The Changing Faces of Catholicism 9789004375796, 9789004380073

Citation preview

The Changing Faces of Catholicism

Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion Editors Enzo Pace, Luigi Berzano and Giuseppe Giordan Editorial Board Peter Beyer (University of Ottawa) Anthony Blasi (Tennessee State University) Roberto Cipriani (Università di Roma Tre) Xavier Costa (Universidad de Valencia) Franco Garelli (Università di Torino) Gustavo Guizzardi (Università di Padova) Dick Houtman (Erasmus University, Rotterdam) Solange Lefebvre (Université de Montréal) Patrick Michel (cnrs, Paris) Ari Pedro Oro (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul) Adam Possamai (University of Western Sydney) Ole Riis (Agder University) Susumu Shimazono (University of Tokyo) William H. Swatos, Jr. (Augustana College) Jean-Paul Willaime (ephe, Sorbonne) Monika Wohlrab-Sahr (University of Leipzig) Linda Woodhead (Lancaster University) Fenggang Yang (Purdue University) Sinisa Zrinscak (University of Zagreb)

volume 9 The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/arsr

The Changing Faces of Catholicism Edited by

Solange Lefebvre Alfonso Pérez-Agote

leiden • boston

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1877-5233 isbn 978-90-04-37579-6 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-38007-3 (e-book) Copyright 2018 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Notes on Contributors vii Introduction to The Changing Faces of Catholicism 1 Solange Lefebvre and Alfonso Pérez-Agote

Part 1 Catholicism in Both Catholic and Pluralistic Societies 1

Religion and National Identity in Catholic Societies: The Quarrel between Religion and Culture 21 Jean-François Laniel

2

Popular Religiosity and Value Changes in Mexico City Youth 43 Jesús Antonio Serrano Sánchez, Ramiro Gómez-Arzápalo and Alejandro Gabriel Emiliano Flores

3

From a Place of Popular Religiosity to a Transnational Space of Multiple Meanings and Religious Interactions 68 Helena Vilaça

4

Cultural Catholics in the United States 83 Tricia C. Bruce

Part 2 Strategies within Specific Countries to Counteract the Secularization Crisis 5

Occupying the Margins of Society: Operationalizing Minority Identity Politics among Canadian Youth within the Catholic New Evangelization 109 Paul L. Gareau

6

Catholic Reconquest: The Case of the Sainte Blandine Megachurch in Lyon 129 Valérie Aubourg

vi

Contents

7

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (ccr) in the Americas 147 Andrea Althoff and Jakob Egeris Thorsen

8

Religious Practices, Beliefs and Commitments on the Margins of the Catholic Church in Belgium 165 Karel Dobbelaere and Liliane Voyé

Part 3 Strategies and General Attitudes of the Catholic Church, and of the Vatican Centre in Particular, in Relation to Problems of the Global Era 9

Catholicism and Eastern Religions: Spiritual Innovators and Interreligious Dialogue (de Mello and Merton) 185 Andrew P. Lynch

10

Religion in a Globalized Culture: Institutional Innovation and Continuity of Catholicism—The Case of World Youth Day 202 Sławomir Mandes and Wojciech Sadłoń

11

The Joy of Dialogue in an Intercultural World: Educational Implications from Evangelii Gaudium 222 Graham P. McDonough

Part 4 Changes in Specific Catholic Institutions 12

Navigating the Fault Lines of Catholic Institutional Identity 247 Kevin Ahern

13

The Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries in the Czech Republic and Austria 269 Barbora Spalová and Isabelle Jonveaux General Index 297

Notes on Contributors Kevin Glauber Ahern, PhD, is a theological ethicist who focuses on the significance of Catholic institutional ministries and Christian social movements. He is Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Manhattan College where he directs the Peace Studies program. He is the author of Structures of Grace: Catholic Organizations Serving the Global Common Good (orbis, 2015) and several other books, including the award-winning Visions of Hope: Emerging Theologians and the Future of the Church (orbis, 2013), The Radical Bible (orbis, 2013), and Public Theology and the Global Common Good (orbis, 2016). Dr. Ahern also serves as the President of the International Catholic Movement for Intellectual and Cultural Affairs (ICMICA-Pax Romana), a global movement of intellectuals and professionals committed to social transformation. Andrea Althoff, PhD, is a sociologist and currently a lecturer for the German Society of European Academies. In the past, her research was situated at University of Chicago Divinity School and Catholic University Eichstätt-Ingolstadt. Previous work and teaching positions include the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (bamf), DePaul University Chicago, and the Elite Academy of the German Armed Forces (Hamburg). Her research interests are the nexus between migration and religion from a transatlantic perspective (Latinos and Muslims), right-wing extremism and Christianity, and human rights. Althoff’s latest book, Divided by Faith and Ethnicity: Religious Pluralism and the Problem of Race in Guatemala, was published in 2014 (Walter de Gruyter). Dr. Althoff currently lives in Berlin, Germany. Valérie Aubourg is a French cultural anthropologist. She is a researcher in the Groupe Sociétés Religions Laïcités (gsrl, cnrs-ephe) and a lecturer at the Catholic University of Lyon. From 2005 to 2011, she lived in Réunion where she conducted research on the island’s Pentecostal movements. In 2011, she coordinated the book Religions populaires et nouveaux syncrétismes (Surya éditions). In 2014, she published Christianismes charismatiques à l’île de La Réunion (Karthala éditions). Currently, her research focuses on the evangelical influence in Catholicism and Catholic migrants in France. In 2016 (with Bernadette Angleraud and Olivier Chatelan), she published 50 ans de catholicisme à Lyon 1965-2015 : De Vatican ii à nos jours (Karthala éditions).

viii

Notes on Contributors

Tricia C. Bruce is Associate Professor of Sociology at Maryville College (Tennessee, usa). Her research explores changes to the structures of religion/Catholicism in response to changing social conditions. Her books include Faithful Revolution (Oxford, 2011), Polarization in the US Catholic Church (co-edited with Charles Camosy and Mary Ellen Konieczny—Liturgical Press, 2016), Parish and Place (Oxford, 2017), and American Parishes (co-edited with Gary Adler and Brian Starks— Fordham, 2019). She has led applied research for the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, and holds a joint appointment with the University of Texas at San Antonio. Karel Dobbelaere is Professor Emeritus at the Catholic University of Leuven and the University of Antwerp (Belgium), where he taught general sociology, sociology of religion and methodology. He received a Doctorate Honoris Causa from Soka University (Tokyo, Japan) and has been a Visiting Fellow of All Souls College (Oxford, GB), Kent State University (Ohio, usa), the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture (Nagoya, Japan), Sofia University (Tokyo), and the Institut de Recherche sur les Sociétés Contemporaines (cnrs, France). His main fields of interest are: secularization, religious and church involvement, pillarization, and religious and sectarian movements. Alejandro Gabriel Emiliano Flores, M.Sc., is Master’s Degree Coordinator in Urban Pastoral at Catholic University Lumen Gentium in Mexico City. Flores is also a researcher and member of the Observatorio Intercontinental sobre la Religiosidad Popular [Intercontinental Observatory of Popular Religiosity], and among other articles has published “Pastorale Herausforderungen in Wohnanlagen” [“Pastoral Challenges in Condominium Complexes”], in Eckhotl M. & Silber S. (eds.) Glauben in Mega-Citys: Transformationsprozesse in lateinamerikanichen Groβstädten und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Pastoral [Belief within Megacities: Transformation Processes in Major Latin American Cities and Their Impact on Pastoral Work] (Grünewald, 2014). Paul Gareau is Métis and French-Canadian from the farming community of Bellevue near Batoche, Saskatchewan, Canada. He is an assistant professor in the Faculty of Native Studies and is a Research Fellow for the Rupertsland Centre for Métis Research (rcmr) at the University of Alberta. As a Religious Studies scholar, his thesis and published works, written in English and French, critically

Notes on Contributors

ix

i­nterrogate the structures and flexibility of socio-religious identity regarding Catholic conservatism, popular Catholic devotion with a focus on gender, as well as an engagement in arts-based research. Overall, Gareau’s academic interests and community research projects explore the influence of Catholicism on early and late modern identity, the legacy of colonial discourses on Indigenous and ethnocultural minorities, and the experiences of rural spaces. His research focuses on the Métis, Indigenous religiosity, youth, gender, la francophonie, and rural Canada. Ramiro Gómez-Arzápalo Dorantes, PhD, is a Professor at Catholic University Lumen Gentium; and at Universidad Intercontinental is Director of the Master’s Program in Philosophy and Critical Culture, Academic Director of the Intersticios Journal and President of the Observatorio Intercontiental sobre la Religiosidad Popular. Dorantes is also a member of conacyt (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología [National Council for Science and Technology]), the Asociación nacional de diálogo filosófico sobre la fe y la ciencia [National Association of Philosophical Dialogue on Faith and Science], and the Grupo Interdisciplinario de Estudios sobre la Religiosidad [Interdisciplinary Study Group on Popular Religion]. Isabelle Jonveaux studied sociology and economics in Paris and Trent (Italy). She is working at the University of Graz (Austria) and is affiliated with the Centre d’études en sciences sociales du religieux (CéSor, Paris). Her doctoral thesis dealt with the monastic economy in West Europe (Le monastère au travail, Bayard, 2011) and she is still researching different aspects of monastic life in Europe but also outside Europe (Africa, Latin America). Her main publications are about Internet and religion (Dieu en ligne, Bayard, 2013), contemporary monastic asceticism (Moines, corps et âme, Le Cerf, 2018), but also collective books about the sociology of monasticism (Jonveaux, Pace and Palmisano, Sociology and monasticism, Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion—Brill, 2014/Jonveaux and Palmisano, Monasticism in Modern Times, Routledge—2016). E-mail: [email protected]. Jean-François Laniel is a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada postdoctoral fellow in the University of Michigan Department of Sociology, and an affiliate of the Center for European Studies/Weiser Center for Europe and Eurasia. He holds a doctorate in sociology from the Université du Québec à Montréal (2018). His research focuses on the dynamics between tradition and modernity;

x

Notes on Contributors

between religion, culture and politics; and between Christianity and nationalism in Europe and America. His doctoral dissertation, A historical sociology of Catholicism and nationalism in Quebec (1840–2015), offers a novel account of the links between Catholicism and nationalism in Québec’s modern history. His postdoctoral research, Religion and politics in a time of pluralism: Bulgaria, Finland and Slovakia, compares three “small nations” of different Christian traditions (Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic) in regard to contemporary political issues (pluralism, secularity, and nationalism). He is widely published in French-language outlets and his work in English was published in Social Compass and Nations and Nationalism. Solange Lefebvre a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, is a Full Professor at the Institute of Religious Studies, University of Montréal, where she holds the Research Chair in Management of Cultural and Religious Diversity. Her areas of interest include religion in the public sphere, religion and politics, laïcité and secularization, youth and generations. Lefebvre’s recent publications include Cultures et spiritualités des jeunes [Youth Cultures and Spirituality] (Bellarmin, 2008); and the following volumes (as editor): Public Commissions on Cultural and Religious Diversity: Analysis, Reception and Challenges (Routledge, 2017); Catholicisme et cultures. Regards croisés Québec-France [Catholicism and Cultures. QuébecFrance Crossed Views] (Presses de l’Université Laval and Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2015); Religion in the Public Sphere: Canadian Case Studies (University of Toronto Press, 2014); and Living with Diversity (International ­Journal of Theology. Concilium 2014/1). She has directed and collaborated on several funded research project and is regularly consulted on religious matters by governments and the media, as well as public and private organizations. She coordinates the Canadian section for the European database EUREL.com and offers her own database pluri that puts hundreds of documents on the management of cultural and religious pluralism at the disposal of the public (http://pluri.gdcr.umontreal.ca). Andrew P. Lynch holds an MA (Hons) from the University of Auckland, and a PhD from the University of Sydney, both in sociology. He currently teaches sociology at the University of Sydney and at the Australian Catholic University. He researches in the area of the sociology of religion and specializes in the study of contemporary Catholicism, with a focus on the Catholic Church as a global religious institution and its activities in local settings. His PhD thesis examined the Catholic Church and social change in the 1960s with an emphasis on Vatican

Notes on Contributors

xi

ii and its project of updating the Church. Lynch has published a number of ­academic journal articles and book chapters focusing on global Catholicism from a sociological perspective, which includes studies on subjects such as modern monasticism, Catholicism and the internet, religious freedom in China, and the Church and the public sphere. He has also published book reviews on studies in religion for the International Sociological Association (isa), and has presented at a number of international conferences on the subject of religion and Catholicism in modern times. He is a member of the isa’s Research Committee 22 on the Sociology of Religion, and other associations. Sławomir Mandes, PhD, is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Sociology at the University of Warsaw. He has worked as participant or coordinator of many national and international research projects concerning social policy and religion. Currently, Mandes is engaged in the newest edition of the European Values Study. He has authored many reports and articles (and book publications as author or editor) directly related to problems of religion and the relationship of religion with other spheres of social systems: national and personal identity, cultural diversity and the public sphere. Graham P. McDonough is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Education, and Associate Fellow at the Centre for Studies in Religion and Society, at the University of Victoria. He is the author of Beyond Obedience and Abandonment: Toward a Theory of Dissent in Catholic Education (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), and co-editor (with Nadeem Memon and Avi Mintz) of Discipline, Devotion, and Dissent: Jewish, Catholic, and Islamic Schooling in Canada (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2013). Alfonso Pérez-Agote is an emeritus professor of Sociology at the Complutense University of Madrid. He is coordinator of the European Group of Interdisciplinary Research on Religious Change, honorary president of the ceic (Centro de Estudios sobre la Identidad Colectiva—University of the Basque Country), as well as a member of cadis (Centre d’analyse et d’intervention sociologiques—EHESSParis), gsrl (Groupe Sociétés, Religions, Laïcités—EPHE-Paris), “Plateforme violence et sortie de la violence” of Fondation de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme (FMSH-Paris), and ipev (International Panel on Exiting Violence— FMSH-Carnegie Corporation of New York). His research and p ­ ublications deal with collective identities, nationalism, religious change and secularization, cultural and religious pluralism, and new forms of social and political ­mobilization.

xii

Notes on Contributors

His publications include: The Social Roots of Basque Nationalism (University of Nevada Press, 2006); Cambio religioso en España: los avatares de la secularización (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2012); Portraits du catholicisme. Une comparaison européenne (Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2012); “The Notion of secularization: Drawing the Boundaries of its Contemporary Scientific Validity”, Current Sociology, 2014, 62 October; “La crise de la représentation démocratique. Le cas espagnol : depuis les indignados jusqu’à Podemos” in Socio (2016/6); and (as co-editor with Karel Dobbelaere) The Intimate, Polity and the Catholic Church (Leuven University Press, 2015). Wojciech Sadłoń, PhD, is a sociologist and theologian. He is the Director of the Institute for Catholic Church Statistics in Poland, member of the Scientific Council of the Polish Central Statistical Office, and editorial board member of the journal Pedagogia Christiana. He has served on the editorial board of the International Catholic Review Communio. Sadłoń has been a lecturer in sociology at Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, and a visiting scholar at Georgetown University in Washington, DC. He collaborates with Pew Research Center and the Center for Applied Research in Apostolate of Georgetown University. During the last 10 years, he has participated in over 20 research projects, recently as an expert in: “Third Sector Impact” (FP7), “Swiss Metadatabase of Religious Affiliation in Europe”, and research on World Youth Day in Poland. His publications in Polish, English, and German deal with civil society, social capital, and religious education. His publications include, Religijny capital spoleczny [Religious Social Capital] (Wydawnictwo Bezkresy Wiedzy, 2014) and an article on religious polarization in Poland; he has also edited a book on religious freedom. He is currently researching the religiosity of Polish migrants in Ireland, and studying religion from the perspective of critical realism and relational sociology. Jesús Antonio Serrano Sánchez holds a PhD in Public Administration and is Professor of Urban Pastoral at Catholic University Lumen Gentium in Mexico City. Serrano is a member of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, and the Observatorio Intercontiental sobre la Religiosidad Popular. He is the author of several works including Planeación estratégica para la pastoral [Strategic Pastoral Planning] (San Pablo, Mexico, 2013).E-mail: [email protected]. Barbora Spalová studied ethnology and social anthropology in Prague. She is a member of the Institute of Sociological Studies at Charles University in Prague, and conducts

Notes on Contributors

xiii

research in the field of anthropology of religion, particularly anthropology of Christianity. She is also involved in border studies and memory studies. She lives in the Czech-Polish-German borderland. She is the editor-in-chief of the journal for qualitative research Biograf. In 2017, she published the book Laici a klerici v české katolické církvi: Na cestě ke spiritualitě spolupráce?[Laity and clergy in the Czech Catholic Church: On the way to the spirituality of collaboration?] (Brno: cdk)E-mail: [email protected] Jakob Egeris Thorsen is an associate professor at the Department of Theology at Aarhus University (Denmark). He studied theology and social anthropology at the University of Copenhagen and received his PhD from the Aarhus University in 2012. He has published various articles and anthology chapters on Christianity in Latin America, World Catholicism and systematic theology. His book “Charismatic Practice and Catholic Parish Life – the Incipient Pentecostalization of the Church in Guatemala and Latin America” was published by Brill in 2015. Helena Vilaça holds a PhD in Sociology from of the University do Porto (UP), where she is Assistant Professor in the Sociology Department and senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology. She is a member of the International Society for the Sociology of Religion, and her scientific work has been particularly focused on religious ethnicity and ethical pluralism; migrations, ethnicities, and religion; Portuguese Catholicism; and Protestant and evangelical communities. Vilaça has been part of the eurel network, the gericr network and several projects related to religion. Her publications include: “Portrait du Catholicisme au Portugal” (co-authored with Maria João Oliveira in A. Pérez-Agote, (ed.) Portraits du catholicisme : une comparaison européenne (Presses universitaires de Renne, 2012); and The Changing Soul of Europe: Religions and Migrations in Northern and Southern Europe (Ed. with E. Pace, I. Furseth, and P. Pettersson—­ Routledge, 2014). Liliane Voyé is Professor Emeritus at the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium), where she taught general sociology, urban sociology, and sociology of religion. She received a Doctorate Honoris Causa from the Université Laval (Québec, Canada). She has been visiting professor at the universities of Geneva (Switzerland), Toulouse (France), Leuven (Belgium), Lisboa and Evora (Portugal). Her main fields of interest are: urbanism and architecture, social movements, and Catholicism.

Introduction to The Changing Faces of Catholicism Solange Lefebvre and Alfonso Pérez-Agote 1

Catholicism: An Over-Institutionalized and Over-Centralized Religion in a Globalized World1

Catholicism represents an important area of research in sociology, as well as across several disciplines. On one hand, Catholicism is a religion that is generally over-institutionalized and over-centralized in comparison to other religions. On the other hand, it finds itself in an increasingly interrelated and globalized world, and is consequently immersed in a great plurality of social realities. The Pew Research Center (2012) estimated that in 2010, one third of the world’s population was Christian, and half of that number practiced Catholicism. These calculations are certainly not an indicator of the vitality of these religious forms, but rather an attempt to calculate how much of the world’s current population lives in areas that have historically had a relevant presence of such forms. Christianity constitutes one of the three “book religions”, a term which has historically implied a significant level of institutionalization: a sacred book strongly determines its core beliefs.2 In the 11th century, the Orthodox Church separated from the rest of the Christian world and became dominant in Greece and certain eastern European countries. Then, in the 16th century, various currents of the Reformation triumphed in central and northern European countries. This was a reaction against what its leaders considered to be serious forms of corruption and commodification, which were protected and maintained by the Church of Rome. The result of this historical process is that Catholicism became the dominant religious form in the countries of Southern Europe. The Reformation involved a decrease in the level of institutionalization of religion; one example of this being the establishment of the principle of free examination, which assumes that God speaks directly to men. With this, 1 The editors would like to thank Liane Grant for her assistance with the general editing and proofreading of the articles in this volume. Solange Lefebvre also would like to acknowledge the support of the Chair for the Management of Cultural and Religious Diversity, Institute of Religious Studies, University of Montreal. 2 But it is also necessary to add that the tension around beliefs is not eliminated by the existence of a sacred book: this is subject to the existence of new versions and interpretations, to the appearance of new manuscripts and other forms of struggle for authenticity.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004380073_002

2

Lefebvre and Pérez-Agote

the need for interpretation by the Church of the divine Word weakened; and the subjective dimension of life was strengthened. The Reformation presumed the loss of religious unity in Christian Europe, and for this reason the European states went looking for an internal religious homogeneity through the application of the principle cuius regio eius religio, that had already been used in the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and later in that of Westphalia (1648). The expansion of Catholicism throughout the world, before reaching the global scale that is shown below, can only be understood through a consideration of the historical processes of emigration and colonization, with their corresponding evangelizing missions, that European Catholic countries carried out in other continents. As a relevant example, we see that today half of the Catholics in the world inhabit the American continent; this is a clear result of the aforementioned historical processes that occurred in Spain, France, and Portugal, on one side of the world, and the entire American continent, on the other.3 Catholics in the world “The number of baptized Catholics has continued to grow globally, from 1,272 million in 2014 to 1,285 million in 2015, with a relative increase of 1%. This represents a total of 17.7% of the total population. If a mediumterm perspective is adopted, for example with reference to 2010, a more robust growth of 7.4% is shown. The dynamic of this increase varies from continent to continent: while, indeed, in Africa there is an increase of 19.4%, with the number of Catholics passing from 186 to 222 million in the same period, in Europe there is instead a situation of stability (in 2015 Catholics amounted to almost 286 million, whereas in 2019 there were just over 800 thousand fewer, and 1.3 million fewer compared to 2014). This stasis is due to the well-noted demographic situation, in which the population is in slight increase and is expected to decline sharply in the coming years. Intermediate situations with respect to the two described above are found in America and Asia, where the growth of Catholics is certainly important (respectively + 6.7% and 9.1%), but in line with the demographic trend of these two continents. Stagnation, obviously with lower values, is also typical of Oceania. 3 The colonization processes carried out by European countries in other continents promoted strong relations between countries. These relations were very relevant after the World Wars, when Europe needed foreign labour for its reconstruction, and significant contingents of population from the old colonies were emigrating to Europe. That is the origin of the current religious plurality in this continent.

The Changing Faces of Catholicism

3

[…] The increased weight of the African continent is also confirmed, with an increase from 15.5% to 17.3% of global baptized faithful. There is, however, a sharp decline in Europe, from 23.8% of faithful worldwide in 2010 to 22.2% in 2015; America instead remains the continent to which almost 49% of baptized Catholics belong. Asian Catholics continue to represent around 11% of the world total 2015. The proportion of Catholics in Oceania also remains stable, although with a figure of less than 0.8% of the world’s Catholic population”.

 Source: http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/ pubblico/2017/04/06.html [accessed January 14th 2018]

Catholic beliefs are over-institutionalized by the existence of sacred texts, as compared to those that have none. The Catholic Church manifests a higher degree of institutionalization than Protestant churches, the latter being influenced by the Reformation which introduced a religious culture that ­encourages the reading of the Bible and implies wide freedom of personal interpretation, since God speaks directly to men. From the religious point of view, Catholicism is governed centrally by the Pope, Bishop of Rome, who is the only religious authority over the bishops of all the dioceses. These bishops are, in turn, sovereign in their own dioceses, without any other requirement of submission than to the authority of the Pope. But, in addition, the Pope is the head of a state, the Vatican State4 (HeathBrown 2015). So, Catholicism is a religion led by a state, this being a complex organization with the capacity for religious action related to Catholics around the world. We can also think about the scrupulous control of doctrinal orthodoxy exercised throughout the world by Vatican institutions. Consider the example of liberation theology (Smith 1991), which emerged as a response from segments of the Catholic Church that were committed to fighting social and political battles against the harsh and confining conditions of major social sectors in Latin America. On one hand, we can say that beyond its remote origins Catholicism is, from a symbolic point of view, a European religion, in the sense that its regulatory centre is clearly established in the Vatican. In addition, one can see how in our era the Vatican centre has progressively focused on increasing its symbolic power by organizing, in various parts of the world, major religious events where 4 http://www.vaticanstate.va/content/vaticanstate/en.html [accessed 17 February 2018].

4

Lefebvre and Pérez-Agote

the Pope is present: World Youth Day5 and World Day for the Poor.6 To reinforce this, we could point out the increasing importance of the trips of the Supreme Pontiff: John Paul ii, Benedict xvi, and Francis. But on the other hand, in tension with the uniqueness of the centre, the situations in which Catholics find themselves throughout the world are as diverse as the conditions of life on the planet. The issue of the relationship between local ­Churches and the universal Church, and so of Peter’s primacy, is a thread running through all of Catholic theological thinking since the 1960s, in all disciplinary fields. This issue was a subject of debate between Joseph Ratzinger and Walter Kasper before the former became Pope Benedict xvi (Ratzinger 2000, 2001; Kasper 2001; McDonnell 2002; Lefebvre 2006), and Pope Francis is seemingly trying to establish a more balanced relation between the local churches and the central Roman Church, in an attempt of decentralisation (Senèze 2017). 1.1 Catholicism in Europe and the Americas Beginning in the 18th century, the process of modernization began on the ­European continent. Throughout the 19th and much of the 20th century, the new science of society analysed the process related to the progressive loss of the centrality of religion: this was called the theory of secularization, as a fundamental part of modernization. Thus, the incompatibility between religion and modernity was announced, and along with this the progressive disappearance of religion in modern societies was predicted (Pérez-Agote 2014). However, at the end of the last century, sociology was entering a stage of convergence (Berger 1992; Davie 2001; Hervieu-Léger 1996, 2001a; Martin 1996) towards the consideration of Europe “as the only geographic and cultural area (maybe alongside Canada) in which the typical ideal schema of secularization as the expulsion of religion can be applied, as opposed to the other continents, including the United States” (Hervieu-Léger 2001a: 7; Berger et al. 2008). Paradoxically, Peter Berger, one of the most relevant contemporary theoreticians of secularization (1967), revised his theory and produced the following diagnosis of the situation of religion in our world in general, and in Europe in particular: The current world is massively religious; it is anything but the secularized world which had been announced by so many modernity analysts. There are two exceptions to this proposal […] The first apparent e­ xception is 5 https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/youth.index.html [accessed 16 January 2018]. 6 https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/poveri/documents/papa-­ francesco_20170613_messaggio-i-giornatamondiale-poveri-2017.html [accessed 14 January 2018].

The Changing Faces of Catholicism

5

Western Europe, where the old theory of secularization seems to still be applicable […] The other exception is much less ambiguous: there is an international subculture of people who have received Western style higher education, particularly in humanities and social sciences, which is actually secularized. berger, 2001: 24–26

Grace Davie, based on surveys from 1986 and 1990 by the evssg (European Values Systems Study Group), proposes as a general trend in Europe the progressive weakening of religious practice, institutional membership, and acceptance of traditional religious beliefs. However, she then adds that the clearest difference occurring within Europe is the separation of the Catholic countries in the South which are more religious (with the exception of France), from the Protestant countries in the North which are less religious (with the exception of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland) (Davie, 2001: 108–109). This means that while there is discernible secularization in both regions, it began earlier and is now stronger in the North than in the South (with the aforementioned exceptions). Catholic countries in southern Europe have formed a zone of greater ­resistance to religious and political modernization, with both dimensions being broadly connected (Pérez-Agote, dir. 2012). Furthermore, analysis of countries in this area has led to some interesting theoretical formulations: religious culture (Hervieu-Léger 2003), implicit religion (Nesti 1990), religious ground base (Bellah 1980), and diffused religion (Cipriani 1989). The case of France is unique: in classifications, it is sometimes included with countries having a Catholic tradition (Davie 1996), while in others it is considered as a uniquely secular country par excellence (Stoetzel, 1983). Table 1 shows some very interesting aspects of the comparison between the Catholic countries of southern Europe: Spain, France, Italy, and Portugal. The 1999 figures lead us to distinguish two different situations. In France, the number of Catholics is 53% of the total population, that of people without religious affiliation around 42%, and the total of other religious affiliations reaches 5%. The other countries—Spain, Italy, and Portugal—have a different and fairly homogeneous situation: the percentage of Catholics exceeds 80%, those who do not have religious affiliation represent 11% to 18% of the total, and the percentage of people belonging to another religion is very low. Between 1999 and 2008, there were some noticeable changes. In France, the percentage of people declaring “no affiliation” increased in parallel with the decline in Catholic membership. In Spain, the sharp drop in Catholic ­affiliation coincided with the strong growth of the other two categories. This is the consequence of the interaction of two different processes. On one hand,

6

Lefebvre and Pérez-Agote

Table 1

Religious affiliation by country: 1999 and 2008

A B Catholic affiliation Other affiliations % % Year Spain France Italy Portugal

C No affiliation %

%

1999

2008

1999

2008

1999

2008

1999

2008

81 53 81 86

58 45 80 83

1 5 1 3

18 6 1 4

18 42 18 11

24 49 19 13

100 100 100 100

100 100 100 100

Source: (Pérez-Agote, dir. 2012: 253). Data taken from the European Values Study, 1999–2000 and 2008 (www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu) [accessed 11 February 2018].

the arrival of large contingents of immigrant population weighs in favour of an increase in non-Catholic religious affiliations, but the existence of Latin American immigration actually favours Catholic affiliation (Pérez-Agote and Santiago 2009). On the other hand, there is a process of rapid individual secularization of the indigenous population: since the 1990s, the percentage of young people who define themselves as atheists, indifferent, or agnostic is increasing significantly. By 2008, Spain had begun to resemble the French model, and only Portugal and Italy maintained a rate of Catholic membership equal to or greater than 80%. If we consider diversity in terms of the opposition between membership and non-membership [A + B vs. C on Table 0.1], we find that the process of declining religious affiliation is much more advanced in France than in Spain, Italy, and Portugal, although the four countries are moving in the same direction. However, as just stated, the Spanish situation is quickly approaching that of France. With regard to the diversity of specific religious affiliation [B vs. A on Table 1] in these countries of Catholic tradition, France is also distinguished from Italy and Portugal by the presence of more religious minorities. The case of Spain is particularly interesting here, the dual process that we have just described having led this country to have, in 2008, the highest percentage of nonCatholic religious affiliations (Pérez-Agote, dir. 2012: 254; Pérez-Agote 2012: Chapter 4). What about the Americas? The Pew Research Center offers recent useful synthetic portrayals, supported by quantitative studies that show significant changing trends. First, in the United States, immigrants and children

The Changing Faces of Catholicism

7

of ­immigrants make up a strong portion of American Catholics today, who are mostly Hispanic. Also, there has been a geographical shift of the overall American Catholic population. Although Catholics are still concentrated in the Northeast (26%; general adult population 18%), their number in this area decreased 3% between 2007 and 2015, while it increased by 3% in the South and West (Lipka 2015). As well, according to the same study, Catholics are aging, their median age being 49 years old, in comparison with nonChristian faiths (40) and the “religious nones” (36). Even though the number of Catholics is more stable in the United States than in Canada, immigrants are changing the landscape in both countries, but even more so in Canada where non-Christian groups are rising more rapidly. Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Eastern Orthodox Christianity are growing and have collectively represented more than 10% of the population since 2011. In the United States, minority religions constituted only 6% of the population in 2012. Moreover, the Pew Research Center dug into the 2011 official decennial ­Canadian general statistics and found that “the number of Canadians with no religious affiliation has been rising (from 4% in 1981 to 24% in 2011), and attendance at religious services has been dropping”(Pew Research Center 2013). While Christians still compose a large part of the Canadian population (two thirds), the number of self-identified Catholics “has dropped from 47% to 39% over the last four decades, while the share that identifies as Protestant has fallen even more steeply, from 41% to 27%” (Ibid.). Religious attendance is also stronger in the United States than in Canada, but the generational factor related to the “religious nones” is central in both countries, with younger people being less religious. Furthermore, in order to avoid framing immigrants as “religious” people, we should not forget that 20% of Canadian foreignborn adults in 2011, and 10% of American foreign-born adults in 2012, had no ­religion. These are mostly from East Asia, notably China. Nevertheless, religious immigrants are attending religious services in a greater proportion than the native population. The strong relationship between ethnicity and Christianity has several paradoxical effects (Bramadat and Seljak 2008; Meunier 2011). The transformation in Latin America is even more spectacular. Home to almost 40% of the worldwide Catholic population, namely 425 million, this vast region is distinguished by the fact that it has experienced a significant decrease in the number of Catholics. Some have joined evangelical churches and others have become members of non-religious groups, and both of these categories are growing (Pew Research Center 2014). During the 20th century, approximately 90% of the residents were Catholic, as opposed to 69% currently.

8

Lefebvre and Pérez-Agote

1.2 Approaches to Diverse Situations As shown in the general picture we have just seen, under the influence of secularism, along with the individualization and pluralization of beliefs, Catholicism throughout the world has experienced significant changes, as has Christianity in general and the entire religious scene (Béraud et al. 2012; Beyer and Beaman 2006; Beyer 2007; Bowen 2004; Inglehart 2004; Pérez-Agote dir. 2012; Thériault 2007). In discussions about secularism and diversity, there are still unresolved questions regarding the way culture, heritage, and religion intersect or differentiate, as pertaining to the political regulation of diversity (Fornerod 2015; Lefebvre et al. 2015, 2017; Voyé 2006). Religious identities are transforming themselves in complex ways, while affiliations are becoming more fluid, intermittent or partial, situating themselves more in a cultural category (Dillon and Wink 2007; Hervieu-Léger 2000, 2001b, 2017; Marienberg 2015). The Church’s internal mechanisms are seeking out new pathways and adopting innovative strategies (Béraud 2007; Brémont d’Ars 2015; Hervieu-Léger 2017). Recently, social and ethnographic anthropology has been studying contemporary practices of Catholicism, taking a fresh look at this religion and its diverse forms of devotional practice. This has particularly been inspired by the very influential approach of sociologist Meredith McGuire (2008), who was preceded by Hall (1997). The concept of “lived religion” has been introducing new research perspectives on the fluidity of contemporary religious practices, based on a reshaping of ideas about tradition, religious identity and hybridity (Bloomer 2017; Giordan and Swatos 2011; Kaell 2017; Norget et al. 2017; ­Whinfrey-Koepping 2008). Issues related to life, sexuality, and gender are giving rise to debates and controversies that have enormous impact in the media, in the sphere of legislation, and among the general public (Bethmont and Gross 2017; Béraud and Portier 2015; Dobbelaere and Pérez-Agote 2015; Rayside 2011). Transnational networks, religious competition, and religious mobility are creating new forms of popular religion and Catholic movements. In a few countries, some forms of revival such as Charismatic renewal and World Youth Day are taking place at the same time as other institutional mechanisms are declining. Several studies are crisscrossed by this fascinating paradox of both the decline and the resistance or persistence of religion in several societies of the world. The contradiction results from the growth of religious options and religious privatization, as well as intense disputes between modernized societies and Catholicism’s sexual doctrine, which have served as a catalyst to mobilize both some fringe Catholic groups and the hierarchy. Analyses of the cultural dimensions of personal, collective, and national identity constitute a very complex field of recent religious studies, where Roman Catholicism comes

The Changing Faces of Catholicism

9

across as a religion particularly involved in cultural claims, reaffirmations and reinvestments (Benedict xvi 2005; Ronchi 2011). Recent approaches have tried to explain the phenomena of reinvestment and of progressive disconnection between inherited Catholic religion and culture. These reaffirmations are connected to intense debates about, secularism, laïcité and state neutrality, and one of the outcomes is the loss of traditional hegemonic state support of religion, especially in Catholic countries. The pluralization of society is increasing, and along with it the coexistence of populations coming from several different cultures and religions amid migratory waves from all regions of the world, which has been increasing in receiving countries since the 1970s. One of the conclusions arising from the wide consultation conducted in 2012 by the Roman Catholic Church of all the dioceses in the world, before the synod about the New Evangelization, is that the global character of the difficulties encountered by Roman Catholicism is clear, as we can see below. The Catholic Faith in the world



“The same phenomenon is taking place in both the North and South and the East and West; in both countries with an age-old Christian tradition and countries which have been evangelized within the last few centuries. The coalescing of social and cultural factors—conventionally designated by the term ‘globalization’—has initiated a process which is weakening traditions and institutions and thereby rapidly eroding both social and cultural ties as well as their ability to communicate values and provide answers to perennial questions regarding life’s meaning and the truth. The result is a significant fragmentation of cultural unity and a culture’s inability to hold fast to the faith and live the values inspired by it. The effects of such a negative environment on experiencing the faith and on the various forms of ecclesial life are generally described in the same manner in all the responses, namely, a weakening of faith in Christian communities, a diminished regard for the authority of the magisterium, an individualistic approach to belonging to the Church, a decline in religious practice and a disengagement in transmitting the faith to new generations. These effects, found in almost every bishops’ conference response, indicate that the whole Church cannot overlook this cultural climate”. Source: Synod 2012: par. 47–48

This volume addresses issues related to responses, strategies, and resistance efforts which are trying to counter this decline, including: the charismatic

10

Lefebvre and Pérez-Agote

­ ovement which is following in the footsteps of the success of evangelical m revival; the cultural affirmation of Christianity in the political arena; the cultural expansion of Catholic identity; the transformation of Catholic education which, in a pluralist context, is becoming a forum for intercultural and interreligious dialogue; the negotiation of the decline of powerful Catholic organisations still present in the culture; the adaptation of monastic missions; and the dissemination to the general public of literature that is spiritually progressive and that falls within inter-spiritual or interreligious trends. As literature about Catholicism in certain contexts substantially expands, there remains a need for current qualitative and quantitative data in specific national contexts via a comparative perspective. 2

Contents of this Volume

This volume offers excellent contributions divided into four sections. The first section explores the links between Catholic symbols, popular religion and space, and national identities. Jean-François Laniel’s article examines case studies about the now-controversial political and legal issue of designating as religious or cultural a practice, symbol, or building. From recent debates on prayer in Quebec (Canada), to Nativity scenes (crèches) in French town halls and the Lautsi case of crosses in Italian schools, “the Christian roots of the West” are challenging (and being challenged by) secularity in times of cultural and religious pluralism. The author contends that Catholicism has acquired in Quebec, France and Italy a status of “cultural Catholicism”, which is now being questioned by “strict” and “open” conceptions of laïcité, with synchronic processes of cultural publicization and religious privatization. Alejandro G. Emiliano Flores, Ramiro Gómez-Arzápalo Dorantes and Jesús Antonio Serrano Sánchez scrutinize the situation in Mexico. From a theoretical standpoint, they draw a distinction between religious affiliation and religious beliefs. By applying principal component analysis to the Religious Cultures in Mexico City Survey and the National Youth Values Survey, they have found evidence that young people in Mexico City are changing affiliation or disaffiliating from churches, but are not losing their beliefs. They actually self-manage their beliefs and practices, creating a new kind of popular religion. Looking at the Fatima Shrine, Helena Vilaça analyses it as a demonstration of the multidimensional presence of Catholicism in Portuguese society—in religion, culture, tourism, and even politics. She looks at the Fatima phenomenon as being indicative of the importance of religion in the public sphere— particularly considering that Portugal is a secular state—and as a lens through

The Changing Faces of Catholicism

11

which we can study the ambiguous relationship between the Portuguese State and the Catholic Church. To do this, she conducted a documentary analysis of material related to Fatima—publications, pilgrimage statistics, and press and web articles mostly written in 2017, the centenary of the apparitions. The last article in this section is by Tricia C. Bruce, who holds that changes to the religious landscape of the United States raise new questions about the flexibility, resilience, and dimensions of Catholic identity. Following a cultural turn in the study of religion internationally, she explores “cultural Catholic” and “cultural Catholicism” as categorical tools to better describe the endurance and liminality of contemporary American Catholicism. Cultural Catholics do not self-identify as Catholic, but nonetheless think of themselves as Catholic in some way. Enduring connections to Catholic practice, culture, tradition, heritage, ethnicity, and more give way to an expansion of Catholic identity in the United States. In the second section, attention turns to strategies that specific countries have taken to counteract the secularization crisis in Catholicism. Canada, a Christian country with a majority of Catholics, can be considered to be in progressive religious decline. The response from the Roman Catholic Church to this reality, explains Paul Gareau, has been to focus on the New Evangelization as a means of religious revitalization. His article looks at a case study of an annual Catholic youth revitalization conference called Journey to the Father. There, young people are engaged in charismatic religiosity and talks in order to proselytize the value of a Catholic evangelical identity. Far from being a “culture war”, the initiative involves a deployment of a minority identity politics from the adult organizers, and the article explores how the young participants negotiate this fluid, religious identity structure in their everyday lives. Valérie Aubourg examines an example of the strong influence of evangelical Christianity, specifically the case of evangelical megachurches as a unique and successful type of Christianity. In France, in the city of Lyon, the parish of Sainte Blandine is directly inspired by these xxl churches. It is very interesting to see how this Catholic parish has imitated elements characteristic of the evangelical Saddleback Valley Community Church in California. On the assumption that it is not a simple transplantation of an exogenous model, the author discusses five specific differences between Sainte Blandine and other evangelical megachurches. This ethnological study reveals how Catholicism in crisis is transforming itself and developing remobilization strategies. Also reflecting on a certain form of revival, Andrea Althoff and Jakob Egeris Thorsen introduce the Catholic Charismatic movement and emphasize its transnational dimensions in North, Central, and South America. They examine countries that have experienced an extraordinary growth in Catholic

12

Lefebvre and Pérez-Agote

­ harismatic Christianity, namely Brazil and Colombia, as well as the country C that has been a prime exporter of Latino Charismatics to the United States, Mexico. Furthermore, the authors portray the interface between migration and religion, and the tensions between the largest Catholic lay movement in Latin America and institutionalized Catholicism. Finally, they describe regional and cultural variations between Charismatic Catholicism and popular religion. Based on empirical research they are carrying out, Liliane Voyé and Karel Dobbelaere present and compare two Belgian Catholic communities that have something important in common: both highlight the inadequacies of the Belgian Catholic hierarchy. One of them carries out its activity in the Flemish area and the other in the French-speaking area. They are two communities whose members have quite similar social characteristics, in terms of gender, age and social, and cultural level. In both communities, there is a critical feeling toward the official Church because of its hierarchical functioning, its centralism, and its distance in relation to the problems of contemporary society. The authors hypothesize that there is an underlying deception with respect to the promises made by the Second Vatican Council. The third section of this volume reveals some of the overall strategies of the Catholic Church as a whole, and of the Vatican centre in particular, to address problems of the global era. Andrew P. Lynch, recalling that Vatican ii called for greater dialogue between Catholicism and other world religions, shows that although this was achieved on a number of fronts, interreligious dialogue is sometimes subject to misunderstandings. His paper examines the work of two Catholic spiritual writers, the American monk Thomas Merton, and the Indian Jesuit priest Anthony de Mello, who both sought to enhance dialogue with Eastern religious traditions. These forays by Catholic writers into other religions were not without some degree of controversy. The article discusses interreligious dialogue and several writers who have attempted to understand the impact of secularism on religious diversity. Looking at the well-known global event and biennial meeting World Youth Day (wyd) which is one of the world’s largest mass religions celebrations involving youth, Sławomir Mandes and Wojciech Sadłoń look at how the scale of wyd celebrations helps to go beyond confessional boundaries. Their article explores wyd from a sociological perspective, looking at its organizational aspects, historical background, and institutional origins. Official data, research conducted during the wyd in Cracow in 2016, and previous research on wyd are presented. The nature of wyd is characterized, including the profiles of its participants, reception, and impact. The authors capture the role of wyd from the perspective of the institution of the Catholic Church. Reminding us how concepts from theology and political philosophy often inform the sociology of religion, Graham P. McDonough argues that Pope

The Changing Faces of Catholicism

13

­Francis’s 2013 exhortation Evangelii Gaudium shifts normative Catholic conceptualizations of interculturalism and dialogue away from past (and even current) Catholic-centred salvation talk, and instead towards social teaching on justice and peace for all. He shows how the Pope goes about this task, arguing that since the trend has not prompted any mass exodus of non-Catholics and non-Christians from Catholic schooling, Evangelii Gaudium in fact reflects Catholic magisterial teaching aligning itself with the intercultural and plural reality already present in Catholic schools. The final section reflects on change in specific Catholic institutions. In nearly every country, points out Kevin Ahern, Catholics have established educational, medical, and charitable structures serving millions of people. In many places, particularly in Europe and the Americas, these institutions are facing an identity crisis in the face of demographic changes and the rise of pluralism. How Catholic institutions navigate these challenges over the coming decades will have a substantial impact on the communities they serve, and on the Church as a whole. The author explores Catholic institutional identity by analysing the identity questions and adaptation strategies facing institutions sponsored by the Society of Jesus (Jesuits), the Lasallian Brothers, and the Sisters of Mercy, especially in the United States. Barbora Spalová and Isabelle Jonveaux discuss monastic orders, comparing contemporary monastic life in the Czech Republic and in Austria through the lens of economy. This last article in the volume seeks to understand the different models of monastic economy, considering the history of each country, especially with the reestablishment of monastic life in the Czech Republic after communism and the hereditament of Joseph ii’s policies in Austria. In particular, the authors develop the concept of the economy of stability, emphasizing some particularities of monastic economy based on monastic spirituality. There is a dimension of sustainable development, which can result in new plausibility for monasteries in society. References Bellah, Robert. 1980. “The Five Religions of Modern Italy”. In Robert Bellah and P ­ hillip E. Hammond (eds.) Varieties of Civil Religion. San Francisco: Harper and Row: 86–118. Benedict, XVI. 2005. General Audience, Wednesday, 27 April 2005. https://w2.vatican.va/ content/benedict-xvi/en/audiences/2005/documents/hf_ben-xvi_aud_20050427 .html [accessed 13 January 2018]. Béraud, Céline. 2007. Prêtres, diacres, laïcs : Révolution silencieuse dans le catholicisme français. Préface de Danièle Hervieu-Léger. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.

14

Lefebvre and Pérez-Agote

Béraud, Céline, and Philippe Portier. 2015. Métamorphoses catholiques : Acteurs, enjeux et mobilisation depuis le mariage pour tous. Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme. Béraud, Céline, Frédéric Gugelot, and Isabelle Saint-Martin (dir.). 2012. Catholicisme en tensions [Catholicism under Stress], Paris: Éditions de l’EHESS. Berger, Peter L. 2001. “La désécularisation du monde : un point de vue global” . In Peter L. Berger (ed.) Le Réenchantement du monde. Paris: Bayard: 13–36. Berger, Peter L. 1992. A Far Glory: The Quest for Faith in an Age of Credulity. New York: Doubleday. Berger, Peter L. 1967. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York: Doubleday. Berger, Peter L., Grace Davie, and Effie Fokas. 2008. Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations. Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate. Bethmont, Rémy, and Martine Gross (dirs.). 2017. Homosexualité et traditions monothéistes : Vers la fin d’un antagonisme ? Geneva: Labor et fides. Beyer, Peter. 2006. Religions in Global Society. London: Routledge. Beyer, Peter and Lori G. Beaman. 2007. Religion, Globalization and Culture. Leiden: Brill Academic Press. Bloomer, Kristin C. 2017. Possessed by the Virgin: Hinduism, Roman Catholicism, and Marian Possession in South India. New York: Oxford University Press. Bowen, Kurt. 2004. Christians in a Secular World: The Canadian Experience. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Bramadat, Paul, and David Seljak (eds.). 2008. Christianity and Ethnicity in Canada. ­Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Brémond d’Ars, N. d. 2015. La liturgie catholique : Quarante ans de pratiques en France. Préface de Danièle Hervieu-Léger. Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes. Cipriani, Roberto. 1989. “‘Diffused religion’ and new values in Italy”. In James A. ­Beckford and Thomas Luckmann (eds.) The Changing Face of Religion. London: Sage: 24–48. Davie, Grace. 2001. “Europe: l’exception qui confirme la règle”. In Peter L. Berger (ed.) Le Réenchantement du monde. Paris: Bayard: 99–128. Davie, Grace. 1996. “Contrastes dans l’héritage religieux de l’Europe”. In Grace Davie and Danièle Hervieu-Léger (eds.) Identités religieuses en Europe. Paris: La Découverte: 43–62. Dillon, Michele, and Paul Wink. 2007. In the Course of a Lifetime: Tracing Religious Belief, Practice, and Change. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press. Dobbelaere, Karel, and Alfonso Pérez-Agote (eds.). 2015. The Intimate Polity and the Catholic Church Laws about Life, Death and the Family in So-called Catholic Countries. Leuven: University Press. Fornerod, Anne (ed.). 2015. Funding Religious Heritage [Cultural Diversity and Law in Association with RELIGARE]. Farnham, England/Burlington, USA: Ashgate.

The Changing Faces of Catholicism

15

Giordan, Giuseppe, and William H. Swatos Jr. (eds.). 2011. Religion, Spirituality and Everyday Practice. Dordrecht/New York: Springer. Hall, David D. 1997. Lived Religion in America: Toward a History of Practice. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Heath-Brown, Nick (2015) “Vatican City State”. In: N. Heath-Brown (ed.) The Statesman’s Yearbook 2016. London: Palgrave Macmillan: 1455–1456. Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 2017. Le temps des moines : clôture et hospitalité. Paris: PUF. Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 2003 Catholicisme, la fin d’un monde. Paris: Bayard. Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 2000. Religion as a Chain of Memory. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 2001a. “Faut-il continuer à débattre de la ‘sécularisation’ ?” In: 1st Meeting of Eurosecularity Project, working paper, Berlin. Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 2001b. Le pèlerin et le converti : La religion en mouvement. Paris: Flammarion. Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 1996. “La religion des européens: Modernité, religion, sécularisation”. In Grace Davie and Danièle Hervieu-Léger (eds.) Identités religieuses en Europe. Paris: La Découverte: 9–25. Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2004. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kaell, Hillary (ed.). 2017. Everyday Sacred: Religion in Contemporary Quebec. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Kasper, Walter. 2001. “On the Church”, America: 184, et The Tablet: 255, 2001. Lefebvre, Solange. 2006. “Conflicting interpretations of the Council: The RatzingerKasper Debate”, in Erik Borgman, Maureen Junker-Kenny et Janet Martin Soskice (eds), Concilium: The New Pontificate. A Time for Change?, 2006/1: 95–105. Lefebvre, Solange, and Patrice Brodeur (eds.). 2017. Public Commissions on Cultural and Religious Diversity: Analysis, Reception and Challenges. UK: Routledge. Lefebvre, Solange, Céline Béraud, and E.-Martin Meunier (dir.). 2015. Catholicisme et culture : Regards croisés Québec-France [Catholicism and Cultures: Quebec-France Converging Views]. Montreal: Presses de l’Université Laval/Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes. Lipka, Michael. 2015. “A Closer Look at Catholic America”: Pew Research Center. Religion and Public Life. 14 September 2015. Marienberg, E. 2015. Catholicism Today: An Introduction to the Contemporary Catholic Church. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. Martin, D. 1996. “Remise en question de la théorie de la sécularisation”. In Grace Davie and Danièle Hervieu-Léger (eds.) Identités religieuses en Europe. Paris: La Découverte: 25–42. McDonnell, Kilian. 2002. “The Ratzinger/Kasper Debate: The Universal Church and Local Churches”: Theological Studies, 63/2, June: 227–250.

16

Lefebvre and Pérez-Agote

McGuire, Meredith B. 2008. Lived religion. Faith and Practice in Everyday Life. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Meunier, Martin (ed.). 2011. Recherches sociographiques : Catholicisme et laïcité au Québec, 52/3. Nesti, Arnaldo. 1990. Implicit religion: The Issues and Dynamics of a Phenomenon. Social Compass 37(4): 423–438. Norget, Kristin, Valentina Napolitano, and Maya Mayblin (eds.). 2017. The Anthropology of Catholicism: A Reader. Oakland, California: University of California Press. Pérez-Agote, Alfonso. 2014. “The notion of secularization: Drawing the boundaries of its contemporary scientific validity”, Current Sociology, October 2014: 886–904. Pérez-Agote, Alfonso. 2012. Cambio religioso en España: los avatares de la secularización. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Pérez-Agote, Alfonso (dir.), 2012. Portraits du catholicisme. Une comparaison européenne. Rennes : Presses universitaires de Rennes. Pérez-Agote, Alfonso, and José Santiago. 2009. La nueva pluralidad religiosa, Madrid: Ministerio de Justicia. Pew Research Center. 2012. The Global Religious Landscape. A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Major Religious Groups as of 2010, December 2012: http:// assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2014/01/global-religion-full. pdf [Accessed 14 February 2018]. Pew Research Center. 2013. “Canada’s Changing Religious Landscape”: Pew Research Center. Religion and Public Life. 27 June 2013. Pew Research Center. 2014. “Religion in Latin America. Widespread Change in a Historically Catholic Region”. Pew Research Center. Religion and Public Life. 13 November 2014. Ratzinger, Joseph. 2000. “On the Relation of the Universal Church and the Local Church in Vatican II”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 December 2000. Ratzinger, Joseph. “A Response to Walter Kasper: The Local Church and the Universal Church”: America 185, 19 November 2001: 7–11. Rayside, David M. (ed.). 2011. Faith, Politics, and Sexual Diversity in Canada and the U ­ nited States. Vancouver: UBC Press. Ronchi, Paolo. 2011. “Crucifixes, Margin of Appreciation and Consensus: The Grand Chamber Ruling in Lautsi v Italy”. Ecclesiastical Law Society, no. 13: 287–297. Senèze, Nicolas. 2017. “Pope Francis moves to develop a more decentralized church”: La Croix international, September 13, 2017. https://international.la-croix.com/news/ pope-francis-moves-to-develop-a-more-decentralized-church/5884 [Accessed 15 February 2018]. Smith, Christian. 1991. The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social Movement Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

The Changing Faces of Catholicism

17

Stoetzel, Jean. 1983. Les Valeurs du temps présent : une enquête européenne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Synod of Bishops. 2012. “XIII Ordinary General Assembly. The New Evangelization for the Transmission of the Christian Faith” . Instrumentum Laboris. Vatican City. Thériault, Barbara. 2007. “Religious Instruction in East Germany: Living in a ‘Secular World’.” Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe, 22(1): 351–373. Voyé, Lilianne. 2006. “Religion et politique en Europe”. Religion et politique dans les sociétés contemporaines : revue Sociologie et sociétés, Vol. XXXVIII (1): 139–163. Whinfrey-Koepping, E. 2008. Food, Friends and Funerals: On Lived Religion. Berlin: LIT Verlag.

Part 1 Catholicism in Both Catholic and Pluralistic Societies

∵

Chapter 1

Religion and National Identity in Catholic Societies: The Quarrel between Religion and Culture Jean-François Laniel 1

“Do Catholic societies really exist?”1

In the context of growing religious and cultural pluralism, what happens to public markers of Christianity in Western societies? From recent debates on prayer in Quebec’s municipalities and the crucifix in Quebec’s National Assembly, to the controversial Nativity scenes (crèches) in French town halls and the Lautsi case regarding crosses in Italian public schools, the “Christian roots of the West” are being brought to the public’s attention, challenging (and being challenged by) secularity in times of cultural and religious pluralism. However, if this new pluralism affects all Western societies, does it affect all of them similarly? Are there elements of debate on secularity in a pluralist context that are specific to societies of predominantly Catholic tradition? Is there such a thing as “Catholic societies”, asks Rodney Stark? This article will attempt to answer these questions by combining studies on multiple secularization and secularity patterns with studies on “cultural religion”, or “cultural Catholicism” (Laniel 2016, Lemieux 1990, Charron 1996, Meunier and Laniel 2012). More precisely, this article will study the quarrel between religion and culture, namely the now-controversial political and legal issue of designating as religious or cultural a practice, symbol or building.2 The legality of their public display depends on this designation. Judicial cases on the matter hence offer * This chapter has been translated from French to English by Cayman Rock. 1 Stark 1992. 2 We will not attempt a priori to define what religion and culture are. It is actually the national and historico-religious debates around their definitions that we seek to discuss. Distinct historical and theological contexts each define “truly” religious according to their own criteria. What religion and religiosity are lies at the centre of debates and conflicts; they vary in intensity over the course of one’s life, and their borders are drawn according to the institutional religious actors, both believers and unbelievers. As such, it could be said that a “strictly” cultural practice (of religious origin) is measured by its distance to the meaning ascribed to it by a religious institution and a religious tradition—and by their faithful adherents. A religion acculturates, inculturates and exculturates itself.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004380073_003

22

Laniel

exceptional insight into the questions raised by religious pluralism in predominantly Christian societies. Thus, this article will focus less on religious pluralism per se, and more on the issues it raises in traditionally Catholic-dominant societies—and how these issues help us to better understand these societies. Specifically, we will argue that much like societies with a predominant Protestant denomination (Finland, Sweden, Norway, etc.), Catholicism frequently acquired—in nations where it is dominant and especially in nations with a “weak state”—a status of “cultural religion”, where Christian faith suffuses the collective identity. Cultural religion is a phenomenon “by which religion affords a sense of personal identity and continuity with the past even after participation in ritual and belief have lapsed” (Demerath 2000: 127). Thus, “beyond the secularization of institutions and the emancipation of consciences from religion, there [would be] a bedrock of Catholic culture, which has, for a long time, deeply touched the collective identity, even for those who practice the least”3 (Hervieu-Léger 2003: 94–95). Cultural religion therefore designates contemporary uses of Christianity as a source of ethical values, cultural identity, and rites of passages; regardless of faith, religious practice, and adherence to dogma. In Italy, Portugal, Quebec, Poland, Spain, and even France, “cultural religion” is more specifically “cultural Catholicism”, for it is a specific Christian faith that colours the collective identity and culture. However, unlike Protestant countries, Catholic societies tend to experience a secularist tradition of strict distinction and separation between religious and public spheres, as well as a republican unitary conception of the nation. Political modernity’s original encounter with Catholicism, formed of radical conflict and mimetism, would thus explain laïcité, typical of societies of Catholic tradition (Martin 1979, ­Zylbergberg 1995). It created “a Latin-Catholic ethos fascinated with a common project or an ideal of unity”, distinct from individual particularisms, and distinct from “an Anglo-Protestant pluralist ethos” (Lefebvre 2012: 80)—an ideal of freedom from belief distinct from the ideal of freedom to believe (Berger et al. 2008) that could also be seen in the Catholic quarrel between religion and culture. Hence, much like laïcité’s distinction between private and public spheres, we will suggest an original distinction between religion and culture, with processes of cultural publicization and religious privatization in societies of dominant Catholic tradition. With that in mind, we will present three examples of the tug-of-war between religion and culture in Catholic settings: the case of prayer in the Saguenay (Quebec) city hall; the case of crosses in Italian public schools, and the case 3 All French citations have been translated into English by the author.

Religion and National Identity in Catholic Societies

23

of Nativity scenes in French councils of Provence. We will then see how the question of the legitimacy of Catholic public symbols was defined, structured and resolved, and observe the lessons offered by these clashes on the evolution of contemporary debates on religion. Moving on from our case studies, we will then raise four questions. What is the historico-religious explanation for such a cultural conception of Catholicism? What are the Catholic Church’s reactions to this debate, and the dilemmas it poses for its evangelical mission, between exculturation and neo-evangelization? What, in brief, does it say about Catholic societies? In conclusion, what does the quarrel of religion and culture say about the status of religion and national identity in so-called “postsecular” and “postdurkhemian” societies? 2

Mouvement laïque Québécois (mlq) v. (The City of) Saguenay—“The Prayer Affair”

In 2006, Alain Simoneau, an avowed atheist living in the city of Saguenay, submitted a complaint to the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la Jeunesse [Commission for Human and Youth Rights], with the support of the Mouvement laïque québécois [Québécois Secularist Movement ]or mlq, for being subject to two distinct discriminations. Firstly, for being compelled to participate in the opening prayer to Saguenay city council meetings, which invoked the help of God to guide the council’s hand, and secondly, for the presence of a crucifix and a statue of Mary of the Sacred Heart in some of the rooms where the meetings were held. Mr. Simoneau called for an end to the “religious ritual” and the removal of these Catholic symbols. Three experts were called upon for the case, tasked with determining whether prayer and Catholic symbols are religious or cultural,4 so as to identify whether there had in fact been religious discrimination—and, if so, its extent. That year, the Tribunal of Human Rights was the first to hear the case. It found that Mr. Simoneau was indeed subject to discrimination: his freedom of conscience as a non-believer was infringed, undermining state neutrality. Further, it found that prayer in the city of Saguenay was in fact a “ritual”, for taking place in a setting of common thought, wherein some are potentially excluded, but more specifically a religious ritual for invoking God (of a specific monotheistic religion). With that in mind, three contextual elements were cited: the mayor, Jean Tremblay, began the prayer by crossing himself and i­nvoking 4 For an account of the experience, see Lefebvre 2016. Several articles on this case may be found in [coll.] 2011.

24

Laniel

the Holy Trinity; he placed his political work under the guidance of his Catholic faith; finally, the crucifix and the statue of Mary of the Sacred Heart invoke symbols of Catholicism and orient the prayer. Both the prayer and the symbols must thus be removed. In 2011, the city made an appeal and the Quebec Court of Appeals agreed to hear the case. This time, the discrimination suffered by Mr. Simoneau was judged to be superficial. He was not being obligated to participate in the prayer, and could withdraw himself for its duration. The court found that the symbols and rituals, if they are imbued with religious meanings, are nonetheless first and foremost cultural and patrimonial: prayer is a historical custom in the city, and Christian symbols are part of Quebec’s cultural heritage: If the history of Quebec’s society, including its symbolic references, must not present an obstacle to schools of thought different from those that were originally in play, its patrimonial existence can nevertheless not be ignored without running the risk of cutting itself off from its roots. The Court found that the province of Quebec cannot ignore “its duty in relation to the preservation of [national] history” any more than “the manifestations which were once intimately tied to religious dogmas which have since become secularized”. The court thus struck a balance between the right to freedom of conscience and the “common good, which the state must defend and safeguard, including its cultural heritage” (Saguenay 2013). The Court of Appeals reversed the Tribunal’s judgement in its entirety, allowing prayer and religious symbols to remain as they were.5 In 2013, it was the mlq and Mr. Simoneau who made an appeal. Two years later the Supreme Court of Canada resolved the debate by splitting it. The Supreme Court concluded that municipal prayer is indeed a religious ritual. While the court conceded that it can in fact be a theist prayer catering to all religious faiths, which the court nonetheless doubted as the reference to Christianity seems explicit, this does not negate the fact that Mr. Simoneau’s atheist liberty of conscience was assaulted, which takes precedence. Responding to the Court of Appeal’s ruling, the Supreme Court took pains to note that if “the state’s duty of neutrality does not demand that we cease to celebrate and preserve our religious patrimony […] that does not allow it to instrumentalize

5 It is worth mentioning that the Court of Appeals referred itself to the Lautsi case, which will be discussed in the following section.

Religion and National Identity in Catholic Societies

25

a discriminatory practice to religious ends” (Mouvement 2015). In fact, even though the Supreme Court banned municipal prayer, it refused to comment on the presence of crucifixes and the Mary of the Sacred Heart statue, which can thus remain in place. In this case, the presence of an openly militant mayor, incessantly invoking his faith and apostolic vocation, and the judgement of a tribunal specializing in matters of discrimination all seemingly benefitted the mlq, by favouring the religious designation of prayer. Many protests were nonetheless made in municipalities across Canada, fearful of a jurisprudential domino effect, as prayers are observed in council meetings in many Canadian towns. 3

Lautsi v. Italy—“The Crucifix Affair”6

A similar court case took place in Italy, on an even greater scale. Twentytwo member states of the European Convention on Human Rights, several ­churches (Annicchino 2011), as well as the Italian state, argued in favour of the legitimacy of Christian symbols in the public sphere, in a case which took place in the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights. In April 2011, Mrs. Soile Lautsi asked for the removal of a cross in a classroom where her two children studied. For some, “the aim of the Italian free-thought organizations acting under the guise of Mrs. Lautsi was to use the European Court to reach a political result that had an impact broad enough to exceed the original legal scope of the application” (Puppinck 2012: 876). After a vote, the school council refused to acquiesce to the request. In the name of laicità and the neutrality of the public administration (Article 97 of the Italian Constitution), Mrs. Lautsi contested the decision before the regional administrative Tribunal of Veneto as violating Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In addition, she asked that the Italian Constitutional Court weigh on the constitutionality of two royal decrees that require the presence of crosses in Italian public schools—a request refused in 2004. In 2005, the Tribunal of Veneto handed down a ruling: standing as a symbol of history, culture and Italian culture, the cross embodies and transmits, despite or rather thanks to its religious roots, Italian values of tolerance and pluralism, that it historically ­fostered and promoted—hence the cross is a “symbol of laicità”.

6 For the most part, we reference the account of Ronchi 2011 and the synthetic analysis of ­Puppinck 2012.

26

Laniel

This ­ruling was confirmed in 2006 by the administrative Supreme Court (Consiglio di Stato).7 It was at this point that the court case broke onto the European scene. The “cultural” nature of the cross had already been evoked before Italian tribunals. It would be even more so on the European level, in light of the contrast between the “essentially religious” (or not) nature of the cross, and that as a “powerful” or “passive” symbol. In 2005, the Second Section of the European Court of Human Rights agreed with Mrs. Lautsi, ruling that the cross and the law making its display obligatory in Italian schools impinge on the right to an education for one’s children in accordance with one’s religious and philosophical convictions as well as their freedom of conscience. For the Second Section: … it was impossible not to notice the cross, whose religious meaning is necessarily predominant, on the wall of each classroom. As such they considered it formed an integral part of the school environment and that it might be perceived as a ‘powerful’ religious symbol, namely ‘a sign that is immediately visible to others and provides a clear indication that the person concerned belongs to a particular religion’. ronchi 2011: 292

According to Christian Joppke, “Lautsi 2009 [Lautsi i] was a veritably ‘countermajoritarian’ European court decision, celebrated by liberal jurists for taking ‘minority rights seriously’”. (2013: 605) Indeed, for the Italian prime minister, “[t]his decision is not acceptable for us Italians. It is one of those decisions that make us doubt Europe’s common sense” (cited in Mancini 2010: 6–7). In a way, it is this “situated sense” (de Been 2011) that the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights rehabilitated in 2011. In a 15–2 vote, it ­reversed the Second Section’s decision. Many reasons were offered (Ronchi 2011: 293–295): (a) respect for the convictions of parents cuts both ways, and 7 Specifically, the Consiglio di Stato finds that: … the reference, via the crucifix, to the religious origin of these values and their full correspondence with Christian teachings accordingly makes plain the transcendent sources of the values concerned, without calling into question, rather indeed confirming the autonomy of the temporal power vis-à-vis the spiritual power (but not their opposition, implicit in an ideological interpretation of secularism which has no equivalent in the Constitution), and without taking anything away from their particular ‘secular’ nature, adapted to the cultural context specific to the fundamental order of the Italian State and manifested by it. Those values are therefore experienced in civil society autonomously (and not contradictorily) in relation to religious society, so that they may be endorsed ‘secularly’ by all, irrespective of adhesion to the creed which inspired and defended them. (Con. Stato, 13 April 2016, no. 556, cited in Puppinck 2012: 881)

Religion and National Identity in Catholic Societies

27

schools are meant to foster shared values; (b) the crucifix does not meet the criteria of a “strong” religious symbol, as opposed to the Muslim veil, and does not evoke proselytism; (c) in this sense, the Grand Chamber applies the same designation to the crucifix as does the Italian state, that of being an “essentially passive” symbol; (d) in fact, no mandatory Catholic (catechism) ­teaching ­accompanies the presence of the crucifix in schools; (e) finally, the Grand Chamber concedes a “national margin of appreciation” to member states of the European Convention on Human Rights, following the principle of subsidiarity, a fortiori, since the sense given to religious neutrality is not the same from one state to another. There is no European “consensus” on the matter. If, for some, this cultural characterization of the crucifix constitutes “confessional secularism”, that is to say “secularism compatible with privileges to Christianity” (Mancini cited in Joppke 2013: 607), for others “the demotion of ‘religion’ to the status of ‘culture’ plays on the fact that there is a difference in kind between separating state and religion—which is the touchstone of liberalism—and separating state and culture” (Joppke 2013: 606). “Religious symbols cannot be correctly understood if one ignores the cultural context”, notably “the social dimension of religion” and “the religious dimension of culture”. This is what the Italian state argued, by inviting the European High Court to take into consideration that “the religious dimension of culture should allow, under some conditions, for the recognition of the legitimate interests that a society may have in preserving its culture, language, national heritage, and socio-religious dimension” (Puppinck 2012: 908, 916, 918). 4

The Vendée et al. Case—“The Nativity Affair”

In December 2014, the administrative tribunal of La Roche-sur-Yon sided with the 2012 plea made by the local branch of the Fédération nationale de la libre pensée [National Federation for Free Thought]. This plea asked that Christmas Nativity scenes be removed from the hall of the Vendée general council. The judge found that the Nativity is a “religious emblem” incompatible with the principle of “public service neutrality” (Gorce 2014). The Vendée general council appealed the decision in the Nantes administrative Court of Appeals, arguing that “respect for laïcité does not necessitate the abandonment of all our traditions and the severing of our cultural roots” (cited in Gorce). This triggered a “Nativity scenes war” (Gomez 2014) which rages on today (afp 2017). A few days later, the Vendée battle was echoed in Béziers, where the mayoralty refused to take down a Nativity scene, as well as in Melun (Seine-et-Marne), also sued by the National Federation for Free Thought:

28

Laniel

The debate pits the tenets of respect for the imperative of state neutrality against those who, depending on the case, defend either the Christian roots of France, or a less minute approach to laïcité, taking into account the cultural dimension of certain religious practices. gomez 2014

While, for some, Nativity scenes are imbued with cultural and universal values which go beyond their religious beginnings, this is not the case for others, who criticize an “imposture” and “amalgamation to justify the unjustifiable”.8 A landmark case, Article 28 of the Loi du 9 décembre 1905, became the subject of a debate on judicial interpretation.9 Sitting in chambers, the Montpellier administrative tribunal found, unlike in La Roche-sur-Yon, that “there is no urgency to give a verdict as to the presence of Nativity scenes in the Béziers city hall” (S.N. 2014). The Montpellier administrative tribunal noted “the absence of particular circumstances which could have resulted” from the Nativity scene, “notably public order issues”, considering that the breach “of the principles of public service laïcité and neutrality” cannot be proven (S.N. 2014). Yet another decision was rendered by the Melun administrative tribunal which, against the advice of the public rapporteur, found that the Nativity scene can stay in the city hall. In October 2015, this decision was reversed by the Paris Court of Appeals, which forbids the installation of Nativity scenes in the Melun city hall: “[its] object is to represent the birth of Christ during the season when Christians celebrate this birth, [and] must be seen as having the character of a religious emblem”. (S.N. 2015c) ­Virtually simultaneously, the Nantes administrative Court of Appeals, to which the Vendée case was sent, itself reversed the previous judgement. The Court did the same to the Roche-sur-Yon administrative tribunal’s ruling, finding that the Nativity scene “[is installed] in the context of a tradition relating to preparations for the Christian family holiday and does not have the gravity […] of a religious emblem”, pointing out its “small size, non-ostentation and the presence of other religious elements” (S.N. 2015c). In November 2015, following on the heels of this decision, the Association des maires de France [the Association of French Mayors] or amf published a handbook advising mayors to “abstain from installing Nativity scenes, for they are not compatible with laïcité”. (S.N. 2015b) According to André Laignel, the 8 In favour: Simon 2014; Picq 2014. Against: Pena-Ruiz 2014. 9 According to this, it is forbidden “to post or set up any religious sign or emblem on any public monuments, with the exception of faith-specific buildings, cemeteries, and funeral monuments as well as museums and exhibits”. (Cited in Pena-Ruiz 2014).

Religion and National Identity in Catholic Societies

29

amf’s first socialist vice-president, “laïcité is part of our Constitution and we offer but recommendations to mayors, while administrative courts have given contradictory verdicts on the matter” (S.N. 2015a). In fact, the Vendée and Melun cases would be sent to the State Council. According to the rapporteur: “unlike a ‘crucifix’, a Nativity scene is a ‘mixed’ object, which cannot be reduced to its religious dimension and whose cultural dimension, furthermore, cannot be denied”. He proposed criteria so as to judge the religious or cultural character of these objects, “the objectionable, or not, character of [its] installation”: by noting the “temporary” character of the installation, in a “festive season tied to the celebration of Christmas”; by noting that it is not tainted by any “form of religious proselytism”; and finally by being assured of its character as a “more or less festive manifestation” and thus its insertion in the “local history and in the public space” (S.N. 2016). The State Council agreed with this line of argument in November 2016. According to its judgment, the Nativity scene is not necessarily a religious emblem: “a Nativity scene is a representation subject to a plurality of meanings”. It certainly has a “religious character”, for it illustrates “a scene which is part of Christian iconography”. But it is “also an element part and party to the decorations and illustrations which traditionally accompany, without a particular religious significance, festivals of the winter solstice”. Nativity scenes in institutional public spaces should first and foremost be considered illegal unless they have a “cultural, artistic or festive character”, which four criteria will determine: “the context of an installation, its particular conditions, its existence or lack of local usage and finally the location chosen for the Nativity scene’s installation”. (cited in Chambraud 2016) The State Council reversed the Paris Court of Appeal’s ban, thus permitting the installation of Nativity scenes in Melun, and reversed the Nantes Court of Appeal’s ban, this time because the criteria set out by the judge were not the State Council’s. (Chambraud 2016). 5

(Press) Pause

Put side by side, these three cases allow the development of at least five ­hypotheses. Let us first note the structuring character of the tug-of-war between religious and cultural. It is precisely this question which the tribunals addressed and which experts were called to weigh in upon, in order to ­determine whether or not religious discrimination occurred. Thus, what is an appropriate criterion for “religious”? The sincerity of the plaintiff’s feeling? The ­municipality’s ­application of its symbols? The Church’s application of the symbols? The ­original meaning of its symbols, rites, and practices?

30

Laniel

Their place in history and the collective memory? The relationship it has with the majority of the population? Answers to these questions are not obvious, as shown by the discordant verdicts and rulings, but the distinction between religion and culture is now recognized by courts and experts.10 Nonetheless, we must note the novel character of these court cases on laïcité rights. As much in Italy as in Quebec and France, these cases had to climb to the highest courts, and even to the supranational level in the case of Quebec (the Supreme Court of Canada) and Italy (European Grand Chamber). A precedent was established, which provides, in the Italian case and most especially in the French case, judicially determined criteria as to what d­ istinguishes religious from cultural. Tribunals define the distinction between religious and ­cultural, and seem to favour hierarchical readings over dichotomic ones. Prayer, crucifixes, and Nativity scenes are varyingly judged to be either ­“mostly” cultural or “mostly” religious—not solely one or the other. More broadly, this ­suggests less a novel “resacralization” or “instrumentalization” of religious symbols, than a dynamic of “revisibilization” of Christian symbols, whose status, opened to public debate and judicial process, have now been “recognized” as having (or being endowed with) cultural or religious status.11 Equally, this highlights the centripetal dynamic of laïcistes’ claims, whether they convey so-called strict or open conceptions of laïcité—or, in the latter case, “State neutrality”. For both conceptions, the public sphere neutrality ­argument was used to claw back Christian symbols in the name of an undue “religious privilege” conferred to a particular denomination, counter to the equality of all religions before the law. It is, however, the “strict” laïciste party (against the presence of religion in the public sphere), typical of “Latin” societies, which has taken on judicial activism, while (supranational human rights) tribunals seem to have favoured the “open” interpretation of laïcité (for the equal presence of religious consciences in the public sphere), with converging results. In that, the political and judicial debate on the tug-of-war between 10

11

We thus prefer the distinction between religion and culture, rather than that between religion and patrimony, religion and folklore, or religion and heritage, for five main reasons : (a) this distinction belongs to a long sociological tradition, rich in works and varied opinions; (b) it lends itself to the secular language of contemporary politicians and tribunals; (c) it equally lends itself to the language used by the Catholic Church, prime actor in these debates over the distinction between culture and faith; (d) it unites more than it divides sociology of culture and sociology of religion, by conferring to each their own objects; and (e) it includes the above-mentioned distinctions into a wider field. We prefer the expression “revisibilized” to expressions which, in a form or another, infer a recent “nationalization” of hitherto “purely” religious (or simply lacking status) symbols, sometimes with a pejorative connotation, with a judgement on the sincerity and “true” meaning of symbols: i.e. “resacralized”, “patrimonalised”, “instrumentalized”, etc.

