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English Pages [257] Year 1969
THE
CANADIAN MUNICIPAL SYSTEM: ESSAY S ON T H E IM P R O V E M E N T O F LOCAL G O V ERN M EN T
DONALD C. ROWAT
T h e C a r le to n L ib r a r y N o . 4 8 M c C le lla n d a n d S te w a r t L im ite d T o r o n to / M o n tr e a l
THE
CARLETON LIBRARY
A series of C anadian reprints and new collections o f source m aterial relating to C anada, issued un d er the editorial supervision of the Institute o f C anadian Studies of C arleton U niversity, Ottawa.
D IR EC TO R O F T H E IN S T IT U T E
P auline Jew ett
G EN E R A L ED ITO R
R o b ert L. M cD ougall
ED ITO R IA L BOARD
C arm an Bickerton (H istory) M ichael S. W hittington (Political Science) H . E dw ard English (E conom ics) Bruce M cFarlane (Sociology) G ordon C. M errill ( G eography) W ilfrid Eggleston (Journalism ) Robin S. H arris (E ducation)
© M cC lellan d a n d S tew art L im ited, 1969 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
T h e C a n a d ia n P u b lis h e r s M cC lelland a n d S te w a rt L im ited 25 H o llin g e r R o a d , T o ro n to 374
P r in te d a n d b o u n d in C a n a d a b y T . H . B e s t P r in tin g C o m p a n y L im ite d
Preface
N o general book on local governm ent in C anada has ap peared since the publication o f m y brief survey, Y our Local G overnm ent, in 1955. M y report o f 1949 on provincial-m unici pal relations in N ova Scotia, w hich proposed a num ber o f re form s including m etropolitan governm ent fo r H alifax and a second tier of m unicipal regions, has long been out of print. M eanw hile I have produced a num ber o f articles, reports, and broadcasts proposing changes in various aspects of local govern m ent. It occurred to m e that these writings could be com bined with revised extracts from my N ova Scotia report in a book of essays covering the m ain problem s of local governm ent and presenting, once again, the proposal for m unicipal regions. A proposal such as this is currently being discussed in O ntario; in addition Q uebec is considering a large-scale consolidation of its m unicipalities; and British Colum bia has recently created a version o f m unicipal regions. T herefore, th e tim e seemed opportune to produce such a book. Except for the portions based on the N ova Scotia report and o n m y 1956 report for the City o f O ttaw a, m ost o f the m aterials, I found, could be reprinted w ithout substantial revision. It was of course necessary to fit them together logically and to om it sections here and there to avoid obvious repetition. Some repe tition o f ideas was inevitable; but, for a book to be used by students, this m ay be all to the good. Because a num ber of the articles w ere w ritten som e time ago, I have m ade m inor revisions to avoid too obvious datedness. But, since the pieces are inter pretative and argum entative (w here the object is m ore to m ake proposals than to present in fo rm atio n ), I did not feel that it was necessary to update all factual inform ation. T his w ould have required a laborious rew riting o f m any o f the pieces and, in any case, w ould have destroyed the flavour of the book as a reprint ing o f previously published m aterials. In som e cases updating m aterial has been added in footnotes; this m aterial is indicated by an asterisk. In the sections from the N ova Scotia and O ttaw a
iv - TH E CANADIAN M UNICIPAL SYSTEM
reports, m ost o f th e specific references to N ova Scotia and O ttaw a have been deleted and som e statem ents have been generalized since the argum ents and conclusions apply to local governm ent in general. So th at students will not swallow too uncritically my own obvious prejudices in favour o f local governm ent and m unicipal regions, and because of the im portance of the issues involved, I have reproduced in an appendix the m ain proposals o f the Byrne and M ichener reports, along w ith portions from the critical reviews of these reports. I have also included the m ore recent Sm ith proposal for m unicipal regions in O ntario, along w ith m y analysis o f it. Since writings on local governm ent are so widely scattered, I have also appended an extensive bibliography. I hope that the collection o f all these m aterials between two covers will m ake it easier for students, officials, and the general reader to p o n d er the problem s o f local governm ent; and easier for university teachers to organize badly needed courses on the subject. N aturally my own essays repeat som e o f the ideas presented in Y o u r Local G overnm ent. B ut the overlap is not a serious m atter, because m y earlier book is a popularized survey at an elem entary level. T he present book will be of m ore interest to university students and those specifically concerned w ith im proving local governm ent. It could be used, perhaps in connec tion with Y o u r Local G overnm ent, as a book of readings for university courses and m unicipal training program m es. I should like to thank the original publishers for granting perm ission to reprint their m aterials and to thank in particular the N ova Scotia D epartm ent of M unicipal Affairs fo r so gener ously allowing me to republish large portions o f m y N ova Scotia report in revised form. T he source fo r each essay is given in a footnote to its title. F o r pieces w hich have been reprinted with only m inor revisions, om itted m aterial is indicated in the usual w ay by three extra periods at the end o f a sentence. I should like finally to thank C arleton U niversity fo r a re search grant and secretarial aid, and the C anada Council fo r its aid in the form o f a Senior Research Fellowship while I was on academ ic leave. W ithout their support the early publication of this book w ould have been impossible. c. R O W A T , Carleton University, June, 1969 D.
Contents
P r e f a c e , iii I n t r o d u c t io n :
T h e M unicipal System and the N eed fo r Change, vii P a r t O n e : L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t a n d A d m in is t r a t io n
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
O u r Form s o f U rban G overnm ent, 1 D o W e N eed the M anager Plan? 4 D o W e H ave the M anager Plan? 13 R eform the Board of C ontrol System, 16 Extend the M unicipal V ote, 18 B etter Civic Personnel, 19 Public R elations Officers fo r Cities? 23 P a r t T w o : M u n ic ip a l F in a n c e
1. T he N eed for Im proving Assessment, 29 2. Im proving the T ax System , 40 3. Revam p the Business T ax in O ntario, 45 P a r t T h r e e : P r o v in c ia l - M u n i c i p a l R e l a t io n s
1. 2. 3. 4.
T rends and Problem s, 48 T h e E qualization o f G rants, 51 Provincial Supervision and Leadership, 57 T h e Problem o f Im plem enting Proposals, 58
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Trends and Problem s, 65 Should Cities be Lim ited in Size? 69 Planning and M etropolitan G overnm ent, 72 H alifax: A Case for a M etropolitan A uthority, 80 T oronto and M ontreal Should be Provinces, 94
P a r t F o u r : M e t r o p o l it a n A r e a s
P a r t F i v e : A F e d e r a l T e r r it o r y f o r O t t a w a - H u l l ?
1. T h e Case for a Federal T erritory, 99 2. T he A rgum ent A gainst a T erritory, 108 3. T h e Problem s of G overning Federal Capitals, 123
P a r t S i x : P r o p o s a l s f o r M u n ic ip a l R e g io n s
1. T h e Case for M unicipal Regions, 139 2. T h e C oncept o f Regional G overnm ent, 147 3. A Proposal fo r O ntario, 160 C o n c l u s io n ,
165
A p p e n d ic e s
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Proposals of Byrne Com m ission (N ew B runsw ick) , 169 Criticism of Byrne R eport, by T hom as J. P lunkett, 174 Proposals o f M ichener Com m ission (M a n ito b a ), 182 Criticism o f M ichener R eport, by D ennis A. Y oung, 189 Regional G overnm ent for O ntario (Sm ith Proposal), 192 A n A nalysis o f the Sm ith Proposal, by D onald C. Row at, 203 B ib l io g r a p h y , 2 0 9 N ote on A uthor,
242
Introduction: The Municipal System and the Need for Change s o u rc e :
[S ee p a g e 1 o f te x t.]
M unicipalities are often forgotten w hen we think o f the institutions o f governm ent. Local governm ent seems dull and uninteresting in contrast with the fascinating problem s a t the higher levels. W e think o f m unicipalities dealing w ith such prosaic things as garbage-rem oval and sewers, as opposed to such w orld-shaking problem s as separatism o r C anada’s role in n uclear disarm am ent. Even in ou r universities, social scientists have been regrettably uninterested in the subject. Few courses are given and even few er studies have been m ade of the struc ture, operation, and problem s of our m unicipalities. Y et local governm ent, because it is local, is of vital im por tance to the health o f a dem ocracy. As the fam ous nineteenthcentury F rench theorist, Alexis de Tocqueville, once said, “A nation m ay establish a system o f free governm ent, b u t w ithout m unicipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty.” In m odern times, local governm ent has becom e even m ore im por tan t because o f urbanization. It can be argued th at now adays the m ain problem s o f governm ent are the problem s o f organiz ing u rban areas in such a way as to give city dwellers a reason ably healthy and happy life. O ur cities and m etropolitan areas present seemingly insoluble problem s o f confusion, congestion, disease, slums, and crime. O ne source of these problem is the existing system of local governm ent itself. But it is difficult to sketch this system briefly because there is no single, overall structure. O ur constitution has granted to the ten provinces the pow er to create and govern th eir own m unicipalities; and so there are really ten different systems. It is true th at these systems are basically th e same, in the sense th at they provide for m any locally elected selfgoverning councils. These councils are even surprisingly sim ilar in form . F o r exam ple, in contrast with those in B ritain and Europe, they are very small, and in m ost urb an areas the m ayor is directly elected. These features we copied from th e U nited States. T h e ten m unicipal systems are also sim ilar in th at nearly
viii - TH E CANADIAN M U NICIPAL SYSTEM
all o f them provide for fo u r classes o f m unicipality: cities, towns, villages, and rural municipalities. H ow ever, the ten systems differ in m any im portant respects, even in their basic organizational structure. L et us review them fro m east to w est in order to note some o f these differences. As can be seen from the accom panying table, N ew foundland, Prince M u n ic ip a l it ie s in C a n a d a b y P r o v in c e *
Newfoundland P.E.I. Nova Scotia New Brunswick Quebec Ontario Manitoba Saskatchewan Alberta British Columbia Total
2 1 3 6 66 38 9 11 10 31
63 7 39 21 84 152 36 130 100 13
177
745
80b 4 — 22 ---c 24 — 87 302 1099 155 562 40 110 358 294 167 49 56 40 1267
2182
Total
Metro. Corp’ns.
•2L 5 3 ft*
Counties & Regions
Villages
Towns
Cities
as at January 1, 1968
—
—
_
—
25
—
149 30 66 114 1726 946 196 793 326 65
137
3
4511
_
.
—
—
—
_____
—
74 38 —
_____
Mtl. Tor. Winn.
a Excludes 102 local improvement districts, which are not selfgoverning (10 in Newfoundland, 18 in Ontario, 18 in Manitoba, 10 in Saskatchewan, and 46 in Alberta). b Local government communities, which have limited powers. 0 Excludes village service commissions, which have limited functions. Based on information provided by Local Government Section, Dominion Bureau of Statistics.
*so u rc e:
E dw ard Island, and N ew Brunswick have no system of rural m unicipalities. N ew Brunswick abolished its rural counties in 1966. In N ova Scotia, on the other hand, the whole geographic area is m unicipally organized. In all of the other provinces, there are sparsely settled northern areas which have no local governm ent. T he m unicipal systems in Q uebec and O ntario are basically different from all the rest, because almost from the beginning they have had a second tier o f local governm ent, the counties. E ach county has a governing council m ade up of
INTRODUCTION - ix
representatives from the councils of the m unicipalities w ithin the co u n ty-villages, rural parishes or townships, and (in O n tario) towns. T h e cities, how ever, are separate from the county. A lberta is unusual in th at it has a relatively sm all num ber of large rural m unicipalities com pared with its sister prairie provinces, M anitoba and Saskatchew an. T he reason is that A lb erta consolidated its ru ral m unicipalities in 1942. British Colum bia is different from the others because, until recently, it had no towns; instead, nearly all urban areas w ere given the status o f cities. A s a result, officially it has thirty-one cities— alm ost as m any as O ntario, w hich has nearly four tim es the population. Also, British Colum bia has recently established regional districts. Like the counties in O ntario and Quebec, they have governing bodies representative o f the municipalities w ithin them , but include cities. T he plan is fo r twenty-seven such districts, w hich will include the m unicipally unorganized areas. By the end of 1967, twenty-five o f them had been created. Except for the financing o f regional hospitals, m ost of them began with few functions, but their pow ers can be expanded by local request. T he other provinces have m ade no sim ilar general adjustm ent of local governm ent to m eet m odern conditions. M etropolitan A reas O ne place w here some provinces have succeeded in making a special adjustm ent is in m etropolitan areas. H ere conditions becam e so bad that the need for reorganizing was clear. Large cities in C anada w ere growing so rapidly after the w ar that they w ere spilling over their boundaries into the surrounding m uni cipalities. As a result, there were no suitable authorities to govern and plan the developm ent o f their m etropolitan areas. T h e largest cities expanded so vigorously that the traditional device o f depending upon the central city to annex the suburbs had failed. A fter considerable study of the problem in T oronto , the legislature of O ntario provided in 1953 for a new type of governm ent fo r the T oronto m etropolitan area. It was called a tw o-tier or federal plan of local governm ent. T his system provided for a governing council for the whole m etropolitan area, including the city and twelve villages, towns, and town ships which had become urbanized. But the new scheme left the local units to govern their own local affairs and transferred to the central body only those functions w hich were obviously of m etropolitan-w ide concern. T he “m etro” council was m ade up
x - T H E CANADIAN M U NICIPAL SYSTEM
of the heads o f the twelve suburban councils, twelve members from T o ronto’s city council, and a chairm an. T h e first chairm an o f the m etro council was appointed by the provincial govern m ent, b ut succeeding chairm en were chosen by the council itself. T his T oronto system was perhaps unique in the world. T h e only well-know n precedent was the county council of London, E ngland, which was created before the tu rn o f the century and governed m ost o f the L ondon urban area a t that tim e. H ow ever, the L ondon county councillors w ere directly elected, as are their successors on the council o f the greatly enlarged m etropolitan authority created in 1963. T h e new T o ro n to m etropolitan authority had m any o f the organizational features of the county councils in O ntario and Quebec. T h e fact that these second-tier councils already existed probably provided the basic idea for the T oronto plan. T o ro n to ’s system of m etropolitan governm ent has w orked very successfully and has attracted a great deal o f attention in the rest o f C anada, in the U nited States, and throughout the world. In 1960, M anitoba’s governm ent created a sim ilar system fo r W innipeg. It is essentially the sam e, except that the ten m em bers of the m etro council are directly elected, as in London. T h e ten electoral districts are purposely shaped like slices of pie w hich cross-cut the city and the fifteen surrounding m uni cipalities, in order to give the m em bers a m etro-w ide point o f view. A serious criticism of both the T oronto and W innipeg m etro systems is th at they left the boundaries of the suburban m uni cipalities untouched. These m unicipalities varied trem endously in size and population. Som e did not have the tax resources needed to provide adequate local services. H ow ever, in 1966, the O ntario governm ent reorganized m etro T oronto by con solidating the suburban m unicipalities into five large cities (called “ boroughs” ) .1 T he size o f the m etro council was in creased from 25 to 33 m em bers, and this action increased the representation o f the suburban population on the council from 12 to 20. Som e action has also been taken to solve M ontreal’s m etro politan problem . In 1959 the form er m etropolitan com mission was reorganized as a m etropolitan corporation, but this au thor ity is m ainly for m etropolitan finance and planning, includes only a fraction of the whole u rban area, and is but a pale shadow o f the m etro systems for W innipeg and T oronto.2 In 1965 the fourteen urban m unicipalities on Jesus Island (just no rth of M ontreal Island) were consolidated into the city o f Laval,
INTRODUCTION - xl
m aking it the second-largest city in Quebec. M ontreal opposes a tw o-tier m etropolitan governm ent and instead insists th a t it should annex the surrounding urban m unicipalities. In 1968 the governm ent o f O ntario created a tw o-tier system o f m etropolitan governm ent for O ttaw a, m odelled on the orig inal T o ro nto plan. F o r fu rth er details, see page 134. E xcept for V ancouver and V ictoria, w here the new regional boards could be developed into full-fledged m etropolitan governm ents, no action has yet been taken to solve the problem o f governing the o th er large m etropolitan areas in C anada. These include H am ilton, Quebec, E dm onton, Calgary, W indsor, and H alifax. P erhaps the new systems in T oronto, W innipeg, and O ttaw a will soon provide a stim ulus to early reform in these areas too. T h e N e e d fo r Change C an ada’s m unicipal systems, except in N ew foundland, were created before the invention of rapid m eans o f transportation and co m m u n ic atio n -th e autom obile, the aeroplane, the tele phone, radio, and television. T he ru ral units w ere therefore m ade sm all enough to be transversed conveniently by horse and buggy. These systems w ere also created before the m odern age o f the w elfare state. A s a result, a great m any m unicipalities are too sm all to provide the skilled staff and financial resources required o f local governm ent today. Saskatchew an, fo r exam ple, has m ore th an 350 villages and nearly 300 ru ra l municipalities. O ntario has over 550 ru ral m unicipalities and Q uebec has nearly 1,100; but of course O ntario and Q uebec have county governm ents w hich handle som e services th at need to be pro vided by a larger unit. A ltogether, there are over 4,500 selfgoverning m unicipalities in C anada, a great m any o f w hich have few er than 1,000 inhabitants and a pitifully sm all budget. T h ere are also thousands of locally elected school boards. Before the Second W orld W ar their num ber was m uch greater th an the num ber o f m unicipalities. School districts tended to be ju st big enough for a child to be able to w alk to school. But since 1 This reorganization into six cities is based on the Goldenberg Report, which, however, had proposed a four-city plan; see Ontario, Royal Commission on M etropolitan Toronto, R ep o rt (Toronto, 1965). 3 All three metro systems are discussed in T. J. Plunkett, “M etro politan Governm ent in C anada," U niversity o f T o ro n to L a w Journal, 14 (1961), 29-51, and in B. Keith-Lucas, “ M etropolitan Local Gov ernm ent in C anada,” P ublic A d m in istra tio n , 39 (1961), 251-262.
xii - TH E CANADIAN M UNICIPAL SYSTEM
then, in m ost provinces they have been consolidated and greatly reduced in num ber. They were trem endously enlarged in W est ern C anada ju st after the war. In 1966, as p art of its program m e fo r m unicipal reorganization, N ew Brunsw ick reduced the n um ber of its school districts from 422 to 33. In 1968 the O ntario governm ent announced a plan to abolish its 882 elem entary- and 246 secondary-school districts, and to replace them with about 100 county-size units. T he 526 Catholic separate-school districts are to be sim ilarly consolidated. T h e basic organization o f local governm ent itself, however, has been changed very little, despite the speed o f recent social and econom ic change. Dissatisfaction w ith the existing situation is steadily growing. In 1966 N ew Brunsw ick’s governm ent took the drastic steps not only o f abolishing the ru ral county govern m ents but also of assum ing the direct adm inistration of some o f th e m ost im portant services o f local governm ent. M any people fear this kind o f centralization for the sake o f efficiency and uniform ity as the wave of the future. I f the values of self-governm ent are to be preserved, local governm ent m ust be reorganized, strengthened, and im proved so th at it can provide a large share o f m odern governm ental services.
PA RT ONE: LOCAL GOVERNM ENT AND A D M IN IS T R A T IO N
1: Our Forms of Urban Government Based on “Le Syst&me municipal canadien,” in Louis Sabourin, ed., L e S ystem e p o litiq u e d u C anada (Ottawa, 1968). By permission of the University of Ottawa Press.
s o u rc e :
A n aspect o f C anadian local governm ent which has seen a certain am ount of change and experim entation is the structure o r form of governm ent w ithin cities. T he traditional and typical form o f urban governm ent in C anada has been the simple council-m ayor system, which has a sm all council headed by a directly elected m ayor. T he m ayor has certain executive powers in addition to his chairm anship of the council, but he shares his pow ers w ith com m ittees o f the council. These com m ittees adm inister the various m unicipal activities and supervise the perm anent heads o f the civic departm ents. A m ong the large cities in Canada, W innipeg is the only one th at still has this system. In view o f the professional skills now required to adm inister m odern city services, the council-m ayor system has been criticized because it provides an opportunity for elected councillors to interfere w ith the day-to-day adm inistration. It m ay lead to political patronage or even corruption. Since different com m ittees are overseeing the various m unicipal activities, it also prevents effective co-ordination of these acti vities, unless there is a strong central finance com m ittee, as there is in W innipeg.1 O ne attem pt to m eet these problem s has been the reduction in size of the council, to a body small enough that “the left hand know eth w hat the right hand doth.” T his was done at an early date in V ancouver, for instance, w here the council has only eleven m em bers including the m ayor. C algary’s council has only thirteen m em bers. In sharp contrast to these exam ples is the size of M ontreal’s council. U ntil it was reorganized in 1960 it had a hundred m em bers, and even now has forty-nine 1T. J. Plunkett, U rban C anada a n d its G o vern m en t (T oronto, 1968), 119.
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TH E CANADIAN M U NICIPAL SYSTEM
(including the m a y o r). T he difficulty w ith the small council is its inadequate representation of th e great variety o f interests found in a large city. T he M anager Plan A n o th er device for m eeting the deficiencies o f the councilm ayor system has been the city-m anager plan. This plan was first adopted in the U nited States and then im ported into C anada. It calls for a very sm all city council o f only six or seven m em bers, elected at large, that is, by the whole city rath er than by wards. This council has nothing to do with supervising adm inistrative activities, and considers only general policy. T he m ayor is chosen by the council, is only the chairm an, and has no executive powers. Instead, the council appoints a professional adm inistrator, the city m anager, as its chief executive officer. H e appoints all the heads of civic departm ents, and they report to the council only through him . T hey in tu rn appoint the civic em ployees. Political patronage is prevented because the elected councillors have no influence over appointm ents. T he m anager m eets w ith the civic heads and co-ordinates their activitiesincluding their budget proposals, w hich he presents to council. T he council, being small and elected from the whole city, finds it easy to take an overall view and to w ork out a co-ordinated plan fo r the fu tu re developm ent of the city. In the U nited States, the m anager plan was first adopted in 1908; it was so successful th at it has spread rapidly, especially since the Second W orld W ar. It is now used in m ore than 1,400 cities o r nearly half o f all cities in that country, and in about 650 county and other units o f local governm ent. Versions of the plan also exist in about 1,800 com m unities in W estern E urope. In C anada, the first city to adopt the plan was W estm ount, Q u e b e c -in 1913, only five years afte r its creation in the U nited States. By the end of the 1920s, it had been adopted by several C anadian cities, m ost o f them in Quebec. Since then the num ber of adoptions has steadily increased, and in the past decade m ore than tw enty cities have shifted to m anager govern m ent. In its 1967 yearbook, the International City M anagers A ssociation listed eighty-five governm ents in C anada as having m anager plans. M anager governm ent in C anada differs from the A m erican plan in a num ber of im portant respects: the elected councils are larger, councillors are usually elected from w ards, and there are usually standing com m ittees o f council. A lso, the C anadian
PART O N E : LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION -
3
m ayor is always directly elected rath er than chosen by council, and he has a m uch higher salary and m uch m ore pow er th an his A m erican counterpart. T he pow er of the C anadian m anager is correspondingly less; the city council m ust approve his person nel policies and senior appointm ents, and may receive inform a tion directly from departm ent heads. T he Plural E xecutive O ntario and Q uebec have provided their largest cities with a plural e x e cu tiv e-th e board o f control in O ntario, and the executive com m ittee in Quebec. M etro T oronto and T oronto also have an executive com m ittee. T he board of control is m ade up of the m ayor and four controllers who, like the m ayor, are elected by the w hole city, while the other m em bers o f the council are elected from w ards. This board is like a cabinet at the higher levels o f governm ent. It has strong executive and legislative powers. It nom inates and supervises the heads o f all civic departm ents. It aw ards all contracts and prepares the annual budget for council approval. It recom m ends m easures to the council and in m ost cases its decisions cannot be reversed except by a tw o-thirds vote of the council. Since its m em bers also have a vote in council, if they are unanim ous on a proposal it will usually prevail. T his scheme w orks with considerable efficiency, and O ntario’s large cities are am ong the best-governed in Canada. T he executive com m ittee system in Q uebec’s large cities and in M etro T oronto has also w orked well. T he executive com m ittee’s pow ers are m uch like those o f the board o f control, b ut instead o f being directly elected to office the com m ittee’s m em bers are chosen from am ong the councillors. M etro T o ro n to ’s com m ittee is com posed o f the chairm an, the m ayor o f each city, and the four m em bers of T oro n to ’s new executive com m ittee. In M ontreal the six m em bers are chosen by the m ayor b u t m ust be approved by the council. In this respect M ontreal’s com m ittee is even m ore like a cabinet than is a board o f control. H ow ever, the m a y o r-u n lik e a prim e minister, who is elected by a constituency and chosen from the legislature—is elected by the whole city, and he is only an ex-officio m em ber o f the com m ittee, w hich has its own chairm an. These systems in O ntario and Q uebec could be converted w ithout m uch difficulty into the parliam entary system used at the higher levels o f governm ent. This could be done simply by requiring th at the council should choose the m ayor and by
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THE CANADIAN M U N ICIPAL SYSTEM
allowing him to choose from the council his own colleagues on an executive com m ittee w hich he would chair. T he m ayor and his com m ittee w ould then be held collectively responsible for their actions to the city council just as the prim e m inister and his cabinet are responsible to parliam ent.2 I am glad that in 1960 the C ham pagne Com m ission proposed an approach to this form of governm ent for M ontreal,3 and that it has now been adopted there. I hope that eventually M ontreal will adopt a full cabinet system, with the council electing the m ayor, the m ayor choosing and chairing his own cabinet, and the cabinet being forced to resign if it loses the confidence o f the council. It is interesting th at the C ham pagne Com mission also recom m ended the retention of M ontreal’s director o f d ep art m ents (now called the executive secretary ), who is an olficer som ew hat like a city m anager. T here seems to be no good reason why a cabinet system cannot be com bined with the m an ager plan. T he cabinet would provide for policy planning and legislative leadership, while the m anager would provide for adm inistrative co-ordination and control.
2: Do We Need the M anager Plan? source:
C anadian P ublic A d m in istra tio n , 3 (M arch, I960), 42-9.
By permission.
As long ago as 1929 an em inent A m erican scholar, W . B. M unro, pointed out that C anadians were m uch too prone to copy A m erican m unicipal experim ents before their appropri ateness for C anada was dem onstrated and even before their success in their hom e country was assured. A m ong other exam ples, he cited not only the commission plan of city govern m ent, which “soon proved to be unsound in theory and unsatis factory in its w orkings,” but also the city m anager plan, which w as then “having its wave o f popularity.” 1 D espite the fact that this “wave of popularity” has rolled on unchecked in the U nited States to the present day, and that the m anager plan has been adopted in a considerable num ber of cities in C anada, I believe th at it is still im portant to ask w hether the plan is appropriate for C anada. It is im portant fo r two reasons: because the plan was developed to m eet entirely diffe
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ren t conditions from those found in C anada, and because A m ericans themselves have found that the plan is som ething less th an perfect. T h e significance of the first of these reasons is often conveniently forgotten by its C anadian advocates. T he fact is th at the m anager plan was created to solve a problem w hich is basic to the whole scheme o f A m erican governm ent and which we have never experienced to nearly the sam e d e g re e -th e separation and dispersion o f governm ental powers. By the turn o f the last century, it was becom ing painfully clear in the U nited States that the parcelling out of bits o f pow er to councils, m ayors, boards, and elected civic officials, and then setting one against the other in a system of checks and balances, had m ade it impossible for the voter to fix responsibility and easy fo r the co rru p t politician and spoils system to sneak in; hard for the city governm ent to act as a whole but easy for it to spend lavishly on bits and pieces. “Checks and balances,” as M unro says, “gave way to cheques and deficits.”2 In short, the disease was se rio u s -a n d the cure, it was felt, had to be drastic. T he result was an extrem e concentration of pow er in a single, small organ o f m unicipal governm ent, the council, and in its single, appointed executive, the m anager. C anada, on the other hand, relying as it does on the British tradition o f sovereignty and concentrated pow er, has never suffered from this d ise a se -o r at m ost suffers only a m ild form by infection from the U nited States. H ence the cure need not be as drastic. C anadian local governm ent already enjoys m ost o f the desirable fe a tu re s-th e absence o f corruption, non-par tisan elections, and appointed civic officials-that the m anager plan was designed to produce in the U nited States; the m ore extrem e features of this p la n —the small council, the appoint m ent o f the m ayor by the council, and the m anager’s exclusive and alm ost autocratic control over the civic se rv ic e -a re not needed in Canada. A s H. L. B rittain pointed out: This fo rm o f civic governm ent has m ade com paratively sm all progress in Canada, probably due to the absence, or 3 F o r a more detailed discussion of the forms o f local government in C anada and this proposal in particular, see my Y o u r L ocal G overn m en t (Toronto, 1955), 29-36.
3 Quebec, Commission to inquire into the Administrative System of Montreal, R ep o rt (1960-61), Vol. I, -13-20 and Vol. II, 23-28. 1 W. B. Munro, A m erica n Influence on C anadian G o vern m en t (T o ronto, 1929), 125-7. s Ib id .. 109.
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TH E CANADIAN M U NICIPAL SYSTEM
existence in less severe fo rm , in Canada o f the conditions which brought about its spectacular spread in the U nited States. M a n y U nited States cities had councils unwieldly in size and procedure. Som e were victim s o f predatory politics. T he attem pt to im prove conditions by giving m ore power to elected m ayors had broken dow n in som e cities and the persistence o f the m ethod o f selecting im portant adm inistra tive officers by popular elections had continued to produce serious results. . . . O n the other hand, m ost Canadian cities have com paratively sm all councils. T he business o f cities is n ot the prey o f provincial and federal patronage. A ll ballots are non-partisan and all are short. A ll adm inistrative offi cials are appointed by the council and not chosen by election. E ven if officials w ithout the proper qualifications are ap pointed they are left in office long enough to becom e, if intelligent, m ore or less expert in the perform ance o f their duties. M o st departm ent heads are not interfered with seriously in the discharge o f their duties. In this respect, Canadian cities have kept to the British tradition in local adm inistration, and it has saved m any Canadian cities fro m the worst excesses o f som e U nited States cities.3 In fact, m any small C anadian m unicipalities had already developed a close approxim ation to the m anager plan w ithout the need for any form al “adoption” at all. By custom and tradi tion the office o f clerk-treasurer had grow n into a position of influence and authority very sim ilar to that o f a city m anager. It m ust be adm itted, however, that in larger cities the division o f the offices o f’clerk and treasurer and the creation o f many separate civic heads o f departm ents dealing directly w ith com mittees of council broke dow n this unity o f adm inistrative direction and created serious problem s of co-ordination. A nd to be fair to the advocates of the m anager plan, it should be noted that the plan has had an im portant influence upon nonm anager cities in C anada in encouraging them to create either an office com parable to th at of m anager or other sim ilar arrangem ents for adm inistrative co-ordination. T he cities of M ontreal and Quebec, for instance, have chief adm inistrators, and in W innipeg the com m issioner of finance has been placed in a position w here he can exercise a strong co-ordinating and advisory influence. In L ondon and V ancouver, an influence sim ilar to th at o f a city m anager has been secured by the crea 3 H. L. Brittain, L o ca l G o vern m en t in C anada (Toronto, 1951), 17-18.
