The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa [1st ed.] 9783030566494, 9783030566500

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Sabella O. Abidde  Editor

The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa

The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa

Sabella O. Abidde Editor

The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa

Editor Sabella O. Abidde Department of History and Political Science Alabama State University Montgomery, AL, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-56649-4    ISBN 978-3-030-56650-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56650-0 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To all the migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons in Africa who are searching for safety and security in a turbulent world and an unkind continent… Be well and be safe! And to Professor Olayiwola Abegunrin (June 6, 1944–April 14, 2020)

Preface

One of my greatest regrets is that Professor Olayiwola Abegunrin—my friend, writing partner, and mentor—did not live to witness the publication of this book. After a protracted illness, he passed on April 14, 2020. This book was his idea. It was wholly his. Ironically, I also suffered bouts of health challenges that necessitated multiple trips to the emergency room of our local hospital. And while I was in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in December 2019 to attend a conference and stay extra days for holidays with my daughter, Olajumoke, my computer crashed causing me to lose three sets of manuscripts I was simultaneously editing. I had no backup. None! I grieved and grieved some more. It was not until early February 2020 could I find the strength and motivation to start all over again. But here we are. Joy at last! Then and now, the African Condition has not improved. Or at least not in a significant manner. Would things ever improve—greatly improve? Several decades after independence, many states and societies on the continent are still in turmoil. Sustained economic growth and long-lasting democratic rule have been elusive. Rather, there have been prolonged stretches of excesses, brutality, malevolence and malfeasance, resource and non-resource-induced conflicts, illiberal regimes, big-­ man politics, and an acute deficiency in basic human needs. In recent years, however, there have been some bright spots and beacons of hope—necessitating scholars, observers, and institutions to be optimistic about the future of the continent. They, for instance, point to Botswana, Senegal, Ghana, and a few places in between. But despite the abundance of hope and optimism and the recent counsel that one must not interrogate, explain, or view the continent from a single lens, one cannot but ask “what’s going on in Africa?” This, after all, is a place where unrestrained behavior on the part of the leaders and elites have forced an untold number of Africans to abandon their homes and respective countries in search of economic security and political safety in distant lands. Seeing Africans fearfully cross the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea or trek the Sahara Desert in search of life and living is an affront to human decency. Indeed, the forced movement of Africans who end up as migrants, refugees, or internally displaced persons does not bode well for the continent or humanity. But that is exactly what millions of Africans have been reduced to by climatic and vii

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g­ eological conditions, terrorism, conflicts, and the absence of good leadership, effective institutions, and a sense of belonging. To be sure, to be a migrant, a refugee internally displaced is a complicated matter and a complicated enterprise. It can be physically and mentally painful and corrosive. Yet, according to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of refugees and others forced to move—internally and across international borders—has, as of December 2018, risen to more than 68.5 million people worldwide. The numbers keep growing. In refugee and IDP camps, many women and children are abused sexually and in other ways, while men are mostly physically and mentally abused. Both classes of victims are known to have their rights violated. Migrants crossing the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea also suffer the same or similar fate. But more heart-­ wrenching are the women and children who lost their lives at sea while trying to make the voyage. The images were heart-breaking. Because the African Condition may not improve significantly in the coming several decades, many continue to ask: “What is the problem with Africans?” We know what the problems and the solutions are. So, what is stopping Africans? Montgomery, AL, USA  Sabella O. Abidde Summer 2020

Acknowledgment

I conceived the idea for this book after a series of conversations I had with the late Olayiwola Abegunrin in fall 2018. Professor Abegunrin was my friend and mentor and writing partner for 15 years. It is him that I owe much of the credit for the scholarly works I have done in the last decade. Although he was ill for a while; still, his passing was a shock to me and many others. I would also like to thank all the scholars who contributed to this volume. But more than that, I would like to apologize for the extended delay in submitting the manuscript (which was caused by bouts of ill-health, multiple assignments, and official errands that caused me to lose focus). Besides, when my laptop computer crashed while I was attending a conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina in December 2019, I was deflated. Finally, I would like to acknowledge three professionals at Springer Publishing for their patience, guidance, and professionalism: Lorraine Klimowich, Maria David, and Faith Su. And of course, a word of gratitude to Dr. Elisha Dung and Professor Paul Erhunmwunsee. I would also like to thank the ever-benevolent and ever-­gracious Caroline Izekor and Angela Stone. Thank you! And finally, I would be remiss if I omitted the anonymous reviewers of my proposal and manuscript. Thank you…thank you!

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Introduction

From their early beginning as scavengers and gatherers in the African plains, humans have been on the move. They moved as small bands, and later as nomads. And even as human society progressed beginning with the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century, they never stopped moving. Two hundred thousand years later, not much has changed in terms of their need to migrate. They moved different directions within and outside the borders of the continent. To the north is the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea, to the west and east are the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. Migration, therefore, is central to our lives and every human society. Then and now, they migrated for the primary purpose of safety and survival. Then and now, they migrated out of their own volition and or were forced by prevailing circumstances. In recent years, however, the sources, causes, and patterns of migration have become complex. And so too have our understanding of these human movements. The typologies are almost endless. There are the “migrants,” “expatriates,” “immigrants,” “asylum seekers,” “the stateless,” “refugees,” and the “internally displaced person.” Of these, this edited volume seeks to pay closer attention to the latter categories: refugees and the internally displaced persons. Refugee, by definition, flees across international borders, while the internally displaced persons, generally remain within national borders. Nonetheless, depending on the individual or group circumstances—or on the prevailing geopolitical conditions—the internally displaced may cross international borders. And while it is not a common occurrence, some refugees who have already crossed international borders sometimes return to become part of the IDP populations. This is especially true when the cost of trekking across the Sahara Desert and or crossing the Mediterranean Sea or any of the oceans that demarcates Africa become too exorbitant to bear. The purpose of this book is threefold: 1. To interrogate the state and state of being of refugees and internal displacement on the African continent. This is important because both categories face danger and maltreatment in their home and host countries; both are sometimes discriminated against—denied their human and civil rights.

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2. To examine conditions in specific refugee and IDP camps on the continent, that is, in Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, and Ghana, and to also examine the emotional/health condition of refugees and the IDP.  Also, there are humanitarian risks associated with refugees and displacement which needs critical interrogation. 3. To critically examine why many African governments have failed in addressing the short- and long-term causes of the factors that make the refugee and the IDP condition possible. And there is the need to know how many African states have failed or performed poorly in their duties and responsibility towards marginalized groups. This book is designed as an edited volume; therefore, the scope, core arguments, themes, and issues to be addressed can be found on the Content Page. Even so, three inter-related threads run through this book: (a) the absence of good governance and strong institutions which could have, in many cases, prevented forced migration within and across national borders; (b) proactive policies and actions by governments and non-governmental organizations that could have, at the very least, helped in lessening the damaging impact of forced migration; and (c) arguing for an urgent need for a concerted effort by the international community to address issues relating to refugees and the internal displacement of people. In furtherance of these objectives, we present 11 chapters. Chapter 1, entitled “Refugees and the Internally Displaced Persons in Africa,” is by Sabella, wherein he argues that while the refugee problems in Africa seem like a recent phenomenon, in reality, it is not. It is a problem that is as old as many modern states on the continent. In the 1970s, for instance, there were an estimated one million African refugees—surpassed only by the 1.5 million Palestinian refugees.1 But today, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Africa is host to the second-largest number of refugees in the world—with an estimated 2.5 million fleeing from South Sudan alone.2 Abidde contends that inhumane conditions brought about by private and public inhumanities compel Africans to flee their communities and countries. Such conditions may include natural disasters and the economic and political policies of illiberal and not-so illiberal régimes that sometimes result in limited basic human needs. Furthermore, Abidde contends that the refugee crisis may not abate until the political conditions on the continent improve. In Chap. 2, “The Spatial Distribution of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps in Africa,” Augustine Avwunudiogba and Elisha Dung examine the spatial pattern of IDPs in Africa mapping the geographic hotspots of IDP camps. Comparatively, little attention and resources have been devoted to solving the plight of IDPs from the international community. Since IDPs are still within their national 1  Gould, W.T.S. “Refugees in Tropical Africa.” International Migration Review 8, no. 3 (September 1974): 413–30. 2  As collated by ALJAZEERA from UNHCR, Amnesty, Reliefweb, World Bank and updated February 7, 2019

Introduction

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boundaries, the international community considers them as local problems that should be handled by their respective governments compared to refugees who are likely to receive international sympathy and attention. Furthermore, the need to respect the sovereign political independence of the countries where IDPs are found adds a layer of complexity in terms of the contribution from international organizations to the solution of the problem of IDPs. This is because, in some situations, IDPs may be viewed as a normal internal political dynamic of political actors and agents within the affected countries. Ivon Alcime, Brenda Gill, and Elisha Dung, in Chap. 3, “African Migrants and Refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean,” state that natural and anthropogenic disasters have heightened the volume and exodus of people. As a result, Africans have migrated to other African countries including Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region, many of them as refugees. The authors investigate the origins of those African refugees while pinpointing the receiving countries. They also adopted Lee’s theory of migration to explain the three elements of the origin-destination concept of the place of origin, the place of destination, and the intervening obstacles. The chapter concludes with an overview of recent LAC immigration policies and some projections for the future of the refugee crisis in the region. In 2017, President Uhuru Kenyatta gave an official directive for the repatriation of the Somali refugees, particularly in Dadaab camp, back to Somalia even though Kenya is a signatory and party to numerous international treaties, conventions, and protocols that deal with the protection of refugees. It is for this reason that Mercy Kathambi Kaburu, in Chap. 4, “State Sovereignty-Non-Refoulement Nexus: Towards Sustainable Legal and Political Refugee Regime in Kenya,” argues that the obligation to observe non-refoulement norm is in the fiduciary political and legal duties of sovereign states, particularly those that have domesticated international treaties and conventions on refugees. Essentially, therefore, it is incumbent upon Kenya to lay the foundation for sustainable and durable political will concordant with the legal regime that protects the rights of refugees inscribed in international treaties, conventions, and protocols and which is also in consonant with the 2006 and 2012 Refugees Acts put in place by the country. While many researchers are particularly interested in refugees’ experience— which include their flight, their settlement, and eventually their repatriation— and address only causes of why refugees flee, types of flights, and roles of conventional actors or agencies, refugees’ personal experiences are often ignored. Roger B Alfani, in Chap. 5, “Refugees, Religion, and Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa,” fills this knowledge gap by focusing on how a refugee from the Democratic Republic of Congo handles this difficult situation by focusing on the important role of one’s religion/spirituality in determining his/her resilience. The central question guiding the chapter is “how does religion or spirituality contribute toward the resilience of a refugee?” In Chap. 6, “North African States as Agents of Europe’s Border Securitization: Tragic Ordeals of Young Refugee and Asylum Seekers from Africa,” Michael Nwalutu and Felicia I. Nwalutu posit that irregular youth migrants from Africa have continued to face criminalization and torture in the hands of North African border agents. Stakeholders ascribed the current trend in securitization

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against a perceived surge in global mobility of individuals to border gatekeeping induced by fear of demographic inundation, which compels the industrialized world to restrict their borders against “unwanted” immigrants. Michael Nwalutu and Felicia Nwalutu’s argument advances beyond the Push and Pull discursive paradigm of transnational migration and highlights yet the entrapment that EU border restriction has come to represent to the struggles of African migrant youth. And in Chap. 7, “From the Margin to the Mainstream: Dealing with the Scourge of Transit Migrants in Morocco,” Seun Bamidele insists that migration, borders, boundaries, and regional integration are increasingly becoming notable concepts that dominate regional and global debates in the twenty-first century. Commonly viewed from international relations perspectives, migration is framed as a transition of political, social, and economic mobility. Contemporary debates link migration with transborder vices. The interpretations of insecurity statistics contrast with the emerging quest to promoting migrants’ protective laws. Nevertheless, the innovations brought by the 2013 UN General Assembly High Level Security collaboration (HLD) on the promotion of sustainability of African migrants across the Morocco-EU borders are still contested. It is in the consideration of this that Bamidele examines the approaches that have been taken by Morocco, with the support of the European Union and the regional intergovernmental security collaboration in managing migrants’ flows. In Chap. 8, “IDPs of Boko Haram War, Emergency Rehabilitation and Human Rights Practice in Nigeria,” James Adeyeri and Jackson Aluede report that the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has so far created over 2 million IDPs, mostly currently internally displaced in Nigeria, and the rest in neighboring countries such as Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. In the Nigerian government’s IDP camps established to manage the emergency, the IDPs, particularly women and girls, continue to suffer various violations of their fundamental human rights by camp leaders, soldiers, policemen, vigilante groups’ personnel, etc. Many spend several months in military screening camps under dehumanizing conditions, preparatory to their transfer to the various IDP camps. Their movement is severely restricted, contrary to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. They are poorly fed and lack adequate necessities such as sanitation and healthcare. Some of the women and girls suffer rape, others are cajoled into sex through false promises of marriage, financial, and material assistance and are abandoned if they become pregnant. The authors, James Adeyeri and Jackson Aluede, went on to argue that the government’s ambivalent management of the IDPs and attitude to violations of their rights is symptomatic of a generally ambivalent policy on human rights advocacy and practice. Danielle Huot, Brent Doberstein, and Carrie Mitchell argue in Chap. 9, “Tenuous Refuge: Probing Links Between (Il)Legality of Urban Refugees in Kenya, Refugee Supports, and Host Country Integration,” that Kenya has been a major hosting nation for refugees and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa for the past two decades. Since the early 1990s, Kenya has operated under an informal encampment policy that mandated all refugees should reside in camp areas. Notwithstanding legal constraints to their freedom of movement, refugees are increasingly found in Kenya’s urban areas. Urban-based refugees however introduce nuanced challenges

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to refugee governance and integration as these communities are often unregistered, dispersed over large areas, and function largely within spheres that are culturally, socially, and economically segregated from the host society. The conflict between the 1951 Convention and Kenyan de facto encampment policy means urban refugees fall into a legal impasse, as neither the UNHCR nor the Kenyan government fully protects and supports this group. This study thus explores the legality of refugees outside of encampment areas in Kenya and examines the degree to which urban refugees in Nairobi can access their Convention-designated rights. In Chap. 10, “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in African Migrant/Refugee Population,” Kizito N.  C. Okeke argues that migration has always been part of human existence, but in recent decades, migration has become notoriously crisis-­ driven and often confronts humanity with the most horrendous and emotionally distressing memories of the treacherous and fatal ordeals of migrants. These migrants are exposed to varying levels of emotional and cognitive distresses and traumatic stress that can metastasize to mental disorders. This chapter explicates the need for mental hygiene, in forestalling potential cases of mental disorders, especially Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), among the African migrant/refugee population. By mental hygiene, I mean the application of a scientific approach, which promotes mental health and thwarts mental disorders through education, early treatment, and public health measures. The detection, for instance, of early symptoms of PTSD among African migrant/refugee population, early diagnosis, and then treatment are necessary steps to thwarting the syndromes and menaces of PTSD and mental disorders in general. Finally, in Chap. 11, “Disparities Between Messages Heard at Home and Messages Sent out by African Refugees in LAC:‘Safe Haven’ Countries,” Ivon Alcime and Brenda Gill allow that African refugees have always recounted their perilous treks from African to North American and European countries. However, what are their experiences when they leave Africa and migrate to Latin America and the Caribbean countries? The importance of hearing their messages is underscored by the UNHCR and the Forced Migration Report for Latin America, both of which suggest that of the 65 million forcibly displaced worldwide, several end up in the LAC region. Using newspaper articles and articles from some organizations, this chapter gives a voice to African refugees who have migrated to LAC countries. It spotlights some of the messages they send from the sanctuary countries to which they have fled. It allows readers to have a better sense of their experiences as they seek to find solace in new lands. It permits readers to learn about the trials and accomplishments of their journey. Hope is a necessary element in the affairs of humans. But alas, “hope” is neither a strategy nor an implementable public policy. So, while many within and outside of the continent are hopeful for a better future, neither the data nor the everyday reality in terms of governance, leadership, and institutions point to a “changing, hopeful, growing and developing continent.” Conflicts, ethnonational sentiments and aspirations, third-rate leadership, political excesses, corruption and corrupting tendencies, inability of governments to manage manmade and natural disasters, cruelty of the economic and political elite, the indifference of the intellectual class, a population

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that is severely uneducated and undereducated, amid these and other inhumanities are a group of nations, private entities, and individuals that are plundering the continent’s wealth while most Africans live in squalor and extreme poverty. The result of these is the multiplication of migrants, refugees, and the internally displaced.

Contents

1 Refugees and the Internally Displaced Persons in Africa��������������������    1 Sabella O. Abidde 2 The Spatial Distribution of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Africa����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   17 Augustine Avwunudiogba and Elisha J. Dung 3 African Migrants and Refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   45 Ivon Alcime, Brenda I. Gill, and Elisha J. Dung 4 State Sovereignty-Non-Refoulement Nexus: Towards Sustainable Legal and Political Refugee Regime in Kenya������������������   63 Mercy Kathambi Kaburu 5 Refugees, Religion, and Resilience in Sub-­Saharan Africa������������������   81 Roger B. Alfani 6 North African States as Agents of Europe’s Border Securitization: Tragic Ordeals of Young Refugee and Asylum Seekers from Africa������������������������������������������������������������   95 Michael O. Nwalutu and Felicia I. Nwalutu 7 From the Margin to the Mainstream: Dealing with the Scourge of Transit Migrants in Morocco��������������������������������  123 Seun Bamidele 8 IDPs of Boko Haram War, Emergency Rehabilitation and Human Rights Practice in Nigeria��������������������������������������������������  141 James Olusegun Adeyeri and Jackson A. Aluede 9 Tenuous Refuge: Probing Links Between (Il)legality of Urban Refugees in Kenya, Refugee Supports, and Host Country Integration����������������������������������������������������������������  161 Danielle Huot, Brent Doberstein, and Carrie Mitchell xvii

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Contents

10 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in African Migrant/Refugee Population������������������������������������������������������������������  175 Kizito N. C. Okeke 11 Disparities Between Messages Heard at Home and Messages Sent Out by African Refugees in LAC “Safe Haven” Countries������������������������������������������������������������  199 Ivon Alcime and Brenda I. Gill

Abbreviations

ASD AU BLAS BMMRS BNI CONARE CRPSF DRA DRC DSM-5 ECOWAS EDF EU FRONTEX GDP GoK GPID GRID IDMC IDP IGAD IOM IPA LAC MJTF MoU NAP NAPTIP NATO NCFR

Acute Stress Disorder African Union Moroccan Bilateral Approaches Brief Multidimensional Measure of Religiousness/Spirituality Gross National Income National Commission for Refugee Regional Protection and Solutions Framework Department of Refugee Affairs Democratic Republic of Congo Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5 Economic Community of West African States National European Union Development Fund European Union European Border and Coast Guard Agency Gross Domestic Product Government of Kenya Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement Global Report on Internal Displacement Internal Displacement Monitoring Center Internally Displaced Persons Inter-Governmental Authority on Development International Organization for Migration Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis Latin American and Caribbean Multinational Joint Task Force Memorandum of Understanding National Action Plan for the Promotion & Protection of Human Rights National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Commission for Refugees xix

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NCFRMI NEMA NEP NGO NGO NRC NTF OAU OCHA PGD PRC PTSD RSD SAD SAD SAR UDHR UN UNCLOS UNGA UNHCR WFP

Abbreviations

National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons National Emergency Management Agency North-Eastern Province Non-Governmental Organizations Non-Governmental Organizations Norwegian Refugee Council National Transformation Fund Organization of African Unity United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Prolonged Grief Disorder Canadian Permanent Resident Card Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Refugee Status Determination Separation Anxiety Disorder Separation Anxiety Disorders International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue Universal Declaration of Human Rights United Nations United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea United Nations General Assembly United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees World Food Program

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Continent-wide representation of the forcibly displaced population. (Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies/July 10, 2019 /https://africacenter.org/spotlight/record-number-of-forciblydisplaced-africans-likely-to-grow/)����������������������������������������������������   8 Fig. 2.1 Aggregate number of internally displaced persons (IDPs): 1993–2018. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)�����������������������  23 Fig. 2.2 Internally displaced persons (IDPs): 1993–1998. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)�������������������������������������������������������������������  25 Fig. 2.3 Internally displaced persons (IDPs): 1999–2003. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)�������������������������������������������������������������������  26 Fig. 2.4 Internally displaced persons (IDPs): 2004–2008. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)�������������������������������������������������������������������  27 Fig. 2.5 Internally displaced persons (IDPs): 2009–2013. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)�������������������������������������������������������������������  28 Fig. 2.6 Internally displaced persons (IDPs): 2014–2018. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)�������������������������������������������������������������������  30 Fig. 2.7 Temporal trend of internally displaced persons (IDPs): 1993–2018. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)�������������������������������������������  31 Fig. 2.8 Internally displaced persons (IDPs) by country: 1993–2018. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)�������������������������������������������  32 Fig. 3.1 African refugee migration to Central America by country: 2014–2018. (Source: Dung, Gill, and Alcime, 2019)�������������������������  52 Fig. 3.2 African refugee migration to Argentina and Brazil: 2014–2018. (Source: Dung, Gill, and Alcime, 2019)���������������������������������������������  53 Fig. 3.3 Central American countries receiving the most African refugees: 2014–2018. (Source: Dung, Gill, and Alcime, 2019)�������������������������  53

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Fig. 4.1

List of Figures

Distribution of the refugee population in Kenya as of July 2016. (Source: UNHCR, Kenya Factsheet, July 2019. https://data.unhcr.org/ horn-of-africa/download.php?=1934. Retrieved on 10 September 2019)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  69

Fig. 11.1 Some messages from refugees derived from newspapers and organizaion websites. (Source. Compiled by Alcime and Gill 2020)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 210

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Documentation held by study participants (n = 32) and corresponding rights������������������������������������������������������������������������� 168

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About the Editor and Contributors

Editor Sabella O. Abidde  is a Professor of Political Science and a member of the Graduate Faculty at Alabama State University and formerly served as an Adjunct Faculty at the University of Oklahoma and Troy University (Montgomery campus). Dr. Abidde is an interdisciplinary scholar with a B.A. in International Relations and an M.Sc. in Educational Administration from Saint Cloud State University Minnesota, an M.A. in Political Science from Minnesota State University Mankato, Minnesota, and a Ph.D. (2009) in African Studies with emphasis on World Affairs, Public Policy and Development Studies from Howard University. His scholarship includes published volumes on Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean and Africa–China– Taiwan Relations. He is a recipient of the 2020 MOFA-Taiwan Fellowship awarded to scholars interested in archival research in Taiwan. Dr. Abidde is a member of the Association of Global South Studies (AGSS), the African Studies and Research Forum (ASRF), the American Political Science Association (APSA), and the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA).

Contributors Olusegun Adeyeri,  Ph.D., is a Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the Ph.D. and M.Phil./Ph.D.  History and Diplomacy programs at Lagos State University, Ojo, Nigeria. His teaching and research focus is on African History and Peace Studies, International Politics, and Human Rights Studies on which he has published extensively in both local and foreign journals/books. Some of his recent works include published articles in Conflict Studies Quarterly, Yonsei Journal of International Studies, and Africa Development and book chapters in Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance, and Development (2018). Dr. Adeyeri is a grantee of several travel awards and scholarships, the most recent being Scholarship of the xxv

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About the Editor and Contributors

International Network of Genocide Scholars (INoGS) to participate in the 6th INoGS Global Conference, “Genocide and Mass Violence: Diagnosis, Treatment, and Recovery?” and “Humanities, Social and Medical Sciences Facing Etreme Violence,” Aix-Marseille University, France. Ivon  Alcime  is an Assistant Professor of Communication in the Department of Communications at Alabama State University. He was a Faculty Member at Tuskegee University, Tuskegee, Alabama. Dr. Alcime received his B.A. in Philosophy in 1997, his M.A. in Organizational Communication in 2004, and his Ph.D. in Intercultural Communication from Howard University in 2012. His published works include Fighting the Long War Against the Klan: The Black Panther as a Symbol of Self-Defense and Social Justice and Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Narrative Ethics and the War Against Terrorism. Dr. Alcime is a member of several scholarly organizations. Roger B. Alfani  is an Adjunct Professor at Seton Hall University, where he teaches Christianity and Dialogue, as well as a Research Fellow in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at the same academic institution. He completed his Ph.D. in Religious Studies at the University of Montreal, Canada. His current researches do not only explore the nexus between religion and foreign policies, but they investigate the role of religious actors in peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, in general, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in particular. Other research interests of Dr. Alfani cover international relations, local ownership, and African theologies. He is the author of the forthcoming book (2019) Religious Peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of Congo and has published peer-reviewed articles and book chapters. Jackson A. Aluede,  Ph.D., obtained his academic degrees from the Department of History and Strategic Studies, University of Lagos. He lectures in the Department of History and Diplomatic Studies at Anchor University, Lagos. His areas of specialization are Border Studies and Trans-Border Crime and Migration Studies. Dr. Aluede’s recent publications include: “The Cross-Border Dimension of Intrastate Conflicts in Africa: An Analysis of the Great Lakes Region and Mano River” in African Borders, War, Conflict Regional and Continental Integration edited by Innocent Moyo and Chris Changwe Nshimbi (London: Routledge, 2019); and “Smuggling in the Nigeria-Benin Border and Its Impact on Nigeria’s Economic Development” in Crime, Law, and Society in Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Stephen Ellis (Amsterdam: Brill, 2019). Augustine  Avwunudiogba  is an Associate Professor of Geography in the Department of Anthropology, Geography/Ethnic Studies, California State University, Stanislaus. He teaches courses in the regional geography of Africa, Mexico, and Central America. His recent publications on Africa and Latin America include two co-authored chapters on Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. He holds an M.A. in Geographical Studies from Southern Illinois University,

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Edwardsville Illinois, and a Ph.D. in Geography from the University of Texas at Austin, Texas. Seun Bamidele,  Ph.D., is a Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of International Relations, Chrisland University, Nigeria. He is also a Research Fellow at the Institute of Peace, Security and Governance, Ekiti State University, Nigeria. He is a recipient of many international grants, awards, and fellowships including the Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa Program; Social Science Research Council and Carnegie Corporation of New York (2017–2018; 2018–2019); Trust Africa Illicit Financial Flow (2015); Equator Peace Academy, Uganda Martyrs University, Uganda (2012); and Women in International Security (WIIS). He has published articles in India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs (SAGE), International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (Brill), African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review (Indiana University Press), and Jadavpur Journal of International Relations (SAGE) Brent  Doberstein  is an Associate Professor of Geography and Environmental Management at the University of Waterloo, Canada. His teaching/research focus is on the human dimensions of natural hazards, environmental and resource management, disaster risk reduction, and climate change adaptation. His research is situated almost exclusively in developing countries, primarily in South East Asia. Elisha  J.  Dung  is an Associate Professor of Geography in the Department of Criminal Justice/Social Sciences at Alabama State University. Dr. Dung holds a Ph.D. in Geography from Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, and teaches courses in World Regional Geography, Cultural Geography, Regional Geography of North America, and the Geography of Africa. His most recent publications have been on African Diaspora; bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean; and African migration. Brenda I. Gill  received her Ph.D. from Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, as a mixed-methods Family Sociologist. She is employed in the Department of Criminal Justice and Social Sciences at Alabama State University Montgomery. Her scholarship includes her service on the Editorial Board, University of Guyana Press. Her recent work includes The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-­ Imperialism 2020; “Contemporary out-migration from CARICOM countries: Its impact and potential for growth of diaspora countries” in Danns, George K., Yaw, Fitzgerald, and Griffith, Ivelaw (Eds.). Dynamics of Caribbean Diaspora Engagement: People, policy, practice. Turkeyen, Guyana. University of Guyana Press; and “Borders and dreams: Immigration, diversity and multiculturalism in the new millennium.” In Alvarez, Sofia Espinoza and Urbina, Martin Guevara (Eds.). Immigration and the law: Race, citizenship, and social control. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.

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Danielle  Huot  is an independent researcher focusing on social inclusion, livelihoods, and migration. She is currently with the UN Development Program in Afghanistan and has worked in South Asia and Africa since 2011. Her work centers on research for program/policy development and evaluation. Through her career, she has been affiliated with various organizations including the World Bank, Overseas Development Institute, and Seefar Enterprise. Danielle is an alumna of the University of Waterloo and the University of British Columbia. Mercy Kathambi Kaburu  is a Lecturer in International Relations at the United States International University (USIU)Africa. She holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from United States International University, Africa, and a Master of Arts degree in International Conflict Management from the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi, Kenya. Her research areas of interest include foreign policy analysis and regional peace and security among others. Carrie  Mitchell  is an Assistant Professor in the School of Planning at the University of Waterloo. Her research focus is on urban climate change, gender and planning, and international development. Felicia  Ihuoma  Nwalutu  holds a Ph.D. in History, Women and Gender Studies from the University of Lagos, Nigeria. She holds an M.A. and M.S.W. in History and Women Studies and Social Work respectfully from the University of Toronto, Canada. She was a Visiting Lecturer at the Institute of Museology, Jos, Nigeria, and has served as a Chief Ethnographer at the National Commission for Museums and Monument, Benin City, Nigeria. Felicia has published locally and internationally. She reviewed for H-Net Africa and has some book chapters and journal publications to her credit. Her research interests are in social work, mental health, African and world history, women and gender studies, youth transnational migration, museum, and museology. Michael  Onyedika  Nwalutu  holds a Ph.D. in Sociology of Education from the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, OISE University of Toronto, Canada. He holds graduate degrees in Education, Marketing, and International Relations, respectively. Michael served as a Lecturer with the Federal University of Technology Owerri, Benin Extension, Nigeria. He co-reviewed for H-Net and has some book chapters and journal publications to his credit. Michael’s research interests are: education and knowledge production, youth and transnational migration, globalization, anti-colonial and anti-racist theories, indigenous world views, disability studies, psychology of children and adults with learning disabilities, and international relations. Kizito  N.  C.  Okeke  studied Psychology at the University of Georgia and West Georgia University, and earned a Master’s degree in Educational Psychology and a Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology, respectively. Previously, he studied Philosophy and Theology in Nigeria and was awarded a Bachelor of Sacred Theology degree by

About the Editor and Contributors

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Pontifical Urbaniana University in Rome, Italy. His interest in psychology is in the philosophy and methodological foundations of psychology, and these have engendered a kind of epistemological dialogue with other branches of psychology. His dissertation and subsequent publications have examined the phenomenon of authenticity, and this empirical research is symbolic of his main area of research on Social Justice.

Chapter 1

Refugees and the Internally Displaced Persons in Africa Sabella O. Abidde

Introduction Unlike refugees who cross international borders and, in the process, prick the conscience of the international community, the plight and tribulations of the internally displaced person (IDP) have only just begun to receive the deserved attention. For instance, until the 1990s, there was no classification for the IDP; therefore, victims rarely attracted the attention of scholars and policymakers even though the phenomenon was and continues to be one of the most significant humanitarian crises in African continent and elsewhere. These phenomena – refugeeism and IDP – are due primarily to the policies of illiberal democracies and authoritarian leaders, natural disasters, terrorism, protracted ethnic conflicts, and wars. For several decades, there were regions of the continent – that is, Rwanda, Liberia, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and Ethiopia – where drawn-out wars and low-intensity conflicts forced people to abandon their homes and communities. And in recent times, the violence and terror that is being perpetrated by Boko Haram in Nigeria, for instance, has forced an untold number of Nigerians in the northern part of the country to flee for safety and security.1 African countries have myriad problems and challenges – many are traceable to the nature of African states and societies. More specifically, they are traceable to how they were founded and to how they are being governed and the class of past and

1  MacEachern, Scott. Searching for Boko Haram: A History of Violence in Central Africa. New  York: Oxford University Press, 2018; See also Thurston, Alexander. Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017.

S. O. Abidde (*) Department of History and Political Science, Alabama State University, Montgomery, AL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. O. Abidde (ed.), The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56650-0_1

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current leaders. Then and now, many states lack autonomy and capacity. By their very nature, states and societies – be it in the Global South or Global North – cannot avoid conflicts because conflicts are an inherent part of what it means to be a state. And, as a state, it must be able to discharge its moral and constitutional duties: protect and provide for its citizens, be able to resolve or adjudicate conflicts through its various institutions, and endanger a sense of belonging and citizenship.2 And in times of natural disasters, communal or ethnic conflicts, violence, or terrorism, the state must be able to care for the maimed and the displaced and for the family of those who lost their lives. Citizens need and want their government to be there for them especially in times of tragedy and uncertainties. The provision or availability of the abovementioned makes a state relevant. In many African countries, however, this has not been the case. Consequently, there is a continent-wide tragedy of movements, that is, the refugees and the internally displaced persons, asylum seekers, migrants, and stateless persons. To aid in the understanding of this phenomenon, insofar as African states and societies are concerned, one must look to the failure of leadership and the failure of state and its various institutions across the continent. Several decades after independence, some states simply do not work: they do not function like their counterparts in Europe, Asia, or North America,3 but rather, many of the states on the continent are weak and fragmented and compete with parallel political authorities like warlords, religious and ethnic leaders, and a multitude of power centers.4

On the Question of Definitions According to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, a “refugee” is a person who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”5 According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC),

2  Meredith, Martin. The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent since Independence. New York: Public Affairs, 2011; Herbst, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015; See also Young, Crawford. The Postcolonial State in Africa: Fifty Years of Independence, 1960–2010. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012. 3  Herbst, Jeffrey. “Responding to State Failure in Africa.” International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 120. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/2539275 4  Widner, Jennifer A. “States and Statelessness in Late Twentieth-Century Africa.” Daedalus 124, no. 3 (1995): 129–53. 5   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “The 1951 Refugee Convention.” UNHCR.  Accessed May 11, 2020. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention. html#:~:text=The 1951 Refugee Convention is,of States to protect them.

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A crucial requirement to be considered a “refugee” is crossing an international border. Persons forcibly displaced from their homes who cannot or choose not to cross a border, therefore, are not considered refugees, even if they share many of the same circumstances and challenges as those who do. Unlike refugees, internally displaced people do not have a special status in international law with rights specific to their situation. The term “internally displaced person” is merely descriptive.6

The IDMC went on to state that “internal displacement was placed on the international agenda and recognized as an important issue of global concern in the early 1990s. At this point, internal displacement was a subject with neither clear definitions nor a normative framework that could guide states and international humanitarian actors. The issue has since come a long way. While there is more work to be done to get internal displacement fully recognized as a development concern, progress has been made. The key milestone in the institutional history of internal displacement was the creation of the Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement.7 Since then, several important developments have allowed the issue some visibility in regional and international policy discussions. Agreement on The Kampala Convention8 and a range of protocols and seminal reports have advanced the understanding of the scale and nature of internal displacement across the globe.”9 The protocols and reports include: 1. Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility. 2. The Great Lakes IDP Protocol. 3. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons.10 IDP, on the other hand, are “Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized

 “Internal Displacement.” IDMC.  Accessed May 11, 2020. https://www.internal-displacement. org/internal-displacement 7  https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/idps/43ce1cff2/guiding-principles-internal-displacement.html 8  According to the IDMC, “Upon coming into force on 6 December 2012, the Kampala Convention made history as the world’s first regional instrument that legally binds governments to provide protection for the rights and well-being of those forced to flee inside their home countries due to conflict, violence, natural disasters, and human rights abuses. The Convention reaffirms that national authorities have the primary responsibility to aid internally displaced people (IDPs) and create the conditions necessary to achieve durable solutions to displacement.” For official document of the convention – legally known as the African Union Convention For The Protection And Assistance Of Internally Displaced Persons In Africa – please see https://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/african-union-convention-for-the-protection-and-assistance-ofinternally-displaced-persons-in-africa 9  Ibid, “Internal Displacement.” IDMC 10  Ibid, “Internal Displacement.” IDMC 6

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violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.”11

The African Condition Eurocentric and Afrocentric scholars may diverge on many issues,12 that is, the origins of the slave trade in Africa, colonialism, foreign aids, and the reasons for the African Condition; even so, both perspectives are perplexed by the state of underdevelopment and the continent’s perennial state of anarchy after several decades of independence. Why Africa is the way it is has been a subject of empirical and systematic studies by scholars and observers at least since 1957 when the African Studies Association was formed. The Department of African Studies at Howard had been founded 4 years earlier to, in part, help emancipate the continent and aid in its economic and political development. Several decades after these historic formations, the African continent lags and confounds despite the “causes, effects, and roadmaps” that has been propagated and submitted by scholars. Afrocentric scholars are wont to point to the residual effects of slavery and colonialism as the starting point of the psychological and physical hindrances that have continued to wreak havoc on the continent and its people. Nonetheless, more recent philosophy and accepted wisdom is that Africa has had time to correct the imbalances and residual effects of slavery and colonialism; therefore, she need not play the victim. Indeed, Africa is not a unique continent – in the sense that everything that has ever happened there has happened somewhere else: slavery, military interventions, wars, natural and man-made disasters, ethnic conflicts, corruption, etc. While other countries and continents have and continue to grow and develop, Africa seems adrift. Roel van der Veen puts it succinctly when he asked “why, despite the rising prosperity elsewhere in the world and widespread changes that took place on the continent itself, Africa failed to break free of poverty”13 and other fetidities. The answers are not limited to weak institutions and the crisis of governance14; the enmity between the government and the governed; the inability of civil servants to draw clear lines between public and private goods; and the sheer inanity and low

 Ibid, “Internal Displacement.” IDMC  Chukwuokolo, Jerry Chidozie. “Afrocentrism Or Eurocentrism: The Dilemma Of African Development.” OGIRISI: A New Journal of African Studies 6, no. 1 (2010); See also Hoskins, Linus A. “Eurocentrism Vs. Afrocentrism. A Geopolitical Linkage Analysis.” Journal of Black Studies 23, no. 2 (1992): 247–57. 13  Veen, Roel van der. What Went Wrong with Africa a Contemporary History. Amsterdam: KIT, 2004. 14  Mbaku, John Mukum. “Good and Inclusive Governance Is Imperative for Africa’s Future.” Brookings. February 03, 2020. Accessed June 19, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/research/ good-and-inclusive-governance-is-imperative-for-africas-future/.; See also Alence, Rod. “Political Institutions and Developmental Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 42, no. 2 (2004): 163–87 11 12

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self-esteem of most African leaders are some of the factors that complicate and hinder the growth and development of states and societies on the continent. And because many Africans allow it, illicit activities by foreign governments, multinational corporations, and private persons and entities continue to hinder development. So, on the one hand, we have the banality of self-serving and third-rate leadership; and on the other hand, we have foreign entities that are plundering Africa’s wealth. The result has been a continent and a people that are finding it difficult to escape poverty and cruel and agrarian conditions. If nothing is done to arrest the African Condition, the looters and instigators of the ongoing crisis will have to contend with the problems associated with migrants and refugees crossing the adjoining Oceans and the Mediterranean Sea. For every migrant and refugee that dies at Sea, at least five will eventually enter Europe and North America. For every migrant or refugee that dies trekking the Sahara Desert, at least five will eventually make it to safety in Western and non-­ Western societies. Again and again, there will be migration and refugee crises; again and again, these migrants and refugees will breach European and North American borders. The fact is that migrants and refugees would rather remain in their respective countries, but when the condition becomes unbearable – unbearable condition made possible and encouraged by foreign entities and groups of individuals – the victims and the aggrieved would have no choice but to flee and breach national and international borders. The recent migration and refugee crisis of 2014/2015–2019 may have caused panic in some Western societies; upcoming crises are likely to be more alarming and with far-reaching negative effects. What is more, the economic, social, cultural, and political problems in Africa would be brought to European and North American societies. Essentially, therefore, the African Condition would be theirs to sort out. They would have to own it.

Reasons Behind the IDP and Refugee Crisis Forced migration and internal displacement “in and into Nigeria in the last 50 years of independence have been triggered by violent conflict. Other causes of displacement include natural disasters and environmental degradation, intercommunal/ inter-ethnic clashes, disputes over land, boundary conflicts between indigenous people and settlers, communal and ethnoreligious clashes, as well as electoral violence. The highest recorded number in the last decade, however, was due to the insurgency in the northeast part of the country, where a spate of violent attacks since 2009 has left well over two million people displaced within and across the borders to neighboring countries, especially over the past three years.”15

 Mohammed, Fatima Kyari. “The Causes and Consequences of Internal Displacement in Nigeria and Related Governance Challenges.” Working Paper Division Global Issues Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs. April 2017. Accessed May 11, 2020. file:///C:/Users/Abidd/OneDrive/Desktop/Mohammed_2017_Internal_Displacement_ Nigeria.pdf.

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There are many understandings of ethnic conflicts, but for the most part, they can be attributed to (1) ancient hatred, (2) manipulative leaders, (3) economic rivalry, (4) spiral of insecurity, and (5) historical myths, fears, and the opportunity to act on such fears. These conditions are exacerbated by weak institutions and poor leadership.16 Besides, Africa’s many wars and low-intensity conflicts in the early years of independence and for the next 30–40 years were a major cause of IDP and refugees. Donald Rothchild asserted that ethnic conflicts are not inevitable and that if there are accommodation, reciprocity, and negotiations, conflicts can be well managed. However, he allowed that not all conflicts lend themselves to state negotiation or mediation. He went on to say that “in the encounter between the state and society, the goal is to establish regularized, positive interaction leading to cooperation.”17 Suggested strategies for containing conflicts include persuasion, political education, control and coercion, power-sharing, and redistribution of resources and political power. According to Raymond Copson, between 1980 and 1994, for instance, there was a war in every region of the continent. There were wars in Sudan, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia, Uganda, Western Sahara, Chad, and Rwanda. Most of the wars were between regimes and the rebels or regimes against resistance movements. Beyond the high casualties and human suffering and collapse of food production, they produced many refugees and the internally displaced. In most countries, there were a collapse of state or semblance of the collapse of the state, the emergence of personalist rule, incessant military coups, political corruption, and ethnic and religious problems.18 All the aforementioned invariably led to the decline and collapse of states. In these countries, as in most of Africa, there are a gap between state and society, high levels of poverty, limited opportunities, and environmental degradation. States in Africa are, for the most part, weak and fragmenting entities. Often, many governments are unable to exercise power beyond a few miles outside of the capital. Their ability to legislate or enforce laws is very weak and so also is their ability to provide political goods and services. Consequently, many groups felt disenfranchised, never developing a sense of belonging hence the feelings and/or wanting self-rule. In many instances, there is never justice and fairness in managing the affairs of the state. Deng and Zartman, in Conflict Resolution in Africa, averred that “conflicts in Africa are primarily over resources. There is an internal struggle over the distribution of national resources and collective wealth. And conflict sometimes arises over the definition of “self” in the struggle for self-determination. Furthermore, conflicts that concern ideology and competing socio-political systems also abound.”19

 Kaufman, Stuart J. Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004. 17  Rothchild, Donald. Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997. 18  Copson, Raymond W. Africas Wars and Prospects for Peace. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. 19  Deng, Francis Mading., and I.  William. Zartman. Conflict Resolution in Africa: Conference: Revised Papers. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991. 16

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Towards the tail end of the Cold War, the thinking was that the post-Cold War world would be a peaceful place: a world of regional and international cooperation and prosperity. It was supposed to be a world where the global community paid greater attention to basic human needs and racial equality and environmental challenges. But alas, things have not turned out that way. Promises were not kept, and expectations have not been met. What we now have is a world of unending terrorism, conflicts, and wars and intolerance; economic inequality; squalid ecological conditions; exploitation of the weak and the needy; and governments that abuse their people. Two decades into the twenty-first century, one of the problems connecting all nations and all peoples is terrorism. Public and private violence is not new in Nigeria. What seems new is terrorism where, since 2009, Boko Haram – the fundamentalist northern Nigeria based anti-Western, anti-education, and anti-­ secular organization – has been wreaking deaths and destruction on innocent citizens and simultaneously challenging the authority of the Nigerian state in some parts of the country. In its very short existence, Boko Haram has achieved notoriety far beyond any geographical borders. The activity of this group accounts for the largest share of the driving force behind refugees and the IDP in Nigeria.

Refugees and IDP – A Representative Data Figure 1.1 is a representation of the forcibly displaced population on the continent. What the map shows is that “there are 27 million people in Africa who have been forcibly displaced from their homes (internally displaced, refugees, and asylum seekers). This figure is a record and nearly triple the number of a decade ago. If forced displacements continue to grow at the current rate of 1.5 million people per year, the cumulative total will double in 18 years. Nearly all of Africa’s forced displacement is a result of conflict and repressive governance.”20 In addition, says the Africa Center for Strategic Studies: • Nine of the ten countries with the highest levels of forced displacement in Africa are experiencing conflict. • Of the ten African countries with the highest numbers of forcibly displaced people, eight have authoritarian-leaning governments. • The ten African countries with the highest levels of forced displacement create a contiguous “arc of instability.” • The five African countries with the highest number of forcibly displaced people in proportion to their entire population are South Sudan (32%), Central African Republic (27%), Somalia (23%), Eritrea (11%), and Sudan (7%).

 “Record Number of Forcibly Displaced Africans Likely to Grow.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies. July 11, 2019. Accessed May 11, 2020. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/record-number-offorcibly-displaced-africans-likely-to-grow/

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Fig. 1.1  Continent-wide representation of the forcibly displaced population. (Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies/July 10, 2019 /https://africacenter.org/spotlight/ record-number-of-forcibly-displaced-africans-likely-to-grow/)

• The ten African countries with the highest number of forcibly displaced people also have some of the fastest-growing populations and are among the least developed. • The number of people living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia (two of the three countries with the greatest number of forcibly displaced people) is expected to increase by around 135% by 2050.21

21

 Ibid

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The Uncertainty of Resettlement Relocation, under any circumstance, is not easy especially if one has spent 15 or more of his productive years his/her native country. Even when well planned, relocating to any African country can be frustrating, energy-sapping, and discouraging. This is so because several years of exile have a way of making one a stranger in one’s community and country. For instance, there is the possibility of getting one’s bearings wrong and one’s worldview and mannerisms out of sync and in the process becoming an alien. But beyond the mental or psychological difficulties are the physicals. Many African countries, for instance, cannot absorb returnees. And of course, there are the problems associated with infrastructures, security, and other social and political goods many immigrants take for granted in foreign countries: the uncertainties associated with basic human needs (electricity, potable water, the ecology, education, good roads and telecommunication, personal security, and healthcare). Nonetheless, how well and for how long one planned the relocation can also determine how things turn out in terms of one’s place and comfort in the new environment. Planned or not, smooth or not, you will, now and then, get your bearings wrong. It is the price you pay for being in exile for many years.22 Of course, there is the irony many immigrants hardly speak about: the shame of a wasted sojourn abroad. This is the case for many immigrants who, after spending many years in the USA, have nothting to show for their time abroad: No residential or commercial real state, no investment portfolios, no savings, and none of those things that constitute the American dream. Not only do they not have anything to show for their several years of sojourn, but they also do not have the tangibles of success back in their homeland. For these immigrants  – impending returnees  – therefore, returning home can be a difficult, embarrassing, expensive, or impossible proposition. At the very least, it can be a complicated undertaking. Many African immigrants have family members who are steeped in poverty. Such people become one’s responsibility. There are school and hospital bills to be paid, debts to help repaid, bribes to give, and family support to render. Because of the much-vaunted African culture, one is forced or forced to be one’s brother’s keeper and, in the process, constraining or stunting one’s economic and social growth. Despite the negativities and fear, many immigrants would like to return home.23 But for the refugees and IDPs, a world of uncertainties awaits them as they think and plan for returning to their homes and communities. After all, these are groups that, in the first place, suffered physical and mental pain on their way out. For many, especially women and girls, they continued to suffer rape and physical abuse in IDP camps. In many of these camps, the general population is subjected to neglect and violation of their human and civil rights and is for the most part housed in ­substandard  Abidde, Sabella O. “African Immigrants and the American Experience.” In Africans and the Exiled Life: Migration, Culture, and Globalization, edited by Sabella O.  Abidde and Brenda I. Gill. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2018. 23  Ibid 22

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housing. And even if they wanted to, millions of IDPs have no home to return to because of the continuing danger, or because their homes and communities have been destroyed and are not habitable  – or are waiting for the government and/or NGO to help rebuild their homes and communities. But for the refugees, some do return home either because the danger has ceased or subsided or because returning home or returning to other parts of their home country is a better option compared to the danger of crossing national and international borders. In recent times, many governments, in concert with nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, have been repatriating refugees and migrants stuck at international borders, refugee camps, and prisons in a place like Libya. Nigeria is one such country that has been repatriating some of its migrants and refugees from Libya.24 However, many of these returnees struggle to adjust to life in Nigeria, and many voluntary returnees in Nigeria report long-term mental and physical health problems as well as suffering social stigma upon returning to Nigeria.25 Elsewhere in the continent, Somali refugees are returning home. As part of the Tripartite Agreement signed between Kenya, Somalia, and UNHCR in 2013, Somali refugees – many of whom were born in Dadaab camp and had never set foot in their own country – were being given the chance to return home. In 2016, for example, more than 36,000 of those refugees returned home. This contributed to the decrease in Somali refugees in the country from 417,900 in 2015 to 324,000 in 2016.26 In resettlement exercises, there is a need to understand that: 1. All persons have the right to choose a durable solution: return and reintegrate to the place of origin or relocate elsewhere in the country. 2. All solutions and efforts towards resettlement must be voluntary, safe, and dignified. 3. Financial and political assistance is provided without discrimination regardless of ethnicity, gender, religious beliefs, membership in a particular social group, class, or political opinion. 4. Humanitarian assistance must be delivered autonomously from military, political, or economic objectives. 5. Support for implementing return, reintegration, and relocation and durable solutions requires a coordinated approach through humanitarian, protection, early recovery, and development activities. 6. The assistance should be coordinated, rights-based, and multi-sectoral, considering locally appropriate and community-based solutions.

 Sanderson, Sertan. “Returnees Struggle to Adjust to Life in Nigeria.” InfoMigrants. September 17, 2019.AccessedApril 12, 2020. https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/19561/returnees-struggle-toadjust-to-life-in-nigeria 25  Ibid 26  Dahir, Abdi Latif. “These Charts Break down the Troubling Trends with Displaced People across Africa.” Quartz Africa. April 20, 2017. Accessed June 19, 2020. https://qz.com/africa/1009886/ world-refugee-day-armed-conflicts-in-sub-saharan-africa-drove-the-displacement-and-refugeecrisis-in-2016/ 24

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7. Assistance needs to consider the logistical and financial constraints and capacity for delivery, as well as the pre-existing baseline of services in each area. 8. All beneficiary groups are informed and involved in assistance and development activities. 9. Special consideration and prioritization will be given to extremely vulnerable persons and those who have been severely affected by the conflict. 10. These elements should also include access to an effective mechanism that restores IDPs’ housing, land, and property and/or provides them with compensation.27

Policy Recommendations Some of the hallmarks of a democratic government are a stable and enriching environment that fosters peace and stability; constitutionalism and the rule of law; strong institutions that arbitrate between all parties; the provision and equitable distribution of political goods and services; and an effective and responsive government that provides and/or encourages the provision of basic human needs. And while no system is perfect, the desired system encourages the vast majority to remain and enjoy a decent lifestyle – as opposed to encouraging or compelling citizens to leave the country and/or to seeking safety and security shelter in IDP camps. In making policy recommendations, one need not reinvent the wheels, especially because governmental, nongovernmental, and intergovernmental organizations around the world have proffered workable and practical solutions to curbing violence, terrorism, and instability and, by extension, the incidence of refugeeism and internal displacements. In addition, there is the understanding the African governments must awaken to their duties and responsibility, that is, protecting lives and properties, and in providing jobs and education and various other economic goods and political goods and services. This understanding is germane because most African governments have been shirking in their purpose for being. “To effectively address the plight of internal displacement and forced migration, interventions should be addressed in such a way that it is not prolonged and in situations where a return is not possible due to extreme insecurity or environmental destruction, and alternative solutions are found. Several factors would need to be addressed, including targeting the underlying drivers of displacement. The assistance should be centered on social inclusion, education, youth employment and empowerment, natural resource management, investment in infrastructure, and environmental protection.

 “Framework for Return, Reintegration and Relocation of Displaced Persons: Achieving Durable Solutions in South Sudan.” Republic of South Sudan Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. February 2017. Accessed April 11, 2020. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5b72a64a4. pdf

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This requires engagement from the Nigerian/African authorities, civil society, governments of neighboring countries, and the international community.”28 Protracted conflicts are the key driver of displacement in Africa and require intensified regional and international engagement to bring them to closure. African and international actors intent on reversing the displacement crisis in Africa must recognize that conflict is the principal driver of human dislocation on the continent. Unless these external actors exert serious effort into ending the conflict, much time, effort, and money will be misdirected to temporary solutions. The fact that all armed conflicts on the continent are internal points to the important role that governance and the lack of power-sharing play in Africa’s displacement crisis. Reducing conflict as a driver of displacement, therefore, will require greater diplomatic engagement to incentivize negotiation and upholding political resolutions.29 Penalize repressive regimes. Governmental intimidation of citizens is another driver of displacement in Africa. Nine of the top 10 countries causing forced displacement in Africa are authoritarian. Economic migrants, furthermore, are indirectly affected by repressive governance and corruption through push factors such as the inability to find work, earn an education, or open their businesses. Such population displacements, in effect, reflect citizens seeking refuge from their governments. Left unchecked, the repression, disenfranchisement, and state-sanctioned political violence by these governments will continue to generate further displacement. This creates real economic, social, and political costs in transit and receiving countries. Effectively, these repressive governments are “exporting” the burden of their poor governance onto their neighbors and the international community.30 Invest in creating job opportunities in economic migrants’ countries of origin. With Africa’s population set to double by 2050, investments will be required to improve the productive capacity of African economies so they are capable of absorbing and benefiting from a growing workforce, expected to reach more than 1.1 billion by then. This will require strengthening public goods such as the quality of educational systems, power grids, roads, and communications capabilities that will enhance productivity as well as Africa’s global competitiveness in export-oriented manufacturing and agricultural production.31

 Ibid, Fatima Kyari Mohammed  Williams, Wendy. Shifting Borders: Africa’s Displacement Crisis and Its Security Implications. Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2019. 30  Ibid 31  Ibid 28 29

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Conclusion There are things we know about internal displacement that are supported by facts. For instance, “we know that internal displacement is a persistent and serious problem in Africa, despite strong commitments on the part of national governments to prevent, address and resolve it; Africa’s decades-long displacement crisis demands a different approach if its scale and impact are to be reversed; the continent accounted for 40% of conflict displacement globally, and the scale and relentless nature of the phenomenon are beyond the scope of humanitarian action; a stronger focus on prevention and reduction of the risk of new displacement requires tackling the drivers of conflict, taking early action on conflict prevention and emerging crises, and reducing the impact on civilians by improving respect for the laws of war; displacement is reversing current development gains and threatens the achievement of future development objectives in Africa; and also that The Kampala Convention is only as strong as its implementation. The persistent scale of displacement in Africa highlights the need for it to be applied more systematically to prevent and address the phenomenon and bring it to a sustainable end.”32 While many scholars and commentators have proffered various reasons for the IDP and refugee crisis in Africa, this chapter has argued that the primary reasons for the crisis of movement are the failure of governance on the continent. We know, for instance, that many states have failed to discharge their constitutional duties and responsibility. Their failure  – either in terms of their inability, incompetence, or indifference – is what leads to the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, led to the economic and political crisis on the continent, and is responsible for weak political institutions that are pervasive in many states and societies. The IDP and refugee problems are only two of the very many problems of the continent. But whatever problem one decides to investigate, central to the solution are effective leadership, viable institutions, and the provision and easy access to basic human needs. The plundering of the continent’s resources by Western, non-Western nations, individuals, and multinational corporations would not have been possible without the involvement and the consent of African leaders, the elites, and greedy individuals. Africans have for decades participated in the steady looting of the continent. The end-result of third-rate leadership, illiberal regimes, weak institutions, and the unmitigated plundering of the continent has been the substandard and sub-human conditions of the majority of Africans in Africa. So long as many Africans have limited opportunity and live in an unsafe and economically and politically toxic environment, they would continue to dream of leaving for the safety and security of Europe and North America. Today and for the last decade, an increasing number of Africans seem to also deem China the new fertile ground, the new destination of

 “African Report on Internal Displacement, 2017.” 2017 African Report on Internal Displacement. December 2017. Accessed April 18, 2020. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ resources/20171206-Africa-report-2017-web.pdf

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choice. What would be the ramification of these exoduses on states and societies in Africa and on states and societies in Western and non-Western societies?

References Abidde, Sabella O. 2018. African Immigrants and the American Experience. In Africans and the Exiled Life: Migration, Culture, and Globalization, ed. Sabella O. Abidde and Brenda I. Gill. Lanham: Lexington Books. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. 2019. Record Number of Forcibly Displaced Africans Likely to Grow. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. July 11, 2019. Accessed 11 May 2020. https:// africacenter.org/spotlight/record-number-of-forcibly-displaced-africans-likely-to-grow/. African Report on Internal Displacement, 2017. 2017 African Report on Internal Displacement. December 2017. Accessed 18 Apr 2020. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ resources/20171206-Africa-report-2017-web.pdf. Alence, Rod. 2004. Political Institutions and Developmental Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Journal of Modern African Studies 42 (2): 163–187. Chukwuokolo, Jerry Chidozie. 2010. Afrocentrism Or Eurocentrism: The Dilemma of African Development. OGIRISI: A New Journal of African Studies 6 (1). Copson, Raymond W. 1994. Africa’s Wars and Prospects for Peace. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. Dahir, Abdi Latif. 2017. These Charts Break down the Troubling Trends with Displaced People across Africa. Quartz Africa. April 20, 2017. Accessed 19 June 2020. https://qz.com/ africa/1009886/world-refugee-day-armed-conflicts-in-sub-saharan-africa-drove-the-displacement-and-refugee-crisis-in-2016/. Deng, Francis Mading., and I. William Zartman. 1991. Conflict Resolution in Africa: Conference: Revised Papers. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution. Framework for Return, Reintegration and Relocation of Displaced Persons: Achieving Durable Solutions in South Sudan. Republic of South Sudan Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. February 2017. Accessed April 11, 2020. https://www.refworld.org/ pdfid/5b72a64a4.pdf. Herbst, Jeffrey. 1996. Responding to State Failure in Africa. International Security 21 (3): 120. ———. 2015. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hoskins, Linus A. 1992. Eurocentrism Vs. Afrocentrism. A Geopolitical Linkage Analysis. Journal of Black Studies 23 (2): 247–257. Internal Displacement. IDMC.  Accessed May 11, 2020. https://www.internal-displacement.org/ internal-displacement. Kaufman, Stuart J. 2004. Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. MacEachern, Scott. 2018. Searching for Boko Haram: A History of Violence in Central Africa. New York: Oxford University Press. Mbaku, John Mukum. 2020. Good and Inclusive Governance Is Imperative for Africa’s Future. Brookings. February 03, 2020. Accessed 19 June 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/research/ good-and-inclusive-governance-is-imperative-for-africas-future/. Meredith, Martin. 2011. The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent since Independence. New York: Public Affairs. Mohammed, Fatima Kyari. 2017. The Causes and Consequences of Internal Displacement in Nigeria and Related Governance Challenges. Working Paper Division Global Issues Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs. April 2017. Accessed May 11, 2020. ­file:///C:/Users/Abidd/OneDrive/Desktop/Mohammed_2017_ Internal_Displacement_Nigeria.pdf.