Religion and National Identity in Catholic Societies

31

religious and cultural seems to concern less the conflict between “majorities” and “minorities” (often taking place within the “majority”) than a (judicially centripetal) debate between “open” or “strict” laïcistes. This suggests, by way of the Saguenay case which made its way to the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Lautsi case that went to the European Grand Chamber, inter-normative divergences between judicial orders, which are likely to exist between national and supranational judges. National judges are sensitive to contextual definitions of religion and state neutrality, whereas supranational judges tend to defend liberal—individualist—conceptions of religion and state neutrality. In other words, universalistic Canadian and Europeanist conceptions of religion tend to differ from national conceptions of religion and historically elaborated judicial traditions.12 Recently, this supranational dynamic has been limited in Europe by the Lautsi case, acting as a test case within a union of nation states, which considers a “margin of national appreciation” in matters of laïcité, in light of multiple paths of secularization and laïcisation. In fact, it seems significant that the tug-of-war between cultural and religious occurs differently in these three societies, regardless of similarities, underlining multiple secularity patterns (Burchardt et al. 2015). They concern the recitation of a municipal prayer in the Québécois case, the presence of a cross in public schools in the Italian case and of Nativity scenes in French town halls. In these three cases, the religio-cultural geography of Catholic symbols differs: crucifixes and prayers have been absent in France’s public sphere since the 19th century; crucifixes have been absent from Quebecois schools since 2000. All of the above are still present in Italy. This more explicitly shows that laïcisation is actualized differently, by way of divergent paths of secularization and nation-state building. Starting with the French Revolution, the French “statenation” was established to be representative of the French nation, throwing off Catholic Church rule, unifying a population under a common and centralized neutral state (Gauchet 1998: 69); in the same period, the Italian “nation-state” made Catholicism the matrix of its national identity so as to unify a politically divided territory (Ferrari, 2010); while the Quebecois status of nationwithout-sovereign-state between 1840 and 1960 made the Catholic Church a

12

A finding which agrees with a “sociology of laïcité” where it is understood that principles of law are carried by actors and institutions, rather than simply by processes, evolutions, essences, which place one on guard against all teleological readings of “convergence”: that of a principle of law “which comes to life” through History. On this topic, see Grammond 2009 and Lavoie 2016. For a descriptive and critical examination, see Koenig 2006, Katzenstein, 2006, and Spohn 2009.

32

Laniel

“Church-nation”,13 long-since criticized for its presumed inability to g­ uarantee the ­integral and optimal burgeoning of the Québécois nation (GrzymalaBusse 2015), resulting in a love-hate relationship with Catholicism, marked by a ­cultural ­Catholicism straddling the French and Italian cases. For this reason, the national role played by Catholicism would have spawned the very values of tolerance and laïcité that are seen to have fused with Catholic culture in Italy; strict separation between church and state applies rigid restrictive criteria to the cultural designation of Catholicism in France; the national role played by Catholicism is called patrimonial by the Quebec Court of Appeals, but its municipal prayer is said to be religious (and hence forbidden) by the Supreme Court of Canada, and by the Tribunal of Human Rights, in part due to an Anglo-Protestant liberal tradition14 which places first the (religious) subjectivity of the plaintiff. But in all three cases, a strict distinction between religion and culture was evoked, in Catholic countries with variously important laicist traditions—or strict separation between Church and State. 6

Cultural Catholicism: Secularization as Acculturation

With the rise of the quarrel between religion and culture, an important issue remains: the sociohistorical understanding of the cultural—culturalized—­ relationships of occidental populations to Christianity and Catholicism. If strict separation of religion and culture, of the private and the public spheres, may be more prevalent in Latin-­Catholic societies, what about ­cultural Catholicism? In 1974 Michel de Certeau noted in Christianisme ­éclaté that “religious and faith behaviours are becoming undone”, that “the elements of the [religious] system are unravelling” and that the borders between s­ ocial and religious are becoming blurred: “objective Christianity is becoming folklore […] detached from faith to become tied to culture” (de Certeau and D ­ omenach 1974). By that, he suggested that Christian heritage is progressively opening to multiple borrowings and appropriations, notably its “aesthetization”, its “emblemization”, its “folklorization”, and even its “patrimonization”. De Certeau thus parallels François-Albert Isambert’s thesis of Catholic “­internal secularization” brought about by the Second Vatican Council, where Catholicism 13 14

Laniel 2015. For a broader theorization, see Turcotte 2012. Something could be said about the role of “personalism”, or left-wing Catholicism, popular in Quebec at the time of the Second Vatican Council, the Quiet Revolution and the 1982 re-foundation of Canada as a charter-citizen country. See also Sullivan, 2005 and Beaman 2003.

Religion and National Identity in Catholic Societies

33

made a leap of faith: appropriating the language of the modern world, so as to find itself among the “signs of the times” (Isambert 1976). This Catholic “internal secularization”, similar to Françoise Champion’s “hollowing” of Protestantism (Champion 1993), more broadly evokes the thesis of secularization as acculturation to the world, originally seen as re-­ inculturation, as “new Christianity” (Roy 2012). Among other things, the Second Vatican Council placed liberty of conscience at the very heart of the Church, at once endorsing plurality of belief and the relaxing of rules surrounding the practice of Catholic rituals, judged to be less important than the interiority of faith.15 The Second Vatican Council equally reconfigured the Church’s role within society—henceforth at the service of the collective, all while refusing to play an auxiliary role to the state. This is what Gilles Routhier called the Catholic Church’s “citizenship leap of faith”, no longer seeking to build, under its remit, a “sub-society”, but to accompany the progress of the Québécois people (Routhier 2009) in light of a globally “personalist” ethic (Meunier 2007). In each case, Catholicism has acculturated itself to modern society. It has thus made its symbols and values available to many forms of borrowing—i.e. cultural, personalized, and collectivized. Thus, we see in many Catholic (and Occidental) countries, for the past few decades, a muting of indicators of religious vitality, with on one hand, a drop in regular religious practice and observance of Catholic dogma and, on the other, a persistence in declared affiliation to Catholicism as well as the practice of its rites of passage.16 7

Cultural Catholicism: The Church’s Exculturation and Neo-Evangelization

It is this cultural Catholicism phenomenon which the Catholic Church has observed since the 1990s. Since then, it is fearful of a progressive culturization, which would paradoxically favour Catholicism’s exculturation, since the Church no longer informs and directs Catholicism’s popular meaning and usages. In an era of “neo-evangelization” (Barreau 2012), such a cultural Catholicism seems less and less desired or even tolerated by the Church. On the

15 16

See especially Grenier 2005 and Grenier 2008. For Quebec, see especially the instructive witness accounts compiled by Colette Moreux (1969 and 1982), as well as an article she wrote (1978). See recent statistics from Bréchon 2013.

34

Laniel

contrary, traditionally Catholic countries are henceforth seen as new “mission lands”, ripe for a new wave of evangelization. This can be found in Annoncer l’Évangile dans la culture actuelle au Québec, published by the Assemblée des évêques catholiques du Québec [Assembly of Quebec Catholic Bishops]: We perhaps took for granted that in Quebec the first wave of Evangelization was fact—once and for all. The persistence of requests for baptism for small children, in a hard-to-measure proportion, a sustained demand for moral and religious education in public schools and an incontestable support in favour of confessional schools were quick to give us reassurance. Nonetheless, these seemingly reassuring facts perhaps do not reflect reality as a whole. Assembly 1999

Put otherwise, certain markers of Catholic affiliation would have masked a more profound secularization. This can be found in the text submitted by the bishops of Quebec to Benedict xvi during their 2006 ad limina visit to Rome: “this project is rooted firstly in the acute crisis of conscience of the greater break between culture and faith”. (Ibid. 2006) Culturization (or secularization by acculturation) would asphyxiate religion, without it being inevitable or fatal, if correctly manoeuvred by the Church. In fact, Gaston Piétri saw in the conservation and evoking of the religious sense of Catholic rituals and symbols one of the great challenges for the ­Catholic Church; or at least, a challenge to prevent secular culture from appropriating them entirely (2010). It could even be an opportunity for “new evangelization”, since popular Catholicism could be Catholicism’s “flickering flame” (Assembly 2006: 32). Christian symbols would thus possess (for the Church) a pedagogical efficiency, a way to make Catholic meaning understandable, because they would still be imbued with religiosity. As such, in Italy, and even in Quebec,17 the Church invites the population to “recall its [individual and collective] baptism”. In Italy, the Catholic Church speaks of its “cultural project” which, on the basis of a Catholic national identity, seeks to recall (and not simply “instrumentalize”) the normative content of the symbols to which Italians

17

The brief filed in 2007 to the Bouchard-Taylor Commission by Cardinal Marc Ouellet, Archbishop of Quebec and Primate of Canada, asked the question: “Quebec, what have you done with your baptism?” See also Assembly 1999 and Assembly 2006, which echoes the new evangelization project.

Religion and National Identity in Catholic Societies

35

are attached and seek to conserve its institutional and symbolic pre-eminence in a pluralizing Italy (Garelli 2013). Also, the Catholic Church’s “cultural project” specifically seeks to avoid Catholicism belonging only to a “small remnant”, that of intransigent Catholics; but on the contrary, desires that it continue to inform predominantly Catholic societies in a privileged manner, within the internal diversity which permits the Troelschian sociological form of the “Church”. Equally, we notice a return to power of the Catholic Church’s anthropological concerns, which causes it to speak up on a number of bio-ethical debates, as well as on the relationships between men and women (Dobbelaere and Pérez-Agote 2015). In each of these circumstances, the Church refuses to limit itself to the sociological form of a “Protestant” denomination; it seeks to have an effect on global society and on the national culture and “culture of birth” of traditionally Catholic countries, and to shape their laws by referring to Christian anthropology. 8

Catholic Societies: The Catholic Quarrel between Religion and Culture

To summarize, the tug-of-war between religion and culture is perhaps more present in traditionally Catholic societies, at least in societies of cultural religion, where a Christian faith has profoundly marked the national culture and institutions. Due to the Church’s historically monopolistic status, Catholic patrimony would naturally be tied to the nation’s history, and could once more make its entrance into the public sphere since Catholic symbols and dogma were partially acculturated during the Second Vatican Council: Catholic patrimony would thus firstly be cultural, then religious, even while keeping pace (if not fusing) with secular humanist values. Such a dynamic would nevertheless not eliminate the view of religion and Catholicism generally held by nominal Catholics (that of an authoritarian, intransigent Church at odds with the conduct of the ordinary world), and would thusty spawn a struggle for freedom from belief. Such strict laïcité in a Catholic context, which recalls the war of two Frances, two Italies, two Quebecs, contrasts with freedom’s struggle for belief, typical of secularity in a Protestant context, intermingling secular and religious. This could equally evoke two distinct endgames for laïcité and secularization—a Taylorian logic of individual authenticity in Protestant countries, and a Gauchetian view of individual and collective autonomy in Catholic countries (Gauchet 2014, Thiebaut 1997).

36

Laniel

We can then ask ourselves if the distinction between public and private, dear to Catholic societies, but also between the individual and the collective, isn’t a cypher for the distinction between cultural and religious, where culture only may be displayed publicly. A similar struggle might, for all that, be rather absent in a Protestant context, where religion is supposed to naturally and intrinsically be part of a person’s identity and by extension their cultural identity. Thus, religion wouldn’t be considered a potential political problem, being historically tied to the freedom to believe.18 The love-hate relationship would, for its part, characterize traditionally Catholic countries, where the “love” side of the coin would recall subscription to Catholic culture, selectively possible since Vatican’s Second Council, and the “hate” side would reflect an intransigent Church, to which strict laïcité would seem like a historically and collectively appropriate remedy. That said, for many sociologists, Catholic countries’ secularizing and laïcisation trek produces a new discriminatory dynamic. Religious-versus-culture categorizations would be instrumentalized by the majority group so as to mask and legitimize its own symbols’ pre-eminence in public institutions (Mancini 2009 and 2010, Beaman 2012). The majority would speak of its symbols in cultural terms and those of the minority in religious terms, justifying their exclusion from the public sphere in the name of religious neutrality. However, if it seems undeniable that Christian symbols are regaining national value in many countries, nationalist parties don’t have the monopoly of said patrimonalization. What is in play, in light of the multiple conceptions of secularity, is much more than an “instrumentalization” of Catholic symbols by the nationalist majority: the religion/culture distinction finds empirical and sociohistoric (theological) roots, that are even enshrined in law. It testifies more deeply to nationally varied modalities of Christianity’s cultural impregnation, as well as different paths of secularization, laïcisation and nation-state building (Burchardt et al. 2015). In our view, the re-visibilization of Catholic symbols conveys much more than a reaction to contemporary religious pluralism, and even more than a strategic opposition between majority and minor-

18

In countries with a pluridenominational Protestant tradition, such as Canada and the United States, the State pulls away from any particular denomination (but not from religion as a national good), so as to allow every creed and denomination freedom of expression. In countries with a unidenominational Protestant tradition, individual religious freedom often parallels the State’s aligning itself to a particular “liberal” denomination.

Religion and National Identity in Catholic Societies

37

ity parties. It is rather an affirmation of culturally inspired and largely shared symbols and values.19 9

Conclusion—Catholicism in “postsecular” and “post-Durkhemian” Theories

In conclusion, it seems pertinent to emphasize certain limits to post-secularist and post-Durkheimian theories.20 Globalization and liberal Europeanization have not eliminated national and confessional frames in matters of religions and laïcité. Rather, the quarrel between religion and culture might have contributed to revisibilize and consecrate them, at least in traditionally Catholic societies, whose models are irreducible to liberal and (Anglo-) Protestant conceptions of “open” secularity. We also note the persistence of a religious “Church” form for Catholicism, again not reducible to a Protestant “post-­Durkhemian” “denomination”.21 Indeed, a majority of Occidental Catholics come to the Church from birth and Catholicism still serves to integrate the collective personality and marks important moments of individual and collective life (Jakelic 2010). Furthermore, the Catholic Church does not seem to have renounced a privileged societal status for having been a historic church, nor has it renounced the fostering of its view of “common good”. Far from the expected post-secularism, “laïciste” parties common in Catholic societies, of the “Latin secularization pattern”, seem to have regained vigour, notably by integrating the pluralist argument of the equality of religions before the law. Whether favourable to “open” laïcité, or “strict” laïcité, to (equal) freedom to believe or freedom from belief, the symbols of majoritarian Catholicism are called upon by the new laïcistes to disappear from the public sphere. “Do Catholic societies really exist?” If, as Rodney Stark noted, Catholic societies seem to exist in three paradoxical and limited forms, either as seldom practiced but claimed by the majority (Italy), vigorously practiced if only claimed by a minority (France), and rarely in societies where it is both practiced and claimed by the majority (Poland), it is not certain that these arith19 20 21

On this topic, see the penetrating book by Weiller 2007, which influenced the arguments presented by the Italian state in the Lautsi case. See the landmark works by Charles Taylor, Jurgen Habermas, José Casanova and JeanMarc Ferry. For a well-informed critical reading, see Beckford 2012. See Alessandro Ferrari’s work on the conceptions of liberty of conscience in Catholic, Protestant and Islamic settings; see also Miliopoulos 2016.

38

Laniel

metic criteria provide a sufficient accounting of “Catholic societies”. It may, perhaps be necessary to more broadly consider Catholicism’s long cultural impregnation, which reaches into political and national culture—which more than ever, frames the public debate. References AFP. 2017. “Crèche à la mairie de Béziers: interdiction demandée en appel”. Le Monde, 22 March 2017: 11. Annichino, Pasquale. 2011. “Winning the Battle by Losing the War: the Lautsi Case and the Holy Alliance between American Conservative Evangelicals, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican to Reshape European Identity”. Religion and Human Rights, no. 6: 231–239. Assembly of Quebec Catholic Bishops. 2006. Bâtir l’Église de Dieu qui est au Québec. La visite ad limina des évêques du Québec. Montreal: Fides. Assembly of Quebec Catholic Bishops. 1999. Annoncer l’Évangile dans la culture actuelle au Québec. Montreal: Fides. Barreau, Jean-Marc. 2012. Systématisation du contenu théologique de l’expression “nouvelle évangélisation” à la lumière de la théologie pastorale de Jean-Paul II. Doctoral thesis, Faculty of Theology and the Science of Religions, Université de Montréal. Beaman, Lori G. 2012. “Battles over symbols: the ‘religion’ of the minority versus the ‘culture’ of the majority”. Journal of Law and Religion, vol. 28, no. 1: 67–104. Beaman, Lori G. 2003. “The Myth of Pluralism, Diversity, and Vigor: The Constitutional Privilege of Protestantism in the United States and Canada”. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, vol. 42, no. 3: 311–325. Beckford, James A. 2012. “Public Religions and the Postsecular: Critical Reflections”. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, vol. 51, no. 1: 1–19. Berger, Peter, Grace Davie, and Effie Fokas. 2008. Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations. Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate. Bréchon, Pierre. 2013. “La religiosité en Europe de l’Ouest. Évolution depuis 30 ans”. Futuribles, no. 395. Burchardt, Marian, Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, and Matthias Middel (eds.). 2015. Multiple Secularities Beyond the West. Religion and Modernity in the Global Age. Boston/­ Berlin/Munich: De Gruyer. De Certeau, Michel and Jean-Marie Domenach. 1974. Le christianisme éclaté, Paris: Éditions du Seuil: 11–18.

Religion and National Identity in Catholic Societies

39

Chambraud, Cécile. 2016. “Le Conseil d’État autorise sous condition les crèches de Noël dans les lieux publics”. Le Monde, 11 November 2016: 16. Champion, Françoise. 1993. “Les rapports Église-État dans les pays européens de tradition protestante et de tradition catholique: essai d’analyse”. Social Compass, vol. 40, no. 4: 589–609. Charron, André. 1996. “Catholicisme culturel et identité chrétienne”. In B. Caulier (ed.) Religion, sécularisation, modernité. Les expériences francophones en Amérique du Nord. Quebec: Presses de l’Université Laval: 157–190. [COLL.] 2011. “La prière dans les assemblées municipales”. Éthique publique. Revue internationale d’éthique sociétale et gouvernementale, vol. 13, no. 2. De Been, Wouter. 2011. “Lautsi: A Case of ‘Metaphysical Madness’?”. Religion and Human Rights, no. 6: 231–235. Demerath, N.J. 2000. “The rise of ‘cultural religion’ in European Christianity: Learning from Poland, Northern Ireland, and Sweden”. Social Compass, vol. 47, no. 1: 127–139. Dobbelaere, Karel and Alfonso Pérez-Agote (eds.). 2015. The Intimate. Polity and the Catholic Church. Leuven: Leuven University Press. Ferrari, Alessandro. 2010. “Civil Religion in Italy: A ‘Mission Impossible’?”. The George Washington International Law Review, vol. 41, no. 4: 839–859. Garelli, Franco. 2013. “Catholiques, politique et culture. Le cas italien”. Social Compass, vol. 60, no. 3: 332–347. Gauchet, Marcel. 2014. “Le désenchantement désenchanté”. In Sylvie Taussig (dir.), Charles Taylor. Religion et sécularisation. Paris: CNRS Éditions: 73–82. Gauchet, Marcel. 1998. La religion dans la démocratie. Parcours de la laïcité. Paris: Gallimard. Gomez, Marianne. 2014. “Bataille rangée autour des crèches de Noël”. La Croix, 8 ­December 2014: 10–11. Gorce, Bernard. 2014. “Le conseil général de Vendée doit renoncer à sa crèche de Noël”. La Croix, 3 December 2014: 6. Grammond, Sébastien. 2009. “Conceptions canadienne et québécoise des droits fondamentaux et de la religion: convergence ou conflit ?” Revue juridique Thémis, vol. 43, no. 1: 83–108. Grenier, Philippe. 2008. “Genèse de la laïcité et prohibition du prosélytisme”. Transversalités, no. 108: 21–37. Grenier, Philippe. 2005. “Activités d’évangélisation de l’Église catholique et prosélytismes”. L’année canonique, vol. 47: 119–144. Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2015. Nations Under God. How Churches use Moral Authority to Influence Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 2003. Catholicisme, la fin d’un monde. Paris: Bayard.

40

Laniel

Isambert, François-André. 1976. “La sécularisation interne du christianisme”. Revue française de sociologie, vol. 17, no. 4: 573–589. Jakelic, Slavica. 2010. Collectivistic Religions. Religion, Choice, and Identity in Late Modernity. Abingdon/New York: Routledge. Joppke, Christian. 2013. “A Christian identity for the liberal state?” The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 64, no. 4: 597–616. Katzenstein, Peter J. 2006. “Multiple modernities as limits to secular Europeanization?” In Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (dirs.), Religion in an Expanding ­Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press: 1–33. Koenig, Matthias. 2006. “Europeanizing the Governance of Religious Diversity: An Institutionalist Account of Muslim Struggles for Public Recognition”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 33, no. 6: 911–932. Laniel, Jean-François. 2016. “What ‘Cultural Religion’ says about Secularization and National Identity: A Neglected Religio-Political Configuration”. Social Compass. International Review of Sociology of Religion, vol. 63, no. 3: 372–388. Laniel, Jean-François. 2015. “L’Église-nation canadienne-française au siècle des nationalités: regard croisé sur l’ultramontanisme et le nationalisme”. Études d’histoire religieuse, vol. 81, nos. 1 and 2: 15–37. Lavoie, Bertrand. 2016. “La tension sociojuridique entre laïcité et multiculturalisme : le bijuridisme comme clé de compréhension des débats québécois sur le rapport entre le droit et la religion”. Recherches sociographiques, vol. 57, nos. 2 and 3: 13–33. Lefebvre, Solange. 2016. “The Prayer Case Saga in Canada: An ‘Expert Insider’ Perspective on Praying in the Political and Public Arenas”. In Benjamin L. Berger and Richard Moon (eds.), Religion and the Exercise of Public Authority. Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing: 111–125. Lefebvre, Solange. 2012. “Effets de la diversité religieuse sur le catholicisme francophone canadien”. In Céline Béraud, Frédéric Gugelot and Isabelle Saint-Martin (eds.), Catholicisme en tensions. Paris: Éditions EHESS. Lemieux, Raymond. 1990. “Le catholicisme québécois: Une question de culture”. Sociologie et sociétés, vol. 22, no. 2: 145–164. Mancini, Susanna. 2010. “The Crucifix Rage: Supranational Constitutionalism Bumps Against the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty”. European Constitutional Law Review, no. 6: 6–27. Mancini, Susanna. 2009. “The power of symbols and symbols of power: secularism and religion as guarantors of cultural convergence”. Cardozo Law Review, vol. 30, no. 6: 2629–2668. Martin, David. 1979. A General Theory of Secularization. New York: Harper and Row Publishers.

Religion and National Identity in Catholic Societies

41

Meunier, E.-Martin. 2007. Le pari personnaliste: modernité et catholicisme au XXe siècle. Montreal: Fides. Meunier, E.-Martin and Jean-François Laniel. 2012. “Congrès eucharistique international 2008. Nation et catholicisme culturel au Québec: Signification d’une recomposition religio-politique”. Sciences religieuses/Studies in Religion, vol. 41, no. 4: 595–617. Miliopoulos, Lazaros. 2016. “The Christian Churches between European and National Identities. Europeanisation via Constitutional Law?”. In John Carter Wood (ed.), Christianity and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Europe. Conflict, Community, and the Social Order. Gottingen/Bristol: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: 189–208. Moreux, Colette. 1982. Douceville en Québec. La modernisation d’une tradition. Montreal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal. Moreux, Colette. 1978. “Idéologies religieuses et pouvoir : l’exemple du catholicisme québécois”. Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, vol. 64: 35–62. Moreux, Colette. 1969. Fin d’une religion. Monographie d’une paroisse canadienne-­ française. Montreal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal. Mouvement laïque québécois c. Saguenay (Ville). 2015. Jugements de la Cour suprême, CSC 16, no. 35496, 15 April 2015: 5. Pena-Ruiz, Henri. 2014. “Les crèches de Noël n’ont pas leur place dans les édifices officiels”. Le Monde, 26 December 2014: 16. Picq, Jean PICQ. 2014. “En débat. Les crèches ont-elles leur place dans l’espace public?”, La Croix, 13 December 2014: 13. Piétri, Gaston. 2010. “Cultures et religions. Les nouveaux enjeux”. Études, tome 413: 643–654. Puppinck, Grégor. 2012. “The Case of Lautsi v. Italy: A Synthesis”. Brigham Young University Law Review, vol. 2012, no. 3: 873–930. Ronchi, Paolo. 2011. “Crucifixes, Margin of Appreciation and Consensus: The Grand Chamber Ruling in Lautsi v Italiy”. Ecclesiastical Law Society, no. 13: 287–297. Routhier, Gilles. 2009. “Le pari d’un catholicisme citoyen”. Sciences religieuses/Studies in Religion, vol. 38, no. 1: 113–134. Roy, Martin. 2012. Une réforme dans la fidélité. La revue Maintenant (1962–1974) et la “mise à jour” du catholicisme québécois. Quebec: Presses de l’Université Laval. Saguenay (Ville de) c. Mouvement laïque québécois. 2013. Cour d’appel, QCCA 936, no. 200-09-007328-112 (150-53-000016-081), 27 May 2013: 8, 12, 14–15, 21, 23, 31. Simony, Hippolyte. 2014. “À propos des crèches, qui peut définir qu’un objet est ‘religieux’ ?”. La Croix, 9 December 2014: 23. [S.N.] 2016. “Les crèches pourraient avoir droit de cité dans les mairies”, La Croix, 24 October 2016: 13.

42

Laniel

[S.N.] 2015a. “Polémique sur les crèches de Noël dans les mairies”. Le Monde, 27 ­November 2015: 9. [S.N.] 2015b. “Réactions après les préconisations de l’A MF sur les crèches de Noël”. La Croix, 26 November 2015: 14. [S.N.] 2015c. “Une crèche de Noël autorisée en Vendée, une autre interdite en Seine-etMarne”. La Croix, 15 October 2015: 8. [S.N.] 2014. “La justice rejette la demande d’enlever la crèche de Béziers”. La Croix, 22 December 2014: 9. Spohn, Willfried. 2009. “Europeanization, Religion and Collective Identities in an Enlarging Europe. A Multiple Modernities Perspective”. European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 12, no. 3. Stark, Rodney. 1992. “Do Catholic societies really exist?” Rationality and Society, vol. 4, no. 3: 261–271. Sullivan, Winnifred. 2005. The Impossibility of Religious Freedom. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Thiebaut, Carlos. 1997. “The logic of autonomy and the logic of authenticity. A twotiered conception of moral subjectivity”. Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 23, no. 3: 93–108. Turcotte, Paul-André. 2012. “The national Church as a historical form of Church-type. Elements of a configurative theorization”. Social Compass, vol. 59, no. 4: 525–538. Weiller, Joseph H.H. 2007. L’Europe chrétienne? Une excursion. Paris: Éditions du Cerf. Zylbergberg, Jacques. 1995. “Laïcité, connais-pas: Allemagne, Canada, États-Unis, Royaume-Uni”. Pouvoirs, no. 75: 37–52.

Chapter 2

Popular Religiosity and Value Changes in Mexico City Youth Jesús Antonio Serrano Sánchez, Ramiro Gómez-Arzápalo and Alejandro Gabriel Emiliano Flores A group of researchers from the Urban Pastoral Master’s Degree at the Universidad Católica Lumen Gentium have undertaken a study of the beliefs of youth and popular religious expression in the wider context of urban religious expression. The relative disaffection of youth from religion is documented, and the hypothesis of this study is that youth have not lost their sense of religion, but that it has become part of a mode that we call the urban popular sense of religion. This new sense combines some traditional values and some new ones. This document explains this phenomenon. In each society, epoch and culture, religion plays a clearly defined social function. The specific social function of religion allows us to understand how the intense practice of popular religion has developed, and has become considered as the foundation of belief. It shows us the meaning that religion offers to the lives of its followers, and as a consequence, it reveals the identity of both individuals and communities. The religious values present in the culture, as well as the culture itself, contribute to mold the religious values in a mutual relation of preservation and change (Aufhebung). 1

Theoretical Framework

Malinowski (1936: 2) considered that religion possesses, among its functions, the possibility of giving cultural and personal meaning to life, especially in relation to crisis and uncertain events. He strongly associated religion with the human fate: “we must always bear in mind the relation between faith and human life, the desires, the difficulties and the hopes of human beings”. The existential is that which goes beyond material needs. A large part of these needs find their expression in religion. For the believer, material needs acquire, or find meaning in the religious, which offers meaning to life, security and the expectation of a better future. Religion allows a person to look toward the future. It does not provide complete answers to a person’s ­existential © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004380073_004

44

Sánchez, Gómez-Arzápalo and Flores

c­ oncerns, but it does respond to anguish, the fundamental questions, and the frustration of the person who does not find a satisfactory solution in the rational or material areas of life (Rokeach 1973). Religion is an inevitable and constant aspect of culture and personal identity. It creates the interpellation that results in a clear opinion. This is not restricted to those who adopt a religious identity, but also includes those who reject religion, doubt it, or are indifferent to it. The way we explain the sense of our own lives comes from this adopting of a position or opinion (Tinoco and Amador 2009: 15). Besides the affiliation with or incorporation into a religion and institutionalized worship, religion is experienced and practiced in unconventional forms denominated in Latin America as “popular religiosity”, as opposed to an institutional religiosity. In Mexico, there was an intense religiosity in pre-Hispanic people, which was integrated, renewed and combined with the also strong religiosity of Spanish Catholicism.1 This resulted in an official Catholic society which has lasted for centuries, whose beliefs and rituals have not been not limited to those ­established by the Roman Catholic Church, but for these communities, syncretism offers a sense of belonging about shared practices and meaning of life—preserved by their own religiosity, which is apparently Catholic. Religious life in Latin America is marked by the way in which Christianity was established, not only through persuasion, but mainly through imposition by the conquerors. This fact still affects the way religion is lived and reproduced in our countries. For centuries, power has played a central role in the Catholic Church, which enjoys the exercise of real power over social life, and even now, it plays an important role in the dialectic identified by Baez-Jorge (2011). This refers to the formal power to sanctify and act as intermediary between God and human beings, even in conflict situations, which is recognized in many contexts (Padrón 2016: 50; Gómez-Arzápalo 2016: 87). Among the dialectic dimensions of the religious power conflict, Báez-Jorge (2011) found: a) One that occurs in terms of symbolic power, because although official religion bears the power of blessing, the giving of the sacraments or sanctifying everyday life, there is another power which 1 The colonialization by Spain was done with the protection of the Bula Inter Cetera of Pope Alejandro vi on 13 May 1493, which established, as a condition for European presence in America, that the aborigines be converted to Christianity and, in the case of Mexico, the Acta solemne de la Declaración de Independencia de la América Septentrional, 1813 stated that in Mexico “no other religion other than Catholicism can be professed or recognized, and no other will be permitted or tolerated in public or in secret”.

Popular Religiosity and Value Changes in Mexico City Youth

45

has its own inherent values and is recognized in socially reproduced practices, which have their own time, place and intermediaries. b) The dynamism that blends permanence and change. Popular religion is the social-cohesion mechanism that anchors those values and meanings, which a community deems as fundamental to endow them with a mythical-foundational value. However, at the same time, this value must transform itself to maintain its symbolic power and stay current with historical and social changes. Even the official religion seeks back-up on the permanency that popular religiosity offers. c) Ancestral origin (i.e. indigenous or rural world) and urban world. In general terms, it is possible to oppose, on the one hand, a temporal and geographical origin that is mystified into a lost paradise and, on the other hand, with a daily urban reality and its challenge of sense, relief and future. d) Syncretism, as an evident characteristic of popular religion, is the mechanism and expression of inter-temporal and symbolic dynamism. As Gómez-Arzápalo (2011) explains: … these relations, always tense, witness moments of overflowing where it seems that rupture is imminent, but that cannot be produced, neither can it be permanent. For example, the local authorities of the Saints’ Stewardships2 defend or impose certain uses of the patronal parochial celebrations, despite the opposition of the ecclesiastical authorities. On those occasions, the Stewardships frequently establish fluctuating alliances with the clergy or the civil authorities, based on their immediate interests. Rupture cannot occur because both sides are polar opposites from the same dialectic relation, which would lose all sense if they were not engaged in this mutual dynamism.

2 Stewardship (Mayordomía) is a historic institution, which allows one person to become responsible for the image of the patron saint of the community. The Steward (Mayordomo) possesses great social prestige and has authority in matters of social, religious and even political organization in his community. Thus, Stewardship is important for the preservation and reproduction of those traditions, which lends reality to the life of the communities, as well as to the relationships adopted within the group, which in turn, will depend on the conservation and the reproductive nature of the group. Because of this relationship, it is not uncommon for the Stewardship to represent a conflict with the ecclesiastical authorities (Emiliano 2014: 84).

46

Sánchez, Gómez-Arzápalo and Flores

When analyzing the phenomena of popular religion, it is essential to consider the internal logic that articulates its integral components. All historically conformed social processes are staggered, and their wealth is found in the group and the interaction that preserves its constituent parts. Thus, a dynamic concept is required that allows interaction with a range of factors in order to give a full account of the observed phenomenon. It was necessary to develop the concept of “popular religiosity” in an attempt to amalgamate related concepts such as: syncretism, hegemony, counter-hegemony, power, worldview, dialectical relation, etc. If desired, the concept of “popular religiosity” can be dubbed as a concept that ties with others, which, if kept apart, would not give a satisfactory explanation to the religious phenomena. These phenomena embody the interaction in the social, economic, political, devotional, and psychological spheres, which are individually too narrow and specialized to give voice to such an ample and complex phenomenon. Gómez-Arzápalo (2008) develops the categorization previously established by Giménez (1978) regarding the problem of popular religiosity, dividing it into three parts: a) Ecclesiastical: the institutional aspect that concerns the autonomy of popular religiosity in relation to the ecclesial institution and its norms and pastoral control. This represents two radically opposing views between popular religion and the perspective of Catholic Orthodoxy, which considers popular religion as a deviation. It creates a distinction between the official and the non-official, the valid and the non-valid, since the institutional is an antagonistic reference point and excludes the external ideas that are outside of its control and comprehension. b) Socio-cultural aspect: indicates a strong relation between the marginalized popular strata and popular religiosity; therefore the countryside, the suburbs, and the popular urban zones are all spheres where popular expressions of religion flourish. c) Historic aspect: popular religiosity usually appears as a form of religiosity resulting from the junction between pre-Columbian indigenous religions and Spanish Catholicism. The use of official religious denominations and popular religious expressions supposes the appropriation of hegemonic power categories. The use of these categories comes at a price. On one hand, an obstacle is placed before the individual where greater importance is given to institutional religion than to the expression of his or her beliefs (Hierneaux, 2009). On the other hand, these categories are used because we think they are useful for social analysis in the

Popular Religiosity and Value Changes in Mexico City Youth

47

context of the structural asymmetry in which real and operative divisions ­exist in social life, and must be represented. That means these categories are not used to validate their normative implications. Popular religiosity is then a term that expresses more than isolated social phenomena; it expresses a cultural logic consistent with social processes that are historically lived, with all the tensions, ruptures, conciliations, and adoptions that are implied. Thus, popular religiosity does not refer to an individual or to an isolated and inoperative set of beliefs in everyday life, but rather to the implication of a worldview. Religion is the systemic and depositary expression of the values of a culture. Inasmuch as it is located in a trans-temporal frame of reference which explains the origin of human life, destiny and consummation, religion contains an account of the values that are considered in the process of realization by the individual, and communal, faith to which they belong. Despite Mexico moving in the direction of becoming a more secular society, many fundamental religious values are still present, and they orient the aspirations of youth. We have been able to verify this in our study. This tendency is explained as the immanent values in the culture, that reflect the tendency to conserve and reproduce it. North (1990) defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. Institutions can be visible and objective, but also have subjacent behavioural rules in the culture. Institutions can have formal constraints (rules, laws, and constitutions) or informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions, and codes of conduct). Religion is a formal institution in terms of its prescribed hierarchy, with its own dogma and rituals. However, popular religiosity is also an institution. It is characterized by informal beliefs and rituals and ubiquity, and it may also have some weak form of authority. In this sense, the formal and the informal are at the extremes of an institutional continuum. Baez-Jorge (2011) and Ramirez (2008) consider that there is institutionalization at both extremes, and that popular religion chooses to use the term “popular religion” because it considers itself homologous to formal religion, but at the opposite end of the social scale. When reading about this bipolar situation, it becomes clear that the hierarchical and dogmatic institution imposes its power to highlight the differences between itself and the other institution which it considers amorphous and suspicious. We, the authors, prefer to use the concept of popular religiosity, as there is no symmetry between the two extremes. Popular religiosity has a certain type of institutional presence which is flexible, and includes prescribed d­ uties

48

Sánchez, Gómez-Arzápalo and Flores

Weak institutional More popular Religion

More Institutional Religion

Strong institutional

More self managed religiosity

Officially managed religiosity

Syncretism

Orthodoxy

Figure 2.1 icat and theoretical model of popular religiosity in Mexico City. Source: Authors’ elaboration

and rituals and even spontaneous ones which are devoid of formality. In the first case, the objective is to preserve tradition, and that is the reason for ­institutionalization, which is the case of the Mayordomias (Stewards). However, popular religiosity can also leave institutionalization aside and exist without hierarchies or doctrinal codes. Particularly important is the religious change among youth which puts them on the side of popular religiosity, even if it is in a more or less institutionalized framework as documented by Cruz (2014) and Mejia (2017). The lack of religious affiliation of youth is an option for more spontaneous and less formal ways of articulating their beliefs and spirituality. If we imagine concentric circles where the nucleus represents official religiosity with its doctrine and rituals, and the rings represent major religious differences, the last rings reflect types of popular religiosity. Popular religion is then distinguished by its flexibility with respect to the official religion. It incorporates elements according to the worldview and history of the communities (Figure 2.1). Within this perspective, the religiosity phenomenon entails a network of social relationships that enables the disruption of abstract elements originating from a worldview that is rooted in material life. In other words, popular religiosity, in terms of a socio-historically determined process, involves elements of identity—such as the figures of the patron saints in neighbourhoods—that create a common referent within a community, allowing a distinction from others, distinguishing the internal and the external. And this is not only in reference to a territory but to a group of human concentrations sharing the

Popular Religiosity and Value Changes in Mexico City Youth

49

same history, worldview and the forms of organization that develop in these contexts. This process is better related to concrete social dynamics than to an alienated abstraction of the material world. The relationship between these elements is only possible because of the intervention of concrete subjects who act with the support of the community in a logic that transcends the official religion. Thus, popular religiosity is not a residual element of official orthodoxy, and must therefore be recognized as an autonomous process, different from the official religion that corresponds to concrete necessities of a community and the individual way of life. Because of the latter, it is necessary to consider once again what type of relationship is established between these two poles: institutional or official religion, on one hand, and popular religiosity on the other. A first aspect to be considered is the existence of spontaneous or charismatic religiosity forms, which evolve depending on their circumstances and the capacity they possess to gain devotees and ensure their reproduction. It is not unusual for innumerable beliefs and practices to arise in society, which would certainly be popular religiosity. But it is not only the existence of these which is required, but their generalization and their wide adoption and recognition. The use of these terms does not intend to circumvent the idea that a determined population, although small, shares a religiosity. For example, the existence of a community that gives recognition to its beliefs and adheres to a shared practice of religiosity is necessary to be able to speak about popular religiosity. Secondly, a co-dependent relationship is established, in the sense that popular religion is semi-independent from religious institutionalization where it affirms its differences, as well as its affinities. Religious syncretism is definitely an element of popular religiosity. Religious syncretism is a two-tempo movement: the first corresponds to a filter to dismiss certain elements, and the s­econd returns and starts discerning, to integrate elements from other forms of ­religiosity. Then a certain type of hybrid is obtained which would not be possible either to configure or understand, without the preceding institutionalization. However, this filter denotes a certain capacity to decide which elements to incorporate, and for what reasons they can be included in the religious system or the religious expression of the popular group. Religious syncretism is not merely a passive result, but an accumulative product of decisions that, among other things, represents a position of resistance to the values and ­referents of the official religion and of the system. This is the key to religious self-management. A co-dependent relationship exists in its resistance, due to an essential factor which acknowledges that institutional religions bear the legitimate and

50

Sánchez, Gómez-Arzápalo and Flores

acknowledged administration of the sacred, the religious assets, and for this reason a schism cannot occur, nor an absolute divorce between both forms of religiosity (Padrón 201: 50). 2

State of the Art

Several specialists of Mexican culture have conducted analytical studies of youth based on statistical data. They have contributed to systematize theoretical approaches about the characteristics, dynamics, socializing forms, communication, value problematic, and political resistance of Mexican young people. Among them are Pérez (2005; 2008), Pérez & Suárez (2008), Nateras (2002), Urteaga (1998, 2007a, 2007b), Reguillo (2002), and Medina (2000). There are a few specialized studies in the stand young people take regarding the religious field. The researches of Tinoco (1998), Tinoco & González (2004), Tinoco et. al. (2009), looks at the issue from the perspective of social psychology; as De la Torre & Gutierrez (2007), and De la Torre (2012) has analysed the relationship between religious affiliation and certain youth values and practices, for example, rituals, sexuality, and gender, among others. Quezada (2004), De la Torre and Gutierrez (2007), Cohen (2012), and Suárez (2014) analyse the new expressions of popular religion in Latin America in the context of cultural transformations and postmodernity. Serrano (2016a, 2016b) has studied the various experiences of Catholicism in Mexico City. With reference to recent studies, Blancarte (2008), Masferrer (2011), Salazar et. al. (2015) and Salazar (2015), examine the religious attitudes of Mexicans. With reference to recent studies, Blancarte (2008), Masferrer (2011), and Salazar et al. (2015), examine the religious attitudes of Mexicans. Tinoco and Amador (2009), recognized three problems: the lack of adequate evaluation mechanisms for the study of religion; that sociological studies of religion usually present information in a synthetic rather than an analytical framework; and the limitations of existing categories to broaden our understanding. Taking this into consideration, we have consulted information from several studies in order to construct analytical statistical categories, as well as critically revising the categories that we have analysed. 3

Objective and Hypothesis

The research seeks to document the pattern of changes in the religious beliefs and practices of young Mexicans, and the way they incorporate different

Popular Religiosity and Value Changes in Mexico City Youth

51

e­ lements in their beliefs, particularly in relation to religious institutions, and to identify some of the characteristics of the agreed values with respect to their religious affiliation. Our hypothesis is that the drop in religious affiliation among youth is due to the transformation of their beliefs, or religious values, where they occupy an intermediate position in what is broadly termed “popular religiosity”. To test this hypothesis, we analysed data from the National Survey of Values in Youth [ENVAJ12] (imj. 2012) and, additionally, we analysed data found in the Religious Cultures in Mexico City Survey (2012). 4 Methodology The two surveys mentioned above were used for the analysis because they collect information about different aspects of the subject of our study, where some variables are contained in one survey but not the other. The data was also used because we do not have the necessary resources to conduct our own survey. To establish the dynamic of religious beliefs among young people in Mexico City, we used the National Survey of Values in Youth database of 2012 [ENVAJ12]. This is the latest survey of Mexican youth and is based on a national sample of 5,000 youth. The survey was produced by a joint effort between the Mexican Youth Institute and the Law Research Institute of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (unam). The survey addresses several issues including the following: work, studies, sexual practices, confidence in national institutions, expectations, among others. The analysis for this article was centred on the segment of questions focused on beliefs. To identify the adherence of youth to religion in a normative model coming from the Catholic Church itself, we used the measure of Catholicity Index (icat) obtained from the Survey of Religious Cultures in Mexico City (2012). This survey was developed jointly by the National Autonomous ­University of Mexico and the Pastoral Vicariate of the Archdiocese of Mexico. In 2005, it consisted of full and representative questionnaires from 426 randomly selected neighbourhoods in Mexico City. The results have the following ­characteristics: Error OHS AB

Note: Alpha 0.05. Source: Authors’ calculus based on the National Survey of Values in Youth (2012) data.

In conclusion, the Index of Orthodoxy (ohs) is in accordance with the Social Participation Index, yet in Mexico the levels of participation are very low (see Table 2.8). This means that the few individuals who are active participants in public matters—in other words, who are institutional players—are closer to orthodoxy and vice versa. For that reason, it is logical that they are very sensitive toward orthodoxy as part of their position in the institutional setting. On the contrary, those participants who have weaker orthodoxy reflect their lack of confidence in the prevailing institutions. Another aspect of youth values is revealed by ENVAJ12. There is weak community involvement based on religion or solidarity. For example, Catholic religious leaders encourage youth to be missionaries for other youth. However, as Table 2.8 shows, Catholics and Other Biblical Traditions participate less in any type of group; in fact, the opposite occurs as Christian non-Catholic believers participate more in the community. This shows that religion is indeed important, but not sufficient for social participation. The most incisive question arising from the ENVAJ12 survey is related to the respondent’s opinion on the impact of religion, since it reveals the expectation of youth with respect to religion and churches. Despite the proven importance of religiosity among young people, we noted their fragile confidence in the utility and transforming potential of religion, that suggests they are not proponents of the official religions. Table 2.9 is another indicator of the segmented responses on the subject of religious affiliation. Catholics are among those who have the least trust in the potential of their religion to impact life and society. When the different

61

Popular Religiosity and Value Changes in Mexico City Youth Table 2.8 Participation by type of association and religious affiliation

Affiliation

Philanthropic

Political

Other

Not specified

Any

0 0

1 7

0 7

1 0

98 86

0

0

0

0

100

10 0

0 8

0 0

0 0

90 92

Catholic Christians non-catholic Other Biblical traditions Others Non believers

Source: Percentage by religious groups. Young ranging from 12–29 years old. Investigators’ elaboration with data from the National Survey of Values in Youth (2012).

Table 2.9 Answer about utility of religion by affiliation

People’s Problems in People’s Do you think the familiar spiritual moral your religion or necessities? life? church has an necessities? answer for…

Catholic Chistians non-catholic Other Biblical traditions Others

Problems of youth?

Concrete daily problems in our country?

42 64

44 75

56 72

35 67

21 54

49

68

68

68

33

39

39

55

20

12

Source: Percentage by religious groups. Young ranging from 12–29 years old. Investigators’ elaboration with data from the National Survey of Values in Youth (2012).

opinions offered in the survey are analysed, all the religions seem to offer some clear answer about contemporary problems in our country and the lives of its youth. Besides that, the strong conversion from Catholicism to Evangelical and other Christian churches is clearly explained by the respondent’s trust in this religious option.

62

Sánchez, Gómez-Arzápalo and Flores

This indicates that believers exercise their choice in a decisive way about what they believe, and are not mere receptors of the indications of the Institutional Church. 6 Conclusions This research proved that there is religious vitality among young people in Mexico. Religiosity in youth cannot be defined or reduced simply to the concept of affiliation. If it were, it would imply that there are only normative models for believers to follow, and that the adoption of religiosity is a continuum, like the diverse tones of colour, where each subject takes up an all-embracing view of beliefs over which he has no power to determine their scope or how they are experienced. The vitality and presence of the way young people live and express their religiosity cannot be understood or measured by their affiliation to an institutional religion. If that were the case, the only conclusion that could be drawn would be religious disaffiliation in practice, which represents the desertion and failure of religious institutions, since they cannot dialogue and receive into their midst the young people of our times. We found that the ohs Index, as a continuous value ranging from absolute heterodoxy to orthodoxy, shows that most believers who were surveyed tend to negotiate their beliefs. Although the majority of the young people surveyed find themselves in a syncretic situation, a bias toward orthodoxy prevails. In comparison, heterodoxy is a lesser choice. This shows that, while beliefs and the values associated with them still ­prevail (inferred from the bias toward orthodoxy), the importance of syncretism shows that young Mexicans are drawn toward self-management of beliefs. The social functions of religion, as Malinovski points out, tend to be more oriented to spiritual and abstract matters than to concrete and prevailing ones. The surveys analysed in the study show the relevance of inter-generational transmission of values. Because of this, it is surprising that young people still confer only a limited potential on religion and its capacity to answer the problems in their everyday world. This result indicates the effectiveness attributed to religion and spiritual matters is in each person’s conscience, which is created in practice, and has an innumerable range of meanings. The presence of Popular Religion was demonstrated, both in the Index of Catholicism as well as in the ohs Index. Both

Popular Religiosity and Value Changes in Mexico City Youth

63

revealed the limitations of religious institutionalization, as well as the fact that the contemporary articulation of beliefs is centred elsewhere, having more to do with personal competence and the way young people participate in these institutions, whether they are believers or not. The main finding of the research was identifying the relevance of belief selfmanagement in youth as a way to verify the effects of the growth of urban culture, secularization and postmodernism. This self-management does not mean that young people isolate themselves from beliefs; it is more a re-creation of their own sense of the value and their use of the religion that they practise. Nevertheless, a dimension which we were not able to prove, and which remains open to further investigation, is that of explaining the role of the community in the creation of popular religiosity, as well as the effect that it could have on the type of association, as well as the creation of a collective identity. The analysis of the surveys leads the researchers to explain religiosity as an individual act, as a personal process of choice and adaptation. However, other analysts focus on the way popular religiosity is lived as a community event that expresses the dichotomy between us and them. Neither interpretation is complete unless both dimensions—the individual and the c­ ommunity—are analysed in the same study. The dynamics of permanence and change were also evident. There is a ­process of acceptance, conservation and reproduction of certain religious values, as can be seen in the belief in Jesus Christ, but not in Catholicism. At the same time, the acceptance of new values associated with autonomy, as well as the possibility to self-determine the scope and meaning of beliefs, is recognized. This movement has a certain dimension of deinstitutionalization, especially if we consider that the Catholic Church is still highly hierarchical and centralized, while Christian and Evangelical Churches have greater plurality and dynamism. The ohs Index is an indicator of religious dynamism since it reflects the degree of acceptance and change in religious beliefs. From this perspective, popular religiosity is not related to indigenous groups, but to the urban, postmodern, and liberal world. Regarding icat, in comparison to the distribution of the total of those surveyed through all strata, we found that even in those people with high Catholicity, who are the more institutionalized believers, the young are not part of this institutionalization. This proves the status of “removed from religion” which appears in most studies where the “nones” are rising in numbers. However, as shown in the data of the ohs Index, they have not distanced themselves from religiosity, nor even from orthodoxy. They have become more flexible in their

64

Sánchez, Gómez-Arzápalo and Flores

beliefs, and we believe this is due to the fact that they have assigned diverse utility to their individual and collective beliefs. Regarding the hypothesis, we found that there is not a real weakening or religious desertion among young people, but a partial change of religious v­ alues. We found religious self-management and an estrangement from strong institutionalization. There is indeed a redefinition of religious values and of the social function that religion has among youth. All this shows that popular religion is flourishing. We cannot confirm if this tendency is centered on the individual or if the collective context is more important. Further research is needed to prove which context is the main factor that leads to popular religiosity. We are currently researching this aspect. References Báez-Jorge, Félix. 2011. Debates en torno a lo sagrado: religión popular y hegemonía clerical en el México indígena. Mexico: Universidad Veracruzana. Blancarte, Roberto. 2008. Cultura e identidad nacional. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Cohen, Elisa. 2012. Una sintaxis del más allá: transgresión y religiosidad popular judía en un caso argentino. Cuadernos Judaicos, No. 29. Cruz, Miriam. 2014. “Con sabor a Religiosidad Popular, experiencias de organización familiar en Iztapalapa”, in Gómez-Arzapalo & Juárez (Comps.), Fenómenos Religiosos Populares en Latinoamérica. Análisis y aportaciones interdisciplinares. Mexico: Artificio Editores, 291–309. De La Torre, Renée. 2012. “La religiosidad popular como ‘entre-medio’ entre la religión institucional y la espiritualidad individualizada”. Civitas, Porto Alegre v. 12, No. 3: 506–521. De la Torre, Renée and Cristina Gutiérrez. 2007. Atlas de la diversidad religiosa en México. Mexico: CIESAS/UQRO/Colef/Coljal/Colmich/Subsecretaría de Asuntos Religosos (Segob), ISBN: 978-968-496-649-9. Dri, Rubén. (Coord). 2007. Símbolos y fetiches religiosos en la construcción de la identidad popular. Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos. Emiliano, Alejandro. 2014. “Mayordomía y Tejido Social”, in Pastoral urbana y mayordomías, edited by Ramiro Gómez-Arzapalo, Emiliano Alejandro, and Jesús Serrano. Mexico: Editorial San Pablo. Giménez, Gilberto. 1978. Cultura Popular y Religión en el Anáhuac, Mexico: Centro de Estudios Ecuménicos.

Popular Religiosity and Value Changes in Mexico City Youth

65

Gómez-Arzapalo, Ramiro. 2011. “Entre la imposición y la apropiación: juegos de poder en los fenómenos religiosos populares en contextos rurales de ascendencia indígena”. Paper presented at the I Coloquio Internacional de Estudios Antropológicos sobre Puebla, BUAP, December 7. Gómez-Arzapalo, Ramiro. 2008. “Consideraciones antropológicas frente al fenómeno de la religiosidad popular en comunidades campesinas de origen indígena en México” in Gaceta de Antropología, 2008, 24 (1), artículo 19· http://hdl.handle .net/10481/6994 [accessed on January 15, 2018]. Gómez-Arzapalo, Ramiro and María Elena Padrón Herrera (editors). 2016. Dinámicas religiosas populares: poder, resistencia e identidad. Mexico: Artificio. Hierneaux, Daniel. 2009. “De los imaginarios a las prácticas urbanas: construyendo la ciudad de mañana”, in Iztapalapa, No. 64–65, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Iztapalapa: 15–35. IMJ [Instituto Mexicano de la Juventud]. 2012. Base de datos de la Encuesta Nacional de Valores en Juventud 2012. http://www.imjuventud.gob.mx/pagina.php?pag_id=1066 [accessed on January 15, 2018]. Lebart, Ludovic, Marie Piron, and Alain Morineau. 1995. Statistique exploratoire multidimensionnelle. Paris: Dunod. Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1936. The Foundations of Faith and Morals. London: Oxford University Press. Masferrer, Elio. 2011. Pluralidad religiosa en México. Cifras y proyecciones. Buenos AiresMexico: Libros de la Araucaria. Mejía, Ernesto. 2017. “San Judas Tadeo: las nuevas vías de la fe en la ciudad. Los jóvenes y la religiosidad popular en la Ciudad de México”, in Gómez-Arzapalo (Coord.), Identidad y pertenencia al abrigo de la devoción: aportes para el estudio de la Religiosidad Popular. Mexico: Observatorio de la Religiosidad Popular-Universidad Intercontinental. Nardo Michela et. al. (2008), Handbook on constructing composite indicators: methodology and user guide, Paris: OECD. Nateras, Alfredo. 2002. Jóvenes, culturas e Identidades urbanas. UAM-M.A. Porrúa. North, Douglass. 1990. Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Padrón Herrera, María Elena. 2016. “Religiosidad, identificaciones y relaciones de poder en San Bernabé Ocotepec, Ciudad de México” in Dinámicas religiosas populares: poder, resistencia e identidad. Aportes desde la Antropología, edited by Gómez-­ Arzapalo, Ramiro. Mexico: Artificio. Pérez, José A. 2008. Teorías sobre la Juventud. La mirada de los Clásicos. Mexico: UNAM- Porrúa.

66

Sánchez, Gómez-Arzápalo and Flores

Pérez, José A. 2005. Encuesta Nacional de Juventud 2005. http://www.insumisos.com/ lecturasinsumisas/Resultados%20de%20la%20encuesta%20mexico%202005.pdf, mayo 2006. [accessed on June 26, 2017]. Pérez, José and Maritza Urteaga (editors). 2004. Historias de los Jóvenes en México. Su presencia en el siglo XX. Mexico: IMJ-AGN. Pérez, José and Herlinda Suárez (editors). 2008. Jóvenes Universitarios en ­Latinoamérica hoy. Mexico: UNAM-Porrúa. Quezada, Noemí, (editor). 2004. Religiosidad popular México-Cuba. Mexico: UNAMIIA-Plaza y Valdés Editores. Ramírez, Jorge. 2008. “Campo religioso latinoamericano y caribeño, efectos de la globalización neoliberal”, in América Latina y el Caribe, territorios religiosos y desafíos para el Diálogo, edited by Alonso Aurelio. Buenos Aires: CLACSO. Reguillo, Rossana. 2002. Estrategias del desencanto. La emergencia de culturas juveniles en Latinoamérica. Buenos Aires: Ed. Norma. Rokeach, Milton. 1973. “Paradoxes of religious belief”, in Aronson Eliot et al. Social P­ sychology, 169–172. Salazar, Pedro. 2015. Estado laico en un país religioso. Mexico: UNAM. Salazar, Pedro, Paulina Barrera, and Saúl Espino. 2015. Encuesta nacional de religión, secularización y laicidad. Mexico: UNAM. http://www.losmexicanos.unam.mx/ religion/index.html [accessed on June 26, 2017]. Serrano, Jesús. 2016a. “La evangelización de las culturas juveniles urbanas”, El ministerio recibido del Señor Jesús. Universidad Pontificia de México. Serrano, Jesús. 2016b. “Vitalidad y complejidad de la religiosidad popular de los jóvenes mexicanos, evidencias empíricas”, in Dinámicas religiosas populares: poder, resistencia e identidad, edited by Ramiro Gómez-Arzapalo. Mexico: Artificio. Suárez, Ana Lourdes. 2014. “El Campo Religioso en los asentamientos precarios de Buenos Aires. Una Aproximación Desde La Situación Religiosa De Las Mujeres”, in Debates do NER, Vol. 15 Issue 25, 241–270. Tinoco, Josué and Amador Louise. 2009. Religión y pensamiento social. Una mirada contemporánea, BUAP-UAM. Tinoco, Josué and González Manuel. 2004. “Pasos en la construcción de un instrumento de religiosidad y política en jóvenes universitarios”, in Revista de la Facultad de Psicología, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Año VII. Vol. 1. Tinoco, José, et. al. (2009). “Factores de la Religiosidad y Preferencia Política en Estudiantes Universitarios”, in Enseñanza e Investigación en Psicología, 14 (2), juliodiciembre: 275–293. Urteaga, Maritza (1998). "Por los territorios del rock. Identidades juveniles y rock mexicano", Jóvenes, revista de estudios sobre juventud, cuarta época, núm. 3. México: IMJ.

Popular Religiosity and Value Changes in Mexico City Youth

67

Urteaga, Maritza. 2007a. Usos y apropiaciones del zócalo por jóvenes, BUAP, CONACYT, UAM—I. Urteaga, Maritza. 2007b. La construcción de lo juvenil desde varios ángulos de mira. Reflexiones en torno al trabajo de campo en centros comerciales. Mexico: UAM, CONACYT.

Chapter 3

From a Place of Popular Religiosity to a Transnational Space of Multiple Meanings and Religious Interactions Helena Vilaça In contemporary Catholicism, pilgrimages are the subject of frequent updates and innovations. The Fatima Shrine, located in the central western region of Portugal, is a popular pilgrimage site. It was there on May 13, 1917, that three shepherd children claimed to have seen the Virgin Mary. These apparitions continued for six months. A phenomenon of popular curiosity and religiosity soon became a public event and the destination of numerous pilgrimages. To understand Fatima, we must understand the role and presence of the Catholic Church in that location. At first, the Church rejected Fatima; it was only later that she became a religious phenomenon. To this day, there is a latent conflict between the popular pilgrimage and the ecclesiastical regulations created to organize and re-catechize the rituals surrounding the voyage and the sanctuary worship. Along with the last three popes, the Catholic Church actively contributed towards establishing Fatima as a prayer site of global importance. In 2017, to celebrate the Centenary of the Apparitions, the Catholic Church promoted several events, both religious (for example, the visit of Pope Francis, who was met by the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister) and scientific (the International Congress of the Centennial of Fatima). The relationship between Fatima and political power is one of the most relevant dimensions of analysis. Though criticized by the First Republic, it was exalted by the dictatorship of the Estado Novo, which was in search of religious legitimization. With the advent of the democratic regime in 1974 and a constitution establishing Portugal as a secular state, the leftist parties became convinced that the Fatima phenomenon was destined for extinction. However, none of the governments that followed have been hostile or critical towards the pilgrimages, the shrine, or the Catholic Church. Fatima is evidence of the multidimensional presence of Catholicism in Portuguese society—in religion, culture, tourism, and even politics. This paper looks at the Fatima phenomenon as being indicative of the importance of religion in the public sphere—particularly considering that Portugal is a secular state—and as a lens through which we can study the ambiguous relationship

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004380073_005

Place of Popular Religiosity to a Transnational Space

69

between the Portuguese State and the Catholic Church. To do this, I conducted a documentary analysis of material related to Fatima—publications, pilgrimage statistics, and press and web articles mostly written in 2017, the centenary of the apparitions. 1

The Three Little Shepherds and the Lady in White

1.1 The Story Fatima is a small town located in the central western region of Portugal. Being based on subsistence agriculture, and having an illiterate population, it is also over 100 kilometres north of the capital Lisbon, the centre of culture and politics (Marujo 2017a). That distance translated into a political chasm between the people, who were predominantly monarchical, and the Republican elites settled in Lisbon who had been in governance since 1910. On May 13, 1917, in Cova da Iria (a rural area in Fatima), three children,1 Lúcia and her cousins Jacinta and Francisco, claimed to have seen a Lady in white after a flash of lightning, whom they believed was the Virgin Mary. Lúcia was the only one to speak to the Lady, who told them to return each month. The apparitions (or visions, according to the theological commentary by the Catholic Church in 20002) took place between May and October of 1917, on the 13th of each month. The news of the apparitions soon spread throughout the country (Fernandes 1999). In a context of social chaos, multitudes came to Fatima— curious, but also searching for something supernatural and prophetic. In all six apparitions, the Lady appeared above a small tree. All three children saw the vision, but Lúcia was the only one who was able to speak to Mary, and each time, she requested them to return. During a third vision, the children were told three secrets, further adding to the mysticism surrounding these events. While Lúcia revealed the first two secrets in her memoirs written in 1941, the third secret would only be revealed by Pope John Paul ii more than eighty years after the first vision, in 2000, having received it from Lúcia in a sealed envelope in 1957. The first secret was a vision of hell, relating to the need for the children to pray for sinful souls to escape it. The second secret was about the conversion and consecration of Russia to the Sacred Heart of Mary, which would happen 1 They became known as “pastorinhos”, i.e. little shepherds. 2 Theological Commentary of Joseph Ratzinger in http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000626_message-fatima_en.html [accessed 20 October 2017].

70

Vilaça

in 1984, with Pope John Paul—five years before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the communist regime in the East. The last secret described a man in a white robe being attacked and killed. Lúcia believed that the man in white was the pope and that the vision related to the attack on John Paul ii. The pope confirmed this in 2000 when he visited the Fatima Shrine and revealed the third secret. On October 13, 1917, the date of the last apparition, a crowd of 500,000 gathered in Fatima, expecting a sign that would cause the world to believe. At noon, after a storm, people described what later became known as the Miracle of the Sun. According to reports, the sun emerged from behind the clouds and began to dance, spin, and tremble (Marujo 2017), which frightened some people into believing it was the end of the world. Stanley Jaki (1999), a Catholic scholar and priest whose work tries to reconcile modern science with Christian orthodoxy, argues that this was a meteorological event witnessed by a mostly illiterate crowd. Just recently, the Catholic Church offered a rational explanation for the Miracle of the Sun. However, the explanation is not accepted in popular Catholicism, which is resistant to the disenchantment advocated by Max Weber. In the last apparition, the Virgin Mary conveyed her message: “Cease to offend God, pray the rosary, build a chapel in honour of Our Lady of the Rosary, and the World War will come to an end” (Pereira 2003). Two of the little shepherds, siblings Francisco and Jacinta, died shortly afterwards of influenza. Francisco died at the age of ten, in 1919, and his sister at the age of nine, in 1920. Lúcia became a Carmelite nun and was nearly a hundred years old at the time of her death in 2005. 1.2 Political and Religious Context The establishment of Portugal as a republic in 1910 began a new era in the relationship between Church and State. A new constitution introduced the law of separation in 1911. The Republic was profoundly anticlerical, and therefore sought to secularize public and political life. The freedom of the Catholic Church became severely restricted, as Church assets were confiscated, and the Republic tried to build a society without religion. More than a new system of government, the First Portuguese Republic is a new worldview based on anticlerical secularism and civic solidarity (Vilaça 2006). During the end of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century, the Catholic Church met with hostility from the State and certain sectors of civil society. The Republican discourse of the time anticipated the end of religion and predicted that a new rational and scientific order would emerge, echoing Comte’s positivism. The hostility between Church and State, which dominated the political and social environment of the First Republic, was somewhat softened by the p ­ residency of Sidónio Paes in 1917 (Reis 2000). Resumption of diplomatic

Place of Popular Religiosity to a Transnational Space

71

r­ elations with the Holy See, and a reform introduced to the law of separation, ensued. The events of Fatima took place in 1917, a disastrous year for the Republican government and the country in general. Historian Fernando Rosas (2017) offers a list: Portugal joined the First World War; several rebellions and strikes led to hundreds of casualties and prisoners being taken; a typhus epidemic hit several cities; Portuguese soldiers died on the battlefield in Flanders and France, and the government became a stage for political conflict. There was a need for “salvific providence, religiously and politically” (Rosas 2017). The events that took place in Fatima were at first a local phenomenon (Reis 2006). Both the Catholic Church and political power were involved in other disputes at the time. Because of the ideological confrontation between political and religious fields (Fernandes 1999 and 2013), it was the local activity and Fatima’s local priest who would legitimize and consolidate that social process. More influential members of the Church would become involved later. It was only in 1930 that the diocese of Leiria confirmed the authenticity of the apparitions, based on the canonical process set up in 1922. This did not stop people from worshipping, organizing pilgrimages or even building the shrine (Barreto 2002). The Catholic Church was cautious under the First Republic. Even though tensions had been defused by the end of the First World War, in 1920 pilgrimages were prohibited. In 1922, a bomb exploded in the Chapel of Apparitions (Fernandes 2013). The State’s attempts to control the Catholic Church increased and the ideological debate escalated. In the Republican sector, ideological currents and organizations such as Freemasonry, the Portuguese Federation of Free Thought, the Association of Civil Registry, and the Carbonari used the press as a vehicle for propaganda. Catholic or monarchical political parties had limited power, but they represent the first attempt to give the Virgin Mary a prophetic message of “national resurgence” (Barreto 2002: 43) to restore the monarchy. The Republicans believed the Fatima phenomena had been orchestrated by the Jesuits, the primary target of Republican attack. Believing the problem to be illiteracy and superstition, they posited that the solution would be to educate the people and therefore pull them away from obscurant religion. This, however, is not what happened. 2

Portugal: A Nation with a Messianic Mission

On May 28, 1926, a military coup d’état gave rise to the Estado Novo (New State) dictatorship. The Estado Novo removed all obstacles to pilgrimages to Fatima and celebrations in that town. Even before the canonical process, the shrine

72

Vilaça

was visited by several members of the episcopate and politicians of the new regime (such as the President, Óscar Carmona). After Salazar became Prime Minister in 1932, and particularly after the new constitution the following year, a Catholic ideology was recovered and strengthened throughout the country. Fatima became a distinctive feature of Portuguese Catholicism, the place for pilgrimages, and a symbol of the unity between the Estado Novo3 and the Catholic Church. Political authorities began encouraging popular religiosity and created the necessary infrastructures (Barreto 2002). The vigilance about pilgrimages and the way in which the episcopate appropriated Fatima sheds some light on the process of social control, resulting from a new convergence between temporal and ecclesiastical powers. This convergence culminated in the Concordat of 1940. The agreement ­between the State and the Holy See acted as compensation for the separation enacted at the beginning of the 20th century (Cruz 1998). Secular opposition, religious minorities (at that time almost exclusively Protestant), and even­ Catholic sectors opposing the dictatorship associated Fatima with the fascist regime. From the canonical recognition and state support in the late 1920s to the present day, Fatima became the site for the religious pastiche of Christian rites and popular Catholicism. It is worth noting the re-emergence and re-­ legitimization of popular religiosity (Voyé 1995) as a reactive consequence to specific decades in the 19th and 20th centuries, in which popular religious practices were delegitimized under the weight of secularizing, rational discourse of a scientific and Marxist nature. 3

From the Local News to the World Stage

3.1 The Pilgrimages There are several rites associated with pilgrimages: a certain route is followed, specific stops are made, sacred objects touched, and offers and ex-votos given. Like many pilgrimage sites, both Christian and non-Christian, Fatima has all those elements. An ex-voto is an offer given to fulfil a vow, one of the most important traditions of Roman Catholic pilgrimages. In Fatima, various kinds of offerings can be made to Our Lady (Vilaça 2010): money,4 jewellery, candles, pictures, photos of a loved one returned safely from war, gold wedding gowns, 3 The Estado Novo dictatorship lasted 48 years, from 1926 to 1974. 4 The sanctuary of Fatima still receives the highest number of offerings. In previous years, annual offerings have totalled approximately 10 million euros, not including church collections (Vilaça 2010).

Place of Popular Religiosity to a Transnational Space

73

military uniforms or wax sculptures of body parts (legs, arms, breasts, a head). Vows are promises made in a moment of despair, to be fulfilled once the desired answer is received. The Fatima Shrine is the focus of substantial intervention by the Church when it comes to organization and mobilization. Church authority also becomes more visible. Despite this, pilgrims resist the efforts of “Christianization” promoted by the Catholic Church. For example, there are no images in the new temple, inaugurated in 2007, and the focus of attention is the cross and the image of the crucifixion, not Our Lady. At the time, this led to manifestations of discontent, demonstrating the vitality of the popular tradition. According to a survey conducted in 2011 by the Survey Centre of the Catholic University, the Fatima Shrine remains a critical focal point in Portuguese religious practices. The statistics show that 90% of respondents had travelled to Fatima (Teixeira 2012), the same percentage as the decade before. More than half the respondents had been there at least three times, and many of those reported that they go almost every year. Most of them came predominantly from rural and semi-urban areas—two subsets that make up for 67.7% of all visitors. Despite this, we can question the belief that pilgrimages are an exclusive indicator of traditional rural religiosity: one third of the 90% of Portuguese visitors comes from urban areas. Practising Catholics tend to visit more often. Because it is central to Catholic identity, the frequency of visits to Fatima is spread throughout the year, more so than in other religious positions and identities (Teixeira 2012). Among other religious positions, mobility practises are less motivated by ex-votos and more by tourism and leisure. Although it is not yet possible to verify the exact number of pilgrims who visit the shrine every year, the Support Service to Pilgrims of the Sanctuary of Fatima (sepe) has developed a calculation system based on the number of people who attend the celebrations. They have estimated that the shrine received 4,750,000 visitors in 2000, a year of particular affluence because of its status as a Holy Year. Although 2001 saw a slight decrease (4,000,000 pilgrims), affluence to Fatima grew in the following years, reaching nearly 5 million pilgrims in 2007 (Vilaça, 2010). In 2015, the Fatima Shrine reported a record number of pilgrimages with 6.7 million participants in 9,948 celebrations.5 The year 2017 was a time of extraordinary growth in pilgrimages to Fatima (Agência Lusa 2017). This was due in part to Pope Francis’ visit on May 13, but it was also the result of new pilgrims from Asia (South Korea, India, Indonesia, 5 Santuário de Fátima. http://www.fatima.pt/pt/news/2016-03-07-santuario-de-fatima-registanumero-recorde-de-peregrinacoes-2016-03-07 [accessed 20 November 2017].

74

Vilaça

the Philippines, and China). In many celebrations, especially those occurring between May and October, the number of foreign pilgrims tripled. Most of them came from Italy, Spain, Poland, and Ireland, the most Catholic countries in Europe, along with Portugal. It is interesting that Italian pilgrims often combine their pilgrimages to Fatima and Santiago de Compostela (Vilaça 2010). For a long time, international pilgrims came mostly from European countries or Latin America.6 This new pattern is indicative of an increasingly globalized world. Another interesting detail is that pilgrimages are more equally distributed throughout every month of the year, with a higher influx on weekends; in the past, pilgrims converged on Fatima on the dates of the most important apparitions, in May and October. In a place like the Fatima Shrine, private devotion and individual faith gain a collective dimension, in which an “emotional community” (Weber 1978: 40–41) is formed, creating a subjective feeling of belonging together. In Fatima, this is particularly visible in the evening service during pilgrimages, when the statue of Our Lady is taken from the altar and across the square among the pilgrims, who wave white handkerchiefs while praying and crying. It is not uncommon for commemorative rituals to generate a collective effervescence in producing beliefs or in maintaining a group’s unity, as Durkheim (1925) argued. This ritual gives people a feeling of community, belonging and social cohesion. Rites of passage, pilgrimages, and the commemorative rites celebrated on arrival ­activate these states of collective effervescence related to the individual’s integration into society. However, Fatima also includes contemporary forms of religiosity, as do other locations. According to some surveys, since the last decade of the 20th century, most of the walking pilgrims stated that their decision to go to Fatima was personal (Fortuna and Ferreira 1993), not a parish initiative. However, unlike in Santiago de Compostela (Spain)—where pilgrimages are profoundly secularized, based on leisure, or driven by the spirituality of the inner self (Lopez 1997, Heelas 2008) or New Age7 ideas—the individual religiosity in Fatima is institutionally framed within Catholicism (Mendes 2009). 6 We should mention that the Blue Army of Our Lady of Fatima was established there in 1950. This is a legal and pontifical international association aiming to promote the Catholic doctrine and adherence to the principles of the Gospel by spreading the message of Fatima (Serôdio 2007). This movement started in the usa and spread to countries such as England, France, Italy, Korea, Canada, and India. American interest in Fatima is connected to the second secret, revealed in 1940, which condemned communism. 7 In 1992 in Santiago de Compostela, the Catholic Church reacted to the attempted appropriation of the Camino by New Age pilgrims, labelling them as “destructive sects” in a booklet titled “Camino de Santiago e esoterismo”. In doing this, it sought to reaffirm the Catholicity

Place of Popular Religiosity to a Transnational Space

75

A study on the profiles of the visitors to Fatima (Santos 2008) shows that 2.8% of Fatima visitors are atheists or affiliated with other (non-Catholic) religions. Fatima is considered an obstacle to ecumenism in Portugal (Felício 2007). Even Protestants involved in ecumenism (Anglicans, Methodists, Presbyterians, Lutherans, and others) state that Fatima undermines dialogue among Christians. In previous years, some evangelicals organized evangelism activities in the main roads to Fatima, during visits from the pope and the pilgrimages of May 13. They offered rest, foot rubs, and food to pilgrims—and at the same time, they talked about Jesus. Protestants are coming in from abroad, but their presence seems to be statistically irrelevant. The first to arrive came from the usa in pilgrimages organized by the Blue Army of Our Lady, during the Cold War. This was the first international organization to popularize the Fatima phenomenon abroad. It is interesting to note that Portuguese Hindus are devoted to Fatima (the Blessed Mother). According to Marujo (2004), this religious group has been going to Fatima to pray and worship for about 50 years. For Hindus, Our Lady corresponds to the goddess or the “Holy Mother” of Hinduism, someone they invoke in connection to the need for world peace. For some Muslims, Fatima is notable for having the same name as the daughter of the prophet (connected with the years of Muslim occupation in Portugal). Mary is also a significant figure in Islam. In May 2017, a Lebanese Muslim, learning about Fatima as the site of the Virgin Mary’s apparitions, travelled from Spain (where he was on holiday) to the sanctuary to fulfil a promise on his knees. The event got the attention of the press, and there was no criticism from Muslim media outlets (Jornal de Notícias 2017). 3.2 The Role of the Popes Unlike Medjugorje,8 which still is not an approved destination for Catholic pilgrimage, Fatima captured the attention of popes from the beginning, becoming a privileged place of worship for several of them. From the devout Pius xii and John Paul ii to Paul vi (the “pilgrim of peace” during Portugal’s colonial war), to Benedict xvi, who rationalized the events, “the relationship of each of pilgrimage, distancing itself from magical and esoteric practices (López 1997 and Mendes 2009). 8 In 1981, in Medjugorje (Herzegovina), six local children (now grown) claimed they had seen apparitions of the Virgin Mary. The events were very similar to Fatima’s: two of the children said they had received messages every month, and several people witnessed a miracle of the sun.