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tion o f an adm inistration b oard com posed o f two o r three senior adm inistrators. T he cities on the prairies have tried to solve the problem o f com bining political leadership w ith adm inistrative co-ordination by creating a board of com missioners, com posed o f the elected m ayor plus one o r m ore appointed com m is sioners to head the civic adm inistration. W here there is only one com m issioner, as in some o f Saskatchew an’s cities, he is p rac tically the sam e as a city m anager. W hile it cannot be denied that in the vast m ajority of cases the adoption of the plan in the U nited States resulted in a great im provem ent o f civic governm ent, it should be kept in m ind that the plan was cham pioned by groups o f citizens as p art of a reform m ovem ent; alm ost any plan that they had advocated would have created an im provem ent simply because, as publicspirited citizens, they w ere determ ined to see th at civic govern m ent d id im prove. M any of them w ent on to be elected to the new m anager-plan councils, w here the atm osphere was naturally receptive to the adoption o f progressive m ethods. M any of the innovations that accom panied the adoption of the plan in the U.S., such as the hiring of professional staff, budgeting and purchasing controls, and planning m achinery, are not necessary features o f the plan a t all and can as well (though perhaps n ot as easily) be adopted under other plans. It can be argued that one of the m ain reasons for the success of the plan was th at the salary o f the new m anager was, on the average, double th at of form er m ayors: m ayors had simply not been paid enough to attract a high calibre of chief executive. Since the plan was p art o f a struggle fo r reform in the U nited States, it has been advanced by its advocates w ith alm ost messianic zeal, and critics have been regarded as traitors to the cause. In short, the plan has been oversold and we m ust be careful th at this does not blind us to som e o f its very real deficiencies. T h e chief deficiencies of the plan in its full-blown form are the direct results o f its having been based on the analogy o f a business corporation. A dvocates said th at a m unicipality should be ru n like a business, w ith a small board o f directors to set policy and a m anager to carry it out. But w hat they forgot was that the activities o f a city governm ent are far m ore com plex than those of a business, and that the great variety of sections, interests, and points of view found in a city require expression on a fairly large representative body. H ence a very small council elected a t large-d esig n ed on the m odel of a board of directors who clearly have a united in te rest-g iv e s inadequate recognition to this need fo r representation. T he business anal
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TH E CANADIAN M U NICIPAL SYSTEM
ogy, m oreover, led advocates to believe th at policy and adm inistration could be com pletely separated, so th at the coun cil could safely be cut off from adm inistration and the appointed official could be expected to keep from m eddling in policy. Y et the plan assured neither. A fter its adoption, councils could still be found w hich interfered in details of adm inistration, and certainly m anagers did not hesitate to create policy. As T. J. P lunkett, a C anadian student o f the plan, has pointed out: Few will deny the desirability o f separating these functions, but it is at least questionable to assum e that an elected council o f laym en can initiate m uch in the way o f policy w ithout som e acquaintanceship with the problem s o f adm in istration which, under the council-m anager plan, becom e an exclusive responsibility o f the city manager. M oreover, through his control o f the adm inistration o f policy he is in a position to initiate and suggest m ajor policy recom m enda tions. T his in itself is not undesirable, but it m ay well be that the area in which the m em bers o f council have oppor tunities fo r initiating policy will thus becom e too sm all or insignificant. The influence o f the city m anager can be fo r good or ill depending upon the em phasis he places on the facts presented to the council. T he council, however, not having any real contact with the adm inistration o f policy, are w ithout sufficient know ledge to fully evaluate the manager’s recom m endations.4 M ore serious than either o f these objections, how ever, is the fact that the insistence upon non-partisan elections and a m ayor appointed by council m akes inadequate provision fo r political le a d e rsh ip -a need which is clearly apparent at all levels of dem ocratic governm ent. Especially in large cities, or those with deep social and econom ic cleavages, there are bound to be com plex problem s requiring political leadership fo r their solution. U nfortunately, the city m anager has been too often tem pted to fill this need. Y et if he does so, he is in an anom alous position. F o r if h e goes publicly to the com m unity in support o f a program m e, he is in the political arena at once and becomes interested in getting his supporters elected to council. A nd the non-partisan tradition ensures th at there is no organized oppo sition to prevent his dom inating the council. T he record shows th at this has actually happened to som e m anager cities in the U nited States. It is significant th at none o f the largest cities in th a t country has seen fit to adopt the m anager plan, and that
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only one middle-sized city (San A ntonio) in the population range 2 50,000-500,000 adopted the plan betw een 1936 and 1954.5 Fortunately, C anada has refused to adopt the m anager plan in the extrem e form recom m ended by its advocates. It is true th a t the councils o f m anager cities in C anada are sm all, but then so are the councils of non-m anager c itie s -in both cases too sm all to m eet the need for adequate representation in our large, rapidly growing cities.0 In refusing to accept the com plete separation of policy and adm inistration, w ith its consequent enhancem ent o f the m anager, we have been wiser. A s Plunkett observes: [Here] the position o f the m anager is a less dom inant one than will be fo u n d in som e U.S. cities. In Canada, there is usually a m ore conscious desire to m aintain the significance and prestige o f the council. W hereas under the theory o f the plan the council is only supposed to deal w ith adm inistration through the city manager, in m ost Canadian cities the council also has a direct relationship with som e o f the principal departm ent heads. In H alifax, fo r exam ple, this is accom plished through the fo u r standing com m ittees o f council. T he appropriate departm ent heads attend com m it tee m eetings along w ith the city manager. . . . The council-m anager plan in Canada does not attem pt to achieve a com plete and form al break between policy and adm inistration. . . . T he city m anager’s chief value as a policy advisor to the council lies in the fa c t that he can help to place the recom m endations o f the departm ent heads w ithin the broader perspective o f the city’s needs and organ ization as a whole. H ow ever, if the council is to be able to properly evaluate these policy recom m endations, it m ust be regularly inform ed w ith respect to adm inistrative prob lem s and m ust also have opportunities fo r discussion with the m anager and civic departm ent heads. A s has been 4T. J. Plunkett, M u n icip a l O rganization in Canada (M ontreal, 1955), 27. BC. R. Adrian, G o vern in g U rban A m erica (New York, 1955), 204. These undesirable aspects o f the plan have caused considerable soul-searching recently in the United States, even among city m an agers themselves. See the series of articles in P ublic A dm inistration R eview , 3, 1954; 2, 1955; 2, 1958; and 2 and 3, 1959. 9 In the writer’s opinion, a city o f more than 50,000 population should have a council o f at least ten members; and one of more than 100,000, at least 15.
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THE CANADIAN M U NICIPAL SYSTEM
indicated, this is accom plished through the council m eeting regularly either as a com m ittee o f the w hole or as a very sm all num ber o f standing com m ittees. In this way the adm inistrator's recom m endation can be evaluated fro m a political point o f view and the politician’s suggestion can be assessed in the light o f its adm inistrative practicability.7 T o preserve political leadership, m ost C anadian m anager cities have wisely retained their form er practice o f directly electing the m a y o r- a practice w hich ou r urban centres origin ally adopted from the U nited States. T h a t country, how ever, in an attem pt to strengthen the position o f the m ayor in conform ity w ith the doctrine of separated powers, w ent fu rth er th a n direct election and gave the m ayor independent executive and legislative powers, including in m any cases a veto over actions o f the council. T his m ade it easy for him to do battle with the council, w hereas in C anada he is m uch m ore likely to becom e its political leader. U nder th e m anager plan, how ever, his political leadership is not likely to be strong, because he tends to be overshadow ed by the m anager. H e is paid far less than the m anager, and the prestige and pow er o f his office are n ot great enough to attract the m ost capable leaders. W e are now in a position to answer the question w hether we need the m anager plan in C anada. T he answer, in short, is th a t we do not need the m anager “plan,” but we do need an appointed m anager o r his equivalent. T h e extrem e form o f the m anager plan is inappropriate for C anadian conditions and in any case w ould be undesirable, but the principle of having a highly qualified expert to advise council and to co-ordinate and supervise civic activities is a good one. T he w riter would there fore recom m end, alm ost w ithout qualification, the appointm ent of a m anager for rural m unicipalities, towns, and cities o f up to ab o u t 100,000 in population. It is im portant to note th at aside from the benefits of the schem e itself are m any th at arise from the cam paign for its adoption. A s has happened in the U nited States, this cam paign in a local com m unity w ould stir up civic interest, be regarded by its advocates as an im portant reform , attract some o f the m ost able and public-spirited citizens into local politics, and set the stage for the adoption of m ore m odern and efficient m ethods o f adm inistration. A serious im pedim ent to any w idespread adoption of the schem e in C anada, how ever, is the shortage o f qualified persons to serve as m anagers. F ro m w hat has already been said, it will be clear th at the profession o f city m anager requires a special
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breed o f ad m in istra to r-o n e w ho is capable and expert yet who realizes that the expert m ust be “on tap rather than on to p .” In oth er words, he m ust have a deep understanding of, and sym p ath y w ith, dem ocratically run local governm ent. In fact, the appointm ent o f suitable m anagers is the key to the success of the plan. A m ong the m ain reasons for its success in the U nited States w ere the early form ation o f a city m anagers’ association w hich soon adopted a code o f ethics for the guidance o f its m em bers, and the creation of training courses by the associa tion and a num ber o f universities for prospective m anagers. H ow ever, an im portant criticism o f the profession there is that too m any are engineers and too few have been educated in the social sciences. As a result, they tend to stress the physical aspects o f civic developm ent rath er than the solution o f a city’s social, econom ic, and political problem s. If we begin to adopt the p lan on a large scale here, w e m ust be careful not to repeat this m istake, and we m ust be ready with suitable university p ro gram m es o f post-graduate education for prospective m anagers. A s to the appropriateness o f the scheme for our large cities, I have grave doubts. O ne o f the chief benefits conferred by the m anager p la n -a d m in istra tiv e ex p e rtise -la rg e cities already have in the form o f professional heads o f civic departm ents. In fact, these heads are m ore expert in their fields than a m anager could ever hope to be, and fo r that reason, as P lunkett has pointed out, they need to advise the council directly. T he appointm ent o f a chief adm inistrator fo r purposes o f co-ordina tion and supervision w ould probably be an im provem ent, however, and this schem e could easily be com bined w ith the existing form s o f large-city governm ent in C anada. But by itself this w ould not solve the m ain problem s o f governm ent for large cities. In such cities these problem s have becom e too com plex to be handled effectively by a sm all council and a single chief executive, o r even by a m anager fo r adm inistrative co-ordination and a m ayor for policy leadership. T h e governm ent o f any large population, as W alter Bagehot once explained, needs both an efficient p art and a representative part. F o r large cities, the m anager plan is long on efficiency but short on representation, while the m ayor-council system meets neither requirem ent adequately. In a small m unicipality, a small council can both provide adequate representation of com m unity interests and, through the leadership o f the m ayor, create policy. B ut in a large city, w here there is need o f a large council for 7 Plunkett, op. cit., 31-32.
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THE CANADIAN M UNICIPAL SYSTEM
adequate representation, such a council becomes too cum ber som e to provide adequate policy leadership. In other w o rd s -to extend Bagehot’s a n a ly sis-th ere m ust be not only the represen tative p art (a large council) to approve policy, and the efficient p art (th e m anager a n d /o r heads of civic departm ents) to carry it out, but also a politically controlled p art to create policy. In large cities, unfortunately, the m ayor cannot do this singlehanded. T h at is why, I think, in some of ou r largest cities the m ayor-council system has been replaced by a large council and a plural political executive resem bling the cabinet at the higher levels of g o v ern m e n t-th e executive com m ittee in Q uebec and the board of control in O ntario. T his political executive, rath er than the m ayor alone, proposes policies; the large council approves or criticizes and revises them on behalf o f the citizens; and the civic o fficials-in M ontreal and Q uebec headed by a chief a d m in istra to r-p u t them into effect. T he difficulty w ith the executive com m ittee scheme in M ont real and Quebec, how ever, is that only som e o f the functions of political leadership and policy execution are allocated, respec tively, to the executive com m ittee and the chief adm inistrator. T h e elected m ayor still retains independent legislative and executive powers, so that responsibility is not clearly fixed. A nd because the board of control system was im ported from the U nited States, it too em bodies features of the A m erican schem e of separated powers. T he m ayor and board are elected at large and fo r m any purposes operate independently of the council. L ike a cabinet, they take action an d m ake proposals collectively. T hey tend to operate secretly, to support one another, and to present a united front to the council. Y et, unlike the cabinet in the parliam entary system, they are not directly responsible to the council. They have not been chosen and are not necessarily supported by a majority of the council, nor is there an organized opposition to criticize them. D espite the present shortcom ings of these plural-executive systems in ou r largest cities, I believe that in revised form they have the potentiality for m uch m ore dem ocratic and efficient city governm ent than either the m ayor-council or city m anager plans. If under th e executive-com m ittee system the indepen dently elected m ayor were instead chosen by the council and w ere chairm an of his executive com m ittee, the schem e would be a very close approxim ation to the parliam entary system of governm ent. Since this system is renow ned throughout the w orld for its effective com bination of efficiency and dem ocracy, and w orks so well at the higher levels o f governm ent, it is
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strange that we have never seriously considered it for o u r large and com plex cities. P erhaps this is because, as M unro says, we have been too m uch under the spell of A m erican influence in ou r experim ents with local governm ent. W e have h ad m uch greater success than the A m ericans in solving the problem of m etropolitan governm ent. T o ro n to ’s tw o-tier m etropolitan schem e and the plans for sim ilar schemes in o u r o th er m etropolitan areas are exerting a strong influence upon A m erican thinking about this problem . T he tim e has now arrived fo r us to shake off ou r inferiority com plex and to have the im agination and courage to invent ou r own solution to the problem of governing large cities. T he w riter would therefore like to recom m end th at som e large city th a t is dissatisfied with its present schem e adopt and experim ent w ith a cabinet form of city governm ent. P erhaps this should be one o f the executive com m ittee o r board o f control cities, which have already had experience w ith a plural executive and a large council elected from w ards, o r W indsor, w hich has recently changed from the board o f control to the m anager plan. T here is no good reason, o f course, why the scheme could not be com bined w ith an appointed m anager as chief adm inistrative officer responsible to the m ayor as head of the cabinet. In this way C anadians could com bine the best o f the A m erican m anager plan w ith the best o f the British cabinet system to create a new advance in efficiency and dem ocracy for the governm ent of the large cities of the world.
3: Do We Have the M anager Plan? C anadian P ublic A d m in istra tio n , 4 (M arch, 1961), 117-18. A comment on John M clver’s “Survey of the City M anager Plan in C anada,” C anadian P ublic A d m in istra tio n , 3 (September, 1960). By permission.
source:
M r. M clver has done us all a great service by dem onstrating in precise term s the extent and nature o f the m anager plan in C anada. F o r example, I m ust confess that before M r. M clver com pleted his survey I was not aw are o f how m any o f our medium-sized cities had already adopted some form of the plan. A ccording to his figures, one-third of the twelve cities in the
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THE CANADIAN M U NICIPAL SYSTEM
50,0 0 0 -100,000 population range, and over half of the twentyseven cities in the 25,000-50,000 range have done so. In other words, in medium-sized cities there are proportionately almost as m any m anager cities in C anada as in th e U nited States. It is only in the population range below 25,000 and above 100,000 th a t the proportions o f adoptions in C anada are m arkedly below those in the U nited States. O ne m ight therefore conclude that the question I asked in “D o W e N eed the M anager Plan?” was off the point. W e already have such a plan. H ow ever, th at is not really the question I was asking. M y full question w as: Should we adopt the m anager plan in the fo rm laid dow n by the M odel City C h arter o f the N ational M unicipal League o r as actually adopted in the U nited States? A nd, fo r the reasons given in m y article, m y answer w as: No. N o t clear from M r. M clver’s conclusions is that, as a m atter of fact, we have not adopted the m anager plan in this form . M r. M clv er says (p. 2 3 1 ): “T he differences in C anada from the plan as it actually exists in the U nited States are m ainly in degree, with the variations being m ore in respect to details than to its overall fra m ew o rk .. . . M any o f the cities in C anada under the council-m anager plan deviate in only one o r tw o unim por ta n t respects from the recom m ended plan of the M odel C h arter.” I subm it th at this statem ent is not true in reference to either the M odel C harter o r the system actually existing in the U nited States. A s M r. M clver recognizes, A m erican m an ager cities depart in certain respects from the M odel C harter. B ut C anadian m anager cities depart even further. A t w hat stage does a difference o f degree becom e one o f kind? A lthough the exact stage may be a m atter o f opinion, clearly the councils of C anadian m anager cities are, on the average, larger than their counterparts in th e U nited States and considerably larger than the size recom m ended in the M odel C harter. If from the point o f view of the advocates o f the C harter they are “too large,” then this, it m ay be argued, is a difference in kind. Similarly, the frequent election of councillors from w ards and the pre dom inant use o f standing com m ittees in C anadian m anager cities as com pared with the C h arter’s proposals and the pre dom inant practice in the U nited States are m arked differences. A lthough M r. M clver’s text and his T able 4 do not agree on exactly how m any C anadian m anager cities use the w ard system, one can say th at roughly half of them use wards and over half use standing com m ittees, as com pared w ith about one-quarter w ith w ards and probably a sim ilar proportion with standing com m ittees in the U nited States.
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M ore im portant than these differences, how ever, are the ones th at clearly characterize the m anager plan in C anad a as different from th at either proposed in the C h arter o r actually existing in the U nited States: the direct election, th e m uch m ore generous paym ent and the greater pow er of the m ayor; the restricted pow ers of the m anager, especially in appoint m ents; and the absence o f a clear distinction between policy and adm inistration in C anadian m anager cities. T he significance of these differences is elaborated in my earlier article. I am arguing, then, that all these differences add up to an im p o rtan t difference in kind from the A m erican m anager plan. In short, we have developed o u r own version of the m anager plan. I will go further and say th at I believe the C anadian m anager plan is superior to th at either proposed in the M odel C h arter or actually existing in the U nited States. A large council and election by w ards provide m ore adequate representation o f the great variety o f interests found in a big city. A nd the direct election of a w ell-paid m ayor provides for strong political le a d e rsh ip -a n elem ent that is entirely neglected in the A m eri can version of the m anager plan. M oreover, the participation o f the council in senior adm inistrative appointm ents and the appearance o f adm inistrative officers before standing com m it tees o f the council prevents the m anager from exercising an autocratic control over his adm inistration and helps to prevent the artificial and rigid distinction between the form ulation and execution o f policy th at is characteristic of the A m erican plan. I therefore conclude th at the differences between the C anadian and A m erican versions of the m anager plan are so significant fo r its successful w orking th at, rath er than slavishly alter o u r plan to fit the M odel C harter, as M r. M clver suggests, we should instead study, and also invite A m ericans to study, these differ ences in order to see w hether both versions of the plan might not be thereby improved.
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T H E CANADIAN M U N IC IP A L SY ST EM
4: Reform the Board of Control System so u rce:
Revision of
a ta lk
on
c b o t -t v ’j
C ivic A ffa irs (June 1 6 , 1 9 6 0 ) .
N o t long ago the city of W indsor abolished its board of control in favour o f the m anager plan. T he only large cities in C anada still using a board o f control are T oronto, H am ilton, and O ttaw a.* D oes this m ean th at the board o f control system h as becom e outm oded? I do not think so. I have already explained w hy I think it is superior to the m anager plan for large cities. But I think also th at it could easily be im proved. L et us exam ine how the system w orks, in order to see how it m ight be reform ed. In O ttaw a, fo r exam ple, the city council is m ade up o f twenty-five m em bers: tw enty alderm en, w ho are elected from ten w ards; and the five m em bers o f the board of control (w hich includes the m ayor) w ho are elected by the whole city. T he board of control, like a cabinet, is the executive body o f the city council, and has m any independent executive powers. It m ust also consider all im portant financial and legis lative m atters and m ake proposals to the council. T hese pro posals can be refused only by a tw o-thirds vote o f the whole council. Since the m ayor and controllers are m em bers o f the council, their vote is included. So if the m em bers o f the board stick together in the council, no less than seventeen o f the tw enty alderm en would have to vote against one o f the board’s proposals to defeat it. W hat are some of the disadvantages o f this system? One is th at the board of control has too m uch pow er over the elected council. A lderm en often com plain th at it is a case o f the tail wagging the dog. In m y view, this disadvantage could be re m oved by a very sim ple change. T he city council should be given the pow er to defeat the controllers’ proposals by a sim ple m a jority instead o f a two-thirds m ajority. Simple m ajority rule is a well-accepted practice of dem ocratic governm ent. So I fail to see why the board o f control should be placed in such a privileged position. O ther disadvantages arise from the fact that the controllers are elected from the whole city, while the alderm en are elected fro m wards. T his leads each side to see issues differently and to disagree too often. Also, at elections, som e o f the best alderm en ru n for the office of controller, but are defeated, and their services are lost to the city. Similarly, often the best controllers
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com pete for the office o f m ayor and all but one of them are defeated. H ence the system elim inates experienced alderm en and controllers. Also, cam paigning for the office o f controller is so costly that m any of the best people cannot afford to run. A nd since som e o f the controllers are constantly angling for the office o f m ayor, often the m ayor and controllers fail to w ork together as a team . M ost o f these defects could be rem edied by a single change: by doing away w ith the direct election of controllers and, in stead, having them chosen by the alderm en from am ong them selves. A bolishing controller elections would avoid the defeat of good alderm en in these elections, and also the high cost of cam paigning. A nd having the controllers chosen by the alder m en w ould m ake them m ore directly responsible to the city council, so that the board and council would w ork together m ore smoothly. T o sum up, then, I am proposing two changes: the rem oval o f the two-thirds rule, and the doing away w ith direct election of controllers. If these changes w ere m ade, I am convinced that m any o f the defects in ou r board o f control system would disappear. But the problem o f the m ayor and controllers not w orking together as a team w ould not be solved com pletely by these changes. T his difficulty could only be rem edied by having the m ayor appoint the controllers from the council, just as a prim e m inister chooses his cabinet. Also, to m ake sure that the m ayor and board do not disagree with the council, the latter should choose its own m ayor. T hen, like a prim e m inister and his cabinet, the m ayor and his board would be responsible to the elected council.
♦London now has a board o f control; and when metro T oronto was reorganized in 1966, three o f the new boroughs (Etobicoke, Scar borough, and N orth Y ork) adopted the system, even though the Royal Commission on metro T oronto had recommended the execu tive committee system instead. Etobicoke had had a three-man board (including the m ayor) even before that time. In 1969, T oronto’s board of control was reformed, as proposed here, by changing it to an executive committee of four aldermen chosen by the council. These four, plus the m ayor, are also members o f M etro T oronto’s executive committee.
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THE CANADIAN M UNICIPAL SYSTEM
5: Extend the Municipal Vote s o u rc e :
Revision of a talk on
c b o t -t v ' s
Civic A ffa irs (Decem ber
1 3 , 1 9 5 9 ).
In some o f the central and A tlantic provinces, voting in local elections is still restricted by property qualifications. I t is restricted to rate-paying ow ners o r tenants of property and their wives. W hy should this be the case? W hy should the m unicipal vote be different from the vote in provincial o r federal elections which is open to all adult citizens? It used to be argued that m unicipal services were m ainly of benefit to p ro p e rty -su c h services as fire-fighting, street and sidewalk building and m aintenance, and so on. By far the most im portant source of local revenue was, m oreover, the real property tax. So it was thought that only rate-payers should be allowed to vote. But these argum ents no longer hold true. N ow adays, m any costly local serv ices-su ch as education, health, and w e lfa re -h a v e nothing to do with protecting property; they are of interest to all local citizens and not to rate-payers only. A nd it is no longer true that those who are not rate-payers do not pay for local services. M uch o f the cost for local services is now paid for by grants from the federal and the provincial governm ents. H ence, those w ho are not rate-payers are sup porting local services through the taxes they pay to the higher levels o f governm ent. T hey even help to pay local property taxes through the rent they pay for their lodgings. It is true that the num ber o f citizens w ho cannot vote because of this property restriction is sm all. But why should anyone be considered a second-class citizen in his com m unity? It is a wellaccepted principle o f dem ocratic governm ent that every citizen should have a vote. T he restriction is an undesirable hangover from our less dem ocratic past. So too is the provision th at gives some people two and even m ore votes in civic elections because they happen to own property in two o r m ore different wards. T h e largest group forbidden to vote are young people living in lo d g in g s-th e very ones we should be encouraging to take an interest in civic affairs, before they becom e too set in their ways. H ere is an exam ple of a m inority whose dem ocratic rights have been disregarded by the m ajority simply because th a t m inority is n ot organized to protect its own interests, and because the m ajority has n ot had the m atter brought forcibly to its attention.
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In O ntario, this restriction on voting existed generally until 1958. In th at year the O ntario governm ent recognized its u n fairness and passed a law which perm itted its rem oval. But the actual decision to im plem ent the law was left to a vote in each m unicipality. A num ber of O ntario’s cities-including T oronto, W indsor, and L o n d o n -to o k action im m ediately, and in the 1958 local elections asked the existing voters w hether they wished to extend the right to vote. F ortunately, voters in all of these cities gave solid approval to th e idea. But it is still possible for other local councils to refuse to put the question to a refer endum , o r for the existing voters to tu rn it down; and there are still m any m unicipalities in w hich the vote has not been extended. W hy should the right to vote be granted in such a left-handed m anner? I t should be regarded as an elem entary dem ocratic right fo r all citizens.
6: Better Civic Personnel Revision o f a talk on c b o t - t v ’s C ivic A ffa irs (Novem ber 19, 1959), and of a section from T h e R eorganization o f ProvincialM u n icip a l R ela tio n s in N o v a S co tia (Halifax, 1949), 142-44-henceforth referred to as N o v a S co tia R ep o rt. By permission. s o u rc e :
T he growing im portance o f the problem o f adm inistrative efficiency at city hall was brought forcefully to our attention in O ttaw a recently by m alpractices in the handling of w aste oil, and by the city’s decision to bring in a firm o f m anagem ent consultants to survey the efficiency o f civic departm ents. T here is now a realization that our cities m ay be suffering from grow ing pains due to their trem endous expansion in recent years. Also, forecasts indicate th at m any o f them will alm ost double their population in the next tw enty years. Since history shows that the num ber o f civic em ployees grows even faster than the population, the size o f civic departm ents may m ore than double in the next tw enty years. Civic adm inistration is fast becoming very big business, involving thousands of employees. C an a survey by m anagem ent consultants solve a city’s ad m inistrative problem s? N o doubt it can help. Increase in size requires reorganization of departm ents and im provem ents in
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THE CANADIAN M U NICIPAL SYSTEM
A serious difficulty, how ever, is that m ost m unicipalities are too small to engage the technical assistance required to set up a plan, and have so few em ployees that the costs cannot be prop erly averaged over th e years. T hey therefore often feel th at it is not w orthw hile to set up a form al retirem ent plan. Y et their em ployees are no less in need o f an organized schem e fo r their retirem ent. T h e solution to this difficulty is the one suggested by the M unicipal F inance Officers’ A ssociation o f the U nited States and C anada: the setting up o f a provincew ide retirem ent plan fo r m unicipal em ployees. In a special pam phlet on retirem ent plans the m . f . o . a . has this to say o f such a solution: Weighing all essential factors, and considering the highly satisfactory experience o f statewide plans over a period o f years, the conclusion to be drawn is that the advantages fa r overshadow any deficiencies o f this type o f planning, and operation o f retirem ent provisions fo r sm all m unicipalities on a statew ide basis is the m ost effective m eans o f providing retirem ent coverage fo r sm all groups o f em ployees.1 Well over h alf o f the A m erican states have already estab lished and are now operating retirem ent plans on the above basis. T he statewide plan in N ew Y ork is the oldest, having begun operation in 1922. Participation is on a voluntary basis, an d to date practically all subdivisions of the state have sub scribed to m em bership. L arge cities are usually excluded from statew ide plans on the ground th at they have their own peculiar personnel problem s, and also because the num ber of employees m akes it possible to operate separate plans on a sound basis. Provinces in C anada th at have not already done so should sim ilarly create provincew ide retirem ent plans for m unicipal em ployees.* Such plans m ight provide for voluntary participa tion by m unicipalities, o r they could be required to join the plan w ith the proviso th at any m unicipality could exem pt itself w ithin a certain period o f tim e. This m ethod has been used effectively in the State of Colorado and “is preferred by students o f the problem .”2 It would not be essential to the operation o f the p lan fo r the province to m ake a financial contribution. H ow ever, a three-way split is suggested, w ith the em ployees, the m unicipalities, and the province each contributing one-third so th at the burden upon the poorer m unicipalities will not be too great. O n the o th er hand, if a province w ere to institute a thoroughgoing
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system o f equalized general provincial aid to its municipalities, probably its financial participation in the plan w ould n ot be necessary.
7: Public Relation Officers for Cities? s o u rc e :
P ublic A ffa irs, 12 (Spring, 1949), 31-4. By permission.
P erhaps the m ost im portant problem connected w ith local governm ent is th at o f developing am ong the people a general interest in m unicipal affairs. A t one tim e the favoured m ethod in the U nited States was the generation of a high degree of em otional excitem ent over new reform s. H igh pressure sales m anship w as often th e core o f such a schem e; w hen the excite m ent died, so did the reform s. Today, how ever, a less spectacu lar b ut m ore perm anent program m e of educating the people in good governm ent is prom ising m uch m ore in the w ay of con crete results. O ne good exam ple o f how local citizens can be duped by a political boss is found in K ansas City, M issouri. T here, despite the early em ploym ent of a city m anager, Boss Pendergast m an aged to keep com plete control until 1939. R eform ers could talk th eir heads off, telling how Pendergast supervised the perversion o f election procedures and how he constantly em ployed corrupt practices. But w hat people saw was tangible evidence of Pendergast’s consideration fo r them . T hey could regard the com plaints against him as not being very im portant. H ere, then, is graphic illustration th a t no ideal fo rm o f civic 1 “Pension Plans for Small Units,” M u n icip a l A ffa irs (Halifax; JuneJuly, 1949), 5. * In 1963 O ntario created one o f the most progressive plans o f this nature in C anada. A prior study had revealed that ninety-seven per cent of civic employees in villages, eighty-eight per cent in townships and sixty-eight per cent in towns did not have the protection of pen sion benefits. The scheme provides for equal contributions by em ployees and municipalities o r local boards. By the end of 1964, 423 municipalities and local boards, including school boards, had joined the plan. By January 1966, the num ber o f participating employees had reached 33,000-a good indication o f the need fo r such a plan. a Ib id ., 7.
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THE CANADIAN M U NICIPAL SYSTEM
organization will necessarily bring about good local governm ent. T h at is an achievem ent which can only be brought about by the concerted action of local citizens who are w ell-inform ed on the problem s and aw are o f the possibilities. Creating a D em and D . W. H oan, one-tim e M ayor o f M ilwaukee, p u t this idea into practice m any years ago and turned the city from one rendering m ediocre services into w hat is now claim ed to be one o f the best-governed cities in the world. W hen he cam e into pow er, a corrupt political organization had been m ilking the city dry, and a huge debt hindered the expansion of m unicipal services. N ow M ilwaukee has high adm inistrative standards of city governm ent, one of the best health records in the U nited States, great success in the prevention o f crim e and the appre hension o f crim inals, a well-developed system o f adult educa tion, recreational facilities fo r old and young, and a high standard o f education in the public schools. A ll this has come about by M ayor H o an ’s m ethod o f inform ing the people about w hat efficient, citizen-controlled city governm ent can do fo r them , and thus creating a general dem and for such governm ent. T h e program m e o f public education m ust continue, how ever, o r the interest o f the people will flag. M ilw aukee’s was developed over a thirty-year period. R eporting H elps O ne phase of such a program m e is good periodical reporting to the citizens. M ost C anadian cities have no general p ro gram m e o f inform ing the public on civic affairs. Indeed, m ost don’t even issue a w ritten annual report to the citizens, other than the annual financial statem ent. T oronto issues a tiny h an d book w h ich -a lth o u g h handy fo r referen c e-w o u ld hardly m ake interesting bed-tim e reading. Com pare this situation w ith th at in the well-governed cities of Cincinnati and M ilwaukee. T hey send o u t pam phlets each m onth with the w ater bills—just two- o r three-page affairs, but they do inform th e citizens on the current problem s o f the city. These pam phlets are clear and illum inating. Even m ore effective are their annual reports. T hese are carefully prepared, clearly phrased, and contain m any charts, diagram s, and photographs to illustrate the contents. As one M ilwaukee city official p ut it, “O u r R eports are sim ple descriptions m ade up o f com m on sense
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instead o f rows of figures m ade up of dollars and cents.” It is only fair to note, how ever, that in 1947 less than ten per cent of all A m erican cities published annual reports of a general n atu re fo r distribution to citizens. T his plan has been adopted in C anada by a few m u n ic ip a lities-fo r exam ple, V erdun, O utrem ont, Shaw inigan Falls, and L a T uque, all in the province o f Quebec. In M ontreal, com petent reports are published sepa rately by the various departm ents, while the city planning de partm ent, like the planning bodies in other C anadian cities, has produced com m endable studies w hich the non-specialist finds both attractive and understandable. But individual reports such as these can be no substitute fo r the short, over-all description o f a city’s annual program m e. T V and R adio C om e N e xt A lthough annual reports are the m ost widely used m eans of bringing civic inform ation to th e people, T V and radio have becom e o f equal im portance. T h e m ayors of som e of o u r largest cities have h ad regular program m es in w hich they have ex plained civic affairs. But the m ost popular m ethod is fo r various city officials to give talks o r be interviewed on the operation o f th eir respective departm ents. T his is a good- w ay of inform ing the public and has been used w ith m uch success in som e C a n a dian cities. B rantford, O ntario, has even broadcast actual city council meetings. As to the probable success of this venture, H alifax’s M ayor A hern pointed out th at it is hard enough to get the city fathers to express opinions in regular council meetings, even w ithout the presence o f a radio m icrophone. T here is also the question o f ju st how m any people listen to such program m es. T hey a re usually dry and often technical. T hey are also puzzling to the listener because th e m ost interesting discussions have already taken place in com m ittees. T he province of S askatche w an, on the other hand, adopted the practice o f broadcasting only im portant meetings o f its legislature. A nother plan is sug gested by the A m erican netw orks’ practice of bringing congresional com m ittee hearings to the nation; discussion at selected sessions is recorded, then edited with com petent narration and com m entary fo r broadcast a t a suitable hour. A n o th er m eans o f “selling” local governm ent to the public is by m eans o f tim e-tested visual techniques. M ost people know little m ore about civic adm inistration than w hat they s e e -th e policem an on his beat, the garbage collector, o r the snow re
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THE CANADIAN M UNICIPAL SYSTEM
m over. If carefully prepared, easy-to-read charts w ere posted in public places, people would notice them and becom e interested. Civic vehicles o f all kinds could also be used to carry posters. O ne particularly good place fo r such inform ation w ould be tram cars and buses. H ere a large p roportion o f the people could be reached, and it w ould be hard fo r them not to read such exhibits, as any “strap hanger” o r ad-m an knows. T h e Total A pproach Reporting, alone, is not enough, how ever. I f citizen partici pation is to be assured, the program m e o f public education m ust be all-inclusive. D ow n-to-earth civics courses in the schools are needed. If the people are taught the fundam entals o f dem ocratic governm ent w hile they are young, they will have a natural interest w hen they becom e full-fledged citizens. N ot only that, but an interest will be aroused in the parents from listening to their children talk a t hom e. In som e cities a start has already been m ade. H alifax, fo r exam ple, has a “ youth governm ent.” T h e schools annually elect a m ayor, alderm en, and city officials, who sit in w ith the council once a year and learn by helping to ru n the city. A n expansion o f such a program m e w ould no doubt be enthusiastically received by the socially aw are teenager o f today. In N ew Y ork, M ayor L a G uardia established a plan of choosing prom ising students from local high schools and col leges and offering them sum m er apprenticeships in the city’s governm ent. Such a plan w ould produce m any fu tu re civic leaders. A t the adult level, too, th e coldness o f p rin t m ust be bol stered w ith the w arm th of hum an contact. Follow ing M ayor H o a n ’s exam ple, top city adm inistrators could be encouraged to address clubs and social organizations on the n ature and extent o f th eir work. T his inexpensive m eans o f educating the public should appeal even to pennyw ise alderm en on finance com m it tees. A nother useful idea is th a t o f tours through the city and its w orks, conducted by civic em ployees. T he m ore obvious appeal o f this plan to visitors and school children m ight be extended to th e com m unity’s adult tax-payers who have an interest in the activities financed by their money. A dult education m ust also play its part. Both D es Moines and M ilwaukee have successfully organized adult classes to study m unicipal governm ent. Several years ago, M ilwaukee took the unprecedented step of holding a “school for politicians” open to all 356 candidates in th e city and county election.
