The Changing Meanings of the Welfare State: Histories of a Key Concept in the Nordic Countries 9781789201253

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THE CHANGING MEANINGS OF THE WELFARE STATE

The Changing Meanings of the Welfare State Histories of a Key Concept in the Nordic Countries

Edited by

Nils Edling

berghahn NEW YORK • OXFORD www.berghahnbooks.com

First published in 2019 by Berghahn Books www.berghahnbooks.com

© 2019, 2021 Nils Edling First paperback edition published in 2021 All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission of the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Edling, Nils, editor. Title: The Changing Meanings of the Welfare State: Histories of a Key Concept in the Nordic Countries / edited by Nils Edling. Description: First Edition. | New York: Berghahn Books, [2019] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018050560 (print) | LCCN 2018052393 (ebook) | ISBN 9781789201253 (ebook) | ISBN 9781789201246 (hardback: alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Welfare states—Scandinavia. | Scandinavia—Social conditions. | Scandinavia—Social policy. Classification: LCC HV318 (ebook) | LCC HV318 C43 2019 (print) | DDC 361.6/50948—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018050560

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-1-78920-124-6 hardback ISBN 978-1-80073-205-6 paperback ISBN 978-1-78920-125-3 ebook

CON TEN T S

List of Figures Acknowledgements Introduction

vi viii 1

Nils Edling

Chapter 1. Multiple Welfare States – Histories of a Keyword

27

Nils Edling

Chapter 2. The Languages of Welfare in Sweden

76

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Chapter 3. The Concept of ‘Welfare State’ in Danish Public and Political Debates

137

Jørn Henrik Petersen and Klaus Petersen

Chapter 4. The Winding Road of the Norwegian ‘Welfare State’

179

Per Haave

Chapter 5. The Conceptual History of the Welfare State in Finland

225

Pauli Kettunen

Chapter 6. The Evolving Concept of the Welfare State in Icelandic Politics

276

Guðmundur Jónsson

Conclusion

315

Nils Edling

Index

331

FIGURES

2.1 ‘Choose welfare politics’ election stamp from 1936

81

2.2 Welfare terms in the major Swedish newspapers, 1930–2015

89

2.3 The new vocabulary of welfare in the major Swedish newspapers, 1976–2015

102

2.4 Always More, Never Enough, 1994

105

2.5 The Witch-Hunt on Welfare, 1994

105

2.6 ‘And anything else?’, Prime Minister Reinfeldt selling out the welfare society, 2011

109

3.1 ‘It is your money, but it is the government’s hands’, Conservative election poster, 1957

145

3.2 Number of articles in major Danish newspapers using ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare society’, 1990–2014

159

4.1 Arbeiderpartiet’s election poster from 1936

183

4.2 Socialist misgivings about the future of the welfare state, 1976

197

4.3 Arbeiderpartiet’s election poster from 1993

199

4.4 The frequency of the terms ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare society’ in Norwegian newspapers, 1945–2014

202

5.1 and 5.2 ‘Welfare for all’, a Social Democratic election poster, 1936, in Finnish and Swedish

244

5.3 From Poverty to a Welfare State, Jouko Siipi’s book from 1967

250

6.1 ‘Social insurance from cradle to grave’ in Iceland, 1945

283

6.2 Frequency of the terms ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare society’ in Icelandic print media, 1940–2009

286

6.3 ‘The Government has to stop attacking the welfare system’

295

ACKN OWLEDGE M E N T S

This book grew out of the project Nordic Centre of Excellence ‘The Nordic Welfare State – Historical Foundations and Future Challenges’ (NordWel), which was funded by Nordforsk 2007–14. Everything started at a meeting in Berlin in 2010 devoted to ‘the welfare state’, the unknown key concept of the twentieth century. Klaus Petersen and Jørn Henrik Petersen came up with the original proposal to trace and study its history and should be duly credited for sharing the idea. One year later, NordWel staged another mini seminar in Rome, where we continued our lively discussions. The idea to write a book took root, and this edited volume has slowly grown over the years. In December 2013, we held a conference in Stockholm, where our invited commentators Stephan Lessenich, Åsa Lundqvist, Urban Lundberg, Dorottya Szikra and Daniel Wincott did a great job with the early versions of the texts. Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang matched their efforts at the second workshop in Stockholm in February 2016. We would also like to thank the commentators and participants at conferences in Reykjavík, Glasgow, Odense, Tromsö and Vancouver, and our publisher’s anonymous reviewers for many constructive questions and comments. NordWel funded our earlier meetings, and Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, who provided Nils Edling’s research grant (P12-0269), generously co-financed the later ones. Pauli Kettunen’s research has been funded by Academy of Finland, Research Council for Culture and Society, research project ‘Nationalism and Democracy in the Welfare State’. Klaus Petersen’s research has been conducted within the Niels Bohr Project ‘“Uses of literature”: The Social Dimensions of Literature’ (Danish National Research Foundation, project no. 26223).

INTRODUCTIO N Nils Edling

Studying the Welfare State as a Historical Concept There are few words so widely diffused and belonging so naturally to modern political vocabulary as the term ‘welfare’. It also belongs, of course, to those widely used forceful expressions whose lack of conceptual clarity is so marked that they can be defined as slogans. Everyone likes welfare, yet disagreement surges when the character and content of the welfare in question are to be decided. This general disagreement becomes evident in politics, where welfare and its compounds ‘welfare state’, ‘welfare society’, ‘welfare politics’ and ‘welfare policies’ are open to constant reinterpretations. To follow Reinhart Koselleck, the doyen of conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte), terms of this kind ‘combine manifold experiences and expectations in such a way that they become indispensable to any formulation of the most urgent issues of a given time. Thus basic concepts are highly complex; they are always both controversial and contested’.1 They are contested because different political and societal actors invest them with different meanings and promote distinct policies based on their diverging experiences and interests and their competing plans and visions for the future. Put in another way, concepts are not above politics – in the sense that common agreement on definitions is a condition of debate – but subject to politics itself. In this fundamental sense, ‘the welfare state’ and the other welfare compounds constitute highly politicized key concepts of the Western world. They are used in popular, academic and political discourses in many different ways. Their ambiguity and fuzziness is a trademark. The objective of this book is to study the shifting usages and frequently conflicting connotations and meanings attached to ‘the welfare state’ in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The contributions share a common starting point: the welfare state and the other welfare compound concepts are highly important for the analysis of the Nordic coun-

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tries, and these concepts are all historically contingent. This holds for all the countries, although with substantial variations between countries and over time. ‘The welfare state’ is a multilayered concept ripe with ambiguities, and this means that only a historical study can uncover and analyse how it has been used and understood over time. Since the 1940s, ‘the welfare state’ has become a powerful political term as well as a frequently used scholarly concept. In academic texts, a common-sense definition centred on social insurance and social services provided by public agencies dominates. ‘A welfare state is a state that is committed to providing basic economic security for its citizens by protecting them from market risks associated with old age, unemployment, and sickness,’ opens the standard definition.2 It can be traced back to the British social historian Asa Briggs’ classic essay on the history of the welfare state from 1961.3 Whereas Briggs painted a broad canvas and included long-term changes, academic focus is on the present and, among historians, on the period from the late nineteenth century onwards, on the economic and social changes brought about by industrialization and on social insurance as the answer to the social question. German social legislation under Bismarck plays the leading part in most narratives about the emergence of the welfare state.4 In this continuously growing body of literature there exists no agreement about the exact definition of key concept, and this confusion is openly acknowledged: ‘The picture is further complicated by uncertainty over exactly what it is that the “welfare state” (and its cognate terms) connotes.’5 At the same time, the short history of the term is underlined. ‘The welfare state’ is a late-breaking term of British origin, and it belongs to the post-1945 period, it is commonly stated.6 This often repeated statement goes back to Briggs’ opening sentence: ‘The phrase “welfare state” is of recent origin. It was first used to describe Labour Britain after 1945. From Britain the phrase made its way round the world.’7 As Danish historians Jørn Henrik Petersen and Klaus Petersen recently have shown, ‘the welfare state’ is considerably older than the 1940s and its history far more complex than usually stated.8 This means that those who argue that ‘welfare state’ came post festum, as ‘a label trailing the fact’, are incorrect; the term was used well before the 1940s in multiple, hitherto unexplored ways. But as Daniel Rodgers correctly adds, social reform in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century included a wide range of issues, and reformers rarely set up a ‘welfare state’ as the future goal.9 We argue that the widespread confusion surrounding its history – with multiple competing inventors of the term combined with a marked presentism, noticeable in academic texts where a fixed definition is imposed upon past and present societies – increases the need for mapping and analysing the different

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historical layers of usages and meanings. The limited knowledge of the ways ‘the welfare state’ has been used and understood make up a starting point for our studies.10 We see the need to historicize ‘the welfare state’, unpack the unknown history of a modern key concept, and we need to take the concept’s history seriously in order to avoid making the fallacious assumption ‘that the cluster of concepts adhering to the welfare state today can be projected back into history and had the same resonance, meaning and significance to contemporaries as they have today’.11 Consequently, we do not use ‘the welfare state’ as a suprahistorical concept, and from this follows that our objective is not to provide fixed and final definitions.12 That being said, we believe that our studies can help increasing our awareness of the differences between academic, public and political usages and understandings and how they have changed over time. Such an undertaking can make a substantial contribution to the field of welfare state studies in general, and we believe that the Nordic countries – highly developed welfare states – provide excellent cases to study. The special status of the Nordic countries as premium welfare states of the world (this elevated position being warranted or not) makes it even more important to map and analyse the different ways the welfare state has been defined and reinterpreted. Our studies will reveal a high level of contestation and conflict surrounding ‘the welfare state’ also in the Nordic countries. Until recent years, there has been relatively little interest in the systematic study of the language and concepts of social policy and welfare. Even the most ambitious efforts such as the useful handbooks on the welfare state from recent years, with their professed objective to cover all relevant aspects and approaches, devote only superficial attention to language and concepts.13 This lacuna in the constantly growing body of research is surprising – not least in the Nordic countries, where the welfare state has been a central political and scholarly topic for decades now. Our book is related to those recent studies that focus on social policy concepts as important objects of study.14

Our Approach The word ‘welfare’ is of Nordic origin. The Old English wel faran – i.e. getting along and/or doing well – comes from the Old Norse velferð, which translates into welfare in modern English and Wohlfahrt in German. Being an old and reasonably common term found in texts in the Nordic languages from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it has over time acquired multiple connotations and synonyms.15 This multiplicity of us-

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ages and meanings include wellbeing, health, happiness, wealth, justice and peace; ‘welfare’ could refer to everlasting bliss – the aim for all good Christians – as well as temporal, worldly goods such as good health and material prosperity. It would be possible to trace, map and compare the different usages in theological, political and literary discourses and their changes over a longer period of time in the Nordic countries. However, except for a short background on ‘the common good’ in the first chapter, our intention is not to write general histories of ideas about welfare since ancient times. Our take on conceptual history is also fundamentally pragmatic in the sense that we use it primarily as a means to open up and enrich the study of past and present politics. Purposeful usage of political concepts can be studied in different ways, and we see no need to make doctrinaire statements about the one and only correct methodology.16 This openness does not make us unaware of the discursive and communicative characteristics of political language.17 The studies in this book share a pragmatic semasiological approach, which means that we search for the term ‘the welfare state’ and study its changing connotations. A nominalist focus is necessary in order to navigate the endless oceans of sources, and it also immunizes against teleological readings, where our present day understanding is imposed on historical actors and texts.18 But our approach does not exclude the contexts where terms receive their meaning through their usage by different political actors or the broader semantic fields with related concepts, adjectives, metaphors and antagonistic counter-concepts. This means that we try to cover conceptual shifts in politics and include competing terms and concepts in the studies. The conflicting usages and the different layers of meaning – traces of older discourses living on untouched only to be revived, recycled or modified in new situations – are important, as they make up the multilayered historicity of key concepts. In our contributions, sensitive to the national contexts and histories, we try to study the conflicting ways in which ‘the welfare state’ has been put into purposeful linguistic usage over time. Focus is mainly on the period from the 1930s–40s up to the present, with short introductions that cover the preceding decades. How was the term used and defined? Who used it and with what objectives? When did it come into circulation? How important has it been in relation to other political concepts? How has usage and understanding changed over time? Was ‘the welfare state’ a description of the contemporary state, a concept encapsulating historical experiences, or a future-oriented political objective, a concept filled with expectations and promises? These basic questions concern the politicization, ideologization and temporalization of a concept, the pro-

INTRODUCTION

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cesses where ‘the welfare state’ became an object of contest between different societal and political actors, where it was incorporated into ideologies and programmes and forged expectations directing them toward an open-ended, potentially better future.19 The questions are all about forms of usage, about agents, arguments, positions and contestations in the historical processes where ‘the welfare state’ became a key concept in social policy and political discourse in general. The relations between concept formation and social reforms are important in our studies. Or put more directly, we study the role of concept of the welfare state in the formation of the systems of social security and services that are described as ‘the welfare state’. How important has it been in relation to other competing concepts? How has it been used as a tool and weapon in the different national discourses and debates? As will become clear, critique and opposition made up key elements of the story at least in Sweden, Denmark and Norway, where debates about ‘the welfare state’ took off in the 1930s and 1940s–50s respectively. In Finland and Iceland, the concept of the welfare state was largely absent until the last few decades, and these differences propose questions about periodization, about conceptual change in relation to the changing situation within each country and in relation to larger historical processes such as the Great Depression, the Cold War, the end of the ‘Golden Age of Welfare’ in the 1970s and the increased importance of European integration.20 This means that national experiences and histories open for variations in time and space. Our focus is on central political actors – experts and opinion moulders on the national level, both collective and individual – such as the political parties and their leading representatives, political economists and social policy specialists, church leaders and newspaper editors. We draw on an extensive number and variety of printed sources: dictionaries and encyclopaedia, central political texts (party programmes, political treatises/declarations and election manifestos), key texts in social reform/ social policies, handbooks on social policy and material from public debates (newspapers and journals). However, the contributions will not be uniform in this respect, as the availability of sources varies between the countries. Our sources reflect their period of origin and are gendered that way; for many decades, men completely dominated politics, public life and scholarly discourses in all the Nordic countries. Nowadays, the Nordic countries are well known for taking gender equality seriously, but their national histories of welfare discourse are, all the same, predominantly male. In addition, national minorities, such as the Sami and the Inuit, and semi-independent regions like the Faroes and Aland are largely left out of the narratives.

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The Nordic Countries as Welfare States Historically speaking, the Nordic region can be divided into a western half, comprising Denmark and Norway, and an eastern half with Sweden and Finland. Before gaining full sovereignty in 1905, Norway was united with Denmark from the fourteenth century to 1814 and then partner in the union with Sweden for the following ninety years. Finland made up the eastern part of the Swedish realm up to 1809 and then became an autonomic grand duchy of the Russian empire until independence in 1917, followed by the Civil War between ‘Reds’ and ‘Whites’, a short class-based conflict with long-lasting effects. The outlier Iceland, through history linked to Norway and later Denmark, gained full independence in 1944. The Nordic countries occupy a privileged position in international political and academic discourses on welfare. The Nordic or Scandinavian welfare states make up a well-established model, and there would seem to be widespread agreement that the Nordic welfare state is something special. They are, arguably, the most admired welfare states and figure prominently as examples to be followed by other countries. As noted in the literature, texts about the Nordic model tend to have strong prescriptive overtones.21 Or, when viewed with different eyes, the Nordic societies set the warning example to be avoided at all costs. Nordic governments of today continue to make strong claims about the special qualities of their welfare model, an obvious case of nation-branding.22 Current self-understanding in the mainland Nordic countries is also impregnated with welfare – that is, ‘the welfare state’ is included in popular descriptions of the country. Differently put, inhabitants of the Nordic countries often identify their own societies as welfare states, and they do it with much pride but not without reservations.23 The idea of some kind of common Nordic welfare model – despite the national differences – can be traced back to the interwar period, and the positive images promoted individually and collectively by the Nordic countries to an international audience have since then been amplified and stereotyped in multiple ways by foreign visitors and distant observers.24 Although the Scandinavians countries were no utopias or social paradises, there was little doubt, declared admiringly the well-known American journalist William Shirer in 1955, that they had done more than anyone else to meet the uncertainties of the modern world through ‘the creation of the ‘welfare state’. According to his not at all unusual judgement, the Nordic countries made up a special case.25 Some historians even talk about notions of a Nordic Sonderweg, ‘a specific egalitarian social democratic community of destiny’ in the 1950s and 1960s, boosted by the seemingly limitless growth of welfare and contrasted with con-

INTRODUCTION

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servative, Catholic continental Europe.26 It is safe to say that a more or less focused image of Nordic specificity existed well before sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen introduced his now classic welfare state regime typology and reinforced the model status in the 1990s. He used ‘socialdemocratic’ and ‘Scandinavian’ regime as synonyms, and one can argue that his general understanding of ‘the welfare state’ draws heavily on the Nordic countries.27 It seems that this distinctive model has survived as the least controversial of the three regimes in the many academic texts, published since 1990, devoted to assessing and modifying the typology.28 Usually, texts about typical Nordic communalities discuss Denmark, Norway and, above all, Sweden, whereas Finland and Iceland, if at all included, are treated as diverging cases. Scholars from the two latter countries tend to support such interpretations.29 This opens for the question of how ‘the welfare state’ has been understood in these different national contexts and how references to a special Nordic understanding of welfare were played out in the different domestic debates. In this way, we try to offer a counterweight to the more or less distinctive Swedocentrism found in international studies of Scandinavia and to the focus on the English language in discussions of history of social policy language in general.30 Furthermore, stereotypes abound in academic, political and popular discourses about Nordic welfare. Above all, the notion of inseparable ties between the Social Democratic labour movement and comprehensive welfare policies seems to live a life of its own. The Social Democratic parties have certainly played a leading role in Nordic politics, but it was only during shorter periods in Norway and Sweden in the 1950s and 1960s that the Social Democrats obtained a majority of their own. Danish, Finnish and Icelandic political patterns have always been more complex.31 In the 2010 and 2014 elections, the Swedish Social Democrats gained slightly more than 30 per cent of the votes, a major drop from the 45 per cent they were accustomed to in the 1970s and 1980s and earlier. Their Norwegian and Danish counterparts have seen similar decreases: the Norwegian Social Democrats have swung between 31 and 24 per cent in the elections since 1989, and the Danish party won 26 per cent in the election in 2015, a good result it was said but a still considerable drop over the last decades. Still, the longevity of this notion of ‘social democratic welfare states’ deserves special attention, and we include the open question of how the Social Democrats in the different Nordic countries have understood and made use of ‘the welfare state’. We also ask how the meanings and connotations have changed during the last few decades when their dominance has been challenged. Related to the idea of the ‘social democratic welfare states’ is the notion of the Nordic countries as typical consensual democracies where

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harmonious social relations produce a comparatively low level of political conflicts. ‘Consensus’ has been understood in different ways: corporatist interest organizations taking an active part in public policymaking, minority governments seeking broad compromises or, seen in the long-term perspective, a distinctive political culture rooted in reasonably egalitarian peasant communities.32 The latter idea seems to be particularly strong in Sweden. However, as British historian Mary Hilson notes, there was nothing inevitable about the Scandinavian transition to democracy, and the notion of an unbroken link between early modern parish assemblies and ‘consensual democracies’ of the present entails a teleological view of history. As she argues, the progressive development path of the five peripheral Northern European countries was not historically predetermined.33

The Nordic Setting As the notion of a common model of social policy makes clear, Norden, the common name for the five Nordic countries, seems to be something more than a geographical region in Northern Europe. The idea of Nordic communalities, of historical connections and similarities building unique ties and a special Nordicness, has many proponents, not least among politicians. Nordic cooperation is a reality surrounded by celebratory rhetoric.34 There are manifest results, such as the monetary union between Denmark, Norway and Sweden 1873–1924. But other efforts to establish grander schemes of cooperation, such Nordic defence and economic unions, have failed; Denmark, Norway and Iceland are members of NATO, and Denmark, Finland and Sweden have joined the European Union. All the same, different forms of both formal and informal exchange and competition have been doing quite well over time. In the field of social and economic policies, Norden is not just a setting for cooperation but also a context for comparison between the countries and, sometimes, for a ‘we-are-lagging-behind-critique’ within the individual countries. In this way, the Nordic context has functioned as a model of reference, a framework for competition and the framing of best practices within specific policy areas. Denmark had the most advanced social legislation up to the 1930s, when Sweden took over the leading role. In Finland, Sweden has customarily filled this role as an example.35 During the last decades of the nineteenth century, platforms for intraNordic exchange were formed with the recurring meetings for economists from 1863, doctors 1870, jurists (lawyers) 1872 and statisticians 1889, followed by many other professions and branches with their Nordic associations, meetings and journals.36 The nascent labour organizations

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staged their Nordic first congress 1886, and employers followed suite with their meetings starting in 1902, and on the government level, senior officials and experts convened regularly from 1907 to discuss different social insurance issues. The Social Democratic labour movements consolidated their cooperation in the 1930s with SAMAK, the Co-operation Committee of the Nordic Social Democratic parties and Trade Union Confederations, with its series of conferences and publications. SAMAK, a platform for meetings and personal contacts, is a good example of the longevity of formalized, yet informal, intra-Nordic exchange under changing historical circumstances.37 At the official level, more formalized cooperation social policy meetings were organized from 1919, and in the wake of World War II the formal agreements on movement between the different national social security systems were created. The de-bordering of social security legislations accompanied the creation of a common Nordic labour market with intra-Nordic freedom of movement.38 In 1952, the Nordic Council, Nordiska Rådet, was formed as the official inter-parliamentary body for cooperation, taking over from the older existing official and informal networks. The five governments set up the Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordiska Ministerrådet, in 1971. As noted in the literature, Nordic cooperation tends to be ‘based on the principle of the common lowest denominator’ whereas European cooperation from the outset was constructed with strong institutions and elements of supranational organization.39 In comparison, cooperation in the voluntary sector seems to be a success, and initiatives within the social and cultural fields have done considerably better than, e.g., proposals for organized economic cooperation. The multiple connections open up for general questions about the significance of transfer and translation, emulation and competition in the conceptual history of the welfare state in the Nordic countries. Of course, the settings for exchange are much larger than the Nordic region; international organizations, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union, are central innovators and regulators in this respect, and the significance of the EU level has grown continuously since the 1990s.40 We try to be attentive to the many links between the countries and to the processes of diffusion and emulation, adaption or rejection. However, the chapters are not designed as transnational conceptual histories, and the reason for this is both simple and important: ‘National political systems remain the field in which political conflicts are resolved.’41 Certain concepts travel easily and are translated and accommodated in different linguistic and political settings and ‘the welfare state’ is definitely a concept of that kind, a universalized concept of the

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modern world. This is especially true of the postwar concept of ‘the welfare state’ in its Anglo-American version, but the same can be said about the older German conceptual inventions Sozialpolitik and Wohlfahrtsstaat. As Finnish historian Henrik Stenius points out, the modern key concepts were European, and modernization in the Nordic countries included the introduction of a new conceptual universe with concepts and discourses from the core of Europe.42 Transfer and appropriation were no doubt vitally important processes, but our point is, nonetheless, that the concrete conceptual interpretations are made by actors who are situated in particular domestic contexts, and we need to start by studying them. This decides our primary focus on the national settings in our five case studies.

State and Society in the Nordic Countries The Reformation in the sixteenth century made the church an integrated part of the emerging state. At the local level the parish priests served both the state administration and the church. The local priests were responsible for their parishioners – for socializing and disciplining them through house tables and catechization. Subsequently, schooling, poor relief, censuses and inoculations became tasks for the priests and parishes. Many scholars have stressed the ideological and institutional significance of this intertwined state-church partnership over many centuries for the twentieth century welfare state developments.43 Fewer have argued that modern welfare rights negate the authoritarian Lutheran heritage. Obviously, the church has been changing over time, and there are substantial differences between the Nordic countries. A general question for the following chapters concerns the relations between organized religion and ‘the welfare state’.44 In addition to the Lutheran hegemony, linguistic similarities – Danish, Norwegian and Swedish are closely related, and Finland, with Finnish and Swedish as official languages, has a small Swedish-speaking population – strengthen the cultural communalities. The societies also show a relatively high degree of ethnic homogeneity with small historically rooted minorities, such as the Inuit people of Greenland and the Sami of northern Finland, Norway and Sweden. Immigration has changed the complexion of the population in all the countries; Sweden has the highest share of foreign-born inhabitants at about 18 per cent and Finland the lowest share at 6 per cent of the total population. In Denmark the figure was 11 per cent at the beginning of 2016; in Iceland 9.6 per cent and in Norway ca 14 per cent.45 Obviously, migration and integration are

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nowadays central policy areas, and new anti-immigration parties have changed the political landscape significantly. Globalization, migration and EU membership, which Denmark, Finland and Sweden hold, are contested issues in all countries. These changes have been described as a normalization of a kind, a Europeanization of values and attitudes, and they highlight the notions of the generous welfare programmes as closed national projects.46 The Nordic conceptual universe includes a weak distinction between state and society. In the conceptualization of social problems and solutions, the concept of society (samhälle in Swedish, samfund in Danish, samfunn in Norwegian, samfélag in Icelandic, yhteiskunta in Finnish) is assigned a crucial role. ‘State’ and ‘society’ were and are frequently used interchangeably; voters and politicians often talk about the duty of society to address this or that particular issue with new policies and invest society with public authority.47 Different explanations for this distinctive trait, usually centred on the Swedish case, have been forwarded. One argues that the development of the Swedish term samhälle (society) to refer to the state derives from the tradition of local self-government among the free-holding farmers. This egalitarian political culture, claimed to be reminiscent of the classical polis, constituted a local public sphere, a samhälle. The term then referentially expanded to include larger political units, what was becoming called the nation and, later, the modern state.48 Supplementary interpretations stress the pivotal importance of the popular movements of the nineteenth century – the temperance, revivalist and labour movements – for fostering a democratic, corporative regime based on cooperation between civil society and the state. In this way, a ‘Lutheran peasant Enlightenment’ is said to make up the historical roots of the modern democratic Nordic societies, and the conflation of state and society grew out of this democratic culture.49 As Pauli Kettunen rightly notes, this line of reasoning exaggerates the egalitarian character of past societies, and it overlooks the conceptual legacies. Nordic political languages have retained a central element in pre-nineteenthcentury political thinking, where ‘society’ and ‘state’ were overlapping; both could be used as vernacular translations of civitas and respublica and both referred to the political community as a totality. In this sense, the Nordic languages have conserved the old unity of state and society to a greater extent than other Western languages.50 It is therefore safe to say that the relations between ‘society’ and ‘state’ have more complex historical roots than has been argued in the ‘society-from-below perspective’. By studying the usages and meanings of state and society in relation to welfare in our different national contexts, we try to make sense of the intricate relations and conflations in the political discourses.

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The Outline of the Book The first chapter ‘Multiple Welfare States’ surveys the history of the different German state concepts of the nineteenth and early twentieth century and their shifting usages. It includes an overview of related developments in the United States and some scattered examples from Britain as well. The goal is to map the new concepts and ideas that were invented abroad and later imported, translated and introduced in the different Nordic countries ca 1870–1940, the period of the social question and liberal social reform. The subsequent chapters trace the history of ‘the welfare state’ in each country. They are presented in the conventional order, starting with Sweden followed by Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland. This is not surrender to the conventional Swedo-centrism of contemporary social science. Instead, we have selected this order because it reflects an implicit and over time seemingly stable Nordic hierarchy of a kind.51 The old kingdoms Sweden and Denmark – arch-enemies for several hundred years – constituted the centre, surrounded by the three younger independent states. In addition, ‘the welfare state’ premiered in public discourse earlier in Sweden than in the other countries. This made Sweden a possible point of reference for the neighbours. The chapters are structured along similar lines with a common time frame and with the searchlight on the same type of actors, arenas and discourses in each country, but they differ in some respects in order to cater for national peculiarities. The short conclusion summarizes the communalities and differences between the Nordic countries. It also touches upon the current situation and the challenges posed by the European Union and migration to national conceptualizations of welfare. Nils Edling is Reader in History, Department of History, Stockholm University. He is currently writing a book on welfare as a key concept in Swedish politics with the working title Kampen om välfärdsstaten. Earlier publications on this topic include the chapter on Denmark and Sweden, co-authored by Klaus Petersen and Jørn Henrik Petersen, in Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language (Policy Press, 2014).

NOTES 1. Reinhart Koselleck, ‘A Response to Comments on Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe’, in Hartmut Lehmann and Melvin Richter (eds), The Meaning of His-

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9. 10.

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torical Terms and Concepts: New Studies on Begriffsgeschichte (Washington DC: German Historical Institute, 1996), 64. For his own essays, Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). For introductions, overviews and reappraisals of Koselleck’s oeuvre and Begriffsgeschichte in general, Melvin Richter, The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Niklas Olsen, History in the Plural: An Introduction to the Work of Reinhart Koselleck (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012); Willibald Steinmetz, Michael Freeden and Javier Fernández-Sebastián (eds), Conceptual History in the European Space (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017). Margaret Weir, ‘Welfare State’, International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, 26 vols (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), vol. 24, 16432. Asa Briggs, ‘The Welfare State in Historical Perspective’, European Journal of Sociology/Archives Européennes de Sociologie 2(2) (1961), 221–58. A few examples will suffice, Gaston V. Rimlinger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1971), ch. 4; Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State: The New Political Economy of Welfare, 2nd ed. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998) ch. 4; Stein Kuhnle and Anne Sander, ‘The Emergence of the Western Welfare State’, in Francis G. Castles et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 61–80. Christopher Pierson and Matthieu Leimgruber, ‘Intellectual Roots’, in Castles et al., Oxford Handbook, 32; cf. Michael Hill, ‘What is a Welfare State?’, in Bent Greve (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 11–19. Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ‘The Historical Core and Changing Boundaries of the Welfare State’, in Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer (eds), The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981), 17–22; Weir, ‘Welfare State’, 16432; Pierson and Leimgruber, ‘Intellectual Roots’, 32; Mary Daly, Welfare, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 84–85. Briggs, ‘The Welfare State’, 221. Klaus Petersen and Jørn Henrik Petersen, ‘Confusion and Divergence: Origins and Meanings of the Term “Welfare State” in Germany and Britain, 1840–1940’, Journal of European Social Policy 23(1) (2013), 37–51. Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in the Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998), 28. See Rodney Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 9: ‘There is no agreement amongst historians and social scientists over when the first welfare states were established or what the term actually means.’

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11. Daniel Wincott, ‘Original and Imitated or Elusive and Limited? A Genealogy of the British Welfare State’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 127–28. See also Jens Alber, ‘Continuities and Changes in the Idea of the Welfare State’, Politics & Society 16(4) (1988), 451–68; John Veit-Wilson, ‘States of Welfare: A Conceptual Challenge’, Social Policy & Administration 34(1) (2000), 1–25; Charles Atherton, ‘Welfare States: A Response to J. Veit-Wilson’, Social Policy & Administration 36(3) (2002), 306–11; John Veit-Wilson, ‘States of Welfare: A Response to Charles Atherton’, Social Policy & Administration 36(3) (2002), 312–17; Daniel Wincott, ‘Slippery Concepts, Shifting Context: (National) States and Welfare in the Veit-Wilson/Atherton Debate’, Social Policy & Administration 37(3) (2003), 305–15; Daniel Wincott, ‘Images of Welfare in Law and Society: The British Welfare State in a Comparative Perspective’, Journal of Law and Society 38(3) (2011), 343–75; Daniel Wincott, ‘The (Golden) Age of the Welfare State: Interrogating a Conventional Wisdom’, Public Administration 91(4) (2013), 806–22. 12. The Historical Dictionary of the Welfare State falls completely short in this respect with its marked presentism. According to its timeline – ‘the major core dates and events for development of the welfare state’ – the welfare state can be traced back to the sixth century BC Greece, Bent Greve, Historical Dictionary of the Welfare State, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), XVII. Its introduction (page 1) reiterates the erroneous statement that the term ‘the welfare state’ is new, dating from the 1930s and 1940s. 13. Francis G. Castles et al., ‘Introduction’, in Castles et al., Oxford Handbook, 1–2. 14. Central stands the volume on the languages of social policies, Béland and Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language. See also, Wincott, ‘Slippery Concepts’; Wincott, ‘Images of Welfare’; Daniel Béland, ‘The Politics of Social Policy Language’, Social Policy & Administration 45(1) (2011), 1–18; Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’; Stephan Lessenich (ed.), Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Grundbegriffe: Historische und aktuelle Diskurse (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2003); Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, Thinking about Social Policy: The German Tradition (Berlin: Springer, 2013). 15. Terry F. Hoad (ed.), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1699; Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, 2nd ed. (London: Fontana Press, 1983), 332–33; Mohammed Rassem, ‘Wohlfahrt, Wohltat, Wohltätigkeit, Caritas’, in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta) vol. 7 (1992), 609; ‘velferð’, in J. Fritzners Ordbok; ‘välfärdh’, in Fornsvensk Lexikalisk Databas; ‘vælfærth’, in Gammeldansk Ordbog. 16. Henk te Velde, ‘The Opening Up of Political History’, in Willibald Steinmetz, Ingrid Gilcher-Holthey and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (eds), Writing Political His-

INTRODUCTION

17.

18.

19. 20.

21. 22.

23.

15

tory Today (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 2013), 383–95. For different approaches, Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson (eds), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), chs. 1–3; Willibald Steinmetz, ‘New Perspectives on the Study of Language and Power in the Short Twentieth Century’, in Steinmetz (ed.), Political Languages in the Age of Extremes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3–51; Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen, ‘Introduction: Social Policy Concepts and Language’, in Béland and Petersen (eds), Analysing, 1–11; Willibald Steinmetz and Michael Freeden, ‘Conceptual History: Challenges, Conundrums, Complexities’, in Steinmetz, Freeden and Fernández-Sebastián, Conceptual History, 1–46. On the numerous theoretical and methodological issues involved, see e.g. Richter, History; Lehmann and Richter, Meaning; Freeden, Ideologies, ch. 3; Hans Erich Bödeker, ‘Begriffsgeschichte as the History of Theory: The History of Theory as Begriffsgeschichte’, in Javier Fernández Sebastián (ed.), Political Concepts and Time: New Approaches to Conceptual History (Santander: Cantabria University Press, 2011), 19–44; Peter de Bolla, The Architecture of Concepts: The Historical Formation of Human Rights (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), ch. 1; Jan-Werner Müller, ‘On Conceptual History’, in Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (eds), Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 74–93; Steinmetz and Freeden, ‘Conceptual History’. As Steinmetz puts it: ‘Even the most elaborate forms of discourse analysis have to start from certain instances in the continuous flow of human communication. I contend that starting from the uses of a particular concept and then follow its trajectory and semantic situatedness through a variety of communicative settings may often produce more meaningful results in a reasonable amount of time than many variants of discourse analysis currently on offer.’ Willibald Steinmetz, ‘Some Thoughts on a History of TwentiethCentury German Basic Concepts’, Contributions to the History of Concepts 7(1) (2012), 89. See Koselleck, Futures Past, esp. chs. 5 and 13. Niels Finn Christiansen and Pirjo Markkola, ‘Introduction’, in Niels Finn Christiansen et al. (eds), The Nordic Model of Welfare: A Historical Reappraisal (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2005), 21–25. Mikko Kautto, ‘The Nordic Countries’, in Castles et al., Oxford Handbook, 586–600. For strong statements about Nordic values and cooperation, see The Nordic Council, ‘10 Facts about the Nordic Region and Nordic Co-operation and Social Policy and Welfare’. See, ‘Welfare Attitudes in Europe: Topline Results from Round 4 of the European Social Survey’, European Social Survey Topline Results series 2, 2012. For analyses of the complex relations between social stratifications, risks

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24.

25. 26.

27.

28. 29.

30.

31.

32.

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and welfare attitudes, Stefan Svallfors (ed.), Contested Welfare States: Welfare Attitudes in Europe and Beyond (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). Kazimierz Musiał, Roots of the Scandinavian Model: Images of Progress in the Era of Modernisation (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002); Carl Marklund, ‘The Social Laboratory, the Middle Way and the Swedish Model: Three Frames for the Image of Sweden’, Scandinavian Journal of History 34(3) (2009), 264–85; Carl Marklund and Klaus Petersen, ‘Return to Sender – American Images of the Nordic Welfare States and Nordic Welfare State Branding’, European Journal of Scandinavian Studies 43(2) (2013), 245–57; Peter Stadius, ‘Happy Countries: Appraisals of Interwar Nordic Societies’, in Jonas Harvard and Peter Stadius (eds), Communicating the North: Media Structures and Images in the Making of the Nordic Region (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013), 241–62. William L. Shirer, The Challenge of Scandinavia: Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland in Our Time (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1955), 5. Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth, ‘Introduction: The Cultural Construction of Norden’, in Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth (eds), The Cultural Construction of Norden (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press 1997) 20. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). His social democratic regime includes Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, not Iceland. For an analysis of his use of ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare regime’, Daniel Wincott, ‘Reassessing the Social Foundations of Welfare (State) Regimes’, New Political Economy 6(3) (2001), 409–25. Wil A. Arts and John Gelissen, ‘Models of the Welfare State’, in Castles et al., Oxford Handbook, 569–85. Pauli Kettunen, ‘The Nordic Welfare State in Finland’, Scandinavian Journal of History 26(3) (2001), 225–47; Risto Alapuro, ‘Nordic and Finnish Modernities’, in Jóhann Páll Árnason and Björn Wittrock (eds), Nordic Paths to Modernity (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 191–206; Jóhann Páll Árnason, ‘Icelandic Anomalies’, in Árnason and Wittrock, Nordic Paths, 229–50; Gudmundur Jónsson, ‘Iceland and the Nordic Model of Consensus Democracy’, Scandinavian Journal of History 39(4) (2014), 510–28. E.g. Evelyn Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001), where Sweden occupies two thirds of the pages devoted to the Nordic welfare states and the Nordic Social Democratic welfare states, 117–44, 241–65. For useful introductions, Mary Hilson, The Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945 (London: Reaktion Books, 2008); Niels Finn Christiansen and Klaus Petersen, ‘Preface. The Nordic Welfare States: A Historical Reappraisal’, Scandinavian Journal of History 26(3) (2001), 153–56; Christiansen and Markkola, ‘Introduction’. David Arter, Scandinavian Politics Today, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 151–69; Hilson, Nordic Model, 25–55; Jónsson, ‘Iceland’.

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33. Hilson, Nordic Model, 33–37. 34. For an overview and discussion of the current state of Nordic cooperation, see the contributions in Johan Strang (ed.), Nordic Cooperation: A European Region in Transition (London: Routledge, 2016). See also, Frantz Wendt, Cooperation in the Nordic Countries: Achievements and Obstacles (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell and the Nordic Council, 1981); Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang, ‘Introduction: “Nordic Democracy” in a World of Tensions’, in Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang (eds), Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2010), 9–36; Ruth Hemstad, ‘Scandinavianism, Nordic Co-operation and “Nordic Democracy”’, in Kurunmäki and Strang, Rhetorics, 179–93. 35. Pauli Kettunen, ‘The Power of International Comparisons – A Perspective on the Making and Challenging of the Nordic Welfare State’, in Christiansen et al., Nordic Model, 31–66, Klaus Petersen, ‘Constructing Nordic Welfare? Nordic Social Political Cooperation’, in Christiansen et al., Nordic Model, 89–93; Pauli Kettunen, ‘The Transnational Construction of National Challenges: The Ambiguous Nordic Model of Welfare and Competitiveness’, in Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen (eds), Beyond Welfare State Model: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 16–40; for details, Lauri Karvonen, ‘Med vårt västra grannland som förebild’: En undersökning av policydiffusion från Sverige till Finland (Turku: Åbo Akademi, 1981). 36. Ruth Hemstad, Fra Indian summer til nordisk vinter: Skandinavisk samarbeid, skandinavisme og unionsøpplosningen (Oslo: Universitetet i Oslo, 2008), appendices list all meetings 1839–1914. 37. Urban Lundberg, ‘A Leap in the Dark: From a Large Actor to a Large Area Approach: The Joint Committee of the Nordic Social Democratic Labour Movement and the Crisis of the Nordic Model’, in Christiansen et al., Nordic Model, 269–72; Kersti Blidberg, Splittrad gemenskap: Kontakter och samarbete inom nordisk socialdemokratisk arbetarrörelse 1931–1945 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1984). 38. Petersen, ‘Constructing’, 67–98; Klaus Petersen, ‘National, Nordic and TransNordic: Transnational Perspectives on the History of the Nordic Welfare States’, in Kettunen and Petersen, Beyond, 41–64. 39. Thorsten Borring Olesen and Johan Strang, ‘The European Challenge to Nordic Institutional Cooperation: Past, Present and Future’, in Strang, Nordic, 29. 40. See Jean-Claude Barbier, ‘Languages of “Social Policy” at “the EU Level”’, in Béland and Petersen, Analysing, 59–80; Rianne Mahon, ‘The OECD’s Search for a New Social Policy Language: From Welfare State to Active Society’, in Béland and Petersen, Analysing, 81–100; Antje Vetterlein, ‘The Discursive Power of International Organizations: Social Policy Language and Concepts in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’, 101–26, all three chapters in Béland and Petersen, Analysing. For Norden, Olesen and Strang,

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41. 42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

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‘The European Challenge’, 27–47; Pauli Kettunen, ‘The ILO as a Forum for Developing and Demonstrating a Nordic Model’, in Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux (eds), Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond (Basingstoke and Geneva: Palgrave Macmillan and ILO, 2013), 210–30. Richard Rose, ‘Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis’, Political Studies 39(3) 1991, 460. Henrik Stenius, ‘A Nordic Conceptual Universe’, in Heidi Haggrén, Johanna Rainio-Niemi and Jussi Vauhkonen (eds), Multi-layered Historicity of the Present: Approaches to Social Science History (Helsinki: Helsingin Yliopisto, 2013), 93. For an overview Pirjo Markkola, ‘The Lutheran Welfare States’, in Kettunen and Petersen, Beyond, 102–18. Bo Stråth, ‘The Normative Foundations of the Scandinavian Welfare States in Historical Perspective’, in Nanna Kildal and Stein Kuhnle, The Normative Foundations of the Welfare State: The Nordic Experience (London: Routledge, 2005), 43–46; Tim Knudsen, ‘Tilblivelsen av den universalistiske velfærdsstat’, in Tim Knudsen (ed.), Den nordiske protestantisme og velfærdsstaten (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2000), 20–64. See also, Sigrun Kahl, ‘The Religious Roots of Modern Poverty Policy: Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed Protestant Traditions Compared’, European Journal of Sociology 46(1) 2005, 91–126. See, Aud Tønnesen, “. . . et trygt og godt hjem for alle”? Kirkeleders kritikk av velferdsstaten etter 1945 (Trondheim: Tapir, 2000); Nils Gunder Hansen, Jørn Henrik Petersen and Klaus Petersen (eds), I himlen således også på jorden? Danske kirkefolk om velfærdsstaten og det moderne samfund (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2010); Markkola, ‘Lutheran Welfare’; Pirjo Markkola and Ingela Naumann, ‘Lutheranism and the Nordic Welfare States in Comparison’, Journal of Church and State 56(1) (2014), 1–12; Jørn Henrik Petersen, Fra Luther til konkurrencestaten (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2016), esp. ch. 7. The historical research on church-welfare state relations is considerably stronger in Denmark, Finland and Norway than in Sweden. This will show in the different country studies. For Denmark, Finland and Sweden, ‘Foreign-Born Population’, table 4 Eurostat data 1 January 2016. Retrieved 12 June 2017 from http://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_ statistics#Migrant_population. For Iceland, http://www.statice.is/publicatio ns/news-archive/population/immigrants-and-persons-with-foreign-backgrou nd-2016/; Norway, https://www.ssb.no/en/innvandring-og-innvandrere (both retrieved 13 June 2017). Bernd Henningsen, ‘Gemeinschaft versus Staat, Nation versus Europa: Nordeuropäische Gemeinschaftskonstruktionen und die modernen Traditionsbrüche’, in Detlef Lehnert (ed.), Gemeinschaftsdenken in Europa: Das Gesellschaftskonzept ‘Volksheim’ im Vergleich 1900–1938 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2013), 65–72; see also, Maurizio Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare: European Inte-

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47. 48.

49. 50.

51.

19

gration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Kettunen, ‘Transnational Construction’, 23–26. Peter Aronsson, ‘Local Politics – The Invisible Political Culture’, in Sørensen and Stråth, Cultural Construction, 172–205. See also Pauli Kettunen’s chapter on Finland in this volume. Aronsson, ‘Local Politics’; Sørensen and Stråth, ‘Introduction’; for discussions, Hilson, Nordic Model; Kettunen, ‘Transnational Construction’, 23–26. Kettunen, ‘Transnational Construction’, 24–25. Bo Lindberg, Den antika skevheten: Politiska ord och begrepp i det tidig-moderna Sverige (Stockholm: Vitterhetsakademien, 2006), 56–97; Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘The Significance of the Distinction between State and Society in the Democratic Welfare State of Today’, in Böckenförde, State, Society and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law (New York: Berg, 1991), 146–74. Norbert Götz, Heidi Haggrén and Mary Hilson, ‘Nordic Cooperation in the Voluntary Sector’, in Strang, Nordic Cooperation, 57.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Alapuro, Risto, ‘Nordic and Finnish Modernities’, in Jóhann Páll Árnason and Björn Wittrock (eds), Nordic Paths to Modernity (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 191–206. Alber, Jens, ‘Continuities and Changes in the Idea of the Welfare State’, Politics & Society 16(4) (1988), 451–68. Árnason, Jóhann Páll, ‘Icelandic Anomalies’, in Jóhann Páll Árnason and Björn Wittrock (eds), Nordic Paths to Modernity (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 229–50. Aronsson, Peter, ‘Local Politics – The Invisible Political Culture’, in Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth (eds), The Cultural Construction of Norden (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 172–205. Arter, David, Scandinavian Politics Today, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008). Arts, Wil A., and John Gelissen, ‘Models of the Welfare State’, in Francis G. Castles et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 569–85. Atherton, Charles, ‘Welfare States: A Response to John Veit-Wilson’, Social Policy & Administration 36(3) (2002), 306–11. Ball, Terence, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson (eds), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Barbier, Jean-Claude, ‘Languages of “Social Policy” at “the EU Level”’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 59–80.

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Béland, Daniel, ‘The Politics of Social Policy Language’, Social Policy & Administration 45(1) (2011), 1–18. Béland, Daniel, and Klaus Petersen, ‘Introduction: Social Policy Concepts and Language’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 1–11. Blidberg, Kersti, Splittrad gemenskap: Kontakter och samarbete inom nordisk socialdemokratisk arbetarrörelse 1931–1945 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1984). Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, ‘The Significance of the Distinction between State and Society in the Democratic Welfare State of Today’, in Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, State, Society and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law (New York: Berg, 1991), 146–74. Bödeker, Hans Erich, ‘Begriffsgeschichte as the History of Theory: The History of Theory as Begriffsgeschichte’, in Javier Fernández Sebastián (ed.), Political Concepts and Time: New Approaches to Conceptual History (Santander: Cantabria University Press, 2011), 19–44. Briggs, Asa, ‘The Welfare State in Historical Perspective’, European Journal of Sociology/ Archives Européennes de Sociologie 2(2) (1961), 221–58. Castles, Francis G. et al., ‘Introduction’, in Francis G. Castles et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1–16. Christiansen, Niels Finn, and Pirjo Markkola, ‘Introduction’, in Niels Finn Christiansen et al. (eds), The Nordic Model of Welfare: A Historical Reappraisal (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2005), 9–29. Christiansen, Niels Finn, and Klaus Petersen, ‘Preface. The Nordic Welfare States: A Historical Reappraisal’, Scandinavian Journal of History 26(3) (2001), 153–56. Daly, Mary, Welfare (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011). De Bolla, Peter, The Architecture of Concepts: The Historical Formation of Human Rights (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013). Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). Ferrera, Maurizio, The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Flora, Peter, and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ‘The Historical Core and Changing Boundaries of the Welfare State’, in Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer (eds), The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981), 17–34. Foreign-born population Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Retrieved 12 June 2017 from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php. Foreign-born population Norway. Retrieved 13 June 2017 from https://www.ssb .no/en/innvandring-og-innvandrere.

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Foreign-born population Iceland. Retrieved 13 June 2017 from http://www.statice .is/publications/news-archive/population/immigrants-and-persons-withforeign-background-2016/. Freeden, Michael, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). Götz, Norbert, Heidi Haggrén and Mary Hilson, ‘Nordic Cooperation in the Voluntary Sector’, in Johan Strang (ed.), Nordic Cooperation: A European Region in Transition (London: Routledge, 2016), 49–68. Greve, Bent, Historical Dictionary of the Welfare State, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). Hansen, Nils Gunder, Jørn Henrik Petersen and Klaus Petersen (eds), I himlen således også på jorden? Danske kirkefolk om velfærdsstaten og det moderne samfund (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2010). Hemstad, Ruth, Fra Indian summer til nordisk vinter: Skandinavisk samarbeid, skandinavisme og unionsøpplosningen (Oslo: Universitetet i Oslo, 2008). Hemstad, Ruth, ‘Scandinavianism, Nordic Co-operation and “Nordic Democracy”’, in Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang (eds), Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2010), 179–93. Henningsen, Bernd, ‘Gemeinschaft versus Staat, Nation versus Europa: Nordeuropäische Gemeinschaftskonstruktionen und die modernen Traditionsbrüche’, in Detlef Lehnert (ed.), Gemeinschaftsdenken in Europa: Das Gesellschaftskonzept ‘Volksheim’ im Vergleich 1900–1938 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2013), 39–72. Hill, Michael, ‘What is a Welfare State?’, in Bent Greve (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 11–19. Hilson, Mary, The Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945 (London: Reaktion Books, 2008). Hoad, Terry F. (ed.), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Huber, Evelyn, and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001). Jónsson, Gudmundur, ‘Iceland and the Nordic Model of Consensus Democracy’, Scandinavian Journal of History 39(4) (2014), 510–28. Kahl, Sigrun, ‘The Religious Roots of Modern Poverty Policy: Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed Protestant Traditions Compared’, European Journal of Sociology 46(1) 2005, 91–126. Karvonen, Lauri, ‘Med vårt västra grannland som förebild’: En undersökning av policydiffusion från Sverige till Finland (Turku: Åbo Akademi University, 1981). Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver, Thinking about Social Policy: The German Tradition (Berlin: Springer, 2013). Kautto, Mikko, ‘The Nordic Countries’, in F.G. Castles et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 586– 600.

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Kettunen, Pauli, ‘The Nordic Welfare State in Finland’, Scandinavian Journal of History 26(3) (2001), 225–47. Kettunen, Pauli, ‘The Power of International Comparisons – A Perspective on the Making and Challenging of the Nordic Welfare State’, in Niels Finn Christiansen et al. (eds), The Nordic Model of Welfare: A Historical Reappraisal (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2005), 31–66. Kettunen, Pauli, ‘The Transnational Construction of National Challenges: The Ambiguous Nordic Model of Welfare and Competitiveness’, in Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen (eds), Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 16– 40. Kettunen, Pauli, ‘The ILO as a Forum for Developing and Demonstrating a Nordic Model’, in Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux (eds), Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond (Basingstoke and Geneva: Palgrave MacMillan and ILO, 2013), 210–30. Knudsen, Tim, ‘Tilblivelsen av den universalistiske velfærdsstat’, in Tim Knudsen (ed.), Den nordiske protestantisme og velfærdsstaten (Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2000), 20–64. Koselleck, Reinhart, ‘A Response to Comments on Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe’, in Hartmut Lehmann and Melvin Richter (eds), The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts: New Studies on Begriffsgeschichte (Washington DC: German Historical Institute, 1996), 59–70. Koselleck, Reinhart, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). Koselleck, Reinhart, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). Kuhnle Stein, and Anne Sander, ’The Emergence of the Western Welfare State’, in Francis G. Castles et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 61–80. Kurunmäki, Jussi, and Johan Strang, ‘Introduction: “Nordic Democracy” in a World of Tensions’, in Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang (eds), Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2010), 9–36. Lehmann, Hartmut, and Melvin Richter (eds), The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts: New Studies on Begriffsgeschichte (Washington DC: German Historical Institute, 1996). Lessenich, Stephan (ed.), Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Grundbegriffe: Historische und aktuelle Diskurse (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2003). Lindberg, Bo, Den antika skevheten: Politiska ord och begrepp i det tidig-moderna Sverige (Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhetsakademien, 2006). Lowe, Rodney, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999). Lundberg, Urban, ‘A Leap in the Dark: From a Large Actor to a Large Area Approach: The Joint Committee of the Nordic Social Democratic Labour Movement and the Crisis of the Nordic Model’, in Niels Finn Christiansen et al.

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(eds), The Nordic Model of Welfare: A Historical Reappraisal (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2005), 269–97. Mahon, Rianne, ‘The OECD’s Search for a New Social Policy Language: From Welfare State to Active Society’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 81–100. Markkola, Pirjo, ‘The Lutheran Welfare States’, in Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen (eds), Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 102–18. Markkola Pirjo, and Ingela Naumann, ‘Lutheranism and the Nordic Welfare States in Comparison’, Journal of Church and State 56(1) (2014), 1–12. Marklund, Carl, ‘The Social Laboratory, the Middle Way and the Swedish Model: Three Frames for the Image of Sweden’, Scandinavian Journal of History 34(3) (2009), 264–85. Marklund, Carl, and Klaus Petersen, ‘Return to Sender – American Images of the Nordic Welfare States and Nordic Welfare State Branding’, European Journal of Scandinavian Studies 43(2) (2013), 245–57. Musiał, Kazimierz, Roots of the Scandinavian Model: Images of Progress in the Era of Modernisation (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002). Müller, Jan-Werner, ‘On Conceptual History’, in Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (eds), Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 74–93. The Nordic Council, ‘10 Facts about the Nordic Region and Nordic Co-operation’. Retrieved 6 January 2018 from http://www.norden.org/en/fakta-om-norden-1 /10-facts-about-the-nordic-region-and-nordic-co-operation. Olesen, Thorsten Borring, and Johan Strang, ‘The European Challenge to Nordic Institutional Cooperation: Past, Present and Future’, in Johan Strang (ed.), Nordic Cooperation: A European Region in Transition (London: Routledge, 2016), 27–47. Olsen, Niklas, History in the Plural: An Introduction to the Work of Reinhart Koselleck (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012). Petersen, Jørn Henrik, Fra Luther til konkurrencestaten (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2016). Petersen, Klaus, ‘Constructing Nordic Welfare? Nordic Social Political Cooperation’, in Niels Finn Christiansen et al. (eds), The Nordic Model of Welfare: A Historical Reappraisal (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2005), 67–98. Petersen, Klaus, ‘National, Nordic and Trans-Nordic: Transnational Perspectives on the History of the Nordic Welfare States’, in Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen (eds), Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 41–64. Petersen, Klaus, and Jørn Henrik Petersen, ‘Confusion and Divergence: Origins and Meanings of the term “Welfare State” in Germany and Britain, 1840– 1940’, Journal of European Social Policy 23(1) (2013), 37–51.

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Pierson, Christopher, Beyond the Welfare State: The New Political Economy of Welfare, 2nd ed. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). Pierson, Christopher, and Matthieu Leimgruber, ‘Intellectual Roots’, in Francis G. Castles et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 32–44. Rassem, Mohammed, ‘Wohlfahrt, Wohltat, Wohltätigkeit, Caritas’, in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, 8 vols (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972–97) vol. 7 (1992), 595–636. Richter, Melvin, The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). Rimlinger, Gaston V. Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1971). Rodgers, Daniel T., Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in the Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998). Rose, Richard, ‘Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis’, Political Studies 39(3) (1991), 446–62. Shirer, William L., The Challenge of Scandinavia: Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland in Our Time (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1955). Social Policy and Welfare. Retrieved 6 January 2018 from the Nordic Council’s website, http://www.norden.org/en/fakta-om-norden-1. Sørensen, Øystein, and Bo Stråth, ‘Introduction: The Cultural Construction of Norden’, in Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth (eds), The Cultural Construction of Norden (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 1–24. Stadius, Peter, ‘Happy Countries: Appraisals of Interwar Nordic Societies’, in Jonas Harvard and Peter Stadius (eds), Communicating the North: Media Structures and Images in the Making of the Nordic Region (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013), 241–62. Steinmetz, Willibald, ‘New Perspectives on the Study of Language and Power in the Short Twentieth Century’, in Willibald Steinmetz (ed.), Political Languages in the Age of Extremes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3–51. Steinmetz, Willibald, ‘Some Thoughts on a History of Twentieth-Century German Basic Concepts’, Contributions to the History of Concepts 7(1) (2012), 87–100. Steinmetz Willibald, and Michael Freeden, ‘Conceptual History: Challenges, Conundrums, Complexities’, in Willibald Steinmetz, Michael Freeden and Javier Fernández-Sebastián (eds), Conceptual History in the European Space (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 1–46. Stenius, Henrik, ‘A Nordic Conceptual Universe’, in Heidi Haggrén, Johanna Rainio-Niemi and Jussi Vauhkonen (eds), Multi-layered Historicity of the Present: Approaches to Social Science History (Helsinki: Helsingin Yliopisto, 2013), 93–104. Stråth, Bo, ‘The Normative Foundations of the Scandinavian Welfare States in Historical Perspective’, in Nanna Kildal and Stein Kuhnle (eds), The Norma-

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tive Foundations of the Welfare State: The Nordic Experience (London: Routledge, 2005), 34–51. Svallfors, Stefan (ed.), Contested Welfare States: Welfare Attitudes in Europe and Beyond (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). Te Velde, Henk, ‘The Opening Up of Political History’, in Willibald Steinmetz, Ingrid Gilcher-Holthey and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (eds), Writing Political History Today (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 2013), 383–95. Tønnesen, Aud, “. . . et trygt og godt hjem for alle”? Kirkeleders kritikk av velferdsstaten etter 1945 (Trondheim: Tapir, 2000). ‘Välfärdh’, in Fornsvensk Lexikalisk Databas. Retrieved 5 May 2015 from http:// spraakbanken.gu.se/fsvldb/. ‘Vælfærth’, in Gammeldansk Ordbog. Retrieved 5 May 2015 from http://gammel danskordbog.dk. Veit-Wilson, John, ‘States of Welfare: A Conceptual Challenge’, Social Policy & Administration 34(1) (2000), 1–25. Veit-Wilson, John, ‘States of Welfare: A Response to Charles Atherton’, Social Policy & Administration 36(3) (2002), 312–17. ‘Velferð’, in J. Fritzners Ordbok. Retrieved 5 May 2015 from http://www.edd.uio .no/perl/search/search.cgi?appid=86&tabid=1275. Vetterlein, Antje, ‘The Discursive Power of International Organizations: Social Policy Language and Concepts in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 101–26. Weir, Margaret, ‘Welfare State’, International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), vol. 24, 16432–35. ‘Welfare Attitudes in Europe: Topline Results from Round 4 of the European Social Survey’. Retrieved 20 August 2014 from European Social Survey Topline Results series 2, 2012, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org. Wendt, Frantz, Cooperation in the Nordic Countries: Achievements and Obstacles (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell and the Nordic Council, 1981). Williams, Raymond, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, 2nd ed. (London: Fontana Press, 1983). Wincott, Daniel, ‘Reassessing the Social Foundations of Welfare (State) Regimes’, New Political Economy 6(3) (2001), 409–25. Wincott, Daniel, ‘Slippery Concepts, Shifting Context: (National) States and Welfare in the Veit-Wilson/Atherton Debate’, Social Policy & Administration 37(3) (2003), 305–15. Wincott, Daniel, ‘Images of Welfare in Law and Society: The British Welfare State in a Comparative Perspective’, Journal of Law and Society 38(3) (2011), 343–75. Wincott, Daniel, ‘The (Golden) Age of the Welfare State: Interrogating a Conventional Wisdom’, Public Administration 91(4) (2013), 806–22.

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Wincott, Daniel, ‘Original and Imitated or Elusive and Limited? A Genealogy of the British Welfare State’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 127–41.

 c ha p te r 1

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istinguished French historian Marc Bloch made the point that historians easily idolize origins.1 His warning that ancestry by itself does not explain later development supports a basic tenet of conceptual history: concepts are historically situated and contingent. They are used for different purposes by different actors in different situations, and usage and connotations are subject to change. In other words, the first appearance of a term may not matter a lot for the later usages and understandings of that term. This means that there are no necessary, intrinsic connections between the Wohlfahrtsstaat of the nineteenth century and ‘the welfare state’ we know from the post-1945 era. That said, earlier usages and understandings make up important historical layers in the modern usage of the term and that makes the longer perspective relevant. This background sets out to excavate some of these layers dating from the last century and a half. It addresses the basic questions about when, in which ways and by whom ‘the welfare state’ was used in divergent historical settings. As a study in concept formation it highlights certain aspects in order to give a background to the subsequent, more detailed studies of the Nordic countries. After a short introduction about older welfare, the chapter is loosely structured around the four main usages ca 1860–1940: the paternalistic, the regulating, the social and the democratic welfare states. Germany dominates much of the chapter, with excursions to the United States and, occasionally, to Britain as well. The topic is enormous, complex and underexplored, and this calls for a narrow focus, which means that this chapter deals with the keyword’s history, and the intention is not to survey the history of modern ideas about social reform or welfare policies and institutions in general. Studies of that kind abound, whereas the history of the keyword has remained unknown.2

D

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The Common Good and Welfare As noted already in the introduction, ‘welfare’ is an old term with multiple meanings and, as a fundamental political objective, considerably older than modern conceptions of a welfare state. It would be possible to delineate a long historical tradition of thinking about governance and policies centred around ‘the common good’ and its multiple conceptual histories, but such an undertaking cannot fit into the limited space available here. Then again, it should be remembered that ‘welfare’, meaning happiness and security in the tradition from Aristotle and Cicero, formed an integral part of a common Western definition of public affairs; politics – virtuous men striving for the wellbeing of the community – and ‘the common good’ could not be separated. This notion, open for different interpretations, stood absolutely central in early modern statecraft, and ‘the common good’ – det allmänna/gemena/gemensamma bästa/väl (Swedish), det almene/almindelige/fælles bedste/vel (Danish and Norwegian) with relatives like ‘Commonweal’ in English and Gemeinwohl in German – signified the final aim of legitimate power. Salus publica/salus populi constituted a core value, the rationale, in early modern Northern Europe as elsewhere in the West. ‘Public welfare’ of this kind concerned the wellbeing of the community or the realm, the relations between rulers and subjects and the protection of peace, justice and moral order in society.3 Not at all original, Jonas Magni, professor of theology and politics at Uppsala University, in 1624 declared that the objective of politics, a branch of practical philosophy, is to direct societal and civic life ‘towards society’s common good, happiness and welfare’.4 Following mainly Pufendorf, the German jurist whose well-known textbook from 1673 saw more than 150 later editions in different languages, playwright, philosopher and historian Ludvig Holberg, a giant in the history of Scandinavian literature, published a bestselling treatise on natural law making the same fundamental point: a virtuous ruler ‘should at all times have the welfare of his subjects in view’ and make ‘laws that serve the common good’.5 In the Lutheran kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden, numerous administrative police regulations on matters concerning religion, privileges, consumption, vagrancy, migration and all trades were introduced in order to protect harmonious societal relations and produce wealth and prosperity. This notion of a well-ordered state entailed a moral theory, which stated that the state administration should be used for development of society and the improvement of the subjects. In this way, god politie (good administration, Gute Policey), good order and welfare maintained by the state ‘legitimated comprehensive regulation in terms of an elastic concept of the public interest’.6 In Nordic cameralist thinking of the eigh-

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teenth century, much inspired by the proliferation of German works of this kind, the actively regulating state and the need to improve the economy constituted main themes with well-known policy objectives and recommendations: increased population, agricultural reforms, subsidies to manufactures, sumptuary laws and export subsidies etc. Consequently, welfare, in the sense of material prosperity or wealth (velstand in Danish and Norwegian, välstånd in Swedish) became far more important than previously when Lutheran orthodoxy ruled. It was a Christian and patriotic duty to make all branches of the economy flourish, it was repeated, and in this endeavour there existed no opposition between the interests of the state and those of the individuals. The prosperity and happiness of the society, protected and promoted by regulating authorities, had precedence, and patriotism, economic improvements and ‘public welfare’ were in this way closely linked. In the latter half of the seventeenth century, the enlightened absolutist rulers in Denmark-Norway and Sweden-Finland tried to put these ideas into dynamic regulating practices.

The Paternalistic Welfare State The German innovations Rechtsstaat and Wohlfahrtsstaat were introduced in the scholarly and political debates on the constitutional character and sociopolitical role of the state in the mid nineteenth century. Rechtsstaat, ‘the legal state’, has remained a key concept for two centuries and produced a substantial literature in German.7 ‘The welfare state’ has definitely been less important than its younger sibling Sozialstaat and, consequently, not the object of much conceptually oriented scholarly interest in Germany.8 Drawing on Kant’s critique of eudaimonistic conceptions of the state, the early adherents of the Rechtsstaat rejected the idea of the state as something God-given, restricted its functions to upholding personal liberty and security and, finally, argued that the state must be governed by the law of reason (civil liberties, rule of law, constitutional government etc.). Politically speaking, this was a liberal conception of the state, a programme for constitutional and legal reform directed against the contemporary rulers in the German states and the old absolutist regimes of Frederick the Great, Joseph II of Habsburg and Catherine the Great of Russia – or for that matter Denmark’s Fredrik VI and Sweden’s Gustav III. Such regimes were labelled Polizei- und Wohlfahrtsstaat, Polizeistaat or sometimes just Wohlfahrtsstaat. ‘The welfare state’ was in this fundamental sense a counter-concept, a negation of the liberal legal state of the nineteenth century. It was a negation because it subordinated individual freedom to the promotion of welfare and happiness, and these

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were not proper tasks of the state. To follow Kant, the paternalistic contract of the old regime violated the human right to freedom: ‘the principle of benevolence toward the people like that of a father toward his children’ is ‘the greatest despotism thinkable’.9 During the course of the century the Rechtsstaat concept was reformulated in multiple ways; the widespread formal definition reduced the political elements and limited it to concern the legality and procedural rule of law. This reformulation, where administrative law became a prime focus, accompanied the march of constitutionalism in the German states in the latter half of the century. In the 1890s, Otto Mayer in his influential Deutsche Verwaltungsrecht defined the Rechtsstaat formally as the ‘state with well-ordered administrative law’.10 For Rudolf von Gneist, who wrote extensively on English constitutional history and was an active liberal politician, the Rechtsstaat was fundamentally used to underpin constitutional reform; he favoured self-government, and ‘the legal state’ provided the alternative to the bureaucratic machinery of Bismarck’s ‘power state’.11 According to Mayer ‘the legal state’ succeeded ‘the police state’ (Polizeistaat) of the previous century, whereas Gneist set up the Rechtsstaat as the opposite of ‘the welfare state’ (Wohlfahrtsstaat). His critique was principal and political in character: ‘the welfare state’ threatened individual rights and proper administrative practices. For Gneist, who used the term pejoratively to describe France, the problem was not historical but contemporary: ‘the welfare state’ negated the fundamental principles of ‘the legal state’. It lacked proper division of power and was ruled by groups susceptible to the changing expression of the will of the people, which in its turn opened for despotism.12 Gneist did not reject social reforms as such but criticized the lack of judicial control of administrative action. In this critique he followed Lorenz von Stein, professor of political economy in Vienna, who in his systematic seven-volume work on administrative law (Die Verwaltungslehre 1865–68) sharply distinguished between the forms of state: the old absolutist welfare state, the transitional police state and the contemporary Rechtsstaat. In the later so often repeated manner, Stein identified the Wohlfahrtsstaat with cameralism and the teachings of Pufendorf, Wolff, Justi and others, who defined the promotion of happiness and welfare as the primary purposes of the state. He stressed the ethical content – the unity of philosophy, law and administration in the old regime – and labelled the Wohlfahrtsstaat ‘a compulsory institution for the happiness and well-being of the people’ (eine Zwangsanstalt für das Glück der Völker).13 The administrative state of the early nineteenth century, the Polizeistaat, which shared many traits of its predecessor save for the unified philosophical foundation, had to be abandoned in favour of the Rechtsstaat, which secured freedom, security and the rule of law. The

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French revolution, Kant’s redefinition of the common good and the rise of constitutionalism made the old conception untenable, stated Stein; state and society were separated, individual rights transformed social relations, and social classes with different interests emerged.14 Stein’s all-encompassing work tried to grasp these epochal changes, and his programme for the necessary conciliation of the social conflicts brought about by industrial society included ‘the social kingdom’ and ‘the social state’ – that is, a monarchy and civil service capable of social reform – in order to alleviate the conditions of the working class. His ‘social state’ took on the task to regulate society without circumscribing individual freedom, and this formula for reform guided Bismarck’s groundbreaking social policies. In this way, Stein is considered a key thinker in the history of German social policy and founder of an ‘administrative science’, Verwaltungswisssenschaft, with the ideas, procedures and techniques for the state to manage ‘the social’ within the limits set by the law.15 From Stein and Gneist onwards, the binary distinction between an old welfare state, a Wohlfahrtsstaat characterized by absolutism, paternalism and state dirigisme in matters large and small, and the Rechtsstaat with a constitution, equality before the law and civil rights became a common description of Germany’s development over time. It told a story of progress from the old regime to the modern world, and numerous German works have since then contributed to establishing one of the standard definitions of ‘the welfare state’ as a premodern, paternalistic and bureaucratic state.16 It was mainly associated with the cameralism and enlightened absolutism of the eighteenth century, but once established, the new term could be applied to different historical periods and studies of the ancient and medieval ‘welfare state-thinking’ were published.17 This historical usage of ‘the welfare state’ with reference to pre-1789 doctrines and regimes lacked contestation and had a clearly defined content with a specific temporality, as it referred to a passed stage in the historical development of the (Western) state.18 Outside of the German- speaking world, this usage does not appear to have been particularly well known; in scholarly German texts it was not uncommon. Into the interwar period, the old paternalistic welfare state constituted the most established variant of welfare state in German discourse.

Kulturstaat and Social Policy In the 1860s and 1870s, Stein and Gneist cemented the binary distinction between the different state forms, but they did not invent the term Wohlfahrtsstaat.19 The earliest known usage dates from the 1840s and

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a text by the young Hegelian journalist Karl Nauwerck. In 1844, he emphasized that ‘the legal state [der Rechtsstaat] does not suffice; it has to develop into the welfare state [der Wohlfahrtsstaat] in order to satisfy all societal needs’. Writing from a radical perspective at a time when then ‘the social question’ and pauperism received more and more attention, Nauwerck argued for the need for the collective – the members of society – to care for the weak.20 His linguistic originality should not be exaggerated; it might have been accidental. Wohlfahrt, welfare, was a very well-established concept in German political philosophy, jurisprudence and sciences of state, where it could be found in many novel compounds such as ‘state welfare’ (Staatswohlfahrt), ‘national welfare’ (Nationalwohlfahrt), ‘welfare of the people’ (Volkswohlfahrt), ‘public welfare’ (öffentliche Wohlfahrt) and ‘welfare administration’ (Wohlfahrtspolizei).21 ‘Public welfare’ and ‘the common good’ were also central objectives of the Prussian Civil Code of 1794.22 ‘Freedom’, ‘security’ and ‘welfare’ stood at the centre of the German theorizing about the purposes of the state (Staatszweckslehre), a fundamental concern in much constitutional and legal theory, practical philosophy, theology and political economy, where highly contested issues about natural rights and the metaphysical justifications of law and state power were at stake. The dichotomies between state and society – between public and private spheres, the collective and the individual – and their political and legal consequences constituted central themes.23 As the many welfare nouns indicate, the more mundane issue of public administration also attracted scholars. The cameralist tradition, reduced in scale and scope in ‘the legal state’, remained a starting point in the massive body of works on administration. For Robert von Mohl, the leading pre-1848 proponent of the idea of the Rechtsstaat, the proper areas of public policy included trade and industry, health and sanitation, poverty and public relief and, of course, education and public order. This state was definitely not absent or inactive in matters that concerned the wellbeing of the population: it was a Kulturstaat, a civilized state (literally ‘Culture state’), which had both positive and preventive administrative powers at its disposal.24 During the latter half of the century, the Kulturstaat emerged as yet another potent concept in the German political vocabulary, a concept deployed to describe the progress of contemporary society vis-à-vis both earlier periods and non-Western cultures. The unified German Reich was a Kulturstaat; it embodied culture, education and learning (Bildung) and rule of law, and included the idea of the modern state as ‘a moral institution for the education of mankind’, as the young political economist Gustav Schmoller declared in 1872.25 For Schmoller, a Kulturstaat represented much more than just social reforms, but the interventionist state,

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which worked to reduce class conflicts in industrial society, formed a central dimension in his conception of the unified German state. Fellow academic heavyweight, the professed state socialist Adolph Wagner, professor of Staatswissenschaften at the university in Berlin, gave this position a strong framing in his textbook on political economy: And the state of progressive peoples, particularly the modern ones, increasingly ceases to be one-sidedly a state of law [Rechtsstaat] – in the sense of the most exclusive realization possible of the state objectives of law and power – and increasingly becomes a state of culture and welfare [Kultur- und Wohlfahrtsstaat], in the sense that its attainments with respect to the state objectives of culture and welfare are constantly expanding and gaining a richer and more diverse content.26

This ‘culture and welfare state’, stated Wagner, was not a thing of the past, and he underlined that its prime target was the totally unregulated society of free market competition, economic exploitation and social atomization. Wagner’s law of increasing state activity in modern society dealt with this process where a regulating state, promoting social reforms, constituted an integral part of modernization. This state had to counteract these dangerous developments in order to protect ‘the common good’. In this way, adherents of comprehensive economic and social policies reintroduced the old notion of the state’s responsibility for the general welfare of society and citizens. The Christian socialist Wagner explicitly defended the older welfare state and its guiding principle.27 Socialists of the Chair (Kathedersozialisten) like Schmoller and Wagner attacked the doctrine of economic liberalism and argued for a state that actively tried to reduce tensions in society through social policies, a state that directly addressed ‘the social question’. In this way they helped prepare the groundwork for Bismarck’s comprehensive social legislation in the late 1870s and 1880s: factory legislation 1878, sickness insurance 1883, industrial accidents insurance 1884 and old age and disability insurance law five years later. State intervention in general became the key issue, with compulsory or voluntary solutions, coverage, funding and institutional design as emerging issues.28 Concepts like Wohlfahrtsstaat or Kulturstaat did not dominate the debates on workers’ protection and insurance, at least not in the Reichstag.29 Most important of the new keywords was Sozialpolitik, social policy, which originated in the 1840s and had gained a somewhat scholarly character before it came to dominate in the 1880s, pushing the more radical Sozialreform, social reform, to the side. It gradually became the covering concept for all matters social – all issues that had something to do with ‘the worker’s question’ (die Arbeit-

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erfrage).30 The neology ‘state socialism’ (Staatssozialismus) appeared – a pejorative label used by the Social Democrats for Bismarck’s combination of repressive legislation and tempting reforms set to pacify the socialist threat – which the chancellor himself adopted and defined as ‘Christianity in practice’, the programme of a paternalistic state responding to the needs of the workers in order to preserve societal order and protect the common good in the manner recommended by politically engaged scholars like Schmoller and Wagner. As the latter declared, strict principles and limits for the state’s intervention were hard to define, as the concrete situations changed and the role of the state had to be decided from case to case.31 The positive view of a strong regulating state could be found also outside of the conservative camp. It echoed in the position of the social democrat Ferdinand Lassalle, who attacked the material, liberal Rechtsstaat concept as a Nachtwächteridee, ‘a nightwatchman idea’ and combined a critique of economic liberalism with a positive view of the state as a moral community and an instrument for political reforms.32 After Lassalle, the Social Democrats, restricted by the Socialist Law 1878–90, sharply opposed Bismarck’s social policies: ‘the so-called social reforms will only be used as a tactical means to divert the worker from the correct path.’33 Eduard Bernstein, the leading revisionist, rejected the idea of an authoritarian state handing out social benefits, yet believed in the possibility of a democratic state mediating class conflicts and regulating detrimental economic conditions and market relations. Social democrats, adhering to democratic reformism, could work within the existing state and gradually transform its institutions and structures, said Bernstein. His reformism meant principal and practical support for social reforms, enacted by the state, that promoted the interest of the working people – i.e. extended political and economic democracy.34 Actually, ‘the welfare state’ was actually not entirely absent in the political debates in the 1880s and 90s. Within the Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum) and its associated organizations a discussion on the pros and cons of an active state had been going for many years. Some of the earliest usage of Wohlfahrtsstaat, a synonym for the old authoritarian state or referring to the contemporary state, can be found in their journals. In the 1880s, after the Kulturkampf, the altercations within Catholic circles focused on Bismarck’s social legislation because it challenged the Church’s position in the field of social reform.35 Congresses discussed the new secular modern welfare state, its possibilities and threats, and Catholic social teaching pondered the issues involved at length. Rerum Novarum, the papal encyclical from 1891 on the rights and duties of capital and labour, strengthened the case for social legislation to support

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‘public well-being’ and supported, it was said, the idea of the old benevolent paternalistic Wohlfahrtsstaat.36 Some representatives of Catholic social thinking adopted the welfare state at this stage; one of them was Joseph Mausbach in Munster, who in 1906 proclaimed that the social reforms of the modern state expressed the ideals of the medieval Christian welfare state.37 Of course, this does not mean that they embraced the Protestant Prussian Kulturstaat in its totality; it was rather the general principle of common social responsibilities and the front against liberalism and socialism that gained support.

The Regulating Welfare State I Already in the 1880s, Gustav Cohn, professor of political economy in Göttingen, noted that the competing state concepts Rechtsstaat, Polizeistaat, Wohlfahrtsstaat and Kulturstaat could be and were used in numerous and overlapping ways. The predominant, formal definition of the Rechtsstaat was not incompatible with ‘the welfare state’ or ‘the culture state’ but only with ‘the police state’ and only when the latter was understood as governing at its own discretion. As long as the formal aspects of Rechtsstaat prevailed, the modern state could appear under different names, he concluded.38 With the translation of an extract from Cohn’s textbook a few years later came, in 1894, the first known appearance of ‘the welfare-state’ in English but used as label for the old paternalistic state of enlightened absolutism. The translator’s note explained the new term without dating its historical reference: ‘The idea is that the State should not merely protect the persons and property of its citizens, but should endeavor [sic] to promote their welfare by some more positive action or interference in their behalf.’39 In the beginning of the new century, two notions – the old welfare state, bureaucratic and unlimited, and a newer one, referring to the contemporary state and its growing administrative capacities – coexisted in Germany. Historical references were far more common, but the welfare state could also be contemporary: ‘the modern welfare state’, which regulated working conditions, limited the freedom of contract, expropriated private land for public use etc., and it did all that within the existing economic order of society. This characterized the modern welfare state, explained sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies on the eve of World War I.40 Tönnies’ tone was somewhat critical; others were more positive, such as the jurist E. von Meier, who dismissed much of the old liberal critique of the paternalistic Wohlfahrtsstaat as idealistic and inconsistent and like Wagner saw the expanding administration with all its new functions and

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services as a natural consequence of growing economic resources – his lengthy list included public hospitals, slaughterhouses, parks, asphalted streets, schools and libraries. Intervention through administrative regulation provided the new form for the state and the contested political issue was, stated Professor Meier, not the regulations themselves but the scale and scope of the new state.41 Wagner himself repeated that newer theories of the state tried to avoid earlier divisions, stressed that the modern state had many different functions and maintained that the culture and welfare purposes defined the contemporary state. Many other scholars and commentators made similar judgements.42 In the words of the sociologist Wilhelm Jerusalem, who in 1915 described the many faces of the contemporary state: ‘In the fields of social insurance and sanitation is the state generally developing into a welfare state and, if it leads in the field of education and contributes to the arts and sciences, then it becomes a culture state.’ Germany at war was also a Machtstaat (power state), noted Jerusalem.43 ‘The power-state’, the state competing with other states for a place in the sun, stood central in many conceptions of the Wilhelmine state, such as Max Weber’s thinking about contemporary Germany. The welfare could certainly be important here, but it was always subordinate to the realpolitische interests and objectives of the state.44 Weber himself, critical of Bismarck’s paternalistic social reforms, mentioned ‘the welfare state’ only in passing in his work; for him the term denoted the old dirigiste state of enlightened despotism in Europe and Asia.45 His main concern was the question of how to reconcile individual freedom, mass democracy and bureaucratization in modern society with, in the German case, the monarchical-bureaucratic state. The Wohlfahrtsstaat of the early twentieth century was primarily a scholarly and non-political concept and, although not exotic and exceptional, it lacked the importance of Rechtsstaat and Kulturstaat and the controversy surrounding Zukunftsstaat, the socialists’ favourite term for ‘the future state’.46 It did not appear as an entry on its own in any of the many specialized dictionaries and encyclopaedias published before 1914, but it can be found in certain contributions.47 Alongside academic discourse and theorizing about the state, a massive proliferation of welfare terms can be seen in all fields associated with practical social reform, both on the national level following Bismarck’s social legislation and, in multiple forms, on the local level. Here Wohlfahrt and its many compounds signified the multitude of municipal, employer and philanthropic initiatives and arrangements, and social services were saturated with new welfare nouns such as Wohlfahrtseinrichtungen (welfare arrangements), Wohlfahrtspflege (welfare work, social care), Arbeiterwohlfahrt (worker’s welfare), Wohlfahrtsfürsorge (social care, social assistance). These public

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and private activities and arrangements linked welfare in very concrete ways to different social reforms in fields like healthcare, housing and social assistance. They established a rich vocabulary of social welfare and tied the abstract concept of welfare to institutions, associations and practices.48 This process of institutionalization took place in Germany and the United States, the two countries where ‘welfare’ became a central term in social reform in the period 1880–1920.

The Regulating Welfare State II Germany spearheaded social insurance legislation and introduced a rich variety of the state concepts. Other countries handled ‘the social question’ in other ways; political contexts, national histories and institutional settings varied, and there is no single formula that can summarize the richness of social reform initiatives and solutions. Social problems, policy proposals and solutions travelled and were translated between states, cities and municipalities.49 But ‘the welfare state’ was no immediate success in English, and early examples from United States and Britain mainly referred to German conditions and discussions.50 In the beginning of the new century, ‘welfare’ was becoming a central theoretical and practical concern everywhere. In American political life, the idea of the federal state’s welfare objectives could gather strength from its venerable origin in the US constitution’s words about ‘general welfare’, appearing both in the Preamble and the clause on taxation.51 ‘The general welfare’ was in this way a respected and, at the same time, fundamentally contestable principle, as it dealt with constitutional interpretation and the scale and scope of public power; it was about ‘the common good’ in relation to different partisan, economic and social interests in a rapidly changing society.52 From this perspective there could be no fixed a priori limit to governmental activity; instead, ‘the general welfare’ and the general interest was decisive and its character had to be determined from case to case, argued political scientist W.W. Willoughby in his important treatise on the nature of the state. These ‘common welfare’ functions of the state included the economic, industrial and moral interests of the people.53 The changing state remained a favourite topic for scholars and commentators, and in 1920, leading American political scientist C.E. Merriam noticed how many political theorists had turned away from the older individualism: ‘they abandoned the earlier idea of the “police state” and substituted in its place the later doctrine of the “general welfare” state.’54 Other North American scholars forwarded similar observations: ‘changes from the individual to the social theory of the

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functions of government have brought a radical transformation’ of government duties and responsibilities.55 According to Professor Albert Kocourek in Chicago, legal philosopher and prolific introducer of European jurists, all modern states were welfare states to some extent, as they navigated the middle grounds between the extremes: the police and laissez faire states. He distinguished three types of welfare states: 1) a state that regulates publicly owned communications but refrains from regulating privately owned roads; 2) a state that not only controls but also operates public utilities such as railroads and telegraphs, as the case was in many European countries; 3) besides regulating and operating public utilities this welfare state also engages in industrial production and competes in spheres that it also regulates. A welfare state of the third kind posed a major threat: ‘It then becomes an Industrial State and if its activities on a large scale supersede the activities of the subjects of the State acting for themselves, the State becomes a Socialist State.’56 Kocourek provided the most detailed treatment of ‘the welfare state’ in the United States before the New Deal, and his focus was, typical of this literature, on state structure, not on concrete policies or social reforms, and the legal foundations of the regulating state power. ‘Welfare’, referring to social reforms, entered common usage in the United States in the 1920s, a few years after the first state Department of Public Welfare was established (Illinois 1916) in an effort to reorganize and coordinate different public efforts introduced during the preceding half century or so.57 Two decades later, all states had welfare departments, in some states divided into specialized administrations for pensions, unemployment, corrections and so forth, and the important point here is that these departments institutionalized welfare in the same manner as Germany – i.e. they tied diverse forms of public social support and protection to the keyword welfare.58 A plethora of welfare nouns were introduced during the first decades of the new century covering all the corporate, philanthropic and public welfare initiatives: welfare for orphaned and neglected children, city planning, housing reform and support to charities, labour legislation etc.59 This means that the general welfare discourse on the changing character of public power accompanied the emergence of ‘social welfare’ as a new concept covering all kinds of practices.

