The China Order: Centralia, World Empire, and the Nature of Chinese Power 1438467508, 9781438467504

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The China Order

The China Order Centralia, World Empire, and the Nature of Chinese Power

Fei-Ling Wang

Cover art: Top left photo: Sun Yet-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing, China: “Tianxia for the public.” Top center photo: Imperial Seal started by the Qin Empire: “Mandate from heaven, longevity and prosperity forever.” Top right photo: The Xinhua Gate, front entrance of Zhongnanhai, in Beijing: “To serve the people.” Bottom photo: The Tiananmen Gate in Beijing: “Long live the solidarity of the people of the world.” Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 2017 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu Production, Diane Ganeles Marketing, Anne M. Valentine Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Wang, Fei-Ling, author. Title: The China order : Centralia, world empire, and the nature of Chinese power / Fei-Ling Wang. Description: Albany, NY : State University of New York Press, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016058083 (print) | LCCN 2017027114 (ebook) | ISBN 9781438467504 (ebook) | ISBN 9781438467498 (hardcover : alkaline paper) Subjects: LCSH: China—Foreign relations—1949—-Philosophy. | China— Civilization—Philosophy. | Great powers—Philosophy. | Imperialism—Philosophy. | China—History—Qin dynasty, 221–207 B.C. | China—History—Han dynasty, 202 B.C.–220 A.D. Classification: LCC JZ1734 (ebook) | LCC JZ1734 .W33 2017 (print) | DDC 327.51—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016058083 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To the Chinese People

Contents Tables and Figures ix Acknowledgments xi Introduction 1 The China Order 3 Arrangement of the Book 4 Chapter 1. The Centralia: The Origin and the Basics 9 The Chinese Nomenclature: More than Just Semantics 9 China as a World: Ecogeography Shapes the Mind 12 The Chinese Peoples and the Chinese Multination 18 History and the Writing of History in China 21 The Precondition: The Pre-Qin China 30 The Glory and Peacefulness of the Warring States 32 Chapter 2. The Qin-Han Polity and Chinese World Empire 39 Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism 40 The Qin Polity: The Chinese Totalitarianism 43 The Qin Tianxia: A World Empire Order 44 The Qin-Han Polity and the China Order 47 The Fused Confucianism-Legalism 51 The Consolidation and Expansion of the China Order 54 The Recurrence of the China Order and the Great East-West  Divergence 55 The Evolution and Refinement of the China Order 59 From the Second Great Disunion to the Ultimate China Order 64 The Qing World Empire 71 Chapter 3. The Forsaken Turn: The Song Era The Song: An Uncommon Qin-Han Empire Song’s Chinese World Chanyuan Treaty: China’s Peace of Westphalia

75 76 80 82

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Contents

Chanyuan System: A New World Order for Eastern Eurasia 86 Chanyuan System in the Chinese Mind 89 The Splendid Song: The Chinese World under the   Chanyuan System 91 Song Era: The Peak of Ancient Chinese Civilization 94 Chapter 4. The China Order: An Assessment The China Order: The Characteristics The China Order versus the Westphalia System Ideal Governance for the Rulers at Exorbitant Expenses Great Incompatibility and Long Stagnation Deadly Sisyphus, Inescapable Inferno Why the Stagnation: A Pausing Note on Monopoly

99 101 114 118 121 126 133

Chapter 5. The Century of Humiliation and Progress 135 The Decay and Fading of the China Order 137 Westernization: The Way to Survive 141 The Unusual Fall of the Qing Empire 145 The ROC on the Chinese Mainland: An Era of Opportunities 149 Late-Qing and the Republican Eras: A Reassessment 154 Chapter 6. Great Leap Backward 159 The ROC: A Tenacious but Transforming Authoritarianism 159 The Rise of the CCP 161 Mao and the Mandate of the People 167 Guns, Ruses, and Promises 170 The PRC: A New Qin-Han State 176 Post-Mao: The Qin-Han Polity Changes and Continues 181 Suboptimal Performance, Rich State, Strong Military 188 Chapter 7. The China Struggle Between Tianxia and Westphalia The Tianxia Mandate Mao’s Global War for a New China Order Rescued and Enriched by the Enemy Opening and Hiding: To Survive the End of the Cold War The China Dream: Rejuvenation and Global Governance

195 195 198 203 207 209

Epilogue: The Scenarios

215

Notes 219 Bibliography 245 Index 315

Tables and Figures Figure 1.1

The Chinese World: Insulation and Isolation

13

Figure 1.2

The Chinese World: Centralia Defined by Precipitation

14

Figure 1.3

The Heihe-Tengchong Line

15

Table 1.1

Diverging Interpretation and Presentation of China and Chinese History

28

Table 1.2

Frequency of War in the History of the Chinese World 36

Figure 4.1

Wars per Year in the Chinese World

123

Figure 4.2

Per Capita and per mu Grain Production

128

Figure 4.3

Populations in the Chinese World and the Mediterranean-European Word

132

ix

Acknowledgments This book is a result of a long academic journey since my years in college and graduate schools. My earlier books on Chinese premodernity and China’s hukou (household registration) system, published in 1998 and 2005 respectively, set the path leading to this project. My writing of essays on the rise of China for the International Herald Tribune in 2005–06 and my participation in the Princeton University–Peking University Project on U.S.–China Relations and World Order in 2010–12 facilitated the formulation and refinement of my thoughts. Over the past decade, in the process of completing this work, I have accumulated immeasurable debt to countless individuals in more than a dozen countries on five continents. To those who have provided leads and inspirations, endured my questions and requests, helped with facts and contacts, and offered critiques and assistance—too many to be named here—I salute you all. My colleagues and students at Georgia Institute of Technology have been my patient audience and stimulating critics. The following institutions kindly hosted my visits for this project over the years: European University Institute, National University of Singapore, National Sun Yat-sen University, National Taiwan University, Sciences Po, Tunghai University, U.S. Air Force Academy, University of Macau, University of Tokyo, and Yonsei University. Generous grants from the Fulbright Commission, the Hitachi Foundation, and the Minerva Initiative helped my research. I received valuable comments when I presented parts of this book at the American Political Science Association, Chinese Cultural University, Council on Foreign Relations, International Studies Association, Joint University of U.S. Special Forces, Korea University, LudwigMaximilians-Universität, National Chengchi University, National Chungshin University, National Tsinghua University, Peking University, Princeton University, Seoul National University, Sun Yat-sen University, U.S. National War College, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, University of Denver, University of Indonesia, University of Malaya, University of Pennsylvania, and Victoria University. I want to thank the anonymous reviewers for their strong endorsement and encouragement and helpful suggestions. The editors and the copyeditor

xi

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Acknowledgments

of SUNY Press have made this book possible. Needless to say, I alone bear all the responsibility for any imperfections that still remain. I would never be able to complete this work without the constant love and support from my family and friends, for which I am truly fortunate and eternally grateful. Finally, this book is dedicated to the Chinese people who, as I am trying to show, have gone through so much for so long. All the hardship, suffering, and injustice I have ever faced pales completely in comparison. This great people has my utmost love and very best wishes. F. L. W. Atlanta, Georgia USA 2017

Introduction

O

ne can easily make a long list of peculiarities about China. It is much harder, however, to decipher and weigh those particularities to ascertain what the rising Chinese power really represents and how the international community should respond, with which rests the future of world peace, world order, and the direction of human civilization. A quick snapshot may illustrate the many paradoxes and topsy-turvies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC): The Chinese economy measured by GDP (gross domestic product) jumped from world’s number ten in 1990 to number two in 2012 and is projected to soon replace the American economy that has been world’s largest since the 1880s. China also has world’s largest population and second largest military budget, which has been growing much faster than its economy. Yet, the PRC appears and acts with a strong and increasing sense of insecurity and discontent, craving ever more power and control at home and abroad. Still a typical developing country by per capita GDP and Human Development Index, China showers money all over the globe to cultivate its image and influence—pledging $1.41 trillion in 2012–15 alone, 100 times more than the Marshall Plan in today’s dollars. Yet, China is disliked widely by the people in the West (the United States, the European Union, Japan) and in places from Brazil, Egypt, India, Israel, Jordan, the Philippines, and Turkey, to Vietnam. Beijing has long vowed never to be a bullying hegemon and promised “to always protect international rule of law, fairness and justice” and to build a new, better world order. Yet, when faced an international legal verdict that favored its small and weak neighbors over maritime disputes for the first time, the PRC behaved just like any other stereotypical hegemonic great power.1 As expected, volumes have been written about China and its rise with a common theme of speculation about what to do.2 Some have specifically attempted at “demystifying” China (Standen 2012). Unlike the scholarship about another rising and distinctive power, the former Soviet Union, that six decades ago quickly gravitated in the West to producing and sustaining the

1

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The China Order

decades-long grand strategy of containment and the Cold War (Kennan 1947 and 1954), the significant literature on China and its rise so far has mostly shown a strong diffidence and a thick ambiguity, lacking solid predictions and firm policies. “Uncertainty” has been the key word describing China and its rise for many years (Shirk 2008; Hachigian 2014). The standard, common suggestion for the reigning world leaders remains largely a muddling-through strategy that usually combines a welcoming engagement to appease, a frightful hedging to contain, and a resilient hope of incorporation for the best (F. Wang 1998a; Bader 2013). The main reason for all that haze and hesitance lies in an obstinately incomplete and inadequate understanding of what China really is and a partial and provisional ascertainment about what the rise of the PRC truly represents (Lampton 2014). It is easy to get lost or at least puzzled when the analytical tools of the old isms such as Realism, Communism, or Fascism seem not exactly applicable to the PRC and when mountains of mixed and conflicting signals and myths (often purposefully and skillfully manufactured) appear to flare and dazzle every minute (Galtung and Stenslie 2015). Consequently, China watching is an “alternately peculiar, frustrating, fascinating, and risky activity” (Baum 2010). “Western policy makers and academics repeatedly get China so wrong” with false assumptions and wishful thinking (Pillsbury 2014). Some have argued over the reality versus fantasy about China and how it may be interpreted and reconstructed by the observers (Mann 2007 and 2016; Lampton and Mann 2007). Some have pondered about what and how China thinks with diverse conclusions and tentative suppositions (Ash et al. 2007; Hessler 2006; Leonard 2008; Halper 2010). Some have turned to history for parallels and clues, recalling World War I to suggest the meaninglessness and tragic fatalism of a U.S.–China conflict (Rosecrance and Miller 2014). Some have started to explore China’s peculiar Sinocentric ideations and their implications (Ford 2010; Callahan 2012 and 2013). Some have asserted that the rise of China is a century-long marathon for the PRC to replace the United States to lead the world (Pillsbury 2015). Some have suggested that the real challenge is to shape China’s policy choices and actions without containing its rise (Christensen 2015). Some have discovered in the PRC a tenacious dictatorial state of “controlocracy” and “sophisticated totalitarianism” that in fact performs rather poorly (Ringen 2016). Some have seen the PRC starting its endgame as the regime is cracking up and the Chinese power heading to a collapse rather than a real rise (Chang 2001; Mattis 2015; Shambaugh 2015a). Few would disagree with the view that the rise of China, or the failure of that, has profound albeit uncertain impact affecting the overall state of the world order and the human well-being (Kissinger 2014, 4–9).

Introduction

3

The China Order To join the discourse, this book attempts a holistic answer to questions about the nature of the rising Chinese power. More specifically, it seeks to ascertain what China is and represents through a rereading of the Chinese history to focus on an analysis of the China Order—an ideation and tradition of governance and world order that give China and the PRC their key characters. The China Order, the Chinese world empire order,3 is based on a Confucian-Legalism imperial state, the Qin-Han (秦汉) polity, authoritarian often totalitarian in nature, that justifies and defends its rule with the Mandate of Heaven to unite, order, and govern the whole known world, the tianxia (天下 all under heaven).4 It denotes a worldwide Qin-Han polity, a Qin-Han world order.5 Rooted in an ecogeographically defined Centralia, a world empire of the China Order was practiced and perfected, and dominated the peoples of Eastern Eurasia from the third century BCE to the mid-nineteenth century CE, albeit with frequent pretentions and several, impermanent intervals or disunions (Levenson 1965, 67; Pines 2012, 11, 22–3; Smith 2013, 5). There was only one major pause of the China Order in the Chinese World, the Song Era (tenth through thirteenth centuries), with rich, significant but underexplored lessons, which will be examined in detail. In history, imperial expansion and political universalism are certainly not exclusively Chinese. There have been many identifiable world empires or “universal empires” on many continents (Wesson 1967, 21–54; Bang and Kolodziejczyk 2012). Imperial rulers from the Romans to the Spanish and British dreamed about a united empire over the oikouménē (the known, inhabited world) (Colás 2007, 6–7). But the Chinese tianxia (all under heaven) system or the China Order is the most lasting and vastly unique, with unrivalled longevity, thoroughness, sophistication, legitimacy, and contemporary relevance. Unlike other world empires (and wannabes) in history such as the Egyptian pharaohs, the Persian shahs, the Muslim caliphates, the Timurid, the Inca, or the world Fascist and Communist movements, the China Order managed to continuously rule what its proponents held to be the whole known world for centuries in the row, and over the millennia has been internalized by the world’s largest population as not just a viable, but also a superior world order. As an ideology and a political system representing peculiar socioeconomic norms and culture values, the China Order resembles a worldwide “closed society” (Popper 1945) that is very much still alive. The China Order is a practically feasible, historically tested, politically appealing although socioeconomically suboptimal polity and world order. An alternative but ambiguous term for it may have been “the Chinese order of

4

The China Order

life” (Lattimore 1951, 512). It has been shaping the civilization in the Chinese World distinct from that in the post-Rome Mediterranean–European World under a de facto and later de jure world order of divided world polity with international comparison and competition—the Westphalia System. Since 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has reincarnated the Qin-Han polity in the PRC that has been destined to seek political legitimacy and security through reordering the world in its image, like the previous imperial rulers. As before, the Qin-Han polity of the PRC has underperformed for its people but is fully capable to enrich and strengthen itself to be highly competitive in international politics. In the twenty-first century, the ideology of the China Order contrasts fundamentally the Westphalia System especially the “American World Order” or the post-World War II and post-Cold War world order (Ikenberry 2011; Ikenberry et al. 2015). The rise of the PRC, with a modified but tenacious Qin-Han polity in charge that predictably seeks a new China Order ever more forcefully, therefore, represents a clear and consequential choice about political governance and world order for humankind.

Arrangement of the Book The first part of this book, chapters 1 through 4, describes and analyzes the sources, nature, prospects, and implications of the China Order. A normative assessment is attempted about the record of the China Order in political governance, socioeconomic development, science and technology, culture and people’s life. Over the centuries, the China Order became attractive and even addictive to autocratic political rulers of all kinds and acquired a seemingly unshakable legitimacy among the elites yet underperformed socioeconomically.6 This sustained a long stagnation of the Chinese civilization or a “super-stability” of the Chinese society,7 despite the many cycles of regime destructions. Only after the mid-nineteenth century did the China Order collapse due to foreign forces: the Chinese World was reduced to be just a part of the real world. China’s rulers since then have never felt content about that, even though China and the Chinese people experienced great experiments and progresses in the so-called “century of humiliation” (1840s–1949) (Z. Wang 2014). Contrary to the Chinese official and mainstream narratives, the best times of the Chinese civilization are actually the periods without the China Order, under a de jure or de facto Westphalia-like world order: the pre-Qin Chinese World, the Song era, and the period after the late-nineteenth century. The profound transformation of the Qin-Han polity itself, the foundation of the China Order, was forcefully suspended with the creation of the PRC in 1949.

Introduction

5

The spectacular victory of the CCP-led revolution was soon proven to be a giant leap backward. The second part of this book, chapters 5 through 7, reveals the powerful presence of the logic and mandate of the China Order in the PRC and their crucial impact on Chinese politics and foreign policy. Peeling off the intentional and inadvertent wrappings of the core of the Qin-Han polity and its preordained drive for the China Order, the PRC, its rise, and what ought to be done about it, become simple and clear, perhaps disappointing many overly complicated analyses and overzealous advocates that frequently misinform and misguide. Leaving the great details of the PRC’s overall suboptimal records of governance and socioeconomics to another volume, this book summarily reports on the CCP’s struggle for power and control. Without the China Order but possessed by the predestined pursuit for it, the CCP-PRC has been essentially a tragic detour of the Chinese history with astonishing costs in life, money, and time. The regime itself has been saved and enriched, ironically, only by its selective acceptance of the West-led Westphalia system, pro tempore. After returning to the pre-1949 socioeconomic path, the deeply harbored ideology of the China Order has risen with a state-capitalism that has disproportionately enriched and empowered the PRC state. The rise of Chinese power, therefore, represents a systemic challenge to the current world order in both of the two fundamental ways described by Neorealist and Constructivist theorists of international relations: a major redistribution of power in the international system and an alteration of the ordering principle of world politics (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981; Wendt 1992 and 1999). The Qin-Han state in Beijing, ever more powerful and wealthy, has thus become “a strongly dissatisfied power” (Lim 2015). The fact that the Chinese economy has become a powerful “crony capitalism” and the PRC has created an alluring kleptocracy, only makes the Chinese discontent for and challenge to the current world order more structural, potent, and consequential.8 The chapters are summarized individually below. Chapter 1 addresses three questions: What is China? How is Chinese history written and read? What has shaped China’s political ideology and tradition? It explores the rich sources and multiple origins of the China Order with a reinterpretation and representation of the basics of China as a country, a state, and a world—the Centralia as a united world of its own. It discusses the religious role of history to the Chinese and the critical need for a rereading of the Chinese history. It also outlines the Westphalia-like pre-Qin Chinese world order, the feudal Warring States prior to the third century BCE. Chapter 2 is about the ideation and tradition of the Chinese polity and the Chinese world order. It describes the China Order, the Sinocentric worldempire order of the tianxia (all under heaven) system. The China Order was

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The China Order

based on a Qin-Han imperial polity that was a superficially Confucian but essentially Legalist (or Realist) autocracy, authoritarian—even totalitarian—in nature, and was destined and compelled to rule (in practice or in pretention) the whole known world. The China Order was the result of special efforts and designs backed by force, ruses, wiles, and sheer luck. As a major achievement of human governance with self-reinforcing mechanisms that facilitates its replication, the China Order became highly attractive, even addictive, to ruling elites of all breeds. It thus acquired a super-stable position in the Chinese hearts and minds and was able to dominate and stagnate the Chinese World for centuries. Chapter 3 offers a revisionist take of an exceptional phase in the Chinese political history. It examines the highly meaningful but long overlooked pause of the China Order in the Song Era (tenth through thirteenth centuries), when the Eastern Eurasia had a de jure Westphalia-like world order: the Chanyuan (澶淵) System. This profound but misinterpreted turn of history contains rich information highly instructive to today’s Chinese and world leaders. The demise of the Song world order, just like the Qin’s ending of the Warring States, was another tragic disruption of the Chinese civilization. Chapter 4 examines the nature and record of performance of the QinHan polity and the China Order. It summarizes and assesses the China Order, its key characteristics, and its extraordinary staying power. Historically and comparatively, this world order appeals highly to the ruling elites and the wannabes but has been largely stagnant and deeply suboptimal in political, socioeconomic, and cultural performances as compared to the Westphalian world order. This chapter also suggests ways to understand and explain the longevity and stagnation of the China Order. Chapter 5 analyzes China’s political history from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, during which the China Order fell but never faded. It examines the grand transition the Chinese World experienced in that long century, finding it the century of experimentation and progression rather than just the “century of humiliation” termed by the Chinese official narratives. It was an era of profound progress for the peoples in Eastern Eurasia but of great defeats and humiliation for the ruling elites. Dashing high hopes and foregoing great opportunities, however, the Qin-Han polity had a seemingly improbable but eventually unstoppable restoration in the creation of the PRC in 1949. Chapter 6 describes and explains the creation and the nature of the current Chinese political system. With a crafty substitution of the Mandate of Heaven with the Mandate of the People, the foreign-funded CCP under Mao Zedong became a Qin-style totalitarian state during World War II. With smart ruses and sheer force, the CCP won the Chinese Civil War to end the Republic of China (ROC) on the Chinese Mainland in 1949–50. It created the

Introduction

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PRC with imported ideological phraseologies and crucial external assistances, a leap backward and a detour that negated much of the changes made in China since the late-nineteenth century. The PRC is a reincarnated Qin-Han polity with a new autocracy, a Leninist–Stalinist party-state or partocracy. Without the China Order, the PRC Qin-Han polity has been struggling internally against the China that had been greatly transformed by the previous century and externally the outside world for its regime survival and security. Tragic governance and failed socioeconomic policies became inevitable. The post-Mao leaders were forced to retreat back to the pre-1949 trajectory of development through import and imitation with impressive results albeit still a suboptimal record; it is still much more undemocratic than the ROC it replaced seven decades ago, not to mention the ROC in Taiwan today. Chapter 7 outlines the PRC foreign policy since 1949: a mighty struggle between its tianxia mandate and its inescapable life under the Westphalia system. Predestined by its Qin-Han polity, Mao Zedong pushed instinctively and hard but failed spectacularly to reconstruct the China Order. Then the very Westphalia system ironically saved and enriched the PRC when Beijing was forced to scale back and suspend its ambitions for the China Order. The post-Mao leaders retreated further by selectively accepting the West-led Westphalia system and has been handsomely rewarded. However, the deeply harbored mandate for the China Order rises in today’s China together with the rise of the PRC state power. The fateful China Struggle thus continues ever more powerfully. The epilogue is a summary of the nature of the Chinese power as a suboptimal giant that is nonetheless competitive internationally. There is a deep mismatch and incompatibility between the PRC and the current world order. It outlines future works needed to address the options for responding to the rise of China.

1

The Centralia The Origin and the Basics

T

o see what China is and represents takes one to an ocean of information about 20 percent of the humankind living on a continent over millennia. Appropriate to its mountainous volume, the existing knowledge of China is defiled by countless myths and distortions that often mislead even the most focused about China’s past, present, and future. Generations of students of China have translated and clarified much of the Chinese mystique. Many sturdy Chinese peculiarities, however, persist to impede standardization and generalization of China studies that still critically need more historically grounded researches (Perry 1989, 579–91). To read the Chinese history holds a key to a proper understanding of China. Yet, the well-kept, rich, and massive Chinese historical records are particularly full of deliberate omissions, inadvertent inaccuracies, clever distortions, and blatant forgeries. A careful, holistic, and revisionist deciphering of the Chinese history, therefore, is the prerequisite to opening the black box of Chinese peculiarities. The first step is to clarify the factual fundamentals of China, the Centralia, that are often missed, misconstrued, or misconceived. The revealed and rectified basics inform well the rich sources and the multiple origins of China as a world empire. This chapter thus explores the nomenclature, the ecogeography, the peoples, and the writing of history in the Chinese World. The starting point is the feudal society prior to the third century BCE, the pre-Qin Era when the Eastern Eurasian continent was under a Westphalia-like world order.

The Chinese Nomenclature: More than Just Semantics China (Sina in Latin, Cīna in Sanskrit, and Chine in French) is most probably the phonetic translation of a particular feudal state, later a kingdom in today’s Western China (秦国 the Qin or the Chin, 770–221 BCE) that 9

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The China Order

became an empire and united and ruled the bulk of East Asian continent (秦朝 221–207 BCE). The Qin ended the Warring States Era with superior force and superb diplomacy, and created the basic model and pattern of a lasting political system and governance for the subsequent Chinese rulers. The word China (Qin) has since been used by foreigners to refer to this vast land of Eastern Eurasian continent, in a way similar to the geographic terms of Europe or America or Africa, in just about all Indo-European languages except Russian.1 Many Chinese and neighboring nations like Japan that utilize Chinese characters called China Zhina (支那)—phonetically translated from Cina in Sanskrit first by Chinese Buddhist scholars in the eighth century.2 Zhina is a geographical name but may literally mean “branch,” definitely without much grandeur. The term became offensive to nationalistic Chinese after the 1930s when the Zhina-using Japan invaded China. After World War II, Japan officially ceased using it while unofficially some in Japan still call China by Zhina today. When Indonesia turned away from the PRC in 1965 after a bloody coup, allegedly with Beijing’s involvement, and killed hundreds of thousands ethnic Chinese, Jakarta ordered the people to call China “Cina” (支那) instead of “Tiongkok” (中国) and reversed that only in 2014 (Sheng 2016). China today rejects the term Zhina with one exception: Instead of yindu-zhongguo (印度中国), Indochina is still translated as yindu-zhina (印度支那). The name China or Zhina in fact has nothing to do with the name Chinese today use to call their country in Chinese: Zhongguo (中国), which literally means “Centralia,”3 “central country” or “middle country.” Its synonym is Zhonghua (中华), which literally means “central refined” or “central brilliance” and has its root in the name of a prehistoric tribe nation of Huaxia (华夏). Archeological evidence suggests that the phrase of Zhongguo is ancient. It was, at the latest, used in the eleventh century BCE as a geographic term describing Centralia or the center of the known world (Chang 2009, 169–256). It was also politically and culturally used to indicate the central location of a tribe, nation, or state. It often described the center of population, wealth, power, and culture of the time.4 Zhongguo, however, was never the official name of China until the late-nineteenth century when it started to appear as a synonym of Great Qing in some Sino-foreign diplomatic documents, thus corresponding to the English word of China. The term Qin (China or Zhina) was never used by Chinese to name their country other than during the short-lived Qin Dynasty (221–207 BCE) and during fourth and fifth centuries when, in the politically divided Chinese World, three kingdoms in today’s Northwest China used that name. The Qin’s successor, the Han Empire, actually called the Roman Empire (and the Mediterranean–European World under it) at the time the Great Qin/ Chin (大秦) (Foster 1939, 124; Jenkins 2008, 64–68). Ever since the dawn of China’s recorded history that can be traced back to Yin Shang (殷商) about 3,500 years ago, the countries in Eastern Eurasia were

The Centralia

11

always named after the specific ruling dynasties, especially those that managed to rule tianxia or the whole known world (Zhang 1944, 2–11). The dynasties were largely named after a location such as Qin, Han, Tang, or Song, or a royal design such as Yuan, Ming, Qing. The Qing Empire referred to itself in the Manchu phrase dulimbai gurun (middle or central country/area) for the first time in the Treaty of Nerchinsk with Russia in 1689 (and later used that term to define its dominance and conquest of the peripheries of the Chinese World), however, its official name always remained Great Qing. It was only in the late-nineteeenth century, when Zhongguo (Centralia) became the name of choice for the country to the Western-educated or influenced elites of the conquered and suppressed ethnic majority—the Han nation (named after the Han Empire two millennia ago).5 The Han elites first felt strongly the need to distinguish their country from the invading foreign (mainly European) powers. They also politically needed to abandon the name of Qing Country, named after the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), which was a regime of the ethnic minority of Manchu, a Tungusic decedent of Sushen and Jurchen nomadic nation from the Northeastern Eurasia that invaded and conquered the Han-nation of the Ming Empire (Liang 1900, 9). On the treaties the Qing government signed with foreign countries in the late-nineteenth century, the official name of China in Chinese was almost always Great Qing Country and the phrase Zhongguo was only used occasionally in text. The English translation was China or Chinese empire (Palace Museum 2011). Zhongguo and Zhonghua formally became the official name of the country only in 1912 when a Han-state replaced the Qing Dynasty. The new country was named 中華民國 (People’s Country of Zhonghua) with an English translation as Republic of China. Zhongguo (Central Country) and China were used, respectively, as the abbreviations. A somewhat wordier new name was adopted by the winning side of the Chinese Civil War in 1949: 中华人民共和国 (People’s Republic of Zhonghua) and People’s Republic of China in English with the same abbreviations of Zhongguo and China (Wei 2014). In imperial semantics, Zhongguo (Centralia) as a sociopolitical location actually migrated around on the East Eurasian continent due to the repeated dynastic cycles and the political divisions of the Chinese World. The empires of Qin and Han enshrined and operationalized the Centralia as a united world empire two millennia ago. This Qin-Han polity mandated a political unification or the China Order for the whole known World in a Centraliaperiphery arrangement (Guan 2014). When a Qin-Han world empire (with various names) collapsed, warlords and warring states inevitably emerged with the predestined urge to reunify the world. They fought fiercely to obtain the scared trophy of the Mandate of Heaven symbolized by the title of Centralia. The location of the Centralia thus moved around geographically in the Chinese World from the Yellow River Valley to the south of Yangtze River and then

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The China Order

back to the Northern China plains. The winner of a world-unification war set a new world empire and got to decide where the center was. The official history books simply codified and recognized that afterwards. Interestingly, the tianxia and Centralia conceptualization and the lexicons of Zhongguo or Zhonghua as the center of the whole known world and as the right name for “us versus the rest (barbarians)” is not exclusively a Han-Chinese practice. The major Japanese framer of the Bushido ideology Soko Yamaga (山鹿素行) argued in the seventeenth century as a Confucian scholar and historian in Han-Chinese language that Japan, not China, was the real Zhongguo and Zhonghua, the real Centralia or Central civilization of the time, inheriting and continuing the Chinese civilization while the Manchu-conquered China had become simply a “foreign dynasty” ruling over the “western land.”6 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, under the Tokugawa Shogunate and the Meiji Government, the Mito School of Confucian historians edited Grand History of Japan in Chinese characters describing the empires of Sui, Tang, Song, and Ming as simply the peripheral, contributing states to the Centralia of the Japanese World, just like the Ezo people (Hokkaido, Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands) and the Ryukyu islands (Okinawa) (Tokugawa 1928). Similar use of the concept and the self-claiming by the small but true “inheritor” of the Centralia were also seen among the Korean elites after the Manchu conquered the Ming Empire in the seventeenth century.7 The Korean scholar of Confucianism and anti-Japanese exile, Ryu In-sok (柳麟錫유인석) argued for the Han Nation-centered world order of the Centralia as late as the 1910s (Ryu 1990). Therefore, instead of Zhongguo or Centralia that often implies political and ethnocentric biases that mislead Chinese people and misinform other nations thus contributing to a “pessoptimist” national “identity dilemma” in the PRC (Callahan 2012, 13), the name of China in Chinese today perhaps could be Qin Country (秦国) or Qin-Han Country (秦汉国) that is historically accurate and also linguistically reflecting properly how the rest of the world calls the country: China. The name of the People’s Republic of China could also be renamed in Chinese to be People’s Republic of Qinhan (秦汉 人民共和国) or simply Republic of Qinhan (秦汉共和国).8

China as a World: Ecogeography Shapes the Mind The Chinese nomenclature reflects the peculiar self-identification and conception of polity and world order in the Chinese mind. It arises from the long interaction between humans and the nature. Just like the experiences of the peoples in Western and Southern Eurasia, the Mediterranean–European World

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and the Subcontinent, the history of the Chinese World has been shaped by geography, especially location, environment, and natural endowment (Jones 2003, ix–xxxvii, 3–44, 225–60). The longevity and the “pattern of centrifugal geographic spread” of the Chinese civilization are also inseparable from the peculiar terrain and location of the Chinese World (Ho 1976, 547–54). The whole known Chinese World on the Eastern Eurasian continent is physically isolated and insulated from the rest of the planet Earth by the great ocean of the Pacific to the east, the frozen Siberia to the north, the high mountains of the Tibetan Plateau and great deserts to the west, and the sea and tropical jungles (harboring deadly diseases such as malaria) to the south. Formed and surrounded by impenetrable geographic barriers, the Chinese World is also shaped by climate especially precipitation. It has two distinctive parts: the Centralia or China Proper and the other, more peripheral regions.9 The Centralia is mostly on the east and southeast side of a 15-inch annual rainfall line maintained by the seasonal moist winds from the western Pacific

Figure 1.1. The Chinese World: Insulation and Isolation. Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ File: China_100.78713E_35.63718N.jpg, public domain image by the U.S. NASA. Downloaded April 20, 2016.

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Ocean (Figure 1.2): mostly the Yellow River Valley, the Yangtze River, and the Pearl River basins, and later the eastern part of Manchuria (the Northeast). The relatively flat terrain and fertile soil, especially the massive accumulation of loess on which early Chinese civilization developed; stable and sufficient rainfall; and suitable seasonal temperature in this region combined to sustain a great non-oasis agrarian economy that has powered civilizations for millennia (Naughton 2007, 21–22). The Centralia, therefore, is where the overwhelming majority of the population of the Chinese World has always lived since the prehistorical time. East of an imaginary demographic demarcation line first drawn by a Chinese demographic geographer in 1935, the Heihe (Aihui)Tengchong Line that parallels the 15-inch rain fall line (Figure 1.3), the China Proper constitutes 43 percent of the total Chinese territory but had more than 96 percent of the total Chinese population in 1935, 94 percent in 2002, and still 92.4 percent in 2011.10

Figure 1.2. The Chinese World: Centralia Defined by Precipitation. Source: Adapted from commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: Average_annual_precipitation_in_China(English).png, Creative Commons license. Downloaded December 2, 2016.

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Figure 1.3. The Heihe-Tengchong Line. Source: Public domain neogaf.com/forum/ showthread.php?t=728038. Downloaded December 6, 2015.

The Chinese reached the end of this isolated Chinese World, the Centralia or China Proper, easily and early in all directions. Ancient Chinese understandably wondered about what was out there beyond. Traveling monks and pilgrims and merchants brought exotic tales and items from other worlds. However, little of significance or relevance was believed or conceived beyond the prohibitive geographical confines and the Chinese largely ignored the non-Chinese worlds until the nineteenth century. The Chinese names of Japan (日本 where sun rises), Tibet (西藏 western land), and Vietnam (越南 beyond the south) illustrate the Chinese mindset.11 The Centralia, mapped as the Qing’s eighteen provinces since the eighteenth century, is relatively flat and small. It was only about one-third the size of today’s China or roughly the size of Algeria or Iran. With the transportation lines of roughly 1,300 miles (Beijing-Guangzhou) or 900 miles (Beijing-Changsha) by 850 miles (Xianyang-Hangzhou), the Chinese World of Centralia was highly manageable by an imperial army of pre-firearm infantry and cavalry for a unified rule. Most Chinese empires were actually smaller than the Byzantine Empire in size, but much better buffered and insulated (Taagepera 1979, 115–38). Despite the existence of mountains and long rivers, centralized governance was economically and technologically feasible, efficient, and desirable—even necessary.12 An exception is perhaps the

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Nanling Range (南岭) that for centuries helped to shield today’s Guangdong from the imperial control based in the north and maintained distinctive Yue (粤) society and culture until the twentieth century. Similarly, mountain ranges also allowed many nationalities, societies, and cultures like Hakka, Miao, Yi, and Dai, to exist in Fujian, Guangxi, Guizhou, and Yunnan, forming parts of the disparate, self-governing Zomia society in the highlands of East and Southeast Asia (Scott 2009). In Western Eurasia, as a comparison, the Mediterranean–European World has great mountains (the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Zagros) and massive waters (the Mediterranean, Black, and Baltic seas) which serve to internally sustain many sizable arable lands separated by natural barriers that are hard to penetrate. Multiple peoples developed in localized ways to prohibitively raise the cost of a centralized administration through military conquests. The peoples of the Mediterranean–European World could also move, exit, or enter (and reenter) in the form of massive invasion, migration, and resettlement with low-tech but cost-effective means of sailing. The Chinese World was internally easy to govern geographically and logistically as a whole unit since a centralized conquest was often effective and even efficient. It was hard for contesting states to coexist due to the lack of natural barriers among them, and they had little option for moving or exiting out of the only livable Centralia. The main “outside” competing power was mostly from one direction in the form of nomadic cavalry looting the mostly agrarian settlers in Centralia, which justified a united effort by the agrarian peoples for their defense.13 Consequently, the whole known Chinese world was often (later “should be” or “ought to be”) united under one ruler as a single entity although the name of that world government could vary, depending on who was the ruler. Ecogeographically and socioeconomically, the Centralia, tended to be a unified world empire. Meaningful contacts and exchanges constantly existed between the geographically insulated Chinese World and the non-Chinese worlds for eons via mostly the migrants and caravans traveling along the chain of oases in Northwest China and Central Asia, and also via maritime routes of communication and the passes through or around the Himalayans and the Southeast Asian jungles. Out of the Centralia and its immediate peripheries, an “international society” was identifiable in East Asia (Buzan and Zhang 2014, 1–50). Archeological evidences suggest that Caucasian settlers from Western Eurasia have lived in today’s West China since 1800 BCE.14 The world-famous Terracotta Warriors buried with Emperor Qin Shihuang in third century BCE might have been “inspired” by Hellenistic arts at the time (Nickel 2013, 413–47). A minority but growing view (even among PRC historians) holds that the ancient Chinese culture and writing characters might have originated or been influenced in various ways by the non-Chinese civilizations in the West (Hellenic World)

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and Southwest Asia (Mesopotamia and the Indus Valley) (Z. Wang 1994, 30). The Chinese ancestors, ancient religions, and language, argues one PRC scholar, were all originally from Africa via West Asia (D. Zhu 2014). The archaeological discoveries in Sanxingdui in Western China have, for example, challenged the standard views of the Yellow River origin of the Chinese civilization.15 Indeed, non-Chinese worlds impacted the Chinese World in numerous ways throughout the entirety of Chinese history, with imported ideologies and numerous important crops such as cotton, wheat, walnuts, watermelons, pepper, grapes, sesame, cucumbers, carrots and later corn, yams, tomatoes, and tobacco. Yet, those external influences were largely trickles and the existence of non-Chinese worlds was easily obscured culturally and politically. To the Chinese people, there were indeed solid and convenient reasons to believe that the whole known Chinese World was all there was, greatly reinforced by the powerful efforts of the rulers and elites of the tianxia world empires to assert and indoctrinate it to be so. The ecogeography of Centralia thus allowed a determined and powerful ruler to relatively easily unite and rule it all. This internally united Chinese World was largely free from the kind of international comparison and competition that have powered much of the history in the post-Roman Western Eurasia and Mediterranean World. Other than the often one-way sailings and treks by missionaries, fishermen, and merchants, and the very rare government-sponsored overland or maritime explorations—the famous ones being the Zhang Qian exploration of Central Asia in late-second century BCE and the Zheng He voyages in early-fifteenth century CE—the Chinese were largely land-locked for millennia. The main external threat and challenge almost always came from the northern nomadic nations and tribes on the harsh Asia Steppes that in fact did repeatedly invade, loot, conquer, and rule part and even the whole of the Chinese World—sometimes for decades like the Yuan, or even centuries like the Qing. The geography and geopolitical location of the Centralia have given the Chinese many deep and lasting characteristics and predispositions for their politics and worldviews.16 China, for many centuries, was a country and a world: a world empire. For efficiency, comfort, and stability of governance, the rulers of the Chinese World later deliberately tried to self-isolate the peoples to enhance the geographic predisposition. The relatively easy-way-out of maritime links were especially, and repeatedly, curtailed with force. Numerous Chinese rulers attempted haijin (海禁 banning maritime contact with outsiders) that peaked in the Ming and Qing empires (fourteenth through nineteenth centuries) (J. Zheng 2002; Z. Chao 2005). Over time, the initial condition of geographical isolation of the Chinese World has become conceptual and ideal, perpetuating a mentality for a unified world empire order: the Qin-Han tianxia system or

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the China Order. Technology has greatly transformed the Chinese World over the past two centuries. Geopolitically, China is now but one country in the world that has about 200 other sovereign units. The barriers that insulated and isolated the Chinese World for millennia are no longer meaningful even though the ideology and tradition of the Centralia and the China Order remain critically important to the contemporary Chinese as this book will show later. Today’s China contains of two components that are de facto independent from each other: the PRC, an one-party authoritarian political system created by the Chinese Civil War in 1949 that now rules the majority of the Chinese land and people; and the ROC, the authoritarian government of whole China from 1912 to 1949 when it fled the Chinese Mainland and has now evolved into a political democracy on Taiwan.17 The PRC has two small subunits that are wealthy and temporarily autonomous in their internal governance (until 2047 and 2049, respectively): the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which was a British colony (1840–1997), and the Macau Special Administrative Region, which was a Portuguese colony (1535–1999). Narrowly and more specifically, the term “China” refers to the PRC (and its two special administrative regions) while the ROC is known as Taiwan. Together, they are often called “Greater China,” sharing many common traits and close ties. The PRC ranks as the world’s largest country in terms of population and the fourth largest in terms of landmass. To unite with Taiwan (the ROC) would not change that ranking. However, the PRC government officially insists and PRC citizens have been educated to believe (and many international organizations have been informed by Beijing) that the country has the world’s third largest territory as it claims several pieces of disputed land (over 120,000 square kilometers) with its neighboring countries, mostly the entire state of India’s Arunachal Pradesh (Editorial Board-history 2013, V1, 2).

The Chinese Peoples and the Chinese Multination Culturally and ethnolinguistically, China as a world and a civilization enjoys a seemingly singular and stable identity with a long recorded history that is often traced back to 3,700 years ago (Chien 1939, i). Official PRC history textbook asserts that the Chinese civilization started 5,000 years ago and “has never discontinued ever since” (Institute of History 2012, chap. 1). The many competing, migrating, and merging tribe-nations in the Chinese World started stable agrarian economy-based civilization long before then (Z. Wang 1994, 30–53, 428–31). Frequent and repeated external invasions and influences, numerous conquests and rulings by the “barbarians” who were first racially, culturally, and linguistically alien, and the merging of many distinctive (but

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now disappeared) tribes, ethnic groups, and nations have contributed to and transformed that shared linguistic and cultural common bond. China has been a lasting, boiling at times, melting-pot of many peoples and cultures coexisting and competing over the millennia.18 Of which, the officially sanctioned, modified and later enshrined ideologies originated from the pre-Qin Era (before third century BCE) served as the core of Chinese culture. Two of those ideologies, the Confucianism and the Legalism, have served as the moral coating and the inner core of the political system for the Chinese World. Started with many different verbal and writing systems (Keightley 1983, 570–71), the Chinese language itself was largely shaped by political forces. The written Chinese characters—the symbolic or pictographic scripts, were officially standardized in the third century BCE and then fixed and maintained to be the written lingua franca for the “worldwide” communication in the Chinese world. This writing system was complicated and fossilized as the Classic Chinese (文言文), which functioned like the Classic Latin in Western Europe since the Western Roman Empire. The verbal Chinese language (the Han language) developed many local dialects and accents that were often divorced from the written scripts and mutually incomprehensible, in addition to the existence of non-Han languages in the Chinese World. While the written signage-like Chinese characters have remained largely the same since the Qin (especially the Han when calligraphy started to become an art and a key part of education), the standard pronunciation, the Mandarin (普通话 or 國語) based on the Northern China (Beijing) accent, emerged merely four centuries ago and became the official tone only in 1932 by a decree of the ROC and reaffirmed by the PRC in 1956 (P. Chen 1999). Indeed, were there no centralized imperial power to forcefully maintain it particularly in the written form, the Han language would have long ago evolved into many languages, making China very much like Europe on the linguistic map.19 The centralized imperial rule of the whole known world unified and molded the language with power-centered deferential and casuistry that belittle and even dismiss reasoning of principles and logic, and even truthfulness.20 In the 2010s, some Chinese scholars openly asserted that the Chinese language itself has been politicized to be duplicitous, degraded, and discourteous (W. Zhang 2014; Z. Su 2016). Like the imperial rulers who used to routinely list certain words as taboos, Beijing today still publishes an official list of “banned words” (Lei 2010; Xinhua 7-21-2014, 1–3). Throughout the Chinese World the people have exhibited a great regional diversity and variety in their physical features, customs, and languages, despite the long and powerful assimilation force exerted mainly by the centralized world empire through its control of education, religions, sociopolitical mobility, resource allocation, and cultural activities. Even today, the Chinese people from the different parts of the PRC often look, speak, live, and behave very

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differently—a great variety that would easily rival the ethnocultural differences among the European Union’s member nations.21 With the noted exception of the Turkic and Slavic minorities, the 1.3 billion Chinese people mostly belong to Mongolian (East Asian) race with the Han ethnic group as the overwhelming majority (currently 91 percent of the total population). There are now officially fifty-five other ethnic or national groups in the PRC, divided mostly along the linguistic-religious cleavages. Some of those minorities actually have their own nation-states outside of China (such as Koreans, Mongolians, and Thai). The Han, the dominant ethnic group, is largely a single written-language group that in fact contains a great diversity of cultures, religions, oral dialects, costumes, tradition, and even facial and physical features. “The Han people today,” concluded a PRC scholar in 2007, “are not genetically pure” or exclusive by DNA analysis (X. Xie 2007). In 1902, to accommodate the reality of the world empire of the past (without losing the minority-concentrated land such as Tibet and Xinjiang) and to fit in the imposed Westphalia world order of nation states, leading Chinese (Han) intellectual Liang Qichao, who was in political exile at the time, coined a political concept of Chinese Nation (中华民族), a Han-based political grouping of peoples living in the Qing Empire, to elastically utilize Han nationalism against the Manchu rulers and also foreign invaders.22 His opponent, Zhang Taiyan advocated a geography-based concept of China (the Centralia or China Proper) and a linguistic concept of Chinese Nation that would include the Koreans, Vietnamese, and Japanese but exclude the Manchu (Zhang 1907). The Han rulers of the ROC since Sun Yet-sen (and the PRC since the 1980s) adopted and elaborated this artificial anthropological concept, a “singular nation of multi-ethnicity” so to have a uniform “patriotism for the single motherland,” to capitalize politically on nationalism while minimizing the negatives (local autonomy, federalism, and separatism) of the multination state inherited from the Qing Empire.23 Influenced by the Soviet Union, the CCP politically has had a nationality policy since the 1920s that recognizes fifty-five nations (about 8.5 percent of the total population) as minority nationalities. Those non-Han nations grow slightly faster than the Han and are granted some affirmative benefits (Statistical Bureau 2011). Nominally, the PRC maintains five provincial-level minority autonomous regions and numerous minority autonomous prefectures and counties—the former Chinese World outside the China Proper that counts for 64 percent of the PRC territory. Consequently, CCP’s Stalinist multination-state policy jars with its increased reliance on nationalism of a singular Chinese Nation, creating worries about geographically based separatism viewed by some in Beijing as “the biggest risk China faces in the 21st century” (R. Ma 2011, 88–108).

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By mitochondria method, the Chinese peoples, just as all humans living today, are the descendants of homo sapiens migrated out of today’s East Africa, arriving in Central and East Asia about 50,000–125,000 years ago (QuintanaMurci 1999, 437–41; Armitage 2011, 453–56; Bower 2011). Fossil and archeological evidence, however, shows that there were ape-men and homo species active in East Asia dating back to a half-million years ago or even earlier (R. Zhu 2004, 559–62). These might be Neanderthal-type homo branches that eventually went extinct. However, to Chinese historians and anthropologists, those “local” ape-men are the direct and unique ancestral origin of “the Chinese Nation” mainly the Han people (Chien 1939, 2; X. Wu 1988, 286–93). Even after Chinese scientists confirmed conclusively the African origin of the Chinese peoples through DNA analysis (Ke 2001), many in the PRC still strongly advance the idea that the Chinese people evolved uniquely and independently on the East Asian continent, developing a “multiple origin” theory of human evolution in opposition to the “out-of-Africa” theory (X. Wu 2012, 269–78). The official PRC history textbooks describe China as one of the birthplaces of the humankind and assert that the Chinese people were descendants of the ape-men who lived locally in China over 1.7 million years ago, ignoring completely the African-origin theory.24 Some PRC publications even argue that China is in fact the origin of the whole of humankind (B. Liu 2008). Thus, many Chinese (often officially) believe themselves to be categorically different from and impliedly superior to the rest of the humankind. Yet, the melting-pot reality has also maintained a strong belief that if the “others” accept or succumb to the Central’s rules and norms, then all could become and must become the one and the same. This ethnohistorical duality and inherent contradiction have constituted a major corner stone of the peculiar Chinese worldview that rigidly ranks peoples and cultures but also practically tolerates and enables racial and cultural submissions and assimilations over time, often by force (Levenson 1964, V1, 137–39; S. Chen 2008, 12–15).

History and the Writing of History in China The Chinese people have held essentially a polytheist religious belief and panspiritual faith system. This pre-Qin tradition, naturally shaped by the long geographical and political divides, was strengthened and institutionalized to be a hallmark of the Chinese culture by the omnipresent and omnipotent imperial political power of the Chinese world empire after the Qin Dynasty. The ruler (emperor) acts and is accepted as the son of heaven or God (a Caesaropapism) who mostly is above any particular organized religion and functions as

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a divine sovereign. The PRC currently continues that policy of subjugating religion to tight and expedient political control (J. Xi 2016). Ancestral-worship and paternal family-kinship linage, often contextualized and deified with Taoist natural religion of heaven and earth, replaced organized autonomous religion to address effectively much of the spiritual needs for the people. This is one of the defining and consequential features of the long Chinese imperial society according to scholars like Max Weber (Weber 1915). The self-proclaimed atheist (communist) ruling elites of the PRC carried on this Chinese characteristic. In China today, all religious organizations are forced to register with and be approved by the government and thus monitored and even salaried by the state. The natural religious practice of ancestor-worship is sanctioned, as reflected by the state’s display and worship of the preserved body of Mao Zedong, the founder of the PRC, as a quasi-religious holy site right in the very center of PRC political symbolism, the Tiananmen Square.25 Yet, just like the ordinary Chinese, the Chinese elites (including the emperors) still have the same religious urges and spiritual aspirations as any other peoples, wondering apprehensively about what is there after life that is only minimally and haphazardly explained by the natural religion of worshiping heaven and earth. Related to and shaped by the emphasis on family-kinship and ancestral worship, at least to the educated elites in the Chinese World, history steps in both as a substitute and an euphemism of the politically suppressed or displaced superior spiritual power or authority that records, judges, rewards, and punishes human behavior perpetually and eternally—to explain the past and to give meaning to life. The Heaven the imperial rulers worshiped and feared is therefore personified by the historical records. “History is the Chinese faith and religion,” claimed some Chinese writers (S. Yu 2012, 23–28). “To us Chinese,” concluded a Chinese historian, “history is our religion” and “in other countries, what is provided by religion is provided to us here by history . . . When other peoples ask for help from religion, we have only history. On our spiritual map, there is no Last Judgment but the judgment of history. We don’t believe there is a fair God above our heads, but believe in a fair history. So totalitarian governments always want to systematically and meticulously rewrite history . . . to bury facts with lies (G. Fu 2010, 297). The self-proclaimed “lawless” and “God-less” PRC founding ruler Mao Zedong was in fact just like any emperor, deeply fearful about how he would be recorded and judged by history and therefore plotted everything possible to whitewash, hide, “create,” and falsify history, even at the expense of persecuting millions of people and deceiving many more.26 Attempting to reshape and evade the comeuppance-like ultimum iudicium by history, Mao started the practice for the top CCP leaders to avoid speaking publicly without a careful script,

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prohibit recording even note-taking and publication of his words without specific authorization and revisions, package acts and facts with duplicitous phraseology, and prefer issuing consequential orders such as deadly purges verbally to minimize written records (S. Guo 2014, 47–54; W. Su 2015). That tradition goes on as both the winners and losers of CCP’s top-level power struggles “all care very much about how history views them” (Q. Li 2013, 57). Liu Shaoqi, Mao’s deputy and designated successor, allegedly professed his last hope that he would be treated better by the history “written by the people” when he was purged (Z. Huang 2011, 1). Jiang Zemin, the still influential former PRC President, wrote in 2012 that everyone especially the CCP officials must study history well to “shape the right kind of worldviews,” to cultivate personal values and norms, and to learn how to govern and rejuvenate China (Z. Jiang 2012). Xi Jinping, the PRC top leader, believes that “history is the foundation of all social sciences” and calls his cadres to “study history” in a way like a religious leader mandating his prelates to study holy scriptures for self-cultivation and serving the country and the world (Xi 8-23-2015 and 9-2011). A “cultural self-confidence” based on reading history, asserts Xi, is the foundation for the much-needed “three self-confidences in (our) direction, theory, and institutions” (F. Li 2014). Wen Jiabao, the then PRC Premier, invoked publicly religious-like verses to conclude his decade-long tenure in 2012, “I shall dare to face the people and face history. Only history will understand me or blame me.”27 And the CCP’s mouthpiece openly called in 2014 for a “holy reverence” for the official narratives of history (J. Cai 2014, 5). As fully expected, the CCP has in the 2010s continued its active “plundering history to justify its present-day ambitions” so to “rewrite the past to control the future” (The Economist 8-15-2015). The powerful and lasting political motivations and spiritual needs have, therefore, combined to give China the world’s longest, continuously kept historical records in the same written language (Chien 1975, 1–27 and 1979, 1–77). It is mostly edited and maintained in the same style and with the same guiding principles, value norms, and selecting and evaluating criteria, started at least in the fifth century BCE when Confucius was credited for editing the political chronology, The Annuals (春秋). Historians documented every ruler of every regime, down to even daily details, to produce thousands of volumes. History is also traditionally a major source of lessons for Chinese rulers and elites about how to understand the world, govern the people, behave properly, and live admirably (G. Wang 2013, 1–22). Yet, China’s near-holy historical records were largely written with the imperial sponsorship, editorial control, official standardization, and massive censorship. They were mostly the careful products of imperial officials and court historians, who monopolized information and the dissemination of it for the declared

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purpose of using history to guide actions (Ng and Wang 2005). Voluminous, meticulous, continuous, and often highly readable as literary stories, Chinese imperial and official historical records have been largely court-anthologies and lineages that inform at best only partially the history of the Chinese World.28 It is the kind of historical narrative that almost entirely neglects and crowds out the real history of the common people, what Michel Foucault termed the life of l’infime (the lowly) and l’infâme (the infamous) (Foucault 1979, 90). Science, technology, and many more aspects of the Chinese life are largely missing in the official history books. The best-known history book that started it all, Records of the Grand Historian (史记) by Sima Qian (145 or 135–86 BCE), clearly contains many fictional and opinionated materials that make the book highly elegant and readable but with many inaccuracies, omissions, and distortions. There has since been the tradition of “no separation between literature and history” (文史不分家) that sanctions politicized, populist, sensational, and even fictional writing and teaching of history.29 The incompleteness and unreliability of the written Chinese history records have been especially true since the eighth century when writing of history became mainly (later exclusively) the domain and enterprise of the imperial court. Particularly in the last world empire ruled by the minority of Manchu, the Qing (1644–1911), non-governmental keeping and editing of history were banned, often by the death penalty (sometime of the authors’ extended families), and the imperial court systematically censored all available books and written materials and destroyed many of them in order to control people’s knowledge of the past (Xie and Wan 1996; Kong 1980, Z. Qiao 2013). As one dissident Chinese scholar commented in the seventeenth century, the Chinese history records, not just the court-written ones, tend to be full of errors, biases, deceptions, and taboos (Zhang 1655). “Chinese history prior to 1840” with its central features of “the art of ruses,” commented a Chinese scholar in 2015, is “very tedious and toxic” (S. Tang 2015). For example, during the reign of Emperor Qianlong (1735–95), the Qing government organized a decades-long “worldwide” effort to collect, purchase, and confiscate (with bloody means when necessary) all books and written materials “under the sun,” then finally edit, frequently rewrite and reword, all of them into only eight imperially controlled copies of 3,457 books (79,070 volumes total)—the famous but officially way-over-rated Four Completed Collections of Books (四库全书) to administratively lock up all publications for the sole purpose of revising history, controlling information, and monopolizing knowledge. The thorough and extensive rewriting and falsification of history archives and publications by the Qianlong Emperor were truly unprecedented and unparalleled in human history. Worse, the imperial ruler used this opportunity to ban and literally burn to eliminate at least 6,766 kinds of books

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(or as many as 100,000 kinds of books as estimated by later scholars, with 93,556 to over 150,000 volumes and countless printing plates)—two to ten times more than were collected and preserved (Baidu 2016; G. Gu 2001, 7; F. Zhang 2001, 412–17). Incomplete official lists compiled later by bibliographers showed that, by 1780 (the heyday of the book-burning campaign), over 3,000 kinds of books were already banned and burned (Yao 1882; Shi 1925). Such a genuinely anti-intellect act of extreme obscurantism created an imaginable hurdle for Chinese educational and scientific development and an irreversible holocaust of Chinese culture, historical records, and accumulated knowledge in general.30 After the mid-nineteenth century, especially during the ROC Era (1912–49), Chinese historians, particularly the foreign-influenced and educated scholars, started to reread and rewrite Chinese history with modern scientific methods and Enlightenment philosophy of free exploration and expression. They broke the state-monopoly and traditional historiography to ground in facts and logic (Moloughney and Zarrow 2012). Influential Chinese intellectuals started to call for “writing a new Chinese history” free from the perverse and pervasive imperial fallaciousness (Lu 1933). Exemplary and significant accomplishments of this rewriting of Chinese history by Chinese scholars include the works by Zhang Taiyan, Liang Qichao, Wang Guowei, Hu Shi, Chen Yuan, Gu Jiegang, Fu Sinian, Chen Yinque, Chien Mu, Lü Simian, and Zhang Yinlin.31 Yet, many if not most of them still continued to a varied extent the tradition of reading and writing history as a religious and political endeavor for contemporary sociopolitical purposes and personal convictions particularly for promoting Han-Chinese nationalism and political changes (J. Wang 2000, 357–81, 409–34). Chinese historiography degenerated deplorably in the PRC (since 1949) as the ruling CCP has gone back to the imperial tradition to dictate the recording, dissemination, and especially the interpretation of history. The scale, depth, and extent of distortion, falsification, and destruction of history records have all reached a new level, perfectly exemplifying a “Mutability of the Past” or “alteration of the past,” as classically described by George Orwell, to practice a belief of “who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past” (Orwell 1949, 19, 124, 143). Not only have there been systematic forgery, omission, and misrepresentation about the PRC history, the CCP has also been hiding, rewriting, and falsifying its own history and records as well as the Chinese history for momentary political purposes (W. Yuan 2006). The countless history publications in the PRC, including the many “official documents,” top leaders’ writings, and “original” historical records and “eyewitness” memoirs, are now deemed by many insiders with conscience to be full of deliberate deception and distortion (F. He 2005).

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Politically motivated (later also profit-driven), often officially sanctioned, fake history and misinformation have been ubiquitous in the PRC.32 The official writing of the CCP history has been a carefully controlled political “construction,” with “the (CCP) Party as the sole yardstick for evaluating every historical event and character” (C. Jin 2014; M. Zhang 2016). One study documented that the CCP-PRC has systematically doctored at least 500 important news photographs since the 1950s (D. Zhang 2010). The editors of a major collection of “truthful” oral history of the CCP told by the party leaders and elders unequivocally declared in the preface “to follow strictly the [CCP] Party Central’s judgment about history” and “to reject completely any material that may not fit in the spirit of the Party Central’s decrees on CCP history” (L. Lu 2002, 2). Countless key facts and basic information have been hidden, distorted, or manufactured.33 In the 2010s, the CCP continues to punish professors who dared to question the party’s official narratives of history in classrooms (L. Zhang 2015). Misrepresentation of history, though, is often poorly done. On the same day in 2015, for example, an official CCP publication about Mao Anying (Mao Zedong’s son) openly and squarely contradicted President Xi Jinping’s account (Xi 5-7-2015; G. Yue 2015, 9). Perhaps more treacherous to the students of China history, the CCP-PRC has apparently systematically destroyed many sensitive but crucial archives, often the sole copies of them, which are deemed inconvenient or embarrassing in addition to hiding documents indefinitely or forging documents (Smarlo 2004, 332–34). A leading CCP party historian openly declared in 2014 that in order to “protect the core interests of the Party,” some historical documents are sealed away forever in the PRC.34 Mao Zedong reportedly ordered the destruction of “two big bags full of top secret files” after his designated successor Lin Biao defected and died in a mysterious plane crash in 1971 (S. Guo 2014). The deposed CCP top leader Zhao Ziyang secretly told his visitor in 1999 (the eleventh year of his house arrest) that, for example, Deng Xiaoping ordered him in early1980s to “destroy all” the documents implicating the late Premier Zhou Enlai in the political persecution cases in the Cultural Revolution (Du 2010, 174). At the same time, countless half-truths or even totally fabricated “facts” or documents have been manufactured and promoted by the state monopoly of education, publication, and media, as today’s PRC has been termed by some Chinese themselves as a “superpower of counterfeits” that makes fake things “everyday and everywhere” (X. Hu 2008).35 At the minimum, the government has made the study of Chinese history dauntingly difficult in the PRC. Consequently, ever since Confucius of the fifth century BCE (with the noted brief pause of a few decades during the ROC Era), to the Chinese elites,

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writing history means keeping scores, forming and changing memories, and shaping and altering worldviews, traditions, and contexts. Therefore, writing and teaching history function as the de facto national and state religion in the Chinese World. Unlike a well-organized religion, the holy scripture itself as well as the divine judgments in this case are constantly rewritten and expanded thus creating an irresistible temptation for the powerful to control their fate through writing and teaching history in their preferred ways. It became inevitable for the rulers, who are above all other restrictions and confines, to routinely censor, revise, and falsify history records and presentations. Imperial rulers routinely use Posthumous Name/Title (谥号) to officially entitle people with words or phrases so to explicitly honor or humiliate them according to the ruler’s criteria in the official narrative of history.36 To be sure, reinterpreting or revising history and historical images for contemporary political and other purposes and values are neither rare nor exclusively Chinese (Bhabha 1990; Anagnost 1997). As Benedetto Croce argued long ago, all written history is essentially about “contemporary history” and inevitably affected by the contemporary cultural values, philosophical thoughts, and sociopolitical norms (Croce 1921, 19, 51, 135–39 and 1955, 149). Many governments in other countries, ancient or modern, have attempted to control the writing and teaching of history. One of the worst culprits of falsifying history has been the former Soviet Union, the creator and teacher of the CCP.37 Even during the qualitatively more open ROC Era (and today’s Taiwan), politicized and Sinocentric distortion of history has still been commonplace.38 However, the kind of effort made by the imperial rulers in the Chinese World has been unparalleled and unrivalled: they monopolized the writing and teaching of the history of the whole world, whereas the divided polity in the MediterraneanEuropean World, by definition, provided alternatives and external checks to mitigate and minimize the singular distortion and fakery of the writing and teaching of history. Therefore, the Chinese in the PRC today have been taught about history in a singular and uncontested official way, starting with the origin of humankind. Some Chinese dissident historians in the PRC have radically asserted that up to 95 percent of the history now taught in PRC schools is either distorted or deceptive (C. Yan 2013).39 A leading example of such politically motivated but highly effective and deeply consequential distortion of history in the PRC has been the construction and indoctrination of the notion of “the century (1840–1949) of humiliation” (David 2008). In 2015, much of the 100 criteria of censorship in the PRC revealed were about history (PRC Central Government 2015).

Table 1.1. Diverging Interpretation and Presentation of China and Chinese History Issue/fact/event

PRC Official Narratives

Contrasting Views*

Size of China

3rd largest in the world

4th largest in the world

People and nation

Multiethnic Chinese Nation

Multination-state

Ancestors of Chinese 1.7 million years ago, 50,000 years ago, from homegrown Africa Start of Chinese history

5,000 years ago, Yellow Emperor

3,700 years ago, archeology evidence

Continuity of history World’s only unbroken socio- culture & same state/nation of five millennia

Like Europe, divided, being conquered & transformed numerous times

Warring States Era Chaotic divided country Slavery system

Feudal states in the Chinese World Source of Chinese civilization

221–207 BCE Qin Kingdom united the country Starting feudal system

Qin Kingdom conquered the known world Imperial system ended feudal system

202 BCE–220 CE Han Empire, a peak of China Han world empire order Enshrining Confucianism Qin-Han Confucian Legalist polity 960-1279 Song, divided country Weak, failure, humiliated

Song, Chinese Westphalia system Best era of imperial China, highest peak

1271–1368 “Our” great Yuan Dynasty

Majority Chinese (Han) conquered & enslaved

1644–1911 “Our” great Qing Dynasty

Majority Chinese (Han) conquered & enslaved

1840–1949 Century of humiliation Chaotic low point

Century of experimentation and progress Forced to leave China Order

October 1, 1949– The PRC, the “New China”

The PRC, leaping backward to the past

*Based on PRC official history textbooks. Contrasting views are based on non-PRC and/or dissident PRC works.

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Over the past thirty years, while the official writing and teaching of history in the PRC remain to be thoroughly and extensively controlled with countless efforts to mislead and distort, some Chinese scholars and repenting ex-officials began to rectify the twisted Chinese history (Y. Shen 2013, V1, 1; X. Feng 5-7-2013). Some even openly call on Chinese students to “don’t even trust a single word in the history textbooks published in China” (Z. Liu 3-14-2015). So far, this considerable, dissenting effort has yielded many impressive results, ranging from reexamining Chinese ancient history to rereading the history of the CCP party. This book has utilized a considerable amount of such works by PRC citizens as well as the non-PRC works that “historicize” China and rectify Chinese history (Standen 2012; Shih and Chang 2011, 280–97). In 2016, 57 PRC and Taiwanese historians jointly published a new take on the Chinese modern history (1840s–1949) with many noteworthy rectifications and revelations (Wang and Huang 2016). Many of the revisionist Chinese works on history still carefully observe and navigate around the CCP’s censorship such as avoiding direct criticisms of the government on politically sensitive issues.40 Yet they are commonly censured or banned in the PRC, due to their candid revelations and independent discussions.41 One exceptional journal based in Beijing, Yanhuang Chronicle (炎黄春秋), published many carefully worded and self-controlled but often outspoken and unmasking articles on the CCP-PRC history in 1991 to 2016 before it was forcibly taken over by the CCP. Another interesting oddity is the web-portal Consensus Net (21ccom.net 共识网), that published considerable revisionist views and daring revelations of history inside the PRC in 2009–16.42 Increasingly, the exchange of travelers and goods with the outside world and the rapid growth of the use of the Internet especially the development of various ways to circumventing the PRC censors in the cyber space—the socalled Chinese Great Fire Wall—through “jumping-over-wall” connections of VPN proxy methods to access non-PRC websites, have allowed the unofficial Chinese rewriting of history to have a visible and growing albeit still disorganized and generally limited impact inside China.43 This is especially true for those web-published samizdat style monographs, articles, and op-eds that are often widely reposted and redistributed via a host of means such as emails, text messaging, and Chinese social media (primarily Weibo, QQ, and Wechat), despite the ever enhancing censorship.44 In the 2010s, as the official media warned, many PRC college educators frequently questioned and ridiculed the official historiography in classrooms (Editors 2014, 1, 4). Still, an eyewitness asserted in 2015 that a major PRC exhibition on World War II history “is 99 percent fake” (W. Li 2015).

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The China Order

The Precondition: The Pre-Qin China Started in the Han world empire two millennia ago, a unitary China Order narrative became the orthodoxy. It projects the accepted political ideal onto the past. Both the imperial court historians and now the PRC official textbooks (and many if not most non-official historians) have asserted that the Chinese history has always been under a unitary polity from the very beginning of Yellow Emperor who united tianxia or the whole known world. The best times of the Chinese history are the peaceful and prosperous times under a mighty world empire order. To a lesser extent, almost all of China’s two-dozen major dynasties are believed to have had a “golden” era or two when the world is pacified and united. In fact, however, the real golden eras of the long history of the Chinese World have been the three periods in Chinese history when the whole known world was politically pluralistic: the few centuries during the Spring-Autumn and the Warring States Eras, prior to the Qin Empire and its unification of the Chinese World in the third century BCE; the Song Era (tenth through thirteenth centuries); and China since the late-nineteenth century when the China Order of a world empire collapsed. The Song Era and China in the past century will be discussed in detail later in this book. Here, the pre-Qin Era of multistate and multination polity is examined as the precondition for our inquiry of the China Order (Kan 2007, 9–13, 53–92; Takao 2007). Before the Qin Empire, the Chinese World was a decentralized and divided feudal society (Zhang 1944, 33–36), under the nominal rule of a patriarchal monarchy called King of Zhou Court (or 共主 Common Ruler) or Zhou Son of Heaven (周天子) that conquered and replaced the likely similar regime of the Shang in the eleventh century BCE. Politically and socioeconomically, the pre-Qin China—the China Proper or the Centralia, mainly the Yellow River and Yangtze River Valleys—featured a feudal system that was similar to the feudal system in the post-Rome Europe until the eighteenth century and in Japan until the nineteenth century. The Chinese feudal system was replaced by the prefecture-county (郡县) system in the fourth century BCE in the Qin Kingdom and later “worldwide” in the late-third century BCE. The feudal system came back periodically but finally faded as a major sociopolitical system after the Han and Jin dynasties. When Europe entered its long era of feudalism after the fifth century, the Chinese World had already solidly replaced it with an imperial political system that crashed the layers between the imperial state and the families/individuals. Landed aristocracy existed but rarely lasted more than a couple of generations because primogeniture was illegal and the emperor owned everything. Local autonomy by manor-like warlords could develop in remote regions and especially when the imperial power was weak (X. Xu 2008; Z. Yi 2014). The official PRC narratives, in order to fit the Stalinist dogma,

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have erroneously insisted that China was a feudal society from Qin to Qing (Ma 1996; Institute of History 2012, III–IV). The pre-Qin China resembles a de facto Westphalia-like world political system, under which the feudal kingdoms, dukedoms, and various hereditary rulers were land-owning, internally autonomous, and externally interacting with one another via trade, diplomacy, and war,45 not too different from the Hellenic World described by Thucydides (fifth century BCE). Naturalism-worship of heaven and earth and layered ancestral worship, deeply rooted in the agrarian settlers’ society and shaped by the dispersed economy of small-scale farmers, were the shared but decentralized faith system (Z. Wang 1994, 434–38). The Chinese religious life thus developed a lasting tradition of conveniently cohabiting with and mostly controlled by the stable paternalistic and deified clan and political authorities rather than acquiring its own autonomous organization and authority, contrasting that of the Hellenic-Roman World and especially the Christian World, where religions created elaborated and lasting theocratic organizations and authorities that could oppose even replace the power of clans and the state (Mikalson 1998). The pre-Qin Era started around eighth century BCE with more reliable archeological and archival evidences. It had two phases: the Spring-Autumn period and the Warring States period, 770 (or 722)–470 (or 403) and 470 (or 403)–221 BCE, respectively. More specifically, it is defined in this book as from 685 BCE when Lord Huan Gong was crowned in the State of Qi and appointed Guang Zhong as his prime minister to start the Qi Hegemony, the first of five to seven such hegemonies among the independent, warring states in the following centuries, to 241 BCE when the last joint resistance war against the Qin Kingdom by the states of Chu, Zhao, Wei, and Han failed, opening the gate for the Qin to conquer all six states and unite the Chinese World in the subsequent two decades. At the beginning of this era, in the early-seventh century BCE, over 120 states existed in the hinterland of the Chinese World, the China Proper or the Centralia, seeking their nominal legitimacy form the Zhou Monarchy which itself was decentralized with two capitals of Zongzhou (宗周) and Chengzhou (成周), but fighting one another to survive and grow. Experiments with different governing styles, ideologies, leaders, international strategies, legal systems, economic policies, technologies, and military tactics were common with different results of power, wealth, and success for the competing states. When the Warring States period started (475 or 403 BCE), there were twenty-some states left. They merged to form only seven and eventually only one, the previously peripheral Qin Kingdom. The Qin, an old feudal state located far away on the fringe of China Proper, reformed and empowered itself through daring and drastic internal reforms along largely the Legalist prescriptions to replace

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The China Order

f­ eudalism with Machiavellian totalitarianism and militarism,46 tight control of the people and their activities through household registration and liability networks, massive employment of immigrants, skillful use of bribery and propaganda, and successive and mostly successful wars of external expansion, gravitated to a great improvement of military technology and skillful utilization of geography, managed to eventually conquer the whole known Chinese World through the use of brutal force and cunning diplomacy (D. Zhao 2006). The rising power of Qin ended the pre-Qin Era politically, institutionally, and socioculturally as well as linguistically. The whole known Chinese World was unified and formed into a single political unit by the last King of the Qin Kingdom and the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty, the highly skilled but infamously despotic Qin Shihuang (reign 247–210 BCE). The Qin was powered by internal mobilization under a strict and effective totalitarian sociopolitical control with the guidance of the Legalist art of ruling.47 The Qin unification of the Chinese World became a political legacy for China that lasted till today. The imperial rulers had the exclusive title of Son of Heaven, Emperor, or Dragon on Earth. The feudal system was abolished and the primogeniture system was reduced mostly to inheriting noble titles, thus the empire successfully eliminated entrenched land-based manors competing for power. Commerce and industry were state-monopolized and suppressed. An imperial appointment system (later improved with the imperial exam system) created and controlled a bureaucracy of imperially defined meritocracy that featured an undifferentiated executive, judiciary, and legislative power of the government, with the emperor monopolized all powers as an absolute ruler. Other than the hereditary royal family and the mostly opaque, ad hoc, and often bloody political processes inside the imperial court (among the royal family members, the eunuchs, the top officials, and generals) and the desperate open rebellions, no competing political forces could meaningfully exist in the entire known world. The emperor was also above religious or ideological competition by forcefully subjugating all religious leaders and organizations. The Qin destroyed a de facto Westphalia world order and replaced it with a centralized rule of autocratic hierarchy, a totalitarian world empire order. Just a few centuries before the Mediterranean–European World on Western Eurasia moved from an imperial world polity to a system of feudal warring states, the Chinese World on Eastern Eurasia moved in the opposite direction.