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Rothchild, Donald. 1997. Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press. Sanderson, Sertan. 2019. Returnees Struggle to Adjust to Life in Nigeria. InfoMigrants. September 17, 2019. Accessed 12 Apr 2020 https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/19561/ returnees-struggle-to-adjust-to-life-in-nigeria. Thurston, Alexander. 2017. Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement. Princeton: Princeton University Press. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2020. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. UNHCR.  Accessed 11 May 2020. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/ idps/43ce1cff2/guiding-principles-internal-displacement.html. ———. 2020. The 1951 Refugee Convention. UNHCR.  Accessed 11 May 2020. https://www. unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html#:~:text=The 1951 Refugee Convention is,of States to protect them. van der Veen, Roel. 2004. What Went Wrong with Africa: A Contemporary History. Amsterdam: KIT. Widner, Jennifer A. 1995. States and Statelessness in Late Twentieth-Century Africa. Daedalus 124 (3): 129–153. Williams, Wendy. 2019. Shifting Borders: Africa’s Displacement Crisis and Its Security Implications. Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Young, Crawford. 2012. The Postcolonial State in Africa: Fifty Years of Independence, 1960–2010. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Chapter 2

The Spatial Distribution of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Africa Augustine Avwunudiogba and Elisha J. Dung

Introduction Human migration involving the movement of persons or groups of people from one geographic location to another has always been a feature in human civilization. By and large, such migrations are often voluntary, involving people making a conscious decision to move from one place to another for economic and other reasons. The past couple of decades has witnessed the massive involuntary movement and dislocation of people within and between national borders. This has given rise to a new classification of groups or persons within the migration lexicon called internally displaced persons (IDPs). IDPs are persons or groups of persons who have been forced to move away from their permanent place of abode to temporary settlements within their national boundaries. This movement is often caused by a variety of factors including political instability, environmental disasters, ethnic and inter-tribal wars, and economic factors that affect them directly or to escape their effects without crossing recognized international borders. For example, in 2017, the IDP population based on conflict and violence had sub-Saharan Africa, contributing about 5,472,000 (46.4% of global total), and the Middle East and North Africa contributing 4,485,000 (38.1% of global total). On the other hand, the IDP population generated based on disasters shows that East Asia and the Pacific regions accounted for 8,604,000 (45.8% of global total), South Asia, 2,840,000 (15.8% of global total), the Americas, 4,476,000 (23.8% of global total), and sub-Saharan Africa, 2,561,000 (13.6% of global total). Whereas Africa and the Middle East accounted for 84.5% (9,957,000) of IDPs resulting from A. Avwunudiogba (*) Department of Anthropology, Geography & Ethnic Studies, California State University Stanislaus, Turlock, CA, USA e-mail: [email protected] E. J. Dung Department of Advancement Studies, Alabama State University, Montgomery, AL, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. O. Abidde (ed.), The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56650-0_2

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c­ onflict and violence, Asia and the Americas accounted for 84.7% (15,920,000) of all IDPs emanating from disasters. Africa’s contribution to IDPs due to disasters from a global perspective was 13.6% (2,561,000).1 The problem of internal displacement is particularly alarming on the African continent where estimates suggest that 15,000 people are displaced every day.2 This phenomenon has attracted the attention of national governments, international organizations, policymakers, and academia because of its ramifications for the political and economic stability of the affected countries. In addition, the humanitarian dimension of the crisis is so severe in many countries that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has elevated the problem of IDPs to be at the same level with that of refugees. Drawing inspiration from the concept of Topophilia and the literature on sense of place, this chapter examines the spatial pattern of IDPs in Africa with an attempt to identifying and mapping the geographic hotspots of these IDPs on the continent. This study is important because comparatively less attention and resources have been devoted to solving the plight of IDPs from the international community. Since IDPs are still within their national boundaries, the international community considers them as internal problems that should be handled by their respective governments, compared to refugees who are likely to receive international sympathy and attention since they are recognized and their rights are enshrined in international law. Furthermore, the need to respect the sovereign political independence of the countries where IDPs are found adds a layer of complexity in terms of the intervention and contributions from international organizations to the solution of the problem of IDPs. This is because, in some situations, IDPs are usually viewed as the result of the normal internal political dynamics of political actors and agents within the affected countries. This chapter is divided into three major sections. First, we explore the concept and different manifestations of IDPs vis-à-vis the United Nations (UN) traditionally defined refugees. Second, the spatial pattern of IDPs in Africa is examined, and lastly, we provide some policy implications of IDPs as it relates to national and international security, food security, economic stability, community cohesion, and the protection and rights of the IDPs, followed by recommendations and a conclusion.

1  Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), Global Report on Internal Displacement 2018, May 2018. Accessed 15 January 2020. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ resources/201805-final-GRID-2018-embargoed_0.pdf 2  Ibid

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Theoretical Framework and Literature Review Human migration, the voluntary movement of people from one geographic location to another, is a fundamental attribute of human civilization. The phenomenon of forced or involuntary migration has given rise to the categories of refugees and more recently internally displaced persons (IDPs). Although the phenomenon of IDPs has long been a hallmark of the process of human and economic development such as major construction projects within countries, the “issue of internal displacement emerged onto the international agenda in the early 1990s.”3 Much work has been done on IDPs and refugees4; however, there are still debates on the issue of forced migration in the literature particularly as it relates to the differences between IDPs and refugees in policy prescription. Nevertheless, the broader literature of forced migration agrees on one core element that differentiates refugees from IDPs. While IDPs and refugees result from involuntary movement, refugee movement occurs across national boundaries, while IDPs take place within national boundaries.5 In 1992, the UN Secretary-General defined IDPs as: Persons or groups who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disaster, and who are within the territory of their own country.6

This definition was further expanded in 1998 in the UN Guiding Principles on internal displacement, a document that has since gained wider acceptance by the international community. Here, IDPs were defined as: Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.7

3  Mooney, Erin. “The Concept of Internal Displacement and the case for Internally Displaced Persons as a category of concern”. Refugee Survey Quarterly 24, Issue 3 (2005): 9–26. 4  Lee, Luke T. “Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: Toward a Legal Synthesis?”, Journal of Refugee Studies 9, Issue 1 (1996): 27–42; see also, Baron N., S. B Jensen, and J.T.V.M .de Jong. “Refugees and Internally Displaced People”. In: Trauma Interventions in War and Peace, edited by, B.L Green., M.J Friedman, J de Jong, S.D. Solomon, T.M. Keane, J.A. Fairbank., B. Donelan, E. Frey-Wouters. International and Cultural Psychology Series. Boston, MA: Springer, 2004 and Crisp, Jeff. “A state of insecurity: the political economy of violence in kenya’’s refugee camps. African Affairs 99, Issue 397 (2000): 601–632. 5  McKeever, David. “Evolving interpretation of multilateral treaties: ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the united nations’ in the refugee convention.” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 64, no. 2 (2015): 405–44; see also, Hathaway, James C. and Michelle Foster. The Law of Refugee Status. second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. 773. 6  United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/23, February 1992. 7  United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on Internally Displaced Persons: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, February 1998.

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Even though this definition expands on the original idea of IDPs, members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), an African subregional group, recommended that development should be explicitly added as one of the causes of displacement in the definition of IDPs.8 Although this definition in the UN Guiding Principles on internal displacement provides a clearer operationalization of the concept of IDPs, it is nevertheless not a legally binding definition and therefore does not confer the same legal rights and status as that of refugees.9 Also, unlike refugees, certain IDPs may not be of concern to the international community if their national government put in genuine measures to address their needs, especially in the form of the protection of their basic human rights.10 Nevertheless, although IDPs may be considered as an internal national problem, they have the potential to become an international issue if the people concerned spill over to neighboring countries, thereby transforming them into refugees. Furthermore, studies show that IDPs and refugees often experience the same vulnerabilities.11 Since both IDPs and refugees suffer the same consequences, they should receive the same attention. In the next section, we draw on the concept of Topophilia to illuminate and understand the plight of IDPs.

Topophilia: Attachment to Place IDPs are people who have been displaced from their permanent place of abode. What is a place and what does it mean? In his groundbreaking work, the humanistic geographer Yi-Fu Tuan coined the term “Topophilia” to signify the love of place and argued that place and space have a deeper meaning to people’s lives.12 According to Tuan, people develop an attachment to a place in various ways and dimensions. These attachments result from the everyday interaction between people and their environment. It has been observed that this interaction takes place in three dimensions: cognitive, behavioral, and emotional.13 The cognitive aspect of the interaction leads to a special perception that people know the environmental elements and use

8  Leus, Xavier, Jane Wallace and Alessandro Loretti. “Internally Displaced Persons”. Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 16, no. 3 (2001): 116–123. 9  Ibid, Mooney, 2005. 10  Cohen, Roberta and Francis M. Deng. “Masses in Flight”. African Studies Review 42, issue 3 (1999): 182–183. 11  Phuong, Catherine. “Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: Conceptual Differences and Similarities.” Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 18, no. 2 (2000): 215–29. 12  Tuan, Yi-Fu. “Humanistic Geography”. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 66, no. 2 (1976): 266–276. 13  Hashemnezhad, H; Heidari, A. A. and Mohamadhosseini, P. “Sense of place and place attachment: A comparative study”. International Journal of Architecture and Urban Development 3, no.1 (2013): 5–12., see also; Yazdanfar, A, A. A. Heidari and F. Nekooeimehr. “An investigation of the relationship between sense of place and place attachment among dormitory students”. International Journal of Architectural Engineering and Urban Planning 23, no. 2 (2013): 121–131.

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them to navigate their way. The behavioral aspects of interaction are the result of the activities and functional relationships between people and the environment. The last dimension which involves emotional interaction with a place points to the satisfaction and attachment to place that people develop over time.14 This attachment is social, psychological, and economic. Social attachment derives from the interaction of the people within their community which leads to the formation of social relationships, group identity, and community support systems that foster the growth of the individual within the context of those communities. Psychological attachment results from the emotional connection of the people to the physical and cultural environment. This attachment provides meaning to people’s lives and therefore influences their psychological, mental, and physical well-being. The economic attachment derives from the fact that the place provides the individual space to engage in meaningful economic activities that sustain productivity and growth on which their livelihood is based. Overall, a place where people live is not just an ordinary space that is bound by geographic constraints. It is also a place within which people interact with space beyond its boundary. Such spatial interaction can vary from regional to national and international dimensions. This interaction further builds relationships, structures, and foundations that enable individuals and communities to thrive within regional and global contexts. By implication, when people are forced to vacate their normal place of abode, they lose their physical, emotional, and economic attachment and sense of place. The consequence of this dislocation is that they are thrust into an environment or space that lacks meaning, is devoid of emotional, communal, and economic support systems that they are accustomed to. It is therefore important from a humanistic geographic point of view to understand how people navigate their new environment. This is particularly pertinent to the issue of IDPs who have been forced to involuntarily leave their long-­ term ancestral homes. Considering the above analysis, the section that follows examines the spatial pattern of IDPs in Africa.

Spatial Patterns of IDPs in Africa Gathering data for IDPs is relatively challenging. Unlike data for refugees that is widely available, data for IDPs is meager in scope and duration. As noted by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), Hard data on the numbers of IDPs do not exist, and estimates are difficult. Depending upon the reasons that force people to flee, figures can seem surprisingly high, e.g., in most natural disasters, or amazingly low, e.g., in displacement due to civil strife. In the latter case, ­governments may be unable or even unwilling to acknowledge the existence of and the real numbers of IDPs.15

 Altman, I. and S. M. Low. Place Attachment: A Conceptual Inquiry. New York: Plenum Press, 1992.  United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, February 1998.

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Nevertheless, the available data suggests that the issue of IDPs deserves an elevation in terms of national and international focus just like those of refugees. The data used in this chapter were obtained from three main sources. This included data from the Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) document published by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The other major sources were from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). It is important to note that these datasets may contain limitations, especially as it relates to the IDP population in Africa. In the first place, basic demographic data on the general population in many countries is often not up to date, and data on IDPs is even a greater challenge. This is due to several reasons, including the fact that a greater proportion of the IDPs do not live in camps; rather, they live with relatives. In some cases, IDPs may be reluctant to volunteer information about their status for fear of persecution and reprisal.16 The data were analyzed and reformatted for use with a geographic information system (GIS) software to facilitate the spatial analysis and visualization of the spatial pattern of IDPs in Africa. Although some of the data on IDPs from these sources is disaggregated according to the causative factor (natural disasters and crises), the aggregate data was used for mapping and visualization because of the focus of this study. In the section that follows, we examine the spatial pattern and trends of IDPs in 5-year intervals starting from 1993 to 2018, the years where consistent data was obtained. As the analyses reveal, the spatial pattern of IDPs in Africa is dynamic, but the trend can be disaggregated into two major regimes of increases and decreases. Figure 2.1 shows the total number of IDPs across the continent between 1993 and 2018. Overall, except for Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Swaziland, Eritrea, and Morocco, the phenomenon of IDPs is seen to be pervasive throughout the continent. Every other country on the continent has some population of IDPs within their national boundaries. Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that the hotspots of IDPs are centered around Central Africa, the Horn of Africa, and, to a lesser extent, the West African region. In this regard, Central African countries including Congo DRC, South Sudan, Sudan, and Somalia have the highest number of IDPs in aggregate terms of between 7 and 20 million persons. This is followed by a cluster of contiguous countries including Congo, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Tunisia, and Burundi with the IDP population of 2–5 million persons. Countries with an IDP population of 1–2 million include Kenya, Rwanda, Libya, and Djibouti. Another hotspot is based on a cluster of countries in the West African subregion. These include Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone with an IDP population ranging from 4 to 7 million persons and Liberia with an IDP population of 1–2 million. The rest of the continent has an IDP population of at least 1 million. The overall picture from Fig. 2.1 indicates that the phenomenon of IDPs is a common problem across the continent although the severity varies from one region to another.  Ferris, Elizabeth and Chareen Stark. “Internal Displacement in West Africa: A Snapshot”. Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, January 2012. Accessed 24 August 2019. https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/library/internal-displacement-west-africa-snapshot

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Fig. 2.1  Aggregate number of internally displaced persons (IDPs): 1993–2018. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)

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To further provide an insight into the evolutionary development of the problems of IDPs on the continent, an analysis of the temporal pattern is imperative. In this regard, it is helpful to examine the pattern over different time intervals to identify emerging patterns and shifting hotspots. This was achieved by examining the population of IDPs over five time periods. Figure 2.2 shows the spatial pattern of the IDP population across the continent between 1993 and 1998. The figure clearly indicates that Africa was a relatively stable continent with a fewer population of people that were internally displaced. The data presented in Fig. 2.2 indicates that only eight countries including Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau had a population of IDPs. Even at this, the problem was less severe as only Sierra Leone had an IDP population of between 2 and 4 million. The other countries had IDP populations of less than 2 million. These include Rwanda, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Somalia, and Angola. Clearly, there was a lack of clusters from a geographic perspective between 1993 and 1998 across the continent. Additionally, a similar pattern can be observed between 1999 and 2003, with seemingly no defined clusters. Figure 2.3 clearly shows a decline in the occurrence of IDPs in Africa. Only six countries had IDP populations including Angola, Congo DRC, and Burundi in Central Africa and Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia in West Africa. The absolute number of IDPs was comparatively low with only Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia having the highest population of IDPs of between half a million and 1.3 million. The remaining three countries of Congo DRC, Burundi, and Côte d’Ivoire had a population of 350,000. This was perhaps the most peaceful period in Africa judging from the number of IDPs across the continent. However, between 2004 and 2008, some discernible clusters started to emerge (Fig. 2.4). Figure 2.4 shows three nascent regional clusters centered on West Africa, Central Africa, and East Africa. The West African cluster includes Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Of the three countries in this cluster, Côte d’Ivoire had the highest number of IDPs of between 3 and 5 million, followed by Sierra Leone with a population of between 0.7 and 3 million, and Guinea-Bissau with a population of less than 0.5 million. The Central African cluster includes Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, and South Sudan. The highest population of IDPs can be observed in South Sudan and Congo with a population of between 0.7 and 5 million, followed by Chad and the Central African Republic with a population of between 0.1 and 0.7 million. In the East African cluster consisting of Burundi and Tanzania, the population of IDPs was between 0.1 and 0.5 million. In addition, a few outliers can be observed outside these three main clusters. These include Tunisia in North Africa with an IDP population of between 3 and 5 million and Botswana and Lesotho in Southern Africa with a population of between 0.1 and 0.7 million. Nevertheless, an increase in the intensity and spatial coverage of IDPs is noticeable between 2009 and 2013 (Fig. 2.5). Figure 2.5 shows two major clusters with an increase in the number of countries with IDPs. The first cluster is centered around West Africa. The second, which is far more expansive, cuts across traditional regions of Africa and runs from Central Africa to North Africa extending east to the Horn of Africa. Finally, Botswana in

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Fig. 2.2  Internally displaced persons (IDPs): 1993–1998. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)

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Fig. 2.3  Internally displaced persons (IDPs): 1999–2003. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)

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Fig. 2.4  Internally displaced persons (IDPs): 2004–2008. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)

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Fig. 2.5  Internally displaced persons (IDPs): 2009–2013. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)

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Southern Africa stands out as an outlier from these two clusters. The IDP population in the West African cluster is relatively low compared to the Central-North-Horn of African cluster. Only two countries appear in the West African cluster including Mali and Côte d’Ivoire with an IDP population of 0.2–1.2 million. In contrast, the Central-North-Horn of African cluster comprises 10 countries with a population of IDPs ranging from 0.1 to 1.2 million, including Libya, Chad, South Sudan, Uganda, and Burundi, while Sudan, Central African Republic, Congo DRC, Kenya, and Somalia have a population of between 1.2 and 8 million. This upward trend in the number and spatial coverage of the population of IDPs in Africa shows further persistence in intensity between 2014 and 2018 (Fig. 2.6). Figure 2.6 clearly shows that only six countries including Senegal, Morocco, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Swaziland did not have IDPs during the years under consideration. All other countries in the continent had populations of IDPs with varying intensity. Between 2014 and 2018, a massive cluster that encompasses West, Central, East, and North African regions is clearly visible. Furthermore, a substantial increase in the number of contagious countries with a high population of IDPs is evident, suggesting the worsening of the phenomenon of IDPs across the continent. In this regard, three broad categories of countries can be observed in terms of the population of IDPs. The countries with the highest number of IDPs ranging from 1.4 to 10 million include Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Congo DRC, Congo, Central African Republic, and Nigeria. This is followed by countries with a comparatively moderate population of IDPs between 0.6 and 1.4 million including Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Libya, Cameroon, and Kenya. The rest of the countries have an IDP population of 0.1–0.6 million (Fig.  2.6). The patterns observed in Fig. 2.6 are consistent with a study conducted by Ferris and Stark in 2012 where they concluded that about 70% of the IDP population in Africa is concentrated in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia.17

Trends in IDPs in Africa Figure 2.7 shows the temporal trend in the aggregate number of IDPs across the African continent between 1993 and 2018. In general, Fig.  2.7 indicates that the problem of IDPs on the continent has escalated over time. Apart from the period between 1999 and 2003 when a huge decline was noticed in the population of IDPs, all the other years under review witnessed an increasing trend. Using the period between 1993 and 1998 as the base year, IDPs in Africa declined by about 72% between 1999 and 2003. This decrease suggests a period in which relative peace returned to the continent and most of the IDP population may have returned home. However, 5  years later, the number of IDPs rapidly increased by 70% between 2004 and 2008. This increase would mark a steady rise in the IDP

17

 Ibid

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A. Avwunudiogba and E. J. Dung

Fig. 2.6  Internally displaced persons (IDPs): 2014–2018. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)

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Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 1993-2018 70000000 Number of Displaced Persons

59735146 60000000 50000000 40000000 31161528 30000000 20336884 20000000

11987362

10000000

3379679

0 1993-1998

1999-2003

2004-2008

2009-2013

2014-2018

Time Period

Fig. 2.7  Temporal trend of internally displaced persons (IDPs): 1993–2018. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)

population for the next 15 years which witnessed a 160% increase between 2009 and 2013 and by a whopping 398% increase between 2014 and 2018. On average, though, the annual increase of the population of IDPs in Africa between 1993 and 2018, a period of 25 years, was 5.6%. To further gain an insight into this trend, the number of IDPs was analyzed by country (Fig. 2.8). The numbers presented in Figure 2.8 are undoubtedly alarming, but they still underestimate the full scale of internal displacement across the region. For instance, displacements that occur as a result of slow-onset disasters and development projects, among others, are not recorded, and the number of people who remain displaced for months and years following sudden-onset disasters such as storms and floods is unknown.18

Figure 2.8 shows that some key notable countries have had a more significant contribution to the incident and the total population of IDPs in Africa in the period under examination (1993–2018). These include Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Rwanda, Congo DRC, Congo, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic. The spatial and temporal patterns of IDPs have some policy implications within the continent and beyond. In the next section, we examine some of these policy implications on the continent.

18

 Ibid

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A. Avwunudiogba and E. J. Dung

Internall Displaced Persons by Country in Africa 1993-2018

Number of Displaced Persons

12000000 10000000 8000000 6000000 4000000 2000000

Bu

Al ge

ria rk Ben in a in C Fa am s er o oo n C ôt Ch e d‘ ad lv o D ire jib Et out hi i op G ia ui ne Ke a ny M Lib a ad e ag ria as ca r M Ma au li ri N tius am ib N ia ig e Se ria ne So So gal ut ma h Su lia Ta da nz n an Tu ia ni Za sia m bi a

0

Countries 1993-1998

1999-2003

2004-2008

2009-2013

2014-2018

Fig. 2.8 Internally displaced persons (IDPs) by country: 1993–2018. (Source: Dung and Avwunudiogba 2019)

Policy Implications of IDPs in Africa The policy implications of IDPs in Africa and elsewhere are complex and multidimensional and require a legal framework that serves as a guiding principle for the exploration and recommendations of effective policies to address the problem. Unlike refugees that are protected by internationally agreed laws and conventions set up by the UN, IDPs do not have comparable abiding international law and conventions. Nevertheless, the UN has put forward a guiding principle on internal displacement that provides some minimum framework for the treatment of internally displaced persons.19 These guiding principles recommend the “minimum standards for the treatment of the internally displaced” including their rights, the obligation of their national governments, and other aspects that are connected to the conditions of the IDPs.20 Although these guiding principles are not legally binding, they are nevertheless derived from International Human Rights treaties and Humanitarian Law. This non legality of the guiding principles,  notwithstanding, many national

 Castles, Stephen, Nicholas Van Hear, Jo Boyden, Jason Hart, Christen Wolff and Paul Ryder. “Developing DFID’s Policy Approach to Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons”. Volume 1: Consultancy Report and Policy Recommendations, Oxford: Refugees Studies Centre, University of Oxford, February 2005. Accessed 12 November 2019. https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/2005/ er-2005-refugees_policy_dfid1/ 20  Crisp, Jeff. “Forced displacement in Africa: dimensions, difficulties, and policy directions”. Refugee Survey Quarterly 29, Issue 3 (2010): 1–27. 19

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g­overnments, international organizations, including the UN, and NGOs have increasingly applied these principles in dealing with IDPs, especially as it relates to their protection and the development of policies and laws within countries with IDP populations.21 The following section examines the policy implications of IDPs in the African continent as it relates to national, international, and food security, among others.

National Security The problem of IDPs in Africa could be a challenge to the national security of the countries in which it occurs. People who were forced to leave their permanent homes or communities find themselves in an unfamiliar environment in their new temporary homes where they may not have emotional, psychological, and economic attachment. In some cases, depending on the causative agents of their unforced movements, IDP populations may lose some or most of their fundamental human and international rights and the rights that are bestowed upon them by their countries as citizens including their ability to participate in the internal democratic political processes such as voting in  local and national elections to select their representatives. Over time, this may foster a series of disenfranchisement which may lead to passive and active demonstrations towards the state. Politicians and political groups with different agendas from that of the national governments may exploit the situation to further their political objectives, thus presenting security issues to the concerned countries. This is particularly important in Africa where most of the countries have nascent democratic institutions and cultures that are very fragile. This problem may be further exacerbated where such IDPs belong to a certain ethnic group. In such a situation, the ethnic group concerned may harbor a feeling of injustice and become agitated, especially if they have stayed a long time outside their homes as IDPs. This is more so because Africans have a strong attachment to their ancestral homes. Unlike in the developed world of Europe and North America, where people might move from their place of birth and resettle elsewhere easily, in most African countries, people still trace their origins to their ancestral lands where they were born. Thus, living outside their normal geographically defined ancestral homes may be equivalent to living in a “foreign land.” All these have ramifications for the political stability and security of the countries where IDPs occur. The possibility of clashes with their “host” community who may not consider them as part of the ancestral landlords of their new abode may further generate national security problems for the impacted countries. IDPs may be treated as second-class citizens in their new location, especially where the host community believes that they have overstayed their welcome. Furthermore, unscrupulous members of the IDP host community may

21

 Ibid

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take advantage of vulnerable persons, especially youths within the IDP population to carry out nefarious activities that will pose national security risks. Although these issues are occurring within national boundaries, over time, it may have ramifications for international security.

International Security Problems that are confined within national boundaries may quickly spill over to neighboring countries and thus pose international security problems. This is particularly true in Africa where ethnic and linguistic groups often cut across national boundaries. Members of the same ethnic groups in countries that have not been affected by IDPs may show solidarity towards IDP kens in the affected country. Depending on how the population of the IDPs is treated in their countries, such external populations may feel the need to intervene, creating possible political hostilities between the two countries. Besides, the population of IDPs can easily escalate to become refugees as they leave their national boundaries to settle in neighboring countries. Such a situation may arise where the IDPs feel a sense of political persecution fearing for their lives and safety and lack of economic opportunities. Once they cross their national boundaries and become refugees, it then poses international security problems between the affected countries where it might not be straightforward for them to be conferred with the status of refugees. In extreme cases, the population might agitate for a political unit of their own, especially where the population of the ethnic group cuts across two or more countries (e.g., the Kurds in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey and Boko Haram in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad).

Food Security The occurrence of IDPs may also pose food security problems in the affected countries. This is particularly so when considered against the backdrop that much of the population in Africa still live in rural areas where they are dependent on agricultural activities, including farming to produce food for the family and domestic consumption. In cases where many of the displaced persons are from rural areas, they lose the ability to produce food for their families and the domestic market. IDPs often depend on food donations from national governments and domestic and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The implications are twofold. First, food shortages become a security issue at the family or household levels. Also, the lack of food production by the displaced population has major impacts on the national agricultural output, thus creating food security issues that the government will need to address. Furthermore, food security issues can also become national security concerns. This is because of the direct or indirect effects of food availability

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on poverty, humanitarian crises, conflicts, and natural disasters such as drought which is tied to climate change. When these issues occur, people are forced to relocate. Ancestral land also provides additional ecosystem services and resources such as a wild game, fruits, and other forest products that form the overall food resources base of the community. Also, these resources provide the community with the ability to generate income that is further used for the purchase of other household essential needs. The loss of this important land resource due to the displacement of the affected population translates into the inability of IDPs to practice their primary traditional productive activities, thereby increasing their vulnerabilities to food insecurity and income for basic survival. Based on these facts, the World Food Program (WFP) recognized that IDPs are more vulnerable to food insecurity compared to the non-displaced population.22 Since IDPs cannot produce food on their own, and they no longer have an alternative source of income, they typically are not able to buy food for their families even when they are available in their new location. This loss of accessibility to food means that IDPs must largely depend on food assistance programs such as those provided by the World Food Program (WFP).23 One of the byproducts of this food insecurity is that malnutrition especially among children is prevalent among IDPs leading to higher death rates compared to non-displaced populations.24 Further compounding this issue is the observation that the food insecurity situation of IDPs may worsen over time, the longer they are away from their usual homes. Thus, it is important to investigate the constraints that IDPs face in achieving food security to develop appropriate measures and policies that will increase their access to food and lessen their food insecurity vulnerabilities.25

Economic Stability The occurrence of IDPs also has economic ramifications. First, the lack of economic activities in the temporary place of abode by the IDPs means that their contribution to the gross national income (GNI) is diminished. The severity of this impact will depend on how long they have been away from their normal place of

 World Food Program (WFP). “Reaching People in Situations of Displacement: A Framework for Action”, WFP/EB. A/2001/4-C, Rome: World Food Program, 2001. 23  World Food Program (WFP). “The Right to Food in Emergencies”, In: The Right to Food in Theory and Practice, Rome: UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 1998. 24  Salama, Peter, Paul Spiegel and Richard Brennan, “No Less Vulnerable: The Internally Displaced in Humanitarian Emergencies”. The Lancet 357, No. 9266 (2001): 1377–1458. 25  Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC). “Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)”, April 2010. Published by: The Brookings Institution - University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, Washington, DC USA. Accessed 12 August 2019. https:// www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/04_durable_solutions.pdf 22

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residence. It is common knowledge that the issue of unemployment and underemployment is pervasive in many IDP populations across the world. Furthermore, national governments of countries in which IDPs exist will have to spend part of their national budget in the form of economic subsidies for the IDPs. This further puts a strain on the meager government resources, especially in African countries.

Community/Social Cohesion As argued in the theoretical framework, a place has meaning to the people who live there. This meaning derives from the knowledge or the physical, social, and cultural environment which results from long-term interaction between the people and the environment. Such interaction builds long-lasting structures that foster social cohesion at the family, community, and regional levels. The transformation and translocation of people from this intimate environment disrupt these community structures and in turn lead to the breakdown of social cohesion, including social and cultural norms and attitudes, among others. As a result, the displaced population now lives in a place that is devoid of meaning and lacking the ability to provide structural support. Furthermore, because IDP camps are temporary, the space does not provide the opportunity for people to rebuild those broken-down structures that enhance community and social cohesion. Although many studies often point to the more obvious loss by IDPs such as homes, landed property, the loss of intangible assets, such as cultural heritage have profound negative effects on IDP population. These negative effects includes social isolation, the breakdown of social relationships, family and community social structure, and access to shared community services such as child caring role in an extended family structure, as well as healthcare and educational support.26 In this regard, children and young adults in their formative years are particularly vulnerable due to the disruption to their educational and social programs provided by the state and the family support network. This subset of the IDP population may suffer irreparable psychological damages often associated with broken homes and the stigma and hostility perpetuated by their host communities. In some extreme cases, the loss of social cohesion makes IDPs more vulnerable to acts of violence, human rights violations, and other forms of criminal behavior, such as sexual assault and forced conscription.27 One of the reasons that exacerbate the breakdown of community and social cohesion is the fact that the provision of housing or shelter for IDPs is often poorly 26  Castles, Stephen. 2010. “Theories of migration and social change”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, no. 10 (2010): 1565–1586. 27   United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Internal Displacement Division, “Strengthening UN Agency Accountability in Crises of Internal Displacement”, Annual Report, 2018. Accessed 20 January 2020. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA2018AnnualReport.pdf

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addressed in contrast to refugees that are often provided temporary housing in a temporary settlement where families can at least maintain some elements of social interaction. As a result, many IDPs are not necessarily aggregated in designated camps but rather seek shelter wherever they can, such as with relatives and friends, abandoned public and private buildings, and shantytowns.28

Health Risks, Education, and Cultural/Religious Activities IDP populations further face the challenges associated with vulnerability to infectious and noninfectious diseases, and low educational attainment, particularly among the youthful population, and an overall decline across the quality of life metrics. In most African countries, the level of social services including health and education often does not meet the needs of the entire population even under conditions of stable political environments. Part of this problem is due to budgetary constraints, a rapidly growing population, and an underdeveloped social services delivery mechanism. This problem becomes even worse within the population of IDPs. Consequently, social services such as education and healthcare are often executed in temporary makeshift substandard environments with less than optimum facilities and resources. It is therefore not surprising that one of the biggest challenges in the management of the IDP population is related to health and general well-being issues. Many IDP camps lack basic sanitary infrastructure. Management and disposal of solid waste are often inefficient. Many lack portable sources of water supply. The result is that a high incidence of contagious diseases such as cholera and tuberculosis is very common.29 Infant and maternal mortality rates have been reported to be higher among IDPs compared to the general population which results in overall lower life expectancy. The problem is further complicated by the fact that in many cases, the IDP population does not have a clear sense of timeline when they will return to their ancestral homes. Many IDP camps are therefore transformed into squatter or urban slums with high levels of informal economic activities, crime, and other nefarious endeavors. If not properly managed, a country may lose a generation of its citizens due to their prolonged stay in an environment that is

  United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). Global Report on Internal Displacement, June 2016. Accessed 26 October 2019. https://issuu.com/christineberger6/ docs/2016-global-report-internal-displac; see also, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), Global Report on Internal Displacement 2016, May 2016. Accessed 24 September 2019. https://www.internal-displacement.org/globalreport2016/ 29  The Centers for Disease Control (IDC), “Cholera Epidemic After Increased Conflict: Monrovia, Liberia, June–September 2003”. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 52, No. 45 (2003): 1093– 1116; see also; Weinstock, D, M. O. Hahn, M. Wittkamp, K.A. Sepkowitzm, G. Khechinashvili G and H. M. Blumberg. “Risk for Tuberculosis Infection Among Internally Displaced Persons in the Republic of Georgia”. International Journal of Tuberculosis and Lung Disease 5, No. 2 (2001): 164–169. 28

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disconnected from the national space and lack the support for the nurturing of productive citizenry. Besides environmental and sanitary conditions that will contribute to health risks exposure, the lack of food security further complicates the overall health and well-­ being of IDPs. For example, lack of access to food has been implicated in higher rates of prostitution and sexual exploitation leading to higher rates of HIV/AIDS infection among IDP populations in Uganda.30 In addition, IDPs not only suffer from contagious diseases but also from mental health problems including suicide rates that are often higher than the national average.31

The Protection and Rights of the IDPs Although the UN has proposed guiding principles for the protection of the rights of IDPs, numerous studies suggest that basic human rights are one of the most violated rights and privileges of IDPs. This is partly because IDPs have only relatively recently been identified as a distinct group that warrants special attention to protect their human rights. Indeed, IDPs may be subjects of discrimination from their governments on religious or ethnic grounds, especially among minority populations. In Africa, many examples abound, notably in Rwanda where the political struggle between the Hutus and Tutsis led to “ethnic cleansing” in which all recognized basic human rights were deliberately and systematically ignored and violated. Although international humanitarian law prohibits the displacement of civilian populations that are not affected by the theatre of war, there is often a lack of political will of the international community to enforce this law while armed conflict is going on. Consequently, IDPs are not protected and suffer various human rights abuses. In most cases, international interventions often come in the form of a posthumous trial of warlords who are often charged with crimes against humanity as exemplified by the case of Liberia. A contributing factor to the violation of the rights of IDPs relates to the fact that the population often lacks verifiable documentation, largely because they may have lost those documents due to political conflicts or natural disasters. It is, therefore, convenient and easy for national governments to deny IDPs certain rights because they cannot prove their nationality. This situation is particularly unique to Africa where ethnic and linguistic groups often cut across national boundaries. This often creates situations in which national government officials may harbor suspicion that people from the same ethnic groups but different nationalities are trying to take advantage of the IDP situation, and causing governments to deny them access to

 Lowicki-Zucca, M, P B Spiegel, S Kelly, K-L Dehne, N Walker, and P D Ghys. “Estimates of HIV burden in emergencies”. Sexually Transmitted Infections 84, no. 1 (2008):142–148. 31  Hamid, A. A. and S. A. Musa.” Mental health problems among internally displaced persons in Darfur”. International Journal of Psychology 45, no. 4 (2010): 278–285. 30

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basic relief and services such as healthcare, education, and housing and the right to participate in the political process, including voting.32

Recommendations The spatial pattern of IDPs across Africa shows that the problem is intensifying both in time and space. As revealed in the preceding analysis, the continent is riddled with numerous hotspots. There are very few countries in Africa that do not have populations of IDPs. The pervasiveness and severity of this problem require urgent attention from different stakeholders including national governments, NGOs, and the international community.

The Role of NGOs The contribution of NGOs is a welcomed development. National and international NGOs are often at the forefront of providing essential services such as primary healthcare and social services such as water and education. The role of NGOs is particularly crucial because national governments may perceive them in a positive light as impartial and nonintrusive agents in contrast to direct intervention from outside national governments that may be construed as an indirect way of meddling into internal affairs. This is particularly useful in situations where the population of the IDPs came about because of politically related confrontation and disputes, such as civil wars and communal conflicts.

The Role of National Governments National governments have the greatest role to play in finding a lasting solution to the problem of IDPs within their borders. This is because as argued, IDPs are technically still nationals of the countries in which they occur and therefore should enjoy all the rights and privileges and responsibilities enjoyed by the unaffected population. In this regard, national governments should channel resources that are designed to provide temporary relief and permanent return of the displaced population to their homeland. If returning to their homeland is impossible, national governments should enact special laws that confer on them the rights and recognition of their new location.

 Mooney, Erin and Balkees Jarrah, “Safeguarding IDP Voting Rights”, Forced Migration Review Issue 23 (2005): 55.

32

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Based on the spatial pattern of the hotspots shown in this study, contiguous countries that have issues of IDPs may establish a cooperative commission for the management of IDPs. The role of national governments is particularly crucial in Africa where political conflicts cause new displacements in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia, and Sudan. Thus, African governments with and without IDP populations should put in place preventive policies that will reduce the emergence of new displacements. Where such displacements have occurred, concerted efforts should be made to address them immediately to prevent them from further escalation while searching for a permanent and peaceful resolution. The displacement should be treated as a matter of national emergency and should be viewed as a national security problem. National governments should not shy away from assistance from international organizations if it will help in finding immediate and long-lasting solutions even though such intervention might impinge on their national sovereignty. In this regard, the signing of the Kampala Convention on internal displacement (adopted October 2009), a legally binding framework that seeks to address the problem of IDPs by member states of the African Union (AU), is a step in the right direction. However, this convention should be reviewed, updated, and renewed regularly to take into consideration new and challenging circumstances affecting IDP populations on the continent.33 Ultimately, it is the responsibility of national governments to find a permanent solution to the problem of displacements within their national boundaries. They should facilitate the safe return of IDPs to their communities by putting in place several measures including assistance programs like the reconstruction of destroyed homes and land restitution to enable them to rebuild their communities.

The Role of International Organizations Although the issue of IDPs is a national and therefore internal problem, our analysis shows that IDPs can easily become refugees. As such, international organizations, especially the UN, should continue to play active roles in helping to resolve the issue of IDPs. This is particularly required in situations where such displacements result from political disagreements such as civil war and ethnic conflicts. In this situation, the international organizations can serve as mediators between the warring parties to protect and reduce the sufferings of vulnerable populations such as women and children, restore peace, and formulate permanent political solutions. International organizations should encourage national governments to set verifiable milestones for the return of displaced persons to their communities. They can encourage the national governments to adhere to these goals by attaching further

 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), Global Report on Internal Displacement 2017, May 2017. Accessed 28 July 2019. https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/ grid2017/

33

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assistance towards the realization of the agreed milestones. Besides, international organizations should continue to shed more light on the plight of the IDPs through domestic and international media coverage and presentations at intergovernmental organizations, such as the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN). In extreme cases, international organizations can put pressure on officers who are in positions of responsibility within the national governments through travel restrictions. The International Organizations can do this by lobbying governments in the advanced countries of the West and North America to put travel and other financial restrictions on officials of such countries.

Summary and Conclusions The problem of IDPs is becoming more prevalent and persistent on the African continent. The foregone analysis indicates that nearly all the countries in Africa have some population of IDPs due to a variety of reasons including natural disasters, civil unrest, ethnic clashes, political instability, and civil and international wars. While some of the IDP camps associated with these displaced populations are temporary, others have existed for so long that they have become a permanent feature in their national space. Although the length of time of the various IDP camps in Africa was not a subject of analysis in this chapter, some clear patterns of persistent hotspot areas based on the analysis of the available data were very apparent (Figs. 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6). An interesting observation is that the problem has become worse in the recent decade (Fig. 2.6). This trend has far-reaching consequences for national and international security, food security, economic stability, community and social cohesion, as well as the health and well-being of the displaced populations. The state of affairs of IDP problems in Africa requires the reexamination of the existing strategy that emphasizes short-term humanitarian needs to a more long-term approach that focuses on the long-term development of projects that reduces the suffering and improves the economic well-being of the internally displaced. African countries should channel efforts to implementing government policies that reduce the probability of incidences of IDPs. In cases where unpredictable circumstances such as natural disasters lead to the emergence of IDPs, concerned governments should muster the necessary economic resources to ensure that the displaced populations are returned to their normal place of abode as soon as possible. All efforts should be made to avoid a situation where the population lives in temporary camps for decades. Where the displaced population cannot return to their former geographic locations, the government should make sure that the population is moved to an alternative permanent location where the population can enjoy all the rights and privileges bestowed on the citizenry. Although the issue of IDPs is a national issue, African countries should be open to the acceptance of help from international organizations and other countries to assist them in finding solutions to the problem of IDPs. In closing, although the

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larger population of a country may experience the same socioeconomic problems, IDPs, nevertheless, require special attention since they are more vulnerable and have fewer opportunities because of their displacement from their ancestral homes. They are faced with unique additional risks and vulnerabilities that the wider population does not experience.

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Lee, Luke T. 1996. Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: Toward a Legal Synthesis? Journal of Refugee Studies 9 (1): 27–42. Leus, Xavier, Jane Wallace, and Alessandro Loretti. 2001. Internally Displaced Persons. Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 16 (3): 116–123. Lowicki-Zucca, M., P.B. Spiegel, S. Kelly, K.-L. Dehne, N. Walker, and P.D. Ghys. 2008. Estimates of HIV burden in emergencies. Sexually Transmitted Infections 84 (1): 142–148. McKeever, David. 2015. Evolving Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties: ‘’Acts Contrary to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’ in the Refugee Convention. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 64 (2): 405–444. Mooney, Erin. 2005. The Concept of Internal Displacement and the case for Internally Displaced Persons as a Category of Concern. Refugee Survey Quarterly 24 (3): 9–26. Mooney, Erin, and Balkees Jarrah. 2005. Safeguarding IDP Voting Rights. Forced Migration Review Issue 23: 55. Moore, Will H., and Stephen M.  Shellman. 2006. Refugee or Internally Displaced Person? To Where Should One Flee? Comparative Political Studies 39 (5): 599–622. Phuong, Catherine. 2000. Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: Conceptual Differences and Similarities. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 18 (2): 215–229. Salama, Peter, Paul Spiegel, and Richard Brennan. 2001. No Less Vulnerable: The Internally Displaced in Humanitarian Emergencies. The Lancet 357 (9266): 1377–1458. The Centers for Disease Control (IDC). 2003. Cholera Epidemic After Increased Conflict: Monrovia, Liberia, June-September 2003. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 52 (45): 1093–1116. Tuan, Yi-Fu. 1976. Humanistic Geography. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 66 (2): 266–276. United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), Analytical Report of the Secretary-­ General on Internally Displaced Persons, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/23, February 1992. United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, February 1998. United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). Global Report on Internal Displacement, June 2016. Accessed 26 Oct 2019. https://issuu.com/christineberger6/ docs/2016-global-report-internal-displac United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Internal Displacement Division. Strengthening UN Agency Accountability in Crises of Internal Displacement. Annual Report, 2018. Accessed 20 Jan 2020. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ OCHA2018AnnualReport.pdf. Weinstock, D., M.O.  Hahn, M.  Wittkamp, K.A.  Sepkowitzm, G.  Khechinashvili, and H.M. Blumberg. 2001. Risk for Tuberculosis Infection Among Internally Displaced Persons in the Republic of Georgia. International Journal of Tuberculosis and Lung Disease 5 (2): 164–169. World Food Program (WFP). 1998. The Right to Food in Emergencies. In The Right to Food in Theory and Practice. Rome: UN Food and Agriculture Organization. ———. 2001. Reaching People in Situations of Displacement: A Framework for Action. WFP/ EB. A/2001/4-C. Rome: World Food Program. Yazdanfar, A., A.A.  Heidari, and F.  Nekooeimehr. 2013. An investigation of the relationship between sense of place and place attachment among dormitory students. International Journal of Architectural Engineering and Urban Planning 23 (2): 121–131.

Chapter 3

African Migrants and Refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean Ivon Alcime, Brenda I. Gill, and Elisha J. Dung

Introduction On Thursday, June 20, 2019, the world celebrated World Refugee Day to honor the strength, courage, and perseverance of millions of refugees. The United Nations suggests that persons become refugees due to persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations.1 The importance of such an observation is emphasized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report that alerts readers to the unparalleled level of displacement of persons globally. The UNHCR affirms that over 10 years, the number of displaced persons (viz., people who are forced from their homes due to some adversity) worldwide grew from 43.3 million in 2009 to 70.8 million in 2018  – an increase of 27.5 million displaced persons worldwide. Of the 70.8 million displaced in 2018, 25.9 million of these persons were refugees. Of these 2018 refugee populations, about 50% was comprised of children younger than 18 years – a 9% increase over 10 years. Of interest to this discussion is that of these 25.9 million refugees in 2018, the UNHCR data suggest that 3.2 million of these refugees come from two African countries: Sudan and Somalia.2 While there is much discussion of refugees from the African continent who settle in other continental African countries, Europe, and North America, the same cannot  The International Organization for Migration (IOM). Key Migration Terms Retrieved September 28, 2019. https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms 2  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2018. pp. 2–4. Retrieved October 5, 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf 1

I. Alcime (*) · B. I. Gill Alabama State University, Montgomery, AL, USA e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] E. J. Dung Department of Advancement Studies, Alabama State University, Montgomery, AL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. O. Abidde (ed.), The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56650-0_3

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be said for those who migrate to the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region from Africa. This chapter seeks to help fill this gap by providing a limited discussion of the movement of African migrants to the LAC region. The focus is primarily on refugees. The chapter first gives a very brief history of refugees in the LAC region. Next, focus shifts to defining the major concepts that are discussed in the chapter: migration, refugees, Latin America and the Caribbean, African migrants and refugees, and push/pull factors. Following this, the authors present data and discussion about some of the places from which African refugees derive. Hereafter, the authors look at the LAC countries in which Africans settle and pinpoint the main sending and receiving countries. A discussion of some of the push and pull factors for refugees in the LAC region is undertaken next. The focus for this section is not just identifying the push/pull factors but providing some examples noted in the region. Finally, the chapter concludes with a look at some of the recent policies adopted in the region and some projections for the future of the refugee crisis in LAC countries.

Refugees in LAC Countries: An Overview This discussion of African migrants and refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean is timely given the world situation. Nonetheless, the discussion of migrants, especially those who leave their homelands because of fear, and “refugees” is no new discussion for the LAC region. The LAC is described as having “a strong and great tradition of openness, solidarity, and humanitarianism.”3 The LAC region has been protecting human rights for several years now. This tradition of protecting and granting asylum to refugees goes back to the 1930s when refugees fled the Spanish Civil War and Portuguese dictatorships. The Jewish community escaping genocide and war during World War II is another example. During the 1970s, the Palestinian refugees and others who fled South American repressive government are yet another example of when the region extended asylum. In the 1980s, civil wars in Central America also saw refugees seeking asylum in various LAC countries. More recently, the plight of Venezuelan and Colombian migrants continues to occupy prominent spots in social media.4 Most of the LAC countries have banded together to show solidarity to refugees regardless of their origins. The LAC countries have been working in solidarity to arrive at workable resolutions for refugees’ protection. Some of their charters include the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, the 1994 San Jose Declaration on Refugees and Displaced Persons, the 2004 Declaration and Plan of Action of Mexico, and the 2004 Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action on International Protection and

3  Forced Migration review. Latin America and the Caribbean. Issue 56, October 2017. Retrieved October 9, 2019. 4  Ibid. p. 4–5.

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Sustainable Solutions for Refugees, Displaced and Stateless Persons in the LAC region.5

Theoretical Basis and the Operationalization of Key Terms One of the neoclassical theories of migration is Ravenstein’s 1889 push and pull factors which refer to the elements that influence people’s wish to leave and then enter another space. Although the theory has been generally criticized for its inability to predict future movements by migrants, its basic assumptions are still very significant in explaining the desire of people to move. The theory is also central to the fundamental tenets of other theories of migration such as Lee’s 1966 theory of migration, which has three elements: (1) place of origin, (2) place of destination, and (3) intervening obstacles. Lee believes that every location consists of positive factors that act to hold people within or attract them to that location and negative factors that repel them from the location. It is easier for people to assess the factors at the origin because of their long connection with the place, but people tend to overestimate the positive or underestimate the negative situations at the destination in part due to ignorance and the uncertainty of how they will be received in the new location. This is captured in the adage that “the grass is greener on the other side, till you get there.” These circumstances in many cases result in evaluating both positive and negative factors in the destination area inaccurately. The final factor in Lee’s theory points to intervening obstacles between the origin and destination locations that may complicate the decision to move. In most cases, these intervening obstacles have been viewed largely as distance, but Lee argues that, while physical distance is still important, personal factors such as general awareness, acumen, interactions, and cultural environment play a significant role in the individual’s decision to move. Thus, the decision to move is the net outcome of the interplay among these factors, which in the final analysis affects the volume and intensity of migration within a given area. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the volume of migration in a given area depends on other factors such as the level of diversity, the degree of difficulty of the intervening obstacles, the prevailing economic and political conditions in both the origin and destination, and the perception and reception of immigrants in the destination region. Consequently, we see how Ravenstein’s and Lee’s theories of migration have helped to elucidate the dynamics of African migrants and refugees to Latin America. Push refers to the situation in which people are pushed out of their home countries for different causes and pulled towards other countries for various benefits. Gill, Dung, and Erhunmwunsee argued that people are pushed away from their native

 Ibid p. 4–5.

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lands because of “unacceptable,” “negative,” and “unbearable” conditions.6 When the conditions of other countries have the potential to render satisfactory results, those individuals are pulled towards them. The push factors Gill and her colleagues referenced generally entail “floods, earthquakes, and volcanic activities, poverty, violence, crime and wars, economic hardship, political and religious oppression, and general instability.”7 Contrariwise, the pull revolves around “economic prosperity, political and religious freedom and liberty, social justice, and violent-free conditions.”8 The distinction between the push and pull factors highlights human’s desire to escape undesirable conditions bestowed upon them and to seek safety and opportunities in other countries. With the main concepts defined, it is now possible to discuss the origins, destinations, and characteristics of the African refugees who enter LAC countries.

Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) Before discussing the Africans who migrate to and have refugee status LAC countries, it is pertinent to define the main concepts: Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region, migrants, refugees, African migrants and refugees, and the pull-push factors.

Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) Region For this discussion, the LAC region is comprised of 33 countries. Of these countries, most (13) countries are in the Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahamas, Barbados, Saint Lucia, Grenada, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Saint Kitts and Nevis. There are 12 South American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The remaining eight countries are in Central America: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama.9 For 6  Brenda I Gill, Elish J.  Dun, and Paul Erhunmwunsee, “Contemporary Out-Migration from CARICOM Countries: Its Impact and Potential for Growth of Diaspora Countries,” In Dynamics of Caribbean Diaspora Engagment, ed. George K. Danns, Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, and Fitzgerald Yaw (Guyana: University of Guyana Press, 2018), 19–34. 7  Ibid. p. 20 8  Ibid. p. 20 9  Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Membership. Retrieved October 4, 2019; https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/community-latin-american-and-caribbean-states-celac/; −-----, “Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Worldometers.

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logistic and easier analysis of the data, we later use the subregion divisions to discuss the source and destination countries for African refugees into the LAC region.

Migrants Becoming a migrant may be occasioned by a multiplicity of reasons. Regardless of these reasons, the International Organization for Migration (IOM)10 asserts that the concept of a migrant is a blanket expression that has no formal legal definition under international law. In its secular connotation, the migrant is applied to persons who move away from their place of usual residence, either across an international border or within a state. This movement may be permanent or long-term (1 year or more) or temporary or short-term (3–12 months), legal or illegal, or national or international. In some instances, migrants may be classified by well-defined legal groupings such as migrant workers and smuggled migrants. In other instances, such as international students, for example, such migrant movement has not been precisely demarcated under international law.11 Often, the concept migrant carries the implied understanding that the move was voluntary, and if needed, the migrant can return home. For this discussion, the latter is applicable. The authors imply that migrants are those persons from any of the 54 African states who voluntarily entered Latin America and the Caribbean region in search of better economic opportunities and who, if they wish, can return to their home safely.12

Refugees Some statistical reports that provide global statistics on international migration tend to use the terms migrants and refugees interchangeably. In such instances, “international migrants” are classified to include asylum seekers and refugees as categories of migrants. Such usage does lend to some confusion and can often complicate things for refugees and asylum seekers as well as states who wish to accommodate and adequately respond to such movements of persons. Unlike migrants, refugees are persons who are explicitly defined and protected by international law. The term applies to very fearful persons. In some instances, these may be fears of persecution, violence, conflict, or other atrocities. Refugees Retrieved August 22, 2016. http://www.worldometers.info/geography/how-many-countriesin-latin-america/ 10   (IOM). Key Migration Terms. Retrieved September 28, 2019. https://www.iom.int/ key-migration-terms 11  Ibid 12  Ibid.

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are therefore persons who move outside of their country of origin because of death-­ defying and insufferable circumstances in their own countries, including movement due to natural and man-made disasters. Often, they cross national borders seeking safety. It is persons who make such moves who are categorized as “refugees” by the international community and as those who qualify for assistance from states and other relevant international organizations. Mostly, refugees seek sanctuary in other countries as they are unable to return to their “homes.” Unlike migrants, when refugees are disallowed asylum, deleterious ramifications may ensue.13

African Migrants and Refugees For this discussion, an African migrant is any person from the continental African countries who moves away from his or her country of nationality. The African migrant is, therefore, one who crosses an international border, willingly, leaving any one of the 54 African countries that include Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe and enters any of the 33 Latin America and Caribbean countries (see above discussion) so that the country of destination successfully becomes his or her new country of usual residence. African migrants may have left their “home” country to pursue economic, educational, and other goals. Mostly, such movement is voluntary and allows the migrant to return “home” if he or she so desires. The African migrant is differently defined and understood by refugees for this discussion. African refugees are those persons from the 54 African states who left because they feared for their lives. Such fear may have been occasioned by threats of wars or wars; acts of terrorism; religious, racial, or other persecution; other generalized violence; man-made and/or natural disasters; or other circumstances that seriously disturb public order. Similarly, the UNHCR also offers a clear distinction between migrants and refugees, stating, “Refugees are specifically defined and protected in international law.”14 Such protections are also enshrined in regional refugee instruments.

 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UN Refugee Agency. Refugees and Migrants – Frequently Asked Questions. 16 March 2016. Retrieved October 2, 2019. https:// www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/3/56e95c676/refugees-migrants-frequently-asked-questions-faqs.html 14  Ibid. n.p. 13

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The Origin of African Migrants and Refugees to LAC Data sourced from the UNHCR Population Statistics were used for determining source and destination countries for refugees who entered the LAC region over 5 years (2014 to 2018).15 To examine the data more efficiently, we separated the LAC region into three subregions (see our definition above), namely, the Caribbean, South America, and Central America. After this was done, we explored the data for each region to see the trends in migration from Africa to each region in LAC. An examination of the data suggests that African refugees came from several African countries to the LAC region. The data show that though in several instances the numbers are very low, refugees come from most of the African countries to the LAC region. Overall, the data returned for the Caribbean region was very low. In several instances, these fell mostly between 1 and 4 persons. In the data provided by the UNHCR for 2018, for example, these values were represented by an asterisk to keep the anonymity of individuals secret. Further examination of the data from 2014 to 2018 reveals that for the Caribbean region, refugees mostly came from Nigeria, Angola, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Liberia, and Cameroon. Other African countries from which refugees to the Caribbean derived were Algeria, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Zambia, Uganda, and South Africa. When data provided for countries in South America were examined, more migration is noted in the region by refugees from African countries. The top ten source countries that reported the most persons migrated to South America were Nigeria, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Somalia, Cameroon, Senegal, and Liberia. Other countries that tended to report less entry of refugees to South American countries were Algeria, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Morocco, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zimbabwe. The largest number of refugees to South America was from Nigeria and Mali, while the least number was from Uganda and South Africa. For Central America, more migrants from Nigeria, Somalia, Cameroon, and Congo (Democratic Republic) entered as refugees compared to persons from other African nations such as Uganda, Congo, Eritrea, Sierra Leonne, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Chad, Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and South Africa (see Fig. 3.1).

 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UN Refugee Agency. Population Statistics. Accessed October 5, 2019. http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern

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Number of Refugees

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I. Alcime et al. 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Countries COSTA RICA

EL SALVADOR

GUATEMALA

HONDURAS

NICARAGUA

PANAMA

MEXICO

Fig. 3.1  African refugee migration to Central America by country: 2014–2018. (Source: Dung, Gill, and Alcime, 2019)

The Destination of African Migrants and Refugees in LAC The foregoing shows that refugees in the LAC region come from several African countries. Nonetheless, to which countries are they more likely to go? Using data from the UNHCR Population Statistics, we next explored this. In the case of the Caribbean, the data suggest that mostly Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahamas, and the Dominican Republic were the desired destinations. For South America, the data indicate that most African refugees end up somewhere or the other in South America. The data show that these refugees were present in each of the 13 South American countries. Though each country received refugees, the data clearly show that between 2014 and 2014, the top destination for African refugees in South America was Brazil (see Fig. 3.2). This was followed by migration to Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Guyana, Bolivia, and Paraguay (see Fig. 3.2). Further analysis of the data reveals that migrants from Mali, Sudan, Guinea, Cameroon, and Côte d’Ivoire were among the top sending countries. Other countries from which refugees came to Brazil were Somalia, Togo, Ghana, Gambia, Eritrea, Algeria, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Senegal, South Africa, and Libya. Interestingly, though Nigeria was a prominent country from which refugees to Brazil were derived, the opposite is true in the case of Argentina where it was the third-largest sending country. Figure 3.2 shows that the top five sending countries to Argentina were Liberia, Senegal, Nigeria, Algeria, and Ghana. Aside from Uganda

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400

Number of Rfugees

350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

countries Argentina

Brazil

Fig. 3.2  African refugee migration to Argentina and Brazil: 2014–2018. (Source: Dung, Gill, and Alcime, 2019)

400

Number of Refugees

350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

South American Countries Costa Rica

Panama

Mexico

Fig. 3.3  Central American countries receiving the most African refugees: 2014–2018. (Source: Dung, Gill, and Alcime, 2019)

and Libya, the compiled data show that all the other African countries purportedly had refugees that migrated to Argentina (see Fig. 3.2). When refugees from Africa who entered Central America between 2014 and 2018 are examined, the data suggest that the pull factors to Mexico seemed to be stronger than that for any other country (Fig. 3.3). Mostly, African refugees tended to go to Mexico, Panama, and Costa Rica. Other countries to which they migrated during this period were El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Belize.