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Sponsored by the public library, five sem inars in m unicipal affairs were conducted by nationally know n authorities. In C anada, various civic organizations could be called upon to help organize discussion groups on local governm ent. Civic Im provem ent A ssociations and Junior Boards o f T rade have already done useful work. In som e localities, the H om e and School organizations have taken steps in this d ire c tio n -a n d logically so, since their special interest is in im proved relations betw een a vital m unicipal activity and an im portant section of the com m unity. Also, a carefully planned program m e o f public discussion should reach beyond the adult population. M any centres have organized teenage clubs, fo r exam ple, w hich might be persuaded to co-operate in a com m unity-w ide p rogram m e of this type. It is obvious th at the new spapers already play an im portant p art in inform ing the public about m unicipal affairs. B ut if the city itself can create a public interest in local governm ent, then the circle is com plete, since the new spapers cater to their sub scribers’ interests. These, then, are the m eans by which citizens have been and can be educated in civic affairs. O nce they are used, the people will, as M ayor H oan has proved, dem and and get better local governm ent. Som eone to D o It T h e big problem , how ever, is: who should organize and run such a program m e? T o leave its developm ent to a single elected official like a m ayor is too uncertain. It m ay even be dangerous. A city m ight start w ith a H oan and end with a Pendergast. Instead, C anadian cities w ould be better advised to entrust this responsibility, to their perm anent, non-partisan officers, who would act o f course under the general guidance of the elected council. V arious form s o f organization m ay be used in a tow n o r city hall for purposes o f public relations activity. O ne plan is for each departm ent to have its own public relations section. T he disadvantage here is the absence o f concerted action. A second is for one of the present officials to be handed the job of co ordination. T his w ould be feasible in the sm aller cities and towns, but would n ot w ork fo r large cities. T o do a job properly, the responsible official m ust not only be interested in it and believe in it; he m ust also have tim e for it. F o r cities, then, the logical step is the appointm ent of a public inform ation officer.
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T H E CANADIAN M U NICIPAL SYSTEM
It m ay be noted th at the British G overnm ent’s C om m ittee on Publicity fo r L ocal G overnm ent reached the sam e conclusion. Such an officer would act as the “inform ation booth” o f city hall, the m edium through which inform ation is funnelled to the public. H is w ould be the job o f m anaging tours, giving speeches, supervising exhibits, w riting pam phlets, arranging radio talks, organizing adult education forum s, taking opinion polls, etc., and, last but not least, planning and editing an annual rep o rt on civic affairs. He, would, of course, require assistants, and would need the full co-operation o f each departm ent. T h e qualifications for such an officer w ould naturally have to be very high. T he first one would be im aginative organizing and executive ability. A second w ould be a wide know ledge of educational and publicity m ethods, including the techniques of direct contact as well as the use o f t v , radio, and the press. T o organize and edit the annual report, publishing experience w ould be invaluable but not essential, provided he had com pe ten t assistance. H is main job w ould be to stim ulate the public ra th e r than to produce technically “slick” publications. A n officer w ith these responsibilities w ould have to be paid a good salary, and a certain am ount of authority should accom pany his position. T h at some such guiding hand in public education is needed fo r m ost m unicipal governm ents is proved by the high incidence o f non-voting in elections. In m ost civic elections less than half o f those listed vote. Studies in the U nited States show th at lack o f interest and general indifference account for almost a third of non-voting. H enpe a system o f public education and reporting is needed to stim ulate not only interest in civic governm ent but also active participation. It cannot be em phasized too strongly th at the cure for a sleepy public is a wide-awake program m e of public education.
PA RT TW O: M U N IC IP A L F IN A N C E
1: The Need for Improving Assessment s o u rc e :
Revision of a section from N o v a S co tia R ep o rt, 83-92.
Im portance o f Assessm ent T h at the provincial governm ents have a direct interest in good assessment is obvious for a n um ber of reasons. M unicipali ties are the legal creatures of the provincial legislature; hence, a province is held responsible to the people fo r the efficiency of the scheme o f m unicipal governm ent w hich it has created. Secondly, in th e total scheme o f provincial-m unicipal finance, the tax on property (including personal-property and business taxes) is still the m ost lucrative single source o f taxation reve nue. In fact, despite the rapid post-w ar increase in revenues fro m provincial taxes, the real property tax remains alm ost as great a source o f taxation revenue as all the m ain sources o f provincial taxation added together. T h e provinces, therefore, have a vital interest in seeing that this tax is collected in a fair and equitable m anner, and that it is m ade as lucrative as pos sible w ithout bearing unfairly upon those who cannot pay. Clearly, a scientific and uniform assessm ent is the key to an equitable and lucrative property tax. If sim ilar properties are assessed by different standards at different values, the tax cannot be applied fairly o r uniform ly. N o t so obvious is that if such properties are assessed a t com paratively uniform values within a class while the valuation from one class to another bears no relation to reality, the tax will fall unfairly upon all those within either one o r another of the classes. F o r exam ple, if valuable properties are assessed at thirty per cent of actual value and poor properties at fifty per cent, the tax will fall m ore heavily upon the ow ners of poor properties; o r the situation m ight be the reverse. A side from the inequity of such a system, the tax is m ade correspondingly less lucrative for m unicipal governm ents because the limit to the tax rate is set, in the one case, by the ability to pay of the owners o f the poorest properties in a m unicipality; or, in the reverse case, by the opposition of the ow ners of the m ore valuable property to increased spending w hose cost, they feel, falls unfairly upon them . Y et it is ex
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trem ely likely th at this sort o f situation will develop under a system o f part-tim e o r untrained assessors. In fact, such a con dition m ay be found in m any C anadian m unicipalities. Since the trend o f m odern public finance has been tow ard a system o f progressive taxation based on ability to pay, it can h ardly be argued th at a uniform application o f the property tax, w hich is a proportional and not a progressive tax, w ould be u n fair to the ow ners of valuable properties. O n the other hand, since progressive incom e taxes generally fall less heavily upon th e ow ners o f poorer properties, it can be argued th a t they should be expected to pay a relatively large share o f the property tax. F rom both points of view, a uniform application of the tax rate to the actual value of all properties m ay be considered fair. A uniform standard w ould be not only m ore equitable but also m ore lucrative in that the tax would fall m ore properly upon all those who are expected and able to bear it. T his w ould increase both the ability an d the willingness to pay. It would also m ean that local councils w ould be m ore willing to raise the level of taxation to m eet new dem ands because they would know th at the increase would not bear unfairly upon those who are unable or unwilling to pay. A side from this fundam ental consideration o f equitable taxation, assessment is of vital im portance to the successful operation of the w hole m unicipal system fo r a num ber o f other reasons. T he assessm ent roll is th e basis fo r the voters’ list. It form s the basic record of p roperty and o f tax-payers o f all kinds fo r a m unicipality. If the recording o r assessm ent of p roperty is defective o r out-of-date, innum erable difficulties will arise in all the subsequent steps o f the taxation process—appeal, collection, tax sales, etc.—and the whole system will becom e inefficient. M ore im portant, the total assessm ent is used for m any purposes n o t directly related to internal finance. It form s a foundation fo r vital-statistical know ledge used in gaining com parative inform ation. W e are all fam iliar w ith the false tax-rate com parisons m unicipalities m ake every year as a basis for im portant financial decisions, sim ply because they have no know ledge of how th eir standard o f assessment com pares w ith th at of their neighbouring m unicipality. Assessment is also used as an index o f fiscal need fo r provincial grants and as a basis for sharing m any expenditures. F o r all the foregoing reasons, then, the m atter of a scientific, uniform system o f assessment throughout a province is u n deniably o f provincial concern.
PART
tw o
:
m u n ic ip a l f in a n c e
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Inadequacy o f A ssessm ent It is hardly necessary to expand on th e inadequacies o f a system of part-tim e o r untrained assessors. A few exam ples o f findings in N ova Scotia at the end of th e Second W orld W ar, w hen part-tim e assessors w ere num erous there, will suffice. M ore im portant is an exam ination of w hy th e system has not changed w ith the tim es in som e provinces, w hat others have done about it, and w hat needs to be done about it in these provinces. In 1945, M r. M artin A rchibald, fo rm er clerk and treasurer fo r H alifax, reported on th e system o f part-tim e assessors used in N ova Scotia at th at tim e as follows: W hen, as is custom ary in the m ajority o f counties, there is a m ultiplicity o f assessm ent officials, having different stand ards o f values, it is hopeless to expect anything approxi m ating an equal, uniform assessm ent in different districts. E ven in one district, when two or m ore assessors act, each valuing the property in his particular area, as is quite com m on, it is not only possible, but it frequently happens, that the assessm ent o f sim ilar properties in different por tions o f the sam e district, differ substantially. N aturally the object o f the [Assessment] A c t is that all assessments in any one district should be determ ined by all the assessors ap pointed fo r that district and not by any one o f them ; b u t in so m e sections, at least, the practice has grown up o f dividing the territory, although all the officials com plete the certifi cate fo r the entire district, thereby assum ing responsibility fo r assessm ents o f w hich they m ay have little or no personal know ledge. In the valuing o f personal property, there is great diver sity o f opinion am ong the assessors them selves. Som e o f them do not consider ordinary household furniture as being assessable; and others look upon such furniture as part o f the house and include it in the real estate assessment. Others again assess such property at a nom inal value only, and it is n ot uncom m on to find an assessm ent not exceeding $200 in a hom e valued at $5,000 or m ore, although it is apparent that such a sum could not possibly furnish any one room in the house. . . . In assessments o f this kind, the advantage seem s to be greatly in favour o f the rate-payer w ith a high real estate assessment, w hen com pared with those assessed in the low er brackets; the latter certainly paying very m uch
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m ore in proportion on their personal property. Farm stock also show s a great variation in values. In one county cows are valued at anyw here fro m $15 to $30 each in different localities. E ven the higher value is only a fraction o f the actual value o f such animals. Tim berlands are the subject o f m uch argum ent. In som e m unicipalities there is a recognized basis o f assessment: virgin tim ber areas at a certain rate per acre, culled tim ber substantially lower, and stripped and waste lands at a nom inal value only. Consideration m ust be given to the location o f the lands, fo r if they are in rem ote areas, operating costs are naturally increased. This, however, calls fo r specialized know ledge on the part o f the assessor and unless all assessors use the sam e basis, uniform ity is o ut o f the question. One o f the great difficulties facing us is the superabun dance o f untrained and unpaid assessors. In 1942 there were approxim ately fo u r hundred assessors in the various m u nicipalities o f N o v a Scotia and their total rem uneration was in the vicinity o f $20,000. . . . In one m unicipality in 1942, forty-eight assessors were appointed, receiving total rem u neration o f $2,255, or an average o f approxim ately $47 each. Y et their com bined w ork represents 14,000 individual assessments, in addition to m ore than 1,000 poll-tax entries fo r m en not assessed on property.1 T h e A ssessm ent C om m ittee of the U nion o f N ova Scotia M unicipalities gave a sim ilar account of the situation in their R eport to the A nnual Convention o f 1946: O ne o f the ch ief clauses in the [A ssessm ent] A c t is that relating to the valuation o f property, providing that all property should be assessed at its actual cash value. F rom a casual scrutiny o f total assessments in m any m unicipalities, it w ould appear that this provision is not being carried out, and we learn that in m any areas assessments have been levied at a m ere fraction o f the actual value o f properties, and this fraction varies in different com m unities. O ne place will tell yo u that their assessm ent is tw enty per cent o f value; others thirty per cent, fifty per cent, etc. In 1947 M r. M cG lashen confirmed and elaborated on these findings, a t least as fa r as ru ral m unicipalities are concerned, through conducting an actual reassessm ent o f the M unicipality o f H alifax County. T he following are excerpts from his R eport to C o u n cil:2
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PE R SO N A L P R O P E R T Y
A d m itte d ly, the assessm ent o f personal property as defined by the A ssessm ent A c t is a trem endous, i f not an impossible, undertaking. Is this any reason w hy hundreds and hundreds o f residents o f the county are not assessed a cent on perso nal property while others are? Y o u can conservatively esti m ate the people who have been overlooked in the hundreds and the property in the m any thousands o f dollars. The sam e is true, but to an even greater extent, in the assessment o f straight poll-tax-payers and the taxing o f dogs. L ivestock also gets a m ixed reception fro m the assessors. Som e tax payers pay taxes on livestock, but in other com m unities the assessors have disregarded livestock fo r years. T h is is rank discrim ination o f the worst kind and an unjust system that calls fo r a rem edy. R EA L ESTA TE
Inequitable and unfair as the system or lack o f system in assessing personal property is, the m ost shocking story o f assessm ent in the county is fo u n d in the com parison o f assessm ent on real estate. N o te here that I say "com parison." G ranted that the percentage o f actual value that the asses sors base their valuations on is low. A ctually, no injustice w ould result as long as any, even a ridiculous, system o f valuations were applied uniform ly to the zone or district. To prove this we have only to realize that five per cent o f $1,000 and one per cent o f $5,000 produce identical re turns. B ut y o u w ill find that there is no consistency in this low valuation. W hen yo u find a fishing shack in perhaps Tangier or D o ver or a poor cottage on the N ew R oad, Preston, paying nearly as m uch taxes as a hom e in m ore prosperous parts o f the county which the ow ner w on’t sell fo r less than $8,000, then there is som ething drastically wrong. A SSESSORS’ C O M P E T IT IO N
F or years a com petition has existed am ong various district assessors. T he object o f the com petition seem s to be to keep the assessment as low as possible and below their neigh 1 “Problems o f Assessment in Nova Scotia,” M u n icip a l A ffa irs (Janu ary, 1945), 1. •A s published in M u n icip a l A ffa irs (Novem ber, 1947), 3.
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bouring districts. Perhaps this m ay be term ed a fo rm o f "district patriotism .” E very assessor know s that the tax rate o f the m unicipality depends on tw o factors, (1) the am ount o f expenditures and (2) the total assessment. By keeping his assessment low he gives his friends and neighbours a “break” and thereby assures them indirectly that they will be paying less than their neighbours in the adjoining district. The great trouble through the years is that other asses sors catch on and begin to play the sam e gam e. I f it con tinues, assessm ent chaos will be the result. Perhaps this is a good way to w in a popularity contest or an election, but it results in a very unjust system o f taxation. This is especially unfair in the district where the councillor has taken the trouble to appoint a conscientious and com petent assessor. U nder the present set-up any councillor who appoints a good m an is penalizing the rate-payers o f his particular district. A RM CH A IR ASSESSOR
T hen you have all heard about the assessor w ho assesses property in a com fortable chair in his parlour, w ith a drink on the table, a cigar in one hand, and a copy o f last year’s assessm ent roll in the other while his w ife copies the new assessm ent roll fro m the old. This m ay be a speedy system o f assessm ent but I question the efficiency and the justice o f such m ethods. In the survey which I have just com pleted, I assessed fo r purposes o f this report dwellings in sixteen com m unities, and have talked to hundreds o f other rate-payers in other com m unities o f the county. O ver eighty per cent o f this cross-section o f the county told m e that assessors never even cam e in their houses. In som e cases they never even came around to exam ine the house fro m the outside. A ssessing properties to people w ho do not ow n them , or missing them altogether, is also costing the county m oney. Because o f this it has been possible fo r widows to be as sessed property which they do not own, and fo r property to obtain com plete exem ption. Last July a cottage rate-payer in one o f the districts called m e and pointed out that his “neighbour cam pers” within a stone’s throw fro m h im had n o t been assessed fo r years, and as far as he knew had never paid taxes. H e questioned the fairness o f such a system , and declared quite vehem ently that he had little respect fo r
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county governm ent if it perm itted part o f its citizens to pay the bills o f others. These stories are w ithout end, and I need not tell yo u that there is som ething wrong. M r. M cG lashen found th at the county’s assessment was ab o u t one-fifth o f actual value, and his reassessm ent jum ped the total assessment figure from $6 million to over $30 million. It is only fair to point out th at this inadequate state of assessm ent was by no m eans peculiar to N ova Scotia. I t was a system created to m eet the conditions o f an earlier day, was until very recently typical o f m unicipal governm ent in the U nited States and C anada, and still exists in some states and provinces. T h e question, then, is: H ow did such a situation develop and why did the assessment system not keep up with the times? M any reasons m ay be adduced to explain this. A t the ro o t is the system o f num erous part-tim e, untrained, and under-paid as sessors, with its resulting “com petitive under-assessm ent” from district to district w ithin a m unicipality. O ther reasons have been the use of assessment in apportioning joint m unicipal ex penditures (som ething which encourages com petitive under assessm ent between m unicipalities) and a general failure to keep up w ith rising property values. A less obvious explanation m ay be th at in all provinces the assessment system has been prescribed in detail by a provincial law, the Assessment A ct. T his has probably m eant th at even w here a m unicipal council saw that times w ere changing and th at a m ore efficient system was necessary, it did not feel responsible. Because it could not on its own initiative change the system it let the situation slide and in effect “passed the buck” to the province. M eanw hile, th e province, not being vitally concerned in the early days w ith the efficacy o f the property tax, in tu rn ignored the problem . O n top o f this, m unicipalities have confined themselves to a fairly narrow list o f activities and services. Since they have been unable to p ay the total cost o f adequate m odern social services from the property tax, and since the provinces have stepped in w ith grants and services of their own in any case, the m unici palities have taken the attitude th at they should not be held responsible for new social and educational services. T hey there fore have lost interest in revising their m ethods o f assessment in o rd er to collect effectively the taxes necessary to m eet these new needs.
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W hether the foregoing explanation of lack o f initiative is a reasonable one or not, there is certainly little doubt that the factors of tradition and inertia, found universally at the level of local governm ent, have played a part. N ew techniques o f valu ation and new adm inistrative procedures have been developed in recent years, of which m any local units have rem ained almost totally unaw are. M unicipal needs and expenditures have in creased the am ount o f taxation revenue required; yet m unicipal governm ents have not increased the efficiency o f their assess m ent and collection m ethods so that the increased costs will be distributed fairly. T he process has no doubt also w orked in a vicious circle: local units have been reluctant to increase ex penditures to m eet m odern social needs because the costs w ould be distributed unfairly. A ll of this illustrates the vital p art that the provinces m ust play in keeping the local units inform ed o f progressive develop m ents in all aspects of finance and tax adm inistration. Local units may justifiably oppose unenlightened and arbitrary central control. But there can be no doubt that they do need leadership, direction, and advice in m atters of this kind. T he crux of this argum ent, then, is that m odern m ethods o f assessment will not be adopted by the local units unless the provinces lead the way. Problem o f Equalization Besides the traditional inadequacy of m unicipally adm inis tered assessment, there are special reasons why the provinces muSt take a direct interest in assessment. O ne of these deserves fuller discussion: the need for a provincew ide equalization of assessment fo r various w ider-than-local purposes and, in par ticular, for the successful operation o f provincial equalization grants. Because of the universal failure o f the system o f untrained local assessors, provinces and states in both C anada and the U nited States have found their schemes o f equalization for county and provincial o r state purposes ineffective. F o r instance, N ova Scotia has a system o f urban-rural arbitration com m ittees to adjust inter-m unicipal assessments fo r purposes of joint expenditure within a county. C ounties in O ntario that have not appointed county assessors have county valuation boards which are expected to conduct reassessments periodically fo r the p u r pose o f inter-m unicipal equalization on a county basis. But the judgm ent of these com m ittees and boards is largely subjective, w ith no attem pt a t scientific valuation. T he trouble is th at they
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do n ot supervise the actual w ork of assessing. As D r. Brittain pointed out in his study o f the C ity and C ounty of Saint John, th ere w ould be little use in a county board conducting a scien tific reassessm ent and then expecting the part-tim e parish assessors to carry on using the reassessm ent as the base, because values are constantly changing and p ro p er scientific assess m ent is a continuing process which untrained assessors cannot m aintain.3 Som e of the western provinces at an early date developed am bitious arrangem ents for provincew ide equalization by boards o r commissions. But because o f their dependence upon local assessors for their basic inform ation, their equalization, too, was largely based on subjective judgm ent supplem ented by sam pling. T hough a considerable im provem ent, it was generally agreed to be unsatisfactory. A lthough m unicipal systems o f assessment and provisions fo r equalization on this continent have not been satisfactory, little positive action has been taken by senior governm ents until recent years. Since the Second W orld W ar a new facto r has entered the situation to give the higher levels o f governm ent a m ore direct interest in adequate m ethods of valuation: grants to m unicipalities for m any services such as education, roads, health, and w elfare. These grants are often based on a form ula w hich makes them vary, inversely with total assessment per head in a m unicipality, as a logical m easure o f fiscal need. The result has been that provinces which did not have a provincially controlled equalization schem e found that if they used such a form ula some local units kept their assessments purposely low in order to gain a larger grant. Even provinces with a schem e of provincial equalization began realizing how arbitrary and un fair th e ir equalizations m ust necessarily rem ain so long as valuations are m ade locally by untrained assessors. T h e increasing pressure o f this developm ent finally per suaded three of the p ro v in ce s-A lb erta, Saskatchew an, and M a n ito b a -th a t the solution to the problem required nothing short o f provincial responsibility for assessment. Soon after the Second W orld W ar they instituted systems o f provincially adm inistered assessment, with valuations controlled directly by the departm ents of m unicipal affairs and an attached assessment com mission for appeals. G re at Britain and the A m erican states have also been 5 H. L. Brittain, A d m in istra tive S u rvey o f th e M u n icip a lity o f th e C ity an d C o u n ty o f S a in t John (1943), 19.
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moving in this direction. U ntil 1947 Britain had a schem e of local, county, and central valuation com mittees. But w ith the introduction in th at year o f equalization grants to local units based on assessment, the governm ent decided that, in order to avoid com petitive under-valuation and to preserve uniform ity of assessment, valuation should not be left in the hands o f the local units. Instead o f the form er m achinery, valuation for rates w as henceforth to be m ade by valuation officers of the Board o f Inland Revenue, w ith rights to appeal firstly to local valuation courts, and secondly to county valuation courts specially selected by the Lord Chancellor.'1 In the U nited States, although few states have yet gone as far as assum ing com plete responsibility fo r assessment, there has been a strong trend tow ard greater state supervision of local assessment. By 1945, according to a special study of the subject by the Council of State G overnm ents, only two states, D elaw are and Pennsylvania, did not have som e state supervision o f local assessors. A lthough at that tim e the supervisory agencies in seven of the states had limited powers, those in the other thirtynine had a considerable degree o f authority. In thirty-three states they h ad a general supervisory pow er over local assess ment. T h e study also revealed the extent and nature o f detailed supervision: O ther pow ers range fro m “advising” local assessors (in thirty-six states) to instituting procedures to rem ove local assessors (in tw enty-six states). State agencies are em pow ered to call m eetings o f assessors (tw enty-five states); interpret tax laws (eight states); require reports (thirty-three states); visit local offices (twenty-five states); investigate com plaints (tw enty-seven states); issue rules and regulation? (twentyseven states); prescribe assessment fo rm s (forty-five states); enforce penalties against tax payers (thirty-tw o states); assess properties o m itted by local officers (eighteen states); order or m ake reassessments (tw enty-tw o states); order local boards o f review or equalization to convene fo r the purpose o f correcting inequities (nine states). Ohio, M aryland, A labam a, and Louisiana have regu latory agencies o f special potency. In Ohio, fo r exam ple, all taxable personal property is assessed directly by the state. The state T ax C om m ission also has wide authority with respect to real estate assessments; it m u st approve all tax exem ptions; and it has the pow er to control the personnel o f
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all county assessing offices. T he C om m ission, furtherm ore, m ay issue rules and regulations w ith respect to assessm ent principles and m ethods. F ew state agencies possess such extensive powers, and in m any states available authority is not fu lly utilized. In the m ajority o f cases, “w hat appears fro m the statutes to be supervisory pow ers are usually adm inistered as if they were advisory duties, and what is supervision in law is co-opera tion and assistance in practice." T his does not m ean, how ever, that state agencies are either im potent or inactive. The sim ple rendering o f advice can have an im portant educa tional effect. P rinted instructions fo r local assessors are used in a num ber o f states (they are required by law in M assa chusetts, M ississippi, N o rth Carolina, and V erm ont), and som e states (notably C onnecticut) distribute com prehensive manuals to localities. Visiting field supervisors are frequently used, and m any state agencies sponsor annual training classes fo r local officers. M ore p ow erful supervisory devices are also utilized. A ssessm ent fo rm s are widely prescribed. Powers to rem ove local assessors and to reassess property are not frequently used, but extensive reassessments have been carried on in at least fo u r states (Illinois, M ichigan, M innesota, and W is consin): M ichigan has pursued the m ost vigorous policy, the state agency having brought about the reassessment o f vir tually the entire state since receiving requisite pow ers in 1911. Assessing property o m itted by local officers has been m ore frequently utilized, M assachusetts, M ichigan, Iowa and K entucky, am ong other states, having added large seg m en ts o f property to the tax rolls through this process.5 T his inform ation about experience elsew here shows th at the problem of achieving uniform , equitable assessments is n ot peculiar to C anada, and th at senior levels o f governm ent else w here have taken positive action either to control o r to super vise assessment. Clearly provinces w hich have not already solved this problem m ust move in the sam e direction.* E xperi ence also shows th at the key to an adequate locally adm inistered * “British Local Governm ent Bill,” M u n icip a l A ffa irs (December, 1947), 1. 'C o u n c il of State Governments, State-L ocal R ela tio n s (1946), 36-7. * In 1966, New Brunswick’s government took over assessment com pletely, and in 1969 O ntario's government did likewise.
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system is full-time, well-trained assessors. W here little was done to assure their appointm ent and training, even elaborate schemes of state o r provincial supervision and equalization have proved unsatisfactory.
2: Improving the Tax System s o u rc e :
Revision o f a section from N o v a S co tia R ep o rt, 130-35.
T h e argum ents for a tax on property as a desirable w ay of obtaining governm ental revenue are strong. N ot the least of these is that the property tax is a valuable source of direct revenue for m unicipal governm ents. It can therefore be assum ed th at this type o f tax should not be abandoned. O n the oth er han d , the various property taxes have been widely criticized as being indiscrim inate in their incidence and only rem otely related to ability to pay. These taxes should therefore be refined and im proved so as to conform m ore closely w ith the principle of ability to pay. R esidential and Business R eal Property T h e general tax on real property does not distinguish be tw een residential and business property, though in m ost prov inces there is an additional local tax on business property. T he incidence o f the tax on residential p roperty is not difficult to determ ine. In the case o f ow ner-occupied residences it is paid w holly by the ow ner, and in the case o f rented prem ises, m ainly by the occupant. Since the value o f a residence varies roughly in proportion to the incom e o f the occupant, the tax on residential property is an approach to the principle o f ability to pay. H ow ever, it could be m ade to accord even m ore closely w ith this principle, and at the sam e tim e would be m ade m ore lucrative, if all household units were given a basic exem ption and the tax rate on the rem ainder w ere m ade mildly progressive, rath e r than proportional as it is a t present. T h e incidence o f a tax on business property, on the other hand, is very difficult to determ ine. Since it constitutes one of the costs o f operation, m ost o f it is passed on to consum ers in
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the fo rm o f higher prices. T herefore, although the tax as applied is proportional, its actual incidence upon consum ers is alm ost certain to be regressive. It m ay be even m ore regressive than a sales tax, although this is almost impossible to determ ine. M ore over, an increase in this tax in a single m unicipality w ould tend to place its businesses a t a disadvantage w here their products o r sales com pete with those o f businesses in other m unicipalities. I t therefore seems evident th at this tax should not be increased by m uch o f a m argin over either the residential tax o r the business tax in other m unicipalities. A t the sam e tim e, since the municipalities are obviously in need of the revenue which they receive from business properties, and since businesses have already adjusted their prices to take account o f the tax, it would not seem advisable to reduce it below its present level. A reduc tion o f the tax would result in a w indfall bonus to the business operators who did not pass on the reduction in the form of low er prices. It is therefore proposed th at the real-property tax be refined by fixing the tax rate upon business property at its present level in each m unicipality and by introducing a m ild progression in the rate upon residential property. T h e following is given as an exam ple o f the sort o f schem e th at m ight be used fo r residential properties, although the actual basic rates and type o f progression adopted w ould require a study o f the total value o f property in each assessment classifi cation. All residential units w ould be given a basic exem ption of $1,000. A m unicipality’s present tax-rate w ould then be used as the basic rate fo r the first year (b u t it w ould apply only to the portion o f the assessed value exceeding $1,0 0 0 ). T his w ould be levied upon the taxable assessm ent o f all residential properties. Properties would then pay an additional five p er cent o f the basic rate for each $1,000 by w hich the taxable value exceeded $2,000. In other w ords, properties whose taxable value w as over $2,000 but under $3,000 w ould pay the basic rate plus an additional five per cent for th e am ount over $2,000; properties whose taxable value was over $3,000 but under $4,000 w ould pay the basic rate plus five p er cent fo r the am ount over $2,000 plus an additional five per cent for the am ount over $3,000; and so on. A fter the first year the basic rate in a m unicipality w ould be struck in m uch th e sam e m anner as the tax rate is now struck, except th at the estim ate o f revenue w ould take into account the application o f the progression. T he only added adm inistrative burden w ould be th at o f calculating the total taxable value of
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properties in each $1,000 assessment classification. T he effect of applying such a progression w ould be lo reduce the tax below its present level fo r all residential properties w hose taxable value is un d er a certain figure (e.g. $8,0 0 0 ), and to increase it fo r all those above th at figure, th e am ount o f th e reduction o r increase varying directly w ith the taxable value. Personal Property A few provinces still have a tax on personal property (m oveables). L ike the tax on real p roperty (land and fixed im provem ents), it does not distinguish between property used fo r business and for residential purposes. T h at p art of the personal-property tax w hich is applied to business stock and equipm ent is subject to the sam e criticisms as the tax on busi ness realty, w hile the tax on household equipm ent should per haps be m ade progressive in the sam e m anner as suggested for residential realty. In m any cases the assessm ent o f personal property is arbi trarily fixed a t a specified uniform percentage (e.g. tw enty per cen t) o f the real property assessment. T he difficulties o f assess ing personal property have usually resulted in an inform al use o f such a fixed percentage. W here this is the case, the only result o f elim inating the tax on personal p roperty would be to low er th e assessment figure and to raise the real property tax rate. T h e total tax on a property would rem ain the same. H ow ever, the percentages frequently differ fo r business and household property. F o r exam ple, in a particular m unicipality the assess m en t of business stock and equipm ent may be fixed at forty per cent of the assessed value o f a property, w hile fo r household property it m ay be fixed a t tw enty per cent. W here the per centage assigned to business stock and equipm ent is higher than th at assigned to household property, the elim ination o f the personal-property tax w ould o f course decrease the burden upon business. Since the difficulty o f assessing the actual value of personal property has resulted in th e use of these fixed percentages of real-property assessment, th ere seems to be little point in having a tax on personal property separate from the real-property tax. In fact, m ost provinces have already abandoned the personalproperty tax, and have usually substituted for it a tax on busi ness which, like the personal-property tax, is often levied on an additional fixed percentage o f the real-property assessment. In effect this has am ounted to abandoning only th at portion o f the
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personal-property tax w hich fell on household and other per sonal belongings, and shifting p a rt o f it to business. R eduction o f E xem ptions M ost provincial governm ents already require provincially ow ned com m ercial corporations to p ay m unicipal taxes on their property. In the case o f provincial properties used fo r the ordinary purposes of governm ent, how ever, the justification for paying m unicipal taxes on them is not so clear. N o t only is their purpose, like th at o f com m ercial properties, to add w ealth and em ploym ent to the area in w hich they are situated, but also it is to provide basic services for the citizens. Nevertheless, a m u nicipality m ust supply services to these properties, and the costs o f m unicipal governm ent are also increased because o f the added frontage, w hich involves longer streets, sidewalks, sewers, etc. M unicipalities in w hich there is a centrally situated and heavy concentration o f provincial o r federal p ro p e rty -a s in a capital city, o r in a defence p o rt like H a lifa x -a re therefore placed at a serious financial disadvantage. In recent years the federal governm ent and m ost o f the provinces have recognized their responsibility in this respect by m aking full paym ents in lieu o f m unicipal taxes on m ost gov ernm ent properties. Som e exem ptions still rem ain, however, and the m unicipalities m ost concerned still com plain th at in some cases the paym ents are based on low valuations set by the higher levels o f governm ent. In such cases o f disagreem ent, there should be provision fo r subm itting the valuation to an independent board o f arbitration fo r decision. T h e exem ption o f charitable, religious, educational, and recreational properties from taxation in reality am ounts to an indirect subsidy to the organizations w hich ow n them . A nd the exem ption becomes increasingly m ore valuable as the costs of m unicipal governm ent, and hence th e tax rate rise. A ll such tax-exem ptions should be carefully reviewed, and reduced o r elim inated w herever possible. Also, the m unicipalities and the provincial departm ents o f m unicipal affairs should publish figures in th eir annual reports show ing the values o f the indirect subsidies granted through exem ption, so th at governm ents and the public m ay be m ade aw are o f the contribution m unicipali ties are m aking in this respect.
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Use o f O ther Taxes T h e poll tax, w hich is usually a flat tax o f a certain sum on all m ale or adult residents of a m unicipality, was widely used in C anada and the U nited States until recent years. I t m ay be justified by saying that, since everyone benefits from m unicipal services, everyone who earns an incom e should be asked to contribute to their support. U sually, how ever, the poll tax takes no account o f w hether o r not a person is earning an income. Before it w as abolished in N ova Scotia in 1951, fo r instance, it applied to all adult m ales of a specified age.1 T h e trad i tional poll tax therefore does not conform w ith the principle o f ability to pay. A dm inistratively, m oreover, it is a very diffi cult type o f tax to collect. In m odern society, w ith w orkers m oving frequently from place to place, residence is very diffi cult to establish. Even if this tax is abolished, and the property tax rate is raised to com pensate for the loss of revenue, form er poll-tax-payers will still contribute indirectly to their m unici pality in o th er ways. T he increase in the property tax will be passed on to them in the form of higher rents, and they will still pay federal and provincial taxes, shares o f which are returned to the m unicipality in the form of grants fo r services. O ne o f the m ost convincing argum ents in favour o f a poll tax is that, since it is a direct paym ent to m unicipalities, it gives poll-tax-payers a greater interest in m unicipal governm ent, and in p articular a m ore responsible interest in careful m unicipal financing. H ow ever, since the traditional poll tax is a fixed am ount, poll-tax-payers are not held responsible for year-toy ear increases in expenditures, as are rate-payers. If not abolished, the poll tax should a t least be m ade to com prom ise with the principle o f ability to pay. T o achieve this, the tax would have to be extended in all cases to include women, and should be applied only to persons w ith an incom e above a specified am ount. It should also be m ade to increase from year to year roughly in proportion with the tax rate. If this were done, the poll tax could be revived as a reasonably equitable source of new incom e for m unicipalities. T w o local taxes widely used in other countries to supplem ent m unicipal revenues are the sales tax and the am usem ent tax. T he sales tax, however, is highly regressive unless necessities are exem pted, w hich makes it hard to adm inister. Also, local col lection is adm inistratively satisfactory only if the tax covers the 1 In Halifax, women, if gainfully employed, were also included.