The Glory and Peacefulness of the Warring States The pre-Qin era of five centuries has been the defining moment in Chinese history. In a de facto Westphalia system of international community, the

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fiercely competitive peoples and states in the Chinese World created one of the three most innovative epochs in Chinese history (the other two being the Song Era and the time after the mid-nineteenth century), forming the essence and foundation of the Chinese Civilization. This is especially illustrated by the phenomena of the so-called Hundred Schools of Competing Thoughts that never again appeared in China until the twentieth century. In cultural accomplishments, the pre-Qin Era clearly rivals the golden eras of the ­Hellenic World and the Roman World, which laid down the foundation for the Western Civilization. The written Chinese language and almost all of China’s leading ideologies, philosophies, and thoughts were created in this period (Zhang 1944, 108–37, 167–201). In the following 2,300 years, there were no more major native ideas to emerge from under the world government of the China Order. Basically, all new ideas were to be imported (such as Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Marxism-Leninism, nationalism, capitalism, democracy, and modern sciences) or offshoots of those Hundred Schools such as the works of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming. The competing political power of the warring states, the vibrant commercial class and its wealth, the international space, and the lack of a unified theocratic world authority provided the crucial nourishment and protection for the preQin Chinese intellectuals to blossom. The profoundly influential Legalism or Legalist School (法家) of sociopolitical thought and policies was formed and practiced by Li Kui (455–395 BCE), Shang Yang (390–338 BCE), Xun Zi (313–238 BCE), Han Fei (280–233 BCE), and Li Si (280? –208 BCE).48 The Confucianism or Confucian School (儒家) of sociopolitical thoughts and policies also emerged during this period with Confucius (551–479 BCE) and Mencius (372–289 BCE) as its two leading scholars. Xun Zi is regarded as a key figure to both Legalism and Confucianism. In fact, Xun Zi’s ideas on statecrafts and the ways to achieve great people-centered and moralistic kingship hierarchy (王道) versus force-based hegemonic hierarchy (霸道) provide the linkage for the symbiotic cohabitation of Confucianism and Legalism in Chinese politics later developed by the Han Empire and its successors (Knoblock 1988–94; X. Yan 2008, 135–65). Confucianism simply became the synonym of the Chinese culture and, with Legalism, constituted the essence and the framework as well as the appearance of politics in the Chinese World. Known records from the pre-Qin Era show that the peoples living in the multistate Chinese World developed and advocated about twenty (figuratively recorded as a hundred) different and often opposing schools of ideology and thought. Other than Confucianism and Legalism, there was a great array of ideas that were extraordinarily colorful, diverse, sophisticated, and profound. Below are some of the leading ones whose ideas and works (many with only fragments survived the time and the deliberated destruction by the late rulers

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of the Chinese world empire). Together they have had definitive influence on the Chinese minds and hearts with great global impact.49 The Taoism (道家 Daoism) or the School of The Way, created by philosophers Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, later evolved into both a prominent philosophy and the only native major religion in China, a religion that uniquely addresses the desire of eternality in combination with fine ways of living this secular life. It has had many offshoots including the arts of qi (气功). It has affected the enterprises of Chinese mysticism, native medicine (中医), alchemistry, astronomy, cuisine, architecture and urban planning, literature and folklore, and indeed the whole Chinese way of life (Kohn 2004). The Mohism (墨家) or the School of Mo, named after Mo Di, advocated universal love, international peace, equality and meritocracy with practical emphasis on communitarianism, utilitarianism, and disciplined self-cultivation and training in engineering technology, logics, mathematics, natural sciences, and financial management and other skills relevant to governance and economy. As such, it was largely dismissed and suppressed after Qin-Han (Watson 2003). Yang Chu (杨朱) School was a very influential, even a top school of thought in the pre-Qin Era but largely vanished after Qin-Han more thoroughly than Mohism. Only a few fragments of its ideas survived as the cited targets of criticisms in Confucian literatures. It advocated individualism, value of life and pleasure, and self-interest centered norms and ethics (Emerson 1996, 533–66). Yin-yang (阴阳家) or the School of Yin-Yang Naturalists, represented by Zou Yan, started the naturalist epistemological theories that later influenced the imperially modified Confucianism and were absorbed into alchemic experiments, Chinese medicine, astronomical observation, and geographic explorations by primarily the Taoists and many imperial officials and court scholars. Ming School (名家) or the School of Name or Logicians, led by Gongsun Long and Hui Shi, is the Chinese version of sophism and dialecticism; it produced some of the well-known orators and debaters of the time. The School of Vertical and Horizontal (纵横家), or the School of Diplomacy, studied and applied the various realist strategies for bandwagoning or balance-of-power facing the rising power of the Qin Kingdom. It developed diplomatic skills of creating, dismantling, and managing the complicated and ever-changing alliances in the pre-Qin Chinese World. It was created by Gui Guzi (Wang Xu) whose many disciples like Su Qin and Zhang Yi were among China’s, perhaps also world’s, best orators, debaters, tacticians, conspirators, and diplomats. Their acts made the pre-Qin an era full of high-stake and highdrama games of international relations (Kuai and Liu, second century BCE). The School of Agriculture (农家) advocated the importance of agriculture, which had indeed developed surprisingly high-level of productivity during the

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pre-Qin Era, and its basic technology and tools developed then were very much in use in China until as late as the mid-twentieth century (X. Zhou 2004). The School of Military Thinkers (兵家), includes influential strategists, military practitioners, and authors like Sun Zi who left the world with his much cited and treasured book The Art of War (Sun Zi 2003). Many other innovators, authors, statesmen, and teachers during this era helped to shape and influence the Chinese culture. The famous poet and failed politician Qu Yuan (340–278 BCE) is just one of those whose works and personal lives have become part and parcel of the Chinese culture. A quantitative analysis shows that this period is also a high peak of Chinese scientific and technological innovation (J. Dong 2014). It is no exaggeration that the pre-Qin Era has dominated the history of the Chinese and Eastern Asian civilizations ever since. The glorious and admirable pre-Qin Era, despite the name of Warring States, was actually a better-governed world than the subsequent united Chinese World under the imperial world empire order, contrary to the current Chinese official narratives. Under the Westphalia-like political order in the Chinese World then, peoples had considerable freedom, individuality, mobility, choice, and prosperity rarely seen again under the China Order after Qin. Chinese civil rights during this period matched the same in the early modern Europe (which was also under a Westphalia international system) (Hui 2008, 6–20). Despite the fact that the multiple states indeed fought many wars against each other, the frequency of wars during those five centuries was by no means more excessive than other periods in the later Chinese history, with the very interesting exception of the Chanyuan Peace in the Song Era in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. More importantly, the death toll and destruction of the wars during the Warring States were significantly lower than that of the imperial wars, civil wars, and rebellions during the later eras. Most of the wars in the pre-Qin Era were regional, repetitive, short, small-scale, and non-destructive types of low-intensity warfare, which actually created a “war-driven rationalization” of efficiency-oriented sociopolitical changes (D. Zhao 2006, 18–20), rather typical international conflicts for limited goals than total wars. The worst death toll of a single war was Qin Kingdom’s mass execution of 400,000 Zhao prisoners of war after the three-year Changping Battle in 260 BCE.50 After the Qin, not only was the frequency of wars increased in the Chinese World under a world empire order, so also were the intensity, length, scope, death toll, and destruction of wars. As the Chinese world empire order became more perfected and thorough by the Yuan, Ming, and Qing empires, more armed conflicts in the Chinese World with increased brutality and destruction

Table 1.2.  Frequency of War in the History of the Chinese World Era

Total numbers of war

Early Era (16th century–685 BCE) Total (685 BCE–1989)

War frequency

War likeliness (100)

(Information too sketchy)

3,765 1.408/year 100

The Pre-Qin China (685–241 BCE)

538 1.212/year 86

Qin-Han World-Empire (242 BCE–219 CE)

431 0.934/year 66

First Disunion of the Chinese World (220–581) (Three Kingdoms, Jin, and North and South dynasties)

605 1.587/year 113

Second Qin-Han World-Empire (Sui-Tang, 581–904)

284 0.879/year 62

Second Disunion of the Chinese World (904–1279) 624   Five Dynasties and Sixteen States, 904–959 73   Liao, Northern Song, Xia, Jin, . . . (960–1127) 256   (Chanyuan Treaty era 1005-1124) 83   Jin, Southern Song, Mongol . . . (1128–1279) 295

1.664/year 118 1.304/year 93 1.533/year 118 0.702/year 50 1.953/year 139

Third Qin-Han World Empire   Yuan (1271–1367)   Ming (1368–1643)   Qing (1644–1911)

1.955/year 2.542/year 2.105/year 1.596/year

1,251 244 579 427

139 181 150 113

Contemporary Era i ROC (1912–1948) PRC (1949–1989)

72 49 45

1.221/year 1.324/year 1.125/year

87 94 80

Based on the database collected by Chinese military historians (Editing Group 2003). Each entry could be an external war, civil war, rebellion, or uprising. The set, perhaps the most complete available, is not ideal. It often counts a multiyear war or rebellion the same as a single battle; it sometimes counts a major battle in a multiyear war or rebellion as a separate entry. This appears to be especially serious a problem for the Sui-Tang era. For instance, the extraordinarily destructive and nationally affecting Huang Chao Rebellion (875–884) that fought many brutal battles in both the Yellow River and the Yangtze River Valleys and sacked the capital of Chang An, was only counted as one war/battle as a small one-time local rebellion (such as the Song Jiang Rebellion) in the Song Era. i. Based on a different set of databases that includes external and civil wars and major violent conflicts and campaigns. The relatively small number of wars during the ROC and PRC era, however, were extraordinarily deadly due to perhaps the use of modern weaponry. According to one study, there were at least 22.49 million people during the ROC era and as many as 45–60.24 million people in the first 40 years of the PRC (1949–89) died from unnatural causes. (Xinhua 8-4-2015; Rummel 1991; J. Yang 2008).

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occurred. Unlike the wars among the warring states, wars under a world empire order tended to be total wars of life-and-death and all-or-nothing struggles, rather typical of the more destructive civil wars. Many of them actually were like ethnic extermination and genocide such as the wars among the Mongol, Han, and Manchu national rulers. Those commonly desperate rebellions, civilwar-like, inter-group, and inter-ethnicity slaughters were merely over who would be the only ruler of the country and also the whole known world. They easily led to the unimaginable losses of 70 to 100 million lives (or one-fourth of the total population) in just a few years, for example, the Taiping Rebellion in 1851–64 (Ge and Cao 2001). During the ROC and PRC Eras, authoritarian polities in China were conditioned and checked by external forces, thus had a Warring States Era frequency of wars, but incurred incredibly heavy losses of lives and wealth (more on this later in chapters 5 and 6). The fact that the pre-Qin Warring States Era was neither more warprone nor more destructive has offered a major historical lesson forgotten or dismissed by the later imperial governments and their writing and teaching of history. That period of a politically divided world with competing feudal states remains to be unrivaled in creativity and prosperity in the three plus millennia Chinese history. It is the most important formative phase of the Chinese civilization for the Han and many other nations and ethnic groups in Eastern Eurasia and beyond. The Chinese history “never again had such sophisticated brilliance” (R. Huang 2007, 17). The pre-Qin China, therefore, is a strong case for the feasibility, desirability, and practical durability of a Westphalia-like world order in China. Its ending illustrates the reversibility and destructibility of such a world order of international relations. Official Chinese narratives insist that its ending was progressive as it united the Centralia and helped to expand the Chinese nation and Chinese civilization. To observers in hindsight, however, the ending of the pre-Qin Era was a tragic consequence of the emergence of an imperial superpower that expanded to singularly unite and rule the whole known world. The fierce international competition failed to sustain the pre-Qin golden era which could have led to, in due time, a de jure nation-state system, capitalist market economy, Enlightenment-like cultural development, and scientific and industrial revolutions in the Chinese World on Eastern Eurasia.

2

The Qin-Han Polity and Chinese World Empire

T

his chapter examines the establishment and evolution of the China Order, a world empire of tianxia (all under heaven). It is the Qin-Han imperial polity based on a Confucianism-coated Legalism authoritarian or totalitarian autocracy that is predestined and compelled to order and rule the entire world that is known and reachable, in reality or in pretension. The China Order had governed the bulk of Eastern Eurasia from the third century BCE to the mid-nineteenth century, albeit with some profound gaps and pauses, chiefly the Song Era (tenth through thirteenth centuries). The China Order was first created by the Qin Empire (221–207 BCE) and then soon reconstructed and legitimized by the two Han empires (202 BCE–9 CE and 25–220 CE). It was further improved, internalized, and perfected by the Sui-Tang empires (581–907 CE) and peaked in thoroughness, rigidity, and power by the Yuan-Ming-Qing empires (1279–1911).1 The China Order was the result of human efforts and design backed by preponderant force, fortitudes, and wiles as well as sheer luck. This peculiar world order was also shaped and sustained by peculiar factors of ecogeography, demography, and technology in the Chinese World (Kan 2007, 1–254). As a high plateau of human polity and governance that was achievable and manageable with preindustrial-age technology, the China Order was highly attractive, even addictive, to ruling elites of all kinds; it thus acquired a super-stable position in Chinese political history.2 Having endured the seemingly endless dynasty cycles, the powerful force of institutional and ideational path-dependency and the elites’ lasting addiction enabled the China Order to be the ideal world order for the post-Qin Eastern Eurasia. The longevity of the China Order practiced, even just in pretension, and the imperial monopoly of historical narratives over two millennia legalized and deeply internalized this world order in the hearts and minds of the Chinese people. Only external forces with alternative ideas such as the Europeans’ expansions after the mid-nineteenth century may shake or even shatter the dominance of the China Order in the Chinese World 39

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and in the Chinese mind. Today, the ideology of the China Order remains a captivating cultural norm, a treasured tradition, a popular world outlook, and a top political value in Greater China, especially in the PRC.3

Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism Politically, the foundation of the China Order is the unitary Qin-Han autocratic polity of Confucian-Legalism, a Chinese version of authoritarianism or, frequently, totalitarianism. Authoritarianism is commonly understood as an autocratic polity, a somewhat softer and less singular thus less thorough version of totalitarianism that allows for limited but still not responsible nor secure sociopolitical pluralism; it promotes a weak and patchwork official ideology. It relies heavily on mass mobilizations (but less extensive and less intensive than totalitarianism) to govern and to achieve state goals but often seeks legitimacy through its performance in governance (order and security) and economic development. It has some informally and poorly defined but still predictable limits of leaders’ personal power. It is often ruled by a small group of rulers collectively with some autonomy of professional career paths in the government and military, opaque and unstable constraints and division of power, unpredictable terror and use of force, extensive propaganda, and the state control of the economy and resources to subjugate all except perhaps the ruling elites. Empirically, hard or harsh authoritarianism was seen in the Militarist Japan (1930s–1945) and the post-Mao PRC while soft authoritarianism has existed widely in many non-democracies today (Linz 2000; Ezrow and Frantz 2011). Totalitarianism is commonly understood as a polity that eliminates almost all sociopolitical pluralism and competition under a coercive monism. It promotes a unified and forcefully imposed ideology often featuring a reachable utopia and a holistic conception of humanity and society. It organizes the people through intensive and extensive mobilization under regime-controlled homogeneous (often obligatory) organizations with social and individual atomization. It is autocratically and personally ruled by the often charismatic or mysterious leader with few constraints, brutal force and mass terror, effective propaganda and indoctrination, best mind and body control technologies, great unpredictability of the governance, and comprehensive state monopoly of the economy and resources to subjugate all, including the elites. Totalitarianism manifested recently as Fascism in Italy and Germany, Stalinism in the former Soviet Bloc, and Maoism in the PRC, and still continues as the Juche (주체) or Kimilsungism in North Korea (Friedrich &Brzezinski 1956; Linz and Stepan 1996; Kołakowski 1999, 1–8, 77–84, and 1978, 525–766, 1044–1139; S. Hu 1941).

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Judicially and normatively, a constitutional rule of law under democracy means that, for individuals, “everything which is not forbidden is allowed” and, for the government, “everything which is not allowed is forbidden” (Andenæs and Fairgrieve 2000, 256). Authoritarianism would just reverse that to make “everything which is not allowed is forbidden” for the individuals and “everything which is not forbidden is allowed” for the authorities; while totalitarianism would go further than authoritarianism to dictate that, with few and uncertain rights “allowed” for the individuals, “everything not forbidden is compulsory” (White 1939, 122). The Qin polity that united the Chinese World in the third century BCE fitted the description of totalitarianism in which the ruler, a hereditary tyrant with a strong state apparatus, had all the power and used it to seek a centralized, direct, and ultimate authority on everything in everyone’s public and private life (Conquest 2001). First coined by the Italian politician Giovanni Amendola (a critic of Fascism) and described illustratively by Benito Mussolini (whose Blackshirts murdered Amendola), totalitarianism is about “everything within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state” (Pipes 1993, 243). Totalitarianism is costly and limited, even compromised, by the state capacity. Technology limit, resource scarcity, and simple demography and geography (size and distance) all affect its practical efficacy (Buchheim 1972). It was a prominent form of polity in the twentieth century, widely practiced by both Fascism and Communism and their many imitators on all continents, visible still today. Totalitarianism can function with preindustrial revolution technology although it may become more feasible, attractive, and powerful with new technology and good disguises such as anti-Semitism, communism, nationalism or populism, even anti-colonialism (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956; Arendt 1951; Pauley 2008). Totalitarianism seems to be a political ideology deeply rooted in human tradition and practiced with varied degrees of thoroughness and success across nations (Pipes 1993, 244–45). The exploration of the Qin-Han China Order in this book, therefore, helps us to see the universal existences and relevance of totalitarianism as a viable and appealing (to the ruling elites), however aggregately suboptimal and undesirable even fragile, form of governance and political order, rather than just a one-time, twentieth-century phenomenon of fanatic radicalism. A key feature and a crucial need of totalitarianism and the first step in creating one, is to have terrifying “external and internal enemies” (Wolf 2007, 44). The worthy and believable enemies then justify and sustain the power concentration, top-down command of socioeconomic and cultural lives, mass mobilization and extraction, censoring of information, total obedience and elimination of opposition and critics, atomization of the society with the state as the only internal organization, harsh dictatorship and brutal use of force,

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and endless sacrifices of human rights and human life—hallmarks of a totalitarian regime.4 The state, if needed, uses propaganda, deception, conspiracy, and arbitrary and random purges to brew hatred and division to create and sustain enemies worthy and credible enough to enable a perpetual war-like environment filled with terror and fear. Modern examples would include the Jews to Nazi Germany and “class enemies” and “Western imperialists” to the former Soviet Union and the PRC. As a companion or an alternative, a vague yet captivating, endless yet mesmerizing, manipulated yet plausible, simple yet grand course or mission is to be invented and used to create and sustain a totalitarian regime. Hence there have been many beautiful isms and slogans frequently used by the ambitious to capture the state and concentrate power throughout human history. Common examples would include grand missions such as a divine decree or a scientific world outlook or a leader’s dream, to purify and improve a race, to unify the motherland even the whole world, to rejuvenate a certain civilization or to revenge the past, to gain more living space, or simply to create a paradise on earth. In the Chinese World, just like elsewhere, the best enemy for a totalitarian regime has historically always been the kind of external one that is easily identified, those who are not “us” hence warrant conflict with, war against, and conquest either because they are threats, i.e., lesser barbarians, or simply wasting land and resources that could be better used by “us” for worthier causes. A totalitarian polity, therefore, is bound to be antagonistic to deviations, differences, and diversity internally leading toward despotism and repressions at home. Externally, a totalitarian regime, even just a wannabe, is expansionist and imperialist in nature as it cannot be really secure and content if there is any meaningful comparison and competition in coexistence. If it were weak in comparison, a totalitarian regime might seek at least to control its people tightly, preventing external influence and constructing a pretended superiority. If it were strong (or even just self-perceived so), a totalitarian regime would inevitably strike out to seek to influence, control, and conquer the whole known world, in stages and in disguise if necessary. Its organizational and operational nature and features, chief of which is the extreme extraction and utilization of all resources including human life, often necessarily give a totalitarian regime an edge over its competitors especially when it enjoys a similar technological potency as its peer non-totalitarian states. Therefore, we see in history so many cases in which the more backward, less civilized and less humane but ruthlessly totalitarian forces defeat and conquer their non-totalitarian or less-totalitarian opponents in dramatic and decisive (however seeming improbable) ways. A totalitarian regime thus by definition is (or has to be) a world regime since it inevitably will seek to govern and subjugate the whole known world in order to run its course.

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The Qin Polity: The Chinese Totalitarianism During the competitive and innovative pre-Qin era, a distinctive Legalism governance was established in the fourth and third centuries BCE in a few states. Later it became the political order for the whole Chinese World, propelled by the military and diplomatic successes of the Qin Kingdom based on its extensive, persistent, and successful practice of Legalism. Legalism values strong governance by a centralized state, ostensibly argues for a no-nonsense, effective, and efficient way of establishing political order and public authority through ruthless use of force and ruses to directly enforce imperial laws, decrees, and regulations, as opposed to the feudal and familiar political structures that rely on indirect ruling, delegation of authority, and persuasion with moral codes of conducts and socialization. Often also called School of Ruses and Gaming (权 术家), Legalism advocates a polity based on centralized supreme power of the imperial ruler, blunt use of brutal force, cunning trickery, and harsh imperial laws that govern everyone but the ruler based on cynical yet pragmatic relative morality, and vicious manipulation of human desires and weaknesses to achieve whatever state objectives—the kind of dark but “real” and practical statecraft later famously described by the Italian Niccolò Machiavelli (Machiavelli 1532). In the classic typology of government, the Qin polity would fall into the category of Hereditary Tyranny. Other than “his own advantage” and “absolute power,” a tyrannical ruler cares for little else, is above the confines of laws, and uses any means however brutal to suppress and against anyone and everyone. (Plato 380 BCE, XIII; Aristotle 350 BCE, X, 219–20; Locke 1690, XVIII, 110–14). Qin’s conquest of the whole Chinese World is thus one historical case of a “worldwide” triumph of totalitarian governance. It was a later-solidified onetime result of forces of history, chief among which are the focused, sustained, and skillful human efforts by the Qin leaders (Hui 2005, 63–107, 216–23). To a detached reader of history, Qin’s victory appears to be simply an inevitable outcome of geography and demography and the dynamic interactions among the warring states. To a fan of totalitarianism and world unity, the Qin Order symbolizes a great progress and accomplishment of human polity (Z. Wang 2002). To a nostalgic Chinese chauvinist, the Qin Empire represents epic success for power and conquest.5 To view it based on our rereading of the history of the pre-Qin Chinese World, however, Qin’s unification of China was a tragic end of a glorious era for the peoples of Eastern Eurasia. To an observer of today’s China and its rise, the Qin Order has been a defining legacy of tradition and ideation that has shaped much of the Chinese mind and Beijing’s preferences and pursuits. Before and after the Qin and elsewhere, there have been, of course, similar conquests of a whole known world by an able ruler such as the Macedonian

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conquest of the Hellenic World (and beyond) and the Mongols’ domination of much of the whole Eurasia. What is intriguing and uncertain, however, is what would happen once a totalitarian regime had indeed conquered the whole known world: Would the world empire order quickly split and then collapse as in the case of the empires of Alexander the Great, Qin Shihuang, or Genghis Khan? Would the totalitarian world empire order decay and transform to become more feudal or federal-like and then disintegrate and disappear, like the legendary world empires of Shang (seventeenth to eleventh centuries BCE) and Zhou (eleventh to eighth centuries BCE) in the ancient Chinese World and the Western Roman Empire (27 BCE–476 CE) in the Mediterranean World? Geography, demography, and technology undoubtedly play key roles affecting the fate of a world empire. More importantly, perhaps, is how totalitarian or authoritarian a world empire is and how thoroughly and well a worldwide governance runs.6 History is littered with successful expansions of totalitarian regimes; they even reach the level of conquering the whole known world. Yet, the fate of those totalitarian world-empires after their conquests of the whole world is historically uncertain and often unenviable, as the Qin Empire shows.

The Qin Tianxia: A World Empire Order Qin’s victorious, centuries-long, growth and expansion led to the abolishment of the feudal states in the Chinese World. The new, united Qin Empire was a world empire: the government of tianxia or the whole known world. It was a top-down imperial regime that appointed all officials to govern at the pleasure of the superiors, ultimately the emperor. The land-based hereditary and layered aristocratic ruling class was replaced by a position-based singular hierarchy that derived its authority and power from the emperor, the son of heaven, who was also the moral arbiter for the whole world. This Qin world order, based on the practice of the Legalist power politics and the use of force and ruses, took the peoples in the Chinese World onto a road of totalitarian governance and world empire that ruled all peoples under the sun with a unification or centralization of the world (天下一统) (Levenson 1959, 112; Burbank and Cooper 2010, 43–52). The concept of tianxia in China could be traced back to the pre-Qin era, beyond the eighth century BCE. It contains the notion that the known world ought to be united under one single ruler, the Son of Heaven, who provides the stability and legitimacy for political order and governance for all (Watson 1967; Levenson 1964, 113). The best-known description of this political ideology is perhaps the famous verse from China’s first collection of ancient poems (edited by Confucius): “all land under heaven belongs to the

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king, all people on land are [the] king’s subjects.”7 Yet in the feudal and divided pre-Qin Chinese World, such a poetic ideal was never really implemented. Even its nominal dominance gradually decreased to the point that the Zhou Son-of-Heaven, the “common ruler” of feudal rulers, was reduced to being just a small lord dependent on the good will and support of the more powerful warring states for survival. In 249 BCE, the Qin Kingdom simply abolished the tiny state of the Zhou Court. The unprecedented world empire order was the logical conclusion and supreme mandate of a Legalist imperial polity of totalitarianism that the Qin had practiced for a century since Lord Shang Yang (390–338 BCE) started the epic Legalist reform in 359 BCE. The Shang Yang Reform was not the first but the most thorough and the longest lasting of such reforms among the warring states. The warring feudal autocracies in the pre-Qin Chinese World were propelled by the same needs and desires to survive if not win the constant international competition. They tried various internal reforms and external alliances to strengthen their governance and military, often along the similar lines Legalism prescribed. Those efforts produced quick and tangible results to strengthen state power and enable successes of external expansion and hegemony, from Guan Zhong in Qi State (early-seventh century BCE), Li Kui in Wei State (late fifth century BCE), Wu Qi in Wei and Chu states (early-fourth century BCE), Zou Ji in Qi State (mid-fourth century BCE), to Sheng Buhai in Han State (mid-fourth century BCE). Yet, those reforms were not nearly as totalitarian as Qin’s reform and more importantly did not last very long or were abandoned by successive rulers for a variety of reasons sometimes including Qin’s diplomacy of bribery, sabotage, and misinformation (Zhang 1944, 207). Qin persisted with Shang’s Legalist regime for over a century until its full fruition, despite his own tragic fate. As a fugitive running away from the displeased new king in 338 BCE, Shang could not hide due to the mighty neighborhood liability network with household registration he created for the Qin and was quickly killed along with his entire family—he was torn into five pieces publicly by five horses sprinting away (Sima second century BCE, V5, V68). Shang Yang regime accomplished the seemingly unthinkable to turn Qin from a marginal, remote, backward and weak state, one among many, into the hegemon that finally wiped out all other states to create a world empire to unite and rule the whole known world. The key principles of this powerful authoritarian-totalitarian polity were outlined in Shang’s late-recounted words with brutal clarity and bluntness: to use all harsh forces, cunning ruses (including secret informants) to induce greed and fear so to atomize, subjugate, impoverish, and manipulate the people with a concerted destruction and erosion of all sociopolitical organizations other than the imperial hierarchy and

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all ethics other than the imperial loyalty; to develop, mobilize and centralize all resources with deliberate deprivation and repression even enslavement of the people so to infinitely empower the state in particular its treasury and military; and to employ all assets and experts including active recruitment of foreigners and adversaries to treacherously corrupt and mercilessly crush all opponents with money and murder (Shang fourth century BCE). This startling but effectual Legalist playbook of how to obfuscate and herd people—viewed by the Chinese historian Qin Hui as “treating the people as the enemy”(Qin 8-15-2015)—to consolidate power and conquer and govern the whole world was elaborated and enriched by Xun Zi and especially his student Han Fei (Xun third century BCE; Han third century BCE). Li Si, another student of Xun’s, later became the royal advisor and prime minister of the Qin Kingdom, and ruthlessly executed those Legalist doctrines and directives with astonishing effectiveness (Sima second century BCE, V87). A well-constructed and carefully managed Legalist polity tends to generate and concentrate extraordinary state capacity to practice a totalitarian control of the people and resources, treating the people like worker bees and centrally appropriating “worldwide” resources, thus becoming capable of serving grand imperial priorities including winning total wars to literally conquer the world and building the Great Wall, the Qin Shihuang Mausoleum with its now wellknown army of terracotta soldiers, and the Epang Palace (阿房宫). Inevitably, a totalitarian Legalist state seeks to rule everyone in order to thrive and draws its justification and power from that endless process of control and expansion until it reaches the physical end of the world or the utter limit of its capabilities. A Qin Legalist autocracy is therefore mandated to seek constant expansion and can hardly be content, secure, and peaceful when there is any meaningful comparison or competition outside of its control, internally or externally. Qin was essentially a vehicle to materialize this powerful inner logic of totalitarian Legalism in the Chinese World. In addition to conquering the whole known world, Qin Shihuang thought about safekeeping his unprecedented world empire for his family for all eternity. He decreed that the future emperors would be named in sequence of generation (with him as the first) and implemented series of policies to unify the wagon road system and measurement units, standardize the written Chinese language, burn non-Qin and “useless” books to control information and eliminate deviant scholars, confiscate all private weapons to be melted down to make giant bells and statues in the capital of Xianyang, slaughter and detain the old aristocrats and rich merchants of the warring states, tear down most of the old city walls, expand ever further the world empire through military conquests, and seek potions for longevity and even eternal life (Zhang 1944, 209–23). Qin Shihuang pursued divine blessing and Mandate of Heaven so to

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deify the emperor through elaborated ceremony of naturalism faith to worship heaven and earth on top of Tai Mountain.8 Still, Qin’s totalitarian rule failed to sustain and internalize. The Qin world empire order was brief (221–207 BCE) as its reliance on the highly centralized martial law-like governance of the vast new world squashed a corrupted imperial court that was thrown into violent disarray of succession and in-fighting after the sudden death of the founding emperor in 210 BCE. A totalitarian rule of so many peoples by severe decrees based on force with preindustrial technology proved to be unsustainably exorbitant. A brief but intense and unimaginably destructive rebellion and civil war ensured to physically exterminate the centuries-old Qin royal family and most clans of the Qin ruling elites. The first-ever Chinese tianxia world empire order ended in total devastation for its rulers and the peoples under it. This powerful lesson, however, has been largely forgotten or papered over in China.

The Qin-Han Polity and the China Order The aspiring leaders in the late third century BCE Chinese World, with varied gifts of talent and uneven endowment of resources and luck, struggled to reestablish order in the post-Qin mayhem. Perhaps all of this chaos has to consciously or unconsciously be addressed through two troublesome questions about the horrendous demise of the Qin Empire: Was the Qin-style totalitarian Legalist imperial regime too tyrannical and deficient to last? Or, was the central governance of the whole world a flawed and unbearable political order? The talented warrior-general and tragic hero Xiang Yu (232–202 BCE), the Hegemon King of Chu (from the former Chu State of over eight centuries in the pre-Qin era), attempted to restore the pre-Qin, quasi-Westphalia, feudal world political order of international relations by forcefully recreating a system of feudal states under one Hegemonic King of kings (himself ). Xiang crushed many ambitious wannabe-rulers and pacified the post-Qin Chinese World briefly by utilizing the successful Qin-style tactics on the battlefield but did not follow the inner logic of the Legalist polity to unite the whole known world as an imperial ruler. Instead, he anointed his allies (often also his competitors) to head several autonomous kingdoms and hoped a moralistic code of conduct based on gentlemen’s agreement would secure a new pre-Qin “good-ole” world order with his new Chu Kingdom and Chu-led coalition army as the international police and rule-enforcer. A feudal or confederation and less tyrannical political order was devised as the answer to rule the post-Qin Chinese World. The Chu Hegemony of international relations in the Chinese World was very short-lived. A fellow rebellious general also from the former Chu State,

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Liu Bang the King of the Han Kingdom crowned by Xiang, employed well the Qin-style Legalist statecrafts and also followed its inner logic fully to quickly topple Xiang in order to unite and rule the whole Chinese World by the end of the third century BCE (Sima second century BCE, V7). The dramatic ChuHan struggle and Liu’s victory attest the superiority of Qin-style Legalism over the competing ways of power struggle. Xiang lost his world and his life but has since become one of the most enduring legends, a tragic hero in Chinese folklore, exemplifying the pre-Qin world lost forever. The Han Empire restored the Qin-style imperial governance for the whole known world and soon faced the same challenge that toppled the Qin Empire: after running a totalitarian course to conquer the world, how to govern successfully with the effective and useful but ruthless and fragile Legalist polity now that there was no more worthy enemy or grand purpose left? It is intriguing to think about the innovations addressing those questions by the twentiethcentury totalitarian leaders with their creation of perpetual enemies like class struggles and endless grand objectives such as racial purity and communist paradise. Of course, the latter-day totalitarian regimes tend to not last very long and none of them have really managed to conquer the whole world, yet. After the long and bloody wars of consolidation, the Han rulers wanted to evade Qin’s misfortune of intending “to rule the world forever.” Qin’s Legalist totalitarianism proved convincingly its efficacy in conquering the world but also its deficiency in governing the world. It was both intimidating and instructive to see that the House of Ying, the great royal dynasty of the Qin that thrived for nearly six centuries in the pre-Qin international relations of the Chinese World, was completely wiped out together with millions of people only a few years after it accomplished the unprecedented mission of uniting and ruling the whole world. The violent implosion of the Qin tianxia world empire order exposed that either the one-century-old Qin’s Legalist imperial polity was fundamentally defective or that a decade-old world empire was a dreadful political order, or both were simply detrimental to everyone especially the ruling elites. The Han Empire tried various measures with much less haste and harshness than Qin Shihuang that included a feudal system (quickly abolished through civil wars and conspiracies), a rebellion-prone royal-family feudalism (pacified and curtailed soon with yet more battles and murders), and Taoist methods of governance, the so-called Way of Yellow Emperor and Lao Zi that emphasized on weak central power, lax taxation, and passive governance. The Han Empire also started an important imperial tradition for the later dynasties: the statemonopoly of the lucrative mining, coinage, salt, and other handcraft industries (Ban first century BCE, V24).9 The state monopoly of salt trade, for example, continued for more than two millennia until the late-2010s because of its

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stable and high profitability based on an inelastic demand.10 Partially because of these experiments and innovations, partially due to the utter exhaustion of the horrendous wars since the Qin’s unification, and partially due to the luck of having a less despotic and more capable leadership at the Han Imperial Court, the new world empire order survived. Yet the same problems of world government continued to plague and haunt the new empire as it struggled for decades to hold on, going through bloody rounds of royal family feuds, palace coups, rebellions, mini-civil wars, and the conflicts with external foes like the rising Xiongnu nation (F. Zhang 2001, 82–91; Zhang 1944, 260–79). As an intriguing but underexplored aspect of the Chinese history, the mighty Qin-Han style world empires in Eastern Eurasia seemed to always have new, external enemies emerging right after a “world unification.” Given the ecogeography of the Chinese World, the nomadic peoples on the vast and harsh Northern Asian Steppes were deemed worthless and meaningless to the agrarian economy-based Centralia rulers. It was indeed prohibitively cost-ineffective to conquer, tax, and rule the dispersed, mobile peoples on horseback. The generally disorganized (or only tribe-sized) nomadic peoples got their necessities such as fabric, metal, salt, grain, and tea through trade with and occasional looting (often prompted by severe climate changes) of the border regions of the Centralia. This ancient pattern was sustainable if not always mutually beneficial. The “out of this world” and often ignored nomads rarely posed serious, lasting threats to the Centralia in the pre-Qin era due to their lack of the capacity and needs to organize and arm in large scale.11 Ironically, the China Order of world empire changed that ecosystem and impaired the Centralia’s border security by driving the nomads to unite and invade en masse. On the one hand, the nomads became the new useful enemy, the barbarians, to the world empire and were indeed frequently exploited and mistreated chiefly by the imperial monopoly, even resulting in a ban on trade. On the other hand, they had to organize and militarize cyclically to attack or fend off the mightier imperial military instead of the previous skirmishes with local garrison forces (Barfield 1989, 1–163). The logic of manufacturing an external enemy in a totalitarian polity was thus supplemented and magnified under the China Order, which seemed to necessarily create strong foes out of the previously negligible tribes who were ungoverned or ungovernable. Once united, however temporarily, the nomadic cavalries frequently delivered devastating blows and even total conquests to the Centralia throughout the imperial Chinese history. The Centralia had to launch ever more costly military campaigns way beyond the China Proper, which easily drained itself dry. Or it had to adopt compromising and accommodating policies like trade and tributary-bribery ties that incorporated the nomads nominally or even substantively through a feudal and confederate system.12 The officially often-dismissed-and-ignored borderland interactions

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between the Centralia and the Northern and Central Asian peoples thus, in reality, became a powerful engine for the expansion and transformation of the Chinese and other civilizations in Eastern Eurasia (Lattimore 1940). Finally, by the long reign of Emperor Han Wudi (141–87 BCE), a lasting solution was found to address the Qin puzzle: to supplement the Qin Legalist world empire order with a modified, monolithic ideology, the pre-Qin ideology of Confucianism. Confucian scholars like Shusun Tong had already convinced the founding Han emperor decades earlier about the political utility of the Confucian patriarchic rituals and Jia Yi argued eloquently for a humanist softening of the Qin polity.13 Based on the proposals of several senior officials and advisors over a decade, the Confucian scholar and official, Dong Zhongshu summarized and submitted to the emperor in 134 BCE the idea of “banning all schools of thoughts other than the six classics of Confucianism” or “promoting Confucius and suppressing hundred[s] of schools.”14 This integrated control of the people and their minds was justified by Dong’s interpretation of a Confucian ideal, modified with heavy doses of the ideas from the pre-Qin Taoist and Yinyang schools as expressed in the classic Book of Change. Dong rationalized the unified Qin-Han world empire with the credence of “grand unification into one is the normal way of the universe, applicable to the past and the present.” A hereditary imperial ruler ought to be a centralized power governing the whole known world, just as the world can only have one heaven, the sky can only have one sun, the humans can only have one heavenly right way, and a family can only have one father. A tianxiaruling emperor derives his power and legitimacy from the unchallengeable, divine Mandate of Heaven as the son of heaven. The heaven (reads “mother nature” or the God in a natural religion) and human life are fundamentally linked, united and synchronized in a totality: “As long as the heaven stays the same, so will be the way of human society.”15 The Confucian-coasted Legalism therefore justifies the Qin-Han polity to be not just man-made but also heavenly mandated natural law, with heaven and earth, two key factors in the agrarian life, as the symbol of the deity. The objective of such a governance is idealized as stability, tranquility, egalitarianism and fairness, prosperity, and security under an appropriate (like a paternal agrarian family) sociopolitical order for the people, classically described as Great Unity or Grand Harmony of “all under heaven for the public.”16 Grand Harmony was later invoked by many Chinese elites from Huang Zongxi (1610–95) to Kang Youwei (1858–1927) who appropriated the concept to describe a utopian sociopolitical order (Kang 1902). Sun Yat-sen made Grand Harmony a motto of his political party and the ROC government enshrined the phrase in its national anthem. To the dismay of true believers of communism but appealing to many Chinese, Mao

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Zedong popularized and vulgarized communism as the millennia-old dream for agrarian egalitarianism and Kang’s Grand Harmony design.17 Thus the tianxia ruler, so long as he observes the right ways of heaven stipulated by the (modified) Confucianism, will have the divine Mandate of Heaven and governs on behalf of heaven (the nature or the God), unquestioned and unchallenged. If and when the ruler strays away from the heavenly way, he risks losing the Mandate of Heaven and there would be warning signs like natural disasters (floods, draughts, locusts, earthquakes), appearance of a comet or other paranormal phenomena, or mass rebellions for him to wake up, contrive, and self-correct—if not, then the Mandate of Heaven could be taken away by others (a new genuine son of heaven) to continue. Adopted by Han Wudi, this long-lasting imperial ideology was later rephrased in the early-twentieth century in the better-known wording of “abolish hundred[s] of schools, enshrine only Confucianism” (罢黜百家, 独尊儒术) so to highlight the essence of it (Yi 1916). The pre-Qin imperial idea of Mandate of Heaven mixed with Taoist idea of humans and heavens are one18; they are blended in to the new ideology to divinely justify, with the long tradition of natural religion and ancestor-worship, a centralized Confucian-coated Legalist autocracy and aristocracy for the whole known world (Smith 2013, 5). Han Wudi, for one, also very actively conducted the natural religious worships of heaven and earth on Tai Mountain to deify his Mandate of Heaven.19 Witchcraft also played a role in the formation of the new polity (L. Cai 2014). To rule the world as mandated by heaven has since been the moral façade for the China Order based on Qin-Han polity, typically invoked by all emperors. Two millennia later, Mao Zedong attempted in the same vein to misappropriate physics and cosmology to justify and promote his political power and ambitions as the ultimate truth of the universe (Y. Cheng 2006, 109–49): the Maoist Mandate of the People.

The Fused Confucianism-Legalism As such, by the late-second century BCE, the Han Empire managed to complete the construction of the Qin-Han Confucian-coated Legalist polity as a world empire order, the China Order, to govern the whole known world (tianxia) (Lewis and Hsieh 2011). This tianxia Mandate of Heaven is an officially constructed and indoctrinated Chinese “culturalism” or “imperial universalism” (Levenson 1959, 109–20; Crossley 1999, 36–39). Others call it a ConfucianLegalism state (D. Zhao 2006, 22). It is a hierarchical and autocratic rule of man, ultimately rule of force, preferably by law but often by whim. It is based on ruthless uses of force and ruses and coated with family-modeled Confucian

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humanist rituals and values (Hui 2008). Han Wudi, for instance, alongside the enshrining of Confucian ideals of loyalty and filial piety, legalized secret informants even on family members as a Chinese ruling craft for control and taxation, a policy first adopted by Qin’s Legalist politician Shang Yang two centuries ago (Ban first century BCE, V24). This Confucian-Legalist autocracy is a combination of Aristotle’s three types of tyranny that has some inner constrains and stated rules or regulations for the ruler and the ruled (Aristotle 350 BCE, 219–20). Confucianism itself evolved and expanded to be a Legalist imperial sociopolitical ideology along the line of the “realist wing of Confucianism” (Fung 1948, 143–54). It advocates a sociopolitical order modeled after an idealized agrarian paternal family and emphasizes on centralized governance with fixed position-related individual rights and obligations, rituals and rules, duties and humanistic ethics, and social harmony based on well-defined hierarchy. It discourages profit-seeking commerce, innovation, and individuality; it values order, tradition, propriety, hierarchy and benevolent dictatorship, and sociopolitical unification of the whole world.20 The evolving and transforming Confucianism as a royal ideology shaped Chinese politics and constituted the normative framework of the Grand Unification (大一统) tianxia worldview. It has also been crucially influential to the political culture and history writing in neighboring countries such as Japan (Z. Qiao 2013). The Qin-Han imperial political ideology is in fact a fused ConfucianLegalism with the Qin-style totalitarian Legalism as its hard core and the modified political Confucianism as its exterior, blending with many elements of other pre-Qin ideas and rituals including especially Taoism and natural religious beliefs (Y. Tang 2011). Confucius, the frustrated teacher and scholar when alive, was deified with many royal titles hundreds of years after his death, and his descendants were given many special privileges and assets thus to enshrine Confucianism as a quasi-state religion or even a full-blown faith (S. Li 1998; Zhang 1944, 108–37). As a belief system, even a world religion as perceived by Max Weber (Weber 1915), Confucianism differs, however, from most religions that first and foremost focus on the pre- and post-life questions through persuasion of myths, conviction, and disciplines of rituals and then acquire their social and political powers. Constantly being reinterpreted, revived, and reconstructed to approach the status of a full-fledged civil religion (A. Sun 2013, 25–44), this state religion or royal ideology with fluctuating theological characters greatly enhanced the Qin-Han polity and the world empire order, the China Order, as a near-perfect form of authoritarianism (or soft-totalitarianism) governance for the Chinese rulers ever since (Levenson 1965, 67; Pines 2012, 11, 22–23). The Legalism scholars, however, were treated by the Qin-Han rulers as dark masters of ruling crafts (帝王术), to be fundamentally relied on but not

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publicly displayed. As obscurantism rose necessarily under the China Order, Legalism classics were further kept in the closet for the ruling elites only. Yet, Legalism was the real game of the two-millennia China Order. The centurylong reign of three Han emperors, Wudi, Xiaozhaodi, and Xuandi (140–49 BCE) operationalized and legitimized the Qin-Han polity as Confucian-coated Legalism (儒表法里).21 It is an ornamented and sophisticated Machiavellian regime or “virtue-based political order” of legalist imperialism (Ford 2010, 184, 226). Over time, the Qin-Han polity under the Confucian-Legalism may in reality manifest a wide spectrum of governance depending on the personality and policy choices of the actual ruler, ranging from despotic totalitarianism, soft totalitarianism or harsh authoritarianism, to even enlightened soft authoritarianism. This Qin-Han polity is preordained to feel insecure and discontent when there are ungoverned competition and comparison coexisting thus bound to be a world order (Fairbank and Reischauer 1958). It was later internalized to become the Chinese intellectual tradition, a monist political ideology that conceives of world order in fundamentally hierarchical terms and idealizes it as tending toward universal hegemony of a single empire (Ford 2010, 39–58). The Confucian-Legalism essentially sanded off the sharp edges of the totalitarian Qin polity and ideologically justified an authoritarian rather than totalitarian regime so to reduce the governance cost by personifying the imperial state as the family and invoking the divine power of the heaven (God or Mother Nature). Functionally, the Qin-Han polity was a premodern organizational structure featuring an undifferentiated relationship between political governance, economic system, and social life (F. Wang 1998B, 76–77). Modeling after the most important and stable human organization, the family, Confucian rules, metaphors and norms about authority, harmony, hierarchy, and succession colored and diluted the totalitarian political dynamics to make the Han version of Qin Legalist polity more stable, less costly, and an easier sell to the people, especially the elites who tend in due time to develop their position, seniority, and virtue-related security and vested interests in the system. The Confucian family norms, even just in rhetoric, modified the objectives of totalitarianism by sanctioning a controlled humanistic value of “right morals, cultivate self, and take care of family” in addition to “rule the country and pacify the world.”22 Confucian scholars’ ideas and explorations of metaphysics, cosmology, and social ethics continued such as the School of Principle (理学) in the Song Era and the School of Mind (心学) in the Ming Era. Moreover, some idealist social norms and values such as the mean and harmony, egalitarianism and education, secular life and personal cultivation in Confucianism facilitated local communal autonomy and social critique even political opposition to those overly despotic imperial rulers (G. Wu 2012).

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The Consolidation and Expansion of the China Order An authoritarian-totalitarian imperial system can only self-moderate and selfcorrect so much, even with the seemingly perfect fusion with Confucianism. Its key rationale, impulses, style, preferences, and performance are determined by its structural (organizational) and normative (chemical) nature, just like any lifeform or sociopolitical organization. The Qin-Han polity-based China Order delivered impressively in many ways in the Chinese World: stability, uniformity, and peacefulness sometimes for many decades; cultural and artistic accomplishments thanks to the “worldwide” concentration of resources and talents; and growth of population under a singular linguistic-cultural bond. However, as we will see more in chapter 4 of this book, the China Order could not escape its inner logic that is compounded by the challenge of its worldwide scope. Comparatively and aggregately, the China Order has a record of suboptimal performance that features despotic governance, long stagnation of economy, suffocation of science and technology, retardation of spiritual pursuits, irrational allocation of resources, great depreciation of human dignity and life, low and declining living standards for the masses, and mass death and destruction periodically and frequently. The Qin-Han world rulers have to constantly expand or keep or assume away the external world at great costs. The Han Empire indeed quickly became an expansionist imperial power, especially when it was strong or felt so and when there were probable reasons for fighting external enemies. Han Wudi himself was engaged in many expensive and expansionist wars against the “barbarians” around the Centralia, sometimes just to punish the disrespectful tribes and nomads far away. As a result of such efforts by generations of emperors, the Han Empire enlarged itself significantly (however temporarily) beyond the Centralia into today’s Korean Peninsula, Southern China and Indochina, Northern China and Mongolia, and Central Asia. The Han drew the basic map of China Proper that has lasted to this day. The continued military expenses and other royal squandering, however, drained the imperial treasury and became a major reason for the decline of the empire (Twitchett and Loewe 1986). The China Order worked for a century until the Han Empire collapsed in the fire of royal family feud, due to bungled fiscal and ritual reforms under Emperor Wang Mang, a royal relative who arrogated the Han throne from the Liu family to rename the Han Empire as Xin Dynasty in 8–23 CE. Massive rebellions broke out. After yet another brutal “worldwide” civil war, a new regime came to power in 25 CE, headed by a remote relative of the Han royal House of Liu to rule with a further fine-tuned Qin-Han polity of Confucian-Legalism as the Second (East) Han Dynasty that lasted for nearly two centuries before it succumbed to palace coups, gross incompetent gover-

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nance, mass rebellions, and the rise of warlords. At least four decades before its formal demise in 220 CE, the East Han Empire became a divided world of many warring states with the Han emperors becoming simple puppets hijacked by various warlords (Fan 445, V6–9). The two Han empires of the House of Liu had lots of problems of governance such as the lingering primogeniture manors and frequent warlord politics, monopoly of power by hereditary clans, dysfunctions and infightings of the royal house, and outrageous grabs of power by the aberrant eunuchs. Yet they maintained the Qin-Han polity-based China Order for the whole known world in Eastern Eurasia for a long time, delivering long world unification and imperial peace, however nominally at times. The China Order thus acquired a tested reputation and legitimacy to the Chinese as a viable and admirable world order. The monopolistic writing and teaching of history ever since powerfully venerated and internalized the Han experience under the China Order as the political tradition, norm, value, and ideal in the minds of the Chinese, for the elites and the common folks. The Han empires also gave the majority of the Chinese people their name, the Han Nation, and the Chinese language the name of Han Language (汉语, 汉字).

The Recurrence of the China Order and the Great East-West Divergence Roughly at the same time as the Roman Empire in Western Eurasia was partied into two amidst crises in the third century, the Qin-Han tiainxia world empire in Eastern Eurasia discontinued. A divided Chinese World ruled by three kingdoms emerged to have about century-long international relations of a tripolar system: the Wei (the direct inheritor of the Han regime), the Shu (founded by a distant decedent of the Han royal family), and the Wu. When the Roman world empire order further decayed to eventually collapse in the Mediterranean World in the fourth to fifth centuries, the Chinese attempts to cement a new divided polity failed, as the Sima family seized the strongest of the three kingdoms to create the Jin (晋) Empire that briefly reunified the Centralia. The Jin recreated an early-Han-like family feudal system that ended quickly in disasters of civil wars, rendering the Jin world empire short-lived after barely twenty years. The royal house ran to the South; regional warlords and invading non-Han nations divided up the Centralia. The Chinese World, just like the Roman World, lost its centralized governance. For more than two centuries (316–589), many, at times a dozen, states competed with each other in the Chinese World. It was the Era of Sixteen States and South-North Dynasties. All of those mini Qin-Han Empires (ruled

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by the Han or non-Han but quickly Sinicized peoples) tried to, at least in pretention, reunify the tianxia to restore the Qin-Han world empire order, so to justify their imperial rules that were often bizarre. They were forced into constant and desperate all-or-nothing struggles just for survival, hampered or slowed down only by sheer exhaustion. All those dynasties except one existed only for a few years to a few decades, utterly incapable to legitimize any nontianxia world order. The only state that survived longer than a century was the East Jin Dynasty (317–420), the remnant of the Jin Empire, which claimed to be the sole guardian of authentic Han-Chinese civilization and pretended the hardest (and also tried but failed a few times) to restore the China Order by use of force (Y. Chen 1995; Z. Wang 2013). Started by the Qin-Han Empire, as part of the effort to replace feudalism with imperial rule of appointment under a prefecture-county system, the practice of primogeniture was restricted and reduced to be for family title and rank (if any) only while all offspring were legally required to divide and share the estates, especially land. This way, the Qin-Han rulers quickly reduced and eliminated large land-holdings of any kind over generations, even those held by royal family members. The emperor was therefore secured to be the unmatchable, largest property and land owner of the whole world as he monopolized the mines, owned all water routes and all unclaimed and uncultivated land, and also frequently confiscated land from just about anyone with any or no excuse (Jian 1984, 24–31; J. Wang 2000, 97–98, 133, 138). In the post-Han world political disunion, political power of land-based manors and warlords resurged but was finally crushed after the chaotic civil war of West Jin, fought among the various royal princes of the empire (T. Li 1962, 11–16, 103–06; Han 1963, 2–94). Imperially appointed government positions and their associated properties including granted or purchased land, especially the office-related massive corruption,23 became the main and often the only avenue to muster meaningful power and wealth, fundamentally dependent on the emperor’s momentary favors. The effective abolishment of primogeniture system thus forever prevented potentially autonomous land-based aristocracies in Chinese politics to reliably check and balance the imperial power. China hence lost “a decisive precondition for modern democracy” with a sociopolitical system that “both encouraged rebellion and put severe limitations on what it could accomplish” (Moore 1966, 417, 217). The post-Roman Mediterranean World remained politically divided and eventually evolved slowly from a de facto to de jure Westphalia world order with feudalism as its foundation. The Chinese World, however, went back to unification before the four-century-long experience of non-tianxia world order could be cemented as a legitimate, de jure or de facto, alternative to the QinHan tianxia world empire order for the peoples in Eastern Eurasia. The great

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disunion of the Chinese World ended with a rebirth of the Qin-Han Empire, the Sui-Tang Empire. The Duke (later King) of Sui under the Northern Dynasty of Zhou arrogated the throne from his grandson-in-law and created Sui Empire (581–618). The Sui then annexed the Southern Dynasty of Chen in 589 to militarily unite the Centralia. The Sui collapsed during the reign of its second ruler who lost his crown and head to his rebel generals. One of Sui’s generals, the Duke of Tang, won the intense but brief civil war to capture the throne and created the Tang Empire (618–907) (Twitchett 1979). The China Order was restored as a new Qin-Han world empire became the center for the whole Centralia again. The Tang vindicated the Qin-Han polity as it did achieve several decades of imperial affluence and tranquility even though primarily just for the enjoyment of the ruling elites. The Han Nation is thus also called the Tang People afterwards (many Chinatowns around the world are still called Streets of the Tang People today). The Sui-Tang Empires not only deeply legitimized the China Order but also improved it with innovative measures to enshrine and cement it to be an essence of the Chinese tradition and ideation till this day. A profound question arises about why, in contrast to the Chinese World, the post-Roman Mediterranean–European World never returned to world empire order. World empire order naturally attracts autocrats everywhere and, indeed, there have been numerous, often very serious attempts at a worldwide governance in Western Eurasia. There have been the Byzantine emperors, many Popes, the Holy Roman emperors like Charlemagne and various European kings, the Islamic warriors, Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler, and the Moscowbased Communist International. Despite all those efforts at building a world empire, the Mediterranean–European World stayed divided and competitive politically among many sovereign units. This is “the first great divergence” between the East and West parts of the Eurasian Continent (Scheidel 2010). The post-Roman versus post-Han divergent routing of human civilization is the origin of the later great divergences between Europe and China since the eighteenth century (Pomeranz 2000). The worldwide political fragmentation entrenched and created lasting incentives for innovation in politics, warfare, taxation, property rights, and technology to enable Europe’s expansion and domination of the globe a millennium later (Hoffman 2015). An exhaustive and definitive answer to ascertain fully the causes of this great East-West divergence in the sixth century is beyond the scope of this book.24 However, a quick answer seems to include the divergent internal sociopolitical structures, traditions, and ideations in the post-Han Chinese World and the post-Roman Mediterranean–European World, respectively. There were many key differences despite the many similarities between the Roman Empire and the Qin-Han Empire to begin with. Vastly different ecogeography and

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demographic and socioeconomic endowments and preconditions, outlined in chapter 1 of this book, had all contributed to this highly consequential East-West divergence. The dissimilar political, legal, and religious origin and tradition and the differing internal structures of the two world empire orders as well as their varied degrees of internal integration and unity seemed to be crucial to their very different staying power and chance of recurrence. For one thing, the post-Roman Europe had a constantly intertwined domestic and international politics due to feudalism and external invasions (Hallam 1880). Contrasting the Qin-Han Empire, the Roman Empire contained in itself the Greco-Roman tradition of the republican and city-states past, peculiar institutional-settings and traditional norms such as the Tetrarchy and the dualempire as well as the election process that sometimes did have a real effect in selecting and legitimizing a particular emperor. Very different from the natural religion of state-controlled faith of heaven-earth and ancestor-worship in the Chinese World, the Mediterranean World had a long tradition of autonomous, well-theorized and elaborated, often personified, and sociopolitically powerful religion and religious centers and organizations such as Delphi to the Greeks and the Pontifical College and the College of Augur to the Romans. The independence and power of the Christian church and the Papal State were even more pronounced—very early on the Church directly challenged the mighty Emperor Theodosius in 390 CE and forced him to repent and change laws after the Massacre of Thessalonica (Williams and Friell 1994), for example. While, by the end of the sixth century, the China Order recurred and the new world empire rulers legitimized the Qin-Han tianxia system as the Chinese tradition and ideation to profoundly shape the destiny of the peoples in Eastern Eurasia, Pax Romana never returned successfully after the fifth century. The post-Roman Mediterranean–European World continued and revived much of the Greco-Roman institutions, culture, and technology with profound adaptations and innovations necessitated and enabled by the international relations among the various sovereign polities especially the “worldwide” competition with the advancing Arabic power (Wickham 2010; Pirenne 1936; North and Thomas 1973). In northern Italy and Western Europe, many competing states solidified and legalized a de facto Westphalia system (Tilly1990; Tabacco 1990). Sovereign states grew and had to live with their enduring competitors externally, internally, and even spiritually with power contenders (Kantorowicz 1957; Spruyt 1994). The peoples of the post-Roman Mediterranean–European World irreversibly entered a world order of many competing feudal nation- (or multination) states, despite the efforts to rebuild the Roman world empire by many ambitious, talented, and powerful rulers. The peoples of the post-Han Chinese World repeatedly returned to the basically same world empire order of

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a centralized and singular Qin-Han imperial rule, the recurring China Order. This is the great East-West divergence that shaped the fate of human civilization ever since on the Eurasian continent and beyond.

The Evolution and Refinement of the China Order The second Qin-Han China Order of the Sui-Tang nominally lasted for three centuries. As an effective world empire it lasted for less than two centuries. It was a high point of the Chinese civilization with two widely praised periods of great prosperity (盛世) of the Zhenguan-Yonghui (627–56) and Kaiyuan (712–55) years for a total of about seven decades. During the decades of its golden era, the Tang politics was widely considered among the best of all Chinese imperial regimes as the imperial rulers behaved less totalitarian and more Confucian, bordering on an enlightened dictatorship of authoritarianism. Internal peace and stability were maintained effectively by an elaborated and well-institutionalized imperial bureaucracy. Rule by law, a Legalist ideal, was generally followed and the state-society relationship relaxed the most permissively since the pre-Qin era with a substantial tolerance of religious, racial and ethnic, lifestyle, and gender differences. The Tang had the only bona fide Empress (Wu Zetian who also renamed the Tang Dynasty to be the Zhou Dynasty for decades) in Chinese history. Economic development and people’s living standard both reached a high point in the Chinese history: per capita grain production during the heydays of Tang was the second highest (roughly 725 kg) in Chinese history, after the Song Era (Cao 1989; Zheng and Huang 1989). Tang architecture, fine art, music, and literature, especially the unrivaled Tang poems, were all the very best of the ancient Chinese World. Externally, in this heyday the Tang managed to defeat the Turkic tribes to the west, destroy Koguryo Kingdom to the northeast and subjugate the Korean Peninsula, pacify the Tibetan, Uyghur, and Khitan nations in the periphery, and interact profitably with faraway peoples including the Arabic Empire. Driven by the same logic of a Qin-Han polity that requires Tang to be a world empire and therefore to conquer or subjugate (even only nominally) all known opponents and competitors, the Tang rulers expanded deeply into the peripheries of the Chinese World in all directions and created, at its peak, a world empire larger than Qin-Han empires. Tang inherited the Han policy of entangling (羁縻), a feudal-confederation-like system to nominally rule the non-Han peoples outside the Centralia. The entangled local autocratic regimes had self-governance and local autonomy. The subsequent Qin-Han rulers all used the system with variations (Gong 2006). In 751, the Tang’s expeditionary

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force was destroyed by the Arabic Empire in the Battle of Artlakh in Talas (on today’s Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan borders), which determined the farthest reach of the Tang Empire (Beckwith 2009, 145–54). Many Tang rulers had the title of Celestial Emperor (Tengri Qaghan 天可 汗) above the various states in western-northwestern China and Central Asia, a title that was later also claimed by some non-Han rulers in the absence of Tang power. For faraway, known but unreachable states such as Persia, the Byzantine Empire, the Arabic Empire of Abbasid Caliphate and especially the nearby Tibet, Silla and Baekje on the southern Korean Peninsula, and Japan, the Tang employed a combination of manipulative diplomacy, appeasement with goodies and women, arrogant obliviousness (banning Tang people from traveling to them and ignoring the disrespectful even offensive words/acts from them), and controlled incorporation (accepting and employing visitors from them even unilaterally and pretentiously granting their rulers’ empty positions and titles) so to effectively fend off external influence and assume away meaningful comparison and competition, at least in the imperial narratives and history books.25 In the process and especially in the later years when the Tang power declined, however, the Tibetan, Turkic, Uyghur, and Khitan rebels and invaders brought repeated havoc to the Centralia including sacking and looting the imperial capitals of Changan and Luoyang numerous times (L. Fu 1989). In fact, there were always active military, business, and cultural interactions between the Tang, the self-appointed “united” world, and the many nations along its borders and far away. The practical incompleteness and inconclusiveness of the China Order during the Tang Era was, counterintuitive perhaps, a key source of Tang’s decades-long economic prosperity and cultural glory (G. Zhang 1995, 2008). The peoples of the Chinese World, the Han and many non-Han nations, had formed a longtime great mixture due to the war-driven migrations and interracial and interethnic marriages. The Sui-Tang rulers themselves had thick non-Han (Mongolic and Turkic) blood and heritages—some have insisted that the founders of the Tang royal family were in fact more Turkic than Han (J. Zhang 2003; Y. Chen 1997, 3–9). Under the Tang world empire order, the mixing and melting of ethnicities reached a new high as many distinctive nations merged with the Han. Not only was the China Order ideologically and institutionally solidified, it was also demographically and genetically buttressed by the intentional and inadvertent creation of an ever expanding and elastic group-identity of the dominant Han Nation that was bonded chiefly by the same centralized imperial power and the same written Chinese language. The unitary nature of the Qin-Han world autocracy powerfully suppressed the ethnic cleavages through the imposed political unity by force and then by the uniform Confucian-Legalism ideology, albeit the same centralized imperial

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regime also frequently manipulated and used those cleavages to consolidate its rule. The imperial manipulation of the ethnic and cultural divides treated the elites of all ethnic groups more or less equally in front of the emperor. Tang appointed non-Han individuals who accepted the imperial rule and adopted Han culture and language to be senior generals and officials, including people from the near periphery of Turkic and Uyghur tribes and the remote nations of Korea and Japan. A well-known Japanese visitor Abe Nakamaro (阿倍仲麿, Han-Chinese name Chao Heng 晁衡) became a senior official in Tang (Liu tenth century, V199; Ouyang eleventh century, V200). Some of the non-Han elites became hereditary regional rulers in the late Tang era. The landmark An Lushan-Shi Siming Rebellion (755–63), which started the long decline of the Tang Empire, was led by two of such senior Turkic generals and regional rulers. To put down the rebellion, the Tang eventually turned to Uyghur forces (Sima eleventh century, V198). More importantly, the Sui-Tang Empire instituted several lasting reforms that greatly improved the China Order to be the nearest to perfect governance an autocracy could ever dream of having in the preindustrial age. Continuing the Qin-Han imperial state ownership of all land, Sui-Tang enhanced the policy of periodic reallocation of land (均田) and administrative organization of peasants through the neighborhood (邻里) system to stabilize the population and taxation base while suppressing the politically challenging large landlords and internal migration.26 Land reallocation policy ceased to function as a nationwide/worldwide policy after the eighth century when the imperial power declined. But it was periodically reemployed by many subsequent rulers and was massively and violently used by the PRC during its Land Reform Campaign (1950–53). The Tang also continued the Qin-Han state monopoly of the cash industries of mining iron and copper, salt production and trade, coinage, and porcelain while systematically suppressing private commerce that was deemed politically destabilizing. Sui-Tang rulers completed the formalization and institutionalization of the imperial bureaucracy to consolidate the centralized and absolute rule of the emperor and his inner court. The power of the prime minister and the high military command were structurally reduced and restricted by an innovative structure of checks and balances among the specialized agencies of the central imperial government: the three branches and six ministries (三省六部) system that was shaped by the Sui and legitimized by the Tang’s long use. It divides the three powers of making, monitoring/approving, and administrating laws and statutes as well as appointments, at the decrees of the emperor (and his inner court, which often includes eunuchs) who also has the veto power over every government decision. This system appears almost similar to the U.S. governmental arrangement but with a crucial difference: instead of the Constitu-

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tion, the emperor is above all laws and scrutiny and he rules all three branches absolutely. The Tang bureaucracy was later further refined by the Song and became a near perfect, both professional and subservient, governing structure for the autocratic even totalitarian rule under the China Order (K. Li 2006). Perhaps the most famous Sui-Tang improvement of the Qin-Han polity and a major, innovative enhancement of the China Order was the Imperial Examination System.27 Around 605 the Sui Empire started a new way of selecting imperial officials through an open and regular examination of all eligible males in the Chinese World. This changed the traditional ways of hereditary appointments based on family lineage or clan relations, the Han way of nomination and recommendations by the imperial officials and local gentries, and the random self-promotion or unsystematic imperial discoveries and tests of the able and the ambitious. The Tang substantially regularized the system as the fabled “Chinese meritocracy” (Twitchett 1976). With fine-tuning (the Song Empire, for example, eliminated the corruption-prone official endorsements with onsite testing only and blind-grading, and opened it to all commoners), the imperial exam system shaped much of the Chinese governance and society, especially education. The system was used by all subsequent Chinese world empires, mini-empires and warring kingdoms, warlords, and even rebels until 1905. Tributary states under the China Order such as Korea and Vietnam used the system with Vietnam being the last to abolish it in 1919. During its long lifespan of 1,300 years, the imperial exam system offered regular exams from one to several years apart, plus special sessions and occasional lapses due to war or other crises. It was comprised of mostly written tests with an oral test at the higher level. There were martial arts demonstrations for the separate, considered lower, military examination. All males without a criminal record and not from under-class families, such as entertainers and other sociopolitical outcastes, are qualified to take it. Some dynasties also excluded the merchants and handicraftsmen. The system produced a fixed number of candidates (ranked by their test scores) each time for various levels of imperial appointments of both civilian and military positions. It took many years and decades of concentrated study, preparation, and luck to pass the (generally) three levels of tests—local, provincial, and national or world—to reach the top class scholars (进士) among whom the number one ranked was called champion and whose name was commonly carved onto one of the monumental stone tablets for perpetuity. In the rigidly stratified and unified imperial Chinese World, the imperial exam was basically the only avenue for orderly upward social mobility. Those who failed to pass or advance usually become local teachers and gentry-clan leaders yet continued to take the examinations until old age or death. Only the thoroughly frustrated and truly disillusioned ones would give up and become monks, hermit writers or artists, and rebel leaders (X. Zhang 1993).

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The imperial examination system has been hailed by some as a major Chinese innovation, “the fifth Chinese invention” (in addition to paper, compass, block printing, and gun powder), for humankind that has shaped not just the Chinese way of governance and the overall Chinese civilization but also the whole of East Asia with global impact on the modern civil service exams and educational entrance and placement exams all over the world (H. Liu 2004, 16; Editorial Board 2004, V2, 17–21). The Japanese were the first to import the imperial exam system in the eighth century, together with an almost wholesale imitation of the Sui-Tang culture. Yet, interestingly, the Japanese were also the first to disuse it by the tenth century—perhaps illustrating the incompatibility and ineptitude of the imperial exam system in a feudal society (H. Liu 2006, 136–42). More specifically, the imperial exam system served the China Order in two crucial ways with comprehensive impact on the Chinese economy, culture, mentality, and personality to this day. First, the imperial exam system gave the imperial ruler regular and open access to the worldwide pool of raw talents to select the able and also the obedient to help govern the vast world empire—to have a meritocracy for the docile educated elites to develop their vested interest in the singular position-based worldwide sociopolitical and economic stratification. By the same token, in a totalitarian way, the imperial exam system thus trapped, distracted, enslaved, and wasted away the ambitious with the endless and exhaustive competition for climbing the only, narrow, but truly life-changing ladder. Otherwise, the countless able and the ambitious in a society that was highly repressive, singularly controlled, and rigidly hierarchical might easily become destabilizing (through developing new and deviant ideas and pursuits) and even simply rebellious to the centralized imperial court. The Tang Emperor Taizong (reign 626–49), one of the few “best rulers” of imperial China (Baidu 2015), openly bellowed gleefully that the imperial exam system “brought all the heroes under heaven into my snare.”28 It is therefore no wonder that all Chinese rulers including today’s PRC have heavily used this system or its variants. Reflecting the Qin-Han Legalist tradition of emphasizing farming and the Confucian preference for the emperor’s powerful servants, land-owning imperial officials were the ideal sociopolitical elite while the successful and the rich were all compelled to own land so that their offspring could participate in the imperial exam. The imperial exam helped constantly de-capitalize the commercial and industrial profits and asphyxiate the politically destabilizing merchant class. The imperial exam system was an appealing and easily accepted way to sustain imperial social stratification and political hierarchy as it was based on the principles of supposedly open and fair competition and meritocracy. In practice, the tests were tightly controlled by the imperial ruler based on the ruling ideology of Confucian-Legalism to serve the China Order. Chinese

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rulers from the Sui Dynasty to today’s PRC have all worked hard to control the process, especially the content of the imperial exam or its mutated later versions. Until the early-twentieth century, the main content to be tested at the imperial exam was largely the same Classics of Confucianism that were first compiled and enshrined by the Han Empire: Book of Rites, Analects, Mencius, Book of Odes, Book of Documents, I-Ching (book of change), Spring and Autumn Annals,29 plus the official narrative of history, other imperially sanctioned and selected ancient essays and poems, calligraphy, and composition of poems and essays. The writing style was restricted to classic Chinese as the infamously rigid eight-legged essay (八股文) after the fourteenth century. It tested very little geography, almost no mathematics and economics, nor any other scientific methods and knowledge. The room for individual creativity was almost nonexistent beyond the art of rhetoric and calligraphy. The imperial exam system thus provided an excellent yet easy way to control people’s minds especially the worldwide (not just national) educational curricula to chiefly promote the official narrative of history, ethics, and individual-society-state relationship. While greatly assisting the Qin-Han polity and safeguarding the China Order, the imperial exam system effectively suffocated China by discouraging, retarding, and extinguishing intellectual, epistemological, and technical explorations and experiments. It therefore crucially hindered and undermined the development of scientific knowledge and technological innovation for not just one nation or one generation but for the whole known world over a millennium.30

From the Second Great Disunion to the Ultimate China Order The second half of the Tang world-empire (after 755 CE), especially its last century (805–905), was a miserable time. The emperors were marginalized, often kidnapped, and even murdered by the rogue eunuchs or the rebellious generals, or both. Large regions were under the autonomous rule of warlords or outlaws who, however, still mostly demanded, bribed, or simply extorted an imperial appointment from the emperor for legitimacy (B. Li 2015). The once tamed non-Han peripheral tribal-nations frequently invaded and looted the Centralia. Millions of people died because of violence, famine, and disease. Massive, desperate rebellions broke out in 859 to usher in an extremely destructive five-decade collapse of the Tang Dynasty. The glorious Tang, one of the finest eras of imperial China, became one of the darkest moments in Chinese history when some of the world’s largest and most glamorous cities, with over one million residents in the capital of Changan alone, vanished completely. Similar to the impact of the collapse of the first Qin-Han world empire order

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in the late-second to early-third centuries, 60 percent to two-thirds of the total “world” population perished in a few decades. The Tang population declined from nearly 100 million to 40 million. Cannibalism became a common way of survival and feeding the soldiers to fight the endless worldwide civil wars (Sima eleventh century, V238–65; Ge 2006). Many non-Han nations established their firm, Sinicized rule over the Yellow River Valley, the heartland of the Centralia. The Chinese World was divided politically without a centralized order for nearly four centuries to constitute the second great disunion in Chinese history (859–1279). The post-Tang disunion was longer in total than the post-Han disunion and very different in important ways. In the first century of the disunion, the Tang Dynasty had an excruciatingly slow death for five decades, followed by five dynasties and a total of ten states with fourteen emperors who took turns fighting desperately for another five decades. The wars were for the Mandate of Heaven to singularly rule the post-Tang Centralia or just for survival. More importantly, the bulk of this era of great disunion featured a legalized political division of the Chinese World: for the first time since the pre-Qin era, a quasi-Westphalia system of international relations existed for centuries among the empires and kingdoms of the Song, Liao, Xia, Huihu, Dali, Tibet, Goryeo (Korea), Jiaozhi (Vietnam), Jin (later replaced Liao), and finally the Mongol. Named after the richest of the coexisting states, the Song Empire (predominately Han nation-state), this Song Era (960–1279) represents not only an epic departure from the China Order of the Qin-Han tianxia system but also a truly golden era of the Chinese civilization. The peoples of the Chinese World had a new world order and great prosperity in a long-lasting peace, with unprecedented and unmatched accomplishments (prior to the late-nineteenth century) in just about every aspect of governance, economic development, living standard, technology innovation, arts, and even the longevity of the royal dynasty. It is no exaggeration to call the Song Era the best of Chinese imperial history. Yet, the Song Era has been disdained, distorted, and dismissed by the subsequent Qin-Han world empire elites and later also the Han Chinese nationalists in their monopolistic narratives of history and politically motivated propaganda even until this day.31 As an attempted contribution to the study of China and its history, chapter 3 of this book will examine in detail the Song Era, its grand experiment of new polity and world order, its distinguished successes, its highly regrettable end, and its profound but dismissed lessons. Peoples of post-Tang Eastern Eurasia made a crucial turn to legalize a Westphalia-like world order six centuries earlier than the Europeans, with magnificent benefits and promises. Yet, the Qin-Han tianxia order managed to recur, perhaps wrought by the same ecogeographic, demographic, and cultural/ideational predispositions that made

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the Qin-Han and the Sui-Tang world empire orders possible, or even inevitable. The powerful inner logic of the Qin-Han polity for world empire order might have been the deep driving force for the restoration of the China Order as the states of the Song Era were all Qin-Han regimes. The Song Empire itself was a moderate Qin-Han polity bordering on an enlightened authoritarianism but still dreaming for a world unification and acting on it from time to time, tragically causing its own demise. Practically, the Qin-Han world empire order returned due to the fatal but avoidable blunders of the Song rulers and the brutally successful Mongol cavalry. The Mongol conquest of the Chinese World firmly resealed the destiny of Eastern Eurasia and especially the Han nation for the next seven centuries. The China Order revived with a vengeance to usher in an ultimate form of harsh authoritarian even totalitarian world government. The third and last round of the China Order of Qin-Han style world empire was composed by the three successive dynasties of the Yuan, Ming, and Qing (1271–1911). Two of them were non-Han invaders and conquers—the former “barbaric” nomads of the Mongols and the Manchu. All three had their imperial capital primarily in today’s Beijing and featured a totalitarian despotism (L. Zhou 1999, 260–82). When the Mongols restored the China Order in the whole Chinese World in the late-thirteenth century, after some of the worst genocides and massacres in human history, the Han-Chinese nation was for the first time completely conquered by a non-Han nation. The melting pot of the QinHan tianxia was overturned with the Han, the majority of the population, enslaved for nearly an entire century in the Mongolian World. The systematic and massive execution and persecution of the Song people and culture were so great that some Han-Chinese intellectuals later asserted that the real, classic Chinese civilization was extinguished with the annihilation of the Song.32 The seventeenth-century Chinese thinker Huang Zongxi viewed the fall of Song and the ending of the pre-Qin era as the two major destructions of Chinese civilization (Huang 1666). The post-Song Chinese became simply “a different species,” asserted a Chinese historian in 2010, morally, culturally even physically decayed, corrupted, and weakened; still made of the same carbon atoms but like “diamond had become graphite” (H. Zhang 2010, 33–35). The HanChinese not only lost their state, they also lost their nationhood to a Mongol Empire, the Yuan that was territorially larger than any Chinese world empire before. The many non-Han nations and states in Eastern Eurasia fared even worse under the Mongolian China Order than under a Han China Order as they often were culturally and physically exterminated. The elites and much of the Xia, Liao, and Jin nations and their records and languages were all wiped out by the Mongol rulers (Saunders 2001). Unlike the previous nomadic nations that conquered and ruled parts of the Centralia and then quickly Sinicized, the Mongol rulers conquered the

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whole Chinese World and adopted the essence of the Qin-Han ConfucianLegalism world empire order while keeping many Mongol and Central Asian institutions, norms, and cultures. The Yuang rulers generally refused to speak the Chinese language and kept their own faith system (Shamanism later blended with Lama-Buddhism) and thus behaved like bona fide conquerors to the peoples in the Centralia. The Yuan chiefly relied on the resources of the Han people but carefully divided, reduced, and even excluded the Han majority from the government. Proven that the appeal and staying power of the China Order clearly transcend ethnical boundaries (Pines 2012, 37), the Yuan carried on many Sui-Tang-Song policies such as the Confucian-Legalist centralization of imperial power, professionalized bureaucratic structure at the central level, maintaining state monopoly of industries and education as well as history writing, and the imperial exam system that however was only held sporadically in the second half of the Yuan Era, perhaps as a sign of the Mongol rulers’ condescension of the Han people and Han culture. People were classified into four hereditary strata (Mongols, other non-Han people, northern Han people, and southern Han people) and about twenty castes (soldiers, peasants, handicraftsmen, Buddhist monks, Taoist clerks, Christian priests, Muslims, clerks, merchants, etc.) (Q. Xiao 1985). Under the Yuan China Order, the despotic Qin-Han imperial power was enhanced to treat the people and even much of the ruling elite as slaves (L. Zhou 1999, 267–73). Beyond the Centralia, the Yuan used a Tang-style feudal and confederation-like governance structure for the whole known world to incorporate the many nations and states in Eastern Eurasia including, for the first time, the hard-to-invade Tibetan Plateau, through military conquests, massive genocides, and religious conversion (Langlois 1981). The Yuan also attempted and failed repeatedly to invade Japan, the only external invasions against Japan in history until World War II. It also maintained, albeit only nominally, the superior position of Great Khan over the three other Mongol empires in the Mongolian World (the Chagatai, the Golden Horde, and the Ilkhanate) reaching out to Eastern Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East. The Mongolian World was much larger than the Chinese World before and after. However, functionally and meaningfully for the Yuan (and its successors of Ming and Qing), the whole known world remained essentially the same Chinese World, the Centralia or China Proper and its surrounding peripheries (Allsen 2004). The vast Mongolian world was never a lasting single unit, despite that it did facilitate land-based communication between the two sides of Eurasia, as illustrated by the remarkable even fantastic tales of China attributed to the Venetian merchant traveler Marco Polo in the late-thirteenth century (Polo fourteenth century).33 Riding the tide of massive rebellions, the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) restored the Han-nation regime in the Centralia in the late-fourteenth century, yet never managed to control the whole known Chinese World that was

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once more “united” by the Qin-Han, Sui-Tang, and Yuan empires. The Ming world empire was territorially roughly the same size as the Han Empire fifteen centuries ago, about 4 million square kilometers at its heyday, compared to the peak sizes of Yuan Empire (nearly 12 million square kilometers) and the Qing Empire (about 13 million square kilometers). It was relatively the smallest Chinese World as it ruled a much smaller portion of the then-known world as compared to the previous or subsequent Chinese world empires. It was almost constantly under the challenge, threat, and even invasion from especially the northern nomadic peoples including the fled Mongol forces that the Ming could not manage to eliminate and later the Manchu nation that rebelled and finally replaced the Ming. Although determined by the same logic of its Qin-Han polity, it failed to actually conquer and rule the whole known world. The Ming rulers had to resort to tighter and harsher control of their own people by using the old Han and Tang policies of entangling to have a nominal rule over the peripheral nations and states and the tributary system to “govern” those even farther away such as Korea, some Japanese Daimyos and merchants, and some Southeast Asian peoples.34 The tributary system in fact was more a deceitful pretention, even self-delusion, by Ming rulers to assume away the uncontrolled comparison and competition of the “outside” world rather than a type of international relations (Wang and Gao 2008; Z. Ge 2015; Perdue 2015). Internally, the Ming world empire was harsh and intolerant. The Ming emperors were among the most despotic, brutal, and inept Chinese rulers on record. A Han regime, the Ming inherited the Yuan values, norms, institutions, and policies. The Ming emperors often behaved more like the abusive Mongol conquerors than the Song sons-of-heaven toward their own people including their family members and top ministers (L. Zhou 1999, 271–75; Brooks 2010, 1–2, 22–23). The status and rights of the imperial officials diminished dramatically. Instead of rarely torturing and almost never executing senior officials in the Song, the Ming emperors (often just their surrogates, the eunuchs) exercised tyrannical power to frequently strip their top officials naked and beat them to death in public for some of the most trivial and meaningless disagreements or offenses. The founding emperor, for example, massively murdered over 35,000 elites and their families, including almost all of the top officials and generals who helped him to create his empire. The use of both Confucian control of the mind and body and Legalist axes of torture and execution was pushed to an extreme. The Ming rigidified and hollowed the imperial exam by requiring all questions from only the nine approved Confucian classics and all answers written in the form of the eight-legged essay. It also solidified male-supremacy and female foot-binding to be part of the Chinese culture, which lasted until the early-twentieth century to physically mutilate and disable women. Perhaps

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more influentially, the Ming rulers created and relied heavily on systematic and elaborated multiple networks of secret police, the Brocade-clad Guards, Eastern Depot, and Western Depot, that were only responsible to the emperor (and often in fact court eunuchs) to govern through fear and informants (T. Wang 1992, 20–21, 184; Ding 1949, 5–145; Tsai 1995). Together with the extensive censorship of publications (violators and their families were often executed), secret police became an innovative and tested tradition of the China Order that has continued to this day. Corruption, hypocrisy, brutality, and incompetence were the trademarks of the Ming officialdom, more commonplace and outrageous than in most Chinese dynasties (Brooks 2005; Wu 2001, 2003; Hong 2014). The China Order and its Qin-Han polity was itself further fossilized to reach an ultimate status of self-isolation. The Ming systematically implemented a tight ban of maritime communications (海禁) policy (Fang 1953, V3, 173–78; Z. Cao 2005), right after it abruptly stopped the fabled seven sailings into the South China Sea and Indian Ocean (reaching the farthest point of today’s Somalia) led by the Muslim-Chinese eunuch-general Zheng He in 1405–33, many decades before Christopher Columbus sailed to the Americas. The evidently grand but expensive voyages that started for still mysterious reasons, however, yielded almost nothing to affect, let alone change, the Chinese World (Leading Group 2005; Dreyer 2006). The Ming inexplicably destroyed the ocean-going fleet and burned all the records of the Zheng He expedition to keep the real world away. However, Sino-foreign trade, even the maritime type that was illegal, continued. Europeans and Southeast Asians came with Spanish-American silver, new crops seeds, and Western luxury goods and weapons like clocks and cannons for the Ming ruling elites. Similar to but harsher than the previous imperial regimes (except the Song), the Ming strictly forbade immigration and emigration. Returned emigrants were routinely executed when discovered. Specially approved foreigners could only visit, live, and trade in designated places and were then prohibited from leaving China again so that they became one-way travelers, including the famous Jesuit missionary-scholar Matteo Ricci (Cronin 1984). The Portuguese, however, started the first European colony in the Chinese World by leasing Macau from Ming officials in 1557 (it was turned into a full colony belonging to Portugal in mid-nineteenth century) and the Dutch occupied Taiwan (1624–62) (Wang and Gao 2008). The ban on maritime communications was in fact an invention of the Yuan Empire but was systematically and lastingly employed by the Ming and then by the subsequent Qing for centuries. The policy was largely motivated by the logical desire of the China Order rulers to keep away the ungoverned and the ungovernable who, unlike in the previous Qin-Han world empires, were becoming more known to the ruling elites. It was also to prevent the empowerment of domestic subjects like merchants and sailors that might

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grow in power and challenge the imperial power. Other concerns included eliminating maritime-based oppositions and rebels, preventing the outflow of silver currency, monopolizing foreign trade, and prohibiting immigration and emigration. When the Europeans started to go overseas for trade, emigration, and colonization, the Chinese were literally locked in by their rulers. The disastrous impact on the Chinese economy, technology, and demography was hard to exaggerate. Politically, the policy actually created more problems than it was supposedly meant to solve (An 2008). Harsh banning of foreign trade and population mobility led to the inevitable growth of smugglers, pirates, fugitives, and open banditry and rebellion that became serious national and regime security issues plaguing the Ming Empire for many generations. Under the grossly misleading label of “Jap pirates” (倭寇), who were mostly Chinese but were blamed on the ungoverned and ungovernable foreigners, the Japanese daimyos, samurais, and ronins on southern Japanese islands sometimes the Chinese fugitive merchants and pirates found hosts and protection (So 1975, 15–19; C. Xiao 2012). In the end, the tianxia-minded Ming expectedly refused to negotiate a peaceful coexistence with a new Manchu state in Manchuria and a rebel state in Northwest Centralia, and thus paid the ultimate price of its total destruction. Under the despotic imperial rule and the tight external isolation, the Chinese World stagnated with staggering poverty, social inequality, and utter disregard for human life and dignity (including that of the elite class), while the emperor, with unprecedentedly centralized power in his hand, often completely neglected governance and left everything to his eunuchs and secret police for personal, often bizarre, indulgences. It was estimated that out of the total of 267 years of the Ming, the emperors did not even meet the ministers for about 121 years, sometimes disappearing into the inner palace for as long as two decades straight (T. Yuan 2012, 148). When the European peoples—under a de facto and later de jure Westphalia world order—started to catch the fever of chinoiserie with an idealized false notion about the Chinese Celestial Empire as an alternative inspiration for reforms and progress and launched the Renaissance, great geographic exploration, and industrial revolution and political changes (Landes 2003), the peoples of the Chinese World were repressed under the increasingly poor governance of the China Order that became ever more delusional and exorbitant (R. Huang 1981). Considerable urbanization did take place toward the end of the Ming as the central government lost its control over the empire. But such socioeconomic development “triggered neither Weberian urban autonomy nor Habermasian civil society” while creating a lasting “unique form of urban–rural contradiction” in China that lasts to this day (Fei 2010). Extraordinarily bloody mass rebellions predictably broke out, followed by the equally destructive and murderous crackdowns. They worked

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together to lead the invasion by the Manchu nation to finally replace this last Han-Chinese Empire. The Chinese World and the Han nation entered the Qing Empire (1644–1911), an intensified and perfected totalitarian rule of the China Order, with a horrendous loss of 40 percent of the total population (over 80 million deaths) in just a couple of decades (S. Fan 2003; J. Ge 2006).