The Social Welfare State in Weimar Germany In the late 1980s it was argued that the Wohlfahrtsstaat remained a rare term in political discourse before the last years of the Republic and that

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Sozialstaat, sozialer Rechtsstaat and above all sozialer Volksstaat, social democracy, held wider significance.60 That Volksstaat, the democratic unity of people and state, stood absolutely central in the first German Republic is evident. But Weimar Germany was also conceived as a welfare state right from the start, with welfare enshrined within the Constitution with its substantial list of social rights, both in the form of the public authority to introduce a comprehensive social insurance system (article 161) and, in article 163, as the right for every German to have the opportunity to support him- or herself through productive labour. In short, parliamentary democracy, rule of law and social equality were the new ideals.61 The postwar reconstruction of Germany needed welfare reforms, and the efforts to turn the articles of the constitution into political practice received wide support; it was central to the Left Liberals, Catholic Centre (Zentrum) and Social Democrats, who represented and defended the new political system. It has been argued that social expectations in Weimar ‘were only superficially concerned with what we would describe today as the welfare state’, as the young democracy inherited the welfare state from the Kaiserreich, but to that argument for the political primacy of societal unity, Volksgemeinschaft, one can add that der Wohlfahrtsstaat – an idea, as an institution and policies – became a divisive factor, since it was linked to the Republic and its Constitution, which held limited legitimacy among conservatives.62 In novel ways, ‘the social welfare state’ with its comprehensive reform programmes opened for a new society, and consequently it became politicized when different political actors struggled for the right to decide the definitions and temporalized, loaded with different visions of the future. Theories about legal rights provided a foundation for ideas about the state’s obligation to protect and promote the welfare of all citizens. Already in 1910 had Gustav Radbruch, prominent legal philosopher, social democrat and Minister of Justice 1921–22 and again in 1923, underlined the significance of the administrative law expanding at the expense of the old Rechtsstaat. Administrative law, which granted the worker rights and protection by modifying the freedom of contract between employer and worker, strengthened ‘the social welfare state’. Professor Radbruch, accepting the collectivist developments in modern society, mentioned social insurance legislation as an example and continued: Here and elsewhere, the administrative law serves to correct the Manchester-like civil law in the social spirit of the welfare state [im sozialen Sinne des Wohlfahrtsstaates]. Administrative Law is social law, and in the socialist welfare state [im sozialistischen Wohlfahrtsstaate] will . . . the Civil Law be completely taken over by administrative law.63

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This statement was included in the two first editions of Radbruch’s influential Rechtsphilosophie (Legal Philosophy) from 1910 and 1929, but it was reworked in the third, enlarged edition from 1932, which focused more on the protection of the rule of law. Radbruch’s book, intended as an introduction to legal philosophy, did not present a full political programme but argued for socialism. The social welfare state – which granted social rights, guaranteed the legality of reforms through judicial review and opened for different bodies to carry out the daily welfare administration – was clearly a desirable objective for Radbruch. Fellow social democrat Hermann Heller explained how the new German constitution included fundamental social rights and duties and that the realization of these social ideas meant a transformation from the old pure Rechtsstaat to the ‘democratic-social welfare state’. Referring to Von Stein’s social ideas, Heller argued that increased societal freedom logically meant ‘the continuation from political to economic democracy’.64 He was not the only progressive political theorist to argue that ‘the welfare state’ constituted a necessary step forward from the Rechtsstaat and that this new state provided a desirable objective for the future.65 And in the Reichstag, leading socialists like Rudolf Hilferding, Minister of Finance 1923 and 1928–30, declared that the new state constituted an important step for the Social Democrats on the road to socialism: ‘We seek the development of the Republic into a real welfare state, into a social republic.’66 It is not hard to find similar declarations from pro-Republican forces supporting this development of Germany into a democratic Kultur- und Wohlfahrtsstaat. ‘We are witnessing the gradual coming into being of the welfare state, of the “social state”,’ announced a Social Democrat enthusiastically in 1921, and a leader of the Innere Mission, the Protestant welfare organization, declared that ‘today the state regards itself as the bearer of primary responsibility for social welfare . . . It does not aspire simply to be a state of order, police and law, but also wants to be a culture and welfare state as well’.67 When Zentrum in the programme in 1922 expressed its support for the welfare state, it should be interpreted as a general support for social protection as a central public commitment and overall objective: ‘In addition, the Centre Party assigns the welfare state comprehensive tasks of immediate public welfare and social care that are to be solved alongside free and church-run charitable activities.’68 Political support for the welfare state did not necessarily mean unconditioned support for the federal government as the main provider of social welfare. The states set up departments for public welfare – Ministerium für Volkswohlfahrt – and the different national welfare organizations, such as the Protestant Innere Mission and the new Social Democrats’ Arbeiterwohlfahrt (Workers’ Welfare) from 1919, competed in the complex

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welfare sector with its national, state, municipal and private agencies and programmes. Consequently, the well-developed welfare sector and many policy issues, ripe with conflicts between the central state, the regions and the welfare organizations and designated as a proper sphere for women, represented standing themes in the parties’ election campaigns, not least when it came to winning women’s votes.69 Contestation surrounded Weimar welfare from early on; the sociologist Tönnies, commenting in 1920 on the political tendencies after the war, noted that ‘the socialist state is by its very nature a police state, or a welfare state as the better sounding name is’. A writer in the conservative-liberal journal Die Grenzboten highlighted the ties between the old welfare state – a German invention – Bismarck’s state socialism, the new welfare state and the socialists.70 State-run social policy programmes constituted no problem per se; problems occurred when they expanded into an ‘unbearable provision- and guardian state’, and the social democrats were working in that direction and they could also be condemned as being un-German.71 ‘Abandon the Welfare State’, demanded one opponent in 1926, whereas an economic liberal like Ludwig von Mises held that an expanding welfare state, promoted by Social Liberals and Social Democrats, meant increased statism and socialism.72 Even more hostile was the chairman of the Saxon houseowner’s association: In the eight years following the war, Germany has been transformed from a German state into a welfare state and the capital of the thrifty individual has been sacrificed to the Moloch of the masses.73

During the last years of the Republic, when the economic and political situation continuously deteriorated, ‘the welfare state’ drew even more fire than before. The malfunctioning, or, at least, heavily overburdened, social sector was under attack from different camps, including welfare organizations, communists, conservatives and national socialists.74 When the Nazis took over, the pejorative interpretation grew in strength, and the ‘socialist welfare state’ was replaced by the racial community of the nation, die Volksgemeinschaft and its Volkspflege (care for the people). The temperature rose already in June 1932, when Chancellor von Papen proclaimed that the ‘social state’ had become a dysfunctional all-providing state (Versorgungs- oder Fürsorgestaat) because of the previous governments’ state socialist policies and continued: They have turned the State into a kind of welfare state and by doing so, have weakened the moral strength of the nation. The state has been attributed responsibilities and obligations which it naturally cannot fulfil.75

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In this way, von Papen, repeating points made over the last decade, denounced the entire social security system of the Republic and its many welfare organizations. This provoked multiple responses; Hans Maier, a welfare reformer in Frankfurt and later Saxony who left the social-liberal Democratic Party for the Social Democrats in 1922, had already given a general reply in the journal of the union of social democratic welfare association, Arbeiterwohlfahrt: The term ‘welfare state’, which has been employed with cynical connotations against the tendency of recent legislation, is of programmatic importance for us and the target of the neo-Malthusians, Manchesterians, and those who oppose a risk-free existence.76

In 1932, Maier answered von Papen directly, defended Weimar’s democratic constitution and ‘a state that protects the weak, takes care of the sick and provides care for the old’ based on mutual help and ‘filled with co-operative spirit’.77 Other social democrats argued along the same lines for ‘the welfare state’, a democratic state that minimized social risks and secured its citizens the right to employment, health and education. Forced to defend their policies, the positive idea of the welfare state as a programme for the future received backing from reformist socialists.78 But not all pro-Republicans gave full support for this idea of the state as the key player in social provision; the Liberal Association had denounced the welfare state for ‘having suffocated the individual’s sense of personal responsibility in feeling of riskless complacency’, and socialists warned that too much public assistance could create dependency and make the recipients ‘more unsuited than ever for the arduous task of creating a socialist society’.79 As a sign of its growing significance, ‘the welfare state’ appeared more often than before in academic texts and now with different contemporary connotations during the dramatic last years of the Republic. It had become a common concept, and both fascist Italy and pre-New Deal United States were described as welfare states, and, of course, many works explicated the theoretical differences between state forms such as Rechtsstaat, Wohlfahrtsstaat, Kulturstaat and what was the newest addition during the Depression, the Wirtschaftsstaat, which actively regulated and intervened in the economy.80 Carl Schmitt contended that the continuously expanding interventionist state had both weakened the distinction between state and society and distorted the principles of the Rechtsstaat. This had turned the parliament into an arena for organized social interests, with their salaried functionaries, support organizations and faithful voters. ‘The welfare state’ – Schmitt listed five synonyms – was just one name for this weak contemporary state controlled by interest groups

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that he contrasted with ‘the strong total state’, where the president embodied the constitution and expressed the unified will of the people.81 From the left, social democrats like Heller advanced ideas about a ‘social Rechtsstaat’ as the alternative to the authoritarian and totalitarian projects. This principle – combining rule of law, parliamentary democracy and social rights – laid the foundation for West Germany’s constitutional development after 1945.82

The Democratic Welfare State Bishop William Temple of the Anglican Church, often regarded as the man who coined the term, underlined the democratic aspect in his recurrent but brief writings about ‘the welfare state’ from the 1928 onwards.83 At the most, Temple, a prolific writer and public intellectual, introduced the term in England, but as this chapter has shown, he did not premiere the term in English. How he found the term remains unknown; maybe he picked it up from German theologians or simply translated the earlier British usage that had retained the German term.84 Bishop Temple used ‘the welfare state’ in a particular way. In 1928, he explained why it had been necessary to fight Germany in the Great War: The War was a struggle between the idea of the state as essentially Power – Power over its own community and against other communities – and of the state as the organ of community, maintaining its solidarity by law designed to safeguard the interests of the community. The power-state has yielded to sheer pressure of circumstance in course of time; but it is contrary to the psychology of the power-state to suffer conversion; it was likely to fight before it let a welfare-state take its place.85

Temple’s ‘welfare-state’ denoted a democratic state, the opposite of ‘power states’ like Germany and Austria. It acted as an organ of community and followed Christian principles and marked historical progress, a step towards the realization of an international state for the community of mankind.86 Popular government and democratic rights and freedoms – a state that existed for the benefit of its citizens – characterized the welfare state, whereas the power state meant the citizens’ complete subordination to the interests of the mighty state. In short, welfare states respected their own citizens and other states while power states were characterized by authoritarian rule and aggressive foreign policies. In the 1930s, specialists in the new field of international relations used ‘the welfare state’ in ways similar to Temple’s. Classicist Alfred Zimmern, from 1930

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professor of international relations at University of Oxford, forwarded this dichotomy between cooperative welfare states and repressive power states. Zimmern did this in an essay 1934, and his ‘welfare state’ embodied the moral order of liberal democracy, ‘the living ideal manifesting itself through individuals and communities’.87 Temple’s and Zimmern’s understanding of ‘the welfare state’ shared certain traits – such as the focus on community and moral values – and this can of course be explained by their roots in British idealism and liberalism, with the obvious addition that Zimmern might have read his old friend from university.88 Their way of classifying states – welfare versus power – was not unique. The Scottish social scientist R.M. MacIver, a major influence on Temple, used it to discern ‘dynastic states’ where coercion dominated from ‘democratic states’, a system ‘maintained for the welfare of the whole’. In democracies, ‘the common welfare’ provided the aim and sole justification of government, and the state was in this sense a servant of community under the rule of law.89 This was primarily about the form of the state, its purpose and its relations to community, in which the common life of society was lived. Above all, it was about democracy and its antithesis, the authoritarian state. As the British writer and military expert Stephen King-Hall contended: it was up to the democratic Western states – Britain and its Commonwealth, France, the US and the Scandinavian countries – to show the world that the democratic state is the welfare state, and that free men operating democratic institutions can solve the economic and political problems of these modern times without recourse to either war or to the suppression of the individual.90

Petersen and Petersen stress that liberal democracy as form of governance, not social reforms, defined Temple’s and Zimmern’s welfare state, a definition that had ‘nothing to do with the welfare state as we understand it today’.91 However – and they also acknowledge this – Bishop Temple’s long-term social commitment is well documented and important. His late book, the bestseller Christianity and Social Order (1942), pleaded for comprehensive social reforms, for ‘social welfare’ as a fundamental Christian goal but without explicitly using the binary state typology from his earlier texts. His influence echoed when the Anglican Church in 1948 fully endorsed Labour’s social reforms, welcomed ‘the growing concern and care of the modern State for its citizens’ and declared that the social welfare state embodied ‘the law of Christ’.92 ‘The welfare state’ was not, it seems, common property in British public discourse in the 1930s, and it was certainly not the preferred term in texts about the state and social reform. British Labour made use of Tem-

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ple’s binary state in the mid 1930s and underlined how the party’s doctrine and proposals, its professed commitment to international peace and cooperation, followed naturally from British democratic traditions, from [T]he humanist and democratic view of the State and of its relation to the individual that is common to the English-speaking peoples. Those peoples have always believed in the welfare State, not the power State; they hold that the State must be the servant and not the master of the people; for the State exists for the people and has been set up by them to serve their common good.93

With direct reference to philosopher T.H. Green, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Arthur Henderson, former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and party leader 1914–17 and 1931–32, stressed how Labour’s programme incorporated well-known British values such as justice, social reform and peace. Typically, Henderson’s main focus was foreign policy and the resemblance with Zimmern’s views is most likely not mere coincidence; they were both practising Christians and shared a commitment to the League of Nations and internationalism.94 But the welfare state in this pamphlet marked an exception, as ‘social service state’ became the preferred term to describe the modern state in Britain. ‘Welfare’, referring to social conditions and policies, originated in North America and entered British English ca 1920.95 It was an important term in political discourse, but the ‘social welfare state’ remained absent in Britain before the 1940s. Instead, ‘social service state’ became the preferred term to describe the modern state. Professor Harold Laski in London, the pluralist turned Marxist socialist, saw the expansion of a ‘social service state’ that had replaced the old ‘laissez faire state’ or ‘police state’, a gradual development where social reforms made up the price paid by those in power for retaining the capitalist system: ‘We have seen the negative state become the positive state, or, to put it in a different way, we have seen the police-state of the nineteenth century become the social-service-state of the twentieth.’96 Social services constituted a positive value and objective for Laski, who believed that the current social crisis of capitalism opened for real social democracy – socialist change – an idea that in itself had been brought about by ‘the social service state’ and its capitalist democracy.97 In the 1940s, William Beveridge repeatedly emphasized that he favoured the term ‘social service state’ instead of ‘welfare state’, as it implied that citizens had duties as well as rights, and ‘social services’ also became the preferred term in the British parliamentary debates.98 This, of course, did not prevent Beveridge being linked to ‘the welfare state’ after 1945, when the label was attached on Labour’s reforms and replaced ‘the social service state’. But the point is

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that this social understanding was as much imported to Britain from the United States as inherited directly from Temple. Furthermore, the later division between the two states as different stages in the development of welfare policies has little to do with the historical, fuzzy and overlapping usages of the terms.99

Many States in One Keyword ‘Confusion and Divergence’ is the telling title selected by Petersen and Petersen for their study of ‘the welfare state’ up to 1930s. As this survey has shown, ‘the welfare state’ was indeed a nebulous term with multiple connotations, and it belonged, although its popularity grew slowly over time and the need to include explanations diminished, primarily to specialists in different academic disciplines. Up to World War II, they produced ‘many isolated outcroppings’, to borrow Daniel Rodgers’ phrase, but no prolonged public debate.100 That leaves out Germany in the 1920s, where ‘the welfare state’ became a well-known term before it was defeated by the Nazis’ racial Volksgemeinschaft. Although the term did not permeate public debates elsewhere, the early ways of defining and using ‘the welfare state’ had significance for the post-1945 era. The concept of the welfare state is in this fundamental sense older than what the focus on 1950s and onwards gives away. In the 1930s, at least four different, yet overlapping, usages of ‘the welfare state’ can be discerned: the historical usage about early modern regimes, the diagnosis of the growing contemporary state, which sometimes but not necessarily included active social policies as a distinctive feature, the ‘social welfare state’ of Weimar, centred on social reforms, and ‘the democratic welfare state’. Over time, new usages multiplied the ways in which the term could be interpreted, and these were not mutually exclusive, nor did they make up separate stages in a sequential development of the concept. But the four ‘welfare states’ had different connotations and temporalities: connoting a past paternalistic state, describing contemporary administrative-institutional developments, directing future reform agendas and, adding the explicit moral dimension, separating good forms of government from evil ones. They contained slightly different accents too: the paternalistic and democratic states were foremost about the constitutional form of the state, whereas their activities defined the regulating and social welfare states. But social policies, ideas and institutions concerning the state’s overall responsibility for welfare could be accommodated in all four understandings. Equally important is that the social policies of these welfare states did not have to be about reduc-

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ing economic injustices or promoting social rights. In other words, there is no built-in progression in conceptual use, no necessary development to the ‘social welfare state’. On the contrary, in Germany, and especially in Catholic Austria, there were several advocates for a strong welfare state who linked their support for active social policies to the need to revive paternalism and preserve a threatened social order.101

The Coming of the Welfare State Gradually, the social policy-oriented understanding of the welfare state moved into the forefront and incorporated various aspects that earlier had been associated with the other usages. This process gained speed during the 1930s and 40s, with the Great Depression and World War II as the sea-changing dramas: first saving Western capitalism and then saving democracy. At the same time as the new dictatorships in Europe challenged the liberal democracies, the crisis of capitalism with surging unemployment levels opened for an active state set to rescue private business and the entire economy. Then the war called for mobilization of administrative capacities, productive resources and entire populations. In this way, the Great Depression and World War II promoted state intervention of an unprecedented magnitude and help explain the many positive and negative commentaries on the growing state from these years. The war reshaped political contexts and preferences too, in addition to the basic fact that it caused human suffering and material devastation of unparalleled dimensions.102 The importance of the New Deal in this process must be underlined, as it ‘transformed not only the range and scale of government but also the character of the country’s economy and the scope of American citizenship’.103 Although research has pointed at the slow economic recovery and the programmes’ many shortcomings – Roosevelt’s plans to set up a federal Department of Welfare and Social Security stranded on the Congress’s opposition – the key issue here is that the ideological and institutional changes centred on social reforms and that these programmes for general welfare defined the New Deal. Roosevelt described the Social Security Act of 1935 as embodying the Constitution’s general welfare principles and stressed that modern government had inescapable obligations to protect and aid its citizens in social and economic matters.104 Towards the end of the decade, the changes were evident, and it is nowadays common, declared an expert on public administration in 1938, to talk about a change in government ‘from the “negative” or “police” character which was its main function in the nineteenth century to that of the “positive” or

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“welfare” state.’105 Governmental organizations for planning and different types of advisory committees and councils in economic matters characterized this advanced state, which had grown since the end of the war. A democratic state that reconciled capitalism with the interests of the people without infringing on private property could be called a welfare state, said a prominent New Deal agricultural economist approvingly: ‘It now appears that the state of the twentieth century is and will increasingly become a welfare state.’106 German-born political scientist C.J. Friedrich at Harvard University confirmed ‘the undeniable growth of regulatory and service functions’ of the government and concluded that there was ‘little question that the government of the United States has developed into what some like to refer to as a “service state”, others as a “welfare state”, still others as “socialism”’.107 As well known, contestation surrounded the New Deal, and the expanding federal state could be interpreted optimistically as naturally building on notions of ‘the general welfare’ or pessimistically as inadequate due to lacking administrative structures – Roosevelt’s unsuccessful attempt ‘to build the social welfare state on the sands of spoil’ – or, with outspoken hostility, as something distinctively un-American.108 This critique gained momentum in 1943 after the publication of the bold plans for postwar reforms aiming at full employment and social security by the National Resources Planning Board. Security, Work and Relief Policies presented a broad and ambitious programme for a complete system of ‘social insurance’ and ‘welfare services’ – the two key terms – and was by contemporaries compared to the British Beveridge Report from December 1942. For Roosevelt’s adversaries, the new plans reeked of statism and totalitarianism, and a wave of opposition swiftly crushed both the Board and its report when Congress rolled back this extension of the New Deal. The New York Times compared them to ‘Bismarck’s state insurance system, which laid the foundation for the German welfare state that ended in Nazi’.109 Roosevelt promised social reforms but promoted ‘state socialism’ and planning that would threaten economic prosperity and American values, continued his critics. Although the critics quashed the postwar plans and the President soon abandoned the concrete social reforms for the war effort, he had set the tone in his famous State of the Union address 6 January 1941 with ‘freedom from want’ as one of the four fundamental human freedoms next to freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship and freedom from fear. These freedoms were key foundations of the healthy and strong democracy that had to come after the victory.110 Welfare for all – ‘Improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security’ – was set as one of the objectives of the Atlantic Declaration from later that same

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year and became an important part of the various plans made for global cooperation and economic development, and Roosevelt also talked about the need for a second bill of – social and economic – rights.111 These ideas about planning for social security and full employment stood central in the discussion about the welfare state in the following years. Beveridge’s Full Employment in a Free Society from 1944 embodied this reconciliation of democracy and welfare, whereas F.A. Hayek’s highly influential The Road to Serfdom, published that same year, gave voice to the sceptics. Although Hayek never directly mentioned ‘the welfare state’ in his diatribe against economic planning and growing economic power of the state with the subsequent collectivism and infringements on individual liberties, contemporaries interpreted it that way, since ‘welfare state’ denoted the federal state of the New Deal in the broader sense: Hayek had identified the welfare state with dictatorship, and thousands of Americans, embittered about the New Deal and the persistent success of Mr. Roosevelt, found in this identification not only proof of all that they had long suspected about Roosevelt, but a new weapon with which to smite him.112

Towards the end of the 1940s, the controversy over ‘the welfare state’ escalated. President Truman won the election 1948 on a pro-welfare platform and confronted ‘the reactionaries’ in the ‘Do Nothing Congress’ who tried to scare the public using phrases like ‘the welfare state’, ‘statism’ and ‘socialism’. ‘The welfare state’, repeated his adversaries, was incredibly expensive, distinctively foreign and entailed state regimentation, encroachment on personal freedom and intolerable state paternalism; the Republican contender for 1948, Governor Dewey, labelled this the ‘ever-growing, nobody-can-feed-you-but-us philosophy’, and former President Hoover warned fellow Americans of ‘these European infections’.113 After intense political battle, ‘welfare’ lost much of its progressive connotations and became a synonym of ‘dependency’, and ‘the welfare state’ became another casualty of the domestic Cold War in the early 50s. A few years later, Republican Vice President R. Nixon highlighted the established difference between good and bad welfare states as the winning side saw it: There is a difference between the general welfare and the welfare state. In the welfare state the government absorbs the citizens and private groups. It may smother them with honey, but nonetheless it smothers them. They are regulated from cradle to grave. In the general-welfare state the government is the servant of the citizen. It seeks to help, not control.114

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Despite the welfare state’s American defeat, the international success of the concept after 1945 depended on the declarations like Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms and Second Bill of Rights, and the Atlantic Charter. Together with the Beveridge Report and the International Labour Organization’s Philadelphia Declaration they contributed to setting the ideals for a new state committed to social welfare, free trade and macroeconomic planning for full employment. Human rights and social rights made up other parts of the package – ILO introduced ‘social’ as the new programmatic concept and included all human beings, and not just workers, into this extensive reform programme, and the Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 stated that each member of society had the right to social security and ‘the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality’.115 Lord Beveridge’s report on social insurances became the classic starting point, and although it did not provide the blueprints for the later reforms, it ‘articulated many of the central moral and political assumptions of the postwar social order’.116 The Report became an instant international success and moved the universalist version of social insurance to the top of the agenda, and later interpretations stressed its inherent notion of social citizenship.117 The reforms carried out by Labour after the war built the first internationally acknowledged ‘social welfare state’; Australia, New Zealand and the Scandinavian countries were other noted examples, but the United Kingdom held the top position. The others were laboratory sized, explained Prime Minister Attlee’s public relations advisor Francis Williams: ‘They are valuable and interesting to watch, but because of their small size and special circumstances they do not and cannot have the world significance that the British experiment has.’118 Britain, on the other hand, was a populous and powerful nation, the centre of an empire, albeit a crumbling one, and above all one of the major victors of the war. Ironically, ‘the welfare state’ conquered the world except Germany, where ‘social state’ (Sozialstaat) or ‘social legal state’ (soziale Rechtsstaat) became the preferred terms, often defined by German politicians as something distinctively different from ‘the welfare state’. Similarly, dynamic capitalism and individualism prevailed over European collectivism in the United States. So, the two countries where the term developed rejected it for different reasons when many other countries adopted it. But the United States, the dominant moral and military power in the Western world, contributed to ‘the welfare state’s victory through democratic leadership and as the chief architect of the postwar moral world order.119 In Western Europe, liberal, Christian democratic or social democratic, ‘the welfare states’ meant both rehabilitation of the destroyed continent and separation from the socialist regimes in the East. A few years after

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the war, commentators used the new keyword freely to describe contemporary society and defined its essential characteristics in diverging ways: democratic, reformist, paternalistic, regulative, bureaucratic, planning, socialist, materialist, Christian, inevitable, necessary, expensive, immoral and so on.120 Nils Edling is Reader in History, Department of History, Stockholm University. He is currently writing a book on welfare as a key concept in Swedish politics with the working title Kampen om välfärdsstaten. Earlier publications on this topic include the chapter on Denmark and Sweden, co-authored by Klaus Petersen and Jørn Henrik Petersen, in Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language (Policy Press, 2014).

NOTES 1. Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 24–28. 2. E.g. Douglas E. Ashford, The Emergence of the Welfare States (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Ernest Peter Hennock, The Origin of the Welfare State in England and Germany, 1850–1914: Social Policies Compared (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Gerhard A. Ritter, Der Sozialstaat: Entstehung und Entwicklung im internationalen Vergleich, 3rd ed. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010). 3. Peter N. Miller, Defining the Common Good: Empire, Religion and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. ch. 1; Thomas Simon, ‘Gemeinwohltopik in der mittelalterlichen und frühneuzetlichen Politiktheorie’, in Herfried Münkler and Harald Bluhm (eds), Gemeinwohl und Gemeinsinn: Historischer Semantiken politischer Leitbegriffe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001), 129–46; Bo Lindberg, Den antika skevheten: Politiska ord och begrepp i det tidig-moderna Sverige (Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhetsakademien, 2006), 58–65. 4. Lindberg, Den antika skevheten, 44 (with the Latin original in note 10). 5. Ludvig Holberg, Moralske Kierne eller Introduction til Naturens og Folke-rettens Kundskab: Uddragen af de fornemste Juristers, Besynderlig Grotii, Pufendorfs og Thomasii Skrifter illustreret med Exempler af de Nordiske Historier og confereret med vore Danske og Norske Love, Recesse og Fordordninger, 2 vols (Copenhagen: Johan Kruse, 1715), vol. 2, ch. 9, 81–82. Holberg’s book, with five editions during his lifetime, was translated into German in 1748 and Swedish in 1789. 6. Kenneth Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 118. This is also stressed by Leif Runefelt, Hushållningens dygder: Affektlära, hushållningslära

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7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

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och ekonomiskt tänkande under svensk stormaktstid (Stockholm: Stockholms Universitet, 2001), 247, who, for the Swedish case, argues with Raeff that the goal was to direct the behaviour and actions of the subjects towards ‘the common good’ and ‘a well-ordered police state’, see Marc Raeff, The WellOrdered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600–1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). For the police regulations, see Ditlev Tamm, ‘Gute Sitte und Ordnung: Zur Entwicklung und Funktion der Polizeigesetzgebung in Dänemark’, in Michael Stolleis (ed.), Policey im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1996), 509–30; Pär Frohnert, ‘Sverige/Schweden’, in Karl Härter and Michael Stolleis (eds), Repertorium der Policeyverordnungen der Frühen Neuzeit, vol. 12: 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2017), 21–73. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘The Origin and Development of the Concept of the Rechtsstaat’, in Böckenförde, State, Society and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law (New York: Berg, 1991), 47–70; Gustavo Gozzi, ‘Rechtsstaat and Individual Rights in German Constitutional History’, in Pietro Costa and Danilo Zolo (eds), The Rule of Law: History, Theory and Criticism (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 237–59. Early English translations used ‘legal state’, e.g. Johann Caspar Bluntschli, The Theory of the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885), VI, 59. German scholars disagree on the similarities between Wohlfahrtsstaat and Sozialstaat, cf. Ernst Rudolf Huber, ‘Rechtsstaat und Sozialstaat in der modernen Industriegesellschaft’, in Huber, Nationalstaat und Verfassungsstaat: Studien zur Geschichte der modernen Staatsidee (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1965), 249–72; Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, European Foundations of the Welfare State (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 8–12. Böckenförde, ‘The Origin and Development’, 47–53; David F. Lindenfeld, The Practical Imagination: The German Sciences of State in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 55–58; cit. from Kant’s ‘On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice’ (in German 1793) from Wolfgang Kersting, ‘Politics’, in Knud Haakonssen (ed.), The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006–8), vol. 2, 1035. Cit. from Böckenförde, ‘The Origin and Development’, 55. On Mayer’s importance, Michael Stolleis, Public Law in Germany 1800–1914 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 392–94; see also Gozzi, ‘Rechtsstaat’, 247–50. Stolleis, Public Law, 377–79; Florian Buch, Grosse Politik im neuen Reich: Gesellschaft und Aussenpolitik in Deutschland 1867–1882 (Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2004), 500–12. For details, Klaus Petersen and Jørn Henrik Petersen, ‘Confusion and Divergence: Origins and Meanings of the term “Welfare State” in Germany and Britain, 1840–1940’, Journal of European Social Policy 23(1) (2013), 41. Gneist’s Der Rechtsstaat was published 1872 and revised 1879 as Rechtsstaat und die Vervaltungsgerichte in Deutschland.

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13. Lorenz von Stein, Verwaltungslehre, 7 vols (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1865–68), vol. 2, 20. 14. Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’, 40; Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Lorenz von Stein as Theorist of the Movement of State and Society towards the Welfare State’, in Böckenförde, State, 115–45. 15. Kaufmann, European, 65–68; Hermann Beck, The Origins of the Authoritarian Welfare State in Prussia: Conservatives, Bureaucracy, and the Social Question, 1815–70 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 66–71, 78; Michael Stolleis, Origins of the German Welfare State: Social Policy in Germany to 1945 (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013), 55–60. 16. E.g. Gustav Marchet, Studien über die Entwicklung der Verwaltungslehre in Deutschland von der zweiten Hälfte des 17, bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts (Munich and Leipzig: Oldenbourg, 1885), pts 1 (on Seckendorff (1626–92) as a forerunner of the ‘eudaimonic welfare state’) and 2:1 (on the philosophical foundation of ‘eudaimonic welfare state’ in the eighteenth century); Wilhelm Dilthey, ‘Das Allgemeine Landrecht’, in Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, 12 vols (Berlin: Teubner, 1914–36), vol. 12, 182–83 (‘The Welfare State and its Omnipotence’); Franz Schnabel, Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert, 4 vols (Freiburg: Herder, 1929–37), vol. 2, 82–83, 104–7 (equates eudaimonism and welfare state); Gerhard Ritter, Dämonie der Macht: Betrachtungen über Geschichte und Wesen des Machtproblems in politischen denken der Neuzeit, 6th ed. (Munich: Leibniz, 1948), ch. 3 (on More’s Utopia and the ideal of the welfare state); Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 156 (on Hardenberg’s welfare state), 310 (on state capitalism and the welfare state as one strand in German social thinking). 17. E.g. Marchet, Studien, 232–37 (Aristotle); August Döring, Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie Gemeinverständlich nach Quellen, 2 vols (Leipzig: Reisland, 1903), vol. 1, 584 (Plato); Paul Joachimsen, Geschichtswiederholungen (Muenich: Hugenduebel, 1914), 126 (US Constitution); Ferdinand Tönnies, Thomas Hobbes: Lehre und Werke, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart: Frohmanns, 1926), 222 (Hobbes). 18. The answer to a question about the German Enlightenment in a preparation book for grammar school pupils (Gymnasium) begins: ‘The form of the state: Enlightened Absolutism. Governing principle: The Prince is the first servant of the State. Purpose: The Welfare State’, Joachimsen, Geschichtswiederholungen, 129. 19. Stein and Gneist were not the only ones who used Wohlfahrtsstaat. Herman Bischof in Giessen – an outsider in the world of German Staatslehrer who supported an organic-Christian doctrine of state against the individualism of the Rechtsstaat – saw ‘the welfare state doctrine’ as an expression of the crudest materialism because it subjected eternal values to the promotion of worldly welfare, Herman Bischof, Allgemeine Staatslehre: Gestützt auf geschichtliche Grundlage und christlichen Prinzipien zur Lösung der sociale Probleme des 19.

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20.

21.

22.

23.

24. 25.

26.

27.

28. 29.

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Jahrhunderts für die Träger der allgemeinen deutschen Bildung und als Leitfaden bei akademischen Vorlesungen (Giessen: Ferber, 1860), 58–65. For more examples, Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’, 40. Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’, 39–40 (from Nauwerck, ‘Ueber den Verein zur Hebung der untern Volksklasse’, Berliner Blätter 1844: 5, 5). On Nauwerck’s marginal position in the association, Jürgen Reulecke, Soziale Frieden durch soziale Reform: Der Centralverein für das Wohl der arbeitenden Klassen in der Frühindustrialisierung (Wuppertal: Peter Hammer, 1983), 75–76, 99, 102 note 203, 153–54. Norman Senk, Junghegelianisches Rechtsdenken: Die Staats-, Rechts- und Justizdiskussion der “Hallischen” und “Deutschen Jahrbücher” 1838–1843 (Paderborn: Mentis, 2007), contains nothing on Nauwerck’s Wohlfahrtsstaat. For the numerous welfare compounds, see the bibliography Oskar Albert Walther, Hand-Lexicon der Juristischen Literatur des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (Weimar: Janssen, 1854); on the Civil Code, Friedrich Ebel (ed.), Gemeinwohl – Freiheit – Vernunft – Rechtsstaat 200 Jahre Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten Symposium der Juristischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin 27.–29. Mai 1994 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1995). Stolleis, Public Law, chs 8–10; Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, Thinking about Social Policy: The German Tradition (Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, 2013), 23– 62; Thorsten Moos, Staatszweck und Staatsaufgaben in den protestantischen Ethiken des 19. Jahrhunderts (Muenster: LIT, 2005). Stolleis, Public Law, 229–33; Lindenfeld, Practical, ch. 3. Schmoller, ‘Eröffnungsrede’ (in Verhandlungen der Eisenacher Versammlung zur Besprechung der sozialen Frage am 6. und 7. Oktober 1872) cit. from Rüdiger vom Bruch, ‘Kulturstaat – Sinndeutung von Oben?’, in Rüdiger vom Bruch, Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Gangolf Hübinger (eds), Kultur und Kulturwissenschaften um 1900: Krise der Moderne und Glaube an die Wissenschaft (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1989), 63. On Kulturstaat, Dyson, State, 87–89, 150–51, 156–58. Wagner, Allgemeine oder theoretische Volks-wirtschaftslehre: Grundlegung from 1876 cit. from Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’, 39. Wagner’s support for a welfare state is not unknown among German scholars, see Ritter, Sozialstaat, 4, 76–77, for Wagner’s writings in 1879. Petersen and Petersen show that Wagner used the term three years earlier (1876). Kaufmann, Thinking, 66 note 98 refers to Wagner 1876. Adolph Wagner, ‘Finanzwissenschaft und Staatssozialismus, mit einer Einleitung über Stein’s und Roscher’s Finanzwissenschaft’, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 43(1, 4) 1887, 81–87; Lindenfeld, Practical, 243–45 and chs 4–6 passim. See also Stolleis, Origins, 59–60. For details on the reforms, Hennock, The Origin, chs 3–4, 8–10; Stolleis, Origins, 53–83. Full text search available of Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichtags, http:// www.reichstag-abgeordnetendatenbank.de/volltext.html (accessed 11 November 2017).

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30. Kaufmann, Thinking, 42–54. 31. On the conservative tradition, Beck, Origins, passim; on ‘state socialism’, Johannes Kandel, Protestantischer Sozialkonservatismus am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts: Pfarrer Rudolf Todts Auseinandersetzung mit dem Sozialismus im Widerstreit der kirchlichen und politischen Lager (Bonn: Dietz, 1993), 119–28; Wolfgang Schieder, ‘Bismarck und der Sozialismus’, in Johannes Kuhnisch (ed.), Bismarck und seine Zeit (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1992), 173–89. 32. Walter Euchner, ‘Ideengeschichte des Sozialismus in Deutschland: Teil 1’, in Helga Grebing (ed.), Geschichte der sozialen Ideen in Deutschland: Sozialismus – katholische Soziallehre – protestantische Sozialethik. Ein Handbuch, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 128–45. 33. Cit. from the Copenhagen resolution 1883, Vernon L. Lidtke, The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878–1890 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 167. 34. Manfred B. Steger, The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), ch. 5. 35. Early examples, ‘Die Freimaurerei und die Gegenwart’, Historische-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland 41 (1858), 760; ‘Die modern-liberale Staat und die Kirche’, Historische-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland 59 (1867), 485; on the 1870s and 80s, Franz Josef Stegmann and Peter Langhorst, ‘Geschichte der sozialen Ideen im deutschen Katholizismus’, in Grebing, Geschichte, 667–87; Hermann-Josef Grosse Kracht, ‘Sozialer Katholizismus und demokratischer Wohlfahrtsstaat: Klärungsversuche zur Geschichte und Gegenwart einer ungewollten Wahlverwandtschaft’, Jahrbuch für Christliche Sozialwissenschaften 46 (2005), 53–74. 36. On the Congress 1890, Paul Misner, Social Catholicism in Europe: From the Onset of Industrialization to the First World War (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 190–94; Rerum Novarum, esp. § 11. 37. Joseph Mausbach, ‘Christlich-Katholische Ethik’, in Die Christliche Religion: Mit Einschluss der israelitisch-jüdischen Religion (Kultur der Gegenwart vol. 1: 4) (Berlin: Teubner, 1906), 544. His verdict followed Theodor Meyer, who in 1891 argued that a welfare state could embody ‘the true Christian idea of the state’, Stegmann and Langhorst, ‘Geschichte’, 684. 38. Gustav Cohn, System der Nationalökonomie: Ein Lesebuch für Studierende, 2 vols (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1885–89), vol. 2 Finanzwissenschaften, § 38. 39. Gustav Cohn, A History of Political Economy (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1894), 83 (of the German vol. 1 § 292, ‘the old police- and welfare state’). The second volume (System der Finanzwissenschaft, 1889) was translated by Thorstein Veblen and published as The Science of Finance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1895). Here, on pages 63–64, the American reader met the argument that ‘the civil-legal state’ (Rechtsstaat) now had ‘come to terms with the more comprehensive modern range of state activity, and has accordingly no quarrel with “the welfare state”’.

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40. Ferdinand Tönnies, ‘Rechtsstaat und Wohlfahrtsstaat: Referat, erstattet auf dem III. Kongress der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Wirschaftsphilosophie’, Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 1914–15(8), 65– 70. 41. Ernst von Meier, ‘Das Verwaltungsrecht’, in J. Kohler (ed.), Encyklopädie der Rechtswissenschaft in systematischer Bearbeitung, 2nd ed., 2 vols (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1904), vol. 2, 640–41. 42. Adolph Wagner, ‘Staat in nationalökonomischer Hinsicht’, Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaft, 8 vols (Jena: Fischer, 1909–11), vol. 7 (1911), 727– 39. Other examples, Fritz Berolzheimer, System der Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 5 vols (Munich: Beck, 1904–7), see esp. vol. 3 Philosophie des Staates samt den Grundzügen der Politik, § 14–15; Fritz Berolzheimer, Moral und Gesellschaft des 20. Jahrhunderts (Munich: Ernst Rheinhardt, 1914), 190–91: Margarete Treuge, Einführung in die Bürgerkunde: Ein Leitfaden für Frauenschulen, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Teubner, 1912), 17 (the modern state fulfils different purposes); Johannes Beck, ‘Arbeiterfrage’, in Kirchliches Handlexikon: Ein Nachschlagebuch über das Gesamtgebiet der Theologie und ihrer Hilfswissenschaften: Unter Mitwirkung zahlreicher Fachgelehrten, 2 vols (Munich: Allg. Verlags-Gesellschaft, 1907–12), vol. 1, 312–14 (on the welfare state’s social legislation to protect industrial workers, women and children). 43. Cit. from Wilhelm Jerusalem, Der Krieg im Lichte der Gesellschaftslehre (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1915), 18; see also, Emil Hammacher, Hauptfragen der modernen Kultur (Berlin: Teubner, 1914), 146 (on continuity from Wolff to the present). 44. Andreas Anter, Max Weber’s Theory of the Modern State: Origins, Structure and Significance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 124–33. Anter, 126, quotes historian Paul Joachimsen, Vom deutschen Volk zum deutschen Staat: Eine Geschichte des deutschen Nationalbewußtseins (1916) for the relation between state power and public welfare: ‘The aim of Prussian policy is the Machtstaat: the welfare of its subjects is taken into consideration only to the extent that they serve the concept of power. This undergoes progressive development as it becomes increasingly plain that there is a relationship between the welfare of subjects and the power of the state.’ 45. Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1922), 492–93, 613; 744; cf. Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’, 41, and Horst Baier, ‘“Vater Sozialstaat”: Max Webers Widerspruch von Wohlfahrtspatronage’, in Christian Gneuss and Jürgen Kocka (eds), Max Weber: Ein Symposion (Munich: dtv, 1988), 47–63. 46. This is based on a simple search in the German parliamentary records 1900–1914: Rechtsstaat 105, Kulturstaat 113 and Zukunftsstaat 274 occurrences. Wohlfahrtsstaat was not used in the Reichstag, see Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichtags, http://www.reichstag-abgeordnetendatenbank.de/ volltext.html (accessed 9 November 2017).

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47. E.g. Karl von Stengel (ed.), Wörterbuch des Deutschen Verwaltungsrecht, 5 vols (Freiburg: Mohr Siebeck, 1890–97); Otto Ladendorff, Historisches Schlagwörterbuch: Ein Versuch (Strasbourg and Berlin: Trübner, 1904); Ludvig Elster (ed.), Wörterbuch der Volkswirtschaft, 2nd ed., 2 vols (Jena: Fischer, 1906–7); Paul Laband (ed.), Handbuch der Politik, 2nd ed., 3 vols (Leipzig and Berlin: W. Rothschild, 1914); Rudolf von Bitter (ed.), Handwörterbuch der preussischen Verwaltung, 2 vols (Leipzig: Roßberg, 1906). There are scattered entries incl. Wohlfahrtsstaat, except Meier, ‘Verwaltungsrecht’, see e.g. Magnus Biermer, ‘Arbeitseinstellungen’, in Elster, Wörterbuch, vol. 1, 182 (on how the modern welfare state through social legislation can do and has done considerably more to improve the workers’ conditions than the unions). 48. E.g. Heinrich Albrecht, Handbuch der Sozialen Wohlfahrtspflege in Deutschland: Auf Grund des Materials der Zentralstelle für Arbeiterwohlfahrtseinrichtungen (Berlin: Carl Heymann, 1902); Richard von der Borght, Grundzüge der Sozialpolitik (Leipzig: Hirschfeld, 1904), pt 2 (some 360 pages on workers’ welfare policies). See also Wilfried Rudloff, Die Wohlfahrtsstadt: Kommunale Ernährungs-, Fürsorge- und Wohnungspolitik am Beispiel Münchens 1910– 1933, 2 vols (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998). 49. For classic studies of transfer and transnational circulation, the export and import of social ideas and policies, Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in the Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998); Ernest Peter Hennock, British Social Reform and German Precedents: The Case of Social Insurance 1880–1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Marjatta Hiettala, Services and Urbanization at the Turn of the Century: The Diffusion of Innovations (Helsinki: SHS, 1987). 50. Munro Smith, ‘Four German Jurists pt 4’, Political Science Quarterly 16(4) (1901), 641–79 (on Gneist); Arthur T. Hadley, ‘Economic Freedom’, in James M. Baldwin (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 3 vols (New York: Macmillan, 1901–5), vol. 1, 305–6 (on W. von Humboldt); Thomas E. Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence, 11th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), 80 note 3 (idea of Wohlfahrtsstaat close to communism); Charles Zueblin, ‘Government: The Administration of the Common Life Involves the Progressive Satisfaction of the Interests of All’, The Twentieth Century Magazine 6(5) (1912), 438 (positive about the Swiss welfare state). 51. Constitution of the United States, Preamble, Clause 8, retrieved 5 May 2016 from http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm. 52. Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics since Independence (New York: Basic Books, 1987), chs 5–6; Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pt 3; John G. Gunnell, Imagining the American Polity: Political Science and the Discourse of Democracy (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), ch. 2. 53. Westel W. Willoughby, An Examination of the Nature of the State: A Study in Political Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1896), 337–43; Ross, Origins, 280–81.

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54. Charles Edward Merriam, American Political Ideas: Studies in the Development of American Political Thought 1865–1917 (New York: Macmillan, 1920), 338. Raymond Gettell, History of American Political Thought (New York and London: Century Inc., 1928), 571–75, traced the same development from ‘police state’ to ‘general welfare state’. 55. Cit. Charles and Bertha Haines, Principles and Problems of Government (New York: Harper Brothers, 1921), 581; see also, James Dealey, The Development of the State: Its Governmental Organization and its Activities (New York: Silver, Burdett & Co, 1909), chs 2:4, 5, 15; Stephen Leacock, Elements of Political Science, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), pt 3:3. 56. Albert Kocourek, An Introduction to the Science of Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1930), 83–89, cit. 86. 57. Michael B. Katz and Lorrin R. Thomas, ‘The Invention of “Welfare” in America’, Journal of Policy History 10(4) (1998), 400–4; for the state welfare departments, Marietta Stevenson, Public Welfare Administration (New York: Macmillan, 1938), 9–13, app. 3. 58. This does not contradict the interpretations stressing the states’ welfare responsibilities – their regulatory power for the protection of the common good – in the nineteenth century, William Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 59. For details, Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings; Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: Social History of Welfare in America, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1996), chs 5–8. 60. Werner Abelshauser, ‘Die Weimarer Republik – Ein Wohlfahrtsstaat?’, in Abelshauser (ed.), Die Weimarer Republik als Wohlfahrtsstaat (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1987), 8–11, who reiterates the erroneous assumption that ‘the welfare state’ was imported to Germany from England. 61. Young-Sun Hong, Welfare, Modernity, and the Weimar State, 1919–1933 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). See also, Detlev Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity (London: Allen Lane, 1991), 35–42, 129–40; David F. Crew, ‘A Social Republic? Social Democrats, Communists, and the Weimar Welfare State, 1919 to 1933’, in David E. Barclay and Eric D. Weitz, Between Reform and Revolution: German Socialism and Communism from 1840 to 1900 (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998), 223–49. 62. Thomas Mergel, ‘High Expectations – Deep Disappointment: Structures of the Public Perception of Politics in the Weimar Republic’, in Kathleen Canning, Kerstin Brandt and Kristin McGuire (eds), Weimar Publics/Weimar Subjects: Rethinking the Political Culture of Germany in the 1920s (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 195. 63. Gustav Radbruch, Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft (1910) in Radbruch, Gesamtausgabe, 20 vols, (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1987–2003), vol. 1, 167, 170–71.

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64. Hermann Heller, ‘Grundrechte und Grundpflichten’, in Heller, Gesammelte Schriften 3 vols (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1971), vol. 2, Recht, Staat, Macht, 291. Originally published in 1924. 65. Hermann Müller-Franken, ‘Zum deutschen Parlamentarismus’, Die Gesellschaft: Internationale Revue für Sozialismus und Politik 3 (1926), 292; Hans Maier, ‘Verwaltungsreform’, Die Gesellschaft 5 (1928), 233–34; see also, Wolfgang Luthardt, ‘Verfassung, Wohlfahrtsstaat und Demokratie’, in Wolfgang Luthardt and Alfons Söllner, Verfassungsstaat, Souveränität, Pluralismus: Otto Kirchheimer zum Gedächtnis (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989), 41–56; Udi Greenberg, The Weimar Century: German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 76–89. 66. Rudolf Hilferding in Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichtags 5 April 1927 (3. Wahlperiode, Sitzung 306, Vol. 393, 10485), retrieved 9 November 2017 from http://www.reichstag-abgeordnetendatenbank.de/volltext.html. Other Social Democrats and Liberals made similar statements in parliament. 67. Cit. from Crew, ‘Social Republic’, 224. Crew quotes Louis Korell, the head of the Social Democrats’ welfare association in Hamburg and member of the Hansestadt’s welfare administration, and Hong, Welfare, 36. Hong quotes Johannes Steinweg 1922. For more examples, see e.g. Manfred Hermanns, Sozialethik im Wandel der Zeit: Persönlichkeiten, Forschungen, Wirkungen des Lehrstuhls für Christliche Gesellschaftslehre und des Instituts für Christliche Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Münster 1893–1997 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006), 109–10, 128, 181–82. 68. Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’, 42. See also, Christine Teusch, ‘Die Sozialpolitik des Zentrums’, in Georg Schreiber (ed.), Politisches Jahrbuch 1927/28 (Mönchengladbach: Volksverein, 1928), 462–88. 69. On the welfare sector, Hong, Welfare, passim; on elections, Julia Sneeringer, Winning Women’s Votes: Propaganda and Politics in Weimar Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 53–59, 88–93, 126–27, 130– 31, 153–56. 70. Ferdinand Tönnies, ‘Bürgerliche und politische Freiheit’, in Gerhard Anschütz et al. (eds), Handbuch der Politik, 3rd ed., 5 vols (Berlin: Walther Rothscheid, 1920–22), vol. 1, Grundlagen der Politik, 178–79; Max Conrad, ‘Zwangswirtschaft und Sozialisierung’, Die Grenzboten: Zeitschrift für Politik, Literatur und Kunst 79(1) (1920), 139–49. 71. Conrad, ‘Zwangswirtschaft’, 141–42. Conrad also used Zwangsstaat, ‘Coercive State’, to describe limitless state social policies. Another line of attack aimed at the very idea of state welfare programmes, characterized as authoritarian and patronizing state tutelage (Vormund), as being completely incompatible with the principles of the new democracy imported from England. The idea of a welfare democracy, socialist and revolutionary in its origin, was therefore full of contradictions and divisions that damaged the German people, Fritz Gerlich, ‘Staatszweck und Staatsform’, Bürger und Staat: Bericht

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72.

73.

74. 75.

76.

77. 78.

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über die vierte Hauptversammlung des Reichsbürgerrats in Bremen (8.–11. Juni 1922) (Berlin: Verlag des Reichsbürgerrats, 1922), 39–53. Cit. Walther Schotte, ‘Vor dem Zusammenbruch’, Preusssiche Jahrbücher 203 (1926), 99–101; August Winnig, Das Reich als Republik 1918–1928 (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1928), 305–6. Schotte belonged to the Young conservatives and would later become chief propagandist for the Papen government. Winnig, a novelist and union leader, moved from support for the Social Democrats in the early republic to a conservative and nationalist völkisch position, Kurt Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik: Die politischen Ideen des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen 1918 und 1933, 3rd ed. (Munich: Nymphenburger, 1968), 23–24, 32, 160, 169, 275. Ludvig von Mises, ‘Antimarxismus’, in von Mises, Kritik des Interventionismus Untersuchungen zur Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsideologie der Gegenwart, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Fischer, 1976), 91–122. The article was originally published in 1925. Cit. Benjamin Lapp, Revolution from the Right: Politics, Class, and the Rise of Nazism in Saxony, 1919–1933 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997), 162. Hong, Welfare, chs 6–7. Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’, 42 and 48 note 9. For welfare critique, see Hong, chs 7–8; David F. Crew, Germans on Welfare: From Weimar to Hitler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 208–12; Rudloff, Wohlfahrtsstadt, vol. 2, ch. 12, esp. 908–10; Crew, ‘Social Republic’, 237–42. Hong, Welfare, 62, 208, 217, cit. 217; Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’, 42–43. Hong and Petersen and Petersen make slightly different translations of this passage from Arbeiterwohlfahrt 1929. Maier repeated the defence in ‘Wohlfahrtsstaat?’, Arbeiterwohlfahrt 6(12) (1931), 381–82, where he argued that the idea of the welfare state should be separated from concrete policy problems. Another prominent leader from the welfare sector, Hans Muthesius in Berlin, argued in a similar manner for a staunch defence of the welfare state against the critics. After that, when the attacks had been fended off, it would be possible to solve the intricate organizational conflicts, Muthesius, ‘Kollektivverantwortung oder Einzelverantwortung in der Wohlfahrtspflege’, in Die Stellung der Wohlfahrtspflege zur Wirtschaft, zum Staat und zum Menschen: Bericht über den 41. Deutschen Fürsorgetag in Berlin am 26. u. 27. November 1930 (Schriften des DeutschenVereins für öffentliche und private Fürsorge 15) (Karlsruhe: G. Braun, 1931), 43–54. Cit. from Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’, 43. E.g. Georg Decker, ‘Politische Wandlung’, Die Gesellschaft 7(11) (1930), 390 (the current hatred of ‘the welfare state’ is directed against the political power of the working class); Ernst Fraenkel, ‘Abschied von Weimar?’ Die Gesellschaft 9(2) (1932), 109 (von Papen’s attack on ‘the welfare state’ was an insult to social democrats); Erich Ollenhauer, ‘Aufruf zum Freiheitskampf’, Arbeier-Jugend: Monatsschrift der sozialistischen Arbeiterjugend 24(7) (1932), 195 (The dismantling of the welfare state, which means in these times of

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79.

80.

81.

82.

83.

84. 85.

86.

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High Capitalism stripping the workers of any public support and forcing them, pressed by hunger, to accept any offer for a job under any condition). ‘Having suffocated . . .’ from Liberaler Tagung 1928 cit. Larry Eugene Jones, German Liberalism and the Dissolution of the Weimar Party System, 1918– 1933 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 313; cit. ‘more unsuited . . .’ Hong, Welfare, 218 note 33; Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’, 42–43. Some Liberals criticized the ways in which publicly organized insurance schemes, especially the new compulsory unemployment insurance, thwarted self-help initiatives and decentralized schemes for provision. This increased dependency on the state characterized the Fürsorgestaat. E.g. Italy, Erwin von Beckerath, Wesen under Werden des faschistischen Staates (Berlin: Springer, 1927), 151; Hermann Heller, Europa und der Faschismus (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1929), 110, 123; United States, Carl J. Friedrich, ‘Die Entwicklung des amerikanischen öffentlichen Rechts nach dem Kriege’, Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 20 (1932), 394–96, 422–23; and generally, Friedrich Darmstaedter, Die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Rechtsstaates: Eine Untersuchung zur gegenwärtigen Krise der liberalen Staatsgedankens, 2nd ed. (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1971), 79, 288; Hans Kelsen, Der Staat als Integration: Eine prinzipielle Auseinandersetzung (Vienna: Springer, 1930), 72–73; Carl Schmitt, Hüter der Verfassung, 4th ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996), 79–82, 92. Peter C. Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law: The Theory & Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 112–15; Schmitt, Hüter, 79–82, cit. 79. Hermann Heller, ‘Rechtstaat oder Diktatur’ and ‘Autoritärer Liberalismus’, in Heller, Gesammelte Schriften vol. 2, 443–62, 643–53. Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty, 144. Matthew Grimley, Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England: Liberal Anglican Theories of the State between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004); David Nicholls, Deity and Domination: Images of God and the State in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London: Routledge, 1989), 44–52; Daniel Wincott, ‘Original and Imitated or Elusive and Limited? Towards a Genealogy of the Welfare State in Britain’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 127–41. See Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’, 37–38, 43–44, for the many different attributions. Holland, Elements, 80. William Temple, Christianity and the State (London: Macmillan, 1928), 169– 70. See also, William Temple, The State in its External Relations (London: Macmillan, 1932), 32–33; William Temple, Citizen and Churchman (London: Eyre & Spottiswood, 1941), 34–39. Already in the 1910s, Joseph Jacobs, Jewish Contributions to Civilization: An Estimate (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1919), 284, 293, used the established German vocabulary with a twist and distin-

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87.

88. 89.

90.

91. 92.

93.

94.

95.

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guished ‘the Welfare State’ of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from the older ‘church-state’. The welfare state constituted historical progress, as it included certain religious liberties for the Jews. See also, Joseph Jacobs, ‘Liberalism and the Jews’, The Menorah Journal 1(5) (1915), 298–309. On the Australian folklorist and historian Jacobs, George F.J. Bergman, ‘Jacobs, Joseph (1854–1916)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography. For a similar story about progress where ‘the welfare state’ connotes a new period in human history, see Norman Bentwich, The Religious Foundations of Internationalism: A Study in International Relations through the Ages (London: Allen & Unwin, 1933), 216–17, 280–81. Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’, 45–46; Wincott, ‘Original’, 130–34 (about Zimmern). Petersen and Petersen’s other example is George Schuster, official in various British colonial governments and later Liberal MP, who also mentioned the welfare state. On Zimmern’s liberalism and its roots in British idealism, especially the work of T.H. Green, and new liberalism, Jeanne Morefield, Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), cit. 93. Frederic A. Iremonger, William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury: His Life and Letters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), 89–90. Robert M. MacIver, The Modern State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926), 3, 229 and ch. 11 and 14, cit. 341; on MacIver and Temple, Grimley, Citizenship, 94–96. For a detailed classification of state forms based largely on MacIver, Lloyd V. Ballard, Social Institutions (New York: D. AppletonCentury Company, 1936), ch. 15 (‘power states’ and ‘welfare states’ were the two main forms of governance). Stephen King-Hall, The World since the War (London: Thomas Nelson, 1937), 100. Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939 (London: Macmillan, 1939), 119–20, saw the separation of politics and economics that Zimmern and others promoted as a dangerous illusion. Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’, 45–46; cf. Wincott, ‘Original’, 131. Cit. Lambeth Conference 1948, Frank Prochaska, Christianity and Social Service in Modern Britain: The Disinherited Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 95. Arthur Henderson, Labour’s Way to Peace (London: Meuthen & Co, 1935), 99. Nicholls, Grimley and Morefield all underline the importance of T.H Green for Temple and Zimmern. On Henderson, Ross McKibbin, ‘Arthur Henderson as Labour Leader’, in McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain 1880–1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 43. John Algeo, ‘Vocabulary’, in Suzanne Romaine (ed.), Cambridge History of the English Language, 6 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992– 2001), vol. 4. 1776–1997, 91; Jose Harris, ‘The “Welfare State” in Legal and Social Philosophy: Origins and Controversies’, in Michael Lobban and Julia Moses (eds), The Impact of Ideas on Legal Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 77.

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96. Cit. Harold Laski, The State in Theory and Practice (New York: Viking Press, 1935), 175; Harold Laski, Democracy in Crisis (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1933), 30–38. 97. Laski, The State, 176, 241–42. Several examples from the 1930s can be listed; for instance, Stanley H. Cair, The Responsible Citizen (London: Thomas Nelson, 1938), 12, 65–68, 72; Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 81, 227, Richard Crossman, Government and the Governed: A History of Political Ideas and Political Practice (London: Christophers, 1939), 164, 203. Like Laski, they used it to describe changes in government over the last hundred years from laissez faire or police state to a social service state. 98. Jose Harris, William Beveridge: A Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 459; Petersen and Petersen, ‘Confusion’, 47. For details on usage in 1940s, Wincott, ‘Original’, 134–39. 99. Cf. Asa Briggs, ‘The Welfare State in Historical Perspective’, European Journal of Sociology/ Archives Européennes de Sociologie 2(2) (1961), 222–24. The singular focus in later research on ‘the welfare state’ and who used it first seems to be the problem here. 100. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 28. 101. Alfred Diamant, Austrian Catholics and the First Republic: Democracy, Capitalism, and the Social Order, 1918–1934 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), chs 5–6; James Chappel, Catholic Modern: The Challenge of Totalitarianism and the Remaking of the Church (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), chs 1–2. 102. For a detailed examination and discussion of causal mechanisms linking war and welfare, Herbert Obinger and Klaus Petersen, ‘War and the Welfare State’, in Bernd Marin (ed.), The Future of Welfare in a Global Europe (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2015) 135–71. 103. Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time (New York: Liveright, 2013), 36. 104. Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need it More than Ever (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 72–78. 105. Herbert Bunbury, Governmental Planning Machinery: A Comparative Study (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1938), 4. See also Ernest L. Bogart, ‘The Changing Economic Functions of Government’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 206 (Nov. 1939), 1–5. 106. Milburn L. Wilson, Democracy Has Roots (New York: Carrick & Evans, 1939), ch. 4, cit. 106. 107. Carl J. Friedrich, The New Belief in the Common Man (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1942), 140. 108. For an optimistic account, Ralph Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought: An Intellectual History since 1815 (New York: Ronald Press, 1940), 415–18; cit. Alpheus T. Mason, ‘In Government We Mistrust’, The American Scholar 7(3) (1938), 347; for the critics, Maurizio Vaudagna, ‘Conservative Critics of the New Deal in the 1930s: Towards Authoritarian Europeanization?’, in Vaudagna, The New Deal and the American Welfare State:

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109.

110.

111. 112.

113.

114. 115. 116. 117.

118. 119.

120.

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Essays from a Transatlantic Perspective, 2nd ed. (Torino: Otto editore, 2014), 205–60. Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal in Recession and War (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 250–58, cit. 254; Edwin Amenta, Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American Social Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 193–202. Matthew Jones, ‘Freedom from Want’, in Jeffrey Engel (ed.), The Four Freedoms: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Evolution of an American Idea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), esp. 126–28; Thomas V. Smith, ‘The Four Freedoms’, in Walter Yust (ed.), 10 Eventful Years: A Record of Events of the Years Preceding, Including and Following World War II, 4 vols (Chicago & London: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1947), vol. 2, 401–5. Smith, 403, identified an international trend from laissez fair to security and continued, ‘In the United States this drift toward the “welfare state” had come to full consciousness only lately, and had indeed been hailed as beneficent only during the depression under the Roosevelt regime.’ Jones, ‘Freedom’, 136–39. William Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society: A Report (London: Allen & Unwin, 1944); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: Routledge, 1944); cit. Henry Commager, ‘Democracy and Planning’, The American Mercury 62(265) (1946), 113. Jennifer Klein, Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen, ‘Social Policy Language in the United States’, in Béland and Petersen, Analysing, 281–86, cit. 285; Katz and Thomas, ‘The Invention of “Welfare”’, 410–12. Cit. James Keogh, This is Nixon (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1956), 89. Kaufmann, European, 102–5; cit. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 22. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 494. Peter Baldwin, ‘Beveridge in the Longue Durée’, in John Hills, John Ditch and Howard Glennerster (eds), Beveridge and Social Security (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 37–55. Francis Williams, The Triple Challenge: The Future of Socialist Britain (London: Heinemann, 1948), 7. Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); David Ellwood, The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2012), chs 6–9; Klaus Kiran Patel, The New Deal: A Global History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), ch. 5. E.g. Seebohm Rowntree and George R. Lavers, Poverty and the Welfare State: A Third Social Survey of York Dealing Only with Economic Questions (London: Longmans, 1951); Wolfgang Friedmann, Law and Social Change in Contemporary Britain (London: Stevens & Sons, 1951), 3–5, 133–49, 277– 310; Edward H. Carr, The New Society (London: Macmillan, 1951) ch. 3; Thomas D. Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics (London: Penguin, 1953), 71,

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86–87, 132; Cyril Garbett, In an Age of Revolution: An Account of the Present Crisis in Faith and Morals and the Christian Answers to it (London: Penguin, 1952), 165–79. For an overview of the different attitudes and positions, see e.g. the contemporary US collection of texts – one of several source books – on the welfare state, Herbert Marx (ed.), The Welfare State (New York: H.W. Wilson, 1950).

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Krieger, Leonard, The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). Laband, Paul (ed.), Handbuch der Politik, 2nd ed., 3 vols (Leipzig and Berlin: W. Rothschild, 1914). Ladendorff, Otto, Historisches Schlagwörterbuch: Ein Versuch (Strasbourg and Berlin: Trübner, 1904). Laski, Harold, Democracy in Crisis (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1933). Laski, Harold, The State in Theory and Practice (New York: Viking Press, 1935). Lassalle, Ferdinand, ‘Arbeiter-Programm: Über den Besonderen Zusammenhang der gegenwärtigen Geschichtsperiode mit der Idee des Arbeiterstandes’, in Ferdinand Lassalle, Gesammelte Reden und Schriften Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Eduard Bernstein, vol. 2 (Berlin: Paul Cassirer, 1920), 139–202. Leacock, Stephen, Elements of Political Science, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913). MacIver, Robert M., The Modern State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926). Maier, Hans, ‘Verwaltungsreform’, Die Gesellschaft: Internationale Revue für Sozialismus und Politik 5 (1928), 231–44. Maier, Hans, ‘Wohlfahrtsstaat?’, Arbeiterwohlfahrt 6(12) (1931), 381–82. Marchet, Gustav, Studien über die Entwicklung der Verwaltungslehre in Deutschland von der zweiten Hälfte des 17, bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts (Munich and Leipzig: Oldenbourg, 1885). Marx, Herbert (ed.), The Welfare State (New York: H.W. Wilson, 1950). Mason, Alpheus T., ‘In Government We Mistrust’, The American Scholar 7(3) (1938), 339–48. Mausbach, Joseph, ‘Christlich-Katholische Ethik’, in Die Christliche Religion: Mit Einschluss der israelitisch-jüdischen Religion (Kultur der Gegenwart vol. 1: 4) (Berlin: Teubner, 1906), 521–48. Meier, Ernst von, ‘Das Verwaltungsrecht’, in Josef Kohler (ed.), Encyklopädie der Rechtswissenschaft in systematischer Bearbeitung, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1904), 637–760. Merriam, Charles Edward, American Political Ideas: Studies in the Development of American Political Thought 1865–1917 (New York: Macmillan, 1920). Mises, Ludvig von, ‘Antimarxismus’, in Ludvig von Mises, Kritik des Interventionismus Untersuchungen zur Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsideologie der Gegenwart, 2nded. (Stuttgart: Fischer, 1976), 91–122. Müller-Franken, Hermann, ‘Zum deutschen Parlamentarismus’, Die Gesellschaft: Internationale Revue für Sozialismus und Politik 3 (1926), 289–305. Muthesius, Hans, ‘Kollektivverantwortung oder Einzelverantwortung in der Wohlfahrtspflege’, in Die Stellung der Wohlfahrtspflege zur Wirtschaft, zum Staat und zum Menschen: Bericht über den 41. Deutschen Fürsorgetag in Berlin am 26. u. 27. November 1930 (Karlsruhe: Braun, 1931), 43–54. Ollenhauer, Erich, ‘Aufruf zum Freiheitskampf’, Arbeier-Jugend: Monatsschrift der sozialistischen Arbeiterjugend 24(7) (1932), 195–97.

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Radbruch, Gustav, Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft (1910) in Gustav Radbruch, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 1 (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Juristischer Verlag, 1987), 91–210. Rerum Novarum. Retrieved 20 February 2014 from http://w2.vatican.va/content/ leo-xiii/en/encyclicals.index.3.html. Ritter, Gerhard, Dämonie der Macht: Betrachtungen über Geschichte und Wesen des Machtproblems in politischen denken der Neuzeit, 6th ed. (Munich: Leibniz, 1948). Rowntree, Seebohm, and George R. Lavers, Poverty and the Welfare State: A Third Social Survey of York Dealing Only with Economic Questions (London: Longmans, 1951). Schmitt, Carl, Hüter der Verfassung, 4th ed. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996). Schnabel, Franz, Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert, vol. 2 (Freiburg: Herder, 1933). Schotte, Walther, ‘Vor dem Zusammenbruch’, Preusssiche Jahrbücher 203 (1926), 99–101. Smith, Munro, ‘Four German Jurists pt 4’, Political Science Quarterly 16(4) (1901), 641–79. Smith, Thomas V., ‘The Four Freedoms’, in Walter Yust (ed.), 10 Eventful Years: A Record of Events of the Years Preceding, Including and Following World War II, vol. 2 (Chicago and London: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1947), 401–5. Stein, Lorenz von, Verwaltungslehre, 7 vols (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1865–68). Stengel, Karl von (ed.), Wörterbuch des Deutschen Verwaltungsrecht, 5 vols (Freiburg: Mohr Siebeck, 1890–97). Stevenson, Marietta, Public Welfare Administration (New York: Macmillan, 1938). Temple, William, Christianity and the Social Order (London: Penguin, 1942). Temple, William, Christianity and the State (London: Macmillan, 1928). Temple, William, The State in its External Relations (London: Macmillan, 1932). Temple, William, Citizen and Churchman (London: Eyre & Spottiswood, 1941). Teusch, Christine, ‘Die Sozialpolitik des Zentrums’, in Georg Schreiber (ed.), Politisches Jahrbuch 1927/28 (Mönchengladbach: Volksverein, 1928), 462–88. Tönnies, Ferdinand, ‘Rechtsstaat und Wohlfahrtsstaat: Referat, erstattet auf dem III. Kongress der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie’, Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie 1914–15(8), 65–70. Tönnies, Ferdinand, ‘Bürgerliche und politische Freiheit’, in Gerhard Anschütz et al. (eds), Handbuch der Politik, 3rd ed., vol. 1, Grundlagen der Politik (Berlin: Walther Rothscheid, 1920), 172–79. Tönnies, Ferdinand, Thomas Hobbes: Lehre und Werke, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart: Frohmanns, 1926). Treuge, Margarete, Einführung in die Bürgerkunde: Ein Leitfaden für Frauenschulen, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Teubner, 1912). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Retrieved 14 November 2017 from http:// www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.

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Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichtags. Accessed 9–11 November 2017 from http://www.reichstag-abgeordnetendatenbank.de/volltext.html. Wagner, Adolph, ‘Finanzwissenschaft und Staatssozialismus, mit einer Einleitung über Stein’s und Roscher’s Finanzwissenschaft’, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 43(1, 4) 1887, 37–122, 675–746. Wagner, Adolph, ‘Staat in nationalökonomischer Hinsicht’, Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaft, vol. 7 (Jena: Fischer, 1911), 727–39. Walther, Oskar Albert, Hand-Lexicon der Juristischen Literatur des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (Weimar: Janssen, 1854). Weber, Max, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1922). Weldon, Thomas D., The Vocabulary of Politics (London: Penguin, 1953). Williams, Francis, The Triple Challenge: The Future of Socialist Britain (London: Heinemann, 1948). Willoughby, Westel W., An Examination of the Nature of the State: A Study in Political Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1896). Wilson, Milburn L., Democracy Has Roots (New York: Carrick & Evans, 1939). Winnig, August, Das Reich als Republik 1918–1928 (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1928). Zueblin, Charles, ‘Government: The Administration of the Common Life Involves the Progressive Satisfaction of the Interests of All’, The Twentieth Century Magazine 6(5) (1912), 434–40.

Secondary Sources Abelshauser, Werner, ‘Die Weimarer Republik – Ein Wohlfahrtsstaat?’, in Werner Abelshauser (ed.), Die Weimarer Republik als Wohlfahrtsstaat (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1987). Algeo, John, ‘Vocabulary’, in Suzanne Romaine (ed.), Cambridge History of the English Language, vol. 4, 1776–1997 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 57–91. Amenta, Edwin, Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the Origins of Modern American Social Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). Anter, Andreas, Max Weber’s Theory of the Modern State: Origins, Structure and Significance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). Ashford, Douglas E., The Emergence of the Welfare States (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). Baier, Horst, ‘“Vater Sozialstaat”: Max Webers Widerspruch von Wohlfahrtspatronage’, in Christian Gneuss and Jürgen Kocka (eds), Max Weber: Ein Symposion (Munich: dtv, 1988), 47–63. Baldwin, Peter, ‘Beveridge in the Longue Durée’, in John Hills, John Ditch and Howard Glennerster (eds), Beveridge and Social Security (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 37–55. Beck, Hermann, The Origins of the Authoritarian Welfare State in Prussia: Conservatives, Bureaucracy, and the Social Question, 1815–70 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

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Bergman, George F.J., ‘Jacobs, Joseph (1854–1916)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography. Retrieved 3 June 2016 from http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/ jacobs-joseph-6817. Bloch, Marc, The Historian’s Craft (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, ‘Lorenz von Stein as Theorist of the Movement of State and Society towards the Welfare State’, in Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, State, Society and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law (New York: Berg, 1991), 115–45. Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, ‘The Origin and Development of the Concept of the Rechtsstaat’, in Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, State, Society and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law (New York: Berg, 1991), 47–70. Borgwardt, Elizabeth, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005). Briggs, Asa, ‘The Welfare State in Historical Perspective’, European Journal of Sociology/ Archives Européennes de Sociologie 2(2) (1961), 221–58. Brinkley, Alan, The End of Reform: New Deal in Recession and War (New York: Vintage Books, 1996). Bruch, Rüdiger vom, ‘Kulturstaat – Sinndeutung von Oben?’, in Rüdiger vom Bruch, Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Gangolf Hübinger (eds), Kultur und Kulturwissenschaften um 1900: Krise der Moderne und Glaube an die Wissenschaft (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1989), 63–101. Buch, Florian, Grosse Politik im neuen Reich: Gesellschaft und Aussenpolitik in Deutschland 1867–1882 (Kassel: Kassel University Press, 2004). Caldwell, Peter C., Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law: The Theory & Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). Chappel, James, Catholic Modern: The Challenge of Totalitarianism and the Remaking of the Church (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018). Crew, David F., ‘A Social Republic? Social Democrats, Communists, and the Weimar Welfare State, 1919 to 1933’, in David E. Barclay and Eric D. Weitz, Between Reform and Revolution: German Socialism and Communism from 1840 to 1900 (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998), 223–49. Crew, David F., Germans on Welfare: From Weimar to Hitler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). Diamant, Alfred, Austrian Catholics and the First Republic: Democracy, Capitalism, and the Social Order, 1918–1934 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). Dyson, Kenneth, The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and Institution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). Ebel, Friedrich (ed.), Gemeinwohl – Freiheit – Vernunft – Rechtsstaat 200 Jahre Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten Symposium der Juristischen Gesellschaft zu Berlin 27.–29. Mai 1994 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1995).

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Ellwood, David, The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Euchner, Walther, ‘Ideengeschichte des Sozialismus in Deutschland: Teil 1’, in Helga Grebing (ed.), Geschichte der sozialen Ideen in Deutschland: Sozialismus – katholische Soziallehre – protestantische Sozialethik. Ein Handbuch, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 13–350. Frohnert, Pär, ‘Sverige/Schweden’, in Karl Härter and Michael Stolleis (eds), Repertorium der Policeyverordnungen der Frühen Neuzeit, vol. 12: 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2017), 21–73. Gozzi, Gustavo, ‘Rechtsstaat and Individual Rights in German Constitutional History’, in Pietro Costa and Danilo Zolo (eds), The Rule of Law: History, Theory and Criticism (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 237–59. Greenberg, Udi, The Weimar Century: German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). Grimley, Matthew, Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England: Liberal Anglican Theories of the State between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). Grosse Kracht, Hermann-Josef, ‘Sozialer Katholizismus und demokratischer Wohlfahrtsstaat: Klärungsversuche zur Geschichte und Gegenwart einer ungewollten Wahlverwandtschaft’, Jahrbuch für Christliche Sozialwissenschaften 46 (2005), 45–97. Gunnell, John G., Imagining the American Polity: Political Science and the Discourse of Democracy (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004). Harris, Jose, ‘The “Welfare State” in Legal and Social Philosophy: Origins and Controversies’, in Michael Lobban and Julia Moses (eds), The Impact of Ideas on Legal Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 75–99. Harris, Jose, William Beveridge: A Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977). Hennock, Ernest Peter, British Social Reform and German Precedents: The Case of Social Insurance 1880–1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). Hennock, Ernest Peter, The Origin of the Welfare State in England and Germany, 1850–1914: Social Policies Compared (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Hermanns, Manfred, Sozialethik im Wandel der Zeit: Persönlichkeiten, Forschungen, Wirkungen des Lehrstuhls für Christliche Gesellschaftslehre und des Instituts für Christliche Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Münster 1893–1997 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006). Hiettala, Marjatta, Services and Urbanization at the Turn of the Century: The Diffusion of Innovations (Helsinki: SHS, 1987). Hong, Young-Sun, Welfare, Modernity, and the Weimar State, 1919–1933 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). Huber, Ernst Rudolf, ‘Rechtsstaat und Sozialstaat in der modernen Industriegesellschaft’, in Huber, Nationalstaat und Verfassungsstaat: Studien zur Geschichte der modernen Staatsidee (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1965), 249–72.

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Iremonger, Frederic A., William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury: His Life and Letters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948). Jones, Larry Eugene, German Liberalism and the Dissolution of the Weimar Party System, 1918–1933 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988). Jones, Matthew, ‘Freedom from Want’, in Jeffrey Engel (ed.), The Four Freedoms: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Evolution of an American Idea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 125–64. Kandel, Johannes, Protestantischer Sozialkonservatismus am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts: Pfarrer Rudolf Todts Auseinandersetzung mit dem Sozialismus im Widerstreit der kirchlichen und politischen Lager (Bonn: Dietz, 1993). Katz, Michael B., In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: Social History of Welfare in America, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1996). Katz, Michael B., and Lorrin R. Thomas, ‘The Invention of “Welfare” in America’, Journal of Policy History 10(4) (1998), 399–418. Katznelson, Ira, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time (New York: Liveright, 2013). Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver, European Foundations of the Welfare State (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012). Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver, Thinking about Social Policy: The German Tradition (Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, 2013). Kersting, Wolfgang, ‘Politics’, in Knud Haakonssen (ed.), The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1026–68. Klein, Jennifer, Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen, ‘Social Policy Language in the United States’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 277–95. Lapp, Benjamin, Revolution from the Right: Politics, Class, and the Rise of Nazism in Saxony, 1919–1933 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1997). Lidtke, Vernon L., The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878–1890 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). Lindberg, Bo, Den antika skevheten: Politiska ord och begrepp i det tidig-moderna Sverige (Stockholm, Kungl. Vitterhetsakademien, 2006). Lindenfeld, David F., The Practical Imagination: The German Sciences of State in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). Luthardt, Wolfgang, ‘Verfassung, Wohlfahrtsstaat und Demokratie’, in Wolfgang Luthardt and Alfons Söllner, Verfassungsstaat, Souveränität, Pluralismus: Otto Kirchheimer zum Gedächtnis (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989), 41–56. McKibbin, Ross, ‘Arthur Henderson as Labour Leader’, in Ross McKibbin, The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain 1880–1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 42–65. Mergel, Thomas, ‘High Expectations – Deep Disappointment: Structures of the Public Perception of Politics in the Weimar Republic’, in Kathleen Canning, Kerstin Brandt and Kristin McGuire (eds), Weimar Publics/Weimar Subjects:

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Rethinking the Political Culture of Germany in the 1920s (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 192–210. Miller, Paul N., Defining the Common Good: Empire, Religion and Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Misner, Paul, Social Catholicism in Europe: From the Onset of Industrialization to the First World War (New York: Crossroad, 1991). Moos, Thomas, Staatszweck und Staatsaufgaben in den protestantischen Ethiken des 19. Jahrhunderts (Muenster: LIT, 2005). Morefield, Jeanne, Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). Nicholls, David, Deity and Domination: Images of God and the State in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London: Routledge, 1989). Novak, William, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). Obinger, Herbert, and Klaus Petersen, ‘War and the Welfare State’, in Bernd Marin (ed.), The Future of Welfare in a Global Europe (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2015) 135–71. Patel, Klaus Kiran, The New Deal: A Global History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). Petersen, Klaus, ‘The Early Cold War and the Western Welfare State’, Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy 29(3) (2013), 226–40. Petersen, Klaus, and Jørn Henrik Petersen, ‘Confusion and Divergence: Origins and Meanings of the term “Welfare State” in Germany and Britain, 1840– 1940’, Journal of European Social Policy 23(1) (2013), 37–51. Peukert, Detlev, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity (London: Allen Lane, 1991). Prochaska, Frank, Christianity and Social Service in Modern Britain: The Disinherited Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Raeff, Marc, The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600–1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). Reulecke, Jürgen, Soziale Frieden durch soziale Reform: Der Centralverein für das Wohl der arbeitenden Klassen in der Frühindustrialisierung (Wuppertal: Peter Hammer, 1983). Ritter, Gerhard A., Der Sozialstaat: Entstehung und Entwicklung im internationalen Vergleich, 3rd ed. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010). Rodgers, Daniel T., Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics since Independence (New York: Basic Books, 1987). Rodgers, Daniel T., Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in the Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998). Ross, Dorothy, The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Rudloff, Wilfried, Die Wohlfahrtsstadt: Kommunale Ernährungs-, Fürsorge- und

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Wohnungspolitik am Beispiel Münchens 1910–1933, 2 vols (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998). Runefelt, Leif, Hushållningens dygder: Affektlära, hushållningslära och ekonomiskt tänkande under svensk stormaktstid (Stockholm: Stockholms Universitet, 2001). Schieder, Wolfgang, ‘Bismarck und der Sozialismus’, in Johannes Kuhnisch (ed.), Bismarck und seine Zeit (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1992), 173–89. Senk, Norman, Junghegelianisches Rechtsdenken: Die Staats-, Rechts- und Justizdiskussion der “Hallischen” und “Deutschen Jahrbücher” 1838–1843 (Paderborn: Mentis, 2007). Simon, Thomas, ‘Gemeinwohltopik in der mittelalterlichen und frühneuzetlichen Politiktheorie’, in Herfried Münkler and Harald Bluhm (eds), Gemeinwohl und Gemeinsinn: Historischer Semantiken politischer Leitbegriffe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001), 129–46. Sneeringer, Julia, Winning Women’s Votes: Propaganda and Politics in Weimar Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). Sontheimer, Kurt, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik: Die politischen Ideen des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen 1918 und 1933, 3rd ed. (Munich: Nymphenburger, 1968). Steger, Manfred B., The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Stegmann, Franz Josef, and Peter Langhorst, ‘Geschichte der sozialen Ideen im deutschen Katholizismus’, in Helga Grebing (ed.), Geschichte der sozialen Ideen in Deutschland: Sozialismus – katholische Soziallehre – protestantische Sozialethik. Ein Handbuch, 2nd ed. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005), 597–862. Stolleis, Michael, Public Law in Germany 1800–1914 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001). Stolleis, Michael, Origins of the German Welfare State: Social Policy in Germany to 1945 (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013). Sunstein, Cass R., The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need it More than Ever (New York: Basic Books, 2004). Tamm, Ditlev, ‘Gute Sitte und Ordnung: Zur Entwicklung und Funktion der Polizeigesetzgebung in Dänemark’, in Michael Stolleis (ed.), Policey im Europa der Frühen Neuzeit (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1996), 509–30. Vaudagna, Maurizio, ‘Conservative Critics of the New Deal in the 1930s: Towards Authoritarian Europeanization?’, in Vaudagna, The New Deal and the American Welfare State: Essays from a Transatlantic Perspective, 2nd ed. (Torino: Otto editore, 2014), 205–60. Wincott, Daniel, ‘Original and Imitated or Elusive and Limited? Towards a Genealogy of the Welfare State in Britain’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 127–42.

c ha p te r 2

The Languages of Welfare in Sweden Nils Edling

elfare’, meaning social reforms and services, conquered Swedish politics in the 1930s and has since then remained the premium concept in Swedish political life and cultural self-understanding. This chapter analyses the shifting usages, connotations and conflicts surrounding the central terms ‘welfare politics’, ‘welfare state’, ‘welfare society’ and ‘the welfare’.1 References to the common welfare, understood as wellbeing, prosperity and peace, constituted a recurring theme in political discourse long before the 1930s, and social conditions and reforms were sometimes included without defining this ‘welfare’. With the accelerating industrialization and the rise of social question in the latter half of the century, this gradually changed and new ideas and concepts originating abroad gained in importance. In the 1880s, adversaries of the Bismarck-inspired reform proposals in the Riksdag argued that the state socialist ideas of protective labour legislation would only bring ‘continuously increased demands for charitable deeds from the state’.2 Others said that the novel social policies entailed a new conception of the state and its right and obligation to regulate social conditions in the interest of the common good, a development, couched in the vocabulary imported from Germany, from the older Rechtsstaat (rättsstat) to a civilized state (kulturstat). Their sibling, the scholarly term ‘the welfare state’, was used occasionally in the first decades of the new century with reference to the past (cameralism) and to the contemporary state (modern administration). The oldest known example of the historical usage is from 1912 by a professor of law, and a few years later, a political economist deplored the modern transition from a ‘nightwatchmen state’ to ‘culture- and welfare state’ as costly for the taxpayers. Other examples from ca 1920 referred to ongoing changes

‘W

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in modern society with the regulating state, a successor to the old liberal state, as a salient characteristic.3 The premium example of early partisan use is the parliamentary debates in 1927 on the new immigration bill, which included stricter regulations. For the first time, ‘the welfare state’ was used as an argument for the proposal. Professor Westman, legal scholar and parliamentarian for the Farmers’ Party (Bondeförbundet), tried to convince the Social Democrats in Riksdagen that the development from ‘the legal state’ to a ‘modern welfare state’ (en modern välfärdsstat) should not be seen as ‘fundamentally distasteful’ by the socialists and that this development made it necessary ‘to take some action against the threat of foreign immigration’.4 His opponents did not accept the coupling of a regulating state and a protective welfare state. Instead, they posited ‘the police and nightwatchmen state’ (polis- och nattväktarstaten), associated with militarism, against their preferred alternative, ‘the social welfare state’ (den sociala välfärdsstaten), which stood for reforms.5 ‘The welfare state’ was used in two different ways in the debate; as a label for the new regulating state in general and as a political objective for the future, a goal to be desired or rejected. In the election campaign of 1928, leading Social Democrat Gustav Möller, Minister of Social Affairs 1924–26, 1932–36, 1936–38 and 1939–51, made direct reference to Lassalle’s critique of the limited state associated with economic liberalism: the modern state had to be more than a nightwatchmen state. For a welfare state, continued Möller, the comfort and security of all hard-working citizens had to be the premium objective.6 Although he made no references to contemporary German social democrats, it is highly likely that he borrowed the new term from them. His ‘welfare state’ was a reformist objective for the future, and he clearly used the term to mobilize electoral support.

The Primacy of Welfare Politics In the 1930s, the Social Democrats launched ‘welfare politics’ (välfärdspolitik) as their key concept. They were successful, and in the process Swedish politics was reformatted. ‘Welfare’ became politicized and temporalized; it gained momentum, and its importance increased dramatically as different actors incorporated it into their competing programmes. Consequently, it became highly contested: ‘welfare’ and ‘welfare politics’ were the concepts that the parties competed to control. ‘Social welfare politics’ (social välfärdspolitik) ran the new formula, which the Social Democrats (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, from the early 1990s Socialdemokraterna) adopted in 1932 as an umbrella

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term for the different measures needed to combat the current economic crisis. Its popularity increased dramatically the following spring when the Riksdag tried to come to a decision on the government’s innovative proto-Keynesian economic policies. ‘The welfare committee’ – välfärdsutskottet – was the popular name for where the negotiations about the recovery programme took place in 1933. In the same way, the concrete policies – the product of the compromise between the Social Democrats and the Farmers’ Party – were baptized ‘welfare politics’.7 This gave ‘welfare politics’ both specific connotations and an institutional foundation, as it referred to a relatively clearly defined set of policies. A political dictionary from 1937 stated this clearly: Welfare politics, the term for the common course, which the Social Democrats and the Farmers’ Party agreed upon in the Riksdag in 1933 [Following the elections 1936] the Farmers’ Party and the Social Democrats formed a coalition government, and this cooperation can be seen as a direct continuation of the welfare politics. The government’s programme includes that the Social Democrats abstain from any nationalisation plans and together with the Farmers’ Party continue the reform programme.8

The package of expansive labour market policies, social reforms and agricultural support constituted the concept of welfare politics, which appeared in May Day resolutions, election manifestos and posters.9 The Social Democrats managed to take full credit for Sweden’s rapid comeback from the Depression, and their propaganda repeated that they had saved the country and that they alone could guarantee social progress and peace. This strategy paid off handsomely: they increased their support from 41.7 per cent of the votes in 1932 to over 50 per cent six years later. Välfärdspolitik became the overarching concept used to describe what the Social Democrats had accomplished and their objectives for the future, and this makes ‘politics’, instead of ‘policies’, the better translation. ‘Welfare politics’ was a future-oriented programme for social reform, and it became a potent mobilizing concept used repeatedly in election campaigns from the 1930s onwards. ‘The surest sign that a society has entered into possession of a new concept is that a new vocabulary will be developed, in terms of which the concept can then be publicly articulated and discussed’, concludes Quentin Skinner, and ‘welfare politics’ definitely had such qualities.10 Contestation started immediately, and the temperature rose until 1936, when the Social Democrats and the Farmers’ Party formed a majority government; this came as a real let-down for liberals and conservatives and cooled the temperature considerably. In general, non-socialist views of the new labour market policies and social reforms focused on the need

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for fiscal moderation, the dangers of producing ‘artificial jobs’ through state intervention and the grave threats to a free society posed by the socialists’ planned economy.11 The battle cry ‘system change’, systemskifte (a term familiar from Swedish politics in the 1980s), was the immediate Conservative (Högerpartiet) answer, and three distinctive lines, well known from Hirschman’s typology, can be found in this criticism: 1) the social democratic reforms would have adverse effects and produce a welfare mentality, a dependency on the state, 2) the reforms were costly and dangerous experiments – ‘welfare policies that undermine welfare’, warned party leader Gösta Bagge, and 3) the reforms were of minor significance compared to the general economic recovery that would have taken place without any costly reforms.12 Variations of these themes can be found in numerous attacks on the social democrats in the 1930s and later, where wealth-producing reforms were contrasted to socialist planning and wastefulness. Critics complained about ruinously high taxes, increasing state interventionism and the new ‘public assistance mentality’ (understödstagarandan) produced by generous socialist almsgiving, which in its turn promoted collectivism.13 Apart from attacking all the flaws in the government’s programme, serious attempts were also made to conquer the new key concept. For the Liberals (Folkpartiet), who largely supported the expansionist economic policies and social reforms, it became customary to question the social democrats’ monopoly on social welfare: the main aspects of ‘the so called welfare politics’ (s.k. välfärdspolitiken) had support from Liberals, Farmers and Social Democrats. No party, the Liberals argued, owned the welfare reforms – they put ‘welfare politics’ within quotation marks – and no party could claim sole credit for the economic recovery.14 This was repeated many times during the election campaign in 1936 and long afterwards. Conservatives reacted in a similar way. ‘The Social Democrats have launched a slogan and they want to base their entire election campaign on this slogan welfare politics,’ noted their leader Bagge in 1936, well aware of the stakes involved. He confronted the socialist welfare myth and warned about the long-term dangers involved: that of a socialist-planned economy. But the imminent threat was equally grave because the social democrats were about to monopolize ‘welfare’ and they did so by portraying themselves as the only positive force in the history of Swedish social reform.15 The welfare of the nation, declared professor Bagge, was the common objective of all parties, and he introduced what would become a standard answer: conservatives had also contributed to the now popular social and economic reforms.16 The debates from the election year 1936 illustrate the contestation well. Minister of Social Affairs Möller declared that the Social Democrats’

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programme since 1932 ‘actually was intended to construct Sweden as a welfare state’.17 His use of ‘the welfare state’ was hardly accidental; he mentioned it in pamphlets in 1928, 1936 and 1940 but did not dwell at any length on its exact meaning. For him, improved working and housing conditions, reduced unemployment, better healthcare and higher pensions, in short comfort and security (trygghet och säkerhet) for the good citizens (he excluded ‘asocial and antisocial elements’) paved the road to a better society, the welfare state.18 In 1936, his statement about ‘the welfare state’ as the Social Democrats’ own project was immediately challenged by liberals and conservatives. Their ripostes repeated that all parties had their share in the implemented social reforms and, from the Liberals, added the claim that only they could protect freedom in the welfare state. Frihetens välfärdsstat, ‘the welfare state of freedom’ ran the message that said that only the Liberals favoured comprehensive social reforms without state monopolies and socialism.19 Clearly, both Social Democrats and Liberals attached positive values to the new term and wanted to own it, or at least stop the opponents from claiming exclusive ownership. Liberals and Conservatives failed to make ‘welfare politics’ common property. Indirectly, their ongoing objections confirmed the political success of the Social Democrats as the true provider of social reforms and their control of the key concept. As sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen puts it: ‘The net effect, be it warranted or not, was the emergence of a synonymity between the Social Democratic movement, political democracy, economic prosperity, and social welfare’.20 Economists and economic historians nowadays stress the general economic changes and reduce the impact of the crisis programme, and numerous studies have analysed the path-setting social reforms of the era 1880–1930.21 Social Democrats promoted the opposite interpretation and did quite well at establishing that message as the political and popular explanation. This caused frustration in the non-socialist quarters, and sarcastic comments on the fantastic performance of the government were heard. Leading liberal daily Dagens Nyheter, alarmed by the prospect of a permanent socialist majority in parliament, declared: The whole nation should by now know that Mr Per Albin Hansson has created the welfare state in Sweden, that Mr Gustav Möller saved us from the crisis, that Mr Ernst Wigforss is the best Treasurer of the Realm [rikshushållare] of all time . . . All these truths are clear and evident from the social democratic election preaching . . . The members of the latest socialist government are already omniscient and omnibenevolent. Now, the only task that remains is to get the voters to make them omnipotent too, at least in the Parliament.22

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Figure 2.1. ‘Choose welfare politics’, encourages this red election stamp from 1936 with the Social Democrats’ leader Per Albin, the only Swedish politician known without his family name (Hansson). Reprinted with permission by SAP Socialdemokraterna, Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek.

