pushed Tanaka and Ōhira to commit to the normalization of relations on the basis of the three principles and to support the conclusion of a new peace treaty with the PRC. Tanaka and Ōhira, however, were more circumspect, favoring an expression of their willingness to normalize relations but leaving the details to later negotiations. In the final three-­faction agreement, Tanaka agreed to enter into negotiations for normalization and to appoint Ōhira as his foreign minister.21 With the support of Ōhira and Miki, Tanaka Kakuei became LDP party president and prime minister on July 5, 1972. In his first press conference Tanaka declared that, “the time is ripe for normalization,” and committed to the speedy normalization of relations.22 A few days later, during a reception for a Yemeni delegation, Zhou Enlai welcomed the new cabinet’s attitude. The stage seemed set for the normalization of diplomatic relations.

Preparing for Tanaka’s China visit The most significant obstacle to the normalization of relations was opposition from within the LDP and MOFA. The split between pro-Taiwan and pro-China forces was acute in both and these were the only key institutions in which the pro-Taiwan viewpoint represented a majority position.23 In the preparations for the normalization of relations, these potential sources of resistance to the policy of Tanaka and Ōhira would have to be won over or neutralized. To create consensus within the party, Tanaka organized an LDP Council for the Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations (Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka kyōgikai). The council was formed on July 13 under Kosaka Zentarō and was charged with producing a consensus position by September 10. By all accounts the council’s meetings were extremely contentious, including tales of hurled ashtrays and overturned tables and chairs. Disagreement centered on the government’s plan to break relations with the Nationalists in order to normalize

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relations with the PRC. On August 3, Ōhira explained to the commission that relations with Taiwan would “end” with the establishment of relations with the PRC, a position he repeated in the Diet on August 9. On August 7, Tanaka told reporters that Japan would not be able to maintain relations with both the PRC and the ROC. All of this caused considerable resentment against Tanaka and Ōhira among the party’s right wing. They charged Tanaka and Ōhira with running roughshod over the party membership and argued that by agreeing to Chinese conditions for normalizing relations, the government was giving away crucial bargaining leverage before negotiations had even begun.24 The normalization council eventually drafted a statement of Basic Principles for the Normalization of Relations (Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka kihon hōshin) according to which normalization with the PRC should be pursued while “giving due consideration to preserving the present state of relations” with Taiwan.25 Pro-Taiwan members of the council interpreted this to include preservation of diplomatic relations, but the wording was vague enough for Tanaka and Ōhira to interpret it as being satisfied by the maintenance of economic and cultural relations. In the final analysis, critics of Tanaka and Ōhira seem justified in seeing the council as a move to contain the LDP right wing by providing pro-Taiwan politicians a forum in which to air their grievances and create the appearance of consultation on a policy that had already been decided. As early as April, Tanaka had told Furui Yoshimi that if he became prime minister he would move quickly to normalize relations. On a visit to Beijing in early September, Furui and Tagawa Seiichi assured Zhou Enlai that the pro-Taiwan sentiments expressed in the commission would not affect the Japanese government’s policy.26 Tanaka and Ōhira also worked to overcome expected resistance to normalization from within MOFA by bypassing the MOFA bureaucracy as much as possible. They did so by secretly recruiting Hashimoto Hiroshi, the head of the ministry’s China desk, to draft the government’s negotiating positions. Even before the formation of the Tanaka cabinet, both Tanaka and Ōhira had been in contact with Hashimoto for “tutoring” on the China problem. By his own account, Hashimoto had counseled that it would not be possible to achieve normalization without breaking relations with the ROC.27 Within the ministry, however, opinion remained overwhelmingly opposed to any change in Japan’s relations with Taiwan. Like many in the LDP, most Foreign Ministry bureaucrats were not opposed to normalization in principle, but were committed to protecting both Japan’s relations with the ROC and past ministry positions. Many in the ministry were against accepting any wording that implied

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that past ministry positions had been mistaken, especially the PRC contention that the 1952 treaty with the ROC was illegal.28 On his first day as foreign minister, Ōhira approached Hashimoto and informed him that he and Tanaka were committed to the normalization of relations with the PRC. Ōhira asked Hashimoto to begin preparations for normalization, but ordered Hashimoto to proceed in secret and to report directly to him in order to avoid expected obstruction from within the ministry. Hashimoto, in turn, enlisted Kuriyama Takakazu of the Treaties Division to draft the government’s position on the legal issues concerning the the 1952 treaty with the ROC and the international legal position of Taiwan. Kuriyama’s superior in the Treaties Division, Takashima Masao, was also brought into the loop, but for the most part the preparations for an expected China visit by Prime Minister Tanaka were left to Hashimoto and Kuriyama.29 Hashimoto and Kuriyama worked together closely from July through the normalization of relations in September 1972. Essentially the two developed a division of labor, Hashimoto handling the political preparations for the trip and Kuriyama drafting the government’s legal positions. The Japanese government positions on the most contentious outstanding issues, including the Taiwan issue, the issue of the status of the 1952 treaty and the status of the US-Japan Security Treaty were all drafted by Kuriyama, in consultation with Hashimoto. Secluding himself for week in a friend’s summer house outside of Tokyo, Kuriyama also prepared the Japanese draft of a joint communiqué on normalization as well as all of Foreign Minister Ōhira’s talking points. Once a formal invitation to Tanaka to visit Beijing had been extended, a task force called the China Problem Policy Council (Chūgoku mondai taisaku kyōgikai) was created within the ministry to formulate government positions. Ōhira, however, continued to work primarily through Hashimoto and Kuriyama and the task force was generally in the position of seconding decisions made by Tanaka and Ōhira through their contacts within the ministry.30 The PRC leadership also did what it could to counter Japanese opposition to normalization by making clear its interest in cooperating with the conservative Japanese government as part of an international anti-Soviet strategy. For example on August 15, 1972, Zhou met a Japanese delegation in Beijing and explained that those on the right who feared normalization as being a communist ploy had an “incorrect analysis of the current international situation.” That is, they did not understand the new strategic imperatives that led the PRC leadership to favor cooperation with conservative governments in the United States and Japan against the Soviet Union and its leftist supporters. Japanese critics of

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normalization on the left like the Japan Communist Party were dismissed as Soviet-­style revisionists and considered as ill-­informed and dangerous as extreme rightists.31 Thus, Zhou sought to make clear to the Japanese leadership that the last thing the PRC leadership wanted to see in the 1970s was conservative government in Japan (or the West in general) replaced by socialist or communist regimes. In circumventing domestic opposition to their initiatives, Tanaka and Ōhira were able to draw on a network of relationships cultivated by pro-PRC conservatives and opposition party politicians to establish contacts with the PRC leadership. For example, preparations for Tanaka’s visit were advanced by a timely visit to Tokyo by Sun Pinghua (then deputy secretary general of the China-Japan Friendship Association) and Xiao Xiangqian of the Chinese Memorandum Trade Office in Tokyo. Ōhira first met Sun, who was in Japan as the head of the visiting Shanghai Dance and Drama Troupe, on July 20 at a reception organized by LDP politician Fujiyama Aiichirō, president of the Diet League for Japan-China Friendship and a long-­time advocate of closer relations with China. The reception was well attended by heavyweights of the Japanese political world including Foreign Minister Ōhira, Miki Takeo, MITI Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro and the heads of the main opposition parties. Ōhira met with Sun and Xiao two days later at the Hotel Okura and expressed the Tanaka government’s commitment to the normalization of relations. Sun promised to convey the message to Premier Zhou Enlai, and extended a formal invitation from Zhou for Tanaka to visit Beijing.32 Thus, within a month after establishing his cabinet, Tanaka had committed to the normalization of relations and had secured a standing invitation to visit Beijing. Tanaka and Ōhira had also already come to terms with the basic conditions for normalization, namely, recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of China and the end of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Yet there were two crucial issues on which the PRC position remained unclear and which had the potential to derail the normalization process: the US-Japan Security Treaty and reparations. The new PRC relationship with the United States would seem to make the first concern moot, but Tanaka and Ōhira as yet had no official confirmation on this point. A similar situation obtained regarding the PRC position on reparations. A 1951 PRC study had estimated war damages at 10 million killed and $50 billion in economic losses.33 The Republic of China government had waived its reparations claim in the peace treaty it signed with Japan in 1952. The PRC, of course, had rejected the legitimacy of this treaty and during the 1950s had

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asserted its right to claim reparations from Japan in any future agreement. Zhu Jianrong has shown that the PRC decision to forgo their reparations claim dates from approximately 1964 and required intensive propaganda work by the PRC leadership to overcome opposition within the Chinese Communist Party. In a 1965 meeting Zhou told visiting LDP Diet member Utsunomiya Tokuma that the PRC did not want to rely on other nations for its development, that one of the lessons of the settlement of the World War I was that reparations were not conducive to peace, and that reparations would only burden a younger generation of Japanese that bore no responsibility for the war in China.34 The ultimate Chinese position on reparations, however, had not yet been clearly or officially communicated to the Japanese government.

The Takeiri Memo The PRC leadership communicated its positions on these issues through Takeiri Yoshikatsu, head of an opposition Kōmeitō delegation that visited Beijing from July 27–29. In their third meeting on the 29th, Zhou read to Takeiri a draft of a joint communiqué on normalization to be issued on the occasion of Tanaka’s visit. Takeiri transcribed the draft verbatim, reading it back to the Chinese to ensure its accuracy. This handwritten record of the Chinese draft became known as the Takeiri Memo.35 It was immediately apparent to Takeiri that the Chinese draft accorded well with Japanese positions on the most important outstanding issues. There was no mention of the US-Japan alliance or the 1969 Nixon-Satō joint communiqué, making it clear that normalization would not affect relations with the United States. The Chinese draft also waived the Chinese reparations claim, a key concession since the Japanese leadership considered any Chinese reparations claim to be a sure deal-­breaker as it would provoke insurmountable opposition from within the LDP. The Chinese suggested that settlement of the Taiwan issue be dealt with in an accompanying secret agreement in which the Japanese government would recognize Taiwan as a part of China and commit to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan after the announcement of the joint communiqué. The Takeiri Memo also assured the Japanese that their economic interests in Taiwan would not be compromised by the normalization of relations with the PRC. Finally, the Chinese draft included an anti-­hegemony clause similar to that contained in the Shanghai Communiqué issued at the end of Nixon’s visit in which both parties pledged not to pursue hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.

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The Takeiri Memo constituted a decisive turning point in the movement for normalization. Despite Tanaka and Ōhira’s connections to the Chinese leadership through LDP and opposition party politicians, most of the information gained through these channels was very general and the intermediaries who transmitted this information were often suspect, given their pro-China sympathies and political interest in the early normalization of relations. The Japanese and Chinese leaderships had managed to communicate their openness to negotiations but considerable uncertainty about the details of Chinese positions on key issues had remained. This uncertainty, combined with the fierce opposition to his policies from within his own party, in fact, had forced Tanaka to become much more cautious in his pursuit of normalization in the weeks before Takeiri’s mission. The Takeiri Memo was the first really credible record of specific Chinese positions on the key issues of the US-Japan alliance, reparations, and relations with Taiwan and ultimately served to convince Tanaka, Ōhira, and MOFA that the normalization of relations was feasible.36 Takeiri delivered his memo to Tanaka and Ōhira at the prime minister’s residence on August 4. The following day, after a review of the memo by Ōhira and the Foreign Ministry, Tanaka decided that he would visit Beijing.

The normalization of relations The Tanaka mission arrived in Beijing on September 25 after an historic direct flight from Tokyo and was greeted by Premier Zhou Enlai. Over the next four days Tanaka and Zhou met four times, and Tanaka met with Mao Zedong for one hour on the evening of the 27th. Most of the details of the final normalization agreement were hammered out in three meetings between the foreign ministers, Ōhira Masayoshi and Ji Pengfei, including a final two-­and-a-­half-hour meeting that stretched past midnight. In the first meeting between Zhou and Tanaka on the afternoon of the 25th, Foreign Minister Ōhira sought Zhou’s understanding of the importance for Japan of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Zhou reiterated the PRC position that the normalization agreement should not touch on the treaty. He then went further, explaining the PRC’s strategic position on the US-Japan alliance, “Conditions in the Taiwan Strait are changing. Therefore the effects of the treaties [the US-Japan Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China] are also changing. Japan, the United States and China have a common interest in avoiding Soviet interference in the Taiwan problem.

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On our side, we have no desire today to touch on either the US-Japan Security Treaty or the United States treaty with Taiwan.”37 There was no talk of Japanese militarism, nor seemingly any worry about Japanese interference in Taiwan (concerns expressed during Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February). Quite the contrary, Zhou seemed to see Japan as an “incipient ally” with a common interest in preventing Soviet interference in Taiwan (reflecting, perhaps, concern on the part of the PRC leadership that if abandoned by the United States and Japan, Chiang Kai-­shek and the Taiwanese leadership might seek accommodation with the USSR).38 The historic visit, therefore, started smoothly, with the PRC leadership revealing the anti-Soviet concerns that would support a relatively accommodating position on the issues of greatest importance to the Japanese— the US-Japan security alliance and relations with Taiwan.

The apology issue Despite the smooth start, the Tanaka visit hit a rather ominous snag at the state banquet later that evening. In his toast, Prime Minister Tanaka apologized for past Japanese actions in China: “Over the past several decades, Japan-China relations have unfortunately followed an unhappy path. During this period Japan has caused great trouble (tadai no gomeiwaku o okakeshita) for the Chinese people. For this I once again express my sense of deep remorse.”39 The Japanese gomeiwaku o okakeshita, was translated into Chinese as “to cause trouble” (tianle mafan) a direct translation which, like the English, sounds casual and lacks much connotation of remorse. To the Chinese present, the expression was entirely inappropriate. When Tanaka and Zhou met for the second time the next afternoon, Zhou immediately expressed his indignation at Tanaka’s apology: Millions of Chinese were sacrificed in the war. Japan also suffered tremendous losses. We must never forget the lessons of this history. We can accept the sentiment that Prime Minister Tanaka expressed when he said he “reflects on the unhappy events of the past.” But Prime Minister Tanaka’s use of the words “caused the Chinese people trouble,” provokes a negative reaction from the Chinese people. In China this expression is only used for very small things.40

Zhou did not directly express any doubts about the sincerity of Tanaka’s apology, and only brought up the problem of his choice of words. From the available evidence, Zhou’s personal thinking on the real import of the apology issue is not clear. It is clear from the available records of Zhou and Tanaka’s conversation,

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however, that Zhou spent much more time on the problems of reparations and the treaty with Taiwan than on Tanaka’s apology. According to some accounts, the apology issue was taken up again in informal discussions between Foreign Minister Ōhira and Chinese Foreign Secretary Ji Pengfei during their drive to the Great Wall on the 27th. In an Asahi shimbun interview in 2002, Zhou Bin, the Chinese interpreter who accompanied the foreign ministers, remembered that when Ji raised concerns about Tanaka’s apology Ōhira explained that too strong an apology might provoke opposition to normalization from the pro-Taiwan wing of the LDP. According to Zhou, Ōhira expressed his personal understanding of Chinese anger. Ōhira pointed out that he had spent time in China as a Ministry of Finance bureaucrat during the war and that Tanaka had been wounded in Manchuria. Through personal experience, he and Tanaka knew that Japan had done terrible things in China, and asked that the Chinese side trust their sincerity, even if the wording of the apology had not been optimal. Unfortunately, this exchange is not recorded in the available record of the conversation. Nor is it recorded by the head of the MOFA China section, Hashimoto Hiroshi, who was in the passenger’s seat during the trip.41 In the end, it is difficult to judge just how important the apology gaffe was at the time. Looking back from the present day, when issues of historical memory and apology regarding the war loom so large in Sino-Japanese relations, Tanaka’s apology seems an ominous harbinger of the contemporary “history problem.” Yet it is clear that, whatever their misgivings, the Chinese leadership gave priority to strategic interests in the normalization process. They accepted informal assurances from Tanaka and Ōhira regarding their understanding of the war and the apology issue did not seriously threaten the progress of negotiations. Instead, the most contentious issues in negotiations involved the legality of Japan’s peace treaty with the ROC which, while related to the history of Japan’s colonization of Taiwan, had much more to do with the international legal status of the PRC government and Japanese bureaucratic interests than with memories of Japanese imperialism.

Negotiating the joint communiqué Negotiations began in earnest on the morning of September 26. In the first foreign ministers’ conference Ōhira began by presenting the Chinese side with a Japanese draft of a joint communiqué and then had Takashima Masao, head of the MOFA Treaties Division, explain the points of difference with the Chinese

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draft delivered in the Takeiri Memo. Two points proved particularly contentious: ending the state of war and the wording of the PRC’s waiver of reparations. Both were related to the legal status of Taiwan and MOFA’s goal of protecting the legality of the 1952 treaty with the ROC. Not recognizing the validity of the 1952 peace treaty between Japan and the Nationalist government, the PRC leadership maintained that a formal state of war still existed between Japan and China. The Chinese draft, therefore, declared the war ended with the promulgation of the joint communiqué. The Japanese draft confirmed that the state of war between the two countries had ended, but avoided any reference to when, exactly, the war had ended. Takashima explained that, while the Japanese government understood the PRC’s position on the legality of the Japanese treaty with Taiwan, it was the stated Japanese government position that the state of war was legally ended by this treaty and the Japanese government could not accept any declaration ending a state of war it had maintained for two decades did not exist. Since there was no way to overcome the difference between these two positions, Takashima suggested that the joint communiqué avoid any reference to the issue of when the state of war had ended and concentrate instead on the common understanding that the war was, in fact, over. Takashima explained the Japanese government’s reluctance to repudiate the legality of the 1952 treaty, “to take the position that a treaty the Japanese government concluded of its own volition was null and void is not something a responsible government could do.”42 The legality of the 1952 treaty was also integral to the Japanese position on reparations. On the reparations issue, Takashima began by expressing appreciation for the PRC decision to waive reparations. He went on however, “just as in the case of ending the state of war, [Japan] cannot accept any expression that clearly means that the peace treaty Japan signed with Taiwan was null and void from the start.”43 Therefore, Takashima explained, the Japanese could not agree to the PRC waiving its right to claim reparations in the joint communiqué since this right had already been waived by the ROC in the 1952 treaty. Instead, in the Japanese draft the Chinese would simply waive their reparations claim. Other key issues in the two draft proposals proved less difficult. Significantly, the Japanese side raised no objections to the Chinese draft’s inclusion of a clause that pledged both countries to oppose hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. Takashima’s presentation of the Japanese case suggests that the key issue in MOFA’s defense of the legality of the 1952 treaty was the domestic political legitimacy and credibility of the Japanese government, including MOFA, which had been responsible for conducting Japan’s relations with the ROC. The LDP

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leadership, including Tanaka and Ōhira, were in a similar situation. Despite the warm welcome he received from the Chinese leadership, Tanaka, like all other Japanese prime ministers since 1955, owed his premiership to his position as president of the LDP. The party had resolutely defended the 1952 treaty and, in fact, a majority of the party still opposed abrogation of the treaty, much less a retroactive repudiation of the treaty as illegal. The LDP leadership and MOFA were willing to change their China policy in light of changed international circumstances but were loath to undermine their own domestic credibility by publically agreeing that their past policies had been mistaken, illegal, or null and void. Tanaka and Zhou met for the second time later that afternoon. Zhou spent most of his time rebutting the Japanese position on the reparations issue. Zhou began by cutting to the heart of the dispute; namely, the incompatibility between the PRC claim to be the sole legal representative of China since 1949, before the conclusion of the 1952 treaty with Taiwan, and the Japanese government’s determination to protect the legality of the treaty. Zhou asserted that if the Japanese were really committed to protecting the treaty with Taiwan, it would be impossible to normalize relations: “If we recognize the legality of this treaty, it would mean that Chiang Kai-­shek’s regime was legitimate and we were the illegal regime.”44 Recognizing the PRC as the legitimate government of China, Zhou reminded his guest, was the very basis of normalization. Zhou then elaborated on the connection to the reparations issue: I want to be clear on the Japan-Taiwan treaty. This is Chiang Kai-­shek’s problem. I was shocked when I heard the Foreign Ministry’s idea that because Chiang waived reparations, China doesn’t need to do so. Chiang waived reparations after he fled to Taiwan and after the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Chiang cannot profit from disposing of others’ things. The damages of the war were borne by the mainland. We know the bitterness of reparations. We do not wish the Japanese people to bear such a burden. Prime Minister Tanaka said he would come to China to solve the problem of normalization, so in the interests of friendship between the two nations, we decided to waive reparations. But we cannot accept the idea that because Chiang Kai-­ shek waived reparations, the problem has been taken care of. This is an insult. I respect the thinking of Ministers Tanaka and Ōhira, and I wonder if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ assertions really reflect their positions.45

Tanaka said he understood Zhou’s complaints and expressed his deep appreciation for the Chinese position on reparations. Tanaka explained, however,

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that unlike Zhou he had to deal with considerable domestic political opposition to his policy. The only thing that could derail normalization, he warned, was opposition from within the LDP. Therefore, he had to be very cautious on contentious issues like reparations that might provoke the pro-Taiwan right wing of his party.46 Hence, Tanaka’s defense of MOFA’s position on reparations was not based on any principled legal or moral objection to the PRC’s right to claim reparations, nor the financial burden of a reparations claim (after all, the fact that the PRC would waive its claim was already well established). Rather, what Tanaka feared was opposition to his policy at home. After raising his objections to Tanaka’s apology and the Japanese position on reparations, Zhou brought up the issue of Japanese militarism. By this point the theme of Japanese militarism had largely disappeared from Chinese rhetoric, but perhaps provoked by Tanaka’s apology gaffe and unexpectedly firm Japanese positions on the Taiwan treaty and reparations, Zhou stressed that many Chinese still feared the resurgence of Japanese militarism and that this fear created domestic political problems for the Chinese government in pursuing improved relations with Japan. Zhou explained that just as Tanaka faced opposition to his policy at home, so there were those in the PRC who opposed Mao’s policies toward Japan and that significant effort would be required to convert Chinese citizens to the government’s position. As Zhou pointedly put it to Tanaka in their subsequent meeting on the 27th, “without education, the Chinese masses who suffered under the ‘three alls’ will not accept normalization,” perhaps seeking to impress upon his Japanese guests the need to avoid future incidents like Tanaka’s apology that could provoke domestic opposition to closer relations with Japan.47 Zhou expressed his hope that normalization would help on this point by encouraging greater exchange through which the Chinese people could come to better understand Japan. If Zhou was seeking understanding of Chinese fears of Japanese militarism, however, he did not get it. Tanaka dismissed out of hand any concerns about the resurgence of Japanese militarism. Tanaka argued that Japan could never be a threat to China, citing the usual list of postwar restraints on Japanese militarism: Article  9 of the constitution confined the Japanese military to self-­defense; Japanese defense spending was limited to one per cent of gross national product (GNP); and Japan did not possess and never would possess nuclear weapons. Tanaka also added a few interesting reasons of his own to dismiss concerns about Japanese militarism. For one, he pointed out that thanks to his ambitious public works program, the Plan for the Reorganization of the Japanese Archipelago (Nihon rettō kaizōron), the Japanese government would lack funds

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for military expansion for years to come. Tanaka also added that given prevailing fertility rates, the Japanese would probably be extinct in 300 years, so their purported militarist tendencies were hardly worth worrying about.48 For his part, Tanaka repeatedly sought assurance from Zhou that the PRC would not try to export revolution or interfere in Japanese politics. Again, this reflected Tanaka’s awareness of conservative opposition to his policy back home. Tanaka made it clear that fear of Chinese interference in Japanese internal affairs was an important source of domestic opposition to relations with the PRC and that he had to reassure the Japanese people on this point just as Zhou had to reassure the Chinese people regarding Japanese militarism. Zhou sought to assuage Japanese worries on this point by explaining that while ideas transcended borders, it was impossible to export revolution.49 In their negotiations Tanaka and Ōhira repeatedly pointed to the specter of domestic political opposition to defend Japanese positions on contentious issues. For example, Ōhira made plain to his counterpart, Ji Pengfei, that what the Japanese sought on contentious issues related to the war was to “arrive at a line we can defend domestically.”50 Even if this was only an effective negotiating tactic, it suggests that, whatever they personally felt regarding Japanese actions during the war, personal or popular feelings of guilt or a desire to atone did not make them more accommodating of Chinese positions. Quite the contrary, Tanaka and Ōhira were constrained mostly by the possibility of domestic opposition to their policies that pushed them to resist Chinese positions on sensitive issues relating to the war and narratives of Japanese national identity, such as reparations and apologies. Japanese negotiators in Beijing were constrained much less by war guilt or remorse than by Japanese nationalist discourse.

Tanaka and Zhou on security issues This concern for domestic politics reinforces another common criticism of Japanese positions in Beijing; namely that Japanese negotiators were driven overwhelmingly by domestic political calculations and displayed a marked lack of concern for the strategic implications of their positions, especially in comparison with the Sino-American rapprochement.51 Yet, strategic and security concerns were not ignored during Tanaka’s visit. In their penultimate conference on the 27th, Zhou Enlai broached the subject of the present world situation, much as in the wide-­ranging conversations that Nixon and Kissinger had found so engrossing. In his talk with Tanaka, the main topics of discussion were the Soviet Union and the related issues of nuclear weapons and arms control.

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On relations with the Soviet Union the two leaders expressed general agreement, if not identical interests. On the issue of nuclear weapons and arms control, however, it seems that the two sides at times were talking past one another. Tanaka and Zhou were in broad agreement in their generally negative images of the Soviet Union, though they came to less agreement regarding the nature of the Soviet threat than characterized Zhou’s talks with the Americans. One important outstanding issue for the Japanese was the status of the 1950 SinoSoviet treaty that targeted Japan as a common enemy. Zhou gave a long historical account of China’s relations with the Soviet Union that culminated in the contemporary build-­up of Soviet troops on the Chinese border. Zhou explained to Tanaka that in light of this history the Soviet Union was no ally of the PRC and that the treaty was already a dead letter. Assured on this point, Tanaka made it clear that he shared Zhou’s negative feelings toward the USSR. Japanese, he told Zhou, could never trust the Soviets due to their betrayal of Japan in the last days of the war when the Soviet Union attacked Japan and seized the Kurile Islands. In fact, Tanaka twice referred to the Soviet seizure of Japanese territory as an attempt to “strangle” Japan.52 The two leaders made clear their shared antagonism toward the Soviet Union and reassured one another that neither would cooperate with the USSR at the other’s expense. In strategic terms, however, Tanaka did not share the commitment to global opposition to Soviet initiatives that had cemented the Sino-American rapprochement. Although suspicious of the USSR, Japanese interest in settling the Northern Territories dispute, combined with a keen concern for energy and resource security, encouraged the Japanese leadership to seek improved relations with both the PRC and the USSR. The inherent tension between this goal and PRC anti-Soviet strategy would erupt into a conflict of interests that characterized Sino-Japanese relations through most of the decade. In the course of the discussion of the Soviet Union, Zhou brought up the subject of nuclear weapons and arms control. Tellingly, Zhou did not press Tanaka for the Japanese position regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Instead, Zhou worried that Soviet arms control proposals, including the abolition of nuclear weapons, might appeal to Japanese popular sentiment. Zhou and the PRC leadership, for their part, were opposed to any such initiatives, describing them as a Soviet plot to preserve the nuclear hegemony of the superpowers: “The Soviet Union calls for outlawing nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons, but this is just a ploy to deceive people that must be exposed. We fear that non-­ nuclear countries might be taken in by Soviet schemes.”53 Thus, in contrast to earlier worries about the possibility of a resurgence of Japanese militarism, the

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Chinese leadership was now concerned about the possibility that Japanese pacifism and anti-­nuclear sentiment might be a threat to Chinese national interests. In this connection, Zhou reiterated Chinese support for the US-Japan alliance, including the American nuclear umbrella. In a tantalizingly brief passage, Zhou said that “there are unequal aspects to the US-Japan Security Treaty, but we understand that Japan cannot soon get rid of it. If Japan were not under the US nuclear umbrella, Japan would have no voice in the international community.”54 Here Zhou not only repeated Chinese support for the alliance but seemed to be actively trying to convince Tanaka that the maintenance of the alliance was in Japanese national interests—guaranteeing the Japanese a voice in the international community. Noting the unequal aspects of the relationship, Zhou seems to be countering nationalist opposition to the alliance within Japan, opposition that the PRC had heartily supported for two decades. So we can see that as the PRC leadership became more concerned with enlisting the Japanese in a united front against the Soviet Union, they became much less worried about the danger of Japanese militarism and, instead, increasingly came to fear the negative implications for PRC security of Japanese pacifism and anti-American nationalism, both of which Chinese leaders had to this point actively promoted. Yet, Tanaka seems not to have interpreted Zhou’s comments in this manner. In his response, he simply reiterated the Japanese commitment to a non-­nuclear policy, declaring that the Japanese had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons (even though, he noted, Japanese technological capabilities would enable them do so fairly easily). He did not respond at all to Zhou’s points on Soviet arms control initiatives. Tanaka also, somewhat oddly, went out of his way to defend the US-Japan alliance. Tanaka insisted that the US had no expansionist or aggressive intent and said he hoped Zhou and the PRC leadership “would deepen their understanding of Japan-US relations.”55 It is clear by this point, however, that Mao and Zhou “understood” the importance of the US-Japan security relationship as well as any Japanese conservative could have hoped. The PRC leadership had no doubts about the importance of maintaining the US-Japan alliance for the protection of Chinese national interests. In fact, it may have been time for Tanaka and the Japanese leadership to begin worrying that the PRC’s new appreciation of the usefulness of the alliance to their anti-Soviet designs itself might become a problem for Japanese foreign policy. The fact that Tanaka did not seem to appreciate the import of Zhou’s discussion of Soviet nuclear policy and the US-Japan Security Treaty would seem to support the interpretation that the Japanese negotiators lacked a strategic

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sensibility. Yet, even if we provisionally accept this position, we might enquire as to the source of Tanaka’s short-­sightedness on this point. It is possible, of course, that he was merely sticking to talking points. Given anti-­nuclear sentiment in Japan, it may have been politically expedient to avoid any comment on the issue beyond the stated government position against developing nuclear weapons. Concerning Soviet arms control policies, Tanaka may have been deliberately avoiding comment so as not to provoke the Soviet leadership. At times, however, it seems he was determined to refute criticisms he expected rather than answering the points Zhou actually made. That is, expecting Zhou to level the usual Chinese criticisms of the US-Japan Security Treaty or the danger of Japanese militarism and nuclear weapons development that Japanese conservatives had always found so grating, Tanaka committed himself to a nationalist defense of Japan. In this sense, Tanaka’s strategic sensibilities were hampered not by naïveté or undue concern for pro-PRC sentiment in Japanese domestic politics, but rather from an imperative to resist expected PRC criticism offensive to conservative Japanese national sentiment.

The meeting with Mao The highlight of the visit occurred on the night of the 27th when Tanaka and party were suddenly invited to Mao’s residence in Zhongnanhai, the leadership compound adjacent to the Forbidden City. The conversation did not involve negotiation on substantive issues. Rather, the meeting itself was taken as Mao’s approval of an early conclusion of negotiations.56 In the course of their conversation, Mao made very clear the new political alignment of the PRC leadership with Japanese mainstream conservatives. Recounting his talks with Nixon, Mao told Tanaka that he preferred dealing with rightists like Nixon. The Democrats, he explained, were more enlightened, but less trustworthy. When Nixon visited, Mao had told him that he had voted for him. Now Mao told Tanaka, “This time we voted for you. It’s just like you said, without the power of the LDP we’d never be able to solve the normalization problem. There are some people who chastise me for associating only with rightists, but the Japanese opposition can’t solve problems. Solving the normalization problem depends on working with the LDP government.”57 Until his death, Mao would guide the PRC leadership in working with the conservative Japanese government against the progressive opposition. In a meeting with Tanaka earlier that afternoon, Zhou had foreshadowed Mao’s criticisms of the Japanese left. Addressing requests by Tanaka that the PRC

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leadership no longer criticize the Japanese government about the return of Japanese militarism, Zhou told Tanaka, “on this point, I am better than the Japan Socialist Party. They are always going on about ‘unarmed neutrality,’ so I told them that it was only natural for Japan to have defense capabilities.”58 Here we can see how far the PRC leadership had come in the space of a year. In his talks with Kissinger the previous autumn, Zhou had referred to the desirability of a neutral Japan. Now Mao and Zhou were telling the Japanese leadership that they would defend Japanese conservatives and the US-Japan Security Treaty against opposition calls for unarmed neutrality.

The joint communiqué After getting the green light from Mao, final details of the joint communiqué were hammered out in a late-­night foreign ministers’ conference immediately following the summit in Zhongnanhai. Ōhira and Ji Pengfei worked past midnight on the final wording. The key agreement arrived at in this final meeting was Chinese acceptance of Ōhira’s promise to deal with Japan’s relations with Taiwan in a press conference immediately after the issuance of the joint communiqué. In the end, the PRC leadership compromised on all major issues of concern to the Japanese. The PRC basically acquiesced to the Japanese insistence on separating the normalization of relations from the issue of the legality of the 1952 Japan-ROC peace treaty. On ending the war, the communiqué made no mention of when the state of war between the two countries had ended, just as Takashima had originally proposed. In fact, the joint communiqué made no mention of the end of the war at all. Rather, the two parties agreed that the “unnatural state of affairs” between the two countries would end with the proclamation of the joint communiqué. On the other most contentious point, that of reparations, the PRC leadership accepted the Japanese wording, according to which the PRC simply waived their reparations claim and omitted any mention of the PRC’s legal right to claim reparations. The final joint communiqué included a preamble which stated that the Japanese side “feels keenly its responsibility for the enormous harm it has caused the Chinese people through war in the past, and reflects deeply on this.” In the preamble the Japanese government also expressed its understanding of the PRC’s three principles of normalization. The rest of the joint communiqué consisted of nine articles. The end of the state of war was dealt with in the first article and reparations in the fifth. In other articles Japan recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China (Art.  2), and said it “understands and

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respects,” the PRC’s claim that Taiwan is a part of China (Art. 3). The two sides agreed to exchange ambassadors (Art. 4), abide by the five principles of peaceful coexistence (Art.  6), conclude a treaty of peace and friendship (Art.  8), and negotiate various technical agreements necessary to carry out normal diplomatic relations (Art. 9).59 Another important feature of the joint communiqué was the inclusion of an anti-­hegemony clause in Article 7. In this clause both countries promised not to seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and committed themselves to oppose such efforts by any other country or group of countries. The anti-­hegemony clause also included a statement that the normalization of relations was not aimed at any third country, reflecting reservations on the part of the Japanese negotiators that the anti-­hegemony clause might antagonize the Soviet Union, the usual target of Chinese charges of “hegemonism.” As we will see, the question of including an anti-­hegemony clause in a subsequent treaty of peace and friendship would become a controversy that impeded the improvement of relations through much of the rest of the decade. At the time of the joint communiqué, however, it seems that very few thought that the anti-­hegemony clause would become a serious issue. After all, a similar clause had been included in the Shanghai Communiqué issued at the end of Nixon’s China visit, and some saw the inclusion of the anti-­hegemony clause as a quid pro quo for Chinese concessions on other issues.60 Immediately after the signing of the joint communiqué, Ōhira Masayoshi held a press conference where he explained to assembled reporters the contents of the joint communiqué. Then, as had been agreed upon in his final meeting with Ji Pengfei, he addressed the implications of normalization for Japan’s relations with the Republic of China: “Although it is not touched upon in the joint communiqué, it is the view of the Japanese government that, as a result of the normalization of Japan-China relations, the Japan-Republic of China treaty has lost its raison d’être and is considered to have ended.”61 This rather ambiguous statement managed to satisfy the demands of the PRC on the Taiwan issue without accepting PRC claims that the 1952 treaty had been illegal, officially abrogating the treaty, or explicitly recognizing Taiwan as a part of China. Despite the efforts of Ōhira and MOFA bureaucrats, however, the statement was not well received in either Taiwan or Japan. Later the same evening the ROC announced that it was severing diplomatic relations with Japan. In Tokyo, Ōhira’s unilateral announcement raised a host of legal questions and, as we will see in the next chapter, became the focus of fierce criticism as being emblematic of a weak Japanese China policy.

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Conclusion The political settlements arrived at in the course of normalization set the political parameters for Sino-Japanese relations for the rest of the decade. Basic agreement had been reached on the most important issues of relations with Taiwan and the US-Japan Security Treaty. The normalization was widely heralded in Japan as opening a new chapter in Sino-Japanese relations and Japanese foreign policy—no longer were friendly relations with China incompatible with the US-Japan alliance. Yet for many Japanese observers, at the time and since, the normalization process seemed fundamentally flawed. Scholars like Sadako Ogata and Soeya Yoshihide have noted an overwhelming concern for domestic politics in Japanese decision-­making on normalization compared to the global strategic outlook behind the Sino-American rapprochement.62 Usually, this concern for domestic politics has been considered a major source of weakness and as inducing in Japanese negotiators a predisposition to compromise and accede to Chinese demands. Many conservative politicians, scholars, and commentators at the time feared that Tanaka, in the pursuit of his own political advantage, and pushed by a public mood in favor of normalization, rushed to conclude an agreement without regard for Japanese national interests. For example, Nakajima Mineo interpreted the Chinese leadership’s willingness to work with Tanaka as evidence that Zhou Enlai recognized Tanaka’s domestic political position would make him much more easily manipulated than Satō.63 A related criticism of the process of normalization holds that Japanese were handicapped in their dealings with China by an overly emotional approach to China created by a sense of war guilt, cultural affinity, or Asianist sentiment that made them reticent to challenge Chinese positions in the pursuit of strategic national interests. For example, Professor Etō Shinkichi characterized the history of modern Japan’s relations with China as being dominated by a cycle of a “love” and “hate” in which Japanese veered between irrational emotional extremes in their attitudes toward China. On the eve of Tanaka’s visit, Etō saw the Japanese public in the throes of another bout of “love,” possessed by emotional, unrealistic expectations toward the PRC. When this mood was fed by a media cowed to uncritical support for PRC positions, a business community enamored with the potential of the China market, and combined with a “subservient” attitude toward Beijing in MOFA, Etō worried that the government would never be able to carry out the rational pursuit of national interests. Etō warned that “we cannot expect true friendship between Japan and China to descend suddenly from heaven one sunny day simply by accommodating all the wishes of Peking.”64

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Tanaka certainly saw normalization as primarily an issue of domestic politics.65 Yet, as we will see in the next chapter, Foreign Minister Ōhira justified normalization in strategic terms as improving relations with the PRC while maintaining the US-Japan security alliance.66 Moreover, scholars have normally interpreted Tanaka’s concern for domestic politics as a source of weakness, making him more likely to submit to Chinese positions. They have not generally recognized that the concern for Japanese domestic political opinion required the Japanese delegation to pander to Japanese nationalist sentiment by softening the terms of apology, defending the legality of the treaty with Taiwan, or dismissing Chinese concerns about Japanese militarism. A concern for domestic politics, therefore, was not necessarily a source of weakness and could be a source of resistance to Chinese demands. During the Tanaka visit, the Japanese position largely reflected the bureaucratic interests of MOFA and a government preoccupation with protecting the legality of previous policy positions regarding Japan’s relations with Taiwan. In negotiating the joint communiqué, the Japanese side stuck to highly legalistic arguments and sought to limit the implications of normalization for previous Japanese policy positions, especially Japan’s treaty with the ROC. The joint communiqué was largely the result of Chinese compromise on these issues. The Japanese certainly did not simply accommodate all the wishes of the PRC leadership. One can, of course, argue that these legal concerns did not warrant the weight given them by the Japanese negotiators. On issues deemed important, however, the Japanese were not shy about pressing their claims or defending their positions and were not constrained by guilt, sympathy, or emotion. As Ming Wan argued, “when it came to substantive national interests, neither government allowed emotions to determine its negotiating position. The Japanese team focused on decidedly nonemotional legal principles.”67 If there was any emotional tendency on the part of the Japanese in Beijing, it was a determination to avoid any appearance of weakness or compromise on issues deemed important or embarrassing, a disposition nearly the opposite of that commonly assumed. As will become clear in the next chapter, however, efforts to protect the legality of the treaty with Taiwan and to avoid the appearance of acceding too readily to PRC positions did not mollify Japanese critics of the normalization agreement. Normalization not only set the political parameters of the diplomatic relationship, it also set the basic themes of the China problem discourse in Japan over the rest of the decade.

4

The China Problem in a New Era

Japanese across the political spectrum scrambled to make sense of the Nixon shock and the normalization of relations with China. Not surprisingly, the Nixon shock provoked considerable anger and resentment in Japan. American ambassador to Tokyo Armin Meyer (who himself had only learned of Nixon’s announcement when he heard news of it on the radio in a barbershop) reported to Nixon that Japanese leaders were “upset as hell.”1 Nixon’s announcement was a political disaster for Prime Minister Satō and an embarrassment for the ruling LDP. Some Japanese thought it a deliberate snub, retaliation, perhaps, for Satō’s failure to deliver promised limits on Japanese textile exports. Etō Jun saw in the Nixon shock a weakened and bitter United States abandoning Japan for China, “Having jilted Japan, America now wants to rekindle the flame with China. Japan has been given the role of opponent and has become the scapegoat for America’s woes.”2 Many American commentators have seconded Japanese objections to their treatment and regretted the effect of the Nixon shock on relations with Japan. U. Alexis Johnson reflected that “there has never again been the same trust and confidence between our two governments.”3 As lamentable as Japan’s treatment had been, however, the Japanese leadership could not have been greatly dissatisfied with the actual political outcome of the US approach to China. After all, improvement in relations between the two powers had been expected for some time, and, in essence, Nixon’s new China policy was not unlike that advocated by Japanese prime ministers since Yoshida Shigeru. In fact, Kissinger answered Japanese criticisms of the Nixon administration’s moves by pointing out that the United States had only caught up with the Japanese position on the PRC.4 Had the news of Nixon’s China initiative been delivered to the Japanese with any tact, it would probably have been quite welcome. The China shock, however, was only the first shock Nixon would deliver to the Japanese. On August 15, the anniversary of V-J Day, Nixon announced a new economic policy that ended the gold standard for the dollar and threatened a 10 percent surcharge on imports. Nixon justified the new policy legally by appeal

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to the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act and called the economic threat America was facing, “far more serious than the challenge that we confronted even in the dark days of Pearl Harbor.”5 As Michael Schaller argued, “while the China shock had primarily injured Japan’s pride, the economic shock, as Nixon put it, was designed to ‘stick it to Japan.’ ”6 Taken together, the Nixon shocks raised serious doubts about the reliability of the United States as an ally and sparked fierce debate regarding the reorientation of Japanese foreign policy. Among the conservative Japanese leadership, the Nixon shocks were taken as heralding the end, for better or for worse, of overwhelming American dominance of the international system. On one hand, the Nixon shocks threatened the unconditional security provided by the Pax Americana and the American “greenhouse” under which the postwar Japanese economy had flourished.7 On the other hand, the breakdown of the Cold War order in East Asia promised to ease the constraints on Japanese foreign policy in general and China policy in particular. Hori Shigeru, then-­secretary general of the LDP, saw in the new international circumstances an opportunity to end Japan’s postwar estrangement from the rest of Asia: the world has ceased to revolve around an American axis. The Americans themselves recognize this fact. The world, it is said, has entered a tri-­polar era, or a five-­polar era . . . For Japan, friendship with the United States remains vital . . . At the same time I believe that it will be necessary for us to once again recognize that Japan is an Asian nation.8

The normalization of relations with China was an important first step in adapting to this new situation. The Japanese government succeeded in establishing relations with the PRC (thereby neutralizing a key source of opposition criticism), without sacrificing extensive economic and cultural ties to Taiwan. Moreover, all this had been achieved within the framework of the US-Japan security alliance. All in all, the normalization should have been a rousing political victory for the conservative Japanese government. Yet, it was difficult to ignore the fact that the normalization of relations was a less a Japanese initiative than a reaction to the strategic initiatives of Washington and Beijing. Combined with increased international uncertainty, this raised troubling questions about Japanese national identity and the Japanese nation’s place in the world. The opposition interpreted the Nixon shocks and normalization as vindication of their own foreign policy positions. Leftists and progressives in the opposition parties and academia argued that the Nixon shocks were a repudiation of the entire postwar conservative foreign policy of alliance with the United States. The

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dangers inherent in sacrificing national independence for dependence on the United States had finally been realized, leaving Japan betrayed and isolated in a dangerous world. The only reasonable response, many argued, was the adoption of a truly independent foreign policy of unarmed neutrality. Expectations ran high that the normalization of relations with China would be a first step toward this goal to be followed by Japan’s liberation from the US-Japan alliance and a new solidarity with Asia. Critics on the right were dismayed by the reactive nature of government policy. They interpreted the Japanese approach to China as an opportunistic, unprincipled capitulation to the demands of an aggressive China, symbolized by what they characterized as the betrayal of an important ally on Taiwan. They sought to capitalize on the increased sense of insecurity in the wake of the Nixon shocks to advance their own nationalist agenda, arguing that without fundamental social and political reform centered on strengthening Japanese patriotism, the normalization of relations with the PRC threatened Japanese national security and independence by exposing the Japanese to Chinese Communist influence and manipulation. Thus, observers across the political spectrum saw the Nixon shocks and the normalization of relations as opportunities to advance not only their political agendas, but also their own narratives of Japanese national identity. The normalization of relations immediately became inseparable from the Japanese nationalist discourse.

Ōhira Masayoshi and the conservative approach to the China problem As foreign minister in the Tanaka cabinet it fell to Ōhira Masayoshi to defend the normalization of relations with China. In fact, Ōhira’s importance in postwar China policy went beyond his role in normalization. He had also served as foreign minister in the Ikeda cabinet from 1962 to 1964, at the high point of the expansion of Sino-Japanese trade ties and as prime minister at the end of the decade engineered the first Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) package of economic aid to the PRC. Ōhira also thought carefully about the challenges and opportunities the Japanese nation faced in the new era of the 1970s as a self-­conscious representative of the postwar conservative mainstream. Ōhira will appear repeatedly in this study and it is worthwhile to consider his ideas in some detail.

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A prewar finance ministry bureaucrat, Ōhira entered postwar politics as a protégé of Ikeda Hayato, serving as Ikeda’s chief cabinet secretary and foreign minister. This placed Ōhira firmly in the Yoshida School of postwar conservatives. At the time of the Nixon shock, Ōhira was one of the LDP’s most powerful politicians, having inherited from Ikeda leadership of one of the party’s largest factions (the Kōchikai) and remained a major figure in Japanese politics for the rest of the decade, rising to become prime minister in December 1978, a position in which he served until his untimely death in office in June 1980. Ōhira was also well known as one of the LDP’s more intellectual politicians, cultivating ties to prominent conservative academics. The journalist Kaminishi Akio credited Ōhira with being one of the pioneers of “brain-­trust politics” (burēn seiji) in Japan, regularly availing himself of the services of scholars for policy advice.9 Ōhira also shared the common intellectual concern for the health of Japanese national identity. For example, Ōhira contributed to a Yomiuri newspaper column called “On Patriotism” (Aikoku ni tsuite) in 1970, in which he expressed the dissatisfaction he shared with many Japanese (not just conservatives) regarding the weakness of national identity in the postwar period. According to Ōhira, national identity had “withered” as a result of defeat and the “uninhibited postwar rush to democracy and internationalism”: It goes without saying that Japan’s postwar was an era in which nationalism (nashonarizumu) was stifled (chissoku), a period when it was a victory to even bring the word nationalism to one’s lips. It was a period in which not only was there a rejection of nationalism, but nationalism itself was taken to have been the culprit that led Japan to war and rooting it out was taken to be a duty of the new Japan. This was certainly an overreaction to defeat, but we cannot say that we have been sufficiently liberated from this constraint.10

Ōhira was heartened, however, by what he saw as an “awakening” of national consciousness manifest in resurgent conservative nationalist narratives (Ōhira used the same term for awakening, jikaku, as the Marxist historians of the earlier national awakening movement). Fundamental to this awakening was the study of national history, as “a nation with no history has no future.” Ōhira specifically cited the work of Umesao Tadao (examined in Chapter 2), and Hayashi Fusao, author of An Affirmation of the Greater East Asia War (Dai tō-A sensō kōteiron, 1963), as evidence of a new, more positive appreciation for modern Japanese history. Where today many see in Hayashi’s work a foundational text of right-­ wing historical revisionism, Ōhira saw a natural, healthy desire on the part of

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Japanese to “uncover their national history.” And Ōhira left no doubt as to who had obscured this national history to begin with, “This excavation [of national history] cannot be carried out satisfactorily if left to a few leftist scholars.” For Ōhira, the emergence of new conservative nationalist narratives was part of a healthy effort to recover national identity from the restraints imposed by defeat, materialism, and leftist ideology: “This movement is one to break postwar taboos and uncover the character of the nation as it actually exists. Through this movement, nationalism, which has long lain dormant, is being brought back to life.”11 Ōhira’s thinking on national identity also evinced a cultural nationalist bent that asserted the uniqueness and value of Japanese cultural traditions and which resonated with works like those of Umesao in the increasingly popular Nihonjinron genre. For example, explaining the historical formation of Japanese national character, Ōhira described the Japanese as occupying a small, resource-­ poor string of islands beset by what he characterized as a “merciless” climate. He also pointed out that, physically, the Japanese were probably too short to be a truly great nation and went so far as to describe the Japanese as “ugly” (minikui minzoku). Although the Japanese had not been blessed with the geographical, climatic, or even biological endowments of other nations (to exactly which countries he was comparing Japan was never entirely clear), pointing out these shortcomings only served to highlight the uniqueness and superiority of Japanese cultural attributes. The struggle to overcome their inherent limitations had instilled in the Japanese a powerful spirit of perseverance and ingenuity as well as a uniquely harmonious culture rooted in the cultivation of cooperative human relations. Ōhira recalled making this point in a conversation explaining the secret of postwar economic success to President Kennedy: “Japan suffers many natural and human disasters. Japanese have the will to struggle, endure, overcome [these disasters] and improve Japan. The power source of Japan’s recovery is the Japanese nation’s rich store of enterprising spirit.”12 Ōhira was confident that the Japanese could depend on this national spirit and their cultural traditions to overcome the shocks of the early 1970s.

Ōhira and the Japanese nation in a new era In the wake of the Nixon shocks, the ruling conservatives were naturally on the defensive. Ōhira, however, interpreted the Nixon shocks as a vindication of conservative policies and an opportunity to develop a more autonomous, more assertive Japanese foreign policy. Ōhira, like many other observers, saw the

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Nixon shocks as only the most visible manifestations of the relative decline of US power and as heralding the end of a rigid bipolar Cold War world dominated by the superpowers. The proximate cause of US decline was the strain on American society and economy imposed by the Vietnam War, but Ōhira also identified a longer-­term trend toward multipolarization driven by what he called (appropriating the opposition’s anti-­imperialist vocabulary), the “revolt” of Asia against the superpowers. Unlike the government’s leftist and progressive critics, however, Ōhira saw this revolt being led by Japan’s economic rise and the conservative leadership that had facilitated it. It was the Yoshida Doctrine—the alliance with the US and a focus on the economy—that had fostered the economic growth that ultimately undermined the global dominance of the superpowers. Ōhira admitted that following the United States as the “boss” (bosu) had been a difficult path to tread in terms of national pride, but it had served Japanese national interests well. Ōhira contrasted the unseemly but successful postwar policies of the Japanese leadership with those of leaders like Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Sukarno in Indonesia, and Jawaharlal Nehru in India, who had courageously resisted superpower domination to little real effect in terms of national development. For Ōhira, the historic rise of Asia was led not by the revolutionary heroes of the decolonization and non-­aligned movements but by Japan and her pragmatic, low-­profile conservative leadership.13 The Nixon shocks did not, therefore, imply the failure of postwar Japanese foreign policy, as the government’s leftist critics would have it, but rather its success. The very success of the Yoshida Doctrine, however, left Japan facing a formidable challenge. While Ōhira predicted that weakening superpower dominance would ultimately reduce the risk of war, it also meant that no country could depend upon either of the superpowers for its security. Each nation, including Japan, now faced the task of ensuring its own survival, of forging its own “individual, national (minzoku-­teki) path” to security and prosperity.14 For Ōhira, this was as much a challenge to Japanese national identity as it was to Japanese policy. To successfully respond to this challenge, Japanese needed a new understanding of their nation’s place in the international community. Throughout the postwar period, Japanese had been free to concentrate on rebuilding their economy without much thought for the outside world. Economic success, however, had altered the Japanese role in international society. By the early 1970s, Japanese stood on the threshold of achieving their century-­long quest to catch up with the West and Japan was increasingly perceived as an important member of the international community and the Western Cold War

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alliance. Ōhira argued that Japan had become an “insider” in the international system, a status quo power, or a “systemic supporter,” with an interest in maintaining the US-led international system on which Japanese security and prosperity depended.15 As an insider among the world powers, Japan had an opportunity to participate in shaping the international order but also a responsibility to actively contribute to the maintenance of the liberal international political-­economic order. Japanese self-­consciousness, however, had not yet adapted to this new reality. Ōhira felt that Japanese still thought of themselves as a small, poor, defeated nation and this made them too reticent in expressing themselves and asserting their interests in international politics: “it is important for Japanese to become aware of themselves as powerful members of a ‘world Japan.’ Japanese are an extremely humble nation, a nation in which a passive or victim consciousness is too strong.” The key to establishing Japan as a responsible, “trustworthy” nation, Ōhira argued, was for the Japanese to become more confident and assertive in international politics. Given their new position in the international community, it would no longer do for Japanese to leave international politics to others; to simply “smile and say ‘Oh yes, Oh yes’ ” in response to other countries’ proposals. Japanese would have to learn to clearly say “yes and no” and to back up their words with deeds, to “do what they say.” In situations where Japanese interests were at stake, Japanese would have to be ready to clearly say “no” to others’ demands.16 While not nearly as confrontational as Ishihara Shintarō’s later The Japan that Can Say No, Ōhira clearly shared the widespread idea that postwar Japanese had been too reluctant to speak up in defense of their national interests and needed to become more assertive. Finally, according to Ōhira, a more autonomous and assertive foreign policy would enable Japanese to actively contribute to regional peace and prosperity, which was Japan’s primary responsibility to the nations of Asia, “this would not simply atone for Japan’s past sins in Asia, it was the indispensable cornerstone of Asian peace and stability.”17 Thus, fulfilling the responsibility imposed on the nation by the past required not deference or accommodation, but greater Japanese autonomy and assertiveness, which itself had to be based on a strengthened Japanese sense of national identity rooted in an appreciation for Japanese history and cultural traditions. In short, successfully fulfilling Japan’s war responsibility depended on nurturing and strengthening Japanese nationalism, not suppressing it. These ideas about Japanese national identity and international role shaped Ōhira’s approach to the China problem throughout the rest of the decade.