The Qing World Empire The tiny Manchu nation, with about one million people originally (11 million in 2012) (Statistical Bureau 2013), had some of the best warriors and most diligent rulers in the history of imperial China during its rise in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. With its superb alliance-making and war-waging against the Ming Dynasty, the well-organized Eight-Banner military state rose, conquered, and ruled the whole Chinese World, putting down rebellions and resistances with the Mongol-style exterminations and massacres (Elliott 2001; Sun and Li 2005). With the alliance with the Mongol nation and the crucial incorporation of Han elites, the Manchu managed to quickly occupy and pacify the Centralia or China Proper, a country a dozen times larger in territory and over one hundred times larger in population—the Han population at the end of the Ming Dynasty was about 200 million (Ge and Cao 2000; J. Ge 2009). As a minority autocracy, the Manchu managed to rule for more than two centuries over many nations in the largest ever Chinese World (with a territory greater than the Yuan world empire excluding Yuan’s nominal rule over the various Mongolian Khanates beyond Siberia and Central Asia). Through bloody military campaigns and a host of effective policies, the Manchu Qin-Han world empire expanded westward to conquer and incorporate the vast lands of Xinjiang, Tibet, and Central Asia (Perdue 2005; Rawski 1996). Only selectively Sinicized and having inherited the Qin-Han-Tang-Ming style of governance, the Qing pushed the China Order to reach its peak during the reigns of three generations of emperors—Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong (1662–1796)—creating the so-called Kang-Yong-Qian Periods of Prosperity. During that time, the China Order dominated the whole known world in east and central Eurasia. It was largely peaceful yet with never-ending internal rebellions, some of which were multi-year Han nationalist uprisings, and the expansionary imperial wars primarily in northwest China. The Qing government ran a significant fiscal surplus for many decades and the size of Chinese population reached a high mark of about 400 million by the earlynineteenth century. The Qing multination empire was the foundation of the territorial claims made later by both the ROC and the PRC. The profusely praised and exaggerated Kang-Yong-Qian Period in the official history books

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has remained a major source of pride and nostalgia, ironically, even weirdly, among many nationalistic Han-Chinese whose ancestors were in fact straightforwardly slaughtered or enslaved by the Qing rulers.35 It has been a sensitive political imperative for the PRC today to painstakingly reconstruct and blur the historical fact that the Han-Chinese were totally conquered and ruled as part of a much larger alien Manchu world empire, while vehemently pursuing and defending the contemporary nationalist objectives of claiming and ruling all of the vast land (more than half of today’s PRC territory) that the Qing ruled far beyond the Centralia (Liu et al. 2012).36 Like the Mongols, the Manchu resisted total Sinification and banned interracial marriages between the Han people and the Manchu-Mongol ruling elites (especially prohibiting the Han men from marrying Manchu-Mongol women while the emperors and Manchu elites took many Han concubines). It continued foot-binding but prohibited it for the women of the ruling Manchu-Mongol nations. Confucian-Legalism continued as the official ideology, as were the imperial bureaucracy and the imperial exam (with the same restrictive content and style started by the Ming). It used the brutal campaign nicknamed “hair or head” (changing hairstyle or being beheaded) to force the Han people to change hairstyle and dress code so to be assimilated into the Manchu culture (Meng 1936). Inheriting Yuan’s ethnic discrimination against the Han people, Manchu people enjoyed state allowances and guaranteed government and military jobs, becoming an “occupational caste” of the ruling class (Rhoads 2000, 289–91). The Qing’s China Order, however, differentiates the China Proper and the vast peripheries, both conquered by the Manchu nation (Elliott 2001, 2004). The Tang-Ming style of feudal-confederate regime governing the peripheral nations in the Chinese World continued with refined administration and religious components to be more effective.37 The Qing used manipulatively and effectively the factional conflicts of Lama Buddhism to govern Tibet and Mongolia, however nominally. Ming’s entangling policy in peripheral regions such as Yunnan were changed from local self-rule to appointed direct governance (改土归流) to further centralize imperial rule. The tributary policy for states like Korea and Vietnam continued, so did the tight ban of maritime communications. For the Centralia or China Proper, the Qing ruled with a refined but same QinHan imperial polity, the Yuan-Ming style (Peterson 2002; Jiang and Zhang 2010). The Manchu emperors ruled like composite, multi-role world rulers. They appropriated the Han-Chinese Son-of-Heaven crown for the majority of Chinese living mostly in the Centralia while playing the role of Kha Khan (Khan of khans) to the Mongol khanates and later the conquered central Asian Muslim tribes, and serving as the theocrat of Manjusri to Tibetans. The Qing Emperor thus became the ruler and arbiter of all the nations in the whole

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known world with sociopolitical and cultural “simultaneities.”38 This Manchu Qin-Han world empire effectively employed the key instruments of empiregovernance found in other continents (Burbank and Cooper 2010, 207–16). With its emperors carefully playing the Confucian-Legalist father-ruler role (F. Liu 2015), the Qing was an ultimate and epitomized form of the China Order. The Manchu rulers of the Qing world empire were much more diligent, attentive, and effective than the rulers of the Yuan or Ming world empires. They were fully aware of their minority status in the Chinese World and thus very vigilant about the Han majority. Starting with the third emperor Kangxi, Qing rulers all learned to use the Chinese language and become well-versed in Chinese literature. To govern with the same Qin-Han polity and in the same Chinese language, the Qing effectively utilized the massive resources and human talent the enslaved Han nation provided through taxation, conscription, and the imperial exam system. At the very beginning, the Qing rulers smartly claimed to be the legitimate inheritors and protectors of the Ming regime (which was first toppled in Beijing by the Han rebels months earlier), although, in fact, it physically exterminated almost all of the tens of thousands of the Ming royal family of the House of Zhu. When starting the forceful campaign of imposing Manchu culture onto the Han, Qing allowed Ten Exceptions to give the Han time and room to adjust and preserve some dignity and tradition. Some of the Qing emperors such as Kangxi and Qianlong were themselves collectors and fans of traditional Chinese culture and fine arts. The notorious role of the eunuchs in the Tang and Ming politics subsided in the Qing. The Qing also adopted a few reforms that lessened and streamlined taxation and conscription, chiefly among which was the consequential policy of replacing the pole tax with an acreage tax (摊丁入亩) (Rowe 2009, 22, 43–44, 96). The Qing successfully incorporated the Han elites and the elites of the other conquered nations as the imperial servants and executioners. To many ambitious and talented Han elites who helped to found and rescue the Qing Empire (from Hong Chengchou, Wu Sangui, Nian Gengyao, Zeng Guofan, and Zuo Zongtang to Li Hongzhang), the Qing was a bona fide Chinese world empire as it was so thoroughly Qin-Han. It had a diligent and careful Legalist ruler who worked hard to maintain a minority but effective rule assisted by a well-designed bureaucracy and a well-tailored Confucian ideological façade that placates and uses people well. Five languages—Manchurian, Tibetan, Mongolian, Eastern Turki (Uyghur), and Han-Chinese (in that order)—were officially sanctioned as the “five styles of the (united) Qing-language” (清文) to be used in the vast world empire (Palace Museum 1794). The overwhelming majority of the Han people and the imperial examination kept the Han language as the lingua franca for the whole Qing world empire. Despite the always present and deeply harbored ethnic division and resentment, the Han

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people were largely pacified as the racial and national boundaries seemed to have masqueraded away under the general label of “child-people of the great Qing” (大清子民) (Rawski 1998, 60, 117–18; L. Fu 1978). A key feature of the strengthened Qin-Han polity under the Qing China Order was the systematic and meticulous literary inquisition and persecution (文 字狱) as the enhanced version of the Ming tradition. Qing jailed and executed many people whose works were deemed critical, dissenting, unapproved, or satiric. Even private notes and chats or just any words deemed inappropriate by the imperial court could get people severely punished, including death by a thousand cuts (凌迟) and execution of all males in the extended family. Private writing, printing and distribution of history books especially often led to the punishment of the extended family and associates of the accused (X. Jin 2010; Z. Zhou 2010; Palace Museum 1934). Both contemporary words and ancient texts were carefully checked, deleted, rewritten, or simply burned. As discussed in chapter 1, the cultural holocaust in the name of making the Four Completed Collections of Books in the eighteenth century was unprecedented and unparalleled in human history (Guy 1987; F. Zhang 2001, 411–13, 416–17). Qing’s trademark tight control of people and their minds, with the forced changes of culture and identity and the severe censorship, succeeded after generations. Later, those indoctrinated ideas and norms, including the previously alien hairstyle and dress code, were deeply internalized to become part of the Chinese culture by many Han Chinese. Han elites were largely domesticated to be part of the ruling elites with vested interests in the system, albeit they rarely rose above the second-class servants level. Indeed, to many Chinese intellectuals since, the power and the appeal of the Qin-Han polity and the China Order were best exhibited by the Qing world empire. The Qing-style good management of the China Order was a near-perfect world order to the imperial elites, indeed an ideal form of governance for any aristocratic and autocratic rulers (Crossley 1999, 359–60; Perdue 2005, 42, 127). Internal dissention, protests, and rebellions predictably continued throughout the Qing but could not alter the world empire meaningfully (Hung 2011). This ultimate form of the China Order could perhaps have lasted for perpetuity if left alone, until a mighty external force shattered it after the mid-nineteenth century. The Qing, together with the China Order, started an excruciating collapse, ushering in a completely different era for the Chinese World.

3

The Forsaken Turn The Song Era

F

unctioning in the Chinese World as the proxy of national religion, the writing and teaching of history have traditionally been controlled by the autocratic rulers who tend to be above all other restrictions and inner constrains. To censor, distort, and falsify historical records and presentations monolithically has been a common and effective statecraft in China since ancient times. The two-millennia history from Qin to Qing was never really a linear series of dynasty cycles repeating the same Qin-Han polity and the same China Order for the whole known world in Eastern Eurasia, as the neatly edited Chinese official (and many unofficial) history books have asserted. In fact, the political history of the Chinese World has been diverse and dynamic, featuring periods of de facto international systems absent of a centralized world empire. More important, there was a de jure world order of international relations for about three centuries: the Song World (960–1279) under the Chinese equivalent of the Westphalia Treaty, the Chanyuan Treaty (澶渊之盟), that not only created the highest peak of ancient Chinese civilization but also represented an epic opportunity unfortunately forsaken and profound lessons largely forgotten until this day. This chapter examines this highly meaningful but long overlooked pause of the China Order during the Song Era when the Chinese World was under a Westphalia-like world order. Our rereading of the history of the pre-Qin Era and the Song Era shows the strength, attraction, weakness, and dreadfulness of the China Order of the tianxia (all under heaven) system. Just like all human-made institutions, the China Order and its antagonist the non-tianxia or Westphalia-like system can both be done and undone with human efforts, eco-demographic and techno-economic dynamics, and sheer luck or misfortunes.

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The Song: An Uncommon Qin-Han Empire When the Tang world empire disintegrated and collapsed in the late-ninth century, the Chinese World entered the second post-Han great disunion. It was truly excruciating as more than half of the world’s largest population vanished during Tang’s fall. Ten short-lived states scrambled for half a century for the Mandate of Heaven to rule the Centralia again, leading to some of the most murderous and senseless wars and destruction in history. One of them, the North Zhou Empire (951–59) was arrogated by its commanding general, Zhao Kuangying, through a bloodless coup d’état. Zhao then established the Song Empire, named after Song Prefecture where he was a governor before the coup, in the way similar to that of the creation of the Sui Empire centuries earlier. The Song soon (in less than two decades) eliminated several other regimes with force in the Centralia and recreated another Han-Chinese-ruled Qin-Han empire to unite the whole China Proper, minus the Yanyun or Youyan Sixteen Prefectures that were earlier ceded to the rising Khitan-ruled Liao (辽) Empire by one of the post-Tang states, the short-lived Turkic-ruled Later Jin Empire in 937 (Tuo fourteenth century 1986, V1–5; Mote 1998). The Han people traditionally populated the sixteen prefectures that were 46,000 square miles in size. The region had been the strategically important northern edge of the Centralia since the pre-Qin era, in today’s northern Hebei and Shanxi provinces including Beijing and Tianjin. The area became a key point of contention between the Song and its northern neighbor from day one and a long-lasting symbol of the dreaded incompletion of the China Order to Han-Chinese rulers and elites. This piece of land was about ten times larger than the Imperial Territory of Alsace-Lorraine and similarly soaked in deep emotions and blood. It was more profound in shaping the international relations in the Song Chinese World than the Alsace-Lorraine-feuded Franco-German rivalry to the international relations in Western Europe. It was the main reason for the Song to fight the powerful Liao Empire and later the Jin Empire (Höpel 2012). Indeed, Song’s traditional dream and inescapable Mandate of Heaven to unify the whole Centralia if not the whole known Chinese World through “recovering” the sixteen prefectures in total led directly to its fatal blunder that doomed the Song Dynasty (Y. Wang 2011, 39–40, 69–70). The Song Empire, therefore, was smaller in territory when compared to the Han nation-ruled empires of the Qin-Han, Sui-Tang, or the Ming, not to mention the much larger non-Han-ruled world empires of the Yuan and Qing. It was never a real singular ruler of the whole Chinese World and thus could not and indeed did not behave as a world empire. Unlike so many other similarly incomplete world empires before or after, the Song Empire soon accepted reality and, however grudgingly and unwillingly, made compromises

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and gave up fighting for a worldwide unification. It formally legitimized and largely observed the divided political order in the Chinese World, under which the Song was just one of the several coexisting states, albeit the leading one at least in self-perception. A pre-Qin world order recurred and was legally maintained and even codified. This profound turn of history of Eastern Eurasia had many reasons, mostly internal in the Song, the richest and most populated country in the Chinese World. In return, the Westphalia-like world order greatly permitted, shaped, and sustained the peculiar internal political economy, society, and ideology of the Song, producing “the highest peak” of ancient Chinese civilization with material accomplishments and cultural-spiritual advancements, “both unprecedented and unmatched throughout” the whole imperial Chinese history (G. Deng 2008, 2). Over time, however, the new, peculiar internal factors and external conditions were both diminished and derailed by the deeply embedded logic of the Qin-Han polity and its tianxia Mandate of Heaven for the China Order. The significantly more lenient and compromised, yet still staunchly preached and practiced, Confucian-Legalism brewed and grew over time, leading to the crucial yet avoidable human errors by the Song rulers. The ambitious and active Emperor Shenzong (reign 1067–85) especially wanted a “rich state and strong army” to expand the empire with force so to emulate the Han and Tang emperors as a truer, mightier Qin-Han ruler of the China Order for the whole world. Yet his extensive and expensive reforms set in motion dynamics that in fact rocked, racked, and eventually undermined the Song Empire under the Chanyuan system (Ye 1996). By the reign of Emperor Huizong (1100–26), imperial ambitions and vanities mixed with the conflicting dynamics of politics unleashed led to an “alienation” of Song’s corporatist polity of the gentry class (士大夫政治), weakening even incapacitating the decision making (C. Fang 2016). Reinforcing with the ferocious external powers of the nomadic empires of the Juchen and the Mongol driven powerfully by the changes of climate and demography, Song’s blunders ended the classic Chinese history and ushered in the ultimate revival of the China Order in the subsequent Yuan, Ming, and Qing world empires (F. Zhang 2001, 257–62). Very rarely and remarkably, the Song emperors, essentially the same QinHan autocratic rulers of Confucian-Legalism, had a much less despotic way of governance from the very beginning, probably shaped by the existing, de facto, Westphalia-like world order at the time. Some of them ruled like enlightened authoritarian leaders bordering on a corporatist aristocracy. The Song emperors were more inward-oriented, more Confucian with a heavy Mencius flavor of humanism, focusing on internal tranquility and well-being of the empire more than conquering the whole world with force. The Song rulers largely gave up their tianxia ambition practically, more inclined to make compromises in

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internal and external policies, although still pretending to be the son of heaven ideologically. They tolerated considerable loyal diversity and partisan dissension in discourses over policy and reforms, observed the regulations to largely rule by law, and pursued wealth and power through trade and growth rather than excessive taxation over imperial ambition and glory through military conquests and expansion. Like the other Qin-Han rulers, the Song continued to use the traditional imperial statecrafts like the imperial exam system with refinement to make it fairer and more open to the commoners. Imperial bureaucracy was further professionalized, greatly expanded, and empowered so to incorporate the elites. The Song continued the tradition of the state writing of history yet with a considerably relaxed attitude toward private scholarship and publication of history, literature, arts, and polemics (Editors twelfth century). New features and practices of state-society relationship developed, with the ruling elites and local gentries to actively participate and influence the state (Hymes and Schirokauer 1993; Bossler 1998). The Song Empire had a philosophy of governance valuing ethical politics (仁政)1 that called for “the emperor and the elites to rule the world together.”2 The emperor retained the power of making rules and laws and served as the ultimate decision-maker, while royal decrees required co-signatures of the top imperial minister(s). The all-civilian cabinet ministers managed the country including military affairs, while the professional military officers were rotated regularly and only authorized to command specific troops during the war under civilian overseeing (Li twelfth century, V18; Tuo fourteenth century, V1–5). The founding emperor set the rule not to apply the death penalty to cabinet ministers, advisors, authors (including private history writers and teachers) and those who wrote to the emperor with proposals and critiques—to exempt the officials and learned people and gentries, even the critics among them, from the lethal jaw of Legalism. Dismissal, internal exile, and a jail sentence are the most severe punishment an elite in the Song Empire could normally face. Essentially, all Song emperors followed this uncommon style of Qin-Han polity, making the Song politics qualitatively more lenient and humane than any other Chinese imperial regime, especially in sharpest contrast to the rulers in the Yuan, Ming, and Qing.3 In the Song Empire, the educated, land and property owning elites, especially the steadily increasing civilian officials who were regularly appointed through the enlarged and expanded imperial exams, enjoyed unmatched pride, prestige, power, and protection in Chinese history (Y. Yu 2004). The Song ensured an elaborated civilian control of the military. This was to prevent anyone from imitating the Song’s founding emperor to launch a military putsch, something very common since the Han Empire one millen-

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nium ago. It was probably also meant to avoid a recurrence of local warlords that plagued the Chinese World for many centuries, especially in the late- and post-Tang eras. Song’s civilian control was so tight and effective that its warfighting ability was likely compromised. Song replaced conscription with recruitment and often enlisted foot soldiers to just feed and pacify the always present landless peasants and hence owned a bulging military that was maintained and expanded not necessarily for the war-fighting purposes (Z. Wang 1983, chap. 6). To discourage militarism and warring spirit, to control and constrain the generals, and to separate or even alienate the officers from the soldiers clearly worked to maintain Song’s internal peace and stability. But the Song Empire consequently lacked generals and officers commanding well-bonded and welltrained field armies, especially sufficient cavalry to fight long, large-scale battles on the flat terrain of northern China.4 It might have been adequate enough when the Song, with its strong preference and skillful use of diplomacy and bribery, could settle international disputes with like-minded countries or relatively weak competitors. Song’s huge, costly but poorly commanded military, even with the best infantry equipment of the time, was seriously ineffective when faced with the mighty Juchen (Jin) and Mongol (Yuan) cavalries who were determined not just to settle disputes but to conquer and occupy (Li twelfth century, V3; Editors 1992, V6). With controlled military and relatively enlightened governance in general, the Song Empire for three centuries never had any serious internal challenges undermining its regime. There were no despotic emperors, nefarious eunuch tyrannies, dreaded local warlords or putsches, or large-scale internal rebellions—all very rare accomplishments for an aristocratic autocracy in the history of the whole Chinese World. Yet, this enlightened Qin-Han polity, “a brave experiment” (R. Huang 1997, 154), still was powerfully pressured and driven by its inner logic to order and rule tianxia, the whole known world. The Song, therefore, had to address its inadequacy and inability to unify the Centralia since most of the Yanyun Sixteen Prefectures were part of the foreign county of the Liao Empire. With a self-restrained, thus weak, military, diplomacy seemed to be the only solution. So when tempting opportunity presented itself in the form of the rise of a mighty new force, the Jin ruled by the Juchen nation, fighting the Liao Empire as rebels inside the Liao in the early-twelfth century, the otherwise able Song rulers at the time “had to” make a tempting but risky deal with the unknown devil of the Jin in the hope of regaining the “long lost” Yanyun prefectures so to accomplish its tianxia mandate at least over the whole Centralia. History quickly proved that move to be a fatal blunder, which was entirely conceivable as it was deeply rooted in the very nature of the Qin-Han polity and illustrated well the powerful logic of the China Order.

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Song’s Chinese World In the post-Tang world political disunion, several states existed in the tenth century under a de facto Westphalia-like world order for the Chinese World, which was legitimized to be a de jure Westphalia-like world order when the Song Empire and the Liao Empire recognized each other as coexisting equals through the Chanyuan Treaty of 1005. Unlike so many treaties and alliances made before and after in Chinese history, the Chanyuan Treaty was between two equals and aimed at a perpetual peaceful coexistence. It was also upheld for the unheard of period of over one century. The peoples of the Chinese World, for the first and perhaps also the last time, willfully and actually departed from tradition and left the China Order for a total of nearly three centuries. The Song Empire has two phases: the Northern Song (960–1127) and the Southern Song (1127–1379) as it fled and moved its capital from Kaifeng (in today’s Henan Province on the Yellow River) to Lin’an (today’s Hangzhou in Zhejiang Province south of the Yangtze River) after its great defeat at the hands of the Jin Empire in 1127. The Song Empire was a Han-nation state, having inherited the Qin-Han-Tang imperial tradition and unified the most of the Centralia. It was the richest and by far the most populous country in the Chinese World and also on the whole planet Earth at the time. The Song rulers, despite their deep unwillingness and perhaps inability to militarily conquer the whole known world, nevertheless made repeated efforts to take the Yanyun Sixteen Prefectures from the Liao Empire with force or purchase so to carry on the preordained mission under the China Order: at least to unify the whole Centralia. It also used force in other areas against “barbaric” nations such as the Xia for land and glory. The Liao Empire (916–1218) was created earlier and ruled by the partially Sinicized northern nomadic nation of Qidan or Kihtan. Similar to the Song, the Liao also had two phases: Liao (916–1125) and Western Liao (1132–1218) as it fled westward to resettle in today’s Central Asia after its defeat and destruction in the hands of the Jin Empire. Liao expanded over decades to acquire the largest territory in the Chinese World and had a large population of Han people and many other nations and ethnicities in today’s northeastern and northern China including Beijing. With its own culture and language using Han Chinese characters, Liao was a formidable military power with large cavalry forces. As any good empire, especially the one under the adapted culture of Confucian-Legalism, the Liao sought continuous expansion and invaded the richer Song but reached the limit of its power by the eleventh century (Tuo 1974). Coexisting and competing with the Song and Liao, there was Xia or Xi (Western) Xia Empire (1038–1227) that was created and ruled by the Tangut

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nation, the Mongolian Tuoba Xianbei from the Tuyuhun Kingdom during the Tang Era. It was located in today’s northwest China and was partially Sinicized but kept its own culture and language using also the Han-Chinese characters, with large number of Han people among its population. Successfully having fought off the Song and the Liao repeatedly, the Xia later entered into treaty arrangements with both and maintained tripolar international relations with them in the Chinese World. It later survived the rise of the Jin Empire, continuing the tripolar international relations with the Southern Song and Jin (in Liao’s place) that lasted until the rise of the Mongol Empire (T. Wu 2009). Liao, Song, and Xia were three distinctive nation-states (or multination states) ruled as empires. They built and maintained externally a legalized and codified Westphalia-like international relations. They engaged one another in constant wars, diplomacy, trade, and alliances but with the accepted fundamental agreement of coexistence, as they became formal treaty equals and even allies. Their alliance and their tripolar quasi-Westphalia system were unprecedented and unmatched in the whole Chinese history in its nature, scope, and longevity. However, the three powers were organized internally with the similar Qin-Han polity, which eventually failed to sustain the new world order as the three autocratic regimes were all under the rule of man (rather than rule of law) and lacked the institutionalized rationality and sustainability for their prudent foreign policies. The deeply held tradition and ideation of the China Order doomed the Liao-Song-Xia world system. Instead of consciously maintaining peace and the existence of the international political order they enjoyed, they (especially the Song) actually acted to undermine the new world order for perceived, momentary gains. The system first broke down after a “worldwide” power redistribution and shift of geopolitics—the rise of a new power of the Jin Empire in the early-twelfth century. Then it managed to revive to be a reconfigured Jin-Song-Xia system, still similarly a de jure Westphalia-like world order. One century later, this system broke down again for the similar reasons, but this time it was never revived—it was extinguished by the conquest of the Mongol Empire in the thirteenth century. The Jin Empire (1115–1234) was created by the Juchen, a nomadic nation in today’s Manchuria under the rule of the Liao Empire. The Juchen rebelled in the north of the Liao. It entered an expedient alliance with the Song by secretive diplomatic negotiations via maritime communications as the Song and the Jin were separated by the Liao on land. The Jin-Song “Alliance on the Sea” (海上之盟) was finalized in 1120 with the aim to dismantle the Liao-Song Alliance and later the Liao-Xia Alliance. The Jin then quickly overthrew Liao and drove its remnants westward to continue as Western Liao in the far west corner of the Chinese World. The Jin destroyed the Northern Song shortly after that, delivered a traumatically humiliating defeat to the Han-Chinese nation,

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and forced the Song to abandon almost half of its territory to the Jin and flee southward to continue as the Southern Song. The Xia, however, managed to survive the rise and expansion of the Jin by forming an alliance with the Jin. The Jin, soon Sinicized, emerged as the hegemon in the new multipolar international relations in Eastern Eurasia. The Jin formed a treaty alliance with the Southern Song, which was still the richest nation in the whole Chinese World, and the Xia to coexist for another century, thus continuing the usual state acts of war, trade, diplomacy, alliance, and conspiracy. The four major powers, Jin, Southern Song, Xia, and Western Liao of the Chinese World were eventually all annihilated by the Mongol Empire in the thirteenth century, after the Mongols successfully enticed with empty promises the Southern Song to end its alliance with the Jin and the Jin to end its alliance with Xia, both with disastrous consequences (Tuo 1345 ). The Mongols then conquered the whole Chinese World to usher in the ultimate form of the China Order. In the Chinese World, in the peripheries outside the Centralia, there were also other smaller independent countries (nation or multination states) in the tenth through thirteenth centuries: Dali (937–1254) ruled by the Bai nation, Jiaozhi dynasties (Vietnam 968–1407), Goryeo or Koryo Kingdom (Korea 918–1392), Kara-Khoja Kingdom (Uyghur 856–1335), and the thendecentralized Tibetan tribes on the Tibetan plateau and even more decentralized ethnic tribes called by imperial historians “barbarian autonomous societies” in the mountainous southwest of today’s China. These self-autonomous states externally entered alliances or tributary relationship with the major powers of Liao, Song, and Jin at various times. Together with the major members of the Song Chinese World, they mostly lost their independence to the Mongol Empire. Further out, many states in Japan, Southern Indochina, the Malay Peninsula, and the Middle East had communication and trade with the Chinese World, especially the Song Empire (Tuo fourteenth century, V246–55). China became a part of the global monetary (silver) circulation starting in the eleventh century (Von Glahn 1996). It has been the traditional way of history writing to refer the three-century-long era of the tenth through thirteenth centuries as the Song Era, as this book also uses it for the sake of convention. In reality, the Eastern Eurasia of that period should be rightfully called the Chinese World of the Liao, Song, Xia, Jin, and many others.

Chanyuan System: A New World Order for Eastern Eurasia In the rich and colorful history of the Chinese World, just like that of the Mediterranean–European World, there is no shortage of armistices, agreements, peace treaties, and alliances among the sovereign regimes and states or

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just warring parties from the pre-Qin era to today’s PRC. The overwhelming majority of international and interstate (and inter-regime) agreements and treaties in the Chinese World are expedient and tactical in nature. They tend to be short-lived and highly fragile, often conspiracy-like plots, especially since the third century BCE when the extremely skillful Qin conquerors infamously employed and betrayed countless empty promises and tempting trickeries to successfully construct the Qin world empire. Fewer still recognize the signing parties as long-term equals or stipulating peace, trade, respect, and friendship between them. The most lasting and consequential exception has been the Chanyuan Treaty of 1005 between the Liao and the Song empires that created a nearly three-century-long Westphalia-like world order for Eastern Eurasia. On a smaller scale, before the Chanyuan Treaty, there was the exceptional international relationship between the Tang Empire and the Tibetan Empire. After almost two centuries of wars and seven peace agreements, the weakened Tang and the also declining Tibet formally agreed in a treaty to call Tibetan king the nephew of the Tang emperor, clarify boundaries and open communication and trade, and respect each other’s sovereignty and territory in eternity. This Tang-Tibet Alliance of Changqing was finalized in 821/822 in their capital cities of Changan and Lhasa and lasted to maintain a peaceful coexistence between the two for decades until their demises (Beckwith 1987, 165–67; Y. Wang 1980, 94–104). After rounds of wars and conflicts for land, money, security, prestige, and ambition between them, the rivaling Liao and Song Empires (the two largest countries in the Chinese World) were unsatisfied yet exhausted by the early-eleventh century. The two empires were similarly driven intentionally or instinctively by the same tianxia logic of their alike Qin-Han imperial polities attempting at a reconstruction of a centralized China Order for the whole world. They also had their own more immediate and peculiar needs for conquest and expansion: the Liao was in constant need of commodities, especially silk, tea, and iron tools from the southern part of the Chinese World controlled by the Song Empire. The Song wanted to “recover” the Yanyun Sixteen Prefectures and also needed goods from the northern part of the Chinese World, especially horses for its military and civilian uses. Finally, in January 1005, yet another exhaustive and inconclusive war, directly commanded by the Song Emperor Zhenzong and the Liao Empress Dowager (and her young son the Liao Emperor Shengzong), respectively, was turned into a stalemate in the deep winter. The Song Empire made a peace treaty with the Liao Empire through the exchange of two, basically the same, Imperial Affidavits—the Chanyuan Treaty (澶渊 誓书 or 澶渊之盟), named after the river by the City of Chanzhou (today’s Puyang City of Henan Province) that was the location of the particular war (X. Zhang 2007).

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Overcoming considerable opposition and criticisms from both sides, the two empires used their imperial affidavits to agree to: (1) accepting their national borders and dropping all territorial and other demands against each other with Song keeping the three of the Yanyun Sixteen Prefectures it had already occupied in previous wars, (2) promising eternal peace and brotherly love and loyalty, (3) recognizing each other as equal peers in familiar or fraternity terms: the older of the two emperors, the Song Emperor Zhenzong, became the elder brother to the Liao Emperor and the Liao Empress Dowager Xiao became the aunt to the Song Emperor. Additionally, (4) both sides would not lure refugees nor harbor fugitives from the other side, (5) the Song would provide the Liao an annual indemnity of 200 thousand bolts of silk and 100 thousand liang of silver as cash—together about 300 thousand sterling ounces of silver,5 (6) the long border region between the two countries would be demilitarized and border crossings opened to create markets for bilateral trade, and (7) the two emperors would “take sacred vows in front of the heaven, gods and holy spirits and pray to the royal ancestors: to abide [by] this treaty by the future generations forever. Being monitored by the heaven, anyone [who] betrayed this treaty would never get to keep his state and would be condemned and destroyed by all” (Li twelfth century, V58). The two empires then withdrew and demilitarized the border regions. They started to implement the treaty later that year by paying indemnities and exchanging diplomatic delegations, gifts, and letters of credence that often called the two sides “Northern Dynasty” (Liao) and “Southern Dynasty” (Song), respectively. The two emperors sent envoys for birthdays and deaths of their imperial counterparts. They exchanged over 380 diplomatic missions in 120 years, informing each other about major moves such as Liao’s launching of war in Korea or Song’s imperial visit to the Tai Mountain for self-divinization. Bilateral trade flourished between the two countries creating new tax revenues for the two states. Citizenship-based loyalty replaced ethnic or cultural loyalty at least in the border region (Standen 2007) and cross-border migration even “dual-citizenship” took place (G. Wu 8-7-2015). The Song was also recorded as providing aid for famines caused by natural disasters in the Liao. Periodical disputes and even conflicts arose but were effectively handled by diplomatic means, wars of words, and policy adjustments. When the Song was engaged in costly wars with Xia, the Liao succeeded in 1044 to force the Song to raise the annual indemnity to a total of 500,000 ounces of silver for a while. All in all, for the first (and also the last) time in Chinese history, two sons of heaven mutually recognized each other to rule their parts of the same Chinese World. More remarkably, this quasi-Westphalia, un-Chinese world order was upheld with its tenets loyally honored and subsequent adjustments made. The highly unusual peace between the two mightiest countries in the Chinese World lasted

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for over 120 years until 1125 when the Song rulers betrayed the treaty and, just as they vowed in the treaty, brought the subsequently horrific demise of both the Liao and Northern Song (Tao 1988). The bilateral agreement of the Chanyuan system was mimicked to govern the relationships between Song and Xia and between Liao and Xia, becoming a worldwide Westphalia-like system for the Chinese World. In 1044, after many years of exhaustive wars in the border regions, the Song and the Xia reached a similar peace treaty, the Qingli Peace stipulating the smaller and weaker Xia to be Song’s tributary state but to retain its independence, the Song to pay Xia annual indemnities for a total of about 200,000 ounces of silver. The SongXia relationship was less equal than the Liao-Song relationship but maintained Song-Xia peace for many decades. After more invasions and counter-invasions on both sides and under the direct international mediation by the Liao Empire in 1099, the Song and the Xia moved to resume their peace treaty in 1119 with the Xia reclaiming itself nominally a tributary state to the Song until the Northern Song was destroyed by the Jin seven years later. The subsequent Southern Song was not territorially linked to the Xia anymore (Tuo fourteenth century, V486; Bielenstein 2005, 623). The Xia kept a similar (often closer) relationship with the Liao throughout, while the Northern Song tried effective triangular diplomacy to distance Liao and Xia at times. Xia later also entered an alliance with Liao’s successor, the Jin Empire. The reduced Song Empire of the Southern Song later established similar peaceful coexistence with the Jin Empire through a series of treaties: the Alliance on the Sea (1125), the Shaoxing Peace (1141), Longxing Peace (1164), and the Jiading Peace (1208), with lesser equal status nominally—the Song ended up calling the Jin uncle—and increased amount of annual indemnities (from 400- to 500- to 600-thousand ounces of silver) but with essentially the same stipulations of the Chanyuan Treaty (Fu 1978). The Chanyuan Treaty and its replicas were largely faithfully observed by the Liao, Song, and Xia Empires. The Northern Song rulers, in a grossly mistaken calculation and tempted by the possibility of “recovering” all of Yanyun Sixteen Prefectures form the Liao, made the Alliance on the Sea with the rising Jin in 1120 (it took effect in 1125) with essentially the same stipulations and indemnity. This fateful move betrayed the Chuanyan Treaty and doomed both Liao and Northern Song in just two years. Later, the Southern Song stopped paying the Jin annual indemnity in 1214 and thus scrapped its peace treaty with the Jin that was struggling for survival against the rising Mongol Empire to its north. In 1232, the Song Empire made the same fatal blunder by accepting the tempting proposal from the Mongol envoy to form an antiJin alliance, in the fanciful hope of revenging the Jin and regaining the land of the Northern Song as the authentic son of heaven with the assistance of

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just another barbaric nomadic force, despite Jin’s plea for collective defense against the mighty Mongol cavalry that was greatly helped by the conquered Han and Juchen people. Some of Song’s own advisors also opposed, citing the historical lesson of 110 years ago. The Jin collapsed two years after that, and the Song lost its buffer zone and ally yet gained very little. A brutal and doomed war for survival endured for the next forty-five years, still the longest resistance war against the Mongols anywhere (1235–79). In the end, the Song became the last major country to succumb to Mongol rule in Eurasia, ushering in the complete enslavement of the Han nation and the disappearance of the Chanyaun world order for the peoples in Eastern Eurasia (Bielenstein 2005).

Chanyuan Treaty: The Chinese Peace of Westphalia In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia treaties concluded the Thirty-Year War and the Eighty-Year War and set up “the first great Europe or world charter” that has survived and gradually evolved to constitute the foundation of the world order and international law for the globe today (Gross 1948, 20–41). Seemingly temporary and insignificant at the time of its making as yet another indemnified peace treaty, the Chanyuan Treaty turned out to be China’s Westphalia Treaty, only 643 years earlier. The Chanyaun Treaty mutually recognized the equal status of the coexisting sovereign states of the Liao and the Song, legalized diplomacy including annual and occasional exchanges of visits and letters as well as gifts or indemnification from the much richer Song and trade as the foundation for enduring peace of international relations, and demilitarized the border regions (Mote 1999, 70–1, 115–24; X. Zhang 2007). The basic principles of the Chanyuan Treaty were later duplicated into more bilateral treaties, functioning similarly like the multilateral Peace of Westphalia treaties in Europe, to govern the international relations in the Chinese World. It structurally reformed the China Order to legitimize two (or even more) sons of heaven to rule separately, but roughly equally, their parts of the same known world (Tao 1988; Twichett and Franke 1994, 108–10). The Chanyuan Treaty itself was not as comprehensive and well-written as the Peace of Westphalia treaties, nor was it a multilateral, well-published, and well-received “world treaty.” It was made in haste and filled with familiar terms, definitely much less legalistic. Unlike the Peace of Westphalia treaties, Chanyuan Treaty said nothing about social or religious diversity and freedom, nor made guarantees for the survival of city-states like Bremen and international commerce and navigation on the Rhine. It lacked the support of prior long practice and had never been widely publicized so had little chance of being socially and culturally accepted and internalized afterwards. The Westphalia treaties codi-

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fied a millennium-long reality in the European–Mediterranean World and it still took the system another 300 years and many balance-of-power struggles, including two world wars and one Cold War in the twentieth century alone, various hegemons to provide the leadership and policing, and major legalization efforts such as the Congress of Vienna and the United Nations to gain a now seemingly unshakeable legitimacy. The Chanyuan Treaty attempted to create a new practice against the prevalent tradition with little infrastructure the Westphalia Treaty had for further enhancement, evolution, and expansion of a new world order (Croxton 2013). The Chanyuan Treaty was not that new in itself as there were countless peace treaties, with indemnity or not, before and after in Chinese history. But the seemingly insignificant Chanyuan Treaty created a new and lasting legal international system that was based on the innovative principle of international relations among states: the equality of coexisting sovereign nations or the principle of an international political anarchy instead of a centralized world government. Even though both did not explicitly mention the exact word of sovereignty in writing, the Westphalia treaties and the Chanyuan Treaty epically replaced world empire with international relations, legally and ideologically (Jiang 1964, 54). Never before, including in the pre-Qin era that had a de facto Westphalia-like system and in those great disunions of the Chinese World, nor after until the late-nineteenth century, would a de jure Westphalia system order the Chinese World. Practically, the Chanyuan Treaty earned a long peace and prosperity for the Song and Liao Empires even in the traditionally wartorn border regions, while creating massive fiscal savings for the Song alone (Tuo fourteenth century, V313–72). The annual indemnity of 300- to 500-thousand ounces of silver, though might sound humiliating to the tianxia-minded world empire worshippers, was only 0.5 to 1 percent of Song’s massive annual military budget (due to its policy of enlisting and feeding the landless and the jobless) and about 0.2 to 0.7 percent of Song’s total annual imperial budget, or about 1 to 1.3 percent of the cost of fighting a middle-sized war (Muo 2012). Furthermore, the Song’s payment was mostly used by the Liao to buy Song exports, financing Song’s economy and tariff incomes. It could be considered a case of compensation for the perennial trade imbalance between the two. The Song Emperor Zhenzong was, in fact, willing to accept an indemnity ten times larger as “cost-effective” (Tuo fourteenth century, V7). It appeared to be a small payment for long-lasting peace and reduced military spending. It is interestingly telling that the wording of the Chanyuan Treaty and its subsequent implementation in the Liao records and the Song records was not exactly the same (using slightly different adjectives), showing the needs for the two sides (especially the more Confucian Song) to maintain the veneer of its

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imperial son-of-heaven world emperor dignity at home. This is especially the case in other similar treaties the Song and later the Southern Song entered into with the Xia and the Jin. The indemnity for Xia, for example, was written in the Song records as bestowing or granting (赐) while in the much less proud settings of the indemnities for Liao and Jin, it was called transporting or giving (输). The whole semantic exercise of portraying the international relations as kind of intra-family relationship was revealing. The Song’s records chose to ignore that the Jin Empire, after destroying the Northern Song, Sinicized and behaved like the real son of heaven for the Chinese world or the hegemon of the Chanyuan system, treating the richer and more populous Southern Song as a less-equal tributary. Deep down, it appeared that even the rather enlightened Song emperors and ruling elites still felt the strong need to package and beautify their highly rational but nontraditional policies, mainly their unwillingness and inability to conquer and centrally rule the whole world. It was essential to keep their Qin-Han polity-determined Mandate of Heaven and their dignity as the only son of heaven for the whole world intact in the eyes of their subjects. The powerful spirit of the China Order still transpired in the unChinese (non-tianxia) world order of the Song Era. Unable or unwilling to restore a world unification to have a full and real Qin-Han world empire, the more self-conscious and ambitious emperors were hence often pained by their inadequacies as the pretended son of heaven, and felt they must launch acts and rituals befitting a son of heaven in addition to warring to unite the world. The Song’s extraordinarily gentle and kind treatment of the officials, elites and the people was therefore perhaps a necessary quid pro quo to pacify criticisms and resentments. The Song also engaged in costly homages to worship the heaven and earth at the Tai Mountain. It had repeated, exhaustive partisan struggles mostly centered on how to strengthen state power and the military so to behave like a real son of heaven. Most seriously, the internalized Qin-Han tianxia ideas propelled the Song rulers to make the repeated blunders of undermining the Chanyuan system in the hope of unifying the Centralia if not the whole known world. The powerful lure and push of the tianxia mandate never disappeared and haunted the Song’s Qin-Han polity, however enlightened and better run it was. That Mandate of Heaven could not be purged and was responsible for the destruction of the golden Song era, the classic China, and the Han-nation. In hindsight, the Chanyuan Treaty was an epic turn in the history of the Chinese World: to redo the China Order. But it did not last. The Chanyuan Treaty opened a new era of history for the peoples in Eastern Eurasia to enjoy unmatched long peace and great prosperity, just like what the Westphalia Treaty did in Western Eurasia. Both world orders were later challenged repeatedly by

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various forces, sometimes overwhelmingly, from within and without. Unlike the luckier Europeans, however, the Chanyuan system as China’s Westphalia system proved to be much more fragile and was critically handicapped and undermined by ecogeography, demography, history (the Chanyuan Treaty had few precedents to follow and past paths to depend on, while the Westphalia Treaty had over a millennium of de facto practice) and most importantly the enduring tradition and ideation of the Qin-Han polity that fundamentally justified, mandated, and revived the China Order instead of supporting a lasting Westphalia-like system. The multilateral “world” Peace of Westphalia treaties of 1648 enshrined sovereign-equality of the states but also granted religious diversity and enhanced people’s right to choose and move, finalized the independence of the new mercantilist republics in the Netherlands, and gradually set up the foundation of worldwide international law (Gross 1948, 20–41). The Chanyuan system, a narrow and mostly bilateral treaty system, eventually broke down and was thereafter smothered, legally, practically, ideologically, even linguistically by the invading conquerors. When the Europeans managed to legalize, sustain, refine, and expand their long-lasting Westphalia system to the whole globe, the peoples of the Chinese World were tightly sealed back in by the Mongolian China Order, never again to have a competitive international system for science and capitalism to thrive until they were forced into the Westphalia system after the mid-nineteenth century. The grand dichotomy of the China Order versus the Westphalia system describes well the different trajectories and performances the two sides of Eurasia have had since the late-thirteenth century. It explains the “Great Divergence” of the two sides of Eurasia at the latest since the sixteenth century: only the Europeans (and by extension North Americans) started the Renaissance and Enlightenment, scientific and industrial revolutions, geographical discovery and expansion, sociopolitical liberalization, and global dominance (Jones 1981; Landes 2003; Pomeranz 2001; Frank 2001, 180–82). The enduring China Order holds the key to answer the so-called China puzzles and elucidates the long decline and stagnation of the Chinese World after the Song Era.6

The Chanyuan System in the Chinese Mind The Chanyuan system was never fully internalized during the Song Era due to the tenacious logic of the Qin-Han polity, the Mandate of Heaven for the China Order or world unification. Song elites, even the enlightened ones, tended to hold the China Order as a top value as the famous poet Lu You wrote in his last poem: “All is void after death, only grieves for that the whole world/ land is not unified.”7 Politicians such as Han Tuozhou (1152–1207) commonly

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used the unification cause for their own power but often ended in disasters (Tuo fourteenth century, V233). The Southern Song was especially common with leaders repeatedly forgetting the lessons and making the futile and even fatal efforts to undermine the Changyuan system, since the humiliating losses of much of the Centralia to the invading Jin Empire or the Mongols were indeed far greater than the loss of those Yanyun Prefectures. After the Song, mostly in the late Ming and especially since the late Qing when the Han nationalists rose up against the Manchu rulers and the incursive foreign imperialists or both, the Chanyuan system has been dismissed by the Han-Chinese historical narratives. Official and mainstream historians of both the ROC and the PRC have depreciated the Chanyuan Treaty, especially its role and impact, and even the whole Song Era. The Song has been viewed as the central government that failed or was unwilling to unite the country of Centralia; the Chanyuan Treaty has been judged as an expedient arrangement between two warring parties of a civil war, rather than an event of international relations between two sovereign states (Z. Yuan 2010, 67–70). The Song has been mostly considered the center of the Chinese World inheriting and defending the Han-nation and the Qin-Han-Tang political tradition. Yet, the Song Empire has been described as cowardly, even traitorously neglecting its Mandate of Heaven for the China Order, and not on par with the Qin-Han and Sui-Tang and the later Yuan-Ming-Qing Empires. Song’s record of foreign policy has been rejected as weak, regrettable, undeletable even ashamed.8 While rightfully concluding and praising that, during the Song Era, “China looks like having entered [the] modern era” and Chinese science and technology all “reached the highest peak” with many innovations, Song is still nonetheless inexplicably scorned to be “the weakest dynasty in Chinese history” (R. Huang 1997, 127–28, 207). Instead of Song’s blunders of betraying and dismantling the Chanyuan system, the Westphalia-like system itself has been commonly but enigmatically and falsely blamed by the Han Chinese later for the destruction of the Song Empire and the Han classic civilization (X. Zhang 2007). With an eye on the multination nature of today’s PRC, the Song’s Chinese World is now sophistically yet deceptively described and taught as a single country divided with several ethnic local regimes—a transitional stage between the great empires of the Tang and Yuan, rather than a great world of live international relations. Song’s increasingly well-known great accomplishments are disguised and packaged as “brilliant achievements of science and culture of the Song and Yuan era” (Editorial Board 2004, V2, 50–82). Nontraditional and unofficial historians may now challenge some of the official indoctrination and even recognize the Song’s unraveled accomplishment in Chinese history, yet still blame the Song for not forcefully “unifying the country” and sensationalize Song rulers’ suffer-

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ings and humiliation from the folly of Song’s “weak” and “cowardly” foreign policy (T. Yuan 2012, 130). The makers and supporters of the Chanyuan and similar treaties during the Song Era have been deemed and fictionalized to be treacherous and inscrutable villains who were mentally and physically weak and incompetent, lacking personal courage and military talent. The detractors and opponents to those nontraditional policies have been commonly glorified and fictionalized to be Han-national heroes even super-heroes of valor, loyalty, patriotism, and moral superiority to be worshiped as semi-divine figures. Their failures were blamed on the maleficent officials and fatuous emperors. Some of the bestknown Han-Chinese folk heroes and heroines in today’s China are the fictional images of some anti-Liao and anti-Jin generals of the Song Empire: from the Warriors of the Yang Family in Northern Song to Yue Fei in Southern Song. In the twenty-first century, some PRC historians have become more factually driven and developed diverse views about the Song with questions about the simplistic and exaggerated black-and-white images of the Song heroes and villains. Yet, the dominant views remain the same with regard of Song’s foreign policy.9 This, indeed, perhaps illustrates well the power and the depth of the China Order in the Chinese mind, as the long lasting and greatly internalized world order. Even the Song emperors could not resist it so they had to pretend to be the singular ruler of the whole known world from time to time, and thus betrayed the crucially important Chanyaun system (and doomed themselves) for the tempting objectives of the China Order, mandated by the Qin-Han polity. The Chinese culture under many centuries of the Qin-Han world empire indeed developed an extremely profound influence to shape preferences and foreign policies for the Chinese rulers and elites.10

The Splendid Song: The Chinese World under the Chanyuan System Due to its unorthodox internal structure of corporatist elite politics, a soft authoritarianism of Confucian-Legalism, consciously problem-prevention institutions and policies, and (as a major contention of this book) the new world order of the Chanyuan system (the codified pre-Qin or the Westphalia-like world order) that secured international peace, trade, comparison, and competition inexpensively, the Chinese World during the Song Era became “the highest peak” of Chinese civilization prior to the twentieth century, according to the Chinese intellectual Chen Yinque (Chen 1943, 245). The Song was “the best era,” the “treasured gem,” the “most admired,” and “the most valuable” time of Chinese history with “the highest achievement of Chinese

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culture ever,” according to Chen and a leading Chinese historian (Chen 1960s; Deng 1943). It was also the “most accomplished era of Chinese culture” and academic development, clearly surpassing the preceding Han, Tang, and the subsequent Yuan-Ming-Qing Eras, according to Wang Guowei (Wang 1926, V5; X. Song 1997). The Song was a golden era of Chinese history with many unprecedented and unparalleled accomplishments in science and technology, a commanding peak of the world before Industrial Revolution (Needham 1954, V1). Japanese scholars Konan Naito and Shijo Miyazaki described the Song as a new, “modern” era in Chinese history with its civil society, pro-trade capitalism, internal tranquility, cultural “renaissance,” and the innovative Chanyuan system as “the first equal state-to-state relationship in human history” (Naito 1922, V8; Miyazaki 1978, V9–12). The Song Empire enjoyed the longest peace in Chinese history with a nearly 50 percent lower frequency of external and internal wars than the Chinese historical average (Editing Group 1985). Had not the Southern Song rulers forgotten the historical lessons by forming a tempting but devastating alliance with the Mongols to eliminate the Jin Empire (which indeed delivered the humiliating defeat to the Northern Song) and then mindlessly attacking the winning new ally of the Mongols “to recover the lost central plains (Centralia)” (Tuo 1345, V18; Tuo fourteenth century, V47), the Mongol’s final victory over the Song might have been delayed or even avoided and Chinese (even world) history might have been very different. The peoples in the Chinese World might have long ago evolved out of the Qin-Han autocratic world empire government and developed new state-society relationship, scientific and industrial revolutions, and full market economy so to rid the long stagnation under the China Order. As mentioned earlier, the Song emperors behaved much less despotic and murderous than the average Chinese emperors and more like some European lords and kings during and even after the Renaissance, to the point of being reported to share and compete peacefully with cabinet ministers for the favor of renowned courtesans with gifts, poems, and paintings rather than the traditional beheading.11 The relationship between the emperor and the imperial officials considerably resembled that of the reigning father and his male-offspring in an agrarian paternal family—the political structure prescribed by Confucianism. More relaxed social and cultural control, lenient taxation and the policy of enlisting the landless and the jobless, solid civilian control of the military, well-protected professional bureaucracy based on functional meritocracy, open and cosmopolitan foreign relations, and the consequent prosperous economy basically controlled and even eliminated some of the most severe cancers of Chinese imperial politics: eunuch tyranny, court putsches, local and regional warlords, and mass rebellions.

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Song’s elite politics of ethical governance including its “royal ancestral law” of no-killing of officials and critics and problem-prevention measures is considered the most superior among all Chinese dynasties (P. Liu 2012, 1–16; F. Zhang 2001, 220–42). As a rare rule-by-law and thus constant and stable government in Chinese history (Q. Zhang 2001), the Song is the only major Chinese dynasty from Qin to Qing that was not overthrown by internal rebellion or coup d’état. It is also one of the very few that limited the role of eunuchs in politics, had basically no warlords managing the country, and practiced little repression of the elites and gentries (Y. Yu 2004). The Song emperors are among the most frugal (even “poor”) rulers in Chinese history, with very small harems, simple palaces, and no extravagant mausoleums,12 despite that the Song Empire scored the highest annul fiscal revenue in Chinese history before the end of the nineteenth century, much higher than any other dynasty that might have had much larger territory and population. Indeed, the Song governance, an enlightened and well-structured and institutionalized authoritarian rule by law, is perhaps the best there is in Chinese history judged by its governing effectiveness, domestic tranquility (even liberty), political placidity, frugality, and longevity. Some Chinese historians call Song politics a “democracy of the landowner (gentry) class” (L. Zhou 1999, 259). Women, for example, enjoyed a noticeably higher, even unrivaled, social and legal status in the Song (Ebrey 1993; Bernhardt 1999). For a total of 319 years, the Song royal family, the same House of Zhao, was the longest single ruling royal family in the Chinese imperial history since the third century BCE and commanded great loyalty from its subjects until the very end. Perhaps an ideal of the Qin-Han polity, the Song was still an imperial autocracy with its usual repression and deprivation of human and civil rights of the common people. It was not a rule-of-law society (although the Song emperors seemed to be bounded by their own rules anecdotally). Arbitrary irrationality in governance and corruption at every level of the empire were still commonplace, albeit less ferocious and deadly. With limited accountability and restricted open discourses for innovative policies, the Song governance and foreign policy both had profound deficiencies, rigidities, and blunders. The Song had an ever-enlarging bureaucracy generously remunerated and a huge, yet weak, military as a welfare-state institution to pacify the populace with public funds, creating chronic deficit spending and periodical inflation thanks to the innovation of paper currency. The Song military budget skyrocketed to the unsustainable level of 65 to 80 percent of the imperial budget at times, or one soldier financed by about ten households, to maintain a standing army of up to 1.25 million men even in peace time (Ye 2006, 7–8, 10–12). This huge army had mostly defensive war-fighting capabilities thanks to the strict civilian control and demilitarism (Muo 2012; F. Zhang 2001, 224–26). To

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reconcile the Song’s prudent foreign policy with its ruler’s tianxia Mandate of Heaven that was deeply embedded in and legitimized by its Qin-Han polity, the otherwise enlightened Song rulers had to carry on a preordained pretention of being the son of heaven while dealing with international relations with multiple sons of heaven, creating a deep and noxious hypocrisy ripe for blunders. The structural and cultural tensions between the Qin-Han polity and international competition, market-based commerce, and civil society were mitigated but not eliminated by the Chanyuan system. The deep incompatibility and duplicity of a Qin-Han polity living in a Westphalia-like world continued to not only raise the cost of governance (such as the huge but ineffective military budget) for the Song but also destined its deeply held despise and final (twice!) betrayal of the critically important Chanyuan system, leading to the horrific demise of the Song regime and the Han-nation state resulting in the tragic vanish of the best Chinese imperial governance.13 Ironically perhaps but logically predictable, the relatively open but deeply duplicitous scholars of the late-Song Era ossified the ruling ideology of Confucianism and Legalism in combination with Taoist and Buddhist ideas to form the influential School of Principle or Neo-Confucianism dogma, epitomized by the writing and teaching of scholar-official Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Later, in the Yuan and especially Ming and Qing, this school became a powerful imperial tool for the ever-tighter social and mind control as the imperial exam would only test the Confucian classics in the form of their narrow reinterpretation made by Zhu Xi. The inadequacy of not being the real son of heaven ruling the whole world and the tragedies of Song’s decent emperors rallied and intensified a powerful culture of royal loyalty among the Han elites and people. Initially trendy cultural rituals like women’s foot-binding started to spread to the masses, to be picked up later by the Ming and Qing as a mandatory way of controlling women. The China Order ideals based on Confucian-Legalism were further rigidified after Song’s fall.

Song Era: The Peak of Ancient Chinese Civilization The best imperial governance and the long internal and external peace unsurprisingly delivered the Song people a prosperous economy, the most developed in Chinese history prior to the twentieth century. The Song prosperity was much longer than any other period of prosperity in Chinese history. The Song population tripled in the century under the Chanyuan system to surpass that of the Tang and reach 100 million in 1110 for the first time in Chinese history and then recovered from the collapse of the Northern Song to pass 100 million again by 1200, an unprecedented size of the Han people. The total population

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of the Chinese World (Song, Liao later Jin, Xia, and Dali) reached the height of 110 to 120 million, or about one-third of the total human population at that time. The capitals of the Song, Kaifeng, and Lin’an, each had 1.8 and 1.2 million residents, respectively. Both were the most populous metropolises of the globe at that time. Tens of thousands Arabic merchants, Japanese students, Southeast Asian businessmen, and Jewish settlers lived in the Song capitals and port cities permanently (J. Ge 2006; S. Wu 2000, V3).14 This great population also had a high living standard rarely seen in Chinese history. Song’s per capita grain production, the main indicator of wealth in an agrarian economy, was estimated to be 728 kilograms, highest of any era throughout Chinese history from the pre-Qin Era to this day: per capita grain production was 505 kg for the Qin-Han Empire, 725 kg briefly for the early Sui-Tang, 591 kg for the Ming, 360–390 kg for the Qing, and 400–500 kg for the PRC (G. Cao 1989; Zheng and Huang 1989; China News Agency 7-9-2009). The Song was called by a comparative study of economic history “the world’s leading economic power” and trading power, while subsequently China under Ming and Qing “turned inward and abandoning both international trade and leadership in economic development” (Powelson 1994). Still mostly an agrarian society, the Song nonetheless had a policy to encourage commerce and was the only dynasty to do so in Chinese history. That led to highly developed handicraft industry and mining, prosperous commerce, and unmatched foreign trade.15 Song’s fiscal income (tax revenue) was the highest of any Chinese regime before the end of the nineteenth century; it peaked at a record level of 126 million ounces of silver a year, ten times larger than that in the Ming Empire two centuries later, despite the fact that the Song tax rate was among the lowest in imperial China. Even the much-reduced Southern Song (with only two-thirds of its former territory) had annual tax revenue six times of that in the Ming. What is even more remarkable was that the main source of Song’s large tax revenue was the industrial-commercial taxes rather than the traditional tyrannical policies of ever more extraction of the peasants. Song’s industrial-commercial taxes rose steadily and dramatically, constituting roughly 35 percent to as high as 70 percent of its total fiscal income while the amount of traditional agricultural-poll taxes remained largely unchanged, signifying the prosperity of massive non-agricultural economic activities. Only by the end of the nineteenth century, was the Chinese industrial-commercial tax once again more than agricultural-poll tax. A quantitative study of world’s economic history concluded that, before the twentieth century, per capita GDP growth in the Chinese world was basically flat for two millennia, with noticeable growth only during the Song Era (still low at about 0.06 percent annual growth rate but already much higher than all other non-European regions) (Maddison 2001, figure 1-4, tables B-21 and B-22). In 1000, an average laborer in the

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Song capital city was earning an income worth $3,200 (at the grain price of 2009), the same as the PRC’s per capita GDP in the 2010s (Q. Liu 2015). From the very beginning, the Song opened many port cities along the Chinese coast (the most famous being Guangzhou in Guangdong and Quanzhou in Fujian) and dispatched imperial messengers abroad to invite foreign traders and investors. Song society was unprecedentedly open to the outside world (Hansen 2000). The Song also pragmatically converted much of its tributary ties with foreign countries into a market-oriented trade relationship. Foreign trade boomed during the Song Era and emigration to settle in Southeast Asia took place significantly as well (Waley-Cohen 2000, 38–41, 52). Over fifty foreign countries in and outside of the Chinese World traded over 300 kinds of commodities with the Song. Tariffs on foreign trade sometimes constituted 10 percent of Song’s very large total fiscal revenue, becoming an important source of income and a sociopolitically blameless substitute to raising taxes on the people or printing more paper money (Tuo fourteenth century, V126–39; F. Jian 2009; Q. Ye 2006, 89–105). In the areas of science and technology, Song’s Chinese World was truly unrivaled in Chinese history. It was called by a noted British Sinophile the golden era of Chinese science and technology (Needleham 1954, V1), and by a leading French sinologist simply the Chinese era of Renaissance in science and technology with many prolific and valuable scientists (Gernet 1962 and 1996, part 5). Indeed, out of the four most famously known original technological innovations made by the Chinese before the twentieth century, two (gunpowder and block printing) were invented and another one (the compass from the preQin Era) was promoted for practical use during the Song. Numerous important innovations and discoveries included the world’s first paper money, the use of petroleum, medical dissection of the human body, and use of mechanical devices. Coal was massively explored and the million-plus residents of the capital Kaifeng were described as using coal (not the traditional fire woods, straws, or charcoal) for fuel, tantalizingly suggesting the approaching of a coal-fired industrialization, “a revolution” in iron and coal industries, that took place a world away in England centuries later (Hartwell 1962, 153–62). Song Era sewer systems even worked better than today’s modern systems (Xinhua 7-132016). The Song was the last high peak of Chinese scientific and technological development and the Chinese World had “basically no innovation after 1300 (CE)” (J. Dong 2014, 29–36). Represented by the creation of the School of Principle, the Chinese World of the Song Era was productive of theorists and preachers developing and incorporating various faiths and philosophies (Zhu twelfth century; Li 1270; N. Wu 1994; Y. Han 2014). It became “another era of active competition of hundred schools” since the Warring States Era (L. Zhou 1999, 259).

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Private writing of history was allowed, literary works flourished, and fine arts blossomed, producing some of the finest and most important history books, poems, paintings, calligraphy, sculpture, and porcelain works. Fine arts in Song reached the peak level in Chinese history.16 Unorthodox ideas like utilitarianism, benevolent governance, and even populism developed (D. Cao 1987, 36–63). Unlike the previous peak of the Chinese civilization, the early Tang Empire, when artisans and entertainment were still segmented and restricted, “the Song has little taboos and the emperor entertains together with the street people” (L. Liu 2006, 126). Demanded and financed by a large class of rich urban residents, the famous Dazu Stone Engravings (mostly made during the Song Era) differed significantly from Chinese rock carvings of other eras: innovative carvings mostly depict secular life, folklore, and popular stories rather than just religious themes, reflecting a rather bourgeois lifestyle and cultural taste. Moreover, unlike all other Chinese ancient rock carvings, the Song carving artists and workers signed their names (CCTV 2015), reflecting a different social status of the artists and a rather capitalist sense about authorship and copyright. The magnificent achievement and brilliant records of the Song Era Chinese World were even more impressive, considering the peace, prosperity, and progress the many other countries in the Chinese World enjoyed. They, however reluctantly and deferentially recorded by the Chinese historians of the later centuries, were equal in sovereignty with fairly well-defined and stably maintained territorial boundaries. Trade, diplomacy and, of course, wars maintained this system for generations. The accumulated Chinese knowledge and technology were dissimilated to far corners of the Chinese World; and the external, non-Han (and non-Chinese even non-Asian) technology and culture also deeply affected the Centralia (P. Xiong 2009). It is remarkable that the history of the two sides of Eurasia exhibited some great similarities in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, suggesting a grand convergence of human civilizations. On the west side in the Mediterranean–European world, under a decentralized world political order, feudal states had profound legal and political transformations that eventually cemented the de facto Westphalia world order and ushered in the modern Europe. Consequential ideas and norms such as restricting the state’s power, trial by jury, and local self-governance were installed by internal and external political struggles as reflected in series legal documents or treaties such as the Edict of Conrad II (Holy Roman Emperor) in 1037, the Coronation Charter by Henry I (English King) in 1100, the Peace of Constance (between Holy Roman Emperor Barbarossa and the Lombard League) in 1183, and the Magna Carta by John (English King) in 1215.17 In Eastern Eurasia, also under a decentralized world political order, profound sociopolitical changes and economic developments took place in the Chinese World especially the Song, indicating

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a departure from the China Order and maybe even from the Qin-Han polity. The Song was “already at the doorstep of modern world” with the peak-level accomplishment of Chinese civilization and the promising “dawn of modern era” featuring capitalist economy, enlightened governance, high urbanization (as high as 20 to 30 percent), cultural renaissance, and technology revolution—epic trends of progress that were stopped and reversed by the Mongol Empire (G. Wu 2014). It is highly unfortunate for all peoples in the Chinese World, with the exception of perhaps the small number of the Mongol conquerors and their successors—the Ming and Qing rulers—that the great Song-Era transformation was truncated by the “worldwide” military conquest and mass slaughters of the Yuan (and later the Ming and Qing) world empires that restored and enhanced the China Order. The Chanyuan system, China’s de jure Westphalia system only six centuries earlier, was never cemented, much less legitimized and internalized. It was a major turning point of history for the better that the peoples in the Chinese World did not, or could not, follow through.

4

The China Order An Assessment

T

his chapter concludes the rereading of the Chinese history prior to the twentieth century with an analysis of the China Order and an assessment of its record of performance. Notwithstanding pauses and gaps, especially the three-century-long Song Era, the peoples in the Chinese World of Eastern Eurasia were mostly under basically the same world order, the China Order, from late-third century BCE to the late-nineteenth century. The China Order was the natural and logical destiny of the Qin-Han polity of Confucian-Legalism autocracy to centrally govern the whole known world as one singular political unit, a world empire or tianxia (all under heaven). Some Chinese scholars have variously described the China Order as “Chinese world order” or “East Asian world order,” “celestial system of rule by rituals,” “Chinese tianxia order,” or “tributary system.”1 Some non-Chinese observers have described the China Order with similar terminologies (Fairbank 1942, 1973; Mancall 1984; Pye 1992, 1993, 107–33). This enduring Chinese premodernity can be understood as an authoritarian, often totalitarian, world order of an undifferentiated socioeconomic-political complex (F. Wang 1998b, 76–77, 105–15). The China Order has been justified and deified by a persuasive cosmology (there is but one sun in the sky) and the agrarian patriarchy (there is but one father in the family) so there can only be one son of heaven to govern the whole known world: “The sky does not have two suns, the land does not have two kings, the family does not have two masters, the worship does not have two supremacies.”2 Peer states and their comparison and competition are viewed as transitional, undesirable, anti-heaven’s way hence anti-human and unacceptable. While the Mandate of Heaven may move from one ruling family to another so the dynasty may change and the world may disunite, the fundamentals of the China Order shall never change as long as the universe stays the same. As the result, before the late-nineteenth century, the Chinese

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civilization was always a world phenomenon either ruled by a centralized world government of a Son of Heaven or organized as a transitional Westphalia-like international system with multiple sons of heaven aspiring and fighting to reunite the world. National, ethnical, religious, and even racial boundaries were diluted and minimized.3 The various peoples in Eastern Eurasia were characterized, ranked, and governed differently by their transaction-cost defined locational differences and the levels of their cultural assimilation that was mostly the acceptance of the Confucian-Legalism and its carrier, the written Chinese language. Looking back, the China Order appeared neither “uniquely benevolent nor uniquely violent” (S. Zhao 2015), and often just existed in imaginations and pretentions (Perdue 2015). The Chinese World, ruled by the Qin-Han polity under the China Order, was insulated from the much larger real world by geography and by choice, especially when the rest of the world became ever more undeniable, even though it in fact could be and was rather open to interactions and exchanges with the rest of the world,4 as long as the whole meaningfully known world was at least perceived to be politically under the same son of heaven. Conceptually, the China Order manifested a worldwide version of a “closed society” contrasting an “open society” as analyzed by Karl Popper (Popper 1945, V1, 49–50, 152–53, 178). Compared to incorporation types of closed societies such as the Russian Empire, the China Order exhibited the characteristics of an “absorptive empire” that not just conquered and controlled but also converted and shriveled the various nations under it. All peoples were either the “proto-Chinese” or the backward, barbaric “not-yet-Chinese” who were “to become Chinese” in due time through cultural socialization or by force (Lattimore 1940, xlix, 56–57, 165, 300–01, 336, 409, 514). The China Order, and the tianxia ideology or the Grand Unification (大 一统) idea, was first successfully implemented by the Qin Empire’s conquest of the whole Centralia or China Proper. It collapsed several times as a world order but never disappeared as a political ideology. The China Order has been revived, improved, and perfected by the Han and Sui-Tang empires. After the destruction of the Song’s deviant experience with corporatist authoritarianism and Westphalia-like international relations, the China Order reached its ultimate form in the Yuan, Ming, and Qing Empires. The unorthodox Chinese thinker Huang Zongxi (1610–95) succinctly summarized Chinese history with two great changes that “ended” the Chinese civilization twice to seal the endless misfortune for the people: the Qin’s world unification in the third century BCE and the Mongol destruction of the Song world in the thirteenth century.5 The world unification ideal of the China Order has formed politics and policy preferences of just about all Chinese rulers for two millennia (J. Wang 2000, 77, 82–83). Well epitomized in many ways by the Qing Empire, espe-

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cially Qing’s periods of prosperity in the eighteenth century, the China Order has provided a long, familiar past path and a lasting legacy to shape the narrative and the reference framework for today’s China (G. Wang 2006). As a lasting case of an approximately complete “global nation,” the experience of the China Order informs powerfully about the current discourse of globalization, especially its feasibility and desirability (Talbott 2008).