76

Vilaça

Pope with the Shrine eventually gave the phenomenon a dimension nobody would have dreamed of 100 years ago” (Marujo 2017b). Pius xii was the first pope to take Fatima beyond national borders. One year after the end of the Second World War, he proclaimed the Lady of Fatima “queen of peace and the world” (Marujo 2017b) in a clear allusion to the armistice. Although he never left the Vatican, he stayed in touch with the seer Lúcia through letter writing. However, his affection towards the Lady of Fatima also suggested a personal mystical experience. Just like the three little shepherds and the crowd in October 1917, Pacelli was struck in 1950 by a phenomenon similar to the so-called Miracle of the Sun, the day before he proclaimed the dogma of the Assumption of Our Lady. This experience is described in a personal manuscript of Pius xii presented in an exhibition in Rome in 2008 (Agência Ecclesia 2008). The Vatican would gradually take ownership of a peace message specific to the First World War and turn it into a motto of the Catholic Church in the 20th and 21st centuries (Marujo 2000). More than the supernatural dimension of the event, the message of peace that Mary embodied was gradually assimilated by the popes. Paul vi, the first pope to visit Fatima, presided over the pilgrimage of May 13, 1967, on the 50th anniversary of the apparitions. By announcing he would come as a “pilgrim of peace”, Paul vi brought a distinctly political directive to the country. Although the Portuguese regime had close ties to the national Catholic Church, the Holy See had gradually moved away from the dictatorship (Reis 2006). This was particularly true since the beginning of the 1960s, when the colonial war began in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea, mobilizing thousands of young soldiers. Paul vi also refused to hold an official meeting with Prime Minister Salazar, declaring that his visit was private. Like Pius xii, John Paul ii was devoted to the Lady of Fatima. The Polish pope visited the sanctuary three times—the first exactly one year after his attempted assassination in St. Peter’s Square, on May 13, 1982. This coincidence, along with his veneration for Mary, led him to establish a connection between Fatima’s third secret—a bishop dressed in white attacked by soldiers—and the attempt on his life (Guerra 2007). John Paul ii would return to Portugal in 1991 and 2000. On his last visit, he beatified the children and announced the third secret (Marujo 2017b). The pontificate of John Paul ii was significant in this process of ­re-legitimization, given the beatifications (such as those of the shepherds of Fatima) and his reaffirming of the Cult of the Virgin Mary. This pope was instrumental in popularizing the phenomenon and the message of Fatima on a global scale. At the same time, his political intervention contributed to the end

Place of Popular Religiosity to a Transnational Space

77

of ­communism in Europe (Coutinho 2007), connecting it to the conversion of Russia as mentioned in one of the secrets. The next pope built a different relationship with Fatima. As a theologian— his most distinctive characteristic—and while he was still Cardinal and Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Ratzinger submitted the apparitions of Fatima and the three secrets to a rational interpretation. In his theological commentary (Ratzinger 2000) accompanying the text for the third secret, he categorizes the doctrine of the Church into “public” and “private revelation” (Marujo 2017b). He proposed a new theological view of the apparitions, in fact replacing “apparitions” with the word “visions”. Using this word as a starting point, he argued that the children had not seen something outside themselves, but within themselves. He still visited Fatima as pope, in 2010. While in Fatima, his schedule included innovative events such as a meeting with 1,300 artists and personalities from the cultural scene, mostly probably non-religious. By meeting with them, Benedict xvi helped reshape Fatima, challenging its connotations of superstition, obscurantism, and conservatism throughout the 20th century. The rationalization he offered is consistent with the internal secularization of the Catholic Church, albeit articulated with traditional and renewed forms of sacralization. Pope Francis is well liked in various sectors of society. He combines charisma with discursive resources capable of attracting general attention. In 2017, Fatima celebrated its centenary with the presence of the charismatic and wellknown Jorge Bergoglio. As he arrived, he declared his coming was “something special” and “an encounter with the Lord and the holy mother of God” (Pereirinha 2017). Both his words and his position strengthened Fatima: he canonized the Blessed Francisco and Jacinta, but also took the opportunity to continue re-catechizing popular religiosity, which moved the majority of the pilgrims (and echoed Bento xvi in tone). In this sense, he pointed to the centrality of Christ and Mary as an example of faith to be followed, more than as an object of worship. The pope was in Fatima for two days, standing before one million people and the highest entities of the Portuguese State: the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, several ministers, and the President of the Assembly of the Republic. This surprising interaction between the religious and political spheres is discussed below.9 This would have been unimaginable for the 9 Demonstrating the relevance and popularity of the Fatima phenomenon both nationally and worldwide, the site has been visited by a range of “distinguished figures” (Freire 2007),

78

Vilaça

­ eralds of the First Republic or the leaders of the first democratic governments h after 1974, who defended the principles of a secular state. Over the course of a hundred years, each of the various pontificates had a unique relationship with the Portuguese shrine. However, the various visits and papal declarations were a decisive element in the ecclesial and international consecration of Fatima as a pilgrimage site (Marujo and Reis 2017) and the rapprochement between the State and the Catholic Church in Portugal. 4

How Democracy and the Secular State Deal with Fatima

With the end of the Estado Novo and the beginning of democracy in April 1974, a new political and religious context emerged. A new constitution was approved in the Assembly of the Republic two years later, reinforcing a democratic State. In this new context, religious freedom would be marked by values intrinsic to the constitution—promoting freedom and equality for citizens and seeking to abolish discrimination. The mark of the current Portuguese constitution is the neutrality of the State and peaceful coexistence between the political and religious fields. This new model would thus reject both previous experiences of a political or confessional union, the separation advocated in secular Republicanism, and the ambiguity during the Estado Novo combining separation with a symbolic union, through which political power would seek self-legitimation (Vilaça 2006). After the Carnation Revolution, there was little episcopal intervention in Portuguese political life, which explains the supposed distance. From an attitude of silence, and the assumption that religious manifestation belonged in the private sphere, political power slowly and timidly approached religion, with Fatima playing a significant role in that process. It happened in part because of the new meaning that the Catholic Church had attributed to the site: Fatima as a place of prayer for peace in the world. Fatima can be a lens through which we analyse how religion re-entered the public sphere. One of the most striking examples is the death of Lúcia, the last of the little shepherds of Fatima, in the middle of the electoral campaign of not only international Catholic prominent figures, but also European royalty and politicians. Public figures in politics include Presidents of Brazil (Juscelino Kubitschek), the Philippines (Corazón Aquino), Poland (Lech Walesa), India (Shanker Daval Sharma), Paraguay (Juan Carlos Wasmosy), East Timor (Xanana Gusmão), Czechoslovakia (Vaclav Havel), and First Lady Hilary Clinton.

Place of Popular Religiosity to a Transnational Space

79

2005. Her death made the news and had a remarkable social impact (­Vilaça 2006). The Prime Minister declared a day of national mourning, and both his liberal-conservative party (psd) and the right-wing party (CDS-PP) interrupted their campaign schedule (Agência Lusa, 2005). The Minister of Defence participated in a funeral tribute to Sister Lúcia. The Socialist Party cancelled certain street activities, but continued others. Only the leftist parties (the Communist Party and the Left Bloc) proceeded with the electoral campaign as scheduled. The harshest critics were the Republic and Laity Association, who considered a day of national mourning to be inappropriate and detrimental to the separation between politics and religion, and “to national unity itself based on democratic values” (Agência Lusa 2005). Interestingly, there was criticism from within the Church, namely from the Bishop of Setúbal, who thought the Government’s decision was arbitrary, suggesting it had been made for political gain. However, mentions of Fatima in political discourse had happened before— in 2003 when the Minister of State and Defence Paulo Portas said the Prestige oil spill (which struck the coast of Galicia in Spain) had not reached Portugal because Our Lady of Fatima had intervened (Carvalho 2017). More recently, in 2013, during a national economic and financial crisis, the President said the positive evaluation of TROIKA’s Economic and Financial Adjustment Program was due, in his wife’s opinion, to a miracle of Our Lady of Fatima (Carvalho 2017). Both statements were objects of criticism, but soon faded from the media. These examples suggest that religion in Portuguese society is becoming increasingly de-privatized. Without intending to start a debate on the validity of secularization as the dominant paradigm in the second half of the 20th century, I feel it is important to remember approaches such as Casanova’s (1994) to the global re-emergence of religion as a political and cultural force in the public domain, even within the secularized West. In political governance in Europe, religion has become more significant. New patterns of immigration have developed, popes have become involved in the political sphere, and traditional forms of religion, such as pilgrimages and sacred sites associated with national identity, have been revived. As Casanova asserts, the very separation between State and Church was more ambiguous than expected. Jürgen Habermas sees this new presence of religion in the public domain as a sign of a post-secular era (Habermas, 2009), and warns that many European countries will have to deal with the continued existence of religious communities in increasingly secularized environments.

80

Vilaça

5 Conclusion Portugal is one of the most Catholic countries in Southern Europe, and Fatima is an apt example of popular pilgrimages. It has been featured in both national and international media. How the Catholic Church reshaped the phenomena surrounding Fatima actively contributed towards establishing it as a prayer site of global significance. Fatima seems to indicate that religion is returning to the public sphere (Vilaça 2006), a shift made possible because Fatima itself has become a place of religion, education, culture, tourism, and politics. This paper looks at the Fatima phenomenon as being indicative of the ­importance of religion in the public sphere—particularly considering that Portugal is a secular state—and as a lens through which we can analyse the ambiguous relationship between the Portuguese State and the Catholic Church. Moreover, we can see how fragile the dichotomies of modernity are (Habermas 2009)—the public and the private, the secular and the religious, the profane and the sacred. References Agência Ecclesia (2008). “Pio XII testemunhou o milagre do sol”. http://www.agencia .ecclesia.pt/noticias/vaticano/pio-xii-testemunhou-milagre-do-sol/ [accessed 14 October 2017]. Agência Lusa. 2005. “A morte da Irmã Lúcia”. Visão: Maio 11. https://www.publico .pt/2005/02/14/sociedade/noticia/morte-da-irma-lucia-d-manuel-martins-critica -cancelamento-da-campanha-eleitoral-1215747 [accessed 05 November 2017]. Agência Lusa. 2017. “Santuário de Fátima registou em 2017 aumento considerável de peregrinos asiáticos”. https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/pais/santuario-de-fatima-registou -em-2017-aumento-consideravel-de-peregrinos-asiaticos_n1041869 [accessed 20 November 2017]. Barreto, José. 2002. Religião e sociedade: dois ensaios. Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais. Carvalho, Miguel. 2017. “Nossa Senhora é para aqui chamada?” Visão. Casanova, José. 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Coutinho, Jorge. 2007. “Comunismo”. Pp. 125–127 in Enciclopédia de Fátima, edited by Carlos Azevedo and Luciano Cristino. Estoril: Princípia Editora. Cruz, M. Braga. 1998. O Estado Novo e a Igreja Católica. Lisboa: Editorial Bizâncio.

Place of Popular Religiosity to a Transnational Space

81

Felício, Manuel da R. 2007. “Ecumenismo”. Pp. 181–184 in Enciclopédia de Fátima, edited by Carlos Azevedo and Luciano Cristino. Estoril: Princípia Editora. Fernandes, António T. 1999. O confronto de ideologias na segunda década do século XX—à volta de Fátima. Porto: Edições Afrontamento. Fernandes, António T. 2013. Fátima e poder político na Primeira República. Porto: Estratégias Criativas. Fortuna, Carlos; Claudino Ferreira. 1993. “Estradas e santuários: Percurso sócio-­ religioso e motivações dos peregrinos caminhantes a Fátima”. Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais 36: 5–79. Freire, José. 2007. “Visitas ilustres”. Pp. 609–612 in Enciclopédia de Fátima, edited by Carlos Azevedo and Luciano Cristino. Estoril: Princípia Editora. Guerra, Luciano. 2007. “João Paulo II e Fátima (1920–2005)”. Pp. 281–285 in Enciclopédia de Fátima, edited by Carlos Azevedo and Luciano Cristino. Estoril: Princípia Editora. Habermas, Jürgen. 2009. “What is meant by a ‘postsecular society’? A discussion on Islam in Europe”, Pp. 59–77, in Europe: The faltering project, edited by Habermas Jürgen. London: Polity Press. Heelas, Paul. 2008. Spiritualities of Life. New Age Romanticism and Consumptive Capitalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Jaki, Stanley. 1999. God and the Sun at Fatima. Royal Oak, MI: Real View Books. Jornal de Notícias (2017). “Muçulmano cumpriu promessa de joelhos em Fátima” https://www.jn.pt/nacional/interior/muculmano-cumpriu-promessa-de-joelhos -em-fatima-8112474.html [accessed 22 November 2017]. López, E. Mouriño. 1997. Vivir o camiño. Revivir a historia. Vigo: D.L Marujo, António. 2000. “O interesse da História por Fátima”. Jornal Público. https:// www.publico.pt/2000/10/28/jornal/o-interesse-da-historia-por-fatima-150529 [accessed 14 October 2017]. Marujo, António.2004. “Hindus vão a Fátima há 50 anos”. Jornal Público. https://www .publico.pt/2004/09/30/sociedade/noticia/hindus-vao-a-fatima-ha-50-anos -1204769/amp [accessed 22 November 2017]. Marujo, António.2017a. “Do lugar inóspito ao cais de cinco milhões”. Jornal de Notícias: Dossier História: 07, Abril. Marujo, António. 2017b. “Os Papas que entronizaram Fátima”. Visão: Maio. Marujo, António; Rui P. Cruz da (Eds.). 2017. A Senhora de Maio. Lisboa: Temas e Debates/Círculo de Leitores. Mendes, Ana C. 2009. Peregrinos a Santiago de Compostela: Uma Etnografia do Caminho Português, Mestrado em Antropologia Social e Cultural. Lisboa: Instituto de Ciências Sociais Universidade de Lisboa. Pereira, Pedro 2003. Peregrinos: Um estudo antropológico das peregrinações a pé a Fátima. Lisboa: Instituto Piaget.

82

Vilaça

Pereirinha, Tânia. 2017. “As 23 horas e 43 minutos do Papa em Portugal”. Observador. http://observador.pt/especiais/as-23-horas-e-43-minutos-do-papa-em-portugal/ [accessed 21 October 2017]. Ratzinger, Joseph. 2000. “Theological Commentary”. http://www.vatican.va/roman _curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000626_message -fatima_en.html [accessed 14 October 2017]. Reis, Bruno C. 2000. “Fátima: os primeiros cinquenta anos”. História 29: 16–27. Reis, Bruno C. 2006. Salazar e o Vaticano. Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais. Rosas, Fernando. 2017. “Apresentação do livro A Senhora de Maio”. http://www .esquerda.net/audio/fernando-rosas-apresenta-o-livro-senhora-de-maio [accessed 20 October 2017]. Santos, Maria da Graça M.P. 2008. Estudo sobre o Perfil do Visitante de Fátima. Porto: Edições Afrontamento. Santuário de Fátima. 2016. “Santuário de Fátima regista número recorde de peregrinações”. http://www.fatima.pt/pt/news/2016-03-07-santuario-de-fatima-regista-nu mero-recorde-de-peregrinacoes-2016-03-07 [accessed 20 November 2017]. Serôdio, Frederico. 2007. “Exército Azul de Nossa Senhora de Fátima (Apostolado Mundial de Fátima)”. Pp. 210–212 in Enciclopédia de Fátima, edited by Carlos Azevedo and Luciano Cristino. Estoril: Princípia Editora. Teixeira, Alfredo (Ed.). 2012. Identidades religiosas em Portugal: representações, valores e práticas—Relatório. Lisboa, Universidade Católica Portuguesa: CESOP e CERC. Vilaça, Helena. 2006. Da torre de Babel às terras prometidas: pluralismo religioso em Portugal. Porto: Edições Afrontamento. Vilaça, Helena. 2010. “Pilgrims and Pilgrimages: Fatima, Santiago de Compostela and Taizé”. Nordic Journal of Religion and Society. Vol 23 (2): 137–155. Voyé, Liliane. 1995. “Le rite en questions” [The Rite in Question]. Pp. 105–135 in Le rite, source e ressources [The rite, sources and ressources] edited by René Devisch, Charles Perrot, Liliane Voyé and Louis-Marie Chauvet. Bruxelles: Publications des Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis. Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society, vol. 1, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds.). Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.

Chapter 4

Cultural Catholics in the United States Tricia C. Bruce Changes to the religious landscape of the United States raise new questions about the flexibility, resilience, and dimensions of Catholic identity. While Catholicism remains the largest denomination in the United States, the population of American Catholics—and their share among Americans overall—is in decline. The Pew Research Center estimates the adult (18+) Catholic population at some 51 million, or 21 percent of all American adults (Pew 2015a).1 This represents a 3 percent drop in seven years. Fully half (52 percent) of U.S. adults raised in the Catholic faith subsequently leave Catholicism at some point (Pew 2015b).2 Each year, six Americans leave Catholicism for every American who joins; some 22 million baptized American Catholics no longer identify as such. While fertility and immigration have long offset Catholics’ disaffiliation, today, they are insufficient to counter the de-Catholicization of the United States. Many once-Catholics reside among an ever-larger proportion of religiously non-affiliated Americans (“nones”). Apostasy from formal religious labels constitutes the most prominent trend in contemporary U.S. religion (Hout and Fischer 2014). Nones now comprise nearly a quarter of Americans … a proportion more populous than that of affiliated Catholics (Pew 2015a). Further still—even those Americans who do adhere to a “Catholic” affiliation report lower levels of practice and conformity to formal Church teachings. Fewer than one in four of U.S. Catholics attend Mass weekly, down from 55 percent just after Vatican ii. The number of Catholic marriages dropped 60 percent between 1972 and 2012. American Catholics are also having fewer babies (mirroring record-low U.S. fertility rates) and are less likely to baptize the babies they do have (Gray 2011, 2013, 2019). Catholic youth struggle to articulate core tenets of their faith, their parents being ill-equipped to socialize them into basic principles of Catholic belief (Smith et al. 2014). Today’s United States of America is, in short, trending less Catholic. Or … is it?

1 Estimates of the total U.S. Catholic population vary. 2 Some later return to the Church; most do not.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004380073_006

84

Bruce

Assessing the American Catholic scene, sociologists of religion typically apply a mutually exclusive binary: “Catholic” or “not Catholic”. This approach, however, insufficiently appreciates the resilience, flexibility, and cultural diffusion of contemporary religious identities in the United States. It ­inadequately conceptualizes the substantial and increasing number of Americans with stated, residual ties to Catholicism. A simplistic “Catholic” / “not Catholic” conceptual binary underappreciates the liminality of contemporary American Catholicism, just as a religious/spirituality binary falters in capturing nuance writ large (see Ammerman 2013). This chapter asserts that transformations in American Catholicism necessitate the introduction of a conceptual space between “Catholic” and “not Catholic” that better acknowledges the symbolic diffusion of American Catholic culture. Namely, it is time to implement conceptual categories for “cultural Catholic” and “cultural Catholicism”. Catholicism is transmitted through the behaviours, practices, meaning system, and felt connections of individuals apart from their self-identified religious labels. Cultural Catholics—and the Catholicism they enact—is interwoven with American public and private life. Cultural Catholicism proffers a language and analytical rubric to nuance the prevalence, endurance, and liminality of contemporary American Catholicism. “Cultural Catholic” describes a populated category of individuals for whom Catholicism matters in self-conception, practice, and/or enduring influence, but not in formal religious affiliation (anymore, at least). Cultural Catholics do not self-identify as Catholic, but nonetheless think of themselves as Catholic or “partially Catholic” in some way (Pew 2015b). Data from a 2015 Pew Research Center study reveal that one in ten American adults (fully 9 percent of the U.S. adult population) fall into this category (Pew 2015b). This means that a sizable proportion of Americans describe themselves by a quasi-religious identity about which we know little, sociologically. What exactly do (or can) we know about cultural Catholics and cultural ­Catholicism in the U.S.? The following pages trace the sources and implications of these underdeveloped analytic categories (“cultural Catholicism” and the “cultural Catholic”), drawing upon secondary data from surveys of Americans and related literature in the sociology of religion, culture, and American Catholicism. This work is conceptual and agenda-setting rather than definitive. It is organized into four main sections: (1) conceptualizing cultural ­Catholicism; (2) operationalizing cultural Catholicism; (3) mapping the characteristics of cultural Catholics; and (4) how cultural Catholicism is changing American ­Catholicism. A concluding discussion on cultural Catholicism as a liminal religious identity urges more research in this ripe field of inquiry henceforth.

Cultural Catholics in the United States

1

85

Conceptualizing Cultural Catholicism

Is there such a thing as cultural Catholicism? And who, exactly, is a “cultural Catholic”? In her book Catholic Identity (1999), sociologist Michele Dillon theorizes Catholic identity as cultural production. Examining gay and lesbian Catholics in “Dignity” and members of the Women’s Ordination Conference, Dillon details how individual Catholics construct identities at the margins of a shared Catholic tradition. What Dillon surmises is that religious identity work relies upon the interpretive autonomy of believers and commitment to tradition. Religious authority rests not solely within the hands of a formal church office, but also within the hands of individual Catholics. Meaning is not given, but forged. The idea of a “cultural Catholic” pushes the agency of individuals further still from the authority of tradition, and from that of an institutional Catholic Church. A cultural Catholic identity may loosen—sever, even—the pseudoautonomous cultural work of individuals from their connections to official Church authorities and teachings. This upends a definition of religion akin to that of Émile Durkheim, which hinged upon its association with a moral community of believers: a Church. Tied to “Church”, religion coheres around a specialized group with a hierarchy and specific set of truths. Cultural Catholicism, by contrast, returns religion to the domain of culture, thereby blurring the systemic, unifying functions of an associated authority and rituals. Cultural Catholicism emerges out of meanings shared across a diffused collective, implying the diminished function and import of Church. This weakens the control function of Catholic hierarchy. Cultural Catholicism makes space for the notion that a Catholic identity can be purely cultural, perhaps more accurately described as ethnic than religious in character. Numerous sociologists of religion operating in non-U.S. contexts point to this kind of cultural turn in religious identity. Demerath (2000: 127), for example, applies the term “cultural religion” to his observations of Poland, Northern Ireland, and Sweden, detailing a “syndrome” wherein “religion affords a sense of personal identity and continuity with the past even after participation in ritual and belief have lapsed”. Davie (2002, 2006) labels this cultural resonance as “vicarious religion”. In the French context, Jean-Paul Willaime argues that religious authorities now hold little power over French society, but the symbolic dimensions of social bonds are increasing in salience. Religion in society is accordingly reconstructed, “forged anew by means of the symbolic materials available in national and religious memories” (Willaime 2004: 384). Still others likewise compel sociologists to shift their gaze toward cultural measures of religiosity (e.g. Hervieu-Léger 2003; Kasselstrand 2015).

86

Bruce

“Culture” itself is a messy concept, of course—made messier by countless sociologists who have attempted to theorize the term. As per Christian Smith’s 2016 critique of culture’s conceptual incoherence: To summarize, different culture theorists in the last few decades define culture as very many different things—as cognitive representations or mental schemas, practices, a realm, or space, collective ­subjectivity, processes, propositions, meanings, public symbolic codes, practical know-how, interpretive knowledge and understandings, beliefs, the semiotic or expressive aspect of dimension of all of social life, visions, self-­ reflexive agency and resistance, ways of life, tools, patterns of orientation to action, linguistic systems, and the grounds, stakes, and outcomes of action. smith 2016: 399–400

Culture becomes a catch-all term. Defining Americans’ cultural Catholicism, then, is hardly a straightforward endeavour. Taking a cue from sociologists of culture, Catholic identity could be linked to the tools one has in her or his “cultural toolkit” (Swidler 1986). A set of Catholic cultural “tools” cohere the label. In this vein, a cultural Catholic identity is a lived accomplishment: individuals may “do” Catholicism even apart from “being” (or identifying as) Catholic. Catholicism operates as a “Catholic habitus” (Dillon 2001) not predicated upon participation in the Catholic tradition. Catholic identities run deeper than any explicit links to formal structures, as scholars of “lived religion” portray (Ammerman 1997; McGuire 2008). Sociologists detail ways in which Latinx Catholics, for example, exemplify cultural connections to faith not circumscribed by institutional authorities (e.g. Chesnut 2017; Castañeda-Liles 2018). Discerning the parameters of a cultural Catholicism camp is made all the more complex by ambiguity surrounding who counts as “Catholic” in the first place. A full excursus in Young Catholic America, for example, asks “who, when it comes to social science analysis of emerging adults, actually is a Catholic” (Smith et al. 2014: 126). Challenging simple indicators of self-identification and Mass attendance, Smith et al. argue that the influence of others (e.g., parents and/or a Catholic upbringing) also matter in classifying individuals’ religious identity. “We might consider being raised Catholic as a valid marker for being included in the Catholic category for analysis, even when respondents and their parents show no signs of being Catholic at the time of the study” (Smith et al. 2014: 135). This would mean moving “former Catholics” into the “Catholic” category given the enduring impact of religious socialization. Injecting a third

Cultural Catholics in the United States

87

category—the “cultural Catholic”—may better equip social scientists to assess the enduring effects of religious socialization. Many sociologists—in particular, those who engage survey methodologies to evaluate broad populations of adherents—utilize a litany of traits to categorize Catholic identity. The authors of American Catholics in Transition (2013), for example, codify the parameters of Catholic identity as both theological and sacramental. Measures ought to “identify what contemporary Catholics view as personally important to them as Catholics and what they also consider less central” (D’Antonio, Dillon, and Gautier 2013: 48). This puts the work of categorization into the hands of individual American Catholics. Researchers ask Catholics which behaviours and beliefs rank as essential to their Catholic identity, and which get relegated to the periphery. Using this rubric, belief in the resurrection, teaching about Mary, the Eucharist, and a regular prayer life constitute the core of Catholics’ faith identity (D’Antonio, Dillon, and Gautier 2013: 48). This reflects a cultural construction of Catholic identity categories, with more than one based upon alignment with institutional indicators. Considering Mass attendance as a core measure of a Catholic identity, political scientist and scholar of Catholicism Mark Gray parses self-identified American Catholics into two categories: a “core” and a “periphery” (Gray 2019). The “core” includes those Catholics who attend Mass at least once a month. The “periphery” still identify as Catholic, but attend Mass less than once a month (or perhaps not at all). Gray uses this as a way to track the gap between the 100 million Americans baptized Catholic versus the 78 million who selfidentify as such (and just 61 million registered with a parish).3 A core/periphery rubric captures more nuance among self-identifying Catholics. Even so, a cultural Catholic category may do better in explaining gaps between baptism and self-identification … and offer a more accurate descriptor of those Americans at the periphery of Catholic practice. Another frequently used composite measure assesses what Americans think it takes to fall into the category of “good” Catholic. This tests the boundaries of Catholic identity by perception: who is in, who is out, and who sits along the margins. What gets excised from a “good” Catholic category may operate as a proxy for cultural Catholicism. Prominently, D’Antonio et al. (2013) find that “the vast majority of Catholics articulate a view of what it means to be a good Catholic that is largely independent of the church hierarchy’s teachings” (D’Antonio, Dillon, and Gautier 2013: 50). Formal rules dictating behaviour, in other words, constrain identities less so than foundational beliefs. American 3 Gray derives this estimate from cara’s national surveys of adult self-identified Catholics.

88

Bruce

Table 4.1 U.S. Catholics' perception of what constitutes a "good" Catholic identity.

A person can be a good Catholic without adhering to Church teachings on… Birth control 78% Weekly Mass 78 Helping the parish 74 Marriage approval 72 Divorce and remarriage 69 Helping the poor 60 Abortion 60 Transubstantiation 40 Jesus’ resurrection 31 Source: D’Antonio, William V., Michele Dillon, and Mary L. Gautier (2013).

Catholics in Transition (2013) reports that the following percentages of American Catholics say that a person can be a good Catholic without adhering to Church teachings on … (see Table 4.1). These responses, of course, come from those who self-identify as Catholic (as opposed to “culturally Catholic” or otherwise). But they signal, nonetheless, the flexibility of American Catholic identity to allow noncompliance to certain religious practices (such as abstaining from birth control) alongside comparative inflexibility when it comes to belief (specifically, the resurrection and transubstantiation). Social behaviours do not immediately move someone out of a “good” Catholic identity. Cultural attributes, then, may translate into a Catholic identity that (perhaps) drops core beliefs (e.g. transubstantiation and Jesus’ resurrection) but retains other components of the faith tradition: i.e., cultural Catholicism. Of course, many theologians question the appropriateness of assessing Catholic identity — “good” or otherwise—via a checklist of behaviours. Lived religiosity is complex. Interviews that informed my first book, Faithful Revolution, illustrate this (T. Bruce 2011). Lay Catholics mobilized as Voice of the Faithful (votf) in the wake of revelations of child abuse by clergy and Church leaders’ complicity. But votf members’ Catholic identity required constant defence. Those internal to the group emphasized their long-term participation in the Church and stated self-identities. Most shared a Catholic habitus shaped by Vatican ii, a long-standing commitment to Catholicism as an institution, and a perception of a Church that could change. For those outside the

Cultural Catholics in the United States

89

movement, though, the Catholic identity of votf members merited heightened scrutiny. Surely they were not legitimately “Catholic” if they critiqued the Church. A self-proclaimed Catholic identity was not enough; some bishops even banned local gatherings of votf in parishes. Despite votf seeing themselves as Catholic, other self-identifying Catholics defined votf as being “outside” the Church. This religious identity work echoes how scholars of race and ethnicity depict social identities as a combination of both external and internal validation. The “dialectical process” of ethnoracial identity formation involves internal as well as external attribution (Nagel 1994; Waters 1990; Lee and Bean 2010). How others label you, in other words, can matter as much as how you label yourself. The process resonates with what Michele Dillon reminds readers in Catholic Identity: “Identity emerges rather from the context of intergroup relations (Tajfel 1978) and depends on the availability of plausibility structures (Berger and Luckmann 1966) that contextualize and legitimate identities as reasonable and real” (Dillon 1999: 160). Religious identities are not purely personal. In the case of a cultural Catholic identity, external and internal validation intermingles in meaningful ways. Feeling as though one would not satisfy any institutional measure of a “good” Catholic identity, a cultural—rather than institutionally wedded—identity may feel more befitting. “Cultural Catholic” validates an internal connection apart from an external one. It signals neither believing nor belonging. Pinpointing the boundary between Catholic and cultural Catholic—or cultural Catholic and anyone else—remains an unsettled question. Among the theologians that Dillon (1999) interviewed was one who said plainly that being Catholic is “not purely cultural” (Dillon 1999: 227). The question turns, then, to how social scientists may operationalize this under-examined category of American religiosity. 2

Operationalizing Cultural Catholicism

Who, then, are cultural Catholics in the contemporary U.S.? The September 2015 Pew Research Center Report, “U.S. Catholics Open to Non-Traditional Families” made a rare attempt to measure not two but three categories of American Catholic identity: Catholics, Cultural Catholics, and Ex-Catholics.4 “Catholics” included those who responded to a question about 4 I served on a team of expert consultants brought in for the conception of this study, invited to give input throughout the process of data gathering and reporting.

90

Bruce

current religion with “Catholic” or “Roman Catholic”.5 “Cultural Catholics” did not respond with “Catholic” when asked about their current religion. They responded instead that they belong to another faith tradition (e.g. Protestantism), or are religiously unaffiliated (atheist, agnostic or “nothing in particular”). But, importantly, cultural Catholic respondents nonetheless consider themselves Catholic or partially Catholic in some other way, per a subsequent, direct question on the Pew survey: ASK IF NOT CURRENTLY CATHOLIC BY RELIGION (RELIG): Do you currently consider yourself Catholic or partially Catholic in any way, or not? [Response options: Yes; No; Don’t know/Refused (VOL.)] By this Pew measurement, cultural Catholics satisfy two criteria: they are (1)  not Catholic by current religion and yet (2) consider themselves Catholic in some other way. This facilitated the creation of a category for Catholic identity “aside from religion”. Cultural Catholics, ergo, are operationalized as non-religious Catholics. A third category in the 2015 Pew study, “ex-Catholic”, is comprised of those who (1) were raised Catholic; (2) are not currently Catholic; and (3) no longer consider themselves Catholic in any way. This operationalization draws a tri-part picture of Catholic identity: religiously Catholic, culturally (and not religiously) Catholic; and not Catholic by either religion or culture. Figure 4.1 visualizes this tri-part conception of Catholic identity. Pew (2015b) operationalizes the identities of both former Catholics and cultural Catholics in relation to current, self-identified Catholics. Ex-Catholics once held a Catholic identity, but now eschew it entirely. Cultural Catholics may have once held a Catholic identity, but now retain only its “cultural” elements, apart from religious self-identification. The three identities overlap most in early socialization: with the exception of converts, Catholics, cultural Catholics, and ex-Catholics were raised Catholic. This places the essential work of building Catholic identity—cultural or otherwise—within families, childhood, and adolescence. The Pew survey asked both Catholic and cultural Catholic respondents whether—to them personally—being Catholic was mainly a matter of r­ eligion

5 The question wording was as follows: “What is your present religion, if any? Are you Protestant, Roman Catholic, Mormon, Orthodox such as Greek or Russian Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, atheist, agnostic, something else, or nothing in particular?”

Cultural Catholics in the United States

91

Cultural Catholics

Ex Catholics Catholics

Figure 4.1 A tri-part conception of Catholic identity.

or ancestry or culture.6 Not surprisingly, Catholics were more likely than cultural Catholics to say that being Catholic is mainly a matter of religion (38 versus 27 percent). But the fact that a full 62 percent of Catholic respondents did not indicate that Catholicism was primarily a matter of religion says that they, too, recognize the hold of a Catholic identity that goes beyond religion. More cultural Catholics than Catholics said it was primarily a matter of ancestry (37 versus 28 percent, respectively). This, again, goes to the connectedness between cultural Catholic identities and early childhood socialization. Those who were raised Catholic or who had a Catholic parent are twice as likely as those without this family background to say being Catholic is mainly a matter of ancestry (44 percent vs. 22 percent). A bit more surprising, perhaps, is that there is not much difference in the percentage of Catholics versus cultural Catholics who, when asked whether being Catholic is mainly a matter of religion, ancestry, or culture, cite “culture”. Two in ten (21 percent) of Catholics cite culture as primary, compared to a quarter (25 percent) of cultural Catholics. Taken together, 38 percent of Catholics cite religion as primary; 62 percent cite something else. Among cultural Catholics, 27 percent cite religion as primary; 73 percent cite something else. That means that in both cases—Catholics and cultural Catholics—there is a 6 Some respondents indicated that it was two or all three of these, together. I focus here on the percentage narrowing in on one of the three: religion, ancestry, or culture.

92

Bruce

clear recognition that Catholic identity and attachment supersede “religion”, per se. Catholicism is also (or more so) ancestry and culture. Specified further, the 2015 Pew survey invited those in the “cultural Catholic” camp to state in their own words what it was that made them consider themselves Catholic in some way other than by religion. The question wording was as follows: ASK IF R CONSIDERS SELF CATHOLIC BUT NOT BY RELIGION (Q.J1=1): Q.J2 In your own words, could you please tell me in what way you consider yourself Catholic? If a respondent volunteered an answer from a precoded set of options, it was coded as such. Responses aside from precoded options were recorded verbatim. In all cases, respondents were not probed to expand upon their answers. This limits this study’s qualitative insight into how and why many Americans consider themselves culturally—but not religiously—Catholic. Within the limits of these precoded and unprobed open responses, 425 sampled cultural Catholics described the rationale behind their cultural Catholic connections. An allowance for multiple responses leads to percentages totalling more than 100. Seven primary themes emerge, ranked in Table 4.2 by frequency.

Table 4.2 Themes in self-described sources of cultural Catholics' connections.

In your own words, could you please tell me in what way you consider yourself Catholic? Catholic background 43% Catholic affinity 24 Catholic-specific beliefs or practices 12 Connections to Catholic institutions 9 Catholic friends/family (aside from 9 parents or grandparents) Other 8 Don’t know/Refused 5 Source: Pew Research Center (Sept. 2, 2015).

Cultural Catholics in the United States

93

Affirming the strong overlap of cultural Catholic and religiously-Catholic identities, having a Catholic background ranks as the most common response offered for why Americans hold a cultural connection to a faith they no longer identify with, religiously. For most, this means that they were raised Catholic, with a Catholic parent or parents. A Catholic childhood lays the foundation for a cultural Catholic identity among those who relinquish the religious identity but nonetheless feel a persistent tie to Catholicism. A smaller proportion of respondents mention a Catholic grandparent or grandparents. Still others refer to having been Catholic at some point. Others do not specify further what “Catholic background” means to them. Respondents with this Catholic upbringing were also invited to specify the main reason why they are no longer Catholic. Among cultural Catholics, half (45 percent) cite organizational factors (e.g. leadership, crisis of abuse, overly restrictive policies). Changes in personal spirituality or belief systems explain the departure of another 24 percent. The remainder list reasons related to family, circumstance, or some other factor. The next most common set of explanations for a cultural Catholic identity fall into the theme of “Catholic affinity”. As indicated by the theme name, respondents here retain a cultural connection to Catholicism by choice and positive association. This may be what separates them most cleanly from ­ex-­Catholics, for whom a negative association may distance them from any residual/claimed cultural connection to Catholicism. The topline report from Pew indicates that the following types of responses fill this category: General Christian beliefs or practices (e.g. believes in God/Jesus, reads the Bible); Beliefs, views, values, morals aligned with Catholic Church/Catholic teaching; Catholicism as part of Christianity/similar to other religions/respondent’s religion rooted in Catholicism; Likes/admires/respects Catholic Church or pope; or Likes liturgy/worship/other aspects of service. Closely related is a set of responses that emphasize Catholic-specific beliefs or practices. These include ties to the sacraments (e.g. received communion, married in Church); attending Mass; Believes in/prays to saints, Mary, Holy Spirit, Trinity; and Celebrations/holidays with Catholic elements or sometimes participates in Catholic practices. This kind of logic resonates with the aforementioned findings among self-identified American Catholics who express high independence from (and/or common disagreement with) Church hierarchy, but simultaneous meaningfulness in their faith practice. As the authors of American Catholics in Transition report, “Catholics are strongly attached to Catholicism even as they may simultaneously question certain aspects of its structure (e.g., celibacy) and teaching (e.g., ban on contraception)” (D’Antonio, Dillon, Gautier 2013: 52). Responses by cultural Catholics in the

94

Bruce

Pew (2015b) study suggest that it may be possible to retain a meaningful attachment to Catholic specific belief and practice without retaining the formal affiliation. Interestingly, the Catholic affinity and Catholic-specific beliefs/practice responses suggest that there are in fact overlaps between cultural and religious Catholics with regard to religious belief (back to that list of core components of a “Catholic” or “good” Catholic identity). But culturally-Catholic respondents do not own the religious aspect (and/or label) of their Catholic identity. Cultural Catholics did not respond “Catholic” when asked their current religion, any shared beliefs notwithstanding. Further, this set of responses hints at the oft-discussed divide between religion and spirituality. Cultural Catholics may embrace what they interpret as a belief/spirituality side of their faith while distancing themselves as joiners in an institutional Church, per se. They believe, but do not belong or affiliate. Compared to ex-Catholics, cultural Catholics in the Pew study are less likely to cite reasons of personal spirituality for no longer identifying as Catholic, religiously. While average American Catholics indicate that believing in core tenets of the faith is more important than weekly Mass attendance, many American cultural Catholics find themselves on the other side of this boundary. They share in essential or core elements of a faith, but not in an explicit (religious) Catholic identity. For still other cultural Catholics, it is actually the institutional connection that links them to Catholicism. One in ten cultural Catholics express that “connections to Catholic institutions” explains their rationale for considering themselves Catholic in some way. For most, this means having attended a Catholic school at some point. A smaller number cite connections to Catholic organizations through work experience. This challenges the idea that cultural Catholicism can be characterized as a category of people who appreciate the faith but distance themselves from the institution. Parishes, schools, universities, organizations, and workplaces all appear in cultural Catholics’ descriptions of what makes them consider themselves Catholic apart from religion. I­nstitutions, too, link individuals to Catholicism culturally, even if not religiously. A spousal connection to Catholicism explains cultural Catholic links for another set of Americans. While fully three quarters of Catholics are married/­ living with a spouse/partner who is Catholic (Pew 2015a), interfaith marriages are increasingly common. A non-Catholic spouse claiming a cultural Catholic connection may reflect either social desirability to mirror one’s partner’s religious identity, and/or (perhaps) reduced stigma around interfaith marriage, while retaining social connections. Sociologist-priest Andrew Greeley once wrote of religious intermarriage that “the strain toward denominational homogeneity is rooted in the American belief that religious differences between

Cultural Catholics in the United States

95

husband and wife are not good either for the marriage relationship or for the children of the marriage” (Greeley 1970: 951). These responses may predict that, today, cultural Catholic connections can substitute for religious self-­ identification to ease such “strain”. Finally, “other” explanatory responses recorded from Pew’s cultural Catholics include those who cite their own conversion-in-progress; who see the Church helping themselves and others in need; and who hold a certain ambivalence about Catholicism. Additional probes would have likely elicited further clarity on these and other explanations for non-religious Catholic connections.7 The 2015 Pew study was novel in its attempt to categorize Americans within a cultural Catholic identity category. Cultural Catholics did not claim a religious Catholic identity, but did cite a connection to Catholicism. This was self-reported. Here, no specific set of behaviours—belief, Mass attendance, sacramental compliance, or otherwise—operates as a set index for cultural Catholicism. Cultural Catholics are found to occupy a wide spectrum of beliefs and behaviours, many overlapping with those of Catholics. But none claimed a (religious) Catholic identity and, as such, would typically be lost in any assessments of contemporary American Catholicism. 3

Mapping the Characteristics of Cultural Catholicism

One in ten Americans (9 percent) are cultural Catholics (Pew 2015b). These Americans do not identify as Catholic religiously, but do “consider themselves Catholic in some way”. Cultural Catholics comprise a sizable proportion of Americans: combining cultural Catholics with self-identified (religious) Catholics accounts for three in ten Americans (29 percent). Adding ex-Catholics and those with “other Catholic connections” accounts for a full 45 percent of Americans (Pew 2015b). Cultural Catholics constitute a meaningful (and surprisingly unacknowledged) part of the American Catholic landscape. Figure 4.2 breaks down the percentage of Americans contained in each Pew (2015b) category (Catholics, cultural Catholics, ex-Catholics, other Catholic connections, and no Catholic connection). All told, nearly half of Americans hold some connection to Catholicism, by way of faith, self-identification, culture, family, or practice. This suggests a strong and enduring link between Catholic culture and American culture. 7 Following up with cultural Catholic respondents to conduct more extensive qualitative interviews was not possible given the confidentiality promised to respondents by the original survey-disseminating agency.

96

Bruce Catholic (20%) Present Religion

Not Catholic

Cultural Catholic (9%)

Ex-Catholic (9%)

Not Cultural Catholic

Other Catholic Connection (8%) No Catholic Connection (55%)

Figure 4.2 Range of Catholic connections among Americans.

Given that earlier studies on American Catholics did not include a similar set of questions to place anyone into a “cultural Catholic” category, it is difficult to know (yet) whether the number of cultural Catholics is growing, stable, or shrinking. We do know, however, that the number of former Catholics (a certain percentage of whom express an enduring, cultural Catholic identity) is growing, as is the percentage of American nones who claim no religious affiliation. The number of Catholics in the United States dropped by three million between 2007 and 2014 alone (Pew 2015a). Half (52 percent) of U.S. adult Catholics raised Catholic have left the Church at some point. Given the linkage of cultural Catholicism to parents and early childhood religious identification, this would suggest that cultural Catholicism is on the rise. Whether cultural Catholicism transmits to subsequent generations, however, is an unanswered question. The percentage of ex-Catholics grew seven points between 2007 and 2014 (Pew 2015a). This large swath of former Catholics generates a pool of potential cultural Catholics whose affiliation has disappeared but for whom a cultural, familiar, and/or personal connection holds. As a proportion of Catholics who left the Church, cultural Catholics comprise a quarter. An increase in former Catholics portends an increase in cultural Catholics. Exempting those who “revert”, meaning that they returned to the Church, cultural Catholics comprise just under a third (31 percent). Giving consideration to Americans who leave the Catholic Church / a Catholic affiliation but later return to it is relevant to understanding cultural Catholics in other ways, too. Specifically, cultural Catholics are most likely to revert—to return to the Church and a religiously-Catholic self-identification. More than four in ten cultural Catholics—43 percent—say that they can see themselves possibly returning to the Catholic Church at some point. Among

Cultural Catholics in the United States

97

others who have left the church (“ex-Catholics”), far fewer express this potential: most (89 percent) say they cannot envision reversion for themselves. This empirical point may help to explain a key difference between different varieties of “ex” Catholics. Many Americans leave the Catholic Church. Were they a denomination in their own right, ex-Catholics would outnumber all other denominations, with the exception of (current) Catholics. Even while the Catholic Church retains members at a higher rate than other faith traditions, they also lose more members given their sheer size. Moreover, while Catholics’ share of the U.S. population stayed remarkably steady for decades, recent indicate that Catholics are losing in their share of Americans … offset, perhaps, by increases in cultural Catholics. Which ex-Catholics sever any cultural ties to their former religion, and which retain them? Most surveys of religious identity rely on self-reports. The limited research done on cultural Catholics requires individuals to admit some enduring connection to Catholicism in order to count as such, at least the way that Pew has measured them. But other ex-Catholics may also carry their socialization into Catholic culture with them, despite not saying so explicitly. How do cultural Catholics differ along the lines of religious affiliation, race, generation, and region? Pew (2015b) reports that the current religious ­affiliations/self-identities of cultural Catholics vary. Of those who were raised Catholic (two thirds of cultural Catholics), half are now Protestant. A third are unaffiliated. The remainder—one in six—now identify with another, ­non-Christian religion. We don’t have a similar breakdown for the smaller percentage of cultural Catholics who were not raised Catholic or did not have a Catholic parent—a third of all cultural Catholics in the U.S. What this data tells us is that—perhaps counter-intuitively—cultural Catholics are not eschewing religion entirely. The departure from a Catholic religious identity does not equate to a departure from any religious identity. A substantial proportion of America’s cultural Catholics affiliate with another ­religious tradition, and/or express an openness to returning to the Catholic faith at some future point. Cultural Catholicism cannot, therefore, be read as a harbinger of a mass exodus from religion—at least not today. This fact resonates with critiques raised by sociologists of religion more generally of the ­attribution of more American nones to secularization (e.g. Schnabel and Bock 2017). Volatility in religious affiliation (summarized by Burge 2018) does not adhere cleanly to a secularization thesis that presumes the irrelevance of religion in public and private life (per S. Bruce 2011). Explanations for cultural Catholicism go beyond Americans’ scepticism toward religious affiliation. With regard to racial differentiation, cultural Catholicism is especially pronounced among Hispanic Americans, 13 percent of whom fit the category.

98

Bruce

­Given that Hispanics constitute some 34 percent of self-identified Catholics (Pew 2015b), it is logical that they would also be overrepresented among cultural Catholics (as well as among ex-Catholics). One in five American Hispanics is ex-Catholic, meaning than an ex-Catholic identity is more common among Hispanics than a cultural Catholic one. Even so, combining self-­ identified Hispanic Catholics with Hispanic cultural Catholics means that 58 percent of Hispanic Americans are either Catholic or culturally Catholic. Catholicism is a substantial cultural marker for a huge proportion of Hispanic Americans. As the proportion of Hispanics in the U.S. continues to grow, so, too, will the cultural impact of Catholicism. There are also generational differences in who falls into the cultural ­Catholic category. Cultural Catholics skew younger. One in ten millennials (born 1981– 1997) are cultural Catholics. Similarly, one in ten Gen x Americans (born 1965–1980) are cultural Catholics. Proportions drop from there: just 8 percent of Baby Boomers (1946–1964) fall into the cultural Catholic category, and 5 percent of the Silent Generation (1928–1945). This generational trend suggests an increasing likelihood (or opportunity) to move away from a religious Catholic identity and toward a culturally Catholic one. A similar trend can be observed among the proportions of nones in the American population: younger generations are more likely than older generations to classify themselves as “nothing in particular”. While many factors may be at play here, a cultural Catholic identity appears to be more tenable to younger Catholics coming of age than it does to older Catholics whose religious ties may feel less malleable. This generational trend reiterates the waning utility of binary religious identity categories (Catholic or otherwise). Even describing a population as comprised entirely of current Catholics, former Catholics, and never Catholics cannot appreciate the resilience of cultural components of religion. Following this rubric, research on millennial Catholics frequently assesses young Catholics’ religiosity as “not as Catholic” as their older generational counterparts. If younger Catholics know less about the faith, participate less in parishes, baptize their children less, marry in the church less, and the like, then (following this methodology) they fall out of the “Catholic” category and necessarily into that of “former Catholic”. Dire headlines question why so many “lose their Catholic identity by their late 20s”.8 More baffling still are findings that affirm the continuance of faith among these same young Catholics: e.g., believe in God, prayer, and openness to ecumenical dialogue (Manglos-Weber and Smith

8 https://icl.nd.edu/assets/170517/icl_former_catholics_final_web.pdf [accessed 10 August 2017].

99

Cultural Catholics in the United States Table 4.3 Regional distribution of Catholics and cultural Catholics.

Northeast Midwest South West Catholics (by religion) Cultural Catholics (aside from religion) Catholics + Cultural Catholics Cultural Catholics as a proportion of cultural Catholics + Catholics

30% 7 37

20% 9 29

14% 21% 9 9 23 30

19

31

39

30

Source: Pew Research Center (Sept. 2, 2015).

2015). Catholic identity “loss” may be a less apt descriptor for generational change than the generational shift to cultural Catholicism. Cultural Catholicism can also be mapped by regional distribution. Looking at Pew self-identified Catholics and cultural Catholics side-by-side, a regional breakdown appears in Table 4.3. Looking only at religious self-identification, the Northeast predominates as most heavily Catholic by religious affiliation; the South, the least. Cultural Catholics are spread out fairly evenly, only slightly less represented in the Northeast. As a proportion of “Catholics” (both self-identified and cultural), the South is more heavily comprised of cultural Catholics than other regions. The Northeast contains the opposite: cultural Catholics comprise a lower proportion of the area’s Catholics, overall. What this distribution means is that cultural Catholicism—more so than religious Catholicism—may better describe the character of certain regions. Even the South—with smaller numbers of self-­identified religious Catholics— is Catholic due to cultural Catholicism almost as much as it is to religiously self-identified Catholicism. Taken together, the preliminary data available regarding cultural Catholics in the United States suggests that they are numerous and varied in distribution, but hint at important religious affiliational, racial, generational, and regional trends impacting American Catholicism overall. 4

How Cultural Catholicism is Changing American Catholicism

Cultural Catholicism is changing American Catholicism, and the ways that sociologists (should) study it. The finding that both Catholics and “cultural Catholics” attribute “being Catholic” to something beyond religion—qua

100

Bruce

r­eligion—parallels the kind of symbolic work long noted among Americans who renegotiate ethnic and national identities, post-migration. Herbert Gans wrote in 1979 with regard to assimilation in ethnic identities that “a new kind of ethnic involvement may be occurring, which emphasizes concern with identity, with the feeling of being Jewish or Italian, etc” (Gans 1979: 1). This “feeling”, Gans then suggested, is carried forward less by organizations and more through symbols. “As a result, ethnicity may be turning into symbolic ethnicity, an ethnicity of last resort, which could, nevertheless, persist for generations” (Gans 1979: 1). Parallel to trends in American Catholicism and U.S. religious writ large, cultural Catholicism might very well act as “symbolic religion”—a religion of last resort which will, nevertheless, persist for generations. Gans, himself, pursued this kind of logic in a 1994 article entitled “Symbolic ethnicity and symbolic religiosity: Towards a comparison of ethnic and religious acculturation”. In this, he defines symbolic religiosity as follows: Symbolic religiosity refers to the consumption of religious symbols, apart from religious participation in a religious culture and in religious ­affiliations—other than for purely secular purposes. As a sacred rather than secular activity, symbolic religiosity is presumably not as often a ­leisure-time activity as symbolic ethnicity, but nonetheless, it involves the consumption of religious symbols in such a way as to create no complications or barriers for dominant secular lifestyles. gans 1994: 585

Drawing upon examples from Judaism, Gans suggests that symbolic religiosity can be found in objects: food, books, art, household symbols, and more. Joining an occasional religious service as a spectator rather than as a participant provides occasion for symbolic religiosity, as does touring religious sites and celebrating holidays. Demerath (2000), similarly, describes cultural religion as “the penultimate stage of religious secularization—the last loose bond of religious attachment before the ties are let go altogether” (Demarath 2000: 136–137). Are we to classify what we now see happening in American Catholicism in this same way? The fact that Catholicism is a diverse and plural tradition (e.g. Baggett 2008; Bruce 2017) makes it all the more difficult to say that someone is a cultural Catholic as opposed to a Catholic. The notion of big-tent Catholicism makes space for many to reappropriate shared tradition, at least from the standpoint of external validation. But from the viewpoint of internal validation, many Americans nonetheless see themselves as not Catholic ­religiously— but still Catholic culturally. The category of cultural Catholic could provide a

Cultural Catholics in the United States

101

simultaneous “out” and “in” for those individuals who do not seem to fit standardized rubrics of a formal, institutional Church. The sociologist-priest Andrew Greeley wrote in an Op-Ed to the New York Times in 1994 that: Catholics remain Catholic because of the Catholic religious sensibility, a congeries of metaphors that explain what human life means, with deep and powerful appeal to the total person. The argument is not whether Catholics should leave their tradition or whether they stay for the right reasons. The argument is that they do in fact stay because of the attractiveness of Catholic metaphors. Perhaps some Catholics remain Catholic … even when they do not remain ­Catholic. They are Catholics who aren’t “Catholic”. The “Catholic ­Imagination”— the very title of one of Greeley’s books—lends stories, images, rituals, and communities of how “Catholics live in an enchanted world” (2000:1). At issue here is whether the Catholic imagination may very well extend beyond the bounds of the institution and formal religious affiliation. Cultural Catholicism, it could be argued, makes space for the Catholic imagination as a resilient metaphoric, symbolic, cultural identity—whether tethered or loosened from institutional allegiance and religious identity. Americans may become increasingly comfortable labelling themselves apart from institutional religious identities. The rise of the nones predicts further reduction in stigma around affiliating with “nothing in particular”. R ­ eligious identities operate in different ways, socially, than they once did. Pew observes this pattern among Americans more broadly: levels of religiosity haven’t necessarily changed, but the consonance of lower religiosity with affiliation labels has (Pew 2015c). Thus, even as the belief and behaviour remain consistent: say, born a Catholic but no longer attending Mass, before, that individual may have been inclined to still call himself or herself “Catholic”. Now, if and when a “cultural Catholic” label gains prominence, they may instead call themselves culturally Catholic. Assessments of contemporary American Catholicism are frequently characterized by a narrative of decline and loss. The authors of American Catholics in Transition are among those who challenge this dominant framework, suggesting that “such narratives frame change as if something has been lost, rather than as is empirically more accurate: some things get lost and some things get added” (163). Cultural Catholicism adds something: it expands space and scope for Americans (and America) to be Catholic. Sociologists must operationalize ways in which Catholicism expands beyond the Catholic Church.

102

Bruce

­ istance from a proscriptive religious identity need not be interpreted as D loss or incompliance but may, instead, be the (re)appropriation of a Catholic identity, ­culturally. Individuals create space to “do” Catholicism apart from “religion”. This pushes observers of contemporary Catholicism in the United States to better recognize and categorize those for whom Catholicism means something other than religious self-identification. Predicting this, Dillon (1999) writes: “The fact that Catholics who disagree with official church teaching continue to participate in Catholicism suggests that meaningful religious identity cannot be reduced to behaviourist indicators of the acceptance of official religious authority” (255). Seeing Catholic identities in this expanded way suggests not merely that Americans are “leaving” Catholicism, but that there is a market expansion, of sorts. Cultural Catholicism counts those who would otherwise be uncounted. This logic resonates with that of sociologists Hout and Fischer (2014) who, in explaining the rise in “no religious preference” among Americans, show that beliefs and religious attachment have not weakened … it is the already-weak religious attachments that give rise to nones. Those with lower formal religious attachments create new “customers”. It is the moderately religious—not the intensely religious—who are disaffiliating at higher rates (Schnabel and Bock 2017). This is not the disappearance of religion, but (perhaps) the expansion of cultural identities for the formally “religious”. Cultural Catholicism captures, conceptually, those moderate Catholics who may otherwise be presumed to signal secularization (defined as religion’s declining significance in private and public life). While cultural Catholics may add to the numbers of American “nones”, they do so in a way that challenges the validity of the “none” category itself. 5 Conclusion An exegesis into cultural Catholicism as a conceptual category in American Catholicism amplifies global conversations regarding religion’s place in modern society. As the population of Catholics in the United States declines, it is tempting to conclude that the United States—as with many European ­contexts—is secularizing. That the United States is less and less “Catholic”. But the face of Catholicism is not disappearing; it is changing. Once again, religion finds a way to “leak out of the box”; it is “empirically resilient in the face of modernization” (Ammerman 2013: 276). Enduring connections to Catholic

Cultural Catholics in the United States

103

practice, culture, tradition, heritage, ethnicity, and more give way to an expansion of Catholic identity. The story of American Catholicism must also include space to understand the rise and substantive import of cultural Catholics and cultural Catholicism. A binary choice between “Catholic” and “not Catholic” is insufficient. Cultural Catholicism subsists in a liminal space between Catholic and not Catholic. Writing about heterogeneity among religious nones in general, sociologists Lim, MacGregor, and Putnam (2010) find that “liminal nones” may be less religious than those who consistently identify with a formal religious ­affiliation, but retain attachments to religious groups nonetheless. Their inconsistent responses to religious preference “appear to reflect a liminal status of religious identity rather than volatility in their religious beliefs or ­behaviours” (Lim, MacGregor, and Putnam: 614). Preliminary assessments of cultural Catholics hint at a similar theme of liminality: former Catholic affiliation, higher likelihood to revert, and persistence of Catholic connections. Cultural Catholics occupy a liminal conceptual space in modern religious identity. We still have much to learn about cultural Catholics and cultural Catholicism in the United States. How linked are these identities to former Catholic identities? If closely, does the decline in religiously affiliated Catholics portend an immediate rise but eventual decline in numbers of cultural Catholics? How else do cultural Catholics differ along the lines of race, gender, region, age, and more? And, perhaps most crucially: what, exactly, does it mean to be a cultural Catholic? Data here are preliminary; these questions are ripe for exploration. Catholicism’s enduring impact on culture, space, socialization, identity, politics, and beyond depends upon sufficient analytical tools to measure Catholicism as culture, not just as “religion” and religious affiliation. Cultural Catholicism expands our conceptualized space for understanding the sphere of influence of the Catholic Church and Catholic practice and belief beyond the confines of formal, institutional space. Cultural Catholicism, moreover, captures a transitional moment in global Catholic identity. As patterns of affiliation and public roles of religion shift, cultural Catholics act as a harbinger of modern religion. “American Catholic” signals an increasingly liminal identity. The interplay of generation, increased diversification, and proliferation of religious nones—many of whom nonetheless believe, pray, and enact religious behaviours—creates fertile context for the rise of a cultural Catholic identity. Cultural Catholicism blurs the boundaries of religious identity, merging traditional institutional affiliation with the cultural toolkit of an unaffiliated, self-defined cultural connection.

104

Bruce

References Ammerman, Nancy T. 1997. “Golden Rule Christianity: Lived Religion in the American Mainstream”. In Lived Religion in America: Toward a History of Practice, edited by ­David Hall. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 196–216. Ammerman, Nancy T. 2013. “Spiritual but not religious? Beyond binary choices in the study of religion”. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 52: 258–278. Baggett, Jerome P. 2008. Sense of the Faithful: How American Catholics Live Their Faith. New York: Oxford University Press. Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Bruce, Steve. 2011. Secularization: In Defense of an Unfashionable Theory. Oxford: ­Oxford University Press. Bruce, Tricia Colleen. 2011. Faithful Revolution: How Voice of the Faithful Is Changing the Church. New York: Oxford University Press. Bruce, Tricia Colleen. 2017. Parish and Place: Making Room for Diversity in the American Catholic Church. New York: Oxford University Press. Burge, Ryan. 2018. Plenty of the “Nones” Actually Head Back to Church. Christianity Today. http://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2018/february/nones-agnostics -religious-identity-switching-cces-christian.html [accessed 6 February 2018]. Castañeda-Liles, María Del Socorro. 2018. Our Lady of Everyday Life: La Virgen de Guadalupe and the Catholic Imagination of Mexican Women in America. New York: ­Oxford UP. Chesnut, R. Andrew. 2017. Devoted to Death: Santa Muerte, the Skeleton Saint (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. D’Antonio, William V., Michele Dillon, and Mary L. Gautier. 2013. American Catholics in Transition. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Davie, Grace. 2002. Europe: The Exceptional Case: Parameters of Faith in the Modern World. London, UK: Darton, Longman, and Todd. Davie, Grace. 2006. “Religion in Europe in the 21st Century: The Factors to Take into Account”. Archives européennes de sociologie, vol. 47, no. 2: 274–281. Demarath, Nicholas Jay. 2000. “The Rise of ‘Cultural Religion’ in European Christianity: Learning from Poland, Northern Ireland, and Sweden”. Social Compass 47: 127–139. Dillon, Michele. 1999. Catholic Identity: Balancing Reason, Faith, and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dillon, Michele. 2001. “Pierre Bourdieu, Religion, and Cultural Production” Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 1: 411–429. Gans, Herbert J. 1979. “Symbolic ethnicity: The future of ethnic groups and cultures in America” Ethnic and Racial Studies 2: 1–20.

Cultural Catholics in the United States

105

Gans, Herbert J. 1994. “Symbolic ethnicity and symbolic religiosity: Towards a comparison of ethnic and religious acculturation”. Ethnic and Racial Studies 17: 577–592. Gray, Mark. 2011. “Exclusive analysis: National Catholic marriage rate plummets” OSV Newsweekly June 15. Available: https://www.osv.com/Magazines/TheCatholic Answer/Doctrine/Article/TabId/803/ArtMID/13656/ArticleID/3054/Exclusive-ana lysis-National-Catholic-marriage-rate-plummets.aspx [accessed 18 August 2017]. Gray, Mark. 2013. “The Growing Mystery of the ‘Missing’ Catholic Infants”. February 7. Available: http://nineteensixty-four.blogspot.com/2013/02/the-growing-mystery -of-missing-catholic.html [accessed 25 July 2017]. Gray, Mark. 2019. “Stable Transformation: Catholic Parishioners in the United States”. In American Parishes: Remaking Local Catholicism, edited by Gary J. Adler, Tricia C. Bruce, and Brian Starks. New York: Fordham University Press. Greeley, Andrew M. 1970. “Religious Intermarriage in a Denominational Society”. American Journal of Sociology 75: 949–952. Greeley, Andrew M. 1994. “Why Do Catholics Stay in the Church; Because of the Stories” Op-ed. The New York Times. July 10. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/ 1994/07/10/magazine/why-do-catholics-stay-in-the-church-because-of-the-stories .html?pagewanted=all [accessed 25 July 2017]. Hervieu-Léger, D. 2003. Catholicisme, la fin d’un monde. Paris: Bayard. Hout, Michael and Claude Fischer. 2014. “Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Political Backlash and Generational Succession, 1987–2012”. Sociological Science 1: 423–447. Kasselstrand, Isabella. 2015. “Nonbelievers in the Church: A Study of Cultural Religion in Sweden”. Sociology of Religion 76: 275–294. Lee, Jennifer, and Frank D. Bean. 2004. “America’s changing color lines: Immigration, race/ethnicity, and multiracial identification”. Annual Review of Sociology 30: 221–242. Lee, Jennifer, and Frank D. Bean. 2010. The Diversity Paradox: Immigration and the Color Line in Twenty-First Century America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Lim, Chaeyoon, Carol Ann MacGregor, and Robert D. Putnam. 2010. “Secular and liminal: Discovering heterogeneity among religious nones”. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 49: 596–618. Manglos-Weber, Nicolette and Christian Smith. 2015. “Understanding Former Young Catholics: Findings from a National Study of American Emerging Adults”. Available https://icl.nd.edu/assets/170517/icl_former_catholics_final_web.pdf [accessed 28 July 2017]. McGuire, Meredith B. 2008. Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in Everyday Life. New York: Oxford University Press. Nagel, Joane. 1994. Nagel, Joane. “Constructing ethnicity: Creating and recreating ­ethnic identity and culture”. Social problems 41: 152–176.

106

Bruce

Pew Research Center. 2015a. “America’s Changing Religious Landscape”. May 12, 2015. Available: http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious -landscape/ [accessed 28 May 2016]. Pew Research Center. 2015b. “U.S. Catholics Open to Non-Traditional Families”. Sept. 2, 2015. Available: http://www.pewforum.org/2015/09/02/u-s-catholics-open-to-non -traditional-families/ [accessed 1 November 2015]. Pew Research Center. 2015c. “U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious”. Nov. 3, 2015. ­Available: http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-less-religious/ [accessed 14 January 2016]. Schnabel, Landon, and Sean Bock. 2017. “The Persistent and Exceptional Intensity of American Religion: A Response to Recent Research”. Sociological Science 4: 686–700. Available: osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/xd37b. [accessed 1 November 2017]. Smith, Christian, Kyle Longest, Jonathan Hill, and Kari Christoffersen. 2014. Young Catholic America: Emerging Adults In, Out of, and Gone from the Church. New York: Oxford University Press. Smith, Christian. 2016. “The Conceptual Incoherence of ‘Culture’ in American Sociology”. The American Sociologist 47: 388–415. Swidler, Ann. 1986. “Culture in action: Symbols and strategies”. American Sociological Review: 273–286. Tajfel, Henry. 1978. Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social-­Psychology of Inter-group Relations. London: Academic Press. Waters, Mary C. 1990. Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America. University of California Press. Willaime, Jean-Paul. 2004. “The Cultural Turn in the Sociology of Religion in France”. Sociology of Religion 65: 4: 373–389.

Part 2 Strategies within Specific Countries to Counteract the Secularization Crisis

∵

Chapter 5

Occupying the Margins of Society: Operationalizing Minority Identity Politics among Canadian Youth within the Catholic New Evangelization Paul L. Gareau Canada is a majority Catholic country that has witnessed a gradual decline of religious influence over the past 40 years. In a recent study outlining the statistical regression of Christian affiliation in Canada since 1945, Brian Clarke and Stuart Macdonald (2017) conclude that, even when faced with consistent decline in participation,1 Catholicism remains relevant to people’s identity regarding a “persistent memory”. This means that Catholics in Canada still strongly maintain their religious identity even when they no longer actively participate. However, Clarke and Macdonald note that the attitudes and perspectives of young people in the Catholic Church still reflect the national, downward trend. For these young people, Catholic identification or identity is beginning to fade to the point that: “[f] or the first time a significant number of Catholic parents are prepared to not identify their children as Catholic. We will have to await further surveys to see whether we are on the cusp of a new era” (Clarke and Macdonald 2017: 162). It is against this reality that the Catholic Church in Canada has taken action in order to disrupt and combat this ambivalence toward the institutional Church, and breathe new life into what it means to be Catholic. The New Evangelization (NE) is a recent development within the Catholic Church seeking to preserve, restore, and reinvigorate Catholic religious identity in the face of what it perceives to be the dominance of secular values, which has instigated ambivalence and decline in the Church (Martin 2012). Though there is strong institutional support from the Holy See for the NE as a global movement (John Paul ii 1990; Ratzinger 2000; Benedict xv 2011; Synod of Catholic Bishops 2012; Francis 2013), there is no demographic or quantitative information available on the NE program, and there is no clear indication of its impact as a proselytizing force. The majority of the literature on the NE is 1 From 45% regular church attendance in 1975 to 26% in 2000 (141), over a Catholic population in decline from 46.2% in 1971 to 38.7% in 2011 (125). For more information, see Reginald W. Bibby (1987, 2011).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004380073_007

110

Gareau

apologetic, stating its potential and clear institutional support. As Paul Grogan asserts, the “new evangelization does not constitute an emergency strategy: it is a renewable engagement of the Church in her perennial task of drawing people to Christ, albeit within cultures which have become particularly hostile to the truth claims of Catholicism” (2015: 262). The NE advocates an affective, evangelical religiosity that encourages a personal relationship with Jesus Christ and with the institutional Church (Boguslawski and Martin 2008; Dulles 2008, 2009; Martin 2012). This experiential and emotional approach represents a program for personal conversion that is enshrined within the precepts and prerogatives of the ­institutional ­Catholic Church. It aims at engendering a strong evangelical impetus among Catholic adherents, especially young people. Though there is research on the topic of Catholic evangelical engagement among youth in different settings (Norman 2011; Perreault 2012; Smith 2014; Sultmann and Brown 2014), little is known of how young Catholics engage with the evangelical ­discourse of the NE regarding the distrust of secular values, a personal relationship with Christ and the institutional Church, and the lived experience of religious and socio-political conversion. The guiding question of this research is: How is evangelical identity structured within a contemporary Catholic setting, and how are young people integrating or negotiating this worldview? Serving as a case study, this article will look at NE activities and experiences at the annual Catholic youth conference Journey to the Father, which gathered young people from Ontario and Quebec to the village of Saint Raphael’s, situated outside of Cornwall, Ontario. This event helps us to understand the ­dynamics and tone of evangelization in a particular location of religious engagement. Through talks and charismatic religious experiences, young people were invited to engage in the Catholic evangelization message that “it is okay to be different, to be Catholic”. Journey to the Father serves to shed light on the NE and the dynamic process of evangelizing Catholic youth through the perspectives of both the adult organizers and the young participants who are navigating competing socio-political and religious values. This article examines how the NE defines Catholic evangelical identity and deploys it through a minority identity politics among young Canadian Catholics. The discussion will be delineated into four sections: (1) defining evangelization in Catholic terms; (2) reviewing the deployment of an identity politics by the adult organizers as a means of engendering an evangelical Catholic identity; (3) presenting an exposition of evangelical identity among Catholic youth from Journey to the Father; and (4) discussing how young participants negotiate (i.e., appropriate and/or negate) evangelical Catholic values through experience. Together these perspectives describe not a dominating or prescriptive

Occupying the Margins of Society

111

proselytization, but rather a complex process of identity formation involving the negotiation of values and lived experiences, representing the changing face of Catholicism. This work offers new insight into how Catholicism is proselytized in a diverse Canada by way of a minority identity politics, and how young people engage this discourse. This examination will reveal the ways in which young Catholics are, paradoxically, finding their religious identities by occupying the margins of society. 1

Evangelization and the Catholic Church

The Catholic Church, from the early modern period to today, has weathered the storm of modernity by drawing from a deep institutional conservatism that asserts the importance of tradition and institutional religiosity. And yet, the Church has also been shaped by the winds of modern change. From the Council of Trent in the sixteenth century to the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s, the Catholic Church has emphasized its importance as an institution while negotiating the rise of liberal political values both without and within (Bokenkotter 2004; Hitchcock 2012). The modern Catholic Church is one that has effectively changed with the times without undermining its fundamental structure. It is this negotiation between “tradition” and “modernization” that defines the Catholic Church today. The New Evangelization (NE), strictly speaking, is a post-Vatican ii movement. In the 1960s, Vatican ii brought about tremendous change through the modernization of the Church. With it came a democratization of liturgical and theological engagement for the laity (Wilde 2007). Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the theological nomenclature of evangelical Christianity was not a Catholic concern. The tone and approach of evangelization were entirely within the realm of Protestantism. But the NE integrated core evangelical values into Catholicism, specifically: (1) the gospels as ­authoritative; (2) personal faith in Christ; and (3) the impulse to disseminate the gospels through evangelism and social reform (Dulles 2009). Though this framework reflects the Protestant theological premise of solo scriptura and solo fides (grace through the Bible alone and faith alone, respectively), the evangelical character of the NE is entirely within the purview of the institutional Catholic Church. This purview is largely represented by the values and ambitions of the Magisterium (the teaching authority of the Catholic Church) as well as a sacramental engagement (i.e., Eucharistic devotion and Reconciliation) that remains within the authority of the ecclesiastical structure. Through this evangelical discourse and ritual engagement, the Catholic laity are invited

112

Gareau

to develop personal relationships with Jesus Christ, which, it is hoped, will lead to them becoming more involved in the Catholic Church and invested in its evangelization. The NE is unique in that its development reflects an intersection between ecclesiastical and lay definitions. There are important papal encyclicals and ecclesiastical writings on the NE (John Paul ii 1990; Ratzinger 2000; Benedict xv 2011; Synod of Catholic Bishops 2012; Francis 2013) and different lay commentators (Boguslawski and Martin 2008; Byerley 2008; Dulles 2008, 2009; Grogan and Kirsteen 2015), each of whom outline the historical significance and current framework of the NE as part of the evolution of the Catholic Church. George Weigel has presented 10 characteristics of the NE that reflect, in his terms, a “deep reform” of the Church and society (2013: 56–88): (1) the NE promotes a personal relationship with Christ; (2) it affirms the authority of divine revelation, but asserts the prerogative of the institutional Catholic Church; (3) it celebrates the seven sacraments in connection to the evangelical experience; (4) it emphasizes rejecting “evil” in constant conversion and renewal of faith; (5) it is connected to the history of the Catholic Church and the teachings of Vatican ii; (6) it is biblically centred; (7) it respects the Catholic hierarchy; (8) it is “both culture-forming and countercultural”, meaning that to evangelize the world is to live in the world (socially and politically), and not apart from it; (9) it engages the public sphere with reason, but informed by “Gospel conviction”; and (10) it has an eschatological orientation, which asserts an urgency for proselytization for the sake of the “world’s salvation”. Together, this creates a matrix for Catholic evangelical engagement that distinguishes itself from Protestant forms and aligns itself with the modern world. Evangelization has become the lingua franca of the Catholic institution today. The New Evangelization refers to missionary activities located within the Catholic faith, the Church as a strong proponent of faith through sacramental and ecclesiological emphasis, and the laity as a leading force for engagement within the family, the parish, and broader society. In this way, the NE aims to help “cure” the ills of society from the bottom up—from the individual transforming her/his family to a transformation within the Church, particular cultures, and society at large, across the globe, and even at a metaphysical level (Boguslawski and Martin 2008; Dulles 2008, 2009; Topping 2011; Martin 2012; Synod of Catholic Bishops 2012; Grogan and Kirsteen 2015). As Weigel summarizes, the challenges of the contemporary world “can only be met by the deep reforms of Evangelical Catholicism: reforms that will reclaim the essential, Christ-given form of the Church while equipping its people and their ordained leaders with the tools to convert a disenchanted and not-infrequently hostile world” (2014: 5). In the face of this “disenchantment”, the issue is not the

Occupying the Margins of Society

113

conversion of non-Catholics, but of Catholics by Catholics through affective religious engagement in order to establish a more “engaged” Catholic identity. Though the NE seeks to evangelize everyone in the Catholic Church, Catholic youth have become an important audience for the evangelical message. In order to examine the deployment of Catholic evangelical discourse and its impact on identity formation in youth, the discussion and analysis of this article is centred on a single case study. Journey to the Father was an annual three-day conference aimed at young Catholics that took place in Saint Raphael’s, a village located 30 kilometres outside of Cornwall, Ontario. Journey to the Father ran for 15 years, from 1999 to 2013, with the exception of 2002 (World Youth Day in Toronto). It was based on the Steubenville Catholic Conferences, which still operate at the Franciscan University of Steubenville in Ohio. The Steubenville Conferences are large events that draw up to 2,000 young participants, and have inspired 18 regional conferences across the United States, as well as in Halifax and Toronto, the latter being just recently initiated in 2014 (“Steubenville Conferences” 2016). Journey to the Father was much smaller, operated by a core group of roughly 200 volunteers and attracting 300 to 500 young participants between the ages of 13 and 18 from across Southern and Northeastern Ontario and Western Quebec. Following the same structure each year, the weekend activities aimed to inspire an engaged Catholic evangelical identity through skits, sessions, and music, a highly affective charismatic experience in the form of Eucharistic Adoration followed by Reconciliation, and a consolidation of these experiences through an open-mic session and Altar Call on the last day. This overall structure centred on the main event, Eucharistic Adoration. Adoration was the paramount experience at Journey to the Father. Eucharistic devotion is a long-standing tradition unique to the Catholic Church, which has been repurposed to resonate with the evangelical program of engendering personal experiences of Jesus Christ (Hardon 1997). Adoration is based on the Catholic theology of Transubstantiation, meaning God’s literal presence within the Eucharistic host. The organizers of Journey to the Father stressed that Jesus was actually in the tent, flesh and blood. This inspired palpable charismatic experiences where participants laughed, cried/sobbed, swooned, and/or spoke in tongues. Adoration generated a real-world charismatic experience that had as its goal a material or lived personal relationship with Christ. In other words, Adoration was not an abstract concept but a lived experience. The organizers arranged the conference activities in order to contextualize and explicate for the young participants the possibility of religious experience through Adoration. Adoration served as a vehicle for internalizing the more abstract lessons drawn from the talks and breakout sessions.