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Ōhira on the China problem Ōhira’s experience with China pre-­dated his career as a politician. He had served in China in 1939 and 1940 as a bureaucrat with the Asia Development Board (Kōain), which managed Japanese interests in occupied China. It is often argued that Ōhira’s experience in wartime China engendered a deep sense of remorse for Japanese conduct in China and that this sense of remorse (reinforced perhaps by his Christian faith) influenced his approach to the China problem.18 In a positive sense, this feeling of remorse is seen as motivating Ōhira to push for improved relations with the PRC in order to atone for Japanese aggression. In a more critical sense, it might be seen as inducing Ōhira to put his personal desire for atonement above the pursuit of Japanese national interests in relations with China. In fact, however, Ōhira’s feelings about the war did not determine his position on China policy. His public policy positions consistently conformed to those of the conservative mainstream, and he held firm to the Yoshida line on China that prioritized the relationship with the United States and sought improved relations with China only within the constraints that relationship imposed. This basically cautious approach to the China problem was only enhanced by Ōhira’s own concepts of Japanese national identity. Ōhira certainly did clearly and publicly express remorse for Japanese actions in China during the war. In 1963 as foreign minister, Ōhira admitted in Diet questioning that,“as a result of the war I have a guilty conscience (zaiaku ishiki), and I think that when considering the China problem, it is plain that we are in a different position than the Americans.”19 He further acknowledged his personal culpability in Japanese aggression as a bureaucrat administering the Japanese government’s wartime “continental management” system: “I cannot deny that [this system] was an agent of aggression in China.”20 In a 1978 interview, just before becoming prime minister, Ōhira acknowledged the need for Japanese to deal forthrightly with the history of aggression in China and suggested that they had not yet done so: There is much we should reflect upon, but this is not the recent trend in Japan, we aren’t looking fairly at Japan-China relations from the position of the aggressor and China as the victim, it was our country that caused harm to China and it was China that was injured . . . Rather than being too accommodating of the Chinese, I have the opposite feeling, that in some respects we have not reflected enough on our role as aggressors.21

If we accept that Ōhira’s personal feelings predisposed him to favor friendly Sino-Japanese relations, this did not seem to determine his policy positions, an

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examination of which reveals a conservative and basically cautious attitude toward relations with the PRC. Ōhira first became directly involved in the formulation of China policy as Ikeda’s foreign minister, in which position he helped implement policies that led to a rapid expansion of bilateral trade. It should be pointed out, however, that enthusiasm for expanded trade with the mainland was thoroughly consistent with conservative policy since Yoshida that sought trade with China within the US-Japan alliance. On political relations with the PRC, Ōhira’s position was even more circumspect. In Diet questioning in February 1964, he laid out several conditions for diplomatic recognition of the PRC. Ōhira explained that Japan would consider normalization if the PRC were admitted to the UN, dropped its opposition to the US-Japan Security Treaty, recognized the validity of the 1952 peace treaty with the ROC, abandoned its reparations claims, and made a pledge of non-­interference in Japanese domestic politics.22 These conditions were hardly a bold call for normalization. Rather, they were a restatement of conservative China policy that effectively put off any improvement in political relations pending substantial change in the American relationship with the PRC. In the end, whatever his feelings, and despite what was widely regarded to be his forward-­looking position on the China problem, Ōhira never joined those in the political opposition or his own party calling for an early normalization of relations with the PRC. Ōhira came out publicly in favor of the normalization of relations only in September 1971, months after Nixon’s announcement of his intention to visit the PRC.23 We might assume that had political circumstances allowed, Ōhira would have done more to assuage his feelings of remorse by moving earlier to improve relations with the PRC. It is clear, however, that Ōhira’s desire for atonement did not take precedence over the pursuit of Japanese national interests or his own domestic political interests. Ōhira’s caution on the China problem was also based on his reading of the modern history of Japan’s relations with China, which he saw as one of failure. The China problem, he declared, had always been a “trap” for the Japanese. The sheer size of Chinese territory and population as well as its geographic proximity made China one of the most important issues in Japanese foreign policy. Combined with notions of cultural familiarity and racial affinity, this made China “enticing” to ambitious politicians and adventurers (tairiku rōnin) seeking to make their mark on history. Whether hoping to forge solidarity in resistance to Western imperialism or seeking to assert Japanese dominance over China, all their efforts had ultimately ended in failure. For 100 years after the Meiji Restoration, Ōhira lamented, Japanese had piled one China policy failure on

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another. Ōhira had seen some of these failures for himself in North China during the war and was not nostalgic about his time in China. Thus, for Ōhira, personal experience and the whole modern history of Japan’s relations with China suggested the need for caution and induced in him a suspicion of Asianist identification with China.24 Ōhira’s basically cautious approach to the China problem was reinforced by his notions of Japanese and Chinese national character. As noted, he was attracted to narratives of Japanese cultural uniqueness. As a result, he was skeptical of narratives of Japanese national identity that stressed the common culture and common race (dōbun dōshu) of the Japanese and Chinese nations. He consistently warned against assumptions that cultural affinity could be the basis of improved Sino-Japanese relations, arguing pointedly that, “the differences between the Japanese and Chinese peoples are greater than the similarities, and mutual understanding is more difficult than most imagine.”25 Like so many others, Ōhira saw differences in national character manifest in the two nations’ distinctly contrasting responses to modernity. While basking in the success of Japan’s postwar economic growth and welcoming a more positive view of Japan’s modern history, Ōhira also lamented that, in their drive for rapid modernization, the Japanese had thrown away their values and traditions in favor of cultural Westernization. Chinese, in contrast, had resisted and “disdained” modernization-­cum-Westernization as impure, unseemly or “greedy” (don’yoku): “Japanese immediately hurried down the path of unbridled (don’yoku) Westernization in the name of ‘Modernization.’ Chinese, however, did not deign to undertake such unprincipled Westernization. The Japanese felt no great hesitation in throwing away their cultural legacy but the Chinese did not throw theirs away so simply.”26 Ōhira made a dichotomous distinction between modern Western materialism and traditional Japanese spirit or culture to argue that while the Japanese had succeeded in acquiring the material attributes of Western modernity, they had paid a heavy price, sacrificing much of their national culture and identity. He expressed admiration for the contrasting strength and tenacity of Chinese national identity which had resisted Westernization, even at the price of material progress.27 In some ways this recalls Takeuchi Yoshimi’s comparison of Japanese and Chinese modernity examined in Chapter 2 except, of course, that Ōhira reversed Takeuchi’s judgment of the relative success or failure of each nation. Where Takeuchi had argued that Japanese modernization had failed, Ōhira held that Japan had succeeded in modernization, though at great cost to national identity. And while Ōhira, like Takeuchi, admired the power of Chinese national

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consciousness, it was clear to Ōhira that Japan was more advanced than the PRC. Thus, by the early 1970s, in light of postwar economic development it was clear, even in the eyes of a presumed friend of China like Ōhira, that Japan was once again the most modern nation in Asia. It was Japan, not China, that would lead the modernization of Asia and by the end of the decade even provide a model for China’s modernization. Ōhira’s basically cautious approach to the China problem, however, did not preclude the pursuit of friendly relations with China and, of course, he played a key role in the normalization of relations in 1972. Ōhira’s role in normalization meant that he bore the burden of defending it at home. In doing so, he cited overwhelming popular support for normalization, painting himself and the Tanaka administration as the democratic representatives of the popular will. Ōhira also argued that international conditions favored normalization in 1972. Many countries, including important Western allies like Italy and Canada, recognized the PRC in the early 1970s. International trends, along with Nixon’s visit to China and the accession of the PRC to UN membership meant that most of the conditions he had earlier set for the normalization of relations had been met.28 Ōhira’s defense of normalization, however, did not rest solely, or primarily, on appeal to public opinion or international trends. It was also based on his assessment of Japan’s strategic position in the international system. This assessment followed from his identification of Japan as an “insider” in the US-led international system in East Asia. Ōhira argued that despite the dramatic changes in 1971 and 1972, Japanese economic and security interests still depended on the maintenance of this system. Even in a period of superpower détente, characterized by the increased importance of “negotiation and interdependence,” Japanese prosperity remained dependent on the open political economy guaranteed by the system of defense treaties between the United States and the non-­communist countries of East Asia, including the US-Japan Security Treaty. The end of the rigid bipolar Cold War order, therefore, did not change Japan’s basic strategic position in East Asia. If there was a change in Japan’s international strategic position, it was that Japan was increasingly expected to contribute to the system’s maintenance. Ōhira argued that normalization constituted an important Japanese contribution to international stability by peacefully integrating relations with the PRC into the Western international system.29 The key point on which Ōhira had to defend normalization was the decision to cut diplomatic relations with the ROC on Taiwan. The politically most potent criticism of the normalization agreement came from the right wing of Ōhira’s own party. These criticisms will be examined in more detail shortly, but they

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focused on what was called as the “abandonment” of Taiwan. Ōhira claimed that he had exerted all his efforts to carry out the conservative party’s preferred policy of concluding the normalization of relations with the PRC without sacrificing relations with the ROC. However, so long as both the ROC and the PRC claimed to be the sole representative of all of China and would tolerate no dual recognition, such a position was impossible. In these circumstances, Ōhira argued that the most practical approach to the problem was to simply recognize whichever government was represented in international organizations. Once the United States had given up on protecting the international legal position of the ROC (by dropping its opposition to PRC representation in the UN and acknowledging the one China principle in the Shanghai Communiqué), there was little reason for the Japanese to keep up the fight.30 Moreover, Ōhira rejected arguments that the defense of Taiwan had been abandoned to the detriment of either Japanese or ROC security. Ōhira claimed that he had been convinced by American leaders during Tanaka’s visit to Hawaii in August 1972 that the United States would stand by its military commitments in Asia, including the defense of Taiwan. Given that Taiwanese security was still guaranteed by the US, Taiwan had hardly been abandoned and cutting diplomatic ties with the ROC did not directly threaten Japanese security. Japan could enjoy the benefits of normal relations with the PRC while maintaining economic and cultural relations with the ROC, all while leaving the defense of Taiwan to the United States. Ōhira also justified normalization as a response to increased realism on the part of the PRC leadership.31 Thus, he suggested that responsibility for the “unnatural” state of affairs that had characterized China-Japan relations after the war lay at least partly with the PRC and its radical revolutionary foreign policy, rather than simply with some presumed enmity toward China on the part of the Japanese government. Normalization, according to Ōhira, was a response to change on the part of the Chinese leadership in abandoning its radical policies and coming around to more sensible Japanese positions. This once again proved the basic correctness of past government policy as well as deflected right-­wing criticisms that Ōhira had concluded normalization on Chinese terms. It also suggests that Ōhira did not see war responsibility or feelings of remorse as obligating Japanese to accept unreasonable Chinese political positions. Finally, Ōhira justified the normalization of relations with China as conducive to achieving a new national unity and recovering Japan’s lost national identity. Ōhira saw normalization as an opportunity to remove the China problem as a major source of ideological division in Japan. Normalization could be a cure for

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what he called Japan’s “political constipation.”32 In popular support for normalization Ōhira found proof that “most Japanese have overcome ideology” in favor of “common sense” and hoped that this achievement could be repeated in the realms of security and economic policy, creating the national unity and consensus required to pursue an autonomous foreign policy.33 Therefore, the concern for domestic politics and national identity was not necessarily a distraction from the pursuit of national interest. Rather, the nationalist project of forging a shared national identity was a prerequisite for the pursuit of national interest. Ōhira’s thinking represents an attempt to interpret the events of the early 1970s, including the normalization of relations, as vindication of mainstream conservative policies and narratives of national identity. Relations with China over the course of the decade in many ways would bolster this interpretation and by the end of the decade encourage a conservative triumphalism.

Leftists and progressives confront the Nixon shocks and normalization For those on the left who had seen improved relations with the PRC as part of a nationalist struggle against American domination, the events of 1971–72 seemed to herald imminent liberation. With the significant exception of the Japan Communist Party (JCP), Nixon’s China visit was nearly universally regarded as a defeat for the United States that, especially in light of expected American defeat in Vietnam, proved the utter failure of US Cold War policy in Asia. By extension, the Nixon shocks were also an indictment of the postwar conservatives’ cooperation with US policy and promised to be a powerful domestic political weapon for the opposition. According to the progressive author and critic Katō Shūichi, the Nixon shock was an “unmitigated disaster for the political, financial and bureaucratic authorities in Japan.”34 The subsequent normalization of relations with the PRC, likewise, was seen as an embarrassing reversal for the Japanese government. Arguing that this repudiation of postwar conservative China policy implied the failure of postwar foreign policy as a whole, leftists and progressives called for an immediate end to the US-Japan alliance and a new foreign policy of unarmed neutrality. Thus, for the opposition (as for conservatives like Ōhira Masayoshi), the normalization of relations promised the realization of long-­held foreign policy goals. As time passed, the Chinese approach to the United States and Japan would come to pose serious challenges for leftists and

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progressives. At this early point, however, it was still possible to welcome the new relationship with the PRC as a vindication of their positions.

The JSP on the Nixon shock and normalization This optimistic interpretation of the Nixon shock was advanced in the political world by the JSP. The JSP hoped that what they saw as American defeat and Chinese victory was a first step toward the liberation of Japan from its neocolonial relationship with the United States. For the Socialists, efforts to improve relations with the PRC had always been part of a broader struggle for Japanese national independence. Communiqués issued during JSP missions to China always included a statement of Chinese support for the Japanese people’s struggle against American imperialism. This struggle, furthermore, was explicitly linked to the Chinese Revolution and Asian national liberation movements. For example, since 1961 it had been standard for JSP missions and their Chinese hosts to reiterate their joint commitment to the Asanuma spirit; namely, that American imperialism was the common enemy of the Japanese and Chinese people. In the joint communiqué issued after the visit of the fourth JSP mission to the PRC in 1964, the Japanese people’s struggle against the US-Japan alliance, US military bases, and for the return of Okinawa was listed as a national liberation movement along with the struggles of the Korean, Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Lao peoples against the United States. The 1964 joint communiqué even equated the US occupation of Okinawa with American military support for the Nationalists on Taiwan. The idea that the Japanese movement against the US-Japanese alliance was a struggle for national liberation analogous to the Chinese Revolution was, therefore, not solely a Japanese leftist conceit, or a product of Japanese victim consciousness, it was repeatedly endorsed by the PRC leadership. In light of this consistent support for the Japanese people’s “total independence,” perhaps it is not surprising that the Socialists downplayed the sea change in Chinese policy in the early 1970s and continued to hope that normalization would contribute to the end of the US-Japan alliance.35 Socialists were as eager as the Japanese government to claim the new relationship with the PRC as vindication of their own positions on the China problem. Normalization was proclaimed a great victory for the JSP and all those who had fought against the containment policy of the US and LDP governments. The party claimed credit for having laid the foundation for normalization through their diplomatic efforts, despite the much more direct role played by the Kōmeitō and pro-China Conservatives.36

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The Socialists also saw the new relationship with China as an opportunity to pursue a more independent foreign policy. The JSP condemned past Japanese government policy toward China in highly-­charged nationalist terms. Policies like Prime Minister Satō’s cooperation with American efforts to defend the ROC seat in the UN were criticized as exposing to the world Japan’s subordination to the United States. The normalization of relations with the PRC and the weakening of the international Cold War order, however, provided an opportunity for Japan to finally escape from this humiliating position: “Given conditions in Asia, the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations advances the trend from dependence on the United States to the return of autonomy.”37 The first step toward real independence, it was argued, would be the abrogation of the US-Japan Security Treaty which, based as it was on the containment of the PRC, had lost its raison d’être, just like the 1952 treaty with the ROC. In its place, Japan would conclude treaties of friendship and non-­ aggression with the United States, USSR and PRC.38 Unfortunately for the JSP, over the rest of the decade, the PRC leadership would emerge as a primary obstacle to this vision. The Japanese Socialists also interpreted the normalization of relations as vindicating their own narratives of Japanese modern history and national identity. The JSP advanced an explicitly Asianist narrative of modern Japanese history and the Japanese nation’s place in the international community. The JSP saw the Japanese as having turned their backs on their Asian identity in the pursuit of Western modernity. The root cause of prewar Japanese aggression in Asia was the Japanese state’s abandonment of solidarity with the Asian victims of Western imperialism in favor of pursuing equal participation in the Western international system as an imperialist nation in its own right. Japanese governments had continued this policy in the postwar period through their cooperation with American Cold War policy, including the containment of China. Normalization offered the Japanese nation an opportunity to finally break with this imperialist legacy and actively contribute to peace in Asia by resisting American imperialism in solidarity with the nations of Asia. In an implicit inversion of the domino theory, it was argued that normalization and the imminent defeat of the United States in Vietnam would lead other Asian nations to repudiate their military alliances with the US and seek improved relations with both Japan and the PRC, moving Asia toward neutrality and true independence.39 Freed from subordination to the United States, the Japanese nation would finally take its rightful place in modern world history as an active participant in the Asian struggle against Western imperialism.

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Although the JSP interpretation of the world situation in the wake of normalization was diametrically opposed to that of conservatives like Ōhira Masayoshi, many of their motivations and aspirations were, in fact, very similar. Both sought to claim changed circumstances as vindication of their past policies and their historical narratives. Both saw the new conditions as an opportunity to strike out on a more independent foreign policy based on a recovered sense of national identity.

The Japan Communist Party’s critique of Chinese revisionism The Japan Communist Party mounted a direct challenge to this optimism regarding relations with the PRC. The JCP challenge grew out of the breakdown of relations between the JCP and the CCP. The break with the CCP had come in 1966, in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, when a JCP mission led by Miyamoto Kenji balked at Chinese demands to include in the mission’s joint statement explicit criticism of both American imperialism and Soviet revisionism. Beyond a desire to avoid becoming embroiled in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the JCP leadership objected in principle to equating the dangers of Soviet revisionism with what the party saw as the overwhelming threat from American imperialism. The JCP remained committed to the maintenance of a united front against the United States that included the Soviet Union. Though the JCP did not oppose improved relations with the PRC in principle, the Nixon shock and moves for normalization forced the party to come out publicly in opposition to the new Chinese policy toward the US and Japan. The JCP criticized the PRC approach to the United States as Chinese “revisionism,” denounced the CCP’s “hegemonic interference” in Japanese domestic politics during the normalization process, and accused the Chinese leadership and their Japanese defenders of “beautifying” American imperialism. In an August 1971 article on “Nixon and American Imperialism,” the JCP argued that the approach to the PRC was not a defeat for the United States. Instead, by welcoming Nixon’s visit, the PRC had thrown a lifeline to a weakened United States desperate for help in its losing war in Vietnam. The party warned that the Chinese leadership’s preoccupation with the Soviet Union was aiding and abetting American aggression in Asia.40 The JCP also explicitly charged the Chinese with betraying the Japanese people’s struggle for national independence. At the 12th Party Congress, convened in 1973 after the normalization of relations, the JCP Central Committee denounced Chinese revisionism, arguing that PRC support for the US-Japan Security Treaty contributed directly to continued Japanese dependence upon the American

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military and the continued subjugation of the Japanese nation.41 This position was also important to JCP electoral strategy. The JCP in the early 1970s succeeded in increasing its electoral support by championing new consumer and citizens’ movements and the strident nationalism of its foreign policy only increased its popular appeal, at times even earning the grudging respect of conservative opponents. Part of the JCP electoral strategy also included implicating the PRC and Maoist ideology in leftist extremist violence in Japan, which had threatened the public image of the JCP and leftist forces in general. In short, nationalist resistance to China could prove as politically profitable to the left as to the right. Opposition to what it called PRC revisionism and hegemonism would characterize the JCP line on Sino-Japanese relations throughout the decade. Uniquely among leftist forces, the JCP early on confronted directly the problems that changing PRC foreign policy posed for narratives of Sino-Japanese relations as a cooperative struggle for national liberation.

The leftist intellectual defense of the PRC Leftist academics also endeavored to make sense of the new state of relations with China. Like their political counterparts in the JSP, most worked hard to square the new relationship with their nationalist identification with the PRC. In doing so, they countered the charge put forward by the JCP that the Chinese leadership had betrayed national liberation movements for the pursuit of narrow national interests through power politics and great power diplomacy. This was especially true for those like Inoue Kiyoshi and Niijima Atsuyoshi who were former JCP members that had broken with the party after the split with the Chinese Communists. Their defense of the PRC after 1971 reveals both the nationalist stakes invested in relations with China and the difficulty of maintaining a consistent link between support for the PRC and Japanese national liberation in the face of changing Chinese foreign policy. The historian Inoue Kiyoshi argued that rather than a retreat from a revolutionary, anti-­imperialist foreign policy, the new Chinese policy was simply a change of tactics from direct confrontation to “pursuing peace while preparing for war.” Inoue cited his meeting in June, 1971 (just before Nixon’s announcement), with Zhang Xiangshan, one of the PRC’s Japan experts, who told him that negotiations with the United States were analogous to the abortive negotiations with the Nationalists at Chongqing in 1945. Inoue was confident that Nixon’s approach to China was similarly doomed to failure. Just as Mao knew in 1945 that Chiang Kai-­shek would not honor his commitments, the Chinese

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Communists would not be taken in by Nixon’s designs to split the Asian socialist camp. In the end, Nixon’s aggressive, imperialist ambitions would be exposed, further isolating the United States and strengthening Asian unity. Chinese foreign policy, in short, had not changed. The PRC had not abandoned its support for Asian national liberation movements, or “gone over the heads” of their allies in Japan. In fact, Inoue insisted that the Japanese should redouble their efforts to cooperate with the PRC. The normalization of relations, he argued, was not only an opportunity for the Japanese nation to finally break free from the American security alliance and achieve true national independence, but also an important Japanese contribution to the struggle for Asian liberation.42 Niijima Atsuyoshi, born in 1928, was of the postwar generation of China scholars, part of a new left whose affinity for the Chinese Revolution was closely linked to identification with Mao and the Cultural Revolution. Niijima worked as a researcher at the China Studies Association and Waseda University and by the late 1960s had established himself as Japan’s most prominent “Maoist” scholar, explaining and defending Mao Zedong Thought and the Cultural Revolution.43 As such, Niijima’s analysis of the events of 1971 and 1972 differed significantly from those of many of his colleagues, in ways that are revealing of the generational and political contests that shaped the China problem in Japan. Like many others on the left, Niijima proclaimed Nixon’s China visit and normalization victories for both the PRC and the Japanese nation’s struggle against the United States. In countering the charge that the PRC leadership had abandoned a revolutionary foreign policy, however, Niijima took a different tack than Inoue and the JSP. Niijima argued that, in fact, the PRC had never really followed a revolutionary foreign policy. The attribution of a revolutionary foreign policy to the PRC was the result of what he called the romanticism of the old left. Asserting a more realistic view, Niijima argued that the PRC since 1949 had consistently pursued “big power diplomacy.” This was the result of the Chinese leadership following the Soviet Union’s subordination of national communist movements to the dictates of Soviet foreign policy. Niijima argued that Mao himself had early on recognized this problem but that factions in the PRC leadership close to the USSR had continued to pursue Soviet-­style big power chauvinism, exemplified by Chinese criticism of national communist parties like the JCP. It was only after Mao eliminated these pro-Soviet forces during the Cultural Revolution that the PRC finally moved away from big power diplomacy toward conformance with international norms respecting national sovereignty and non-­interference in domestic affairs.44

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Niijima’s argument is driven by a critique of the old left as well as the somewhat arcane factional politics of the Japanese left caused by the Sino-Soviet dispute and the Cultural Revolution. As is obvious from the above, Niijima took a strong pro-China, anti-Soviet position and was committed to an all-­out defense of the Cultural Revolution. The complexity of these factional politics, however, should not be allowed to obscure the national identity concerns that also drove Niijima’s evaluation of relations with China. For Niijima, as for others on the left, the contribution to Japanese national independence remained the ultimate standard by which relations with the PRC were judged. Rather than deny any change in the relationship (like Inoue and those in the JSP), Niijima salvaged association with the PRC by arguing that it was the change wrought by Mao’s Cultural Revolution that cleared the way for a Chinese foreign policy that contributed to Japanese national independence. Therefore, despite his unique position in the China problem discourse, Niijima’s writings are exemplary of both the inseparability of the China problem and Japanese nationalist discourse as well as the difficulties inherent in appropriating relations with China in the construction of Japanese national identity; namely, the danger that Chinese leaders were likely to define their own national interests in ways that did not necessarily support Japanese nationalist narratives. Despite some early misgivings, for most on the left the Nixon shock promised the imminent realization of their long-­sought nationalist goal of liberation from American domination. Subsequent events, however, would not bear out their expectations. The Sino-American rapprochement and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations were built upon the PRC leadership’s interest in enlisting the American and Japanese governments in a global anti-Soviet strategy. For the rest of the decade, the PRC leadership would consistently support the maintenance, and even strengthening, of the US-Japan security relationship and would not support any form of Japanese neutralism or “liberation” from the alliance with the United States. The PRC leadership no longer worried about the possible return of Japanese militarism and instead became increasingly concerned about the perceived dangers of Japanese pacifism and nationalist opposition to the US-Japan alliance. This change in PRC policy would completely transform the place of the PRC in Japanese nationalist discourse. Inoue Kiyoshi had argued that anti-American nationalism was an essential element of Japan-China friendship.45 After 1972, close relations with China would no longer require being anti-American and support for the PRC would no longer be synonymous with support for a Japanese struggle for national liberation.

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Japanese right-­wing opposition to normalization and the abandonment of Taiwan Reactions to the Nixon shock from the right wing of the conservative camp were initially fairly muted. Organized public opposition to normalization from the right wing emerged as it became clear that Tanaka and Ōhira were contemplating a break in diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan as part of a normalization agreement. While claiming that they were not opposed to normalization in principle, right-­wing conservatives came out in force to oppose what they called the “abandonment” of Taiwan and what they saw as a precipitous move to establish relations on Chinese terms. The right criticized the TanakaŌhira position on normalization from every conceivable angle—raising political, ideological, security, legal, economic, and moral objections. Tying them all together, however, was anxiety regarding the state of national identity provoked by the normalization process. For right-­wing critics, every aspect of normalization was redolent with Japanese weakness and submission. Tanaka’s approach to normalization was commonly denigrated as dogeza gaikō (an obsequious or “kow-­towing” diplomacy). For Kaya Okinori, the way pro-China politicians dealt with the PRC was “just like peasants licking the boots of a feudal lord.”46 In this sense, right-­wing criticism of normalization was a mirror image of earlier leftist criticism of the government’s China policy as humiliating submission to the United States. Members of the pro-Taiwan faction of the LDP were predictably antagonized by the Tanaka administration’s moves to bypass their opposition within the party. As noted in the last chapter, the Council for the Normalization of JapanChina Relations had been established to manufacture consensus within the party and to set the basic policy line for normalization. As Kaya and others pointed out, however, the fact that Ōhira announced at the outset that normalization would require breaking relations with Taiwan made consensus impossible. After several contentious sessions, the normalization council had arrived at a statement of Basic Principles for the Normalization of Relations, which called for “giving due consideration to preserving the present states of relations” with Taiwan in the pursuit of normalization. Yet the government had ended relations with the ROC as part of the normalization process in violation of the spirit of the council and its recommendations.47 Anti-­communist ideology was an important source of apprehension regarding relations with the PRC. Confronted with dramatic change in Chinese foreign policy, many on the right were as reluctant to change their views of the PRC as

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were their leftist adversaries. For example, Nakayama Masaaki, a young member of the LDP right wing, echoed those on the left who argued that the change in PRC policy was merely tactical by claiming that the Sino-American rapprochement was nothing but a communist ruse. The Chinese leadership remained committed to the “socialization” of Japan as part of the world communist revolution while the popular Japanese sentiment in favor of SinoJapanese normalization made the Japanese dangerously susceptible to communist propaganda and influence.48 Kikuchi Yoshirō of the Diet’s upper house predicted that after normalization the PRC would dispatch “at least three thousand” agents to Japan and would funnel funds deposited in Chinese banks by Japanese firms doing business in China to Japanese opposition parties in order to undermine the US-Japan alliance.49 Nabeyama Sadachika, a prewar socialist who had recanted (tenkō) and become a postwar defender of Taiwan and the ROC, made similar claims about PRC aims to foment revolution in Japan, complete with reference to undisclosed secret plans smuggled out of China.50 Ishihara Shintarō, then a young, up-­and-coming LDP politician, recognized more quickly the change in PRC strategy, but found it no less threatening to Japanese security. Where others saw a communist plot to export revolution to Japan, Ishihara warned of an anti-Japanese Sino-American entente. Ishihara argued the Sino-American rapprochement was motivated partly by a common interest in resisting the Soviet Union but also by a common interest in the containment of Japan. A declining United States sought to maintain a favorable balance of power in Asia by enlisting Chinese help in suppressing the expansion of Japanese economic power while the PRC was interested in containing Japan as it pursued its own aspirations for superpower status and regional dominance. Ishihara also struck directly at the heart of his progressive opponents’ identification with China. The PRC, he argued, had delivered a “China shock” to the North Koreans and North Vietnamese that was every bit as cynical and “egoistic” as the Nixon shocks visited upon the Japanese.51 Obviously, the PRC leadership respected nothing but its own interests and would not hesitate to betray its allies, including those in Japan. Many argued that the abandonment of Taiwan would negatively affect Japanese security. Kaya pointed out that cutting diplomatic relations was a hostile act normally undertaken only as a prelude to war, to which the ROC could conceivably respond by cutting economic and cultural ties, or even retaliating militarily through its control of the sea lanes to Japan. Others pointed to the danger that Japanese abandonment of Taiwan could lead to the weakening, or “hollowing out” of the US-Japan alliance if Japan reneged on its commitment

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to the security of Taiwan spelled out in the 1969 Nixon-Satō joint communiqué. Even if the US-Japan Security Treaty survived, Japan would have shown itself to be untrustworthy, not only to the United States but to other non-­communist Asian nations like the Republic of Korea, which along with the Republic of China, had played a crucial role in defending the Japanese against communism.52 The abandonment of Taiwan would damage Japanese credibility, weakening the US-Japan alliance and isolating Japan from non-­communist Asia. Critics also raised a host of legal objections, arguing that abandoning Taiwan violated domestic and international law. They claimed that breaking the 1952 treaty with Taiwan was unconstitutional, violating Article 98 of the constitution by which Japan was bound to honor its international treaties and commitments, and delighted in pointing out what they saw as the hypocrisy of progressives (the self-­appointed protectors of postwar democracy), ignoring the constitution when it suited their purposes. Abrogating the treaty with Taiwan was also problematic because of its importance as the instrument legally ending the state of war. As Genda Minoru, a conservative member of the upper house, asked, would the unilateral repudiation of the treaty mean that Japan would once again be at war with the Republic of China? Others charged that the Japanese government’s position constituted a violation of the Taiwanese people’s right to self-­determination. They argued that Japan had already renounced all interest in Taiwan when they accepted the Postdam Declaration at surrender and that if the fate of Taiwan really was a domestic Chinese political issue then the Japanese had no right to say anything on the matter, and they certainly could not deny the legal right of the Taiwanese to decide on independence in the future by accepting the one-China principle.53 Pro-Taiwan critics were also unconvinced by economic arguments in favor of normalization. For example, Genda Minoru dismissed the prospects for expanded trade with the mainland, pointing out that Japan was already the PRC’s largest trading partner, yet China accounted for only 2 percent of Japan’s total trade. Given the state of the Chinese economy, the market for exports of Japanese consumer goods was likely to remain limited, nor was there much the Japanese could import from the PRC beyond raw materials and natural resources, and even these were likely to be cost-­prohibitive given the underdeveloped state of PRC infrastructure. And as long as the PRC remained ideologically committed to economic self-­sufficiency, trade would be limited regardless of factor endowments or economic development. Against these rather meager prospects one had to weigh the possible loss of the Taiwan market for Japanese firms. Taiwan was already a more important market for Japanese firms than the

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mainland, and if trade relations with Taiwan were damaged in the process of normalization, Japanese firms would lose this important market to other countries like the United States (which did not cut ties with Taiwan in its approach to the PRC).54 For all these reasons, many concluded that there really was no need for the Japanese to normalize relations with the PRC, and certainly no rush to do so. As Kaya and many others pointed out, Japan had prospered in the postwar period through cooperation with the United States and the Republic of China and Japan’s economy had recovered from the ravages of war to become the envy of the world, all without access to the mainland. Why should Japan risk the beneficial relationships it had nurtured thus far for the uncertain gains and potential dangers of relations with the PRC? Others noted that it was the PRC, not Japan, that needed normalization to counter the threat from the Soviet Union and rebuild its economy after the Cultural Revolution. Thus, Japan’s bargaining position was strong, and the Japanese government should capitalize on this position to protect its relationship with Taiwan.55 Arguments based on the utility and legality of normalization, however, were only part of the right-­wing offensive against the China policy of Tanaka and Ōhira. Some of the most common objections raised by the pro-Taiwan elements of the LDP were moral arguments against abandoning Taiwan. Kaya and others argued that the Japanese owed a moral debt to Chiang Kai-­shek on at least four counts which (despite questions about their veracity), became de rigueur in right-­wing narratives of Sino-Japanese relations. First, after the war Chiang had called on the Chinese people to refrain from acts of retribution against Japanese on the continent, to “repay violence with virtue.” Second, Chiang had waived China’s reparations claims, in spite of the damage caused by the Japanese invasion. Third, it was argued that Chiang had refused to participate in a divided occupation of Japan, sparing Japan the fate of Germany, Korea, and China itself. Fourth, Chiang had opposed trying the emperor as a war criminal, arguing that it should be up to the Japanese people to decide the fate of the emperor. The Japanese had never even thanked Chiang for his magnanimity and now, rather than repay their obligations to Chiang, they proposed to abandon him to his mortal enemy, in essence “repaying benevolence with enmity.” Japanese treatment of Chiang and the Taiwanese, Kaya scolded, was “impolite, unethical, a betrayal of trust and an immoral act . . . a denial of the humanity of the Taiwanese.”56 Nakagawa Ichirō, one of the leaders of the new generation of right-­wing conservatives, appealed to Japanese moral conscience by painting Taiwan as the victim of PRC power politics. Nakagawa took issue with being labeled a “hawk” on

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the China problem for trying to protect Taiwan and asked how any real “dove,” supposedly committed to international peace based on a sense of justice and sympathy for the victims of aggression, could simply abandon a poor, weak country (kawaisō na kuni) like Taiwan to its great power enemy.57 Nabeyama Sadachika argued that Japan had a moral obligation to protect the people of Taiwan (if not the Republic of China), as former colonial subjects. Nabeyama pointed out that most of Taiwan’s inhabitants were indigenous Taiwanese, not mainlanders, whose fathers and grandfathers had lived under Japanese colonial rule, received Japanese educations and who, despite some lingering resentment over colonial policies, maintained feelings of affinity for Japan and the Japanese. Nabeyama charged that to abandon former fellow imperial subjects who were so kindly disposed toward Japan and leave them at the mercy of the Chinese Communists was a moral failure on the part of the Japanese that would only serve as more evidence that the Japanese were flighty (keiboku) and untrustworthy, and reinforce the common international perception of the Japanese as “economic animals” or petty “Sony salesmen” pursuing profit and market share heedless of moral principles.58 This moral argument may seem contrived to many. Not least because arguments about a moral obligation to atone for wartime Japanese aggression, when attributed to progressives, were regularly criticized as a dangerous sentimentalism that, however well-­intentioned, hindered the pursuit of Japanese national interests and the recovery of a normal national identity. Kaya Okinori, one of the most adamant proponents of Japanese war responsibility toward Chiang Kai-­shek, who had served in the Konoe and Tōjō cabinets and held posts in Manchuria and China during the war, pointed out matter-­of-factly that, while he thanked Chiang for his generosity toward the Japanese after the war, he never apologized to Chiang for “the so-­called China incident.”59 Whatever the real depth of obligation felt toward Chiang Kai-­shek for wartime behavior, right-­ wing conservatives had no reservations about invoking collective, national war guilt to support their own positions. Any moral obligation felt toward Chiang Kai-­shek did not, however, translate into support for his policies or respect for his vision of Taiwan’s future. Namely, most of the Japanese defenders of Taiwan did not share Chiang’s commitment to reunification. They instead leaned toward a two-China policy and were much more concerned with Taiwanese self-­determination and preserving the possibility of Taiwanese independence in the future. This was true even of Kaya, who argued that the Japanese must make every effort to maintain relations with both the ROC and the PRC. That such a position was as anathema to Chiang as it was to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai did not seem to weigh on him too heavily.

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Kaya recounts that in their meetings, he advised Chiang that retaking the mainland was unrealistic, even had the Nationalists possessed the military power to do so. Kaya remembered that Chiang did not respond to his advice, but got the feeling that Chiang agreed with it.60 Others were less reticent about expressing their dissatisfaction with Chiang’s position. The economist and demographer Kitaoka Juitsu admitted in exasperation that Japan’s China policy would be made much easier if Chiang would just give up his claim to represent all of China and declare Taiwanese independence. Barring this, the Japanese should leave room for recognition of Taiwanese independence at some point in the future, presumably after Chiang’s passing.61 In the end, much right-­wing angst seems to have stemmed less from fears of communist subversion, threats to Japanese security or affinity for Chiang Kai-­ shek than from nationalist pique at what many saw as Chinese arrogance, bullying and unwillingness to treat the Japanese as equals. Many harked back to the Sino-­centric tributary system and ancient Chinese notions of China as the “central kingdom” and simply did not believe that the Chinese government would ever extend to the Japanese the respect due a sovereign nation. Conservative critics bristled at what they considered interference in Japanese domestic politics, manifest in Chinese leaders’ cultivation of relations with proPRC politicians and open support for Tanaka in the LDP presidential election. Hackles were also raised by the lists of conditions put forward by the Chinese— the one China principle, the three principles of normalization, the four principles of trade, the five principles of peaceful coexistence—to which Japanese were expected to submit simply for the privilege of having relations with the PRC. Kaya complained about PRC “tyranny” (ōbō) in the demands it forced on Japan in exchange for the normalization of relations.62 Kikuchi Yoshirō claimed that this bullying and arrogance was central to Chinese national character: “the Chinese (Shinajin) are a people committed to the idea of ‘serving the great’ (jidaishugi), they submit to the strong and take an arrogant attitude toward the weak”—this was why the Chinese leadership constantly sought to humiliate a peaceful, unarmed Japan by forcing them to submit to unilateral demands in their relations with the PRC.63 If these proclivities of the Chinese were merely infuriating, however, they were made dangerous by the weakness of Japanese national identity. Kaya explained that he would worry less about the intentions of the Chinese if he had faith in the ability of the Japanese to stand up to and resist the Chinese. In a conversation with Ishihara Shintarō, Kaya elaborated a list of factors—defeat, occupation, the imposed constitution, the influence of Western materialism,

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and Cold War ideological division—that had stripped the Japanese of the national subjectivity required to preserve national independence, leaving them especially vulnerable to Chinese designs.64 Nakayama Masaaki similarly explained that the danger of Chinese communist subversion in Japan was especially acute because of the lack of national unity, itself the result of the destruction of Japanese national identity by defeat and foreign occupation. Nakayama explained (and here he echoed Takeuchi Yoshimi) that this lack of national identity left the Japanese peculiarly vulnerable to the influence of foreign ideologies from both sides in the Cold War, resulting in the intense split between left and right that paralyzed postwar Japanese politics and foreign policy.65 Others found a deeper source of Japanese weakness in the long history of Chinese cultural influence on Japan. Ōhira Zengo, a professor of international law at Hitotsubashi University, argued that the Japanese were always at a disadvantage in dealing with the PRC due to a sentimental attachment to China born of a long history of cultural affinity.66 Ishihara worried that the historical and cultural influence of China saddled the Japanese with a “passivity complex” in their relations with China.67 This idea had wide appeal even among mainstream conservative scholars. Etō Shinkichi argued that many pro-PRC activists did not understand modern diplomacy and instead continued to conceive of diplomacy with China in terms of the ancient tributary system in which Chinese superiority was accepted a priori.68 For right-­wing critics of normalization, the real threat from China stemmed less from aggressive PRC intent than from the weakness of Japanese national identity. They feared that the Japanese were in danger of subjugating themselves to the Chinese, just as they had earlier submitted to the Americans. To avoid this, Japanese needed to recover a truly independent national identity rooted in opposition to both the United States and the PRC. Nakayama called on Japanese to return to abandoned Japanese cultural traditions he called Nihonkyō (literally “Japanese teachings” or “Japanism”), borrowing from the popular author Isaiah Ben-Dasan. These traditions he associated mainly with the imperial institution, which had historically provided a source of national unity under conditions of political competition and could inoculate Japanese against the foreign ideological influences that divided them.69 Ishihara argued that Japanese needed to develop an “independent spirit” that could overcome ideological division and unite them in resistance to both the United States and the PRC: “Japanese must now recommit themselves to the realization that Japan is neither the United States nor China. It is only Japan. The realization of this undeniable fact must be the basis for all of Japanese diplomacy.”70

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Normalization and the settlement of the past One anticipated consequence of normalization welcomed across the political spectrum was a settlement of historical accounts that would release Japanese from the political and psychological burdens of the past and finally liberate them from their own history in dealing with China. The literature of the time is full of references to “new stages” and “new pages” in the history of Sino-Japanese relations reflecting widespread expectations that normalization would be a break with “postwar diplomacy” focused on settling accounts from the war. Normalization as a comprehensive settlement with China would alleviate the feelings of guilt and remorse that were assumed to dominate Japanese attitudes and policy toward China so that Japanese could leave the past behind and forge a more normal relationship with the PRC. Liberating Japanese foreign policy from the restrictions imposed by the past had been an important goal of the government in pursuing normalization. In the first foreign ministers’ meeting in Beijing on September 26 (the very meeting in which he would reject Chinese positions on reparations and ending the state of war), Takashima Masao, head of the Treaties Division, stated his aim as, “in these talks and the resulting joint communiqué, solving all the problems related to clearing up the past unnatural state of relations between Japan and China, including the war, leaving nothing to come back to later.”71 Likewise, Tajiri Akiyoshi, a former MOFA bureaucrat defending the ministry’s role in normalization, argued that with the joint communiqué all the issues related to the war had now been taken care of. Relations now would be directed toward building a better future by dealing with practical issues like economic, technical, and cultural exchanges.72 Normalization as a comprehensive settlement of the problems of the past was also welcomed by the government’s critics on both the left and the right. The JSP welcomed the normalization of relations as the culmination of Japanese reflection on the past and expected that the joint communiqué would “settle (seisan suru) the history of Japan’s past war of aggression.”73 The conservative military analyst Kuzumi Tadao argued that extirpating Japanese feelings of guilt and concern with the past was a prerequisite for normal, peaceful Sino-Japanese relations. Japanese dealing with China had been preoccupied with addressing the legacies of the war which kept them from addressing real, practical problems. Now released from this unhealthy preoccupation with the past, Japanese could finally begin to pursue a normal diplomacy aimed at promoting peaceful relations.74 Even more circumspect observers were optimistic that, after normalization, Japanese could focus on the future rather than the past in their relations with

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China. Ōhira Masayoshi was careful to remind his audiences that normalization would not solve all the problems between Tokyo and Beijing. Yet he too identified one of the most important consequences of normalization as clearing up the problems of the past so that Japanese and Chinese could focus on peaceful resolution of practical political problems and build better relations in the future.75 Etō Shinkichi, who similarly pointed out that the problems of the past could not be cleared up in one summit meeting, was still optimistic that normalization would ease “Japanese feelings of guilt about Japan’s past behavior toward China,” and “help in the development of more detached and objective attitudes toward Chinese affairs among Japanese intellectuals and journalists.”76 Of course, looking back from the present, we know that the normalization agreement did not eliminate issues of historical interpretation as irritants in the relationship. In fact, as we’ll see, international politics and PRC policy in the 1970s tended to bolster conservative Japanese nationalist and historical narratives that the Chinese leadership later came to find so objectionable. In the end, normalization and the political settlements of the 1970s may have done as much to incubate as to head off the future “history problem.”

Conclusion In the wake of the Nixon shocks, Japanese attempted to make sense of the changing international political situation and the new relationship with China. For the embattled LDP conservatives, Ōhira Masayoshi attempted to portray the Nixon shocks as both a challenge and an opportunity and the normalization as proof of the wisdom of postwar conservative foreign policy. Leftists and progressives, on the other hand, saw the Nixon shocks and normalization as a sign of American weakness and an indictment of all postwar foreign policy based on cooperation with the United States in Asia, and expected the imminent end of the US-Japan security relationship. Those on the Japanese right who worried about a precipitous Japanese response to the Nixon shocks came to conclude that their fears had been realized in the normalization agreement and recommitted themselves to recovering a national identity that would enable the Japanese to resist further Chinese demands. The changing relationship with China over the rest of the decade would tend to validate the conservative approach to the China problem, undermine the expectations of leftists and progressives, and embolden the right-­wing critics of the relationship with China.

Part III

Anti-hegemony, 1973–76

5

Anti-­hegemony: Japan and the Sino-Soviet Cold War The normalization of relations with the PRC in September 1972 was widely heralded as opening a new chapter in Japan’s relations with China. The normalization agreement was expected to usher in a period of Sino-Japanese friendship. The immediate impediment to improving relations with the PRC remained how to manage relations with both the mainland and Taiwan. That this problem had not been solved became clear in the negotiation of an aviation agreement. A less anticipated problem was how to manage relations with both the PRC and the Soviet Union. This problem dominated Sino-Japanese relations in the mid-1970s in the form of a dispute regarding Japanese commitment to the principle of anti-­hegemony in a Sino-Japanese peace treaty.

Taiwan and the aviation agreement The first order of business after the conclusion of normalization was to negotiate a set of technical agreements to govern the nuts and bolts of everyday relations. Having already achieved general agreement on the most contentious issues (Taiwan, reparations, the US-Japan security relationship, etc.) in the joint communiqué, it might be expected that negotiation of the technical agreements would be a rather routine, bureaucratic affair. Indeed, on most issues negotiations proceeded quickly. The first PRC ambassador to Japan, Chen Chu, arrived in Tokyo in March 1973. His Japanese counterpart Ogawa Heishirō landed in Beijing a month later. A series of agreements were soon concluded dealing with undersea cable connections (May 1973), trade (January 1974), shipping (November 1974), and fisheries (August 1975). In fact, a history of the technical agreements would be unremarkable except that the terms of an aviation agreement became unexpectedly contentious and an object of intense criticism within Japan. The dispute regarding the aviation agreement

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is illustrative of the themes that would dominate discourse on the China problem in the 1970s. The main point of contention was the management of air links between Japan and Taiwan, especially the treatment accorded to national carriers, after the conclusion of the agreement with the PRC. The PRC position was that, with the recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of China, China Airlines (an ROC government enterprise) should no longer be accorded any of the privileges of a national carrier. In practice, the PRC government maintained that to operate in Japan, China Airlines should change its name, should not be allowed to display the ROC flag on its aircraft, and should not be accorded what are known as “beyond rights” (i’enken) that would allow China Airlines flights from Japanese airports to other international destinations. These privileges would be reserved for the Chinese Civil Aviation Corporation, the national carrier of the PRC. The PRC government even demanded that Taiwanese aircraft not use the same airports as those from the mainland. In addition, it was expected that the Japanese national carrier, Japan Airlines (JAL), would end its service to Taiwan. The Japanese government, for its part, wanted as little change as possible to air connections with Taiwan on the grounds that these connections constituted private, unofficial relations provided for in the normalization agreement. Needless to say, the ROC government opposed any changes to the treatment of its national carrier or to air service between Japan and Taiwan.1 By January 1974 talks had deadlocked and Foreign Minister Ōhira traveled to Beijing to try to break the impasse. Ōhira proposed that JAL would stop flights to Taiwan and that flights from the ROC would use Tokyo’s Haneda airport, while PRC aircraft would use the new Narita airport. Ōhira insisted, however, that the Japanese government had no right to comment upon or ask for changes to the name of China Airlines or the removal of the ROC flag from its aircraft. After two days of tense and fruitless meetings with Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei and Zhou Enlai (some of which lasted past 1 a.m.), and an audience with Mao Zedong, an exhausted and physically ill Ōhira decided he would leave Beijing without agreement and drafted a press release explaining the lack of progress. Faced with the total breakdown of negotiations, and perhaps fearful of weakening Ōhira’s domestic political position, the Chinese side relented and agreed to conduct further negotiations “along the lines proposed by Ōhira.”2 A final agreement was signed in Beijing on April 20, 1974, which basically conformed to Japanese positions. Japan Airlines would no longer fly to Taiwan. These routes would be taken over by a subsidiary corporation wholly owned by JAL. PRC planes would use Tokyo’s Narita airport, while those from the ROC

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would use Haneda airport. The Japanese government made no request to change the name of China Airlines or remove the ROC flag from its aircraft. However, in an announcement reminiscent of the way he dealt with the Japan-ROC treaty in 1972, Ōhira declared that the agreement with the PRC was an “agreement between two countries, and between Japan and Taiwan there are private, regional air links,” and that the Japanese government “did not recognize the flag emblem on Taiwanese aircraft as a national flag.”3 Ōhira’s biographers suggest that he saw the agreement as a successful defense of Japan’s relations with Taiwan and thought that, “since we had gone so far to preserve Taiwan’s advantages, there would no longer be any complaints from the pro-Taiwan factions.”4 If so, he seems naïve in retrospect because the aviation agreement became an immediate target of fierce criticism. The attack was led by the Seirankai, a newly-­formed group of young, conservative LDP politicians, committed to the overthrow of the Tanaka cabinet. I will examine the Seirankai in more detail in the next chapter, but the group’s basic position was that the aviation agreement was an insult to the ROC government and, more importantly, that Ōhira’s handling of the negotiations, especially his trip to Beijing, was submissive and traitorous. During the negotiations Fujio Masayuki, one of the group’s leaders, leaked diplomatic cables to the press exposing confidential details of the talks in a last-­ditch attempt to derail negotiations. On conclusion of the agreement, the Seirankai threatened a no-­confidence motion against the foreign minister. In May, when the agreement came up for ratification in the Diet, eighty LDP politicians absented themselves from the vote in protest. The reaction from the ROC government was immediate; all air links with Japan were suspended and the ROC government warned Japanese aircraft not to violate Taiwanese airspace. Air links remained suspended for the next year. The row over the aviation agreement makes clear that the normalization of relations did not ameliorate the China problem in Japanese diplomacy or discourse. Normalization did not make balancing relations with the mainland and Taiwan easier. Nor did normalization remove China policy as a major source of domestic political contestation as Ōhira and the mainstream conservatives might have hoped. Instead, as leftist criticism of government China policy subsided, the most vehement opposition increasingly came from the right wing of the LDP itself. Despite the new political orientation of this opposition, the basic objection was exactly the same: the government’s approach to China was submissive, reflective of the fact that the Japanese lacked the independent national identity necessary for the definition and pursuit of Japanese national interests.