The China Order: The Characteristics The China Order is based on the authoritarian even totalitarian Qin-Han polity, internally autocratic and often despotic. Externally, it can hardly be content or peaceful until it incorporates and governs the whole known world to have a singular sovereignty over all peoples; or it must keep or assume away the ungoverned and the ungovernable (Kissinger 2014, 4–9). This world empire could not live well with equals, alternatives, comparison, and competition. Thus the inner logic of the Qin-Han polity has always led to a Mandate of Heaven, the tianxia mandate, to guide Chinese foreign policy toward the building of a singular world governance in practice or in pretension (Pines 2012, 21–39). Key characteristics of the China Order include its totality, universality, dualities, control, hypocrisy and duplicity, efficacy, and longevity.6

Totality Justified by the modified Confucianism (with Taoist idea of the oneness of life, world, and universe) that models the state after the paternal family and governance after the ways of the heaven (Mother Nature or God), the China Order mandates the political leaders and elites to fight for a centralized rule of all peoples under the sun. All political power and all judicial verdicts must come from a singular source of the son of heaven, just like all light of life comes from a single sun. All lives are at the willful disposal of the emperor and often given or taken by the momentary decision of the imperial officials in the name of the emperor. Not only collecting and controlling the fiscal revenues of the whole world, the son of heaven is also the unchallengeable, largest property owner and the ultimate landlord of the whole world. All properties, especially real estate, are ultimately and often directly owned by the emperor in the name of the tianxia with the phraseology of public’s world (公天下) but essentially a family’s world (家天下) system that gives the ruler unlimited and absolute owning rights over all properties and all people (Fan 1965, 206–36).7 Confiscation and reallocation of any property by the willful imperial decree is the norm. From the Qin Empire to the PRC, imperial/

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state monopoly of cash-generating industries (from mining and coinage, salt, porcelain, to alcohol and later tobacco) and key commercial activities such as foreign trade and banking is a major pillar of the China Order (Fan 1953, 46–59. Yi 2007, 204–14). The emperor owns the world empire, controls all resources, rules by will with little limitation and opposition (Woodside 1991, 31–67). Monism must eradicate pluralism. The totality of the China Order necessarily extends into education and the cultural-spiritual world. The imperial exam system tightly controls the content and style of education. The long-lasting natural religion of heaven-earth worship (often associated with Taoism) and ancestor-worship (often associated with Confucianism) are safely confined and subjugated by the imperial power. Indeed, native Chinese religion is often reduced to the pervasive worship of the folklore God of Wealth (von Glahn 2004). The Qin-Han rulers since the Qin have all attempted to control and incorporate the imported, more elaborated and established religions that tend to be more autonomous and politically inconvenient, even challenging: from Buddhism and Islam to the lesser Manichaeism, Nestorianism, and Zoroastrianism—they all had state-sponsored rises and suffered imperial holocausts, for example, in the same Tang Dynasty (Sima eleventh century, V246). Later, the potent but alien Roman Catholicism (started with the Jesuit missionaries), Protestantism, and Mormonism have had the similar fate of royal tolerance and even sponsorship, control and incorporation, and persecution, sometimes even eradication, by the rulers during the Ming, Qing and the PRC (Wang 1940; L. Yu 2012; Bays 2011). Often justified in the name of fairness and justice for all in front of the ruler with the Mandate of Heaven, the totality and singularity of political sovereignty and authority under the China Order have been normatively and functionally, perhaps even religiously and cosmologically, elaborated, justified, and praised by court historians and scholars (J. Wang 2000, 340–43; Kissinger 2011, 5–32). Indeed, the Chinese World under the China Order exhibits strong tendencies of an “onslaught of the intolerant” (Popper 1945, 226).

Universality Given the ideal of having a centralized sociopolitical order as heaven’s way, the China Order is a worldwide political system that mandates a political unification (even just nominally or in pretention) of the whole known world, or a grand unification (大一统) that has been “the ultimate goal and highest rule of Chinese political history” and the “sacred mission for all Chinese rulers” (L. Zhou 1999, 308). It has the long-enshrined norm of “Han and rebels can’t coexist, imperial rule can’t survive in a corner.”8 Han or not, any ethnic ruler can be the son of heaven of the Centralia and beyond, as long as he manages

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to conquer the whole known world and adopt the same Qin-Han polity of Confucian-Legalism: the interchangeable Cathay-barbarian distinction (华夷 之辩) under the China Order (Y. Liu 2008). The Yuan and the Qing world empires, ruled by non-Han former barbarians, were easily justified by citing the pre-Qin ancient idea of “barbarians become Centralists when elevated; Centralists become barbarians when [they] behave as such,”9 and the pragmatic view worded by some Han elites that “whoever can employ shi (士 ConfucianLegalist elites of the Han nationality) and govern in the Centralia’s way, then he is the rightful ruler of the Centralia.”10 An interesting and profound twist of the universality of the China Order has been the deep fear that has haunted the Chinese ruling elites ever since the mid-nineteenth century: the “barbarians” from the West (and Westernized Imperial Japan) would take over and rule the Centralia and the whole Chinese World to fundamentally displace and replace the Qin-Han polity of ConfucianLegalism, the Centralia’s way known and cherished indispensably by the Chinese ruling elites. The new conquerors had proved conclusively that they were much more advanced in organization and technology than the Centralia’s Cathay way, which actually was hopelessly exposed as genuinely barbaric or semi-barbaric and grossly incompetent and inadequate (Guo 1879, 439, 444–45). To face this “great change once in more than three thousand years”11 that threatens to exterminate not just a dynasty but also the whole China Order and eradicate the Qin-Han ruling elite, the thoughtful ones started to call wisely but wishfully for “preserving Chinese essence using Western means.”12 Some picked up the traditional policy of “using barbarians to control barbarians” that was practiced from Han to Qing (F.C. Wang 1998). Both ideas have since developed in China as the preferred solutions to this day. In the traditional official writing of Chinese history, including that in today’s PRC, the Grand Unification universality of the China Order is commonly and sycophantically viewed as the highest value and criterion for judging individuals, policies, and events; higher than nationalism, good governance, class-division, or peace (Q. Ji 2008). Fundamentally, international comparison and competition among coexisting peer states are considered to be transitional, anti-nature and antiheaven’s way and thus undesirable. The universality of the China Order, however, often was more of an ideal and pretention than reality in the history of the Chinese world (Perdue 2015). The Qing, for example, often painted and displayed majestic scenes of the imagined “ten thousand countries paying tribute” to please the rulers and the elites (X. Li 2014, 118–25). The Chinese World was unified since the Qin world empire nominally for about two-third of the time (66 percent of the twenty-one centuries) but was under one effective centralized regime for at most half the time (57 percent). To calculate from the year 841 BCE when

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the Chinese history records became reliable to 1895 when the pretention of the China Order was finally dashed by the Japanese victory, the Chinese World was under an effective Grand Unification for at most only 45 percent of the time. By that calculation, most Qin-Han imperial rulers were failed leaders, not to mention other, really meaningful and important, criteria such as life, living standards, and socioeconomic development. The universality nature of the China Order is a direct companion of its totality nature. The Qin-Han polity has only one power center, one singular structure of governance, and one singular set of Confucian-Legalism values and norms. This polity is meant to be a world system by nature and design as it neither tolerates nor is able to survive well with equals, alternatives, comparison, and competition. External rivals and alternatives necessarily constitute an unfriendly and even uninhabitable environment for the Confucian-Legalist polity. Thus a Qin-Han ruler must adapt by making uncomfortable and hard changes and compromises internally to be less totalitarian and more accommodating (like the Song Empire). Or he needs to pretend the universality of the China Order through enhancing the geographic isolation of China by either constructing the militarily useless but symbolically meaningful barrier of the Great Wall to keep out the ungoverned or ungovernable; or, like the Yuan-Ming-Qing rulers, to restrict and even ban subjects’ maritime contacts with the unknown and uncontrolled outsiders. Therefore, a Qin-Han empire can never rest peacefully for long before it manages to conquer and rule (even just in pretension) the world (the real or the conceived whole world) by force, conversion, or conspiracy, or reach the absolute limit of its ability and then pretend there is no more worthy (much less compatible or higher) civilizations beyond. A Qin-Han ruler is destined to lock the people in and/or fight to the death (often literarily) to be the son-of-heaven to rule the whole known world—a natural and logical mission, an inevitable destiny, a sad and often lethal curse, and a professed ambition to pursue the China Order. From Qin Shihuang to Mao Zedong, indeed, very few Chinese rulers have been able to evade or abandon that fate of the tianxia Mandate of Heaven for the China Order.

Hierarchy The China Order stratifies peoples, groups, and individuals in a strict and rigid hierarchy in which all powers come from above. At each level roles, rights, and duties are defined and maintained, only to be altered either when the whole stratification (the particular ruler) is overthrown or the individual’s position has changed by natural courses (aging and succession) or by imperial decrees. This one-way top-down social hierarchy is maintained with brutal force and internalized rigid rituals for the purpose of control and domination, as revealed

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by dissident thinkers like Dai Zhen (1724–77, Dai eighteenth century). Very much as in an extended paternal family, one’s morally and culturally fixed and justified rights and obligations as a son, for example, would never change until he becomes a father or even a grandfather. All individuals exist only in relationships and they have no absolute personal freedom or rights but only relative autonomy and equality.13 No one under heaven is free from relationships, especially not from the governance of the son of heaven who is the only one that could alter one’s given sociopolitical and economic stratification with a decree, or physically eliminate the whole extended family of anyone for any momentary reasons. Political competition is reduced and twisted to become backstabbing and sabotage among the officials to curry favors from the top. Often times, though, the despotic, deified emperor is not free either, heavily confined by the ritual and traditional rules and constrained by the royal family, the inner court conspiracy and manipulation by concubines and particularly the eunuchs, and the well-entrenched imperial bureaucracy of scholar-officials (士大夫), the imperial ruling elites who have vested interest in governing the world in the “right” Confucian-Legalist way (J. Wang, 298–311). The bureaucratic hierarchy, with its power and survival all in the hands of the superiors (ultimately the emperor), created a profound social stratification and cultural norm of the officials-standard (官本位) or officialism polity (官本主义) (K. Yu 2013, 52–61). The Qin-Han politics under the China Order has sustained a “power fetishism” that is more powerful than ordinary religions.14 Even in the twenty-first century, Chinese elite and masses still widely exhibit and even act out China’s millennia-old “emperor dream” and “imperial minister/general-dream” (H. Zhang 2015). The retired imperial officials and the official-wannabes (mostly the learned and the resourceful) constituted the instrumental layer of local elites (Esherick and Rankin 1990). The appointed, top-down bureaucracy evolved and functioned to be an elaborated imperial meritocracy based on the imperial examination system. It constituted the backbone of the Qin-Han polity, greatly helping to manage the China Order sociopolitically and economically in an authoritarian, even totalitarian, omnipresent and omnipotent manner (Wang 1948). The PRC has abolished the local political autonomy manned by the local gentries and stacked up the authoritarian bureaucracy hierarchically at the central, provincial, prefecture, county, and township levels to make the governance more bloated and costly.15

Dualities The China Order in practice largely had two spheres: the Centralia or China Proper where most people were the Han nation, and the peripheries where many non-Han nations lived. Beyond the Centralia, the rising transaction cost,

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diminished resources, changed geography and local conditions necessarily limited the intensity and scope of the Qin-Han governance. Therefore, the China Order often had a clear duality or circles of core-periphery that combined two or more ways of governance for the Centralia and the various parts of tianxia outside the Centralia: A direct imperial rule for as many people as possible and a feudal or confederation-like structure of governance for the geographically and ethnically remote regions. The submissive local aristocracies were entangled and vassal states under a tributary system of lopsided diplomatic and trade relations.16 As long as they remained insignificant and inconsequential to the Qin-Han polity in the Centralia, the ungoverned were ignored. For faraway and powerful foreign countries, peer-like diplomacy might be used so long as the son of heaven could continue the world empire pretention at home.17 For the peoples in the Chinese World, especially those living in the Centralia, the China Order dictated their ownership to be in the hands of the emperor. Emigration (even just move from the densely populated Centralia to the less controlled periphery) was basically prohibited until the nineteenth century. Those who dared to emigrate anyway were considered discarded treacherous people, were banned from retuning, and could face beheading if caught even in Tang, one of the more open and more cosmopolitan eras when foreigners could visit the Centralia relatively easily. Imperial rulers very rarely organized and sponsored overseas and overland expeditions abroad such as those in the early Han, Tang, and Ming Dynasties. They never supported overseas emigration and colonization that the emperor could not control. The only known independent overseas Chinese colony was the Lanfang Republic (蘭芳 1777–1884) created in today’s West Kalimantan of Indonesia by the “illegally” emigrated Han-Chinese. It was never recognized let alone supported by the Qin-Han rulers in China (Luo 1961; Reid 2008, 74–75; A. Huang 2009; Yunos 2011). Of course, some Chinese authors today embellish or even sloppily make up that the Lanfang rulers were “patriotic” Chinese and focused on “promoting the Chinese civilization” (Zhang and Zhang 2003). Outsiders were banned from immigration and those who did come (usually with special permission or for special needs), such as the Jesuit priests Matteo Ricci in the Ming and Giuseppe Castiglione in the Qing, were then banned from leaving again. In late Ming, the Dutch governor mass murdered 20,000 local people with Han-Chinese ancestry to crack down a rebellion in the Philippines and then proposed to the Ming officials in Guangdong and Fujian to settle the issue with some financial compensation. One year later, the response from the Ming emperor arrived: instead of condemning and demanding compensation and justice, the Ming rewarded the Dutch governor 20,000 ounces of silver (one ounce per each killed Han-Chinese) for his good deed of rightfully “punishing” those Han-Chinese “traitors” (Yuan 2012, 174).

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Over time, the China Order created and maintained another symbiotic duality in the Chinese psyche: the culturally internalized and ethically sanctioned complex of tyranny-envy and slavery-fatalism, China’s “imperial ideology” or “celestial mentality” and pragmatic worship of power and force (F. Zhang 2004, 228–32; Xing 2015). “Fatalism is not only a Chinese mental habit, it is part of the conscious Confucian tradition,” concluded the West-educated Chinese intellectual Lin Yutang, “this doctrine of fatalism is a great source of personal strength and contentment, and accounts for the placidity of Chinese souls” (Lin 1936, 189). A PRC scholar in the twenty-first century summarized the Chinese “natural philosophy” as the fatalistic view that “fate determines life and death, fortune and power are all up to the heaven” (L. Li 2013). Like the two sides of the same coin, for the Chinese, especially the able and the ambitious, the choice and value in life have been to either strive unscrupulously to be the all-mighty tyrant or else be a devoting and unprincipled assiduous head slave however fearfully and dishonestly, profoundly exemplified by the consequential relationship between Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in the CCP-PRC years (W. Gao 2003). For the less powerful, a philosophy of going with the flow (順生) has been deeply and widely held (Z. Zhang 2006). The concept of citizenship for all was simply a deadly heresy. Consequently, “the character and quality of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people,” decried a Chinese historian in 2013, “has endured non-stop regression and decay” after the Qin and especially after the Song under “the tyrannical emperor system” to be among the worst in the world in the Yuan, Ming, and Qing and “will have no hope for fundamental reformation and improvement without a fundamental change of (China’s sociopolitical) system” (H. Zhang 2013, 73–77).

Control The China Order could only be achieved and maintained with a heavy reliance on the centralized vertical control of the people and their minds. “One of the most striking characteristics of Chinese civilization is what might be called the centrality and weight of the political order within the civilization,” concluded an American Sinologist (Schwartz 1996, 114). “Control is this state’s nature. . . . It controls because it must,” so discovered a study of the current version of the Qin-Han polity, the PRC “party-state” (Ringen 2016, 5, 15). The Qin-Han style governance required and developed extensive and effective ways to have a tight control of the people, their behaviors and their movements with a few statecrafts: the brutal use of force such as some of the most horrific ways of torture and public executions; the state monopoly of ideology and the writing and teaching of history; the time-tested critical hukou (household registration) and baojia (neighborhood collective) systems (F. Wang

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2005, 32–60); the suppression even elimination of land-based aristocracy and any wealth (from landowning or commerce) that was independent from the imperial power; the imperial examination system; the extensive secret police and internal-spying networks; and the rewarding of loyalists and informants backed by emperor’s centralized monopoly of worldwide wealth. For the sake of imperial control, no life (even afterlife) or rights or rules were off limits to the use of imperial power. Private properties were all subject to confiscation by the imperial decree. Not only disobedient behavior, but also simple disagreement and even just remotely inappropriate words, could mean the beheading of the whole extended family of nine-layers apart. Governance under the China Order was classically a despotic state “whose principle is fear,” in Montesquieu’s words (Montesquieu 1777, 175). In reality and in practice, though, it was common to see that the efficacy and extensiveness of the Qin-Han imperial power of control hampered, distorted, compromised, and even restricted by simple logistics and costs, various human factors, and the embedded inefficiency and corruption of the imperial bureaucracy. As the Chinese proverb quips: the heaven (or mountain) is high and the emperor is far away. A profound aspect of the total control under the China Order was the state control of the economy. In addition to being the ultimate landlord of the whole world, the imperial state traditionally monopolized key industrial and lucrative commercial sectors that could produce and sustain societal forces to compete with and resist the imperial political power. Foreign trade and even internal cross-region commerce were marginalized, suppressed, and squeezed. Starting with Qin and Han, the imperial court mostly owned and ran mining and coinage, copper and iron works, salt making and wholesale, porcelain, and even silk industries. The grain market, especially the cross-regional grain market, was basically state appropriations and transportation such as the grain shipping (漕运) to the North in the Ming and Qing to supply the imperial government and the military (Z. Li 1997). Merchants were forced to decapitalize themselves through purchasing land and political office to become dependent on the imperial state. Businessmen commonly paid 40 percent or more of their profit to just bribe officials and the emperor in order to survive, for example, in the Ming Era (J. Wang 2000, 262). The most celebrated merchant groups such as the fabled Anhui merchants (徽商) and Shanxi merchants (晋商) during the Ming and Qing were essentially charter-agents of the imperial grain-shipping, salt-monopoly, and money-management businesses. Even the Song Empire that was most encouraging for private industrial and commercial activities still tried hard to messily monopolize the salt business, eying its lucrative quick money. The Qin-Han state thus extracted as much surplus as possible from both the farmers and the merchants to concentrate wealth of the whole world in the

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hands of essentially one person for imperial governance and other non-investment expenditures. Capitalism, industrial revolution, urban bourgeoisie, and enlightenment all had little chance under such a tight and universal control, despite the fact that there were many mega-cities and significant commercial prosperity in the Chinese World for centuries.18

Hypocrisy and Duplicity The China Order, based on the combination of two seemingly opposite political ideologies of Confucianism and Legalism and with the structural and mental dualities, required and facilitated a widespread and deep deceitfulness in the Chinese politics and sociocultural life. The ruthless and unpredictable Legalist rule of brutal force and cunning ruses complemented and confronted the humane Confucian values and slogans while providing an inexpensive and effective centralized authoritarian rule. Massive manipulation and deep hypocrisy and duplicity were consequentially inevitable. The Confucian value of “people first, state second, and monarchy last” coexisted seemingly seamlessly with the totally reversed order that, described by the same Confucian classic, all of the world should be “unified and pacified into and by one.”19 Indeed, all sizable human groupings and governances always have certain gaps between the official words and the real deeds of the rulers with inevitable asymmetry of information between the leader and the led. The Qin-Han polity under the China Order, however, had the inherent logical and normative tension between its core of Legalism and its appearance of Confucianism. Its worldwide totality precluded alternatives and autonomy for individuals but contradicted often with the reality that there were other ungoverned. Its rigid top-down sociopolitical hierarchy created great need and tolerance for widespread, even institutionalized, hypocrisy and deception. Pragmatism, flexibility, and compromises that were keys to good and dynamic diplomacy and governance were structurally and normatively discouraged or even eliminated. Rarely were there a nation and a culture so morally and ideologically sanctioning so much highly utilitarian duplicity and pretentiousness.20 A sociologist even called duplicity and hypocrisy two of the three main “logics of governance” in imperial China (X. Zhou 2014). Bragging family-like affection as the ruling ethics, the Qin-Han rulers invented and routinely used countless ruses, mass murders, and some of the most inhumane tortures and executions in human history (Yi 2007, 151–53; Brook et al. 2008). The officially sanctioned “Twenty-four Filial Exemplars,” for example, were all basically irrational social and mind controls dressed up as ethics leading to blatant deceits and inhumane disgusts (R. Li 2006). The

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deep duplicity between the official words that are colored with addictively mesmerizing humanistic slogans of Confucianism and the real deeds that are rooted in the harsh realist dominion of Legalism through cunning ruses and brutal force has now been popularly described by Chinese scholars in the twenty-first century as China’s lasting rule by hidden-rules (潜规则).21 A PRC scholar in 2010 concluded that The Art of War, a classic attributed to Sun Zi in the Warring State Era that addressed strategies on winning and prevailing unscrupulously with ruses, was the leading book that summarized the essence of the not just Chinese but also human values and political culture—the philosophy of struggle and that the “unruliness is the only rule.”22 Widespread duplicity and rationalized hypocrisy have long been revealed by Chinese intellectuals themselves as key characteristics of the Chinese mind shaped and nourished under the China Order. The dissident scholar Li Zhi (1527–1602) declared that Chinese rulers and elites tended to “all talk phony words, take fake actions, write false articles” to make “fakeries all around.”23 The British-educated Chinese translator and educator Yan Fu (1854–1921) wrote in 1898, “all flaws of the Chinese way can be summarized as starting with duplicity and ending with shamelessness.”24 The Malaysia-born and Westerneducated Chinese scholar and translator Ku Hung-Ming (1857–1928) characterized “Chinese spirit” in his widely cited treatise in English as with unique “depth,” “broadness,” “simplicity” or child-like, and “delicacy” or “docility” that are “eminently phlegmatic and unspeculative” under a centralized hierarchy of the “divine rights of the kings.” Ku himself also lived as a Han-Chinese zealot, bordering supremacist, illustrating that those physiognomies were essentially fine euphemisms ingeniously crafted in modern phraseology to describe the long culture and deep tradition of polished duplicity and pretentiousness under the China Order as a preferred way of life for the elites and an intended prescription to better the world.25 A little later, Lin Yutang wrote that the “Chinese characters” and the Chinese mind were featured with roguery; a “survival-value of indifference” to rights, ideals, and truth; an absence of analytical ability, scientific outlook, and simple logic that rendered Chinese “activities to the level of alimentary canal and other simple biological needs;” and the “absence of the social mind” that precluded public spirit, civic consciousness and social service.26 Eight decades later, the Chinese scholar Qin Hui similarly pointed out that “[today’s] Chinese intellectuals are mostly discussing fake issues,” misleading the people with empty talk and deceptions (Qin 1-19-2015). Indeed, Chinese classic literature such as the Big Four Novels (Dream of Red Chamber, Romance of Three Kingdoms, Water Margin, and Journey to the West) all contains rich and extensive reflections of the pervasiveness of fakery and trickery in Chinese society and culture under the China Order.27

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Efficacy At great costs, both tangible such as the heavy tax and conscription burdens, the general inefficiency and ineptness of the imperial bureaucracy and the massive destruction and death associated with the periodical and never-ending wars and rebellions, and the intangibles such as the suppression of scientific and cultural innovation and the pervasive hypocrisy, the China Order based on Qin-Han polity was perhaps an apex of human political organization capable of delivering a rather high efficacy of governance for a vast world. To the ruling elites, it could bring peace for years, even decades, with a relatively small bureaucracy (Fairbank 1983, 36–38). Even though, in reality, the appointed and paid officials were just a small part of the large imperial government that included the many more locally financed minor officials, runners, and staff (胥吏衙役) who necessarily made the Qin-Han polity ever more costly and extractive to an agrarian economy and incapable of growing its income for financial investment (Wang 1973; X. Zhou 2014). The widespread existence of the so-called brotherhood organizations and forces of secret or underground societies (江湖, 会党) especially during the Ming-Qing Eras illustrated the actual inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the China Order in providing property rights protection, social order, and judicial discourse (Y. Yu 2006 and 2016). Yet, given the alternative-less acceptance of the China Order by the Chinese ruling elites, terrible governance such as much of the Ming Empire could continue for many decades almost on autopilot, despite some of the worst and most insane leaders in history. To the ruling elites, this premodern but effective way of governance was perhaps an ideal, near-perfect, system to ensure them an orderly and stable access to power, prestige, and wealth of the whole known world. One remarkable power of the Qin-Han polity under the China Order was its ability of cultural-ethnic assimilation. Countless cultural, linguistic, ethnic, even racial groups over time merged and assimilated by force of the imperial rule and the sheer strength of socialization of a worldwide unity of the Confucian ideals and norms. An example has been the Chinese Jews who, unlike many other Jewish populations that tenaciously maintained their identity all over the globe for millennia, peacefully faded in the Ming and Qing Eras to disappear into the gigantic mixing pool of the ever-remolded Han-Chinese nation (Goldstein 1999; J. Yan 2002; Pan 2004). The Chinese Muslims, a much larger group and constantly connected to its origin outside of China, have powerfully resisted Sinification or Han-assimilation while serving and affecting importantly the Qin-Han rulers (X. Xiao 2007). The Hui Nation (the Han Muslims) and the non-Han Muslim nations (mostly in today’s Xinjiang) have

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managed to survive distinguishably till this day to prove the limit of cultural assimilation under the China Order but have been paying extraordinarily high prices of immeasurable blood shed in their endless struggles against repression and even extermination (Forbes 1986; Israeli 2002, 7, 60–66, 291–95).

Longevity Over time, the China Order had a great staying power in Chinese history, rejuvenated from its numerous collapses and even its great discontinuation during the Song Era, with an extraordinarily deep legitimacy in the Chinese culture. The staying power and legitimacy of the China Order grew after each rejuvenation and reached its peak by the time of its ultimate form in the eighteenth century under the Qing world empire, when the China Order governed many peoples and a very large territory in Eastern Eurasia, despite the fact that this so-called prosperity era was actually filled with stagnation, tyranny, injustice, poverty, misery and hunger-driven cannibalism (Spence 1979; Yao eighteenth century). It appeared that the history (at least the official version of it) of the Chinese World had ended with a diligently, carefully, and shrewdly managed Qin-Han polity of Confucian-Legalism for the whole known world. The tyrannical Qianlong Emperor (reign 1736–95), while ignorantly dissing and fatefully dismissing the Macartney Mission from the Great Britain, the true world hegemon at the time, was perhaps accurate to feel like calling himself the “Elder with ten-perfections” (Qianlong 1792).28 What was left uncertain was only the so-called dynastic cycle which determined who would be the winner of the constant, cruel games of power politics as the victorious, genuine son of heaven to carry on the tianxia Mandate of Heaven. The Qin-Han politybased China Order was indeed an ultimate albeit understudied example of the logic of political survival and endurance based on peculiar winning coalitions and selectorates for regimes of corruption and misery (Morrow et al. 2003). Under the China Order, only very few Chinese had ever written dissenting words, much less had them survive the imperial banning fires, about non-Qin-Han polity and almost none about non-tianxia world order. During the chaotic years between the two world empires of the Ming and Qing, unorthodox even anti-traditional but marginalized and suppressed Chinese thinkers of Enlightenment-like ideas and caliber emerged to critically examine the Qin-Han polity and to propose alternatives. Huang Zongxi (1610–95) argued that the Qin-Han imperial system was against the “original” natural laws and morals since the emperors caused the greatest harm to the world (tianxia) and the people.29 Tang Zhen (1630–1704) simply concluded that “kings and emperors since Qin are all actually thieves.”30 Wang Fuzhi (1619–92) revived the pre-Qin idea for individual rights and interests and local self-rule, call-

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ing for making “the whole tianxia not for one person to own.”31 Gu Yanwu (1613–82), who questioned the China Order like an Enlightenment thinker in the tradition of Mencius, started to argue that it is the people’s life, well-being and rights, not the ruler’s family rule that ought to be the focus of politics. He advanced the idea of rule by the many instead of one man through a modified pre-Qin feudal system that resembled local autonomy.32 Yet, Gu’s famous assertion “everyone is responsible for the well-being of the tianxia (world)” has been used by the various rulers from the Qing emperors to the CCP and their court scholars to be “everyone is responsible for the well-being of the state” to demand people’s unconditional support for the regime in the name of the country and the world.33 Only by the end of the Qing in the late-1890s, Western (and Japanese) influenced Kang Youwei (1858–1927) started to argue for China “to govern the tianxia in coexistence with other states rather than with just one unified power for all.”34 Later, Kang’s student and assistant, the influential writer and political activist Liang Qichao (1873–1929) promoted the phrase of Chinese nation (中华民族) and advanced Chinese rights and interests as an independent nation under the Westphalia system as well as advocating Western ideas of rule of law, liberty, science, and democracy to reform the Chinese politics and society (Liang 1929). The China Order, therefore, could hardly change from inside despite the extremely costly ways of replicative rejuvenation (and momentary policy adjustments) through the dynastic cycles. Native sociopolitical ideas and critiques under the China Order, even the most revolutionary ones such as Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzhi, and Gu Yanwu, could not match the depth, logic, and vision in the political analyses of Aristotle let alone the European Enlightenment thinkers (J. Wang 2000, 282–91). The great thinkers and innovative scholars of politics and law in the Mediterranean–European world under the Westphalia system, from Francis Bacon, David Hume, John Locke, Martin Luther, to Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau could never emerge in the Chinese world empire. External factors and influences were left to be the major, often only, source of innovation, change, and progress for the peoples under the China Order (Elman 2009). The sociopolitical framework or “productive organization,” deemed crucial to “the great transformation” of market economy by Karl Polanyi (1944), can hardly ever emerge from under the China Order. The German philosopher Friedrich Hegel analyzed in the nineteenth century that China was locked out of the World Spirit and History as even the emperor was not free there, only outsiders might perhaps help to change the sad destiny of the Chinese people so they would not perpetually “sell themselves as slaves and to eat the bitter bread of slavery” (Dwight and Hawthorne 1899, 101, 138) The American missionary Arthur Smith concluded on the eve of the twentieth century from his first-hand observation that “China can never be reformed

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from within . . . what is needed by China is not merely admission into the family of nations, but unrestricted intercourse, free trade” of goods and ideas with the outside world and “some force from without” (Smith 1894, 324–26). Ever since the mid-nineteenth century, external influences have been indeed disturbing and disruptive to the ruling elites but often devastating and bloody to the people as the Qin-Han rulers inexorably mobilized the people for forceful resistances. The natural, nativist, and nationalist reactions against the strong and deadly but often progressive and transformational external influence have almost always been sinisterly manipulated and misappropriated by the ruling elites to preserve their power and privileges that are best served and maximized by the China Order.

The China Order versus the Westphalia System Humankind has evolved in several worlds on planet Earth, largely disconnected for eons until the past few centuries. Two of those distinctive worlds, the Chinese World and the Mediterranean World, on the two sides of the Eurasian Continent, have evolved separately to constitute the so-called Eastern and Western civilizations. On the west side, the Mediterranean–European World politically evolved from long disunions to a brief worldwide governance of the Roman Empire, the Roman Order, followed by a millennium-long political division before it entered the Westphalia international system. On the east side, the Chinese World also evolved from long disunions to a worldwide governance of the Qin-Han Empire, followed by repeated and finally unshakeable rejuvenation of unified world government of the China Order until it violently crushed into the expanding Mediterranean–European World in the nineteenth century. Unlike the Roman Order, the China Order demonstrated a great staying power and extraordinary ability of rejuvenation as a worldwide political system. The Mediterranean World has its origins in some of the oldest human civilizations in the Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, and Italy. It achieved a singular, centralized worldwide political governance, a world empire order under the Roman Empire, proceeded by a brief attempt of world unification by the Macedonian conquest of Alexander the Great. Started in the late-first century BCE, the Roman Order peaked with a unified world government to cover territory from the British Isles to Central Asia-Northern India and from the Baltic Sea to the Sahara Desert. The Roman Order, the Pax Romana, ruled this huge and dynamic region of the globe and the many multirace, multination, and multilinguistic societies for centuries. Yet, the peoples in the Roman World, especially on the Italian Peninsula, the Latin Tribes and the often pesky privileged citizens in the City of Rome, kept much of their diverse,

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feudalistic, parochial, and legalistic sociopolitical and economic traditions and ideations. Religion continued to be autonomous from political power, as were the landlords, wealthy merchants, and mercenary generals. The mighty Roman Legions never fully subjugated all rivalries in the whole known world like the Gauls, the Germans, the Saxons, the Persians, and other Minor Asian rulers who almost constantly opposed, penetrated, and weakened Rome. The Roman emperors never had the same totality of control or thorough unification as the Qin-Han emperors. As described in chapter 1 of this book, crucial ecogeographic, demographic, and historical peculiarities ensured that the Roman Order was never fully revived after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries. The Roman World was replaced by a long, over one millennium, de facto Westphalia-like international system and then the de jure Westphalia system in 1648. The peoples of the Roman World and their Hellenic–Roman institutions, ideology, knowledge, legal norms, arts, and languages continued to survive, develop, and grow in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. Later, this evolving Western World expanded through the fiery and bloody processes of conquering many other human civilizations and colonizing many other worlds, especially the Americas, South and Southeast Asia, the whole of Africa, and Oceania. By the late-nineteenth century, the Westphalia system, rooted in Hellenic–Roman–European world order and shaped and strengthened by wars and revolutions, achieved its domination of the real whole known world, the globe (Blanning 2008). After the infernos of the two world wars (1914–18 and 1937/9–1945) and one Cold War (1947–91) in the twentieth century, this Westphalia world order has further evolved to be a U.S.-dominated but globalized liberal world order as the political system for the whole of humankind (Ikenberry 2011). Determined by its very nature of diversity, self-rule, and sovereign-equality, the Westphalia world order does not ensure the implementation of the same sociopolitical ideas and norms in all nation-states or multination-states that live under it. Years into the twenty-first century, the dominant European–American institutions, values, and norms are only adopted and practiced very unevenly by the 200 plus units of the world. The political governance, economic performance, and social development of those individual countries therefore naturally differ and vary greatly to make them comparatively look like different worlds: from liberal democratic republics to despotic autocracies or theocracies and from excessive affluence to abject poverty or even failed states. The distribution of power in the world also shifts constantly among the nations. But, as long as the fundamentals of the Westphalia system are observed and maintained, the world order remains intact. Diplomacy, trade, migration, conflicts, and yes, occasional wars, even the rise and fall of various hegemons work to maintain

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this dynamic world order of international relations and facilitate the highly consequential comparison, cooperation, and competition among the nations. External political comparison and competition inevitably lead to and are reinforce by internal political comparison and competition. At present, a globalization powered by same-day global transportation and instantaneous communication is profoundly reshaping the world for humankind with perhaps an increasingly uncertain fate for the Westphalia system itself. The emergence of a global elite and their well-shared global norms from just about all racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds may signal enormous new incentives and motives to fundamentally reform the sixteen-centuries-old (de facto) or five-centuries-old (de jure) Westphalia system. In the name of progress and the urge to deal with many pressing global issues, the world may be politically moving ever closer to have a worldwide governance or even a singular world government. The Chinese World evolved out of the many ancient civilizations in Eastern Eurasia, mainly the Centralia or China Proper in the Pre-Qin Era. Slightly earlier than the Mediterranean World, the Chinese World similarly achieved its world unification in the late-third century BCE and established the Qin-Han world empire, the China Order. Like the rulers of the Roman Empire, the Qin-Han Empire naturally sought imperial expansion and conquest to rule the whole known world and then collapsed violently. Critically unlike the Roman Empire, the Qin-Han Empire revived after relatively brief disunions, or eras of de facto international systems, to continue and improve. After the promising Chanyuan system, a de jure Westphalia-like international system during the Song Era, the China Order rejuvenated again with a vengeance to rule (or at least pretend to rule) the whole known world under the Yuan-Ming-Qing Empires until the late-nineteenth century when the Chinese World was forcibly incorporated into the whole globe under the Western world order of the Westphalia system. Under the China Order, a same set of sociopolitical institutions, ideas, values, and norms was strictly, often brutally and effectively, implemented throughout the politically unified world. The dominant Confucian-Legalism was the ruling ideology for all rulers under the China Order for more than two millennia, regardless of their racial, ethnic, or cultural backgrounds. Centralization, singularity, totality, and uniformity in sociopolitical hierarchy and stratification, governance, ideology, and resource allocation were ensured worldwide. Only geography and distance, the capacity and mindset of a particular ruler, and the feudal/confederation-like governance of entangling and the ever more pretentious tributary system (for the peoples out of the manageable Centralia) might slow, distort, and even prevent the politically imposed imperial sociocultural assimilation of the various parts of Eastern Eurasia. No

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political peers or opposition were allowed. External comparison and competition must be crushed, kept at bay, or assumed away. Exits of emigration did not meaningfully exist. Thus, unlike the Westphalia system that structurally and ideologically justified and encouraged nonconformity and innovation driven by international comparison, competition, trade, war, and migration or colonization, the China Order comprehensively discouraged commerce, obstructed even banned foreign trade and migration, and suppressed and even distinguished deviation and innovation worldwide for centuries at a time. Several variables have determined the great staying power and the extraordinary rejuvenation of the China Order in the Chinese World. Ecogeography (terrain and location), demography (homogenous ethnolinguistic majority of the agrarian Han nation versus nomadic tribe-nations), history (deprivation of feudalism, private property rights, and legalistic tradition), culture (the state monopoly of ideology, faith, and history writing), and random factors like the personal characters and visions of the leaders and sheer luck at critical moments (such as Xiang Yu’s failure and the Mongol’s success) all mattered greatly. The duplicitous yet highly complementary ruling ideology of Confucian-Legalism held the key. The intentional and later internalized manipulation of the mind and words profoundly equalized the singular autocratic ruler to the state, the state to the nation, country or the world, and to Mother Nature or the God/heaven. People, therefore, lived, worked, and died for the China Order, not the other way around. In Chinese, the phrase of the state and country is written as guojia (国家 country-family), and the phrase of tianxia means both the whole world and the country or the worldwide ruling of a political regime. The thoroughness and pragmatism of a Qin-Han polity about power at all cost and by any means led to a long-lasting and effective union of overwhelming force with “splendid dupes,” as a twentieth-century thinker put it, to form a powerful and “disastrous alliance between abnormal innocence and abnormal sin” (Chesterton 1922, 4). Technological measures and improvements such as household registration and imperial examination were indispensable. Furthermore, the very totality and universality of the practiced China Order precluded alternative, comparison, and exit to powerfully forge a lasting legitimacy and an unshakable path-dependency over the centuries. Frequent and significant social protests and rebellions naturally occurred under the China Order but they were too heavily confined and shaped by the Chinese mind to be institutionally innovative or revolutionary (Hung 2011). As summarized by an American sinologist, “China today is what Europe would have been if the unity of the Roman Empire had lasted until now and there had not been the separate emergence of the separate entities of England, France, Germany and the like” (Pye 1993, 130).

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Ideal Governance for the Rulers at Exorbitant Expense To an autocratic ruler and the aristocratic ruling elites, hereditary or not,35 the China Order is ideal and near perfect, albeit with prices. For millennia, therefore, the tianxia Mandate of Heaven for the China Order has propelled just about all of China’s rulers and ruling elites toward building and maintaining a singular and harmonious Qin-Han world empire system. The China Order and its foundational Qin-Han polity historically proved to be able to repeat and perpetuate. It was a simple, predictable, and effective way to govern, sometimes could be almost on autopilot for years or even decades as long as the incurable corruption of the officialdom, the inevitable autocratic irrationality of the sometimes inept (even crazy) emperors, the constant rebellions, and the external incursions and invasions all were reasonably checked (Fairbank 1973; Pye 1992; G. Wang 2006). Even if a particular dynasty imploded, institutional rejuvenation of the China Order was expected with a new emperor, a different ruling family or group, and a much-reduced population (even a bigger territory if the invaders were incorporated into the new world empire) to start all over again (Jin and Liu 2011). To serve happily successful rulers of even alien ethnic and cultural backgrounds was rarely a legal or moral problem for many of the Chinese ruling elites. This was well-exemplified by the massive Han Chinese fighting for the Mongols to destroy the Han nation-state of Song, fighting for the Manchu to eliminate the Han nation-state of Ming, and fighting for the Japanese against the Han nation-state of the ROC.36 Under the China Order, the government centrally extracts, accumulates, and utilizes massive wealth and talent from the whole known world, thus making the imperial ruler super rich and powerful through tight control and massive mobilization with relaxed (if any at all) concerns for the rights, well-being, or benefits of the people. Indeed, the massive size of the Chinese World did have world’s largest GDP for many centuries (Maddison 2007). The Qin-Han rulers could enable speedy and immoderate even fantastical projects of construction or conspicuous spending such as building the Grand Canal (and maybe the high-speed railways in today’s PRC), the massive metropolises and palaces, the countless city-like imperial mausoleums and monuments, the militarily useless Great Wall, or financing largely fruitless overland and maritime expeditions and projects. Under the orderly peace over a vast land and many peoples for long periods, the ruling elites easily maximized their personal and family power and wealth to very high levels with legitimate means or more commonly through corruption and rent seeking. The privileged ruling elites, always a tiny minority in numbers,37 enjoyed what the whole known world had to provide. They could have the exclusive and extravagant luxury that

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technology and human imagination could ever produce, especially the laborintensive goods and pleasuring-services such as the exotic and exquisite but often nutritionally dubious cuisines and magic tonics.38 Expensive gardens and household items, excessively fine handicraft products with mainly decorative or conspicuous showing utilities, massive harems at all levels, the elaborated art of domestic servitudes, and exotic tributes and imports from far away are the kind of luxury that is often literally buried with the mandarins, hardly producing much gainful investment, seldom benefiting the physical and mental health of the indulging elites themselves, and rarely promoting any innovation or mass production for the market (J. Wang 2000, 234–38). No wonder that ruling elites elsewhere, such as in Japan, have also attempted to construct their versions of the China Order, a Japan Order for their own Japanese World.39 Near perfect as an ideal way of authoritarian governance, the China Order of the Qin-Han polity had profound structural flaws as a premodern sociopolitical system. It lacked fundamentally accountability thus suffering from persistent inefficiency and widespread injustice with incurable corruption and rent-seeking at every level of the government and every corner in the society (Feng 3-13-2014; Hong 2014). This “state of nature” was a singular monopoly of everything that systematically suppresses and twists competition thus suffocating innovation and efficiency in both governance and economy (North et al. 2009, 41–45). The great compliment and the inherent contradiction between Confucianism and Legalism indeed offered the autocratic emperor maximum room of personal power and maneuverability. But the high concentration of power in one person’s hand, without institutional and ideological framework for a rule of law, inevitably steers the whole world to unpredictable leadership with frequent, uncertain, and dangerous succession problems. Peaceful and effective self-correction is a key mechanism largely missing. The only way to have innovative ideas and policies is the highly uncertain change of the ruler through death, assassination, coup d’état or rebellion. The China Order therefore structurally and functionally necessitates a periodical shutdown and restart, an excruciating and costly change of an ossified dynasty that will necessarily bring in great havoc of the total upheaval for the whole world leading to total chaos (天下大乱). The simple dynamics of population growth over time with a stagnated and uninnovative economy bound to destroy every mighty Qin-Han world empire. The reset and the rejuvenation of the China Order were only achieved though massive, unimaginable losses of life. The peoples in the Chinese World have indeed experienced numerous mass reductions under the China Order when a world empire crumbles or a ruler made blunders. One failed dynasty-cycle, the Taiping Rebellion in the mid-nineteenth century, wiped out nearly 100 million or a quarter of the

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total Chinese population in one decade; one man-made famine in Mao’s PRC killed 30 to 45 million or 5 to 10 percent of the total population in three peaceful years.40 The elites actually suffered under the China Order and the Qin-Han governance. Much of the history of the China Order featured personal, despotic rule of emperors who on average were replaced every dozen years with costly, often bloody and disrupting, royal successions and were mostly “corrupt, sadist, idiotic, or underage, sick and incompetent” (L. Zhou 1999, 200). In addition to the mental enslaving and submission, the elites had only limited personal dignity and little security, especially facing their superiors. They tended to constantly living in fear of rebellion, conspiracy, and most frequently the unpredictable rage of the emperor who could ultimately take everything (including literally the heads of all of his extended family) away with a momentary loss of temper. Worse, there was basically no place to run to, to vanish as an exile, or to hide in order to weather out a stormy imperial punishment under the China Order. During the Ming and Qing for which detailed records are now available, the cabinet ministers often treated every routine meeting with the emperor as facing a possibly humiliating execution. The imperial despotism of a total disregard of human life, property, and dignity was often compounded by the twisted eunuch tyrannies and secret police. The ruling elites in the China Order enjoyed indulgences and luxury, even despotic power, over their subordinates, yet they themselves fundamentally lacked dignity, freedom, justice, and security. For the more numerous mid- to low-level officials, the luxury and power at the top were mostly addictive mirages. Leading a life full of constant inhumanity and indignation while “must” acting always as a brutal mini-tyrant to the subordinates and the masses was hardly desirable or pleasant to anyone with a good conscience.41 The emperors paid a high price too. Their daily life was rigid, insecure, wearying, and highly stressful with unhealthy indulgences as the escape. The emperors were the most envied yet “the most unfortunate” people under the China Order, condemned “to do only two things in life: to grab and to keep the throne” (H. Zhang 2012, 1). The 209 Chinese emperors from Qin to Qing, from reliable personal data, on average had a life span of only 39 years, 10 to 18 years shorter than the life expectancy of the average people at the time despite the best material and medical conditions they had. More than 44 percent of the 611 rulers of the various empires or regimes in Chinese history died of unnatural causes such as assassination or execution. About one-quarter of the emperors had mental or psychological illnesses. Chinese history is full of intra-royal family brutality and murder as well as simple paranoia and insanity of the rulers. Many royal families (often with many tens of thousands of members) of the once mighty world rulers were completely wiped out physically when their dynasties fell (H. Zhang 2007; Bo 1979).

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Great Incompatibility and Long Stagnation The China Order of Qin-Han world empire is structurally and ideologically incompatible with independent and scientific reasoning, individual decision-based market economy, human rights-based civil society, and sovereignty-equality-based international community. With the absence of external challenge, competition, and alternatives, the system tends to perpetuate, repeating itself through costly and bloody cycles, condemning a great civilization and many great peoples into endless cycles of stagnation, despotism, and mass death. It creates systematic deprivation of human life and human rights as well as property rights, suboptimal living standard, and long and deep stagnation of socioeconomic development for the whole known world—grand prices paid by the peoples of the Chinese World for the political order, sociocultural uniformity, and extreme indulgences enjoyed by the tiny ruling elites.42 Technological and socioeconomic stagnation compounded by population growth means that the worldwide sociopolitical tranquility is inherently unsustainable. The China Order thus has persistent social tensions, political chaos, and humanitarian disasters. Therefore, the China Order was a systemic factor that decisively sent Eastern Eurasia onto its peculiar route of long stagnation and deep poverty of materials and ideas. The main reason why China has been backward and poor, concluded a PRC historian, is not the mere lack of technology (as the CCP has insisted) but the “bad genes” of China’s long “political system and culture” (S. Yang 2012, i–ii). The genes seem to have continued: a PRC economist argued publicly in 2015 that “60 to 99 percent of the Chinese today still don’t treat themselves as human beings” as they do not have much human dignity or a marketplace for ideas, nor freedom of thinking and expression (W. Zhang 2015). It would certainly be a fallacy of the single-cause causal reductionism to attribute all the problems in the Chinese World to just this one source. But the worldwide structure holds a key. Indeed, comparatively, a China Order-like world empire seems to have also facilitated long-term socioeconomic stagnation in different racial, cultural, and historical settings such as the Mesoamerican civilization, the Inca people, pre-Meiji Japan, and Sub-Sahara Africa. Monopoly in economy hurts efficiency and innovation, monopoly of politics corrupts governance, and monopoly of ideas devastates people’s minds. A worldwide monopoly of all three is simply the most abysmal.43 As this book has shown, contrary to the official narratives of Chinese history, the real golden eras in Chinese history have been the few centuries before Qin’s unification of the Chinese World, the Song Era when the peoples in the Chinese World departed from the China Order, and the time since the late-nineteenth century when China was forced into the Westphalia system of international relations. Even the commonly dismissed chaotic era of the post-

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Han disunion, the South-North dynasties and sixteen states (316–589 CE), was in fact not a dark age at all with regard to economy, culture, and technology (R. Huang 1997, 74). The political decentralization and competition as well as the resurgence of feudalism and cultural diversity during this “quasi-Warring States period” in fact lay down the foundation for the cultural achievements in the subsequent early periods of the Sui-Tang Empire (Yi 2007, 103–04). The chaos and losses of life and wealth during the disunions of the Chinese World were more appropriately the results of than the reason for the China Order— they were simply the periodical and inevitable explosions of the accumulated and magnified problems of injustice, incompetence, stagnation, deficits, and imbalances, chiefly the population-resource imbalance, under the China Order. In addition to the Song, the officially praised prosperous periods of the early Han, early Tang, early Ming, and early Qing were all in fact still under a de facto non-tianxia world order with meaningful and rewarding external competition, interaction, and exchanges in and around the Chinese World (G. Zhang 1995 and 2008). Those great world empires in fact all declined and decayed rapidly after they finally managed to forcefully destroy external competitors, thus solidifying and sealing tight a complete China Order. A traditionally praised leading virtue of the China Order is that it takes away the need and facility for unpredictable conflicts and wars among sovereign states for the whole known world. Similar views on political order and peace are indeed shared by many worldwide today. Some have hypothesized that political centralization by a great Leviathan leads to, aggregately, more peace and a lower number of war deaths, thus an imperial hegemonic world political order is better for significant war reduction overall (Elias 1994, 183–438; Gat 2006, 401–42). “War made the state, and the state made peace,” declared a popular American author of history (Morris 2014, 18). Yet, there is the pesky Chinese peculiarity. The tianxia system of the China Order was by no means more peaceful or less destructive than non-tianxia international systems of the pre-Qin and Song Eras. It merely transformed the international competition and warfare from less predictable and highly competitive but mostly limited for dispute-settling especially under a legal framework of international relations such as the Westphalia system or Chanyuan system, to civil wars and rebellions that might be easier for the ruler to survive but much more disastrous and murderous as they were unlimited and desperate life-and-death total wars. Both the frequency and intensity of wars and conflicts in the Chinese World increased as the China Order solidified and peaked (Figure 4.1). One Taiping Rebellion in 1850–64 caused the loss of 100 million lives, more than the total death toll of all wars that nations fought in the twentieth century, two world wars included (Ge and Cao 2001). Out of the ten worst ever wars in human history prior to the twentieth century measured by death ratio of the

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population, at least five occurred in the Chinese World after the Qin (Pinker 2011, figure 5-3). More Chinese died in civil war, purges, and mass murders in 1946–76 than in all the external wars China endured from 1840 to 1945. What is even more tragic about the China Order and its impact on war proneness is that, unlike the many wars fought in other worlds, especially those under the de facto and later de jure Westphalia system in Western Eurasia and the Western Hemisphere, that may have produced good side effects to make the humankind eventually safer and richer (Gat 2006, 445–673; Morris 2014, 3–26), the ever more and brutal total wars fought in Eastern Eurasia under the China Order were largely violent reductions of the unsustainable population or for the repetitive cyclical conflicts over who would be the victorious son of heaven. Very little progress of military-related technological, ideological, organizational, or managerial innovations developed over the millennia. No meaningful colonies were established. Not much new land and resources were profitably obtained as the result of those wars either, as the basic size of the Centralia or China Proper remained the same from Qin to Qing. The acquisition of the vast non-Centralia land such as Manchuria, Xinjiang, and Tibet only became profitable to the Chinese during the most recent few decades. Under the China Order, the state-society relationship was compressed to be a total owning and ruling of the people by the emperor and the ruling elites. As succinctly stated in the Confucian-Legalist classic, allegedly authored

Figure 4.1. Wars per Year in the Chinese World. Source: Based on table 1.2 of this book.

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by a major Legalist politician Guan Zhong but in fact finalized by a royal official-scholar centuries later in the Han Era, the Qin-Han polity-based China Order structurally and ideologically restricted and reduced and even stripped human rights and civil rights of the people to effectively render the people as livestock to be properly herded and farmed, cleverly manipulated and controlled, and better utilized or even slaughtered if necessary by the imperial officials and ultimately the emperor for the purpose of pacifying and governing the world (Guan first century BCE, V1). In the words of a non-PRC Chinese philosopher, the China Order and the Qin-Han polity were just inferior “ways of governing” people, not the elevated “ways of politics” for the people (Mu 1991). In practice, the emperors appointed imperial officials with that intent and often the exact title of herdsman such as herdsman of prefecture (州牧) or guardian of prefecture (太守) (Pan 1983). Softer version of this state-society relationship with more Confucian coating would paint the people as the never-grown-up children of the emperor to be owned, cared, controlled for, indoctrinated, and expended by the imperial state so the local officials were called parent-official (父母官) and the people under the China Order were indoctrinated to believe they were being kept and fed by the emperor and his officials, rather than the other way around.44 Like livestock farming, the China Order was built on the premise of sustaining, herding, and growing the population at a generally fixed, lowest possible, agrarian living standard of subsistence—it could indeed do a remarkable job for that purpose, sometimes for many decades in the row—rather than enriching and enabling people to reach their potentials at an ever rising level of satisfaction. Those imperial shepherds then acted like hungry dogs or wild wolves rotating to herd the people as sheep, with structurally inevitable, unstoppable and insatiable corruption and exploitation (Yi 2007, 163–93; Hong 2014). Similar to many other pre-Enlightenment political systems, the Qin-Han polity governed for the sake of the rulers. Instead of being the first to ensure order, security, and justice for the people through the public-consented and exercised authority, those premodern polities alienated the people, making the authoritarian power and the limitless extraction of the imperial state the very objectives of politics and government, replacing the end of politics with the means of governance. Unlike the post-Roman de facto and later de jure Westphalia world order in the Mediterranean–European World, however, the China Order eliminated interstate competition and comparison, precluded people’s choices and emigration, restricted trade and external exchanges and exploration, and created a self-isolation that took away the competitive spirit and the explorative adventurism. It prevented a renaissance of the pre-Qin ideas and dismissed the Song lessons, and precluded any possible native-grown enlightenment for the peoples. Political democracy and human rights as well as

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rule of law thus were simply impossible to originate or flourish in the Chinese World under the China Order that cemented an illiberal sociopolitical order. The only answer sanctioned by the China Order to the “central question” of political philosophy, “why should anyone obey anyone else” (Berlin 1952, 6) was the imperial Mandate of Heaven to unite and rule the whole known world. Unfortunately, the same as its devastating impact on the development of political ideologies and theories and on the progression of state-society relationship, the China Order systematically discouraged and punished (often through physical elimination) independent thinking, discovery, and experimentation (X. Yang 1999, 77–113). It thus suffocated technological invention and innovation in all areas that had any public implication on tradition and the political status quo. It fundamentally blocked scientific and industrial revolution, restricted and castrated education, dampened and even extinguished sparks of new ideas and new technology, making the Chinese technological progress minuscule and causing economic efficiency to deterioratie for many centuries in the row.45 After Song, for over 700 years, the Chinese (mostly 20 percent to one-quarter of humankind) have been lacking innovation under the China Order in just about every field from philosophy, science, and technology, to medicine (Wang 1997, 59–66; Rao 2009, 176–267; X. Gu 2015, 13). One quick visit to the display of technology, especially the farming tools used from Qin (especially after Song) to Qing in any good museum of Chinese history, would vividly reveal the long stagnation of science and technology under the China Order.46 Dynasties and emperors came and went, leaving China with “no Renaissance, no Enlightenment, no Industrial Revolution” (Y. Zhao 2014, 47). The Western Eurasia, on the stark contrary, took off under the de facto and especially the de jure Westphalia system and started enlightenment, scientific and industrial revolution, religious and political reformations, and geographic discoveries and expansion (Landes 1998). The maddening absence of original ideas or technology after the Song (with its innovations and efficiencies finally exhausted in the Yuan Empire in the fourteenth century), the so-called China Puzzle or “Needham Puzzle” persisted (Finlay 2000, 265–303; Sun 2010, 86–91). China’s economic expansion without technological progress or “quantitative growth with qualitative standstill” was therefore structural and predestined (Finlay 2000, 265–303). In 2014, a team of Chinese scholars published their quantitative analysis of human history of science and technology from 3000 BCE to 2012 with the following conclusions (J. Dong 2014, 29–36): Major technological innovation in the Chinese World accounts for 5.8 percent of the human total (1,235), while the US has 34.9, Western Europe about 31.2, the Middle East about 8, and South Asia about 3 percent respectively.

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Scientific discoveries in the Chinese World (5 contributions) accounts for less than 1 percent of the human total (515), while Western Europe about 65.5, the US 18.2, the Middle East abut 4.5, and South Asia 3.2 percent respectively. Unlike in the European/Mediterranean World, scientific work in the Chinese World was sporadic, never became systematic trends or schools. Scientific and technological innovation and invention in the Chinese World have always been lower than that in the European/Mediterranean World. They basically stopped shortly after the Song Era ended (1300 CE).

Deadly Sisyphus, Inescapable Inferno As early as the eighteenth century, the Scottish economist Adam Smith had already detected that there was unrivaled poverty, inhuman living-standards, and long stagnation in China since the Chinese economy had neglected or despised international commerce, depleted the meager surplus of the laborer with disastrous population growth, discouraged changes and innovations, and simply reached the limit of an agrarian economy long ago (Smith 1776, 73–97). The life of the non-elite masses in a Qin-Han world empire, as the result of the China Order, was indeed at best suboptimal survival and at worst atrocious. Despite visible albeit slow growth of production mainly due to new (imported) crops and expanded acreage of farmland, Chinese peasants, the overwhelming majority of the people, constantly shouldered ever-increasing tax burdens estimated to be 30 to 50 percent or higher (up to 70 percent at times), plus the frequent conscription duties that took away basically all of their surplus to solidly lock them into endless hard labor for subsistence living with no capital or time to engage in any other possible industries or to improve farming technology. As a contrast, the farmers in Medieval England (twelfth century) typically paid only 10 to 30 percent of their income in taxes with 20 percent left to be the accumulated capital (J. Wang 2000, 177–78, 184, 226). For two millennia, with perhaps the exception of the Song Era when significant industrial-commerce revenues and foreign trade helped to keep the tax burden the lowest in Chinese history, Chinese peasants were often only one bad harvest away from bankruptcy, cadging, banditry, cannibalism, starvation, or desperate rebellion. “China had famines just about every year” with massive “worldwide” famines happening with increased frequency under

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the China Order: from 69 times in the first century CE and 171 times in the second century to 391 times in the fourteenth century and 504 times in the sixteenth century (Deng 1937, 1, 61). A Taiwanese-Japanese author calculated that, from 205 BCE to the 1930s, large-scale famine-induced (excluding war or rebellion-caused) cannibalism happened in China once every eighteen years (H. Huang 2005). Diseass, illiteracy, idiocy, obscurantism, and gross abuse of women and the disadvantaged were common features of daily life.47 Growing slowly to reach its highest level during the Song Era in the twelfth century, per capita GDP in China stagnated for centuries with basically no growth. Then it declined all the way until the late-twentieth century. Real income per laborer from Han to Qing was largely a long stagnation and then a one-way decline, despite some spikes during the Song Era. The real annual income per laborer rose by only 37.5 percent from 27 CE to 1107 (from 1,440 to 1,980 liter of grain per laborer), then declined 84.8 percent by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (to below 300 liters) (Liu and Zhao 1988, 874–85). The Chinese per capita GDP stagnated for centuries after the Song while the European per capita GDP took off during that time, even though that the total GDP of the post-Song China was world’s largest (still a staggering 32 percent in purchasing power parity terms by the 1820s) (Maddison 2007, 29, 44). Chinese studies estimate that the financial surplus a British worker produced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was 120 times higher than a Chinese laborer at the time, and the British Empire’s annual fiscal revenue was six times larger than the Qing Empire (which had a population 20 times larger) (Z. Huang 2013). The highly praised Kangxi Period of Prosperity (1662–1723) was in fact a Kangxi Depression with the usual injustice and atrocious corruption, abject poverty and destitution, frequent and deadly floods and famine (one out of every three years) and even cannibalism right in the most developed and wealthiest region of Southern Jiangsu (J. Wang 2011). Chinese Engle Coefficient (income spent on food) was 75 to 80 percent (59 percent would mean abject poverty) in Qing’s “prosperity” time (Hong 2014). Per capita grain production is a key indicator that can perhaps be more reliably assessed over time in Chinese history. Medical science estimates that the minimum daily intake of calories to sustain a human life is between 1,000 (infant) to 3,000 (active adult) with a mean of about 2,200 (Zelman 2013). One kilogram of processed grain contains roughly 3,500 calories (World Watch 2013). Considering the inevitable losses in food processing and storage, simple wastes, elastic needs for animal feed, and other significant uses such as alcoholmaking, a population needs a per capita annual grain production of more than 400 kg to sustain itself. Growing slowly from Qin-Han (524 kg) to Song (729 kg) and then stagnating for a long time, per capita grain production declined after the mid-Ming (595 kg), all the way down to the Qing (390 kg) and

Figure 4.2. Per Capita and per mu Grain Production. Note: Crops of grains and the calories they provide vary greatly across time and countries. The comparative estimates here are for illustration purpose only. Based on H. Wu 1985, G. Cao 1989, Zheng and Huang 1989, China News Agency 2009, C. He 2013, and Earth Policy Institute 2013.

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sank to the lowest on record of imperial China by the late-Qing in 1900 (365 kg) (H. Cheng 1994, 13–16). China’s per capita grain production went lower still in Mao’s PRC in 1962 (only 207 kg). With imported modern farming technology and equipment (with the serious soil degradation and water pollution as the price), the highest per capita grain production in the PRC was 435 kg in 2012, when it finally went above the “minimum amount of 430 kg needed for a decent living standard,” according to Chinese official estimates (CCTV 9-9-2009; D. Wang 2013), but was still only 60 percent of that in the Song one millennium ago. A chronological and comparative study of the growth of per capita GDP reports an identical and even more striking pattern of long stagnation in the Chinese World, especially after the Song Era, with an annual growth rate of zero for more than 500 years from the fifteenth century until the twentieth century while the Europeans (with a per capita GDP actually lower than China’s in the thirteenth century) enjoyed a steady growth, creating an insurmountable lead over the Chinese (6.3 times in 1913 and still 5.7 times in 1998) due to the centuries of compounded growth differentials (Maddison 2001, figure 1-4, tables B-21 and B-22). The very thin surplus of the slow-growing Chinese economy, mostly from planting imported crops of corn and yams and the cultivation of more hilly land, was often squeezed to depletion by the rising imperial tax and official grafts to meet the growing size and appetite of the ruling elite and their greedy agents. The growth of population, sanctioned by the family-based Confucian values and necessitated by the labor-intensive small family-farming economy, then wiped out any leftover surplus to chronically impoverish and decapitalize the Chinese society (Y. Lin 2012, 300–05). It is indeed very sad to see that given the gross inequality of grain distribution and the incredibly wasteful imperial extravagance without any meaningful international trade to substantially import food, countless if not the majority of the Chinese people from the Ming to the PRC were in fact simply undernourished and starved for many generations. The largely imperial state-monopolized industries were unsurprisingly inefficient as well. Even during the more vibrant Song Era, the expensive state monopoly of horse-husbandry failed to provide adequately for the Song cavalry forces to defend against the nomadic invaders (Z. Huang 2010). China’s mother river, the Yellow River, had increasingly more disastrous floods over time, with basically annual dam-breakage that killed countless and buried major cities after the Tang Dynasty (J. Wang 2000, 165–66). Mass death and senseless destruction were both results of the frequent, desperate, and extremely violent spasms of the China Order. Unlike in the feudal societies of Western Europe and Japan, the splendid buildings and mega cities of the Qin, Han, Tang, and Song basically all disappeared without much trace. There are simply no equivalent of the still-

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standing Jerusalem, Aye Sofia, the Coliseum, or the Roman Aqueducts in China; and few contemporaries of St. Peter’s Cathedral or the Italian Renaissance arts remaining. One has to go to admire the once magnificent but now long gone Sui-Tang wooden buildings, for instance, in Kyoto and Nara of Japan. By the 2010s, only four tiny buildings of the Tang Era have been discovered in China, all small religious structures hidden in remote mountains (J. Wang 2000, 345). Oftentimes, the destruction of antiquity and environment were mostly stateorganized and deliberately ordered during those China Order-building total wars or by the mobs and looters en masse due to the lack of lasting private property rights and legal tradition, much more so than the collateral damage caused by the fire of wars and rebellions.48 The stagnated Qin-Han political economy and lifestyle under the China Order also appeared to be more destructive to the environment than its alternatives: in the eighteenth century, natural environment in the Chinese World was already significantly more degraded than that in Western Europe (Elvin 2004; Marks 2011). The epitomized time of the China Order, the Qing in the eighteenth century, was especially anti-intellectual, anti-human rights, and self-isolating. The brutality and thoroughness of body and mind control reached a peak and the falsification of history was equally massive and meticulous (Guy 1987; Spence 2001; Brook et al. 2008). Legalist methods of violence and tricks and indoctrination of Confucian humane rituals and slogans created a culture of hypocrisy and duplicity in China that has lasted to this day. The China Order was impactful on narrowing people’s minds and corrupting their morals, according to many Chinese intellectuals who have lamented about the “low characters,” “the inherent deficiency, decay, corruption and flaws” of HanChinese people, and the “cannibalistic history of China.”49 Moral relativism, through a forced worship of power, bribery, and sheer cynicism reigned. Fear dictated the behavior of not just the elites but also the general masses. Group identities and loyalties including national, ethnic, and even racial belongings were often only secondary and easily tradable in the face of force. Under the China Order, especially after the Song, “the Chinese characters” and “the Chinese personality” seemed to have endured long decays and people tended to become either the vicious and atrocious slave-owners or the submissive and shameless slaves (Liang 2012, 2–12; Jing 2014). Individual human character and rights were systematically erased. At the end of the nineteenth century, an American observer noted that out the many things China desperately needed for reform and betterment, the most crucial “are only Character and Conscience. Nay, they are but one, for Conscience is Character” (Smith 1894, 320). In the twenty-first century, Chinese scholars continue to moan the “terrible national characters” of the Chinese passed down by the Qin-Han China Order (and exacerbated by the PRC) that include the pathetic master-slave schizophrenia,

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widespread duplicity and hypocrisy, cynicism and power-fetishism, and gross disregard of human life and dignity (L. Qian 2012, V2, 308–13). Essentially, the China Order provided the greatest possible power and the best possible life for the very few while forever locking the people into a life of sustenance. It encouraged growth of population with an agrarian economy that only grew expansively rather than intensively—a perfect recipe for poverty, stagnation, and disasters. The China Order, therefore, almost always had the companion of endless rebellions, banditry, and civil wars as eruption of violence resulted regularly from destitution and desperation. Not a single decade went by without enormously destructive rebellions and uprisings somewhere in the Chinese World. Those bloody rebellions generally produced no new ideas, institutions, or sociopolitical progresses (Sun 1956). It is truly sad that the only political choice for the Chinese people under the China Order was either the brutal tyranny of a unified world empire or the horrific chaos of warlordism that took their turns (Yi 2007, 283). The China Order, manifested in the tributary system, was destined to collapse also because of its inherent “self-decay” tendencies (F. Zhou 2011, 29–58). The Chinese people periodically paid with the loss of millions of lives and the accumulated wealth and knowledge of many generations for the few decades of peace and stability under the unified China Order that was mainly meaningful to the ruling elites. Ironically, the rich (albeit largely only anecdotal rather than statistical) historical records about the horrific periodical devastations have been shrewdly used by the ruling elites as justification for a repeat of the China Order rather than a verdict against it. Individually and within the family and even local communities, life is valued by the Chinese just as by any other peoples. However, aggregately and for the China Order, human life is reduced in its value and importance as the often quoted maxim in Chinese media would say, “Chinese life is never valuable.”50 The stability and the survival of the China Order, essentially the privilege and power of the ruling elites, have acquired a value of their own, superseding that of life, justice, efficiency, and innovation. A striking example of the sociopolitical dismissal and discount of human life under the China Order is the fact that imperial history records have grossly inaccurate, often totally omitted, figures of the frequent disaster deaths and war deaths, a tradition continued in today’s PRC. Other than supporting the luxurious and enviable life of a tiny ruling elite, the unaccountable imperial administration, the extravagant royal projects, and the inevitable military expenses, the “world” economy under the China Order ended up by basically only growing the size of the population at the expense of a low and declining living standard of subsistence. That grown population was only to be massively and brutally reduced by the certain recurrences of famine, flood, epidemics, or more seriously the mass murder and destruction caused by

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the next rebellion or the next dynastic cycle that made the Chinese people as a whole endure a very bloody and deadly Sisyphus-like fate. Population growth and demographic pressure, viewed by economic historians as major forces for institutional change and economic innovation (North 1982), became only destructive under the China Order. There were no meaningful outlets of emigration and colonization, which was shunned and banned with the death penalty. There were few scientific, technological, and organizational innovations to enable intensive economic growth or industrial revolution. The expansive growth of the agrarian economy thus hit the ceiling inevitably, quickly, and repeatedly, with cyclically devastating consequences. Very few nations and civilizations have ever had the Chinese pattern of steady population growth combined with a stagnant and declining living standard, plagued by periodical interruptions that drastically eliminate the population by up to half or more in a few years or decades, as a consequence of major collapses and rejuvenations of the China Order at least eight times from Qin to the nineteenth century (Figure 4.3).51 The population

Figure 4.3. Populations in the Chinese World and the Mediterranean–European Word (in millions, 221 BCE–1953). Note: Population figures are often imprecise in history. They are presented here to illustrate the general pattern. Based on Ge Jianxiong 2006, Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed November 17, 2013. Historical Estimates of World Population by Census.gov, accessed November 17, 2013; Cipolla 1972–76.

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in the post-Roman Mediterranean–European World with a compatible size and timeframe, as a contrast, grew similarly and emigrated out widely over the same twenty-three centuries, with mass deaths caused by the Plague of the sixth through eighth centuries and the Black Death in the fourteenth century. It never experienced the kind of periodical man-made drastic declines common in the Chinese World. The China Order of Qin-Han polity, a near perfect way of governance for the ruling elite, is indeed like an endless asceticism of “eating bitterness” (吃苦) and frequently an inescapable inferno for the people.52

Why the Stagnation: A Pausing Note on Monopoly This chapter has shown that the China Order, a centralized world order of the Qin-Han world empire, had its strength and addictive appeal yet major weaknesses and great undesirability. Why the China Order is such a politically effective world order but delivers very suboptimal socioeconomic performance clearly deserves to be explored further. It is especially crucial to the never-ending debates about political values of stability versus change and innovation, equality versus efficiency, and individual rights versus sociopolitical order. While the examination of the China Order in this book is probably sufficient for the purpose of understanding China and the nature of the rising Chinese power, much should and could be done to study it for generalizable findings. As a quick pausing note here, it is hypothesized that much of the China Order’s record of performance can be explained by the well-established theory of monopoly in economics. The state, by definition, is an inherent monopoly organization based on the exclusive use of force to be the public authority to meet the human needs for politics (F. Wang 1998B, 8–18). Unlike a business monopoly that seeks to control the entire market but is fundamentally limited in its ability to totally eliminate competition and innovation, a state monopoly could extinguish competition as it has the ultimately most effective means to physically eliminate deviances and challengers by force. There are two ways to mitigate and manage the inherent cost and undesirables of having such a monopoly of power that could easily create a dreadful long-lasting devastation: first, internal checks and constraints against the state’s power that can be furnished vertically by a federal system and of rule of law and horizontally by a functional democracy with freedom of speech, and second, external competition among the states with or without adequate internal constraints.53 Inner inhibitions of the rulers generated by faith, values, and cultural norms are frequently important but do not seem to be structurally reliable. It is often observed that internal constraints may require the external constraints to develop and survive. Therefore, with either the internal or external or both mitigations, the monopolistic state(s) could

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fulfill the key role of providing order and security without extinguishing socioeconomic innovation and changes nor easily depriving human rights and lives. The China Order based on Qin-Han polity, unfortunately, takes away the internal and external constraints of the monopoly state power of a world empire in all aspects of life by eliminating political competition within and without. Unlike other, similarly authoritarian or totalitarian, world empires in history such as the Roman Empire, the Persian shahs, or the Muslim caliphates, the China Order managed to continuously rule what its proponents held to be the whole known world for centuries in the row, and over the millennia has been internalized as the world order. It thus forged the worst case of monopoly in political governance and socioeconomic spheres. With that, information growth and sharing are institutionally and culturally stunned and suppressed by the singular power for the whole world and the lack of individual trust among the people, leading all to the inescapable, long underperformance and stagnation (Hidalgo 2015). Under the China Order, social order and political governance are both grossly suboptimal, argued one Chinese author, as the mighty centralized imperial rule evaporated social capital and rendered the Chinese society into “a plate of sands” with trust rarely existed outside of blood-families (Y. Zheng 2001, 119).

5

The Century of Humiliation and Progress

T

he century of the 1840s through the 1940s defined today’s China. With roughly the average lifespan of a Qin-Han world empire, the Manchuruled Qing was declining by the nineteenth century and the Chinese World was ready for another dynastic cycle as the dynamics of political repression, socioeconomic stagnation, and population growth had accumulated enough energy to explode. However, chiefly due to the invasion, influence, and direct presence of external, non-Chinese powers of the Europeans, Americans and later the Japanese, the Chinese World entered a new era. Unlike the past runs of the dynastic cycle, the passing of the Qing World Empire did not end as yet another replication of the China Order through violently replacing even eliminating the ruling elites and massively reducing the population. Begining with the Anglo-Chinese War of 1840–42, the Chinese World was forced to live under the expanding Westphalia world order. The power, prestige, and perspectives of the Chinese elites, Manchu and Han alike, were repeatedly challenged and decimated decisively and humiliatingly resulting in countless involuntary reformation and reorientation, similar to what happened to many other Asian empires and societies at the time (Mishra 2012, 12–45, 242–98). The century has been therefore termed “the century of humiliation” and the lowest point of Chinese history by the Chinese elites of many stripes and persuasions especially by the government (Editorial Board 2004, V1; Institute of History 2012). The CCP leader Xi Jinping described the century as “the most chaotic and most humiliating historical period for the Chinese nation and the saddest and most painful historical period for the Chinese people” (Xi 11-11-2014). This chapter intends, however, to show that the 1840s–1940s held much more than defeat and disgrace for the Chinese. It was indeed a long century of humiliation for the Qin-Han ruling elites and their indoctrinated subjects. But it redefined and remade China with great experimentation and comprehensive progress. The peoples in Eastern Eurasia departed the increasingly pretentious China Order and China rightfully became one of the important members of the world community under the Westphalia system of international relations. 135

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The Qin-Han polity and the dynastic cycle were altered by the imported republicanism and the efforts for rule of law and democracy (Westad 2012), a profound sociopolitical transformation that is still unfinished today. The long stagnation and backwardness in the Chinese World were replaced by tremendous modernization through learning, imitation, import, and experimentation. Socioeconomic conditions, living standards, education, and culture all qualitatively improved. Even the humiliation and degradation acutely felt by the Chinese elites in the first half of the century were replaced with pride and success by the end of the century. Struggling in the unfamiliar new world of Westphalia system, China wisely or luckily “joined the right side” of the two world wars in the twentieth century. The young republican government did rather well diplomatically at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, even though both the revolutionary parties of the Nationalists and the Communists have asserted a Chinese “diplomatic failure” there to justify their Soviet-influenced rebellions and revolutions in the name of advancing Chinese nationalism (Tang 2014). With its increasingly skilled and effective bilateral and multilateral diplomacy at the Washington Conference (1921–22) and the United Nations (Qin 1-23-2012 and 2-6-2012), China managed to revise many of the treaties made during the Qing Era and regained control of the border regions including Manchuria, Taiwan, and Xinjiang that were occupied by the Japanese and the Soviet Russians as well as the concession zones in many Chinese cities that were leased out to foreigners by the Qing.1 China was uplifted from a semi-colony around 1900 to be fully independent by the 1930s, then to be one of the world leaders by 1945, becoming a founding member of the United Nations and one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (Gu 1985–87, V3–5; Taylor 2009). Unfortunately, the imperialist subversions and aggressions from the two powerful neighbors of Japan and especially the former Soviet Union were too disruptive to the young New China. The foreign-aided Republican Revolution (1911–12) ended the Qing Empire and founded the ROC (Republic of China) to remake the Chinese nationhood and statehood with great foreign influence, just like many other non-Western nations in the twentieth century (Bull and Watson 1985; Tilly 1998; Chong 2012). But the new Soviet Union soon directly financed, armed, and even directed another Chinese Revolution in 1924 for primarily Moscow’s own security and world revolution needs. The KMT (Kuomintang or Guomindang, Nationalist Party) took over the ROC by force in 1927–28 to turn the ROC into a soft authoritarian party-state but rejected the communists. Moscow then turned to sponsor its second client and agent in China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to launch a decade-long

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but largely failed armed rebellion to create a Chinese Soviet Republic inside the ROC (1927–36). The CCP rejoined the KMT-ROC to resist the Japanese aggression in World War II, also at Moscow’s directives. The two parties then split and fought a bloody Chinese Civil War (1946–50). The KMT-ROC government lost and fled to Taiwan to later evolve into the first ever Chinese democracy in the 1980s and ’90s. The dramatic century of both humiliation and progress ended with the creation of the PRC (People’s Republic of China) to rule the Chinese Mainland to this day. The PRC has self-labeled as the “New China” but is in fact a giant leap backward with its restoration of a more authentic Qin-Han polity, a totalitarian or hard-core authoritarian party-state, and its revival of the aspirations for the China Order.