114

Gareau

All these activities were conducted in the hope of instiling an evangelical impetus or identity in the young participants, and combatting the influence of modern society and its negative impact on Catholic identity. After three years of ethnographic research (between 2011 and 2013) and 50 ­semi-structured interviews with the adult organizers and young participants (who are given pseudonyms in this research to protect their privacy), I have come to realize that Journey to the Father is an optic through which we can gain some understanding of the formulation and deployment of an identity politics by the Catholic Church, an issue that sheds light on the Catholic Church today, its purview, and its contentions regarding modern society. 2

Identity Politics as a Means to Religious Engagement

The largest concern raised by both the adult organizers and young participants of Journey to the Father was the prevalence of secularism in modern society. It is without question that secularism has become a dominant framework in the West and in Canada (Clarke and Macdonald 2017), affecting political governance and influencing the contours of normative or conventional society. The premise is that the emergence of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment values of free thought and political neutrality necessitated a worldview free from the machinations of religion. Though there are important critiques of the “separation” of Church and State underscoring its limitations (Connolly 1999; Asad 2003; Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2004; Beckford 2012; Beaman 2014; Berlinerblau 2014), socially- and politically minded religious actors like the participants in Journey to the Father see secularism as having impeded their claim to an “authentic” religious identity through which they could be recognized and respected for their religious values within a diverse or pluralistic society. Secularism therefore serves as a backdrop for an examination of the different forces of normativity that the participants in Journey to the Father engaged with in the process of forming their religious identities. A number of social and political thinkers have elaborated theories of identity that consider the interplay between religion and modern secular values (Lash and Featherstone 2001; Beckford 2003; Bayart 2005; Parekh 2008, 2009; Eisenberg 2009; Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010; Ericson 2011). A common theme throughout this literature is that identity formation is tied to epistemological subjectivity—a feature of life in a modern secular society—which suggests we must examine how the individual is impacted by multiple sources of meaning. Though identity is linked to different categories of socio-cultural and political significance (i.e., culture, ethnicity, race, gender, socio-economic

Occupying the Margins of Society

115

class, nationality, religion, etc.), it is also informed by individual experiences that allow people to “make sense of themselves, of their activities, of what they share with, and how they differ from, others” as well as the discursive imposition or “identity talk” that shapes the collective (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 4–5). Identity has become a hub where the individual can be accounted for in the analysis of social systems and power relations. Charles Taylor offers a view of modern identity that is germane to the socio-political discourse of the NE present at Journey to the Father. In line with how identity is formed between personal and collective forces, Taylor sees identity as a process that oscillates between the formation of the self through the retrieval of authenticity, and engagement with the other through recognition (Taylor 1989, 1991; Taylor and Gutmann 1994). Authenticity is a key factor in Taylor’s understanding of the construction of identity. Authenticity, for Taylor, is not arrived at in a vacuum, but through a dialogical process involving recognition (i.e., the recognition of others, and seeking recognition from others through the relations of common experience). This process of dialogical identity formation—between the assertion of authentic identity and the impulse to recognize others and gain recognition from others—lends itself directly to a “politics of recognition” (Taylor 1997). This suggests that individuals or groups must marshal into distinct, “recognizable” communities in order to gain recognition and circumvent a misrecognition by normative institutional and social structures, which has potential ­social, political, and economic ramifications. Though there are critiques of the imposition of reified socio-cultural boundaries in theories of authenticity and recognition such as Taylor’s (Connolly 1999, 2004; Akhtar 2011; Coulthard and Alfred 2014), we can appreciate how a politics of recognition can translate into identity politics. Identity politics is a means of generating socio-political recognition by virtue of asserting a differentiation or difference as against the homogenization of social and political normativity. David Macey explains: [i] dentity politics usually takes the form of a demand for the right to be different, and for that difference to be recognized as legitimate. This form of politics can be viewed either as a celebration of cultural diversity and a defence of minority rights, or as a betrayal of the universalist values of the Enlightenment (2000: 197). Though identity politics, like Taylor’s politics of recognition, is a complex and contested category (Butler 1990; Nicholson and Seidman 1995; Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Hekman 2000; Bernstein 2005), it remains a legitimate form of

116

Gareau

political action typically employed by groups or individuals who are marginalized by normative society and who seek political recognition; i.e., social and political subcultures, indigenous nations and peoples, people of colour and ethno-cultural minorities, women, and feminist organizations, LGBTTQQIP2SAA communities,2 and anti-ableist political movements.3 Their continued apparent or inherent marginalization through various kinds of social, political, or economic discrimination affirms the need to deploy this type of minority identity politics. They must be first seen in order to be heard and understood. It has been my observation that the adult organizers at Journey to the Father deploy a minority identity politics when talking about Catholic identity. This is legitimated by the feeling among Catholic evangelicals of having to be “closeted” for their beliefs and worldview, which are perceived as being different from the norm. There is a palpable sense of urgency throughout the global NE movement because of the impact of secularism and the estrangement of the populace from the institutional Catholic Church (Grogan and Kirsteen 2015: 264). In this context, evangelical discourse focuses on differentiation from secular society and even within the Catholic Church, portraying evangelicals as having to fight for their recognition as authentic Catholics against a secularism that has even permeated the Catholic Church itself. At Journey to the Father, there was a strong emphasis on the “crisis of faith” affecting the Catholic Church and society in general. This crisis is rooted in the dominance of secularism in society at large, but also within the Church itself, in the form of disaffected or “cultural” Catholics. Cultural Catholics are broadly defined as members of the Catholic Church who claim cultural identification, but participate in the Church only nominally, mainly through life-cycle rituals, i.e., to baptize, marry, and die in the Church (Corcoran and Share 2008; Gaudreault-DesBiens 2009; Portmann 2010; Perreault 2012; Gillis 2013; Inglis 2014). John Portmann explains that cultural Catholics “espouse secular culture, not condemn it” and “squirm at the idea that conversion to Catholicism … is even necessary for salvation” (2010: 165). For the organizers of Journey to the Father, cultural Catholics are a major adversary of the NE program and an impediment to the vitality of the Catholic Church. This perceived conflict provides a backdrop for a program of identity formation that mobilizes Catholic evangelical action and religious identity against the hegemonic influence of secularism both outside and within the Catholic Church. 2 LGBTQQIP2SAA is an acronym representing lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, questioning, queer, intersex, pansexual, two-spirit (2S), androgynous, and asexual. 3 Anti-ableism is a political movement against discrimination based on physical, emotional, developmental, or psychiatric (dis) abilities.

Occupying the Margins of Society

117

A question arises regarding how a dominant, mainline religious denomination like the Catholic Church in Canada can appropriate a minority identity politics when they are largely associated with the hegemonic centre rather than the margins of society. How can the Catholic Church, whose ecclesiastical structure and long-standing tradition depicts an inherent conservatism, appropriate the discourse of minority identity? The organizers of Journey to the Father utilize the perceived lack of recognition of “authentic” Christian identity within secular society to justify the Catholic evangelization program. This misrecognition is a key political assertion for the organizers—it both shapes the contours of evangelical Catholic identity and justifies Catholic evangelization. In order to operationalize this identity politics, the organizers of Journey to the Father stress two key elements: (1) choice is the operational factor in order for young people to fully embrace their religious identities; and (2) the view that it is okay to be Catholic, and therefore different, and therefore marginalized. Choice is a central idea at Journey to the Father. The adult organizers state again and again that young people need to make the choice to engage with Jesus Christ in order to fully benefit from the experiences of Journey to the Father, and in life generally. Bishop Marcel, who presided at the 2013 conference, summarized this notion of choice as surrender. He explained, “Surrender in a sense that you recognize Christ as being your master, your Lord, your king. He is everything to me; he is everything to everyone. So, it’s learning how to die to yourself of all the worldly things so that you can embrace Christ totally”. The choice is to engage in a personal relationship with Jesus and the Catholic Church by placing God at the centre of every action one takes. André, the founding member of Catholic Christian Outreach (cco) and a speaker at Journey to the Father, echoed Bishop Marcel, stating, “We need to call [young people] into making a choice to be radical, to make Jesus the centre of their lives”. The organizers are advocating the idea that young people must make a choice that is difficult and unconventional (i.e., radical), and that this is a choice they can only make on their own. Though the adult organizers spoke as if the young participants had a choice to make, their rhetoric was morally unilateral. The implication was that to choose not to embrace an authentic Catholic identity would leave one spiralling out into the confines of the secular world. André said of the young participants in Journey to the Father: They came and Jesus was real to them. So, they’re choosing. So, the ones that move forward are those that chose for themselves, but they had a community that supported that language of choice, meaning choose him,

118

Gareau

believe in him, enter into a relationship with him. Those are the ones that continue from the experience of Journey to the Father. André sees that, in the plurality of choices, choosing Catholicism is not easy, and yet it is the only reasonable choice if one is to be a part of the authentic Catholic community. Again, this drive toward an identity politics of being different helps to shore up the boundaries of an evangelical Catholic identity. And this identity is ultimately based on an exclusivist vision of its own boundaries that is decidedly evangelical. Within this structure that asserts the authenticity of engaged Catholicism as the basis for seeking recognition as a marginalized group, the organizers of Journey to the Father build an identity framework that effectively promotes evangelical Catholicism to young Catholic Canadians. Borrowing from Taylor’s identity structure, the contours of an evangelical Catholic identity politics can be described as follows: (1) authenticity is centred around a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, which allows for the recovery of the self from the social and moral alienation of secular society; (2) the boundaries of Catholic evangelical identity must be clearly defined in order to defend against the hegemonic forces of secular society, even from within the Catholic Church; and (3) this process involves seeking recognition for religious identity from secular society itself. Ventures like Journey to the Father assert the right of Catholic youth to be recognized by others for their “outed” (i.e., openly evangelical in a secular world) religious identities, which necessitates a minority identification. The message presented to young Catholics is that it is okay to be Catholic; it is okay to be different. 3

Evangelical Catholic Youth: In Perspective

The young people who participated in Journey to the Father encountered a complex and yet carefully crafted discursive structure. Though the organizers presented or deployed a compelling evangelical minority identity politics of struggle against the moral ambiguity of modern society, most of the young participants with whom I spoke described living a more fluid reality between these two antagonistic worlds. The question, then, is: How did the young participants engage with and absorb the complex identity structure with which they were presented? The perceived impact of secularism on religious life was an important theme for many of the young participants in Journey to the Father. As with the organizers, many took issue with cultural Catholics as a pervasive normative

Occupying the Margins of Society

119

force in their lives as engaged Catholics. John, 14 years old, mentioned how difficult it was to speak to his friends and family, who scorned him for his religious engagement, about Catholicism. He said: Those kinds of people, I don’t want to totally stay away from because I want them to realize that people do love their faith. Like, they don’t hate it, they actually want to practise it and that they should try too … They’ll only be Catholic because their parents have taught them to be Catholic, but they still don’t want to be. So, it can be any person to put down your faith. It can be your closest friend, it can be your enemy. This kind of experience was described by many of the young people. Those closest to them tried to dissuade or discourage them from their religious engagement. Many experienced contempt for their expressions of religious identity. Though no one mentioned being mistreated, some were pointedly questioned why they believed in God, and about God’s agency in affecting the physical world. Carrie, 18, related an experience with a peer at school: “I had one person tell me outright, ‘God isn’t real … God, if you’re real, throw down a strike of lightning right beside me but don’t kill me. Send me a sign that you’re real. And it’s like, it doesn’t work that way”. Carrie went on to say that she had explained to that person how to properly look for God in their life, but still felt aggravated for having been belligerently questioned for her faith. Many others also shared experiences of being ridiculed by their friends or family for being religious. Kyle, a 16-year-old who was involved in his school’s football team, spoke of being ridiculed by his teammates and school peers and receiving scornful comments about bringing “church into the game”. He described an experience where his schoolmate confronted him during play: “He called me a ‘Bible Thumper’ and I was just like, ‘What? They actually called me that?’ So, I was just like taken aback that they had called me that”. This led to confusion, hurt feelings, and a sense of being marginalized for expressing his religious identity at school. These young people were made to feel like they were in the spotlight for having a religious identity, which consistently provoked a feeling of marginalization. They were no longer invisible, within the background noise of social normativity. They were different because they were religious. Monique, 16, wished that other Catholics would not feel so embarrassed about letting people know about their religious identity. But she admitted: Sometimes I just go with it too because like I don’t want to seem like that weirdo so strong in their faith and so different from everybody else, but

120

Gareau

I just try to forget what other people think and say, and just ignore that … Almost embarrassing, because you want to fit in but you don’t really know how to and let people know that you’re Catholic. This reflects the delicate balance that these young people were trying to achieve within their precarious social world. The adult organizers of Journey to the Father emphasized that evangelization was an essential part of Catholic identity; it was the underlying justification for Journey to the Father. The young participants made it clear to me they did not see proselytization as a matter of zealous moralizing. At Journey to the Father and throughout the interviews, there was a common idea among the young people that evangelization is not something you talk about, it is something you do. In other words, to evangelize others in a Catholic context should be done indirectly (i.e., one should lead by example and not through aggressive proselytization). Though they held to the idea of evangelizing through the self, the young participants expressed trepidation about proselytizing others. Though my interviewees expressed different reasons for their discomfort with proselytizing, many referred to a desire to not dissuade their friends or family, Catholic or non-Catholic, from the possibility of their religious engagement through overzealousness. Most said that they would never proselytize to non-Catholics. When asked this question, Vanessa, 16, responded in an ardent tone, “No, I would never do that, no .… When we die, who knows, Muslims might be right!” Some of the young people spoke of having Protestant and other non-Catholic friends in their schools and communities. Jimmy expressed his view of Protestant-Catholic relations: “What real reason do we have to hate each other for our religions? Because we should learn from each other, far more than we should fight each other”. His view, one echoed by many of the other young people, was that there was no point in fighting over truth claims, but rather those with different value systems can learn from one another. Some participants pointed to the strength of their religious conviction being central in their lives, but also spoke of having friends who did not share their values. Vanessa said: Most of my friends have high expectations of themselves, but mine are based on different things, mine are different like you know, I go to church and like and then just, theirs are based on their own morals for like what’s best for them. But I’m like, “What is best for my faith, and what does my faith expect of me as opposed to what I expect of myself?”

Occupying the Margins of Society

121

Many said that having friends who did not share their values did not dissuade them from living out their evangelical Catholic values. In other words, religious and moral difference did not lead to cognitive dissonance or identity crisis. Malusi, a youth leader at Journey to the Father, spoke of asserting his evangelical identity without becoming alienated from friends and family: “You can be a full person and be out there and be popular and have everyone know you, but also have this faith and not be subject to all the abuses and struggles that you would find in high school with drinking and partying and all those things”. Monique, a 16-year-old who was confident in her religious identity, described the mutual respect between her and her peers: “All my friends know that I’m Catholic and I’ve asked them not to swear around me and to respect my religion. So, they’re pretty good about it, sometimes they’ll slip up, but everyone who knows me, knows that”. These experiences, positive and negative, paint a picture of what it is like to live as a young evangelical Catholic in a diverse society like Canada. 4

Journey to the Father and the Significance of Experience

When describing their experiences at Journey to the Father, some of the young participants displayed some resistance to engaging fully with evangelical discourse. They expressed ambivalence, mentioning being bored, confused, or shy, not liking the rules, or being there for purely social reasons. 17-year-old Peggy said: It’s like I’m two people; one’s the angel, the other’s the devil. It’s like, “Do this, no do that” kind of thing. So, um, I don’t want to go against God, but sometimes that’s really hard and that’s when you have to make the choice, “Am I going to do it, am I not?” And will I suffer the consequences, because there are consequences for everything. This was a sentiment echoed by some of the other young people—feeling pulled in multiple directions when thinking and feeling through difficult moral issues and choices. Regarding the issue of choice, Jimmy made an intriguing statement: “God gave us free will for a reason. So that we could choose for ourselves”. This represents an enticing intersection between the concerted efforts of the organizers to inspire the young participants to “choose” to embrace an evangelical identity, and the agency of the young participants.

122

Gareau

On one hand, Jimmy’s statement reflects precisely the intent of the adult organizers that the young participants put God at the centre of their lives. But Jimmy’s own view of God exposes his potential act of resistance—God granted him the free will to choose. The young people are making their own choices, as the adult organizers want them to, but their choices may not conform entirely to the aspirations of the organizers. Just as Lori Beaman writes about Protestant Evangelical women, these young evangelical Catholics “perceive themselves as agents, not doormats” (1999: 138). They express a religiosity that comes from a lived and engaged commitment to Catholicism, without matching the adult organizers’ imperative proselytization. This is not to say that the young participants are not forming religious identities as Catholic evangelicals. Rather, they are synthesizing Catholicism with the secular values of freedom, tolerance, and equality, accepting the social and cultural pluralism of modern society. To return to Jimmy’s statement, his view of “God” reflects less the institutional moral authority of the Church, and more his own discernment through personal experience in a plural society. As discussed earlier, Journey to the Father was designed to generate both a discursive space in which to introduce evangelical ideas and values to the participants, and an affective and emotional religious experience through Eucharistic Adoration in order to anchor these values. The adult organizers used Adoration as a means to conversion, promoting it as a material and personal encounter with Jesus Christ. Having led Adoration twice at Journey to the Father, Father Stéphane explained: It’s a Catholicism that leads to a personal encounter with Jesus Christ and that doesn’t substitute the Sacraments for Jesus Christ, but uses the Sacraments as a way to encounter Jesus Christ. So, it’s not a ritual for the sake of the ritual; it’s the Sacraments as a visible encounter with Christ. Father Stéphane saw Adoration as a unique aspect of Catholicism, offering a corporeal representation of God to young people as a conduit for religious experience, which, it was hoped, would lead to conversion and the complete surrender of the self to God. The organizers believed that, if treated with respect, young people could absorb and embrace these values and experiences to the point of paradigmatic conversion; i.e., from living with Catholicism to living their Catholicism. But experience remained secondary to the complete surrender to God, and the social and moral precepts of the institutional Church.

Occupying the Margins of Society

123

For young people, however, experience is the epistemological framing for the negotiation of different, competing values and discursive forces. As Ryan, 18, said, “Journey to the Father, it’s been an experience of education”. Adoration was described by the participants as the central religious experience at Journey to the Father. But their own understandings were diverse, ranging from positive to negative, spiritual to mundane, reverential to awkward. Some remarked that the performance of Adoration had a strong impact on them. The coloured lights, the wafting smell of incense, the feeling of kneeling or lying prostrate in the dewy grass, the crisp evening air, the swelling music, the floating Eucharistic monstrance gilded and shaped like a blazing sun, and the sounds of others expressing emotions all deepened the effect. The performance of Adoration made for a ritualistic event calling attention to the moment and leading to heightened emotional experiences that were, for most of the young participants, out of the ordinary. Some spoke of a conversion experience and a rush of emotions that left them feeling empowered. Some described conversion as a clear moment, saying that it was “life changing”, “a high moment of faith”, or “a clear moment of connection with Jesus”. Others saw their conversion as gradual, taking place over years of participating in Adoration at Journey to the Father. Some regretted the fact that they failed to have a religious experience. Erika, a 16-year-old with a very religious family life, spoke candidly of her experience: “It was pretty emotional and then everyone was like, ‘Did you feel God’s presence?’ And I was like, ‘Yah but didn’t really have the Jesus moment.’” She was disappointed by her perceived failure, though this did not dissuade her from seeking out her “Jesus moment” by returning to Journey to the Father the next year. These examples allude neither to acquiescence nor staunch negation of the evangelical message, but show a negotiation of experiences through which these young people explored their Catholic identities. The case study of Journey to the Father offers insight into how young people negotiate different value systems. Acting as social agents, they determine and shape their own identities. We also see the crucial role that experience plays. Lived experience facilitates engagement with discourses because, unlike abstract concepts, it is both tangible and personal. It shapes how young people see themselves and the world around them. In this case, experience is the lens through which these young people processed the religious discourse presented at Journey to the Father. From religious conversion to the confusion of the Adoration event, young people gleaned what they could through their spiritual and social experiences, carrying these experiences forward in the process of identity formation as young, evangelical Catholics.

124 5

Gareau

Conclusion: Occupying the Margins

This article examines the structuring of an identity politics based on the Catholic New Evangelization generated at a specific location, the Journey to the Father youth conference. Borrowing Charles Taylor’s ideas about modern identity formation, we can see how the adult organizers of Journey to the Father deployed a minority identity politics in seeking “authenticity” as well as developing a “recognizable” or cogent identity structure for a contemporary evangelical Catholicism. Their key strategies were to present Catholic religious identity as a radical choice, and to inspire religious experience in order to encourage conversion. The larger purpose of this evangelical program was to influence and direct young Catholics in becoming more engaged with their Catholic identities within the Church. Presenting themselves as a marginalized minority, the organizers of Journey to the Father hoped to provide a tangible or operable modern identity structure for young Catholics. The young participants in Journey to the Father, however, engaged with this “modern” evangelical discourse in dynamic ways that speak of the negotiation of competing values rather than the affirmation or negation of particular value systems. These young people embraced evangelical values, but on their own terms. When faced with evangelical identity politics, young people asserted the core values of evangelization (i.e., put God at the centre of your life), but jettisoned any exclusivist attitude. When faced with the notion of radical choice, they chose to invest in and disseminate the evangelical Catholic agenda (i.e., conversion and proselytization), but in ways that allowed for some resistance rather than complete surrender. And when faced with the experience of charismatic religiosity (i.e., Adoration), they chose to believe, but used their personal experiences rather than institutional authority as the ultimate discerning factor. The case of the young participants in Journey to the Father shows that we cannot dismiss Catholic evangelicals as being hostile to modern values, nor assume that they share all the same values as the recalcitrant Christian Right. Rather, subscribing to an identity politics is a way of engaging in a modern discourse that reflects the liberal values of freedom, equality, and tolerance. These young participants are living as evangelical Catholics while also engaging with the diverse, plural nature of modern society. Fluidity, and even ambiguity, are acceptable to them, though they may not be for the adult organizers. Their own agency, tempered by experience, determines the orientation of these young Catholic evangelicals as they occupy the margins of a changing, global Catholic Church situated within a diverse Canadian society.

Occupying the Margins of Society

125

References Akhtar, Sahar. 2011. “Liberal Recognition for Identity? Only for Particularized Ones”. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 10 (1): 66–87. Asad, Talal. 2003. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Cultural Memory in the Present. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Bayart, Jean-François. 2005. The Illusion of Cultural Identity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Beaman, Lori G. 1999. Shared Beliefs, Different Lives: Women’s Identities in Evangelical Context. St. Louis, MO: Chalice Press. Beaman, Lori G. 2014. “Between the Public and the Private: Governing Religious Expression”. In Religion in the Public Sphere: Canadian Case Studies, edited by Solange Lefebvre and Lori G. Beaman, 44–65. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Beckford, James A. 2003. Social Theory and Religion. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. Beckford, James A. 2012. “Public Religions and the Postsecular: Critical Reflections”. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 51 (1):1–19. Benedict XV, Pope. 2011. “Porta Fidei [Apostolic Letter on the Indiction of the Year of Faith]”. 11 October 2011. http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/motu _proprio/documents/hf_ben-xvi_motu-proprio_20111011_porta-fidei.html [accessed 4 June 2017]. Berlinerblau, Jacques. 2014. “The Crisis in Secular Studies”. Chronicle of Higher Education 61 (2):B6–B9 [accessed 4 June 2017]. Bernstein, Mary. 2005. “Identity Politics”. Annual Review of Sociology 31 (August): 47–74. Bibby, Reginald W. 1987. Fragmented Gods: The Poverty and Potential of Religion in Canada. Toronto: Irwin Pub. Bibby, Reginald W. 2011. Beyond the Gods & Back: Religion’s Demise and Rise and Why It Matters. Lethbridge, AB: Project Canada Books. Boguslawski, Steven C. and Ralph Martin. 2008. The New Evangelization: Overcoming the Obstacles. New York: Paulist Press. Bokenkotter, Thomas S. 2004. A Concise History of the Catholic Church. New York; Toronto: Doubleday. Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. 2000. “Beyond ‘Identity’”. Theory and Society 29 (1):1–47. Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York; London: Taylor and Francis. Byerley, Timothy E. 2008. The Great Commission: Models of Evangelization in American Catholicism. New York: Paulist Press. Clarke, Brian P., and Stuart Macdonald. 2017. Leaving Christianity: Changing Allegiances in Canada since 1945. Montreal; Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Press.

126

Gareau

Connolly, William E. 1999. Why I Am Not a Secularist. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Connolly, William E. 2004. “Response: Realizing Agonistic Respect”. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 72 (2): 507–11. Corcoran, Mary P. and Perry Share. 2008. Belongings: Shaping Identity in Modern Ireland. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. Coulthard, Glen Sean and Taiaiake Alfred. 2014. Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Dulles, Avery Robert. 2008. “Current Theological Obstacles to Evangelization”. In The New Evangelization: Overcoming the Obstacles, edited by Steven C. Boguslawski and Ralph Martin, 13–25. New York: Paulist Press. Dulles, Avery Robert. 2009. Evangelization for the Third Millennium. New York: Paulist Press. Eisenberg, Avigail. 2009. Reasons of Identity: A Normative Guide to the Political and Legal Assessment of Identity Claims. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Ericson, David F. 2011. The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion Identity Politics in TwentyFirst Century America. London; New York: Routledge. Francis. 2013. “Evangelii Gaudium [Apostolic Exhortation on the Proclamation of the Gospel in Today’s World]”. 24 November 2013. Gaudreault-DesBiens, Jean-François. 2009. “Religious Challenges to the Secularized Identity of an Insecure Polity: A Tentative Sociology of Quebec’s ‘Reasonable Accommodation’ Debate”, in Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity, edited by R.D. Grillo, 151–76. Farnham, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing. Gillis, Chester. 2013. Roman Catholicism in America. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Grogan, Paul, and Kim Kirsteen, eds. 2015. The New Evangelization: Faith, People, Context and Practice. London; New York: Bloomsbury Publishing. Hardon, John A. 1997. The History of Eucharistic Adoration: Development of Doctrine in the Catholic Church. CMJ Publishers and Distributers. Hekman, S. 2000. “Beyond Identity: Feminism, Identity and Identity Politics”. Feminist Theory 1 (3): 289–308. Hitchcock, James. 2012. History of the Catholic Church: From the Apostolic Age to the Third Millennium. San Francisco: Ignatius Press. Inglis, Tom. 2014. Meanings of Life in Contemporary Ireland Webs of Significance. Cultural Sociology. Basingstoke, UK; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Jakobsen, Janet R., and Ann Pellegrini. 2004. Love the Sin: Sexual Regulation and the Limits of Religious Tolerance. Boston: Beacon Press. John, Paul II. 1990. “Redemptoris Missio [Encyclical on the Permanent Validity of the Church’s Missionary Mandate]”. 7 December 1990.

Occupying the Margins of Society

127

Lash, Scott, and Mike Featherstone. 2001. “Recognition and Difference: Politics, Identity, Multiculture”. Theory, Culture & Society 18 (2–3): 1–19. Macey, David. 2000. “Identity Politics”. The Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory. London; New York: Penguin Books. Martin, Ralph. 2012. Will Many Be Saved? What Vatican II Actually Teaches and Its ­Implications for the New Evangelization. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co. Nicholson, Linda, and Steven Seidman. 1995. Social Postmodernism: Beyond Identity Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Norman, Alex. 2011. “World Youth Day: The Creation of a Modern Pilgrimage Event for Evangelical Intent”. Journal of Contemporary Religion 26 (3): 371–385. Parekh, Bhikhu. 2008. A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdependent World. Basingstoke, UK; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Parekh, Bhikhu. 2009. “Logic of Identity”. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 8 (3): 267–84. Perreault, Jean-Philippe. 2012. “Vers Un Catholicisme de Marché ? Les Jeunes et Le Congrès Eucharistique de Québec”. Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 41(4): 578–94. Portmann, John. 2010. Catholic Culture in the USA: In and out of Church. London; New York: Continuum International Publishing. Ratzinger, Joseph. 2000. “Cardinal Ratzinger on the New Evangelization”. 12 December 2000. https://www.ewtn.com/new_evangelization/Ratzinger.htm [accessed 24 July 2017]. Smith, Christian author. 2014. Young Catholic America: Emerging Adults in, out of, and Gone from the Church. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. “Steubenville Conferences”. 2016. Steubenville Conferences (blog). 2016. http://steuben villeconferences.com/youth/ [accessed 24 July 2017]. Sultmann, William1, [email protected], and Raymond2 Brown ray.brown@ griffith.edu.au. 2014. “Catholic School Identity and the New Evangelization”. Journal of Religious Education 62 (1): 1–13 [accessed 4 June 2017]. Synod of Catholic Bishops. 2012. “Instrumentum Laboris [The New Evangelization for the Transmission of the Christian Faith]”. The General Secretariat of the Synod of Bishops (Libreria Editrice Vaticana). Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press. Taylor, Charles. 1991. The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press. Taylor, Charles. 1997. “The Politics of Recognition”. In New Contexts of Canadian Criticism, edited by Ajay Heble, Donna Palmateer Pennee, and J.R. Struthers, 98–131. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press.

128

Gareau

Taylor, Charles, and Amy Gutmann. 1994. Multiculturalism Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Topping, Ryan N.S. 2011. “On the Intellectual Tasks of the New Evangelization”. Catholic Insight, December 2011. Academic OneFile. Weigel, George. 2013. Evangelical Catholicism: Deep Reform in the 21st-Century Church. New York: Basic Books. Wilde, Melissa J. 2007. Vatican II: A Sociological Analysis of Religious Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ysseldyk, Renate, Kimberly Matheson, and Hymie Anisman. 2010. “Religiosity as Identity: Toward an Understanding of Religion from a Social Identity Perspective”. Personality and Social Psychology Review 14 (1): 60–71.

Chapter 6

Catholic Reconquest: The Case of the Sainte Blandine Megachurch in Lyon Valérie Aubourg For more than half a century, Evangelical Protestantism (and especially its Pentecostal version) has been showing undeniable vitality. Increase in membership around the world follows a reverse curve to that of Catholics in Western societies. Noting this “decline” (Le Bras 1976), the Catholic Church has sought to renew its approach so that the “Christian message reaches modern man”.1 With John Paul ii, the expression “new evangelization” was deployed and the Pope promoted it with determination.2 Currently, Pope Francis seeks to “renew the missionary impulse” and invites a “kerygmatic catechesis” favouring a “personal encounter with the love of Jesus, who saves us”.3 In this context, many Catholic parishes are adopting a so-called missionary approach based on the principle of growth—in line with the Church Growth Movement and its founder, Donald McGavran—and are influenced by examples from mega-evangelical churches. The most emblematic and oldest of these mega-evangelical churches is the Full Gospel Central Church, set up by Korean Pastor David Yonggi Cho (Hui-Yeon, 2011). The principles laid down by Yonggi Cho are subsequently taken up by megachurches such as the New Hope Community Church (Portland, Oregon), founded by American pastor Dale Galloway, and California’s Saddleback Valley Community Church. In Catholic circles, several parishes are inspired by an ecclesial model based on small units meeting in homes. In the United States, this was pursued by Michel Eivers, the pastor of St. Boniface Church in Miami, following the example of the Korean Yoido Full Gospel Church and the Calvary Orlando Church (Florida). Don Pigi Perini visited the Florida parish with the intention of creating a similar one in Italy. Beginning in 1987 at the St. Eustorgio parish in Milan, 1 Pope Paul vi, 1975, Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Nustandi, n°3, 8 December 1975, DC 1689, 4 January 1976: 1–22. 2 The expression was used by Pope John Paul ii in 1979, during his speech in Poland to the workers of Nowa Huta. Afterward, he employed it more than 300 times. 3 Pope Francis, Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium, 25 November 2013. Available at: http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/fr/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco _esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004380073_008

130

Aubourg

he developed a model that came to be known in Catholic circles as the Parish Cells System of Evangelization. More recently, two North American Catholic parishes have been successful in drawing following the example of evangelical megachurches: the Nativity parish in Baltimore (Maryland, usa) and the Saint-Benedict parish in Halifax (Nova Scotia, Canada). The former is led by Father Michael White, who along with a collaborator (Tom Corcoran, a layman and father of six) published Rebuilt (2013), in which they relate how they sought inspiration from prosperous, growing churches, “with no excuses, and shamelessly” (Corcoran and White, 2013). The Canadian parish set up an innovative program—initiated by Father James Mallon—that has been changing the parish’s image and increasing its attendance. Mallon’s book, Divine Renovation (2014), explains how to move from mere maintenance of a building to the creation of an effective missionary community. Apart from a few chapters dealing with the Alpha Course (Rigou-Chemin 2011; Labarbe 2007), contemporary parish renewal in France remains only marginally documented. Accordingly, I propose to study Lyon’s Sainte Blandine parish, which has adopted aspects of the evangelical megachurch model. I will show how a French Catholic parish is inspired by the dynamism of evangelical churches and acclimatizes it to the local context, as well as the elements of Catholicism that distinguish it from evangelical churches. Evangelical megachurches are expanding, and their growth can be observed on every continent. With these burgeoning churches, a unique type of Christianity is emerging. For Scott Thumma, Dave Travis and Warren Bird, “­megachurches are the most influential contemporary dynamic in American religion” (Thumma et al. 2007: 218). According to French historian Sébastien Fath,4 this religious phenomenon is changing “the way of living Christian worship” to such an extent that he describes the transformation of American Protestantism as a “revolution”.5 Fath attributes three main functions to the modern megachurch: the gathering of Christians within a prestigious and monumental religious space; the facilitation of both innovation and emulation in worshiping God; and the affirmation of the influence of faith on the territory through both architecture and evangelism. These new churches are characterized by their spectacular height, the number of worshippers (at least 2,000 every Sunday), and a wide range of extra-religious activities. “Megachurches catalyze an active community life. Today, they are the new places where Christian crowds 4 All French citations have been translated by the author. 5 La révolution des megachurches [The revolution of megachurches] is the subtitle of his book Dieu xxl. (Fath 2008).

Catholic Reconquest

131

in need of lofty spaces materialize” (Fath 2008: 7). In the United States, Omri Elisha focuses on two Tennessee megachurches. His ethnographic studies explore evangelical attitudes and social engagement (Elisha 2011). In his book The Megachurch and the Mainline, Stephen Ellingson examines the permeability of Lutheran congregations in Northern California to the forms and practices of megachurches (Ellingson 2007). He is particularly interested in links between consumerism and these large churches (Ellingson 2013). In Southern California, the ethnographic observations of David A. Snow, James Bany, Michelle Peria, and James E. Stobaugh explain the success of megachurches through their capacity to provide answers to the personal problems of their members, especially in small groups (Snow et al. 2010). In France, in the city of Lyon, the parish of Sainte Blandine is directly inspired by these xxl churches. Since 2010, this parish has been led by Father David Gréa, whose objective is to help “people who have deserted their churches” to return to faith (Du Chaffaut 2013: 24). To reach this goal, he initiated the Lyon Centre project, which has met with great success: in less than seven years, attendance has multiplied sixfold. In the spring of 2017, a mezzanine had to be installed because the church could no longer contain the 1,200 worshippers attending Sunday service. In a periodical of the Lyon diocese, the young priest explained that he let himself be “moved by the ministry of an evangelical church in Los Angeles, and by these very different Christians being stimulated by that ministry” (Du Chaffaut 2013: 24). Spectacular size, technical innovation, intensive community life, the availability of a wide range of services, and the involvement of lay spirituality have all served to fuel individual regeneration; this Catholic parish has imitated elements characteristic of the evangelical Saddleback Valley Community Church (California). However, based on the assumption that this is not mere transplantation of an exogenous model, I shall also demonstrate how this French Catholic parish has customized the features of the Californian model to fit its own needs. In this paper I discuss five specific differences between Sainte Blandine and other evangelical megachurches: the predominant role of the historically Catholic institution; an involvement in the surrounding urban environment and local religious life; various types of membership; the value of sacramental practice; and restrained expression of faith. This ethnological study is based on observations collected in Lyon between 2012 and 2016, and in open-ended interviews, supplemented by three field visits to the Nouvelle Vie [New Life] megachurch of Longueuil, Quebec. Analysis of the experience of the Lyon parish reveals how “Catholicism in crisis” (Pelletier 2002) is transforming itself. The parish is developing remobilization strategies and is promoting a new missionary approach oriented to successful results in

132

Aubourg

terms of increased membership. After reviewing the historical situation of the Sainte Blandine parish, I look at various features of evangelical Protestantism. Then, I focus on those elements most likely to be integrated into the Catholic matrix of the Lyon Centre project. Finally, I show how this Lyon parish is part of a larger network of parishes actively participating in the reconquest of Catholicism. 1

Genesis of the Lyon Centre Project

David Gréa was born in 1969 and grew up in the La Croix-Rousse neighbourhood of Lyon’s 4th District. His parents, originally from the Jura region, were involved in a local movement called “catholicisme social” in Lyon. After being ordained as a priest in 2000, he pursued a Ph.D. focusing on the British theologian John Henry Newman. In 2007, he began his ministry in the Presqu’île Sud [South Peninsula] parish, where he met Benjamin Pouzin, founder of the musical band Glorious. In 2010, Father Gréa was named parish priest for the Sainte Blandine church. Located just beyond the arches that support the Perrache train station, this 2nd District neighbourhood is characterized by a mostly working-class population. Subsequently renamed “Confluence” after an ongoing urbanism project launched 20 years before, the neighbourhood has been undergoing a major transformation: modern buildings, a commercial centre, the Conseil Régional [Regional Council] headquarters, the Musée des sciences et sociétés [Museum of Science and Society], and the Université catholique de Lyon have replaced the factories, wholesale market, and the Saint-Paul and Saint-Joseph prisons. In this neighbourhood, the parish gathers Catholics militating for social action. The average age of the group was fairly high at the time Gréa was installed, and the members were generally middle-class. In 2011, Gréa and five parishioners travelled to California to visit the Saddleback Valley Community Church founded by Baptist minister Rick Warren, whose worshippers number 22,000. When they returned from the usa, the group of French Catholics established the Lyon Centre project. It organizes the parish around five principles: fellowship, discipleship, worship, ministry, and evangelism. 2

Imitating Evangelicals

Seven years later, it is clear that the Catholic parish of Lyon has adopted certain critical features of American megachurches. Spectacular size, technical innovation, a wide range of services, an intense community life, the i­nvolvement

Catholic Reconquest

133

of laypeople, and spirituality focused on individual regeneration: these six aspects help define American megachurches and can now be observed in the Catholic parish of Sainte Blandine. 2.1 A Growing Megachurch On average, 2,900 worshippers gather in a given megachurch each Sunday. Some 90% of these churches have seen their congregations grow over the past 20 years (Fath 2008: 30). The evangelical sphere places great value on the growth dynamic. A rise in church service attendance or an increase in the number of people being baptized are two indicators of improvement, and proof of the health of a given Christian community as well as its compatibility with the divine project. This emphasis on growth relates to a larger and older movement whose leading figure was Donald Anderson McGavran.6 The goal of multiplying the number of worshippers is linked to the proselytism set up by religious assemblies. However, in contrast with traditional structures, the success of megachurches lies in the proselytizing strategy of their leaders, which targets a specific type of audience. This is an inheritance from McGavran and his principle of the homogeneous unit. In the Sainte Blandine parish, a specific target was defined: non-practicing Catholics. As in evangelical megachurches, the rise of the parish has been the result of a multidirectional strategy aimed at proselytes: Alpha courses, small groups, and training for secular persons, all based on the conviction that the growth of congregations is willed by God. In 2014, 27 adults asked to be baptized, while 30 others received the sacrament of Confirmation.7 In 2016, 37 marriages were celebrated. Attendance at Sunday services has risen to such a degree that seating has become insufficient. Moreover, demographic renewal has been observed in the parish community. Before, the parishioners tended to be elderly, from middle and working-class backgrounds, comprised of Catholics and activists who were socially committed and politically leftist. Today, the parish is more heterogeneous. It welcomes young people, families from the Lyon bourgeoisie and foreign immigrants (from Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the West Indies). Increased attendance at Sunday services by neighbourhood residents alone does not account for the church’s rise in popularity. Indeed, 6 Donald Anderson McGavran (1897–1990), North-American missionary to India, then founder of the Institute of Church Growth in 1961. 7 In 2014, France had some 15,000 parishes which recorded 19,704 baptisms, 44,011 confirmations, and 59,918 marriages. Although parish characteristics vary greatly, the figures supplied by Sainte Blandine are ten times the average number for these sacraments recorded per parish overall.

134

Aubourg

Sainte Blandine has become an affinity parish where believers from all nine districts of Lyon—and beyond—now gather together. 2.2 Technological Modernity and Liturgical Innovation The mastery of new technologies is a constant feature of megachurches. All provide impressive facilities: large buildings with pleasant and ample surroundings, as well as modern and comfortable furniture. Their use of media and new audiovisual and communication technologies is striking, transforming the ministries in terms of modernity and professionalism. Megachurches aim at the highest quality, and every liturgical element is subjected to long and meticulous preparation. In Australia, the Hillsong megachurch of Sydney exemplifies the role of contemporary music in these largest churches (Lindenbaum 2012; Goh 2008; Connell 2005). At Lyon Centre, the openness to new technologies is evident. Sainte Blandine parish pays great attention to its communications, down to the smallest details. It features a dynamic website with engaging design and animations, and its Facebook page is also very active. Every week, the Sunday sermon is made available online. The technological investment and desire for high quality in logistics can even be seen at the weekly Eucharist. At the front of the church, white capital letters a metre long are positioned directly on the floor, spelling out the word Bienvenue [Welcome]. On the porch, volunteers dance to hymns emanating from the building. These dancers are ushers, there to welcome arriving worshippers and guide them to a seat. In the entry hall, pastries are offered on tables surrounded by colourful folding chairs. At the back of the nave, pews have been replaced by Acapulco8 armchairs of multicoloured braided rope, and floors have been covered with carpet. Glorious, the pop-rock band, performs catchy tunes that induce the audience to clap along. The priest employs a clip-on microphone to liberate his movements in front of the audience, and he delivers his sermon without notes. His voice is friendly and rhythmic, energizing the audience. Inside the church, three giant screens broadcast the celebration. At the end of the celebration, traditional parochial announcements have been replaced by music videos in the style of television commercials. Eager for permanent change, the parish offers innovative liturgies. For example, on December 24, 2016, the parish organized its Christmas Eve event at a novel place: the municipal ice-skating rink. According to church leaders,

8 Retro-design chairs in the shape of an egg.

Catholic Reconquest

135

innovation in liturgy is a matter of survival: “Within a year, changes will occur. If not, it means we’re dead!”9 Father Gréa has stated. 2.3 A Wide Range of Activities Offered One of the specific features of megachurches, in comparison to other evangelical assemblies, is the availability of a wide range of extra-cultural activities on their extensive and well-tended premises: restaurants, library, market, children’s game areas, computer rooms for teenagers, etc. In these gigantic churches, worshippers can find whatever they need. This diverse menu of services is not an option, but rather a key element in the church’s xxl definition. “The service package offered to consumers marks a striking difference between a very large religious space and a megachurch”, notes Sébastien Fath (2008: 38). Apart from religious rituals, megachurches offer other types of religious activities, and this is also the case of the Sainte Blandine parish: besides Masses, one finds youth groups, Bible studies (“Plunge into the Gospel”), work groups for deepening one’s faith (a course entitled “Zacharus”) and conferences. Above all, the specificity of Lyon Centre in comparison to other evangelical structures can be found in its close relationship with the nearby “Maison des Familles” across from the church, on the other side of the Cours Charlemagne. This community service was inaugurated in 2012 by Cardinal Barbarin and is run by Thierry and Frédérique Veyron-Lacroix. For its purpose, a former parish building was completely renovated. The new premises are bright, large, and modern, and are divided into several rooms: a game room for children, a training restaurant managed by Apprentis orphelins d’Auteuil [Auteuil Orphan Apprentices], a prayer room, several meeting rooms and offices, student rooms, and an entire apartment for a family. Among the activities offered, worshippers have access to: support for couples (family mediation, marriage counselling, Alpha duo10); parenthood support (conferences, cooking and weaving workshops, coffee meetings, single mothers’ groups); and educational support (academic tutors, Cycloshow11 workshops). The relationship between this structure, the Sainte Blandine parish, and the pop-rock band Glorious is very close: Father Gréa and the musicians have their offices there, on the mezzanine above the main room where parochial activities are organized. “Everything is linked”, says Benjamin Pouzin, the leader of Glorious. Thierry Veyron-Lacroix confirms that, “The

9 10 11

Sunday Eucharist, September 2015. A series of interactive sessions for couples. aears, Ateliers d’Éducation Affective, Relationnelle et Sexuelle [Emotional, Relational and Sexual Education Workshops] designed for parents and their teenage children.

136

Aubourg

­connection to the parish appeared by osmosis, by capillarity”.12 Beyond shared premises, the Maison des Familles, the parish and Glorious form an authentic triptych, and the Lyon Centre project is based upon these three interconnected entities. 2.4 “Fraternal and warm” Small Groups In his ethno-geographical study of megachurches, J. Wilford underscores the value of small groups. Beside weekly congregations that gather over 2,000 people, the relationships created by the participants themselves in groups of about twelve contribute to the loyalty of the evangelical community. These groupes de maison truly serve as the church’s backbone (Wilford 2010). Thus, the key challenge for xxl Christianity lies in the tension between the individual and the community, termed “communitarian individualism” by Jean-Paul Willaime (2004: 171). Inside the megachurches, individuals find both the intimacy of small groups and the freedom to participate in different activities, depending on their own needs; possibilities are offered with close personal support—the large community of fellow believers, as well as warm and welcoming mutual help and discussion groups. Concerning the celebrations held at Lyon Centre, the casual participant will immediately notice the large kakemono at the entrance of Sainte Blandine church, where the dates and locations of smaller group meetings are displayed. “Join a small group to develop fraternal relationships and your faith!”13 These groups with a human face bring Catholics together in a family atmosphere under the responsibility of a motivated layperson. Today, the Sainte Blandine parish offers 25 small groups, but the parish is planning to increase this number. Each group has between six and twelve participants. 2.5 Responsibility of Laypeople When I attended Nouvelle Vie to hear a Mother’s Day sermon by Pastor Stéphanie Reader-Poirier (from Longueil, Quebec, near Montréal), I observed the energy of her speech, the rigorous construction of her message, and the quality of the PowerPoint presentation she had prepared for the event. On that morning (in May 2015), I collected information from several female members of the Nouvelle Vie church. They told me of their love and admiration for Pastor Stéphanie. They identified with her as spouses and as mothers, and they greatly admired her talents as an orator. Most leaders of megachurches are married pastors who have children. Family members of these leaders are ­usually 12 13

Frédérique and Thierry Veyron-Lacroix, oral presentation (16 January 2017). Available on: http://egliseconfluence.fr/Site/home-group (Accessed on 11 April 2016).

Catholic Reconquest

137

­encouraged to become involved in the church. Sébastien Fath observes a “radicalization of the Protestant principle of believers” priesthood through a vigorous call to laypeople, including ministry and leadership) (2008: 55). At Sainte Blandine and the Maison des Familles, many laypeople participate in the project. Moreover, one peculiarity of this parish is the value given to couples in terms of pastoral responsibility. Benjamin Pouzin became involved full-time in the activities of Glorious. His spouse, Claire Pouzin-Becker, who is manager of the band, shares their offices. Benjamin has a key role in the parish: besides organizing the musical performances for praise and worship evenings and for Sunday services, he gives biblical teachings every two weeks to a group of 80 participants. At the Sunday service, one young participant told us that she liked his words a lot: “When Benjamin is speaking, because he’s married, he reaches married people. Because he’s young, he reaches young people. Because he’s open, he reaches people who aren’t necessarily from the same background”. Both he and his brother Thomas are officially instituted as readers, which gives them the right to preach in place of the priest who celebrates the Eucharist. 2.6 A Spirituality Focused on Individual Regeneration In his book The Purpose Driven Church, Rick Warren lists five strategic elements necessary to ensure the growth of a church. Four of these elements serve the primary one, which is worship (Warren 1995). As in Saddleback, the religion offered in megachurches is aimed at self-regeneration. A theological message and an evangelical parish are developed to promote a direct relationship with God, who is seen as a benevolent power able to respond directly to the personal needs of those who put their trust in him. In Lyon, the Sainte Blandine parish leaders place a high value on a certain kind of spirituality centred on the individual, where emotions prevail over doctrine. One leader claims that: Today, we often notice that in the Church, intelligence is offered, but the heart is missing ( …) Now our goal is to found a Church where the human being is welcomed along with his/her emotions, fears, tears, sensitivity, and way of being … We are not just here to give people theoretical knowledge. This parish gives much attention to the personal development and spiritual regeneration of individuals, as evidenced by two facts observed during the Sunday Eucharist. One is the content of the discourse, especially the homilies. Many parishioners ascribe their dedication to the services to feelings of

138

Aubourg

e­ ncouragement, to words of consolation, and to the restoration of their selfesteem. Far from political and social commentaries around biblical texts, sermons deal with issues to which the congregation can relate. The preacher draws easily on an intimate register and tone, illustrating his ideas with personal examples and not hesitating to conclude his remarks with words addressed directly to God. The significant value given to personal regeneration can be seen secondly in the custom known as “fraternal prayer”. During communion, lay members are at the disposal of parishioners, to pray for them. This prayer may be offered to ask for change in an unfortunate situation (sickness, unemployment, family conflict, etc.), or for the transformation of the parishioner through the removal of negative aspects of his or her personality (anxiety, depression, anger, etc.) or improvement of his or her capacities (to pray, to communicate, to better manage his or her time, etc.). 3

Catholic Acculturation

Catholic places of worship certainly have the potential to offer xxl Christianity, according to the features present in Protestant megachurches. However, this imitation will be undertaken in “the Catholic way”. Noteworthy differences separate megachurches from their Catholic counterparts. In the case of Sainte Blandine, five Catholic specificities can be highlighted: the leading role of the Catholic institution; its place in the urban context and local religious life; the diversity of membership status; the value given to sacramental practice; and restrained expression of faith. 3.1 A Major Role of the Catholic Institution In his description of evangelical sanctuaries, Fath writes: “With an adequate framework for entertainment and stage production, pastors of strong charismatic power find the necessary space to fulfil a major role”. He draws a parallel between such ministers and celebrities or successful televangelists. He also compares them to “independent sme entrepreneurs, free to extend the range of activities solely depending on their power of persuasion” (Fath 2008: 63). Just like these pastors, Father David Gréa has an unequivocal role in the genesis and success of the Lyon Centre. His extremely charismatic personality, youth, energy, and capacity to mobilize are all decisive factors. Additionally, pastors in megachurches work with councils of elders and surround themselves with numerous collaborators. In the same way, the priest in Lyon relies on a base of 80 parishioners who hold key responsibilities in Sainte Blandine.

Catholic Reconquest

139

Furthermore, in Weberian terms, it cannot be said that Father Gréa’s charisma as an individual has overcome the charisma awarded by his function and conferred by the Catholic Church. The support given by the Catholic hierarchy has been clear and decisive—the Lyon Centre project would not have taken shape without the incentive and support of Cardinal Barbarin. Furthermore, the Cardinal regularly visits the Sainte Blandine parish (for ecumenical celebrations, conferences, and confirmations) and seizes every opportunity to encourage the parishioners. “Make new suggestions, get out of your comfort zone!” (Richard 2015: 16). Yet this situation emphasizes a significant ecclesiological distinction between megachurches and the parish of Lyon Centre. Megachurches are comprised of groups of converts and are often self-regulated. Their model is ­congregationalist and focuses on the autonomy of local communities. The founder of an assembly is very likely to remain part of it for his entire life, and in most cases leadership is very stable. Alternatively, the Saint Blandine parish is wholly linked to the supra-local hierarchical structure on which it depends. No one knows whether the eventual successor to Father Gréa will choose to continue his project. This was mere hypothesis until recently, but it became an issue when David Gréa was discharged from his functions in February 2017—to enable him to marry. Next September, a new priest will be nominated. That priest’s future decisions will allow a clearer view of the possibility of sustaining a megachurch project in the Catholic sphere, independent of the personality of the priest in charge. 3.2 Involvement in Urban Space and Religious Local Life To organize concerts, the parish of Lyon had to rearrange the interior of the Sainte Blandine Church. Still, noteworthy differences from evangelical sanctuaries can be observed. Sainte Blandine is a neo-gothic church built in the middle of the 19th century: a cross, a bell tower, a pulpit, a sacristy, and stained glass are among the elements present in the building. These architectural features are all those of traditional Catholic churches. Evangelical assemblies, on the other hand, are established in non-sacred spaces. Their places of worship may be rented or purchased by local assemblies. Sainte Blandine, on the other hand, is owned by the municipality of Lyon, like most church properties built before 1905. Megachurches are usually located on the outskirts of cities; the homogeneity of suburban architecture makes them significantly less visible. The colossal dimensions of their parking lots are in line with the vastness of their buildings. By choosing untraditional locations, Evangelicals show their willingness to remove the sacred character of the religious space, a process

140

Aubourg

initiated by Protestants. For them, the religious building is a functional tool, whereas Catholics associate the very presence of God with a particular place (Grellier 2004: 206). Sainte Blandine parish has carved out its own place in the local religious landscape, and in the neighbourhood in which it is established. In this regard, it is worth mentioning some of the parish’s initiatives. Every year, the parish celebrates the Pardon des mariniers [Seamen’s Pardon]. Several cultural and sports activities are offered, and a “forgiveness liturgy” is given by David Gréa. This event fuses patrimonial, cultural, and religious elements; traditionally, Lyon has blended Catholic institutions with those of the municipality. Furthermore, every Thursday, Father Gréa welcomes about thirty prominent leaders from beyond the Catholic sphere.14 Lutherans, Anglicans, Protestants, Evangelicals, and Catholics gather for a breakfast followed by a common prayer. Another initiative has been advanced by the Sainte Blandine parish in the inter-religious realm. Following the attacks in Paris in November 2015, the Deputy Mayor of the Lyon’s 2nd District offered Father Gréa the chance to gather Muslims and Catholics from the neighbourhood together on the parish premises. This attitude illustrated a larger phenomenon, seen on a national scale, where a French mayor may willingly rely on Catholic leaders to foster cooperation among their Christian, Jewish, and Muslim counterparts on a local scale. Finally, I should note another element of interest concerning the Maison des Familles. This project is registered as a “society” (as described in a law dating from 1901), and every reference to Catholicism has been removed. Consequently, its buildings reflect a willingness to be neutral in religious terms; because of this, certain activities such as academic support are mostly frequented by atheists and Muslims. As for the volunteers, they do not behave with an evangelical purpose vis-à-vis these non-parishioners. In the megachurch I visited in Quebec, activities had likewise been created for people in need who were not members of the church. However, these were organized off the megachurch’s premises. If activities are offered inside the megachurch edifice, religious symbols are not hidden, and no one is prohibited from explicitly expressing their personal faith. Sainte Blandine, unlike its evangelical counterparts, is characterized by such initiatives as: Catholic rituals organized in cooperation with the municipality, interfaith and interreligious meetings, and non-ritual activities t­argeting 14

The group has slowly grown. It has around thirty members, but only about half of these actually attend every week. Meetings take place a hundred metres away, on the premises of the Catholic University of Lyon, in the Campus of Saint Paul.

Catholic Reconquest

141

a wide audience. These projects are based on collaboration and promote the involvement of the parish in the social issues of the neighbourhood, and its participation in community life. 3.3 Diversity in Membership Status Protestant evangelicalism is characterized in part by the fact that it seeks converts by way of volunteer groups. Converted individuals are usually strongly involved in their local communities. The activism mounted by these militants is reflected in their deep involvement in ecclesial activities. In the case of the Sainte Blandine parish, various categories of churchgoers can be observed. First, one type of participant shared by every Catholic parish is the irregular churchgoer.15 However, in Catholicism, weekly attendance at religious services is by no means the norm. Among French Catholics, only 7% attend services every week, while 83% attend church only for important religious ceremonies, large gatherings, or rites of passage (Cibois and Raison du Cleuziou 2017). In Sainte Blandine parish, churchgoers are generally more regular. In this regard, individuals attend Sunday services at least once a month, and they are also involved in a minimum of one other activity offered by the parish. This second category, practicing believers, can be found in virtually every parish or congregation, be it Catholic, Protestant, or evangelical. The third type of member is less often found among Evangelicals: individuals who participate irregularly in cultural activities of the parish, but who are strongly involved in another parish, in a Church movement, a new community, or some other diocesan group. This situation is possible because Catholics do not define themselves by the link they create with a volunteer group of converts; rather, they define themselves according to a vertical institution, which is the Catholic Church. For such worshippers, attending services at Sainte Blandine gives them the opportunity to unwind—they “do their duty” in some other place, then enjoy an energetic mass at Sainte Blandine. Last, but not least, the fourth category comprises members of other Christian churches who combine regular activism within their Protestant or evangelical community with irregular participation in Sainte Blandine’s celebrations. From irregular churchgoers to zealous ones, from faithful people loyal to their parish to those who jump from one parish to another, a wide spectrum of possibilities is offered to those Catholics willing to involve themselves. This leads me to emphasize that the range of membership status is broader in the Sainte Blandine parish than in Evangelical congregations. 15

Several statistical studies on Catholics in France document the decline in Sunday Mass attendance (Raison du Cleuziou and Cibois 2017).

142

Aubourg

3.4 Enhancing the Practice of the Sacraments When David Gréa describes the Lyon Centre project, and how he was inspired by the Saddleback experience, he explains his desire to break with the usual functioning of a parish, including its ritual celebrations. He says: Our church is missionary. For this reason, I deliberately set aside everything related to doctrine and typically Catholic devotion in my preaching. I go straight to the heart of the Church. I want to have an impact, connect hearts to Jesus. I frame my words in a kerygmatic approach. To this end, David Gréa sought to develop the five principles delivered by Rick Warren in his own megachurch. However, the French priest modified the Californian model to make it compatible with Catholicism. He says, “If I compare with Saddleback, which gives 101, 102, 103, 104 courses (…) I give five courses following the Catholic progression: baptism, communion, profession of faith, confirmation, and the gift of life. I take the Catholic path to live these courses”. He holds that “what makes us different is the sacraments”. Sunday service is central to the Lyon Centre project, and its pastoral approach attracts most of its audience. More generally, the practice of sacraments is encouraged in the Catholic parish, a fact confirmed by the priest: “These sacraments need to be enhanced again”. In a specifically Catholic manner, Saint Blandine highlights certain liturgical dates. For example, for Lent 2014, the parish published a 32-page booklet given out to parishioners16 that focused on key moments in the Catholic liturgy: Palm Sunday, the Easter Triduum, the Annunciation, Pentecost, and Trinity Sunday. The pamphlet discusses such Catholic topics as holiness, the Mass, and spiritual retreat. It also blends in biblical verses, a reference to Rick ­Warren, and numerous quotations from Catholic authors: Saint François de Sales, Pope Francis, Enzo Bianchi, Benoit xvi, and Anselm Grün. 3.5 Restrained Expression of Faith Christianity, as it was developed in France is the result of a ritual tradition that emphasizes observance and contemplation. The Evangelical revivalist movement, on the other hand, is characterized by public and uninhibited expression of one’s faith, and by strongly emotional demonstrations. Leaders of the parish of Lyon Centre, inspired by Anglo-Saxon Churches, have muted those aspects which seemed out of place with local cultural and religious practices. 16

Confluence Sainte Blandine Church, 2014, “La vie en abondance. Livret Carême et Pâques” [Life in Abundance, booklet for Lent and Easter].

Catholic Reconquest

143

The Masses celebrated at Sainte Blandine Church certainly attract young Catholics via their pop-rock musical performances, dynamic preachers, the gestures of worshippers, etc. However, several features typical of North American evangelicalism have not been replicated here, three in particular. First, cries of “Hallelujah” and “Amen” that punctuate the oratory of preachers are considerably less often heard here. Second, Catholic celebrations are different from megachurch assemblies: periods of silence are judged to be conducive to the interior reflection of worshippers. Third, a Catholic quality can be observed during the “prayer of the brothers”: those surrounding the person asking to be prayed for express themselves quietly, with their bodies still and their faces directed toward the floor. Moments of silence, the moderation of corporal expression, and control of the sound level: all these elements suggest that the Sainte Blandine parish seeks to master or lessen the emotional demonstration of faith. 4

Conclusion: A Network of Missionary Parishioners

Fathers White and Mallon know one another and maintain a good relationship; both participate in the Amazing Parish Conference, an event organized each year since 2014. In 2016, more than 200 parishes were represented by their priests and parochial teams. These conferences provide an opportunity for participants to share their experiences and to be trained in parochial organization. Co-founded by businessmen Patrick Lencioni and John Martin, Amazing Parish is an organization that aims at supporting Catholic leaders who want to revive their parishes. The Amazing Parish website is an original mix of ideas borrowed from the business and evangelical spheres, also including typically Catholic features. In 2015 and 2016, two meetings similar to the Amazing Parish Conference were organized in Lyon by the leaders of Sainte Blandine. The first meeting attracted 250 attendees, the second about 500. Three other French parishes assisted in organizing the event: Sophia-Antipolis (Alpes-Maritimes), Hyères (Var), and Senlis (Oise). These parishes are also moving toward the organizational principles displayed by growing churches: evangelization, small groups, an emphasis on prayer and adoration, close collaboration between priests and lay persons, and commitment to the Church. Each parish uses its own words to express the “essentials” formalized by Rick Warren17 and ensures a balance between each of the five dimensions. In France, several dioceses have taken 17

Fellowship, discipleship, worship, ministries, evangelism.

144

Aubourg

the experiences of Lyon, Senlis, Hyères, and Sophia-Antipolis as examples, offering their own approach to “pastoral conversion”. To help them toward this goal, they participated in a training program called “Des pasteurs selon mon cœur” [“Pastors according to my heart”] developed by Alpha and Talenthéo.18 The program targets priests and bishops and is built on methods formalized by James Mallon (2014). In practical terms, the program is divided into four modules over a period of eight months. The first three modules bring together parochial leaders, so they can explain their “pastoral vision” in detail and “acquire governance and leadership skills”. The final module gathers a larger team: at least ten persons per parish who may be involved in the project of “pastoral renewal”. The ultimate goal of this training is to reverse the current tendency of de-Christianization in French society. One of the laypeople organizing the meetings explained to us: “Bishops and priests are so busy that they forget about evangelization! (…) Nowadays, downsizing is the main issue, but here we are discovering the opposite. They are told: Live your life through growth! It is a revolution at all levels!” All the priests and bishops involved in this movement legitimize their decisions by quoting extracts from Evangelii Gaudiium (The Joy of the Gospel 2013). Reference to this apostolic exhortation by Pope Francis is constant, and the word “mission” is significantly promoted. In the past, the term had been rehabilitated by Pope Jean Paul ii (1991), and then, following his path, by Pope Benedict xvi. The evolution of vocabulary in Catholic language and its spread to the parish level is happening simultaneously with a reactivation of the missionary model in pastoral life (Prudhomme 2000). Moreover, this is being carried out on the basis of a closer relationship with evangelical revivals. The example of the Sainte Blandine parish shows how Catholicism can borrow features from evangelical megachurches without eliminating certain faith boundaries between Catholicism and Protestantism. The Catholic network of parishes undergoing a process of growth has established a new beginning for religious reconquest. Catholicism is not merely enduring the crisis of faith. Instead it is moving, remobilizing, and transforming itself. It borrows from evangelical movements their forms of expression and sociability to “reinstate faith on spiritual foundations” (Perez-Agote 2012: 289).

18

The society pulls together a network of 80 professional Christian coaches in France, Switzerland, and Belgium. Its objective consists in “voluntarily accompanying the priests and bishops to strengthen their vision and pastoral leadership, serving the growth of the Church”.

Catholic Reconquest

145

References Bebbington, David, 1989. Evangelicalism in modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s. London: Unwin Hylan. Cibois, Philippe and Raison du Cleuziou Yann, 2017. “Enquête Bayard-Ipsos”. Le Pèlerin, n° 6998: 18–32. Connell, John, 2005, “Hillsong: A Megachurch in the Sydney Suburbs”. Australian Geographer, Vol. 36: 315–332. Du Chaffaut, Bénédicte, 2013. “Permettre une conversion. Entretien avec David Gréa, Benjamin et Thomas Pouzin”. Église à Lyon, n 8, septembre 2013: 24–25. Elisha, Omri. 2011, Moral Ambition: Mobilization and Social Outreach in Evangelical Megachurches. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011. Ellingson, Stephen. 2013. “Packaging Religious Experience, Selling Modular Religion: Explaining the Emergence and Expansion of Megachurches”, in François Gauthier and Thomas Martikainen, eds., Religion in Consumer Society: Brands, Consumers and Markets. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited: 131–134. Ellingson, Stephen. 2007. The Megachurch and the Mainline: Remaking Religious Tradition in the Twenty-first Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Fath, Sébastien, 2008. Dieu XXL. La révolution des megachurches. Paris: Autrement. François (Pape). 2013. Exhortation apostolique Evangelii Gaudiium. La joie de l’Évangile, 25 novembre 2013. Paris, Bayard, Le Cerf, Fleurus, Mame. Goh, Robbie B.H. 2008, “Hillsong and megachurch practice: semiotics, spatial logic and the embodiment of contemporary evangelical Protestantism”. Material Religion: The Journal of Objects, Art and Belief, Volume 4: 284–304. Grellier, Isabelle. 2004. “L’inscription des protestantismes dans l’espace urbain français : entre le musée et le supermarché”, J-P. Bastian (dir.), La recomposition des protestantismes en Europe Latine: 203–221. Hui-Yeon, Kim. 2011. Le “pentecôtisme coréen à l’épreuve de la transnationalisation : le cas de l’Église de Cho Yonggi”, Thèse de doctorat, Paris, École des hautes études en sciences sociales. Jean-Paul, II (Pape). 1991. “Encyclique Redemptoris missio”, 7 décembre 1990. Documentation Catholique 2022, 17 février 1991: 152–191. Labarbe, Frank. 2007. “Un ethnologue au Cours Alpha. Évangélisation et cure d’âme en milieu charismatique—Un exemple montpelliérain”. PentecoStudies, vol. 6.1, 2007: 150–87. Le Bras, Gabriel. 1976. L’Église et le village. Paris: Flammarion. Lindenbaum, John, 2012. “The pastoral role of Contemporary Christian Music: The Spiritualization of Everyday Life in a Suburban Evangelical Megachurch”. Social & Cultural Geography, vol. 13: 69–88.

146

Aubourg

Mallon, James. 2014. Divine Renovation: From a Maintenance to a Missional Parish. New London: Twenty-Third Publications. Pelletier, Denis. 2002. La Crise catholique. Religion, société, politique en France (1965– 1978). Paris: Payot. Pérez-Agote, Alfonso, 2012, “Synthèse comparative”. In Alfonso Pérez-Agote (dir), ­Portraits du catholicisme, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, p. 255–298. Prudhomme, Claude. 2000. “Le grand retour de la mission ?” Vingtième Siècle, revue d’histoire, n° 66, avril-juin 2000: 119–132. Richard, Isabelle. 2015. “Lyon, centre de la joie”, Église à Lyon, n° 7: 16. Rigou-Chemin, Bénédicte. 2011. Les virtuoses religieux en paroisse. Une ethnographie du catholicisme en acte. Thèse de doctorat en anthropologie, EHESS. Snow, David A, James A. Bany, Michelle Peria and James E. Stobaugh, 2010. “A team field study of the appeal of megachurches. Identifying, framing, and solving personal issues”. Ethnography, vol. 11, n° 1: 165–188. Thumma, Scott, Dave Travis and Warren Bird. 2007. Beyond Megachurch Myths: What We Can Learn from America’s Largest Churches. Haboken, NJ: Wiley/Jessey-Bass. Warren, Rick. 1995. The Purpose Driven Church. Grand Rapids: Zondervan. White, Michael and Tom Corcoran. 2013. Rebuilt. Notre Dame, Indiana: Ave Maria Press. Wilford, Justin. 2010. Sacred Subdivisions: The Post-Suburban Transformation of American Evangelicalism. New York: NYU Press. Willaime, Jean-Paul. 2004. “Le statut et les effets de la conversion dans le protestantisme évangélique”, S. Fath (dir.), Le protestantisme évangélique, un christianisme de conversion, Turnhout, Brepols: 167–178.

Chapter 7

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (ccr) in the Americas Andrea Althoff and Jakob Egeris Thorsen At the beginning of the 21st century, global Christianity is undergoing impressive transformation. Whereas church membership and attendance are declining in Europe and North America, Christianity is spreading rapidly in the so-called “Global South” where many new Christians are joining Charismatic and Pentecostal churches. Latin America has been nominally Christian for five centuries, but here, too, an impressive awakening ties people closer to newer forms of Pentecostal Christianity; millions have left the once omnipresent Catholic Church and joined Pentecostal, neo-Pentecostal, and Evangelical communities. A significant number are also experiencing a Pentecostal revival within the Catholic Church, as they form part of an internal Catholic Charismatic movement, which in the year 2000 encompassed at least 74 million Catholics in the Americas and a minimum of 120 million globally (Barrett et al. 2001: 275–278). This contribution gives an introduction to this movement in the Americas and places an emphasis on the transnational dimensions of the Catholic Charismatic movement in North, Central, and South America. Attention will be given to countries that have experienced an extraordinary growth in Catholic Charismatic Christianity, namely Brazil and Colombia, as well as to the country that has been a prime exporter of Latino Charismatics to the United States, Mexico. Furthermore, we portray the interface between migration and religion, and the tensions between the largest Catholic lay movement in Latin America and institutionalized Catholicism. Last but not least, we describe regional and cultural variations between Charismatic Catholicism and popular religion, and provide an overview of some theoretical explanations tied to the phenomenon. The research for this article is based on two different empirical-qualitative studies. Andrea Althoff, a sociologist, wrote her Ph.D. thesis on religious pluralism and ethnicity in Guatemala: including the Catholic Charismatic Renewal, the neo-Pentecostal and Pentecostal movements, and the Maya movement. Jakob Egeris Thorsen, a theologian, wrote his doctoral thesis on the Catholic Charismatic Renewal movement in Guatemala; in particular, the spread of © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004380073_009

148

Althoff and Thorsen

Charismatic practices in Guatemalan church life. Both studies included longterm fieldwork stays; one year and six months respectively. For the purpose of this chapter, the literature and current numbers have been reviewed and updated. 1

A Short History of the Movement in the Americas

The Charismatic movement in the historic Protestant churches during the early 1960s, and the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), prepared the ground for the Catholic Charismatic movement (Balmer 2002: 118). Later, resulting from these developments, the Catholic Charismatic Renewal (ccr) was founded as an officially recognized lay movement within the Roman Catholic Church.1 There are four themes that are of special significance: first, the emphasis on the Holy Spirit; second, the role of the laity in the life of the movement and the Church; third, the opening up to ecumenical activity; and fourth, the emphasis on evangelization. These themes (Holy Spirit, laity, ecumenism, and evangelization) emerged during the Second Vatican Council when the Vatican’s pronouncements recognized the importance of the Holy Spirit and charismatic gifts: “a stress that was championed in council sessions by the Belgian Cardinal León-Joseph Suenens who later was to provide critical support for the charismatic movement” (Thigpen 2002: 460). Furthermore, the “recognition that the Spirit could bestow graces among the “separated brethren” allowed for the possibility that Protestant Pentecostals might be able to contribute to the renewal of the Catholic Church” (Thigpen 2002: 460). Many accounts of the ccr, however, state that the movement started in the U.S. in the early months of 1967 among students and lay faculty at Duquesne University in Pittsburg, a Roman Catholic school operated by the Congregation of the Holy Spirit. Historian and priest Peter Hocken, nevertheless, identifies similar developments in Bogotá, Colombia, as an independent locale from Duquesne (Hocken 2002b: 498; Cleary 2011: 55). Charismatic splinter groups ­began even earlier, in 1962, including the Legion of Mary (Legio Mariae) in ­Kenya (Burgess: 2002: xix). In the U.S., at Duquesne, the immediate catalysts were two young theology instructors, Patrick Bourgeois and Ralph Keifer. Influenced by David Wilkerson’s The Cross and the Switchblade (1963) and John Sherrill’s They Speak with Other Tongues (1964), they wanted to experience 1 Important to note is the hybrid form of religiosity that Catholic Charismatics characterize, at least in Latin America. As Edward L. Cleary, O.P., described it: “There is no “pure” Catholic Charismatic model” (Cleary 2011: 19).

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (ccr) in the Americas

149

baptism in the Holy Spirit (Balmer 2002: 118; Thigpen 2002: 460) and sought out a charismatic prayer group in the area that was attended by Presbyterians. Soon they received the typical Pentecostal experience, including speaking in tongues. In mid-February 1967, they conducted a spiritual retreat which became known as the Duquesne Weekend, in the course of which approximately thirty students received Spirit baptism (Thigpen 2002: 460; Balmer 2002: 118). From Duquesne, the movement soon spread to the University of Notre Dame and to the campus of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. From April 7–9, 1967, about a hundred students from these three universities gathered on the Notre Dame campus for a weekend of prayer and reflection on their recent experiences. Before long, the movement had reached other Midwestern campuses, from which it spread throughout the rest of the U.S. (Balmer 2002: 118; Thigpen 2002: 460–461). Important in this dynamic were the so-called covenant communities, or charismatic Catholic communities, in which committed members lived for some years in households and developed a powerful community ministry. Particular examples include the People of Praise in South Bend, Indiana, and the Word of God Community in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The former was formed by Kevin Mathers Ranaghan, Dorothy Ranaghan, and Paul DeCelles; the latter by two early converts, Ralph Martin and Stephen B. Clark (Hocken 2002a: 473). Martin and the Word of God Community in Ann Arbor, and Francis Scott MacNutt, then a Dominican priest, would have a strong impact on Latin America (Strang 2002: 856; Cleary 2011: 10). These covenant communities played prominent roles in the leadership, expansion, and consolidation of the ccr, in the U.S. and globally (Thigpen 2002: 460–461). Other factors that contributed to provide the ccr with rapid growth, visibility, unity, and a sense of identity were social networks of families and friends, small local prayer groups (often set up by families and friends), frequent large conferences, and Catholic media (Thigpen 2002: 461, 463; Cleary 2011: 10). At Notre Dame, for instance, the ccr held annual conferences starting in 1967; and by 1973, the conference was attended by 20,000 people (Balmer 2002: 118). As early as 1973, the ccr not only had become firmly rooted in the U.S. but had also extended—often through international conferences—into Canada, Latin America, Europe, and Asia (Balmer 2002: 118). In the U.S., in 1970, the National Service Committee (nsc) was created to coordinate services such as the national conferences. In 1972, the nsc leaders founded an International Communications Office (ico) in Ann Arbor, Michigan, with Ralph Martin as director. In 1976, the ico, at the invitation of Cardinal León-Joseph Suenens, moved to Brussels, and then in 1978 to Rome. In Brussels, the ico changed its name to the International Catholic Charismatic Renewal Office. Suenens himself was an important figure in the Second

150

Althoff and Thorsen

­ atican Council and acted as patron and sponsor for the movement. He was V also given a special mandate by the Vatican to oversee the movement internationally. Today, the office is called the International Catholic Charismatic Renewal Services, or iccrs (Cleary 2011: 12). In Canada, the Catholic Charismatic Renewal emerged in 1967 (Balmer 2002: 118) or 1968 (cccb). Prayer groups sprang up in virtually every diocese across the nation, and very soon service teams and diocesan committees were set up to unite and assist them. In the French sector, as early as 1974–75, the Assemblée Canadienne Francophone du Renouveau Charismatique Catholique (acfrcc) came into being, ten years later becoming the Association des Délégués Diocésains du Renouveau Charismatique (addrc). Soon thereafter, in order to unite and assist the Charismatic Renewal leadership at the national level, the Canadian Charismatic Renewal Services of Canada (ccrsc) was established for the English sector; and for the French sector, the Conseil Canadien du Renouveau Charismatique (ccrc). Each sector has its official magazine: The Bread of Life and Selon Sa Parole. In 2003, over 1 million Catholic Canadians were in some way influenced by the Charismatic Renewal and some 862 prayer groups existed in roughly 16% of all Catholic parishes in the country (cccb 2003; Kydd 2002: 48–51). 2

The Expansion of the Movement in Latin America

There is a strong connection between the development of the movement in the U.S., its decline there, and the growth of the movement in Latin America. In the U.S., the success of the ccr started to dwindle in the early 1980s. There were several factors that were responsible for this: primarily, the movement had reached its peak in the late 1970s, with many charismatics exiting it or the Catholic Church altogether. Large conferences were also not a guarantee for binding members; and although attendance at regional conferences soared, the number of active Catholic charismatics fell, causing ccr leaders to call for a “back to basics” strategy. According to Paul Thigpen, some of those who left the movement came to question the validity of the Pentecostal experience, or they came to see that experience as one facet of a much richer and more complex Catholic spirituality with no need for a special identity. Others joined Protestant groups or turned to movements such as the growing Marian movement (Thigpen 2002: 461). As Paul Thigpen explains: [an] interest in the supernatural aspects of the charismata often shows some continuity with interest in the supernatural aspects of Marian

151

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (ccr) in the Americas

a­ pparitions, and the end-time themes commonly emphasized among Protestant Pentecostals easily find a parallel in the apocalyptic warnings of Marian visionaries. thigpen 2002: 461

A core of firm followers, however, continued in the movement, notably at the Word of God Community and at the Franciscan University in Steubenville, Ohio. Meanwhile, missionaries from the U.S., as well as Latin Americans who had come in contact with the charismatic movement in the U.S., were building the groundwork for an international expansion of the movement in Latin America. In fact, Latin Americans would reignite the movement in the U.S. in the 1990s, and that trend continued in the following decade through the m ­ igration Table 7.1

Presence of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal in Latin America

Country (percentage of Catholics who are Charismatic) usa Canada usa (Hispanic Catholics only) Latin America (total) Brazil Mexico Colombia Argentina Peru Venezuela Chile Ecuador Guatemala Bolivia

Barrett et al. 2001 (ccr-census)

Pew 2006 (Charismatic practices)

Pew 2014 (self-identify as Charismatics)

15% 8% No data

36% No data No data

16%

No data

No data No data 54% (data: Pew 2007: 31) No data

22% 10% 28% 14% 10% 14% 14% 10% 9% 12%

57% No data No data No data No data No data 26% No data 62% No data

58% 27% 24% 20% 32% 38% 23% 40% 38% 30%

Sources: data derived from Barrett et al. 2001: 275–278; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2006: 76–80; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2014: 64; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2007: 31.