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Anti-­hegemony and the Sino-Soviet cold war The Taiwan issue, of course, had long been a core problem in relations with the PRC and could be expected to periodically obstruct the smooth development of relations, as it did in the negotiation of the aviation agreement. Less anticipated was the eruption of the Sino-Soviet dispute as a major problem in Japanese foreign policy, exemplified in the breakdown of negotiations for a Japan-China peace treaty. In the 1970s, the Sino-Soviet dispute took on many of the attributes of a cold war with striking similarities to the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Sino-Soviet conflict was globalized and came to be viewed in stark zero-­sum terms that encouraged the formation of new alliance systems and support for proxies the world over. Under these conditions, the PRC sought US cooperation in a global strategy of “joining with the Unites States to oppose the Soviet Union.”5 As Kissinger summarized the situation in a report to President Nixon, “In literally every region of the world the Chinese see the Soviet hand at play . . . Mao and Zhou urged us to counter the Russians everywhere—to work closely with our allies in Europe and Japan, and to take more positive action to prevent the Soviets filling vacuums or spreading their influence in areas like the Middle East, Persian Gulf, Near East, South Asia and Indian Ocean.”6 Mao and the Chinese leadership came to see the world and Soviet ambitions much as hawkish American cold warriors: they were distrustful of détente, critical of Western and Japanese leftists and pacifists, and invoked the Munich analogy in warning of the dangers of appeasement in the face of Soviet expansionism. Most pertinent for the Japanese, the new Sino-Soviet cold war allowed no more room for neutralism or non-­alignment than did the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The PRC leadership, for its part, sought to enlist the Japanese in their struggle with the Soviet Union, pushed for a more active Japanese defense and worked to obstruct any improvement in Japan’s relations with the USSR. The PRC government attempted to use negotiations for a Sino-Japanese peace treaty to undermine Japanese relations with the Soviet Union by insisting on the inclusion in the treaty of an anti-­hegemony clause, widely seen as anti-Soviet. This ran directly counter to Japanese desires to maintain a policy of equidistance between the PRC and USSR while improving relations with both powers. In the end, the Japanese leadership’s attempt at equidistance proved no more feasible than opposition desires for unarmed neutrality in the Soviet-American Cold War.

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The opening of peace treaty negotiations Initially, it was assumed that negotiation of a treaty of peace and friendship, called for in Article  8 of the joint communiqué, would begin only after the completion of the various technical agreements and, hence, was not a pressing issue. In late 1974, however, the PRC began pushing for an early conclusion of the treaty. The new urgency on the part of the Chinese leadership resulted from worries about the viability of the Tanaka cabinet and the fate of the treaty should the opponents of Tanaka and Ōhira come to power. During Ōhira’s visit to Beijing in January 1974 to conclude the aviation agreement, Mao and Zhou had expressed their desire to conclude the technical agreements and the peace treaty while Tanaka and Ōhira were still in office.7 Tanaka’s prospects, however, faded over the course of the year. In addition to the fierce opposition provoked by the aviation agreement, the July 1974 upper house election had gone badly for the LDP and in October 1974 the monthly Bungei shunjū ran a sensational exposé on Tanaka’s corrupt “money politics,” unleashing a scandal that would eventually lead to his resignation. Given the weakened position of Tanaka and Ōhira, and the prospect of a cabinet headed by Fukuda Takeo, who was closely associated with many of the leaders of the pro-Taiwan faction, the PRC leadership pushed to accelerate the conclusion of the treaty. On September 26, 1974, PRC Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua asked the new Japanese Foreign Minister Kimura Toshio (Ōhira had become finance minister in a cabinet reshuffle in July), to begin negotiations. The first preparatory meetings between Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Han Nianlong (who was in Tokyo for the signing of a shipping agreement), and his Japanese counterpart Tōgō Fumihiko, took place on November 13. At this initial stage, it seems both sides expected the conclusion of the peace treaty to be a fairly simple matter. Deng Xiaoping, who after his rehabilitation in 1973 was given responsibility for the negotiations, estimated in talks with Japanese upper house member Kōno Kenzō that the negotiations shouldn’t take more than about six months. On the Japanese side many expected the peace treaty would be a fairly pro-­forma, apolitical statement of goodwill. One Foreign Ministry official compared the treaty to chanting a nembutsu (a short Buddhist prayer believed to confer immediate salvation), and quipped that the treaty could be wrapped up in fifteen minutes.8 Contrary to expectations, negotiations quickly came to an impasse over Chinese demands to include in the treaty an anti-­hegemony clause similar to that in the joint communiqué. The Japanese side opposed the inclusion of such a

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clause, arguing that the treaty was fundamentally a statement of both sides’ desire for long-­term peace and friendship. As such, the treaty should not comment on the specific contemporary international political situation and, as a bilateral treaty, should not refer to either signatory’s relations with third countries. Tōgō recalled that, “at that time, I indicated my intention that the present treaty was to proclaim peaceful, friendly, long-­term relations between the two countries and that opposition to the hegemony of a third country was not an issue for the present treaty.”9 For Japanese negotiators, the treaty was not an instrument for the pursuit of present political interests, but rather was a commitment to put aside past enmity and pursue friendly relations going forward. It soon became clear, however, that the Japanese side had underestimated the importance of the treaty in the PRC’s global anti-Soviet strategy. The PRC had begun using the term “hegemony” after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia to criticize Soviet interference in the affairs of other socialist countries. Early on, the term was used to refer to the hegemony of both superpowers. Once the United States itself committed to opposing hegemony in the Shanghai Communiqué, however, anti-­hegemony came to be practically synonymous with opposition to the Soviet Union. Following the format of the Shanghai Communiqué, the 1972 Sino-Japanese joint communiqué also included an anti-­hegemony clause (Article 7), which read: “The normalization of JapanChina relations is not directed against any third country. Neither country will seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and both countries oppose the attempts of any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.”10 At the time of the normalization, some in MOFA had expressed reservations about including the anti-­hegemony clause in the joint communiqué. They had objected that hegemony lacked any accepted definition in international law, and also worried about possible Soviet responses. The Japanese side, therefore, insisted on the inclusion in Article  7 of a “third-­country provision” stating that, “The normalization of Japan-China relations is not directed against any third country,” in the hope that this might assuage Soviet misgivings. In the end, whatever their reservations, no one on the Japanese side anticipated the problems the anti-­ hegemony issue would cause. Kuriyama Takakazu, at the time director of the MOFA Treaties Division, remembered, “we recognized the political implications of the anti-­hegemony clause, but accepted it in the joint statement in view of other more important issues . . . we did not foresee that it would constitute such a major stumbling block to the subsequent peace treaty negotiations.”11 While peace treaty negotiations stalled, financial scandal finally forced the beleaguered Tanaka from office in December 1974. Fortunately for the PRC

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leadership (or so it seemed at the time), Tanaka was succeeded not by Fukuda but by Miki Takeo. Miki was generally viewed as being pro-China. He had come out publicly in support of normalization after his visit to Beijing in April 1972, and he had pushed Tanaka and Ōhira to commit to restoring relations as part of the factional bargain that brought Tanaka to power. Thus, there were hopes that the Miki cabinet would provide an opportunity to advance negotiations. Upon taking office, Miki immediately came out publicly in support of an early conclusion of the treaty and a second round of talks opened in January 1975. Miki’s choice for foreign minister, Miyazawa Kiichi, however, was much less enthusiastic about the treaty. As Miyazawa’s biographer notes approvingly, Miyazawa turned out to be much more “hawkish” than most expected from someone primarily viewed as pro-American. He was especially so on policy toward the Soviet Union and Taiwan. Miyazawa, like many other conservatives, felt Tanaka and Ōhira had treated Taiwan shabbily in the normalization process and desired to repair relations with the ROC. In December 1974, just after taking up his post, Miyazawa met with officials from MOFA and expressed his dissatisfaction with the state of relations with Taiwan: “The Tanaka cabinet achieved the establishment of Sino-Japanese relations. This is important, but we can’t simply brush off the Taiwanese and cut off those with whom we’ve had close relations. While having relations with Beijing, we should still maintain relations with Taiwan. That’s diplomacy.”12 Miyazawa also encouraged a more active American defense of the ROC’s international political position. For example, in a meeting with US Senator Mike Mansfield in July 1976, Miyazawa warned the United States not to jeopardize the security of Taiwan by following the “Japan model” of cutting relations with the ROC in order to establish relations with China, a comment that drew official protest from the PRC government.13 To this point, the differences over the anti-­hegemony issue were still secret. On January 23, 1975, however, the Tokyo shimbun newspaper published an article which revealed that the anti-­hegemony issue was the main sticking point in negotiations and that MOFA opposed the inclusion of an anti-­hegemony clause out of fear that it would be interpreted as anti-Soviet and would negatively affect Japanese relations with the USSR. The article provoked a predictable response within Japan, with leftist and pro-PRC forces supporting the PRC position on anti-­hegemony and urging quick conclusion of the treaty and many others (not just conservatives) urging neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute and charging the PRC government with interference in Japanese relations with a third country.

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After the Tokyo shimbun article, the Soviet Union also came out publicly against any treaty that contained an anti-­hegemony clause. On February 3, 1975, the Soviet ambassador to Tokyo, Oleg Troyanovsky, lodged a formal complaint with LDP Vice-President Shiina Etsusaburō and the Soviet media complained that the negotiations were being conducted in an “extremely anti-Soviet atmosphere.”14 Unsurprisingly, Soviet opposition to the treaty only inspired the PRC leadership to take an even more uncompromising line on anti-­hegemony and negotiations quickly deadlocked. A third round of talks opened in February 1975, and continued in March and April before being suspended indefinitely. Negotiations were not helped by the death of Chiang Kai-­shek in April 1975 which occasioned high-­profile pilgrimages to Taipei by conservative Japanese politicians, including former Prime Minister Satō Eisaku.15 There would be no substantive progress in negotiations from the summer of 1975 to the autumn of 1977. Even after the breakdown of talks, however, Prime Minister Miki sought some formula for compromise on the anti-­hegemony issue. Besides his reputation as being pro-China, Miki had other, more prosaic, political reasons to seek a breakthrough on China policy. Miki had been a compromise choice as prime minister in the wake of Tanaka’s resignation, primarily because he had a reputation as being relatively untouched by scandal. “Clean Miki,” however, headed a small faction and was seen by the rest of the LDP leadership as an interim caretaker until the financial scandal that brought down Tanaka had blown over. Miki may have seen conclusion of a peace treaty with the PRC as a way to strengthen his own domestic political position. In June 1975, Miki sent word to the PRC leadership (through LDP Diet member Kawasaki Hideji) that the Japanese side would accept inclusion of an anti-­hegemony clause so long as the clause also made clear that anti-­hegemony was a universal principal of international relations embodied in the five principles of peaceful coexistence and the UN Charter.16 Thus, Miki sought to compromise by agreeing to inclusion of an anti-­hegemony clause with wording that would hopefully soften its anti-Soviet connotation. The PRC leadership rejected Miki’s compromise and until late 1977 rejected any Japanese attempt to make anti-­hegemony less provocative to the Soviet Union. For example, in September 1975, Miyazawa met PRC Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua at the UN General Assembly. In an attempt to get negotiations started again, Miyazawa proposed a set of four conditions on which the Japanese side would agree to include anti-­hegemony in the peace treaty, and which thereafter

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became known as Miyazawa’s Four Principles: 1) anti-­hegemony applied globally, not only in the Asia-Pacific; 2) anti-­hegemony was not aimed at any third country; 3) anti-­hegemony did not imply any joint action on the part of Japan and the PRC; and 4) anti-­hegemony did not contradict the principles of the UN Charter. Qiao rejected any conditions on anti-­hegemony. Anti-­hegemony, he maintained, did not need to be defined or qualified because everyone knew hegemony when they saw it, and any country that opposed anti-­hegemony (that is, the Soviet Union), only proved its hegemonic intentions. Qiao also charged that all responsibility for the breakdown in peace treaty negotiations lay with the Japanese who were retreating from established positions. After all, he pointed out, the United States had committed to opposing hegemony in the Shanghai communiqué and the principle had already been agreed upon in the joint communiqué. In fact, Qiao argued that the anti-­hegemony clause wasn’t even a Chinese idea, claiming it had been put forward first by Kissinger. Qiao suggested that the Japanese should follow the lead of their American ally. Charging the Japanese with a lack of fortitude, Qiao claimed that anti-­hegemony had only become a problem because the Japanese side buckled under Soviet pressure.17 Not only did the PRC leadership reject any qualification of the anti-­hegemony principle, they also made no attempt to hide the fact that anti-­hegemony was directed at the Soviet Union and, in fact, emphasized the strategic importance of anti-­hegemony. Deng repeatedly charged the Japanese leadership with “playing diplomatic games,” focusing on the legalistic minutiae of wording rather than on the larger political and strategic import of the treaty. In April 1975, Deng explained the political importance of anti-­hegemony as having two parts. First, anti-­hegemony was a commitment by both the PRC and Japan to refrain from seeking hegemony in East Asia, given the modern history of relations between Japan and China, he pointed out, such a commitment was the cornerstone of peaceful relations. This seems closest to the spirit in which Japanese negotiators originally thought about the importance of the peace treaty. The second part of anti-­hegemony, however, was a commitment to oppose any other nations seeking hegemony in East Asia. It just so happened, Deng argued, that at the present time there was only one superpower seeking hegemony in East Asia (though he left the Soviet Union unnamed), and both Japan and the PRC had an obligation to oppose it. In July of the same year, Deng told a delegation of Japanese reporters that the peace treaty must be viewed from a political rather than a legal angle. Anti-­hegemony, he explained, was no mere platitude, as Miyazawa would have it. It had real political consequences. Since anti-­hegemony committed both parties to resist the unjust actions of those seeking regional dominance, anti-­hegemony

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by definition must be aimed at any third party seeking hegemony. This was why the inclusion of a third-­country clause was unacceptable. Thus, Deng and the PRC leadership made it abundantly clear that the peace treaty did more than lay the legal or philosophical basis for peaceful bilateral relations. It also demanded a political commitment by the Japanese to oppose the Soviet Union’s pursuit of regional hegemony. In short, the peace treaty was to commit Japan to the PRC side in the Sino-Soviet cold war. Of course, the Japanese side understood only too well the political and strategic import of the PRC’s insistence on the inclusion of the anti-­hegemony clause. This is why the Japanese Foreign Ministry so strenuously opposed it. Failing that, Japanese negotiators sought to qualify the anti-­hegemony clause, to reduce it to mere platitude just as Deng charged. Thus, the legalese deployed in Japanese opposition to anti-­hegemony should indeed be considered strategic. In response to Japanese stubbornness on the anti-­hegemony issue, Deng repeatedly insisted that the PRC absolutely would not compromise on this issue and that, if need be, the PRC was prepared to postpone conclusion of the treaty until the Japanese came to their senses. Putting off the treaty, of course, was exactly what Miyazawa and the Japanese Foreign Ministry would have preferred. After his talks with Qiao in New York, Miyazawa described the peace treaty negotiations as “frozen in a friendly atmosphere.”18 In reality, Deng and the PRC leadership had no intention of simply waiting for the Japanese government to come around on the anti-­hegemony issue. The PRC leadership kept up a steady attack on the Japanese government, and Miyazawa in particular, for dragging their feet on conclusion of the treaty and (without any apparent irony) for holding the peace treaty hostage to the anti-­hegemony issue. Despite these strategic differences, however, there was always the possibility that cultural or racial affinity might form the basis for Sino-Japanese resistance to the Soviet Union. Both Chinese and Japanese leaders attempted to capitalize on presumed Asianist sympathies and common antipathy toward the Soviet Union. For example, during his meetings with Miyazawa in New York, Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua compared the Soviet Union to Ah Q from Lu Xun’s famous story. Just like the benighted Ah Q, he argued, the Soviets were bullies who only understood force and took advantage of any perceived weakness in others. Any truly independent nation, he argued, would resist such bullying, apparently hoping to appeal to Japanese national pride. Opposition to Soviet hegemonism was thus both a moral obligation and essential to the very maintenance of Japanese national independence. Continuing the metaphor with an oblique reference to the Japanese constitution, Miyazawa countered that,

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although the Japanese also did not like Soviet bullying, since Japan had no ability to physically resist Ah Q, it was best to avoid provoking him.19 For his part, in October 1975, Miki entrusted another letter for Deng to Kosaka Zentarō who was visiting Beijing. Miki reiterated that he was committed to the conclusion of the treaty and also sought to convince Deng that the Japanese understood PRC antipathy toward the Soviet Union. Miki assured Deng that Japanese always felt closer to China than the Soviet Union but that diplomatic necessity made it imperative to arrive at an understanding of anti-­hegemony that would avoid provoking the Soviet Union. Deng rejected Miki’s concerns as obstructionism no different than Miyazawa’s principles. In his meeting with Kosaka, Deng criticized Miki and the Japanese government for holding up the treaty, and questioned Miki’s actual control of the Japanese government. Finally, Deng suggested that perhaps negotiations needed a push from “people’s diplomacy,” a veiled threat to appeal to the political opposition and public opinion in Japan to pressure Miki.20

Competing peace treaties The Soviet leadership had early on expressed their reservations regarding the anti-­hegemony clause. Just after the announcement of the joint communiqué, in October 1972, the Soviet Union recalled its ambassador in Tokyo for consultation. Later that month, when Foreign Minister Ōhira traveled to Moscow to explain the new Japanese relationship with China, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko raised concerns that the joint communiqué could be aimed at the USSR. In the early days after normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, however, the Soviet leadership sought to improve their own relations with Japan, rather than come out publicly against improved Sino-Japanese relations. When the Soviet ambassador returned to his post in Tokyo on October 13, 1972, he carried a letter from Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to Tanaka calling for new peace treaty negotiations. As part of this strategy, in the spring of 1973, the Soviet Union floated the idea of an Asian collective security system. This idea had first been proposed in 1969, about the same time that the PRC had begun to talk about resisting Soviet hegemonism. While the idea was not spelled out in detail, there was never any doubt that such a system would target the PRC, which rejected the idea as, “a plot by the Soviet socialist imperialists aimed at containing China.”21 At the same time it came out publicly against the Japan-China peace treaty, the Soviet Union proposed its own treaty of friendship and cooperation. Thus, the Japanese were soon in the position of being courted with competing treaties

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from the PRC and USSR as both countries sought Japanese favor in the developing Sino-Soviet cold war. The proposed Soviet treaty, however, foundered on the familiar shoal of the dispute over sovereignty in the Kurile Islands, what the Japanese call the Northern Territories. The Soviet Union had proposed a treaty of “friendship and cooperation” rather than a peace treaty in the hope of avoiding the territorial issue. The Japanese government, however, stuck to its position that the Northern Territories issue would have to be resolved as a precondition for the conclusion of any treaty. Soviet leaders also feared that cultural and racial affinity between the Japanese and Chinese might put them at a disadvantage in competing with the PRC for Japanese favor. Soviet leaders attempted to counter suspected Asianist sentiment in Japan by denouncing the new relationship with China as racist, raising the specter of a Sino-Japanese racial alliance aimed at the Soviet Union: “Japanese and Chinese leaders have forgotten the lessons of the past and make hegemonist claims to a leading role in Asia based on the so-­called ‘racial exclusiveness of their people.’ ”22 The Soviet leadership also complained of a racist double standard in Japanese diplomacy, pointing out that the Japanese had been willing to shelve the Senkaku dispute in pursuit of normalization with the Chinese but now were unwilling to do the same on the Northern Territories in order to improve relations with the Soviet Union.23 All sides thus drew freely on racial rhetoric to advance their positions. In the end, however, there is little evidence that appeal to race or Asianist sentiment appreciably affected the positions of any party. The eventual conclusion of the peace treaty (detailed in Chapter 7), was facilitated much more by changes in PRC foreign policy following the death of Mao and the collapse of détente at the end of the decade.

China and Japanese relations with the USSR Entanglement in the Sino-Soviet cold war was especially unfortunate from the Japanese point of view, because many had held high hopes for the development of relations, especially economic relations, with the Soviet Union in the wake of the normalization of relations with China. Tanaka hoped that normalization would actually make improving relations with the Soviet Union easier, and made a breakthrough in relations with the USSR the next item on his foreign policy agenda, famously declaring “Next, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union!”24 Tanaka made a state visit to Moscow in October 1973 that was hailed by some as a major breakthrough because the resulting joint communiqué included an agreement to work toward the settlement of “unresolved issues from the war.”25

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The Tanaka government interpreted this as a Soviet commitment to work toward resolution of the Northern Territories dispute. Unfortunately for Tanaka, the Soviet Union immediately rejected this interpretation and, for its part, never agreed that the “unresolved issues” included the territorial dispute. While Tanaka’s visit ultimately did nothing to advance Japanese claims to the Northern Territories, the joint communiqué did call for cooperation in the development of Siberian resources. Soviet leaders were well aware of the importance of resource diplomacy in Japanese foreign policy, especially after the oil shock. The lure of access to Soviet natural resources provided the Soviet Union with considerable diplomatic leverage that might compensate for the Soviet Union’s generally unfavorable image in Japan and its intransigence on the Northern Territories issue. After the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, the Soviets used the prospect of joint development of Siberian resources to compete with the PRC for Japanese favor. Chief among these joint development plans was the Tyumen oil fields project. First proposed in 1966 and expanded several times, the project was to provide Japan with crude oil in exchange for Japanese investment in infrastructure for exploration, drilling, and transport, including the construction of a pipeline. It was estimated that on completion in 1981, the project would supply Japan with up to 40 million tons of crude over twenty years. The project never made much progress and, as Joachim Glaubitz has shown, the general trend was for costs and Soviet demands for loans to increase in tandem with uncertainty about Soviet ability to actually provide oil.26 In 1974, after Tanaka’s visit, the Soviets floated a new plan, under which transport would be, not by pipeline, but via a second Trans-Siberian railway, which Japanese capital would help to construct. The prospect of Japanese participation in the strategically important Trans-Siberian railroad project, however, provoked opposition in both Washington and Beijing. The Chinese leadership, for its part, worked hard throughout the decade to counter any possible economic cooperation between Japan and the USSR. For example, in March 1973, as Tanaka was negotiating his Moscow visit, Liao Chengzhi warned of “bitter feelings” and possible Chinese counter-­measures should the Japanese participate in oil and infrastructure projects in Siberia.27 In these efforts, the PRC leadership enjoyed the full support and encouragement of the United States government. Leaders in both capitals perceived the need for resources, especially petroleum, as a main source of Japanese weakness that Soviet leaders might exploit. For example, in his February 1973 meeting with Mao, Kissinger worried about the possibility of the Japanese being lured by economic possibilities in Siberia into closer relations with the Soviet Union. Mao

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assured him that he shared Kissinger’s concerns and that the PRC would try to head off such a development: “we can also do some work there.”28 In their November 1973 meetings, Kissinger and Zhou agreed that they had to act to deter Japanese economic cooperation with the Soviet Union in the wake of the oil shock. Kissinger promised to pressure the Japanese government to pursue Siberian investment only in cooperation with the United States. Zhou accepted American help and assured Kissinger that “We have also said to Japan that if they want to exploit Siberia, it is better to be done with you than alone . . . We said we do not fear their exploiting Siberian resources. The only thing is that we are afraid they might be taken in.”29 For both Chinese and American leaders, the Japanese focus on economic and resource diplomacy raised doubts about Japanese dependability in the struggle with the Soviet Union and the two governments sought to obstruct any improvement in economic and trade relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. In September 1974, the US Congress passed limits on financing for Siberian development projects, thereby limiting not only American participation but also the prospects of any joint US-Japan projects in Siberia. In October of that year the Japanese finally withdrew from the Tyumen project in the face of American and Chinese pressure as well as new PRC promises of access to expanded Chinese oil production.30 If the Japanese predilection for economic and resource diplomacy presented challenges for Chinese foreign policy, it also presented opportunities. In the wake of the oil shock, international speculation regarding Chinese reserves was rampant and the PRC government used the lure of Chinese oil exports to undermine the Soviet approach to Japan.31 Chinese oil exports to Japan (the first exports of Chinese oil to a non-­communist country), began in 1973. In 1974, the PRC offered to export 10 percent of its annual production to Japan and, probably not coincidentally, the Chinese government estimated they could supply Japan with 40 million tons of petroleum by 1980, exactly the same amount estimated to be delivered to Japan under the Soviet Tyumen project. While PRC oil exports increased in the early- and mid-1970s, accounting for 3 percent of Japanese petroleum imports annually between 1975 and 1979, Chinese petroleum exports were limited by quality concerns and these ambitious targets were never achieved.32

The China problem and the Northern Territories dispute The Sino-Soviet cold war was also manifest in strong Chinese support for Japanese claims in the Northern Territories dispute. In their attempts to sell the

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Japanese on committing to the anti-­hegemony principle, Deng and the Chinese leadership claimed that Sino-Japanese cooperation in opposing Soviet hegemony would be helpful for Japan in resolving this dispute.33 Of course, just the opposite was true—Chinese support for the Japanese only hardened Soviet positions on the issue. Throughout the 1970s, the PRC leadership offered vocal support for the Japanese government position on the Northern Territories issue in order to torpedo any improvement in relations between Japan and the USSR. The PRC leadership had long been aware of the possible value of the territorial issue as a wedge in Japanese-Soviet relations and had expressed support for the Japanese position as early as 1964. Designed to undermine any Japan-USSR settlement, such support was almost always expressed at times least welcome to the Japanese government. For example, in early 1972, on the eve of a visit to Tokyo by Gromyko, Zhou Enlai expressed support for the Japanese position, prompting the Soviet foreign minister to warn the Japanese that any outside interference in the territorial problem was intolerable. Just four days before Tanaka’s trip to Moscow in October 1973, PRC Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua in a speech to the UN General Assembly expressed support for the Japanese position and demanded that the USSR return all the disputed islands to Japanese control. In December of the same year, the Chinese ambassador in Tokyo, Chen Chu, visited Northern Hokkaidō on an inspection tour of the Northern Territories and publicly criticized the Soviet position.34 Japanese policymakers, cognizant of PRC intentions, generally avoided comment on Chinese statements. Unsolicited Chinese support for the return of the Northern Territories, however, put the Japanese government in a difficult position on an issue on which the LDP was vulnerable in terms of domestic Japanese nationalist discourse. The LDP government was subject to criticism from opposition parties for being too soft on the Northern Territories issue. For example, the JSP argued that all of the Kuriles (not just the four southern islands claimed by the Japanese government) were Japanese territory and blamed the present Northern Territories conflict on the Yoshida government for having bowed to US pressure to renounce Japanese claims to the Northern Kuriles in order to end the occupation.35 In 1973, Zhou Enlai endorsed this position and publicly expressed his support for Japanese claims to all the Kurile Islands. By 1976 PRC “support” on the issue had become so onerous that Foreign Minister Miyazawa felt it necessary to publicly remind the Chinese that the Northern Territories problem was a bilateral issue between Japan and the USSR in which PRC involvement was “not desirable.”36 PRC reaction to Miyazawa’s

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statement illustrates how the leadership sought to capitalize on Japanese nationalist discourse. The Chinese government rejected the Miyazawa statement as “anti-Chinese” but then also criticized Miyazawa for bowing to Soviet intimidation and for lacking the courage to resist Soviet occupation of Japanese national territory. Recalling the PRC’s earlier support for populist leftist nationalist narratives, the Chinese government vowed to continue “resolute support for the Japanese people’s struggle for the recovery of the northern territories.”37 In September 1976, Miyazawa felt compelled to make his own inspection tour of the Northern Territories. In December 1976, a representative of the Hokkaidō Society for the Support of the Return of the Northern Territories visited Beijing as part of a cultural delegation. In a meeting with the delegation, Tan Chenlin, vice president of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, tied the Northern Territories issue to the global containment of the Soviet Union. In language reminiscent of American cold warriors, Tan traced a history of Soviet aggression in countries from Czechoslovakia to Angola and warned that Japanese must stand firm against this threat: “Unless you fight, the Soviet Union will not be satisfied with obtaining the four islands as its territory, and it will lay its hands on Hokkaidō, too.”38

The PRC on Japanese defense In hindsight, perhaps the most conspicuous result of the Sino-Soviet cold war was the change in Chinese attitudes toward the US-Japan Security Treaty and Japanese defense capabilities. At the time of Nixon’s visit to Beijing, Mao and Zhou still expressed reservations about possible American support for a revival of Japanese militarism. Nixon and Kissinger had worked to convince the Chinese leadership that the US-Japan alliance was necessary to restrain any possible development of Japanese militarism. By the time of Kissinger’s February 1973 visit, Kissinger noted that the Chinese leadership had not only come around to the idea of the alliance as a brake on Japanese militarism but had gone beyond it to see Japan, in Kissinger’s words, as an “incipient ally . . . to counter Soviet and Indian designs.”39 Under these circumstances, the Chinese leadership subordinated any concerns about Japanese militarism to the drive to mobilize Japan and the US-Japan alliance against the Soviet Union. The PRC leadership began to encourage the Japanese to strengthen the alliance and Japan’s own defense capabilities. In January 1973, in a meeting with LDP Diet member Kimura Takeo, Zhou told Kimura that despite lessening tension in East Asia, and the fact that one day, when Japan became

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“completely independent,” the alliance would be unnecessary, for the time being Japan needed to maintain the US-Japan alliance and the American nuclear umbrella.40 Just after Kimura’s visit, a trade mission headed by MITI Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro was in Beijing. In Nakasone’s recollection of his meeting with Zhou, the Chinese premier showed little interest in discussing economic and trade matters and repeatedly steered their conversations to security issues. Zhou was especially interested in the state of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (Nakasone had earlier served as head of the Defense Agency) and reiterated the importance of the US-Japan Security Treaty.41 In October of the same year, Zhou told a visiting Japanese delegation that Japan should maintain the alliance with the US and strengthen its own defense capability.42 In July 1974, the two countries reached agreement on the exchange of defense envoys and the first Japanese military attaché arrived in Beijing in September of the same year.43 The new appreciation for Japanese defense capabilities also inevitably affected the attitude of the PRC leadership toward both the conservative Japanese leadership and the leftist opposition. In the Chinese global anti-Soviet strategy, the pacifist Japanese opposition (like leftists in the United States and Europe) were seen as a definite liability. In his meetings with Kissinger, Mao repeatedly lamented the naïveté of the Japanese and European left who he generally considered weak on the Soviet threat.44 The Chinese leadership increasingly backed conservative politicians in Japan and the United States. During his meeting with Tanaka, Mao expressed his opinion that the Japanese opposition were of little practical political use and committed himself to working with conservatives in the LDP.45 Zhou summed up the new PRC relationship with the Japanese conservative mainstream during a meeting between Kissinger and Mao in February 1972. After Kissinger and Mao expressed some worry about the Japanese ability to resist Soviet economic lures, Zhou noted that “Ōhira has a clearer idea of the Soviet Union than others. But there are some not so clear in their understanding as their Foreign Minister.”46 During Kissinger’s visit in November 1974, Deng repeated these sentiments, telling Kissinger, “we like those on the right!” and listed Tanaka and Ōhira along with conservative European politicians like Konrad Adenauer and Charles De Gaulle as the PRC’s preferred political partners.47

Conclusion Any breakthrough in peace treaty talks was stymied by the political instability that afflicted the United States, Japan, and the PRC in the mid-1970s. Domestic

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politics in all three countries in the years 1974 to 1976 worked against any bold diplomatic initiatives. The instability began in the United States. Nixon’s resignation in August 1974 raised doubts about the American relationship with China, the cornerstone upon which Sino-Japanese relations had been built. The trouble then spread to Japan, where Tanaka followed Nixon into disgrace in December, only to be caught up in the Lockheed scandal and arrested in 1976. Finally, the death of Zhou Enlai in January 1976, the fall of Deng Xiaoping after the April Tiananmen incident, and the death of Mao in September, largely brought Chinese diplomacy to a halt. Dramatic change would await the emergence of a new political order after the death of Mao. The Sino-Soviet cold war led the PRC leadership to work to enlist Japan in its struggle against the Soviet Union and, failing that, to obstruct any improvement in Japanese relations with the USSR. The Japanese government consistently resisted this PRC strategy in favor of a policy of equidistance between the two communist powers and improved relations with both. In pursuit of its goals, the PRC leadership did not hesitate to appeal to Japanese nationalist sentiment. As will become clear, however, this had some unintended consequences within Japan. PRC policy and rhetoric worked to undermine leftist and progressive political influence while at the same provoking resentment of PRC interference in Japanese affairs that strengthened critics on the right.

6

Japan’s China Problem in a Time of Crisis

The national crisis of the 1970s Difficult relations with China and the Soviet Union were interpreted in the context of international and domestic political turmoil. The mid-1970s was a time of perceived national crisis that threatened the hard-­won success of the Japanese. The sense of crisis that pervaded public discourse in Japan in the 1970s colored the discourse on relations with China. The perceived crisis was provoked mainly by a series of international shocks beyond the control of the Japanese. First among these were the Nixon shocks. Nixon’s opening to China challenged the basic premises of Japanese foreign policy. The floating dollar threatened the export competitiveness of a country built on trade (bōeki rikkoku). A third and now little remembered Nixon shock, a threatened embargo on US soybean exports to Japan, seemed to target even the most basic necessities of the Japanese way of life. The oil shock of 1973 made plain the dangerous position of a fledgling world power dependent on trade and imports of raw materials, and drove home the point that the relationship with the United States itself could be a source of insecurity. The oil shock sparked inflation, the first recession of the postwar period in 1974, and considerable panic within Japan, manifest in a famous run on supermarket stocks of toilet paper. Prime Minister Tanaka’s tour of Southeast Asia in 1974 was greeted with massive protests against the Japanese economic presence in the region. All at once, Japanese economic prosperity was threatened by US policy, the oil embargo, and regional resentment. To many, it seemed that Japan, which more than any other power depended upon international peace, stability, and goodwill, was isolated and unpopular. The postwar success that in the 1960s had encouraged a new appreciation of Japanese traditions and the search for a new, more prominent role in the international community seemed suddenly tenuous. The world seemed a much more dangerous place in the 1970s.

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Conditions within Japan offered little comfort. The decade began with the dramatic, if mystifying, suicide of the author Mishima Yukio, an extreme expression, perhaps, of the sense of cultural loss that for many Japanese accompanied the sweeping changes in postwar society. The political instability attending the resignation and arrest of Tanaka Kakuei shined an unflattering light on the structural corruption at the heart of the Japanese miracle. The rise of violent left-­wing radicalism and the involvement of Japanese citizens in acts of international terrorism raised disturbing questions about the values of a new generation of Japanese. Pollution, urban overcrowding, and a sense that quality of life had been sacrificed for GNP growth raised basic questions about the priorities on which postwar Japan had been built. Progressive and leftist forces, though they lamented the present state of Japan, could at least take heart from the possibility that crisis might provoke change. If the extremism of groups like the United Red Army tarnished the image of the left, new citizens’ movements and charismatic young leaders like Oda Makoto promised to revitalize progressive movements. Internationally, the normalization of relations with the PRC was to be celebrated, as was the end of the war in Vietnam. US defeat and the oil crisis, it could be hoped, might finally prove to the Japanese people that the US-Japan Security Treaty was the liability that leftists had always claimed and might inspire them to strike out on a course toward true national independence. For the ruling conservatives, of course, the possibility of domestic political change was precisely the problem, and electoral trends were worrying. LDP electoral dominance had been declining since the last years of the Satō cabinet. In the 1976 lower house election, the LDP won less than 50 percent of seats for the first time since its creation in 1955. By the time of the 1977 upper house election, many predicted an outright opposition majority.1 Many conservatives, especially younger politicians, concluded that the postwar conservative mainstream, the heirs of Yoshida, had lost their way and set out to revitalize the conservative movement. The sense of crisis was not limited to Japan. Foreign observers did not hesitate to chime in with their assessments of Japanese vulnerability. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who would go on to play a prominent role in relations with Japan and China as President Carter’s national security advisor, in 1972 described Japan as The Fragile Blossom.2 Harold Hinton called Japan a “vulnerable giant.”3 Foreign Policy magazine in 1974 ran a special issue on Japan entitled “Japan: Diplomatic Cripple?” The PRC leadership picked up on the theme as well. In Riben wenti (Japan Issues), a CCP journal established in 1972 to educate party members on

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conditions in Japan, the introduction to Japanese economics concluded that, after the oil shock, Japanese capitalism had entered a new crisis (the seventh crisis of Japanese capitalism, to be precise), which exposed the weakness and unbalanced nature of Japanese economic development in the 1960s, especially its international dependence and vulnerability to foreign pressure.4 Perhaps nothing captured the spirit of the times quite like the 1973 novel Japan Sinks (Nihon chinbotsu). Komatsu Sakyō’s novel imagined the Japanese islands submerged by tectonic activity in the Japan Trench and the Japanese people scattered as refugees in foreign lands where they were not always welcome. The novel moved even otherwise sober scholars like Umesao Tadao, who in the 1960s had led the movement to explain the cultural roots of Japanese success. In a 1974 article on “International Interchange and Japanese Civilization,” Umesao asked his readers to imagine the Japanese predicament should the events portrayed in Japan Sinks come to pass. The Japanese would be cast adrift in a hostile world, stateless and subject to suspicion, prejudice, and persecution analogous to the historical plight of the Jews. Of course, Japan Sinks was fiction, but Umesao concluded that, “I cannot help but think that the day is fast approaching when Japan will be set upon by the rest of the world.” Umesao characterized international interchange as a “cruel and merciless collision of mutually suspicious and distrustful cultures.”5 Thus, for Umesao, by the mid1970s international cultural interchange was no longer an opportunity to display the superior traits of Japanese civilization but a clash of civilizations that threatened the very existence of the Japanese nation. To some the Japanese seemed peculiarly unprepared to deal with this new, more dangerous world. Umesao in his article argued that Japan’s long history of seclusion and cultural insularity made the Japanese uniquely unprepared to deal with the “cruel and merciless” world of international interaction. Etō Jun had earlier made a similar argument in his influential essay, “The End of the World of Make Believe,” in which he argued that the security provided by the alliance with the United States, combined with the harmony and homogeneity of Japanese society, spoiled the Japanese, making them weak, dependent (amae), and unprepared for the harsh realities of international politics.6 Ōhira Masayoshi echoed this feeling when he worried that the Japanese lacked a proper consciousness of their new position in the international community. To deal with this danger, the Japanese had to abandon their naïve assumptions about international interaction and awaken to the fact that the world outside Japan was cruel and dangerous. They had to become more united and more assertive in defense of Japanese civilization and the Japanese homeland. Kano Tsutomu, the

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influential translator and editor of the Japan Interpreter, summed up Japan’s national predicament in 1976. Dependence on the United States had inhibited the development of a “coherent national identity” and Japanese now faced a “national identity crisis” as a result of the “lack of a commonly held sense of national self that could guide foreign policy-­making and individual behavior in an international context.”7 In other words, the key to overcoming the present national crisis (just in the immediate postwar period) was a national awakening, the forging of a more powerful national identity.

The right wing to the fore on the China problem For many conservatives, especially right-­wing critics of the mainstream conservative government, all the shortcomings that hindered the Japanese ability to deal with the national crisis of the 1970s were manifest in Japan’s policy toward China. The normalization of relations enjoyed popular support and, by establishing relations with China within the framework of the US-Japan alliance, achieved a long-­sought goal of the mainstream conservative establishment. What could have been seen as a great triumph, however, provoked considerable dissatisfaction within the conservative camp itself. For those on the right, the new relationship with China epitomized the failure of Japanese diplomacy and became a focal point for anxieties about Japanese national identity.

The Seirankai The most notable right-­wing critics of the new China policy were a group of young conservative politicians organized in the Seirankai. While criticism from the Seirankai is duly noted in most studies of Sino-Japanese relations in the period, Seirankai arguments are usually fairly quickly dismissed, often as being extremist or ultra-­nationalist. Yet many Seirankai concerns about Japan’s relations with China were widely shared and are common even today. Therefore, the group deserves more attention than it normally receives. The Seirankai (which translates roughly as “the Young Storm Society”) was formed in July 1973, originally with thirty-­one members from both houses of the Diet, under the sponsorship of Fujio Masayuki, Watanabe Michio, and Nakagawa Ichirō. The group brought together many of the LDP’s most hawkish young politicians, many of whom would go on to hold powerful positions in the party and government. Some of the most notable members included: Ishihara

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Shintarō, one of the most recognizable, if controversial, contemporary Japanese politicians; Mori Yoshirō, the future prime minister; Nakao Eiichi, who went on to serve as MITI minister; Nakayama Masaaki, who eventually served as construction minister; and long-­time LDP politician and TV personality Hamada Kōichi. Provoked by what they saw as the corruption of postwar Japanese conservative politics, symbolized by Tanaka’s “money politics,” the Seirankai sought to rejuvenate Japanese conservatism by overcoming factional divisions and dedicating themselves to acting solely “in accordance with the interests of the state and nation.”8 The Seirankai mission statement laid out six points that reflected long-­time conservative objectives as well as unease with the postwar political and economic order. First, in foreign affairs the Seirankai were committed to the maintenance of close relations with the Western camp in the Cold War. Second, aiming to “raise the morals of the citizenry,” the Seirankai sought education reform, what they called the “normalization of education,” that would inculcate patriotism and arrest rampant materialism. Third was a vague commitment to eliminate unearned income and alleviate income inequality. Fourth, they needed to convince the Japanese people that national defense and public order were the foundations of a truly peaceful nation in order to counter left-­wing pacifism and build a more independent defense capability. Fifth, they were committed to the enactment of a new, fully autonomous constitution. Finally, the Seirankai sought the reform of the LDP to eliminate the “evil habits” of “easy compromise, bureaucratism and opportunism.”9 Most dramatically, members sealed their pact in blood, each member affixing a bloody fingerprint next to their signatures. In later years, Ishihara Shintarō claimed credit for the idea of the blood pact and insisted that the blood oath was necessary to ensure solidarity in the face of expected persecution from the “absolutist” Tanaka government. Ishihara admitted that, of course, the blood oath was also good publicity, instantly garnering the group intense media attention.10 The official statement of Seirankai foreign policy positions was drafted by Fujio Masayuki and stressed continuing threats to Japanese security. Despite détente, Fujio argued, the USSR and PRC remained threats to Japan as nuclear powers espousing dangerous political ideologies. The drawdown of US military forces in Asia after the Vietnam War only increased Japanese vulnerability to these threats. The oil shock made it clear that Japanese security increasingly rested on access to vital overseas markets and resources while Japanese efforts to secure such access were increasingly likely to provoke foreign resentment and

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resistance.11 Seirankai analysis of international conditions thus echoed the popular sense of crisis engendered by the events of the early 1970s. Of even greater concern than the dangers of the international environment, however, were the domestic constraints on foreign policy that kept Japan from responding to them effectively. Most of these could be traced to the pernicious influence of the Japanese left. The most important of these constraints was a “lack of national consensus on foreign relations” as a result of the progressive opposition’s idealistic misconception that “the primary meaning of peace is to avoid the harsh realities of national security and to ignore the military strategies of other countries.”12 When this naïve pacifism was combined with the remarkable development of the postwar Japanese economy, it created a perception gap between foreigners who tended to overestimate Japanese power and Japanese who were excessively suspicious of national power. Increased foreign expectations toward Japan combined with continued reticence on the part of the Japanese made it difficult for Japan to fulfill its international obligations, leading to distrust and resentment of Japan. Japan’s ability to play a more constructive international role was further limited by leftist anti-American propaganda calling for “autonomous diplomacy” (jishu gaikōron) and an “escape from dependence on the United States” (tai-Bei izon dakkyakuron), that undermined cooperation with the liberal Western camp on which Japanese security depended.13 In fact, within the Seirankai this last issue of Japan’s relations with the United States was considerably more complicated than the public policy statement revealed. Most in the group supported the US-Japan alliance as the most practical foreign policy given contemporary circumstances, but shared their left-­wing opponents’ resentment of what they saw as American domination and a lack of Japanese independence in the relationship with the United States. Rather than pacifism and unarmed neutrality, however, the Seirankai sought liberation from American dominance through constitutional revision and an independent Japanese military. Tactical support for the US-Japan alliance, therefore, did not necessarily entail positive views of the United States or the US-Japan relationship. Cooperation with the United States in the Cold War also rested uncomfortably with the desire among many in the Seirankai to undo what they saw as the excesses of the American occupation and the corrupting influence of American culture. Thus, despite their intense criticism of leftist nationalist narratives of opposition to the Japanese state and its relationship with the United States, Seirankai members manifested an intense ambivalence toward the United States—the alliance with the United States was vital to Japanese national security yet the historical relationship with the US as manifest in the postwar

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constitution was the main obstacle to achieving an independent Japanese national identity. Nakagawa Ichirō, for example, blamed the US-imposed constitution for the lack of national unity and purpose in postwar Japan. Nakagawa argued that the constitution had been imposed on Japan for the same reason Germany had been divided territorially—to keep the two nations weak so that they would never again become threats to the Allies. Japan was saved from territorial division, Nakagawa imagined, only by Chiang Kai-­shek’s opposition to unconditional surrender and partition. Though Japan had not been partitioned, the constitution fostered political division between left and right, created social division between labor and management, parents and children, men and women, and weakened national morals through the pernicious influence of American individualism. Through the constitution the Americans sought to extinguish the “Japanese spirit” and aimed for nothing less than the “extermination of the Japanese nation.” In fact, according to Nakagawa, Japan was even worse off than territorially divided nations like Germany where partition at least provoked a powerful nationalist commitment to reunification. In Germany, unlike Japan, “the territory and people were divided, but their hearts were united.”14 While they rejected much of postwar democracy as an American imposition, many of the young politicians in the Seirankai brought to the group a romantic, populist spirit that called for individual participation in national political life through the fight against bureaucratic elitism and corruption. Politicians like Ishihara Shintarō sought a return to what they saw as the original spirit of Japanese conservatism in popular political participation and national identification with the Japanese state. As Ishihara put it, “Japanese have to think of Japan as their own, it cannot be left to the politicians to handle. The problems of Japan can only be solved through the conscious effort of every individual Japanese.”15 The only way to achieve a truly independent, democratic society was to overcome the separation between state and nation fostered by the constitution, the Japanese left and Tanaka’s money politics, in order to return to an individual identification with the state. To quote Ishihara again, “the absolute goal of politics is human liberty and at the same time the freedom of the state and nation.”16 Many in the Seirankai saw themselves as defending liberal society even as they sought to undo many postwar liberal reforms. China policy, especially, seemed to embody all of the worst aspects of postwar Japanese politics. Tanaka’s China policy seemed dangerous to Japanese national interests, injurious to Japanese national identity, and a violation of democratic principles. In national security terms, Tanaka’s abandonment of the ROC at the

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same time American forces were being drawn down in Asia damaged Japan’s international credibility and undermined the alliance with the United States. The Japanese government was cutting relations with an American ally at precisely the moment Americans were calling on Japan to make a more active contribution to the defense of East Asia. Japanese actions also contributed to the international isolation of the ROC, a government that had contributed considerable military, financial, and human resources to the defense of the free world, including Japan. Moreover, in their haste to conclude normalization, Tanaka and Ōhira seemed oblivious to the threat of subversion that Chinese communism posed to an open, liberal society like Japan. The danger that the Chinese communist regime could exploit the open nature of the Japanese political and social order need not preclude state-­to-state relations, but did limit the development of closer relations and required constant vigilance to contain. As Nakao Eiichi explained,“China is a closed society . . . We hope that in the near future China will become an open society and freely develop extensive, peaceful relations with its neighbors. But as long as China is a closed society, Japan should limit its relations to peaceful coexistence.”17 The threat of subversion would have been less acute if the Japanese people and their political leaders could be trusted to mount an effective defense of their national political, social, and cultural institutions. For Seirankai observers, however, the lack of identification with the state made Japanese selfish, prone to both a narrow, materialistic sense of self-­interest that invited corruption and a sentimentality or emotionalism that left them blind to the threat from the PRC and vulnerable to Chinese manipulation. The Japanese people and their leaders had been carried off on a wave of pro-China hysteria fed by the mass media and a business community that dreamed of a “mountain of treasure” in China. Nakao Eiichi argued that popular sentiment in favor of normalization was evidence of the Japanese nation’s “susceptibility to mood” (mūdo ni yowai Nihon minzoku), and a repetition of the dangerous irrationality that had led Japan into the Axis Alliance and the Pacific War.18 Tanaka and Ōhira, rather than resist the popular mood, sought to capitalize on it for their own benefit. Ishihara Shintarō accused Tanaka of sacrificing national interests “in order to earn points with a media that is overly sympathetic to China.”19 This short-­sighted opportunism made them powerless to resist demands put forth by the Chinese, particularly on Taiwan. Nakao criticized Ōhira’s press conference announcing the end of relations with the ROC as “meekly doing as he was told by China” and indicative of “a diplomatic attitude completely devoid of autonomy.”20 Every aspect of the relationship with China was redolent of this lack of national consciousness, even the enthusiastic reception given to two pandas

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offered as a gift from the PRC government to celebrate the normalization of relations. When Ran Ran and Kan Kan went on display at Tokyo’s Ueno Zoo in November 1972, the pandas drew throngs (56,000 people on the first day), who waited in line for hours for a glimpse of them.21 To many, this “panda boom” constituted further proof of the sentimentalism and popular hysteria that ruled Japan’s relations with China. Watanabe Michio worried that with their images of China warped by the hullaballoo attending normalization and the arrival of the pandas, the Japanese harbored an idealistic impression of a peaceful, friendly PRC that obscured true Chinese motives and interests.22 Worse yet was the way that Tanaka and the LDP leadership tried to capitalize on this sentiment. Riding a wave of popular support in the wake of the normalization agreement, Tanaka had called a lower house election in December 1972. The results, however, proved an embarrassment for the LDP. The party lost seventeen seats while the JSP picked up twenty-­eight seats and the JCP made significant gains, becoming the second largest opposition party. The results of this election, in fact, were a major motivation for the formation of the Seirankai. Many of the group’s members criticized the way the LDP had sought to capitalize on the popularity of normalization by using images of pandas in its campaign materials. For Nakagawa, it was precisely such crass opportunism that made the Japanese soft on communism: “we cannot confront the Communist party if the LDP is using a Chinese Communist emblem as its campaign symbol.”23 In comparison to Tanaka’s pandering, the Japanese Communists actually earned the grudging respect of conservatives like Watanabe for running a highly nationalist campaign: “the LDP campaigned using a panda emblem. The JCP used Mount Fuji. I think you can see from the election results which one was more effective.”24 The aviation agreement provoked similar criticism. Some criticized the agreement on practical grounds. Ishihara objected to the granting of beyond rights (i’en ken) that allowed Chinese planes to fly on to third countries from Japan, without receiving similar rights in return. In fact, Ishihara found the agreement so lopsided he characterized it as being one hundred-­to-one in the PRC’s favor.25 Watanabe Michio pointed out that every year a million people traveled between Japan and Taiwan while it was generally estimated that about 20,000 people would travel between Japan and Beijing in the first five years after the aviation agreement. Given that links with Taiwan were so much more lucrative than those with the mainland, he wondered, why did Ōhira need to submit to unreasonable Chinese demands to conclude a pact with the PRC?26 Worse than the practical consequences of the aviation agreement, however, was that it was just one in a string of national humiliations that revealed the

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weakness of Japanese foreign policy. Nakagawa Ichirō called Japanese treatment of Taiwan in the aviation agreement, especially the decision not to recognize the ROC flag as a national symbol, “cruel” (muzan) and Ōhira’s trip to the PRC in January 1974 to conclude the pact “humiliating” (kutsujokuteki). This subservient attitude also characterized Ōhira’s policy in the Middle East where, in the wake of the oil shock, he sent special envoy Miki Takeo to “bow to the Arabs” and “beg the Arabs for oil.” This submissive diplomacy made Japan an international “laughing stock” and encouraged the flag-­burning, anti-Japanese demonstrators that greeted Tanaka on his tour of Southeast Asia in 1974.27 The general image of Tananka Kakuei as pandering, opportunistic, and corrupt extended to his China policy, which many in the Seirankai saw as a violation of democratic principles. They charged that Tanaka and Ōhira had run roughshod over majority opinion within the party itself, especially regarding the treatment of the ROC. Tanaka’s use of secret channels and opposition politicians to approach the Chinese leadership also seemed to subvert the democratic process. The connections between Tanaka and the Kōmeitō’s Takeiri Yoshikatsu especially raised suspicions, as the Kōmeitō was the political arm of the layBuddhist association Sōka Gakkai which many members of the Seirankai considered a corrupt and dangerous cult.28 Despite their strenuous anti-­ communism, many members of the group also displayed a distrust of corporate capitalism and were suspicious of the connections between Tanaka and the Japanese business community, who they accused of corruption in their dealings with the PRC leadership and pushing relations with the PRC in hopes of profiting from increased exports.29 For all these reasons, Tanaka’s China policy for many smacked of opportunism with a decidedly corrupt and dictatorial cast. Nakagawa Ichirō called Tanaka and Ōhira’s handling of normalization “fascist.”30 The Seirankai was fairly short-­lived, effectively disbanding in 1979. In the end, despite the considerable heat, light, and newsprint generated, the group’s direct influence on China policy was fairly limited. The Seirankai could not reverse the normalization of relations with the PRC or achieve the re-­establishment of relations with the ROC. While some, like Nakagawa Ichirō, called for the immediate restoration of relations with the ROC, most resigned themselves to the recognition of the PRC as a fait accompli and instead of rollback, committed themselves to the containment of relations with the PRC.31 Nor was the Seirankai able to block the aviation agreement or the later peace treaty. If their policy influence was limited, however, the Seirankai had an important impact on the China problem discourse. One analyst has identified the Seirankai’s main political impact as the creation of an “aesthetic form of opposition” to

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mainstream conservative politics that over time increasingly influenced political discourse in Japan, concluding that “the foundations of a shift to the right in Japanese politics since the 1990s were created in large part by members of the Seirankai.”32 Seirankai influence on the China problem discourse was similar. Seirankai criticism of China policy reflected concerns that were fairly widespread, many of which today constitute commonsense regarding the history of postwar Japan’s relations with the PRC. The idea that relations with the PRC were carried out in an emotional, pro-China atmosphere heedless of the realistic calculation of national interests and that this sentiment was exploited by opportunistic Japanese politicians and businessmen as well as a manipulative PRC leadership is by now a fairly common account of relations in the period. One reason Seirankai positions on China did not have more immediate policy impact in the late 1970s is explained by the easing of the sense of national crisis and by the way that PRC foreign policy came to support the policy positions and triumphalist nationalist narratives of the resurgent conservative mainstream at the end of the decade.