The Decay and Fading of the China Order After the China Order reached its peak and the Qing world empire expanded to control the whole known world in the eighteenth century to form the Qing-Chinese culture that has shaped China to this day (Smith 2015), the Manchu-ruled Qin-Han polity decayed rapidly. Massive uprisings started with the dissenting branch of Sinicized Buddhism, the White Lotus Religion (白莲 教) in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries in the hinterlands of the Centralia (Harr 1999). Peasant rebellions and ethnic civil wars broke out constantly in the nineteenth century including the Han-Chinese Muslim Revolt in southwest China (Yunnan), the multiethnic Muslim Uprising in Northwestern provinces that killed at least 20 million people, and the widespread Nian Rebels (捻乱) in Northern Centralia (Han 2006; Perry 1980). The Taipei Rebellion (太平), one of the most destructive rebellions and civil wars in Chinese history, almost toppled the Qing Empire and lasted for over a decade (1851–64/72), affected half of the entire Centralia, and led to the death of 100 million people or about one-quarter of the total population (Spence 1996 and 1990, 165–93). The coming of the Europeans brought great shocks to the Chinese World and fundamental challenges to the China Order. External aggression and influence eventually ended the overall China Order and turned the Qing Empire from a multination world empire to a collection of semi-colonies and quasiautonomous regional and ethnic chiefdoms over a few decades (Rhoads 2000). Outside forces, for the first time in millennia, altered the dynamics and prospects of China’s dynastic cycle and concluded the history of Imperial China. The post-Enlightenment and post-Industrial Revolution Westerners not only defied Sinification but also comprehensively started to replace the Chinese essence of the Qin-Han polity, Confucian-Legalism. The ending of the Qing world empire

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was excruciating and, in the words of a Han-Chinese leader at the time, was an unprecedented “great change once in more than three thousand years” (Li 1901). Unlike some of the past Chinese world empires, the Qing rulers were quite aware of the real world outside of the Chinese World from early on. Perhaps instinctively they felt the danger but more likely, driven by the same logic of the Qin-Han polity for the China Order to keep and assume away ungoverned and ungovernable external comparison and competition, the Qing Court adopted and insisted on self-isolation to intensely pretend in its “worldwide” rule. It intensified the Ming’s ban of maritime contacts with the outside world and prohibited emigration and highly restricted immigration with the simple but effective penalty of beheading (Fang 1953, V3). For the practical needs of the imperial court, the Qing chartered and monopolized trade with the outside and reduced ports of foreign trade from the initial four to only one port of Guangzhou in 1757.2 Emperor Kangxi (reign 1662–1722), who is praised by the Chinese official narratives as the wise and able founder of the ultimate China Order, the Kang-Yong-Qiang Period of Prosperity, foresaw the long-term devastating threat of the Western nations but used that to justify the Qing’s isolation policy.3 Pretending to rule the whole known world, the Qing nonetheless in practice had to interact and manage the neighboring peoples and the visiting foreigners in different ways, implying the varied “cultural inferiority or geographical marginality” of the various foreigners but with essentially the same mentality of centrality and superiority: the northwest (Central Asia), the missionaries and merchants (from Europe), and the south (Southeast Asians) (Dunnell 2004; Spence 1990, 117–19). While military conquests and religious conversions expanded and stabilized the China Order in the northwest through the traditional feudal and confederation-like system, the Qing continued to ban foreign missionaries and discouraged foreign merchants. The Qing rulers felt their world empire secure behind impenetrable fences. In 1793, when the Qing already started to decline, Emperor Qianlong, the self-proclaimed “perfect man” and the personification of a “philosophy King” mistakenly projected by the French thinker scholar Voltaire (Spence 1990, 133), refused and rejected the visiting Earl George Macartney, the British envoy went to China on a royal mission to seek an equal state-to-state diplomatic and trade relationship (Elliott and Stearns 2009, 136–39). “Issuing a mandate”-like decreeing to just another tributary state, Qianlong spelled out the policy of banning maritime contacts that restricted foreign trade only to the bare minimum in Macau-Canton and reiterated the ancient policy of banning emigration and immigration. Foreigners, if especially allowed, could only have a one-way trip to come to China and were never allowed to leave. China needed nothing from the outside, much less from the faraway Britain. In a grandpa-like considerate but ignorantly condescending reply to the British King George III, the Qing emperor finished his edict this way:

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[T]he ordinances of my Celestial Empire are strict in the extreme, and the local officials, both civil and military, are bound reverently to obey the law of the land. Should your vessels touch the shore, your merchants will assuredly never be permitted to land or to reside there, but will be subject to instant expulsion. In that event your barbarian merchants will have had a long journey for nothing. Do not say that you were not warned in due time. Tremblingly obey and show no negligence. A special mandate.4 Macartney, however, described in his notes and memoirs the strikingly obvious stagnation, despotic imperial rule, great inequality between the mandarins and the people, widespread abject poverty, extremely poor quality of life, and the lack of dignity of the Chinese people under Qing’s China Order and concluded that The Empire of China is an old, crazy, first-rate Man of War, which a fortunate succession of and vigilant officers have contrived to keep afloat for these hundred and fifty years past, and to overawe their neighbours merely by her bulk and appearance. But whenever an insufficient man happens to have the command on deck, adieu to the discipline and safety of the ship. She may, perhaps, not sink outright; she may drift some time as a wreck, and will then be dashed to pieces on the shore; but she can never be rebuilt on the old bottom. (Robbins 1908; Hsu 1995, 162) As the self-locked China became more known to outsiders, the image of the great Celestial Empire changed dramatically by the late-eighteenth and earlynineteenth centuries. China was seen as a civilization actually falling behind the Europeans quickly and hopelessly and the Chines people as desperately lacking liberty, opportunities, and decent living conditions. European thinkers from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Baron de Montesquieu, and Adam Smith to Friedrich Hegel all penetratingly analyzed and criticized the hopeless irrationality, poor performances, and dreadful prospects of the Qin-Han China Order (Spence 1990, 136–38). The ruling Manchu nation also degenerated, transformed from a conquering caste to a spoiled ethnic minority (Crossley 1990). The rising and expanding European powers, driven by the search for new land, profits, and glory and armed with the latest technology of the industrial age especially lethal firearms, came to the Chinese World from all directions, first from the sea, and shook the China Order to its core. Sparked by Qing’s harsh and clumsy moves to shut the opium smuggling and narrow the door of foreign trade, the Anglo-Chinese War of 1840 ended up forcefully dismantling

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the ban of maritime contacts and opening the Chinese World to foreign traders and missionaries. A small but superior British expeditionary force decimated the large Qing army that was worse than incompetent in defending an obsolete foreign policy. The Chinese officials and diplomats, including the emperors, were equally oblivious and inept in dealing with foreigners who were still conceptualized as manageable and purchase-able uncivilized barbarians rather than more advanced competitors and conquerors.5 Similar defeats and forced concessions repeatedly took place in the following decades, often due to the arrogant and ignorant follies and utter incompetence of the Qing government and fueled by the growing frictions and conflicts between the conservative (and dominant) elements of the Chinese ruling elites and foreigners, especially the rapid influx of Christian missionaries. Colonial and imperial ambitions for expansion, exploitation, and control by many foreign powers, especially Russia and Japan, were crucially menacing. The fading China Order pressed by foreign forces would endure more: the war with Britain and France in 1856–60, the rounds of forced territorial concessions made to Russia, many treaty deals that granted foreigners unequal extraterritoriality and other privileges, the SinoFranco War (1884), and the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) that finally nailed the coffin of the China Order in Eastern Eurasia as the previously periphery state on the edge of the Chinese World emerged as a modernized power and decisively and humiliatingly defeated the much larger Centralia (Spence 1990, 147–64, 199–210, 216–24). Indeed, the Chinese sense of citizen rights, popular sovereignty, and nation-state started to really emerge only after Qing’s total defeat by the Japanese (Lei 2014). The Son-of-Heaven changed the name of his Great Qing Dynasty (大清朝) of tianxia (the whole world) to Great Qing Empire (大清帝国), “as an equal of, if not exactly the same as, European empires” and started to see China as one of the hegemons in a new world of Warring States (G. Wang 2013, 29–30). The foreign influences irresistibly dragged the Chinese World by force into the Westphalia system and started the modernization of the Chines economy and society, setting up the foundation for today’s China. Epistemologically and technologically, the Chinese World was forced to attempt a leap-frog maneuver to leave the centuries of stagnation through a wholesale importation of goods, tools, knowledge, and culture. Education was revamped, culture refreshed, and the living standard rose. The ancient Chinese language was greatly refurbished and transformed with countless idioms imported particularly from the Japanese—a trend that continues today (Masini 1993; P. Hu 2011). The Chinese people, for the first time in history, largely avoided the traditional mass death and destruction at the fall of a dynasty and kept growing in size. The prices paid for those earthshaking and progressive changes as the consequences of the

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fading of the China Order were by no means insignificant. China lost all of its vassal states (from Korea to Vietnam), large chunks of territory (roughly 3 million square kilometers or more than one-quarter of Qing’s peak size) mostly in Eastern Siberia, Mongolia, and Central Asia plus Taiwan, innumerable lives and wealth (due to looting by both foreigners and the Chinese themselves along with war retributions), and much of the Chinese elites’ pride and self-esteem was significantly reduced in the process. The epic progress and great gains aside, all those crushing blows, disorienting defeats, and heavy losses later constitute the factual basis and the bulk of anecdotes that have formed the lastingly dominant theme of the Century of National Humiliation in the Chinese official writing and teaching of history: China was bullied and victimized deeply and unfairly from 1840 to 1949 (many have insisted that it has continued to this day) by the powerful (Western) foreigners under the alien and undesirable world order of the Westphalia system of international relations.6 By 1900, riding on the waves of the fanatic and xenophobic Boxer Rebellion (Cohen 1998), the desperate Qing Court under Empress Dowager Cixi (reigned behind the curtain from 1861 to 1909) declared war on just about every foreign country (eleven in total) for fear of losing her power. The Qing troops and the Boxers were slaughtered in their very quick and total defeat in the subsequent war with the joint-expeditionary forces of eight nations, which actually included a sizable number of Han-Chinese mercenaries. Beijing was sacked and looted by foreigners for the second time in four decades and China agreed to pay a huge indemnity. The United States sent troops from the Philippines which it had just occupied after the Spanish-American War, the only time the Americans to militarily fought the Chinese on Chinese soil. The central authority of the Qing Court declined mortally as the local governors of most provinces of the Centralia declared neutrality in the war to avoid invasion and occupation by foreign powers, the so-called Mutual Protection of Southeast, and started the localized warlordism that later shaped Chinese politics for many decades. This epic and final destruction of the China Order ignited a frenzy of foreign powers to demand and grab territories, concessions, privileges, and influence throughout China, which sank perilously close to becoming a collection of divided colonies of many foreign powers (D. Tang 1998; Spence 1990, 231–35).

Westernization: The Way to Survive Unlike the past experiences of being invaded and conquered by the Mongols and the Manchu, China in the nineteenth century faced more than one foreign

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power, thus there were sound reasons for some ruling elites to hope to play the traditional strategy of using barbarians to control barbarians (以夷制夷) (F. C. Wang 1998). Led by more open-minded leaders such as Li Hongzhang (1823–1901), the Qing attempted repeatedly to enlist and bribe some foreign powers to check or balance against the others all the way until its end. This strategy, however, was carried out at heavy expense to the Chinese in terms of land and wealth and often backfired, devastating Manchuria as the battlefield for the competing Russians and Japanese in 1904–05, for instance, and ultimately it failed to save either the Qing Empire or the China Order. But it created a lasting tradition for the Chinese political forces to have their varied foreign supporters and sponsors. More importantly, the past external invaders and conquerors were mighty nomadic militaries but less sophisticated and advanced institutionally and ideologically. They all tended to pick up the Chinese way of life and get Sinicized to continue the Qin-Han polity and the China Order. But in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the threatening foreign forces were fundamentally different. They had far superior power than the Centralia in just about every aspect and at every turn. This absolute superiority installed a mortal fear about not just a particular ruling dynasty, or even a ruling nation or ethnic group, but about the whole way of life and the two-millennia-old China Order itself—the very essence of life, identity, and the whole world were at stake for the Chinese elites. Facing such an unprecedented challenge, some wise Han and Manchu elites proposed in the mid-nineteenth century the strategy of “learning the superior technology of the barbarians to control the barbarians” as the way to defend the Centralia if not the entire Chinese World.7 Great efforts by the government and government-charted merchants after the 1860s started an industrialization by imitation and importation of technology, talents, tools, factories, and education to particularly strengthen the military—the Self-Strengthening Movement.8 This strategy of modernizing the economy, especially the military, through import and imitation has continued in China to this day. On how to learn and imitate the West, however, there was a crucial divide from the very beginning that has profoundly shaped Chinese politics and foreign policy and the rise of China itself. Two approaches of self-strengthening emerged in the late-nineteenth century. With varied expressions, formulations, and admixtures, they have molded the Chinese mind and guided Chinese policies and actions ever since (Teng and Fairbank 1979). It has been a profound struggle between tianxia and Westphalia (Chen and Zhou 2008). One way is the utilitarian approach of preserving the Chinese essence with Western means,9 to learn and grasp modern Western technologies and weaponry while

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safeguarding and following the basics of the Chinese sociopolitical system and ideology. This is the dominant idea that has guided Chinese reaction to the outside world since the nineteenth century with variations in expressions and contents, exemplified by the many self-strengthening efforts throughout the late-Qing, ROC, and PRC eras. One peculiar stretching of this approach was to simply treat the rising “Western” power of Japan as the “genuine” carrier and defender of the Chinese essence so to recruit and rely on Japan to reintegrate and rejuvenate the Chinese civilization (Ku 1924, 274–82). The other approach was to have a total Westernization, to transform the Chinese society and politics comprehensively from the Qin-Han polity of Confucian-Legalism to a European-American style of rule of law and democracy. Some even called for Latinizing the Han-Chinese language.10 Early advocates of Westernization include Wang Tao, Xue Fucheng, and Liang Qichao.11 Senior official Zhang Shusheng summarized this approach in his deathbed memo to the throne in 1884: “. . . should adopt the Western (sociopolitical and ideological) essence so to well utilize the Western technology.”12 This deviant approach for a comprehensive remake of Chinese politics, society, and culture was further formulated in the early-twentieth century by Western-educated or influenced advocates of liberalism including Hu Shi (1891–1962) (Hu 1965). The ROC indeed generally moved in that direction throughout its rule on the Chinese Mainland. Later, this idea was radically and controversially rephrased as “China needs three hundred years of colonization (by the West) in order to be modernized” by the PRC dissident writer and political prisoner (since 2009) Liu Xiaobo who was awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize (X. Liu 2006). A somewhat less radical version of the Westernization approach but much more comprehensive than Western means-only approach was to model after the partial and selective Westernization successfully carried out by the Japanese Meiji Restoration of 1868, the so-called “leaving Asia going to the West” (脫亞論) (Fukuzawa 1885). The massive flow of Chinese students to Japan shortly after the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) and the avalanche of Japanese (translated and imported) Western ideas and terminology continued to shape the sociopolitical and ideological landscape of China. The Soviet-created and funded Chinese Communist Party essentially also promoted a total Westernization even more radical than Liang Qichao or Hu Shi, albeit following a crucially different Western recipe that claims to be a universal truth. Instead of imitating the mainstreams of the dominant Western powers such as Britain, France, and the United States (or even Germany or Japan), the CCP took the banner of world communism from Moscow and wanted to overhaul China structurally and culturally with a radical, extremist branch of Western ideology and political practice, the Stalinized Marxism-

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Leninism that conveniently fit some of the key attributes of authoritarianism and totalitarianism of traditional societies including China’s Qin-Han polity (Pipes 2001). The CCP’s violent revolution restored the past Qin-Han polity with the wrap of imported European (Russian) ideology. It was revolutionary or innovative only in rhetoric and decoration, as we will analyze more in the next chapter. The post-Mao CCP, so far, has basically moved back to the position of Western means-only with some, still highly selected, learning and imitation of the West in sociopolitical norms, similar to but still less comprehensive than the approach of the post-Meiji Restoration Japan. Practically, by the late-nineteenth century, the conflicting foreign powers formed a three-way competition and power-projection in the Chinese World among the Anglo-Franco-Americans, the German-Austrian-Russians, and the Japanese. Smaller outsiders such as the Dutch, the Spanish, and the Italians played lesser roles. Some of the external powers like the UK and especially the US were more interested in China’s opening and transformation and taking advantage of the commercial opportunities it might provide. Others, Russia and Japan, were more for territorial expansions to chip off, slice up, even gobble up China by the smell of blood from a dying dynasty under the collapsing China Order. This competitive external environment, dictated by the law of relative gains under the Westphalia system of international relations, provided not only vital room for the Qing (and later the ROC) to breath and survive, but also the possibility for the Chinese to practice both the new strategy of self-strengthening through emulation and the old strategy of using the barbarians against barbarians. Diverse and competing ideologies and sociopolitical forces also grew in China under the influence and support of the various external powers to greatly determine the transformation and destiny of the Chinese World and the Qin-Han polity. By the end of the nineteenth century, in 1899, the United States, the new world economic leader if not yet a military and political leader, proposed the unquestionably self-serving but also greatly pro-Chinese “Open Door” policy that instrumentally helped to secure China’s political independence and territorial integrity (Joseph 1928, 399–410). Repeated in 1900 by U.S. Secretary of State John Hay and largely accepted by the world’s leading powers, codified again at the Washington Conference in 1921–22, the Open Door Policy became a foundation of the U.S.–China policy until World War II—a “special relationship with China” since at least the two-way missions by Anson Burlingame decades earlier. It provided a crucial external support to the Chinese leaders during their extremely difficult struggle to depart from the China Order and the Qin-Han polity and also their desperate fight to survive as a nation facing colonial powers in the inherently competitive Westphalia system of international relations.13

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The Unusual Fall of the Qing Empire Under the dual pressures of the periodical dynastic cycle and the unprecedented invasion by foreign powers, the Qing Empire had a long fall after the midnineteenth century. Similar to the many falls of a Qin-Han world empire since the third century BCE, the Chinese people including the ruling elites suffered many decades of disorder, violence, death, and destruction. Unlike in the past, however, the influence and intervention of the more advanced Western powers, diverse and competitive among themselves, greatly altered the dynamic and direction of the fall of the Qing (Wakeman 1991, 68–102). The peoples in the Chinese World this time avoided the mass holocausts and the hellish miseries that commonly resulted from the collapse of a world empire so many times before. The Qing got the crucially important help of imported weapons and even soldiers such as the Ever Victorious Army (1860–64) to put down rebels (Smith 1978) so to survive many rebellions especially the Taiping Rebellion (Jen 1973; Platt 2012). The Taiping Rebellion aroused Han nationalism but claimed its divine connection with a butchered dogma of the imported Christianity and thus alienated and antagonized the Confucian-Legalist Chinese elites, Han or non-Han. Its leader, Hong Xiuquan, was an imperial official-wannabe but repeatedly failed the imperial exam. He claimed to be God’s second son, the younger brother of Jesus Christ, and wanted to replace the barbaric Qing with a Han-nation Christian Heavenly Kingdom on earth. This unusual ideology failed to befriend either the European powers or the Chinese elites (Spence 1996; Wright 1957). It might still have had a chance for a new dynasty to come in to renew the China Order. But the Taiping leaders turned out to be more corrupt, despotic, and inept than even the decaying Qing court (Pan 2000). The European powers eventually endeavored to help the Qing to put down the Taiping, despite the superficial appearances of Christian similarity (Kuhn 1970; Luo 1937). Indeed, the Han-Chinese elites led by Zeng Guofan played the instrumental role in destroying the Taiping under the banner of “let’s all rise up to protect our Confucian tradition” that neutralized Taiping’s Han-nationalist calling—a strong testimony for the power of the China Order that transcends nationalism (Zeng 1854). Local and diverse, even experimenting, self-governance under the decaying Qing emerged in many provinces especially in the coastal regions from Tianjin to Guangdong.14 This brand new un-Qin-Han development of politics in the Chinese World was first forcefully created by the invading foreign powers through their obtaining of legal extraterritoriality due to the fundamental incompatibility between European-American laws and the crude and cruel Qing Criminal Codes. Self-governed concession or leased lands and zones (租

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界) and numerous church-based autonomous rights for the missionaries and converts, especially regarding publication and education, were obtained from the Qing. The Qing court and the local governments dreaded foreign political authority in China so they initiated the “foreigners only” concession zones to better control both the foreigners and the Chinese and prevent their mingling. Autonomous foreign authorities thus existed and grew in China. The first foreign concession zone was leased to the British in Shanghai in 1845 and the last to the Austrians in Tianjin in 1902. The totally more than two dozen foreign concessions were under the rule of eight foreign powers with the United States share of two “public” concessions. They were gradually taken back by the ROC and ceased to exist by the early 1940s (C. Jin 2004). Together with other leased lands and foreign-run railway corridors, the concessions were indeed a great affront to the Chinese ruling elites and an embarrassing compromise of Chinese state sovereignty—a long well-used symbol in the Chinese historiography of the Century of Humiliation.15 But, in fact and on balance, those foreign-ruled lands were essentially visa-free ports open to anyone including the Jewish refugees in the 1930s (Daxiang 2015). The overwhelming majority of people who lived in those concession zones soon became the Chinese people who voted with their feet to run away from the Chinese government. Those zones were the bastion of new ideas and institutions of governance, experimentation and adventures, free press and new education, and safe havens for dissidents and revolutionaries such as the CCP “wanted” by the Chinese rulers, reshaping the sociopolitical landscape and cultural-educational activities in the Chinese World in the general direction of modernization with immeasurable tangible and intangible legacies to this day (X. Feng 2015, 182–222). Unequal, unpleasant, and even humiliating foreign concessions were in fact powerful catalysts for uplifts and progress in the Chinese World with the impact hard to exaggerate. Furthermore, localized warlord power of Han-Chinese leaders was released by the Qing’s mobilization to crush the Taiping Rebellion and steadily grew to peak in 1900 in the Mutual Protection of Southeast China. Local autonomous rulers and the growing capitalist and foreign-educated/influenced new elites later ushered in the final fall of the Qing central government by declaring provincial independences from Beijing soon after the Wuhan Mutiny on October 10, 1911 (Esherick and Wei 2014). Directly forced by the Han-Chinese local governors and particularly the military commanders of the New Army led by Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), the Qing Court abdicated on February 12, 1912, while the new ROC Government already have been declared in Nanjing on January 1 under the interim presidency of Sun Yat-sen. As a negotiated deal, Sun resigned and was replaced by Yuan on February 15. The two-­millennia-

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old dynastic system ended together with the China Order in Eastern Eurasia, although the authoritarian Qin-Han polity lingered on. Relying on generally loyal and able Han-Chinese officials in both internal governance and external affairs (Lei 2008), the Qing Empire not only survived for half a century after the fateful mid-nineteenth century but also in fact achieved a number of important accomplishments and progress. By the end of the nineteenth century, Qing’s imperial fiscal revenue went up to finally match the size of fiscal income of the Northern Song Empire one millennium ago with commercial and industrial taxes surpassing land and agriculture taxes for the first time also since the Song, signaling significant growth of capitalist economy powered by foreign trade, foreign investment, and native industrialization. The modern and efficient management of the Chinese customs authority by foreigners in 1855–1911 was a major reason (Spence 1990, 203–04, 209, 220, 284). Direct foreign presence and influence led to the emergence and growth of modern, European-style cities like Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, and Wuhan, mostly designed and managed by foreigners as the owners of the various concessions there (Belfour 2013, 9–193). Modern postal, telegraph, transportation by river and maritime shipping, railroad, and later by automobiles, and electricity services were developed, as well as various types of reformed schools and new curricula (Gu 1983, V1, 5–22). Often based in the concession zones or nearby, private newspapers, journals, and presses of all stripes in Chinese and English flourished after the 1860s. One influential and often politically critical private Chinese newspaper, Shanghai Daily (申報), continued to publish from 1872 to the 1940s (G. Fu 2010, 87–89, 146, 218, 235–36). In 1891, with two decades of the landmark legalization of Chinese workers emigrating to the United States—a historical move facilitated by the legendary Anson Burlingame and based on the suggestion of the reformist official-diplomat Xue Fucheng, the Qing scrubbed the traditional (since at least the Tang Dynasty) policy of anti-emigration and granted the returned Chinese from aboard equal rights and status at home (Hsieh 2013). As a major symbol of capitalism, the first modern Chinese commercial bank opened in 1897, and the Qing government created the first Chinese state-owned bank in 1905. Over the next three decades, sixty commercial banks emerged with many of them issuing paper notes of the silver-standard currency of Yuan until 1935 when the KMT-ROC government centralized the printing of paper currency into only three state-owned banks: Central Bank, Bank of China, and Jiaotong Bank (G. Fu 2010, 165–82). Chinese native capitalism took root and grew significantly in many sectors even before the fall of the Qing Dynasty. Consequently, living standards and income of the elites and

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the society rose. Rapidly rising foreign trade also greatly increased the supply of imported grain. Other than the interruption of the Taipei Rebellion, the Chinese population did not typically decrease, but in fact uncharacteristically grew in size at a time of dynastic fall. The Qing governance under Cixi, however, continued to irreversibly slide on the destined trajectory of downfall. After losing a mortifying war in 1894–95 to Japan, Cixi bloodily stopped the Hundred-day Reform of 1898 (戊戌变法), thus closing the door of an already overdue imitation of the successful Japanese Meiji Restoration and dissed the opportunity for peacefully transforming China.16 Only after another even more humiliating defeat in 1900 at the hands of foreign powers, the Qing under Cixi started clumsily and belatedly its ambitious but often insincere-appearing New Policy (新政) to save the Manchu Dynasty. There were some concrete changes and progress: foot binding of the Han women was outlawed in 1902 (the practice ended decades later after repeated decrees and campaigns by the ROC government). The millennium-old imperial examination was abolished in 1905 to be replaced by new schools and sending students studying aboard (D. Wang 1987). In 1906, the Qing proclaimed the building of a constitutional monarchy and issued an Imperial Outline of Constitution in 1908 that had the division of executive, legislative, and judicial powers under a still powerful emperor but guaranteed freedoms of press and assembly and individual rights. Administratively, the central imperial bureaucracy was modernized with functional ministries, and local self-governance started to take place. The archaic Qing criminal codes were revised to eliminate some cruel punishments and methods of execution. A modern police force and court system started to develop. In 1910, monetary and fiscal reforms were launched to publish the first national budget in Chinese history. Business chambers, civic groups, and political parties emerged to compete for votes, voices, and influence, especially in local quasilegislative councils (Spence 1990, 245–62; Y. Zhu 1996; G. Fu 2010, 64–72). The falling Qing appeared to be making history to renew its life. The ROC largely inherited and carried on Qing’s New Policy (Xu and Xu 2001; Xiao 1993, 61–66). The official acceptance of representative democracy, capitalist entrepreneurship, and guaranteed freedoms and rights for the people were truly groundbreaking in Chinese history; they are still yet to be fully implemented in today’s PRC.17 Much of the New Policy took effect thanks to the decline of the Qing’s central power of control rather than a sincere effort by the imperial rulers. Many Qing leaders resisted strongly as the old ruling elites, mainly the Manchu nobles, worried about the ramifications of the empowerment of the Han-Chinese elites. They miscalculated and misbehaved, trying to hang on for as long and to as much as possible (Rhoads 2000). The Qing decreed a

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press censorship by preapproval in 1907, for example, creating a tradition that has lasted into the twenty-first century, although the decree was soon largely ignored by the Qing government itself. After the death of Cixi in 1909, the Qing Dynasty and its planned nine-year (later shortened to be three years by 1913) implementation of a constitutional monarch were swiftly brushed aside by the armed rebellion in the autumn of 1911, triggered by a massive riot against Qing’s plan of nationalizing a railroad project. The forced abdication of the six-year-old Manchu Emperor Xuantong and the compromise to create a Yuan Shikai-headed ROC government in February 2012 led to a very merciful ending of the Qing for its royal family and ruling elites, as they avoided the terrible fate of physical extermination usually associated with a dynastic fall for the first time ever in Chinese history (Z. Liu 2013, V1, 20–135).

The ROC on the Chinese Mainland: An Era of Opportunities The Republic of China on the Chinese Mainland (1912–49), argued a PRC historian in 2013, was a bona fide laboratory of constitutionalism (Z. Liu 2013, Preface). In fact, the ROC era was not just a political lab but also a continuation of the grand, mostly successful and progressive, multifaceted changes and experimentation that started in the mid-nineteenth century in just about every aspect of the Chinese society, politics, economy, ideology, culture, and foreign policy—chiefly among which was the emergence, solidification, and enshrinement of republicanism (Zarrow 2012). The ROC was heavily influenced and shaped by the European-American ideas of liberty, democracy, constitutionalism, capitalism, and socialism (Sun 1924). In 1905, years before the fall of the Qing, the revolutionary party of United League (同盟会) in exile in Tokyo already had a formal American-style checks-and-balances system among the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of the party’s leadership (Z. Liu 2013, V1, 14). In 1947, the ROC started constitutional governance, after fifteen years of decentralized authoritarian politics and two decades of the KMT party-state rule that was named military governance and tutoring governance. This second half of China’s great Century of Experimentation and Progress, as opposed to the Chinese official narrative of the Century of Humiliation, rivals any other period of Chinese history in its exhilarating dramas and sagas, theatrical twists and plots, high hopes and inspirations, great sacrifices and accomplishments, deep sorrows and heavy tolls, unfortunate failures and disappointments, and its final tragic ending—all in epic proportions.18 Overall, the 48-year-long ROC on the Chinese Mainland was a great era of openness with advances in liberties and the rule of law in governance; greater freedom

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of movement of the people internally and externally; spirited exchange and education of ideas and sciences; and thriving and open markets that resulted in sustained economic growth (Dikotter 2008). This was especially the case in the first sixteen years, before a Moscow-supported Leninist party rose to power with military force to create the KMT-ROC by 1928 (X. Feng 2015a, 76–190, 2014a). Incidentally, since both the KMT and the CCP rose as revolutionary forces against the ROC government, they have been overly critical and dismissive about the late-Qing and early ROC eras. A “dark age” of endless warlord wars and chaotic political divisions has been, inaccurately, the common label for this era in the KMT-ROC, especially in regard to the CCP-PRC narratives of history.19 Internationally, the ROC endeavored to save China as an independent nation and largely preserved the Qing territory of the entire Centralia or China Proper plus Manchuria, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, and even Outer Mongolia. Furthermore, years before its overthrow by the CCP-led rebellion, the KMT-ROC had managed to uplift China to be one of the five winning great powers of World War II and eradicated whatever humiliation the Chinese elites might have indeed experienced at the hands of the foreign powers in the previous century. A genuinely new China was created in the ROC (Xin 1999, V1). China became a major player of the world under the Westphalia system of international relations and achieved a successful departure from the China Order despite all odds, especially the importunate aggressions, annexations, and subversions by the neighboring powers of Japan and especially Russia/the former Soviet Union. Economically, technologically, socially, and culturally, the peoples in the Chinese World, especially the Han nation, continued the progressive diversification and development that started in the mid-nineteenth century with profound accomplishments. Heavily influenced by the American political system and ideas as well as the then-rising thoughts of socialism, the ROC was created from the very beginning with the aspiration of becoming a constitution-based federal democratic republic. The political development had a bumpy start and many twists in its four short decades with indeed many disappointments, detours, and debacles. Yet, the ROC managed to survive after many rounds of civil wars among various warlords, assorted rebellions, and many misfired reforms and reversals including two quickly failed restorations of imperial rule,20 getting close to transforming the one-party (KMT) authoritarian regime in 1947 with a constitutional-governance and substantial local autonomy. In the end, however, the ROC tragically failed to sustainably transform China out of its Qin-Han polity to be a genuine democracy—until four more decades later in Taiwan as a much reduced exile government. The first phase of the ROC from 1912 to 1928 was led by Yuan Shikai and then his Northern New Army generals after he died in disgrace in 1916

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due to his short-lived attempt to be the founding emperor of a Chinese Empire in an attempt to create another dynastic Qin-Han polity. Based in Beijing, this ROC government was essentially a weak and shrinking authoritarian government that nonetheless had significant ingredients of party-politics—with an estimated 300 political parties in action (Xie 1926; CCP Central Party History 2002, 12), a great amount of freedom of assembly and speech, private entrepreneurship, and active and meaningful diplomatic acts and successes (Gu V1, 83–395). It was constantly embroiled in unfortunate civil wars with various local leaders who disobeyed and even openly rebelled just like many ambitious warlords had done in the past whenever an old dynasty collapsed. To contend for the Mandate of Heaven to unite and rule the whole tianxia has always been the predictable instinct of the Chinese ruling elites, especially those with power who could use force. Conditioned and constrained by the significant presence of foreign influence and sociopolitical diversification, however, this Warlord Era as it is officially termed by the Chinese history books today was by no means very hostile or harmful to socioeconomic development in China or even China’s international position, despite chaotic appearances. Many local leaders and aspiring elites advocated local autonomy and even provincial independence to form new Chinese states. The China Order was replaced by a Warring Stateslike political order for the Centralia. Unlike the Warring States, however, the old Chinese World was now just one disintegrating country often held together ironically by foreign forces, rather than the whole known world itself. The Chinese elites were in fact fighting for uniting and ruling a small and backward part of the real world, still powered often by essentially the same ConfucianLegalist values and slogans and often dressed in imported words and ideas, ranging from American-style liberalism to Soviet Marxism-Leninism. A strong, united, and powerful central government, democratic or not, appeared to be the Holy Grail to most Chinese politicians and intellectuals (R. Huang 1997, 241–310). Yet, totally un-Chinese and anti-Qin-Han ideas, policies, and acts were also imported and tried by many. Confucianism was heavily attacked by some of the most enlightened and respected intellectuals. China would have peacefully evolved into a multiparty democracy had the outstanding Nationalist Party leader Song Jiaoren (宋教仁 1882–1913), “the only ROC politician who understands and practices true republicanism and democracy” (Yi 2007, 270), not being assassinated on the eve of his taking over the government after electoral victory—a truly tragic loss for China. During this unusual period, when external and internal political and cultural forces competing with the freedom and openness never seen under the China Order, a profound enlightenment took place in the New Cultural Movement after 1915 to save and rejuvenate China. It critically reexamined the Chines history and advocated fundamental changes including even a

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r­eplacement of the Chinese culture with European-centered globalism. Its leaders were foreign educated or influenced intellectuals like Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu, Lu Xun, and Qian Xuantong.21 Chen openly urged China to “resolutely emphasize science and human rights” for self-strengthening in 1915 and called for only “following Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science” as the new belief in 1919.22 Pushed and pulled by various external forces, chiefly the Nippon-American compromise over the former German concessions in China and Soviet Russia’s effective campaigns and deceptive propaganda for a world revolution, the Chinese enlightenment ended in the nationalist May Fourth Movement of 1919. Worship of science and democracy and human rights was fatefully crowded out and even replaced by other imported, more radical ideologies of nationalism, populism, and especially Marxism-Leninism mingled with a resurgence of Sino-centrism that was energized by a widely held sense of China’s national survival and “world crisis.” Mao Zedong, the founder of the PRC, for example, went through imported ideas of social Darwinism, Nationalism, Voluntarism, Pragmatism, and Anarchism calling for dividing China into twenty-seven independent sovereign republics in as late as 1920, to be a founding member of the Moscow-organized CCP in 1921.23 This “China’s Weimar Republic” era of the ROC rapidly transformed itself from a weak but constitutional democracy to an authoritarian military regime of party-state (J. Xu 2014). By 1928, the KMT military force led by Chiang Kai-Shek and armed, trained, and advised by the Soviet Union, won the two-year “Northern Expedition” war to unify the most of the Centralia and Manchuria. Right before the victory, in mid-1927, the KMT severed its ties with Moscow. Both the ROC government in Beijing and the subsequent KMT’s new ROC government in Nanjing broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, accusing Moscow for directly sponsoring Communist subversions in China, expelled Soviet advisors, and purged communists from its ranks, turning to the West, especially the United States, for assistance. A KMT one-party “tutoring governance” of the ROC created an authoritarian regime under Chiang’s weak dictatorship. Under Chiang, the ROC entered a “golden decade” of the Nanjing Era (1928–37) as Chinese native capitalist economy continued to take off and great sociopolitical development unfolded (JRG 2006, chap. 2). Externally, built on the successes of the early ROC diplomacy—chiefly the Washington Conference of 1921–22 that affirmed the Open Door policy to stop the efforts by foreigners to slice and swallow China and started to return Chinese sovereignty such as the management of customs—the KMT-ROC continued the efforts of revising the treaties the Qing had signed with external powers especially the legal extraterritoriality to finally erase in 1943 the humiliations China suffered since the mid-nineteenth century (Gu 1985, V3, 355–63; 1987, V5, 186 and

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260). Chiang, a Han nationalist autocrat well-versed in Confucian classics and educated in Japanese military school, became a Christian and was heavily influenced by American ideas through his Americanized last wife, Chiang Soong May-ling, and many of his U.S.-educated associates and assistants.24 Chiang’s government sought a complete unification of the territory that was once ruled by the Qing through classic Confucian-Legalist methods but had to accommodate the imported ideas and demands such as liberty and human rights. The KMT, an authoritarian ruling party, was ideologically committed to constitutional democracy and rule of law. It was also internally diverse, divided, and decentralized. Living with the heavy presence of foreign powers that still enjoyed many rights and privileges, including their rule in those concessions, the KMT’s one-party rule was at most a weak, constrained, and incomplete Qin-Han polity with structural, organizational and personnel, and ideological seeds for non-Qin-Han politics and practices to grow and take over gradually (R. Huang 1998; Q. Wang 2010). Unfortunately, the ROC had to constantly fight internal factions, volatile local leaders and warlords, and especially the aggressions and annexations by the two neighboring powers of Japan in Shandong, Manchuria, and Northern China and the Soviet Union in Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, and Xinjiang (Jacobs 2016). The most serious internal threat, initially overlooked by many ROC leaders, was the peasant rebellions—the red armies and rural Soviet Republic led by the Moscow-funded and commanded CCP in several remote and rural regions. By the mid-1930s, Chiang’s ROC government managed to almost genuinely unite China after defeating all warlords and driving the Communist guerilla forces to near extinction into the barren Northern Shaanxi (Taylor 2009). A new, united, and rising ROC was about to fully concentrate on its internal economic development programs and its external threats, especially the Japanese aggression that had already occupied Manchuria in 1932 with the puppet regime of Manchukuo and was threatening Northern China including Beijing (then renamed Beiping). In December 1936, however, Chiang was dramatically kidnapped by some of his senior generals in the critical Xian Incident and was forced to stop eliminating the CCP. His kidnapers were former warlords turned CCP-sympathizers and often hired by the Moscowbased Comintern (Communist International) for the purpose of safeguarding the Soviet Union against the threatening Japanese Empire. As a fateful turn of history, the KMT-ROC formed a united front with the CCP in the name of resisting the Japanese aggression (Garver 1991, 145–75; Fenby 2003, 124–37; K. Yang 2006a). Perhaps to preempt the rising Chinese nationalist power that was destined to take revenge on Japan’s aggression and challenge Tokyo’s imperialist ambitions in East Asia, the Empire of Japan attacked in July 1937, hoping

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to subdue the ROC for its dream of Asian and even world dominance. Some new Chinese scholarship has suggested that the KMT-ROC was influenced and duped by Moscow to unwisely and unnecessarily agitate and provoke the Japanese (X. Feng 2014). In fact, the militarist Japan was perhaps possessed by its own version of the China Order tianxia pursuits, the so-called hakkō ichiu (八紘一宇 eight cords, one roof ) idea of using force and conversion to conquer and rule the whole known world as one (Beasley 1987, 226–27, 244; Edwards 2003, 289–324). By November 1938, after the Japanese Imperial Army had occupied most of the major cities in the Centralia, the smug Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe actually invoked the idea and language of the China Order to declare “whoever controls the Centralia gets the tianxia” and urge a total surrender of the ROC so that a Tokyo-dominated “new Asia Order” would be established based on “the ancient Japanese Spirit” with the rejuvenated “real Chinese Spirit” to replace the existing “irrational and unjust” international order.25 The United States, still under Isolationism at the time, reacted to Tokyo’s Japan Order in Asia with abrogation of economic ties (Sant et al. 2010, 18). This Second Sino-Japanese War (started in 1931 and becoming full scale in 1937) profoundly delayed the ROC’s planned constitutional governance, originally scheduled for 1937, and its economic modernization. It was largely a disastrous failure of the ROC foreign policy toward Japan after 1928, resulting from a radical anti-West Han-nationalism the Soviet Union inserted in the KMT and decreed on the CCP.26 It mortally wounded and weakened the ROC state and the new China. Despite significant defections including the number two leader of the KMT, Wang Ching-wei, to collaborate with the Japanese occupation under a Tokyo-dominated Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,27 the ROC Government made the tough decision to stay in the costly war and sided with the winning side of the Allies to play “an essential role” in World War II (Mitter 2013). This finally elevated China’s international status to that of a full-fledged major power of the world (Z. Liu 2013, V5–6). Then the ROC tried to start its elected constitutional governance in 1947 but the political and ideological subversive rivalry of the CCP, discretely but significantly aided by Moscow, grew strong militarily. It successfully rebelled again to overthrow the ROC on the Chinese Mainland after three years of fierce civil war and to create the PRC in 1949 (Z. Liu 2013, V7, 323–679).

Late-Qing and the Republican Eras: A Reassessment The Chinese World was forced by the Western powers to enter the Westphalia system of international relations in mid- to late-nineteenth century. The ROC

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continued the sociopolitical changes of the late-Qing and formally ended the dynastic imperial system. However, successive rulers of the ROC from Yuan Shikai to Chiang Kai-shek were mostly all Qin-Han autocratic rulers with varied power and effectiveness in their authoritarian governance, struggling with the imported ideas of rule of law and democratic party-politics. The China Order collapsed, yet the Qin-Han polity stayed on. Heavily influenced by European and American ideas, a new political ideology of Three Principals of the People and three stages of military, tutoring, and constitutional governance became the KMT-led ROC’s political guidance.28 China was gradually doing away the Qin-Han polity internally. Externally, successive leaders successfully secured China and wisely and firmly placed the Han-Chinese nation and the renewed multination state of the ROC to be a major member of the world under the Westphalia system. Started in the early 1920s and completed by 1943, the treaties imposed on China during the late-Qing were revised, ending all foreign concession zones and legal extraterritoriality. Britain, led by Winston Churchill who vowed not to be the burier of the British Empire, promised reluctantly in 1942–43 to return Hong Kong peacefully after the end of World War II (Gu 1985, V3, 355–63, 367–79; 1987, V5, 14–19). Anti-Chinese laws and practices in foreign powers subsided. The infamous Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) in the United States was repealed by the Magnuson Act in 1943.29 China regained the lost lands of Manchuria and Taiwan and the ROC became a new global leader as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in 1945. During this long century (1840s–1940s), the Chinese people lost the millennia-old China Order. They also started to forsake the Qin-Han polity inspired and affected by external influences as well. The Chinese ruling elites, however, had indeed suffered great humiliation and indignation in the process, as they not only lost their world but also their ideology. To many, if not most, of the Chinese elites at the time, it was indeed an unprecedented experience of repeated disgrace destroying their identity, dignity, and way of life. Often times, such as during the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1900) when China declared war on just about all foreign powers, asserted a Chinese writer in 2014, “the real humiliation was in fact the incredible absurdity, barbarism, arrogance and . . . war crimes of the Qing government and its people” that the Chinese government (of both the ROC and the PRC) has traditionally whitewashed.30 With gradual and steady efforts and successes to secure and elevate their statehood and nationhood, the Chinese definitively celebrated the end of the humiliations by 1945 when the Chinese people became an equal to other nations legally and ideologically, and China emerged from the brutal World War II to be one of the Big Five in the world. Other than those who would forever miss the Qin-Han polity and the China Order, whatever humiliation (the real and the

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perceived) the Chinese experienced was primarily gone with the victory winds of the Second World War. Chiang Kai-shek declared in January 1943 with a great relief that “all of the humiliations China has suffered for the past century is now erased” (Gu 1987, V5, 186). The same foreign powers that brought down the China Order also assisted in securing, reshaping, and elevating the new China, albeit as one nation rather than the whole world. This long century was a century of all-encompassing learning, great experiments, fundamental changes, and epic progress. China without the China Order acquired significant and continued improvement and uplift. There was an immeasurably beneficial wholesale import of modern science, medicine, and education through massive translation that qualitatively elevated Chinese standards of living, knowledge, and socioeconomic development (T. Li 2016). There were consequently great outbursts of new scholarship of Chinese historiography, philosophy, sciences, technology, and arts to give the Chinese an open, free, and competitive environment for scientific inquiry and innovation, a genuine competition of the hundred schools thrived in China for the first time since the pre-Qin Era, despite the pressures and crackdowns by forces inevitably generated by the still largely Qin-Han style authoritarian politics (J. Wang 2000, 387–79). More than six decades later, the great emphasis on and massive investment in the world-class level of accomplishment in education during the ROC era were still admired and unmatched (Hua 2014). The fabled achievement of the Southwest Union University (西南聯大) in the 1930s and ’40s, for example, was in no small part because “all but 23 of the 179 full and associate professors had studied abroad” (Israel 1999, 161). The Chinese worldviews, way of life, and mind were all immensely enriched and transformed. As soon as the China Order broke down, the Qin-Han polity itself was deeply shaken and started to lose ground and legitimacy, being eroded or even replaced by the imported institutions and ideas of sociopolitical organizations and governance. By the time of the final fall of the Qing Empire and especially in the subsequent decades, republicanism, democracy, personal liberty and equality, freedoms of speech and assembly, people’s interests overruling the ruler’s interest, civil and human rights, private property rights, and socialist ideas became the new but fundamental and dominant sociopolitical values and norms. For the first time in Chinese history, the ROC legalized private land ownership on day one as the foundation of private property rights, doing away the millennia-old imperial ownership of all the land under the sun.31 Many foreigners came to and stayed in China as the critical, catalytic agents for the epic changes in China. They were often indeed motivated by selfish, self-serving interests, although some were there for seemingly altruistic causes such as missionary work, as volunteers and representing charitable organizations. Chinese diaspora, especially those returning home, also played

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an instrumental role since tens of thousands Chinese students were legally barred from staying in the United States permanently after graduation before 1953.32 There were also foreigners who stroked China mostly for imperialist and expansionist objectives, even with the dark desire of enslaving the Chinese based on racial and ethnic or cultural prejudices. The foreign influences were often delivered bluntly, brutally, and bloodily, and generated great pain and deep humiliation to the Chinese elites who were formerly the masters of the whole known world. Together, the foreigners broke much ground and have helped to shape China ever since, yet most have been deliberately forgotten in today’s Chinese official history books. Illustrative examples of those catalytic foreigners would include Anson Burlingame (1820–70 蒲安臣), the American politician and diplomat who served as Qing’s first Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to head the first Chinese diplomatic mission to the United States and Europe (1967–70). He pioneered Chinese diplomacy by making the first equal treaty for China in the nineteenth century, the Burlingame-Seward Treaty of 1868 between China and the United States, granting China the Most Favored Nation status with the Qing legalizing Chinese emigration (Williams 1912; Spence 1990, 204, 214–15). Sir Robert Hart (1835–1911 赫德), the British diplomat who served as the Qing Empire’s Inspector-General of Imperial Maritime Custom Service (1863–1911) (Spence 1969, 93–128; Bell 1985, 168–70; Lu 1986). He and five other British and one American (the last) led the Qing and ROC Maritime Custom Service from its creation in 1855 until 1950, exemplarily making the administration perhaps the only major institution of government that was efficient and largely corruption-free (Brunero 2006)—he crucially affected China’s state-building and norm-transformation (C. Chang 2013, 183–90). In short, the millennia-old Chinese mind shaped by the Qin-Han polity and the China Order was dislodged and started to transform (Fung 2010). A representative scholar of the time, the Chinese historian Chen Yinque, bravely reaffirmed to the CCP-PRC leaders in 1953 that he always considered “independent spirit and free mind” for all as the ultimate guidance for any academic work and the highest value that must be fought for with even the sacrifice of life (Chen 1953). All Chinese rulers, political parties, and elites had to accommodate, accept, and abide by those new norms and values even just nominally, grudgingly, or expediently. The only major exception to this general trend has been the CCP, which pursued a Stalinist Communist ideology and a nativist “national rejuvenation” above those common values and norms that first originated from the West. Yet even Mao Zedong had to nominally accept the centrality of those imported values, despite his bewitching semantics game to “make a distinction” between the “reactionary, bourgeois, rightist, Western, or American kind of ” democracy, freedom and liberty versus his “revolutionary,

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proletarian, leftist, our, or Chinese kind of ” democracy, freedom and liberty to justify and smuggle in his Qin-Han polity wrapped in Stalinism.33 Compared to the two other golden times in earlier Chinese history, the pre-Qin Era and the Song Era under the Chanyuan system, the late-Qing and Republican era under the Westphalia system was even more dynamic, innovative, open and productive, with unprecedented and (so far) unrepeated freedom and openness for the Chinese mind. One Chinese writer observed later that, during the late-Qing Era, “the only thing China lost was the superficial royal dignity and the so-called ‘sovereignty’ that the people could not enjoy” (Tuidao 2010). Chinese economy did exceptionally well in this century. The GDP grew 3.52 times in 1894–1931; per capita GDP grew 3.55 percent annually in 1887–1902 and 5.62 percent in 1920–31 (Qin 11-11-2012), much higher than the previous centuries. China scored the fastest economic growth in Chinese history, averaging 13.8 percent annually in 1912–21, mostly a boom of private capitalism (X. Zhao 2013, 90–97). It was followed by the state-led industrialization efforts that scored a lower but still 8 to 9 percent annual growth during 1927–37 (Chang 1969, 99, 112), with the industry growth of 9.3 percent annually, greatly contrasting the Great Depression around the world at that time (H. Huang 2007; X. Li 2003, 1–18). Both per acreage grain production and the total population grew during this time of the collapse of the China Order, thanks to the imported agricultural technology of fertilizers and new seeds as well as booming foreign trade (Y. Zhang 2006, 83–91). Consequently, the Chinese population had “perhaps the fastest growth unprecedented in Chinese history” during 1912–49, despite the endless civil wars and external invasions (Hou 2001, 575). It was the first time ever that population did not decline during the fall of a Qin-Han world empire; and the old ruling elites were not physically exterminated either. In due time, this great century of experiment and progress promised to usher in a true and lasting time of prosperity that would certainly outperform the pre-Qin and Song Eras to push the Chinese civilization to an unprecedented new high.34

6

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C

hiefly affected by external factors and forces, the ROC (Republic of China) started the arduous building of a Han-Chinese nation-state with promising departures from both the China Order and the Qin-Han polity. A leading design for that is the San-min Doctrine or Three Principles of the People proposed by Sun Yat-sen for the KMT (Nationalist Party) that calls for the Chinese to live as an independent country “uniting with all other nations that treat us equally,” for democracy, equality and socioeconomic development.1 Yet, the ROC rulers on the Chinese Mainland were all basically Qin-Han style Confucian-Legalist authoritarian strongmen, even warlords to varied degrees, from Yuan Shikai to Chiang Kai-shek. The Westernized and idealistic Sun Yat-sen, who never actually ruled the country, also quickly adopted the traditional authoritarian, dictatorial style of personal governance. External forces, especially the comprehensive subversion and aggression by Russia/Soviet Union and the aggressions by Imperial Japan, shaped China’s choices. Countless Chinese elites acted as the willing or duped agents of foreign, mainly Soviet and Japanese, powers at the expense of Chinese lives and interests (Liu 7-26-2015). China’s state-building and nation-building were eventually hijacked by the politicized and foreign manipulated nationalism and populism since the mid-1920s, retarding and distorting the much needed sociopolitical reforms. With a crafty substitution of the Mandate of Heaven with the Mandate of the People, the foreign funded CCP (Chinese Communist Party) under Mao Zedong became a powerful Qin-style totalitarian state during World War II. With smart ruses, sheer force, imported ideological phraseologies, and crucial external assistances, the CCP unscrupulously won the Chinese Civil War to end the ROC on the Chinese Mainland in 1949/50, causing both Chinese internal politics and foreign policy to take a giant leap backward.

The ROC: A Tenacious but Transforming Authoritarianism Externally, the post-China Order ROC was content with the unification of the Chinese World (mostly the Centralia) instead of pursuing a tianxia mandate 159

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and gained its major world power statues as part of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s vision for the post-World War II world order.2 It also actively and positively contributed to the construction and management of the new world order of Westphalia System (Loke 2013, 209–26). Internally, the ROC remained tenaciously albeit feebly authoritarian. The liberal-turned-authoritarian leader Sun Yet-sen became “unscrupulous in attempting to achieve his ends” (Liang 1925; D. Tang 1998, 140–46). His KMT managed, after his death, to take over the ROC under the more authoritarian military rule by Chiang Kai-shek. Yet, the weakened and incomplete Qin-Han polity of the KMT-ROC continued to transform, influenced and nudged by the West, especially the United States. The comprehensive gains and changes since the late-nineteenth century, outlined in the previous chapter, became part of Chinese life and were furthered and legalized constitutionally by the 1912 Temporary Charter and the 1947 ROC Constitution (Lu 2005, chaps. 3–16). In due time and with sustained and improved implementation, the ROC was on the seemingly irreversible road to be ever less Qin-Han-like and more democratic. However, despite the revolutionary institutional and ideological changes that were taking strong root, the great tradition and ideation of the China Order lurked robustly and the elite-pleasing Qin-Han polity died hard. The “loss” of the Chinese world empire always irritated many Chinese elites. The Soviet agitation and propaganda powerfully hypnotized and attracted many to further brew the rather traditional Qin-Han authoritarianism disguised in nationalism, populism, and socialism/communism.3 Both the KMT and the CCP have now been wielding the banner of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation over the past eight decades.4 Idealistic Chinese especially the youth were often like kids in a candy store for the first time, mesmerized by the competing ideologies while enjoying liberty. They easily felt dissatisfied and frustrated by the pace of political reform in contrast with the well-developed democracies they could easily see in the West. The fragmented and factionalized government, brutally exhausted and weakened by foreign subversions and invasions, energized the politically ambitious. The ROC was an ever softer and fading Qin-Han polity, even the more authoritarian, semi-Leninist KMT-ROC was caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one side, popular pressure grew for more sociopolitical reform, human and civil rights, and genuine rule of law—also strongly supported by the United States, ROC’s major ally. On the other side, the lethal challenge of the far more authoritarian Leninist-Stalinist CCP rose with a well-armed military and sophisticated propaganda to disguise the CCP as democracy fighters and anti-West nationalists—crucially supported by the Soviet Union, the ROC’s unwilling colleague in the Club of Great Powers that steadily sought to subdue and subvert China.

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The differences between Chiang Kai-shek’s tenacious but weak (or “necessary” as he saw it) authoritarianism and the United States created serious, costly, and sometime open friction and mistrust as early as in 1943–44.5 General George Marshall headed the mission impossible to mediate the disputes between the KMT-ROC government and the rebellious CCP in 1945–47. In good faith for peace and with genuine and even altruistic goodwill for the Chinese people, Marshall effectively restricted and chastised the ROC government, especially regarding the pivotal battles in Manchuria, while he had little leverage to affect the CCP (Tanner 2013, 15, 76–105, 192–222). The seemingly promising peace negotiations broke down due to insincerities, mistrusts, miscalculations, and overreliance on force on both sides. The American effort for a democratic coalition government in China to contain the Soviet Union failed and a disappointed Washington inadvertently contributed to the tragic result of having a worse government in China: the fall of the ROC on Chinese Mainland and the “loss of China” to Moscow.6 Funded, armed, and directed by the Moscow-based Communist International (Comintern or Third International, 1919–43), the CCP was created in 1921 and started an armed rebellion in 1927–36 against the ROC government. It was saved by Japanese aggression and grew in 1937–45 by pledging loyalty to the ROC government. The CCP won the Chinese Civil War (July 1946–June 1950), officially termed Liberation War in the CCP narratives, and toppled the ROC on the Chinese Mainland, which was mortally weakened and eroded by internal division, corruption, and betrayal.7 The PRC has been colored with the imported Stalinist-Communism to radically and totally Westernize China under a coercive monism of international communism.8 However, it in fact restored the Qin-Han polity dressed in Marxist-Leninist phraseology. As a tragedy of epic proportion, the disappointing KMT-ROC was replaced by a much less democratic and decidedly more authoritarian, even totalitarian, regime of the CCP-PRC that represented institutionally and ideologically a great regression of Chinese history.

The Rise of the CCP The PRC official narratives typically praised the creation of the CCP in late July of 1921 as a secret grouping of thirteen Chinese Marxists led by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Chinese proletarian class and the Chinese nation to fight for China’s salvation and the world communist revolution that “created a new heaven and earth in Chinese history.”9 Later, as the communist ideology fizzled and the true facts started to emerge, the CCP’s founding was rebranded

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in the 2010s as the “Beginning of the Great Revival” of the Chinese nation and Chinese civilization with some foreign (Soviet) assistance, but with little reference to the communist ideology or the creation by and funding from Moscow (Huang and Han 2011). The CCP was in fact directly organized and financed by the Moscow-based Comintern as its branch in China, a revolutionary conspiracy group, to be a part of Moscow’s clandestine effort to safeguard the Soviet Russia through instigating revolutions and instability in the neighboring countries (Y. Jin 2010, 11–12; CCP Central History 2002, 40–42). The crucial Soviet secret payment to the Chinese communists, totally hushed away in the official PRC narratives, actually started in 1920. In the first year of its existence (1921–22), the CCP’s total budget was 17,655 silver Yuan, of which 16,655 (roughly 35,000 U.S. dollars) or more than 94 percent was from the Soviet Union via Comintern agents. This payment increased rapidly as the CCP expanded from under 100 to 10,000 members in 1927. Available yet incomplete data showed that from 1921 to 1931 the CCP got financial subsidies of 50 to 70 silver Yuan or 250 to 400 (1990) USD per member every year from the Soviet Union, equivalent to 60 to 80 percent of the Chinese per capita GDP at the time,10 covering the most of its expenses. The critical Soviet payment directed the types and intensity of CCP’s activities and performances during that period and was often the only lifeline for the whole party (K. Yang 2011, 66–57, 72–75, 89). The Comintern also spent one million (2012) USD (58,130 ounces of silver or over 1,600 folds of the Chinese per capita GDP at the time) to train and place each of the estimated 1,300 cadres and agents to organize and lead the Chinese revolutionaries during the 1920s and ’30s (Feng and Shi 2014).11 But the CCP was just one of Comintern’s many ventures in China. At great cost to the Russian people who endured famines and poverty, Moscow spent even more to support multiple “communist” groups and secretly or openly bribe and aid several “leftist” warlords such as Feng Yuxiang (and later Sheng Shicai) to disturb, weaken, revolutionize, and influence China (Liu 3-14-2015). More importantly, Moscow forcefully backed the KMT in the early 1920s with arms, funds, and advisors. In 1926, the KMT was actually accepted as one of the several Comintern branches in China. The CCP, ideologically more radical and unconditionally pro-Soviet Union as shown with its full support to the Sino-Soviet agreement in 1924 between Moscow and the Beijing ROC government—the chief enemy of both the KMT and the CCP at that time— was instructed to join the KMT as a junior partner to conquer and control China (Y. Shen 2013). The CCP had such a humble and insignificant start, mostly as Moscow’s spare tire in China while Moscow was mainly betting on the bigger, more mainstream KMT that the CCP has celebrated its birthday

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since the 1930s on the wrong date—very few cared to record and remember exactly when the first meeting that started the party was actually held.12 The CCP had a clear duality from its beginning. It was a Chinese revolutionary movement composed of the politically active and ambitious but non-mainstream youth influenced by radical sociopolitical aspirations including Marxism from the West (often via the Japanese translation) and Han-nationalism that was energized by the humiliation the Chinese elites felt during the fall of the Qing world empire. It was also a willing tool of subversion funded and controlled by the Soviet Union in the name of the world socialist and communist revolution (Brown 2009). It was a foreign-funded and employed resurgent group grasping for power that also had many idealists, nationalists, political speculators, adventurists, and “red terrorists” among its members (Liu 3-142015). Many of the founding members including Chen Duxiu (1879–1942), the General Secretary of the CCP for its first six years, later inevitably went their separate ways and some became strong critics and nemeses of the CCP (Meng 2009; Smarlo 2004, 219–32). After the initial success in unifying China by force, the two Chinese revolutionary parties, the two branches of the same Comintern, violently split in 1927 and the KMT-ROC government rejected Moscow (Y. Shen 2013). The purged CCP became the only Chinese branch of the Comintern. It was then mobilized by Moscow, went underground, and moved to the remote rural areas to start armed rebellions just like so many riots in Chinese history but with crucial foreign support and command. Similar to the Taiping Rebellion six decades earlier, the CCP built a traditional peasant rebellion on socioeconomic appeals such as wealth redistribution, clan retribution, and power shifts, specifically land reform (reallocation), under the cover of an imported Western ideology of Marxism (Wou 1994; Y. Chen 2002 and 2012). Unlike Taiping’s twisted Christianity that was shunned by foreign powers, however, the CCP was organized and funded by Comintern and had institutions and practices that systematically imitated the Stalinist Soviet Union to have a Chinese Soviet Republic state, violent class-struggles (against the landlords and “rich peasants”) for mobilization and extraction, and internal purges and mass executions of tens of thousands of comrades with various accusations including the groundless Anti-Bolshevik Regiment (AB 团) in order to “eliminate dissenters and nonconformists” (Gong 1978, 353–54, 562–67; P. Wang 1992, 24–27; Zhong 1995, 16–26). The deadly internal violence was perhaps effective or even inevitable to control the party, but it was indeed “shockingly terrifying . . . and stupidly suicidal,” according to its survivors (H. Q. Liu 2004, 14–17). Moscow continued to pay the CCP vast sums of at least 60,000 silver Yuan a month in late 1928. Before the channel of funding was

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blocked by the ROC’s victory over the CCP’s Red Army in 1934, Moscow paid the CCP at the minimum 70,000 silver Yuan (or roughly 150,000 U.S. dollars) every month, a great addition to the income generated by the CCP through its own taxation, extraction (physical elimination of all “rich people”), and some exports (of specialty mineral ores like tungsten) in areas under its control (K. Yang 2011, 83). Consequently and unsurprisingly, the CCP adopted a peculiar and nonnationalist foreign policy stance to first and foremost protect and promote the interests and wishes of the Soviet Union rather than those of China. The CCP was literally commanded by a Moscow-sent Otto Braun (1900–74), the German-Soviet military secret agent (Braun 1982; Y. Jin 2010, 237–50). During this period, the CCP was clearly more of Soviet subversive instrument of violent insurgence than a nationalist or idealist political movement. The CCP, for example, called for “armed rebellion to protect the Soviet Union” during the Sino-Soviet conflict over the Russian railroad rights in Manchuria in 1929, the first external war fought and lost by the newly united ROC to the superior Soviet Red Army ironically commanded by none other than the former Chief Soviet Military Advisor to the KMT-ROC in 1924–27, General Vasily Blyukher (Galen 加仑) who was later promoted to be a Marshal before being purged by Stalin (Lensen 1974; Z. Liu 1998, 184–94; Wilson 2002, 24 and 105). After several rounds of harsh military campaigns, the KMT-ROC government managed to defeat the CCP’s Red Army and the Chinese Soviet Republic.13 The CCP was forced to run away from its main guerilla bases in the mountains of Southern and Central China, nearing China’s then political and economic centers, to zigzag into the remote regions in Southwestern China and ended up in the barren mountains of Northwestern China with the purpose of eventually taking refuge in the Soviet Union or the Soviet-controlled Outer Mongolia. This year-long (1934–35) run on foot during which the CCP lost about 90 percent of its nearly 100,000-man forces was later self-glorified as the Long March and became a major source of charisma for the CCP’s political legitimacy and a legendary history of heroism and survivability known to everyone in the PRC.14 In fact, however, the CCP leaders were basically carried by soldiers on stretchers the entire time (Smarlo 2004, 295). The ROC government made the critical miscalculation to only drive and chase the CCP away from the center of the Centralia to the Soviet border in the hope of drawing Moscow into fighting the Japanese and also to fully conquer the entire Centralia in the process, rather than eliminating the CCP all together when and where it could (Liu 7-26-2015). In the middle of the Long March, when the CCP literally lost contact with the bosses in Moscow, the more native segment led by the sidelined Mao

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Zedong rose to seize the top leadership of the military and later the party from the Moscow-trained and appointed leaders and Soviet advisors in early 1935 in Zunyi. After that, the CCP became more of a native Chinese peasant rebellion and a military-dependent organization based on the pursuit of “power comes from the barrel of the gun” than an internationalist Soviet agent.15 The nativist nature of the CCP started to overtake the communist characters, and the CCP aimed more at acquiring political power in China through the use of force and ruses at all costs than promoting an abstract world communist movement led by Moscow, although the latter remained always a key part of the CCP’s professed mission and ideological banner for the appealing cultural sophistication and lucrative Soviet aid. Hoping to use the Chinese to deflect the rising threat of the Japanese militarism and to preserve the CCP, Stalin ordered the CCP through Comintern in 1935 to pretend submission to the ROC government so to form an anti-Japan united front in China—the CCP released its “August 1st Declaration” in Moscow (without Mao’s input) to pronounce its new position (B. Wang 2010, 131–32). After the CCP reached Northern Shanxi in early 1936, closer to the Sino-Soviet-Mongolian border region, Moscow reestablished links with the transformed CCP and quickly resumed its financial aid at the average rate of about USD 500,000 per month in addition to significant weapon supplies so to keep the CCP alive in China Proper, even just in a very remote part of it, rather than having it run into the peripheries of Xinjiang or take refuge in the Soviet Union, thus losing its Moscow-hoped subversive role in the ROC (K. Yang 2011, 80–84). In December 1936, the CCP was literally saved by the critical Xian Incident, a mutiny that kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek by the ROC General Zhang Xueliang (1901–2001) in the name of stopping civil war and forming a Chinese united front to fight the encroaching Japanese Imperial Army. Zhang, who had already aided the CCP before the Incident, might actually have been a secret CCP member (Z. Liu 2013, V4, 610–62; K. Yang 2006 A; Zhang quoted in China News 2014). He was powerfully affected by the Moscow-orchestrated plots and campaigns of the CCP front organizations, the “non-partisan patriots” of a National Salvation Committee that smartly utilized the anti-Japanese sentiments to save the CCP and serve Moscow’s new needs (B. Wang 2010, 131–59, 184–208). The Incident forced the ROC to stop its final lethal blow against the CCP and became a major turning point in Chinese history. Zhang later publically regretted his fateful action when he was under house arrest in Taiwan (Zhang 1956 and 1957). He did not repeat (nor refute) his repentance after he was released in 1990. The CCP has praised Zhang as an old friend, a great patriot, and a national hero, but Zhang’s brother who joined the CCP was persecuted to death under Mao (Fan

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1978). Tellingly, Zhang chose to live in Hawaii in freedom for his last decade and never returned to Chinese Mainland after 1949, despite the CCP’s many invitations (Tang and Wang 2002). The growing Sino-Japanese conflicts, especially the subsequent SinoJapanese War (1937–45), rescued the CCP and also empowered it to be a credible even invincible rivalry with the KMT for ruling China (Mitter 2013). Japan’s aggression against China in the 1920s and ’30s were reckless, aggressive, and militarist overreactions to the Soviet-fanned Chinese anti-Japanese movement. It served Moscow well in the Far East and mortally wounded the ROC and later destroyed Japan itself as the war got out of control to finally draw the United States in (X. Feng 2014; Liu 7-26-2015). With the new room for breath created by the war against Japanese aggression and the new legitimacy granted by the ROC government through the Chinese national united front, the CCP rejuvenated to become a successful rebellious state within the state. It left the war for the nation largely to the ROC government which was weakened steadily in an almost directly reversed co-relationship with the rise of the CCP power (Xie 2002; Y. Chen 1986). The CPP first utilized the nationalist cause to obtain funds, weapons, and equipment. In 1937–40, 58 to 86 percent of CCP’s annual income came from ROC government appropriations (J. Zhang 2012). Moscow kept its significant financial aid to the CCP, “5.2 times as much as (CCP’s) total local revenue in 1937” from its controlled regions with one payment of $1.5 million in November 1937 alone, and was still “1.5 times of the total local revenue in 1940” (L. Xiao 2014, 73). By 1941, the ROC decided to cut the unaccountable funding to the rapidly expanding CCP and its military forces. Moscow also reduced its secret payment to Mao after Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. To deal with this “extremely harsh” financial condition, the CCP stepped up class warfare and confiscation of the wealthy.16 Over-printing its own paper money quickly led to hyperinflation. An unsustainable rate of 35 to 44 percent tax drove many peasants to run away or to take part in anti-tax riots. The efforts of ordering the troops to produce their own food and clothing as well as running government mills and factories were only marginally helpful (Zhu 2012). The CCP then turned to illicit means, including counterfeiting currency and drug trafficking (Feng 3-11-2013). Farmers and troops were ordered to reintroduce the banished crop of poppies to massively produce opium. Secret convoys were organized to smuggle and sell opium to the Chinese people in the ROC and the Japanese-occupied regions.17 CCP’s highly lucrative opium trade started in 1941 and continued to as late as 1948 (L. Gao 2013). By 1943, the CCP-monopolized secretive opium business (ineffectively banned by the ROC government and the Japanese occupiers) already supported half of the CCP budget. It contributed a whopping 96.9 percent

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of the CCP-controlled region’s total trade surplus by 1945 (Y. Chen 1990). What is remarkable about the power of the CCP was that the Party launched and successfully ran a decade-long “revolutionary opium war” against the ROC and the Chinese people (Y. Chen 1990, 41–117; Chang and Halliday 2006, 268–74), then managed to cover it up well and rooted it out when the CCP became the new ruler of China in 1949.18

Mao and the Mandate of the People Mao Zedong (1893–1976) was a bona fide product of the paternalistic agrarian society and traditional Chinese imperial culture from the rural Hunan in Southern China. He proved to be a very shrewd and effective Legalist practitioner of Qin-Han polity.19 Well-versed in Chinese classics and the Chinese language and with great ambitions and a penetratingly cynical understanding of human nature and weaknesses, he was a master of words and ruses for power and domination (S. Xiao 1993 and 2004; J. Xiao 2013, V1). With the deliberate cultivation by Joseph Stalin, Mao remained as a senior factional leader of the CCP despite being marginalized from time to time by Moscow’s other disciples in “dog eat dog, communist style” infightings (Pantsov and Levine 2012, 185–288). After the heaven-sent Xian Incident, Mao managed to rise to be the undisputed dictator of the CCP by 1942–43 via many ethically challenged maneuvers, plots, bribes, misinformation, manipulations, force and even torture, and murder to subdue and eliminate competitors such as Wang Ming and Zhang Guotao.20 He used a multi-year Rectification Campaign of 1941–45 to relentlessly and mercilessly employ the imported techniques of the Soviet Chaka/KGB-style persecution, purge, intimidation, and brainwashing—or thought-remodeling or thought-reform in CCP lexicon—in combination with the traditional Confucian-Legalist ruses, especially information control, self-criticism, and submission.21 Stalin’s personal approval and selection were key to Mao’s rise with the price being that Mao follow and obey Stalin with great deference until the latter’s death in 1953 (Pantsov and Levine 2012, 305–99). Mao “unscrupulously and unrestrictedly” “abandoned all ethics, idealisms, and principles” to turn the CCP into the military vehicle for pursuing his personal imperial dictatorship that betrayed Chinese national interests and “had nothing to do with Communism anymore,” observed one of his former competitors (G. Zhang 1966, V3, 341–47 and 430). Underneath the powerful and fascinating promise of “loving the people,” “for people’s happiness,” and “to create a new China” by Mao “the great savior of the people,”22 the goal that really mattered appeared to be the ambition for power to rule. For that objective, everything and anything including truth,

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­ orality, lives, people’s living standard, national interest, peace, and the envim ronment all became secondary and dispensable, as Mao famously declared that he was simply godless/fearless and lawless,23 pursuing and enjoying the endless struggles against heaven, earth, and people.24 The cynical way of Legalist governance, ends (of ruling) always justifies means, was pushed to an extreme with the supposedly “scientific” dogma of Marxism and the commonsensical but empty slogan of “serve the people” replacing Confucian humanism. Ideologically and for propaganda purposes, the People became the surrogate for God or heaven and the CCP led by Mao self-declared (and forcefully defended with all carrots and sticks) to be the sole representative of the People indefinitely. In a poem Mao wrote in 1945, he was “to be the master with land, godless and lawless for the people.”25 The mighty concept of Mandate of Heaven in Chinese tradition and ideation under the China Order was therefore revived with the Mandate of the People as the mesmerizingly appealing but absolutely specious source of legitimacy. People’s human and civil rights, freedoms, democracy, and rule of law were in fact obliterated by the people’s savior in the name of the people. To many Chinese, “the people are Chairman Mao, and Chairman Mao is the people” (H. Yu 2011, 4). To posture and claim to rule as the people’s representative or servant is not Mao’s invention, nor is it necessarily immoral or bad. But the CCP led by Mao, like many other authoritarian and totalitarian rulers, used force and ruses to make sure that it was the sole, self-appointed and eternal representative of the people, appropriating and abusing the name of the people for self-serving purposes. CCP’s duplicity and hypocrisy have indeed rivaled even surpassed the imperial duplicity and hypocrisy of monopolizing and abusing the Mandate of Heaven. All PRC government entities and affiliates and the currency have born the name of “people’s” and Mao’s motto of “serve the people” is literally carved onto the front gate of the CCP headquarters in Zhongnanhai.26 A people’s republic by the Mandate of the People is very much the same as the imperial slogan used by the Qin-Han world empire rulers: a celestial empire by the Mandate of Heaven.27 In 2015, in the tradition of chanting official slogans during celebratory parades, the CCP-PRC leader Xi Jinping ended his main speech with the illuminating mantra “The people shall/must win.”28 Shrewd businessmen cashed in with billboards declaring people as the heaven and “The Heaven is simply the Party and Government” with the backdrop of a bright sun rising from behind the Tiananmen Gate.29 Mao and the CCP thus successfully restored the Qin-Han polity as an autocratic governing system dressed up in new phraseology and imported ideology. The Mandate of Heaven was replaced by the equally empty Mandate of the People and the ideology of Confucianism by the more decorative Communism. This new Qin-Han polity exceeded its past versions for it pushed

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the Legalism core further, justified by the supposedly ultimate truth of Marxism, acquiring elements of a radical theocracy. It is hardcore authoritarianism even totalitarianism as it seeks to break the family structure to atomize and utilize the individual, trashing Confucian norms. As power-fetish Legalists, the CCP dismisses the appreciation and apprehension of the ancestors, heaven (the nature or God), and life or afterlife—values at least nominally preached by the Confucian-Legalist rulers. Human life including that of the comrades’ is dispensable for the leader’s objectives. Tactical advantages and momentary convenience as such keep its broadly defined secrets, which are indeed vital to a conspiracy political group (X. Xiao 2012). “[A] Communist Party member and revolutionary fighter in whatever work he does,” declared a CCP internal book on secrecy, “must first and foremost think about keeping secrets” (CCP Central Party History 1994, 113). For example, from the very beginning in the 1920s, the CCP has always tried to sweep the battlegrounds to collect its wounded and fallen-behind who could not be carried out and then simply execute them all under the supervision of political commissars to prevent the possible “leak of our secrets.”30 During the desperate run of Long March (1934–35), top CCP leaders including Mao kept having babies but ordered their babies abandoned on the road so as not to burden or delay the escape (Salisbury 1987, 151–22, 214). Some CCP officials were praised for selling their children to finance clandestine work (S. Qiu 2013). Like the Qin Empire, this bottomless, borderless, and fearless way of totalitarian polity indeed has the potential to be politically invincible if it has enough resources (Gu 1988, V6–B, 323). When resources and technology are lacking, a situation the CCP often faces due to its economic incompetence and inability of innovation, people’s livelihood and lives are squeezed and sacrificed in lieu of change, as in the infamous Maoist way of war fighting with the tactics of “human waves” and the strategy of “people’s war” or total war,31 and later the Great Leap Forward campaign. When human life was no issue, institutional constraints were lacking, and inner ethical considerations did not matter, then the CCP became indeed very powerful, especially when dealing with opponents who happened to (or had to) value human life and were bound by laws and moral or religious confines. With its new Mandate of the People, the Soviet secret payments and assistance, ROC government’s appropriations, centralized military organization, high extraction and mass mobilization, and illicit trade of narcotics, Mao’s CCP built its much treasured tradition of the Yan’an Spirit or Yan’an Model or Yan’an Way that enabled the CCP to conquer and rule. This hardened version of the Qin-Han polity unsurprisingly has had great effectiveness and long staying power.32 As asserted in an official documentary glorifying that part of the CCP history, the Yan’an Model is still very much alive in today’s PRC

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as the basic mode of governance and management, socioeconomic programs, culture and ideology, and even foreign policy (J. Ye 2012). The official CCPPRC ideology has always had “Mao Zedong Thought,”33 the refined doctrine of the Yan’an Spirit, at its core since 1945 (Charter of the CCP 2012, 1). In fact, today’s rising power of the PRC still demonstrates what the Yan’an Model is capable of.