152

Althoff and Thorsen

of practitioners of Catholic Charismaticism (especially from Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Haiti, and Guatemala). Latin American missionaries would also come to evangelize Catholics in the U.S., as itinerant preachers or as residents. Furthermore, returning U.S.-American missionaries, such as Bishop Nicholas D’Antonio of New Orleans, breathed new life into the faltering movement in the United States (Cleary 2011: 11). Finally, in the 1980s, and particularly by 1986, evangelism, in response to Pope John Paul ii’s stress on the New Evangelization, was coming into focus as a primary task for the movement. This new focus was clear in the New Orleans conferences on evangelization of 1986 and 1987, organized by the North American Renewal Services Committee (Thigpen 2002: 461). Francis MacNutt, then a Midwestern-U.S. Dominican friar, introduced the Catholic Charismatic movement in several Latin American countries. Notably, he preached the Life in the Spirit Seminars (lss)—retreats to prepare people for receiving baptism in the Holy Spirit—with a team of Catholics and Protestants, both men and women. With these seminars, he basically started the movements in Bolivia and Peru (1970); the Dominican Republic (1971); Guatemala, Mexico, and Costa Rica (1972); and Colombia and Chile (1972) (Cleary 2011: 30, 36). MacNutt later left the Dominican order and married. In 1980, he created, together with his wife Judith MacNutt, the ecumenical Christian Healing Ministries in Clearwater, Florida. In 1987, at the invitation of the Episcopal Diocese of Florida, they moved to Jacksonville, Florida, and expanded Christian Healing Ministries into a healing centre for prayer ministry and teaching (chm 2015). In 1973, leaders from eight Latin American countries met in Bogotá, Colombia, and decided to establish a Latin American communication centre, the Latin American Catholic Charismatic Encounter (Encuentro Carismático Católico Latinoamericano, eccla) (Thigpen 2002: 462). The meetings of eccla have been supplemented by the Latin American Catholic Charismatic Counsel (Consejo Carismático Católico Latinoamericano, concclat), founded in 1995 and made up of national coordinators and advisors from every country in Latin America. This development reflects the fuller structuring of the ccr and the growth of the movement in every Latin American country (Hocken 2002b: 513). For many years, the ccr was accepted within the Roman Catholic Church, but not strongly supported by the bishops in Latin America. The Bishop’s Conference of Panama was the first to accept the ccr, in 1975; the powerful Brazilian Bishops Conference was the last, in 1994. While the ccr in Brazil was very successful among the laity, its clergy was (more than in any other ­country)

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (ccr) in the Americas

153

a­ ttached to the movement of liberation theology and hence hostile to the ccr’s theological and pastoral focus on personal sanctification and religious experience (Cleary 2007: 168). In the 1990s, however, the advance of Pentecostal and Charismatic churches in Latin America persuaded many bishops that the only effective Catholic response against Protestant Pentecostalism would be a spiritual renewal and encouragement of the ccr (Hocken 2002b: 513). Many observers regard the simultaneous rise of the ccr and Protestant Pentecostal churches in the region as part of the same general Pentecostalization of religion in Latin America (Chesnut 2003b). Undoubtedly, the ccr in Latin America is the largest and fastest growing movement in the Catholic Church. With estimates of some 74 million adherents in the year 2000, Latin America leads all Catholic regions in the world in this trend. Following the chart above, numbers could easily have doubled by 2017. By the year 2000, the number of Charismatic Catholics was greater than the 40 million or so estimated Latin American Protestants, most of whom were Pentecostal (Cleary 2011: 1). Until the late 1990s, Western scholars focused almost exclusively on the theologically influential, but numerically insignificant, movement of liberation theology (Berryman 1987: 4), as well as the church’s competitors (Protestant Pentecostalism and neo-Pentecostalism), completely overlooking the ccr, particularly in Latin America (Althoff 2014: 41–42; Hocken 2002: 497). In Edward L. Cleary’s words, the ccr became the “invisible giant” which no one studied, although it was ten to twenty times bigger than the Christian Base Communities movement (Cleary 2009: 66). One of the few scholars who did cover the rise of Charismatic Catholicism is Andrew Chesnut. In his view, the research gap is a product of academic taste. According to him, conservative and socially disengaged movements dedicated to transforming individual lives through conversion do not appeal to scholars with a progressive leftist background (Chesnut 2003a: 55). Protestant Pentecostals and neo-Pentecostals (which are also conservative, spiritually oriented, and, most importantly, have an agenda strikingly similar to that of the Catholic Renewalists) did, however, catch the attention of numerous social scientists. It might be that the Catholic background of the ccr explains the research gap. Those who publish on Protestant Pentecostalism, neo-Pentecostalism or liberation theology often have a Catholic background or are sympathetic to progressive tendencies within the Catholic Church. The movement, therefore, does not match the progressive image that partially exists in (Catholic) academia; it ascribes to neither social activism nor traditional formality. In his last book, from 2011, Edward L. Cleary, O.P., analysed the presence of the Renewal in Latin America using data made available by Barrett et al.

154

Althoff and Thorsen

(2001), listed in the chart above. He distinguished three categories. First, he ranked countries by the number of Charismatic Catholics (in millions); the five leading countries being Brazil with 33.7, followed by Colombia with 11.3, Mexico with 9.2, Argentina with 4.7, and Venezuela with 3.1. His second table ranked countries by the percentage of Catholics who were Charismatic; the first five countries being Colombia (28%), Brazil (22%), Puerto Rico (18%), Argentina (14%), and Chile (14%). The third table ranked countries by the percentage of priests who were Charismatic; the first five countries being Dominican Republic (23%), Brazil (11%), Guatemala (11%), Nicaragua (10%), and Argentina (9%) (Cleary 2011: 27–29; Barrett et al. 2001: 275–278). Statistical figures, however, have to be treated with caution. According to the 2006 survey conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, the percentage of Catholic Charismatic worshippers among the Catholic population was 62% in Guatemala, 57% in Brazil, and 26% in Chile (Pew Forum 2006). The striking discrepancies can best be explained by the fact that the numbers cited in Barrett and Johnson are based on a census of participants in Charismatic prayer groups organized under the ccr umbrella, whereas the Pew Forum numbers are based on Catholic respondents who engage in diverse Charismatic worship practises (enthusiastic songs of praise, speaking in tongues, prayer of healing, ecstatic conversion experiences, testimonies, etc.). Furthermore, in the Pew Forum survey, group attendance was not necessarily linked to the organized ccr; independent charismatic groups without formal attachment to institutionalized Charismaticism were also counted (Thorsen 2015: 41). Overall, tensions continue between two major branches with antagonistic perspectives, as they each attempt to revitalize the church, particularly in Latin America. First, there is the branch consisting of groups who focus on liberation theology, Christian Base Communities (cebs), and political activism. These groups believe that social inequalities must be changed structurally along with the human heart (Berryman 1987). On the other side are spiritually oriented groups such as the Charismatic renewal groups, and covenant communities. They believe that societal improvement is dependent on personal conversion and that discussions of changing social structures are secondary (Cleary 2011: 146). Studies by anthropologists of ccr groups and cebs in Brazil, nevertheless, have indicated that for participants on the ground the same type and degree of personal and communal empowerment is achieved no matter whether the prayer group is from the ccr or linked to the ceb movement. Likewise, there seems to be a blurring of lines between the two, where many cebs take over worship practises founded in the ccr (Theije 1998, 1999; Mariz and Theije 2008).

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (ccr) in the Americas

3

155

Catholic Charismatic Christianity in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico

As noted in the chart above, the percentage of Catholics who have become Charismatics varies substantially from country to country in Latin America. We will, therefore, describe the status of the movement in three countries where it has experienced the greatest numerical growth: Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico (the country of origin for many Catholic migrants who are, or would become, Charismatic worshippers in the U.S.). The ccr in Brazil is both numerous and influential. According to the numbers cited above, between 22% and 58% of Catholics can be described as Charismatic; and according to a census by the Brazilian ccr, the organization had prayer groups in 6,000 of Brazil’s 8,600 parishes (Barrett et al. 2001: 119–122; Cleary 2011: 96; Pew 2006 and 2014). One of the important factors in the continued growth of the ccr in Brazil is the Charismatic superstar priest Marcelo Rossi (born 1967), who attracted many people to the ccr during the first decade of the millennium (Althoff 2017; Cleary 2011: 97). Marcelo Rossi’s twelve studio albums have sold more than 11 million legal copies (and presumably many times more pirated copies). The weekly attendance at the daily masses in his megachurch, Mãe de Deus in São Paulo, exceeds 200,000 people. This specially constructed sanctuary was inaugurated in 2012 and has space for 100,000 people (Althoff 2017). A network of busses allows access from the greater São Paulo area (Cleary 2011: 140,145). Rossi’s songs and preaching about the transforming power of God are transmitted to all parts of Brazil and the globe by radio and television. The private channel Rede Globo has broadcast his Charismatic Sunday masses for many years (ibid.: 42). Father Rossi is the last and most successful representative of a recent Brazilian line of singing Catholic priests. The famous Padre Zezinho (José Fernandes de Oliveira, born 1941) has recorded more than 60 studio albums since 1972. Other famous priests who engage in singing are Padre Jorjão, Padre Antonio Maria, Padre Joãozinho, and Padre Zeca, who are mostly known by their nicknames, similar to football players and gang leaders. Music has been an effective medium of evangelization for Charismatic Catholics because it effectively connects the religious message with the alluring rhythms of popular music, enabling Catholics to compete with media-effective Pentecostals (Cleary 2011: 149). This leads to another observation: Father Rossi’s megachurch and the Charismatic music production must be understood in the context of a fierce competition with Brazilian Pentecostalism, which has grown rapidly during the last five decades, encompassing 23% of the population in 2014. Thus, while Brazil is the most populous Catholic country in the world (123 million Catholics), it is at the same time the Latin American country with the most Protestants: 43 million. ­Presumably,

156

Althoff and Thorsen

the influence of liberation theology on Brazilian bishops made them the last in the hemisphere to approve the ccr, in 1994 (Cleary 2007: 168). Today, the ccr has undoubtedly become a bulwark against the further erosion of the Catholic Church (Cleary 2011: 108). The rivalry between liberation theology’s ecclesial base communities, or as they are called in Spanish, communidades ecclesiales de base, and Charismatic prayer groups has decreased over the years; and in many places, people are members of both cebs and Charismatic prayer groups. Similarly, many cebs have adopted the enthusiastic music and worship style of Charismatics (Theije 1999; Cleary 2007). Colombia is a different case. Unlike Brazil, the institutional Catholic Church in Colombia has traditionally been strong and more conservative. Furthermore, Colombia has, compared to other Latin American countries, a relatively low percentage of Protestants and Pentecostals (between 4% and 10%) (Cleary 2011: 76). The growth of the ccr in Colombia, where around only one-fourth of Catholics are Charismatic (see chart above), therefore, is far below the Brazilian rate. Given that the Brazilian example was linked to the competition with Pentecostals, these numbers can be used as an argument against the assumption that the ccr is first and foremost a pragmatic Catholic reaction to Pentecostalism (Chesnut 2004a; Cleary 2011: 76,130). In Colombia, the ccr has enjoyed closer supervision by bishops and priests than in other Latin ­American countries. It is also linked to the phenomenon of Minuto de Dios (“God’s Minute”), the beginning of a short daily radio program founded by the priest Rafael García-Herreros (1909–1992). The program became very popular and expanded to the small screen when television arrived in Colombia in 1955. Over the course of the next few decades, Padre Rafael raised funds for extensive social work. During the 1960s, the large housing project Minuto de Dios was constructed on the fringe of Bogotá with a school, church, and medical services. Since 1990, there even has been a university (Uniminuto) among the facilities, which grew into eight campuses and extended to thirty-five Colombian towns and cities. Today the Minuto de Dios Corporation provides nationwide social services, housing projects, child sponsorships, microcredit, education, and clothing assistance (Cleary 2011: 57). In 1970, Padre Rafael became baptized in the Holy Spirit, and since then the missionary outreach and charity ­activism of the Minuto de Dios project became linked to the emerging Charismatic Renewal. The ccr has often been accused of being purely spiritual and lacking social conscience. In Colombia, Minuto de Dios proved otherwise, although it was built on a model of traditional charity and not the liberation-oriented project that many of García-Herreros’ contemporaries preferred to support. Finally, the example of Mexico offers a striking perspective on Catholic Charismaticism. Like Colombia, Catholicism in Mexico has a strong position

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (ccr) in the Americas

157

both institutionally and in the religious practices of the population (Cleary 2011: 152). As noted in the chart above, the Mexican ccr was estimated to include around 12% of all Catholics in the year 2000; the 2014 survey even described 27% of all Catholics as being self-identifying as Charismatic. After its birth in the U.S. in 1967, the ccr rapidly spread to Mexico. Soon it became popular among lay groups, and various priests and bishops were favourable to the movement. In the very same year, a small national umbrella organization was formed. By 2008, sixty dioceses, almost all the dioceses in the country, sent representatives to the annual national meeting (Cleary 2011: 156). After more than a century of tensions between secularist, anticlerical governments, and the Catholic Church, including lengthy persecutions, a more comfortable stasis with the state has been reached. The ccr profited from this, taking root in existing ecclesial structures and establishing ties to several wellorganized lay organizations. The Missionaries of the Holy Spirit, founded in 1914 as a local religious order, became an active promoter of the ccr after one of their priests, Padre Alfonso Navarro Catelanos, became a Charismatic. Navarro modified Charismatic expressions and practices to a Mexican context, downplaying some of the more “Protestant” aspects, and giving more space to popular Catholic practices, e.g. the veneration of the Virgin of Guadalupe and the use of holy water and scapulars (Cleary 2011: 154). Navarro worked in the San José del Altillo parish in Mexico City, and the church became a centre for the movement. At this church, the famous Charismatic lay preacher José Prado Flores (born 1947) experienced his conversion and Spirit baptism. “Pepe” Prado has been a Catholic Mexican equivalent to Billy Graham, and he was very important for the growth of the ccr in the Americas and globally (Althoff 2017). Another important figure was the late Bishop Carlos Talavera Ramírez (1923–2006). When he was still a priest, he represented the Mexican delegation at the first eccla meeting in Bogotá. Furthermore, after his episcopal ordination, he became an important link between the ccr and the bishops’ conference in Mexico. Talavera is an interesting figure because he combined liberation-oriented social-justice activism with Charismatic spirituality, a combination seldom seen (Cleary 2011: 158). After the Second Vatican Council, in a period of modernization and urbanization, the Catholic Church in Mexico made great efforts to strengthen knowledge of the Church’s teachings among the baptized masses, who were loyal to the Church by tradition, but were easily challenged by the strong secular education system and by Protestant missionaries. By the year 2003, the Church in Mexico had prepared more than 170,000 lay catechists, which is an average of more than thirty per parish (Cleary 2011; Froehle and Gautier 2003). Many of them belong to the ccr and function as internal missionaries who proactively promote the faith among nominal and lapsed Catholics. Mexico has also become

158

Althoff and Thorsen

a ­major exporter of missionaries to countries abroad, mainly the U.S. Charismatic lay preachers visit Hispanic communities in the U.S. and hold retreats at which they present the Charismatic experience to the Spanish-­speaking ­sections of the U.S. Catholic Church. As we saw in the chart above, around 50% of the L­ atino Catholics in the U.S. can be characterized as Charismatics. 4

Linking Theory and Practice: Doctrinal Characteristics, Popular Religion, and Rational-Choice Approaches

The Holy Spirit and its spiritual gifts, such as healing, are clearly emphasized among the beliefs and practices of Catholic Charismatics. Other characteristics include evangelization, personal conversion, a focus on Jesus, praise, love of the Bible, a re-enchanted worldview, spiritual warfare, and ­eschatological expectation (Cleary 2011: 5). In contrast to Protestant Pentecostals, C ­ atholic Charismatics place less emphasis on speaking in tongues, do not share Pentecostals’ world-denying Holiness origins, typically belong to the middle and lower classes (although many are members of the upper class or the cultural elite), and have expressive lifestyles (such as in their musical preferences). Paul Freston also notes that Catholic Charismatics, to a higher degree than other converts, retain their basic identities, with lifestyles frowned on by classic Pentecostals and older Evangelicals with stricter forms of Christianity (cited in Cleary 2011: 6). As in the case of Pentecostals, there has been a discussion about how to characterize the practices and spirituality of Catholic Charismatics and how to understand their success. Anthropologists studying the ccr movement in ­Colombia and Brazil have characterized it as a resource for a pre-modern worldview, which has a special appeal to adherents because it reinvigorates popular religious, shamanistic, and ecstatic practices within a Catholic framework (Várguez 1998; 2007; 2008; Ospina Martínez 2006). Others have argued that it is the remodelling of the re-enchanted worldview along modern functional lines and the acquisition of the spiritual skills to navigate in it. This, in combination with the possibility of moral restoration from destructive vices (alcoholism, gambling, spousal infidelity), has enabled the ccr to grow as explosively as it has (Thorsen 2012). In particular, the central role attributed to healing (physical and psychological/emotional) in the ccr in Latin America cannot be overemphasized (Althoff 2014: 141–144; Chesnut 2003: 45; Cleary 2011: 32, 47; Thorsen 2015: 51). One theory explaining religious pluralism and Catholic Charismaticism currently in vogue is the religious economy theory, or new paradigm. Embedded

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (ccr) in the Americas

159

in this theory is an economic rational-choice perspective. Peter Berger, Roger Finke, Rodney Stark, and Laurence Iannaccone are well-known representatives of this theory. For Latin America, the works of Anthony Gill and Andrew Chesnut are important (Chesnut 2003; Gill 1998).2 Before some specifics regarding these theorists are explained, a clarification of its common denominator is in order. By definition, this approach explains the success of contemporary religious movements, such as the Catholic Charismatic Renewal, in terms of the open market. Therefore, not one but several religious actors are part of the research agenda and theoretical corollaries. Peter Berger was the first prominent scholar to apply microeconomic theory to explain religious phenomena. In The Sacred Canopy, he argued that in a new pluralistic religious environment, the faith that was once imposed on society as a monopolistic product (by, for instance, the Catholic Church or other staterelated churches) must now be marketed and sold to customers who are free to purchase the religious goods that most appeal to them (Berger 1969: 138). In other words, churches, denominations, and religious agencies must act as companies in order to thrive. Religion is seen as a product similar to other goods on the market. Those most effective in finding out the tastes and wants of their customers are the most successful religious agents. Roger Finke and Rodney Stark later followed Peter Berger but broadened the perspective, in particular with regard to how the state relates to this new “religious economy”. Most importantly, Finke and Stark discovered that rates of participation in religious activities were greater in unregulated spiritual economies than in monopolistic ones (Finke and Stark 1992: 18). This finding provides a coherent answer as to why a higher percentage of U.S. Americans attend religious services and engage in ecclesial activities than Latin Americans (Chesnut 2003: 6; Warner 1993: 1047); however, the conditions in the United States are very different from those in Latin America or Europe,3 where the state is often intimately connected to one or two religious denominations (Vásquez and Marquardt 2003: 23). As Anthony Gill noted, pluralist conditions are becoming a reality in Latin America, too. According to Gill, this is because the established Catholic Church is losing its hegemony and state-sanctioned legal protection (Gill 1998). In 2 Chesnut writes in his introduction that his research was guided by Anthony Gill’s work. 3 The United States differs from Latin America and Europe in that the state may not support religion, but also has no right to determine what an acceptable religion is. This is called “the disestablishment clause” and has existed since the founding of the American republic. For more information on the United States and Europe, see R. Stephen Warner, A Church of Our Own: Disestablishment and Diversity in American Religion (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2005).

160

Althoff and Thorsen

Guatemala, for instance, the peace process contributed to a broadened public understanding that there were other forms of belief besides the Catholic Church in this pluricultural nation. Undoubtedly, Mayan spirituality as a religious belief system of pre-colonial origin, and now a generic religious choice, profited from such a view, gaining greater visibility and attention in the new ethnic climate (Althoff 2017: 27). One aspect that speaks for the model is that this approach helps to understand religious pluralism in the light of macro sociological phenomena, namely, how collective religious actors benefit from an opening of the public religious sphere, the weakening of established religious institutions, particularly the Roman-Catholic Church, and changing church-state relationships. Furthermore, neo-Pentecostalism, the most successful religious movement in Latin America, employs the market metaphor itself. These churches clearly understand mission as a religious enterprise, offering religious goods. The extent to which the United States serves as a role model for these churches is evident in their architecture, worship, and doctrine; and it explains much of the origin of their self-understanding. This is also, however, one of the theory’s major shortcomings. The idea is based on a historical condition present in the United States, and it is in line with an economic presupposition that incorporates the assumption that individuals base their decisions on rational cost-benefit analyses. Consequently, decisions that are not based on Western individualism, with the possibility of free choices, are excluded. Also, decisions and actions that are not based on rational factors but on values, emotions, or traditions are not included.4 In short, in Latin America, which has countries with vastly different political and constitutional systems, ecclesial histories, and cultural mentalities, this model seems awkwardly out of place (Althoff 2014: 25–27). To do justice to such a complex, controversial, diverse, multi-layered, and international phenomenon such as the ccr, research should keep in mind four domains which are present when analysing this movement: discourse, practice, community, and institutions. Furthermore, different perspectives—such as the global, national, urban, and rural outlook of the movement—should be recognized, as distinct from the significance it has for its members. Recognizing these contextualized versions of faith is important because it u ­ ncovers 4 In this respect, Max Weber’s action theory proves helpful. Weber distinguished four types of action: (1) instrumental action, wherein the actor perceives goals clearly and combines means to attain them (this type of action is clearly the one rational-choice theorists have in mind); (2) value rationality, wherein the actor is willing to accept consequences to remain faithful to values; (3) affective action, wherein the act is based on emotions; and 4) traditional action, wherein the action is based on customs. See Weber, Soziologische Grundbegriffe (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1984).

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (ccr) in the Americas

161

d­ ifferent notions of religious agency among diverse populations and how these have historically developed. Additionally, this approach is able to shed light on conflicts that arise from different understandings of belief, religious belonging, and spirituality, such as the conflicts between Liberation Theology and the Catholic Charismatic Renewal and between the interests of the institutional church and its members (Althoff 2014; Steigenga 2014). 5

Conclusion: Ecclesial Influence, Status Quo, and the Future of the ccr

After almost fifty years of existence, the ccr has gradually gained a substantial influence on the institutional Church, especially in Latin America, but less so in the U.S. When analysing the concluding document of the Fifth General Conference of the Bishops of Latin America and the Caribbean in Aparecida in 2007 (celam), observers have noted that the language and the pastoral priorities described therein are markedly influenced by the Charismatic movement (Arntz 2008: 56; Libanio 2008: 44; Suess 2008; Thorsen 2015: 161). The document launches a “Great Continental Mission” and declares the Church to be “in permanent mission” (celam 2007). The stated aim is to transform all baptized Catholics into “disciples and missionaries” through a “personal encounter with Jesus Christ”, the latter being explained as “a profound and intense religious experience … that leads to a personal conversion and to a thorough change of life” (celam 2007: 226). Throughout the document, there is a strong focus on conversion, religious experience (for instance, as an “encounter with Jesus”), the Holy Spirit, mission, and other terms that play a key role in the religious repertoire of the ccr (Thorsen 2015: 160). The election of Pope Francis in 2013 has given the ccr a solid anchoring in the Vatican. On various occasions, Pope Francis has strongly supported the movement. He was the first pope to accept an invitation to a ccr mega-event in a soccer stadium in Rome, in June 2014, where he engaged in Charismatic-style worship and firmly endorsed lay preaching and missionary outreach. Unlike many Charismatics in Latin America, Pope Francis combines the Charismatic Revival with a focus on social justice, and he does not miss any opportunity to remind the ccr of the “horizontal” dimensions of the faith (Thorsen 2015: 221). It is our belief that the success of the movement in the future will depend in large parts on how the disenfranchised lay groups in the Church (such as women, poor, blacks, and the indigenous) are able to live their religiosity within this particular movement—a movement that now constitutes the largest lay movement within the Catholic Church as a whole, not just in the Americas.

162

Althoff and Thorsen

References Althoff, Andrea. 2014. Divided by Faith and Ethnicity: Religious Pluralism and the Problem of Race in Guatemala. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. Althoff, Andrea. 2017a. “Prado Flores, José (Pepe) H.”, in Encylopedia of Latin American Religions. Berlin: VS Springer. Althoff, Andrea. 2017b. “Padre Marcelo Mendoça Rossi”, in Encyclopedia of Latin American Religions. Berlin: VS Springer. Arntz, Norbert. 2008. “Einführung in Aufbau und Inhalt des Schlussdokuments der 5. Generalversammlung des Episkopats von Lateinamerika und der Karibik”. Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft 92(1–2): 48–67. Balmer, Randall Herbert. 2002. Encyclopedia of Evangelicalism. Louisville and London: Westminster John Knox Press. Barrett, David B. ed. 2001. World Christian Trends, AD 30–AD 2200: Interpreting the Annual Christian Megacensus. Pasadena: William Carey Library. Berger, Peter. 1969. The Sacred Canopy. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. Berryman, Phillip. 1987. Liberation Theology. Essential Facts about the Revolutionary Movement in Latin America and Beyond. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Burgess, Stanley M. and Eduard M. van der Maas. 2002. “Introduction”. pp. xvii–xxiiii in The New International Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements, 2nd ed., edited by Stanley M. Burgess and Eduard M. van der Maas. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. CCCB [Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops]. 2003. Pastoral Letter. http://www .cccb.ca/site/Files/charismatic_renewal.html [accessed 7 June 2017]. CELAM [Conferencia General del Episcopado Latinoamericano y del Caribe]. 2007. Final Document of the Fifth General Conference of Bishops of Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin American Conference of Bishops. http://celam.org/aparecida%20/ Ingles.pdf. [accessed 15 March 2016]. Chesnut, R Andrew. 2003a. “A Preferential Option for the Spirit: The Catholic Charismatic Renewal in Latin America’s New Religious Economy”. Latin American Perspectives 45(1) (Spring, 2003a): 55–85. Chesnut, R Andrew. 2003b. Competitive Spirits: Latin America’s New Religious Economy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. CHM [Christian Healing Ministries]. 2015. Organization History. http://www.­christian healingmin.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=140&Item id=352 [accessed 12 April 2016]. Cleary, Edward L. 2007. “The Catholic Charismatic Renewal: Revitalization Movements and Conversion”. pp. 153–173 in Conversion of a Continent, edited by Timothy Steigenga and Edward L. Cleary. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Cleary, Edward L. 2009. How Latin America Saved the Soul of the Catholic Church. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (ccr) in the Americas

163

Cleary, Edward L. 2011. The Rise of Charismatic Catholicism in Latin America. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida. Finke, Roger and Rodney Stark. 1992. The Churching of America, 1776–1990. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. Freston, Paul. 1997. “Charismatic Evangelicals in Latin America: Mission and Politics on the Frontiers of Protestant Growth”. pp. 160–183 in Charismatic ­Christianity: S­ ociological Perspectives, edited by Stephen J. Hunt, Tony Walter, and Malcom ­Hamilton. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Froehle, Bryan and Mary L. Gautier. 2003. Global Catholicism: Portrait of a World Church. New York, NY: Orbis Books. Gill, Anthony. 1998. Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Hocken, Peter D. 2002a. “Charismatic Communities”. pp. 473–476 in The New International Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements, 2nd ed., edited by Stanley M. Burgess and Eduard M. van der Maas. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. Hocken, Peter D. 2002b. “Charismatic Movement”. pp. 477–519 in The New International Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements. 2nd ed., edited by Stanley M. Burgess and Eduard M. van der Maas. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. Hocken, Peter D. 2002c. “Martin, Ralph”. pp. 861–862 in The New International Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements, 2nd ed., edited by Stanley M. Burgess and Eduard M. van der Maas. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. Kydd, Ronald A.N. 2002. “Canada”. pp. 48–51 in The New International Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements, 2nd ed., edited by Stanley M. Burgess and Eduard M. van der Maas. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. Libanio, Joao Batista. 2008. “Conferencia de Aparecida. Documento final”. Revista Iberoamericana de Teología, 4: 23–46. Martínez, Ospina. MA 2006. “Satanás se ‘desregula’: sobre la paradoja del fundamentalismo moderno en la Renovación Carismática Católica”. Universitas humanística 61: 135–163. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. 2006. Spirit and Power: A 10-Country Survey of Pentecostals. Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. 2007. Changing Faiths: Latinos and the Transformation of American Religion. Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. 2014. Religion in Latin America. Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center. Steigenga, Timothy J. 2014. “Pentecostalization, Politics and Religious Change in Guatemala: New Approaches to Old Questions”. PentecoStudies. 13(1): 9–34. Strang, Stephen Edward. 2002. “MacNutt, Francis Scott”. pp. 855–56 in The New International Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements, 2nd ed., ­ ­edited by Stanley M. Burgess and Eduard M. van der Maas. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.

164

Althoff and Thorsen

Suess, Paulo. 2008. “Die missionarische Synthese nach Aparecida”. Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft 92(1–2): 68–83. Theije, Marjo E.M. de. 1998. “Charismatic Renewal and Base Communities: The Religious Participation of Women in a Brazilian Parish”. pp. 225–248 in More Than Opium. An Anthropological Approach to Latin American and Caribbean Pentecostal Praxis, edited by Barbara Boudewijnse, André F. Droogers and Frans Kamsteeg. Lanham: Scarecrow Press. Theije, Marjo E.M. de. 1999. “CEBs and Catholic Charismatics in Brazil”. pp. 111–124 in Latin American Religion in Motion, edited by Christian Smith and Joshua Prokopy. New York: Routledge. Theije, Marjo E.M. de and Cecília Loreto Mariz. 2008. “Localizing and Globalizing Processes in Brazilian Catholicism: Comparing Inculturation in Liberationist and Charismatic Catholic Cultures”. Latin American Research Review 43(1): 33–54. Thigpen, T. Paul. 2002. “Catholic Charismatic Renewal”. pp. 460–467 in The New International Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements, 2nd ed., edited by Stanley M. Burgess and Eduard M. van der Maas. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. Thorsen, Jakob Egeris. 2012. “Challenged by Pluralism: Catholic Expansion into Magic and Prophetism—The New Roles of the Catholic Church in Latin America”. Iberoamericana—Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 47(1–2): 35–68. Thorsen, Jakob Egeris. 2015. Charismatic Practice and Catholic Parish Life—The Incipient Pentecostalization of the Church in Guatemala and Latin America. Leiden: Brill. Várguez, Pasos, A Luis. 1998. “De la fe al delirio. Manifestaciones religiosas en una colonia popular de Mérida”. Mitológicas 13: 33–49. Várguez, Pasos, A Luis. 2008. “Constructing and Reconstructing the Boundaries of Tradition and Modernity. The Catholic Church and the Catholic Charismatic Renewal in the Holy Spirit”. Convergencia—Revista de Ciencias Sociales 46: 175–204. Várguez, Pasos, A Luis. 2007. “Los Sacerdotes del Movimiento de Renovación Carismática en el Espíritu Santo. ¿Brujos, Magos o Hechiceros Profesionales?” Ciencias Sociales y Religión/Ciências Sociais e Religião 4(4): 55–85. Vásquez, Manuel and Marie Friedmann Marquardt. 2003. Globalizing the Sacred. Religion across the Americas. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. Warner, R. Stephen. 1993. “Work in Progress toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States”. American Journal of Sociology 98(5): 1044–1093. Warner, R. Stephen. 2005. A Church of Our Own: Disestablishment and Diversity in American Religion. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. Weber, Max. 1984. Soziologische Grundbegriffe. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Chapter 8

Religious Practices, Beliefs and Commitments on the Margins of the Catholic Church in Belgium Karel Dobbelaere and Liliane Voyé For many decades, the Catholic churches in Belgium have been getting emptier (Voyé et al. 2011: 152, 159). In particular, young people are turning their backs on them, and “religious culture” is progressively wearing off. Rites of passage (especially funerals) are more or less surviving, but they are often adapted to reflect personal and familial “taste”. In any case, these rites are thought about and “integrated” more from the viewpoint of families than from the question of how well they fit into ecclesiastical prescriptions. Popular religion (including the cults1 of saints, pilgrimages, processions, etc.) seems to be thriving, but its relationship with the institutional Church is deteriorating. In fact, the Church has never been enthusiastic about it. The cult of saints belongs to the realm of popular beliefs, in the sense that people are particularly likely to appeal to saints when there are problems in their families or with health—and in some cases to take preventive action against any problem that might occur in the future. As far as pilgrimages are concerned, the example of St. James of Compostela is eloquent. The religious function of a pilgrimage might be missing, at least at the start. A pilgrimage is frequently envisaged as being conducive to introspection, to achieving balance in one’s life; but it can also serve as a physical exercise, even as a time for asceticism. In some cases, pilgrims have claimed that a spiritual dimension—rather than a religious one—only emerged over the course of the journey (Voyé and Dobbelaere 2016: 175–180). And, as far as religious processions are concerned, whereas they used to occur every year in most cities and villages, when statues of their saints would be taken out of the churches and paraded around the streets, processions are now mostly limited to big cities with a historical tradition. And, although the religious reference may still be active, processions are now associated more with local folklore or the city’s patrimony, as in the city of Mons (Belgium) where the battle between Saint George and the dragon is featured. 1 In this context, the term “cults” refers to the time-honoured practice of venerating Christians saints—not to controversial religious sects.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004380073_010

166

Dobbelaere and Voyé

There is no doubt that religion has been “dispossessed” of a whole series of the attributes which, in the past, used to tie it strongly to local social life. Although this does not necessarily indicate that the growth of atheism is the driving force, this evolution reflects the fact that the religious message and the practices which are meant to express it no longer reach the majority of our contemporaries. These forms of religion and their content do not provide what people are looking for in response to their needs for meaning and spirituality. This, without doubt, also explains that, in parallel with this decline, groups have been emerging—some large and some small—which claim to be “Christian” rather than “Catholic”. This is their way of affirming their desire to distance themselves from the Ecclesiastical Institution and, at the same time, to express their proximity to Christ’s words and actions. The diversity of these groups can be very wide—and their practices more so, even if they belong to the same category with the same label. This is the case, for example, with the “Communautés de Base” [Base Communities], some of which differ strongly from others—and which are even more insistent on distinguishing themselves from groups outside the category of Base Communities. The relationship of these groups to the Institutional Church also shows wide variations. Some seek to be integrated into the Church and want their celebrations recognized by the Church; this is the case with the first example we will discuss below. Others seem to live their own life, according to the forms and rhythms which they themselves have chosen, as will be illustrated by our second example. 1

The “Lier” in Bruges (Flanders)

Friends searching for a “liturgy fitting the modern feeling of life”2 that they were missing in traditional Catholic liturgy, found it in the music and texts of the Dutch poet Huub Oosterhuis, which they experienced in celebrations at the “Burg” in the city of Lier in 2003. This led them to the conclusion that there must also be a potential for such celebrations in the agglomeration of Bruges. They opted for a strong Bible-oriented Word and Table Service, in which the songs and texts of Oosterhuis should have a prominent place, since they translate the biblical message into contemporary language, together with an active involvement of the participants. They also considered that a choir and collective singing, as well as a time for meeting after the service, were very 2 Citations within quotation marks which are not followed by a reference to a publication are taken from the monthly reports of the Steering Committee of the “Lier”.

Religious Practices, Beliefs and Commitments

167

­important. Furthermore, they wanted to elaborate a “meaningful and demystified liturgy” and to “de-sacralise” the ministry. Although they insisted that they did not want to break from the Catholic Church, they formulated a clear opposition to a strict hierarchy, the position of women and of laypeople in general compared to that of the priests, and priestly celibacy. They called their community the “Lier” in reference to the city where their inspiration had emerged, and they informed the local bishop of their intentions, expecting at least a tolerant attitude.3 The initiators of the “Lier” established a monthly meeting of the Steering Committee which consists of eleven members.4 The renewable mandate is for a period of one year. To keep these members informed about possible problems or suggestions coming from the grassroots, an open steering committee is held once a year to which members are invited. The “Lier” started with a group of about 20 members, but 85 families are now registered and receive a regular newsletter. In January 2014, a “mission statement” was accepted, in which the position of the “masters of ceremony” was outlined. They must serve as “hosts” and “directors” in religious services. They can be priests or laypersons, male or female, homo- or heterosexual, single, married, or divorced. They “do not lord it over the other members”; they are “at the service of the community” and “receive their mission from the community”. However, not everyone can be a master of ceremony. According to their “Theological Vision text” (2008), the candidates “should be lively believers”, “having a certain familiarity with prayer and the scriptures”, and being “able to warmly animate” the members of the community. They also become members of the Steering Committee and may be evaluated by the local community on the basis of “their liturgical creativity”. 1.1 The Word and Table Services The weekly celebration starts with the Word Service. After a word of welcome from the master of ceremony and a moment to remember recently deceased persons by lighting a candle, there is time for singing, prayers, and silence. In the middle of the service is a Bible lecture, followed by a clarification and/or a testimonial address by a speaker. The themes may be limited to one service or elaborated in a cycle of three. They are related to the liturgical calendar, e.g. Christmas or Easter, special events, religious, moral, or social issues. The lectures always refer to the Bible, which is used to analyse actual situations 3 The Lier has its own website, www.delier.be, and has links with similar initiatives in their own region (Flanders) [www.bezield verband.be], the Netherlands and Europe. 4 Our study covers a period of 14 years from September 2003 until 30 June 2017.

168

Dobbelaere and Voyé

or subjects. These subjects may be religious. For example, in reference to the Sermon on the Mount, the words of the Our Father prayer (Matthew 6:9–13) are situated in the culture of those times, analysed and rethought for today’s society. In addition, discussion of a theme such as “belief and doubt” which refers among other sources to Genesis (15: 6–18) and the story of the men going to Emmaus (Luke 24: 13–35) could be elaborated. Also, moral questions about “faithfulness and unfaithfulness” are discussed with reference to the Ten Commandments. And even in a lecture cycle such as “Changing the World”, there are citations from a parable of Jesus, as well as a reference to an encyclical of Pope Francis in which he stated that Christians should be conscious of “their responsibility for the creation” in the sense that “their duty vis-à-vis Nature and the Creator is an essential part of their faith”. The style of the lectures is an invitation to reflect, an encouragement to critically analyse one’s acts and opinions, and where needed, to adapt one’s daily behaviour and opinions. The style is certainly not dogmatic or condemnatory; rather, it is encouraging. After the lectures, there is a moment of silence and singing. The first part of the service is brought to a close with announcements for the community. During the interval, there is a collection and a table is set. The second part of the celebration is the Table Service which starts with people moving towards the table. Each member of the community assembled around the table may tear off a piece of bread (“bread of tears resulting from the suffering in the world”) and/or pour some wine into the cup (“wine is a foretaste of the joy that will come”), and share “a hopeful or dreadful event of the past week with the assembled members”.5 Indeed, joy and pain may—and should—be voiced at that moment, according to their vision. Finding connections between joy and pain is very important, so that the pain can be borne, and it promotes a feeling of community. Then they sing the table prayer together, at which point the master of ceremony concludes the breaking of the bread. This is followed by the Our Father prayer and the wish of peace. Bread and wine are then partaken of. The people return to their seats, and the Sunday service finishes with prayers and acclamation, encouragement and benediction, as well as a final song. 1.2 The Relationship with the Official Church The Lier began with a “horizontal structure” in contrast to the Catholic Church, which has a “hierarchical structure”. However, they did not opt for conflict, stating that their community and the community of the Church have an 5 Theologische visietekst van het liturgisch initiatief de Lier in Brugge, Document of the Lier. 2012: 9.

Religious Practices, Beliefs and Commitments

169

i­mportant mission to jointly evaluate the authenticity of their religious and moral values, on the basis of which they could renovate their respective visions. Consequently, in the beginning, they informed the local bishop of their initiative. They also informed the new bishop who was appointed in 2010, and his reaction was, “If it has already existed for seven years, then it must be good”. However, he asked them not to compete with his parishes. In 2014, following an article in the press, he told them clearly what he could, and could not, agree with, adding that “they are in fact a dissidence which may be meaningful but not wanted by the Church”. In September 2017, they again contacted the bishop and a meeting with him is expected. The Lier has had—and continues to have—positive contact with local parish priests, who plead for a variation in the liturgies that can be offered. From the very beginning, however, and even later in some local parishes, there was a critical attitude towards them since established parishioners had left their parishes to join the community; and some critics even called the Lier “sectarian”. Notwithstanding these tensions, some members of the community participate in parochial celebrations, e.g. in Holy Week or at Christmas. In 2011, the Lier even joined a number of parishes organizing an Easter Vigil. However, it is noted in the records of the Steering Committee in 2010 that they “cannot and may not be a partner in the pastoral planning of the city”, concluding that “we do not put ourselves outside the Church, but the fact is that we are excluded”. 1.3 Community From the onset, they wanted the Lier to be a “Gemeinschaft” as conceptualized by the German sociologist Tönnies.6 According to him, “do ut des” relationships do not prevail in a “Gemeinschaft”, in contrast to a “Gesellschaft”. Instead, relationships are personal, and intimate acquaintance predominates among members because of their proximity to each other, their solidarity and their willingness to make sacrifices. Admittedly, territorial vicinity does not apply to the Lier and this “is a pity”, according to a member of the steering committee who said, “otherwise we would see each other more frequently and informally”. From the start of the community until 2015, the July-August vacation period when there were no services, was experienced as a hindrance to the community’s development. However, the steering committee encouraged activities to promote a feeling of community such as the monthly Lier-dinner

6 Tönnies, F. Gemenschaft und Gsellschaft. Leipzig: Buske, 1887 1st, 2005 8th Ed.

170

Dobbelaere and Voyé

prepared by members for the first Sunday of each month and, subsequently, a “vacation-service”.7 They also want the Lier to be a “comprehensive community”, that can react against the surrounding individualism and anonymity, with the objective of being a “place of sharing and reciprocal support”, as clearly expressed in the Table Service. And although documents state explicitly that the Lier was established for “ourselves”, not being at ease any more in the “traditional Church”, from the first years onwards, a new dimension emerged and expanded over the years: that is being a “contrast community”, a community in opposition to the materialism typical of our modern society. The idea was that one needs to care for those “who fall out of the boat” and to be “a source where people may draw strength and where they can share”. Consequently, they have extended their “Theological Vision Text” to include social engagement, social justice and ecology. Social engagement is also central in the Word Service in order to “keep it lively”. Attention is given to “a culture of austerity”, “people in need”, and “lonely and elderly people”. All these are linked to Jesus’ “radical option for the poor” and his call for charity. They financially support projects like a “Home for ex-prisoners”, different “welfare services” and “t‘Huizeke”, an organization promoting a fair market for underprivileged people. But their social engagement is not limited to financial support. At Christmas time, their choir sings for those in jail; they participate in the discussion groups called “Abolish Bars”; and they support a benefit fund for the families of detainees. In view of the problems that refugees have, they emphasize in their Sunday services the need for people to accompany refugees to official centres, and for foster families to look after unaccompanied minors. In addition, they stimulate young people to participate in projects in underdeveloped countries during their vacations. It should also be stressed that the Lier community is considered to be elitist, which is acknowledged by the Steering Committee, when it admitted as early as 2008: “You choose for a certain language register (in casu the poems of Oosterhuis), which cannot be offered in a trivial version”. However, they add that “the ritual of bread and wine and the wish for peace offer a counterbalance to the songs and the readings from the Bible and the addresses”. This does not contradict their social engagement, but it is linked to the options taken at the start of the community. 7 Since 2016, there has been a “vacation-service” every Sunday in July and August, in which the liturgy is reduced to its essence: a reading from the Bible that is commented on by those present with reference to their own religious experiences, and the partaking of bread and wine.

Religious Practices, Beliefs and Commitments

171

1.4 Young People In the earliest years, the Lier community was confronted with young children who needed to be babysat during services, and with older children who needed a program to interest them before they could join their parents after the Word Service. In 2006, when some of the older children reached the age of ten, questions arose about the significance of another traditional sacrament in the Catholic Church: Confirmation. The community considered that the age of twelve signalled an important transition in their young lives: the start of secondary schools, and the onset of puberty, which also implied more independence and freedom. In other words, it was a turning point in their lives which also needed to be marked by a meaningful religious initiation ritual. In July 2009, such a celebration was established under the name “Threshold Celebration”, indicating “that you receive, take and have a (young) adult position/ responsibility in our Christian community which promises to stand behind you”. The first celebration was preceded by a preparation of one year under the guidance of leading members (who eventually came to include former “thresholders” in the years following 2009). It was expected that the future “thresholders” would participate regularly in Sunday service. Their parents were also involved in the preparation and encouraged to stimulate their children. The future “thresholders” were also active in certain Sunday services. For “post-thresholders”, a program was planned with the parents. Their original intention was to propose three meaningful activities a year with a social engagement. However, such a program did not get off the ground. In fact, some “post-thresholders” eventually left Lier, although some of them returned for certain services after adolescence. There is a great concern within the Steering Committee and among parents to involve youngsters in celebrations, and not only by addressing them during services. In 2007, at the explicit request of parents, celebrations were organized for youngsters. They were individually invited to such celebrations being prepared by some youngsters with the help of much time invested by parents. But this quite soon gave rise to the questions of: “Does this respond to a need that youngsters themselves have?” And “Is this what they really want themselves?” The evaluation made it clear that it was not a great success. And a new initiative was taken in 2010: a fixed Sunday was introduced each year in a cycle that targeted youngsters in particular. As well, it was constantly emphasized that children preparing for their first communion, and later on, their “Threshold Celebration”, should feel “safe, and at ease” in the Sunday celebrations. It is clear that everything was being done to reach youngsters, and another new initiative was taken, i.e. organizing a “courage celebration” before

172

Dobbelaere and Voyé

the school examinations: students received invitations, and those who did not come received an encouragement by mail, but that again was not a success. It is “clearly difficult to motivate youngsters for religion, they are still searching for their own place in society”, as a female member put it in an open meeting of the Steering Committee. In response to the questionnaire that we sent to members, parents pointed out that their children at the secondary school level have to do their schoolwork on Sunday, because on Saturdays they have a lot of social and sports activities. Moreover, their children told them that they were not interested and that the services were boring. One mother added, “This is not a place where they may meet their buddies”. 1.5 Social Characteristics of the Membership In Lier’s first years, there were no more than 20 to 25 people present at the Service, but more than ten years later, there are generally about 50 in attendance. Thirty people make up the core. In addition to these who are present each Sunday, are those attending once or twice a month. Some come only occasionally and especially on holidays. A regular newsletter which is sent to 90 addresses reaches 118 persons, of whom 65 are more or less actively involved: the members of the Steering Committee and the Choir, the speakers who regularly give an address in the Word Service and those preparing the monthly Lier-meal. Our questionnaire was sent twice to the 118 registered members of the Lier. More than forty percent replied. Seventy-five percent of respondents are at least fifty years old; only two are younger than forty. The gender distribution is equal. The great majority of the respondents had university educations, especially in theology, philosophy, religious and human sciences; a few studied natural sciences and engineering. Some did non-university studies in nursing, social and secretarial work, education, and arts. Most of these members have jobs in education, pastoral work, administration, medical and social work, and industry, but a large number of them have already retired. As may be expected, most of the members answering the questionnaire were very positive. They place a high value on the work done by the Steering Committee and on the Word and Table Services. Many express their appreciation for the choir, the content and the music, the readings, and lectures. As far as the Table Service is concerned, they strongly appreciate the solidarity with those in need that it expresses, and the feeling of being a supportive community. However, some feel that the horizontal dimension largely eclipses the sacred vertical dimension. And as far as the readings and the lectures are concerned, some wrote that they were sometimes set at a level that was too difficult for them.

Religious Practices, Beliefs and Commitments

173

1.6 Some Reflections The very active Steering Committee makes monthly evaluations of the celebrations in all their aspects. It gives positive evaluations of the presenters and, if necessary, they try to adjust—among other things—the length of the celebrations, the level of comprehensibility of the addresses, and the involvement of children in the celebrations. They also pay attention to the integration of newcomers, and try to sound out the reasons why people stop coming. The open Steering Committee is very helpful in these matters. A community spirit is promoted, and they continue to take new initiatives, for example, to motivate any youngsters who lose interest. This involves a lot of work for the committee members, who may ask questions themselves if these efforts prove unsuccessful in the long-term, e.g. the special celebrations for youngsters and the “courage celebration”. The community reacts spontaneously to “the expressed demands of parents”, seemingly without making a cost-benefit analysis, a typical characteristic for a “Gemeinschaft” (Tönnies). Such an analysis is certainly needed. As observers, we wonder whether they take too much initiative, since the “manpower” is limited and is based on the goodwill of parents, for instance, to get involved. The Lier does not receive any “state subsidies” for paid help for its many initiatives, and failures may give rise to discouragement in the long run. The Lier was founded by a group of friends in search of “a liturgy fitting a modern feeling for life”. Some of them studied Religious Studies or Theology and are acquainted with the Bible, which is not true for “ordinary people”, certainly insofar as the Old Testament is concerned. They may know some biblical stories, but more in-depth knowledge is mostly lacking. It is also clear that the songs and poems of Oosterhuis were topical for the founders, and possibly for their contemporaries, but the question is whether or not that is still the case. Is this why the liturgy of the Lier does not appeal to young people today? If so, this may explain the decline in their involvement and even the fact that some parents also drop out. The Steering Committee clearly wants to retain its initial preferences, even though there is cooperation with like-minded organizations in the context of the “Bezield Verband” (Animated Bond), which includes Flemish organizations focused on “philosophy of life”, “being future oriented”, “rooted in the biblical beliefs narration” and “searching for new forms”. The Lier certainly does not want to cancel out “the differences in inspiration” between these organizations, nor to achieve “the greatest common denominator” among its members. The fact that children do not join the Sunday celebrations after the Threshold Celebration also indicates that we have moved from a period in which

174

Dobbelaere and Voyé

parents were the reference group for the children, to a different one in which peers are the main point of reference. This alienation from the Sunday rituals is related to the typical characteristics of contemporary youngsters. To the degree that, in most areas of life, they give precedence to the mores and habits of their peers over those of their parents, they will have a tendency to distance themselves from the mores and habits of their parents. This is observable in their attitude towards religion, in casu of the Lier. They want to make their choices themselves, and to behave like their contemporaries whose estrangement from religion in general and, more specifically, religious practices, is clearly demonstrated in research reports. The fact that, on the contrary, they participate on special occasions such as Christmas or Easter is because these deviate from what they call the banality of daily and weekly routine. And religion is not the only domain in which this is manifested. Think for example of the “ritual” of family meals, which are fixed/imposed by the rhythm of the parents’ lives. This does not make sense for youngsters, and in this case they adopt a de-synchronized behaviour. They tend to follow their own rhythm by taking into account their own activities, which are often numerous, and such behaviour has become quite easy thanks to the microwave. For them, being free to manage their own time means being themselves, confirming their independence and displaying their autonomy. The Lier holds strongly to its original vision. Does a certain loss of members result from that? Our research recorded some critical remarks in that area. Does the Lier have “churchly” characteristics such as strongly hanging on to a certain “historical moment” in the evolution of religious thinking which may not suit today’s “searching adults or youngsters”, since it is time-bound, i.e. typical of the years 1970–80 and with a waning impact since the 2000s? In other words, are they not establishing their “own church”, being “bound” to that which they strictly hold onto? In their own documents, they acknowledge that Lier is called “elitist” by some of the members. Naturally, if the Catholic Church acknowledged that “universality” could be expressed in different forms, then it would be one of these many different forms and would not be put outside the Church. 2

A Base Community8 in Francophone Belgium

As in other European countries, Base Communities have been established in Belgium. Although using the same generic name, each one differs from the 8 This expression and the creation of such communities originated in Latin America, and more specifically in Brazil. They appeared there at the end of 1960s. They arose from ­social

Religious Practices, Beliefs and Commitments

175

o­ thers. This depends among other things upon the social composition of the group and the socio-economic conditions of the region in which it has developed. Nevertheless, all were developed in the spirit of the second ­Vatican ­Council (1962–1995), and this indeed aroused an expectation of more democracy and participation in the Church, with less hierarchy and authority. ­Another inspiration also nourishes the group—as it does the other Base Communities: that of the movement of “Christians for Socialism”, which is linked to the theology of liberation for another society and for another Church. In a duplicated document of 2003, stemming from the coordinating office of Base Communities in Belgium, the general characteristics are described. It emphasizses, first of all, that these communities define themselves as “autonomous places of sharing the Gospels, the celebrations, the quest for liberty, the reflections about social life and the support for diverse commitments in favour of justice and fraternity”. If this definition is globally shared, its translation into concrete arrangements shows many variations both in forms and in applications. Nevertheless, they are all small groups (usually 10 to 20 people), ­favouring speech and exchanges. Everyone may be the actor in these encounters—men and women, young and old, lay and priest—and they share the same entitlement to it. Jesus is the first reference, primarily seen in his humanity and in references to the Bible turned into action. It is from the real-life of “rank and file believers” in their actual context that “belief emerges”, and not from the authority at the top. Moreover, it is this “people of God” that makes the Church: not the hierarchy. The communities themselves choose their sacramental and liturgical practices, which take place with or without priests. Most often, the members become socio-politically involved in a personal capacity and are concerned about social problems of various types. As an illustration, we will present one of these communities here, while insisting once more on the fact that they are all different. However, they do have some major characteristics in common, but this is true more for their content than for their form. It all started from the participation of two members of the future group (one being a priest) in an assembly of Christians for Socialism. Until 1987, both ­ ovements wanting to support landless farmers and to create food cooperatives…. They m were inspired by “liberation theology”, which was not entirely welcomed by the Church. Before being pastoral movements, the first aim of Base Communities was to respond to material needs of the people (housing, equipment, health education, food …), in particular for those living in shanty towns, and to build a civic, responsible society. This example later spread to Africa before reaching Europe, where these communities keep the same spirit in spite of their very different concrete conditions of work. They exclude for the most part concrete actions such as claiming land and the illegal syphoning of electricity from the electricity network to provide for the shanty towns.

176

Dobbelaere and Voyé

participated in alternative celebrations each Saturday evening in the Abbey of Val Dieu (in the country of Herve). In 1988, these two people decided to establish a Base Community and asked those who joined to commit themselves as individuals to the struggles that it supported. No shared actions were taken. Certain members of the original group joined as a result of their participation in a class on the exegeses of the Gospel of St. Luke, given by one of the founding members. The group emerged in Gemmenich, a small town northeast of Liège near the German border. Today it operates throughout the whole neighbouring region. It was originally—and still is—a small group of 12 persons, aged 50 to 75 (their number and age remain stable, although the actual members change). Children and grandchildren do not attend. These persons belong to the uppermiddle class and most of them undertook higher educational studies. At the start, the celebrations were held in a college where one of the two founders was teaching. After the death of the priest in 1995, the group continued to function as before and even more smoothly, since the priest had not had a specific function. According to a document, the community assembles for three hours on the morning of the last Sunday of each month, in the house of one of its members. This member is in charge of preparing the meeting, which they call their “partage (sharing)”. It consists of a reading from the Gospels, another text from the Bible, and a secular text as a commentary. These readings are followed by a long period of sharing during which everyone can intervene. And during these exchanges, the Scriptures are linked to the current situation. The readings are interspersed with music and singing. This is followed by the sharing of wine and bread by the members of the group, who repeat the words of Jesus. The meeting finishes with “le verre de l’amitié” [a friendship drink]. The declared aim of this sharing is to “construct another society, another Church”. 2.1 Questioning the Institutional Church We were able to study some 20 files dated 2006 to 2016 in preparation for these encounters; this allowed us to discern their major preoccupations, which are remarkably consistent. All are based on actual questions, which allow the community to question the Church and to voice certain criticisms of it. In this line of reasoning, a celebration in 2014 picked up a text by J. Moingt: … when in fact the world does not come to our religious edifices, nor listen to the teachings of the Church, which, moreover, does not speak the language of this world. The most urgent need (for the Church) is not to

Religious Practices, Beliefs and Commitments

177

make structural reforms, it is to announce the Gospel. The priests (…) do not live in immediate contact with this world, to which they are not introduced because of their usual occupations. Jesus (…) spoke to them in simple and appealing terms: the liberation of the territory, the healing of illnesses and sorrow, a good family meal, an abundant harvest, a compassionate man observing our wounds. Not a word on religion in the gospel of Jesus, only humane words, gestures of humanity, acts of humanization. Another criticism of the institution is expressed as follows: “the hierarchical constitution of a Church becoming a religion of empire”: the creation of a consecrated priesthood anchoring the distinction between clerics and lay people, for and on behalf of the previous common priesthood; the stiffness of a tradition; the end of the coexistence of a domestic and private Eucharist, celebrated in communities of lay people without the presence of priests; and, on the other hand, parochial and public celebrations (presided over by a bishop or his representative) and consequently more exceptional and more festive (July 3, 2014). In addition, the “sexism” of this Church which always refers to “Our Father …” whereas this group, on the contrary, insists on “our Father being also our Mother”. Two other reproaches are also directed at the Church. On the one hand, “The Church still uses a language and an outlook today which is outdated instead of up-to-date. One does not look in texts of the 4th century for how to develop medicine or biology or how to manage an enterprise. Why do they search for God there?” (June 22, 2008). On the other hand, most of the clerics do not accept the symbolic character of the biblical language, notably parables such as the miracle of the five loaves and two fishes. For the members of the community, this miracle underlines the importance of sharing; this must not be taken literally! So that “the word ‘multiplication’ is never used in the story … except in the title of our Bibles” (May 29, 2015). The group also reproaches the Church for proclaiming its absolute power when it should be “service”, as suggested by the washing of feet. “The hand of God is a hand of housekeeping, of laundry and of washing-up. [Notice that the tasks mentioned are those traditionally attributed to the wives, which reinforces the idea of God being at the same time woman and man.] The hand of God has as jewelry on his fingers the red skin of the household women (…) God wears an apron, the sleeves tucked up, not the arms lifted up to the sky but on his knees to wash feet. One expected to see a priest and it is a servant who comes (…) Religious service is only a service to God when it is a service to humans” (March 20, 2016).

178

Dobbelaere and Voyé

Furthermore, the group regrets the dominant stress placed on “eternal life”, on the expectation of the resurrection of the dead and the life to come, leading towards contempt of the earthly life (September 27, 2009). Since they said that to please You, one had absolutely to recite prayers and to go to church each Sunday, we thought that you were not returning from the crib where Jesus was born, the shepherds tell us that God’s name is not God as is stated, a name saying nothing, a name used to produce fear. He has the name of a human, a common name; his name is Jesus, he has parents, you do not have to fear him. It is just a child, a little child and a child of poor people. God does not impose himself in definitions, not in certitudes, nor in proofs. Another criticism emerged in the discussions: the lack of comprehension of actual realities: dogmas lead the Church to show little mercy towards, among others: remarried divorcees, homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia … And to cite Pope Francis: “Who am I to judge some one?” These criticisms towards the Church-institution are frequent. They are expressed very clearly, straightforwardly, in a direct language, precisely and in a modern way. Without doubt, their criticisms are shared by many Catholics who tiptoed away from the Church, an institution which strikes them as disconnected from contemporary life as underscored by Moingt (see supra). The group also calls the “Nicene Creed” (June 25, 2008) into question, insofar as it seems “to reduce Christ’s human episode to his birth, his suffering and his death”, forgetting all other aspects of his life. Some find it difficult to adhere to such a reduced view, and criticize the priority given to God’s might, to his reign and glory, and the adoration which should be given to him more than to his mercy, his love and forgiveness. This way of talking means that “many believers morally cross their fingers behind their back during this recitation. More and more intelligent and cultivated people turn away from Christianity since, in conscience, they can no longer adhere to a cultic liturgy and to recite these views”. Such a situation, the group estimates: “means that conservative churches, more or less fundamentalist, feel at ease in such a Church while a more open, a more liberal Christianity is the victim and is likely to progressively disappear. The moment will arrive when Christian belief will be represented by only a fundamentalism that affirms that the whole Bible is divinely inspired and cannot contain errors and which at the same time rejects the modern world, science,

Religious Practices, Beliefs and Commitments

179

ethics, and theology. We must urgently rethink our faith and our way of expressing it. The difficulty being that one does not realize the gravity of the situation. In general, ministers and priests do not mention these questions in their sermons which seems absurd to outside people. They are afraid to scandalize the parishioners who are still present, while it is exactly this silence that is discouraging. The distance is growing between the authoritarian fundamentalists who are assuming power and the liberals who do not want to come any more.” (June 22, 2008) Please note that this text is dated before the arrival of Pope Francis; and note that the same opposition is currently very visible in the Vatican. All these criticisms do not signify that there is a tendency to break away from the Church. So, the Coordination Committee of the Base Communities in Liège, having had a meeting with the bishop, invited him to share a Christmas celebration with them, and he did. “This signifies that we are not an ‘other church’ but a ‘different church’”, according to the group. 2.2 An Ecological Vision From the start, there was ecological dimension to the community: “Faith implies respect for human beings, animals, and the earth in general”. This orientation resulted from the group’s involvements and not from its initial objectives. It was the involvement in social justice issues that led to the foundation of Base Communities, and not ecological commitments. However, one resulted from the other very early in the group’s existence (April 11, 2007). This engagement with ecology goes a long way, since it appeals not only for members to “respect the planet, the trees, the plants and the sea, the rivers and the air and all living beings”, but also to see in God “a cosmic energy, life which animates our planet” (November 27, 2016). It is interesting to note that this definition of God is consistent with that which 37% of Belgians who believed in God gave in 2016 (24% in 1981), while only 18% (39% in 1981) saw God as a person (Voyé et al. 2012: 153). At a celebration (December 3, 2015), the community borrowed a very eloquent song from Pierre Perret, a popular French song writer, which summarizes their ecological philosophy: “I am green, green, green, I am green from anger against these bad guys who smash up the earth …” This song enumerates all the economic and managerial problems produced in the world: global warming, chemical products, radioactive waste, depletion of resources: “the song of profit against that of life”. The community also refers to Pope Francis, who urges resistance against climatic change and the threat to biodiversity and ecosystems, which is generated by the way of life of the wealthiest people and

180

Dobbelaere and Voyé

by the system of production. The community appeals for consumer society to be banned and replaced by a “long-lasting society” to ensure “the survival of the world” (April 11, 2007). This aspect is rooted in the assertion that “the earth is a gift of God to share”. In turn, this leads to the condemnation of social injustice and the unequal distribution of wealth, which is based on the greed of those who want to monopolize everything. Testimonies are given which make this vision concrete and show that they are timely and universal. It is illustrated, for example, by the testimony of a farmer’s wife, who evoked the costs of machines and the borrowing that it requires. She stated the outcome clearly: production to extremes, “which forces the soil and the cow to produce ever more and which creates anxiety about a fall in prices” (November 27, 2016). The community also demonstrates respect for the planet (November 27, 2015): “trees, forests, seas, rivers and all living beings”, asking all humans to collaborate with humans and with God. 2.3 Diversity and the Stranger The community is also very attentive with regard to another aspect of our today’s society: the difficulty of living together in the midst of diversity, including religious diversity (March 20, 2006). Admittedly, this phenomenon is not new; the assassination of the monks and the prior of Tibhirine in Algeria is an example. “In this Islamic ocean, what was important was only what they called a place of fraternity and to share their life, shoulder to shoulder, side by side with their Islamic neighbours, under the eyes of the same God”. (Ch. Ray, in La Croix, February 5, 2015) However, places of diversity are everywhere today, including in Europe. Facing this grave problem, the Base Community does not engage in collective actions. The initiatives are mostly individual and taken outside the group; albeit addressed in celebrations and discussions. They celebrate “universal fraternity and reject turning inwards and into one’s own small tribal identity” (March 20, 2016). They ask that space should be left for the stranger “at one’s table, one’s feasts and in daily life in general”. Citing the Muslim Bin Arabia (13th century), who pleaded for the peaceful coexistence of different religions: “my heart became able to welcome all forms (…) be it an abbey for monks, a temple for idols and the Kaaba for those who go around. Be it the Tables of the Torah and also the pages of the Koran” (March 20, 2016). It is also true that the group invites strangers to their celebrations and that it evokes sad events affecting any of them. It is clearly more at the level of reflection than of actions that the community is interested in the stranger; actions are left for individual initiatives such as: listening, welcoming, meetings, invitations to meals. However, once more, it is not the community as such that takes these concrete actions.

Religious Practices, Beliefs and Commitments

181

2.4 Synthesis Celebrations at the Base Community of Gemmenich essentially centre on three themes: a very long, elaborate critique of the institutional Church; ecology; and the stranger. These themes are presented and discussed in the celebrations, but do not lead to collective actions. Furthermore, one can define the members as “liberals”, whose unsatisfied expectations of Vatican ii have led them to “invent”, by and for themselves, answers to their expectations. Although maintaining occasional relations with the Church, they have become autonomous from the institution, without, to the contrary, any feelings of guilt. 3 Conclusions Although very different in their dimensions, the two communities presented here, are composed in similar ways by: men and women, fifty and older, uppermiddle class and mostly with higher educational qualifications. Notwithstanding their efforts, their children and grandchildren are not interested in these groups; they have, they say, other things to do, including their studies. Furthermore, they see these meetings as boring, and they do not see their friends there. This is without doubt the most off-putting aspect of it for them in a society where peers are most important. The age of most of the members allows us to estimate that, in most cases, these people were stimulated by the promises offered by Vatican ii, and were eager to invest themselves in a renewed Church. Their disappointment with this was such that they distanced themselves from a Church that relied on its certitudes; its own way doing things, its hierarchical way of functioning, and— as much in its language as in its actions—is ever more conspicuous estrangement from contemporary life. Distancing themselves from the Church takes different forms in the two communities. The Lier features an ambiguity. On the one hand, there is a desire to be part of the “organization of the Church”: for example, they “cannot and may not be a partner in the pastoral planning of the city of Bruges”, which they consider as being excluded by the Church. But, on the other hand, the Steering Committee’s wish to organize their community according to their own rules, even, for example, not using the term Eucharist but Table Service in order not to appear provocative towards a Church that thinks it has the sole legitimate use of the term. At any rate, the dialogue with the Church hierarchy continues. There is nothing resembling this in the case of the Base Community of Gemmenich, which lives it life autonomously and in full tranquillity, even having occasional contact with representatives of the Church.

182

Dobbelaere and Voyé

As such, the Lier devises more and more action projects for a variety of causes as a community. The full meaning of this concept for the members involves increasing the number of their actions that favour encounters and stimulating mutual acquaintances beyond what is typical of the normal life of a group. In Gemmenich, it is more unusual for relationships to be cultivated outside the group, and these relationships also seem more “functional” even though they are not less cordial. References Tönnies, Ferdinand. 1887 (1st edition), 2005. Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaftt. Voyé, Liliane and Karel Dobbelaere. 2016. Pilgrimages: Space, Polysemy and Three Cases. In AIMS Geosciences, 2(2): 166–181. http://www.aimspress.com/ [accessed 10 September 2017]. Voyé, Liliane, Karel Dobbelaere and Jaak Billiet, 2011. “Une Église marginalisée ?” pp. 145–171 in Autres Temps, Autres Mœurs : Travail, Famille, Éthique, Religion et Politique, edited by Liliane Voyé, Karel Dobbelaere and Koen Abts. Brussels, Éditions Racine.