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This piece called ‘Miracle Workers’ (Undergörare) illustrates well how ‘the welfare state’ was used in 1930s. It appeared as a by-product of ‘welfare politics’ and could refer to concrete reforms in the sense Möller and his liberal opponents used it. Prominent Social Democrat Arthur Engberg, Minister of Education 1932–39, gave this view a strong interpretation when he stated that ‘the welfare state’ (välfärdsstaten) was the natural outcome of ‘the restless process of transformation’, where the state shouldered more and more responsibilities in areas such as education, healthcare, transportation and industry. This evolutionary process was irreversible and open-ended, and it could be called socialization, he argued; the expanding welfare state, a response to popular demands, was in this sense inseparably linked to the modernization of society. Engberg’s ‘welfare state’ constituted a new kind of state in the making.23 Resembling the German usages, ‘the welfare state’ could also denote larger processes, general tendencies in the modern world that were not per se linked to social reforms or particular parties. This understanding linked ‘the welfare state’ to the growth of regulating state capacities in general, a change from the old laissez faire state. These traits reminded some commentators of the old, paternalistic welfare state, and some papers tried to exploit the links between old authoritarian and new social democratic despotism.24 The swift and successful recovery from the depression and the international attention the reforms attracted elevated the status of ‘welfare’ even more. At the same time as liberals and conservatives at home complained about their lack of influence and attacked ‘the myth about the importance of “the welfare politics” for Sweden’s recovery, which duped the electorate’, the country of Middle Way with its celebrated ‘New Deal’ was becoming a minor international success.25 Foreign guests marvelled over the wonders of the economic recovery and the seemingly harmonious labour market relations. The Swedish stocks were rising and the praise abroad attracted attention back home; Social Democratic propaganda repeated these statements, and these positive reports reinforced national pride and self-understanding.26 As Möller proudly explained in 1940, when summing up the achievements of the past decade brought to a halt by the war, ‘We were on our way to rebuild old Sweden into a social welfare state. It is not an exaggeration to claim that we in Sweden had advanced further than any other country, maybe with the exception of New Zealand.’ Sweden was the most advanced country in the world in social matters, a developing ‘social state’ (socialstat) of the highest order.27 It is repeatedly and erroneously argued that the Social Democrats labelled their programme folkhemspolitik and that folkhemmet, ‘the people’s home’, constituted their core concept. ‘The people’s home’ has certainly

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been a common term in modern Swedish, although not in a political sense but as a flagging metaphor for Swedish society in general. Prime Minister Hansson sometimes used it, but other leading Social Democrats did not, and the competing parties were not interested. Folkhem had acquired a non-partisan character already in the1930s and made its debut in the Social Democrats’ party programme as late as in 1990 (see below). It cannot be found in any national programme or election platform before that year.28

The Welfare State in the Cold War In March 1950, Minister of Foreign Affairs Östen Undén made an official declaration in the Riksdag about the government’s central foreign policy principles and objectives: non-alignment, neutrality and cooperation in bodies like the United Nations and the European Council. As an ideological underpinning for this policy he forwarded ‘the idea of the welfare state’ constituting a third way of a kind, an alternative to the division and opposition between Communist dictatorships and capitalist NATO allies. In other words, ‘the welfare state’ was used by the Social Democrats to legitimate Swedish neutrality, and this declaration about the international significance of domestic reform objectives constituted an exception in Swedish foreign policy.29 The Swedish welfare state would show the world that there was an alternative to the dictatorship of the proletariat and could in this way indirectly help to reduce the impact of both Communism and the prospect of coming military conflicts. This was stated in a roundabout way by Prime Minster Erlander: This theory of catastrophe, in its international version, and its power over peoples’ minds will best be reduced, if the actual development provides support for the possibility of a condition where the political democracy also matches the idea of the welfare state (välfärdsstatens idé), such as, for example, we here in Sweden try to realize this idea.30

Criticized by the non-socialist party politicians, who among other things attacked the statement’s self-aggrandizing Swedo-centrism, Erlander rephrased the position and made Sweden less exceptional: ‘Obviously, we do not view this issue from the standpoint that Sweden is the only state where the citizens work collectively to build a social welfare state [social välfärdsstat]. Norway, Denmark and England follow the same model.’31 Undén also insisted that the Swedish efforts to create a state corresponding to the idea of the welfare state, which the Social Democrats were doing their best to realize through social reforms, must have international

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significance. Confronted by the Liberal and Conservative leaders, both of them ironic and negative concerning the impact of domestic social reforms on foreign regimes and refusing to accept that welfare reforms precluded allegiance to Western democratic values, the Minister of Foreign Affairs relied on President Truman to substantiate his claim that economic and social reforms mattered in international relations. He defended the official position of the government, the statement that it was of ‘international significance that we here in Sweden tried to build a state in accordance with the idea of the welfare state. I’m not saying that we have reached that state but we are striving in that direction’.32 Coming back to the strongly negative reactions from the opposition, Undén repeated that the Social Democrats’ objective, a society that combined political, social and economic democracy, provided a real alternative to unfettered capitalism and communism.33 He used ‘the welfare state’ without any definition, and politicians from all parties talked about ‘welfare’ and ‘the welfare state’ without recursion to the old binary divisions between ‘legal state’ and ‘welfare state’ of the previous decades.34 Although prominent Social Democrats like Möller used ‘the welfare state’ already in the late 1920s, some years passed before the term was fully endorsed by the party. The conceptual ambiguities that linked comprehensive social reforms, introduced by the state, to authoritarian dirigisme help explain the delay. These ambiguities were exploited by their adversaries. In 1943, the leading conservative daily lamented the change from the old society to the ‘current industrialised and commercialised welfare state’, a state characterized by dirigisme, and the volume was cranked up quite a bit after the war. The dystopian mirage of totalitarian regimentation, a modern Leviathan, waited around the corner; a socialist system where the general welfare depended on obeying ‘the lords of the commando state’. ‘The welfare state’ did indeed incarnate Leviathan and demanded priority over all individual interests in society; it was in fact a form of state idolatry that suppressed human and universal liberal values.35 Confrontations like these, inspired by Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom from 1944 and published in Swedish that same year, were typical of the postwar debates leading up to the election in 1948. Principal agreement on the social reforms combined with intense and polarized conflict over taxation, economic planning and regulation were their salient characteristics, and all talk about welfare was to a large extent about the relations between the state and the business sector. Costly planning, unnecessary regulations and accusations of a more or less hidden socialist agenda were central points in the vociferous centre-right campaigns. In the end, the Social Democrats won the elections but lost the fights over nation-

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alization and economic planning to the Liberals, during ten years from 1946 the dominant non-socialist party, and the Conservatives.36 All through the 1940s, the Social Democrats stayed true to the winning message of the pre-war years: vote for continued welfare reforms. The objective of continued ‘social welfare politics’ (social välfärdspolitik) was to guarantee every citizen a level of basic social security; this goal, which had been completely unattainable for earlier generations, was now within reach. The utopian dream was about to realized: ‘We can count on our fingers the years until this society will be a living reality,’ concluded Möller when he in detail explained the content of the new reforms (improved pensions, child allowances, flat rate health insurance and housing subsidies) that would provide a decent subsistence minimum.37 This signified the great transformation from ‘Poor-house Sweden to Social Sweden’, he declared in an election pamphlet in 1948 where he also trumpeted forth the key message: only the Social Democrats could guarantee that further social reforms would follow and only they had the track record to show that they could deliver popular welfare.38 And welfare reforms stood right at the centre of their election campaign. ‘The reforms provide freedom and security,’ stated Our Way (Vår väg), the labour movement’s widely spread glossy magazine, and proclaimed: ‘Let us make Sweden a social model state!’ (social mönsterstat).39 ‘Social Sweden’, the elderly Möller’s preferred term, had not been perfected, but the process was well under way, it was said. Sweden showed the highest standard of living in Europe and was continually improving the social and economic democracy for all citizens. It strived to become ‘a modern democratic social state’ (en modern demokratisk socialstat) where the government step by step had introduced reforms covering all areas and strata of society.40 Apart from the domestic events, with the close election in 1948 as a climax, two non-domestic factors facilitated using ‘the welfare state’ in official policy statements. The first one was the general impact of the British Labour government and its reform programme. Swedish social democrats did not describe Britain as ‘a welfare state’ before 1950 and did not publish any detailed surveys of British social policies. All the same, British Labour stood out as a friendly ally; an example of a major and victorious nation where the democratic socialists had huge electoral successes with a platform that resembled that of the Swedish government. Great Britain provided a case for inspiration and comparison, and the Nordic exceptionalism became less accentuated.41 Secondly, foreign reports stated quite clearly that Sweden was a ‘welfare state’, maybe even ‘the welfare state’. American books – such as Sweden: Model for the World and Sweden: Champion of Peace (both from

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1949) – described the generous public welfare programmes and the high standard of living in a positive tone and presented Sweden with an almost utopian glow.42 The authors had reservations about ‘the womb to tomb’ inclusiveness of social welfare, and they rarely used the concept ‘the welfare state’. Nonetheless, this experiment in progressiveness and modernity, ‘the Story of a Constructive Compromise between Socialism and Capitalism’ as Marquis Childs subtitled the third edition of his Sweden: The Middle Way, was definitely worth studying, ran the general conclusion. As one of the more cautious voices declared in 1949: Sweden has already travelled quite a distance on the road to the establishment of the Welfare State which makes the State responsible for the economic security of the individual and taxes the well-to-do heavily in order to raise the necessary money as well as to level wealth.43

The author, seemingly surprised by the coexistence of a monarchy, a socialist government and a capitalist economy, noted that ‘the welfare state’, defined as a mild form of socialism, was generally considered the ‘modern trend’.44 The Swedish foreign policy declaration of 1950 exploited that trend. In other words, the apparent popularity of ‘the welfare state’ abroad helps explain its inclusion into a declaration on foreign policy. Foreign testimonies were important, since they confirmed Swedish self-understanding and, as they usually bent in a favourable direction, helped repair its slightly tarnished reputation as a neutral during the war. ‘The welfare state’ label served to legitimize Sweden’s neutrality in the polarized world of the Cold War, and this makes the foreign policy declaration significant: the Social Democrats in government used ‘the welfare state’ in a systematic way to support their foreign policy. Furthermore, it was the last time they tried to do that in a planned way for twenty-five years.45 The Social Democrats turned away from using välfärdsstat and socialstat when the tides turned. More precisely, its low standing in the United States after the intense debates in the late 1940s and early 50s help explain Swedish reluctance to use it later on. The failure of Truman’s Fair Deal and the rise of anti-statism in the US soon defined ‘the welfare state’ as semi-socialism, and ‘welfare’ was reduced to mean nothing but public assistance.46 This shift, reinforced by British Labour’s defeat in 1951, was not left unnoticed in Sweden. According to the Swedish Conservatives, Labour’s loss signified a political sea change and ‘the welfare state’, with its ‘blind faith in the state, in control and regulation, and in the possibility to spiritually and economically regiment the people’, now belonged to the past.47

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‘The Strong Society’ At the Social Democrats’ party congress 1952, only the foreign delegates ventured to mention ‘the welfare state’.48 Party chairman Erlander, Prime Minister 1946–69, talked about the successful economic policies for full employment and continually increasing standard of living in ‘Social Sweden’. Erlander, who like Möller had believed that the recent reforms had provided a permanent structure for social security, was now open to a revision.49 In 1952, he was still searching for the guiding concept for this continued reform programme, and in this process he and other leading social democrats stayed away from welfare nouns other than ‘welfare politics’, the established description of the government’s reform record and agenda. This became standard procedure, and politicians, party programmes, platforms and pamphlets did not talk about the state or the welfare state. Instead, they used ‘society’ (samhället). ‘The strong society’ (det starka samhället) became the new formula, launched in 1953–54, and was later adopted and developed by his aide and successor Olof Palme. The guiding principle of ‘the strong society’ was the assertion that increased wealth in a society with full employment raised the demand for further reforms and that there was absolutely no conflict between comprehensive welfare policies and individual freedom. On the contrary, tax-financed comprehensive reforms empowered the individual: The social reforms are basically an expression of co-operation between human beings, where society’s resources are used to create social security. This is a co-operation beneficial to all members of society.50

‘The strong society’ was needed to balance and reconcile tensions between economic growth, which demanded individual adaption to a changing society, and social security.51 This was the ideological underpinning for the expansion of the welfare sector in the 1960s and 70s: an incrementally enlarged and improved system of reforms and services introduced to meet a growing popular demand and individual needs, financed through taxes and provided by the public authorities. ‘The discontent produced by increased expectations,’ a phrase coined by Prime Minister Erlander in 1956 to describe the popular demand for further reforms, was justified, according to the Social Democrats. Reforms were badly needed to guarantee full employment, high productivity and an increased standard of living, and this gave the welfare programmes a fundamental role; they were the premium instruments of progress.52 ‘The strong society,’ a break with older programmes that aimed to combat the manifest poverty and squalor, promised richer lives and livelihoods for all

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through public investments in pensions, education, housing, healthcare etc. and set up only one precondition: the absolute necessity ‘to provide society with the resources that are needed’.53 ‘Society’, ‘change’, ‘growth’, ‘resources’ and, of course, ‘comfort and security’ and ‘freedom’ were the catchwords, and the almost complete absence of ‘the state’ in these texts is telling. The social democratic usage of ‘society’ as a synonym for ‘state’ can partly be explained by the premodern heritage, with its weak conceptual distinctions (see the introduction), and partly by tactical considerations, where the nicer and softer ‘society’ replaced the colder ‘state’. To Erlander and later Palme, the interchangeability seemed unproblematic, in the same way that there could be no conflict between the state, public interests and the individual’s best interests, since more and better welfare policies were introduced to make life easier for the individual, to increase personal freedom.54 ‘The politics of progress’ (Framstegens politik 1956), a programmatic pamphlet about this new main emphasis, underlined the need for growing societal resources in order to satisfy the increasing demands for higher standards and better services – housing and education were the designated key sectors – that the citizens rightfully made.55 No easily defined debate for and against ‘the welfare state’ can be found in the 1950s; no special publication can be isolated. The term’s popularity increased considerably, partly because it was used to describe governments and policies all over the world. In this way, ‘the welfare state’s’ breakthrough internationally was echoed also in Swedish newspapers as Figure 2.2 shows. Välfärdsstat dominated, with more than 700 hits in the press in the 50s compared to only 60 in the 40s. Möller’s neologism Socialsverige, ‘Social Sweden’, showed some popularity around 1950, whereas ‘welfare society’, välfärdssamhälle, took off in the late 50s (see Figure 2.2). The different welfare terms were employed in diverse ways, often as synonyms, with few efforts made to produce more precise definitions. ‘Welfare state’ and ‘welfare society’ both came to denote contemporary Sweden with its booming economy and growing public sector. They were used interchangeably in both a narrow sense (policies, institutions, services) and a broader sense (society in general). Despite the social democratic reluctance to use ‘the welfare state’ after 1950, a couple of attempts were made to come to terms with it. For Ernst Wigforss, the leading ideologue of his generation and Minister of Finance 1932–36, 1936–49, the primary objective was to sort out the relation between short and long objectives for the party and more precisely to clarify how comprehensive welfare reforms were to be understood in relation to the long-term objectives concerning socialism and the end of

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Figure 2.2. Welfare terms in the major newspapers, 1930–2015. Full-text occurrences (truncated search) of the terms welfare state (välfärdsstat), welfare politics/policies (välfärdspolitik) and welfare society (välfärdssamhälle) in Dagens Nyheter (liberal), Svenska Dagbladet (conservative), Aftonbladet (liberal, from 1956 social democratic) and Expressen (founded 1944, liberal). Source: The digitized newspaper archive Svenska Dagstidningar, data retrieved 20 October 2017 from http://tidningar.kb.se.

capitalist society. He discussed this in Efter välfärdsstaten, a short book about the future of socialism from 1956, the standing theme in his texts from the 1950s and 60s. ‘The welfare state’ was apparently a novel concept to him, and he approached it from different angles, probing its relation to his view of socialism and its future. In ‘After the welfare state’ Wigforss discussed the ‘the welfare state’ in relation to economists like Schumpeter and Galbraith and above all British socialists such as G.D.H. Cole and concluded, like Cole, that the welfare state by itself had nothing to do with socialism.56 According to him, the new concept was too vague; the social reforms linked to ‘the welfare state’ could, no matter how important they were in order to improve social conditions and reduce inequalities, only be perceived as gradual changes, not as societal change. Consequently, ‘the welfare state’ should not be the long-term political objective for social democrats, he concluded, airing a leftist scepticism that would become more common in the 1960s. The well-connected semi-outsider and renowned political economist Gunnar Myrdal, from the late 1940s chief secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva, provided the scholarly description of the welfare state, the first theory of the new, integrated state

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and its organized economy to be found in Swedish. Professor Myrdal’s An International Economy: Problems and Prospects, published in English and Swedish in 1956 (Världsekonomin), deals with the need for economic integration in a world marked by a few rich and many poor national economies. ‘Economic integration’ meant the realization of the ideal of equal opportunity, its organized economy included ‘an ever greater volume of interventions by governments and organized social groups’ into the market economy, and the welfare state, finally, included the commitment to ‘vigorous measures to even out differences in incomes and wealth’ through progressive taxation, publicly funded education and health services and certain redistributive economic policies etc.57 Myrdal’s Beyond the Welfare State (1960) reiterated many of the same points: a new state characterized by coordination, planning and rationalization had emerged: In the last half century, the state, in all rich countries in the Western world, has become a democratic ‘welfare state’ with fairly explicit commitments to the broad goals of economic development, full employment, equality of opportunity for the young, social security and protected minimum standards as regards not only income, but nutrition, housing, health, and education for people of all regions and all social groups.58

Gunnar and Alva Myrdal had been at the forefront since the 1930s, writing about reform needs and thinking about means and ends of social policies: prophylactic social policies, social engineering, family and population policies and economic planning make up topics with special significance in the Swedish setting.59 The Myrdals helped define these issues, and their views on the integrated, actively planning and regulating welfare state can be seen as a logical outcome of their lifelong preoccupation with social policy. In 1953, the social democrats’ journal Tiden published Myrdal’s early text about this state; here he used ‘the comfort/security state’ (trygghetsstaten) and ‘the welfare state’ (välfärdsstaten) as synonyms of the interventionist state.60 This state, with its Keynesian-Myrdalian-Galbraithian features, was a product of forces in modern society and a sociological matter of fact defined by a prominent social scientist, not a weapon to be used in political arguments.61 The Myrdals saw this new state as both historically inevitable and a positive force in modern society, a form of democratic socialism. This was the long-held view of theirs, and in the latter part of the 1950s it represented the dominant view, one which corresponded with the ideology of ‘the strong society’, where ‘the welfare state/welfare society’ was understood as contemporary Swedish society.

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Confronting the Idyll From 1951 to 1957, the Social Democrats and the Farmers’ Party governed in coalition. In practice, this meant that Liberals and Conservatives were in permanent opposition, per definition excluded from power as long as the coalition lasted. The two competing opposition parties held somewhat different views on the welfare state. In theory, they shared the notion that private savings and individual choices and initiatives should play a larger part than increased state spending in the realization of the common objective: increased individual welfare. Generally speaking, the Liberals supported further social reforms. This was central to the ideology of social liberalism associated with Bertil Ohlin, party leader 1944–67.62 Liberals attacked high taxes and over-bureaucratization at the same time as they forwarded their own proposals for social reforms, often meant to include the most vulnerable groups that had been forgotten by the social democrats.63 The Conservatives’ alternative to the ‘strong society’ was ‘property-owning democracy’ (egendomsägande demokrati), a concept borrowed from the British conservatives and successfully promoted by party leader Jarl Hjalmarson. It has been described as a counter-utopia to social democratic welfarism, and the programme’s objective was to increase the citizens’ economic independence through work and savings and reduce dependence on the state.64 This meant fewer reforms and, above all, tax cuts. Social reforms were not per se excluded, but new reforms and new subsidies meant higher taxes and increased public regulation, or as conservatives liked to call it, more socialism. The Conservatives continued the critique of the growing state, controlled by socialists, from the early postwar years well into the 1960s. The increasing dirigisme was deplored in election manifestos and pamphlets: The background to this is the notion of state responsibility to arrange all things great and small, the blind faith in its ability to do so and in addition permissiveness from all inhibitions. In the old days, so many things were simply not permitted. The omnipotent modern state recognizes no boundaries.65

They did not directly mention ‘the welfare state’, but the target was obviously the emerging ‘strong society’. Towards the end of the decade, when the Conservatives opposed the idea of compulsory superannuation pensions (ATP), the arguments hardened: a voracious state run by an irresponsible party tried to nationalize private property through taxation, and socialism via taxation and bureaucratization made up the government’s

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secret strategy. ‘The welfare mentality, the querulousness and the lack of respect is thoroughly impressed on the young ones from an early age,’ stated an election pamphlet in 1960.66 Hjalmarson attacked the general programme of the Social Democrats: ‘The whole so called ‘welfare society’ is about to degenerate into welfare without personal responsibility with its indifference to the human beings and its gloominess.’67 In the 1950s, the stronger dissenting voices were easily marginalized due to the fact that they lacked lasting influence on Liberal and Conservative parliamentary actions and positions. Portions of the critique can be found in conservative press, where the socialist ‘guardian state’ or ‘centralized control’ (centraldirigering) were alternative names for the growing socialist state and its hidden agenda for ‘creeping nationalization’ (smygsocialisering).68 Strongly critical views of the social democrats provided a lowest common denominator for the prolific anti-welfare state arguments. In short, ‘the welfare state’ stood for some kind of socialism and had to be opposed for many different reasons. One target was the state’s increasing economic regulatory powers and the threats posed to the market economy by continued expensive welfare reforms. A mild version of this view restated the liberal and conservative argument that expansionist state policies risked hampering economic growth. The Tax Payers’ Association (Skattebetalarnas förening) propagated this message: public thriftiness in order to reduce the taxes and increase wealth. Their journal Sunt förnuft, Sound Reason, scrutinized local, regional and national budgets and administration, always looking for cuts and improved efficiency. It rarely ventured into principal welfare state critique, but the overall message was nonetheless quite obvious: increased and unnecessary public welfare spending harmed the tax payers.69 For pronounced adversaries the main problem consisted of ‘the idolization of the state, the etatist thinking, the state idiocy which of course is something abnormal and unhealthy’.70 General welfare policies handed out benefits to those who really did not need them, and in this way, ‘the welfare society’ created proselytes – those in power bought the voters’ sympathy with favours – who became paralyzed, dependent upon the state. One tough critic, the economist Sven Rydenfelt, repeated this grave message in essays titled ‘The Stepchildren of Welfare Politics’, ‘Welfare Politics, Power and Moral’ and ‘The Proletariat in the Welfare State’. His harsh verdicts, castigating a corrupted political system, were unusual but not unique.71 Other critics focused on the need to limit the state, to have a modernized rule of state law instead of the welfare state. This was necessary or we would end up with a totalitarian state like those behind the iron curtain, or at least a state that violated fundamental constitutional principles.72 ‘The welfare state’ was governed by needs and interests,

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not by legal principles, and this constituted a major weakness; the risks were especially high in Sweden because of ‘its one-sided regime during two decades’, a common complaint about the Social Democrats’ strong parliamentary position. ‘Welfare’ corrupted politicians and voters and this called for a revolt, as the contributors to the angry book Revolt mot välfärdsstaten demanded 1958. The welfare reforms produced immediate negative effects on human behaviour and economic performance, and the dangerous signs that could be seen today by the informed ‘would become a painful reality which will fall upon all of us in the socialist society of the future when we no longer have the chance to revolt’.73 It is hard to assess the import and significance of the hardliner’s welfare state criticisms. One can see their views as an undercurrent of dissent; their obvious weakness was the lack of support from the non-socialist parties regarding the concrete proposals. Accelerating state interventionism in general and economic planning in particular constituted the main targets for the critics, who argued from the positions set out by Hayek, Röpke and others. Their critique had an economic focus but concerned individual freedom in general.74

Taking Care of the Welfare State The Social Democrats won the decisive reform battle of the late 1950s, the protracted and intense parliamentary struggle over the superannuation pensions (ATP pensions). The large-scale pension reform attracted support from large segments of the middle classes at the same time as the divided opposition became distinctively weakened. The Social Democrats managed to enforce their position as the premium political force, the guarantee for increased material and social welfare. When Erlander presented the new party programme to the party congress in 1960, he underlined the significant development over the last few decades: The pension reform represents a new kind of policy, one that admittedly there have been traces of in the past – in family policy, the health insurance and accident insurance etc. – but which now has seen its full breakthrough. It was no longer about fighting mass poverty among the old. That was the problem of the 30s. Nor was it about securing fairly decent living conditions for the elderly, a minimum standard for all. That was the problem of the 40s. It was about something more adding to all that, namely about securing essentially the same standard of living for the families, the elderly and invalids.75

The new social reforms of the 50s, the sickness insurance and the ATP reform set benefits proportional to earnings. Income security, not min-

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imum standard, became the guiding principle. The Social Democrats successfully claimed ownership to the reforms; ‘The Social Democrats – Guaranteed Progress’ (socialdemokratin – framstegsgarantin) boasted an election poster from 1960. Erlander interpreted the renewed electoral success that way: ‘The attack on the welfare policies had been warded off. The pension reform was secure. The politics of progress could resume.’76 Welfare made up the central theme in the new programme adopted in 1960. Full employment reigned where unemployment used to rule, and mass poverty, insecurity and sharp class divisions had been replaced by ‘the welfare society’ (välfärdssamhälle).77 Despite the progress in all areas, the economic inequalities characteristic of capitalist society had survived. In other words, the struggle for economic and social equality and solidarity had to continue. Like before, ‘freedom and comfort/security’ (frihet och trygghet) were the keywords directing future reforms while full employment constituted the premium prerequisite. A new paragraph talked about the increased opportunities for happiness (ökade lyckomöjligheter) produced by increased economic wealth and social security and the need to combat the sense of failure and unhappiness that capitalist competitiveness tended to produce.78 Welfare, answered the programme, whose happiness paragraph enlarged the political concept of welfare to include non-material values, was also about social solidarity, human interaction and cultural activities. In my view, it should be interpreted as a comment to the emerging gloominess criticism of the 1950s. Alienation in modern society was not directly mentioned but looms in the background.79 Erlander explained to the delegates at the congress: The welfare society is far from completed, but we have today come further than we were in 1944. We now have reason to consider certain questions that have proven to be more difficult to deal with than we thought before the major reform programme was launched . . . Happiness was not included in the 1944 programme. It peaks shyly through the slightly open door in the proposal from 1960.80

Increased social services and reforms in the educational and cultural sectors provided the cure to unhappiness. For Erlander, economic growth and expanding services would make it possible to tailor welfare policies to better suit individual needs. This would make it possible to assist those in need and satisfy the growing demand for services. ‘Comfort/security’ and ‘freedom of choice’ (his pamphlet from 1962 was titled ‘The Society of Freedom of Choice’ (Valfrihetens samhälle) remained the guiding principles for the reforms that balanced the citizens’ economic self-interest and his need for more and better social services in the welfare state.81 This

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new state had absolutely nothing in common with ‘the old authoritarian guardian state’, countered Erlander, the conservative attack of the preceding decade. He dismissed that as ‘socially reactionary propaganda’ and repeated the central argument that ‘the welfare society’ provided the people with ‘more comfort and security, more freedom and improved possibilities to find their way in life’.82 ‘The strong society’ catered for the new needs that arose in a changing society. An expanding public sector was also needed to balance a growing business sector, said Erlander following Galbraith.83 The American economist provided inspiration and was definitely the most popular foreign academic for leading social democrats ca 1960. Galbraith’s The Affluent Society (in Swedish 1959) helped them elaborate and legitimize their own ideas and reforms of older and more diverse origin. A larger ‘public sector’ (offentlig sektor) provided the answer to the challenges of the new decade; the public sector lagged behind, and it needed to expand in order to satisfy new social demands, ‘the discontent produced by increased expectations’, declared Palme enthusiastically.84 The 1950s and early 60s can be described as the age of social democratic hegemony in Sweden. The Social Democrats were in charge, economic growth seemed endless and welfare services, especially at the municipal level, expanded continuously. To follow Michael Freeden: they managed to decontest ‘welfare’ and secure its relation to social democratic ideology and reform policies.85 They accomplished that in the 1930s and defended the relation successfully for several decades. This forced the centre-right parties to accommodate the continued success of the Social Democrats and the growing expansion of public services. That growth was sometimes described as a socialization and democratization of a kind, one that surpassed the objectives set up in the party programme and that had been achieved, as Palme explained, through full employment, through extended social security and labour market policies, through the huge expansion of the public sector, through financial policies, through supplementary pension funds, through the stronger position of the unions and through the expanding cooperative sector.86

Naturally, the ruling party tried to take advantage of its dominant position, and party leaders Erlander and later Palme would now and then claim that the non-socialist parties were always reluctant and negative and in reality not in favour of the reforms yet forced to accept them and afterwards eager to support them. I know, improvised a slightly amused Palme in a debate in the early 1980s, that

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modern Swedish history is full of valuable reforms which you [the centre-right parties] have labelled evil socialism only to later fight hard to take credit for the reforms when people found out what they meant.87

Of course, this is an expression of social democratic self-understanding as the primary historical force in modern Sweden, the governing, webuild-the-country party.88 Without accepting the interpretation’s selfcongratulating character, it is clear that the non-socialist parties were removed from the driving seat at the same time as they wanted a different or at least a redesigned map. In the 1950s, the Conservatives forwarded an alternative to ‘the strong society’, an alternative to the welfare state. When they lost the election in 1960 after yet another narrow defeat, party leader Hjalmarson lamented: ‘The myth of the welfare state won the election’.89 His successor Gunnar Heckscher, professor of political science, condemned ‘the spider-web socialism’, the process when a socialist way of thinking was gradually introduced into lager sections of society: ‘In the continued struggle to build their socialist, guardian society the dominant social democrats use spider-web socialism. It paralyzes and covers the people.’90 At that time, the conservative journal Svensk tidskrift, arguing that the average citizen both needed and wanted freedom of choice in the field of social policy, complained that an ever-expanding welfare system was now seen as inevitable and continued: ‘To question the welfare state in its normal Western form is widely regarded as being “politically impossible”.’91 Statements like this confirm the social democrats’ dominance. Continued electoral success – the Social Democrats won over 50 per cent of the votes in 1962 – and a growing welfare sector in a strong economy pointed at a bright future.

The Caretaker’s Responsibilities As the carrier of welfare policies, the Social Democrats triumphed. However, the triumphs came at a cost. One problem concerned the relation between democratic socialism as an ideology and more pragmatic welfare reforms. How were comprehensive social reforms to be understood in relation to the long-term objectives concerning socialism and the end of capitalism, ran the perennial question for ideologically concerned social democrats. For Möller, chief architect of the reforms in the 1930s and 40s, the answer was quite simple: welfare reforms could be seen as crutches, not a substitute for the socialist future. Consensus-seeking party leader Hansson saw an indirect connection between the socialist principles and the political reforms; the latter would in a longer time

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frame lead to socialism. Social reforms were important in themselves and also as vital instruments for societal change.92 These exchanges about short- and long-term party objectives were echoed in the texts by Wigforss, who in the 1950s reminded the younger generations within the labour movement that the social policies by themselves never would lead to socialism.93 He made these interjections at the time when the party chairman Erlander started to forward ‘the strong society’ – i.e. comprehensive and inclusive welfare policies – as the ideological catchphrase. In the latter half of the 1950s, when young poets and novelists scorned society’s growing materialism and emptiness, younger social democrats advanced similar ideas. They wanted to shift the focus from economic growth and welfare to socialism and welfare. The ‘myth of the welfare state’ as the final stage in modern history had to be debunked in order to pave the way for reforms promoting real economic and cultural equality, reforms needed to free the individual from capitalist society’s ‘perverted and suffocating ideals’.94 This growing radicalism gained momentum with the rise of different socialist parties and organizations to the left of the established parties. A turn to the left from the mutual agreement and co-understanding, which in certain respects characterized the previous decade and a half, took place in the mid 1960s. From 1965, the year of the first Vietnam demonstration in Sweden, to 1975, the political left set the agenda and defined the issues for much of the public debate.95 The Social Democrats still dominated party politics – they reached one of their best results with more than 50 per cent of the votes in 1968 – but they were now challenged from the left. These groups, leaving aside their many schisms, attacked the welfare state’s confident caretaker, the Social Democrats, and made radical change a top priority. And social democracy, captivated by bourgeois hegemony, was held accountable for the lack of real socialist transformation of capitalist society. As the authors of En ny vänster (A New Left, 1966), a starting signal for leftist social analysis, made clear from the outset: Not even our most complacent party friends can say that Sweden is a socialist country. In no other country has social democracy reached such political successes. In no other country has the old social democracy reached an impasse, it seems.96

The Social Democrats’ programme was labelled ‘this consumptive and of complacency flaring programme draft’ by the socialist critics, and the income-related social insurance systems were fundamentally wrong, as they conserved market inequalities instead of providing protection from the domination of market mechanisms. In short, the welfare reforms were anything but socialist.97 The affluence, materialism and self-conceitedness

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of liberal-capitalist Sweden, where social democrats and big business ruled hand in hand, constituted the prime targets for the younger generation in the New Left. Contemporary society in general and specific social policies were scrutinized and criticized in numerous reviews, articles and books. The social democrats were part of the problem in these texts about lack of real industrial and economic democracy in a society marked by persistent alienation, bourgeois hegemony and conventions and, finally, a completely unjust capitalist world order. In other words, the caretaker, the party that claimed ownership of and copyright to ‘the welfare society’, was under attack for not having done enough or, even worse, for having abandoned socialism.98 Internationally renowned crime novel authors Sjöwall and Wahlöö gave the message an accessible form. The real crime they were portraying in The Story of a Crime was of a colossal magnitude: the betrayal of the Swedish working class by those in power.99 These ideological challenges from the left were supplemented by an increasing focus on inadequacies in the existing welfare programmes. The objective was not primarily political change but more and better reforms. Newspapers exposed the poverty and squalor ‘Behind the Welfare Wall’ and ‘the gaping holes’ in the welfare system.100 Greater impact had The Incomplete Welfare (Den ofärdiga välfärden) from 1967, a sociological study of the ‘hidden poverty and deprivation’, which saw several editions within a few years. Class society and capitalism explained most the persisting problems, and this meant that the welfare reforms needed to be supplemented by ‘radical measures which among other things address the division of society into social classes with irreconcilable interests and privileges’.101 Other books and reports followed, and issues of this kind – the persistence of social inequalities despite economic growth and the problem of low wages for many organized workers – gained weight in the radicalized political climate of the late 1960s and early 70s. The social democratic welfare state as a soft capitalist state was the target of this critique. All the established parties responded and adapted to the changes in the political and cultural climate. Palme, from 1965 a member of the cabinet, talked about the cracks in society and the need to mend them through continuous socialist reformism in order to include the large low-income groups left outside the welfare society of the majority. Arne Geijer, chairman of The Swedish Trade Union Confederation, forwarded the same view: ‘no one can deny that we still have enormous deficiencies in the Swedish society and huge gaps in incomes and fortunes’.102 Structural changes and persisting inequalities in the labour market were gradually defined as ‘welfare issues’, and this widened, of course, the definition of the concept. New aspects, increased focus on equality (jämlikhet), co-

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determination (medbestämmande) and economic democracy (ekonomisk demokrati), and later equal opportunities (jämställdhet), gained prominence in the old sphere of economic policy and formed policy fields such as gender equality. This gave ‘social comfort and security’ (social trygghet) an intrinsic value instead of being subordinated to economic growth, and it made the ideology of ‘the strong society’ even stronger. The new party programme from 1975 confirmed the social rights of numerous defined weaker groups – children, immigrants, elderly, disabled and victims of addictions – and it also introduced ‘the welfare state’ as a prominent feature in a programme, the concept used to describe contemporary society.103 With Palme as chief architect, the programme summed up the social democratic image of society: the democratic welfare society had been created by the Social Democrats and, although substantial gains had been made in all fields, contemporary society still retained many of the social inequalities that were characteristic of capitalism. ‘Democratic socialism,’ Palme’s confessed ideological position, called for further reforms in order to increase equality, stated the programme. It was about time, he had declared at the party congress three years before, to include working life and industrial relations in social democratic welfare policies, to let ‘our social aims’ set their marks upon this sector. ‘This means,’ he continued, ‘an expansion of the old and familiar concept of welfare which will be of significance for the development of society.’104 In this way, the labour market legislation of the 1970s, which Palme alluded to, can be seen as the product of a gradually enlarged concept of welfare; a change, or socialist radicalization as the adversaries put it, which in its turn helped to open for the neoliberal contestation of the welfare state in the 1980s. Conservatives, Liberals and Centre – the old Farmers’ Party had shed its skin in the late 1950s and emerged as the largest non-socialist party a decade later – were also affected by the strong winds from the left. The Conservatives faced a hard time adopting, and the rash change of name to the Moderates (from Högerpartiet to Moderata Samlingspartiet) in 1969 can be seen as a sign of the times, and this can also be said about the new and distinctively welfare-state friendly programme, adopted that same year, with its extensive list of neglected welfare needs.105 In the early 1970s, they launched ‘the new insecurity’ as the buzzword in an attack on the shortcomings of the social democratic welfare system. The Centre Party set equality as their overarching objective in the new programme from 1970 and underlined common responsibilities of society for our mutual welfare. Environmental protection was their premium added value; they explicitly included it in their definition of the modern concept of welfare.106 In a similar way, the Liberals promoted ‘social re-

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forms without socialism’, highlighted development aid and talked about the need to increase the tempo in social reforms in order to address all the grave problems which the Social Democrats had failed to handle.107 The non-socialist parties tried to make two points at the same time. First of all, they repeated that the social democrats should not take the credit for all the good welfare reforms that had received more or less unanimous support from all parties. Secondly, they blamed the complacent government for not doing enough. This competition in social reformism did not exclude substantial conflicts, as the parties were competing for power in a hung unicameral parliament 1973–76 when the first signs of the economic downturn appeared. But the adherence to welfare policies as the lowest common denominator for all political parties was confirmed. The new constitution from 1975 illustrates this: the second paragraph, added 1976, does not say that Sweden is a welfare state, yet it sets out a number of welfare objectives as guidelines for all public activity: The personal, economic and cultural welfare of the private person shall be fundamental aims of public activity. In particular, it shall be incumbent upon the public institutions to secure the right to health, employment, housing and education, and to promote social care and social security.108

This paragraph was a compromise; the non-socialist parties argued for civil rights, whereas the Social Democrats wanted ‘a statement about the welfare state’s aspirations for economic, social and cultural development and equality’. The question was whether the rights of citizens towards society – the committee wrote ‘society’, not the state – would primarily apply to protection from abuse, or the right to economic and social security, or maybe both.109 Later research has mainly been interested in the questions of civil rights, but the interesting aspect here was the attempt to define the welfare state and its responsibilities, an attempt to define social rights in a general way. The suggested definition was clearly marked by the new expanded concept of welfare, which could include economic and social equality, living conditions in general, labour market relations, environmental protection and many other topics.

‘System Change’ In 1976, the non-socialist coalition defeated the Social Democrats. Its period in office 1976–82 was marked by internal divisions and lengthy negotiations and a failure to provide an alternative to the inherited programmes and policies. Above all, the economic downturn set the agenda.

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Sweden dropped from its international top position and growth slowed down. The complexities of the processes are enormous; oil crisis, stagflation, industrial depression and influences from Thatcher’s Great Britain and Reagan’s US played a part (e.g. monetarism, neoliberalism).110 In the late 70s, when the seemingly automatic increases in the costs of the welfare system and growing budget deficits started worrying economists and politicians, the welfare programmes were no longer seen a prerequisite for economic growth but more as a burden on public finances. This marked a fundamental and long-lasting change in conceptualizations: ‘the welfare state’, expensive and inefficient according to dominant views, was now part of the problem or, for some, the root of all problems. The entire ‘public sector’ – an older term, which increased in popularity and was used in diverse and undefined ways as a synonym of the welfare state – could be described this way. ‘Deficit 100 Billions’, alarmed a liberal pamphlet, and the books In a Fragile Bark and The Grim Truth are just two out of several publications from social democrats in the early 1980s about the dark economic outlook and need for tough reforms.111 Widely shared notions of structural problems in the public sector and – since the 1990s – the need for strict budget control have set their marks on Swedish politics. Of course, they have many different roots, including lessons learned from unsuccessful policies. One new factor was the new role of economists as the experts with strong claims to have correct diagnosis and remedies to combat high costs and low efficiency.112 ‘The crisis of the welfare state is a crisis of efficiency and credibility,’ stated the government’s experts in the Lindbeck commission in 1993, and other reports, from business-related think tanks, talked about ‘suedosclerosis’, the dangerous combination of high taxes and a regulated labour market in a continuously growing welfare state.113 The general impact of economics on welfare thinking and policies in the form of an economization of welfare of discourse with a new focus on incentives, costs, evaluations and quantitative measurements constitutes one of the most significant and long-lasting changes. Equally important was the break-up of the successful social democratic claim to own the concept of welfare since the 1980s. The level of political contestation and conflict concerning welfare increased significantly in the 1980s. In comparison with the neighbouring countries, the temperature was higher, and the starting point provides much of the explanation for this: Sweden, the most celebrated ‘supermodel’, embodied the strong social democratic welfare state and this made the stakes involved greater.114 Employers’ organization and industry interests orchestrated campaigns to reconquer the public agenda and reverse the previous turn to the left. Old leftists reconsidered their previous commitments, and socialist positions were rapidly marginalized.

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Standpoints that had been beyond the pale in the period 1950–75, such as an outspoken anti-Keynesian economic liberalism, were now accepted. The times were changing rapidly and the conceptualization of the welfare state changed with them, and the new political buzzwords, such as renewal (förnyelse), deregulation (avreglering), freedom of choice (valfrihet) and privatization (privatisering) are evidence of the profound transformations of welfare state discourse.115 As Figure 2.3 shows, the new terms increased rapidly in popularity, and they tended to be more frequently deployed than some of older the welfare compounds. But the intensified ideological debates also increased the usage of välfärdsstaten, the object attacked and defended in the exchanges (see Figure 2.2). In the late 70s and early 80s, organized labour’s proposal for wage earner funds became the divisive issue. It confirmed that the political struggle concerned (or it could at least be portrayed that way) the survival of the free enterprise. All opponents could collectively mobilize against ‘the wage-earner-fund socialism’, which burdened the Social Democrats in government 1982–91 when they tried to enforce a hard line in economic policy in order to rescue generous welfare programmes (den tredje vägen, the third way). The polarized wage-earner-fund debates strengthened economic liberalism and anti-socialism. Like fund socialism, the welfare state came to symbolize collectivism and bureaucratization.116 The notion    

 



   


  

                                                              



Figure 2.3. The new vocabulary of welfare in the major Swedish newspapers, 1976–2015. Full-text occurrences (truncated search) of the terms privatization (privatisering), deregulation (avreglering) and system change (systemskifte) in Dagens Nyheter (liberal), Svenska Dagbladet (moderate), Aftonbladet (social democratic) and Expressen (liberal). The terms ‘freedom of choice’, ‘market’ and ‘renewal’ are too unspecific and common to allow for searches. Source: The digitized newspaper archive Svenska dagstidningar, data retrieved 20 October 2017 from http://tidningar.kb.se/.

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that the welfare state had become inefficient and over-bureaucratized, or at least too expensive, set its mark on party politics. In their political offensive in the early 1980s, the Moderates’ leader Gösta Bohman called for a liberal revolt against the dictatorship of the public sector, against increasing bureaucracy, against the on-going politicization of social life and against the tendency to limit the freedom of the individual.117

Critique of high taxes, lack of freedom and lack of individual choice were the central tenets when the Moderates as the leading non-socialist party took on the social democratic state. Critics attacked the general welfare policies as a costly and inefficient system tailored to suit the collective instead of helping the individuals who really needed assistance. Pamphlets such as ‘The Callous Welfare State’ (Den hjärtlösa välfärdsstaten 1983) by former party co-chairman Staffan Burenstam Linder, Minister of Trade 1976–78, made this clear. ‘The strong society’ of the social democrats was full of good intentions producing terrible results: new benefits and regulations, increased taxes, new distributive polices and public services only aggravated the problems. The overgrown welfare state was occupied with correcting problems caused by its expansion, which had eroded social bonds and human compassion. He proposed a simple remedy: shrinking the welfare state and strengthening welfare society with individual choices, market-based solutions and human solidarity: ‘The solidarity of welfare society is human compassion. The solidarity of the welfare state is budget policy.’118 Like many others, Burenstam Linder tried a sharp division between state and society, and this conceptual transformation that started in the early 1980s is vitally important. During the previous decades, ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare society’ had been synonyms. Now, this changed, at least to some extent, and state and society were more often seen as opposites. The new Moderate party programme from 1984 illustrates this well. It started from the premise that it was time to reverse the power relation between the state and the individual citizen, and this called for a ‘legal state’ (demokratisk rättsstat). The introduction of this concept of state was matched by the replacement of the welfare state by a welfare society: ‘welfare society instead of welfare state’. A welfare society was, contrary to the welfare state, characterized by the rule of individual preferences and choices. The welfare society was like a market economy for services run, whereas politicians and representatives of the public sector made the decisions in the welfare state.119 Now was the time to address the historical problem of the overgrown and inhuman state, as the journal Svensk tidskrift explained in 1986:

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The socialist vision of welfare with all its good intentions becomes a straightjacket for society and the individual through its uniform implementation and claims for power [maktanspråk]. The welfare state, which in the beginning increased personal freedom, now threatens that freedom through its weight [tyngd].120

In the joint election manifesto from Liberals and Moderates in 1991, ‘New start for Sweden’, the need for a ‘freedom of choice revolution’ in the welfare sector had a prominent position, and the breaking-up of old monopolies was needed for the sake of economic efficiency and individual empowerment.121 It was not just about making ends meet in the budget and control public spending but also about changing the older ideas of welfare, to strengthen civil society instead of state power, to have customers make individual choices instead of patronizing politicians deciding over clients, and to have productive private alternatives to ineffective public monopolies. These were the new leitmotifs in this successful contestation of older welfare ideas, and they helped refashion the welfare sector. In this substantial way, ‘welfare society’ has successfully challenged the ‘welfare state’. Carl Bildt, Moderate party chairman and head of government 1991–94, described this as a ‘liberal system change’ in society in general with a ‘freedom of choice-revolution’ in the welfare sector. The socialist walls, regulations and obstacles were being torn down, and this opened for a new era of prosperity in Sweden and all over Europe. Increased freedom of choice for the individuals meant reduced costs and higher efficiency in the welfare sector, argued Bildt. Towards the end of the decade, the new Liberal party leader Lars Leijonborg in a similar vein proclaimed the arrival of ‘the new age of liberty’.122 A basic aspect of their message, one that previously had come from the lone voice of the employers’ organizations and business interests but now had received a new significance, was that economic growth, private enterprises and the free market economy laid the foundations for social welfare. Sometimes this point was made in a confrontational way, which was shown by statements of Fredrik Reinfeldt (at the time the leading representative of the younger Moderates and later both party leader 2004–14 and Prime Minister 2006–14) on the welfare state’s illusory benevolence, which only produced victims – a population lured into sleep by empty promises: The welfare state is an impossible construction. Those who have something to gain in the short run always shout down those who have to pay in the long run. Abandon general welfare policies and stop making promises that the welfare can be guaranteed through political decisions. Politicians do not create any resources and can, consequently, not make any promises on how they should be distributed.123



the languages of welfare in sweden

Figure 2.4.  Always More, Never Enough from 1994 by the journalist and social democrat Anders Isaksson on the growing welfare state and the constantly increasing demands for more welfare. Reprinted with permission by Bokförlaget T. Fischer & Co.

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Figure 2.5.  The Witch-Hunt on Welfare from 1994 by sociologist Joachim Israel attacking the manufactured crisis and the assaults on the welfare state. Photo: © 1994 Christer Hellmark and Ordfront förlag.

Other examples of similar statements highlighting the welfare state’s inherent problems can be easily found, and the general point is that it was now possible to question the scale, scope and design of the welfare programmes now the old social democratic ownership had been overturned. The general election in 1998 was, according to the Moderates’ platform, a choice between the obsolete ‘social benefit state’ (bidragsstaten) and the emerging new welfare society with individual opportunities and freedom of choice.124

Nostalgia for the People’s Home ‘Civil society’ was one of the novel ideas of the 1990s, drawing on a more or less pronounced anti-etatism of the previous decade, a negative view of the bureaucratic state, which marked the lowest common denomina-

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tor for representatives of most political camps, including many leading social democrats.125 Cooperation among citizens and individual freedom were social democratic values too, it was stressed. Freedom included employee rights in the labour market and decent wages to enable good living conditions. But there was more to it; freedom of choice meant defending comprehensive welfare reforms and, at the same time, increasing the citizens’ right to choose the school, care centre and retirement home they wanted. This became the favoured position of the Social Democrats, in government 1982–91. Increased individual freedom within the old framework was the answer to ‘the blue vision’ of the Moderates, which according to social democrats only meant tax cuts, redistribution in favour of the wealthy and the dissolution of social solidarity.126 At the same time as they defended the defining features of the now completed welfare state – i.e. tax-financed universal programmes aimed at social solidarity and equality – against those who argued for targeted programmes or basic social security (grundtrygghet), they wanted to avoid being identified with that state. The welfare state could not remain unchanged in a changing world, and this opened for further reforms. In this way, the Social Democrats tried to square the circle and simultaneously satisfy those within the party who argued for less state and more decentralization and community-based cooperation and disarm the liberal critique by incorporating individual preferences into existing welfare policies.127 Structural economic problems – above all huge budget deficits and in the 1990s also high unemployment rates – and strong non-socialist critique of the old system pressed the social democrats, and one of their answers was a return to an old concept. The assassination of Palme in 1986, globalization and marketization, the European Union and migration – multiple threats to choose from depending on held views – made the old national welfare model even more precious. The boom for social democratic nostalgia and critical stories about the dark side of utopia are telling signs of the contestation surrounding ‘the welfare state’ in general since the 1980s. Now, Folkhemmet, ‘the people’s home’, debuted as a strongly politicized concept in the heated debates about the public sector and the neoliberal critique.128 It encapsulated solid social democratic values and welfare policies, the outcome of successful reforms over many decades, which needed to be defended against the onslaught of ‘market liberals’.129 Its present popularity as a metaphor for Swedish society in general dates from the 1980s, and its popularity increased in the early 90s when the hard recession hit at the same time as the government deregulated premium welfare sectors as healthcare and education. Folkhemmet was set up as the alternative to ‘system change’, a useful concept when the prime objective was to stop, safeguard (slå vakt om) and restore

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(återställa) what the economic crises and, above all, the non-socialist governments had destroyed. The Social Democrats, in office again 1994–2006, had to manage the economic recovery with strict budgets and few new welfare reforms. Furthermore, the restoration was primarily concerned with benefit levels, and it did not confront the new notions of rendering the welfare sector more efficient through competition and making individual preferences the starting point for services. This has imparted Swedish social democracy with a somewhat conservative character, and the resurgence of folkhemmet was imbued with nostalgia of this kind when ideological crisis threatened, and this despite the efforts to revitalize it with ‘the green people’s home’, the environmentally friendly vision for the future.130 The folkhem nostalgia is in that sense related to the enduring notion of a crisis, the experience of a fundamental shift in Swedish society, which was born in the 1980s and has survived since then despite the measurable positive economic performance. The best medium for studying this still-thriving notion of loss is probably the Swedish crime novel, moulded in the form created by Sjöwall and Wahlöö, where the safe and caring welfare state is falling apart; a paradise lost where social solidarity has been replaced by the most callous and calculated selfishness. This decaying welfare state provides the setting and the political master narrative for a great many books and films in the genre – one of the bestselling sequels is even called ‘the downfall of the welfare state’.131 The calls for ‘system change’ and the efforts to realize ‘the people’s home’ were about larger issues than just changes in social security and social services. The conflicts concerned the general character of Swedish society and politics and included topics such as corporatist arrangements in the labour market, regulations and bureaucratization in general, economic policies, EU membership and so on. Consequently, ‘welfare state’ often referred to society in general or, specifically, to the social democratic state. The general trend in public discourse was a move away from the traditional social democratic conception of society and economy towards more market-oriented and individualistic understandings.

From Welfare State to ‘the Welfare’ In 2010, the Moderate Prime Minister Reinfeldt underlined the need to safeguard the common welfare: ‘We have good welfare which provides comfort and security through our lives.’132 A couple of years earlier, after the election in 2002, which cost them one third of their seats in the Riksdag, the Moderates had reinvented themselves under Reinfeldt’s leader-

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ship using concepts formerly associated with the Social Democrats. This makeover into ‘the new labour party’ brought them electoral success in 2006 and 2010 in the coalition with the other established non-socialist parties (Centre, Liberals and Christian Democrats, together called the Alliance). Gone was the earlier principled critique of a paternalistic and bureaucratic welfare state that regulated the lives of ordinary citizens. Instead, the Moderates moved towards the political centre in the same way as the Social Democrats had done over the last decades, and the Alliance provided a convincing alternative to the left.133 In their post-election analysis in 2006, a defeat that followed the solid performances four and eight years earlier, the Social Democrats identified their opponents’ move to the centre as one explanation for their loss. This made the Alliance seem less dangerous, said their analysis. Their own task was described as saving the welfare state from collapsing, a mission that had demanded unpopular decisions.134 One way of interpreting this gravitation towards the centre would be to stress the primacy of the welfare state and the continued general support for the tax-financed, universalist insurance programmes from all parties. The changes in benefit levels, periods and coverage can be seen as a process of restructuring and recalibration within the well-known, historically defined institutional settings. Studies of public attitudes and opinions seem to confirm the picture of continued popular support for this welfare state.135 The other interpretation highlights the substantial changes in the Swedish welfare mix since the early 1990s. All parties, except the socialist Left (Vänsterpartiet), have contributed to and accepted the emergence of a welfare market in education, healthcare, care for children and elderly and other welfare services. These programmes are publicly funded but delivered by public and, increasingly, also by non-public actors. Individual preferences and competition between public and private service providers are salient characteristics supported by new legislation from 2008 and 2010. This has fundamentally reduced the stateness of Swedish welfare, as basic social services are no longer administered exclusively by the state or municipalities.136 One consequence is the move from ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare society’ to ‘the welfare’ as the covering concept in public discourse. Nowadays, politicians and media talk about ‘the welfare’ (välfärden) when referring to what used to be called ‘welfare state’, ‘welfare reforms’ etc. ‘Reliable welfare’ for all, demanded the Social Democrats’ election manifesto in 2014 and added that ‘the welfare (välfärden) must provide freedom and comfort to everyone so that we can all live well our entire lives’, and the Alliance in a similar manner stated that no government had invested more in ‘the welfare’ than them.137 The common retreat to ‘the welfare’ reflects the expansion of market actors

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Figure 2.6. ‘And anything else?’, asks Prime Minister Reinfeldt selling out the welfare society in a cartoon from January 2011, originally published in the daily Dagens Nyheter and titled En handlingens man, roughly translated as ‘A man of business’. Illustration by Magnus Bard, reprinted with permission.

in the welfare sector and, at least for some, the notion of an irrevocable historical transformation: the end of the egalitarian and solidaristic social democratic welfare state. In the leftist critique, this death is often described as the result of covert attacks led by the Reinfeldt government, whose tax reductions, workfare legislation and marketization of the welfare sector produced growing social divisions in ‘Ill-fare-land’ (Ofärdsland). Critics claim that the current welfare system is not just incomplete but fundamentally flawed and unjust in a planned way.138 Some of these points have been adopted by the Social Democrats, internally divided over the issues of private actors

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and profits in the tax-financed sectors, who in recent years have talked about Sweden, basically a good country, ‘falling apart’ due to the former government’s policies. The notion of loss and the need for restoration make up important aspects of this rhetoric, although the Social Democrats, in office since 2014, have been reluctant to propose reforms in order to roll back the freedom of choice legislations and privatizations in the welfare services. Currently, the battle rages between those such as the Left party, who stress that ‘the welfare’ is not for sale and that ‘the common welfare’ must be protected from ‘the greed of the market’, and their opponents such as the Christian Democrats, who argue for the wealth- and job-producing private entrepreneurs in the welfare sector.139 In this sense, ‘the welfare’ remains a premium political battleground with polarized debates where all parties claim ownership to the best policies. Characteristic of this current conceptualization of ‘the welfare’ is ‘exclusion’ (utanförskap), surfacing as a key concept in the elections in 2006, when the non-socialist parties used it to beat the social democrats, and then again as a standard term in 2015, when migration to Sweden soared.140 Its popularity reflects the stronger focus on shortcomings and divisions in a post-welfare state. When it was used systematically by the Alliance in 2006 it referred to exclusion from the labour market and the problem of welfare dependency (bidragsberoende), which the Social Democrats, it was said, tried to conceal. Nowadays, it is commonly used to label issues associated with migration and integration; areas of exclusion (utanförskapsområden) describe entire suburbs with many immigrants, and ‘exclusion’ might refer to high unemployment, wage earners with precarious positions in general, persistent high levels of sick leave or just segregation in general.141 ‘Exclusion’ is described as the eminent challenge, and its significance increased in 2015 with the comparatively substantial immigration of refugees and the subsequent, dramatic shift from generous to strict immigration policies. Here, migration and ‘welfare’ became opposites, and it appeared necessary to stop the former in order to safeguard the latter, as the government argued.142 The refugee crisis, probably best described as a critical juncture when policies and strategies were dramatically reshaped with far-reaching and unforeseen consequences, also exposed the national dimension in dominant understandings of ‘welfare’. The rise of the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), staunchly anti-immigration and anti-European Union, as the third block in Swedish party politics over the last decade has intensified the possible tensions between transnational migration and national welfare. According to them, massive immigration is tearing apart the welfare systems, and their ideal is the old welfare state, a return to the comfort and security of ‘the people’s home’, with their objective

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being to guard ‘the common national identity which provided the foundation for the welfare state’, as their programme states.143 The other parties denounce the outspoken social conservative nationalism yet propose stricter migration policies in order to protect ‘the welfare’ and combat ‘exclusion’. Currently, the tensions between marketized welfare services, universalist ideals, rising costs and populist resentment are clearly visible in current debates about ‘the welfare’.

Welfare, Welfare, Welfare – A few Conclusions ‘Welfare’ has since the 1930s been at the centre of Swedish politics. It forms a vital part of popular national self-understanding and is tightly linked to images of ‘state’ and ‘society’. Put differently, Sweden became a ‘welfare state’ already in the 30s at the same time as the Social Democrats successfully used ‘welfare politics’ as their overarching concept, a concept with strong orientation towards the future and the making of a new society through piecemeal social reforms. During the boom years of the postwar era, when Sweden emerged as the premium welfare state in the eyes of foreign observers, the warmer ‘welfare society’ remained the preferred term for Social Democrats, who delivered new popular reforms every term in office. Gradually, with the increased standard of living for larger groups, the transformative character waned and ‘welfare policies’ replaced ‘politics’. Despite the continued reforms, leading politicians sometimes regarded the social safety net as completed; both Minister of Social Affairs Möller – in his case already in the late 40s – and his successors made statements of that kind on several occasions. For them the welfare state (‘Social Sweden’ or ‘strong society’) had been firmly established, and only smaller modifications needed to be taken care of. Newspapers and magazines also painted the picture of a happy and prosperous society. Consequently, ‘the welfare state’ became descriptive more than prospective, more contemporary than future-oriented. Over time the meanings of ‘welfare’ have been expanded to include labour market relations, gender equality, environmental issues and, lately, the new stress on non-material values and subjective wellbeing. The enlarged welfare concept of the 1970s can be seen as a culmination – before the crisis and the different challenges of the 80s ended the social democratic hegemony over welfare. Since then, the understanding of the Swedish welfare state has changed considerably, and some even say that the real welfare state – the one that many foreigners admired so much – is permanently gone, be it for good or worse depending on political point of view. There is a case to be made for that interpretation, although it does not mean

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that the welfare state as an institution has been dismantled or that the high standard of living belongs to the past. On the contrary, the key point is the changed conceptualization since the 80s, where ‘the welfare state’ no longer is the obvious part of the solution; instead it might be part of the problem or at least something that needs tight control and constant defending. One outcome of this open-ended process is the emergence of ‘the welfare’ as the nebulous concept used in public discourse covering the new mix of tax-financed services provided by competing public and private actors and the social insurance system. Nils Edling is Reader in History, Department of History, Stockholm University. He is currently writing a book on welfare as a key concept in Swedish politics with the working title Kampen om välfärdsstaten. Earlier publications on this topic include the chapter on Denmark and Sweden, co-authored by Klaus Petersen and Jørn Henrik Petersen, in Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language (Policy Press, 2014).

NOTES 1. For the full story with a more elaborated discussion, full context and multiple references, see my forthcoming study Kampen om välfärdsstaten. Obvious lacunae exist in this chapter – it has nothing on the Church and the views of clergy on welfare and little on intellectual debates. I have also excluded the parties left of the Social Democrats. The corpus used here includes: party programmes, election manifestos, political pamphlets from the major parties, national newspapers and handbooks and studies in the social sciences, from 1900 up to 2016. 2. Nils Elvander, Harald Hjärne och konservatismen: Konservativ idédebatt i Sverige 1865–1922 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1961), 70–97, cit. 96. For an overview, Nils Edling, Jørn Henrik Petersen and Klaus Petersen, ‘Social Policy Language in Denmark and Sweden’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 13–34. 3. Johan Leffler, Grundlinier till nationalekonomiken eller läran om folkens allmänna hushållning (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1881), 25–26; Johan Leffler, Nationalekonomiens grunddrag (Stockholm: Looström, 1902), 26–27 (legal and culture state); Carl-Axel Reuterskiöld, Föreläsningar i juridisk encyklopedi: Grunddragen af den allmänna rätts- och samhällsläran, särskildt med hänsyn till positiv svensk rätt jämte grundlinier till rättsutvecklingslärans och rättsvetenskapens historia (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1912), 34 (‘the theory of welfare state’); Fritz H. Brock, ‘Objektskatterna och kommunalskattereformen’, Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 23 (1920), 30 (from ‘nightwatchmen

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4.

5. 6.

7.

8. 9.

10. 11.

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state’ to ‘culture- and welfare state’). Other examples, Carl-Axel Reuterskiöld, ‘Statens moderna förvaltningsuppgifter’, Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 8(5) (1905), 250–69 (‘culture-legal state’); Ivar Öman, Karl Staaffs första ministär (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1923), ch. 7 (from economic liberalism to the welfare state). The oldest known example dates from Stockholms Dagblad, 16 October 1878, and a report about Bismarck’s anti-socialist legislation, ‘Den tyska socialistlagen’, which claims that German socialists wanted to replace ‘the legal state’ with ‘the welfare state’. Minutes from the First Chamber, Första kammarens protokoll (FK) 1927:36 (vol. A4), 45 (Westman), and the Second Chamber, Andra kammarens protokoll (AK) 1927:35 (vol. B4), 22 (O. Järte). Cit. from Westman, italics in original. On the new, stricter immigration law from 1927, Tomas Hammar, Sverige åt svenskarna: Invandringspolitik, utlänningskontroll och asylrätt 1900–1932 (Stockholm: Stockholms universitet, 1964), 198–219. AK 1927:35 (vol. B4), 24 (Engberg). Gustav Möller, Trygghet och säkerhet åt Sverges folk: Ett socialdemokratiskt program inför valen (Stockholm: Tiden, 1928), 5. Möller referred directly to Lassalle’s ‘welfare state’, a term that the German apparently never used. Arthur Engberg, Member of Parliament and editor-in-chief of Social-Demokraten, made a similar statement when he stressed that the proposed reforms combined constituted a welfare state of a kind that must be seen as a socialist project, since it extended the scale and scope of state interventionism, ‘Från Ingentingskogen’, Svenska Dagbladet [SvD], 28 August 1928. The digitized newspaper archive, Svenska dagstidningar, shows a total of 556 hits for ‘welfare committee’ from 1831 to 1930 in the three main Stockholm papers Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter (DN) and Svenska Dagbladet (SvD). A majority of these referred to foreign events. Between 1930 and 1935 there were 250 hits referring mainly to Swedish politics and the crisis agreement. Gunnar Dahlberg and Herbert Tingsten, Svensk politisk uppslagsbok (Stockholm: A-B Svensk Litteratur, 1937), 389–90. Nils Edling, ‘The Primacy of Welfare Politics: Notes on the Language of the Swedish Social Democrats and their Adversaries in 1930s’, in Heidi Haggrén, Johanna Rainio-Niemi and Jussi Vauhkonen (eds), Multi-layered Historicity of the Present: Approaches to Social Science History (Helsinki: Helsinki University, 2013), 125–50. Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) vol. 2, 352. For overviews, Leif Lewin, Planhushållningsdebatten, 2nd ed. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1970), ch. 2; Olof Wennås, Ohlin, Folkpartiet och socialliberalismen: Ett bidrag till den idéhistoriska litteraturen (Lund: Gleerup, 1970), 33–87; Benny Carlson, The State as a Monster: Gustav Cassel and Eli Heckscher on the Role and Growth of the State (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), chs 8, 12.

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12. Gösta Bagge, Politiska tal år 1937 (Stockholm, 1937), 78; Albert O. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1991). For earlier attacks, Arvid Lindman, Med högern för systemskifte: Tal av Arvid Lindman vid det nationella medborgartåget i Stockholm söndagen den 27 maj 1934 (Stockholm: Allmänna Valmansförbundet, 1934); Lindman, Frihet eller förtryck: Tvenne föredrag av Arvid Lindman den 14. och 16. mars 1935 i Stockholm (Stockholm: Allmänna Valmansförbundet, 1935); Lindman, Trygghetskrav i orostider: Föredrag i 1936 års valrörelse (Stockholm: Allmänna Valmansförbundet, 1936). 13. See my forthcoming study Edling, Kampen. 14. Gustaf Andersson and Bertil Ohlin, Välfärdspolitiken, valet och framtiden (Stockholm: Folkpartiet, 1936 (Politikens dagsfrågor 8)), see also Folkpartiets valhandbok, vol. 2. Riksdagsmannavalet 1936 (Stockholm: Folkpartiet, 1936 (Politikens dagsfrågor 7)), 5–6, 12–15. Ohlin, Fri eller dirigerad ekonomi (Stockholm: Folkpartiets Ungdomsförbund, 1936), used ‘welfare arrangements’ (välfärdsanordningar) and ‘social policies’ (socialpolitik). 15. Gösta Bagge, Politiska tal år 1936 (Stockholm, 1936), 60–63, 71–73, 91–94, 98–112, cit. 98. 16. Politisk valhandbok 1938 (Stockholm: Högerns riksorganisation, 1938), 20, 64; Politisk valhandbok 1940 (Stockholm: Högerns riksorganisation, 1940), 140–41; Politisk valhandbok 1942 (Stockholm: Högerns riksorganisation, 1942), 134–37. 17. Cit. from ‘Sverige som en välfärdsstat’, SvD, 20 March 1936. 18. Möller, Trygghet, 27; Möller, Bättre bostäder (Stockholm: Tiden, 1936), 11–12. 19. ‘De stora frågorna’ and ‘Välfärd och samförstånd’ [two printed model speeches for Liberal campaign 1936]; Yngve Larsson, ‘Frihetens välfärdstat’, vols C:1, H:1, Yngve Larssons samling, Stockholms stadsarkiv. See also reports from the Liberal campaign, ‘Sverige’, SvD, 20 March 1936, ‘Folkpartiet företräder en samlande medellinje’, DN, 16 September 1936. 20. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, ‘The Making of the Social Democratic State’, in Klaus Misgeld, Karl Molin and Klas Åmark (eds), Creating Social Democracy: A Century of the Social Democratic Labor Party in Sweden (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 44. 21. For an overview, Lennart Schön, Sweden’s Road to Modernity: An Economic History (Stockholm: SNS, 2010) 281–307; for social reforms, Per Gunnar Edebalk, Välfärdsstaten träder fram: Svensk socialförsäkring 1884–1955 (Lund: Arkiv, 1996); Klas Åmark, Hundra år av välfärdspolitik: Välfärdsstatens framväxt i Norge och Sverige (Umeå: Boréa, 2005). 22. ‘Undergörare’, DN, 8 September 1936. 23. Arthur Engberg, ‘Socialiseringen’, in Engberg, Tal och skrifter, 2 vols (Stockholm: Tiden, 1945), vol. 2, 95–96 (originally published 20 August 1936). 24. ‘Andligt och lekamligt svängrum’, SvD, 2 January 1936 (quoting a piece from a liberal newspaper); ‘Skördefester på av andra besådda fält’, SvD, 24 May 1937 (a speech by the chairman of the Conservative organization); Anon. ed-

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25. 26.

27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34.

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itorial, ‘Politik och förvaltning’, Svensk tidskrift 23 (1936), 760, on the blurred division between legislature and administration in the modern welfare state, changes reminiscent of the eighteenth century state. For academic use, e.g. Georg Andrén, Tvåkammarsystemets tillkomst och utveckling in Sveriges riksdag: Historisk och statsvetenskapliga framställning, 18 vols (Stockholm: Sveriges Riksdag, 1931–65), vol. 9 (1937), 678 (‘the modern welfare state’); Carsten Welinder, Kommunala avgifter i de svenska städernas hushållning: Särskilt med hänsyn till den kommunala affärsverksamheten (Lund: Lund University, 1935), 77 (‘the modern culture- and welfare state’). Cit. Gunnar Heckscher, ‘Högerns valnederlag’, Svensk tidskrift 23 (1936), 626. On Sweden’s rise as a model society, Kazimierz Musiał, Roots of the Scandinavian Model: Images of Progress in the Era of Modernisation (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002), 80–94; Carl Marklund, ‘The Social Laboratory, The Middle Way and the Swedish Model: Three Frames for the Image of Sweden’, Scandinavian Journal of History 34(3) (2009), 264–85; Peter Stadius, ‘Happy Countries: Appraisals of Interwar Nordic Societies’, in Jonas Harvard and Peter Stadius (eds), Communicating the North: Media Structures and Images in the Making of the Nordic Region (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013), 241–62; Klaus Kiran Patel, The New Deal: A Global History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 228–33. Gustav Möller, En svensk väg genom krisen (Stockholm: Tiden, 1940), 11–12. The headline of this subchapter in the pamphlet is ‘Sweden was on its way to becoming a leading country in social matters’. On Möller’s programme, Åmark, Hundra år, 66–76. For a full critique with details and references, Edling, ‘The Primacy of Welfare Politics’, 125–50. Hans Lödén, ‘För säkerhets skull’: Ideologi och säkerhet i svensk aktiv utrikespolitik 1950–1975 (Stockholm: Santérus, 2005), 81–82. FK 1950:11 (vol. A1), 13 (Erlander). FK 1950:11 (vol. A1), 35 (Erlander). AK 1950:11 (vol. B1), 11 (Undén), 23–24 (Ohlin), 26 (Hjalmarson), 35 (Fast), 53–54, cit. 53 (Undén). Östen Undén, ‘Välfärdspolitik i utrikesdebatt’, Tiden 42 (1950), 201–4. See also, Kaj Björk, ‘Ideologisk utrikespolitik?’, Tiden 44 (1952), 1–5 and Dag Hammarskjöld, ‘Politik och ideologi’, Tiden 44 (1952), 6–17, esp. 15–17 on the possible ideological importance of welfare in Swedish foreign policy. When Sweden joined the United Nations in 1946, Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Undén in his speech declared that Sweden was the country of the middle way, as Childs had stated ten years earlier, explicitly referring to Swedish social reforms, Marklund, ‘Social Laboratory’, 274. In 1946, Undén also described the trajectory of Sweden and the other Nordic countries as ‘the development towards the social welfare state’, Undén, ‘Lag och rätt’, in Nordisk samhörighet: En realitet (Stockholm: Föreningen Norden, 1946), 45.

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35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

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Another example is Rickard Lindström, ‘Arbetarrörelsen och försvarsfrågan’, in Arbetets söner: Text och bilder ur den svenska arbetarrörelsens saga, 4 vols (Stockholm: Steinsvik, 1944–56), vol. 3, Segrarnas tid (1946), 338: ‘If we used our resources to create a social welfare state and develop our cultural possibilities, then Sweden would become a society with such an elevated position in many areas and good standing in the world that other powers would hesitate to attack it.’ Jean Braconier, ‘Liberal i går – konservativ i dag’, Den raka vägen: 14 inlägg i den dagspolitiska idédebatten (Stockholm: Medborgaren, 1949), 43; Eli Heckscher, ‘Gammal och ny merkantilism’, in Till Axel Gjöres på sextioårsdagen 11 november 1949 (Stockholm: KF:s bokförlag, 1949), 97. Jytte Klausen, War and Welfare: Europe and the United States, 1945 to the Present (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1998), 95–136; Lewin, Planhushållningsdebatten, chs 3–4; Diane Sainsbury, Swedish Social Democratic Ideology and Electoral Politics 1944–1948: A Study of the Functions of Party Ideology (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1980); Alf W. Johansson, Herbert Tingsten och det kalla kriget: Antikommunism och liberalism i Dagens Nyheter 1946–1952 (Stockholm: Tiden, 1995), esp. chs 10–11. Gustav Möller, ‘Socialpolitiken’, in Vår politik: Dagsfrågor och idéfrågor i socialdemokratisk politik (Stockholm: SAP, 1947), 120. Möller also published this text as ‘Kan trygghet skapas? Socialpolitiska översikter’ 1–3, Tiden 39 (1947), 133–49, 195–206, 325–43. Gustav Möller, Från fattighus-Sverige till social-Sverige (Stockholm: Tiden, 1948). See also, Möller, ‘Folkpartiet och socialreformerna’, Tiden 40 (1948), 264–67. ‘1948 ett svenskt märkesår’, Vår väg 8(1) (1948), 4. The illustrated magazine Vår väg was published jointly by Landsorganisationen, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), and the Social Democratic party 1941–59. ‘Välfärdspolitikern’, Vår väg 5(3) (1945), 7. This issue was devoted entirely to Party Chairman Hansson and his achievements. Hansson turned 60 on 28 October 1945. The celebratory text about him as ‘Welfare Politician’ (välfärdspolitikern) used ‘social state’ twice to describe the objective: a society that is a social state following a Swedish model. E.g. the articles in the Social Democrats’ journal Tiden: Rickard Lindström, ‘Vem styr socialdemokratin?’ 38 (1946), 463–65; Arne Björnberg, ‘Omdaningen i England’, (1946), 577–81; Kaj Björk, ‘Vårt parti och andras’, 41 (1949), 233–41; Björk, ‘Vem vann?’ 42 (1950), 173–77; Lindström, ‘Fackföreningar och politik’ 42 (1950), 328–39; Björk, ‘Bevan och Möller’ 43 (1951), 321–26. Hudson Strode, Sweden: Model for a World (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949); David Hinshaw, Sweden: Champion of Peace (New York: Putnam, 1949); See also, Leonard Silk, Sweden Plans for Better Housing (Durham: Duke University Press, 1948); Franklin D. Scott, The United States and Scandinavia (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), chs 4–5. See, Marklund, ‘Social Laboratory’, 273–76; Carl Marklund and Klaus Petersen, ‘Return to Sender –

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43. 44. 45.

46.

47. 48.

49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54.

55.

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American Images of the Nordic Welfare States and Nordic Welfare State Branding’, European Journal of Scandinavian Studies 43(2) (2013), 249–54. Frederic C. Nano, The Land and People of Sweden (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1949), 111. Nano, Sweden, x–xi. Nano was former Romanian ambassador to Sweden and a naturalized US citizen after WWII. However, see theoretical discussion about ‘the welfare state’ and its standing as an alternative to communism in a debate between Swedish and Yugoslavian socialists in Tiden, see Kaj Björk and Rodoljub Colakovic, ‘Socialismen och demokratin: Debatt Belgrad–Stockholm’, 1–3 Tiden 44–45 (1952–53), 519–33, 35–42, 165–73. For a general discussion of the welfare state and the Cold War, Klaus Petersen, ‘The Early Cold War and the Western Welfare State’, Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy 29(3) (2013), 226–40. Jennifer Klein, Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen, ‘Social Policy Language in the United States’, in Béland and Petersen, Analysing, 281–86; Michael B. Katz and Lorrin R. Thomas, ‘The Invention of “Welfare” in America’, Journal of Policy History 10(4) (1998), 410–12. Högerpartiet, ‘Tid för Högern’ (1952), Vi vill. . . ! Svenska partiprogram och valmanifest 1887–2010. Only Denmark’s Hedtoft, Britain’s Attlee and Nowogradsky from International Jewish Labor Bund mentioned ‘the welfare state’, Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetarepartis 19:e kongress i Stockholm, 2–7 juni 1952 (Stockholm: SAP, 1952), 18, 194, 474. SAP, 19:e kongress (1952), 10–12. Tage Erlander, Människor i samverkan (Stockholm: Tiden, 1954), 20. See Jenny Andersson, Between Growth and Security: Swedish Social Democracy from a Strong Society to a Third Way (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), ch. 2; Peter Antman, ‘Olof Palme och välfärdsstaten’, in Peter Antman and Pierre Schori, Olof Palme: Den gränslöse reformisten (Stockholm: Tiden, 1996), 21–38. Framstegens politik (Stockholm: Tiden, 1956). Cit. from Krister Wickman, who co-wrote Framstegens politik, Antman, ‘Olof Palme’, 33. This makes up an important element in the argument for the state as the promoter of individual freedom through social reforms that liberate the individual from ties that bind (family, church, local community etc.), Henrik Berggren and Lars Trägårdh, Är svensken människa? Gemenskap och oberoende i det moderna Sverige, 2nd ed. (Stockholm: Norstedts, 2015 [2006]). Framstegens politik, 46: ‘The increased resources for society that this publication has pinpointed as a necessary prerequisite to make it possible to more quickly meet the rising demands from the citizens are needed to further increase and consolidate the freedom and security of the individual as far as possible in an insecure world.’ See also the pamphlets by Gunnar Sträng, So-

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57. 58.

59.

60.

61.

62. 63.

64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

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cial trygghet och kortare arbetstid (Stockholm: Tiden, 1954); Per Edvin Sköld, Svensk ekonomi under tio år (Stockholm: Tiden, 1955); Kampen för bättre bostäder (Stockholm: Tiden, 1954); Aktiv kommunalpolitik (Stockholm: Tiden, 1954). Ernst Wigforss, Efter välfärdsstaten (Malmö: Arbetets debattforum, 1956). Noteworthy is the absence of the ‘welfare state’ in his book four years earlier on the same topics, Wigforss, Socialism i vår tid (Stockholm: Tiden, 1952). ‘The welfare state’ was actively used by British socialists in the early 1950s and appeared frequently in New Fabian Essays (1952), translated into Swedish the following year as Arbetarrörelsens ekonomiska program. New Fabian Essays (Stockholm: KF: s bokförlag, 1953). See also ‘Engelsk idédebatt’, Tiden 44 (1952), 113–14. Gunnar Myrdal, An International Economy: Problems and Prospects (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 17–31, cit. 25 and 27. Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State (New Haven and London: Duckworth, 1960), 45. Sweden had, Myrdal added in the Swedish edition Planhushållning i välfärdsstaten (Stockholm: Tiden, 1961), the world’s most advanced welfare state, but the Swedes were not much ahead of anyone else in understanding the ongoing profound societal changes and their ideological consequences. Allan C. Carlson, The Swedish Experiment in Family Politics: The Myrdals and the Interwar Population Crisis (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1990); Thomas Etzemüller, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal: Social Engineering in the Modern World (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016). Gunnar Myrdal, ‘Psykologiska hinder för effektiv internationell samverkan’, Tiden 45 (1953), 132–45, 197–209 (published in English in Journal of Social Issues 1953). Galbraith’s The Affluent Society (1958) provided a briefer definition where the welfare state was the result of the many measures taken over a long period to soften and civilize capitalism and make it tenable (11). Cf. Myrdal, Beyond, 81, on Locke, Jefferson, Marx, Mill and the idea of the modern welfare state. For Ohlin’s views, Sven-Erik Larsson, Bertil Ohlin: Ekonom och politiker (Stockholm: Atlantis, 1998), 218–68. ‘The forgotten Sweden’ was the catchphrase for more and better social reforms launched by Ohlin in the 1930s, when he chaired the Liberal youth association, Wennås, Ohlin, chs 9–10. Stig-Björn Ljunggren, Folkhemskapitalismen: Högerns programutveckling under efterkrigstiden (Stockholm: Tiden, 1992), ch. 3. Nils Herlitz, Samhällsanda (Stockholm: Riksdagshögerns kansli, 1952), 3–4. Cit. Ljunggren, Folkhemskapitalismen, 132–33. ‘“Välfärden u.p.a.” måste bort: Värdigare vägar måste beträdas’, Medborgaren 46(26–27) (23–30 June 1960), 10. E.g. ‘Människan i centrum’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 4 September 1950; ‘Gemensamma principer’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 9 November 1951; ‘Vilket

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69.

70. 71.

72.

73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83.

84. 85. 86.

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samarbete?’, Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 24 November 1953; ‘Ideologiska skiljelinjer’, SvD, 9 February 1953; ‘Vart syftar socialdemokratien?’, SvD, 7 May 1956; ‘Den stora skiljelinjen’, SvD, 14 September 1958; Henrik Munktell, Smygsocialisering: En väg till en socialistisk samhällsomdaning (Stockholm: Gebers, 1952). See Sunt förnuft 30–40 (1950–60). One typical example will do: public daycare for children was too expensive and private alternatives were therefore to be preferred, ‘Kritik av barndaghemmen’, Sunt förnuft 35 (1955), 9–11, 26–27. Sven Rydenfelt, Staten och makten: En studie i svensk regleringsekonomi (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1955), 102. Reprinted in Sven Rydenfelt, Bakom folkhemmets fasader (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1958), 47–67. For the same message, Rydenfelt, Socialpolitik och samhällsekonomi (Stockholm: Byrån för ekonomisk information, 1955); Rydenfelt, ‘Välfärd eller välstånd’, in Gustaf Söderlund et al., Revolt mot välfärdsstaten (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1958), 24–35. Karl Erik Gillberg, Statlig makt och enskild frihet (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1955); Lennart Thuresson [Anders Byttner], Staten, makten och rätten (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1955); Halvar G.F. Sundberg, ‘Rättsstat contra välfärdsstat’, in Söderlund et al., Revolt, 107–23. Gustaf Söderlund, ‘Var hamna vi med välfärdsstaten?’, Balans 10 (1958), 9–10. Lewin, Planhushållningsdebatten, 349–57, one-sidedly stresses the economic character of the argument. SAP, 21:e kongress i Stockholm, 6–10 juni 1960 (Stockholm: SAP, 1960), 247. Tage Erlander, Valfrihetens samhälle (Stockholm: Tiden, 1962), 36. SAP, ‘Program för Sveriges Socialdemokratiska arbetareparti 1960’, Vi vill. . . !. SAP, ‘Program för Sveriges Socialdemokratiska arbetareparti 1960’. Kaj Björk, Socialdemokratins grundsatser: Kommentarer till det nya partiprogrammet (Stockholm: Tiden, 1961), 26–27, was not entirely satisfied with the happiness paragraph. SAP, 21:e kongress, 239. Erlander, Valfrihetens, 60–64. Erlander, Valfrihetens, cit. 8, 84. Erlander, Valfrihetens, 27–28; See Olof Ruin, Tage Erlander: Serving the Welfare State, 1946–1969 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 197–98. Olof Palme, ‘Radikal förnyelse’, Tiden 52 (1960), 409–10. See Kjell Östberg, I takt med tiden: Olof Palme 1927–1969 (Stockholm: Leopard, 2008), 136–44. Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 75–77. This is from a TV debate in 1965, and Palme called his contribution ‘the driving forces of welfare’ (välfärdens drivkrafter), quoted from Östberg, I takt, 205.

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87. Cit. Göran Greider, Ingen kommer undan Olof Palme (Stockholm: Ordfront, 2011), 53. This is a quote from the final TV debate in the election campaign 1982. See also, Alvar Alsterdal, Samtal med Tage Erlander mellan två val (Stockholm: Tiden, 1967), 62–63. 88. Åsa Linderborg, Socialdemokraterna skriver historia: Historieskrivning som ideologisk maktresurs 1892–2000 (Stockholm: Atlas, 2001), ch. 7; Martin Wiklund, I det modernas landskap: Historisk orientering och kritiska berättelser om det moderna Sverige mellan 1960 och 1990 (Eslöv: Symposion, 2006), ch. 4. 89. Cit. Gösta Bohman, Så var det: Gösta Bohman berättar (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1983), 55. 90. Heckscher in 1963 cit. from Tommy Möller, Mellan ljusblå och mörkblå: Gunnar Heckscher som högerledare (Stockholm: SNS, 2004), 171–72. 91. ‘Dagens frågor’, Svensk tidskrift 50 (1963), 244. 92. Alf W. Johansson, Per Albin och kriget: Samlingsregeringen och utrikespolitiken under andra världskriget (Stockholm: Tiden, 1984), 360–65; Sten O. Karlsson, Det intelligenta samhället: En omtolkning av socialdemokratins idéhistoria (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2001), 623–32. 93. Wigforss, Efter välfärdsstaten; Ernst Wigforss, Välfärdsstaten – anhalt till socialismen: Ernst Wigforss tal till ungdomen i Stockholms stadshus tisdagen den 6 september 1955 i anslutning till Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Ungdomsförbunds 14:e kongress (Stockholm: SSU, 1955). 94. Roland Pålsson, ‘Välfärdsstaten som myt’, in Pålsson (ed.), Inför 60-talet: Debattbok om socialismens framtid av tio författare, 2nd ed. (Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren, 1960 [1959]), 9–23. Cit. from Clas-Erik Odhner, ‘Reformismens dilemma’, in Pålsson, Inför, 41. Similar calls were made by Odhner, Framtidens socialism: Ett inlägg i programdebatten (Stockholm: Tiden, 1957); Hilding Johansson, Det demokratiska välfärdssamhället (Stockholm: Tiden, 1960). 95. Anders Frenander, Debattens vågor: Om politisk-ideologiska frågor i efterkrigstidens svenska kulturdebatt (Gothenburg: Göteborgs universitet, 1999), chs 5–6; Kjell Östberg, 1968: När allting var i rörelse (Stockholm: Prisma, 2002); Wiklund, I det modernas, ch. 5. 96. Göran Therborn et al., En ny vänster (Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren, 1966), 18. 97. Therborn et al., En ny vänster, 197–214, cit. 199. 98. On this caretaker theme, cf. Klaus Petersen and Urban Lundberg, ‘Immanent, transzendent und exterretorial: Dänische und Schwedische Sozialdemokratie und die ideologische Herausforderung des Wohlfahrtsstaates in den letzen 30. Jahren’, Nordeuropaforum: Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschfat und Kultur, Neue Folge 21 (1999), 57–87. 99. Michael Tapper, Swedish Cops: From Sjöwall and Wahlöö to Stieg Larsson (Bristol: Intellect, 2014), 81–115. 100. ‘Bakom välfärdsvallen, 1–4’, DN, 2–22 May 1964; ‘Gapande hål i välfärdsbygget: Reformviljan måste överleva’, Expressen, 22 January 1967; ‘Fattig 71, 1–4’, DN, 18 October–15 November 1971.

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101. Gunnar Inghe and Maj-Britt Inghe¸ Den ofärdiga välfärden (Stockholm: Tiden and Folksam, 1967), 275. 102. Olof Palme, Politik är att vilja (Stockholm: Prisma, 1969), 51–53 (a speech held October 1965), also 19–20, 179–81; Arne Geijer at the Social Democrats’ party congress 1967, Protokoll. SAP extra kongress 21–21 oktober 1967 (Stockholm: SAP, 1968), 359. See Andersson, Between, ch. 3–4. 103. ‘1975 års partiprogram’, Vi vill. . . !; Andersson, Between, 74. ‘Strong society not strong enough’, Claes Arvidsson, Ett annat land: Sverige och det långa 70-talet (Stockholm: Timbro, 1999), 204. 104. Cit. from Greider, Ingen, 213; see also Palme, ‘Vidgad välfärd’, in Sven Ove Hansson (ed.), Palme själv: Texter i urval (Stockholm: Tiden, 1996) 74–78. 105. Samverkan, Rättvisa, Ansvar: Partiprogram antaget 1969 (Stockholm: Moderata Samlingspartiet, 1969), 29–34. On these changes within the Conservatives, Ljunggren, Folkhemskapitalismen, ch. 6. 106. Centerpartiet, ‘Jämlikhet och trygghet i ett decentraliserat samhälle’, Vi villl. . . ! 107. See Folkpartiet, Öka takten: Vägar till större effektivitet och trygghet (Stockholm: Folk och Samhälle, 1968); Välfärdens villkor: En debattskrift inför ett nytt liberalt partiprogram (Stockholm: Folkpartiet, 1971). 108. The Instrument of Government 1976 § 2. 109. Grundlagberedningen: Ny regeringsform, ny riksdagsordning, SOU 1972:15 (Stockholm: SOU, 1972) 106. See Olle Nyman, ‘Regeringsformens målsättningsstadganden’, Förvaltningsrättslig tidskrift 49 (1986), 290–92. 110. Schön, Sweden’s Road, ch. 6. As noted in the literature, the character and causes of the changes in the 70s are contested among scholars, journalists and politicians, Kjell Östberg and Jenny Andersson, Sveriges historia, 8 vols (Stockholm: Norstedts, 2009–13), vol. 8, 1965–2012, 297–302; also Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), ch. 7. 111. Bengt Westerberg, Minus 100 miljarder: Vägar att spara på statens utgifter (Stockholm: Industriförbundet, 1983); Berndt Ahlqvist, I bräcklig farkost: En bok om svensk ekonomi i internationell miljö (Stockholm: Tiden, 1983); Klas Eklund, Den bistra sanningen: Om Sveriges ekonomi och de kommande magra åren (Stockholm: Tiden, 1982). 112. Agneta Hugemark, Den fängslade marknaden: Ekonomiska experter om välfärdsstaten (Lund: Arkiv, 1994). 113. Assar Lindbeck et al., Turning Sweden Around (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 97. Lindbeck’s report was originally published as Nya villkor för ekonomi och politik: Ekonomikommissionens förslag SOU 1993:16 (Stockholm: SOU, 1993); Three Suedosclerosis reports were published by Timbro 1993–95. See also, Barry P. Bosworth and Alice M. Rivlin (eds), The Swedish Economy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1987); Thorvaldur Gylfason (ed.), The Swedish Model under Stress: The View from the Stands (Stockholm: SNS, 1997).

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114. Jyrki Smolander, ‘Neoliberalism or Economic Nationalism? Changes in the Welfare Policy of the Finnish and Swedish Conservatives during the 1970s and 1980s’, in Anu Lahtinen and Kirsi Vainio-Korhonen (eds), History and Change (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2004), 239–52; ‘Scandinavian Supermodels’, Catherine Jones Finer, ‘Trends and Developments in Welfare States’, in Jochen Clasen (ed.), Comparative Social Policy. Concepts, Theories, and Methods (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 18. 115. Kristina Boréus, Högervåg: Nyliberalismen och kampen om språket i svensk debatt 1969–1989 (Stockholm: Tiden, 1994); Frenander, Debattens, ch. 7; Wiklund, I det modernas, ch. 8; David Brolin, Omprövningar: Svenska vänsterintellektuella i skiftet från 70-tal till 80-tal (Lund: Celanders, 2015). 116. Hugh Heclo and Henrik Madsen, Policy and Politics in Sweden: Principled Pragmatism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), ch. 6; Östberg and Andersson, Sveriges historia, 233–35, 297–306. 117. Gösta Bohman, Kurs mot framtiden: Ett friare och öppnare Sverige (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1981), 76. 118. Staffan Burenstam Linder, Den hjärtlösa välfärdsstaten (Stockholm: Timbro, 1983), 60. See also, Den nya fattigdomen (Stockholm: Moderata Samlingspartiet, 1983); Vägen ut ur välfärdsstatens kris: Politik för ett friare Sverige (Stockholm: Fria Moderata Studentförbundet, 1982); Gunnar Hökmark et al., Ett friare Sverige: Tio unga moderater om en ny politik för ett bättre Sverige (Stockholm: Moderata Ungdomsförbundet, 1983). 119. Partiprogram (Stockholm: Moderata Samlingspartiet, 1984), 6–10, 45–46; Handlingsprogram (Stockholm: Moderata Samlingspartiet, 1984), 2–6, 32– 38. 120. ‘Välfärd och valfrihet’, Svensk tidskrift 72 (1985), 60. See also, Återupprätta rättsstaten (Stockholm: Moderata Samlingspartiet, 1987); Land för hoppfulla: Manifest för ett nytt sekel (Stockholm: Moderata Samlingspartiet, 1997). 121. Moderaterna and Folkpartiet Liberalerna, Ny start för Sverige (Stockholm: Moderaterna and Folkpartiet, 1991). 122. Carl Bildt, ‘Det liberala systemskiftet’, Svensk tidskrift 81 (1994), 224–28; also Bildt, Den enda vägen (Stockholm: Moderaterna, 1994); Lars Leijonborg, Nya frihetstiden: Om makten över våra liv (Stockholm: Ekerlids, 1999). 123. Fredrik Reinfeldt, Det sovande folket (Stockholm: Moderata Ungdomsförbundet, 1993), 111. 124. Moderata Samlingspartiet, ‘Gör det möjligt för Sverige’, (1998), Vi vill. . . !. See also e.g., Hans Zetterberg, Before and Beyond the Welfare State: Three Lectures (Stockholm: City University Press, 1995); Mauricio Rojas, Välfärd efter välfärdsstaten (Stockholm: Timbro, 1999). 125. Frenander, Debattens, 228–48, 305. Lars Trägårdh, ‘The “Civil Society” Debate in Sweden: The Welfare State Challenged’, in Trägårdh (ed.), State and Civil Society in Northern Europe: The Swedish Model Reconsidered (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 9–36.

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126. Lars Anell and Ingvar Carlsson, Individens frihet och framtidens välfärdssamhälle (Stockholm: LO, 1985); Framtiden i folkets händer: Socialdemokratiskt program för medborgarskap och valfrihet (Stockholm: Socialdemokraterna, 1986); 90-talsprogrammet: En debattbok om arbetarrörelsens viktigaste frågor under 90-talet (Stockholm: Tiden, 1989). 127. This is the main theme in the extensive programme documents Framtiden i folkets händer from 1986 and 90-talsprogrammet from 1989. 128. Folkhemmet, as the Social Democratic era characterized by social engineering and limited individual rights, was towards the end of the 1990s at the centre of the exchanges about Swedish sterilization programmes, for a study of the debate, Åsa Kroon, Debattens dynamik: Hur budskap och betydelser förvandlas i mediedebatter (Linköping: Linköpings universitet, 2001), 133–73; see also, Nils Edling, ‘Att lägga folkhemmets historia till rätta’, ms. fc. 129. E.g. Anna Hedborg and Rudolf Meidner, Folkhemsmodellen (Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren, 1984); Hans Haste and John-Olle Persson, Förnyelse i folkhemmet (Stockholm: Tiden, 1984); Hans Haste and John-Olle Persson, Folkhem eller systemskifte (Stockholm: Tiden, 1985); Sven Aspling, 100 år i Sverige: Vägen till folkhemmet (Stockholm: Tiden, 1989); Peter Antman, Göran Greider and Tomas Lappalainen (eds), Systemskifte: Fyra folkhemsdebatter (Stockholm: Carlsson, 1993). 130. Jenny Andersson, The Library and the Workshop: Social Democracy and Capitalism in the Knowledge Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 49–52, 56–61. Andersson’s popularized Swedish version of this story is titled ‘When the future has already happened’, När framtiden redan hänt: Socialdemokratin och folkhemsnostalgin (Stockholm: Ordfront, 2009). Andersson seems to believe that ‘the people’s home’ was a vital ideological concept from the 1930s onwards. I disagree, see Edling, ‘The Primacy of Welfare Politics’. 131. See Tapper, Swedish Cops, chs 5–8. Leif G.W. Persson’s Välfärdsstatens fall exploits the multiplicity of meanings, as ‘fall’ in Swedish can mean both ‘case’ and ‘downfall’. In English they are called ‘The Story of a Crime’. 132. Fredrik Reinfeldt, Framåt tillsammans: Min berättelse om Föregångslandet Sverige (Stockholm: Moderaterna, 2010), 12. 133. The character of the Moderates’ change is open for discussion, see Anders Lindbom, ‘The Swedish Conservative Party and the Welfare State: Institutional Change and Adapting Preferences’, Government and Opposition 43 (2008), 539–60; Östberg and Andersson, Sveriges historia, 475–80; Aron Etzler, Reinfeldteffekten: Hur nya moderaterna tog över makten i Sverige och skakade socialdemokraterna i grunden (Stockholm: Karneval, 2013); Ann-Marie Ekengren and Henrik Oscarsson, ‘Ett liv efter Nya Moderaterna?’ Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 117 (2015), 158–62. 134. SAP, Valet 2006: Valanalysgruppens slutrapport, 9. ‘Everyone must be included’, was the title of their election manifesto 2006.

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135. Anders Lindbom, Systemskifte? Den nya svenska välfärdspolitiken (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2011) makes this argument. Cf., Anders Lindbom, ‘Dismantling the Social Democratic Welfare Model? Has the Swedish Welfare State lost its Defining Characteristics?’ Scandinavian Political Studies 24 (2001), 171–93, Paula Blomqvist, ‘The Choice Revolution. Privatization of Swedish Welfare Services in the 1990s’, Social Policy and Administration 38 (2004), 139–55; Sven E.O. Hort, Social Policy, Welfare State, and Civil Society in Sweden, 3rd ed., 2 vols (Lund: Arkiv, 2014), vol. 2, The Lost World of Social Democracy 1988–2015. On public support, Stefan Svallfors, ‘A Bedrock of Support? Trends in Welfare State Attitudes in Sweden, 1981–2000’ Social Policy & Administration 45 (2011), 806–25. 136. Bo Rothstein and Paula Blomqvist, Välfärdsstatens nya ansikte: Demokrati och marknadsreformer inom den offentliga sektorn (Stockholm: Agora, 2001), Laura Hartman (ed.), Konkurrensens konsekvenser: Vad händer med svensk välfärd? (Stockholm: SNS, 2011); Henrik Jordahl (ed.), Välfärdstjänster i privat regi: Framväxt och drivkrafter (Stockholm: SNS, 2013); Johan Vamstad and Kerstin Stenius, Valfri välfärd: Ett medborgarperspektiv på den svenska välfärdsstaten (Lund: Arkiv, 2015). 137. SAP, Kära framtid: Ett bättre Sverige för alla (Stockholm: SAP, 2014), esp. 32–41; Alliansen, Vi bygger Sverige (Stockholm: Alliansen, 2014), 6–13. The usage of ‘the welfare’ (välfärd, välfärden) in this way has increased from ca 800–900 hits per year in the 1990s to 3–4,000 yearly 2013–16 – i.e. a much higher frequency than the other welfare compounds combined, see the digitized press archive, Svenska dagstidningar. 138. E.g. Kent Werne, Ofärdsland: Livet längs arbetslinjen (Stockholm: Atlas, 2014); Stefan Carlén, Christer Persson and Daniel Suhonen, Reinfeldtkoden: Den ädla konsten att rasera den svenska modellen (Stockholm: Ordfront, 2014); Kristina Mattsson, Välfärdsfabriken: Om arbetets mening och gränslös kontroll (Stockholm: Leopard, 2014). 139. SAP, Kära framtid, 6; SAP, Klyftorna delar Sverige (Stockholm: SAP, 2014); Vänsterpartiet, Valplattform för riksdagsvalet 2014 (Stockholm: Vänsterpartiet, 2014); Kristdemokraterna, Frihet och gemenskap: Kristdemokraternas valmanifest 2014 (Stockholm: Kristdemokraterna, 2014). 140. The first appearance in the press archive dates from 1972, and from the 90s the frequency of the term increased to 400 to 500 hits per year and over 800 yearly occurrences from 2013 in the four major newspapers, Svenska dagstidningar. 141. On the multiple meanings, Tobias Davidsson, ‘Utanförskapelsen: En diskursanalys av hur begreppet utanförskap artikulerades i den svenska riksdagsdebatten 2003–2006’, Socialvetenskaplig tidskrift 2010, 149–69; Mariann Björkemarken, Begreppet “utanförskap” (Stockholm: LO, 2014); Magnus Dahlstedt, ‘The Politics of Making Demands: Discourses of Urban Exclusion and Medialized Politics in Sweden’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 28 (2015), 101–17.

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142. See the government’s statement, retrieved 1 October 2016 from http://www .regeringen.se/artiklar/2015/11/regeringen-foreslar-atgarder-for-att-ska pa-andrum-for-svenskt-flyktingmottagande/; ‘Sweden Slams Shut its Opendoor Policy towards Refugees’, The Guardian, 24 November 2015. 143. Sverigedemokraterna, Sverigedemokraternas principprogram 2011.