The Japanese left and the China problem in the mid-1970s As detailed earlier, many Japanese leftists and progressives preferred to interpret the normalization of relations in such a way as to preserve their own nationalist narratives. While the Japan Communist Party was openly critical of what it saw as the Chinese abandonment of Asian national liberation movements and the Japanese people’s struggle for independence from the United States, most on the left resisted this interpretation. They preferred to see the establishment of relations with the PRC as a defeat for the United States and its conservative allies in Japan, and a first step toward ending the US-Japan Security Treaty. For the first few years after normalization, any unease about the change in Chinese foreign policy was offset by international and domestic trends that seemed supportive of the progressive cause. As Robert Service pointed out, the 1970s seemed a good time for international leftist movements, a time when the red areas of the world map expanded greatly and the forces of socialism and national liberation seemed everywhere on the advance.33 Progressives could especially take heart in what they saw as the triumph of the Vietnamese national liberation movement with the withdrawal of US forces in 1973 and the unification of the country in 1975. Domestically, optimism regarding the electoral prospects of Japan’s opposition parties mirrored conservative gloom. In China, the

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resurgence of radicalism and the general political tumult surrounding the succession to Mao in the mid-1970s temporarily stalled the deepening of ties between the PRC leadership and Japanese conservatives. It took time, therefore, for the full import of the changes in Chinese foreign policy to sink in among Japanese leftists and progressives. Over time, however, it became apparent that normalization and the Chinese foreign policy priorities behind it would put leftists and progressives in an increasingly difficult position. First, the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the PRC robbed the opposition of a potent political weapon with which to attack the ruling LDP. Second, as the decade progressed, evidence mounted that the PRC had no desire to see the Japanese nation liberated from the US-Japan alliance. Third, as China’s relations with other socialist and Third World nations, especially Vietnam, deteriorated, many Japanese would come to realize that the PRC leadership would not support national independence movements that did not contribute positively to Chinese definitions of national interest. By the end of the decade this would produce a crisis in Japanese progressive and leftist perceptions of the PRC.

The JSP confronts the anti-­hegemony principle For the JSP, the failures of postwar conservative politics associated with the Nixon shock and the oil shock combined with the contradictions of Japanese capitalism as manifest in industrial pollution and citizen’s movements were interpreted as bringing Japanese politics to a crisis that would force radical change and promised success at the polls. The international socialist movement also appeared to be progressing apace. The Paris Peace Accords that ended the US war in Vietnam in 1973 inspired optimism among the Japanese political opposition. The settlement in Vietnam was seen as a victory for national liberation, peace, and socialism. The US defeat in Vietnam was interpreted by the JSP and many other leftists in much the same way that Nixon’s trip to Beijing had been—as further evidence of the failure of US Cold War policy, the breakdown of the US-imposed Cold War order in Asia and the imminent demise of Japan’s alliance with the United States. The US-Japan alliance was an anachronism, a military alliance which bound Japan to the United States even as other Asian nations broke free of American domination, and now constituted the main source of tension in East Asia and the major threat to Japanese peace and prosperity.34 National liberation and the breakdown of superpower domination of Asia were the dominant trends of the times. Soon the tide of national liberation would crash on Japanese shores and Japan would take

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its rightful place in the world historical drama and achieve real national independence and unity. Under these conditions, it was easy for socialist politicians to ignore the troublesome signs of change in Chinese foreign policy and to continue claiming the PRC as a partner in the nationalist struggle to free Japan from the US-Japan security alliance. Socialists and leftists were encouraged in this direction by the possibility that the PRC leadership itself might return to a more “leftist” path in the mid-1970s. In the years from 1974 to his death in September 1976, it appeared that Mao Zedong once again set policy on a more radical course. By 1974 the PRC was in the grip of a mass campaign to “criticize Confucius and Lin Biao” that was widely interpreted as an attack by Cultural Revolution radicals on the policies of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. In April 1976, Deng was purged from all his posts for allegedly trying to reverse the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. The move to a more radical domestic politics suggested the possibility of a return to a foreign policy less supportive of the US-Japan alliance. Thus, domestic Chinese political trends and international trends allowed the Japanese Socialists a temporary respite from dealing with the problematic implications of the new PRC foreign policy and to preserve the identification of the PRC with national liberation. Inevitably, however, the new PRC foreign policy of cooperation with American and Japanese conservatives created problems for the identification of the PRC with national liberation. In 1972, the JSP had hailed normalization as advancing the cause of neutralism. It was hoped that the anti-­hegemony clause of the joint communiqué would become “the basis for a regional friendship and non-­ aggression system” which would institutionalize Japanese neutralism through a system of non-­aggression pacts with the US, USSR, and the PRC.35 Of course, the joint communiqué could never be the basis for such a foreign policy. The very function of the joint communiqué for the PRC leadership was to preclude neutralism and enlist Japan in its struggle against the Soviet Union. In fact, for the rest of the decade the Chinese leadership would devote all their efforts to strengthening the US-Japan alliance and the anti-­hegemony principle was deployed strategically to prevent any improvement in relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. The Japanese Socialists, just like the conservative government, were going to face Chinese pressure to choose sides in the Sino-Soviet cold war. This problem was brought home to the Socialists during the sixth JSP mission to Beijing in May 1975. No official JSP delegation had been invited to China since 1970, during which time the PRC leadership was busy cultivating its relations with the ruling LDP. The mission, headed by Party Chairman Narita Tomomi, was aimed at raising the party’s profile in front of the 1976 general

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election and at countering the LDP’s dominance of China policy. On the Chinese side, the invitation, coming at just the time that intergovernmental peace treaty negotiations had stalled, could be seen as an expression of the leadership’s frustration with the Japanese position on anti-­hegemony and as making good on the threat to use peoples’ diplomacy to pressure the Japanese government. On this point the JSP proved a willing partner, enthusiastically echoing PRC criticism of the Japanese government’s inability to conclude the treaty in a timely manner. The mission was also an important front in JSP intraparty factional politics which were complicated by the Sino-Soviet dispute. The party included both pro-Soviet and pro-PRC factions, as well as a substantial mainstream that sought to maintain neutrality in the Sino-Soviet split. Narita and the pro-Beijing factions in the JSP sought to use the mission to counter what they perceived as the increasing power of pro-Soviet factions in the wake of a high-­profile JSP delegation to the USSR and Eastern Europe in 1974. The pro-Soviet and mainstream factions in the party, on the other hand, wanted to avoid committing the party to an anti-­hegemony declaration that might provoke the USSR. To ensure this, before sending the mission to Beijing the party Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution calling on the delegation to refrain from identifying any specific country in an anti-­hegemony declaration. Thus, the JSP found itself divided on China policy and battling to preserve a neutral position in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The anti-­hegemony issue dominated the mission’s discussions. In meetings with Chinese Japan experts like Liao Chengzhi, Sun Pinghua, and Zhang Xiangshan, the Japanese delegation resisted persistent Chinese pressure to commit to opposing the hegemony of both superpowers. Narita attempted to put off Chinese demands by pointing out that a hard line on the anti-­hegemony issue was likely only to strengthen Japanese opposition to the peace treaty.36 It is reported that at one point Sun Pinghua threatened to cut off the talks, telling the Japanese that if they did not want to discuss anti-­hegemony, perhaps they would prefer to spend the rest of their visit sight-­seeing. Alarmed by the situation in Beijing, Party Secretary General Ishibashi Masashi phoned Narita from Tokyo to urge him to stick to the party resolution on anti-­hegemony. In the end, the Japanese delegation split on the issue. Unable to come to any consensus, the final decision on the wording of the anti-­hegemony clause of the joint communiqué was left to Narita. Narita managed to resist inclusion of some of the more inflammatory Chinese anti-Soviet rhetoric but agreed to the inclusion of a clause in which, “both sides agree to oppose the hegemonism of the two superpowers,” thus labeling the Soviet Union a hegemon.37

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Outside of the anti-­hegemony clause, the rest of the joint communiqué signed by Narita and Liao Chengzhi was generally amenable to JSP positions. On the situation in Indochina the two sides agreed that the people’s victory in Vietnam proved that the “historical trend of states pursuing independence, nations pursuing liberation and people pursuing revolution,” was irreversible and that their great victory was a model for all oppressed nations struggling for liberation. The PRC side expressed its “respect” for the Japanese Socialists’ struggle to abolish the USJapan Security Treaty, evict US troops from Japanese soil and regain the Northern Territories. The PRC also “commended” JSP efforts in advancing Japan-China friendship and its continued promotion of the Asanuma spirit (that American imperialism was the common enemy of the Chinese and Japanese peoples).38 Chinese endorsement of these JSP positions, however, was decidedly lukewarm. The PRC leadership did not commit itself to support any of these JSP efforts, nor did the leadership express its own commitment to the Asanuma statement. Moreover, every mention of US imperialism or criticism of the United States was carefully balanced with a denunciation of the Soviet Union. For example, the joint communiqué noted, “In Japan, American Imperialism seeks to further strengthen its military bases and violates Japanese independence and sovereignty. The Soviet Union openly uses its armed forces to intervene in Czechoslovakia, illegally occupies the territory of others, such as Japan’s [Kurile] Islands, and everywhere pushes its so-­called ‘Asian Collective Security System.’ ”39 The Japanese side also reiterated its commitment to neutralism and pacifism: “The Japan Socialist Party delegation, following a neutralist policy based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, opposes power politics (kyōken seiji) and emphasizes its desire to maintain and develop relations with all countries.”40 Tellingly, this statement of long-­standing, fundamental JSP principles elicited no comment from the Chinese. Back home, the mission’s joint communiqué and the anti-­hegemony issue split the party. To some extent the Sino-Soviet cold war produced factional tensions within the Socialist Party on the China question that mirrored those that plagued the LDP during the Cold War, when the conservatives were split into pro-Taiwan and pro-PRC factions with a large non-­committal mainstream. The JSP similarly was split between a pro-Soviet and a pro-PRC faction with a largely uncommitted mainstream. The pro-Soviet wing of the party associated with the faction of Sakisaka Itsurō and the Socialist Association attacked the Narita-Liao communiqué and forcefully rejected any inclusion of an anti-­ hegemony clause in the peace treaty. The Socialist Association denounced the accommodation with PRC policy as “rightist” support for the US-Japan alliance.

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They were opposed by the faction headed by Sasaki Kōzō and pro-China party leaders like Kuroda Hisao of the party’s Alliance for the Destruction of the US-Japan Security Treaty System (Ampotaisei daha dōshikai) and head of the Japan-China Friendship Association (Orthodox Headquarters). The pro-China faction argued that superpower hegemony was the greatest threat to world peace and that Soviet policy in Asia, including Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories, constituted hegemonism every bit as dangerous as that of the United States. They wanted the JSP to forge a united front with the PRC that would lead the Third World in opposition to both Western superpowers. Several of the party’s most powerful leaders, like Eda Saburō, Katsumata Seiichi, and Ishibashi Masashi, however, remained committed to a policy of equidistance between the PRC and the USSR and feared that a position openly critical of the Soviet Union would make the conclusion of a peace treaty with the PRC even more difficult. Over time, however, the centrist factions came more and more to support Narita and the pro-Beijing position out of concern to counter the growing influence in party organizations of the Sakisaka faction and the Socialist Association. The March 1976 JSP National Congress adopted a compromise position on the Narita mission which ratified the communiqué while reaffirming the JSP commitment to work for improved relations with the USSR.41 As Chae-­jin Lee has shown, this compromise on policy toward China also required coming to grips with the new relationship between the PRC and the United States. A series of visits by Socialist Party leaders to the US and China in 1975 and 1976 led to an accommodation with the new international political situation in East Asia. Eda visited the United States in September 1975 and returned to Japan convinced that there was no need to oppose the new relationship between the United States and China. In June 1976, while Sasaki, head of the pro-PRC faction in the party was in the United States, Eda visited the PRC and in a meeting with Li Xiannian publicly criticized Soviet hegemonism.42 Thus, the leadership of the Japan Socialist Party in the mid-1970s gradually succumbed to Chinese efforts to enlist the party’s support for the PRC foreign policy of cooperation with the United States and Japan against the Soviet Union.

The alienation of progressive intellectuals The challenge presented by new PRC foreign policies went beyond the opposition parties. Progressive intellectuals would also struggle to come to terms with what Chinese policy meant for the Japanese nation. Some among the pro-China forces stuck stubbornly to past positions. Inoue Kiyoshi, a leader of the postwar

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movement for national enlightenment and long-­time champion of PRC positions, rejected any suggestion of drastic change in Chinese domestic or foreign policy and took heart in the fall of Deng Xiaoping in 1974 as evidence that the Chinese leadership remained committed to continual revolution at home and opposition to American imperialism abroad.43 Less ideologically committed progressives, however, wrestled with the implications of the new PRC policy toward Japan and the United States for progressive causes in Japan. Seki Hiroharu, a University of Tokyo professor of international politics who had served as president of the progressive Peace Studies Association of Japan (Nihon heiwa gakkai), was critical of PRC foreign policy after the opening to the United States. In a roundtable with Nomura Kōichi (who doggedly defended PRC foreign policy), Seki argued that the PRC had abandoned the foreign policy of anti-­imperialist nationalism in favor of old-­ fashioned Cold War power politics and that this threatened the pacifist program of Japan’s progressives. Seki described a visit to the PRC in May 1976, just before the death of Mao, during which he and his delegation presented their Chinese hosts with some of the publications that had resulted from their peace studies research. The reaction from the Chinese, as Seki related it, was “that peace studies in Japan and Europe were built on an illusion,” and that “such studies were worthless.” In their struggle with the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership had betrayed their support for Japanese pacifism. Like hawks in the United States and Europe, Seki argued, “Chinese see peace studies as easily becoming a tool of the Soviets.”44 Seki thus saw the Chinese leadership, even before the death of Mao, as little different from conservative Cold War politicians in Japan or the West in their rejection of international peace and justice in favor of power politics. On the anti-­hegemony issue, Seki was critical of both the Chinese and Japanese government positions. Seki understood PRC insistence on anti-­hegemony as a cynical ploy in a global anti-Soviet strategy. Rather than resisting anti-­hegemony, however, Seki argued that anti-­hegemony was a principle the Japanese themselves should be promoting. Japan, he argued, should push anti-­hegemony as a principle applicable to all powers, including the PRC.45 Seki saw the PRC itself as a great power pursuing hegemony in the region and saw principled resistance to this pursuit as part of a progressive, pacifist foreign policy. Seki’s is an important line of argument that would become increasingly prominent in the second half of the decade and is a good illustration of the tenuous place of China in postwar progressive and leftist nationalist narratives. Having mobilized the Chinese Revolution and the PRC as part of a nationalist narrative seeking the liberation of the Japanese nation from American

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domination, Japanese progressives were forced to re-­evaluate their identification with the PRC once Chinese policy and propaganda no longer supported that agenda. The upshot was the gradual eclipse of pro-China progressive narratives in the China problem discourse. Some of the most committed leftists doggedly worked to square the new Chinese foreign policy initiatives with the struggle for Japanese national liberation from the United States. Most, however, would quietly drop their identification with the PRC. For example, Niijima Atsuyoshi, Japan’s most prominent Maoist, known for unequivocal support for the PRC and as a defender of the Cultural Revolution, left China studies altogether in the 1970s, resigning his position at Waseda University to join a Yamagishi commune.46 Most of the LDP’s pro-China conservatives left the party in 1976 to form their own political party, the New Liberal Club (NLC), which increasingly took up causes like international arms reduction and opposition to Japanese rearmament that directly conflicted with PRC policies. Others, like Nomura Kōichi would argue that the Chinese Revolution had died with Mao, and that after 1976 the Chinese had abandoned the quest for peace through anti-­imperialist nationalism (even though the actual policies that undermined his positions were Mao’s own initiatives and had been instituted long before his death).47 For many more progressives like Seki, however, by the late 1970s, the equation of nationalism and peace no longer held. Chinese nationalism would increasingly seem atavistic, out of step in a new trans-­national, post-­nationalist age. Chinese foreign policy increasingly seemed hopelessly modern in a postmodern world. In this new liberal world order, it would be Japanese progressives and democratic socialists who were at the cutting edge, carrying the torch of international peace toward the twenty-­first century, not an atrophied Chinese Revolution animated by nineteenth-­century nationalism. This liberal world view dovetailed conveniently with conservative triumphalist nationalist narratives that at the end of the decade reversed the postwar progressive hierarchy of Chinese and Japanese modernity. By the end of the decade, it was clear to many on both sides of the Japanese political spectrum that it was Japan that had successfully modernized while China lagged, and Japan that was the model of Asian modernity.

The Chinese leadership on the Japanese China problem Throughout the postwar period, the PRC leadership sought to capitalize on Japanese nationalist discourse in order to advance its own agenda. We have seen

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that the PRC leadership had long supported progressive policies and rhetoric it found advantageous or gratifying. After the normalization of relations, the Chinese leadership continued to appeal to Japanese nationalist sentiment to encourage the Japanese government to pursue policies it found appealing. For example, we saw in the previous chapter how the Chinese leadership sought to use the Northern Territories issue to provoke nationalist sentiment and preclude improvement in Japan-Soviet relations. The PRC leadership also increasingly found itself defending the policies of the Japanese government against its critics. As might be expected, the Seirankai came in for especially strident criticism. In February and March 1974, the PRC media ran a series of articles on the Seirankai. On February 1, the People’s Daily described the Seirankai as an anti-Chinese organization committed to the revival of Japanese militarism. On March 23, the People’s Daily carried an article by Liu Lianren, who had served as a forced laborer in Hokkaidō during the war, warning of the dangers posed by the Seirankai.48 The Seirankai took up the challenge enthusiastically, holding their first press conference to refute Chinese charges and protest foreign interference in domestic politics.49 Despite the highly centralized nature of the Chinese political system, PRC foreign policy was subject to domestic political contestation. In the mid-1970s PRC policy toward Japan became entangled in the domestic Chinese political struggles surrounding the succession to Mao Zedong. The possibility that policy toward Japan would become part of a political struggle between radical leftists or the Gang of Four, on the one hand, and Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and the pragmatists, on the other, was a cause of some concern within Japan. With the opening of the propaganda campaign to “criticize Confucius and Lin Biao” and especially the fall of Deng Xiaoping after the April 1976 Tiananmen incident, many feared that the Cultural Revolution radicals might mobilize nationalist sentiment against relations with Japan to attack their enemies in the Chinese leadership. An examination of the internal Communist Party publication Riben wenti (Japan Issues), however, shows that while policy toward Japan was indeed mobilized in the domestic political struggle, it was not used in the manner feared. Established after the normalization of relations in 1972, Riben wenti was an internal party journal meant to educate party members about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations.50 For most of the first few years the journal took a fairly pragmatic, though cautious, approach to expanding relations with Japan. The pages of its early issues were devoted to introducing the basics of Japanese history, economy, politics, and geography with a focus on communicating the information necessary to support the party line on closer relations with Japan. Early issues also included articles on the history of Japanese imperialism and

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militarism, but in fairly factual rather than polemical terms. Articles pertaining to the Japanese economy betrayed a fairly skeptical view of the prospects for the Japanese economy in the 1970s and were fairly cautious about the prospects for a rapid expansion of trade with Japan.51 In 1974, however, editorial control of the journal was very clearly taken over by the so-­called “ultra-­leftists” associated with the Gang of Four and the Cultural Revolution group. They did indeed use Japan policy and the state of SinoJapanese relations to attack their domestic enemies. They did not do so, however, by criticizing or seeking to undo the opening to Japan. The approach to the United States and Japan was, in the end, clearly Mao’s policy. Despite tensions in the mid-1970s with the United States over Taiwan and the pace of normalization, and with the Japanese over peace treaty negotiations, Mao never reversed his policy of using relations with the United States and Japan in the strategic struggle with the Soviet Union. So long as Mao supported the policy, relations with Japan could not be rolled back. Therefore, whatever misgivings the leftists may have held regarding policy toward Japan (or indeed whether they actually cared at all), they could not directly attack the opening to Japan. The leftists instead sought as much as possible to associate their domestic political enemies with opposition to closer relations with Japan. In the context of the campaign to criticize Confucius and Lin Biao, the leftists worked to associate Confucius (that is, Zhou Enlai), with Japanese right-­wing opposition to closer Sino-Japanese relations, the Seirankai, and wartime Japanese militarism. Thus, in 1974 we find an article on the “Confucian, Anti-Chinese, Anti-Communist, Anti-People ‘Seirankai.’ ” The article seized upon a statement by Nakao Eiichi that the most important thing lost in postwar Japan was Confucian morality to argue that it was, in fact, Confucianism that motivated Seirankai opposition to closer Japan-China relations.52 Other articles contended that the root cause of wartime Japanese militarism and aggression was the reactionary influence of Confucianism in Japan. It was argued that “Confucianism is the theoretical foundation of bushidō,” and that Confucian morality provided the ideological basis for the wartime Emperor System as laid out in the Imperial Rescript on Education.53 Confucian influence in postwar Japan was also seen in attempts to re-­establish the political position of the emperor and Mishima Yukio’s attempted coup and ritual suicide.54 Lin Biao, the other target of the campaign, was associated with Japanese militarism through his son Lin Liguo, of the PLA air force, who was exposed as a militarist for (it was rumored) arguing that the Chinese military could learn from the “Etajima spirit” of the Imperial Japanese Navy after seeing a copy of the Japanese film Admiral Yamamoto.55

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We cannot know what the leftists really thought of relations with Japan. Perhaps, had they succeeded in coming to power after the death of Mao, they might have engineered a drastic change in policy toward Japan. Nowhere in the pages of Riben wenti, however, was there a suggestion that the opening to Japan was ideologically problematic as an abandonment of socialist internationalism, nor was there any suggestion that the opening to Japan ignored historical grievances in the name of political expediency. There was no opposition to conclusion of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty. All the leftists’ efforts were bent on associating their domestic enemies with rightist nationalist opposition to the treaty in Japan. Thus, whatever misgivings we can imagine there must have been regarding the new relationship with Japan, there was great continuity in Japan policy. Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping continued Mao’s basic policy toward Japan, including the policy of courting the Japanese conservatives, though they were encouraged to go even further in this direction out of a desire to enlist Japanese capital in pursuit of Chinese economic reform.

Conclusion The mid-1970s was a period of perceived crisis as Japanese struggled to come to grips with the profound international political changes wrought by the Sino-American rapprochement, the normalization of relations with the PRC, the Sino-Soviet cold war, and the oil shock. The sense of crisis put the ruling conservatives on the defensive and energized right-­wing critics of the conservative establishment, and China policy was one of the main targets of their criticism. After initial optimism in the wake of normalization, and temporarily buoyed by the victory of the Vietnamese in their war with the United States, leftists and progressives gradually became disillusioned with the new political conditions created by PRC initiatives and their voices became less influential in the China problem discourse as the decade progressed, replaced by critical voices from the right wing. Part IV will show that at the end of the decade the sense of crisis in Japan eased. A new leadership came to power in the PRC with a vision of China’s place in the world that placed relatively greater weight on the necessity of economic reform over anti-Soviet policy. This change supported mainstream conservative foreign policy and encouraged a triumphalist nationalist narrative of Japanese leadership and tutelage to the PRC.

Part IV

Peace and Cooperation, 1977–79

7

From the Peace Treaty to Economic Cooperation The common characterization of the 1970s as a period of Sino-Japanese friendship obscures somewhat the complexities of the relationship in this decade. Even Professor Mōri Kazuko’s qualification of the period as one of “strategic friendship” seems problematic in light of the tension over strategy toward the Soviet Union examined in Part III.1 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, relations between the two countries entered a new phase that, in hindsight, may well represent the “golden age” of postwar Sino-Japanese relations. Relations in the last years of the 1970s were dominated by the conclusion of the peace treaty and culminated at the end of 1979 in an agreement to extend large-­ scale Japanese economic aid to the PRC. As earlier in the decade, the diplomatic relationship was driven mostly by policy initiatives emanating from Beijing and Washington. The new political dynamics of the late 1970s were also the result of new political leadership in each country. In the PRC, the centrality of economic reform in the policy agenda of the new Deng Xiaoping regime made the Chinese leadership more willing to compromise on the terms of the peace treaty in an effort to secure Japanese support for these reforms. In Washington, perceived Soviet expansionism led the new president, Jimmy Carter, encouraged by his national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, to abandon détente and work more closely with the PRC in opposing the Soviet Union. In line with this strategy, the American administration offered active support for the conclusion of the Japan-China peace treaty. These developments made the Japanese government during the Fukuda and Ōhira cabinets much more open to cooperation with the PRC. By the end of the decade, cooperation with the Chinese economic reform program had become the basis of government policy toward China and had also become a key pillar of support for mainstream conservative nationalist narratives of Japan as the leader of Asian modernization. This political process is the subject of the current chapter. The final chapter will

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turn to how these political agreements impacted the China problem discourse at the end of the decade.

Negotiating the peace treaty Diplomatic initiatives aimed at advancing stalled peace treaty negotiations awaited the establishment of a new regime in Beijing after the death of Mao in September 1976. Just before his death, Mao settled on the relatively unknown Hua Guofeng as his successor. Coming to power with little backing, Hua proved able (in alliance with the old guard of the revolutionary leadership) to carry out a coup against the Gang of Four and their allies in October 1976. He then faced the more formidable challenge, however, of protecting his position against the return of Deng Xiaoping, whose standing in the party was officially restored in July 1977. Over the next year, Hua and Deng waged a struggle for political dominance couched in terms of a theoretical battle of Hua’s “two whatevers” (whatever Mao decided was valid, whatever Mao instructed should be followed), versus Deng’s dictum to “seek truth from facts,” from which Deng ultimately emerged victorious at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978.2 Despite their struggle for power, Deng and Hua, along with most of the rest of the PRC leadership, were in basic agreement regarding the need to refocus national policy on the task of economic reform, or “modernization” in the contemporary Chinese parlance. From 1977, therefore, national policy centered on implementation of the Four Modernizations, which sought reform and innovation in the four broad fields of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. In March 1978 a new ten-­year plan made the Four Modernizations the centerpiece of Chinese economic planning and set ambitious targets that inspired enthusiastic talk of a “new leap forward” for the Chinese economy.3 The Four Modernizations initiative also had important foreign policy implications in that it required an opening to foreign trade, capital, and technology that became the basis for the Reform and Opening (gaige kaifang) program that began in December 1978. In the long-­term, Japanese support for Chinese economic modernization became the foundation for relations in the 1980s. In the short term, the commitment to the Four Modernizations was the key development in reopening stalled peace treaty negotiations. In Japan as well, a change of leadership created conditions conducive to movement on the peace treaty. Fukuda Takeo succeeded in ousting Miki Takeo and claiming the premiership in late 1976. Fukuda’s victory was secured through

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a private agreement with his main rival, Ōhira Masayoshi, for Fukuda to serve for two years and then cede the position to Ōhira. From the Chinese point of view it might be assumed that Fukuda’s assumption of the prime ministership would bode ill for progress on a peace treaty. Fukuda had long been associated with the pro-Taiwan wing of the LDP and the Fukuda faction provided the largest number of members in the Seirankai, which had been so vocal in criticism of the government’s China policy. Given Ōhira’s pedigree as foreign minister in the Ikeda and Tanaka cabinets, an Ōhira cabinet would probably seem more conducive to an early conclusion of the treaty. In the end, however, it was Fukuda who presided over the conclusion of the treaty in August 1978. Although the eventual conclusion of the treaty was mostly due to policy changes in Beijing rather than to any dramatic initiative on Fukuda’s part, it may be that Fukuda’s reputation made it easier to conclude the treaty under his leadership. His anti-­ communist and pro-Taiwan sympathies beyond doubt, Fukuda could conclude the treaty without the intense opposition that someone like Ōhira would have provoked from the right wing of the LDP. Just as it was said that only Nixon, the arch-­cold warrior, could have carried out the opening to China, perhaps Fukuda, heir to Kishi and Satō, was best able to overcome conservative opposition to the conclusion of the peace treaty with the PRC. On taking office in December 1976, Fukuda proclaimed his commitment to an “omni-­directional” foreign policy (zenhōi gaikō) that sought good relations with all countries. What this might mean for the peace treaty with China, however, was unclear. In his first policy speech in January 1977, Fukuda said only that the peace treaty should be “satisfactory for both sides,” suggesting little change on the Japanese side.4 On the other hand, in the same month, Fukuda dispatched the Kōmeitō’s Takeiri Yoshikatsu, who had been such an important conduit for Tanaka in 1972, to Beijing to sound out the position of the new Chinese leadership. On arriving in Beijing, Takeiri found no change in the Chinese position. Hua Guofeng at this early date was probably not in a position to strike bold new foreign policy initiatives. The Chinese insisted that the treaty include a clear statement of the anti-­hegemony principle and that the treaty could never be concluded on the basis of Miyazawa’s Four Principles. His Chinese hosts dismissed all Japanese concerns Takeiri raised as illegitimate, reflecting the pernicious influence of anti-Chinese elements and placed the blame for the impasse entirely on the Japanese.5 Thus, early on neither side showed much new thinking on the peace treaty. In late 1977, however, Deng Xiaoping met with several visiting Japanese delegations and signaled an increased interest in restarting talks. In a September

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meeting with Hamano Seigo, head of the Diet League for Japan-China Friendship, Deng famously insisted that the treaty could be concluded in “one second” if Fukuda would just make up his mind to sign it. Deng also hosted a delegation led by Kōno Yōhei of the New Liberal Club, a new political party formed by several former members of the pro-China faction of the LDP, and in October Deng met Nikaidō Susumu who had accompanied Tanaka to Beijing in 1972. Nikaidō again floated the idea of including a third country provision in the treaty along with anti-­hegemony and this time was not immediately rebuffed.6 In response to renewed Chinese interest, domestic pressure on Fukuda to conclude the treaty increased. On September 25, after Hamano’s return to Japan, a group of forty-­three different organizations, including the Diet League for Japan-China Friendship and the Japan-China Friendship Association, organized a Peace Treaty Promotion Rally in Tokyo and adopted a resolution calling on the prime minister to immediately conclude a treaty with a clear anti-­hegemony clause.7 The following month, an Association for the Promotion of the JapanChina Treaty of Peace and Friendship was organized, headed by former foreign minister Kōsaka Zentarō to push the treaty in the LDP.8 In the midst of these activities, Fukuda met with Zhang Xiangshan, a PRC Japan specialist who was in Tokyo heading a Chinese media delegation, and evinced a more positive attitude toward improving relations. Zhang explained the PRC’s Four Modernizations program and later remembered that Fukuda suggested a confluence of interests between Japan and the PRC. “Japan and China,” Fukuda told him, “form a community of fate (mingyun gongtongti). We are in the same boat.”9 This suggests that as the focus of PRC policy moved from strategic competition with the Soviet Union to economic development, it became easier for Fukuda and the Japanese leadership to perceive a national interest in concluding the treaty as a step toward improving relations. As the news coming out of the PRC raised expectations that the Chinese leadership was embarking on a serious program of economic expansion, important leaders of the Japanese business community began to come out in support of the treaty. In October 1977, Fujiyama Aiichirō, scion of one of modern Japan’s leading industrialists and the ranking elder of Japan’s pro-China conservatives, visited Beijing and met with Vice Premier Li Xiannian. Li explained that the Chinese faced difficulties in three key industries—energy, steel, and chemicals—and expressed his hope that Japanese cooperation might be forthcoming in reforming these industries, especially in re-­equipping outdated industrial facilities. The Fujiyama visit spurred the Japanese business community to actively promote conclusion of the treaty. In November 1977, a

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Mitsubishi delegation visited Beijing. Dokō Toshio, chief of the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), came out publicly in favor of a quick conclusion of the treaty and Inayama Yoshihiro, president of Nippon Steel, testified at the time that “among those of us in the economic community, there is almost no one opposed to conclusion of the treaty.”10 In light of these developments, in November 1977, Fukuda stated in a press conference that conditions were moving in a direction that favored conclusion of the treaty. To this point, conclusion of the treaty had offered very little profit for the Japanese side in terms of either national interest or political gain for the ruling party. Japan already enjoyed normal diplomatic relations with the PRC and it was difficult to see how a speedy conclusion of the peace treaty would advance Japanese interests. On the contrary, if it included an anti-­hegemony clause, the treaty promised only to damage relations with the USSR. In terms of domestic politics, any political points to be gained by concluding the treaty would have to be weighed against the inevitable nationalist opprobrium incurred for being seen as having capitulated to Chinese demands on the anti-­hegemony issue. The prospect of significant Japanese investment in infrastructure and plant projects in connection with the Four Modernizations, however, changed these political calculations. First, it offered the prospect of tangible benefits in the form of corporate profits and national gains from trade. Secondly, the conservative Japanese leadership might benefit in domestic political discourse if conclusion of the treaty could be presented in a way that was gratifying to Japanese national identity, paving the way for a relationship in which Japan played a leadership role, aiding the modernization of a less developed China.

The movement to reopen peace treaty talks Efforts to reopen talks now began in earnest. MOFA had called a Tokyo conference of Japanese ambassadors to Asia for December 1977. In advance of this meeting, Satō Shōji, Japanese ambassador to the PRC, met with Liao Chengzhi and Han Nianlong in Beijing so that he might sound out the Chinese position on the treaty and communicate it to the Fukuda government. On December 15, after the ambassadorial meetings, Satō delivered a report to Fukuda’s new foreign minister, Sonoda Sunao, urging conclusion of the treaty as soon as possible. In Satō’s view, the PRC’s Four Modernizations program and the concomitant desire for Western and Japanese assistance improved Japan’s position in peace treaty negotiations. Satō argued that it would be best to conclude the treaty now, when the Japanese position was comparatively strong,

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than to wait until circumstances (including the likely normalization of SinoAmerican relations), might weaken the Japanese position.11 Satō’s report was favorably received as it basically conformed to Sonoda’s own views on the China issue. Sonoda, who became foreign minister in a cabinet reshuffle in November 1977, was a rising star in the Fukuda faction. In a faction well-­known for being the home of pro-Taiwan politicians, however, Sonoda had a reputation as an “old friend of China.”12 Sonoda had served as political vice-­ minister of foreign affairs in the Hatoyama cabinet, in which capacity he had visited the PRC as part of Hatoyama’s abortive attempt to improve relations. He had been a member of the Japan-China Friendship Association since the early 1950s, and the Diet League for the Promotion of Japan-China Trade. Sonoda’s appointment itself, therefore, suggested increased interest in the treaty on Fukuda’s part. Bolstered by Ambassador Satō’s report and motivated by his own political ambition, Sonoda set out in 1978 to achieve a breakthrough in negotiations with the PRC. In this endeavor he was aided by the actions of the Soviet leadership.

Soviet opposition to the peace treaty Predictably, renewed Chinese initiatives on the treaty provoked Soviet concern. In November 1977, the Soviet Union warned that “in the event that a JapanChina treaty is concluded, the Soviet Union will take retaliatory measures against Japan,” including banning Japanese fishing boats from the Soviet Union’s 200-nautical-­mile exclusive fishing zone.13 In addition to threats, the Soviet Union also made a few last-­ditch diplomatic efforts to woo the Japanese. Just after taking up his post as foreign minister, Sonoda was approached by Soviet Ambassador to Japan Dmitiri Polyanski who proposed reopening suspended foreign minister-­level consultations. In January 1978, Sonoda duly visited Moscow, presenting a last best chance for the Soviet leadership to achieve a breakthrough in relations with the Japanese which might obstruct the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese treaty. During the talks, Foreign Minister Gromyko presented Sonoda with a draft of a treaty of “friendship and goodwill,” a step short of a peace treaty, the negotiation of which had proven so contentious. Foreign Minister Gromyko cited as precedent for such a treaty one recently concluded between the Soviet Union and India (a precedent which, incidentally, was bound to rile the PRC leadership which saw the pact with India as a Soviet attempt at encirclement). Sonoda only reluctantly received the draft, and stuck to the Japanese position that any such treaty could be legally concluded only after a

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formal peace treaty ending the state of war between the two countries, the conclusion of which was contingent upon solution of the territorial issue. Sonoda, for his part, sought a Soviet commitment to discuss “issues outstanding from the war,” and to get Soviet agreement that these issues included the settlement of the Northern Territories issue, positions which the Japanese believed the Soviets had agreed to during Tanaka’s 1973 visit.14 Sonoda was entirely unsuccessful in this effort and returned to Tokyo having achieved no progress in improving relations with the USSR. The following month Ambassador Polyanski presented Fukuda with a letter from Brezhnev proposing the prime minister visit Moscow to discuss a goodwill treaty. When Fukuda rejected this offer, the Soviets published the draft treaty Gromyko had earlier presented to Sonoda. The draft treaty included provisions promising that Japan would not allow its territory to be used for activities detrimental to Soviet security, a commitment to consult in the event of a threat to peace (which was seen as an attempt to revive the Soviet proposal for a regional collective security system in Asia aimed at the Chinese), and a Soviet version of anti-­hegemony that committed the signatories to oppose “special rights” or “domination” by any power in East Asia. The contents of the treaty, now public, made it clear that it was meant as a counter to the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, aimed at obstructing relations between Japan and the PRC.15 As Joachim Glaubitz has argued, the failure of Soviet moves in early 1978 were crucial to the Japanese decision to resume peace treaty talks with the PRC.16 Japanese attempts at neutrality in the Sino-Soviet cold war had clearly failed. The Japanese were presented publicly with competing Chinese and Soviet treaties, each intended to exclude relations with the other power. Five years of determined Japanese resistance to PRC attempts to use the peace treaty to sabotage relations with the USSR had elicited no hint of compromise from the Soviets on the all-­ important territorial issue. The promise of Japanese participation in Siberian development schemes had also come to naught due to Chinese and American obstruction as well as Soviet unreliability. The beginning of economic reform in the PRC, in contrast, at least offered the promise of profit through Japanese support for the Four Modernizations. If ultimately forced to abandon equidistance, greater opportunity seemed to accrue from leaning toward the PRC.

Fukuda moves to reopen peace treaty negotiations Accordingly, in February 1978, Fukuda moved to reopen peace treaty talks with the Chinese. The following month a Kōmeitō delegation headed by party

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Secretary General Yano Jun’ya visited Beijing at Chinese invitation. Before his trip, Yano met with Fukuda, Sonoda, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shintarō. Fukuda asked Yano to communicate to the Chinese his desire to conclude a treaty as soon as possible, but also that the pursuit of peaceful relations with all countries remained the basis of Japanese foreign policy. In the delegation’s meeting with Liao Chengzhi and Deng Xiaoping, PRC positions did not change fundamentally, but the Chinese hinted at increased flexibility on the anti-­ hegemony issue. Deng expressed his understanding of the Japanese desire to maintain friendly relations with all countries, though he still expressed reservations about an explicit third-­country provision. Liao reiterated that China and Japan had an obligation to oppose any country seeking hegemony but also assured the Japanese that the peace treaty was not aimed at any specific country, and that anti-­hegemony did not imply any commitment to joint action.17 The PRC leadership also extended an invitation for Foreign Minister Sonoda to visit Beijing. Yano’s report and the invitation to Sonoda suggested sufficient PRC flexibility for Fukuda and the Japanese cabinet to begin the preparation of a draft treaty. At the end of March, Fukuda, Sonoda, and Abe met with Foreign Ministry officers to go over thirteen different drafts of a treaty, all of which now included variations of both an anti-­hegemony clause and a third-­country provision.18 Having decided the time was right to conclude the treaty, Fukuda faced the task of bringing the rest of his own party around to his position. He quickly gained the support of Ōhira, Kosaka Zentarō, and much of the LDP leadership as well as the pro-China groups like the Asian-African Problems Study Group and the Diet League for Japan-China Friendship. Yet no party consensus was forthcoming. At the same time that Fukuda was going over treaty drafts with MOFA, the Asian Problems Study Group, the organization that brought together the pro-Taiwan faction of the LDP, heavy with members from Fukuda’s own faction, was meeting to draft a resolution opposed to the treaty. An Asahi shimbun poll of LDP Diet members from early April 1978 revealed that those who were “cautious” (shinchō) on the treaty outnumbered those advocating an early conclusion 158 to 118.19

The Senkaku Islands incident At just the time that Fukuda and Sonoda were working to get a reluctant LDP behind the conclusion of the peace treaty, the Senkaku Islands dispute, dormant since 1972, erupted into an open confrontation that threatened to sink the treaty altogether. The Japanese legal claim to the Senkaku Islands (located just north of

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Taiwan and known as the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese and the Pinnacle Islands in the British Naval Record), rests on an 1895 cabinet resolution that incorporated the islands into Japanese territory as terra nullius. Chinese cite references to the islands in Chinese historical and navigational records dating back to the Ming dynasty to claim sovereignty and argue that the islands were returned to Chinese jurisdiction along with Taiwan under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration at the end of the World War II. In fact, however, the disposition of the islands only became an issue in Sino-Japanese relations in the wake of a 1969 UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) survey which found that the seabed in the area held potentially rich reserves of petroleum and natural gas. Prior to this study, the islands were so remote and economically insignificant that they had not appeared by name (in any language) in any international treaty. It was only with the discovery of possible oil deposits that Chinese governments challenged the Japanese claim to the islands. In July 1970, the nationalist government on Taiwan approved exploration and development of the area by the China Petroleum Company and in September a group of Taiwanese reporters planted a ROC flag on the islands. The first PRC claim to the islands followed in December 1970. In response, the Japanese claim to the Senkaku Islands was explicitly included in the agreement with the United States returning Okinawa to Japan in 1972.20 In September 1972, Tanaka had raised the Senkaku issue during his talks with Zhou Enlai, but Zhou had refused to discuss the matter, “As for the Diaoyu problem, I don’t want to talk about that at this time. It won’t do to talk about it now. This is a problem because there’s oil there. If there were no oil no one would care about it.”21 So the problem was avoided in order to conclude the normalization of relations. Deng Xiaoping subsequently stuck to this position in peace treaty negotiations, claiming that the two sides should focus on “areas of broad agreement” and “leave aside small differences,” and expressing his confidence that future generations would be better able to resolve the issue.22 In contradiction to these efforts to avoid the problem, on April 12, 1978, more than 100 Chinese fishing vessels appeared in the waters around the Senkaku Islands, some of them armed, festooned with banners claiming the islands as Chinese territory. Approximately forty ships were judged to have invaded Japanese territorial waters and were surrounded by vessels of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces. The Japanese government protested the incident and called for the ships’ immediate withdrawal. After some initial confusion, on the 15th the PRC government responded, explaining that the incursion was accidental and attempting to downplay the incident: “this incident is accidental.

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We should leave the solution to the problem of these small islands for the future.”23 The next day, the PRC government repeated its explanation and the Chinese ships began to withdraw from the area. The coordination evident in so many ships arriving in the same place at the same time armed with political propaganda materials suggested to most observers that the incident was anything but accidental. Many in the Japanese opposition at the time suggested that the PRC government had engineered the incident in order to “prod Prime Minister Fukuda over his slowness in moving ahead [with peace treaty negotiations].”24 As we have seen, however, Fukuda had already decided on conclusion and was personally involved in engineering an LDP consensus in favor of the treaty at the time the incident erupted. Instead, the Senkaku incident seemed perfectly timed to undermine these efforts. In addition, the withdrawal of Chinese ships was neither immediate nor orderly, suggesting considerable confusion in command. This has led most to speculate that the incident was engineered by forces within the PRC opposed to Deng in the leadership struggle, assumed to be either remnants of the Cultural Revolution faction or allies of Hua Guofeng, in order to embarrass Deng and undermine his foreign policy.25 If the PRC leadership had indeed hoped that the Senkaku incursion would move the Japanese government to hasten conclusion of the treaty, they were sorely mistaken. While the Japanese government eventually accepted the Chinese explanation of the incident as accidental, the incursion became a rallying point for opposition to the treaty within the LDP and the movement to restart talks ground to a halt. Sonoda and Fukuda both expressed their hope that the Senkaku problem and the peace treaty negotiations could be treated separately, but opinion in the LDP, where there was intense criticism of the Japanese government response to the crisis, made this impossible. On April 13, opponents of the treaty in the Asian Problems Study Group drafted a resolution condemning the incursion as “hegemonic” behavior by the Chinese and calling for the “forceful exercise of sovereignty” over the islands.26 In this atmosphere, Fukuda abandoned moves to restart talks, which would have to wait at least until after his visit to the United States scheduled for May 1978. During this trip Fukuda received important encouragement from the Carter administration for conclusion of the treaty.

US support for the peace treaty The Carter administration came to office in 1977 committed to the continuation of détente and arms control with the Soviet Union as well as a new foreign policy

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focus on the promotion of human rights. On China policy, while Carter was committed to achieving the long-­delayed normalization of relations, he was also critical of the Nixon-Kissinger approach to the Chinese leadership, which he considered too accommodating of Chinese positions. Carter was determined not to “ass-­kiss them [the Chinese] the way Nixon and Kissinger did.”27 Carter’s secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, similarly sought a more balanced approach to relations with China and the Soviet Union. In August 1977 Vance visited Beijing, where this balanced approach and an attempt to drive a harder bargain on the Taiwan issue received a predictably hostile reception. Vance and Carter pushed for the maintenance of some formal American diplomatic presence on Taiwan after the normalization of relations with the PRC, a position rejected by the Chinese as a retreat from promises made by Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford to conclude the normalization on the “Japan model,” which entailed the complete severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan as a precondition for the establishment of relations.28 As relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, however, the Carter administration increasingly moved toward greater cooperation with the PRC. Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, pushed strongly for a policy of closer strategic cooperation with the PRC in order to oppose what he saw as aggressive Soviet moves around the globe. By early 1978, Soviet actions, especially in the Horn of Africa, had inclined Carter toward Brzezinski’s position. In late May 1978, Brzezinski made his own visit to Beijing to communicate to the Chinese leadership President Carter’s determination to normalize relations and to forge a “tacit security relationship” with the Chinese.29 In policy terms, Brzezinski and the administration continued to provide PRC leaders with American military intelligence on Soviet forces and promised to aid the PRC by easing restrictions on the sale of arms and dual-­use technology to China by US allies. After Brzezinski’s visit, negotiations for the normalization of Sino-American relations proceeded apace and on December 15, 1978, the US government announced the normalization of relations with the PRC effective January 1, 1979. In the wake of normalization, American cooperation with the PRC reached unprecedented levels. In addition to allowing allied arms sales to the PRC, cooperation on intelligence expanded to include the establishment of intelligence-­gathering stations in Western China staffed jointly by Chinese and American personnel. In February 1979, PRC troops invaded Vietnam with the resigned acquiescence of President Carter (who urged restraint in a private letter to Deng), and aided logistically by US intelligence on Soviet troop deployments supplied by Washington.

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Fukuda’s visit to the United States in May 1978 thus came at crucial juncture, just as the Carter administration was coming around to Brzezinski’s position on China, a position supportive of improved relations between China and US allies. The day before the May 3 Fukuda-Carter summit, Foreign Minister Sonoda met with Secretary of State Vance. Sonoda sought Vance’s help in pushing Fukuda on the conclusion of a treaty with China. In his memoirs, Sonoda recalls that he laid out for Vance the common interests of Japan and the United States in cooperating with the PRC. Where Carter and Brzezinski tended to be concerned above all with the geostrategic importance of the PRC, Sonoda’s analysis was heavy on economics, and expressed the kind of liberal assumptions about the positive influence of Western economic practices that would come to underlie both countries’ engagement with the PRC in the 1980s. Sonoda told Vance: A Soviet-Chinese monolith would be a threat to the world . . . I don’t think such a Soviet-Chinese union will occur in the next ten or twenty years. But to make sure, we must cooperate with the Four Modernizations on which the Chinese have staked their political fortunes. Japan can’t do this alone however. The United States, Japan and Europe have to join together to help. If we do, we can nurture Western liberal mechanisms in the Chinese economy. It will become impossible to think of a China separated from the West.30

In line with this thinking, Sonoda asked Vance if he could talk to the president and get him to urge Fukuda to conclude the treaty as soon as possible. The following day during lunch, Carter asked about peace treaty negotiations and told Fukuda he would like to see more progress. Later, at the end of May, on his return from Beijing, Brzezinski stopped in Tokyo to add his own encouragement for the conclusion of the treaty.31 In the end, it is difficult to measure the importance of American prodding in reopening peace treaty talks. After all, Fukuda hardly needed to be convinced of the desirability of the treaty. He had already committed to conclusion of the treaty and was waiting for the fallout from the Senkaku incident to blow over before pursuing further talks. The encouragement of Carter and Brzezinski, however, in a fairly classic case of using external pressure (gaiatsu) to push a domestic political agenda, seems to have helped Fukuda and Sonoda finally overcome resistance to the treaty within the LDP.32 On returning to Japan, Fukuda again actively took up the peace treaty issue. On May 13, Fukuda mentioned that he would like to begin negotiations before the Bonn Summit that July, and turned to the task of getting the LDP behind the

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treaty. On the 16th, Fukuda met with Nadao Hirokichi, head of the pro-Taiwan Asian Problems Study Group, and Fujio Masayuki of the Seirankai, and on the 23rd he met for lunch with several more leading members of the Seirankai. In a party meeting on the 26th, while registering concerns about the Senkaku issue, the treatment of Taiwan and the Sino-Soviet treaty, it was agreed that Japan would reopen peace treaty talks. On May 31, Ambassador Satō called on Han Nianlong at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to express the Japanese government’s desire to reopen talks.33 In winning the acquiescence, if not support, of the pro-Taiwan forces in the LDP, Fukuda was undoubtedly helped by the fact that many of these politicians were members of his own faction and that Fukuda himself had long been associated with a pro-Taiwan position. These politicians also had to consider the political position of the Fukuda cabinet. Should opposition to the peace treaty compromise the popularity and endanger the viability of the Fukuda government, a cabinet under Ōhira Masayoshi seemed highly likely (even without the knowledge that Fukuda had secretly agreed to hand over power to Ōhira after two years), whose position on the treaty was likely to be even more disagreeable.34 So it was that the Sino-Japanese peace treaty was concluded under the auspices of the Fukuda government.