Guns, Ruses, and Promises By the end of World War II when the Allies, mainly the United States, forced the Japanese to surrender, the mighty totalitarian organization of the CCP under Mao was ready to create a new Qin-Han polity to replace the ROC in China. The resourceful CCP expanded to over 1.2 million party members, occupied a large chunk of Chinese territory (over one million square kilometers or roughly one-quarter of the Centralia) with a population nearly 100 million (almost one-quarter of the total Chinese population) to form a powerful state within the state of the ROC—the craftily named Liberated Regions. The CCP raised a well-disciplined military force of 1.2 million (nearly one-third the size of the debilitated and divided ROC military) and an even larger militia of 2.6 million plus a countless conscripted civilian supporting force (CCP Central History 2002, 396, 407). Mao not only established personal control of the CCP and especially its military, but also created watertight control of information internally and smart propaganda externally. Internal dissension and critics were completely silenced and often physically eliminated as the beheading of the writer Wang Shiwei illustrates (G. Fu 2007). The rectified party organization, active networks of secret police,34 and the traditional Qin-Han statecraft of the hukou (household registration) and mutual responsibility systems all created an effective centralized control of the people in CCP controlled areas. Modeled after the Qin-Han rulers in the past, the CCP controlled migration, trade, and flow of information. It screened carefully all immigrants and generally prohibited emigration (Editing Team 1997, 38–39, 109; Y. Sun 1994, 29). With tight media control internally, the CCP milked and manufactured a populist and progressive, even democratic, image in and outside of China thanks to its effective propaganda efforts (with the great help of many foreign communists). Some exemplary work through people like Edgar Snow was later believed by the CCP historians for having directly affected many U.S. officials and officers including the U.S. State Department and Presidents Roosevelt and Truman (Liu and Zhang 2011, 125–30). While CCP’s publications were readily distributed in China and abroad as the ROC government was forced to allow due to its internal diversity and divisions, the need of anti-Japan united front and later the American pressure for freedom of speech, tolerance, and

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democracy.35 ROC and foreign publications and media, however, were strictly prohibited in the CCP-controlled areas with jailing and death penalties for the offenders. The CCP systematically and successfully manufactured and distributed misleading and bogus but highly effective propaganda publications to discredit and undermine the ROC government.36 A critical source of power for the CCP was its extensive espionage networks inside the ROC government and military including infiltration into the inner circles and high command of Chiang Kai-shek and his field commanders such as Fu Zuoyi, Hu Zongnan, Tang Enbo, Wei Lihuang, and Zhang Zhizhong (Xiong 1999, 1–81). The CCP recruited and used family members and assistants of many ROC officials and officers at all levels including Chiang’s stenographer Sheng Anna and four of the eight children of Chiang Kai-shek’s longtime personal secretary Chen Bulei (H. Wu 2010, 58–61; Z. Meng 2013, 31–33). Throughout the Civil War, Chiang’s top secrets were basically all leaked almost instantaneously to the CCP and many senior ROC officials and officers became turncoats.37 Indeed, the CCP has a long tradition of using spies and subversive agents against all kinds of enemies including the political exiles overseas during the twenty-first century.38 Tragically, those brave and invaluable underground agents were often discarded and purged by Mao when he took over the country.39 A similar fate continued for CCP agents during the PRC era as well.40 The idealism-appearing totalitarian CCP enjoyed a lopsided great advantage against the divided, diverse, and forced-to-be-open and tolerant ROC government. With all that, Mao and the CCP secretly and confidently decided in 1944, before the end of World War II, that “it is the time to definitely” topple the ROC and take over the country with force as soon as possible (K. Yang 1997, 519). A key to the CCP’s rapid expansion of its military force was its massive use of former enemy soldiers. As revealed sixty years later by its own documents, the CCP started to turn POWs (prisoners of war) especially the conscripts of the ROC government army by the use of force and indoctrination as well as bribery in 1931. Even before the Civil War with the ROC government broke out at full scale in July 1946, the CCP enhanced its tradition of turning POWs and secretly instituted a policy of “basically releasing no POWs” so all POWs or surrendered enemy combatants were either jailed indefinitely and/ or executed, or forced to join the CCP forces, or at least forced to labor for the CCP, completely contrary to the CCP’s open official statement of treating the POWs well and letting them go home freely. Only the “useless” and a few healthy ones were released “for specific propaganda and united front purposes.” Later, as the CCP-controlled regions were exhausted with conscription and extraction, even the “useless” POWs were all kept and forced to work. Those forcefully recruited, reprogramed, and reorganized POWs were then employed and deployed in great numbers, with special monitoring and control, in battles

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against their former comrades. The turned POWs or “liberated soldiers” as they were called by the CCP, actually constituted the majority (60 to 70 percent by mid-1948 and 70 to 80 percent by mid-1950) of CCP’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (L. Jiang 2012, 96–103; S. Zhang 2008, chap. 1). The CCP also secretly recruited and deployed many tens of thousands of ex-Japanese officers, soldiers, and technicians as well as Korean POWs after 1945 to fight in the Chinese Civil War as critically useful forces (Gu 1988, V6, 472–73; L. Fu 2006). Such an easy and cheap supply of trained troops crucially enabled the CCP’s swift and effective human-wave attacks.41 The PLA, therefore, despite its heavy loss of over 1.5 million people during the Civil War, rapidly grew in size from 1.27 million in July 1946 to over 5 million by June 1950 (PLA Military Science Academy 1987, 586). During the Korean War in 1953, the CCP’s commanders forced the fresh American and South Korean POWs to turn around and shell their former comrades right on the spot of their capture and later just “proudly laughed at” the U.S. protests for such illegal acts at the armistice negotiating table in Panmunjeom (P. Wang 1992, 454). The CCP choreographed extremely well to misinform and mislead the Americans, which subsequently affected U.S.–China policy. Led by Zhou Enlai and his extensive team of able propagandists and secret agents under the slogan of “any means is justified for the revolution,” the CCP and its friends in and outside of China had a great success.42 The counterproductive role of the U.S. mediation and U.S. aid (and the lack or withholding of it) was indeed a powerful testimony to the crucial role of external influences in the post-China Order Centralia, together with the secretive but significant support and supply to the CCP from the Soviet Union, the nominal ally of the ROC. The CCP had a great play of public relations warfare that bought it critical time, resources, and support in and outside of China, even in Washington and London. In addition to embellishing its nationalist (while hiding its communist) credentials and aspirations for China, the CCP specifically published volumes, for external consumption only, of craftily simulated often embarrassingly flattering praises of the United States and its idealistic leaders and made solemn pledges committing the rising CCP power to promoting multi-party electoral democracy, freedom, socioeconomic equality, capitalism, and human rights.43 With those promises that were never meant to be honored, Mao and CCP went out of their way to please, befriend, and influence Americans from George Marshall down to U.S. Army soldiers (Q. Hu 2003, 89–92, 335–60, 428–40). The U.S. Army observer team, for example, was exemplarily influenced by the CCP during their four-month visit to Yan’an (J. Zhang 2015). Beginning right after World War II, the U.S. actions and inactions about China, chiefly the permission for the Soviet Red Army to enter Northeast China, the failed mediation, and the American credulousness facing Mao Zedong’s “breathtaking deceit” and Zhou

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Enlai’s beguiling manipulation, inadvertently improved the odds for the CCP.44 In 1943–44, the CCP, a branch of the Moscow-led world communist party, declared that the United States shines the light of democracy, science, and liberty every day and night “to warm all the suffering people and enable them to feel that this world still has hope. . . . Ever since we were young, [we] have felt that the United States is a specially lovely country.” And China and the U.S. “will be forever the friendly partners.” It continued: “the work of our (Chinese) communists, is the same work done by Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln in the United States long time ago, and it will certainly have the sympathy of the democratic United States (Tang 1943, 4; Editorial Board 1944, 1). In 1945, Mao Zedong openly announced that he would have “A free and democratic China with all of its governments including the central government elected by the universal, anonymous and equal voters, and are responsible to the people who elected them. It will realize Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles, Lincoln’s of the people, by the people, for the people, and Franklin Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms” (Mao 1945, 1). In 1946, the CCP formally proposed the following and they were accepted by the ROC Government as the Guidelines for Peaceful State Construction: End tutoring governance, adopt constitutional governance, completely implement the Three Principles of People. . . . Political democratization, military nationalization, and legalization and equalization of political parties. People have all freedoms enjoyed by a democratic country: thinking, faith, speech, publication, convention, assembly, communication, residence, migration, enterprising, striking, parade, demonstration, and freedom from poverty and terror. Immediately hold election. . . . Local autonomy at below the provincial level. Unconditionally abolish all censorship of news, press, plays, movies, and post.  .  .  .  Abolish Party-education, protect freedom of teaching. Universities governed by the professors. . . . No political party will be funded by the national treasury.45 Those proposals scored greatly for the CCP but have yet to be implemented in the CCP-PRC seventy years later. The CCP’s ingenious double-talking and creative duplicity indeed surpassed most imperial rulers under the China Order.

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Mao’s masterful manipulation of words and narratives sold the CCP propaganda for liberal democracy while rallying his troops to boldly restore the opposite Qin-Han polity. For instance, Mao invented the oxymoron of “people’s democratic dictatorship” to simultaneously address the Marxism-Leninism dogma of proletarian dictatorship for communism thus to continue the crucial umbilical cord with Moscow, to tap in the Mandate of People twist of the traditional Chinese norm of Mandate of Heaven as a source of political legitimacy, and to attract the democracy-promoting United States and its many liberal-leaning followers in China who rightfully disliked the fact that the KMT-ROC was not yet democratic and not democratizing fast enough (Mao 1949, V4, 1468–82). This Maoist invention of deception and propaganda was powerful and successful, and has remained one of the core principles of the CCP-PRC regime ever since.46 Mao’s nationalist rhetoric and his popularization of communism through appropriating the ancient Confucian ideal for an egalitarian agrarian sociopolitical order, the Grand Harmony (Mao 1949, V4, 1468–82), appealed to a wide spectrum of Chinese, greatly excited and attracted many land-hungry, respect-deprived, and equality-craving followers (Qian 1998, 5–90). Therefore, in addition to guns, spies, and external help (from both the Soviet Union and United States in the opposite directions) and also the critical safe haven and logistics provided by the then-Soviet-controlled North Korea (Lü 2013), the CCP’s skillful and duplicitous use of revolutionary slogans captivated countless Chinese intellectuals including many liberals who might have deep suspicion about the nature of communism and the CCP but nonetheless gambled for the perceived nationalist and socialist progressive causes.47 However, those who decided to stay under the new PRC government, from the CCP members (or underground members) Guo Moruo, Mao Dun, Jian Bozhan, and Nie Gannu to the less political Ba Jin, Chen Yingque, Feng Youlan, Jin Yuelin, Lao She, and Shen Congwen were later all purged, abused, enslaved, or emasculated. Very few intellectuals and writers such as Fu Sinian, Hu Shi, Liang Shiqiu, Lin Yutang, Chien Mu, and Zhang Ailing saw through the nature of the CCP and made the choice to either run away with the ROC government or take exile overseas. In the words of a later purged CCP senior official, Mao was a good actor and fooled the Americans and Chinese with his scheme of nationalism and “democracy show” (T. Bao 2013). In the end, the ROC under Chiang Kai-shek’s incomplete and ineffective dictatorship lost the Chinese Mainland to the CCP.48 Still, opinion surveys of various sorts in the 1940s (as late as in December 1948) consistently revealed that only a minority of the people polled supported or welcomed the CCP while a larger group of people wanted to keep the ROC political system and about half of the respondents wanted a KMT-CCP coalition government (Pepper 1999, 89–92, 199–228). But it was

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proven once again that, like it has been so often in China or elsewhere, raw force, unscrupulous efforts, smart ruses, and external interferences tend to prevail over people’s preferences and intellectuals’ reasoning.49 In the end, “one hundred random events evolved into one inevitability”: to make the CCP the winner of the Civil War, driving the ROC government offshore to Taiwan in 1949–50.50 The CCP’s improbable but fateful victory may indeed well illustrate the assertion that “evil always wins through the strength of its splendid dupes; and there has in all ages been a disastrous alliance between abnormal innocence and abnormal sin” (Chesterton 1922, 4). The Chinese people, 20 percent of humankind, driven by their natural desires for better life, more freedom, and improved political governance while being over-pushed by the idealistic United States eager to help, fatefully abandoned the diversified, restricted, and transforming soft authoritarian government of the KMT-ROC (a nationalist de facto federal republic accepting the Westphalia system) for the illimitable, unscrupulous, and hardened authoritarian-totalitarian leadership of the CCP (a Moscow-created and led world revolution versed in Qin-Han ruling crafts) (K. Yang 2014; Q. Hu 2003, 135). The CCP, “the daughter of the Comintern and the granddaughter of World War I” created the PRC, “the daughter of the Cold War and the granddaughter of World War II” (Z. Liu 2014, 73–79). Mao excelled in the powerful Legalist skills to grab power and conquer, matching the record of some of the most successful founding emperors in China’s past. The impressive victory of the CCP in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, like the victory of the Qin in 221 BCE, was a turn of history made with concerted human efforts and errors rather than a historical inevitability (Westad 2003; Tanner 2015). It was a great triumph of the millennia-old Qin-Han polity and the traditional Chinese ruses, a personal victory for Mao, and has been the main source of political legitimacy for the CCP’s one-party rule of China.51 Mao and the CCP created a new Qin-Han polity and won spectacularly for themselves. For the Chinese people, however, the attractive promises quickly faded to usher in a grand tragedy of epoch proportion and unrivaled melancholy—the “tragedy of the Chinese Revolution” (Bernstein 2014, 385–98). Indeed, before even the formal establishment of the PRC, widespread mass killings of various “class enemies” already had taken place in the “liberated regions” to mobilize, extract, and discipline the peasants. CCP leaders admitted that, in 1947 alone, over 250,000 “landlords and rich peasants” were executed. In Jin-Sui region, an incredible 25 percent of the peasants were killed (K. Yang 2009, V1, 49–99). The founding of the PRC was unmistakably a great victory for the CCP but soon appeared to be an enormous calamity, an exorbitant detour, and a great leap backward for China and the Chinese people.

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The PRC: A New Qin-Han State The creation of the PRC, like so many rebellions in the past, was a serious bloodbath. To this day, there is still no official death toll of the Chinese Civil War as the PRC government has not released that information, like all other imperial rulers in the past. Often times, it appears that the CCP lost equal even more people than the ROC troops in battles (Zhong 1995, 99–124; Feng 1963, 21–78). The PLA formally recorded that it “annihilated” 10.66 million ROC military forces from 1945 to 1950 but with no specifications of how many of that were physical casualties (Z. Wang 2013). In 2016, a top CCP leader told his audience that at least 3.7 million known CCP members “were martyred” in 1921–49 (Z. S. Li 2016). In Jiangxi Province, where the CCP’s main military basis was located in the 1920s and ’30s, population declined by more than half from 43 million to 21 million.52 At least many if not many tens of millions of people perished in the Civil War, rivaling if not surpassing the death toll of the war against the Japanese invasion during World War II. In Changchun, a key post for the Battle of Manchuria in 1948, for example, the CCP used a 105-day “military terrorism” to starve to death reportedly 330 to 650 thousand civilians to finally force the ROC commander there to surrender, more than the 300,000 deaths reportedly caused by the brutal Rape of Nanking when the Japanese sacked the ROC capital city in 1937. Similar tragedies took place in places like Yongnian in Hebei Province, where two years of siege by the PLA in 1945–47 led to the death of 90 percent of the city’s residents.53 The PRC the CCP created in 1949 has been officially called the “New China,” a revolutionary departure from the old Chinese history, and ultimate victory of the Chinese Revolution for national independence started in 1840 so the Chinese people finally “have stood up” (Editorial Board 2002, 2–4; CCP Central History 2002, 495, 502–03). The imported ideology and phraseology of Marxism-Leninism and the comradeship with the Soviet Bloc added the impression of newness. Mao and the CCP extensively imitated the Soviet Union (or simply followed Moscow’s commands) from early on (Bernstein and Li 2010). Some of the crown jewels in Mao’s political arsenal such as political control of the military, secret police and informants, party monopoly of the economy and education, propaganda, class struggles, and manipulated nationalism and united front all seem to be faithfully copied from Lenin and Stalin, very much in concert with many recycled Chinese imperial statecrafts such as the household registration.54 Indeed, the Leninist-Stalinist party-state and China’s Qin-Han polity seem to be good matches ideologically and practically. The PRC imitated the Soviet Union in the hope of quickly enriching and strengthening itself (Kong 2010). Even though Mao privately asserted that

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his regime was neither genuinely communist nor a carbon copy of the Soviet Union, his true ambition was to be in charge of the world in his own way (Xing 2005, 16–23). Some China watchers have from early on realized the regressive nature of the PRC (Walker 1955; Wittfogel 1964, 463–74; Teiwes 1979; Michael 1986, 175–277). The PRC has been essentially a reincarnation or replica of the Qin-Han polity, a “new Chinese empire,” with some new coatings and trappings (Terrill 2004). The Maoist reign was in fact a “great leap forward to the past” to restore and maintain an undifferentiated premodern state of the Qin-Han polity (Li and Liu 1997, 328; F. Wang 1998b, 93–115). With the same hardcore of Legalist autocracy, Mao’s totalitarian governance was coated with a “scientific” ideology of the Maoist pseudo-Marxism that replaced the family-based Confucian ideology with rigid class divisions and violent class struggles, and substituted social harmony under the Mandate of Heaven with the promised fantasia of communism under the Mandate of the People. The thoroughness, extensiveness, and unscrupulousness of an autocratic polity reached a new high, matching the totalitarianism seen typically in Qin Shihuang’s Qin Empire, Stalin’s Communist Soviet Union, or Hitler’s Nazi Germany. Instead of the traditional Confucian-Legalism, Mao’s PRC was pseudo-Communismcoated Legalist despotism. After Mao’s death, over the past three decades, the CCP-PRC has evolved to be a fusion of pseudo-Communism-coated and pseudo-Confucianism-coated Legalist authoritarianism (Buckley 2014). Led by Mao, who promoted a state-mandated personality cult of himself (P. Hu 2014), CCP leaders were much less genuine believers or practitioners of Communism or Confucianism but more devotees to a dialectic combination of Voluntarism, Pragmatism, worship of force and violence, and unscrupulous use of the traditional Qin-Han Legalist politics and ruses of ruling, almost exclusively for the political power of an autocracy.55 Mao’s regime was perhaps “new” in that he never got even close to creating a real world empire and was ruling just a country that had been transformed by the previous century under the Westphalia world order, rather than the whole known world. He was thus condemned to struggle haplessly against the real world powers to build the dreamed China Order through the only way he knew: endless revolutions and campaigns for totalitarian control and mobilization. “Before the world was united, Mao was only a king, even just a bandit king (山大王),” commented a Chinese philosopher, “he had to rule the country like always in the war. The so-called ‘exporting revolution’ was just Mao’s strategy to compete for international hegemon (world leadership)” (Deng 2014). Therefore, Mao’s reign was exceedingly active, endlessly restive, and ultra-impacting with disastrous experiments and bloody persecutions to change China and the Chinese people to prepare and launch a world revolutionary war.

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The Mao era was thus filled with constant tensions, crises, failures, and gross underperformance (Harris 2015; Walder 2015). The totalitarian governance fed on nonstop sociopolitical campaigns and mass purges and executions from the very beginning.56 One study estimated that there were forty-three national political campaigns against various enemies and opponents or for promoting party policies just in the first six years of the PRC history, making the CCP “party’s all-under-heaven” (党天下), termed by Chu Anping, a scholar friend of the CCP’s who was purged in 1957 and then vanished, “the most unethical and untrustworthy among all the rulers in Chinese history” (Y. Xie 1999, 54–55; Y. Hua 2015).57 Continuing its practice since the 1920s and even before the end of the Civil War on the Chinese Mainland, the CCP launched Land Reform in 1946 that became national in 1950–53 and totally wiped out the relatively successful farmers in China, often physically. It executed an estimated 2 to 4.5 million “landlords and rich peasants” and their families.58 Then almost immediately, Mao negated his pledge of land allocation to the peasants who had died by the millions for his seizure of power. For control and extraction, Mao pushed his social reengineering idea of “continuous revolution” and forcefully implemented the hasty and highly destructive nationalization of the economy with the campaigns of Agricultural Collectivization and Urban Socialist Reforms (1954–58) and the state monopoly and ration of grain and almost all key commodities (since 1953)—all imported Stalinist statecrafts,59 but very much in agreement with the tradition of the Qin-Han politics in the past. The establishment of the PRC hukou (household registration) system since 1950 (formalized in 1958) restored with unprecedented extensiveness and enforcement the key imperial statecraft started by Shang Yang in the Qin Kingdom twenty-four centuries ago (F. Wang 2005, 44–53). People’s land and assets, “means of production,” basic supplies, and personal mobility were all thoroughly and institutionally centralized into the CCP-controlled people’s communes, various units (danwei 单位), and agencies so that the urban dwellers directly or indirectly became powerless state-dependents and the majority of the Chinese (over 80 percent) in the countryside became serf-like for generations until the early1980s. The CCP-PRC state has been the only landlord and asset-owner in the country, in the name of serving the people.60 Simultaneously, the CCP “eliminated,” often physically, about two million “bandits” and leftovers of the ROC troops in 1949–52.61 Then it carried out systematic executions and imprisonment of various “enemies” and “bad people” in the Suppressing and Eliminating Counterrevolutionaries Campaign (1950–53). Mao personally set a quota of jailing 5 percent and executing 0.1 percent of the total population for the campaign that killed “at least” 712,000 people (or 0.124 percent of the 500-million Chinese population at the time)

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who were mostly members of the ROC elites or employees—many of them actually critically helped the victory of the CCP (Strauss 2002, 80–105; C. Li 2005, 41–44; K. Yang 2006, 46–62). In reality, this incredibly murderous quota was often exceeded by the over-zealous local CCP officials eager to please Mao: Jiangxi Province executed 0.16 percent of its people and Fujian Province massively killed 0.26 of its population. In Shanghai and Jiangsu, Mao even personally and repeatedly telegrammed an order to “to quickly kill thousands more” so the most cosmopolitan Shanghai organized many mass executions, including one that publically shot 285 hastily convicted on April 30, 1951, in the city’s central square.62 The CCP also launched Three-Anti and FiveAnti campaigns (1951–52) that crushed and controlled the industrialists and merchants, leading to widespread confiscations, imprisonment, and death.63 Mao immediately used force to establish a totalitarian reform and control of the Chinese elites and the Chinese mind in the name of “thought reform of the intellectuals” that started to “destroy China’s elites” (X. Hu 2012).64 It started with a ban of the movies Secret History of Qing Palace in 1950 and Story of Wu Xun in 1951. The case of Gao Gang-Rao Shushi Anti-Party Clique in 1954 and the Anti-Hu Feng Campaign in 1955 started the nonstop brutal purges against CCP officials and loyalists themselves who showed any sign of dissention (Spence 1990, 542–67; H. Li 2003, 339–86). In fact, Mao’s CCP launched merciless ideological and personal attacks and purges to rectify its ranks and followers in 1947–48, in the CCP tradition started by the Yan’an Rectification Campaign (peaked in 1942–43), before the creation of the PRC (Qian 1998, 21–47, 127–47, 245–67). Other than Gao Gang (who committed suicide) and Marshal Lin Biao who died in his rebellious but mysterious escape in 1971, just about all of Mao’s countless purge victims were later exonerated or rehabilitated by the post-Mao CCP (van Ginneken 1976; Zhao and Liang 2008, 18; Z. Li 2011, V2, 765–98, 846–56). Very soon it became obvious that even in the first few honeymoon years the CCP’s “liberation” and “revolution” did not bring much “peace, liberty, and justice. It is first and foremost a story of calculated terror and systematic violence” (Dikötter 2013, ix). The worst deeds and best illustrations of the totalitarian autocracy in Mao’s PRC, also a stunning testimony of a Qin-Han polity’s awesome power for control and destruction, were the series of events from 1957 to Mao’s death in 1976 with a despotism of deadliness rarely rivaled in human history.65 Driven by the logic of the China Order for world ambition and trigged by the Khrushchev Thaw (Ottepel, the post-Stalin political changes) in the Big Brother of the Soviet Union (Taubman 2004), Mao perpetrated the malicious “open plot” of Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957 and the “Anti-Right Tendencies” in 1959 to trash and destroy Chinese intellectuals and the Chinese conscience.66 One half to one million (or as many as 3 to 4 million), or the mandated quota

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of 5 percent of cadres and intellectuals including college students, often China’s best, brightest, and bravest, were condemned with their extended families as class (or state or people’s) enemies until 1980 when almost all of the surviving 100,000 Rightists were “rehabilitated” (Yao 1993; Dai 2000. Y. Xie 1999, 202–322; D. Guo 2009, 12–18). With only one free mind and one voice allowed—that of Mao—in the country of hundreds of millions people, great fiascos and disasters were simply inevitable. Dreaming to miraculously strengthen his Qin-Han state to take over from Moscow the leadership of the world Communist revolution and from the United States the world leadership, Mao micro-managed the economy with extraordinary haste, arrogance, incompetence, absurdity, and brutality in the so-called Great Leap Forward Campaign that quickly crashed into a great famine lasting more than three years (1958–62) and killing an estimated 30 to 45 million people (or around 7 percent of the population), the worst ever peacetime unnatural death in world history and also “the greatest demolition of real estate in human history.”67 Hunger-driven cannibalism was widely reported during the Great Leap famine.68 Forced to give up the management of the economy that he knew nothing about, Mao was mortified about his precarious and challenged position in history so to conspire with ruses to smash those who dared to reduce his power (D. Yang 1996; R. Wang 2002, 146–53; F. He 2013). He cunningly delayed the 9th Party national congress (due five years after 1956 in 1961) to 1969, after he set fires and traps to launch the Four Cleaning Campaign (1964–66) and the Great Cultural Revolution (1966–76/7), nationwide purges and civil war-like mass chaos and violence.69 Mao managed to use those campaigns of empty and phony slogans and postures to cruelly consolidate his imperial power by smashing and reorganizing the government he feared of losing control over and persecuting tens of millions people including his designated successor and top lieutenant Liu Shaoqi.70 Barely two years after finishing Liu, his co-conspirator and officially declared successor Lin Biao and his family were themselves purged and died mysteriously in a desperate run from a supposedly failed palace coup, but possibly as the result of a Mao directed conspiracy (Gao 2008). The decade-long Cultural Revolution led to massive unnatural deaths (estimated to be 1.8 to 7.3 or even 20 million), wrongful treatment of over one hundred million people, and a deluge-like destruction of China’s antiquity and epic holocaust of Chinese culture (Rummel 1991, 253–63; L. Xin 2011; Y. Yu 2015). It was Mao’s Nero-like tyranny at the expense of just about everyone that “institutionally ruined morality and ethics for the whole country.”71 Hatred-driven cannibalism, public tortures, and group rapes were reported in many places during the Cultural Revolution.72 These “premeditated

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group extermination and crime against humanity” are still whitewashed inside the PRC as mere “mistakes” and hushed away (Y. Wang 2006). In an astonishing way, Mao was as dominant and powerful, tyrannical and murderous, vulgar and selfish, and cunning and unscrupulous as any Chinese emperor. He was also as incompetent and egomaniacal in managing the country, especially the economy,73 and as corrupt and unethical in his personal life as any of the Chinese emperors with an ultra-luxury lifestyle and endless sexual indulgences (Li 1994). Mao was indeed the “freest” man, the only free man in a great nation where no one else had much freedom, to experiment at all costs with his ultra-narcissistic ultimate truth of “science for the fundamental order of the universe” that was actually recycled ideas of the China Order of the imperial times (Cheng 2006, 128 and 130; Qi 2013). Toward the end of his life, as an heirless emperor who failed to have a family dynasty (his only surviving son was mentally disabled), Mao developed ever more cynical and antisocial attitudes and acted in a consequentially disastrous way for the sole purpose of preserving his own power and “legacy” or position in history.74 Mao’s violent and bloody Qin-Han polity (more Qin than Han with a pseudoMarxism as its cover) was secretly deemed by its own elites when he was still alive as a nonstop giant “meat-grinder” that destroyed China, Chinese culture, and the Chinese people and elites including top CCP leaders (Lin 1971). Later, a Chinese scholar simply likened Mao’s endless purges to S&M (sadism and masochism) games for power and gratification (Liu 5-7-2015).

Post-Mao: A Qin-Han Polity Continues with Changes Mao’s clever effort of making and writing history his way, driven by the mandate for the China Order at the unspeakable cost, quickly unraveled only days after his death on September 9, 1976. Having purged all of his designated successors and fearing a coup and a postmortem trial against him, on his deathbed Mao picked the weak Hua Guofeng as the caretaker. His final words about political succession, however, have been kept in secrecy to this day. Some in the PRC have long asserted that Mao willed to have his nephew, wife, and even mistress rule the CCP-PRC since he could only trust his inner-family members, however incompetent they might be, just like those emperors before: his only sane son was killed by a U.S. air raid in Korea in 1950 and he seemed to not value his daughters very much.75 The deeply legitimized republicanism among the Chinese after the Qing (especially since the fiasco of Yuan Shikai) made an open family dynasty, however, very toxic even in Mao’s PRC. The imported Communist ideology décor further forced Mao’s hand. He thus

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had to exhaustively play a costly, secretive, complicated, and ultimately failed game of making a Mao dynasty after his death indirectly through regents and agents.76 In a rather traditional way, his cronies and coteries betrayed him and quickly launched a palace coup to sentence his banner-carrier wife to death (with a two-year suspension and later commuted to life in prison, she finally committed suicide). The other members of his trusted regents, the so-called “Gang of Four,” and his young nephew were all put in jail to rot (Spence 1990, 650–52). Mao’s inept programs and policies were mostly scrapped and abandoned while his name and his preserved body have been used against his will to provide legitimacy and continuity to the CCP-PRC regime. To publicly display the preserved corpse of a former leader, a tradition started with the Soviet Union’s treatment of the bodies of Lenin and Stalin, however, is actually a major insult and huge punishment in the Chinese traditional culture (Mao in fact penned in 1956 to have his body cremated).77 “The entire Maoist project,” concluded a recent Mao biography, “died with Mao himself ” (Pantsov and Levine 2013, 8). In that way, Mao became also a tragic victim of his own creation, dressed and mutilated at will by his successors for their political power and needs. The CCP Qin-Han polity, however, lives on. The party-state evolved from a one-man totalitarian dictatorship to an autocratic overlord rule of Deng Xiaoping (1904–97), and to an authoritarian regime by a small group of appointed, often aristocratic, men. Those leaders, the five to nine members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP’s Central Committee centered around one designated “core-man” plus a few “retired” senior leaders, are not necessarily biologically linked and rule the vast and diverse country imperially in the name of the CCP, the only political organization allowed.78 Symbolized by the first peaceful power transition in CCP’s history in 2012–13 (from the Deng hand-picked Jiang Zemin/Hu Jintao team to Xi Jinping), the party-state has seemingly established a new way of succession that combines personal appointment by the top leader with an opaque internal selection by a few and an endorsement by about 400 to 500 senior cadres and powerbrokers or “selectorates” (Shirk 1993, 70–82; U.S. Embassy 2014). A mixture of “political manipulation and the ritual mobilization of formal institutions” has helped the CCP to govern with the cycle of a party congress every five years (G. Wu 2015). The stability and effectiveness of an autocracy without a hereditary emperor, a grand and consequential experiment of the PRC QinHan polity, remain to be seen.79 Less deadly and less chaotic, the post-Mao CCP continued to have opaque power struggles and purges starting at the very top that include the coup d’état condemning the Gang of Four right after Mao’s death in 1976,80 the removal of Mao’s anointed regent successor Hua Guofeng in 1978 and Mao’s chief of

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staff Wang Dongxing in 1980, the purge of Deng’s two designated successors Hu Yaobang in 1987 and Zhao Zhiyang in 1989, and the bloody Tiananmen Uprising or June 4th Massacre in 1989.81 While Deng still used the Maoist way of “political mistake” for purges, the post-Deng leaders have instead used the even more opaque charges of corruption (bribery, graft, embezzlement, nepotism, and womanizing) or just “violation of disciplines and rules” to get rid of Yang Baibin in 1993, Chen Xitong in 1995, Chen Liangyu in 2006, Bo Xilai in 2012, Xu Caihou, Zhou Yongkang and Ling Jihua in 2014, and Guo Boxiong in 2015. The purge of top CCP leaders (members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo) continued in the post-Mao PRC with slightly less intensity. Mao purged five of the total seventeen top leaders in twentyseven years, plus blemishing another five former top leaders. In the thirty-eight years since 1976, the CCP purged eight of the total forty-one top leaders and disgraced one posthumously.82 Instead of using mass and often chaotic-appearing campaigns to purge a category of dissenting and opposing or untrusted cadres or intellectuals or anyone who has the will and/or resources to challenge, the CCP has resorted to using the seemingly orderly anti-corruption operations by its secret police arm of Discipline Inspection Committees (DICs) in mostly extralegal ways.83 The Central DIC conducts classic secret police work with “half of the leads from informants and confessions” and heeds the secret commands from the top to investigate, detain, interrogate (sometimes with torture), and convict people before law enforcement and legal aid get involved; and they have long been the most effective and “deadliest weapon of power struggle inside the CCP.”84 The purged are no longer labeled or required to admit political or policy mistakes or anti-party acts and thoughts; they just have to accept the charges on their ethical or criminal wrongdoings.85 Popular with the people and easily justified by the need to curb the widespread and rampant corruption inevitably typical of any Qin-Han-style officialdom, anti-corruption has been thoroughly politicized and selectively used to purge opponents and challengers, redistribute positions and rent-seeking rights, and consolidate power at a large scale. The CCP-PRC officially declared that it had “punished” as many as 4.2 million officials (including rapid-fire executions and numerous “involuntary suicides”) from 1982 to 2012 on corruption or misfeasance charges mostly with undisclosed details, on average 140,000 a year.86 This number increased to over 180,000 in 2013 (including 65,000 “leading officials,” 36 percent more than in 2012) (Xinhua 1-10-2014). In fewer than three years, out of the 376 members of the CCP Central Committee, twenty-four (or more than 6 percent) were purged (Xinhua 9-11-2016). In the first half of 2016, the cadres “punished” at the various levels jumped from 76 to 233 percent over the same time a year ago (CDIC 8-25-2016). The powerful political utility of selective

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anti-corruption perhaps explains why every CCP leader since Mao has been adamant about eliminating corruption, yet none of them has really tried the proven successful anti-corruption methods such as an independent judicial system, free media, publicizing and monitoring officials’ personal and family assets, and political empowerment of the people through elections. The PRC Qin-Han state looks and functions fundamentally the same way as the previous imperial regimes albeit with some peculiarities. The CCP has been the ladder for political and socioeconomic upward mobility, similar to the imperial officialdom and imperial exam system in the past. The Party has grown in size from 4.5 million in 1949 (37 million in 1978) to 88 million in 2015, with branches of multiple layers covering all of China’s urban districts and residential neighborhoods, rural townships and villages, firms and factories (including foreign-owned and private companies), and cultural and educational entities (X. Yu 2011; CCP Organization 2015). This world’s largest and most highly centralized ruling party monopolizes all political power; owns all of the armed forces, police, and secret police; owns or directs the country’s media, educational, cultural, financial, and industrial apparatuses; and owns or controls all the land and the vast majority of the Chinese wealth. Still, like the imperial rulers, Beijing has to fight endlessly and at great cost against local “centrifugal” tendencies (Chung 2016). The CCP members are selected and promoted mostly for their loyalty and obedience, just like their imperial predecessors. Moreover, they are also made to vow to “safeguard party secrets, [be] loyal to the party . . . be prepared to sacrifice everything at any time for the party” (CCP Central 1982; Xinhua 1-27-2016). The PRC ruling elites thus resemble a secret-society autocratic class for life (very few in the PRC could willingly quit the party without adverse consequences).87 The CCP-PRC started to replace life-tenure of office with age-specific retirement for its cadres in 1982. However, retired cadres, especially senior officials, enjoy full pay, many perks, and various creative titles for life (Q. Ma 1989, 179). About 5 to 6 percent of the Chinese population, the CCP is a “red machine” that controls everything and rules everyone everywhere in China (McGregor 2011, 1–33). The CCP-PRC has at least 640,000 active-duty, all top-down appointed “leading officials” at or above county-division-regiment level—less than 0.5 percent of the Chinese population—including 44,200 senior officials (above the rank of prefecture-bureau-division chief ) and 2,200 at or above deputy ministry-province.88 A larger group of retired or non-active-duty cadres at or above those ranks constitute the rest of the CCP autocracy that rules China today. The CCP power is ensured by the PLA, the nationally financed and staffed but the Party’s military that pledges its total allegiance to the CCP and is under a tight and highly centralized, often personal, control by the CCP top leader

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(H. Zhang 2013). When he was alive, Mao required the deployment of just a platoon to be personally approved by him. Mao also personally interviewed and appointed all PLA officers down to the division commander level (F. Wu 2006, 731). It now requires the direct approval from the CCP’s top leader to deploy a company or larger unit.89 Vertically, China is governed by an undifferentiated premodern state at all levels with the same “seven-office” party-state apparatus of a CCP committee that makes all key decisions, a CCP discipline inspection committee, a people’s congress, a people’s political consultative conference, a people’s government, a people’s court, and a people’s procurator, plus the government-run local mass organizations such as the Communist Youth League, trade union, women’s association, and chamber of commerce.90 In a totalitarian corporatist fashion, the CCP integrated the leaders of all professional and business associations, social groups, educational and cultural entities, and religious organizations— to form an elite class with vested interest in the regime (Z. Deng 2011). All churches, temples, and mosques in the PRC must be registered with the state and under the monitoring of the state-religious management authority, with the senior religious clerks commonly secret CCP members and paid as state employees with official ranks.91 Self-organized religious groups are illegal and subject to prosecution. The death penalty is used at times to get rid of the leaders of uncontrolled faith organizations (Liao 2008, V2, 48–73). Like the Qin-Han rulers in the past, the CCP relies heavily on secret police to control and govern.92 Other than the well-funded and equipped Discipline Inspection Commissions all the way down to the township level, there are at least four other vertical systems of secret police in the PRC, each has extensive networks of clandestine agents and informants: the Ministry of State Security (the equivalent of the KGB of the former Soviet Union), the secret bureaus and divisions of the Ministry of Public Security (the political protection units and cyber police), the political commissars and intelligence networks of the PLA,93 and the classified investigative reporting by state media and think-tanks such as the Xinhua News Agency.94 Wiretapping, cyber snooping, and audio and video surveillance are common in China.95 Local governments and officials have reportedly set up their own secretive spying networks against each other (He and Huang 2013, 91–92). This Qin-Han state is further assisted by the fullyequipped second military of People’s Armed Police (renamed People’s Armed Garrison Force in 2016) comprised of at least 1.5 million people (Wines 2009, A6), a massive number of local police station-financed police assistants that can total two to four times more than regular police officers (Cao 2000, 464–65), and the regular police force that is the largest per capita in the world.96 When necessary, the CCP still orders armored divisions of the PLA field army to put down mass rebellions as it did in Beijing in 1989 (Spence 1990, 738–47).

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The CCP-PRC state has penetrated the society much deeper and further than any past Qin-Han rulers in order to control and extract directly below the county even the township levels, down to every rural village and urban neighborhood. The hallmark social atomization and political marginalization have surpassed the imperial regimes to replace the de facto local autonomy of the gentries below the counties with party organizations. The regular, secret, and armed police forces (and the police assistants) are augmented by a large army of informants including recruited famous artists, scholars, college enrollees, and even high school students.97 Those paid or volunteer, but secretive, informants exist in every community as the so-called “ears and eyes,” “public security team members/activists” or “information personnel” including the secretly recruited college students placed in classrooms.98 To control and manipulate the Internet, the PRC has “at least 2 million” cyber police as online censors (Beech 2015, 50). In addition, the Communist Youth League (CYL), the youth arm of the CCP, recruits and deploys over 10 million imposter bloggers and posters online, including hundreds of thousands teenagers.99 Two million hired individuals include some inmates and the net commentators or web-propaganda workers, who are nicknamed the “fifty-cents” party since every officially deployed/ approved posting is supposedly worth 50 cents RMB (about 0.08 USD) or more in payment.100 They fabricate and post at least 488 million deceptive writings and distracting comments on the Chinese websites and social media every year as directed by the CCP propaganda officials (King et al. 2016). In one district of Beijing, Xicheng, over 70,000 informants and security assistants were on the police payroll, and the police there paid more than half a million RMB in cash rewards to retirees recruited as informants for 753 “valuable leads and tips” in just four months in 2015 (Chi 2015, A6). All foreigners staying or visiting China including those state-invited “foreign experts,” as expected, have been systematically and thoroughly monitored and “managed” (Brady 2003). Anecdotally, a “deeply-trenched” and “useful” police-gangster collusion seems to exist and function in the PRC and Hong Kong (Sun 2009; Central News 2014). CCP’s eavesdropping and infiltration also seem to have reached out to work on overseas Chinese communities (Freitas 2015). The post-Mao PRC continued the totality of the Qin-Han polity. The educated, able, ambitious, influential, and the rich who are defiant, not controlled enough, or connected to the wrong officials and factions are routinely exiled, destroyed, or jailed even executed with various excuses and often trumped-up charges. In most if not all countries, the wealthy tend to have more security and obtain real political power, exemplified by the real estate mogul Donald Trump and his election to be the U.S. President in 2016. It is a stark contrast in the PRC. In 1999–2008, out of the list of China’s richest people, forty-nine were rounded up by the government: nineteen sentenced to jail or death, sev-

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enteen investigated, seven disappeared, six died “unnaturally,” and many were exiled abroad (Y. Wang 2009). “The proportion of those charged, investigated or arrested after being on the (super rich) list was 17%, compared to 7% of other entrepreneurs in the same period” (Economist 9-29-2012). Unlike their peers in other countries, Chinese billionaires like Zhou Zhengyi, the Yuan Baojing brothers, Huang Guangyu, Xu Ming, the Liu Han brothers, Xu Xiang, and Yang Bin, regardless of how submissive they might have been politically or because of their association with the purged CCP leaders (the losers of power struggles), often ended up in prison or executed with their assets confiscated.101 Successful businessmen like Zeng Chengjie trying to start private banks have been speedily executed to deter the lethal threat to CCP’s vital state monopoly of the Chinese banking industry (R. Wang 2013). In 2009–10, the ambitious party boss of Chongqing Bo Xilai launched a mass campaign of “striking against gangs” to arrest, confiscate, and jail many hundreds of local business elites (some quickly executed) (Tong 2011). After Bo’s dramatic downfall in 2012 and theatric sentencing to life in prison in 2013, however, little has been done to count or return the looted assets (estimated to be hundreds of billions RMB) (Z. Li 2013). Similar campaigns have also been launched by Bo’s colleagues and rivals in places like Guangdong (X. Song 2012). In 2014, at least twenty of China’s richest 100 were in various troubles with the government: one executed, seven in jail, eight under investigation, three became fugitives in exile, and one bankrupted (Sina 2014). Therefore, both horizontally and vertically, the CCP Qin-Han polity is more encompassing than most Chinese empires in the past particularly the late-Qing and the ROC. At its core, this Qin-Han polity consistently relies on classic Chinese Legalism to govern and now attempts to rule by law as opposed to rule of law although often just simply a rule of man by will.102 This Communism- (now blending with Confucianism) Legalism creates force-induced fear, shrewd manipulation of human weaknesses, centralized top-down appointments and position-related officials-standard perks and corruption, controlled meritocracy and social mobility, active and creative propaganda and tight control of information, and innovative campaigns of misinformation. The ideological exterior or coating of the CCP-PRC party-state, however, has unscrupulously gone through many colorful, often drastic, changes and fusions: from the imported pseudo-Soviet socialism and communism expressed in Mao’s masterful oxymoron of people’s democratic dictatorship or new people’s democracy, to radical revolutionary totalitarianism and Han-Chinese racist-nationalism wrapped up in Mao’s class struggles and world revolution, to naked materialism and, after the moral bankruptcies and “spiritual voids” and confusions created by Mao and the CCP over the years, to now a revival of pre-PRC values and ideas, chiefly the well-tested and trusted imperial ideology of Confucianism

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(Osnos 2014, 30–35). In the 2010s, Mao’s successors recycled his doubletalk to propose a political oxymoron of upholding concurrently three supremacies: supremacy of (CCP) Party’s interest/cause, supremacy of people’s interest, and supremacy of the Constitution and laws.103 The relentlessness and excessiveness of the CCP Qin-Han polity in terms of its power, control, and socioeconomic penetration are logical given Beijing’s need to survive without the China Order and also its desire to rebuild the China Order with all the strength it can gather. As a more taut Qin-Han empire, the CCP-PRC has demonstrated its extraordinary staying power despite all odds over seven decades. In spring of 2011, the CCP-PRC leaders “solemnly declared” that their monopolistic leadership “cannot be shaken” and it would not change the fundamentals of its sociopolitical system, governance structure, and officially upheld ideology: “We will never have a rotating-governance by multiparties, nor ideological pluralism, nor checks-and-balances among the three powers (of executive, legislature, and judiciary), nor bicameralism of legislation, nor federalism and nor privatization (of property and land ownership” (B. Wu 2011). Two years later, in 2013, the CCP further issued a stern decree to simply prohibit the mention and discussion of “seven issues” that range from constitutional democracy, universal values, media independence and civic participation, neo-liberalism, to “nihilist” examination of CCP’s past (Buckley 2013, A1). “The banner of Mao Zedong Thought,” vowed CCP leadership, “will be upheld forever” (Xi 2013). In early 2017, the PRC Chief Justice openly attacked the notions of constitutional democracy, checks and balances of power, and judicial independence (Zhou 2017). The CCP one-party polity of autocracy, as a reincarnation of the Qin-Han Confucian (and Marxian)-coated Legalist empire, has been unabashed and unapologetic while its power is rising rapidly, thanks ironically to the very Westphalia system (to be analyzed in the next chapter of this book). This hardened Qin-Han polity appears hard to change without a costly implosion or explosion. International comparison and competition of the outside world remain the leading force for change and thus principal threat to the CCP: the inner logic of the Qin-Han polity has dictated that the whole world must be controlled under the China Order, in reality or in pretention, or to be kept away to ensure the regime’s survival and security.

Suboptimal Performance, Rich State, Strong Military As a Qin-Han regime yet without the mandated China Order, the CCP-PRC has struggled harder than most Chinese empires through self-strengthening in order to keep away the competing outside world and to ideally reorder the

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world its way. In line with the imperial states in the past, the PRC has had a barely average, mostly suboptimal record of performance in socioeconomic development but a rather successful even spectacular achievement of the regime survival and state power.104 On the one hand, the CCP-PRC state has maintained an astonishing extraction ability to enrich and power itself with the resource of a continental country and the output by 20 percent of the humankind. The Chinese people, cultured to “eat bitterness” by the China Order for so many centuries, have demonstrated indeed extraordinary industriousness, discipline, and endurance for hard work and inordinate sacrifices. On the other hand, the competitive nature of the Westphalia system allowed the PRC to obtain critical technology, capital, and markets from the outside for the Chinese economy to survive and grow, especially in the post-Mao era when Beijing scaled back and suspended its effort of reordering the world. During Mao’s time, the stagnated and failing economy was squeezed to the brink of collapse, with mass death and abject poverty. China’s economic output was 4.7 percent of the world’s total in 1955, but steadily declined to 2.5 percent in 1980 while the Japanese share rose from 2.5 percent to 10 percent during the same time. China’s per capita GDP was about 20 percent of that in Japan in early 1950s, but shrank to be only 10 percent in 1965 (S. Lu 2003). China’s per capita grain production sank to the lowest point in 1962 with only 207 kilograms. Chinese economy developed very “unspectacularly” and endured long “stagnations and even regressions” several times; PRC industrialization was low, out of balance, and costly; “People’s living standard was not improved at all;” Labor productivity, investment-return, and energy efficiency were all declining; And a great amount of predatory extraction was basically wasted during the man-made economic depressions of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution (Tengxun 2014). Still, with the effectiveness of a Qin-Han regime in accomplishing a few chosen mega ventures, the PRC managed to build some heavy industries, acquire modern military hardware including nuclear weapons and missiles, and expand its international footprints even in faraway places like Africa. The post-Mao PRC has gone back to the late-Qing and ROC route of economic development with an equally impressive accomplishment. China had a 9.8 percent annual GDP growth from 1979 to 2012 and became the world’s largest producer of 220 industrial products and moved up from tenth to the second place in the world in terms of the size of GDP, and accumulated the world’s largest foreign exchange reserve of $3.3 trillion in 2013 (Statistical Bureau 2013a; IMF 2014). Some “frontline” cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen now resemble mid-level developed countries.105 A full assessment of PRC’s economic record would require another lengthy book. Four reasons, however, stand out to show that the PRC, even with the

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highly praised boom over the past three decades, has an average and mostly suboptimal record of socioeconomic development (Ringen 2016, 16–26). First, counterfactually, according to the British journal The Economist, the Chinese economy would have been 42 percent larger by 2010 had the ROC continued to rule the Chinese Mainland, minus the tens of millions of mass deaths and a long list of atrocities and sufferings.106 Another counterfactual estimate puts that China’s per capita GDP around $15,000 by 2011, in par with other East Asian nations, rather than just US$4,000 under the PRC (Q. Zhang 2011; D. Cai 2007). Second, comparatively and without even questioning the reliability of Chinese official data,107 the PRC economy has been underperforming to raise per capita GDP, living standards, and the human development index (HDI). By either conventional or PPP (purchasing power parity) methods, per capita GDP of the PRC was still only about half of the world’s average in 2013 (IMF 2014). China’s HDI scores improved from 1980 to 2012 but its HDI ranking in the world (just below the world average) actually declined in comparison, from 81/124 (65 percentile) to 101/187 (54 percentile), while the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong either basically maintained or substantially raised their positions in that ranking. The PRC has since 1980 remained a typical developing country in the same third tier (out of four) of “medium human development” that also include countries like the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, India, and the Philippines (UNDP 2013, 148–49). Consequently, the real living standard in the PRC remains low in the 2010s as shown by the Engel Coefficient that measures the portion of income spent on food. In 2011, China’s official Engel Coefficients were 0.38 for the urban sector and 0.43 for the rural sector, actually rose due to inflation,108 at roughly the same level Americans had all the way back in the 1890s, and would require forty-seven more years of “rapid economic growth” to just reach the average level (0.15) of the low income OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) countries.109 Third, factor-analyses show that the PRC economy, heavily state investment-driven and export dependent, is clearly inefficient in returns on capital and energy consumption. Government capital investment projects have accounted for nearly half of China’s total GDP, more than twice that in a developed economy, contributing to 72 percent of China’s annual GDP growth.110 This ratio, too high even by the standard of a developing country, usually signals great dislocation and inefficiencies such as bad loans and wasteful bubbles. Chinese economy has limited, declining, even negative gains of total factor productivity over the past two decades, signaling a systemic and massive inefficiency and misallocation (Economist 10-11-2014). The poorly reasoned and opaquely managed excessive investment-driven growth, made possible by the

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state’s monopoly of the Chinese savings, may have already pushed marginal return of capital to below the depreciation rate so to literally destroy capital while starving long-term consumption. Judged by Incremental Capital-Output Ratio, the Chinese GDP growth is increasingly inefficient when compared to other Asian economies during their rapid growth, on par with or worse than that in India (OECD 2013, 280–81). China’s yield of GDP per unit energy consumed is ranked as one of the lowest, worse than inefficient economies such as Haiti (World Bank 2014). Burning nearly half of the world’s coal and emitting 23 percent of world’s carbon dioxide and other pollutants, the PRC contributes only about 11 percent of world’s GDP (X. Wang 2013; IMF 2014; U.S. EPA 2014). Finally, the PRC economic growth has been suboptimal due to its breeding of some of the world’s worst socioeconomic inequality, environmental pollution, and intellectual property violations. Environmental destruction and piracy issues aside, the income inequality measured by Gini Coefficient in the PRC has been among the world’s highest, much higher than its neighbors in East Asia (Sicular 2013, 1–5). The sporadic PRC official figures of Gini Coefficient ranged from 0.472 to 0.491 in 2003–13, way above 0.4 “at which a society becomes vulnerable to social unrest” according to the United Nations (Guo and Sun 2012; Kuo 2014). Researchers at the University of Michigan estimated that PRC income Gini Coefficient grew from 0.3 in 1980 to 0.55 in 2014 (compared to 0.45 in the U.S.).111 A group of Chinese scholars reported a very high Gini Coefficient of 0.61 in 2010 (H. Shen 2012). Researchers at Peking University concluded in 2014 that PRC wealth Gini Coefficient exploded from 0.45 in 1995 to 0.55 in 2002 and then to the astonishing height of 0.73 in 2012 (Y. Xie 2014). Yet, suboptimal and underperforming for the Chinese people, the Chinese economy has been rapidly enriching and strengthening the PRC state due to its world-record high rate of extraction that is unabated and unchecked in a Qin-Han polity that has little free media and no democracy. China may have just circumvented some roadblocks on its way to escape from poverty (Ang 2016). The rise of China, defined as the growth of the PRC state treasury and military, is already “for real” (Christensen 2015, 15–36). In 2011, PRC central government revenue (excluding the significant income from the massive and monopolistic state-owned enterprises and land sales) was 35.3 percent of the Chinese GDP, and “it has been steadily rising to have a bigger share of the GDP in recent years” (PRC Ministry of Treasury 2012, table 3.3). Excluding social security-equivalent funds, Beijing’s take of the Chinese GDP by international criteria was 31.3 percent in 2011, growing steadily and rapidly every year for twenty years, many times faster than the GDP growth, and more than doubling from 1994 to 2013 (Xinhua 1-23-2013).

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The PRC government collects nearly one thousand kinds of taxes and fees that include 47 percent on real estate purchases in Beijing. An average middle-class Chinese family pays 51.6 percent of total income in many, mostly “hidden” indirect taxes in the 2010s (Xuan 2010, 24–40). Some local governments even insatiably collect future years’ taxes under creative names including “preparing for war with Japan soon.”112 As a comparison, the U.S. federal government revenue (including social security funds) was 15.4 percent of the GDP (historically the highest point was 20.9 percent in 1945). If social security funds are excluded, then the U.S. government’s take of the GDP was only 9.9 percent in 2011.113 PRC income tax rate (capped at 45 percent) is higher than that in many countries.114 Chinese employees and employers shoulder the world’s heaviest burden of six kinds payroll taxes at a combined rate of 40 to 50 (66 in some cities) percent of wages, “higher than that in Germany, Korea, Japan or the U.S.,” yet the pension plans and health benefits cover only parts of the population with serious insufficiencies.115 Out of the estimated two-thirds of GDP extracted by the PRC state, the central government in Beijing gets a disproportionately larger share. The PRC central government routinely takes in more than 70 percent of the total tax revenue plus its huge and opaque “auxiliary budgets” income (from the state monopoly of banking, land sales, numerous fees, and other “flexible sources”) to increase its total revenue in the 2010s to be as much as 47 percent of China’s GDP. As a result, extensive tax evasion has been the norm in the PRC since “if the (Chinese) enterprises all honestly paid their mandated taxes, then 80 percent of them would have gone broke” (T. Zhou 2010). To enrich the state and strengthen the military (富国强军), Beijing has become an extractive state with little restrictions to accumulate unprecedented wealth over the past decades to be now one of the richest governments in the world. According to some Chinese economists, the PRC has become a “strong state, rich central (government), and poor people” with three highly irrational and twisted wealth-transfers “that must be stopped”: from the people to the government, from ordinary firms to the state monopolies, and from China to foreigners (through export subsidies and capital flights) (S. Zhang 2011). Just like all governments, especially the ones poorly monitored, the massive Chinese wealth disproportionately accumulated by the CCP tends to be wasted, misused, and embezzled. It is revealed that the PRC government only pays for 17 percent of health care cost in China in the early-twenty-first century, while the EU governments pay over 80 percent, the U.S. government pays 46 percent, and the Thai government pays 56 percent. Worse, over 80 percent of that already very small government health care funding for 1.3 billion people is reported to be only for the 8.5 million CCP-PRC officials.116 The CCP’s

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secretive Discipline Inspection committees alone employ 810,000 “inspectors,” one monitoring every eight state cadres (C. Li 2014; S. Wang 2014). Given the inescapable mandate for the China Order, the PRC has focused on spending its new wealth to build a powerful state machine for internal control and a strong military and a huge cash chest for its ever-expanding overseas ventures. The PRC state has thus scored the kind of focused effectiveness and speed a Qin-Han empire is typically capable of delivering. If the rise of China is still subject to debate and doubts, the rise of the PRC power as a formidable international competitor is already clear and present. The Chinese military, the world’s largest in size and second largest in budget, has had budget increases at the speed of twice as fast as the Chinese GDP growth for two decades. By 2015, the Chinese government had already pledged to spend $1.41 trillion (or close to half of China’s total foreign exchange reserve) to build and promote its “soft power” abroad; “in contrast, the Marshall Plan cost the equivalent of $103 billion in today’s dollars” (Shambaugh 2015). To strengthen its claims in the South China Sea, Beijing has built seven artificial islands with an unknown but likely very large budget. Real results and issues of cost-effectiveness aside, the rise and expansion of the PRC state power have been among the most massive and speediest the world has ever seen. Based on its suppression of human rights and environment protection, argued a PRC scholar, Beijing has forged its “shocking competitiveness” on the international stage (H. Qin 2016). The PRC Qin-Han polity is still without its mandated China Order, for now, but has acquired ever more gold and guns to build one.

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L

ike in the previous century, foreign exchanges and influence have been instrumental in affecting, facilitating, and determining the political, social, economic, and cultural development in China since 1949 (B. Zhang 2002, 4–19; Westad 2012). The CCP-PRC state itself has been created, rescued, and empowered by external factors and forces. Beijing’s official ideology (MarxismLeninism), key pillars of political legitimacy (nationalist rhetoric and state-led development programs), and main provision of technology are all externally sourced. The rapid growth of the Chinese economy and sociocultural changes over the past three decades have also been framed, facilitated, and financed by foreign capital and international trade. The PRC now seems to be integrating with the West-led world of the Westphalia system and rewarded amply in the process. Yet, the very logic of the Qin-Han polity that necessitates the China Order for the tainxia, the whole known world, which is fundamentally incompatible with the reigning Westphalia world order, cements the deep gap between China’s rewarding integration into the current world and CCP’s mighty struggle to stay away from and challenge the current world norms that are politically lethal to its Qin-Han polity. This structural tension thus has predestined the PRC into endless striving for regime survival and security with epic dramas, great uncertainties, and profound implications. The rise of the PRC state power has only made that struggle between tianxia and Westphalia ever more potent and profound. The “real” Chinese challenge is not just “the regional security challenges” but also “the global governance challenges” (Christensen 2015, 288–89).

The Tianxia Mandate As this book has analyzed, a Qin-Han polity, whatever its color and decoration or whoever the ruling group, can hardly be peaceful and content when there are other uncontrolled and ungoverned yet undeniable powers in coexistence 195

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and competition. The China Order of the whole known world is the logical and prized destiny, the tianxia mandate, for any confident and powerful QinHan polity, in practice or in pretension. Mao, the self-proclaimed new Qin Shihuang (the first Qin Emperor in third century BCE), instinctively knew from the beginning the fundamental need to work toward a new China Order to control the whole known world so to really preserve and govern his new empire, and to realize his personal ambition for power and fame as the greatest ruler of all. Mao wrote in 1958 that “the only thing regrettable is that the whole world is not unified.”1 Perhaps the most visible illustration of Beijing’s aspiration for a new China Order of world unification is one of the two slogans carved on the Gate of Heavenly Peace, Tiananmen, in central Beijing: “Long live the grand unity of the people of the world” since 1950 when it replaced the one-year-old slogan of “Long live the central people’s government.”2 Ever a brilliant tactician of power politics, Mao mastered the Chinese ancient wisdom of disguise, deception, and manipulation in foreign policy. Similar to his constant struggles against rivals inside the CCP and inside China, Mao was remarkably consistent and focused about his main objectives of staying in power and maintaining control as well as unscrupulously dealing with foreigners for his main objectives: “to create a new world” (N. Wang 1988, 2–4). Therefore, to safeguard and strengthen his personal power (via the CCP’s monopoly of everything) under the Qin-style polity and seek a China Order in the world in the name of a grand unity of all peoples in the world or a world communist revolution and “liberation” (or a “new and fairer world order” by the current PRC leaders) have always been the real core interests of the PRC foreign policy. In 2009, the top PRC diplomat told his host, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, that China had three “core interests” in the following order: to safeguard its political system and state security, to preserve national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to have a sustainable and stable socioeconomic development (J. Li 2009). The PRC Foreign Minister openly wrote in 2013 that Beijing seeks a “new global governance system” to replace the current “U.S.-led” world order (Y. Wang 2013). In its lexis, the PRC core objective in foreign policy is now mostly described as state security.3 In 2015, a leading Chinese scholar of international relations put it bluntly this way: “Only if the U.S. respects—and does not challenge—China’s basic political system and the rule of the Communist Party, will it be able to persuade China to do the same vis-à-vis America’s leadership position in the world” (J. Wang 2015). In practice, the CCP’s ways, alliances, tactics, methods, and especially rhetoric have changed drastically and dramatically overtime, demonstrating dazzling inconsistence and illusory colorfulness even deceiving flexibility and pragmatism. CCP’s standard official narrative tends to describe the PRC foreign policy as loyal pursuit of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”—Pancha

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Shila that was first jointly proposed by India and the PRC in 1954 (Richardson 2010). The history of PRC diplomacy, however, has shown that Beijing has made many total reversals in its alliance allegiance and international commitments always motivated by its peculiar domestic political needs for “state formation and survival” (Garver 2016, xii). A key “driver of Chinese diplomacy is to support the Chinese Communist Party and keep the regime in power,” concluded another observer of Chinese foreign relations (Shambaugh 2013, 56). Depending on how critical they are of the CCP regime, dozens of countries (including many previous “comrades at arms”) and international organizations have been expediently accused by Beijing as enemies “hurting Chinese people’s feelings” (K. Fang 2014 and 2015). Before it could control or conquer much beyond its border, the CCP-PRC, as a Qin-Han state, has worked hard to disguise its true intentions and take methodical steps. So far, Beijing has been tenaciously focusing on disabling and discrediting the current world order first, invoking some of the norms of the current world order such as nationalism, self-determination, and liberation of nations.4 To fight for and safeguard national independence and sovereignty for China and for all other “repressed nations” has been Mao’s and thereafter the PRC’s officially stated objective in foreign policy. Fitting the general pattern about war-proneness and politicization of external conflicts by autocratic regimes (De Mesquita and Siverson 1995, 841–55; De Mesquita 1999, 791–807), the CCP-PRC has indeed had a diplomatic history full of external confrontations and conflicts. This is especially true when Beijing feels itself weak in the international system and needs to mobilize for support, analogous to the CCP’s winning strategy of mobilizing the poor and the disadvantaged through its unscrupulous “united front” and “liberation” to come to power and then never leave. As in domestic politics, Mao and the CCP have had little problem, moral or legal or personal, abandoning professed objectives, attacking allies and dealing with enemies, and breaking any promises, even to making 180-degree turns in foreign policy for their main, consistent purpose dictated by the Qin-Han political logic. Even national independence and national sovereignty are often means to safeguard the PRC Qin-Han polity that ultimately require the restoration of the China Order. China’s national interests, much less the interests of the Chinese people, are often secondary. PRC’s real goal in foreign policy, therefore, has always been at fundamental odds with the existing world order, especially the post-World War II world norms of national autonomy, sovereign equality, universal human rights, and political democracy. The PRC was thus born to be a rebel and has remained always an insurgent, seeking no less than a revolutionary change of the current world’s political order in its own image whenever and wherever possible, so as to ensure the security and power of the ruling CCP leadership. As George Orwell’s dark

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prophecy puts it: “The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. . . . Power is not a means, it is an end. . . . The two aims of the Party are to conquer the whole surface of the earth and to extinguish once and for all the possibility of independent thought” (Orwell 1949, 121–22 and 113). Just like internally where, in the name of revolution and statist nationalism, the interests and even life of any and every group and individual are all fair game to the CCP’s rise to and goal to stay in power, Beijing has pursued consistently (though seemingly erratically) a foreign policy of anti-establishment power competition that has frequently subjugated and extensively sacrificed Han-Chinese national interests, not to mention the interests of other nations. In the late 2010s, the PRC remains just as suboptimal externally as it is internally with regard to the overall performance of its foreign policy, judged by how much protection and maximization of China’s national interests for the Chinese people. Yet, PRC foreign policy has served the purpose of safeguarding and empowering the CCP-PRC Qin-Han polity quite well. The packed energy and the destined drive in Chinese foreign policy for a revolutionary change of the existing world order for the China Order, ad postremum, remain real, potent, persistent, and ever larger and apparent as the PRC state power grows.

Mao’s Global War for a New China Order The Moscow-led world communist revolution in the twentieth century was first a great fit to Mao’s political needs and aspirations. The fact that the CCP and its victory in China were crafted and critically supported by the former Soviet Union also helped to cement the genetic link between Beijing and Moscow. Mao immediately declared his “one-sided” foreign policy for the PRC to become a junior member of the anti-West Soviet Bloc (Mao 1949, 1472–73; Editors 1998; Scott 2007, 20–40). Thus Mao led the young PRC to follow Joseph Stalin to advance a communist world order that critically resembled a pursuit for a new China Order, a “pre-modern family-like world order,” rather than a typical alliance of modern nations (K. Yang 2009, V2, 66–77; Shen and Li 2011). The CCP secretly pledged itself to be a “branch army” under the command of the “headquarters” of the Soviet Communist Party (Editors 1998, 12). The CCP “respected and obeyed” Moscow “far more than people know,” recalled a senior CCP official (Mao’s political secretary at the time).5 The United States, though instrumental to China’s survival and rise in the first half of the twentieth century, became Beijing’s sworn enemy for political (portrayed as ideological or cultural or nationalistic) reasons of power consolidation and mind control, rather than a genuine national interest for the

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Chinese people. The PRC worked hard to use expropriations and executions to erase the U.S.-led Western ideas and influence.6 On behalf of the Soviet Bloc to support Pyongyang’s invasion against South Korea and under Stalin’s direct even micro-managing instructions, Mao led the PRC into fighting China’s only war with the United States in Korea (1950–53) (Whiting 1960; Z. Shen 1995, 2003 and 2013; J. Chen 1996; Hwang 2010). The Korean War made the PRC an international pariah during the Cold War and sealed the U.S.-China relationship into a deep freeze for more than two decades, with monumental sacrifices of Chinese blood, resources, international image and stature, and development opportunities.7 Decades later, Chinese analysts conceded even openly that the Korean War was “Mao’s biggest fiasco” and China became in fact “the only total loser” of the Korean War.8 An insider PRC official openly characterized the Korean War, the officially much propagated foreign venture and the only PRC international “victory” on record, as a costly blunder and failure caused and exacerbated by Mao’s ambition to be “the leader of world revolution in the East” and his many misjudgments and mismanagements.9 China’s exorbitant intervention in the Korean War, similar to its equally costly interventions in the wars against France and the United States in Indochina (from 1950 to the mid-1970s) (Shen and Yang 2000; Editors 2002; K. Yang 2009, V2, 144–78; Zhai 2000), were obligations for the Moscow-led (later Beijing’s self-centered) anti-West revolution causes. They conveniently benefited Mao’s consolidation of his new Qin-Han polity by justifying internal mobilization and extraction, purges and murders, and anti-West/American hysteria leading to strict mind control (Christensen 1996; J. Chen 2000). Mao’s personal power and the CCP regime were significantly served and strengthened by those external adventures, as a Qin-Han polity traditionally needs political enemy or external barbarians to survive and thrive.10 But the Chinese people bore the incredible burden and losses, suffered decades of utter isolation, and thus fell back profoundly in socioeconomic development and international comparison. Mao’s joining of the Soviet Bloc and fighting the Korean War for Stalin even hurt the CCP’s party interest as the United States was propelled to intervene in the already waning Chinese Civil War to protect the ROC in Taiwan with the Seventh Fleet, thus “indefinitely” stopping the CCP from completely conquering the whole China and destroying its domestic political rivals—a deep embarrassment and great source of the built-in insecurity for the CCP-PRC regime that has continued to beleaguer Beijing ever since.11 Like so many pacts of convenience between two wannabe world rulers in the past who cared little about legality or ethics, the PRC-USSR alliance developed problems even before its formal creation in February 1950 (Q. Hu

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2003; K. Yang 2006, 31–34). The fundamental issue was who’s in charge of the massive bloc and which party would be ruling the new world order in its image even before it was born (Goncharov et al. 1995). Mao vigilantly purged his pro-Moscow lieutenants whenever he could and strongly, albeit secretly, resented the “undisputed” leader of the whole bloc, Joseph Stalin, even though Beijing publicly and brazenly worshipped the Soviet dictator who indeed did not treat Mao as an equal or Beijing as a leader of communist world revolution.12 The death of Stalin in 1953 liberated Mao, who then started to fully air his ambitions beyond the PRC for his new China Order through the world communist revolution. The subsequent clumsiness of Nikita Khrushchev, who wanted to conquer the world “peacefully” rather than by using force in the age of nuclear weapons, gave Mao the opportunity to dream to succeed Stalin and lead a more “effective” and more “authentic” world revolution of violence to create a new China Order for the world under the now “scientific” banner of “real” communism or simply the mystic “East Wind,” with Mao himself as the new great leader and Beijing as the center of a new world order.13 The dogmatic disputes and debates between Beijing and Moscow in the 1950s–’60s were really just Mao’s fight to be the leader of international communist movement, according to a CCP insider (M. Yan 2015). Having failed to get the position and power from Moscow, Mao had to search for his own.14 With a Leap Forward “to enter communism earlier than the Soviet Union,”15 Mao would thus become the exclusive son-of-heaven (or “the savior of the people”).16 A new founding emperor for the world would be a great accomplishment befitting Mao, who rallied his followers with “surpassing Marx” and making the PRC “the mightiest power in the world” (R. Wang 2002, 126–28). “We will certainly conquer the Planet Earth and build the great power,” Mao secretly told his top comrades in 1959, with “the solidarity of the whole party and whole people and the proletarians of the whole world.”17 He “quickly turned against his Moscow patron in a very ungrateful way” after feeling stable and strong at home (Z. Liu 3-14-2015). Even when the catastrophic consequence of the Great Leap Forward with the largest peacetime mass death in human history already became known, Mao continued to dream that “we will set up an Earth-management committee in the future to carry out a united planning for the whole Earth” after “destroying class divisions.”18 By 1967, Mao further secretly instructed his assistants to work on “an unprecedented, ultimate plan for the whole humankind” based on the two-millennia-old Zhang Lu egalitarianism, utopian ideals rooted in an undifferentiated Qin-Han sociopolitical order of premodernity under the China Order, dressed with the phraseology of communism (Qi 2013). Always egoistic and blindly believing in material force,19 Mao quickly felt that he and his party were in fact very weak in comparison to the real

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great powers outside of his control. The new emperor had no new ideas and only very few real capabilities and resources. Mao declared in 1955 that he could never be at ease until his country “finally catches up and surpasses the United States” (as world’s top power) (Y. Zhang 2007, 8). To surpass the United Kingdom and catch up with the United States in industrial-military power, to acquire the nuclear bomb, became Mao’s solution (K. Yang 2009, V2, 186–94). The next year, Mao set the ultimate goal for the CCP-PRC to “definitely surpass the United States” by the end of the twentieth century at the latest (Mao 1956, 294). With a burning desire to build a new world order, Mao launched a “catching up” with the United Kingdom in fifteen years and the United States in twenty to thirty years in raw industrial capabilities such as steel and coal production.20 He and his associates further revised the dream in 1958–59 to fantasize about surpassing the UK, in two years and catching up with the US in seven years (Mao 1958, 368). Mao’s objective was for China “to become four United States” in ten to twenty (or thirty) years, or twice as large and powerful as the Soviet Union, since Moscow boasted then about becoming two United States in two decades.21 For that grand mission of rebuilding the China Order, the PRC adopted the Stalin-style military-industrial complex to build arms at all costs to prepare for a world nuclear war. Indeed, for domestic political needs and due to its systemic incompatibility with the exiting world order, the CCP-PRC has always used the phantom of external warfare to justify its internal mobilization, extraction, and control—to keep the outside world away. In the 1960s–’70s, Beijing openly declared the inevitability and imminence of a total world war. Only by the mid-1980s, Deng Xiaoping recalculated that a world war, though still inevitable, could be postponed for a while, maybe a decade (T. Jiang 2014). Since the 1990s, especially after the September 11 Attack in 2001, the CCP further asserted that a new world war may not break out in the near term and a two-decade “period of strategic opportunity” emerged for the PRC to strengthen itself (Peng 2013; J. Xu 2014). The CCP created in 1962 a secret super “Central Focus Committee” (中央专门委员会) headed by the PRC Premier and staffed with over a dozen leaders of all relevant agencies, including treasury and intelligence, to concentrate national resources and spare no effort to develop military hardware especially nuclear weapons, missiles, satellites, warplanes, and warships. Six ministries of mechanical industry (out of a total of eight) were set up and tasked to specifically produce armament.22 The CCP also applied this monopolistic “total national mobilization” (举国体制) to compete for the perceived international prestige, such as winning Olympic medals, and to address urgent problems like the stock market crash in 2015 (D. Wang 2012; Ransom and McNeil 2012; Li and Lu 2015). Costs and consequences are literally of no concern to such

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grand endeavors and any means are justified by the ends.23 Mao infamously talked about sacrificing one-third to one-half of the (then 2.9 billion) humankind in a global nuclear war “to completely eliminate capitalism and acquire an eternal peace” for the world.24 From the late-1950s until his death, Mao fought nasty worldwide battles against Moscow for the leadership of the world Communist movement.25 Yet, Beijing failed to capture that throne and the PRC ended in a dramatic SinoSoviet split that isolated China further when just about all of the Communist countries moved to the side of Moscow (Z. Shen 2013). The utter international isolation and Mao’s radical pursuit for power to lead a world revolution were directly responsible for internal disasters like the Great Leap Forward that starved to death tens of millions people (Lüthi 2008; Radchenko 2010). Mao pressed on to create a “genuine” world Communist revolution. He told his top lieutenants in 1958 that he was already surpassing Marx and Lenin in leading real revolution.26 Other than challenging Moscow for the authentic mantle of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, Beijing engaged in expensive, both in money and blood, export of its vision and methods of armed rebellion and guerilla warfare for revolution—the so-called China Way or China Model—to just about all neighboring countries, especially Burma, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and ventured to faraway places in Africa and Latin America (Z. Xu 2000; K. Yang 2011, 48–49). The PRC for decades also showered significant resources to purchase mostly token support from any foreign political groups or individuals abroad (even some fake communist groups) and finance and instigate uprisings everywhere (Z. Shen 2013; K. Yang 2009, V2, 252–61). In 1961, Mao secretly decreed his wish to “lead an international communist revolution” (L. Qian 2012, V1, 335). In 1962, the PRC Premier Zhou Enlai asserted internally that “the truth of Marxism-Leninism and the center of world revolution have now moved from Moscow to Beijing.”27 In 1965, Mao’s deputy Lin Biao declared publicly that the PRC was leading humankind toward a communist eternal peace through “people’s war” to destroy the U.S.-led capitalism-imperialism (Lin 1965, 1). Beijing’s going-alone efforts of instigating and leading a world revolution during the Cold War were exorbitant: the still hidden price tag was that Beijing gave massive and often free aid to 110 countries around the world while the Chinese people were enduring abject poverty and great famine.28 Yet those efforts ended as almost total failures with the Chinese people gaining only hostility, mistrust, even hatred as the result while Beijing’s politicized foreign policy might have served the regime well. Having spent an incredible amount of money and blood and having given away Chinese territories “almost every time” at negotiations to settle border disputes (Z. Shen 2013, 2014, 22–32), the PRC absurdly turned just about all of its preciously few allies and comrades

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into either bitter enemies (like the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Albania) or vexatious often problematic partners of convenience (such as North Korea) in a few short years—more than proving the futility of Mao’s tianxia pursuits (Z. Shen 2013; H. Wang 2008; Perlez 2014, A6). Beijing also quickly ruined its partnership with New Delhi to start a long hostility between the world’s two largest populations (K. Yang 2006). Mao indeed led the PRC to fight “against the world” (Scott 2007, 41), creating a lingering low international image and stature for China and its people still today. To regain control after the mass purges and political chaos in the Cultural Revolution, Mao reused his classic playbook of making external enemies to, in 1969, start border skirmishes with the Soviet Union on the Heilong (Amur) River and provoke a full confrontation with Moscow (D. Li 1993; Y. Xu 2006). Barely two decades after its creation the PRC was led into deep hostilities with just about every neighboring country and direct confrontation, simultaneously, with both of the two superpowers that each could literally annihilate China with qualitatively superior military power (K. Yang 2009, V2, 216–319).