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Causative Factors of African Migration and Refugees to LAC As previously noted, refugees are fleeing (push) their home countries because of poverty, crime, wars, political and religious persecutions, and sexual orientation discrimination. They are voyaging (pull) to countries with favorable conditions, such as the ability to work, having religious freedom, and freedom from political persecutions and sexual orientation discrimination. Recently, the gruesome experiences that forced the refugees to flee their home countries and the attractive motives that pulled them to their destinations were captured through the stories they told. Through a systematic review of news reporting and databases, the refugees’ experiences are retold in this chapter to highlight some of their push and pull factors. The exodus of persons from the African continent to the Latin American and Caribbean region oftentimes involves communication. Many refugees rely heavily on effective communication to receive information, disseminate information, and make sound decisions about their current conditions and future endeavors. For example, in one of the stories we highlighted, the refugee asserted that he chose Ecuador as a preferred destination because his friends told him about the easy entry into Ecuador. There are many reasons, however, that could impede the refugees’ abilities to communicate effectively or receive information. For example, the refugees are from diverse nationalities; they speak different languages; and they reflect varying levels of literacy, social status, and income. All those elements can influence the refugees. In the following section, we draw attention to the reported communication of some of the refugees to gain an understanding of the factors either favorable or unfavorable that may have caused them to enter the LAC region.

The Advantageous Factors A pull factor is noted in the case of Grenada. Due to its very friendly and accommodating refugee policies, Grenada is one of the countries to which refugees go. Grenada is also the only country that has a citizenship by investment program and a bilateral investment treaty with the United States that consists of an E-2 treaty investor visas to which citizens of Grenada can apply. In countries that are not part of the E-2 treaty, their nationals can apply for it by participating in the Grenada Citizenship by Investment Program. Furthermore, citizens of Grenada are granted travel visa-­ free to China, Brazil, Hong Kong, and 100 Europe’s Schengen countries.16 In 2013, Grenada introduced the citizenship by investment program without any country-specific restrictions to applying for these benefits. Applicants are not required to travel to Grenada to complete the application. The spouse, dependent  Antoine Saliba Haig. Benefits and Requirements of the E2 Visa (2017). Published February 24, Updated March 10. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://www.chetcuticauchi.com/publications/e2-visa

16

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children under 26 years, and dependent parents over 55 years can be added to the application. The application takes approximately 3–4 months to process.17 Citizens of Grenada who are granted the E-2 visa can enjoy many of its perks, such as legally avoiding paying US taxes on worldwide income. The visa is valid for 5 years maximum and is renewed with a 2-year extension, and the spouses can work. The US Consulate takes 60 days to process the E-2 visa application.18 Although Grenada’s paths to citizenship are appealing, the requirements are designed to benefit only the wealthy refugees. For instance, to apply for citizenship, the main applicant must choose between two potential paths. Either the applicant chooses to contribute to the National Transformation Fund (NTF) or invest in an approved project (real estate) in Grenada. The NTF is a government fund responsible for financing projects that will benefit the country’s economy and help its diversification. Applicants who prefer this route must make a one-time contribution to the NTF. On the other hand, if the applicants choose to invest in an approved project, the investment must go through an authorized local agent, and they must invest in the real estate for at least 3 years from the date the citizenship was granted. Many of the approved projects consist of real estate developments, such as luxury hotels, resorts, and villas.19 The costs for both citizenships are exorbitant. For example, the cost for a single applicant to contribute to the NTF would be USD158,000 compared to USD350,000 for the real estate option. The costs increase for both options if the spouses and children of the applicants are included. Grenada has various appealing options for refugees. The requirements, however, exclude those who cannot afford them.20 Other LAC countries, however, have made it financially easier for the less fortunate refugees to enter their countries and provide desirable services for them to stay. In Argentina, for example, the refugees receive work permits, free health care, language classes, and access to education within a few weeks of applying for asylum. To illustrate, Ibrahim Abdoul Rahman, a native of Sierra Leone, went to Argentina and married an Argentine lady. Due to the facilities and services he enjoyed, he was able to send money to his mother and seven sisters in Sierra Leone. Additionally, he enjoyed the freedom of religion there and was permitted to practice his Muslim religion unhindered. In addition to the social services acting as a pull agent, some refugees see the promise of other freedoms as positive pull factors. This is realized, for instance, in the case of refugees from Senegal and Ghana who escaped to Argentina. In some instances, some of these refugees have been free to pursue their dreams and have  -----. Grenada Citizenship by Investment. Access October 20, 2019, https://www.goldenvisas. com/grenada 18  Antoine Saliba Haig. Benefits and Requirements of the E2 Visa (2017). Published February 24, Updated March 10. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://www.chetcuticauchi.com/publications/e2-visa 19  “Becoming A Citizen,” Grenada Citizenship by Investment, Access October 23, 2019, https:// www.cbi.gov.gd/grenada-citizenship/type-of-citizenship/ 20  Ibid 17

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become musicians, professional soccer players for local clubs, and even street merchants.21 Ghanaian refugee Bayan Mahmud and his brother were the perfect example of a young refugee who landed his dream job playing soccer for a major Buenos Aires team. His story of how he got to Argentina is heartbreaking. He reports that in 2010, ethnic violence erupted again in northern Ghana between Mamprusis and the Kusasis tribes. Earlier violence between the two tribes had claimed the lives of their parents, which contributed to them staying in an orphanage. When the resurgence erupted again in 2010, Bayan and his brother ran away but got separated in the process. Bayan sneaked onto a ship unaware of its destination. He landed in Argentina after three dreadful weeks in the Atlantic Ocean. When he arrived in the first port of Argentina, he slept in the streets for the first two nights. A generous person placed him on a bus for the capital Buenos Aires.22 Upon his arrival in Buenos Aires, a Senegalese man directed Bayan to Argentina’s National Commission for Refugees (CONARE). He immediately was granted refugee status, services, and protection because he was a minor. Bayan got his big break when he was spotted by a scout from Boca Juniors, Argentina’s top soccer club, as he played soccer in Buenos Aires Park with his friends. Boca Juniors signed Bayan. Bayan aspired to be the first black football player in the Argentina national team. For many refugee athletes, sports have provided a bright future for them in Argentina.23 Through the compelling stories of many refugees, along with the data presented previously in this chapter, Brazil has been identified as a preferred destination for refugees. Some reasons for this are because of its booming economy, progressive refugee policies, and large African descent population. For example, Congolese Lola Fernandis stated, “I think Brazil is a country that accepts everyone . . . Everyone can come here and do what they want to do. So that’s why I chose Brazil.”24 Similarly, Nigerian Donald Eneka revealed that he went to Brazil because of the opportunities to work, send money to his family, and easy entry to Brazil.25 Additionally, the easy entry to Brazil also allows African refugees to resettle to other LAC countries where they also may secure better opportunities. Theresa Ocampo, an Angolan women’s rights activist, lived in São Paulo, Brazil, for 6 years with her family. Following that length of stay, she and her family were able to migrate through Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Columbia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua,

 Luis Andres Henao. More African Immigrants Finding a Home in Latin America (2010). January 25.Accessed October 13, 2019. https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/more-african-immigrants-findinghome-latin-america 22  Pico, Victoria. Soccer-mad African Stowaway finds new goals after passage to Argentina. UNHCR.  October 7, 2013. https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2013/10/5252bfea6/soccer-madafrican-stowaway-finds-new-goals-passage-argentina.html 23  Ibid 24  Cowie, Sam. 2014. Brazil: Destination of choice for Africans. September 3. Accessed October 10, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/09/brazil-destination-choice-africans-201493113721757775.html 25  Ibid 21

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and Guatemala. In June 2019, the Ocampo family arrived and stayed in the city of Nueva Esperanza, Mexico, the southern border of Mexico.26 Commenting on this movement of her family, Ocampo stated, “I want to go to Canada, I believe we could be free there. My children could have a better life, and I can go back to my work as an activist for women’s rights.”27 According to Luisa Feline Freier, former President Rafael Correa of Ecuador introduced a policy of “open doors” that allowed all nationals easy entry into Ecuador. The policy enables individuals to stay in Ecuador for 90 days without a visa. It is estimated that 1000 Nigerians took advantage of it.28 For example, after being rejected for a Netherlands visa, Abeo, a native Nigerian, admitted, “One person advised me that if I had to leave Nigeria very quickly, I can come to Ecuador”29; he further stated, “So why did I come to Ecuador? It’s not that I like Ecuador. I came because it’s visa-free to Nigerians.”30 Similarly, Chibola, another Nigerian, revealed that when Nigerian heard of the visa-free policy in Ecuador, they came to escape suffering.31 It is worth mentioning that the pull factors in LAC countries save lives. This is in comparison to the push factors that could spell the demise of many refugees if they were not driven away from their countries. Next, we would discuss the pull factors that drove the refugees away from their countries.

The Unfavorable Factors Most push factors for leaving one’s country of residence or birth are negative and forceful. Often, these push factors force people to move away from their home countries. It is imperative, nevertheless, to reiterate the refugees’ gruesome stories of the push factors that drove them away from their native countries. Let us begin with the story of Congolese Lola Fernandis, who fled to Brazil on a tourist visa for the World Cup. Before Lola’s departure, she was kidnapped and beaten by a government-­connected militia as he was headed home from work. “They told me

 Deslandes, Ann. 2019. African migrants are trying to cross North America to make it to Canada. Trump is keeping them in Mexico. October 2. Accessed Ocobter 10, 2019. https://www.insider. com/african-migrants-us-mexico-border-canada-2019-10 27  Deslandes, Ann. 2019. African migrants are trying to cross North America to make it to Canada. Trump is keeping them in Mexico. October 2. Accessed Ocobter 10, 2019. https://www.insider. com/african-migrants-us-mexico-border-canada-2019-10 28  Luisa Feline Freier. Against the Odds, African Migration to South America Grows. 2018. December 4. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/26901/ against-the-odds-african-migration-to-south-america-grows 29  Ibid 30  Ibid 31  Ibid 26

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that if I kept working, they would kill me.”32 Lola was working for an opposition television channel in his city Kinshasa, Congo, at the time of the attack.33 Similarly, Nigerian Donald Eneka, then 36 years old, escaped Nigeria after Boko Haram invaded his town and demolished his house. Like Donald, many Nigerians who fled shared parallel depressing experiences. For instance, John was a native of the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria. He graduated from the Port Harcourt Polytechnic in Rivers State with a bachelor’s degree in business administration. He reported that militants disembarked in his town, shooting, raiding homes, and kidnapping the town’s local youth leader. “When they kidnapped our youth president, everybody started fleeing left and right, because if you stay, they will kidnap you,”34 John articulated. His dream was to work and raise a family in the region. He was forced to leave. Abeo was another Nigerian who bolted because his uncle killed his father in the father’s home during a land dispute.35 Abeo first fled to Ghana, then returned to Nigeria, and then later went to Ecuador. Likewise, Sani escaped Ghana because of the persecution of gay men. He told the Los Angeles Times that acid was poured on him. The home of his family was burned – all because he was gay.36 The aforementioned push stories reveal the horror African refugees experienced in their native countries. The negative and unbearable conditions the African refugees endured were the driving force of their departure, leaving behind family members, friends, and countries they love and adore.

Future Projections and Conclusion Though the LAC countries have enacted numerous protection policies and legislation for the protection of refugees, not all the countries are signatories to these. Further, there are problems relative to the effectiveness of the programs and their implementation. In some instances, the processes and quality of service are both poor, not readily transmitted to refugees, and social services are in several occurrences not readily available. These situations often incur additional discomfort and suffering to refugees when they enter the region. The aforementioned conditions in which some refugees find themselves remind us of the complicated and incongruous task of receiving and providing humanitarian

 Ibid  Ibid 34  Freier, Luisa Feline. 2018. Against the Odds, African Migration to South America Grows. December 4. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/26901/ against-the-odds-african-migration-to-south-america-grows 35  Ibid 36  Patrick J. McDonnell. African migrants stuck in southern Mexico, their American dream on hold. September 22, 2019. Accessed October 13, 2019. https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/ story/2019-09 32 33

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assistance to them. Although the LAC region is not considered the poorest in the world, most countries in the region lack the budgetary power, infrastructure, and adequate resources to accommodate the influx of refugees. For example, “central government social spending in 17 Latin American countries was 11.2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016.”37 Compared to the English-speaking Caribbean, “the average for 2016 was 11.6% of GDP.”38 In 2017, 184 million people lived in poverty in Latin America. Most of these persons are women, children, indigenous people, people with disabilities, and “Afro-descendants.” In many countries in the region, the education systems are segregated based on social and educational backgrounds. Health care systems are inadequate, with services varying depending on the groups. Despite these inadequacies, the LAC region remains the most attractive place for refugees to seek shelter.39 Apart from the extended accommodation with little resources provided by those LAC countries to the influx of recent migration of refugees, it is hoped that the Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework (CRPSF) Plan would assist, similar to Trinidad and Tobago that is willing to issue registration cards to allow Venezuelans to work. Furthermore, an increase in international funding and collaborations with the global community is necessary for LAC countries to withstand the influx of refugees and provide much needed adequate humanitarian assistance to them. The push and pull stories of the African refugees are essential in understanding them and their movement out to other regions of the world, more specifically to the LAC region. Therefore, more stories need to be told from their perspectives. Most African refugees, however, do not communicate their lived experiences because of the language barriers, cultural assumptions, or for fear of retaliation on their family members they left behind. Consequently, more research needs to be done to explore the barriers that impede the refugees from communicating. Furthermore, refugees also need to be trained in effective communication skills, which will empower them to freely express themselves.

References Baltica, Cabieses, Helena Tunstall, Kate E.  Pickett, and Jasmine Gideon. 2013. Changing patterns of migration in Latin America: How can research develop intelligence for public health? Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública 34 (1): 68–74. Bárcena, Alicia, Mario Cimoli, Raúl García-Buchaca, Laís Abramo, and Ricardo Pérez. 2019. Critical obstacle to inclusive social development in Latin America and the Caribbean.

 Alicia Bárcena, Mario Cimoli, Raúl García-Buchaca, Laís Abramo, and Ricardo Pérez, “Critical obstacle to inclusive social development in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), p. 43, Access on 10/21/2019, https:// crds.cepal.org/3/sites/crds3/files/19-00578_cds.3_critical_obstacles_web.pdf 38  Ibid. p. 43 39  Ibid. 37

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Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Access on 10/21/2019. https://crds.cepal.org/3/sites/crds3/files/19-00578_cds.3_critical_obstacles_web.pdf Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Membership. Retrieved October 4, 2019. https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/ community-latin-american-and-caribbean-states-celac/. Cowie, Sam. 2014. Brazil: Destination of choice for Africans. Aljazeera. Published September 3, 2014. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/09/brazil-destination-choice-africans-201493113721757775.html. -----. Becoming A Citizen. Grenada Citizenship by Investment. Accessed on October 23, 2019. https://www.cbi.gov.gd/grenada-citizenship/type-of-citizenship/. -----. Nigeria evacuates nationals in Caribbean Islands devastated by hurricane. September 29, 2019. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/244624-nigeria-evacuates-nationalscaribbean-islands-devastated-hurricane.html. -----. Where South Africans are looking to emigrate  – and how to get to the US on the cheap. October 23, 2017. https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/205728/ where-south-africans-are-looking-to-emigrate-and-how-to-get-to-the-us-on-the-cheap/. ------. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Worldometers. Retrieved August 22, 2019. http://www.worldometers.info/geography/how-many-countries-in-latin-america/ -----. Grenada Citizenship by Investment. Access October 20, 2019, https://www.goldenvisas. com/grenada Deslandes, Ann. 2019. African migrants are trying to cross North America to make it to Canada. Trump is keeping them in Mexico. Insider. Published on October 2, 2019. https://www.insider. com/african-migrants-us-mexico-border-canada-2019-10. Freier, Luisa Feline. 2018. Against the Odds, African Migration to South America Grows. World Politics Review. Published December 4, 2018. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/ insights/26901/against-the-odds-african-migration-to-south-america-grows. Gill, Brenda I., Elisha J. Dung, and Paul Erhunmwunsee. 2018. Contemporary out-migration from CARICOM countries: Its impact and potential for growth of diaspora countries. In Dynamics of Caribbean diaspora engagement, ed. George K. Danns, Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, and Fitzgerald Yaw, 19–34. Guyana: University of Guyana Press. González, Alvarado Iván and Sánchez, Hilda. Trends in the Region - Migration in Latin America and the Caribbean: A view from the ICFTU/ORIT.n.d. Retrieved August 20, 2016. library.fes. de/pdf-files/gurn/00084.pdf. p. 101. Haig, Antoine Saliba. 2017. Benefits and Requirements of the E2 Visa. Chetcuti Cauchi. Updated March 10, 2017. https://www.chetcuticauchi.com/publications/e2-visa Henao, Luis Andres. 2010. More African Immigrants Finding a Home in Latin America. YaleGlobal. Published on January 25, 2010. https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/ more-african-immigrants-finding-home-latin-america. Herrberg, Anne. 2011. African refugees turn to Latin America over Europe. 09 20. Accessed 14 Oct 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/african-refugees-turn-to-latin-america-over-europe/a-15174828. McDonnell, Patrick J. 2019. African migrants stuck in southern Mexico, their American dream on hold. Los Angeles Times. Published September 22, 2019. https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-09-21/ african-migrants-stuck-in-southern-mexico-their-american-dream-on-hold. Payi, Bulelwa. 2017. Those who can afford it are leaving SA to retire. 2017. October 22. Accessed 7 Oct 2019. https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/ those-who-can-afford-it-are-leaving-sa-to-retire-11658930 Pico, Victoria. 2013. Soccer-mad African Stowaway finds new goals after passage to Argentina. UNHCR.  October 7, 2013. https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2013/10/5252bfea6/soccermad-african-stowaway-finds-new-goals-passage-argentina.html Ravenstein, E.G. 1889. The laws of migration. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 52 (2): 241–305.

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Lee, S.Everett. 1966. A theory of migration. Demography 3 (1): 47–57. Rolle, Rashad. 2019. Lawyers Angry Over Dpp’S Expat Hirings. June 18. Accessed 8 Oct 2019. http://www.tribune242.com/news/2019/jun/19/lawyers-angry-over-dpps-expat-hirings/ The International Organization for Migration (IOM). Key Migration Terms. Retrieved September 28, 2019. https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2018. Retrieved October 5, 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Population Statistics. Retrieved October 1, 2019. http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern.

Chapter 4

State Sovereignty-Non-Refoulement Nexus: Towards Sustainable Legal and Political Refugee Regime in Kenya Mercy Kathambi Kaburu

Introduction For over two decades, Kenya has been home to thousands of refugees from the neighboring conflict plagued states in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region. A report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) indicates that as of January 2016, 593,881 refugees and asylum seekers were living in Kenya.1 While the majority of refugees are settled in the designated Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps, a significant number reside in various urban centers in the country. Refugees of Somali descent account for most of the refugees, most of whom reside in the Dadaab refugee camp. This can be explained by the continued state of anarchy in Somalia since the military ouster of Siad Barre in 1991 and Somali’s proximity to Kenya among other factors.2 While Kenya adheres to various conventions and protocols relating to refugee protection, the rise of international terrorism has been a major concern in the recent past. In particular, the emergence of the Al-Shabaab (a militant group linked to the Al-Qaeda) that has exploited the

1  UNHCR-Kenya. Kenya Comprehensive Refugee Programme 2016. Nairobi: UNHCR-Kenya. https://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/05/Kenya. 2016. Accessed on 25th August 2019. 2  Thompson, V. B. Conflict in the Horn of Africa: The Kenya- Somalia Border Problem, 1941–2014. Lanham: University Press of America, 2015. See also; Kaburu, M.  K. (2018). “Regional Organizations and Conflict Management in Africa: A Contextual Assessment of the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Somalia”. Journal of Language, Technology & Entrepreneurship in Africa 9, no. 2 (2018): 16–27; Mwanika, P.  N. “Kenya’s Soft Power Dipomacy and Strategic Intervention in the Somali Conflict”. Occasional Paper, No. 1, 2015. Africa Institute of South Africa.

M. K. Kaburu (*) United States International University-Africa, Nairobi, Kenya © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. O. Abidde (ed.), The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56650-0_4

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ungoverned spaces in Somalia to carry out their terror-related activities, remains a threat to Kenya’s national security.3 Consequently, there has been increased political pressure for the adoption of more stringent measures of dealing with Somali refugees to avoid possible infiltration of the Al-Shabaab into the refugee camps. Closure of refugee camps and repatriation of Somali refugees is one of the strategic approaches that Kenya had hoped would ease the burden associated with the hosting of refugees and enhance national security. For example, while addressing a Special Summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Heads of State and Government held in March 2017 in Nairobi, President Kenyatta called for a durable solution to the Somali refugee crisis which includes their repatriation to Somalia. President Kenyatta observed that “what is clear to me, as it is to you leaders, and to all the Somali refugees, is that the time for lasting solutions is now.”4 Such attempts have however been frustrated by, among other factors, Kenya’s international obligations as a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and other laws relating to the protection of refugees. Furthermore, according to the 2010 Constitution, Kenya takes cognizance of treaties and conventions she has ratified. More specifically, Article 2(5) and Article 2(6) of Kenya’s 2010 Constitution provide in part that “…the general rules of international law shall form part of the law of Kenya…Any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution.”5 The obligation to observe the non-refoulement norm relating to the management of refugees is one of the political and legal duties of sovereign states, particularly those that have domesticated international treaties and conventions on refugees as is the case of Kenya. As a principle, non-refoulement holds that states shall not expel or return a refugee or asylum seeker to frontiers or territories where his/her life is threatened on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership to a social group.6 The principle, therefore, forms a backbone for legal and political frameworks relating to the management and protection of refugee rights internationally. In the wake of international terrorism, Kenya finds herself at a crossroads between securing her sovereignty from external threats and adhering to her international obligation of hosting and protecting refugees from the neighboring state of Somalia. This chapter adopts the concept of a refugee as defined by international, regional, and national legal instruments, namely, the 1951 United Nations (UN) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and related 1967 Protocol, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention of 1969, and Kenya’s Refugee 3  Mogire, E., & Agade, K.  M. “Counterterrorism in Kenya”. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29, no. 4 (2011): 473–491. 4  The East African. Call to repatriate Somalia refugees. 2017. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/ news/ea/Call-to-repatriate-Somalia-refugees/4552908. Accessed on 25th August 2019. 5  Republic of Kenya. Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Nairobi. Government Printer. 2010. https:// www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/the%20constitution%20of%20kenya.pdf. Accessed on 5th July 2019. 6  United Nations. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 1951. www. unhcr.org. Accessed on 6th July 2016.

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Act of 2006. In these legal instruments, the status of a refugee is characterized by a person crossing of international borders in search for safety and security, due to well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group, political opinion, as well as victims of generalized violence, external occupation, foreign domination, or events disturbing public order in parts or the entire country.7 The chapter proceeds from the premise that notwithstanding the security situation in the country, it is incumbent upon Kenya to lay the foundation for the sustainable and durable system, concordant with the legal regimes that protect the rights of refugees as inscribed in international treaties, conventions, and protocols, and which are in consonant with the country’s 2006 Refugee Act. To this end, the chapter examines the international refugee protection legal framework and the principle of non-refoulement in relation to Kenya’s sovereignty. While Kenya hosts refugees of different nationalities, this chapter will focus on refugees of Somali descent who are the majority of the refugee population in Kenya.

International Law and Refugee Protection The international refugee protection legal framework is founded on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, which guarantees the rights to all individuals including asylum seekers who leave their country in search of protection. In particular, Article 14(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights grants that “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”8 Founded on this provision, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter the 1951 Convention) is one of the specific legal regimes that focus on the plight of asylum seekers and refugees. Article 1(2) of the 1951 Convention defines a refugee as a person who is forced to leave his country of origin, …owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.9

7  Ibid. See also; Organization of African Unity. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. 1969.www.achpr.org/files/instruments/refugee-convention/achpr._ instr_conv_refug_eng.pdf. (Accessed on 6th July 2019), Republic of Kenya. Refugee Act, 2006. Nairobi. Government Printer. 2006. www.kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownlord/acts/refugeeact_No13of2006.pdf. Accessed on 5th July 2019. 8  United Nations. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948. 9  Ibid, UN, 1951.

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Equally, the Convention spells out on rights of refugees including the right to asylum and recognition as a refugee by the contracting state, right to legal representation, and right to employment among other social rights. Closely related to the 1951 Convention is the 1967 Protocol that addresses the question of 1 January 1951 dateline in the definition of a refugee as adopted by the 1951 Convention. The removal of the dateline by the 1967 Protocol expanded the definition to include individuals affected by events beyond 1951. The conceptualization of a refugee by the 1951 Convention and its related 1967 Protocol did not address some unique features of the African refugee. This prompted the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to adopt the OAU Convention on Specific Problems of Refugees in Africa in 1969. In particular, the 1969 OAU Convention sought to include victims of generalized violence, external occupation, foreign domination, or events disturbing public order in parts or the entire country, as part of aspects that define a refugee.10 The OAU also provided for the recognition of refugees using the prima facie status that caters to refugees not as an individual victim but as a group. This was meant to protect groups of individuals from ethnic groups that may suffer from armed conflict or war.11 In domesticating international refugee law, Kenya adopted the 2006 Refugee Act founded on the provisions of the 1951 Convention and 1969 OAU Convention. Moreover, the 2010 Constitution commits Kenya to the principles and practice of international law including all the treaties that the country has ratified. Of importance and particularly for this chapter is the legal protection of refugees from forced repatriation to frontiers or territories where their rights and freedoms are likely to be threatened, otherwise known as the principle of non-refoulement. While the conventions advocate for voluntary repatriation of refugees when the situation in their country of origin has improved, Kenya raises concerns of possible threats posed by continued hosting of refugees and its implication on national security. Oluoch12 notes that though Kenya had previously adopted an open-door policy, the influx of refugees and related security concerns led to a radical departure on Kenya’s approach to the management of refugees including forced repatriation which is against non-refoulement as a principle. The next section explores the principle of non-refoulement and its application in the management of refugees.

 Organization of African Unity. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. 1969.www.achpr.org/files/instruments/refugee-convention/achpr._instr_conv_ refug_eng.pdf. (Accessed on 6th July 2019). 11  Oluoch, K. “Kenya’s National Security and International Refugee Law”. In F. Onditi et al. (eds) Contemporary Africa and the Foreseeable World Order, pp.  313–329. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2019. 12  Ibid 10

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Understanding Non-refoulement Principle and Its Application The concept of non-refoulement is derived from the French word “refouler” which means to drive back. The principle which is explicitly incorporated in various refugee legal regimes and accepted by the international community prohibits receiving states from returning refugees or asylum seekers to frontiers or territories where their rights and freedoms are threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, among others. Article 33(1) of the 1951 UN Convention provides that “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” The principle may however not apply to any individual who is deemed as a threat to the security of the contracting states. Article 33(2) makes this provision stating that “The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”13 Equally, the 1969 OAU Convention adopts non-refoulement as a principle relating to the management of refugees by member states. According to Article 11(3), “No person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened ….”14 In domesticating the 1951 and 1969 UN and OAU respective refugee legal regimes, Kenya incorporated non-refoulement as part of the 2006 Refugee Act that provides the legal framework of managing refugees in the country. Article 18 of the 2006 Refugee Act provides that No person shall be refused entry into Kenya, expelled, extradited from Kenya nor returned to any other country or to subjected any similar measure if, as a result of such refusal, expulsion, return or other measure, such person is compelled to return to or remain in a country where— (a) the person may be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or (b) the person’s life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened on account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in part or the whole of that country.15

Thus, non-refoulement principle forms the basis of Kenya’s practice regarding the protection of refugees. By its very nature, non-refoulement bears a jus cogens or a peremptory norm status in international law, meaning that the principle is recognized and accepted by the international community as bidding and that states cannot

 Ibid, UN, 1951.  Ibid, OAU, 1969. 15  Republic of Kenya. Refugee Act, 2006. Nairobi. Government Printer. 2006. www.kenyalaw.org/ kl/fileadmin/pdfdownlord/acts/refugeeact_No13of2006.pdf. Accessed on 5th July 2019. 13 14

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set it aside, modify, or overrule it by another legal provision.16 Based on this premise, I argue that being a signatory to various conventions and protocols relating to the protection of refugees, Kenya is obliged to continue hosting Somali refugees for as long as their rights and freedoms are deemed as threatened by violence or political instability in their country of origin. However, the presence of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the prevailing perception by the government of Kenya that some refugees are sympathizers of the militant group raise concerns of possible contradictions between observing non-refoulement and securing Kenya’s sovereignty from external threats. The next section provides a situational analysis of refugees in Kenya, with emphasis on the management of refugees of Somali descent who are the focus of the chapter.

Refugees in Kenya: A Contextual Analysis Since her early years of independence, Kenya has been a receiving state to refugees from most of her neighboring states.17 However, the last two decades have witnessed the country faced numerous challenges as a state of asylum to a large number of refugees. This is attributed to Kenya’s contiguity to states that have experienced violent conflicts and other forms of political instability. For instance, states within the Great Lakes region such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda have previously been involved in a conflict that has led to the displacement of their respective populations. In addition, the Horn of Africa region has been characterized by some of the world’s longest conflicts such as that of Somalia that spans for over two decades.18 Moreover, the region has occasionally experienced a prolonged drought that has led to a further upsurge of refugees in search of security and food. The ouster of Siad Barre and the subsequent collapse of Somalia resulted in a refugee crisis as individuals and groups sought protection in the neighboring states. In response to the crisis, Kenya adopted encampment as a means of managing the rising numbers of asylum seekers. Three refugee camps including Dadaab, Alinjugur, and Kakuma were established in the northeastern part of the country. Although most refugees were and are still hosted in the three camps, there is a significant population of urban refugees residing in Nairobi and other towns in Kenya. Figure 4.1 illustrates the distribution of refugees from their various states of origin. Dadaab is the largest and most populated refugee camp with most refugees from Somalia. Statistics as per Fig. 4.1 indicate that Somali refugees represent the largest refugee population in Nairobi. Indeed, 70% of the total refugees are of Somali  Riyanto, S. “The Refoulement Principle and Its Relevance in the International Law System”. Indonesian Journal of International Law 7, no. 4 (2010): 731–756. See also; Shaw, M. N. International Law (6thEd). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 17  Ibid, Oluoch, 2019. 18  Ibid. See also; Ibid, Kaburu, 2018. 16

4  State Sovereignty-Non-Refoulement Nexus: Towards Sustainable Legal and Political…

Country of origin

Refugee Location

Total

Percentage

Daadab

Kakuma

202, 439

40, 954

119, 227

30, 657

393,227

70%

1, 274

85,309

31

1, 310

87, 924

16%

11, 242

5, 649

3, 088

8, 777

28, 756

5%

173

9, 464

140

17, 680

27, 547

5%

73

9, 421

1

155

9, 650

2%

Burundi

142

5, 688

68

1, 889

7, 787

1%

Uganda

68

8

680

1, 873

0.3%

Eritrea Rwanda

19 22

66 523

12

1, 472 999

1, 557 1, 556

0.3% 0.3%

Other

10

62

6

219

297

Somalia South Sudan Ethiopia Dem. Rep. of Congo Sudan

Total Percentage

21, 462 38%

Alinjugur

1, 7

158, 253 28%

-

122, 581 22%

69

Nairobi

63, 828 11%

0.05%

560, 134

Fig. 4.1  Distribution of the refugee population in Kenya as of July 2016. (Source: UNHCR, Kenya Factsheet, July 2019. https://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/download.php?=1934. Retrieved on 10 September 2019)

descent, validating Kenya’s concerns of challenges associated with hosting refugees from neighboring Somalia. This reality can be explained by, among others, the protracted conflict that saw Somalia remain without an effective government for over two decades since 1991.19 Increased cases of terror attacks in Kenya have resulted in the refugee factor becoming critical in defining Kenya’s geopolitical and geostrategic interests in the Horn of Africa and her subsequent foreign policy behavior towards Somalia. The contiguity of Kenya to Somalia, coupled with the problem of the porous borders, not only allows for transnational movement of populations including refugees but also illegal goods such as light weapons.20 Notably, the refugee situation in Kenya has been complicated by the nature of the protracted conflict in Somalia, making it more of a permanent undertaking as opposed to the temporary nature of asylum. Also, the approach towards the refugee problem by the international community has remained more of a humanitarian issue, with minimal efforts to address the root

 Mwanika, P.  N. “Kenya’s Soft Power Dipomacy and Strategic Intervention in the Somali Conflict”. Occasional Paper, No. 1, 2015. Africa Institute of South Africa. 20  Ibid, Oluoch, 2019. See also; Ibid, Kaburu, 2018. 19

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causes. Taking note of the continued neglect of the Somali refugee crisis in the past decades, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) continues to persuade the international community to increase support for the stabilization of Somalia to facilitate voluntary repatriation of the refugees. Challenges associated with prolonged hosting of refugees such as environmental degradation and competition for scarce resources have resulted in anti-refugee sentiments from the host communities. This notwithstanding, the changing perception of Somali refugees has been worsened by the rising cases of terror attacks after Kenya’s military engagement was launched in 2011.21 The government of Kenya has also held onto the position that the Al-Shabaab had infiltrated the Somali refugee community and that most of the planning of terror attacks was carried out in the Dadaab refugee camp.22 For example, the Kenyan government linked the refugee camps to the planning and execution of large-scale terror attacks in the country including the Garissa University in 2015, the Mpeketoni attack in the coastal region in 2014, and the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in 2013.23 Refugee camps are perceived as a convenient place for planning terror-related attacks by the militant group. Kaburu24 opines that challenges relating to the identification of Al-Shabaab members aided their free interaction with the Somali refugee community in the camps. This is because refugees hosted in Dadaab refugee camp are predominantly of the Somali descent as illustrated earlier in Figure 4.1 and the fact that the process of their registration has been challenging resulting in undeserving persons acquiring a refugee status.25 Kenya’s management and protection of Somali refugees are founded on her national and international obligations. Nationally, the government has the mandate to secure her sovereignty through enhanced national security. In this regard, any kind of policy action in relation to refugees by the Kenyan government is not only informed by international refugee law but also by the political and security realities

 Kenya Defence Forces. Operation Linda Nchi: Kenya’s Military Experience in Somalia. Nairobi: Kenya Defence Forces, 2014. 22  Fisher, B. “Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005–2012”. Small Wars and Insurgencies 25, no. 2 (2014): 492–494. See also, Kenya, National Assembly. Report on Investigation into the Garissa University Terrorist Attack; Departmental Committee on Administration and National Security. 2015. www.parliament.go.ke/committees/ committee_reports/…/1907_aef6a56571ccf836c Accessed on 12th July 2019; and Kenya, National Assembly. Report of the Joint Committee on Administration and National Security; and Defence and Foreign Relations on the Inquiry into the Westgate Terrorist Attack, and other Terror Attacks in Mandera in North Eastern and Kilifi in the Coast Region. info.mzalendo.com/file_archive/westgate_report. 2013. Accessed on 12th July 2016. 23  Republic of Kenya. Government Press Statement and Update on Repatriation of Refugees and Scheduled Closure of Dadaab Refugee Camp. 2016. www.interior.go.ke/?p=3113. Accessed on 17th August 2019. 24  Kaburu, M. K. Decision Making Theory and Foreign Policy Process: Empirical Ontological and Epistemological Contextualization of Kenya’s Diplomacy Towards Somalia, 1996–2012. PhD Dissertion, 2017, United States Ingternational University, Nairobi. 25  Ibid, Oluoch, 2019. See also; Ibid, Kaburu, 2017. 21

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in the country.26 Moreover, policy responses take cognizance of the fact that the state should, where possible, maximize the possible benefits and reduce the burden of refugees on the existing social, economic, and political infrastructure. Article 9 of the 1951 Convention makes provision for the contracting state to take provisional measures concerning its national security.27 Aimed at ensuring efficiency in managing the large refugee population, Kenya adopted encampment policy, enactment of national legislation, border closure, and repatriation of refugees among other strategies. The next section expounds on these strategic approaches and their legal implication on the rights and freedoms of refugees as well as Kenya’s sovereignty.

Managing Somali Refugees in Kenya: Strategic Approaches As noted earlier in the chapter, continued anarchy in Somalia since 1991 led to a large population of asylum seekers in Kenya. In response, Kenya adopted an encampment policy that saw refugees contained in various camps established in the northeastern part of the country. The encampment policy was adopted through a government executive order and later adopted by the Refugee Act of 2006. Article 16(2) of the 2006 Refugee Act empowers the Minister concerned to establish refugee camps in consultation with the host communities.28 Currently, there are two main refugee camps located in the northeastern region of Kenya. Their proximity to Somalia makes it easy for the registration and provision of humanitarian assistance to newly arriving refugees and asylum seekers. While the adoption of camps has been relatively successful, some refugees have managed to leave the camps in search of better social amenities in Kenyan cities, while others have managed to relocate to other countries.29 Edward Mogire30 opines that the process of maintaining refugee in the camps is occasionally carried in a manner that it violates the rights of the refugees. Indeed, encampment policy is occasionally enforced through police roundup of refugees outside the camps. For example, in 2014 the government made attempts to profile refugees in Nairobi in a move to have them relocated to the camps. The exercise was however marred with cases of corruption as Somali refugees paid money to the police to evade the vetting process and possibly transfer back to the camps.31 According to Oluoch,32 encampment policy not only raises social-economic concerns with regard to the exploitation of the individual refugee’s  Ibid, Kaburu, 2017.  Ibid, UN, 1951. 28  Ibid, Kenya Refugee Act, 2006 29  Lindley, Anna. (2011). Between a Protracted and a Crisis Situation: Policy Responses to Somali Refugees in Kenya. Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 1–36. 30  Mogire, E. “Refugee Realities: Refugee Rights versus State Security in Kenya and Tanzania. Transformation”: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies 26, no. 1 (2009): 15–29. 31  Ibid, Kaburu, 2017. 32  Ibid, Oluoch, 2019 26 27

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potential but also curtails fundamental human rights of the refugees like denying them the right to employment as inscribed in international refugee law. While the policy could undermine the rights of refugees, it is perceived as enhancing national security as the state can use its institutions to control activities within the camps. Enacting national legislation was another approach that Kenya adopted in the management of refugees. Kenya remained without an explicit legal framework towards the management of refugees until 2006. The country adopted an open-door policy especially in the late 1980s and 1990s until 2006 when Kenya adopted the 2006 Refugee Act. The 2006 Refugee Act provides the legal guidelines for the management of refugees. In particular, the Act has expounded on key aspects including the definition of a refugee, disqualification from admission, cessation of the status, and adoption of non-refoulement as a principle. In addition, the 2006 Refugee Act addresses challenges relating to the accurate registration of asylum seekers and refugees. Previously, the registration of refugees was carried out by the UNHCR based on humanitarianism, with the government taking a minimal role in the process. Kaburu33 observes that the humanitarian approach allowed for the acceptance of all asylum seekers, with minimal considerations of Kenya’s geopolitical and geostrategic interests, particularly the implication on national security. Oluoch34 opines that Kenya lacked the experience of managing large numbers of asylum seekers resulting from the collapse of neighboring Somalia. Using the prima facie status as provided for in the OAU Convention, asylum seekers from Somalia were given en masse admission in the country awaiting determination of their status. This compromised the vetting and registration process and allowed for the admission of non-­ genuine individuals as refugees in Kenya. To address the challenge of registration, Articles 6 and 7 of the 2006 Refugee Act provide for the establishment of a Department for Refugee Affairs and a Commissioner for Refugee Affairs, respectively.35 Based on the provisions of the Act, the government established the Department of Refugee Affairs under the Ministry of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons. Charged with the management of refugee affairs in consultation with the relevant Minister, the Department and Commissioner for Refugee Affairs provide an opportunity for the government to effectively address issues relating to refugees in Kenya without relying solely on UNHCR. For example, the emergence of the militant Al-Shabaab  and its perceived link with the Somali refugee remains a major concern for the Kenyan security agencies.36 Such concerns have resulted in stringent measures in the vetting of refugees and asylum seekers from Somalia as provided for in the 2006 Refugee Act. In any case, the Refugee Act empowers the Commissioner to withdraw and repatriate or deny entry to any refugee

 Ibid, Kaburu, 2017.  Ibid, Oluoch, 2019 35  Ibid, Kenya Refugee Act, 2006 36  Ibid, Mogire and Agade, 2011. 33 34

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suspected on reasonable grounds of being a threat to national security or any community in the country.37 Attempts to curb insecurities emanating from the failed Somalia informed Kenya’s decision to adopt border closure as another strategic measure of managing refugees from Somalia. For example, in 1999 Kenya closed her borders with Somalia citing concerns of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the need to reduce refugee influx in the country.38 The practice was repeated in 2001 and 2007 to prevent Al-Qaeda-related Islamic militants from infiltrating into the genuine refugee population from Somalia.39 Equally, the closure of the border was aimed at reducing the smuggling of small arms to the Nairobi Eastleigh area where it is believed that Kenyan Somalis helped facilitate entry of their Somali counterparts as refugees.40 Closing of the Kenya-Somalia border was further recommended by the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry to the Westgate Mall terror attack in 2013. The Committee identified the influx of Somali refugees through the porous borders as a factor that made Kenya more vulnerable and an easy target for terrorist attacks.41 While the closure of the border may have had severe consequences on the asylum seekers from Somalia, the Kenyan government justified its actions on the basis that the refugees posed a threat to national security. However, Kaburu 42 observes that manning of the Kenya-Somalia border was likely to remain problematic because of the kin and clan associated relationship between Kenyan Somalis and the Somali citizens across the border which leads to challenges of identification. Furthermore, the closing of the border has occasionally been counterproductive as asylum seekers find unofficial alternative routes into the country. Rampant corruption at border points has also been blamed for aiding Somali citizens into the country in the guise of business partners without the necessary documentation.43 Border closure is also challenged by a lack of adequate resources. Kenya-Somalia border is significantly long and would require substantial resources for effective border security.44 The continued political instability in Somalia makes the situation very unpredictable;

 Ibid, Kenya Refugee Act, 2006  Ibid, Mogire, 2009. See also; Snodgrass, L., & Mwanika, P. N. (2013). Dynamics and Politics of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Violent Conflicts Arms Control and its Challenges in Somalia. Africa Insight 43, no. 1 (2013): 61–76.; Ibid, Mogire and Agade, 2011 39  Ibid, Mogire, 2009. See also; Muhoro, N. “The Implementation of Kenya’s Refugee Act: Implications on National Security”. Contemporary Security Studies 1, no. 2 (2012): 27–42. 40  Ibid, Mwanika, 2005. See also; Samora, M. (2013). The Somali Question. World Policy Journal 30, no. 3 (2013): 99–106. 41  Kenya, National Assembly. Report of the Joint Committee on Administration and National Security; and Defence and Foreign Relations on the Inquiry into the Westgate Terrorist Attack, and other Terror Attacks in Mandera in North Eastern and Kilifi in the Coast Region. info.mzalendo. com/file_archive/westgate_report. 2013. Accessed on 12th July 2016. 42  Ibid, Kaburu, 2017. 43  Ibid. 44  Samora, M. (2013). The Somali Question. World Policy Journal 30, no. 3 (2013): 99–106. See also; Ibid, Muhoro, 2012.

37 38

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thus, the closure of the Kenya-Somalia border poses a major threat to asylum seekers in search of protection. Kenya has used repatriation as a solution to curb the rising numbers of Somali refugees and the associated insecurities. The 1951 UN Convention provides for three durable solutions to the refugee problems. They include repatriation, local integration in the country of asylum, and resettlement in the third country of asylum.45 Equally, the Kenya Refugee Act of 2006 provides repatriation but excludes local integration as one of the durable solutions to the refugee problem.46 Kenya has occasionally employed repatriation (in some cases forced repatriation) as a solution to the Somali refugee crisis.47 This is done against the principle of non-refoulement which prohibits forced repatriation and forbids states from returning refugees to their country of origin or any other residence where their lives and freedoms are threatened. In 2013 Kenya sought to institutionalize the repatriation of Somali refugees by entering into a Tripartite Agreement with the Federal Government of Somalia and UNHCR. This was meant to ensure that the repatriation process was carried out in a humane and dignified manner as provided for in the various legal instruments. According to the provisions of the Tripartite Agreement, Kenya’s prolonged hosting of Somali refugees and the associated environmental and national security concerns were acknowledged as being legitimate, and thus there is a need for voluntary repatriation of the Somali refugees. Kaburu48 opines that increased terror attacks and the subsequent threat to national security informed Kenya’s decision towards a more inclusive and formalized approach towards the repatriation process. As noted earlier in the chapter, the 2013 and 2015 Westgate Mall and the Garissa University terrorist attacks led to intensified calls for the repatriation of Somali refugees who were perceived as a major threat to national security. A report by the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the Westgate attack recommended a repeal of the Refugee Act of 2006, to allow for the closure of the Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps.49 The report further recommended the repatriation of all refugees to their respective countries of origin. The move to repatriate refugees and closure of the camps had previously been discussed and supported by parliament in 2011. During the parliamentary proceedings on the 7th of December 2011, parliament identified the infiltration of the refugee camps by Al-Shabaab, noting that most of the terror attacks in Kenya were planned and executed from Dadaab refugee camp.50 Confirming the government position on continued repatriation, the Minister for Interior and Coordination of the National Government, through a press statement in May 2016, noted that Kenya was committed to the repatriation of Somali refugees and subsequent closure of Dadaab refugee

 Ibid, UN, 1951,  Ibid, Kenya Refugee Act, 2006 47  Ibid, Mogire, 2009. 48  Ibid, Kaburu, 2017. 49  Ibid, Kenya National Assembly, 2013. 50  Ibid. 45 46

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camp. The envisioned closure of the Dadaab refugee camp and the repatriation of Somali refugees have been faced by internal constraints. For example, there was a general realization a substantial number of Kenyans are registered as refugees and may not be willing to declare their actual citizenship for fear of the possible consequences, including jail terms. A report by the UNHCR in 2016 confirmed that indeed 42,000 Kenyan nationals had been registered as refugees and were residing in the Dadaab refugee camp.51 The above refugee management approaches adopted by Kenya regarding Somali refugees ought to have been implemented within the framework of international refugee law. Although the strategies were meant to improve efficiency in refugee protection and reduce possible threats to Kenya’s sovereignty, they were in contradiction with core principles such as non-refoulement. The principle is anchored on the need to protect refugees against repatriation into territories where life is threatened based on race, religion, and political opinions among other factors. The next section examines the principle of non-refoulement and its implication on state sovereignty.

 efugee Protection, Non-refoulement, and Kenya’s R Sovereignty The principle of non-refoulement prohibits receiving states from returning refugees or asylum seekers to frontiers or territories where their rights and freedoms are threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, among others. It is also founded on the 1948 UDHR which guarantees the rights to all individuals including asylum seekers who leave their country in search of protection. The principle is binding to states that are signatories to international legal instruments relating to refugee protection such as the 1951 Convention. Occasionally, the principle conflicts with state sovereignty especially in cases where refugees have been perceived as a threat to national security. State sovereignty which is founded on the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia gives a sovereign state exclusive mandate to govern its territory and the citizens therein. Thus, the state bears the power to create its own body of laws and their enforcement mechanisms without external interference. Founded on international law, hosting and protection of refugees is not only dependent on the willingness of the state to adhere to its international obligation, but also on the need to pursue its national interest. As noted earlier in the chapter, Kenya has been host to large populations of Somali refugees for over two decades of war in Somalia. As a neighboring state, Kenya used an open-door policy towards refugees with the UNHCR carrying out

51

 Ibid, UNHCR, 2016.

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the registration process.52 However, recent internal dynamics relating to the protracted Somali conflict including the rise of the terror-related militant group, the, Al-Shabaab, has seen Kenya engage stringent measures in the management of Somali refugees. The main concern is whether the approaches by Kenya are in concordant with non-refoulement as a principle and their subsequent impact on Kenya’s sovereignty. Kenya has occasionally used border closure to manage the rising numbers of asylum seekers from Somalia. As a sovereign state, Kenya is free to open and close her borders and take control of any form of external interference. However, the move to close the border can be construed as a violation of non-refoulement principle, considering that there are asylum seekers from Somalia whose rights and freedoms are threatened by armed conflict and war in their country. Unfortunately, as a host state, Kenya does not have the freedom to choose who to host as a refugee unless based on national security where one can be denied entry. However, the complexity of the identification of refugees from Somalia in the wake of international terrorism led to Kenya’s increased monitoring of border security. Although border closure contravenes the principle of non-refoulement, it can be viewed as a move by Kenya to protect her sovereignty. Repatriation is one of the durable solutions to refugee problems as provided for by the 1951 Convention and other related refugee legal regimes. Emphasis has been laid on its voluntary nature. Notably, Kenya has been repatriating Somali refugees via the guidelines by a Tripartite signed by Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR. Unfortunately, and as noted by Kaburu,53 there are cases where repatriation has not been voluntary but rather forced by the relevant government officials. Once repatriation is perceived as forced, it is understood as being against the principle of non-refoulement. In support of repatriation and subsequent closure of the Dadaab refugee camp, parliament adopted the Security Amendment Act of 2014 which requires that three-quarters of registered refugees be repatriated. Observance of such a law would mean that refugees are to be repatriated regardless of whether the situations in their country of origin have improved as is the case of Somalia. While this kind of undertaking was viewed as important in securing Kenya’s sovereignty, it is against the principles of refugee protection. Adoption of the Security Amendment Act of 2014 was not only in contradiction with Kenya’s 2010 Constitution which provides for a monist approach to international treaties, but also the 2006 Refugee Act that acknowledges non-refoulement as a principle in protection of refugees. The above observations regarding Kenya’s management of Somali refugees paint a picture of existing conflicts and contradictions between state sovereignty and non-­ refoulement as a principle. It is important to note that while states are bound by international treaties, they act out of good faith in respect to international law. Indeed, in most cases states behavior is informed by their national interests.

52 53

 Ibid, Oluoch, 2019. See also; Ibid, Mogire, 2009.  Ibid, Kaburu, 2017.

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Non-refoulement as noted by Dauvergne54 is the only principle that limits the behavior of sovereign states in relation to the protection of refugees. Although non-­ refoulement tends to adopt a jus cogens in international law, there are concerns about the interpretation of what consists of threats to refugee rights. For instance, Kenya has hosted Somali refugees for over two decades making what was meant to be temporary to become more of a permanent situation. Although Somalia went through a successful democratic election in the recent past, there have been calls for Kenya to continue hosting Somali refugees as their country is viewed as unstable and likely to threaten the rights and freedoms of refugees. This leads to questions of an undefined time limit of refugee status, the subjective interpretation of political stability concerning security of the refugees, and its implication on state sovereignty especially in the wake of international terrorism. While this may be the case, I argue that it is incumbent upon Kenya to lay the foundation for sustainable systems in concordant with the legal regime that protects the rights of refugees inscribed in international treaties, conventions, and protocols and also in agreement with the country’s 2006 Refugee Act. Thus, Kenya can use various approaches including unilateral and multilateral diplomacy to enhance sustained political stability in Somalia, a situation that would pave way for successful implementation of voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees.

Conclusion Founded on UDHR of 1948, international refugee law has been adopted by states as a legal framework for the protection of individuals that cross their territorial borders for fear of persecution based on, among others, race, religion, and political affiliation. At the core of international refugee law is the principle of non-refoulement which prohibits states from returning refugees to territories or frontiers where their rights and freedoms are threatened. While the principle provides the foundation on which refugee law is established, it occasionally conflicts with national interests and sovereignty of host states. A sovereign state bears power over its territory and the citizens therein, and thus non-refoulement contradicts the right of the state to determine the fate of refugees within its territory with regard to the timing of their repatriation. Using the case of Kenya, this chapter has examined the nexus between non-refoulement principle and state sovereignty. Having hosted refugees from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region, Kenya has had to deal with a myriad of challenges ranging from the unprecedented rise of refugee populations to the associated insecurities including international terrorism. Kenya has been a receiving state for refugees from neighboring Somalia for over two decades. While Kenya adopted an open-door policy in receiving and

 Dauvergne, C. Challenges to Sovereignty: Migration Laws for the 21st Century. Geneva: UNHCR: 2003.

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registration of Somali refugees, internal dynamics relating to Somalia conflict and the emergence of international terrorism led to the adoption of more stringent mechanisms of dealing with refugees. Consequently, strategies such as encampment, enactment of national legislation, border closure, and repatriation were adopted in a move to manage refugees from the failed state of Somalia. Although the strategies were geared towards securing Kenya’s sovereignty, they have occasionally conflicted with the rights and privileges of refugees and more particularly with the non-­ refoulement principle. Being a signatory to various refugee regimes and having domesticated international conventions and related protocols relating to the protection of refugees through national legislation, I argue that it is incumbent upon Kenya to establish a sustainable system in concordant with the legal regimes that protect the rights of refugees.

References Dauvergne, Catherine. 2003. Challenges to Sovereignty: Migration Laws for the 21st Century. Geneva: UNHCR. Fisher, Benjamin. 2014. Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005–2012. Small Wars and Insurgencies 25 (2): 492–494. Kaburu, Mercy Kathambi. 2018. Regional Organizations and Conflict Management in Africa: A Contextual Assessment of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Somalia. Journal of Language, Technology & Entrepreneurship in Africa 9, no. 2 (2018): 16–27. ———. 2017. Decision Making Theory and Foreign Policy Process: Empirical Ontological and Epistemological Contextualization of Kenya’s Diplomacy Towards Somalia, 1996–2012. Ph.D. Dissertation, United States International University, Nairobi. Kenya Defence Forces. 2014. Operation Linda Nchi: Kenya’s Military Experience in Somalia. Kenya Defence Forces: Nairobi. Kenya, National Assembly. 2015. Report on Investigation into the Garissa University Terrorist Attack; Departmental Committee on Administration and National Security. www.parliament.go.ke/committees/committee_reports/…/1907_aef6a56571ccf836c. Accessed on 12th July 2019. ———. 2013. Report of the Joint Committee on Administration and National Security; and Defence and Foreign Relations on the Inquiry into the Westgate Terrorist Attack, and other Terror Attacks in Mandera in North Eastern and Kilifi in the Coast Region. info.mzalendo.com/ file_archive/westgate_report. Accessed on 12th July 2016. Lindley, Anna. 2011. Between a Protracted and a Crisis Situation: Policy Responses to Somali Refugees in Kenya. Refugee Survey Quarterly 30 (4): 1–36. Mogire, Edward. 2009. Refugee Realities: Refugee Rights versus State Security in Kenya and Tanzania. Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies 26 (1): 15–29. Mogire, Edward., and Kennedy Mkutu Agade. 2011. Counterterrorism in Kenya. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29 (4): 473–491. Muhoro, Njeri. 2012. The Implementation of Kenya’s Refugee Act: Implications on National Security. Contemporary Security Studies 1 (2): 27–42. Mwanika, Philip Njuguna. 2015. Kenya’s Soft Power Diplomacy and Strategic Intervention in the Somali Conflict, Occasional Paper, No. 1. Africa Institute of South Africa. Okoth, Pontian Godfrey. 2008. Terrorphobia as the Cornerstone of American Post September 11, 2001 Africa Policy. In Peace and Conflict Studies in a Global Context, ed. P.G.  Okoth, 134–145. Kakamega: Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology Press.

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Oluoch, Ken. 2019. Kenya’s National Security and International Refugee Law. In Contemporary Africa and the Foreseeable World Order, ed. F. Onditi et al., 313–329. Lanham: Lexington Books. Organization of African Unity. 1969. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.www.achpr.org/files/instruments/refugee-convention/achpr._instr_conv_ refug_eng.pdf. Accessed on 6th July 2019. Republic of Kenya. 2016. Government Press Statement and Update on Repatriation of Refugees and Scheduled Closure of Dadaab Refugee Camp. www.interior.go.ke/?p=3113. Accessed on 17th August 2019. ———. 2010. Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Nairobi: Government Printer. https://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/the%20constitution%20of%20kenya.pdf. Accessed on 5th July 2019. ———. 2006. Refugee Act, 2006. Nairobi: Government Printer. www.kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/ pdfdownlord/acts/refugeeact_No13of2006.pdf. Accessed on 5th July 2019. Riyanto, Sigit. 2010. The Refoulement Principle and Its Relevance in the International Law System. Indonesian Journal of International Law 7 (4): 731–756. Samora, Mwaura. 2013. The Somali Question. World Policy Journal 30 (3): 99–106. Shaw, Malcolm N. 2008. International Law. 6th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Snodgrass, Lyn., & Mwanika, Philip Arthur Njuguna. 2013. Dynamics and Politics of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Violent Conflicts Arms Control and its Challenges in Somalia. Africa Insight 43 (1): 61–76. The East African. 2017. Call to repatriate Somalia refugees.https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/ news/ea/Call-to-repatriate-Somalia-refugees/4552908. Accessed on 25th August 2019. Thompson, Vincent Bakpetu. 2015. Conflict in the Horn of Africa: The Kenya-Somalia Border Problem, 1941–2014. Lanham: University Press of America. UNHCR-Kenya. 2016. Kenya Comprehensive Refugee Program 2016. Nairobi: UNHCR-Kenya. https://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/05/Kenya. Accessed on 25th August 2019. United Nations. 1967. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. www.unhcr.org. Accessed on 6th of July, 2016. ———. 1951. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. www.unhcr.org. Accessed on 6th July 2016. ———. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). https://www.un.org › udhrbook › pdf › udhr_booklet_en_web. Accessed on 13th September 2019. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Kenya Factsheet July 2016. https://data.unhcr. org/horn-of-africa/download.php?=1934. Accessed on 10th September 2016.

Chapter 5

Refugees, Religion, and Resilience in Sub-­Saharan Africa Roger B. Alfani

Introduction According to the recent United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) statistics, the number of refugees has skyrocketed reaching in 2017 an unprecedented estimate of 25.4 million out of 68.5 million forced from home. While researchers of many schools,1 who focus on Africa and are particularly interested in refugees’ experiences,—which include their flight, their settlement, and eventually their repatriation—only address causes of refugees, types of flights, and roles of conventional actors or agencies (e.g., states and international organizations), refugees’ personal experiences are often ignored. Since refugees are the main focus of these studies and whose lives should at least be incorporated in their investigations, this chapter seeks to fill this gap of knowledge. In other words, I will be focusing on how refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo have handled this difficult situation of flying their homes towards a temporary place of settlement in

1  Anthony, Constance G. “Africa’s Refugee Crisis: State Building in Historical Perspective.” International Migration Review 25, no. 3 (1991): 574–591. See also; Bariagaber, Assefaw. Conflict and the Refugee Experience: Flight, Exile, and Repatriation in the Horn of Africa, Contemporary Perspectives on Developing Societies. Aldershot, England: Routledge. Book, 2006.; Damme, Wim Van. “How Liberian and Sierra Leonean Refugees Settled in the Forest Region of Guinea (1990–96).” Journal of Refugee Studies 12, no. 1 (1999): 36–53.; Hansen, Art. “Refugee Dynamics: Angolans in Zambia 1966 to 1972.” The International Migration Review 15, no. 1/2 (1981): 175–194.; Omata, Naohiko. 2013. “Repatriation and Integration of Liberian Refugees from Ghana: The Importance of Personal Networks in the Country of Origin.” Journal of Refugee Studies 26, no. 2 (2013): 265–282.; Rogge, John R. “Africa’s Resettlement Strategies.” International Migration Review 15, no. 1–2 (1981): 195–212.