The conclusion of the peace treaty Treaty talks between Ambassador Satō and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Han Nianlong opened on July 21, 1978. Negotiators soon found that, despite renewed interest on both sides, positions had not changed substantially from 1975. Disagreement centered on familiar issues, especially the wording of an anti-­ hegemony clause. Talks stretched over fifteen meetings in late July and early August, proceeding along predictable lines and making little progress until the ninth meeting on August 2, when the Chinese presented a draft of the anti-­ hegemony clause that included the phrase, “The strengthening and development of peaceful, friendly relations that the signatories undertake in this treaty is not aimed at any third country.” The Japanese negotiating team saw this as Chinese acceptance of their long-­standing position that any anti-­hegemony clause include a third-­country provision. On August 7, the Japanese presented their own formulation, drafted by Takashima Masao (who in 1972 had borne the brunt of Chinese criticism of Japanese positions): “The present treaty shall not affect the signatories’ relations with any third country,” which was eventually incorporated into the treaty.35

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Sensing that a resolution was at hand, Nakae Yōsuke, head of the MOFA China desk (and later ambassador in Beijing), returned to Tokyo for consultations. In an August 5 meeting with Foreign Minister Sonoda, Nakae expressed his opinion that working-­level talks had advanced as far as they could and suggested Sonoda visit Beijing to seal the deal. The next day, Sonoda met with Fukuda in the hot-­spring resort town Hakone. The two decided that Sonoda would leave for Beijing on August 8 (the date selected partly because it was considered particularly auspicious since it contained three eights, a lucky number in both Japan and China). Fukuda and others in the party, however, remained suspicious of Sonoda’s political ambition and worried that eagerness to score a personal diplomatic victory might make him too accommodating of Chinese demands. Therefore, on the morning of August 8, just before Sonoda left for Beijing, Fukuda called him to the prime minister’s residence to remind him that he was not to agree to any treaty conditions that would contradict Fukuda’s own omni-­ directional foreign policy.36 In Beijing, Sonoda met with Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua on the morning of August 9. Sonoda duly reiterated the Japanese government’s omni-­ directional foreign policy and sought Chinese understanding of the differences between Japanese and Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union. In their second meeting that afternoon, Huang Hua obliged and finally agreed to the Japanese formulation of a third-­country provision. Once agreement had been reached on this crucial point, the treaty was all but concluded. The highlight of Sonoda’s trip was his meeting with Deng Xiaoping on August 10. In this meeting, Sonoda pressed Deng for his position on some issues of concern to the opponents of the treaty in the LDP, namely, the status of the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty and the Senkaku problem. On the Sino-Soviet treaty (which specifically targeted Japan as an enemy of the two powers), Deng told Sonoda that the treaty was already a dead letter and that the PRC government would inform the Soviet Union that it would not renew the treaty the following year as per the terms of the treaty.37 Sonoda had originally planned not to raise the Senkaku issue at all during his trip. Both he and Fukuda felt that acknowledging the issue only weakened the Japanese government’s position that there was no legal territorial dispute and gave the Chinese a high-­profile opportunity to assert their claims.38 On August 10, the day he was to meet Deng, however, in an LDP executive meeting, Fujio Masayuki and Nakao Eiichi of the Seirankai charged that the Japanese government’s refusal to raise the issue violated the party resolution authorizing the reopening of peace treaty negotiations, which called for the clarification of sovereignty over the islands. The stated position of the Ministry of Foreign

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Affairs, that there were no grounds for Chinese claims and hence no reason to broach the subject, failed to quell criticism from within the LDP. Under these conditions, Sonoda felt forced to address the issue in his meeting with Deng. The parts of the discussion dealing with the Senkaku issue have not been made public in the Japanese record, but according to Chinese sources and Sonoda’s reminiscences, Deng reiterated the Chinese explanation that the April incursion was accidental and wouldn’t be repeated. According to Sonoda, Deng did not reassert the Chinese claim to the islands but only said that the problem should be put off for twenty or thirty years. Sonoda took this to mean that Deng would not challenge de facto Japanese control of the islands.39 The final potential stumbling block removed, Sonoda spent the morning of the 11th visiting Mao’s mausoleum in Tiananmen Square and a Zhou Enlai memorial exhibit at the national history museum. On the evening of the following day the treaty was signed at the Great Hall of the People. It was also agreed that Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping would visit Tokyo for the ratification of the treaty. Reviewing the diplomatic history of the peace treaty negotiations, there is little evidence to support the view, popular then as now, that the Japanese rushed to conclude the treaty and that their haste led them to submit to Chinese demands heedless of the international political implications of their decisions.40 After four years, the peace treaty had been concluded as a result of compromises on both sides. The Japanese government, which had originally opposed the inclusion of any mention of anti-­hegemony in the treaty, fairly early on compromised and agreed to include an anti-­hegemony clause conditioned by a third-­country provision. In the end, the treaty was brought to a conclusion by a Chinese compromise to accept a Japanese position they had resisted for years. Therefore, conclusion of the peace treaty does not appear to be the result of Japanese capitulation to Chinese demands. In terms of the international security implications of the treaty, despite the best efforts of Fukuda and Sonoda to maintain at least the appearance of non-­ involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the USSR immediately came out against the peace treaty. The months following the signing of the treaty also witnessed a dramatic increase in tensions in East Asia. In November, the Soviet Union signed an alliance with Vietnam, which at the time was at loggerheads with the PRC over territorial disputes, the treatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, and policy toward Cambodia. On December 15, the United States and the PRC announced the normalization of relations. On the 25th, the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia and deposed the Khmer Rouge regime, provoking a Chinese invasion of Vietnam

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in February 1979. Finally, in December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. It is probably going too far to suggest, as some Japanese have, that the Sino-Japanese peace treaty was the trigger for these events, but the treaty was one link in the chain of events that, in hindsight, mark the end of détente and the beginning of the new Cold War of the 1980s.41 Yet the new Cold War was forged in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, and it is doubtful that any position leaders in Tokyo had taken on the peace treaty could have dissuaded policymakers in these capitals from their subsequent courses of action or could have avoided Japanese entanglement in these events. Moreover, by 1978, the Japanese government had very little to gain by holding out further on the peace treaty in deference to the Soviet Union. Four years of resisting the anti-­hegemony clause in hopes of improving relations with the Soviet Union had come to naught, especially on the all-­important Northern Territories issue. In fact, by 1978, relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated significantly. In 1975, the Soviet Union conducted worldwide military exercises. The following year an incident in which a Soviet defector landed his MIG jet in Hokkaidō without detection by or opposition from Japanese Self-Defense Forces served to heighten the sense of Japanese vulnerability to the Soviet military threat. For the rest of the decade the Soviet Union dramatically increased its military presence in the Far East, including the construction of military facilities and the conduct of military exercises on the disputed islands of the Northern Territories.42 Even fishing rights around the islands were the subject of contention. Under these conditions the Japanese needed little persuading from the Chinese as to the danger from the Soviet Union. In 1977, a Japanese Defense White Paper outlined the importance for Japan of the increase of Soviet forces in the Far East in the context of the drawdown of US forces in the area.43 By 1978 the Japanese had little to lose in their relations with the Soviets by concluding the peace treaty. Could the Japanese leadership have used conclusion of the treaty as leverage to drive a harder bargain on the Senkaku issue and perhaps gain PRC government recognition of Japanese claims to the islands? In his talks with Sonoda in August, Deng avoided explicitly reasserting Chinese claims to the islands in order to smooth conclusion of the treaty and had seemingly decided not to challenge de facto Japanese control of the islands. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that the PRC would have been willing to go as far as to renounce its claim to the islands in exchange for conclusion of the peace treaty or access to Japanese economic aid. Nor could Japanese negotiators have counted on US support for such a negotiating position as the United States consistently refused to comment on the legal status of the islands.44 Though dropping the issue certainly was not

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optimal for the Japanese government, it is not clear that prolonging peace treaty negotiations would have improved the Japanese position. A Chinese silence that could be taken as acquiescence in de facto Japanese control of the islands may have been the best option available. Most importantly, in judging the value of the peace treaty to Japan, we need to keep in mind the expectation that Japan stood to gain from the conclusion of the treaty through participation in economic development in China. After normalization, Japanese trade with China increased steadily, but the growth of trade was limited by Chinese political instability and commitment to economic self-­reliance. Thus, through most of the 1970s, the Japanese government had little to gain from conclusion of the peace treaty that would offset the risk of provoking Soviet retaliation or domestic political opposition. With the new emphasis on economic modernization under Deng Xiaoping, however, there loomed the prospect of significant profits to be made by Japanese firms as well as the danger that if the Japanese held out on the peace treaty, these opportunities might be seized by firms from other countries. Therefore, to understand the real significance of the peace treaty we should see it as clearing the way for the dramatic expansion of economic cooperation which formed the foundation upon which Sino-Japanese relations were built in the 1980s and 1990s. On the other side, why did the Chinese compromise in 1978 and accept a third-­country clause in the peace treaty? By 1978, after four years of publicly identifying the Soviet Union with hegemonism, any anti-­hegemony clause, even one qualified by a third-­country provision, was bound to have the desired effect of alienating the Soviet Union and it was clear that Japanese attempts to mollify the Soviet leadership would fail. Kosygin had warned the Japanese publicly that support for the treaty with the PRC was “support for a policy of war against the Soviet Union.”45 On the morning of August 11, while Sonoda was visiting Mao’s mausoleum, TASS carried an article titled “Pressure from the Hegemon” warning that if the treaty were concluded on Chinese terms it would damage Japanese interests and heighten international tension.46 On August 23, after the contents of the treaty were made public, the Soviet ambassador in Tokyo informed MOFA that “because the contents of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship go beyond the framework of bilateral relations, the Soviet Union cannot remain disinterested and will take all measures deemed necessary to protect its own interests.”47 So the PRC leadership achieved its aims of isolating the Soviet Union even with the inclusion of a third-­country provision. Equally important was the priority of economic interests relative to strategic interests in relations with Japan as a result of the Four Modernizations program.

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Of course, the modernization program cannot be meaningfully separated from strategic considerations. Military modernization was one of the Four Modernizations and the modernization program was largely motivated by the belief that economic stagnation had left the PRC weak and vulnerable to the Soviet threat. By 1978, however, rebuilding the economic foundation of national security was the paramount concern of Chinese leaders, making it increasingly important to resolve the anti-­hegemony problem and conclude the treaty in a timely manner as a step toward securing Japanese economic and technical support for the Four Modernizations. In this sense, as Sonoda himself put it in his talks with Deng, the conclusion of the treaty “was not an end but a starting point.”48 Conclusion of the treaty was prelude to closer Sino-Japanese economic cooperation.

The beginning of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation Economic cooperation, a term that encompasses aid, trade, and investment, became the watchword of Sino-Japanese relations beginning in the late 1970s. Trade had been an important part of the postwar Sino-Japanese relationship, but politically more sensitive forms of economic cooperation, including the provision of Japanese aid in the form of government loans, became possible only at the end of the decade with the new Chinese leadership’s all-­out focus on economic development. Economic development, of course, had always been a primary goal of the Chinese Revolution. In 1949 Mao declared that by the turn of the twenty-­first century China aimed to be “a powerful country with a high degree of socialist industrialization.”49 At times in the history of the PRC, access to foreign capital and technology was considered indispensable to the pursuit of this goal. As the most obvious example, at the height of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the PRC received a total of $2.6 billion in assistance from the USSR and Eastern European countries, the majority ($1.9 billion) in the form of loans from the Soviet Union. The bitter experience of repaying these loans after the Sino-Soviet split, however, made reliance on foreign capital, especially foreign government loans, seem threatening to national sovereignty. Thereafter, advocating either foreign government loans or foreign direct investment came to constitute what Lin Xiaoguang calls the “two forbiddens” in PRC economic policy discourse.50 Trade was left as the main source of access to foreign technology. After the Sino-Soviet split and the disaster of the Great Leap Forward, Mao and the PRC leadership looked to the West, and Japan in particular, as sources of

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technology. The expansion of Sino-Japanese trade under the Liao-Takaski (LT) and memorandum trade agreements was part of this general turn to the capitalist world in the 1960s, during which the PRC signed sixty-­five trade and economic agreements worth $280 million. By 1965, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, trade with the West accounted for 52.8 percent of total PRC trade and Japan was the PRC’s largest trade partner.51 The end of the Cultural Revolution combined with the strategic opening to the United States and Japan brought a new round of economic engagement with the outside world. In 1973 Mao approved a plan for the import of $4.3 billion worth of industrial plant and equipment in fields like fertilizer, steel, synthetic fibers, electrical power generation, and mining to be paid for by exports of raw materials, especially oil and coal. In 1975 Zhou and Deng pushed to make an early version of the Four Modernizations a national priority with imports of foreign technology to be covered by the export of raw materials.52 Japan was to be an important source of these imports and in 1974 a trade agreement was signed, prompting a “China boom” in the Japanese business community when optimism ran high regarding the prospects of increased trade with the PRC. In all, between 1972 and 1979, Japanese trade with the PRC expanded six-­fold.53 Whereas the strategic program had the full backing of Mao and was largely immune to overt opposition, however, foreign economic policy was much more politically vulnerable. By 1975, Zhou was under attack in the campaign to criticize Confucius and Lin Biao, and Deng was being targeted (in a campaign to learn from the fourteenth-­century novel The Water Margin), as a “capitulationist” for trading away China’s natural resources for foreign technological novelties.54 Dramatic expansion of economic cooperation came only after the death of Mao and the fall of the Gang of Four. The new regime’s Four Modernizations drew heavily from the plans put forward by Deng and Zhou in 1975. In February 1978, an ambitious ten year plan (covering the years 1976–85), was adopted providing for 120 projects in basic industries like iron and steel, coal and oil, and electrical power generation as well as infrastructure like railroads and ports. Despite the renewed enthusiasm for economic development, however, the “two forbiddens” endured. In April 1978, Minister of Foreign Trade Li Qiang explained that while the PRC was open to exploring new forms of international economic cooperation, neither foreign loans nor direct foreign investment, like joint ventures, would be utilized.55 The ten-­year plan soon proved financially infeasible, largely due to a shortage of foreign currency reserves to cover the cost of plant and technology imports. In 1977, the PRC had concluded agreements with foreign companies worth $3

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billion; in 1978 this rose to $13 billion; and in the first six months of 1979, $17 billion worth of agreements were concluded. Earnings from Chinese exports never covered the cost of these contracts, leading to a large trade deficit and a rapid fall in foreign currency reserves necessitating drastic retrenchment. The plan became emblematic of the irrational exuberance of PRC economic planning in 1977–78, and was attacked by its critics as the “Foreign Leap Forward” (yang maojin) for its heavy reliance on the importation of foreign technology.56 These problems did not, however, lessen the ambition of the Chinese leadership so much as suggest the necessity of something more radical than an old-­fashioned campaign of socialist economic construction. Over the course of the year 1978, the PRC leadership dispatched a series of overseas missions to study world economic conditions. These included a delegation that visited Japan in March 1978 and requested briefings on Japanese involvement in export processing zones like Masan in South Korea and Kaohsiung in Taiwan. The delegation then visited Hong Kong and Macao, and the mission’s reports eventually became the basis for the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China open to foreign investment like those at Shenzhen and Zhuhai. The reports of these missions, especially the influential report of Vice Premeir Gu Mu’s mission to Western Europe, concluded that the rapid economic growth many countries experienced after World War II proved that a variety of forms of foreign capital and investment could be used to support economic development without sacrificing national political independence, and that international conditions were highly favorable for a similar effort in China. These conclusions were incorporated into the “Economic Planning Proposal for 1979–1980,” which was adopted at the Third Plenum (at which Deng consolidated his leadership position), and called for the “active import of advanced foreign technology, using foreign capital and boldly entering international markets.” The Third Plenum, therefore, marked not only the political triumph of Deng over Hua and his “two whatevers,” but also the defeat of the “two forbiddens” in economic policy, setting the stage for the Reform and Opening program as well as a rapid expansion of economic cooperation with Japan.57

Japanese economic aid to China The beginning of the Japanese aid program to China was a response to these travails of PRC economic policy. In March 1977, as the movement to restart peace treaty negotiations was gaining steam, a Keidanren delegation visited the PRC and agreed to begin talks for a long-­term trade agreement which was

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eventually signed in February 1978. Based on the PRC’s ten-­year plan, the agreement envisioned approximately $20 billion in total trade composed of Japanese exports of industrial equipment and construction materials covered by the import of an equal value of Chinese coal and oil. The centerpiece of the agreement was a steel complex to be built at Baoshan near Shanghai, which rather quickly became a symbol of the problems of the post-Mao leadership’s early economic plans. On February 23, 1979, just a year into the new long-­term trade agreement, as part of the general readjustment of economic policy in light of the problems of the ten-­year plan, the Chinese leadership requested the suspension of almost two dozen contracts totaling more than $2 billion, including over $1 billion in contracts signed as part of the Baoshan project. The suspension of contracts provoked vocal consternation in the Japanese business community and quickly became known as the “Baoshan shock,” earning a place on the list of shocks to which Japanese were subjected in the 1970s. This first retrenchment was dealt with in a private deal between the Chinese government and a consortium of Japanese banks brokered by Ōkita Saburō (formerly of the Economic Planning Agency, and on whom more later).58 The larger problem of Chinese capital shortage remained however. One obvious way to deal with payment problems was the extension of Japanese economic aid. The first calls for Japanese ODA to the PRC came from within the Japanese business community. As early as January 1977, Ōkita had suggested that preferential loans under the Japanese ODA program might be one way to overcome the PRC capital shortage.59 The PRC leadership at this point was still not willing to accept foreign government loans, but Japanese business leaders kept up efforts to encourage the Chinese in this direction. In September 1978, Inayama Yoshihiro of Nippon Steel visited the PRC and, in a meeting with Vice Minister of International Trade Liu Xiwen, suggested that the PRC utilize loans provided by Japanese ODA. Dokō Toshio of Keidanren also visited the PRC at the time to explain the basics of the Japanese ODA system in a meeting with Deng Xiaoping.60 Government initiatives on the ODA front began after the conclusion of the peace treaty in August 1978. In September, Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao met his Chinese counterpart Huang Hua at the UN and suggested the PRC seriously consider requesting Japanese aid. Sonoda also laid out three principles upon which Japanese ODA would be extended, which would come to govern aid to China for the next two decades: 1) economic aid to the PRC would be carried out in cooperation with the United States and Europe; 2) the PRC would receive

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the same treatment as other developing nations in receiving Japanese aid; and 3) there would be no military cooperation between Japan and the PRC.61 These conditions were meant to allay fears in the United States and Europe that Japanese aid might lead to Japanese dominance in the Chinese market, to assure other aid recipients, especially in Southeast Asia, that Japanese aid funds would not be diverted to China at their expense, and to address fears that Japanese aid would strengthen the Chinese military or become the basis for a Sino-Japanese alliance. Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Tokyo in October 1978 was a golden opportunity to advance the prospects for economic cooperation, including Japanese economic aid. During his visit Deng expressed admiration for Japanese technology and interest in closer Japanese cooperation with the PRC modernization effort, while his Japanese hosts worked to inform the Chinese delegation about Japanese ODA policies and procedures.62 Deng met with representatives of six major economic and business organizations including Keidanren, the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai dōyūkai), and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce.63 On the afternoon of the 24th Deng toured a Nissan Motors plant, after which he declared, “Now I understand what modernization is. We welcome the cooperation of the developed countries in China’s modernization, especially our friends in the Japanese industrial world,” and presented an example of his calligraphy that read, “Study from and pay respects to the great, hard-­working, courageous and wise Japanese people.”64 Deng also suggested that Chinese thinking on government loans was evolving. In a meeting with leaders of the Democratic Socialist Party, Deng hinted that the PRC leadership was open to government aid, telling his hosts that bilateral economic problems “that could not be solved on the private level would need to be solved by governments.”65 In his talks with Prime Minister Fukuda, Deng stressed the complimentary interests that supported Sino-Japanese friendship, praised Japanese economic assistance to developing countries, and said he hoped that Japan would do even more on this front.66 Fukuda responded enthusiastically, telling Deng that he was praying for the rapid realization of the Four Modernizations and that “our country can cooperate with your country’s modernization, so if there is anything we can do, please don’t hesitate to ask.”67 In December 1978, as Deng was consolidating his position in Beijing, Ōhira Masayoshi succeeded Fukuda as prime minister in Tokyo. There was a fortuitous coincidence in the beginning the Chinese Reform and Opening program and the formation of the Ōhira cabinet. Ōhira, of course, had long been involved in China policy and in both Japan and the PRC was widely regarded as a friend of

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China. Ōkita Saburō, his surprise choice for foreign minister in 1979, had spent his childhood in Manchuria and over the course of the 1970s had become increasingly involved in the China problem, having accompanied Miki Takeo on a visit to Beijing as an economic advisor in April 1972, and at the end of the decade served as an informal economic advisor to the Chinese government. The Ōhira cabinet also brought together a group of former bureaucrats from the wartime Kōain (Asia Development Board) with experience planning the economy in occupied China. Ōhira had been stationed in the Mengjiang Liaison Office of the Kōain in Zhangjiakou while Ōkita served in Beijing, where he worked with Sasaki Yoshitake, who became MITI minister in the Ōhira cabinet. Itō Masayoshi, Ōhira’s long-­time political ally, chief cabinet secretary and successor to Ōkita as foreign minister, held a post with the Kōain in Shanghai.68 A colleague of Ōhira’s at the Kōain headquarters in Tokyo, Isozaki Satoshi (who would go on to serve as president of Japan National Railways), remembered the Kōain as a relatively open and creative place: “The Asia Development Board [Kōain] was an anomaly among Japanese government offices, and we were always looking at maps of China and entertaining vague notions of ‘East Asia management,’ here proposing to establish a steel mill, there to develop agriculture. Many of the persons gathered there tended to be not so hard-­headed and rather non-­traditional.”69 Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Ōhira and the Kōain group responded enthusiastically to the opportunity to use economic aid in support of the Chinese modernization program and put their visions of Chinese economic development into practice, this time at the request of the Chinese government. Just after taking office Ōhira announced that the Japanese government was prepared to use government funding, including ODA, to advance Japan-PRC cooperation on large-­scale development projects, and MITI officials confirmed that they had already begun preparations in anticipation of a PRC aid request.70 Even the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979 did not slow Japanese preparations for the extension of aid. While the Japanese government suspended plans for aid to Vietnam in response to that country’s invasion of Cambodia, preparations for an aid package to the PRC proceeded apace. On March 15, while PRC troops were still in Vietnam, Ōhira told Kawamoto Toshio, head of the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council, that he would approve an expected Chinese request for ODA.71 In September 1979, Vice Premier Gu Mu visited Tokyo and, in a meeting with Prime Minister Ōhira, submitted an official request for $5.54 billion in aid to fund eight large-­scale infrastructure projects. Ōhira welcomed the request while reiterating the three principles Sonoda had enumerated earlier. Within the

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Japanese bureaucracy there was general support for the extension of aid, with MITI being especially proactive. The only real disagreement concerned whether aid ought to be “tied” or “untied.” Viewing ODA as a form of export promotion, MITI officials wanted aid to China to be tied to contracts with Japanese firms. MOFA and Foreign Minister Ōkita, on the other hand, concerned about reactions from the United States and compliance with the norms of international aid organizations, successfully pushed for aid to be generally untied.72 In December 1979, Ōhira visited Beijing and presented the first of what would become a series of Japanese aid packages. The package would provide $1.5 billion over the years 1980–85 in the form of ODA loans which would be untied, with an interest rate of 3 percent to be repaid over thirty years with ten years deferred. The first disbursal of more than $200 million would fund six of the proposed Chinese infrastructure projects including the construction of an electric power station and the construction or expansion of two ports and three railroads. In addition, the Japan-China Friendship Hospital, a monument to the new Sino-Japanese relationship, was to be funded by a separate $61 million grant.73 Economic cooperation and the Japanese aid program in support of Chinese economic reform became the bedrock for the golden age of Sino-Japanese relations. By 2008, when the loan program ended, Japanese aid to the PRC, mostly in the form of low-­interest loans but including also grant aid and technical cooperation, amounted to more than 3 trillion yen (or almost $30 billion).74 For the Chinese, Japanese ODA eased capital shortages and helped to build infrastructure (especially in transportation and power generation), that contributed to economic growth. Japan was the single largest supplier of economic aid to China and “no country played a greater role in assisting China build its industry and infrastructure than Japan.”75 For example, it is estimated that to 1995 Japanese ODA had funded 40 percent of the expansion of railway electrification and 11 percent of added electric power generation capacity in China. A Mitsubishi Research Institute study estimated that in the twenty years from 1979 to 1999 Japanese ODA added 0.84 percent to China’s GDP, amounting to approximately RMB70 billion in 1999, an amount larger than the annual output of some Chinese provinces.76 For the Japanese, aid to China promoted the expansion of trade and the development of the Chinese market for Japanese trade and investment. It also offered the chance to diversify sources of energy imports. Several of the six initial infrastructure projects funded in 1979 were directly related to the export

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of Chinese coal from mines being developed by joint ventures including Japanese firms. Support for Chinese economic reform was also part of an engagement policy that aimed at encouraging a more open, stable and Western-­oriented China. This was touted as a Japanese contribution to regional peace and prosperity that could answer American calls for greater Japanese burden-­sharing. Japanese aid would also give the Chinese leadership a stake in good relations with the Japanese government and was expected to provide the Japanese with some influence and leverage in their relationship with the PRC. In addition, it has been argued that the provision of aid to China could help Japanese assuage feelings of guilt for past aggression and repay the Chinese leadership for its decision to waive reparations in 1972. Shared economic interests also, arguably, helped the two governments manage political, territorial, and historical disputes that arose in the 1980s and 1990s.77

The new Sino-Japanese relationship and Japanese defense The Four Modernizations program also included the modernization of the Chinese military, a project that had significant implications for the PRC leadership’s position on Japanese defense. With the conclusion of the treaty, the PRC leadership moved from public and private encouragement of greater Japanese defense efforts in the face of Soviet military initiatives, to active cultivation of Sino-Japanese military and defense exchanges. As the PRC leadership sought to build closer contacts with the Japanese military and increased access to Japanese military technology as part of the modernization of Chinese military forces, Japanese leaders suddenly found themselves in the presumably somewhat bewildering position of having to politely decline Chinese requests for greater military cooperation.78 Military contacts began even before the signing of the treaty. Resident defense attachés had been exchanged beginning in 1974. In April 1977, Iwashima Hisao, director of the First Research Department for Military History of the Japanese National Defense College, visited the PRC and met with Liao Chengzhi and Sun Pinghua as well as Chen Xilian, commander of the Beijing military district. They discussed a number of issues relating to regional security including Soviet military capabilities and intentions, the strength of the Japanese military and the possibility of Japanese arms exports to the PRC. Deng also told a former Japanese military commander that the PRC was interested in purchasing weapons overseas, including from Japan.79 The New York Times in July 1978 reported that

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Beijing had invited representatives of Japanese munitions manufacturers to visit with a view to procuring Japanese arms.80 In fact, the first official Chinese visitor to Japan after the signing of the peace treaty was Deputy General Chief of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army Zhang Caitian in September 1978. During his visit he invited the director of the Japanese Defense Agency to Beijing. Vice-Minister of Defense Su Yu had been in Tokyo in May 1978, and the following year proposed student and instructor exchanges between the two countries’ military academies. Nakasone Yasuhiro, soon to become prime minister, made a high-­profile trip to the PRC in May 1980, during which Hua Guofeng suggested that the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force should be expanded so that it could protect Japanese sea lanes, and Chinese Deputy Chief of General Staff Wu Xinquan offered his opinion that “nothing is strange about Japan becoming a military power,” and that Japan ought to double defense spending.81 The new Chinese thinking on Japanese defense also dovetailed with calls from Washington for greater Japanese burden-­sharing in the defense of Asia. PRC support for a more active Japanese defense was welcomed by many Japanese conservatives who had long championed such a policy at home, often under intense Chinese criticism. Nakasone, for one, had been the object of Chinese criticism in 1970 and 1971 when, as head of the Japanese Defense Agency, he had proposed an expansion of Japanese military capabilities in the Fourth Defense Plan. Former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, long the Chinese Communists’ bête noir, responded favorably to the new PRC attitude.82 Given PRC rhetoric in the late 1970s, it is not surprising that conservative politicians like Nakasone felt that their more hawkish positions on defense and more assertive nationalist rhetoric would be compatible with a closer Japan-China partnership. Chinese attitudes supported not only conservative moves to overcome postwar constraints on Japanese defense and foreign policy but also conservative narratives of national identity.

Conclusion The conclusion of the peace treaty and the extension of Japanese aid to the PRC laid the foundation for Sino-Japanese relations for the rest of the twentieth century. For many observers, the new relationship marked the end of the “postwar” period in Japanese foreign policy, promising to remove the last of the constraints imposed on Japanese foreign policy by defeat and make Japan a more

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normal, independent country. In 1979, Professor Hosoya Chihiro judged the conclusion of the peace treaty “epochal.” It was the first equal treaty signed between Japan and China. It was also the first case of an autonomous decision in postwar Japanese foreign policy. Unlike all agreements since the end of the war, the peace treaty did not deal primarily with the postwar settlement, but was concluded between two states with normal diplomatic relations. In this sense, the peace treaty was the first postwar international agreement that was not forced upon Japan by defeat or the circumstances of the Cold War.83 Professor Tanaka Akihiko similarly called the conclusion of the peace treaty and the extension of Japanese aid in support of the PRC modernization program a “watershed” in postwar Japanese foreign relations. The treaty finally brought an end to Japan’s postwar diplomacy—the process, beginning with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, of normalizing relations with Japan’s neighbors and reintegrating into the international community. The extension of Japanese aid to the PRC was the first truly strategic decision in postwar Japanese foreign policy: The 1979 decision to undertake economic cooperation with China was not totally unrelated to settling issues left over from the war, but basically this was an active political decision made according to a consideration of Japanese interests . . . in contrast to postwar diplomacy in which the object was the normalization of relations with the countries surrounding Japan, this active political decision was taken on the basis of established normal relations and was a determination of the most effective means by which to achieve Japan’s own ends.84

The new relationship with the PRC also changed the basic narrative of SinoJapanese relations. It supported narratives of the Japanese as mentors to the Chinese, who were helping the Chinese to overcome their own admitted mistakes. Professor Mōri Kazuko has argued that relations in the 1980s were based upon a common understanding of the relationship as one between an “aiding” country and an “aided” country.85 Similarly, the scholar Robert Scalapino argued that, to a certain extent, relations after 1978 marked a return to a pattern that prevailed after 1895 when Chinese looked to Japan as a model and as a source of support for Chinese reform.86 This new narrative of Sino-Japanese cooperation proved the success not only of postwar conservative foreign policy but of modern Japanese history in general. The decade of the 1970s, which began with a series of shocks that challenged the most basic assumptions of Japanese foreign policymaking and provoked anxious re-­examination of Japanese identity,

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thus ended with heady optimism and the widespread consciousness that Japan had recovered its rightful place as a respected member of the international community and a leading nation in Asia. The next chapter will show how the relationship forged with the PRC at the end of the 1970s was the basis for a triumphalist conservative narrative of national identity.

8

Triumphalism and Alienation: The China Problem Transformed

The new relationship with China supported a conservative foreign policy aimed at using Japanese economic power to make a more active contribution to international society, and also a conservative triumphalist narrative of national identity in which an advanced, modern Japan aided and tutored a relatively less advanced China. As PRC policy and rhetoric increasingly made the China problem useful and attractive for conservatives, it became correspondingly less so for Japanese progressives and leftists. Progressives and leftists were increasingly alienated from a China that no longer supported their nationalist narratives. Chinese nationalism, once a source of inspiration, for many on the left seemed increasingly atavistic, out of step with a world characterized by deepening interdependence and issues of transnational interest. Thus, by the end of the 1970s, changes in PRC policy and rhetoric had worked in the context of Japanese nationalist discourse to support an assertion of Japanese progress in contrast to Chinese backwardness across the political spectrum, a complete reversal of conditions at the beginning of the decade.

Conservative triumphalism and the China problem By the end of the 1970s, the sense of crisis prevalent earlier in the decade had eased. Increased confidence and affirmations of Japanese success validated the policies and narratives of a resurgent conservative establishment. The Japanese economy, by 1978 the world’s second largest, had recovered from the recession induced by the oil shock and was seen by many observers to have weathered the second oil crisis more smoothly than many other powers. Japan was amassing annual trade and current account surpluses that over the next decade made the country the world’s largest creditor and were poured into overseas investment and foreign aid. Japanese and foreign observers who had only a few years earlier

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prognosticated on the nation’s fragility and vulnerability began to talk about Japan as an economic superpower and perhaps even “a new kind of power”—a trading state or merchant nation—better adapted to world politics characterized by deepening interdependence and the increasing salience of economic forms of power. The new international recognition of Japanese success was most famously and succinctly captured in the title of Ezra Vogel’s 1979 best-­selling Japan as Number One.1 The perception of Japanese success, especially when explained by reference to unique Japanese cultural traits, made identification with China or the Chinese Revolution less relevant to narratives of Japanese national identity. The Chinese leadership itself was at the time repudiating much of the post-1949 revolutionary experience as an economic dead end and turning to Japan as a source of aid and a model of successful modernization. Popular conceptions of Japanese success and Chinese failure, seemingly recognized even by the Chinese leadership, validated a more positive interpretation of modern Japanese history and encouraged a conservative triumphalism that characterized Japanese discourse in the late 1970s and 1980s.

Ōhira Masayoshi and Ōkita Saburō on Sino-Japanese cooperation and Japanese leadership in Asia Prime Minister Ōhira and his foreign minister, Ōkita Saburō, as the main architects of the aid program to the PRC, took the lead in justifying the new relationship with China within a narrative of conservative triumphalism at home and Japanese leadership in Asia. In his first speech on becoming LDP party president, Ōhira contended that there was a broad domestic consensus in favor of the postwar conservative order, a consensus bolstered by international recognition of postwar Japanese success.2 In his speech at the LDP party convention the following year, Ōhira claimed that the great postwar political debates on security and foreign policy had all been settled in favor of LDP positions.3 Ōhira was nearly ready to declare victory for the conservative mainstream in the postwar political struggle with the progressive opposition. Admittedly, the Japanese nation still faced challenges. Pollution, a perceived “imbalance between freedom and responsibility,” and the lack of a “deep-­rooted spiritual life,” were evidence for Ōhira that rapid economic growth and the “material culture of modern rationalism” had reached their limits in Japan.4 The new national consensus, however, afforded the opportunity to transcend these limits. The 1980s, he declared, would be period in which Japan “moved from an

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era of modernization to an era of overcoming the modern (kindai o koeru jidai), from an era centered on economic growth to an era valuing culture.”5 Ōhira was optimistic that the Japanese nation stood on the threshold of finally achieving the recovery of national cultural essence and national unity that had so long eluded it in the pursuit of Western material modernity. Internationally, Ōhira declared that the 1980s would be the “age of the global society,” characterized by the neo-­liberal buzzwords interdependence and multipolarity.6 Ōkita likewise saw a shift in the international balance of power away from American dominance toward a more equal, cooperative system of group leadership (shūdan shidōsei), in which Japan was expected to play an increasingly important and active role.7 Ōhira and Ōkita built upon Ōhira’s earlier characterization of Japan as an “insider” in the international system to define Japanese national interests in these new circumstances. As a resource-­ poor nation built on trade, Japan’s national security depended upon the maintenance of the liberal international political-­economic system. Unlike in the prewar period, when Japan sought to overturn the established political-­ economic order, Japan was now a principle stakeholder in the stability of the international system with a national interest in using its economic power to help manage the shifting international balance of power and to address problems like global inequality that threatened that stability.8 Economic aid was to play a key role in this more active Japanese foreign policy. In 1978 the Japanese government announced a plan to double ODA and by 1986 Japan was the developed world’s second largest provider of economic aid. ODA was seen as an ideal way to utilize the Japanese trade surplus, which by the end of the decade stood at $10 billion annually, to forge a new, more active Japanese role in the world. The provision of economic aid could help answer calls for greater burden-­sharing, smooth over rough relations with the United States and help secure access to Third World markets and resources, all while avoiding undue involvement in international military affairs.9 International development assistance was also integral to the exercise of Japanese regional leadership. In 1980, Ōkita resurrected the “flying geese” model of development associated with the wartime economist Akamatsu Kaname, to describe Japan’s leading role in the “great transformation” of East Asia into the world’s most dynamic region of economic growth. Ōkita saw Japan’s role as a regional leader in a long historical perspective of the rise of great powers. He noted that Japan was becoming a capital-­exporting nation just as the United States had been after World War II and the United Kingdom before that, and he predicted that Japan could use ODA to play a constructive role in Asia similar to

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that of the United States in the early postwar period. Japan was taking over regional leadership from the United States, providing the public goods required for regional stability, at least in terms of fostering economic development if not in extending military protection.10 The Japanese aid policy toward the PRC was to be a showcase for this new Japanese international role. On December 7, 1979, during his trip to Beijing to announce the Japanese aid package, Ōhira gave a speech at the Great Hall of the People that was broadcast live on Chinese television and radio, providing an unprecedented opportunity for a Japanese leader to address the Chinese people. In his speech Ōhira explained Japanese policy toward China by arguing that in an age of increasing interdependence the problems of the world could no longer be solved by individual nations and that, therefore, every nation had a responsibility to contribute to the solution of common problems. Applied to the Sino-Japanese relationship, Chinese and Japanese both had a responsibility to ensure that Chinese modernization contributed to international peace and stability.11 Aid to the PRC, therefore, was presented as part of Japan’s international obligation, as a stakeholder or an “insider” in the international system, to make a contribution to international society commensurate with its capabilities. Economic cooperation, however, involved a mutual obligation on the part of the PRC to contribute positively to the international community. The countries of the world, Ōhira told the Chinese, hoped for the success of the modernization program in the expectation that a more prosperous PRC would contribute to international peace, stability, and prosperity. Japanese economic aid to China was not simply charity. Nor was economic aid a moral obligation, something the Japanese owed the Chinese. Aid was extended on the assumption that the Chinese leadership would act responsibly and contribute positively to international society. Ōhira declared that he had come away from his visit impressed by the commitment of the new PRC leadership to making a more active contribution to international peace and stability and promised the active cooperation of the Japanese government in this effort.12 Thus, although he began his speech praising Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai for their efforts in bringing about the normalization of relations, Ōhira here implied that the change in the relationship was largely the result of a change in Chinese behavior toward greater responsibility and conformance to international norms. Aid to the PRC was justified by Ōhira’s judgment that the PRC leadership was committed to making modernization contribute to the international system on which Japanese security and prosperity depended, not to challenging it, as had the revolutionary policies of Mao.

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Ōhira’s optimism did not, however, blind him to the potential problems of cooperation between Japan and China. In his speech in Beijing, Ōhira identified mutual understanding as one of the biggest problems confronting the two nations. Despite 2,000 years of cultural interaction, he maintained, mutual understanding was difficult, requiring hard work, and he cited this as the reason that one of the initiatives he introduced in his speech was Japanese government support for Japanese language training in China.13 Ōhira often attributed the barriers to mutual understanding to differences in national character. Hua Guofeng visited Japan in May 1980, completing the first exchange of heads of state in the two nations’ history. In his reception for Hua, Ōhira claimed that Sino-Japanese friendship could not be based merely upon economic interests, it also required a clear understanding of national character (kokuminsei). Ōhira pointed to several similarities in national character that would support cooperation between the two nations; for example, both Chinese and Japanese “love nature and place importance on culture and human relations.” The differences in national character (which he left unspecified), he attributed, as was popular, to the influence of geography and climate on “Chinese raised in the climate and conditions of a vast continent,” and “Japanese living on a tiny piece of land blessed with bountiful surrounding seas.”14 Differences in national character need not hinder friendly relations between the two nations however. Japanese and Chinese could study each other’s strong points to make up for their own shortcomings. Ōhira expressed the hope that in this way national character might become complementary, much like the two nations’ economic interests. Japanese could learn from “the great conceptual power (kōsōryoku) and tenacious perseverance (nebaritsuyoi nintairyoku) of the Chinese.” The Chinese, Ōhira was confident, could learn from the “spirit and ingenuity (kufū) the Japanese have shown in the process of modernization they have doggedly carried out since the Meiji Restoration.” Ōhira tactfully left respective national shortcomings unstated, but expressed his confidence that increased interaction would lead to “new understanding and respect,” and, enigmatically, “deeper blood exchanges” (issō fukai chi no tōtta kōryū).15 Leaving aside what Ōhira might have envisioned in terms of deepening blood ties between the two nations, what do Ōhira’s ruminations on national character reveal about how he thought about Sino-Japanese relations? In light of Ōhira’s previous lament regarding the sacrifice of national culture and spirit in pursuit of material modernization, his suggestion that the Japanese could learn from the perseverance of the Chinese suggests that what Ōhira admired in Chinese national character was similar to the ideas he expressed earlier in the decade,

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that the Chinese, unlike the Japanese, had somehow managed to maintain a powerful, independent, national identity through the trials and tribulations of its twentieth-­century modernization. The hardships and suffering the Chinese had endured in their pursuit of modernization had forged an enviably “tenacious” national character. Thus, Ōhira’s view of Chinese national character shared many similarities with those like Takeuchi Yoshimi who found in the Chinese a spirit of perseverance and resistance to Western modernity that the Japanese lacked. The lessons the Chinese were to learn from the Japanese, however, completely reversed the relative success or failure of the two nations posited by Takeuchi. Whatever the cost in terms of national identity, one had to conclude that Japan’s modernization was undeniably successful and that the Chinese were now in the position of learning from Japan the proper course to modernity. Ōhira’s reference to Japanese modernization since the Meiji period, moreover, put postwar Japanese success in a much broader historical context that implied that the history of modern Japan was one of success rather than one primarily of imperialist aggression and war (though Ōhira was forthright about these aspects of the Japanese past). Ōhira’s vision of “overcoming the modern” further reinforced the new relationship between the two nations. Having successfully modernized, having indeed reached the limits of Western modernity, the Japanese now stood on the cusp of a new postmodern age while the Chinese were only just beginning their own modernization. The respective strong points of national character revealed Japan as successful, modern, and advanced, a leader and tutor to China. Ōhira, therefore, consistently explained and justified friendship with the PRC in a way that validated his notions of Japanese national identity and modern history. For all his circumspection and his reputation as a friend of China, Ōhira’s public pronouncements focused on cooperation with the PRC as a celebration of the achievements and unique cultural attributes of the Japanese nation. Cooperation with and assistance to the Chinese modernization program proved Japan was an advanced nation playing an important role in the international community by providing aid and tutelage to China. Ōkita made similar arguments in explaining Japanese aid to the PRC in the context of Japan’s role as regional leader. He always justified ODA in general, and aid to the PRC specifically, in terms of national interest. For a Japan built on trade and dependent upon access to overseas markets and resources, the maintenance of political stability in East Asia was of paramount interest. Japanese economic aid could help the PRC integrate peacefully into international society

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and give it a stake in the maintenance of the international economic order, dissuading the Chinese leadership from a return to the revolutionary adventurism of the past. Japanese aid also promised to raise Japanese living standards by encouraging cheaper imports from recipient countries while Japanese companies moved into higher-­value added industries. Finally, as recipient countries developed, especially a country the size of the PRC, export opportunities for Japanese firms increased. Ōkita’s conception of national interests, however, was overwhelmingly economic. He stuck to the image of Japan as a small island nation, poor in natural resources, dependent on international trade that must above all maintain peaceful relations with all nations. Ōkita at times described his foreign policy prescription as one of happō yabure—a term taken from kendō (Japanese fencing), in which one eschewed a set defensive posture in order to be ready to defend against an attack from any possible direction. In policy terms Ōkita explained that this required “making a lack of principles the basic principle of foreign policy.”16 Thus, Ōkita’s basic foreign policy vision was very much in the pragmatic, neo-­mercantilist tradition of the postwar conservative mainstream. Ōkita was much less concerned about the implications of Japanese development aid to the PRC for relations with the Soviet Union. Pressed on this question in 1979, Ōkita stated that the PRC’s anti-Soviet strategy was “of no concern to Japan.”17 The Sino-Soviet confrontation, he believed, was merely a short-­term problem. Japan, he argued, had to take a long-­term view of the PRC modernization project and focus on its long-­term self-­interest (jikoku no rieki) in using aid to the PRC to stimulate and “internationalize” the Japanese economy, enhance Japanese energy and resource security, and deflect international criticism of Japan as a free-­rider in the international system.18 In fact, through most of the 1970s, Ōkita had evinced considerable skepticism in his estimations of the PRC’s economic prospects and the likelihood of expanded Sino-Japanese trade. It was not until the new Chinese leadership’s modernization program became clear that Ōkita pushed for more active engagement with the PRC. Ōkita welcomed the new Chinese focus on economic modernization, and while acknowledging that there were likely to be problems and periodic adjustments of specific plans or targets (as in the case of the ten-­ year plan of 1978), he felt that the general direction of Chinese reform was sound and he expressed confidence in the commitment of the PRC leadership to reform. The Chinese leadership in general, Ōkita felt, was pragmatic and realistic and was committed to correcting the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution, which had wasted fifteen years of development. Ōkita felt that the biggest problems the

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PRC leadership would face were a lack of technical expertise, as a result of the neglect of technical and administrative skills during the Cultural Revolution, and a lack of capital and foreign reserves. Both of these problems could be addressed with Japanese aid. Ōkita’s China policy bolstered the nationalist narrative of Japanese success and the image of Japan as the leader of regional economic development. Japanese aid in support of the Chinese modernization program became one of the most important Japanese leadership tasks in the region. Ōkita came to see Japan’s role as socializing a less advanced China into the international political economy and, in fact, came to see himself as tutoring the Chinese leadership in the norms of that economy. For example, in 1981, Ōkita visited the PRC to deal with another round of Chinese economic readjustment that threatened contracts concluded by Japanese firms. Ōkita described his trip as an important opportunity to explain to the PRC leadership the serious repercussions of a unilateral cancellation of contracts in international business.19 Ōkita could often draw on statements and actions of the PRC leadership to affirm his conception of Japan’s role in the world. The PRC leadership itself was in the process of re-­evaluating the history of Chinese development, and coming to some of the same conclusions. The excesses of Maoist revolutionary ideology had compromised the pursuit of national development, leaving the PRC well short of the revolutionary goal of restoring China to its rightful place among the world’s leading nations. The PRC leadership was indeed looking to learn from abroad, particularly from Japan. For example, in 1981, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences published a report titled, “Viewpoints and Opinions of our Japanese Friends on Our Country’s Economic Tasks,” which reprinted reports and speeches on the Chinese economy by Japanese economists and business leaders, including Ōkita.20 Ōkita welcomed this change in PRC consciousness as a new, more realistic self-­image. Describing this change in attitude, he argued that the Chinese had tended to act as though China were a world unto itself, its own “Fourth World.” At the end of the 1970s, however, the PRC leadership was clearly conscious of the PRC’s real position as a member of the less-­developed Third World, a poor nation in need of aid from the developed world and international organizations.21 Ōkita’s vision of the relationship with China, like Ōhira’s, confirmed a triumphalist narrative of Japanese success that gratified Japanese national identity and validated modern Japanese history by portraying an advanced Japan leading a relatively less advanced China on the path to modernization.

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Economic cooperation, reparations, and war guilt It is sometimes suggested that Japanese aid to the PRC was extended out of a concern to atone for Japanese aggression in China or in appreciation for the Chinese government having dropped its reparations claim in 1972. Examination of the public pronouncements of Ōhira and Ōkita, the major figures in the formulation of Japanese aid policy toward the PRC, offers little support for this argument, at least in its strongest form.While both Ōhira and Ōkita acknowledged wartime Japanese aggression and expressed appreciation for the Chinese waiver of reparations, such considerations were at best secondary—rhetorical support for policies justified overwhelmingly on the basis of Japanese national interests defined largely in economic terms. Neither justified his policy toward China primarily on normative grounds, as making amends for past Japanese aggression or as reciprocating the Chinese waiver of reparations. Moreover, any sense of contrition was not injurious to national pride. Both Ōhira and Ōkita interpreted the relationship with the PRC in a way that gratified their concepts of national identity and vindicated modern Japanese history. As mentioned previously, Ōhira fully acknowledged the history of Japanese aggression in China and believed that understanding this history was important for relations with China. For example, in February 1979 in the Lower House of the Diet, Ōhira warned that overcoming the past would not be easy: “We can’t forget this dark past, even if we try . . . Without deep reflection on this we won’t succeed in building a new Japan-China relationship.”22 In an interview from August 1978 (mentioned in Chapter 4), Ōhira had argued that Japanese had to approach policy toward China from the position of a past aggressor and noted that, “Although Japan is the country that caused so much damage to China, [the PRC] did not seek any reparations from the aggressor, Japan. Therefore [I] can’t say that China is aggressive.”23 This suggests, perhaps, that Ōhira felt the Chinese waiver of reparations should be considered when making China policy, including the later aid policy toward the PRC.24 Yet, it should be pointed out that this passage does not explicitly link the waiver of reparations to economic cooperation or aid to the PRC (it came in response to a question about the aggressive nature of the Chinese Communist regime and the differences between China and the Soviet Union). In the same interview, Ōhira also specifically rejected the implication that this sort of historical consciousness made Japanese weak in their relations with China: “Japan was an aggressor, reflecting on this is completely different than being weak (hikutsu).” Ōhira also again repeated his warnings against “idealism,” the

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danger of becoming “enchanted” with China, and stressed the importance of national interest, especially Japan’s overriding interest in the US-Japan security relationship, in the formation of China policy. In his December 1979 speech in Beijing, the only time Ōhira mentioned the war was in explaining Japan’s refusal of any military cooperation with the PRC, which was “based on solemn reflection on the past war.”25 Thus, the lessons of the war were presented not as creating an obligation to extend aid to China, but rather as a reason to limit cooperation with the PRC to economics. Ōhira certainly was conscious of the legacies of the past in Japan’s relations with China, but he did not publicly cite issues of personal or national atonement or the Chinese waiver of reparations as justification for the extension of economic aid to the PRC and his historical consciousness should not obscure the national interests Ōhira pursued in his policy toward China. Ōkita, for his part, in a November 1979 interview with a reporter from the Asahi newspaper, did indeed list, as one reason for accepting the PRC aid request made earlier that year, “consideration of the Chinese waiver of reparations,” at the time of normalization. Ōkita also added that from a long-­term political view, Japanese aid might be used to overcome the lingering effects of the war. He immediately qualified this, however, by pointing out that such considerations were only secondary to the overriding goal of building long-­term business opportunities in China.26 In his memoir published in 1980, in explaining the decision to extend aid, Ōkita wrote that, “We also appreciated that China was continuing the policies of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in not demanding wartime reparations from Japan.”27 We should weigh these two brief passages against the larger body of Ōkita’s pronouncements on the China problem. As mentioned previously, Ōkita had been extremely cautious on the possibility of expanding economic ties with the PRC throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. His caution had always been based on his negative assessment of the prospects for economic and business opportunities in the PRC, which he usually found to be limited by the policies of the PRC government itself. It was only with the beginning of the PRC reform program, after “China had abandoned its radical xenophobia,” that Ōkita became committed to aiding Chinese development.28 Therefore, any normative motivation in Ōkita’s approach to the China problem was always subordinated to the pragmatic calculation of national economic interests. There is little evidence that this pragmatism was compromised by normative concerns; that Ōkita sacrificed real, material, national interests in order to assuage his normative compunctions. In fact, just the opposite seems far more likely. Ōkita may not

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have been averse to considering aid to the PRC as a tool to overcome lingering distrust caused by the war with China, but considered this a secondary benefit of, rather than a primary reason for, the extension of aid. In fact, it is difficult to locate in Ōkita’s public pronouncements any mention of the past as a consideration in economic policy toward China. Indeed, the rejection of any implication that reparations or history ought to be an issue in Japanese aid policy to the PRC occurs more often in Ōkita’s public pronouncements. On his return from his visit to the PRC in 1981, Ōkita argued for the extension of Japanese ODA to cover contracts threatened by Chinese economic readjustment, but explicitly rejected the argument that Japan had a duty to extend aid to China as a form of reparations. Ōkita attributed such an argument to some in the business community friendly to the PRC, specifically mentioning Okazaki Kaheita, a Japanese business leader long active in JapanChina friendship activities: “among some people, like Okazaki Kaheita, there is an argument that because Japan did not pay reparations to China, we should at least do this [extend aid for basic construction and economic adjustment]. But of course we have to think about these issues separately. I think we have to proceed on the basis that business is business.”29 Ōkita then went on to justify a generous aid policy toward the PRC in terms of Japanese national security. The real reason Japan should work with the PRC and not to give up on the Chinese modernization program in the wake of recurrent setbacks was that if Japan and the West took too unsympathetic a line on dealing with PRC economic difficulties, it could negatively affect political relations as well. Economic distress could lead the PRC leadership to turn inward once again and pursue adversarial policies toward the West with negative consequences for Japanese national security.30 In April of the same year, in an interview in the major monthly Chūō kōron, Ōkita forcefully rejected the linkage of aid and reparations: In a Hong Kong newspaper, it seems there was a strange article claiming I said that because Japan owed [the Chinese] a debt for having avoided reparations shouldn’t we extend unconditional aid to China? I absolutely have not said this. Moreover, my thinking is that Japan should not indulge (amayakasu) China. That was an extremely misleading report and I want to take this occasion to correct it.31

Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility that Ōhira and Ōkita were, in fact, motivated to extend aid to the PRC out of a sense of guilt or to repay Chinese generosity in waiving reparations, and that their arguments regarding Japanese economic interests and national security were simply cover, or a post-­hoc

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defense against charges of appearing soft on China. It should be pointed out, however, that in such a case, the elaborate justification of their policy in terms of national interest (to the point that one must sift through all of Ōkita’s voluminous public pronouncements to find just one sentence linking aid and reparations amongst reams of national and economic interest arguments), and fierce rearguard action to avoid the appearance of being soft or “indulging” the Chinese are, in fact, important evidence that arguments based on making amends for past Japanese wrongs were not rhetorically effective in the Japanese discourse on the China problem; that Ōhira and Ōkita were aware that these arguments would not be accepted by the Japanese public. This would suggest that the Japanese approach to China was impacted at least as much by Japanese nationalist discourse, which made such arguments politically unprofitable, as by war guilt or contrition. In fact, in the public pronouncements of the architects of Japan’s aid strategy toward the PRC, mention of the past is far outweighed by arguments based on the calculation of Japanese national interest in terms of business and economic opportunities in China and access to Chinese resources. This is not to deny any normative or moral motivation in Ōhira and Ōkita’s approach to the China problem or to suggest that they did not sincerely reflect upon the history of Japanese aggression. Certainly both displayed what critics of contemporary Japanese historical revisionism would consider a “correct” view of history. Nor is the point here that the Japanese should have used economic aid to make amends for past Japanese aggression in China. Rather, the point is that the public statements of Ōhira and Ōkita do not suggest that atoning for past Japanese actions was a primary motivation for the extension of economic aid to the PRC. We do not need to deny the possibility that feelings of remorse or contrition predisposed Ōhira, Ōkita, or Japanese in general to support the extension of economic aid to the PRC, but it is clear that these feelings were secondary to other, more concrete interests and should not be seen as somehow compromising the pursuit of national interests in relations with the PRC. Nor did this historical consciousness compromise national pride. The public pronouncements of Ōhira and Ōkita make clear that the new relationship with China was not based on a sense of shame that was injurious to a healthy Japanese national identity. Rather, the new relationship with China gratified their narratives of national identity. For Ōhira and Ōkita economic cooperation in support of the PRC modernization program was part and parcel of their vision of Japan as an active, responsible power contributing to the maintenance of the international political and economic order as the leader of regional development

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in East Asia. The Chinese need for Japanese capital and technology validated narratives of national identity based on Japanese success and leadership. Despite their reputations as friends of China, the image of China that comes out of the public statements of Ōhira and Ōkita is one of the PRC as an unstable, developing Third World country turning to Japan for aid and guidance in modernization. An examination of the way in which Ōhira and Ōkita justified their policies toward China shows, in the end, that the acknowledgment of the history of Japanese aggression is not necessarily a source of weakness or somehow incompatible with the pursuit of either national interest or national pride in relations with China. In fact, the attitudes that supported extension of aid to China were emblematic of a nationalist triumphalism that formed the basis of the conservative Japanese approach to the PRC, not just for Ōhira and Ōkita, but for many in the late 1970s and 1980s.