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tures and Images in the Making of the Nordic Region (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013), 241–62. Svallfors, Stefan, ‘A Bedrock of Support? Trends in Welfare State Attitudes in Sweden, 1981–2000’, Social Policy & Administration 45 (2011), 806–25. Tapper, Michael, Swedish Cops: From Sjöwall and Wahlöö to Stieg Larsson (Bristol: Intellect, 2014). Trägårdh, Lars, ‘The “Civil Society” Debate in Sweden: The Welfare State Challenged’, in Lars Trägårdh (ed.), State and Civil Society in Northern Europe: The Swedish Model Reconsidered (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 9–36. Vamstad, Johan, and Kerstin Stenius, Valfri välfärd: Ett medborgarperspektiv på den svenska välfärdsstaten (Lund: Arkiv, 2015). Wennås, Olof, Ohlin, Folkpartiet och socialliberalismen: Ett bidrag till den idéhistoriska litteraturen (Lund: Gleerup, 1970). Wiklund, Martin, I det modernas landskap: Historisk orientering och kritiska berättelser om det moderna Sverige mellan 1960 och 1990 (Eslöv: Symposion, 2006).

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The Concept of ‘Welfare State’ in Danish Public and Political Debates Jørn Henrik Petersen and Klaus Petersen

he welfare state (velfærdsstat) is a key concept in Danish political debates. Looking from the perspective of today, there is a general agreement that Denmark can be characterized as an advanced welfare state. Most social and political actors put a positive emphasis on the welfare state as representing characteristics and values of Danish society that should be protected against external and internal threats. But some actors voice a more sceptical approach towards the welfare state as representing a threat to economic growth and global competiveness. Across these normative differences the last four decades have been characterized by a growing awareness – right or wrong – that the welfare state as we know it has to be reformed and adapted to a new social and economic context. This all seems very straightforward: ideological disagreements and the need to reform have characterized most European debates since the 1980s. However, as soon as we try to take a closer look at the meanings of the concept ‘welfare state’ in these debates we find confusion and disagreement. Even within the broad political consensus embracing the ‘welfare state’ as a societal ideal there seems to be variation with respect to what is actually to be defended or reformed. In other words, there is a growing need for clarification. In this chapter we will address this problem of clarification from a historical perspective. Based on a large corpus of published text, including mainly newspapers, magazines, books and party manifestos, we will map out and analyse the historical career of the concept ‘welfare state’ in Denmark. After a short discussion of the origins of the concept of ‘welfare state’ our study will focus mainly on the post-1945 developments, where the ‘welfare state’ was picked up in the broader political debate in Den-

T

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mark and became a contested concept. Our approach will be nominalist, focusing on text actually using the concept of ‘welfare state’, but we will also have an eye for the use of counter-concepts and discuss the semantic innovation that happened in the 1980s when the ‘welfare state’ partly was reframed as the ‘welfare society’.1

The Prehistory of the Term ‘Welfare State’ in Denmark We need to carefully distinguish between the semantic roots of a concept – and even its first uses – and the political importance of the concept in the longer run. In this section we will try to trace the linking of ‘welfare’ and ‘state’ in Danish history; however, not as an etymological exercise of the two concepts, bringing us centuries back in history, but with a focus on political thinking from the eighteenth century until the 1940s, as this is arguably an important historical layer in the history of the concept of the ‘welfare state’ in Denmark. In the course of the eighteenth century, professorial chairs began to be provided for the teaching of what was described, in Germany, as Cameral Science or Science of the State and what may be more accurately described as Principles of Economic Administration and Policy (Polizeiwissenschaft). To justify absolutism’s power, the theories of the state prescribed guarantees of security and promotion of welfare (Wohlfahrt) and bliss (Glückseligkeit). This thinking influenced Danish ideas.2 The German professor J.H.G. von Justi – a representative of the late Cameral Science – stayed in Copenhagen 1757–58. He strongly influenced Danish economic thinking as seen for instance in the works of the economist Frederik Lütken. For Lütken the aim of the sovereign was ‘to keep and to promote the welfare and peacefulness, the bliss and security of the state and republic’, and later he quoted Von Justi, emphasizing ‘the welfare and bliss of the state’.3 It is obvious that ‘promotion of public welfare’ and ‘public bliss’ were aims serving to justify the absolute power of the sovereign rather than entitling social rights.4 The present-day understanding of the welfare state as a social welfare state only gradually developed to be cemented in the post-1945 era. The first Danish examples of such ‘contemporary’ understanding were the philosopher and Georgist Carl Nicolai Starcke in 1915 and the economist and conservative politician Lauritz Birck in 1916.5 Both warned against turning the state into a ‘welfare state’ with high and rising expenditures devoted to ‘social purposes’. Even though Birck and Starcke did not have a major impact on Danish political language, their use of the concept reflected both the discussions on the role of the state that had

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taken place around and after the Danish constitution of 1849 and the first wave of national social legislation in the 1890s.6 The 1849 constitution was a liberal constitution but included also a general commitment of the state to provide some sort of provision for those not able to provide for themselves (§89). However, questions on how to organize, finance and define need triggered heated debates among liberals, conservatives and later also socialists, both on a national and local level. Eventually, from the 1890s, a number of social reforms were introduced: old age pension (1891), Sickness insurance (1894), Worker’s accident insurance (1898), Child Welfare (1905) and unemployment insurance (1907). Even though this set of laws was formulated within a social-liberal paradigm, it set the trajectory for the development of the Danish welfare state in the twentieth century. However, with exceptions such as Birck and a few other mainly critical accounts, the term ‘welfare state’ was not used to describe this development. In the 1920s the few references to ‘welfare state’ in Danish media were almost exclusively referring to the public lectures by the philosopher and single-taxer Axel Dam, warning against the welfare state in 1924–25. He mainly was noticed by the local media on the remote island of Bornholm, and, interestingly, especially by the local Social Democratic newspaper. This hardly qualifies as a major societal impact.7 Whereas we see Social Democrats in Germany and Sweden, and occasionally also Norway, in the interwar years picking up the term as a positive goal, this did not seem to be the case in Denmark. The single rare exception was a notice in June 1934 in Vestjyllands Socialdemokrat, referring to the Conservative critique in Germany of the Weimar Constitution as a ‘welfare state’. According to the Social Democratic newspaper, his ‘epithet was an honour for the republic, as it demonstrated the will to care for the poorest of the poor, not allowing the victims of capitalist society to starve to death’.8 Also during the 1940s the term also only appeared on rare occasions. In October 1941 the historian Hans Jensen – maybe inspired by the heated German debate on the Weimar Constitution – looked back on the Danish constitution of 1915 as providing the framework for a strong active state enabling the development towards a ‘welfare state’.9 The same year, discussing calculations of a price index, statistician H.C. Nybølle noted that when the ‘state governed by law’ extended its activities and moved towards a ‘welfare state’ taxes could not as before be seen as part of the cost of living.10 The welfare state was mainly interpreted as a state with rising social expenditures. This was also the view of the Single Tax Party (Retsforbundet).11 In January 1943, the internationally and social democratically minded civil servant Georg Nelson used the term welfare state advocating for public housing projects.12 In a similar vein, the

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economic-statistical advisor to the Ministry of Social Affairs, Henning Friis, saw the welfare state as synonymous with ‘a well-developed system of social insurance and social assistance’.13 Friis’s more positive interpretation was most likely – as was the case for Nelson – based on his close connections to both Sweden and the United Kingdom. Interestingly, even if very rare, the examples also bear witness that the term could be used in Danish political debates – and by people with quite different perspectives and political outlooks. However, the term was often used with some distance and was not to be picked up by Danish Social Democrats yet. This was illustrated when the weekly journal of the Social Democratic Party, Socialdemokratiske Noter, in 1951 referred to the ‘welfare state’ as an ambition of the Labour Party in Britain.14 This kind of ‘othering’ of the term as something British demonstrates that ‘welfare state’ was far from a well-established concept in Denmark in 1951. This is also illustrated by the fact that the influential Social Democratic economist Jørgen Paldam did not use the term welfare state in his comprehensive analysis in the book Planning for Welfare (Planlægning for velfærd).15 Neither is the term used in the following debate on ‘welfare policy’ (velfærdspolitik) that took place in the Social Democratic periodical Verdens Gang in 1952. But this was soon to change. Only a year later, at Party congress in Copenhagen, in the summer of 1953, Danish Social Democrats followed in the footsteps of the British sister party and embraced the welfare state as part of their ideological goals. This link between Social Democrats and ‘welfare state’ had already been noticed by Poul Meyer, later professor of political science, distinguishing between ‘the welfare state as an objective of practical policies’ with deep roots in recent political history and ‘the welfare state as a concept’ belonging to the period after the World War II.16 He wrote about ‘the Social Democratic elaboration of the welfare state’ – i.e. the Social Democratic endeavours to determine the basic principles of the party after having left the doctrinal socialism in a Marxian sense. According to Meyer the welfare state was more or less synonymous with Social Democratic policies. History proved him right.

Politicization of the ‘Welfare State’, 1953 The ‘welfare state’ as a political concept was solidly placed on the political agenda for the Social Democratic Party Congress in 1953. The party’s vice-chairman, Alsing Andersen, stated that ‘the ideas of democratic socialism are pushed forward. The movement towards the social welfare state can be obstructed or delayed when conservative, reactionary forces

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temporarily gain strength, but it cannot be stopped’.17 The concept of the ‘social welfare state’ may very well have been imported from Sweden, where it had been used by Swedish Social Democrats since the 1930s.18 It seems as if ‘the social welfare state’ for Danish Social Democrats was used more or less identically to ‘ideas of democratic socialism’. It might be argued that in the following decades the ‘welfare state’ replaced ‘democratic socialism’ as the realistic utopia of the Danish Social Democratic Party. At the 1953 congress the chairman of the party, Hans Hedtoft, followed up scrutinizing the draft of the party manifesto Vejen til Fremskridt (1953). Whereas the manifesto talked about the ‘welfare of all citizens’ as the basis for progress without actually mentioning the welfare state, Hedtoft in his speech emphasized that during the previous fifty years ‘We have come nearer to the social welfare state. The working class in towns and in country has politically achieved full citizenship.’19 The welfare state was, in Hedtoft’s understanding, a social democratic vision of the future: ‘We have taken a step towards the welfare state, but yet much remains to be changed, and faced with irresoluteness and uncertainty democratic socialism comes forward as the only positive way through the difficulties.’20 Hedtoft’s statement – like Alsing Andersen’s – was, however, ambiguous. On the one hand the ‘welfare state’ was more or less identified with the ideal of social citizenship in Marshall’s sense,21 but on the other hand both the specific social policy implications and the relationship between ‘welfare state’ and ‘democratic socialism’ remained unspecified. Was the welfare state simply the sum of the existing social legislation or was it an ideological project? It can be argued that the strength of the project was that it could be both. This pragmatism was clearly stated by the influential Social Democratic economist Jørgen Paldam, who somewhat bluntly stated that it was unimportant whether the party’s objective was described as ‘democratic socialism’, ‘welfare state’ or ‘regulated economy’.22 However, this conceptual pragmatism also made the concept very difficult to defend, as it allowed the critics of the welfare state (and of Social Democratic politics) to put forward their interpretations of the concept. The uncertainty of the meaning of the term paved the way for a strong criticism from the right-wing parties. Welfare state quickly became a contested concept. In the years 1954–1959 we find a heated debate about the meaning and connotations of ‘welfare state’ in Danish newspapers and magazines. The debate was triggered by the question of old age pension reform. The Social Democratic government had launched plans for the introduction of a universal People’s Pension, and the political contestation on old age pensions also developed into a more general debate about

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social security, taxation and the role of the state in Danish society. In this debate the concept of welfare state was at the forefront. The People’s Pension was finally legislated in the autumn of 1956 – and came by both contemporary observers and later historians to symbolize the breakthrough of the welfare state in Denmark.23 However, the heated debate also put its mark on the term ‘welfare state’. Discussions in the late 1950s quickly became dominated by critical voices, which we will take a closer look at in the following. We locate three positions of critique of the emerging welfare state: centre-right parties (conservatives and liberals), left-wing critics and certain groups of church men turning against the welfare state. The defenders of the welfare state as a positive vision of future society were mainly to be found on the centre-left: the Social Democrats and the Social Liberal Party.

The Centre-Right Parties 1954–59: The Welfare State as a Dystopia The Danish centre-right parties – especially the Conservatives and the Liberal-Agrarian Party – quickly turned against the welfare state as part of the larger political struggle over the role of the state in Danish society. Accepting the concept as future-oriented, they simply turned the Social Democratic visions upside down and portrayed the welfare state as a dystopia or, in the more positive version, as the road to hell paved with good intentions. During the negotiations of a tax reform in 1954, the spokesman of the Conservative People’s Party, Poul Møller, contrasted the ‘liberal society based on private saving and capital formation’ and ‘the social welfare state in which the public purse is the road towards progress’.24 Rising taxation and bureaucracy were important elements in his critique: ‘if the road towards Social Democratic progress will be taken, the welfare state will rise like a phoenix above us all, but that road will be paved with increasing expenditure and taxes’.25 For Møller it was clearly a political struggle about the future. The welfare state had not yet been realized, but a continued move along the Social Democratic route would lead towards increasing expenditures and taxes and eventually end in the welfare state. Møller ascertained that the term ‘welfare state’ had replaced socialism as a short-term description for Social Democratic objectives.26 All human problems were seen as societal problems, implying the commitment of the state to help all human beings through their difficulties – the liberal society would succumb. Thus, it was decisive to challenge that the state had a duty to help all and to insist on an individuals’ responsibility for their own lives – a choice

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between ‘the dearly bought delightfulness of the welfare state and a society of free, responsible and resourceful citizens’. Møller praised previous social reforms because they had strengthened the liberal society by removing the worst complaints over liberalism, whereas he was critical towards the welfare state in which ‘man was seen as a product of heredity and environment’.27 The corollary would be the equalization of incomes that in turn would hamper initiative and saving and, therefore, the expansion of private economic life. The programme of welfare, therefore, would lead towards a socialistic society. This line of criticism to a large degree echoed contemporary debates in the US, where the welfare state in the context of the early Cold War was defined as a socialist project.28 It is not possible to actually trace the transnational links of these debates, but, also similar to the US, the introduction of counter-terms with a clearly negative framing played an important role in the shaming of the ‘welfare state’. Aksel Møller, Poul Møller’s brother and also a leading Conservative politician, promoted the term ‘the guardian state’ (formynderstat).29 Following the classical line of argumentation known from Hayek (in The Road to Serfdom) and the US debate, Aksel Møller pointed to the paternalistic aspects of the welfare state and to what he saw as a trade-off between state responsibility and individual freedom. He argued that not only the Social Democrats had ‘the welfare of the people’ as an objective, and what was a welfare measure for one person could be the opposite for another. Consequently, it was impossible for the state to be a guardian for all people’s welfare from the cradle to the grave without giving up individual freedom. Møller did not explicitly use the term ‘legal state’ but implicitly argued in favour of the legal state against the welfare state. Rather than the welfare state as a guardian, paternalistic and bureaucratic state, Møller argued that public policies should aim at liberating men from the power of the state and to make them free in their relation to collective institution. Also liberal politicians voiced similar lines of criticism, picking up the counter-concept of the guardian state. A leading party member, Axel Kristensen, underlined ‘. . . that the Liberal Party was opposed to the guardian state towards which the Social Democratic policy points’.30 To ensure a defined standard of living irrespective of the efforts of the individual meant that the fruits of work were taken from some and given to others. In doing this the state acted as a guardian deciding what the single individual could spend as a share of his income. This was not a welfare state but a ‘guardian state’ – just another name for the socialistic state.31 The struggle between liberalism and the socialistic welfare state was portrayed as a struggle between faith in man as met in the liberal view and faith in the state.32

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Following the critique voiced by the Møller brothers and other centreright politicians, the welfare state suddenly found itself at the centre of sceptical attention. Numerous observers – intellectuals, politicians, commentators – felt called to offer their opinion on this newcomer to the Danish political language. The term welfare state was first registered in an official Danish dictionary in 1955.33 Judged by quantitative terms, it was the sceptics dominating the debate. However, also within the group of sceptics we find different understandings of the term and consequently different lines of criticism were put forward. In the following we have developed five types of centre-right criticism: the responsibility argument, the incentive argument, the free-choice argument, the risk-has-value argument and religious arguments. Clearly, the criticism within each type varied in intensity: from die-hard rejections of welfare to moderate sceptics, who embraced the idea about social security but saw potential dangers in developing a welfare state. We also want to underline that each of the ideal types has a longer history dating back to classical discussion on the introduction of social policy in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.34 In many ways, the core argument against the welfare state was far from new, but still, as the vision of welfare state gradually started to materialize through a number of social reforms in the latter half of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s, it left a growing sense of standing on a burning platform on the centre-right. Paradoxically, it can be argued that the term welfare state was a victim of this success: the welfare state as social citizenship was realized but the concept ‘welfare state’ suffered and only really regained its positive connotations when welfare state came into crisis in the 1970s. But let us first take a closer look at the five types of centre-right welfare state criticism.

The Responsibility Argument As already stated, one prominent argument against the welfare state was that it was a threat to individual responsibility. If freedom were to be preserved and initiative and love of work were to flourish, society had to develop free and resourceful men with responsibility for their own destiny. As argued by Poul Møller, the welfare state would make man a hot house plant that would die if placed outside the hot house.35 Undermining individual responsibility to the advantage of institutional (collective) responsibility led to lax morals and irresponsibility in societal and family life, in the school and in the conception of justice.36 Removal of binding responsibility meant removal of initiative. Other critics emphasized that true solidarity presupposed individual responsibility and duty vis-à-vis society, but the principle of the welfare state was ‘that everyone grab

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Figure 3.1. ‘It is your money, but it is the government’s hands’, explains this Conservative election poster from 1957. It was all about the costs of a growing welfare state. Photo: © Det Konservative Folkeparti, Denmark.

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everything’.37 Even the Social Democratic Minister of Defence, Poul Hansen, warned against the risk of developing a culture of dependency and underlined that he was a strong opponent of an all-encompassing and regimenting state.38 The potential development of a ‘claiming mentality’ was a criticism frequently voiced by the centre-right parties: ‘the corollary to rights is duties. Duties are weakened, only rights and claims remain’.39 The welfare state implied that most people saw it as meaningless to pay for the benefits themselves.40 Concepts like universalism and selectivity were obviously unknown to the politicians of the day. But liberals frequently argued in favour of a selective, residual welfare state: ‘the aim of social assistance is to help people in distress, but it has passed the limits’; ‘the weak ought to be helped, but the sound and healthy have to carry their own responsibility’.41 This position culminated by the 1959 joint statement (Nye Signaler) of the Liberals and the Conservatives: ‘Support by the State must be restricted to cases of indigence’.42

The Incentive Argument Another core line of criticism was concerned with the welfare state’s implications for economic incentives. The welfare state undermined personal thrift, the incentive to work, the incentive to save, private capital formation, the will to improve one’s own conditions and to protect oneself against sickness and old age.43 Moral values like assiduity, providence, crusading spirit, honesty, sense of responsibility etc. were lost. The individual, therefore, became weak-willed and unsatisfied. When adherents of the welfare state appealed to ‘the common good’, this was an appeal to an abstraction with which the individual could not identify. Contributory efforts were not equivalent to what the individual received, and what was given was less worth than what was earned.44 If conditions were improved due to one’s own efforts, self-help would be promoted.45 When the state – caused by party political and ‘purchasing of votes’ motives – had taken over the responsibility for individual welfare, the incentives of the better off to engage in charity were diminished.46 The incentives to save and to work as well as to engage in charitable efforts were weakened by the welfare state, the critics argued.

The Free-Choice Argument Even before the politicization of the term, the implications of the welfare state for the free choice of consumption were put on the agenda.47 This argument was frequently referred to in the media.48 The economist Jørgen Pedersen endorsed the view of the welfare state as ‘a confidence

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trick’ and saw it as a paternalistic regime utilizing the fiscal illusions of the common man.49 Discussing the welfare state’s impact on production highlighted the trade-off between redistribution and efficiency of production.50 Several critics distinguished between ‘the Social Democratic guardian state’ and ‘the productive state complying with a conservative attitude to life’.51 Needless to say, the argument regarding the free choice of consumption was heavily used by politicians of the right-wing parties.

The Individual Man Argument The Danish author Hans Jørgen Lembourn – later member of parliament for the Conservatives – tried to develop the idea of a conservative attitude to life.52 He criticized adherents of the welfare state for arguing almost always along materialistic lines, but the problem was the psychological effects of the wide-ranging assistance. Economic security did not cause human happiness and satisfaction. Those who had to take risks to keep their living standard were generally more satisfied. Risk was to be preferred to security. Risk had value, because risk implied incentives to unfold oneself and one’s own potential, whereas ‘security society’ let the individual fall asleep convinced that others will solve his problems. It was also argued that incentives to saving and work were strongly dependent on risk.53 In developing his conservative view of life, Lembourn argued that men were born unequal and that material satisfaction ceased when it had been accomplished.54 Man was egoistic, and it was economic selfinterest that caused wealth. If the individual acted morally – industrious, decent, responsible – he served himself and influenced others to act similarly. ‘The conservative man would stand alone, and make him comfortable and independent by undertaking the risk of his acts’.

Religious Arguments against the Welfare State Another critical stance was represented by the clergy and representatives of the Church establishment. They were not a unanimous group, however.55 Some were strong critics, some had a more nuanced view and some supported the idea of the welfare state. The latter group was often connected to the Christian philanthropic tradition, but even within this group there was certain scepticism towards state colonization of this traditional working field of the philanthropic movement. There is no doubt that the sceptics dominated. The views of the clergy included more spiritual warnings against the welfare state becoming self-referential (not needing the church or Christian justifications) and placing itself on God’s throne, as it was formulated by one Danish priest:

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One can clearly make out the contours of a state where people are degraded into being a workforce that is directed as desired, as if one were dealing with cattle – without taking into account if the individual becomes rootless or is ruined physically and mentally. It calls itself the welfare state, but there is good reason to ask if the modern state is not becoming a threat to human welfare. If, in its belief in itself, it is not placing itself on God’s throne.56

Left-Wing Critique of the ‘Capitalist Welfare State’ It was not only on the centre-right that the (Social Democratic) welfare state was the victim of tough criticism and outright negation as a concept. Also left of the Social Democratic Party (and even within the left of the Social Democratic Party) – there was a strong scepticism towards reformist reforms and the term welfare state. The latter was, to put it short, a cover up disguising the true capitalist nature of centre-left reformism. Representatives of the Communist Party, acknowledging the Social Democratic use of ‘welfare state’ as a positive term appealing to the electorate, insisted that the assertion that Denmark was a welfare state was a hypocritical lie.57 Andreas Jørgensen, editor of Dialog, viewed the term welfare state as being propagandist and devoid of meaning.58 The aim was only to relieve some of the most evident inhumane effects of the capitalist system. Welfare capitalism – Jørgensen’s term for the welfare state – formed the Social Democratic Party, whereas the party did not create the welfare state. Social Democrats were captives of the welfare capitalist system, and men were reduced from being ends into being means. The human content of the welfare state was wealth and vulgar materialism, leading to cultural emptiness, isolation and rootlessness. Generally, intellectuals on the left viewed the emerging welfare state as part of the capitalist system, it being the system’s defence against radicalization of the working class.59 Societal implications and worries about mass culture and commercialization were focal points. The author Erik Knudsen saw the welfare state as the political social liberalism’s need to implement reforms respecting private property and, therefore, obstructing possibilities for a socialistic development.60 Commercialization stabilized ‘the capitalist welfare state’ by blunting the senses and disuniting the working class. In this manner the capitalists ensured against revolutionary unpleasantness, supported by an affable welfare state that took care of its main obligation: to secure the private ownership of the means of production. Others on left pointed towards the shortcomings of the welfare state. The basic argument was that the concept did not match reality. In the words of the chairman of the Socialist People’s Party (and

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former communist) Aksel Larsen: ‘As long as we have unemployed, one should not put forward claims that Denmark is a welfare state.’61 Also ‘orthodox’ Social Democrats argued along such lines, exemplifying that the transition from democratic socialism to the welfare state was also contested. The trade unionist Magnus Johansson, for example, argued that the dominant right-wing media and the advertisement industry had persuaded the population to believe that the welfare state was synonymous with a ‘consumer state’.62 The welfare state, however, ought not only to promote materialism but also the spiritual development of the single human being. Another Social Democrat, Ole Hyltoft Petersen, agreed that it was the business world that had created people’s overdimensioned ‘needs’ and made them sluggish and disgruntled, but it was for the welfare state – satisfying material minimum needs – to ensure a ‘true’ life not governed by selfishness.63 The welfare state not only secured material wellbeing; it also caused alienation and apathy. A lead article in the left-wing magazine Dialog (1960) argued that the welfare state was merely a slogan covering the fact that the poor minority was getting worse because the ‘idea’ of ‘the welfare state’ served to weaken interests in their position.64 The welfare state’s aim was to make the bourgeois-capitalist societal mechanism more efficient. An ideology having the capitalist ‘welfare state’ at its core represented a world of mental impoverishment. Cooperation and solidarity were replaced by a competitive rat race, dreams of personal success, cultivation of one’s career and a mentality of the jungle. Another left-wing criticism – partly overlapping with some arguments on the centre-right – had to do with the welfare state’s inherent technocratic and bureaucratic tendencies. In his review of the new Social Democratic Party programme from 1961, the author Villy Sørensen argued that the ideology of the welfare state claimed to be ethically and politically free of values.65 Even so, the welfare state mirrored a political and, therefore, also ethical choice that demanded that the old economic rules of the game were to be maintained as a frame within which the next (restricted) step was to be taken. To some extent the critical tone on the left was overlapping with the right-wing criticism, but the inspiration came from elsewhere, mainly from intellectuals like the American sociologist C. Wright Mills and the economist John Kenneth Galbraith (as well as the young Karl Marx). In the most serious and pessimistic variant of the critique, the welfare state itself was the problem, whereas a milder criticism argued that the welfare state was not able to ensure the happiness of the single individual. This was emphasized by the author Villy Sørensen in his critical comments (and defence of the welfare state) on the young student Hans Hertel.66

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In Sørensen’s view people needed security if they were not to be exposed to social traumas impeding their self-realization. It was precisely such traumas the welfare state could perhaps remove, thus creating the preconditions for people to occupy themselves with ‘the essential’. The welfare state could perhaps emancipate people from external ‘threats’ that impeded the ‘inner emancipation’. The welfare state might solve the social but not the existential problems. If the state interfered with existential problems, it turned into a guardian state impeding rather than promoting emancipation. Sørensen’s views were shared by at least some Social Democrats.67 Villy Sørensen’s arguments were directed against the criticism of the welfare state that it had not brought about happiness,68 emphasizing as he did that ‘inner emancipation’ or ‘the essential’ could never be realized by the state. ‘The silent assumption of the welfare system is, that it is only a means – not a goal; social security can never be a goal itself, only a basis for the personal existence’.69

Defending the ‘Welfare State’ as the Status Quo As the criticism both from the left and right piled up and came to dominate the debate, the defenders of the welfare state – both in real terms as the advocates of reform and as the actors using the term as a vision for the future – tried to develop a more positive meaning of the term. In the decade from the mid 1950s to the mid 1960s the coalition between the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals successfully spearheaded a number of social reforms. In other words, this was a period of massive welfare expansion both in terms of social expenditure and institutional setup.70 However, as we shall see, the critics had the upper hand in the conceptual contestation, and throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s the term became to a larger degree a positive description of the status quo rather than a future-oriented concept. At the Social Democratic Party congress in 1957, Prime Minister H.C. Hansen emphasized that the party would ‘fight for the welfare state as the citizen’s protector, helper and defender. To change its principles meant to roll back the development’.71 It was more about the present and less about the future. H.C. Hansen even recognized the dominating role of the welfare state critics, as he called out for the centre-right to ‘stop using the cheap catchwords’ and instead say whether they actually intended to change ‘the welfare stately laws’.72 In the following we will take a closer look at how the Social Democrats and the Social Liberals developed their generally more positive as well as pragmatic understanding of the concept.

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As the critique from the Conservatives and the Liberals intensified after 1955, even leading Social Democrats became uncertain as to the meaning of the term welfare state. This can be illustrated by the following anecdote: October 1956, the later Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag, then Minister of Economy and Employment, wrote a letter to the economic-statistical advisor to the Ministry of Social Affairs, Henning Friis.73 Krag was invited to discuss the welfare state at a public meeting and asked Friis what all this fuss was about the welfare state. In a detailed response, Friis informed Krag that the concept seemed to have been imported from the US, and it was especially the use of the state apparatus in distributing social and economic goods that had triggered the criticism. With direct reference to the American debate and drawing on Achinstein’s report for Library of Congress, Friis summarized six points of criticism for Krag to be prepared for:74 1. The welfare state demoralized the beneficiaries by weakening individual responsibility and the duty to provide for oneself and the family. 2. The welfare state weakened private initiative, enterprise and the incentive to save. 3. The welfare state acted as a paternalistic guardian because it interfered in the free choice of consumption. 4. The welfare state weakened cultural and spiritual values. 5. The welfare state made people secure, and this caused apathy and lethargy. 6. The responsibility of the well-to-do to engage in the distress of society was weakened, and the beneficiaries were tempted to increase their claims. As we have seen, these lines of criticism were clearly present in the Danish debate both to the left and to the right of the Social Democratic Party – and were even echoed within the party. Overwhelmed by the scope of criticism – or lacking time to engage with it – Krag chose the pragmatic way out, simply defining the welfare state as ‘the sum of our social and humanitarian legislation and administration’ – a rather defensive position.75 However, the comprehensive and multifaceted criticism towards the idea of the welfare state was to a large degree also a criticism towards the Social Democrats and their social reform agenda. So, other party members felt obliged to defend the welfare state against what they considered ideological and misleading criticism. They tried to specify the meaning in ways that had positive connotations and aligned with social democracy:

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The welfare state is a society that protects all citizens against political and economic suppression and ensures security from the cradle towards the grave.76 The core of the welfare state is the same as characterized the Stauning-period (1929–1942): Denmark for the people . . . it is not the citizens’ nanny, but a creator of social security and employment setting human worth in the high seat.77 The objective of the welfare state is to provide greater equality of opportunities and conditions.78 The welfare state is a society in which the citizens’ security and respect for the welfare of all individuals are the objectives of the economic, social and cultural policy . . . The welfare state is not static, but a continuous march towards happier conditions of life.79 The welfare state ‘acknowledges social solidarity as a natural component of national solidarity’.80

Even though the welfare state was enlarged and developed from one social reform to the next, the Social Democrats did not succeed in making the welfare state (as a concept) popular, and from the end of the 1950s the term was toned down in the political rhetoric of the party. In 1960, the Minister of Finance, Viggo Kampmann, asked whether the welfare state merely was a scapegoat in line with ministers of finance and other unpopular terms.81 During the 1960s the term did not disappear from Social Democratic language, but it was used infrequently only and in such cases often in connection with assertions that without this or that social reform Denmark would not be a welfare state. The term ‘welfare state’ did not appear in the Social Democratic programme of principles from 1961.82 The core concept used was still ‘democratic socialism’. In a book published as a commentary to the programme of principles, only Lena Vedel-Petersen – a not that prominent Social Democrat – mentioned the welfare state, which was understood as the happiness of good family life and the implied obligations transferred to the societal level. It is the expression of community relying on respect for the single human being – not only respect for the strong ones. The idea of the welfare state is the idea of solidarity so that no one with or without his or her own responsibility perishes or has to live a life in misery.83

From the end of the 1960s, use of the term (in particular within the party) became more frequent but now clearly without any future orientation. It was used in two ways. First, the term was used to describe a move away from the policy of the 50s towards more explicit policy of

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redistribution and equality – i.e. a radicalization that passed beyond the idea of the welfare state.84 Here the ‘welfare state’ was representing the present and the past. Second, it was used as a catch-all term for things that ought to be defended against growing criticism (the combined effect of the neoliberal Progress Party and criticism from the left): economic challenges (deficit of the public budget and the balance of payment), external threats (for instance the EU) and social pressures on the system of social security (growing unemployment, new family patterns). In this respect the term was used as a positive description of the status quo. The programmes of the party and the content of the ‘ideological’ periodicals (Verdens Gang and Ny Politik) show that the defence of the welfare state took place alongside a political radicalization during the 1970s, so that the term at best was reduced to a denominator serving the larger aims of ‘democratic socialism’ or ‘economic democracy’.85 The term – either welfare state (only as a reference to the Scandinavian welfare state) or (more frequently) ‘welfare society’ – reappeared only in the working programme in 1988. It is noteworthy that the programme talked about ‘renewal of the welfare state’. The Social-Liberal Party (Det radikale Venstre) had historically positioned itself as a centre party rejecting both state-directed socialism and traditional liberalism.86 The Social-Liberal Party had since the 1920s formed a political alliance with the Social Democratic Party with respect to social reforms. This welfare coalition continued after 1945 and can be characterized as the main driving force behind the expansion of the welfare state. However, this welfare coalition was not without limitations. The Social-Liberal Party followed a more market-oriented course in economic policies and resisted Social Democratic inclinations towards comprehensive state regulation or socialization. This centre-seeking attitude also characterized the party’s use of the term welfare state. It generally tried to define the welfare state as a middle of the way project that was neither socialist nor liberalist (or anti-statist). In this way they talked to both the critics, rejecting their criticism as unfair, and to the Social Democrats, rejecting any radicalization of the term. In short, the Social-Liberals tried to define the welfare state as aligned with the party’s ideological position. The leading Social Liberal Bertel Dahlgaard ascertained that he had always thought that sound politics had the welfare of the state and the citizens in mind.87 The welfare state was not a nightmare image and not a state in which all citizens were equal but a state that intended to offer all citizens equal possibilities and to ensure a minimum of social security for all. The unification of private enterprise and social solidarity was superior to a socialistic society. The Social Liberals saw this social-liberal society as the best way of ensuring the freedom of the citizens materially as well

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as culturally. Denmark was in Dahlgaard’s view a welfare state built up by all democratic parties in cooperation and a middle road between liberalism and socialism – a social liberalism. For the Social Liberals the welfare state meant the phasing out of the former days of a conservative upperclass state. The freedom and welfare of citizens was best safeguarded by this social liberal society, which was in harmony with deep currents in the Danish way of life. One might, therefore, juggle with catchwords like ‘socialism’ and ‘liberalism’ and sneer at the welfare state, but this was backward looking.88 This ascertainment mirrors on the one hand the Social Democratic understanding of the welfare state but clearly without granting a carte blanche for growing state intervention. The idea of equality, for example, was not to be taken too far, and Dahlgaard warned against ‘the risks of misuse’.89 One had to keep watch against excessive care, assistance and subsidies.90 For the Social Liberals, the welfare state was seen as a middle course between socialism and liberalism and as integrated part of the ‘consensus democracy’.91 The Social Liberal parliamentarian Johannes Christiansen (1958) struck similar chords writing that ‘It was just as stupid to idolize as to downgrade and condemn the welfare state.’92 It was more important to see ‘the necessity of pruning the welfare state in the same manner as the careful gardener, who every year frees his fruit trees from sick and unnecessary shoots’. The Social Liberal use of the term welfare state was clearly more centrist than the Social Democratic version (seeing the welfare state as aligning with democratic socialism). However, there was enough conceptual overlap to legitimize close ties and cooperation between the two parties in the period from 1945 to the 1970s.

A Short Period of Welfare State Consensus? The 1960s have often been singled out as ‘the golden age of the welfare state’. This was a period characterized by high economic growth, full employment, expansion of the welfare state and Social Democratic hegemony as well as a high level of political consensus. In a similar vein, the early 1960s was a period of ceasefire in the debate about the concept of welfare state. On the one hand, this was the result of a conceptual contestation where the critical interpretations of the concepts gained the upper hand and especially the Social Democrats downplayed their previous understanding of the concept as a future oriented and ideologically loaded. The term welfare state became more descriptive and less dangerous. On the other hand, this was also a reflection of real politics. The centre-right

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parties had turned towards a more pragmatic stand on the role of the state and comprehensive social security. The 1960 national election had been a lesson in this respect. Whereas the Social Democratic government had promised to ‘make good times better’ (a slogan borrowed from Sweden), the Conservatives and the Liberal-Agrarian Party had advocated a clear break with the welfare state in a joint election manifesto.93 The voters clearly opted for the primer and left the two bourgeois parties with ideological and strategical hangovers. As a result, subsequent to their common 1959 statement, the centre-right parties gradually moved closer to the Social Democratic Party’s and the Social Liberals’ welfare state social policy both in sematic and real terms. A change made possible by the de-radicalization of the term in the 1950s. The term ‘welfare state’ more or less disappeared from the vocabulary of the right-wing parties in the 1960s or was demystified, as when liberal observers advocated for creating a ‘liberal welfare state’ as an alternative to the more statist Social Democratic one.94 But as the decade turned to an end, the political landscape changed and the ceasefire was destabilized, and the ‘welfare state’ gained renewed attention in the political debate. Welfare state criticism struck back with a vengeance, and eventually the ‘welfare state’ was relabelled as a ‘welfare society’. Another feature of the debate of the 1950s and 1960s was its national perspective. Whereas recent debates of the welfare state had been heavily influenced by transnational forces (including immigration) and globalization, the concept of ‘welfare state’ was surprisingly local.95 There are of course occasional exceptions. This probably became most clear in discussions of development aid for the so-called Third World. As early as 1953 Henning Friis, in a survey of Scandinavian developmental aid programmes, argued that ‘the national welfare state’ should be ‘extended also on an international level’.96 The Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal’s plea for exchanging the national ‘welfare state’ with an international ‘welfare world’ was echoed in the Danish debate.97 The few non-national interventions in the debate about the Danish welfare state included comparisons to welfare states in other countries (mostly Nordic) or suggestions for policy learning. We also find examples of what might be labelled semantic transfers, where especially welfare criticism from the outside was featured in the Danish debate. On the one hand this could be critical books such as the Swedish 1958 book Rebelling against the Welfare State (Revolt mot välfärdsstaten), which was picked up by the Conservative welfare state critic Hans Jørgen Lembourn (see above).98 On the other hand, there are also examples of especially US critique of Danish or Scandinavian welfare states that was echoed in Danish media from former President Eisenhower’s so-called Eisenhower

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thesis (presented in Readers Digest 1960 arguing that Scandinavian welfare states resulted in moral decline and high suicide rates) to Roland Huntford’s critical accounts of the Swedish welfare state in the book The New Totalitarians (translated into Danish in 1972).99 But at the end of the day, the concept of welfare state seemed clearly to work within a taken for granted national frame. Even the debate on membership of the European Union from the early 1960s to the decision to join in the autumn of 1972 did not seem to have influenced the usages and national understanding of the welfare state except for emerging welfare state nostalgia among former critical groups on the left.100

What to Do with the ‘Welfare State’? Growing Scepticism and Conceptual Innovation after 1973 A Gallup poll in June 1974 showed that 63 per cent of the respondents thought that ‘the welfare state had gone too far’.101 The view was even shared by 53 per cent of the social democratic respondents. Even though, as researcher at the National Institute of Social Research Else Marie Kjerkegaard pointed out, the ‘welfare state’ was far from being an unambiguous term and that ‘gone too far’ was an ambiguous phrase, there is no doubt that public opinion had turned more sceptical regarding the welfare state.102 This growing scepticism was the result of both external and domestic challenges. The political turmoil of the early 1970s with the so-called landslide election of December 1973 where four new parties including the welfare state sceptics in the Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet) the Christian Peoples Party (Kristeligt Folkeparti) and the Left-Socialist Party (Venstresocialisterne) entered parliament was a political blow to the welfare state consensus of the 1960s.103 It followed a decade of weak minority governments that fuelled a political legitimacy crisis. Parallel to this was the challenge of macroeconomic problems in the wake of the oil crises, growing unemployment and growing deficits of the public budget and the balance of payment. There was a genuine feeling of crisis – economic crisis, democracy in crisis and not least a welfare state in crisis. Whereas the ‘welfare state’ in the 1950s and especially in the 1960s was increasingly seen as a solution to social problems in the 1970s and in the 1980s, it became increasingly the problem to be solved. The Danish debate on the welfare state was triggered by international debates: the emerging neoliberal critique and to a lesser degree various lines of Marxist and New Left analysis. Lines of welfare state criticism that were voiced in the 1950s regained new strength.

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As pointed out by political scientist Paul Pierson, this has a temporal perspective: one group was fighting for the welfare state as a goal of the future; another was defending the realized welfare state.104 Looking at the Danish debate, we find a significant change in the temporality of the concept of welfare state. In the 1950s it was something in the near future; in the 1960s it was (more or less) realized; and in the 1970s it became something potentially lost (for better or for worse), and in the discussions on welfare state reform, retrenchment and restructuring, from the 1980s the ‘welfare state’ was increasingly portrayed as backward looking. In the following we will take a closer look at these changes. First, we will illustrate the renewed criticism; second we will take a closer look at the conceptual innovations of the last four decades. Overall, the use of the term ‘welfare state’ was generally much more frequent in this period compared to the 1950s and 1960s. To a large degree this simply illustrates that the concept was used as a descriptive term in the public debate. The welfare state was the established umbrella concept for social reforms – in the same way as the Social Democratic politician Jens Otto Krag had defined the term in 1956 (see above). Welfare state and related concepts such as welfare politics (velfærdspolitik), welfare sector (velfærdssektor) or welfare reform (velfærdsreform) were mostly used without any ideological connotations simply to describe a set of policies or a certain political field. As a consequence, the concept itself was also far less contested than in the 1950s. The new wave of welfare criticism is illustrative in this respect. Often the critics did not directly engage with the ‘welfare state’ but turned the critical attention towards ‘the public sector’, ‘public employees’, ‘public expenditure’ or similar terms. The content of the critique remained the same, but the welfare state concept played a more marginal role as a direct target of the political encounters. This also allowed for some occasional welfare state romance. From 1973, a marked and strident criticism of the welfare state and the employees of the public sector as well as the financing and rationale of the welfare state at all was voiced by the new Progress Party. Suddenly there was a populist right to the right of the Liberal-Agrarian Party and the Conservatives that represented a critical stance to the welfare state and welfare policies in the 1950s. Whereas the ideological content of the Progress Party and its charismatic leader Mogens Glistrup did represent something fundamental, there was certainly a change in style.105 Glistrup’s populism was backed up by his skills as a semantic innovator, labelling public employees as ‘paper movers’ (papirnusser) or ‘counter Pope’ (skrankepave). Partly influenced by international neoliberal discourses and partly by local events (the growth of the welfare state and the Progress Party), also

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the centre-right turned more critical. In 1973 the recently elected leader of the Conservative party, Poul Schlüter, asked whether ‘the social security net’ had become too tight.106 However, he did not use the term ‘welfare state’ but directed his criticism against ‘the tyranny of the institutions’ and the ungovernable and ineffective public sector etc. This line of criticism was intellectually elaborated throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s by other Conservatives and especially a new generation of young Liberals in a number of books and articles.107 But also in these analyses the term ‘welfare state’ was sparsely used and was rarely at the centre of the ideological controversies. Also on the New Left the critique of the existing social security system went from a die-hard Marxist analysis of the welfare state as an integrated part of capitalist exploitation to a less draconic critique of alienation and inefficient social policies. On the left the welfare state was often characterized as ‘the so-called welfare state’.108 However, in general the term welfare state was used only sparingly on the left. In most cases the welfare state was reduced to a mechanism – for reproduction or safeguarding private property rights – in the larger capitalist machinery. Often the address of the critique was more the Social Democratic labour movement than the welfare state itself as when the young socialist Preben Wilhjelm talked about ‘Social Democracy’s opportunistic lack of principles as administrators of a gradually more and more conservative welfare state’.109 Even if the critics from the 1970s clearly focused less on the concept and more on the content (social security, taxes, public administration etc.), the intensity of this criticism left a mark on Social Democratic attitudes to the welfare. More so as similar lines of criticism were also voiced inside the labour movement and the party. In 1970, the new party’s programme was described as guidelines for developing a ‘true welfare state’.110 Adding ‘true’ to the concept clearly echoed left-wing criticism. Three years later, the (former) social democratic professor of social policy, Jørgen Dich, published his bestselling book on ‘the ruling class’, identified as the public employees who – under the banner of ‘perfection’ – exploited the working class.111 The criticism mounted up, and Social Democracy was influenced to a degree that the new party manifesto from 1974 was entitled: ‘After the welfare state – a Social Democratic Program’.112 The ‘welfare state’ was left for the past (at least for a moment), but what was to come after the welfare state? We want to point out two characteristics of the following decades of conceptual development: First, the ‘welfare state’ as an ideological concept of the future was replaced with the concept of ‘welfare society’. In this process the welfare state remained as a concept describing the past. The yearly meeting of the Association of Social Policy in 1973 had had the theme ‘The dream of the welfare society.

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Has the ideal of the 1960s failed?’ Second, the ‘welfare state’ had a small revival in the 2000s. The differentiation between welfare state and welfare society became less pronounced in that both concepts were mainly and synonymously used as descriptive concepts or with a romantic tone as something to defend against external threats.

From ‘Welfare State’ towards ‘Welfare Society’ in the 1980s and 1990s The major conceptual innovation in the 1980s and 90s was that ‘welfare society’ gained semantic ground vis-à-vis ‘the welfare state’.113 The provision of ‘welfare’ outside the public sector was (re)discovered. By using the term ‘welfare society’ the activities of the civil or third sector became part of the Danish welfare regime. The distinction between welfare state and welfare society should not be over-exaggerated, because there has been and still is a tendency in Danish debates to use the terms more or less synonymously. This was not a new phenomenon. A number of articles from the 1950s and 60s also used the two terms without noting any differences.114 However, the changed rhetoric in the 1980s mirrored an ideological shift – a changed societal configuration of state, market and civil society.       

 
  


  

                                                 



Figure 3.2. Number of articles in major Danish newspapers using ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare society’, 1990–2014. Source: Authors’ calculations based on Infomedia.dk. Newspapers included: Politiken, Jyllands-Posten, Berlingske Tidende (BT), Ekstra Bladet and Information. Please note that the calculation counts number of articles using the search words and not the overall frequencies. Data retrieved 3 October 2016.

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Whereas centre-right parties were clearly uneasy with the term welfare state, the term welfare society allowed them at the same time to be anti-statist and pro-welfare. In the mid 1980s the conservative Minister of Social Affairs, Palle Simonsen, stated that ‘We have demonstrated that the Conservative People’s Party is an adherent of the welfare society, parallel with our efforts to restrain the role of the State as far as possible.’115 A similar confession of adherence to welfare accompanied by a state-critical dimension is found in liberal politician and later Prime Minister (2001–11) Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s political rhetoric: ‘My assumption is that welfare is not to be measured by the engagement of the State in the economy. On the contrary, it is my understanding that men to develop true welfare have to take a personal responsibility for their own existence.’116 In this way Fogh Rasmussen reframed the welfare debate and challenged the Social Democratic ‘ownership’ of the welfare state.117 He successfully developed a narrative in which the Social Democratic Party as the backward-looking representative of the ‘welfare state’ was attributed the role of the actor who wanted to bring renewal of the ‘welfare society’ to a stop.118 This semantic strategy was launched already in the mid 1980s. In a political statement from 1985, Venstre critically argued that . . . the institutionalization and professionalization of the welfare state has led to a weakening of private and voluntary social efforts. Human help, care, interests and mutual duties have been discredited. The welfare state has become cold and formal and these characteristics have replaced the warm humanity that ought to characterize a well-functioning welfare system . . . The Liberals will change the welfare state into a welfare society.119

The temporality of the welfare state/welfare society shift was even clearer in Fogh Rasmussen’s New Year’s speech of 2002: ‘We used the Twentieth Century to develop the Danish welfare state. We are now confronted with the challenge to develop a modern welfare society complying with the Twenty-first Century.’120 Politically, this was a successful strategy of rhetoric, which contributed to placing the Liberal Party as the driving force (‘we’) in Danish politics during the 2010s.121 Interestingly, also the Social Democrats were influenced by the changing temporality of the concept of ‘welfare state’. This is maybe not so surprising, as most political parties want to be forward looking rather than represent the past. In the 1980s and 90s, the Social Democratic Party in programmatic statements clearly preferred the term ‘welfare society’ to the term ‘welfare state’.122 In the 1984 programme, welfare society was linked to ‘democracy’, whereas four years later the programme stated that ‘The benefits, the information and service activi-

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ties of the public sector form the cornerstone of our welfare society.’ The 1992 programme saw the welfare society as cooperating with ‘the third sector’, thus making a distinction between state and civil society. It looks as if a more conscious use of ‘welfare society’ replaced ‘welfare state’ – a distinction between ‘the old’ and ‘the new’, emphasizing the interplay of state, municipalities, voluntary organizations and the family – as seen in the Liberals’ 1985 statement. However, the centre-right used the term ‘welfare society’ more systematically in an effort to link the Social Democrats to ‘the state’. Throughout the 1990s, the Social Democrats used ‘welfare society’ mainly in a defensive manner to absorb neoliberal as well as left-wing state criticism.123 In the 2000s the temporality of the welfare state/welfare society gained even more ground. This was partly a result of the success of the Liberal Party claiming issue-ownership to welfare policies through the successful reframing of the welfare society as the new and up-to-date welfare state; partly the result of a paradigmatic policy change towards workfare policies.124 Figure 3.2 shows that welfare society was the preferred concept but also that from the late 1990s the usage of the two concepts developed in parallel, reflecting the intensity of the political debate on welfare reforms. The two concepts were clearly interdependent: the ‘old’ welfare state concept was needed to frame the welfare society as future oriented. In this way the semantic change was a discursive weapon paving the way for a specific kind of welfare reform. Whereas the term ‘welfare state’ had its breakthrough in the Golden Age of the welfare state – characterized by an expansion of social rights – the term ‘welfare society’ aligned very well with an era characterized by retrenchment, workfare and welfare reform. This was clearly the case under the centre-right government 2001–11; and this was equally clear during the centre-left government 2011–15. In 2011–12, the Social Democrat Minister of Social Affairs initiated a media debate on the population’s claiming attitudes vis-à-vis the public sector, arguing for a stronger focus on duties and rights.125 The Social Democratic Minister argued in favour of a welfare society supporting initiative, independence and energy. A welfare society helping everybody to become active citizens instead of passive recipients of welfare benefits . . . We have to demand that everyone contributes and assumes responsibility for himself and the community. We have to remind ourselves that care for other people is not to be provided by tax payments alone. The civil society and the voluntary sector also have their roles to play.126

She was backed up by the Minister of Employment arguing that the allembracing welfare state had to be replaced by a welfare society in which

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citizens assumed greater responsibility for themselves and their fellow human beings.127 Another party comrade, the Minister of Finance, went even further by referring to a society in transition, marked by globalization, financial crises and social differentiation.128 In his opinion, a ‘trimming’ of the welfare state did not mean phasing out but further development. ‘The competition state’ was the ‘modern welfare state’. It was more important to support the individual in becoming self-reliant and to live their according to their own choices than to compensate for the absence of abilities. It seems like the political establishment – from centre-right to centreleft – agreed that the ‘welfare state’ was a thing and a concept of the past, whereas the future was the less statist ‘welfare society’ or even the ‘competition state’, where social security had become a means to archive the goal of economic growth and competiveness. However, this consensus of the political establishment has also triggered certain welfare state nostalgia. In the political landscape this has been most visible on the far left (the socialist alliance in Enhedslisten) and on the populist right where the Danish People’s Party have cemented their political position by merging anti-immigration with a defence for the Danish welfare state. It has also triggered a number of non-parliamentary reactions. Trade unions especially representing employees in the public sector have launched a number of demonstrations and campaigns in defence of the existing welfare state, and this welfare movement even includes a number of local campaigns, such as when social assistance recipients in the Danish city Randers in a response to ongoing welfare restructuring in 2014 arranged the funeral of the welfare state.129

Conclusions and Perspectives We have outlined elements of the history of the term ‘welfare state’ and its use in Danish political debates. Our investigation shows – first and not surprisingly – that the concept has been contested throughout the postwar era. Even though Denmark (as the other Nordic countries) is often portrayed as a strong and highly developed welfare state, the concept was highly controversial and often used with a high degree of scepticism. Critics on the right labelled the term negatively and introduced also counter-concepts such as guardian state, Formynder-stat. Critics on the left either pointed out the shortcomings of the social security system (that it did not qualify as a ‘welfare state’) or even saw the whole idea of a welfare state as a defence mechanism of the capitalist society. Secondly, we show that the ‘classical’ positions of the ‘welfare debate’ – the

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right wing, the left wing, the social democratic – are more complex and changeable over time than one would immediately suspect. This means that investigations of the history of the welfare state cannot rely on any a priori definition. One has to be open towards the changing content of the term, depending on time and context. If we take as a point of departure the temporality of the concept ‘welfare state’, we find a clear pattern. In the early postwar decades the welfare state for both critics and defenders was a vision of the future – a utopia or a dystopia. In the 1960s, this changes, and the ‘welfare state’ becomes a description of the existing society. The Golden Age of the Danish welfare state brought concept and reality in line. Triggered by the crisis of the welfare state and growing criticism, especially from neoliberalism, this gradually changed from the 1970s, where the concept ‘welfare state’ becomes more and more backward looking. At certain points – for instance in relation to the EU and globalization – it was portrayed as something to be defended but in general it became an image of the past that needed to adapt to a changing social, economic and cultural context. In this process, alternative concepts such as ‘welfare society’, ‘welfare’ or even ‘the competition society’ were used as markers for a less statist and more market-oriented future. As a result, the term ‘welfare state’ is still frequently used in Danish political language, but it has become a rather descriptive term often aligned with a certain nostalgia. Jørn Henrik Petersen, PhD. Economics 1971, DPhil. History 1985, is Professor emeritus of social policy, University of Southern Denmark. His research mainly covers the history of the Danish welfare state and recently Luther’s social ethics and modern society. Together with K. Petersen, he is the editor of and main contributor to the seventh volume history of Danish welfare history, Dansk velfærdshistorie (University Press of Southern Denmark, 2010–14). Klaus Petersen is Professor in welfare history and director of the Danish Centre for Welfare Studies at University of Southern Denmark in Odense. He has published extensively on topics such as the Nordic welfare model, history of the Danish welfare state, war and welfare, and social policy language.

NOTES 1. Our chapter is based on a large collection of political and media texts as well as recent completed research, especially Jørn Henrik Petersen, Klaus Petersen and Niels Finn Christiansen (eds), Dansk Velfærdshistorie, 7 vols

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7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

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(Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2010–2015); Klaus Petersen, ‘Velfærdsstaten i dansk politisk retorik’ Tidsskrift for Velferdsforskning 5(1) (2001), 16–28; Henrik Madsen, ‘For velfærdens skyld: En analyse af de danske debater om velfærdsstat og medlemskab af EF 1950–1972’ (PhD thesis, Department of History, University of Southern Denmark 2006); Michael Kuur Sørensen, ‘Velfærdsstatens kritikere – En kortlægning af Venstre – og højrefløjens kritik af velfærdsstaten i 1960’erne og 1970’erne’, (unpublished manuscript: University of Southern Denmark, 2014). It is possible to find the concept ‘Velfærdspoliti’ (welfare polizei) used in Danish police law – however this refers to protection of state property. See Janus L.A. Kolderup-Rosenvinge, Den danske politiret: Til brug ved forelæsninger, 2nd ed. (Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1828), 71–73. See also chapter 1 in this volume. Frederik Lütken, Oeconomiske Tanker til høiere Efter-Tanke, 9 parts in 2 vols (Copenhagen: N. Møller, 1755–61), vol. 1:4, 10; vol 2:8, 67. Axel Nielsen, Die Entstehung der deutschen Kameralwissenschaft im 17. Jahrhundert (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1911), 42, 49, 97, 118. See also chapter 1 in this volume. Ålborg Amtstidende, 21 June 1915 (Starcke); Lauritz V. Birck, ‘Statsmonopoler og regalretten’, Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift, 3rd series 24 (1916), 178–79. See Niels Finn Christiansen, Hans Christian Johansen and Jørn Henrik Petersen, ‘Periodens idestrømninger’, in Petersen, Petersen and Christiansen, Dansk Velfærdshistorie, vol. 1, Frem mod socialhjælpsstaten. Perioden 1536– 1898 (2010), 37–107; Klaus Petersen, Jørn Henrik Petersen and Niels Finn Christiansen, ‘Det socialpolitiske landskab’, in Petersen, Petersen and Christiansen, Dansk Velfærdshistorie, vol. 2, Mellem skøn og ret. Perioden 1898– 1933 (2011), 83–149. See e.g. ‘Velfærdsstat og Retsstat’, Bornholms Social Demokrat, 23 October 1925. Vestjyllands Socialdemokrat, 4 June 1934. Hans Jensen, ‘Nordisk Statstyre’, Berlingske Aftenavis, 28 October 1941. See also his review in Nationaltidende, 5 June 1941. Hans C. Nybølle, ‘Omkring pristallet’, Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift, 3rd series (49) (1941), 305–55. ‘Velfærdsstatens ambulanceudgifter’, Vejen Frem 13(31) (1947), 3–4. Georg Nelson, ‘Byggeriet’, Social-Demokraten, 29 January 1943. Henning Friis, ‘Har Danmark mistet sin Stilling som socialt Foregangsland’, Social-Demokraten, 20 March 1947. ‘Storbritannien’, Socialdemokratiske Noter 23–24(1) (1951–52), 67. Jørgen Paldam, Planlægning for Velfærd (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1952). Poul Meyer, ‘Moderne Socialisme I’, Information, 21 July 1952. Socialdemokratiet, Protokol for Socialdemokratiets kongres 1953 (Aarhus: Socialdemokratiet ), 45–46.

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18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38.

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See Nils Edling’s chapter on Sweden in this volume. Socialdemokratiet, Protokol 1953, 45. Socialdemokratiet, Protokol 1953, 46. Thomas H. Marshall, ‘Class, Citizenship and Social Development’, in Thomas H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (London: Pluto Press, 1992), 3–51. Jørgen Paldam, ‘Den demokratiske socialisme’, in Jens Otto Krag (ed.), Tidehverv og samfundsorden (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1954), 78. Poul Møller, Gennembrudsår: Dansk politik i 1950’erne (Copenhagen: Vendelkær, 1977); Jørn Henrik Petersen, Klaus Petersen and Niels Finn Christiansen, ‘Det socialpolitiske idelandskab’, in Petersen, Petersen and Christiansen, Dansk Velfærdshistorie, vol. 3, Velfærdsstaten i støbeskeen 1933–1956 (2012), 133–51. Folketingstidende: Folketingets Forhandlinger 1953–54 (vol. 105) (Copenhagen: J.H. Schultz, 1954), 5532. Folketingstidende 1953–54, 4062. Poul Møller, ‘Fornyelsen’, Dagens Nyheder, 1 December 1955. Poul Møller, ‘Svaret til velfærdsstaten’, in Til alle mænds tarv. Udg. af Det konservative Folkeparti ved partiets 40 års jubilæum (Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1956), 90, 103. Jennifer Klein, Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen, ‘Social Policy Language in the United States’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 283–88. Folketingstidende: Folketingets Forhandlinger 1955–56 (vol. 107) (Copenhagen: J.H. Schultz, 1956), 5413–14. The importance of the term ‘formynderstat’ is also illustrated by the fact that the renowned Danish author Villy Sørensen entitled his 1956 essay collection Formynderfortællinger (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1956). ‘Velfærdsstat – ja, formynderstat – nej’, Skive Folkeblad 6 December 1956; ‘Velfærdsstat – formynderstat’, Holbæk Amtstidende, 7 December 1956. See Axel Kristensen, ‘Velfærdsstat – Liberalisme’, in Frederik Nielsen and Ole Hyltoft Petersen (eds), Hug og Parade (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1960), 9–15. ‘Troen paa mennesket mod troen paa staten’, Sorø Amtstidende, 18 September 1956. Petersen, ‘Velfærdsstaten i dansk’, 17. See also Albert O. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1991) for this argument. Poul Møller, ‘Svaret til velfærdsstaten’, 92. ‘En farlig mentalitetsændring i velfærdsstatens kølvand’, Randers Dagblad, 27 September 1956; ‘Nej tak til velfærdsstaten’, Korsør Avis, 17 September 1956. ‘Velfærdet igen’, Information, 27 June 1956. ‘Er det ikke snarere skatterne end velfærden, man er trætte af?’, Holbæk Amtstidende, 18 September 1956. This has to be understood in the context of the Cold War.

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39. Folketingstidende 1953–54, 4058–59. 40. Erik Rostbøll, ‘Kristensen, Thorkil 1955’, in Erik Rostbøll (ed.), Menneskeværd – velfærdsstat: Samtaler med Thorkild Kristensen, Julius Bomholt m. fl. (Copenhagen: Kristeligt Dagblads Forlag, 1955), 8–13. See also ‘Velfærdssystemet udvikler en uheldig mentalitet’, Aalborg Amtstidende, 16 October 1956; ‘Tiden er ikke inde til at kalde paa Krævementaliteten’, Horsens Folkeblad 20 June 1956; Mogens Ellermann, ‘Gør velfærdsstaten os triste?’, Politiken, 24 October 1962. 41. See for example ‘Stadig kamp for at bevare den enkeltes indflydelse’, Vejle Amts Folkeblad, 6 March 1956. 42. Venstre and Det konservative Folkeparti, Nye Signaler i den økonomiske politik: Fællesudtalelsen af 4. oktober 1959 og den finans- og pengepolitiska baggrund [joint party manifesto] 1959, retrieved 5 May 2017 from http://www .kb.dk/pamphlets/dasmaa/2008/feb/partiprogrammer/object21657/da/. 43. Kuur Sørensen, ‘Velfærdsstatens kritikere’, 37–38. 44. Hans Jørgen Lembourn, ‘Der er moralske værdier i en fri økonomi’, Vor Tid 12(6) (1956), 3. 45. ‘Velfærdskasse eller fattigkasse’, Holbæk Amts Avis, 16 August 1956. 46. Jyllands-Posten, 27 August 1954. 47. Knud Vedel-Petersen, ‘Jeg ville egentlig hellere have en cykel’, Politiken, 17 October 1951. 48. See e.g. ‘Lad os bestemme selv’, Jyllands-Posten, 19 April 1955; ‘Daarligt Humør i Velfærdsstaten’, Frederiksborg Amts Avis, 11 August 1956. 49. Jørgen Pedersen, ‘Hvad er en velfærdsstat?’, Gads Danske Magasin 5 (1957), 103–12. See also Anders Clausager, ‘Velfærdsstaten analyseret’, JyllandsPosten, 25 October 1960; ‘Staten og dens børn’, Information, 23 February 1957; ‘Centralsjæleanvisning’, Information, 17 March 1957. 50. Knud Vedel-Petersen, ‘Der skal også produceres i velfærdsstaten’, Politiken, 22 August 1957. 51. See for example ‘Formynderstatens vrangsider’, Århus Stiftstidende, 25 August 1957. 52. Hans Jørgen Lembourn, ‘Velfærdspolitik og personligt ansvar’, Politiken, 16 August 1956; Hans Jørgen Lembourn, ‘Det konservative livssyn’, Berlingske Tidende, 23 October 1956. 53. Kristian Mogensen, ‘Opsparing i en velfærdsstat’, Vor Tid 12(6) (1956), 5. 54. Lembourn, ‘Det konservative livssyn’. 55. For an in-depth analysis of the welfare state debate among church people see Jørn Henrik Petersen and Klaus Petersen, ‘The Good, the Bad, or the Godless Society: Danish “Church People” and the Modern Welfare State’, Church History 82(4) (2013), 904–40. 56. ‘En præst angriber velfærdsstaten’, Sønderjyden, 2 February 1956. See also: Johannes Horstmann, ‘Velfærdskristendom’, Tidehverv 35(8–9) (1961), 61–75.

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57. See for example Aksel Larsen, ‘Kvindens og familiens stilling i velfærdsstaten’, Tiden 20 (1959), 291–95; Ragnhild Andersen, ‘Om velfærd og enkepension’, Land og Folk, 2 April 1959. 58. Andreas Jørgensen, ‘Velfærdsstat og socialisme’, Dialog 11(4) (1961), 38– 45. 59. See also Kuur Sørensen, ‘Velfærdsstatens kritikere’, 64–67. 60. Erik Knudsen, ‘Demokrati og velfærdsstat’, Information, 26 May 1956; Erik Knudsen, ‘Demokrati og socialisme’, Information, 28 May 1956. 61. Quote (1960) from Kuur Sørensen, ‘Velfærdsstatens kritikere’, 68. 62. Magnus Johansson, ‘Velfærdsstat – og hvad så’, Verdens Gang 15 (1961), 146–49. 63. Ole Hyltoft Petersen, ‘Kultur og velfærd’, Verdens Gang 13 (1959), 106–9. 64. See the lead article in the left-wing magazine Dialog 10(1) (1960). 65. Villy Sørensen, ‘Historien om vattet og pinden’, Dialog 11(4) (1961), 29–37. 66. The reason was that the ‘welfare state’ had been the subject of that year’s essay for the final exam of the high schools. See: Hans Hertel, ‘Oprør mod tomhed’, Politiken, 22 June 1957. According to media reports, the final exam students had been very critical of the welfare state (see for example Lolland Falsters Folketidende, 25 June 1957); Sorø Amtstidende, 25 June 1957. Villy Sørensen’s comment (from Politiken, 22 June 1957) was reprinted as ‘Velfærdsstat og personlighed’, in Villy Sørensen, Digtere og dæmoner (Poets and Demons) (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1962), 219–28. 67. See the interview of Julius Bomholt in Rostbøll, Menneskeværd, 4–8. Oluf Lauth, ‘Om velfærdsstaten’, Vort Røde Kors 8 (1960), 32–37 had read the works of economists and sociologists to find out what a welfare state was, but finally he found what he was looking for by a poet: Villy Sørensen. 68. For such arguments see Ellermann, ‘Gør velfærdsstaten os triste?’; Erik Pouplier, ‘Mennesket i Velfærdsstaten’, Politiken, 28 March 1964; Ole Hyltoft Petersen, ‘Den gamle drøm om lykke: Velfærdsstaten og de menneskelige behov’, Politiken, 12 March 1964; Jørgen Christensen, ‘Myten om det lykkelige velfærdssamfund’, Berlingske Tidende, 18 July 1977. 69. Sørensen, ‘Velfærdsstat og personlighed’, 222. 70. See Petersen, Petersen and Christiansen, Dansk Velfærdshistorie, vol. 4, Velfærdsstatens storhedstid 1956–1973 (2012). 71. Socialdemokratiet, Protokol for den Socialdemokratiske partikongres 1957 (Copenhagen: Perfecta Tryk, 1957), 9. 72. Socialdemokratiet, Protokol 1957, 50. The political statement from the congress stated, that ‘By a positive policy of production guaranteeing working opportunities for all, the welfare state shall be developed and further social and cultural progress ensured’. See Socialdemokratiet, Frihed og Velfærd (Copenhagen: Socialdemokratiet, 1957). 73. Jens Otto Krag, ‘Velfærdsstaten’, Politiken, 9 August 1956. See also Jørn Henrik Petersen, Klaus Petersen and Jørgen Søndergaard, ‘Velfærdsstaten –

168

74.

75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83.

84.

85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

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utopi eller dystopi?’, in Peter Andersen et al. (eds), Hvordan ser verden ud? 73 bidrag om økonomi, institutioner og værdier: Professor Niels Kærgaard 70 år (Copenhagen: DJØF Forlag, 2012), 348–55. Petersen, Petersen and Søndergaard, ‘Velfærdsstaten’, 352; Asher Achinstein, The Welfare State (Washington DC: Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, 1950). Jens Otto Krag, ‘Velfærdsstaten’, Social-Demokraten, 23 October 1956. ‘Tryghed i velfærdsstaten’, Sønderjyden, 16 March 1956. ‘Velfærdsstat kontra formynderstat’, Ny Tid, 28 July 1956. ‘Velfærd eller fattigdom’, Sydfyn, 3 August 1956. Prime Minister Hans Christian Hansen, ‘Ja eller nej til Velfærdsstaten’ [public speech given in Copenhagen 5 December 1956], vol. 226, Henning Friis samling, Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen. Julius Bomholt, ‘Moderne socialpolitik’, in Nielsen and Petersen, Hug og Parade, 108. Viggo Kampmann, ‘På vej mod velfærdsstaten’, in Nielsen and Petersen, Hug og Parade, 16. Socialdemokratiet, Vejen frem: Socialdemokratiets principprogram, vedtaget på den 28. kongres (Copenhagen: Socialdemokratiet, 1961). Lene Vedel-Petersen, ‘Ansvaret for medmenneskets frihed’, in Knud B. Andersen, Niels Matthiasen and Ole Vernerlund (eds), Idé og hverdag (Copenhagen: AOF, 1961), 77. See also Bent Pihl (ed.), Mennesket i nutidens samfund (Copenhagen: AOF, 1960), 8–9, who identified the Social Democratic idea with the welfare state in which it was ‘the obligation of the state to provide for the greatest happiness for all citizens’. Urban Lundberg and Klaus Petersen, ‘Social Democracy and the Welfare State in Denmark and Sweden since the 1960s’, Arbejdspapirer fra Institut for historie (Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, 1999), 4. See for example Anker Jørgensen, ‘Efter velfærdsstaten – et socialdemokratisk program’, Ny politik 5(11) (1974), 9–11. Sven Thorsen, ‘Det socialliberale samfund’, Politiken, 7 September 1955. Folketingstidende 1955–56, 5434. Folketingstidende 1955–56, 5434–35. ‘Velfærdsstat – endnu engang’, Kristeligt Dagblad, 5 October 1956. Helge Larsen, ‘Vore dages reaktionære’, Politiken, 12 September 1956. For positive Social Liberal expressions on the welfare state see: ‘Vi maa se at komme bort fra Almisse-politiken’, Ekstrabladet, 10 November 1956; ‘Vi tager ansvaret for velfærdsstaten’, Nordsjællands Venstreblad, 14 February 1957; ‘Velfærdsstat – ja, formynderstat – nej’, Skive Folkeblad, 6 December 1956. However, it should be noted that we also find more critical voices (see: ‘Det sundeste og solideste grundlag’, Fyns Tidende, 12 August 1956; ‘Reaktionen viser sig’, Ny Dag, 14 February 1956; ‘En misforstaaelse om Kritik’, Middelfart Venstreblad, 17 September 1956; ‘Et radikalt angreb på velfærdsstaten’, Dagens Nyheder, 30 April 1959; ‘Selvmodsigende’, Berlingske Tidende, 2 May 1959).

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92. Johannes Christiansen, ‘Velfærdsstat og sindelag’, Dagens Nyheder, 6 August 1956. 93. Interestingly, the manifesto did not explicitly use the term ‘welfare state’. 94. Lars Hansen, ‘De liberale partier bør finde sammen om det væsentlige’, Liberal Debat 3(11) (1963), 3. Interestingly, the counter-concept ‘guardian state’ seemed to be more sticky. See Michael Kuur Sørensen, ‘Velfærdsstatens kritikere’. 95. For a detailed analysis of this see Madsen, For velfærdens skyld, especially chapters 11 and 15. 96. Quoted from Sune Kaur-Pedersen, ‘Spiren til dansk udviklingspolitik 1945– 1962’, in Carsten Due-Nielsen et al. (eds), Idealer og realiteter: Dansk udviklingspolitiks historie 1945–2003 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2008), 75. 97. See Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and its International Implications (New Haven: Yale University Press 1960); Torolf Elster, ‘Internationalismens chance’, Demokraten 19–20 February 1961; Johannes Bøggild, ‘Og efter velfærdsstaten’, Berlingske Tidende, 18 July 1961. 98. Hans Jørgen Lembourn, ‘Oprør mod velfærdsstaten’, Berlingske Tidende, 17 November 1958; Madsen, For velfærdens skyld, 155–61. 99. Melvin Tumin, ‘Velferdsstat og moral: En granskning af “Eisenhowerhypotesen”’, Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning 2(1), March 1961, 1–16; Roland Huntford, Fagre nye Sverige: Demokrati eller diktatur (Copenhagen: Erichsen, 1972). 100. See Madsen, For velfærdens skyld, 219–21, 284. 101. ‘Ugens Gallup, Artikel no. 24’, Berlingske Tidende, 29 July 1974. 102. See Else Marie Kjerkegaard, ‘Velfærdsstat ud til højre’, Politiken, 27 August 1974. See also Henning Tjørnehøj, ‘Hvor blev velfærdsstaten af?’, Jyllands-Posten, 26 August 1974. 103. Klaus Petersen, Legitimität und Krise: Die politische Geschichte des dänischen Wohlfahrtsstaates 1945–1973 (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1998). 104. Paul Pierson, ‘Introduction: Investigating the Welfare State at Century’s End’, in Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1–2. 105. Michael Kuur Sørensen, ‘Den innovative ideolog i politisk historie: Mogens Glistrup som case’, TEMP. Tidsskrift for historie 8 (2014), 115–29. 106. Poul Schlüter, Den lange vej – fra nederlag til fremgang: Taler og artikler 1973–80 (Copenhagen: Peter la Cours Forlag, 1980), 19. 107. A number of trend-setting bourgeois politicians took part in this implicitly welfare-critical chorus. Among them were Bertel Haarder, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Ove Guldberg and Peter Brixtofte, all representing the Liberals. Haarder wrote about the guardian state, the state of apparatchiks marked by servitude, bureaucracy and waste or resources as in the Eastern European countries, see Bertel Haarder, ‘Den liberale grundholdning er imod formynderstatens magt’, Sjællands Tidende, 29 December 1979. In 1973, Haarder published Statskollektivisme og spildproduktion (Copenhagen: Bramsen & Hjort), followed in 1974 by Institutionernes tyranni (Copenha-

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108.

109. 110. 111. 112.

113. 114.

115. 116.

117.

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gen: Bramsen & Hjort) and Den organiserede arbejdsløshed (Copenhagen: Bramsen & Hjort, 1975). Publications of Anders Fogh Rasmussen followed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and Peter Brixtofte published Krisen i det danske samfund (Holte: Forlaget Liberal, 1977). Ove Guldberg in 1979 wrote Det uregerlige Danmark (Copenhagen: Gyldendal). Niels Finn Christiansen, ‘Velfærdskritik fra venstre’, unpublished paper for the seminar ‘Criticism of the welfare state – past and presence’, 3–4 December 2012, University of Southern Denmark, Odense. Israel Grünbaum, ‘Særinteresser og samfundspolitik’, Politisk Revy 3(54) (1965), 8–10. Søren Hansen, ‘Det nye program viser vejen frem til et velfærdssamfund’, Aktuelt, 17 September 1970. Jørgen S. Dich, Den herskende klasse: En kritisk analyse af social udbytning og midlerne imod den (Copenhagen: Borgen, 1973). Anker Jørgensen, ‘Efter velfærdsstaten – et socialdemokratisk program’, 9–11. Note that Jørgensen uses ‘welfare state’ as a headline but writes about ‘welfare society’ in the article. Madsen, For velfærdens skyld, 95. This is clearly illustrated by Villy Karlsson, ‘Myten om velfærdssamfundets mirakel er død’, Frit Danmark 33(7) (1974), 4–5, using both terms in the same sentence: ‘Who invented the concept “welfare state”? A welfare society making everyone secure from the cradle to the grave?’. See also Jens Otto Krag, ‘Velfærdsstaten’, Politiken, 9 August 1959; Vagn Christensen, ‘Velfærdssamfundets behov for privat initiativ på sociale og sundhedsmæssige områder’, Vort Røde Kors 10 (1962), 184–88; Knud Damsgaard Hansen, ‘Lever lønmodtagerne i et velfærdssamfund?’, Løn og Virke 60 (1964), 31–37; Helge Kjems, ‘Den mentalhygiejniske service i velfærdssamfundet’, Mentalhygiejne 19 (1966), 123–30. Only Jørgen S. Dich, ‘Bidrag til belysning af den moderne velfærdsstats økonomiske problemer’, Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift 96 (1958), 17–50, differentiated conceptually between a ‘welfare state’ and a ‘welfare society’ – the former using positive interventions to promote people’s welfare, whereas the latter represented the general liberal idea of the neutral state promoting welfare by leaving the economy to the market – ‘a neutral welfare state’ stood for ‘the welfare society’. Simonsen is quoted from Jens Wagner (ed.), Den danske model – en bog med Palle Simonsen (Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1986), 47. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Fra socialstat til minimalstat (Copenhagen: Samleren, 1993). For an in-depth analysis of Fogh Rasmussen’s welfare semantics see Anne Stokkendal, ‘Imod velfærdsstaten – for velfærdssamfundet: Udviklingen i Anders Fogh Rasmussens velfærdspolitiske retorik 1992– 2005’ (unpublished MA thesis, Department of History, University of Southern Denmark, 2007). See Christopher Green-Pedersen, ‘Dør lægen nødvendigvis, og lykkedes operationen nu også så godt? Socialdemokratiet og velfærdsstaten på den politiske dagsorden i Danmark’, Arbejderhistorie 4 (2005), 27–39.

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118. Folketingstidende: Folketingets Forhandlinger 1993–94, (vol. 145: ser. 1) (Copenhagen: J.H. Schultz, 1995), 185. 119. Venstre, Fra velfærdsstat til velfærdssamfund (Copenhagen: Venstre, 1985). 120. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Nytårstale 2002 (New Year’s speech by the Prime Minister, 2002). Retrieved 16 April 2017 from www.stm.dk/_p_7354.html. 121. See Urban Lundberg and Klaus Petersen, ‘Socialdemokratiet, borgerlige partier og velfærdsstaten: Et essay om moderne velfærdspolitik’, Arbejderhistorie 5 (2005), 6–26. 122. Klaus Petersen, ‘Programmeret til velfærd? Om ideologi og velfærdspolitik i Socialdemokratiske partiprogrammer efter 1945’, Arbejderhistorie 2 (2001), 23–51. In most cases one finds the phrase ‘from welfare state towards welfare society’ – a phrase obviously taken over from the Liberals – described as a strategy for renewal or defence of the welfare state. 123. See Lundberg and Petersen, ‘Social Democracy and the Welfare State’. 124. An important element in this change was the rhetoric of ‘rights and duties’. See Jørn Henrik Petersen, Pligt & Ret, Ret & Pligt: Refleksioner over den socialdemokratiske idéarv (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2014); Jørn Henrik Petersen, ‘From Unilateral Towards Reciprocal Social Policies: The Changing Normative Basis of the Danish Welfare State’, in Rune Ervik, Nanna Kildal and Even Nilssen (eds), New Contractualism in European Welfare State Policies (Burlington: Ashgate, 2015), 139–65, for an in-depth analysis. 125. Petersen, Pligt & Ret, 45–74. 126. Karen Hækkerup, ‘Prioritering skal sikre velfærden’, Jyllands-Posten, 15 March 2012. 127. ‘Rødt angreb på velfærdsstaten’, Jyllands-Posten, 26 March 2012. 128. Bjarne Corydon, ‘Jeg tror på konkurrencestaten’, Politiken, 24 August 2013. 129. Gravtale fra velfærdens bisættelse [Funeral Address for the Welfare State], retrieved 12 January 2016 from http://kasperfuhr.dk/2014/02/gravtale-fravelfaerdens-bisaettelse/.

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Archival Collections Rigsarkivet (The National Archives, Copenhagen) Henning Friis samling (privatarkiv 8042) Vol. 226: 54 Diverse: arkiv, personlige forhold, korrespondance m.m.

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Bøggild, Johannes, ‘Og efter velfærdsstaten’, Berlingske Tidende, 18 July 1961. Bomholt, Julius, ‘Moderne socialpolitik’, in Frederik Nielsen and Ole Hyltoft Petersen (eds), Hug og Parade (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1960), 104–15. Brixtofte, Peter, Krisen i det danske samfund (Holte: Forlaget Liberal, 1977). ‘Centralsjæleanvisning’, Information, 17 March 1956. Christiansen, Johannes, ‘Velfærdsstat og sindelag’, Dagens Nyheder, 6 August 1956. Christensen, Jørgen, ‘Myten om det lykkelige velfærdssamfund’, Berlingske Tidende, 18 July 1977. Christensen, Vagn, ‘Velfærdssamfundets behov for privat initiativ på sociale og sundhedsmæssige områder’, Vort Røde Kors 10 (1962), 184–88. Clausager, Anders, ‘Velfærdsstaten analyseret’, Jyllands-Posten, 25 October 1960. Corydon, Bjarne, ‘Jeg tror på konkurrencestaten’, Politiken, 24 August 2013. ‘Daarligt Humør i Velfærdsstaten’, Frederiksborg Amts Avis, 11 August 1956. ‘Det sundeste og solideste grundlag’, Fyns Tidende, 12 August 1956. Dich, Jørgen S., ‘Bidrag til belysning af den moderne velfærdsstats økonomiske problemer’, Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift 96 (1958), 17–50. Dich, Jørgen S., Den herskende klasse: En kritisk analyse af social udbytning og midlerne imod den (Copenhagen: Borgens Forlag, 1973). Ellermann, Mogens, ‘Gør velfærdsstaten os triste?’, Politiken, 24 October 1962. Elster, Torolf, ‘Internationalismens chance’, Demokraten, 19–20 February 1961. ‘En farlig mentalitetsændring i velfærdsstatens kølvand’, Randers Dagblad, 27 September 1956. ‘En misforstaaelse om Kritik’, Middelfart Venstreblad, 17 September 1956. ‘En præst angriber velfærdsstaten’, Sønderjyden, 2 February 1956 ‘En stil’, Sorø Amtstidende, 25 June 1957. ‘Er det ikke snarere skatterne end velfærden, man er trætte af?’, Holbæk Amtstidende, 18 September 1956. ‘Et radikalt angreb på velfærdsstaten’, Dagens Nyheder, 30 April 1959. Folketingstidende: Folketingets Forhandlinger 1953–54, 1955–56, 1993–94, vols 105, 107, 143:ser. 1 (Copenhagen: J.H. Schultz, 1954, 1956, 1995). ‘Formynderstatens vrangsider’, Århus Stiftstidende, 25 August 1957. Friis, Henning, ‘Har Danmark mistet sin Stilling som socialt Foregangsland’, Social-Demokraten, 20 March 1947. Friis, Henning, ‘Kritikken af Velfærdsstaten’, Dagens Nyheder, 12 February 1956. Gravtale fra velfærdens bisættelse [Funeral Address for the Welfare State]. Retrieved 12 January 2016 from http://kasperfuhr.dk/2014/02/gravtale-fra-vel faerdens-bisaettelse/. Grünbaum, Israel, ‘Særinteresser og samfundspolitik’, Politisk Revy 3(54) (1965), 8–10. Guldberg, Ove, Det uregerlige Danmark (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1979). Haarder, Bertel, Statskollektivisme og spildproduktion (Copenhagen: Bramsen & Hjort, 1973). Haarder, Bertel, Institutionernes tyranni (Copenhagen: Bramsen & Hjort, 1974).

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Haarder, Bertel, Den organiserede arbejdsløshed (Copenhagen: Bramsen & Hjort, 1975). Haarder, Bertel, ‘Den liberale grundholdning er imod formynderstatens magt’, Sjællands Tidende, 29 December 1979. Hansen, Knud Damsgaard, ‘Lever lønmodtagerne i et velfærdssamfund?’, Løn og Virke 60 (1964), 31–37. Hækkerup, Karen, ‘Prioritering skal sikre velfærden’, Jyllands-Posten, 15 March 2012. Hansen, Lars, ‘De liberale partier bør finde sammen om det væsentlige’, Liberal Debat 3(11) (1963), 2–5. Hansen, Søren, ‘Det nye program viser vejen frem til et velfærdssamfund’, Aktuelt, 17 September 1970. Hertel, Hans, ‘Oprør mod tomhed’, Politiken, 22 June 1957. Horstmann, Johannes, ‘Velfærdskristendom’, Tidehverv 35(8–9) (1961), 61–75. Huntford, Roland, Fagre nye Sverige: Demokrati eller diktatur (Copenhagen: Erichsen, 1972). Jensen, Hans, ‘Nordisk Statstyre’, Berlingske Aftenavis, 28 October 1941. Johansson, Magnus, ‘Velfærdsstat – og hvad så’, Verdens Gang 15 (1961), 146–49. Jørgensen, Andreas, ‘Velfærdsstat og socialisme’, Dialog 11(4) (1961), 38–45. Jørgensen, Anker, ‘Efter velfærdsstaten – et socialdemokratisk program’, Ny Politik 5(11) (1974), 9–11. Kampmann, Viggo, ‘På vej mod velfærdsstaten’, in Frederik Nielsen and Ole Hyltoft Petersen (eds), Hug og Parade: Tolv indlæg om velfærdsstaten og kulturen (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1960), 16–24. Karlsson, Villy, ‘Myten om velfærdssamfundets mirakel er død’, Frit Danmark 33(7) (1974), 4–5. Kjems, Helge, ‘Den mentalhygiejniske service i velfærdssamfundet’, Mentalhygiejne 19 (1966), 123–30. Kjerkegaard, Else Marie, ‘Velfærdsstat ud til højre’, Politiken, 27 August 1974. Knudsen, Erik, ‘Demokrati og velfærdsstat’, Information, 26 May 1956. Knudsen, Erik, ‘Demokrati og socialisme’, Information, 28 May 1956. Kolderup-Rosenvinge, Janus L.A., Den danske politiret: Til brug ved forelæsninger, 2nd ed. (Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1828). Krag, Jens Otto, ‘Velfærdsstaten’, Social-Demokraten, 23 October 1956. Krag, Jens Otto, ‘Velfærdsstaten’, Politiken, 9 August 1956. Kristensen, Axel, ‘Velfærdsstat – Liberalisme’, in Frederik Nielsen and Ole Hyltoft (eds), Hug og Parade (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1960), 9–15. ‘Lad os bestemme selv’, Jyllands-Posten, 19 April 1955. Larsen, Alvilda, ‘Kvindens og familiens stilling i velfærdsstaten’, Tiden 20 (1959), 291–95. Larsen, Helge, ‘Vore dages reaktionære’, Politiken, 12 September 1956. Lauth, Oluf, ‘Om velfærdsstaten’, Vort Røde Kors 8 (1960), 32–37. Lembourn, Hans Jørgen, ‘Velfærdspolitik og personligt ansvar’, Politiken, 16 August 1956.

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Lembourn, Hans Jørgen, ‘Det konservative livssyn’, Berlingske Tidende, 23 October 1956. Lembourn, Hans Jørgen, ‘Der er moralske værdier i en fri økonomi’, Vor Tid 12(6) (1956), 3. Lembourn, Hans Jørgen, ‘Oprør mod velfærdsstaten’, Berlingske Tidende, 17 November 1958. Lütken, Frederik, Oeconomiske Tanker til høiere Efter-Tanke, 9 parts in 2 vols (Copenhagen: N. Møller, 1755–61). Lysholt Hansen, Ralph, ‘Velfærdsstaten er det bedste udtryk for næstekærlighed og menneskelighed’, Ny Dag, 12 November 1956. Meyer, Poul, ‘Moderne Socialisme I’, Information, 21 July 1952. Meyer, Poul, ‘Moderne Socialisme II’, Information, 23 July 1952. Mogensen, Kristian, ‘Opsparing i en velfærdsstat’, Vor Tid 12(6) (1956), 5. Møller, Poul, ‘Fornyelsen’, Dagens Nyheder, 1 December 1955. Møller, Poul, ‘Svaret til velfærdsstaten’, in Til alle mænds tarv. Udg. af Det konservative Folkeparti ved partiets 40 års jubilæum (Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1956), 83–103. Møller, Poul, Gennembrudsår: Dansk politik i 1950’erne (Copenhagen: Vendelkær, 1977). Myrdal, Gunnar, Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and its International Implications (New Haven: Yale University Press 1960). Myrdal, Gunnar, ‘Velfærdsstat – velfærdsverden’, Kontakt 14(4) (1961), 11–20. ‘Nej tak til velfærdsstaten’, Korsør Avis, 17 September 1956. Nelson, Georg, ‘Byggeriet’, Social-Demokraten, 29 January 1943. Nielsen, Axel, Die Entstehung der deutschen Kameralwissenschaft im 17. Jahrhundert (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1911). Nybølle, Hans C., ‘Omkring pristallet’, Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift 49(3) (1941), 305–55. Paldam, Jørgen, Planlægning for Velfærd (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1952). Paldam, Jørgen, ‘Den demokratiske socialisme’, in Jens Otto Krag (ed.), Tidehverv og samfundsorden (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1954), 57–79. Pedersen, Jørgen, ‘Hvad er en velfærdsstat?’, Gads Danske Magasin 5 (1957), 103–12. Petersen, Eggert, ‘Velfærdsstatens videreudvikling – mentalhygiejnisk set’, Mentalhygiejne 16 (1963), 156–73. Petersen, Ole Hyltoft, ‘Kultur og velfærd’, Verdens Gang, 13 (1959), 106–9. Petersen, Ole Hyltoft, ‘Den gamle drøm om lykke: Velfærdsstaten og de menneskelige behov’, Politiken, 12 March 1964. Pihl, Bent (ed.), Mennesket i nutidens samfund (Copenhagen: AOF, 1960). Pouplier, Erik, ‘Mennesket i Velfærdsstaten’, Politiken, 28 March 1964. Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, Opgør med skattesystemet (Holte: Forlaget Liberal, 1979). Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, Fra socialstat til minimalstat (Copenhagen: Samleren, 1993).

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Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, Nytårstale 2002 (New Year’s speech by the Prime Minister, 2002). Retrieved 16 April 2017 from www.stm.dk/_p_7354.html. ‘Reaktionen viser sig’, Ny Dag, 14 September 1956. ‘Rødt angreb på velfærdsstaten’, Jyllands-Posten, 26 March 2012. Rohde, Peter P., ‘Velfærdsstat og åndsliv’, Perspektiv 8 (1960), 5–12. Erik Rostbøll (ed.), Menneskeværd – velfærdsstat: Samtaler med Thorkild Kristensen, Julius Bomholt m. fl. (Copenhagen: Kristeligt Dagblads Forlag, 1955). Schlüter, Poul, Den lange vej – fra nederlag til fremgang: Taler og artikler 1973–80 (Copenhagen: Peter la Cours Forlag, 1980). ‘Selvmodsigende’, Berlingske Tidende, 2 May 1959. Socialdemokratiet, Protokol for Socialdemokratiets kongres 1953 (Aarhus: Socialdemokratiet, 1953). Socialdemokratiet, Vejen til fremskridt: En henvendelse til det danske folk (Copenhagen: Socialdemokratiet, 1953). Socialdemokratiet, Frihed og Velfærd (Copenhagen: Socialdemokratiet, 1957). Socialdemokratiet, Protokol for den socialdemokratiske partikongres 1957 (Copenhagen: Perfecta Tryk, 1957). Socialdemokratiet, Vejen frem: Socialdemokratiets principprogram, vedtaget på den 28. kongres (Copenhagen: Socialdemokratiet, 1961). Socialdemokratiet, På menneskets vilkår: Socialdemokraternes arbejdsprogram 1988–92: Vedtaget på partikongressen September 1988 (Copenhagen: Socialdemokratiet, 1988). Sørensen, Villy, Formynderfortællinger (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1956). Sørensen, Villy, ‘Historien om vattet og pinden’, Dialog 11(4) (1961), 29–37. Sørensen, Villy, ‘Velfærdsstat og personlighed’, in Villy Sørensen, Digtere og dæmoner (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1962), 219–28. ‘Stadig kamp for at bevare den enkeltes indflydelse’, Vejle Amts Folkeblad, 6 March 1956. ‘Staten og dens børn’, Information, 23 February 1957. ‘Storbritannien’, Socialdemokratiske Noter 23–24(1) (1951–52), 67. Thorsen, Svend, ‘Det socialliberale samfund’, Politiken, 7 September 1955. ‘Tiden er ikke inde til at kalde paa Krævementaliteten’, Horsens Folkeblad, 20 June 1956. Tjørnehøj, Henning, ‘Hvor blev velfærdsstaten af?’, Jyllands-Posten, 26 August 1974. ‘Troen paa mennesket mod troen paa staten’, Sorø Amtstidende, 18 September 1956. ‘Tryghed i velfærdsstaten’, Sønderjyden Aabenraa, 16 March 1956. Tumin, Melvin, ‘Velferdsstat og moral: En granskning af “Eisenhower-hypotesen”’, Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning 2(1) (1961), 1–16. ‘Ugens Gallup, Artikel no. 24’, Berlingske Tidende, 29 July 1974. Vedel-Petersen, Knud, ‘Jeg ville egentlig hellere have en cykel’, Politiken, 17 October 1951.