R. B. Alfani (*) Seton Hall University, South Orange, NJ, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. O. Abidde (ed.), The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56650-0_5

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neighboring African countries and particularly around the African Great Lakes regions. Few researchers,2 however, from the European and American contexts have focused on the important role of one’s religion/spirituality in determining his/her resilience.3 The purpose of this chapter is to understand how one’s religion or faith contributes to the resilience of a refugee amidst his or her experience that includes the flight from home to a temporary settlement. It is important to note that leaving one’s home, abandoning everything, and, in most cases, without notice and preparation, and experiencing traumatic events (stress, distress, anxiety, loss of loved ones, torture, etc.) has a physical and psychological impact on the lives of refugees.4 In examining the relationship between the religious identity of Syrian refugees in Jordan and experiences of and responses to displacement, Khatereh Eghdamian observes, for instance, that refugees experience a sense of estrangement and

2  Carneiro, Élida Mara, Satyaki Afonso Navinchandra, Lorene Vento, Rodolfo Pessato Timóteo, and Maria de Fátima Borges. “Religiousness/Spirituality, Resilience and Burnout in Employees of a Public Hospital in Brazil.” Journal of Religion and Health., 2019. See also; Gozdziak, Elzbieta M. “Spiritual Emergency Room: The Role of Spirituality and Religion in the Resettlement of Kosovar Albanians.” Journal of Refugee Studies 15, no. 2 (2002): 136–152.; Ní Raghallaigh, Muireann, and Robbie Gilligan. 2010. “Active Survival in the Lives of Unaccompanied Minors: Coping Strategies, Resilience, and the Relevance of Religion.” Child & Family Social Work 15, no. 2 (2010): 226–237.; Schwander, Lissa M. “The Role of Religion/Faith in the Lives of Young Adult Refugees in West Michigan.” Social Work & Christianity 45, no. 3 (2018): 113–129. 3  Ager, Alastair. “Annual Research Review: Resilience and Child well-being  – Public Policy Implications.” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 54, no. 4 (2013): 488–500. See also; Amatea, Ellen S., Sondra Smith-Adcock, and Elizabeth Villares. “From Family Deficit to Family Strength: Viewing Families’ Contributions to Children’s Learning from a Family Resilience Perspective.” Professional School Counseling, 2006/02/, 177–189.; Berkes, Fikret, and Helen Ross. “Community Resilience: Toward an Integrated Approach.” Society & Natural Resources 26, no. 1 (2013): 5–20.; Berson, Ilene R., and Jennifer Baggerly. “Building Resilience to Trauma: Creating a Safe and Supportive Early Childhood Classroom.” Childhood Education 85, no. 6 (2009): 375–379.; Boon, Helen J. “Risk or Resilience? What Makes a Difference?” The Australian Educational Researcher 35, no. 1 (2008): 81–102.; Brown, Joel H. “Systemic Reform Concerning Resilience in Education.” TechTrends 45, no. 4 (2001): 47–54.; Davidson, Rosemary. 2009. “More than ‘Just Coping’: The Antecedents and Dynamics of Resilience in a Qualitative Longitudinal Study.” Social Policy and Society 8, no. 1 (2009): 115–125.; Davis, Rachel, Danice Cook, and Larry Cohen. 2005. “A Community Resilience Approach to Reducing Ethnic and Racial Disparities in Health.” American Journal of Public Health 95, no. 12 (2005): 2168–2173.; McLellan, Janet. Cambodian Refugees in Ontario: Resettlement, Religion, and Identity. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009. 4  Gorst-Unsworth, Caroline, and Eva Goldenberg. 1998. “Psychological Sequelae of Torture and Organised Violence Suffered by Refugees from Iraq: Trauma-related Factors Compared with Social Factors in Exile.” British Journal of Psychiatry 172, no. 1 (1998): 90–94. See also; Schweitzer, Robert, Fritha Melville, Zachary Steel, and Philippe Lacherez. “Trauma, Postmigration Living Difficulties, and Social Support as Predictors of Psychological Adjustment in Resettled Sudanese Refugees.” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 40, no. 2 (2006): 179–187.

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isolation just by the fact of being displaced from their homes.5 I argue in this paper that religious beliefs of many refugees can help to explain their resilience when facing difficult and often life-threatening experiences. If the central question guiding this exploratory research is about how religion or religious beliefs contribute to the resilience of refugees, from this question emerges the following sub-questions: First, how do refugees explain their experiences as religious actors? Second, what role does their faith play in standing strong against adversities?

Conceptual Framework: Refugees, Religion, and Resilience The Complexity of Sub-Saharan Africa Refugeeism According to the 1951 text of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is defined as someone who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his[/ her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself[/herself] of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

This definition, adopted a few years after the Second World War, was limited in terms of its target population: primarily Europeans, fleeing events that happened prior to January 1, 1951. In many respect, the provisions and nature of this convention left African refugees out of its scope.6 For instance, this convention that relies on an individual’s motives hardly responds to the demand of the waves of Africans fleeing their homes. Other limitations include, on the one hand, the failure of refugees’ states of origin that continue to suffer from security issues and thus their failure to protect their citizens and to provide them with basic goods and services. On the other hand, refugees’ host countries are limited in terms of human and financial resources.7 However, a more comprehensive and inclusive definition of “refugee” was adopted on September 10, 1969—OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects

5  Eghdamian, Khatereh. “Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement: An Examination into the Discursive Representations of Syrian Refugees and Their Effects on Religious Minorities Living in Jordan.” Journal of Refugee Studies 30, no. 3 (2017): 447–467. 6  Betts, Alexander. Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Book, 2013. 7  Bariagaber, Assefaw. Conflict and the Refugee Experience: Flight, Exile, and Repatriation in the Horn of Africa, Contemporary Perspectives on Developing Societies. Aldershot, England: Routledge. Book, 2006. See also; Ibid, Betts, 2013.

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of Refugee Problems in Africa—and entered into force on June 20, 1974.8 In addition to the 1951 Convention, the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention definition of “refugee” includes the following: “person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.”

Since this second definition (from the OAU convention) covers additional components that fit into the parameters of this chapter, it shall, therefore, serve as my working definition. Contrary to migrants, refugees do not voluntarily initiate their flights, which involves, in most cases, life-threatening and material loss situations. In other words, refugees do not have any other choice but to leave their homes, in many cases unprepared and oftentimes endangering both their own lives and that of their loved ones including material loss. However, migrants have enough time to prepare and to choose a preferred destination. What I mean here is that refugees, contrary to migrants, are very limited (and in most cases do not have any) in terms of both flight options and the time allotted to make an informed decision. Yet, they are still rational actors in determining their destinations. Assefaw Bariagaber rightly points out that “the factors that push refugees are overwhelming and their departure from home and arrival at the destination are not orderly.”9 Although root causes of postcolonial refugee crises in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are complex and remain multidimensional, their common drivers, particularly in the Great Lakes region of Africa,10 are still associated with sociopolitical conflicts. Elsewhere, Sarah Kenyon Lischer identifies in her book Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid three types of refugees’ flights.11 First, situational refugees refer to individuals fleeing their home countries, primarily for unbearable lifestyles and destruction due to civil. Usually, these types of refugees do repatriate once the cause of their flight is resolved. The second category of the cause of refugees’ flight, persecuted refugees, encompasses those who flee for direct persecution/oppression on cultural, identities, or political grounds, and not necessary for general chaotic situations in their home countries. Until they are guaranteed that their lives will not be endangered, these refugees do not return. This chapter focuses particularly on this second group of refugees. Third,

8  Cf. https://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/45dc1a682/oau-convention-governing-specificaspects-refugee-problems-africa-adopted.html (last accessed, November 14 2019). 9  Ibid, Bariagaber, 2006. 10  Ibid. See also; Ibid, Betts, 2013; Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.; Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. 11  Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.

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refugees flee their homes for political and military reasons like defeat in a civil war and still have the intention to return to their home countries.12 Amidst these conflictual situations that trigger, among other things, refugee crises, religion plays an important role in the lives of refugees. The next section addresses the notion of religion in relation to refugees and their functional aspects.

Religion and Refugeeism Defining religion or explaining a religious experience is not an easy task mainly because of its subjective and evolutive nature. There is no such thing as a static and universal definition of religion. For instance, thinking from a global perspective, religion may have one meaning for an American and a different one for an African or an Asian. In other words, the complexity of defining religion (or even spirituality) lies primarily on its subjectivity: each person has her or his perception and understanding of what religion or spiritual experience is all about. Yet, it maintains its importance not only for the individual but even more for the community, especially in the African context. The importance of religion resides not only in the ubiquity of religious facts in African contexts,13 but as I argue in this study, it also rests on its influence in the lives of refugees throughout their (flight) experience. In fact, religion has generally been studied from a structural or institutional perspective while the individual perspective has often been ignored. Also, religion and spirituality in Africa have been perceived as cultural elements or, as Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar put it, “cultural artifacts.”14 That is, many have placed religion under the cultural category. I disagree with this all-encompassing view of religion in culture, mainly because of their conceptual dissociation. I, therefore, concur with those who choose not to include religion and/or spirituality under the same cultural umbrella.15 Frans Wijsen’s definition of religion suggests its separation from culture and the inclusion of an invisible world to which African religions can relate.16 Bolaji

 Ibid.  Ellis, Stephen, and Gerrie ter Haar. Worlds of Power: Religious Thought and Political Practice in Africa, Series in contemporary history and world affairs. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. See also; Idowu, E.  Bolaji. African Traditional Religion: A Definition. London: S.C.M.  Press, 1973.; Mbiti, John S. African Religions & Philosophy. 2nd ed. Oxford: Heinemann, 1990. 14  Ellis, Stephen, and Gerrie ter Haar. “Religion and Politics: Taking African Epistemologies Seriously.” Journal of Modern African Studies 45, no. 3 (2007): 385–401. 15  Wijsen, Frans Jozef Servaas. Seeds of Conflict in a Haven of Peace: from Religious Studies to Interreligious Studies in Africa, Studies in world Christianity and interreligious relations. New York, NY: Rodopi, 2007. See also; Ibid, Idowu, 1973. 16  Ibid, Wijsen, 2007. 12 13

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Idowu,17 for his part, strongly critiques the mingling approach to religion and culture, especially in the African context, noting that it has led to errors of identity. He explains: It would seem that what happened in the Western world, as it is now happening in Asia and Africa, was that one early religion, more or less aboriginal, formed the cohesive factor of, and gave the foundation complexion to, culture, while another culture was, or other cultures were, superimposed on this. In this way the fabric of life became a thing made up of strands of various hues and stresses each of which has gone inextricably into the wrap and weft of the complex whole.

Idowu further stresses that several errors of identity with reference to religion in Africa are the results of this confusion between religion and culture.18 In this chapter, I dissociate religion from culture and incorporate spirituality in it (religion). While one’s religious beliefs—which individuals generally associate with one or more religions—carry spiritual elements (e.g., prayer, faith, meditation, etc.), the opposite is not always true. That is, one does not necessarily associate spirituality with religion. For example, a Christian believing for God’s intervention in his affairs—using, for instance, biblical scriptures or prayers—may be framed within Christianity, whereas another person may be trusting and hoping for the same thing without necessarily meaning that s/he belongs to organized religion. Thus, my use of religion and spirituality as synonyms reflects this perspective. The common definition that is given to “religion” stems from the Latin word religio to which is associated either the Latin verb religare (to bind together, to put together, or to tie) or religere/relegere (to read over).19 One may imply that a believer is connected to the spiritual and transcendent realm in the quest for meaning and solutions with respect to issues of life like circumstances surrounding the refugee’s experience.20 Sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists, to name but a few, have proposed substantive and functional definitions of religion.21 While these two different categories that define “religion” include the same elements such as beliefs, practices, symbols, and experiences in their categorization, they differ when it comes to the focus of believers. On the one hand, a substantive perspective of religion focuses on what is perceived as sacred without necessarily specifying what it is. Contrary to the other perspective of religion (functional), dynamic, this view (substantive) is

 Idowu, E. Bolaji. African Traditional Religion: A Definition. London: S.C.M. Press, 1973.  Ibid. 19  Appleby, R.  Scott. The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict series. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000. See also; Filoramo, Giovanni. Qu’est-ce que la religion? thèmes, méthodes, problèmes. Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2007. 20  Mella, Orlando. Religion in the Life of Refugees and Immigrants. Sweden: CEIFO, 1994. 21  Berger, Peter L. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion, Doubleday Anchor book. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969. See also; Pargament, Kenneth I. The Psychology of Religion and Coping: Theory, Research, Practice. New York: Guilford Press, 1997.; Willaime, Jean-Paul. “La religion: un lien social articulé au don.” Revue du MAUSS 22 (2003): 248–269. 17 18

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perceived as more static. Kenneth Pargament, an American psychologist, observes that a substantive perspective describes what religion “is, not how it works.”22 On the other hand, a functional definition of religion is not only concerned about issues of life, but it also seeks to understand and offer meaning or explanations to situations surrounding one’s life and usually its negative aspects. As Pargament notes, functional religion is more concerned about “life’s most profound issues.”23 Even though an individual may relate his or her lived refugee experience from a substantive perspective, it can, however, have more meaning and significance through a functional viewpoint. For example, two functions that may be ascribed to religion include a cognitive function that influences one’s behavior and a function that shapes one’s identity. These two functions do not operate exclusively but, rather, they reinforce each other.

Resilience and Refugeeism Similar to coping theory, resilience theory examines the positive adaptation of refugees in the midst of negative situations, adversities, trauma, tragedies, threats, or any significant sources of stress. Bruce Smith, Alexis Ortiz, Wiggins, and others point out that resilience basically refers to bouncing back or recovering from stress.24 Etymologically speaking, one may separate resilience in two: (1) re- meaning “back” and (2) salire referring to jump or leap. Putting the two terms together could mean to “bounce or spring back.”25 Seeking to understand the link between religion and resilience, Smith, Ortiz, Wiggins, and others observe that religion and spirituality “may be important protective factors [i.e., conditions that buffer, interrupt, or prevent problems from occurring] or ‘resilience resources’ that may contribute to or promote a person’s resilience to adversity.”26 That is, religion and spirituality do not only fuel one’s resilience but erect at the same time mental edges of protection to stand against adversities. They conclude in this topic noting that “spirituality [and religion] may increase resilience by the influence on relationships, life values, personal meaning, and coping.”27 These conclusions of Smith and others concur with other studies of scholars and humanitarian practitioners I will examine in the next sections (particularly the case of discriminated Syrian religious minority refugees in Jordan).  Pargament, Kenneth I. The Psychology of Religion and Coping: Theory, Research, Practice. New York: Guilford Press, 1997. 23  Ibid. 24  Smith, Bruce W., Alexis J. Ortiz, Kathryn T. Wiggins, Jennifer F. Bernard, and Jeanne Dalen. “Spirituality, Resilience, and Positive Emotions.” In The Oxford Handbook of Psychology and Spirituality, edited by Lisa J. Miller. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 25  Ibid 26  Ibid. 27  Ibid. 22

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Generally, researches on resilience have focused on the adversity element, which is regarded either from a collective or an individual experience perspective.28 In either way, the influence of religion in the individual and collective construct of resilience is still present and relatively similar. However, mechanisms or processes of the construction of resilience may also differ from an individual to a group perspective. In their article Active Survival in the Lives of Unaccompanied Minors: Coping Strategies, Resilience, and the Relevance of Religion, Muireann Ní Raghallaigh and Robbie Gilligan29 examine the important role of religion in different strategies unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Ireland. In their qualitative study that consisted of interviewing 18 females and 14 males from 13 different countries (30 from Africa) and 2 religions (23 Christians and 9 Muslims), religion revealed to be an essential element in elaborating resilience strategies. Raghallaigh and Gilligan’s work demonstrated that those minors’ asylum seekers developed at least six religion-­ related strategies which include adaptations, adjusting to new environments, adopting positive outlooks, emotions’ management, etc. For instance, even though they left everything behind them, both their relationships with God and their religious practices remained constant and alleviated their sufferings in a new environment.30 In other words, both the substantive and functional aspects of religion we discussed earlier were in motion and served as a “bridge between the old and the new [world]” of these minors. For Khatereh Eghdamian31—whose work focused on Syrian religious minority refugees in urban centers across Jordan—religion played a double role in the settlement of Syrian refugees in Jordan. On the one hand, religion and religious identity served as dividing factors between Syrian refugees—who were either Christian or Druze—and Muslim Jordanian. On the other hand, religion did not only create a sense of solidarity and cohesiveness between refugees (Syrians and Iraqis) experiencing exclusion and isolation in their settlements. According to Eghdamian, this community of refugees who shared similar experiences reflected the notion of inclusive exclusion. That is, “a refugee community is at once included and excluded in a host community.”32 Despite these experiences, she observes that religion played a central role as far as resilience in hardship is concerned: “most of the Syrian

 Bottrell, Dorothy. “Understanding ‘Marginal’ Perspectives: Towards a Social Theory of Resilience.” Qualitative Social Work 8, no. 3 (2009): 321–339. See also; Carneiro, Élida Mara, Satyaki Afonso Navinchandra, Lorene Vento, Rodolfo Pessato Timóteo, and Maria de Fátima Borges. “Religiousness/Spirituality, Resilience and Burnout in Employees of a Public Hospital in Brazil.” Journal of Religion and Health., 2019. 29  Ní Raghallaigh, Muireann, and Robbie Gilligan. 2010. “Active Survival in the Lives of Unaccompanied Minors: Coping Strategies, Resilience, and the Relevance of Religion.” Child & Family Social Work 15, no. 2 (2010): 226–237. 30  Ibid. 31  Eghdamian, Khatereh. “Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement: An Examination into the Discursive Representations of Syrian Refugees and Their Effects on Religious Minorities Living in Jordan.” Journal of Refugee Studies 30, no. 3 (2017): 447–467. 32  Ibid. 28

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Christian refugees interviewed drew on religious concepts of love, compassion, and forgiveness when recalling their experiences of displacement.”33 Two of her interviewees, a Syrian Christian, first, and then a Syrian Druze, shared the following experiences expressing their resilience amidst hardship: Jesus teaches us that we should forgive those who wish us evil…even when it’s hard it hurts or it’s scary, we have to find ways to love one another. Otherwise, why are we here? We are all God’s children.

The other went on to say: [I]t’s hard but, because of this, really, we are not different to the other Syrians that are suffering or the Jordanians …but it can be hard. It can be hard to meet each other, to be friends. There’s a lot of mistrust we need to get over first.34

Some items (and values) the above interviewees have noted like “forgiveness,” “friendship,” and “perseverance” serve in the measurement of one’s resilience. Whether considered as substantive or functional, I argue that religion, as an independent variable, plays an important role in the construct of refugees’ resilience, as a dependent variable. Religion does not only help religious individuals and groups cope with hardship and adversities, but it enables them to transcend discriminations and isolation of populations in host countries as illustrated in the case of Syrian refugees. However, one question that may arise is the issue of measurement of refugees’ resilience.

Evaluation of Religiousness/Spirituality and Resilience Whether concerning religiousness, spirituality, or resilience, several tools have been conceived for their evaluation. For this paper, I will highlight two tools that evaluate individuals’ levels of religiousness or spirituality. First, Brief Multidimensional Measure of Religiousness/Spirituality (BMMRS) was used by Élida Carneiro and others in the case addressing resilience and burnout in employees of a public hospital in Brazil.35 The BMMRS is made up of 38 items and measures 11 dimensions which respondents have answered and are scaled. Some of these dimensions one measures include “daily spiritual experiences,” “values/beliefs,” “forgiveness,” “private religious practices,” etc.36 Second, a Resilience Scale (RS) helps assess the level of one’s resilience amidst difficult circumstances. Similar to the BMMRS, the RS uses a few topics related to individuals’ levels of resilience. It consists of assessing by scaling five different

 Ibid.  Ibid. 35  Carneiro, Élida Mara, Satyaki Afonso Navinchandra, Lorene Vento, Rodolfo Pessato Timóteo, and Maria de Fátima Borges. “Religiousness/Spirituality, Resilience and Burnout in Employees of a Public Hospital in Brazil.” Journal of Religion and Health., 2019. 36  Ibid. 33 34

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topics respondents answer which include “serenity,” “perseverance,” “self-confidence,” “the sense of life,” and “self-sufficiency.”37

Congolese Refugees and Resilience Violent conflicts of the last few decades in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have forced many Congolese to seek refugee status in neighboring countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya.38 Although western DRC provinces have also been affected by conflict and violence, eastern regions have paid the high toll of many years of armed conflicts. Whether in western or eastern provinces, Congolese displacements are both internal (i.e., within the country) and external (beyond Congolese borders). According to the 2018 UNHCR report, “Supplemental Appeal,” more than 4.49 million Congolese were displaced within the countries and 630,500 Congolese—of which 78% are women and children—were hosted in neighboring countries.39 The journey of these people towards a relatively safer haven is accompanied by serious humanitarian difficulties including trauma-related disorders, depressions, and life-threatening experiences.40 For many Congolese, and other nationalities also, leaving home has never been an option, and returning is probably the first choice. The initial phase of refugees’ journeys oftentimes leads to unknown places without any means for sustenance nor guarantee of return. They leave everything behind (e.g., personal belongings, properties, and sometimes family members including children). Their flights are not only unpredictable, but they are oftentimes recurring, i.e., they might go from one flight to another. They can happen amidst the night or during the day when, for instance, children or parents are absent from home. Many have lost contact with their relatives for several years with no idea of whether they are still alive or dead. Deprived of many things that matter most for them, religion or spirituality is what sustains most refugees for pursuing in life. Refugees employ different religious or spiritual mechanisms to go the extra mile of life. Refugees express their faith and trust to God through songs writing and prayer. They compose songs related to their experiences as a coping strategy considering their present situation as a transitory towards a better life. One main objective is to  Ibid.  Hecker, Tobias, Simon Fetz, Herbert Ainamani, and Thomas Elbert. “The Cycle of Violence: Associations Between Exposure to Violence, Trauma-Related Symptoms and Aggression— Findings from Congolese Refugees in Uganda.” Journal of Traumatic Stress 28, no. 5 (2015): 448–455. 39  Cf. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/partners/donors/5a8c27fb7/2018-congolese-situation-supplementary-appeal-january-december-2018.html?query=congolese (last accessed November 15, 2019). 40  Ibid, Hecker et al., 2015. 37 38

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deflect the attention from the present situation to an invisible expected reality through the instrumentality of God or a supernatural being.41 In other words, songs writing and prayer serve as a medium to fuel refugees’ resilience. For many Congolese refugees, surviving the refugee’s experience is nothing else but the manifestation of God’s miraculous intervention. Any good news is received as a building material for two main purposes. On the one hand, it does strengthen their resilience; and on the other hand, it is credited into the refugees’ spiritual account to be used in what I call the “next resilience fueling.” The refugees’ experience encompasses their flight experiences as well as their settlements. While life in refugee camps is extremely difficult, it is also perceived as a relatively better and safer place than their previous flight experiences where they are constantly exposed to insecurity. One of the difficulties encountered in refugees’ settlement is the acceptance of the contingency of time. For many, the perception of time requires some adjustments. Being some of the settlements like in Kenya or Burundi could mean being in a transitory place to receive their asylum papers and tickets towards Australia or Canada overnight. But the reality upon arrival in those camps is different. Many have spent decades in those camps; others have even built houses as they await their relocations to new places (usually western countries). Arrival in a refugee settlement camp can, therefore, be a depressing moment and at the same time an opportunity for resilience exercise. The latter is often the chosen option.

Discussion and Conclusions I analyzed in this study the causal relationship between religion or spirituality (independent variable) and refugees’ resilience (dependent variable). There is a clear relationship between these two variables. That is, the spirituality of Congolese refugees in such places as Kenya, Burundi and Uganda has influenced their resilience. The opposite cannot be attained, i.e., resilience did not produce or increase one’s religiousness/spirituality. There are similarities between disciplines (e.g., medical psychology) and fields (e.g., Kosovo, Brazil, and Jordan). This study raises not only theoretical and practical implications, but it also suggests policy recommendations. It has shown the importance of religion and spirituality in the lives of refugees in constructing their resilience amidst adversity, trauma, and life-threatening experience. Religion and religious issues are important to refugees, equally complex to international organizations like UNHCR in regard to

 Ai, Amy L., Christopher Peterson, and Bu Huang. “The Effect of Religious-Spiritual Coping on Positive Attitudes of Adult Muslim Refugees from Kosovo and Bosnia.” The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 13, no. 1 (2003): 29–47. See also; Wai-Yee, Chung Joanne, Wong Bonny Yee-Man, Chen Jing-Han, and Chung Margaret Wai Ling. “Effects of Praise Dance on the Quality of Life of Chinese Women.” The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine 22, no.12 (2016): 1013–1019.

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collecting data designed to address issues on the ground.42 Instead, scholars, practitioners, and international organizations have often ignored this important aspect of the life of a refugee. Many humanitarian organizations and workers do not take into importance religious factors of refugees and often despise them in part because they consider them as “non-essential feature.”43 It is therefore important to consider further resilience mechanisms (including religious aspects) instead of focusing on physical, temporal, and short-term goals’ initiative (which have their appropriate place as well).

References Ager, Alastair. 2013. Annual Research Review: Resilience and Child well-being – Public Policy Implications. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 54 (4): 488–500. Ai, Amy L., Christopher Peterson, and Bu Huang. 2003. The Effect of Religious-Spiritual Coping on Positive Attitudes of Adult Muslim Refugees From Kosovo and Bosnia. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 13 (1): 29–47. Amatea, Ellen S., Sondra Smith-Adcock, and Elizabeth Villares. 2006. From Family Deficit to Family Strength: Viewing Families’ Contributions to Children’s Learning from a Family Resilience Perspective. Professional School Counseling 02: 177–189. Anthony, Constance G. 1991. Africa’s Refugee Crisis: State Building in Historical Perspective. International Migration Review 25 (3): 574–591. Appleby, R.Scott. 2000. The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict series. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Bariagaber, Assefaw. 1995. Linking Political Violence and Refugee Situations in the Horn of Africa: An Empirical Approach. International Migration 33 (2): 209–234. ———. 2006. Conflict and the Refugee Experience: Flight, Exile, and Repatriation in the Horn of Africa, Contemporary Perspectives on Developing Societies. Aldershot: Routledge. Berger, Peter L. 1969. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. In Doubleday Anchor book. Garden City: Doubleday. Berkes, Fikret, and Helen Ross. 2013. Community Resilience: Toward an Integrated Approach. Society & Natural Resources 26 (1): 5–20. Berson, Ilene R., and Jennifer Baggerly. 2009. Building Resilience to Trauma: Creating a Safe and Supportive Early Childhood Classroom. Childhood Education 85 (6): 375–379. Betts, Alexander. 2013. Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Boon, Helen J. 2008. Risk or Resilience? What Makes a Difference? The Australian Educational Researcher 35 (1): 81–102. Bottrell, Dorothy. 2009. Understanding ‘Marginal’ Perspectives: Towards a Social Theory of Resilience. Qualitative Social Work 8 (3): 321–339. Brown, Joel H. 2001. Systemic Reform Concerning Resilience in Education. TechTrends 45 (4): 47–54.

42 43

 Ibid, Eghdamian, 2017.  Ibid.

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Carneiro, Élida Mara, Satyaki Afonso Navinchandra, Lorene Vento, Rodolfo Pessato Timóteo, and Maria de Fátima Borges. 2019. Religiousness/Spirituality, Resilience and Burnout in Employees of a Public Hospital in Brazil. Journal of Religion and Health 58 (2): 677–685. Van Damme, Wim. 1999. How Liberian and Sierra Leonean Refugees Settled in the Forest Region of Guinea (1990–96). Journal of Refugee Studies 12 (1): 36–53. Davidson, Rosemary. 2009. More than ‘Just Coping’: The Antecedents and Dynamics of Resilience in a Qualitative Longitudinal Study. Social Policy and Society 8, no. 1 (2009): 115–125. Davis, Rachel, Danice Cook, and Larry Cohen. 2005. A Community Resilience Approach to Reducing Ethnic and Racial Disparities in Health. American Journal of Public Health 95, no. 12 (2005): 2168–2173. Eghdamian, Khatereh. 2017. Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement: An Examination into the Discursive Representations of Syrian Refugees and Their Effects on Religious Minorities Living in Jordan. Journal of Refugee Studies 30 (3): 447–467. Ellis, Stephen, and Gerrie ter Haar. 2004. Worlds of Power: Religious Thought and Political Practice in Africa, Series in contemporary history and world affairs. New  York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2007. Religion and Politics: Taking African Epistemologies Seriously. Journal of Modern African Studies 45 (3): 385–401. Filoramo, Giovanni. 2007. Qu’est-ce que la religion?: thèmes, méthodes, problèmes. Paris: Éditions du Cerf. Gorst-Unsworth, Caroline, and Eva Goldenberg. 1998. Psychological Sequelae of Torture and Organised Violence Suffered by Refugees from Iraq: Trauma-related Factors Compared with Social Factors in Exile. British Journal of Psychiatry 172, no. 1 (1998): 90–94. Gozdziak, Elzbieta M. 2002. Spiritual Emergency Room: The Role of Spirituality and Religion in the Resettlement of Kosovar Albanians. Journal of Refugee Studies 15 (2): 136–152. Hansen, Art. 1981. Refugee Dynamics: Angolans in Zambia 1966 to 1972. The International Migration Review 15 (1/2): 175–194. Hecker, Tobias, Simon Fetz, Herbert Ainamani, and Thomas Elbert. 2015. The Cycle of Violence: Associations Between Exposure to Violence, Trauma-Related Symptoms and Aggression— Findings from Congolese Refugees in Uganda. Journal of Traumatic Stress 28 (5): 448–455. Idowu, E.Bolaji. 1973. African Traditional Religion: A Definition. London: S.C.M. Press. Kreibaum, Merle. 2016. Their Suffering, Our Burden? How Congolese Refugees Affect the Ugandan Population. World Development 78 (2016): 262–287. Lemarchand, René. 2009. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. 2005. Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Mbiti, John S. 1990. African Religions & Philosophy. 2nd ed. Oxford: Heinemann. McLellan, Janet. 2009. Cambodian Refugees in Ontario: Resettlement, Religion, and Identity. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Mella, Orlando. 1994. Religion in the Life of Refugees and Immigrants. Sweden: CEIFO. Ní Raghallaigh, Muireann, and Robbie Gilligan. 2010. Active Survival in the Lives of Unaccompanied Minors: Coping Strategies, Resilience, and the Relevance of Religion. Child & Family Social Work 15 (2): 226–237. Omata, Naohiko. 2013. Repatriation and Integration of Liberian Refugees from Ghana: the Importance of Personal Networks in the Country of Origin. Journal of Refugee Studies 26 (2): 265–282. Pargament, Kenneth I. 1997. The Psychology of Religion and Coping: Theory, Research, Practice. New York: Guilford Press. Rogge, John R. 1981. Africa’s Resettlement Strategies. International Migration Review 15 (1–2): 195–212. Schwander, Lissa M. 2018. The Role of Religion/Faith in the Lives of Young Adult Refugees in West Michigan. Social Work & Christianity 45 (3): 113–129.

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Schweitzer, Robert, Fritha Melville, Zachary Steel, and Philippe Lacherez. 2006. Trauma, Post-­ migration Living Difficulties, and Social Support as Predictors of Psychological Adjustment in Resettled Sudanese Refugees. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 40 (2): 179–187. Smith, Bruce W., Alexis J. Ortiz, Kathryn T. Wiggins, Jennifer F. Bernard, and Jeanne Dalen. 2012. Spirituality, Resilience, and Positive Emotions. In The Oxford Handbook of Psychology and Spirituality, ed. Lisa J. Miller. New York: Oxford University Press. Wai-Yee, Chung Joanne, Wong Bonny Yee-Man, Chen Jing-Han, and Chung Margaret Wai Ling. 2016. Effects of Praise Dance on the Quality of Life of Chinese Women. The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine 22 (12): 1013–1019. Wijsen, Frans Jozef Servaas. 2007. Seeds of Conflict in a Haven of Peace: from Religious Studies to Interreligious Studies in Africa, Studies in World Christianity and Interreligious Relations. New York: Rodopi. Willaime, Jean-Paul. 2003. La religion: un lien social articulé au don. Revue du MAUSS 22: 248–269.

Chapter 6

North African States as Agents of Europe’s Border Securitization: Tragic Ordeals of Young Refugee and Asylum Seekers from Africa Michael O. Nwalutu and Felicia I. Nwalutu

It is sad that while the Transatlantic slave trade saw Africans chained and forcefully taken to foreign lands, the harsh economic realities at home today (and we would add, political insecurities and mismanagement of resources), force our people to embark on suicidal journeys into Europe and other parts of the world. This is very scandalous. We must initiate urgent and concerted efforts to end the suicidal voyages.1

Introduction Young migrants from sub-Saharan Africa have continued to face criminalization, restrictions, and torture in the hands of North African border agents who are serving the Fortress Europe’s (mainland Europe’s) bid to keep the “unwanted immigrants” at bay. Many of the migrants face death or deportation2 and in receiving societies of Europe they frequently encounter severe racism and repression.3 The Western stakeholders put up a simplistic front to absolve themselves of culpabilities, and invoke

1  Ekweremadu, I.  ECOWAS parliament decries deaths in the Mediterranean. ECOWAS Summit Press Release; National Assembly Complex, Abuja Nigeria, 2015. 2  Baxter, J. Dust from our eyes: An unblinkered look at Africa. Hamilton, Canada: Wolsak and Wynn Publishers, 2008. 3  Wong, S. Migration through the eyes of young people panel on the occasion of international migrants’ day. New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), United Nations Headquarters, 2009.

M. O. Nwalutu (*) The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada e-mail: [email protected] F. I. Nwalutu Faculty of Social Work, Factor Inwentash, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. O. Abidde (ed.), The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56650-0_6

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the push and pull narrative, which blames the immigrants and their states of origin for the migrants’ woeful experiences. This they do by insisting that the surge in global mobility of individuals4 also implies that border gatekeeping induced by fear of demographic inundation5 is compelling industrialized world to restrict their borders against “illegal” or unwanted immigrants. It implies that while extending their border surveillance strategies and apparatuses to the shores of North Africa (imagined territories), the industrialized West unilaterally constructs binary labels by polarizing the migrant Other accordingly. Nevertheless, the undaunted youth migrants from the developing world and, in this context, irregular migrants from subSaharan Africa (headed to Europe) are compelled to engage more perilous modes of movement and pliable transit routes to their destinations. In the chapter, we also view migrant youth’s drive to emigrate through the lenses of African Indigenous worldviews while grounding our analysis on anti-racist theory to trouble existing border restriction practices that have continued to generate migrant youth’s tragedies in the passages to Europe. The caption quotation below from the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS chair,6 albeit overlooked the impact of the transSaharan slave trade, yet begs for salient questions that will guide the thrust of this work: Why would the sub-Saharan Africans always be on the receiving end of other nation’s misjudgments and violation of (if we might be a little anachronistic) International Charter of Rights and Freedom? How might the efforts of African regional governments be coordinated to evolve youth-sensitive and migrant-friendly interventions to eradicate the tragedies associated with irregular youth migration?

Authors’ Positioning in the Work We initially struggled with certain questions surrounding the news of the tragic death of young Nigerians attempting to reach Europe by land. Such multiple and often rhetoric questions as why were these young adults with promising future be convinced to take the trip? What were their aspirations? What informed their decisions to emigrate and the ordeals that ended their lives so abruptly were the questions raging on our minds. We were however nudged into rethinking our positioning as African couple gifted with Western education later on the 31st of March 2005, during our trip to secure permanent residence in one of North America’s nations of repute. Our flight made a stopover in the Netherlands, and surprisingly, during check-in routines, we, as young African migrant couple, were separated from the queue and taken into an office with complex surveillance technologies for special

4  Appadurai, A. Modernity at large: Cultural dimension of globalization. New York, University of Minnesota Press, 1996. 5  Berriane, M. and de Haas. “Migratory flows and migrants’ profiles: Moroccan emigration towards Spain”. In Berriane M. and de Haas H. (Eds.). African migrations research: Innovative methods and methodologies. New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2012. 6  Ibid, Ekweremadu, 2015

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checks on our travel documents. Apologies were made to us later and we were hurried into the plane. This experience came despite clear indications on our travel documents that we had permanent residence visa. Understandably so because after the 9/11 terrorists’ attacks in the United States, Western transnational borders transformed to politicized spaces for migrants’ securitization, negotiation, and ­resistance. These gatekeeping and supra-surveillance processes are grounded on biases constructed around migrants’ nationality, ethnicity, race, religion, and cultural affiliations.7 This chapter is made timely therefore by the attention of the international community, which in recent times is drawn to a pervasive and pernicious social trend we have been grappling with for some time. Youth besides women, children, and men are ferrying across North African coasts to the borders of Europe in large numbers, fed by the internal displacement of peoples in the Middle East, Asia, and particularly the ongoing war in Syria. Before now, the largest number of casualties of Africa-Europe migration were young men, women, children, and a few adults, all of whom were of African descent. These were mostly dark-skinned Africans whose lifeless bodies continued to wash up on the European coast with none batting an eyelid. The lucky ones who overcome the lethal rages of the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea have their dreams of ever reaching the Fortress Europe foiled through quasi-humanitarian efforts of EU border authorities who would round them up in a decoy of a rescue mission. They are detained and later fingerprinted and released without documents. The questions that emerge are: What changed? Why is the West suddenly waking up to the challenges and plights of migrants on the Mediterranean Sea? Why the sudden opinion and policy shift from restriction and detention to reception and accommodation and from burying the remains of vagrant subjects (boat people, illegal, clandestine, Iswed—the Maltese term for a Black person often used derogatorily) to deliberation on opening the border to refugees?

Review of Literature Transnational border mobility, surveillance, and state control of territorial borders are as old as the creation of nation-states in the Mercantilist period, specifically during the 1648 Westphalia treaty marking the end of the Thirty-Year War. Surveillance and control of transnational mobility have also been major concerns of the international community before, during, and after the two World Wars, 1914–1918 and 1939–1945.8 While the earlier passports and other documents were used to protect foreign travelers in England, the Magna Carta of June 1215 granted merchants “unhindered travel in accordance with ancient and lawful customs” but

7  Nyers No one is illegal between city and nation. Studies in Social Justice 4, no. 2 (2010): 127–143. 8  Moses, J. W. International Migration: Globalization’s Last Frontier. London: Zed Books, 2006.

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the state (sovereign) “retained the right to expel or exclude specific groups of aliens,”9 an experience similar to what currently happens at all transnational borders. We will draw from Browne’s10 submissions on border surveillance and gatekeeping. Browne11 visualizes border-surveillance identity documents as currently the key technology in the state management of human mobility—the production procedures of which, if critically analyzed, shed light on the processes of state and nation formation. This contribution foregrounds our postulation that most industrialized nations and multinational NGOs are not interested in addressing the root cause(s) of the surge in transnational migration but in migration management. It also foregrounds the procedures in the production and issuance of transnational border personal identifiers such as the Canadian Permanent Resident Card (PRC) as a border gatekeeping mechanism and by so doing reveals how documentation and other procedures in the introduction of the PRC construct people through the logic of binary opposites into differentiated and identifiable state subjects.

 orders as Imagined Territories, the Politics of Border B Crossing: A Case for Migrants at the Margin The battle of border control is presently going far beyond the ambits of the nation-­ state to imagined territories. Against this backdrop, Bigo12 examines the link between the prevailing border securitization, penalization, and incarceration concerning Western countries and the new form of border surveillance. Under the new border control system, industrialized nations exert a pushback at unwanted immigrants through border expansion. In other words, they police their contiguous borders beyond limits recognized by international treaties to be the exclusive economic zones. Policing from a distance implies adopting a delocalized border strategy for a new social and imagined territory within and outside the territorial boundaries of the nation-state,13 which raises a critical question in the contribution that asks: “Who is entitled to move?”14 Hence globalization as a sociopolitical concept becomes a tactic conceived by the industrialized world to position economy-driven mobility

 Kapur, R.  Erotic justice: Law and the new politics of post colonialism. London: Glass House Press, 2005. See also. Ibid, Moses, 2006. 10  Browne, S.A. Trusted travelers: The identity-industrial complex, race and Canada’s permanent resident card. Doctor of philosophy thesis, Department of Sociology And Equity Studies in Education, OISE, University of Toronto, 2007. 11  Ibid. 12  Bigo, D. “The legal framework: Who is entitled to move?” In Bigo, D., and Guild, E.(Eds.). Controlling frontiers: Free movement into and within Europe. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005. 13  Guild, E. Criminalization of migration in Europe: Human rights implications. Council of Europe. Paris, France: Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009. 14  Ibid. 9

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above the authority of the nation-state in which multinational corporations secure passage across the barriers of transnational borders using their economic powers. Guild recognizes that “The right to move for economic gain, however, whether in the form of goods, capital, service or persons, in a globalizing world is increasingly limited to those who are already economically advantaged,”15 and, we would add, to those deemed acceptable to the host nations. For instance, in Araujo,16 the realization of another group of subordinate “Other” in more recent developments, as opposed to the usual African migrants, poses a serious problem of conscience and re-evaluation of action to the immigration policymakers in Portugal. Until now, immigrants probably were the “illegal Africans,” so dubbed by the nation-state’s coloniality of power,17 and tropes of racism. But now, Brazilians and Ukrainians are part of the burgeoning migrant labor border-crashers in Portugal. The notion of cultural diversity in a supposedly homogeneous Portugal thus becomes a concern for the critics of Portugal’s immigration policy. We argue therefore that accepting the narratives of globalization as a precursor for racism in immigration discourses in Portugal as elsewhere subsumes neocolonial projects into the dynamics of push and pull rationality, which obscures the role of the extant colonial projects that globalization represents. In the contemporary constitution of race and debates on immigration in Portugal, as in other European countries, current influences and the perpetuation of subjugation through colonial legacies are always occluded.18 We argue that Araujo’s19 use of the term postcolonial is both illogical and unrealistic because it is an assumption or outright denial of the presence of colonization in the current global sociopolitical processes. Neocolonial subjugation is not just the persisting epistemic salience (lived experiences) of countries of the developing South but a continuously breeding and mutating sociopolitical virus. Therefore, the contemporary narrative on immigration and diversity in Portugal as in many Western states humanizes colonization through the logic of history and Indigenous connections. This denial of colonization and efforts to establish a false link to intercultural relations in the state appear to be providing excuses for the immigrant-receiving states to wittingly evade the racism concerns engendered by the presence of the migrant Other in their societies. It is important to also stress that Guild’s, Toasije’s, and Araujo’s20 works were

 Ibid.  Araujo, M. “Challenging mainstream narratives on diversity and immigration in Portugal: Accounting for the history of colonialism and racism”. In Kretsedemas, P., Capetillo-Ponce, J. and Jacobs, G. (Eds.). Migrant marginality: A transnational perspective. New York; Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014. 17  Quijano, A. “Coloniality of power, eurocentrism, and Latin America”. Nepantla: Views from the South 1, no. 3 (2000): 1–48 18  Toasije, A. “The Africanity of Spain: Identity and problematization”. Journal of Black Studies 39, no. 3 (2009): 348–355. Retrieved August, 2014 from: http://jbs.sagepub.com/content/39/3/348. full.pdf+html. 19  Ibid, Araujo, 2014. 20  Ibid, Guild, 2005. See also, Ibid, Toasije, 2009; Ibid, Araujo, 2014. 15 16

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not so much concerned with the demographic constitution of the African migrant population highlighted in their treaties as on the oppressive politicking and policies of the current EU leadership directed toward possible elimination of the migrants’ encroachment on the European mainland. However, if Phillips’21 notion of mixed migration is brought into the dialogue, carefully assessing the various categories of migrants in boats arriving at EU shores will ensure that the violation of migrants’ rights provided for in international charters does not occur. Such steps, for instance, will safeguard the rights of vulnerable migrants such as children, youth, women, and people with disabilities. Careful assessment of immigrants will prevent retraumatizing the already endangered immigrants by repatriating genuine asylum and refugee-status seeking migrants to their countries of origin where their lives would be in jeopardy.

“ Europe by Land” Made (Im)possible: Understanding Transnational Migration in Africa Although the need for appropriate methodological research into transnational migration of Africans bears more relevance today than at any other time in the continent’s checkered history, quantitative data and reports from such international organizations and NGOs as the United Nations, International Organization for Migration, and African Union (AU) would not be misconstrued or whisked away as part of media frenzy. It is crucial to note that while inter-regional migration in Africa accounts for a high percentage of the total transnational migration, the ever-rising cases of migration of African young adults to the developed world must be highlighted and given its deserved priority in research efforts because of its insidious socioeconomic and developmental implications. Only within the context of such studies would the understanding of the phenomenon be elucidated: its nature, flow, volume, and category of migrants. Closely related to Berriane and de Haas’s22 study is Brachet23 which investigates youth movement toward North Africa and Europe on the trans-Saharan route through the Niger Republic. Brachet’s work challenges existing approaches employed by studies on transnational migration that is compartmentalized into the study of departure or origin and destination or arrival. The work emphasizes the urgent need for African migration researchers to follow their subjects from origin through transitions to the destinations. The essence is to buttress the importance of journey (transition) in the process of human migration. It implies that instead of being a passage with a virtual lack of  Phillips, M.  Guest Post: The effect of negative labelling  – Why are we still talking about ‘migrants’? Migrants at Sea, 2014. Retrieved October, 2014 from: 22  Ibid, Berriane and de Haas, 2012. 23  Brachet, J. “From one stage to the next: Transit and transport in (trans) Saharan Migrations”. In Berriane M. and de Haas H. (Eds.). African migrations research: Innovative methods and methodologies. New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2012. 21

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interruption, transit in migration must also be seen as an unfathomable time and space determined solely by the migrant’s thought process and epistemic saliencies (lived experiences). His work is invaluable to this chapter that examines the dilemma of African migrant youth whose aspiration of arriving in mainland Europe is often cut short by the EU border securitization measures. Gebre and Ohta24 analyze the causal factors of population displacement in Africa with the view of identifying the various risk groups. The work examines the risks involved in the displacement of migrants from the natural and sociocultural habitat and explores the confluences and divergences of the various displacement experiences to proffer countermeasures and policy imperatives. Gebre and Ohta’s work is crucial to this contribution not so much of its focus on Africa and the demographic constituents of its displaced populations, but its replacement of the term migration with displacement to capture the integrative nature of the process. Displacement encompasses all forms of disruptions resulting from forced deracination (removal from physical natural), economic, sociocultural, and psychological environment. Gebre and Ohta’s work advances a thesis that retheorizes migration and by so doing introduces a new paradigm for understanding African migrants’ experiences. The work enthuses a trajectory from which to view migration as an aspect of a broader concept of displacement. Displacement in itself does not necessarily have to involve physical mobility of person(s) but incorporates the experiences of the host communities for new settlers and other groups of people in camps or protected areas. With no intention to romanticize African population issues, we would argue that Gebre and Ohta’s work approaches African population displacement issues from the colonizers’ lenses and neoliberal capitalist worldviews on the continent. Similar to Gebrewold,25 and like many pro-West writers, the African continent is once more portrayed as ridden with chaos and disarray needing the Whiteman messiah. Displacement by human-made and natural disasters is happening all over the world; and of course, as Klein26 declares in The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, the colonizing capitalist world is taking the upper hand in these. It remains unsettling to us though if Gebre and Ohta’s27 work is a cry to the West, which has its own house to put in order, to come over to politically recolonize Africa. The economic life-wire of Africa’s fledgling independent states is yet enmeshed in the West’s stranglehold and chaos called structural adjustment and globalization, yet this piece of representation seemed to be sending similar SOS as is contained in Gebrewold’s28 work—for the all-merciful, traditionally humane and  Gebre, Y. D., & Ohta, I. “Introduction: Displacement in Africa – conceptual and practical concerns”. In I. Ohta & Y. D. Gebre (Eds.), Displacement risks in Africa: Refugees, resettlers and their host population. Japan; Australia: Kyoto University Press, Trans Pacific Press, 2005. 25  Gebrewold, B. “Introduction: Migration as a transcontinental challenge”. In Gebrewold, B. (Ed.) Africa and Fortress Europe: Threats and opportunities. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007. 26  Klein, N. The shock doctrine: The rise of disaster capitalism. Vintage Canada Edition, 2007. 27  Ibid, Gebre and Ohta, 2005. 28  Ibid, Gebreworld, 2007. 24

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kind Europe—to open the door to promiscuous Africa’s promised land. Gebre and Ohta29 even go further to predict future displacements from natural and man-made disasters in the continent but fail to see how the politico-economic interests of the West and other colonizers have constituted African states and other developing economies into hot seats of sociopolitical displacement factors,30 such as war, environmental degradation, and political upheavals.

 estrictions at Europe Borders and the Sordid Experiences R of Migrants from the South As we stressed earlier, the efforts on border securitization among industrialized nations are going far beyond the spheres of the nation-state to imagined territories. Goldin, Cameron, and Balarajan (2011)31 in a paradoxically non-polarized world study featured a power-balanced model through which to advance their argument of two factors compelling receiving states to securitize and control their territorial borders. The work argues that concerns about globalization and terror are the major developments compelling the immigrant-receiving economies to restrict their borders. The atmosphere prevalent in the world constructed in the work of Goldin, Cameron, and Balarajan is inconsistent with the reality of a polarized world in which the industrialized North, that is, the colonizer detect who migrates, and to where? The South, as is apparent in the narrative, is constructed not as part of the competitors in the global political and socioeconomic theatre (except as a supplier of terrorism) but as an involuntary supplier of undesired talents and raw materials— a justification therefore for the North to securitize its borders against the unwanted vagabond. The questions our paper continues to advance in this neocolonial and neoliberal rhetoric that symbolized a regurgitation of justification for colonization are: Have the Southern states equal opportunities to gatekeeping and border surveillance as those in industrialized North? How might we begin to understand the invasion of Southern border spaces by Northern states and alliances during military involvements? Only a deviation from the paradigm insinuated in Goldin, Cameron, and Balarajan’s work would clearly point to the lopsided power imbalance in the North-South border control and surveillance systems. Highlighting the urgent need for an extended intellectual and political debate on “world without borders,”

 Ibid, Gebre and Ohta, 2005.  Simms, A. Ecological debt: Global warming & the wealth of nations. New York: Pluto Press, 2009. 31  Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped Our World and Will Define Our Future 29 30

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Anderson, Sharma, and Wright’s32 work, which is consistent with Jonathan Moses’33 argument for a world without border, insists that …the simultaneous process of granting more freedom to capital and less to migrants is far from a contradiction and is in fact a crucial underpinning of global capitalism and the equally global system of national states. The growing restriction on the freedom of people to move has not led to fewer people crossing nationalized borders. Exactly the opposite: today more people are doing exactly this than ever before.34

Similarly, Nyers35 studies the active sociopolitical engagements of groups of non-­ status migrants and refugees to uncover how their operations challenge the government’s established models on citizenship and membership of the social community. In a view divergent to the popular representations of refugees and non-status migrants as passive players in the border politicking, Nyers’ work referred to irregular migrants’ activism in Australia, Canada, and Egypt, and it reasons that “migrants with precarious status are emerging as key protagonists in global struggles concerning freedom of movement, social recognition, worker protections, and the right of asylum.”36 In agreement with Nyers’ thesis, we would insist that to strike a balance at transnational border accessibility, governments of the industrialized West should allow entry to conventional refugees, “conventional refugee and persons in need of protection are people who are unable, or because of their fear, unwilling to be protected by their country of origin.”37 This definition, nevertheless, implies a power relation in which the immigrant is neither hapless nor helpless as depicted in Browne38 cited earlier.

 esistance to Subjectification and the Price African Youth R Migrants Pay This chapter takes a peek at the subjects of transnational border crossing through Foucauldian lenses in which subjects are rather seen as desirous of freedom; this means that the subject submits to subjecthood or becomes “a good disciplinary subject.”39 Yet as power imbalance always produces resistance, the surveillance, dis-

 Anderson, B., Sharma, N. and Wright, C. “Why no borders?” Refuge 26 no. 2 (2009): 5. Retrieved October, 2014 from: https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/People/staff_publications/ Anderson/Refuge26-2-Why-No-Borders.pdf 33  Ibid, Moses, 2006. 34  Ibid, Anderson, Sharma, and Wright, 2009. 35  Nyers No one is illegal between city and nation. Studies in Social Justice 4, no. 2 (2010): 127–143. 36  Ibid. 37  Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Interpreters Training Manual 2010, p. 7. 38  Ibid, Browne, 2007. 39  Davies, B. “Subjectification: The Relevance of Butler’s Analysis for Education.” British Journal of Sociology of Education 27, no. 4 (2006): 425–438. 32

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ciplinary, and border control technologies must be and have been resisted by those dubbed illegitimate non-trusted travelers too, for in a Foucauldian perspective, even the disciplinary subject is capable of resistance. In the context of the experiences of African migrant youth at the borders of Europe resistance comes yet at a price. Finding the alternative mode of reaching mainland Europe by attempting to circumvent the restrictive activities of border authorities implies defying death in the hazardous and precarious routes the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea represent. In one of her papers, a prolific Maltese scholar, Pisani,40 who also is a founder of an NGO working to influence policies for integrating youth migrants, with particular interest in sub-Saharan Africans insists that “For some, the Mediterranean Sea has become synonymous with death. Since 1998 as many as 13,500 people, the vast majority asylum seekers, have died in an effort to cross the Mediterranean, including at least 1,500 in 2011, the deadliest on record.”41 In the ongoing discourses on transnational border crossing, we argue that despite the surge in global youth migration, attention to the victims of contemporary migration and border restriction policies is parochially focused largely on females and children, understandably so. But overlooking the various subcategories of individuals constituting the migrant population invisibilizes the excluded bodies and minimizes the rationality of modifying existing policies to improve their migration experiences. In addition, a little or nothing is yet done to contextualize the transnational border crossing experiences of migrants who are also living with one disability or the other; by this, we do not mean persons who sustained disabling injuries in their migration process, but those living with disabilities in their countries of origin who also felt the drive to migrate to oversea countries for a temporary or permanent stay. Until conversations on migration are broadened enough to encompass various categories of migrants, and the interlocking chains and processes of events that generate their lived experiences, full knowledge of the global migrant subjects would remain mere conjectures. This perspective of reasoning emanates from the understanding that terminologies and categories matter so much in the perception, considerations, and interventions migrants receive at the border and within the host society, as spelled out in the international maritime and refugee laws, respectively, Melissa Phillips argues: Assuming that all people have the same reason for leaving their homes and getting onto boats, that all people rescued at sea are migrants and that there is a one size fits all policy response misrecognizes the heterogeneity of this group. Such heterogeneity includes country of origin, gender, age, (race and ability, addition, mine) and family make up including pre-existing links to Europe.42

 Pisani, M. Lifelong learning and inclusion: the ‘citizenship assumption’ and the exclusion of 8 million bodies. Malta: Paper presented at the 44th EUCEN November Conference “BorderCrossing as a Viable Choice: Collaboration, Dialogue and Access to Higher Education” www, 2012. 41  Ibid. 42  Ibid, Phillips, 2014 40

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Many youth migrants are situated in the intersections and often at the margins of these categories outlined by Phillips. Also clarifying between categories enables scholars to aspire for a nuanced narrative of individual migrants as more authentic account and epistemic saliency (lived experience) of the migrant subjects in question. This is in opposition to the hyped-up narratives of the media that often generate unbalanced and therefore unfair public opinion (and of course policies) that negatively affect migrant individuals in their host environments. A clear understanding of the demographic constituents of the migrant population involved in Africa-­ Europe migration and critical information about their cross-border ordeals will expose how all categories of subjects are labeled together and subsumed under one title: “Boat people”43 at the receiving societies, which also permits of no distinction in terms of how vulnerable individuals such as minors (children), women, and migrants with disabilities are subjected to policy restrictions at the border.

Method of Data Collection and Analysis This chapter incorporates analyses of a segment of 2013 research that focused on the lived experiences of Nigerian youth migrants to Europe. The data, which was collected in a qualitative field interview in the Republic of Malta, was analyzed using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). Application of interpretative phenomenological analysis in the original research provided the basis for the work to explore in great depth how the research participants (Nigerian youth migrants in Europe) made sense of their transnational migration experiences. Understanding the epistemic realities of African youth migrants to Europe was the central goal of that study, and the merit of IPA as an analytical tool is the light it casts on the broader context. It might justifiably be argued that in IPA, breadth is literarily sacrificed for depth.44 The main currency for IPA study according to Smith and Osborn is to explore “the meanings particular experiences, events, or states hold for participants.”45 The rationale for adopting interpretative phenomenological analysis in this chapter, therefore, is that IPA elicits the meanings individuals involved attribute to events and experiences of life as it occurs in the narratives with respect to the concept of analysis, which in this case is the unrelenting flow of African youth migrants into Europe and the roles of African states in the construction of the EU migrants’ death

 Ibid, Pisani, 2012. See also; Sunderland, J. “Hidden emergency: Migrants death in the Mediterranean”. Human rights in Europe. New  York, Human Rights Watch, 2012. Retrieved October, 2014 from: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2012_EU_ Hidden%20Emergency.pdf; Ibid, Phillips, 2014 and Frenzen, N.  Shifting responsibilities, EU FRONTEX and Migrant Rights Violation. Migrants at Sea, 2014. Retrieved October, 2014 from: http://migrantsatsea.org/2014/03/24/interview-with-frontex-director-laitinen/ 44  Smith, J. A., & Osborn. “Pain as an assault on the self: an interpretative phenomenological analysis”. Psychology and Health 22, (2007): 517–534. 45  Ibid. 43

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trap. IPA transcends the push and pull model of transnational migration and highlights yet the entrapment that EU border restrictions and detention in the Island of Malta have come to represent to the struggles of African youth migrants.

 acism in Surveillance Praxis: How EU Continues to Wall R Out African Youth Migrants Racism is a preconceived process that derogatorily labels an individual or group for the purpose of segregation, marginalization, domination, and imposition of hegemony by the dominant individual(s). It is an act of social representation and construction of difference aimed at positioning the dominant social group to enjoy certain exclusive privileges that are girded around by sociopolitical power imbalances and barricaded from the subordinate individual(s) with taboos of normativity. It is difficult to talk about race without looking into power relationships which is where the nineteenth-century Western colonization and present neocolonial structures and processes play critical roles. Sefa Dei46 reasons that as anti-racists agents we must move to an inclusive race-based analysis of colonial relations with the understanding that representation is not only about subject identities and identifications but also about fundamental issues of economic, material, and structural manifestations in existing human conditions. The anti-racist theory therefore must aim to redress these fundamental issues. As an analytical approach, anti-colonial framework is a perspective that challenges all manifestations of hegemony and imposition of ideas and practices of cultural and sociopolitical domination. In other words, any exercise of self-assertion or self-location is meaningful if it seeks to challenge or disrupt existing social dynamics of power imbalances. Relating the discourses of anti-racism to the phenomenon of African youth’s experiences at the transnational borders, particularly at the extended borders of the European Union, the realities of skewed power relationship begin to emerge. The systems of border securitization and surveillance are designed to intercept and detain signifiers of racialized bodies or their representation. The taking up of such worded symbolisms as victims of traffickers, illegal migrants, clandestine, and boat people are racist coinages of representation and markers of social difference at the borders of the European Union. The disturbing reality of representation of difference is the positioning of the racialized individual(s) at the margins of the social echelon. Spaces such as the transnational borders tend to reproduce hegemony, dominance, and privilege because such spaces also come with particular histories and readings. Therefore, the experiences of the racialized bodies of African youth in European borders cannot be fully grasped in discourses of split binaries of regular

 Sefa Dei “Introduction”. In Sefa Dei, G. (ed). Indigenous philosophies and critical education: A reader. New York. Peter Lang, 2011.