Part 3 Strategies and General Attitudes of the Catholic Church, and of the Vatican Centre in Particular, in Relation to Problems of the Global Era

∵

Chapter 9

Catholicism and Eastern Religions: Spiritual Innovators and Interreligious Dialogue (de Mello and Merton) Andrew P. Lynch In the twentieth century, two Catholic priests living thousands of miles apart attempted to create greater levels of understanding between Catholicism and East Asian religions. Although they never met each other, Anthony de Mello from India and Thomas Merton from the United States tried to develop closer ties with the spirituality of Buddhism and Hinduism, while remaining within their own Christian faith. In doing so, they sought to share the riches of Eastern faiths with other Catholics. However, they had mixed levels of success in undertaking this project, and as we shall see, de Mello’s work has been criticized by the Vatican, while Merton’s has been more widely acknowledged by Catholics. Both of these men worked in an atmosphere where interreligious dialogue was becoming more accepted after having been a contested issue in Catholicism, and the impact of Vatican ii will be an aspect of our analysis. This paper argues that with regard to interreligious dialogue, theory and practice can sometimes be difficult to reconcile. While Vatican ii’s Nostra Aetate (see Flannery 1981) opened the way for greater dialogue between Catholicism and other religions, including the Eastern faiths, the realities and shortcomings of such interreligious dialogue are evident in de Mello and Merton’s difficulties in bridging the theological and spiritual disparities between faiths. In what follows, we shall first examine the Catholic Church’s reform of its own stance on interreligious dialogue, which took place at Vatican ii. We will then analyse the cases of de Mello and Merton to assess to what degree the Church was able, in the final analysis, to put into practice the council’s goal for a closer dialogue and relationship with other faiths. The paper will then provide an evaluation of de Mello and Merton’s interreligious efforts in light of the legacy of the council, and the role of interreligious dialogue in contemporary Catholicism. This paper offers a unique insight into these issues by comparing two Catholic thinkers on the topic of interreligious dialogue, which has received little attention in the social sciences. De Mello and Merton’s work, and interreligious dialogue more generally, is an important aspect of the Church’s project since © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004380073_011

186

Lynch

Vatican ii to engage more closely with the modern world and secular institutions. As such, interreligious dialogue is an integral component of the Church’s efforts, in the context of modernity, to maintain its relevance in a world where the forces of globalization, and a shift towards diffuse formations of capital and power, are challenging the message of mainstream religions. Furthermore, in a time of increased global instability, interreligious dialogue offers a credible channel through which religion can contribute to peace and global interconnectedness, and the efforts of people such as de Mello and Merton provide the means whereby specific instances of interfaith communication and understanding lay the groundwork for closer collaboration between religions and cultures. These efforts are an important aspect of the continued presence of public religions in the public sphere, as religious institutions such as the Catholic Church face a world of increased global interconnectedness (Casanova 1994, 1997, 2001; Habermas 2006). Finally, as we shall see later, the work of these innovators is useful at a time when Catholicism is facing a world where religious habits are shifting towards greater levels of individualized religious practice. We will examine this issue through a brief discussion of the work of Charles Taylor (2007) and other authors. 1 Vatican ii and Interreligious Dialogue During the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) the issue of interreligious dialogue came to the fore in sessions in the third period (1964), during a series of debates about how the Church could best open itself to greater communication with other Christian denominations, and with the world’s other major religions (Cf. Acta 1976: 637ff). Prior to the council, the Church’s attitude towards other religions was simply to avoid dialogue, and to warn the faithful against contact with other religions. As one scholar has expressed it, “Before the council ‘interreligious dialogue’ was not high on the agenda of the Catholic Church” (Cassidy 2005: 125). Interfaith marriage was largely frowned upon, with Canon law making such unions difficult to enter into for Catholics, and the Church refrained from sharing communications with other religions in international affairs. The Catholic Church was absent from the World Council of Churches when it was formed in 1948, and continues to prefer not to be an official member. But despite this, the Church is aware that it has always existed in a world of religious pluralism, and that such a context was integral to its development (D’Costa 2009: 5). Vatican ii was concerned not only with the Church’s relationship to other faith communities, but also how such relationships would

Catholicism and Eastern Religions

187

be played out in a time of increased secularism. The bishops and their advisors discussed world religions, ecumenism with other Christian churches, and relations with Orthodox churches, in the context of modern social life and the challenges it presents to religion. These deliberations resulted in three separate documents coming out of the council on other religions or churches, including Nostra Aetate (on world religions), Unitatis Redintegratio (on ecumenism), and Orientalium Ecclesiarum (on the Orthodox churches) (see Flannery 1981). This is quite remarkable, considering the large number of topics that participants at the council wanted to discuss, and which they desired to see enshrined in a conciliar document. As the bishops at the council discussed ecumenism, and focused on the Catholic Church’s relations with other Christian denominations, the relationship with Judaism took on greater importance. The focus on Judaism opened the way for a more general discussion of the Church’s relations with the world’s major religions, including Islam, as well as the faiths of the East, including Buddhism and Hinduism. As Nostra Aetate was specifically concerned with the Church’s relationship to other world religions, it will be our focus here. Although it is one of the shorter texts to come out of the council, it has had a significant impact for the Church’s position among global religions. Much of the debate that took place on the council floor during discussions of Nostra Aetate was about the Church and Judaism (Alberigo 2006: 70; O’Malley 2008: 218ff). The council fathers were acutely aware that relations with Judaism had stagnated, and that there was a widespread feeling of inertia in the Church about how it related to the Jews. This was something that the council wanted to rectify (Cassidy 2005: 125–126). The desire to set things right was in many ways a product of the Holocaust. The council was taking place in the mid-1960s, only twenty years after the Second World War, and many of the bishops and theologians gathered at the council had been alive during that war. There was also some degree of unease in the Church about the perception that during the war, Pope Pius xii had not done enough to speak out directly against Nazi genocide. This perception of inaction was resulting in a great deal of confusion about what the Church had done to help victims of the Nazis. Pope John xxiii, the instigator of the council, had assisted Jews during the war, and it was his belief that better relations were needed between the two faiths. His views were crucial for having the issue on the conciliar agenda in the first place (O’Malley 2008: 219). Regardless of how much Judaism was discussed at the council in relation to Nostra Aetate, the themes that the document develops apply to other world religions. The council members were conscious that they wanted to revise the long-held idea that other religions were somehow inferior, and instead sought

188

Lynch

to highlight the special qualities of other faiths as vehicles for holiness and the living of a spiritual life. The debate about other religions held at the council, and about how interreligious dialogue should be approached, was therefore based on the notion that dialogue is always challenging. Contradictions between religions would have to be admitted, but a spirit of patience and tolerance was the order of the day, and dialogue would need to take place between equals. Nostra Aetate states that what binds the Church to other religions is a common search for meaning among humanity, and the recognition among different religions that there is more to reality than the natural world evident to the senses (Flannery 1981: 738–739). The document stresses that Christianity has strong links with Judaism, which is attested to by the importance of the Hebrew Bible. It stresses that anti-Semitism no longer has any place in society, nor will it be tolerated in the Church. On Islam, the text states that over “the centuries many quarrels and dissensions have arisen between Christians and Muslims” (Flannery 1981: 740). But it asks that the followers of each of these religions set aside these conflict, and look towards peace and fellowship, and it highlights commonalities between the two faiths that can serve as a basis for improved relations. Nostra Aetate also singles out Hinduism and Buddhism, their status as religions of “advanced civilizations”, which seek answers to the questions and mystery of human existence. Hinduism, it states, does this through its beliefs and ascetic practices, while Buddhism provides a pathway towards liberation from earthly existence, and illumination of the mind and spirit. Overall, Nostra Aetate praises each of these religions for providing moral guidance and a system of ethics that has formed the basis of complex societies, and which have guided social action. Of Hinduism and Buddhism, it states unequivocally that they contain truths in their teachings which, although they differ from Christianity, have great value for the pursuit of a meaningful and morally ordered life, and which have been the basis of highly functional communities (Flannery 1981: 739). In some respects, Nostra Aetate dovetails with the council’s overhaul of the Church’s position on religious liberty (see Dignitatis Humanae in Flannery 1981), another topic contested during lengthy deliberations (O’Malley 2008: 254). By acknowledging that human beings are free to follow the religion of their choice as a pathway to holiness, and by declaring that the state, or any other institution, cannot enforce any form of religious belief or unbelief on citizens, and that to do so is a violation of human rights, the council acknowledged the status of non-Christian religions, and in some ways opened the door for greater communication between Catholics and adherents of the other world faiths. This process, according to Casanova (1997: 130), meant ­championing religious

Catholicism and Eastern Religions

189

freedom as a right for all people, not only for Catholics, which had previously been the Church’s position. Merton and de Mello, therefore, had the backing of a number of Vatican ii rulings behind them as they undertook their work of interreligious dialogue with the religions of Asia. Even so, reaching out to the Asian religions presents a number of challenges for Catholic efforts in interreligious dialogue. The Church has had a close, if fractious, relationship with both Judaism and Islam over many centuries. Christian, Jewish and Islamic communities have lived alongside one another in many parts of the world for sustained periods of time, and although violence and misunderstandings have occurred on numerous occasions, close proximity has led to increased levels of knowledge about each other among these faiths. Furthermore, Christianity, Judaism and Islam share certain theological commonalities, being revealed religions “of the book”, and are monotheistic and Abrahamic, looking back to a common ancestor in faith (Heft 2012: 20–21). Christian contact with Asian religions, however, is more recent; there is a lack of a shared history, and very different theological suppositions are involved. The Asian religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, are very different religions, both from each other and from the monotheistic faiths. They comprise a diverse range of traditions and beliefs, and are represented by authorities from diverse geographical locations. Moreover, these religions have their own highly developed theologies that are distinct from those found in Judaism, Christianity, or Islam. These differences make the work of de Mello and Merton all the more extraordinary, especially as they have tried to make sense of Eastern religions for Catholics, and to show them what these faiths have to offer in a world beset by secularism, relativism, and a form of individualism that encourages social agents to live without religion. This includes the struggles by different religions to respond to globalization and the accompanying increased levels of migration, and the impact that these have on religion in specific societies (see Casanova 2001: 438). We will now turn to a discussion of the interreligious work of Merton and de Mello. 2

Thomas Merton and the Call of the East

Thomas Merton (1915–1968) is remembered as America’s most famous monk. He became a novice in the Trappist order in 1942 and spent most of his years as a priest and monk at the Abbey of Gethsemani in Kentucky. In his bestselling autobiography The Seven Storey Mountain (Merton 1948), Merton charts his journey from worldly concerns to the monastery, and the book is an insight into both his spiritual and intellectual journey towards Catholicism and the

190

Lynch

monastic life. A talented writer, Merton was given the freedom to work on his literary pursuits at Gethsemani, and produced a number of spiritual and historical works that were sold through the abbey’s publishing house. His earlier writings are mainly concerned with spirituality and the monastic and ascetic life (Merton 1961), and he produced a series of texts devoted to helping others with their spiritual journey in the modern world (Merton 1958, 1972). In the 1960s, Merton began to be more deeply involved in the political affairs of the Cold War and human rights, which were sweeping through America and being fuelled by protests over the Vietnam War, and the Civil Rights movement. It was also at this time that Merton’s relationship with his abbot became increasingly strained, especially because Merton felt drawn to the eremitic life of living alone, which his abbot, Dom James Fox, tried to accommodate while at the same time attempting to keep Merton within the boundaries of the monastery (Lipsey 2015). Merton and his abbot had never seen eye to eye, but both men tried their best to make the situation workable. Dom James allowed Merton a number of privileges, such as being able to spend extra time alone beyond that allotted to other monks, and gave him permission to live in a hermitage on the abbey’s grounds. Since he was a dedicated seeker, such latitude seemed to fuel Merton’s desire for solitude more deeply, rather than placate it. Merton was a firm believer in the importance of interreligious dialogue, and he felt that the best way for different religious traditions to understand each other was for people to experience the spirituality of other faiths, rather than trying to reconcile them intellectually (Shannon and Bochen, in Merton 2008: 333). Merton exchanged letters with clergy and scholars from a range of religions, and in them he stressed the shared search for the divine, rather than deliberating on doctrinal differences. In the 1950s and 1960s, there was a renewed interest in Eastern religions in the West, and high-profile writers such as Allen Ginsberg and others of the Beat generation were weaving the principles of Buddhism into their work. Merton had long had an interest in various strands of Buddhism, and maintained correspondence with leading Buddhist intellectuals and teachers, such as D.T. Suzuki and Thich Nhat Hanh. The political atmosphere of the 1960s prompted him to spend more time thinking and writing, which he did in his hermitage on the monastery grounds. He published a series of books on Buddhist spirituality and Eastern monasticism (Merton 1961a; 1965) and began to travel. He headed to Asia where he met the Dalai Lama, and attended interfaith conferences, including one in Thailand where he died in his hotel room from an electric shock. For Merton, Zen and other Buddhist traditions were essential for overcoming the modern individual’s preoccupation with the self, and he included stories and verse from the Buddhist tradition in his final work, which sought

Catholicism and Eastern Religions

191

to help seekers overcome their false, exterior self that was inured in the one-­ dimensional materialist concerns of daily life, and to reach their inner self where the truth about themselves could be found: The inner self is not a part of our being, like a motor in a car. It is our entire substantial reality itself, on its highest and most personal and most existential level. It is like life, and it is life: it is our spiritual life when it is most alive. merton 2003: 6

Merton provides the example of sartori in Zen Buddhism, where the contemplative’s false self is shattered by the sound of a thunderclap, and he or she reaches an awakening of a true sense of self (Merton 2003: 7–8). Merton, however, does not stop with this example from Buddhism, or claim that Christian mysticism should adopt such spiritual strategies tout court. Rather, Merton emphasizes that his monograph is a book with a focus on Christian spiritual practice, and he reminds readers that what distinguishes the contemplative life of Christian and Buddhist practitioners is the presence, for Christians, of a monotheistic God to which their spiritual life is directed. This is not, for Merton, an evaluative statement about the pros or cons of either religious tradition, but rather an example of what each shares and how each remains unique. It was Merton’s ability to build bridges between religions, without slipping into a tone of condescension towards another faith and while refraining from a haughty sense of superiority about his own, that won him respect from believers from other religions. Merton sought to stress the shared experience of the mystical journey across different religious faiths, and this was something that his readers, regardless of their own religion, could relate to. As he wrote to D.T. Suzuki in 1959: “The fact that you are a Zen Buddhist and I am a Christian monk, far from separating us, makes us most like one another” (Merton 2008: 362). In late 1968, Merton left Gethsemani to journey to India and Asia in an effort to gain a better first-hand experience of Eastern faiths (Lipsey 2015: 252). During his travels, he had a series of meetings with the Dalai Lama at Dharamsala, where they discussed meditation and mysticism, and how each of their r­ eligions sought deeper levels of inner experience. Current affairs and politics, including communism and its suppression of religion, were also topics of discussion. Merton found the Dalai Lama to be a wise sage regarding his own faith, yet also someone he could relate to when discussing the intricacies of Christian mysticism. Merton wrote, “I feel a great respect and fondness for him as a person and believe, too, that there is a real spiritual bond between us” (Merton 1999: 425). Likewise, the Dalai Lama was impressed with Merton’s

192

Lynch

knowledge of spiritual practices, both those of Christianity and those from outside his own religion. As well as meeting the Dalai Lama and many other spiritual masters, he attended a conference on East-West monastic dialogue held in Thailand. When Merton had left his monastery for this journey he was uncertain if he would ever return—he was seeking greater solitude than the busy abbey, with its routine of tasks and constant stream of visitors, could o­ ffer. As it turned out, he was never to return alive, as he was accidentally electrocuted in his hotel room after speaking at the conference in Bangkok on December 10. His body was returned to Gethsemani, where he was buried. Merton’s efforts to open a discourse between Catholicism and Buddhism were validated by Vatican ii. As he wrote after reading Nostra Aetate, the council “clearly recognized the validity of the ‘profound religious sense’ which has enabled men of all races and peoples to recognize God” (Merton 1965: 206). In Merton’s opinion, interreligious dialogue should seek out “the inner and ultimate spiritual ‘ground’ which underlies all articulated differences” (Merton 1965: 204). Merton’s understanding of interreligious dialogue was, therefore, one which sought common ground between religions and how together they could respond to the challenges of a secular world order that was more concerned with materialism and power than with spiritual goals. Furthermore, Merton writes that there is a special group of people whose role it is to seek understanding between religions through interreligious dialogue, and these are those men and women who devote themselves to the spiritual life (Merton 1968: 309). It is through contemplatives, and those who live in monastic ­communities, that greater understanding between religions can be reached (Merton 1968: 311). But there were also limits for Merton when it came to interreligious dialogue and communication, and a melding of different religious traditions was something that he was careful to warn against. In his understanding, any sort of syncretism led to confusion rather than genuine religious harmony (Merton 1965: 207–208). Merton’s work has had an ongoing legacy for interreligious dialogue between Catholics and spiritual practitioners of Buddhism. In 1996, Buddhist and Catholic monks met at Gethsemani Abbey with the Dalai Lama present (Fredericks 2012: 127–128). The meeting, called the Gethsemani Encounter, inspired “a number of unexpected discussions and outcomes” (Fitzgerald and Borelli 2006: 203). These included common prayer and meditation sessions, discussions of spiritual traditions, symbols, and rituals, and collaborative studies of sacred and monastic texts. Merton’s focus on a shared experience of the ­sublime, rather than argument over doctrinal differences, is evident in these interreligious endeavours. Below we will assess Merton’s work in interreligious dialogue in more detail, but before doing so we will examine the work of

Catholicism and Eastern Religions

193

a­ nother Catholic, whose goal it was to build connections between Catholicism and the faiths of the East. 3

Anthony de Mello, Catholicism, and Eastern Thought

Anthony de Mello (1931–1987) was an Indian-born Jesuit priest who was trained at Mumbai, and worked in active ministry near Poona, in India. He directed the Sadhana Institute of Pastoral Counselling, which he founded in 1972, and from there ran a series of retreats attended by people from around the world. The Sadhana Institute continues to be operated by Jesuit clergy and lay people, and offers a range of retreats and courses. De Mello was educated in India, and undertook training in psychology at Chicago and in spirituality in Rome. De Mello was also the author of a number of popular books on spirituality, which mixed Christian and Buddhist, Taoist, and Hindu teachings. It was through holding his retreats and running spiritual workshops that de Mello developed his unique approach of blending Catholicism and Eastern spiritual practices, and his psychological training is also evident in his work, with a concern with the self and the pressures of modern society (see de Mello 1990). De Mello had undertaken the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola as part of his formation as a Jesuit, and he used these as the basis of his own retreats, where participants were taught a spiritual approach that included Christian and Eastern spiritual ideas based on the framework and structure of Ignatius’s method (de Mello 1978). Early in his career as a retreat leader and spiritual instructor, de Mello drew resistance from some fellow Jesuits for his methods (Valles 1987: 2–3). These involved concerns about his blending of diverse spiritual traditions in an uncritical manner. On the other hand, those who attended his workshops attested to their value, and to the benefits that they received which helped them overcome personal problems and strengthen their faith (Brys and Pulickal 1995). De Mello’s pedagogical method of instruction in his retreats and publications involved using traditional stories from Christianity and Eastern religions to encourage his listeners and readers to deeper levels of self-awareness, and in doing so help them to overcome their life’s challenges and plumb deeper levels of spiritual understanding. Narrative was, therefore, an important theological and spiritual method in his approach. As he wrote in the preface to one of his collections of stories: Everyone loves stories and you will find plenty of them in this book: Stories that are Buddhist, Christian, Zen, Hasidic, Russian, Chinese, Hindu,

194

Lynch

Sufi; stories ancient and contemporary. And they all have a special quality: if read in a certain kind of way, they will produce spiritual growth. de mello 1982: xv

An example of his method is found in his book Prayer of the Frog, which de Mello edited shortly before his death and which was published posthumously. In the first chapter of Volume One on prayer, de Mello presents stories and anecdotes from Christian, Jewish, Hindu, and Buddhist sources, all of which seek to provide a deeper understanding of what prayer is, and its efficacy. In the first story, a monk called Bruno is annoyed by the singing of a bullfrog while he is attempting to pray the Divine Office. He commands it to be silent, but then an inner voice tells him that the song of the bullfrog is as pleasing to God as Bruno’s prayers. De Mello concludes that, “With that discovery, Bruno’s heart became harmonious with the universe and, for the first time in his life he understood what it means to pray” (de Mello 1987: 3). Another narrative relates how a Zen Master takes his students to a ballet and tells them that although they have prayed in speech and mind for many years, they will now witness prayer expressed through the body and its graceful movements. He teaches them that they have heard many prayers, but now they will be able to see one in action (de Mello 1987: 5). In another story, an Indian sage, Narada, is sent by Lord Hari to a poor peasant to learn the discipline of prayer. While he is with the peasant, Narada wonders how this man, who spends most of his time working the fields and prays only twice a day, can teach him anything about prayer. The Lord Hari makes Narada carry a bowl filled to the brim with milk around the city, and then asks him if he was thinking about spilling the milk or about his lord while he did so. Narada replies that balancing the milk took his whole attention. Lord Hari points out to him that although the poor peasant is kept busy with the cares of the world for most of the day, he still remembers to pray in the morning and at night, while Narada easily forgets his devotions (de Mello 1987: 12–13). These stories, drawn from Christian and Buddhist and Hindu religious traditions, reveal to de Mello’s readers that their own religion shares a common goal with that of others, which is the seeking of the divine and the overcoming of the self. In doing so, de Mello is engaging in a form of interreligious dialogue that attempts to understand the spiritual connections between different faiths, rather than trying to reconcile the doctrinal distinctions between Christianity and Eastern faiths. In this respect, his approach is similar to that taken by Merton. De Mello’s blending of Christianity and Eastern faiths earned him a loyal following, and his ideas generated a degree of popularity both in his native

Catholicism and Eastern Religions

195

India and in the West. After his sudden death from heart failure in New York, his work continued to draw adherents, to the degree that the Vatican became aware of his writings and popular following. However, de Mello’s eclectic fusion of religious traditions came under critical scrutiny, and his work landed on the desk of theologians at the Vatican. The status of de Mello’s interfaith theology is more ambiguous than that of Merton, and he has been the subject of official censure from the Vatican. In 1998, the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (formerly known as the Holy Office) issued a Notification that judged de Mello’s work to be outside the norms of acceptable Catholic teaching. The Notification was issued under the authority of Pope John Paul ii, and the Congregation, headed at the time by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict xvi), wrote that de Mello’s work shows “a progressive distancing from the essential contents of the Christian faith” (Notification 1998). Of particular concern regarding de Mello’s work was, according to the Congregation, his ideas about God being pure void, of which nothing could be said with any confidence, and that death would be akin to a dissolving of the human spirit into God, like sugar dissolving into water. In this respect, the Notification argues that de Mello’s approach to interreligious understanding falls into syncretism, and it is his uncritical mixing of religious ideas that the Congregation views to be problematic. This is an unfortunate outcome for the legacy of de Mello’s work, as the spirit of his writings is certainly one which wants to encourage closer connections between religions, as opposed to an indiscriminate combining of them. In this regard, de Mello’s project highlights one of the persistent arguments against interreligious dialogue, namely that it blurs what makes each religion distinct, and that it encourages the idea that each faith tradition is essentially the same as every other, which depreciates the unique cultures and beliefs that underlie different religions. De Mello’s work continues to draw followers, and for many years Fordham University in the United States hosted the De Mello Spirituality Centre, founded by Jesuit priest J. Francis Stroud, who was a friend of de Mello’s. Since Stroud’s death, however, Fordham no longer hosts the Centre, and it is now run by a group of Trustees and operates a website. Some Jesuit websites and universities continue to acknowledge de Mello’s contribution to spiritual thought, although they point out the Notification’s warning about his works. On the whole, de Mello’s efforts at interreligious dialogue reveal the challenges faced by all contemporary religions in their efforts to help individuals find spiritual solace in secular times. De Mello’s combination of stories, and his insights about the self, touch on a common theme faced by many in today’s world, which is how to find the sublime in the context of everyday life and the pressures of work and domestic life.

196

Lynch

Also, as stated in Nostra Aetate, and as scholars working in the area of interreligious dialogue readily admit, both Hinduism and Buddhism present unique challenges when it comes to dialogue with Christianity, due to their very different understandings about the divine. Thomas Merton addressed this challenge by focusing on contemplation, which these religions share, while de Mello was more interested in how the teachings of these faiths can help social agents live meaningful lives in the contemporary world. Although the Church has found that de Mello’s efforts have crossed into syncretism, it should still be acknowledged that he has opened a way towards greater contact between Catholics and the Eastern religions, which continues to inspire many Catholics. 4

Assessing the Interreligious Dialogue of Two Catholic Seekers

The work of de Mello and Merton in the area of interreligious dialogue reveals the tensions that exist when the policy of interfaith dialogue meets the realities of doctrine and dogma. Merton tried to circumnavigate the doctrinal differences between religions, which is often where misunderstanding develops, through focusing on the shared mystical experiences that different religions offer, and which are often achieved without having to rely on doctrinal interpretations. Contemplation accesses feelings of the sublime and allows for self-awareness, and leads towards greater charity and understanding, which in themselves are valuable tools for transcending dogma. To some degree, Merton was successful in his efforts, as he was on common ground with those from other religions, and could write about spiritual topics at a level removed from the doctrine and dogmas of any particular religion. It is for this reason that his work has inspired many, and has been largely left alone by censors at the Vatican. De Mello, on the other hand, developed a body of work that has been interpreted by some as an attempt to reveal the similarities between Christian and Eastern doctrine. His writings, largely symbolic and analogical as they are, raised the concern at the Vatican that he was lumping the Christian God and Christian teachings into the same framework as those of other religions. On the whole, the work of both of these men to bridge the divide between Catholic teaching and Eastern religious traditions reveals the difficulties that can occur when the sometimes idealized desire for interreligious dialogue comes head to head with the harsh realities of doctrinal differences between different religions. This is not to suggest that interreligious dialogue is doomed to failure, or that the projects of Merton or de Mello are without value; rather, their efforts

Catholicism and Eastern Religions

197

show that interreligious dialogue is in some ways limited to offering a sympathetic comparative understanding of other faiths, while the borders between religions continue to be patrolled diligently. This also is not to suggest that interreligious dialogue should lead to the melding together of a range of different religions, which is not its purpose nor its goal, and is not a desirable outcome in any case. But it does suggest that interreligious dialogue faces a number of challenges that have not always been well considered before it is promoted. The results of de Mello’s career highlight this problem quite clearly, as after his death his writings were censured by the Vatican and his following has lost momentum since the Notification was issued. Merton’s writings on Eastern religions have not been the subject of a negative assessment by the Church, and so he has maintained his high status among Catholics, especially American Catholics. In broader terms, de Mello and Merton’s interreligious work underscores the importance of accounting for shifts in religious behaviour in the contemporary world, and how religious organizations such as the Catholic Church can respond. As Charles Taylor (2007) has argued, secularity today is more about a change in how people believe, rather than a wholesale loss of belief. Taylor writes about what he calls “secularity 3”, whereby social agents are faced with a wider range of spiritual options, which may include remaining in established churches, or pursuing their own spirituality through individualized pathways, or joining small groups who explore a diverse array of spiritual ideas, something that has been sometimes inaccurately termed the “New Age” movement (Taylor 2007). Taylor sees a distinction between those who choose to remain in the established churches in the West, whom he calls “dwellers”, and those who pursue novel forms of spirituality, whom he calls “seekers” (see Taylor et al. 2012). These points align with research carried out by Heelas and Woodhead (2005), who found a preponderance of spiritual activity in British contexts where official church membership had fallen. The authors uncovered a lively culture of seeking among those who had become disaffiliated with their churches. Grace Davie (1994) sums up this situation in spiritual seeking as “believing without belonging”, and in her research also shows that low levels of church membership do not mean that people have lost their appreciation for the sacred, or no longer believe in the transcendent. Rather, their spirituality is being expressed in new ways. The Catholic Church has yet to formulate a response to these shifts in religious habits. It decries relativism, which it defines as an ideology which purports to promote all beliefs and lifestyle options to equal status (Heft 2012: 7). But apart from this, the diversity of spiritual practices that are on offer in the

198

Lynch

West today, and which have been examined by the authors mentioned above, is something that the Church has yet to come to grips with. A part of the reason for this is its resistance to spiritual practices that are novel or unconnected with its teachings and doctrinal orthodoxy. Furthermore, the Church is not likely to change its stance on such an issue, as to do so would undermine a key element of its identity, which is its unity as a religious organization. Interreligious dialogue, therefore, offers a way forward, and the interfaith bridges built by people such as de Mello and Merton may well provide it with a means for reaching out to those attracted to diverse spiritual pathways. Moreover, as the Church takes on more and more the identity of being a global church in a global and interconnected world (see Casanova 1997, 2001), interreligious dialogue as carried out by innovators such as de Mello and Merton will be an important platform for closer relations with the world’s other religions. At the time of writing, the Vatican is in negotiations with the Indian government for an official visit to India by Pope Francis (McElwee 2017). Such a visit is testimony to the awareness in the Church that closer relations with distinct cultures and religious traditions are paramount in the new global order. 5 Conclusion Communication and greater understanding between the Catholic Church and other religions became an important issue at Vatican ii, as the Church sought to develop closer and more productive relations with modern society. The council inspired new thinking about the significance of productive relations with other religions, overcame an attitude of suspicion about other faiths, and inculcated an atmosphere of mutual exchange and interfaith learning. Merton and de Mello contributed to these efforts through their experience with Eastern religions. Their work was innovative and daring at a time when dialogue with other religions was still in a nascent phase, and their efforts met a number of challenges. This paper has shown how interreligious dialogue can be a noble idea in theory, but difficult to achieve in practice. Thomas Merton made bridges with other religions through his focus on the contemplative aspect of the spiritual life, but to do so successfully required him to forgo questions about doctrine between faiths. Anthony de Mello has proved to be very popular with Catholics seeking enlightenment from the East, but was censured by the Vatican, a sanction that has put a cloud over his works and which has stalled, to some degree at least, the number of his followers. Vatican ii committed the Church to an outward focus on modern society and other religions, and key documents such

Catholicism and Eastern Religions

199

as Nostra Aetate, Unitatis Redintegratio, and Orientalium Ecclesiarum made this possible. But the council could not anticipate the results of interreligious dialogue, or how the process of creating dialogue that was undertaken by innovators such as Merton and de Mello would unfold. The Catholic Church remains committed to the project of interreligious dialogue, and communication with other religious communities is essential if the Church is to maintain its relevance in twenty-first century multifaith societies. As the relationship between religion and secularism becomes more complex, fuelled by technological developments and greater levels of individual autonomy, and as the global public sphere is beset by increased insecurity and anxiety over issues such as the environment and inequalities being created by unrestrained capitalism, the need for increased collaboration between religions will only become more urgent. The Catholic Church, as it contemplates a future of both increased opportunities and risks, is well placed due to its global scope to take a leadership role in interreligious communication. To do so, however, it will need to revisit the efforts of interfaith understanding promoted by innovators within its own ranks, of which de Mello and Merton are examples. References Acta Synodalia Sacrosancti Concilii Oecumenici Vaticani II (1976). Vol. 3 (8), Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis. Alberigo, Giuseppe. 2006. A Brief History of Vatican II. New York: Orbis. Brys, Aurel and Joseph Pulickal. 1995. We Heard the Bird Sing: Interacting with Anthony de Mello. Anand: Gujarat Sahitya Prakash. Casanova, José. 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Casanova, José. 1997. “Religion, the New Millennium, and Globalization”. Sociology of Religion, 62(4): 415–441. Casanova, José. 2001. “Globalizing Catholicism and the Return to a ‘Universal’ Church”. Pp. 121–143 in Transnational Religion and Fading States, edited by Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Cassidy, Edward. 2005. Ecumenism and Interreligious Dialogue: Unitatis Redintegratio, Nostra Aetate. New York: Paulist Press. Davie, Grace. 1994. Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging. Oxford: Blackwell. D’Costa, Gavin. 2009. Christianity and World Religions: Disputed Questions in the Theology of Religions. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

200

Lynch

De Mello, Anthony. 1978. Sadhana: A Way to God. Anand: Gujarat Sahitya Prakash. De Mello, Anthony. 1982. The Song of the Bird. Anand: Gujarat Sahitya Prakash. De Mello, Anthony. 1987. The Prayer of the Frog: A Book of Story Meditations (2 Vols.). Anand: Gujarat Sahitya Prakash. De Mello, Anthony. 1990. Awareness: A de Mello Spirituality Conference in His Own Words. London: Harper Collins. Fitzgerald, Michael L. and John Borelli. 2006. Interfaith Dialogue: A Catholic View. New York: Orbis. Flannery, Austin. 1981. Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents. Collegeville: Liturgical Press. Fredericks, James L. 2012. “Off the Map: The Catholic Church and Its Dialogue with Buddhists”. Pp. 127–144 in Catholicism and Interreligious Dialogue, edited by James L. Heft. New York: Oxford University Press. Habermas, Jürgen. 2006. “Religion in the Public Sphere”. European Journal of Philosophy 14(1): 1–25. Heelas, Paul and Linda Woodhead. 2005. The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality. Oxford: Blackwell. Heft, James L. 2012. Catholicism and Interreligious Dialogue. New York: Oxford University Press. Lipsey, Roger. 2015. Make Peace Before the Sun Goes Down: The Long Encounter of Thomas Merton and His Abbot, James Fox. Boston: Shambala. McElwee, Joshua J. 2017. “Exclusive: Bishops’ president ‘losing hope’ Francis will visit India in 2017”. National Catholic Reporter, 16 June. Merton, Thomas. 1948. The Seven Storey Mountain. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. Merton, Thomas. 1958. Thoughts in Solitude. Tunbridge Wells: Burns & Oates. Merton, Thomas. 1961. The Wisdom of the Desert: Sayings from the Desert Fathers of the Fourth Century. London: Hollis and Carter. Merton, Thomas. (1961a). The Way of Chuang Tzu. New York: New Directions. Merton, Thomas. 1965. Mystics and Zen Masters. New York: Delta Books. Merton, Thomas. 1968. The Asian Journal of Thomas Merton. New York: New Directions. Merton, Thomas. 1972. New Seeds of Contemplation. New York: New Directions. Merton, Thomas. 1999. The Intimate Merton: His Life from His Journals. Oxford: Lion. Merton, Thomas. 2003. The Inner Experience: Notes on Contemplation. San Francisco: Harper. Merton, Thomas. 2008. Thomas Merton: A Life in Letters. San Francisco: Harper. Notification. 1998. Concerning the Writings of Father Anthony de Mello, S.J. Rome: Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. O’Malley, John W. 2008. What Happened at Vatican II. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Catholicism and Eastern Religions

201

Taylor, Charles. 2007. A Secular Age. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Taylor, Charles, José Casanova and George F. McLean. 2012. Church and People: Disjunctions in a Secular Age. Washington D.C: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Valles, Carlos G. 1987. Unencumbered by Baggage: Father Anthony de Mello. Anand: Gujarat Sahitya Prakash.

Chapter 10

Religion in a Globalized Culture: Institutional Innovation and Continuity of Catholicism— The Case of World Youth Day Sławomir Mandes and Wojciech Sadłoń Since the first official World Youth Day (wyd) in Buenos Aires in 1987, the regular meeting of young Catholics with the Pope has been among the world’s largest mass religious celebrations involving young people from various countries and continents. The scale of wyd and the media response driven by the participation of millions of young people in meetings with subsequent Popes are presented as an example of Peter L. Berger’s theory of counter ­secularization (Lynch 2008), or as an example of a new form of socialization to religion in an individualized society (Taylor 2007: 516–518). The direct impulse to organize wyd came from John Paul ii, who wanted to reach out to young people in his very own way. Gradually, wyd became part of the new evangelization program, which is the response of the Catholic Church to cultural and social changes in its environment and to the limited opportunities for socialization to faith among successive generations of Catholics (Rymarz 2005). When preparing wyd, the organizers draw on diverse ways of communicating with the young generation, using a variety of mass culture tools: events, concerts, and festivals, but filled with religious content. In this way, a new channel of communication is created between the Church and the contemporary young generation (Ebertz 2000; Hepp and Krönert 2008; Vogelgesang 2008; Pfadenhauer 2010a, 2010b; Lorenzo et al. 2012). The short duration of wyd, the intensity of preparations, and the physical effort involved in travel and participation in religious ceremonies and additional events create, as Trinitapoli and Vaisey (2009) put it, an “institutionalized religious experience”, an event concentrated in time, constructing and sustaining powerful experiences of various kinds among its participants. wyd is not the only such undertaking in the Catholic Church, or more broadly, in Western Christianity. Other events that can be named here include: Taizé: European Youth Meeting, diocesan youth festivals such as “Kirche + Jugend + X” in Germany, or youth meetings organized by the Dominican Order in Lednica, Poland. None of these events, however, can match the scale and the intensity of the community experience of wyd. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004380073_012

Religion in a Globalized Culture

203

This article is an attempt to inspect the wyd phenomenon from a sociological perspective. The description of this event will refer to its organizational aspects, historical background, and institutional origins. Official data showing the scale of previously organized wyds as well as previous research on wyd will be presented. Based on the authors’ multifaceted research1 conducted during the wyd in Cracow in 2016, the nature of wyd will also be characterized, including its ­participants, reception and impact. In this way, we will capture the role of wyd from the perspective of the institution of the Catholic Church. Most of the data we use here come from the wyd in Cracow where we conducted our fieldwork. 1

The Scale and Programme of wyd

Because of the organizational format of wyd, it is not easy to provide the exact number of participants (cf. Table 10.1). The most precise numbers refer to people who sign up in the wyd organizers’ online system, pay the required fee and receive the pre-prepared pilgrims’ packs. In the history of wyd, the number of participants has ranged from 300,000 to 500,000. In Cracow, the number of registered persons, coming from 187 countries, was exactly 356,294. From this number, the most, i.e. 80,000, were from Poland; 64,000 came from Italy; and 33,000 from France. It is worth noting that the organizers observed a decline in the number of registrations, which was undoubtedly related to the terrorist threat in Europe. In March 2016, Europe was shocked by the terrorist attacks in Brussels. In mid-July, a similar attack took place in Nice, France. As a result, one particular characteristic of the wyd in Cracow was the omnipresence of police and security services. There were 17,000 police officers and 11,000 border guards involved in providing security during the central events. The total number of wyd participants is based on the estimates of those taking part in the Holy Mass concelebrated by the Pope at the end of wyd. Until 1997, the World Youth Day was organized each year: in the first year it was held in all dioceses in the world, and in the second year it took place in a designated city: in 1989 in Santiago de Compostela (Spain), in 1991 in Częstochowa (Poland), in 1993 in Denver (usa), in 1995 in Manila (Philippines) 1 The methodology of research performed in Cracow by the research team of Institute for Catholic Church Statistics and National Centre for Culture was partly based on the methodology developed by the Australian team. Full description of methodology of the Australian research is available in Mason 2008. The description of methodology of Polish quantitative research is available in Mandes 2016. We would like to thank the Australian team for their permission to use a portion of the questionnaire. In particular, our thanks go to M. Mason for supporting the fieldwork in Poland.

204

Mandes and Sadłoń

Table 10.1 Estimated number of wyd participants

Year

Place

1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 2000 2002 2005 2008 2011 2013 2016

Rome Buenos Aires Santiago de Compostela Częstochowa Denver Manila Paris Rome Toronto Cologne Sydney Madrid Rio de Janeiro Cracow

Number of participants 250,000–350,000 900,000–1,000,000 400,000–600,000 1,500,000–1,800,000 500,000–1,000,000 4,000,000–5,000,000 1,100,000–1,200,000 2,000,000–2,500,000 400,000–800,000 1,200,000 350,000–500,000 1,500,000–2,000,000 3,000,000–3,700,000 2,500,000–3,000,000

Source: A. Jackowski et al., 2016; J. Stala, J. Stala, 2016.

and in 1997 in Paris (France). Starting from 1997, wyd was officially held every year, yet diocesan celebrations were often held for two years in a row. This was the case in 1998 and 1999. It was not until 2000 that wyd took place in Rome, in 2002 in Toronto (Canada), in 2005 in Cologne (Germany), in 2008 in Sydney (Australia), in 2011 in Madrid (Spain), in 2013 in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), and in 2016 in Cracow (Poland). The next wyd is scheduled for 2019 in Panama (Panama). Looking at this list, we can clearly see that wyd was global right from the outset, and was organized on almost all continents except Africa. Excluding the diocesan wyd celebrations, but including the first events of 1984 and 1985, John Paul ii presided over ten editions of World Youth Day, from Rome to Toronto. Pope Benedict xvi participated in the World Youth Day in Cologne, Sydney and Madrid. Pope Francis took part in the celebrations in Rio de Janeiro and Cracow. Due to the specificity of the hosting countries—their culture, political context, and role of the Church—each wyd was somewhat unique (Pfadenhauer 2008). For example, the first Polish wyd took place in 1991 in Czestochowa. When inviting people to this event, Pope John Paul ii pointed out the need for evangelization and the return of Poland to its Christian roots. It is estimated that about 70,000 people arrived in Częstochowa from the Soviet Union and

Religion in a Globalized Culture

205

met with numerous young Catholics from France, Italy and Spain. The wyd in Madrid in 2011 was the biggest mass event in Spanish history. The number of registered participants reached almost 500,000, which is a record figure for all wyds so far. According to the data from mobile operators, a total of 1,520,000 phones were active in three major mobile networks during the main wyd events in Madrid. Moreover, the wyd in Madrid had over 5,247 participants with disabilities, 841 bishops, and 14,000 priests. Pilgrims were hosted in 2,462 places (private homes, parishes, and various institutions). More than 11,000 police officers were active and 9,974 journalists accredited. The number of visits to the wyd website in Madrid exceeded 22.5 million, while the wyd profile in social media reached 400,000 users. The total TV broadcast time for the wyd from Madrid exceeded 52 hours. Another element worth noting is the involvement of volunteers in the organization of wyd. At the wyd in Madrid, over 28,000 people worked as volunteers. In Cracow, a total of 25,000 volunteers were involved. The research conducted among volunteers shows that most of them were already active in the structures of the Church, they had already participated in previous wyds, and were often involved in religious movements (Webber 2012, Rogaczewska 2016). The scale and technical challenges of organizing an international mass event meant that the wyd was widely discussed in the public discourse long before the main celebrations (Wilk 2016). Prior to the wyd in Sydney in 2008, the government’s involvement in the organization of the event was criticized (Halter 2013). The situation was similar in Poland, before the wyd in Cracow, when the cooperation between the Church and the central and local government led to a discussion of public financial support of wyd. There were also voices criticizing the various elements of the organization and challenging the ability of Polish security forces to ensure the safety of the participants. In both cases, as wyd began, critical voices disappeared from public discourse and the media focused on reporting various events in either an accepting or a neutral tone. The wyd program includes events of a strictly religious nature, as well as cultural events and even entertainment. Right from the beginning, the following elements were integral to the wyd: the Way of the Cross, an open-air vigil, and the Holy Mass at the end. Beginning with the wyd in Buenos Aires (1987) and Santiago de Compostela (1989), a festival has been organized under the name of the “Youth Festival”. Starting from the wyd in Paris (1997), the Youth Festival took the form of the so-called “Days in Dioceses”, largely based on the partnership between various Catholic dioceses. The “Days in Dioceses” are organized before wyd in the dioceses of the host country except the diocese which is the main organizer. The participants enjoy a choice of the diocese they wish

206

Mandes and Sadłoń

to visit. During that time, they have the opportunity to get acquainted with the local culture and with the hosts welcoming them in their homes. The dioceses organize concerts, exhibitions, and sightseeing tours for the participants. Beginning with the wyd in Santiago de Compostela (1989), bishops from various countries began to preach during wyd for the first time. Additionally, in 2008 (Sydney) an opportunity was offered for those who did not come to wyd to take part in those teachings online. Since the wyd in Rome (2000), special zones have been organized for young people who want to go to confession. Starting with the wyd in Denver (1993), in collaboration with the Vatican Museum, exhibitions designed as “visual catechesis” have been held. In Cologne (2005), the Eucharistic adoration was organized for the first time and then became a regular part of subsequent wyds. Since 2002, i.e. the meeting of youth in Toronto, a vocation centre has been active during wyd, aiming to promote the priestly and monastic vocations among young people. In addition, the wyd program includes unique attractions related to the special characteristics of the host city. In Cologne, pilgrims worshiped the relics of the Three Kings. In Rome (in 2000), they passed through the Holy Door in St. Peter’s Basilica, and in Cracow pilgrims visited the tomb of St. Faustyna Kowalska. The organizer of the subsequent wyd is announced at the end of the previous wyd. From that moment onwards, the country chosen to host the wyd undertakes organizational as well as strictly religious preparations. One element of this process is the so-called peregrination of the cross—the official wyd symbol—combined with prayers in youth ministry centres and meetings with wyd organizers. The duration of wyds depends primarily on the program of the Days in the Dioceses, and may last from two days (as in Buenos Aires in 1987) to six days (Madrid 2011). We will describe the wyd program in more detail using the example of the recent wyd in Cracow. It is estimated that about one million people were involved in wyd preparations throughout Poland. This figure includes, for example, Poles hosting young people in their homes. During wyd, each Polish diocese adopted a name associated with the main theme of the wyd, i.e. the Divine Mercy. Symbolically, the organizers called the whole of Poland “the Camp of Mercy”—Campus Misericordiae. Registration for the “Days in Dioceses” took place directly in individual dioceses, and was coordinated by the specially appointed diocesan coordinating teams. A total of 115,000 pilgrims from 135 countries of the world participated in the Days in Dioceses in Poland in 2016. In connection with the wyd theme, in addition to visiting museums and participating in concerts, they also visited the elderly, the sick, former residents of children’s homes and prisoners. Days in Dioceses ended with the socalled “Mass of Sending”, celebrated by bishops in all dioceses of Poland.

Religion in a Globalized Culture

207

The central wyd celebration began in the Błonia part of Cracow on July 26, 2016 with the Opening Mass, celebrated by Cardinal Stanisław Dziwisz. The next day, Pope Francis arrived in Cracow. The young people primarily participated in catechesis at that time. There were about 1,000 catecheses delivered during the Cracow wyd. In the evening, the Pope appeared in the “papal ­window” of the Palace of Cracow Bishops, where John Paul ii had repeatedly appeared and spoken from. During his speech, the Pope mentioned one wyd volunteer, Maciej Szymon Cieśla, who developed the elements of graphic design for the wyd and died shortly before the event started. On Thursday, July 28, the Pope met with young people in Błonia. About 600,000 people participated in the event. On Friday, the Pope visited the concentration camp in Auschwitz, and participated with the youth in the Way of the Cross in the evening. On Saturday, July 30, the Pope visited the Sanctuary of Divine Mercy in Łagiewniki, where he heard confession from eight young people. Then he met seminarians and consecrated persons and had lunch with young pilgrims from all continents. On that night, a prayer vigil was also held. The next day, the “Mass of Sending” was celebrated near Cracow. The wyd program confirms the claim made by Alex Norman and Mark Johnson (2011) about the key role of the Pope in constructing the meaning of wyd. However, this does not necessarily testify, as A. Norman and M. Johnson claim (2011: 381), to the “postmodern understanding of pilgrimage” resulting from the “shift of the notion of sacred locale from the geographically established and historically accrued to the mobile within an ecclesial hierarchy”. It is not unusual for Catholics to make pilgrimages to the current place of residence of a charismatic person. The ritual of peregrination of images or relics is also a typical element of Catholic piety. Andreas Hepp and Veronika Krönert (2008, 2009) take a different view of the role of the Pope. Referring to Ulrich Beck’s theory of the meditation of religion, they describe the Pope as “the brand” of the Church. From this point of view, wyd is an event that is wrapped in the means of communication adopted from modern marketing, and the Pope acts as a logo that can bring the meaning of the whole event to a simple message about a meeting with the head of the Church. The Pope logo plays a role of a bridge between the sacred and the secular elements of wyd. Therefore, in opposition to Norman and Johnson, Hepp and Krönert believe that the presence of the Pope gives the event a popular character and enables the inclusion of various commercial elements in the religious event. The interpretation by Hepp and Krönert is partially supported by content analysis of the press coverage confirming that mass media is centred on the Pope’s arrival and his activities (Klenk 2008; Temmerman, Trioen 2009;

208

Mandes and Sadłoń

Wilk 2016). The significance of the Pope’s presence is also confirmed by the research conducted among wyd participants in Sydney and Cracow, which shows that the meeting with the Pope is one of the most important motivations for taking part in wyd (Singleton 2008; Mandes 2016). Both interpretations overlook the fact that the Pope-centrism of the wyd stems primarily from the fact that he is the initiator of the whole event and that he invites young people to meet him. The moving locations are a way to reach as many young people from different continents as possible. Thus, the Pope is the host of the meeting who meets the invited participants halfway. The wyd program is designed in such a way that individual events prepare young people for the meeting with the Pope, and during that meeting he communicates the main idea of the encounter and evangelizes them. During wyd, young people have the opportunity to be introduced to a selected aspect of religious experience by the successor of St. Peter. This is in line with the concept of the new evangelization, which makes the successor of St. Peter mainly responsible for its implementation (Ang 2008; Rymarz 2010). From a wider perspective, the Pope-centrism of wyd is another manifestation of centralization in the Catholic Church, taking place at least since the second half of the 19th century (Chadwick 2009; Turina 2015). Organizational and charismatic power has been increasingly concentrated in the Pope’s hands. The meeting of young people with the Pope is therefore a way to introduce them to the organizational order of the Catholic Church, and to familiarize them with the Pope as a central figure in the hierarchy of the Church. The structure of the program is clear: first, young people are organized by priests and nuns into groups in parishes. During the diocesan days and at the beginning of wyd, they participate in masses and catechesis conducted by bishops. Only after this is the role of teacher taken over by the Pope. For young people, meeting the Pope is about encountering the head of the Church and having a spiritual experience. 2

Historical Background and Institutional Origins

John Paul ii himself pointed out, “No one invented World Youth Days. Young people created them” (John Paul ii, Messori, 1994: 124). The idea of organizing World Youth Day first emerged in 1983 at the congress of the Italian Catholic Action, and was articulated by Bishop Paul Cordes, then secretary of the Pontifical Council for the Laity (Bedeschi 2016). However, the role of John Paul ii in the organization of World Youth Day is crucial. John Paul ii, and earlier Karol Wojtyła, had a wealth of experience of working and being in touch with youth.

Religion in a Globalized Culture

209

During his studies in Rome, Karol Wojtyla had contact with Joseph Cardijn, the founder of the World Christian Workers, a youth organization (John Paul ii 1997). Then in Cracow, he worked at a youth ministry centre at the church of St. Florian. As a bishop of Cracow, Karol Wojtyła was also involved in the creation of an innovative movement, “Light and Life” by Fr. Franciszek Blachnicki, which gathered hundreds of thousands of young people in Poland in the 1980s (Nosowska 2012). Unlike Wojtyła, many bishops distanced themselves from this movement, seeing its emotional and spontaneous piety as a form of Protestantization of Catholicism (Grabowska 1989). During the inauguration of his pontificate, Pope John Paul ii, seeing the young people gathered in St. Peter’s Square, spontaneously said: “You are the future of the world, the hope of the Church. You are my hope”. (John Paul ii, Messori, 1994: 125) Less than five years later, he founded the Centro San Lorenzo in Rome, dedicated to youth ministry in Rome. At the same time, in the same year, he announced the Jubilee Year of Redemption for the Catholic Church. At the end of this jubilee year, lasting from March 25, 1983, to April 22, 1984, John Paul ii invited young people from all over the world to Rome from April 11 to 15 for what he himself called “the Jubilee of the Youth”. The Palm Sunday was a central point of these events, symbolizing the triumphal entrance of Jesus to Jerusalem (Dziwisz, 2016: 21). The organization of the event was the responsibility of the Pontifical Council for the Laity, which invited representatives of Catholic organizations from all over the world. As one of the organizers of this event recalls, the organizing committee was visibly sceptical about the Pope’s initiative. The scepticism was primarily driven by the reluctance towards seeing the new triumphalism in the Church and the belief that young people would not be interested in participating in such an event (Bedeschi 2016). Contrary to those pessimistic expectations, about 300,000 young people came to Rome in 1984. “It was definitely a meaningful symbol clearly indicating that after the turbulent 1960s and 1970s something new was born in the world of the young: some kind of a thorough change of attitudes to life, faith and the Church” (Ryłko 2016: 29). At the end of the Jubilee Year, in 1984, John Paul ii handed over a wooden cross to the young people—it was the cross that had been brought by young people to St. Peter’s Basilica on their own initiative at the opening of the Jubilee Year. The cross became the symbol of World Youth Day. Already at that time, John Paul ii had decided to organize the same event in the following year, coinciding with the International Youth Year announced for 1985 by the United Nations. The Pope also issued a special letter to unesco on the occasion of the International Youth Year, where he expressed his appreciation for contemporary youth and the hope of their ability to shape the future responsibly.

210

Mandes and Sadłoń

One of the most important Italian paintings of Our Lady, the Icon of Our Lady Salus Populi Romani (Protectress of the Roman People), is the second symbol of wyd. It originated from the 6th century and was worshiped by Pope Gregory the Great during the plague in Rome. This icon first appeared during the World Youth Day in Rome in 2000.2 The initiative of John Paul ii was, however, more than just a flash of organizational innovation. The Pope from Poland began his pontificate in the period after the Second Vatican Council. It was the end of the corporate Church: a large, hierarchical organization that provided people with the possibility of living in a closed Catholic milieu from birth to death (Thung 1983; Weigel 2014). However, the search for new forms of functioning for the Church in the modern world had not produced the expected outcomes. On the contrary, churches became ever more deserted and the faithful were aging (Gannon 1988). The fundamental problem did not lie in open rejection of the Church or in hostile atheism, but in weakening bonds with the Church, manifested through ever less frequent participation in Mass, the growing acceptance of attitudes, morals, and behaviours rejected by the Church, the spread of belief in the private nature of faith, and, what is important from our point of view, failure to attach importance to the religious socialization of successive generations. Europeans, who rarely participated in religious rites, still preserved their Catholic identity, but there were many signs indicating that the next generation would be deprived of the knowledge of basic religious symbols or access to religious experience. These were not completely new phenomena, yet their scale in the 1970s began to endanger the existence of the Church in many European countries. The program of the New Evangelization was a response to those challenges (Boguslawski and Martin 2008). The basic framework of the New Evangelization program was formulated by Paul vi in his apostolic exhortation “Evangelii Nuntiandi”, then repeated and further developed in the “Redemptoris Missio” encyclical of 1990. Both these documents, together with a number of others, contain a diagnosis of secularization and call for a renewed evangelization of Europeans, who are Catholics in name only. Since that time, the New Evangelization was quickly becoming popular in pastoral theology and in the official teaching of the Catholic Church (Pawlina 1995). According to the documents of the Catholic Church, the New Evangelization is a missionary activity addressed to individuals and groups in traditionally Christian societies which are deeply secularized (John 2 However, the youth meetings organized in Rome in 1984 and 1985 are not considered to be the first wyd. The first World Youth Day ever is the one organized in Catholic dioceses around the world in 1986. The first global wyd was held in Buenos Aires in 1987.

Religion in a Globalized Culture

211

Paul ii: 33). The New Evangelization refers to the traditional Christian mission but includes new “ardour, methods, and expression” (Szlachetka 2011: 63) . wyd is part of the New Evangelization program addressed to young people (Rymarz 2005). The challenge was, among others, to find new ways to communicate with young people. As had already happened many times in the past, the Catholic Church reached out to the media (like cinema, radio, or TV) and symbols already existing in secular culture, associating them with traditionally preserved forms to give them new meaning (Kappeler 2009; Biltereyst and Gennari 2015). Up till now, wyd has been organized during the summer holiday season, which coincides with the time of many pilgrimages. The organization of wyd in the summer has obvious practical advantages (the possibility of planning large outdoor events, the summer school break), but, more importantly, it is a part of religious socialization: it introduces the practice of spending leisure time in a way that is geared towards religious experience. This is indicated in the definition of wyd as “a pilgrimage event” (Norman, Johnson 2011, Rymarz 2007a). In official documents, the participants are referred to as pilgrims, and the trip to the wyd location is referred to as a pilgrimage. On the one hand, this is a way to make wyd part of a centuries-old tradition of pilgrimages and to introduce young people into one of the key forms of religious practices. On the other hand, a pilgrimage is a form of leisure and a kind of tourism (Nolan, Nolan 1992), which enables young people to achieve important values, such as seeing new places and meeting new people. As Alex Norman and Mark Johnson (2011) point out, wyds are quite an unusual kind of pilgrimage: firstly, the pilgrims go to a different place each time, and this place is not a usual pilgrimage destination. Secondly, the pilgrimage and the local events are not accompanied by any spectacular miracles that would attract the attention of most participants. Therefore, this is not so much a pilgrimage to a specific place, but to the Pope. And only the act of meeting between young people and the Pope gives the sacred character to the meeting place. This is enhanced by the carefully prepared, extensive wyd program that has evolved over the years. 3

Participants and Impact of wyd

The survey data collected during three wyds reveal a fairly consistent picture (Mason 2010, Mandes 2016). wyd participants are mainly young people attending secondary schools or just starting college. The average age of participants at the wyd in Sydney was 21. The average age of wyd participants in Cracow was

212

Mandes and Sadłoń

18.1, with the median at 16. Women represent the majority of the participants: in Sydney, they constituted about 69%, with about 66% in Cracow. The average age for women was 17.5 and the median was 15. The average age for men was slightly higher: 19.3, with a median of 17. The online survey prepared by the Australian researchers and partly repeated by the Polish team contained a series of questions on religious practices and acceptance of the truths of faith. The analysis of the results of both studies revealed a very high intensity of religious practices. The data from the wyd survey in Cracow, covering representatives of different nations, showed, for example, that 97% of Polish participants attended Mass on Sundays or more often (N = 3093), the respective figure for Italians was 89% (N = 1627), with 72% for the French (N = 994). Both surveys also showed a very high level of acceptance of the truths of faith. These data provide important information on the nature of wyds: they are attended by the elite of young Catholics. This primarily results from the participant recruitment rules. Officially, the organizers invite all young people to wyd, including non-Catholics. In practice, however, participation is available through groups organized by local parishes, especially for international participants. There is no promotional campaign encouraging non-Catholics to participate. As a result, participants who are officially registered are already involved with the Church in some way. Many are members of religious movements, members of the altar service or young people centred around a local charismatic leader. Individual or unregistered participation in the wyd is possible, but requires considerable organizational effort, primarily associated with travel and accommodation. In addition, unregistered people have difficulty accessing the main wyd events. Data on the economic status of the participants shows that those are young people, mostly coming from the middle class, which can be, in part, explained by the fact that participation in wyd involves travel expenses and participation fees. Contrary to appearances, young people taking part in wyd form a diverse group. Data from three wyds collected through in-depth interviews shows that the acceptance of individual truths of faith among young people is often associated with various reservations, or is full of doubts about specific elements of Catholic doctrine. This is even more evident in statements concerning the hierarchical Church and manifested, above all, in the opposition between the hierarchical organization and authentic, living religiosity. Direct, authentic religious experience is portrayed as something that is hampered by the established order of the Church represented by bishops and hierarchical relationships. However, it must be emphasized that the distance towards bishops or priests does not extend to the Pope, who is perceived as one of the sources of authentic religiousness.

Religion in a Globalized Culture

213

The image of diversity among Catholic youth is supplemented in an interesting way by German researchers conducting participant observation at the wyd in Cologne (Hepp et al. 2007). They noticed generational diversification in that young participants, aged 15–18, showed their joy of participation, were spontaneous and cheerful. Older participants, however, were more withdrawn and calm. In the opinion of the German researchers, the differentiation of expressiveness can also be seen among groups representing traditionalist trends and groups originating in charismatic movements. This diversity manifests itself not only in emotional expressiveness (young people from charismatic movements tend to be more spontaneous) but also in clothing, symbols, and even the songs they sing. The breakdown, however, applies to about a quarter of the participants, whereas others are not directly associated with any specific movements. Since the very beginning, wyd has been surrounded by questions about its effects. The questions were primarily asked in the context of the New Evangelization project, exploring the direction and sustainability of the changed attitudes (Rymasz 2007a, b, 2008). Other elements studied included the impact of wyd on the image of the Church in public discourse, and the changes to the ongoing activities of the Church brought about by the organizational effort put into preparing wyd. The list of various initiatives that sprang from wyd is long. After the event in Rome on the occasion of the jubilee of the year 2000, the first wyd in the 21st century took place in Toronto in 2002. It attracted a few hundred thousand participants representing 172 countries. The fruit of this event was the emergence of a Catholic television station in Canada in 2003 under the name of “Salt and Light TV”. Following the wyd in Cologne in 2005, an increase in the number of priestly vocations was observed (Metzlaff 2016: 94). The number of people taking part in the wyd from the country where the previous wyd was organized is clearly higher. The German organizers of the wyd in Cologne tried to leverage the mobilization around the wyd and to initiate a new youth movement through the Youth Pastoral Center. As Paul Metzlaff points out, these topdown initiatives failed to produce sustainable results. Only the spontaneous initiative by two young people called “wyd Goes On”, which later evolved into “Nightfever”, turned out to be more permanent and spread to all German dioceses. Nightfever is organized by various types of youth religious communities in the darkened churches of large cities. Traditional Catholic prayers take place during this celebration. Over three thousand such initiatives have taken place to date. In many countries, the organization of wyd explicitly addressed the issue of religion in the public space. The wyd organizers in Cologne considered that

214

Mandes and Sadłoń

the important outcome of wyd was that “wyd 2005 has helped re-establish the Church and religion as an acceptable topic in all kinds of forums” (Metzlaff 2016). Similar conclusions about impact on image were expressed by Nicholas Halter, who stated that the wyd 2008 “showed that the Catholic Church was very capable of negotiating the Australian public sphere, and successfully marketed and energized an inclusive brand of Catholicism to the broader public”. (2012, 261). In the case of the wyd in Cracow, it is difficult to talk about any great breakthrough as a result of wyd, but this is primarily connected with the fact that the public position of the Church in Poland is strong. In addition, the organization of that wyd was, to some extent, overshadowed by the nato Summit held on July 8–9, 2016. The internet survey data3 from the Cracow wyd show that there was a growing acceptance among the wyd participants in Cracow of the authority of the Church and of the belief that Catholicism holds the truth. In the former case, the proportion of people who strongly agree with the statement “The Pope and the bishops have the authority to indicate to Catholics what they should believe and do in order to be in harmony with the teachings of Jesus” increased by 8.4%. The flow mostly came from the group of respondents who did not agree or disagree with this statement before wyd: the share of such people decreased by 5.1%. On the other hand, some minimal changes occurred in the group of people who disagreed strongly or tended to disagree with this view. Very similar results were obtained in the case of the second question, i.e. the acceptance of the claim that “Catholicism contains more of the truth than other religions”. The percentage of people who strongly agreed with this statement increased by 8.7%. This was mainly thanks to those who were previously undecided: the share of this group dropped by 5.3%. These results can be interpreted as the effect of participation in wyd, which encouraged some previously undecided respondents to accept the authority of the Church hierarchy. We also asked the respondents about their attitude towards the following statement: “You can choose your religious beliefs without having to accept all the basic teachings of your religion”. Before wyd, 75% of the participants disagreed strongly or tended to disagree with this statement, whereas after wyd this percentage declined by 2.2%, but the percentage of people without a strong opinion increased by 2.6%. This result shows that wyd had hardly any effect on the respondents’ opinions on this matter. 3 The methodology was developed by the Australian researchers, and with some changes was repeated in the Polish study. An internet survey was conducted before and after wyd in order to track the degree and scale of change in the same group of participants. We present selected findings from the Polish survey. They are largely consistent with the results concerning the wyd in Sydney.

Religion in a Globalized Culture

215

The second question concerned morality. We asked our respondents to express their view on the statement that “There are no definite rules ever established to distinguish between good and evil. What is good and what is evil depends entirely on the situation at the particular moment”. Answers to this question before and after wyd varied. Before the wyd, 63% strongly disagreed or tended to disagree with this opinion, whereas after wyd this percentage decreased to 55%. On the other hand, the acceptance for contextual morality increased from 24% to 29%. There was also an increase in the number of people having no firm opinion on the matter. In the third question, we asked whether or not it was appropriate to judge another person on the basis of their religion. Both before and after wyd, most respondents agreed or tended to agree that “The only thing that counts when evaluating a person is how they live; It does not matter at all if someone is Catholic or not”. After wyd, there was an increase in the number of such people from 56% to 60%. The change observed at the level of the total sample is small. This is primarily due to the fact that the initial percentages were already high at the outset, which means that before coming to Cracow, the majority of young people accepted the authority of the Church. As shown in an analysis by Andrew Singleton and confirmed in data collected at the wyd in Cracow, the change occurs primarily among people with moderate levels of religious practices (see Singleton 2011). This result is consistent with the theory of attitudes, whereby the greatest change occurs among people with moderate opinions. With respect to wyd participants, this result also shows that participation in wyd helps to make the attitudes held among moderately religious young people conform to the adopted model. On the other hand, the impact on people with ambiguous opinions is small. As Singleton (2011: 67) summarizes these findings: wyd is an event has the capacity to produce increases in religious practice, particularly among those with a moderate pre-wyd base of religiosity. It provides a context in which the particular combination of encouragement, religious instruction, community and religious experiences can motivate already religious youth to increase their religious practice. wyd is perhaps best understood as a time of consolidation and encouragement, rather than effective evangelization to marginal or nominal Catholics. wyd builds on and strengthens existing religious commitments. Qualitative research complements the picture obtained from the survey and shows that young people leave wyd primarily with the experience of community. Participation in wyd is a great opportunity for young people to experience a community of views and sensitivities together with their peers from other

216

Mandes and Sadłoń

countries. They have the opportunity “to experience religion in a completely new way” (Hepp et al. 2007: 19) and to become part of the “total community experience [our translation]” (totales Gemeinschaftserlebnis). The German researchers who studied the impact of wyd see it primarily in the hybrid nature of the events, combining secular elements with religious ones. This is also how they explain the emotional participation of young people in the events and the emotional nature of the emergent community. Hybrid events par excellence should thus be called event-shaped equivalents of experience-oriented moral communities or morally charged experiential communities. Accordingly, religious hybrid events imply event-shaped correlations of experience-oriented religious communities or experiential communities with a religious affinity. (Hitzler, Pfadenhauer 2007: 53–54). [our translation] The same aspect is pointed out by Rymarz (2005: 487) in a slightly different way: Participation in wyd is intended to provide youth with a heightened sense of religiosity by providing a peak religious experience of the universality and strength of the Catholic tradition. It is anticipated that youth will develop their spirituality by sharing their experiences with disparate groups of similar ages, all within the atmosphere of communal expression of religious faith. [our translation] Therefore, the direct outcome of wyd is to create a sense of community among the elite of young Catholics who, by participating in the events and in the meeting with the Pope, reinforce their identity. This is especially true for Catholics coming from countries where Catholicism is a minority. Thanks to their participation in wyd, they can experience a community of views and experiences of being with other young Catholics who have identical views. This experience is equally important for young people from Catholic countries, since it confirms that their attachment to religion in a secularized environment turns them into members of an elite group of deeply religious young people. However, the question of the long-term impact of wyd is a separate issue. Unfortunately, there is no research on this issue and we need to rely on researchers’ judgements. Hervieu-Léger (1994) believes that the impact is weak and the emotional experience of community fades away once young people return to their homes and networks. Interestingly, Charles Taylor, who relies on the work of Hervieu-Léger, has a more optimistic view of wyd and the

Religion in a Globalized Culture

217

e­ motional experience of community which it creates. He believes that this kind of experience can become the foundation for authentic, profound religiousness that will find a place in the modern world (cf. Taylor 2007: 516). German researchers also believe that wyd has a long-term impact on participants and are an effective tool for evangelization, because it roots religious practices in the well-known experience of mass culture. Mass culture formats help young people to warm up to religious experience, and introduce them into the world of Catholic symbols using a sort of a back door. However, this interpretation does not seem to recognize the fact that wyds attract young people with an above-average level of religiousness. 4 Conclusion Undoubtedly, wyds are a huge organizational success and an important innovation in the Roman Catholic Church. Organized since 1985, they regularly attract millions of young Catholics to meet the Pope, allowing them to experience a feeling of community that influences their religiosity and, above all, gives them a sense of belonging to a community of views and experiences that they can carry back to their everyday social environments, which are often indifferent to their religiousness. The meetings of young people and the Pope help to shape the image of the Church as a dynamic organization, capable of utilizing various modern techniques and attracting young people. Despite the fact that wyds are attended by an elite of the Catholic youth, the Church has managed to preserve the image of wyd as an open event, somewhat similar to the meetings in Taize. This is particularly evident when we compare wyd with papal visits to various countries, which have a strictly confessional profile. The scale of wyd celebrations with the Pope and accompanying events help to go beyond confessional boundaries and are a way for the Church to manifest its presence in public space, fully successful so far. Despite the various controversies accompanying the organization of wyd, the final course of events and the effects are presented in a positive light. wyds are not necessarily, as Rymarz (2007: 33) believes, an “exception to the privatization of religious expression”, but beyond doubt one of the most spectacular denials of the privatization of religion. It is more difficult to determine what wyd has changed in the Church itself. The experience of unity which young people have when leaving wyd is certainly conducive to building a sense of belonging to a single Church, and prevents them from closing themselves into the circle of small communities and movements within the Church. There is, however, no evidence to support

218

Mandes and Sadłoń

Lynch’s claim that the wyds are a testimony of the “re-Christianization from below carried out by the Catholic Church” (2008: 41). Despite the various attempts to institutionalize the wyd-specific means of community building, wyd has neither a large scale nor a high significance within the Church. We could not find in the literature very many examples of long-term effects of wyd, and those which we have found have very limited scope. Thus, we can say that the expectation of some commentators that wyd is an example of counter secularization are exaggerated, or premature at best. For over a dozen or so years, the wyds have already established their format and are organized without much change. The question is how much the program and resources, familiar for years, will continue to be successful in communicating with youth in a situation where the young people of today are increasingly different from the youth of the 1980s and 1990s in their experience of popular culture. This change is primarily related to the rise of the internet and social media, which are becoming a native habitat for teens. Therefore, the organizers of wyd are faced with a challenge to adapt these established measures to the new reality. References Ang, D. 2008. “What Now? Youth Ministry in the Wake of World Youth Day 2008: The Ongoing Challenge”. The Australasian Catholic Record 85(4): 403–414. Bedeschi, M., 2016. “World Youth Day. Its origins and the development of an idea, in World Youth Days. A Testimony to the Hope of Young People”. Pp. 39–46 in World Youth Days. A Testimony to the Hope of Young People, edited by Józef Stala, and Andrzej Porębski. Kraków: Pontifical University of John Paul II. Biltereyst, Daniel, and Daniela Treveri Gennari. 2015. Moralizing cinema: Film, Catholicism and power. New York: London; Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. Boguslawski, Steven C., and Ralph Martin, eds. 2008. The New Evangelization: Overcoming the Obstacles. New York: Paulist Press. Cantoni, Lorenzo Miriam Stefania, Silvia De Ascaniis. 2012. “Online Communication of the Catholic World Youth Days”. Pp. 130–144 in Reflecting on Religious Tourism and Pilgrimage, edited by Razaq R. Kevin Griffin. Arnhem: ATLAS. Chadwick, Owen. 2009. A history of the popes: 1830–1914. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. Dziwisz, Stanisław. 2016. “The ‘genesis’ of World Youth Day”. Pp. 17–25 in World Youth Days. A Testimony to the Hope of Young People, edited by Józef Stala, and Andrzej Porębski. Kraków: Pontifical University of John Paul II. Ebertz, Michael N. 2000. “Transzendenz im Augenblick. ‘Über die Eventisierung’ des Religiösen—dargestellt am Beispiel der Katholischen Weltjugendtage”. Pp. 345–362

Religion in a Globalized Culture

219

in Events: Soziologie des Außergewöhnlichen, edited by Winfried Gebhardt, Ronald Hitzler, and Michaela Pfadenhauer. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Gannon, Thomas M. 1988. World Catholicism in Transition. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company. Grabowska, Mirosława. 1989. “Odnowa religijna jako wydarzenie”. Pp. 276–298 in: Mirosława Grabowska, Tadeusz Szawiel, Religijność społeczeństwa polskiego lat 80—tych. Od pytań filozoficznych do problemów empirycznych, Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Halter, Nicholas. 2013. “The Australian Catholic Church and the Public Sphere. World Youth Day 2008”. Journal of Religious History 37(2): 261–282. Hepp, Andreas, and Veronika Krönert. 2008. Medien, Event und Religion: Der Weltjugendtag als religiöses Medienevent. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Hepp, Andreas, and Veronika Krönert. 2009. “Religious Media Events: The Catholic ‘World Youth Day’ as an Example for the Mediatisation and Individualisation of Religion”. Pp. 265–282 in Media events in a global age, edited by Nick Couldry, Andreas Hepp, and Friedrich Krotz. London: Routledge. Hepp, Andreas, Ronald Hitzler, Michaela Pfadenhauer, Ursula Engelfried-Rave, Julia Reuter, Waldemar Vogelgesang, Jörg Hunold, and Veronika Krönert. 2007. Megaparty Glaubensfest: Weltjugendtag: Erlebnis-Medien-Organisation. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Hervieu-Léger, Daniele. 1994. “Religion, Europe and the Pope: Memory and the Experience of French Youth”. Pp. 127–139 in Religion in contemporary Europe, edited by John Fulton, and Peter Gee. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press. Hitzler, Ronald, and Michaela Pfadenhauer. 2007. “Erlebnisreligion: Religiosität als Privatsache und Glauben als Event. Der Weltjugendtag 2005 in Köln”. Pp. 46–60 in Woran glauben? Religion zwischen Kulturkampf und Sinnsuche, edited by Gerd Nollmann, and Hermann Strasser. Essen: Klartext Verlag. Jackowski, Antoni and Izabela Sołjan, Elżbieta Bilska-Wodecka, Justyna Liro, Maciej Trojnar, and Edyta Kostrzewa. 2016. “World Youth Day in Kraków in the light of experience from around the world”. Pp. 137–157 in World Youth Days. A Testimony to the Hope of Young People, edited by Józef Stala, and Andrzej Porębski. Kraków: Pontifical University of John Paul II. John Paul II, Redemptoris Missio. Available at http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paulii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_07121990_redemptoris-missio.html Retrieved April 3, 2018. John Paul II. 1997. Gift and Mystery, Rockland: Wheeler Pub. John Paul II with Vittorio Messori. 1994. Crossing the Threshold of Hope, New York: Alfred Knopf. Kappeler, Warren A. 2009. Communication habits for the pilgrim church: Vatican teaching on media and society. New York: Peter Lang. Klenk, Christian. 2008. Ein deutscher Papst wird Medienstar: Benedikt XVI. und der Kölner Weltjugendtag in der Presse. Berlin: LIT.

220

Mandes and Sadłoń

Lynch, Andrew. 2008. “Social Theory, Theology, Secularization and World Youth Day”. New Zealand Sociology 23(2): 34–46. Mandes, Sławomir. 2016. Młodzi Polacy przed Światowymi Dniami Młodzieży w Krakowie. http://iskk.pl/images/stories/Instytut/dokumenty/Mandes_IDI.pdf [accessed 01 January 2018]. Mason, Michael. 2008. Method of the “Pilgrims’ Progress 2008” Research Project. https:// resource.acu.edu.au/wyd/Method_of_the_PP08_project.pdf [accessed 01 January 2018]. Mason, Michael. 2010. “World Youth Day 2008. What did we gain? What did we learn?” Australasian Catholic Record 87(3): 334–348. Metzlaff, Paul. 2016. “Pastoral and spiritual fruits of World Youth Day 2005 in Cologne”. Pp. 93–97 in World Youth Days. A Testimony to the Hope of Young People, edited by Józef Stala, and Andrzej Porębski. Kraków: Pontifical University of John Paul II. Nolan, Mary Lee and Sidney Nolan. “Religious Sites as Tourism Attractions in Europe”. Annals of Tourism Research 19.1(1992): 68–78. Norman, Alex and Mark Johnson. 2011. “World Youth Day: The Creation of a Modern Pilgrimage Event for Evangelical Intent”. Journal of Contemporary Religion 26(3): 371–385. Nosowska, Agnieszka. 2012. Oazy jako zjawisko społeczne i religijne. Rozwój ruchu i jego tożsamość, Warszawa: Warsaw University, manuscript. Pawlina, Krzysztof. 1995. Nowa ewangelizacja i jej realizacja w Polsce po 1989 roku, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sióstr Loretanek. Pfadenhauer, Michaela. 2008. Organisieren: Eine Fallstudie zum Erhandeln von Events. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Pfadenhauer, Michaela. 2010a. Marketingstrategie “Eventisierung des Glaubens—Der Katholische Weltjugendtag als innovative Antwort auf religiöse Pluralisierung”. Pp. 59–72 in Stand und Perspektiven der Eventforschung, edited by Cornelia Zanger. Wiesbaden: Gabler. Pfadenhauer, Michaela. 2010b. “The eventization of faith as a marketing strategy: World Youth Day as an innovative response of the Catholic Church to pluralization”. International Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing 15(4): 382–394. Rogaczewska, Maria. 2016. Młodzi wolontariusze podczas Dni w Diecezjach i Światowych Dni Młodzieży w 2016 roku. http://iskk.pl/images/stories/Instytut/dokumenty/­ Rogaczewska_SDM.pdf [accessed 01 January 2018]. Ryłko, Stanisław. 2016. “World Youth Day Generation”. Pp. 27–34 in World Youth Days. A Testimony to the Hope of Young People, edited by Józef Stala, and Andrzej Porębski. Kraków: Pontifical University of John Paul II. Rymarz, Richard. 2005. “World Youth Day”. Pp. 517–518 in Encyclopedia of Religious and Spiritual Development, edited by Elizabeth M. Dowling, and W.G. Scarlett. Sage Publications, Inc.

Religion in a Globalized Culture

221

Rymarz, Richard. 2007a. “Who goes to World Youth Day? Some data on under-18 Australian participants”. Journal of Beliefs & Values 28(1): 33–43. Rymarz, Richard. 2007b. “The impact of World Youth Day: A twelve-month follow-up of under-18 Australian WYD 2005 participants”. Australasian Catholic Record 84(4): 387–400. Rymarz, Richard. 2008. “WYD 2008: Some Seasoned Observations”. The Australasian Catholic Record 85(4): 464–469. Rymarz, Richard. 2010. “John Paul II and the ‘New Evangelization’: Origins and Meaning”. Australian Ejournal of Theology 15: 1–22. Singleton, Andrew. 2008. Pilgrims’ hopes and expectations for World Youth Day 2008, A paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion Louisville KY, https://resource.acu.edu.au/wyd/UPDATES/SSSR2008/081017 _AS_SSSR_paper.pdf [accessed 25 June 2017]. Singleton, Andrew. 2011. “The impact of World Youth Day on religious practice”. Journal of Beliefs & Values 32(1): 57–68. Stala, Józef. 2016. “Overview of the World Youth Day Krakow 2016”. Pp. 32–33 in: World Youth Day Cracow 2016. Selected Research Results, Warsaw: National Centre for Culture. Szlachetka, Waldemar. 2011. Fenomen szkół nowej ewangelizacji, Kraków: Nomos. Taylor, Charles. 2007. A secular age. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press. Temmerman, Martina, and Marit Trioen. 2009. “Idolatry versus authenticity: A lexical and systemic-functional analysis of the coverage of the World Youth Day 2005 in the Flemish press”. Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research 2(3): 183–201. Thung, A. Mady. 1983. “From pillarization to new religious pluralism”. Social Compass 30: 503–524. Trinitapoli, Jenny, and Stephen Vaisey. 2009. “The Transformative Role of Religious Experience: The Case of Short-Term Missions”. Social Forces 88(1): 121–146. Turina, Isacco. 2015. “Centralized Globalization: The Holy See and Human Mobility since World War II”. Critical Research on Religion 3(2): 189–205. Vogelgesang, Waldemar. 2008. “Symbiotische Religiosität: Die Jugend-und medienkulturelle Rahmung religiöser Erfahrung auf dem XX. Weltjugendtag 2005 in Köln”. Pp. 175–191 in Medienkultur und soziales Handeln, edited by Tanja Thomas. Wiesbaden: VS, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Webber, Ruth. 2012. “Exploring volunteering of committed young Catholics”. Journal of Beliefs & Values 33(1): 71–82. Weigel, George. 2014. Evangelical Catholicism: Deep Reform in the 21st-Century Church. New York: Basic Books. Wilk, Wojciech. 2016. “Reception in Foreign Media”. Pp. 75–77 in World Youth Day Cracow 2016. Selected Research Results, Warsaw: National Centre for Culture. http://iskk .pl/images/stories/Instytut/dokumenty/WYD_Cracow_2016.pdf.

Chapter 11

The Joy of Dialogue in an Intercultural World: Educational Implications from Evangelii Gaudium Graham P. McDonough Pope Francis’s exhortation Evangelii Gaudium (2013)1 opens a remarkably new perspective on religious interculturalism within Catholic teaching on interfaith and interreligious dialogue. It signals his leading the Church away from: (1) any remaining pre-Vatican ii hope for institutional Christian reunification; (2) the thin emphasis that Vatican ii’s documents Declaration on Relations with Non-Christian Religions (1965)2 and Decree on Ecumenism (1964)3 place on similarities across religions; and (3) John Paul ii’s (1990) and Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger’s (cdf 2000)4 post-conciliar reassertions of Catholic-centrism. In my interpretation, Francis conceives of a kind of secular space as the meeting place and “common language” among a plurality of religious traditions (McLeod 2000: 13), each presenting itself to Others in their fullest existential being. Moreover, as it steps away from past Catholic teaching that perceived religious Others in comparative deficit to Catholicism, it likewise abandons a narrow conception of dialogue that functions as a strategic means to procuring converts, and replaces it with a conception that instead promotes flourishing interreligious plurality. Since Francis imagines this plurality as an intercultural space whose purpose is to design and continuously revise a public sphere through the integration of several religious traditions, if the Church receives EG with vigour it may lead to a re-thinking of what it means to be a Catholic Church, person, and educational institution in a religiously diverse world. EG only mentions “school” and “education” in very broad strokes, and certainly makes no practical prescriptions about teaching or administering in a Catholic school or university. However, like all Catholic teaching, it still has implications for education and schooling, because the authorization to govern is also the authorization to teach and determine what is taught. For example, Michael Chambers observes that “a pluralist approach to Catholic schooling” 1 Hereinafter EG. 2 Also known by its Latin title Nostra Aetate: Herinafter NA. 3 Unitatis Redintegratio: Hereinafter UR. 4 In 2005 Ratzinger ascended to the papacy as Benedict xvi, and reigned until his resignation took effect in 2013. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004380073_013

The Joy of Dialogue in an Intercultural World

223

in Vatican ii’s Declaration on Christian Education is heavily dependent upon a prior, foundational pluralist ecclesiology in the Council’s Dogmatic Constitution on the Church that gives “primacy [to] the local Church” (2012: 190). Likewise, any defensive and exclusivist postures in Catholic education and schooling are grounded in defensively oriented papal documents (2012: 189, 191), while ecumenical and inclusive postures are likewise congruent with Vatican ii’s Declaration on Religious Freedom, UR (2012: 191–192), and NA (2012: 195). Seen in this way, the socio-religious aims of a magisterial document like EG inform the institutions and relationships of Catholic Education. When EG directs Catholic persons and institutions to consider themselves in a dialogic relationship with non-Catholic and non-Christian persons, it no less challenges Catholic educators to revisit how they think about engaging those they serve. Finally, EG is also remarkable for showing how Francis moves a papal teaching toward congruence with what institutional life already looks like in Catholic schools, rather than issuing a directive that mandates compliance. This case thus shows an instance where the distinction between magisterial teaching church and lay learning church collapses. This interpretation of EG thus shows how EG is an example of Francis’ approach to ecclesiology, within which Catholic schools can be thought of as the Church that teaches and learns, rather than simply being an arm that does what the head commands. 1

Why Should Sociologists of Religious Education Attend to Theological Discussions?

It is of interest for sociologists of religion and of education to know not only the general theoretical discussions of concepts like interculturalism, but also how the religious institutions they are working with define and enact these concepts for themselves and in their own contexts. The imperative of knowing these particular conceptions thus has immediate methodological importance when doing research about and in institutions of religious education (including, but not limited to schools), especially the importance of not bringing preconceptions about a group into any research about or with them. It would be inaccurate and unfair, for example, for an imagined religious outsider to characterize contemporary Catholic groups using caricatures based on preVatican ii Catholicism.5 Simultaneously, it would be intellectually lazy for a religious insider to accept magisterial documents as the last word about these 5 For example, Walter Feinberg observes that in the present day, the “commonly expressed [concern]” that “religious schools … shortchange critical thinking and autonomy” remains based on “the stereotypical Catholic parochial school of the 1800s and early 1900s” (2006: 45).

224

McDonough

same concepts or as an accurate descriptive reflection of lived Catholic life—­ especially in all contexts. So how does this chapter contribute to the sociology of religious education? It follows that if an institution like the Catholic Church holds (A) a particular normative theological conception of religious pluralism, it will translate that into (B) its political structure of governance, which will then influence (C) lived institutional life in the school (or equivalent). An example of this phenomenon can be found in the Ontario Catholic School Trustees’ resistances to same-sex dance partners at school dances, and to Gay-Straight Alliances, which prevailed between 2002 and 2012 (McDonough 2016: 160–161). Or, from a perspective that reverses that model of institutional primacy, if a particular community of Catholics holds a belief or ideological orientation that informs its (C) lived institutional life, then it will likely structure (B) its local governance according to it and hence present a contribution within (A) the range of views within the whole Church—although not necessarily completely congruent with its normative teaching. An example of this phenomenon is the Liberation Theology movement in Latin America in the second half of the 20th century. The sociologist need not accept these models exactly as presented, but should appreciate their instructive value for demonstrating that any social theorist or researcher is well served to know how religious groups contextually situate and enact concepts like pluralism and interculturalism within their thinking and institutions. Taken together, these methodological considerations point to a conclusion that the greater the degree a social researcher appreciates and applies this kind of conceptual awareness from related fields like theology and political philosophy, the richer their own work will be for its accuracy, trustworthiness, and sensitive relatability. 2

What is Interculturalism?