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Vedel-Petersen, Knud, ‘Der skal også produceres i velfærdsstaten’, Politiken, 22 August 1957. Vedel-Petersen, Lena, ‘Ansvaret for medmenneskets frihed’, in Knud B. Andersen, Niels Matthiasen and Ole Vernerlund (eds), Idé og hverdag (Copenhagen: AOF, 1961), 76–81. ‘Velfærd eller fattigdom’, Sydfyn, 3 August 1956. ‘Velfærdet igen’, Information, 27 June 1956. ‘Velfærdskasse eller fattigkasse’, Holbæk Amts Avis, 16 August 1956. ‘Velfærdsstat – endnu engang’, Kristeligt Dagblad, 5 October 1956. ‘Velfærdsstat – formynderstat’, Holbæk Amtstidende, 7 December 1956. ‘Velfærdsstat – ja, formynderstat – nej’, Skive Folkeblad, 6 December 1956. ‘Velfærdsstat kontra formynderstat’, Ny Tid, 28 July 1956. ‘Velfærdsstat og Retsstat’, Bornholms Social Demokrat, 23 October 1925. ‘Velfærdsstaten: ja eller nej!’, Nyborg Avis, 16 December 1956. ‘Velfærdsstatens Ambulanceudgifter’, Vejen Frem 13(31) (1947), 3–4. ‘Velfærdsstatens fjender’, Ny Dag, 3 January 1956. ‘Velfærdsstatsprincippet har udtømt Mulighederne’, Skatteborgeren 35(4) (1956), 1–2. ‘Velfærdssystemet udvikler en uheldig mentalitet’, Aalborg Amtstidende, 16 October 1956. Venstre, Fra velfærdsstat til velfærdssamfund (Copenhagen: Venstre, 1985). Venstre and Det konservative Folkeparti, Nye Signaler i den økonomiske politik: Fællesudtalelsen af 4. oktober 1959 og den finans- og pengepolitiska baggrund [joint party manifesto] (Copenhagen 1959). Retrieved 5 May 2017 from http:// www.kb.dk/pamphlets/dasmaa/2008/feb/partiprogrammer/object21657/da/. ‘Vi maa se at komme bort fra Almisse-politiken’, Ekstrabladet, 10 November 1956. ‘Vi tager ansvaret for velfærdsstaten’, Nordsjællands Venstreblad, 14 February 1957. Wagner, John (ed.), Den danske model – en bog med Palle Simonsen (Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1986).

Secondary Sources Christiansen, Niels Finn, ‘Velfærdskritik fra venstre’, unpublished paper for the seminar ‘Criticism of the welfare state – past and present’, 3–4 December 2012, University of Southern Denmark, Odense. Christiansen, Niels Finn, Hans Christian Johansen and Jørn Henrik Petersen, ‘Periodens idestrømninger’, in Jørn Henrik Petersen, Klaus Petersen and Niels Finn Christiansen (eds), Dansk Velfærdshistorie, vol. 1, Frem mod socialhjælpsstaten. Perioden 1536–1898 (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2010), 37–107. Green-Pedersen, Christopher, ‘Dør lægen nødvendigvis, og lykkedes operationen nu også så godt? Socialdemokratiet og velfærdsstaten på den politiske dagsorden i Danmark’, Arbejderhistorie 4 (2005), 27–39.

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Hirschman, Albert O., The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1991). Kaur-Pedersen, Sune, ‘Spiren til dansk udviklingspolitik 1945–1962’, in Carsten Due-Nielsen et al. (eds), Idealer og realiteter: Dansk udviklingspolitiks historie 1945–2003 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2008), 24–115. Klein, Jennifer, Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen, ‘Social Policy Language in the United States’, in Danel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 277–95. Lundberg, Urban, and Klaus Petersen, ‘Social Democracy and the Welfare State in Denmark and Sweden since the 1960s’, Arbejdspapirer fra Institut for historie (Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, 1999). Lundberg, Urban, and Klaus Petersen, ‘Socialdemokratiet, borgerlige partier og velfærdsstaten: Et essay om moderne velfærdspolitik’, Arbejderhistorie 5 (2005), 6–26. Lundberg, Urban, and Klaus Petersen, ‘Socialdemokratiet og velfærdsstaten i et nyt politisk landskab: Et essay om moderne velfærdspolitik’, Arbejderhistorie 4 (2005), 6–26. Madsen, Henrik, ‘For velfærdens skyld: En analyse af de danske debater om velfærdsstat og medlemskab af EF 1950–1972’ (PhD thesis, Department of History, University of Southern Denmark 2006). Marshall, Thomas H., ‘Class, Citizenship and Social Development’, in Thomas H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (London: Pluto Press, 1992), 3–51. Petersen, Jørn Henrik, ‘Marketization and Free Choice in Provision of Social Services, Normative Shifts 1982–2008: Social Democratic Lip-service as Response to Problems of Legitimacy’, in Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen (eds), Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 170–98. Petersen, Jørn Henrik, Pligt & Ret, Ret & Pligt: Refleksioner over den socialdemokratiske idéarv (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2014). Petersen, Jørn Henrik, ‘From Unilateral Towards Reciprocal Social Policies: The Changing Normative Basis of the Danish Welfare State’, in Rune Ervik, Nanna Kildal and Even Nilssen (eds), New Contractualism in European Welfare State Policies (Burlington: Ashgate, 2015), 139–65. Petersen, Klaus, Jørn Henrik Petersen and Niels Finn Christiansen, ‘Det socialpolitiske landskab’, in Jørn Henrik Petersen, Klaus Petersen and Niels Finn Christiansen (eds), Dansk Velfærdshistorie, vol. 2, Mellem skøn og ret. Perioden 1898–1933 (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2011), 83–149. Petersen, Jørn Henrik, Klaus Petersen and Niels Finn Christiansen (eds), Dansk Velfærdshistorie, vol. 4, Velfærdsstatens storhedstid 1956–1973 (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2012). Petersen, Jørn Henrik, Klaus Petersen and Niels Finn Christiansen, ‘Det socialpolitiske idelandskab’, in Jørn Henrik Petersen, Klaus Petersen and Niels Finn Christiansen (eds), Dansk Velfærdshistorie, vol. 3, Velfærdsstaten i støbeskeen 1933–1956 (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2012), 133–51.

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Petersen, Jørn Henrik, Klaus Petersen and Jørgen Søndergaard, ‘Velfærdsstaten – utopi eller dystopi?’, in Peter Andersen et al. (eds), Hvordan ser verden ud? 73 bidrag om økonomi, institutioner og værdier: Professor Niels Kærgaard 70 år (Copenhagen: DJØF Forlag, 2012), 348–55. Petersen, Jørn Henrik, Klaus Petersen and Niels Finn Christiansen (eds), Dansk Velfærdshistorie, vol. 5, Velfærdsstatens storhedstid 1956–1973 (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2013). Petersen, Klaus, Legitimität und Krise: Die politische Geschichte des dänischen Wohlfahrtsstaates 1945–1973 (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1998). Petersen, Klaus, ‘Programmeret til velfærd? Om ideologi og velfærdspolitik i Socialdemokratiske partiprogrammer efter 1945’, Arbejderhistorie 2 (2001), 23–51. Petersen, Klaus, ‘Velfærdsstaten i dansk politisk retorik’, Tidsskrift for Velferdsforskning 5(1) (2001), 16–28. Petersen, Klaus, and Jørn Henrik Petersen, ‘The Good, the Bad, or the Godless Society: Danish “Church People” and the Modern Welfare State’, Church History 82(4) (2013), 904–40. Pierson, Paul, ‘Introduction: Investigating the Welfare State at Century’s End’, in Paul Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1–15. Sørensen, Michael Kuur, ‘Den innovative ideolog i politisk historie: Mogens Glistrup som case’, TEMP. Tidsskrift for historie 8 (2014), 115–29. Sørensen, Michael Kuur, ‘Velfærdsstatens kritikere – En kortlægning af Venstre – og højrefløjens kritik af velfærdsstaten i 1960’erne og 1970’erne’ (unpublished manuscript: University of Southern Denmark, 2014). Stokkendal, Anne, ‘Imod velfærdsstaten – for velfærdssamfundet: Udviklingen i Anders Fogh Rasmussens velfærdspolitiske retorik 1992–2005’ (unpublished MA thesis, Department of History, University of Southern Denmark, 2007).

c ha p te r 4

The Winding Road of the Norwegian ‘Welfare State’ Per Haave

nce a utopian concept describing future society, ‘the welfare state’, velferdsstaten in Norwegian, is nowadays widely used by politicians and academics to portray contemporary Norway.1 It is also a highly valued keyword in political debates on the origin and development of modern Norway, yet academics have found it hard to define exactly.2 However, by using this elusive term as an analytical concept, social scientists and historians have singled out three defining stages in the development of the Norwegian welfare state from its first stumbling efforts in the late nineteenth century to its full realization in the post-World War II era.3 In this, the conceptual history matters but little. Furthermore, there exists a myth that ‘the welfare state’ was brought to Norway as a British loanword by a liberal politician in 1945, the day after the liberation from five years of German occupation.4 This is the Norwegian counterpart of the myth that Archbishop William Temple had first used the English phrase in 1941.5 It has also been maintained that ‘the welfare state’ was a key concept in social democratic discourse, a factor in shaping and changing postwar society.6 Although Arbeiderpartiet, the Norwegian labour party, was in government from 1945 to 1965, except for some weeks in 1963, and played an important role in shaping postwar society, it is still an open question if they at that time called their vision of the good society ‘the welfare state’.7 The present study is based on a large corpus of published texts – mainly newspapers, books, party programmes and parliamentary proceedings – that for the most part is digitized. It tells a story of contestation and decontestation until ‘the welfare state’ eventually achieved the status of a national identity marker towards the end of the twentieth century. Critical

O

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questions concern when, how, by whom and with what meanings and purposes the phrase was used.

Defining Stages in the Emergence of the Welfare State ‘The welfare state’ was brought to Norway as a German loanword by Ebbe Hertzberg, professor in statistics and economics, in 1884. He used it in a talk on German ‘State Socialism’ at the first meeting of the Statsøkonomisk forening (Association of Political Economy). He did not apply it to contemporary Norway or a future utopia. Instead, and like several other German academics, Hertzberg associated the welfare state with the Age of Absolutism: ‘The Prince was [then] the father of the nation, the responsible national patriarch of the nation’s household and the State was rightly called a welfare state, because the State in principle was responsible for everyone’s private welfare’.8 Hertzberg, who feared a rebirth of absolutism, advocated the idea of a minimum state; general welfare was best promoted when state intervention was kept at the lowest possible level. On this basis, he rejected the welfare state idea promoted by the German economist Adolph Wagner, who influenced the social policy thinking of Bismarck. Prior to his lecture in 1884, Hertzberg had labelled Bismarck’s efforts to improve workers’ conditions through legislation as a false and dangerous doctrine.9 Hertzberg, member of the old regime’s (1814–84) political elite, used velferdsstaten just prior to the first of the three defining stages in the emergence of the Norwegian welfare state, singled out in modern research. The first ‘liberal’ stage, ca 1885–1920, was succeeded by a short second stage, covering the years of Labour’s minority government (1935 to the German occupation in 1940). The third stage started in exile, with the Norwegian Trade Union Federation making plans for the postwar society, and was completed a few weeks after the liberation in 1945 with the programme Arbeid for alle (Work for all), which gained support from all political parties. So, did ‘the welfare state’ have any significance during these defining stages?

The Liberal Order (1884–1935) ‘The welfare state’ was used occasionally in this period, but it never guided social reforms. Prominent conservative economist T.H. Aschehoug, professor in statistics and economics and long-standing leader of Statsøkonomisk forening, paraphrased the liberal German narrative of the shift from the old welfare state (i.e. the absolutist state) to a modern legal

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state (rettsstat).10 To his colleague Oskar Jæger, an acclaimed expert on old age pensions, it connoted a socialist state in which means of production and distribution of wealth were heavily regulated. As a social-liberal politician, Jæger used the term critically.11 Unlike German economists, such as Adolph Wagner, Norwegian economists did not use ‘cultural state’ synonymously with ‘welfare state’. To them, the cultural state connoted a third way between a liberal legal state and a socialist welfare state.12 The phrase folkehjem (‘people’s home’), usually associated with the Swedish welfare state, was another name of the good society during the liberal order.13 Dating from the 1860s, in the beginning of the new century it was used by the Labour Democrats – Arbeiderdemokratene, a social-radical antisocialist party under the leadership of the influential social politician Johan Castberg – for their vision of a social and economic just society in complete social harmony.14 Our objective is to create ‘a people’s home for all Norwegians’, stated the editor of a regional socialradical newspaper in 1918.15 In the late 1920s the term was picked up by the Norwegian labour movement. The labour press stated that the political aim was to create a ‘folkehjem’, a socially integrated society with a high standard of living. Most certainly influenced by the Swedish social democrat Per Albin Hansson, the Norwegian labour press infused the term ‘folkehjem’ with socialist meanings.16 After being a term used by economists for many decades, ‘the welfare state’ made its public debut in 1932 in the most influential daily newspaper in western Norway. Trygve Mohr, a leading official in the poor relief system, reported from a visit to the Weimar Republic shortly after Franz von Papen’s negative use of the German phrase Wohlfahrtsstaat in 1932. Mohr referred to German arguments for and against social benefits before rejecting the welfare state idea.17 This provoked a Communist reply commenting critically that velferdsstaten was nothing but ‘a political fraud against the working people’.18 Two years later Halvard Lange, the future long-standing Social Democratic Minister of Foreign Affairs (1946–65), used the term in an article on democracy and dictatorship in the important journal Samtiden to name a liberal state that by means of social policy legislation sought to modify the social and economic consequences of the system of market economy. The aim of the labour movement was, according to Lange, to go beyond this and extend the political democracy of the liberal order to ‘social and economic democracy’.19

Social Reformism of the Late 1930s The year 1935 marked the ending of a period of fifteen years with several liberal and conservative minority governments, social and economic

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crises, and no social reform of significance. A political settlement with the Agrarian Party (Bondepartiet, later Senterpartiet) brought Labour to power, and with the liberal Venstre as the main consenter in the Parliament, Stortinget, the new Social Democratic government immediately grabbed the initiative in the field of social reform. Means-tested old age pensions for all citizens older than 70 years (1936) and unemployment insurance for all industrial workers (1938) terminated poor relief as the main public measure to relieve economic distress. In this context, Arbeiderpartiet used – as the first Norwegian political party – velferdsstaten as a vision of the good society. In a radio speech prior to the 1936 general election, party leader Oscar Torp made the building of a welfare state the great political aim of the labour movement: ‘We have faith in our country’s possibilities, we have faith in our own people’s ability, we are going in for a welfare state – for a new and better Norway’.20 Torp was most likely inspired by Gustav Möller in Sweden, whose use of the term this year Norwegian papers also highlighted.21 Despite this, ‘the welfare state’ did not achieve immediate popularity within the labour movement; it seems to have been used only once, and only in passing, by a labour economist at the third Nordic statistics meeting in Oslo in 1939.22 Instead, velferdspolitikk (in the sense of both welfare policy and welfare politics), which was picked up from Swedish fellow party members, became widely used in the labour press and also in Arbeiderpartiet’s 1939 political platform, which signified the final departure from a revolutionary past. A national politics and policy of social and economic welfare was both meant to be a prophylactic against fascism and a means to socialist nation building.23 According to conservatives, this made ‘welfare politics’ little more than a rephrasing of ‘Marxism’.24 The notion of the late 1930s as a defining stage in the history of the welfare state was established already during the German occupation 1940–45, although without using the term. Relying on pre-war Swedish and Norwegian political language, the Social Democrats’ Haakon Lie, the future long-standing and powerful party secretary, said in 1942 that Norway had already in 1940 become a ‘people’s home’, which made social security an ‘opportunity’ for the majority of the people.25 However, it did not take long before velferdsstaten was applied to the pre-war society. Shortly after the liberation of Norway in 1945, an important economist and expert on planning, and later influential senior official in central administration, maintained that Norway by 1940 was ‘one of the foremost welfare states in the world’.26 British Labour’s William Warbey held a similar view and honoured the 1930s ‘Labour government’ for having implemented social reforms that placed Norway in ‘the very front-rank of “Social Welfare States”’.27 Warbey, who belonged to Labour’s left wing, did not list any other national states as welfare states, not even Britain,

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Figure 4.1. In the 1936 election campaign, Arbeiderpartiet used, as the first Norwegian party, the term velferdsstaten. It did not appear on any poster, but the message was all about welfare: ‘Our solution is work and secure living conditions for all’. The poster shows Johan Nygaardsvold, Prime Minister from 1935 to 1945. Photo: © The Norwegian Labour Party/The Norwegian Labour Movement Archives and Library.

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which is retrospectively held as a leading welfare state by 1945. At that time, hardly anyone portrayed Britain as a welfare state.28

Planning for the Good Postwar Society In the early 1940s, the Norwegian labour movement prepared the postwar recovery in exile. In the most important planning document, Framtidens Norge (The Future of Norway), the Trade Union Federation outlined a social security programme and named it ‘the people’s home’: ‘If we can make Norway a people’s home, where all people live in good and safe settings, then we create a model’.29 Despite the ideological importance of this planning document, the term folkehjem did not gain political salience. The Labour party entered the postwar era with an ambition to reform the capitalist order. The social reforms, elaborated by the Trade Union Federation during World War II, were part of this ambition, and directly after the war all political parties supported these reforms. The Joint Programme ‘Work for all’, Arbeid for alle, laid the framework for a quick reconstruction, economic growth and the levelling of social and geographical inequalities in standard of living.30 Guided by the Beveridgean principles of social security, the main goal was to replace the system of poor relief with a common social insurance system in case of illness, disability, unemployment and old age. In this process, Labour’s Einar Gerhardsen, the new chairman from 1945, did not return to the welfare state language of his predecessor Torp, and in 1945 only a few labour papers set up ‘the welfare state’ as the guiding political vision of Arbeiderpartiet.31 While being neglected by Social Democrats, Paal Berg, who during the occupation was head of the resistance’s Central Committee of the Home Front, used ‘the welfare state’ programmatically in a radio broadcast the day after the liberation in 1945. Berg, a former Liberal Minister of Social Affairs (1919–20) and Minister of Justice (1924–26), and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (1929–41, 1945–46), spoke about reconstructing liberal democracy and building a welfare state: ‘We shall rebuild our old legal state, but our time requires that the state not only has the task of protecting life and property. The state will also be a welfare state that sees its mission to make life worth living for us all.’32 This talk has given Berg a pioneering status in the Norwegian literature that is shared by William Temple in British studies (see above). As shown, Berg did not introduce velferdsstaten in Norway, but prior to the broadcast he elaborated on the concept in two texts written during the German occupation of Norway that were published soon after the liberation.33 In a historical account of the Norwegian Constitution, Berg portrayed the welfare state as a new stage in Western cultural develop-

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ment: ‘It is the unfading honour of liberalism to have created the modern legal state. But the state’s task is not complete with the protection of life, liberty and property. The present answer is that the state should be a welfare state [original italics] with social responsibility towards all its citizens.’34 He anchored the welfare state idea to the political thinking of the German social democrat Ferdinand Lassalle and considered the Weimar Constitution (1919) its first realization.35 Several newspapers printed Berg’s speech, and shortly after, the social-liberal feminist Margarete Bonnevie, leader of Norsk Kvinnesaksforening (Norwegian Association for Women’s Rights), maintained in public that Berg’s idea of the welfare state provided ‘the guidelines for a true and real democracy’.36 She also used the speech to persuade the coalition government under Labour’s leadership to examine the female labour question. Bonnevie’s thoughts on equality between the sexes and women’s economic independency were well known in Norway, and now she linked them to a vision of a social-liberal welfare state.37 Despite all this, ‘the welfare state’ fell short in popularity, and when it debuted in Stortinget in 1946, it was only used in passing by a liberal politician, who emphasized the duty of the society to reintegrate the national traitors from the German occupation years: ‘It is not only their legal right but also a consideration that our modern society by virtue of a welfare state must take.’38

The Social Democratic Order In 1949 the Labour Party confirmed its absolute majority from 1945 and kept it until 1961. When losing power to a coalition of centre-right parties in 1965, the period of parliamentarian stability started to erode, but the social democratic ideological hegemony prevailed. As a labour press editor assumed in 1966, any social reform by the centre-right parties in power (1965–71) would not differ radically from ‘the social democratic welfare state’.39 This statement reflects the key role of social democracy in a Norwegian political culture with a relatively strong consensus between the political parties, which has caused historians to name the period from the early 1950s to the late 1970s as ‘the social democratic order’. It has been defined as a period with a strong commitment to economic growth and full employment, and one with an expanding welfare state providing fuller insurance and new services.40 The Labour Party outlined the ideological foundation of this order in its 1949 platform, which stayed unaltered for twenty years. Here, they stressed that the ‘socialist society’ was to be built on the ideas of ‘dem-

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ocratic socialism’, a term adopted from the British Labour Party to mark an ideological difference from Soviet communism. Some party members added the word ‘democratic’ or ‘socialist’ to ‘the welfare state’ in order to create a semantic firewall against communism.41 The grand old Labourite Martin Tranmæl, who did not even like the term ‘welfare state’, did use it in anti-communist rhetoric: the ‘socialist welfare state [is] the only alternative to communism.’42 However, a Cold War framing of social reforms was not a social democratic peculiarity as a former influential centre politician made clear: ‘chaos, want and misery . . . provide a breeding ground for communism.’43 Except for the Communists, social reforms were by all political parties considered part of an anti-communist strategy, which resembled the Bismarckian idea of social insurance as a prophylactic against socialism.44 However, even though social redistribution of wealth was considered a hallmark of Western democratic socialism, social reform did not figure highly in Arbeiderpartiet’s 1949 platform, and no one at the party congress talked about ‘the welfare state’.45 In short, it did not occur in any documents that made up the postwar ideology of the Norwegian labour party. This was, however, not a hindrance for social democrats to use the phrase. In 1948 the main social democratic newspaper declared that the Labour government by outlining the principles and future development of a comprehensive system of social insurance had brought Norway ‘closer to the modern welfare state’.46 During the 1949 election campaign the Minister of Defence Jens Chr. Hauge repeatedly declared in public that the great aim of Arbeiderpartiet was to create a welfare state.47 It does not surprise, then, that the labour government was ascribed the ambition of building a welfare state. In 1950 the liberal politician Gunnar Jahn declared from his powerful position as Chairman of Norway’s central bank that next to economic recovery the major postwar goal of the government had been ‘to create what is called a welfare state where incomes are evenly distributed and [an] average standard of living [is] constantly rising’.48 Yet again, after the election victory in 1949 the use of the phrase almost vanished from social democratic vocabulary, and almost as an exception Minister of Foreign Affairs Lange, who had used the phrase in 1934 to name a liberal state taking social responsibility, stated that Norway by 1950 had become a welfare state with ‘increasing prosperity’.49 Those other social democrats who used the term continued to use it prospectively, as a utopian image of the future society.50 However, the career of the term did not depend on the social democrats. By the early 1950s, some regarded it as established in Norwegian political language.51 Besides a growing use in the press, the term was lexically defined as early as 1951, which comparatively speaking seems to be ahead

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of time. The ‘welfare state’ was defined as an extended ‘legal state’: ‘a state ruled by the view that the state’s task goes beyond that of protecting life, liberty and property (legal state); it also has a social responsibility to all citizens’.52 The term occurred with a similar definition in textbooks for the lower secondary school and the high school. According to the author, professor of law Johannes Andenæs, the task of the state was not only to safeguard freedom and constitutional rights but also to protect all citizens against undeserved distress and to ensure that everyone gets the opportunity to live a happy and dignified life. ‘This is what one thinks of when one says that the modern state is not only a rettsstat, but also a velferdsstat’ [original italics].53 Shortly after, Knut Dahl Jacobsen, who in 1965 became Norway’s first professor in political science, declared Norway to be a ‘welfare state’, due to the evolution from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ state.54 This was a notion of societal development that was about to sink in, but it was not necessarily applauded; some legal scholars were anxious about the degree of governmental control and regulation.55 In 1954, a new lexical definition reflected these concerns: A legal state sees its significant role in protecting citizens’ lives, liberty and property against internal and external enemies. A welfare state will also ensure citizens’ welfare by social measures, education, poor relief, social insurance and economic policy measures, in modern times the term also includes economic planning, income and price control and production management.56

From the late 1940s to the early 50s, economic planning, income and price control and production management had been highly contested issues in Norwegian politics. By linking these issues to the welfare state idea, the 1954 lexical definition related the term to questions that for a while destabilized postwar consensus in party politics. The melange of economic regulation and welfare state, however, did not occur out of nowhere. A Social Democrat and Supreme Court advocate said in public that the system of permanent price and rationalization regulation, of which he was the main architect, was a precondition for a welfare state.57 When Arbeiderpartiet in 1952–53 for several reasons abandoned the idea of such a system, oppositional groups did, however, continue to associate the welfare state idea with state regulation and unwanted paternalism and used its name as a term of abuse in an ideological attack on the Social Democrats.58

A Term of Abuse In 1955, a famous artist and writer wrote that velferdsstaten had become ‘the most important political slogan in our time’.59 He did not, how-

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ever, inform the readers that the term was mostly used as a foul word by those who opposed social democratic governance. Four years later, a Norwegian encyclopaedia rightly noted that: ‘To many, the term has gained an odious sound’.60 Thus, the well-known American journalist William L. Shirer was obviously wrong when he wrote in 1955 that: ‘The term “social welfare state” does not frighten [the Norwegians] as it does some people elsewhere.’61 The independent daily newspaper Verdens Gang (founded in 1945) was a major carrier of liberal criticism of social democracy. The famous editor Christian A.R. Christensen, the Liberals’ representative in the preparation of the parties’ Joint Programme of 1945, defined ‘welfare state’ as ‘a planned economy and state-directed society with an almost comprehensive social insurance system’.62 He did not oppose the welfare state idea, but stressed that the welfare state had to be ‘democratic’ and in harmony with the legal state. He did, however, fear that far-reaching state regulation would sacrifice democracy and constitutionalism and pave the way to totalitarianism and, hence, accused Arbeiderpartiet of monopolizing ‘the welfare state’. In the end, he considered the term a disguise for the ‘socialist society’.63 Economic liberals belonging to a Friedrich Hayek-inspired group called Libertas (1947–88) were more concerned about market than constitution. In 1950 one of the free marketeers stated in a lecture that was quoted in several newspapers: ‘There is every reason to be on guard against the kind of planned economy that involves detailed regulation of the economic activity in society. It aims at a welfare state, but it may lead to a police state’ [original italics].64 To free marketeers ‘the welfare state’ connoted ‘the long term goal of socialists and planned economists’, which was held as ‘essentially totalitarian’ and irreconcilable with a free society.65 These critics also confronted the idea of a system with universal and broadly redistributive social insurances by arguing that collectivism knows no logical stopping point short of the totalitarian state. Therefore public benefits should be reserved for the deserving needy. Then the ‘totalitarian welfare state with comprehensive power’ would be transformed into a limited ‘social state that sees its mission to relieve poverty’ [original italics].66 In the late 1950s, a liberal study group in deep opposition to redistributive social policy argued that if the social obligations of the state went beyond those in utmost need, Norway would face a totalitarian state on a par with Nazi Germany and the Communist Soviet.67 The targets included Arbeiderpartiet as well as Høyre, the Conservatives, who were considered too state friendly in social policies. Leading representatives of the Church forwarded a similar critique. Directly after the war, the theologian and the future bishop Alex Johnson

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in a preface to the Norwegian edition of a report from The British Council of Churches on ‘The Era of Atomic Power’ lumped together ‘the powerloving welfare state’ with ‘the new paganism’ and ‘the technical type of man’.68 Several theologians and State Church authorities continued and strengthened these points. It was argued that Labour was planning a welfare state similar to the totalitarian state that Norwegian churchmen had fought against during the German occupation.69 This position was fostered by a fear of a state colonizing all areas of social life and making them purely materialistic. As maintained by a theologian at the 1951 annual joint meeting of the various Inner Mission organizations, a stronghold of conservative power in the Norwegian State Church, the welfare state was in its outline an atheistic state that ignored the ‘sinful, selfish nature of man’.70 The ecclesiastical offensive received great public attention after Bishop Eivind Berggrav’s keynote talk on the church-state relationship at the 1952 Lutheran World Federation world assembly in Hanover. In his speech, which was broadly covered in media back home, Berggrav summarized and extended already existing ecclesiastical disapproval. But his arguments were more influenced by liberalism than Lutheran doctrines. To him ‘the welfare state’ was not just another word for secular state; it was as ‘totalitarian’ and ‘demonic’ as the Nazi state and hence a fundamental threat to Christian civilization.71 The ecclesiastical criticism of the welfare state idea seems to have been important to Kristelig Folkeparti (Christian People’s Party), who in 1954 voted against a proposal from the labour government to make the right to work constitutional. In their eyes, the proposal was nothing but an attempt to constitutionalize the welfare state.72 In fact, the proposal was a pale imitation of article 163 in the Weimar Constitution, which stated that every citizen should be given an opportunity to gain a living by productive work. The Norwegian proposal did not imply any individual right to work; it was only intended as a policy statement, which gave the state a moral obligation to pursue an economic policy and a social policy that aimed to avoid unemployment. The communists also made ‘the welfare state’ a term of abuse. The labour movement had once given the working class hopes of a classless society; now it masked its alliance with capitalism with the welfare state’s name. So went the narrative in the daily newspaper Friheten (The Freedom), published by Norges Kommunistiske Parti, the Norwegian Communist Party.73 The narrative also worked its way into the Communists’ party programmes, and in the 1953 programme, the very first programme in which the term velferdsstaten occurred, they made clear that the ‘rightwing socialist leaders’ of the labour movement had created ‘the myth of “the welfare state”’ to disguise its class betrayal.74 As a former

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Norwegian communist leader wrote in 1951, ‘the welfare state is the glamourous word for the dictatorship of the American monopoly capitalism in Norway’.75

A Word of Honour Some conservatives accused the governing Arbeiderpartiet of using ‘the mysterious term “welfare state”’ in order to socialize ‘the responsibility for the well-being of the homeland’.76 But Høyre did not officially adapt to the pejorative use of velferdsstaten. Instead the social-conservative elite sought to bend the phrase to its own interests. Sjur Lindebrække, the leading conservative politician in the early postwar years, was puzzled by the negative use. To him the phrase signified ‘the essence of a social system’ that combined individual liberty and free enterprise with social and economic security.77 Lindebrække argued this way by creating a conservative tradition in the making of the welfare state: ‘the foundation of the Norwegian welfare state’ was laid by the old liberalism of the mid nineteenth century. In the long term, Lindebrække considered a welfare state in conservative outfit inconsistent with the socialism of the Norwegian labour party. The quest for a conservative welfare state was voiced in the 1952 parliamentary debate on finance. A leading social-conservative said it was time that ‘society’ decided ‘where the illusionistic welfare state will end, and where the real one will come into being’.78 Two years later, Høyre pictured ‘the socialist welfare state’ with its high prices, taxes and cost of living as dystopic. The alternative was a non-socialist welfare state in which social security and full employment were reconcilable with individual freedom, humanism and national economic security.79 As maintained by a smaller conservative newspaper: ‘The voters do not have to choose between [having a] welfare state and not [having a] welfare state, but between Arbeiderpartiet’s welfare state . . . and the . . . welfare state that Høyre aims at.’80 The liberal party Venstre, above all its social-liberal wing, valued the conservative quest for ‘a real welfare state’ but feared that it had to make way for conservative anti-statism. As observed in the liberal press, several Conservatives used ‘the welfare state’ negatively, and conservative newspapers regularly used it with quotation marks. This commentator found the meaning of the term somewhat ambiguous in the political context of the 1950s but was convinced that the idea of making social and economic security an individual right was rooted in social-liberal thinking.81 In fact, the core of the social-liberal welfare state language was two-sided: on the one hand it detached social liberalism from anti-statism in the liberal

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ranks; on the other it claimed shares in the making of the welfare state. As a liberal politician said in Stortinget in 1955, the social democrats were wrong when claiming the ownership of the welfare state.82 The new left, a group of socialists within Arbeiderpartiet who resisted Norwegian NATO membership and established their own weekly newspaper Orientering in 1953, also disapproved the pejorative use of the ‘the welfare state’. One of these socialists, Karl Evang – the long-standing General Director of Health (1938–72) and one of the architects of the World Health Organization – condemned the pejorative language and the ideas behind it as deeply detrimental to the development of modern social policy.83 The new leftists also criticized Arbeiderpartiet, their own party, for having created a ‘capitalist welfare state’ that in fact preserved ‘the false ideals’ of capitalism.84 The elderly Christopher Hornsrud, Labour’s first Prime Minister for three weeks in 1928, shared this goal of the new left ‘to create a socialist welfare state’.85 When the socialists left Arbeiderpartiet and established their own party in 1961, they became more inclined to criticize their parent party for having adjusted the social reforms to capitalism and therefore having reduced the possibility of economic redistribution. In the words of a prominent socialist: ‘Our welfare state is a capitalist welfare state.’86

Differing Opinions within Social Democracy in the 1950s As a term of abuse velferdsstaten served as a many-sided attack on Arbeiderpartiet, and among social democrats the criticisms caused differing opinions on the virtue of the phrase after being almost neglected in the wake of the election victory in 1949. One paper considered the term ‘brilliant for the kind of “state” our movement wants to create’.87 This editor did not hesitate to criticize those fellow party members who disliked the term: ‘It is not the welfare state which is ridiculous, but our opponents’ “understanding” of it.’ Erik Brofoss – Minister of Finance (1945–47), Minister of Trade (1947–54) and a leading postwar ideologist of economic planning – valued the term after the conservative accusation of Arbeiderpartiet for creating an ‘illusionistic welfare state’. To Brofoss the term signified ‘a great and living reality’. Prime Minister Torp, who had introduced ‘the welfare state’ as a social democratic term in the 1936 general election campaign, said in his speech on the 1952 International Worker’s Day that he was provoked by those who continued to ‘mock the term’.88 However, Torp was still most inclined to use the term prospectively; it is the goal of the labour movement to transform the society into what ‘we usually call a “welfare state”’, by which he meant a society without the insecurities and inequities of the past.89 It was also during the period with

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Torp as Prime Minister (1951–55) that Arbeiderpartiet in a campaign brochure explicitly used ‘the welfare state’ and criticized those who used it as a term of abuse.90 However, Arbeiderpartiet did not bring the term to prominence in the 1950s; it was not used in the party programmes, and it occurred only once, and in passing, at the party congresses.91 In a 1957 parliamentary debate, Trygve Bratteli, deputy party chairman (1945–65) Minister of Finance (1951–60) and Prime Minister twice in the 70s, even said that the labour movement had never ‘chosen or used welfare state as a label on our goals or the work we are trying to do’. Hence, the term was ‘still unused for those who might want to use it’.92 In this respect, Bratteli echoed Martin Tranmæl, who in 1955 said in public that he disliked the term ‘welfare state’ and emphasized that Arbeiderpartiet did not invent it.93 Later that year, the editor of the national social democratic newspaper Arbeiderbladet wrote that Labour did not like the term very well; ‘it sounds too complacent in our ears’.94 There were at least two reasons for the sidestepping of the phrase. One is that it was considered discredited after being used as a term of abuse by oppositional groups; another is that Arbeiderpartiet since 1949 had made ‘democratic socialism’ an all-embracing concept: the ‘welfare state is a term that is linked to democratic socialism’, said Tranmæl.95 As stated in the programme for 1953–57, the overall goal of democratic socialism was to create ‘a society that provides economic and social security, and freedom, equality and brotherhood to mankind’.

Decontestation But No Shared Enthusiasm The strong and stable postwar economic growth fostered a new optimism, for some also on behalf of ‘the welfare state’. As historian Halvdan Koht, former labour Minister of Foreign Affairs (1935–40), concluded in 1959, ‘The state has grown from a legal state to what we now call welfare state.’96 The following year, the welfare state’s name occurred widely in parliamentary debates on the overall design and content of politics and economics. Taken together, these debates constituted what may be called the first general parliamentary debate on the welfare state idea. In the light of the 1950s, this debate was surprisingly sanitized of a pejorative use of the phrase ‘welfare state’. To be sure, some centre-right politicians were in doubt about the adequacy of the term because the distribution of social welfare was still considered to be socially and geographically uneven. Others restated former arguments in favour of a welfare state in conservative outfit; one with strong but minimal state action

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in social and economic life.97 This was the core of the 1960 general parliamentary debate. The idea of a welfare state gained currency, but while Social Democrats argued for a certain tax level to operate a redistributive social policy, Conservatives argued that economic growth and social welfare depended on minimum taxation. Finally, this was an ideological confrontation over the boundaries of state action in society. Social Democrats still differed in their opinion on the virtue of velferdsstaten as a political term. To a significant social democrat like Aase Lionæs, it was no less than ‘a health certificate to Norwegian democracy’, as it expressed in a glorious way the great achievement of the labour movement that none of the political parties now dared to challenge.98 Thus, all future governments, whether red or blue, had to build upon ‘the basic idea of the welfare state’ to stay in power. The long-standing leader of the Trade Union Federation, Konrad Nordahl, appreciated that conservatives used the term approvingly; ‘once it was a term of abuse, now it has become a decent word’, but Prime Minister Gerhardsen himself was less enthusiastic; in fact, he did not like the term yet found it hard to resist it, as it was in growing use.99 In 1961, it premiered in the election campaign handbook, where it was related to questions of increased production and fair distribution of wealth, but it did not enter the new party programme in 1962, and this was probably due to the lukewarm enthusiasm among party leaders. ‘I twist it a little on the tongue when I use it,’ deputy chairman Bratteli said in 1962.100 In the aftermath of the crisis in 1963 – which was caused by a fatal accident in the state- owned coalmines on Svalbard and which forced Arbeiderpartiet to resign and then pushed the centre-right government out of office four weeks later – centre-right politicians stressed that the building of the welfare state was a joint venture, ‘created by the Norwegian society together’.101 Per Borten from Senterpartiet (the Centre Party) assumed that Labour was determined to topple the centre-right government to maintain the ‘myth’ that only Arbeiderpartiet was capable of managing the welfare state. Social democrats on their part did not share the notion of the welfare state as a joint venture; one social democrat recalled the former mockery of the term.102 In 1966–67, when Arbeiderpartiet was in opposition to the new centre-right coalition government with Borten as Prime Minister (1965–71), Stortinget witnessed new general debates on the welfare state idea by several politicians now epitomized with the term ‘welfare society’. In 1966, Labour’s new parliamentary leader Bratteli maintained that the economic-political foundations of what ‘some call the welfare society’ had been developed despite the opposition from Høyre but that no one could

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any longer ‘attack the so called welfare society’. Hence, old opponents to planned economy, now in power, had to build upon what was ‘consolidated’.103 These exchanges also included the first thorough parliamentary debate on political shares in the development of public welfare. Social democrats stressed the role of the liberal party Venstre before the 1930s and the role of its own party when in power from the mid 1930s, while conservatives underlined their role in the late nineteenth century and maintained that the historical roots of present-day welfare extended back beyond the time when Arbeiderpartiet became influential in politics. This caused Bratteli to stress that social reforms of the far past were of small relevance to the society that had been built during the last generation.104 Gerhardsen on his part gave a lesson in political history and emphasized that before World War II conservatives had been the strongest opponents of social reform. Thus, current conservatives ‘would do well not so often to provoke debate’ on their role in the social politics of the past.105 The debate continued in 1967, now by accentuating unsolved societal problems and the need to transform the society into a ‘wellbeing society’. However, in contrast to the 1966 debate, political confrontations on the design and content of the welfare state were almost gone.106 During the 1960s, Labour never agreed on the value of ‘the welfare state’ or made any consistent effort to make it a key concept. It did not occur in any election programmes, and it was used only in passing at party congresses.107 A salient feature of the political language of the 1960s is that the parliamentarians in all camps were more inclined to use welfare state’s name in overall debates on the design of politics and economics than in debates on social reforms. In fact, none of the major social reforms were designed and implemented under the welfare state rubric.108 The term was absent even in the great 1966 parliamentary debate on folketrygdloven (the National Insurance Act) – considered by historians the final realization of the Norwegian welfare state.109 This also applies to the main social reforms back in the 1940s and the 1950s.110 Thus, those reforms that retrospectively are held to constitute the institutional core of the welfare state were not labelled as welfare state reforms. So the statement by historian Sverre Steen in 1964 that ‘everyone calls Norway a welfare state’ was, strictly speaking, premature.111 However, when put into operation from 1967, the National Insurance Act seems to have caused a change, at least in the general public. A survey made by the Norwegian Gallup Institute indicated that a great majority of the population – 85 per cent – held Norway to be a welfare state with a high standard of living and economic prosperity. The main conservative daily newspaper Aftenposten published the results with the comment that ‘the

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term “welfare state” has entered public knowledge and become accepted as a term for the conditions of our lives and society’.112

From Politics to Academics, and Back When velferdsstaten debuted lexically in 1951, it vaguely signified a socially responsible state. Similar definitions followed in other encyclopaedias, yet few attempts were made to define it more exactly. A liberal critic, who found it worthless to discuss pros and cons unless the term was given a shared definition, made one try: the term should denote nothing but state obligations to provide work for the able-bodied, to care for those unable to work and to distribute fairly society’s ‘benefits and burdens’.113 He was aware that this was a narrow definition, but he thought that a definition that ‘holds everything, holds nothing’. Others, such as the office manager and future General Director of the Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund, found the 1951 lexical definition of a socially responsible state adequate.114 This also became the standard definition in Norwegian encyclopaedias.115 It was developed by jurists and derived from Paal Berg’s narrative of the welfare state as a new stage in Western cultural development. In the 1962 edition of a highly influential textbook on the Norwegian Constitution, the author wrote that: ‘The state has gone from being a liberal legal state that ensures peace and order, but otherwise allows citizens to be alone with their own tasks, to a social welfare state that sees it as its duty to actively care for its citizens’ welfare . . . without any restriction on their freedom.’116 In the 1969 edition of a seminal introductory book on Norwegian law, the welfare state was depicted as the third ‘ideological stage’ after legal state and democracy: ‘It is now generally recognized that legislation . . . in many ways also has the task of promoting the welfare state idea.’117 The internationally known human rights expert Torkel Opsahl saw it likewise: ‘What one might call the Nordic synthesis of the two concepts, rettsstat and velferdsstat, is one of the most valuable achievements of our countries.’118 In his eyes, the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Rights had laid the foundation of the synthesis, albeit with a dispute between the West highlighting civil and political rights and the East giving precedence to social, economic and culture rights.119 Opsahl was convinced that the pejorative use of the term in the domestic setting in the 1950s was rooted in the same considerations that marked the negative Western attitude towards social rights within United Nations in 1948. It was not until the late 1960s that academics and professionals outside the law profession showed a growing interest in welfare state devel-

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opment, as manifested by the left-wing journal Kontrast, which published special issues on ‘The Invisible Norway’ (1967) and ‘The Crisis of the Welfare Society’ (1969). In 1970 the articles from both issues were published in a book called Myten om velferdsstaten (The Myth of the Welfare State). A recurring theme was that the existing welfare state neglected the weakest groups in society and masked class antagonism.120 However, the welfare state was not considered an idea to be rejected; it was still one left to be realized. The late 1960s also witnessed the first attempts by other academics than jurists to define velferdsstaten. An economist stressed the role of national authorities to ‘ensure that all citizens’ material conditions are not below a certain minimum standard’.121 A sociologist made economic planning and social and economic equality defining criteria, but the term was, however, not fully discussed by academics.122 The classic 1961 definition by the British historian Asa Briggs was not elaborated until the historian Anne-Lise Seip established the Norwegian welfare state as a topic of historical research in the late 1970s.123 Kontrast’s focus on welfare issues had a political impact. Gerhardsen, now retired as head of government, used it to argue for empirical welfare research, and other voices complimented it for highlighting the ‘incomplete’ welfare.124 This helped establish within politics an academic pro-welfare state understanding that at the same time was critical of its shortcomings. Yngvar Løchen, one of the contributors to Kontrast, came to play a key role by being a member of a public social reform committee appointed by the centre-right coalition government in 1969. The committee’s report (1972) was followed up by a ‘special analysis’ from the Ministry of Social Affairs and added to the Long Term Programme 1974–77 (1973) of a new centrist coalition government. This analysis, an important planning document in the 70s social politics, encouraged welfare research and planning to prevent and solve the problems that followed ‘the footsteps of the industrial and urban society’. According to the centrist coalition government, social politics since 1945 had to a limited extent been able ‘to realize the welfare state’s ideals of justice and equality’.125 The portrayal of the welfare state as an ‘experiment’ with certain blemishes influenced both political and public conceptions of the welfare state in the 1970s.126 From the mid 1970s, velferdsstaten appeared more often in reports from public committees as a name of the Norwegian society or in a more narrow sense as the name of the system of social security and healthcare. The term also appeared more often in academic publishing and public debate but now more descriptively than prospectively. Thus, when the social democratic order was coming to a close, the most familiar use of

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Figure 4.2. The title and the cover of The Future of the Welfare State and the Democratic Socialism, published in 1976 by the socialist wing of the Norwegian labour movement, reflects a growing left-wing concern typical of the period: the Norwegian welfare state, built by the labour movement, faced a difficult future. Reprinted with permission by Tiden Norsk Forlag.

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velferdsstaten shifted from a visionary one to one picturing the actual society.

In the Wake of the Social Democratic Order In the 1970s the social democratic order experienced a growing crisis, caused among other things by the contested question of Norwegian membership in the European Community and the ending of stable economic growth, until its windup at the turn of the 1980s. The crisis was marked by a weakening of the trust in a strong state with the ability to control economic and social development.127 Since the late 1970s, and even more since the early 1980s, state welfare provision has been continuously debated in Norway. At the outset, it was mainly a discussion of the social, economic and moral effects and how generous welfare was to be financed. In the new liberal climate of the 1980s, the question of cutbacks became a burning issue as did, in the new millennium, especially from the early 2010s, the question of economic viability. However, in spite of the rhetoric of countervailing powers in a challenging period, the Norwegian welfare state enjoyed further expansion and support and became more generous, but not necessarily more than other European countries.128

The Welfare State – the Final Breakthrough The continuous welfare state debate made velferdsstaten a common political term, also within Arbeiderpartiet. From being used five times and almost in passing at the party’s congresses in the 1970s, the rate increased in the 1980s. From 1981 and onwards, velferdsstaten also appeared regularly in the annual reports of the Trade Union Federation, after previously being used only once (1958). It is often said that the term velferdsstaten lost ground in the Labour Party under the leadership of Gro Harlem Brundtland (1981–92), internationally well recognized for chairing the World Commission of Environment and Development (1983–87) and as Director-General of WHO (1998–2003).129 In fact, it is the other way round. As party leader Brundtland used the term more often than her forerunners, and it was during her leadership that it achieved popularity within the labour movement. Brundtland did, however, emphasize that Labour were no longer aiming for an unlimited welfare state and, hence, encouraged welfare provision by civil society: ‘There are limits to how far the welfare state can create human happiness’.130

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Figure 4.3. Arbeiderpartiet’s election poster from 1993. ‘It took a lot of effort to build the welfare state. It also costs to keep it’ (top) and ‘Security for the future’ (bottom). Gro Harlem Brundtland together with a veteran social democratic voter. Poster: © The Norwegian Labour Party/The Norwegian Labour Movement Archives and Library.

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The growing popularity of the term velferdsstaten took place in the context of economic liberalization that followed the brief revival of economic planning in the 1970s.131 Tax cuts and reduction of public expenditure were on the agenda of most political parties. For the 1981 political platform, Arbeiderpartiet made concession to the new climate by replacing the terms ‘socialism’ and ‘democratic socialism’ with the less contested phrase ‘social democracy’ and by valuing the market, individual self-fulfilment and freedom of choice.132 At the same time, they for the very first time included velferdsstaten in a platform but only once and in the section on cultural policy: ‘The welfare state has provided more secure living conditions.’ In an election programme, the term did not make its debut as a name for Labour’s overall political goal until 1993. It now also figured on election posters for the first time in the history of Arbeiderpartiet. It seems paradoxical that the Social Democrats made velferdsstaten a key concept at the same time as they made concessions to the liberalism of the 1980s. It is likely that the party used the term to signalize a political identity different from centre-right parties, and if so, this parallels the renewal of the term ‘solidarity’.133 However, using the welfare state as a social democratic identity marker was not particularly successful, as the term now experienced a growing popularity across party lines, with the populist right as an exception. After the forming of a conservative government in 1981, the status and future of the welfare state was a major topic in the parliamentary debates on the overall design of economics and politics. Labour, now in opposition, feared that the government’s readiness to implement tax reductions and to lower public consumption would end the welfare state, while centre-right politicians accused Labour of wanting to preserve one that was in utmost need of renewal.134 Thus, from the early 1980s the growing popularity of the welfare state’s name was paralleled with a certain political controversy about the boundaries and design of state welfare provision. In this debate, centre-right parties were inclined to favour a residual model, to restrict social benefits to those in utmost need, as did economic liberals in the 1950s. In the 1990s only the populist right – with Fremskrittspartiet (the Progress Party) as the most popular among the voters – used the term pejoratively in their party programmes. To them the term connoted a large-scale impersonal state that created nothing but dependency and irresponsibility. In this context, feminist research added new meanings to the welfare state’s name. In the early 1980s this research had conceptualized the development of the welfare state as a reorganization of patriarchy; women’s dependency on men was replaced by a dependency of the state.135 Later

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feminist research in Norway – and the other Scandinavian countries – developed a new and positive view of the state, as expressed in the phrase ‘the women-friendly welfare state’, coined by the political scientist Helga Hernes.136 At the core of this research was that the Scandinavian welfare states allowed women to participate in the labour market without being forced to make difficult choices because of pregnancy and child fostering.137 The programmes of the political parties did not reflect the growing use of velferdsstaten in public debates. Until 1989 it almost only appeared in left-wing programmes. Norges Kommunistiske Parti still used it as a term of abuse: the welfare state was a myth invented by the social democratic labour movement and monopoly capital to disguise the class society. The Norwegian Maoist communists, with their own political party and electoral alliance, shared this type of criticism but were in the late 1990s more concerned about right-wing welfare state criticism. Sosialistisk Venstreparti (the Socialist Left Party, formerly the Socialist People’s Party), who in the 1960s criticized the welfare state for being capitalist, called in the 1980s and later for further development of a redistributive welfare state. More explicitly than other political parties, the socialists advocated the role of the state in welfare provision. When measured by the number of political parties that in a specific year included velferdsstaten in their programmes, it did not break through until 1993, but not as a vision of a future society. Except for the populist right, who still charged it with negative meanings, the term was now used to portray a valued achievement. Moreover, the 1980s witnessed a growing use of the phrase velferdssamfunnet, the welfare society, also among social democrats. The populist Fremskrittspartiet, who preferred ‘welfare society’ above ‘welfare state’, accused the Social Democratic government (1986–89) of replacing the – ‘out of fashion’ – term ‘welfare state’ with ‘welfare society’.138 Norwegian scholars too often think of ‘welfare society’ as a sequel and diverging term to ‘welfare state’ due to the centre-right criticism that gained ground from the 1980s.139 The story is, however, more complex.

‘Welfare Society’ and ‘Welfare State’ – A Changing Relationship The term velferdssamfunnet entered the Norwegian language in the late 1940s.140 In the early 1960s it appeared quite frequently in parliamentary debates, while Venstre, as the first political party, applied it in its 1961 election programme. Thereafter other political parties used it infrequently until the 1989 election programmes, where it was widely used, four years prior to the programmatic breakthrough of the phrase velferdsstaten. This

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means that the term has had a longer career than is usually assumed. This is indicated in Figure 4.4, which shows the frequency of articles in a large selection of Norwegian local, regional and national newspapers of different political affiliations in which the keywords velferdsstat and velferdssamfunn appear. Figure 4.4 also indicates that the use of these terms developed in parallel and that contrary to popular assumptions ‘welfare society’ occurred more often than ‘welfare state’ from the late 1960s to the mid 1980s and less often in the following decades. The parallel development indicates a synonymous and interchangeable use of the terms. A broad review of newspapers and parliamentary debates confirms that this was the case until the early 1980s. This may be because ‘state’ and ‘society’ had traditionally been used this way. For example, societal steering had normally signified steering by the state. It is not surprising, then, that ‘welfare society’ was used as much as a term of abuse as ‘welfare state’, especially in the context of a Cold War mentality as this statement in 1951 by the future Minister of Church and Education in the short-lived 1963 centre-right coalition government illustrates: the ‘road is not long from the socialist welfare society . . . to the totalitarian state.’141 There were, however, some early attempts to separate these two terms. In 1958 a liberal critic argued that welfare provision was not a state privilege, hence the ultimate goal must be a ‘welfare SOCIETY’ and not a ‘welfare STATE’ (with capital letters). He considered this distinction important because a welfare state in his mind represented a threat to freedom and other ‘traditional rights highly valued by the centre-right parties’.142 This 16000 14000

Number of articles

12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 1945-49 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 2010-14 velferdsstat

velferdssamfunn

Figure 4.4. The frequency of the terms velferdsstat (welfare state) and velferdssamfunn (welfare society) in Norwegian newspapers, 1945–2014. Source: National Library of Norway, the Digital Library. Retrieved 15 April 2018 from https://www.nb.no/.

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may be the first ideologically motivated attempt to make ‘welfare society’ a concept of a sphere of welfare provision outside of state control. Within Arbeiderpartiet, the career of velferdssamfunnet is as complex as that of velferdsstaten. During the social democratic order both terms were used interchangeably as synonyms.143 Social Democrats did not agree on the value of velferdssamfunnet, but at length it was more preferred than velferdsstaten, as it was by party leader Gerhardsen. Others, like Bratteli, were sceptical.144 At the party congress in 1967, he was even admired for not using velferdssamfunnet in his keynote talk. As a participant said: ‘The word “welfare society” is very dangerous, it seems so cosy.’145 Still in 1977, after terms in office 1971–72 and 1973–76, Bratteli kept it at a distance and added ‘what is called by many’ whenever he used the terms velferdssamfunn or velferdsstat.146 Still, despite being preferred over velferdsstaten, time passed before velferdssamfunnet gained popularity within Labour. It occurred sporadically at the party congresses from 1963 until 1977 and more often from 1979 and onwards. It was used in the 1969 election programme but only in the context of international politics: ‘The goal must be an international welfare society, in which the class distinctions between nation-states are torn down.’ In the 1981 political platform, velferdssamfunnet connoted a society with a high level of employment, and four years later a society with a high and an equal standard of living. Back in office in the late 1980s (1986–89), Labour tended to let the term connote a mix of public-private welfare provision, and this change of meaning of the phrase is obvious in the government’s Long-Term Programme 1990–93 (1989) as well as in the 1989 election programme. So, no wholesale shift in the political vocabulary from ‘welfare state’ to ‘welfare society’ took place, but there was a connotative change of both terms. From being used interchangeably as synonyms, the meaning of the ‘welfare state’ was limited to state welfare provision, while ‘welfare society’ developed into a broad term that encompassed welfare provision by the state as well as civic society, which was considered supplementary to state welfare provision. In contrast, the centre-right parties were gradually more eager to use ‘welfare society’ as a counter-concept to ‘welfare state’ to signalize the aim of rolling back the state in welfare provision. As the Conservative party’s deputy chairman John G. Bernander said in 1993: ‘The welfare state is the phrase of the social democrats. We, the Conservative party, want a welfare society . . . in which families care for themselves and with a public safety net only for those individuals who are unable to take care of themselves’.147 In line with this, some leading conservatives adopted ‘welfare society’ as a future-oriented concept and devalued ‘welfare state’

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as a socialist or social democratic concept of the past. The most radical devaluation was made by Fremskrittspartiet. Both the conservative and populist welfare state language of the 1990s resembled the liberal antistatism of the 1950s. In recent political language the meaning of the terms velferdssamfunnet and velferdsstaten has reappeared as less distinct. A telling illustration is that shifting governments since 2005 have used them interchangeably as synonyms in their principal statements on the future development of the Norwegian society.148

Political Struggles for Discursive Ownership The Norwegian welfare state has become a national identity marker, its history an epic narrative. As stated by a social democrat as early as 1959: ‘The development of our society into a welfare state is one of the greatest human achievements which has occurred since World War II.’149 In recent years, the reading of this development has been a topic of political contestation between left and right. For example, liberal-conservative intellectuals have accused Arbeiderpartiet of claiming that the Norwegian welfare state is a social democratic construction and ignoring liberal and conservative influences and contributions.150 Conflicting narrations of welfare state development are, however, not a current invention; since the early postwar years they have been an integral part of the welfare state language, playing the role of constructing persuasive historical images. The liberal press was among the first to create a heroic welfare state narrative, by honouring liberal politicians past and present as ‘milestones on the road towards the welfare society’.151 The core of this narrative was that the modern welfare state was founded by the liberal governments between 1908 and 1920 because they advocated the principle of universalism.152 Conservatives made early claims on behalf of their own political party.153 And so did Social Democrats. During the municipal election campaign in 1951, Werna Gerhardsen – Prime Minister Gerhardsen’s wife – declared that it was Arbeiderpartiet that had transformed Norway into a ‘welfare state’.154 Even though ‘the welfare state’ entered the political language of the Norwegian social democracy late, Labour managed to create the strongest welfare state narrative.155 In 1962 Arbeidernes Opplysningsforbund (the Workers’ Educational Association) framed the core of this narrative in this way: ‘The labour movement was the strongest force in the development of the modern welfare state with its greater security, its greater justice and greater social responsibility.’156 As Halvdan Koht wrote in

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1965, the year he died: ‘With Arbeiderpartiet in power, Norway became a “welfare state”.’157 Yet this narrative was partly contested within the labour movement. In 1955, Martin Tranmæl maintained that no single party could take credit for the growth of prosperity, even though he considered the development impossible without ‘a socialist government’ paving the way.158 Even in the 1970s, some social democrats emphasized the role of consensus politics.159 It was not until the early 1980s, when the welfare state achieved greater popularity both within and outside the labour movement, that the social democratic narrative became almost hegemonic within the party: ‘The welfare state that was built by the governments of Gerhardsen [1945–51, 1955–63, 1963–65] was confirmed and strengthened by the governments of Bratteli and Nordli in the 1970s.’160 This was at the core of the historical narrative of Gro Harlem Brundtland, framed in 1981, the year of her breakthrough, as a powerful politician. It has since been an integral part of the welfare state identity of the Labour Party.161 As current party leader Jonas Gahr Støre stated in 2012: ‘Martin Tranmæl, Oscar Torp, Trygve Bratteli and Einar Gerhardsen . . . had the vision of a welfare state.’162 Taking past actors’ way of speaking into consideration, this narrative is, however, paradoxical. As has been shown, none of these politicians except Torp used the term ‘welfare state’ to name the political vision of Arbeiderpartiet. The present-day conservative narrative builds on the social-conservative claims from the 1950s and was firmly established in the course of the 2010s. It differs from the current social democratic one by emphasizing the role of consensus politics as well as the role of non-governmental and private bodies in the building of the welfare society or the welfare state.163 In 2013 the Conservative Prime Minister Erna Solberg stated that the goal of the new right-wing coalition government between Høyre and Fremskrittspartiet was to continue the development of the Norwegian welfare society that had been ‘built up over generations’ from the late nineteenth century.164 This coalition survived the 2017 elections, and after including the Liberals in January 2018, it repeated the overall ambition to strengthen ‘the economic viability of the welfare state’. To facilitate this goal, the government insisted on ‘a restrictive, fair and responsible immigration policy’.165 Once again arguments in favour of a welfare state were placed in a larger, transnational context. In the 1950s it was the context of the Cold War; in the 2010s it was the context of migration. Current political narratives of the history of the welfare state have been described as Norway’s new ‘myth of origin’ in political debate, over which both centre-right and centre-left struggle for ownership of the welfare state – its idea, its name and its literal meaning.166 However, these narratives rarely accord with past policy language; there is, rather, a gap

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between past actors’ way of speaking and the present political speaking of the past.

Conclusions The term ‘welfare state’ entered the Norwegian language at the end of the old regime (1814–84) but did not take hold as a political term in the era of liberal order (1884–1935). Yet it did appear in public earlier than 1945, which has long been held as the year of birth. In 1936 the Norwegian labour leader used it as a social democratic vision of the good society. However, it was a long time before velferdsstaten achieved prominence. Despite some approving social democratic – and social-liberal – use in early postwar Norway, the term did not develop into a social democratic catchword during the social democratic order (from the early 1950s to the late 1970s). In the course of the 1950s, it was mostly used as a term of abuse, anchored to a hostile image of social democracy in the context of the Cold War. Used this way mainly by groups without significant political influence, the devaluing of the welfare state’s name did not, however, convert into political capital, affecting the course and pace of social reform, but it did cause reluctance among politicians, especially social democrats, to use the term. It may also be that the term was seen as protean and thus meaningless. As T.H. Marshall, a leading commentator on the British welfare state, said in 1953: ‘it would be difficult to find any definition acceptable both to its friends and to its enemies – or even to all its friends.’167 It is likely that such considerations made an impact, as Marshall, like other British social theorists, was read by Norwegian civil servants and parliamentarians of all camps.168 This does not mean that the political parties ignored the ‘welfare state’, but in the 1950s the conservatives appeared more eager than leading Social Democrats to bend it to their own interests. In the 1960s ‘the welfare state’ almost disappeared as a term of abuse, however, without experiencing a grand breakthrough in political language. It came into usage in political and academic thinking about social and economic development and became more familiar in parliamentary debates but not in those concerning the social security system, the institutional core of the welfare state. In parliamentary debates, it was widely used only in the 1980s, and it did occur widely in the party programmes only from the early 1990s. The late entrance in party programmes implies that the term was ideologically institutionalized only after the new liberal climate and not prior to, as conventionally held.169

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In Norway, the term ‘welfare society’ is as well a late arrival in political party programmes. Yet in contrast to what is usually claimed, it was ideologically institutionalized prior to ‘welfare state’. Both terms were used interchangeably as synonyms but gradually more often differently in order to distinguish between state welfare provision on the one hand and non-governmental and private welfare provision on the other, especially from the late 1980s and onwards. This resulted in a rethinking across party lines of the state as welfare provider as well as the ideological and normative foundations of the welfare state.170 Right-centre parties aimed at a limited state power; Arbeiderpartiet at a continued but modified state power that would gradually open the door to public-private welfare. The socialists stood firm on state-centeredness. In recent political language there is, however, a trend within all political parties to recap a former interchangeable and synonymous use of the terms. The closer attention to the historical record within a broad temporal frame suggests that the history of ‘the welfare state’ in Norway differs from standard accounts in several ways. A main difference is that the historical actors rarely used it to depict a welfare state ‘project’ or ideology. The term did not become a powerful indicator of and a factor in social reform until later struggles over the welfare state development.171 The image of a political vision being realized in the welfare state’s name emerged in retrospect, while the name in the past was one with ambiguous, controversial and contested meanings. Per Haave is a government grant holder and guest researcher at the Institute of Health and Society, University of Oslo. He is currently writing a monograph on the history of the ‘welfare state’ in Norway and coauthoring a study of the Norwegian welfare state (1967–2017), both to be published in 2019.

NOTES 1. The author thanks Nils Edling, Anne Lise Ellingsæter, Harald Espeli, Aksel Hatland, Dag Jenssen, Stein Kuhnle, Anne-Lise Seip and Steinar Stjernø for comments on previous drafts. 2. See e.g. Jon E. Kolberg, ‘Kampen om den norske velferdsstaten’, in Jon M. Hippe (ed.), Ny kurs for velferdsstaten? (Oslo: FAFO, 1985), 29; Anne-Lise Seip, Om velferdsstatens framvekst (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981), 9. 3. See e.g. Stein Kuhnle, Velferdsstatens utvikling: Norge i et komparativt perspektiv (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1983), 146–61; Anne-Lise Seip, Om velferdsstatens framvekst, 35–60; Rune Slagstad, De nasjonale strateger (Oslo: Pax, 1998), 208–9.

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4. Hans F. Dahl, Dette er London: NRK i krig 1940–1945 (Oslo: Cappelen, 1978), 341; Hans F. Dahl, De store ideologienes tid: Norsk idéhistorie (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2001), 355; Kåre Hagen and Jon M. Hippe, Svar skyldig? Velferdsstatens utfordringer – partienes svar (Oslo: FAFO, 1989), 9; Even Lange, Samling om felles mål 1935–70 (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1998), 202; Seip, Om velferdsstatens framvekst, 87; Slagstad, De nasjonale strateger, 209; Aud V. Tønnesen, ‘. . . et trygt og godt hjem for alle’? Kirkeleders kritikk av velferdsstaten etter 1945 (Trondheim: Tapir, 2000), 86; Kåre Willoch, Strid og samarbeid mellom høyresiden og venstresiden i norsk politikk fra 1814 til i går (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2015), 49. 5. On the Temple myth, see Klaus Petersen and Jørn Henrik Petersen, ‘Confusion and Divergence: Origins and Meanings of the Term “Welfare State” in Germany and Britain, 1840–1940’, Journal of European Social Policy 23(1) (2013), 37–51. 6. Se e.g. Berge Furre, Norsk historie 1905–1990: Vårt hundreår (Oslo: Samlaget, 1992), 238–41, 248–50; Slagstad, De nasjonale strateger, 349. 7. Arbeiderpartiet, founded in 1887, followed a winding road from classical social democracy (1887 to 1918) to modern social democracy (from 1981), see Knut Kjeldstadli and Idar Helle, ‘Social Democracy in Norway’, in Ingo Schmidt (ed.), The Three Worlds of Social Democracy: A Global View (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 46–67. Please note that Arbeiderpartiet rejected the term ‘social democracy’ when adopting a revolutionary ideology in 1918 (until the early 1930s) and reintroduced it as a regular term only in 1981. Thus, unlike its sister parties in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden, the Norwegian labour party did not call itself social democratic in ‘the golden age of social democracy’. However, in this chapter I will interchangeably use Labour and Social Democrats as synonyms for Arbeiderpartiet. 8. Ebbe Hertzberg, ‘Statssocialisme’, vol. Ms.8° 2301: 2, Ebbe Hertzberg’s samling, Nasjonalbiblioteket i Oslo. See Trond Bergh and Tore J. Hanisch, Vitenskap og politikk: Linjer i norsk sosialøkonomi gjennom 150 år (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1984), 94. On the German term Wohlfahrtsstaat, see Nils Edling’s chapter on Multiple Welfare States in this volume. 9. Olav Bjerkholt, Økonomi og økonomer i UiOs historie: Professorkonkurransen 1876–77 (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2012), 18. 10. Torkel H. Aschehoug, Socialøkonomik: En videnskabelig Fremstilling af det menneskelige Samfunds økonomiske Virksomhed (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1903), 377. Cf. Nils Edling’s background chapter in this volume. 11. Oskar Jæger, Socialøkonomi: En fremstilling av samfundslivets økonomiske love og av principerne for samfundets økonomiske ordning (Oslo: Tidens tegn, 1912), 218. 12. Thorvald Aarum, Læren om samfundets økonomi, 2 vols (Oslo: Norli, 1924– 28), vol. 2, 32–33; Oskar Jæger, Finanslære: En videnskabelig fremstilling av de offentlige samfunds, statens og kommunernes husholdning (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1930), 115. 13. See the chapter on Sweden in this volume.

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14. On the dating, see Slagstad, De nasjonale strateger, 202. Castberg was a member of liberal governments (1908–14) and contributed heavily to shaping social reforms in these years, see Jostein Nerbøvik, ‘Kven “fann opp” sosialpolitikken? Mytar og realitetar i norsk sosialpolitisk historie’, Syn og Segn 73(9) (1967), 486–94; Slagstad, De nasjonale strateger, 140–42; Inger E. Haavet, ‘Sosialdepartementet og Johan Castbergs tredje vei’, in Hege Forbord (ed.), Arbeidsdepartementet 100 år. 1912–2013 (Oslo: Arbeidsdepartementet, 2013), 31–64. 15. ‘Valget’, Indherreds-Posten, 4 October 1918. 16. ‘Vor tids samfundsutvikling staar i socialismens tegn’, Smaalenenes SocialDemokrat, 4 January 1929. Cf. Nils Edling, ‘The Primacy of Welfare Politics: Notes on the Language of the Swedish Social Democrats and their Adversaries in 1930s’, in Heidi Haggrén, Johanna Rainio-Niemi and Jussi Vauhkonen (eds), Multi-layered Historicity of the Present: Approaches to Social Science History (Helsinki: Helsingin Yliopisto, 2013), 125–50. 17. Trygve Mohr, ‘Offentlig forsorg i Tyskland’, Bergens Tidende 22 July 1932. On Papen, see Chapter 1 in this volume. 18. ‘Hr. Mohr på studiereise’, Arbeidet, 25 July 1932. 19. Halvard Lange, ‘Demokrati og diktatur’, Samtiden 45(9) (1934), 578, 585. 20. ‘Vårt program er arbeid og trygge kår for alle’, Nordlys, 9 October 1936. 21. ‘Negativ panikk eller positiv oplysning’, Arbeiderbladet, 19 September 1936; ‘Den svenske seier og Norge’, Arbeiderbladet, 24 September 1936; ‘Den svenske seier og Norge’, Bergens Arbeiderblad, 29 September 1936. On Möller’s use of the term, see Nils Edling’s chapter on Sweden in this volume. 22. Arne Skaug, ‘Statistikkens oppgaver og betydning i dag og de krav en må stille til den’, in Beretning om Det 3. nordiske statistikermøte i Oslo den 28. og 29. juni 1939 (Oslo; Grøndahl, 1940), 15–16. See also Kuhnle, Velferdsstatens utvikling, 21. 23. Ole Øisang, Vi vil oss et land: Arbeiderbevegelsen og det nasjonale spørsmaal (Oslo: DNAs forlag, 1937), 90, 93. On the Swedish term, see Nils Edling’s chapter on Sweden in this volume. 24. Olaf Ellingsen, Marxismen strander på mennesket (Oslo: Høires Centralstyre, 1939), 76. 25. Haakon Lie, Nazi i Norge (London: Arbeiderns Faglige Landsorganisasjon/ Norsk Sjømannsforbund, 1942), 3. 26. Eivind Erichsen, ‘Våre første mål i den økonomiske politikken i dag’, Dagbladet, 19 May 1945. 27. William Warbey, Look to Norway (London: Secker & Warburg, 1945), 21. 28. Daniel Wincott, ‘Original and Imitated or Elusive and Limited? Towards a Genealogy of the Welfare State Idea in Britain’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 134–38. 29. Framtidens Norge: Retningslinjer for gjenoppbyggingen (Stockholm: Arbeidernes Faglige Landsorganisasjon/Norsk Sjømannsforbund, 1944), 124. 30. Arbeid for alle: De politiske partienes felles program (1945).

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31. ‘Oppgavene’, Nordlys, 12 June 1945; ‘Heimesitteren’, Nordlands Framtid, 5 October 1945. 32. Paal Berg, ‘Tale i Krinkastingen 9. Mai 1945’, in Paal Berg, For Godvilje og rett: Taler og artikler (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1947), 38. 33. Paal Berg, Arven fra Eidsvoll – Norges grunnlov (Oslo: Sverdrup Dahl, 1945); Paal Berg, Retten til arbeid (Bergen: Grieg, 1945). 34. Berg, Arven fra Eidsvoll, 188. 35. Berg, Arven fra Eidsvoll, 190. 36. Margarete Bonnevie, ‘Demokratiet og kvinnene’, Dagbladet, 31 May 1945. 37. Elisabeth Lønnå, Stolthet og kvinnekamp: Norsk kvinnesaksforenings historie fra 1913 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1996), 137. 38. Stortingsforhandlinger [SF], vol. 8, 1945–46 (14 February 1946), 19 (Oscar Olsen, Venstre). 39. ‘Borgerlige mellomspill’, Rogaland Avis, 20 September 1966. 40. The term ‘the social democratic order’ (den sosialdemokratiske orden) was coined by the historian Berge Furre, see Furre, Norsk historie 1905–1990, 248–53. On the characteristics outlined by Furre, see Kjeldstadli and Helle, ‘Social Democracy in Norway’, 48. Cf. Trond Bergh, Storhetstid (1945–1965): Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge (Oslo: Tiden, 1987), 404–405, 551; Francis Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy: Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011), 241–66. 41. ‘Oppmarsjen’, Arbeiderbladet, 2 May 1950. On ‘democratic socialism’ as English loanword, see Dagfin Juel, Folkestyre og byråkrati: Velferdsstatens krise (Oslo: Tiden, 1984), 233. 42. Martin Tranmæl, ‘Julebudskapet’, Arbeiderbladet, 24 December 1954. 43. SF, vol. 7a, 1949 (22 March 1949), 473 (Gabriel Moseid). 44. See Klaus Petersen, ‘The Early Cold War and the Western Welfare State’, Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy 29(3) (2013), 233. 45. DNA, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1949 (Oslo: DNA, 1950). 46. ‘Året brakte oss nærmere den moderne velferdsstaten’, Arbeiderbladet, 29 December 1948. The newspaper referred to St.meld. nr. 58 (1948), Om folketrygden. 47. See e.g. ‘Oppgavene’, Nordlys, 12 June 1945; ‘Valget står mellom arbeiderpartiets planøkonomi og kreftenes frie spill’, 1ste Mai 5 September 1949. See also Finn Olstad, Frihetens århundre: Norsk historie gjennom de siste hundre år (Oslo: Pax, 2010), 161. 48. Gunnar Jahn, ‘Foredrag på Norges Banks representantskapsmøte 13. februar 1950’, in St.meld. nr. 51 (1950), Norges Bank – Beretning og regnskap 1949, 15. The speech was also printed in the press, see e.g. ‘Vi må se en hard omstilling i øynene, sier direktør Jahn’, Bergens Tidende, 14 February 1950. 49. SF, vol. 7a, 1950 (22 March 1950), 440. 50. See e.g. ‘Vår dagsparole’, Arbeiderbladet, 22 February 1950; ‘Oppmarsjen’, Arbeiderbladet, 2 May 1950. 51. Per Torsvik, ‘Åpen forvaltning’, Verdens Gang, 15 December 1951.

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52. ’Velferdsstat’, Aschehougs konversasjonsleksikon, 3rd ed., 15 vols (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1939–51), vol. 15, 658. 53. Johannes Andenæs, Odd Aukrust and Ingard Hauge, Samfunnskunnskap for realskolen (Oslo: Cappelen, 1951), 73; Johannes Andenæs, Odd Aukrust and Ingard Hauge, Samfunnskunnskap for gymnaset (Oslo: Cappelen, 1951), 76. In professional settings, the liberal Johannes Andenæs did worry that the welfare state would undermine the principles of the legal state, see Johannes Andenæs, ‘Garantier for rettssikkerheten ved administrative avgjørelser’, in Förhandlingarna å det Nittonde Nordiska Juristmötet i Stockholm 23–25 augusti 1951 (Stockholm: Den Svenska styrelsen, 1952), 218–29. 54. Knut D. Jacobsen, ‘Statssekretærene’, in Fra vårt styringsverk (Bergen: Grieg, 1952), 8. 55. Trygve Leivestad, ‘Forvaltningsretten og juristene’, Aftenposten, 15 May 1951. 56. ‘Velferdsstat’, Kringla Heimsins: Norsk konversasjonsleksikon, 2nd ed, 8 vols (Oslo: Nasjonalforlaget, 1948–54), vol. 8, 745. 57. ‘Rasjonaliseringen må ikke føre til at folk blir kastet på gata’, Arbeiderbladet, 29 March 1952. 58. This idea was abandoned, see Bergh, Storhetstid (1945–1965), 240–44; Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy, 296–301; Slagstad, De nasjonale strateger, 241–50. 59. Ole Mæhle, ‘Den lille manns hyggelige verden’, Dagbladet, 21 October 1955. 60. ‘Velferdsstat’, Gyldendals store konversasjonsleksikon, 4 vols (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1959), vol. 4, 3549–50. 61. William L. Shirer, The Challenge of Scandinavia: Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland in our Time (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955), 74. 62. ‘Velferdsstat og rettsstat’, Verdens Gang, 28 August 1951. 63. ‘Stortinget i faresonen’, Verdens Gang, 12 January 1952; ‘Berggravs tale’, Verdens Gang, 1 August 1952; ‘Hannover-talen’, Verdens Gang, 7 August 1952; ‘Sosialismens framtid’, Verdens Gang, 15 May 1951. 64. Morten Tuveng, ‘Virkninger av det planøkonomiske system’, in Beretning om Det 10. nordiske handelsmøte i Oslo, 6.–7.10.1950 (Oslo: [not specified], 1951), 23. 65. Sverre Thon, Frihetens samfunn eller planøkonomisk velferdsstat (Oslo: Tanum, 1955), 13, 84, 157. 66. Sverre Thon, ‘Velferdsstaten og inntektsutjevningen’, Aftenposten, 11 January, 1956. 67. Studieselskapet Samfunn og Næringsliv, Sosial velferd – eller velferdsstat? Sosialpolitikkens mål og midler (Oslo: Studieselskapet Samfunn og Næringsliv, 1959). The study group was established by Libertas in 1955. See Anne-Lise Seip, ‘Velferdsstaten Norge’, in Lars Alldén, Natalie R. Ramsøy, Mariken Vaa (eds), Det norske samfunn (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1986), 216; Anne-Lise Seip, Veiene til velferdsstaten: Norsk sosialpolitikk 1920–75 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1994), 216–17; Francis Sejersted, Opposisjon og posisjon, 1945–1981 (Oslo: Cappelen, 1984), 263–64.

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68. Alex Johnson, ‘Forord’, in Kirken og atomalderen: Innstilling fra en komité nedsatt av The British Council of Churches (Oslo: Land og Kirke, 1946), 9. 69. Aud V. Tønnesen, ‘The Church and the Welfare State in Postwar Norway: Political Conflicts and Conceptual Ambiguities’, Journal of Church and State 56(1) (2014), 21. 70. Olav Valen-Sendstad, ‘Den kristne og staten’, in Valen-Sendstad, Samlede verker, 4 vols (Stavanger: Eikenes, 2000), vol. 4, Dogmatiske og apologetiske skrifter, 453–55. The lecture was also featured in the press; see e.g. ‘Velferdsstaten kan bli en diktaturstat’, Bergens Tidende, 12 January 1951. 71. Tønnesen, ‘The Church and the Welfare State’, 28–29, 35. 72. SF, vol. 7b, 1954 (16 November 1954), 2629–33, 2648. 73. See e.g. ‘La oss gjøre slutt på denne ødeleggende politikk’, Friheten, 9 December 1949; ‘På frigjøringsdagen 8. mai’, Friheten, May 8 1952; ‘Rustningsgalskapens følger’, Friheten, 2 August 1952. 74. Vi vil! Norske partiprogrammer 1884–2001 (Bergen: Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste/Institutt for samfunnsforskning, 2001). This is the source for all party programmes mentioned or cited in this chapter. 75. Peder Furubotn, Vi må våkne alle som vil tjene livet – sannheten og freden (Oslo, 1951), 57–58. 76. ‘Når ansvaret sosialiseres’, Adresseavisen, 11 June 1950. 77. Sjur Lindebrække, Tillit og tillitspolitikk (Oslo: [not specified], 1953), 57–58. 78. SF, vol. 7a, 1952 (1 April 1952), 833. See also ‘Vi må brøyte oss nye veier i kampen for menneskets eget verd og velferd’, Aftenposten, 6 October 1952. 79. ‘Høires vervingsmåned’, Fylkestidende for Sogn og Fjordane, 1 October 1954. 80. ‘Etter landsmøtet’, Fylkestidende for Sogn og Fjordane, 18 June 1955. 81. ‘Løftebrudd mot de gamle’, Dagbladet, 21 January 1956; ‘Velferdsstaten som syndebukk’, Dagbladet, 5 March 1956. 82. SF, vol. 7a, 1955 (22 April 1955), 935 (Alfred Nilsen, Venstre). 83. ‘Sosiale trygder istedenfor lønnsøkning’, Dagbladet, 14 December 1952. See also Karl Evang, ‘Velferdsstaten på svartelisten’, Orientering, 13 February 1954. 84. See e.g. ‘Krisen nærmer seg’, Orientering, 21 May 1955; ‘Stagnasjon’, Orientering, 10 October 1959. 85. ‘Vi må skape en sosialistisk velferdsstat’, Orientering, 7 November 1959. 86. SF, vol. 7a, 1961–62, (9 November 1961), 376 (Finn Gustavsen). 87. ‘Er velferdsstaten latterlig?’, Halden Arbeiderblad, 17 December 1952. 88. Brofoss, SF, vol. 7a, 1952 (1 April 1952), 913; Torp, ‘Viljen til solidaritet og innsats ble kraftig understreket 1. Mai’, Arbeiderbladet, 2 May 1952. 89. SF, vol. 7a, 1954 (9 February 1954), 132. 90. DNA, Framskrittet skal fortsette (Oslo: DNA, 1953), 3, 28. 91. DNA, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1955 (Oslo: DNA, 1955), 132. 92. SF, vol. 7a, 1957 (22 January 1957), 133. 93. ‘Sosialiseringstanken står ennå sterkt i folket’, Dagbladet, 11 March 1955. 94. ‘De fire klipp’, Arbeiderbladet, 13 October 1955.

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95. See e.g. Alf Skåum, ‘Politikerne, dikterne og velferdsstaten’, Verdens Gang, 21 October 1955; ‘Biskopens tale’, Arbeiderbladet, July 31 1952; cit. Tranmæl, ‘Julebudskapet’, 1954. 96. Halvdan Koht, Drivmakter i historia (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1959), 148. 97. See e.g. SF, vol. 7a, 1960–61 (13–14 October 1960), 189. 98. SF, vol. 7a, 1960–61 (1 November 1960), 424–25. 99. SF, vol. 7a, 1960–61 (16 December 1960), 1695 (Nordahl); SF, vol. 7a, 1960–61 (13–14 October 1960), 124 (Gerhardsen). 100. Handboka 1961: Argumenter og fakta i valgkampen (Oslo: DNA, 1961), 134–35; Trygve Bratteli, ‘Økonomien er ikke alt’, Arbeiderbladet, 16 August 1962. 101. SF, vol. 7c, 1962–63 (18–19 September 1963), 4589. 102. SF, vol. 7c, 1962–63 (18–19 September 1963), 4624 (Borten); SF, vol. 7c, 1962–63 (18–19 September 1963), 4667. 103. SF, vol. 7a, 1966–67 (17 October 1966), 84, 86. 104. SF, vol. 7a, 1966–67 (17 October 1966), 91. 105. SF, vol. 7a, 1966–67 (17 October 1966), 139–40. 106. SF, vol. 7a, 1967–68 (16 October 1967), 123–57, 162, 202–45. 107. The term was used in 1961, 1967 and 1969 to highlight the role of the labour movement in the welfare state development, see DNA, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1961 (Oslo: DNA, 1961), 21, 236; DNA, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1967 (Oslo: DNA, 1967), 48; DNA, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1969 (Oslo: DNA, 1969), 68. 108. SF, vol. 8, 1963–64 (19 June 1964), 219; SF, vol. 7c, 1964–65 (21 June 1965), 4192. I have searched for ‘the welfare state’ in white papers and parliamentary papers on the disability pension (1960), social services (1964), widow pensions (1964), People’s Pension (1964/65, no decision) and National Insurance (1966). 109. SF, vol. 8, 1965–66 (9–10 June 1966), 226–324. On the absence of the term, see also Ulf Torgersen, ‘“Velferdsstat” i norsk politisk retorikk’, Tidsskrift for velferdsforskning 1(4) (1998), 227–31. On realization of the welfare state, see e.g. May-Brith O. Nielsen, Norvegr: Norges historie etter 1914 (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2011), 154–55; Sejersted, Opposisjon og posisjon, 258. 110. This statement is based on a study of the preparatory works to family allowances (1946), compulsory sickness insurance for all residents (1956) and the change of old age pension from means-tested and tax-financed benefit to an insurance-based benefit without means-testing (passed in 1957, implemented in 1959). 111. Sverre Steen, Fra norsk historie: Essays i utvalg (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1966), 121. 112. ‘Stort flertall betegner Norge som velferdsstat’, Aftenposten, 25 January 1967. 113. Benjamin Vogt, ‘Velferdsstat – hva mener vi med ordet?’, Verdens Gang, 19 December 1956. 114. Knut C. Jarl, ‘Velferdsstaten og dens vrengebilde’, Verdens Gang, 12 March 1956.

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115. ‘Velferdsstat’, Gyldendals store konversasjonsleksikon, 3549–50; ‘Velferdsstat’, Fokus – illustrert familieleksikon, 6 vols (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1958–61), vol. 5, 500. 116. Johannes Andenæs, Statsforfatningen i Norge (Oslo: Tanum, 1962), 198–99. 117. Birger S. Lassen and Knut S. Selmer (eds), Knophs oversikt over Norges rett (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969), 12. 118. Torkel Opsahl, ‘Reform av statsrettslige grunnprinsipper’, in Nordisk rettsdebatt: Foredrag og diskusjonsinnlegg fra det XVI. Nordiske Studentjuriststevne, Danmark 1968 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969), 43. 119. Torkel Opsahl, ‘De Forente Nasjoner, menneskerettighetene og vi’, in Opsahl, Statsmakt og Menneskerett, 2nd ed., 2 vols (Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal, 1995), vol. 2, 16–17. 120. Jan Messel, I velferdsstatens frontlinje (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2013), 44–49. 121. Fritz C. Holte, Sosialøkonomi (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1965), 271. 122. Ståle Seierstad, ‘Norsk økonomi’, in Natalie R. Ramsøy (ed.), Det norske samfunn (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1968), 94; Yngvar Løchen, ‘Velferdsstaten og sosialforskningen’, in Sosialpolitikken og samfunnsforskningen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), 17. 123. Seip, Om velferdsstatens framvekst, 9–20, 35. Asa Briggs, ‘The Welfare State in Historical Perspective’, European Journal of Sociology 2(2) (1961), 228. 124. SF, vol. 7b, 1966–67 (25 April 1967), 3065 (Gerhardsen); SF, vol. 7a, 1967– 68 (16 October 1967), 140 (Korvald, Kristelig Folkeparti); SF, vol. 7a, 1969– 70 (2 December 1969), 1023 (Liv Andersen, Arbeiderpartiet). 125. Cit. Per Haave, ‘“Reformativ politikk” – ideal og virkelighet i et regjeringskontor’, in Forbord, Arbeidsdepartementet, 93. 126. The notion of the welfare state as an experiment in politics was coined by Løchen, see Yngvar Løchen, ‘Om utvikling og virkemåte i et sosialt tiltak: Lovene om attføringshjelp og uføretrygd’, Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning 7(1) (1966), 1; Yngvar Løchen, ‘Velferdsstaten og sosialforskningen’, 17, and Løchen, ‘Velferdsstatens handicaps’, in Lars G. Lingås (ed.), Myten om velferdsstaten (Oslo: Pax, 1970), 34. 127. Tore Grønlie, ‘Velstands-Norge fra 1945 til våre dager’, in Knut Helle et al., Grunnbok i Norges historie fra vikingtid til våre dager (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2013), 305–7; Furre, Norsk historie 1905–1990, 417–20. 128. Stein Kuhnle, ‘The Scandinavian Welfare State in the 1990s: Challenged but Viable’, West European Politics 23(2) (2000), 209–28; Stein Kuhnle and Tord Skogedal Lindén, ‘Norge – et annerledesland?’ in Aksel Hatland, Stein Kuhnle and Tor Inge Romøren (eds), Den norske velferdsstaten (Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2018), 260; Trygve Gulbrandsen and Fredrik Engelstad, ‘Elite Consensus on the Norwegian Welfare State Model’, West European Politics 28(4) (2005), 898–918. 129. Hagen and Hippe, Svar skyldig?, 9; Else Øyen, ‘Velferdsstat eller velferdssamfunn?’, Stat & Styring 8(2) (1994), 3–5.

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130. DNA, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1981 (Oslo: DNA, 1981), 24. 131. On the retraction of state regulation, see Grønlie, ‘Velstands-Norge fra 1945 til våre dager’, 393–96. 132. Cf. Steinar Stjernø, Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 192–93. See also Olav Njølstad, ‘Selvmotsigelse per definisjon? Gro Harlem Brundtland som ideolog’, in Knut Sogner, Einar Lie, Håvard B. Aven (eds), Entreprenørskap i næringsliv og politikk: Festskrift til Even Lange (Oslo: Novus, 2016), 261–78. 133. Steinar Stjernø, ‘Sosialdemokratiet og solidariteten’, Vardøger 36 (2016), 79, 83. 134. SF, vol. 7a, 1981–82 (2–3 November 1981; 17–18 November 1981; 20 November; 1 December 1981). 135. Anne L. Ellingsæter, ‘Familiepolitikk i klassesamfunnet’, in Anne L. Ellingsæter and Karin Widerberg (eds), Velferdsstatens familier (Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2012), 99–121. 136. Helga M. Hernes, Welfare State and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1987). 137. Ellingsæter, ‘Familiepolitikk i klassesamfunnet’, 102. 138. SF, vol. 6a, ‘Foreløpig innstilling fra finanskomiteen om langtidsprogrammet 1990–93’, Innst. S. No. 305 (1988–89) (Oslo: Stortinget, 1989), 204. 139. Øyen, ‘Velferdsstat eller velferdssamfunn?’, 3–5. 140. ‘Så selvfølgelig’, Nordlys, 22 January 1947; ‘Sosialistiske tendenser’, Bergens Tidende, 3 September 1947; Sven Oftedal, ‘Tenk selv og velg’, Arbeiderbladet, 1 July 1948. 141. Olaf Kortner, Venstre: Idé og gjerning (Oslo: Norges Venstrelag, 1951), 69 (original italics). 142. Benjamin Vogt, ‘Selsomt følge’, Verdens Gang, 20 January 1958. 143. See e.g. Aase Lionæs in SF, vol. 7b, 1960–61 (1 June 1961), 3317. 144. DNA, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1965 (Oslo: DNA, 1965), 277 (Gerhardsen), 154 (Bratteli); SF, vol. 7c, 1964–65 (25 June 1965), 4435 (Bratteli). 145. DNA, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1967, 66. 146. Trygve Bratteli, Hva mener vi med sosialismen: Med demokratisk sosialisme til større frihet og større trygghet (Oslo: Arbeidernes Opplysningsforbund/ Tiden, 1977), 16. 147. Tiril Bryn, ‘Valgfrihet . . . privatisering . . . soleklart!’, Morgenbladet, 26 October 1993. 148. Perspektivmeldingen 2009, St.meld. nr. 9 (2008–9); Perspektivmeldingen 2013, Meld. St. 12 (2012–13); Perspektivmeldingen 2017, Meld. St. 29 (2016–17). 149. Rolf Hofmo, ‘Forord’, in Ideer og tips til bedre møter (Oslo: Kirke- og undervisningsdepartementet, Statens ungdoms- og idrettskontor, 1959), 4. 150. Mathilde Fasting, Marius Doksheim and Eirik Vatnøy, Den norske velferden (Oslo: Civita, 2011); see Ketil Knutsen, ‘Political Frames of Welfare History’, in Barbara Törnquist-Plewa and Niklas Bernsand (eds), Painful Pasts and

216

151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156.

157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164.

165.

166. 167.

168. 169.

170.

171.

PER HAAVE

Useful Memories: Remembering and Forgetting in Europe (Lund: The Centre for European Studies at Lund University, 2012), 179–92. ‘Folketrygden er en sosialpolitisk revolusjon’, Bergens Tidende, 3 September 1949. This article was published in several liberal newspapers. ‘Vårt århundre må skape økonomisk demokrati’, Dagbladet, 14 August 1951. See e.g. Lindebrække, Tillit og tillitspolitikk, 57–58. ‘Norge ligger som en god nr. 1’, Arbeiderbladet, 20 September 1951. See e.g. Reidar Hirsti, ‘Arbeiderbevegelsens kulturoppgaver’, Arbeiderbladet, 3 May 1953. Arbeidernes Opplysningsforbund, Slik kan det gjøres. Håndbok i praktisk organisasjonsarbeid (Oslo: Det norske arbeiderparti og Arbeidernes Opplysningsforbund, 1962), 108. Halvdan Koht, ‘Opplysning – kraftkjelde for framtida’, Syn og Segn, 72(1) (1966), 6–14. Tranmæl, ‘Julebudskapet’, 1954. SF, vol. 7c, 1970–71 (24 March 1971), 2342 (Odd Højdahl, the Minister of Social Affairs). DNA, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1981, 19 (Harlem Brundtland). Knutsen, ‘Political Frames’, 180–82. Jonas Gahr Støre, ‘Arbeid til alle er fortsatt jobb nr. 1, Stavanger 1. mai 2012’, retrieved 24 September 2018 from http://virksommeord.no/tale/5507/. Knutsen, ‘Political Frames’, 182–84. ‘Tiltredelseserklæring fra regjeringen Solberg 18. Oktober 2013’. Retrieved 1 August 2016 from https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/tiltredel seserklaring-fra-regjeringen-so/id744122/. ‘Politisk platform, Jeløya-plattformen, 14. Januar 2018’. Retrieved 24 March 2018 from https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/politisk-plattform/id 2585544/. Knutsen, ‘Political Frames’, 190. Thomas H. Marshall, ‘Social Selection in the Welfare State’, The Eugenics Review 45(2) (1953), 81. Cf. Richard M. Titmuss, ‘The Welfare State: Images and Realities’, Social Service Review 37(1) (1963), 3. Haave, ‘“Reformativ politikk”’, 88. Anders T. Jenssen, ‘Tilbake til sosialhjelpstaten?’, in Anders T. Jenssen and Willy Martinussen (eds), Velferdsstaten i våre hjerter (Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal, 1994), 6. Nanna Kildal and Stein Kuhnle, ‘Introduction’, in Kildal and Kuhnle (eds), Normative Foundations of the Welfare State: The Nordic Experience (Oxford: Routledge, 2005), 1–9. Cf. Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 86–88.