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or irregular, legal, and illegal migrants, because we are not unaware of the maxim that occupying certain spaces comes with predetermined political antics. The racially symbolic positioning of whiteness at international borders implies that Europe wields an unlimited power to extend its authority of border surveillance to the North African seaports of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco. These ports are patrolled by FRONTEX, an EU border security agency charged with keeping the unwanted vagrant bodies out of mainland Europe. Averting romanticism on transnational migration experiences of African youth, we will continue by raising the questions: How are the sub-Saharan African youth complicit to their repressive migration experiences and untoward treatment by border authorities at the entry-­ ports of Europe; and how have the logics of neocolonialism; in fact, how have the structures and processes in their environments of upbringing predisposed African youth to migrate to Europe? Also, one would be tempted to ask what complicit role the leaders of the North African frontline states (ports of departure) play to make EU aggressive border policies and praxis worthwhile. The answer is worse than imagined. Many young Africans have been brutally gunned down at the borders of North Africa on their passage to Europe.47 It is paradoxical, however, that European youth traveling to Africa do neither face harassments, criminalization, restrictions, detention, and deportation nor the violence African youth migrants suffer at the borders of Europe. If trillion dollars worth of unfinished goods daily shipped, often illegally, to the industrialized world from the RICH, naturally endowed African continent do not face barriers at the receivers’ entry-ports, why are African migrants treated with disdain by border security officials? Whiteness is, in essence, a system and is also a property. There is therefore a politicization of biological pigmentation at the spaces of border representation. Whiteness thus becomes a pigmentary passport of privilege. Sefa Dei48 reasons therefore that whiteness has no meaning outside of colonialism and oppression. Also, Applebaum49 points out that The discourse of meritocracy functions to marginalize certain groups of people by allowing whites to direct attention away from their own privilege and to ignore larger patterns of racial injustice. The assumption that people get ahead as a result of individual effort or merit conceals how social, economic and cultural privileges facilitate the success of some groups of people but not others. Moreover, it allows the privileged to see themselves as innocent bystanders rather than participants in a system that creates, maintains and reproduces social injustice.50

To young Africans, colonization and racism also brought about major severance from their geo-cultural environments (an experience Frantz Fanon referred to as amputation) of the colonized peoples first, from themselves, and then from their environment, culture, and knowledge base. Thus, alienated from their languages,51

 Ibid, Baxter, 2008. See also; Ibid, Toasije, 2009; and Ibid, Brachet, 2012.  Ibid, Sefa Dei, 2011. 49  Applebaum, B. “In the name of morality: moral responsibility, whiteness and social justice education”. Journal of Moral Education 34, no. 3 (2005): 277–290 50  Ibid. 51  Wa Thiong’O, N. Decolonizing the mind: The politics of language in African literature. Nairobi, East African Educational Publishers, 1986. 47 48

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knowledge of their past, and their environment,52 and having lost touch with their identity and humanity, devoid of liberty and freedom as human beings,53 and ­completely oblivious of the basis of their humanity, that is, spirituality,54 the colonizers’ imposed ways of knowing became reified, essentialized, and taken up as the way of salvation from the supposedly “primitive” entrapment the colonized knew before the encounter. After the partitioning and subsequent colonization of Africa by Europe, for instance, the West realized that the task was not just to rid the continent of its epistemological and ontological bases and cultural heritages but also to  contest the legacies of earlier Arab colonization and cultural vitiation. In his Black Skin, White Masks, Frantz Fanon55 depicts his view on human nature which must not be encased or subjugated for it is human destiny to be free. The annexation of Africa, the imposition of foreign rule and cultural suppression coupled with ruthless brutality meted out on the colonized bodies, was in Fanon’s view a measure of “violence” that left significant damage on the psyche of the colonized, depriving them first of knowledge of self and identity. Then it robs them of their freedom and liberty. To Fanon, decolonization in each of these tasks might require some level of violence, for decolonization is as much a “violent phenomenon” as colonization itself.56 It implies that the dissonance resulting from repressions experienced by young African migrants at the borders of Europe constitutes a psychological trauma, a climax of knowing, and an apex of unrealized hope from whence a dénouement of the inequities in the global migration drama would unravel. The resulting realization of self might constitute a turning point whence decolonization of self might be the outcome in the psyche of the migrant youth traumatized by colonial hegemonic border controls, frustration from the goal of arriving at their destination, and the dilemma of cultural encapsulation.

 reach of Transnational Laws at the Peril of African Migrant B Youth There often are conflicting intersections between domestic policies and maritime laws of the receiving states and international refugee law. Ship crews are under obligation to rescue sea migrants who run into distressful conditions, but they also have to transfer the rescued individuals to the nearest safe haven to save cost for  Ibid, Sefa Dei, 2011. See also; Lebakeng, T. “Discourse on indigenous knowledge systems, sustainable socio-economic development and the challenge of the academy in Africa”. CODESRIA Bulletin. Nos. 1&2 (2010): 24. 53  Fanon, F. Black skin, white masks. New York: Grove Press, 1957. 54  Ibid, Sefa Dei, 2011. See also; Wane, N. “Practicing African spirituality: Insights from ZuluLatifa, and African woman Healer”. Theorizing Empowerment: Canadian Perspective on Black Feminist Thought, (2007: 55–74. 55  Ibid, Fanon, 1957. 56  Ibid. 52

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themselves as well as in compliance with the provisions of the laws. States are however under no obligation to accept rescued persons because if there are refugees among the rescued individuals, the host country might be violating the law by repatriating them to their countries of origin57 (ICMSAR, Chapter 2.1.10; UNCLOS, Art. 98: 2). The question however is: Has there been a reduction in cases of migration into Europe via the sea or, more specifically, are we foreseeing any reduction in the flow of migration of African youth to Europe? The view of this work is that the root cause of youth migration must be addressed if the phenomenon would be minimized or eradicated. Tackling the current surge in African youth migration to Europe would not be achieved through the existing policies and practices of border restriction and migrant management as is presently the case. The various states of origin (mostly developing countries) must be involved in the study geared toward understanding the drives of youth migration, bearing in mind that a one-size-fits-all strategy might not always work particularly when it comes to youth migration. Besides, the understanding that migrants are either political or economic refugees, which led Bjarnesen58 to reason that labor migrants and refugees are intertwined, also brought about the notion of mixed migration. But as Phillips59 argues, migration evokes a polarized atmosphere of competition between immigrants and the citizens of a host country—meaning that, among mixed migrants in a rescued boat - political refugees and asylum seekers would be predisposed to receive more empathy from the citizens than do economic immigrants. For migration stakeholders and policymakers, there is however the need to tease out distinct categories of youth migrants to properly analyze and make provisions that might be tailored to and expedient for each group’s needs.

 oles of Foreign Policies of the Industrialized North R in the Making of Migrant Other The Western and Eastern colonizers (by Eastern colonizers we mean Iran and the oil-rich Arab states) must take a reflective and retroactive gaze to articulate how their foreign policies in the developing countries have continued to engender massive displacement and therefore current flow in the migration from the developing economies.60 While drawing attention to the roles of the dominant societies in generating the current surge in transnational migration, we do not intend to romanticize  https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm  Bjarnesen, J. Refugees or migrants? Research and Policy Analysis. Uppsala: The Nordic African Institute. Uppsala Universitet, 2014. 59  Ibid, Phillips, 2014. 60  Chua, A. World on Fire: How Exporting Free-Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred & Global Instability. New York: Doubleday Publishing, 2003. See also; Chomsky, N. Failed states: The abuse of power and assault on democracy. New York: Henry Holt Books, 2006.; and Ibid, Klein, 2007. 57 58

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the traumatic experiences of the migrant subjects from developing economies such as Nigeria. We would rather hint that African migrant youth wield a lot of power in determining their migratory experiences. The migrant youth have agency and do, in fact, exhibit this in a way of resistance against the host societies’ attempt to irrationally or unconstitutionally repatriate them. In this way, they also contribute to their subjectification and subjugation. The reflective gaze our work calls for might be necessary for the rich and developed nations to halt and reassess the complicit roles their economic and sociopolitical foreign policies play in the current surge in the migration from the South to the North. This step might substantially equip these nations toward initiating de-escalation roles in unrest and crises in African states, the Middle East, and other developing economies. Iran and Saudi Arabia have, for instance, been implicated for stoking the fire of religious and violent political uprisings in the Middle East, Syria, Africa, and Yemen. They fund, support, and supply weapons to Islamic fundamentalists of their interest. What happened in Libya should serve as an eye-opener to the EU and all Western countries. The late Col. Muammar Gaddafi  was never himself a peace model, at least in practice, but he managed to hold Libya and other North African nations in check against Islamic fundamentalists. Today, four years after the West-­ backed coalition killed him, Europe and the world would testify that Libya is now a haven for nurturing and escalating the most anti-West and worst terrorist activities ever recorded. France, Russia, the United States, Britain, and China were incriminated in funding, supporting, and supplying weapons to perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide Boko Haram in West Africa and ISIS in the Syrian wilderness, respectively.61 In fact, French nationals were reportedly caught among the Boko Haram terrorist group that has been on the rampage in North-Eastern Nigeria, but France demanded her citizens back from the Republic of Cameroon and continues to deny this information.62 It is important to highlight the contributions of Western and Arab states in insinuating and escalating violence in developing countries, especially Africa and the Middle East, because the resultant political and socioeconomic displacement joins forces with cultural encapsulation induced by colonization to bring about the sociopolitical and economic upheaval in these societies, and the refugees generated by these circumstances seek relocation and settlement in the peace havens that developed economies represent (at least to the hapless imagination of the migrants). It becomes necessary at this point to accentuate our concerns that unilateral efforts of Europe or any other industrialized nation to tackle the problems aris-

 Abusidiqu, O. France accused of sponsoring Boko Haram with the ultimate aim of invading Nigeria, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.newsrescue.com/; See also; Penketh, A. Rwandan president accuses France of direct role in 1994 genocide: French justice minister will not attend commemorations marking 20th anniversary of genocide, after Paul Kagame’s comments, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/06/rwandan-president-france-genocide; and Simpson, J. “Obama accused of obstructing battle against Boko Haram to promote Axelrod’s Nigerian Muslim client: Exclusive to accuracy in media”.Accuracy in Media, 2015. 62  Tembang, S. “France pressures Cameroon to handover captured French Boko Haram fighters”. Eden Newspaper, 2015. Retrieved May 2015 from http://www.edennewspaper.net/ france-pressures-cameroon-to-handover-captured-french-boko-haram-fighters/ 61

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ing from migrants crossing transnational borders (and more specifically) between Europe and Africa, would be short-lived and at the long-run appear both myopic and inefficient.

 frican States’ Complicities: How AU Actions or Inactions A Influence Outcome To advance our argument for the African states to adopt a more uniform and youth-­ sensitive and immigrant-friendly policies with respect to regulation of their border-­ surveillance agencies, we call on the African Union to rise to the challenges of the member states on sociocultural development. We pay close attention to the understanding that AU, as a regional and continental body, can borrow a leaf from the European Union in contributing significantly to its member states’ cultural, political, and socioeconomic development. By so doing it will transcend its present tepid position and situate itself to regulate and oversee the activities of member states concerning youth development. Only by assuming its right of place with respect to being the centerpiece of member states’ foreign policy would AU relate at par with the multinational NGOs and other regional bodies and be in a position to negotiate on level grounds on matters affecting the displaced peoples, refugees, and asylum seekers in and around their territorial borders. Speaking as one voice in matters affecting the continent, the organization would benefit its citizenry at this junction by deploying its diplomatic measures to compel other parties to comply with established international laws with respect to AU citizens, for instance, ensuring that the EU border agencies execute their functions in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, Art. 98: 2) when dealing with African migrants. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) representative to the AU and ECA, Mr. Cosmas Chanda, recognized that the issue of migration and mixed migration flows remains of deep concern to UNHCR as a significant number of persons on the move through and from the Horn of Africa to Europe and Southern Africa are asylum seekers and refugees –persons of concern to UNHCR deserving of international protection and durable solutions.63

Supporting our views on the need for AU to rise to the challenges of the continent and collaborate with other intervening bodies, Mr. Chanda highlighted the need for the AU to continue to liaise with HOAI as an important step toward establishing and moving forward a comprehensive regional response to the challenges of human trafficking and smuggling of persons in the subregion. The IOM representative to the AU/IGAD/UNICA, Maureen Achieng, insists that the spirit of the inter-state partnership and collaboration that continues to characterize the AU-Horn of Africa Initiative has been a critical ingredient in bringing together states with  AU. 2nd Specialized Technical Committee Meeting on Youth, Culture and Sports. Aspiration five (05) of the AU Agenda 2063, 2016. Retrieved September 2016 from: http://www.au.int/en/sa

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varied perspectives for frank dialogue with the end goal of agreeing to collective and cooperative approach to combating trafficking and smuggling network that sometimes seem to operate with great efficiency across national borders.64

The European Council (EC) met and enacted a draft that established a new border-­ policing strategy based on distance surveillance with advanced technologies. EUROSUR was therefore established to, among other things, use technological devices such as satellite imagery and drones to monitor the Mediterranean Sea and North African coasts. Exceptions were made to the effect that the draft should pay priority attention to EU member states, persons in distress at sea, children, asylum seekers, and victims of human trafficking, as well as person(s) in need of medical attention. All these are in line with the UN provision to safeguard human rights in the international waters.65 In an analysis of EU regulations for the FRONTEX (EU border policing agency), coordinating surveillance of external sea borders was foremost in agenda, and the priority was aimed at enhancing protection (at least in writing) of migrants who must be intercepted or rescued. Interestingly, such a cogent and extremely critical document contains many obvious loopholes that enable state agencies of EU and its member states to wash their hands off any blame when migrant-related tragedies occur on EU territorial waters or areas within its jurisdiction. One of such loopholes is that the regulation was silent in respect to the circumstance migrants’ interception occurred in territorial waters of a third state (non-member state of EU). This raises concern over pushback. It has been observed, for instance, that before the Libyan revolution, Italy extended its borders to Libyan coasts by proxy. This means it was patrolling Libyan coasts with the sole aim of intercepting and disembarking migrant boats carrying Africans since Libya is one of the coasts of departure for migrants from Africa.66 Today, the demographic constituents of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Europe are buoyed by the war in Syria, Middle East unrests, and displacements in parts of Asia. Mediterranean migrants today include Arabs, Asians, and Eastern Europeans, and despite the escalation of anti-West terrorist attacks by Islamic fundamentalists, the EU has adopted an open-border and immigrant assimilation policies instead of the initial detention and deportation of largely African youth who were escaping the continent for obviously similar reasons as their Arabian, Asian, and Middle Eastern contemporaries. It is in light of these developments that this chapter contribution continues to ask if skin color is a factor in how African youth migrants are treated at the borders of Europe. In 2009, Italy intercepted migrant boats with individuals in distress over Italian territorial waters, and instead of rescuing them, deported all the occupants back to Libya, not  AU. “Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants within and from the Horn of Africa”. Retrieved September 2016b. Retrieved September 2016 from: http://www.au.int/en/sa 65  Newland, K.  Troubled waters: rescue of asylum seekers and refugees at sea. Migration Information Source. Washington, D.C. Migration Policy Institute, 2003. Retrieved October, 2014 from: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/troubled-waters-rescue-asylum-seekers-and-refugees-sea; See also; Ibid, Frenzen, 2014; Ibid, Phillips, 2014. 66  Ibid, Newland, 2003. See also. Ibid, Frenzen, 2014. 64

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considerate of the implication of such drastic action for the various categories of migrants on board the boat.67 This pushback strategy did not forestall the trip of subsequent migrant boats, but it further raised the death toll of hapless African migrants including women and children. The EU regulations for FRONTEX also prescribed that boats intercepted in the territorial sea or contiguous zone of any EU member state should be disembarked in the same territory. This specific regulation provided a condition that allows authorities to still order an alteration of the course of migrant boats that have made it thus far. This action is in flagrant violation of not just the fundamental right of the migrants but the international refugee laws and international maritime laws that demand that EU member states should, under the circumstance discussed above, use all available means to identify intercepted persons to afford migrants opportunity to assert a non-refoulement claim.68 Non-refoulement is a term given to a fundamental principle of international law that forbids a country receiving asylum seekers from returning them to a country in which they would be in likely danger of persecution based on “race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”69 The aggressively heightened anti-immigrant operations of FRONTEX beyond EU territories informed a paradox that requires closer details for at the auspices of FRONTEX many more migrants’ deaths are recorded in the Mediterranean Sea.70 For instance, during the 2011 Libyan revolution that ousted Col. Gaddafi, FRONTEX sent its joint operations consisting of ships and aerial surveillance systems to Libya as a backup for Italy to frustrate the influx of migrants from Africa. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also deployed 21 ships at the Mediterranean as a tactical bid to foil arms supply to the Gaddafi regime.71 The intensification of the Libyan crisis, expectedly, drove an ethnically mixed multitude of immigrants in Libya to the sea. These group of immigrants were escaping the onslaught of the Libyan dictator, Gaddafi, but the incident that follows would begin to unsettle the humanitarian angle of the EU’s, NATO’s, UNHCR’s, and (International Organization for Migration) IOM’s operations on the Mediterranean Sea. While dallying over whose responsibility it was to rescue the

 Ibid, Frenzen, 2014. See also; Sunderland, J. “Hidden emergency: Migrants death in the Mediterranean”. Human rights in Europe. New  York, Human Rights Watch, 2012. Retrieved October, 2014 from: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2012_EU_ Hidden%20Emergency.pdf 68  Sunderland, J. “Hidden emergency: Migrants death in the Mediterranean”. Human rights in Europe. New York, Human Rights Watch, 2012. Retrieved October, 2014 from: http://www.hrw. org/sites/default/files/related_material/2012_EU_Hidden%20Emergency.pdf 69  UNHCR.  Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High Commissioner) EC/SCP/2. Executive Committee Of The High Commissioner’s Programme Twenty-Eighth Session SubCommittee Of The Whole On International Protection, 1977. 70  Ibid, Sunderland, 2012. 71  Ibid. 67

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boat conveying a batch of migrants out of Libya, the West watched 63 of them including 20 women and 2 babies die in the infamous “left to die” case.72 This case accentuates the paradoxical outcome of deceptive propagation of international orders—it is a violation, legal and binding when and only when racialized and marginalized bodies from developing countries are not the victims. The 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) enjoins governments and all stakeholders to “… ensure that assistance is provided to any person in distress at sea … regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found.”73 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, Art. 98: 2) also passes a responsibility on every coastal state party to “…promote the establishment, operation, and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional arrangements co-operate with neighboring States for this purpose.”74 Nevertheless, the Italian authorities and NATO military helicopters and warships came in contact with the boat and offered them no meaningful help. The boat drifted for 14 days on the Mediterranean and was pulled back to the Libyan coast by a strong current. On arrival, the ill-equipped migrants have lost 61 people. Only 9 survived and one later died in a Libyan jail.

 outh-North Youth Migration from the Lenses of Neocolonial S Antigenic Drift It is expedient for us at this juncture to provide another way of thinking about the ever-rising cases of African youth migration to Europe as a way of disturbing the hackneyed concepts of push and pull, which both rationalizes Western management approach to the unhealthy trend and blames the surge in migration on the sociopolitical and economic lapses in the sending countries. It becomes imperative for us to start by raising the question: How might we begin to rethink the twentyfirst-century youth transnational migration? Rethinking global youth migration becomes crucial to unsettling existing assumptions, policies, and praxis that have  Heller, C., Pezzani, L. and Situ Studio. “The ‘Left-To-Die Boat’ Forensic Oceanography Report”. The European Research Council project. Forensic Architecture Centre for Research Architecture, Goldsmiths, University of London, 2012. Retrieved October, 2014 from: http://www.fidh.org/ IMG/pdf/fo-report.pdf. See also; Strik, T. “Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is responsible? Report”, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons Netherlands, Socialist Group, Council of Europe, 2012. Retrieved October, 2014 from: http://assembly.coe.int/committeedocs/2012/20120329_mig_rpt.en.pdf 73  International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (London, 1974). Entry into force generally:1980. Entry into force for Australia: 1983. AUSTRALIAN TREATY SERIES 1983 No. 22. Australian Government Publishing Service Canberra. Commonwealth of Australia 1995. Retrieved on October, 2014 from: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1983/22.html 74  Ibid, Heller, Pezzani, and Studio, 2012. 72

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neither yielded positive outcomes toward reducing global youth migration trends nor ameliorated the transit ordeals of the migrant subjects. Almost all extant migration theories are grounded in the banal push and pull narratives, which essentially projects immigrants as burdens to the receiving societies (largely the industrialized countries of the North). This theoretical inclination both blames the sending nations for the migrants’ woes and beclouds the contributions of the host states to the making of migrant subjects, and the benefits receiving states derive from the contributions of immigrants to the economies of the host countries. We have detailed how colonization has frustrated and continued to thwart and subvert Indigenous people’s worldviews and socioeconomic and geo-cultural environments. The disruptions imposed by colonization and neocolonial processes leave in their trail an unending troupe of environmentally irrelevant, economically marginalized, and sociopolitically displaced individuals, who having been equipped with the colonizers’ cultures and worldviews would migrate overseas. It is often easy to summon the apparition called “postcolonial” as a knockout point to anyone who dares to blame colonization as a cause for the twenty-first-century youth transnational migration. And the term postcolonial has been shrewdly invented by the colonizers to continue to sustain the stifling grip of colonization on the hoodwinked and hapless lots who are caught in the labyrinth of neocolonialism. It is however very likely that colonization did not end with the attainment of political independence of the colonized peoples of the South. In fact, colonization, an imposition of political, economic, or cultural power (on a social group by another dominant group), is an insidiously sustained domination strategy that could be manipulated, mutated, and twisted to keep the colonized perpetually on a secured economic and sociopolitical leash of the colonizer.

 ntigenic Drift in the Context of Colonization: Implications A for Youth Migration We will advance an understanding of the constantly changing form of colonization with an illustration from one of the features of the influenza virus. In its antigenic drift, there are small but constant changes in the genes of influenza virus overtime, which reproduce viruses that are related but antigenically different. Such transformations make it difficult for human immunologic memory to recognize and respond to it appropriately. These changes that result in viruses with completely distinct antigenic properties are the reasons flu vaccines are composed every year and people are advised to take new flu shots each year. Similarly, colonization and the structuring of neocolonial projects are deliberately and systematically designed. It is executed as an ongoing project whose existence has continued to be sustained by two factors: one is the colonizers’ skillful but questionable and deliberate repudiation of every attempt to uncover its evergreen

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nature. The second sustaining factor is the inherent ability of the neocolonial process to mutate and take up different forms at different periods. The antigenic drift in the system of capital expansion in Europe led to a systematic mutation that saw Europe as a militarized colonizer of many established kingdoms and Indigenous societies whose natural and human resources were harnessed to meet the developmental requirement in Europe. The abolition of the trans-­Atlantic slave trade and granting of independence to the formally annexed territories spurred another era of antigenic drift. These did not come until the West had weaved another maze for the subjugation of developing economies. The twentieth-century world order brought an economic policy with a façade termed globalization, free market, and open democracy.75 With these strategies came the structural adjustment policy, the aids-shock, and the use of loans and foreign aids to destabilize developing nations. The aim of this phase in the antigenic drift of Europe’s system of capital expansion was to create massive displacement of people who would migrate to feel the labor and human resources gap created by the aging population in the industrialized world.76 The various phases of antigenic drift discussed so far are not coincidental but planned, articulated, and executed. Therefore, the colonizers’ economic interest is the centerpiece of capital expansion and neocolonial projects around which the global orders are weaved. Ultimately, a subtle slavery era has emerged in which the colonizers do not stain their moral conscience, if it exists at all, by using military force to annex or coerce people into slavery. It is a system designed to impel the politically and economically displaced peoples of the developing world to cross transnational borders in search of better conditions of living that have been destroyed in their home countries. It is therefore designed to consummate the total subjugation of the displaced migrants. On that note, many policies are put in place in the receiving nations to continue to under-valorize the migrants’ educational qualifications and professional skills. Even after updating their qualifications and skills, the system is designed to deny most of the immigrants certain privileges so that their status as quasi-slaves would be consolidated.77 They work hard and pay the most taxes (while “real citizens” enjoy tax benefits and largess) to keep them afloat economically. For instance, most immigrants and their families barely can afford food, shelter, clothing, education, and access to good healthcare in their host societies. And these are the social determinants of healthy livelihood. We insist that the current trend in youth transnational migration is not different from but tantamount to modern-day slavery in disguise. It is a mutated form of enslavement. It is a deliberate creation of the changing faces of colonization, which is why the colonizers (industrialized world) focus majorly on migration management.

 Ibid, Chua, 2003.  Ibid, Anderson, Sharma, and Wright, 2006. 77  Ibid. 75 76

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Conclusion/Recommendation Evidently, youth migration to Europe from Africa is becoming a huge tragic concern both to Africa and to the receiving nations. As the most populous country in Africa, for instance, Nigeria must initiate a leading role in addressing youth-related concerns in its domain. Insecurity, unemployment, poverty, and unenviable living conditions were highlighted in the earlier research interviews. The efforts of Nigerian leadership in conjunction with AU and IOM to manage issues of youth emigration and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are commendable, at least for being a timely intervention. It is not, however, an effective or appropriate longterm solution to the serious social concern that youth emigration represents. This accounts for why the presence of IOM and the creation of the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) have not succeeded in reducing or eradicating youth emigration from the country. The country might borrow a leaf from the Philippine government. In that case, Nigeria needs to establish two labor-­exporting agencies (one for permanent and the other for temporal employment) through its National Commission for Refugees (NCFR). The government might use its ongoing relations with the European Union to solicit assistance from the National European Union Development Fund (EDF) to establish skill training centers that will prepare prospective migrants and equip them to be labor-market ready for industrialized economies. The representatives of the sending and receiving countries here work closely to establish areas of labor need and develop skills training programs to meet these needs. This collaborative migrant’s preparatory arrangement will reduce, if not eradicate, cases of irregular migration and its attendant tragedies. Authorities of industrialized nations must also be seen to be genuine in their foreign policy strategizing and effort to cushion the pervasive social trend of youth migration and not direct their angst toward migrant youth by deporting them. We should bear in mind that if migrant youth are summarily sent back to their countries of origin without vigorously addressing their driving factors, they will re-emerge, this time employing a more self-risking, hazardous migratory strategy to ensure they succeed. This is the experience in the European, Australian, and North American borders. The paradox remains that so long as the international organizations, policymakers, and other stakeholders on transnational migration continue to channel their efforts to managing migration to optimize the benefits and reduce risks,78 engaging theories to meet praxis might remain a mirage, especially in assuaging the long-term effect of youth migration on the African continent. The allocation of funds should not be mainly intended to achieve border securitization and restriction goals. Rather, it should be geared toward resolving the challenges inherent in the intersection of international laws and codes of practices concerning the operation of EU border officials toward migrant individuals. There should be spelled-out boundaries for policies and praxis that are devoid of implementation loopholes. Also, 78

 International Organization for Migration

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regional transnational border agencies such as FRONTEX and EUROPOL should be monitored, their actions evaluated regularly, and they must be made accountable and punishable for violations of migrants’ rights at the international waters or within EU frontiers as a measure to reinforce the credibility of international promulgations and forestall future breaches of its provisions by other subregional enforcement agencies globally. The rescue of distressed migrants at international or territorial waters must be an imperative function for all international maritime operatives irrespective of the victim’s nationality, sex, ability, or ethnicity. Besides the ­ UNHCR’s provision to publicly commend the gestures of seafarers who rescue migrants,79 individuals or agencies that have failed to carry out this civic and humanitarian responsibility should be held culpable regardless of origin or creed. This will reinforce the tradition of seafaring codes of which the purpose is to respond to migrant distress calls.80 To further safeguard the provisions and forestall possible violation of Safety of Life at Sea Convention, defaulting agencies or individuals must be held accountable at the international court of justice instead of leaving different countries to apply measures as they deem fit. Youth have to be raised with honesty and be guided with untainted wisdom. The leaders of Nigeria, and by extension other African developing economies, must not drive their youth to desperation through dishonest political practices and maneuvers that have continued to engender insecurity in the society. The leaders must transform themselves into mirrors of credibility, accountability, and responsibility (that are qualities of African Indigenous leadership) for their youth to emulate. Africa has abundant natural and human resources that its leaders must harness to provide the youth with modern infrastructures, like power supply, schools, skills training centers and technical institutes, hospitals, roads, etc. The wealth of the continent should not be pillaged by few criminally minded politicians who would transfer the stolen funds to foreign banks while their society is thrown into the chaos of poverty and lawlessness, as it appears to be the case in most African societies today. The youth who are the future of the society wander into negative survival mode, and the result is that as many as would find their way out of the failing social system would migrate. Other young persons who feel less fortunate to emigrate would lapse into decadence with unimaginable impunity: robbery, cult, and gang-related activities; militancy and gorilla-militia, kidnapping, and other social vices, perpetuated by disgruntled angry youth become the order of the day. The worrisome fact remains that the criminals who assume political office by evil underhand manipulations collude with the colonizers in Arabian and Western societies where the wealth they stole are banked to ensure they are perpetuated in power. While they watch their citizens rot away in abject penury, they buy the most expensive and luxurious dwellings overseas where their children live, attend schools, and receive the best healthcare conditions their fellow citizens can only imagine in

 Ibid, Sunderland, 2012.  Strik, T. “Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is responsible? Report”, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons

79 80

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dreams. This is why we accentuate in this work that the duplicities of the colonizing Arabian, Western, and currently Indo/Chinese regimes are to a large extent responsible for the woes in developing African countries and the resulting sociopolitical deracination that ultimately informs the current flow in mass migration. The current breakdown in law and order as are presently witnessed in some African countries like Mali, Northern Nigeria, Cameroon, and Central African Republic, to mention a few, are results of bad leadership and resource mismanagement. The multiplicity of religious and ethnic-based militia and fanatic groups like ISIS, Boko Haram, Odua, MEND, MASSOB, etc., is the result of poverty and despair the dubious politicians have created over a long period of wasteful spending and looting of public coffers. The youth must be raised and guided to represent a competent and resourceful demographic constituent that would use available resources to meet their pressing needs and those of their societies rather than engage in irregular migration.

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Pisani, M. 2012. Lifelong Learning and Inclusion: The ‘Citizenship Assumption’ and the Exclusion of 8 Million Bodies. Malta: Paper presented at the 44th EUCEN November Conference “Border-­ Crossing as a Viable Choice: Collaboration, Dialogue and Access to Higher Education” www Quijano, A. 2000. Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America. Nepantla: Views from the South 1 (3): 1–48. Sefa Dei, G. 2011. Introduction. In Indigenous Philosophies and Critical Education: A Reader, ed. G. Sefa Dei. New York: Peter Lang. Simms, A. 2009. Ecological Debt: Global Warming & the Wealth of Nations. New York: Pluto Press. Simpson, J. 2015. Obama Accused of Obstructing Battle Against Boko Haram to Promote Axelrod’s Nigerian Muslim Client: Exclusive to Accuracy in Media. Accuracy in Media. Smith, J.A., and Osborn. 2007. Pain as an Assault on the Self: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. Psychology and Health 22: 517–534. Strik, T. 2012. “Lives Lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who Is Responsible? Report”, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons Netherlands, Socialist Group, Council of Europe. Retrieved October 2014 from: http://assembly.coe.int/committeedocs/2012/20120329_mig_ rpt.en.pdf Solimano, A. 2010. International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sunderland, J. 2012. Hidden Emergency: Migrants Death in the Mediterranean. In Human Rights in Europe. New York: Human Rights Watch. Retrieved October 2014 from: http://www.hrw. org/sites/default/files/related_material/2012_EU_Hidden%20Emergency.pdf. Tembang, S. 2015. France Pressures Cameroon to Handover Captured French Boko Haram fighters. Eden Newspaper. Retrieved May 2015. http://www.edennewspaper.net/ france-pressures-cameroon-to-handover-captured-french-boko-haram-fighters/ Toasije, A. 2009. The Africanity of Spain: Identity and Problematization. Journal of Black Studies 39 (3): 348–355. Retrieved August 2014. http://jbs.sagepub.com/content/39/3/348.full. pdf+html. UNHCR. 1977. Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High Commissioner) EC/SCP/2. Executive Committee of The High Commissioner’s Programme Twenty-Eighth Session Sub-­ Committee of the Whole On International Protection Wa Thiong’O, N. 1986. Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers. Wane, N. 2007. Practicing African Spirituality: Insights from Zulu-Latifa, and African Woman Healer. Theorizing Empowerment: Canadian Perspective on Black Feminist Thought: 55–74. Wong, S. 2009. Migration Through the Eyes of Young People Panel on the Occasion of International Migrants’ Day. New  York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), United Nations Headquarters.

Chapter 7

From the Margin to the Mainstream: Dealing with the Scourge of Transit Migrants in Morocco Seun Bamidele

Introduction Transit migration and security are increasingly becoming notable concepts that dominate regional and global debates in International Relations. Commonly viewed from the perspectives of peace and security studies and international relations, transit migration is viewed as transition or territory of political, social, and economic mobility.1 With the occurrence of natural disasters and all forms of violent conflicts across Africa, the concept of transit migration and security have become increasingly controversial. Contemporary debates link transit migration with trans-border vices such as terrorism.2 The interpretations of insecurity statistics contrast with the emerging quest to promote transit migrants’ protective laws. Nevertheless, the innovations brought by the 2013 AU Heads of State and Government Solemn Declaration [Assembly/AU/Decl.3 (XXI)] Migration Agenda 2063 on the promotion of sustainability of transit migrants across the globe are still contested.3 The 2018 World Report on transit migrants indicated an alarming record of over 84,000 migrants in

1  Schapendonck, Joris. What if Networks Move? Dynamic Social Networking in the Context of African Migration to Europe, Population, Space and Place 21, no. 8 (2015): 809–819. 2  The North Africa Post. “Morocco Takes Part in EU G6 Interior Ministers’ Meeting on Terrorism, Migration,” The North Africa Post, October 9, 2018. http://northafricapost.com/25747-moroccotakes-part-in-eu-g6-interior-ministers-meeting-on-terrorism-migration.html 3  African Union. Africa Agenda 2063, DECLARATION ON MIGRATION Doc. Assembly/ AU/18(XXV), 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration, Heads of State and Government of the African Union, meeting at the 25th Ordinary Session of our Assembly in Johannesburg in the Republic of South Africa from 14–15 June 2015, under the theme “Year of Women Empowerment and Development towards Africa’s Agenda 2063” 2013. https://au.int/sites/default/files/ decisions/9664-assembly_au_dec_569_-_587_xxiv_e.pdf

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Morocco; the Moroccan diaspora consists of 5.6 million Moroccans living abroad.4 The basic tenets of transit migrants’ rights are undermined, while the principles of social and economic integration and regionalization lack any real substance in the rhetoric of national and regional security. The ratification of the treaty between Morocco and the African Union led to the operationalization of the African Transit Migration Observatory, which aims to support existing national and regional initiatives on transit migration through analyzing and sharing information, thus, efficiently addressing the challenges of transit migration. In recent times, transit migration has become a vital margin of securitization.5 In 2017, a good number of migrants constituted around 84,001 of Moroccan’s population.6 This is reflective of the large increase in transit migration flows over the past 20 years. The Kingdom of Morocco is the first most significant host nation for transit migrants. It is followed by Mali, Libya, and Egypt. In 2017, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) stated that the country was hosting thousands of transit migrants, with 70% transit migrants coming from African countries.7 Since the 1980s, countries such as Mali, Libya, Egypt, and Morocco have become necessary destinations for transit migrants from poor African countries.8 This chapter on transit migration flows from Africa to the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco examines the approaches that have been taken by the country, especially through interstates/regional cooperation, in a bid to manage these transit migrants’ flows. Considering these issues, this study further opens a debate on transit migration and security through the strategic approaches adopted by the Kingdom of Morocco to tackle the issues and problems associated with transit migrants. It also re-evaluates the strategic and consultative approaches being used by the country to manage the transit migrants. The aim of this study, among others, is to re-accentuate the intersectionality of the important linkages between transit migration, security, and transit migrants.

4  Kasraoui, Safaa. International Migrants Day: Morocco Between Emigration, Migration, and Transit, 2017. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/12/236750/international-migrants-daymorocco-transit-sub-saharan/ 5  Ibid, African Union, 2013. 6  Ibid, Kasraoui, 2017. 7  de Haas, H.  Morocco: Setting the Stage for Becoming a Migration Transition Country? Washington DC: Migration Information Source, 2014. Accessed May 25, 2015. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/morocco-setting-stage-becoming-migration-transition-country 8  Cherti, Myriam and Collyer, Michael. Immigration and Pensée d’Etat: Moroccan migration policy changes as transformation of ‘geopolitical culture.’ The Journal of North African Studies 20, no. 4 (2015): 590–604.

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Overview of Transit Migration in the Kingdom of Morocco Transit migration is understood as the migration process that includes, in addition to the source and the destination, one or more transit countries.9 This simply means that migrants may travel through many countries before arriving at her or his final destination.10 Transit migration in Morocco owes its growth to a mixture of natural disasters and armed conflict crises in Africa. According to the North Africa Post,11 citizens of African countries have been migrating to the territory of Morocco because of wars and armed conflicts arising from religious, political, social, ethnic, and economic violence. The significance of transit migration in Morocco is evident from the alarmingly high rates there. In 2018, the percentage of insecurity rates for the Moroccan society stood out because of the high rate of the activities of transit migrants.12 These migrants choose Morocco as a nation of transit to other European countries. As shown by Bachelet,13 Morocco’s degree of insecurity and proneness to attack is drastically on the increase compared to many of the other North African countries. Even for the inhabited North African countries where transit migration rates are getting higher, the extent of transit migration is considerable, given their cross border movement populations, and this is indicated in the significance of transit migration for the Moroccan internal security, especially in the urban metropolis, where transit migrants standing form about 10% of the local population. There has been a two to threefold increase within the transit migrant movement in Morocco over the past few years.14 The number of transit migrants in Morocco has increased to 33.8 million in 2014 and might increase further.15 Likewise, between 2013 and 2014, the transit migrant number has increased to 32,566 of transit migrants at the border of Morocco.16 The importance of transit migration in Morocco is mirrored by the massive remission flows and their contribution to the insecurity of Morocco. In 2018, total remission on security on transit migrants by EU and Moroccan officials is $160 9  Lahlou, Mehdi. “Morocco’s Experience of Migration as a Sending, Transit and Receiving Country”, in Lorenzo Kamel, ed., Changing Migration Patterns in the Mediterranean, Rome, Nuova Cultura, p. 97–116, 2015. http://www.iai.it/en/node/5702 10  Harrami, Noureddine. “New Directions in Migration Research in Morocco”, in Ahmet İçduygu and Ayşem Biriz Karaçay, eds., Critical Reflections in Migration Research: Views from the North and the South, Istanbul, Koç University Press, 2015. 11  Ibid, North Africa Post, 2018. 12  Bachelet, Sébastien. In Press. ‘Fighting Against Clandestine Migration’: Sub-Saharan Migrants’ Political Agency and Uncertainty in Morocco. Political and Legal Anthropology Review. 13  Bachelet, Sébastien. ‘Wasting mbeng’: Adventure and Trust Amongst sub-Saharan Migrants in Morocco, Ethnos 84, no. 5 (2019): 849–866 14  Cherti, Myriam and Grant, Peter. The Myth of Transit: Sub-Saharan Migration in Morocco. London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2013. 15  Ibid, Kasraoui, 2017. 16  Ibid.

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­ illion emergency funding package, making the North African country the third-­ m largest recipient of EU funds earmarked for that purpose, while $80 million is being injected directly into the Moroccan government’s budget for 2018.17 When compared to the remission on the security of transit migrants’ inflows of other countries in North Africa, this amount surpasses the total amount officially budgeted over the last 20  years.18 It has been stated that the remission on security against transit migrants within the territory has a grave impact on the Moroccan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).19 As indicated by the Moroccan government, the amount of resources needed to manage the illegal transit migrants in the country affects the economy.20 Various regions in Africa constitute the prominent sources of transit migration flows towards Morocco. Furthermore, Morocco, located in the North African region, is also the most preferred destination country. Most of the transit migrants stay in Morocco for temporary employment before they finally migrate to Europe. They move from the outskirts to the urban areas.21 In terms of security profile, many transit migration crimes or related offenses have been reported to the security officials of the Moroccan government. These flows of insecurity might eventually metamorphose into serious transit migration crises. Most of the transit migrants are usually engaged in various illegal or terrorist operations. Sometimes, they function as spies for terrorist or criminal groups. Given the high proportion of transit migrants within the Kingdom of Morocco, they are usually found in occupations such as domestic work which have typically associated issues with insecurity and crimes.22 Overall, the management of Africa’s transit migrants in Morocco is characterized by many key strategic approaches that involve national, cooperative, and consultative approaches to transit migration routes and patterns. Notwithstanding, the existence of Moroccan security and legal frameworks is usually within the hands of the government and the entire local population, which is infrequently subject to porous security practices. Furthermore, there is an oversized quantity of irregular and undocumented transit migration security policies.

 Arostegui, Martin. EU Turns Attention to Morocco in Bid to Slow African Migrant Flow. 2018. https://www.voanews.com/africa/eu-turns-attention-morocco-bid-slow-african-migrant-flow 18  Ibid. 19  Ibid. 20  Jacobs, Anna. Global Compact for Migration: Security Constraints versus Humanitarian Morality in the Case of Morocco, 2019. http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2019/01/global-compactmigration-security-constraints-humanitarian-morality-case-morocco-190109102101353.html 21  Schuettler, Kirsten. “A second regularization campaign for irregular migrants in Morocco: When emigration countries becoming immigration countries,” World Bank, January 13, 2017. http:// blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/second-regularization-campaign-irregular-immigrants -morocco-when-emigration-countries-become 22  Berriane, Mohamed, de Haas, Hein, and Natter, Katharina. 2015. Introduction: revisiting Moroccan Migrations. The Journal of North African Studies 20, no. 4 (2015): 503–521. 17

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 orocco–EU Intergovernmental Security Collaboration M Approaches on Managing Transit Migrants In the Kingdom of Morocco, transit migrants have been primarily managed using Intergovernmental security collaboration frameworks.23 However, a vital development in this country and within this North African region, together with the EU, has been the shift from a unilateral, national policy response-based approach to coordinated and intergovernmental security approaches, in addition to bilateral cooperation strategies to manage transit migrants.24 In Morocco, there is an increase in Morocco–EU intergovernmental security collaborations, by the host and supply countries, in forums regarding cross-country cooperation in transit migrants’ management.25 The latter trend reflects the growing recognition of the difficulties in transit migration and the importance of Moroccan government cooperation handling short-term and long-term intergovernmental security collaboration. What makes EU cooperation necessary in Morocco is the significance of low and high flows of transit migrants within the borders that raises problems with migrants’ rights, protection, and reintegration, which require a coordinated strategic approach in transition.26 Recently, there have been many consultations and gatherings between Morocco and EU countries regarding transit migrants.27 Although non-binding and non-­ committal in nature, these meetings have provided EU countries in intergovernmental security collaboration with the Moroccan government with a forum to debate broader problems bordering on transit migration, in addition to specific concerns affecting the country and EU neighboring countries.28 It also provides a platform for these countries to shed light on the state of their respective societies. Two of the earliest initiatives were the Morocco–EU intergovernmental security collaboration. These initiatives have provided a council for temporary security collaboration to

 Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Morocco-Country report, 2018 https://atlas.btiproject.org/ share.php?1*2018*CV:CTC:SELMAR*CAT*MAR*REG:TAB 24  Kostas, Stylianos. “Morocco’s Triple Role in the Euro-African Migration System,” Middle East Institute April 18, 2017, https://www.mei.edu/publications/ moroccos-triple-role-euro-african-migration-system 25  Quinn, Ben. “Morocco rejoins African Union After 30 years,” The Guardian, January 31, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/jan/31/morocco-rejoins-africanunion-after-more-than-30-years 26  Alami, Aida. “Morocco Unleashes a Harsh Crackdown on Sub-Saharan Migrants, The New York Times, October 22, 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/22/world/africa/morocco-crackdownsub-saharan-migrants-spain.html 27  European Commission. “Migration: Regional Disembarkation Arrangements: Follow-up to the European Council Conclusions of 28 June 2018,”, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20180724_factsheet-regionaldisembarkation-arrangements_en.pdf 28   United Nations. “Intergovernmental Conference,” 2018. https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/ intergovernmental-conference-2018 23

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many countries in the EU region. The consultations of the Moroccan and EU countries, which were organized in cooperation with the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA),29 have involved the participation of a broad variety of EU nations and have centered on specific areas of Morocco–EU cooperation against inflow and outflow of transit migrants.30 The Intergovernmental Conference 2018 declaration of Marrakesh, the capital of Morocco, on the irregular or undocumented number of transit migrants, following the regional conference on transit migration entitled “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration”, is one of the outcomes of this consultation.31 This declaration underscored the importance of transit migrants’ management for trying irregular transit migrants and other vices associated with the flow. The Marrakesh Intergovernmental Conference 2018 Declaration caught up bilateral, regional, and four-sided consultations and cooperation on the flow of transit migrants and stirred countries of origin, transit, and destination to enter into regular security collaboration to exchange information and address the matter of illegal transit migrants.32 There are alternative Morocco–EU intergovernmental security collaborations on transit migrants in recent years, some under the auspices of four-sided organizations. One of the key Morocco–EU intergovernmental security collaborations in this regard has been the strategic control initiated in 2018, which involves all the countries in the region of North Africa. This intergovernmental security collaboration aimed to offer a forum for the most affected countries in Morocco, North African region, and the EU region to share their experiences, debate on transit migrants’ problems and considerations/management, and form recommendations on needed policy responses.33 All the North African heads of states were duly represented. In addition, senior security officers and resource persons from the EU and international organizations also participated during this transit migrant’s intergovernmental security collaboration. The establishment of the Migration and Border Surveillance Directorate and the Migration Observatory in November 2003 identified the nature of transit migration within the North-African region, together with rising regional and activity patterns in Morocco.34 It centered on the matter of irregular transit migrants and problems with the creation of insecurity. Morocco, collaborating with the EU and ­North-­African countries, recognized the necessity of managing transit migrants’ flows within the region through bilateral and regional consultations, and orderly  UNGA, “Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Marrakesh Dec. 10 and 11, 2018 A/CONF.231/3 http://undocs.org/en/A/ CONF.231/3 30  Ibid. 31  Ibid. 32  Ibid. 33  Ibid. 34  Park, Nathan. From Transit to Integration: A Moroccan Initiative for Community Development, 2018. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/05/247599/transit-integration-moroccan -migration/ 29

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transit migrant’s policies through intergovernmental security collaboration between North African countries and the EU.35 The intergovernmental security collaboration strategically addressed three of Marrakesh themes, namely, protection of transit migrants in the borders of EU region, especially in Morocco, provided to them; optimization of the advantages from organized EU countries’ security on transit migrants; and institutional capacity building and interregional Morocco–EU intergovernmental security collaboration.36 The Migration and Border Surveillance Directorate and the Migration Observatory formulated policies in these areas. Many resolutions and policy recommendations have emerged from this intergovernmental security collaboration on every one of those themes, together with the commendation of major regional conventions bearing on transit migrants, providing services, like procedures for deportation information and orientation of security agencies on transit migrants challenges, deportations of transit migrants through normal channels, preventing illegal transit migration through the host to other countries with the region, taking help from Intergovernmental institutions for capability building, and developing common positions for four-sided intergovernmental security collaborations, among alternative measures for the EU countries, especially from the angle of Morocco.37 The collaboration between the Kingdom of Morocco and EU countries and destination countries has led to regular follow-up consultations with help from the European Commission within the EU region. The strategic consultation and collaboration have been followed by an intergovernmental security collaboration in Marrakesh, Morocco in 2017. At the Marrakesh intergovernmental security collaboration, Morocco joined the group and, for the first time, transit migrant’s destination countries attended as observers (European countries like Spain, Germany, and Italy, amongst others.).38 The strategic intergovernmental security collaboration was a vital revolution because it created a means to interact in security collaboration with destination countries in Europe. It was a vital upshot because it centered on the matter of deportation, security, and trafficking of transit migrants and expressly recognized the term, ‘Transit Migrants’ as characterizing migrants’ flows to EU countries.39 More recently, in early 2017, the Intergovernmental Strategy on Combating Illegal Migration, supported by other countries in the EU region, was implemented by the Moroccan government. The Moroccan government focused on

 Ibid.  Ibid, UNGA, 2018. 37  Thorsen, Dorte. “Is Europe really the dream? Contingent paths among sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco”. Africa 87, no. 2 (2017): 343–361 38  Ibid, Lahlou, 2018. 39  Roman, Emanuela et al. “Investigating Cognitive and Normative Frames of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Stakeholders on Migration and Mobility Issues, in Their Relations with the EU”, in MEDRESET Methodology and Concept Papers, No. 6 (September), 2017. http://www.medreset. eu/?p=13445 35 36

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the difficulty of ‘Transit Migration with Dignity’ and every aspect of transit migrant that collide with the security of the host countries.40 Morocco affirmed the mutual interest of building security, restricting and deporting citizens of countries in managing the transit migrants within its borders. Therefore, this would sustain bilateral and intergovernmental security collaboration to create viable security against any form of external attack to the host nations and destination countries, in conjunction with support from EU countries and regional and international organizations. Key areas for cooperation highlighted within the treaty signed were: (a) working transit migrants managing security policies and therefore the formulation of rules and laws that change legal, humane, and orderly transit migrants; (b) streamlining of security policy, legal, and institutional mechanisms to eliminate unethical practices regarding transit migrant borders, promote transparency within the security agencies, strengthen observance and superintendence of accomplishment managing transit migrants operations; and (c) building capability within Morocco and host countries to capture and deport transit migrants to their home countries through formal security exchange and regular consultations.41 Moroccan consultations between the North African regional host countries and the destination countries formed a part of the Morocco–EU and Destination Security collaboration on Transit Migrants organized by the European Commission.42 The main focus was on managing transit migrants between Morocco and, therefore, the EU host countries to facilitate security and legal transit migrants’ quality between Morocco and the destination EU countries and support security in hosting and receiving countries.43 Morocco’s 2014 transit migration policy was another vital milestone that also helped in consultations on transit migrants in the country.44 It informed the inter-­ governmental strategic security and reaffirmed the importance of intergovernmental collaboration within the North African region and, therefore, the joint responsibility of North African nations of origin and destination in managing transit migrants’ flows.45 All the countries serving as host countries always participate during these security collaborations.

 Harrami, Noureddine and Mouna, Khalid. Migratory Management in Morocco – What Do the Stakeholders Think? MEDRESET Working Papers, No. 20, September 2018. 41  European Commission. Maximizing the Development Impact of Transit migration: The EU contribution for the UN High-level Dialogue and next steps towards broadening the developmentTransit migration nexus, COM(2013) 292 final, Communication from the Commission, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 21.5.2013. 42  Ibid, Roman et al; 2017. 43  Ibid, Cherti and Collyer, 2015. 44  Natter, Katharina. The Formation of Morocco’s policy towards Irregular Migration (200–2007): Political Rationale and Policy Processes. International Migration 52, no. 5(2014): 15–28. 45  Andersson, Ruben. Europe’s Failed ‘Fight’ Against Irregular Migration: Ethnographic Notes on a Counterproductive Industry. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42, no. 7 (2016): 1055–1075. 40

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One of the most significant areas in Morocco’s consultative security collaboration with the regional countries in North Africa was the growing number of transit migrants within the region, especially in Morocco. This led to the need to address future insecurity and generate strategic legal processes in receiving and hosting transit migrants from different countries. It also raised collaboration and partnership to manage such transit migrants’ flows.46 The intergovernmental security collaboration recognized the importance of strengthening the ability to manage transit migrants. To contend globally and improve the security process to attain the most effective security outcomes, security agencies ought to be given smart information and dealing conditions concerning transit migrants. Furthermore, intergovernmental security collaborations and operations ought to be clear and in accordance with national laws and laws of nations of origin, host, and destination countries, whose remittances ought to be expedited. The Moroccan intergovernmental security collaboration with other countries in the EU and North African region highlighted the requirement for tripartite cooperation to facilitate temporary written agreement as regards the transit migrants. Overall, several of the challenges that were mentioned, as well as the resolutions and suggestions, were addressed through this intergovernmental security collaboration with other host North African region and destinations countries. Morocco had been set to launch a brand-new intergovernmental security collaboration approach to handle legal transit migrants’ laws with the destination countries. Specific partnerships were known for this purpose with the target of promoting intergovernmental security collaboration information sharing, capability building, technical security cooperation, and intergovernmental security collaboration.47 These known intergovernmental security collaboration and partnerships included: (1) building content within the region concerning transit migrants’ trends, capability profiles, and legal policies; (2) capability building to fight and manage the transit migrants within the region; (3) preventing outlaw accomplishment practices and promoting intergovernmental security collaboration and protection measures for the contacted treaty in each origin, host, and destination countries; (4) developing a comprehensive intergovernmental security collaboration framework to manage temporary written agreements for the mutual advantage of the host and destination countries.48 As is obvious, the known areas for collaboration all relate to the maximization of security and legal framework to host and origin countries, with the involvement of all relevant stakeholders and countries. Morocco had been set to continue this

 Monterisi, Sara. Africa: Comparative analysis of the mapped bilateral agreements concluded by African countries: Draft report prepared for the ILO-KNOMAD Thematic Working Group on Low Skilled Transit migration, Labor Transit migration Branch, Geneva, 2014. 47  Natter, Katharina. “The Formation of Morocco’s Policy Towards Irregular Migration (2000– 2007): Political Rationale and Policy Processes.” International Migration 52, no. 5 (2014b): 15–28. 48  Natter, Katharina. Fifty Years of Maghreb Emigration: How States Shaped Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian Emigration. DEMIG working paper. Oxford: International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, 2014a. 46

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c­ ollaboration with additional consultations within the North African countries and destination countries with help from the EU.49 Both the strategic security collaboration and consultations indicate that there has been a gradual evolution within the approach to transit migrants from unilateral management to regional collaboration among host countries and, recently, to regional collaboration among origin, host, and destination countries. Thus, the extent of intergovernmental security collaboration has been systematically widened and, therefore, the role of a wider variety of stakeholders from the Moroccan government for managing transit migrants effectively is being expressly recognized within the North African region. While these intergovernmental security collaborations are informal and non-binding, they provide a forum to debate about security operation and protection, the relationship between security and transit migration; issues that have been the main focus of intergovernmental security collaborations and wider intergovernmental discussions on transit migrants, such as the Moroccan Forum on Transit Migration.50 The Moroccan government expedited a lot of discussion on transit migrants’ sensitive problems. However, it may be that a selected characteristic of the intergovernmental security collaborations in Morocco is the importance of a temporary written agreement among regional countries’ transit migrants’ flows, especially because of the presence of a number of the host destination and countries for such movement among the EU countries. This causes problems with irregular security measures against transit migration, as well as the future security strategic process. These are all pertinent to any discussions on transit migrants’ management in Morocco, given the magnitude of the transit migrants’ flows within Morocco and in the region.

 oroccan Bilateral Approaches (BLAS) and Memorandum M of Understands (MOUS) in Managing Transit Migrants Although Morocco has become a more active participant in regional security collaborations and forums on transit migration and security, there has been very little concrete action ensuing from these consultations in reducing the transit migrants in all the borders of the country. There has been comparatively additional progress at the bilateral security level, through the institution of bilateral security arrangement and memorandum of understanding (MoU), formal and informal, binding and non-­ binding with the other North African countries and destination countries.51 In recent

 Ibid, de Haas, 2014.  Berriane, Mohamed, M. Aderghal, M. Idrissi Janati, and Berriane, Johara. “Immigration to Fes: The Meaning of the New Dynamics of the Euro-African Migratory System.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 34, no. 5 (2013): 486–502. 51  Ustubici, Ayşen. 2014. “Mobilization for the Rights of ‘Sans-Papiers’: Political Incorporation of Irregular Migrants in Morocco.” Moroccan Migrations Workshop Paper. Fez, May 2014. Accessed February 15, 2015. http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/events/moroccan-migrations/papers/ustubici.pdf 49 50

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years, the Moroccan government has signed bilateral agreements within the variety of security arrangement agreements or MoUs with key host countries or destination partner nations within and outside the North African region. These security agreements supplement national transit migration policies and legislative frameworks because of the regional informative mechanisms.52 Some of the foremost active countries in this regard are Portugal and Spain, which have signed MoUs with key supply countries such as North African countries, Mali, Niger, Chad, Libya, Algeria, and Mauritania to manage transit migrants’ flows from other African nations. Morocco has signed MoUs with many African nations for intergovernmental cooperation in the accomplishment of transit migrants; and border control has entered into MoUs with Mali, Niger, Chad, Libya, Algeria, and Mauritania under its strategic security system.53 These agreements are being engaged by the host countries to deal with the immediate and long term control and management of transit migrants to avoid the security risks. These agreements have been signed to facilitate and regulate transit migrants within the host countries and borders, keeping in mind political and strategic interests and cultural and historical links with countries involved, and dealing with issues specific to the bilateral relationship.54 These agreements reinforce the role of security agencies within the accomplishment strategies and ensure adherence to regional and international conventions for the protection of the local population against the security risk from transit migrants. Critical host countries for transit migrants, like Morocco, have MoUs with other major host receiving countries, together with Mali, Niger, Chad, Libya, Algeria, and Mauritania, to ensure the protection of borders against terrorism or other threats. Different Sub-Saharan countries and Morocco have agreed to MoUs with destination countries within the geographical area.55 The BLAs and MoUs primarily draw upon the IOM. Most African countries within the region have tried to include the broad objectives embarked on within the AU and IOM agreement, including: (a) Regularization of interstate transit migrants’ flows (b) Exchange of strategic security information about the transit migrants (c) Assistance within the security of accomplishment, deportation, and certification of transit migrants (d) Protecting the rights and safety of transit migrants and imposing early warning mechanism conditions within the destination countries

 Ibid, Natter, 2014b.  Üstübici, Ayşen and İçduygu, Ahmet. “Border closures and the externalization of immigration controls in the Mediterranean: a comparative analysis of Morocco and Turkey”. New Perspectives on Turkey 60 (2019): 179–202 54  Norman, Kelsey P. 2019 Inclusion, exclusion or indifference? Redefining migrant and refugee host state engagement options in Mediterranean ‘transit’ countries. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45, no. 1 (2019): 42–60. 55  Gazzotti, Lorena. From irregular migration to radicalization? Fragile borders, securitized development and the government of Moroccan youth, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45, no. 15 (2018): 2888–2909. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1493914 52 53

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(e) Facilitating simultaneously gathering of information, creating networks, and building capital against the transit migrants (f) Building provisions to traumatized transit migrants without documents (g) Designing social security arrangements for transit migrants (h) Building cordial operating relationships between the various state actors, thereby ensuring some co-operation between the transit migrants’ connection and host countries and imposing the reciprocity in agreement to security provisions of the bilateral arrangements. There have been arrangements made to deal with the particular security interests and issues of the transit migrants’ host and receiving countries. However, the fundamental security framework has, by and large, been adopted from the North African regional agreement.56 Some countries have been introduced to ensure the operation of those agreements with relation to accomplishment and exchange of information between the host and receiving countries. However, in general, these agreements have suffered from weak social security control mechanisms and focus on accomplishment and readying rather than on security and protection problems. These security agreements are largely temporary, confirming the recognized importance of temporary written security agreements against transit migrants within the North African region. The problems addressed are those that are most pertinent to border security and are also almost like those addressed by the various regional security consultations on transit migration. Most of the problems that are addressed embrace the accomplishment of trans-border security agencies through intergovernmental cooperation, preventing irregular transit migration, regulation of the role of security agencies, and their protection. The countries that feature most in these agreements are Algeria and Mauritania. It is fascinating to note that within the case of transit migration to the North African region, especially to Morocco, the security initiative has been taken principally by the receiving countries of Europe, involving all the prominent supply and host countries like Morocco. On the other hand, within the case of transit migration to the North African countries, the security initiative has been taken principally by the regional countries in the geographical area. Although the transit migrants’ problems addressed are similar across various North African countries, there are some interesting security variations. The security agreements involving the destination countries primarily tend to specialize in security connected problems, whereas those involving European destination countries cover problems with irregular transit migration. It is important to note that a number of these MoUs are two-way in the sense that they specialize in orderly transit migration and respect of transit migrants’ rights in each direction, though, by and large, these security arrangements tend to be autonomous in their focus. Another notable feature that emerges is that MoUs are more common than bilateral security agreements. This indicates the preference of the African countries to exchange MoUs as opposed to quite formal BLAs. While BLAs are formal, de jure binding security treaties tend to be a lot more comprehensive in coverage with

56

 Ibid, de Haas, 2014.