Etō Jun and triumphal Japanese nationalism The new relationship with China appealed even to conservative critics of the government’s China policy. It is emblematic of the new Sino-Japanese relationship at the end of the 1970s that Etō Jun, one of Japan’s best-­known conservative writers, was one of the first Japanese visitors to the PRC after the signing of the peace treaty. In October 1978, Etō traveled to Beijing under MOFA auspices for a meeting with Deng Xiaoping. The talk was off the record, at Deng’s request. Therefore, we can’t know the exact contents, especially what Deng had to say to his guest. But Etō’s account of his trip and his impressions of Deng and Beijing tell us a great deal about what was at stake, in terms of national identity, in the new relationship with the PRC. In China, Etō found a complete refutation of leftist and progressive constructions of China and narratives of modern Japanese history, and found instead an affirmation of a triumphalist nationalist narrative of modern Japanese success. Etō in his own eyes was a representative of all genuinely independent and patriotic Japanese. In the new, normalized relationship the PRC leadership could no longer confine their interactions with Japanese to what he saw as obsequious opposition politicians and fawning leftist intellectuals. Chinese leaders were now obligated to deal with Japanese like Etō: “China cannot simply deal with a set of Japanese men of letters (bunshi) and must deal with the country of Japan as a country. It follows that even if they do not like it, the Chinese must accept people like me who are definitely not pro-Chinese and have never lavished one word of praise on China.”32 Etō thus saw his trip and his reception by the Chinese as a test

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of whether the PRC was really committed to treating Japan as a normal, independent, and equal nation. Etō also credited his trip with breaking the pro-China monopoly on information about China. Japanese like Etō were now to be able to observe Beijing and the PRC first hand and form their own conclusions based on information unfiltered by those sympathetic to the PRC. In this sense, Etō’s trip was also an important test of progressive and leftist constructions of the PRC. Not surprisingly, it was a test in which the PRC and its supporters fared badly. Although Etō conceded that Mao had managed to unify China after decades of war, based on his observations of life in contemporary Beijing, he concluded that after unification Mao had accomplished “nothing” for the nation and that the PRC in the Maoist period had completely failed in the drive for modernization. Etō observed that all the architecture in Beijing was of 1950s vintage, and concluded that what development the PRC had achieved had been the result of Soviet assistance. After the Sino-Soviet split, development had stopped and even been reversed as a result of Mao’s radical experiments during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Etō estimated that in 1960, even after the disaster of the Great Leap Forward, the PRC had probably been only “two or three steps behind Japan.” By the late 1970s, however, the PRC was “twenty or thirty steps behind,” leaving the PRC leadership no choice but to “humbly” turn to Japan for assistance.33 Etō thus completely overturned the idea, associated with Takeuchi Yoshimi, that the PRC represented a case of successful modernization. Nor was the PRC a model of national independence. In fact, whatever progress had been achieved in the PRC had been achieved with Soviet assistance and any future progress now depended on foreign, especially Japanese, aid. The newly concluded peace treaty, therefore, should be seen, not as a symbol of friendship, but as an admission of failure by the PRC leadership and a reflection of their dependence on Japanese assistance.34 Having reversed the historical judgment on the relative success of Chinese modernization, Etō used his experience in Beijing to completely revise the progressive interpretation of modern Japanese history. In a speech on his return to Tokyo, Etō explained that while he disliked the way progressive intellectuals were always harping on about all the terrible things the Japanese had done in China, he had to admit that past policy toward China had been mistaken and that these mistakes contributed to the contemporary problems between the two countries. Etō was relieved to discover, however, that the Chinese he met in Beijing seemed uninterested in the past. He “had not had to say one word” about the past. In their meetings the Chinese stuck to the official line that the war was

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just a “brief shower” in the overall sunny history of relations between the two nations.35 In Etō’s judgment, this was the result of the PRC leadership having acknowledged both the failures of Chinese modernization and Japanese success. For Etō, this was a general vindication of modern Japanese history: “Of course various things have happened, but the actions of the Japanese nation to this point have not been fundamentally mistaken. This fact is all the more powerfully supported by the extent to which even the aggrieved party has come to recognize it without hesitation or resentment.”36 Etō was undeniably gratified by what he saw as the PRC leadership’s recognition of the validity of his own views of Japanese history and was able to appropriate the rhetoric of the Chinese leadership to discredit his domestic opponents and their historical narratives. For Etō, the new relationship with China freed Japanese from historical narratives focused on Japanese imperialism and aggression. Japanese would now be free to celebrate their modern history on their own terms. After his meeting with Deng, Etō said he returned to his hotel room and was “overcome with emotion” (mune ga atsuku narimashita) as he recalled once-­taboo wartime military songs.37 Not all of Etō’s impressions of China were negative. In some cases, the Chinese had things to teach the Japanese, especially in the realms of diplomacy and national identity. In his analysis of Chinese diplomacy, Etō contrasted Japanese sentimentalism with Chinese realism. Unlike progressive Japanese, who interpreted the conclusion of the peace treaty as an act of friendship, Etō saw Deng’s policy motivated by cold realism and nationalism. Deng had no commitment to either Sino-Japanese friendship or the Japanese “friends of China.” He sought only Japanese economic and technical assistance for the Chinese modernization project. In this quest, Deng was perfectly willing to abandon the old friends of China, those who had “dug the well” from which Deng now sought to drink. In the end, Etō concluded, Deng’s foreign policy was motivated not by friendship but by his “matchless patriotism” (taguimarena aikokushin). This was for Etō an admirable quality the Japanese lacked. Japanese, he claimed, consistently underestimated the crucial importance of national boundaries. They did not sufficiently distinguish between “inside” and “outside,” between domestic and foreign, or between Japan and China. Unlike Deng’s realist pursuit of national interest, Japanese politicians sought only domestic political advantage in the pursuit of which they were content to simply follow the foreign policies of others, either the United States or China.38 Thus, even while Etō tore down progressive and leftist constructions of China, like them he found in the Chinese a vital national identity worthy of emulation.

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While he found the new relationship with China gratifying, Etō did not necessarily support the Japanese government’s enthusiasm for cooperation with the PRC. Etō was not convinced of the importance of the China market, pointing out that the postwar Japanese economy had done just fine without access to the China market. Nor was he optimistic about the development of the Chinese economy, which he thought to be threatened by political instability. He thought it better to let the Americans assume the risks of doing business in China, somewhat presumptuously suggesting a 51–49 percent split of the China market between the United States and Japan. Finally, Etō argued against those like Ōhira who saw cooperation with the PRC modernization program as an important part of a new, more active Japanese role in the international community. Etō warned that cooperating too closely with the PRC would only prevent Japan from achieving Ōhira’s historical mission to “overcome the modern.” Relying too much on trade with the continent, he warned, would prevent Japan from moving from a heavy industrial economy to an advanced, twenty-­first century green economy that would correct the excesses of Western modernity.39 Etō argued, in short, that cooperation with a backward, modernizing China would only be a drag on Japan’s postmodern future. In sum, although Etō was not enthusiastic about Japanese government policy toward China, he found the new state of relations gratifying to his own sense of national identity. Etō reveled in using Sino-Japanese relations and the authority of the Chinese leadership to overturn the historical narratives of his domestic political opponents, and to support a triumphalist narrative of modern Japanese history. Despite his criticisms of progressive naïveté, his own constructions of the PRC and Sino-Japanese relations hardly seem more realistic or objective. Just like those he criticized, Etō constructed the PRC and Sino-Japanese relations to suit his purposes in a domestic contest to define Japanese national identity. Like his progressive opponents, Etō even found something to admire in the Chinese—a powerful national identity.

Conservative criticism of the new Sino-Japanese relationship Of course, not all conservatives were gratified by the new relationship with the PRC and many remained troubled by the same doubts they had long harbored concerning Japanese policy toward China. They worried about the strategic implications of the anti-­hegemony clause of the peace treaty. They also expressed concern about the long-­term security implications of cooperating with the Chinese modernization program. As always, they criticized government

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policy toward China on nationalist grounds, lamenting the lack of national subjectivity manifest in what they saw as Japanese capitulation to Chinese demands. The inclusion of the anti-­hegemony clause in the peace treaty was particularly vexing for many. Ever since the Nixon shock, conservative Japanese commentators had been warning against becoming entangled in the Sino-Soviet dispute by acceding to the Chinese position on anti-­hegemony. On the eve of the conclusion of the treaty in May 1978, international relations scholar Nagai Yōnosuke warned once again against choosing sides in the dispute, going so far as to suggest that a Sino-Japanese peace treaty that included an anti-­hegemony clause could be a diplomatic blunder of the order of the 1940 Tripartite Pact. Nagai pointed out the irony that, at the time of the San Francisco conference, while Japan was still occupied and Japanese had no control over their foreign policy, the opposition had come out in force to demand a comprehensive peace, one which would not commit Japan to either side in the Cold War. In 1978, however, when the Japanese had full control over their own foreign policy, the opposition sat silently by as the Japanese government concluded a partial peace that committed the Japanese to an anti-Soviet alliance.40 Nakajima Mineo criticized the conclusion of the peace treaty in familiar terms as emotional and unrealistic. Despite the strategic import of the treaty, he argued, Japanese had signed it “without sufficient awareness of this [strategic importance], without consideration for future diplomacy and without national consensus (kokuminteki gōi).” Instead, the treaty negotiations were conducted “in a kind of mood that had been created without our even realizing it.”41 Nakajima argued that Japanese were unable to grasp the strategic import of international relations or to think clearly about relations with China due to a lack of a clear national identity. In relations with China, Japanese tended to identify with China in a way that made it difficult to think of relations with China as relations with a foreign country. Rather, Japanese rested on easy assumptions about cultural and racial affinity as well as a strongly-­held emotional “sympathy” for China. Japanese intellectuals, for their part, projected their own desires and self-­image onto China. This hindered scientific or objective analysis of China and prevented the development of an independent or objective China image: “We have not yet been able to develop an effective vaccination for this chronic malady in our China consciousness. This weakness in our China consciousness makes not only our grasp of Chinese conditions, but also our understanding of foreign policy and global strategy arbitrary and clouds our view of Japan-China relations as an international relationship.”42

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The lack of national subjectivity was fully manifest in the conclusion of the peace treaty. Nakajima noted that MOFA had sought to deflect criticism of the inclusion of the anti-­hegemony clause by arguing that this position was no different than the anti-­hegemony clause in the Sino-American Shanghai Communiqué. For Nakajima, this proved that the conclusion of the peace treaty was just another example of Japanese following the United States (tai-Bei tsuizui). Yet, progressives hailed the treaty in order to preserve their image of the PRC as the champion of their own national liberation even while doing so was clearly just another example of Japan’s submission to the United States.43 Thus, for Nakajima the peace treaty was one more example of the Japanese lack of national identity. Economic aid to the PRC also came in for criticism. On November 29, 1979, just before Ōhira’s China visit, the Asian Problems Study Group met with the prime minister and urged caution in extending aid to the PRC. They contended that any economic aid amounted to indirect military aid, as it freed up resources for investment in the military, and warned that economic aid might provoke the Soviet Union. They also worried about the reaction from Southeast Asian nations to a massive aid package for the PRC. Finally, Ōhira’s aid package smacked of being a gift (omiyage) offered as a sign of appreciation that made the Japanese seem a supplicant currying favor with the Chinese.44 Nakajima Mineo similarly warned that Japanese economic support for the PRC modernization program, even if it excluded direct military assistance or cooperation, indirectly funded PRC military expansion. He also reveled in pointing out the irony of Japanese pacifists uncritically supporting Japanese aid to the PRC while Deng and the Chinese leadership forged closer and closer ties with conservative politicians, “who a few years ago most adamantly supported what the Chinese called ‘the revival of Japanese militarism.’ ”45 Yet, there was little in this criticism that suggested what a more autonomous or “subjective” policy toward China would have entailed. There was little discussion of alternatives to the treaty or suggestions as to how economic cooperation might be effectively tied to other political issues such as, for example, settlement of the Senkaku Islands dispute. Rather, criticism often seemed driven principally by nationalist resentment of the perceived lack of independence in Japanese foreign policy. In this respect, it seems similar to the purported idealism of the postwar leftists and progressives who lamented the lack of resistance to the United States and protested the pragmatism of the Japanese government in sacrificing relations with China in favor of the US-Japan Security Treaty.

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Leftist and progressive alienation from Chinese nationalism Leftist and progressive forces in Japan welcomed the conclusion of the peace treaty as the culmination of their efforts to promote Sino-Japanese friendship. Many soon began to have misgivings, however, about the nature of the PRC reform program and its implications for China’s foreign relations, as Chinese strategic and economic interests encouraged greater cooperation with Japan and the United States. Moreover, as Sino-Japanese relations became more supportive of conservative nationalist narratives, the PRC became correspondingly less useful for progressive Japanese nationalists. An important turning point in leftist and progressive views of China was the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in early 1979, after which they began to abandon the PRC and construct new narratives of Sino-Japanese relations that in some ways reinforced conservative triumphalism.

The Sino-Vietnamese War, 1979 In early 1979, Japanese leftists and progressives watched with horror the punitive Chinese military expedition against Vietnam. The war, which involved only about three weeks of fighting, today ranks as a fairly minor event in the history of the Cold War. In 1979, however, the war between the two Asian socialist countries, both so intertwined with Japanese notions of national identity, came as a great shock to many and touched off a short but intense debate regarding the nature of the PRC regime. Although the immediate debate had largely run its course by the middle of the year, it is illustrative of some of the long-­term changes in Japanese perceptions of the PRC in the late 1970s.46 Conservatives, not surprisingly, reveled in the opportunity to attack their domestic opponents’ socialist internationalism and narratives of Sino-Japanese relations. In a round-­table discussion published in the monthly Chūō kōron in April 1979, Nakajima Mineo, Nagai Yōnosuke, and Yano Tōru, a scholar of Southeast Asia, traced the cause of the war to the nature of the PRC regime, the aggressive nature of socialist states in general and gave considerable, at times inordinate, attention to the Sino-Japanese peace treaty as contributing to the outbreak of the war. They blamed the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty for pushing the Vietnamese to conclude their own treaty with the Soviet Union which led to the decisive breakdown in Sino-Vietnamese relations, the invasion of Cambodia, and ultimately the Sino-Vietnamese War. Yano concluded that it was actually the Sino-Japanese treaty that destroyed the peace in East Asia and

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characterized the treaty as one of the “greatest lapses of judgment” in Japanese diplomatic history.47 For Nakajima, the war was really a grave miscalculation on the part of the PRC leaders—a miscalculation that resulted in heavy casualties and threatened the reform program.48 The PRC was drawn into this fiasco, he claimed, partly by poor intelligence capabilities but, more importantly, by a dangerous, obstinate nationalism. Chinese nationalism had two attributes that made it dangerous. One was the continued influence of Sino-­centric thinking in the PRC, which led Chinese leaders to overestimate their own capabilities and made them arrogant and reluctant to back down in any confrontation. The second was the Leninist tradition of anti-­imperialist nationalism which, contrary to Japanese socialist dogma, made socialist states more concerned than other states with protecting the integrity of territorial borders and more belligerent in solving interstate conflicts.49 Thus, Nakajima contended that Asian anti-­imperialist nationalism and socialism, two pillars of postwar Japanese progressive national identity, made the PRC dangerously belligerent. Nagai similarly argued that Japanese intellectuals had fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the PRC regime and Marxism-Leninism. Lenin, Nagai argued, had been heavily influenced by Carl von Clausewitz, whose military theories also significantly influenced classical realism. Lenin applied Clausewitz’s idea of war as an extension of ordinary politics to the international class struggle. This made socialist states particularly prone to political violence in international disputes.50 The logical outcome of this analysis was a construction of the PRC as a state following basically realist tenets in international politics: seeking to maximize state power for the pursuit of national interests, and willing to use any means necessary, including violence, to attain them. Nagai concluded that, in fact, the PRC represented the ultimate example of the unprincipled pursuit of national power: we can say that China represents the pinnacle of Machiavellianism. In 1972 they were criticizing “Japanese militarism,” now they are inviting defense agency officials to Beijing . . . Because [of ideas like] the enemy of my enemy is my friend and yesterday’s enemy is today’s friend, the Chinese are opportunistic and quick to change their positions, even compared to the Soviet Union. I dare say that China is the least trustworthy and most dangerous country.51

In a pointed critique, Nagai argued that if they did not come to grips with this reality, Japanese intellectuals, who had always regretted their failure to prevent

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Japan’s last war, may well find themselves regretting that their idealism and pro-Beijing sentiments made them complicit in another war in Asia. Interestingly, this view of the PRC—as an old-­fashioned great power devoted to the pursuit of national interests by military means—came to be shared even by progressives. For example, the pacifist scholar of international relations Seki Hiroharu, in a discussion on the war, adopted a liberal worldview in which increasing economic interdependence, pressing new transnational issues, and changing international norms against the use of military force were leading the world toward a more peaceful political order. He identified the main threat to this new international order as the continued influence of the modern nation-­state concept, a concept increasingly at odds with the more interdependent, “synchronized” world system. Another discussant, Kugai Saburō, well known as a critic of the American war in Vietnam, agreed that the basic problem of international politics was that while in the advanced, industrial North, people had already begun to think in global terms, those in the Third World and socialist countries were still stuck in the “old-­fashioned” (furukusai) mode of thinking in terms of the nation-­state.52 Seki and Kugai thus envisioned a bifurcated world political system: a new post-­nationalist liberal world order governed by the moderating effects of economic interdependence and shared norms of international cooperation, and the old world ruled by the nationalist ideology and military security demands of the nation-­state. Seki argued that the key to determining which of these two worlds prevailed lay with the United States and the PRC. Seki argued that American leaders were split between those committed to the new world, who were working to advance the liberal cause, and those locked into an old-­fashioned nationalist, military-­strategic mode of thinking. The leadership of the PRC, on the other hand, was completely governed by the old, nationalist ideology committed to the pursuit of national military power, intensified by a powerful victim mentality (this despite the fact that, for Seki, the PRC was undeniably a military and political superpower). Seki concluded that the fate of the new liberal order rested with American liberals’ ability to both rein in their own domestic hawks and at the same time deal with the challenge from a militant, nationalist PRC. Without US leadership on this front, the world risked slipping back into a modernist nation-­state system governed by the recourse to military force in the settlement of international disputes.53 Here we have a complete reversal of early postwar progressives’ normative judgments of the United States and the PRC. The US was now perceived as the more benign and progressive power in whom was invested the responsibility to temper the aggressive proclivities of an “old-­fashioned” China.

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For many Japanese, the PRC appeared even more old-­fashioned and threatening because of the declared aim of the Chinese invasion to “punish” the Vietnamese. Many drew an explicit comparison with Japan’s invasion of China, which began as a limited war to “punish” the Chinese. For example, Kugai noted that the PRC’s use of the word punishment (chōbatsu) brought to mind the use of similar terms in wartime Japan. Nagai argued that the similarity of the terms like punishment or sanction (seisai) used to justify Chinese intervention in Vietnam and the term punishment (yōchō) used by Japanese militarists suggested that the Chinese leadership was animated by an ideology that, like wartime Japanese Asianism, posited an international moral hierarchy in which Chinese leaders reserved the right to punish their perceived inferiors.54 Tsuji Kōgo, a reporter specializing in covering China for the Mainichi shimbun, argued that the PRC leadership’s choice of terms was proof that they were out of touch with international political and diplomatic norms.55 For conservatives and progressives alike, China’s war in Vietnam encouraged a view of the PRC as driven by the pursuit of old-­fashioned, state-­centered definitions of national interest through the maximization of state power, possessed by an atavistic, aggressive nationalism that predisposed the Chinese to resort to military force. The PRC was thus a potential, if not yet actual, threat to world peace and stability. Added to this view, moreover, was a kind of postmodern conceit constructing the PRC as backward, out of touch with the norms of the international community—a modernist remnant in a postmodern, post-­ national, globalized world—that dovetailed with the triumphalist narratives of conservatives.

The JCP and the new relationship with China The JCP had long been at odds with its Chinese counterpart. In fact, other Japanese critics in the late 1970s were only just coming around to a view of the PRC that the Japanese Communists had been advancing for a decade or more. Although the JCP did not publicly oppose the conclusion of the peace treaty, they attacked the anti-­hegemony clause, denouncing the “hegemonial and great power policies of Peking’s leaders” and their attempts to “draw Japan into an antiSoviet alliance.”56 The Chinese attack on Vietnam predictably provoked vociferous condemnation. All blame for the Indochina problem was placed squarely at the feet of the Chinese—Pol Pot was a puppet of Mao, who the PRC leadership had encouraged to violate Vietnamese borders in response to which the Vietnamese

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invasion of Cambodia was an act of self-­defense. The party accused the US and Japanese governments, as well as the UN Security Council, of aiding and abetting Chinese aggression and hegemonism. The JCP even defended the Vietnamese government against criticism of its treatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, arguing that the exodus of Vietnamese boat people (the vast majority of whom were ethnic Chinese) was orchestrated by the PRC leadership. The Chinese withdrawal was hailed as a defeat for Chinese hegemonism and a victory for Vietnamese national resistance.57 JCP criticism meshed well with increasing criticism from other quarters of the PRC leadership as pursuing a narrow, aggressive, nationalist agenda. Throughout the rest of the 1980s, while conservative Japanese governments worked to maintain cooperative relations with the PRC, the Japanese Communists would take great pride in being among the staunchest critics of Chinese “hegemonism.”

The JSP on the PRC and the nature of Asian socialism The JSP welcomed the conclusion of the peace treaty. The party claimed political credit for its part in advancing the treaty, though, in fact, the JSP had played little role in Sino-Japanese relations since the party’s importance in this regard was overshadowed by the Kōmeitō after the Takeiri mission of 1972. Displaying a remarkable naiveté regarding PRC foreign policy goals, or perhaps simply wishful thinking, the JSP also claimed the peace treaty would be the final blow to the US-Japan alliance, which was deemed to be incompatible with the Japanese commitment to anti-­hegemony. In short, the JSP preferred to maintain its faith in Japan-China relations as contributing to Japanese national liberation, regardless of troublesome signs from the PRC leadership that it was now fully supportive of the postwar conservative Japanese political order and had no desire to see the Japanese nation “liberated” from its alliance with the United States.58 The Sino-Vietnamese War, however, finally provoked a rethinking of the role of the PRC in world politics. Although criticism of the PRC was generally rather muted, the JSP officially condemned both the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. The JSP acknowledged, however, that the great powers, including China, bore a greater responsibility for international conditions and that the PRC must therefore bear a greater share of the blame for the conflict with Vietnam. The JSP regretted the Chinese invasion, but in a backhanded defense explained that since the world was still governed by the

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norms of power politics, at times even socialist powers fell into the trap of putting their own national interests ahead of world peace and socialism.59 Therefore, although generally mild when compared to the that of the JCP, the party’s criticism of the PRC similarly recast the PRC as a great power pursuing its own narrow national interests in the world of power politics, rather than the leader of international socialism or sponsor of national liberation. Most telling, however, was a new contrast the JSP drew between Japanese and Chinese socialism. In previous pronouncements the party had always equated revolutionary socialism and national liberation movements with the world peace movement and claimed that the JSP’s involvement in the Japanese peace movement and opposition to the US-Japanese alliance were inseparable from these international movements. The party now repudiated these links. “The JSP,” the party declared, “is a pacifist, democratic socialist party dedicated to unarmed neutrality; [JSP socialism] is different than the socialism in countries established through armed revolution.” The JSP differed from the revolutionary parties in the PRC, Vietnam, and Soviet Union in that, “our party from its establishment has fought for peace based on the peace constitution . . . and has fought for world peace. During this time we have always criticized the power politics of socialist countries such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and have clearly expressed our opposition to Chinese nuclear tests.”60 The Chinese or Vietnamese revolutions could no longer be considered models for the socialist or peace movements in Japan. In fact, Japanese socialism was now considered different and implicitly more advanced—more committed to peace, less narrowly nationalist, less prone to power politics—than the socialism of the CCP and other Third World revolutionary parties. The most advanced forms of socialism were no longer to be found in Asian national independence movements, but in the democratic socialist parties of Japan and Western Europe.

The intellectual repudiation of Chinese nationalism The JSP re-­evaluation of Chinese socialism in the wake of the Sino-Vietnamese War was part of a broader repudiation of Chinese nationalism on the part of Japanese progressives. Etō Shinkichi, one of postwar Japan’s pre-­eminent China scholars, warned throughout his career against the danger inherent in Japanese identification with China. Japanese intellectuals, he argued, identified with an idealized vision of China. Their own identities were thus threatened when contact with the real China inevitably contradicted their idealized image, producing disappointment and resentment. This drove a “love-­hate” cycle in

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Japanese views of China in which Japanese veered between periods of uncritical idolization of China and periods of contempt for China accompanied by attitudes of Japanese superiority.61 The disappointed reaction of many Japanese leftists and progressives to their own “loss of China” in the late 1970s in some ways conforms to Etō’s pattern as they repudiated their identification with China and came to propound notions of Chinese backwardness that reversed early postwar images and eerily mirrored the triumphalism of conservatives. Perhaps the most remarkable example of this pattern is Niijima Atsuyoshi, Japan’s premier Maoist scholar, who had staked his career on unswerving dedication to Mao and the Cultural Revolution. When the PRC betrayed the ideals he had invested in China, Niijima responded by rewriting the history of the PRC as one of failure and backwardness that proved the superiority of Japanese and Western modernity. In February 1979, on the eve of the Chinese punitive expedition against Vietnam, Niijima, who had left China studies in 1972, returned to re-­examine his earlier views of Mao’s China and the Cultural Revolution. Niijima explained that he had left China studies in the early 1970s as a protest against the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, which he interpreted as the first step toward a Sino-Japanese alliance. Niijima feared that once this was achieved, the field of China studies would become just another establishment discipline (taisei no gakumon) that supported the domestic conservative political order and the international Cold War order.62 Thus, once it became clear to Niijima that China studies would no longer serve as a movement of national resistance to the domestic and international political orders, he had abandoned it. In the late 1970s he carried forward this process, abandoning not just China studies, but even the Cultural Revolution when it no longer supported his nationalist program. What Niijima called the “fall of China” was the result of the Chinese leadership’s abandonment of the internationalist ideals of the Cultural Revolution in favor of the goals of the communist state. Niijima claimed that he had always supported the Cultural Revolution as a spiritual revolution that would create a new socialist world order, one that would “achieve the true nature of humanity.” The Cultural Revolution as it actually developed, however, was nothing but a power struggle for control of the state apparatus, “even a ‘dimwitted China scholar’ like myself came to see that,” Niijima confessed.63 Niijima, like so many others at the end of the 1970s, came to see the PRC as a normal, modern great power dedicated to the pursuit of narrow interests over the ideals he had invested in China.

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Niijima was unsparing in his criticism of PRC foreign policy under Deng Xiaoping as a betrayal of all the revolutionary ideals he had invested in Mao and the Cultural Revolution and as a betrayal of the Japanese people’s movement for national liberation. The anti-­hegemony clause of the peace treaty, he charged, when combined with PRC support for Japanese defense forces, had to be seen as a program for joint Japanese-Chinese domination of Asia. Niijima made even more provocative criticisms of Deng’s 1978 visit to Japan, especially his meeting with the Japanese emperor. Niijima explicitly accused Deng of betraying the Japanese people: “I wish [Deng] would not go against the feelings of the people in Japan who have struggled against the reactionaries and for a people’s alliance [between Japan and China].” In the end, however, Niijima argued that there was a certain moral logic to the meeting of Deng and Hirohito as symbols of oppression and the violence of the state: “the emperor represents the blood of the Japanese people and the people of the Japanese colonies . . . massacred or held in long-­term detention and tortured by the secret police under the Peace Preservation Law. Deng Xiaoping . . . represents the blood of millions of political prisoners as reported by Amnesty International.”64 Niijima thus echoed conservatives in proposing the moral equivalency of contemporary Chinese Communist policies and those of wartime Japan. Niijima’s citing of an Amnesty International report in his criticism of the PRC may seem a minor point, but it echoes the JSP repudiation of Asian socialism and is indicative of a pattern repeated by other Japanese leftists and progressives in the late 1970s. Niijima’s conversion represents what might be considered a progressive “escape from Asia” (datsu-A) in which Japanese progressives embraced Western norms of international conduct, standards of social democracy and human rights, by which they increasingly judged the PRC. The PRC generally scored poorly by these new standards, reversing postwar judgments regarding the historical development of Chinese and Japanese society with Japan now the more modern and advanced society. Niijima was not the only example of this phenomenon. Other Japanese leftists and progressives came to similar conclusions, if usually expressed in more lamenting and less damning tones. Nomura Kōichi explained Japanese disappointment with the PRC by reinterpreting the history of the Chinese Revolution as a national, rather than a socialist, revolution. This suggested a tension between the two that had been largely absent in the earlier postwar period, when nationalist and socialist movements were taken to be nearly synonymous, when real nationalism was by definition socialist. Now, however, the nationalist character of the revolution, which Nomura referred to with the

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foreign loan-­word nashonarizumu, was reason to look critically at the Chinese Revolution rather than to identify with it. Nomura pointed out that for Mao, socialism had only ever been a means to an end, the “arrow” used to hit the “target” of national salvation, summed up in Mao’s belief that “only socialism could save China.”65 As a means to an end, socialism was always liable to be abandoned should it prove ineffective in the pursuit of state goals, as the new PRC regime under Deng had seemingly concluded. Nomura, like others, worried that the PRC at the end of the 1970s was repeating the mistakes of the prewar Japanese. The Deng regime, he argued, while holding high the banner of Mao Zedong Thought was, in fact, “walking the path of national socialism (nashonaru sōsharizumu).”66 Nomura wondered whether the Chinese reform program was motivated by the same “honor-­ student” mentality of catching up with the West that Takeuchi Yoshimi had argued led prewar Japanese to seek equality with the West through the domination of Asia. The historical judgment of Japanese progressives like Nomura thus had come full circle. Whereas the question of war responsibility and the lessons of history in the early postwar period seemed to impel an identification with the PRC, by the end of the 1970s, the lessons of Japanese history were now being applied to a critical analysis of the PRC, according to which it seemed to many Japanese progressives that the PRC was repeating the mistakes of prewar Japan. Oda Makoto, who had always been somewhat suspicious of the pro-China sympathies of his colleagues, followed a similar course to a critique of Japanese identification with China. Oda evinced a typically ambiguous attitude toward the peace treaty. Although unobjectionable in principle, Oda, like others, saw the treaty as yet another manifestation of Japanese subordination to the United States. Oda saw the treaty as being principally the product of US Cold War policy, and worried that the treaty would become an anti-Soviet military alliance or merely an opportunity for Japanese businessmen in China. But he also saw the possibility of appropriating the treaty for Japanese purposes, of making the treaty “our own”: I think that for Japan the number one problem is not China but America. This is because the United States rules us now . . . The Soviet Union rules China, so for China there are a lot of reasons for feeling that the Soviet Union is behaving as a hegemon. But if we apply the principle of not seeking hegemony to our own situation, we must first apply it to the United States. If we don’t, we will end up entering into a Japan-US-PRC military association . . . We must always think focused on Japan.67

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Therefore, Oda saw the treaty as another example of the lack of Japanese national independence, but hoped to use the anti-­hegemony principle to regain some of that autonomy through resistance to American domination. At the time of the conclusion of the treaty, Oda worried most about Japan’s part in US Cold War strategy and was seemingly less concerned about the dangers of Chinese hegemony. Oda’s focus changed with the Chinese attack on Vietnam. For Oda, easily the most recognizable leader of the Japanese anti-Vietnam War movement, the Chinese invasion was not only a great betrayal of the Vietnamese people’s struggle for national liberation, a cause he had championed for years, it was also the final nail in the coffin for a nationalist identification with China. Oda found the basic flaw in the Asianism of his colleagues going back to Takeuchi Yoshimi in basically equating China with Asia. Oda argued that Asia was defined less by geography or common culture than by a common position in the world political system. He argued that Asia by definition was made up of small, poor countries united in resistance to great power domination. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam exposed the PRC as a great power. As such, the PRC could not be included in his vision of Asia as a transnational non-­aligned movement opposed to superpower domination of international society. In fact, in Oda’s terms the PRC was no longer even a legitimate member of Asia. Rather, the PRC was counted among those great powers, along with the United States and Soviet Union, against which the oppressed nations of Asia were to struggle. On this basis, Oda was critical not only of the Japanese government’s policy of cooperation with the PRC but also of the whole discourse of Sino-Japanese friendship. Of course, Oda conceded, friendship was always desirable, but simply appealing to friendship and accepting every position of a foreign country ran the risk of making one a tool of that country and violated the principle of national independence. Thus, Oda saw Japan’s relations with the PRC in terms similar to other more conservative critics— as a fundamental compromise of Japanese national independence, a submission to the PRC that replicated Japan’s domination by the United States.68 Leftists and progressives faced a basic dilemma at the heart of the China problem. If relations with China were to contribute above all to Japanese national independence, how was one to deal with Chinese policy that contradicted this ultimate goal? Confronted with this dilemma at the end of the 1970s, leftists and progressives increasingly repudiated their earlier identification with China and Chinese nationalism. This basic dilemma existed, however, not just for those Japanese on the left of Japanese politics, but for conservatives who appropriated the relationship with China to support triumphalist narratives of Japanese history and national identity as well.

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Conclusion The changes in Chinese foreign policy over the course of the 1970s made the China problem increasingly attractive to conservatives. The beginning of the Reform and Opening program, and especially the Japanese aid program to the PRC, made relations with the PRC gratifying to the national self-­image of Japanese conservatives, supporting a narrative of Japanese success and a positive reinterpretation of modern Japanese history; narratives that seemed, moreover, to be shared by the Chinese leadership itself. Relations with China, in 1970 one of the most important challenges to postwar conservative policies and narratives of national identity, had by the end of the decade become a powerful support. The redefinition of national interests and identity in both countries was the basis for the period of Sino-Japanese friendship in the 1980s. As PRC foreign policy and Sino-Japanese relations became more useful and gratifying for Japanese conservatives, they became less so for Japanese progressives and leftists. By the end of the decade, which had begun with high hopes that the improvement in Sino-Japanese relations would contribute to the ultimate realization of the progressive policy program of unarmed neutrality and the project of complete national independence, progressives and leftists were renouncing the PRC as old-­fashioned and threatening to a new postmodern, internationalist vision of the future of the Japanese nation. Progressive and leftist alienation contrasted sharply with the early postwar identification with the PRC and Chinese nationalism and, like conservative triumphalism, reversed the relationship between the two nations. The transformation of China’s place in Japanese discourse, however, could have unanticipated and unintended consequences. Triumphalism encouraged Japanese conservatives to assume Chinese acquiescence, if not support, for their conservative agenda, assumptions that, when challenged, could produce feelings of betrayal and resentment. At the same time, Japanese leftists and progressives, who earlier might have been expected to support a Chinese nationalist challenge to conservative triumphalism, were alienated and more circumspect, if not suspicious of any Chinese nationalist agenda. All of this made it more likely that changes in definitions of national interest and narratives of national identity that challenged Sino-Japanese friendship would increase the discursive influence of the right-­wing critics of government policy toward China as submissive and symbolic of the lack of a normal national identity.

Epilogue and Conclusion

In the spring of 1980, the Tōshōdaiji, a Buddhist temple in Nara, Japan, sent a lacquer statue of the Chinese monk Ganjin (Jianzhen, in Chinese) to the PRC for a month-­long public exhibition as a celebration of the new relationship between the two countries. The Tang-­dynasty monk landed in Japan in the year 753 and, in addition to propagating Buddhism, is credited with disseminating Chinese medical and architectural knowledge as well as founding the Tōshōdaiji, where the statue, a Japanese national treasure, had resided since its completion just after his death in 763. In April 1980, it went on display at the Daming Temple in Yangzhou from where Ganjin had started his journey more than 1,200 years earlier. In both countries the story of Ganjin was touted as a symbol of the restoration of a long history of Sino-Japanese friendship. In Japan, Inoue Yasushi’s account of Ganjin’s exploits, The Roof Tile of Tempyō, was made into a feature film. In newly reopened Chinese universities scholars turned out articles on the life of Ganjin, rewriting the history of Sino-Japanese relations as more than a millennia of friendship. In 1980 there were good reasons for the optimism reflected in the celebration of the life of Ganjin. It seemed the two countries had overcome a century of imperialism, war, and Cold War estrangement to establish a foundation for close, cooperative relations. The Chinese leadership had succeeded in breaking out of the isolation that had characterized PRC foreign relations for most of the 1960s and was welcomed by a Japanese government eager to contribute to the Reform and Opening program. Japanese leaders, for their part, faced a Chinese leadership favorably disposed to the US-Japan alliance and much of their conservative political agenda, especially on defense. Moreover, the Chinese leadership seemed hungry for Japanese aid and technology and eager to learn from the modern Japanese experience in way that gratified Japanese self-­images. The new relationship with the PRC seemed to promise regional stability, profit for Japanese industry, the opportunity to make a distinctly Japanese contribution to international society, as well as considerable returns in terms of national pride.

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As of 1980, it seemed that the dramatic events of the 1970s had prepared a solid base for close, stable Sino-Japanese relations for the foreseeable future.

The China problem and the history problem Of course, in hindsight, with knowledge of the political, territorial, and historical disputes that today increasingly threaten stable relations, this early optimism might seem naïve. Indeed, for a contemporary reader, the most striking part of the Ganjin story might be the fact that he successfully made landfall in Japan only after five failed attempts over several years during which he lost friends and suffered numerous shipwrecks, including one that left him blind for life. Ganjin’s life may seem more symbolic of the trials and tribulations of pursuing SinoJapanese friendship than its long history. This study is not an investigation into the origins of the history problem. Yet any history of modern relations, especially one that focuses on the role of national identity, is bound to provoke questions about the historical disputes that seem to dominate the contemporary relationship. It might be worthwhile, therefore, to hazard a few preliminary thoughts about what the findings of this study might tell us about the history problem that arose in the 1980s (with the caveat that these are not offered as conclusions about the origins of, or an attempt to assign blame for, the history problem). In 1982 the Chinese government protested reports of changes to Japanese history textbooks that allegedly downplayed the aggressive nature of Japan’s wartime conduct. In 1985 student protests erupted in Chinese cities in response to the official visit by Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo which enshrines Japan’s war dead (including, since 1978, those executed as war criminals after World War II). These early history crises were contained, usually through Japanese efforts to placate the Chinese, and while irritating did not threaten the general mood of friendship or the policy of economic cooperation. Yet confrontations continued, fueled by nationalist resentment on both sides, until by the middle of the 1990s conflicts over history, combined with the dramatic rise of Chinese political, economic, and military power, threatened to eclipse the compatible interests upon which cooperative relations had been established. The history problem was partly the result of the changing international strategic context. The Sino-Japanese relationship in the 1970s was built upon shared American and Chinese strategic concern regarding the Soviet Union.

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After the 1982 Twelfth Party Congress, however, the PRC leadership shifted to a new “independent and autonomous” foreign policy line that lessened the relative importance of anti-Soviet strategy in PRC foreign policy and weakened the strategic underpinnings of the Sino-Japanese relationship. For this reason, some scholars have sought the origin of the history problem in changing Chinese strategy. For example, Okabe Tatsumi has argued that, “In 1982 China radically altered its foreign policy and sought some reconciliation with the Soviet Union. Not by coincidence did the textbook issue come to the fore between Japan and China in that very year.”1 While changing Chinese strategy is certainly important, if one considers the discursive context of the China problem in Japan, the history problem seems less like a radical break with, and more like a continuation of, trends observed in this study—the rise of conservative triumphalism, the alienation of leftists and progressives from the PRC, and increasing criticism of government China policy from the right. Ironically, the transformation of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s that helped to create compatible definitions of national interest also helped to reinforce conflicting concepts of national identity and historical narratives that erupted in the 1980s as the history problem. There were latent tensions in the relationship from the beginning. For example, recall that, as Professor Mōri Kazuko put it, relations in the early 1980s were built upon a common understanding of the relationship between the two countries as one between an “aiding country” and an “aided country.”2 Such a consciousness supported economic cooperation but was also fraught with tension from the outset due to the hierarchical relationship it implied. There were also, as Professor Okabe has pointed out, important differences in how each side interpreted the settlement of historical issues in the 1970s.3 Both Mao and Deng had proclaimed on several occasions that the past was past and the two nations ought to look to the future rather than dwell on history. For the Chinese leadership, this was possible because the correct understanding of history, agreed upon by both nations in the Japan-PRC joint communiqué of 1972, had been settled in favor of the historical narrative of Japanese aggression and Chinese resistance on which CCP legitimacy was based. Even when suggesting that the two countries not be bound by their past, no PRC leader ever suggested that the Japanese interpretation of the past was unimportant. In fact, in the 1970s PRC leaders expressed concern regarding historical consciousness in Japan as reflected in the suicide of Mishima Yukio, the activities and ideology of the Seirankai and, most famously, the wording of Prime Minister Tanaka’s apology in 1972.

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Many Japanese, on the other hand, took the postwar settlement and the focus on the future as liberation from a historical burden. As described earlier, Japanese across the political spectrum welcomed the normalization of relations as a settling of accounts, a decisive end to the postwar period of reconciliation and rehabilitation. Japanese conservatives, especially, took this to mean that they had been freed to pursue their domestic nationalist agenda without opposition or interference from the Chinese government. Conservative triumphalism encouraged movement on a raft of long-­delayed initiatives aimed at finally recovering a lost national identity by overturning leftist and progressive nationalist narratives and historical interpretations. Beginning in the late 1970s, conservatives sought to rehabilitate imperial and state symbols by, for example, legalizing the use of imperial reign names in official dates and making Kimigayo the legal national anthem. In 1978, priests of Yasukuni Shrine challenged the justness of postwar legal and historical judgments by secretly interring the souls of executed Japanese war criminals. The government also renewed efforts aimed at the patriotic revision of history textbooks, a basic plank in the LDP platform dating back to its founding in 1955, efforts that would result in the Chinese (and Korean) protests in 1982 that in hindsight generally mark the outbreak of the history problem.4 In some ways the new relationship with China encouraged these efforts. After the normalization of relations in 1972, Chinese leaders turned away from the leftist and progressive contacts they had developed in the early postwar period and cultivated a new group of conservative friends of China. In fact, PRC efforts to forge closer relations with the Japanese conservative establishment advanced to the point that in 1979 rumors appeared in the Japanese press that Chinese leaders had extended an invitation to visit Beijing to former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, long considered by both the Chinese leadership and Japanese progressives as Japan’s most infamous reactionary.5 Many conservatives expected that the new relationship with the PRC had finally removed a major obstacle to revision of the postwar settlement, including what they saw as an overly critical, masochistic view of history imposed on Japan after defeat. These expectations would be dashed by the emergence of the history problem, leading to considerable resentment and a sense of betrayal. This renewed conservative offensive in the contest to define Japanese national identity occurred at the same time the Chinese leadership was engaged in its own historical revisionist project. The new regime was busy rewriting the history of the PRC in order to shore up its legitimacy and justify the reform program. The 1981 party resolution on history exposed the mistakes of Mao’s most radical

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policies associated with the Cultural Revolution, while concluding that Mao’s achievements outweighed his mistakes. This helped to reclaim Mao as the founder of the ruling party, but also pushed the party to identify itself with the anti-­imperialist narratives of the early revolution, downplaying the significance of the struggle with the Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War and stressing national unity in opposing foreign aggression. The prominence of Japan in the history of imperialism in China both made Japan an easy target of this nationalist narrative and made the hierarchy and inequality implied in the new relationship with Japan a potential threat to government legitimacy. This threat was only exacerbated by challenges from Japanese historical revisionists who seemed to downplay the Japanese role in the history of the victimization of China. Thus, by the early 1980s, for both strategic and ideological reasons, the PRC leadership was becoming more wary of conservative narratives that their own policies had encouraged. In Japan, conservatives were not the only ones who saw Chinese policies as encouraging conservative Japanese political agendas and historical revisionism. Many of the alienated progressives and leftists, who otherwise shared Chinese concern regarding conservative historical revisionism in Japan, agreed that Chinese policy and rhetoric enabled the emergence of the very narratives that PRC leaders claimed to find so offensive in the 1980s. In 1981 Furukawa Mantarō published the first detailed monograph on the history of postwar Sino-Japanese relations. Furukawa’s study is sympathetic to Chinese positions and has been taken by subsequent scholars as an exemplar of normative, pro-China scholarship in Japan.6 Despite his pro-China sympathies, however, he was critical of PRC policy toward Japan in the late 1970s and early 1980s and lamented the fact that the Chinese leadership had abandoned its support for the Japanese nation in its struggle against the Japanese conservatives and United States in favor of cooperating with “top-­level” Japanese political and business leaders.7 Furukawa held that, in courting the Japanese conservative leadership and supporting the expansion of the Japanese military, the Chinese leadership was at least partly responsible for the history problem: “it is those very forces that oppose the Japanese people’s desire for peace and anti-­militarism that are the source of the intellectual trends manifest in the textbook problem. Chinese support for Japanese military expansion is equivalent to supporting these forces and acting to promote their antics.”8 Similarly, Tagawa Seiichi, a long-­time conservative “dove” who had spent his career pushing a pro-China policy in the LDP until splitting with the party in 1976 to join the New Liberal Club, simultaneously welcomed Chinese support for his position in the history

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textbook dispute but also criticized the PRC leadership for contributing to the problem in first place. In the last chapter of his 1983 political memoir, Tagawa held the Chinese leadership at least partly responsible for the development of the history problem by encouraging the very right-­wing revisionist forces they now criticized. He noted press reports that PRC leaders had welcomed visits by right-­ wing stalwarts like Kishi Nobusuke and argued that the obvious effect of welcoming even the most “unrepentant” to Beijing as “honored guests” was to “give them the impression that they had been given a free pass on the role they had played from before the war until normalization,” ultimately encouraging the very behavior the Chinese leadership now claimed to find so intolerable. At the very least, Tagawa complained, the Chinese leadership should not encourage “those who cover their eyes to the war of aggression waged by Japan.”9 While the settlements of the 1970s laid the foundation for close, cooperative relations, they also helped plant the seeds of the history problem. Over the course of the 1970s, the China problem was transformed into a central support for the government’s policy of engagement and cooperation with the PRC, but also supported a triumphalist nationalist narrative that the Chinese leadership increasingly came to see as threatening. Progressives and leftists, natural allies in a struggle against these conservative narratives, had been alienated from the Chinese leadership which they saw as a less than wholly dependable partner, weakening their voice in the China problem discourse. On the other hand, right-­ wing critics of the government, who had spent the decade railing against government China policy as weak and submissive were primed to take over the fight against a government China policy they saw as appeasement and a threat to Japanese national identity.

Japanese national identity and the China problem What conclusions can we draw about the relationship between Japanese national identity and Sino-Japanese relations? The history of the China problem in the postwar period should make clear, first of all, that there was no lack of national sentiment in the Japanese debate on China policy. Quite the contrary, an overriding concern for the health of Japanese national identity was the primary motivation for participation in the China problem discourse. The discourse on China in postwar Japan was a nationalist discourse. Authors of various political stripes took up the pen to write on Sino-Japanese relations out of a desire to use the relationship with China to diagnose the problems with Japanese national

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identity and to prescribe their own remedies for a healthy, normal national consciousness. In fact, much of the literature examined in this study had as much to say about Japanese national identity as about conditions in China or the state of Sino-Japanese relations. The history of the China problem offers no evidence to support the idea that there was no nationalism in postwar Japan or that national identity was peculiarly weak or lacking. Not only was national sentiment a major motivation for participants in the China problem discourse, but the concerns of the discourse remained remarkably consistent. Throughout the postwar period and regardless of political position, observers of Japan’s relations with China found them marked by a lamentable and peculiarly Japanese lack of a normal, healthy national identity. Leftists and progressives saw the lack of relations with the PRC and incorporation into the American Cold War alliance system as proof that the Japanese nation had yet to achieve true national independence from foreign domination. Conservatives and those on the right found their adversaries’ identification with the PRC indicative of the loss of national consciousness to defeat, occupation, and foreign ideological influence. The obvious solution to this problem was also remarkably similar across the political spectrum. What was required was the awakening or recovery of a national consciousness that could be the basis for a truly independent approach to China and allow for the assertiveness and resistance necessary for the Japanese nation to play an autonomous world role. In short, the solution to postwar Japan’s China problem was always more Japanese nationalism. Nor was engagement with the China issue in postwar Japan, contentious as is was, an exercise in self-­flagellation imposed upon the Japanese by defeat or guilt. Participation in the China problem discourse did not require the suppression or sacrifice of national identity to atone for the collective sins of the past. Japanese took up the China problem not to challenge but rather to gratify their own notions of national identity. Dealing with the China issue did not involve becoming somehow less Japanese, but was an opportunity to advance one’s own vision of the Japanese nation in order to rescue national identity from the perceived crisis occasioned by defeat and occupation. Of course, historical narratives of the war were an important component of any construction of national identity and appeal to war guilt and war responsibility was an important rhetorical strategy. Authors on both the left and the right sought to associate rival nationalist narratives with past aggression and to associate their own with the fulfillment of the Japanese nation’s war responsibility. In the end, however, the China problem discourse was not driven primarily by guilt or contrition.

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Japanese policy toward China was not constrained by a lack of national consciousness or by a guilt-­induced reticence that inhibited the pursuit of national interests. The conservative mainstream that dominated Japanese government policy followed a consistent strategy in relations with China that was a corollary to the Yoshida Doctrine and sought expanded relations with the PRC, especially trade and economic relations, to the extent that these were compatible with the strategic alliance with the United States. The new relationship in the 1970s was the result largely of changes in Chinese foreign policy— rapprochement with the United States in the beginning of the decade and the move to economic reform at the end of the decade—that made relations with the PRC compatible with Japanese government strategy. Japanese leaders were not swept away on a tide of emotion and the settlements of the 1970s did not represent Japanese submission to Chinese demands. Japanese government negotiators were not reticent about asserting their positions in negotiations with the Chinese. On issues they deemed important, Japanese negotiators were decidedly unsentimental in sticking to their positions. This is not meant as a defense of Japanese government policy in the 1970s. One can argue with the policies pursued by the Japanese government, but these policies were based primarily on definitions of national interest and did not reflect the sentiment and emotion often assumed to define the Japanese approach to China. Government policy toward China was, of course, the subject of intense criticism in Japan from both the left and the right. The alternative policies put forward by these critics, whether left-­wing unarmed neutrality or right-­wing solidarity with the ROC, were often advanced in highly-­charged nationalist terms as alternatives to what were characterized as weak, traitorous policies of submission and appeasement. Thus, if one is to treat the influence of sentiment on Japanese policy toward China, this treatment would have to include not only sentiments like cultural affinity and war guilt but also the nationalist sentiment that often constrained Japanese negotiators, especially on sensitive issues like reparations and apologies. It is clear that postwar Japanese were not inhibited in the pursuit of national interest or national pride in their relations with China. They often disagreed on what those interests were or what they should be proud of, but this is hardly peculiar to the Japanese or their relations with China. The focus in this study on Japanese national identity is not meant to provide a final, comprehensive explanation for the evolution of postwar Sino-Japanese relations or to deny the importance of other factors in shaping those relations including, especially, the changing international strategic environment. It is undeniable that the transformation of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s was

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driven by strategic decisions in Washington and Moscow. Yet, it was through the mediation of Japanese nationalist discourse that these influences were brought to bear on the China problem in a way that produced coherent implications for Japanese national interest and national policy. Japanese engaged with the China problem as political agents, formulating a range of opinions and positions on the question of relations with China and what those relations meant for Japan. Japanese appropriated Chinese policy and rhetoric when it suited their purposes, criticized and resisted them when they did not. Sino-Japanese relations in the 1970s were far more complicated than can be captured in a narrative of either friendship or appeasement.

Notes Introduction   1 Brian J. McVeigh, Nationalisms of Japan: Managing and Mystifying Identity (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 3.   2 Harumi Befu, “Symbols of Nationalism and Nihonjinron,” in Ideology and Practice in Modern Japan, eds Roger Goodman and Kirsten Refsing (London: Routledge, 1992), 26–46; Kevin M. Doak, A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan: Placing the People (Leiden: Brill, 2007).   3 Ishibashi Masashi, “Aikokushin ni tsuite,” in Aikokushi ni tsuite, ed., Yomiuri shimbunsha (Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1970), 23.   4 Ōi Kai, “Toward the Formation of a New Japanese Nationalism,” Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan 2/2 (August, 1964), 16, originally published in Chūō kōron, July 1963.   5 Quoted in Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 2.   6 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991), 7; Ernst Haas, “What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?” International Organization 40/3 (Summer, 1986), 727.   7 Haas, “What is Nationalism?” 727.   8 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995), 146.   9 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7 10 Yosef Lapid, “Theorizing the ‘National’ in International Relations Theory: Reflections on Nationalism and Neorealism,” in International Organization: A Reader, eds Friedrich Kratockwil and Edward D. Mansfield (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), 26. 11 Billig, Banal Nationalism, 4. 12 Ibid., 6. 13 See for example, Wu Xuewen, Li Liande, and Xu Zhixian, Dangdai Zhong-Ri guanxi 1945–1994 (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe 1995); Tian Huan, ed., Zhanhou Zhong-Ri Guanxishi 1945–1995 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 2002). 14 Furukawa Mantarō, Nit-Chū sengo kankeishi (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1981); Tagawa Seiichi, Nit-Chū kōryū to Jimintō ryōshūtachi (Tokyo: Yomiuri shumbunsha, 1983). 15 Gao Zengjie, Riben de shehui sichao yu guomin qingxu (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2001), 198.