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‘Den svenske seier og Norge’, Bergens Arbeiderblad, 29 September 1936. Det norske Arbeiderparti [DNA], Framskrittet skal fortsette (Oslo: DNA, 1953). Det norske Arbeiderparti, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1949 (Oslo: DNA, 1950). Det norske Arbeiderparti, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1955 (Oslo: DNA, 1955). Det norske Arbeiderparti, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1961 (Oslo: DNA, 1961). Det norske Arbeiderparti, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1965 (Oslo: DNA, 1965). Det norske Arbeiderparti, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1967 (Oslo: DNA, 1967). Det norske Arbeiderparti, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1969 (Oslo: DNA, 1969). Det norske Arbeiderparti, Protokoll: Landsmøte 1981 (Oslo: DNA, 1981). Ellingsen, Olaf, Marxismen strander på mennesket (Oslo: Høires Centralstyre, 1939). ‘Er velferdsstaten latterlig?’, Halden Arbeiderblad, 17 December 1952. Erichsen, Eivind, ‘Våre første mål i den økonomiske politikken i dag’, Dagbladet, 19 May 1945. ‘Etter landsmøtet’, Fylkestidende for Sogn og Fjordane, 18 June 1955. Evang, Karl, ‘Velferdsstaten på svartelisten’, Orientering, 13 February 1954. Fasting, Mathilde, Marius Doksheim and Eirik Vatnøy, Den norske velferden (Oslo: Civita, 2011). ‘Folketrygden er en sosialpolitisk revolusjon’, Bergens Tidende, 3 September 1949. Framtidens Norge: Retningslinjer for gjenoppbyggingen (Stockholm: Arbeidernes Faglige Landsorganisasjon/Norsk Sjømannsforbund, 1944). Furubotn, Peder, Vi må våkne alle som vil tjene livet – sannheten og freden (Oslo, 1951). Handboka 1961: Argumenter og fakta i valgkampen (Oslo: DNA, 1961). ‘Hannover-talen’, Verdens Gang, 7 August 1952. ‘Heimesitteren’, Nordlands Framtid, 5 October 1945. Hernes, Helga M., Welfare State and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1987). Hirsti, Reidar, ‘Arbeiderbevegelsens kulturoppgaver’, Arbeiderbladet, 3 May 1953. Hofmo, Rolf, ‘Forord’, in Ideer og tips til bedre møter (Oslo: Kirke- og undervisningsdepartementet, Statens ungdoms- og idrettskontor, 1959), 3–5. Holte, Fritz C., Sosialøkonomi (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1965). ‘Hr. Mohr på studiereise’, Arbeidet, 25 July 1932. ‘Høires vervingsmåned’, Fylkestidende for Sogn og Fjordane, 1 October 1954. Jacobsen, Knut D., ‘Statssekretærene’, in Fra vårt styringsverk (Bergen: Grieg, 1952), 7–18. Jahn, Gunnar, ‘Foredrag på Norges Banks representantskapsmøte 13. februar 1950’, in Norges Bank – Beretning og regnskap for 1949, appendix to Norges Bank – Beretning og regnskap 1949, St.meld. nr. 51 (1950) (Oslo: Finansdepartmentet, 1950), 11–27. Jarl, Knut C., ‘Velferdsstaten og dens vrengebilde’, Verdens Gang, 12 March 1956. Jenssen, Anders T., ‘Tilbake til sosialhjelpstaten?’, in Anders T. Jenssen and Willy Martinussen (eds), Velferdsstaten i våre hjerter (Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal, 1994), 5–26.

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Johnson, Alex, ‘Forord’, in Kirken og atomalderen: Innstilling fra en komité nedsatt av The British Council of Churches (Oslo: Land og Kirke, 1946), 7–10. Juel, Dagfin, Folkestyre og byråkrati: Velferdsstatens krise (Oslo: Tiden, 1984). Jæger, Oskar, Socialøkonomi: En fremstilling av samfundslivets økonomiske love og av principerne for samfundets økonomiske ordning (Oslo: Tidens tegn, 1912). Jæger, Oskar, Finanslære: En videnskabelig fremstilling av de offentlige samfunds, statens og kommunernes husholdning (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1930). Koht, Halvdan, Drivmakter i historia (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1959). Koht, Halvdan, ‘Opplysning – kraftkjelde for framtida’, Syn og Segn 72(1) (1966), 6–14. Kortner, Olaf, Venstre: Idé og gjerning (Oslo: Norges Venstrelag, 1951). ‘Krisen nærmer seg’, Orientering, 21 May 1955. ‘La oss gjøre slutt på denne ødeleggende politikk’, Friheten, 9 December 1949. Lange, Halvard, ‘Demokrati og diktatur’, Samtiden 45(9) (1934), 575–87. Lassen, Birger S., and Knut S. Selmer (eds), Knophs oversikt over Norges rett, 5th ed. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969). Leivestad, Trygve, ‘Forvaltningsretten og juristene’, Aftenposten, 15 May 1951. Lie, Haakon, Nazi i Norge (London: Arbeidernes Faglige Landsorganisasjon/ Norsk Sjømannsforbund, 1942). Lindebrække, Sjur, Tillit og tillitspolitikk (Oslo: [not specified], 1953). Løchen, Yngvar, ‘Om utvikling og virkemåte i et sosialt tiltak: Lovene om attføringshjelp og uføretrygd’, Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning 7(1) (1966), 1–17. Løchen, Yngvar, ‘Velferdsstaten og sosialforskningen’, in Sosialpolitikken og samfunnsforskningen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), 17–41. Løchen, Yngvar, ‘Velferdsstatens handicaps’, in Lars G. Lingås (ed.), Myten om velferdsstaten (Oslo: Pax, 1970), 33–48. ‘Løftebrudd mot de gamle’, Dagbladet, 21 January 1956. Marshall, Thomas H., ‘Social Selection in the Welfare State’, The Eugenics Review 45(2) (1953), 81–92. Mohr, Trygve, ‘Offentlig forsorg i Tyskland’, Bergens Tidende, 22 July 1932. Mæhle, Ole, ‘Den lille manns hyggelige verden’, Dagbladet, 21 October 1955. ‘Negativ panikk eller positiv oplysning’, Arbeiderbladet, 19 September 1936. ‘Norge ligger som en god nr. 1’, Arbeiderbladet, 20 September 1951. ‘Når ansvaret sosialiseres’, Adresseavisen, 11 June 1950. Oftedal, Sven, ‘Tenk selv og velg’, Arbeiderbladet, 1 July1948. Øisang, Ole, Vi vil oss et land: Arbeiderbevegelsen og det nasjonale spørsmaal (Oslo: DNAs forlag, 1937). ‘Oppgavene’, Nordlys, 12 June 1945. ‘Oppmarsjen’, Arbeiderbladet, 2 May 1950. Opsahl, Torkel, ‘Reform av statsrettslige grunnprinsipper’, in Nordisk rettsdebatt: Foredrag og diskusjonsinnlegg fra det XVI. Nordiske Studentjuriststevne, Danmark 1968 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969), 6–44.

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Opsahl, Torkel, ‘De Forente Nasjoner, menneskerettighetene og vi’, in Torkel Opsahl, Statsmakt og Menneskerett (Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal, 1995), vol. 2, 13–25. ‘På frigjøringsdagen 8. mai’, Friheten, May 8 1952. Perspektivmeldingen 2009, St.meld. nr. 9 (2008–9) (Oslo: Finansdepartementet, 2009). Perspektivmeldingen 2013, Meld. St. 12 (2012–13) (Oslo: Finansdepartementet, 2013). Perspektivmeldingen 2017, Meld. St. 29 (2016–17) (Oslo: Finansdepartementet, 2017). ‘Politisk platform, Jeløya-plattformen’ [14 January 2018]. Retrieved 24 March 2018 from https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/politisk-plattform/id 2585544/. ‘Rasjonaliseringen må ikke føre til at folk blir kastet på gata’, Arbeiderbladet, 29 March 1952. ‘Rustningsgalskapens følger’, Friheten, 2 August 1952. ‘Så selvfølgelig’, Nordlys, 22 January 1947. Seierstad, Ståle, ‘Norsk økonomi’, in Natalie R. Ramsøy (ed.), Det norske samfunn (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1968), 92–129. Shirer, William L. The Challenge of Scandinavia: Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland in our Time (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955). Skaug, Arne, ‘Statistikkens oppgaver og betydning i dag og de krav en må stille til den’, in Beretning om Det 3. nordiske statistikermøte i Oslo den 28. og 29. juni 1939 (Oslo: Grøndahl, 1940), 13–40. Skåum, Alf, ‘Politikerne, dikterne og velferdsstaten’, Verdens Gang, 21 October 1955. ‘Sosiale trygder istedenfor lønnsøkning’, Dagbladet, 14 December 1952. ‘Sosialiseringstanken står ennå sterkt i folket’, Dagbladet, 11 March 1955. [Interview with Martin Tranmæl] ‘Sosialismens framtid’, Verdens Gang, 15 May 1951. ‘Sosialistiske tendenser’, Bergens Tidende, 3 September 1947. St.meld. nr. 58 (1948), Om folketrygden. ‘Stagnasjon’, Orientering, 10 October 1959. Steen, Sverre, Fra norsk historie: Essays i utvalg (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1966). Støre, Jonas Gahr, ‘Arbeid til alle er fortsatt jobb nr. 1, Stavanger 1. mai 2012’. Retrieved 24 September 2018 from http://virksommeord.no/tale/5507/. ‘Stort flertall betegner Norge som velferdsstat’, Aftenposten, 25 January 1967. ‘Stortinget i faresonen’, Verdens Gang, 12 January 1952. Stortingsforhandlinger [SF, Parliamentary Papers], 1880–2016, available online, https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Stortingsforhand linger/. Studieselskapet Samfunn og Næringsliv, Sosial velferd – eller velferdsstat? Sosialpolitikkens mål og midler (Oslo: Studieselskapet Samfunn og Næringsliv, 1959).

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Thon, Sverre, Frihetens samfunn eller planøkonomisk velferdsstat (Oslo: Tanum, 1955). Thon, Sverre, ‘Velferdsstaten og inntektsutjevningen’, Aftenposten, 11 January, 1956. ‘Tiltredelseserklæring fra regjeringen Solberg 18 Oktober 2013’. Retrieved 1 August 2016 from https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/tiltredelseserklari ng-fra-regjeringen-so/id744122/. Titmuss, Richard M., ‘The Welfare State: Images and Realities’, Social Service Review 37(1) (1963), 1–11. Torsvik, Per, ‘Åpen forvaltning’, Verdens Gang, 15 December 1951. Tranmæl, Martin, ‘Julebudskapet’, Arbeiderbladet, 24 December 1954. Tuveng, Morten, ‘Virkninger av det planøkonomiske system’, in Beretning om Det 10. nordiske handelsmøte i Oslo, 6.–7.10.1950 (Oslo: [not specified], 1951), 11–24. Valen-Sendstad, Olav, ‘Den kristne og staten’, in Olav Valen-Sendstad, Samlede verker (Stavanger: Eikenes, 2000), vol. 4, Dogmatiske og apologetiske skrifter, 444–59. ‘Valget’, Indherreds-Posten, 4 October 1918. ‘Valget står mellom arbeiderpartiets planøkonomi og kreftenes frie spill’, 1ste Mai, 5 September 1949. ‘Vår dagsparole’, Arbeiderbladet, 22 February 1950. ‘Vårt århundre må skape økonomisk demokrati’, Dagbladet, 14 August 1951. ‘Vårt program er arbeid og trygge kår for alle’, Nordlys, 9 October 1936. ‘Velferdsstat’, Aschehougs konversasjonsleksikon, 3rd ed., vol. 15 (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1951), 658. ‘Velferdsstat’, Fokus – illustrert familieleksikon, vol. 5 (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1960), 500. ‘Velferdsstat’, Gyldendals store konversasjonsleksikon, vol. 4 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1959), 3549–50. ‘Velferdsstat’, Kringla Heimsins: Norsk konversasjonsleksikon, 2nd ed., vol. 8 (Oslo: Nasjonalforlaget, 1948–54), 745. ‘Velferdsstaten kan bli en diktaturstat’, Bergens Tidende, 12 January 1951. ‘Velferdsstaten som syndebukk’, Dagbladet, 5 March 1956. ‘Velferdsstat og rettsstat’, Verdens Gang, 28 August 1951. ‘Vi må brøyte oss nye veier i kampen for menneskets eget verd og velferd’, Aftenposten, 6 October 1952. ‘Vi må se en hard omstilling i øynene, sier direktør Jahn’, Bergens Tidende, 14 February 1950. ‘Vi må skape en sosialistisk velferdsstat’, Orientering, 7 November 1959. Vi vil! Norske partiprogrammer 1884–2001. CD Version 1.1 (Bergen: Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste/Institutt for samfunnsforskning, 2001). ‘Viljen til solidaritet og innsats ble kraftig understreket 1. Mai’, Arbeiderbladet, 2 May 1952. Vogt, Benjamin, ‘Velferdsstat – hva mener vi med ordet?’, Verdens Gang, 19 December 1956.

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Vogt, Benjamin, ‘Selsomt følge’, Verdens Gang, 20 January 1958. ‘Vor tids samfundsutvikling staar i socialismens tegn’, Smaalenenes SocialDemokrat, 4 January 1929. Warbey, William, Look to Norway (London: Secker & Warburg, 1945).

Secondary Sources Bergh, Trond, Storhetstid (1945–1965): Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge (Oslo: Tiden, 1987). Bergh, Trond, and Tore J. Hanisch, Vitenskap og politikk: Linjer i norsk sosialøkonomi gjennom 150 år (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1984). Bjerkholt, Olav, Økonomi og økonomer i UiOs historie: Professorkonkurransen 1876–77. Memorandum no. 12, Department of Economics (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2012). Briggs, Asa, ‘The Welfare State in Historical Perspective’, European Journal of Sociology 2(2) (1961), 221–58. Dahl, Hans F., Dette er London: NRK i krig 1940–1945 (Oslo: Cappelen, 1978). Dahl, Hans F., De store ideologienes tid: Norsk idéhistorie (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2001). Edling, Nils, ‘The Primacy of Welfare Politics: Notes on the Language of the Swedish Social Democrats and their Adversaries in 1930s’, in Heidi Haggrén, Johanna Rainio-Niemi and Jussi Vauhkonen (eds), Multi-layered Historicity of the Present: Approaches to Social Science History (Helsinki: Helsingin Yliopisto, 2013), 125–50. Ellingsæter, Anne L., ‘Familiepolitikk i klassesamfunnet’, in Anne L. Ellingsæter and Karin Widerberg (eds), Velferdsstatens familier (Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2012), 99–121. Furre, Berge, Norsk historie 1905–1990: Vårt hundreår (Oslo: Samlaget, 1992). Grønlie, Tore, ‘Velstands-Norge fra 1945 til våre dager’, in Knut Helle et al., Grunnbok i Norges historie fra vikingtid til våre dager (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2013), 297–471. Gulbrandsen, Trygve, and Fredrik Engelstad, ‘Elite Consensus on the Norwegian Welfare State Model’, West European Politics 28(4) (2005), 898–918. Haave, Per, ‘“Reformativ politikk” – ideal og virkelighet i et regjeringskontor’, in Hege Forbord (ed.), Arbeidsdepartementet 100 år. 1912–2013 (Oslo: Arbeidsdepartementet, 2013), 65–117. Haavet, Inger E., ‘Sosialdepartementet og Johan Castbergs tredje vei’, in Hege Forbord (ed.), Arbeidsdepartementet 100 år. 1912–2013 (Oslo: Arbeidsdepartementet, 2013), 31–64. Hagen, Kåre, and Jon M. Hippe, Svar skyldig? Velferdsstatens utfordringer – partienes svar (Oslo: FAFO, 1989). Kildal, Nanna, and Stein Kuhnle, ‘Introduction’, in Nanna Kildal and Stein Kuhnle (eds), Normative Foundations of the Welfare State: The Nordic Experience (Oxford: Routledge, 2005), 1–9.

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Kjeldstadli, Knut, and Idar Helle, ‘Social Democracy in Norway’, in Ingo Schmidt (ed.), The Three Worlds of Social Democracy: A Global View (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 46–67. Knutsen, Ketil, ‘Political Frames of Welfare History’, in Barbara Törnquist-Plewa and Niklas Bernsand (eds), Painful Pasts and Useful Memories: Remembering and Forgetting in Europe (Lund: The Centre for European Studies at Lund University, 2012), 179–92. Kolberg, Jon E., ‘Kampen om den norske velferdsstaten’, in Jon M. Hippe (ed.), Ny kurs for velferdsstaten? Utviklingen 1977–85 (Oslo: FAFO, 1985), 27–52. Koselleck, Reinhart, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). Kuhnle, Stein, Velferdsstatens utvikling: Norge i et komparativt perspektiv (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1983). Kuhnle, Stein, ‘The Scandinavian Welfare State in the 1990s: Challenged but Viable’, West European Politics 23(2) (2000), 209–28. Kuhnle, Stein, and Tord Skogedal Lindén, ‘Norge – et annerledesland?’, in Aksel Hatland, Stein Kuhnle and Tor Inge Romøren (eds), Den norske velferdsstaten (Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2018), 245–261. Lange, Even, Samling om felles mål 1935–70 (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1998). Lønnå, Elisabeth, Stolthet og kvinnekamp: Norsk kvinnesaksforenings historie fra 1913 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1996). Messel, Jan, I velferdsstatens frontlinje (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2013). Nerbøvik, Jostein, ‘Kven “fann opp” sosialpolitikken? Mytar og realitetar i norsk sosialpolitisk historie’, Syn og Segn 73(9) (1967), 486–94. Nielsen, May-Brith O., Norvegr: Norges historie etter 1914 (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2011). Njølstad, Olav, ‘Selvmotsigelse per definisjon? Gro Harlem Brundtland som ideolog’, in Knut Sogner, Einar Lie and Håvard B. Aven (eds), Entreprenørskap i næringsliv og politikk: Festskrift til Even Lange (Oslo: Novus, 2016), 261–78. Olstad, Finn, Frihetens århundre: Norsk historie gjennom de siste hundre år (Oslo: Pax, 2010). Øyen, Else, ‘Velferdsstat eller velferdssamfunn?’, Stat & Styring 8(2) (1994), 3–5. Petersen, Klaus, ‘The Early Cold War and the Western Welfare State’, Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy 29(3) (2013), 226–40. Petersen, Klaus, and Jørn Henrik Petersen, ‘Confusion and Divergence: Origins and Meanings of the Term “Welfare State” in Germany and Britain, 1840– 1940’, Journal of European Social Policy 23(1) (2013), 37–51. Seip, Anne-Lise, Om velferdsstatens framvekst (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981). Seip, Anne-Lise, ‘Velferdsstaten Norge’, in Lars Alldén, Natalie R. Ramsøy, Mariken Vaa (eds), Det norske samfunn (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1986), 199–232. Seip, Anne-Lise, Veiene til velferdsstaten: Norsk sosialpolitikk 1920–75 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1994). Sejersted, Francis, Opposisjon og posisjon, 1945–1981 (Oslo: Cappelen, 1984).

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Sejersted, Francis, The Age of Social Democracy: Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). Slagstad, Rune, De nasjonale strateger (Oslo: Pax, 1998). Stjernø, Steinar, Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Stjernø, Steinar, ‘Sosialdemokratiet og solidariteten’, Vardøger 36 (2016), 72–86. Tønnesen, Aud V., ‘. . . et trygt og godt hjem for alle’? Kirkeleders kritikk av velferdsstaten etter 1945 (Trondheim: Tapir, 2000). Tønnesen, Aud V., ‘The Church and the Welfare State in Postwar Norway: Political Conflicts and Conceptual Ambiguities’, Journal of Church and State 56(1) (2014), 13–35. Torgersen, Ulf, ‘“Velferdsstat” i norsk politisk retorikk’, Tidsskrift for velferdsforskning 1(4) (1998), 227–31. Willoch, Kåre, Strid og samarbeid mellom høyresiden og venstresiden i norsk politikk fra 1814 til i går (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2015). Wincott, Daniel, ‘Original and Imitated or Elusive and Limited? Towards a Genealogy of the Welfare State Idea in Britain’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 127–41.

c ha p te r 5

The Conceptual History of the Welfare State in Finland Pauli Kettunen

einhart Koselleck has taught us that one of the main characteristics of modern political concepts is their being ‘temporalized’. They were shaped as a means of governing the tension between ‘the space experience and the horizon of expectation’ that was constitutive of the modern notions of history and politics. The concepts became ‘instruments for the direction of historical movement’, which was often conceptualized as development or progress.1 From our current historical perspectives, the making of the welfare state easily appears as an important phase and stream of such a ‘historical movement’ in the Nordic countries. However, it was actually quite late that the concept of the welfare state played any significant part in the direction of this movement.2 In Finland, after the era of the expanding welfare state, the notion of the welfare state as a creation of a joint national project has strongly emerged. Such a notion seems to be shared in Finland more widely than in other Nordic countries, especially in Sweden, where a hard struggle opened up between the Social Democrats and the right-wing parties over ownership of the history of the welfare state.3 This may seem paradoxical, as still in the early 1990s Finnish social policy researchers could, with good reason, argue that in Finland the concept of welfare state (hyvinvointivaltio) did not play as significant a role as did välfärdsstat in Sweden.4 The current strength of the consensual historical-political interpretation actually reflects the fact that in Finland, more so than in other Nordic countries, the making of the welfare state was a process of short-term interest conflicts and compromises, and it has been less obvious that any political force (most notably, the Social Democrats) could claim that the welfare state had been its planned political project and achievement.5

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The observations of the case of Finland suggest that in any analysis of the introduction and usage of the concept of welfare state it is also important to pay attention to how the concept came to refer to past times and activities in ways not conceived of by contemporary actors. Consequently, it is necessary to ask how they did conceive of those activities. In what follows, the analysis begins with the last question.6 How did the actors defining social problems and solutions conceive of what was later discussed as the history of the welfare state in Finland? How were ‘welfare’ and ‘state’ – notably the Swedish and Finnish equivalents of these terms – included in these conceptualizations? From these questions, the discussion proceeds to the emergence of the concept of welfare state; to the criteria for the situations in which the term is used; to its range of references; and to the contested valuations associated with the term.7 Finally, political charges associated with the distinction between the welfare state and welfare society are examined. The research material consists of texts discussing social policies, including pamphlets, handbooks and textbooks written by social policy scholars, party manifestos, minutes of (Social Democratic) party congresses, government programmes and journals and newspapers, with the last-mentioned material being (in June 2017) covered until 1920 by the digitized newspaper archive of the Finnish National Library.8

Finland as a Nordic Case Finland may easily qualify as the most exceptional of the five national exceptions that comprise the Nordic model. It was a latecomer to industrialization and urbanization, and it was also the Nordic latecomer in the field of social policies and industrial relations. Connections and conflicts with the Czarist and Soviet empires are a particular dimension of Finland’s history, and the class-based Civil War of 1918 and the two wars against the Soviet Union (1939–40 and 1941–44) as a part of World War II had many political, not least social-political, implications. In a study on concepts and language, the Finnish exceptionality may appear especially striking, as the Finno-Ugrian language spoken by the majority of the population is totally different from the Indo-European Scandinavian languages. New sovereign nation states were built after the collapse of the Eastern and Central European multi-ethnic empires, and Finland was one of them. The country declared its independence after the October Revolution, in December 1917. In January 1918, the Civil War began between the socialist Reds and the bourgeois Whites, preconditioned by the international

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crisis and domestic class-based conflicts. It ended with the victory of the Whites in May 1918. Despite the counter-revolutionary outcome of the Civil War, however, Finland was established in the constitution of 1919 as a parliamentary republic. Again, this solution had its prerequisites in international transformations. The alliance of the White winners with the German Empire collapsed after the German Empire not only lost World War I but was also dissolved through revolution. Importantly, however, parliamentary democracy survived in Finland in the 1920s and 1930s as the form of political system, even though it was threatened and limited by right-wing pressure, especially in the early 1930s.The sustaining of democratic forms made Finland exceptional among the new nation states created after the collapse of the Eastern and Central European empires. In order to understand this exceptionality, it is important to recognize that Nordic political traditions had played a crucial role in the Finnish nation-building. Sweden lost its eastern provinces in the Russo-Swedish War of 1808–9, which was part of the Napoleonic Wars, and they were reshaped as the Grand Duchy of Finland within the Russian Empire. In the nineteenth century, the Grand Duchy developed into an autonomous nation state. In the borderland of the Russian Empire, old Swedish legal and religious (Lutheran) institutions and traditions continued, utilized by and intertwined with the new Finnish nationalism that was largely compatible with the Russian imperial interest of promoting the separation of Finland from Sweden. In the loyal Grand Duchy of Finland, the old Swedish Four-Estate (nobility, clergy, burghers, and farmers) Diet was reintroduced in 1863. Space for political debate and civic organization opened up in the 1860s. ‘The people’ emerged in the debates of the political elite as a target for education and ‘national awakening’ and as the source of political legitimacy. Conflicts tended to be shaped as struggles for the right way and privilege to speak in the name of ‘the people’. This was evident in the controversies between the so-called Fennomanians and the so-called Liberals from the 1860s onwards, concerning the role of language, culture and constitution in the making of the nation, and it was also characteristic of later political conflicts concerning the right ways of defending the autonomy of Finland and the handling of social class divisions.9 The Finnish nation builders could, by means of real historical references, make use of and contribute to the development of Nordic nationalist myths. Most importantly, this concerned the idealized heritage of the free Nordic peasant that had been capable of local self-government and integrated with the state, as the peasantry had formed one of the four estates in the Swedish realm. In the late nineteenth century, the Finnish

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polity was shaped on the basis of this ideational and institutional continuity. At the same time, the idea of Norden came to play an important role in Finland as a framework for international comparison, communication and cooperation in various fields of social knowledge, and ‘Nordic’ became an ingredient of Finnish national identity. On the other hand, the making of the Finnish nation and nation state in the nineteenth century occurred through the construction of a cultural identity distinct from Sweden’s. This also included a change of language from Swedish to Finnish (the language of the majority of the people) by many families of the political, economic and cultural elite. A central, yet contested, part of the nation building had to do with refining the Finnish language so that it was capable of dealing with politics and sciences and of connecting the people and the educated. The coexistence of the Finnish and Swedish languages was associated with political controversies about the right way of defining and representing the nation, but it also implied policies of translation that made the structures of meaning of the two languages converge, even though the refiners of the Finnish language eagerly made use of vernacular raw materials when developing the Finnish vocabulary. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Swedish-speaking population comprises little more than 5 per cent of the whole population. However, in constitutional terms, Swedish is not a minority language (as are the Sámi languages); rather, Finnish and Swedish constantly have an equal status as the two official languages of the bilingual country. The conceptual history of the Finnish welfare state is a history of välfärdsstat (Swedish) and hyvinvointivaltio (Finnish). However, this history also encompasses different layers of meaning that were embedded in linguistic modes of constructing social problems, which only later were grasped and reshaped via the concept of welfare state.10 As a particular Nordic case, Finland indicates that the concept of society played a significant role in discussions of social problems and solutions. Provided with a strong normative charge and frequently used as a synonym for ‘state’, the concept of society appears as an effective tool for how space was opened up for divergent viewpoints on the legitimacy and limits of state intervention. It was in this ideational space that ‘welfare’ and ‘state’ later became combined as a way of conceptualizing the contents and outcomes of past processes rather than as the name for a future goal.

A Conceptual Confusion In Sweden, critics of the ‘patronizing’ welfare state observed in the 1980s that no clear distinction existed between ‘state’ (stat) and ‘society’

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(samhälle) in the political language. Not infrequently, ‘society’ appeared where one might expect to see the words ‘state’ or ‘public power’. Critics concluded that this, as they supposed, unique conceptual confusion indicated a weakness of liberalism and a kind of social democratic totalitarianism. To overcome such defects, ‘civil society’ (civilt samhälle) had to be created or revitalized.11 Swedes do tend to conflate ‘state’ with ‘society’. They may demand that ‘society’ – rather than the private or voluntary sector – take responsibility for social services or, conversely, that ‘society’ should now leave many of its functions to the private and voluntary sectors.12 However, this kind of conceptual use is not uniquely Swedish. In fact, all Nordic political languages commonly conflate ‘state’ and ‘society’, though differences of degree may be seen in how frequently ‘society’ refers to the state or to the state and municipalities together. It is not difficult to find examples of such society-as-public-authorities uses of ‘society’ in all the languages. The Swedish critics were obviously wrong when they associated this conceptual historical phenomenon with a strong social democracy. There is much in common in the Swedish and Finnish ways of using this concept, yet in Finland, since the Civil War of 1918, social democracy has been much weaker than in Sweden. In fact, the conceptual confusion regretted by the critics had begun much earlier than the era of an expanding public sector and corporatism – i.e. those practices that the critics referred to as the major links between state and society and the reasons for the lost understanding of the boundaries between them. How should we then understand this conceptual confusion and its political implications? One may argue that Nordic political languages conserved elements from the political philosophy existing before the nineteenth century, when civil society did not mean a sphere separate from the state but was a way of conceptualizing the state.13 The Nordic use of ‘society’ for the state implied that the state or public power was supposed to be capable of involving associative, integrative and inclusive principles of ‘society’ and ‘the social’. However, the society-as-state usage also implies that society carries out the normative force of the state. In Finland, the conception of the state in terms of its societal, associational principles was seemingly subordinated to this latter aspect of society-as-state usage. The influential role of the Hegelian tradition in Finnish nation-building, represented especially by the ‘national philosopher’ Johan Vilhelm Snellman, contributed to such a view of the state. Later, a notion of politics as the non-political fulfilment of externally determined necessities was reinforced by experiences that were easy to interpret as issues of national existence. The experiences of World War II, especially the Winter War of 1939–40, came to have a long-term ideological legacy. During the

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Cold War, the national political agenda and national political agency were shaped by the necessity to cope with the tight limits placed on its room to manoeuvre in international politics. According to the social democratic ideology developed in the Nordic countries, the state could and should be changed into an instrument of political will and planning. However, this mode of thought never achieved a hegemonic position in Finland. One can argue that in Finland – in accordance with the Hegelian-Snellmanian legacy – a wide spectrum of political forces have viewed rational agency as an inherent property of the state itself, and politics has been supposed to put into action the agency of the state. The ideal of national consensus did not imply an absence of conflicts. Finland has a more conflict-laden past than the other Nordic countries. The Civil War of 1918, with its class-based preconditions, had many longterm effects on social memory and political institutions. In the post-World War II era, the relatively strong support of the communists was one of the political phenomena that made Finland exceptional in the Nordic context. In industrial relations, obvious ‘low-trust’ elements appeared until the 1980s, indicated by comparative strike statistics. The parliamentary system was unstable, and short-lived governments were typical until the early 1980s. The Finland of too-much-conflict and the Finland of too-much-consensus were intertwined. Conflicts deepened as they easily turned into struggles over the right way to define and represent the general national interest and the right to talk in the name of the ‘people’ and ‘society’.14 Just who represents the true interests of the whole was a core topic and question in the struggles between the Fennomanians and the Liberals after the mid nineteenth century. The former, inspired by a mixture of Herderian and Hegelian ideas, imagined the nation as a language-based cultural community and were active in attempting to substitute Finnish in place of Swedish as their own family language. The latter, in turn, were oriented towards developing the idea of a nation based on a constitution, including maintaining the continuity of Swedish as the language of education and cultural connections to Sweden. However, both parties associated the true interests of the whole with the concept of society, and neither of them seem to have adopted any clear distinction between the state and society in their argumentations. The Hegelian distinction between Staat as a sphere of freedom and bürgerliche Gesellschaft as a sphere of necessities was important for Snellman in his philosophical works but much less so for the Fennomanians following in his footsteps. The idea of civil society as a sphere of freedom outside the authority of the state, in turn, did not assume any major role in how the Liberals used

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the concept of society; they as well associated this concept with the entity of the nation.15 The concept of society was provided with a normative charge that implied both requirements and legitimations for the state. Paradoxically, ‘state’ and ‘society’ were in late nineteenth century Finland turned upside down with respect to the concepts of Hegel. Yhteiskunta or samhälle frequently referred to the state in contexts in which the state was seen as an agent with ethical capacities, while valtio or stat was often used for those legal coercive institutions that Hegel had included in bürgerliche Gesellschaft. Yhteiskunta clearly carried out the normative force of the state in a series of articles, which placed ‘the labour question’ on the Finnish political agenda in 1874. It was written by one of the foremost Fennomanian leaders, Yrjö Koskinen or Georg Zacharias Forsman, by his original Swedish name: Yhteiskunta, i.e. the state [valtio], is the foundation for all historical progress. The mission of yhteiskunta is to watch over all the areas of common life [yhteiselämä], including the economic, to see that selfish interests and undertakings do not gain such free reign as would completely doom the lot of the weaker in that battle or as would lead yhteiskunta itself into ruin.16

Yhteiskunta (= the state) should regulate yhteiskunta (= societal practices) in order to bring resolution to the yhteiskunnallinen (= social) question. Koskinen’s yhteiskunta was defined in a political context in which the Fennomanian movement had made ‘the will of the people’ a fundamental basis of their political argument and of the legitimation of power.17 At the same time, they viewed ‘the people’ and ‘its will’ as a problem needing oversight and definition. This yhteiskunta called for a moral relationship between the state and the people. Implicitly, there were two normative kinds of yhteiskunta: one referred to the state as carrying out the best interests – and, therefore, the will – of the people; the other referred to the population living within the order maintained by the state. As a normative concept, yhteiskunta offered a means for determining what actions represented the people’s real and correct will and what actions constituted simple rebellion arising from the dangerous potentials of the social question. The notion of society as carrying out the general interests of the people and of society as constituting the conditions for living within the state became entwined in a variety of ways. The conservative Fennomanian, Agathon Meurman, gave a defence at the Finnish National Economic Association in 1886 of yhteiskunta and its ‘basic pillars: religion, family

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and property’ against the misconception that ‘yhteiskunta was solely responsible for all the afflictions the individual suffers or thinks he suffers’. According to Meurman, ‘the development of society’ with all that such a development entails is moving towards making improvements to the position of labour and narrowing class differences. The causes of the ills and discontentments reside in human beings themselves.18 The dual nature of yhteiskunta was even more clearly fleshed out in the manifestos of the labour movement. The predominant conditions were referred to as ‘class society’ (luokkayhteiskunta) in the Finnish Social Democratic Party’s (est. 1899) first explicitly socialist programme, the Forssa manifesto in 1903, which followed the Marxist model of the Austrian Social Democrats. After harshly critiquing society, the programme demanded that the means of production be taken into society’s possession.19 Thus, one can distinguish between a normative and a descriptive society. The combination of these two societies can be characterized as a society capable of self-criticism. The concept of society referred to normative criteria and capacities, and these criteria and capacities were then applied to an empirical society in which need, poverty, class divisions, discontent and a lack of discipline were recognized. However, not only was society capable of self-criticism: it also possessed self-anticipating capacities. The concept of society became, in Koselleckian terms, a temporalized ‘instrument for the direction of historical movement’, as social problems and solutions were defined from a peripheral perspective.

An Instrument for the Direction of Historical Movement The particular overlapping of temporal and spatial dimensions appears important in terms of how the modernizing nation-state society was adopted as the framework for defining social problems and solutions in the countries of Europe’s northern periphery. The elite groups active in the nation-building processes consciously adopted the distinction between what later came to be referred to as centre and periphery. According to this view, the educated elite of a peripheral country, and later the popular movements, e.g. the labour movement, could and should define their political tasks on the basis of the knowledge of more developed – or more ‘civilized’ – countries. Problems should be anticipated and solutions should be planned by acquiring information on the experiences, solutions and mistakes in what were seen as centres of industrial modernization.20 In a country like Finland, which was small and, even by Nordic standards, late to industrialize, international comparisons came to play a particularly prominent role. From the latter half of the nineteenth century

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onwards, such comparisons became integral to the way the educated elite analysed society and defined sociopolitical tasks. The outside world provided a framework of external preconditions and constraints, hopes and threats, as well as impulses, but also alarming ideas, models but also cautionary examples, points of reference but also boundaries to the possible. A good example is the aforementioned series of articles by Yrjö Koskinen in 1874 on ‘the labour question’. He argued that efforts should be made to forestall threats to social stability by examining Finnish conditions ‘from a European perspective’, by trying to learn, in other words, from what was happening in countries that were more highly developed than Finland. Koskinen’s articles also demonstrated that both the threat – that is, socialism – and the economic system, which provided a breeding ground for socialism through its inherent conflicts between capital and labour, were perceived as international phenomena. It was considered important to learn from both the solutions and the mistakes of these countries so as to be able to exploit what Alexander Gerschenkron has called ‘the advantages of backwardness’.21 Many ideas and impulses were transferred to Finland via Sweden, but it was only after the 1930s and, especially, after World War II that Sweden itself was looked at as representing the forefront of modernization. Nevertheless, contacts with Sweden and the positioning of Finland in Norden came to play an important role for the ‘comparative imagination’ that was constitutive of the nation as an ‘imagined community’.22 Promoted by intra-Nordic communication in different fields of social knowledge since the late nineteenth century, the word ‘Nordic’ came to represent an active future-oriented peripheral perspective towards the centres of modernity that varied according to the topic. In general, the Nordic countries developed into small, relatively open, economies that were – each country in its own specific way – highly dependent on exports and exposed to the cycles and crises of the world economy. This international dependence provided the preconditions for the articulation of strong notions of national economy and national society and for the legitimacy of the active role of the state, often expressed in the form of ‘society’.23 Society was at the same time both an agent and a target of knowledge and politics. In this dual understanding of the concept of society, the former aspect referred to the state, while the latter aspect, in turn, was associated with the conceptual construction called ‘economy’. This implied society’s dynamics of wealth creation and integration but also the potential for destruction and disintegration. In relation to economy, the agency of society as the state also had two sides. When the state was called ‘soci-

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ety’, it referred, on the one hand, to the interests of the national economy above private economic interests and, on the other hand, to the social principle that put limits on the economic actions aiming to preserve or reconstruct social cohesion. Transfers and translations of ideas from ‘more civilized countries’, motivated by the effort of anticipating problems and solutions, were in Finland a crucial practice in the development of this dualism that later became a core part of the concept of welfare state. One precondition of such a conceptualization was that the nineteenth-century uses of ‘welfare’ were first pushed aside by a vocabulary built around the concept of society.

Substituting Social for Welfare In the German sciences of government, Polizeiwissenschaften, which were developed on the basis of the tradition of cameralism, combining Wohlfahrt and Polizei was a way of conceptualizing the relationship between the state and economy.24 The Polizei functions of the state, Wohlfahrtspolizei (welfare police) and Sicherheitspolizei (security police), were supposed to guarantee the general welfare and order of the population. In Finland, Johan Ph. Palmén, professor of law at the University of Helsinki, was inspired by the work of Robert von Mohl, who aimed to subordinate both Wohlfahrtspolizei and Sicherheitspolizei under the constitutional principles of Rechtsstaat. In his juridical handbook published in 1859, Palmén used the term välfärdspoliti, the direct Swedish translation of Wohlfahrtspolizei.25 The first time the compound word välfärdsstat appeared in newspapers or journals in Finland seems to have been in 1878. In a magazine put out by the student nation of Nyland province at the University of Helsinki, Album utgifvet af nyländningar, C.F. Vendell critically assessed ‘the attacks of the Social Democratic School against the property’ and in this context also discussed the views of German Socialists of the Chair (Kathedersozialisten). In their view, Vendell wrote, the state was ‘not only a state of law but also a welfare state’ (icke allenast en rätts- utan äfven en välfärdsstat). The Socialists of the Chair believed that viewing the state as a welfare state would promote the interests of ‘the fourth estate’ (workers) in a way corresponding to how it earlier as a state of law had elevated those of the third estate. Vendell, a liberal student, was not convinced, noting that the rise of the third estate had only indirectly been an outcome of legislation.26 One may find in Vendell’s text a remarkably early appearance of a concept that only much later gained frequent use. On the other hand, however, it is reasonable to assume that here – in Vendell’s article as

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well as in the vocabulary of the Socialists of the Chair – old cameralistic tools were applied in a new context. It was a context in which society was discussed as processes and structures that could not be derived from the Polizei functions of the state but instead resulted from the unintended consequences of its members’ actions. The new ‘labour question’ and ‘social question’ were constructed in this context, and the cameralistic vocabulary lost much of its applicability. Combining welfare with state, politics or policies did not, however, become an influential way of conceptualizing the contents of and solutions for the ‘labour question’ and ‘social question’. As a translation of Wohlfahrt, välfärd was also later occasionally used as an attribute of the state. The political situation in France was the topic of an article taken from the Austrian newspaper Neue Freie Presse and published in Swedish by Nya Pressen in 1899. According to the article, though socialists were different in Germany and France, both ultimately believed in the coming of the great day when they would take control of political power and create den sociala välfärdsstaten (the social welfare state).27 Later, in 1901, välfärdspolitik (welfare policy) was used as a characterization of political objectives when discussing French politics.28 Välfärdspoliti disappeared with cameralism, but välfärdspolisen (welfare police) appeared in 1907 in news about Russian police reforms.29 Both the Swedish välfärd and the Finnish hyvinvointi appeared in newspapers, journals and other publications in Finland in the nineteenth century. These words could in part be used synonymously, yet the contexts of their usages differed significantly. Hyvinvointi was a word used to describe positive conditions in the life of an individual, a family, a community or a nation, but it did not refer to any action or actorness, and it was not used in compound words as an attribute of any particular activities or institutions. In this respect, it was closer to välstånd (wellbeing) than välfärd in Swedish. Välfärd was used in compound words and associated with actorness. However, since the late nineteenth century the most common context in which välfärd was combined with agency and institutions was not in respect to governmental policies but, rather, regarding the employer activities of industrial companies. The Swedish vocabulary for the paternalistic policies of industrial companies – in Finland as well as in Sweden – made use of välfärd. The terms commonly used for these employer practices, including, for example, housing arrangements, were välfärdsinrättningar or välfärdsanstalter (welfare institutions). In these contexts, hyvinvointi was not used as a Finnish translation of välfärd. In the Finnish version of Palmén’s juridical handbook, Elias Lönnrot, best known for compiling the national epic Kalevala, translated

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välfärdspoliti as onnivallinto (the state of happiness).30 A corresponding translation was made in a newspaper report on a meeting of the Finnish Technical Association (Tekniska föreningen i Finland) in 1883, in which a lecture was given about välfärdsinrättningar (welfare institutions) in the Krupp factory in Essen. The Finnish translation was onnilaitokset (institutions of happiness).31 However, this translation was not elevated to an established position. In the late nineteenth century and during the first decades of the twentieth century, the most popular Finnish translation of companies’ välfärdsinrättningar was työväenmenestyslaitokset (institutions for workers’ success). In the 1920s and 1930s, the most common expression was työväenhuolto (workers’ service). Then, during World War II the adjective ‘social’ was adopted as the attribute best describing such employer activities, työnantajien sosiaalinen toiminta (employers’ social action), in order to remove the patronizing vocabulary and increase the legitimacy of these practices as a tool for creating industrial peace.32 The steps taken leading from ‘welfare’ (välfärd in Swedish, and onni or menestys but not hyvinvointi in Finnish) to ‘social’ as the idea best describing the attributes of employer policies had their preconditions in how the vocabulary used to discuss the concept of society, including the associating adjectives, changed over the years. Consequently, space then opened up for again combining welfare with the state, yet in a different way to how it had been done via the traditions of cameralism and Polizeiwissenschaften. However, this change only occurred after the agency of the state and the targets of state action had been conceptualized via the concept of society, and the attributes of policies had been derived from this concept.

National Economy and Social Order In late nineteenth-century Finland, the concept of society and associated adjectives used as attributes of policies played an effective role and were in varying ways related to the concept of economy. Society and economy were combined in the words samhällsekonomi and yhteiskuntatalous. These were used synonymously with nationalekonomi and kansantalous (national economy). The Fennomanian association Kansantaloudellinen yhdistys (The Finnish National Economic Association), founded in 1884, was a central forum for examining the social question in its rural and urban forms, and inspiration came from the German historical school of economics and Verein für Socialpolitik. The Swedish-language counterpart, Ekonomiska Samfundet i Finland (The Finnish Economic Association, est. 1894), was for its part oriented towards liberalism and the

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mechanisms by which the market economy functioned.33 Since the turn of the century, the two aspects of relating society to economy – the general economic interest above private interests, or national economy (samhällsekonomi, yhteiskuntatalous), and the social principle putting limits on economic action, or social policies (socialpolitik, yhteiskuntapolitiikka/ sosiaalipolitiikka) – gradually became more distinct, also in terms of academic studies. However, even after this distinction the quest for nationalistic purity when refining Finnish political language – that is, the vigorous search for vernacular ingredients – contributed to the normative charge of the concept of society. ‘Social’ had been translated in Finnish using an adjective directly derived from the Finnish word for society, yhteiskunta, namely yhteiskunnallinen. In his writings about the labour question in 1874, Koskinen distinguished between two opposing views, ‘economism’ and ‘socialism’, both of which he criticized. The ‘economism’ viewpoint, based on truths conceived by Adam Smith, ‘contained only the natural side, but left completely out of the equation the ethical dimension, that is, yhteiskunta’. The other view, which ‘has trumpeted itself as yhteiskunnallinen and thus taken the name of “socialism”’, had understood sociality (yhteiskunnallisuus) in a dangerously misguided way according to Koskinen.34 Since valtio (state) and yhteiskunta (society) were often used synonymously and ‘social’ had been translated as yhteiskunnallinen, options were open for portraying political battles as being confrontations between ‘pro-society’ and ‘anti-society’ forces. These options were used, not least, in the conclusions drawn from the Civil War of 1918. For the victorious White side, the image of society as an acting subject was reinforced: ‘society’ had to robustly defend itself against ‘anti-societal’ ideologies and actions.35 The wide semantic range of yhteiskunnallinen made it linguistically possible to lump many kinds of people together into the same ‘anti-society’ category. The concept could cover anyone from ‘social misfits’ with diagnosed antisocial disorders to individuals guilty of subversion or state treason. The noun form of the word, yhteiskunnanvastaisuus (societal contrariness, societal opposition), could lend itself also to racial hygiene propaganda about the threat of ‘degeneracy’. It was used in just such a way by right-wing debaters when attempting to account for the Red rebellion against the state in the Civil War and in the directions given to guide the creation of ‘a new Finland’.36 In the first decades of the twentieth century, the state’s regulative activities concerning ‘the yhteiskunnallinen question’ were still most often called yhteiskuntapolitiikka, a translation of German Sozialpolitik and Swedish socialpolitik.37 When using the word in this compound form,

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yhteiskunta referred to the specific target of politiikka (policy), mainly class relations and the position of the working class. However, yhteiskunta also brought other connotations to the word: yhteiskunta (i.e. the state) was the party that determined and executed these policies, and these policies in turn promoted and strengthened yhteiskunta (i.e. the prevailing state-maintained social order within the nation state). However, yhteiskunnallinen – or the prefix yhteiskunta- in compound words – was not an unproblematic translation of ‘social’. Obvious difficulties were linked to the distinction between ‘social’ and ‘political’. The vernacular construction of the adjectives for ‘social’ and ‘political’ was based on the distinction between society and state, yhteiskunta and valtio: ‘social’ was yhteiskunnallinen and ‘political’ was valtiollinen. At the same time, yhteiskunta was frequently used synonymously with valtio.38 Translating ‘social’ as yhteiskunnallinen had in some cases proven difficult even before the 1920s. When the Finnish Labour Party approved its socialist programme in 1903, it changed its name to the ‘Social Democratic Party of Finland’, emphasizing social democracy as well as internationalism. From 1917 to 1919, several agencies were formed using sosia(a)li- as a prefix, including sosialitoimituskunta/sosialiministeriö (Ministry of Social Affairs) and sosialihallitus (National Board of Social Affairs). In some cases, the Finnish expression for the Swedish word social was neither sosiaalinen nor yhteiskunnallinen. In the Parliament, which had since 1906 been based on general suffrage and a unicameral organization, the permanent committee preparing social-political issues was called in Swedish socialutskottet, but in Finnish it was työväenasiainvaliokunta (committee for labour issues). This dualism remained until the 1960s. Nevertheless, the synonymity of sosiaalinen and yhteiskunnallinen does not seem to have been an issue yet in the 1920s. Some wrote of ‘the sosiaalinen question’, despite the foreignness of the word. The Swedish-speaking theologian G.G. Rosenqvist did so in his book on this topic, published in 1923 in both Swedish and Finnish, Sociala frågan och socialismen, Sosiaalinen kysymys ja sosialismi (The Social Question and Socialism). However, yhteiskunnallinen was still the favoured term, as when, e.g. the University of Helsinki student journal referred to the Settlement League’s educational activities in working-class areas as yhteiskunnallinen work.39 Signs were emerging in the 1920s and 30s that the Finnish political language was neglecting precisely what was in need of conceptualization. Some were seeking ‘political’ (poliittinen) concepts and options, which would not simply refer to the state (as in valtiollinen), and ‘social’ (sosiaalinen) concepts and options, which would not simply refer to society (as in yhteiskunnallinen). As a result of this trajectory, the meanings of the existing terms valtiollinen and yhteiskunnallinen changed as well.

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Related to the changes was also the fact that yhteiskunta was becoming less and less applicable to communities smaller than that of the nation state.40 Using the concept of society synonymously with the concept of state was made easier by moving to a less vernacular-fixed vocabulary.

Societal and Social Policies The earliest explicit distinction between yhteiskunnallinen (societal) and sosiaalinen (social) may have been drawn by Eino Kuusi, a founding father of the discipline called ‘social policy’ in Finland, in his two-volume textbook Sosialipolitiikka (Social Policy), published in 1931. It was no longer any great novelty that Kuusi did not use the term työväensuojelu (labour protection) in its earlier, broader meaning, which had, until the 1920s, often included not only the risks in working life but the whole range of social-political agendas. What was a novelty was that he also rejected the previously popular yhteiskuntapolitiikka and chose to refer only to sosialipolitiikka from the title onwards. He argued his decision on the grounds that the words produced different effects on the imagination. In his judgement, the word sosialinen: . . . is connected to the feeling of commonality, or mutual aid, which is present in socius (which is toveri (companion, comrade)). Since yhteiskunnallinen also lacks this warmth, yhteiskuntapolitiikka does not quite match the concept. Since we lack any other Finnish alternative, I consider ‘sosialinen’ and ‘sosialipolitiikka’ to be the best choices, as they are also quite well suited to Finnish. The only caveat is to be careful against confusing these words and their meanings with what is meant by ‘sosialistinen’ (socialist as adjective) and ‘sosialismi’, which means something altogether different. 41

However, Eino Kuusi did not by any means abandon yhteiskunta. The motives of social policy in his presentation took into full account the interests, needs, demands and obligations of yhteiskunta. In his argumentation, sosialinen was associated not only with warmth and interactions between people but also with class conflicts, which were a threat to social cohesion and to society itself. Kuusi can be interpreted as wishing to reserve the use of yhteiskunta and yhteiskunnallinen to refer to an essentialist national cohesion, one which had been endangered by the revolution attempted in Finland in 1918. At the same time, a distinction between social and societal also emerged from another perspective. It stemmed from the dualism in how society was related to economy. In the 1930s, new meanings were attached to the distinction between a society associated with national economic in-

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terests and a society associated with social cohesion. This conceptual change was supported by the lessons drawn from the experiences of the Great Depression, and it appears that it was inspired by ideological developments in other Nordic countries. As an attribute of economic life, the adjective directly derived from the word for ‘society’ – in Finnish yhteiskunnallinen, in Swedish samhällelig, in Norwegian and Danish samfundsmessig – was increasingly associated with the principles of a ‘planned economy’, which, during the economic depression of the 1930s, became a popular objective at the international level, albeit with various political colours. According to this line of thought, ‘society’ would actively steer and rationalize the economy, and such steering was ‘societal’.42 Following the example of Scandinavian social democratic parties, Eero A. Wuori’s draft of the Finnish Social Democratic Party’s 1933 economic policy programme spoke of how ‘the anarchical system of capitalistic production’ could be transformed ‘into a plan-based, socialistic system of production under the power and leadership of society’.43 In the 1940s, during and after World War II, the adjective yhteiskunnallinen was in many texts still more explicitly associated with regulation and governance in the name of real economic rationality and rationalization.44 Sosiaalinen, in turn, had a quite different meaning in the context of economic rationalization. It was associated with the delimiting or compensating of those outcomes of economic development that endangered the welfare of those involved (notably the workers) and threatened the cohesion of society. As these concepts became associated with the distinction between public institutions and private life, they also became gendered so that yhteiskunnallinen (societal) came to have a masculine connotation and sosiaalinen (social), in turn, a feminine one. The strong links between the concepts of state and society contributed to the masculine connotations of ‘societal’ that carried over into public power and the domain of public life. As for ‘social’, its meaning was limited to what was between society and the family, or between the public and private domains, and was thereby marked as feminine. In the 1940s, sosiaalinen and social were also adopted in the field of industrial welfare. In large industrial companies, these activities greatly expanded in Finland soon after World War II, carried out predominantly by female ‘social workers’, often under the direction of male ‘social directors’.45 In the 1950s, the yhteiskuntapolitiikka that Eino Kuusi had abandoned in 1931 returned in a new way. In his university textbook Sosiaalipolitiikka (Social Policy), Armas Nieminen defined the hierarchy between the two. Yhteiskuntapolitiikka was the general concept for ‘efforts and measures to organise society so that the conditions of society are regarded as ef-

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ficiently suited and right for the purposes’. Sosiaalipolitiikka was a subconcept for ‘measures intended to ensure a level considered fair in the standard of living, social security and amenities for society’s various groups, families and individuals’. Sosiaalipolitiikka was thus no longer based on a concept of ‘class’ and class conflicts. Nieminen portrayed the actors and interests behind sosiaalipolitiikka in stating that this kind of policy was ‘on the one hand, a practical expression of the common responsibility felt by society for its various groups and citizens; on the other hand, it involves different groups’ own activities aimed at promoting and realising their own self-interests’. He related this tension to another contradiction that drives social policy: planning based on the knowledge of experts and involving compromises between differing goals and interests.46 The inference is that, for Nieminen, yhteiskunta was a social actor functioning as the centre of social solidarity and with the ability to set up projects and goals based on a scientific knowledge of itself. In 1961, Pekka Kuusi, Eino Kuusi’s nephew, published a book on social policy of the 1960s, 60-luvun sosiaalipolitiikka (Social Policy for the 60s) The book was initiated by The Social Policy Association in Finland, and it was later translated into Swedish and English. The book is often regarded as laying out the plan for the Finnish welfare state, but in fact Kuusi did not use the concept of welfare state. Instead, he further developed the hierarchical order between yhteiskuntapolitiikka and sosiaalipolitiikka. His perspective differed from Nieminen’s in that he programmatically treated sosiaalipolitiikka as a component of yhteiskuntapolitiikka and called for the actors of the former to be clear about the general goals of the latter. Pekka Kuusi did not find any essential contradiction between the universal interests of society and the particular interests of various groups, as had Nieminen. Instead, inspired by Gunnar Myrdal’s theory of circular cumulative causation, Kuusi expressed his strong confidence in virtuous circles within modern society: ‘Democracy, social equalization and economic growth seem to be fortunately interrelated in modern society. Social policy seems to spring from free and growth-oriented human nature.’47 Social policy played an important role within this fortunately interconnected society. In such a ‘growth-oriented society’, ‘social’ was no longer a counter-principle to ‘economic’, and the society, ‘our society’, was simultaneously the subject, object and framework of all growthoriented action. Finnish social policy language developed counter to its mainstream uses by the postwar social sciences, which were in Finland greatly influenced by American sociology. The distinction between yhteiskunnallinen and sosiaalinen paralleled the German distinction between gesellschaftlich and sozial, but it was difficult to find support from the English lan-

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guage for this kind of distinction. In any case, in social policy texts the conceptual linkage of social policies with the state was in the 1950s and 60s elaborated through the distinction between societal and social rather than by means of the concept of welfare state.

Welfare Hyvinvointi was the Finnish word for welfare and could be used synonymously with the Swedish word välfärd. However, as noted above, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century there were contexts in which hyvinvointi did not work as a translation of välfärd. It was not applicable as an attribute of governmental, voluntary or private activities or actors. It was not used in compound words. In such connections – for example in the translations välfärdspoliti (welfare polity) for government-related actions and välfärdsanstalter (welfare institutions) for employer-related actions – the words onni (happiness) and menestys (success) appeared as Finnish equivalents to welfare, välfärd and Wohlfahrt, instead of hyvinvointi. However, when the concept of welfare state was introduced in the Finnish vocabulary in the early 1950s, it was not constructed by means of the words for ‘happiness’ or ‘success’ but by extending the usage of hyvinvointi. This linguistic operation had implications with respect to the references, contexts of use and valuations of the concept of welfare state in Finland. On the one hand, the neologism hyvinvointivaltio did not imply any older cameralistic or paternalistic connotations that might have been included in the words Wohlfahrtstaat and välfärdsstat or ‘welfare state’ as such. On the other hand, hyvinvointivaltio was, and is, easy to use as a description of socio-economic circumstances rather than as the agency of the state. The Finnish conceptualization of it seems to have shaped the Swedish political language in Finland. Välfärd never gained such an active role as an integrating attribute of policies as it did in Sweden. The party focusing on the representation of Swedish-speaking Finns, the Swedish People’s Party, added this word to its party programme for the first time in 1964 (välfärdsutvecklingen, ‘welfare development’).48 The concept of welfare state was introduced in the Finnish vocabulary in the early 1950s, but in the following decades it very seldom appeared in programmatic texts where governments and parties described their policies. In the policy programmes of the Finnish parties, hyvinvointivaltio has occasionally appeared since 1954, but it was no earlier than 2003 that the word was for the first time specifically included in a government programme. When specifying and interpreting these findings, it is useful to first focus on the usages of the word ‘welfare’ in such programmatic documents. It appears that, in the defining of political objectives, välfärd

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or hyvinvointi were not used as central concepts before the end of the twentieth century. In the period from the foundation of the republican political system in 1919 until World War II, the political programmes of new governments were introduced in speeches that the prime ministers gave at the beginning of their governments. After World War II, the practice of adopting particular government programmes was established. Only since 2003, however, has an official Swedish version of the whole programme also been published. The length of these programmes greatly increased after the 1980s, as coalition-based majority governments, sitting the whole four-year period between parliamentary elections, became the rule. Before the 1980s, short-term governments, including both majority and minority cabinets, were characteristic of the Finnish political system. Between the end of the Civil War, May 1918, and the end of the Continuation War, September 1944, Finland had twenty-seven governments. Only two of them used the word ‘welfare’ (hyvinvointi) in their programme manifestos. In 1919, Prime Minister Kaarlo Castrén noted in the programme speech of his bourgeois centre-party government that the finances of the state and ‘the welfare of the people’ (kansan hyvinvointi) should be based on ‘the healthy development of agriculture, manufacturing, trade, shipping and other industries’.49 The second time ‘welfare’ appeared was in a speech that Väinö Tanner gave in Parliament in 1926, manifesting the programme of his Social Democratic minority government, which, formed less than ten years after the Civil War and the White victory, was a remarkable phenomenon. In Tanner’s speech, the concept of welfare appeared in a way quite similar to how Castrén had used it – that is, as a word for economic prosperity. Tanner told Parliament that the government was well aware that ‘a necessary precondition of the country’s political (valtiollinen) success was its economic progress and welfare’ and would therefore pay special attention to ‘the further development of the country’s economic forces’.50 In both cases, ‘welfare’ appeared as an outcome of successful economic action that could be supported by correct economic policies. It was not associated with a redistributive role of the state or with any other policy areas other than the economic one. When analysing Finnish conceptualizations in the Nordic context, the vocabulary used by the social democratic parties deserves special attention. Nordic cooperation between social democratic parties and trade unions was reinforced in the 1930s, and it played a significant role as a source of inspiration for the Finnish Social Democrats. In their campaign before the parliamentary elections of 1936, the Finnish Social Democratic Party had ‘welfare’ as one of its main slogans: Hyvinvointia kaikille/ Välstånd åt alla (Welfare for all).51

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Figures 5.1 and 5.2. ‘Welfare for all’, a Social Democratic election poster, 1936, in Finnish and Swedish. Reprinted with permission by The Labour Archive in Finland.

The slogan indicates the influence of the Nordic social democratic community, in which ‘welfare’ had strongly emerged as an objective. However, the way the Finnish Social Democrats used this word differed importantly from how their closest Nordic comrades, the Swedish Social Democrats, politicized it. While the Swedish Social Democrats adopted ‘welfare politics’ (välfärdspolitik) as the overarching concept for integrating their reform policies, the Finnish variant, ‘welfare for all’, referred to outcomes of good policies, the wellbeing of people, rather than to the characteristics of those policies themselves, or to the politics of policies.52 In the Swedish translation, using välstånd instead of välfärd, the difference from Sweden was even more evident. The Social Democratic Party’s slogan during the 1936 electoral campaign did not lead to any breakthrough with respect to ‘welfare’. In 1937, the Social Democratic Party and the Agrarian Party, together with social liberal forces from the smaller National Progressive Party and Swedish People’s Party, formed a joint government inspired by the Scandinavian coalitions of ‘workers and farmers’. The programme speech given by Prime Minister A.K. Cajander of the National Progressive Party did not include the word ‘welfare’, not even in the economic sense in which Tanner had used it in 1926.53 In the Social Democratic Party’s manifesto be-

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fore the 1939 parliamentary election, the expressions ‘general welfare’, ‘the welfare of the whole people’ and ‘the welfare of the countryside’s less advantaged people’ appeared, yet ‘welfare’ did not play any integrative role in the manifesto.54 ‘Welfare for all’ implied the idea of redistribution, yet after the late 1930s ‘welfare’ was still mostly a concept used to describe the outcomes of economic success. After Tanner, it took almost twenty years before the government next added the word ‘welfare’ to its programme manifesto. It was a left-majority government of the Agrarian Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Finnish People’s Democratic League. The last-mentioned organization had been formed by the communists and left-wing social democrats in 1944, after the end of the Continuation War and the emergence of Finnish communism from illegality to legal party status. In the agreement included in the programme manifesto of the new government in 1945, these three equally large parties – the largest parties in Parliament – declared that their coalition aimed to conduct an effectively planned economic policy that would raise ‘the general standard of living and welfare’.55 After two governments in the years 1945–48, there have been in Finland two ‘popular front’ governments in which the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party formed the majority, both during the very rare period of socialist majority in Parliament in the years 1966–70. In addition, the Social Democratic Party twice formed a minority government after World War II: once in the period 1948–50 and again in 1972. The word ‘welfare’ appeared in the programme of one of these four leftwing governments. The programme of Mauno Koivisto’s government in 1968–70 stated that ‘private entrepreneurship aimed at the welfare of our society and people should be effectively supported’.56 True, in a few other government programmes of the 1950s and 60s, ‘welfare’ had been associated not merely with the outcomes of successful economic action but also with a redistributive agency of the state. The programme of Ralf Törngren’s government in 1954, a coalition of the Social Democratic Party and the Agrarian Party, aimed to increase ‘the welfare and social security of our people’ and mentioned social insurance as a means for doing so. According to the programme of the Agrarian Party minority government in 1957, led by V.J. Sukselainen, ‘the economic and social welfare of our people’ was the main objective. The association of welfare with redistributive policies was more pronounced in the programme of Ahti Karjalainen’s government in 1962–63, which had the Agrarian Party as its dominant force but was completed with trade union leaders from the minority faction of the recently divided Social Democratic Party. The government especially wanted to ensure that ‘the wage earners and small-scale farmers who were in a weaker position would

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feel their life secured and increasingly get their share of the growth of our country’s economic, social and educational welfare’.57 It was much later that ‘welfare’ was used in government programmes as part of compound words referring to ‘state’, ‘society’ or ‘policy’. However, such usages had occasionally appeared since the early 1950s in public debates and party programmes.

Welfare State and Its Right-Wing Critics Hyvinvointivaltio seems to have been occasionally used in the first years of the 1950s in translations of foreign news.58 However, it was only in 1954 that it was included in the annual list of new words of the year, published by the popular Finnish ‘citizen’s yearbook’, Mitä, Missä, Milloin (What, Where, When). One of the first to introduce the word hyvinvointivaltio was the young social liberal lawyer Kauko Sipponen, who was impressed by Fabian ideas and British postwar development. In a book published in 1954, in which representatives of different fields of societal life, concealed by pseudonyms, discussed topical national problems, Sipponen defined the welfare state in the context of an East-West confrontation. He had noticed a new way of understanding the role of the state in some Western countries, notably Britain and the Nordic countries, which combined the goal of full employment with the principle of individual freedom. This understanding of the state had resulted in what Sipponen wished to call hyvinvointivaltio (welfare state) or yhteishyvävaltio (common good state).59 The latter conceptual innovation did not enjoy any immediate success,60 though hyvinvointivaltio was gradually, but not always eagerly, adopted in wider use. The first political party programme to use the word hyvinvointivaltio was the Social Democratic Party’s programme for economic policy in 1954, according to which ‘the system of social security’ was ‘a basic feature of the welfare state’. The programme was published for the electoral campaign of 1954, and individual Social Democratic candidates advocated hyvinvointivaltio in their election posters, associating it with full employment and social security.61 However, the word did not gain any central role in Social Democratic rhetoric. In the party congress of 1955, the British president of the Socialist International, Morgan Phillips, was the only one to mention ‘welfare state’,62 and the frequency with which the word was used barely increased in the party congresses of the next couple of decades. To the extent that the word ‘welfare state’ was included in Social Democratic rhetoric, it was a way to manifest a Western and Nordic political

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orientation. In the electoral campaign of 1962, the Social Democratic Party published a full page advertisement in the largest newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, assuring readers that ‘the welfare state (hyvinvointivaltio) is a good thing, it is social democracy’. All countries where the Social Democrats were in charge of development rapidly advanced and built up the welfare state, ‘with our Western neighbouring countries as examples’.63 The formulation indicated that not everyone found the welfare state to be ‘a good thing’. The concept had also been used as a tool of right-wing critiques of public policies. In 1959, in its programme for municipal policy, the conservative National Coalition Party opposed the current ‘efforts of the state to be a “welfare state”’. In its view, left-wing social policy was subordinating the individual to ‘a subservient inmate of a “welfare state” led by a small group of politicians’. Defending the ancient tradition of ‘Nordic democracy’ was a major message of the programme, and the welfare state appeared as a left-wing threat against this tradition. The National Coalition Party had in 1957 adopted the German Christian Democratic Party’s slogan of ‘social market economy’ in its general party programme.64 Thus, one can conclude that the National Coalition Party found not only the welfare state and Nordic democracy but also the welfare state and social market economy as incompatible ideas. In the 1950s, the party also adopted the notion of ‘people’s capitalism’, thus responding to socialist demands and redefining ‘economic democracy’. In a programmatic text from 1966, ‘people’s capitalism’ appeared not only as the concept for the proper meaning of economic democracy but also as the right way to construct a ‘welfare system’. Through owner-occupied housing and by owning a car, television, refrigerator, washing machine, sewing machine and telephone as well as the tools of one’s trade, more and more homes would have a share in ‘the welfare system based on people’s capitalism’ (kansankapitalistinen hyvinvointijärjestelmä). Obviously, this system was supposed to be essentially different from the welfare state, although this concept was not mentioned in the programme.65 True, in the 1960s changes appeared in how the party criticized the welfare state. For representatives of the younger generation, the major concern was excessive confidence in the possibilities of the welfare state to improve people’s living conditions, rather than its fatal societal consequences, as described, for example, in the municipal programme of 1959.66 The Finnish conservatives – that is, the National Coalition Party – found the Social Democrats as their partners in the struggle against communism, and while they contrasted their policies with social democratic social policy ideas, they did so less sharply than did the conservatives in Sweden.67 However, the anti-communist compliance with social-political reforms was not expressed by means of the concept of welfare state.

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In Finland, as in other Nordic countries, the concept of welfare state was in the 1950s also utilized by Churchmen in their critique of governmental interference in the spheres of life in which confidence in God’s will, an individual sense of duty and responsibility, respect for home and family and love for one’s neighbour should prevail. Bishop Eino Sormunen published in 1958 a book entitled Hyvinvointivaltio ja henkinen elämä (The Welfare State and Spiritual Life), in which he argued that it was the task of the Church to prevent the state from developing into ‘a total custodial state’ (totaalinen huoltovaltio) and, by the same token, to strengthen ‘the foundations of the state of law’ (oikeusvaltio). Nevertheless, Sormunen did not share the demonizing critique the Norwegian bishop Eivind Berggrav had a few years earlier targeted against the welfare state, but called for more dialogue and cooperation between the state and the Church.68 In his work on social policy for the 60s (1961), Pekka Kuusi did not use the concept of welfare state. For him, hyvinvointivaltio brought to mind a cowhouse-like image of well-fed people, which he did not want to associate with his message, as he later explained.69 However, the concept did appear in a critique of the book. The philosopher Urpo Harva, a leading figure in Finnish adult education, argued that the welfare state advocated by Kuusi would weaken an individual’s possibilities to develop his or her human personality.70 Indeed, hyvinvointivaltio, to the extent that it was used as a concept describing the role of the state, was until the 1970s most frequently used by right-wing and left-wing critics. As a tool of critique, ‘welfare state’ was often provided with an ironic charge. A popular encyclopaedia called Facta, published in eleven volumes in the years 1969–1974, included a short entry on hyvinvointivaltio. It stated that hyvinvointivaltio referred to the high standard of living and comprehensive social services typical of modern industrialized countries. The concept was often used ‘in an ironic sense’, however, meaning ‘the detailed regulation of all areas by the state power and the restrictions of individual freedom’. The author of the entry seems to have agreed with this critique, as he continued in his characterization of the welfare state by saying the following: ‘In addition, typical defects of the welfare state include that initiative becomes irrelevant, problems concerning the use of leisure increase, and obesity, together with subsequent degenerative diseases, becomes common.’71

Welfare State and Its Left-Wing Critics After the 1954 Social Democratic Party’s programme for economic policy, it took more than ten years before the welfare state was next mentioned

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as a positive policy objective in a party programme. The Finnish People’s Democratic League declared in 1967 that its goal was ‘a high-level independent and democratic welfare and culture state’ (korkean tason itsenäinen ja demokraattinen hyvinvointi- ja kulttuurivaltio/en självständig och demokratisk välfärds- och kulturstat på hög nivå). The programme was based on the idea of extending democracy as the core of political and social reform, and the welfare state, imbued with the attributes ‘high-level’, ‘independent’ and ‘democratic’, appeared as the result of a process of democratization that included, not least, ‘economic democracy’.72 One may interpret the 1967 programme of the Finnish People’s Democratic League as an attempt to redefine ‘welfare state’ by locating the concept within the context of democratization. The League, which included the Communist Party as its major force, had since 1966 – for the first time after 1948 – begun participating in a government coalition together with the Social Democrats and the Centre Party (the former Agrarian Party). In such a situation, incentives emerged for the parties to elaborate a political profile that demonstrated their crucial role as advocates of democratization. On the other hand, the programmes of the League had from the first beginning, since 1944, highlighted ‘democracy’ instead of ‘socialism’. The Finnish People’s Democratic League had aimed to become a wide alliance of different ‘democratic forces’, among whom the Communist Party was supposed to represent the working class and define its socialist mission. The League’s 1967 programme was published in the year of the 50th anniversary of Finland’s independence. The concept of welfare state had gained some popularity in historical accounts of the nation’s successful development. Jouko Siipi, an assuredly non-socialist researcher of social policy, published a book on Finland’s road ‘from poverty to a welfare state’.73 In such accounts, hyvinvointivaltio referred to social and economic circumstances rather than to the functions of the state, thus actualizing ‘wellbeing’ as one meaning of hyvinvointi. In its programme of 1967, the Finnish People’s Democratic League also used ‘welfare state’ in a similar manner – that is, as a description of social circumstances within a nation state, yet one that pointed towards a brighter future. At the same time, the combination of the attributes ‘democratic’ and ‘independent’ was obviously targeted against those who found the League and its communists a threat to the existing democracy and independence of Finland. In the Finnish Social Democratic Party, a split had taken place in the late 1950s, and it prevailed until the end of 1960s. The new party, the Social Democratic League of Workers and Small-Scale Farmers, had its background in social democratic trade unionism, but it did not receive

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Figure 5.3. From Poverty to a Welfare State. In Jouko Siipi’s book from 1967, hyvinvointivaltio primarily referred to improved living conditions and changes in social and occupational structures. Reprinted with permission by Tammi Publishers.

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much electoral support. In 1967, the party adopted a radical leftist programme, and it was here that the concept ‘welfare policy’ or ‘welfare politics’ (hyvinvointipolitiikka) for the first time appeared in a Finnish party programme. The programme contrasted ‘the so called welfare politics’, aimed to preserve capitalism and large income and wealth gaps, with ‘socialist welfare politics’.74 The attribute ‘so called’ indicates that the authors of the programme were familiar with the expression ‘welfare politics’. However, the 1967 programme of the Social Democratic League of Workers and Small-Scale Farmers and that of the Finnish People’s Democratic League did not imply any breakthrough in the understanding of ‘welfare politics/policy’ or, respectively, ‘welfare state’. Hyvinvointivaltio as a characterization of present conditions in Finland appeared in a programme put forward by the Centre Party in 1968, which advocated for more regional policies to ensure ‘the constant success of the welfare state’.75 In 1974, the Swedish People’s Party included ‘democratic welfare and equality policies’ (demokratisk välfärds- och jämlikhetspolitik) in its programme. However, ‘welfare’ as an attribute of the state or its policies gained wider popularity in party programmes only after the concept of welfare state began to mean a historical achievement that had to be defended against external pressures. In the parties carrying on the socialist tradition, different ways of relating the ‘welfare state’ to ‘socialism’ had appeared. In 1968, in Sosialistinen Aikakauslehti (Socialist Journal), put out by the Social Democratic Party, Ahti M. Salonen argued for ‘a democratic welfare state’ as an alternative to ‘socialization’, whereas Olavi Jäminki, in turn, identified the welfare state with socialism, which he warmly supported.76 However, advocating the welfare state as a substitute for socialism, as the content of socialism or as a step towards socialism did not achieve any central role in Finnish political debates. In the party congresses of the Social Democratic Party, the concept of welfare state was very rarely used in the 1970s. The guidelines the party congress of 1975 approved for the future elaboration of party programmes mentioned ‘the future of the so-called welfare society’ (ns. hyvinvointiyhteiskunta) and the associated problems of taxation and redistribution in the list of important issues but only after ‘the future of growth-aimed economic policy’ and ‘the need for a planned economy and the objectives of socialist economic policy’.77 In the next party congress, in 1978, a programme for Social Democratic Party politics in the 1980s was approved. ‘Welfare state’ was not included in the programme. The extension of ‘public welfare services’ was mentioned in connection with job creation, and ‘welfare society’ appeared once in a sentence stating that increasing the resources allotted for culture and leisure was an

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essential feature of a welfare society. The congress repeated the 1975 guidelines for future programme work, including the item concerning ‘the future of the so-called welfare society’.78 The critique of the idea of the welfare state became a largely shared feature in Marxist social sciences as they strengthened and developed in Western Europe in the 1970s. ‘Welfare state’ provided ideological legitimation for a new stage of the bourgeois state. The state in capitalist society was doomed to be incapable of keeping its promise to provide comprehensive welfare, implicated by the very concept of welfare state. In any case, the crisis of capitalism, so evident according to 1970s Marxist diagnoses, was a crisis of the welfare state as well. The extension of state interventions and corporatist forms of interest representation were conceptualized, for example, by means of the theory of state-monopolistic capitalism in particular and not only in Marxist-Leninist variants of Marxism. In Finland, all these aspects of the Marxist critique of the welfare state appeared especially in the follow-up to international theoretical discussions.79 However, the limited role of the ‘welfare state’ as a tool for justifying current circumstances or as an integrative concept for reformist policy objectives implied that it did not work well as a target of effective social critique either. After the mid 1970s, three books were published that presented, from different Marxist perspectives, general historical accounts of modern Finnish society: the first one was on the history of the labour movement, the second on the past and present of Finnish democracy and the third on Finnish capitalism. The concept of welfare state was almost absent from these texts.80 The authors of the last-mentioned book, Suomalainen kapitalismi (Finnish Capitalism, 1979), noticed that the way Pekka Kuusi had in 1961 advocated for ‘social democracy’ resembled discussions about ‘the welfare state’ or ‘the social state’ in many Western European countries. They assessed, however, that such discussion had not enjoyed widespread popularity, and the main reason for this was the fact that ‘class antagonisms had in Finland remained relatively strong, making it impossible to talk about a shift to a classless society, as one usually talks in the discussion on “the welfare state”’. The crisis of capitalism in the 1970s had, then, buried any talks about the changed nature of contemporary society, the authors concluded.81 In retrospect, the 1970s and 1980s was a period of great welfare-state expansion in Finland. It was also a period in which much of the left-wing critique of the welfare state moved, via international discussions on ‘the crisis of the welfare state’, to defence of the welfare state against the neoliberal politics of market-based deregulation. Researchers gradually adopted the ‘welfare state’ as their analytical concept and began to talk

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about ‘a Nordic model’ or ‘Nordic models’. The lead author of Suomalainen kapitalismi (1979), Pekka Kosonen, completed and published in 1987 his sociological dissertation on the challenges to the welfare state and, especially, to the Nordic models.82

Welfare State and Welfare Society The era of the expanding welfare state ended in Finland in the early 1990s. Experiences of the emergence of neoliberalism, the globalization of capitalism, the end of the Cold War, the new phase of European integration and the deep economic crisis in Finland all became intertwined. The conclusions implied that much of the previous left-wing critique had turned into a defence of the welfare state, and use of the concept increased at this time. Neoliberal arguments for a radical deregulation emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s, yet by the turn of the century all political parties and interest groups began to talk warmly and sympathetically about the welfare state. An ambiguous part of these changes was the increased popularity of the concept of a welfare society. It had now and then appeared in descriptions of social and economic conditions, interchangeably being used with that of ‘welfare state’. Since the late 1970s, in connection with the diagnoses of ‘the crisis of the welfare state’ and based on the advice of the OECD, the concept of ‘welfare society’ was internationally adopted as a tool of critique for what was seen as an overly large public sector and a bureaucratic and patronizing welfare state.83 The conceptual distinction between state and society was linked with the international emergence of ‘civil society’ in the 1980s as a concept used to refer to the sphere of private and voluntary actors and activities. In Sweden, the right-wing critics of the welfare state argued that the conceptual confusion of state and society was a sign of the type of social democratic totalitarianism that should be opposed by revitalizing civil society.84 The international debate in general and, once again, the Swedish impulses in particular played a role in Finland. The concept of civil society, kansalaisyhteiskunta, was used as a critique of the welfare state, although apparently to a less extent than in Sweden. The concept of welfare society, hyvinvointiyhteiskunta, was made use of by those demanding less state and more market. In the 1994 party programme of a short-lived neoliberal party, the Young Finns, the principal slogan was ‘The Activating Welfare Society’.85 However, in Finland as well as in other Nordic countries, any attempt to create a political alternative by replacing ‘state’ with ‘society’ faced

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the heavy constraints of old conceptual conventions. ‘Welfare society’ could actually be used to support the legitimacy of the welfare state because, within the Nordic tradition, ‘society’ represents the general and public against the particular and private and is a warm and fuzzy term for the state. In Finland, it was, and still is, easy to use ‘welfare state’ as a concept referring to wellbeing in society and ‘welfare society’ as a concept referring to functions of the state. Any attempt to operate with the distinction between welfare state and welfare society needs a clarifying explanation: one has to state clearly that he or she is advocating a welfare society in opposition to an excess of governmental intervention (as did the Young Finns in 1994) or defending the welfare state against the policies of privatization (as did the small Communist Party in 2004 by supporting ‘a democratic welfare state’).86 It has been much easier to make use of the ambiguities of the concepts to legitimate one’s own political objectives and also conceal controversies regarding the welfare state and, thus, facilitate consensual politics. Thus, in the programmes of the Social Democratic Party, ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare society’ have been used interchangeably. After preparatory discussions held in the mid 1970s, including those expressing concern about ‘the future of the so-called welfare society’ in the aforementioned guidelines of the 1975 and 1978 party congresses, the Social Democratic Party adopted a new basic party programme in 1987. In its introduction, the new programme interpreted the contents of earlier programmes in a way that indicated a change concerning the role of the welfare state in the party’s historical understanding of itself. The preceding basic programme had dated back to 1952. While sharply condemning communism as an anti-democratic political force, it had been based on a Marxist view of social transformation and political agency. The inherent laws of capitalist development and the social democratic focus on class-based politics would together lead to a ‘socialist planned economy’.87 The 1952 programme had replaced the first explicitly socialist programme of the Social Democratic Party, adopted in 1903. This programme, following German and Austrian models, had emphasized class struggle, the need to refrain from collaborating with the bourgeoisie and the international character of capitalism and its proletarian, social democratic counter-force. In addition to supporting the main goal of socialism, the 1903 programme presented a list of what were characterized as shortterm objectives, including universal suffrage, equality between men and women, free healthcare and education and an eight-hour work day.88 In the new programme of 1987, the old objectives were interpreted as guidelines for politics that had been able to move Finland ‘in the direction of a welfare state corresponding to social democratic objectives’ and ‘to

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take the first steps towards economic democracy’. The concept of welfare state as such did not appear elsewhere in the 1987 programme. The concept of socialism, specified by means of the attribute ‘democratic’, still played a significant role in the programme, and this ‘democratic socialism’ did not only refer to ‘values’ of current social democratic politics but also to the principles of future society.89 The programme was still framed via a particular mode of thought, according to which different societal systems were constantly competing in the world, including competing visions of a socialist society. However, the historical account of previous programmes and the ambiguous usage of socialism made it possible to read the programme as suggesting that the welfare state and economic democracy were the final goals of social democratic politics – that is, the contents of democratic socialism. Breaking its tradition of prescribing long-lasting basic programmes, the Social Democratic Party renewed the programme already in 1999. ‘Socialism’ still appeared in the programme, yet it no longer referred to societal structures but only to ‘values’ that informed social democratic politics and were ‘deeply rooted in the whole of democratic Europe’. In the post-Cold War framing, the option of viewing socialism as an alternative to the capitalist system as well as the possibility of divergent visions of a socialist society were pushed aside. The previous struggle of Social Democrats against ‘capitalism and communism’ occurred in parallel with their current struggle against ‘ultra-liberalism and social conservatism’. The concepts of welfare state and economic democracy were absent from the programme. Instead, ‘welfare society’ was used in their place. By virtue of its ambiguity, the concept made it possible to view the programme as advocating and defending the welfare state – given the Finnish and wider Nordic use of ‘society’ as a friendly synonym for ‘state’ – or as an announcement that the Social Democrats acknowledged that non-governmental actors as well were important for promoting people’s possibilities ‘to take part in society’.90 One can conclude that at the level of party programmes, the Social Democrats clearly avoided drawing any contrasts between ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare society’. The consensual employment of the ambiguities of these words, especially of ‘welfare society’, also appears in governmental programmes.

Making Consensual Use of Conceptual Ambiguities It was not until 1987 that any Finnish government programme included ‘welfare’ (hyvinvointi) as part of a compound word. A political coalition

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was achieved between the Social Democratic Party and the conservative National Coalition Party, with Harri Holkeri from the latter party serving as prime minister. The government declared that it was committed to striving for ‘a modern and equal welfare society on our own national basis’.91 The government broke the tradition of coalitions based on the Social Democrats and the Centre Party. It also ended the more that twenty-year period in which the National Coalition Party had remained outside government. This had been partly due to Urho Kekkonen’s, president of Finland from 1956 to 1981, view of what the Finnish-Soviet relationship required. On the other hand, the National Coalition Party had increased its electoral support in the 1970s and 1980s. Many of its voters were salaried employees, often educated women in modestly paid jobs of the expanded welfare state. The party had adopted the view in its programmes of the 1970s that individual choice could be promoted via equality-oriented social and educational policies, and this view was expressed by modifying the 1950s slogan ‘social market economy’ to read ‘social choice economy’ (sosaalinen valintatalous).92 The formulation of the ‘blue-red’ government programme in 1987 on welfare society did not include anything that would not have been problematic for the National Coalition Party. The emphasis on ‘our own national basis’ in the programme was obviously the party’s achievement and was probably meant to take a certain distance from Swedish examples. In a speech to the party faithful in 1987, Holkeri declared that the work of the party would be completed by ‘the support of the modern middle class’. It would result in ‘a welfare state without patronage’ and ‘progress without socialism’.93 The National Coalition Party and Centre Party formed the next government in 1991, and both were satisfied with just using the word hyvinvointi only once in their programme manifesto, and even then only in the sense of wellbeing (‘citizens’ health and wellbeing’). ‘Welfare society’ returned to this category of political documents in 1995, after the deep economic crisis of the early 1990s. The leader of Social Democratic Party, Paavo Lipponen, formed the so-called rainbow government, in which parties ranging from the National Coalition Party to the Greens and the Left Alliance, the recently founded successor to the Finnish People’s Democratic League, were represented. In its programme manifesto of 1995, the government noted that ‘the core of welfare society’ consisted of social and health services, income-related social security and basic social security, which could only be rescued by cutting down on spending: ‘the Finnish welfare society will be reformed so that it corresponds to our own resources and the citizens can accept it as just, effective and fair.’ The programme also noted that the welfare of citizens would be promoted by

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lower income taxes and by membership and active participation in the European Union.94 Lipponen continued as prime minister in the government formed by the same political coalition after the parliamentary election of 1999. In the government programme, hyvinvointi appeared more frequently than it had previously and was associated with what was achieved by encouraging individual initiative as well as with development policies. The programme talked of ‘welfare services’ (hyvinvointipalvelut), which was the first time any government programme had done so. It was also the first time that a government programme added the word ‘Nordic’ as an attribute of the ‘welfare society’: ‘The point of departure for the government’s social policy is to preserve the Nordic welfare society.’95 The popularity of ‘welfare’ and ‘welfare society’ still increased in the programme of the government formed after the parliamentary election of 2003. After eight years in opposition, the Centre Party, now the largest party, returned to government as part of a coalition that included the Social Democrats and the Swedish People’s Party. The government was for a brief period of time lead by Anneli Jäätteenmäki of the Centre Party, then by Matti Vanhanen of the same party. In the introduction to its programme, which now for the first time had an official Swedish version as well, the government combined welfare and security: ‘The government will reinforce the security of citizens by continuing the stable line of foreign and security politics of our country and by developing the welfare society, which enjoys widespread support among the citizens.’ Moreover, ‘welfare state’ was now for the first time included in the government programme. According to the introduction of the programme, ‘By means of its politics for work, entrepreneurship and solidarity, the government will develop the welfare state and welfare society (hyvinvointivaltio ja -yhteiskunta/välfärdsstat och välfärdssamhälle) that has been during the previous decades successfully built up by wide collaboration’.96 The expression including both state and society probably reflected an awareness of arguments operating around the distinction between ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare society’, but the programme did not make use of this distinction. The focus was on the consensual interpretation of the welfare state/welfare society as a joint national achievement to be defended. The practice of the two largest parties building the basis for a governmental coalition, adopted since the late 1980s, resulted in 2007 in a coalition government that included the Centre Party, the National Coalition Party, the Greens and the Swedish People’s Party, with Matti Vanhanen as prime minister. Its programme manifested the popularity of the vocabulary of welfare/wellbeing (hyvinvointi in Finnish, välfärd or välbefinnande in Swedish). Yet, the programme did not include ‘welfare state’,

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only ‘welfare society’, in its conventionally ambiguous usage. In relation to the series of government programmes, a novelty of this programme was the concept of ‘welfare policy’ (hyvinvointipolitiikka/välfärdspolitik). It was used as the name for one of several policy areas, notably the area containing social and health policies, working life issues and employment policy.97 The administrative usage of the concept was clearly different from the way in which the Swedish Social Democrats had in the 1930s adopted ‘welfare politics’ as the main concept for integrating their major political objectives. It was also different from how the concept had occasionally appeared in Finland in left-wing efforts to contrast capitalist and socialist welfare politics. In the parliamentary election of 2011, the populist Finns Party98 grew remarkably, and there were now four ‘big’ parties in the country: the National Coalition Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Finns Party and the Centre Party. After difficult negotiations, a government was formed consisting of the National Coalition Party and the Social Democrats together with the Greens, the Left Alliance, the Swedish People’s Party and the Christian Democratic Party. The programme of the government, led by Jyrki Katainen of the National Coalition Party, was written with a rhetoric effectively concealing controversies between the different coalition parties and the shock caused by the rise of the anti-EU and anti-immigration Finns Party. The programme began by introducing two expressions that were novelties in Finnish governmental programmes, ‘the Nordic welfare state’ and ‘the Nordic welfare model’: The aim of Jyrki Katainen’s government is a caring and successful Finland. Finland will be developed as a Nordic welfare state and as a society that carries its responsibility not only for its own citizens but also at the international level as a part of the Nordic countries, Europe and the world.99

The programme continued by convincing the public that ‘the Nordic welfare model, based on a high level of employment, competitive economy, equal services and care’ had proved to be ‘the best societal system’. Hints at impending austerity politics were covered up via such expressions as ‘the strengthening of the basic structures of the welfare society’ and ensuring ‘the sustainable financing of the welfare state’. The concept of welfare policy was used in a similar way as it had appeared in the programme of the preceding government – that is, as an administrative-type name for a particular policy area. A considerable change in the style in which government programmes were written took place after the parliamentary election of 2015. A government was formed consisting of the Centre Party, the National Coali-

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tion Party and the Finns Party. Its programme was written in accordance with the ideals of strategic business management, reflecting the entrepreneurial background of Prime Minister Juha Sipilä of the Centre Party. ‘Welfare/wellbeing’ appeared in the programme, but ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare policy/politics’ did not. ‘Welfare society’ was mentioned once, namely as the first strength in a table listing the strengths and weaknesses of Finland: ‘Finland is a competent, persistent, egalitarian and solution-seeking welfare society.’100 While the participation of the Finns Party in the government101 corresponds to a Finnish tradition of integration as a means of handling political protest, signs of a fragmenting consensus began to emerge in the middle of the 2010s.102 True, the Sipilä government managed to help broker a central agreement between trade unions and employer organizations on measures aimed to improve the competitiveness of Finland by increasing working hours and diminishing some social benefits. However, business life organizations have subsequently even more vigorously argued against a national system of labour market agreements. In the planning of a large reform of social and health services, the Sipilä government is aiming to strengthen the role of private service providers in a way harshly opposed by the red-green opposition. Ideas of a radical deconstruction of public and collective social regulation have been developed in right-wing think-tanks. However, rescuing the welfare state – or usually interchangeably, the welfare society – is one of the most widely shared arguments in Finnish politics in the 2010s. Those concerned about economic competitiveness or advocating austerity politics motivate these concerns by the necessity to create or rescue resources for the welfare state. The welfare state is used as an argument for restrictive immigration policies as well as for the promotion of labour immigration. Those defending the welfare state against the pressures of globalized capitalism argue that the welfare state actually generates competitive advantages by means of its security networks and risk-sharing systems. Rescuing the welfare state seems to be a goal that sanctifies the means and a means that sanctifies the goal.

Conclusion: The Welfare State and the National Narrative Historiallinen Aikakauskirja (Historical Journal), the leading Finnish scholarly journal of history, published in 1992 a special issue on ‘Finland and the Finns’ in honour of the 75th anniversary of Finland’s national sovereignty. The issue included an article on ‘the welfare state in Finland’ (Hyvinvointivaltio Suomessa), written by the sociologist Matti Alestalo. He

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noted that in Finnish vocabularies, hyvinvointivaltio had not achieved so self-evident a position as välfärdsstat had in Swedish. He was obviously referring to a crucial difference between Finland and Sweden: one could hardly have found much evidence on any difference between the vocabularies of Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking Finns in this respect. Alestalo was nevertheless motivated to use this concept and argued that Finland no doubt was a welfare state. After describing the building of the welfare state as part of a catch-up process by a Western European and Nordic latecomer, he discussed contemporary tendencies towards a retrenchment of the welfare state and warned about the outcomes of such politics in a society in which the welfare state was deeply rooted in social structures.103 Indeed, until the 1980s conceptual tools other than ‘welfare state’ had mostly been employed to define social problems and solutions in Finland. One effective tool had been the concept of society (yhteiskunta in Finnish, samhälle in Swedish), provided as it was with normative and descriptive capacities and with the properties of being an agent and a target of agency at the same time. It was, and is, often used – as in other Nordic countries – as a synonym for ‘state’, referring to the state as an ethical entity and thus legitimating governmental interventions into social relations. ‘Welfare state’, or ‘welfare society’, was not a must in terms of how Finnish governments chose to define their political agendas. In government programmes, the concept of welfare (hyvinvointi, välfärd) was since the 1950s occasionally associated with the redistributive role of the state, but it was only in 1987 that it appeared in a government programme as part of a compound word, namely ‘welfare society’. The word ‘welfare state’ was for the first time included in a Finnish government programme in 2003. The attribute ‘Nordic’ appeared in front of ‘welfare society’ in 1999, and in the 2011 government programme Finland was for the first time referred to as ‘a Nordic welfare state’, representing ‘the Nordic welfare model’, the best societal system in the world. In Finland, the concepts of welfare state and welfare society, or welfare politics, never played a major future-oriented role as ‘tools for steering historical movement’ (Koselleck). ‘Welfare state’ and ‘welfare society’, often provided with the attribute ‘Nordic’, did achieve the position of key concepts in Finnish national narratives, but this only occurred during a phase when they came to refer to the existing valuable achievements of past politics, to be defended and rescued. Between the 75th anniversary (1992) and the 100th anniversary (2017) of Finland’s independence, public constructions of the national past in Finland became based on two major pillars: the wars of the twentieth

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century and the making of a Nordic welfare state. Sometimes they represent rival ideas about the historical core of national agency but they also become intertwined, not least in how national politics are described as the action of internal will responding to compelling external threats and challenges. Ideological associations with joint efforts during wartime are evoked, for example, by the Finnish word talkoot, meaning that the members of a community voluntarily, out of an internal sense of duty, cooperate in completing an urgent task. The word was constantly used to describe activities on the home front during the World War II. The need for a national talkoot to rescue the welfare state is a favourite phrase when advocating many divergent and controversial political objectives, including austerity politics, consensual corporatism or improved competitiveness. In international scholarly discussion, the concept of competition state emerged in the early 1990s, referring to how the nation states are being reshaped by the imperatives of national competitiveness in a globalized capitalist world.104 Likewise in Finland, researchers have accounted for the move from a welfare state to a competition state or from a welfare state to a workfare state.105 These accounts critically question a rhetoric that tries to justify any policies as necessary reforms for saving the welfare state or welfare society. At the same time, however, such an understanding of current changes may also contribute to the national(istic) narrative of the welfare state as a long-term national project. In any case, by the mid 2010s an affirmative use of the concept ‘competition state’ to describe a post-welfare state stage of progress has not gained any significant support in Finland, while, on the other hand, rescuing the welfare state is rarely discussed by envisioning any transnational extension of the concept.106 Pauli Kettunen is Professor of Political History at Helsinki University. He has published extensively on topics such as labour relations, the Nordic welfare model, the history of the Finnish welfare state and the conceptual history of politics.