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w hole o f a m etropolitan area. O therw ise, residents shop across boundaries to escape the tax. T he am usem ent tax, on the other hand, is not as regressive and is well suited for collection by m unicipalities. A lthough the revenue from such a tax w ould not be large, taxes w hich are adm inistratively suitable fo r local collection are few. A ny new source of revenue such as this, w hich w ould m ake m unicipalities less dependent upon provin cial governm ents, should be carefully investigated by local governm ents and, if found adm inistratively m anageable, urged upon provincial governm ents.
3: Revamp the Business Tax in Ontario : Presentation at a panel discussion, Annual Conference of the Canadian Tax Foundation, Novem ber 16, 1960; revision of R ep o rt o f Proceedings, 1960 (T oronto, 1961), 239-40. By permission. s o u r c e
W hen O ntario’s m unicipal business tax was first im posed in 1904 the intention w as to substitute this tax fo r the personalproperty tax w hich previously had been levied on ow ners of residential and business property alike. T he business tax is levied upon a certain additional percentage of the assessed value o f a business property. T his percentage varies greatly according to the type of business. T hus a business will pay a tax on the assessed value of its real property plus a business tax on an additional ten p er cent to one hundred and fifty p er cent of the value. H otels pay on an additional twenty-five per cent, small stores on twenty-five to thirty-five per cent, departm ent stores on fifty per cent, chain stores and wholesalers on seventy-five p er cent, brewers on seventy-five p er cent, and so on. T he graduated percentages were intended to represent roughly the differing values o f the personal property (stock, and m oveable equipm ent) of different types o f business in relation to the value of the real property. But the particular percentages de cided upon were no doubt also intended to take account of presum ed difference in ability to pay. T h at they also included an elem ent o f judgem ent regarding the social value o f a business is indicated by the high percentage rate established for liquor m anufacturers (one hundred and fifty per ce n t). M any of the argum ents for and against the business tax also apply to the real-property ta x - f o r example, the inequities in
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herent in the m ethods of assessm ent and the difficulty o f relating the tax to ability to pay. O n behalf of these taxes it can be said th a t local m unicipalities are able to adm inister and to collect them easily. Both taxes are revenue sources th at belong to the m unicipalities exclusively and therefore help m unicipalities to retain their autonom y. O n balance therefore, despite w hat Dr. C lark 1 and M r. F innis- say, I think that there is no m ore justifi cation for abolishing the business tax than there is for abolishing the real-property tax. T h e real question, then, is not w hether the business tax should be abolished but w hether the percentages applied to different types o f business should be changed. T he difficulty is, o n w h at principles w ould the change be based? It is tru e that the criteria behind the present proportions are not very logical, b ut any alterations would have to be m ade arbitrarily unless we can clearly define w hat the percentages are intended to m easure. T h e first step, therefore, is to m ake up ou r m inds on this point. U ntil we do that the question cannot be answ ered definitely. It has been pointed out th at business as a whole is n ot too disturbed about the O ntario business tax, o r even the relative percentages, so perhaps there is not m uch urgency for revision. But if there is to be a revision, the sim plest and m ost easily justified would be to establish a uniform , flat percentage for all types of business. If the revision is to be m ore com plex than this, then certainly a com mission along the lines suggested by M r. J. P. C oom be3 should be appointed to draw up logical, justifiable criteria for establishing the various percentages. The justice o f altering any particular percentage o r o f elim inating the tax m ust be clearly established before any move is m ade; otherw ise the w hole question should be left alone. I t was stated by M r. Finnis, and others have said the same, th a t the business tax is passed on to the consum er. Econom ists do n ot agree on this point and m any em phasize that, in an econom y of im perfect com petition such as ours, it is impossible to establish how m uch is actually passed on.4 It is also said to be a regressive tax, but keep in m ind that alternative taxes such as the property tax or the retail-sales tax are probably ju st as regressive. W hat w ould happen if the tax w ere rem oved? If no alter native taxes w ere levied, it w ould sim ply be passed on the the real-property tax-payer (including the form er business tax payer) in the form of higher property taxes to m ake up fo r the loss in revenue from the business tax. M oreover, price levels over the years have adjusted themselves to the business tax and
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therefore its sudden rem oval w ould sim ply provide a w indfall to businesses w ithout m uch chance o f the full benefit being passed on to the consum er. W hat alternative taxes could be levied? Possibly a sales tax o r an increased tax on personal or co rp o rate incom e. T he provinces could collect additional taxes fro m these sources and hand over p art to the m unicipalities. But the effect would be to rob m unicipal governm ent o f a source o f local revenue and hence of independent pow er. In short, local governm ent w ould be weakened. I t is true th at the business tax is n o t based on a sound m easure o f ability to pay but this is also true of the property tax itself. N either can be m ade progressive like the incom e tax o r otherw ise based on m ore ability to pay w ithout com plicating th eir adm inistration. H ow ever, even added together they rep re sent a very small p art o f o u r total taxes and therefore cannot be said to create an undue burden on the tax-payer. In conclusion, then, the business tax should not be rem oved. In o u r m odern, com plex econom y, diverse types of taxes are needed so th at he w ho escapes one will be caught by another. T h e business tax accords well w ith w hat politicians rightly regard as one o f the basic principles of taxation: it picks a lot of feathers w ith surprisingly few squawks! It is convenient, easily adm inistered, adds to the lim ited num ber o f taxes upon w hich o u r m unicipalities rely, and supports the im portant principle o f local autonom y. Social change often results in unanticipated, undesirable consequences and so, before any change is m ade, the injustice calling fo r it should be crystal-clear. In this case the in justice is n ot clear. T herefore, the system should be left undisturbed except perhaps for a rationalizing o f the assessm ent percentages u p o n w hich the tax is based.
1R. M. Clark, T h e M u n icip a l B usiness T a x in C anada (T oronto, 1952), 44-50. 3 R e p o rt o f Proceedings, 1960, 232. 3 Ib id ., 238. * See, for example, P. E. Taylor, T h e E co n o m ics o f P ublic F inance (N ew Y ork, 1953), 276-81.
PART THREE: PROVINCIAL-MUNICIPAL RELATIONS
1: Trends and Problems s o u r c e
:
Revision o f sections from N o v a Scotia R ep o rt, xi, 8-25.
In recent years there has been considerable w orry ab o u t the trend tow ard centralization and the consequent sapping o f local autonom y. Several services have been taken over directly by the provincial governm ents-highw ays, bridges, and liquor control, for exam ple. O thers are in the process of being taken over, o r their assum ption is being c o n sid e re d -fo r example, assessment, snow rem oval on m ain roads, and the adm inistration o f justice. T he greatest change in higher-level participation, how ever, has occurred precisely in the three fields w here m uni cipalities spend m ost of their m oney: education, health, and w elfare. T hese subjects have becom e so im portant in recent years that not only the provinces b ut also the federal governm ent have taken on new activities connected with them. It is therefore im portant for us to exam ine m ore fully the causes and nature o f this centralization. T h e basic centralizing force has been industrialization. P articularly since the Second W orld W ar, the growth o f largescale business and industry, the consequent crow ding o f people into cities and towns, and the greatly im proved m ethods of travel and com m unication have caused the social and econom ic p atterns o f the whole country to becom e closely knit and highly interdependent. W hat, then, have been the effects o f this revo lutionary developm ent upon inter-governm ental relations? T he E ffects o f Industrialization O ne effect has been stronger feelings of provincial and national unity. M any services which w ere once m ainly of local c o n c ern -su ch as roads, education, and w e lfa re -a re regarded as having a province-w ide o r nation-wide aspect. T hus the feeling has grown th at there should be a provincial o r even a national uniform standard for social and educational services. M oreover, im provem ents in travel and com m unication have
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m ade adm inistration by the higher levels o f governm ent quite possible, while the specialization o f knowledge, equipm ent, and personnel has for m any services m ade it seem desirable. Industrialization has also increased econom ic disparities, n ot only am ong individuals but also am ong com m unities. As a result, school sections and m unicipalities have becom e ex trem ely unequal in w ealth. In m any, the local tax-payers are in no position to bear the costs of the trem endously increased services th at are expected of m odern governm ent, especially since the need fo r services is usually greatest in the poorest com m unities. Because industrialization has created an econom y of w orkers d ependent upon insecure wage-jobs, the need for state socialsecurity schemes and social services of all kinds has grown trem endously. A t the sam e tim e, the rising standard o f living m eans th at citizens can now better afford such services. Local governm ents, however, have failed to im prove their social services in keeping w ith m odern standards and w ith public dem and. T his explains why the higher levels o f governm ent have had to step in w ith aid to education and public housing, and have developed their own program m es for health and welfare. T h e higher levels have been in a position to do so through another effect o f industrialization. T he form s o f w ealth have shifted fro m ,la n d and fixed im provem ents to m oveable and intangible w ealth, such as vehicles, bonds, and wage-incomes. H ence new form s of taxation have had to be developed: gaso line, m otor-vehicle, liquor, and sales taxes; succession duties, and personal and corporate incom e taxes. These can be m uch m ore easily and equitably collected by the higher levels of governm ent. T here has been an accom panying shift in the public’s attitude tow ard favouring these taxes as a m ethod of paying fo r public serv ices-particularly tow ard progressive in com e taxes w hich represent paym ent according to ability to pay. T h e traditional form o f m unicipal revenue, the property tax, is proportional rath er than progressive and not necessarily related to income. A t the sam e tim e, the unprecedented pros perity throughout the w ar and post-w ar years has added trem endously to the lucrativeness o f these higher-level form s of taxation. T h e im portance o f this shift o f taxation revenue to the higher levels can hardly be overestim ated. B ank o f C anada figures show th at in 1930 the m unicipal share o f total govern m ent revenues was alm ost forty percent. By 1948, it had dropped
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to twelve percent. Similarly, the m unicipal share o f provincialm unicipal revenues dropped, from nearly tw o-thirds o f the total in 1930 to considerably less than half in 1948.1 T he m unicipal share o f total expenditures shows a parallel decline. T his long-term decline in the relative im portance o f m unicipal finance m eans that, since the Second W orld W ar, local govern m ent has controlled a m uch sm aller share of total public ser vices than in form er years. The M ain Problem T he m ain problem o f provincial-m unicipal relations, created by the effects o f industrialization, then, is this: now that the provinces are in a financial position superior to th at o f the m unicipalities, how can they im prove provincial and m unicipal services w ithout at the sam e time w eakening local participation and control? T here is a variety o f alternatives to consider, for a province could: (a) develop new services itself; (b ) assume the cost and adm inistration of existing m unicipal services; (c) give new tax-sources to the m unicipalities, o r im prove the lucrativeness o f existing taxes; (d) m ake grants to the munic ip alitie s-e ith e r specific o r general grants, or a com bination of both. In deciding which of these m ethods to stress, the declining relative im portance o f m unicipally-controlled services clearly indicates that one o f the determ ining factors should be the m ethod’s effect on the strength of local governm ent. M unicipal governm ent is a particularly effective agency for ensuring th at governm ental action is responsive to local needs and desires and m ade subject to the control o f the citizens. It is therefore, in a society which aspires to dem ocracy, a desirable thing in itself. But local governm ent cannot be strong and effective unless it is m ade directly responsible for adm inistering a significant proportion of all governm ental services. T h e basic question then, is: H ow can provincial-m unicipal relations be rearranged and how can local governm ent be reorganized, so th at m unicipalities will be able to supply a significant proportion of governm ental services w ith reasonable efficiency?
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2: The Equalization of Grants s o u r c e
:
Revision o f sections from N o v a Scotia R ep o rt, 59-61, 123-5.
In the past few years, the provinces have reluctantly recog nized th at their local governm ents need massive financial assistance. T hey have given such assistance in several w a y sby increasing grants to local authorities, especially fo r educa tion and w elfare; by developing provincial services th at reduce the cost o f sim ilar m unicipal services; by assum ing services which form erly the local units carried; and by setting up loan funds for m unicipal capital expenditures. T his selective type of assistance has perm itted a gradual adjustm ent through m eeting those needs which have been m ost pressing at a particular tim e. H ow ever, it has not taken account of m unicipal circum stances as a whole, nor has it m et properly the needs of individual local units. T here are really two quite different types o f need which m ust be m et. O ne is th at created by differences betw een m uni cipalities, both in the ease w ith w hich they can raise m oney fo r m unicipal purposes and in their requirem ents for expen diture per head of population. T hese differences in circum stances require that some m unicipalities should be helped m ore than others. T he other type o f need is that w hich has resulted from local dependence upon a tax whose revenue-raising ability has n o t grown in proportion to the grow th in the dem and for education and social services. In the past the provinces have concerned themselves prim arily w ith easing this general burden through a selective type o f assistance for specific purposes. It is true th at in recent years the provinces’ assum ption of responsibility for certain health and w elfare services, and their grants fo r education, have had som e equalizing effect through giving greater aid to those m unicipalities whose need is greater. But this aid, based upon existing local expenditures o r facil ities, has not been thorough-going o r scientific in its equaliza tion. A nd it has done little to equalize the expenditures of municipalities so far as other m unicipally-supported services are concerned. O ne m ethod o f taking account o f both revenue-raising ability and expenditure requirem ents is a schem e o f provincial 1The figures for the provinces and municipalities include grants for general, but not for specific, purposes from higher levels of govern ment.
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aid for specific services in which a province requires a uniform m inim um tax rate in all m unicipalities as the local share o f the cost o f a specified service, and then pays enough provincial aid to bring the service up to a specified m inim um standard in all m unicipalities. T he aid is paid on the basis of some specific indicator o f need such as the num ber of pupils, patients, etc. H ow ever, since existing assessment has to be used as a basis fo r the specified tax rate, the burden upon m unicipalities is n ot uniform if there are variations from one local u n it to an o th er in standards of assessment. Also, fo r some services it is difficult to choose a satisfactory indicator o f expenditure requirem ents. T he m ain argum ent against granting provincial aid on this basis is th at a com plex system o f provincial grants fo r specific services grows up, requiring detailed supervision o f m unicipal services and expenditures by provincial departm ents, and leav ing unaided services to languish at the m unicipal level. O n the o th er hand, a straight general-purpose, per capita grant, or a general percentage-of-expenditure grant, as a substitute fo r specific conditional grants would not take sufficient account of the variations in financial circum stances from one municipality to another; in som e m unicipalities the tax burden fo r the support o f m unicipal services still would rem ain m uch greater than average. In order to equalize the financial position of m unicipalities, then, the ideal solution w ould be to equalize educational and general-purpose grants according to the actual b urden of m unicipal taxation upon the citizens in each m uni cipality. If aid w ere granted to m unicipalities according to general ized indicators o f revenue-raising ability and expenditure requirem ents, detailed supervision w ould not be necessary, and the m unicipalities w ould be left free to decide how the money should be spent. This w ould place m unicipal bodies in a m ore autonom ous position, and w ould save the provinces a good deal of adm inistrative w ork. T he argum ent that m unicipalities could not be trusted to m aintain a high level of social and educational services has been overw orked, and has arisen mainly because m unicipalities have not been in a financial o r adm inis trative position to do so. Nevertheless, a province could justifi ably expect to require a generalized approval of aided m unicipal expenditures in return for the provincial grant. T he difficulty with this proposal is to find a m ethod of m easuring the local tax bur'den. It is popularly believed that the average tax per head o r per rate-payer in a m unicipality gives
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such a m easure. H ow ever, if the tax-per-head is high in a m unicipality, one cannot necessarily say that the burden is great. A ctually, the tax-per-head m ay be high precisely because the com m unity is w ealthy and can afford better services, rath er than because its expenditure requirem ents are high. F o r ex am ple, the higher tax-per-head in urban m unicipalities is largely due to the fact that urban citizens are supplied with m ore and b etter services. O n the other hand, the tax-per-head may equally well be high because the need for expenditure is great. F or instance, one m unicipality, com pared with another of the same population, may have far m ore old people o r children of school age fo r whom it m u st supply services, even though its revenueraising ability m ay be the same. In other words, there is no direct correlation between the need for social services and the ability to pay for them . In fact the correlation is usually inverse, because factors that cause low revenue-raising ability also cause high expenditure requirem ents. It is clear, then, that in order to com pare the tax-burden in m unicipalities for the purposes o f provincial equalization, w hat is needed is two in d e x es-o n e of their relative abilities to collect taxes and one o f their relative expenditure requirem ents. F or the first, ideally, taxable assessment relative to population would give this com parison. T he valuation of property is the only m easure conveniently available of the relative wealth of m uni cipalities. Since the property tax is the chief source of m unicipal revenue, it is reasonable to use relative assessment as an index of a unit’s relative ability to raise revenues from its own resources. T his type o f index, however, requires a reasonably uniform standard of assessment throughout a province. F o r the educational and social (including health) services, a generalized index o f expenditure requirem ents would be the relative proportions o f children and old people (say, under the age o f sixteen and over the age o f sixty) in m unicipalities, since m ost expenditure on such services is for people in these age groups. Also, a higher-than-average percentage of people in these groups means th at a com m unity has a sm aller productive population; and consequently, other things being equal, that it will be less able to finance such services. A nother factor which should be taken into consideration in determ ining expenditure needs is the density of population. A lthough this is true for all social services, it is especially true for education, since in sparsely populated areas a relatively higher num ber o f less economical schools will be required p er hundred pupils, o r extra expenditures will be necessary fo r transportation.
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It is therefore proposed th at provincial aid for educational and social services should be allocated to m unicipalities o n the basis of a form ula w hich takes account o f relative tax-paying ability through a com parative index of taxable assessment per head o f population, and w hich takes account o f expenditurerequirem ents through a population index w eighted by age and density factors. T he proposed form ula is substantially the sam e as the one used in Britain as the basis for grants since 1929 and fo r the revised grant system introduced in 1948. It w as m ainly so as to enable this sort o f equalization form ula to be used successfully that local valuation was taken over in 1948 by the B oard of Inland Revenue.1 A s can be seen, the proposal implies th at grants for educa tion should be m ade to m unicipalities rather than to school boards. This m eans that m unicipal councils w ould have some control over school-board budgets. P referably, the councils should be m ade directly responsible fo r adm inistering education, as in Britain. E ither arrangem ent w ould have the advantage of increasing their strength and also their im portance in the public eye. T he proposed form ula would provide a basis for equalization th at could be applied to both urban and rural m unicipalities in so far as educational and social services are concerned. H ow ever, u rb an units spend money fo r m any services w hich are not required in rural m unicipalities and w hich are not as clearly related to indexes of social need. T he burden o f expenditures fo r these services varies am ong urban units and should also be equalized. Provincial aid to date, how ever, has not taken m uch account o f these needs. T he provinces should therefore m ake additional general grants to the urban m unicipalities, and these grants should be m ade op an equalized basis, varying inversely w ith assessment-per-head. T he Form ula Explained T h e form ula fo r equalizing local expenditures on the educa tional and social services could be determ ined as follows. W hile the tax resources taken into consideration w ould be only those of th e m unicipalities, the m easure of expenditure requirem ents w ould include provincial aid. F o r example, the first index would indicate that, o f the total am ount that all m unicipalities taken together can raise from their own resources for expenditure on the educational and social services, u n it A should be able to raise Y dollars; the second would indicate that o f th e total
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am ount to be expended on these services by local authorities (local plus provincial contributions) unit A requires X dollars. Since the second index would include provincial aid, it would be higher than the first. T he difference between the two (X m inus Y ) will give the am ount o f provincial aid on the equaliized services that unit A should receive. T h e actual indexes, then, could be derived as follows: 1. T he am ount that any m unicipality should be able to raise (called, for purposes o f exposition, the Y index) w ould be obtained by m ultiplying the total expenditures o f all m uni cipalities fro m their own resources on the educational and social services by the particular m unicipality's taxable assess m en t divided by the total taxable assessment o f all m unici palities. W hat this am ounts to in effect is calculating how m uch would be raised in a particular m unicipality if a uniform tax-rate were applied to all municipalities. 2. The need fo r expenditures in any unit (the X index) w ould be obtained by m ultiplying the total expenditures by all municipalities (m unicipal expenditures plus present pro vincial grants) by the m unicipality’s w eighted population divided by the total population o f the province. The weighted population o f the local unit w ould be determ ined by the age and density factors, a higher than average ■ density giving a greater weighted population fo r purposes o f the grant. T h e am ount of a local unit’s grant would be the second minus the first. In this case, the am ount taken as w hat all m unicipalities can raise from their own resources has been their present total expenditures on the educational and social services. If it were felt that m unicipalities in general should contribute m ore tow ard the cost of these services, a figure greater than this could be used. But this procedure might, because of local opposition, prevent the equalization system from being successfully intro duced. If the raising of local expenditures is to be encouraged, it should be done through a m ethod which would provide for increased provincial aid to accom pany higher local expen ditures. 1 See “Britain Reorganizes Local Governm ent,” P ublic A ffa irs (D e cember, 1947), 52; also H. Bowen, E nglish G rants-in-A id (1939), 35-6.
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A pplication o f the Form ula T he application o f this form ula w ould very likely result in th e m ost prosperous m unicipalities receiving less th an they do at the present tim e. A lthough this effect would be perfectly justifiable in term s o f their ability to pay fo r additional services fro m their own resources, the suddenness o f its im pact (if the schem e w ere introduced in a single y ear) w ould be too great. T o surm ount this problem the technique developed in New Y o rk State could be used: a gradual system o f tapering over a five-year period, so th at no m unicipality w ould lose m ore in any one year than ten percent o f its existing grant.2 A lthough this still m ight leave up to fifty percent of the decrease to be applied after the five-year period, in the interval a m uni cipality should be able to m ake the necessary preparations. T h ere is good reason also to tap er the increases to units benefitting from equalization: since tim e is required to build up services, they m ight find it impossible to spend the addi tional m oney wisely. T herefore, the equalization grant to these units should increase each year by not m ore than about tw enty percent o f existing grants. Quite properly, through the assessment and populationdensity factors, the proposed form ula w ould favour the rural units, fo r it is clear th at because of the relative scarcity of population and their generally low er assessm ent per head of population, they need m ore assistance than do the tow ns and cities. W hether the form ula would change very greatly the existing rural-urban distribution o f grants is difficult to say. I t is clear th at the assessm ent factor, based on a revised and equalized assessment, w ould give a good indication o f the revenue-raising ability o f rural relative to urban m unicipalities. B ut since it is impossible to say how m uch weight should be given to the population-density factor, one cannot determ ine w hether the present o r any future rural-urban distribution of provincial grants is absolutely equitable. T aking account of assessm ent and age of population, how ever, w ould be an ap p roach to equity; and the density factor could be adjusted so as not to change too greatly the present division of grants betw een rural and urban units.
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3: Provincial Supervision and Leadership so urce:
Revision o f a section from N o v a S co tia R ep o rt, 145-6.
U ntil recent years the supervisory functions o f provincial departm ents o f m unicipal affairs have been m ainly financial. T he departm ents have done extrem ely valuable w ork in im plem enting uniform accounting practices, in com piling the annual reports o f m unicipal statistics, and in im proving the financial position and credit of the m unicipalities. B ut the w atchw ords have been supervision and control rath er than service and leadership. T he departm ents could perform m any valuable services fo r the m unicipalities w ithout infringing upon local self-governm ent. T hus, they should support and arrange for the training o f present and prospective m unicipal em ploy ees, since only the largest cities can be expected to provide their own training facilities. T he departm ents should also expand their services for supplying advice and inform ation to the m unicipalities. A t present the departm ents provide such services m ainly in the field of finance. T hese should be extended to other m unicipal activities. F o r instance, the departm ents should em ploy full-tim e planning consultants, to ensure adequate local planning. These consultants w ould give advice either free of charge o r at a nom inal cost to local planning boards. Similarly, the departm ents o f education could m aintain full-tim e archi tects w ho would be responsible for developing and recom m end ing the m ost advanced plans fo r new school buildings. E ach departm ent o f m unicipal affairs should also prepare a m anual on m unicipal governm ent, w hich w ould in particular sum m arize and explain the m ost im portant m unicipal legisla tion, fo r the inform ation and guidance of m unicipal officers and councillors. T his m anual should be revised periodically in order to incorporate new m unicipal legislation and to provide infor m ation on new developments. T h ere is a growing need fo r the co-ordination o f provincial relations w ith m unicipalities, particularly in the fields o f edu cation, h ealth ’ w elfare, planning, housing, and roads. In all provinces, several provincial departm ents are involved in supervising various aspects of m unicipal affairs. T he departm ent a See New York State Commission on M unicipal Revenues and Re ductions of Real Estate Taxes, R ep o rt (1946), 19.
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o f m unicipal affairs w ould appear to be the logical agency to effect this co-ordination. Provincial governm ents w hich have n o t already done so should therefore create a co-ordinating com m ittee on m unicipal affairs, chaired by the m inister or deputy m inister o f m unicipal affairs, and com posed o f rep re sentatives from the departm ents concerned. If a schem e fo r m unicipal regions w ere adopted in a prov ince (such as th at proposed in P a rt Six), the m inister o f m unicipal affairs would becom e responsible for the difficult and heavy task o f bringing about the reorganization. T he argum ent w ould then be strong fo r the assum ption of the post of m inister o f m unicipal affairs by the p rem ier himself.
4: The Problem of Implementing Proposals : Abridgement of “Municipal Governm ent R evisited-R eports on Accomplishments and Results Since the Recent Provincial-Muni cipal Reports: Provincial-Municipal Relations in Nova Scotia,” Insti tute of Public Adm inistration of Canada P roceedings (1952), 241-49. By permission. s o u r c e
T h e study w ith which I was concerned, entitled The R eor ganization o f Provincial-M unicipal R elations in N ova Scotia, was a R eport prepared at the request o f the G overnm ent of N ova Scotia by the N ova Scotia M unicipal B ureau, D alhousie U niversity, following a Provincial-M unicipal C onference in O ctober, 1947. A t that tim e D r. L. R ichter was D irector of the Bureau, and although m uch of his thinking and philosophy guided the reasoning w hich form ed the basis for th e final proposals, the R eport itself was w ritten after D r. R ichter’s death in O ctober, 1948, and I m ust assume responsibility fo r the actual writing o f the R eport and for the proposals which it contains. T he R eport w as com pleted in D ecem ber, 1949, and released to the m unicipalities and the public in the fall of 1950. T he m ost far-reaching proposal contained in the R eport was the recom m endation th at there should be set up in N ova Scotia nine m unicipal regions including the H alifax m etropolitan region. T hese regions w ould be governed by all-purpose locallyelected regional councils, to adm inister certain services (includ
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ing public health, w elfare, education, adm inistration o f justice, and institutional care) w hich can be m ore efficiently perform ed by such regional governm ents than by the existing m unicipalities o r even by the province. A ll other local services w ould rem ain un d er the jurisdiction of the existing m unici palities. T his recom m endation is founded on the assum ption that local governm ent can not be strong unless it adm inisters a significant proportion of all governm ental services, and on the observation that, since m ost o f the existing m unicipalities in N ova Scotia are too sm all and financially w eak to adm inister the aforem entioned services efficiently, either as individual units o r through the existing arrangem ents fo r joint expenditure, these services are gradually being lifted out o f the hands of m unicipal authorities altogether. It is also founded on the conclusion, based on a study o f provincial-m unicipal finance, that the m unicipalities as a whole can and should pay a sub stantial share o f the cost of these services, provided the tax on property is uniform over a large area (the region) so as n ot to be too burdensom e upon the tax-payers in particular m unicipalities. T h e second m ajor proposal was that, in order to equalize fu rth er the burden on tax-payers from m unicipality to m unici pality, provincial grants should m ore clearly adhere to the criterion o f fiscal need, and, to increase the freedom o f action o f m unicipalities (and o f the proposed R egions), should be so far as possible in the form of general, o r unspecified, rath er than conditional grants. T he R eport suggests p er capita grants for the social and educational services, w ith fiscal need taken into account by varying the grant to a m unicipality (o r Region) according to its revenue-raising ability (m easured in term s of property assessment p er head) and its expenditure requirem ents (m easured in term s o f the num ber o f old and young in its p o p u latio n ). T he R eport found, how ever, th at m unicipalities were paying a sm aller share o f total provincial-m unicipal ser vices than elsewhere in C anada and th at on a per capita basis their contribution w as fa r below th at o f m unicipalities in other provinces. It therefore concluded that m unicipalities should be expected to share the cost of the expanding social and educa tional services and th at increased aid be granted to m unici palities only if they entered a regional arrangem ent, except for a grant on an equalized basis to urb an units fo r the support of streets. T h e third basic proposal was concerned with the inadequacy and inefficiency o f the existing system for assessing property
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in N ova Scotia, especially since the p roperty tax is the founda tion o f m unicipal finance and since the success of the foregoing proposals for increasing the strength and responsibility of m unicipal governm ent w ould depend upon achieving a prov incewide equalization o f assessment as a basis for provincial grants and for local sharing of the cost o f regional services. W hile the R eport did not go so far as to recom m end centralized control of assessments, it did recom m end that the provincial governm ent create an adequate supply of full-time, trained local assessors and that, in addition, it set up supervisory m achinery at the provincial and regional levels in the form o f a provincial com mission and regional supervisors o f assessment. A ction Taken on R eport I t rem ains now to record the action taken [to Septem ber, 1962] with respect to the R eport, first by the U nion of N ova Scotia M unicipalities ( u . n . s . m . ) and then by the G overnm ent o f N ova Scotia. In lu ly of 1950 the H onourable M r. Fielding, M inister of M unicipal Affairs, presented the R eport to the Executive of the U nion o f N ova Scotia M unicipalities, w ith the request that they study it and m ake fu rth er recom m endations to the M inister. A t the annual convention o f the U nion in Septem ber, 1950, the executive reviewed the R eport briefly but, “ because it was impossible to digest it sufficiently to give a report at this tim e,”1 m ade no recom m endations other than that the incoming execu tive should deal with the m atter. T he new Executive m et with the M inister o f M unicipal Affairs in N ovem ber, 1950, and again in February, 1951, and in order to obtain the views of the individual m unicipalities organized regional m eetings of the m ayors and w ardens under the chairm anship of the executive m em ber in each region. In the m eantim e, the D epartm ent o f M unicipal Affairs arranged for extra copies of the R eport to be printed and sent to each m ayor and w arden. T he R eport w as further discussed with the M inister of M unicipal A ffairs, his D eputy M inister and the M unicipal Com m issioner in A ugust, after the recom m endations o f the regional meetings had been received. A ccording to the Executive’s R eport to the u .n . s . m . C onvention in September, these meetings showed “forem ost th at the basis of m unicipal difficulties was lack of uniform assessment and until such was established very little progress could be m ade w ith the other m atters affecting the M unicipalities,” and th at “the suggestion
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in the R ep ort that Regional Units, which m eans another tier of governm ent, be established, was not favoured by the M unici palities, as it w as felt th at no useful purpose would be served by it, particularly if the m atter of assessment and joint expen diture w ere satisfactorily settled.”2 T he Proceedings of the Convention fu rth er recorded th at “the delegates were unani m ously in accord in not favouring the establishem ent of Regional U nits.”3 T h e Convention did, however, adopt two recom m endations of its executive relevant to the m ajor proposals contained in the R eport: 1. Assessment - T h a t the D epartm ent o f M unicipal A ffairs be requested to give leadership in the m atter o f establishing an uniform basis o f assessment, to set up a school fo r train ing assessors, and generally to assist in helping to correct the assessm ent irregularities at present existing. 2. Joint E x p e n d itu re -T hat a C om m ittee o f the Union, in co-operation with the D epartm ent o f M unicipal Affairs, stu d y the question o f joint expenditure with a view to lifting the freeze now existing [on the proportion o f the cost fo r joint services that each m unicipality should bear].* T h e first recom m endation, it will be seen, adopted the R ep o rt’s views on assessment, w hile the second assum ed that most of the existing difficulties w ith respect to joint expenditure by m unicipalities could be rem edied by adjusting the basis on which costs were shared rath er than by creating the proposed m unicipal reg io n s-a n assum ption w hich the R eport had clearly rejected. It will also be observed th at no recom m endations w ere m ade regarding the R eport’s proposals on provincial-m unicipal finance. N o r were any specific proposals m ade w ith respect to the R ep o rt’s supplem entary recom m endations. It is interesting to note, how ever, that at this sam e Convention the U nion decided to continue to hold regional meetings. T o w hat extent the R ep o rt’s em phasis on regions influenced this decision is hard to say. F o r its part, the G overnm ent of N ova Scotia adopted the 1 Union o f Nova Scotia Municipalities, P roceedings o f the F o rty-F ifth A n n u a l C o n ven tio n , 1950, 18. 3 Union o f Nova Scotia Municipalities, P roceedings o f the F orty-Sixth A n n u a l C o n ven tio n , 1951, 51. 8 Proceedings, 1951, 58. *Ibid.