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16 Wan Ming, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic and Transformation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 84; Mike Mochizuki, “China-Japan Relations: Downward Spiral or a New Equilibrium?” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 135. 17 See for example, Nakajima Mineo, Nit-Chū yūkō to iu gensō (Tokyo: PHP shinsho, 2002); Kojima Tomoyuki, “Japan’s China Policy: The Diplomacy of Appeasement,” Japan Echo 15/4 (1988), 25–28. 18 Etō Shinkichi, Nijusseiki Nit-Chū kankeishi (Tokyo: Tōhō shobō, 2004), 265. 19 Okabe Tatsumi, “Historical Remembering and Forgetting in Sino-Japanese Relations,” in Memory and History in East and Southeast Asia: Issues of Identity in International Relations, ed. Gerrit W. Gong (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 2001), 49. 20 Okabe Tatsumi, Nit-Chū kankei no kako to shōrai: gokai o koete (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2006), 10; and Ibid., 52. 21 Kitaoka Shin’ichi, “Is Nationalism Intensifying in Japan?” Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry 20/1 (January 1, 2001). 22 Hidenori Ijiri, “Sino-Japanese Controversy since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization,” in China and Japan: History, Trends and Prospects, ed. Christopher Howe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 61. 23 Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, trans. Howard Greenfeld (New York: Orion Press, 1965), 52–53; and Lawerence R. Alschuler, The Psychopolitics of Liberation: Political Consciousness from a Jungian Perspective (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 44–45. 24 Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson, Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts (New York: Harcourt, 2007), 200. 25 Rikki Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the Search for Autonomy (London: Routledge, 1996), 13. 26 Kaizuka Shigeki and Sugawara Takeo, eds, Kōza Chūgoku, vol. 5, Nihon to Chūgoku (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1968), 261–76. 27 Etō Jun, Nakajima Mineo, Nishi Haruhiko, Kobori Keiichirō, and Takeda Taijun, “Shinpojiumu: Chūgoku kindai hyakunen no jitsuzō to kyozō,” Kikan geijutsu 5/3 (Summer, 1971), 51. 28 Delmer Brown, Nationalism in Japan: An Introductory Historical Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), 239. 29 Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1994), 221, 415. 30 See especially, Ishii Akira, Zhu Jianrong, Soeya Yoshihide, and Lin Xiaoguang, eds, Kiroku to koshō: Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka, Nit-Chū heiwa yūkō jōyaku teiketsu kōshō

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(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2003); and University of Tokyo Professor Tanaka Akihiko’s Database “The World and Japan” which makes available declassified documents on Japan’s international relations, including Sino-Japanese relations, at http://www. ioc.u-­tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/index.html. See also the documentary collection published by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kazankai ed., Nit-Chū kankei kihon shiryōshū, 1949–1997 (Tokyo: Kazankai, 1998). Important memoirs and oral history projects preserving the experiences of Japanese participants in relations with China in the 1970s include: Kuriyama Takakazu, Nakashima Takuma, Hattori Ryūji, and Etō Naoko, eds, Gaikō shōgenroku: Okinawa henkan, Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka, Nichi-Bei “mitsuyaku,” (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2010); Ogura Kazuo, Kiroku to koshō: Nit-Chū jitsumu kyōtei koshō (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2010); Morita Hajime, Hattori Ryūji, Nobori Amiko and Nakajima Takuma, Kokoro no ittō: kaisō no Ōhira Masayoshi sono hito to gaikō (Tokyo: Daiichi hōki, 2010); Nakae Yōsuke, Nit-Chū gaikō no shōgen (Tokyo: Sōtensha, 2008); and Nakae Yōsuke, Wakatsuki Hidekazu, Kanda Yutaka, and Kusunoki Ayako, Ajia gaikō dō to sei: moto Chūgoku taishi Nakae Yōsuke ōraru hisutorī (Tokyo: Sōtensha, 2010). See also, Hattori Ryūji, Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka: Tanaka Kakuei, Ōhira Masayoshi, kanryōtachi no chōsen (Tokyo: Chūō kōron shinsha, 2011). 31 “Official and semiofficial” sources are generally works by Chinese authors with privileged access to materials not publically available, see Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 15. On the nature of Chinese sources in general see, Chen Jian, “Not Yet a Revolution: Reviewing China’s ‘New Cold War Documentation,’ ” National Archives, 1998. http:// www.archives.gov/research/foreign-­policy/cold-­war/conference/chen-­jian.html; and Xia Yafeng, “The Study of Cold War International History in China: A Review of the Last Twenty Years,” Journal of Cold War Studies 10/1 (Winter, 2008), 81–115. Published documentary collections relevant to the study of relations with Japan in the 1970s include: Tian Huan, ed., Zhanhou Zhong-Ri guanxi wenxianji 1971–1995 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 1997); Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe/Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1994); Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1990); Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949–1976, 3 vols (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997); Deng Xiaoping ninanpu, 1975–1997, 2 vols (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2004). Memoirs include: Sun Pinghua, Zhong-Ri youhao suixianglu (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1986); Zhang Xiangshan, Zhong-Ri guanxi guankui yu jianzheng (Beijing: Dangdai shijie chubanshe, 1998); Wu Xuewen, Fengyu yinqing wosuo jingli de Zhong-Ri guanxishi (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2002). Some of the relevant official and semiofficial publications include: Chen Dacai, Yimin cuguan: Zhou Enlai yu Zhong-Ri guanxi (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1998); Pei Hua, Zhong-Ri waijiao fengyunzhong de Deng Xiaoping (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe,

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2002); and Lin Xiaoguang, Riben zhengfu kaifa yuanzhu yu Zhong-Ri guanxi (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2003). 32 The literature on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations is too voluminous to list here. For the history of relations in the 1970s specifically see, Ishii et al., Kiroku to koshō; Inoue Masaya, Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka no seijishi (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2010); and Hattori Ryūji, Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka. For general histories of the relationship that include treatment of the 1970s in Japanese see, Tanaka Akihiko, Nit-Chū kankei, 1945–1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1991); Amako Satoshi and Sonoda Shigeto, eds, Nit-Chū kōryū no shihanseiki (Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shimpōsha, 1998); Shimizu Yoshikazu, Chūgoku wa naze “han-Nichi” ni natta ka (Tokyo: bunshun shinsho, 2003); Mōri Kazuko, Nit-Chū kankei: sengo kara shinjidai e (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2006); Okabe Tatsumi, Nit-Chū kankei no kako to shōrai: gokai o koete (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2006); and Nit-Chū kankeishi, 1972–2012, 3 vols (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2012). In Chinese, see Lin Daizhao, Zhanhou Zhong-Ri guanxi (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1992); Wu Xuewen, Li Liande, and Xu Zhixian, Dangdai Zhong-Ri guanxi, 1945–1994 (Beijing: shishi chubanshe 1995); Tian Huan, ed., Zhanhou Zhong-Ri guanxishi, 1945–1995 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 2002); Jin Xide, Zhong-Ri guanxi: fujiao 30 zhounian de sikao (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2002); Xu Zhixian, ed., Zhong-Ri guanxi sanshinian, 1972–2002 (Beijing: shishi chubanshe, 2002); and Shi Guifang, Zhanhou Zhong-Ri guanxi, 1945–2003 (Beijing: dangdai shijie chubanshe, 2005). 33 Victor J. Koschmann, “Intellectuals and Politics,” in Postwar Japan as History, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 396.

Chapter 1   1 On Japanese reactions to the occupation see, John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 65–87.   2 Ibid., 255–73.   3 Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 31. On the Korean War and US-Japan relations see, John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System, A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy (London: Athlone Press, 1988), 47–48; and Tian, Zhanhou Zhong-Ri guanxishi, 87–95.   4 Quoted in Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 49–50.   5 Schaller, Altered States, 35–36; and Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 229–30.   6 Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1996), 27.

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  7 Franziska Seraphim, War, Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 113; Okamoto Kōichi, Imaginary Settings: Sino-Japanese Relations during the Occupation Years (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2000), 148–63; Adam Cathcart and Patricia Nash, “War Criminals and the Road to Sino-Japanese Normalization: Zhou Enlai and the Shenyang Trials, 1954–1956,” Twentieth-Century China 34/2 (April 2009), 89–111.   8 On reparations see Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future? (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 41–48.   9 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 37. 10 Schaller, Altered States, 39. 11 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 26. See also, Tian, Zhanhou Zhong-Ri guanxishi, 105–6. 12 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 26. 13 John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard East Asia Monographs 84, 1979), 4–12, 33–38. 14 Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 41; Dower, Empire and Aftermath, 37. 15 Schaller Altered States, 53. 16 Ibid., 53. 17 Pyle, Japan Rising, 317. 18 Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 41. 19 Schaller, Altered States, 34. 20 Ibid, 41. 21 Ibid., 43. Japanese text of the Yoshida Letter can be found at: Database “The World and Japan,” “Kokumin seifu no kōwa ni kansuru Yoshida shokan,” December 24, 1951, http://www.ioc.u-­tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/index.html. 22 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 32–38. 23 Ibid., 38. 24 Chen Zhaobin, Sengo Nihon no Chūgoku seisaku (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2000), 214. There has been significant scholarly debate regarding Yoshida’s intentions at the time of the Yoshida Letter. Hosoya Chihiro, who argued that the Yoshida Letter was, in fact, penned by Dulles, sees Yoshida as choosing Taiwan over the PRC only under US pressure. At the other extreme, Yuan Ke sees Yoshida as essentially pro-Taiwan, but using US pressure as a cover for the recognition of the ROC, using external pressure (gaiatsu) to overcome domestic support for recognition of the PRC. The Japanese negotiating position in Taipei, the efforts to limit the applicability of the treaty, and Yoshida’s comments after the conclusion of the treaty seem to suggest that Yoshida was genuinely committed to preserving room to pursue relations with the PRC, while Yoshida’s anti-­communism and his later role in relations with the ROC (see later discussion of the second Yoshida Letter), support Chen’s argument that Yoshida preferred a two-China solution. See Tian, Zhanhou Zhong-Ri guanxishi, 108; Chen, Sengo Nihon no Chūgoku seisaku, 1–2.

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25 For PRC reaction to the Yoshida Letter see Tian, Zhanhou Zhong-Ri guanxishi, 108. For PRC reaction to the peace treaty see Ibid., 109, and Ibid., 98–130; 26 Ibid., 108; Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 39. 27 Chen, Sengo Nihon no Chūgoku seisaku, 94–95, 210; Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 41; This is the White Group (Baituan), a group of former Japanese officers who served as military advisors to Chiang Kai-­shek and the ROC military until 1969 (by which time a total of eighty-­three former Japanese military officers had served in Taiwan). Okamoto, Imaginary Settings, 127. 28 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 42. 29 Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, 228. 30 Chen, Sengo Nihon no Chūgoku seisaku, 94. 31 For example, Liao Wenyi was a leader of the Taiwanese independence movement active in Japan, setting himself up as the “Great Leader” (da zongling) of a provisional government. He operated freely in Japan through most of the occupation, but was briefly arrested by occupation authorities in response to ROC protestations. Released on bail, Liao went underground for a year before being recaptured. Under American interrogation, Liao testified that he had received support from Japanese police and friendly treatment from members of the Japanese government. See, Chen, Sengo Nihon no Chūgoku seisaku, 100; and Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, 342, 544. 32 Chen, Sengo Nihon no Chūgoku seisaku, 106. 33 Tian, Zhanhou Zhong-Ri guanxishi, 119; Schaller, Altered States, 85. 34 Chen, Sengo Nihon no Chūgoku seisaku, 146; Tian, Zhanhou Zhong-Ri guanxishi, 119. 35 Chen, Sengo Nihon no Chūgoku seisaku, 146. 36 Ibid., 180. 37 Ibid., 310, 191. 38 Ibid., 203. 39 Wakamiya Yoshibumi, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia: How the Political Right has Delayed Japan’s Coming to Terms with its History of Aggression in Asia (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1998), 122. 40 Tanaka, Nit-Chu kankei, 50–51; Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 119, 1251. 41 Database “The World and Japan,” “Chūkyō taisaku yōkōan oyobi Yoshida Shigeru motoshusho no Chō Gun kokufu sōtōfu hisshokan ate shokan,” February 26, 1964, http://www.ioc.u-­tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/index.html. 42 Etō Shinkichi, Satō Eisaku (Tokyo: Jiji tsūshinsha, 1987), 231. 43 See Zhuge Weidong, Zhanhou Riben yulun, xuejie yu Zhongguo (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2003), 34. 44 Soeya Yoshihide, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945–1978 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 57. 45 Ibid., 58.

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46 Huang Dahui, Riben dui Hua zhengce yu guonei zhengzhi – Zhong-Ri fujiao zhengzhi guocheng fenxi (Beijing: Dangdai shijie chubanshe, 2006), 37. 47 Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy, 55. 48 Michael Petersen, “The Intelligence that Wasn’t: CIA Name Files, the U.S. Army, and Intelligence Gathered in Occupied Japan,” in Researching Japanese War Crimes Records: Introductory Essays, Edward Drea, Greg Bradsher, Robert Hanyok, James Lide, Michael Petersen, and Daqing Yang (Washington DC: National Archives and Records Administration for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2006), 219–21. 49 Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy, 55; Huang, Riben dui Hua zhengce, 41. 50 Huang, Riben dui Hua zhengce, 36.

Chapter 2   1 William Chapman, Inventing Japan: The Making of a Postwar Civilization (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1991), 232.   2 Zhuge Weidong, Zhanhou Riben, 204; Owada Hisashi, “In Search of a New National Identity: An Analysis of the National Psyche of Post-­war Japan,” in A New Japan for the Twenty-­first Century: An Inside Overview of Current Fundamental Changes and Problems, ed. Rien T. Segers (New York: Routledge, 2008), 234–49; Yumiko Iida, Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan: Nationalism as Aesthetics (New York: Routledge, 2002), 193.   3 Doak, A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan, 250.   4 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 19.   5 Doak, A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan, 203.   6 Ibid., 33.   7 Ibid., 33.   8 Maruyama Masao, “Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism,” in Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 1–24.   9 Doak, A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan, 25. 10 Oguma Eiji, “Minshu” to “Aikoku”: Sengo Nihon no nashonarizumu to kōkyōsei (Tokyo: Shin’yōsha, 2002), 272. 11 Curtis Anderson Gayle, Marxist History and Postwar Japanese History (London: Routledge, 2003), 1. 12 On the movement for national awakening see ibid. Gayle’s work informs much of the following discussion. 13 Inoue Kiyoshi, Tsurumi Shunsuke, and Pak Seikō, “Nihon nashonarizumu no jigazō,” Gendai no me 10/8 (August, 1969), 120.

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14 Ibid., 120. 15 Ishimoda Shō, Rekishi to minzoku no hakken (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1952), 15, 33–35. 16 Fujiwara Akira, “Fashizumu no shomondai,” in Rekishi to gendai: rekishigaku kenkyūkai 1954 nendo taikai hōkoku, Rekishigaku kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1955), 196. 17 Inoue Kiyoshi, Jōyaku kaisei: Meiji no minzoku mondai (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1955), ii–iii. Kevin M. Doak, “What Is a Nation and Who Belongs? National Narratives and the Ethnic Imagination in Twentieth-Century Japan,” American Historical Review 102/2 (April 1997), 305, esp. fn. 69. 18 Inoue, Jōyaku kaisei, iii. 19 Oguma, Minshu to Aikoku, 264. 20 Ibid., 272. 21 Oguma Eiji, “The Postwar Intellectuals’ View of ‘Asia’,” in Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders, eds Sven Saaler and Victor J. Koschmann (London: Routledge, 2007), 200. 22 Andrew Barshay, The Social Sciences in Modern Japan: the Marxian and Modernist Traditions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 61. 23 Ibid., 61. 24 Okamoto, Imaginary Settings, 141–142; Mōri, Nit-Chū kankei, 10–11. 25 Zhuge, Zhanhou Riben, 33–34. 26 On Takeuchi’s background see, Richard F. Calichman, trans., ed., What is Modernity: Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 1–2; Oguma, Minshu to Aikoku, 395–97; and Lawrence Olson, Ambivalent Moderns: Portraits of Japanese Cultural Identity (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), 46–52. 27 Calichman, What is Modernity?, 29–32. 28 Olson, Ambivalent Moderns, 56–58. 29 Calichman, What is Modernity?, 52–53. 30 Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Nihonjin no Chūgokukan,” in Takeuchi Yoshimi hyōronshū, vol. 3, Nihon to Ajia (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1966), 63. 31 Kersten, Democracy in Postwar Japan, 120. 32 Zhuge, Zhanhou Riben, 38; Maruyama Masao, “Hao-­san to no tsukiai,” in Maruyama Masao shū (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995), 10, 354. 33 Maruyama, “Hao-­san to no tsukiai,” 350. 34 Takeuchi, “Nihonjin no Chūgokukan,” 60. 35 Ibid., 60. 36 Maruyama Masao, “ ‘Nihon seiji shisōshi kenkyū’ atogaki”, in Maruyama Masao shū, 5, 289–90. 37 Ishimoda, Rekishi to minzoku no hakken, 35–36.

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38 Ibid., 33–35. 39 Gayle, Marxist History, 67–68. 40 Database “The World and Japan,” “Asanuma Inejirō shakaitō hō-Chū shisetsu danchō no ‘Beiteikokushugi wa Nit-Chū kyōdō no teki’ ensetsu,” March 12, 1959, http://www.ioc.u-­tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/index.html. 41 Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 219–20, 457. 42 Ibid., 221, 415, 460. 43 Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 21. 44 Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 438–42 45 Ibid., 219. 46 Kurt Werner Radtke, China’s Relations with Japan, 1945–83: The Role of Liao Chengzhi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 143. 47 Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 221–22, 438, 460. 48 Ibid., 460–61. 49 Ibid., 481. 50 The Economist (November 28, 1964), 983–1040. 51 On the impact of the modernization paradigm in postwar Japan see, Iida, Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan, 117; Zhuge, Zhanhou Riben, 136–50. 52 Ueyama Shunpei, “Kaidoku: dokusōteki na Nihon kōteiron,” Chūō kōron 79/10 (October, 1964), 341; Iida, Rethinking Identity, 141–42. 53 Umesao Tadao, An Ecological View of History: Japanese Civilization in the World Context (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2003), 34. On Umesao and China see Hu Lingyuan, “ ‘Riben wenming’ de suming yu zhanhou Zhong-Ri guanxi,” in Zhanhou Riben de zhuyao shehui sichao yu Zhong-Ri guanxi, eds Hu Lingyuan and Xu Jingbo (Shanghai: Shanghai caijing daxue chubanshe, 2003), 198–200. 54 Hu, “Riben wenming,” 200. 55 Oguma, “Postwar Intellectuals,” 200. 56 Oguma Minshu to Aikoku, 660, 673. 57 Ibid., 666. 58 Ibid., 664. 59 Ibid., 565, 661. 60 On Honda see, John Lie, ed., The Impoverished Spirit in Contemporary Japan: Selected Essays of Honda Katsuichi (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1993), 15–17, 21–24; Yoshida Takashi, The Making of the “Rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in Japan, China and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 81–87; Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, “The Nanking 100-Man Killing Contest Debate: War and Guilt amid Fabricated Illusions, 1971–75,” Journal of Japanese Studies 26/2 (Summer, 2000), 314. 61 Honda Katsuichi, “Chūgoku ni kako no Nihon no hanzai o ‘shazai’ shite wa naranai,” Gekkan shakaitō 179 (January, 1972), 89–90.

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62 Ibid., 92. 63 Etō Jun, Nakajima Mineo, Nishi Haruhiko, Kobori Keiichirō, and Takeda Taijun, “Shinpojiumu: Chūgoku kindai hyakunen no jitsuzō to kyozō,” Kikan geijutsu 5/3 (Summer, 1971), 50–51. 64 Ibid., 51. 65 Kaizuka and Kuwahara, eds, Kōza Chūgoku, 5, 263. What contact Oda did have with Chinese of the Cultural Revolution era was not necessarily positive. Oda noted that the Chinese delegates he met at international peace conferences turned him off with a belligerent and bureaucratic attitude, in comparison with which even Soviet bureaucrats, “came to look like gods of democracy and flexibility.” Ibid., 261. 66 Ibid., 261. 67 Ibid., 264. 68 Ibid., 268. 69 Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 55; Koschmann, “Intellectuals and Politics,” 401–3; Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson, eds, Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security (London: Routledge, 2012), 85. 70 Hook et al., Japan’s International Relations, 62. 71 Etō Shinkichi, “Nit-Chū gakujutsu tōronkai urakata no jo,” in Nit-Chū sensō to Nit-Chū kankei: Rokōkyō jiken 50 shūnen Nit-Chū gakujutsu tōronkai kiroku, eds Inoue Kiyoshi and Etō Shinkichi (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1988), 4. See also, Noriko Kamachi, “Japanese Writings on Post-1945 Japan-China Relations,” in Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power, ed. Lam Peng Er (New York: Routledge, 2006), 50–68. 72 Nakajima Mineo, “Nihon chishikijin no Chūgokuzō: ‘sayokuteki chisei’ hihan,” in Chūgokuzō no kenshō, ed. Nakajima Mineo (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1972), 156, 158, 160–61.

Chapter 3   1 Quoted in Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 295; see also, Michael Schaller, “The Nixon ‘Shocks’ and US-Japan Strategic Relations 1969–74,” National Security Archives, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/schaller.htm.   2 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1979), 762. For Taiwanese reactions see, Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2007), 297–99; and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 45–46.

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  3 On ping-­pong diplomacy see, Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949–1972 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 153–54.   4 See Huang, Riben dui Hua zhengce, 52; Database “The World and Japan,” “Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura’s Presentation at the Press Conference on the Conclusion of the Japan-US Summit Meeting,” October 24, 1970, http://www.ioc.u-­tokyo.ac. jp/~worldjpn/index.html; Schaller, “The Nixon ‘Shocks’ ”; Furukawa, Nit-Chū sengo kankeishi, 335; and William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill & Wang, 1998), 239–40.   5 Bundy, A Tangled Web, 239; Ijiri Hidenori, The Politics of Japan’s Decision to Normalize Relations with China, 1969–1972 (PhD dissertation, 1987), 75; Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 348.   6 Database “The World and Japan,” “Joint Statement of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and U.S. President Richard Nixon,” November 21, 1969, http://www.ioc.u-­tokyo. ac.jp/~worldjpn/index.html.   7 Mōri, Nit-Chū kankei, 19–20.   8 Etō Shinkichi, “The Concept of ‘Militarism’ in Marxism-Leninism and Maoism,” Military and State in Modern Asia, ed. Harold Z. Schiffrin (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic Press, 1976), 97.   9 On Satō’s moves to improve relations see, Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 69; Ijiri, The Politics of Japan’s Decision, 41–46; and Huang, Riben dui Hua zhengce, 50. 10 William Burr, ed., The Beijing-Washington Back-Channel and Henry Kissinger’s Secret Trip to China, September 1970–1971, National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 66, National Security Archive (2002) “Document 38: Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, 11 July 1971, 10:35 a.m.-11:55a.m,” 12, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/; and Kissinger, White House Years, 773–74. 11 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 71; Huang, Riben dui Hua zhengce, 50. 12 George Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World: An American Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1976), 178. 13 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 72. 14 Tagawa, Nit-Chū kōryū, 138; emphasis added. 15 On the Hori letter see, Nakajima Mineo, “’Hori shokan’ wa watashi ga kaita,” Bungei shunjū 60/12 (1982), 144–53; Hattori, Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka, 40; and Ijiri, The Politics of Japan’s Decision, 108. 16 On China policy and the 1972 LDP presidential election see, Hattori, Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka, 48–51; Huang, Riben dui Hua zhengce, 57–69; and Ijiri, The Politics of Japan’s Decision, 114–131. 17 Huang, Riben dui Hua zhengce, 62; Pei, Deng Xiaoping, 30. 18 Ozawa Tatsuo quoted in Tamura Shigenobu, ed., Nik-Ka dankō to Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka (Tokyo: Nansōsha, 2000), 17.

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19 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 1058. The three principles for normalization of relations were first put forth by Zhou Enlai in 1971 during the first Kōmeitō mission’s visit to Beijing. Sadako Ogata, Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 44. 20 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 1058. 21 Huang, Riben dui Hua zhengce, 68. 22 Hattori, Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka, 52. 23 Ibid., 57. 24 On the normalization council see ibid., 91–94; Mōri, Nit-Chū kankei, 83; Ijiri, The Politics of Japan’s Decision, 221; Huang, Riben dui Hua zhengce, 72–80, 231–32. On pro-Taiwan sentiment in MOFA see, Hashimoto Hiroshi, “Hashimoto Hiroshi ni kiku—Nit-Chū seijōka kōshō,” in Ishii et al., Kiroku to kōshō, 212–25. For representative contemporary conservative criticisms of the government position on normalization see, Kishi Nobusuke, “Tanaka shushō no dokudan gaikō oyobi Ōhira hatsugen wa ‘yurusenu’,” Keizai jidai 37/10 (October, 1972), 23; and Kaya Okinori, “Taiwan kirisute no bōkyo o imashimeru,” Keizai jidai 37/9 (September, 1972), 36, 40. 25 Hattori. Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka, 94. 26 Ijiri, The Politics of Japan’s Decision, 216, 249. 27 Hashimoto, “Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka kōshō,” 213. See also Hattori, Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka, 42–44. 28 Hashimoto, “Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka kōshō,” 212. 29 Kuriyama Takakazu and Nakashima Takuma, Hattori Ryūji, and Etō Naoko, eds., Gaikō shōgenroku: Okinawa henkan, Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka, Nichi-Bei “mistuyaku” (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2010), 13–14, 118; Hattori, Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka, 76–77. 30 On the China Problem Policy Council and its relationship with the Tanaka-Ōhira administration see, Ijiri, The Politics of Japan’s Decision, 261–65. 31 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 1060. 32 Ijiri, The Politics of Japan’s Decision, 219–20. 33 Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations, 43; and Zhu Jianrong, “Chūgoku wa naze baishō o hōki shita ka,” Gaikō fōramu 5/10 (October, 1992), 28. 34 Zhu, “Chūgoku wa naze baishō o hōki shita ka,” 30–32; Mōri, Nit-Chū kankei, 32–33. 35 Takeiri Yoshikatsu, “Rekishi no haguruma ga mawatta, nagarekimetta Shū shushō no handan,” in Ishii et al., Kiroku to kōshō, 204–5. 36 Kuriyama, Gaikō shōgenroku, 119–20; and Hattori, Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka, 61–64. 37 Database “The World and Japan,” “Tanaka sōri—Shū Onrai sōri kaidan kiroku,” September 25–28, 1972, http://www.ioc.u-­tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/index.html; Ishii et al., Kiroku to kōshō, 55. 38 Burr, The Kissinger Transcripts, 84. 39 Database “The World and Japan,” “Shū Onrai sōri shusai shōen ni okeru Tanaka naikaku sōridaijin aisatsu,” September 25, 1972, http://www.ioc.u-­tokyo.ac. jp/~worldjpn/index.html.

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40 Ishii et al., Kiroku to kōshō, 56; and Database “The World and Japan,” “Tanaka sōri—Shū Onrai sōri kaidan kiroku,” September 25–28, 1972, http://www. ioc.u-­tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/index.html. Zhou made his objections in his second meeting with Tanaka in the afternoon of the 26th. 41 Ishii et al., Kiroku to kōshō, 81–82. Zhou Bin’s interview is from the Asahi, September 29, 2002. 42 Ibid., 110–11. 43 Ibid., 114. 44 Ibid., 56. 45 Ibid., 56. 46 Ibid., 58. 47 Ibid., 60, 65. The “three alls,” refers to the Chinese characterization of the Japanese Army’s wartime policy in northern China as one of “kill all, burn all, loot all.” 48 Ibid., 65–66. 49 Ibid., 59–61. 50 Ibid., 87. 51 See for example, Ogata, Normalization with China; Soeya Yoshihide, “Japan’s Relations with China,” in Vogel et al., The Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle, 210–26. 52 Ishii et al., Kiroku to kōshō, 62–65. 53 Ibid., 66. 54 Ibid., 66. 55 Ibid., 66–67. 56 Ibid., 125–31. 57 Ibid., 130; and Mao Zedong waiajiao wenxuan, 598. 58 Ishii et al., Kiroku to kōshō, 68. Zhou here is referring to meetings on October 10 and November 1, 1970 with a JSP delegation in Beijing. In this meeting Zhou dismissed JSP proposals for a five-power treaty guaranteeing Japanese security as unrealistic. See, Zhou Enali nianpu, 3, 405. 59 The joint communiqué is reprinted in Ishii et al., Kiroku to kōshō, 425–27; for an English translation see, Etō Shinkichi, Selected Works on Modern Japan-China Relations (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 2005), 82–84. 60 Ijiri, The Politics of Japan’s Decision, 292–93, and Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 83. 61 Hattori, Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka, 190–91. 62 Ogata, Normalization with China, 99; Soeya, “Japan’s Relations with China,” 213–16. 63 Nakajima Mineo, “Yūkō no kijuku sureba koso,” Bungei shunjū 50/13 (1972), 92–100. 64 Etō, Selected Works, 1–8, 36–37, 66, 81. 65 Soeya, “Japan’s Relations with China,” 215. 66 Ōhira Masayoshi, “Nit-Chū seijōka ni oete,” in Fūjin zassō (Tokyo: Kajima shuppankai, 1977), 159–62. 67 Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 105.

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Chapter 4   1 Michael Schaller, Altered States, 229.   2 Etō Jun, “Japan’s Shifting Image: Reflections from the Local American Press, 1969–1971,” The Japan Interpreter 8/1 (Winter, 1973), 73. Etō predicted, however, that the US approach to China would ultimately fail because, as the Nixon shocks showed, Americans would never treat Asians as true equals.   3 Bundy, A Tangled Web, 240.   4 Kissinger, White House Years, 761–63.   5 Schaller, Altered States, 236.   6 Schaller, “The Nixon ‘Shocks.’ ”   7 Donald Hellmann, “Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democracy within an American Green House,” in The Political Economy of Japan, vol. 2, The Changing International Context, eds Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto (Berkeley: Stanford University Press, 1988).   8 Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 297.   9 Kaminishi Akio, Burēn seiji (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1985), 39; and Fukunaga Fumio, Ōhira Masayoshi: “sengo hoshu” to wa nani ka (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 2008), 235. Scholars, writers, and bureaucrats who served as members of Ōhira’s “brain trust” included Satō Seizaburō, Kumon Shunpei, Kōyama Ken’ichi, Umesao Tadao, and Ōkita Saburō. 10 Ōhira Masayoshi, “Nashonarizumu no aratana tenkai,” in Aikokushin ni tsuite, 15. 11 Ibid., 9–13. 12 Ōhira Masayoshi, “Yureugoku sekai to Nihon,” Jiyū 14/1 (January, 1972), 125. 13 Ibid., 112–15, 117. 14 Ibid., 115. 15 Ibid., 120. 16 Ibid., 120, 122–23; Ōhira Masayoshi, “Genzai no sekai jōsei to wagakuni no tachiba,” Seikai keizai hyōron 16/10 (October, 1972), 13. 17 Ōhira, “Genzai no sekai jōsei,” 13–18. 18 See for example, Liu Jiangyong, Zhong-Ri guanxi ershi jiang (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2007), 41–43; and Ni Zhimin, “Ōhira Masayoshi to ahen mondai,” Ryūkoku daigaku keizaigaku ronshū 48/1 (September, 2009), 106–7. 19 Ni, “Ōhira Masayoshi to ahen mondai,” 107. 20 Ōhira Masayoshi, Zaisei tsuredzure gusa (Tokyo: Josui shobō, 1953), see the section, “Tairiku keizai no kaihatsu,” second page, http://www.ohira.or.jp/cd/book/ zai/za_04.pdf. 21 Ōhira Masayoshi and Tanaka Yōnosuke, Fukugōryoku no jidai (Tokyo: Raifu, 1978), see the section, “Chikakute tōi Nit-Chū kankei,” pages 6–7, http://www.ohira.or.jp/ cd/book/fk/fk_04.pdf.

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22 Mōri, Nit-Chū kankei, 14–15; Morita, Kokoro no ittō, 66–67. See, Liu, Zhong-Ri guanxi ershi jiang, 43, for an interpretation of Ōhira as an early proponent of normalization. 23 Ōhira Masayoshi, “Nihon no shinseiki no kaimaku—shio no nagare o kaeyō,” in Ōhira Masayoshi kaisōryoku: shiryōhen, Ōhira Masayoshi kaisōryoku kankōkai (Tokyo: Kajima shuppankai, 1982), 210; see also, Ni Zhimin, “Tanaka naikaku ni okeru Chū-Nichi kokkō seijōka to Ōhira Masayoshi (1),” Ryūkoku daigaku keizaigaku ronshū 45/5 (March 2006), 36. 24 Ōhira Masayoshi, “Chūgoku mondai e no apurōchi,” in Fūjin zassō, 363–64; Morita, Kokoro no ittō, 31–32. According Morita, Ōhira’s son-­in-law and long-­time personal secretary, Ōhira sought to return to Tokyo as early as possible and had mostly bad memories of his time in China. 25 Ōhira, “Chūgoku mondai e no apurōchi,” 366. 26 Ibid., 365. 27 Ibid., 365. 28 Mōri, Nit-Chū kankei, 14–15. 29 Ōhira, “Nit-Chū seijōka ni oete,” 159–62. 30 Ōhira, “Nit-Chū seijōka ni oete,” 166; Ōhira, “Chūgoku mondai e no apurōchi,” 367. 31 Ōhira, “Nit-Chū seijōka ni oete,” 166. 32 Ibid., 166. 33 Ōhira, “Genzai no sekai jōsei to wagakuni no tachiba,” 10. 34 Katō Shūichi, The Japan-China Phenomenon: Conflict or Compatibility? (London: Paul Norbury Publications, 1974), 51. 35 Nihon shakaitō seisaku shingikai, ed., Nihon shakaitō shiryō shūsei (Tokyo: Nihon shakaitō chūō honbu kikanshi kyoku, 1990), 499. 36 Nihon shakaitō kettō 40 shū nen kinen shuppan kankō iinkai, ed., Shiryō Nihon shakaitō 40 nen shi (Tokyo: Nihon shakaitō chūō honbu, 1986), 967. 37 Shiryō Nihon shakaitō 50 nen kankō iinkai, ed., Shiryō Nihon shakaitō 50 nen (Tokyo: Nihon shakaitō chūō honbu kikanshi kōhō iinkai, 1995), 434; Nihon shakaitō 40 nen shi, 967. 38 Nihon shakaitō 40 nen shi, 968. 39 Ibid., 967. 40 Nihon kyōsantō chūōiinnkai, ed., Nihon kyōsantō 80 nen 1922–2002 (Tokyo: Nihon kyōsantō chūō iinkai shuppankyoku, 2003), 220–22, 240. 41 Chalmers Johnson, “How China and Japan See Each Other,” in China and Japan: The Search for Balance since World War I, eds Alvin D. Coox and Hilary Conroy (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio 1978), 14. 42 Inoue Kiyoshi, “Chūgoku ni totte no hō-Chū no shingi,” Gendai no me 12/9 (September, 1971), 29–31; and Inoue Kiyoshi, “Amerika teikokushugi to Nihon,” Gendai no me 12/11 (November, 1971), 79.

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43 Yoshihiro Kuriyama, “A Japanese ‘Maoist’: Niijima Atsuyoshi,” Asian Survey 16/9 (September, 1976), 848–49. 44 Niijima Atsuyoshi, Iwata Hiroshi, “Mō Takutō shisō to Chūgoku katoki shakai,” Gendai no me 12/9 (September, 1971), 80. 45 Inoue Kiyoshi and Suda Teiichi, “Sekaishi no naka no bunka daikakumei,” Gendai no me 12/9 (September, 1971), 59. 46 Kaya Okinori, The Communist China Problem (Tokyo: Japan National Foreign Affairs Foundation, 1968), 26. 47 Kishi, “Tanaka shushō no dokudan gaikō,” 23; Kaya Okinori, “Taiwan kirisute no bōkyo o imashimeru,” Keizai jidai 37/9 (September, 1972), 36; see also Ijiri, The Politics of Japan’s Decision, 246. 48 Nakayama Masaaki, “Kokusai kyōsanshugi ga nerau keizai taikoku Nihon,” Keizai jidai 37/4 (April, 1972), 51. 49 Kikuchi Yoshirō, “Mugensoku no tai-Chū kokkō kaifuku wa kiken shigoku,” Keizai jidai 37/9 (September, 1972), 43. 50 Nabeyama Sadachika, “Nit-Chū kokkō kaifukugo no Chūkyō no Nihon kaihō kōsaku,” Keizai jidai 37/9 (September, 1972), 30. 51 Ishihara Shintarō, “Bei-Chū shunō kaigi to waga kuni no gaikō shisei,” Keizai jidai 37/4 (April, 1972), 45. 52 Kaya, “Taiwan kirisute no bōkyo o imashimeru,” 38, 41; see also, Kikuchi, “Mugensoku no tai-Chū kokkō kaifuku,” 45. 53 Kaya, “Taiwan kirisute no bōkyo o imashimeru,” 37–38, 42; Genda Minoru, “Taiwan o kirisuteru nara Nit-Chū fukkō wa nasubekarazu,” Keizai jidai 37/9 (September, 1972), 50–51; Kuzumi Tadao and Ōhira Zengo, “Taidan: Kongo no Nit-Chū mondai o uranau,” Keizai jidai 37/9 (September, 1972), 25. 54 Genda, “Taiwan o kirisuteru nara,” 51–53. 55 Kaya, “Taiwan kirisute no bōkyo o imashimeru,” 39; Kuzumi and Ōhira, “Taidan: Kongo no Nit-Chū mondai o uranau,” 20. 56 Kaya, “Taiwan kirisute no bōkyo o imashimeru,” 38–39. For background and some questions about these claims see, Kawashima Shin, Shimizu Urara, Matsudaira Yasuhiro, and Philip Yang, Nit-Tai kankeishi 1945–2008 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2009), 20. 57 Nakagawa Ichirō, “Nit-Chū kokkō sejōika ni tsuite,” Keizai jidai 37/9 (September, 1972), 49. 58 Nabeyama, “Nit-Chū kokkō kaifukugo,” 38–39. 59 Kaya Okinori, “Shō Kaiseki to watashi,” in Kaya Masao and Kaya Kazuko, Uzu no naka: Kaya Okinori ikōshō (Tokyo: Kaya Masao and Kaya Kazuko, 1979), 178. 60 Ibid., 178. 61 Kitaoka Juitsu, “Tai-Chūkyō kokkō seijōka no kikensei,” Keizai jidai 37/9 (September, 1972), 34–35.

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62 Kaya, “Taiwan kirisute no bōkyo o imashimeru,” 39. 63 Kikuchi. “Mugensoku no tai-Chū kokkō kaifuku,” 45. 64 Ishihara Shintarō and Kaya Okinori, “Kyōsan kakumei to Nihonjin,” in Kaya Okinori, Kono mama de wa kanarazu okiru Nihon kyōsantō kakumei (Tokyo: Rōman, 1973); and Ishihara, “Bei-Chū shunō kaigi to waga kuni no gaikō shisei,” 46. 65 Nakayama, “Kokusai kyōsanshugi ga nerau keizai taikoku Nihon,” 51. 66 Kuzumi and Ōhira, “Kongo no Nit-Chū mondai o uranau,” 24. 67 Ishihara, “Bei-Chū shunō kaigi to waga kuni no gaikō shisei,” 46. 68 Etō Shinkichi, “Japan and China: A New Stage,” in Selected Works, 73. 69 Nakayama, “Kokusai kyōsanshugi ga nerau keizai taikoku Nihon,” 51. Isaiah Ben-Dasan was the Jewish alter ego of Yamamoto Shichihei, author of the best-­ selling The Japanese and the Jews. On Yamamoto and the history of Sino-Japanese relations see, Robert Hoppens, “Peace through Historical Revisionism: Yamamoto Shichihei on Sino-Japanese Relations in the 1970s,” Sino-Japanese Studies 19/4 (2012), 47–65, http://chinajapan.org/articles/19/4. 70 Ibid., 45–46. 71 Mōri, Nit-Chū kankei, 81, and Ishii et al., Kiroku to kōshō, 115. 72 Tajiri Akiyoshi, “Nit-Chū kankei no shōrai,” Keizai jidai 38/1 (January, 1973), 70. 73 Nihon shakaitō 50 nen, 438. 74 Kuzumi Tadao, “Nit-Chū yūkō kankei no fukkō ni tsuite,” Keizai jidai 37/10 (October, 1972), 30. 75 Ōhira, “Nit-Chū seijōka ni oete,”170. 76 Etō, “Japan and China,” 81.

Chapter 5   1 On the aviation agreement, see an interview with Ōhira’s former secretary Fujii Hiroaki conducted in 2000, “Fujii Hiroaki shi ni kiku ‘Nit-Chū kōkū kyōtei kōshō,” available at the Masayoshi Ōhira Memorial Foundation website, http://www.ohira. or.jp/cd/; Ogura Kazuo, Kiroku to kōshō: Nit-Chū jitsumu kyōtei kōsho (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2010); Fukuda Madoka, “Nit-Chū kōkū kyōtei kōshō, 1973–75,” in Nit-Chū kankeishi 1972–2012, vol. 1, Seiji, eds Takahara Akio and Hattori Ryūji (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2012), 71–98; Satō Seizaburō, Kenichi Koyama and Kumon Shunpei, Postwar Politician: The Life of Former Prime Minister Masayoshi Ōhira (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1990), 321–24; Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 89, 203; Tian, Zhanhou Zhong-Ri guanxishi, 305–6; and Chalmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), 248.   2 Satō et al., Postwar Politician, 321; Fujii, “Fujii Hiroaki shi ni kiku,” 4.

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  3 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 471; Fukuda, “Nit-Chū kōkū kyōtei kōshō,” 88.   4 Satō et al., Postwar Politician, 323.   5 Zhai Qiang, “Jianli fandui qian Sulian baquan de guoji tongyi zhanxian 1972–1979,” in Lengzhan shiqi de Zhongguo duiwai guanxi, ed. Yang Kuisong (Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe, 2006), 180.   6 Burr, The Kissinger Transcripts, 112.   7 Pei, Deng Xiaoping, 20.   8 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 89–90.   9 Ibid., 90. 10 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 428–29. 11 Chae-­jin Lee, “The Japan Socialist Party and China, 1975–1977,” Asian Survey 18/3 (March, 1978), 276, fn. 2. 12 Kiyomiya Ryū, Miyazawa Kiichi zen jinzō (Tokyo: Gyōsei mondai kenkyūjo, 1977), 246–47. On the differences between Miki and Miyazawa on the treaty, see also Pei, Deng Xiaoping, 30. 13 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 1083. 14 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 90–91. 15 Johnson, Japan: Who Governs?, 249. 16 The five principles of peaceful coexistence—mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence—were developed in 1954 to guide relations between India and the PRC at the high point of the non-­aligned movement and the Bandung spirit and became a rhetorical fixture of PRC foreign policy. By citing the principles Miki may have hoped to convince the PRC leadership that a third country provision was consistent with PRC foreign policy doctrine, not “backsliding” from the spirit of the joint communiqué as the Chinese leadership charged. 17 Pei, Deng Xiaoping, 37–43. 18 Kiyomiya, Miyazawa Kiichi, 248. 19 Pei, Deng Xiaoping, 39–40. 20 Ibid., 44–45. 21 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 88. According to Joachim Glaubitz, in the original Soviet proposal, the Asian collective security system would include both the PRC and Taiwan, which only made it more offensive to the PRC leadership. See Joachim Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow: The History of an Uneasy Relationship, 1972 to the 1990s (London: Hearst & Company, 1995), 7. 22 Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, 143, 49, fn. 57. 23 Ibid., 84. 24 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 88. 25 On Tanaka’s Moscow visit, see ibid., 88–89; and Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, 54–63.

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26 Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, 104. 27 Ibid., 105. 28 Burr, The Kissinger Transcripts, 92. 29 Ibid., 172–74. 30 Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, 113. 31 In 1973 the US consulate in Hong Kong estimated total reserves at 50 billion barrels. A Congressional joint committee on economics in 1974 produced an estimate of 4.9 to 7.6 billion barrels, and the CIA in 1975 estimated Chinese reserves at anywhere from 80 to 100 billion barrels. See Aoki Naoto, Mō Takutō to Tanaka Kakuei: Nit-Chū gaikō antō 30 nen (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2002), 108–9. 32 Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, 106. Chinese petroleum was “heavy,” having a high wax content which raised refining costs. 33 Pei, Deng Xiaoping, 34. 34 See Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, 137–40, for Chinese statements on the Northern Territories issue. 35 Nihon shakaitō 40 nen shi, 962–64. 36 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 1083. 37 Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, 140. 38 Ibid., 142. 39 Burr, The Kissinger Transcripts, 83. 40 In an odd passage, Zhou even mentioned the possibility of a Chinese nuclear umbrella for Japan, but deemed Chinese nuclear capabilities insufficient. Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 455–56. 41 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 1063; Nakasone Yasuhiro, Jiseiryoku: rekishi hōtei no hikoku to shite (Tokyo: Shinshōsha, 2004), 132. 42 Johnson, “How China and Japan See Each Other,” 13. 43 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 1071–72; Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 34. 44 Burr, The Kissinger Transcripts, 393. 45 Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 598. 46 Burr, The Kissinger Transcripts, 92. 47 Ibid., 303, 310–11.

Chapter 6   1 The LDP in the 1976 Lower House election won 249 seats, adding twelve independents to the LDP numbers gave the conservatives control of 261 seats, just five above the 256 needed for a majority. See, Satō et al., Postwar Politican, 398–99.   2 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change in Japan (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

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  3 Harold Hinton C., Three and a Half Powers: The New Balance in Asia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), 214.   4 “Zhanhou Riben jingji weiji jianshi,” Riben wenti 12 (February, 1975), 39–41.   5 Umesao Tadao, “Escape from Cultural Isolation,” in The Silent Power: Japan’s Identity and World Role, ed. Japan Center for International Exchange (Tokyo: Simul Press, 1976), 18, 28. Originally published as “Kokusai kōryū to Nihon bunmei,” Kokusai kōryū (January, 1974).   6 Kitaoka Shin’ichi, Sengo Nihon gaikō ronshū: Kōwa ronsō kara wangan sensō made (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1995), 251–74. Originally appeared as Etō Jun, “ ‘Gokko’ no sekai ga owatta toki,” Shokun! (January, 1970).   7 Kano Tsutomu, “Preface,” Japan Center for International Exchange, The Silent Power, vii–ix.   8 “Seirankai shuisho,” in Nakagawa Ichirō, Seirankai: Keppan to yūkoku no ronri (Tokyo: Rōman, 1973), 195.   9 Ibid., 195–96. 10 Ishihara Shintarō, “Seirankai chisome no kekki,” Shokun! 28/11 (November, 1996), 156–58. 11 Fujio Masayuki, “Seirankai no gaikō no kihon seisaku,” in Nakagawa, Seirankai, 197–99. 12 Ibid., 199. 13 Ibid., 197–99. 14 Nakagawa Ichirō and Iimori Shigetō, “Nihon no kiki ni tatsu Seirankai,” Keizai jidai 38/8 (1973), 24. Nakagawa Ichirō, “Nihon o mamoru tame ni tachiagaru,” Keizai jidai 39/3 (1974), 20–21. 15 Ishihara Shintarō, “Kaiken koso Nihonkoku o mamoru michi,” Keizai jidai 39/3 (1974), 43. 16 Ishihara Shintarō, “Atarashii bunmei o sakidori suru seiji o,” in Nakagawa, Seirankai, 8. 17 Nakao Eiichi, “Seirankai wa kaku tatakau,” in Nakagawa, Seirankai, 31. 18 Ibid., 24–25. 19 Ishihara, “Seirankai chisome no kekki,” 155. 20 Nakao, “Seirankai wa kaku tatakau,” 24. 21 Ienaga Masaki, “Panda ga yatte kita! (1972): Chūgoku no tai-Nichi sofuto-­pāwāshi,” in Nit-Chū kankeishi, 1972–2012, vol. 3, Shakai bunka, ed. Sonoda Shigeto (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2012), 24. 22 Watanabe Michio and Tada Minoru, Gendai seiji e no keishō: Seirankai no shuchō (Tokyo: Kokumin seiji kenkyūkai, 1974), 3. 23 Nakagawa Ichirō, Seirankai no ito suru mono (Tokyo: Kokumin seiji kenkyūkai, 1973), 11. 24 Watanabe, Gendai seiji, 3. Nakao, “Seirankai wa kaku tatakau,” 25. 25 Ishihara Shintaro “Nit-Chū kōkū kyōtei no ‘ayashisa,’ ” Jiyū 16/8 (August, 1974), 31, 46. 26 Watanabe, Gendai seiji, 34–35.

Notes

259

27 Nakagawa, Seirankai no ito suru mono, 22; Nakagawa, “Nihon o mamoru tame ni tachiagaru,” 19; Nakayama Masaaki and Iimori Shigetō, “Kyō no gaikō: Nikkyōso, kyōsantō o kiru,” Keizai jidai 39/3 (March, 1974), 48. 28 Nakayama Masaaki, “Shinnen no nai Nit-Chū gaikō sokushinsha ni mono mōsu,” Keizai jidai 37/6 (1972), 37. 29 Ibid., 35, 38. 30 Nakagawa, Seirankai no ito suru mono, 10. 31 Fujio, “Seirankai no gaikō no kihon seisaku,” 200; Nakao, “Seiranakai wa kaku tatakau,” 31. 32 James Babb, “The Seirankai and the Fate of its Members: The Rise and Fall of the New Right Politicians in Japan,” Japan Forum 24/1 (2012), 76, 86. 33 Robert Service, Comrades!: A History of World Communism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 323. 34 Nihon shakaitō 50 nen, 529; Nihon shakaitō 40 nenshi, 978–79. 35 Nihon shakaitō 40 nenshi, 968. 36 Nihon shakaitō 50-nen, 536. 37 Lee, “The Japan Socialist Party and China,” 277–78. 38 Nihon shakaitō 50-nen, 532–34. 39 Ibid., 533. 40 Ibid., 533. 41 Lee, “The Japan Socialist Party and China,” 284. 42 Ibid., 285. 43 Inoue Kiyoshi, “Musan kaikyū dokusaika no keizoku kakumei,” Gendai no me 17/11 (November, 1976), 35–36. 44 Seki Hiroharu, Nomura Kōichi, and Mori Kyōzō, “Chūgoku wa doko e: bunka kakumei wa teichaku shiuru ka,” Asahi jānaru 18/39 (September 24, 1976), 22. 45 Ibid., 23. 46 Kuriyama, “A Japanese ‘Maoist,’ ” 853. 47 Seki et al., “Chūgoku wa doko e,” 23. 48 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 1070. 49 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 1069; “Sun Kong, fanhua, fangong, fanrenminde ‘Qinglanhui’ juebuhui you haoxiachang,” Riben wenti 7 (March, 1974), 14–16. 50 See Lin Chang, Zhongguo de Riben yanjiu zazhishi (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2001), 100–10. 51 See for example, “Shilun zhanhou Riben jingji de jixing fazhan,” Riben wenti 5 (1973), 1–59. This article claims that Japanese capitalism had entered its sixth crisis of the postwar period in 1970. It specifically denied any Japanese miracle, or that the Japanese economy could ever be a model of economic development or a new form of capitalism; a position that contrasts markedly with thinking at the end of the decade. 52 “Sun Kong, fanhua, fangong, fan renmin de ‘Qinglanhui’,” 14.

260

Notes

53 “Kong-Meng zhi dao zai Riben de fandong yingxiang,” Riben wenti 7 (March, 1974), 9–10. 54 Ibid., 12–13. 55 Ibid., 12–13.