NOTES 1. Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 251. 2. Cf. the different country chapters in this volume; Pauli Kettunen, ‘The Language of Social Politics in Finland’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 157–76.

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3. See the chapter on Sweden in this volume. 4. Matti Alestalo, ‘Hyvinvointivaltio Suomessa’, Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 90 (1992), 233–34. 5. Pauli Kettunen, ‘The Nordic Model and Consensual Competitiveness in Finland’, in Anna-Maija Castrén, Markku Lonkila and Matti Peltonen (eds), Between Sociology and History: Essays on Microhistory, Collective Action, and Nation-Building (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2004), 289–309. 6. This chapter is part of the authors’s work in the research project Nationalism and Democracy in the Welfare State, funded in 2013–17 by the Academy of Finland, Research Council for Culture and Society. 7. This three-aspect distinction comes from Quentin Skinner, ‘Language and Political Change’, in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russel L. Hanson (eds) Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 8–22. 8. Helsingin Sanomat, the largest newspaper in modern Finland, has expanded digital access to more recent times, and in a late phase of this study, I made unsystematic use of this material. The POHTIVA database – Poliittisten ohjelmien tietovaranto, http://www.fsd.uta.fi/pohtiva, contains programmes and platforms. The government’s online resources, http://valtioneuvosto.fi, has the government declarations. 9. Risto Alapuro, State and Revolution in Finland (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Matti Klinge, The Finnish Tradition: Essays on Structures and Identities in the North of Europe (Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1993); Tuija Pulkkinen, ‘One Language, One Mind: The Nationalist Tradition in Finnish Political Culture’, in Tuomas M.S. Lehtonen (ed.), Europe’s Northern Frontier: Perspectives on Finland’s Western Identity (Jyväskylä: PS-Kustannus, 1999), 118–37. 10. Cf. Malcolm Spector and John I. Kitsuse, Constructing Social Problems, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001). 11. Lars Trägårdh (ed.), Civilt samhälle kontra offentlig sektor (Stockholm: SNS Förlag, 1995). 12. On this, see the Introduction and the chapter on Sweden in this volume. 13. Manfred Riedel, ‘Gesellschaft, bürgerliche’, in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, 8 vols (Stuttgart: KlettCotta, 1972–97), vol. 2, 719–800; Norberto Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship: The Nature and Limits of State Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989); John Heilbron, The Rise of Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 14. Kettunen, ‘The Nordic Model’, 289–309. 15. Pauli Kettunen, ‘Yhteiskunta – “Society” in Finnish’, Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought 4 (2000), 173–75. 16. Yrjö Koskinen [Y.K.], ‘Työväen-seikka 1–3’, Kirjallinen Kuukauslehti (1874), 4. 17. Ilkka Liikanen, Fennomania ja kansa: Joukkojärjestäytymisen läpimurto ja Suomalaisen puolueen synty (Helsinki: SHS, 1995).

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18. Agathon Meurman, ‘Rikkauden jaosta (Esitelmä pidetty joulukuussa 1886)’, in Esitelmiä Kansataloudellisessa yhdistyksessä: 1:nen osa. Kansataloudellisen yhdistyksen toimituksia (Porvoo: WSOY, 1893), 30, 35–36. 19. ‘Sosialidemokraattisen puolueen ohjelma: Hyväksytty Forssan puoluekokouksessa 17.–20.8.1903’. POHTIVA – Poliittisten ohjelmien tietovaranto, http:// www.fsd.uta.fi/pohtiva/ohjelmalistat/SDP/445. 20. Marta Petrusewicz describes similar kinds of periphery perspectives and intellectual activities in the case of Poland, Ireland and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Marta Petrusewicz, ‘The Modernisation of the European Periphery; Ireland, Poland, and the Two Sicilies, 1820–1870: Parallell and Connected, Distinct and Comparable’, in Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor (eds), Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-national Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2004), 145–65. 21. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1962), 356–63. 22. George M. Fredrickson, The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Glenda Sluga, ‘The Nation and the Comparative Imagination’, in Cohen and O’Connor, Comparison and History, 103–15; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 23. Dieter Senghaas, Von Europa lernen: Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtungen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982); Rune Slagstad, De nasjonale strateger (Oslo: Pax, 1998). 24. Keith Tribe, Governing Economy: The Reformation of German Economic Discourse in 1750–1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 25. Johan Philip Palmén, Juridisk handbok för medborgerlig bildning (Helsinki: Frenckell, 1859); Johan Philip Palmén, La’in-opillinen käsikirja: Yhteiseksi sivistykseksi (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 1863). His interest in Von Mohl and his use of välfärdspoliti also appears in ‘Helsingfors’, Finlands Allmänna Tidning, 19 February 1861. 26 .Carl Frithiof Vendell [C.F.V.], ‘Den socialdemokratiska skolans angrepp mot egendomen och dess nuvarande fördelning’, Album utgifvet af nyländningar 7 (1878), 73. 27. ‘Betydelsen af den franska ministerkrisens lösning’, Nya Pressen, 28 June 1899. 28. ‘Utlandet: Utrikespolitiska bref’, Björneborgs Tidning, 10 December 1901; ‘Politisk öfversikt’, Wiborgs Nyheter, 10 December 1901. 29. ‘Ryssland: Ifrågasatt reorganisation af polisen’, Nya Pressen, 8 September 1907; ‘Kejsardömet: Polisväsendets omorganisering’, Hufvudstadsbladet, 17 November 1907. 30. Palmén, La’in-opillinen käsikirja, 259. 31. ‘Sammanträden: Tekniska föreningen’, Nya Pressen, 6–7 September 1883; ‘Yleisiä kotimaan uutisia’, Ilmarinen, 18 September 1883.

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32. Pauli Kettunen, Suojelu, suoritus, subjekti: Työsuojelu teollistuvan Suomen yhteiskunnallisissa ajattelu- ja toimintatavoissa (Helsinki: SHS, 1994), 255–58; Jussi Vauhkonen, Elatuksesta eläkkeeseen: Vanhuudenturva suomalaisessa työnantajapolitiikassa työeläkejärjestelmän rakentamiseen saakka (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, 2016), 75–80. 33. Heimer Björkqvist, Den nationalekonomiska vetenskapens utveckling i Finland intill år 1918 (Turku: Åbo Akademi, 1986), 517–27; Sakari Heikkinen et al., The History of Finnish Economic Thought 1809–1917: History of Learning and Science in Finland 1828–1918 (Helsinki: Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters, 2000), 181. 34. Koskinen, ‘Työväen-seikka’, 93–94. 35. Mirja Satka, Making Social Citizenship: Conceptual Practices from the Finnish Poor Law to Professional Social Work (Jyväskylä: SoPhi, 1995), 69–91; Pauli Kettunen, ‘Yhteiskunta’, in Matti Hyvärinen et al. (eds), Käsitteet liikkeesssä: Suomen poliittisen kulttuurin käsitehistoria (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2003), 191–93. 36. An extreme example is Martti Pihkala, Minkälainen Suomi meidän on luotava? (Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1918). 37. E.g. Leo Ehrnrooth, Nykyaikainen yhteiskuntapolitiikka (Porvoo: WSOY, 1913). 38. It is noteworthy that the word politiikka appeared mostly as a compound stem meaning ‘policy’. In this way, it did not refer to political activity, or to politics, but to the result of politics. In a general way, this expresses a stateto-society direction. Politics – i.e. the battles and compromises that precede policies – were rarely called politiikka until the 1920s. The common expression had been valtiollinen toiminta, thus casting politics as ‘actions within the state’, or as activities pertaining to or taken on behalf of the state. The phrase valtiollinen toiminta lent itself to efforts to achieve or defend valtiollinen kansanvalta (political democracy) and the socialist labour movement was engaged in a valtiollinen luokkataistelu (political class struggle). 39. K.E.P.H., ‘Tunne yhteiskuntasi’, Ylioppilaslehti 8(14) (1920), 168–69; K.E.P.H., ‘Yhteiskunnallista työtä’, Ylioppilaslehti 8(24) (1920), 288–89; K.E.P.H. ‘Isänmaallisuus ja yhteiskunnallisuus’, Ylioppilaslehti 12(13) (1924), 232. The author’s name is unknown. 40. Kettunen, ‘Yhteiskunta’, 198–99. 41. Eino Kuusi, Sosialipolitiikka, 2 vols (Porvoo: WSOY, 1931), 13–14. 42. Slagstad, De nasjonale strateger, 192. 43. ‘Suomen Sosialidemokraattisen Puolueen talouspoliittiset suuntaviivat’, in Pöytäkirja Suomen Sosialidemokraattisen Puolueen XVI puoluekokouksesta Tampereella 25–18.5.1933 (Helsinki, 1934), 119. 44. E.g. Pekka Railo, Tie yhteiskunnalliseen suunnitelmatalouteen (Tampere: Työväen Sivistysliitto, 1942). – True, at the same time yhteiskunnallinen could still sometimes appear in the context of social policy as a vernacular synonyme of sosiaalinen. Satka, Making Social Citizenship, 158.

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45. Kettunen, ‘Yhteiskunta’, 195–196; Vauhkonen, Elatuksesta eläkkeeseen, 75–80. 46. Armas Nieminen, Mitä on sosiaalipolitiikka: Tutkimus sosiaalipolitiikan käsitteen ja järjestelmän kehityksestä (Helsinki: WSOY, 1955), 43, 95. 47. Pekka Kuusi, 60-luvun sosiaalipolitiikka (Porvoo: WSOY, 1961), 8; Pekka Kuusi, Social Policy for the Sixties: A Plan for Finland (Helsinki: Finnish Social Political Association, 1964), 34. 48. Svenska Folkpartiet, Program för Svenska Folkpartiet i Finland (1964). 49. ‘Pääministeri Kaarlo Castrénin hallituksen ohjelma: Castrénin ohjelmapuhe valtioneuvoston yleisessä istunnossa 22.4.1919’. http://valtioneuvosto.fi/tiet oa/historiaa/hallitusohjelmat. 50. ‘Pääministeri Väinö Tannerin hallituksen ohjelma: Tannerin tiedonanto hallituksen ohjelmasta eduskunnan täysistunnossa 13.12.1926’. http://valtione uvosto.fiicv/tietoa/historiaa/hallitusohjelmat. 51. SDP.n eduskuntavaaliteemoja 1907–1999 (Helsinki: Työväen Arkisto, 1999); Museot Finna, Eduskuntavaalijulisteet 1936. https://museot.finna.fi/Search/ Results?lookfor=eduskuntavaalijulisteet+1936. 52. See Edling’s chapter on Sweden. 53. ‘Pääministeri A.K. Cajanderin ohjelmapuhe valtioneuvoston yleisessä istunnossa 12.3.1937’. http://valtioneuvosto.fi/tietoa/historiaa/hallitusohjelmat. 54. Pöytäkirja Suomen Sosialidemokraattisen Puoluen XVIII puoluekokouksesta, joka pidettiin Turun työväenyhdistyksen talossa toukokuun 18–20 päivinä 1939 (Helsinki, 1940), 106–9. 55. ‘Pääministeri J.K. Paasikiven III hallituksen ohjelma 17.4.1945’. http://valti oneuvosto.fi/tietoa/historiaa/hallitusohjelmat. 56. ‘Pääministeri Mauno Koiviston hallituksen ohjelma 23.3.1968’. http://valti oneuvosto.fi/tietoa/historiaa/hallitusohjelmat. 57. ‘Pääministeri Ralf Törngrenin hallituksen ohjelma 6.5.1964’. http://valtion euvosto.fi/tietoa/historiaa/hallitusohjelmat. 58. Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen published in 1952 a pamphlet in which he referred to recent news concerning a speech by the English President of the Board of Midland Bank, Lord Hearlech. He had declared that ‘social security and the welfare state’ (the Finnish translation in Kekkonen’s text: sosiaalinen turvallisuus ja hyvinvointivaltio) could only be created by hard work. Urho Kekkonen, Onko maallamme malttia vaurastua? (Helsinki: Otava, 1952). 59. Eino S. Repo (ed.), Toiset pidot tornissa (Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1954), 242– 43; Pauli Kettunen, Globalisaatio ja kansallinen me: Kansallisen katseen historiallinen kritiikki (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2008), 154–55, 242. 60. Yhteishyvävaltio had an association with old Finnish translations of Wohlfahrt and välfärd as they appeared in the compound words Wohlfahrtsausschuss and välfärdsutskottet, the German and Swedish translations of Comité de Salut Public, which had been founded during the French Revolution in 1793. The Finnish translations of German and Swedish texts used the words yhteishyvän valiokunta (committee for common good). This expression was

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62. 63.

64.

65. 66. 67. 68.

69.

70. 71. 72.

73. 74.

75.

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later, during the World War II, used as the name for an information and propaganda committee in the administration overseeing rationing. Sosialidemokraattinen puolue [SDP], ‘Suomen Sosialidemokraattisen Puolueen talouspoliittinen ohjelma perusteluineen 1954’, POHTIVA; Helsingin Sanomat, 3 March 1954 (election advertisement of the Social Democratic MP candidates Valdemar Liljeström and Viljo Korhonen). Pöytäkirja Suomen Sosialidemokraattisen Puolueen XXIII puoluekokouksesta Helsingissä 3.–6.6.1955 (Helsinki, 1955), 39–41. Helsingin Sanomat, 1 February 1962; Päivi Uljas, Hyvinvointivaltion läpimurto: Pienviljelyhegemonian rapautumisen, kansalaisliikehdinnän ja poliittisen murroksen keskinäiset suhteet suomalaisessa yhteiskunnassa 1950-luvun loppuvuosina (Helsinki: Into, 2012), 235. Kansallinen Kokoomus, ‘Kansallisen Kokoomuksen yleisohjelma: Vahvistettu puoluekokouksessa Helsingissä 28–29.4.1957’; ‘Kansallisen Kokoomuksen kunnallisohjelma: Vahvistettu Kansallisen Kokoomuksen valtuuston syyskokouksessa 26.9.1959’, POHTIVA; Jyrki Smolander, Suomalainen oikeisto ja ‘kansankoti’: Kansallisen Kokoomuksen suhtautuminen pohjoismaiseen hyvinvointivaltiomalliin jälleenrakennuskaudelta konsensusajan alkuun (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2003), 118–36. Kansallinen Kokoomus, ‘Kokoomuksen Poliittinen Toimintaohjelma 1966 – Kohti huomispäivän yhteiskuntaa’, POHTIVA. Smolander, Suomalainen oikeisto, 161. Smolander, Suomalainen oikeisto, 310–312. Eino Sormunen, Hyvinvointivaltio ja henkinen elämä: Eräitä ajankohtaisia ongelmia (Pieksämäki: Suomen Kirkon Sisälähetysseura, 1958); Pirjo Markkola, ‘The Lutheran Nordic Welfare States’, in Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen (eds), Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives to Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 113. Pekka Kuusi, ‘Hyvinvointivaltion ideologia’, in Kauko Sipponen and Jouko Hulkko (eds), Yhteiskuntasuunnittelu (Helsinki: Suomalaisuuden liitto, 1963); Erkki Tuomioja, Pekka Kuusi: Alkoholipoliitikko. Sosiaalipoliitikko. Ihmiskuntapoliitikko (Helsinki: Tammi, 1996), 139. Urpo Harva, Ihminen hyvinvointivaltiossa (Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä, 1964). Facta – 10-osainen tietosanakirja, 3 GAS-ISL (Helsinki: WSOY, 1969), 765. Suomen Kansan Demokraattisen Liitto, ‘Suomen Kansan Demokraattisen Liitton Periaateohjelma: Hyväksytty SKDL:n 8.liittokokouksessa Helsingissä 13.5.–15.5.1967’, POHTIVA. Jouko Siipi, Ryysyrannasta hyvinvointivaltioon: Sosiaalinen kehitys itsenäisessä Suomessa (Helsinki: Tammi, 1967). Työväen ja Pienviljelijäin Sosialidemokraattinen liitto, ‘Työväen ja Pienviljelijäin Sosialidemokraattinen Liitto: Periaateohjelma: Hyväksytty III varsinaisessa puoluekokouksessa Kiljavalla 4.6.1967’, POHTIVA. Keskustapuolue, ‘Keskustapuolueen yleisohjelma: Hyväksytty 15.–16.6.1968 Tampereella pidetyssä puoluekokouksessa’, POHTIVA.

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76. Ahti M. Salonen, ‘Sosialisoinnista ja pääomavirtojen valvonnasta’, Sosialistinen Aikakauslehti 24(1) (1968), 26–29; Olavi Jäminki, ‘Länsimainen sosialidemokratia ja sosialismi’, Sosialistinen Aikakauslehti 24(2) (1968), 32–34. – I am grateful to Ilkka Kärrylä for informing me about this debate. 77. SDP:n XXX puoluekokouksen päätökset: SDP:n XXX puoluekokous pidettiin Jyväskylässä 5.–8.6.1975 (Joensuu: Kansan Voima, 1975), 50. 78. Pöytäkirja Suomen Sosialidemokraattisen Puolueen XXXI puoluekokouksesta Espoossa 1978 (Joensuu: Kansan Voima, 1979), 124–135, 355–359, 433, 484–492; SDP, ‘Sosialidemokratian suunta: SDP:n tienviitat 1980-luvulle: Hyväksytty SDP:n 31. puoluekokouksessa v. 1978 Espoossa’, POHTIVA. 79. E.g. Raimo Blom, Yhteiskuntateoria ja valtio (Tampere: Vastapaino, 1983); Risto Eräsaari, Sosiaalivaltio ja sosiaalipolitiikan itseymmärrys (Helsinki: Sosiaalipoliittinen yhdistys, 1984). 80. Lauri Haataja et al. (eds), Suomen työväenliikkeen historia (Helsinki: Työväen Sivistysliitto, 1976); Jukka Gronow, Pertti Klemola and Juha Partanen, Demokratian rajat ja rakenteet: Tutkimus suomalaisesta hallitsemistavasta ja sen taloudellisesta perustasta (Helsinki: WSOY, 1977); Pekka Kosonen et al., Suomalainen kapitalismi: Tutkimus yhteiskunnallisesta kehityksestä ja sen ristiriidoista sodanjälkeisessä Suomessa (Helsinki: Love Kirjat, 1979). 81. ‘Kovin laajasti tällainen keskustelu ei kuitenkaan ulottunut Suomeen. Syynä oli paitsi edellä mainitut kehityksen ristiriitaiset piirteet myös yleisemmin se, että luokkavastakohdat pysyivät Suomessa suhteellisen voimakkaina eivätkä mahdollistaneet puhumista luokattomaan yhteiskuntaan siirtymisestä, jollaista keskustelu ‘hyvinvointivaltiosta’ paljolti on. / Kriisi ja lama 70-luvun jälkipuoliskolla ovat haudanneet puheet yhteiskunnan luonteen muuttumisesta.’ Kosonen et al., Suomalainen kapitalismi, 320–21. 82. Pekka Kosonen, Hyvinvointivaltion haasteet ja pohjoismaiset mallit (Tampere: Vastapaino, 1987). 83. Matthieu Leimgruber, ‘The Embattled Standard-bearer of Social Insurance and its Challenger: The ILO, the OECD, and the Crisis of the Welfare State (1975–1985)’, in Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux (eds), Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond (Basingstoke and Geneva: Palgrave Macmillan and the ILO, 2013), 293–309. 84. Trägårdh, Civilt samhälle. 85. Nuorsuomalainen Puolue, ‘Nuorsuomalainen Puolue r.p. Yleisohjelma hyväksytty Helsingissä 6. joulukuuta 1994’, POHTIVA. 86. Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue, ‘Toimintaan demokraattisen hyvinvointiyhteiskunnan puole sta – SKP:n kunnallisohjelma’ (2004), POHTIVA. 87. SDP, ‘Suomen Sosialidemokraattisen Puolueen periaateohjelma perusteluineen: Hyväksytty XXII:ssa puoluekokouksessa 22.–24.5.1952’, POHTIVA. 88. SDP, ‘Sosialidemokraattisen puolueen ohjelma: Hyväksytty Forssan puoluekokouksessa 17.–20.8.1903’, POHTIVA. 89. SDP, ‘Periaateohjelma hyväksytty SDP:n 34. puoluekokouksessa Helsingissä 4.–7.6.1987’, POHTIVA.

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90. SDP, ‘Sosialidemokratian periaatteet: Hyväksytty XXXVIII puoluekokouksessa Turussa 29.5.1999’, POHTIVA. 91. ‘Pääministeri Harri Holkerin hallituksen ohjelma 30.4.1987’. http://valtio neuvosto.fi/tietoa/historiaa/hallitusohjelmat. 92. Jouko Marttila, Hillitty markkinatalous: Kokoomuksen ja SDP:n talouspoliittinen lähentyminen ja hallitusyhteistyö 1980-luvulla (Jyväskylä: Docendo, 2016), 85–93. 93. Marttila, Hillitty markkinatalous, 168. 94. ‘Pääministeri Paavo Lipposen hallituksen ohjelma 13.4.1995’. http://valtio neuvosto.fi/tietoa/historiaa/hallitusohjelmat. 95. ‘Pääministeri Paavo Lipposen II hallituksen ohjelma 15.4.1999’. http://val tioneuvosto.fi/tietoa/historiaa/hallitusohjelmat. 96. ‘Pääministeri Anneli Jäätteenmäen hallituksen ohjelma 17.4.2003’. http:// valtioneuvosto.fi/tietoa/historiaa/hallitusohjelmat. 97. ‘Pääministeri Matti Vanhasen II hallituksen ohjelma 19.4.2007’. http://val tioneuvosto.fi/tietoa/historiaa/hallitusohjelmat. 98. The most usual English translation of the party’s name Perussuomalaiset had been ‘The True Finns’. In 2011 the party announced that they would be ‘The Finns’ in their international communication. 99. ‘Pääministeri Jyrki Kataisen hallituksen ohjelma 22.6.2011’. http://valtio neuvosto.fi/tietoa/historiaa/hallitusohjelmat. 100. ‘Suomi on osaava, sisukas, tasa-arvoinen ja ratkaisukeskeinen hyvinvointiyhteiskunta’. ‘Pääministeri Juha Sipilän hallituksen ohjelma 29.5.2015’. http://valtioneuvosto.fi/tietoa/historiaa/hallitusohjelmat. 101. In June 2017, a dramatic split took place within the Finns Party. After the election of a new chair representing the most anti-immigration wing in the party, the majority of its MPs and all ministers left the party and founded a new one, the Blue Future. It was now a coalition partner in Sipilä’s government, whereas the Finns Party moved to opposition. 102. Kettunen, ‘The Nordic Model’; Johanna Rainio-Niemi, ‘Small State Cultures of Consensus: State Traditions and Consensus-Seeking in the Neo-corporatist and Neutrality Policies in Post-1945 Austria and Finland’ (Helsinki: Dissertation, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, 2008). 103. Alestalo, ‘Hyvinvointivaltio Suomessa’, 233–42. 104. Philip G. Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency, and the Future of the State (London: Sage Publications, 1990). 105. Kettunen, ‘The Nordic Model’, 302–6; Anu Kantola and Johannes Kananen, ‘Seize the Moment: Financial Crisis and the Making of the Finnish Competition State’, New Political Economy 18(6) (2013), 811–26; Johannes Kananen (ed.), Kilpailuvaltion kyydissä: Suomen hyvinvointimallin tulevaisuus (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2017). 106. In Denmark, the Social Democratic Minister of Finance, Bjarne Corydon, in 2013 acknowledged the ‘competition state’ as a good concept for de-

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scribing ‘contemporary national politics’, ‘Corydon: Konkurrencestat er ny velfærdsstat’, Politiken, 23 August 2013. Given the lively interest of many Finnish debaters in the supposedly competitive aspects of ‘the Danish model’, it would not be surprising if his example – supported by such Danish scholars as Ove K. Pedersen – encourages some Finnish politicians as well.

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Secondary Sources Alapuro, Risto, State and Revolution in Finland (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). Alestalo, Matti, ‘Hyvinvointivaltio Suomessa’, Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 90 (1992), 233–42. Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). Björkqvist, Heimer, Den nationalekonomiska vetenskapens utveckling i Finland intill år 1918 (Turku: Åbo Akademi, 1986). Bobbio, Norberto, Democracy and Dictatorship: The Nature and Limits of State Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989). Cerny, Philip G., The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency, and the Future of the State (London: Sage Publications, 1990). Fredrickson, George M., The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). Gerschenkron, Alexander, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1962), 356–63. Heikkinen Sakari et al., The History of Finnish Economic Thought 1809–1917: History of Learning and Science in Finland 1828–1918 (Helsinki: Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters, 2000). Heilbron, John, The Rise of Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). Kananen, Johannes (ed.), Kilpailuvaltion kyydissä: Suomen hyvinvointimallin tulevaisuus (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2017). Kantola, Anu, and Johannes Kananen, ‘Seize the Moment: Financial Crisis and the Making of the Finnish Competition State’, New Political Economy 18(6) (2013), 811–26. Kettunen, Pauli, Suojelu, suoritus, subjekti: Työsuojelu teollistuvan Suomen yhteiskunnallisissa ajattelu- ja toimintatavoissa (Helsinki: SHS, 1994). Kettunen, Pauli, ‘Yhteiskunta – “Society” in Finnish’, Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought 4 (2000), 159–97.

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Kettunen, Pauli, ‘Yhteiskunta’, in Matti Hyvärinen et al. (eds), Käsitteet liikkeesssä: Suomen poliittisen kulttuurin käsitehistoria (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2003), 167– 212. Kettunen, Pauli, ‘The Nordic Model and Consensual Competitiveness in Finland’, in Anna-Maija Castrén, Markku Lonkila and Matti Peltonen (eds), Between Sociology and History: Essays on Microhistory, Collective Action, and NationBuilding (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2004), 289–309. Kettunen, Pauli, Globalisaatio ja kansallinen me: Kansallisen katseen historiallinen kritiikki (Tampere: Vastapaino, 2008). Kettunen, Pauli, ‘The Language of Social Politics in Finland’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 157–76. Klinge, Matti, The Finnish Tradition: Essays on Structures and Identities in the North of Europe (Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1993). Koselleck, Reinhart, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). Leimgruber, Matthieu, ‘The Embattled Standard-bearer of Social Insurance and its Challenger: The ILO, the OECD, and the Crisis of the Welfare State (1975– 1985)’, in Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux (eds), Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond (Basingstoke and Geneva: Palgrave Macmillan and the ILO, 2013), 293–309. Liikanen, Ilkka, Fennomania ja kansa: Joukkojärjestäytymisen läpimurto ja Suomalaisen puolueen synty (Helsinki: SHS, 1995). Markkola, Pirjo, ‘The Lutheran Nordic Welfare States’, in Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen (eds), Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives to Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 102–18. Marttila, Jouko, Hillitty markkinatalous: Kokoomuksen ja SDP:n talouspoliittinen lähentyminen ja hallitusyhteistyö 1980-luvulla (Jyväskylä: Docendo, 2016). Petrusewicz, Marta, ‘The Modernisation of the European Periphery; Ireland, Poland, and the Two Sicilies, 1820–1870: Parallell and Connected, Distinct and Comparable’, in Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor (eds), Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-national Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2004), 145–65. Pulkkinen, Tuija, ‘One Language, One Mind: The Nationalist Tradition in Finnish Political Culture’, in Tuomas M.S. Lehtonen (ed.), Europe’s Northern Frontier: Perspectives on Finland’s Western Identity (Jyväskylä: PS-Kustannus, 1999), 118–37. Rainio-Niemi, Johanna, ‘Small State Cultures of Consensus: State Traditions and Consensus-Seeking in the Neo-corporatist and Neutrality Policies in Post1945 Austria and Finland’ (Helsinki: Dissertation, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, 2008). Repo, Eino S. (ed.), Toiset pidot tornissa (Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 1954). Riedel, Manfred, ‘Gesellschaft, bürgerliche’, in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon

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zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1975), 719–800. Satka, Mirja, Making Social Citizenship: Conceptual Practices from the Finnish Poor Law to Professional Social Work (Jyväskylä: SoPhi, 1995). Senghaas, Dieter, Von Europa lernen: Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtungen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982). Skinner, Quentin, ‘Language and Political Change’, in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russel L. Hanson (eds), Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 6–23. Slagstad, Rune, De nasjonale strateger (Oslo: Pax, 1998). Sluga, Glenda, ‘The Nation and the Comparative Imagination’, in Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor (eds), Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-national Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2004), 103–15. Smolander, Jyrki, Suomalainen oikeisto ja ‘kansankoti’: Kansallisen Kokoomuksen suhtautuminen pohjoismaiseen hyvinvointivaltiomalliin jälleenrakennuskaudelta konsensusajan alkuun (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2003). Spector, Malcolm, and John I. Kitsuse, Constructing Social Problems, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001). Tribe, Keith, Governing Economy: The Reformation of German Economic Discourse in 1750–1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Uljas, Päivi, Hyvinvointivaltion läpimurto: Pienviljelyhegemonian rapautumisen, kansalaisliikehdinnän ja poliittisen murroksen keskinäiset suhteet suomalaisessa yhteiskunnassa 1950-luvun loppuvuosina (Helsinki: Into, 2012). Vauhkonen, Jussi, Elatuksesta eläkkeeseen: Vanhuudenturva suomalaisessa työnantajapolitiikassa työeläkejärjestelmän rakentamiseen saakka (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, 2016).

 c ha p te r 6

The Evolving Concept of the Welfare State in Icelandic Politics Guðmundur Jónsson

Introduction Welfare issues have long been debated under different labels in modern politics, yet the key concept of welfare state (velferðarríki) is a reasonably new addition to the political vocabulary.1 It first entered the Icelandic language relatively recently, towards the end of the 1940s, and only slowly came into common use. Until then there were no equivalent, totalizing concepts of similar meaning that referred to a social organization or type of society encompassing all the different social provisions and policies that were later to be subsumed under the umbrella term of the welfare state. The closest precursor was ‘social security’ (félagslegt öryggi), which in Iceland emerged as a bold attempt in the early 1940s to integrate the ideas of William Beveridge and John Maynard Keynes into a new social and economic policy. The term ‘welfare state’ did not gain popularity in Icelandic politics until the 1960s and even then it was primarily used as a signpost of an emerging type of society in the other Nordic countries. The late entry may have been partly due to the low propensity of political actors to frame their policies in general terms based on moral or political philosophies. Instead, political parties tended to be pragmatic and oriented towards specific policy ideas rather than carefully developing long-term policy programmes, let alone grand visions of the ideal society.2 It is therefore rare to come across manifestos or elucidations by the main political actors elaborating on the underlying philosophical objectives or ideological foundations of their social policies.

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More importantly, for most of the twentieth century social policy had a subordinate role in public policy, while economic policies with their focus on production, economic growth or fiscal and monetary issues had the highest priority. The welfare state as a societal ideal never gained the same elevated status in Icelandic politics as in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. It was not just because the Icelandic Social Democrats failed to gain the same pivotal political position as in the other Nordic countries but also because of the widespread popular belief that the primary goal of government was to ensure full employment so individuals and families could create their own welfare (public provision of welfare was secondary) conditioned on the fortunes of the economy. These individualistic, liberal notions fitted well with the grand narrative of a nation made up of free-spirited, equal and self-reliant peasant farmers and fishermen, the bearers of the national heritage.3 So, the shift towards a Nordic social democratic regime was only partial, and the popular symbol of society in Icelandic national imagery was never the warm national home but the national ship (þjóðarskútan) sailing through rough seas, manned by hardy crew under the leadership of adventurous entrepreneurs and politicians. Instead of social security there was enterprising uncertainty. Neither did Scandinavian ideas of the ‘middle way’, the philosophical midway between the communist East and capitalist West, gain much ground in Iceland as successive governments aligned themselves firmly with the United States and its security and foreign policy.4 In this chapter I will examine the evolution of the concept of the welfare state and related concepts in the realm of social politics in Iceland.5 Behind these concepts lie different political ideas and therefore it is necessary to pay attention to their ideational content, their relationships and their different uses while also seeking to understand their wider political context. As the contributions to this book show, the welfare state has always been a contested concept, given different meanings in different historical settings and by different actors in the public discourse. Thus, the subject calls for awareness of not only the historical contingency of concepts and their changing content over time but also the disparity between the contemporaries’ use of the language and retrospective academic conceptualizations. As Daniel Wincott points out, we can think about the welfare state concept on the one hand in ‘ontological terms, as a “redefinition of what the state is all about”’, and on the other hand in a sectoral manner, where the welfare state is seen as encompassing large-scale entitlement programmes such as social insurance, health and education.6 Here, we will be concerned with both of these levels of analysis, although greatest at-

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tention is given to the latter, in particular ideas and concepts related to social insurance.

Redefining the Social Historical and sociological scholarship on the Icelandic welfare state has been steeped in a national framework with a focus on the distinctiveness of the Icelandic path, especially its exceptionalism vis-à-vis the other Nordic countries.7 Yet, the bonds with Norden were strong, and ideas and concepts entering the social policy debate were largely transmitted from the fermenting pot of ideas circulating in the Nordic countries. The ideational development of the Icelandic welfare state, and the Nordic welfare states for that matter, was a transnational process in which solutions travelled across borders in search of social problems, as Daniel Rodgers so eloquently puts it. He maintains that there was an Atlantic world of social politics in the making in the last decades of the nineteenth century with ‘transferable social experience and appropriable policy’ in which ideas and models moved freely across national borders.8 Icelandic society tapped into the ‘transnational traffic in reform ideas, politics, and legislative devices’ towards the end of the nineteenth century and embarked upon policies that were to sprout from what later became known as the welfare state. Despite its small size and backwardness, Iceland followed the latest developments in social politics from early on.9 The most notable change in the political discourse was associated with a shift in social policy around the turn of the twentieth century from the age-old and paternalistic poor relief, provided mainly as domiciliary care, to a mix of charity and institutionalized support for the poor. Ideas of individual self-development, charity and help-to-self-help filtered in from the Nordic countries, Britain and Germany, indicating the growing intellectual influences of ‘new’ liberalism. A redefinition of the relationship between the individual and society was under way that was to lead to a more active role for the state.10 The relatively new concepts of the deserving and undeserving poor were espoused by proponents of liberalism like Páll Briem, a Danish-educated lawyer and a member of the Parliament (Althingi), who encompassed both ideas of individual responsibility and social reform. Briem attached great importance to the firm regulation of the poor and advocated the establishment of poorhouses – institutionalized social care was almost non-existent at the time – for the unruliest of the undeserving poor, while insurance, based on the principle of help-toself-help, and savings banks, would provide an important safety net for the deserving poor.11

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Páll Briem was to lead a parliamentary commission on the revision of the poor law in 1901–5. The commission’s report advocated a more active role for the state in social affairs by arguing that it is the moral duty of society to help all paupers, regardless of the causes of their poverty. The report makes a clear distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor and lays out different strategies to tackle the social problems facing each group.12 The commission’s recommendations were to pave the way for important social reforms in the following years: a more humanitarian poor law (1907), the establishment of an asylum for the mentally ill (1907) and old-age and disability pensions with contributions from the insured and, to a lesser degree, the state (1909).13 These and other groundbreaking reforms at the beginning of the last century brought new concepts and discourses into the public debate, signalling a shift in the understanding of poverty, its causes and remedies. However, the notion of subsuming all the diverse social policies and programmes under one category was late to develop. The closest equivalent of the term social policy was ‘the workers question’ (verkmannamálið), an international concept commonly used in Iceland from the 1890s onwards. A translation of social policy first entered the language in the 1930s with words like lýðpólitík and umbótapólitík, but soon félagsmálapólitík won the battle and was promulgated in the first comprehensive survey of social policy in Iceland, published in 1942.14 Only after 1950 did the currently used concept, félagsmálastefna, gain prominence. Social reform in the first decades of the twentieth century was mainly driven by two ascending social movements, both of which strove for the redefinition of the role of the state. Couched in the language of compassion, inclusion, social rights and social justice, their campaigns aimed at the extension of political and social citizenship to include women and workers, the improvement of living conditions of the poor and socially excluded, and public provision of education, health and housing. The women’s movement spoke with a distinctive voice, offering radical social ideas and gaining significant influence over the framing of social problems and the design of policies. ‘Society needs everywhere the meticulous, loving, motherly care of women,’ claimed Briet Bjarnhéðinsdóttir, one of its leaders. ‘Wherever we look they should be included; as voters as well as parliamentarians, women are essential wherever culture and morality need spokesmen.’15 Inspired by international women’s movements, women’s slates were established both in local and parliamentary elections between 1908 and 1926, campaigning not only for the political rights of women but also a new social policy best described as ‘maternal politics’, promoting novel ideas such as equality of the sexes, municipally run childcare, free school meals, old people’s homes, maternity wards and public healthcare.

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The Language of Social Democratic Politics The other movement making its mark on social politics was the labour movement. One of the central ideas of the Icelandic Federation of Labour, established in 1916 with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) as its political wing, was comprehensive social insurance financed largely by the state. It was a radical programme both for its bold vision of a safety net for the population and the way in which it was to be financed. Central government had hitherto played a limited role in provision, as poor relief was in the hands of local governments, and the sick and disabled were mainly taken care of by voluntary associations. The state’s role was primarily to provide certain aspects of healthcare, secondary and tertiary education and pensions for public employees. The labour movement built on a tradition of working class self-help, especially in Reykjavík, where it created its own social support network of emergency funds, sickness pension funds, cooperatives, childcare facilities and libraries.16 Soon, though, labour turned its efforts increasingly to social reform through the political process. Its first political programme in 1917 was dressed in the language of social liberalism, claiming: ‘Public assistance to the poor’ should be viewed as ‘help-to-self-help’, and those in need through no fault of their own should get sufficient support without losing their good name or civil rights.17 The Social Democrats made social insurance a key issue in their political programme in 1923, focusing on the establishment of sickness pension funds with public support and, from 1928 onwards, making demands for a comprehensive state-funded social insurance system for the working class. They were moving from social liberal notions to a more radical stance, as social insurance and poor relief were now increasingly seen as instruments of income redistribution and social justice rather than paths to self-help. Healthcare and hospital admittance were to be free of charge and without ‘any loss of rights’. Occupational accident insurance and unemployment insurance paid by the employers were also endorsed by the programme. They also pointed out how limited and patchy the existing legislation was in comparison with that of other ‘civilized’ countries and demanded the abolition of the poor law’s ‘despicable injustice’ of stripping the recipients of social assistance of their voting rights. Social insurance as an indication of civilization was a common thread in this rhetoric. A bill proposed by the Social Democrats in Althingi in 1932 maintains: ‘The emphasis on [social insurance] among most civilized nations is such that their level of civilization is measured by how far they have advanced in the field of insurance for the general public.’18

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The Icelandic Social Democrats did not succeed in transforming themselves into a party of the nation, folket, unlike their counterparts in Denmark, Norway and Sweden in the 1930s. One of the reasons was the deep split and rivalry between the Social Democrats and the Communists, who radicalized the former for a while, but repeated splits to the left eventually moved the party to the Right, leading to a more centrist political outlook and cooperation with, first, the agrarian Progressive Party (PP) and then the liberal Independence Party (IP) in the postwar period. The Social Democrats managed as the smaller partner in the red-green ‘government of the working classes’ 1934–38 to reach an agreement with the PP on wide-ranging social and economic changes, including comprehensive social insurance legislation, revision of the poor law and an extension of public healthcare; all of which required extensive state involvement and financial support. The Social Democrats’ solutions to growing poverty and unemployment were gaining ground not only in the ideological battle but also for financial reasons, as it was increasingly perceived as an alternative to the ever more costly social assistance. Even on the conservative side of the political spectrum, intellectuals and politicians were beginning to embrace the idea of universal social insurance in order to enhance social harmony between classes, provided that there was a proper balance between rights on the one hand and obligations and ‘loyalty to society’ on the other.19

Social Security: Welfare State by another Name World War II was a time of fermenting social and political ideas that were to lead to fundamental social reforms in the immediate postwar period. The foundations of the contemporary welfare state were laid, although the term had not come into circulation in political debate. The key idea was social security, which became the buzzword of the time and, according to a government booklet from 1943, Social Security after the War (Félagslegt öryggi eftir stríðið), meant that ‘every citizen who is willing to work . . . is ensured certain minimum living standards, i.e. food, clothing, shelter, etc.’20 A government white paper on new social policy from 1945 describes the normative foundations of the concept: Although the concept of social security, as it is now understood, is not old, the ideal it rests on is one of the oldest moral sentiments of humanity. It is of the same root as the Christian ideal of brotherhood, supported by the same arguments as the French Revolution’s demand for equality and brotherhood, it derives from the same ideals of humanity as the finest individuals of this country and spiritual

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leaders of varying secular and religious beliefs have fought for. . . . Would it not be a magnificent task for the newly founded Icelandic republic to make this noble ideal of freedom a reality in the smallest nation state in the world.21

The policy renewal was part of an international wave of social reform. The white paper acknowledges the influences of the US social insurance legislation of 1935, President Roosevelt’s State of the Union Address (the Four Freedoms speech) from 1941 and the Beveridge Report, ‘Social Alliance and Allied Services’, from 1942 (freedom from want, comprehensive social security, a minimum income and universal benefits). During the war, high priory was given to social affairs in public policymaking. A new Ministry of Social Affairs, established in 1939 and headed by SDP minister Stefán Jóhann Stefánsson, was the main driver of policy reform and put considerable resources into reviewing social insurance and the public health system. Icelandic politics was in flux, and the balance of political power was shifting in favour of the Left and the labour movement, which had gained a much stronger position vis-àvis employers and government as a result of high demand for labour and successful strikes in 1942. One of the chief architects of the new policy was Jón Blöndal, an economist and a prominent member of the Social Democrats. As a senior manager at the Social Insurance Administration, he was assigned the task of editing and writing a report, published in 1942, on the development of social policy and the current state of social welfare programmes and services, the first of its kind in Iceland.22 In March the following year Blöndal was appointed by the Ministry of Social Affairs to chair a committee to investigate and prepare legislation that ‘best ensures social security of the nation’. Social insurance was to be the core programme and should seek to prevent, within the financial means of the nation, ‘all citizens willing to work suffering from privation’.23 The policy review took a new turn with the ‘reconstruction government’ coming to power in 1944, who pledged in its policy statement to introduce a comprehensive system of social insurance that ‘covers the whole nation regardless of class and income so that Iceland will be at the forefront among the neighbouring countries in this field’.24 A white paper published in 1945, ‘Social Insurance: Reports and Recommendations on Social Insurance, Health Care and Employment’, contained radical and sweeping proposals that amounted to no less than a new comprehensive and integrated social and economic policy.25 The key idea was social security, seen not as assistance to the poor but a social net for the whole nation based on social rights to secure the citizens a basic standard of living.

Figure 6.1. ‘Social insurance from cradle to grave’ according to the comprehensive social insurance system proposed in the 1945 white paper. The schema depicts the different types of benefits, some of which were not enacted (unemployment benefits and funeral grants) or postponed (healthcare centres). Reprinted from Sæmundsson, and Blöndal, Almannatryggingar á Íslandi (1945).

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The new policy rested on two main pillars. The first was social security and welfare provisions to ensure a minimum income, health and education of the population, comprehensive social insurance, a national healthcare system and a unified national education system, all of which were enacted in the following years. The 1946 Social Security Act stipulated a comprehensive social insurance system ‘from the cradle to the grave’, with universalism, wide coverage and unified benefits at its core. The second pillar was a new economic policy framework premised on economic growth, organization of the production and full utilization of the labour force. The primary goal, full employment, was considered realistic in the light of the wartime experience and recent findings of economist John Maynard Keynes. The report recommends that the right to work be enshrined in the constitution.26 A State Employment Agency was to be set up to monitor the employment situation and make plans to adjust demand to activity levels in the economy. The Agency’s tasks included the registration of the labour force, and provision of employment services, public works, youth employment programmes and unemployment insurance. A welfare state was in the making where the government sought to integrate social security, demand management and economic planning into a coordinated system of institutions and programmes. Iceland was in many ways well equipped to embark on an ambitious social and economic renewal, having escaped most of the ravages of the war and enjoying economic growth and rising income. The left-wing parties, the Social Democrats and the Socialist Party, were on the rise, polling a good third of the vote in general elections from 1942 onwards. The founding of the Republic in 1944 raised the ambition level in public policy and inspired new political thinking about Iceland’s future and its place in the world. Besides the more lofty ideas about social rights, Keynesian economics and social investment arguments permeated social policy statements and legislation. The most comprehensive social insurance scheme in the Nordic countries so far was enacted in Iceland in 1946, establishing the principle of universalism in terms of coverage and, thus, extending the beneficiaries of social insurance to all citizens. Blöndal claimed that the social insurance legislation was ‘the greatest victory in the social policy campaign of the working class’.27 However, the second pillar of the scheme – economic planning, the State Employment Agency and unemployment insurance – did not materialize due to opposition from the Independence Party. These programmes were considered too costly and constituting, in the case of the unemployment insurance, a major infringement on individual liberty and free enterprise. As a consequence, a much more limited version of universal social and economic welfare came to fruition in the following years than policymakers had envisaged.

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The Rise of the Welfare State, 1950–1980 The social reforms in the immediate postwar period were perceived as a landmark in the development of Icelandic society. In the parliamentary debate on the social security legislation in 1946, Páll Hermannsson of the Progressive Party commented: ‘I think this bill has no parallel in Icelandic law except the constitution itself. By this legislation, I believe, a new society is being created which is to my mind a better one than we now have.’28 But the concepts of the welfare state or welfare society were not used in the public discourse nor did the political parties refer to them in their statements and programmes on social policy. The concept of welfare state first appeared publicly in newspaper reports in 1949, referring to the policies of the current US and UK governments and the outgoing government in New Zealand. It was immediately associated with socialism and therefore critically received in the right-wing press. Morgunblaðið, the biggest newspaper in Iceland, commented: ‘Promises of paradise (sæluríki) look pretty on paper and sound good at election hustings, but experience has shown the opposite, both in Britain and elsewhere in democratic countries, where socialism had had a chance to be tried out . . .’29 The concept of ‘welfare state’ seeped into the language in the 1950s and 1960s and was usually associated with Scandinavian countries and their fast growing public sector and expanding welfare systems.30 Gradually, though, it was more commonly used to depict Icelandic society, an embryonic welfare state akin to, but less developed than, the other Nordic countries for better or worse. On the occasion of a tripartite agreement on a big housing project in Reykjavík in 1966 the right-wing daily Vísir said that it marked a new path in the social services of the state, which should be welcomed, and bear all the hallmarks of a welfare society that has at last emerged in this country. . . . This is done in the interest of the lowest earners, in a similar vein to the tax measures which abolished tax on ordinary wage income. It is interesting that these measures are taken by a party that the Opposition constantly tries to portray as a party of big profit and special interest.31

The Left believed, on the other hand, that Iceland lagged far behind the other Nordic welfare states and needed a big push in that direction. ‘The Icelandic “welfare state” is an illusion’ exclaimed the weekly, left-leaning Ný vikutíðindi on its front page in November 1970, expressing its disgust with the low old-age and disability benefits in comparison with the other Nordic countries.32

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The following graph shows the frequency of the concepts of welfare state (velferðarríki) and welfare society (velferðarþjóðfélag and velferðarsamfélag interchangeably used). As the graph shows, the two concepts were hardly used until the 1960s, when the former rapidly gained popularity while the latter slowly gained ground to become the more popular of the two in the 1970s. The reasons for the reduced occurrence of the terms after 1990 are not clear but they have probably more to do with the fall in the number of newspapers than shifts in public policy priorities. It is rare to find elaborations on these two concepts earlier on; they were often used interchangeably, although different connotations can be discerned. For liberals, ‘welfare society’ had a more positive connotation, as it referred to the broad concept of welfare, whereas ‘the welfare state’ tended to be linked to state action and public provision of welfare. Increasingly, instead of these words the term ‘welfare system’ became common, both in popular and academic parlance, towards the end of the century, referring to the sectors of the state that provided social insurance, social services, healthcare and education.

        







 








 


Figure 6.2. The graph shows the frequency of the terms velferðarríki (welfare state), velferðarþjóðfélag and velferðarsamfélag (welfare society) in the Icelandic print media. The last two are joined in the counting as they have an almost identical meaning. The data is extracted from www.timarit.is, a digital library of historical newspapers and periodicals that covers all Icelandic newspapers and a large proportion of magazines and journals published since the seventeenth century. Source: Timarit.is, National and University Library of Iceland, retrieved 25 September 2016.

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No political party was more committed to the idea of the welfare state than the Social Democrats, having led the groundbreaking policy changes of the 1930s and 40s and perceived itself since then as its principal custodian. With the sudden death of Blöndal in 1946 they lost a bold visionary without anyone taking his place. Interesting attempts were made by its leader, Stefán Jóhann Stefánsson, to connect social democratic welfare ideals to visions for the fledgling Republic of Iceland. Borrowing the well-known idea of the nation as a good home, Stefánsson envisioned the republic as a society where everyone could live comfortably as free and educated citizens. ‘The republic needs to become a national home (þjóðarheimili) which ensures that no one is excluded, everyone has the right to live and work, while simultaneously being bound by duties towards society.’33 Society is made of many different classes and all of them have the right to live a civilized live, in security and freedom. Like in Sweden, ‘the people’s home’ did not, however, gain currency in the political discourse – and even in ceremonial speeches the Social Democrats rarely uttered the word.34 The same applies to the terms welfare state and welfare society: they rarely appeared in political programmes or pamphlets until after 1970. The first instance seems to be the political programme of the Social Democrats before the 1963 general election, which opens with the statement: The aim of the Social Democratic Party is that Icelanders advance a civilized society (menningarþjóðfélag) based on sound democracy and complete equality – a welfare state where everyone can achieve a good standard of living and no one has to fear for his livelihood, human rights or personal freedom.35

The Social Democrats much preferred to talk about ‘social security’ and ‘the welfare system’ when describing their social policies. One of the first attempts to define the term welfare state in an Icelandic context was Gylfi Þ. Gíslason, prominent Social Democrat and economist. In a newspaper article in 1954 he said that in order to ensure ‘a just society, a kind of welfare society’, it was not enough to obtain ‘financial balance’ ( fjárhagslegt jafnvægi) but also ‘social balance’ (félagslegt jafnvægi) by way of social action.36 Gíslason was referring to the government’s constant preoccupation with economic problems with no regard to the social costs of economic policy, leading to increased inequality of wealth and income and middlemen profits under an unsound protectionist system. In the 1960s, welfare state development became increasingly associated with science and knowledge production. One of the key points of the SDP’s political platform in 1964 was to make Iceland a welfare state ‘based on scientific foundations. . . . By scientific foundations the

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Social Democrats mean the full utilisation of modern science and technology to ensure better living standards for all. This is modernity’s way to a brighter future.’37 The postwar social reform could not have taken place without the support of the conservative Independence Party, the leading partner in the ‘reconstruction government’ of 1944–47. The policy change was a complete turnaround for a party that had fought against the extension of social provision in the 1930s and extolled rugged individualism and free enterprise. In a speech on 17 June 1944, the day of the founding of the Republic of Iceland, the party leader Ólafur Thors said that: Every nation has to live according to its nature if it is to succeed. . . . During the long struggle of Icelanders with the harsh elements of nature from the time of settlement to the present, their individualism has matured and Icelanders’ wants and needs for freedom of enterprise have been enforced. The driver of this struggle has long been the knowledge that the fruits will fall into the hands of the individual and his family. . . . The main issue is to create wealth. It will quickly disperse and be of benefit to all, if not today then tomorrow.38

The Independence Party’s U-turn in social policy was partly a political expediency because the Social Democrats had made major social reform a condition for joining the coalition government in 1944. The IP accepted most of the policy proposals of the SDP and the Socialist Party (SP), except on two fundamental issues: economic planning and unemployment insurance on the one hand, and flat-rate pension benefits on the other. The other government parties had to back away from their demand of universalism, and a scheme of income-related benefits was introduced instead. In the coming decades, benefits for low-income earners became the IP’s central tenet in social policy. It had now accepted extensive ‘socialization’ of society on the premise that increased equality of income and wealth would enhance freedom of choice. The party argued that without a basic standard of living, the individual was unable to exert his freedom. Gísli Jónsson, the IP spokesman on social policy, remarked in a parliamentary debate in 1955: The view that all men have a natural right to live a decent life is increasingly taking hold among civilized nations, but the precondition for securing this right of individuals is social insurance. Hence, the firmer and more humane these laws are, the more secure is this individual right, regardless of the mental or physical health of the individuals or their earnings.39

The new thinking within the IP was truly a break with the past as it, however cautiously, came to accept increased public provision of welfare; but

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within its ranks the concept of welfare state continued to have negative connotations. Public debate in the 1950s and 1960s was dominated by the politics and rhetoric of the Cold War, where each of the political parties attempted, to borrow Michael Freeden’s term, to decontest the concept of the welfare state – i.e. impose their specific understanding of the concept.40 The political Right viewed the ‘Nordic Middle Way’ between the ‘free market’ and communism as tainted with socialist ideas and levelled strong criticism against the welfare state as a regime of ever-increasing power of the state at the cost of individual freedom and enterprise.41 The criticism was not confined to politicians: many conservative intellectuals drew parallels between ‘state interference’ in the Nordic welfare states and the authoritarian Soviet system. In a public talk in 1959, the poet Tómas Guðmundsson claimed that the idealism embedded in ‘the socalled welfare state’ was an illusion derived from well-meant humanitarian ideals, and the state’s concern for the individual could well lead to individual freedom being sacrificed. The state’s prying into people’s private affairs, personal and financial, and its useless interference could well provoke ‘revolt of the individual’.42 Sweden came increasingly to serve as a stark warning of the dark sides of welfare society – a country where social welfare was most advanced, people sheltered from all possible misfortunes and the state always ready to support them when misfortunes come. Anti-Swedish sentiments grew stronger in the late 1960s and early 70s. Sweden was often depicted as a society suffering from excessive taxation, serious inflation, lack of residential housing and healthcare and crises in education. Social ills abounded, such as crime, alcoholism, drug abuse, suicide and demoralization among the youth.43 The critique of the authoritarian ‘nanny state’ fitted well with the individualist, free-market philosophy of the IP, but it enjoyed support from different sections of society. One version of this view was graphically expressed in an editorial in Morgunblaðið in April 1959, commenting on Guðmundsson’s aforementioned talk. The newspaper extolls the ethos of the self-reliant fisherman and farmer and identifies them with free-market liberal philosophy: A planned economy where everything is measured, as in the socalled welfare states, is nowhere as unsuitable as in Iceland, where everything is dependent on sun and rain. The state cannot lead the fish to the fishing grounds. In a harsh country like Iceland, which is like an arduous and unyielding farmland, all available forces need to be as free as possible. This might not, perhaps, apply to industrial nations where production is fairly regular, yet government intervention

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and the planned economy of a welfare state always have detrimental effects. The only possible way to live in Iceland is by giving people freedom of enterprise.44

It took the IP a long time to adapt to a more social-oriented policy. As the editor of Morgunblaðið later explained, even the word social had a negative connotation among many party members: it was an anathema to them and equated with unwelcome state intervention.45 However, as a party of humanism and liberalism it had always concerned itself with social issues, including social security, as its political programmes and resolutions testified. The party gradually moved to a more ‘welfarist’ position, and its policies even became more ‘social democratic’ in the 1960s, as demonstrated in its more corporatist approach towards the labour movement; accepting, for instance, an ambitious social housing programme.46 The party engaged with the idea of the welfare state as it gained more currency in the political discourse, but it was usually couched in the terminology of economic liberalism. A welfare state could never be realized without the recognition that free enterprise and individual freedom were the driving forces of progress.47 The policy resolution of the party conference in 1971 stated that social insurance and social support (samhjálp) should be increased but only if it did not infringe on private enterprise or encourage abuse. The leader in Morgunblaðið opined: ‘Social support is the foundation of social justice and, as such, a driving force of progress and welfare.’48 The Progressive Party (PP) had, as the party of opposition in 1944–47, been the most vocal critic of the new social security legislation, arguing that it was too costly. The party leader, Hermann Jónasson, advocated caution and believed parliament was advancing far ahead of public opinion on this issue. He pointed out: ‘Every nation needs to be educated to use social insurance naturally and honestly. . . . It takes time for this insurance culture to take root and it is very debatable whether to extend social insurance faster than it takes the people to learn to make use of it.’49 The Progressives showed little enthusiasm for the postwar legislation on social security; its political heartland was rural Iceland, where the effects of social welfare were much less felt than in the towns. One might argue that the rural areas had developed their own welfare network through, on the one hand, public agricultural support of various kinds (subsidies, grants, investment funds and price regulation ensuring the farmer a minimum income) and, on the other hand, through the cooperative movement; extending its nationwide network to wholesale and retail cooperatives and auxiliary institutions in banking and insurance, transportation, oil distribution, education programmes and publishing.

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The local co-op often became the centre of communal activity and its manager or chairman the leader in local government, some even rising to become national politicians.50 The Socialists and their forerunner, the Communist Party, were opposition parties until 1944, usually taking a more radical stance on social protection, such as unemployment insurance and social housing, than the Social Democrats. Many on the far Left, especially the communists of the 1930s and even the 1968 generation later took a critical view of the idea of the welfare state and did not see its advancement as a political priority. As one left-wing journalist later put it: ‘They were so preoccupied with the dreams of the revolution that they thought child benefits and workers’ homes were not worth spending much time on.’51 When the extensive social provision under the umbrella term of ‘social security’ emerged as a vision of new society during the 1940s, the socialists’ response was mixed. Many socialists were deeply sceptical and argued that the new model ‘did not cure the ills of capitalism’. In a critical review of Beveridge’s collection of essays, translated in 1943, the novelist Halldór Kiljan Laxness found the author well-meaning but naive and short-sighted, offering remedies on unemployment insurance but none on unemployment. In a very British way, Laxness continued, Beveridge’s big idea of ‘Social Security’ does not challenge capitalism but aims to stave off the danger of resurgence and revolution by organizing ‘tolerable unemployment’.52 In practical politics, however, the mainstream Socialist Party and its successor, the People’s Alliance (PA), gave firm support to a bigger and more generous welfare system that would act as an instrument of income redistribution. When a left-wing government was in the making in the summer of 1956, the Þjóðviljinn, The People’s Will, which had close ties with the party, claimed that a left-wing political platform should contain three major goals: secure national independence, promote economic growth and increase the power of the working class and improve its conditions through social reform; in particular, social security and social housing.53 The acceleration of the European integration process in the 1950s and 1960s added a new dimension to the debate. At a meeting of the Nordic Council in 1962, the PA leader Einar Olgeirsson pointed out that if any of the Nordic countries joined the EU and left the other Nordic countries ‘behind a wall of import restrictions’ it could jeopardize ‘what we have fought for for decades and centuries: the nation states and the so-called “social welfare state” . . .’54 The PA became the most ardent supporter of a generous welfare system, as demonstrated in the expansive social policy of the left-wing government of 1971–74.

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The radical Left of the 1960s and 70s continued the earlier socialist critique of welfare society, turning the focus increasingly on the ills of consumerism, alienation and fetishism of economic growth. As earlier generations of the Left, the young generation rejected the social democratic ‘myth’ of welfare society as a middle way between capitalism and socialism and eventually replacing the former. They saw social policy within welfare state as essentially a tool to ameliorate the problems of the needy, the sick, the disabled and the old without aiming for a radical change in the social structure or distribution of income. On the contrary, the social insurance system had limited redistributive effects, and the welfare system in general was much more limited than those in the other Nordic countries.55 The rise of the ‘second wave’ of the women’s movement in the 1970s and 80s was a major event in Icelandic politics, leading to electoral successes for women’s slates on the local and national level. The movement brought about an increased awareness of the gendered relationship between family, work and welfare and how the welfare state promoted the idea of the male breadwinner family. Feminists insisted that, instead of gaining entitlements by virtue of their dependent status within the family as wives and mothers, women should be entitled to equal rights to men on an individual basis. Although the 1946 Social Security Act had improved the rights of women and children, they still rested on the male breadwinner model in which the family was seen as the basic unit and married women the dependents of the male breadwinner.56 Entitlements such as childbirth subsidy, sickness benefits and old-age and disability benefits depended on their marital status and/or incomes of their husbands. The radical feminists of the 1970s and 80s opened up a new dimension in the critique of the welfare state. One of its leading proponents, Guðrún Jónsdóttir, stated in 1984: ‘The patriarchy and the welfare state set us limits and maintain our oppression. The ideology of the welfare state is a male-dominated ideology which presupposes continued oppression of women. This ideology is therefore not the road to women’s freedom.’57 Equal entitlements of men and women in the social security system became an important campaign issue. Furthermore, in the wake of the rapid entry of women into the labour force in the 1960s and 70s, one of the primary concerns of the women’s movement was to improve the social support system for families, to facilitate the move from unpaid work in the home to paid work. These demands were in line with policies in the other Nordic countries of bringing women into the workforce and making the ‘two-breadwinner family’ the norm.58 Most of these disparities were amended in legislation and better social services in the following decades, but some of them remained unresolved; one of which was the

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sensitive issue of how highly income-related old-age and disability pensions were.

The Neoliberal Critique, 1970–1990s The rise of the radical Right in the late 1970s was a turning point in Icelandic politics, shifting the political debate towards a critique of ‘the excesses’ of the state and its stifling effects on the operation of the market economy. The year 1979 saw an upsurge in support for the neoliberalist agenda, with the Independence Party adopting a more radical market economy platform under the banner Renewal in the spirit of liberalism. The young generation within the party stepped up its political activism, publishing books and pamphlets and inviting some of the most famous advocates of neoliberalism to Iceland to bolster their cause. It is revealing, however, that in one of their most influential expositions at that time, The Revolt of Liberalism (1979), radical ideas about restructuring the welfare system were hardly to be seen. The focus was on improving economic management and reducing government control of the economy by liberalizing prices, interest rates and the exchange rate, selling off public enterprises in competition with private firms, reducing the size of the state sector and scaling down state intervention in labour market negotiations.59 Cuts in public expenditure were to be obtained by reducing state subsidies and pricing public services at cost prices. The last point could be interpreted as an introduction of user charges at real cost, or privatization of some parts of the welfare services, but these statements were too vague to draw definitive conclusions from them. Thus, the debate on ‘the crisis of the welfare state’ was heavily focused on economic issues, inefficient economic management and extensive government controls of the economy but less so on the welfare sector.60 Although frequently attacking the bloated welfare state, the neoliberal critics rarely pointed their finger at the welfare system per se. Their primary target was the mixed economy, Keynesian economic management and the corporatist character of the labour market. There are undoubtedly a number of reasons for the emphasis on the economy rather than the welfare system: high inflation and huge fluctuations in the economy were regarded much more urgent political problems than the reasonably good state of public finances and the moderate welfare sector, giving the neoliberals little ammunition to call for major cuts in social expenditure. The Left was on the defence, responding to the neoliberal challenge by calling for ‘the welfare state of wage earners’ instead of ‘the welfare state of business’, which it saw as thriving under a lax monetary policy and ex-

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tensive government support to the private sector. The pampering of the private sector, the Left claimed, was causing the most serious economic problems the nation was facing: rampant inflation, economic inefficiency and rising national debt.61 In the following years, the critique of the welfare state intensified among a small group of neoliberal intellectuals. Hannes H. Gissurarson, an ardent disciple of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, claimed that taxes were in themselves an unjustified act of force. Assistance to the poor could be delivered through other forms than state taxes, e.g. by voluntary contributions, quoting Friedman’s famous assertion that the eleventh commandment should be that every person should be free to do well at his own expense.62 The neoliberal choice-based critique of the welfare state was gaining ground. The welfare state was on the wrong track and needed a radical overhaul. But what kind of overhaul? Again, the neoliberals were vague when it came to the welfare system itself and offered mostly generalities, such as the reduction of the public sector and increased individual responsibility. In a short essay, Hreinn Loftsson contrasted the bloated welfare state with the Rechtsstaat, ‘legal state’, which he saw as the true foundation of a society governed by the rule of law, constitutional government and civil liberties.63 Various welfare issues are not incompatible with the Rechtsstaat, such as health and education, while the demand for unlimited income security is a threat to the market economy and individual freedom. Despite the neoliberal critique, substantial changes to the welfare system were limited during the 80s. The mainstream politicians within the IP stood for a moderate view in social policy, advocating restraint in welfare spending (still, welfare expenditure grew in real terms by 25 per cent from 1981 to 1991) and a welfare system with minimum effects on income redistribution.64

From the Welfare State to the Competition State? The 1990s were a difficult time for the welfare state both in material and ideological terms. The protracted economic recession of the early 1990s put enormous pressure on the state budget to which the government responded by cutting social welfare expenditure. It was an ironic twist of history that the SDP, controlling the key ministries of finance, health and social insurance in the coalition government with the IP 1991–1995, had to execute unprecedented cuts in welfare expenditure in order to bring down budget deficits and rising public debt. User charges were increased, benefits were not kept in line with wages and the income-relatedness of benefits was increased still further.

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An ideological shift in public policy could be discerned even among the Social Democrats, the principal custodians of the welfare state, who were rethinking many of their economic and social principles under the leadership of Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson. Embracing market liberalization and the opening-up of the economy, the Social Democrats became the most ardent supporters of joining the European Economic Area. It is therefore little wonder the SDP experienced yet another split of left-wingers, as Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir and her supporters founded a new party, Þjóðvaki, gaining four seats in the general elections of 1995.

Figure 6.3. ‘The Government has to stop attacking the welfare system’. On 10 February 1992 the founding meeting of Almannaheill (The Public Good), an umbrella organization of old, sick and disabled people, was held in front of the parliament, Althingi, to protest against recent cuts in the public welfare budget. The cartoon shows the leaders of the two government parties, Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson (SDP) and Davíð Oddsson (IP), on the run. In the background is the island of Viðey where they had finalized the government platform the previous year. Cartoon by the artist Sigmund (http://sigmund.is). © Safnahús Vestmannaeyja, reprinted with permission.

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From the late 1980s a wave of market liberalization was sweeping Icelandic politics, ranging from the abolition of price and trade regulations to the privatization of state companies. The welfare state was on the defensive, and the focus of public policy gradually shifted towards the idea of ‘the competition state’. If Icelanders were to tackle growing unemployment, public deficit and meet the challenges of globalization they would have to speed up market liberalization and move towards a more open economy. The Independence Party and the business community, led by the Iceland Chamber of Commerce and SA-Business Iceland (Samtök atvinnulífsins), were rapidly changing the political discourse, advocating an alternative to the ailing welfare state. In the name of competitiveness, public expenditure was to be kept in check, government red tape discarded, regulations of the labour market relaxed and corporate taxes reduced. As put by Morgunblaðið: ‘The campaign for the protection of welfare in the country is primarily a campaign for the competitiveness of Icelandic industries.’65 The notion of the competition state was by no means confined to the right-wing parties: many on the left-wing sought to justify stronger social welfare by arguing that it was a crucial measure to invigorate the economy and improve its international standing.66 International surveys of competitiveness became an important compass for the neoliberal reformers on policy performance, and they seemed to confirm that Iceland was on the right track, scoring ever higher and well above the other Nordic countries in terms of competitiveness and economic freedom. At the height of the economic bubble in early 2006, the Chamber of Commerce published a report titled ‘Iceland 2015’, which boldly claimed that since the country superseded on most counts the other Nordic countries, who were riddled with high taxes and overloaded welfare systems, it should stop comparing itself with them. Iceland should instead promote itself as a beacon of economic freedom – ‘the land of freedom’ – aiming to become the most competitive economy in the world by 2015.67 In the atmosphere of excess and hubris, generated by one of the most spectacular bubble economies in Europe, many of the newly rich saw greater opportunities for private enterprise in welfare provision. The time of the social entrepreneur had come: rich men and women who were willing to plough back some of their wealth to the community. Some of the richest families in the country, predominantly the upstarts, rushed to declare in public that they ‘cared’ and poured money into all sorts of cultural and social charities.68 The new philanthropy corresponded well with a greater emphasis in government policy on outsourcing social services to private enterprises and self-help organizations. The rise of the super-rich was in stark contrast to the experiences of people less affected by the economic boom, not to mention people de-

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pendent on welfare benefits and services. Difficult and divisive issues concerning income inequality, growing poverty and the widening gap between wage earners and benefit recipients were building up pressure for radical overhaul and reinvigoration of the welfare system. The growing dissatisfaction with the government’s social policies was fuelled by low levels of benefits and excessive income-relatedness, which led many welfare recipients to succumb to poverty. The issue came to a head in 2000 when the Organization of Disabled in Iceland took the Social Insurance Administration to court for unlawfully relating invalidity benefits to the incomes of the individuals’ (married) partners. In a landmark ruling at the end of 2000, the Supreme Court supported the Organization’s view and ruled that the extent to which the state was reducing disability pensions to persons with disabilities based on the income of their able-bodied spouses was in breach of the human rights section of the constitution (equality before the law and support obligations of the state).69 It is not surprising that debate about the welfare system was at the forefront of political debate in the last years of the twentieth century. Never before had social policy taken such a prominent place in election campaigns as those of 1999 and 2003. The Left called for the restoration of the welfare system that would be on an equal footing with those of the other Nordic countries. A resolution proposal by a group of Left-Green MPs in Althingi in 1999 stated: One of the consequences of the decline of the welfare state in Iceland is that society has increasingly moved towards self-interest and protecting the interests of the financially and socially privileged. At the same time, we have seen the retreat of values that until recent years have been the foundations of the welfare state. Thus, care for others, social support and social responsibility are increasingly perceived as old-fashioned and backward views.70

A major realignment of the parties on the left and centre was under way in the run-up to the 1999 general election. Four parties: the PA, SDP, the Women’s Party and Þjóðvaki (a short-lived splinter group from the SDP) united to form a centre-left party, the Social Democratic Alliance (SDA, Samfylkingin), while the more radical Left founded the Left-Green Movement (LGM, Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð). The social policies of these two new parties were very similar, with both parties putting the revival of the welfare system to fight poverty and inequality at the heart of their political agenda. No doubt spurred by the excessive income-relatedness of benefits, there was growing support on the Left for regarding social security benefits as strictly individually based social rights. The Social Democratic Alliance was the more pro-market of the two parties,

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making the idea of ‘the Nordic welfare society’ a key idea in its political programme while being open to new ideas about the provision of health and social services.71 The Left-Green Movement called for ‘a welfare government’ and claimed that the party was the clearest alternative to the neoliberal attack on the welfare system.72 In his personal political manifesto, We All: Icelandic Welfare Society at the Crossroads (2006), the party leader, Steingrímur J. Sigfússon, describes his ideas of the welfare state: Radical socialism – leftism – [is] a call for social justice, an ideology premised on the notion that we care for other people. Welfare society, with its collective responsibility, is based on those foundations. . . . Socialists believe that the state should strive for equality so that everyone, not just some, can develop and make use of their abilities, and live a rich and good life. The education system and the health system should be publicly run and can be regarded as important instruments of equality . . .73

Sigfússon’s ideas are basically a defence for the traditional values of the social democratic welfare state: a comprehensive provision of state-financed, universal social insurance and services. This was also true for the Icelandic Confederation of Labour (ASÍ), which was giving welfare issues high priority, launching a major policy review in 2000 in which a wide consultation with organizations and experts was carried out. It is interesting that in the final report, ‘Welfare for All’ (2003), there is no vision offered of the welfare state and its future, only a detailed policy statement consisting mainly of a large number of urgent issues such as raising the level of guaranteed minimum income for all, individually based rights, access for all to social services on the basis of need and not income and efficiency improvements in the provision of the health service.74 This strategy was very much in line with the pragmatic, non-ideological approach of many of the political actors in the field of social policy. Despite unpopular cuts in social expenditure and harsh criticism from the Opposition for dismantling the welfare system, the coalition government of the Independence and the Progressive Parties stayed in power for twelve years, 1995–2007. The IP won a major victory in the 1999 general election, securing a staggering 41 per cent of the vote. The good shape of the economy held more sway over the minds of Icelandic voters than pressing welfare problems. The party now had an even stronger mandate than before to push for neoliberal reforms. Self-confident and more powerful than it had been for decades, the IP claimed in its conference resolution of 2001: ‘The Icelandic pensions system is solid

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and stands up well in international comparison. In general, the welfare system is one of the most important tools of the nation in international competition for people during times of greater opportunity for them to choose a place to live.’75 Thus, the IP claimed support for the welfare system as a means to strengthen the nation’s competitiveness. Their stance was also an indication that views on the welfare state as an ideal were becoming more positive across the political spectrum. All the political parties were now accepting the welfare state as a general idea and surveys indicated that the Nordic model enjoyed wide support among the general public. A sign of the times was a debate played out in the media in 2002 on which political party was the true ‘founding father’ of the Icelandic welfare state. All the parties except the PP staked a claim for the glory. Even the IP argued strongly for their claim, stressing their leadership in the social reform in the immediate postwar years, the cooperation between government and the labour movement in the workers’ housing projects of the 1960s and the ambitious social services established by Reykjavík Council under the leadership of the IP.76

‘A Nordic Welfare Government’: The Significance of the 2008 Crisis The financial crisis in 2008 and the ensuing economic recession shifted the political balance in favour of the Left, and more active pro-welfare politics ensued despite the enormous financial difficulties facing the public sector. The SDP and the Left-Green Movement were swept to power in the 2009 election, forming the first left-wing government in Iceland that pledged itself to follow the principles of a ‘Nordic welfare government’. As the government coalition statement in May 2009 said: In the national elections just concluded, a majority of voters gave social democratic and left-wing parties a clear mandate to continue, and to prioritize new values of equality, social justice, solidarity, sustainable development, gender equality, moral reform and democracy in Iceland. The new government, guided by these values, aims at creating a Nordic welfare society in Iceland, where collective interests take precedence over particular interests.77

Prime Minister Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir claimed: ‘We stand at a crossroads in Icelandic history. The ideology of neoliberalism and unrestricted markets has collapsed. Ahead is the reconstruction of society on a new foundation of social democracy and solidarity.’78

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The government’s strategy was characterized by a mix of balanced budgets combined with an emphasis on shifting the tax burden from the poor and onto the more affluent. Aiming at redistribution through the tax system, proactive labour market policies and household debt relief, the government was moving closer to the Nordic welfare states.79 The extensive use of the welfare system to cushion the impact of the economic crisis was a crucial factor in generating a more positive view among the public towards the welfare system. The mood of the nation changed dramatically in favour of pro-welfare policies: polls showed wide support for the extension of the welfare system and active government, as strong calls were made for various public measures to address unemployment and debt relief of individuals and households. When respondents to a poll conducted between December 2008 and April 2009 were asked if Icelanders should move more towards a Scandinavian type of society in the future, three out of four agreed, either somewhat or strongly.80 Welfare in every possible combination became a most cherished term in the political debate. The neoliberal agenda was rejected in favour of a societal renewal that would bring ‘New Iceland’ closer to a Nordic welfare society. However, although the Nordic social democratic ideal of ‘the welfare state’ seemed to enjoy wide support, the reality was quite some way away.

The Contested Principle of Universalism Few concepts illuminate better the different understandings of the defining characteristics of the welfare state during the postwar period than the principle of universalism. A recurrent theme in social policy and political theory, this principle in welfare provision is traditionally associated with social democracy and social liberalism, albeit a complex and highly contested concept that has different dimensions and different meanings attached to it.81 However, there is a core meaning shared by many in the realm of social policy that regards policy as universal ‘if it applies equally to everyone of a particular kind’, for example all citizens.82 Here we will briefly discuss notions of universalism in the Icelandic context and its significance as an attribute of the welfare system.83 The long-standing debate on family benefits (child benefits from 1975) throws light on the different understandings and controversies surrounding the principle of universalism.84 Family benefits were introduced as tax-financed payments in the Social Security Act of 1946, starting with the fourth child of married (or cohabiting) couples. In 1952, the benefits were extended to the second and third children and to all children in

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1960, becoming a substantial part of the social budget and an important source of income for families. The extension of the family benefits was not a result of principled debate in Althingi, rather a government contribution to a settlement of a wage dispute and bitter strike in Reykjavík in 1952, and again in 1960, as a measure to cushion the effects of a government economic stabilization plan that greatly reduced real wages. In both cases the changes were premised on the principle of universalism: the same benefit amount was to be allocated for each child, regardless of the number of children or the parents’ income. A parliamentary debate in 1952 opened up the conflict between ‘the universalists’ and ‘the selectivists’ – i.e. those in favour of targeted support. Gísli Jónsson, spokesman for the IP on social insurance, defended the universalist view, pointing out that the social security legislation contained both insurance and social assistance elements, ensuring minimum income for the poorest section of the population as well as the rights of individuals who paid their contribution to receive benefits regardless of their income: And it is this part of the insurance legislation which in the future will make it popular and more established, but hitherto it has not met with the understanding it deserves. I have frequently come across people who do not understand why a poor man, 67 years or older, does not receive a higher pension than the higher income one . . .’85

Many politicians disagreed with Gísli Jónsson, in particular those on the left. Finnbogi Rútur Valdimarsson, of the People’s Alliance, commented: I ask, what purpose does it serve for society to offer a man with 100,000 krónur in income a few hundred krónur as support for caring for his children. This is absurd, in my view, and I also believe that the highest earners see this as simply ridiculous. . . . I had assumed that the purpose of all the benefits assigned in the childcare legislation . . . was to ensure that children of poor parents or children neglected by their parents would receive decent care and they would not need to suffer physically or mentally as a result of poverty.86

Another important area of social insurance where the principle of universalism was contested was old age and disability benefits. The introduction of a Beveridge type of social insurance at the end of the war, based on universal rights and flat-rate benefits, was a novelty in Icelandic social policy. The new social insurance replaced a means-tested, income-related system targeted at the working class. Icelandic policymakers became enthusiastic supporters of the Beveridge programme, but their plans were to take an unexpected turn. At the insistence of the IP, demanding that the costs of the bill on social insurance be reduced, a provisional amend-

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ment was inserted in the act in which old-age and disability pensions were linked to earnings. The measure was meant to be temporary but turned out to be a permanent and increasingly prominent feature of the benefit system.87 The introduction of income-related benefits was certainly a relaxation of the principle of universalism but did not cause a great stir. In the coming decades demands for a change in the social insurance legislation focused more on levels of benefits, the disparities between married and unmarried women, extension of family benefits, the introduction of unemployment insurance and so on. Within all political parties, as well as the labour movement, opinion was split between those supporting flat-rate benefits and those supporting individually based entitlements.88 A good indication of the wide support for income-related benefits was a survey conducted in 1955 among local governments as part of preparations for the revision of the Social Security Act. Of the 165 communes responding, 85 supported the continuing cap on benefits, nearly 60 were in favour of abolishing it and 20 abstained. In light of these results and the fact that recipients of social benefits had only paid premiums for nine years, amounting to only a third of the total contributions, the parliamentary committee in charge of the revision did not consider it right to abolish the caps.89 Only six years later the policy was changed and all caps on old-age and disability benefits due to income were abolished as a part of government measures to cushion the effects of its economic stabilization plan. The new programme lasted for twelve years until a two-tier old-age pension system was introduced in 1972 with a low flat-rate basic pension and an income-related supplement, which led to the latter becoming proportionally bigger as time progressed. These radical shifts in public policy between the universalist and selectivist views show how unresolved the underlying principles were and how short-term considerations, strategic or financial, could influence social policy. Furthermore, the dividing lines were drawn not so much between the left and the right but between individual persons. In the coming decades, the Icelandic social insurance system developed as a hybrid between the universalist, ‘social-democratic regime’ normally associated with the Nordic countries and the more liberal welfare state of meanstested assistance and modest universal transfers.90 It became more akin to the Anglo-Saxon systems of basic security, with fixed minimum benefits that are reduced with higher income. During the years of welfare retrenchment in the early 1990s, even basic old-age and disability pensions were earnings-related, with caps starting at a low level of income. The extreme income-relatedness of pensions became hugely unpopular in the 1990s, culminating in the aforementioned conflict between the Or-

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ganization for the Disabled and the government. The issue was a huge embarrassment to the government, which was forced to relax the criteria for relating benefits to income and raise the minimum disability benefits and, a little later, old-age benefits as well.91 The disability pension issue forced the political parties to clarify their stand on the principle of universalism. The IP leader, Prime Minister Davíð Oddsson, did not retreat from his position and said Icelanders should be proud of the existing system that targets low-income earners, thus ensuring the financial soundness of the social security system – in contrast to those of the other Nordic countries, which have run into major financial problems so as to effectively become bankrupt.92 In the following years, however, heavy income-relatedness seems to have lost support across parties. At the insistence of the SDP in the short-lived IP-SDP coalition government of 2007–9, income-relatedness of social security benefits was greatly reduced, most importantly by totally abolishing caps due to a spouse’s income and caps on pensions for the 70+ age group due to income. The welfare system was moving in favour of individually based entitlements.

Conclusion The term welfare state has a relatively short history in the Icelandic language, although the ideas and concepts underlying its post-1945 version have long been debated under different labels. The concept that comes closest in meaning is that of social security (developed in the 1940s), which had all the hallmarks of the welfare state concept emerging after World War II. As with most ideas and concepts in social policy, the welfare state and related concepts entered the Icelandic language via the other Nordic countries and Britain. Its first occurrence in the print media was in 1949, but since it was so closely associated with social democratic political thinking, it was not well received by liberals or socialists. In the 1960s, the concept became popular in the public discourse, primarily as a depiction of dominant characteristics of postwar Denmark, Sweden, Norway and, only gradually, of Iceland. Across most of the political spectrum the welfare state was perceived as a desirable societal ideal, and even a partial reality of Icelandic society, but its meaning was ambiguous and disputed. Political ideologies tried to decontest the concept; incorporate it into their universe and impose their understanding of it. The ideational development of the welfare state in Iceland was closely linked to the other Nordic countries, but for obvious reasons Iceland was

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bound to develop some distinctively national features in accordance with its culture and own historical trajectories. The concept of the welfare state and related concepts came relatively late to Iceland, and the political debate tended to revolve around concrete ideas rather than visions or underlying philosophies. Social liberals and Social Democrats were the driving forces in the early ideational development of the welfare state, but the strong position of the liberals, the leading political power in the second half of the twentieth century, influenced Icelanders’ conception of the welfare state a great deal. The Right succeeded in intertwining old notions of work ethic and self-sufficiency, nationalist ideas of unity and cohesion and liberal ideology, which stressed individualism, free enterprise and self-help. The hybridity of the Icelandic welfare state, the often uneasy compromises between the liberal and the social democratic models, is well reflected in the different interpretations and meanings of core concepts in social policy. The debates revolved around practical organization of policies but also the constitutive elements of welfare state, the state-market-family nexus, universal versus selective rights and state-financed versus user-financed welfare benefits and their underlying values and objectives, such as freedom, equality and social solidarity. The early shift in the political discourse from welfare state to welfare society can be seen as an indication of a strong position of liberalism in social politics. Later, socialist and feminist critique were to significantly influence the public discourse, but even more influential was the neoliberal critique during the last two decades of the twentieth century, which coincided with both material and ideational crises in the welfare state. By the turn of the twenty-first century, the welfare state had taken centre stage in Icelandic politics; all the parties were embracing the idea of welfare society and all except the Progressive Party were claiming to be its ‘founding father’. Although challenged for a while by the idea of the competition state, support for the welfare state rebounded in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, and ‘the Nordic welfare model’ was hailed as an ideal more than ever before, reaching almost hegemonic status in the welfare discourse. However, there were no clear signs that the gap between the rising aspirations for social democratic welfare and the reality of the welfare state were getting any narrower. Guðmundur Jónsson is a Professor of History at the University of Iceland in Reykjavík. His research interests include economic growth and development, Iceland and the European integration, and social policy and welfare state development. Among his publications are ‘The Icelandic Welfare State in the Twentieth Century’, Scandinavian Journal of History

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26(3) (2001) and ‘Iceland and the Nordic Model of Consensus’, Scandinavian Journal of History 39(4) (2014).

NOTES 1. See Chapter 1 in this book, and also Yuichi Shionoya‚ ‘The Oxford Approach to the Philosophical Foundations of the Welfare State’, in Roger E. Backhouse and Tamotsu Nishizawa (eds), No Wealth but Life: Welfare Economics and the Welfare State in Britain, 1880–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 91–113. 2. See e.g. Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson, ‘Raunhæf skynsemi eða stefnufálm? Samband þings og framkvæmdarvalds við undirbúning opinberrar stefnumótunar’, Stjórnmál & stjórnsýsla 9(2) (2013), 257–77. 3. See e.g. Guðmundur Hálfdanarson, ‘Discussing Europe: Icelandic Nationalism and European Integration’, in Baldur Þórhallsson (ed.), Iceland and European Integration: On the Edge: Europe and the Nation State (New York: Routledge, 2004), 128–144; Guðmundur Jónsson, ‘The Icelandic Welfare State in the Twentieth Century’, Scandinavian Journal of History 26(3) (2001), 249–67. 4. Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang, ‘Introduction: “Nordic Democracy” in a World of Tensions’, in Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang (eds), Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2010), 13–17. 5. Sources for this study include published and unpublished material of the Ministry of Social Affairs, parliamentary papers and reports, party programmes, election manifestos, political pamphlets, newspapers and magazines and studies in historical and social sciences. Parliamentary papers are available online 1845–1881 and from 2009 onwards, cf. Althingi.is. http:// www.althingi.is/thingstorf/leidbeiningar-og-yfirlit/althingistidindi/. The National and University Library of Iceland provides a digitized archive of Icelandic newspapers and journals, see http:timarit.is. 6. Daniel Wincott, ‘Ideas, Policy Change, and the Welfare State’, in Daniel Béland and Robert Henry Cox (eds), Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 143. 7. Stefán Ólafsson, ‘Variations within the Scandinavian Model: Iceland in the Scandinavian Perspective’, in Erik J. Hansen et al. (eds), Welfare Trends in the Scandinavian Countries (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1993), 61–88; Stefán Ólafsson, ‘The Icelandic Model: Social Security and Welfare in a Comparative Perspective’, in Comparing Social Welfare Systems in Europe, 4 vols (Paris and Nantes: Mire-Drees, 1996–99), vol. 4, 61–83; Jónsson, ‘The Icelandic Welfare State’. 8. Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998), 6. 9. Guðmundur Jónsson, ‘Agents and Institutions in the Creation of the Icelandic Welfare State, 1880–1946’, in Rapporter til Det 24. Nordiske Historikermøde, 3

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10.

11. 12.

13. 14. 15.

16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23.

24.

25.

26.

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vols (Aarhus: Jysk Selskab for Historie, 2000), vol. 2 Frihed, lighed og velfærd: Velfærdspolitik i Norden, 61–89. Guðmundur Jónsson, ‘Hjálp til sjálfshjálpar: Borgaralegar rætur velferðarríkisins á Íslandi’, in Dóra S. Bjarnason et al. (eds), Menntaspor: Rit til heiðurs Lofti Guttormssyni sjötugum 5. apríl 2008 (Reykjavík: Sögufélag, 2008), 371–93. Páll Briem, ‘Nokkur landsmál einkum fátækramálið og skattamálið’, Andvari 15 (1889), 15–55. ‘Tillögur um frumvarp til fátækralaga frá nefnd þeirri, er skipuð hefur verið samkvæmt konungsúrskurði 13. nóvbr. 1901 til þess að íhuga og koma fram með tillögur um fátækra- og sveitarstjórnarmál’ (Reykjavík, 1905). Jónsson, ‘Hjálp til sjálfshjálpar’, 371–93. Jón Blöndal, Félagsmál á Íslandi (Reykjavík: Félagsmálaráðuneytið, 1942), v–vi. Auður Styrkársdóttir, Barátta um vald: Konur í bæjarstjórn Reykjavíkur 1908– 1922 (Reykjavík: Háskólaútgáfan, 1994), 35. See also her book, From Feminism to Class Politics: The Rise and Decline of Women’s Politics in Reykjavik, 1908–1922 (Umeå: Umeå University, 1998). Sumarliði R. Ísleifsson, Saga Alþýðusambands Íslands, 3 vols (Reykjavík: Forlagið, 2013); Þorleifur Friðriksson, Við brún nýs dags: Saga Verkamannafélagsins Dagsbrúnar 1906–1930 (Reykjavík: Efling stéttarfélag, Sagnfræðistofnun Háskóla Íslands, 2007). Alþýðuflokkurinn: Nýr stjórnmálaflokkur: Hvað hann er og hvað hann vill (Reykjavík, 1917), 9. Alþingistíðindi 1932 A, 591. See also Alþýðublaðið 16 March 1929, 5. Ágúst H. Bjarnason, Vandamál mannlegs lífs, 2 vols (Reykjavík: Háskóli Íslands, 1943–45), vol. 2, 168. Jón Blöndal, Félagslegt öryggi eftir stríðið (Reykjavík: Félagsmálaráðuneytið, 1943), 6. Jóhann Sæmundsson and Jón Blöndal, Almannatryggingar á Íslandi: Skýrslur og tillögur um almannatryggingar, heilsugæslu og atvinnuleysismál (Reykjavík: Ministry of Social Affairs, 1945), 13. Blöndal, Félagsmál á Íslandi. Ráðuneyti til Jóns Blöndal 15 March 1943, Félagsmál, félagslegt öryggi o.fl. Félagsmálaráðuneytið. 1971- B/195 1 1942–1946, National Archives of Iceland. Frétt frá ríkisstjórninni 31 October 1944, Félagsmál, félagslegt öryggi o.fl. Félagsmálaráðuneytið. 1971- B/195 1 1942–1946. National Archives of Iceland. Sæmundsson and Blöndal, Almannatryggingar. See also the accompanying report on social security legislation in other countries: Jón Blöndal, Alþýðutryggingar á Íslandi og í nokkrum öðrum löndum: Erlendar framtíðartillögur (Reykjavík: Félagsmálaráðuneytið, 1945). Sæmundsson and Blöndal, Almannatryggingar á Íslandi, 264–269.

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27. Jón Blöndal, ‘Almannatryggingar: Mesti sigurinn í félagsmálabaráttu alþýðu’, Skutull, 21 June 1946, 1–2. 28. Alþingistíðindi 1945 B, 1954. 29. ‘“Sæluríki” sósíalismans, sem fjell fyrir dómi reynslunnar eftir 14 ár’, Morgunblaðið, 8 December 1949; See also ‘Truman óttast ekki ásakanir afturhaldsins um sósíalisma’, Alþýðublaðið, 6 September 1949, and ‘Nýr fræðimaður Morgunblaðsins’, Alþýðublaðið, 13 December 1949. 30. See e.g. ‘Er ríkið óvinurinn’, Morgunblaðið, 6 January 1957; Sigríður Jónsdóttir, ‘Velferðarsamfélag – samfélagsleg velferð’, Félagsleg þjónusta undanfarið og framundan. Samband íslenskra sveitarfélaga: Fræðslurit 3 (1985), 135–43. 31. ‘Áfangi velferðarþjóðfélagsins’, Vísir, 27 August 1966. 32. ‘Íslenzka “velferðarríkið” blekking!’, Ný vikutíðindi, 27 November 1970. 33. Stefán Jóh. Stefánsson,‘Sambandsslitin og lýðveldisstofnunin’, Alþýðublaðið, 17 June 1944, 9–10. 34. See Nils Edling, ‘The Primacy of Welfare Politics: Notes on the Language of the Swedish Social Democrats and their Adversaries in 1930s’, in Heidi Haggrén, Johanna Rainio-Niemi and Jussi Vauhkonen (eds), Multi-layered Historicity of the Present: Approaches to Social Science History (Helsinki: Helsinki University, 2013), 125–50. 35. ‘Stefnuskrá Alþýðuflokksins’, Alþýðumaðurinn, 21 May 1963. 36. Gylfi Þ. Gíslason, ‘Atvinnulíf og fjármál árið sem leið’, Alþýðublaðið, 31 December 1954, 2–3. 37. ‘Velferðarríki á vísindagrundvelli’, Alþýðublaðið, 25 November 1964. 38. Ólafur Thors, ‘Stefna Sjálfstæðisflokksins og þjóðareðli Íslendinga’, Morgunblaðið, 17 June 1944, 9–10. 39. Alþingistíðindi 1955 B, 983. 40. Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 76–77. 41. Eyjólfur K. Jónsson and Ólafur Björnsson, Hægri stefna og velferðarríkið: Tvö erindi flutt á þjóðmálaráðstefnu Vöku 18. og 19. marz 1961 (Reykjavík: Vaka, 1961). 42. ‘Ríkisafskipti og einstaklingurinn’, Morgunblaðið, 25 April 1959. 43. These bleak accounts often had their origins in the US media, see e.g. ‘Velferðarríkið og reynsla Svíþjóðar’, Morgunblaðið, 10 February 1966. See also Sólveig Nielsen, ‘“Sænska Mafían”: Viðhorf Íslendinga til Svía og sænska velferðarríkisins 1960–1980’ (BA thesis in History, University of Iceland, 2006). 44. ‘Ríkisafskipti’, Morgunblaðið, 25 April 1959. 45. Matthías Johannessen, Ólafur Thors: Ævi og störf, 2 vols (Reykjavík: Almenna bókafélagið, 1981), vol. 2, 416. See also ‘Félagslegt öryggi’, Morgunblaðið, 12 May 1971. 46. ‘Flokkur framfara og frjálslyndis’, Morgunblaðið, 6 June 1962. 47. ‘Sterkir einstaklingar skapa sterkt þjóðfélag’, Morgunblaðið, 30 August 1964. 48. ‘Félagslegt öryggi’, Morgunblaðið, 12 May 1971.