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view th at it should not take action on the R eport’s basic proposals until it had received the recom m endations o f the U nion. W ith respect to the proposed m unicipal regions, the G overnm ent has taken no action to date. . . . Regarding provincial-m unicipal finance, the G overnm ent has n ot im plem ented the schem e recom m ended in th e Report fo r the equalization of provincial grants, but it does seem to have adopted w ith enthusiasm the R eport’s view th at the m unicipalities should spend m ore than they have in the past fo r the social and educational services. . . . O n the question of assessment, although no action has been taken yet with respect to the R eport’s m ajor recom m endations, the D epartm ent has arranged a training-course for m unicipal assessors sim ilar to th at given in the past for clerks and treasurers. This, then, indicates the extent to w hich the G overnm ent has so far im plem ented the three m ajor proposals in the Report. T he R eport also contained a series o f supplem entary recom m endations. T hese dealt w ith a wide range o f m atters in the fields o f m unicipal finance, organization, and adm inistration, and provincial adm inistration. Some o f these have been im plem ented in whole or p a rt by the G overnm ent___ O n the other hand, m any o f them have not. A m ong those not yet adopted are the proposals that councils in rural m unicipalities should have no m ore than twelve m em bers; rural m unicipalities should assess property and collect taxes from towns under 1,500 in population; in towns, the term o f office for mayors and coun cillors should be extended to three years and the system of staggered elections should be abolished; the G lace Bay and New Glasgow urban areas should be allowed and encouraged to set up “city-zone” councils to adm inister specified zonew ide ser vices; and th e appointm ent o f tow n m anagers should be perm itted, with appointm ents approved by a proposed local governm ent board. A dditional duties o f this board w ould be arranging for the training o f prospective m unicipal officers and approving their qualifications; m aking recom m endations to the province for the im provem ent o f the m unicipal public service, including a suitable province-w ide retirem ent plan; and approv ing m unicipal borrowing. Points fo r D iscussion I should like to conclude by raising som e points for discus sion. A n im portant question is w hy the proposal fo r m unicipal
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regions was rejected by the U nion o f N ova Scotia M unicipalities and so far has not been supported by the G overnm ent. T he only reason given by the u . n . s . m . for rejection of the proposal was that it would constitute a second tier of m unicipal govern m ent. Y et this is precisely w hat the Report, for reasons th at were clearly set forth, set out to recom m end! W as it that the reasons were inadequate and the proposal itself inappropriate? O r that it was too “radical” fo r a “traditionally traditional” province? O r was it because of the way in w hich the proposal cam e to the attention o f the m unicipalities in N ova S c o tia -th e suddenness o f its presentation, o r the fact that it was the w ork of an “outsider”? In other words, there m ay have been a disregard o f w hat M ary P arker Follett has called one o f the basic principles o f public adm inistration: “co-ordination in the early stages,” m eaning the participation o f all affected groups from the very beginning. O r perhaps the answer is, as Professor Maxwell has suggested in reviewing m y R eport,5 that for any reorganization of m unicipal governm ent so far-reaching as this, one should not expect the concurrence of the m unicipalities, and th at a higher level o f governm ent m ust take the initiative and the responsibility. A n o th er interesting question is the relative m erits of the techniques em ployed by the various provincial G overnm ents to study m unicipal problem s. F o r example, is the use of a Royal Com m ission a better device than a com m ittee on inde pendent Bureau for conducting such a study?* A nother fruitful area o f discussion might be the sim ilarities and differences in approach found in the four R eports.t I think it is tru e to say th at all four R eports rejected the “benefit” p rin cip le-p ay m en t only for direct benefits receiv ed -w ith re spect to the property tax, and held that property tax-payers are not at present relatively overburdened and should therefore BJ. A. Maxwell, “Reports on Local Governm ent,” C anadian Journal o f E co n o m ics a n d P olitical Science (August, 1951), 382. * In the case of my Report, no systematic hearings were held to collect local opinions o r to influence local views. A related moral question for the social scientist is this: How far should one go in making proposals for reform ? Is it better to recommend what one thinks is the long-term, ideal solution, o r should one “water down” pro posals to what one thinks is politically acceptable in the immediate future? t On taxation in Alberta (1948), and on provincial-municipal relations in British Columbia (1947), Nova Scotia (1949) and Saskatchewan (1950); see Bibliography under heading “Provincial-Municipal Rela tions."
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expect to share increases in the cost o f the expanding social and educational services. It is certainly true to say th a t all o f the R eports agreed in adopting the basic prem ise th at in a dem oc racy strong local governm ent is a desirable end in itself. T here w ere, however, significant differences o f view as to how local governm ent is best m ade strong. T here was some disagreem ent, for example, on how far it is possible in the m odern w orld to obtain a clear-cut division o f pow ers and responsibilities between the two levels of governm ent and to elim inate m unicipal depen dence upon provincial grants, on the stress to be placed upon general grants as opposed to conditional grants, and on the extent to w hich the principle o f equalization should be used as a criterion fo r grants. On the question of reorganizing the system o f m unicipal units, while all R eports adm itted th a t some m easure of reor ganization o r adjustm ent w as necessary, all but the R eport w ith w hich I am associated hesitated to m ake any far-reaching recom m endations other than th at a provincial body should be set up to study the subject. It w ould appear th a t in this case the N ova Scotia R eport rushed in w here angels feared to tread! Y et the inclusion in the R eport of such far-reaching proposals was dictated by the conviction th at local governm ent cannot be strong unless it is placed in a position to adm inister a signi ficant portion o f all governm ental services. N o useful purpose can be served by m aking m unicipalities free to rule th eir own dom ain if th at dom ain includes nothing of any particular significance. T his question is vital to th e future strength, effi ciency and well-being of m unicipal g o v ern m e n t-an d ultim ately to the health of d em o crac y -in this country.
PART FOUR: METROPOLITAN AREAS
1: Trends and Problems s o u r c e : Revision o f sections from O ttaw a’s F u tu re D evelo p m en t a n d N e e d s (Ottawa, 1956), 3-10, 56-7. By permission.
M etropolitan G rowth W e are all well aw are o f the long-term historical tren d to larger and larger cities. In 1871, w hen the first census after C onfederation was taken, C anada boasted only one city of over 100.000 population. In 1931, sixty years later, there were seven. By th at tim e a new phenom enon was a p p e a rin g -th e m etro politan area, w hich the census took account of for the first time in 1931 as the “greater city.” This m eant th at cities were burgeoning beyond their legal boundaries into the surrounding m unicipalities. Since then, and particularly since 1941, suburban developm ent has proceeded apace. A lthough the basing of statistics for urban areas on cities w ith relatively fixed bound aries has tended to obscure this growth, it has been estim ated th at by 1951 about one-third of the entire C anadian population was living in m etropolitan areas o f over 100,000 population and about forty-five percent of it was in urban aggregations of 40.000 o r m ore. Between 1941 and 1951 the com bined suburban p arts o f the eight largest urban areas grew by sixty-seven percent.1 In trying to m eet the problem of m etropolitan growth, O ttaw a was the first big C anadian city to succeed in bringing about large-scale annexation. It was influenced in this respect by its agreem ent w ith the proposal o f the N ational Capital P lanning C om m ittee that the core of O ttaw a’s m etropolitan area should be solidly built up from the centre outw ards to lim its provided by a so-called G reen Belt. This could best be done u nder the guidance o f a single m unicipal governm ent. A fter obtaining the approval o f the O ntario governm ent, O ttaw a in 1950 added large tracts of open land to its area through 1 These and most o f the figures in the succeeding paragraphs are from a study of urban growth and needs in Bank of Nova Scotia, M o n th ly R eview (July and M arch, 1955).
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annexation, and thus m ultiplied its total acreage by no less than five tim es (from 6,100 to 30,500 ac res). In other large m etropolitan areas, annexation failed because of the opposition of the suburban m unicipalities. A lthough the growth of m etropolitan areas has been ex trem ely rapid in the past, there is reason to believe th at the largest o f them will not grow as rapidly in future. Because of the increasing m obility of our urban population, these areas m ay be reaching a sort of “saturation point,” o r at least a point beyond which it becomes increasingly difficult for them to grow at the sam e rate expressed as a percentage of their total popu lation. A s they grow in size, the population spills over not only into the surrounding suburbs, but also increasingly into sm aller u rban and m etropolitan areas nearby. Consider the growing cluster of urban concentrations in southern O ntario. T his may now be considered one gigantic m etropolitan agglom eration, with population spilling over from the T oronto and H am ilton areas. Industry m ore and m ore appears to be locating in the smaller u rban areas, at and beyond the fringes of m etropolitan cores. T h e 1951 census showed th at in m etropolitan T oronto and M ontreal about thirty-seven percent o f the labour force was in m anufacturing, while H am ilton and W indsor had no less than fifty-two percent. T here is a sim ilar heavy and growing concen tration o f m anufacturing in the sm aller urban centres. This concentration appears geographically to cluster around cores of heavy industry, which, when developed, have a cum ulative effect in attracting other industries to the region but often not to the cities in w hich the heavy industry is situated. T he net effect will be to increase the total num ber o f m etropolitan areas. A nd this, of course, will m ean a larger num ber of urban areas having fragm ented local governm ent within them.* G rowing N eeds fo r Social Capital In addition to the trend tow ard larger and m ore m etropolitan areas, a series o f factors has com bined to produce a serious problem for these areas. T he postponem ent o f essential capital expenditures for so long during the D epression and the W a r a period extending over fifteen y e a rs-le ft a trem endous backlog o f projects to be planned and financed by the m unicipalities. In addition, there was a spectacular post-w ar rise in the birth-rate and a large increase in the num ber of old people. Since a disproportionately large share o f m unicipal social costs is for
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the young and the old, both developm ents require enorm ously increased capital and current expenditures for schools, hos pitals, homes fo r the aged, and other health and w elfare services. O n top o f this has com e a sudden and continued expansion of post-w ar im m igration, with m ost o f the new population con centrating in urban centres and contributing to a m ushroom ing o f suburbs around larger cities. E ntire new com m unities have had to be provided w ith housing and facilities in a short space o f tim e, while the existing cores of m etropolitan areas have becom e inadequate to handle the greatly increased population. Traffic congestion, for example, has becom e a serious problem , and has been greatly intensified by the trem endous increase in cars and trucks. M otor vehicle registrations m ore than doubled between 1945 and 1955 and sent the costs for building and m aintaining streets soaring. A dded to these developm ents is the fact that a m uch higher standard o f facilities is now being called fo r than in pre-w ar d ay s-larg ely , o f course, because o f the continuing rise in real incomes of the population. A t the same tim e, the cost o f capital projects to m eet all these dem ands was swelled by the dispro portionate post-w ar rise in building costs. As a result o f these accum ulating capital dem ands, m unicipal debt showed a spec tacular rise after the war. Bank o f C anada estim ates show a post-w ar jum p in net debt from $860 million in 1946 to $2,100 m illion in 1954, an increase o f alm ost one hundred and fifty percent. Y et, in term s o f m eeting the need, this increase was far from adequate. In the field o f education, for exam ple, high birth and im m igration rates had been adding large num bers o f children, especially in O ntario. H igher fam ily incom es, the m ovem ent to u rban areas, the establishm ent o f rural high schools, and better transportation arrangem ents have enabled m ore children to attend high school. H ence, enrolm ent in secondary schools, w hich was at an ebb after the Second W orld W ar because of the low birth rates o f the 1930s, began to shoo, :ip in the 1950s. B etw een 1945 and 1955, over h alf the increase in m unicipal debt was for schools. This capital expenditure- las continued at a high level, with a shift in em phasis from creating new schools to replacing obsolete structures. Similarly, the rise in the dem and fo r hospitals has been * The Economic Council o f Canada estimated in its F ourth A n n u a l R eview (1967) th at by 1980 sixty percent o f C anada’s population will live within 29 major urban complexes having populations of more than 100,000.
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sharper than the increase in population. D uring this century the rise in the proportion o f births and deaths taking place in hospitals has been spectacular. In O ntario, between 1901 and 1949 the percentage o f births in hospitals rose from two to eighty-six, and sim ilarly the percentage for deaths, from six to thirty-nine.2 H om e care of the sick has becom e increasingly difficult under m odern urban living-conditions, new methods o f treatm ent m ake hospitalization advisable, and the develop m ent of pre-paid hospital-care plans is enabling m any m ore people to afford hospitalization. M oreover, the proportion of elderly people in the population, who require a disproportionate am ount of hospital care, has been steadily increasing. In fact, the problem o f caring fo r chronically ill, aged persons has becom e one o f the most serious in the health field. T he federal and provincial grants for hospital construction m ake up, in the case o f large, w ell-equipped hospitals, only a small portion of th e total cost, w hich m ay run as high as $20,000 a bed. U rban streets provide another exam ple of disproportionate increase in need. In m etropolitan areas traffic congestion has reached form idable proportions, and the im provem ents needed are very costly engineering undertakings. Y et the post-w ar rise in capital expenditures on streets lagged far behind that on highways and rural roads. A m ajor reason for this may be that, though m ost vehicle owners are urban, license fees and gasoline taxes, which should pay the m ajor share for the streets on which the owners drive, are collected by the provincial governm ents. In m ost cases other m etropolitan needs are also growing m ore than in proportion to p o p u la tio n -fo r parks, libraries, homes fo r the aged, sewage systems, w aterw orks, and redevelopm ent o f the urban core. T he Im plications T h e im pact of the anticipated rapid grow th of u rban services will be great. In term s of organization and personnel, it will place a heavy burden on city governm ent. Because o f the disproportionate rise in need for civic services, the num ber of civic em ployees in m any cities is likely to double in the next twenty-five years. T he problem s of developm ent and rising costs will dem and a close co-ordination of all civic activities for m axim um econom y and efficiency, and will require a reexam ination of the city governm ents’ organizational structu re and procedures to ensure their accom m odation to the requirem ents of large-scale operation. T here will also be a dem and fo r many
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m ore highly trained and expert personnel to advise city councils on how to deal w ith the m ore com plicated problem s of com plex m etropolitan areas, and for the efficient personnel procedures characteristic of large-scale organization. In term s o f finance, the capital costs o f physical develop m en t and the m ain factors affecting cu rren t civic expenditure will rise far m ore rapidly than in proportion to population. In O ttaw a, for instance, it has been estim ated that by 1980, while the total population will have increased by roughly tw o-thirds over 1951, the num bers of children and old persons will have alm ost doubled. T he implications fo r social planning are ob vious. F uture costs o f education, health, and w elfare services will increase far faster than in proportion to population and probable civic tax resources, and debt charges may be expected to rise sharply. W hat the future will hold in term s o f tax-resources is hard to predict. W ith continued prosperity, taxable assessment will no doubt increase m ore than in proportion to population. But th at it will be able to keep pace w ith the rapid rise in the factors affecting civic expenditure seems highly unlikely. Unless m ore aid from the higher levels of governm ent is m ade available, therefore, either the forecast heeds will not be m et, or property taxation will increase rapidly. T he fundam ental econom ic and social question posed by this situation is w hether it is desirable to try to m eet m ost o f the rising cost of urb an living out o f an increase in this form of taxation. If the answer is no, then because o f the overw helm ing social im portance o f m eeting the need, the federal and provincial governm ents m ust provide financial aid on an increasing scale.
2: Should Cities be Limited in Size? s o u r c e
:
Revision of a section from O ttaw a’s F u tu re D evelopm ent
a n d N eed s, 12-18. By permission.
T h ere is good reason fo r thinking th at the ultim ate popu lation of large urban areas should be lim ited by a green belt. T entative evidence from m etropolitan areas in the U nited States a O ntario H ealth Survey Committee, R ep o rt (Queen’s Printer, 1952), 57.
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and C anada indicates that civic costs per capita rise in a startling fashion after a population o f about 500,000 is reached. A m eri can figures show th at as cities increase above 250,000 towards 500,000, the average increase in per-capita cost of governm ent is 3.1 percent, but as they go beyond 500,000 to 1,000,000 the average increase is no less than fifty-one p ercent. Sim ilar figures fo r O ntario indicate that as population increases from 35,000 to 55,000 per-capita costs increase by fo u r percent; from 95,000 to 225,000, by tw enty percent; and T oronto, w ith a population o f about 670,000, has a per-capita cost o f govern m ent tw enty percent higher than that o f the next largest city.1 T h e small num ber o f very large cities, especially in Canada, and the probability that the standard and quality of civic services is som ew hat higher in these cities, of course m eans that the evidence is not conclusive. Y et an analysis o f the situation and of the recent experience o f rapidly growing cities like O ttaw a, strongly support this evidence. In the early stages o f a city’s grow th there is probably a decline in per-capita costs o f governm ent because initial sewer and w ater systems are usually designed to take care of antici pated future dem and. H ence when grow th occurs the per-capita cost o f operation goes down. But beyond this p o in t costs m ultiply. Sewage systems are forced into less desirable areas. T o guard against stream -pollution, secondary treatm ent be com es imperative. T he capacity o f the w ater-treatm ent plant m ust be increased, and w ater reservoirs m ust be built to m aintain adequate pressure. Since the area available as one approaches the urb an centre shrinks in geom etric progression, every extension o f the fringe is reflected in greatly intensified traffic and dem and for parking in the centre. Traffic congestion m ultiplies passenger-mile costs o f th e transit system, and expen sive road, bridge, and railway redevelopm ent is required. In a city like O ttaw a this is particularly expensive because o f the traffic barriers created by th e old railway lines superim posed over a netw ork o f natural w ater courses, w hich have divided the city into nine separate “islands.” A m erican experience seems to show th a t the provision o f rapid-access roads to the centre is com pletely self-defeating. I t only hastens the grow th of popu lation at the fringe, and encourages an increase in autom obile traffic. F o r the great m ajority o f m etropolitan dwellers, m uch o f the increased leisure tim e resulting from shorter w orking hours is being consum ed in a lengthened journey to w ork. A s cities increase in size, m oreover, there is a far m ore than proportional increase in costs o f social w elfare and protection.
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T h ere appears to be a qualitative difference in the social organi zation of large cities which results in m ore crim e, delinquency, and m ental illness. Finally, unlim ited urban growth creates com plexity of organization, and this in turn m ultiplies adm inis tration problem s, headaches, and costs. F o r these reasons it is desirable that the physical spread o f a m etropolitan area should be limited by a green belt. A t the sam e tim e, the density of population m ust be held down so that population growth will take place in self-contained satellite com m unities beyond the belt. Policies m ust be designed to locate new industry in these satellite com m unities, in order to reduce traffic congestion, the length of the journey to w ork, and the growth of population in the centre. It is true th at the geographical spread of industry into satellite com m unities w ould increase the distance of industrial transportation from one plant to another, but probably it would not increase the cost as m uch as the savings in reduced public and private autom obile tran s p ortatio n and the consequent avoidance of congestion. T he stalling o f truck traffic in M ontreal, for exam ple, represented a loss estim ated to be $30 million in 1952.2 In a predom inantly service and com m ercial city such as O ttaw a, the increased cost o f transportation resulting from decentralization should be very little in proportion to the savings in relieved congestion. Even w hen industry locates within a city, this does not necessarily result in a net gain to the civic treasury. T he property and business taxes on the new assessm ent are likely to be m ore th an eaten up by services p ro v id e d -n o t only to the plant itself b ut also to the new labour force in the form o f new schools, augm ented police protection, enlarged w ater and sewage sys tem s, etc. I f there are already heavy problem s o f growth imposed upon a civic adm inistration, additional industry and its accom panying new population should not be encouraged to enter the city or locate close to its boundaries. Any encouragem ent given should be only w hat is necessary to induce firms which plan to enter the area anyw ay to locate w ithin the city rather than just beyond its boundaries. T h e prior provision o f serviced sites is often the only encouragem ent needed. Industries often locate just beyond the boundaries of a city in o rd er to enjoy low er taxes and wage-rates. This usually involves the city m unicipality in a net cost because a consider able proportion of the new labour force reside close to o r within 1 Leonard Gertler, “Why Control the Growth of Cities?” C o m m u n ity P lanning R eview (Decem ber, 1955), 152. 3 Ib id ., 154.
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the city lim its and consum e city services. Even if they live w ithin the city, the tax on their hom es does not m eet the total cost o f the services provided. A green belt at the boundary of the city would prevent this leech-like location of industry. A nother great advantage o f a green belt would be that, as its border w as approached, costly dem ands for new services on the fringe w ould decline. T he central city could then accu m ulate borrow ing and spending pow er w hich would be available fo r the im provem ent o f conditions in the older areas and for the redevelopm ent o f blighted and congested districts in the u rb an core. F o r all o f these reasons, then, it is contended th at the central city o f a growing m etropolitan area should be lim ited in both size and population.
3: Planning and Metropolitan Government : “Planning and M etropolitan Government,” C anadian P ublic A d m in istra tio n , I (M arch, 1958), 14-20. By permission.
s o u r c e
A lthough com m unity planning in the tw entieth century has been preoccupied w ith a rational developm ent o f large urban areas, it is unfortunately tru e that in all o f the western w orld’s great cities planning has not been a success. D espite their best efforts, planners everyw here have failed to see their plans im plem ented precisely w here they w ere needed m o s t-in the largest o f ou r rapidly growing urban concentrations. W hy has this been so? I t is the contention of this article th at th e m ajor reason is th at in none o f the great urban concentrations o f the w estern w orld has there been a unit o f local governm ent which has corresponded with the urb an o r built-up area. A com m on feature o f o u r great cities is th at the total population of the urban area is m uch greater than th at of the legally defined city. In m ost cases a very large proportion of the urban population lives beyond the m other city’s boundaries. This is well illustrated by the following tabulation w ith respect to some of the largest cities in the world, indicating the approxi m ate total m etropolitan population in 1951 and the percentage living outside the central city:
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M etropolitan A rea M ontreal N ew Y ork Chicago Buenos Aires Copenhagen T oronto Paris M anchester Los Angeles L ondon Boston P ittsburgh
Population (m illions) 1.4 12.8 5.5 4.7 1.2 1.1 5.0 (ap p ro x .) 1.3 4.4 8.3 2.4 2.2
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Percent outs central city 27 33 34 35 38 40 43 45 5560 66 70
I t is to be noted that these population figures are dated and, except fo r Paris, are based on officially defined m etropolitan boundaries. In nearly all cases the actual urb an population or built-up area now extends considerably beyond these boun daries. C onsequently the percentage now living outside the central city is larger than th at show n here. But even though this is n ot taken into account, it will be observed th at in m ost cases m ore than a third, and in som e instances m ore than half, of the m etropolitan population resides outside the boundaries o f the m other city. As a result o f this spraw l o f population the largest m etro politan areas are now characterized by a large num ber o f local governm ent units w ithin each area. T he following examples will illustrate this point: M etropolitan A rea
N u m b e r o f local G overnm ents
T o ro nto
23 (including 10 outside the officially defined area) 33 80 80 (outside the C ounty o f London) 86 60 (plus 30 island areas w ithin the city) 100 (plus 3 second-tier D epartm ents) 100 530 800
Sydney M ontreal L ondon M anchester L os Angeles P aris R om e N ew Y ork C hicago
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It is contended th at this m ultiplicity o f units of local govern m ent within ou r largest m etropolitan areas has been prim arily responsible for the failure to achieve planned developm ent o f these areas. In the first place, it has m ade it difficult to create an adequate m etropolitan planning authority. Secondly, even w here such an authority has been created it has prevented the im plem entation of any desirable plan that the authority might form ulate. W ith respect to the creation o f a planning authority, the absence o f a unit of local governm ent covering the whole area has m ade it difficult to create an official planning authority with adequate powers. In m ost of the w orld’s great cities where m etropolitan planning has been carried forw ard, either this planning was done under private auspices and therefore had no legal sanction, o r an official authority w as created th at was either im potent o r weak. M oreover, the absence o f a m etro politan governm ent has m ade necessary the creation of a special body fo r m etropolitan planning containing representatives of the m unicipalities w ithin the area. D espite the insistence of experts like H arvey W alker in the U nited States and SpenceSales in C anada that there should be no separate planning board and that planning should be done by a technical com m ittee of the heads of civic departm ents, in large m etropolitan areas this is impossible because the city does not correspond with the planning area. H ence it is im possible to dispense with planning boards in m etropolitan areas because there are no m etropolitan governm ents which could take over their functions. In all of ou r great m etropolitan areas the need for planning has been painfully obvious, and in m ost of them valiant attem pts have been m ade to im plem ent an effective plan o f development. But even in cities w here such planning has gone farthest, the failure of the plans for the reasons noted above has been amply dem onstrated. As early as 1909 an unofficial plan was created for the city o f Chicago, and later a C ity Plan Com m ission to carry it into effect. But no official plan exists for the whole m etropolitan area, and its only planning body is an unofficial Regional Planning Association. A plan for the N ew Y ork region was developed by H enry W right in 1926, and later by T hom as A dam s under the auspices of the Russell Sage foundation, beginning in 1929. But because N ew Y ork’s m etropolitan popu lation lies in three states, no official planning authority has been created and these plans have never been officially adopted. Similarly, in Copenhagen, D enm ark, an unofficial com m ittee in 1948 developed an interesting “five-finger” plan w hich would
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have involved a controlled growth o f the m etropolitan popula tion outw ard in projections like the fingers o f a hand. L ater, how ever, an official M etropolitan C om m ittee on the reorganization o f local governm ent in the area disagreed w ith the plan. N either the plan no r the Com m ittee’s proposals on reorganization have been adopted. In Sydney, A ustralia, a county planning council, created in 1945, prepared a plan for the Sydney area w hich was adopted in 1951, but no m etropolitan governm ent exists to p ut the plan into effect. Com prehensive plans have been produced and are being im plem ented in some of the largest urban concentrations in Britain. F o r instance, a regional planning com m ittee for M an chester in 1947 produced a plan designed to reduce the density of population in the central city and to re-house about 150,000 people beyond the city’s borders. A plan for G reater London initiated by the national governm ent was prepared in 1944, designed to m ove about one million people o u t of the central area and to create eight new towns. Because these plans have been encouraged and are supported by the national governm ent there has been considerable success in im plem entation, espe cially since the central cities have been given the pow er to create vast housing estates outside their borders. But there is no doubt that serious difficulties are being experienced because o f the absence o f a unit o f governm ent covering the whole urb an area. In the L ondon area, the L ondon County Council once consti tuted such a unit o f governm ent, but by now nearly tw o-thirds of the m etropolitan area’s population live outside the jurisdic tion o f the L ondon C ounty Council. A n o ther city th a t has had som e success w ith planning be cause o f the greater degree o f control exercised by th e central governm ent has been Paris. A great Paris plan, encom passing p arts o f the fo u r second-tier units o f governm ent (D epartm ents) surrounding Paris, has been in existence since 1935.T he national governm ent has required th at the plans and activities o f the local governm ents (com m unes) surrounding th e central city m ust conform w ith this regional plan. Nevertheless, the im ple m entation of the plan has not been notably successful. O ne of its m ajo r proposals was the creation o f a town at Orly, but partly because this required the financial assistance o f Paris, which could n ot afford the expense, and because there was no m etropolitian governm ent to carry the financial burden, this p art of the plan has n ot been p u t into effect. T hese exam ples serve to illustrate that, because in our largest u rb an concentrations there is no central u nit o f local govern
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m ent encom passing the w hole o f the m etropolitan area, not only is it extrem ely difficult to create adequate plans, but even if they are created it is quite impossible to p u t them fully into effect. If we are to have any sort of success a t planning and guiding the future developm ent of the w orld’s rapidly expanding great cities, then w hat is the solution o f this problem ? M ost of the solutions that have been attem pted so far either are undesirable o r have failed. C hief am ong these have been control by the central governm ent, as in the cases o f Moscow, Paris, and London; the creation of ad hoc m etropolitan bodies fo r special purposes such as w ater supply o r sewerage, as in m ost large A m erican cities; or the am algam ation of the whole m etropolitan area into a single unit of governm ent. If we value local self-governm ent, the first of these is patently undesirable. T h e second is but a partial and highly unsatisfactory solution, and the third, although superficially neat and attractive, has failed miserably in the tw entieth century. F o r instance, there have been no substantial annexations o r am algam ations in the N ew Y ork area since 1915, in San Francisco since 1856, in P hiladelphia since 1854, and in London since 1888, to take only a few representative cases. Since the creation of a single local governm ent covering the whole built-up area seems such an obvious solution to the problem , the interesting question is, why has it not been successful? W. A. Robson, in his introduction to G reat Cities o f the W orld, has sum m ed up the situation as follows: O pposition to the expansion o f the great city is essentially political. I t is often fo u n d e d on a sense o f separateness on the part o f the inhabitants o f the outlying suburban areas, who do not identify them selves com pletely with the m etro politan com m unity, although they m ay w ork in the great city, use it fo r shopping, recreation, and m any other pur poses. T he local politicians, councillors, and officials usually try to fan the flam es o f such resistance and their attitude m ay be quite sincere in that they them selves fail to identify their district w ith the larger m etropolis o f which it fo rm s a part. On the other hand, their attitude is som etim es due to self-regarding m otives springing fro m a desire to retain an official appointm ent or to remain a councillor at all costs, regardless o f the wider public interest involved. W hen a fu ll account has been taken o f such considerations, the stark fa ct remains that am algam ation usually results in the ab sorbed unit ceasing to be a separate entity, and thereby
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losing its local governm ent institutions. Instead o f having its own elected council, m ayor, chairm an or city manager, it becom es an insignificant fraction o f a vast city governed fro m a rem ote centre with which it has little contact. Is it surprising that, faced w ith such a prospect, the sm all towns, urban and rural districts, villages, etc., should resist what appears to them to be the lethal encroachm ents o f an ad vancing tide? From their point o f view, it is a fight fo r life. Technical, financial, and adm inistrative considerations concerning efficiency or econom y, the equalization o f ser vices and resources, the broadening o f the incidence o f taxation: all these count fo r little com pared with the prim i tive em otions which are aroused by the urge to survive.1 T h e psychological explanation for the failure o f am alga m ation and fo r the successful creation o f special-purpose m etropolitan bodies instead, m ay be neatly sum m ed up in this unsophisticated w ay: local citizens will fight to the death against the liquidation o f dear old Oshkosh Junction, but w ho ever heard o f anyone dropping a tear over the demise of the dear old w ater departm ent? W e now realize th at this passionate attachm ent to dear old O shkosh Junction helps fill the indivi dual’s im portant psychological need for security. It represents a feeling of “ belonging” which can be fully experienced only in the closely-knit local com m unity. F o r this reason the elim ina tion o f the local m unicipality not only m eans a loss o f civic spirit but is a further step tow ard the isolation o f the individual in urban society. In view o f these considerations, the best way to solve the m etropolitan problem is by means of a tw o-tier system of local governm ent w ith the second tier being a m ulti-purpose m etro politan council w hich governs the whole m etropolitan area for all functions and services that are o f m etiopolitan-w ide concern but which leaves the purely local services to the low er tier of existing m unicipalities. As Robson has observed (p. 6 3 ): T he argum ents fo r a tw o-tier system in a great m etropolitan area are overw helm ing, fo r only by such a m etho d is it possible fo r the suburban and outlying districts to retain their institutional identity and com m unal life whilst becom ing part o f the m etropolitan area fo r the larger governm ental purposes. O nly by this means, m oreover, can we hope to find l W. A. Robson (ed.), G reat C ities o f th e W o rld (London, 1954), 62-3.
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a solution to the problem o f providing the m etropolitan area with a dem ocratic system o f local governm ent w hile also giving the citizen a smaller and m ore easily com prehensible unit o f com m unity life in whose governm ent he can parti cipate. It is perfectly feasible and logical to aim sim ultane ously at both larger and sm aller units o f local governm ent in m etropolitan areas; and to evoke in the citizens a sense o f civic interest in both the larger com m unity and the smaller. It is interesting th a t although this type o f solution had been proposed by m any students of city governm ent, especially in the U nited States, L ondon (1 888) was the only large m etropolitan area in the English-speaking w orld w here this system o f govern m ent had been successfully introduced before its adoption by T oronto in 1953.2 N o doubt the m ain reason for the failure to create a sim ilar system fo r any of the large cities o f the U nited States has been the great strength o f the tradition o f local selfd e te rm in a tio n -th e notion th at the sm allest unit o f local gov ernm ent m ust consent to any change affecting its pow ers or authority. State governm ents have been unwilling to intervene and m ake changes in the interests o f th e w hole m etropolitan population if any o f even the sm allest constituent m unicipalities are opposed. T here is no doubt, how ever, th at the T oronto system will exert a great influence on the thinking o f students and practitioners of governm ent in the U nited States. Clearly it has influenced thinking w ith respect to o th er m etropolitan areas in Canada. In the brief o f the C anadian Federation of M ayors and M unicipalities to the Royal Com m ission on C an ada’s Econom ic Prospects, the authors o f th e sections dealing w ith m etropolitan problem s (E. H ardy and K . C allard) both reported favourably on the tw o-tier system as exemplified by T o ro n to .3 A nd official bodies have recom m ended sim ilar m etro politan authorities fo r W innipeg, M ontreal, W indsor, V ancou ver, and V ictoria.4 C anada therefore has an opportunity to lead the w orld in the planning and governm ent of m etropolitan areas. It appears to m e th at the m ajor deficiency o f m etropolitan planning in the past has been too great a preoccupation with the physical and architectural aspects o f planning and not enough w ith the adm inistrative and governm ental. F o r som e m ysterious reason m etropolitan planning authorities seem to have felt that the system of governm ent required for th e m etropolitan area was beyond their field of interest o r concern. P erhaps this is because the planning m ovem ent historically has been developed
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w ith an engineering and architectural em phasis. In any case, there is little value in developing an ideal plan for the physical lay-out and developm ent o f the built-up area if no thought has been given to the problem o f how these plans m ay be im ple m ented. I would therefore argue th at the very first recom m enda tion o f a m etropolitan planning board should be concerned w ith the creation o f a suitable system of m etropolitan govern m ent which w ould be capable of putting its plans into effect. U nfortunately, the adoption of the tw o-tier system of governm ent will not of itself guarantee a solution to the problem s of planning and governm ent in the large m etropolitan areas o f the w orld. Because of the speed with which the population is geographically spreading at the edges of these areas, some provision m ust be m ade for the progressive incor poration of surrounding m unicipalities into the m etropolitan governm ent as they becom e urban or even potentially urban. O therw ise m etropolitan areas w ith the tw o-tier system may suffer the same fate as did L ondon w here, for a tim e, the L ondon C ounty Council successfully solved the problem s of the L ondon area but was soon engulfed and overwhelmed by a spreading population, m ost o f w hich now lives beyond the boundaries of the County. A m ore difficult problem is th at in some regions o f the w orld the concentration o f urban population is becoming so great th at it is now no longer confined to single m etropolitan areas. Like the grouping o f stars, these regions constitute whole “galaxies” of cities and m etropolitan areas which, though grow ing tow ard one another, are separated by considerable stretches of agricultural land. Such regions are found, for exam ple, sur rounding London, Los Angeles, Boston, and N ew Y ork, and in the T oronto-H am ilton-K itchener area of O ntario. H ere plan ning for future developm ent and grow th m ust be done on the basis o f a region m uch larger than the single built-up area. Such planning, for exam ple, involves influencing the location of industry w ithin the w hole region rather than sim ply within single m etropolitan areas. W hether this should be done directly 3 On the T oronto scheme see: W. W. Crouch, “M etropolitan G overn
m ent in Toronto,” P u b lic A d m in is tr a tio n R e v ie w , X IV (Spring, 1954), 85-95, and footnote 3. 3 F o r e c a s t o f U rb a n G r o w th P r o b le m s a n d R e q u ir e m e n ts , 1 9 5 6-1980
(1956), sections K and MX. ‘ Even before the Toronto system had been created, the author had recommended such a scheme for Halifax, in 1949. [See following chapter.]