Interculturalism is one of many political theories that respond to the fact of diversity within a society. According to Maxwell et al.: … the central distinguishing feature of interculturalism is its elaboration of a paradigm for integrating citizens from diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds into an open-ended, ongoing project of collectively defining the public culture of a nation—a project based on dialogue, intercultural engagement, and inclusiveness (2012: 430). It posits a thick stance on social integration that calls for persons and groups to present strong, undiluted forms of their culture to the public sphere, such that

The Joy of Dialogue in an Intercultural World

225

when they “connect through roots and also encounters” (Bouchard 2011: 446) they avoid superficially trivializing difference. Interculturalism presents an advantageous alternative to not only the absolutism of assimilationist views, but also the relativism of some forms of multiculturalism: In Multiculturalism, the pursuit of integration and diversity management capitalizes on the promotion and valorization of cultural diversity as a political end in itself. By contrast, Interculturalism regards the integration of new citizens as part of a dynamic, open-ended process of transforming a common societal culture through dialogue, mutual understanding, and intercultural contact. maxwell et al. 2012: 432; cf. bouchard: 462.

Like any political ideology, interculturalism does not come into practical being simply because everyone agrees on its theoretical merits. Intertwining cultural roots and propagating contrapuntal branches requires work, and so the theoretical concept and practical mechanism for this task is dialogue. In concrete terms, intercultural dialogue follows an existential path that allows that each member to participate in creating a new society, with the expectation that this creation honours both the participants’ authentic selves and their collectively created new society. As a constituent feature of interculturalism: Dialogue refers to … the process of constructing a common political culture [that] takes place through encounter, democratic interaction, and cultural exchange among citizens of various cultural origins and values perspectives. In this respect, all sectors of society are encouraged to participate in this collective project. In contrast with Multiculturalism, which seems to promote diversity as an inherent social value, Interculturalism considers the acceptance of difference, mutual respect, and cultural rapprochement to be conditions facilitating convergence toward a common societal culture maxwell et al.: 433, emphasis original.

A final salient feature of interculturalism is its recognition of sociological asymmetry, or the fact that there is an established majority culture in a political unit, and that this de facto status supports its claim to precedence in some areas (Bouchard 2011: 451–460). This means recognizing “that in the process of political dialogue, the values, beliefs, and practices that immigrants bring with them and those of the dominant cultural space into which they have moved do not carry equal weight” (Maxwell et al.: 433). Bouchard observes that there

226

McDonough

is “no idea of a majority culture in multiculturalism” (465): a feature that some theorists argue simply opens the door for the dominant group in a multicultural society to assert its dominance covertly.6 But in terms of the intercultural civic relationship between established cultures and recent immigrants, Maxwell et al. state that: Newcomers are responsible for integrating and adapting, while established citizens have the responsibility of welcoming and accepting newcomers by (among other things) learning about and engaging with their cultures and adjusting their practices in order to facilitate social inclusion. The ideal is of a balanced but asymmetrical give-and-take of adjustment, exchanges, and compromise between the home society and those of new arrivals (434). A significant point on which integration differs substantively from assimilation is, therefore, that both the “established” and the “recent” populations are expected to transform through the process of intercultural dialogue. Alongside recognizing interculturalism’s features and purported advantages, it is important to be cautious when transposing it—or any concept—from political theory into a religious context. Political interculturalism often brings assumptions of a sovereign entity like a state or province to talk of its realization; so, its references to building a society, or of giving historical precedence to the founding majority culture, thus entail some jurisdictional boundary and host group. In this sense, one can say that the transposition is smooth where the theological, cultural, juridical (and so forth) reference for the institution is Catholic. A Catholic school can claim precedence for Catholic teaching, curriculum, observances, rituals, etc. in its response to non-Catholics and nonChristians, because its institutional scope is sufficiently analogous to that of a sovereign state; and depending on context, Catholic students may be in the majority (although this is neither necessary nor always true). However, everything changes when considering the relationship of the whole Church in dialogue with other religions and Christian denominations, because that encounter occurs on a level that is far away from any idea of jurisdiction or sovereignty, and knows no precedence of an established majority since everyone is a new arrival to it.

6 See Boyd (1996 and 2010) for arguments that dominant groups maintain their status using political stances that waver between relativism and universalism (1996) or that simply assert that superficial commonalities trump deeply rooted particularities (2010).

The Joy of Dialogue in an Intercultural World

3

227

Intercultural Innovations in the Theory and Practice of Catholic Education

Insofar as multiculturalism and its various passive and active forms remain prevalent in both the theory and practice of education, intercultural approaches are a current and ongoing innovation. Intercultural education requires a commitment to rigorously work to build “the competence to address varied cultural forces, by learning from diverse cultures and by acknowledging the complexities of cultural interchange” (Hajisoteriou and Angiledes 2016: 52). It contrasts sharply, both in conceptual terms and work required to enact it, from passive approaches to multicultural education. There are more active approaches to multicultural education that involve a greater practical commitment to working for social change (Hajisoteriou and Angiledes 2016: 48–51; cf. Banks 2006), and that contrast less sharply as a result, but even these still “[fall] short in clarifying the complex interrelationships between culture, class, and gender” and in terms of “[placing] immigrant students in a culture which is broader than the group-specific cultures of their groups” (Hajisoteriou and Angiledes 2016: 52). As a unique approach to diversity management that promises a preferable alternative to multicultural education, intercultural education offers richer inter-group contact as a significant enactment of this commitment. Roger Austin, Angela Rickard, and Jacqueline Reilly (2017) show how these intergroup experiences follow from Gordon Allport’s (1954) contact theory, and argue that while contact is necessary and important, it is nonetheless an insufficient condition for intercultural education to succeed (Austin et al. 2017: 323). They make this qualified claim on the basis that proper interculturalism quantitatively involves a long-term and cooperative commitment among all involved, as opposed to a short-term and competitive orientation (2017: 327), and qualitatively attention must also be paid to “the nature of the contact” (2017: 327) as opposed to its unmodified presence, as an essential condition. From a perspective informed by the history of Catholic theology, Kathleen Engebretson ­pursues the details of what constitutes a desirable kind of interfaith contact. Following her work, triumphalist beliefs about one’s own religion and patronizing approaches to Other’s beliefs have no place in genuine intercultural dialogue (2012: 52–53), but one can still hold firmly to their particular commitments as long as they do not slip into an exclusivist trap that obstructs reception and appreciation of the Other (2012: 59–60). Tim McCowan describes a particular program of interfaith education among students from religious and government schools in Australia called the Building Bridges through Interfaith Dialogue in Schools Programme (bbp). McCowan

228

McDonough

understands the bpp as an intercultural effort, since it situates its approach to interfaith education as “an interactive, participatory process through which people learn about and learn from a diversity of religions and faiths, including those of Indigenous peoples” with the “intent of developing a religious self with understanding of different religious traditions through participation in dialogue between adherents of those diverse traditions” (McCowan 2017: 270). This description notably contains the substance of interculturalism because it relies on contact among religious Others in a secular meeting space for the purposes of enriched mutual understanding through dialogue. Damian Breen describes a conceptually similar, although contextually distinct, institutional approach at a school in England that has adopted a responsive “approach to engaging with cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity” (2009: 106). He introduces a Catholic primary school in Leicester, England, that is situated within “a large South Asian predominantly Muslim community of Indian Gujarati descent, with a smaller number of Hindu and Sikh families” (2009: 103), and proceeds to show how it directly “[challenges] the notion that faith schools are socially divisive” by “[engaging] its surroundings (i.e. other schools, local communities, etc.) which are not characterized by the faith of the school as a means of promoting dialogue” (2009: 104). Part of the theoretical framework that supports responsiveness is “Jackson’s (2003) argument that policy should support faith education which provides information about other religions, social cohesion through dialogue and communication, and the opportunity for all children to participate in debates about plurality” (Breen 2009, 105). Like the program McCowan describes, this program is congruent with interculturalism, because it aims to propagate substantive social, intellectual, and affective gains that extend far past lauding the mere presence of diverse cultures and beliefs. Both McCowan’s and Breen’s studies coordinate with Abe Ata’s conclusion (2016)—based on his study of how Muslims are perceived in Australian Catholic schools—that school policies can and should affect the sociocultural atmosphere in which good intercultural relations are formed (2016: 349–350). At the same time, though, Arweck and Penny’s empirical work (2015) is helpful as it qualifies the power of school policies by showing that no matter how promising the school’s intercultural approach may be, a student’s family remains a very significant influencer of attitudes toward one’s own religion and the beliefs of Others—followed by friends and community. Concurrently, though, they point out that no matter how powerful one’s family influence is for determining one’s beliefs in the private sphere, the school has a great influence in the public sphere in its capacity as a meeting place of diverse private experiences.

The Joy of Dialogue in an Intercultural World

229

In this way, Arweck and Penny uphold “the importance of direct contact with representatives of other faiths, as contact theory suggests” (2015: 270). 4

Historical Context

The contemporary Church’s turn toward interculturalism arrives as the latest in a sequence of Church views on interreligious difference that changed throughout the last half of the 20th century. Tridentine Catholicism taught that it was the one true Church to which all non-Catholics and non-Christians should return or convert, but the horrors of World War ii and the Shoah strongly motivated rejecting this view. This was because, as Gregory Baum observes, those events had been enabled by “religious and philosophical traditions” that were structured upon binary distinctions between “normative and deficient, the civilized and the barbarians, the chosen and non-chosen, the free and the slaves, men and women, insiders and outsiders, where respect and solidarity were restricted to people belonging to the normative sphere” (2005: 19). Consequently Vatican ii’s NA and UR documents reflect major laudatory advances in the Church’s interreligious and ecumenical outlook because they express positive views of non-Christian religions and non-Catholic Christian denominations, even if two of their notable weaknesses are their Catholic-centred expression, which elides how religious Others define themselves, and substantively thin emphasis on commonalities.7 In the post-conciliar aftermath, however, a new absolutism resurged and returned through John Paul ii’s and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s teaching. So, in order to demonstrate the sequential context into which Francis has placed EG, I will now present a brief demonstration that shows the institutional mind of the Church changing from Trent’s absolutism to a politically significant but conceptually thin pluralism at Vatican ii, and then drifting back toward a new absolutism toward the end of the 20th century. In drawing this picture, I am indebted to Baum’s 2005 book Amazing Church for the form, and some of the examples. Baum demonstrates Trent’s absolutism by quoting the prayers in its Good Friday liturgy (Baum 2005: 102; See also Boys 2013: 78). Prior to Vatican ii, ­Mass-goers would recite these texts at one of the liturgical year’s most solemn occasions, and in them one can see a Church that is intent on arrogating its ­triumphal claim to define all that is true and sacred, to the exclusion of every7 Dias states that parts of NA are naively optimistic (2016, 344).

230

McDonough

thing and everyone else. All three stanzas paternalistically and ­condescendingly ­portray religious Others in deficient states of ignorance and depravity, and the second stanza’s reference to the Jews is particularly alarming, since it would have only reinforced the commonly believed charge of deicide during the very memorial of Jesus’s crucifixion and death:8 Let us pray for heretics and schismatics. May our God and Lord save them from all errors. May he be pleased to call them back to our holy Mother the Catholic and Apostolic Church. Let us pray for the Jews. May the Lord our God tear the veil from their hearts so that they also may acknowledge our Lord Jesus Christ … May they acknowledge the light of your truth … and be brought out of all darkness. Let us pray also for the pagans. May almighty God take away the evil from their ears. May they give up their idols and be converted to the living and true God and his only Son, Jesus Christ in baum 2005: 102.

It almost needs no mention that there is no conception of interreligious dialogue, ecumenism, or secular interreligious space here. If any such space were imagined to exist, I imagine the Tridentine Fathers would simply call it a process of conversion to or reconciliation with Catholic Christianity. This absolutism crumbled at Vatican ii, which authored significant changes in its positive assessment of non-Catholic and non-Christian religious traditions. NA carries a very strong tone of emphasizing commonalities among religions and among persons as experiencers of the divine, even if only in generic terms.9 Regarding Hinduism and Buddhism, the Council writes that: “The Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these religions” (NA, No. 2); moreover, “The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems [sic]” (NA, No. 3), and concerning the Jews, “the Church … remembers the bond that spiritually ties the people of the New Covenant to Abraham’s stock,” and instructs that “the Jews should not be presented as rejected or accursed by God, 8 Boys 2013: 101; Dias 2016: 342. 9 Mary Boys observes that, in spite of all NA accomplished, its “documentary refinement and expansion … appears largely absent from the Catechism,” which “contradicts one of the most formative principles to emerge from the post-Vatican period, namely, Christians should learn how Jews define themselves” (2013: 102). The main focus of concern at the highest documentary level seems to remain on Christian characterizations of religious Others (Boys 2013: 85n52; 88; 101). Dias (2016: 344–346) also finds that NA is limited in terms of revising how Catholicism understands religious Others, while leaving untouched the topic of how they define themselves.

The Joy of Dialogue in an Intercultural World

231

as if this followed from the Holy Scriptures” (NA, No. 4). With regard to ­other Christian denominations UR is more cautiously phrased and less eager to point out similarities; nonetheless, it offers a positive outlook on ecumenism that differs from what had existed prior to the council, and the final phrase in this excerpt even foreshadows an intercultural stance by calling forth a strong view: The way and method in which the Catholic faith is expressed should ­never become an obstacle to dialogue with our brethren. It is, of course, essential that the doctrine should be clearly presented in its entirety. Nothing is so foreign to the spirit of ecumenism as a false irenicism, in which the purity of Catholic doctrine suffers loss and its genuine and certain meaning is clouded (UR, No. 11). Relationships with other religions and denominations were thus now imagined in terms that had stepped away from the pre-conciliar absolutism.10 This change opened a new question, though, about exactly how to relate positively with religious Others, which inevitably focused on the question of whether the Church’s evangelical attitude should focus on dialogue with or proclamation to religious Others. It also raised the question of how to even define these concepts in mutual relationship. Does dialogue simply aim to achieve mutual understanding and strengthening, does proclamation carry the intent of procuring converts, and, importantly, are dialogue and proclamation essential features of each other or mutually exclusive? In 1991 the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue and the Congregation for Evangelization of Peoples attempted to resolve this problem by stating that: “Proclamation and dialogue are … component elements and authentic forms of the one evangelizing mission of the Church. They are both oriented towards the communication of salvific truth” (1991: No. 2). Taken literally, this statement might imply that dialogue and proclamation are conceptually equal; however, later on in the document the Pontifical Council defines dialogue within the context of discussing religious plurality as being: ‘directed at mutual understanding and enrichment’ (Dialogue & Mission, No. 3), in obedience to truth and respect for freedom. It includes both witness and the exploration of respective religious convictions. It is in 10

At least within the scope of conciliar documents as teaching Church. But the believing Church’s norms—including beliefs of Magisterial figures—took more time to change. Boys observes that the disparagement of Jews and Judaism in liturgy and preaching did not immediately end after the Second Vatican Council (2013: 87).

232

McDonough

this third sense that the present document uses the term dialogue for one of the integral elements of the Church’s evangelizing mission (No. 9, my emphasis). Integral, yes, but equal, no: immediately following this statement proclamation is defined as “the foundation, centre, and summit of evangelization” (No. 10; cf. Evangelii Nuntiandi: 27). The relationship here is not oriented toward an equality between dialogue and proclamation, but actually an uneven equilibrium that gives primacy to proclamation. Dialogue may be integral, but only in subordination to that primary core. If non-Catholics and non-Christians had any suspicion that dialogue could mask an agenda that aims at their conversion to Catholicism, this may sustain it.11 That preference for proclamation is no aberration. It in fact coordinates with a confirming, and even stronger statement from the cdf in its 2000 document Dominus Iesus (hereinafter DI), which states that any non-Catholic or non-Christian expression is at best an approximation of Catholic Christianity: This truth of faith does not lessen the sincere respect which the Church has for the religions of the world, but at the same time, it rules out, in a radical way, that mentality of indifferentism ‘characterized by a religious relativism which leads to the belief that one religion is as good as another’ (Redemptoris Missio, No. 36 [hereinafter RM]). If it is true that the followers of other religions can receive divine grace, it is also certain that objectively speaking they are in a gravely deficient situation in comparison with those who, in the Church, have the fullness of the means of salvation (cf. Mystici Corporis). (No. 22, italics original, my underlining). Notably, the cdf also conflates relativism—where anything is true or right simply because one believes or judges it to be so, without basis on any other reason—with pluralism, where a variety of possible truths and judgements can be had because they are based on reasonable, albeit incommensurable, cultural or scholarly traditions (Ruitenberg 2007). The cdf’s view here, unfortunately, reflects the kind of thinking that sustains the mindsets which impede genuine dialogue in the first place, because it relies on a binary between absolutism and relativism. Pluralism, which is a necessary condition for genuine

11

For a real-life example of how this ambiguity affects interfaith relationships, see Boys’ (2013: 97) description of the process through which the United States Bishops eventually disclaimed any connection between dialogue and “invitation to baptism”.

The Joy of Dialogue in an Intercultural World

233

dialogue and thus interculturalism, seems to have been forgotten: possibly because the binary view precludes it. 5

The Congregation for Catholic Education’s Attempt at Interculturalism

Prior to 2013, one could only infer, by interpreting the above documents, that the Catholic Church was thinking in alignment with interculturalism. This situation changed approximately one month (October 28, 2013) before Francis issued EG (November 24, 2013), when the Congregation for Catholic Education (hereinafter cce) explicitly featured that concept in the title and substance of its document Educating to Intercultural Dialogue in Catholic Schools (hereinafter eidcs). The near simultaneous release of EG and eidcs is interesting, because it demonstrates the cce’s greater coordination with past teaching, rather than with the new direction Francis takes in EG. Interestingly, where EG does not specifically mention interculturalism, it is in fact more genuinely and generously intercultural than its contemporary cousin. eidcs reveals at least five main features of interculturalism that Catholic thought finds attractive: the expression of strong particular identities of participants in its programs (No. 4); rejection of assimilation, relativism, and diluted Catholicism (No. 25); recognizing religion as a constituent feature of culture (No. 12); and promoting religion’s greater presence in the public square (Nos. 9 & 11). Finally, interculturalism is congruent with a Catholic ideal that “Cultural diversity should therefore be understood within the broader horizon of the unity of the human race” (No. 32) and that “It is above all the potential universality of every culture that establishes dialogue among cultures” (No. 33) for the purpose of building a common culture (No. 63). Further, a major strength of this document is its recognition that interculturalism makes sense for interpreting and responding to the current reality in Catholic schools. According to the cce, “Catholic schools are seeing an ever growing presence of students with different nationalities and religious beliefs.” Regardless of whether Catholics are in the majority in a school or society at large, “interreligious encounter is now unavoidable” (No. 55), which means, “An indispensable condition for cooperation is openness to plurality and differences” (No. 61; see also No. 50) and hence the school should endeavour to prepare students for this reality. Aside from its elucidation of this interpretive value, though, eidcs also has some noticeable problems. First, it does not offer a positive definition and theoretical analysis of interculturalism, and only explicates the concept in nega-

234

McDonough

tive contrast with multicultural, relativist, and assimilationist approaches. This situation requires readers to infer its meaning, which may or may not match the cce’s intent. This feature is more problematic than a merely amateurish philosophical slipperiness because it opens a negative space for any dominant but tacit interpretation to take hold without facing scrutiny. This  lack of a ­positive definition then amplifies the second problem, which is the concurrent lack of definitions for the document’s foundational concepts of culture and religion.12 Moreover, its attempt to show how religion and culture are related is also ambiguous. For example, even as Franchi offers his strong, if also apologetic endorsement of eidcs, he can only infer, in conditional terms, that the cce understands culture “as the embodiment of religion and religious worldviews, with due regard … for those not attached to any religious t­ radition” (2016: 122).13 Consequentially it is not clear whether or how interculturalism compares with interreligious or interdenominational relations.14 So without any explicit discussion of this relationship, readers must constantly infer throughout eidcs whether the cce is speaking only in terms of culture as race and ethnicity, or if it means the full spectrum of religious culture. The greatest problem with this lack of conceptual refinement is that it eclipses any mention of how John Paul ii’s and Ratzinger/Benedict xvi’s statements on other religions logically imply an evaluation of non-Catholic and non-Christian cultures. In its first chapter, eidcs makes a positive evaluation of “culture” by stating that people “[use] the resources of their cultural heritage, which they possess from the moment of their birth … [to] develop in a serene and balanced way, in a healthy relationship with their environment and with other human beings” (No. 1). Nothing in eidcs suggests that religion does not inform one’s cultural experience or is not integral to it, and there is even a strong implication that Catholicism informs a Catholic person’s cultural identity and the identity of a Catholic school (No. 63; recall No. 12, quoted above). However, in paragraph 4 of the introduction, it also states that “one 12

Not all Catholic educational scholarship struggles with this problem. For a helpful contrast see Eva Lumas’ use of Gallagher’s and Shorter’s work to situate religion as a key aspect of culture (2011: 28–29). 13 Eva Lumas (2011) finds that the prevailing norms of Catholic teaching and learning already have difficulties in receiving, appreciating, and responding to a descriptively multicultural reality (see esp. 33–35). These difficulties would be no less significant if the Church and school merely exchanged multiculturalism for interculturalism. 14 In his commentary on eidcs, Leonardo Franchi maintains that “the meaning of intercultural dialogue will be understood as referring principally to dialogue between people of different religious traditions” (2016: 117). His rationale for this assumption is limited to asserting that it is “implicit throughout the document” (134n3).

The Joy of Dialogue in an Intercultural World

235

needs the ability to witness and dialogue, without falling into the trap of that facile ­relativism which holds that all religions are the same and are merely manifestations of an Absolute that no-one can truly know” (Introduction). So it is therefore strange to see that eidcs upholds the intrinsic goodness of all cultures at the same time it diminishes those that are non-Catholic. The ­logical implication is that (at least a significant part of) their identity is in a deficient state.15 A later statement in the document only amplifies the confusion, where the cce promotes an attitude of recognition in advising educators that “one must avoid the trap of imposing one’s views on the other person, asserting one’s own lifestyle and one’s own way of thinking without taking into account the other person’s culture and particular emotional situation” (No. 78c). Finally, this document also repeats the conceptual problems from elsewhere in the Church regarding the distinction between dialogue and proclamation, which, in this instance simply leaves an unanswered question about the purpose of intercultural dialogue within an institution that insists on Catholicism’s epistemic and salvific primacy. In this sense, eidcs only intensifies any suspicion that interculturalism merely serves as an instrumental means to announce this view with greater volume, and that the Catholic school is imagined as an institutional means to this proclaiming end.16 6

EG’s Movement into Intercultural Secularity

Interculturalism is incompatible with binary or absolutist kinds of claims, because its focus on building a new way of association depends on a variety of 15

16

Eva Lumas finds the same problem within Catholic multicultural education: “Roman Catholic pastoral leaders do not subscribe to a single definition of culture or the critical need to fully engage a people’s culture in the development of their faith. The content of most standardized Roman Catholic catechetical curricula contain a multicultural array of pictures, biographies, stories, and music, but the prevailing theology and pastoral focus of these catechetical materials is still dominated by Eurocentric ethno-religiosity” (2011: 27) … “Adaptations only ‘translate’ or ‘supplement’ the substantive and structural content of the standardized curriculum that articulates the religious sensibilities of the dominant cultural group” (2011: 28). Franchi paraphrases the cce’s aspirations: “In this line of thinking, the invitation to dialogue is a form of ‘pre-evangelization’ precisely because a stated commitment to intercultural dialogue is in itself a manifestation of a robust, not diluted Catholic identity. This is where the energy emanating from the new evangelization has the potential to strengthen the Catholic school’s approach to knowledge and understanding of the Catholic tradition. In essence, the proclamation of the Gospel and dialogue with other religions, while not on the same level, are complementary pathways: in other words, authentic dialogue is a form of apostolate.” (2016: 123, emphasis original).

236

McDonough

traditions participating. It is instead compatible with pluralism and an interreligious secular meeting space. Francis imagines that this secular space must be a public space where persons present their religious views in their strongest, fullest form: A healthy pluralism, one which genuinely respects differences and values them as such, does not entail privatizing religions in an attempt to reduce them to the quiet obscurity of the individual’s conscience or to relegate them to the enclosed precincts of churches, synagogues, or mosques. This would represent, in effect, a new form of discrimination and authoritarianism. (No. 255) The difference between this statement and DI is stark, for it encounters difference with a disposition to build something new in association with it, and not to comparatively evaluate it. And where Francis plainly rejects stripping religion away from the public sphere, he can also be heard speaking against any intellectually thin and reductive responses to diversity that simply valorize its appearance without looking deeper into what it means to be a member of any group. This observation presents a strong caution to anyone who would read NA and be tempted to reduce all religions together simply because they all search for the divine (just with different language), and conclude that any differences between them are simply accidental features. To overcome this facile understanding, then, dialogue with religious Others is required. Here the Pontifical Commission’s Dialogue and Proclamation is tentatively helpful on a procedural level: this dialogue would begin with acquiring that deeper understanding—what is it like to think and live as a Lutheran, Jew, or Muslim, for example? From here, however, one cannot avoid the political question: what is the purpose of one’s seeking and having this knowledge? For Francis, it is an interreligious outcome where the perspectives of all preclude the dominance of any powerful segment of society: In a culture which privileges dialogue as a form of encounter, it is time to devise a means for building consensus and agreement while seeking the goal of a just, responsive and inclusive society. The principal author, the historic subject of this process, is the people as a whole and their culture, and not a single class, minority, group, or elite. We do not need plans drawn up by a few for the few, or an enlightened or outspoken minority which claims to speak for everyone. It is about agreeing to live together, a social and cultural pact (No. 239).

The Joy of Dialogue in an Intercultural World

237

Presumably, one might read this passage as humbling any pretensions to dominance that may linger within religious groups. However, since this quotation sits in a part of the exhortation that concerns “social dialogue as a contribution to peace,” one might also reasonably wonder if Francis only aims it at the civic sphere, and if it is therefore not intended for application with ecclesial and ­interfaith domains. In response, I observe that Francis conceives of this dialogue as a specifically “interreligious” one that is therefore contingent on one’s own religious self-knowledge and knowledge of Others in order to work, and that is explicitly oriented toward the primary end of “justice and peace” among its participants: Interreligious dialogue is a necessary condition for peace in the world, and so it is a duty for Christians as well as other religious communities … In this way we learn to accept others and their different ways of living, thinking and speaking. We can then join one another in taking up the duty of serving justice and peace, which should become a basic principle of all our exchanges (No. 250). Notably absent here is any remote similarity to the theological clarifications about “approximations” that DI takes pains to make. Here, Francis’ preference for shifting emphasis rather than changing teachings takes prominence; instead of taking direct aim to modify or reinterpret DI, Francis simply moves away from its statements about Catholic primacy in favour of magnifying an aim to promote interreligious justice and peace. And while not being analytically very orderly about distinguishing dialogue from proclamation, Francis seems purely content to fold proclamation into something like the announcement or declaration of one’s identity and beliefs, because stating one’s identity is simply necessary for authentic participation in dialogue:17 In this dialogue, ever friendly and sincere, attention must always be paid to the essential bond between dialogue and proclamation, which leads the Church to maintain and intensify her relationship with non-­ Christians (Pastores Dabo Vobis, No.10) … True openness involves remaining steadfast in one’s deepest convictions, clear and joyful in one’s own identity, while at the same time being “open to understanding those of the other party” and “knowing that dialogue can enrich each side” (Redemptoris Missio, No. 56). What is not helpful is a diplomatic openness which says “yes” to everything in order to avoid problems, for this would 17

Massimo Faggioli arrives at a similar conclusion that Francis “does not see a contradiction between dialogue and proclamation” (29).

238

McDonough

be a way of deceiving others and denying them the good which we have been given to share generously with others. Evangelization and interreligious dialogue, far from being opposed, mutually support and nourish one another. (Benedict XVI, Address to the Roman Curia, December 21, 2012) (No. 251) Notably, Francis grounds this passage in language that echoes UR (quoted above) and directly quotes his immediate papal predecessors, but on closer inspection what is of greatest significance is actually an omission that I strongly contend is deliberate, and that, if noticed, strongly signals his departure from John Paul ii and Benedict xvi on this topic. The clue to discovering this omission begins with looking closer at his reference to Number 56 in RM. At that point, he follows John Paul’s assertion that dialogue’s purpose is to uncover all that is good and truthful in humanity’s religions, but remarkably he does not quote its immediately neighbouring section at Number 55. In that place, John Paul states that “Dialogue should be conducted and implemented with the conviction that the Church is the ordinary means of salvation and that she alone possesses the fullness of the means of salvation” (No. 55, emphasis original).18 That phrase quotes UR and anticipates DI, but as there is no phrase like it in EG, and it is highly doubtful—if even impossible—that Francis is ignorant of it, there seems to be no obstacle to concluding that the omission was deliberate. So here is a statement from Francis that downplays a past pope’s views on salvation as it is relevant to engagement with Others, and emphasizes instead religions being represented in their strongest, fullest form solely with a view to justice and peace as the primary end. By shifting the discourse on dialogue away from salvation talk and into social teaching, he has softly but purposefully diminished the significance of analytical concerns about its relationship with proclamation. The sincere simplicity of this situation aligns well with Faggioli’s interpretation that “Francis’ ecumenism is not systematic. It is contextual and inductive. It is spiritual, not dogmatic” (2016: 33). Catherine Clifford observes that EG attempts to overcome the tendencies toward “self-righteousness and complacency” that afflict those of all Catholic ideologies, where attitudes of “superiority or elitism … lead one to dismiss the views of those who differ, or to abandon and neglect those in need of healing and mercy … Such persons have ceased to recognize the face of Christ in 18

Dias observes that “[t]he tension between mission [evangelization] and dialogue, which touches on the very nature of the church as missionary and questions the purpose of dialogue (whether ultimately ordered to conversion or not) is clearly present in [John Paul ii’s] magisterium”.

The Joy of Dialogue in an Intercultural World

239

others” (2015: 43). This criticism need not apply to the entirety of their papacies, but John Paul’s and Benedict’s views on salvation and dialogue do severely impair the possibility of a true interculturalism emanating from their teachings, because they clearly imply that interreligious dialogue occurs among unequals, and is possibly also a means to procuring converts. By attenuating and ­shifting his predecessors’ views, Francis has reoriented the Church toward an aim where (continued) intercultural participation is a sufficient end in itself. EG thus seems to be the most intercultural stance the Church has ever articulated. 7

Conclusion: Implications for Catholic Educational Institutions

There are three implications for Catholic educational institutions that emerge from the above discussion. The first concerns curricular content and the question of whether and how schools teach about the shifts in Catholic identity and posture toward other religions and denominations. It is ultimately a question of what the Church in its entirety19 means when it states that it respects other religions. How is a school to respond to a teacher who states a belief that Lutheranism, Judaism, and Islam are equal to Catholic Christianity? Given that RM and DI insist this is not true, does this mean the teacher is promoting something that is harmful to its Catholic students’ salvation? On the other hand, consider a teacher who makes statements that non-Catholic Christianity and non-Christian religions are only approximations of Catholicism. How are the non-Catholic and non-Christian students going to receive this news? To the degree that neither RM nor DI instigated any mass exodus of non-Catholics and non-Christians from Catholic schools, and that all teachers (it is hoped!) place greater priority on their students’ psychological well-being and sustaining good relationships with them, it seems that the General Will of Catholic school culture—in its interreligious, interdenominational, and even multi-ideological20 totality—has decided not to receive those teachings and was even already aligned with EG before Francis wrote it. Catherine Clifford’s reading of EG is instructive here, as she observes that it “serves as a concrete example of a substantive shift toward a more collegial expression of the teach19

The need to define “Church” looms large here. Although this chapter critiques documents of the magisterial Church, Catholic ecclesial self-understanding is greater than its institutional and magisterial expressions. Expressions like “People of God” and “Body of Christ” more accurately reflect an inclusive picture of the whole Church. 20 See Dillon 1999, Cuneo 1999, and McDonough 2012 for examples of intra-Catholic diversity.

240

McDonough

ing office, one that understands reception no longer in unidirectional terms, but as a process of mutual exchange” (2015: 36) among the various locations— whether formally or informally authoritative—within Catholicism. This leads to the second implication, which is to recognize that religious plurality is not limited to life outside Catholicism. Catholicism also has its own internal diversity, including ongoing discussions of what it means to be Catholic that are evidenced in the differing approaches Francis and Benedict have taken to the papal office21 and many Catholics’ (non-) reception of teachings on sexual ethics and ordination. These phenomena lead to questions of how Catholic schools should engage students with these topics. And given that they are controversial—and that proposals to even open their discussion are also controversial—how does the school receive a view that it would be prudent to speak in the abstract to students about a Church that is not changing, and then let the family discuss ecclesial controversy at home? I argue elsewhere that such a restriction deprives the whole community of the opportunity to engage in higher-order thought and only privileges those families who are already equipped to have such a discussion (McDonough 2010). In my reading of EG such conflict avoidance also lets the requirement for religiously laden dialogue slide away in favour of a thinly superficial appearance of unity.22 Finally, how should social theorists of religious education understand secular space? Clearly the Christo-centric understanding remains in Catholicism’s recent discourse, even if not expressed in the same language as the Tridentine Church. Even though NA and UR retain Christo-centrism and rely on thin portraits of religious Others, their welcoming attitudes sharply contrast with both earlier attitudes and the reassertive grip RM and DI take some 25 and 35 years following their publication, and so their value as living documents must continue to be stressed. So to move from the promises of Vatican ii and understand the secular space in religious intercultural terms would first require not conflating relativism and pluralism, in order to see that the religious world outside Catholic Christianity is not based on a whim or accident. It is actually probable in the Canadian context that Catholic Schools have already moved past thin notions of multiculturalism through their promotion of thicker Catholic notions of the dignity of all persons and religious freedom. Catholics are also far 21 22

“Pope Benedict’s pontificate put the emphasis on the priority of the doctrinal c­ onsensus— in the absence of which, all the rest of the ecumenical relations suffered” (Faggioli 2016: 20). Faggioli states that “the ecumenism of Francis is the embodiment of the post-conciliar impression that the most difficult ecumenism is the one you try to build with the member of your own Church with whom you disagree” (2016: 18).

The Joy of Dialogue in an Intercultural World

241

from perfect in this regard, for even though there is a long history of Catholicism adapting to and taking on the forms of local cultures, the Church also has a history of mistreating Canada’s Indigenous persons. So in practice, Catholic schools may have already adopted the “majority precedence” feature of interculturalism in that they focus on Catholic teaching while at the same time reflecting the great religious variety among their students. It is the s­ tudents, after all, who are important constitutive actors in the school—it would not exist without them. It is in this sense that I propose that Catholics schools are in theory and practice already intercultural and interreligious spaces. In this way, so long as EG formally announces—or in a large way recognizes and confirms—the way to this interculturalism, it clearly has educational import.23 References Allport, G.W. 1954. The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. Arweck, E. & G. Penny 2015. “Young people’s attitudes to religious diversity: Socialising agents and factors emerging from qualitative and quantitative data of a nationwide project in the UK.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 36(3): 255–273. Ata, A. 2016. “Research Note: How Muslims are perceived in Catholic schools in contemporary Australia: A national survey.” Intercultural Education 27(4): 337–351. Austin, R., A. Rickard and J. Reilly. 2017. “Face-to-face contact in blended learning for intercultural education: The role of teachers.” Irish Educational Studies 36(3): 320–340. Banks, J.A. 2006. “Approaches to multicultural education reform.” In J.A. Banks (Ed.), Race, culture and education: The selected works of James A. Banks: 181–190. London: Routledge. Baum, G. 2005. Amazing Church: A Catholic Theologian Remembers a Half-Century of Change. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis. Breen, D. 2009. “Religious diversity, inter-ethnic relations, and the Catholic school: introducing the responsive approach to single-faith schooling.” British Journal of Religious Education 31(2): 103–115. Bouchard, G. 2011. “What is Interculturalism?” [Trans. B. Pelsue & S. Ross] McGill Law Journal 56(2): 435–468. Boyd, D.R. 1996. “Dominance Concealed Through Diversity: Implications of Inadequate Perspectives on Cultural Pluralism.” Harvard Educational Review 66(3): 609–630.

23

An earlier version of this chapter was presented at St Thomas More College’s Dialogue and Diversity conference, 28 February 2015, in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada.

242

McDonough

Boyd, D.R. 2010. “Character Education and Citizenship Education: A Case of Cancerous Relationship.” In Philosophy of Education 2010, ed. Gert Biesta: 384–392. Ubrana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society. http://ojs.ed.uiuc.edu/index.php/pes/article/ view/3061/1136 [accessed 17 January 2018]. Boys, M. 2013. “What Nostra Aetate Inaugurated: A Conversion to the ‘Providential Mystery of Otherness.’” Theological Studies 74(1): 73–104. Chambers, M. 2012. “Students Who Are Not Catholics in Catholic Schools: Lessons from the Second Vatican Council about the Catholicity of Schools.” International Studies in Catholic Education 4(2): 186–199. Clifford, C. 2015. “Pope Francis’ Call for the Conversion of the Church in our Time.” Australian eJournal of Theology 21(1): 33–55. Congregation for Catholic Education. 2013. Educating to Intercultural Dialogue in Catholic Schools: Living in Harmony for a Civilization of Love. http://www.vati can.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccatheduc/documents/rc_con_ccatheduc _doc_20131028_dialogo-interculturale_en.html [accessed 17 January 2018]. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. 2000. Dominus Iesus [On the Unicity and Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church]. http://www.vatican.va/roman _curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000806_dominus -iesus_en.html [accessed 17 January 2018]. Cuneo, M.W. 1999. The Smoke of Satan: Conservative and Traditionalist Dissent in Contemporary American Catholicism. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Dias, D.J. 2016. “Fifty Years and Learning: Developments in the Roman Catholic Church’s Encounter with Religions.” Toronto Journal of Theology 32(2): 341–361. Dillon, M. 1999. Catholic Identity: Balancing reason, faith, and power. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Engebretson, K. 2012. “Foundational issues in educating young people for understanding and appreciation of the religions in their communities.” Journal of Catholic Education, 16(1): 49–64. Faggioli, M. 2016. “Ecumenism in Evangelii Gaudium and in the Context of Francis’ Pontificate.” Perspectiva Teologia 48(1): 17–35. Feinberg, W. 2006. For goodness sake: Religious schools and education for democratic citizenry. New York, NY: Routledge. Franchi, L. 2016. “Catholic Education and Intercultural Dialogue: Continuing the Conversation.” Logos 19(4): 117–139. Francis, Pope. 2013. Evangelii Gaudium [On the Proclamation of the Gospel in ­Today’s World]. http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents /papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html [accessed 17 January 2018]. Hajisoteriou, C. & P. Angelides. 2016. The globalization of intercultural education. London, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

The Joy of Dialogue in an Intercultural World

243

John Paul II, Pope. 1990. Redemptoris Missio [On the permanent validity of the Church’s missionary mandate]. http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/ documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_07121990_redemptoris-missio.html [accessed 17 January 2018]. Lumas, E. 2011. “Catechesis in a Multicultural Church.” New Theology Review 24(1): 27–37. Maxwell, B, D. Waddington, K. McDonough, A. Cormier and M. Schwimmer. 2012. “Interculturalism, Multiculturalism, and the State Funding and Regulation of Conservative Religious Schools.” Educational Theory 62(4): 427–447. McCowan, T. 2017. Building bridges rather than walls: Research into an experiential model of interfaith education in secondary schools. British Journal of Religious Education 39(3): 269–278. McDonough, G.P. 2010. “The Problem of Catholic School Teachers Deferring to the Home on Controversial Religious Issues.” Journal of Catholic Education, 13(3): 287–305. McDonough, G. P. 2012. Beyond obedience and abandonment: Toward a theory of dissent in Catholic education. Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press. McDonough, G.P. 2016. Cultivating identities: The Catholic school as diverse ecclesial space. Philosophical Inquiry in Education 23(2): 160–177. http://journals.sfu.ca/pie/ index.php/pie/article/view/434/545 [accessed January 2018]. McLeod, H. 2000. Secularisation in Western Europe, 1848–1914. Basingstoke, Hants: St Martin’s Press. Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue. 1991. Dialogue and Proclamation. http:// www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/interelg/documents/rc_pc _­interelg_doc_19051991_dialogue-and-proclamatio_en.html [accessed 17 January 2018]. Ruitenberg, Claudia. 2007. “‘That’s Just Your Opinion!’—‘American Idol’ and the Confusion Between Pluralism and Relativism.” Paideusis 16(1): 55–59. Vatican Council II. 1964. Unitatis Redintegratio [Decree on Ecumenism]. http:// www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_ decree_19641121_unitatis-redintegratio_en.html [accessed 17 January 2018]. Vatican Council II. 1965. Nostra Aetate [Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions]. http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican _council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html [accessed 17 January 2018].

Part 4 Changes in Specific Catholic Institutions

∵

Chapter 12

Navigating the Fault Lines of Catholic Institutional Identity Kevin Ahern In a very real way, institutions shape the contours of Roman Catholicism. In nearly every country, Catholics, often through movements of vowed religious, have established impressive educational, medical, and charitable structures serving millions of people. In many places, voices from both inside and outside the Church are raising questions as to the nature, continued relevancy, and identity of Catholic institutions. In Ireland, for example, where a large number of the country’s hospitals and schools describe themselves as Catholic, critics question the need for such state-funded institutions, following the revelations of past abuse and a decreasing number of self-identified Catholics. In the United States, courts are considering a range of cases relating to institutional identity, including challenges to prohibitions on abortion at Catholic healthcare facilities and the rights of workers to unionize in Catholic universities. Now more than ever, people are questioning what it means for an institution, such as a hospital or university, to describe itself as “Catholic”. This paper examines the corporate identity crisis facing many institutions and the adaptation strategies employed by some groups to maintain a common sense of mission in the face of pluralism and change. The experiences of institutions linked to the Jesuits, Lasallian Brothers, and Sisters of Mercy will help to illuminate both the potential and challenges of being a Catholic institution in the world today. Part 1 engages demographic data to highlight both the influence of Catholic institutions and the identity crisis that they are facing today. Despite growth in many areas, the ministries sponsored by these three religious congregations must contend with several internal and external pressures. In the second part, this paper briefly considers the contours of organizational identity by engaging the work of organizational theorists. The final section builds from the work of organizational theory to examine how Catholic institutions are mainlining identity amidst change. The experiences of institutions linked to the Jesuits, Lasallians and Sisters of Mercy reveal three adaptation strategies in the ongoing process of identity work.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004380073_014

248 1

Ahern

Catholic Institutions and Their Identity

At their very best, Catholic institutions publicly embody the values that are at the centre of the Catholic Christian tradition. Many of these are summarized by the biblically inspired Corporal Works of Mercy, which invite Christians to feed the hungry, give water to the thirsty, clothe the naked, shelter the homeless, visit the sick and imprisoned, and bury the dead. From these concerns, Catholics have established a wide range of institutional structures aimed at serving the needs of people, especially those who are poor. These include congregations, societies, and orders of vowed religious, lay movements, hospitals, schools, charities, and universities. For centuries they have functioned, not without controversy and abuse, as agents of evangelization and mission. The rights and responsibilities of Catholics to establish such structures to live out the Gospel have long been recognized in Church law (Canon Law) and practice. Canon Law (1983) frames such collectives as “juridic persons” (Nos. 114–123). The church extends juridic personhood to both geographic structures, such as parishes and dioceses, and to those set up for a specific mission. For an institution to be considered Catholic, however, the collective “person” must be formally recognized as such by a competent ecclesial authority (No. 117), usually a bishop or a Vatican office (Morrissey 2001). For many Catholic institutions, this recognition is granted through a sponsoring religious congregation. A high school directly sponsored by the Jesuits, for example, participates ipso facto in the juridic personality granted to the Society of Jesus. If the sponsorship ceases, it would need to seek juridic personhood through another entity or request it on its own (O’Rourke 2006). Today, such institutions are impacting the lives of millions of people around the world. According to the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate (cara) (2017), over fifty million people are served by more than 147,000 Catholic primary and secondary schools. Millions of others are served by 5,391 hospitals and 9,924 orphanages. The Society of Jesus, the Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools, and the Sisters of Mercy are among the largest sponsors of Catholic institutions. Independent of the larger Catholic community, these religious congregations and their global networks of schools, universities, hospitals, and other ministries would be noteworthy. St. Ignatius of Loyola (1491–1556) founded the Society of Jesus, or the Jesuits, in 1540. Together, they envisioned a new and creative form of apostolic religious life better equipped to respond to needs of a post-Reformation and colonial context. From the onset, the Jesuits established several charitable and educational works including the Casa Santa Marta in 1537 for marginalized women (O’Malley 2014: 182). The Jesuit model inspired the creation of over

Navigating the Fault Lines Catholic Institutional Identity

249

a dozen congregations of women religious, many of whom created their own works of education, healthcare, and charity. The spiritual and structural renewals brought about by the Second Vatican Council (1962–1963) had a profound impact on religious congregations, including the Jesuits. Following the council, the 32nd General Congregation (GC 32) of the Society of Jesus (1974–1975) rearticulated the Jesuit mission as “the service of faith, of which the promotion of justice is an absolute requirement” (General Congregation 32 2009: 2). This renewed commitment inspired the creation of new local and international works with a strong social justice dimension, including Jesuit Refugee Service (jrs) and Fe y Alegría, an international federation of schools for the poor. According to the Jesuit Secretariat for Secondary and Pre-Secondary Education (2016), there are over 800 secondary and pre-secondary schools sponsored by the Society of Jesus serving over 800,000 students. Of these, 396 are in South Asia and 51 in Africa. In addition, jrs and Fe y Alegría sponsor their own schools enrolling nearly 1.3 million vulnerable children. Additionally, there are 186 Jesuit colleges, universities, and institutions of higher education, including 53 in South Asia (Garanzini 2017). Over the past two decades, the Jesuits continue to be innovators in Catholic education. In 1996, for example, they developed a new model of secondary education that combines rigorous academic study with an innovative “Corporate Work Study Program”. This “Cristo Rey” model has been adopted up by other religious congregations and has grown to 32 schools across the United States serving over 10,000 students (“About the Cristo Rey Network” 2017; Sweas 2014). These include three (co)sponsored by the Lasallian Brothers and two by the Sisters of Mercy. The Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools, or Lasallian Christian Brothers, was founded in 1680 by Jean-Baptiste de La Salle (1651–1719), a French priest who was moved by the plight of poor children in Rheims. While originally concerned with providing primary and secondary education to the poor, the Christian Brothers expanded their mission to post-secondary education in the 19th century and created new ministries outside the educational world in the 20th century. Following Vatican ii, the Thirty-Ninth General Chapter of the Institute (1967) rearticulated the Brothers’ mission, including changes to their habit (dress), rule of communal life, and a renewed approach to educating the poor. Today, there are 984 Lasallian educational institutions serving over a million students around the world. These include 71 post-secondary institutions, with 15 in Mexico, 12 in the Philippines, and six in the United States (Institute 2017: 296). Beyond education, the Lasallian Brothers have established innovative institutions, such as Christian Brothers Services to serve the managerial

250

Ahern

needs of Catholic institutions, including healthcare and retirement benefits, and Christian Brothers Investment Services, which manages over seven billion US dollars of investments by other Catholic institutions. The Sisters of Mercy were founded in 1831 by Catherine McAuley (1778–1841) as a pontifical congregation “established for the visitation of the sick poor and charitable instruction of poor females” (Darcy 1993: 14–15). Just a few years later, McAuley expanded beyond Dublin, founding ten autonomous congregations in Ireland and England. By 1900, there were dozens of autonomous communities in Newfoundland, Australia, Scotland, South Africa, and notably in the United States, where, at one point, there were up to sixty separate congregations (Darcy 1993: 41–42). Following the Second Vatican Council, the Sisters of Mercy returned to McAuley’s original vision and also adopted a strong concern for social justice. They took on new ministries, modified or eliminated the traditional habit, and developed structures of coordination across the autonomous congregations. Today, the Sisters of Mercy serve millions of people through their hospitals, charities, and schools. According to the Executive director of the Mercy International Association, congregations of the Sisters of Mercy sponsor over 8,000 institutions globally (Reynolds 2017). A brief look at these three congregations highlights the power and potential of Catholic institutions. While imperfect, institutions driven and inspired by the Christian faith and a post-Vatican ii turn to social justice shape the lives of millions of people and provide a vehicle for the Church to live out its mission of mercy. But what is the future of these structures? As Cardinal Joseph Bernardin (1991), the late archbishop of Chicago, acknowledged, it is not always easy for Catholic institutions to maintain a dynamic sense of identity in public: Catholic colleges and universities, healthcare institutions and social service agencies already live with one foot firmly planted in the Catholic Church and the other in our pluralistic society. It should come as no ­surprise, then, when the competing vision and value systems of the ‘tectonic’ plates on which they stand are in tension … shifts in the plates cause tremors. This tectonic plate analogy is constructive, as it highlights the precarious nature of balancing institutional identity. On the one hand, if they lean too much in the direction of a pluralistic society, they risk secularizing or relativizing their mission. On the other hand, if they lean too much in the direction of the Church, they risk a sectarianism that would inhibit their ability to live out their

251

Navigating the Fault Lines Catholic Institutional Identity

social missions in the world. Over the past five decades, most Catholic institutions have struggled to maintain this delicate balance between sectarianism and relativism in the face of four seismic shifts. 1.1 Changing Congregational Demographics One major shift impacting Catholic institutions emanates from the changing demographics of religious congregations. Following an unprecedented period of growth, there has been a sharp decline in membership for religious congregations over the past five decades. This well-documented shift represents a major change in Catholic culture globally, and it will continue to have a major impact on the institutions they sponsor (Johnson, Wittberg, & Gautier 2014; Wittberg 1994). Table 12.1 illustrates these changes. While the Catholic population almost doubled globally between 1970 and 2015, the number of vowed religious decreased dramatically. Vocations in Europe and the United States have been hardest hit. For example, according to the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, the number of religious sisters in the United States has dropped 73% from nearly 180,000 in 1965 to less than 50,000 in 2016 (2017). Religious brothers and priests have seen similar drops of 66% and 50%. Worldwide, the Jesuits, Lasallians and Sisters of Mercy have all seen similar declines in membership as detailed in Table 12.2. These changing demographics have caused institutional identity issues at both the congregational and local levels. Congregational leaders must discern if and how they will continue. Large congregations have undertaken the complex and often painful process of giving up sponsored institutions and merging provincial structures. For example, over the past decade the Jesuits in the United States have initiated a process to consolidate their ten provinces into four (McDermott 2017). Similarly, the Lasallian Brothers have decreased Table 12.1 Demographics of vowed religious

Globally Religious priests Religious brothers Religious sisters Catholic population

1970

2015

Percent change

148,804 79,408 1,004,304 653,600,000

134,142 54,229 670,330 1,285,000,000

−10% −32% −33% +97%

Source: (The Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, 2017).

252

Ahern

Table 12.2 Global demographic trends among Jesuits, Lasallian Brothers, and Sisters of Mercy

Total Jesuits Lasallian Brothers Sisters of Mercy

1965

2016

Percent change

36,038 17,760 More than 20,000

16,378 3,829 7,226

−54.55 −78.44 ~ −63.87

Sources: Jesuits: (“Society of Jesus” , 2016); Christian Brothers: (Institute, 2017) ; Sisters of Mercy: (Reynolds, 2017).

their structures in the region from thirteen districts in 1966 to four (“About the Christian Brothers Conference” 2017). For communities of women, the demographic challenge has invited them to find new ways to collaborate. While some have created umbrella coordination networks, such as the Dominican Sisters Conference, others have decided to take the monumental step of merging. In 1991, the Sisters of Mercy of the Americas was founded as a merger of 25 autonomous juridic persons and provinces in six countries (Darcy 1993). This new congregation itself then participates in an umbrella network called Mercy International Association, a global network founded in 1992 to network most of the Mercy congregations worldwide. At the level of local institutions, the decreasing number of vowed religious and the changing nature of the congregational structures raise serious questions. How will institutions, such as schools or hospitals, maintain their identity when there are no more vowed members on staff or on the board? What happens to the institutions if the sponsoring congregation dissolves, merges, or changes its mission? 1.2 Pluralism Second, Catholic institutions are challenged by the growing reality of pluralism. Following the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church officially set aside its defensive stance in favour of a more engaged relationship with the world. This new approach to mission emerging from Vatican ii valued religious freedom, affirmed the separation of church and state, and recognized the dignity, and the possibility of salvation, of those outside the Catholic Church. As part of their reception of the Council’s teachings, schools, hospitals, charities, and even entire religious congregations uplifted dialogue and inclusivity as core values. Many Lasallians, for example,

Navigating the Fault Lines Catholic Institutional Identity

253

e­ numerate “inclusive community” as one of their five core principles (“5 Core Principles” 2018). Similar language affirming inclusivity and can be found in many mission statements of institutions sponsored by the Sisters of Mercy and the Jesuits. Many structures, particularly universities and hospitals, have opened up their services to non-Catholics and do not see their role as converting the people they serve. The increasing pluralism within Catholic institutions and their surrounding communities, however, has put pressure on them to define who they are. What does it mean, for example, to be a Lasallian Catholic college like Bethlehem University or Christian Brothers University when the majority of students and faculty are not Catholic? These questions have been raised by some church officials, particularly under the pontificates of John Paul ii and Benedict xvi, who sought to emphasize the obligation of Catholics, and Catholic communities to proclaim the uniqueness of Jesus Christ and the deficiency in the truth claims in other traditions. 1.3 Intra-Catholic Divisions A third seismic shift facing Catholic institutions comes from internal friction within the Catholic community. Schools, hospitals, and charities have often been at the centre of debates on the correct interpretation of the Second Vatican Council and the proper role of authority. Schools have been condemned for employing openly gay and lesbian staff. For universities, questions on the limits of academic freedom have surfaced in relation to faculty research, the awarding of honorary degrees to public figures with positions that are in tension with the Church, and the presence of gay and lesbian student clubs. Critics argue that many of these institutions, and even their sponsoring religious congregations, have surrendered their Catholic identity in favour of social concerns, what Pope John Paul ii critiqued (1990) as a “horizontalism” (John Paul ii 1990: 2). Interpretations of the Church’s teachings on sexual ethics have been particularly contentious. Hospitals and charities have been criticized for distributing contraceptives or performing abortions. For example, in 2009, Margaret McBride, a Sister of Mercy and a vice president for mission integration at a Mercy sponsored hospital in Arizona, was temporally excommunicated by the local bishop for approving a medical abortion to save the life of the mother (O’Rourke, 2010). Around that same time, the Catholic Health Association, an umbrella network for most Catholic hospitals, strongly supported the passage of President Barack Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (aca) despite the strong opposition by the US Conference of Catholic Bishops (Alvare: 2014). Following the passage of the bill, the Little Sisters of the Poor filed

254

Ahern

lawsuits claiming the bill’s mandates to offer employees contraception coverage violated their religious freedom. By 2017, members of the Little Sisters of the Poor appeared by President Donald Trump in a public ceremony affirming religious freedom At the same time, civil liberty groups are organizing campaigns critiquing Catholic hospitals for violating reproductive rights and denying women necessary care (Kaye et al.: 2016). In some cases, unofficial watchdog groups monitor adherence to a specific interpretation of Catholic orthodoxy and orthopraxy. The Cardinal Newman Society, in the United States, for example, regularly publishes reports on how universities are failing to adhere to strict interpretations of Catholic identity (Morris-Young: 2012). In other cases, new institutions have been created with the specific aim of forming and preserving a more robust Catholic identity with thick boundaries and visible identity markers (Johnson et al. 2014: 89–95). The Religious Sisters of Mercy of Alma, Michigan, for example, was founded in 1973, partly as a response to the changing sense of identity in the wider Mercy movement and it remains separate from the Sisters of Mercy of the Americas and Mercy International Association. In its small Health Care Center in Michigan, Catholic identity is made more visible with statements of adherence to Church doctrine on bioethics and the use of the traditional Mercy Habit by the sisters (“The Religious Sisters of Mercy of Alma Michigan” 2017). The Cardinal Newman Society’s Guide to Choosing a Catholic College enumerates a list of 17 US colleges and universities they deem to be “faithfully Catholic” according to clear identity markers, such as high percentages of Catholic populations, the number of days confession is scheduled, whether or not Mass is celebrated in Latin and whether or not members of the opposite sex are allowed in student bedrooms. Most institutions included on the list are small and founded in the last three decades (Cardinal Newman 2017). The list does not include most of the major Catholic universities in the US, including the 26 Jesuit institutions, the 6 Lasallian colleges, and the 17 colleges sponsored by the Sisters of Mercy. 1.4 Institutional Complexity A final, and no less important, set of identity tremors emanates from the growing complexities of running structures. Hospitals, for example, have been transformed into centres with complex technologies and highly specialized professionals. The introduction of government and private health insurance, along with the commodification of healthcare, has increased the costs, scope and complexities of responding to the Gospel mandate to care for the sick (McGuinness 2013: 87–110).

Navigating the Fault Lines Catholic Institutional Identity

255

A major change within Catholic healthcare in the United States over the past 30 years has been the establishment of hospital systems sponsored by the same congregation (Gottemoeller 2001: 11). These systems bring together multiple institutions, including hospitals and clinics, into a unified corporate structure. Eventually, many of these congregational systems joined together with others. One major example of this is Ascension, the “largest nonprofit health system” in the United States and the “world’s largest Catholic health system” comprising of over 2,500 healthcare sites including 141 hospitals (“Facts and Stats” 2017). The system originated in 1999 as a collaborative effort of two distinct systems sponsored by the Daughters of Charity and Sisters of St. Joseph. Later, it grew to include others. In 2010, the sponsoring congregations decided to move away from a sponsorship model where the congregations served as the guarantee of Church recognition, to one where the system itself would be canonically recognized as a public juridic person. This helped to address the needs of the system that brings together the works from multiple congregations, who have fewer vowed members. In some cases, systems have brought together Catholic and non-Catholic facilities, raising serious questions and lawsuits around identity, especially in terms of Church prohibitions on delivering reproductive health services. Some systems have made the decision to rebrand or secularize in order to be more competitive and inclusive of non-Catholic facilities. For example, Catholic Healthcare West, which was formed by two congregations of the Sisters of Mercy in 1986, changed its name to Dignity Health in 2012. Today, Dignity, the fifth-largest health system in the United States, is comprised of 39 hospitals, 24 of which are recognized as Catholic (“History, Mission, Vision and Values” 2017). Largely, as a response to these changes, the Catholic Health Association, an umbrella structure networking Catholic hospitals in the United States, commissioned M. Therese Lysaught (2013) to draft a report on theological foundations of Catholic healthcare in order to explore the relatively new question of what it means to be Catholic. Among the questions raised by her report concerns the involvement for profit systems in Catholic Healthcare. In 2010, for example, Caritas Christi Health Care in Boston was sold to a secular for-profit healthcare company. While efforts are being made to ensure that the individual Catholic hospitals abide by the Church’s ethical directives, questions still remain as to whether a for-profit model can ever be consistent with Catholic healthcare’s concern for the poor and the common good. Meanwhile expectations and costs of higher education have also risen. Like hospitals, some colleges and universities have merged, and a few have closed

256

Ahern

Table 12.3 Catholic institutions in the United States

United States Catholic colleges and universities Students in Catholic colleges and universities Catholic hospitals Patients served in Catholic hospitals in previous year

1965

2016

305 409,471

221 776,443

800 16.9 million

549 87.7 million

Source: (The Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, 2017).

under increasing pressure. In 1991, the Australian Catholic University was formed as an amalgamation of four Catholic tertiary institutions, including institutions created by the Lasallain Brothers and Sisters of Mercy of Australia. In Catalonia, several Catholic institutes of higher education in the 1990s, ­including Lasallian and Jesuit institutes, formed the Universitat Ramon Llull, a new university that federates these existing structures. In the United States, many American Jesuit universities, including Boston College, Loyola Marymount University, and the University of Detroit Mercy, have merged with or acquired smaller colleges sponsored by women religious. These trends create an interesting dynamic in both healthcare and higher education, particularly in the United States. While the number of institutions has decreased, the overall number of people served by them has grown (see Table 12.3). Moreover, Catholic institutions face pressures from outside agencies. Standards of care, professional codes of conduct, and accreditation agencies put external pressures on institutions that sometimes can distract from mission. Government funding and regulation add another layer of complexity, as was demonstrated in the recent controversies with mandates included in President Barack Obama’s Affordable Care Act. For humanitarian organizations, receiving funding from state governments often comes with many strings attached, which may sometimes come into tension with mission and identity (Ahern 2015: 184). 1.5 Three Paths Ahead In the face of these four shifting tectonic plates, it is not surprising that stakeholders both inside and outside Catholic institutions are asking questions related to the nature and meaning of Catholic identity. As leaders seek to respond

Navigating the Fault Lines Catholic Institutional Identity

257

to these questions, three broad options emerge. One option, to refer back to Bernardin’s tectonic plate analogy, would be for institutions to move completely off the ecclesial plate and to dismantle the distinctive boundaries between them and the wider culture (Johnson et al.: 58). Several colleges, hospitals, and charities have already done this, whether consciously or unconsciously. Rather than finding a way to adapt that maintained their identity, these institutions secularized. Given the pressures, it would not be surprising to see other waves of secularization occur in the coming decades. An opposing path would retreat from pluralistic society into the Church, which Rod Dreher (2017) has described in his recent bestselling book as the “Benedict Option”. A small group of institutions, like the Sisters of Mercy of Alma or some of the universities in the Newman Guide, are already doing this by constructing thick and rigid identity boundaries. This includes returning to visible symbols of the faith, such as religious dress and clear adherence to Church teachings on sexual ethics. A third and more challenging path would be to find a way to maintain the precarious position of being both in the Church and in the world. To do this, however, organizations must be prepared to respond to the increasingly complicated question, “Who are you as an organization?” Organizational theory, which emerged from the business sector, offers one way to address this question. In their seminal 1985 article, Stuart Albert and David A. Whetten outline three constitutive characteristics of organizational identity. Collective identity, they propose, is found in the claims by stakeholders as to the organization’s central purpose, in those characteristics that are enduring over time, and in those features that make the organization distinctive and “recognizably different from others” (267). Subsequent theorists raise concerns about defining identity too rigidly (Gioia, Schultz and Corley 2000). Identity, and the ways it is interpreted by different stakeholders, they argue, is “actually relatively dynamic” (63–64). Instead of focusing on supposedly unchanging features, they emphasize the positive value of “adaptive instability” (74) to enable organizations to “learn to change and yet somehow stay the same” (64). In order to survive and remain relevant, organizations, they argue, must find ways to adapt to change in an ongoing and dynamic process. This notion of “adaptive instability”, or what might even be described in terms of institutional resilience, highlights the need to respond to changing realities, such complexities in healthcare delivery or pluralism in higher education. But how can organizations change and adapt while also remaining true to who they are? Is everything, including the characteristics that were

258

Ahern

once understood as central, enduring, and distinctive, ultimately relative and ­subject to revision and change? Many Catholic organizations today are facing precisely this question. One study, examining the Episcopal Church in the United States, seeks to reframe Albert and Whetten’s original characteristic approach by proposing “organizational identity elasticity” (Kreiner, Hollensbe, Sheep, Smith and Kataria 2015: 982). They do this by outlining three sets of dialectical tensions that can aid leaders in their “organizational identity work” (985). First, organizations must consider what stakeholders define as the core versus the peripheral features of identity (998). Catholic institutions face this tension in a variety of ways. How should concerns for the poor relate to concerns for status and excellence? How central are the values of pluralism, interreligious dialogue, and inclusivity? How do these relate to more specific-Catholic values and claims, such as faith in Jesus Christ, Catholic social teaching, and moral codes concerning sexual ethics? Second, organizations must find a way to balance the “dialectic tension of continuity versus change” (1000). This points to a need to avoid both the rigid temptation to resist any identity changes and the overly elastic temptation to jettison everything from the past if and when it is expedient. The question that must be addressed thus becomes: What are the elements that can and cannot change when faced with a need to adapt? Finally, organizations must contend with balancing “enhancement and loss” (1001). Over time, the distinctiveness of organizations tends to diminish in the face of “strong forces that tempt us to conform to what others are doing” (Franz 2006: 39–40). This is particularly the case as institutions increasingly contend with professional standards, accreditation, assessment processes, public expectations, and government regulation. However, if organizations eventually become so similar, there seems to be little point in continuing as separate organizations. At the same time, overly emphasizing one’s distinctiveness risks the construction of overly rigid identity barriers that make the institution inhospitable. Catholic organizations face the question of distinctiveness on a number of levels. What makes a Catholic hospital, for example, different from a secular institution on the other side of the city? Even more challenging, perhaps, is to consider the distinctiveness of Catholic institutions sponsored by different religious congregations. What makes a Jesuit high school different from a Lasallian one? The framework of organizational identity elasticity as presented here is constructive for Catholic organizations as they seek to respond to the pressures and tensions facing Catholic institutions today. Each of these three dialects

Navigating the Fault Lines Catholic Institutional Identity

259

points to “the socially constructed tensions that simultaneously stretch identity while holding it together, akin to the boundaries of a balloon or rubber band expanding and contracting” (982). In other words, identity requires boundaries of some kind. Defined too rigidly, identity will be unable to respond to changes. Defined too loosely, identity will have little meaning. The boundaries in defining a collective identity therefore must be both flexible enough to enable adaptation, but also stable enough to offer shape and stability. This tension can be seen in the three main strategies employed by Catholic institutions as they seek to respond to the changing realities. 2

Strategies for Identity Adaptation

If institutions, as some organizational theorists argue, need a certain amount of adaptability and elasticity in order to maintain their central, enduring, and distinctive features, then how can Catholic organizations respond to the shifting terrains in which they operate? How can they cultivate an identity that avoids both the extremes of overly rigid sectarianism and a loose relativism? How do they respond to what Patricia Wittberg, SC describes as the “collapse of ideological frames” (Wittberg 1994: 256)? A look at the experiences of the Jesuits, Lasallians, and Sisters of Mercy reveals three adaptation strategies being employed to maintain identity with elasticity. 2.1 Identity Integration Structures The most visible adaptation strategy employed over the past fifty years has been the creation of specific structures to cultivate identity within institutions. In general, these structures have appeared in areas where identity is most contested as a result of pluralism and declining vocations. At the level of governance, a question arises for those institutions sponsored by religious congregations as to who will ensure identity, with decreasing numbers of vowed religious. According to the traditional model, the congregation would directly manage the local institution and serve as the juridic person under Canon Law. Over the past fifty years, a new model emerged, whereby the founding congregation voluntarily incorporated the institution as separate structures with lay boards. American Catholic universities led the way in this process. Following the groundbreaking Land O’Lakes meeting in 1967, colleges and universities across the country transferred ownership to lay boards of trustees (Gleason 1995: 314). Often, these followed the American philanthropic model by selecting members who could help in fundraising. Other institutions and structures, including high schools, charities, and healthcare works, imitated this move.

260

Ahern

Though largely positive, this transfer of power and property raises the question of how an institution with a lay board, whose members may not necessarily be Catholic or trained in the mission, would maintain identity, ecclesial recognition, and links to the founding congregation. One solution developed was to make special provisions for vowed religious on their governing structures. This includes reserving standing seats for leaders or delegates of the sponsoring religious congregation. Some even opt for a “two tiered” board. In this structure, a core group of “members”, usually vowed religious, is designated special reserved powers, such as the appointment of senior leadership and approval of budgets (Curran 1997: 96). Increasingly, congregations are creating specific structures to manage representation on the boards of the many ministries. The Sisters of Mercy of the Americas, for example, have recently established the Mercy Education System of the Americas (mesa), to be the one official public juridic person for all Mercy-sponsored primary and secondary schools. The members of the mesa Corporation, comprising the congregation’s leadership team, will then serve as members of the corporation of each local school. Together with the lay people on the wider mesa board, the system will then help to ensure identity at all the sponsored and affiliated schools, including through a formal mission assessment process that will evaluate how identity is integrated throughout the institution (One Mercy Education System, 2016). Similar assessment mechanisms are already in place for many Jesuit and Lasallian institutions. At the same time, new leadership positions have been created to promote identity. At the level of the local institution, some have opted to create executive leadership positions to deal specifically with identity formation, often a vice-president for mission, mission integration, or mission and identity. The nature and scope of these positions vary, but they are often charged, among other things, to organize training internally and to connect with partners outside. Among the more promising structures to emerge in recent years are institutionalized training programs. For example, the Lasallians in North America have instituted a series of programs for leaders and staff of their schools in the region and from other English-speaking countries, including a three-year program on Lasallian Studies, called the Buttimer Institute, a two-year mission training program called the Johnston Institute, and an annual training program on Lasallian social justice themes. At the same time, the International Association of Lasallian Universities, since 2007, has organized an annual twoweek leadership program in Rome to train higher educational leaders from around the world in the Lasallian Catholic mission. The creation of these mission-specific structures and processes thus becomes one way to identify central features, promote distinctive ­characteristic

Navigating the Fault Lines Catholic Institutional Identity

261

and share identity across time. Still, questions remain. Clearly, institutions sponsored and linked to religious congregations have an advantage. But what about those sponsored by parishes and dioceses? What of those like many of the new hospital systems or Christo Rey schools that are co-sponsored by more than one congregation? Moreover, there is a clear risk in a rigid institutionalization whereby the structures take precedence over and against the mission, identity, and the very “charisma” that they were designed to cultivate. This danger is not new, as Max Weber detailed nearly a century ago (1922). 2.2 Horizontal Networking A second adaptation strategy employed by Catholic institutions has been the creation of horizontal networks. Unlike the identity integration strategies, which are more vertical and focus on structures, these new networks focus on relationships across institutions, sometimes bypassing identity structures entirely. In the past, the links between Catholic institutions were largely facilitated through vertical links from a priest or a vowed religious in a specific institution to the leadership of the diocese or sponsoring congregation. Over the past five decades, an increasing number of horizontal networks have been created to connect leaders and other parts of institutions both nationally and globally. This has enormous potential for strengthening identity, but it can also be disrupting to traditional, more vertical, ways of operating. Now it is possible, for example, for a lay faculty member at a Jesuit university in Brazil to directly engage her counterparts at a Jesuit university in India without ever involving a vowed Jesuit. An added advantage to facilitating such networks is that it can enable different levels of membership and engagement in the mission. Differentiated levels of engagement in networks can enable participation by institutions that may no longer fully embrace the specific identity, but wish to remain involved to a certain degree. The Jesuits have especially embraced this networking trend over the past decade. In its sixth decree, Collaboration at the Heart of Mission, the 35th General Congregation (2008) recommended the “Society’s government at all levels to explore means by which more effective networking might take place among all apostolic works associated with the Society of Jesus” (GC 35 2009: 29) Partly as a response to this call, in 2012, a conference published a document entitled International Networking in the Society of Jesus Challenges from a Universal Mission. Networking, they insist, is “urgently needed” as it “enables better global and regional cooperation at the service of the universal mission, raising the apostolic structures to a new level of agency with global (or regional) impact” (Confrence 2012: 2, 7). These concerns were echoed in the document on governance issues by the most recent General Congregation (2016). Here, the leadership strongly

262

Ahern

a­ ffirms the value of horizontal forms of operating. “When properly conceived, ­networking provides a healthy balance between authority and local initiative. It strengthens local capacity and encourages subsidiarity while assuring a unified sense of mission from a central authority” (GC 36 2016: 8). At the same time, the decree recognizes the challenges of this new reality for the more traditional structures of authority within the Society, and calls the newly elected Father General to “study the governance of Jesuit networks and other forms of ministry which extend beyond a Province or Conference” (GC 36 2016: 16). The website Jesuit Networking lists over 40 Jesuit networks that span the traditional provincial borders. These include Fe Y Alegria, Jesuit Refugee Service, the African Jesuit aids Network, regional networks of Jesuit colleges and universities in the Latin America, Asia-Pacific, and the United States, the International Association of Jesuit Business Schools, a network of Jesuit African Social Centers, and a network of educators from Jesuit and Ignatian secondary and primary schools (Villanueva 2016). There are signs as well that many religious congregational structures are trying to reimagine themselves as networks. In a recent address at De La Salle University in Manila, Philippines, Superior General Br. Robert Schieler fsc described the Lasallian family as a “global education network”. For Schieler, the growth of networks alongside the Institute structures is a source of hope in light of the rapidly decreasing number of brothers. “Effective networking”, he stressed, “is essential to realizing some of our dreams for the education of the poor, the vulnerable and the working classes and for confronting some of the challenges to those dreams” (Schieler 2016). With the development of such relationships and networks, it could be conceivable that these might bring about new structures, including university systems, akin to the congregational hospital systems. Within the International Association of Lasallian Universities, there are efforts to enable students to study across the network and to organize a joint educational program in Rome. As with any network, there is a risk that it only becomes relevant when it is useful to the needs of specific institutions. A certain voluntary nature and looseness is a valuable dimension of networking, but it can make it difficult to mobilize commitment across local institutions. Networking, thus, can more easily allow for local institutions to drift apart than do the more vertical models of the past. At the same time, networking along congregational lines may shift the focus more to congregational identity than to the institution’s Catholic identity. The religious identity of the institution might even be suppressed or reduced to a concern for social justice, which John Paul ii described as horizontalism. For example, the descriptions and mission stamens of many networks make mention of the congregational mission and founder, but make

Navigating the Fault Lines Catholic Institutional Identity

263

little to no mention of Jesus Christ and the wider Christian mission. This raises questions as to how central the Catholic religious dimension is to their specific congregational identity. More study is needed to understand what this means for the Catholic identity of these networks. 2.3 Charism A third adaptation strategy to emerge over the past fifty years has been a reinterpretation of the meaning and nature of charism. Theologically, charism has traditionally referred to the special gifts bestowed upon individuals for the common good of the community (1 Corinthians 12: 1–4). For St. Paul, these included practical gifts to assist in the Christian mission of healing, teaching, organizing, and preaching. For centuries, the concept was not a central part of Church life. Pope Gregory the Great (c. 540–604) even declared that the gifts ceased to exist after the “Golden Age of the apostolic era” (Leahy 2011: 83). In the early twentieth century, charism reappears in the sociological work of Max Weber and the emergence of Pentecostal movements. With the Second Vatican Council, the Church rediscovered the centrality of this concept, especially for congregations of religious life who were asked by the Second Vatican Council to return to the life story of the founders and to update it to the present context. For many religious congregations, there has been a significant evolution in the understanding of the concept. In the immediate wake of Vatican ii, congregations framed charism in relation to the gifts given to the founder of their community and the ways vowed members were called to live them out in the present. Soon, many congregations began to see that the charism directing their work went beyond the personal gifts given to founders like Ignatius, de La Salle and McAuley. Living the charism was not just about emulating the founder, nor was it limited only to vowed members. Pope John Paul ii affirmed this recognition in his 1996 apostolic exhortation, Vita Consecrata. “Today”, he writes, “often as a result of new situations, many Institutes have come to the conclusion that their charism can be shared with the laity”. This sharing, he continues, can have an important impact on sustaining the works sponsored by the congregation (John Paul ii 1996: 44–45). What emerged then was a more dynamic and corporate sense of charism than anything previously envisioned. For example, it was only in 2000 that the general chapter of the Lasallian Brothers formally recognized that lay partners and students, including non-Christians, could share in charism and mission (Houry 2006: 187–190). Some Lasallians have taken this notion further. JeanLouis Schneider, for instance, writes: “to live the Lasallian charism today it is not necessary to be a Christian or a believer or to belong to one of the r­ eligious

264

Ahern

named by Transcendence”, if one is committed to the pedagogical vision ­modelled by the Lasallian tradition (245–246). As a result, the term Lasallian has become flexible and inclusive to encompass staff, students, alumni, and partners. This has been one effective way to address the declines in the number of vowed members. Similar dynamics have been taking place in the Mercy and Jesuit families. For the Sisters of Mercy, like other communities of women, new structures of lay associates, companions, and young volunteers have been created to engage others in the Mercy mission. For the Jesuits, the growing popularity of the term Ignatian has been one way in which non-vowed staff and partners have been able to identify with the wider movement. The 35th General Congregation of the Society of Jesus, for example, differentiates between Ignatian and Jesuit. For a person or a work to be Ignatian, they must be inspired by the charism of St. Ignatius. However, the term Jesuit is reserved only for vowed men of the Society and institutions that possess “a clear and definitive relationship with the Society of Jesus” (GC 35, 2009: 9–10). The expanding notions of charism and the introduction of identity terms like Ignatian and Lasallian have an enormous potential to enhance identity in sponsored works. Now, lay people, including non-Christians, can claim participation in the global movement. However, this shift raises its own sets of issues related to the centrality of Christianity and the distinctiveness of Lasallian identities. Francis Tri Nguyen, fsc, details an interesting reality facing some Catholic institutions today, whereby stakeholders who might feel uncomfortable with Catholic identity have no problem with the specific congregational identity, such as Lasallian or Ignatian (Nguyen 2007: p. 27). While this enables more participation in the mission, it also raises a question of distinctiveness: “the more Lasallian universities define themselves exclusively in terms of openness to diversity”, he writes, “the more the differences that make them unique erode” (25). In the face of major changes, such as decreasing numbers of vocations, it could be tempting, as Patricia Wittberg, SC (1994) points out in her study on religious life, to make accommodations that erase, rather than define identity boundaries (256). This can ultimately be counterproductive, as “a false or naïve sense of inclusivity can lead to serious unintended consequences” (Johnson et al. 2014: 57). Without boundaries to “protect and undergird any group’s identity”, it becomes difficult to define who you are and to attract new people (58). In other words, if everything or anyone can be Lasallian, Mercy, or Jesuit, then there is a danger of losing the prophetic and transformative elements of these traditions.