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p­ rovisions for countries of origin to own higher access to the destination country, MoUs are non-binding with the extent of commitment relying entirely on the African countries that sign them and the levels of security co-operation they are willing to provide on a mutual basis. The preference for MoUs over BLAs among African countries possibly indicates the fact that MoUs are considered easier to exchange or negotiate and relatively more versatile. They will be comparatively less effective than BLAs due to their non-binding nature. BLAs, on the other hand, are rigid and tougher to negotiate. They are typically more comprehensive in their coverage and have provisions for the African countries of origin to own higher access to the destination transit migrants. The capability of African countries suggests that there is a higher tendency to get together through loose arrangements like MoUs instead of security borders binding commitments.57 Mali, Niger, Chad, Libya, Algeria, and Mauritania and the Kingdom of Morocco have MoUs with many countries from Africa and Europe. Morocco, however, has entered into bilateral agreements on transit migration.

 orocco as a Host Country: Policies to Manage Transit M Migration There is substantial variation in transit migration management security policies and frameworks across the country in Morocco. This country has had integrated security policies and elaborate institutional security mechanisms to manage transit migration. The security approach put in place by the Moroccan government has involved a logical security system, taking part in a crucial role and rendering the transit migration system subject to issues of deportation and different punishment. The country transit migration security policies and transit migrants’ accomplishment security strategies have principally been supported by its bilateral security agreements with origin countries, as mentioned earlier. The Moroccan government has, however, made concerted efforts in its security approach to managing transit migration, starting from security communication bilateral agreements with the key origin and destination countries and introducing laws to regularize transit migrants, to imposing bans on any security officers and agencies collecting things like bribes from transit migrants, cracking down on security officers involved in the manipulation of non-deporting transit migrants. The Moroccan government has experimented with numerous security mechanisms in addition to establishing a Special Task Force on transit migrants. In recent years, however, the Moroccan government has shifted to a security approach just like that followed by other host countries. It has instituted a security

 Aderghal, Mohammed. “Discours, images et opinions sur l’émigration au Maroc.” In Marocains de l’extérieur  – 2013, edited by Mohamed Berriane, 139–158. Rabat: Observatoire de la Communauté Marocaine Résidant à l’Etranger, 2014.

57

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system to reduce its dependence on high flow transit migrants and introduced a strict policies system and strong internal social security control measures to manage transit migration. Underneath the security system, foreign security support to Morocco has been quite helpful. The Moroccan government has introduced measures to keep away transit migrants as they constitute the prosecution within her jurisdiction. Therefore, many transit migrants have been subjected to prosecution and jailing. However, Morocco transit migration security management policies and frameworks are subject to abundant criticism due to issues of implementation, poor coordination, and conflicting security policies across completely different intergovernmental security agencies from different countries, and lack of consistency. Nonetheless, the establishment of institutional security mechanisms and coordination efforts with vital host countries may lead to limitations within the transit migration security frameworks of Morocco. One major drawback is the continuing lack of correct and effective security implementation of transit migration policies. This is evident in previous discussions on issues arising from unregulated security negotiation and consultative security practices by Moroccan security agencies. National transit migration security policies in the country are also undermined by the absence of an overall regional transit migration security framework, given the fact that security policies in one country affect transit migration into and out of the opposite countries within the region. The several security issues that countries in the region are attempting to handle within the context of transit migration also constitute a major drawback.

Conclusion Given the security dimensions of cross-border transit migration in Morocco and the presence of several the foremost necessary flow and host by Morocco in the North African region, the potential gains from the management of transit migrants are important. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Morocco‘s geographic area is moving from impromptu unilateral security approaches to managing transit migration flows towards bilateral security approaches and, more recently, towards regional cooperation and collaboration with other host North African countries, although national transit migration security policies remain the top priority. The country’s experiences indicate that entry into bilateral security agreements and MoUs on transit migration alone is not enough. It must be supported by the institution of country-­ level institutional security mechanisms, coordination with security agencies to determine transit migrants and develop strong desires, and strong capability to manage transit migration effectively. Such steps are now being taken, albeit to totally different levels, by the Moroccan government with security reforms in governance processes. The country’s examples reveal a twin approach to managing transit migration, counting on the ability and activity profile of transit migration. While the movement is addressed through security integration arrangements, managing the transit

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­ igration is being pursued through bilateral security agreements and MoUs. Going m forward, Morocco’s regional cooperation on transit migration will play a very important role, given Morocco’s growing security significance as an engine of protection for the local population against security threats within the country. However, progress on security is probably going to stay under such security integration arrangements, in addition to being under the IOM and AU. Hence, it is going to be helpful for Morocco to adopt the most effective security practices from bilateral security agreements signed by countries in different regions to control transit migrants. Overall, security agreements on transit migrants are to be pursued at the regional and bilateral levels.

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Chapter 8

IDPs of Boko Haram War, Emergency Rehabilitation and Human Rights Practice in Nigeria James Olusegun Adeyeri and Jackson A. Aluede

Introduction The outbreak of the Boko Haran insurgency in the north-eastern part of Nigeria, since the first decade of the twenty-first century, has impacted negatively on the region, and more importantly, on the people. The insurgency has resulted in the loss of lives and property, ruined the economic activities of the people, created fear and tension, and likewise led to the displacement of millions of people, particularly women and children within and beyond the borders of the affected states.1 Since the Boko Haram insurgency started in the north-eastern part of the country in 2009, following the killing of the leader and founder of the Islamic sect Mohammed Yusuf the same year, the escalating nature of the insurgency compelled the Nigerian government to deploy the military to curtail the threat the terrorist group posed to the country and its citizens. Similarly, the Nigerian government, in conjunction with her immediate neighbors in the north-eastern part of the country, namely, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, established a Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) to checkmate the threat and spread of the Islamic terrorist group within and beyond their borders.2 After a decade of the outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency, there are conflicting accounts concerning the extent to which the Nigerian military and MJTF have been able to tackle the terrorist group’s challenge. While the Nigerian military and the MJTF claim that they had regained the territories previously held by the Islamic 1  Medinat A. Abdulazeez and Temitope B. Oriola, “Criminogenic Patterns in the Management of Boko Haram’s Human Displacement Situation” in Third Worldly Quarterly 39, no. 1 (..): 88. 2  Isaac Olawale Albert, Rethinking the Functionality of the Multinational Joint Task Force in Managing the Boko Haram Crisis in the Lake Chad Basin Africa Development, vol. XLII, no. 3, (2017): 123–124

J. O. Adeyeri (*) · J. A. Aluede Anchor University, Lagos, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. O. Abidde (ed.), The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56650-0_8

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terrorist group, on the other hand, the group’s leaders are quick to refute the claims citing areas or territories within the northeast still under their control. This notwithstanding, however, a major concern of the Boko Haram insurgency in the north-eastern part of Nigeria is the profusion in the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) arising from the conflict and scattered within and beyond the region into neighboring countries sharing boundaries with Nigeria. According to the 2017 Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of “Internally Displaced Persons” in Nigeria: … There were more than 2.2 million persons in the country who had been internally displaced as a result of the conflict with Boko Haram, 1.4 million of them in Borno State. Some 186, 000 took refuge in neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger. As of August 2016, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) has managing 15 official camps for internally displaced persons in the newly recovered and accessible areas around Borno State, containing over 300, 000 such persons. There are several other non-official and camp-like settlements in Adamawa and Borno.3

Furthermore, more worrisome is the neglect of humanitarian assistance and basic social amenities needed to improve the living conditions of the IDPs in their respective camps, as well as human right abuses inflicted on the IDPs, especially women and the girl child, by men and officers of the military, the staff of the relief agency saddled with the responsibilities to cater for IDPs and also, abuses by the Boko Haram terrorist group through sporadic attacks on some of the IDPs camps.4 The neglect and abuse suffered by the IDPs in the northeast, arising from the Boko Haram insurgency, raises some fundamental issues on the state and nature of human rights practices in Nigeria. It is imperative to state that since the country returned to democratic rule in 1999, efforts had been made by successive administrations, from President Olusegun Obasanjo to the present administration of Muhammadu Buhari, to improve Nigeria’s human rights practices. For instance, the Obasanjo administration initiated and carried out several reforms to address human rights abuses suffered by Nigerians— there were investigations of past human rights abuses through the Oputa Panel and attempts to reform the justice system, among others.5 Obasanjo’s successors, namely, President Umaru Yar’Adua, Goodluck Jonathan, and the incumbent, Mohammadu Buhari, have likewise made similar efforts to address issues affecting human rights practices and the entrenchment of the rule of law. However, each of these administrations has been found culpable in gross human rights abuses against 3  Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons on his Mission to Nigeria, United Nations (UN), General Assembly, 2017 4  Patricia McIlreavy and Julien Schopp “A collective shame: the response to the humanitarian crisis in north-eastern Nigeria” in Humanitarian Exchange no. 70 (2017): 10, Hindatu Maigari Yerima and D.S.  Ranjit Singh, “Insurgency in Nigeria: The Perspectives on Health Care Delivery to Gender Affected Victims amongst IDPs” IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, vol. 22, no 5, (2017): 39 Faith Osasumwen et al., “Boko Haram Insurgency and the Management Internally Displaced Women in Nigeria: A Focus Situation”, in African Population Studies, vol. 32, no. 1 (2018): 4028–4029 5  Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Nigeria 2000

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its citizens. President Obasanjo’s authorization of the military invasion of Odi town in Bayelsa State in 1999 was locally and internationally condemned.6 In the same vein, the local and international community decried the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the Boko Haram Islamic sect, during the Umaru Yar’Adua administration in 2009.7 The Jonathan administration was accused of human rights abuses for the manner the officers and men of the Nigerian military were treating captured Boko Haram fighters under their custody.8 The present administration is confronted with human rights abuses, particularly the inability of the administration to address human abuses and violations of the rights of the IDPs scattered in various camps in the north-eastern part of the country and neighboring countries. Thus, this chapter focuses on the plight and violations of human rights of IDPs of the Boko Haram War during the government’s emergency rehabilitation and counterinsurgency operations in the northeast region of the country. The work commences with clarifications of some concepts that are key to the study. Furthermore, it embarks on an overview of the IPDs phenomenon globally, examines the effect of the Boko Insurgency on IDPs in the north-eastern part of the country, efforts of the Nigerian government to rehabilitate the IDPs in their respective camps in the region, the humanitarian needs denied the IDPs as well as the human rights abuses suffered by them. Lastly, it considers the relevant international and local instruments for the protection of the rights of IDPs and the extent to which the Nigerian government has adhered to these instruments.

Conceptual Clarifications Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) For clarity and understanding of some concepts that will run through this chapter and the sense in which they will be used, it is important to explain these concepts properly at this juncture. “Internally Displaced Persons” (IDPs), according to the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, are “persons or groups of persons” who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result ofor to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally

6  The Punch, “Odi massacre: Anyone with tribal marks on their chest was slaughtered, corpses littered everywhere –Bolou, former Bayelsa commissioner” December 16, 2017, 1 7  Jackson A. Aluede, “Terrorism in the Lake Chad Region: The Nexus between Land Borders and Expansion of Islamic Fundamentalism” in African Insight 48, no. 3 (2018): 112 8  Human Rights Watch

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recognized State border.9 In recent times, an increase in the number of violent conflicts across the world, as well as the frequency of natural disasters, has contributed immensely to the numbers of IDPs in different parts of the world. Interestingly, in more than 50 countries around the world, some 26 million individuals are uprooted from their homes and displaced in their own countries because of conflict or human rights violations. In addition, natural disasters caused the displacement of 36 million persons worldwide in 2008.10 However, a worrisome consequence, in the increase and expansion in the number of IDPs globally, is the neglect of their needs and the violation of their human rights, even by their government. This is common in developing countries and countries with poor human rights records. The leaders of the governments of some of these countries fail to realize that IDPs are part of the broader civilian population that needs protection and assistance because of conflict and human rights abuses or due to natural disasters.11 It is pertinent to stress here that in Africa, some IDPs were forced to flee their countries to neighboring countries to avoid being caught in communal, ethnic, and religious violent conflicts, particularly in countries in the Mano River and Great Lakes regions, as well as the Lake Chad region in West and Central Africa.12 IDPs, because of their peculiar situation, deserve special attention from their government as well as the international community, but this has not been the case, as ample evidence revealed the horrors many of them faced in their respective camps across the globe. This is the experience of the IDPs of the Boko Haram insurgency in the north-­ eastern part of Nigeria. Some of the IDPs lack humanitarian assistance, suffer poor living conditions, and various abuses, including their basic human rights. In addition, some of the IDPs have been relocated or forced to flee their homes to neighboring countries, namely, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger for safety, to escape the deadly and scary attacks of the Boko Haram terrorist group. Although this work aligns with the definition of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (IDPs), it, however, notes that in some parts of the world, IDPs have been forced to flee their borders to neighboring countries for safety, as the case of the IDPs of Boko Haram War (the main focus of this study) has shown.

9  United Nations (UN), Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, (New York, United Nations, 1998), 53 10  Handbook for the Protection of the Internally Displaced Persons 2006www.unhcr.org. (accessed October, 2019) 11  Ibid. 12  Jackson A. Aluede, “The Cross-Border Dimension of Intrastate Conflicts in Africa: An Analysis of the Great Lakes Region and Mano River Region” in African Borders, Conflict, Regional and Continental Integration edited by Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi (London: Routledge, 2019), 122–123

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Humanitarianism The concept of Humanitarianism entails the principles that provide the foundations for humanitarian actions. It is imperative to state that the objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.13 They are central to establishing and maintaining access to affected people, whether in a natural disaster or a complex emergency, such as armed conflict.14 These principles are critical for promoting and ensuring effective humanitarian coordination all over the world; they include humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.15 Victims of IDPs from different parts of the world have suffered immensely from humanitarian action/operations of their home government and the officials saddled with the task of alleviating their plight. This can be said of IDPs in the north-eastern part of Nigeria that have been forced to flee their homes because of the Boko Haram insurgency. In several IDPs camps, the humanitarian principles that are meant to guide operations and influence relations with the IDPs are not adhered to and this explains the neglect and abuse of the human rights of the IDPs. In the several IDPs camps in Nigeria’s northeast region, as well as neighboring countries, created to house families displaced by the Boko Haram conflict, local and international observers have persistently decried the lack of humanitarian support and assistance to the IDPs.16 The neglect of humanitarian assistance to the IDPs by the Nigerian government, particularly in protecting them from the Boko Haram terrorists and catering to the needs, invariably infringe on their fundamental human rights.

Human Rights Human Rights are commonly understood as being those rights which are inalienable, universal, and inherent to all human beings. The concept of human rights acknowledges that every single human being is entitled to enjoy certain basic rights without distinction as to race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth, or another status.17 Human rights are legally guaranteed by human rights law, protecting individuals and groups against

 Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship www.2wpro.who.int (accessed October, 2019) 14  Simon Bagshaw, OCHA Message: Humanitarian Principles www.un.org (accessed October, 2019) 15  Ibid. 16  Patricia McIlreavy and Julien Schopp “A collective shame: the response to the humanitarian crisis in north-eastern Nigeria”, 10 17  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights: A Basic Handbook for UN Staff United Nations staff College Project, www.unhchr.org (accessed October 31, 2019) 13

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actions that interfere with fundamental freedoms and human dignity. They are expressed in treaties, customary and international laws, bodies of principles, and other sources of law. Unfortunately, some states have failed to respect and honor the human rights of their citizens, especially those who are victims of violent conflicts and natural disasters. IDPs are among the victims whose human rights have been denied and abused. In Nigeria’s northeast region, ample evidence shows the prevalence of widespread violation of human rights to humanitarian support, provision of basic amenities, and sexual abuse by officials of government and the Boko Haram terrorists.

Rehabilitation The concept of Rehabilitation can be viewed from different perspectives, such as rehabilitating people with health issues, prison inmates, and their reintegration into the society as well as soldiers who had been victims of wars (who had sustained injuries).18 On a broader perspective, rehabilitation is the process of removing, or reducing as far as possible, the factors that limit the activity and participation of a person with a disability, so that he/she can attain and maintain the highest possible level of independence and quality of life: physically, mentally, socially, and vocationally.19 The disability faced by IDPs in their respective camps across the world has been documented in the literature, which calls for concerted efforts by states to address these disabilities, namely, poor living conditions, lack of basic amenities, insufficient security personnel to protect them, and the abuse of their human rights.20 In Nigeria’s northeast region, the rehabilitation of IDPs in their respective camps has been castigated by many for falling short of the standard required to rehabilitate peoples who had been forced to flee their homes because of the Boko Haram War. The budget for the IDPs has been very poor, government officials have been involved in corrupt practices with funds allocated for the IDPs, and some of the sites of the camps are in far remote locations that hindered logistics and movement of relief items.21

 John L. Todd, “The Meaning of Rehabilitation” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 80, (1918): 1., Clara Sandoval Villalba, “Rehabilitation as a Form of Reparation Under International Law” REDRESS’ 2009 www.redress.org (accessed 05 November, 2019) 19  Understanding the concept of Rehabilitation: Definition, Aims & Interventions International, Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 20  Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, “Foreword: The 20th anniversary of the Guiding Principles – building solidarity, forging commitment” Forced Migration Review, Iss. 59 (2018): 4 21  Medinat A. Abdulazeez and Temitope B. Oriola, “Criminogenic Patterns in the Management of Boko Haram’s Human Displacement Situation, 88–90. 18

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“Internally Displaced Persons” (IDPs): An Overview In the past two decades, the world has witnessed an astronomical rise in the level of internal displacement in different parts of the world, accompanied by disturbing consequences on the victims, especially women and children. Internal displacement is a byproduct of political instability, religious, communal armed conflict, and violence as well as sudden and slow-onset disasters, a development that has forced many people to flee their homes to other locations in search of safety.22 IDPs fall within the categorization of people that are internally displaced, likewise, refugees. IDPs are people forced to leave their homes but have not crossed an international border. Often persecuted or under attack by their own governments, they are frequently in a more desperate situation than refugees. They also outnumber refugees two to one. No international agency has a formal mandate to aid them. But they are increasingly at the forefront of the humanitarian agenda. They are sometimes called ‘internal refugees,’ but are more often known as internally displaced persons.23

In more than 50 countries around the world, some 24 million individuals are uprooted from their homes and displaced in their own country as a result of conflict or human rights violations.24 In recent times, IDPs have become part of the broader civilian population thatneeds protection and assistance because of conflict and human rights abuses. Most of the victims of IDPs are forced from their homes, many of them experienced specific forms of deprivation, such as loss of shelter, and often face heightened or particular protection risks. These risks may include armed attack and abuse while fleeing in search of safety; family separation, including an increase in the number of separated and unaccompanied children; heightened risk of sexual and gender-based violence, particularly affecting women and children; arbitrary deprivation of land, homes, and other property; and displacement into inhospitable environments, where they suffer stigmas, marginalization, discrimination, or harassment.25 Of all the factors responsible for IDPs, the eruption of violent conflict stands out as the most direct impact in the creation of IDPs centers or camps across the world. The First and Second Wars witnessed the establishment of IDPs camps in different corners of the globe to accommodate and respond to the humanitarian needs or disasters of the internally displaced that had lost their homes and in need of shelter, food, and other necessities of life.26 The trend continued into the post–Cold War era,

 UN MIGRATION (IOM) and International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Global Partnership on Internal Displacement, 2019–2023 Imasuen Emmanuelar, “Insurgency and humanitarian crises in Northern Nigeria: The case of Boko Haram African” Journal of Political Science and International Relations 9, no. 7, (2015). 287–288 23  Internally displaced persons, The State of World’s Refugees 24  Global Protection Cluster, Handbook for the Protection of the Internally Displaced Persons (Geneva, Global Protection Cluster Working Group, 2007), 1 25  Ibid 26  See, Wayne McWilliams and Harry Piotrowski, The World Since 1945: A History of International Relations (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 22

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which witnessed the expansion of violent conflicts across the world, majority of which were intra-state conflicts, except for the United States–led invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003. The violent conflicts resulted in the death of thousands of people, destruction of property and sources of livelihood, and an unprecedented increase in the number of IDPs in the affected states.27 The Balkan region in Eastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and some parts of Africa witnessed various degrees of intrastate conflicts that resulted in the creation of IDP camps to accommodate the homeless and cater to their needs. Concerning Africa, the data on IDPs report shows that internal displacement is truly a development concern: at least 37 of 55 member states of the African Union (AU) are affected and face a challenge to meet national and regional development goals unless internal displacement is addressed.28 Nigeria is one of the countries in Africa confronted with the issues of IDPs. The causes of IDPs in Nigeria are not different from other countries in Africa, as well as other parts of the world. Both human and natural disasters, as well as the eruption of conflict driven by religious, communal, and political differences among Nigerians, have contributed to the expansion of IDPs in different parts of the country. Since the return of the country to democratic rule in 1999, the outbreak of communal and ethnoreligious conflicts, such as the Agulere-Umuleri boundary dispute of 1999, the Urhobo and Itsekiri crisis of 1999, the protracted Ife-Modakeke crisis 2000–2005, Jukun-Tiv ethnic crisis of 1999, Kaduna religious riot of 2000, Kano religious riot of 2001, Jos crisis of 2001, and the Niger Delta crisis, not only resulted in the death of hundreds of persons and the destruction of property, but, likewise the creation of IDPs who either had lost their homes to the crisis or had to flee for their lives to another location.29 Similarly, in recent times, the post-election violence of 2011 saw about 65,000 persons internally displaced in the northern part of the country, just as natural disasters, such as torrential rainfall, witnessed in 2012. According to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) report, from July to October, a total of 2.1 million residents were sacked by floods in Nigeria. The Boko Haram conflict further increased the number of IDPs in the country, particularly in the north-eastern part of the country.30 Since the commencement of the conflict and government’s counter-insurgency operations to curtail the terrorist group’s activities, about two

 Jackson A. Aluede, “The Cross-Border Dimension of Intrastates Conflicts in Africa: An Analysis of the Great Lake Region and Mano River” in African Borders, Conflict, Regional and Continental Integration edited by Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi (London: Routledge, 2019), 115 28  Sorche O′ Callaghan and Chloe Sydney, 2017 Africa Report on Internal Displacement (Addis Ababa: International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2017 (IDMC)), 7 29  Jackson A. Aluede, “The Contribution of the Nigerian Armed Forces to the Internal Security of Lagos State: 1990–2007” Journal of the International Relations and Affairs Group 3, (2013): 124 30  Eweka, Osagioduwa and Olusegun, Toluwanimi Oluwakorede “Management of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa: Comparing Nigeria and Cameroon” African Research Review An International Multidisciplinary Journal, Ethiopia 10 (1), no. 40 (2016): 195 27

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million Nigerians in the north-eastern part of the country had been internally displaced or, better still, had become IDPs in their own country; some relocated to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.31

Boko Haram War and IDPs in North-Eastern Nigeria The Boko Haram war, since its outbreak, has limited itself to the northern part of the country. The insurgency has been entrenched in the north-eastern part of northern Nigeria comprising Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe States, with Adawama, Borno, and Yobe States being the major theater of the conflict between the Islamic terrorist group and the Nigerian state/forces.32 Similarly, the proximity of Nigeria’s northeast region to neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger had not only accounted for the spillover of the conflict to these nearby states but also contributed to the movement of several IDPs from Nigeria to these neighboring countries. The killing of the leader and founder of the Boko Haram Islamic sect, Mohammed Yusuf in 2009, gave impetus to his followers to launch insurgency, backed by external support of other terrorist organizations in the Middle East and North Africa.33 The Boko Haram insurgency in the north-eastern part of Nigeria since its outbreak has received local and international attention for several reasons. First, several works on some of the factors that led to the birth of the Islamic sect and its transformation to a terrorist organization has been extensively documented in large volumes.34 Second, the various approaches and strategies of the Nigerian government to contend with the terrorist group and the aftermath of the counterinsurgency strategies have equally found large space in the literature.35 And, lastly, a major  Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2019 Global Report on Internal Displacement (2019): 18 32  Sam Omadjohwoefe, “Insecurity and Sustainable Development: The Boko Haram Debacle in Nigeria” American International Journal of Social Science 2, no. 7; October (2013): 84, Abimbola, J.O, and Adesote, S.A, “Domestic Terrorism and Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria, Issues and Trends: A Historical Discourse” Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society 4, (2012): 5–9 33  Aliyu Mukhtar Katsina, “Boko Haram, Nigeria and Sub-national Security” Nigerian Journal of Internal Affairs 37, no. 3 (2011): 34. 34  Faith Osasumwem Oviasogie, “State Failure, Terrorism and Global Security: An Appraisal of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria” Journal of Sustainable Society 2, no. 1 (2013): 28, C. Jaja Nwanegbo and Jude Odigbo, “Security and National Development in Nigeria: The Threat of Boko Haram” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 3, no. 4 (2013): 288, Ogege Sam Omadjohwoefe, “Insecurity and Sustainable Development: The Boko Haram Debacle in Nigeria” American International Journal of Social Science 2, no. 7; (2013): 83–84, Adetoro Rasheed Adenrele, “Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria as a Symptom of Poverty and Political Alienation” Journal of Humanities and Social Science (JHSS) 3, 5 (2012): 22–24 35  Okoli, Al Chukwuma and Iortyer, Philip, “Terrorism and Humanitarian Crisis in Nigeria: Insights from Boko Haram Insurgency” Global Journal of Human-Social Science Political Science vol. 14 (2014): 45, M.  Arirabiyi-Ibrahim, Olorunfemi Misahel, Bamako-Mali, “Boko Haram’s Tactics, Targets and Arsenals of Terrorism” African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 31

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c­ onsequence of the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria which has received scholarly attention is the issue of IDPs of the Boko Haram War which has increased significantly since the eruption of the conflict between the Islamic sect and government forces.36 The impact of the Boko Haram insurgency in the north-eastern part of Nigeria since inception has been massive on the people in the region, and more especially on the victims of IDPs. As the 2015 Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General titled “Violations and Abuses Committed by Boko Haram and the Impact on Human Rights in the Countries Affected” affirmed: As at July 15, there were 1.3 million internally displaced persons (56 percent of which are children) in Nigeria (with the State of Borno hosting the largest population): 81,693 displaced persons across four divisions of the far north region in Cameroon; and 18,882 displaced persons in Chad, including returnees from Nigeria, spread across four districts. The internally displaced are held in camps, informal settlements, host communities, with families, in rented houses, in places of worship and public buildings and at border crossings. Consequently, their enjoyment of the rights to education, food, health, shelter, and water and sanitation has been greatly reduced. Numerous displaced children have no access to education, while those who remain in their communities often receive poor quality education owing to insecurity, the lack of teachers (who have fled) and the destruction of schools.37

A recent report on the statistics of IDPs emanating from the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria’s northeast region estimated that over 2 million people, majorly women and children, have been displaced from their home due to the on-going fighting between the terrorist group and the Nigerian military.38 Despite the rehabilitation of IDPs and the creation of IDPs camps in some parts of the northeast, as well as in some locations in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, the majority of the IDPs are deprived of humanitarian and basic needs to live a decent life in their respective

vol. 4 no, 2 (2013): 37–47, International Crisis Group, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency Africa Report no. 216 (2014): 30 – 41Judit BARNA, “Insecurity in context: The rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria” Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies European Parliament (2014): 12–21 36  Fatima Kyari Mohammed, “The Causes and Consequences of Internal Displacement in Nigeria and Related Governance Challenges” Working Paper Division Global Issues Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs (2017): 26–29, Imasuen Emmanuelar, “Insurgency and humanitarian crises in Northern Nigeria: The case of Boko Haram African”, 287–288 37  Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Violations and Abuses committed by Boko Haram and the Impact on Human Rights in the Countries Affected, 2015, 4 38  .“They Betrayed Us” Women who Survived Boko Haram Raped, Starved and Detained in Nigeria Amnesty International (2018): 22–35, Joe Read, “Sexual violence and the Boko Haram crisis in north-east Nigeria” The Lake Chad Basin: an overlooked crisis? Humanitarian Exchange no. 70 (2017): 24–25, Okechukwu innocent Eme, Boko Haram and Population Displacement in Nigeria: A Case for Psychological Input Practicum Psychologia 8, (2018): 81

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camps.39 The IDPs are subjected to human rights abuses and their fundamental human rights are denied by some government officials. The Nigerian government’s inability to cater for them adequately and defend them from the Boko Haram fighters, who occasionally stormed the respective camps to perpetrate atrocities against women and young girls in particular, has furthered raised some pertinent questions on the state of Nigeria’s human rights law to protect the helpless, such as the IDPs, as well as Nigeria’s commitment to domestic and international laws to protect the rights and cater to the needs of the IDPs.40

Emergency Rehabilitation of IDPs of Boko Haram War The Nigerian government’s response to the conflict through emergency rehabilitation of the IDPs has been greeted by mixed feelings from local and international observers, donor agencies, and international institutions, such as Amnesty International and United Nations (UN) agencies.41 This notwithstanding, it is acknowledged that the Nigerian government had established institutions or agencies to respond to victims of internal conflicts and the outbreak of disasters across the country. These structures are meant to respond to the plight and needs of the victims of internal conflicts and disasters from across the country. Apart from the federal government, the state governors across the country had, likewise, established similar institutions and agencies in their states to address or respond to similar crises whenever it occurred in their respective states. At the federal level, the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI) and the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) is saddled with the responsibilities to respond to the emergence and the rehabilitation of victims of natural disasters, communal, ethnic, and religious conflict, as well as the humanitarian needs of IDPs in different parts of the country.42 The NCFRMI was set up through Decree 52 of 1989 (now embedded in Cap. N21, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (NCFRMI Act). The NCFRMI has an internationalist focus. The Act establishing the organization incorporated the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967

 Virginie Roiron, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Politics of Disaster Management in Northeastern Nigeria in Humanitarian Exchange no. 70 (2017): 16, Improving the living conditions of internally displaced persons in Adamawa, North-East Nigeria UN Volunteer 2018, Sara Karimbhoy, The challenges of emergency response in Cameroon’s Far North: humanitarian response in a mixed IDP/refugee Humanitarian Exchange 70, (2017): 29–32 40  Joe Read, “Sexual violence and the Boko Haram crisis in north-east Nigeria” The Lake Chad Basin: an overlooked crisis? Humanitarian Exchange no. 70 (2017): 24–25 41  Bagoni Alhaji Bukar, Nigeria Needs to take Responsibility for its IDPs. General Article FMR 40, 2011 42  Medinat A. Abdulazeez and Temitope B. Oriola, “Criminogenic Patterns in the Management of Boko Haram’s Human Displacement Situation” 88 39

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Protocol and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention governing specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa’. In its original conceptualization, NCFRMI was concerned with protecting and managing the affairs of refugees and persons seeking asylum in Nigeria. Its mission was expanded to encompass IDPs in 2002 and migrants in 2009.43 NEMA, on the other hand, was established in 1999 “via Act 12 as amended by Act 50 of 1999, to manage disasters in Nigeria.” The agency is responsible for crafting policies on the management of disasters, coordinating the response to disasters, and ensuring adequate preparation by all stakeholders.44 These agencies or institutions have been very active in the northeast despite their many challenges. However, they are assisted by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), humanitarian organizations, as well as human rights organizations.45 Interestingly, however, despite the presence of institutions or agencies of government at the federal and the state levels to address the plights of IDPs in the country in general, and in the north-eastern part of the country in particular, the emergency and rehabilitation response and efforts of the Nigerian government have been condemned severally, locally and internationally. The condemnation emanates from the haphazard approach to issues concerning the IDPs in the northeast, non-­ implementation of its policy on IDPs, and a complete disregard for international instruments on the IDPs.46 Similarly, the UN Human Rights Council Report on internal displacement in Nigeria affirmed that essential elements of an effective national response are absent, notably legislative and policy frameworks on internal displacement that are in accordance with international standards, including the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention).47 The report went further to argue that they are urgently required to guide and inform responses and establish the rights of internally displaced persons and the obligations of the national authorities in domestic law. Such legislative and policy frameworks would have a crucial role to establish guidelines on interventions for recovery and durable solutions, to create much-needed clarity regarding the roles and responsibilities of different bodies and agencies, and to ensure coordination as well as establishing and guaranteeing budgets for humanitarian and development initiatives. Existing laws and policies, including the bill establishing the

 Ibid., 89  Ibid. 45  OCHA, Face Sheet North-East Nigeria: Bama LGA (2018), 2–3 46  IDMC, Internal Displacement in Africa: A Development Challenge, Exploring Development Initiatives to Alleviate Displacement Caused by Conflict, Violence and Natural Disasters www. internal-displacement.org (accessed October 30th 2019), Jessica Wyndham, “A Developing Trend: Laws and Policies on Internal Displacement” Human Rights Brief 14, iss. 1 (2006): 8, Patricia McIlreavy and Julien Schopp “A collective shame: the response to the humanitarian crisis in northeastern Nigeria” 10, 47  Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons on his Mission to Nigeria, 43 44

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National Emergency Management Agency, are not sufficient to address the challenges facing internally displaced persons.48

 uman Rights Practice: Local and International Instruments H to Protect the Human Rights of IDPs in Northeast Nigeria Human rights practice in Nigeria, since independence, has gone through several phases of development with respect to the adherence to the rule of law by successive administrations. Unfortunately, the military era has witnessed the worst period of human rights practice in Nigeria’s history. Successive military regimes systematically violated the rights of Nigerians with impunity, as each of the military administrations from Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi to General Abdulsalami Abubakar recorded one human rights abuse or the other.49 However, the military regime of General Sani Abacha stands out in the dark era of human rights practice in Nigeria due to his tyrannical rule that witnessed the killings of innocent citizens, imprisonment of some of its citizens on false allegations, and the assassination of persons opposed to his regime. During his administration, prominent citizens were killed, such as Alfred Rewane, Musa Yar’ Adua, and Mrs. Kudirat Abiola.50 The civilian administrations also have recorded gross violations of human rights of Nigerian citizens, despite the provisions of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Odi invasion by the Obasanjo civilian administration and the extra-judicial killing of the leader of Boko Haram, among others, are just a tip of the iceberg in terms of human rights infractions by various civilian administrations since the return to civil rule in 1999. Interestingly, since the return of the country to democracy, none of the civilian administrations, from President Olusegun Obasanjo to Muhammudu Buhari, had deemed it fit to honor the provisions of Chapter 2 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution tagged Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, which compel the state to cater and provide for the welfare of Nigerians.51 The major reason why this section of the constitution that seeks to promote social and economic rights has not been implemented by successive administrations is partly due to the reckless spending and stealing of public funds.52 Nevertheless, despite the contradictory state of human rights practice in Nigeria since the dawn of the twenty-first century, some measures to improve and protect  Ibid.  Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Action Plan for the Promotion & Protection of Human Rights in Nigeria (2006), 3 50  David Aworawo, “Nigeria from Independence to year 2000” in History and Cultures of Nigeria Up To AD 2000 edited by Akinjide Osuntokun, David Aworawo and Florence Masajuwa (Lagos: Frankad Publishers, 2002), 226 51  0.1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 52  Johnson, Idowu and Salau, Jelil Olawale “Human Rights and Governance in Nigeria, 2011–2015” African Research Review 13, no. 53 (2019): 18 48 49

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the human rights of the citizens were embarked upon by some civilian administrations. The Obasanjo administration, in 1999, began the process of formulating a policy to protect the rights of the citizens. In 2005, the document of National Action Plan for the Promotion & Protection of Human Rights (NAP) in Nigeria was handed over to the President by the Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, who was the Chair of the Steering Committee for the development of NAP. The Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria successfully developed and adopted the NAP,53 which enunciates the human rights of Nigerians and how and where the citizens can seek protection when they have been violated. However, despite the adoption of the policy of the National Action Plan for the Promotion & Protection of Human Rights in Nigeria, the failure to make it statutory, that is, giving it legal backing through the National Assembly, created a vacuum that allowed their operations to be hindered by the various arms of government. In recent times, particularly, with the outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency, one group of people whose human rights have been violated with impunity by the government for failing to cater to their needs and not providing adequate security to protect them from the abuse of Boko Haram fighters are the IDPs. The IDPs in Nigeria’s northeast have suffered all manners of human rights violations, ranging from the non-availability of basic social amenities in their respective camps, sexual abuse from government officials and Boko Haram members, and hostile relations from the host community. The IDPs are variously given poor attention or neglected by the Nigerian government whose responsibility it is to cater to them. This has exposed the government to blame for not complying with local and international instruments on the protection of IDPs. Also, failure of the Nigerian government to give the IDPs law the legislative backing it deserves is seen as a major impediment to the protection of human rights of the IDPs in the northeast region and other parts of the country.

I nternational Instruments for the Protection of the Rights of IDPs The move to protect IDPs through the instrument of international law began 1992, when an analytical report published by the UN Secretary-General in 1992 found that there was “no clear statement” of IDPs’ rights in international law and highlighted the need to create a normative frame of reference for responding to internal displacement.54 Therefore, aware that member-countries might resist the adoption of an international treaty led to the proposal that the Commission on Human Rights

 Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Action Plan for the Promotion & Protection of Human Rights in Nigeria, 30 54  Jacopo Giorgi, “Regulatory Frameworks on Internal Displacement: Global, Regional and National Developments” Global Protection Cluster, (accessed November 7, 2019) 53

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draws up a non-binding instrument with a “comprehensive, universally applicable body of principles” from existing international law to guarantee IDPs’ effective protection and to establish a focal point within the UN human rights system.55 In 1998, the UN approved the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which brought together in one document the main rules of international law, drawn from international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and, by analogy, refugee law, that are relevant to protection in situations of internal displacement. The Guiding Principles set out the rights of IDPs and the responsibilities of States and other authorities towards them.56 Furthermore, these Guiding Principles address the specific needs of internally displaced persons worldwide. They identify rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of persons from forced displacement and to their protection and assistance during displacement, as well as during return or resettlement and reintegration.57 The Principles state the various roles of the UN agencies involved with the assistance of internally displaced persons and those representing the Secretary-­ General, the role of national governments in tackling internally displaced persons in their respective countries, as well as the contributions of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement of the UN serves as the model for regional organizations and countries of the world in addressing the issues of IDPs. These principles have been domesticated by regional organizations and countries to guide them in protecting the rights of IDPs.

 he Kampala Convention and the AU Convention T for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons The unprecedented increase in the number of IDPs emanating from disasters and violent conflicts across Africa and the absence of a policy guide to address the plight of the internally displaced across the continent propelled its leaders to work out an international instrument binding on the continent to protect and assist victims of IDPs. The initiative started in 2004, when the AU Executive Council set out to develop a legal framework for the protection of the rights of IDPs in Africa. Two years later, a draft outline for an IDP convention was endorsed at a ministerial conference in Ouagadougou. After a series of states’ meetings, consultations with African civil society, and international partners, the draft convention on IDPs was adopted at a ministerial meeting in November 2008. The draft was discussed at a

 Ibid.  Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, “Foreword: The 20th anniversary of the Guiding Principles – building solidarity, forging commitment” Forced Migration Reviev, Handbook for the Internally displaced persons, (2007), 16 57  Ibid. 55 56

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meeting of the AU and CSOs and, the following week, the final text of the Kampala Convention was adopted at a special summit held in Kampala on 22–23 October 2009.58 The Kampala Convention, like the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, states the role of national governments in Africa, their agencies and institutions, local and international agencies, and human rights organizations in addressing the plights of IDPs on the continent. The provisions of the Kampala Convention on IDPs in Africa came into force on 6 December 2012, following the accession to the Convention by Swaziland as the 15th ratifying state. The Kampala Convention builds on regional and international standards regarding the protection and assistance of IDPs in Africa. It is a demonstration of the determination of a continent disproportionately affected by internal displacement to put in place legal and institutional frameworks to better protect and assist IDPs.59 AU member countries are enjoined to comply with the provisions of the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons, more also, they are charged to domesticate these provisions of the convention as statutory domestic law.

Local Instruments on IDPs in Nigeria As part of the efforts of the Nigerian government to address the challenges faced by IDPs across the country in line with international law, the country’s leadership, in 2003, set up a committee to draft a National Policy on IDPs to assist in registration and issuance of identity cards, prevention or reduction in instances of internal displacement, and allocation of responsibilities to agencies and organs of government, non-governmental, and civil society organizations. In 2012, the Federal Government of Nigeria launched the National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria. The policy was influenced by the UN Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement of 1998 and the Kampala Convention on Internally Displaced Persons in Africa of 2009. The National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) made provisions for the following: Policy Thrust, Rights and Obligations of IDPs, Responsibilities of Government, Humanitarian Agencies, Host Communities and Armed Groups to IDPs, Policy Implementation Framework and Strategies, Funding, Monitoring and Evaluation, and Policy Review. The national policy on IDPs in Nigeria is complemented by other institutions and agencies saddled with the responsibilities of addressing issues affecting victims of disasters, conflict, and  The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) of the African Union, “Making the Kampala Convention work for IDPs: Guide for Civil Society on Supporting the Ratification and Implementation of the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa”, IDMC (2010): 9–13 59  Minelik Alemu Getahun, “Report of the Draft AU Model Law for the Implementation of the African Union Convention for the Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Africa” Addis Ababa, African Union (2014), 2 58

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displacement. However, a major obstacle affecting IDPs in Nigeria, particularly those in the north-eastern parts, is the failure of the Nigerian government to legislate the national policy on IDPs and human rights. By legislating these policies, the government will/can be compelled to implement its provisions.

Conclusion This chapter examined the plight of IDPs created by the Boko Haram insurgency in the north-eastern part of Nigeria and the state of human rights practice in the country, with particular respect to the protection of the IDPs against rights abuse in the course of government’s emergency rehabilitation response and operations. It revealed the dimensions and deep sufferings of the IDPs, the neglect by the government of its responsibilities to the IDPs, and the gross violations of their human rights by the government and its officials and the Boko Haram terrorists. The study detailed upon the contradictory state of the country’s human rights policy and practice and how this affects the rights of IDPs, particularly the failure of government at the federal level to give legislative backing to some of its regulatory frameworks and policies on human rights and that of the IDPs. The discourse further noted the array of existing international and local instruments for the management of IDPs and protection of their rights and concluded that the failure of the Nigerian state to give necessary statutory backing to some of these policy frameworks is the underlying factor responsible for the slow and weak protection of the rights and catering to the needs of IDPs of the Boko Haram War. Given this, the civil society, NGOs, press, and human rights scholars need to rededicate themselves to the crucial and urgent task of vibrant, consistent, and effective advocacy for the government to provide an enabling environment for credible human rights practice in respect of IDPs and the citizenry in general.

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———. 2018. Terrorism in the Lake Chad Region: The Nexus between Land Borders and Expansion of Islamic Fundamentalism. African Insight 48 (3): 112. ———. 2019a. The Cross-Border Dimension of Intrastate Conflicts in Africa: An Analysis of the Great Lakes Region and Mano River Region. In African Borders, Conflict, Regional and Continental Integration, ed. Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi, 122–123. London: Routledge. ———. 2019b. The Cross-Border Dimension of Intrastates Conflicts in Africa: An Analysis of the Great Lake Region and Mano River. In African Borders, Conflict, Regional and Continental Integration, ed. Inocent Moyo and Christopher Changwe Nshimbi, 115. London: Routledge. Arirabiyi-Ibrahim, M., and Bamako-Mali Olorunfemi Misahel. 2013. Boko Haram’s Tactics, Targets and Arsenals of Terrorism. African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 4 (2): 37–47. Aworawo, David. 2002. Nigeria from Independence to year 2000. In History and Cultures of Nigeria Up to AD 2000, ed. Akinjide Osuntokun, David Aworawo, and Florence Masajuwa. Lagos: Frankad Publishers. Bagshaw, Simon. OCHA Message: Humanitarian Principles www.un.org. Accessed Oct 2019) Barna, Judit. 2014 Insecurity in Context: The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies European Parliament: 12–21. Bagoni Alhaji Bukar, Nigeria Needs to take Responsibility for its IDPs. General Article FMR. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 40, 2011. Emmanuelar, Imasuen. 2015. Insurgency and Humanitarian Crises in Northern Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram African. Journal of Political Science and International Relations 9 (7): 287–288. Eweka, Osagioduwa, and Toluwanimi Oluwakorede Olusegun. 2016. Management of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa: Comparing Nigeria and Cameroon. African Research Review An International Multidisciplinary Journal, Ethiopia 10 (1)., no. 40: 195. Federal Republic of Nigeria. 2006. National Action Plan for the Promotion & Protection of Human Rights in Nigeria 3. Getahun, Minelik Alemu. 2014. Report of the Draft AU Model Law for the Implementation of the African Union Convention for the Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. Addis Ababa, African Union, 2. Jacopo Giorgi. “Regulatory Frameworks on Internal Displacement: Global, Regional and National Developments” Global Protection Cluster, https://www.globalprotectioncluster. orgfiles>unchcr-gpc-regional-framework-idp. Global Protection Cluster. 2007. Handbook for the Protection of the Internally Displaced Persons, 1. Geneva: Global Protection Cluster Working Group. Handbook for the Protection of the Internally Displaced Persons .2006. www.unhcr.org. Accessed Oct 2019. Human Rights Council. 2000. Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons on his Mission to Nigeria. Geneva: Human Rights Watch Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Nigeria. ———. 2017. Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons on his Mission to Nigeria, United Nations (UN), General Assembly. IDMC, Internal Displacement in Africa: A Development Challenge, Exploring Development Initiatives to Alleviate Displacement Caused by Conflict, Violence and Natural Disasters www. internal-displacement.org. Accessed 30 Oct 2019. Improving the living conditions of internally displaced persons in Adamawa, North-East Nigeria UN Volunteer 2018, Sara Karimbhoy, The challenges of emergency response in Cameroon’s Far North: humanitarian response in a mixed IDP/refugee Humanitarian Exchange no. 70 (2017): 29–32. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). 2019. 2019 Global Report on Internal Displacement: 18. Internally displaced persons, The State of World’s Refugees.

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Chapter 9

Tenuous Refuge: Probing Links Between (Il)legality of Urban Refugees in Kenya, Refugee Supports, and Host Country Integration Danielle Huot, Brent Doberstein, and Carrie Mitchell

Introduction Sub-Saharan Africa is a highly mobile region where large-scale displacement is common. As noted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “the iconic image of refugees [has been] row upon row of white tents in a sprawling emergency camp.”1 However, this visual no longer provides an accurate picture of forced migration. Globally, refugee populations are rapidly urbanizing, with approximately 60%2 of the world’s 26 million refugees3 living in cities and towns rather than designated rural encampment areas in 2019. Since the early 1990s, Kenya has operated under an unsanctioned encampment policy that deems all refugees must reside in camps, the most notable of these being Dadaab and Kakuma.4 1  UNHCR, Urban refugees: trying to get by in the city (2014). Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr. org/pages/4b0e4cba6.html 2  Centre for International Governance Innovation, Refugees and the city: The twenty-first century frontline. (2018) https://www.cigionline.org/publications/refugees-and-city-twenty-first-centuryfront-line 3  UNHCR, Figures at a glance.(2020) https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html 4  Pavanello, S., Elhawary, S., & Pantuliano, S. (2010). Hidden and exposed: urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya. Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper. London.; Refugees Bill, The. (2011). Republic of Kenya www.cickenya.org/index.../198_1428153dc672e0aba7fe5417b9d856de

D. Huot (*) United Nations Development Programme, Kabul, Afghanistan B. Doberstein Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada e-mail: [email protected] C. Mitchell School of Planning, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. O. Abidde (ed.), The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56650-0_9

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Despite this, in keeping with global trends, a growing proportion of Kenya’s refugees now reside in urban areas, particularly Nairobi. Official figures state that Nairobi is home to approximately 81,000 refugees, or approximately 7% of the total Kenyan refugee population.5 These statistics, however, do not account for the thousands of unregistered refugees in the city, and some unofficial estimates hover upward of 100,000.6 As a relatively stable country in a region beset with conflict and insecurity, Kenya has long been a destination for asylum seekers. The period from 1960 to 1980 has been called the “golden age of asylum” in Africa insofar as governments were generally hospitable to refugees, allowing the displaced to cross borders and access a range of socioeconomic and legal rights.7 During this time, Kenya hosted moderate numbers of refugees who enjoyed freedom of movement and access to the formal economy and national education systems.8 In the early 1990s, ongoing humanitarian and political crises in neighboring countries such as Somalia and Sudan spurred the beginning of a large-scale wave of refugee movement into Kenya.9 Today, Kenya is home to approximately 500,000 refugees.10 The situation in Kenya aligns with two broader trends throughout sub-Saharan Africa; the first is a dramatic increase in arrivals and the second a progressive erosion of the hospitable regimes previously observed by host governments. Sharp expansions in people displaced to Kenya have led to an increasingly hostile atmosphere for refugees, with heightened levels of xenophobia, routine denial of basic rights, and few opportunities for local integration.11 The Kenyan example thus juxtaposes the emerging problem of urban refugees with, in many cases, deteriorating sociopolitical conditions for the displaced. Refugees in urban areas present myriad challenges for governing institutions regarding management, protection, and socioeconomic support, largely because there is no effective way to monitor or regulate urban refugee movement and activity. Urban refugee communities are often referred to as “hidden,” “forgotten,” and “invisible,” as they are economically autonomous, highly mobile, and culturally diverse and have a large unregistered subset. Nairobi’s refugees are notoriously undersupported with regard to legal documentation, which creates numerous problems in accessing formal employment, public

 UNHCR Kenya. Figures at a glance. (2020) https://www.unhcr.org/ke/figures-at-a-glance  Campbell, E., Crisp, J., & Kiragu, E. (2011). Navigating Nairobi: a review of the implementation of UNHCR’s urban refugee policy in Kenya’s capital city. Geneva: UN High Commissioner for Refugees Policy Development and Evaluation Service 7  Crisp, J. (2010). Forced displacement in Africa: dimensions, difficulties, and policy directions. Refugee Survey Quarterly (29): 1–27 8  Campbell, E. (2006). Urban refugees in Nairobi: problems of protection, mechanisms of survival, and possibilities for integration. Journal of Refugee Studies (19): 396–413 9  Ibid, Pavanello, S., Elhawary, S., & Pantuliano, S., 2010 10  UNHCR (2020). Figures at a glance. https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html 11  Ibid, Crisp, 2010; Ibid, Pavanello, Elhawary, & Pantuliano, S, 2010 5 6

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education, and support structures.12 Without documentation, refugees have no access to fundamental rights and, as a result, are commonly detained or deported when intercepted by Kenyan police, military, or immigration officials. Furthermore, documentation is integral to refugee livelihoods, as legality is a requirement of registration for primary school, applying for a work permit, and accessing health services. As a signatory to the United Nations (UN) 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (henceforth referred to as the 1951 Convention), people displaced to Kenya have several rights as both asylum seekers and legal refugees. Specifically, the Convention entitles refugees to education, employment, public services, housing, freedom of movement, legal documentation, and non-refoulement, which bans forced repatriation to unsafe countries.13 Deriving from UN Conventions interdependent with the 1951 Convention, Kenya has the additional obligation of preventing and punishing human rights abuses committed against all people inside their borders, including refugees and asylum seekers.14 Though the 1951 Convention affords refugees these rights regardless of where they reside, the Government of Kenya’s (GoK) encampment policy makes it difficult for the UNHCR to offer forthright assistance to refugees outside camps. As such, Kenya’s urban refugees are commonly denied material supports and services and are largely unable to exercise their Convention rights. The tension between the 1951 Convention and Kenyan national policy means urban refugees fall into a legal impasse, as neither the UNHCR nor the Kenyan government fully protects and supports them. This chapter explores the legality of refugees outside of encampment areas in Kenya, focusing specifically on the degree to which urban refugee populations in Nairobi can access rights conferred to them by the 1951 Convention. The chapter first gives a brief explanation of the urban case study examined and the research methods used for data collection. Following this, the empirical evidence is examined.

Methods and Context Primary data collection for this research took place over several months spanning 2011–2012 in Eastleigh, a densely populated neighborhood in central Nairobi that is home to most of the city’s urban refugee population. Primary data collection was coupled with a literature review of articles from 2002 to 2017. Though large  Campbell, 2006; Kobia, K. & Cranfield, L. (2009). Literature review: urban refugees. Refugees Branch, Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/4b0a528c9. pdf; UNHCR (2018) Global trends: Forced Displacement in 2018. https://www.unhcr. org/5d08d7ee7.pdf 13  UNHCR (2011). The 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 protocol. Geneva: UNHCR 14  Human Rights Watch. (2002). Hidden in plain view: refugees living without protection in Nairobi and Kampala. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch 12

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factions of unregistered refugees make it impossible to cite a numerical breakdown of ethnicities in the area, Somali nationals are thought to comprise the majority of the neighborhood’s population, followed by an Ethiopian Oromo community, with minorities from the DRC, Eritrea, and South Sudan.15 Eastleigh is one of the most densely populated, low-income areas in Nairobi and is characterized by unregulated development and flourishing informal markets. Qualitative, in-depth, semi-­ structured interviews were conducted with 32 refugee participants of Somali, Ethiopian, and Eritrean descent. Each interview lasted approximately 30 min to one and a half hours and was conducted in the language the interviewee was most comfortable with. A local translator/research assistant conducted many of the interviews, and this paper’s first author was present for all interviews.