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by the senior governm ents o r by som e new type of regional authority rem ains an open question. In any case, it seems clear th at the creation o f the tw o-tier system can n o t be a com plete solution to the problem s of planning and governing ou r largest urb an concentrations. Nevertheless, since it appears to be the best solution arrived at to date, its adoption should n ot be opposed for this reason. Indeed, I would argue th at through its adoption the problem of planning the developm ent o f whole urbanized regions will be all the m ore easily solved.
4: Halifax: A Case for a Metropolitan Authority Reprinted from C o m m u n ity P lanning R eview , I (November, 1951), 134-41. By permission. Though much of the factual inform a tion in this article is by now out o f date, it is a useful case-study because the problems described are typical of m etropolitan areas, and the solution proposed is still generally applicable.
s o u rc e :
U ntil the recent w ar the city o f H alifax and its satellite, the tow n o f D artm outh im m ediately across the harbour, were alm ost wholly contained w ithin their legal boundaries. Since then, how ever, the “fringe” p opulation surrounding these m uni cipalities has grow n so rapidly and has becom e so urbanized th at the whole H alifax-D artm outh region m ust now be regarded fo r m any purposes as a single econom ic and cultural u nit with problem s peculiarly its own. T his phenom enon o f large cities spilling over their legal boundaries into the surrounding area is by no m eans peculiar to H alifax. W ith increasing industrial expansion, the developm ent o f rapid means o f transportation, and especially the rapid rise in urban population during the war, it has becom e almost universal. T he result has been the M etropolitan A rea: an urban social and econom ic unit, w hich has m any problem s of areaw ide concern but no corresponding unit of local governm ent to solve them. T h e pattern o f growth in a M etropolitan A rea is always m uch the sam e.1 People from the central city move to nearby rural areas to build their hom es, hoping to gain the advantage o f low-cost land, low er taxes, and rural living, and at the same
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tim e to retain the urb an advantages of industrial o r com m ercial em ploym ent and urban am usem ents and recreation. F o r a period these advantages are enjoyed but, as population density increases, eventually services which at first were m erely a convenience to be foregone for the sake o f econom y becom e a necessity. L arger schools are required; sewage and garbage disposal facilities and a central sanitary w ater supply becom e necessary to health; fire protection and increased public health and w elfare services becom e im perative; and the lack of com m unity planning becom es impressively apparent. In short, a ru ral com m unity becom es suburban. T hose who have fled the high costs of u rban living find themselves trapped into providing m ost o f the services responsible for those high costs and, a t the sam e tim e, paying perpetually the psychic costs of living in a com m unity th at grew w ithout proper planning and control. A t the sam e tim e, the parent city m ust continue to supply services for these sam e people, who continue to live their econom ic and cultural lives w ithin its borders. O ften, too, the p aren t city is left w ith large areas o f vacant and hence u n p ro ductive land. T his is true only to a slight degree in H alifax, for the city has com paratively little vacant land suitable fo r build ing. In this case, shortage o f land has been one o f th e main factors responsible for the m ovem ent of population from the city into the fringe. T h e N ova Scotia M unicipal Bureau m ade a special study o f the H alifax region, including H alifax, D artm outh, and, for purposes of th e study, a F ringe A rea falling w ithin a radius of about ten miles from the city, and form ing p art of the rural M unicipality o f the County o f H alifax w hich surrounds, b ut is adm inistratively separate from , the city and th e tow n.2 This study revealed how rapidly the fringe population grew relative to the populations o f the incorporated m unicipalities. C om par ing 1947 estim ates with the 1941 census figures, one finds that, while the population of the city increased by about twenty-one percent, and th at o f D artm outh by eleven percent, the fringe population grew by almost forty-three percent. M eanwhile, the population o f th e rem ainder o f the ru ral m unicipality had grown by less than nine percent.3 T here can be no doubt, then, th at the growth o f th e fringe population has been due to the spread of H alifax and D artm outh beyond their legal boundaries. 1 See, for example, V. Jones, M etropolitan G o vern m en t (New York, 1942), ch. 1. a R. G. Speller, T h e H a lifa x M etro p o lita n A rea (Halifax, 1947). 3 Ibid., 4.
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Because special w artim e conditions caused a bulge in growth, it is unlikely that the population of the H alifax metropolitian region will expand in future as rapidly as it did during the w ar. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for believing that the fringe population will m aintain its high w artim e rate of expansion. Because of the shortage o f both land and housing, and also because of the high cost of building in H alifax and D artm outh, it is likely that nearly all the expansion will take place in the Fringe A rea. Projects likely to accelerate this growth are the recent com pletion of a highway rim m ing Bedford Basin, the projected construction of a H alifax-D artm outh bridge and the proposed construction o f a bridge across the N orthw est A rm from H alifax to Jollim ore. These, by m aking it easier to com m ute to the city, will encourage a centrifugal spread of population in the m etro p olitan region; and they will cause a heavy concentration of residential building beyond the bridges, especially north of D artm outh. T h e H alifax region, then, shows, the typical growth sym p tom s o f the m odern m etropolitan area. T he people of the fringe have become particularly conscious o f the acute need for com m unity planning and for the m ore efficient provision of public health, w ater and sewerage services. But the supplying o f these services is m erely the first in a series of problem s with w hich all m etropolitan areas have to contend as their fringe areas grow into full-fledged but interdependent com m unities. N e e d fo r an Over-all A pproach T he following brief review o f the problem s which the H alifax m etropolitan area now faces indicates the way in which an over-all approach w ould m ost effectively help to solve them. P U B L IC H E A L T H
Public health is perhaps the m ost im portant field in which m etropolitan action, rath er than individual unit action, appears necessary. O f the three m unicipalities in the area, the City is the only one which, by present m unicipal health standards, has a service that is a t all adequate. D artm outh has no hospital and no full-time public health staff. T he service provided to the Fringe A rea by the ru ral M unicipality, although on a par with that provided to the rest of the M unicipality, is negligible. T he A tlantic H ealth Division of the provincial D epartm ent of H ealth, w hich em ploys one full-tim e public health officer and
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tw o-full-tim e public health nurses, provides the only real public health service in the M unicipality. T h e following table shows th e 1947 expenditures on public health in the m etropolitan area by the three m unicipal units from their own resources:4
City Tow n M unicipality (F ringe only)
Total
Per Capita
$105,858 2,076 560
$1.24 .17
.02
It is clear that, m easured against m odern standards, the public health services provided in the Tow n and in the Fringe A rea are seriously inadequate. T o set up satisfactory separate organi zations in the Tow n and in either the M unicipality or the F ringe Area w ould be an inefficient use o f resources and an unnecessary hardship fo r the tax-payers'of these units. T here is no need for additional public health organizations w hen that of the C ity is well able, with some additions o f personnel and equipm ent, to supply the public health needs of the entire m etropolitan region, and also, if need be, o f all H alifax County. A health unit fo r the w hole region, then, would bring the savings o f large-scale organization and the benefits o f specialized knowledge, equip m ent and personnel. SA N IT A TIO N , W A T E R , AND W E L F A R E
A M etropolitan H ealth U nit by itself, how ever, w ould not satisfy the health needs o f the region. U nsanitary conditions in the fringe settlem ents are the direct result o f the lack o f norm al urban sewerage and w ater facilities. N evertheless, these condi tions are a m enace to the health o f the entire m etropolitan area, and the problem s o f providing w ater, sewerage and sewage disposal plants are ones best solved on a m etropolitan-w ide scale. In the field o f w elfare, m oreover, the City is the only one of the three m unicipalities th at has an organized W elfare D e partm ent, and even this organization lacks sufficient qualified w elfare personnel. It appears evident th at better service could be provided if the w elfare services o f all three units w ere adm inistered by a single authority and integrated w ith the proposed m etropolitan health service.
‘ Ibid.
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IN S T IT U T IO N A L PL A N N IN G
N o t the least of the advantages to be gained from an over-all approach to the region’s problem s would be the planned use of institutional facilities. T his w ould perm it a functional rearrange m ent of present facilities. F o r instance, other suitable provision could be m ade fo r the indigent and aged healthy persons at present housed in the City H om e and in the rural m unicipality’s C ounty H om e at Cole H arbour. T he C ounty H om e could then be reserved for m entally defective persons, and the present City H om e could be used as a hospital fo r the chronically ill and the aged infirm, an institution not at present existing in the m etropolitan area, but one which is greatly needed. This would enable invalids to be housed in close proxim ity to the general hospitals, should this type o f hospital service be needed for them . A t the sam e tim e it would ease som ew hat the load im posed upon the general hospitals by chronic invalids. T hus used, the H om e would also becom e a m ost useful adjunct to the present teaching facilities o f D alhousie U niversity’s Medical School. In view o f the inform al existence o f a dual system of denom inational schools in the City, it would perhaps n ot be feasible to have all the educational facilities of the A rea fit directly into an integrated m etropolitan scheme. N evertheless, some savings could be effected by co-operation am ong the m unicipal units in secondary education. F o r instance, high schools in H alifax and D artm outh, particularly those near the outskirts, could be planned so as to accom m odate students from the fringe settlements. H ere the function o f a m etropolitan authority could be that of effecting econom ies through co operative action in the location of schools. In the adm inistration o f justice, if the Province assumes responsibility for prisons not now provided by the Dom inion (i.e., to accom m odate persons incarcerated for less than two y e a rs ), m uch of the burden of corrective care will be taken from the local units. H ow ever, jails will still be needed for persons sentenced for petty offences and for those awaiting trial. Since existing jail facilities will then be adequate to serve the entire M etropolitan A rea their use could also be co-ordinated by a m etropolitan authority. A nother aspect of the m etropolitan problem in supplying institutional services is th at several city-financed social services are supplied to persons w ho are not residents of the city. It is estim ated th at in 1947 the City spent $25,000 in supplying
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tuberculosis control service to non-residents. A pproxim ately twenty-five percent of the patients o f the Infectious Diseases H ospital were non-residents, representing a net cost to the City o f over $8,000. F urtherm ore, an undeterm ined cost was incurred in providing im m unization, vaccination and advice on child and m aternal w elfare to non-residents. A t least eighty percent of these non-resident costs were for residents of D artm outh or the rural M unicipality.5 T he supplying o f these services on a m etro politan scale w ould elim inate the difficulty o f residence. M oreover, the provision o f com m unity cultural institutions and services, such as libraries, m useum s, auditorium s, and a sym phony orchestra could best be encouraged o r undertaken by a m etropolitan authority, since in large m easure they would serve the entire region. F o r instance, the public library recently erected for H alifax could becom e the m ain library of a regional library organization, w ith branches in the sm aller settlements. PH Y SICA L PL A N N IN G
E ach of the three m unicipalities has its own planning board. T h at of the rural m unicipality is, o f course, chiefly concerned with the problem s o f the F ringe A rea. Planning surveys have been com pleted and m aster plans draw n up fo r the City and the Town. T here is as yet, how ever, no such plan fo r the F ringe A rea. A M etropolitan Planning Com mission, which was envis aged in 1943 when the Provincial A ct of 1939 providing for its inception was proclaim ed, died alm ost at birth through lack of local support. N evertheless, the need for a planning authority with m etropolitan-w ide jurisdiction is still very great. T he construction of the H alifax-D artm outh and H alifaxJollim ore bridges, as proposed in the H alifax M aster Plan, will m ake m etropolitan planning even m ore necessary in future. T he decision to build these bridges will raise the problem of w hat type of authority is best suited to undertake their construction and m aintenance. M oreover, their construction will have a trem endous directive effect upon the growth of built-up areas and upon the econom ic life o f the region, and will create pro b lems which for their proper solution will require an integration of planning for the whole area. F o r instance, it will be advisable to review the passenger transportation facilities o f the region. I t seems apparent th a t as the population grows an integrated transportation system w ith uniform fares and transportation rights w ould be a decided im provem ent._____________________ 5 R e p o rt o f the C o m m issio n er o f H ealth and W elfare (City of Halifax, 1947).
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O ther natural functions for a m etropolitan planning au thority would be: a general control o f land use within the area, so th a t w here land is being used in such a w ay as to affect an interest broader than that o f the local unit in which the land is located, th at broader interest w ould prevail; the co-ordination of housing standards and building codes; the control of bridges, of the approaches to ferries and bridges, of m ain traffic arteries and of parks and rcreation areas norm ally used by the residents o f m ore than one m unicipal unit; the allocation and planning of land for these uses, and the industrial developm ent o f the entire m etropolitan region. T his calls for a divided control o f planning, w ith the m etropolitan authority assuming responsibility fo r all developm ents w hich are of regional interest, and the local au thorities being responsible fo r developm ents of purely local interest. P U B L IC H O U SIN G
A new field of local governm ent activity in which a m etro politan authority could play a vital p a rt is that o f low -rental housing. I f present plans fo r the provision o f additional lowrental housing projects in the H alifax area should m aterialize, it is extrem ely likely that the m ost desirable sites will lie in the F ringe A rea. If this is found to be true, their control and m an agem ent by an authority responsible to a u nit o f governm ent outside the borders of the F ringe A rea w ould create undesirable com plications. M oreover, there is a m ore general yet nonethe less im portant argum ent for the adm inistration o f low -rental housing on a m etropolitan basis: the provision o f low -rental housing is o f w ider-than-local concern. T herefore, although it m ust to a large extent be paid for by higher levels o f governm ent, the local share o f the cost should be extended over the whole u rban com m unity in w hich it is situated. T he justification for this has been cogently set dow n by M r. H um phrey C arver: Because the econom y o f the urban region is based upon certain industries and services which m ust pay wages that are not com m ensurate with the costs o f private-enterprise housing, there is clearly no justification fo r im posing a tax upon a particular group o f citizens w ho happen to live in the m unicipality where low -incom e fam ilies can m ost con veniently be housed. In this the central city and the suburban municipalities have m utual obligations. A n y costs o r deficits o f low-rental housing that m ust be carried by m unicipal tax-payers should be borne jointly by all the m unicipalities
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in the m etropolitan area, and the share o f each should be in proportion to its revenue-raising capacityG GARBAGE D ISPO SA L AND F IR E PR O T E C T IO N
T h e collection and disposal o f garbage and particularly the location o f garbage dum ps, insofar as these affect the health and w elfare o f the entire Region are also m atters o f m etropolitan interest. Bedford, W oodside, and one other settlem ent are sup plied this service by private contractors, the cost being paid directly by the users. H ow ever, there is no incinerator in any of these settlem ents. T he C ity and the Tow n, on the other hand, provide com plete garbage collection and disposal facilities, in cluding incinerators, and these facilities could be m ade to serve m ost o f the settlem ents in the F ringe A rea. A s long as there are no w ater lines in the fringe settlem ents, there is little possibility o f extending either the Tow n o r the City fire-fighting facilities to care for the Fringe A rea. H ow ever, w hen the fringe settlem ents have been provided with w ater, and w hen the H alifax-D artm outh bridge is com pleted, the provision of a m etropolitan fire-fighting service would becom e possible. I t is clear from the foregoing th at there are even now m any problem s o f m etropolitan scope which call for an over-all ap pro ach to their solution. A s the Fringe A rea grows and the population of the whole region becomes m ore closely integrated, the fields o f service assum ing a m etropolitan-w ide interest will increase in num ber. Inadequacy o f Existing A rrangem ents It is true that there have been attem pts to solve these m etro politan problem s as they appeared, through co-operative ar rangem ents between the City, th e Tow n and the rural M unici pality. F o r exam ple, a Join t Expenditure B oard, which has been in operation for m any years, takes the financial responsibility fo r the operation o f the County C ourt H ouse and jail. T he costs are apportioned am ong the three units according to their total taxable assessments at the tim e the board cam e into being.7 °H . Carver, H o u ses fo r Canadians (Toronto, 1947), 118. See also his more general arguments in favour of a federal o r borough type of m etropolitan authority such as that proposed here, 116-120. 7 City, eighty-one point two percent; Town, six point seven percent and Municipality, twelve point one percent. Estim ated 1947 population ratios are: City fifty-seven percent; Town eight percent; and M uni cipality thirty-five percent.
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Probably a large factor in the successful operation of this scheme has been the relatively sm all expenditure involved (about $50,000 in 1947). A s elsewhere in N ova Scotia, the three units have also operated jointly for m any years a M unicipal School F und, w ith the costs apportioned on the sam e basis as for Joint Expenditure. M ore recently, other attem pts at co-operation between the units have been m ade. F o r exam ple, a joint com m ittee w as set up by the ru ral M unicipality and the C ity to try to solve the problem o f supplying sewage disposal facilities and w ater to the settlem ents on the N orthw est A rm , in conjunction w ith pro posed additions to the C ity’s services. Also, M unicipal and T ow n representatives w orked together on a scheme whereby D artm outh w ould supply w ater and sewerage facilities to the nearby com m unity of W oodside. A vocational high school has been constructed in the C ity as a joint enterprise of the Province and the three local units, with the D om inion also paying p art of the cost. A sim ilar financial arrangem ent has been agreed upon fo r the construction of the H alifax-D artm outh bridge. All these efforts reveal that, at least in som e fields, the need fo r co-operative action has been and is being appreciated. A t the sam e tim e it is evident th at co-operative arrangem ents have n o t been extensive enough to m eet the need and th at the full benefits of an over-all approach have not been in any sense obtained. O ne reason for this has been the difficulty of allocating the costs o f joint enterprises in an equitable m anner. T he ratios of the recorded total taxable assessments of the three units are by no m eans w hat they would be on the basis of a uniform standard o f valuation. In recent years, only in cases w here the higher levels of governm ent have offered to pay a large portion of the cost o f a project, have the local units been induced to agree upon an apportionm ent o f costs. In each such case, the appor tionm ent had to be renegotiated since no criteria exist for deter m ining an equitable sharing o f costs. T here is no doubt th at this has prevented the practical realization o f m any proposed joint enterprises. T he equalization o f assessments would rem edy this situation. H ow ever, it is contended th at a m ore fundam ental reason fo r the failure o f joint projects to m aterialize is th at the unity of interest existing in the m etropolitan com m unity has been sub m erged because of the lack o f m unicipal boundaries m arking o ut that com m unity. T he joint m etropolitan com mission fo r com m unity planning would have involved little expense; yet
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after one o r two m eetings o f the representatives from the three units the scheme was abandoned. T h e only recent proposal for the joint provision of services solely in the M etropolitan A rea has been in the field of public health. In 1946, D rs. M cIntosh and M ilam of the R ockefeller F o u n d atio n strongly recom m ended that the City organization be used as the foundation for either a M etropolitan or a C ounty health service.8 T hey suggested tw o alternatives: (1 ) th a t a co-operative health service be built on the present City organi zation, to be controlled jointly by the C ity, the Tow n and the M unicipality and to serve either the M etropolitan A rea o r the entire C ounty; (2 ) th a t the P rovince take the C ity organization into its A tlantic H ealth D ivision and supply all public health services in the entire County. I t is questionable w hether the p ro p er solution w ould be the assum ption of responsibility for the new services by the Province, rather than by local govern m ent. The-proposals contained in this article are dictated by the belief th a t as m any services as possible should be controlled by representatives of the local com m unity. N evertheless, as D rs. M cIntosh and M ilam show, it is desirable th at services o f m etropolitan interest such as this should be provided on a u n i form basis for the whole M etropolitan A rea. A com m ittee re presenting the City, the T ow n and the M unicipality has been appointed to attem pt, in co-operation w ith the provincial D e p artm en t o f H ealth, to w ork out a p lan for a joint public health scheme. T o date, how ever, no action has been taken. Proposed Solution Because o f the lack of action on m any problem s of m etro p olitan concern, it is felt th at the m ost profitable m ethod of approach is to regard the problem s o f the M etropolitan A rea as aspects of a single, over-all problem requiring a com prehensive approach for its solution. M any cities elsewhere have tried to solve their m etropolitan problem through annexing suburban populations. T his can be a tem porary solution, especially if the suburban populations are sufficiently well integrated w ith the city to be considered sepa rate only in nam e. H ow ever, w here they form distinct units with a com m unity feeling peculiarly their own, annexation can lead 8 W. A. M cIntosh and D. F. Milam, A S u rvey o f G overnm ental P ublic H ealth O rganization O perating W ithin th e C o u n ty o f H alifax, W ith R e co m m en d a tio n s fo r th eir A d m in istra tive U nification (1946), 13-21.
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to resentm ent and the destruction of civic spirit, and by the time it is accom plished, m ay be too late to rem edy effectively the difficulties th at have developed. M oreover, as th e population grows, new suburban areas appear, and the process o f “too little too late” m ust be repeated. I t is subm itted th at the F ringe com m unities in the H alifax area are too distinct and th at the rem ainder o f the F ringe popu lation is at present too scattered for annexation ever to be a com pletely successful solution to H alifax’s m etropolitan prob lem. I t is therefore proposed th at the M etropolitan A rea should becom e a separate m unicipal Region, and th at the com m unities of the area should unite under a central authority fo r certain specified purposes o f local governm ent w hich are m etropolitan in scope. In this w ay they could retain their individuality and their autonom y for all other purposes. T h at p a rt o f the ru ral M unicipality w hich w ould be excluded from the M etropolitan A rea is predom inantly ru ral and m ost of its residents depend upon farm ing, lum bering o r fishing fo r their livelihood. A lthough m any o f the residents of the F ringe a t present follow rural pursuits, an increasingly large proportion o f them depend upon urban em ploym ent for their livelihood. Consequently, the residents of this p art o f the rural M unicipality are becom ing ever m ore closely bound econom ically and cul turally w ith the C ity and the Tow n. It is therefore highly advis able to take account of these fu tu re developm ents and to attem pt to solve present problem s in such a w ay as to sim plify the solution of those which will arise in the future. M oreover, the non-m etropolitan p art o f the M unicipality could provide itself w ith m ore suitable social and educational services through co operation w ith adjacent rural m unicipalities having sim ilar eco nom ic and social characteristics, leaving the M etropolitan A rea free to be organized as the separate social and econom ic unit which it is. In this way it w ould be possible to achieve the m ost perm anent solution of the problem s o f the entire County. In sum m ary, then, the solution proposed is th at the M etro politan A rea should becom e a single u n it for th e control or supervision o f m any o f the functions discussed, w ith the Fringe A rea separated from the rural M unicipality fo r these purposes, and th at these functions should be adm inistered by a body representative of the A rea. T h e detailed recom m endations m ade here are intended only to be thoughtful contributions to the solution of the m etropoli tan problem , and persons w ho are m ore closely in touch with local conditions m ay quite validly reach conclusions at variance
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with these. Nevertheless, th e m ain p ro p o sa l-th a t m atters w hich clearly are of m etropolitan interest should be treated as p arts of a single integrated problem o f g o vernm ent-should be adopted as the guiding principle. а
.
s u g g e s t e d s e r v ic e s
F ro m the discussion it appears evident th at the following existing o r proposed services could be best provided on a m etropolitan basis: 1. Public health and w elfare, including institutional services 2. W ater supply and sewage disposal in their m etropolitan aspects 3. G arbage collection and disposal in their m etropolitan as pects 4. Physical com m unity planning in its m etropolitan aspects 5. C om m unity cultural undertakings б. L ow -rental housing 7. C orrective institutions 8. Supervision o f assessment Since the local share of the cost o f com pletely m etropolitan services would be paid by a uniform levy upon the City, the Tow n, and by the M unicipality upon the F ringe A rea, based on total assessments, a uniform standard o f assessm ent would be essential. T he M etropolitan Region should therefore have a Supervisor of A ssessm ent who w ould be responsible for m ain taining such a uniform standard. In addition to the eight fields o f activity listed above, m etro politan co-operation in the use o f high schools would be im m e diately beneficial. Also, w ithin a few years the extension o f the present C ity and T ow n fire protection services and possibly their unification under a m etropolitan authority m ight be desir able. T h e eventual form ation o f a m etropolitan police service is a possible benefit, even though there is no im m ediate need. T he grow th o f population and new housing developm ents will m ake it necessary to review the total situation every few years, and to adapt all services to local needs through using the level of organization th at can provide them m ost effectively. B.
T H E PR O PO SE D BOUNDARY
In defining the boundary o f the H alifax M etropolitan R e gion the criteria followed in determ ining w hether a particular p art o f the rural M unicipality should be included have been: (1 ) a large proportion o f its residents m ust be em ployed in the City o r the T ow n; (2 ) its m ost im portant com m unication lines
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m ust connect it w ith the C ity o r the Tow n; (3 ) it m ust be p art o f a contiguous territory whose population is not less than 100 persons per square mile (the low lim it generally accepted for m etropolitan are as); (4 ) it m ust be connected culturally with the C ity o r the Tow n; (5 ) existing local boundaries should be follow ed w herever possible. T h e proposed boundary, then, includes an irregularly shaped area whose extrem e lim its are approxim ately ten miles from H alifax. T h e accom panying m ap shows the H alifax M etropolitan Region in relation to other m unicipal Regions proposed by the au thor0 and to the existing boundaries of H alifax and adjacent rural M unicipalities. A n exam ination o f road connections shows th at m ost o f the population in H alifax E ast (the eastern p art of the M unicipality) is m ore accessible to T ru ro than it is to the City o f H alifax. Even Sheet H arbour, the m ost distant concen tratio n of population, is closer to T ru ro . M oreover, H alifax W est has good road connections w ith Chester, the M unicipality bordering it on the west. It would therefore seem m ore logical fo r the rural parts o f the M unicipality o f H alifax to unite fo r regional purposes with adjoining rural m unicipalities having sim ilar econom ic and social characteristics. T he proposed reorganization need not disturb the existing structure of the ru ral M unicipality. T he only significant changes required w ould be the redraw ing of D istrict boundaries to con form with the M etropolitan boundary and the reorganization of the M unicipality’s records, so th at taxes for Regional purposes could be levied separately upon H alifax East, H alifax W est, and the F ringe A rea. U ltim ately, how ever, it w ould be desirable to separate the F ringe A rea from the rest of the ru ral M unicipality fo r all pur poses and to organize it as a M unicipality w ithin the m etropoli tan fram ew ork. H alifax E ast w ould then becom e a separate M unicipality (pop. 15,000). H alifax W est (pop. 5,000) could also be organized separately o r could join th e rural M unicipality o f Chester (pop. 6,323) and thus enlarge the population o f that u n it to nearly 12,000. C.
M E T R O P O L IT A N A D M IN ISTRA TIO N
A Regional authority to control the very im portant func tions th a t should be operated on a m etropolitan basis would h ave large pow ers and a wide responsibility. M oreover, it would have pow er to fix tax rates to be levied upon its constituent m unicipalities fo r financing the services th at it w ould control.
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In keeping w ith dem ocratic theory and practice, therefore, it should becom e com pletely a local governm ent body, responsible to the people it serves. Preferably, some o f its m em bers should be directly elected to represent the interests o f the entire Region. T h e M etropolitan Council should also be large enough to represent the City, the Tow n and the F ringe A rea in some relation to their relative populations, and, a t the sam e tim e, should be small enough to be able to act as an efficient executive body. It is therefore proposed that the Council should consist of nine m em bers, w ith three m em bers appointed by th e City, one by the Tow n, tw o by the M unicipal Councillors elected from th e F ringe A rea, and the rem aining three elected a t large. The proposed num ber o f representatives for each local unit is roughly in accordance with population, although D artm outh and the F ringe A rea w ould be slightly over-represented in order to prevent dom ination by the City. It is considered desirable th a t at least three m em bers should be elected at large in order to give adequate stress to the A rea-w ide p o in t o f view. T o give a single body of this nature final authority, subject to provincial authority, over all m atters of m etropolitan interest w ould avoid overlapping o f authority, lack of co-ordination and consequent inefficiency. I t would also hold those responsible for adm inistering these m atters clearly accountable to the public, adm inistering these m atters clearly accountable to the public— Since H alifax has not yet em barked upon any extensive p ro g ram o f piecem eal solutions to particular problem s, the time is o pportune to tackle these problem s from an over-all point of view and, by doing so, to set an exam ple fo r the rem ainder of C anada.
0 See Nova Scotia R ep o rt p art III, ch. 2, and p art IV, ch. 2.
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5: Toronto and M ontreal Should be Provinces M aclea n 's, 15 (June 16, 1962), 46-7-w ith paragraphs added on the Senate, Vienna, and Berlin. By permission.
s o u rc e :
E ver since 1867 this country has been bedevilled by the fact th at O ntario and Q uebec are elephants am ong mice. A dom inant them e in our history has been the struggle by the M aritim es and the w est against the im perialism and influence o f these wealthy central provinces. T he solution to this problem is sim ple: carve the region around T oronto o u t o f O ntario and the region around M ontreal out o f Q uebec and m ake them separate provinces. O ne need only com pare population figures to realize that Q uebec and O ntario are fa r too large to be sensible units in our federation. W hile the other provinces average well under a m illion in population, Q uebec has five m illion and O ntario six. T aken together these two com pletely overshadow the rest; the other eight are left w ith only thirty-seven p er cent of our p o p u lation. T he result, o f course, is th at in th e federal H ouse of Com m ons and usually in the governing political p arty the m em bers from O ntario and Q uebec are in the m ajority by far. Since the Senate does not protect provincial rights as was intended, it is sm all w onder th a t the people o f the sm all eastern an d western provinces feel they are being sacrificed to the interests o f the centre. In 1867 it was thought th a t requiring senators to be ap pointed in equal num bers from each region would protect provincial interests in the federal Parliam ent. But because our senators are appointed for life and realize th at they do not have a m andate from the voters, the Senate has been w eak in its dealings w ith the H ouse o f C om m ons and the party in pow er. A nd because they are appointed by the federal governm ent instead o f being elected to represent the provinces, as they are in the U nited States, their sense o f provincial interest has been weak. T he Senate has taken on party lines, and a senator will usually vote fo r th e interests o f his centrally dom inated party ra th e r th an his province. T his helps to explain the rise o f third parties in the west. T hey have been parties of protest against the dom ination o f the industrial centre. O ne reason our federation has not broken up long ago is
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th at the cultural isolation of Q uebec m akes it difficult fo r Que bec and O ntario to com bine against the rest o f Canada. B ut the perennial get-tough policy o f these provinces in their dealings w ith the federal governm ent shows that they are far too pow er ful if o u r federal system is to w ork as sm oothly as it should. It is tru e that one often reads about state governors in the U nited States shouting im precations at their federal g o v ern m e n t-as in th e school integration issue. But their barks are worse than their bites and do n o t shake their federation to its foundations the way the obstreperous stands taken by ou r prem iers from O ntario and Q uebec have so often shaken ours. T his is simply because th e U.S. has so m any states th at none of them alone represents a great proportion o f the total population, w ealth and political power. A dvantages Because o f postw ar grow th in the urb an regions of T oronto and M ontreal, each o f thees regions now has a population ap proaching two m illion, considerably greater than th at o f any of the provinces outside O ntario and Quebec. M aking them sepa rate provinces w ould reduce O ntario’s population to less than fo u r m illion and Q uebec’s to about three. N o province would th en have m ore than about a fifth of C anada’s total population. T his p lan would also reduce the cultural isolation o f Quebec, fo r French-speaking C anada w ould no longer be a m onolithic, isolated society. T he new provinces o f M ontreal region and the rest of Q uebec w ould follow different paths in their federalprovincial arrangem ents and in their relations w ith the rest of C anada. A nd F rench C anada w ould have to fight fo r its cause in the national arena, thus contributing m uch m ore to our national culture. A few years ago Professor A. R. M . Low er proposed in a M aclean’s article that, to reduce provincial powers, Canada should be carved up into tw enty provinces, w ith Q uebec and O ntario split into fo u r and five, respectively.1 But this w ould w eaken all o f the provinces too m uch in relation to the centre, and would result in too m uch centralization. M y solution is less drastic and m uch simpler. A nother im portant reason fo r proposing th at m etropolitan M ontreal and T o ro n to should becom e provinces is this. C ount 1 “W hat This Country Needs is 10 New Provinces,” M aclean ’s (O c tober 15, 1948), 77-9.