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49. Alþingistíðindi 1945 A, 1409. 50. See e.g. Thorsten Odhe, Iceland: The Co-Operative Island (Chicago: Cooperative League of the U.S.A, 1960). 51. Árni Bergmann, ‘Hver á höfundarrétt að velferðarþjóðfélagi?’, Morgunblaðið, 1 December 2002, 34. 52. Halldór Kiljan Laxness, ‘Veikar stoðir’, Þjóðviljinn, 10 February 1944, 3. 53. ‘Vinstri stjórn og vinstri pólitík’, Þjóðviljinn, 12 July 1956. 54. Einar Olgeirsson, ‘Við verðum að velja milli Efnahagsbandalags Evrópu og sameinaðra Norðurlanda’, Þjóðviljinn, 23 March 1962, 3. 55. Drög að stefnuská fyrir Alþýðubandalagið (Reykjavík: Alþýðubandalagið, 1973), 32; Þjóðviljinn, 13 January 1973. 56. Sigríður Th. Erlendsdóttir, Veröld sem ég vil: Saga Kvenréttindafélags Íslands 1907–1992 (Reykjavík: Kvenréttindafélags Íslands, 1993), 264–65. 57. Guðrún Jónsdóttir, ‘Konur og velferð’, Vera 3(4) (1984), 30–32. 58. Guðmundur Jónsson, ‘Hvers kyns velferðarkerfi? Ísland í spegli hinna kvenvænu velferðarkerfa á Norðurlöndum’, in Irma Erlingsdóttir (ed.), Kynjafræði – Kortlagningar (Reykjavík: RIKK, 2004), 204–208; See also Sigríður Dúna Kristmundsdóttir, Doing and Becoming: Women’s Movements and Women’s Personhood in Iceland 1870–1990 (Reykjavík: University of Iceland Press, 1997). 59. Uppreisn frjálshyggjunnar (Reykjavík: Kjartan Gunnarsson, 1979). See also a collection of essays by the influential economist Jónas H. Haralz, Velferðarríki á villigötum: Úrval greina frá áttunda áratugnum (Reykjavík: Félag frjálshyggjumanna, 1981), 99–101. 60. See e.g. Valur F. Steinarsson, ‘Endurreisn frjálshyggjunnar í hugmyndafræði Sjálfstæðisflokksins 1971–1983’ (BA thesis in History, University of Iceland, 2005), 39. 61. The chief proponent of this formulation was not a politician but the sociologist Stefán Ólafsson, see e.g. his ‘Rætur verðbólgunnar’, Þjóðviljinn, 23 June 1982, 8–9, and Íslenska velferðarríkið: Lífskjör og stjórnmál (Reykjavík: Háskóli Íslands, Félagsvísindadeild, 1984), 7–12. 62. Hannes H. Gissurarson, ‘Félagi Orð’, Frelsið 4(3) (1983), 200. See also Vilhjálmur Egilsson, Félagsleg aðstoð við fullfrískt fólk: Velferðarþjóðfélag á villigötum (Reykjavík: Heimdallur, félag ungra sjálfstæðismanna, 1985). 63. Hreinn Loftsson, ‘Réttarríki eða velferðarríki’, in Björn Hermannsson et al., Hugmyndir ungra manna: Samband ungra sjálfstæðismanna 50 ára (Reykjavík: Samband ungra sjálfstæðismanna, 1980), 36–39. 64. See e.g. Matthías Johannessen, ‘Frjálshyggja og velferðarþjóðfélag’, Frelsið 6(2) (1985), 94–134; Jónas H. Haralz, ‘Velferð og hagþróun’, Frelsið 5(3) (1984), 210–17. 65. ‘Reykjavíkurbréf’, Morgunblaðið, 31 March 1996. 66. See e.g. Framtíðarhópur Samfylkingarinnar: Starf frá flokksstjórnarfundi 19. júní 2003 til landsfundar 20. maí 2005; Alþingistíðindi 2002 B, 1176–79 (Ögmundur Jónasson).

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67. Viðskiptaráð Íslands, ‘Ísland 2015’, 22. 68. Guðmundur Jónsson, ‘Velferðarkerfið: Ávöxtur af baráttu verkalýðshreyfingarinnar?’, in Þórunn Sigurðardóttir and Sumarliði R. Ísleifsson (eds), Samfélagsleg áhrif verkalýðshreyfingarinnar á 20. öld: Framtíðarsýn á 21. öldinni (Reykjavík: Efling, Reykjavíkurakademían, 2007), 85–99. 69. ‘Óheimilt að tengja tekjutryggingu við tekjur maka’, Morgunblaðið, 20 December 2000. 70. Alþingistíðindi 1999–2000 A, 4660. 71. See e.g. Samfylkingin ’99: Stefnuyfirlýsing, Verkefnaskrá (Reykjavík: Samfylkingin, 1999). 72. See e.g. Vinstri græn, Ræða Steingríms J. Sigfússonar á landsfundi 2001. 73. Steingrímur J. Sigfússon, Við öll: Íslenskt velferðarsamfélag á tímamótum (Reykjavík: Salka, 2006), 38. 74. Velferð fyrir alla: Áherslur og framtíðarsýn Alþýðusambands Íslands í velferðarmálum: Áfangaskýrsla (Reykjavík: ASÍ, 2003). 75. Fleiri tækifæri – farsælla mannlíf: Stjórnmálaályktun 34. landsfundar Sjálfstæðisflokksins 11.–14. október 2001 (Reykjavík: Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn, 2001). 76. ‘Velferðarstefna og vinstri menn’, Morgunblaðið, 17 November 2002; Steingrímur J. Sigfússon, ‘Velferðarstjórn og vinstrimen: Viðbrögð við leiðara’, Morgunblaðið, 20 November 2002, 31; ‘Saga velferðarríkis’, Morgunblaðið, 21 November 2002; Bergmann, ‘Hver á höfundarrétt’, 34; Kristín Ástgeirsdóttir, ‘Mæður og feður velferðarinnar’, Lesbók Morgunblaðsins, 28 December 2002, 3. 77. Prime Minister’s Office, Government Coalition Platform of the Social Democratic Alliance and Left-Green Movement 2009. 78. Prime Minister’s Office, Prime Minister’s Address Opening the Parliamentary Session on Monday 5 October 2009. 79. Stefán Ólafsson, ‘Crisis and Recovery in Iceland’, in Guðmundur Jónsson and Kolbeinn Stefánsson (eds), Retrenchment or Revival? Welfare States in Times of Economic Crisis (Helsinki: Nordwel, 2013), 106–25. 80. ‘Breytt gildi Íslendinga í kjölfar hrunsins: Könnun á viðhorfum til endurreisnar samfélagsins’, Þjóðmálastofnun Háskóla Íslands. Fréttabréf 4 (2009). 81. Anneli Anttonen et al., ‘Universalism and the Challenge of Diversity’, in Anneli Anttonen, Liisa Häikiö and Kolbeinn Stefánsson (eds), Welfare State, Universalism and Diversity (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), 1–3. 82. Kolbeinn Stefánsson, ‘What is in a Word? Universalism, Ideology and Practice’, in Anttonen, Häikiö and Stefánsson, Welfare State, 46. 83. See also Stefán Ólafsson, ‘Framþróun velferðarríkisins: Frá ölmusu til borgararéttinda – og aftur til baka?’, in Friðrik H. Jónsson (ed.), Rannsóknir í félagsvísindum IV 2003 (Reykjavík: Háskólaútgáfan, 2003), 93–104. 84. Guðný B. Eydal, Family Policy in Iceland 1944–1984 (Gothenburg: Gothenburg University, 2005), especially ch. 6. 85. Alþingistíðindi 1952 B, 996. 86. Alþingistíðindi 1952 B, 1006.

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87. Alþingistíðindi 1955 A, 510–11. 88. Ragnhildur Helgadóttir, ‘Félagslegt öryggi’, Stefnir 22(3) (1971), 3–4.; Morgunblaðið 7 January 1971, 14. 89. Alþingistíðindi 1955 A, 518. 90. See for general discussion Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), ch. 1. 91. ‘Skýrsla starfshóps um Hæstaréttardóm’, Morgunblaðið, 11 January 2001. 92. Alþingistíðindi 1999–2000 B, 1887–88. This view was reiterated in Morgunblaðið in the following years, see e.g. Morgunblaðið 17 November 2002, 32; 20 November 2002, 31; 21 November 2002, 32; 1 December 2002, 34.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Collections Þjóðskjalasafn Íslands, Reykjavík (National Archives) Félagsmál, félagslegt öryggi o.fl. Félagsmálaráðuneytið Vol. 1971- B/195 1 1942–1946

Primary Sources ‘Áfangi velferðarþjóðfélagsins’, Vísir, 27 August 1966. Alþingistíðindi [Parliamentary Papers] 1905–2010. Alþýðuflokkurinn: Nýr stjórnmálaflokkur: Hvað hann er og hvað hann vill (Reykjavík, 1917). Ástgeirsdóttir, Kristín, ‘Mæður og feður velferðarinnar’, Lesbók Morgunblaðsins, 28 December 2002, 3. Bergmann, Árni, ‘Hver á höfundarrétt að velferðarþjóðfélagi?’, Morgunblaðið, 1 December 2002, 34. Bjarnason, Ágúst H., Vandamál mannlegs lífs, 2 vols. (Reykjavík: Háskóli Íslands, 1943–45). Blöndal, Jón, Félagsmál á Íslandi (Reykjavík: Félagsmálaráðuneytið, 1942). Blöndal, Jón, Félagslegt öryggi eftir stríðið (Reykjavík: Félagsmálaráðuneytið, 1943). Blöndal, Jón, Alþýðutryggingar á Íslandi og í nokkrum öðrum löndum: Erlendar framtíðartillögur (Reykjavík: Félagsmálaráðuneytið, 1945). Blöndal, Jón, ‘Almannatryggingar: Mesti sigurinn í félagsmálabaráttu alþýðu’, Skutull, 21 June 1946, 1–2. Briem, Páll, ‘Nokkur landsmál einkum fátækramálið og skattamálið’, Andvari 15 (1889), 15–55. Drög að stefnuská fyrir Alþýðubandalagið (Reykjavík: Alþýðubandalagið, 1973). Egilsson, Vilhjálmur, Félagsleg aðstoð við fullfrískt fólk: Velferðarþjóðfélag á villigötum (Reykjavík: Heimdallur, félag ungra sjálfstæðismanna, 1985). ‘Er ríkið óvinurinn’, Morgunblaðið, 6 January 1957.

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‘Félagslegt öryggi’, Morgunblaðið, 12 May 1971. Fleiri tækifæri – farsælla mannlíf: Stjórnmálaályktun 34. landsfundar Sjálfstæðisflokksins 11.–14. október 2001 (Reykjavík: Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn, 2001). ‘Flokkur framfara og frjálslyndis’, Morgunblaðið, 6 June 1962. Framtíðarhópur Samfylkingarinnar: Starf frá flokksstjórnarfundi 19. júní 2003 til landsfundar 20. maí 2005. Gíslason, Gylfi Þ., ‘Atvinnulíf og fjármál árið sem leið’, Alþýðublaðið, 31 December 1954, 2–3. Gissurarson, Hannes H., ‘Félagi Orð’, Frelsið 4(3) (1983), 200. Haralz, Jónas H., Velferðarríki á villigötum: Úrval greina frá áttunda áratugnum (Reykjavík: Félag frjálshyggjumanna, 1981). Haralz, Jónas H., ‘Velferð og hagþróun’, Frelsið 5(3) (1984), 210–17. Helgadóttir, Ragnhildur, ‘Félagslegt öryggi’, Stefnir 22(3) (1971), 3–4. ‘Íslenzka “velferðarríkið” blekking!’, Ný vikutíðindi, 27 November 1970. Johannessen, Matthías, ‘Frjálshyggja og velferðarþjóðfélag’, Frelsið 6(2) (1985), 94–134. Jónsdóttir, Guðrún, ‘Konur og velferð’, Vera 3(4) (1984), 30–32. Jónsson, Eyjólfur K., and Ólafur Björnsson, Hægri stefna og velferðarríkið: Tvö erindi flutt á þjóðmálaráðstefnu Vöku 18. og 19. Marz 1961 (Reykjavík: Vaka, 1961). Laxness, Halldór Kiljan, ‘Veikar stoðir’, Þjóðviljinn, 10 February 1944, 3. Loftsson, Hreinn, ‘Réttarríki eða velferðarríki’, in Björn Hermannsson et al., Hugmyndir ungra manna: Samband ungra sjálfstæðismanna 50 ára (Reykjavík: Samband ungra sjálfstæðismanna, 1980), 36–39. ‘Nýr fræðimaður Morgunblaðsins’, Alþýðublaðið, 13 December 1949. Odhe, Thorsten, Iceland: The Co-Operative Island (Chicago: Cooperative League of the U.S.A, 1960). ‘Óheimilt að tengja tekjutryggingu við tekjur maka’, Morgunblaðið, 20 December 2000. Olgeirsson, Einar, ‘Við verðum að velja milli Efnahagsbandalags Evrópu og sameinaðra Norðurlanda’, Þjóðviljinn, 23 March 1962, 3. Prime Minister’s Office, Government Coalition Platform of the Social Democratic Alliance and Left-Green Movement, 19 May 2009. Retrieved 1 October 2018 from https://www.government.is/news/article/2009/05/19/Government-Coali tion-Platform-of-the-Social-Democratic-Alliance-and-Left-Green-Movement/ Prime Minister’s Office, Prime Minister’s Address Opening the Parliamentary Session on Monday, 5 October 2009, 8 October 2009. Retrieved 1 October 2018 from https://www.government.is/news/article/2009/10/08/Prime-Min isters-Address-Opening-the-Parliamentary-Session-on-Monday-05-Octo ber-2009/ ‘Reykjavíkurbréf’, Morgunblaðið, 31 March 1996. ‘Ríkisafskipti og einstaklingurinn’, Morgunblaðið, 25 April 1959. ‘Saga velferðarríkis’, Morgunblaðið, 21 November 2002. ‘“Sæluríki” sósíalismans, sem fjell fyrir dómi reynslunnar eftir 14 ár’, Morgunblaðið, 8 December 1949. Samfylkingin ’99: Stefnuyfirlýsing, Verkefnaskrá (Reykjavík: Samfylkingin, 1999).

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Sæmundsson, Jóhann, and Jón Blöndal, Almannatryggingar á Íslandi: Skýrslur og tillögur um almannatryggingar, heilsugæslu og atvinnuleysismál (Reykjavík: Ministry of Social Affairs, 1945). Sigfússon, Steingrímur J., ‘Velferðarstjórn og vinstrimen: Viðbrögð við leiðara’, Morgunblaðið, 20 November 2002, 31. ‘Skýrsla starfshóps um Hæstaréttardóm’, Morgunblaðið, 11 January 2001. Stefánsson, Stefán Jóh., ‘Sambandsslitin og lýðveldisstofnunin’, Alþýðublaðið, 17 June 1944, 9–10. ‘Stefnuskrá Alþýðuflokksins’, Alþýðumaðurinn, 21 May 1963. ‘Sterkir einstaklingar skapa sterkt þjóðfélag’, Morgunblaðið, 30 August 1964. Thors, Ólafur, ‘Stefna Sjálfstædisflokksins og þjóðareðli Íslendinga’, Morgunblaðið, 17 June 1944, 9–10. ‘Tillögur um frumvarp til fátækralaga frá nefnd þeirri, er skipuð hefur verið samkvæmt konungsúrskurði 13. nóvbr. 1901 til þess að íhuga og koma fram með tillögur um fátækra- og sveitarstjórnarmál’ (Reykjavík, 1905). ‘Truman óttast ekki ásakanir afturhaldsins um sósíalisma’, Alþýðublaðið, 6 September 1949. Uppreisn frjálshyggjunnar (Reykjavík: Kjartan Gunnarsson, 1979). Velferð fyrir alla: Áherslur og framtíðarsýn Alþýðusambands Íslands í velferðarmálum: Áfangaskýrsla (Reykjavík: ASÍ, 2003). Retrieved 24 March 2016 from Rafhlaðan, http://hdl.handle.net/10802/9192. ‘Velferðarríki á vísindagrundvelli’, Alþýðublaðið, 25 November 1964. ‘Velferðarríkið og reynsla Svíþjóðar’, Morgunblaðið, 10 February 1966. ‘Velferðarstefna og vinstri menn’, Morgunblaðið, 17 November 2002. Viðskiptaráð Íslands, ‘Ísland 2015’. Retrieved 24 March 2016 from https://vi .is/%C3%BAtg%C3%A1fa/sk%C3%BDrslur/2006_02_08%20Island_ 2015.pdf. Vinstri græn, Ræða Steingríms J. Sigfússonar á landsfundi 2001. Retrieved 24 March 2016 from http://eldri.vg.is/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Setningarr %C3%A6%C3%B0a-Steingr%C3%ADms.pdf. ‘Vinstri stjórn og vinstri pólitík’, Þjóðviljinn, 12 July 1956.

Secondary Sources Anttonen, Anneli et al., ‘Universalism and the Challenge of Diversity’, in Anneli Anttonen, Liisa Häiki and Kolbeinn Stefánsson (eds), Welfare State, Universalism and Diversity (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), 1–15. ‘Breytt gildi Íslendinga í kjölfar hrunsins: Könnun á viðhorfum til endurreisnar samfélagsins’, Þjóðmálastofnun Háskóla Íslands. Fréttabréf 4 (2009). Retrieved 4 March 2014 from http://thjodmalastofnun.hi.is/sites/thjodmalastof nun.hi.is/files/frettabref_4_2009.pdf. Edling, Nils, ‘The Primacy of Welfare Politics: Notes on the Language of the Swedish Social Democrats and their Adversaries in 1930s’, in Heidi Haggrén, Johanna Rainio-Niemi and Jussi Vauhkonen (eds), Multi-layered Historicity of

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the Present: Approaches to Social Science History (Helsinki: Helsinki University, 2013), 125–50. Erlendsdóttir, Sigríður Th., Veröld sem ég vil: Saga Kvenréttindafélags Íslands 1907–1992 (Reykjavík: Kvenréttindafélags Íslands, 1993). Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). Eydal, Guðný B., Family Policy in Iceland 1944–1984 (Gothenburg: Gothenburg University, 2005). Freeden, Michael, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). Friðriksson, Þorleifur, Við brún nýs dags: Saga Verkamannafélagsins Dagsbrúnar 1906–1930 (Reykjavík: Efling stéttarfélag, Sagnfræðistofnun Háskóla Íslands, 2007). Hálfdanarson, Guðmundur, ‘Discussing Europe: Icelandic Nationalism and European Integration’, in Baldur Þórhallsson (ed.), Iceland and European Integration: On the Edge: Europe and the Nation State (New York: Routledge, 2004), 128–44. Ísleifsson, Sumarliði R., Saga Alþýðusambands Íslands, 3 vols. (Reykjavík: Forlagið, 2013). Johannessen, Matthías, Ólafur Thors: Ævi og störf, vol. 2 (Reykjavík: Almenna bókafélagið, 1981). Jónsdóttir, Sigríður, ‘Velferðarsamfélag – samfélagsleg velferð’, Félagsleg þjónusta undanfarið og framundan. Samband íslenskra sveitarfélaga: Fræðslurit 3 (1985), 135–43. Jónsson, Guðmundur, ‘Agents and Institutions in the Creation of the Icelandic Welfare State, 1880–1946’, in Rapporter til Det 24. Nordiske Historikermøde, vol. 2 Frihed, lighed og velfærd: Velfærdspolitik i Norden (Aarhus: Jysk Selskab for Historie, 2000), 61–89. Jónsson, Guðmundur, ‘The Icelandic Welfare State in the Twentieth Century’, Scandinavian Journal of History 26(3) (2001), 249–67. Jónsson, Guðmundur, ‘Hvers kyns velferðarkerfi? Ísland í spegli hinna kvenvænu velferðarkerfa á Norðurlöndum’, in Irma Erlingsdóttir (ed.), Kynjafræði – Kortlagningar (Reykjavík: Rannsóknastofa í kvenna- og kynjafræðum, 2004), 191–214. Jónsson, Guðmundur, ‘Velferðarkerfið: Ávöxtur af baráttu verkalýðshreyfingarinnar?’, in Þórunn Sigurðardóttir and Sumarliði R. Ísleifsson (eds), Samfélagsleg áhrif verkalýðshreyfingarinnar á 20. öld: Framtíðarsýn á 21. öldinni (Reykjavík: Efling, Reykjavíkurakademían, 2007), 85–99. Jónsson, Guðmundur, ‘Hjálp til sjálfshjálpar: Borgaralegar rætur velferðarríkisins á Íslandi’, in Dóra S. Bjarnason et al. (ed.) Menntaspor: Rit til heiðurs Lofti Guttormssyni sjötugum 5. apríl 2008 (Reykjavík: Sögufélag, 2008), 371–93. Kristinsson, Gunnar H., ‘Raunhæf skynsemi eða stefnufálm? Samband þings og framkvæmdarvalds við undirbúning opinberrar stefnumótunar’, Stjórnmál & stjórnsýsla 9(2) (2013), 257–77.

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Kristmundsdóttir, Sigríður Dúna, Doing and Becoming: Women’s Movements and Women’s Personhood in Iceland 1870–1990 (Reykjavík: University of Iceland Press, 1997). Kurunmäki, Jussi, and Johan Strang, ‘Introduction: “Nordic Democracy” in a World of Tensions’, Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2010), 9–36. Nielsen, Sólveig, ‘“Sænska Mafían”: Viðhorf Íslendinga til Svía og sænska velferðarríkisins 1960–1980’ (BA thesis in History, University of Iceland, 2006). Ólafsson, Stefán, ‘Rætur verðbólgunnar’, Þjóðviljinn, 23 June 1982, 8–9. Ólafsson, Stefán, Íslenska velferðarríkið: Lífskjör og stjórnmál (Reykjavík: Háskóli Ìslands, Félagsvísindadeild, 1984). Ólafsson, Stefán, ‘Variations within the Scandinavian Model: Iceland in the Scandinavian Perspective’, in Erik J. Hansen et al. (eds), Welfare Trends in the Scandinavian Countries (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 61–88. Ólafsson, Stefán, ‘The Icelandic Model: Social Security and Welfare in a Comparative Perspective’, in Comparing Social Welfare Systems Europe, 4 vols (Paris and Nantes: Mire-Drees, 1996–99), vol. 4, 61–83. Ólafsson, Stefán, ‘Framþróun velferðarríkisins: Frá ölmusu til borgararéttinda – og aftur til baka?’, in Friðrik H. Jónsson (ed.), Rannsóknir í félagsvísindum (Reykjavík: Háskólaútgáfan, 2003), 93–104. Ólafsson, Stefán, ‘Crisis and Recovery in Iceland’, in Guðmundur Jónsson and Kolbeinn Stefánsson (eds), Retrenchment or Revival? Welfare States in Times of Economic Crisis (Helsinki: Nordwel, 2013), 106–25. Rodgers, Daniel T., Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998). Sigfússon, Steingrímur J., Við öll: Íslenskt velferðarsamfélag á tímamótum (Reykjavík: Salka, 2006). Shionoya, Yuichi, ‘The Oxford Approach to the Philosophical Foundations of the Welfare State’, in Roger E. Backhouse and Tamotsu Nishizawa (eds), No Wealth but Life: Welfare Economics and the Welfare State in Britain, 1880– 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 91–113. Stefánsson, Kolbeinn, ‘What is in a Word? Universalism, Ideology and Practice’, in Anneli Anttonen, Liisa Häikiö and Kolbeinn Stefánsson (eds), Welfare State, Universalism and Diversity (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), 42–68. Steinarsson, Valur F., ‘Endurreisn frjálshyggjunnar í hugmyndafræði Sjálfstæðisflokksins 1971–1983’ (BA thesis in History, University of Iceland, 2005). Styrkársdóttir, Auður, Barátta um vald: Konur í bæjarstjórn Reykjavíkur 1908–1922 (Reykjavík: Háskólaútgáfan, 1994). Styrkársdóttir, Auður, From Feminism to Class Politics: The Rise and Decline of Women’s Politics in Reykjavik, 1908–1922 (Umeå: Umeå University, 1998). Wincott, Daniel, ‘Ideas, Policy Change, and the Welfare State’, in Daniel Béland and Robert Henry Cox (eds), Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 143–66.

CONCLUSIO N Nils Edling

Our Approach That ‘welfare’ and ‘state’ have multiple usages and connotations is a truism. They are vague and fuzzy yet indispensable keywords. It might even be the case that the compound ‘the welfare state’ belongs to the class of amoebic terms that are scholarly in origin, inclusive, reductive, stereotypic and international at the same time. That ‘welfare’ belongs to the plastic words is quite clear.1 But ‘the welfare state’ has over time received an institutional anchoring and it is now identified with certain institutions, policies and services, and this provides a core of some kind, however malleable it might be. That core is central to the modern standard definition: ‘A welfare state is a state that is committed to providing basic economic security for its citizens by protecting them from market risks associated with old age, unemployment, and sickness.’2 Contemporary welfare states come in different sizes and shapes; they are founded on diverging conceptions of social rights and duties, embody different ideas about freedom, solidarity and equality. In contemporary research, a single analytical concept, often implicitly defined, is used to cover this diversity.3 In this volume we set out to historicize that analytical definition and study the changing usages and understandings of ‘the welfare state’ and their political significance. We wanted to know what different political actors meant when they used the term or, put more generally, to uncover the unknown history of a modern key concept that is used all the time and almost taken for granted. The contributions offer detailed historical studies of the term and its semantic siblings in each of the five Nordic countries, the world’s most acclaimed and – perhaps less often – criticized welfare states. They start from the premise that the object of study is an extremely powerful concept of the modern world and that concepts of this magnitude are open for continuous redefinitions and

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contestations. Key concepts change over time and distance. They are reinterpreted, translated and adapted in new settings. As a key concept of the twentieth century, ‘the welfare state’ has been the object of both intense politicization and ideologization and accelerating scientification – e.g. through the explosion of welfare studies in many disciplines since the 1980s – and mediatization. Its content has changed, often gradually but sometimes rapidly, and ‘the welfare state’ has become popularized and, as hinted above, elasticized – i.e. it exposes ‘a great degree of plasticity in meaning’ so typical of many contemporary key concepts.4 In the emerging scholarly discussion on the characteristics of the key concepts of the twentieth century, all these processes have been identified, and they can, without difficulty, be applied to the conceptual history of ‘the welfare state’.5 They seem all to be relevant, above all the politicization and ideologization that are central in our focus on the political history of the concept.

The History of the Keyword ‘The welfare state’ is considerably older than usually assumed in contemporary social science. It had manifold usages and connotations in German and English well before the 1940s. The background chapter traces these usages and sketches a typology with four different main connotations: 1) the pre-1789 enlightened absolutist and paternalistic welfare state, 2) the late nineteenth and early twentieth century contemporary regulating welfare state, 3) an emerging social welfare state centred on social reforms, and 4) the democratic welfare state as the opposite of evil power states. Usages one and three were unusual outside of Germany before the 1930s, the second can be found there and in the United States as well, whereas the fourth was a British speciality. These four different usages were the main plates on the smorgasbord of meanings where the available courses could be mixed according to taste and interest and make up new welfare states. A main point, which we want to repeat, is that the different usages and understandings did not replace each other in a progressive order; instead, they added new flavours to the common table where different users could pick their favourites. However, this does not rule out that certain dishes, such as the idea of the welfare state as a historical concept denoting only past states, over time became somewhat mouldy. Der Wohlfahrtsstaat is a German conceptual invention from the mid nineteenth century, in the beginning mainly used to distinguish the contemporary Rechtsstaat from older paternalistic regimes such as the mon-

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archies of enlightened absolutism. That ‘welfare state’ was a counterconcept, a negation of the ideals of rule of law and civil liberties. During the last decades of the century an alternative understanding focused on the contemporary German state’s regulating ambition and capacities; a strong ‘culture and welfare state’ intervened in order to ameliorate social conditions and reduce tensions in society. Bismarckian social policies made up one facet, but the interventionism remained the key feature – this welfare state was the growing contemporary administrative state. These two usages, the historical referring to past regimes and the administrative describing contemporary tendencies, dominated up to 1918. They were both exported from Germany; the earliest English translations appeared in the 1890s but the new term remained the property of specialists for quite some time. At the beginning of the new century, both Germany and the United States saw an institutionalization of ‘welfare’, a process where ‘welfare’ became a common term for all kinds of voluntary, municipal and corporate institutions and programmes (Wohlfahrtspflege, ‘welfare work’, ‘child welfare’ ‘industrial welfare’ etc.). This gave ‘welfare’ new social connotations by linking the vague term to concrete practices. Furthermore, the German and American states also set up public welfare departments and administrations and this strengthened the institutionalization of ‘social welfare’. In addition, ‘general welfare’, an inherited and opaque constitutional principle, had a venerable history in US politics and was open to reinterpretations. In the early twentieth century, scholars analysing the expanding state saw the emergence of a ‘general welfare state’, a concept which could be equated, but not necessarily so, with the German ‘welfare state’. In the interwar period, the German ‘welfare state’ became politicized and contested in novel ways. Building and maintaining ‘the social welfare state’ became a premium political objective for the progressive parties, the left Liberals, Catholic centrists and Social Democrats, who shouldered the Republic. ‘Social welfare state’ meant policies designed to reduce social risks and provide social benefits by right for all citizens. When the economic and political situation deteriorated from 1928, ‘the welfare state’ came under renewed attack. It was a favourite target for Conservatives and Nazis, and their attacks prompted a principled defence of the welfare state. This means that Weimar Germany saw the first open debate over the welfare state, understood in a modern sense, centred on social policies and social legislation. To the absolutist-paternalistic, administrative and social welfare states can be added the British contribution, where the ‘welfare state’ was posited against ‘the power state’ – good democratic and peaceful welfare states separated from bad and aggressive dictatorships. Bishop Temple

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and others who employed the term this way in the 1930s referred primarily to international relations; social reforms were important but not central to the definition of the state types that they deployed. In the United Kingdom, ‘social service state’ was the emerging keyword of the 1930s for the expanding public sector. Gradually, following the Great Depression and World War II, the social understanding of the welfare state came to dominate, and the emerging new concept included both planning and social reforms, both of which extended administrative capacities and ideological commitment to popular welfare. Of course, the welfare state of the West was decidedly democratic, an antithesis to Communist dictatorships. Tony Judt aptly describes it as the rehabilitation of Europe and underlines the importance of restoration under state supervision: ‘And in the aftermath of depression, occupation and civil war, the state – as an agent of welfare, security and fairness – was a vital source of community and social cohesion.’6 At the same time as welfare and social rights conquered Western Europe, ‘the welfare state’ became politically marginalized in the United States. ‘Welfare’ received the residualist connotations it has owned since then. But the United States definitely helped promote welfare state ideals abroad: the New Deal, the Atlantic Declaration and the UN Charter provided both examples and principles.7 ‘The welfare state’, an established concept in political discourse in the late 1940s, was said to include a commitment to full employment and economic growth, to social security and social rights. In the 50s, it became an international model for modernization and prosperity.8 The concept – the ideas, plans and expectations – and its practical political implications were of course contested from the outset.

Politicization and Ideologization of the Nordic Welfare States A guiding idea for this volume was to avoid Swedo-centrism, where the other Nordic countries are treated as deviations from the common pattern that Sweden somehow provides. Our studies show numerous similarities and divergences between the five Nordic countries. An important communality is the weak boundary between state and society, where the terms are often used interchangeably as synonyms. There is a viable argument for ‘society’ as a temporalized concept in the Koselleckian sense, ‘an instrument for the direction of historical movement.’9 ‘Society’ in Nordic political thinking has at the same time been both an agent and a target of knowledge and politics. Following Pauli Kettunen, this Nordic use of ‘society’ as a synonym for the state implies that the state or public

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power was supposed to be capable of involving associative, integrative and inclusive principles of ‘society’ and ‘the social’.10 The concept of society referred to normative criteria and capacities, and these criteria and capacities were then applied to the empirical society in which need, poverty, class divisions, discontent and a lack of discipline were recognized. The normative ‘society’ seems to have been provided with a stronger charge of agency and with a larger amount of normative power than was the case in many other European countries. Judging from these entangled conceptual relations, it seems unlikely that any simple separation between state and society, such as the OECD policy favouring ‘welfare society’, would work successfully in Nordic politics.11 It seems that Sweden and Finland are the two countries with the weakest boundary statesociety. Generally speaking, the different welfare compounds – politics, policies, state and society etc. – tend to make up one large composite welfare concept – i.e. ‘welfare society’ often means ‘welfare state’ and can incorporate national policies, state agencies, regional authorities, municipal services and also welfare associations. Our studies start with basic questions about when, by whom and how the welfare state was used in each country. On a higher level, we also asked about the political importance of the concept of the welfare state in the formation of the systems of social security and services that are described as ‘the welfare state’. Although the differences should not be exaggerated, our studies show that Sweden stands out in both respects: the welfare state was used in Swedish politics earlier and had a more central position as a temporalized mobilizing concept there. Early scholarly examples from the four mainland countries dating from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century mirrored the German pattern: ‘welfare state’ described the character of past paternalistic and modern regulating states. In all countries we see ‘the legal state’ being contrasted to the new regulating state. The first example of an overtly party political usage and socially oriented understanding can be found in Sweden in the late 1920s, when both leading Social Democrats and the opponents made use of the novel term. In the early 1930s, politicization exploded when the Social Democrats made ‘social welfare politics’ their central concept, and from that moment on ‘welfare’, connoting social security and services and active labour market policies, has been the central value in Swedish politics, shaping objectives and directing the historical movement in the Koselleckian sense. Social reforms and active labour policies were the central ingredients of this comprehensive concept of welfare. Hardly surprising, all political agents raised claims to ownership and contested the opponents’ rights to define what constituted proper social welfare and how it was best attained. For Social Democrats, welfare politics meant

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increased social democracy and solidarity, or as Minister of Social Affairs Möller defined the goal: comprehensive reforms that combated social risks and provided comfort and security for all diligent and hardworking citizens. Välfärdsstaten, the welfare state, as a new term used to describe contemporary Sweden was a by-product of ‘welfare politics’ (välfärdspolitik). In the 30s, both Social Democrats and Liberals tried to control conceptual ownership of the reform-related welfare terms and set up the welfare state as a positive value, whereas conservatives criticized the over-confidence in the state as a provider of welfare. In their view true welfare meant increased individual independence and not enhanced reliance on the state. Similar polemical positions can be found in Denmark and Norway in the early postwar years and above all in the 1950s. However, the earlier inventions in Swedish political language in the 1930s do not prove that Sweden was ahead of Norway or Denmark in the field of social reform at that time – i.e. more advanced with higher coverage and more generous social benefits, or that it lacked social reforms before the Social Democrats came to power in 1932. The three countries formed the core of the successful Nordic democracies, where comprehensive social legislation made up a constitutive part of the political self-understanding already in the 30s. Efforts were made to incorporate Finland, drawn into the war after the Russian attack November 1939, and name it an aspiring welfare state. Since independence, Finland had gone through dramatic changes, a ‘true popular reformation’, and had become ‘a social democracy, a welfare state’ in the Nordic way, declared activists working in Sweden and eager to promote Finland’s cause.12 This echoes the proclamations made in the preceding years by Social Democrats like Möller in Sweden and Norway’s Oscar Torp, who picked up ‘the welfare state’ from the Swedes. In short, welfare was salient in Danish, Norwegian and Swedish politics in the 30s, and wartime ‘Nordic Democracy’ embraced it as a truly Nordic value.13 At the same time, the German occupation of Denmark and Norway helps explain the later conceptual breakthrough of ‘the welfare state’ in these countries. And Finland’s three wars 1939–40, 1941–44 and 1944–45 most certainly curbed earlier reform initiatives at the same time as they created new social needs. Tellingly, reflecting both the necessity to break with the unlawfulness of the Nazis and the will to connect to the international wave of welfare thinking, a leader of the Norwegian Resistance in May 1945 spoke about the need to reinstall the legal state and introduce ‘a welfare state with social responsibilities towards all its citizens’.14 It should not come as a surprise that the speaker had training in law – he was a high-ranking judge.

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In Norway ca 1950, the ideals of the legal state (rettsstat) and the perceived need to defend the individual against a powerful state (both positions must be seen as grounded in the war experiences) influenced exchanges about ‘the welfare state’. Well-known church leaders, referring to the war experience, condemned the ungodliness and totalitarianism of that new state, and leading Social Democrats had to defend their support for a state that actively promoted social and economic equality, full employment and comprehensive social reforms. As in Sweden, the Norwegian debate had many references to the welfare state as a new stage in the modernization of society, a way of reasoning with well-known predecessors in Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany. Danish public discussion on the welfare state took off in the early 1950s, and exactly like in the United States but quite different from the Nordic neighbours it was a proper debate, a heated exchange about the role of the state with the centre-right parties on the attack. The pension reform of 1956 came to symbolize the coming of the welfare state, which critics described as dystopian and harmful for economic prosperity and personal liberty. It seems that objections and misgivings in the 1950s about paternalism, over-bureaucratization and excessive taxation had larger resonance in Denmark and Norway rather than in Sweden. The timing is probably a factor here – ‘social welfare’ conquered Sweden in the 30s – to which can be added the relative strength of organized labour. Sweden had already reached the most advanced level of social reform, said not only social democrats self-assuredly in the late 1930s. But even Swedish Social Democrats preferred the softer metaphors ‘strong society’ and ‘welfare society’ to the harder and inherently controversial ‘welfare state’. And many Swedish conservatives and economic liberals had strong reservations about the socialization of social security, and this makes clear that even the happy, consensual democracies of Northern Europe saw a great deal of political contestation concerning the welfare state. Generally speaking, critical voices forwarded principal arguments whereas pro-welfare state arguments were more vague and pragmatic, with references to better social protection, higher standard of living and increased individual freedom. Put differently, more and better social reforms and continuously improved living conditions made it relatively easy to defend the growing state, and one did not have to talk explicitly about ‘the welfare state’. The altercations surrounding ‘the welfare state’ in the Nordic countries reflect the larger international trends. They were definitely not uniquely Nordic. In the mid 50s Friedrich von Hayek once again warned that the growing state power threatened individual freedom and that ‘the line which divides the welfare state from the totalitarian state is a very thin

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and indistinct one which may be easily crossed without our noticing it’.15 In the same volume (The Future of Freedom from 1955) British Labour’s Hugh Gaitskell refuted that claim as nonsense and continued in defence of the welfare state: Those who advocate more intervention do so not because of any love of controls for their own sake but chiefly because they regard it as necessary to achieve some valuable social objective, such as full employment, higher productivity, a fairer distribution of income and wealth, and more generally to correct what they regard as the weaknesses or evils of a free economy.16

Clearly, differences in political cultures and socio-economic structure matter a lot for the politicization and ideologization of the welfare state in the different countries. In Denmark, Norway and even more so in Sweden, the Social Democrats managed to claim more or less exclusive ownership to ‘the welfare state’ for longer periods. The national welfare state can be seen as the jewel in the crown, the product and symbol of the age of social democracy.17 This notion of ‘we have built the welfare state’ is certainly not unimportant in social democratic self-understanding. But such ownership also opened it up to reproach from the left flank, with socialist criticism of the Social Democrats’ failure to fundamentally change society and the notion that ‘welfare’ underpinned capitalist exploitation. The considerably weaker Finnish and Icelandic Social Democrats could not make the same claim to ownership that easily. In both countries, issues relating to economic growth and modernization had larger political significance. In Finland and Iceland, ‘wealth’ was in this sense a more central value than ‘welfare’ for large parts of the last century – an argument that market liberal conservatives in Denmark, Norway and Sweden failed to make common property. Of course, this does not mean that ‘the welfare state’ was completely absent in Finland and Iceland, only that it and its siblings ‘welfare politics’ and ‘welfare society’ never played a future-oriented role in shaping plans and objectives. This marks a major difference between the Nordic centre and the two relative peripheries. Finnish scholars of the late nineteenth century talked about different states and their objectives in the German tradition, and scattered examples of ‘the welfare state’ can be found from early on. But ‘welfare’ never gained that momentum in Finnish politics; it did not become a catchphrase in the same way as in Sweden. Actually, ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare society’, often with the attribute ‘Nordic’, did achieve the position of political keywords only from the 1990s onwards, when they came to denote existing institutions and policies that had to be defended.

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In Iceland, ‘the welfare state’ made its debut in the 1960s and was then mainly used in descriptions of the other Nordic countries. Instead, ‘social security’, comprehensive social legislation and policies for full employment inspired by Beveridge and Keynes became the pivotal concept with universalism as its most contested element. Both ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare society’ appeared in printed media from the 60s but were of secondary importance compared to ‘welfare system’, which referred to the sectors of the state that provided social insurances, services, healthcare and education. At the same time, warnings about ‘nanny-statism’ and the threats to free enterprise visible in the other Nordic countries, especially in Sweden, were not unusual. The end of the Golden Age of economic growth in the 70s and the subsequent crisis of the welfare state from the 1970s are well-known phenomena.18 Retrenchment and marketization challenged ideas of expanding public services, although the welfare systems were not immediately affected. The fundamental change had above all a discursive and ideational character: ‘the welfare state’ was no longer the solution for the future, now it was costly, ineffective and in need of reform in order to survive. Neoliberal arguments for deregulation and marketization were heard to some extent in all countries but with varying impact. Being the exception once again, Sweden saw the pendulum swing more than the other countries, and the strength of the older social democratic hegemony partly accounts for the dramatic shift. Norway, with its revenues from the oil industry, is the opposite case, but competition, marketization and globalization set their marks there too. One example of the changes is the recasting of conceptual contents: the former synonyms ‘welfare state’ and ‘welfare society’ were in the 1980s depicted as complete opposites, a clear challenge to the old fuzzy boundary between the two. This separation made it possible to be anti-state and pro-welfare at the same time. Another aspect is the resurging critique of the paternalistic state and the new stress on individual choice as the fundamental principle. As the Danish liberal party Venstre argued in 1985: ‘the institutionalization and professionalization of the welfare state has led to a weakening of private and voluntary social efforts.’19 For the critics, the welfare state was the problem that could be corrected with the right market-oriented reforms. For the supporters, financing the extensive and generous public welfare system had become the perennial problem over the last decades. Since the 1980s, the sense of an enduring crisis can be noticed; debates and proposals are mainly about ‘restoring’ and ‘defending’ or introducing ‘necessary reforms’ in order to secure the welfare system. The terms and content of welfare policy discourses have changed, and the associated transformative, future-oriented

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ideas and programmes have been pushed aside. To put it in more general terms: presentism dominates the horizon of expectations in discourse about the welfare state, its current status and future prospects. This preoccupation with the present, the current issues and the inevitability of the current state of affairs might be a sign of the times.20 Three effects of this long-term change are in any case obvious: first of all, the welfare state has survived the waves of economic downturns and marketization since 1980 fairly well. It still provides comprehensive insurances and services of a very high standard, and the continuously changing welfare state still has strong popular support. Secondly, discursive battles between the political parties over the origins and ownership of still popular reforms are not uncommon. All parties claim ownership of the welfare state, and professed support for the reformed welfare state from every political camp – which means that many staunch critics from the 1980s and 90s U-turned to embrace tax-financed comprehensive programmes – and strategies for blame avoidance for cutbacks go hand in hand in the era of permanent austerity.21 Thirdly and equally significant, when crises and problems dominate over opportunities, there is the nostalgic longing for the good old days when resources and reforms were plenty and societies, it is argued, were more homogenous.

Welfare Nationalism and the World A state is per definition territorial. Concepts and ideas are not; they travel easily. As a value in human existence, welfare – defined broadly as health, prosperity, comfort and security etc. – is universal. A welfare state on the other hand, has geographical boundaries, administrative regulations and different rules for membership. The social rights and the collective sharing of risks, institutionalized in the systems for social protection and services, are national and guarded in one way or another by the state. Social protection of the population constitutes a main task for the modern state.22 This makes the questions of membership of national systems pertinent and highlights first of all the complex relations between national and supranational institutions such as the European single market. Secondly, welfare nationalism and questions of inclusion and exclusion become pertinent. Denmark, Finland and Sweden are members of the European Union. Iceland and Norway belong to the European Economic Area, which means membership of the single market. In short, EU regulations and standards affect all five countries. The social policy agendas at the EU level are probably not problematic in themselves, although the three Nordic mem-

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bers are, generally speaking, reluctant. Instead, all EU policies are open to critique from the now stronger nationalist groupings. Tensions will most certainly arise if the Union in substantial ways tries to reform national welfare legislation. For the nationalist parties, welfare nationalism makes up a unifying core value: the country has to be protected from Brussels and from foreigners. The electoral successes of these parties – the Danish Peoples’ Party (Dansk Folkeparti) and Norwegian Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) with the disciples of the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) and True Finns (Perussuomalaiset) – has changed the political landscape and agenda in several ways. Currently, migration is depicted as the main challenge, if not an outright threat to common welfare, and all parties, except those left of the Social Democrats, have introduced proposals to restrict access to national welfare systems for new non-EU migrants. The stronger politicization of migration, both slowly over many decades and rapidly since autumn 2015, has brought new tensions to the surface in the conceptions of welfare, a germinating conflict between ‘national welfare’, migration and international regulations. Terms like ‘challenge’, ‘crisis’, ‘costs’, ‘exclusion’ and ‘integration’ – and ‘welfare crime’ as a label for benefit fraud – gain in usage, and these new keywords point at substantial changes. We know little about their longevity, but at the moment it seems clear that migration and welfare – comfort and security (Danish: tryghed, Finnish: turva, Icelandic: öryggi, Norwegian: trygd, and Swedish: trygghet) – are at odds. Accordingly, migration and ‘integration’ are said to decide over the future of the welfare state. A third side of welfare nationalism is uncontested and a Nordic specialty: the branding and marketing of the unique Nordic welfare state all over the world. Since the 1930s, the Nordic countries have made concerted efforts to market themselves using ‘the Nordic umbrella’, and they continue to make strong claims in this field: design, films, crime novels and social protection are all included in the branding.23 As small open economies, the Nordic countries are all highly sensitive to the reactions of the surrounding world. Their limited size – i.e. their limited economic, political and military powers – holds part of the explanation. Another factor is their earlier successes; their high status as first-class welfare states based on their performance since the 30s. A report on branding strategies states that the financial crisis of 2008 showed, ‘that the Nordic Welfare model and political model once again had succeeded in renewing itself, which allowed states around the world to consider our model as a possible buffer and stabilizing factor in a steadily more uncertain global economy’.24 The countries are at the same time competing individually both within Norden and internationally for attention as world leaders in welfare. Transfer and emulation between the countries

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have long histories, and intra-Nordic exchange has almost been a causal factor on its own, driving social reform in the individual countries.25 In addition, the continuous reference to the other countries as models and the multiple forms of Nordic cooperation has created a Nordic welfare state norm. Nowadays, the welfare state, as an institution, idea and a service, is absolutely fundamental to Nordic self-understanding. ‘Welfare’, referring to the high standard of living or concrete social policies, defines the societies. This is not unique for Northern Europe, as social protection integrates Western wage-earner societies and is at the core of state legitimacy.26 Arguably, the national pride and almost missionary glow – ‘we are a model for the world’ – make the Nordic countries stand out. In the book Freedom and Welfare from 1953 – a Nordic joint venture commissioned and sponsored by the Ministries of Social Affairs – it was readily admitted that ‘the conception of the Nordic countries as an oasis in a troubled world is a truth with severe modifications’. That being said, there was absolutely no doubt that – as the book demonstrated over 530 pages – the Nordic family of peaceful nations was far ahead of everybody else in social welfare.27

Coda In this collection we have chosen a relatively narrow geographical focus, with five closely related countries that are often treated as belonging to the same welfare regime. We provide a general background, but the analysis does not dig that deep outside of the Nordic countries. This means that there is ample room to broaden the perspective to include several countries and investigate how ‘the welfare state’ has been used and understood in each case and how the term has fitted into the political language in general. The need for comparative studies is obvious, and since ‘the welfare state’ is a travelling global key concept used in multiple ways all over the world, studies of transnational and ideational transfer, of translations and appropriations in different settings, are welcome. The conceptual history of the last century is largely unwritten, and the systematic historical study of concepts and languages in modern politics has just begun. Nils Edling is Reader in History, Department of History, Stockholm University. He is currently writing a book on welfare as a key concept in Swedish politics with the working title Kampen om välfärdsstaten. Earlier publications on this topic include the chapter on Denmark and Sweden,

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co-authored by Klaus Petersen and Jørn Henrik Petersen, in Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language (Policy Press, 2014).

NOTES 1. Uwe Poerksen, Plastic Words: The Tyranny of a Modular Language (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1995), 22–26. 2. Margaret Weir, ‘Welfare State’, International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, 26 vols (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), vol. 24, 16432. 3. For a useful overview of contemporary welfare states, Kees van Kersbergen and Barbara Vis, Comparative Welfare State Politics: Development, Opportunities and Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 4. Willibald Steinmetz, ‘Some Thoughts on a History of Twentieth-Century German Basic Concepts’, Contributions to the History of Concepts 7(1) (2012), 98. 5. Christian Geulen, ‘Plädoyer für eine Geschichte der Grundbegriffe des 20. Jahrhunderts’, Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History 7 (2010), 79–97; Willibald Steinmetz, ‘New Perspectives on the Study of Language and Power in the Short Twentieth Century’, in Willibald Steinmetz (ed.), Political Languages in the Age of Extremes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3–51; Jan-Werner Müller, ‘On Conceptual History’, in Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (eds), Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 74–93. 6. Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), 67–77, cit. 77. 7. ‘The British New Deal’ is the title of a chapter on Labour’s postwar social reforms in John Bew, Citizen Clem: A Biography of Attlee (London: Riverrun, 2016), ch. 17. 8. Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 9. Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 251. 10. Pauli Kettunen, ‘The Transnational Construction of National Challenges: The Ambiguous Nordic Model of Welfare and Competitiveness’, in Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen (eds), Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 19–31. 11. Rianne Mahon, ‘The OECD’s Search for a New Social Policy Language: From Welfare State to Active Society’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 85–87; Matthieu Leimgruber, ‘The Embattled Standard-bearer of Social Insurance and its Challenger: The ILO, The OECD and the “Crisis of the Welfare State”, 1975–1985’, in Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux (eds), Globalizing Social Rights: The International

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12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25.

26. 27.

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Labour Organization and Beyond (Basingstoke and Geneva: Palgrave Macmillan and ILO, 2013), 293–309. Edvard Robert Gummerus and Sten Söderberg, Finland: Vad det är – Vad det kämpar för (Stockholm: Gebers, 1940), cit. 109 and 136. On Nordic values, see the contributions in Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang (eds), Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2010); Mirja Österberg, ‘“Norden” as a Transnational Space in the 1930s: Negotiated Consensus of “Nordicness” in the Nordic Cooperation Committee of the Labour Movement’, in Mary Hilson, Silke Neunsinger and Iben Vyff (eds), Labour, Unions and Politics under the North Star: The Nordic Countries, 1700–2000 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 237–57. On Möller and Torp, see the chapters on Sweden and Norway in this volume. See the chapter on Norway in this volume. Friedrich von Hayek, ‘Challenge to a Free Society’, in The Future of Freedom (Paris: Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1955), 70. Hugh Gaitskell, ‘The Economic Challenge to Freedom’, in The Future of Freedom, 242–43. Francis Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy: Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). See Kersbergen and Vis, Comparative Welfare. See Klaus Petersen and Jørn Henrik Petersen’s chapter in this volume. François Hartog, Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). On blame avoidance, Kersbergen and Vis, Comparative Welfare, 177–83. See Maurizio Ferrara, The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), chs 1–2; Jean-Claude Barbier, The Road to Social Europe: A Contemporary Approach to Political Cultures and Diversity in the Europe (London: Routledge, 2013), chs 1–2. See ‘The Nordic Model’ and ‘International Branding of the Nordic Region’, both retrieved 22 May 2017 from http://www.norden.org/en/. Nordic Council, Strategi for international profilering og positionering af Norden 2015–2018 (Copenhagen: Nordic Council, 2015), 5. Klaus Petersen, ‘Constructing Nordic Welfare? Nordic Social Political Cooperation’, in Niels Finn Christiansen et al. (eds), The Nordic Model of Welfare: A Historical Reappraisal (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2005), 67–98; Klaus Petersen, ‘National, Nordic and Trans-Nordic: Transnational Perspectives on the History of the Nordic Welfare States’, in Kettunen and Petersen, Beyond, 41–64. Barbier, The Road, chs 1–2. George Nelson (ed.), Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns in the Northern Countries of Europe (Copenhagen: The Nordic Ministries of Social Affairs, 1953), 501.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Barbier, Jean-Claude, The Road to Social Europe: A Contemporary Approach to Political Cultures and Diversity in Europe (London: Routledge, 2013). Bew, John, Citizen Clem: A Biography of Attlee (London: Riverrun, 2016). Ferrera, Maurizio, The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Gaitskell, Hugh, ‘The Economic Challenge to Freedom’, in The Future of Freedom (Paris: Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1955), 240–55. Geulen, Christian, ‘Plädoyer für eine Geschichte der Grundbegriffe des 20. Jahrhunderts’, Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History 7 (2010), 79–97. Retrieved 26 May 2014 from https://zeithistorische-forschun gen.de/1-2010/id%3D4488. Gilman, Nils, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). Gummerus, Edvard Robert, and Sten Söderberg, Finland: Vad det är – Vad det kämpar för (Stockholm: Gebers, 1940). Hartog, François, Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). Hayek, Friedrich von, ‘Challenge to a Free Society’, in The Future of Freedom (Paris: Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1955), 63–71. ‘International Branding of the Nordic Region’. Retrieved 22 May 2017 from http:// www.norden.org/en/. Judt, Tony, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005). Kettunen, Pauli, ‘The Transnational Construction of National Challenges: The Ambiguous Nordic Model of Welfare and Competitiveness’, in Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen (eds), Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 16–40. Koselleck, Reinhart, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). Kurunmäki, Jussi, and Johan Strang (eds), Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2010). Leimgruber, Matthieu, ‘The Embattled Standard-bearer of Social Insurance and its Challenger: The ILO, The OECD and the “Crisis of the Welfare State”, 1975–1985’, in Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux (eds), Globalizing Social Rights: The International Labour Organization and Beyond (Basingstoke and Geneva: Palgrave MacMillan and ILO, 2013), 293–309. Mahon, Rianne, ‘The OECD’s Search for a New Social Policy Language: From Welfare State to Active Society’, in Daniel Béland and Klaus Petersen (eds), Analysing Social Policy Concepts and Language: Comparative and Transnational Perspectives (Bristol: Policy Press, 2014), 81–100.

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Müller, Jan-Werner, ‘On Conceptual History’, in Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (eds), Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 74–93. Nelson, George (ed.), Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns in the Northern Countries of Europe (Copenhagen: The Nordic Ministries of Social Affairs, 1953). Nordic Council, Strategi for international profilering og positionering af Norden 2015–2018 (Copenhagen: Nordic Council, 2015). Österberg, Mirja, ‘“Norden” as a Transnational Space in the 1930s: Negotiated Consensus of “Nordicness” in the Nordic Cooperation Committee of the Labour Movement’, in Mary Hilson, Silke Neunsinger and Iben Vyff (eds), Labour, Unions and Politics under the North Star: The Nordic Countries, 1700– 2000 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 237–57. Petersen, Klaus, ‘Constructing Nordic Welfare? Nordic Social Political Cooperation’, in Niels Finn Christiansen et al. (eds), The Nordic Model of Welfare: A Historical Reappraisal (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2005), 67–98. Petersen, Klaus, ‘National, Nordic and Trans-Nordic: Transnational Perspectives on the History of the Nordic Welfare States’, in Pauli Kettunen and Klaus Petersen (eds), Beyond Welfare State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 41–64. Poerksen, Uwe, Plastic Words: The Tyranny of a Modular Language (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 1995). Sejersted, Francis, The Age of Social Democracy: Norway and Sweden in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). Steinmetz, Willibald, ‘New Perspectives on the Study of Language and Power in the Short Twentieth Century’, in Willibald Steinmetz (ed.), Political Languages in the Age of Extremes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3–51. Steinmetz, Willibald, ‘Some Thoughts on a History of Twentieth-Century German Basic Concepts’, Contributions to the History of Concepts 7(1) (2012), 87–100. ‘The Nordic Model’. Retrieved 22 May 2017 from http://www.norden.org/en/. Van Kersbergen, Kees, and Barbara Vis, Comparative Welfare State Politics: Development, Opportunities and Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Weir, Margaret, ‘Welfare State’, International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, vol. 24 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), 16432–35.

I N DEX

Note: Page references with an f are figures. absolutism, 29, 31, 138, 180, 317 Agrarian Party (Norway), 182, 244, 245 Alestalo, Matti, 259 Alliansen (the Alliance, Sweden), 108, 110 Althingi (Iceland), 278, 280, 295f, 301 Andenæs, Johannes, 187 Andersen, Alsing, 140, 141 An International Economy: Problems and Prospects (Myrdal), 90 anti-statism, 86, 190, 204 Arbeidernes Opplysningsforbund (Workers’ Educational Association), 204 Arbeiderpartiet (Norwegian labour party), 179, 182, 183f, 186, 187, 188, 190, 192, 193, 198, 199f, 200, 204, 205, 207, 208 Arbeid for alle (Work for all), 180, 184 Aristotle, 28 Aschehoug, Torkel H., 180 Atlantic Declaration, 48, 318 Australia, 50 Bagge, Gösta, 79 Berg, Paal, 184, 185, 195 Berggrav, Eivind, 189, 248 Bernander, John G., 203 Bernstein, Eduard, 34

Beveridge, William, 45, 49, 184, 276, 291, 301, 323 Beveridge Report (1942), 48, 50, 282 Beyond the Welfare State (Myrdal), 90 bidragsberoende (welfare dependency), 110 bidragsstaten (social benefit state), 105 Bildt, Carl, 104 Birck, Lauritz, 138, 139 Bismarck, Otto von, 2, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 41, 48, 113, 180; state insurance, 48; state socialism, 41; welfare reforms, 76, 181, 317 Bjarnhéðinsdóttir, Briet, 279 Bloch, Mark, 27 Blöndal, Jón, 282, 284 Bohman, Gösta, 103 Bondeförbundet (Farmers’ Party Sweden), 77, 78, 79, 91, 99 Bonnevie, Margarete, 185 Borten, Per, 193 Bratteli, Trygve, 192, 193, 203, 205 Briem, Páll, 278, 279 Briggs, Asa, 2, 196 British Labour Party, 44, 86, 186 Brofoss, Erik, 191 Brundtland, Gro Harlem, 198, 199f, 205 Burenstam Linder, Staffan, 103 bürgerliche Gesellschaft (Hegel), 230 Cajander, A.K., 244 The Callous Welfare State (Den hjärtlösa välfärdsstaten), 103

332

INDEX

Cameralism, Cameral Science, 28, 30–2, 76, 138, 234–35, 242 capitalism, 45, 47, 50; Denmark, 148– 50; Finland, 247, 251, 252; Iceland, 291; Norway, 189–91; Sweden, 84, 86, 96, 98, 99, 118 capitalist welfare states, 148–50 Castberg, Johan, 181 Castrén, Kaarlo, 243 Catherine the Great, 29 Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum), 34, 39, 40 Centre Party (Finland), 249, 251, 256, 258, 259 Centre Party (Sweden), 99, 108 centre-right parties (Denmark), 142– 48, 154, 155; free-choice argument, 146–47; incentive argument, 146; individual man argument, 147; responsibility argument, 144–46 Childs, Marquis, 86 Christensen, Christian A.R., 188 Christian Democratic Party (Germany), 247 Christianity, arguments against welfare states, 147–48 Christian Peoples Party (Denmark), 156 Christiansen, Johannes, 154 Cicero, 28 Civil War of 1918 (Finland), 6, 226, 227, 229, 230, 243 class: antagonism, 196; divisions (Finland), 232; society (luokkayhteiskunta), 232 Cohn, Gustav, 35 Cold War, 5, 49, 143, 186, 202, 206, 230, 253, 255, 289; neutrality (Sweden), 86; welfare states in (Sweden), 83–86 Cole, G.D.H., 89 common good, 28–29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 45, 52, 58, 76, 146, 246, 265 communism, 83, 84, 186, 245, 318

Communist Parties, communists: Denmark, 148; Finland, 249, 254; Iceland, 280, 291; Norway, 201 competition state, Denmark, 162; Finland, 261; Iceland, 294–99 compulsory superannuation pensions (ATP), 91, 93 Conservative People’s Party (Denmark), 142 Conservatives (Högerpartiet, Moderaterna Sweden), 79, 80, 84, 91, 99, 103 constitutions: Denmark (1915), 139; Norway (1814), 195; Sweden (1975), 100; Weimar Constitution, 39, 42, 139 Continuation War, 245 counter-concepts, 4, 29, 79, 138, 143, 162, 203, 241, 317 creeping nationalization (smygsocialisering), 92 Dagens Nyheter, 80, 109f Dahlgaard, Bertel, 153, 154 Dam, Axel, 139 Danish Peoples’ Party (Dansk Folkeparti), 162, 325 decontestation, 95, 192–95 democracy, 160; economic, 153; Finland, 249, 252; Nordic, 247, 320; social, 300 democratic socialism, Denmark, 140, 141, 152, 153, 154; Finland, 247, 255; Norway, 186, 192, 197f, 200; Sweden, 90, 96, 99 democratic welfare states, 27, 43–46, 44, 45, 316 Denmark, 1, 5, 303, 320, 322, 324; centre-right parties, 142–48; Child Welfare, 139; Christian Peoples Party, 156; concept of welfare state in, 137–78; Conservative People’s Party, 142; Conservatives, 142; constitutions (1915), 139;

INDEX

free-choice argument, 146–47; incentive argument, 146; individual man argument, 147; Left-Socialist Party, 156; left-wing critique of welfare states, 148–50; LiberalAgrarian Party, 142, 155; Liberal Party, 143, 160; Lutherans in, 28; monetary union, 8; New Left, 158; newspapers, 159f; pensions, 139; politicization of welfare state, 140–42; politics in, 7, 137, 138; prehistory of welfare state, 138–40; Progress Party, 153, 156; religious arguments against welfare states, 147–48; responsibility argument, 144–46; Sickness insurance, 139; scepticism and innovation, 156–59; Social Democratic Party, 140, 142, 148, 151, 155, 160; Socialist People’s Party, 148; Social Liberal Party, 142, 153; toward welfare society, 159–62; unemployment insurance, 139; Venstre, 323; welfare state as status quo, 150–54; welfare state consensus, 154–56; as welfare states, 6–8; Worker’s accident insurance, 139 Department of Public Welfare (United States), 38 deregulation, 323; Finland, 252, 253; Sweden, 102, 106 det starka samhället (the strong society), 87–90, 111 Deutsche Verwaltungsrecht (Mayer), 30 Dialog, 148 Die Grenzboten, 41 Die Verwaltungslehre (von Stein 1865–68), 30 economic democracy, 34, 40; Denmark, 153; Finland, 247, 249, 255; Norway, 181; Sweden, 84, 85, 98, 99

333

economic planning, 49, 50; Iceland, 284, 288; Norway, 187, 191, 196, 200; Sweden, 84, 85, 93 Efter välfärdsstaten (Wigforss), 89 egendomsägande demokrati (property-owning democracy), 91 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 155, 156 Ekonomiska Samfundet i Finland (The Finnish Economic Association), 236 En ny vänster (A New Left), 97 Engberg, Arthur, 82 equality, gender, 5, 99, 111, 299; social, 39, 94, 100, 241 Erlander, Tage, 83, 87, 88, 93, 94, 95, 97 Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, 7, 80 European Council, 83 European Economic Area, 295, 324 European Union (EU), 8, 9, 163, 324, 325 Evang, Karl, 191 exclusion (utanförskap), 110 Fair Deal (United States), 86 Farmers’ Party (Bondeförbundet, Sweden), 77, 78, 79, 91, 99 félagslegt jafnvægi (social balance), 287 félagslegt öryggi (social security), 276 Fennomanians (Finland), 227, 230 Finland, 1, 5, 319, 322, 324; Centre Party, 249, 251, 256, 258, 259; communism, 245; Communist Party, 249, 254; concept of welfare state, 228–32, 242; conceptual ambiguities, 255–59; democracy, 249, 252; Fennomanians, 230; Grand Duchy of, 227; historical movement, 232–34; languages, 228, 229; left-wing critics of the welfare state, 248–53; Liberals, 230; National Coalition Party, 256, 258; national economy and social order, 236–39; Nordic model and,

334 226–28; politics, 7; right-wing critics of the welfare state, 246–48; Sami, 10; Social Democratic Party, 246, 247, 248, 254, 255; social policy, 237; societal and social policies, 239–42; substituting social for welfare, 234–36; welfare, 242–46; welfare state and welfare society, 253–55; as welfare states, 6–8, 225–75; World War II, 226, 227 The Finnish Economic Association (Ekonomiska Samfundet i Finland), 236 The Finnish National Economic Association (Kansantaloudellinen yhdistys), 231, 236 Finnish People’s Democratic League, 249 Finns Party (True Finns, Perussuomalaiset), 258, 259, 325 Fogh Rasmussen, Anders, 160 folkehjem (people’s home, Norway), 181 Folkeparti, Kristelig (Norway), 189 folketrygdloven (the National Insurance Act), 194 folkhemmet (the people’s home, Sweden), 82, 105–7 Forsman, Georg Zacharias (Yrjö Koskinen), 231, 233 Four Freedoms, 50, 282 Framstegens politik (The Politics of Progress), 88 Framtidens Norge (The Future of Norway), 184 Frederick the Great, 29 Fredrik VI, 29 free-choice argument (Denmark), 146–47 Freeden, Michael, 95, 289 Freedom and Welfare, 326 Fremskrittspartiet (Norwegian Progress Party), 201, 204, 325

INDEX

Friedman, Milton, 294 Friedrich, Carl J., 48 Friheten, 189 Friis, Henning, 140, 151, 155 Full Employment in a Free Society (Beveridge), 49 The Future of Norway (Framtidens Norge), 184 The Future of the Welfare State and the Democratic Socialism, 197f Gaitskell, Hugh, 322 Galbraith, John Kenneth, 95, 149 Gerhardsen, Einar, 184, 193, 194, 203, 204, 205 Geijer, Arne, 98 ‘general welfare’ (United States), 37, 38, 47, 48, 49 Germany, 27, 278, 316, 317; Christian Democratic Party, 247; paternalistic welfare state, 29–31; social welfare state, 38–43; Social Democrats, 39, 41, 42, 77 Gerschenkron, Alexander, 233 Gíslason, Gylfi Þ., 287 Gissurarson, Hannes H., 294 Glistrup, Mogens, 157 globalization, 11, 106, 155, 163, 253, 296, 323 Gneist, Rudolf von, 30, 31 god politie (good administration, Gute Policey), 28 good administration (god politie, Gute Policey), 28 Great Britain, 27, 246, 278, 285, 303; democratic welfare states, 44, 45; relationship with Norway, 179 Great Depression, 5, 47, 240, 318 Green, T.H., 45 Greenland, Inuit people, 10 guardian state, 41; Denmark, 143, 147, 150, 162, 169; Sweden, 92, 95 Guðmundsson, Tómas, 289 Gustav III, 29

INDEX

Hannibalsson, Jón Baldvin, 295 Hansen, H.C., 150 Hansen, Poul, 146 Hansson, Per Albin, 80, 81f, 96, 181 Hauge, Jens Chr., 186 Hayek, F.A., 49, 84, 93, 143, 188, 294, 321 Heckscher, Gunnar, 96 Hedtoft, Hans, 141 Henderson, Arthur, 45 Hermannsson, Páll, 285 Hernes, Helga, 201 Hertzberg, Ebbe, 180 Hilferding, Rudolf, 40 Hilson, Mary, 8 Hirschman, Albert O., 79 Historiallinen Aikakauskirja (Historical Journal), 259 Hjalmarson, Jarl, 96 Den hjärtlösa välfärdsstaten (The Callous Welfare State), 103 Hornsrud, Christopher, 191 Huntford, Roland, 156 Hyvinvointia kaikille/ Välstånd åt alla (Welfare for all), 243, 244f hyvinvointivaltio (welfare state), 225. See also Finland; welfare states Iceland, 1, 5, 322, 323, 324; anti-Swedish sentiments, 289; Communist Party, 291; Communists, 280; as competition state, 294–99; government attack on welfare, 295f; healthcare, 280; hybridity of welfare state, 304; Independence Party (IP), 281, 284, 288, 293; Left, 297; neoliberal critique (1970s-1990s), 293–94; Organization of Disabled, 297; People’s Alliance (PA), 291, 301; politics, 7, 277; poor laws, 279; principle of universalism, 300–303; Progressive Party (PP), 281, 290, 304; public debt, 294; redefining

335

the social, 278–79; Right, 304; rise of the welfare state (1950–1980), 285–93; significance of the 2008 crisis, 299–300; Social Democratic Alliance (SDA), 297; Social Democratic Party (SDP), 280, 281, 282, 287, 288, 294, 295, 303; social democratic politics, 280–81; social insurance, 283f; Social Insurance Administration, 297; Socialist Party (SP), 288; social security, 281–84; social welfare state, 291; State Employment Agency, 284; as welfare states, 6–8, 276–314; women’s movement, 292; Þjóðvaki, 295 Iceland Chamber of Commerce, 296 Icelandic Confederation of Labour (ASÍ), 298 Icelandic Federation of Labour, 280 incentive argument (Denmark), 146 The Incomplete Welfare (Den ofärdiga välfärden), 98 Independence Party (IP [Iceland]), 281, 284, 288, 293 International Labour Organization (ILO), 9, 50 Isaksson, Anders, 105f Israel, Joachim, 105f Jäätteenmäki, Anneli, 257 Jacobsen, Knut Dahl, 187 Jæger, Oskar, 181 Jahn, Gunnar, 186 Jensen, Hans, 139 Jerusalem, Wilhelm, 36 Johansson, Magnus, 149 Johnson, Alex, 188, 189 Joint Programme of 1945, 184, 188 Jónasson, Hermann, 290 Jónsdóttir, Guðrún, 292 Jónsson, Gísli, 288, 301 Jørgensen, Andreas, 148 Joseph II, 29

336

INDEX

Judt, Tony, 318 Justi, J.H.G. von, 30, 138 justice, 4, 28, 45, 144, 196, 204, 279, 280, 290, 298, 299 Kalevala (Lönnrot), 235 Kampmann, Viggo, 152 kansalaisyhteiskunta (civil society), 253 Kansantaloudellinen yhdistys (The Finnish National Economic Association), 236 Kant, Immanuel, 29, 30, 31 Katainen, Jyrki, 258 Kekkonen, Urho, 256 Kettunen, Pauli, 11, 318 Keynes, John Maynard, 276, 284, 293, 323 Keynesian, Keynesianism, 78, 90, 102, 284 King-Hall, Stephen, 44 Kjerkegaard, Else Marie, 156 Kocourek, Albert, 38 Koht, Halvdan, 192 Koivisto, Mauno, 245 Kontrast, 196 Koselleck, Reinhart, 1, 225 Koskinen, Yrjö, 231, 233 Kosonen, Pekka, 253 Krag, Jens Otto, 151, 157 Kristensen, Axel, 143 Kulturstaat (German ), 31–35, 36, 76 Kuusi, Eino, 239, 240 Kuusi, Pekka, 241, 248, 252 Labour (Great Britain), 44, 86, 186, 322 laissez faire state, 38, 45, 82 Lange, Halvard, 181 languages (Finland), 228, 229 Larsen, Aksel, 149 Laski, Harold, 45 Lassalle, Ferdinand, 34, 77, 185 Laxness, Halldór Kiljan, 291 Left (Iceland), 297

Left-Green Movement (LGM [Vinstrihreyfi ngin – grænt framboð]), 297, 298, 299 Left-Socialist Party (Denmark), 156 left-wing critics of the welfare state, 96–98, 148–50, 248–53 Legal Philosophy (Rechtsphilosophie), 40 Legal state, 319; Germany, 29, 30, 32, 50, 55; Denmark, 143; Norway, 181, 184, 185, 187, 188, 192, 195, 211, 320–21; Iceland, 294; Sweden, 76, 77, 84, 103 Leijonborg, Lars, 104 Lembourn, Hans Jørgen, 147, 155 Liberal-Agrarian Party (Denmark), 142, 155 Liberal Party (Denmark), 143, 160 Liberals (Finland), 230 Liberals (Sweden), 79, 80, 84, 91, 99, 104 Libertas, 188 Lie, Haakon, 182 Lindbeck commission (1993), 101 Lindebrække, Sjur, 190 linguistic similarities, 10 Løchen, Yngvar, 196 Loftsson, Hreinn, 294 Long Term Programme 1974–77 (1973), 196 Long-Term Programme 1990–93 (1989), 203 Lönnrot, Elias, 235 luokkayhteiskunta (class society), 232 Lutheranism: in Denmark, 28; in Finland, 227; hegemony, 10; peasant Enlightenment, 11; in Sweden, 28 Lutheran World Federation world assembly (1952), 189 Lütken, Frederik, 138 Machtstaat (power state), 30, 36 MacIver, Robert M., 44

INDEX

Magni, Jonas, 28 Maier, Hans, 42 marketization, 106, 109, 323 Marshall, T.H., 141, 206 Marx, Karl, 149 Marxism, Marxist, 45, 140, 156, 158, 182, 232, 252 Mayer, Otto, 30 Meier, Ernst von, 35, 36 menningarþjóðfélag (civilized society), 287 Merriam, Charles E., 37 Meurman, Agathon, 231 Meyer, Poul, 140 middle way, 82, 86, 115, 277, 289, 292 Mills, C. Wright, 149 Mises, Ludwig von, 41 Moderates (Sweden), 99, 103, 104 Mohl, Robert von, 32 Mohr, Trygve, 181 Møller, Aksel, 143, 144 Möller, Gustav, 77, 79, 80, 84, 85, 87, 96, 111, 182 Møller, Poul, 142, 143, 144, 320 Morgunblaðið, 285, 289, 290, 296 multiple welfare states: coming of, 47–51; common good and welfare, 28–29; democratic welfare states, 43–46; histories, 27–75; Kulturstaat (a civilized state) and social policy, 31–35; paternalistic welfare states, 29–31; regulations, 35–38; Weimar Germany, 38–43 Myrdal, Alva, 90 Myrdal, Gunnar, 89, 90, 118, 115, 241 nation-branding, 6, 325 National Board of Social Affairs (sosialihallitus), 238 National Coalition Party (Finland), 247, 256, 258 the National Insurance Act (folketrygdloven), 194 nationalism, 111, 227, 324–26

337

National Progressive Party (Finland), 244 NATO, 8, 83, 191 Nauwerck, Karl, 32 Nazi, Nazis, 41, 46, 48, 188, 189, 317, 320 Nelson, Georg, 139, 140 neoliberal, neoliberalism, 99, 101, 153, 157, 163, 252, 253, 293–94, 298, 299, 323 Neue Freie Presse, 235 New Deal (United States), 38, 42, 47, 82, 318 New Left (Denmark), 158 New Left (Sweden), 97, 98 A New Left (En ny vänster), 97 The New Totalitarians (Huntford), 156 New Zealand, 50, 82, 285 nightwatchmen state, 34, 76, 77 Nieminen, Armas, 241 Nixon, Richard M., 49 Nordahl, Konrad, 193 Norden (the Nordic countries), 8, 228, 278, 325 Nordic Council of Ministers, 9, 291 Nordic countries: communities (setting), 8–10; linguistic similarities, 10; state and society in, 10–11; as welfare states, 6–8; see also specific countries Nordiska Ministerrådet, 9 Norges Kommunistiske Parti, 189, 201 Norway, 1, 5, 303, 320, 321, 324; defining emergence of the welfare state, 180–85; Labour Party, 185; the liberal order (1884–1935), 180– 81; monetary union, 8; political struggles for discursive ownership, 204–6; politics, 7; post-World War II, 184–85; social democratic order, 185–98; social reformism (late 1930s), 181–84; Venstreparti, 201; wake of social democratic order,

338 198–206; as welfare states, 6–8, 179–224 Norwegian labour party (Arbeiderpartiet), 179, 182, 183f, 186, 187, 188, 190, 192, 193, 198, 199f, 200, 204, 205, 207 Norwegian Maoist communists, 201 Norwegian Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet), 325 Norwegian State Church, 189 Nya Pressen, 235 Nybølle, Hans C., 139 Nygaardsvold, Johan, 183f Ny Politik, 153 Ný vikutíðindi, 285 Oddsson, Davíð, 295f, 303 Den ofärdiga välfärden (The Incomplete Welfare), 98 Olgeirsson, Einar, 291 onnivallinto (the state of happiness), 236 Opsahl, Torkel, 195 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 9, 253 Orienteering, 191 Paldam, Jørgen, 140, 141 Palme, Olof, 87, 88, 98, 99 Papen, Chancellor von, 41, 181 paternalism, 29–31, 47, 49, 187, 321 paternalistic welfare states, 29–31, 46, 82, 108, 316 Pedersen, Jørgen, 146 pensions, 38; Denmark, 139, 141, 142; Iceland, 279, 280, 293, 297, 302; Norway, 181, 182; Sweden, 80, 85, 91, 93 People’s Alliance (PA [Iceland]), 291, 301 people’s home (folkehjem), 181 the people’s home (folkhemmet), 82, 105–6

INDEX

The People’s Will (Þjóðviljinn), 291 Perussuomalaiset (Finns Party, True Finns), 258, 259, 325 Petersen, Jørn Henrik, 2, 46 Petersen, Klaus, 2, 46 Petersen, Ole Hyltoft, 149 Philadelphia Declaration, 50 Phillips, Morgan, 246 Pierson, Paul, 157 Planlægning for velfærd, (Planning for Welfare), 140 planning, 48, 49, 50, 318; Finland, 230, 241, 259; Norway, 182, 184– 85, 189, 196; Sweden, 79, 90, 93 plastic words, 315, 316 politics of progress (Framstegens politik), 88 politiikka (policy), 238 Polizeistaat (old police state), 29, 30, 35 Polizeiwissenschaften (science of government), 138, 234, 236 poor laws (Iceland), 279 power state, 30, 36, 43, 45, 316 privatization, Finland, 254; Iceland, 293, 296; Sweden, 102, 110 Progressive Party (PP [Iceland]), 281, 290, 304 Progress Party (Denmark), 153, 156 property-owning democracy (egendomsägande demokrati), 91 public assistance mentality (understödstagarandan), 79 Radbruch, Gustav, 39, 40 rättsstat (legal state), 76, 77, 103 Reagan, Ronald, 101 Rebelling against the Welfare State (Revolt mot välfärdsstaten), 93, 155 Rechtsphilosophie (Legal Philosophy), 40 Rechtsstaat, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 50, 55, 76, 234, 294, 316 regulating welfare states, 35–38, 316



index

Reinfeldt, Fredrik, 104, 107, 109, 109f religion, 10, 147–48, 188–89, 231 responsibility argument (Denmark), 144–46 rettsstat (legal state), 181, 187, 195, 321 Revolt mot välfärdsstaten, 93, 155 The Revolt of Liberalism, 293 rights, social, 39, 40, 43, 47, 50, 99, 100, 138, 161, 195, 279, 282, 284, 315 Riksdagen (Sweden), 78, 107 The Road to Serfdom (Hayek), 49, 84, 143 Rodgers, Daniel, 2, 46, 278 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 47, 48, 50, 282 Röpke, Wilhelm, 93 Rosenqvist, Gustaf G., 238 Rydenfelt, Sven, 92 SA-Business Iceland (Samtök atvinnulífsins), 296 Salonen, Ahti M., 251 SAMAK, 9 Samtiden, 181 Samtök atvinnulífsins (SA-Business Iceland), 296 Schlüter, Poul, 157 Schmoller, Gustav, 33 Second Bill of Rights, 50 Seip, Anne-Lise, 196 Shirer, William, 6, 188 Sigfússon, Steingrímur J., 298 Sigurðardóttir, Jóhanna, 295, 299 Siipi, Jouko, 250f Simonsen, Palle, 160 Sipilä, Juha, 259 Sipponen, Kauko, 246 Sjöwall, Maj, 98 Skinner, Quentin, 78 Smith, Adam, 237 smygsocialisering (creeping nationalization), 92 Snellman, Johan Vilhelm, 229, 230

339

social balance (félagslegt jafnvægi), 287 social benefit state (bidragsstaten), 105 social choice economy (sosaalinen valintatalous), 256 Social Democratic Alliance (SDA [Iceland]), 297 Social Democratic League of Workers and Small-Scale Farmers (Finland), 249, 251 social democratic order (Norway), 185–98 Social Democratic Party (Denmark), 140, 142, 148, 151, 155, 160 Social Democratic Party (Finland), 238, 246, 247, 248, 254, 255, 256 Social Democratic Party (SDP [Iceland]), 280, 281, 282, 287, 288, 294, 295, 303 Social Democrats, Austria, 232; Germany, 39, 41, 42, 77 Social Democrats (Norway). See Arbeiderpartiet Social Democrats (Sweden), 77, 78, 80, 81f, 84, 85, 91, 94, 107, 108, 111, 141, 225, 319 social insurance, 2, 33, 36, 39, 48, 50, 323; Denmark, 139, 140; Finland, 245; Iceland, 277, 278, 280, 282, 283f; 284, 288, 290, 301; Norway, 182, 184, 186, 188, 194; Sweden, 85, 93, 97, 108 Social Insurance Administration (Iceland), 282, 297 socialism, 86, 88, 251, 254, 255; democratic, 154; Western democratic, 186 socialist Left (Vänsterpartiet), 108 Socialist Party (SP [Iceland]), 288 Socialist People’s Party (Denmark), 148 socialstat (welfare state), 82, 85, 86 Social-Sverige (Social Sweden), 85, 87, 88

340

INDEX

social liberalism, 91, 139, 190, 300 Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre, Denmark), 142, 153 social mönsterstat (social model state), 85 social policy, 3, 5, 8, 33; Finland, 237, 239–42; Kulturstaat and, 31–35 Social Policy Association in Finland, 241 social reformism (late 1930s [Norway]), 181–84 social security, 5, 9, 42, 47, 48, 49, 318, 319; Denmark, 142, 150, 152, 153, 158, 162; Finland, 245, 246, 256; Iceland, 276, 281–84, 290, 292, 300, 303; Norway, 182, 184; Sweden, 85, 87, 100, 106 social service state, 45, 318 social services, 2, 36, 45, 94, 107, 229, 285 social state (Sozialstaat, welfare state), 31, 40, 41, 50, 82, 85, 252 Social Sweden (Social-Sverige), 85, 87, 88, 111 social välfärdsstat (social welfare state), 83, 86, 90, 320 social welfare politics (social välfärdspolitik), 77–83 social welfare state (social välfärdsstat), 83, 86, 291 Socialistisk Venstreparti (Socialist Left), 201 Socialists of the Chair (Kathedersozialisten), 33, 234, 235 society: concept of (Finland), 229, 231; in Nordic countries, 10–11 Solberg, Erna, 205 Sørensen, Villy, 149, 150 Sormunen, Eino, 248 sosaalinen valintatalous (social choice economy), 256 Sosialipolitiikka (Social Policy), 239, 240, 241

sosialitoimituskunta/sosialiministeriö (Ministry of Social Affairs), 238 Soviet Union, World War II and Finland, 226 Sozialpolitik, 10, 33, 237 Sozialstaat, 29, 39, 50 Staatssozialismus (state socialism), 33, 34, 41 Starcke, Carl Nicolai, 138 state, 315; concept of (Finland), 228, 229, 231, 237; redefinition of, 277; and society in Nordic countries, 10–11, 88; 202–3, 228–30 State Employment Agency (Iceland), 284 the state of happiness (onnivallinto), 236 state socialism (Staatssozialismus), 33, 34, 41, 48, 76, 180 Statsøkonomisk forening, 180 status quo, welfare states as, 150–54 Steen, Sverre, 194 Stefánsson, Stefán Jóhann, 282, 287 Stein, Lorenz von, 30, 31, 40 Stenius, Henrik, 10 Stortinget (Norway), 182 strong society (det starka samhället), 87–90, 111 Sukselainen, V.J., 245 Sunt förnuft, 92 Svensk tidskrift, 96, 103 Sverigedemokraterna (Swedish Democrats), 110, 325 Sweden, 1, 5, 303, 319, 321, 324; budget deficits, 106; caretaker’s responsibilities, 96–100; confronting the idyll, 91–93; Conservatives, 80, 84, 91, 99; constitution (1975), 100; Farmers’ Party, 78, 91; individual freedoms, 87, 88; languages, 228; languages of welfare in, 76–136; Liberals, 79, 80, 84, 91, 104; Lutherans

INDEX

in, 28; Moderates, 99, 103, 104; monarchies, 86; monetary union, 8; New Left, 97, 98; nostalgia for the people’s home, 105–6; pensions, 91, 93; People’s Pension, 141, 142; politics, 7; poverty, 98; primacy of welfare politics, 77–83; public services, 95; recovery, 82; RussoSwedish War of 1808, 227; Social Democrats, 77, 78, 80, 81f, 84, 85, 91, 107, 108, 111, 141, 225, 244, 258, 319; social security, 85, 106; the Strong Society, 87–90; system change, 100–105; taking care of the welfare state, 93–96; taxation, 91; welfare state in the Cold war, 83–86; as welfare states, 6–8; from welfare state to the welfare, 107–11; World War II, 233 Sweden: Champion of Peace (Hinshaw), 85 Sweden: The Middle Way (Child), 86 Sweden: Model for the World (Strode), 85 Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), 110, 325 Swedish People’s Party (Svenska Folkpartiet, Finland), 242, 244, 251, 257 system change (systemskifte), 79, 100–5 Tanner, Väinö, 243, 245 taxation, 37, 321; reforms (Denmark), 142; Sweden, 91 Temple, William, 43, 44, 179, 184 Thatcher. Margaret, 101 Thors, Ólafur, 288 Tönnies, Ferdinand, 35, 41 Törngren, Ralf, 245 Torp, Oscar, 182, 191, 192, 205, 320 totalitarian, totalitarianism, 43, 48, 84, 92, 156, 188, 189, 202, 229, 253, 321

341

Tranmæl, Martin, 186, 192, 205 True Finns (Finns Party, Perussuomalaiset), 258, 259, 325 Truman, Harry S, 49, 84 UN Charter, 318 Undén, Östen, 83 Undergörare (Miracle Workers), 82 understödstagarandan (public assistance mentality), 79 unemployment insurance: Denmark, 139; Iceland, 284 United Nations (UN), 83, 89 United States, 27, 37–38, 317, 321; Department of Public Welfare, 38; Fair Deal, 86; New Deal, 38, 42, 47, 82, 318 universalism principle of Iceland, 300–3 utanförskap (exclusion), 110 Valdimarsson, Finnbogi Rútur, 301 Vår väg, 85 välfärden (the welfare), 107–11 välfärdspolitik (welfare politics/ policies), 77–83, 85, 89f, 235, 244 välfärdssamhälle (welfare society), 88, 89f, 94, 257. See also Sweden; welfare states välfärdsstaten (social welfare state), 83, 86, 89f, 90, 320 välfärdsutskottet (the welfare committee), 78 välstånd (wellbeing, prosperity), 29, 235, 243, 244f Vanhanen, Matti, 257 Vänsterpartiet (socialist Left), 108 Vedel-Petersen, Lena, 152 velfærdspolitik (welfare politics), 157 velfærdsreform (welfare reform), 157 velfærdssektor (welfare sector), 157 velfærdsstaten (welfare state), 137. See also Denmark; welfare states

342

INDEX

velferðarríki (welfare state), 276, 286, 286f. See also Iceland; welfare states velferðarþjóðfélag and velferðarsamfélag (welfare society), 286, 286f velferdspolitikk (welfare politics, policies), 182 velferdssamfunn (welfare society), 202f, 203, 207 velferdsstaten (welfare state), 179, 202f, 203. See also Norway; welfare states Vendell, Carl F., 234 Venstre (Denmark), 142, 160, 323 Venstre (Norway), 182, 190, 194, 201 Verdens Gang, Denmark, 140, 153; Norway, 188 verkmannamálið (the workers question), 279 Vestjyllands Socialdemokrat, 139 Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð (Left-Green Movement [LGM]), 297, 298, 299 Vísir, 285 Volksstaat, 39 Wagner, Adolph, 33, 34, 35, 36, 54, 180, 181 Warbey, William, 182 We All: Icelandic Welfare Society at the Crossroads (Sigfússon), 298 Weimar Constitution, 39, 139, 189 Weimar Germany, 38–43, 317, 321. See also Germany welfare, 315; common good and, 28–29; etymology and definitions, 3, 4, 76; Finland, 242–46; Golden Age of Welfare, 5, 154, 161; Icelandic government attack on, 295f; nationalism and the world, 324–26; public, 28; reliable, 108; social policy and, 3, 5; in Sweden, 76–136; terms in newspapers, 89f

welfare administration (Wohlfahrtspolizei, välfärdspoliti), 32, 234 welfare committee (välfärdsutskottet), 78 welfare dependency (bidragsberoende), 110 Welfare for all (Hyvinvointia kaikille/ Välstånd åt alla), 243, 244f Welfare for All report (2003), 298 welfare institutions (välfärdsanstalter), 235 welfare policy, politics (välfärdspolitik), 76, 77–83, 78, 81f, 89f, 235, 244, 320 welfare politics (velfærdspolitik), 140, 157 welfare reform (velfærdsreform), 157 welfare sector (velfærdssektor), 157 welfare society (välfärdssamhälle), 88, 89f, 94, 257 welfare society (velferðarþjóðfélag and velferðarsamfélag), 286, 286f welfare society (velferdssamfunn), 202f, 203, 207 welfare state (hyvinvointivaltio), 225 welfare state (välfärdsstat, välfärdsstaten), 77, 82, 83, 86, 88, 89f, 90, 102, 225, 228, 234, 235, 242, 257, 260, 320 welfare state (velfærdsstat), 137, 159f welfare state (velferdsstat, velferdsstaten), 179, 180, 181, 182, 183f, 184, 187, 193, 195, 196, 198, 200, 202f welfare state (velferðarríki), 276, 286, 286f The Welfare State and Spiritual Life (Hyvinvointivaltio ja henkinen elämä [Sormunen]), 248 welfare states, 1, 2, 315; in the Cold war (Sweden), 83–86; coming of, 47–51; common good and

INDEX

welfare, 28–29; concept of, 2, 285; consensus, 154–56; culture and, 33; definitions, 46–47; democratic, 27, 43–46, 316; Denmark, 137–78; emergence of (Norway), 180–85; Finland as, 225–75; historization of, 3, 315, 316; histories, 27–75; history of the keyword, 316–18; Iceland as, 276–314; Kulturstaat and social policy, 31–35; leftwing critics of the, 248–53; left-wing critique of, 148–50; Nordic countries as, 6–8; Norway, 179–224; paternalist, 29–31, 316; politicization and ideologization of, 318–24; politicization of (Denmark), 140–42; prehistory of (Denmark), 138–40; regulating, 316; regulations, 35–38; religious arguments against, 147–48; rightwing critics of, 246–48; scepticism and innovation, 156–59; social, 316; social-liberal, 190; as status quo, 150–54; Sweden, 76–136; toward welfare society, 159–62; velferdsstaten (Norway), 202f, 203; Weimar Germany, 38–43; see also specific countries welfare work (Wohlfahrtspflege), 36, 317

343

Wigforss, Ernst, 88, 89, 97 Wilhjelm, Preben, 158 Willoughby, W.W., 37 Wincott, Daniel, 277 Winter War of 1939–40, 229 Wohlfahrtspflege (welfare work), 36, 317 Wohlfahrtspolizei (welfare police, administration), 32, 234 Wohlfahrtsstaat (welfare state), 10, 27, 29, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 52, 181, 316 women-friendly welfare state, 200–1 women’s movement (Iceland), 292 Work for all (Arbeid for alle), 180, 184 World Health Organization (WHO), 191, 198 World War I, 227 World War II, 9, 47, 233, 240, 243, 318; conservatives (Norway), 194; Finland, 226, 227; post-World War II Norway, 179, 184–85 Wuori, Eero A., 240 yhteiskunta (state), 231, 237 Young Finns, 253, 254 Zimmern, Alfred, 43, 44, 45 Zukunftsstaat, 36