Rescued and Enriched by the Enemy The astonishingly reckless and narcissistically unwise choices Mao made for Chinese foreign policy, accompanied by and reinforced with Mao’s equally abysmal domestic policies quickly dragged the PRC and the Chinese people into a mortal danger of being attacked externally by one or both nuclear superpowers and/or collapsing internally from its own outrageously mismanaged weight. On top of that, Mao’s malevolent and desperate efforts, including creating a family dynasty in the end, so to safeguard his power and position in history in a supposedly communist republic without an able and recognized male heir, further weakened and ruined the leadership of the CCP.29 Of course, to say that Mao’s governance of the PRC was an absurd failure does not mean that Mao was mentally crazy or his policy did not help to preserve his personal power and the Qin-Han polity he created. Rather, what was clearly rational, even considerably clever to him and his ambition for his dream for the China Order, was utterly irrational and calamitous to the Chinese nation and the Chinese people in the twentieth century. Mao and the CCP might have created a “can’t help it” situation by making those maleficent and heedless choices as the agent of history—a great testimony of the awesome power of the ideation and tradition of the China Order. Nevertheless, like the short-lived Qin Empire two millennia ago, the PRC was due for a deserved demise by the early 1970s, after the epic fiasco of the Great Leap Forward and in the mist of the ludicrous but deadly chaos of power struggle in the name of the Cultural Revolution.

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The CCP itself admitted that the PRC was “almost on the verge of collapse” and “faced death” in the early 1970s (Hua 1978). Unlike the past cycles of the Qin-Han polity under the China Order in the Chinese World, however, the PRC was just a small part of a much larger and interconnected world this time. China, after the century of progress (1840s through 1940s) under the Westphalia system, could not go back to pre-1840s nor conquer the whole world even with Mao’s horrendous efforts. The same West-dominated Westphalia system that blocked Tokyo’s effort to create a Japan Order in China earlier (and hence saved not only China but Mao’s CCP) and then frustrated Mao’s tianxia dream since 1949, now also worked to save his Qin-Han Empire. The balance of power logic, especially the ongoing Cold War between the two superpowers, prompted Beijing’s nemeses to realign and come to Mao’s rescue so, as in the 1930s, external forces and factors saved the CCP once again. The U.S.-led harsh sanctions and embargo (and later the Moscow-led expulsion and excommunication of the CCP) were highly consequential—they brought great and lasting pain and suffering to China and affected much of Chinese domestic and foreign policies—but never completely sealed off the PRC as neither Washington nor Moscow could control the world trade and international transportation and communication entirely under the Westphalia system (S. Zhang 2002). For their own interests and pursuits and as part of the natural dynamics under the Westphalia world order, major Western powers such as the United Kingdom (complicated by its interests in Hong Kong), France (challenging the U.S. leadership), and Japan (seeking commercial interests) continued to provide the PRC with life-saving access to the very crucial food supply, medicine, new technology and key machinery, income in hard currency, and open sea lanes (Mitcham 2005). Politicians of realpolitik in the West gradually bent under the pressure of humanistic concerns (the CCP controls 20 percent of the humanity after all) and pragmatic purposes (the PRC could be a counterweight to the aggressive and weightier challenger of the Soviet Union and/or to the bossy leadership in Washington). The United States started a nuanced practical China policy as early as in the 1950s (Tucker 2012). The British-controlled free port of Hong Kong was literally PRC’s lifeline to the outside world throughout the Cold War era, providing the lion’s share of foreign currencies, technology, and luxuries for the CCP rulers (Schenk 2001; Dodsworth and Mihaljek 1997). Paris under Charles de Gaulle established a full diplomatic relationship with Beijing in 1964, the first Western nation to do so. De Gaulle, no friend of communists, made that trailblazing move probably motivated more by the French desire to take advantage of the thentranspiring Sino-Soviet split so to better its position in the Cold War than to challenge Washington. Mao was so desperately seeking this breakthrough for

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his regime that he did not even bother to customarily insist that Paris to cut off its ties with Taipei or state that the PRC is the only China as a precondition (PRC Foreign Ministry 1964; B. Yao 2013). It is interesting and telling that Chiang Kai-shek, perhaps with his own ideation of the Qin-Han China Order, uncompromisingly cut off diplomatic ties with France to protest and later refused to accept a two-Chinas arrangement regarding United Nations membership in the early 1970s (Y. Wang 1990, 128, 54–55). Many followed when Canada did so in 1970. Most consequential of all, the masterful geopolitical realists of President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, who were eager to get out the quagmire of Vietnam War and gain an upper hand in the Cold War against the Soviet Union, but perhaps inadequately informed about the CCP and PRC (Waldron 2015), started a historic rapprochement with Beijing in 1969–’70, just when Mao was deeply worried about and afraid of an immanent Soviet invasion (K. Yang 2009, V2, 283–95; Ehrlichman1986; Walker 2012; Griffin 2014; Lüthi 2012, 378–97). A new era of PRC foreign relations began with the highly dramatic visits to Beijing by Kissinger (July 1971) and Nixon (February 1972) (Burr 2002; Nixon 1978; Kissinger 1979). The PRC made a quick turnaround to treat its former patron and elder-brother Moscow as its most deadly enemy during the next two decades. The United States once again became the most important external factor shaping and affecting the Chinese history until this day. The U.S. success in getting to Beijing very likely helped the US–USSR detente cumulated by the American-Soviet summits and the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 1972 that have the two superpowers openly pledged to uphold the fundamentals of the Westphalia system, “the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs,” and to “recognize the sovereign equality of all states,” to have effectively reduced the risk of a nuclear world war and essentially blocked Moscow (or Beijing)-led violent world revolution of communism or of the China Order.30 The U.S. overture and Mao’s extravagant procurement of political favors in the newly independent former colonies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America helped Beijing to enter the United Nations in November 1971, inheriting the ROC as one of the Big Five on the U.N. Security Council.31 Mao was in fact caught by surprise and “completely unprepared” at the time for this “unexpected victory” (Xiong 1999, 336). Equally important, but largely overlooked or covered up, were the great opportunities and benefits of external help to the PRC generated by the competitive nature of international politics and domestic politics in the powerful and wealthy nations under the Westphalia world order. More specifically, as an able Machiavellian Qin-Han ruler, Mao and the CCP skillfully recruited and utilized foreign sympathizers and aficionadas as helpers and agents to influence

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public opinion and policies in the West for legitimacy and resources (P. Xu 2012; Pantsov and Levine 2012). The diversity and contentiousness of ideology, politics, and social advocacies in the West drove many otherwise intelligent and sharp critics of tyranny and injustice to be unwittingly mesmerized and enlisted (some purchased or blackmailed) by tyrannical regimes with meticulous handling, showering of accesses and rewards, and displaying revolutionary (or nationalist, social progressive, multiculturalist) even romantic façades and slogans.32 Many foreigners, including some of the movers and shakers in the Western societies, projected their ideals, wishes, and self-fulfillment and secular-vindication onto the novel, deviant, and hyperactive CCP-PRC state to become what Vladimir Lenin allegedly called “useful idiots,” helping to defend, legitimize, and assist Beijing in many crucial ways.33 In an ironic and theatrical way, Mao and his successors thus survived their China Order-building blunders and were saved by the very system they always wanted to overthrow (Z. Liu 3-14-2015). As a typical Qin-Han ruler, Mao “completely monopolized” personally the PRC foreign policy with Zhou Enlai as his skillful executioner.34 Mao used meeting visiting foreign dignitaries to symbolically show and bolster his political legitimacy at home (Z. Xin 2009, 407–08), as the regaining of some of China’s world stature first obtained by the ROC in the mid-1940s became perhaps the only selling point to Chinese elites about Mao’s governance that otherwise was increasingly known as a total failure.35 Gradually, the PRC acquired a full membership in international organizations. The United States finally recognized Beijing diplomatically in 1979. The sovereignty-based international institutions and norms presume and grant equal moral right and standing to all humans and respect and preserve all nations-states, thus greatly ensured, protected, and empowered the PRC as it, after all, rules and dominates, however suboptimally and atrociously, one-fifth of humanity. Beijing was finally subdued by reality and grudgingly moved to the safety of being just a sovereign nation out of many rather than a center or leader of world revolution. Essentially, just like his domestic programs such as the Great Leap Forward, Mao’s foreign policy of world revolution was costly, futile, and farcical.36 The CCP was forced to make a giant retreat and change of course in order to survive when it clearly failed to alter the world for a new China Order as the PRC was proven ineffective, isolated, and weak with a political and socioeconomic system that underperforms disastrously. Mao, always a shrewd survivor, was forced to resort to “using barbarians against barbarians” like those late Qing-rulers he despised. And he did this as early as in the mid-1960s, while still pretending to wage his world revolutionary war against both the United States and the Soviet Union.37 The U.S. shielding and the access to Western food, technology, capital, and market, at the expense of forcing Beijing to betray its ideological and

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treaty ally of Moscow and to abandon its revolutionary comrades all over the world after the 1980s (Y. Chen 2015), have saved and enriched the CCP-PRC ever since.38 For the past three decades, the booming trade with the United States with massive trade surplus alone has been the major source of income to finance China’s economic growth and enrich the PRC state: the U.S. commodity trade deficit with China was $1.6 billion in 1986 (21 percent of the total volume); jumped to $103 billion in 2002 (69 percent of total volume) and $344 billion in 2014 (58 percent of total volume), constituting 50 to 80 percent of the total U.S. trade deficits every year and often more than 100 percent of the PRC total trade surplus.39

Opening and Hiding: To Survive the End of the Cold War The post-Mao CCP, under the more pragmatic, less imperial, and less ambitious Deng Xiaoping, has abandoned Mao’s world revolution pretention and Third World Theory. It seems to be content with the power and joy of ruling a continental country with 20 percent of humanity. Beijing’s foreign policy had a general name of “opening” after 1978 (Pantsov and Levine 2015, 377–94). Wisely seizing the opportunity offered by the Westphalia world order, the PRC returned to the same policy of the Qing Dynasty in the late-nineteenth century: the strategies of using barbarians to deal with barbarians and SelfStrengthening described in chapter 5 of this book. Hailed by many as innovative, like so many other aspects of the CCP-PRC, however, the opening policy is essentially a recycled idea of the late-Qing and the ROC, albeit now with a more centralized, enhanced, and monopolistic role of the state in leading and pushing a mercantilist export-led growth, a “capitalism without democracy” or “capitalism with Chinese characters” (Tsai 2006; Y. Huang 2008). China has since modernized greatly its economy and military through imitation and foreign trade and investment (Moore 2002; Naughton 2006; Pettis 2013). In a grand exchange with international capitalists, the PRC offered cheap labor, relaxed environmental regulations, and subsidies to foreign investors, inventers, and consumers.40 In return, Beijing has mustered a fast economic growth and the world’s largest foreign exchange reserve. The PRC has acted like a typical sovereign nation competing in the Westphalian international relations for wealth and power. All these, however, have yet to alter the political nature of the CCPPRC as a Qin-Han polity. The one-party regime of Mao’s is structurally intact under the banner of the so-called Four Cardinal Principles that are essentially to preserve the one-party authoritarian rule.41 Deng Xiaoping willed his “Basic Party Line” to be followed unwaveringly “for one hundred years” until the

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CCP succeeds in establishing an “advanced socialism in China” to reach the level of a developed country in terms of power and wealth by the mid-twentyfirst century (Deng 1993, V2, 370–71). It has been reaffirmed and elaborated ever since by his successors (J. Hu 2008, 4; Xi 2013). According to a Chinese political scientist, the PRC is still a “late-phase totalitarianism, has not really progressed into authoritarianism” (F. Li 2013). Nonetheless, the outside world embraced the PRC. The West especially provided enthusiastic support and aid to Beijing in the hope of building China into a weightier counterforce against the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The bloody crackdown of the Tiananmen uprising in 1989 caused only a temporary pause, however terrifying it was to Beijing. In the hope of ending the Cold War and building a “New World Order” that needed China’s vote in the U.N. Security Council, the PRC was allowed to resume its access to the world market without giving up its political system albeit that Beijing indeed retreated further from its global revolution ambitions and made concessions to the West’s demands including pledging dearly to join the World Trade Organization in 1999 thus to neutralize the U.S. political conditions on the vital Sino-US trade.42 Beijing totally gave up any pretention and talks of world revolution, deliberately went hiding and low-key diplomatically as instructed by Deng’s “lie low hiding” strategy first issued in September of 1989: “To keep low profile, be good at pretending and hiding, never take the lead, act out selectively, preserve ourselves, and gradually and quietly expand and develop.”43 Beijing made largely successful efforts to paper-over its political and ideological differences with the West and quietly but firmly played geopolitics and power politics. China showed greater cooperative and integrationist efforts by opening more but highly carefully and selectively to foreign business community. The PRC has focused on quietly and “harmoniously” playing the international competition game for a mercantilist self-strengthening (T. Liu 2014, 556–74). The West quickly backed up its extensive cooperation with Beijing with a widely shared belief, a “China Fantasy” perhaps (Mann 2007 and 2016), that the PRC will inevitably and quickly transform even abandon its sociopolitical system through the ever closer and more extensive trade and exchanges with the outside world as the Chinese reformers would gain more credibility and the Chines people would develop ever more vested interest in the current world order—at least Beijing would become more peaceful and more integrating into the existing system of world order, to become a new “responsible stakeholder.”44 Beijing’s state-capitalism and mercantilism of getting rich with any means and at any cost, accumulating vast human rights deficits and mounting environmental deficits, provided a golden and enormous opportunity to motivate the profithungry Western capitalists to go to China thus created the booming economic exchange between a stubbornly authoritarian state with communist banner and

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the Western capitalists.45 Just when the United States started to question this logic and view the PRC as a serious competitor in 2000–01 (Bush 2015), the CCP was timely “saved by bin Laden,” an odd ball of international relations, and the subsequent war on terrorism since September 11, 2001: the U.S.-led West once again formed an opportunist collaboration with the PRC to this day (Z. Liu 3-14-2015).

The China Dream: Rejuvenation and Global Governance Voluminous number books even operas have been written about Beijing’s seemingly 180-degree turn of foreign policy in the early 1970s that has been often listed as one of the most momentous changes in international relations during the Cold War (MacMillan 2008; Tudda 2012; Adams 2013). For students speculating about the nature and future of the rising Chinese power, two questions seem imperative: Is Beijing changed to be just like any other nation in the Westphalia system to maximize its security and interests through balance of power and/or self-strengthening? Has the PRC given up its revolutionary agenda and revisionist foreign policy for the China Order? Given the analysis of this book, the PRC Qin-Han polity constantly and inevitably feels discontent and insecure without the China Order. It is compelled to either expand to conquer or convert the whole known world, to deny the ungoverned, or to keep the ungovernable away. The impressive record of China’s socioeconomic development over the past three decades has rendered the Maoist effort for the China Order a grand failure. The CCP political system, however, has refused to change. It is therefore logically predictable that the rising Chinese power will continue its struggle between tianxia and Westphalia to pursue its mandate for the China Order. The CCP-PRC has indeed been consistent in that regarding its core interest of regime survival and security. Beijing has awkwardly kept up its rhetoric of continued world revolution with different code names ever since it made that great strategic retreat to save itself: from anti-(American and Western) imperialism and fighting (Soviet) socialist imperialism throughout the 1960–’70s, uniting with the West to “first defeat” the Soviet Union in the 1970–’80s, supporting and leading the Third World nations against the First World (mostly the United States and the Soviet Union) and dreaming about leading a “international united front” to oppose hegemonies since the 1970s,46 “independently” striving for a new and fairer world order but keeping a deliberate low-profile to hide and dodge since 1989 especially since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s (Y. Xie 2009; Niu 2010, 196–258, 304–08), to advancing a so-called Chinese development model and an “Asian spirit” and calling for Asians to take charge of Asia affairs in the

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2010s (J. Hu 2011; Editorial Board 2011; Xi 5-20-2014). This rhetoric and the associated actions may have been a Mao style “empty talk” propaganda and posture to save Beijing’s face and/or for domestic consumption so as to help justify the rule of the CCP in the name of a grand vision and ideology. They also show a clear continuity of CCP’s zeal in a world revolution for the China Order, however covered-up and whether communist or not, despite its massive, embarrassing, and repeated setbacks and failures.47 Notwithstanding the many dazzling changes and turns and betrayals, the CCP rulers have never given up their ideal and pursuit for the China Order; they have not transcended or abandoned their Qin-Han polity that mandates and predestines such an effort. The current version of the CCP’s struggle has been termed since the 1990s as a “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation/civilization.” In 1997, the goal was set “to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation based on socialism” that would take at least 100 years and dozens of generations under the leadership of the CCP. This grand objective was repeated and elaborated in 2007 and 2012.48 Citing Deng Xiaoping who decreed that “consolidating and constructing socialism will take a long time of many even many dozens of generations,” Xi Jinping concluded in 2013 that the CCP’s rule is therefore for a very long time, comparable to the entire history of the China Order since “it’s been only 70 some generations since Confucius.”49 A grand China Dream has since been articulated to describe this open-ended mission to rejuvenate China’s past power and glory (CCP Central Document 2013). The top leadership, the CCP Politburo, met in late-2015 to discuss how to “push for a global governance that is more just and rational” so “to realize the China Dream for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” More specifically, the China Dream seems to be about “to respond to global challenges, to make rules and set directions for the (fairer and more rational) international order and international relations system . . . to construct a human community of common destiny.”50 This latest strategic vision indeed sounds like an echo of Mao’s not-so-secret wish to “better manage the planet earth” half a century ago.51 The entire CCP-PRC machinery has been mobilized to elaborate and promote the China Dream. PRC scholars have come up with various theories to justify the China Dream. Some have proposed a China-ism or Centralia-ism based on the Confucian-Legalism with Taoism ingredients that are supposedly “opposing” and superior to the current world order of “Americanism.”52 The Chinese worldview of tianxia that “is entirely different from” and opposing to the dominant Western worldview of nation-states is being promoted as the timely strategy for the rising Chinese power. It is to be a singular sociopolitical system and thought-system as well as a set of values and norms that emphasize the oneness, all-inclusiveness, unity, centrality, and totality of the whole world to ensure order, harmony, and to maximize “world interests” and “world

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rights” rather than the inherently divisive and conflicting individual human and group, unit, nation-state rights and interests. Such a tianxia worldview is the precondition for a new, better, more harmonious and rational world order. It “allows (us) to move forward to manage the whole world.”53 That is, to restore the China Order. Noted voices of neo-Confucianism call for a dreamily superior King’s Way under a benevolent son-of-heaven as the “Chinese way of governance” and order to remake and replace, in China and the whole world, the “unethical Western” governance and order of democracy based on “inferior ways” of social contract, rule of law, and individual rights. The history record edited by Confucius, The Annals, is viewed as the “Grand Charter” and “eternal law” for all human political activities (Q. Jiang 2003). Radical neo-Confucians have openly called for “Chinese universal values” to replace the “Western universal values” based on liberty and democracy (Zeng and Guo 2013). Some Westerneducated scholars have furthered such views to construct a Moral Realism that is supposedly based on Chinese ancient wisdom of “benevolence, righteousness, and rituals” or “fairness, justice and civility,” transcending the Western ideas of “freedom, equality, and democracy,” for a “just, righteous, fair, and civilized world.” Superior to the Realist international politics, this Chinese theory would guide China’s now “more active” foreign policy toward “more accomplishment.”54 Some PRC political historians have reexamined the Chinese Empire world order of a “tributary system” and theorized a “Chinese hegemony” in East Asian history (F. Zhang 2009 and 2015). Both “Old Left” and “New Left” populists have also turned to openly advocating unchecked and unlimited sovereign power for the CCP-PRC party-state, in the name of rejuvenating Chinese civilization that emphasizes the Sino-centric and Sino-unique “core values” of the imperial times (L. Xue 2011; L. Chen 2015). Leading PRC foreign policy analysts have presented the rejuvenated tianxia idea as a legitimate or superior alternative to and a powerful critique of the Westphalia world order (Y. Qin 2007). Others argue for reintroducing the tianxia idea with more emphasis on Han-Chinese nationalism and active defenses of the Qin-Han tianxia systems practiced in the past (Z. Li 2002). Some PRC scholars have declared that now is the time for China to be the destined world leader to reorganize the world as one, to turn the China Dream into the World Dream, since the United States has declined and the PRC has simply the Mandate of Heaven to do so (Ni 2013, 2; Cheng and Wang 2015). Officially, PRC President Xi Jinping has announced that “the China Dream has its basic denominator of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. . . . Today, China has unprecedentedly approached the center of the world stage, unprecedentedly approached the realization of the dream for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation. . . . Through achieving the

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China Dream (first, then) to hold the hands of other nations to realize the World Dream.” The World Dream is to be a (singular) “human community of common destiny” featuring a world harmony/unity (天下大同) or an incorporation of “America Dream, Europe Dream, Africa Dream, Asia-Pacific Dream, Latin-America Dream. . . .” And thus “the world is now experiencing an unprecedented great transformation in over 400 years” (S. Du 2016, 1). “Chinese people have always wanted to have a great harmony for the whole world as one family (世界大同, 天下一家),” declared Xi in his 2017 New Year’s Message (Xinhua 12-31-2016). It is remarkably similar to the Maoist slogan of “grand solidarity of the world’s people,” a restoration of the China Order at new scale that tantalizingly suggests a fundamental challenge to the four-century-old Westphalia System. The re-popularized idea of the China Order, with colorful new names, implies an “inevitable civilizational showdown with the West,” as a PLA general puts it in his version of “going West,” a geostrategic blueprint for capturing the “world island” of Eurasia and then competing with the “American Empire” with imported Western democracy as a useful tool for world power if needed (Y. Liu 2010). A bestseller glorifies civilizational confrontations and racial-ethnic conflicts, with overt praises for brutal force and the wolflike wild spirit of predators as the way to rejuvenate the glories of the Han, Tang, Yuan, and Qing world empires to remodel the world (R. Jiang 2004, 378–401). Others unsubtly prescribe a new Qin-Han Legalist recipe for the PRC to advance in the world (Pan 2003). China ought to repeat the success of the Qin Dynasty—“to establish a new clean world modeled after Chinese ways and laws” that are the (superior and invincible) “way of the heaven versus the West’s acting out of the (disastrous and undesirable) way of humans” so to save the whole humanity (Qu 2008 and 2010). Specific calls have emerged for preparing for another, new Warring States Era in the twenty-first century (J. Wang 2004). Normatively, the China Order-related ethics and values have been revived significantly: China in the world now is often portrayed to be in a life-and-death struggle and, like those all-or-nothing struggles for the tianxia in the past, a strategy of winning with any means at any expense has become trendy.55 Senior PLA officers have openly argued that the PRC must proudly work to replace the United States as the world’s top military power and strive to be the new, “better” leader of the whole world (M. Liu 2010). A “consensus” is seen emerging in Beijing to treat the United States as China’s top and ultimate enemy (Liu and Ren 2014), even though the United States at most creates only political threat to the CCP Qin-Han polity and is clearly not in any significant conflict with Chinese national interest (F. Wang 2016). The statist China Dream for a new China Order for the world promises a giant leap backward for the Chinese people and the world. As this book

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has attempted to show, the true “best times” of the Chinese civilization have been the eras when the China Order was either weak or absent, not under any of those Qin-Han world empires that have been erroneously, ignorantly, or pretentiously but widely venerated in the PRC. China and the Chinese people including the PRC ruling elites themselves have been greatly rewarded over the past three decades by returning to the trajectory of one of those eras, the late-Qing and ROC route. The much promoted and heavily funded effort for a new “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” appears to aim, unfortunately, at a remaking of Qin, Han, Tang, or Qing for the world: to have a world empire of the China Order based on the Qin-Han polity. The now rich and powerful PRC Qin-Han state, still without the China Order, seems to have reenergized the Maoist solution to address its inherent incompatibility with the Westphalia world order: instead of change and adaptation sociopolitically itself, the CCP has determined to follow its destiny to use force and ruses to game the system for power and then to reorder its environment and ultimately the whole world in its image. If the overheated nationalist sentiments decisively enabled the Fascist movement for totalitarian order in Germany and Italy in the twentieth century (Drucker 1939), an appropriated Han-Chinese nationalism could powerfully push a CCP statist movement for the China Order in the PRC in the same way in the twenty-first century. The mandate for China Order seems now to be poised to capture and guide the rising Chinese power. To reappropriate Confucianism, China has set up 500 Confucius Institutes in 125 countries (109 in the U.S. alone) by 2016 to serve its “going global” strategy.56 Beijing has made increasingly active moves to extend power in places like Africa and the East and South China seas with the aim of becoming a “maritime great power” (Wang and Elliot 2014; Johnson and Luce 2015; AFP 11-8-2015). PRC leaders have literally toured and binge-spent around the world to promote a “new, upgraded diplomacy” of China’s “global ambition and vision” for a “new type of great power relations” and “more Chinese voice” as well as a “new East Asian Order” and a global “human community of common destiny” (Y. Wang 2015). With the “One Belt One Road” grand schemes of multinational investment programs and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICKS Bank, a China-led “great chess game” to make rules for a “new international economic order” is taking shape with a strong intent to oppose the U.S.-led existing international financial and trade regimes (Yuan Chen 2015; Nie 2015; F. Wang 2015b, 46–47; Pang 2016). For that, Beijing pledged $1.41 trillion in three years, over 100 times more than the Marshall Plan in today’s dollars (Shambaugh 2015). The international community ought to be attentive and inquisitive about the China Dream. The rejuvenation of the China Order would place the world under one centralized ruler, a hopefully benevolent dictator rather than rule

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of law to pretentiously repackage the long stagnation and despotism under the Chinese world order before the nineteenth century as China’s alternative to the Westphalia System (F. Wang 2006). It portrays and praises the current Chinese governance and politics as harmonious and superior, thus to enhance “China’s soft power as a source of a universally valid model of world politics,” fueling the international debate about clashes of civilizations and presenting “a new hegemony where imperial China’s hierarchical governance is up-dated for the twenty-first century” (Callahan 2008, 749–61). Framed as one of the “alternative modernities,” Beijing’s new effort has been viewed as just another form of imperialism (Dirlik 2012). Unlike during the Mao era, however, there already have been criticisms inside the PRC against the CCP’s “rejuvenation” ideas. Popular and appealing as the cause may have been to many Chinese elites, the China Order is viewed by some as “an interesting and perhaps exceedingly beautiful utopia” (S. Zhang 2006; F. Zhang 2010, 112). The increasingly suppressed yet still visible liberal thinkers in the PRC have started to openly ditch the China Order ideation and warn that a populist PRC statism, as a mutated Qin-Han authoritarianism moving to reconstruct the China Order, would simply lead the Chinese nation into catastrophes just like what the Nazi and Militarist statisms did in Germany and Japan (J. Xu 2011; Lai 2016).

Epilogue The Scenarios

T

o restore and govern a Qin-Han polity over the great Chinese people is hard. To do that without the predestined China Order is more daunting. To face so many undeniable and more powerful foreign peers and competitors is crueler still. Unlike the many reruns of the Qin-Han polity in the past, the PRC under the CCP suffers from two additional problems. First, the CCP autocracy has been stuck as an empire without a dynasty.1 A “collective hereditary” group of ruling families (the so-called princelings), instead of a hereditary emperor, seems to monopolize all powers (J. Yang 2008, 50–52). Classic writers from Plato and Aristotle to John Locke classified such a nonhereditary autocracy or aristocratic oligarchy as the worst type of government long ago (Plato 380 BCE; Aristotle 350 BCE; Locke 1690). It evidently produces the least stability and rationality of power succession in China (J. Wu 2013), exacerbating the inherent underperformance of a Qin-Han polity. Second, the Mandate of the People (or Mandate of the Nation) idea has been at the very center of the patchwork of the official ideology in the CCP-PRC today. The top leader Xi Jinping reaffirmed that mandate by telling his senior officials that “the heaven is watching (what you do) and our heaven is the (CCP) party and the people.”2 Yet this keystone of the new Confucianism-Legalism-Statism is inherently more unstable than the Mandate of Heaven to a Qin-Han polity. The people, not the abstract Heaven, inevitably pursue and even fight for their diverse, individual, and evolving rights and desires, however suppressed and duped. It is a hard battle to represent and appropriate the people indefinitely without a democracy that would do away the very Qin-Han polity. Constantly challenged by the Westphalian system, the PRC Qin-Han polity is structurally poised and fundamentally motivated to reorder the world, to restore the China Order, however costly and gradually. For that, Beijing enjoys, ironically, two critical advantages provided by the very West-led post-Cold War world order. The dominant Western norms and values about human life and 215

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human equality have made the 1.3 billion people, one-fifth of humankind, tightly controlled and herded by the CCP a great source of power. Beijing has thus become disproportionally powerful and competitive through its heavy deficit spending of Chinese life and Chinese human rights. Relatedly, the PRC has an increasingly unobstructed and selectively unilateral access to foreign markets, resources, and especially technology so it enriches and strengthens rapidly without being itself efficient and innovative. An inherently suboptimal giant plagued by an inferior governance, the PRC state nonetheless still rises to be very formidable and competitive in international relations. Therefore, great tragedies, profound suboptimum, and repeated failures aside, the PRC has been making epical efforts and accomplishing significant strides to safeguard and strengthen its Qin-Han polity. It is also increasingly influencing the world toward a tenacious, eventual rebuilding of its mandated China Order in its image. Some CCP supporters thus declared in 2016 that “the peaceful China Century arrives” for the world (Hsiung 2016). Based on the analysis of the nature of the Chinese power in this book, three scenarios seem likely concerning the prospects of the PRC and its rise. First, the PRC could evolve further politically and ideologically to be a more open and less illiberal Qin-Han polity, a soft authoritarianism like the Song Empire in the tenth through thirteenth centuries, if not a functional liberal democracy with rule of law, so to live long with security and prosperity under the Westphalian world order. Beijing would reread its history, refocus its worldviews and reorient its strategy, to suppress and even abandon the tianxia (all under heaven) world empire ideal with sufficient institutional, international, and ideological assurances. As a full member of the post-Cold War world community and subscribing to the universal norms and values, China could play the game of international competition well to become a comfortable great power or a new superpower, eyeing the position of the hegemon even to replace the United States as the new world leader but without desiring anymore a world political unification of the China Order. Second, the PRC could return to a Maoist revolutionary state and beyond, a hardcore authoritarianism, even totalitarianism and militarism, in order to survive through reshaping and reordering the world. The ideology of the China Order would continue to revive and dominate, craftily dressed up as Han-nationalism and the China Dream for rejuvenation of the Chinese civilization. Mao failed miserably in that approach. But the new wealth and technology that have been strengthening the PRC could offer Beijing confidence and resources to retry it with more force and smarter ruses. The rising tide of globalization driven by the needs to deal with some pressing global issues such as climate change and international terrorism may be a powerful current to significantly improve the odds for Beijing. A PRC China Order may be surprisingly victorious in due

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time to unite the world, however improbable as it may seem today, like what the Qin Empire did to the Chinese World twenty-four centuries earlier and the CCP did to the Centralia seven decades ago. Third, the PRC could be torn apart by itself between, on the one side, the Qin-Han rulers’ inherent desire and attempts for the China Order and, on the other side, the changed and ever changing Chinese demography, economy, culture, and ideology that are increasingly Westernized and internationally connected. Great strains, problems, failures, and foreign conflicts even wars would occur inevitably or by design, leading to political chaos and possibly civil war. The Centralia could eventually lose some of its peripheries. A collapse of the CCP-PRC, either peacefully or violently, could result in a phoenix rebirth of a Chinese nation-state like post-World War II Germany and Japan or a failed state armed with weapons of mass destruction. There is a fourth, though likely only a transitional scenario: the PRC could continue and extend its three-decade practice prior to 2008–12 when the CCP seemed to have made a strategic choice to hide its mandate for the China Order. Instead of trying to resist, reduce, and replace the United States to reorder the world,3 the PRC could pragmatically and selectively follow the Westphalian system and the Western leadership to resist sociopolitical and ideological changes at home while suppressing its urges of leading and reordering the world. Growing, enriching, and carefully opportunistic, the CCP may get by and muddle through with its Qin-Han polity without the China Order for some time to come, with whatever discontent, difficulty, and precariousness accompany that option. Which of those scenarios is more probable, more feasible, and more desirable, and what could be done by the Chinese and the international community to shape the preferences and affect the outcome are important and urgent questions. Outside of the PRC, active discourse and rich scholarship on the rise of China have produced many wise ideas and insightful thoughts.4 Some have started to call for moving beyond the hesitant and expedient strategy of the two-decades-old hedging-engagement in the United States and seriously “getting real with China” (Clark 2014). Others have long argued for the U.S. to make the “necessary” and adaptive and accommodating moves for the bigger good of regional and world peace and prosperity (Swaine 2011; Shambaugh 2012). Some may share the view, however contrarian, that “China is a successful authoritarian developmental state which is now rich enough to start setting its own rules rather than just accepting other peoples’. . . . (It) is its own country, and other people’s problem. It will develop in its own way, on its own terms, and others will just have to work with it as best they can” (Kroeber 2014). Talks about “revising the U.S. grand strategy towards China” have also emerged (Blackwill and Tellis 2015).

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Doubts about what and how much the PRC could really aim for and accomplish remain.5 The quality of governance already appears to be the most obvious and largest obstacle for the Chinese economy to avoid the so-called middle-income trap (Vandenberg et al. 2015, 3, 34). Internally, Beijing is weak in collecting individual income tax, a powerful indication of its low political legitimacy at home.6 Externally, Chinese ventures have been just as suboptimal and cost-ineffective as before with its “overseas investment unsuccessful in general”—by 2015, over 20,000 Chinese firms invested overseas with at least $140 billion invested since the mid-1990s, growing 15.5 percent in 2014 (while Chinese intake of foreign direct investment grew only 1.7 percent that year); yet “more than 90 percent of those ventures are losing money” (B. Fu 2015, 1). Beijing seems especially weak in accumulating and exercising the so-called soft power beyond its immediate neighborhood, despite the massive efforts. As typical of an autocracy, the CCP has periodically and cyclically tried everything to stir anti-Japan flames (Reilly 2014, 197–215). Prime time TV screens were so full of laughable dramas about magically obliterating countless Japanese that even the CCP censors had to reign in the zeal in 2013 (Y. Liu 2013). Yet, in 2014, when the Japanese government slightly relaxed visa restrictions for Chinese tourists, over one million Chinese flocked to Japan in six months, a jump of 88 percent over the year before (Chinese news 7-25-2014). Perhaps even more profound is that inside China, many have become increasingly vocal about political changes that unsettle the core of the CCP QinHan polity, despite the repression. The 21st century could be indeed different, after all, from the third century BCE. The rising Chinese power, mandated by the tradition and ideation of the China Order, may be indeed running a notso-secretive hundred-year long marathon to lead and rule the whole world at the expense of the United States and its allies by the mid-twenty-first century (Pillsbury 2015). The seemingly successful grand rise of the PRC, however, could very well turn out to be just a long, expensive, uncertain, and exhaustive struggle for the fate of a mighty political system of the past (Hung 2015). Based on the analysis in this book and with the quick prelude above, an analysis of the prospect and the impact as well as the management of the rising Chinese power, therefore, could then be attempted in another volume.

Notes Introduction  1. Figures of the Chinese economy and military spending are in ICP 2014, IMF 2014, and SIPRI 2015. For world’s opinions of China, see Pew 2015. Chinese foreign spending figures are in Shambaugh 2015. For Beijing’s stated foreign policy and its reaction to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, see Xi 2013 and July 12, 2016, and Allison 2016.  2. Over 100 books were published in English about China in a six-month period (Fenby 2014). An incomplete list of academic books on China and its rise would include (listed alphabetically by author): Callahan 2013, Christensen 2015, Chung 2015, Deng and Wang 2005, Dickson 2016, Friedberg 2012, Goldstein 2005, Hung 2015, Kissinger 2011, Lampton 2008, Lieberthal 2005, McGregor 2012, Nathan and Scobell 2012, Naughton 2006, Pillsbury 2015, Rosecrance and Miller 2014, Ringen 2016, Shambaugh 2013, Schell and Delury 2013, Shirk 2008, Sutter 2012, Wasserstrom 2013, and Westad 2012.   3. Empire, as a political system, refers to a “centralized polity” that features a unified and bureaucratic administration (Eisenstadt 2010, 21–22), a “self-centered” and “self-engrossed” state in a “noncompetitive world” of politics (Wesson 1967, 46–47) that subjugates all other sociopolitical communities, group, and organizations under its rule.  4. The Chinese notion of tianxia is similar to the Greek idea οἰκουμένη (oikouménē, the inhabited world) or oecumene (ecumene) to the Romans and the Europeans (the civilized, Christian world). It often refers to, however, the whole world in its entirety.   5. China, of course, now means the Chinese country, nation, and state. As will be analyzed later, China should be historically viewed as a world (the Chinese World or the Eastern Eurasia) more than a single country. In Chinese, “the China Order” thus does not mean 中国秩序 (Chinese state/country order). It means 中华世界秩 序 (Chinese world order) or perhaps more accurately, 秦汉世界秩序 (Qin-Han world order or Qin-Han Order).  6. For a theory on how a bad governance could nonetheless build sufficient support of the key elites to endure a long time, see Morrow et al. 2003.  7. Jin and Liu 2011. The long Chinese stagnation refers to the chronic lack of science and technology innovation and qualitative socioeconomic progresses such as the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, notwithstanding the quantitative and

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incremental growth and expansion of the population and the size of economy with, mostly marginal, technological improvements.  8. Machan 2008, 272–73; Khatri1 et al. 2006; Kingston 2013; Wademan 2012; Bai et al. 2014; Pei 2014. For the U.S. declared policy of anti-kleptocracy, see US DOS 2005.

Chapter 1   1. China in Russian is called Китай or Khitan (契丹), the name of the ruling nation of Liao Empire (辽 916–1125) in northern China.   2. For Chinese uses of the term Zhina during eighth through twentieth centuries, see X. Feng 2015, 70–76.   3. Thomas Bartlett is acknowledged for this interpretation.  4. “Heaven gives the people to the Centralia” (皇天既付中國民), Book of documents-book of Zhou-rottlera timber (尚書‧周书‧梓材). “Bestow this central country, so to pacify the four corner” (惠此中国, 以绥四方), Book of odes-major court hymns-laboring people (诗经•大雅•民劳). S. Yu 1998, 1515–24; Chang 2002, 17–20.   5. For ethnographic and historiographical discussion about this, see Kan 2007, 1–148, 217–54, 325–38.   6. Yamaga (1669) 1925. In Japan, a region of five prefectures on Honshu Island has been named Zhongguo Place (中國地方) since the ninth century.  7. Korean royal records amply reflected this view until the early nineteenth century. Korean archives in Academy of Korean Studies, Seongnam, Korea, 2005–06. Z. Ge 2014.   8. Or People’s Republic of Zhina (支那人民共和國) as two young politicians in Hong Kong said in 2016. Some Chinese netzens have used other phonetically similar words such as “Chaina” (拆拿 dismantle and take/embezzle) to refer the PRC (Chaina 2015).  9. For the historic and geographic concepts of “China Proper” and “Han Chinese nation,” see Ebrey 1996 and Mote 1999. 10. Hu 1935 and 1990. Charles Parton made the additional calculations, April 25, 2014. 11. For the deep impact of China’s ecogeographical conditions, see Keightley 1983, 3–64. 12. For the relationship between irrigation and flood-control needs and centralized imperial regime in ancient China, see Wittfogel 1957. 13. For treatment of this interaction as the major factor to explain the Chinese World beyond the China Proper, see Lattimore (1940) 1988. 14. In the Xinjiang Museum in Urumqi, the author in 1998 saw an “internal exhibit” of four-millennia old mummies of Caucasian men and women discovered in Xinjiang. DNA and other methods of archeological research have led to scholarly assertions about migration from west Eurasia to China via Xinjiang (Mallory and Mair 2000). 15. Exhibits in Sanxingdui Museum, Guangan, Sichuan, 2016. PRC historians have minimized and dismissed the signs of the Western sourcing of Chinese civiliza-

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tion revealed by the artifacts discovered in Sanxingdui (and similar sites in Qinghai) that were very different from, more advanced, and even many centuries or millennium older than the earliest Chinese archeological sites in the China Proper. 16. For how geographic and demographic features determine the uniqueness of national and “world” politics in Africa, see Herbst 2000, 3–57. 17. By 2013, the PRC population was 1.354 billion, the world’s largest (Statistical Bureau 2013). The ROC at the same time had 23.35 million people (ROC 2013). 18. For this, at the end of the Chinese imperial history, see Crossley et al. 2006. 19. For the evolution of the Chinese language in the PRC, see Link 2013. For the politically motivated misuse of the written Chinese language in today’s China, see H. Yu 2011 and C. Li 2012. For examples of political semantics in the PRC, see Lao 2014. For the translation of peculiar Chinese phrases, see Carlson 2014. For the imperial power held China together as a multicultural and linguistic group, see Crossley 2010. 20. Some have suggested that the written Chinese has an “essential primitiveness . . . (a) combination of a donné of elementary and primeval simplicity with stupendous complexity and refinement” and is a “pre-Babelian script, which conveys meaning beyond language and transcends all differences of speech, links mankind to its earliest origins and proposes the very emblem of an essential unity” (Leys 2013, 302–13). The CCP’s politicized use of the Mao-style “dialectics” further aggravated the problems inherent in the Chinese language and culture (X. Xu 2015; Murong 2015). There are many examples of the politicized and state-mandated misuse of the language in today’s China: unemployment as off-duty (下岗), internal exile as down to the village and up to the mountains (上山下乡), and labor camp as work-education (劳教). 21. For the rich and diverse Chinese-ness in the Chinese language, see McDonald 2011. 22. To Liang, Chinese nation was essentially the Han nation (Liang 1907). 23. X. Fei 2003. To avoid semantic confusion and historical and logical conflicts, the PRC officially also sometimes calls Chinese Nation (中华民族) as All Nations of China (中华各民族) (PRC Central Government 2013; Xi 5-29-2014). 24. Institute of History 2012, chap. 1. Editorial Board (2006) 2013, 2–3. 25. Such practices in the former Soviet Union (Vladimir Lenin), Vietnam (Ho Chi-ming), and the PRC perhaps reveal vividly the true premodern nature of the supposedly postmodern communist way of seeking political legitimacy through iconic ancestor-worship. 26. P. Hu 2015; S. Shan 2015; Z. Xin 2009, 17, 268–308, 436–67. On his deathbed, Mao was reportedly concerned about how people will view him in history (L. Qian 2012 V2, 154–55). 27. Wen Jiabao, Press Conference, Beijing, Xinhua, March 14, 2012. 28. For how a “wisest” emperor effectively censored his history records, see J. Ge 2015. 29. X. Liu 2014. Unlike the similar practice in the ancient Hellenic World, this tradition contuinued in China. As a result, even top leaders often study history with popular novels such as Three Kingdoms (三国演义) (J. Chen 2015). 30. Of course, burning books and libraries for political reasons are not exclusively Chinese behavior (Polastron 2007). But such massive, “worldwide,” longtime, and

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systematic destruction and control of knowledge and records are never seen elsewhere (Guy1987). 31. 章太炎, 梁启超, 王国维, 胡适, 陈垣, 顾颉刚, 傅斯年, 陈寅恪, 钱穆, 吕思勉, 张荫麟. 32. For the countless cases of forgery and plagiarism in the PRC, see the massive collection and revelation on an often-blocked website devoted to “anti-fakery,” xys.org, accessed April 20, 2016. For the many deceptive gimmicks during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, see J. Guan 2009. 33. Some claim that the Chinese casualty numbers during World War II are exaggerated from 6 to 7 to 40 million over time by the CCP (Q. Huan 2005; B. Lin 2005). 34. Xie Chuntao (谢春涛), quoted in Wan and Li 2014. 35. For a collection of the CCP’s made-up official assertions and fake news, see Shi 2014. 36. Such as the very long honorary title granted to Confucius by various emperors, the praising name Wudi (武帝) for Liu Che (the sixth ruler of the Han Empire), the derogatory name Yangdi (炀帝) for Yang Guang (the second ruler of Sui Empire), or the appreciative name of Wenzheng (文正) for Zeng Guofan (曾国藩 the imperial official-general who put down the Taiping Rebellion for the Qing Dynasty). 37. Almost two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the distorted Russian history finally started to be extensively rewritten and rectified in Russia (Zubov 2009). 38. An example of distortion of history shared by the KMT-ROC and the CCP-PRC is the beautification of the Yuan Empire and the belittlement of the Song Era (F. Zhao 2015). 39. For a Chinese effort to debunk popular myths in modern history, see X. Feng 2015. 40. For an example of popular history books that have carefully navigated the censorship yet is clearly revisionist, see the book series This History Book is Good to Read (这本史书真好看文库), jointed published by seven PRC presses with seventeen published in 2012–15. 41. For battle cries to “safeguard our (way of writing and teaching) history” by a former CCP top leader, see T. Li 2015. 42. The editors of Yanhuang Chronicle, mostly ex-CCP cadres, were reprimanded even dismissed periodically. It was forcefully taken over and castrated by the CCP propaganda apparatus in July 2016. With a few other media products, the Consensus Media Group was led by a former CCP cadre with rumored special protections from the PRC State Security Ministry. Both the Net and its sister publication Leader were also quietly shut down, however, by fall of 2016 (South China Morning Post, 7-18 and 10-4-2016). 43. For the Internet and Chinese society, see G. Yang 2009 and Lagerkvist 2010. For overseas Chinese websites dedicated to penetrating the Chinese Great Firewall, see chinagfw.org and program-think.blogspot.com, accessed January 16, 2016. Of course, the CCP has made great effort to block and disrupt such penetration (Z. Qin 2015 and PRC MIIT 2017). 44. For a revelation of Beijing’s deep concern about losing control of the new media, see Y. Li 2014. For how the popular Weibo (micro blog) being strangled by

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the censors, see Bei 2015. For a collection of PRC blog essays that are popular and influential, mostly opposing to the CCP propaganda, see Z.T. Li 2016. 45. For the Westphalia system-like Chinese international relations, see X. Yan 2011. Exemplified by the Ming Empire, the tianxia rulers later also inherited much of those rather typical realist strategies in dealing with external enemies (Johnston 1995). 46. Many warring states, started with the Qi Hegemony of seventh century BCE, tried similar reform with varied degrees of success in advancing their position in the pre-Qin international relations. The Qin’s reform, more totalitarian in nature and continued after its architect was typically executed, was the most lasting and successful. For the concepts of totalitarianism and authoritarianism see the next chapter of this book. 47. Started with Lord Shang Yang’s (390–338 BCE) Legalist reform and later under the tutoring of Prime Minister Li Si, a master of Legalist politics, the Qin utilized many ambitious talents from other states and eventually emerged as a farming-military superpower. However, the Qin imperial victory and conquer was a result of human efforts and mishaps as well as random factors, not necessarily inevitable (Hui 2005). 48. Legalism gets its name because it advocates an authoritarian even totalitarian governance with strict and manipulative laws and rules. It is commonly misconstrued, often deliberately, in China as rule of law. Its ideal is at most just rule by law: the rulers, as lawmakers and judges/enforcers, are above the law. 49. Not all of those schools left behind well-defined or established disciplines or even lengthy texts. For reviews of them, see Fung (1948) 1997 and Hsiao 1979. 50. The exact figure of the casualties of the battle, however, was likely exaggerated and is now seriously disputed (Jin and Xie 1998).

Chapter 2  1. Some Chinese historians call it “Chinese imperial despotism” (L. Zhou 1999, 205–82). For PRC scholars’ confusions in reconciling the China Order with the imported Western concepts of nation and nation-state, see M. Jiang 2014.  2. The powerful addiction to the China Order remains strong among many elites in the ROC on Taiwan today (Chu 2015). Yet, to the young Taiwanese who grew up after the democratic reforms of the 1980s–’90s, the appeal of the Chinese identity itself has declined significantly, suggesting that the China Order may lose its addictive power once the sociopolitical system ceases to be authoritarian. Author’s interviews in Taiwan, 2015.  3. The China Order is viewed by a Chinese historian as a post-feudalism peculiar regime of “official-ism” (官家主义) from the Qin Empire to today’s PRC (S. Wu 7-22-2014). Another calls it everlasting “China’s imperial ideology” (帝王观念) (F. Zhang 2004).  4. Historians have attempted to dissect many great totalitarian regimes from Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union, to Mao’s PRC. For vivid illustrations of a totalitarian society, see the fictions by George Orwell (1945 and 1949) and Aldous Huxley (1932).

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 5. This was tryingly expressed in the film Hero by Zhang Yimou (张艺谋, 英雄, 2004).   6. For a comparative study of empires in history, see Burbank and Cooper 2010.  7. 溥天之下, 莫非王土; 率土之滨, 莫非王臣, Confucius, Book of odes-lesser court hymes-north hill (诗经-小雅-北山), fifth century BCE.  8. Fengchan (封禅), the elaborated semi religious, Taoist-influenced, ceremony of worshiping heaven and earth on top of a high peak such as Tai Mountain (泰山) so to symbolize the mandate of heaven and connect to the divine power of heaven and earth, started by the pre-Qin rulers but which became an imperial event during the Qin in 218 BCE and recurred periodically with varied extravagance and seriousness to the Qing Dynasty in 1790 (stone tablets and carvings, Tai Mountain and Temple 岱庙, Taian, Shandong).   9. After 1949, the PRC central planning system allocated nearly all goods and services to include 1,450 kinds of commodities (CCP Central History 2008, 12-1 and 17-1). 10. In the 2010s, the state salt monopoly had a profit margin of 578 percent (B. Liu 2014). 11. Some of them, like Quanrong (犬戎), did become involved in important political events and wars in the Centralia from time to time (F. Li 2006, 215–349). 12. The problem might disappear if a world empire could conquer and rule the whole world to leave no one ungoverned, something that has never happened on planet Earth. Modern technology may make such a genuine world empire feasible, even cost-effective, though. 13. Sima second century BCE, V99. On Qin’s fault (过秦论) by Jia Yi (贾谊 200–168 BCE). 14. 诸不在六艺之科孔子之术者, 皆绝其道 and 推明孔氏, 抑黜百家 (Sima second century BCE, V121). 15. 大一统者, 天地之常经, 古今之通谊也; 天不变, 道亦不变 (Ban, first century BCE, V56). 16. 大同 and 天下为公 in Confucius et al., Book of rituals-destiny of ritualsgrand unity (礼记-礼运-大同), fifth to third centuries BCE. 17. Y. Zhang 2009. For critique of the Grand Harmony ideal, see G. Liu 1986, 33–36, 200–01. 18. 天命 (Confucius Shangshu,V14); 人与天一 (Zhuang Zhou, Zhuangzi No 20). 19. Sima second century BCE, V28. For cosmological elements of the tainxia view, see Kan 2007, 181–216. 20. Confucianism moved far beyond the original ideas formulated by Confucius, Mencius, and Xun Zi. Key scholars like Dong Zhongshu, Zhu Xi, and Wang Yangming reinterpreted the doctrines profoundly (Fung 1948, 38–48, 143–54, 191–217, 266–328). 21. Xun Zi is considered the early representative thinker of this fusion political ideology with a realist and constructivist understanding of human nature (C. Zhou 2014, 116–35). 22. 正心修身齐家 and 治国平天下 (Confucius Book of Rites)

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23. Unwritten but institutionalized and internalized graft, “grey” or “extra” incomes often are dozens or even hundreds of times more than imperial salaries, enabling obscene wealth and extreme luxury for the imperial officials (J. Wang 2000, 229–30; Hong 2014). 24. For a historian’s view, see R. Wong 1997. 25. The Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258) also seemed to have cultivated its own world order (M. Huang 2011, 133–42). 26. Both policies were first adopted in 485 by the Sinophile Emperor Xiaowen of Northern Wei Empire that made the emperor the ultimate landlord who owns and allocates all land and suppresses landed gentries (Cen 1980, 338–78; R. Huang 1997, 96–98). 27. For the evolution of imperial exam system into the later ears, see P. Ho 1964. 28. 天下英雄入吾彀中矣 (Wang tenth century, V1). 29. Zhu Xi in the twelfth century edited them into nine books to be called Four Books and Five Classics (四书五经). Only the brief Taiping regime (1851– 61) replaced the nine books with the edited Chinese version of Christian Bible (Reilly 2004). 30. For a critical examination of the imperial exam system, see Miyazaki 1981. 31. Even a popular PRC author who challenged much of the official historical narratives still propagated sensational gobbledygook about the Song (Yuan 2012, 130). 32. “No more Chinese after the Yashan (Battle)” (崖山之后再无中华) (Qian seventeenth century, V2; Zhou and Gu 1993, preface). Yashan was Song’s last battle resisting the Mongols in 1279. For this grand “disruption” of the Chinese history, see Brooks 2010. 33. The incredible stories of prosperity at the early Yuan probably reflected the previous Song Era. For questions on the authenticity of the Polo tales, see Wood 1998. 34. Y. Yu 1967; D. Kang 2010, 54–81; Smith 2013, 10–1; Lee 2016. 35. As evidenced by the popularity of the whimsical tales of the Qing rulers on the PRC TV screens in the 1990s–2010s and the historical fictions glorifying the Qing emperors such as the best-selling “emperor trilogy” of Kangxi the Great, Emperor Yongzheng, and Emperor Qianlong by Eryue He, published in the 1990s and 2000s. 36. For the so-called “New Qing History” school led by American and Japanese historians that disagrees with the ROC-PRC standard views, see Dunnell et al. 2004. For summaries of the Beijing-disliked rewriting of Qing history, see W. Dang 2012; Ding and Elliott 2013. For the positive implication of the new Qing history in China, see Yao 2015. For mostly critical responses to the new Qing history school by PRC and ROC scholars, see J. Wang 2014. For a harsh PRC condemnation, see Z. Li 2105. 37. For debates about the identity and nature of the Qing, see Liu and Liu 2010; Yao 2015. 38. Crossley 1999, 133–34. A perhaps stretched analogy is that the King of the United Kingdom was also crowned as the Emperor of India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

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Chapter 3  1. Ren (仁) is a central value and ideal of Confucianism, referring to proper, benevolent, observant of the heavenly ways, self-cultivating and posed, and altruistic behavior that is often exemplified by the aphorism of “not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself.” Confucius Analects-Yanyuan, Chapter 12 (论语-颜 渊篇 12) fifth century BCE.  2. 皇帝与士大夫共治天下, articulated in Song emperor’s discussions with cabinet ministers in the tenth and eleventh centuries (Li twelfth century,V221).   3. In 300 years, the Song executed only a few senior officials including Yue Fei (岳飞), China’s most well-known patriotic war hero (Z. Wang 2007). The ubiquitous Chinese ritual of kneeling before the emperor or superiors did not exist in the Song (G. Wu 1-4-2016).  4. Song’s “failure of horse policies,” thus the lack of sufficient cavalry, might be responsible for the Song’s military defeats by the nomadic invaders (X. Zhang 2012, 55–60).   5. One liang (两) in ancient China is roughly 31.2 grams or about 1.1 ounce. One bolt of silk (roughly 13 meters) cost slightly less than one liang of silver at the time (Muo 2012).   6. Many have tried to address the “China puzzles,” including Joseph Needham’s “grand question,” on why science and industrial revolutions did not happen in modern China since the fourteenth century (Finlay 2000, 265–303), and “why Chinese per capita income stagnated for a very long time” (Y. Lin 2012, 591–96).  7. 死去元知萬事空, 但悲不見九州同, Lu You, To my son (陸游, 示兒), 1209.   8. Chien Mu, for example, appreciated Song’s accomplishment yet still labeled it as “chronically impoverished and weak.” Chien 1939, 523–600.  9. The popularity of the Yangs and Yue perhaps reflected a sharpened sense of nationalism under the Chanyuan system but was a political creation by the ruling elites. General Yang Ye (?–986) was first praised by writers decades after his death while the stories about his family became legend of folklore after twelfth century. The more popular legend of Yue Fei (1103–42) started two decades after his execution when he was exonerated. He has since been a semi-god with temples for worshipers (X. Cai 2007; Gong 2008). 10. Only a small group of PRC historians and writers have now started to take a new look at the Chanyaun Treaty (P. Xiong 2009). 11. As in the legend of Emperor Huizong and Courtesan Li Sisi (Zhang thirteenth century). 12. Most Chinese emperors started constructing their excessive sepulchers right after crowning. The Song emperors did not build their tombs while alive and their simple graves must be finished within seven months after death (T. Yuan 2012, 111). 13. For the magnificence of the Northern Song Dynasty and Emperor Huizong’s tragic failures and sad end, see Ebrey and Bickford 2006 and Ebrey 2014. 14. A lasting Chinese Jewish population started to settle in Song but finally faded away in 1850 when its last Rabbi died without a successor (Q. Yan 2002; X. Xin 2003).

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15. For the debates and choices of economic policies in the Song Court, see Ye 1990. 16. H. Wu 2012. Chinese painting and calligraphy are viewed as reached their peak in the Song and has since stagnated and deteriorated (Editors 2008; Y. Jiang 2014). 17. Cabrillo and Puchades-Navarro 2013, 50; McNeal and Thatcher 1905. For analyses of those documents, see Cannon 1909; Comyn 1923 V1, 138–40; Vincent 2012.

Chapter 4  1. T. Zhao 2005; C. Zhang 2010, 106–46; Huang 1994; Q. Wang 2011; F. Zhang 2010, 33–62. Chinese Social Science News (中国社会科学报), Beijing, June 27, 2014.  2. 天無二日, 土無二王, 家無二主, 尊無二上 (Liu first century BCE).   3. For a Chinese work describing the China Order in vague and often awkward ways perhaps to evade censorship, see Z. Liu 2014.   4. Self-centered and isolated, the Chinese World obviously does not always fit in the rigid mode of “isolationism” (Hansen 2000; Waley-Cohen 2000).  5. 夫古今之變, 至秦而一盡, 至元而又一盡。經此二盡之後, . . . 雖小小更 革, 生民之戚戚終無已時也. (All changes in history ended first by Qin, then ended again by Yuan. After these two endings . . . even with small changes, the sufferings of the people became endless) (Huang seventeenth century “On ruler.”)  6. A Chinese historian described five characteristics of the “Chinese imperial despotism”: grand unity, high centralization of power, slavery-like patriarchic rule, firm control of the people and anti-industry/commerce, and total cultural tyranny (L. Zhou 1999, 304–52).  7. The imperial ownership of land constituted the very economic foundation of Qin-Han polity (Lin 1983, 11–30; Wittfogel 1957).   8. 汉贼不两立, 王业不偏安. Worded in Second Petition for Expedition, allegedly authored by Zhuge Liang in 228 CE (诸葛亮, 后出师表), in Chen 280.  9. 夷狄进于中国, 则中国之. 中国而为夷狄, 则夷狄之 (Emperor Yongzheng 1729; Yang 1944, 8–25). 10. 能用士, 而能行中国之道, 则中国之主也 (Hao 1260). 11. 三千余年一大变局 (Li 1901). 12. 中学为体, 西学为用, best elaborated by Zhang Zhidong (Zhang 1898). 13. It is coded in the Chinese language as everyone could quickly identify the rightful and relative position in any given relationship by titles as “old Zhang” or “little Chen.” Rather than simply uncle or aunt, it is specified every time “father’s older brother,” “mother’s younger sister,” or “the wife of mother’s second brother.” Everyone is organized in a relationship of extended family (X. Fei 2005). 14. 权力崇拜 or 权力拜物教 (Y. Xu 2006; Dan 2009; X. Xu 2012; S. Fang 2013). 15. Nie and Gu 2016. A typical county government in the 2010s was reported to have 90 “standard agencies,” 16 “mass organizations,” 35 county-financed “units,

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and 55 “other agencies and offices” with a total of over 200 “leading officials” alone. tieba.baidu.com/p/3422163689, accessed August 16, 2015. 16. For the illustrative Ming tributary system, see Fang 1953 V3, 173–75. 17. The Qing had different ways to deal and trade with the non-Centralia nations and the non-Chinese countries (Liao 2013). Qing signed treaties of Nerchinsk (1689), Kiakhta (1727), Aigun (1858), and Peking (1860) with the expanding Czarist Russia for managing its remote, non-Centralia, boarders (Mancall 1971; Lincoln 2007). 18. J. Wang 2000, 223–65, For a history of capitalism, see Neal and Williamson 2014. 19. 民为贵, 社稷次之, 君为轻 and 天下定于一 (Mencius, Mengzi-Liang Huiwang). 20. For a biting and insightful take of the Chinese culture, see Leys 2013, 285–432. 21. Wu 2001. For an American bestseller summarizing similar ruses as tested wisdoms of social life, see Greene 1998. 22. 唯一的规则, 就是没有规则 (L. Li 2010, xiv, 4). 23. 言假言、事假事、文假文 . . . 满场是假 (Li 1590). 24. 華風之敝, 八字盡之: 始於作偽, 終於無恥 (Yan 1895). 25. Ku 1915, i–iv, 2–38, 112. Ku’s views were long criticized but reappreciated in the PRC recently, translated and published in Chinese fully for the first time only in 1996 (中国人的精神, Haikou, Hainan). Ku, who made a living in China with his Western education and connections and especially his command of English, lived with a dual personality himself: he had two wives simultaneously, enjoyed bound female feet, and kept the Manchu hairstyle long after the Qing Dynasty. He also advocated a “holly mission” for the rising Japanese power to resist Westernization and to reintegrate and rejuvenate the “spirit of Chinese civilization that was lost in China itself since the Yuan (dynasty)” because the Japanese were in fact the “genuine Chinese” (Ku 1924, 274–82). 26. Lin 1935, 42–75, 49, 53, 81, 86–91, 69. Lin wrote influentially to affect modern Chinese literature with imported ideas and methods. While appreciating and appraisingly introducing Chinese culture to the English readers, unlike Ku, Lin lived almost entirely like an American/European middle-class man. 27. The best quote is “when the fake poses as the real, the real becomes fake as well” (假做真时真亦假), Cao (1791) 2008, 10. Chinese writers have described the Chinese culture as corrosive “Chinese grey water” (Fu 1919) or “giant pickle vat” (大酱缸) (Bo 1992). 28. 十全老人. There was in fact a sociopolitical decay under Qianlong (Kuhn 1992). 29. 为天下之大害者, 君而已矣 (Huang seventeenth century “On law”). 30. 自秦以来凡帝王皆贼也 (Tang 1705). 31. 不以天下私一人 (Wang 1691, V18). 32. The idea of “rule by masses” (众治), (Gu seventeenth Century). Also, Gu’s nine essays “On prefectures and counties” in Gu A seventeenth century, V2. 33. 天下兴亡, 匹夫有责 versus 国家兴亡, 匹夫有责. 34. 不当以一统垂裳之势治天下 (Kang 1898, 62). 35. Aristocratic and autocratic rulers may not necessarily be completely hereditary, such as the elected Holy Roman Emperors and the many other authoritarian

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regimes including today’s PRC. The hereditary ones, however, perhaps tend to enjoy extra legitimacy. 36. The most famous example is Feng Dao (冯道 882–954), who served with distinguished record at high levels for ten emperors of eight royal families in five successive competing dynasties including the Liao Empire (Xue 954, 16–17; Ouyang 1053, V42). 37. The imperial ruling elites rarely exceeded one percent of the total population. In the PRC when the size of bureaucracy exploded to be less than three percent of the population. But they, in 2012 for example, spent 11 percent of the China’s fiscal income just for meals, travel, and office vehicles, in addition to the much greater pay, benefits, and corruption (G. Yuan 2007; L. Xu 2013). 38. The Chinese cuisines, among the most elaborated and sophisticated in the world in taste, variety and novelty, ironically reflect the obsession for eating due to the chronicle shortage of food under the China Order and also the unrestricted pursuit of meaningless indulgence by the ruling elites. For a vivid illustration, see the recipe of cooking eggplant described in Cao (1791) 2008, 547–59. For anecdotes of extreme cuisines (live monkey brains and aborted human fetus) in contemporary China, see Liao 2002 V1, 9–11. 39. For a Japan Order attempt in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Toby 1991 and Arano 1987. 40. Figures from Spence 1990, 165–93 and 1996; Pan 2000; Jin 1993; Ding 1991; R. Li 1999, 76–85; J. Yang 2008; Dikötter 2011, xi, 169; Manning and W­ernheuer 2012. 41. For vivid descriptions of the miserable and degrading life of the imperial officials and clerks in the Ming Empire, see the private letters in Yuan seventeenth century. 42. Some PRC official-scholars seem to share the view, albeit very subtly and fleetingly, that the long lasting Grand Unification was responsible for China’s long “isolation” and “the subsequent backwardness” (F. Wang 2006). 43. For theories on the negative role of monopoly, see Stigler 2008. 44. This powerful and long-lasting yet inverted belief first appeared in Confucian classics such as Great Learning and Mencius-Liang Huiwang in the third and second centuries BCE and was later repeated countless times. In today’s PRC, it is still frequently used in news reports and official statements (M. Zhang 2006). 45. For the political and artisan use of technology and the general suppression of invention and innovation during imperial China, see Schäfer 2012. 46. R. Huang 1982. There is a revisionist but weak assertion that China’s imperial system was capable of making innovations and dynamic evolutions (Mungello 2013, 2–5). 47. Chinese historians tended to overlook the miserable livelihood of the people while some conscientious intellectuals like Bai Juyi (白居易) left poetic and literary records on people’s pain and suffering even during some of the most celebrated prosperous times. 48. Such as the burning of Xianyang at the fall of Qin in 207 BCE and the disappearance of the Yuanming Garden in the late Qing (Sima second century BCE, V7; Shangdu 2011).

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49. Such enlightened heresy realizations can be traced to thinkers such as Li Zhi (1527–1602) and Hunag Zongxi (1610–95) who were often punished or banished. The writer Lu Xun (1881–1936) made the well-known characterization of the Chinese history as “the history of cannibalism” in his Diary of a Mad Man (狂人日记), a rewrite of the Russian novelist Nikolai Gogol’s work with the same name (1835), published in 1918. 50. PRC official media Xinhua and CCTV quoted this saying in the 2010s while insisting that “it has now become a thing of the past,” news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-05/28/content_8270685.htm, and cctv.com/news/china/20050523/102459. shtml. 51. Some think that the periodical reduction of population in China due to dynastic cycles such as the collapses of Han or Tang was as high as 90 percent (Wen 2008). 52. Some PRC historians have now gingerly argued that political “unification is not necessarily happy and divisions are not necessarily painful” (J. Ge 2008). 53. Some ancient Chinese thinkers instinctively realized the great utility of interstate competition, see Liu Zongyuan (773–819), “Enemy vigilance” (柳宗元,敌戒).

Chapter 5  1. For a first-hand recollection of the ROC diplomacy in 1912–49, see Gu 1983–94, V2–6.  2. The super-rich Thirteen Factories (Firms) in Canton monopolized Qing’s highly restrictive foreign trade (J. Liang 1999; Farris 2007, 66–83).  3. “Overseas peoples like the Western (European) countries, will likely hurt Centralia hundreds of years later—this is my prediction.” Emperor Kangxi (1719) 2005, 1–19.   4. “Ch’ien lung’s Letter to George III,” in Backhouse and Bland 1914 (2010), 331.   5. H. Mao 1995; Lovell 2011. The landmark war was first criticized by its British opponents as an “Opium War,” a misleading name later adopted by the Chinese.  6. “National humiliation” (国耻) was first coined in 1915 during the SinoJapanese negotiation by ROC elites including the president (Z. Luo 1993, 297–319; Kaufman 2010, 1–33; Callahan 2012). For the CCP massive utilization of it, see Z. Wang 2014.  7. 师夷之长技以制夷, first phrased by Wei Yuan (1843/52). Later, it was promoted by Qing leaders like Prince Gong, Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, Shen Baozhen, Zhang Zhidong, and Sheng Xuanhuai.  8. 洋务运动 (Feuerwerker 1958; Pong 1994).  9. 中学为体, 西学为用(Feng 2002). It was later substantiated and popularized with the state-approved polemic Exhortation to Study by Zhang Zhidong 1898. 10. 全盘西化 (Feng 1935; L. Zhao 2005). Mao also entertained the idea of Latinization. 11. 王韬, 薛福成 and 梁启超 (Teng and Fairbank 1979, 135–46, 220–22).

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12. 应采西人之体以行其用 (S. Zhang 张树声 1884). 13. Spence 1990, 203–04, 283, 379–88; Gu 1985 V2, 103–236; Z. Liu 2013 V2, 158–65. 14. A good example is the story of Nantong, a city on the Yangzi River (Shao 2003). 15. For the role of foreigner-run railway systems, see Elleman and Kotkin 2010. 16. Liang 1899. A different interpretation of the event is in Kwong 1984. 17. G. Xiao 2007; W. Yuan 2013. For a new praise of the Cixi reform, see J. Chang 2013. 18. For a concise chronology of the ROC era, see Mackerras 2014, 28–82. 19. 军阀混战天下大乱 (CCP Central Party History 2002, 9–10; Tsiang 1938). This review was popularized by Tao 1959. For a scholarly work, see Ch’i 1976. 20. Yuan Shikai’s 83 days reign as Emperor of the Empire of China in 1916 and the restoration of the Qing Emperor Xuantong for 11 days in 1917 by Zhang Xun. 21. 胡适, 陈独秀, 鲁迅 and 钱玄同 (D. Tang 1998). 22. 當以科學與人權並重 (Chen 1915); 擁護德謨克拉西和賽因斯兩位先 生 (Chen 1919). Chen later took up Leninism for the Chinese revolution, although he remained resistant to Stalinism and was abandoned by the CCP (C. Guo 1992; B. Tang 2011). 23. Lieberthal 1991, 119–200; G. Du 2004, 87–136, 169–80; Li and Liu 1997. For Mao’s early thoughts, see Mao 1920, 2; CCP Central Document Office 1995, 11–540. 24. For the Soong family, see Seagrave 1985. For a critique of Seagrave, see Gillin 1986. 25. Fumimaro Konoe, “Second Declaration to China,” November 3, 1938. Collected in Gu 1985 V2B, 357–79 and Yoshitake 1983, 80–95. 26. For a revisionist view that Japan was in fact “driven” to invade China by the Moscow-manipulated Han-Chinese nationalist anti-West (and Japan) misdeeds and mistakes, see X. Feng 2014. For achieves on the Sino-Japanese relations by the 1930s, see Wang 1934. 27. Wang (汪精卫) led a collaborating government and over 3 million Chinese soldiers to join the 1.2 million Japanese forces. This “world’s largest traitor army” perhaps illustrates the lingering power of the China Order ideation and tradition that enabled the invading Japanese to claim its mandate of heaven to rule China (X. Wang 2005). 28. 三民主义 and 军政, 训政, 宪政 (Sun 1931, 36–48; Z. Liu 2013, V3, 224–26). 29. Dong and Hu 2010, 12. The racist Chinese Exclusion Act became permanent in 1902. It was repealed in 1943 and regretted in 2012 by the U.S. Congress (E. Lee 2003). 30. Gong Shi 2014. The essay was soon censored by the PRC web police. 31. Stipulated constitutionally by ROC Temporary Charter (中华民国临时约 法) of 1912, ROC Charter (中华民国约法) of 1914 and ROC Constitution (中华民 国宪法) of 1923 (S. Yang 2009, 95–99). Private land ownership was destroyed by

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the CCP in its land reform in 1948–50 and has since remained dysfunctional on the Chinese Mainland. 32. Chinese students in the United States were granted permanent residency for the first time ever in 1953 with the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 (U.S. State Department 1954). 33. Mao’s speeches to top CCP cadres in 1959, cited in R. Li 1999, 225, 254 and 279. Mao’s successors inherited and improvised the same Maoist sophistry and legerdemain with “Chinese characteristics” and patriotism (C. Su 2014). 34. A group of semiofficial PRC-ROC historians have started to make new albeit still inadequate and incomplete reassessment of this century (Wang and Huang 2016).

Chapter 6   1. Wang 1925. Sun explained the three principles as: nationalism (民族主义) for China’s international equality, people’s right (民权主义) for political equality and participation, and people’s livelihood (民生主义) for economic equality and development (Sun 1924).  2. Britain and especially the Soviet Union were forced by the United States to accept China’s new place in the world (Gu 1987 V5, 396–97, 400–22, 434–46).   3. Even the cynical author Lu Xun, known for his independent thinking and acidic essays, wrote to unduly praise and defend the Soviet Union and the communists (Lu 1932).  4. The KMT’s slogan was “national rejuvenation” (民族復興); The CCP’s “China Dream” featured a wordier “great national rejuvenation” (伟大民族复兴) (Chiang 1934; Xi 2013).  5. Chiang clashed with Washington’s representative General George Stilwell over corruption and poor governance, political and military reforms, conduct of war in the China Theater, and disputes over the CCP (Gu 1987, V5, 422–43, 446–54).  6. Tsou 1963, 401–93; Stoler 1989, 145–78. Jiang and Liu 2013; Bradley 2015, 133–362.  7. As a Qin-Han polity, the ROC was plagued by corruption that was well revealed by the scrutinizing Western/American journalists and exaggerated by the rebellious CCP, despite that the ROC started to grow both external and internal checks to curb corruption. Premier H. H. Kung (孔祥熙), for example, was removed due to exposure by scholars (T. Yang 1998, 528–66). Chen Lifu (陈立夫), one of the four ROC leaders accused by the CCP as “the most corrupted and the richest,” turned out to have a family wealth below middle-class level and had to farm chickens to survive in exile (L. Chen 1994, 418–24).  8. For international communism, see Kołakowski (1978) 2005. For analysis of the inherent flaws and inevitable failure of communism, see Brzezinski 1989. For catalogue of the sociopolitical consequences of communism in the twentieth century, see Courtois 1999.  9. Editorial Board 2001, 49–51. Countless and contradicting volumes have been published in Chinese about CCP’s history. There are official narratives such as

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CCP Central History 2002 and 2010, condemning takes by dissident groups such as the Falun Gong 2004, history by defected CCP senior members like Guo 1969 and 1971, revelation by the disillusioned CCP friends like Dong 1951, collection of insiders’ accounts like Z. Jin 1999, exposés by CCP insiders and observers such as Smarlo 2004, narratives by ROC historians such as Wang 1974, and works by nonPRC scholars such as Y. Chen 1998. 10. One silver Yuan in the 1920s–1930s was roughly 6.25 to 9.5 (1990) USD (Baidu 2014). Chinese per capita GDP in the 1920s was 500 (1990) USD (Maddison 2006, 558–60). 11. For the figures of Soviet-trained Chinese elites in the 1920s–1930s, see J. Song 2003. 12. The official CCP birthday (July 1) is off by 22 days (CCP Central History 2002, 40–42). 13. For an official account of ROC’s efforts to destroy the CCP, see KMT Central 1935. 14. CCP Central History 2002, 229–48. For a participant’s account by a senior CCP official who later was turned to be a ROC official in Taiwan, see Cai 1970. For fresh but heavily censored anecdotes collected by some participants in 1936, see Xu (1936) 2006. 15. Mao Zedong first articulated this belief in 1927 (CCP Central History 2002, 144). 16. For CCP’s tradition of expedient and predatory taxation, see Liu and Li 2011. 17. Vladimirov 1975, 153–54; J. Xiao 2013, 399. For the extensive evidence listed about CCP’s opium trade, see www.letscorp.net/archives/65083, accessed October 1, 2016. 18. The Beijing-supported Burmese Communist guerillas started in the 1960–’70s their massive opium trade that has plagued many countries ever since (F. Ye 2013). 19. Countless Mao biographies have been published. Official ones in the PRC include C. Jin 2003 and 2004 and CCP Central Documents (1993) 2013. Unofficial biographies by PRC scholars include (all banned in the PRC) Shan 2001, Xin 1993 and 2009. Mao biographies in English include Wilson 1980, Z. Li 1996, Terrill 2001, Chang and Halliday 2006, Benton 2007, Cheek 2010, Karl 2010, Pantsov and Levine 2012, and Walder 2015. 20. 王明 and 张国焘 (Wang 1974, 11–170; Q. Hu 1994, 178–298). 21. 整风运动 and 思想改造. For the harshness, thoroughness and effectiveness of the CCP’s thought-reform efforts especially after 1949, see P. Hu 1999 and 2012, 9–228. 22. The lyrics of East is Red (东方红), the best-known official carol of Mao in China since 1945. The original melody was a popular folk song of erotic romance in Northern Shaanxi, Sesame Oil. It was first reused in 1930–’40s with lyrics for military mobilization purposes retitled Riding White Horse (Q. Dai 2004). 23. 无法无天, Mao told Edgar Snow in 1970 (Xiong 1999, 216 and 219–20; Z. Lin 2013). 24. 与天斗其乐无穷, 与地斗其乐无穷, 与人斗其乐无穷. Mao’s motto since his early years (S. Xiao 2004, 15).