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ing the whole o f their urbanized regions, nearly half the p o p u lation o f m etropolitan M ontreal now lives outside the city boundaries and well over h alf lives outside T oronto. In other w ords, these areas have becom e a new kind o f vast, u rban agglom eration w ith region-w ide problem s dem anding regionw ide governm ent. P artly because ou r provincial legislatures over-represent farm ers, w ho are not concerned w ith urban problem s, the governm ents of O ntario and Q uebec have not moved far enough and fast enough to solve the problem s of these urban regions. T hose who live in them only have to think of planning, housing, parking problem s, traffic snarls, crow ded buses, and local tax inequities to realize this. Quebec, in particular, has failed to deal effectively with these problem s. A lthough successive com m issions have recom m ended the creation of a new level o f governm ent for M ontreal’s m etropolitan region, the province has taken no action. It is true th at O ntario has gone fu rth er than Quebec by its creation in 1953 of a new governm ent for the T oronto area. But the M etropolitan C orporation takes in only T oronto and the im m ediately adjacent m unicipalities, while the urbanized region extends west a t least as fa r as H am ilton, and east perhaps as far as Oshawa. M oreover, it is a cum bersom e and confusing extra level of governm ent. T hink how m uch sim pler it w ould be if the u rb an region w ere itself a province. T hen it could solve its own problem s directly instead o f having schemes imposed upon it by a vast province w hose people know little and care less about its special headaches. A nd its governm ent could deal directly with federal authorities on m ajor urban problem s instead of becom ing enm eshed, as at present, in negotiations am ong four levels o f governm ent-m unicipality, m etropolitan authority, province, and O ttaw a. Precedents T h e idea o f urban provinces, o r city-states, m ay seem strange to C anadians. A ctually, city-states are quite com m on in the E uropean federal systems. F o r exam ple, in W est G erm any, th ere are H am burg and Brem en; in Sw itzerland, Zurich and Basle; and in A ustria, V ienna. Berlin, o f course, is a special case. In a recent study-tour through E urope I visited m ost of these city-states and found th at they have w orked very well within th eir federations. Indeed, the setting up o f V ienna as a separate state when th e new A ustria w as created at the end of the F irst W orld W ar,
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actually m ade th at country viable as a nation. T he Social D em o crats in V ienna w ere at loggerheads w ith the A grarians in the rest o f the country. So, in m uch the sam e w ay that F rench C anadians w ere given separate control over Quebec, it was decided th at the best way to prevent civil w ar w as to give the Social D em ocrats separate control over V ienna. As a result of thus turning V ienna into a city-state, the governm ent of V ienna was able to m ake som e o f th e earliest and m ost successful experim ents w ith state w elfare schemes and m unicipal ow ner ship, including an im pressive record in public housing. Because V ienna is legally both a federal state and a city, it has the sam e governm ent for both purposes. But, curiously, the legal distinction is preserved, so th at the elected representatives m eet at one tim e as a state legislature and then, w earing different hats, so to speak, m eet at another as the city council. T hey even have different chairm en for these sessions. T his distinction is n o t preserved in the other city-states, even though m ost o f them are a com bined state and city governm ent. I w ould not expect the new provinces surrounding M ontreal an d T o ro n to to have a com bined provincial and city govern m ent. E ach province w ould contain several city governm ents and perhaps other types of m unicipality. A m ong the European city-states, W est Berlin provides an exam ple o f this tw o-tier arrangem ent. Before H itler’s dictatorship, G reater Berlin had been divided into tw enty self-governing districts, and afte r the w ar the twelve elected councils th at form erly existed in W est Berlin w ere re-created. So now W est Berlin has not only its own city-state governm ent but also local councils for local purposes, as would m y proposed m etropolitan provinces. Boundaries I t is not easy to say exactly w here the boundaries o f the new provinces should be, but certainly they should extend far enough to take in areas likely to becom e urbanized in future. T his w ould also have the advantage o f increasing the popula tions o f the new provinces and reducing the overgrown popu lations o f Q uebec and O ntario. T hus the province incorporating M ontreal w ould take in not just the w hole o f M ontreal Island b ut also Jesus Island and th e eleven adjacent counties on the north, w est and south sh o res-g iv in g the new province a popu lation of m ore than two m illion. T he T oronto region w ould take in the present m etropolitan area and the counties o f Y ork, O ntario, Peel, H alton and W entw orth (including the city of I
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H a m ilto n ). T his w ould give it w ell over tw o m illion people. H ow ever, O ntario’s rem aining population w ould still be larger than th at o f any other province, and southern O ntario w ould be even m ore seriously cut off from northern and eastern O ntario than it is now. So there w ould then be a good case for splitting O ntario into two m ore separate provinces, w ith G eor gian Bay and the eastern boundary o f Simcoe C ounty as the dividing line. (Since Simcoe C ounty is p art of T oro n to ’s recre ation area, it could be added to the m etropolitan province.) T his w ould m ake the English-speaking provinces o f Canada m ore nearly equal in population. T he three new provinces in O ntario would be the largest, w ith roughly two m illion each, followed by British Colum bia, with about 1,700,000. R ural Quebec, w ith over three million, w ould be the m ost populous province, and w ould feel m uch m ore secure in the federation; talk about separation from the rest o f C anada would then subside. I have been able to sketch these proposals in only the b road est o f term s. O f course a few bothersom e details rem ain to be settled by the p o litician s-su ch as w hat to nam e the new prov inces, w here the capital (o r capitals) o f the new O ntario (or O ntarios) should be, and how to overcom e the apparently in superable political problem o f im plem enting my proposals. But these em barrassing political realities should not obscure the fact th a t m y idea is a stroke o f sheer genius. F o r it w ould kill two birds w ith one stone: it w ould reduce O ntario and Q uebec to size; and it w ould solve the problem o f governing our two great urban agglomerations.
P A R T F IV E : A F E D E R A L T E R R IT O R Y F O R O T T A W A -H U L L ?
1: The Case for a Federal Territory This essay and the next one have been selected from the Introduction and last three chapters o f T h e P roposal o f a F ederal T errito ry f o r C anada's C apital (T oronto, 1966). By permission of the Chairm an of the Ontario Advisory Committee on Confederation. s o u rc e :
I t m ay be useful to clarify a t the outset w hat the proposal fo r a federal capital territory involves. Because of th e division o f pow ers in the British N orth A m erica A ct, the federal'govern m ent has no control over the federal capital or its surrounding area regarding any m atter w hich com es under provincial o r m unicipal jurisdiction. F o r any such m a tte r O ttaw a and its adjacent m unicipalities are governed by the laws o f the province o f O ntario, while H ull and its adjacent m unicipalities are gov erned by Q uebec law. This m eans th at the central governm ent has no direct pow er to impose its will on the capital district, o r to im plem ent any plan it m ay have for it, w ithout the agreem ent and co-operation o f the provincial and m unicipal governm ents th a t m ay be involved. T h e proposal fo r a federal territory, on the other hand, w ould require the ceding o f land on the O ttaw a and H ull sides o f the O ttaw a River by the governm ents o f O ntario and Q uebec to the federal governm ent, and the whole area w ould com e directly u nder the jurisdiction o f the federal P arliam ent. P ro vincial laws and court systems w ould no longer apply to the federal territory, except by agreem ent betw een th e federal gov ernm ent and the provinces concerned, and all norm al provincial and m unicipal services and taxes would have to be provided fo r u nder federal law. It is im portant to note, how ev er-b ecau se of the freq u en t assum ption to the c o n tra ry -th a t the proposal does n ot necessarily im ply th e abolition of all m unicipalities in the area, the loss o f voting rights, o r direct adm inistration by the federal governm ent, as in W ashington. T he proposal usually assumes th at the boundaries o f th e new federal territory w ould approxim ate those o f th e present N ational C apital R egion, as defined fo r the purposes o f the N ational C apital P lan and fo r th e activities o f the N ational C apital Com m ission [an area of
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about 1,800 square miles, alm ost equally divided between the O ttaw a and H ull sides of the O ttaw a River]----T h e case in favour o f a federal territory m ay be reduced to fo u r m ain argum ents, all o f w hich are closely related: 1. on grounds o f principle the capital o f a federal coun try should belong to the people o f the whole nation and should not be located w ithin the boundaries o f any one province or city o f that province; 2. precedents elsewhere dem onstrate the superiority o f a federal capital territory; 3. the physical redevelopm ent o f the capital w ould be m uch easier under a federal territory; and 4. the bilingual-bicultural nature o f the national capital would be greatly im proved. 1. The Principle o f a Federal Capital A s early as 1872, John H am ilton G ray, one of the fathers of C onfederation, gave an eloquent exposition o f this principle: A t the tim e o f the [C onfederation] C onvention, one m istake occurred: no provision was m ade fo r creating a Federal D istrict fo r the capital, and withdrawing it fro m the exclu sive control o f the local legislature o f one o f the Provinces. T hat which was designed to be the capital o f the C onfedera tion, m ight fairly rest its claim fo r support upon the people o f the D om inion. Its order, well-being, sanitary arrange m ents, police regulations, adornm ents, and im provem ents are essential to the co m fo rt and security, not only o f the representatives who attend Parliament, but o f all those who are com pelled to resort to it as the capital o f the country in the discharge o f the various duties attendant upon the ad m inistration o f public affairs. Its reputation should be na tional, not provincial. I t belongs no m ore to Ontario than it does to N e w Brunsw ick, N o v a Scotia, Q uebec or any o f the provinces constituting the Confederation. The expenses in cident to its civic control m ust necessarily be far greater than w ould devolve upon it if m erely an ordinary m unici pality. It is no answer to say that increased value in property is sufficient consideration fo r the increased burden put upon its inhabitants. T hat does not m eet the question. T hey m ay not choose to accept the responsibility; and the D om inion Parliament, under confederation, has no pow er to legislate upon the matter.
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T he legislation fo r the capital in all civil m atters is en tirely under the control o f one province, differing in its laws fro m the others. T he em ployees and officials o f the D o m in ion G overnm ent, residing at Ottawa, num bering alm ost two thousand m en, in every respect com petent as voters, and under other circumstances, capable o f enjoying and exercis ing their franchise, are wisely interdicted, by the policy o f the G overnm ent o f the D om inion, fro m interfering in the local Provincial politics, or taking part in the elections fo r the Provincial Legislature. Y e t they are subject to the taxa tion im posed upon them by that Legislature; and bluff old H arry the E ighth never unfrocked a bishop with m ore satis faction than the Ontario Legislature, fo r local purposes, taxes a body o f m en w hom they do not pay, and w ho are debarred fro m exercising any influence upon the selection o f their body.1 G ray then goes on to describe favourably the experience of the U nited States with the D istrict o f C olum bia, and concludes: T h us we see that the character o f a national capital, the security o f those who attend it, the elim ination o f sectional a nd provincial interests in its governm ent, the preservation o f the national public property, the protection o f the public interests, and the m aintenance o f the national reputation in its status, are too im portant to be left to local councils, how ever good they m ay be. A m ericans have their capital, Canadians have no capital fo r their country. T hey borrow a m unicipality fro m Ontario, and w hether they com e fro m the Provinces o f the A tlantic or the Pacific, w hether fro m Q uebec or M anitoba, their representatives in the D om inion Parliam ent have no power to legislate on any m atter touching the property or civil rights o f the so-called capital o f the D om inion, how ever great the wrong to be redressed or the evil to be remedied. T his should not be.2 G ray ’s argum ents as to why federal M em bers of P arliam ent an d civil servants resident in the capital city should not com e u nder the laws o f any one province are very convincing. To these may be added the argum ent th at the far-aw ay provincial capitals o f T oronto and Q uebec tend to neglect the interests of 1 C onfederation o f C anada (T oronto, 1872), 108. 3 Ib id ., 110.
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th e N ational C apital Region, especially since such a large p ro portion o f its residents are non-political civil servants. T w o opposing points, how ever, should be noted. N ine-tenths o f federal civil servants are located outside O ttaw a, and are of course subject to the laws o f the provinces in w hich they live. Also, O ttaw a and H ull have histories w hich pre-date C onfedera tion, and a large proportion o f their residents are not federal civil servants. In this respect, the C apital Region is a sort of “Siamese-twins” a re a -b e in g a t one and the sam e tim e the loca tio n o f the national capital and an old population centre w ith its own traditions o f self-governm ent and its own industrial, com m ercial and agricultural interests. G ray ’s argum ents w ould have been tru er o f a newly created capital such as W ashington or C anberra w here from the beginning the overw helm ing p ro portion of its residents w ere, federal civil servants o r their dependents. Nevertheless, since O ttaw a is not a great industrial o r com m ercial centre, well over one third o f its residents are federal em ployees o r their dependents. T hroughout this century the federal governm ent has becom e increasingly im portant as a source o f em ploym ent in the area and is o f course by now by fa r the largest em ployer. A com parison of labour force distribu tion by m ajor industry group in 1961 shows 33.2 per cent in “public adm inistration and defence” in the O ttaw a m etro area as com pared w ith, for exam ple, 5.5 per cent in the T oronto area.3 T his figure does not include the em ployees o f a num ber o f large federal Crow n corporations in O ttaw a, w hich w ould considerably increase the percentage. N o r does it include em bassy staff, headquarters o f national organizations, political lobbies, or parliam entary newsm en. Probably three-quarters of the labour force in the area directly o r indirectly are dependent fo r th eir em ploym ent upon the fact th at O ttaw a is th e national capital. 2 . Precedents Elsewhere T hroughout the history o f the argum ent over a federal district, the existence o f precedents elsewhere has, o f course, always been referred to. Since the U nited States was the original federal system, was regarded as a m odel fo r the rest o f the w orld, and was close at hand, the exam ple o f the D istrict of Colum bia was constantly used. G ray devoted a considerable proportion o f his argum ent to praising the A m erican example, and every proposal since then seems to have done likewise,
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adding to it the exam ple o f C anberra after its successful creation in a federal territory by the G overnm ent of A ustralia after 1909. Because o f the constant reference to these two exam ples, they cam e to be regarded as the standard and only possible models. U nfortunately, both o f them provided for direct ad m inistration by th e federal governm ent an d allowed virtually no self-governm ent o r voting rights for the local citizens. A s a result, these facts becam e standard argum ents against a federal territory for Canada. T he facts th at other arrangem ents were possible and that other federal capital territories existed with different arrangem ents w ere ignored. F o r exam ple, in an article entitled “We D on’t W ant a Federal D istrict fo r O ttaw a” ( Cana dian Business, F eb., 1958), J. H arvey P erry, a form er senior civil servant, constantly identified the proposal w ith the existing arrangem ents in W ashington and C anberra and used them as a m ain reason for opposing the idea. O pponents often fail to note th at W ashington had a locally elected governm ent until 1871, and that one o f the m ain reasons fo r its failure and abolition was the lack o f sufficient financial support from the federal governm ent. N o r do they note that in recent years there has been a rising criticism of the lack o f selfgovernm ent and voting rights in W ashington and C anberra. Self-governm ent has not been granted to W ashington because of the opposition of Southern representatives in Congress to giving political pow er to the m ajority negro population. T he gran t of voting rights in federal elections to the residents o f the D istrict o f Colum bia requires a cum bersom e constitutional am endm ent procedure. N evertheless, as a result o f th e growing criticism the C onstitution was am ended recently to allow them to vote in presidential elections, and proposals are now being m ade fo r an am endm ent to give them representatives in Congress. In the A ustralian C apital T erritory until now the one m em ber elected to the H ouse o f Representatives has had only the right to vote on m atters affecting the T erritory. But in fu tu re he will have full voting rights on all m atters. T he A ustralian G overnm ent is also considering proposals for replacing the present partly elected Advisory Council for the T erritory by a fully elected governing council. T hose w ho favour a federal territory, on the other hand, often fail to note th at the m ain provisions fo r it m ust be placed in the C onstitution and so cannot be adapted easily to social 3 Larry Smith and Company, E co n o m ic Prospects, N ational C apital R eg io n (Toronto, 1963), 35-37.
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and econom ic change. T he difficulty o f obtaining voting rights in the D istrict o f Colum bia is a case in point. Also, urban W ashington long ago overflowed the boundaries o f the constitutionally-created D istrict into the two surrounding states, and this has created frightful problem s of governing and controlling the developm ent o f the w hole m etropolitan area. T he lesson to be learned is that, if a federally governed district is to be cre ated, the provinces m ust cede enough territory to accom m odate any conceivable future expansion of the built-up area. Projec tions indicate th at the present N ational C apital Region will com fortably contain the urban population until the y ear 2000. B ut will it do so in th e y ear 2050, o r 2100? N o thorough study o f o th er federal capital territories has been m ade in C anada, the relevant inform ation is not easily available, and n o t m uch is know n about them . M any o f th e m such as M exico City, Buenos A ires in A rgentina, C aracas in V enezuela, Rio de Janeiro and later Brasilia in B r a z il- a r e in South A m erican countries w hich are not regarded as m odels of dem ocratic governm ent. But others do o r did exist in countries having a stronger dem ocratic tradition, such as V ienna in A ustria, N ew D elhi in India, and Berlin under the W eim ar R epublic. In any case, several o f them provide for som e form o f local self-governm ent, w ith varying degrees of local inde pendence and voting rights, so th a t a study of their experience in this respect, and o f their form s o f territorial governm ent, w ould be valuable. 3. T he Physical D evelopm ent o f the Capital F ro m th e beginning, one o f the m ain argum ents has been th at the physical and aesthetic developm ent o f the O ttaw a area into a capital w orthy of a great country w ould be m uch m ore easily and fully achieved under a federal territory. T he lack of a planned developm ent o f the area in the early years seemed to p rove this contention, and by the end o f the Second W orld W ar the federal governm ent was faced w ith the m uch m ore difficult an d costly problem of re-developm ent, especially in the urban core. Serious difficulties o f divided jurisdiction w ere involved. A lthough these problem s have been partly solved in recent years, new difficulties are developing for the future. T h e argum ent has always been th at if th e federal govern m ent had control over the physical developm ent and govern m ent o f the area, the plans for the capital could be m uch m ore am bitious and impressive in concept, and m uch m ore successful
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in execution. Experience elsew here has dem onstrated th a t a m etropolitan plan cannot be successfully and com pletely im plem ented unless a corresponding unit of governm ent exists or is created w ith authority to im plem ent the plan. O n the other hand, the history of planning in the national capital shows th at generous federal financial support is able to overcom e m any o f the present difficulties o f divided jurisdic tion. F ro m a dem ocratic point o f view the participation o f the local residents in both the form ulation and execution of the N ational C apital P lan is desirable. Y et even under a federal territory this problem w ould still rem ain, and there w ould be inevitable conflicts o f interest betw een the federal governm ent and the local residents. 4. T he D esire fo r a Bilingual-Bicultural Capital T h ere is no doubt th a t federal control o f a capital territory, w ith p ro p er guarantees for equal m inority rights-linguistic, religious, educational, and cu ltu ral-w o u ld m ake it possible fo r the national capital to become a sym bol and m odel of bilingual ism and biculturalism for the rest o f the country. O ttaw a is already the m ost bilingual o f the large cities outside Quebec. V anier (form erly E astview ), a separate sm all city w ithin O t taw a’s boundaries, is the only city outside Q uebec th at has a F rench-speaking m ajority. E xcept for one sm all city in Q uebec (Sillery, population 14,000 in 1961), V anier and H ull are the only cities in C anada whose population is half bilingual. T he addition o f these cities to the capital w ould therefore greatly strengthen its bilingual-bicultural character. T h e form ation o f a federal territory corresponding w ith the boundaries o f the N ational C apital Region w ould greatly im prove the whole ethnic, linguistic, and religious balance of the capital’s population. . . . T he 1961 census figures reveal th at turning the whole Region into the federal capital w ould increase F rench C anadians as an ethnic group from one qu arter to about forty p er cent of the total population. It w ould also increase those whose m other-tongue is F rench from un d er one quarter to nearly forty percent, and the num ber of people w ho could speak both English and F rench w ould increase from one q u arter to o ver th irty percent. T he ethnic distribution o f th e population w ould then be: Anglo-Saxon, forty-four percent; French, fortyone percent; and other, fifteen percent. T hose whose m othertongue is English w ould be fifty-six percent; F rench thirty-eight percent; and other, six percent. A lthough English w ould p re
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dom inate as a language, A nglo-Saxons and F rench w ould be ab o u t equally balanced as ethnic groups, and R om an Catholics w ould be in a com fortable m ajority (fifty-nine p ercen t). Since elsewhere in C anada the population tends to be either overw helm ingly English-speaking and P rotestant o r overw helm ingly French-speaking and R om an C atholic, the C apital Region w ould have the best-balanced ethnic, linguistic and religious population o f any large m etropolitan area o r province in C an ada. Its balance would, for exam ple, be fa r superior to th at of th e provincial capitals of O ntario and Quebec. T he only serious com petitors w ould be N ew Brunsw ick and m etropolitan M ontreal. . . . T he num ber o f English-speaking people in the proposed federal territory who w ould be able to speak French would at first be disappointingly sm all. H ow ever, since O ttaw a’s civil service is now becom ing m ore bilingual, and since one o f the m ain objectives of creating a federal territory w ould be to prom ote bilingualism, one could expect the proportion of people who can speak both English and F rench fluently, and in p articular the num ber o f English-speaking people w ho can speak F rench, to rise rapidly. These com parisons show th at though the ethnic and linguis tic balance in the federal territory w ould be good, it would be far from perfect. F o r this reason the political difficulties in volved in creating and governing the territory would not easily be solved. A lthough the addition o f the H ull side o f th e river w ould certainly add strength to the F rench m inority on the O ttaw a side, F rench C anadians would still be slightly in the m inority. Y et one could expect their position to im prove further if the proportion o f French-speaking civil servants is increased, as m ay be expected. M oreover, linguistic and educational guar antees in the constitution of the new territory could fu rth er p ro tect their position, even though the P arliam ent o f Canada, w hich w ould be the ultim ate governing authority, has an English-speaking m ajority. A s D r. M arion has pointed out, the position o f the French O ntarians in the O ttaw a area would be greatly im proved, com pared w ith their present position under th e laws o f O ntario. Even if they did not consider it an ideal arrangem ent, from their p o in t of view it w ould certainly be by fa r “ the best o f evils.” T he H ull side of the river, how ever, would have fa r less to gain. A t first glance their position w ould appear to be consider ably worsened. T he reaction o f G atineau’s m . l . a . to M r. F la herty’s proposal for a capital province4 was to object to it fo r
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this reason.5 Y et w ith suitable guarantees fo r m inority rights, and especially if a considerable m easure of local self-governm ent were granted to the H ull side, this m ay be a false fear. By becom ing constitutionally part o f the national capital, H ull could expect to participate m uch m ore fully in, and to benefit m uch m ore financially from , the beautification of the capital and th e redevelopm ent o f its urb an core. F o r exam ple, m any m ore federal buildings w ould be located on the H ull side o f the river. A lthough the effect o f this m ight be to increase the English-speaking population, one could also expect m any m ore French-speaking civil servants to live on th e H ull side. These would include educated senior officials, som e o f w hom w ould becom e leaders in the local com m unity. T he position of F ren ch C anadians on the H ull side o f the river m ay therefore be im proved by becoming p art o f a federal territory. T h e creation o f a federal territory w ould itself be very likely to stim ulate a rapid grow th o f bilingualism , especially if the educational system in the territory w ere reorganized so as to provide genuinely bilingual public and separate schools w here instruction is given in both languages. O n the O ttaw a side o f the river the difficulty a t present is th a t in m ost areas there are not enough non-C atholic F rench-speaking families in any one area to justify the creation o f a bilingual public school. T his is tru e even o f separate schools in a predom inantly English-speaking area. F o r exam ple, the Separate School B oard o f N epean, a tow nship bordering O ttaw a to the south, recently refused the request o f an organized group of French-speaking families for such a school because only th e first grade would have a large enough class. A s a result, som e o f these fam ilies are moving from the tow nship because they fear th at their children will lose the ability to speak French. T he answ er to th e problem lies in direct encouragem ent and financial subsidies from a higher level o f governm ent to support sm all, uneconom ic schools of this kind, o r to tran sp o rt the pupils to larger schools. A t the sam e tim e, there are now a n um ber o f English-speaking parents w ho w ould like their children to becom e bilingual by attending bilingual public o r separate schools. If the schools were easily available, and w ith p roper encouragem ent, m any m ore Englishspeaking parents w ould desire their children to do so. This w ould increase th e size o f the schools and m ake them a m uch m ore econom ically feasible proposition. 4 W eeken d M agazine (June 29, 1963), 1-4, 23. BLe D ro it (August 1, 1963). On the other hand, the form er m ayor of Lucerne has spoken in favour of a federal territory.
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T h ere is also a need fo r bilingual schools on the H ull side of the river. But there the-need is not as great because the Englishspeaking m inority are not in as m uch danger o f losing their m o th er tongue and the F rench C anadians tend to becom e bi lingual in any case. N evertheless, som ew hat the sam e need exists for establishing bilingual C atholic schools w here p art of th e instruction is given in English, and bilingual P rotestant schools w here p art o f the instruction is given in French.
2: The Arguments Against a Federal Territory T he case against a federal territory m ay b e sum m ed up u n d er these four broad argum ents: 1. it w ould be both constitutionally and politically diffi cult to create such a territory, especially because o f local opposition and Q uebec’s reluctance to cede territory to the federal governm ent; 2. the problem o f governing it as a unit w ould be in soluble because o f the double splitting o f interest that would be in v o lve d -fed e ra l versus local, and French law, language and culture on one side o f the river versus A nglo-Saxon on the other; 3. other alternatives are available; 4. in any case, a federal territory is not needed. L et us consider each of these in turn. 1. T he D ifficulty o f Creating It F rom a constitutional p oint of view th e creation o f a federal territo ry does not appear to present any great difficulty. . . . T h e British N o rth A m erica A ct was am ended in 1871 to provide th a t the Parliam ent o f C anada m ay alter the boundaries of a province w ith the consent o f th at province. . . . I t w ould there fore be possible for the federal governm ent to arrange fo r the provinces to cede the necessary lands w ithout a constitutional am endm ent.
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Politically, how ever, the creation of a federal territory w ould no doubt require such an am endm ent, because it w ould affect the rights and interests o f a large num ber o f the residents o f O ntario and Quebec. T he pow er of the federal G overnm ent to am end the C onstitution is at present governed by the provi sions of the 1949 am endm ent to the b . n . a . A ct, which provides th at the federal Parliam ent has pow er over “the am endm ent fro m tim e to tim e o f the C onstitution o f C anada, except as regards m atters com ing within the classes of subjects by this A ct assigned exclusively to the Legislatures o f the Provinces, o r as regards rights o r privileges by this o r any other Constitutional A ct granted or secured to the Legislature o r the G overnm ent of a P rovince, o r to any class of persons with respect to schools, or as regards the use o f the English o r the F rench language. . . Since the ceding o f territory by Q uebec w ould affect the lan guage and school rights of Q uebec and o f a considerable num b er o f its present citizens, it seems clear th at th e instrum ent creating a federal territory w ould have to be in the form o f a S tatute passed by the U nited K ingdom am ending the b . n . a . A ct. C onstitutionally it w ould require the consent o f only O ntario an d Quebec, but politically it w ould be wise to secure the consent o f the rem aining provinces. T h e desirable linguistic, cultural, educational, and religious guarantees for the residents of the territory could be w orked o ut by agreem ent w ith O ntario and Q uebec and placed in the Statute creating the territory, so th at they could not be abrogated or changed by the federal governm ent w ithout the agreem ent o f these provinces and an am endm ent to the Im perial Statute. I f it w ere thought th at the objectives o f prom oting bilingualism and biculturalism should be em phasized, these objectives could be included in the S tatute. Similarly, certain essential features of the form o f governm ent for the new territory m ight also be placed in the Im perial Statute so th at they could not be changed w ithout the consent of the provinces, o r a t least O ntario or Quebec. F o r exam ple, to ensure a desirable degree o f selfgovernm ent for the territory, it m ight be specified th at the local residents shall elect representatives to P arliam ent, to the terri torial council or legislature, and to local governm ents in the Region. Even the m ain outlines o f the structure o f governm ent fo r the territory m ight be specified in the S tatute but w ith the instruction that this structure m ay be changed in future by a sim ple A ct o f th e federal Parliam ent. T his w ould be som ew hat like the provision in the British N o rth A m erica A ct o f 1867 fo r
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the constitutions o f O ntario and Q uebec until such tim e as their legislatures m ight decide to am end their constitutions. It would have the advantage of allow ing provincial participation and agreem ent in draw ing up the original constitution fo r the terri torial governm ent but at the sam e tim e w ould preserve flexi bility by allowing the federal Parliam ent to m ake m inor changes and adjustm ents in future by itself. M ore im pressive than the constitutional difficulties o f cre ating a federal territory are the political ones. A standard oppo sition argum ent has been th a t Q uebec w ould not agree to the loss of territory and population involved. H ow ever, the strength o f this argum ent may be over-estim ated. O ntario w ould be giving up over 400,000 o f its population, w hile Q uebec would lose only about 125,000. I f th e federal territory is to becom e a m odel for the protection o f m inority rights and for th e develop m ent o f bilingualism and biculturalism , Q uebec m ay be per suaded th at it has m ore to gain than to lose. A second standard argum ent has been th at the local m unici palities and residents w ould be unalterably opposed to the cre ation of a federal territory. T his argum ent is an im pressive one, because the fact is th at local civic politicians have frequently, and in recent years alm ost consistently, voiced their opposition to the proposal. Exam ples o f such statem ents are contained in th eir evidence before the parliam entary Joint C om m ittees of 1944 and 1956. T h e assum ption is always m ade, h o w e v e r-a n d this is always given as the m ain reason fo r their o p p o sitio n -th a t local self-governm ent w ould disappear and the local residents w ould lose their political rights. T his argum ent w ould be answered by a proposal w hich included the preservation of local self-governm ent and the election o f representatives to a territorial governm ent and to P arliam ent. I t is difficult to know w h at the attitude o f local politicians and residents w ould be if they w ere faced w ith this kind of proposal, b u t I suspect th a t the opposition w ould decline greatly and local opinion m ight even change in its favour. T his raises th e interesting question o f the extent to which local consent should be sought for such a proposal. It seems to m e th at on theoretical grounds the consent o f a m a jo rity -sa y in th e form o f a pleb iscite-sh o u ld not be required. Indeed, one can argue th at on such an issue the interests of the people of C an ad a in the national capital and in the objectives sought to be achieved by the creation o f a federal territory should override if necessary the opposition o f a small m inority o f th e country’s population residing in th e territory. But this w ould depend, of
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course, upon the strength o f feeling of the local opposition. A s long as a significant p roportion o f the local population seemed to be in favour of the idea, an d no significant group w ere strongly opposed, the federal governm ent, w ith the agreem ent o f the two provinces, could justifiably proceed. In any case, the governm ents o f O ntario and Q uebec w ould not be likely to agree to the proposal in the face o f strong opposition fro m a significant proportion o f their local constituents. T h e strongest opposition w ould very likely com e fro m the H ull side. H ull feels so strongly about its past neglect by the federal governm ent th at the latter w ould have to m ake a clear com m itm ent to finance a large share of th e redevelopm ent o f dow ntow n H ull and to place new federal buildings there.* This would m ake sense in any case. M any people feel th at federal departm ents are now becom ing physically too decentralized. D ow ntow n H ull is in the heart o f the capital. Placing key fed eral departm ents there w ould im prove inter-departm ental and policy co-ordination. It would also prom ote bilingualism. T he resulting increase in population on the H ull side, how ever, w ould require im portant changes in the N ational C apital Plan and in the recent O ttaw a-H ull transportation plan. 2. T he P roblem o f G overning It T h e problem o f governing a federal territory involves recon ciling a two-way split: the split in legal systems, laws, political traditions, and interests betw een the two sides o f the river, and the split betw een the interest o f the federal governm ent in its ow n seat o f governm ent and the desire o f the local residents to govern their ow n affairs. O pponents o f a federal territory argue th a t the differences betw een the tw o sides o f the river are so great th at they w ould be extrem ely difficult, if n ot impossible, to reconcile, and th at th e creation o f a federal territory w ould wipe o ut local self-governm ent. Regarding the first o f these argum ents there is no doubt that the difference in legal systems and provincial laws now in force on the tw o sides o f the river w ould create problem s. It should be pointed out, how ever, th at the courts and laws need not necessarily be integrated o r unified. T he constitutional instru m en t creating the territory could simply provide th at th e legal * In May, 1969, the federal government made such a commitment. It announced th at it will place twenty-five percent of its new buildings in Hull and will contribute $200 million over the next twenty-five years toward the redevelopment of downtown Hull.