Chapter 7   1 Mōri, Nit-Chū kankei, 96; Gao, Riben de shehui sichao yu guomin qingxu, 199.   2 Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao’s Last Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 378, 429, 433–34; Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), 124, 129–30; Deng Xiaoping nianpu 1975–1994, 157.   3 Lieberthal, Governing China, 130–31; and Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (London: Routledge, 2006), 11–12.   4 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 96.   5 Pei, Deng Xiaoping, 48.   6 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 96–97; Pei, Deng Xiaoping, 51. Tanaka Akihiko’s account, based on reports in the Asahi newspaper, quotes the Chinese response to Nikaidō as, “give [it] serious consideration” (shinken ni kentō suru). Gotōda Masaharu, who accompanied Nikaidō, remembered that the Chinese response to Nikaidō’s suggestion was that they, “did not mind at all” (ikkō ni kamawan) including a third-­country clause in the treaty. Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 97, fn. 17.   7 Nit-Chū yūkō kyōkai, ed., Nit-Chū yūkō undō 50 nen (Tokyo: Tōhō shoten, 2000), 277–78.   8 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 96–97; Pei, Deng Xiaoping, 52.   9 Zhang, Zhong-Ri guanxi, 82; Pei, Deng Xiaoping, 53. 10 Pei, Deng Xiaoping, 54. 11 Ibid., 56–57 12 Ibid., Deng Xiaoping, 55. 13 Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, 147. 14 For details of Sonoda’s Moscow visit see, ibid., 147–49. 15 Ibid., 150. 16 Ibid., 149. 17 Pei, Deng Xiaoping, 60–62. 18 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 98. 19 Ibid., 98–100. 20 On the history of the dispute and rival historical claims see, Suganuma Unryū, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 118;

Notes

261

Suganuma Unryū, “The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: A Hotbed for a Hot War?” in China and Japan at Odds: Deciphering the Perpetual Conflict, James C. Hsiung (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 158–60; and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “The U.S. Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, 1945–1971,” The China Quarterly 161 (March, 2000), 98–102. For the official Japanese government claim to the islands see MOFA website, “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-­paci/ senkaku/senkaku.html. For the Chinese position see the State Council White Paper, “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China,” available at http://news.xinhuanet. com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131872152.htm. 21 Ishii et al., Kiroku to kōshō, 68. 22 Pei, Deng Xiaoping, 84; Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 74. 23 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 1090. 24 Satō et al., Postwar Politician, 413–14. 25 Wakatsuki Hidekazu, “Heiwa yūkō jōyaku teiketsu kōshō kara tai-Chū enshaku no kyōyō e, 1974–1979,” in Nit-Chū kankeishi, 1:113; Nagano Nobutoshi, Tennō to Tō Shōhei no akushu: Jitsuroku Nit-Chū hishi (Tokyo: Gyōsei mondai kenkyūjo shuppankyoku, 1983), 234–36; Reinhard Drifte, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute Between Japan and China: Between the Materialization of the ‘China Threat’ and Japan ‘Reversing the Outcome of World War II?’ ” UNISCI Discussion Papers 32 (May, 2013), 28. 26 Nagano, Tennō to Tō Shōhei, 225. 27 James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Knopf, 1999), 79. 28 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 75–79; Breck Walker, “ ‘Friends, But Not Allies’—Cyrus Vance and the Normalization of Relations with China,” Diplomatic History 33/4 (September 2009), 580–82. 29 Walker, “Friends, But Not Allies,” 588–89. 30 Nagano, Tennō to Tō Shōhei, 231–32. 31 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 218. 32 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 102–3. 33 Ibid., 100-101; Nagano, Tennō to Tō Shōhei, 239. 34 Wakatsuki, “Heiwa yūkō jōyaku,” 114; Nagano, Tennō to Tō Shōhei, 238. 35 Wakatsuki, “Heiwa yūkō jōyaku,” 115–16; Nagano, Tennō to Tō Shōhei, 256, 257–58. 36 Sonoda Sunao, Sekai, Nihon, ai (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1981), 319; Nagano, Tennō to Tō Shōhei, 266, 268, 274. 37 Ishii et al., Jitsuroku to kōshō, 166, 151–52; Wakatsuki, “Heiwa yūkō jōyaku,” 116–17. 38 Sonoda, Sekai, Nihon, ai, 324.

262

Notes

39 Ishii et al., Jitsuroku to kōshō, 179–80; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianpu 1975–1997 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998), 74. Sonoda described his discussion with Deng and the political events surrounding it in a September 1978 interview, reprinted in Sonoda, Sekai, Nihon, Ai, 328. 40 See for example, Nagai Yōnosuke, Nakajima Mineo, and Yano Tōru, “Haken no rensa hannō,” Chūō kōron 94/4 (1979), 66–80. 41 See for example, ibid., 66–80; and Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 106. 42 On the deterioration of Japan-Soviet relations in the late 1970s see, Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, 182–98. 43 Ibid., 182. 44 Blanchard, “The U.S. Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands,” 120. 45 Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, 152. 46 Nagano, Tennō to Tō Shōhei, 290. 47 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 105. 48 Ishii et al., Jitsuroku to kōshō, 182. 49 Quoted in Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic (New York: Free Press, 1999), 395. 50 Lin Xiaoguang, Riben zhengfu kaifa yuanzhu yu zhongri guanxi (Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 2003), 179, 187. 51 Ibid., 181. 52 Ibid., 182. 53 Michael Yahuda, Sino-Japanese Relations after the Cold War: Two Tigers Sharing a Mountain (London: Routledge, 2014), 69. 54 Meisner, Mao’s China and After, 403. 55 Hughes, Chinese Nationalism, 11; Meisner, Mao’s China and After, 429; Lin, Riben zhengfu kaifa yuanzhu, 191. 56 Lin, Riben zhengfu kaifa yuanzhu, 183–84, 206–7. 57 Ibid., 199–200; Masuo Chisako, Chūgoku seiji gaikō no tenkanten: kaikaku kaihō to “dokuritsu jishu no taigai seisaku” (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2010), 92–94. 58 Kojima Sueo, “Puranto keiyaku mondai,” in Nit-Chū kankeishi 1972–2012, vol. 2, Keizai, eds Hattori Kenji and Marukawa Tomoo (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2012), 126–27; Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 1275–76; Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 109. 59 Lin, Riben zhengfu kaifa yuanzhu, 212. 60 Ibid., 212–15. 61 Ibid., 213. 62 Ibid., 216. 63 Pei, Deng Xiaoping, 162. 64 Ibid., 158–59.

Notes

263

65 Kazankai, Nit-Chū kankei, 1092. 66 Deng Xiaoping nianpu, 407. 67 MOFA, Fukuda sōri—Tō fukusōri kaidanroku, October 25, 1978, MOFA Diplomatic Archives, 01-935-2, 23. 68 Satō et al., Postwar Politician, 74–83; Ōhira, Zaisei tsuredzure gusa; Ni, “Ōhira Masayoshi to ahen mondai”; Ōkita Saburō, Tightrope: Balancing Economics and Responsibility in Japanese Diplomacy 1979–1980 (Tokyo: Institute for Domestic and International Policy Studies, 1992), 6–7. 69 Quoted in Satō et al., Postwar Politician, 81 70 Lin, Riben zhengfu kaifa yuanzhu, 217. 71 Wakatsuki, “Heiwa yūkō jōyaku,” 121. 72 Lin, Riben zhengfu kaifa yuanzhu, 216; Sekiyama Ken, “Tai-Chū ODA no kaishi,” Nit-Chū kankeishi, 2:113–15; Wakatsuki, “Heiwa yūkō jōyaku,” 123–24. 73 Lin, Riben zhengfu kaifa yuanzhu, 218; Sekiyama, “Tai-Chū ODA,” 115–16; Wakatsuki, “Heiwa yūkō jōyaku,” 123–24; Reinhard Drifte, “The Ending of Japan’s ODA Loan Programme to China—All’s Well that Ends Well?” Asia-Pacific Review 13/1 (2006), 95. 74 Mōri, Nit-Chū kankei, 108; MOFA, “Overview of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/region/e_asia/china/index. html. 75 Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 310. 76 0.84 percent, to be exact. Sekiyama, “Tai-Chū ODA,” 118–20. 77 Ibid., 116; Wakatsuki, “Heiwa yūkō jōyaku,” 122; Pyle, Japan Rising, 324; Yahuda, Sino-Japanese Relations, 70; Drifte, “The Ending of Japan’s ODA,” 94–95. 78 William T. Tow, “Sino-Japanese Security Cooperation: Evolution and Prospects,” Pacific Affairs 56/1 (Spring, 1983), 52. 79 Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, 158–59. 80 Joshua A. Fogel and Mitchell Rapoport, Japan ’79: A New York Times Survey (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 229. 81 Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, 160; Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 34; Tow, “Sino-Japanese Security Cooperation,” 52, see especially footnote 6; Mōri, Nit-Chū kankei, 96. 82 Tow, “Sino-Japanese Security Cooperation,” 52. 83 Hosoya Chihiro, “ ‘Zenhōi’ Nihon no shinro,” in Nihon gaikō no zahyō (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1979), 232–33. 84 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 111. 85 Mōri, Nit-Chū kankei, 97. 86 Robert A. Scalapino, “Introduction,” in Coox and Conroy, eds China and Japan: The Search for Balance, xviii.

264

Notes

Chapter 8   1 Pyle, Japan Rising, 256–62; “A new kind of power” is from James L. Huffman, Japan in World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Chapter 7, 119; Ezra F. Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).   2 Ōhira Masayoshi, “Sōsai aisatsu,” Gekkan jiyūminshu 278 (March, 1979), 233.   3 Ōhira Masayoshi, “Sōsai aisatsu,” Gekkan jiyūminshu 290 (March, 1980), 244.   4 Ōhira Masayoshi, “Dai hachijūkai kokkai ni okeru shisei hōshin enzetsu,” in Eien no ima (Tokyo: Kajima shuppankai, 1980), 16.   5 Ibid., 16.   6 Ibid., 16. On neo-­liberal international relations theory in the 1970s see, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1977); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” World Politics 40/2 (January, 1988), 235–51.   7 Ōkita Saburō, “Waga gaikō 250 nichi,” Bungei shunjū 58/10 (October, 1980), 134–35.   8 Ōhira, “Dai hachijūkai,” 16; Ōkita Saburō, “Chūgoku o misuteru wake ni wa ikanai,” Keizai kōron 14/5 (1981), 37.   9 MOFA website, “50 Years of Japan’s ODA,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/ cooperation/anniv50/pamphlet/progress2.html; Ōkita Saburō, “Nihon, Chūgoku, Beikoku,” Chūō kōron 95/1 (1980), 175. 10 Ōkita Saburō, “Japan, China and the United States: Economic Relations and Prospects,” Foreign Affairs 57/5 (Summer 1979), 1091, 1100, 1102. 11 Ōhira Masayoshi, “Shin seiki o mezasu Nit-Chū kankei—fukasa to hirogari o motomeru,” in Eien no ima, 294–95. 12 Ibid., 294–95. 13 Ibid., 297–98. 14 Ōhira Masayoshi, “Ka Kokuhō sōri shusai resepushon ni okeru aisatsu,” in Eien no ima, 330. 15 Ibid., 331. 16 Ōkita Saburō, “Ōkita gaikō no 251-nichi,” Ushio 257 (1980), 58. 17 Ōkita Saburō, “Chūgoku o fukumu keizai kyōryoku no taiō,” Kokusai kaihatsu jānaru 281 (1979), 28. 18 Ibid., 28. 19 Ōkita, “Chūgoku o misuteru,” 40, and Ōkita Saburō, “Nit-Chū keizai kyōryoku o dō chōsei suruka,” Chūō kōron 96/4 (1981), 116. 20 Jingji yanjiu cankao ziliao bianjibu, ed., Riben pengyou dui woguo jingji gongzuo de kanfa he jianyi (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1981). 21 Ōkita, “Nit-Chū keizai kyōryoku,” 117. 22 Ni, “Ōhira Masayoshi naikaku to Chū-Nichi kankei (2),” 77.

Notes

265

23 Ōhira, Fukugōryoku no jidai, see the section, “Chikakute tōi Nit-Chū kankei,” 6–7. 24 Ni Zhimin, “Ōhira Masayoshi naikaku to Chū-Nichi kankei (2),” Ryūkoku daigaku keizaigaku ronshū 49/3 (December 2009), 77. 25 Ōhira, “Shin seiki o mezasu Nit-Chū kankei,” 295. 26 Ōkita, “Chūgoku o fukumu keizai kyōryoku no taiō,” 27. 27 Ōkita, Tightrope, 13–14. 28 Ibid., 12. 29 Ōkita Saburō, “Chūgoku no keizai chōsei o megutte,” Ajia jihō 134 (June, 1981), 18. 30 Ibid., 19. 31 Ōkita Saburō, “Nit-Chū keizai kyōryoku,” 121. 32 Etō Jun, “Saikin no Chūgoku o tazunete,” Keizai jidai 43/11 (1978), 40. 33 Ibid., 46–48. 34 Etō Jun, Panda jirushi no tabako (Tokyo: Hokuyōsha, 1980), 88. 35 Etō, “Saikin no Chūgoku o tazunete,” 48. 36 Ibid., 48. 37 Ibid., 48. 38 Etō, Panda jirushi no tabako, 96–99. 39 Ibid., 77, 109. 40 Nagai Yōnosuke, “Nit-Chū ‘katamen’ jōyaku no kiketsu,” Chūō kōron 93/5 (1978), 72–73. 41 Nakajima Mineo, “Nit-Chū jōyaku no kokusai kankyō,” Sekai 395 (1978), 234. 42 Ibid., 239. 43 Ibid., 239–40. 44 Asahi shimbun, November 30, 1979. 45 Nakajima, “Nit-Chū jōyaku,” 234. 46 Portions of the following discussion appeared in Robert Hoppens, “The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the Transformation of Japan’s Relations with China in Diplomacy and Discourse,” Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies 14/2 (July, 2014), http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk. 47 Nagai Yōnosuke, Nakajima Mineo, Yano Tōru, “Haken no rensa hannō,” Chūō kōron 94/4 (1979), 66–68. 48 Ibid., 68. 49 Ibid., 68, 71. 50 Ibid., 70. 51 Ibid., 79. 52 Seki Hiroharu, Kugai Saburō, Tsuji Kōgo and Imagawa Eiichi, “Chū-Etsu sensō sono shōgeki to Ajia e no hamon,” Ekonomisuto 57/9 (March 6, 1979), 23. 53 Ibid., 24–25, 28, 32–33. 54 Nagai et al., “Haken no rensa hannō,” 69. 55 Seki et al., “Chū-Etsu sensō,” 28.

266

Notes

56 Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow, 154. 57 Nihon kyōsantō, Nihon kyōsantō no 80 nen, 222–23. 58 Nihon shakaitō 50 nen, 645–46, 792. 59 Nihon shakaitō 40 nen, 1192. 60 Ibid., 1192. 61 See for example, Etō Shinkichi, “Evolving Sino-Japanese Relations,” in Selected Works on Modern Japan-China Relations (Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko, 2005), 1–20; and Etō Shinkichi, “Nit-Chū mochiaji o sonchō suru no ron,” Bungei shunjū 59/7 (1981), 100–1. 62 Niijima Atsuyoshi, “Chūgoku wa tsuiraku shiteiru,” Shokun! 11/2 (1979), 85. 63 Ibid., 85. 64 Ibid., 89. 65 Nomura Kōichi, “Gendai Chūgoku no henbō: Chūgoku shakaishugi no yukue,” Sekai 402 (1979), 141–42. 66 Ibid., 141. 67 Oda Makoto, “Kono goro omou koto, kangaeru koto,” in Shisha ni kodawaru (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1979), 196, 200–1. 68 Oda Makoto, “Shisha ni kodawaru shisō o,” Asahi jānaru 21/15 (April 10, 1979), 35–36.

Epilogue and Conclusion   1 Okabe, “Historical Remembering and Forgetting in Sino-Japanese Relations,” 56.   2 Mōri, Nit-Chū kankei, 97.   3 Okabe, Nit-Chū kankei no kako to shōrai, 41–43.   4 Caroline Rose, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A Case Study in Political Decision-Making (London: Routledge, 1998), 64–71.   5 Amako Satoshi, “Yūkō ippendō kara no tankan: posuto ‘ido hori bito’ seidai no Nit-Chū kōryū,” in Nit-Chū kōryū no yonhanseiki, eds Amako Satoshi and Sonoda Shigeto (Tokyo: Tōyō keizai shinpōsha, 1998); Asahi shimbun, March 24, 1979.   6 Tanaka, Nit-Chū kankei, 210, fn. 2;   7 Furukawa, Nit-Chū sengo kankeishi, 425.   8 Furukawa Mantarō, Nit-Chū sengo kankeishi nōto (Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1983), 321.   9 Tagawa, Nit-Chū kōryū to jimintō ryōshūtachi, 219.

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Index Abe Shintarō, 178 Admiral Yamamoto (film), 166 Adenauer, Konrad, 145 An Affirmation of the Greater East Asia War (Hayashi), 102 Ah Q, 138–39 Aichi Kiichi, 36, 74 Akamatsu Kaname, 201 Alliance for the Destruction of the USJapan Security Treaty (JSP), 162 Allied occupation of Japan, 19, 20–22, 24, 25, 41, 43, 121, 143, 152; and Japanese modernization, 44, 48; and national identity, 2, 3, 40, 44, 45–47, 123, 124, 235; reverse course, 20, 41, 43, 45 Amnesty International, 224 Andō Hikotarō, 67 anti-hegemony, 129; conservative criticism of, 215–16; JCP and 220–21; JSP and, 159, 160–62; and the Northern Territories dispute,143; Oda Makoto on, 226; and peace treaty negotiations, 133–39, 173–78, 183–88; Seki Hiroharu on, 163 anti-hegemony clause; 15; conservative criticism of, 214, 215, 216; JCP and, 220; in the joint communiqué (1972), 96, 134; JSP and, 159, 160–61; Niijima Atsuyoshi on, 224; in peace treaty negotiations, 133–38, 174, 175, 178, 183, 185, 186, 187; and the Sino-Soviet cold war, 132, 136, 139; in the Takeiri Memo, 84. See also third-country provision apology issue during Tanaka’s Beijing visit (1972), 86–87, 90, 98, 231 Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, 20, 90 Article 14 of the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty, 23, 27 See also reparations; San Francisco Peace Treaty Article 98 of the Japanese constitution, 120 Asakai Kōichirō, 75; Asakai’s nightmare, 75

Asanuma Inejirō, 53; Asanuma spirit, 11–12, 161; Asanuma statement (1959), 53, 161 Asia Development Board. See Kōain Asian-African Problems Study Group (AAken), 37–38, 178 Asian collective security system (Soviet), 139, 161, 177, 256n21 Asian Problems Study Group (A-ken), 37–38, 76, 178, 180, 183, 216 Asianism/Asianist nationalist narratives, 6, 25, 97, 138, 140, 220; JSP and, 113; Marxists and, 52; and the national awakening movement, 46–47; Oda Makoto on, 226; Ōhira Masayoshi and, 108; PRC leadership and, 55; Takeuchi Yoshimi and, 48; Umesao Tadao on 59; Vietnam War and, 62, 63 Association for the Promotion of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship (LDP), 174 aviation agreement (1974), 129–31, 132; criticism of, 133, 155–56 banal nationalism, 5 Bandung Conference, 30, 36, 55 Baoshan shock, 191 Baoshan steel complex, 191 Barshay, Andrew, 47 Basic Principles for the Normalization of Relations (Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka kihon hōshin), 81, 118 Beheiren (Citizen’s League for Peace in Vietnam), 64 Ben-Dasan, Isaiah, 124 Billig, Michael, 5 Brezhnev, Leonid, 139, 177 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 148, 171, 181, 182 Carter, Jimmy, 148, 171, 180, 181, 182 Chen Chu, 129, 143 Chen Xilian, 195

290

Index

Chen Zhaobin, 28, 29 Chiang Kai-shek, 21, 28, 31, 32, 34, 86, 89, 115, 153; death of (1975), 136; Japanese moral obligation to, 12, 121, 122, 123; relationship with Japanese conservatives, 29, 36, 122, 123 China. See People’s Republic of China (PRC); Republic of China (ROC) China Airlines, 130, 131 China boom, 189 China Lectures (Kōza Chūgoku), 50 China-Japan Friendship Association, 22, 83 China Petroleum Company, 179 China problem, 1, 2, 5–9, 14, 15–16, 19–20, 32, 64, 74, 81, 130; in academia, 66–68; changing discourse of, 57, 60, 61, 126, 164, 167, 199, 227; and the history problem, 231–34; and Japanese domestic politics, 14, 35, 38; leftist/progressive positions on, 46, 62, 112, 116–17, 226; and national identity, 39, 40, 42–43, 68, 235–37; and normalization, 98, 131; Ōhira Masayoshi and, 79, 105, 106–10, 210; Ōkita Saburō and, 193, 208, 210; PRC leadership and, 12–13; right-wing positions on, 122, 156–57; war guilt/ responsibility and, 9–12 China Problem Policy Council (Chūgoku mondai taisaku kyōgikai), 82 China Problem Research Council (Chūgoku mondai chōsakai), 77 China Studies (Chūgoku kenkyū), 67 China Studies Association (Chūgoku kenkyūjo), 67, 116 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 7, 206 “Chinese and Japanese Modernity” (Takeuchi), 48, 58 Chinese Civil Aviation Corporation, 130 Chinese Civil War, 20, 21, 233 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 20, 23, 24, 27, 29, 35, 84, 122, 148, 196, 222, 224, 231; relationship with the JCP, 114–15 Chinese invasion of Vietnam (1979). See Sino-Vietnamese War (1979) Chinese Literature Study Group (Chūgoku bungaku kenkyūkai), 48 Chinese oil exports, 142

Chinese Revolution, 26, 61, 188, 200; as inspiration or model, 42, 47, 50, 53, 54, 55; JSP and, 112; leftist/progressive critical reevaluation of, 116, 163, 164, 224, 225; Maruyama Masao on, 50–51; as a national liberation movement, 2, 45; Oda Makoto on, 65; PRC as the culmination of, 6, 21; Takeuchi Yoshimi on, 47–49 Clean Government Party (CGP). See Kōmeitō cognitive dissonance, 10 Cold War, 1, 6, 15, 16, 25, 38, 132, 161, 197, 217, 229; breakdown of in the 1970s, 100, 109, 158; and the China problem, 42, 46, 53, 163; and Japanese academia, 66, 223; and Japanese domestic politics 20, 35; and Japanese national identity, 40, 43, 44, 61, 113, 124, 235; Japan’s position in, 12, 104; Japanese neutrality, 24, 215; Korean War and, 21; new Cold War of the 1980s, 186, 225, 226; Nixon shocks and, 111; Seirankai and, 151, 152; and US policy toward Japan, 20, 21; and the Yoshida Doctrine, 19–20 conservative triumphalism, 111, 200, 217, 227, 231, 232 Constitution Problems Study Group (Kempō mondai kenkyūkai), 50 Council for the Normalization of SinoJapanese Relations (Nit-Chū kokkō seijōka kyōgikai), 80 criticize Confucius and Lin Biao, 159, 165, 166, 189 Cultural Revolution, 34, 65, 67, 76, 121, 180, 233; and Chinese domestic politics,159; and Chinese economic reform, 189, 205, 206; and Chinese studies of Japan, 165, 166; Etō Jun on, 212; and JCP-CCP relations, 114; Niijima Atsuyoshi and, 116, 117, 164, 223, 224 Daming Temple, 229 De Gaulle, Charles, 145 defense exchanges, Japan-PRC, 145, 195–96, 218 Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), 192, 222 Deng Xiaoping, 143, 145, 167, 181, 191, 216, 224, 225, 231; and Chinese economic

Index reform, 171, 187, 188–90; competition with Hua Guofeng, 172; fall of (1976), 146, 159, 163, 165; on Japanese defense, 195; meeting with Etō Jun (1978), 211, 213; and peace treaty negotiations, 133, 137–39, 173, 174, 178, 184–85; and Senkaku issue, 179, 180, 184–85, 186; Tokyo visit (October, 1978), 192 détente, 74, 109, 132, 140, 151, 171, 180, 186 Diaoyu Islands. See Senkaku Islands Diet League for Japan-China Friendship, 83, 174, 178 Diet League for the Promotion of JapanChina Trade (Nit-Chū bōeki sokushin giin renmei), 35, 176 Doak, Kevin, 40–43 Dokō Tokio, 175, 191 Dulles, John Foster, 21–26 economic aid, Japanese economic aid to China, 15, 101, 171, 186, 191–94, 202, 204, 208, 210, 216; and Japanese foreign policy, 201. See also Official Development Assistance (ODA) economic cooperation, 187, 188 197, 202, 216, 230, 231; Chinese economic reform and, 189–90; and Deng’s Tokyo visit (October 1978), 192; and Japanese ODA to PRC, 194; Japan-USSR, 141, 142; reparations and, 207–10 economic development, 202, 206; Chinese, 120, 174, 187, 188–90, 193; Japanese, 21, 37, 60, 149; and Japanese national identity, 57–59, 109 Economic Planning Proposal for 1979– 1980, 190 Eda Saburō, 162 Emperor System, 44, 45, 63, 166 Escape from Asia (datsu-A), 47, 59, 224 Etō Jun, 60, 61, 99, 149; China visit (1978), 211–14 Etō Shinkichi; 8, 67, 97, 124, 126, 222–23 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 161, 256n16 The Fragile Blossom (Brzezinski), 148 Foreign Leap Forward (yang maojin), 190 Four Modernizations, 172, 174–75, 177, 182, 187–88, 189, 192, 195

291

Fourth Defense Plan, 196 Fujio Masayuki, 131, 150, 151, 183, 184 Fujiwara Akira, 44, 45 Fujiyama Aiichirō, 30, 38, 83, 174 Fukuda Takeo, 36, 76; and economic cooperation with China, 192; and the Japan-China peace treaty (1978), 133, 135, 171–76, 177–78, 182–85; and LDP presidential election (1972), 79–80; and Senkaku incident (1978), 178–80; Washington visit (May, 1978), 182 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 47, 59 Funada Naka, 36 Furui Yoshimi, 79, 81 Furukawa Mantarō, 233 Gang of Four, 165, 166, 172, 189 Ganjin (Jianzhen), 229–30 Gao Zengjie, 7 Genda Minoru, 120 generational change, and academia, 66–68; and national identity, 57, 60–61; and war guilt/responsibility, 61–66 Glaubitz, Joachim, 141, 177 Great Leap Forward, 32, 33, 67, 188, 212 “The Greater East Asia War and Our Determination” (Takeuchi), 48 Gromyko, Andrei, 139, 143, 176, 177 Gu Mu, 190, 193 Hamada Kōichi, 151 Hamano Seigo, 174 Han Nianlong, 133, 175, 183 Hashimoto Hiroshi, 81–82, 87 Hatoyama Ichirō, 30–32, 41, 176 Hayashi Fusao, 102 Hinton, Harold, 148 Hirano Yoshitarō, 67 Hirohito, Emperor, 224 Historical Science Society (Rekishigaku kenkyūkai), 44, 45, 53 History and the Discovery of the Nation (Ishimoda), 44 history problem, 13, 87, 126, 230–34 Hokkaidō Society for the Support of the Return of the Northern Territories, 144 Honda Katsuichi, 60, 62–64, 65; and apology issue, 62–63 Hosoya Chihiro, 197

292

Index

Hori Shigeru, 78, 100; Hori letter, 78 Hua Guofeng, 167, 172, 173, 180, 190, 196, 203 Huang Hua, 184, 191 Ienaga Saburō, 46 Ijiri Hidenori, 10 Ikeda Hayato, 32, 36–37, 76, 79, 101–2, 107, 173; China policy of, 33–34 Inayama Yoshihiro, 175, 191 Inoue Kiyoshi, 44–46, 115–17, 162 Inoue Yasushi, 229 Institute of Japanese Studies (CASS), 7 International Relations Consultative Committee (Kokusai kankei kondankai), 76 Introduction to an Ecological History of Civilization (Umesao), 58 Ishibashi Masashi, 2, 160, 162 Ishibashi Tanzan, 30–32, 36 Ishihara Shintarō, 60, 62, 105, 123; and conservative narratives of national identity, 60–61; on normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, 124; on SinoAmerican rapprochement, 119; and the Seirankai, 150, 151, 153–55 Ishii Mitsujirō, 36–37 Ishikawa Tadao, 67 Ishimoda Shō, 44, 52–53 Isozaki Satoshi, 193 Itō Masayoshi, 193 Iwamura Michio, 67 Iwashima Hisao, 195 Japan Airlines (JAL), 130 Japan as Number One (Vogel), 200 Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai dōyūkai), 192 Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade, 35 Japan-China Cooperation Committee (Nik-Ka kyōryoku iinkai), 36, 37, 76 Japan-China Friendship Association (Nit-Chū yūkō kyōkai), 35, 162, 174, 176 Japan-China Peace Treaty (1952), 27–29, 113, 120, 131; and the normalization of Japan-PRC relations, 80, 82–84, 87, 88–89, 95–96, 107

Japan-China peace treaty (1978), 15, 129, 132, 133–39, 140, 145, 156, 172–73, 175, 177–78, 183–88, 190, 191, 217, 224–25; American support for, 171, 182–83; Chinese economic reform and, 171, 172, 175–76; Chinese radicals and, 166–67; conservative criticism of, 211–13, 214–16, 217; JCP on, 220; JSP and, 160–62, 221; in PRC anti-Soviet strategy, 132, 136–38; scholarly appraisals, 196–98; and the Senkaku Islands incident (1978), 179–80 Japan-China Trade Promotion Association (Nit-Chū bōeki sokushikai), 35 Japan Communist Party (JCP), 27, 83, 111, 116, 155, 157, 222; on normalization, 114–15; relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 114; on the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 220–21 Japan Export-Import Bank, 33 Japan Issues (Riben wenti), 148, 165–67 “Japan model” of normalization, 135, 181 Japan-ROC treaty. See Japan-China Peace Treaty (1952) Japan Sinks (Komatsu), 149 Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 2, 28, 53, 56, 95, 115, 116, 117, 155, 158–59, 224; on normalization, 112–14; on normalization and historical settlement, 125; on Northern Territories, 143; reevaluation of Chinese socialism and nationalism, 222; on the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 221–22; sixth JSP mission to Beijing (1975), 159–62 The Japan that Can Say No (Ishihara), 105 Japanese Defense White Paper (1977), 186 Japanese Freedom of Information Act, 15 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 38, 77, 85, 87, 89, 97, 187, 211, 216; and anti-hegemony, 134–35; and economic aid to China, 194; and normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, 80–82, 87–90, 96, 98, 125, 134; and peace treaty negotiations, 175, 178, 184 Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF), 145, 179, 186 Ji Pengfei, 85, 87, 91, 95, 96, 130 Johnson, U. Alexis, 75, 99 Journey to China (Honda), 62

Index Kaminishi Akio, 102 Kamiya Fuji, 66 Kano Tsutomu, 149 Katō Shūichi, 111 Katsumata Seiichi, 162 Kawamoto Toshio, 193 Kawasaki Hideji, 136 Kaya Okinori, 36, 37, 118–19, 121–23 Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), 175, 190, 191, 192 Kennedy, John F., 61, 103 Kersten, Rikki, 11 Kikuchi Yoshirō, 119, 123 Kimigayo, 232 Kimura Takeo, 144–45 Kimura Toshio, 133 Kishi Nobusuke, 30, 34, 41, 76, 173, 196; China policy as prime minister, 31–33; PRC courting of, 232, 234; and relations with the Republic of China, 32, 36, 37 Kissinger, Henry, 91, 95, 132, 137, 141–42, 144, 145, 181; and Nixon shock 73, 74, 99; and UN representation problem, 77 Kitaoka Juitsu, 123 Kitaoka Shin’ichi, 9 Kitazawa Naokichi, 36 Kōain (Asia Development Board), 106, 193; Kōain group, 193 Komatsu Sakyō, 149 Kōmeitō, 79, 84, 112, 156, 173, 177, 221 Kōno Ichirō, 38 Kōno Yōhei, 174 Kōno Kenzō, 133 Kōsaka Masataka, 60, 66 Kosaka Zentarō, 80, 174, 178 Korean War, 21–23, 37 Kugai Saburō, 219–20 Kurile Islands, 30, 92, 140, 143, 161 Kuriyama Takakazu, 82, 134 Kuroda Hisao, 162 Kusuda Minoru, 73 Kuzumi Tadao, 125 Lectures on the History of Modern Japanese Thought (Kindai Nihon shisōshi kenkyūkai), 50 Lee, Chae-jin, 162 Let’s See Everything (Oda), 64 Li Qiang, 189

293

Li Xiannian, 162, 174 Liao Chengzhi, 80, 141, 175, 178, 195; and LT trade agreement, 33, 189; and sixth JSP mission to Beijing (1975), 160–61 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 33, 35, 54, 77, 81, 83, 84, 85, 89, 94, 99, 100, 112, 119, 123, 126, 131, 136, 143, 144, 145, 158, 161, 180, 182, 184–85, 193, 200, 232; 1972 lower house election, 155; 1974 upper house election, 133; 1976 lower house election, 148; JSP competition with on China policy, 159–60; Ōhira Masayoshi and, 102; opposition to normalization, 80–81, 90; presidential election (1972), 78–80; pro-China (PRC) faction, 14, 35–36, 37–38, 164, 174, 233; pro-China/ pro-Taiwan split, 38, 178; pro-Taiwan (ROC) faction, 36–37, 80, 87, 118, 121, 173, 183; Satō Eisaku and LDP factionalism, 76; Seirankai and, 150–51 Lin Biao, 159, 165–66, 189 Lin Liguo, 166 Lin Xiaoguang, 188 Liu Lianren, 165 Liu Xiwen, 191 Lockheed scandal, 146 long-term trade agreement (1978), 190–91 LT Trade, 34 Lu Xun, 35, 48, 52, 138 Mansfield, Mike, 135 Mao Zedong, 50, 52, 57, 74, 90, 93, 115, 122, 133, 140, 146, 158, 159, 163, 164, 165, 167, 172, 185, 187, 191, 208, 212, 220; 1981 CCP resolution on, 232–33; anti-Soviet strategy of, 132, 141–42, 144–45, 166; and economic development, 188–89; meeting with Tanaka Kakuei (1972), 85, 94–95; meeting with Ōhira Masayoshi (1974), 130; Niijima Atsuyoshi on, 116–17, 164, 223–24; Nomura Kōichi on, 225; Ōhira Masayoshi on, 202; support for leftist Japanese nationalist narratives, 13, 54–55; on the war and Japanese aggression, 56, 231 Maruyama Masao, 14, 58, 68; on China, 50–51, 65; and Japanese national identity, 41, 43–44, 46; and Takeuchi Yoshimi, 48,

294

Index

50–51; and the war responsibility issue, 11–12, 65 Matsumura Kenzō, 31, 33, 38, 55 May Fourth movement, 49 Memmi, Albert, 10 Memorandum Trade (MT Trade), 34, 189 Meyer, Armin, 99 Miki Takeo, 37, 83, 156, 172, 193; and the LDP presidential election (1972), 79–80; and peace treaty negotiations, 135–37, 139 Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 35, 83, 145, 151, 193–94 Minobe Ryōkichi, 78 Mishima Yukio, 148, 166, 231 Miyamoto Kenji, 114 Miyazawa Kiichi, 135–39, 143–44 Miyazawa’s Four Principles, 136–39, 173 modernization theory, 58 Mōri Kazuko, 171, 197, 231 Mori Yoshirō, 151 Morrison, Herbert, 23 movement for national awakening (minzoku jikaku), 44–46, 102 Nabeyama Sadachika, 119, 122 Nadao Hirokichi, 183 Nagai Yōnosuke, 66, 215, 217–18, 220 Nagasaki flag incident, 32–33, 36 Nakae Yōsuke, 184 Nakagawa Ichirō, 121–22, 150, 153, 155–56 Nakajima Mineo, 60, 65, 97; on the China studies discipline, 67–68; on economic aid to the PRC, 216; and the Hori Letter, 78; on the peace treaty, 215–16; on the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 217–18; on war responsibility, 12, 63–64 Nakao Eiichi, 151, 154, 166, 184 Nakasone Yasuhiro, 83, 145, 196, 230 Nakayama Masaaki, 119, 124, 151 Nan Hanchen, 34 Narita-Liao joint communiqué (1975), 161 Narita Tomomi, 159–62 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 104 national identity, 15–16, 91, 217; concepts/ definitions of, 3–5; and the China problem, 1, 6, 8–9, 38, 39, 100–1, 226, 227, 234–36; conservative/right-wing

narratives of, 6, 39, 57–59, 118–24, 131, 150, 153, 175, 198, 199–200, 211–14, 215–16, 218; generational change and, 60–61; and the history problem, 13, 230–34; in Japanese academia, 67; and Japan’s relations with China, 91; lack/ loss of national identity, 40–41, 42–43, 150; leftist/progressive narratives of, 6, 20, 35, 39, 43–47, 52–53, 113–14, 117; the Nixon shock and, 75; and normative accounts of Sino-Japanese relations, 7–8; Ōhira Masayoshi on, 102–3, 104–5, 108, 110–11, 204–11; in postwar Japan, 2–3, 68–69; PRC leadership and, 12–13, 54–57, 196; state and nation in, 41–42; Takeuchi Yoshimi and, 47–51; war guilt/ responsibility and, 9–12, 61–64 national liberation, 61, 65, 216, 222, 224, 226; leftist identification with, 2, 6, 44–46, 52–53, 55, 57, 112, 115–17, 157–59, 164, 221 national nihilism, 40 nationalism, 26, 47, 67–68; as civic nationalism (kokuminshugi), 43, 68; definitions, 3–4; as ethnic nationalism (minzokushugi), 2, 43, 44, 68; Etō Jun on, 213; as ideology/discourse, 3–4; as identity, 3; lack of in postwar Japan, 3, 8–9, 40, 235; leftist alienation from, 163–64, 199, 218, 220, 222–26, 227; leftists/progressives and, 43, 44–45, 52, 60, 115, 117; Maruyama Masao and, 41, 43–44; nationalist discourse, 5; nationalist narratives, 5; normative definition of, 4–5; Ōhira Masayoshi and, 102–3, 105; as patriotism (aikokushugi), 2, 42, 43, 68; PRC and, 13, 93; problematic nature of in postwar Japan, 2; state and nation and, 41; Takeuchi Yoshimi and, 48–50; war responsibility and, 11; wave metaphor of, 5 Nationalist Party of China (GMD), 27, 28, 36, 80, 112, 115, 123, 233; American support for, 21, 23; Nehru, Jawaharlal, 104 New Cold War, 186 New Liberal Club (NLC), 164, 174, 233 Nihonjinron (Nihon bunkaron), 58, 103 Niijima Atsuyoshi (Junryō), 67, 115, 116–17, 164, 223–24

Index Nikaidō Susumu, 174, 260n6 “Nixon and American Imperialism,” 114 Nixon, Richard, 15, 62, 73–77, 84, 86, 91, 94, 96, 99–100, 107, 109, 111, 114–16, 173, 181, 132, 144, 146, 158 Nixon-Satō joint communiqué (1969), 74, 76, 84, 120 Nixon shock, 15, 19, 73–79, 99–103, 104, 126, 147, 158, 215; leftist interpretations of, 111–12, 114–17; right-wing interpretations, 118–19; second Nixon shock, 99–100; third Nixon shock, 147 Noda Takeo, 77 Nomura Kōichi, 67, 163, 164, 224–25 normalization of Sino-American relations, 176, 181, 185 normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, 7, 15, 28, 31, 78, 80–98, 99–101, 107–11, 126, 129, 130, 131, 134–35, 139, 140, 141, 148, 165–66, 167, 197, 202, 208, 223, 232, 234; JCP on, 114–15; JSP on, 111–14, 159; and the LDP presidential election, 78–80; leftists/progressives on, 115–17, 157–58; normalization and the history problem, 125–26; right-wing criticism of, 118–24, 150–57; and the Senkaku Islands, 179 Northern Territories, 30, 92, 140, 141, 161, 162, 177, 186; Chinese support for Japanese claim to, 55, 142–44, 165 occupation of Japan. See Allied occupation of Japan Oda Makoto, 11–12, 60, 64–66, 148, 225–26 Ōe Kenzaburō, 60 Official Development Assistance (ODA), 101, 191–95, 201, 204, 209 Ogata, Sadako, 97 Ogawa Heishirō, 129 Oguma Eiji, 43, 60 Ōhira Masayoshi: 15, 33, 38, 101–2, 103–4, 105, 114, 133, 135, 173, 178, 183, 192–94, 214; on the apology issue (1972), 87; and the aviation agreement (1974), 129–31; on the China problem, 106–11; and economic aid to China, 171, 193–95, 202; on Japanese national identity, 102–3, 104–5, 108–9, 111, 149, 200–6; and LDP presidential election

295

(1972), 79–80; and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, 80–85, 87–91, 95–96, 98, 109–11; and relations with the Soviet Union, 139, 145; reparations and economic aid to China, 207–11; right-wing criticism of, 118–24, 154–56, 216; on war responsibility/guilt, 87, 105, 106, 126 Ōhira Zengo, 124 oil crisis/oil shock, 141–42, 147–49, 151, 156, 158, 167, 199 Okazaki Kaheita, 209 Ōkita Saburō, 193, 194, 200–1; and economic aid to China, 191, 194, 204–26; reparations and economic aid to China, 207–11 Okabe Tatsumi, 8–9, 60, 67, 231 Okinawa, 22, 55, 60, 73, 112, 179; and China policy of Satō Eisaku, 75–78 omni-directional foreign policy (zenhōi gaikō), 173 Ōno Banboku, 36 “On the Motherland” (Ishihara), 61 “On Patriotism” (Aikoku ni tsuite), 102 overcoming the modern (kindai o koeru jidai ), 201, 204 pandas, 154–55 Paris Peace Accords (1973), 158 patriotism, 2–3, 42–43, 54, 58, 61, 68, 101–2, 151, 213 Peace Problems Discussion Council (Heiwa mondai danwakai), 66 Peace Studies Association of Japan (Nihon heiwa gakkai), 163 Peace Treaty Promotion Rally (1977), 174 people’s diplomacy, 28, 36, 54, 139 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 1, 37, 69, 99, 199, 229; and the aviation agreement (1974), 129–31; Cold War and Japan’s relations with, 6, 19; economic aid to, 15, 101, 171, 188, 190–95, 197–98; economic policy, 188–90; Hatoyama Ichirō and, 30– 31; and the history problem, 13, 125–26, 231–34; Ikeda Hayato cabinet and, 33–34; Ishibashi Tanzan cabinet and, 31; and the Japan-China peace treaty (1978), 133–39, 171, 172–76, 177–78, 184–88, 197–98; and the Japan-China (ROC) peace treaty

296

Index

(1952), 28–29; and Japanese defense, 144–45, 195–96; on the Japanese economy, 149–50; Japanese national identity and, 9, 39, 42, 53–54, 57, 59, 69, 100–1, 198, 199, 217, 227, 235–36; Kishi Nobusuke cabinet and, 31–33; Korean War and, 21; and LDP presidential election, 78–80; leadership on Japanese national identity, 13, 54–57, 164–67; left wing and, 6, 20–21, 39, 42, 46, 52, 53, 62–63, 64–66, 111–17, 148, 157–64, 167, 220–26; normalization of Japan’s relations with, 7, 80–98, 100, 129; and the Northern Territories, 143–44; Ōhira Masayoshi and, 106–7, 109–11, 200, 202–4; Ōkita Saburō and, 204–6; pro-PRC forces in Japan, 7, 14, 35–36, 38; relations with the Soviet Union, 132, 139–40, 141, 146, 176–77; relations with the United States, 73–74, 99, 141–42, 171, 181–82; right wing and, 39, 42–43, 57, 63–64, 66, 67–68, 118– 24, 152–57, 211–16; and the San Francisco Peace Treaty, 22–25; Satō Eisaku and, 34, 75–77; and the Senkaku Islands, 178–80; trade with, 36, 189; and UN representation, 77–78; war guilt/responsibility and, 11, 106, 207–11; war with Vietnam (1979), 217–20; Yoshida Shigeru and, 26–28 ping-pong diplomacy, 74 Plan for the Reorganization of the Japanese Archipelago (Nihon rettō kaizōron), 90 Pol Pot, 220 Polyanski, Dmitri, 176, 177 postwar faction (sengo ha), 60 Potsdam Declaration, 179 private trade agreements, 30, 31, 36 Qiao Guanhua, 133, 136–37, 138, 143 Red Cross, 22 Red Star Over China, 74 Reform and Opening program, 172, 190, 192, 227, 229 Reischauer, Edwin, 58 reparations, 12; under the occupation, 22; in the San Francisco peace treaty, 23; and the Japan-ROC treaty, 27; and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, 83–85, 87, 88–90, 91, 95, 107, 121, 125, 129, 195, 207–11, 236

repatriation, 22 Republic of China (ROC), 9, 30, 33, 76, 109, 110, 113, 135, 236; and the aviation agreement (1974), 129–31; conservative/ right-wing support for, 14, 6, 32, 35–37, 76, 79, 118–24, 153–54, 156; and the Japan-China peace treaty (1952), 26, 27–29; and LDP presidential election, 78–80; and the normalization of SinoJapanese relations (1972), 80, 81–91, 95–96, 98, 107, 109–10; and the Senkaku Islands, 179; and UN representation, 77–78. See also Taiwan reverse course. See Allied occupation of Japan Riben wenti (Japan Issues), 148, 165–67 Rogers, William, 73, 74–75 The Roof Tile of Tempyō (film), 229 Rostow, W. W., 58 Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 66 Sakisaka Itsurō, 161–62 San Francisco peace conference, 22–23 San Francisco Peace Treaty, 22–25, 44, 45, 197; and reparations, 23, 27, 89 Sasaki Kōzō, 162 Sasaki Yoshitake, 193 Satō Eisaku, 32, 37, 38, 79, 84, 97, 113, 120, 136, 148, 173; China policy of, 34, 36, 74, 75–78; Nixon shock and, 73–74, 99 Satō Shōji, 175–76, 183 Scalapino, Robert, 197 Schaller, Michael, 100 Security Treaty Problem Study Group (Ampo mondai kenkyūkai), 46 seek truth from facts, 172 Seirankai, 131, 150–57, 173, 183, 184; Chinese criticism of, 165, 166, 231 Seki Hiroharu, 163–64, 219 Service, Robert, 157 Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands, 140, 178–80, 182, 183, 184–85, 186, 216 separation of politics and economics (seikei bunri), 32, 36 Shanghai Communiqué (1972), 84, 96, 110, 134, 137, 216 Shiina Etsusaburō, 38, 136 Shimizu Ikutarō, 46, 59 Sino-Soviet alliance, 26, 67, 188

Index Sino-Soviet treaty (1950), 27, 92, 183, 184 Sino-Soviet cold war, 132, 138, 140–44, 146, 159–62, 167, 177 Sino-Soviet split, 33, 55, 114, 117, 132, 160, 185, 188, 205, 212, 215 Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 181, 185, 193, 217–20, 220–22, 223, 226 sixth JSP mission to Beijing (1975), 159–62 Snow, Edgar, 74 Socialist Association (JSP), 161–62 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968), 134, 144, 161, 222 Soeya Yoshihide, 97 Sōka Gakkai, 156 Sonoda Sunao, 175–76, 178, 180, 182, 184–88, 191, 193; relations with the Soviet Union, 176–77 Studies in the History of Japanese Political Thought (Nihon seiji shisōshi kenkyū), 51 Soviet Union (USSR), 24, 26, 96, 116, 119, 121, 135, 145, 147, 163, 174, 184, 185–86, 205, 207, 216, 217, 218, 225, 226; and the Japan-China peace treaty (1978), 136, 137–38, 176–77; Japanese attitudes toward, 32, 92, 138–39; and the JCP, 114; and the JSP, 159–62, 222; and the normalization of SinoJapanese relations, 82, 91–93, 96; and the Northern Territories, 142–44; relations with Japan, 30, 129, 139–42, 147, 186; relations with the PRC, 13, 74, 82, 132, 134, 146, 166, 187, 188, 230–31; relations with the United States, 20, 171, 180–81 Su Yu, 196 Sugiura Minpei, 65 Sukarno, 104 Sun Pinghua, 83, 160, 195 Tagawa Seiichi, 81, 233–34 Takashima Masao, 82, 87–88, 95, 125, 183 Taiwan, 7, 12, 14, 47, 55, 112, 132, 161, 176, 183, 190; abandonment of, 6, 110, 118–24, 153–54; and the aviation agreement (1974), 129–31; and Japan-US relations, 26, 32, 73, 76, 243n24; and LDP presidential election, 78–80; and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations (1972), 80, 81–91, 95–96, 98, 100–1 107,

297

109–10, 135; preference for Taiwanese independence, 29, 120, 122–23, 244n31; pro-Taiwan forces in Japan, 12, 35–38, 76, 79, 118–24, 133, 154–56, 173, 178, 183; and relations with the ROC, 27, 29; and UN representation, 77–78; and USPRC relations, 21, 23, 166, 181; and the Senkaku Islands, 179. See also Republic of China (ROC) Tajiri Akiyoshi, 125 Takasaki Tatsunosuke, 30, 33 Takeda Taijun, 48 Takeiri Memo, 84–85, 88 Takeiri Yoshikatsu, 84–85, 156, 173, 221 Takeuchi Yoshimi, 47–51, 52–53, 58, 64, 68, 108, 124, 204, 212, 225, 226; and Maruyama Masao, 50–51 Tan Chenlin, 144 Tanaka Akihiko, 197 Tanaka Kakuei, 38, 133, 101, 134–35, 145, 173, 174, 179; and apology issue, 86–87, 231; and LDP presidential election (1972), 79–80; and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, 80–98, 109–10; relations with the Soviet Union, 139–43, 177; right-wing criticism of, 118–23, 131, 151–56; scandal and resignation, 133, 134, 136, 146, 148; Southeast Asia tour (1974), protests, 147 Tanizaki Jun’ichirō, 35 technical agreements, 96, 129, 133 ten-year plan (1978), 172, 189, 191 Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee (1978), 172, 190 third-country provision, 134, 137–38, 174, 178, 183, 184, 185, 187, 260n6 three alls, 90, 251n47 three principles of Japanese aid to China, 191, 193 three principles of normalization, 80, 95, 123, 250n19 Tiananmen incident (1976), 146, 165 Tōgō Fumihiko, 133, 134 Tokyo Olympics (1964), 58 Tōma Seita, 44 Tōshōdaiji, 229 trade agreement (1974), 189 Troyanovsky, Oleg, 136 Truman, Harry S., 21

298

Index

Tsuji Kōgo, 220 Tsurumi Shunsuke, 64 two-China policy, 28, 30, 34, 122 two forbiddens, 188, 189, 190 two whatevers, 172, 190 Tyumen oil project, 141–42 Ubukata Naokichi, 67 Uchiyama Kanzō, 35 Uehara Senroku, 46 Ueyama Shunpei, 59 Umesao Tadao, 58–59, 102–3, 149 unarmed neutrality, 66, 95, 101, 111, 132, 152, 222, 227, 236 United Red Army, 148 United Nations representation problem, 77–78 United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), 179 US-Japan alliance, 150; and Japanese autonomy, 30; and Japan-PRC relations, 26, 28, 54, 84–85, 93, 97, 107,117, 119–20, 144–45, 150, 158, 229; and Japanese national identity, 41, 44, 152; left-wing opposition to, 101, 111, 112, 158–59, 161, 221; PRC opposition to, 55, 112 US-Japan Security Treaty (1952), 14, 109, 157, 216; and Japan-PRC relations, 24, 82, 83, 85–86, 93–94, 95, 97, 107, 120, 144–45; left-wing opposition to, 22, 44, 45, 66, 113, 114, 148, 157; renegotiation of, 31, 32, 33 Utsunomiya Tokuma, 84 Vance, Cyrus, 181–82 Vietnam War, 34, 73; Honda Katsuichi and, 62–63; Ishihara Shintarō and, 61; Japanese perceptions of American defeat in, 104, 111, 113, 114, 148, 151, 157, 158, 161, 167; Oda Makoto and, 64, 66, 226; and US-PRC relations, 74 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, 185, 221 “Viewpoints and Opinions of our Japanese Friends on Our Country’s Economic Tasks,” 206 Vogel, Ezra, 200 Wakaizumi Kei, 66 Wan, Ming, 98

war guilt, 53, 65, 91, 98, 122, 125–26, 210, 235–36; as a constraint on relations with China, 8, 9–12, 65, 67–68, 97; as a constraint on Japanese national identity, 61; and economic aid to China, 195, 207–11; generational change and, 63, 65–66, 67; Ōhira Masayoshi on, 106; PRC leadership on, 56–57; and support for Chiang Kai-shek, 122 war responsibility, 9–12, 52, 61–66, 84, 95, 105, 110, 122, 225, 235; PRC leadership on, 56 Watanabe Michio, 150, 155 White Group (Baituan), 28, 244n27 Whitlam, Gough, 73 “The World Significance of the Chinese Revolution” (1951), 55 Wu Xinquan, 196 Xiao Xiangqian, 83 Yamagishi commune, 164 Yanaihara Tadao, 47 Yano Jun’ya, 178 Yano Tōru, 217 Yasukuni Shrine, 230, 232 Yoshida Doctrine: 19–20, 21, 25, 29–30, 31, 35, 38, 76, 104, 236; China corollary to, 20, 21, 29, 35, 38, 236 Yoshida School, 33, 76, 79, 102 Yoshida Shigeru, 19, 33, 34, 36, 99 Yoshida Letter, 26 Yoshida Letter, second, 34, 36 Zhang Caitian, 196 Zhang Xiangshan, 115, 160, 174 Zhou Bin, 87 Zhou Enlai, 28, 30, 31, 34, 73, 76, 77, 97, 122, 132, 133, 142–46, 159, 165–66, 185, 189, 202, 208; and the aviation agreement, 130; and the Hori Letter, 78; on Japan-China (ROC) treaty, 28; on Japanese national identity, 13, 24, 28, 55; and the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, 81–95; on the Senkaku Islands, 179; and the three principles of normalization, 79–80 Zhou Hongqing incident (1963), 33 Zhu Jianrong, 84 Zhuge Weidong, 47