Refugees in an Urban Environment The Historical Context of Kenya’s Refugee Regime Until the early 1990s, Kenya hosted approximately 12,000 refugees, and the environment was relatively safe and welcoming.16 There were no camps; rather, refugees and asylum seekers were allowed to settle in a place of their choosing and were granted full status rights.17 However, spurred by humanitarian and political crises in the neighboring countries of Somalia and Sudan, the early 1990s saw the beginning of a large-scale wave of refugee movement into Kenya.18 The number of refugees, dominated by Somalis and Sudanese, temporarily leaped to over 400,000 in only 1 year and eventually leveled off at 220,000 by the early 2000s.19 Following these sharp increases in arrivals, three important shifts occurred in Kenya’s refugee policy and practice. The first two happened almost simultaneously and were very closely related: Firstly, refugee camps, most notably Dadaab and Kakuma, were established near the border areas of Kenya, and secondly, the informal encampment policy began to be applied, making it mandatory for refugees to reside in camps. From the early 2000s through the following decade, many self-­ settled refugees who lived in Nairobi or the coastal region were relocated to camps under this policy.20 Thirdly, in 1992, the Kenyan government withdrew from refugee affairs and delegated all monitoring, protection, and regulation responsibilities to

 Ibid, UNHCR Kenya, 2020  Ibid, Campbell, 2006 17  Ibid, Campbell, Crisp, & Kiragu, 2011 18  Ibid, Pavanello, Elhawary, & Pantuliano, 2010 19  Ibid, Campbell, 2006 20  Lindley, A. (2011). Between a protracted period and a crisis situation: policy responses to Somali refugees in Kenya. Refugee Survey Quarterly (30): 14-49 15 16

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the UNHCR.21 Prior to this, the government was responsible for refugee status determination (RSD), which is the process by which an asylum seeker applies for a formal refugee designation. In 2014, the GoK’s Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) resumed some RSD duties.22

 enya’s Institutional Landscape and the Legal Framework K for Refugees Kenya’s legal landscape for refugees is marked by ambiguity and is the result of a protracted period of institutional instability on refugee affairs. Policy and legislation on legality is comprised of a patchwork of international, domestic, and unmandated ad hoc policies. When the GoK withdrew from refugee affairs in 1992, it assigned this responsibility to the UNHCR, which until 2014 was solely in charge of refugee governance, protection, assistance, and registration. After nearly 15 years of complete disengagement from refugee affairs, in 2006, the government passed the Refugee Act, which established the DRA. Despite housing large numbers of refugees since the early 1990s, the Refugee Act was the first piece of refugee-related legislation the GoK drafted. Prior to 2006, the government relied on existing immigration laws, as well as a series of unwritten extemporized policies to govern refugee issues.23 In 2011, the DRA began implementing a 3-year plan to reassume key management responsibilities, including refugee reception and registration.24 Nominally, the department has taken over “all administrative matters concerning refugees in Kenya, and…activities and programs related to refugees.”25 This includes the promotion of welfare and the protection of refugees, the formulation of policy in accordance with international standards, and the facilitation of durable solutions for those granted asylum in Kenya. The transition from the UNHCR, however, was fraught with issues; the DRA, as a newly established department, largely lacked the fiscal and logistical capacity to fully assume responsibility for refugee affairs.26 Developments since 2014 suggest that the DRA will begin to take a more active role in refugee processing and RSD, including making the final decision whether to grant refugee status. However to date the UNHCR has remained the primary system

 Campbell, Crisp, & Kiragu, 2011  Goitom, H. (2016) “Refugee Law and Policy: Kenya”. Library of Congress. https://www.loc. gov/law/help/refugee-law/kenya.php#Recent 23  Campbell, E. (2005). Formalizing the informal economy: Somali refugee and migrant trade networks in Nairobi. Global Migration Perspectives (47), Global Commission on International Migration: Geneva; Ibid, Lindley, 2011 24  Ibid, Lindley, 2011. 9 25  Section 6, Article 2, pp. 4, Refugee Act, 2006 26  Ibid, Pavanello, Elhawary, & Pantuliano, 2010 21 22

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for refugee management in Kenya and maintains a central role in most aspects of refugee support.27 The 1951 Convention assigns Kenya, as the host state, the ability to develop its national legislation and policy on refugee affairs. It suggests that domestic policies should parallel the principles of international treaties, thus providing refugees with Convention-stipulated rights. These rights should be accessible to refugees regardless of where they reside and should transcend national policy.28 However, discrepancies between policy and practice are common. Though encampment has been the GoK’s working model for nearly three decades and is implicit in Kenya’s Refugee Act (2006), it has not been fully mandated into law.29 The encampment policy states movement out of camps should only be granted through administrative exceptions; in some cases this allows temporary or permanent settlement in Nairobi for those seeking specialized medical or psychological care, pursuing further education, facing severe security threats in the camps, or undergoing resettlement interviews or processing.30 Refugees granted leave from the camps are given movement passes and made to forfeit their rights to protection, support, and material assistance.31 Refugees must verify their understanding that there will be no provisions from the UNHCR upon reaching Nairobi and that they must be “economically self-sufficient.”32 In practice, the application of these exceptions is often arbitrary, and it is difficult for refugees to leave camps through this formal system.33 However, the undermonitoring and overcrowding of camps allow for easy undocumented and informal movement to urban areas, which over time has resulted in a large community of urban refugees, particularly in Nairobi.34 As UNHCR extension services are limited by encampment, there are several independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Nairobi that provide various services, such as basic medical care, emergency food aid, and shelter. These services are afforded on a selective, case-by-case basis resulting in fragmented provision of specific supports to small groups of refugees. As such, in 2007, the UNHCR produced an urban refugee program for Nairobi to synergize operations with civil society.35 However, implementing these initiatives has been difficult in the absence of a clear government position on the right of refugees to settle in urban areas.  Ibid, Goitom, 2016  Jacobsen, K. “Refugees and asylum seekers in urban areas: a livelihoods perspective”. Journal of Refugee Studies 19 (2006): 273–360 29  Ibid, Campbell, Crisp, & Kiragu, 2011 30  Ibid, Campbell, Crisp and Kiragu, 2011; Ibid, Goitom, 2016 31  Ibid, Pavanello, Elhawary, & Pantuliano, 2010 32  Ibid, Pavanello, Elhawary, & Pantuliano, 2010 33  Ibid, Campbell, Crisp and Kiragu, 2011 34  Ibid, Lindley, 2011 35  UNHCR. The Nairobi Refugee Program 2005–2007: Working with partner agencies and refugee communities to strengthen urban refugee protection. UNHCR Branch Office for Kenya. Retrieved May 2017 from: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/48abd53c3.pdf 27 28

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Legality, Access to Services, and Protection Legal documentation is seen as an indispensable piece of protection and socioeconomic integration for urban refugees, facilitating access to gainful employment, education, and social assistance.36 Documented refugees are nominally able to obtain work permits, enroll children in free primary education, and have their communities protected by the police. However, obtaining legal documentation was among the most pervasive issues facing respondents of this research. This was at least in part due to institutional limitations in the UNHCR and DRA, which has resulted in enormous backlogs and long wait times: “To reach the right office in the UN can take weeks; some people will even be sleeping outside” (Participant 4). Many participants reported a multiyear process of seeking a UNHCR Refugee Mandate and/or awaiting resettlement and corroborated the experiences described by other authors (e.g., Campbell, Crisp, and Kiragu): a refugee will be given an Appointment Letter detailing the time and date of their RSD appointment. As noted in Table 1.1, an Appointment Letter provides one with grounds to be in Nairobi but does not afford access to services or other Convention rights. Appointments are commonly scheduled for months or, in some cases, more than a year in the future. When the day arrives, many go to their appointment only to discover a queue of hundreds (Participants 4–9, 23–26, 31). UNHCR staff ultimately cannot process every appointment for that day, and RSD dates are pushed back. Many respondents discussed the extortion commonly experienced at both UNHCR offices and the DRA. For example, respondents reported being solicited for bribes by guards at the UNHCR as a way to move ahead in the long queue (Participants 4–9). Consequently, the poorest are among the most vulnerable, and their inability to pay adequate bribes means they will be without identity documents the longest. As examples of this, Participant 12 had been in Nairobi for 7 years and was still only holding an Appointment Letter. Similarly, Participant 17 had been seeking a UNHCR Refugee Mandate for 9 years in place of his GoK-issued Alien Card, as the latter does not come with resettlement options. Despite this, many respondents had some form of documentation, and more than half (19) were in possession of a UNHCR Refugee Mandate or a GoK Alien Card which both provide full legal basis to reside in Kenya. Since the 2006 passage of the Refugee Act, a refugee should in theory hold one of two documents assigned by the GoK: an Asylum Seeker Certificate or a Refugee Identification Card. An Asylum Seeker Certificate should be issued to those during RSD. Following this, if refugees are granted asylum, they will be given a Refugee Identification Card.37 In reality, however, refugees are often in possession of an array of other documents, mainly issued by the UNHCR (see Table  1.1). Movement Passes, though issued by the

 Ibid, Campbell, 2006; Ibid, Campbell, Crisp and Kiragu, 2011; Ibid, Kobia, & Cranfield, 2009; Ibid, Lindley, 2011 37  Republic of Kenya. The Refugees Bill, 2011 36

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Table 1.1  Documentation held by study participants (n = 32) and corresponding rights Respondents Documentation in possessiona UNHCR issued Refugee Mandate 16

Corresponding rightsb Fully legal refugee status, legal basis to be in the region of registration and access to all Convention rights Provides legal basis to be in Nairobi, while awaiting an RSD appointment; no access to Convention rights Allows movement from camps to Nairobi for special designations, discussed above

Appointment Letter

6

Movement Pass

2

Ration Card

1

Signifies entitlement to food, oil, and water rations in camp, no other legal associations

GoK Issued: Asylum Seeker Card

3

Alien Card

3

Refugee Identification Card

0

Undocumented

4

Signifies one is in the midst of RSD, provision of legal basis to be in Nairobi Provision of legal basis to be in Kenya on the same terms as other non-nationals Fully legal refugee status, legal basis to be in the region of registration and access to all Convention rights N/A

Subjective importance to respondents Very important and highly sought, comes with the (remote) possibility of a third country resettlement Not important for integration, as it is a transitionary document Not important for integration as it is a transitionary document, applicable only to movement from camps Not important, only accepted in camps for rations

Not important, comes with no protections or rights Not important, does not come with resettlement option Not important, does not come with a resettlement option N/A

Some participants held more than one document, therefore the figures cited above do not match the sample size of n = 32 b Compilation from The Refugees Bill (2011); UNHCR Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951); GoK Department of Immigration Alien Registration (2014); and participant responses a

UNHCR, are recognized by the GoK in the Refugees Bill as they are granted in camps on an individual basis for temporary travel.38 Highlighting a gap between policy and practice, legal refugees sampled in this research were highly vulnerable to police abuse and had limited access to the formal economy and public services. Working respondents were largely employed in the informal economy (15 of 16) with jobs in the markets of Eastleigh including petty

 Note: During publication of this chapter in 2019, Kenya drafted an updated Refugees Bill in 2019 that is not included in this research.

38

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trade, hawking clothing, and selling tea. Some cleaned for wealthy families and worked in restaurants or shops owned by family or friends. The economic returns from activities such as these are mostly modest; respondent 1, for example, worked as house-help to a wealthier Somali family and was paid 300 Kenyan Shillings per day (USD 1.93), and respondent 2 could make between 200 and 400 Kenyan Shillings per day (USD 1.93 and 2.90) selling tea in Eastleigh. Many relied on remittances from relatives abroad (13/32). Though authorities are responsible for protecting and securing refugee communities, chronic police abuse, harassment, and extortion are common themes in the literature.39 Respondents confirmed this, reporting police abuse to be the most prevalent source of insecurity for refugees. All respondents reported routine police extortion and harassment in their communities: “This is what we are facing every day” (Participant 9). Respondents also described instances of physical and mental abuse, violence, and arbitrary arrests and detainment. Many reported that police routinely stop refugees in Eastleigh to perform an “identity check” and expect bribes of kitu kidogo or “something small.” The interaction is often accompanied by arbitrary arrest, detainment, and the threat of deportation. As one participant commented, “The police know who is new” (Participant 5) and are likely to target newcomers to exploit their lack of documentation and relative lack of integration into the community. Respondents reported that authorities understand the strong networks of their communities, speaking of the sporadic sweeps of Eastleigh, in which groups of refugees are arrested and detained until police are provided with a large communal bribe. Participants 19, 20, and 21 described being detained in a sweep of this nature for which the requested bribe was 20,000 Kenyan Shillings (250 USD) or about 2.5 times Kenya’s monthly minimum wage at the time. While in custody, they were stripped, beaten, and had excrement poured over them. To this end, Participant 21 stated that in Eastleigh, “It is better to be caught by a thief than by the police.” The authenticity and validity of legal documents are often questioned or disregarded by the police. There are several different types of documentation in circulation in Eastleigh, which compounds the ambiguity of refugee legality in Nairobi, legitimizes police abuse, and, importantly, devalues genuine legal documents for those that hold them. According to Participant 2, when presenting police with legal documentation, she would often be told to “put that paper away.” This exploitation creates mistrust of authorities. Many respondents were fearful of the police which in turn dissuaded them from reporting offenses.40 This, compounded with the lack of institutional protection available to refugees, created a culture of impunity in which refugee communities were vulnerable to both police and civilian infringements. This was evidenced in 2012, when Somali business

39 40

 Ibid, Kobia, and Cranfield, 2009  Ibid, Jacobsen, 2006; Ibid, Lindley, 2011

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owners protested the lack of police involvement after armed gunmen robbed several shops in Eastleigh.41 Legal status is often positioned in refugee literature as the means to achieve increased socioeconomic integration and as a safeguard from police exploitation and abuse. However, respondents’ experiences suggest that legality alone does not translate into security and/or access to rights. Rather, it is best viewed as a factor that plays only a contributing role to integration. In connection, urban refugee literature tends to discuss preclusions to integration and rights in terms of isolated barriers and presents gateway solutions to marginalization and segregation. Barriers to integration are many, are highly interdependent, and interact with larger contextual factors. With respect to key areas of integration such as access to services and formal sector employment, no notable differences were observed between participants who were in Kenya legally and illegally. In this research sample, those who had legal documents (n = 19 of 32) did not access social services or claim institutional support at higher levels than those who did not have documentation. They were not relatively better protected from extortion or discrimination, and they did not exhibit a higher degree of involvement with the formal economy. Thus, refugees of this sample were facing the same sweeping problems irrespective of their legal status or documents, which would suggest that legality has minimal impact on the lived experiences of urban refugees in Nairobi. This was confirmed by Participant 27, who stated, “it makes no difference what document you hold.” If the sample in this research is indicative of Nairobi’s urban refugee population, it can be suggested that legal status alone is insufficient to protect Nairobi’s urban refugees, will likely not result in heightened integration, and cannot be expected to provide access to the rights chartered in international treaties. Lack of legality then is just one of several issues that intersect and compound to create low integration levels in Nairobi. Respondents named numerous other obstacles in accessing socioeconomic services and security. Firstly, legal status is not accompanied by automatic institutional protection or support in Kenya. Because Kenya has no policy to implement the Refugees Bill, the rights the bill affords (which generally follow that of the 1951 Convention) are, in practice, unenforceable. Thus, refugees are largely unable to access or exercise their rights. Secondly, many refugees are unaware of the rights that accompany legal status, and there are large discrepancies between perceived and actual entitlements stemming from lived experiences. For example, if a Headmaster refuses entrance to a refugee child or requests an arbitrary fee, it is then believed that they are not entitled to these public services or that exercising their right to education is an impossibility. Connected to this and thirdly, most respondents were uncertain how to access basic services or how to use their documents if they possessed them. Lastly, many respondents also spoke of the potential of deportation by the government despite their 1951

 Africa Service News. “Kenya: Somali’s protest against robberies in Nairobi’s Eastleigh district”. All Africa, 2012

41

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Convention right to non-refoulement. It is therefore evident that many intersecting vulnerabilities are at play; respondents who feared deportation may not have been aware of their right to non-refoulement. Conversely, even if he or she was aware of that right, a lack of institutional support or access to justice means that refugees could very likely not ensure that this right was upheld. Finally, in deporting refugees, Kenya is violating its international obligation not to forcibly repatriate those for whom it is not safe to “go home.” As a result of these complexities, Nairobi’s urban refugees live in a state of legal limbo. They are concurrently acknowledged and ignored, living in communities that from the perspective of the government technically do not exist, yet are highly visible and well known to police and authorities. UNHCR processes and provides services to thousands of urban refugees in a year in Nairobi but is unable to acknowledge they are residents of the city. Newly developed urban refugee programs are largely unenforceable and are disconnected from practice and the lived experiences of urban refugees. From the perspective of both the refugee and the institutions responsible for their governance, the GoK’s lack of a clear legal mandate on urban refugees has led to ambiguity over their legal status and associated rights.42 While acknowledging that refugee experiences are diverse, it is important to note that all respondents of this research fell into the same general economic/class bracket and are a subset of Kenya’s urban poor. As such, financial limitations were highlighted as key obstacles in the refugee community regarding accessing health care, education, and legal documentation (due to extortion and corruption). In this experience, poor refugees face some of the same structural challenges as impoverished Kenyans. Though beyond the scope of this research, this could indicate that integration is divided along lines of economic class differentiation as well as legality or ethnicity. Furthermore, a wider study could conceivably find that refugees of higher socioeconomic status may have better opportunities for integration and may be able to access their rights more readily.

The Sociopolitical Context Surrounding Nairobi’s Refugees Police abuse and exclusionary policies are among the most significant institutional vulnerabilities at play for refugees in Nairobi. Police abuse and discrimination can be looked at as a single element in a larger body of xenophobia toward refugees and Somalis in particular.43 A strained geopolitical relationship between Kenya and Somalia and the influence of al-Shabaab on public perception of the Somali community have resulted in discrimination toward refugees. A long history of political violence and instability in Somalia has made Kenyans suspicious of Somalis, which has been aggravated by the intensification of al-Shabaab terrorist activity in Kenya.

42 43

 Ibid, Pavanello, Elhawary, & Pantuliano, 2010  Jesuit Refugee Service. Kenya: rising xenophobia affects refugees in Nairobi. May 9, 2013

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In 2011 Kenya invaded Somalia in an effort to secure the northeastern province after al-Shabaab conducted a series of cross-border raids. In response to the invasion, al-­ Shabaab carried out a wave of attacks in Kenya, the worst of which being the assaults on Westgate Mall in September 2013 and Garissa University in April 2015, which killed 7544 and 147,45 respectively. Terror events turn a spotlight on an otherwise legally ignored community, heightening national awareness of Kenya’s large Somali presence and drawing false linkages between Islamic terrorism and the Somali refugee population.46 Security threats – both perceived and real – shape refugee legislation and policy in many host countries including Kenya.47 The continued encampment policy is therefore justified in the interest of national security.48 Terror incidents also build public support for other exclusionary policies that preclude refugees from socioeconomic integration and have been connected to increasing xenophobia, discrimination, and violent attacks on Somali nationals and Somali-Kenyans alike. For instance, in 2012, on the same day as an improvised explosive device was thrown into a matatu (minibus) in Eastleigh, a wave of attacks erupted on Somalis in the area; several people were stabbed or stoned, and Somali-owned shops were looted and vandalized.49 The 1951 Convention intends to promote integration and extend protection from the host government. However, in reaction to Kenya’s increasing terror threats, national security concerns are now central to government policy relating to refugees.50 The GoK does not view Kenya as a destination country but rather as a temporary host for asylum seekers who will either ultimately resettle to a third country or repatriate. Encampment henceforth continues as a practical attempt to curtail the influx of refugees and keep them geographically, economically, and culturally segregated.51 Accordingly, rather than foster integration, the GoK has facilitated segregation through practices that essentially ensure refugees stay refugees. The GoK pushes repatriation despite a continuing insurgency, unstable governance, and environmental hardships in Somalia. The sociopolitical context is also important when considering the Tripartite Commission for the Voluntary Repatriation of Somali refugees in Kenya,

 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Investigators in Kenya work to identify victims, attackers. CBC News. Sept. 25, 2013. Retrieved May 2017 from: http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ investigators-in-kenya-work-to-identify-victims-attackers-1.1867463 45  British Broadcasting Company. “Kenya attack: 147 dead in Garissa University attack”. BBC News, 2015. Retrieved May 2017 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32169080 46  Burns, A. “Feeling the pinch: Kenya, al-Shabaab, and east Africa’s refugee crisis”. Refuge (27), (2010): 5–15 47  Ibid, Kobia, & Cranfield, 2009 48  Ibid, Human Rights Watch, 2013. See also; Ibid, Pavanello, Elhawary, & Pantuliano, 2010 49  Ibid, Human Rights Watch, 2013 50  Ibid, Lindley, 2011 51  Ibid, Burns, 2010 44

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established in 2013 between the GoK and the Somali government.52 In 2017 alone, over 23,000 Somali refugees were repatriated, with a total of over 63,000 since 2013.53 In light of Kenya’s numerous attempts to relocate refugees to encampment areas and prolonged reluctance to offer integration to refugees, a critical look must be taken at Kenya’s ability to impartially facilitate voluntary repatriation. It must also be asked if conditions in Somalia are truly amendable for en masse returns.54 Moreover, the tripartite agreement has the potential to serve as further justification for policies that keep refugees segregated, as successful integration into a host society is a major disincentive to voluntary repatriation.

Conclusion For the past two decades, Kenya has served as a hosting nation for hundreds of thousands of displaced people from Africa. In keeping with global trends, refugees in Kenya commonly settle in urban areas rather than camps. Large communities of city-dwelling refugees create nuanced challenges to refugee governance and management as they are often unregistered and politically, socially, and economically autonomous from national society. Despite efforts on the part of the GoK to keep refugees confined to camp areas, many seek to escape the insecure and overcrowded camps. Upon arriving in the city, however, refugees are often met with a new set of vulnerabilities that compound and act as barriers to integration. This chapter endeavored to understand the legal, social, and economic state of Nairobi’s urban refugees by assessing the amount of ownership they have over rights accorded to them in the 1951 Convention. Results imply that Kenya is not fulfilling its international obligations under the 1951 Convention regarding the provision of rights for displaced people. The vulnerabilities observed within the research sample stem from deeply rooted systemic and institutional factors. Refugees in this study were not readily able to exercise their right to obtain documentation, employment, public services, or protection from human rights abuses. Furthermore, respondents had to navigate systemic barriers to integration, including xenophobia, police abuse, and complex legal and political environments. Legality therefore cannot be considered in a vacuum; the existence of legality in the continued absence of integrative policies, formal employment, access to public services, and police accountability should not be considered a durable solution and is unlikely to lead to increased local integration.  Ibid, Burns, 2010  UNHCR.  Weekly Update: Voluntary Repatriation of Somali Refugees From Kenya, 2017b. Retrieved May 2017 from http://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/04/ Voluntary-Repatriation-Analysis-21-April-2017.pdf 54  MSF (Medicin Sans Frontieres). Dadaab to Somalia: Pushed Back Into Peril, 2016. Retrieved May 2017 from: http://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/dadaab_to_somalia_pushed_back_into_ peril-0.pdf 52 53

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References Africa Service News. 2012. Kenya: Somali’s protest against robberies in Nairobi’s Eastleigh district. All Africa. Retrieved from: http://allafrica.com/stories/201205100109.html. Burns, A. 2010. Feeling the pinch: Kenya, al-Shabaab, and east Africa’s refugee crisis. Refuge 27: 5–15. Campbell, E. 2005. Formalizing the informal economy: Somali refugee and migrant trade networks in Nairobi, Global Migration Perspectives. Vol. 47. Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration. ———. 2006. Urban refugees in Nairobi: problems of protection, mechanisms of survival, and possibilities for integration. Journal of Refugee Studies 19: 396–413. Campbell, E., J. Crisp, and E. Kiragu. 2011. Navigating Nairobi: A review of the implementation of UNHCR’s urban refugee policy in Kenya’s capital city. Geneva: UN High Commissioner for Refugees Policy Development and Evaluation Service. Crisp, J. 2010. Forced displacement in Africa: Dimensions, difficulties, and policy directions. Refugee Survey Quarterly 29: 1–27. Human Rights Watch. 2002. Hidden in plain view: refugees living without protection in Nairobi and Kampala. New York: Human Rights Watch. ———. 2012, March 30. Kenya: Somalia unsafe for refugees to return. Retrieved from: http:// www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/30/kenya-somalia-unsafe-refugees-return. ———. 2013. “You are all terrorists”: Kenyan police abuse of refugees in Nairobi. Retrieved from: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/05/29/you-are-all-terrorists. Jacobsen, K. 2006. Refugees and asylum seekers in urban areas: A livelihoods perspective. Journal of Refugee Studies 19: 273–360. Kobia, K. and L. Cranfield 2009. Literature review: Urban refugees. Refugees Branch, Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/4b0a528c9.pdf. Lindley, A. 2011. Between a protracted period and a crisis situation: policy responses to Somali refugees in Kenya. Refugee Survey Quarterly 30: 14–49. Pavanello, S., S.  Elhawary, and S.  Pantuliano. 2010. Hidden and exposed: urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper. London: Overseas Development Institute. The Refugees Bill. 2011. Republic of Kenya. Retrieved from: www.cickenya.org/index.../19 8_1428153dc672e0aba7fe5417b9d856de. UNHCR. 2011. The 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 protocol. Geneva: UNHCR. ———. 2014. Urban refugees: Trying to get by in the city. Retrieved from: http://www.unhcr.org/ pages/4b0e4cba6.html.

Chapter 10

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in African Migrant/Refugee Population Kizito N. C. Okeke

Introduction Migrant and refugee populations have progressively skyrocketed across the globe in recent times, in Africa, Asia, America, and Europe, and the experiences of these populations have called to question our general humanity because of the regrettable and indisputable facts that the actions taken against them are unacceptable in many measures. According to the international migration statistics,1 the migrant population was about 173 million in 2000, and in 2010 it was about 220 million, while in 2017 it reached 258 million. It is estimated that more than 60% of all international migrants reside in Asia, which is about 80 million people, and Europe is fast closing the gap with a record of about 78 million migrants. Northern America recorded the third largest number of migrants at 58 million, while Africa ranks fourth with about 25 million. Others include Latin America and the Caribbean with about 10 million, and, lastly, Oceania with 8 million. Migration is, therefore, a common phenomenon across the globe. The United Nations’ statistics have indicated a geometric progression for the world’s displaced population at the end of 2018,2 which is recorded at an alarming 70.8 million displaced people globally. These are people who were forced to leave their countries of origin for other countries because of war and persecution. This refugee population has a significant and an unprecedented population 1  UN News. “International Migration Report 2017” https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017 2  UN News. “African Migrants Reportedly Being Sold in ‘Slave Markets’ in Libya, UN Agency Warns”. 79.05. 2017 – http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56540. See also; Picheta, Rob. “One in Every 108 People on the Planet Has Been Displaced, Says UN Refugee Agency.” CNN News, June 19, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/19/world/un-refugee-report-2018-intl/ index.html

K. N. C. Okeke (*) Alabama State University, Montgomery, AL, USA © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. O. Abidde (ed.), The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56650-0_10

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of minors; while the number of refugees has an alarming population of 30 million, the population of minors, those below the age of 18, has a much more alarming population of more than 15 million, and these are all-time high that our history has known. When the current refugee population is compared with the refugee population a decade ago, the former almost doubles the population. These statistics already indicate a crisis of great magnitude for our generation and requires a large-scale approach to securing a lasting solution. In recent times, especially in Europe and America, discussions on migration have been dominated by the issues of legal and illegal migrations. Unfortunately, the latter connotes rejection and the migrants in this category are incessantly burdened with worry, fear, and pain of not achieving their dreams, being rejected, denied entrance, and repatriated. Many have been rejected, unfairly treated, and repatriated, and they suffer the brunt of unfulfilled dreams, enduring pain of rejection, and perhaps, cultural syndromes. The gory stories and pictures of migrants from Africa to Europe and the various death-trap means of crossing the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea have shown a historic record of casualties, human trafficking, physical and sexual abuses, exploitations, betrayals, unexpected maltreatments, violence, and death. These painful and disturbing stories have drawn my attention to the plights of all migrants and refugees, but I have decided to focus on the African migrant and refugee population this time. These migrants are, in no doubt, already exposed to levels of emotional and cognitive distresses and traumatic stress that can develop to mental disorders, if unchecked. The stories of African migrants and refugees are gory and shameful in our acclaimed civilized world, and what they have experienced, in a way, reminisce what early Africans suffered hundreds of years ago when they were hunted all through Africa and forced into foreign countries in Europe and America, where they were enslaved. I should necessarily give space at this juncture, in remembrance of all Africans, whom this period of my writing this chapter marks the 400 years of their enslavement in America. They went through the most horrendous and worst kind of torture and unimaginable cruelties in the hands of the slave masters who forced them to immigrate to their own countries overseas and only to be treated worse than humans can imagine. History has it that 400 years ago, a ship, which carried Africans who were captured and forcefully taken to be enslaved in British North America, docked on the shores of Virginia, an event that will not only transform forever the modern world but the life experiences of their descendants, the AfricanAmericans.3 Painfully and unfortunately, the brunt of such ordeals has left indelible marks in the conscious and unconscious expressions of the African-Americans even after hundreds of years, and even after 400 years of the American slaves’ experiences. This, however, is not the immediate purpose of this chapter, but it is still significant in the understanding of the plight of the black race as I focus on posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in African migrant and refugee populations. 3  The New York Times. “The 1691 Project.” https://www.nytimes.com › 2019/08/14 › magazine › 1619-america-slavery. See also; Kaur, Harmeet & Natasha Chen. “Thousands of People Gather to Commemorate 400 Years Since American Slavery Began.” CNN News, August 25, 2019. https:// www.cnn.com/2019/08/25/us/1619-enslaved-africans-ship-commemoration/index.html

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In this chapter, I will give special attention to the mainstream media in my literature review because the issues of immigration and refugees have received many tractions, headlines, and publicity in the mainstream media. I will discuss the experiences of these populations and some mental health risks associated with their experiences, and to indicate that a precautionary measure, an appeal for mental hygiene, and prevention perspectives would be a humane path to take. Mental hygiene, in other words, the science of promoting mental health and thwarting mental disorders through conscious efforts to communicate the necessary knowledge to the people, reaches out to those who may be at risk in a timely fashion for treatment, and to apply other public health measures.4 Mental hygiene can forestall potential cases of mental disorders, especially posttraumatic stress disorder among the African migrant and refugee populations. In this case, a scientific approach, which is used in the early detection and treatment of mental disorders, will be made available to the African migrant and refugee populations. Therefore, the detection, for instance, of early symptoms of PTSD among African migrant and refugee populations, early diagnosis, and then treatment are necessary steps to thwarting the syndromes and menaces of PTSD, and mental disorders at large. These issues raised are succinctly obvious when one understands the true lived experiences of migrants and refugees, and I will first briefly discuss the causes of migrations and refugees and then spend more time on their lived world.

Causes of Migrations The global surge in migration can be attributed to familiar factors, such as, the old story of the need and search for spices that engendered the early European voyages to make the extreme efforts to travel the world in search for spices and which brought them to the continent of Africa and other parts of the world. Spices became a very special commodity that made the Europeans embark on the most treacherous journey in search of spices. One can say that this desire for spices was the catalyst for European significant migration and the creation of political, military, and commercial networks with the insatiable thirst for dominance; it is an unbelievable risk that was taken by these Europeans, a risk that can be credited with the earliest move towards globalization.5 This desire for spices has continued to fuel migrations and,

4  Kearny, Christopher & Trull, Timothy. Abnormal Psychology and Life (2nd ed.), pp.111–120. Canada: Cengage Learning, 2015. 5  Freedman, Paul. “How the Search for Flavors Influenced Our World.” Yale Global Online, 2013. Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2003. https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/spices-howsearch-flavors-influenced-our-world. See also Donkin, Robin A.Between East and West: The Moluccas and the Traffic in Spices Up to the Arrival of Europeans. Pennsylvania: Diane Publishing Company, 2003. See; Kalidasan, Vinod Kottayil “Routes of Pepper: Colonial Discourses Around Spice Trade in Malabar” in Kerala Modernity: Ideas, Spaces and Practices in Transition, Shiju Sam Varughese and Sathese Chandra Bose (Eds). Orient Blackswan, New Delhi, 2015.

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in a way, refugees seeking asylum; all are in search of spices: the desire for better spices, in other words, better life, opportunities, and to escape violence, persecution, and war. Those who left their countries of origin for other countries for any reason, either for greener pastures or to escape violence, persecution, or war, are doing what humans are best known for, and this introduces the next factor, an evolutionary factor. By evolutionary factor, I mean that humans have migration etched in their DNA, which explains the reason humans can migrate within their states of origin, countries of origin, outside countries of origin, and to the ends of the earth. The space explorations and the global scientific efforts to know where else humans can find the kind of life we have here on earth give credence to this evolutionary perspective on migration. Another factor is the operating system of the world. I should like to state that what has led to the escalating number of migrants and refugees is the oppressive old system, which has not been completely surmounted and replaced with another system, which would empower humanity at all levels and work towards holistic human development, justice and peace, irrespective of color, country, continent, and race. The old system I am referring to is the colonial system, which is still clandestinely as powerful as of old because it is still the power that dictates in the economic, political, social, and military sectors. Although the old system seems gone, the old system is still active in the new system, as the masters of this system use their neocolonial tools to keep securing their lopsided interests and dominance. The system can decide who rises from poverty to join the so-called world powers; it decides a country that should languish in wars and countries that must not be attacked; it closes its eyes on decades of war in the Congo, or does very little about it, a country where the abundance of earth’s costliest treasures are found in large deposits and stolen away by the powers that dictate the system and will resist anyone who dares to attack countries where it has vested interest, a system who owns weapons that can destroy the world and decides on those allowed to own such weapons, and a system that condones totalitarian governments that foster their interests and will neglect democratic regimes that threaten this oppressive system; therefore, the system is a significant factor in the migration crisis. There is no doubt that wars and natural disasters do cause migration and have rapidly increased in millions of the population of migrants and refugees across the globe. A few examples are the wars in Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen and then the Tsunami, Hurricane Maria and Dorian, respectively. The refugee crises caused by wars are huge and incomparable to the displacements caused by natural disasters. Lastly, this era of social media has seriously impacted on migration because it makes the world of opportunities easily identifiable and traceable to more people than what was the case previously. More people are easily exposed to the worlds of opportunities through a click of the button in the social media; people can communicate easily with those who have ventured and are succeeding and can establish useful contacts with both fellow country people and foreigners. Social media may have pushed migration to the tipping point. But what it is like to be an immigrant and a refugee is my next major concern.

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The World of Immigrants and Refugees The experiences of immigrants and refugees en route to their host countries are better described as a two-world experience because the word migration connotes two phenomena. In the first place, it can be the flight of refugees from their countries of origin because of the threat of war, persecution, violence, oppressive and unjust imprisonment, or death.6 In the second place, it can be the voluntary departure of some people from their own countries of origin to other countries, and it could be for economic reasons, social reasons, or generally in search of a better life, unrealized ambitions, and dreams. Therefore, refugees and immigrants face two worlds in their new host countries because of the propelling reasons for such ventures, why and how they decided to embark on making the journey. It is easy to understand how immigrants can be better prepared than refugees: the latter, who leave their countries of origin unprepared, and the former, who more likely have thought about such a journey and may have support networks at home and abroad, or mentally, better prepared to absorb the shock of any unpleasant experience in a foreign country.7 The experiences of acculturation and stress will differ in magnitude for immigrants and refugees. By acculturation, I mean the experiences, changes, and challenges that one is confronted with, or a group of people are confronted with when in contact with a foreign culture. These experiences are often very stressful. Some of us who have accepted the fact that we are immigrants can reminisce how it all started; it often begins with a decision-making process where many options are considered before migration. In some cases, an adult immigrant may be well employed in his or her own country but may decide to immigrate to another country for better opportunities for oneself and one’s families and extended families as it is often the case among Africans. It could equally be in the name of brain derail, where African intellectuals, professionals, and highly gifted individuals are offered some attractive remunerations to immigrate to other countries. These place immigrants at vantage positions than refugees while going through the acculturation process, since a sense of social and economic support makes it easier for them to have the comforting feeling of making a new home abroad, and a great relief indeed. Unlike refugees, immigrants enjoy the social gathering in small or large scale to bid goodbye to 6  Chung, R.  C. Y., and F.  Bemak. “Asian Immigrants and Refugees”. In Handbook of Asian American Psychology, edited by F. T. L. Leong, A. G. Inman, A. Ebreo, L. H. Yang, L. Kinoshita, and M. Fu, 2nd ed., pp. 227–243. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2007. See also Hong, G. K., and M.  D. C.  Ham. Psychology and Counseling with Asian American Clients: A Practical Guide. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001; Prendes-Lintel, M. “A Working Model in Counseling Recent Refugees”. In Handbook of Multicultural Counseling, edited by J.  G. Ponterotto, J.  M. Casas, L. A. Suzuki, and C. M. Alexander, 2nd edition, pp. 729–752. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 2001.; Wong, E. C., J. D. Kinzie, and J. M. Kinzie. “Stress, Refugees, and Trauma”. In Asian American Psychology: Current Perspectives, edited by N, Tewari and A. N. Alvarez, pp. 441–462. New York: Psychology Press, 2009.. 7  Wong, E. C., J. D. Kinzie, and J. M. Kinzie. “Stress, Refugees, and Trauma”. In Asian American Psychology: Current Perspectives, edited by N, Tewari and A. N. Alvarez, pp. 441–462. New York: Psychology Press, 2009.

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family members, friends, and colleagues, and the memory is consoling and reassuring. The joy immigrants’ harbor in their hearts and look forward to actualizing it is that joy of having the opportunity to travel back to their sweet homes.8 This is sometimes orchestrated and visually obvious in the kind of well-loaded luggage and carry-on that many Africans who board flights to travel back home are found with. They are often greeted with celebrations at home. In as much as we have interesting and rewarding experiences of immigrants for these reasons, there are other painful sides of immigrants’ experiences. In other stories, immigrants leave their countries of origin due to insecurity, political violence, ethnic clashes, religious violence, drug wars, high rate of interpersonal violence, and, worst of it all, the militarism and dictatorship of their governments.9 In these instances, immigrants can experience acute stress, harsh trauma during their acculturation process in their respective host countries; immigrants who are confronted with pluralistic cultures will have to go through multiple frontiers in the acculturation process when, for example, an African migrant finds himself or herself in a community that is sharply populated by European-Americans on one hand and the Hispanic-Americans on the other hand.10 There are pathetic stories of migrants, who were doing very well and living very well, too, in their countries of origin, and who were lured by the propaganda that heading to the Western countries and America would launch them to the highest levels of economic growth and prosperity. Unfortunately, they sold all that made them wealthy in their countries of origin to immigrate. These immigrants spread across all professions: professionals, medical doctors, specialists, and skilled and unskilled workers. In this category, a well-trained medical doctor from Nigeria, who was doing very well in Nigeria, and who immigrated to the United States, through a lottery visa, found himself in his darkest nights, when he couldn’t practice his medical profession for a long period, and he remained jobless for about 5 years. The only job he could find was the kind of job that was humiliating and outrightly ridiculous by all standards in Nigeria. This experience plunges one in between the devil and the deep sea; he cannot go back home to his former wealth, which had vanished in pursuit of American dreams, and here in America, he has nothing to show to himself or his family at home. His experience of trauma cannot be downplayed. At times, some immigrants have the nightmare of planning and hoping to make enough money and go back home to reestablish, and which in many cases did not materialize till retirement strikes. The experience of cultural shock and cultural conflicts can make life so unbearable, like the case of an immigrant from Ghana who expressed her frustration of not being completely at ease with either her own culture or the culture of the host country, the United States. It is the experience  Ibid.  Bolzman, C., R. Fibbi, and M. Vital. 2000. “What to do After Retirement? Elderly Migrants and the Question of Return”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 32, no. 8 (2000): 1359–1375. 10  Sladkova. J. “The Guys Told Us Crying That They Saw How They Were Killing Her and They Could Not Do Anything. Psychosocial Explorations of Migrant Journeys to the U.S. Psychosocial Intervention 23, no. 1 (2014): 1–9. 8 9

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of finding herself in a setting of two opposing lifestyles, between her collectivist culture at home and the new individualistic culture she must adopt in the host country. Cultural crises and crises of identity may taint sincere efforts to relate to people in the country of origin and the host country.11 Some remorseful and regrettable statements abound, such as “If I had known that this is how America or Europe is, I would not have ventured into this territory in the first place.” In discussing the experiences of refugees, Berry12 gives a good insight into the difficult world of refugees in the six stages of a refugee career, namely, the predeparture, flight, first asylum, claimant, settlement, and adaptation. In the first stage, the predeparture, the refugees are forced to flee from their countries of origin because of the unbearable conditions because of wars, insurrections, revolutions, and natural disasters. These conditions necessitate a flight from the country of origin to the host country with the painful reality of leaving sweet home to an uncertain future, and which engenders the next stage. In the second stage, the flight stage, humans run away from their home countries for the safety of their lives and faced with the precarious world ahead of them, neither knowing how successful their escape will be nor the hospitability of the unknown world of the host countries. Whatever is out there in the host countries is not an immediate concern as the haste to run to anywhere for the safety of their lives, and the decision may have to be taken in a matter of days or hours. Their arrival to their host countries signals the next stage. In the third stage, which is the first asylum, the refugees have arrived in a place other than their country of origin and settle with a sense of safety and relief from life-threatening experiences of their countries of origin. The conditions are not comparable to the comfort of home and often vary widely from safe and relatively good to woefully overcrowded, underfunded, and unhealthy. The refugee camps in the Darfur region of Sudan, which was erected on the border of Chad, were made to house tens of thousands of people but ended up with hundreds of thousands of people. The difficult challenges in this first asylum stage are not limited to overcrowding, but an extreme shortage of food, water, and medicine. The conditions were so terrible that some experts predicted the death of half a million people or even more because of the extremely difficult conditions.13 In certain instances, the experiences of both immigrants and refugees may be similar, and one good example will be the Cuban refugees. Sequel to the Cuban revolution in the 1950s, Cuban refugees fled to the United States, and most of them to the Miami area.14 This group

  Mio, Jeffery S., Lori Barker A., Melanie Rodriguez M.  D. Multicultural Psychology: Understanding Our Diverse Communities. 3rd Edition, pp. 140–171. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 12  Berry, J. Understanding the Process of Acculturation for Primary Prevention. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, National Institute of Mental Health Refugee Assistance Program, 1998. See also Berry, J. W. “Managing the Process of Acculturation.” In U.S Department of Health and Human Services, Mental Health Services for Refugees. DHHS Publication No. ADM 91–1824, pp. 111–122. Rockville, MD: National Institute of Mental Health, 1991. 13  Ibid, Mio et al., 2016. 14  Kitano, H. H. L. Race Relations. second edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall 1999. 11

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of refugees seemed to have enjoyed what immigrants enjoy when they leave their countries of origin. Some of these Cuban refugees prepared for their journey to live in another country were able to think through the need to migrate and were able to transfer their money and relocate their businesses to the host country. Only in rare cases do refugees have this kind of setting. Whether refugees will be allowed to stay indefinitely or for a period in their host countries take us to the next stage. The fourth stage, claimant, discusses with the country that grants asylum to refugees. Refugees do not have the certainty of being granted asylum, and therefore, asylum seekers may be accepted or denied and may be deported or repatriated, as the uncertainties surrounding the life of refugees continue to linger. However, more often, refugees are permitted to stay in the initial country of contact for only a limited time. Deportation may be enforced when the time elapses and when the host countries deem it necessary to do so. But if the host countries decide not to enforce deportation, and there is the likelihood that the refugees may be given a new home, it leads to the next stage. The fifth stage, settlement, indicates the realization of the hope of the refugees when the host countries make an official statement to accept the refugees who have asked to settle there. Finally, the sixth stage, which signals adaptation, or technically acculturation, is when the refugees battle the difficult experiences of adjusting and learning to live in a foreign country and begin to make a new home. The experiences of immigrants and refugees have been discussed to open the minds to their challenges and difficult ordeals. I will proceed to discuss how such difficult and stressful experiences could metastasize into a posttraumatic stress disorder and other mental disorders by discussing the symptoms of these disorders.

 osttraumatic Stress Disorder in Migrant and Refugee P Populations It is understandable how immigrants and refugees can experience some troublesome feelings, thoughts, and harsh stressors, which expose them to mental disorders, like posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The discussion on the world of migrants and refugees makes it easy to understand that the experiences of refugees are more susceptible to mental disorders because they encounter extremely difficult situations. When refugees run for their dear lives in times of war, at times, families are forced to run in different directions and are separated; husbands and wives, siblings, children, and parents are separated, and these are in no doubts excruciating experiences,15 and they may or may not be reunited, and some may even die. Such

 Ibid, Mio et al., 2016. See also; Ibid Chung and Bemak, 2007; Prendes-Lintel, M. “A Working Model in Counseling Recent Refugees”. In Handbook of Multicultural Counseling, edited by J. G. Ponterotto, J. M. Casas, L. A. Suzuki, and C. M. Alexander, 2nd edition, pp. 729–752. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 2001; Wong, E. C., J. D. Kinzie, and J. M. Kinzie. “Stress, Refugees, and Trauma”. In Asian American Psychology: Current Perspectives, edited by N, Tewari and A.  N. Alvarez, pp. 441–462. New York: Psychology Press, 2009.

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stressful and painful separations can engender separation anxiety disorders (SAD) and, in the case of the death of family members and friends, a prolonged grief disorder (PGD). The memory is burdened with the painful ordeal of thinking whether they are alive or dead, the experience of those who had died, and these may last for a very long time until all pondering questions in the expectations of answers are satisfied, and even at that, the experiences linger in the subconscious. Among these mental disorders often associated with immigrants and refugees, PTSD is paramount. An understanding of the symptoms and syndromes of these disorders is necessary to know how they are implicated in the mental health of immigrants and refugees. Posttraumatic experience is common parlance in our world today because our generation has experienced many wars, warlike shootings, or criminal acts that resonate with war stories and experiences. These include the indiscriminate shooting of civilians in public places, such as shopping centers, institutions of learning, places of worship, and other public gatherings. Also, natural disasters of high magnitude have equally echoed posttraumatic experiences, from hurricane Katrina to tsunami, and from hurricane Maria to Dorian, which left humans with the worst kinds of natural disasters. Posttraumatic stress disorder is known to follow a traumatic event.16 When somebody finds himself/herself in a troubling situation, where he/she feels terrified, helpless, or extremely vulnerable, these can produce changes in his/her feelings, thoughts, and behavior and can shape his/her personality. For some individuals, recovery may not take a long time, while for others it may linger for a long time because the event is often reexperienced, and the troubling situation remains a trauma of a long and painful process of recovery. PTSD, therefore, is generally marked by the frequently reexperiencing of traumatic events through images, nightmares, flashbacks, memories, and other things that can reactivate the dreaded event. Other visible manifestations of this disorder include a feeling of detachment from other people, have fewer positive emotional responses than before the event occurred, and have the expectation of additional harm, or some negative stuff, or some terrible consequences.17 One hit by this disorder may experience dissociative symptoms of depersonalization and derealization. In the former, one feels persistent experiences of a feeling of detachment, as if one is an observer of one’s mental processes or one’s body, while in the latter, one feels persistent experiences of the unreality of the surroundings. Other symptoms include cognitive distortions and experiences of substantial physical arousal; one may think that other humans would not like to socialize with one because of the trauma and may have difficulty sleeping, concentrating, and coping with the daily demands of life. It is important to note that the symptoms of PTSD must last, at least, a month for a diagnosis to be made. There could be a case of delayed expression of PTSD; in this case, some symptoms of PTSD are delayed for

16  Kearny, Christopher & Trull, Timothy. Abnormal Psychology and Life (2nd ed.), pp.111–120. Canada: Cengage Learning, 2015. 17  Ibid.

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more than 6  months from the time of the troubling event, or trauma was experienced. However, most of the symptoms generally develop within 3–6 months of the traumatic experience.18 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5 (DSM-5) stipulates the criteria be applied to adults, adolescents, and children older than 6 years, and children 6 years and younger. Some people may be so impacted by troubling events that some symptoms are already manifested in the personality; this is to say that the trauma is immediately felt, and in this instance, it is not exactly a case for PTSD, but rather acute stress disorder (ASD). The symptoms have some similarities with PTSD, but ASD generally refers to distressing memories, dissociative symptoms, such as the feelings of detachment from reality or the feelings of disconnectedness from other people. One experiences negative mood and isolates oneself from others or avoids socialization. Unlike PTSD, these troubling experiences and the arousal for ASD must last between 3 days and 1 month after the trauma. One can say that ASD is a first warning sign of PTSD, and in fact, people with ASD may more likely be diagnosed with PTSD when the symptoms continue for more than 1 month. Therefore, most psychologists would agree that ASD is a good predictor of PTSD.19 This information is of vital importance in mental hygiene, in curbing out the progression of ASD through therapy and to thwart the more extreme syndromes of PTSD. In both cases of PTSD and ASD, the following traumatic experiences are risk factors: the experiences of war; torture; severe physical abuse; sexual abuse and maltreatment; natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods; robbery; home invasion; or the witnessing of dehumanizing ordeals and horrifying event.20 Other risk factors include vehicle accidents; the knowledge of trauma to family members, relatives, or friends; and the first responders’ experiences of trauma. Although these are risk factors for both disorders, it does not mean that everyone who is exposed to these traumatic events will necessarily develop either of the disorders; humans may have different reactions to these traumas and may have subjective interpretations of the stressors.21 Separation anxiety disorder (SAD) and prolonged grief disorder (PGD) are the two disorders that I will discuss in connection with the mental hygiene of immigrants and refugees’ populations. Most humans can connect with separation anxiety, and I had a good deal of separation anxiety when I had to go far away from home for my High School education, and in a boarding high school. It was all going

 Ibid. See also Holeva, V., N.  Tarrier, and A.  Wells. “Prevalence and Predictors Acute Stress Disorder and PTSD Following Road Traffic Accidents: Thought Control Strategies and Social Support.” Behavior Therapy 32, (2001): 65–83. 19  Bryant, R. A., M. Creamer, M. L. O’Donnell, D. Silove, and A.C Mcfarlane. “A Multisite Study of the Capacity of Acute Stress Disorder Diagnosis to Predict Posttraumatic Stress Disorder”. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 69, (2008): 923–929. 20  Ruggiero, K.J., T.L. Morris, and J.R. Scotti. 2001. “Treatment for Children with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Current Status and Future Directions”. Clinical Psychology: Science and Social Practice 8, (2001): 210–227. 21  Ibid, Kearny & Trull, 2015. 18

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to be great, and I was very happy to leave home like my other brothers and sisters for high school; however, the experience changed less than a week after experiencing the new world without my mother, father, and siblings. It is a normal experience, I think so, but it becomes troublesome when the experience goes to the extreme, and then it is no longer separation anxiety but a SAD. It is generally marked by substantial distress when one experiences a separation from a major attachment figure or when there is the likelihood of such separation occurring in the future.22 The troublesome experiences must last, at least, for 4 weeks in children, so that the normal experiences of missing a major attachment figure is excluded. SAD is often linked with children, and their refusal to go school, and some of the symptoms include trouble sleeping alone and irritability and use of tantrums when a parent wants to leave the child and go somewhere, and children may make physical complaints, for example, stomachache when they are put away from parents. In the worlds of immigrants and refugees, SAD may not be restricted to children, because adults who long so much to return or visit their countries of origin but find themselves trapped in their host countries because they do not have the means to achieve this important goal or other unsurmountable factors may likely experience a form of SAD. In the same light, we can understand the PGD, in the worlds of immigrants and refugees. PGD is relatively rare, and it consists of a set of symptoms people go through sequel to the death of a significant person in their lives. There is no differentiation between normal grief and prolonged grief in the DSM, but I have decided to include PGD in this discussion because it is an essential part of the experiences of immigrants and refugees as indicated in the previous paragraphs. One of the most painful stories of refugees will be the terrible experience of witnessing the death of their loved ones and friends, or significant others, and the African immigrants’ experiences, which are at times shown on the mainstream media, should resonate with the traumatic death experiences that engender PGD. Some of the symptoms of PGD include trusting issue when one experiences the inability to trust others and the feeling that oneself is trapped in grief; inability to accept the reality of the loss, when one experiences bitterness and emotional numbness due to intense yearning for the person; and some cognitive issues, when one experiences identity confusion, and negative outlook to the future and the world, and inability to take care of oneself.23 The discussions on immigrants and refugees’ worlds illuminate the experiences that are risk factors to these mental disorders I have discussed, and the discussion of the African immigrants and refugees’ populations will make a clear case in the same direction.

22 23

 Ibid.  Ibid.

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The Experiences of African Immigrants and Refugees Many Africans have died a torturous death in the Mediterranean Sea and the Sahara Desert, and this is a very traumatic experience in all dimensions. The clarion call by Charlie Yaxley, spokesman of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), should not fall on deaf ears when he said “The tragedy of the Mediterranean cannot be allowed to continue.”24 It is reported by UNHCR that more than 1000 migrants and refugees have died this year, 2019, and this has been the case for the past 6 years. It is unbelievable that in our era, more than 18,000 people have lost their lives in the Mediterranean since 2014, and it is noted that 70 percent of the deaths occurred when the migrants attempted to cross over to Italy or Malta through Libya. The African migrant population is significant in the total migrant population globally. It may sound phony to say that migrants’ population may be the fifth largest population among the countries of the world; however, the recent UN figures indicate the same about the migrants’ population. The UN indicated that the total number of international migrants has rapidly increased from 150 million to 214 million in a decade and concluded that the numbers indicate that migrants’ population would constitute the fifth most populous country in the world.25 The African migrant population is significant in the total population of immigrants worldwide. This very significant population of migrants should attract very special attention in promulgating laws that protect the rights of migrants. The UN General Assembly is highly commended for proclaiming December 18, 2000, as International Migrants Day, which marks the day on which the body adopted the treaty known as the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families in 1990.26 The horrifying experiences of African migrants en route to their host countries lay a greater burden on the practical implementation and upholding of the migrants’ rights at all levels. It is not an exaggeration to state that some Africans have explored the most dangerous roots to immigrate to Europe and America and have been punished by high levels of fatalities. The mainstream media have shown so many gory stories and pictures of migrants from Africa en route to Europe and the various death traps means of crossing the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea, which have shown a historic record of casualties caused by nature and criminalities. The nature of this adventure embarked by Africans in the name of migration makes them highly vulnerable as they cross borders and countries en route to their intended host countries. In as much as Africans try to migrate to Europe and North America, most of the

 Nebehay, Stephany and Cecile Mantovani. “Migrant, refugee death toll in Mediterranean tops 1000 for 6th year: U.N.” John Stonestreet and Sandra Maler, eds., October 01, 2019. https://www. reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants/migrant-refugee-death-toll-in-mediterraneantops-1000-for-6th-year-un-idUSKBN1WG3FE 25  UN News. “On International Migrants Day, Human Rights Experts Call for End to Criminalization of Irregular Migration.” December 2012. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43795 26  Ibid. 24

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Africans generally prefer to immigrate to fellow African countries than European countries and North America, and most Africans migrate within the continent.27 A few examples include South Sudan which has recorded more than 2.2 million people that disappeared within the continent since the outbreak of the war in 2013 and Eritrea where a population of about 2500 refugees escape into Ethiopia every month for an extended period and have registered about 175,000 refugees. It is a high commendation to Ethiopia who has an open hand policy to receiving refugees. The Eritrean refugee crisis is because of President Isaias Afwerki’s dictatorship,28 and the Eritrean refugee population is the third largest group in Ethiopia, who was already hosting over 900,000. I will present the experiences of Africans in such a way to give enough insight into the possible development of PTSD and other mental disorders I have discussed. The African migrants through land borders often work with or fall in the hands of traffickers and smugglers who are paid to facilitate their immigration to their host countries, and these endeavors have often ended tragically. There are cases where up to 160 migrants were thrown into the sea from a boat by smugglers, which resulted in fatalities; five bodies were recovered, and 50 migrants were still missing. In another instance, smugglers forced more than 120 Somali and Ethiopian migrants into the sea when they got close to the coast of Shabwa, a Yemeni Governorate along the Arabian Sea, and it is in this location that a shallow grave of 29 migrants was discovered by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). There are reports about immigrants who got drowned in the treacherous journey, and in one instance, about 50 bodies were discovered. These are migrants who were hoping for a better future in the host Gulf countries through Yemen, a country ravaged by war,29 and according to IOM, around 55,000 migrants left Africa for Yemen in 2017, for a hope of better opportunities, and more than 30,000 of those migrants are under the age of 18 and from Somalia and Ethiopia, and females are in large numbers too. This shows a significant vulnerable population of minors. Their fate while in the hands of their traffickers as they make the treacherous journey to unknown or unfamiliar territories raises a serious concern. On a painful note, according to the United Nations, an average of six migrants died every day in the Mediterranean, while trying to cross the Mediterranean last year, 2018, and if this is the case, then we have a total of more than 2000 deaths in the Mediterranean last year.30 As unbelievable and disheartening this death toll may sound, worse death tolls are reported from Libya, where an estimated death rate  BBC News. “African Migration: Five Things We’ve Learnt.” March 26, 2019. https://www.bbc. com/news/world-africa-47705944 28  Ibid. See also Jeffrey, James. “Eritrea-Ethiopia Peace Leads to a Refugee Surge.” The New Humanitarian. November 15, 2018. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2018/11/15/eritrea-ethiopia-peace-leads-refugee-surge 29  Ibid, UN News, 2017. 30  Ibid, BBC News, 2019. See also, Winer, Stuart, and Toi Staff. “Likud Plans to Revive Bids to Expel Migrants, Terrorists’ Families – Report.” Times of Israel, May 13, 2019. https://www.timesofisrael.com/likud-plans-to-revive-bids-to-expel-migrants-terrorists-families-report/ 27

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from Libya is at one death for every 14 arrivals in 2018. This is an increased death rate from what was one death in 38 arrivals in 2017. The migrant crisis has attracted serious international debates and controversies, and some European governments have backed the anti-migrant stance, which has caused some humanitarian crises. The Prime Minister of Italy, Guiseppe Conte, who failed to embrace the UN migrant pact, paved the way for Italy’s adoption of tough migrant law, and with the new bill, it is easier for Italy to reject migrants and expel them from Italy.31 This Italian bill, according to the UN refugee agency, lacks the provisions for the protection of victims of abuse and torture, and vulnerable individuals. This move by the Italian government jeopardizes the rights of migrants and refugees agreed upon by many countries and promulgated in the UN general assembly. Sequel to this bill, other countries such as Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Slovakia, and even the United States did not show any interest in continuing with the pact and signaled their withdrawal from it; in another development, Switzerland made the negative move of postponing its decision due to parliamentary opposition.32 These countries’ withdrawal or negative actions against the UN pact will have adverse effects on migrants and refugee populations. In fact, it already did, because thereafter, it was reported that rescued migrants were kept stranded in the humanitarian boat for 12 days. To be stranded in the humanitarian boat for 12 days will not be the worst African migrants have undergone, as they force their ways through the land border of Melilla and Ceuta, the two tiny Spanish enclaves. These enclaves share borders with Morocco and about 250  miles from the African continent. It is on the northern shores of the Mediterranean coast, and the gateway to Europe. As greatly fortified as the three-walled fences are that separate Morocco and Spain, the African migrants are ready to pay the price and get to Europe in the hope of realizing their dreams of a better life. African migrants are sewn into hollowed-out mattresses, wedged into the tightest spaces in vehicles, such as dashboards, and the excruciating experience of having to wait for hours to get through the highly fortified security checkpoints. Some made it through, but with broken legs and hands, injuries they sustained while attempting to climb the three-walled fences, and some received serious beatings as illegal migrants. The end reward is that migrants who go undetected and arrive in either of the two bordering enclaves can file for asylum. In 2018, migrants who made it to Europe through these borders were 56,914, which was double the number of migrants in 2017, at 26,707. It is not all those who attempt to cross the borders are successful, and an estimated 68,000 migrants were purportedly stopped by the Moroccan government.33 The influx of migrants in large numbers through these  France 24 News. “Italy Adopts Tough Anti-Migrant Law.” November 28, 2018. https://www. france24.com/en/20181128-italy-adopts-tough-anti-migrant-law 32  Ibid. 33  Kershner, Isabel. “Israel Moves to Expel Africans. Critics Say That’s Not Jewish.” New York Times, February 02, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/02/world/middleeast/israelmigrants-african.html; CBS News. “Fortified Morocco-Spain border fence is under pressure from African migrants.” January 18, 2019). https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fortified-morocco-spain31

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small enclaves makes it a difficult task to cope up with their needs, and there may be cases of overcrowding and lack of enough provisions. At the Spanish side of the Melilla border, for example, a center that was built to accommodate 700 migrants had to hold twice that number. To the credit of the European Union, a 25 million dollar was given to Spain to assist them in taking care of migrants. However, that did not stop the photograph taken by Jose Palazon from going viral in 2015, where it showed migrants straddling two worlds as they scaled a border fence from Morocco, while golfers in Spain played on an elite course in the foreground.34 Two seemingly distinct voices describe the plight of these migrants, one from Jose Palazon who sees it from a more positive outlook that “The people who don’t support them say they come to invade us – that they want to steal, take our jobs and take advantage of our health system. But they just want to work and send money back to their families.”35 While another, First Officer Jose Ferron, may have seen it from a positive, capitalist perspective, “We see the difference between the third world and the industrialized world. You see a country with (little) hope –they don’t have food or a future and – separated by a very thin line – a world like Europe that has a future, democracy, and liberty.”36 The wrecked Libyan country through the heavy bombardment of both American and France’s forces reduced the once-thriving economy of Libya into a lawless country and a den of criminal gangsters, and at their hand, many migrants experienced their worst nightmares. Some of the migrants that winded up in Libya after they were intercepted in the Mediterranean Sea reported that Libyan authorities held them in detention centers with horrifying abuses and even been sold as slaves; many reported that they received unimaginable abuses by the prison guards, were starved, were physically abused and raped, and were traded as slaves.37 These Libyan evil acts have become endemic in their detention system. A somewhat pathetic story is told by one of the prisoners who was en route to Europe in 2015 but was arrested and taken to one of the Libyan prisons. There he had no one to bail him, and usually, there is a middleman in the bailing business and would charge about 690 dollars per person. He had no help until he borrowed money from his border-fence-is-under-pressure-from-african-migrants/; Alami, Aida. “Morocco unleashes a harsh crackdown on Sub-Saharan Migrants.” The New  York Times, October 22, 2018). https://www. nytimes.com/2018/10/22/world/africa/morocco-crackdown-sub-saharan-migrants-spain.html; Cotovio, B. & Masters, J. “Spanish police clash with migrants after 800 storm Morocco border fence.” CNN News, August 23, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/26/europe/ceuta-migrantsmorocco-spain-intl/index.html See also, Smith-Spark, Laura. “llegal migration to EU falls to lowest level in 5  years -- but spikes in Spain.” CNN News, May 1, 2019. https://www.cnn. com/2019/01/05/europe/migrant-figures-drop-europe-intl/index.html 34  CBS New. “Fortified Morocco-Spain border fence is under pressure from African migrants.” January 18, 2019. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fortified-morocco-spain-border-fence-is-underpressure-from-african-migrants/ 35  Ibid. 36  Ibid. 37  BBC News. “African Migration: Five Things We’ve Learnt.” March 26, 2019. https://www.bbc. com/news/world-africa-47705944

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family in Nigeria. He paid and was freed; unfortunately, he was rearrested and this time had no hope of getting money from anywhere. Something that seemed to be the blessing from a good Samaritan, when a man volunteered and made the payment on his behave, turned out to be an assistance by a devil’s agent. This man used him to work in his business until he paid the whole amount many times over. When he rejected further enslavement, the Libyan man retorted to beating him with an iron bar. He bound him with barbed wires on his hands and feet and had him taken back to prison. He spent an additional 7 months in a Libyan prison before his repatriation, and he recalls witnessing about 20 deaths before he left for Nigeria. Others in the same prison attested to the fact that people were dying daily. The climax of the abuses of migrants who were trapped in Libya and the poor handling of the migration crisis by the appropriate bodies, like the UN who has been accused of not doing enough, is in the self-immolation of a Somali refugee, who burnt himself to death when he did not make the UN refugee list after a long wait time.38 However, the UN later indicated that he and his wife, who were asylum seekers, were on the list for the next month. Libya has been notoriously blamed for many atrocities and heinous crimes against migrants. The troubling stories and shocking testimonies of victims have been documented by the IOM who has sounded an alarm against this evil on African migrants bound for Libya.39 There are several African migrants from countries including Gambia, Ghana, and Nigeria; these victims describe the horrific experiences of torture, exploitation, extortion, enslavement, and the objectification of migrants in Libya. The IMO has been instrumental in the rescue of these victims and the eventual voluntary repatriation to their respective countries. Some of these migrants were deceived into believing that a brighter future awaits them; they use their financial savings to venture into these foreign territories only to be made worse than their previous life situations. The repatriation of migrants from Libya amidst the horrific crimes against humanity in Libya is a commendable one. It was reported that many migrants had registered at Tripoli for repatriation, and a record number of about 3850 Nigerians are among those who were registered.40 In 2018, more than 16,000 migrants were repatriated, and these migrants were from 32 countries in Africa and Asia.41 It was a voluntary program of repatriation for those who had failed to realize their dreams in the migration bid sequel to the voluntary return program of IOM. There are still a good number of migrants who are yet to be repatriated then, about 56,000, who looked forward in hope of leaving Libya through this program one day, while a good number of refugees who were seeking asylum, over 4000 of them, have the privilege of evacuation from Libyan nightmare and for resettlement.