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25. 有田有地吾为主, 无法无天为人民 (Li and Tang 2005, 143). 26. Mao 1944. This Maoist mandate of the people was inherited and reiterated by CCP leaders Hu Jintao (2012) and Xi Jinping (2013). 27. 奉天承运. Mao’s initial naming of his regime was even wordier “Democratic People’s Republic of China (DPRC),” rivaling the regime in Pyongyang (X. Chen 2005, 87). 28. 人民必胜. CCTV Live Newscast, Beijing, September 3, 2015. 29. Blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_44f792630100h7l0.html, accessed April 23, 2016. 30. Gong 1978, 406. This policy effectively reduced the number of CCP POWs and gave it an edge until the Korean War when the CCP could no longer conduct the kind of battleground sweep under the superior U.S. surveillance and firepower. 31. George 1967; O’Dowd 2007 and K. Xie 2016. Lin 1965 and X. Shi 2002, 92–132. 32. 延安精神. Some earlier works on Yan’an Spirit were often limited by the PRC’s official narrative and tight control of information, tended to overly emphasize the façade of idealism, socialism, even romanticism of Maoist CCP (Selden 1971 and 1995). 33. Mao Zedong Thought was first coined by Wang Jiaxiang in 1943 as a Sinicized refinement of Marxism-Leninism. It became the dogma supreme for the CCP with the key support by Mao’s protégée and designated successor Liu Shaoqi in 1945 (C. Jin 1998, 476–69 and 509–15; Cheek 2010, 14–132). Mao described it in 1945 as his “fragrant, live Marxism” versus his political opponents’ “stinky, dead Marxism” (CCP Central History 2002, 399). Both Wang and Liu were later cruelly purged by Mao in the 1960s. 34. In addition to its functional departments of organization, propaganda, and united front, the CCP had a secret Protection/Society/Investigation Department since 1927 for internal policing and external espionage and subversion. It was merged into the Ministry of State Security in the 1980s (H. Chen 1952; J. Wang 1983, 332). 35. For the powerful pressure from the United States throughout the 1940s to force the ROC to tolerate the CCP, see Gu 1987, V5, 422–54 and 685–727 and Gu 1988, V6, 16–202. 36. A good example of such ends-justify-means deception is the influential but largely made-up exposes attacking ROC leaders by Mao’s secretary and later a top leader (purged by Mao in 1971) Chen Boda (1946 and 1948). For Chen’s career as the powerful Joseph Goebbels-like propagandist for Mao and his two books, see Zeng 2012, 28–33. 37. CCP secret members and Chiang Kai-shek’s top military aides Lt. General Liu Fei and Lt. General Guo Rugui were alleged by historians in the PRC and in Taiwan as the “red agents who decided the Civil War” for the CCP (L. Xu 1997, 144–50 and 203–05). 38. Some Chinese political exiles have alleged that “more than 80 percent of the political dissidents” living overseas were actually PRC secret agents or informants. wpoforum.com/viewtopic.php?fid=1&tid=70874, accessed May 8, 2015. 39. Mao issued a secret “16 words policy” for that in 1949 (G. Fu 2011; G. Mu 2012, 8–10).

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40. A highly meritorious but abused agent in Hong Kong later ran away with boiling “hatred and disgust for the (CCP) totalitarian dictatorship” (Chou 1963, 11 and 92). 41. Z. Zhang 1989 (soon banned in the PRC). For a historian take see Y. Chen 2011, 96–97. For how this strategy was later used in the 1970s against Vietnam, see Q. Qin 2014. 42. For anecdotes of CCP’s secret agents in action, see Smarlo 2004, 55–60, 83–90, 263–65. 43. S. Xiao 1999, which collected some typical official CCP publications and declarations in 1941–49 that looked like a captivating blueprint for an American-style liberal democracy in China. However, the republication of those propagandist words half century later was deemed to be advocating subversive universal (Western) norms by the CCP and the book was quickly banned in China. 44. Bernstein 2014, 106–15, 203. For the idealism and naiveté of American diplomats in China then, see Service 1974 and Davies 2012. A Belgian-Australian China-watcher later found that Zhou a “compulsive seducer,” “had the talent for telling blatant lies with angelic suavity . . . repeatedly and literally got away with murder” (Leys 2013, 379). 45. Chinese People’s Political Consultation Conference, Guidelines for Peaceful State Construction (和平建國綱領), adopted January 1946. 46. The Preamble of The PRC Constitution, Beijing, 2004. 47. Y. Xie 1999, 35–36 and 44–45. M. Lin 2002, 28–32. 48. For an insider’s assessment about why the ROC lost, see Gu 1988 V6-B, 623–28. 49. The survey respondents were already heavily influenced by the Soviet Union’s “rogue diplomacy” and the CCP’s many clever plots to spread rumors, bribe elites, organize mass riots and bloodsheds to score public relations points (Liu 8-11-2015). 50. Y. Zheng 2007. Indeed, some Chinese intellectuals foresaw in the late-1910s that the radicalization of the ROC politics “shall end in communism” (Z. Luo 2013). 51. CCP officially claims its power is based on winning the Civil War as “the historical choice by the Chinese people” (C. Xie 2014). 52. Many counties lost two-thirds of their people (R. Ding 2015). For a case of mass civilian death and destruction caused by CCP’s guerilla warfare in 1932, see G. Fu 2005. 53. Z. Zhang 1989, 467–511; Lang 2014; Z. Cheng 2015; Long 2009, 198–201; 54. Avtorkhanov 1973, 14, 31–41, 216, 315–67; Pantsov and Levine 2012, 233–74, 390–412. 55. R. Li 1993, 142. For Mao’s personal belief system, see his undoctored essays and personal notes in CCP Central Document Office 1995, 1–2, 64–76, 184–88, 449–94. 56. For some of those political campaigns, see Hoover Institution Archives 2014. 57. For a collection of archive documents related to those campaigns, see Y. Song 2015. 58. Mao led radical campaigns in Hunan in 1926–27 to often physically wipe out the landlords with the slogan “everyone with land is bad” (G. Zhang 1966, V2,

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215–19). For anecdotes of the bloody land reform in Southwestern China, see Liao 2008. For CCP’s official narrative of land reform, see Luo 2005. For a sympathizing American report, see Hinton 1966. For the CCP’s use of the land reform or “turn-over” (翻身) to “flip the hearts and minds” (翻心) of the peasants, see F. Li 2010, 5–35. 59. Started with the state monopoly of grain trade and ration (统购统销) (Y. Chen 1983, 209). For the state exploitation of the Chinese peasants, see Ash 2006, 959–98. 60. Spence 1990, 576–83; Walder 1988; Friedman 1993; S. Dong 2011; Thaxton 2016. 61. Report by PRC Minister of Internal Affairs Bo Yibo, cited in L. Xin 2008. 62. K. Yang 2009, 191, 215–59; S. Ying 2014, 3–7. Similarly mandated mass executions happened other places such as Baoan(Shenzhen), Guangdong (Nan 2016). 63. Spence 1990, 536–540. For Mao’s legal system, see Cohen 1968. For the CCP’s long and massive politicized use of the death penalty, see N. Zhang 2016. 64. For an apologist view of the sociocultural reengineering campaign, see X. Xia 2014. 65. Qiu 1997. For stories by surviving CCP senior officials purged, see Xiao, Li and Gong 1998. For anecdotes of this era recounted by the educated elites, see Pomfret 2006. 66. L. Guo 2014, 3–8. For a collection of the CCP’s internal chronicle bulletins of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, see Y. Song 2015. 67. Dikötter 2011, xi, 169. More works on the famine death are Jin 1993, 13–22, J. Yang 2008, Ding 1991, R. Li 1999, V2, 76–85, Manning and Wernheuer 2012 and X. Yu 2015. For eyewitness accounts see Yi 2013. For a collection of the Leap-related CCP documents, see Y. Song 2013. For three representative cases, see S. Yao 2010, 48–49, Z. Zhang 2004, 42–44 and Dong 2008. For reports on the massive death and cannibalism, see Liao 2002, V3, 240–50. In one county, a fertile “land of fish and rice” with normal weather conditions, 20 percent of the population perished in the three-year Leap (G. Xie 2006). 68. Rich evidence is presented in J. Yang 2008 V1 (49, 99–100, 131–32, 243, 274–78, 353, 451), J. Yang 2008, V2, 879, Y. Song 2013, Z. Liang 2014, 39–44. 69. L. Yan 2015, 69–72. The Cultural Revolution finished with Mao’s death in September 1976 but was officially ended only in October 1977 by the post-Mao CCP. For PRC documents of the Cultural Revolution, see Song 2006. For internal collection of files, see N. Wang 1988a. For articles on the period, see Song 2007. For scholarly accounts, see MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2009, Clark 2008, N. Wang 1988. For an official account, see Xi and Jin 2006. For a later banned official take, see Gao and Yan 1986. For an early and penetrating report on Mao’s brutal purge disguised as revolution, see Leys 1971. For a concise history of the Chinese social discontents against the CCP state that were stirred, released, manipulated and used, see Kraus 2012. 70. For an insider’s account about Mao’s manipulation and disregard of the CCP meeting rules and “elections,” see Chi 2003, 44–51. For Mao’s purge of two million cadres and maltreatment of 100 million people with various case-teams, see J. Huang 2014, 18–22. 71. Gu Zhun (顾准) cited in Qian 2012, V2, 311–12; Brown 2015.

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72. Anecdotal evidence in Zheng 1993, 39–87, Z. Deng 2000, 130 and Ou

73. Mao demanded fantastic grain production in the Great Leap Forward, perhaps duped by the idiosyncratic assertions made by the physicist Qian Xuesen who worked for PRC’s missile program (R. Li Real Records 1999, 51–52 and R. Li Witness 1999, 50). 74. For Mao’s deep moaning and self-pitying of this in front of his senior cadres in 1959, see R. Li Real Records 1999, 110. 75. Yao Wenyuan’s banned memoirs, cited in Cheng Ming (爭鳴), Hong Kong, December 2003. Also see Z. Xin 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2015. For an earlier (in 1969) secret discussion about Mao’s wife as his successor, see Qiu 2011, V2, 638–39 and D. Wu 2004, 110–11 and 224. For a rebuttal of such allegations, see Yan & Yang 2010, 25. 76. Zarrow 2012; R. Wang 2002; Z. Xin 2009. Chiang Kai-shek also used an indirect approach for his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, to succeed him with Yen Chia-kan as the loyal and trustworthy regent. Chiang’s son (who ended the dynasty and started democracy in Taiwan) was much more capable and established than Mao’s inept wifenephew duo. The father-son succession of leadership in Singapore appeared similarly indirect. 77. Y. Xu 2010, V2, 767). Some dissidents have petitioned for burying Mao so to end his punishment with corpse-on-display (曝尸示众) (J. Yu 2014). Deng Xiaoping, in another communist/atheist tradition started by Friedrich Engels (and Zhou Enlai), willed to have his remains cremated and discarded (Xinhua News, Beijing, March 2, 1997). 78. C. Li 2001 and 2009. The PRC also has eight decorative “democratic parties” (Jacobs 2013, A6). Not strictly hereditary, many top leaders and senior cadres of the CCP-PRC including Xi Jinping are “princelings” (the offspring of leaders) who have been specially cultivated and promoted since the early 1980s. 79. F. Wang 2011; M. Yang 2014. To some, the CCP-PRC under Xi Jinping is becoming a new Maoist dictatorship (Ringen 2016). 80. At least one of them, Wang Hongwen (1935–92), the number two man of the CCP at the time, was reportedly seriously tortured and drugged (Qiu 2011, V2, 930–32). 81. The CCP leadership has costly imposed tight censorship to create a national amnesia about the Tiananmen Uprising ever since (Lim 2014). 82. Before 1949, out of the total of 24 CCP leaders in twenty-eight years, five were purged and another five defected. After 1949, Mao purged Chen Boda, Deng Xiaoping, Lin Biao, Liu Shaoqi, Tao Zhu, plus former top leaders Li Lisan, Lu Futan, Wang Jiaxiang, Wang Ming, and Zhang Wentian. In the post-Mao Era, the CCP purged Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Hua Guofeng, Wang Dongxing, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili, Zhou Yongkang (after retirement), and Kang Sheng posthumously. 83. Indefinite detention incommunicado, the so-called Two Designations (双 规 to confess at designated place by designated time), wiretapping and anonymous informants are some of the feared methods (M. Lin 2016; W. Zhou 2015; P. Li 2015; L. Wang 2015). 84. He and Huang 2013; P. Zhu 2015, 11. The DICs, of course, are not immune of corruption themselves (H. Feng 2015). For the history of the DICs, see L. Li 2015.

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85. Perhaps reflecting their insiders’ understanding of power politics in the absence of rule of law, as a noted Chinese lawyer concluded, senior officials charged tend to all refuse defense lawyers, accept their verdicts, and give up appeals for the hope of uncertain mercy, or commit suicide rather than going to trial (Y. Chen 2016). 86. Statement by Cui Hairong (deputy minister for corruption prevention) on May 11, 2012, Beijing times, May 15, 2012, A7 87. For a glimpse of its tradition of tight secrecy, see CCP Central History 1994. 88. Yidianzixun.com/n/0AO2lKCj?s=8&from=groupmessage&isappinstalled=0, zhihu.com/question/21197062, blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_441f25da0102vey4.html, all accessed August 20, 2015. 89. P. Wang 1992, 584; Author’s interviews with senior PLA officers, 2010–14. 90. A typical county government in China is reported to have ninety “standard government agencies,” sixteen “mass organizations,” thirty-five county-financed units, and fifty-five “other agencies and offices.” See: tieba.baidu.com/p/3422163689, accessed August 16, 2015. 91. The leaders of the Chinese Islamic Association, Buddhist Association, Patriotic Catholics, and Independent Christian Patriots were commonly revealed as secret and long-time CCP members by their official obituaries such as this for Bao Erhan (包尔汗). See: cpc.people.com.cn/daohang/n/2013/0226/c357214-20604566.html, February 26, 2013. 92. The CCP created its secret police the State Political Protection Bureau in its infancy (Gong 1978, 569–79). It was expanded in the late-1930s to be Departments of Society, Intelligence, and (underground) Urban Works (CCP Central History 1994, 119–25, 139, 162). Systematic works on Chinese secret police are rare. For a recent but inadequate effort, see X. Guo 2012. 93. The PRC and the PLA intelligence networks frequently spy internally to detect dissention and opposition or for power struggles (S. Lin 2012). For the world’s most sophisticated web policing in the PRC, see X. Tao 2007. 94. Sohu 2013; Y. Hai 2014; X. Ma 2014. For how Deng Xiaoping relied on those internal reporting (内参) for information, see Yin 2012 and K. Yu 2014, 5–6 and 9. 95. George Knowles, “Inside China’s Big Brother HQ,” Daily Mail, October 1, 2016. 96. China’s urban police density internally reported in the late 1990s was more than twice of that in the United States (Z. Li 1999). 97. PRC Ministry of Public Security 1999, 234–52. For examples of famous artists and scholars recruited as informants, see Ying and Conceison 2009 and W. Gu 2009, C15. 98. The classroom informants are mostly used to ensure that the teachers follow CCP party lines. Author’s interviews with PRC college administrators and faculty, 2010–16. 99. The “youth web civilization volunteers” were mandated to be 10.08 million (10 percent of the CYL members) (CYL Central 2015, 8). In two months, the CYL recruited 157.6 thousand in Fujian including 92,359 boys of 14 to 18 and 3,870 girls younger than 14, to meet the mandated 330,000 for that province (CYL Fujian 2015).

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100. Q. Zhang 2014; T. Li 2014. For the “fifty-cents party (五毛党),” see L. Zhang 2010. For non-PRC reports, see AFP 5-15-2011 and Phillips 2013. For expose of the hyperactive “fifty-cents” and web-spying in one locality (an urban district in Jiangxi Province), see Zhanggong 2014. For the leaked records of massive college students as informants and fifty-cents workers in Shanghai, see the 100 files in Shanghai Government 2015. 101. Chao 2013. For a profile of ten jailed PRC billionaires, see Renmin 2014. 102. 依法治国 or 法制 as opposed to 法治. For a deliberate mistranslation of those concepts, see xinhuanet.com/english/special/cpclenum2014/index.htm, October 29, 2014. 103. 三个至上 (Hu Jintao 2007) and reiterated by Xi Jinping (L. Huang 2015). 104. For a general survey of the Chinese economy in the 2010s, see Kroeber 2016. 105. China’s GDP growth slowed to 6.9 percent and lower after 2015. Its foreign exchange reserve reached its peak of nearly $4 trillion in 2014 (World Bank 2016; Li and Kim 2014). It then declined to $2.99 trillion in 2017 (Xinhua Daily Telegraph, February 6, 2017). 106. Economist, August 1, 2015, 20. 107. The PRC official statistics have long been questioned for accuracy and reliability. (“China’s Data, Superstition ain’t the way,” The Economist, September 3, 2016, 61–62). 108. Statistical Bureau 2012, table 10. The chief of the Statistical Bureau, however, wrote in a CCP journal with slightly different figures of 0.36 and 0.40 (J. Ma 2012). 109. The Economist, August 13, 2010. The U.S. national Engle Coefficient in 2010 was 0.1 (0.07 for the high income and 0.145 for the low income) (U.S. Department of Labor 2012, 8; Pritchett and Spivack 2013, 15–19). 110. The Economist, January 14, 2010; M. Zhang 2013; Lahart 2014. 111. Swanbrow 2014; news.163.com/13/0118/11/8LGH1BBF00014JB6.html; finance.sina.com.cn/china/20150120/100321340647.shtml, accessed January 26, 2015. 112. See: opinion.china.com.cn/event_1805_1.html, accessed May 21, 2015. 113. Figures are in U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2014, table 2.3. 114. Law on personal income tax in the People’s Republic of China (中华人民 共和国个人所得税法), Beijing, amended 2011. Gov.cn, accessed January 24, 2015. 115. Only 10 out of 125 countries had China’s high payroll tax (Qi 2015; Y. Fang 2013). 116. Dao 2006. For more on the problems and lessons of the PRC health care system, see Blumenthal and Hsiao 2005, 1165–70 and 2015, 1281–85.

Chapter 7

PRC.”

 1. 但悲不见五洲同 (Mao 1992, 648).  2. 世界人民大团结万岁. The other slogan since 1949 remains “Long live the  3. 国家安全 (X. Yan 2006). Yan reaffirmed it with the author in spring 2014.   4. For the PRC arrogation, use, and abuse of nationalism, see Unger 1996.

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 5. Q. Hu 2003, 328–29. Fitting his world unity wish, Mao wanted in the 1950s to follow Moscow’s plans to eventually replace the Han Chinese characters with Latin letters so as to be in “the common trend as the world” (People’s Daily, December 20, 1977, 1).   6. Hooper 1986. The CCP could not rule China its way without breaking its promises of freedom of the press and political democracy. To demonize the American and Western ideas even through an exorbitant war was an effective way to eliminate liberals and liberal ideas. Mao thus launched anti-Hu Shi campaign as early as 1950 (peaked in 1954–55) to cleansing the mind of the intellectuals (Y. Xie 2006; Ran 2014).  7. Beijing keeps the cost and casualty state secrets. Scholars and participants estimate that China had 400 to 800 thousand (even one million) deaths in the war, or ten to sixteen (or even twenty) times that of the American casualties (G. Cheng 2013; Chang and Halliday 2006, 372). Chinese war dead in Korea basically remain nameless (L. Zhang 2013). For a scathing critique of Mao’s Korean War, see Z. Xin 2010; Y. Mao 2013; W. Qian 2001; Z. Wu 2013.   8. Liu Jinfeng 2013. Moscow, Tokyo, and Taipei are viewed as “the real winners;” Washington (with its military presence and alliance) and Seoul (independence secured with larger territory) are “partial winners;” Pyongyang (lost land but survived) is the “partial loser;” but Beijing is the “only total loser of the war fought for others,” having lost its chance to “liberate Taiwan,” missed the trade with the West for decades afterwards, and backed down from all of its major demands for the armistice negotiation (repatriating all Chinese POWs, going back to the 38th parallel, withdrawal of all foreign troops). Others dryly commented that the Korean War did have two “positive byproducts” for the Chinese people: “authentic Chinese culture is preserved in Taiwan” and “a Mao dynasty is derailed” as Mao’s only able son was killed in Korea. Author’s interviews of PLA analysts and historians in China, 2002–04 and 2010.  9. Mao soon secretly regretted the “big mistake” of fighting the Korean War but blamed it all on Stalin and Kim Il-Sun (F. He 2014). Pyongyang, of course, did provide critical aid and protection to the CCP in the Chinese Civil War earlier in 1946–49 (Lü 2013). 10. As Mencius pointed out in Mengzi-Gaozi xia (third century BCE) 2004. 11. While it is major historic luck and probably a long-term blessing to the Chinese people for the ROC to continue on Taiwan due to Mao’s folly of joining the world communist revolution, it is still hard to overlook the uncountable resources Beijing has spent ever since to “unify” China and the negative impact of a hung Civil War on the political environment and socioeconomic development and people’s life on the Chinese Mainland (K. Yang 2009, V2, 174–215 and 2011, 208–38). 12. Z. Shen 2013. In the CCP propaganda, Stalin was praised as the CCP-PRC’s father, teacher, central leader, and commander-in-chief (Mao 1953, 1). 13. Chang and Halliday 2006, 331–84, 397–408, 450–60; Z. Xin 2009, 24, 97–110, 131–36; L. Qian 2012, V1, 335; Pantsov and Levine 2012, 413–48. 14. Mao eagerly sought for but failed to get nuclear weapons from Moscow (Jersild 2013). 15. R. Li, Witness Account. 1999, V2, 526–27.

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16. Mao “followed Moscow’s instructions for the last time” to agree to ceasefire in Korea in July 1953 and then started to grab the leadership of the world communist movement so as to alter the previous “father-son relationship” between Moscow and Beijing (K. Yang 2006, 52, 118–20). Mao almost openly manifested his ambition in 1957 and afterwards, as observed by a senior official, his North Korean comrade at the time (Hwang 2006). 17. 我们战胜地球, 建立强国, 一定要如此, 一定要如此。全党全民团结起 来，全世界无产者团结起来,目的一定可以达到 (Mao 1993, 524). 18. Mao’s secret speech to top CCP leaders on August 19, 1959, cited in R. Li, Witness Account, 1999, V2, 99. 19. To perhaps cover up their power-fetish, weakness, and incompetency, Maoists often pretended to believe in voluntarism and boasted Mao’s thought as “spiritual atomic bomb” (Mao 1966, 1) that essentially was the unbounded sacrifice of human rights and human lives. 20. People’s Daily (人民日报), January 1, 1958. Mao first mentioned “surpassing the UK” in Moscow in November 1957. R. Li, Witness Account, 1999, V2, 202. 21. Mao’s vision declared to top CCP cadres by Liu Shaoqi in June 1958 and by Bo Yibo on August 31, 1959, R. Li, Witness Account, 1999, V2, 127, 166, 204. 22. The six ministries later became state-owned companies (S. Zhang 2005, chap. 6, 10). 23. The PRC satellite launching operations based in Xichan, for example, have been deadly with falling rocket debris injuring and killing people since the 1990s (Z. Zhang 2009). 24. Mao’s secret speech to top CCP leaders on May 17, 1958 (R. Li, Witness Account, 1999, V1, 390). In Moscow earlier in 1957 Mao said to “sacrifice 300 million Chines lives” and “scared away those East European comrades” (Shen 2013-A, chap. 9). 25. For Mao’s efforts in Latin America and Cuba, see Y. Cheng 2015 and Rothwell 2012. 26. Mao’s secret speech on May 8, 1958 (R. Li, Witness Account, 1999, V1, 323). 27. Zhou Enali, Speech at the 10th Plenum Meeting of the 8th CCP Central Committee, September 26, 1962 (K. Yang 2009, V2, 236). 28. For a partial revelation of the “extravagant and unbearable” foreign aids to support world revolution over the past six decades, see Tencent Reviews 2015. 29. Mao was reported that he “had to try at all cost” to pass his throne to his incompetent and unpopular wife, his equally inept and more inexperienced nephew, and even his head mistress, as his two brothers died before him and his carefully groomed and only sane son was unexpectedly killed by American napalm bombs during the Korean War in 1950 (Z. Xin 2009 and 2014). For Mao Anying and his death, see L Wu 2006 and Teng 2014. 30. Nixon 1972, in Peters and Woolley 2014. 31. As evidence of the power of the Westphalia system, the Soviet Bloc, with its dozen votes and deep animosity against Beijing at the time, still voted to support the PRC. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, U.N., October 25, 1971.

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32. For an earlier and well-known case, see Taylor 1990. For how those Westerners discovered and were disillusioned by, on the spot, the CCP’s stage-managed propaganda but nonetheless chose to keep a sympathetic silence afterwards, see Barthes 2012. 33. For the phrase of “useful idiots,” see Safire 1987. For a report on some Chinarelated cases, see BBC 2010 and Mirsky 2010. For a history of “political pilgrims” in the twentieth century to Moscow, Beijing, and Havana, see Hollander 1981. For the case of leading French intellectuals and the PRC, see Wolin 2010. 34. Historian Shen Zhihua cited in Q. Li 2013, 97. 35. Mao apologists today still cite his overture to the West for regime survival as opening China thus evidence of his wisdom and accomplishment (L. Deng 2004; S. Yan 2015). 36. Of course, Mao and the CCP tried hard to conceal and spin about their embarrassing failures ever since with unscrupulous self-denials. For a cautious but enlightening treatment of this subject by a PRC historian, see K. Yang 2009, V2, 302–19. 37. K. Yang 2009, V2, 252–319 (quotes on pp. 292–94). 38. From late-1970s to 1989, the United States massively sent air traffic control and many dual-use technologies to the PRC to “completely upgraded their systems.” Author’s interview with senior Pentagon and Raytheon officials overseeing the transfers, 2000. 39. U.S. and the PRC government figures, census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/ c5700.html; zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/tongji.shtml, accessed May 5, 2015. 40. For a Chinese take of hidden cost of attracting foreign capital, see Q. Cai, June 2006. 41. “To uphold the leadership of the CCP, socialism, the people’s democratic dictatorship, and Marxism-Leninism.” First proposed in 1979 (Deng 1983, V2, 158–84). Later these four were written into the CCP Party Charter as the “fundamentals of the nation” (CCP Central 2007 and 2012). 42. Niu 2010, 304–14. For the CCP’s new internal “survival strategy,” see Dickson 2016. 43. 韬光养晦, 善于守拙, 绝不当头, 有所作为, 保存自己, 徐图发展 (Leng 2004, V2, 1346; Z. Jiang 2006, 202). 44. Zoellick 2005. For a U.S. Congressional Hearing address this wish, see U.S. Congress 2006. For a counterargument, see Patrick 2010. 45. Beijing cleverly realized this from early on and tried hard with attractive, however artificial and temporary, lures even naked bribery to recruit foreign traders, investors, and “talents.” Author’s interviews in China, 2004 and 2010; Freeland 2011. For an American admiration of the PRC pro-business policies, see Stoll 2012. 46. Mao ordered the PRC delegation to the U.N. to do so (Xiong 1999, 349–54). 47. For a penetrating Chinese take on this, see K. Yang 2009, V2, 297–319. 48. 中华文明伟大复兴 (Z. Jiang 1997; J. Hu 2007 and 2012). 49. Xi Jinping’s speech to the CCP Central Committee (CCP Central Document 2014). 50. 人类命运共同体, Xinhua October 13, 2015, 1; H. Yu 2016.

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51. For Mao’s wish, see Qi 2013 and R. Li, Witness Account, 1999 V2, 99. 52. 华夏主义 (Ye and Long 2013). 53. 天下主义 (T. Zhao 2005, i–25, 123–24). 54. 道义现实主义 (X. Yan 2015). 55. As illustrated by the bestseller Unrestricted Warfare (Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui 超限战, Wuhan: Changjiang Wenyi, 2015) and its many copycats that advocate boundless and asymmetric use of force and ruse including terrorism to win a total war. 56. Hanban.edu.cn/confuciousinstitutes/node_10961.htm, accessed January 3, 2016.

Epilogue   1. For Mao Zedong’s exhaustive yet failed effort for a dynasty, see chapters 6 and 7 of this book and R. Wang 2002, 12–13, 196–97, 211–12; Z. Xin 2009, 17, 267–68, 315–88, 411–52.   2. Xi Jinping Speech to the CCP Politburo on June 26, 2015 (CCP CDIC 2016).  3. F. Wang “China’s Four-R Strategy” 2015a. The Chinese military started in 2013 to ready its troops for a comprehensive contest with the United States (J. Huang 2013).  4. Campbell and Andrews 2013. Lawrence J. Korb 2014, Christensen 2015. For gauges of the Americans’ “largely neo-liberal rather than realist” diverse views about China, see Xie and Page 2010, 479–501 and Aldrich et al. 2015.  5. For a doubtful yet benign estimate of the Chinese challenge that backs a more appeasing China policy, see Gurtov 2013.   6. For a nation of nearly 1.4 billion and a working population of about 800 million, the PRC now has only 28 million people paying income tax (D. Yang 2015).

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Index Abbasid Caliphate, 60, 225 Abe, Nakamaro (阿倍仲麿, 晁衡), 61 abolish hundred of schools, enshrine only Confucianism (罢黜百家, 独 尊儒术), 50–51, 224 Africa, 10, 17, 21, 28, 115, 189, 202, 205, 212, 221 Agricultural Collectivization (农业合作 化), 178 Albania, 203 Alexander the Great, 44, 114 All Nations of China (中华各民族), 221, see also Chinese Nation all under heaven for the public (天下为 公), 50, 224 Alliance on the Sea (海上之盟), 81, 85 Alliance of Changqing (长庆之盟), 83 Alsace-Lorraine, 76 Amendola, Giovanni, 41 American-Spanish War (SpanishAmerican War), 141 An Lushan-Shi Siming Rebellion (安史 之乱), 61 Analects (论语), 64, 226 Anglo-Chinese War, 135, 139, 230 Anhui merchants (徽商), 108 Anti-Bolshevik Regiment (AB 团), 163 anti-corruption campaigns, as power struggle, 183–84 Anti-Hu Feng (胡风) Campaign, 179 Anti-Rightist Campaign (反右运动), 179, 236 anti-Semitism, 41

Arabs, in China, 95 Aristotle, 43, 52, 113, 215 Art of War (孙子兵法), 35, 110, 228 arts of qi (气功), 34 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 214 Asian spirit, 209 authoritarianism, 40–42, 52–53, 59, 66, 92, 100, 144, 159–61, 169, 177, 208, 214, 216, 223 Aye Sofia, 130 Ba Jin (巴金), 174 Bacon, Francis, 114 Bai Juyi (白居易), 229 ban of maritime communications (海 禁), 69, 72 Bao Erhan (包尔汗), 238 baojia (保甲 neighborhood liability/ collective), 45, 61, 107 Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 205 Battle of Artlakh in Talas, 60 Battle of Manchuria, 176 bestowing or granting (赐), 88 Big Five, 136, 155, 205 bin Laden, Osama, 209 Black Death, 133 Blyukher, Vasily (Galen 加仑), 164 Book of Change or I-Ching (易经), 50, 64

315

316

Index

Book of Documents (尚书), 64, 220 Book of Odes (诗经), 64, 220, 224 Book of Rites (礼记), 64, 224 Boxer Rebellion, 141, 155 Braun, Otto, 164 BRICKS Bank, 214 Brocade-clad Guards (锦衣卫), 69 Brotherhood/underground society (江湖, 会党), 111 Buddhism, 33, 67, 72, 94, 102, 137, 238 bureaucracy, imperial, 32, 59, 61, 62, 72, 73, 78, 92, 105, 108, 111, 148 size of, in imperial and PRC eras, 94, 227–28, 229 Burlingame, Anson (蒲安臣), 144, 147, 157 Byzantine Empire, 15, 57, 60 calligraphy, of Han language, 19, 64, 97, 227 Canada, 205 cannibalism in China, 65, 112, 126, 127, 230 in the PRC, 180, 236 capitalism, 5, 33, 89, 92, 109, 143, 149, 158, 202, 207, 208, 228 Castiglione, Giuseppe (郎世宁), 106 Catholicism & Jesuits missionaries, 17, 69, 102, 113, 138, 140, 146, 157 Cathay-barbarian distinction (华夷之 辩), 103 Caucasians in ancient China, 16, 220 CCP (中国共产党 Chinese Communist Party), 4, 5–6, 20, 107, 143–44, 157, 159–88, 192, 197, 203–204, 209–14, 217–18, 234 and history, 22–23, 25–27, 29, 113, 135, 150, 222, 242 and the military, 184–85 as the social ladder, 184 casualties of, 176–81, 183–84, 186–87, 236, 237 creation of, 161–63, 175

history of, 136–37, 143, 146, 150, 153–54, 161–88, 233–34 funds from and ties to Moscow, 152–53, 159, 161–66, 176–77, 198–200, 201, 240 keeping secrets, 169, 234, 238 opium trade, 166–67, 233 post-Mao, 181–88, 189, 207–209 under Mao, 165–81, 189, 195–206 problems and advantages today, 215–16 rescued by its enemy, 204–209 size of, 184, 186, 238 struggle with Westphalia System, 195–214 using of foreigners, 172–74, 186, 205–206, 242 using of POWs, 171–72 using of propaganda, 121, 170–71, 172–75, 221, 222, 223, 230, 233, 235 using of secret agents, 171, 234, 235, 238 CCP-PRC, 5, 29, 107, 150, 161, 173–74, 177–78, 181–84, 186–89, 192, 195, 197–98, 201, 206–207, 210–11, 217, 222, 237, 240, also see CCP and PRC Celestial Emperor (Tengri Qaghan 天可 汗), 60, 70, 139, 168 Central Asia, 16–17, 50, 54, 60, 67, 71, 80, 114, 138, 141 Central Focus Committee (中央专门委 员会), 201 Centralia (中国), 3, 5, 9, 10–18, 20, 30–31, 38, 49–50, 54–55, 57, 59–60, 64–67, 70–72, 76, 79–80, 82, 88, 90, 92, 97, 100, 102–103, 105–106, 116, 123, 137, 140–42, 150–52, 154, 159, 164, 170, 172, 210, 217, 220, 224, 228, 230, also see China Proper Century of Experimentation (and Progress), 3, 6, 28, 65, 135–58, 204

Index Century of Humiliation, see Century of Experimentation and Progress Chaka/KGB, 167, 185 Changan (长安), 60, 64, 83 Changping Battle (长平之战), 35 Chanyuan System (澶渊), 77, 82–86, 89–94, 98, 116, 122, 158, 226 Chanyuan Treaty (澶渊誓书 or 澶渊之 盟), 83, 86–89 Charlemagne, 57 Chen Boda (陈伯达), 234, 237 Chen Bulei (陈布雷), 171 Chen Duxiu (陈独秀), 152, 163, 231 Chen Lifu (陈立夫), 232 Chen Yingque (陈寅恪), 174, 222 Chen Yuan (陈垣), 25, 222 Chiang Ching-kuo (蒋经国), 237 Chiang Kai-Shek (蒋介石), 152–53, 155–56, 159–61, 165, 171, 174, 205, 232, 234, 237 Chiang Soong May-ling (宋美龄), 153, 231 Chien Mu (钱穆), 174, 222 child-people of the great Qing (大清子 民), 74 China, nomenclature of, 9–12 ecogeography of, 12–18 history of, 21–29 in Chinese, 10–12 in Russian, 10, 220 peoples of, 18–21 China Dream (中国梦), 209–14, 216, 232 China Fantasy, 208 China Order, 3–4, 5–7, 11, 18, 28, 30, 33, 35, 39–40, 41, 47, 54, 135, 145, 215, 223, 227, also see QinHan world empire and Qin-Han world order and monopoly, 133–34 assessment of, 99–101, 110–14, 118–33 characteristics of, 101–14 compared to Westphalia system, 114–17, 215

317

defined, 3–4, 39–40, 41, 54, 99–101, 219 evolution/perfection/improvement of, 54–74 fading of, 140–42, 144, 147, 150–51, 155–58 impact and role of, 49, 52, 60, 69–71, 74, 87–91, 97–98, 107–14, 119–34, 229, 231 in the PRC, 69, 137, 168, 172–73, 177, 179, 181, 188–89, 193, 195– 98, 200–201, 203–206, 209–14, 216–18 in the ROC, 159–60 internalization of, 55, 57, 60–62, 79–82, 87–91, 100–101, 107–10, 118, 223 interruption of, 75–98 its foundation, 47–53, 99–101 its Japanese version, 154 peak of, 71–72, 73, 137–39 China Proper, 13–15, 20, 30–31, 49, 67, 71, 72, 76, 100, 105, 116, 123, 150, 165, 220, 221, also see Centralia China Puzzle or Needham Puzzle, 89, 125, 226 China Way or China Model, 202 Chinese Civil War, 6, 11, 18, 35, 137, 154, 159, 161, 171–72, 175–76, 178, 199, 234, 235, 240 Chinese Communist Party, see CCP Chinese cuisines, 119, 229 Chinese culture, 16, 19, 21, 25, 33, 35, 68, 73, 74, 91–92, 112, 137, 152, 180–81, 228, 240 as “grey water” (灰色水), 228 as “giant pickle vat” (大酱缸), 228 Chinese development model, 202, 209, 212, 214 Chinese diaspora or overseas Chinese, 106, 158, 171, 186, 222, 234 Chinese Exclusion Act and Magnuson Act, 155, 231

318

Index

Chinese Great Fire Wall, 29 Chinese language, 12, 19, 33, 46, 55, 60, 67, 73, 100, 140, 143, 167, 221, 227, see also Han language Chinese Nation (中华民族), 20–21, 25, 28, 38, 66, 81, 107, 113, 135, 159–62, 166, 203, 210, 211, 213–14, 221 Chinese peripheries, 11, 16, 59, 61, 67, 72, 82, 105–106, 140, 165, 217 Chinese Revolution, 5, 136, 144, 149–50, 152, 161–63, 167, 172, 175, 177–80, 198–200, 231 Chinese Soviet Republic (中华苏维埃共 和国), 137, 153, 163–64 Chinese World, 3–6, 9–11, 13–22, 24, 27, 30–37, 39, 41–49, 54–59, 62, 65–75, 76–92, 95–98, 99–100, 102–104, 106, 109, 112–14, 116–19, 121–23, 125–26, 129–33, 135–37, 139–40, 142, 144–46, 150–51, 154, 159–60, 204, 214, 217, 219, 220, 227, also see Eastern Eurasia insulation and isolation of, 13–18, 69–70, 104, 113, 124, 126, 131, 138–39, 199 chinoiserie, 70 Christian missionaries, 102, 138, 140, 146 Christianity, 33, 145, 163 Chūgoku Region (中國地方), 220 Churchill, Winston, 155 Cixi, Empress Dowager (慈禧), 141, 148–49, 231 climate change, 49, 216 Clinton, Hillary, 196 Cold War, 2, 4, 87, 115, 175, 199, 202, 204–205, 207–209, 215–16 Coliseum, 130 collective hereditary, 43, 118, 182, 215, 228–29, 237 Comintern (Communist International), 153, 161–63, 165, 175

Communism, 2, 41, 50–51, 143, 160–61, 167–68, 174, 177, 187, 200, 205, 232, 235 Communist Youth League, 185, 186 concession or leased lands and zones (租界), 136, 140–41, 145–47, 152–53, 155 Consensus Net (共识网), 29, 222 Confucian-Legalism or Confucian-coated Legalism (儒表法里), 3, 6, 28, 39–40, 51–54, 60, 63, 67, 72–73, 77, 80, 91, 94, 99–100, 103–105, 109, 112, 116–17, 123–24, 137, 143, 145, 151, 153, 159, 167, 169, 177, 210, 215 Confucianism or Confucian School (儒 家), 12, 19, 28, 33, 50–54, 59, 64, 68, 92, 94, 101–102, 109–10, 119, 129–30, 151, 168, 174, 177, 187, 188, 211, 213, 224, 226, 229, see also Confucian-Legalism Confucianism-Legalism-Statism, 214, 215 Confucius (孔子), 23, 26, 33, 44, 50, 52, 210, 211, 222, 224 Confucius Institute, 213 Containment, strategy of, 2 Coronation Charter, 97 corruption, massive and incurable, 56, 62, 69, 93, 108, 112, 118–19, 124, 127, 130, 161, 225, 232 in the PRC, 183–84, 187, 229, 237 Croce, Benedetto, 27 crony capitalism, 5 Cuba, 241 cultural-ethnic assimilation in China, 19, 21, 100, 111–12, 116 Dai Zhen (戴震), 105 Dazu (大足) Stone Engravings, 97 death by a thousand cuts (凌迟), 74 Delphi, 58 democracy, 18, 33, 41, 56, 93, 113, 124, 133, 136–37, 143, 148,

Index 149–53, 156, 157–59, 168, 171, 172–74, 187–88, 191, 197, 207, 211–12, 215–26, 235, 237, 240 Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), 26, 182–83, 201, 207–208, 210, 237, 238 Discipline Inspection Committee (DIC), 183, 185, 193, 237 Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒), 50, 224 Dream of Red Chamber (红楼梦), 110 dual-use technologies, 242 Dutch in Taiwan, 69, 144 East is Red (东方红), 233 East Wind, 200 East-West Divergence, 55, 57–59, 89 Eastern Depot (东厂), 69 Eastern Eurasia, 3, 6, 10, 11, 13, 32, 38–39, 43, 49–50, 55–56, 58, 65–67, 75, 77, 82–83, 86, 97, 99–100, 112, 116, 121, 123, 135, 140, 147, 219, also see Chinese World eating bitterness (吃苦), 133, 189 economic growth in Chinese history, 78, 95–96, 119, 125–29, 131–34, 147–49, 219–20 in ROC, 150, 158 in PRC, 1, 189–93, 195, 207, 239 Edict of Conrad II, 97 Egypt, 1, 3, 114 Eight-Banner, 71 eight-legged essay (八股文), 64, 68 emigration in Chinese history, 69–70, 96, 106, 117, 124, 132, 138, 147, 157, 170 emperor dream (帝王梦), 105 emperors, life of, 22, 64, 68, 70, 72–73, 77–79, 93–94, 112, 120, 140, 175, 181, 226 empire, defined, 3, 219 Engel Coefficient, 127, 190, 239 Enlightenment, 25, 38, 89, 112, 113, 124–25, 137, 219 entangling policy (羁縻), 59, 68, 72, 116

319

environmental deficit, 208 Epang Palace (阿房宫), 46 ethical politics (仁政), 78, see also Ren eunuch, in Chinese politics, 32, 55, 61, 64, 68–70, 73, 79, 92–93, 105, 120 European Union (EU), 1, 20 European-Mediterranean World, 4, 10, 12, 16–17, 27, 32, 44, 55–58, 82, 87, 97, 113–16, 124, 126, 133 Ever Victorious Army (常胜军), 145 everyone is responsible for the wellbeing of tianxia (天下兴亡, 匹夫 有责), 113 exporting revolution, 177 fakery, in Chinese history, 26–27, 29, 110, 222, 228 Falun Gong (法轮功), 233 family’s world (家天下), 101 famines in China, 64, 84, 120, 126–27, 131, 162, 180, 202, 236 Fascism, 2, 40–41 Feng Dao (冯道), 229 Feng Youlan (冯友兰), 174 Feng Yuxiang (冯玉祥), 162 Fengchan (封禅 worship of heaven and earth), 22, 31, 47, 51, 88, 102, 224 feudal system/society, feudalism, 5, 9, 28, 30–32, 38, 43–45, 47–49, 55–56, 58–59, 63, 67, 72, 97, 106, 113, 117, 122, 129, 138, 223 fifty-cents party (五毛党), 186, 239 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Pancha Shila), 196–97 five styles of the Qing-language (清文), 73 foot-binding, 68, 72, 94 foreign exchange reserve, size of, 189, 193, 207, 239 foreign influence in China, 25, 46, 69, 136, 140, 151, 157, 186

320

Index

foreigners in China, as catalysts, 10, 136, 138, 140–41, 146–47, 156–57, 206 forgery and plagiarism in the PRC, 25, 222 Foucault, Michel, 24 Four Books and Five Classics (四书五 经), 225 Four Cardinal Principles (四项基本原 则), 207 Four Cleaning Campaign (四清运动), 180 Four Completed Collections of Books (四库全书), 24–25, 74 four innovations (四大发明), 96 France, 117, 140, 143, 199, 204, 205 frontline cities, 189 Fu Sinian (傅斯年), 13, 174, 222 Fu Zuoyi (傅作义), 171 Fukuzawa, Yukichi (福澤諭吉), 143 Gang of Four (四人帮), 182 Gao Gang-Rao Shushi Clique (高岗-饶 漱石), 179 GDP in Chinese history, 95–96, 118, 127, 129, 158, 233 in the PRC, 1, 162, 189–93, 239 Genghis Khan, 44 gentry/scholar-officials (士大夫), 62, 77, 93, 105 Germany, 40, 42, 117, 143, 166, 177, 192, 213, 214, 217, 223 Gini Coefficient, 191 global nation, 101 globalization, 101, 116, 216 going global strategy, 213 going with the flow (順生), 107 grain trade and ration (统购统销), 236 grain production, 59, 95–96, 127–29, 158, 178, 189, 237 grain shipping (漕运), 108 Grand Unification (大一统), 50, 52, 100, 102–104, 196, 224, 227, 229

Great Britain, 112, 138, 140, 143, 155, 232 Great Cultural Revolution (文化大革 命), 26, 180, 189, 203, 236 Great Divergence, see East-West Divergence Great Famine or Great Leap famine, 120, 180, 200, 202 Great Leap Forward Campaign (大跃 进), 169, 189, 200, 202–203, 206, 236, 237 Great Unity or Grand Harmony (大同), 50–51, 174, 224, see also Grand Unification Great Wall, 46, 104, 118 Greater China, 18, 40, also see Chinese world Greece, 114 Gu Jiegang (顾颉刚), 25, 222 Gu Yanwu (顾炎武), 113 Gu Weijun (顾维钧 Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo), 230 Gu Zhun (顾准), 236 Guang Zhong (管仲), 31 Gui Guzi (鬼谷子 Wang Xu 王诩), 34 Guidelines for Peaceful State Construction (和平建國綱領), 173, 235 Guo Moruo (郭沫若), 174 haijin (海禁 banning maritime contacts), 17, 60, 69, 70, 72, 81, 104, 138, 140 hair or head, 72 hakkō ichiu (八紘一宇), 154 Han (汉) Empire, 10–11, 28, 33, 39, 48–51, 54–55 Han (汉) nation/people, 11, 12, 20, 55, 57, 60, 65–67, 71, 73, 76, 80, 86, 88, 90–91, 94, 103, 105, 117–18, 145, 150, 153–54, 163, 216, 221 Han/Chinese language (汉语), 19, 55, 73, 240, see also Chinese language Han Fei (韩非), 33, 46 Han Wudi (汉武帝), 50–54, 222

Index Hart, Robert (赫德), 157 hedging-engagement, 217 Hegel, Friedrich, 113, 139 hegemonic hierarchy (霸道), 33 Heihe-Tengchong Line (黑河-腾冲), 15 Heilong (Amur) River (黑龙江), 203 Hellenic-Roman world, 16, 31, 33, 44, 55, 115, 221, see also Roman World herding people or herdsman of the people, 46, 124 hidden-rules (潜规则), 110 history, as religion in China, 21–27 Hitler, Adolf, 57, 177, 223 Holy Roman Empire, 57, 97, 228 Hong Kong, 18, 155, 186, 190, 204, 220, 235 Hong Chengchou (洪承畴), 73 Hong Xiuquan (洪秀全), 145 House of Ying (赢氏), 47, 48 Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), 182, 234, 239 Hu Shi (胡适), 25, 143, 152, 174, 222, 231, 240 Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦), 183, 237 Hu Zongnan (胡宗南), 171 Hua Guofeng (华国锋), 181–82, 237 Huang Zongxi (黄宗羲), 50, 66, 100, 112–13, 227 Hui Nation (回 Han Muslims), 111 hukou (户口 household registration), 32, 45, 107, 117, 170, 176, 178 human community of common destiny (人类命运共同体), 210, 212–13, 242 human development index (HDI), 1, 190 human rights deficit, 108 Hume, David, 113 Hundred Schools of Competing Thoughts (百家争鸣), 33, 96, 156 Hundred-day Reform (戊戌变法), 148 hypocrisy, in Chinese politics, 69, 94, 101, 109–11, 130–31, 168

321

immigration in Chinese history, 69, 70, 106, 138 Imperial Examination (科举) System, 62–64, 73, 105, 108, 117, 148 as “the fifth Chinese invention,” 63 imperial minister/general-dream (将相 梦), 105 Inca, 3, 121 income tax, in PRC, 192, 218, 243 Incremental Capital-Output Ratio, 192 India, 1, 17, 18, 114, 190, 191, 197, 225 Indochina (印度支那), 10, 54, 82, 199 industrial revolution, 38, 70, 89, 92, 109, 125, 132, 137, 219, 226 informants, 45, 52, 69, 108, 176, 183, 185–86, 234, 237, 238, 239 innovation in China, 35, 49, 63, 65, 90, 93, 96, 156 lack of, 52, 64, 113, 119, 123, 124–26, 132–34, 219 internal reporting (内参), 185, 238 international terrorism, 216 Islam, 3, 33, 57, 67, 69, 72, 102, 111, 134, 137, 238 Italy, 40, 48, 114, 213 Jian Bozhan (翦伯赞), 174 Jiang Zemin (江泽民), 23, 182 Jap Pirates (倭寇), 70 Japan, Japanese, 1, 10, 12, 15, 20, 30, 40, 52, 60–61, 63, 67–68, 70, 82, 95, 103–104, 118–19, 121, 129–30, 136–37, 140, 142–44, 148, 150, 153–54, 159, 161, 163, 165–67, 170, 172, 176, 189, 190, 192, 204, 214, 217–18, 220, 225, 230–31 Japan Order, 119, 154, 229 Jerusalem, 130 Jews, 42, in China, 111 Jia Yi (贾谊), 50 Jiading Peace (嘉定和议), 85 Jiang Qing (江青), 181–82, 237, 241

322

Index

Jin (晋) Empire, 55–56 Jin (金) Empire, Juchen, 76, 77, 79–81, 85–86, 88, 90, 92 Jin Yuelin (金岳霖), 174 Journey to the West (西游记), 110 Juche (주체) or Kimilsungism, 40 Kaifeng (开封), 80, 95–96 Kalimantan, 106 Kang Youwei (康有为), 50–51, 113 Kang-Yong-Qian (康雍乾) Prosperity, 71, 138 Kangxi (康熙), 71, 73, 127, 138, 225 Kha Khan (Khan of khans), 72 Khrushchev Thaw (Ottepel), 179, 200 King George III, 138 King’s Way or kingship hierarchy (王 道), 33, 211 Kissinger, Henry, 205 Kleptocracy, 5, 220 KMT (Kuomintang, 国民党 Nationalist Party), 136–37, 147, 149–50, 152–55, 159–64, 166, 174–75, 222, 232 Koguryo Kingdom, 59 Konoe, Fumimaro (近衛文麿), 154, 231 Korea, Koreans, 12, 20, 40, 54, 59–62, 65, 68, 72, 84, 141, 174, 181, 190, 192, 199, 203, 220, 241 Korean War, 172, 199, 203, 234, 240, 241 Ku Hung-Ming (辜鸿铭), 110, 143, 228 Kung, H. H. (孔祥熙), 232 Kyoto (京都), 130 Land Reform Campaign (土改), 61, 163, 178, 232, 235–36 Lanfang Republic (蘭芳), 106 Lao She (老舍), 174 Lao Zi (老子), 34, 48 Latin America, 202, 205, 212, 241 leaving Asia going to the West (脫亞 論), 143

legal extraterritoriality (治外法权), 145, 152, 155 Legalism or Legalist School (法家), 19, 33, 39, 43, 45–46, 48, 50, 52–53, 78, 94, 109–10, 119, 169, 187, 223, see also Confucian-Legalism Lenin, Vladimir or Leninism, 7, 33, 144, 150–51, 152, 160, 174, 176, 182, 195, 202, 206, 221, 231, 234, 242 Li Hongzhang (李鸿章), 73, 142, 230 Li Si (李斯), 33, 46, 223 Li Zhi (李贽), 110, 230 Liang Qichao (梁启超), 20, 25, 113, 143, 222, 230 Liang Shiqiu (梁实秋), 174 Liao (辽) Empire or Khitan, 36, 59, 60, 65–66, 76, 79–88, 91, 95, 220, 229 Liao Empress Dowager Xiao (辽萧太 后), 83–84 Liao-Song-Xia world system, 81–86 Liberated Regions (解放区), 170, 175 lie low hiding (韬光养晦) strategy by Deng Xiaoping, 208, 242 Lin Biao (林彪), 26, 179–80, 202, 237 Lin Yutang (林语堂), 107, 110, 174 Lin’an (临安), 80, 95 Lincoln, Abraham, 173 literary inquisition and persecution (文 字狱), 74, 94, 130 Liu Bang (刘邦), 48 Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇), 23, 180, 234, 237, 241 Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波), 143 Liu Zongyuan (柳宗元), 230 local self-rule to direct governance (改土 归流), 72 Locke, John, 113, 215 London, 172 Long March (长征), 164–65, 169 Longxing Peace (隆兴和议), 85 Lu Xun (鲁迅), 152, 230, 231–32 Lu You (陆游), 89

Index Lü Simian (吕思勉), 25, 222 Luoyang (洛阳), 60 Luther, Martin, 113 Macartney, Earl George, 112, 138–39 Macau, 18, 69, 138 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 32, 43, 53, 205 Magna Carta, 97 Manchu, 11–12, 20, 24, 66, 68, 70–73, 81, 90, 118, 135, 137, 139, 141, 142, 148–49, 228, see also Qing Empire Manchukuo (满洲国), 153 Manchuria, 14, 70, 73, 81, 123, 136, 142, 150, 152–53, 155, 161, 164, 176 Mandate of Heaven (天命), 3, 6, 11, 46, 50–51, 65, 76–77, 88–90, 94, 99, 101–102, 104, 112, 118, 125, 151, 159, 168, 174, 177, 211, 215, 224, 231 Mandate of the Nation, 215 Mandate of the People, 6, 51, 159, 167–69, 177, 215, 234 Manichaeism, 102 Mao Anying (毛岸英), 26, 237, 240–41 Mao Dun (茅盾), 174 Mao Zedong (毛泽东), 6–7, 40, 104, 107, 159, 161, 164–85, 189, 196–206, 214, 216, 223, 233, 241 failures and tragedies of, 120, 129, 171, 175, 177–82, 189, 242 fearing and control of history, 22–23, 26, 181, 221 foreign policy, 172, 174, 176, 196–206, 212, 240, 242 his political campaigns, 178–81, 234–35, 236–37, 240–41 life style, 169, 181 mindset, 152, 157, 167–70, 174–75, 177, 181, 231, 233, 234–35 on nuclear war, 201–202 ordering executions, 178–79 succession plans, 181–83, 237, 240–41, 243

323

wordsmith, 50–51, 157–58, 174, 177–81, 187–88, 221 world empire or tianxia ambition, 196–203, 209–10, 230, 232, 239–41 worship of, 22, 182, 233, 237 Mao Zedong Thought, 169–70, 188, 234 Marshall, George, 1, 161, 172, 193 Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, 33, 143, 151–52, 163, 168, 169, 174, 176–77, 181, 195, 202, 234, 242, see also Lenin Massacre of Thessalonica, 58 May Fourth Movement (五四运动), 152 meat-grinder politics, of the CCO’s, 181 Mediterranean World or MediterraneanEuropean World, see EuropeanMediterranean World Meiji Restoration, 12, 121, 143–44, 148 Mencius (孟子), 33, 64, 77, 113, 224, 229, 240 Mercantilism, 208 Mesoamerican, 121 Mesopotamia, 17, 114 Middle East, 67, 82, 115, 125–26 middle-income trap, 218 Ming (明) Empire, 11–12, 17, 35, 36, 39, 53, 66–74, 76–78, 90, 92, 94–95, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106–108, 111–12, 116, 118, 120, 122, 127, 129, 138, 223, 228–29 Ming School (名家), 34 minor officials, runners, staff (胥吏衙 役), 111 Miyazaki, Shijo (宮﨑市定), 92, 225 Mohism (墨家), 34 Mongol, Mongolian, Mongol Empire, 20, 36, 38, 44, 60, 65–68, 71–72, 79, 81–82, 85–86, 90, 92, 98, 100, 117–18, 141, 165, 225 Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, 54, 72, 141, 150, 153, 164

324

Index

Mongolian World (Yuan, Chagatai, Golden Horde, Ilkhanate), 66–67, 71, 89 monopoly, by the state, 25–26, 39–40, 48–49, 55, 61, 67, 102, 107–108, 117, 119, 121, 129, 133–34, 176, 178, 187, 191–92, 196, 229 of banking, 48, 61, 102, 108, 187, 119–92 of grain trade (统购统销), 236 of salt, 48, 61, 102, 108, 224 Montesquieu, Baron de, 108, 113, 139 Mormonism, 102 Moscow, 57, 136–37, 143, 150, 152–54, 161–67, 173–76, 180, 198–205, 207, 231, 240–42 Mr. Democracy Mr. Science (德先生, 赛先生), 152, 231 Muslim, see Islam Muslim Revolt and Uprising, 137 Mussolini, Benito, 41 Mutual Protection of Southeast (东南互 保), 141, 146 Naito, Konan (内藤湖南), 92 Napoleon Bonaparte, 57 Nara (奈良), 130 Nazi Germany, 42, 166, 177, 214 neighborhood (邻里) system, 45, 61, 107, 184 Nestorianism, 102 New China, 28, 136–37, 150, 154, 156, 167, 176, see also PRC and ROC New Policy (新政) of Cixi, 148 New Qing History school, 225 new Warring States Era, 212 New World Order, 65, 81, 82, 87, 91, 160, 200–201, 208 Nian Gengyao (年羹尧), 73 Nian Rebels (捻乱), 137 Nie Gannu (聂绀弩), 174

Nixon, Richard, 69, 106 nomads on Northern Asian Steppes, 17, 49, 54, 66 North Korea, 40, 174, 203, 241 Northern Expedition (北伐), 152 Northern New Army (北洋军), 150 nuclear weapons, 189, 200–201, 240 oecumene (oikouménē, ecumene), 3, 219 officials-standard (官本位), 105, 187 One Belt One Road (一带一路), 213 Open Door Policy, 144, 152 opening policy (开放政策), 207 Opium War (鸦片战争), 230, see also Anglo-Chinese War Orwell, George, 25, 197–98, 223 out-of-Africa theory, 21 Panmunjeom (판문점, 板門店), 172 Papal State, 58 paper currency, 93, 174 parent-official (父母官), 124 Paris Peace Conference, 136 Partocracy, 7 party-state apparatus in PRC, sevenoffices, 185 party’s all-under-heaven (党天下), 178 Pax Romana, 58, 114 Peace of Constance, 97 Peace of Westphalia, 86, 89, see also Westphalia System people’s communes (人民公社), 178 people’s democratic dictatorship (人民民 主专政), 174, 187, 242 people’s war (人民战争), 169, 202 period of strategic opportunity (战略机 遇期), 201 Permanent Court of Arbitration, 219 Persia, 3, 60, 115, 134 PLA (人民解放军 People’s Liberation Army), Red Army, CCP’s military, 1, 152, 160, 163–64, 169–72, 176,

Index 184–85, 188–89, 191–93, 201, 203, 207, 212, 243 its human waves tactics, 169 using POWs, 171–72, 234 Plague, 133 Plato, 215 Polanyi, Karl, 113 polity of gentry class (士大夫政治), 77, 93 Polo, Marco, 67, 225 Pontifical College and College of Augur, 58 Popper, Karl, 100 population, size and changes in Chinese history, 1, 3, 14, 18, 20, 38, 64–65, 71, 76, 94–95, 118–20, 122–24, 126–27, 131–33, 137, 148, 158, 170, 176, 221, 230, 236, 243 Portuguese, 18, 69 Posthumous Name/Title (谥号), 27 power fetish/fetishism, 105, 131, 169, 227, 241 PRC (中华人民共和国 People’s Republic of China), see also CCPPRC as authoritarian/totalitarian state, 40–42 alternative names, 12, 220 death toll for its creation and consolidation, 137, 176, 178–81 health care system, 192, 239 taxation and extraction, 233, 178, 189, 191–93, 199, 201 foreign aid, 241 suboptimal record of economy, 5, 7, 188–91 statistics, 239 Pre-Qin China or pre-Qin era, 4–5, 9, 19, 21, 30–38, 43–45, 47–52, 59, 65–66, 75–77, 83, 87, 91, 95–96, 103, 111, 113, 116, 122, 156, 158, 223–24

325

prefecture-county (郡县) system, 30, 56 premodernity, in China, 99, 200 preserving Chinese essence using Western means (中学为体, 西学为 用), 103, 142–43, 227 primogeniture, 30, 32, 55–56 Prince Gong (恭亲王), 230 princelings (太子党), 215, 237 Protestantism, 102 public’s world (公天下), 101 Quanrong (犬戎), 224 Qian Xuantong (钱玄同), 152, 231 Qian Xueshen (钱学森), 237 Qianlong (乾隆), 24, 71, 73, 112, 138–39 Qin (秦 Chin), kingdom/dynasty/ empire, 6, 9–12, 19, 21, 28, 30–32, 34–35, 39, 44–46, 47 totalitarian polity of, 6, 41–44, 47–50, 52–53 Qin-Han (秦汉) Order or Qin-Han world order, 3, 219, also see China Order Qin-Han (秦汉) polity, 3–7, 11, 39–74, 75, 77–79, 81, 88–89, 91, 93–94, 98–101, 103–107, 109, 111–12, 117–19, 124, 133–34, 136–38, 142–44, 147, 150–51, 153, 155–56, 227, 232 in PRC, 157–61, 167–70, 174–77, 179–93, 198–99, 203–204, 207, 212, 215–18 incompatibility with Westphalia order, 195–97, 199, 209–10, 212–13, 215–18 Qin-Han (秦汉) world empire, 11, 36, 50, 56–57, 64–66, 69, 71, 73, 88, 91, 116, 118–19, 121, 126, 133, 135, 145, 158, 168, 213, also see the China Order Qin puzzle, 47, 50 Qin Shihuang (秦始皇), 16, 32, 44, 46, 48, 105, 177, 196

326

Index

Qing (清) Empire, 10–11, 17, 20, 24, 28, 35–36, 39, 66–69, 71–74, 76, 77–78, 90, 92–95, 98, 100–104, 106–108, 111–14, 116, 120, 122– 23, 125, 127, 129–30, 135–58, 163, 181, 189, 206–207, 212–13, 222, 224–25, 228–29, 230–31, also see Manchu Qu Yuan (屈原), 35 Realism, 2, 211 reallocation of land (均田), 61, 101, 163 Rectification Campaign (整风), 26, 167, 179 rejuvenation of the Chinese nation/ civilization, 112, 113–14, 117–19, 132, 157, 160, 209–14, 216, 232 religion in China, 5, 17, 19–22, 25, 27, 31–32, 34, 50–52, 58, 67, 72, 75, 102, 105, 115, 137, 185, 224 Ren (仁), elite/ethical politics, 91–93, 226, see also ethical politics Renaissance, 70, 89 replacing pole tax with acreage tax (摊 丁入亩), 73 Republican Revolution, 136 Ricci, Matteo (利玛窦) rich people (billionaires) in the PRC, 186–87, 239 Rich State Strong Military (富国强军), 188–93 right morals, cultivate self, and take care of family (正心修身齐家), 53, 224 rise of China, 2, 7, 142, 188–93, 217–18 scenarios of, 216–17 views of, 1–2, 215 ROC (中华民国 Republic of China), 6–7, 18–20, 25–27, 37–38, 50, 71, 90, 118, 136–37, 143–44, 146–67, 169–76, 178–79, 187, 189–90, 199, 205–207, 213, 221–23, 225, 230–35, 240

ROC Constitution (中华民国宪法), 160 ROC Temporary Charter (中华民国临时 约法), 160 Roman Empire, 10, 19, 44, 55, 57–58, 114–17, 134 Roman Order, 114–15, see also Pax Romana Roman World, 33, 55, 58, 114, 115, see also Hellenic World Romance of Three Kingdoms (三国演义), 110 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 160, 170, 173 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 113, 139 rule by law, 59, 78, 93, 187, 223, 239 rule of force, 51 rule of law, 1, 41, 81, 93, 113, 119, 125, 133, 136, 143, 149, 153, 155, 160, 168, 187, 211, 216, 223, 238–39 rule of man, 51, 81, 187 rule the country and pacify the world (治国平天下), 53, 224 ruling crafts (帝王术), 52, 175 Russia, Czarist, 11, 100, 140, 142, 144, 150, 222, 228, 230 Ryu In-sok (유인석, 柳麟錫), 12 Sanxingdui (三星堆), 17, 220–21 School of Agriculture (农家), 34–35 School of Military Thinkers (兵家), 35 School of Mind (心学), 53 School of Principle (理学 NeoConfucianism), 53, 94, 96 School of Ruses and Gaming (权术家), 43, see also Legalism School of Vertical and Horizontal (纵横 家), 34 Secret History of Qing Palace (清宫秘 史), 179 secret police, in China, 69–70, 108, 120, 170, 176, 183–85, 238 Self-Strengthening Movement (洋务运 动), 142 September 11 Attack, 201, 209

Index Seventh Fleet, 199 Shang (殷商) Dynasty, 10–11, 30, 44 Shang Yang (商鞅), 33, 45–46, 52, 178, 223 Shanghai daily (申報), 147 Shanxi merchants (晋商), 108 Shaoxing Peace (绍兴和议), 85 Shen Baozhen (沈葆桢), 230 Shen Congwen (沈从文), 174 Sheng Shicai (盛世才), 162 Sheng Xuanhuai (盛宣怀), 230 Shusun Tong (叔孙通), 50 Sima Qian (司马迁), 24 Singapore, 237 Sino-Franco War, 140 Sino-Japanese War, First (甲午战争), 140, 143, Second, 154, 166 Sisyphus, 126, 132 Sixteen States and South-North Dynasties, 55–56, 122 Sixteen-Words Policy of Mao’s, 234 Smith, Adam, 126, 139 Snow, Edgar, 170, 233 Socialism, 149–50, 160, 187, 208, 210, 234, 242 son of heaven (天子), 21, 30, 32, 44–45, 50–51, 68, 72, 78, 84–86, 94, 99–102, 104–106, 112, 123, 140, 200, 211 Song (宋) Empire or Song Era, 3–4, 6, 11–12, 35–37, 39, 53, 65–69, 75–98, 99–100, 104, 107–108, 112, 116, 118, 121–22, 124–27, 129–30, 147, 158, 216, 222, 225–27 as peak of Chinese civilization, 4, 28, 30, 33, 59, 62, 65, 77–79, 91–98 blunders and destruction of, 66, 76–77, 79, 85, 88–91, 93–94 dismiss of, 65, 90–91, 98, 124 world order of, 76, 80–89, see also Liao-Song-Xia world system Song Huizong (宋徽宗), 77, 226 Song Jiaoren (宋教仁), 151

327

Song Shenzong (宋神宗), 77 Song Zhenzong (宋真宗), 83–84, 87 Southwest Union University (西南聯 大), 156 Soviet Bloc, 40, 176, 198–99, 241 Soviet Union, the former, 1, 20, 27, 42, 136, 150, 152–54, 159–66, 172, 174, 176–77, 179, 182, 185, 198–99, 200–201, 203–206, 208–209, 221–23, 232, 235 spiritual atomic bomb (精神原子弹), 241 Spring and Autumn Annals (春秋), 64, 211 Spring-Autumn (春秋), 30–31 St. Peter’s Cathedral, 130 stagnation, in the Chinese World, 4, 6, 54, 70, 89, 92, 112, 119, 121–27, 129–31, 133–34, 135–36, 139–40, 189, 214, 219, 226–27 Stalin, Joseph, Stalinism, 7, 20, 30, 40, 143, 157–58, 160–61, 163–64, 165, 167, 176–79, 182, 198 Standing Committee of CCP’s Politburo, 182–83 state-capitalism, 5, 208 Stilwell, George, 232 Story of Wu Xun (武训传), 179 Sui (隋) Empire, 12, 57, 64, 76, 222 Sui-Tang (隋唐) empires, 36–37, 39, 57, 59–63, 66–68, 76, 90, 95, 100, 122, 130 Sui Yangdi (隋炀帝), 222 Sun Yat-sen (孙中山), 50, 146, 159, 173 Sun Zi (孙子), 35, 110 Suppressing and Eliminating Counterrevolutionaries Campaign (镇反), 178 Taiping Rebellion (太平), 38, 119, 122, 145–46, 163, 222, 225 Taiwan, 7, 18, 27, 29, 69, 136–37, 141, 150, 155, 165, 175, 199, 223, 233–34, 237, 240

328

Index

Tang (唐) Empire, 11–12, 57, 59–68, 71–73, 76–77, 80–81, 83, 90, 92, 94, 97, 102, 106, 122, 129–30, 147, 212–13, 230, see also Sui-Tang empires Tang Enbo (汤恩伯), 171 Tang Taizong (唐太宗), 63 Tang Zhen (唐甄), 112 Taoism (道家 Daoism), 34, 52, 102, 210 terracotta soldiers, 16, 46 Tetrarchy, 58 The Art of War (孙子兵法), 35, 110 Third World Theory of Mao’s, 207 Thirteen Factories (十三行), 230 thought reform or thought work (思想 改造), 167, 179, 233 three branches six ministries (三省六 部), 61–62 Three Kingdoms (三国), 36, 55, 221 three supremacies (三个至上), 188, 239 Three-Anti and Five-Anti (三反五反), 179 Three Principles of the People (三民主 义), 159, 231–32 Tiananmen Square (天安门), 22, 168, 196 Tiananmen Uprising or June 4th Massacre, 183, 208, 237 tianxia (天下 all under heaven), 3, 5, 7, 11–12, 17, 30, 39, 44, 47–48, 50–52, 56, 58, 65–66, 70, 75, 77, 79, 83, 87–88, 94, 99–101, 104, 106, 112–13, 117–18, 122, 140, 142, 151, 154, 219, 223 in the PRC, 195–204, 209–12, 216 Tianxia Mandate, 7, 51, 77, 79, 88, 94, 101, 104, 112, 118, 159, 195–96, see also Mandate of Heaven tianxia order, 65, 99, see also China Order Tibet, Tibtan, (Xizang, 西藏), 13, 14, 20, 59–60, 65, 67, 71–73, 82–83, 123, 150

Tokugawa Shogunate, 12 total national mobilization (举国体制), 201 totalitarianism, totalitarian state, 2–3, 6, 22, 32, 39–49, 52–54, 59, 62–63, 66, 71, 99, 101, 104–105, 134, 137, 144, 159, 161, 168–71, 177–79, 182, 185, 187, 208, 213, 216, 223, 235 transporting or giving (输), 88 tributary states, 49, 62, 68, 72, 82, 85, 88, 96, 138 tributary system (朝贡体系), 68, 99, 106, 116, 131, 211, 228 Trump, Donald, 186 Turkic, 20, 59–61, 76 Twenty-four Filial Exemplars (二十四 孝), 109 Two Designations (双规), 237 U.N. Security Council, 136, 155, 205, 208 Unification/centralization of the world (天下一统), 30, 32, 44, 52, 121, 159, 216 united front (统一战线), 153, 165–66, 170–71, 176, 197, 209, 234 United League (同盟会), 149 United Nations, 87, 136, 155, 191, 205, 241–42 United States, 2, 61, 115, 141, 143–44, 146–47, 152, 154, 155, 157, 160– 61, 166, 170, 181, 186, 190–92, 211, 216, 231–32, 238–39 as PRC’s financier and helper, 205–207, 242 as PRC’s rival and target, 2, 180, 196, 198–99, 201–202, 204–205, 208–209, 212–13, 217–18, 220, 234, 243 Open Door policy of, 144 role in Chinese Civil War, 153, 170–75, 234 Urban Socialist Reform, 178

Index useful idiots, 206, 242 using barbarians to control barbarians (以夷制夷), 103, 142, 207 Uyghur, 59–61, 73, 82 Vietnam, Vietnamese, 1, 15, 20, 62, 65, 72, 82, 141, 203, 221, 235 Vietnam War, 199, 205 Wang Ching-wei (汪精卫), 154, 231 Wang Fuzhi (王夫之), 112–13 Wang Guowei (王国维), 25, 92, 222 Wang Jiaxiang (王稼祥), 234 Wang Mang (王莽), 54 Wang Ming (王明), 167, 233, 237 Wang Shiwei (王实味), 170 Wang Tao (王韬), 143, 230 Wang Yangming (王阳明), 33, 224 Warlord Era, 151 warlords, in politics, 11, 30, 55–56, 62, 64, 79, 92–93, 150–51, 153, 159, 162 Warring States (战国), 5–6, 10–11, 28, 30–38, 43, 45–46, 55, 96, 122, 140, 151, 212, 223 Washington, 161, 172, 204, 232, 240 Washington, George, 173 Washington Conference, 136, 144, 152 Water Margin (水浒), 110 Way of Yellow Emperor-Lao Zi (黄老之 道), 48 Weber, Max, 22, 52, 70 Wechat (微信), 29 Weibo (微博), 29 Wei Lihuang (卫立煌), 171 Wei Yuan (魏源), 230 Western Depot (西厂), 69 Westernization, 141–43, 228 Westphalia system, 4–5, 7, 87, 89, 113– 17, 121, 125, 135–36, 140–41, 144, 150, 154–55, 158, 160, 175, 188–89, 195, 204–205, 209, 212, 214, 241

329

in China, 28, 32, 65, 81, 87, 89, 98, 116, 122, 223, see also Chanyuan System and pre-Qin de facto, 4, 56, 58, 70, 77, 80, 97, 115, 122, 124 White Lotus Religion (白莲教), 137 world communist revolution, 161, 180, 196, 198, 200, 202, 240 World Dream, 211–12 world empire or “universal empire,” 3, 38, 44, 55, 57–58, 76, 83, 99, 101–102, 106, 114, 122, 134, 177, 216, 224 in the Chinese world, 3, 9, 11–12, 16–17, 19–21, 24, 30, 32, 34–35, 36, 39, 44–52, 55–60, 62–69, 71–77, 87–88, 91–92, 98–99, 103, 112–13, 116, 118–19, 121, 126, 131, 133–35, 137–38, 145, 158, 160, 163, 168, 212–13 world harmony/unity (天下大同), 43, 212, 240, see also great unity world empire or tianxia ambition, of the CCP-PRC, 196–203, 209–10, 212–14 world order, Chinese, 3–6, 9, 32, 38–39, 44, 47, 53, 55, 65, 74, 77, 80–84, 86, 88, 91, 99–100, 122, 133–34, 198, 200–201, 209, 211, 214, 219, see also China Order world order, current/liberal, 4, 115, 197–98, 208, 210, 215 World Revolution, 136, 152, 175, 177, 187, 199–200, 202, 205–10, 241 World Trade Organization (WTO), 208 World War I, 2, 87, 115, 122, 136, 175 World War II, 4, 6, 10, 29, 67, 87, 115, 122, 136–37, 144, 150, 154–56, 159–60, 170–72, 175–76, 197, 217, 222 Wu Sangui (吴三桂), 73 Wu Zetian (武则天), 59 Wuhan Mutiny (武昌起义), 146

330

Index

Xi Jinping (习近平), 23, 26, 135, 168, 182, 210–11, 215, 234, 237, 239, 242–43 Xia (夏) Empire, Tangut nation, 36, 65–66, 80–82, 84–85, 88, 95 Xiang Yu (项羽), 47–48, 117 Xianyang (咸阳), 15, 46, 229 Xiaowen, Emperor of Northern Wei (北 魏孝文帝), 225 Xinjiang (新疆), 20, 71, 111, 123, 136, 150, 153, 165, 220 Xiongnu (匈奴), 49 Xue Fucheng (薛福成), 143, 147, 230 Xun Zi (荀子), 33, 46, 224 Yamaga, Soko (山鹿素行), 12, 220 Yan Fu (严复), 110 Yan’an Rectification Campaign (延安整 风), 179 Yan’an Spirit, Yan’an Model, Yan’an Way (延安精神), 169–70, 234 Yang Chu (杨朱) School, 34 Yang family warriors (杨家将), 91 Yanhuang Chronicle (炎黄春秋), 29, 222 Yanyun or Youyan Sixteen Prefectures (燕云/幽燕十六州), 76, 79–80, 83–85, 90 Yao Wenyuan (姚文元), 237 Yashan Battle (崖山之战), 225 Yellow Emperor (黄帝), 30, 48 Yen Chia-kan (嚴家淦), 237 Yin-yang (阴阳家), 34, 50 youth web civilization volunteers, 238

Yuan (元) Empire, see Mongol Yuan Shikai (袁世凯), 146, 149–50, 155, 159, 181, 231 Yuanming Garden (圆明园), 229 Yue Fei (岳飞), 91, 226 Zeng Guofan (曾国藩), 73, 145, 222, 230 Zhang Ailing (张爱玲), 174 Zhang Guotao (张国焘), 167, 233 Zhang Lu (张鲁), 200 Zhang Qian (张骞), 17 Zhang Shusheng (张树声), 143, 231 Zhang Taiyan (章太炎), 20, 25, 222 Zhang Xueliang (张学良), 165–66 Zhang Yinlin (张荫麟), 25, 222 Zhang Zhidong (张之洞), 227, 230 Zhang Zhizhong (张治中), 171 Zhao Kuangying (赵匡胤), 76 Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳), 26, 237 Zheng He (郑和), 17, 69 zhina (支那), 10, 220 Zhongguo (中国), 10–12, 220, see also China in Chinese and Centralia Zhongnanhai (中南海), 168 Zhou (周) Dynasty, 30–31, 44–45, 59 Zhou Enlai (周恩来), 26, 107, 172–73, 202, 235, 237, 241 Zhu Xi (朱熹), 33, 94, 224–25 Zhuge Liang (诸葛亮), 227 Zoroastrianism, 102 Zunyi (遵义), 165 Zuo Zongtang (左宗棠), 73