Navigating the Fault Lines Catholic Institutional Identity

265

As with the other adaptation strategies, the expansion of charism, by itself, will not be sufficient for Catholic institutions to address the complex ­identity tremors facing them today. Each must contend, in different ways, with the three dialectical tensions presented by Kreiner et al. Nevertheless, these strategies offer some ways forward for those structures that wish to identify as Catholic in a pluralistic context. 3 Conclusion Catholic social institutions have historically served as important expressions of the Catholic Christian faith. At their best, they present themselves as embodiments of the Gospel command to serve the needs of millions of people on the margins. These institutions today, however, face a number of disruptive pressures from both inside and outside the Church. Like one’s personal identity, an organization’s identity is not static. This is particularly the case for those organizations that seek to engage ever-changing social dynamics through education, healthcare, social assistance, and humanitarian aid. In many places, the development of government-sponsored social development programs has made the need for religiously-sponsored institutions less urgent. Looking ahead, it is unlikely that these pressures will dissipate. For some institutions, the future will involve difficult decisions. There will continue to be closures and mergers of long-established institutions, including entire religious congregations. Some may continue, but with a different or formally severed relationship to the Church. But there will also likely be the creation of new innovative projects like the recently created Fe y Alegría and Cristo Rey education models, or the innovative developments in Catholic healthcare systems. Attending to identity throughout these changes will not be easy for some involved, and it will demand what Kreiner et al. call “organizational identity work” or what I have described elsewhere with a theological lens as “communal discernment” (Ahern 2015: 148). References About the Cristo Rey Network. 2017. https://www.cristoreynetwork.org/about [accessed on 30 June 2017]. Ahern, Kevin. (2015). Structures of grace: Catholic Organizations Serving the Global Common Good. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

266

Ahern

Albert, Stuart and David A Whetten. 1985. “Organizational Identity”. Research in Organizational Behavior, 7: 263–295. Alvare, Helen 2014. “Bishops v. Nuns in Jeeps—Why a Facially Intra-Catholic Health Care Dispute Matters”. Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 25(2): 563. Bernardin, Joseph. 1991. “Catholic Institutions and Their Identity”. Origins, 21(2): 33–6. Bevans, Stephen B. and Jeffrey Gros. 2009. Evangelization and Religious Freedom: Ad Gentes, Dignitatis Humanae. New York: Paulist Press. The Cardinal Newman Society. 2017. The Newman Guide to Choosing a Catholic College. https://cardinalnewmansociety.org/program/the-newman-guide/ [accessed on 20 January 2018]. Code of Canon Law. 1983. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana. Retrieved from www .vatican.va [accessed 21 June 2017]. Conference at Boston College. 2012. International Networking in the Society of Jesus Challenges from a Universal Mission. Jesuit Networking. http://jesuitnetworking.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/2012_Conference_International_Jesuit_­Networking.pdf [accessed 15 June 2017]. Curran, Charles E. 1997. “The Catholic Identity of Catholic Institutions.” Theological Studies 58(1): 90–108. Darcy, Catherine C. 1993. The Institute of the Sisters of Mercy of the Americas: the ­canonical development of the proposed governance model. University Press of America. Dignity Health. “History, Mission, Vision and Values”. 2017. Dignity Health. https://www .dignityhealth.org/about-us/our-organization/mission-vision-and-values [accessed on 30 June 2017]. Dreher, Rod. 2017. The Benedict Option: A Strategy for Christians in a Post-Christian Nation. New York: Penguin. Franz, Craig J. 2006. “True to a Vision, Steadfast to a Dream.” Pp. 29–45 in Reflections on Lasallian Higher Education: Current Opportunities and Future Visions. Moraga, ca: International Association of Lasallian Universities. Garanzini, Michael. 2017, June 16. Higher Education Institutions. Email correspondence with author. General Congregation 32. 2009. Decree 4: Our Mission Today: The Service of Faith and the Promotion of Justice. In Padberg, J.W. (Ed.), Jesuit Life and Mission Today: The Decrees of the 31st–35th General Congregations of the Society of Jesus (pp. 298–316). St. Louis, MO: Institute of Jesuit Sources. General Congregation 35. 2009. Decree 6: Collaboration at the Heart of Mission. In Padberg, J.W. (Ed.), Jesuit Life and Mission Today: The Decrees of the 31st–35th General Congregations of the Society of Jesus (pp. 780–788). St. Louis, MO: Institute of Jesuit Sources.

Navigating the Fault Lines Catholic Institutional Identity

267

Gioia, Dennis A., Majken Schultz, & Kevin G. Corley 2000. “Organizational Identity, Image, and Adaptive Instability”. Academy of Management Review, 25(1): 63–81. Gleason, Philip. 1995. Contending With Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth Century. New York: Oxford University. Gottemoeller, Doris. 2001. “History of Catholic Institutions in the United States”. New Theology Review, 14(2): 16–27. Houry, Alain. (2006). “Charism in Recent Institute Documents”. In The Lasallian Charism (181–194). Rome: Brothers of the Christian Schools. Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools, Memento. 2017 (49th ed.). Rome: Casa Generalizia La Salle. Jesuit Secretariat for Secondary and Pre-Secondary Education. 2016. “Summary of Statistics 2016”. Society of Jesus. http://www.sjweb.info/documents/education/ reports_ICAJE_2016-summar_20160628.pdf [accessed 30 June 2017]. John Paul II. 1990. Redemptoris Missio, On the Permanent Validity of the Church’s Missionary Mandate. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana. http://www.vatican.va/holy _father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_07121990_redemptoris -missio_en.html [accessed 10 July 2017]. John Paul ii. 1996. Vita Consecrata, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation on Consecrated Life and Its Mission in the Church and in the World. Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana. Johnson, Mary, Patricia Wittberg, and Mary L. Gautier (2014). New Generations of Catholic Sisters: The Challenge of Diversity. New York: Oxford University Press. Kaye, Julia, Brigitte Amiri, Louise Melling, and Jennifer Dalven 2016. Health Care ­Denied: Patients and Physicians Speak Out About Catholic Hospitals and the Threat to Women’s Health and Lives. New York: American Civil Liberties Union. https:// www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/healthcaredenied.pdf [accessed on September 2017]. Kreiner, Glen E., Elaine Hollensbe, Mathew L. Sheep, Brett R. Smith, and Niyati Kataria. 2015. “Elasticity and the Dialectic Tensions of Organizational Identity: How Can We Hold Together While We Are Pulling Apart?” Academy of Management Journal 58(4):981–1011. Leahy, Brendan. 2011. Ecclesial Movements and Communities: Origins, Significance, and Issues. Hyde Park, ny: New City Press. Lysaught, M. Therese. 2013. Caritas in Communion: Theological Foundations of Catholic Health Care. Washington: Catholic Health Association. McDermott, Jim. 2017. “The Francis Effect on Jesuit Mergers: Being More Present and Going to the Margins.” America. https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2017/06/ 21/francis-effect-jesuit-mergers-being-more-present-and-going-margins [accessed on 30 June, 2017]. McGuinness, Margaret M. 2013. Called to Serve: A History of Nuns in America. New York: nyu Press.

268

Ahern

Morris-Young, Dan 2012. “Cardinal Newman Society Takes on Watchdog Role for Catholic Identity”. National Catholic Reporter. https://www.ncronline.org/news/parish/ cardinal-newman-society-takes-watchdog-role-catholic-identity [accessed 30 September 2017]. Morrissey, Francis. G. 2001. “Toward Juridic Personality”. Health Progress, July-August: 27–31; 51. Nguyen, Francis Tri. 2007. Lasallian Universities Identities in the Twenty-First Century: An Analytical Research Paper. Rome: Brothers of the Christian Schools. O’Malley, John. W. 2014. The Jesuits: A History from Ignatius to the Present. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. O’Rourke, Kevin. D. 2006. “Canon Law and Ethical and Religious Directives”. Health Progress: 42–43. O’Rourke, Kevin D. 2010. “What Happened in Phoenix?: The Complicated Reasons ­behind an Abortion at a Catholic Hospital”. America Magazine. https://www.ameri camagazine.org/issue/741/100/what-happened-phoenix [accessed 20 January 2018]. Reynolds, Mary. 2017, June 20. Research Question. Email correspondence with author. Schieler, Robert. 2016. “The Lasallian Mission: A Global Educational Network,” July 19, De La Salle University, Philippines. Sweas, Megan. 2014. Putting Education to Work: How Cristo Rey High Schools Are Transforming Urban Education. New York: Harper Collins. The Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate (CARA). (2017). “Frequently Requested Church Statistics”. http://cara.georgetown.edu/frequently-requested-churchstatistics/ [accessed on 30 June 2017]. Thirty-Ninth General Chapter. 1967. The Brother of the Christian Schools in the World Today: A Declaration. De la Salle Brothers. Villanueva, Dani. 2016. “An ‘Updated’ List of Jesuit Networks.” Jesuit Networking. http:// jesuitnetworking.org/a-list-of-jesuit-networks [accessed on 30 June, 2017]. Weber, Maximillan. 1922. “The Nature of Charismatic Authority and its Routinization” in Theory of Social and Economic Organization. London. W. Hodge, 1947. Originally published in 1922. Wittberg, Patricia. 1994. The Rise and Fall of Catholic Religious Orders: A Social Movement Perspective. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Chapter 13

The Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries in the Czech Republic and Austria Barbora Spalová and Isabelle Jonveaux Monastic life is characterized by a specific dimension in comparison with other forms of consecrated life: stability or stabilitas loci.1 This means that a monk or a nun enters a particular monastery and theoretically stays in it forever. On the contrary, in apostolic orders, brothers or sisters choose a congregation in a geographical province and then change the place and community according to the mission they receive. Initially stability meant, in theological words, staying in the same place in order to grow fidelity to the faith, and was established in the profession as a move against the gyrovagues—monks who are continually changing their location (de Vogüé 1974: 107–111). What does stability mean for the economy of the monastery? What is the influence of stability in the places and time of the monastic economy? According to the Rule of St. Benedict, monks must work inside the monastery. They also must learn to develop the surrounding natural environment in order to provide for the community. For Benedictine order, stability also means autarchy from an economic point of view, even though we find only a few cases of real autarchy in the history of monasticism. The economy of stability therefore concerns places of economic activity and work, as well as the agency of the monastery to develop the best environmental conditions to provide sustenance to the community for a long period. The second dimension of the economy of stability is time itself, which is considered from a long perspective of unlimited duration, and which refers to religious eschatology. Stability also concerns the community as a stable variable, not in individual people, but in the continuity of the group. The economy of stability is therefore characterized

1 This text is the product of cooperation between the Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University Prague and the Theology Faculty at the University of Graz, supported by the programme Aktion Česká Republika—Rakousko, project no. 76 p9, Moral Economy of the Monasteries in the Czech Republic and in Austria. The authors of the text are deeply grateful to all the monastics and collaborators we met during the research, as well as our colleagues and students from Prague University who actively participated in all stages of the project: Marek Liška, Zuzana Pešková, Tereza Picková, Jana Proboštová, Tereza Sedláčková, and Jan Tesárek.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004380073_015

270

Spalová and Jonveaux

by three main unities: place, time, and community. It is a place of convergence for Benedictine spirituality and the economic management of the monastery. Many authors, especially economically trained ones, quite recently rediscovered the Benedictine economic model based on the principle of stabilitas loci as uniquely longstanding and resistant, and analysed its different upsides and downsides: quasi-democratic Benedictine governance with a culture of consensus, long-term orientation and guardian behaviour, but also tensions between the secular and sacred in economic decisions, the limitations of useful austerity measures by strong local networks and the resulting conflictual roles of cellarers (Feldbauer-Durstmüller and Neulinger 2010; Hiebl and FeldbauerDurstmüller 2014). Some have also studied the role of Benedictine spirituality in promoting the values of ecological sustainability (Aversano Dearborn, Freyer and Leipold 2013). Our aim in this text is different. Rather than attempt to take useful lessons from the monastic economy for the business world, our aim is to continue the work of Isabelle Jonveaux (2011), and more broadly that of Danièle HervieuLéger (2017), in analysing different types of monastic economies as places of complex relationships within particular societies. We want to understand what the labour and economic questions mean to the monks and how topics raised in monastic communities’ internal discussions about labour (dis)connect to societal discourses. From our socio-anthropological perspective, we always try to speak about economic activities in connection with the values and logic of the studied culture. Therefore, we chose for comparison two countries—the Czech Republic and Austria—where the Catholic Church shares a long history. In the Czech Republic, however, the communist period interrupted the continuous development of monasteries and produced the possibility of new starts after 1989. In Austria, we can see what the Czech monasteries would probably look like without the communist interruption, which, on the other hand, enables the renewed Czech communities to search, perhaps more freely—without the “heavy burden of tradition,” for the “authentic” Benedictine life. We will analyse this specific renewal through the lens of the economy of stability. 1

Historical Context

The centuries-long shared Catholic history of both countries includes the suppression of monasteries during the reign of the Enlightenment-era Austrian monarch Joseph ii. After the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, the two countries developed very different frameworks for Church-State-society relations.

Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries

271

In the Czech Republic, the Roman Catholic Church lost one million believers directly after the fall of the empire, who converted to the nationalistic Czechoslovak Hussite Church. Then in 1949, the communist state expropriated churches, and religious life was strictly controlled. Until 1990, consecrated life was illegal in Czechoslovakia. More recently, the process of separating Church and State began with the adoption of a restitution law in 2012 which returns properties and gives financial compensation to all those registered churches and religious organizations. Long-term economic strategies are currently being discussed and established (Spalová, Tesárek, Pešková, Drábková and Hemerová 2016). The situation of Austrian monasteries is still marked by “Josephinism,” especially as concerns economic activities. In 1780, influenced by the physiocrat theories of French economist Quesnay, the emperor Joseph ii started a policy of suppression of all monastic and religious communities which did not have a “useful” activity for society. Male monasteries with a school or parishes could stay, but were forced to accept new parishes from the state. The heritage of this period is still seen in contemporary Austrian monasteries, as monks are mainly occupied in parishes or schools (Jonveaux 2011, 2014a). 2

Legal Framework of the Economic Activities of Monasteries in the Czech Republic and Austria

In 1949, Czechoslovakia adopted Act No. 218/1949 Coll., on state economic support of churches and religious societies, which codified the expropriation and legislated the complete dependence of churches on the state budget. Church employees became state employees and priests had to have permission from the state to perfor their service. In 1950, the state illegally and violently invaded 219 monastic houses, confiscated movable and immovable property and imprisoned 2,376 monks in internment camps. For this reason, monasteries were the first legal persons from the church to obtain buildings (but not agricultural lands and forests) in 1991. That year Czechoslovakia approved the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and Act No. 308/1991 Coll. on the freedom of religious beliefs and the status of churches and religious communities, which gave the churches the greatest autonomy in the history of state-church relations (Tretera and Horák 2015: 85).2 2 Some of these freedoms were later limited by Act No. 3/2002 Coll., which introduces the possibility of controlling and limiting churches and religious societies in order to preserve the security and morality of society.

272

Spalová and Jonveaux

But the economic dependence of the churches on the state continued for another twenty years until the adoption of Act No. 428/2012 Coll., on property settlement with churches and religious societies, which regulates the restitution of properties seized after February 28, 1948 and assures financial compensation over the course of the next 30 years (the properties to be returned have an estimated value of 75 billion czk and compensation may be around 59 billion). In return for the restitutions, the previous state financial contributions will decrease by 5% every year starting in 2016 and will completely stop in 2029. Therefore, entrepreneur activities are to become more and more important for the financial stability of the churches (Novotná 2014). After 2012, the monasteries also slowly received back their historical properties and reoriented their economies to a more self-sufficient model. The incomes of monasteries generally come from: (A) own economic activities, (B) state financial compensation for non-restituted properties, (C) salaries or pensions of monks or nuns (especially monk priests, teachers, academics, etc.), (D) grants and (E) donations (exempt from income tax). Contrary to common belief, Austrian monasteries do not receive money from the Church tax, and even less from the Vatican. The legal framework does not present many particularities, apart from an exemption from local property tax for properties used for religious purposes according to the Property Tax Law of 1955 (Grundsteuergesetz), or for public concerns. This therefore concerns monastery churches, on the one hand, and schools, cemeteries, and sports installations on the other (Prettenthaler et al.: 2015, 20). Properties which are used for agricultural or economic activities are not exempt ­(Prettenthaler et al.: 2015, 20). 3

Methodology

For our research we choose only monasteries from the Benedictine family:3 three Benedictine, one Cistercian and two Trappist monasteries in Czechia and one Benedictine and two Cistercian in Austria (see Table 13.1).4 3 This means that these communities live according to the Rule of St. Benedict, making an effective framework for comparison. 4 The Czech Republic now has 3 male and 1 female Benedictine monasteries, 1 male and 1 female Cistercian monastery, and 1 male and 1 female Trappist monastery. The communities are small, with a maximum of about 20 people in the Trappist monasteries, but only 4–5 in Cistercian and Benedictine. Austria has 15 male and 3 female Benedictine monasteries, 8 male and one female Cistercian monasteries, and one Trappist male monastery. The Austrian Benedictine congregation had 288 monks in 2017, including 6 novices. We worked in

273

Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries Table 13.1 The studied monasteries in Austria and Czech Republica

Benedictines Czech Republic Austria

Břevnov Rajhrad Men Men Kremsmünster Men

Venio Women

Cistercians

Trappists

Vyšší Brod Men Heiligenkreuz Rein Men Men

Nový dvůr Poličany Men Women

a The female monasteries in Austria are rare because of Josephinism, therefore they have not been represented in the study.

Below are short introductions to the monasteries: Břevnov—Founded in 933; on the fringe of Prague; a large Baroque complex; always important in history; 12 monks today (4 of them living outside the community serving in the parishes); privileged ties to the Benedictine monastery of Rohr in Bavaria where exiled abbot Anastáz Opasek lived during the communist era (1968–1990); https://www.brevnov.cz/ Rajhrad (Ger. Raigern)—1,000 years old, but subordinated to Břevnov; an independent abbey since 1813; located in south Moravia; a large Baroque complex only partially renovated today; community of 8 to 10, mostly young monks; only one of them is a priest; privileged ties to the Benedictine monastery of Gottweig in Austria and to Břevnov; http://www.rajhrad.cz/benediktini/ Venio—Founded in 2007 from the Venio community in Munich, Germany; a special form of Benedictine life where sisters have no papal enclosure and therefore have secular jobs and live the community life only in the evening and on weekends; situated at the pilgrimage site of Bílá Hora next to the Břevnov monastery; community has 5 sisters; currently the only female Benedictine monastery in Czechia; http://www.benediktinky.cz/cz/ Vyšší Brod (Ger. Hohenfurt)—Founded in 1259; situated in South Bohemia near the Austrian border; large historical complex partly converted into a museum; community of 4 monks; privileged ties to the Cistercian monastery of Rein, Austria, where the community of Vyšší Brod was exiled during the communist era; currently the only Cistercian male community in Czechia; http:// www.klastervyssibrod.cz/

all the Czech monasteries and analysed all except two very small communities; in Austria we chose monasteries connected either historically or currently in cooperation with Czech monasteries.

274

Spalová and Jonveaux

Nový Dvůr—Founded in 2002 from Sept-Fons, France; situated in the deserted former Sudetenland of West Bohemia; treasured, architecturally m ­ odern building; international community of 27 monks; the first and only Trappist male monastery in Czechia; http://novydvur.cz/ Poličany—Founded in 2007 from Vittorchiano, Italy; situated about 90 km south of Prague; large complex with big guesthouse built as a modern reinterpretation of Roman Italian Cistercian style; community of more than 20 sisters; the first and only Trappist female monastery in Czechia; https://www.trappistevitorchiano.it/storia-fondazioni-nasi-pani-cz.asp Kremsmünster—Founded in 777 from lower Bavaria; situated in Upper Austria; immense, mostly baroque complex hosting a gymnasium; the biggest Benedictine community in Austria with 48 monks; the largest Benedictine monastery in Austria; https://stift-kremsmuenster.net/ Heiligen Kreuz—Founded in 1133; about 30 km from Vienna; a large complex including many architectural styles with a modern theology college; biggest monastic community in Austria, with 98 monks; https://www.stift-­ heiligenkreuz.org/ Rein—Founded in 1129; near Graz in Styria; monastic complex includes Romanesque parts as well as High Baroque; hosts a state gymnasium; community of 16 monks; https://www.stift-rein.at Before the fieldwork at the monasteries, we attempted to define the position of monasticism in national memories (Spalová 2012), contemporary cultural production, and media coverage (with the help of a Newton Media database search for 1991–2017). We also analysed the web presentations of the monasteries. During our visits to the monasteries (October 2016–June 2017) we conducted interviews with different members of the monastic communities: priors, cellarers, novice directors, and monks responsible for a specialized economic field (especially forestry and wineries). Another important source of knowledge consisted of informal discussions in monastic shops and guesthouses, as well as observations made while visiting the monasteries. These participant observations gave us at least a limited experience of monastic time and space, of monastic rhythm. 4

Economy of Stability

In the remainder of the text, we analyse the manifestations of the ideal of stability in the economic activities of the monasteries. We found four main fields: (re)constructions of monastic complexes; management of memory and tradition; economy of hospitality; and sustainable economy. However, we first present the main types of economic models of the monasteries in both countries.

Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries

275

4.1 Economic Models in Austrian and Czech Monasteries The goal of the monastic economy is not to make profit, but to provide for the sustenance of the community. As the prior of Břevnov says, “We come back to the Benedictine tradition to produce what we need. It is not about having golden doors here, but to have just enough to live on.” The monasteries in this inquiry present different models of sources of income. In the monastic world, we can distinguish five models of sources of income: internal economy of production, economy of external activities, economy of hereditament, economy of gifts and economy of aging (Jonveaux 2015). Almost all Austrian male monasteries present an economy of hereditament. This means the main revenue comes from properties of the monastery, and not directly through the labour of the monks. The Kremsmünster and Heiligenkreuz cases correspond exactly to this model, as the main source of revenue for both of these monasteries is forestry (80%). In each monastery, only one monk currently works in monastic forestry, as a manager, while all other work is done by lay employees. Some monasteries in Austria have very large properties, such as the Benedictine Abbey of Admont, which is the 7th biggest landowner in Austria.5 In the Czech Republic, the structure of the monastic economy is more diverse. Before the suppression, male monasteries had an economy of hereditament like Austria, but they lost their properties in the communist period. The economic models of Czech monasteries are actually very similar to the models of the countries that founded, or refounded, the monasteries after the 1989 Velvet Revolution. In Nový Dvůr for instance, we find an economic model of internal production like in France, and exactly the same as in Poličany, which was founded by Italian sisters. This means the communities have developed modes of production in the monastery in which monks and nuns are directly employed. In Břevnov, on the contrary, we find the Austrian model, with building rental as the main source of income. Under the other sources of income, we can quote the guesthouse, the shop, donations, and reimbursement for non-restituted properties. As we can see in the diagram on p. 288, the breakdown of income in these six Czech monasteries contrasts highly between models, with the main source of income coming from production in the secondary sector, like in Nový Dvůr (production of mustard and cosmetics) and Poličany (biscuits, sweets, writing of icons), and models where agriculture and rental of land and buildings represent the largest sources of income, as in Rajhrad, Vyšší Brod and Břevnov. The case of Venio is quite different—the sisters live off their own salaries, as they also work outside the community. We can also see that no monastery nowadays 5 Die Presse 18.06.2011, http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/oesterreich/671228/Grundbesitz _Wem-gehoert-Oesterreich [accessed 6 June 2017].

276

Spalová and Jonveaux

could live off donations alone, apart from the specific case of Venio, where the sisters are very active in applying for grants. For the majority of monasteries, these represent less than 10% of income. The structure of income does not necessarily reflect the real work of monks or nuns. All monasteries in this study live according to the Rule of St. Benedict, for whom monks “are truly monks when they live by the labour of their hands” (RB 48, 8). In the economic model of hereditament, such as in Kremsmünster, Heiligenkreuz or Břevnov, monks are not directly employed in the most productive activities. As was already said, monks in Austria are mainly occupied in parishes or schools, as almost all monasteries from the Benedictine tradition have a school and parishes. In Kremsmünster and Heiligenkreuz, half the community lives not at the monastery but in the surrounding parishes, only coming in for important community events. In these cases, almost 90% of the monks are priests (Jonveaux 2014b). Conversely, in monasteries with an internal eco­ nomy of production, the monastics really do live in the community and need not go outside the monastery often. Therefore, the economy of stability can take different forms according to the socio-political context of the monastery. The period of refounding Czech monasteries also implies development of economic activities which go together with the restabilization of monastic life. The growth of the community, restitution of properties and transition from the charismatic refounding phase to routinization have influenced the economic structure of the monastery. For instance, in Břevnov, the prior explains that they are undergoing a transformation from renter to manager, where activities inside the monastic complex are taking priority over those outside. This is possible because the community is in a process of stabilization and can take direct responsibility for more activities: The rents in the (monastic) complex will end next year, thus we want to take over all of those things. We are talking about hotel management, restaurant and event management as well. We’ve gained certain experience and those people who are doing it now would like to come under our management. (…) And we have also become entrepreneurs in the hops industry: we planted the first 24 ha of a new hops garden and we plan to increase it to 80. Prior, October 2016

In Vyšší Brod, after the recent restitution of old farm buildings, the prior is thinking about relaunching the production of beer. The outcomes of monastic communities have nearly the same structure on each continent. According to André Ardouin, a French monk from Ligugé, who

Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries

277

manages the accounts of monasteries in Europe, North America, and Africa, the structure of outcomes reflects that of society. In African monasteries, food is the top expenditure, as is the case in poor countries according to Engel’s law, whereas housing takes first place in Europe. In the monasteries we are studying here, buildings occupy the top spot, especially in Czech monasteries, which must presently renovate the buildings they have received in restitution or build a new monastery. 4.2 (Re)construction of Monastic Complexes The building complexes in contemporary Benedictine monasteries bear testimony to the long historical development of the communities, materialize their understanding of monastic life and provide a “face” for the monastery to present before society. They are archives of memory (Assmann 2010) and their contemporary look is a representation of the actual interpretation of its tradition. Some look more like fortresses, some like universities, others like an isolated farm. Benedictine monasteries always work with the ideal form of the monastery as an autarchic world concentrated on the spiritual aim of the community.6 However, they must also reflect the functions they fill for the world today, which includes the function of heritage managers. In Kremsmünster, Austria, two symbols in the monastery are privileged: the Tassilo Chalice from the 8th century and the Mathematical Tower with its astronomical observatories from the 18th century. The tower, as high as the church towers, is a monument of the position of the monastery in the academic world and works as a distinctive mark in comparison with other monasteries. Today, the majority of monastic buildings in Kremsmünster serve the public, not the monks: they include a school, museum, restaurant, shop, the gardens, and garden shop, etc. Heiligenkreuz also reserves its core historical enclosure for thousands of tourists (150,000 every year according to its webpage) visiting from around the world. However, these monasteries are not only conserved as museums, they change their faces continuously as well. In Heiligenkreuz, they rebuilt their farm outbuildings into a modern theological college and seminary next to the enclosure. In Kremsmünster, they invested 8 million euros into the 6 The first architectonic plan of Europe is a plan of the ideal Benedictine monastery from around 820 ad, archived in the Abbey of St. Gallen. The plan is divided into four areas: the church has a central position in the main enclosure together with a dormitory, refectory, and scriptorium. The second area is an enclosure for novices and ill monks neighbouring the cemetery. The third area is designed for visitors; there is a guesthouse, a bakery, brewery, the abbot’s residence, an infirmary and school for laypeople. The last area is reserved for economic activities: there are the industrial outbuildings and the homes for all sorts of farm animals (Duft 1998, Kuthan 2014).

278

Spalová and Jonveaux

reconstruction of a section of the former enclosure, now used by children as a gymnasium run by the monastery. What we can observe in the Austrian management of monastic buildings could be termed an effort to open the monastery up to many different groups of visitors: tourists; students (and their families); locals (the monasteries usually employ hundreds of local people); groups of believers; pilgrims; and clients of monastic shops, wine cellars, and restaurants. As one monk in Kremsmünster said, “Naturally, publicity is very important for every monastery. A monastery actually should be attractive. It is also important because of the potential novices.”7 (Friar responsible for winery, April 2017) As the Austrian monasteries were never closed throughout their history (unlike France and Germany in the 19th century and Czechoslovakia in the 20th century), their complexes are very large and all their buildings must have a reasonable purpose—something that makes the monastery “attractive.” But reasonable also means economically profitable (at least somehow). This profitability is even more important to Czech monasteries. In 1990 and 1991, the property rights of 170 monasteries were returned to the orders (Tretera and Horák 2015: 253). The buildings were, with rare exceptions, in very poor condition, having served for more than 40 years as military stocks and garages (Rajhrad), military archives, the headquarters of state secret police (Břevnov and Bílá Hora, see figure 13.1), or even as an internment camp for monks and

Figure 13.1

Břevnov in 1991. Photo: jindřich štreit.

7 To this interpretation, we should also add the internalized demand on monasteries to be socially useful, which has an even longer tradition in Austrian monasticism than the impact of “Josephinism” (see Niederkorn-Bruck 1994 about Melk reform). Many Benedictine monasteries in Austria were reconstructed after the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) as a symbol of

Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries

279

nuns (Broumov). As the prior of Břevnov says, “Of course, it would be much easier and cheaper to build a new monastery than to reconstruct a national historical monument with 17 kilometres full of archive materials.” (Prior, May 2017) All the researched communities had to start living in provisionally adapted buildings outside the enclosure, with some living there to date (Rajhrad). But the situation can also be seen as an opportunity to reconstruct and revitalize the monasteries without the burden of heavy tradition. The Cistercians of Vyšší Brod used the rupture in tradition as a kind of retirement from society. The publicly engaged pre-WWII community with 73 brothers (in the 1930s, the prior was the mayor of Vyšší Brod, the monks taught at the Gymnasium in České Budějovice and served in the parishes) is now a small community of four monks which represents itself on its webpage in this way: The real discontinuity of monastic life in Vyšší Brod has also some positive aspects. In Czechia, there are already many orders performing active pastoral work among the people (e.g. the Premonstratensiens). The Church has asked orders to return to their roots and therefore we have begun living out the monastic calling strictly. Who else would hold the place of monasticism in the Czech church?8 Prior, April 2017

This idea has been implemented in the renovation of the complex through a strict division of places inhabited by monks and others designed to accommodate tourists. The Cistercians from Vyšší Brod are close to the Trappists definition of the meaning of monastic life, who are newly settled in the Czech Republic. Both Trappist monastic complexes are new, and the communities have put a lot of effort and prayers into finding suitable places for them—in beautiful wilderness areas and as far from other people as possible. The female monastery is built “according to the old Roman Italian Cistercian plans,” as a sister said, in a place where the sisters could also buy enough of the property around the monastic complex to create a kind of “natural enclosure.” “We live in the enclosure as a detachment from the world,” she explains. The monastery has a large guesthouse with 19 rooms, but it is actually only the guesthouse, the church, re-Catholicization and dominance, becoming the “cities of God” (Coomans 2015: 54) with considerable spiritual, intellectual, economic, and political power. (During this period, the architecture of the monasteries were similar to palaces of the noblesse, with the so-called Kaisersaal and library as the two most prestigious buildings.) 8 See http://www.klastervyssibrod.cz/Historie/Obnova-klasterniho-zivota-po-padu-komunis mu-r-1989 (last accessed 24 May 2017).

280

Spalová and Jonveaux

and the shop that a visitor can see in Poličany. All other parts of the complex are not only closed to the public, but also visible only from a bird’s-eye perspective. The Trappists from Nový Dvůr also bought 120 hectares of forest around the monastery in order to also have a ring of calm around.” The architecture of the monastery is stunning—the masterpiece by British minimalist architect, John Pawson, with the local studio Soukup being awarded many architectural prizes: “Referring to the theology of St. John, we can articulate that the balance between Christian existence in the world and the transcendence of this world was incorporated into this building. Schmidt, 2004

Here again, the building is the expression of the unique focus on God, which should not be disturbed by the “world.” This logic of distantness as a value is also observable in other features of the economy of stability in some Czech monasteries (see figure 13.2). On the other hand, we also visited the Břevnov monastery, which represents a clear oppositional logic to the logic of distantness. The complex of buildings at the fringe of Prague with its generous gardens, brewery and farm ­outbuildings is today a very busy centre of local life. In a newspaper interview, the prior was reported as being proud of reviving the local traditions and ­making it a lively place:

Figure 13.2

The Trappist monastery of Nový Dvůr. Source: Regionální stavební sdružení Karlovy Vary.

Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries

281

We like to live all together in the one yard: here, we have the hotel, the pub, the brewery and also the car repair shop. (Danda 2014) Břevnov also opened its gardens for the public (in exchange of money from City Hall to care for the garden) and regularly hosts public events of many kinds: concerts, lectures, exhibitions, school feasts, festivals and a very noisy and colourful “traditional” fair with carousels. The prior presents these activities as “a service for the public, as charity, as another level of hospitality.” “Traditional” is the key word for the interpretation. It is the core value to reviving a tradition which is presented as that of being rooted in society, a tradition of playing an important role in society’s spiritual and secular life. More than that, it seems to be spiritually important for the Benedictines of Břevnov to be connected with society in many ways. As concerns the reconstruction of monastic complexes in the Czech Republic, we can see two trends—the Trappists and the Cistercians attempt to revive the ideal of fuga mundi as far as is economically possible (Vyšší Brod, for example, has to reserve a part of the monastery for tourists), while the Benedictines in the Czech Republic are nearer to the monasteries in Austria in their efforts to revive the “traditional” role of the monastery in society (meaning the monastery as a centre of spiritual, intellectual, cultural, and economic influence). They are ready to turn some parts of the monastic complexes into heritage sites in exchange for recognition of this position, which is then further commercialized and commodified (monastery trademarks, monastery guided tours, etc.). 4.3 Monastics as Curators of Memory and Tradition Stability in its temporal dimension means monastic communities have often been in the same place since the foundation of the monastery, which in some cases occurred 1,000 years earlier. How do monastic communities manage this historic heritage? With the present dynamic of refounding in the Czech Republic, we identified three situations. Either the monastic community is returning to a historic location and buildings like those in Břevnov or Vyšší Brod; or a new community is established in an old monastic place, such as the community of Venio at Bílá Hora; or a new community is founded, either by itself or by another community, mostly from a foreign country such as in Nový Dvůr from France (2000) and in Poličany from Italy (2007). The Austrian cases we studied all had historical foundations from the 8th, 12th and 13th centuries. Tradition plays a specific role in monasticism, as Delpal describes it: unlike the Church, monasticism cannot base itself on divine foundation and requires tradition for its legitimacy (Delpal 1998: 15). Identification with the tradition of monasticism is therefore an important dimension of monastic identity. In the

282

Spalová and Jonveaux

case of a return to a historic monastery after 40 years of communism, care for tradition, buildings, Gregorian liturgy and the history of the monastery works indeed as justification9 of their monastic identity after the rupture and refounding. Working on the heritage of the monastery as a cultural object, monks also work on the reconstitution of monastic continuity. When a rupture has occurred in the tradition, the necessity arises for monastic communities to recreate the continuity. The development of old activities can also work to reconnect with tradition after the rupture, such as in Břevnov and Vyšší Brod, where priors plan to produce beer, a traditional monastic activity. But the reinvestment of tradition begs the question of knowing to which tradition it is referring. Tradition is not a monolithic block, and referring to it requires selecting which tradition it is about. In Nový Dvůr, for instance, monks decided to opt for a dormitory, ­although very few Trappist monasteries in France still had dormitories in 2,000 and a collective dormitory did not appear before 500 ad in the history of monasticism (de Vogüé 1985: 19). Therefore, on one hand, monastic tradition is an important dimension for the justification of monastic life, while on the other hand, monasteries are also important places of collective memory for society. According to Maurice Halbwachs: The believer entering a church, a cemetery, or other consecration place knows he will recover a mental state he has experienced many times. Together with fellow believers he will re-establish, in addition to their visible community, a common thought and remembrance formed and maintained there through the ages. halbwachs 1980: 151

Especially for Czech society, monasteries can be approached as places of Christian memory (or spiritual traditions of the nation), which are attractive now because of the long period of suppression of this part of the national memory. Jean Davallon speaks about “values of rememoration” which confer to a place its value because it belongs to the past. They refer to the distance between the moment of the production of the building and the present moment (Devallon 2006: 67). Rein and Heiligenkreuz highlight their role as places of memory for the history of Styria and Austria, as important dynasties are buried there. According to them, they are curators of tradition for society, a function that the state would otherwise have to take on. The Abbey of Rein presents itself as the centre of Styrian history, but also as the oldest Cistercian monastery in the world, as we can see on the first page of its website.10 This monastery carries 9 10

We refer here to the concept of Boltanski and Thévenot 1991. This means the oldest Cistercian monastery in the world without interruption in monastic life. The oldest Cistercian monasteries are naturally in France, with Cîteaux and

Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries

283

therefore the collective memory of the region and also the whole Cistercian order, which nowadays gives it its legitimacy, despite the community currently being very small. When communities are living in historic buildings, one activity consists of taking care of this heritage and enhancing it. So it is that we can observe, as for instance in Břevnov, real management of memory. This specifically means that the monastery is becoming a museum; it is selling itself as a historic place. This corresponds to the process of “patrimonialisation of monasteries” (Jonveaux 2015), which also raises the question of the patrimonialisation of the communities and monastics themselves. If monasteries are for society places of memory, and monastics are the curators of this tradition in the name of society, it also means, in economic terms, that monastic products benefit from the added value of tradition. The traditional dimension of monastic products plays a role of differentiation and lets them find a place in the market. In case of a rupture in the tradition of production, laypeople can reconstitute the missing link by adapting old recipes to modern demands of natural and organic products. In Rajhrad, a layperson worked on updating old monastic recipes to commercialize them under the name of the monastery (see fig. 13.3). We sell herbal liqueurs and syrups, which we make, because in these rooms there used to be a pharmacy […] We have found old recipes in our library and one man, who we know, and who has a degree in biochemistry, says—you know we should put it together, I like this job and you do not have the capacity for it. So we agreed that we are the owners of the recipes—these secrets—and he makes it under our brand. Because he says, if he would sell it under his name (‘Motyčka’), he’ll sell nothing, but if he sells it as Benedictines, he will. The little factory is supposed to be here, however bureaucrats from the National Heritage Institute did not give us permission, even if though it is supposed to be in the nondecorated rooms. So, we have it in Rosnice near Brno, but we sell it here. Friar, April 2017

We can observe the same situation in Rome for the brand “Ai monasteri,” where a lay chemist adapted old monastic recipes in cooperation with some Italian monasteries (Jonveaux 2011). Tradition that is sold to visitors as products must therefore be adapted to modern norms and tastes, as with monastic tradition in general, which is situated between offer and demand. its daughters Pontigny, Morimond, Clairvaux, but those communities had to undergo suppressions.

284

Spalová and Jonveaux

Figure 13.3

The “minishop” in Rajhrad. Photo: zuzana pešková.

4.4 Economy of Hospitality: Economy or Pastorate? Hospitality is a special feature of the economy of stability. All monasteries of the Benedictine family must deal with this feature because of the importance of hospitality in Regula Benedicti: “Let all guests who arrive be received like Christ […]. And to all let due honour be shown, especially to the domestics of the faith and to pilgrims” (RB 53, 1). Today, it can also be analysed as a place of confrontation between the monastic world and the outside world—“confrontation of sacred and profane, of economy and religion” (Jonveaux 2012: 127). Monastic communities must carefully navigate between the strictly Catholic framing of receiving guests (and so closing the door to the majority of surrounding societies) and a wide openness to everybody. Discussions in the communities about the limits of hospitality represent “a key place of invention of monastic testimony for the post-Christian society” (Hervieu-Léger 2017: 661). The researched monasteries in Austria—Kremsmünster, Heiligenkreuz and Rein—have an internal guesthouse with only a few rooms.11 On their websites, visitors can find information about it under the label Klosterleben, monastic life. People coming to share the monastic regime are supposed to be Christians, especially men discerning their vocation or priests willing to spend some 11

Jonveaux discerns between the internal (for people with religious motivation) and external guesthouses (for tourists). In Italy, it is very common to have both (Jonveaux 2012).

Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries

Figure 13.4

285

The monastery shop in Kremsmunster. Photo: zuzana pešková.

days in silence. But with the category of pilgrims mentioned in Regula, the doors can open to many others: spiritual, not necessarily Christian, seekers; travellers; managers needing a few days off from stress; people in difficult situations (refugees were being accommodated in all the Austrian monasteries we visited in 2017). The brochure for visitors of Heiligenkreuz says Patent portae, magis cor: Our doors are open for you, our hearts even more! The Austrian monasteries offer quite a wide range of hospitality options with a more or less Christian framing. The nearer to the community the guest is, the more “right” their motivation should be. But there are also plenty of possibilities for tourists, such as a visit to the shop (fig. 13.4), a glass of monastic wine in the wine cellar, a tour of the museum, or a rest in the gardens. These people are also conceptualized by the monastics not (only) as a source of money (income from tourism is not important for Austrian monasteries), but as potential “pilgrims” without knowing it, as people who need (pre)evangelization or the pastorate even if they are ignorant of it. The way the transmission of belief takes place today is by listening to people very openly: Usually, the people who come to the monastery are believers. But in the wine cellar I also meet people who have nothing to do with religion, and it brings about really interesting discussions. Wine is so far for me a different basis, different art of dialogue, different art of approach, also to belief. Often it is exciting. Friar responsible for the winery, April 2017

286

Spalová and Jonveaux

In the Czech Republic, monasteries and society are only at the beginning of negotiations about the purpose of a monastic visit or monastic stay. It has only been in the last ten years that some monasteries have started offering this possibility, not only for friends and families but laypeople or tourists as well. As in Austria, the visitor can have the monastic experience through accommodation, or accommodation with a monastic flavour, but usually not under one roof. The Trappists from Nový Dvůr are the strictest about admissible motivations for coming to the monastery, as stated on the webpage of the abbey: We refuse systematically to collaborate with travel agencies, as well as with groups of architects and students coming for a visit. We are not a museum. Groups of such visitors can see the film about our life in the shop. For individuals, we try to discern their motivations. A good ­criterion can be their dress. People don’t go to church in inappropriate dress. If you want to join our prayers, contact the brother guardian in advance. If somebody is accepted as a guest, their stay is framed as a “stay in the desert” (in silence, without digital devices, with assistance during prayers, and ­eventually a meeting with the priest). The rooms in the guesthouse are single, with a Holy Bible under the huge window looking out on the natural surroundings (fig. 13.5).

Figure 13.5

A room in the guesthouse of Nový Dvůr. Photo: tereza sedláčková.

Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries

287

Quite the same “spiritual sojourn” is offered in Vyšší Brod, especially for families fond of Latin liturgy and coming not only from the Czech Republic, but also from France, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Estonia and Lithuania. The Trappist women’s monastery in Poličany built what can be considered in the Czech context a large guesthouse for 40 persons. It is interpreted as the answer to Cardinal Miloslav’s prophecy,12 who predicted that many people will come to the monastery. The sojourners are mainly Catholic groups or individuals on retreat, but also non-religious people. About these visitors one sister notes: “Of course, we prefer people with whom we can share our spirituality, but we are also open to non-believers, if they conform to the rules of the house (silence, day timetable).” (Sister serving in guesthouse, May 2017) The Christian (pre)evangelization framing is thus very sensible here. In contrast, the mission of the Venio guesthouse is interpreted differently, as seen on the webpage: Our community lives very near to our guests. We offer the possibility of staying a few days in privacy and calm, and in exchange we receive new friendships and feedback. Groups such as retreats, group supervisions, work seminars, or choir summer schools like to come to our guesthouse especially. The sisters take the guesthouse as well as their secular jobs as an opportunity to witness life centred on God, not by preaching the belief or Christian morality but by living according to certain principles unusual in society, such as taking the time to meet people, eat together, receive people properly, etc. Their guesthouse can therefore be open to different categories of people, but still communicate some monastic values. From the perspective of income (see table 13.2), their house is also more important than in other communities, but the economic profit is not the most important reason for their openness, it is rather their spirituality formed by their work in the “world.” Břevnov and Rajhrad do not have real guesthouses—both can receive monks’ families or friends inside the community in limited numbers, but otherwise they try to be hospitable “on another level,” meaning to be open to the different demands of society. In Břevnov, they allow the organization of concerts, lectures, festivals (as well as a noisy fair) in their buildings or gardens. 12

Cardinal Miloslav Vlk was the Prague archbishop who invited the sisters from Vittorchiano to come to the Prague diocese.

288

Spalová and Jonveaux

Table 13.2

Breakdown of incomes for six Czech monasteries (2016–2017) Repartition of incomes for six Czech monasteries

Venio Poličany Nový Dvůr Vyšší Brod Rajhrad Břevnov 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% primary sector: agricultural production secondary sector: non agricultural production tertiary sector: museums, shops, restaurants... tertiary sector: guesthouses reimbursement for non restituted properties rent of lands and buildings salaries, pensions collections, gifts, grants trademark fees Source: Presented research

They also interpret their work for the parish as the realization of hospitality. It is a very nuanced play that the prior of Břevnov practises: he opens the doors to many activities which are at first sight almost contradictory to C ­ hristianity, such as secular marriages or the “traditional burning of witches”13 in the monastery gardens. In his vision, the monastery should be the centre of life in society and therefore he is able to find new ways to bring together the Christian/ monastic mission and the values of society, saying it is better that couples are married, even secularly, rather than not at all. He strongly believes that the connection with the monastery brings “something valuable” to the lives of those connected. The forms and intentions of hospitality speak to the monastic testimonies for society and the societal expectations of monastic life and values. In Austria the monasteries try to represent the Christian tradition for the “still-somehowChristian” society. The Benedictine monasteries in Czechia are close to the Austrian model of multifaceted hospitality but the received society is different. If Danièle Hervieu-Léger speaks about post-Christian society in France, we can perhaps speak about a post-atheistic society in the Czech Republic.14 Therefore, 13 14

A very popular festivity in the Czech Republic on the evening of 30 April, connected with local community gatherings around a big fire. The magic interpretations of this night are today not usually in use, but it remains a lively social festival. The country has strong Catholic as well as Protestant traditions, but Christianity is clearly a minority orientation (only about 14% of the population declared themselves as denominational Christians in the last census in 2011, 6% are believers without religious affiliation,

Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries

289

the values that connect monasteries to society and create a plausible testimony for it should also be more general than in Christian society: a balanced life, communitarian values, time for other people, no stress, no workaholism, etc. The Trappists and Cistercians play their testimony on a radically different interface. They strive to live monastic utopia (Séguy 2014) every day and this is the main experience they transmit under severe conditions. While the Benedictine monasteries try to stay connected with society, these monasteries take guests out of their context in order to mediate the monastic experience for them. 4.5 From Economy of Stability to Sustainable Economy As we have already said, an economy of stability means in the Rule of Benedict developing all that the monastics need in the monastery enclosure or its close surroundings. As the prior of Břevnov says: “Monks need to have everything next to them.” (June 2017). It is for this reason that monastic communities try to develop economic activities that can take place at or near the monastery, so that monks and nuns can work without going outside the enclosure. Along the same lines, in the traditional Benedictine model, monasteries also have workshops for the maintenance of the monastery inside the enclosure—Kremsmünster, for instance, still has a small sawmill. Energy has also always been an important topic in monasteries due to its early development of hydraulics. Nowadays, monastic communities try to develop sources of renewable energy: Vyšší Brod still has a small hydraulic system for instance, and Kremsmünster has a biomass installation. Jean Séguy describes the monastery as a utopia of the Kingdom of God, already here and still to come. A utopia is “a complete ideological system aiming to transform radically the existing global system implicitly or explicitly, by appealing to an imaginary vision of the world or by applying it in practice” (Séguy 2014: 288). At the economic level, this means that monastics develop an economy which must correspond to the values of the religious utopia. Economy is part of this alternative system (Jonveaux 2014). Time is also a central variable in the utopia, which is turned towards an ideal past and preparation for eternity: 35% declared themselves as “without faith,” the rest did not answer the question). After more than 40 years of forced state atheism, society is, on the one hand, largely ignorant of religious topics, but also actually very open to them. The religious and spiritual market in Czechia is very complex; there is not a firmly established hierarchy between religious and spiritual traditions as in more Christian European countries. Austria is, according to a study of the Vienna Institute of Demography (2017), still a country with a Catholic tradition; 64% say they are Catholic but the phenomena of “exiting the Church” also exists, whereby people no longer want to belong to the Church, often because they do not want to pay the tax. 17% of Austrian people say they have no religious affiliation.

290

Spalová and Jonveaux

In this configuration, time is merely the space between the expectant and the expected: the space of a creation, the space of a non-repetitive cycle, the space of the limited and unlimited millenarian, which may be the archetype of a time in which not only do things last, but in which they enter into evolution, indeed into revolution. desroche 1979: 86

In contrast to secular firms, monastic communities not only work for the ­immediate future or generation, but with a perspective to the next generations, as they have already received a monastery with a sometimes thousandyear-old heritage (Feldbauer-Dürstmüller, Sandberger and Neulinger 2012). The prior of Vyšší Brod explains that for him the sense of monastic economy is to work for eternity: “I want to preserve the tradition of a long-term economy” (April 2017). The time of the monastery is indeed long-term, which is, on the one hand, connected to the long history of monasticism—1,500 years in ­Europe—and on the other, to the utopian perspective of eschatology for which monastics are working. The traditional architecture of monastic buildings reflects this perspective. For instance, the garden in the middle of the cloister in Cistercian monasteries (also in Heiligenkreuz and Vyšší Brod) is closed but visible and represents paradise (Kobielus 1995: 223). This economy and its eschatological perspective are connected to the stability of the place. Establishment of a monastery in a specific place includes from the beginning a long-term perspective, as some monasteries are still in the same place after more than 1,300 years. Taking advantage of the environment for the sustenance of the community must therefore integrate a longterm variable. According to Denis Edwards, this is a specific Benedictine approach to relationships with nature, which is best described as “cultivating and caring for creation” (Edwards 2006: 25). “In this tradition, love for God’s creation takes the form of responsible farming and preservation of the land. It also involves the love of learning and the conserving of a previous cultural heritage.” (Edwards 2006: 25) This long-term perspective of economy in monastic life is not the fruit of present reflections on ecology, but could be interpreted nowadays as sustainable economy. For one thing, this societal concern can make monasteries valuable again for society. Furthermore, they can become models of sustainable development. On the other hand, monks do not like to use this term “sustainable” because they have the impression of being dispossessed of something which was traditionally monastic before it became a societal concern. Sustainable economy as a long-term perspective economy can especially be observed in forestry, as one young monk from Heiligenkreuz explains:

Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries

291

I do not think we start with the wood. We start with planting trees, or with natural regeneration of the trees. And from this point to the end, when we harvest the wood, I think the whole process should be good. I think our economy is a part of the monastery, part of the Church and I think we must be better in this case than others. We must take a position of leadership. Yes, of a good example. When you talk about sustainability— I don’t use the word, I don’t like to use it, because I think ‘nobody really knows what it is.’ So, I think it is better to use other words, more detailed. But when you use sustainability, you can speak about three sectors—the economic, the ecological and the social part. And I think in these three parts we should provide a good example in our country, to other firms and companies. So, in the social part, I think we must like the people, really like them. And to help them when we can help. Of course, none of our workers gets thousands of euros [laughing] a month because we like them—that is not possible. […] And also, with the visitors of the forest, we want to show the possibilities of how to use the forest in a good way. Friar forester, April 2017

As Weber puts it for Calvinists, monks also try to do all things “ad majorem Dei gloriam” (Weber 2003: 173)—they attempt to do everything as best as they can. Respect for creation and sustainable management of resources of production allow monastics to justify their monastic way of working as they can also do it for God. On the other hand, society, which does not always recognize the religious charisma of monks, expects them to be ethically perfect in all that they do according to the ethical concerns of the day. This can be the case for economy and for environmental issues. Thus, the monastic economy, which was founded on stability for religious purposes, can become a model of sustainable economy for present society. 5

Conclusions

Stabilitas loci implies a community rooted in a specific place and therefore in a specific culture. The refounding of monastic communities in the Czech ­Republic by French, Italian or German communities demands, as a consequence, the question of acculturation, such as those in countries where Catholic monastic life is still new and communities are often founded by European communities. Some monasteries in our sample, which were refounded by Czech monks, also try to rebuild the ancient model of monastic life, taking Austrian monasteries as examples. The process of growing the roots of new

292

Spalová and Jonveaux

or renewed communities in Czech culture and the construction of stability deserves analysis in the coming decades. What we were able to observe during our research is the development of two contradictory trends in the testimonies monasteries in the Czech Republic communicate to society through different means of the economy of stability. One trend stresses a disconnection between monastic utopia and the world, the other searches for connections with the world. The testimony of monasteries like Nový Dvůr, Poličany and Vyšší Brod is concentrated around the idea of seclusion—a solitude which enables ­concentration on sole service to God, like the Egyptian eremite fathers whose tradition is often evoked. This isolation should lead to the process of mystic unification with God. These monasteries opt for an internal economy so as not to create contact between monastics and laypeople. The monastery buildings are constructed as an “other world,” with a high barrier between the community and the world. If they accept the role of curators of memory, it is preferably the religious, Catholic memory that they want to care for. They accept guests under severe conditions and offer them seclusion as an important value. They disconnect from the world in order to set a balanced sustainable life for individuals and the eternal life of the community. This message is attractive in the Czech post-atheistic society as a lived radical otherness, even if the strictly Catholic framing is not accepted by everybody. Austrian male monasteries are models of open monasteries, which are religious, economic as well as cultural centres in local areas. The stability of the monastery in time and space allows for a new appreciation of it as a pillar of traditional identity. A new appreciation is also given to the monastic economy by the present interpretation of the economy of stability as sustainable economy. The second, and in many regards contradictory, orientation of some Czech monasteries (Břevnov, Rajhrad, Venio) places the monastery in the centre of ­society as a shining exemplary form of life connected to many spheres of societal life. Their economy is based on “wise caretaking” of their properties, ­echoing the biblical caretaking of Creation. Their monastic complexes are open to the public, which should be attracted by the varied activities on offer and “traditional” products. Hospitality takes many unexpected forms and is led by an interest in being close to the people and bringing them the values of monastic life in an easy accessible form—by meeting people, listening to them, spending the time with them, etc. This message is also appreciated by a considerable part of Czech society for its openness and “low-threshold” character. This model of monastery as a shining centre of local life was continually developed in Austria and can be experienced there in Benedictine as well as in Cistercian monasteries. The above-named Czech communities work on

Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries

293

restoration of this model, which was also their own, but which is also present in everyday life through the numerous ties between Czech and Austrian (and German) communities: the praeses of the Benedictine Slavonic congregation (Břevnov (CZ), Rajhrad (CZ), Emauzy (CZ), Čokovac (Croatia), Maribor (Slovenia)) was the abbot from Austrian Gőttweig Clemens Lashofer (1990–2001), today again it is a former abbot from Salzburg Edmund Wagenhofer. After 27 years of renewed monastic life in Czechia, monasteries are finding their specific places in society. Analysis of this process is instructive for the study of connections and disconnections of European societies with their Christian background. References Assmann, Aleida. 2010. “Canon and Archive.” Pp. 97–108 in A Companion to Cultural Memory Studies. Ed. by Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning. Berlin: de Gruyter. Aversano, Dearborn, Bernard Freyer Valentina and Sina Leipold. 2013. “Sacred Sustainability? Benedictine Monasteries in Austria and Germany.” Pp. 491–492 in Rapport mondiale sur les sciences sociales: Changements environnementaux globaux. Unesco & International Social Science Council. Boltanski, Luc and Laurent Thévenot. 2006. On justification: Economies of worth. ­Princeton: Princeton University Press. Coomans, Thomas. 2015. “L’ordre autour du cloître: L’architecture des abbayes et des couvents, entre tradition, réformes et réaffectations.” Pp. 13–110 in Des couvents en héritage. Religious Houses: A Legacy. Eds. by Luc Noppen; Thomas Coomans and Martin Drouin. Montreal: Presses Universitaires du Québec. Danda, Oldřich. 2014. Klášterní podnikání: Silná piva, likéry, bylinky i bio hořčice. Novinky.cz. Available at http://www.novinky.cz/domaci/344699-klasterni-podnikanisilna-piva-likery-bylinky-i-bio-horcice.html [accessed 8 June 2017]. Davallon, Jean. 2006. Le don du patrimoine: Une approche communicationnelle de la patrimonialisation. Paris: Lavoisier. Delpal, Bernard. 1998. Le silence des moines: Les Trappistes au XIXe siècle. Paris: Beauchesne. Desroche, Henri. 1979. The Sociology of Hope. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Duft, Johannes. 1998. Der karolingische Klosterplan in der Stiftsbibliothek St. Gallen. Rorschach: Löpfe-Benz. Edwards, Denis. 2006. Ecology at the Heart of the Faith. New York: Orbis Books. Feldbauer-Durstmüller, Birgit and Maximilian Neulinger. 2010. “Stabilität über Jahrhunderte—Corporate Governance österreichischer Benediktinerklöster.” Pp.  ­219–244 in Corporate Sustainability. Springer Science & Business Media B.V.

294

Spalová and Jonveaux

Feldbauer-Durtsmüller, Birgit, Sandberger, Simon and Maximilian Neulinger. 2012. “https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2101571” Sustainability for Centuries–Monastic Governance of Austrian Benedictine Abbeys. European Journal of Management, 12 (3): 83-92. Halbwachs, Maurice. 1980. The Collective Memory. New York: Harper & Row. Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 2017. Le temps de moines: Clôture et hospitalité. Paris: PUF. Hiebl, Martin R.W. and Birgit Feldbauer-Durstmüller. 2014. What can the corporate world learn from the cellarer? Examining the role of a Benedictine abbey’s CFO. Society and Business Review 9(1): 51–73. Jonveaux, Isabelle. 2011. Le monastère au travail: Le Royaume de Dieu au défi de l’économie. Paris: Bayard. Jonveaux, Isabelle. 2012. “L’hôtellerie des monastères: Un exemple des tensions de l’économie monastique.” Pp. 127–139 in Catholicisme en tensions. Ed. by Céline Béraud; Frédéric Gugelot and Isabelle Saint Martin. Paris: Éditions EHESS. Jonveaux, Isabelle. 2014a. “Redefinition of the Role of Monks in Modern Society: Economy as Monastic Opportunity.” Pp. 71–86 in Sociology and—Monasticism, between Innovation and Tradition. Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion 5. Ed. by Isabelle Jonveaux, Enzo Pace, and Stefania Palmisano. Leiden: Brill. Jonveaux, Isabelle. 2014b. Mönchtum in Zahlen.: Benediktinerklöster in Österreich im Spiegel der Statistik. Erbe und Auftrag: Benediktinische Monatsschrift 2: 202–209. Jonveaux, Isabelle. 2015. “Patrimonialisation des monastères en Europe et nouvelles charges symboliques pour les moines.” Pp. 435–452 in Des couvents en héritage. Ed. by Luc Noppen, Thomas Coomans, and Martin Drouin. Quebec: Presses Universitaires de Québec. Jonveaux, Isabelle, Enzo Pace and Stefania Palmisano. eds. 2014. Sociology and Monasticism, Between Innovation and Tradition. Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion 5. Leiden: Brill. Kobielus, Stanislas. 1995. “Les moyens de rétablir l’harmonie paradisiaque dans la vie monastique du Moyen-Âge.” Pp. in La vie quotidienne des moines chanoines réguliers au Moyen-Âge et Temps Modernes. Ed. by Marek Derwich. Wroclaw: Publication de l’Institut d’Histoire de l’Université de Wroclaw. Kuthan, Jiří. 2014. Benediktinské kláštery střední Evropy a jejich architektura. Praha: Univerzita Karlova v Praze & Nakladatelství Lidové noviny. Niederkorn-Bruck, Meta. 1994. Die Melker Reform im Spiegel der Visitationen. Wien, München: Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, Ergänzungsband: 30. Novotná, Pavla. 2014. Hospodaření církví a náboženských společností v kontextu tzv. restitucí církevního majetku. Dissertation thesis. Praha: Faculty of Humanities Charles University.

Economy of Stability in Catholic Monasteries

295

Prettenthaler, Franz et al. 2015: “Gliederung der römisch-katholische Kirche.” Pp. 15–26 in Wirtschaftsfaktor Kirche. Ed. by Franz Prettenthaler and Alexander Schnabl. ­Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Schmidt, Norbert. 2004. Krok z průměrnosti. Stavba, 10 November 2004: 14. Séguy, Jean. 2014. “A Sociology of Imagined Societies: Monasticism and Utopia.” Pp. 71–86 in Sociology and Monasticism, between Innovation and Tradition. Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion 5. Ed. by Isabelle Jonveaux, Enzo Pace, and Stefania Palmisano. Leiden: Brill 2014. Spalová, Barbora. 2012. Bůh ví proč. Studie pamětí a režimů moci v křesťanských církvích v severních Čechách. Brno: CDK. Spalová, Barbora et al. 2016: Redefinice smyslu zasvěceného života. Dingir, 2016(1): 15–20. Full version is available at: http://dingir.cz/cislo/16/1/redefinice_smyslu_­ zasveceneho_zivota.pdf [accessed 14 April 2016]. Tretera, Jiří Rajmund and Záboj Horák. 2015. Konfesní právo. Praha: Leges. Vogüé, Adalbert. 1985. Les Règles monastiques anciennes (400–700). Turnhout: Brepols. Vogüé, Adalbert. 1974. “Stabilità.,” Pp. 105–117 in Dizionario degli istituti di perfezione. Eds. by G Pelica. and G. Rocca. Roma: Edizioni Paoline. Weber, Max. 2003. L’Éthique protestante et l’esprit du capitalisme. Paris: Gallimard.

General Index Absolutism 225, 229–32, 234–5 Africa 2–3, 133, 175, 204, 249 Alcoholism 158 Americas vi, 2, 4, 6–7, 13, 106, 147–164, 252, 254, 260, 266, 297 Assimilation 100, 225–6, 233, 297 Asymmetry (sociological) 225–226, 247, 297 Austria vi, ix, 13, 269–95, 297 Authenticity / Recognition: 115, 118, 124 Authority 3, 9, 39, 40, 45n2, 47, 73, 85, 102, 111–112, 122, 124, 175, 195, 214–215, 248, 253, 262, 268, 297 Religious 85, 102, 169 Base communities 153–154, 156, 164, 166, 174–175, 179, 214–215, 248, 253, 262, 268, 297 Communidades ecclesiales de base (cebs) 156 Enthusiastic music 156 Worship style 156, 173 Belgium 165–182 Benedictines 273, 281 Rule of st. Benedict, Regula Benedicti  269, 284, 289 Bible vii, 3, 93, 111, 119, 135, 158, 166–168, 170n7, 173, 175–178, 188, 286, 297 Bogotá 148, 152, 156–157, 297 Bolivia 151–152, 297 Brazil 12, 78n9, 147, 151–152, 158, 164, 174n8, 204, 161, 297 Brazilian Bishops’ Conference 152 cebs in 154 Catholic Charismatic prayer groups 155 Catholic laity 152 Liberation theology 156 Pentecostalism 156 Buddhism 7, 185, 187–192, 196, 230, 297 Canada viii, ix, x, xi, xiii, 4, 7, 10–11, 14, 16, 24–25, 30–32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 74n6, 109, 111, 149–151, 163, 204, 297. See also Quebec Canon Law 248, 259, 297

Cardinal Newman Society 254, 257 Catholicism. See Church, culture, Pope, Vatican ii Being catholic (definition) 53 Habitus 86, 88, 297 Institutions 248–253. See canon law Institutionalization 1, 347–49, 63–64, 261, 297 Laïcité Versus protestant societies 21–22 Societies 21, 22, 23, 32, 35, 37 Charismatic Renewal Movement (Catholic) 147–164, 297 Catholics 15 Healing 158 in Argentina 151, 154 in Bolivia 151–152 in Brazil 151–152, 154–156 in Canada 150–151 in United States 155 Practices 148 Religiosity 113, 119, 123–124 Speaking in tongues 154, 158 Spirit baptism 157 Worshippers 155 Choice 117–118, 122, 124 Church 4, 109, 110–114, 116–118, 124. See also megachurch Cistercians 273, 279, 281, 289, 297 Colombia. See Bogotá Colonization (the Americas) 2, 2n3, 44, 297 Communism 3, 74n6, 77, 191, 282, 281, 297. See also socialism and Russia 69–70, 74n, 77 Community vii, ix, 11, 40, 45n2, 48–49, 60, 63, 74, 85, 117–118, 129–133, 135–137, 141, 149, 151, 160, 167–182, 202, 216–218, 224, 228, 240, 248, 253, 263, 269, 270, 273–277, 279, 281–283, 285, 287, 297 Conservatism 111, 117, 156, Contact theory 227, 229 Conversion 5, 61, 69, 77, 95, 144–146, 153–154, 157–158, 161–162, 230, 232, 238n18, 241–242, 297

298 Crisis of faith 116 Crucifix. See Italy Culture 9, 86 Acculturation 32, 33, 34, 100, 105, 138, 291, 297 Cultural religion / cultural Catholicism 21, 22, 23, 32, 33, 35, 37, 68,   83–103, 116, 118 characteristics of 95–99 defining 84, 85–89 and generation 98 Exculturation 23, 33 Inculturation 33 Czech Republic 269–95 Decline 9, 109, 165–166 of liberal christianity 178 Dialogue/dialogic 222, 223–8, 230–33, 232n11, 233, 234n14, 240, 241 and proclamation 231–2, 235–8, 235n16, 237n17, 238, 238n18 Interreligious 185–186, 188–190, 192, 194–199 Diversity  8, 111, 114–115, 121, 124, 180. See also Pluralism Ecology 179–180 Ecumenism 75, 187, 223, 229–31, 238, 240n21, 240n22. See also Pope Education 222–4, 227–8, 234n12, 235n15, 239–41 School/schooling 222–4, 226–8, 233–5, 234n13, 235n16, 239–41 Encuentro Carismático Católico Latinoamericano (eccla) 152, 157 Engaged Catholics 119 Ethnicity 86, 234 Eucharistic Adoration 113, 122–124 Europe 2–6 Evangelical Catholic identity 110, 117–118 Evangelization Neo-evangelization 23, 33 New Evangelization v, 9, 11, 17, 34n17, 17, 109–113, 115, 116, 124–129 , 152, 202, 208, 210, 213, , 218, 221, 235n16, 297 Ex-Catholics 90, 95–96 Experience 216 Experience / Lived experience 110–113, 115, 117–119, 121, 216

General Index Fatima shrine Lúcia 69–70, 76, 78–79 Our Lady Apparitions 69–70 Secrets 69–70, 74n, 76–77 France 22, 27–29, 129–146 Freedom. See also Human rights Free-will 121–122 Fuga mundi 281 Generations 96, 98–99, 100, 202, 210, 267, 290, 298 Globalization 9, 14, 37,74, 186, 189, 199, 221, 242, 298 Heritage 8, 11, 14, 24, 27, 30n10, 32, 103, 234,271, 290, 277, 281–283, 290, 293–294, 298. See also Culture Heritage site 281 Heterodoxy 62, 58, 298 Hierarchy. See also authority, catholicism, church, Mexico Criticism 4, 177–179 Hinduism 7, 14,75, 185, 187–189, 196, 230, 298 Hispanics vii, 97–98, 163, 298 Holy Spirit 93, 148–149, 152, 156–158, 161, 164, 298 baptism in the 149 Hospitality 274, 281, 284–285, 287, 288, 292, 298 Human rights vii, 23, 25-27, 30, 32, 38, 188, 190, 298 Freedom from belief: 22, 35, 37 Freedom to believe: 22, 35, 37 Identity v-vi, ix, xi, 8, 10-11, 13, 21–41, 43–44, 48, 53, 63, 73, 79, 83–105, 109–128, 149–150, 180, 198, 210, 216, 234–235, 237, 239, 242, 247–268, 281-282, 292, 298 See also ethnicity, evangelical, generation, liminality, politics as cultural production 85 as lived accomplishment 86 as religion, ancestry, or culture 91–92 Christian rather than Catholic 166 Formation 111, 113–116, 123 Internal and external validation 89, 100 Measures of 87–88 Mission and identity integration 259–60 Organizational theory 257 Imagination (Catholic) 101

299

General Index Individualism 136, 160, 170,189, 298 Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools (Lasallian Christian Brothers)    249–50, 260, 264 Institutional religiosity 47–48 Interculturalism 222–6, 231–5, 234n13, 234n14, 235n16, 238–41 and Catholic Education 227–9 Ireland 247 Islam xi, 7, 37n21, 75, 81, 125, 180, 187–189, 239, 298 Italy ix, 5-6, 10, 13-14, 16, 22, 25, 30-32, 34, 37, 39, 41, 74n6, 129, 203, 205, 274, 281, 284, 297, 298 Lautsi v. Italy 25–27 Judaism 7, 100, 298, 187–189, 231n10, 239, 298 Korea 73, 74n6, 129, 298 Laïcité. See Catholicism Latin America viii, ix, 3, 6, 7–9, 12, 16, 44, 50, 74, 147, 152, 158, 174, 224, 262, 298 Liberation theology. See also theology, Brazil Liminality 11, 84, 102–103, 298 Little Sisters of the Poor 254 Liturgy 93, 135, 140, 142, 166-167,169, 170n7, 173, 178, 229, 231, 282, 287, 298 Mayas 160 Mayan spirituality 147, 160 Media (Catholic) 149 Meditation 207 Megachurch 129–146, 155 Memory xiii, 15, 30, 109, 125, 219, 274, 277, 281, 282, 283, 292 Mexico v, viii, xii, 10, 12, 43–67, 147, 151, 154–157, 249, 298, 299 Anticlericalism, catechists, bishops, priests, persecution of Catholics 157 Migration 147, 151 Ministries vii, 134, 143n17, 152, 162, 247–250, 254–56, 260, 299 Minority­ v, ix, 6, 7, 11, 26, 31, 36–38, 58, 72, 109–124, 116, 216, 236, 250, 288n14, 299. See Politics Modernity ix, 4, 22, 38–39, 50, 80, 111, 125, 134, 164, 186, 267, 299

Monasticism ix, xi, 190, 269, 274, 278–279, 281, 282–290, 294–295, 299 Multicultural/multiculturalism 40, 128, 225–7, 233, 234n13, 235n15, 240, 243, 299 Nativity (Christmas). See France Networking 261–63, 255, 266, 268, 299 Nones (non religious) 6, 83, 101–103 Organizational theory 257–259 Orthodoxy 58 Pentecostalism (Catholic) 147. See also Charismatic Renewal Movement; Identity – Evangelical in Latin America 147–164 Pew Research Center xii, 1, 6–7, 15–6, 83–84, 89–90, 92–99, 101, 106, 151, 154–155, 163, 299 Pilgrimage 11, 68–69, 71–76, 78–80, 82, 127, 165, 182, 207, 211, 218, 220, 273, 299 Pluralismr 11, 21, 22, 25, 36, 68–69, 71–76, 78-80, 82, 127, 165, 182, 207, 211, 218, 220, 224, 229, 235–6, 252–53, 273, 299 and relativism 232, 240 Catholicism as a plural tradition 100 Multifaith societies 199 Poland xii, 22, 37, 39, 74, 78n9, 85, 104, 129n2, 202, 203n1, 204–206, 209, 210, 214, 299 Politics Identity politics / Minority identity:  110–111, 114–118, 124 Pope 3–4, 207 Benedict xvi 4, 75–77, 222, 222n4, 234, 238, 240, 240n21 Francis – 4, 13, 17, 68–70, 73, 77, 109, 112–113, 125–126, 129n3, 142, 144, 149, 151–153, 161, 163, 168, 178–179, 198, 200, 204, 207, 222–223, 229, 233, 235–6, 238–239, 240n22, 242, 264, 267–268, 299 and ecumenism 238 John Paul ii 4n5, 69–70, 75–76, 109, 112, 126, 129n2, 152, 202, 204, 207–210, 218, 220–222, 229, 234, 238, 238n18, 242, 253, 262–263, 267, 299 Paul vi 76 Pius xii 75–76

300 Popular religiosity/religion ix, 8, 10, 12, 43, 45–50, 62–64,72, 147, 158, 165, 299 Portugal xiii, 2, 5–6, 10, 22, 68–82, 299 Church and State 70–71, 78–79 Estado Novo dictatorship 68, 71–72, 78 First Republic/secularism 70–71 Democracy 78 Postdurkheimian 23, 37 Power and religion 44–47 Prayer in the political arena. See Quebec Private/Public 22, 32, 35 Privatization of religion 217 Public sphere 68, 78–80, 186, 199 Procession 165 Protestants x, xiii, 3, 5, 7, 22, 32–33, 35, 36n18, 37n21, 38, 72, 75, 90n5, 97, 111, 120, 122, 129–130, 132, 137-138, 140–141, 144–146, 148, 150, 155–158, 163, 209, 288n14, 295, 297, 299 Quarrel / tug-o-war 21, 22, 23, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 37 Quebec 21–25 (Saguenay Case) Race vii, 89, 97–98, 103, 105, 114, 162, 192, 233–234, 241, 299 Relativism 225, 226n6, 232–4. See also pluralism Rossi, Marcelo (priest) 155 Russia. See communism, 38, 69, 77, 90n5, 193, 297 Secularization/Secularity v, viii, x, xi, xii, 4–6, 8, 11, 16, 21–22, 31–37, 40, 63, 77, 79, 97, 100, 102, 104, 107, 202, 210, 218, 220, 257, 299 Counter-secularization 202 De-sacralize 167 Multiple secularities 21, 31, 36 Postsecular 23, 37 Secular 222, 228, 230, 235, 240 Secularism 109–110, 114, 122, 187, 189, 199 Secularism in the Church 114, 116 Separation of Church and State 114 Sexuality 8, 50, 167, 178

General Index Shamanism 158 Sisters of Mercy 250, 253, 255, 260, 264 Social justice/engagement 157, 161, 170, 179, 249–250, 260, 262, 299 Socialism 175 Society of Jesus (Jesuits) 13, 71, 193, 247–249, 251–253, 259,, 261–62, 264, 268 Spain 22, 205 Spiritual warfare 158 Stability, stabilitas loci 269, 270, 281, 290, 291, 292 Economy of stability 274, 276, 280 Stewardships 45 Sustainability 270, 291 Symbolic religion/religiosity 100–101 Syncretism vii, 44–46, 48-–49, 58–59, 62, 192, 195–196, 299 Theology 223–224, 227, 235n15, 237 Liberation theology 153–154, 156–157, 161, 175. See also Base communities Tradition ix, x, 5-6, 8-9, 11–12, 14, 21n2, 14, 22, 27–29, 30n10, 31–33, 35, 36n18, 37–38, 41, 43, 45n2, 48, 52, 57, 59-61, 72–73, 77, 79, 85–56, 88-90, 97, 100–101, 103, 106, 111, 113, 117, 133–134, 139–140, 142, 145, 153, 156–157, 160n4, 164–166, 170–171, 177, 189–196, 198, 210, 211, 213, 222, 228–230, 232, 234n14, 235n16, 242, 248, 250, 253–354, 259, 261–264, 270, 274, 276, 277, 281, 282, 288n14, 289-290, 292-295, 299 Trappists 273, 279, 280, 281, 286, 289 Truth claims 110, 120 United States 129–130, 147–148, 159. See also Charismatic Catholic population 7, 83, 96–97 Religious communities 247–268 Values xi, 2, 5–6, 9-10, 14, 22, 25, 26n7, 27–28, 32–33, 35-36, 43, 45, 47, 49–51, 57, 59–64, 78–79, 93, 109–111, 114–115, 120–124, 160, 160n4, 169, 201, 211, 221, 225, 236, 248, 252, 255, 258, 266, 270, 282–292, 300 Liberal values 122

301

General Index Vatican ii (Second Vatican Council) 83, 88, 111–112, 148–149, 157, 175, 185–186, 189, 192, 198, 252 Vicarious religion 85 Virgin Mary. See also Fatima Virgin of Guadalupe (Vírgen de Guadalupe) 157 Vocations to religious life 251–52 Women 35, 85, 104, 161, 22, 125, 152, 164, 167, 175, 177, 181, 192, 212, 229, 248–249, 252, 254, 256, 264, 267, 273, 287, 300

Worship practices 156, 160 Charismatic 154 Worldview 158 pre-modern 158 disenchantment 112 re-enchanted 158 Youth 110, 113, 118, 121, 124, 171–172, 174 Young evangelical 121–123 World Youth Day 202–221