 Ibid.  Ibid. See also UN News. “African Migrants Reportedly Being Sold in ‘Slave Markets’ in Libya, UN Agency Warns”. 79.05. 2017 – http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56540 40  Ibid, UN News, 2017. 41  Ibid, France 24 News, 2019. 38 39

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The poor treatment and rejection of immigrants and refugees seem to be a common phenomenon across the globe; while we discuss their experiences in Europe, countries like Israel, the United States, and some African countries are not exonerated in the ugly treatment of migrants. An estimated 35,000 African immigrants reside in Israel, though not without hostilities from lawmakers and communities with larger migrants’ presence. There were reports about the unfair treatment of African migrants in Israel, but the decision of the Interior Minister, Aryeh Deri, to deport hundreds of asylum seekers from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), was a big step further, and it received a public outcry and disapproval from different quarters42; Deri had to rescind the decision and claimed that the deportation will resume when the situation in DRC is clear. Deri’s cancellation of the original plan of deportation was well acknowledged by the Hotline for Refugees and Migrants and calling his initial plan wrong and irresponsible. DRC has been ravaged by many years of war, and it is a very unsafe place to live, and still deplorable is the fact that many of the asylum requests by Congolese nationals haven’t been considered for over a decade.43 There were efforts to introduce anti-migrant’ laws in Israel, to use legislation to overrule High Court in pushing anti-migrant’ laws, in which the High Court previously struck down as unconstitutional in 2013. However, a watered-­ down version was approved by Knesset in 2014, which eased the detention procedures for African migrants, and these migrants could be discouraged to remain in the country through incarceration in a detention facility for up to 20 months.44 These efforts did not go without a stiff opposition and with warnings about the infringements on human rights and the international condemnation that will cast a dark shadow on Israel. On this issue, the Supreme Court Chief Justice, Esther Hayut, warned against the possibility of a constitutional crisis in Israel. There are a good number of migrants from Eritrea and Sudan in Israel, about 50,000 since 2006; as an enticement, the Israeli government offered some 38,000 of them a difficult choice of taking 3500 dollars and a plane ticket to a third country in Africa, or face going to jail.45 This move again received strong opposition from different quarters in Israel, medical doctors, professors, rabbis, pilots, retired diplomats, etc., with the most moving statement that a nation formed by refugees after the atrocities of the Holocaust has a special obligation to treat others who go through this same

 Winer, Stuart, and Toi Staff. “Likud Plans to Revive Bids to Expel Migrants, Terrorists’ Families – Report.” Times of Israel, May 13, 2019. https://www.timesofisrael.com/likud-plans-to-revive-bids-toexpel-migrants-terrorists-families-report/ 43  Ibid. 44  Ibid. 45  Kershner, Isabel. “Israel Moves to Expel Africans. Critics Say That’s Not Jewish.” New York Times. February 2, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/02/world/middleeast/israel-migrantsafrican.html; See also, Kershner. “Isabel. Israel offers African migrants a choice: Ticket out or jail.” New York Times, January 4, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/world/middleeast/ israel-africans.html; Kershner, Isabel. “Israeli leader is forced to retreat on African migrant deal.” New York Times, April 2, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/world/middleeast/israelafrican-migrants-un-resettlement.html 42

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e­ xperience with more compassion.46 The Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu who was in favor of passing bills that would enable the government to crack down on migrants received another passionate plea from 36 Holocaust survivors from Europe not to take his planned path but beseeched him “to learn the lesson” and not to expel Africans seeking asylum in Israel.47 The words of Rabbi Nava Hefetz synthesized the feeling of the empathy of some Israelis about their refugees: “We are talking about the history of the Jewish people from the exodus from Egypt to the tragedy of the Holocaust. Refugeedom is in our DNA. Seeking asylum is in our blood.”48 The prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, is determined to deport the African migrants, and it is reported that 20, 000 or more have left Israel for Rwanda and Uganda, where they are faced with joblessness. The migration surge into the United States cannot be said to be restricted to South American migrants since, recently, the African migrant population is increasing in hundreds. Unlike Europe, which has borders nearer to African countries, it will be difficult for African migrants to find an easy route to the United States. It must have been a stressful journey of several months to cross several borders en route to the United States. This is verifiably so because it was the story of some migrants from Cameroon and Congo, who plan to seek asylum in the United States and have traveled for several months to the US-Mexico border. There are migrants from the Anglophone regions of Cameroon. Since late 2016 they have experienced violent conflicts, and the use of military force against the citizens, and the United Nations official indicated that about 4.3 million people need humanitarian assistance.49 One of the refugees from Cameroon claimed that the government does not treat the people from the Anglophone regions with equal rights with the Francophone regions and that they in the Anglophone regions are deprived of basic needs; he has been waiting amidst other crowds of refugees in Tapachula every morning for about 6 weeks for travel documents to the United States. He started his journey through Ecuador and traveled overland through South and Central America. Another African refugee, 26  years of age from the Democratic Republic of Congo, narrated the migration ordeal that took him 3  years. He left his country to Angola to escape political oppression and from there to Brazil and then to America.50 Refugee experiences are no doubt very difficult, and at times, they may denounce their treatment, and that was the case with the African refugees. After several weeks of waiting for transit permits, they could not stomach it any longer, as they launched a protest outside the immigration office. They accused the Mexican officials as racist.51 These African immigrants to the United States are mostly from the Democratic Republic  Ibid.  Ibid. 48  Ibid. 49  Selsky, Andrew, and Patrick Whittle. “Record Number of African Migrants Coming to Mexican border.” AP News, June 16, 2019. https://www.apnews.com/429f04067c38428ba0d06749b53e 6df0 50  Ibid. 51  Ibid. 46 47

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of Congo, and other countries like Angola, Cameroon, Eritrea, Mauritania, and Sudan.52 These African migrants and refugees are subjected to live in deplorable conditions. At the Tapachula detention center in Mexico, they have denounced their poor living conditions, but they can do very little about such conditions; after traveling several months for a better future, they have found themselves, between the devil and the deep sea, one would say, because going back to Africa on their own is unrealizable and getting out of the deplorable living condition by themselves is unachievable.53 The US empathy for migrants and refugees has speedily dwindled under the presidency of Donald Trump; perhaps, should the members of both parties, the Democratic and Republican parties work collaboratively and responsibly they will come up with bills that will facilitate a more humane and justifiable immigration process and respect and protect the rights of the migrant and refugee populations. Although most African migrant and refugee populations are within the continent, migration which is a global crisis did not spare the African continent, especially as natural disasters and the corrupt practices by government officials have ignited increased migration and leading to the migration crisis. The recent violence against immigrants in South Africa – a xenophobic violence that did claim some lives – has indeed cast a dark shadow on South Africa as an African country. Some South African mobs attached fellow Africans, burnt their shops and properties, killed some of them, and clashes ensued between South Africans and other Africans in South Africa. There were voices of condemnation from different quarters in South Africa, but I see the xenophobic violence as a result of an agglomeration of issues  Averbuch, Maya, and Kevin Sief. “Hundreds of Africans Tried to Reach the United States. Now They’re Stuck in Mexico.” Washington Post, April 16, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/the_americas/hundreds-of-africans-tried-to-reach-the-united-states-now-theyre-stuck-inmexico/2019/04/16/6ebb7b48-5fa4-11e9-bf24-db4b9fb62aa2_story.html; Fernandez, Manny. “A New Migrant Surge at the Border, This One from Central Africa.” New York Times, June 16, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/16/us/border-africans-congo-maine.html; Da Silva, Chantal. “Why Are Hundreds of African Asylum Seekers Showing Up at The U.S.-Mexico Border?” Newsweek, June 7, 2019. https://www.newsweek.com/border-patrol-surge-african-migrants-usmexico-border-1442748; Selsky, Andrew, and Patrick Whittle. “Record Number of African Migrants Coming to Mexican border.” AP News, June 16, 2019. https://www.apnews.com/429f04 067c38428ba0d06749b53e6df0; Selsky, A. & Whittle, P. “Record number of African migrants coming to Mexican border.” PBS News, June 16, 2019. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ record-number-of-african-migrants-coming-to-mexican-border; Jervis, Rick. “At US-Mexico Border, Migrants from Africa, Haiti Wait to Seek Asylum.” USA Today, June 4, 2019. https://www. u s a t o d a y. c o m / s t o r y / n ew s / n a t i o n / 2 0 1 9 / 0 6 / 0 4 / a f r i c a n - m i g r a n t s - b o r d e r- t r u m p immigration-nuevo-laredo-congo/1319996001/ 53  Averbuch, Maya, and Kevin Sief. “Hundreds of Africans Tried to Reach the United States. Now They’re Stuck in Mexico.” Washington Post, April 16, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/the_americas/hundreds-of-africans-tried-to-reach-the-united-states-now-theyre-stuck-inmexico/2019/04/16/6ebb7b48-5fa4-11e9-bf24-db4b9fb62aa2_story.html; Fernandez, Manny. “A New Migrant Surge at the Border, This One from Central Africa.” New York Times, June 16, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/16/us/border-africans-congo-maine.html; See also Selsky, Andrew, and Patrick Whittle. “Record Number of African Migrants Coming to Mexican border.” AP News, June 16, 2019. https://www.apnews.com/429f04067c38428ba0d06749b53e6df0 52

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in South Africa, from unemployment, idleness, to political chauvinism and fascism, a distraction from corrupt government practices, and the apartheid mentality that has not been completely washed off from some South Africans. There are some South Africans who are not anti-migrant, or at least, will not pursue the path of violence on immigrants. Some South Africans are flourishing in other African countries, some in their multi-million businesses, and Africa should be a home for all Africans, to begin with. The aftermath of this violent xenophobic attack led to the return of some Africans to their respective countries of origin voluntarily, and about 200 hundred Nigerians purportedly accepted this move and are now in Nigeria, while about 600 more are expected to return to Nigeria.54 Ill-treatment and anti-­ immigrant behaviors are not restricted to South Africans, there are claims that Angolan government used forceful means to expel migrants from Angola, and the Angolan government has denied such allegation55; however, many migrants have left Angola, and the way these migrants left Angola should pose difficult questions for the Angolan government and leave the Angolan government with much to explain to be exonerated from the accusation of anti-migrant and refugees’ practices. It is generally not an easy endeavor to give the needed care to migrants, but it is also generally true that the worse humans will do is to compromise the dignity of the human, especially where this dignity is tested, which is among migrants and refugees.

Conclusion Migration in this era has skyrocketed on a global level and so also the death toll, migration is crisis driven. We must all agree with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that the tragedy of the Mediterranean cannot be allowed to continue, and we should add that the tragedy that migrants and refugees are facing globally must not be allowed to continue, and with the readiness for action. We cannot ignore the fact that over 1000 migrants have died in the Mediterranean this year, and this has been the story for 6 years in a row. Many migrants are ready and willing to take the risks to their host countries even when they are not certain of the kind of future that awaits them in the host countries. In many cases, the stories these migrants were told about the host countries before they embarked on these treacherous journeys to immigrate, and their expectations about the host countries turned out to be great disappointments. Both voluntary migration and involuntary migration can have dare consequences with traumatic events that can develop into mental disorders, and the understanding of the  Ibid, France 24 News, 2019. See also, Al Jazeera News. “Nigerians Repatriated from South Africa After Attacks.” September 12, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/nigeriabegins-repatriate-nationals-south-africa-190911074310949.html 55  VOA News, October 21, 2018. voanews.com/africa/angola-says-380000-illegal-migrants -exit-weeks 54

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e­xperiences of these immigrants and refugees calls our common humanity into action to ameliorate their mental health conditions. The experiences of migrants and refugees I have discussed so far leave no doubt that the experiences are those of acute stressors and traumatic events in all measures. Their experiences have the symptoms that can gradually develop to mental disorders, such as acute stress disrober (ASD), prolonged grief disorder (PGD), and, even worse, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), if unchecked. It suffices to state that many of these migrants and refugees, if not all, should be attended clinically to help their mental health conditions and uphold mental hygiene, which in turn will improve the quality of health in the community, state, country, and society at large, as it is said that “a healthy nation is a wealthy nation.” The care of these immigrants and refugees require the application of the science of promoting mental health and thwarting mental disorders through prevention perspectives; the conscious efforts to communicate the necessary knowledge to them, reach out to them, especially those who may be at risk in a timely fashion for treatment, and to apply other public health measures. Therefore, the detection, for instance, of early symptoms of PTSD among African migrant and refugee populations, early diagnosis, and then treatment are necessary steps to thwarting the syndromes and menaces of PTSD and mental disorders at large. These issues raised are succinctly obvious when one understands the true lived experiences of migrants and refugees. In addition, a collective effort is needed from all nations to consider the causes of the rapid increase of migration and to address these causes from the grassroots, to put just systems in place that will promote and support economic independence and sustainability in the less technologically developed countries, and to put a stop to proxy wars. Since war is a proximal factor in migration, the United Nations, the Security Council, and all Nations should appeal to reason and responsibility and consciously arrive at resolutions that will lead to the avoidance of wars or proxy wars for the benefit of humanity, if only pride is tamed and truth and justice lead the way.

References Al Jazeera News. Nigerians Repatriated from South Africa After Attacks. September 12, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/nigeria-begins-repatriate-nationals-southafrica-190911074310949.html Averbuch, Maya, and Kevin Sief. Hundreds of Africans Tried to Reach the United States. Now They’re Stuck in Mexico. Washington Post, April 16, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/the_americas/hundreds-of-africans-tried-to-reach-the-united-states-now-theyre-stuckin-mexico/2019/04/16/6ebb7b48-5fa4-11e9-bf24-db4b9fb62aa2_story.html Axelrod, Josh. 150 Migrants Feared Dead in Mediterranean’s Worst Loss of Life This Year. NPR News, July 26, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/07/26/745584178/150-migrants-feared-deadin-mediterraneans-worst-loss-of-life-this-year BBC News. African Migration: Five Things We’ve Learnt. March 26, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-africa-47705944

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Berry, J.W. 1991. Managing the Process of Acculturation. In Mental Health Services for Refugees, DHHS Publication No. ADM 91-1824, ed. U.S Department of Health and Human Services, 111–122. Rockville: National Institute of Mental Health. ———. 1998. Understanding the Process of Acculturation for Primary Prevention. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, National Institute of Mental Health Refugee Assistance Program. Brennan, David. South African Firebrand Party Leader Calls for Xenophobic Anger to be Directed at Wealthy Whites. Newsweek, September 4, 2019. https://www.newsweek.com/ south-africa-xenophobic-violence-wealthy-whites-racism-land-seizures-1457595 Bolzman, C., R. Fibbi, and M. Vital. 2000. What to Do After Retirement? Elderly Migrants and the Question of Return. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 32 (8): 1359–1375. Browne, Malachy, and Christiaan Triebert. How the Times Analyzed the Migrant Center Airstrike. The New York Times, July 17, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/reader-center/libyamigrant-center-airstrike-reporting.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FLibya Bryant, R.A., M.  Creamer, M.L.  O’Donnell, D.  Silove, and A.C.  Mcfarlane. 2008. A Multisite Study of the Capacity of Acute Stress Disorder Diagnosis to Predict Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 69: 923–929. Chung, R.C.Y., and F.  Bemak. 2007. Asian Immigrants and Refugees. In Handbook of Asian American Psychology, ed. F.T.L. Leong, A.G. Inman, A. Ebreo, L.H. Yang, L. Kinoshita, and M. Fu, 2nd ed., 227–243. Thousand Oaks: Sage. CNN News. African Migrants Denounce Conditions at Mexico Border. June 2019. https://www. cnn.com/videos/world/2019/06/16/african-migrants-detained-mexico-holmes-pkg-vpx.cnn Collier, Neil, Yousur Al-Hlou and Jacob LaMendola. 65 Migrants Were Picked Up at Sea. Then the Politics Began.The New York Times, July 23, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/ europe/100000006498001/seawatch-migrants-europe.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2 FLibya Cotovio, Vasco, and James Masters. Spanish Police Clash with Migrants After 800 Storm Morocco Border Fence. CNN News, August 23, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/26/europe/ceutamigrants-morocco-spain-intl/index.html Da Silva, Chantal. Why Are Hundreds of African Asylum Seekers Showing Up at The U.S-Mexico Border? Newsweek, June 7, 2019. https://www.newsweek.com/ border-patrol-surge-african-migrants-us-mexico-border-1442748 Donkin, Robin A. 2003. Between East and West: The Moluccas and the Traffic in Spices Up to the Arrival of Europeans. Pennsylvania: Diane Publishing Company. Fage, John Donnelly, et  al. 1975. The Cambridge History of Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fernandez, Manny. A New Migrant Surge at the Border, This One from Central Africa. New York Times, June 16, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/16/us/border-africans-congo-maine. html France 24 News. Italy Adopts Tough Anti-Migrant Law. November 28, 2018. https://www. france24.com/en/20181128-italy-adopts-tough-anti-migrant-law ———. More than 16,000 Migrants Repatriated from Libya in 2018: IOM. June 2, 2019. https:// www.france24.com/en/20190206-more-16000-migrants-repatriated-libya-2018-iom ———. 2019, December 9. Nearly 200 Nigerian Migrants Repatriated from South Africa After Xenophobic Violence. https://www.france24.com/en/20190912-nigeria-migrants-nearly200-nigerians-repatriated-south-africa-xenophobia-violence France-Presse, Agence. 2018. Angola Says 380,000 Illegal Migrants Exit in Weeks. VOA News, October 21, 2018. voanews.com/africa/angola-says-380000-illegal-migrants-exitweeks Freedman, Paul. How the Search for Flavors Influenced Our World. Yale Global Online, 2013. Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2003. https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/ spices-how-search-flavors-influenced-our-world Hill, Evan, Dmitriy Khavin, Christiaan Triebert, Haley Willis, Malachy Browne and David Botti. Europe Shut These Migrants Out, Libyan Rebels Bombed Them. The New York Times, July 11,

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2019. https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000006594318/europe-shut-african-migrants-out-libyan-rebels-bombed-them.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FLibya Holeva, V., N. Tarrier, and A. Wells. 2001. Prevalence and Predictors Acute Stress Disorder and PTSD Following Road Traffic Accidents: Thought Control Strategies and Social Support. Behavior Therapy 32: 65–83. Hong, G.K., and M.D.C. Ham. 2001. Psychology and Counseling with Asian American Clients: A Practical Guide. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Jawad, Rana. Migrant Crisis: Self-Immolation Exposes UN Failures in Libya. BCC News, July 31, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49154959. Jervis, Rick. At US-Mexico Border, Migrants from Africa, Haiti Wait to Seek Asylum. USA Today, June 4, 2019. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/06/04/ african-migrants-border-trump-immigration-nuevo-laredo-congo/1319996001/ Jeffrey, James. Eritrea-Ethiopia Peace Leads to a Refugee Surge. The New Humanitarian, November 15, 2018. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2018/11/15/ eritrea-ethiopia-peace-leads-refugee-surge Kalidasan, Vinod Kottayil. 2015. Routes of Pepper: Colonial Discourses Around Spice Trade in Malabar. In Kerala Modernity: Ideas, Spaces and Practices in Transition, ed. Shiju Sam Varughese and Sathese Chandra Bose. New Delhi: Orient Blackswan. Kaur, Harmeet, and Natasha Chen. Thousands of People Gather to Commemorate 400 Years Since American Slavery Began. CNN News, August 25, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/25/ us/1619-enslaved-africans-ship-commemoration/index.html Kearny, Christopher, and Timothy Trull. 2015. Abnormal Psychology and Life. 2nd ed, 111–120. Boston: Cengage Learning. Kershner, Isabel. Israel Moves to Expel Africans. Critics Say That’s Not Jewish. New York Times, February 2, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/02/world/middleeast/israel-migrantsafrican.html ———. Israel Offers African Migrants a Choice: Ticket Out or Jail. New York Times, January 4, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/world/middleeast/israel-africans.html?action=cli ck&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article®ion=Footer Kitano, H.H.L. 1999. Race Relations. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. Magdy, Sam. Libya’s Coast Guard Recovers Dozens of Bodies of Migrants. Times of Israel, July 27, 2019. https://www.timesofisrael.com/libyas-coast-guard-recovers-dozens-of-bodies-of-migrants/ Mio, Jeffery S., A. Lori Barker, and M.D. Melanie Rodriguez. 2016. Multicultural Psychology: Understanding Our Diverse Communities. 3rd ed, 140–171. New  York: Oxford University Press. Momigliano, Anna. About 150 Migrants Drown in Shipwreck Off Libya. The New York Times, July 25, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/world/middleeast/migrants-shipwreck-libya. html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FLibya Nebehay, Stephany, and Cecile Mantovani. Migrant, Refugee Death Toll in Mediterranean Tops 1,000 for 6th Year: U.N.  John Stonestreet and Sandra Maler, ed. October 01, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants/ migrant-refugee-death-toll-in-mediterranean-tops-1000-for-6th-year-un-idUSKBN1WG3FE Nordland, Rod. ‘All of Africa Is Here’: Where Europe’s Southern Border Is Just a Fence. New York Times, August 19, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/19/world/africa/ceuta-moroccospain-migration-crisis.html Picheta, Rob. One in Every 108 People on the Planet Has Been Displaced, Says UN Refugee Agency. CNN News, June 19, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/19/world/un-refugeereport-2018-intl/index.html Prendes-Lintel, M. 2001. A Working Model in Counseling Recent Refugees. In Handbook of Multicultural Counseling, ed. J.G. Ponterotto, J.M. Casas, L.A. Suzuki, and C.M. Alexander, 2nd ed., 729–752. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

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Ruggiero, K.J., T.L.  Morris, and J.R.  Scotti. 2001. Treatment for Children with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Current Status and Future Directions. Clinical Psychology: Science and Social Practice 8: 210–227. Selsky, Andrew, and Patrick Whittle. Record Number of African Migrants Coming to Mexican Border. AP News, June 16, 2019. https://www.apnews.com/429f04067c38428ba0d06749b53 e6df0 Sladkova, J. 2014. The Guys Told Us Crying That They Saw How They Were Killing Her and They Could Not Do Anything. Psychosocial Explorations of Migrant Journeys to the U.S. Psychosocial Intervention 23 (1): 1–9. Staff, Toy. Interior Minister Delays Planned Deportation of Congolese Migrants. Times of Israel, March 7, 2019. https://www.timesofisrael.com/ interior-minister-delays-planned-deportation-of-congolese-migrants/ Stevis-Gridneff, Matina. Europe Keeps Asylum Seekers at a Distance. The New  York Times, September 8, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08/world/europe/migrants-africarwanda.html The New Humanitarian. Migrants’ limbo in Spain’s African enclave. May 22, 2015. https://www. thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/255326 The New  York Times. The 1691 Project. https://www.nytimes.com.2019/08/14. magazine.1619-america-slavery UN News. Smugglers Throw Hundreds of African Migrants off Boats Headed to Yemen. 76.38. 2017. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57336 ———. International Migration Report 2017. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/ population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017 ———. African Migrants Reportedly Being Sold in ‘Slave Markets’ in Libya, UN Agency Warns. 79.05. 2017 – http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56540 ———. UN Agency Begins Assisting Thousands of West African Migrants to Leave Libya. 77.9. 2017 – http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=58255 ———. On International Migrants Day, Human Rights Experts Call for End to Criminalization of Irregular Migration. December 2012. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43795 Walsh, Declan, and Nada Rashwan. ‘We’re at War’: A Covert Social Media Campaign Boosts Military Rulers. September 6, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/world/middleeast/ sudan-social-media.html Winer, Stuart, and Toi Staff. Likud Plans to Revive Bids to Expel Migrants, Terrorists’ Families  – Report. Times of Israel, May 13, 2019. https://www.timesofisrael.com/ likud-plans-to-revive-bids-to-expel-migrants-terrorists-families-report/ Wong, E.C., J.D. Kinzie, and J.M. Kinzie. 2009. Stress, Refugees, and Trauma. In Asian American Psychology: Current Perspectives, ed. N.  Tewari and A.N.  Alvarez, 441–462. New  York: Psychology Press.

Chapter 11

Disparities Between Messages Heard at Home and Messages Sent Out by African Refugees in LAC “Safe Haven” Countries Ivon Alcime and Brenda I. Gill

Introduction Every two seconds, one person flees his or her home country.1 One major source of those refugees is the continent of Africa. As European countries have tightened their borders, most Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries have implemented friendly immigration reforms. This makes it more practical and feasible for African refugees to migrate to, live in, and trek across the region by foot, bus, and boat. The news of the immigration reforms, which also provides faster track and greater opportunities for refugees to migrate to the Mexican-US border, has immensely increased the flow of refugees in the region. Remarkably, Brazil and Ecuador’s relaxed visa requirements are most progressive in the region. In 2008, for example, the Ecuadorian government allowed all nationalities to enter the country without a visa. Cameroonians, for instance, have become one of the beneficiaries of Ecuador’s visa-free agreement. According to Brooke Kipling, then a graduate student of Spanish at UC Davis and a researcher with Humanizando la deportación in Tapachula, Mexico, “This agreement between Cameroon and Ecuador gives thousands of Cameroonian refugees a legal entryway into Latin America. They fly from either Cameroon or Nigeria to Ecuador to begin the perilous journey to the Mexico-US border.”2 By 2010, However, the Ecuadorian

1  “Figures at a Glance,” UNHCR.org, Accessed November 16, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/ figures-at-a-glance.html 2  Arvind Dilawar, ‘The Graveyard of Migrants’: Traveling Through the Most Dangerous Jungle in the World, September 24, 2019, https://www.thenation.com/article/immigration-panama-colombiadarien/

I. Alcime (*) · B. I. Gill Alabama State University, Montgomery, AL, USA e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 S. O. Abidde (ed.), The Challenges of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56650-0_11

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government reinstated the visa requirements for nine Asian and African countries due to the influx of migrants entering the country.3 Meanwhile, the overflow of refugees has created a handful of problems in the region. First, some communities, in which the refugees assemble, cannot accommodate them. Those communities already have their inadequacies – such inequalities and limited housing, health care, jobs, and security – that predate the presence of refugees. Second, if residents feel their needs are not met, then any attempt by the municipal authorities and humanitarian groups to reallocate resources to the refugees can create hostilities between the refugees and residents. Despite the stumbling blocks, unique opportunities have arisen for the local communities and some refugees. First, migrating to the region is fairly easy. Second, those refugees who have permanently settled in their host countries or passing through have added to the diversity of the region. They have brought their skills and talents with them, which have slightly contributed to the local economy and the educational and cultural development of the region. The flip side is the racism, psychological and mental abuse, pilfering, and human trafficking that most refugees must endure. The aforementioned opportunities and agonies are well documented on various platforms. For this section of the chapter, we used published documents from various media and organization platforms to examine the communication of the African refugees in the LAC region. The purpose is to see what we can learn about the refugees’ dwelling, temporary or permanently, and the reasons they left their countries. In the next section of the chapter, we first define all the main concepts that are used in our discussion. Following that, we present a snapshot of the African refugees in the LAC region to show from where they are more likely to derive and where they mostly seek asylum. Then, we explore the communications they share from their sanctuary countries to show how their experiences often are at odds with the reality they experience once they settle in their “safe haven.” Finally, we offer our insights and conclusion.

Latin American (LAC) Countries For this discussion, the LAC region is comprised of thirty-three countries. These countries fall within three broad subregions, namely, the Caribbean, South America, and Central America. Of the thirty-three LAC countries, most (13) countries are in the Caribbean. The South American countries constitute the next largest subregion in LAC with 12 countries. The remaining 8 countries are in Central America

3  Nicole Ledesma, “Ecuador Migration Trends,” accessed December 15, 2019, https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Ecuador-Migration-Trends.pdf

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(Community of Latin American and the Caribbean States.4 This discussion will use the three broad subregional divisions as the discussion proceeds.

African Refugees The term “refugees” is reserved for persons who are unequivocally characterized as such and who are safeguarded by international law.5 The term pertains to very frightened individuals. In some cases, these fears may pertain to conflict, violence, disasters, persecution, or other atrocities. Bearing the afore in mind, refugees are people who move outside of their country of origin because of death-defying and insufferable circumstances in their own countries, including movement due to natural and man-made disasters. These persons and who mostly cross international borders hope to find safe spaces. Bearing the foregoing in mind then, African refugees are those persons from all fifty-four African states who have left their home country because they dreaded for their lives.

LAC “Safe Havens” for African Refugees For several refugees from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean is perceived as a viable route for entry into the United States, Canada, and Europe.6 Nonetheless, to which LAC countries are they more likely to go? The aforesaid broad subregional divisions are used to respond to this question. Data sourced from the UNHCR Population Statistics7 reveal that African refugees to the Caribbean mostly go to Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Tobago, Bahamas, and the Dominican Republic. African refugees are likely to migrate to all the 13 South American countries. The data divulge that some South American countries do receive more African refugees than others. For example, between 2014 and 2018, the top destination for 4  Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Membership. Retrieved October 4, 2019; https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/community-latin-american-and-caribbean-states-celac/; Worldometers (2016). Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. [Online] Available at: http://www.worldometers.info/geography/how-many-countries-in-latin-america/. [Accessed 22 August. 2016]. 5  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UN Refugee Agency. Refugees and Migrants–Frequently Asked Questions. 16 March 2016. Retrieved October 2, 2019. https:// www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/3/56e95c676/refugees-migrants-frequently-asked-questions-faqs.html 6  Caitlyn Yates. “As More Migrants from Africa and Asia Arrive in Latin America, Governments Seek Orderly and Controlled Pathways.” Migration Information Source, October 22, 2019. https:// www.migrationpolicy.org/article/extracontinental-migrants-latin-america 7  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2019). The UN Refugee Agency. Population Statistics. [Online] Available at: [Accessed 5 Oct. 2019].

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African refugees to South America was Brazil. Other countries to which significantly more African refugees went were Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Guyana, Bolivia, and Paraguay. The UNHCR Population Statistics for 20198 confirms that refugees from Mali, Sudan, Guinea Cameroon, and Cote d’Ivoire were more likely to be the ones that fled to Brazil. Other source countries for refugees to Brazil were Somalia, Togo, Ghana, Gambia, Eritrea, Algeria, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Senegal, South Africa, Somalia, and Libya. Another prominent country from which refugees to South America were derived was Nigeria. Aside from Brazil, several Nigerian refugees also went to Argentina. Though in lesser numbers, apart from Uganda and Libya, all other African countries had refugees that went to Argentina. Other countries with a larger number of refugees entering Argentina were Liberia, Senegal, Algeria, and Ghana. Except for Uganda and Libya, the UNHCR Population Statistics9 further show that between 2014 and 2018, all the other African countries supposedly had refugees that migrated to Argentina. When refugees from Africa who entered Central America between 2014 and 2018 are examined, the data propose that the pull factors to Mexico seemed to be stronger than that for any other country. Mostly, African refugees tended to go to Mexico, Panama, and Costa Rico. Other Central American countries to which they migrated during this period were El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Belize.10 It is clear that based on whatever messages these African refugees heard, they believe these messages and often chose the LAC region as a place of escape. Often the decision of where to head to avoid some form of the unpleasant situation in one’s country is based on many factors. These factors some scholars have labeled push/pull factors.

Some Reasons Why They Leave We observe from the preceding discussion that African refugees have entered and continue to enter LAC countries. Several of these African refugees fled to escape varied negative and unbearable conditions in their home countries (religious persecution, sexual orientation discrimination, political persecution, inability to work or lack of access to job opportunities, famines, drought, gang violence, poverty, and natural disasters). Interestingly, some of these refugees had fled their homelands in the hopes that they would gain great opportunities and enjoy a better quality of life. Often, remaining in their homelands could result in their demise. For several, the LAC countries were perceived as “safe havens” so they fled there. Regardless of the

 Ibid.  Ibid. 10  Ibid. 8 9

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reasons for leaving, the bottom line is that the refugees believed there was something better to be derived by the end of their sojourn to the LAC region. Despite the messages they may have heard while back in the African continent, research on refugees’ reports via print media often suggests that in several instances the opposite ensues. In the next section, we explore the communication of African refugees to see how they document their experiences in their host countries. We examine these communications as captured by the media and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who used messaging apps and face-to-face interviews to solicit these responses.

Messages of African Refugees from Their “Safe Havens” Upon their arrival to most of the LAC countries, they are again exposed to conditions like those they had fled. Regularly, refugees place severe financial, political, economic, and social obligations on already impoverished and straining financial systems. This onus boosts concern and strains policies as these societies try to pass measures to cater to their obligations to host these refugees. Moreover, in some host countries, refugees are denied citizenship rights and must withstand expanded phases of insecurity.The African refugees have been very vocal about their experiences while dwelling in the LAC region. Some have taken advantage of every opportunity to verbally express their discontent and satisfaction. To protect the identities of the refugees and their families back home, interviewers have used pseudonyms for the interviewees. Therefore, a lot of the refugees were referred to by a first name. The setup of this section is as follows: Depending on what information was provided, we introduced each refugee separately along with the reason he or she had left his or her country. Following this, we discuss the opportunities afforded to them as well as their agonies in the LAC country.

Message from Mexico Yakpaora Yakpaora had escaped persecution in Guinea during the latter part of 2008 in which a coup d’état had overthrown the Guinean government. Yakpaora and other Guineans took to the streets, protesting the coup. In retaliation, the new regime imprisoned demonstrators as well as Yakpaora’s friends and brother, who was a police officer. Not wanting to be arrested, Yakpaora, who was studying cinema, fled to Guatemala via Cuba. Since the UNHCR did not have an office in Guatemala to advise Yakpaora on asylum procedures, he illegally crossed the Mexican border city of Tapachula for

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assistance from UNHCR. He was detained for 100 days but released with refugee status.11 Upon his release, Yakpaora faced many challenges. Yakpaora, who is fluent in French, had a language barrier. He could not speak Spanish, which made it difficult for him to find jobs. For this reason, he enrolled in Spanish classes but dropped out. “I can’t attend class and look for a job at the same time. I’ve been here for some months, but I’ve been told there are no [job] vacancies.” For him, “life as a refugee is an uncertainty.”12 Although Yakpaora had many challenges, his experience was not all ghastly. He felt safe. Paul Like Yakpaora, Paul could not avoid the internal conflict in his country. Accordingly, he fled his Anglophone town of Cameroon to Mexico by way of Ecuador after his uncle was kidnapped. Cameroon has had its share of instability over the years. The territory was once occupied by German colonizers. After World War I, Britain and France divided the territory into separate colonies, Anglophone and Francophone. In 1960, the Francophone region gained its independence from France, followed by the independence of the Anglophone regions a year later from Britain. After their independence, the two regions formed a union.13 In 2016, the Anglophone regions were mired by peaceful protests the appointment of Francophone judges, and the intrusion of the French language in the regional administration. The government violently crushed the protests. A year later, the Ambazonia Defense Forces, an armed separatist group, attacked Cameroonian military posts. Since the conflict started, both the Anglophone separatist group and the Cameroonian military have been accused of terrorizing the average citizens. Hence, nearly half a million people have been displaced and thousands have sought refuge in other countries. As of 2019, Cameroonians have become the most asylum seekers in Mexico. In the first half of 2019, however, 4, 779 Africans were arrested traveling to Mexico to seek asylum in the United States or Canada.14 Paul was not immune to the challenges of other African refugees in the region. They encountered racist discrimination, physical threats, and health issues. Paul, however, had a rare cultural challenge. He had difficulty performing a burial ritual for a fellow Cameroonian who had died in his arms while they were trekking through the Darién Gap, a 20,000-square-mile mountainous rainforest and swamp dividing Colombia and Panama. They buried the man in the area where he died.15  Mariana Echandi, “Africans and Asians attracted to Latin America as a migration route,” November 10, 2010, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2010/11/4cdacd4c6/africans-asiansattracted-latin-america-migration-route.html 12  Ibid. 13  Joe Penney, “Cameroonian Asylum-Seekers at the Border Are Fleeing A U.S.-Backed Military Force,” December 1, 2019, https://theintercept.com/2019/12/01/us-asylum-seekers-cameroon/ 14  Ibid. 15  Ibid. 11

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In the word of Paul, “As the African tradition holds, when somebody dies, if you cannot transfer the corpse back home … what you do is that when you bury the person, you have to take soil from the person’s grave and send it back to his family. The soil will help him. I’ve been carrying somebody like me in my backpack for more than five months now.”16 Paul has not been able to send the soil home. The postal services in Costa Rica and Mexico were uncooperative, not inclined to send the soil back to Cameroon. Therefore, the soil remained with Paul. Not knowing his fate, Paul stated, “I have said to myself, if not that it is God who brought me here, I have prayed that I should go back home. There are so many people who have said no, home is better, but they don’t have a choice. Because at this juncture now, if they should get home, it’s death.”17 In the interim, Paul participated in marches in Tapachula against the Mexican government’s discriminatory policies.

Messages from Argentina Brian Argentina is one of the countries to which several African refugees flee. One such refugee is Brian. For Brain, there was humanity in the region for him and others like him. One of the few places that accepted his sexuality. In March 2017, Brian, then 26 years old, fled to Argentina from Ghana with the help of the Rainbow Railroad, a Canadian organization that assists LGBT+ people to escape prosecutions in their countries and find safety in other countries.18 Despite such vulnerabilities and dangers that exist, Brain expressed that he felt more comfortable in Argentina than in Ghana. He states, “I left because I felt it was the only way to freedom and happiness.”19 He continues, “I came to Argentina because it’s one of the few countries that have gay rights. It was a difficult journey, but I felt happy when I arrived. My favorite part of living here is being able to finally live a free lifestyle.”20

 Ibid.  Ibid. 18  Oscar Lopez, “Fleeing persecution, LGBT+ migrants seek refuge in South America,” December 19, 2018, http://news.trust.org/item/20181219141424-0oeey 19  Ibid. 20  Ibid. 16 17

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Messages from Brazil Justine Justine is another African refugee who also fled to find a safe place. She was searching for a safe place to enjoy her sexual preferences. Unlike Brian, however, Justine, who fled Cameroon because she was gay, wanted to be in the United States. When a neighbor learned that Justine was gay, he threatened to kill her. As a result, she fled to Brazil on a boat with just $20. She said, “In my country, you have to lie. Sometimes you must have a boyfriend to show that you are normal.”21 If she was caught having sex with her girlfriend, she would be jailed for five years. In Cameroon, gays are insulted, beaten, killed, and imprisoned. Being in South America was a relief for Justine.22Taking advantage of the opportunities in Brazil, Justine worked in a meatpacker near the coast and saved $1200 before migrating north through the Darién Gap to Mexico. Throughout her journey, she also begged on the streets and slept in shelters. Justine hoped to receive asylum in the United States and petition for her girlfriend and child to join her.23 Though Justine fled to Brazil, it is noted that her intended destination was the United States. Not everyone is eager to move to the United States. Gregory Gregory, a refugee from Lagos, Nigeria, was one refugee whose focus was not on getting to the United States. His message is “You can apply for refugee status — that works. You can get married, or you can find a company to sponsor your visa.”24 Since Gregory had landed in Brazil, he had gotten married to a Brazilian woman, worked at a photography store, and received a master’s degree in International Trade. Despite Gregory’s success in Brazil, he was not shielded from racism. Commenting on this he asserted, “They get my resume and they think, ohh … an African, from a poor country. Black. There is a myth that there isn’t racism here, but it’s just swept under the carpet. If dark-skinned Brazilians are suffering, imagine how it is for an actual African.”25 Unlike Justine, Gregory’s chief aim was not to get to the United States.

 Gustavo Solis, “African migrants flock to Mexicali,” Sept 23 2016, https://www.desertsun.com/ story/news/2016/09/23/thousands-african-migrants-coming-us-through-mexico/90519476/ 22  Ibid. 23  Ibid. 24  Vincent Bevins, “In Brazil, opportunity and obstacles for Africans flowing in,” September 16, 2012,https://www.latimes.com/world/la-xpm-2012-sep-16-la-fg-brazil-african-immigrants-20120916story.html 25  Ibid. 21

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Richard Emeka Richard Emeka, another refugee from Nigeria, agreed with Gregory’s assertion. Not only did he complain about the low paying jobs but also the harassment from the Brazilian police. He relates, “We are close to cracolandia [the local term for crack-­ addicted street communities], but we have nothing to do with it,” he said. “But the police come by here to hassle us, and if we don’t pay them off, they plant drugs on us and arrest us.”26 Furthermore, he continued, “Drugs come from Colombia or Bolivia, not from Africa.” “What comes from Africa is all of Brazil’s culture  — samba, the food, almost everything. They ought to recognize that.27 Some African refugees have had better luck than others in the region, for example, Melanito whose message we report on next. Melanito Melanito was one of the first group of Cameroonians to migrate to Brazil. She grew up in a lower-middle-class family in the capital of Cameroon. In 2004, she visited Brazil and never left. Originally, she wanted to open a salon in Brasilia to introduce various techniques of treating African hair. In 2007, she moved to Sao Paulo. Eventually, she opened a restaurant, serving fried fish, spicy sautéed spinach, and other dishes to new immigrants from Africa and other Latin American countries. She claimed that since she opened her restaurant, other African restaurants have opened on the same street.28 According to Melanito, African refugees, who are living in Brazil, are better than most of the Africans who migrated to European countries. “I know some are doing very well and some have some problems,” she said. “Brazilians are receptive to immigrants, and I think it’s easier here than for my cousin in France, for example, even though there is a larger community of Africans there.”29 Uchen Henry Uchen Henry, yet another refugee from Nigeria, also thought Brazil is a better place with more opportunities. He fled Nigeria after a local politician killed his brother. He came to Brazil hidden in a ship’s crane. “I was very scared of the people on board. They could have thrown me in the sea, and nobody would have known,”30 he

 Ibid.  Ibid. 28  Ibid. 29  Ibid. 30  Sam Cowie, “Brazil: Destination of choice for Africans,” Sept 3, 2014, https://www.aljazeera. com/indepth/features/2014/09/brazil-destination-choice-africans-201493113721757775.html 26 27

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revealed. Upon his rival in the port city of Santos, he cleaned dishes and tables at a restaurant for a week. He, then, traveled to São Paulo where he received asylum within two months of applying.31 Uchen’s stay in Brazil was one of the most successful ones. “Brazil is cool, I feel more comfortable here than in my country,” he declared. “You can be whatever you want to be here. There are more chances here than in Africa.”32 Almost two years since Uchen moved to São Paulo, he became an English teacher and earned $450 monthly. He also became a musician, producing Afro pop and hip hop.

Messages Out of Other LAC Countries Hassan Not every refugee fled his or her home because of war. Some bolted because of love. Hassan, the 24-year-old university student, became a Somalis refugee in Mexico for secretly marrying a young lady of a rival tribe. As his story goes, he had fallen in love with a young lady whom he had met in his family’s store. He proposed to her, but her family opposed it. Undeterred, the couple eloped and moved. Their inability to financially support themselves forced them to return home. Upon her return, her family beat her and demanded that Hassan’s family turn him over to them. Not wanting to die, Hassan escaped to Kenya and later absconded to Brazil. Unfortunately, Hassan’s brother was murdered in his place, he states, “My brother died to save me. I am responsible.”33 Somalia is not exempt from the internal instabilities. According to Hassan, Somalia fought two wars, “One war, with the terrorists and the government, and the second war, by the tribes and clans.”34 The country has undergone sectarian conflicts, armed militias, and incompetent governance for decades. Furthermore, Somalis have suffered years of famine. The combination of wars, famine, and inept governments has led to thousands of displaced Somalis. In the past five years, 25 percent of African refugees in Mexico have been Somalis. The typical route has been, not necessarily in chronological order, from Africa to Brazil and then Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala, and Mexico, with the intent to cross the US border.35 In the months following his arrival in the LAC region, Hassan and other refugees were frequently robbed. That is because they traveled with money. They hid money in their socks, shoes, pockets, bags, underwear, and mouths. In Peru, they would  Ibid.  Ibid. 33  Molly O’Toole, “As Trump Blocks Refugees, Africans Fleeing Violence Make the Treacherous Trip to the U.S. through Mexico. 34  Ibid. 35  Ibid. 31 32

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flag taxi drivers to transport them to immigration checkpoints. Instead, the cab drivers would first rob them and then take them to the police. The police would arrest them until they pay $20 per person to be released. Hassan recalled the Peruvian police telling them that “Otherwise we will kill you.”36 In Turbo, Colombia, the saga continued. There a local gang barged into the hotel where Hassan and others were temporarily staying. Hassan remembered another Spanish-speaking Somali instructed them to “Give them the money  – they will shoot you now.”37 These instances of insecurity and terror did not end there. In Costa Rica, he was robbed again at gunpoint. He recounted, “They checked us one by one. Even if we had anything in our mouths. They take everything. I kept my shoes only because I’m a size 43 and the guy [thief] was a size 41.”38 Hassan’s unsafe and dangerous encounters were by no means over. Trekking through the Darién Gap and trucking to Mexico posed one of the greatest threats to Hassan. His legs got swollen from trekking across the Darién Gap. He could have died like the deceases he often stumbled upon. “I can’t express with words what I saw there.”39 He recounts, “I saw skeletons in the jungle.”40 He was smuggled on an overcrowded truck with no air with a group of 100 Indians, Pakistanis, Eritreans, and Somalis. To survive the journey, they drilled two small holes in the side of the truck, taking turns inhaling air. “We all thought we were going to die,” Hassan reminisced. Eventually, he crossed into Tapachula, Mexico, crossing seven countries on bus, boat, and foot. “I’ll never, ever forget this journey,”41 he sighed, “There is no humanity.”42

Discussion: Examining the Messages When examined, nine distinct messages arose from the newspapers and organizations’ websites that reported on African refugees in the LAC region. We present these messages in Fig. 11.1. A very salient message is that for some of the African refugees, the LAC region was merely a transit route to North America and Europe.

 Ibid.  Ibid. 38  Voice of America (VOA) News. (2017). [TV Program]. January 16. Surge of African Migrants Brave Latin America Jungle Trek for US Dream. [Online] Available at: https://www.voanews.com/ africa/surge-african-migrants-brave-latin-america-jungle-trek-us-dream. [Accessed 29 December 2019]. 39  Molly O’Toole, “As Trump Blocks Refugees… 40  Voice of America (VOA) News. Surge of African Migrants Brave Latin America Jungle Trek for US Dream. 41  Molly O’Toole, “As Trump Blocks Refugees… 42  Ibid. 36 37

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Fig. 11.1  Some messages from refugees derived from newspapers and organization websites. (Source. Compiled by Alcime and Gill 2020)

The LAC countries were merely a Segway to other countries such as the United States and Canada and in some instances to European countries. Interestingly, in some occurrences, even when some refugees were offered legal papers to achieve naturalization status, the message sent out was that some of them refused such status. Instead, they preferred to and embarked on the hazardous and rather difficult journey through several LAC countries in the hopes of finally reaching their desired destination – the United States, Canada, and Europe. The case of Hassan bears this out rather pellucidly. Regardless of the dangers, discomforts, and other challenges he encountered, he aimed to make it to the United States. This trend of using the LAC region as a pathway to “greener pastures” is noted in several instances from the messages sent out by the African refugees in the LAC region. The quest to get to “greener pastures” often resulted in an unsafe passage through several LAC countries. In some cases, refugees were attacked by robbers, gang members, dishonest law enforcement personnel, and others. The message of problems with unsafe encounters is genuinely concerning. In several instances, the refugees reported on situations that challenged their safety and well-being. The reference to “death” or being shot in some instances is cause for concern. For several of these refugees, there was mention of scenarios in which safety was a big deal; oftentimes even the threat of death seemed imminent. As the refugees journeyed through the LAC region intent on getting to North America, and more specifically the United States, several messages about dangerous encounters with robbers, gang members, and even law enforcement agents were

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recounted as occurring in several of the countries as they were en route to their final destinations. Another prominent message is that of employment. Though some refugees can secure jobs, and in some instances, “good jobs,” for others this remained a challenge. Those who found great jobs expressed satisfaction, joy, and contentment. Those without jobs expressed frustration, disappointment, and even stress. Like several other societies. Incidents of racism were a prominent theme that emerged from the refugees’ messages. The inability to find jobs was associated with the refugees’ messages with that of their skin color and/or ethnicity. The stories of Paul and Gregory discussed before highlight the experiences these migrants face as they navigate the employment field. Other themes that arose from the print media messages were those of freedom of sexual expression, homelessness, limitations in fully expressing cultural differences (as in the case of burial practices), and travel restrictions and hardships. For Brain and Justine, for example, there was humanity in the LAC region for them, and others with similar situations. They were able to find acceptance and the freedom to be themselves. Brian, just 26 years old at the time, had fled to Argentina from Ghana and was permitted to live peacefully in the LAC country he chose. He was able to escape prosecutions in his home country.43 Similarly, Justine was able to migrate to another country where her sexuality was more accepted. Same-sex relationships are currently illegal in 72 countries and are punishable by death in eight of those countries. Where same-sex marriage is not illegal, same-sex attraction and transgender identity are culturally and religiously unacceptable. Luckily, the UN Geneva Convention specified that sexual orientation and gender identity is a good enough reason to claim refugee status.44 Argentina, Brazil, and numerous other Latin American countries offer legal protection to same-sex marriages and acknowledge gender identity. Argentina makes it easy for people living in countries with anti-gay laws to travel to its country without a visa and then apply for refugee status. Most of the LGBT+ from Africa, applying for asylum in Argentina and Brazil, have come from Nigeria, Cameroon, and Ghana.45 Although some LAC countries provide safe passages to LGBT refugees, some refugees are still vulnerable and often face dangers. Despite this, Brain felt more comfortable there compared to being in Ghana. Hence, he was able to conclude, “I came to Argentina because it’s one of the few countries that have gay rights. It was a difficult journey, but I felt happy when I arrived. My favorite part of living here is being able to finally live a free lifestyle.”46

 Oscar Lopez, “Fleeing persecution, LGBT+ migrants seek refuge in South America,” December 19, 2018, http://news.trust.org/item/20181219141424-0oeey 44  Antonio Zappulla, “Forgotten twice: the untold story of LGBT refugees,” January 19, 2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/forgotten-twice-lgbt-refugees/ 45  Oscar Lopez, “Fleeing persecution, LGBT+ migrants seek refuge in South America.” 46  Ibid. 43

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Conclusion From the foregoing communication narratives from some refugees, it appears that there is no clear path to deal with the challenges of African refugees in the LAC region. As this chapter shows, the impetus for the refugees fleeing their countries is linked to multiple factors related to unemployment, domestic and regional conflict, same-sex attraction discrimination, persecutions, and the presence of various drivers of miseries. Ironically and in some cases, the same push factors that drove the African refugees out of their countries are reemerging in their preferred destinations. The communication of the African refugees, which has been well documented, presented a coherent and collective voice of the aforementioned reality on the ground. When assessing the refugees’ communication, there is evidence that not all interventions to their agonies produced their desired outcome. That is because the refugees’ lived experiences challenged the commonly held assumptions around the factors that are pulling them to their preferred destinations. There are expectations from some of the African refugees that migrating to other countries would give them access to jobs, health care, the freedom to date the same sex, and the liberty to go as you please. In some cases, a sizable number of African refugees have achieved those objectives over time and with patience. For instance, the African refugees’ communication revealed that some refugees were able to find gainful employment at various levels in their host countries. Some refugees occupy honorable and respected positions, such as teaching, cooking, translating, and so forth. These achievements are the result of some LAC countries’ stable and growing economy, the refugee policies, and the fact that some of these African refugees are highly educated and/or skilled. Brazil, for example, has been identified as an emerging global power with a myriad of opportunities for its citizens. Refugees seeking asylum in Brazil have higher education than the average Brazilian. Advantageously, the Brazilian refugees have the right to work and access to education and health care. Therefore, Brazilian refugees have been able to receive informal and temporary employment in the service and retail industry and other sectors.47 In Ecuador, the government issues identity cards to refugees. This allows them to access jobs, banking, education, and other services. This access, in turn, clears the way for them to engage actively and fully in the life there and permits them to make positive contributions to Ecuador’s development.48 Contrariwise, some refugees have stumbled into the same push factors that drove them away from home. For example, they were unable to find jobs. They were

 Rochelle R.  Dean, “Ten Facts about Brazil Refugees,” accessed December 14, 2019, https:// borgenproject.org/facts-about-brazil-refugees/ 48  Daniel Almeida, “Ecuador ID cards give refugees a better chance to start over,” May 1, 2018, https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2018/5/5ae8262e4/ecuador-id-cards-give-refugees-betterchance-start.html 47

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discriminated against because of the color of their skin and sexually. They were robbed and beaten. They slept on the street and in shelters. They begged for food. Their future remains bleak, not knowing if the southern or northern countries would take them in or deport them to their home country. As Paul [discussed previously] stated, “I have said to myself, if not that it is God who brought me here, I have prayed that I should go back home. There are so many people who have said no, home is better, but they don’t have a choice. Because at this juncture now, if they should get home, it’s death.”49 It is unclear if the risk of fleeing home outweighs the benefits of the pull factors. Most refugees who made the treacherous journey from Africa were aware of [at least] some of the serious and immediate dangers of the trip. Some would do it again, just to escape the calamities at home. By shining light on the communication of the African refugees regarding their lived experiences in their host Latin countries, it would encourage other refugees to freely express their thoughts and concerns about their conditions. Furthermore, it would alert other prospective African refugees of the pitfalls of going to unknown territories. It is unrealistic to think refugees will end. We live in a world with people who have opposing needs and views, which perpetuate conflicts. The need to work collaboratively to end refugees is more crucial than ever. However, it behooves us to pay more attention to the unified voices of the refugees both at home and abroad. The plight of refugees continues and demand collective global attention to reduce the negative experiences of those who must flee their homelands.

References Almeida, Daniel. Ecuador ID Cards Give Refugees a Better Chance to Start Over. May 1, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2018/5/5ae8262e4/ecuador-id-cards-giverefugees-better-chance-start.html Almeida, Samuel. People Fleeing put at Risk Through Dangerous Government Migration Policies. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). March 16, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.msf.org/ effects-state-policies-people-who-flee-their-homes-central-american-migration Bevins, Vincent. In Brazil, Opportunity and Obstacles for Africans Flowing in. September 16, 2012. Retrieved from https://www.latimes.com/world/la-xpm-2012-sep-16-la-fg-brazil-african-immigrants-20120916-story.html Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Membership. Retrieved October 4, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/ community-latin-american-and-caribbean-states-celac/ Cowie, Sam. Brazil: Destination of Choice for Africans. September 3, 2014. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/09/brazil-destination-choice-africans-201493113721757775.html Dean, Rochelle R. Ten Facts About Brazil Refugees. Accessed December 14, 2019. Retrieved from https://borgenproject.org/facts-about-brazil-refugees/

  Joe Penney, “Cameroonia Asylum-Seekers at the Border Are Fleeing a U.S.-Backed Military Force.”

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Dilawar, Arvind. The Graveyard of Migrants’: Traveling Through the Most Dangerous Jungle in the World. September 24, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.thenation.com/article/ immigration-panama-colombia-darien/ Echandi, Mariana. Africans and Asians Attracted to Latin America as a Migration Route. November 10, 2010. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2010/11/4cdacd4c6/africans-asians-attracted-latin-america-migration-route.html Ledesma, Nicole. Ecuador Migration Trends. Accessed December 15, 2019. pp. 1–5. Retrieved from https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Ecuador-Migration-Trends.pdf Lopez, Oscar. Fleeing Persecution, LGBT+ Migrants Seek Refuge in South America. December 19, 2018. Retrieved from http://news.trust.org/item/20181219141424-0oeey O’Toole, Molly. As Trump Blocks Refugees, Africans Fleeing Violence Make the Treacherous Trip to the U.S.  Through Mexico. December 13, 2017. Retrieved from https://theintercept. com/2017/12/13/africans-refugees-mexico-immigration-trump/ Penney, Joe. Cameroonian Asylum-Seekers at the Border Are Fleeing a U.S.-Backed Military Force. December 1, 2019. Retrieved from https://theintercept.com/2019/12/01/ us-asylum-seekers-cameroon/ Solis, Gustavo. African Migrants Flock to Mexicali. September 23, 2016. Retrieved from https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/2016/09/23/thousands-african-migrants-coming-usthrough-mexico/90519476/ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Figures at a Glance. UNHCR. org. Retrieved November 16, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-aglance.html ———. 2019a. Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2018. Retrieved October 5, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf ———. 2019b. The UN Refugee Agency. Refugees and Migrants  – Frequently Asked Questions. Retrieved December 5, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/ latest/2016/3/56e95c676/refugees-migrants-frequently-asked-questions-faqs.html ———. 2019c. The UN Refugee Agency. Population Statistics. [Online] Retrieved from http:// popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern. Accessed 5 Oct 2019. Voice of America News. Surge of African Migrants Brave Latin America Jungle Trek for US Dream. VOA News, January 16, 2017. Retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/africa/ surge-african-migrants-brave-latin-america-jungle-trek-us-dream Worldometers. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Worldometers. Retrieved August 22, 2016. Retrieved from http://www.worldometers.info/geography/how-many-countries-inlatin-america/ Yates, Caitlyn. As More Migrants from Africa and Asia Arrive in Latin America, Governments Seek Orderly and Controlled Pathways. Migration Information Source, November 22, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/extracontinental-migrants-latin-america Zappulla, Antonio. Forgotten Twice: The Untold Story of LGBT Refugees. January 19, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/forgotten-twice-lgbt-refugees/