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systems and laws o f O ntario and Q uebec shall continue to be in effect unless and until they are changed by the P arliam ent of C anada o r the new territorial governm ent. In the creation of new governm ental authorities this type of provision is quite com m on/ O ne w ould expect any integration of th e tw o legal system s to be done only gradually and over a long period of tim e, and only if and when it seemed desirable. T h e new territory w ould simply take over the tw o court systems as they now exist on each side o f the river, except that it would, of course, provide fo r the use o f the French language in the courts on the O ntario side. T he E xchequer C ourt of C an ad a could be m ade the C o u rt of A ppeal for the territory. L ocal police could continue as before, and policing form erly done by the governm ents o f O ntario and Q uebec could be pro vided by the r . c . m . p . in the sam e m anner as it provides policing fo r the other provinces. Som e legal difficulties would, of course, arise from placing th e civil code and com m on law un d er one legislative jurisdic tion, such as a case involving residents on each side of the river, or w here the principal in a case was resident on one side, but the transaction took place on the other. H ow ever, sim ilar diffi culties occur now in cases involving both the civil code in Q uebec and the com m on law in the o th er provinces. T h e prin ciples applied to these cases could be used as a guide. It should also be recalled th at the sam e type of situation existed fo r some years before C onfederation, w hen U pper and Low er C anada were united un d er one legislature. M ore serious than the division o f legal systems are the political problem s th at m ight arise in governing the territory. T hese cannot be easily predicted. A lthough the w hole territory w ould show a reasonable ethnic, linguistic and religious balance, there w ould still be a predom inant French-speaking m ajority on the n o rth side o f the river, and a predom inant English-speaking m ajority on the south side. C ould these two groups be success fully united under a single territorial governm ent, o r would the union be relatively unsuccessful, like th e union o f U pp er and L ow er C anada before C onfederation? If so, a possible solution m ight be to create two territorial c o u n c ils-o n e for each side of the riv e r-th o u g h this w ould m ainly defeat the purposes for w hich the territory was created. A t any rate, the difference in traditions and political interests on the tw o sides argues fo r the continued existence of m unicipalities and o f a large m easure of local self-governm ent on each side. T h e argum ent th at the creation o f a federal territory w ould
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w ipe o u t self-governm ent in the area is, o f course, setting up a straw m an in order to knock him down. Few people would seriously propose the abolition o r denial o f political rights as in the D istrict o f Colum bia or C anberra. But the argum ent does raise the difficult problem of the division betw een federal and local interests in th e territory, and o f balancing these interests through a p roper system of representation. C ertainly, the cre ation o f a federal territory w ould bring w ith it no magic solution to the problem o f governing a large and populous area. M any o f those who have proposed a federal territory w ould be quite willing to concede that a p roper representation o f local interests requires the continuation o f local self-governm ent, continued election o f representatives to P arliam ent, and, as a substitute fo r electing representatives to a provincial legislature, the election of m em bers to a territorial council. It has also been suggested th at th e territory m ight be allotted several Senators, th at one of the territory’s M em bers o f P arliam ent m ight trad i tionally be included in the C abinet, and th at another local con stituency m ight form the basis fo r electing a p erm anent Speaker fo r the H ouse o f Com mons. M ost proposals have been ra th e r vague about the extent of local representation in the territorial governm ent, and even w hether there w ould be such a governm ent. Probably the m ost detailed proposal was the one m ade by M r. John H . M cD onald in his briefs to the Bilingualism and Jones com missions. H e has suggested a seven-m an territorial com mission consisting of a m ayor o r chairm an elected for five years, three com m issioners elected at large fo r six-year overlapping term s, and three com missioners appointed by the O ntario, Q uebec and federal gov ernm ents, the latter appointee to be a senior civil servant. T he com mission w ould have a single chief adm inistrator com par able to a city m anager.1 I t seems clear th at a territorial governm ent would be desir able, fo r a t least tw o reasons. Otherwise, no special governing authority w ould exist to take over the pow ers o r provide the services now handled by the tw o provincial governm ents. T ran s ferring these powers and services directly to the federal level w ould very likely overburden P arliam ent. Secondly, th e resi dents o f the territory w ould lose the extra representation they enjoyed by electing m em bers to a provincial legislature. F o r
1 Ottawa, Eastview and Carleton County Local Government Review, S u m m a ry o f S u b m issio n s (Toronto, 1965), 57.
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this reason, a territorial governm ent should exist to w hich they could elect members. T he questions are, however, w hat should be the pow ers and fo rm o f this new governm ent, and w hat should be the division o f representation in it betw een the central governm ent and the local residents, in order to give a p roper balance o f national and local interests? A s already pointed out, a territorial governm ent could n ot have the sam e status and independence as a province because of the special nature o f the federal governm ent’s interest in the control and developm ent o f its own seat of governm ent. Its constitutional position should be m ore like that o f the govern m ents of the Y ukon and the N orthw est T erritories. H en ce the constitution and organization o f their territorial and m unicipal governm ents m ight provide som e useful precedents. Because of th e size, com plexity, and large future population o f the area, and the fact that a territorial governm ent w ould eventually be taking over services form erly held by the provincial govern m ents, its responsibilities w ould no doubt be great. O ne would expect it to possess m ost o f the pow ers of a provincial govern m ent as outlined in section 92 of the British N o rth A m erica A ct. Y et these pow ers should be granted by delegation from the federal P arliam ent, rath er than exercised exclusively by the territorial governm ent. Similarly, even if the powers and struc tu re o f the territorial governm ent are spelled out in the Im perial A ct creating the territory, these should be m ade m ainly am end able by the federal P arliam ent acting alone, ra th e r than by either requiring provincial consent o r allowing the territorial governm ent to am end its own constitution. O therw ise, the territorial governm ent would become too independent o f the federal P arliam ent. So th at it will not be regarded as having the sam e degree o f independence as a province, the territory’s representative body should be called a “council” rath er than a “legislature,” and it should pass “ordinances” ra th e r than “laws.” F o r the sam e reason, and also because of the high propor tion o f federal civil servants in the area, the territorial govern m ent should not be controlled by political parties. N o r should it have a cabinet form of responsible governm ent, w hich encour ages the form ation o f parties. Y et, unlike M r. M cD onald, I th in k the territory’s council should be fairly large in order to represent the great variety o f interests in the territory, and to deal w ith the im portant “provincial” m atters th at will come u n d er its jurisdiction. Since it should not have a cabinet as its
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executive body, provision could be m ade fo r an executive com m ittee chosen from the council, as in the council o f M etro p olitan T oronto. T he chairm an o f the council and its executive com m ittee m ight be appointed by the federal G overnm ent (just as th e first chairm an o f the T oronto M etropolitan Council was chosen by the O ntario G ov ernm ent). T he G overnm ent m ight even nam e a cabinet m inister as chairm an. O r the chairm an m ight be elected by the territorial council (as the chairm an of the T o ro n to M etropolitan Council is chosen now ). W hat should be the division betw een federal and local representation on the territorial council? Obviously the council should n ot be entirely federally appointed o r th ere would be a serious danger of disregarding local interest. O n the other hand, if the council w ere all locally elected, there w ould be a danger o f its disregarding the national interest, just as locally elected councils in the area have done in the past, and as the elected council in W ashington seems to have done before local govern m ent w as abolished there in 1871. M r. F ran k F laherty sug gested th at the federal and local interests m ight be represented by having a tw o-cham ber le g isla tu re -a locally elected low er cham ber and a federally appointed upper cham ber w ith a veto pow er. W hile this would neatly divide the appointed and elected representatives, it m ight also divide federal and local interests too m uch. A m ore successful arrangem ent m ight be to have federally appointed and locally elected representatives in the sam e cham ber and in about equal proportions. T o prom ote a closer co-ordination of national and local interests, one o r two cabinet m inisters, the m . p .’s and Senators for the territory, and the m em bers of the N ational C apital Com m ission w ho are n ot from the local area, could be appointed as federal representa tives on th e territorial council. T h e local residents should perhaps be granted a m ajority o f the representatives, since th e federal Parliam ent w ould be legally superior to the council and w ould be financially pre dom inant. It could exercise its u ltim ate legal control if necessary, and could exert a pow erful influence through its financial support to the territory. It w ould therefore seem safe to provide for a locally elected m ajority a t the beginning. If this did n ot w ork successfully, the federal governm ent could change the arrangem ent by am ending the constitution o f the council. T h e local residents should, I think, be granted the right to elect their representatives directly to the council, in order to grant them the equivalent o f their previous right to elect representa tives directly to a provincial legislature, and also because o f the
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im portance and volume o f the issues w ith which the territorial council would deal. One could not expect m unicipal councillors to serve double duty on the territorial council as they do on the T o ro n to M etropolitan Council. Since the territory w ould be governed by an English-speak ing m ajority, and would com e under the ultim ate control o f an English-speaking m ajority in Parliam ent, it would perhaps be wise to slightly over-present the French-speaking population on the territorial council. T his could be done m ost easily by over-representing the population on the H ull side o f the river. If it w ere done by constitutional provision, the likelihood of Q uebec and the H ull side agreeing to the creation of the territory would be greatly increased. W hat services would the territorial council provide? It would have the power to provide basically the sam e services as the provinces now provide in the area, plus any federal pow ers and services com ing under Section 91 of the b . n . a . Act delegated to it by Parliam ent. O ne would expect the provinces to continue to provide their services, by agreem ent w ith the federal governm ent, until such time as the council is prepared to take on their adm inistration and to reorganize them . F or example, the council m ight decide a t an early date to reorganize education in the territory in order to provide equality of services. If the prom otion of bilingualism were stated as an objective of national policy in the territory’s constitution, the council might decide to increase dram atically the extent of bilingualism in the territory, especially am ong the English-speaking population, by providing that in English-speaking areas the instruction in elem entary schools should be given partly in F rench, and in high schools almost wholly in French, and vice versa in entirely French-speaking areas. It m ight also m ake adult classes in oral F rench and English much m ore easily available, and encourage the creation o f a bilingual theatre group, bilingual radio and television stations, movie theatres, etc. It might even decide, with the federal governm ent’s help and in collaboration with C arleton and O ttaw a universities, to organize a great national bilingual university or graduate school in the territory, like the A ustralian N ational University. Since the territorial council would be expected eventually to deal with the whole range of services provided and taxes now levied by the provincial governm ents, there would still be plenty o f room for local governm ents to continue to provide m unicipal services. T heir powers, o f course, w ould now be delegated to them by the territorial governm ent, and it would have the pow er
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to reorganize them , perhaps subject to federal approval. T h e existing m unicipalities on each side of the river could continue to operate under their respective provincial laws until changed by the territorial council. It could then reorganize them and eventually adopt a com prehensive m unicipal code for the whole territory, picking the best features from the laws of O ntario, Q uebec and elsewhere. T he council m ight decide that, though the city governm ents o f O ttaw a and H ull should con tinue to exist, there should be som e consolidation o f local governm ent in other areas already urbanized o r about to be u rb a n iz e d -fo r example, that H ull should annex the area as far west as A ylm er and as far east as G atineau, and that new city governm ents should be created for the three projected urban areas beyond O ttaw a’s G reenbelt. O n the o th er hand, it might decide th at the best solution to the urban problem s of the area w ould be to leave the existing m unicipal boundaries relatively untouched and to take over and adm inister m etropolitan-w ide services directly. H ow ever, this w ould place a heavy burden on the territorial governm ent. In view of the different traditions on the O ntario and Q uebec sides o f the river and of the physical splitting o f the urban area by the river itself, this m ight also im pose an undesirable degree o f uniform ity in m etropolitan services w ithout significant savings in cost and efficiency. F o r these reasons, the council m ight decide instead to create a second-tier m etropolitan council on the H ull side of the river, based on the new O ttaw a model, and representing the local municipalities in the area. A lthough this would have m uch to com m end it from the point o f view o f preserving local govern m ent and at the sam e tim e solving urban m etropolitan problem s, it w ould still leave an adm inistrative gap between the O ttaw a and H ull sides o f the river, and would create a four-level division o f responsib ility -fed eral, territorial, m etropolitan, and local. One might easily argue th at this pattern w ould be even m ore com plicated than the present three-level division-federal, p ro vincial, and local. But the difference would be that each level w ould be legally and constitutionally subordinate to the next, so th at there would not be the sam e constitutional difficulty of divided jurisdiction. Also, there w ould be a cross-representation o f interests at all levels. T he local units w ould have represen tation on the m etropolitan councils, and local residents would have representatives on the territorial council, w ho would meet and reach agreem ent with federal representatives on th at coun cil. A com plex social situation, involving both diversity and
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interdependence, requires com plex interlocking governm ental arrangem ents. I t w ould not be as com plex as the four-level division th at was created by setting up a m etropolitan level of governm ent fo r the O ttaw a region. T he territorial council would have the pow er to require joint action by the two m etropolitan governm ents, and could control o r take over any service that concerned both sides of the river, such as pollution control and public transportation. N o m atter w hat system o f local governm ent it created, the territorial council could be the focal point for the revision, approval, and im plem entation of the N ational C apital Plan. A lthough the N ational C apital Com mission m ight continue as a m anager of federal properties in the area, its planning func tions could be transferred either to a com m ittee of the territorial council, w hich w ould o f course have both federal and local representatives, o r to a new planning com mission w hich would be an arm o f the territorial council. T he new com m ission could have representatives nam ed by the federal, territorial, and m etropolitan (o r local) governm ents. T he present planning staff o f the N ational C apital Com mission could be taken over by the territorial council to w ork for either the planning com m ittee or the new planning com mission, and the federal governm ent could afford to pay for all o r m ost o f the cost of this staff because of its saving on n . c . c . staff. T h e N ational Capital P lan and any proposed revisions to it would, o f course, have to be approved by both the federal governm ent and the territorial council. O nce the P lan was approved, how ever, the council w ould have the pow er to im plem ent it fully and com pletely. It could require all local m unicipalities to prepare and im plem ent detailed plans th at are in general conform ity w ith the M aster Plan, in som ew hat the sam e way as local m unicipalities in the O ttaw a P lanning A rea are expected to prepare plans in conform ity with the Official Plan for the A rea. W ith the prom ise o f generous financial support from the federal governm ent, the territorial council w ould therefore be in a position to call for and im plem ent a bold and imaginative new Federal C apital Plan. This would require the creation of a revolutionary new netw ork o f freew ays and other roads, as proposed in the O ttaw a-H ull A rea T ransportation Study, the controlled developm ent o f the projected new cities beyond the G reenbelt and on the H ull side, and the reconstruction o f the cores o f O ttaw a and H ull into a civic centre w orthy of a national capital.
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T his outline o f the changes th at could com e about under a territorial governm ent is only a vision of w hat m ight be achieved. A s long as the decisions are left p ard y to locally elected rep resen tativ es-an d this is th e way it should be in a d em o crac y -th ere is no guarantee th a t these objectives would be achieved. All one can argue is th a t they w ould be m ore likely to be achieved under a territorial governm ent. 3. The Existence o f A lternatives T here are o f course less far-reaching alternatives to the proposal fo r turning the N ational C apital Region into a federal territory. O ne is the idea of restricting the federal territory to the O ntario side o f the river. T his w ould solve the problem of the difference in.legal systems, laws, and traditions between the O ntario and Q uebec sides of the river, and w ould avoid the difficulty of gaining Q uebec’s agreem ent to ceding the necessary, territory. It w ould also m ake unnecessary the creation of a second-tier m etropolitan governm ent on the O ntario side. H ow ever, it w ould not create as good a linguistic and cultural balance, and w ould leave the French-speaking C anadians w ithin the territory in a m uch sm aller m inority. N o r w ould it be as good a solution to the problem o f im plem enting the N ational Capital Plan on the Q uebec side. N evertheless, the co-operation o f the new territorial governm ent, and the continuing co operation of a reorganized N ational C apital Com mission, w ith the Q uebec G overnm ent and the m unicipalities on the Q uebec side m ight go far tow ard solving this problem . F o r exam ple, the G overnm ent of Q uebec and the local m unicipalities might be persuaded to create an over-all planning body and a consoli dated or tw o-tier m etropolitan governm ent for the whole urban area on the north side, w ith pow ers to im plem ent the N ational Capital Plan on th at side. In order to prom ote co-operation, the n . c . c . could include representatives o f these new authorities, and could invite them to propose revisions in their share of the Plan. A m uch less far-reaching alternative was proposed to the Bilingualism Com m ission by the Saint Jean Baptiste Society of Eastview : th at F rench should be m ade an official language in O ntario’s legislature and m unicipalities. A lternatively, the federal governm ent m ight achieve the objective o f official bi lingualism in the O ttaw a area by attaching appropriate condi tions to its grants to local m unicipalities for shared national capital projects. H ow ever, neither of these proposals w ould go far enough tow ard m eeting the problem s o f bilingualism and
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biculturalism in the area. T hey would only change the status of F rench in the conduct o f local governm ent. M any m ore educational and cultural changes w ould be required to m ake the area truly bilingual and bicultural. A nother proposal, which is restricted to an attem pted solution o f the purely planning problem , is that the federal governm ent could achieve the objective of a m uch m ore im aginative redevelopm ent o f the centres o f O ttaw a and H ull by a radical extension of its policy o f purchasing o r expropriat ing the land that it wishes to control. N ow th at its pow er to expropriate h n d for purposes of im plem enting the N ational Capital Plan has been constitutionally validated by the Suprem e C ourt, it could buy o r expropriate the w hole o f their business sections that are directly adjoining o r opposite Parliam ent Hill. T he capital cost of this move w ould be trem endous, but the federal governm ent could eventually recoup a great deal of the cost through redeveloping these areas and reselling blocks of land to private interests fo r existing use o r for reconstruction u nder appropriate regulations for conform ity with its plan fo r redevelopm ent. If there were doubt about the constitutionality o f the federal Parliam ent’s pow er to 'd o this, it could perhaps buttress its case by declaring the reconstruction o f the core of the national capital to be a “ w ork fo r the general advantage of C anada,” under section 92, subsection 10 (c ) o f the b . n . a . A ct, although it is doubtful w hether the courts would accept this as being a “w ork o r undertaking” within the m eaning o f the Act. This proposal may not be as breath-taking as it seems upon first im pact, because the O ttaw a-H ull A rea T ransportation Study projects a considerable rebuilding o f the business core o f O ttaw a by 1986 in any case. It expects, how ever, th at a good deal o f the cost will be borne by the provincial and local governm ents. If the federal governm ent expropriated and re developed this area it would face its form er difficulties of opposition from private interests, lack of co-operation from the provincial and m unicipal governm ents, and insufficient provin cial and local sharing o f costs. A n alternative proposal is the delegation o f provincial and local planning and other pow ers to the N ational C apital C om mission. T his proposal has been m ade a num ber o f tim es in the p a s t- f o r example, by M r. C auchon in his report o f 1922, and by M r. W atson Sellar, form er A uditor-G eneral, in his evidence before the parliam entary com m ittee o f 1956, w here it generated considerable discussion. W hile it would be constitutionally possible fo r one level of governm ent to delegate pow ers to the
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agency of another, it would be difficult in practice to co-ordinate the delegation o f uniform pow ers from both o f the provincial governm ents and all of the m unicipalities. T he delegation of any extensive pow ers w ould also be politically unacceptable unless the N ational C apital Com m ission were in som e way m ade directly representative of provincial and local interests in the area. F o r these reasons the delegation o f pow er w ould very likely be restricted to a general control over the im plem en tation o f the N ational C apital Plan. Like the previous proposal, its adoption would provide no solution to the m ore general problem s o f bilingualism and m etropolitan governm ent in the national capital. 4. The Question o f N eed A m ore general argum ent against a federal territory, which sums up m ost o f the others, is that it is not needed: m ost of the problem s it would solve are gradually being solved anyway, and the slight benefits to be achieved would not be w orth the farreaching constitutional, legal and political disturbances that would be involved. T o test the validity o f this argum ent, one m ust balance the tim e, effort, energy and cost that w ould have to be p u t into the creation o f the new territory against the benefits th at m ight be achieved; and this in turn requires a consideration o f the extent to w hich the four m ain p ro b lem srevising and im plem enting the N ational C apital Plan, govern ing the m etropolitan area, achieving a bilingual and bicultural capital, and generally overcom ing the difficulties of divided jurisdiction—are now being solved o r may be solved w ithout the creation of a federal territory. It seems clear th at if a federal territory is not adopted, m any changes and im provem ents m ust be brought about in order to achieve results that are in any way com parable with the results probable under a federal territory. W ith regard to revising and im plem enting the N ational C apital Plan, for exam ple, the provinces and local m unicipalities m ust be brought m uch m ore intim ately into the planning process. T his could be done m ost directly by restoring locally nam ed representatives on the N ational C apital Com m ission and adding provincial represen tatives. M oreover, suitable m achinery for local planning and m etropolitan governm ent m ust be created for the whole O ttaw aH ull area. . . . O n the H ull side, there already exist two general planning com m ittees, one each for the urban areas east and w est o f the G atineau river, but they are insufficiently supported
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by the provincial governm ent. T he m unicipalities in these areas are u nder no com pulsion to adopt o r im plem ent the com m it tees’ plan. A lthough the com m ittee for the west side prepared a M aster Plan rep o rt in 1964, an official of the Q uebec D ep art m ent o f M unicipal A ffairs m ade this significant com m ent: “Its final rep o rt was handed in to the m unicipal councils con cerned, and it is now up to these to carry out (o r not carry o u t!) as they see fit the conclusion o f the above report.”2 A revised N ational C apital Plan will not be im plem ented satisfactorily, nor the urb an area governed adequately, until som e form o f m etropolitan governm ent is created on the Hull side o f the river. The political prospect fo r this is, I w ould say, very good. T he m unicipalities on the O ttaw a side seem to have agreed th at their new form o f m etropolitan governm ent is desirable. T his change on the O ttaw a side will, no doubt, stim u late, especially w ith support from the Q uebec governm ent, a sim ilar change on the H ull side. If no m etropolitan governm ent is created on the H ull side, the prospects for controlling the fu tu re developm ent of the capital area are not good, and the proposal for a federal territory will becom e m ore and m ore attractive. Regarding the bilingual-bicultural objective, the im prove m ent o f the national capital in this respect depends largely upon changes encouraged o r required by the O ntario G overnm ent. It is already instituting changes in the school system designed to im prove and extend th e teaching o f French, and it m ay decide to require locally the use of F rench as an official language. But it is unlikely th at these changes will com e fast enough o r go far enough to approach w hat m ight be achieved u nder a federal territory. If progress in this respect is slow, the attitude o f Q uebec and o f the French-speaking Canadians in the area may shift rapidly in favour o f a federal territory. T h e principle th at th e federal governm ent should have ultim ate and com prehensive control over its ow n seat of govern m ent would, o f course, be impossible to satisfy w ithout the creation of a federal territory. U nder the present system the old constitutional difficulty of divided jurisdiction will inevit ably continue. T he creation o f a federal territory is often said to be difficult, if not impossible, because the co-operation and agreem ent o f all interested p a rtie s-fe d e ra l, provincial, and lo c al-w o u ld be needed. Y et even under the existing system a p ro p er solution to all o f the capital’s problem s requires m any and continuous co-operative arrangem ents involving all o f these parties.
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T h e problem o f balancing the probable advantages u nder a federal territory against the im provem ents that m ay take place in fu tu re w ithout its creation is, however, a difficult one. N o full-scale study has ever been m ade o f the proposal, including the experience o f federal districts elsewhere and a detailed consideration of the problem s involved in creating and govern ing a federal territory. T he Bilingualism Com m ission has been studying the N ational C apital Region and m ay issue a rep o rt with recom m endations fo r it, probably late in 1969. H ow ever, it is likely to concentrate on the bilingual-bicultural aspects of the problem . F o r these reasons, the G overnm ent of O ntario m ay wish to consider putting the proposal on the agenda o f a federal-provincial conference and asking th at a study com m it tee be set up. T his com m ittee m ight be com posed of persons nam ed by the federal governm ent, by a t least the two provinces concerned, and perhaps also by the two m ain cities in the area. It could be asked to consider the proposal for a federal territory and oth er possible solutions to the problem s of divided juris diction, planning, m etropolitan governm ent, bilingualism, and biculturalism in the N ational C apital Region.
3: The Problems of Governing Federal Capitals : C anadian Journal o f P olitical Science (September, 1968), 359-70. By permission o f the editors. Slightly revised.
s o u r c e
Seventeen countries of the w orld have federal constitutions, and all of them were included in the survey on w hich this paper is based.1 It is interesting th at a num ber o f them are w orrying about how their federal capitals should be governed. C anada is n ot at all unique in this respect. H ence a com parative study 3 W h a t's N e w in Planning, 7 (M ay, 1965), 20. 1 T he num ber o f countries which can be identified as federations de pends on the definition used. F o r purposes of this paper the seven teen states classified as federations are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Cameroun, Canada, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakis tan, Switzerland, U . S . A . , u . s . s . r . , Venezuela, West Germ any, and Yugoslavia.
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o f these federal capitals m ay throw som e valuable new light o n the subject. T h e difficulties experienced by federations in governing their capital cities arise from three m ain sources. T he first is a prob lem com m on to m ost large cities o f the m odern w orld: the provision of governm ent adequate for a w hole m etropolitan a r e a - th e centre o f the city plus its suburbs. Secondly, com m on to all capital cities is the need to achieve a just and proper balance between the interests o f the local residents of the capital area and the interests o f the nation. T hirdly, arising fro m the nature o f federalism , and as such a problem peculiar to federal capitals, is th at o f giving the federal governm ent sufficient control over its own capital and preventing the capital from being dom inated by one o f the states. T his com bination o f problem s has resulted in several dif ferent arrangem ents or types of governm ent for federal capitals, which m ay be placed in three m ain categories. Those (fo r exam ple, O ttaw a) which com e under the jurisdiction o f one of the states in the federation are governed in m uch the sam e way as other cities in that state. O nly five o f the other sixteen federal capitals are in this category: Belgrade, Bern, Bonn, Moscow (all in E u ro p e ), and Y aounde in C am eroun. T he second, an unusual type, is the federal capital w hich is itself one o f the states of the federation: V ienna is not only a city and one of the states of A ustria, but at the sam e tim e, oddly enough, the seat o f governm ent for an adjoining state, Low er A ustria. T he federal district of Lagos is expected to becom e a sim ilar citystate in the new federation prom ised for N igeria w hen civil w ar there com es to an end. T he third type exists w here federal capitals are governed by federal law. A m ajority o f the w orld’s federal c a p ita ls-te n of the existing se v en teen -fall into this category. In addition to Lagos, there are five in N o rth and South A m erica (W ashington, M exico City, C aracas, Brasilia, and Buenos A ires) and fo u r in the F a r E ast (C anberra, K uala L um pur, N ew D elhi, and Islam abad, the new capital o f Pakis ta n ). N one o f these arrangem ents for the governm ent o f the capital city has been entirely satisfactory. 1. T he Problem s o f Capitals U nder State Law W hat are the problem s o f governing a federal capital which com es under the laws o f one state? In a genuine, relatively decentralized federation, the chief difficulty is th a t the federal governm ent has no direct control over its own capital city.
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A lthough it has a definite interest in developing the capital as a sym bol o f the nation, it does not have the constitutional pow er to do this. U sually the pow ers in a federal constitution are divided in such a way th at the central governm ent has no jurisdiction over city planning o r local governm ent. T he rapid grow th o f urban areas and the spread of the urban population into m any m unicipalities surrounding the capital city has inten sified this problem . Also, the laws, influence, and culture o f the governing state dom inate the capital city and m ake it unrepre sentative o f the nation as a whole. M ost readers are fam iliar w ith these problem s in relation to O ttaw a.2 T hree of the federal capitals governed by state law have not experienced the sam e difficulties as O ttaw a because they are in relatively centralized federations. In each o f these cases, the state governing the capital city is the largest one and dom inates the federation. T here is, therefore, little likelihood o f disagree m ent between the state and central governm ents, and the centre m anages to control its capital city to its satisfaction. O f the federations referred to, th at is, the u s s r , Y ugoslavia, and C am eroun, the last is especially interesting because it has a language situation alm ost the reverse of C anada’s. It is a twostate federation w ith fo u r m illion people in the French-speaking E astern State and one m illion people in the English-speaking W estern State. H ow ever, C am eroun has only one political party, and Y aounde is the capital o f both the federation and the larger E astern State. T herefore, the possibility o f disagreem ent be tw een the federal'governm ent and the capital city o r its govern ing state is not very great. In the relatively decentralized federations of Switzerland and W estern G erm any, how ever, the problem s o f divided jurisdic tion over the federal capital and its m etropolitan area are surprisingly sim ilar to those in Canada. Bern, like O ttaw a, cannot be controlled directly by the federal governm ent. F o r instance, the central governm ent does not have jurisdiction over the planning and developm ent o f the Bern area. In fact, it cannot even control its own construction. If it wishes to p u t up a building, it has to secure approval o f the 3 Those who are not fully aware of the numerous difficulties since C on federation caused by divided jurisdiction over the Ottawa area should read W ilfrid Eggleston’s excellent history. T h e Q ueen's C hoice (O t tawa, 1961). F o r the m ost recent period see my own report, “The Proposal for a Federal Territory for Canada’s Capital,” in Ontario Advisory Committee on Confederation, B a ckg ro u n d P apers a n d R e p o rts (Toronto, 1967), 215-82.
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design from the city planning departm ent. Bern, like m ost growing cities o f the w orld, is overflowing into the suburbs, and, as in O ttaw a, a serious problem of planning and m etropolitan governm ent is developing. A nother interesting w ay in w hich B ern parallels O ttaw a is in language usage. B ern and Belgrade are the two federal capitals m ost like O ttaw a in this respect. Switzerland has fo u r languages: G erm an, F rench, Italian, and Rom ansch, the two m ain lang uages being G erm an and French, with F rench in m uch the same m inority position as in C anada. Bern, a G erm an-speaking city in the G erm an-speaking p art o f the country, i9 governed by a G erm an-speaking state just as O ttaw a is an English-speaking city governed by an English-speaking province. Like O ntario, the canton or state o f Bern has a French-speaking m inority in the north and also in the federal capital. T herefore the problem arises of the rights of the French-speaking m inority, especially the federal civil servants, w ho naturally wish to have their families use F rench in daily life and thus have easy access to th eir own culture. B ut for several reasons the language problem in Bern is not as acute as in O ttawa. In the first place, the G erm an-speaking m ajority in Switzerland have been m ore generous in m eeting the language requirem ents and wishes of the m inorities. F o r in stance, nearly all o f the educated m ajority have learned to speak French, and usually m ake a point of doing so socially when French-speaking persons are present. They even go m ore than half way in this respect by not expecting a French-speaking social group to speak G erm an w hen G erm an-speaking persons are present. Also, the French-speaking population are well represented in the federal civil service. French is used m ore there than in ou r federal service, partly because F rench rath er th an G erm an in the traditional diplom atic language. T he French-speaking m inority are therefore over-represented in the M inistry o f F oreign Affairs. O n the other hand, the language policy in Switzerland is that, though m inority language rights are guaranteed at the federal level and in the state of Bern, the official language in each district is the m ajority language of th a t district. This means th at Bern’s city governm ent, school system, and w orking lang uage, are G erm an. N aturally this cultural environm ent does not satisfy the French-speaking civil servants. F o r instance, there is n ot a single F rench-speaking public school in Bern to which they can send their children. T he federal governm ent can do nothing about this because public education is a state m atter.
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T he problem has partly been solved in an inform al w ay by the federal and state governm ents m aking grants to a private French-speaking school.3 Since Bern is a sm all city, one school has been enough to m eet the im m ediate problem . This use of federal m oney to overcom e a problem in the capital caused by divided constitutional pow ers is strikingly sim ilar to O ttaw a’s case. A n o th er sim ilarity is th at B ern’s street signs are only in the m ajor language, and there are other language usages of this kind w hich are likely to becom e a basis for com plaint. It seems that, as in O ttaw a only a few years ago, the m ajority in Bern are m uch too com placent about how well they are m eeting the language needs of the m inorities. I was in Bern not long after G eneral de G aulle’s visit to C anada in 1967, and the joke then travelling around was that de G aulle’s next visit w ould be to Sw itzerland w here he w ould sim ilarly urge the French-speaking m inority to throw off their chains. Since jokes often express underlying em otions, in my opinion the language problem in both the state and the city of Bern is likely to becom e m ore serious. In fact, the French-speaking m inority in Switzerland may be influenced directly by recent developm ents in C anada, including the separatist m ovem ent in Quebec. O f all the federal capitals, Bonn seems to be the closest parallel to O ttaw a. Indeed the sim ilarities are very striking. In the first place, the city has had a long history o f independent self-governm ent, and secondly, of the other five state-governed federal capitals only B onn is not also the capital of the state in which it is situated. I t too is governed from a state capital, D usseldorf, w hich is a considerable distance away; like the province of O ntario, the state of N orth-R hine W estphalia which governs Bonn, is the m ost populous one in the federation, and also governs several other large cities; and like the residents of O ttaw a and H ull, the citizens of Bonn feel th at they are being neglected by the state governm ent. A third parallel is th at the federal governm ent has no direct control over o r financial responsibility fo r Bonn o r its surrounding area. T he residents and local m unicipalities com plain th at the federal governm ent does n o t pay a large enough share for new facilities, such as bridges, highways, and cultural centres, w hich are required because Bonn is the capital city; others com plain th a t it is n o t a capital w orthy o f W estern G erm any, and so on, in m uch the 3 K enneth D. McRae, Sw itzerland: E xa m p le o f C ultural C oexistence (T oronto, 1964), 68.
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sam e phrasing th at one hears about O ttaw a. In addition, Bonn’s rtietropolitan area is divided by a river, and across the R hine is the sm aller city o f Beuel w hich corresponds to Hull. In contrast to H ull, how ever, this city is not in another state, yet it does create the sam e transportation and bridge-building problem s. A fifth sim ilarity is th at Bonn has a serious problem of m etropolitan governm ent. Because Bonn was m uch too small as a capital, m ost embassies had to be located in adjoining Bad G odesberg, w hich is a rich embassy area like O ttaw a’s Village of Rockcliffe P ark but on a m uch larger scale. By now it is a good-sized city o f about 80,000. T he federal ministries also spread beyond B onn’s boundaries, several o f them into the tow n to the w e st-H a rd tb e rg . U ntil recently, no action had been taken to solve B onn’s m etropolitan problem because Bonn was regarded as only a tem porary capital. In 1968, however, the governm ent o f N orth-R hine W estphalia announced a plan fo r regional governm ent in th e Bonn area surprisingly like O ntario’s schem e for the O ttaw a area: m ost of the existing municipalities will be preserved, but m any of their functions will be taken over by a new m etropolitan council. Also, in July, 1969, Bonn is to annex Bad G odesberg and several adjoining towns, thus increasing its population by about tw o-thirds. F rom this inform ation it is clear th at O ttaw a’s federal capital is not the only one with problem s of divided legal and financial jurisdiction. In fact, the problem s of O ttaw a, Bern, and Bonn are so sim ilar th at the interested governm ents could no doubt trade inform ation to their m utual benefit. 2. The Problem s o f a Capital as a State L et us now consider the idea o f turning a federal capital into one o f the states o f a federation. This intriguing idea has actually been proposed for O ttaw a’s national capital region.4 H ow ever, A ustria’s experience with this type o f arrangem ent has not been entirely happy: its political history has been chiefly one of struggle between the central governm ent and the huge city-state of V ienna. Because o f the degree o f autonom y acquired with full statehood, a federal capital which is also a state gives the state even m ore control over the federation’s seat of governm ent than does a capital which is governed by a state from outside. Also, if the city-state is not m ade big enough at the tim e of its creation, the urban population m ay eventually spread far beyond its boundaries into other states, and create a serious problem o f m etropolitan governm ent. V ienna has not had to
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face this problem yet because, as the form er capital of the A ustro-H ungarian em pire, it was too large to be econom ically supported by the A ustrian federation. Its population actually declined betw een the w orld w ars, and has been growing only slowly since then. W here the capital o f a federation is very large, like V ienna, and has m any industrial and other interests n o t directly related to its functions as the capital, the case fo r an autonom ous city-state m ay be strong. B ut since O ttaw a does not have these characteristics, the idea of a city-state is n o t very relevant to O ttaw a’s case. 3. T he Problem s o f Capitals in Federal D istricts Since m any federations have chosen the federal district type o f arrangem ent, the question naturally arises w hether this is n ot the best w ay o f governing a federal capital. It is often argued that, as a m atter o f principle, the capital of a federation should not be governed by the laws o f any one state in the federation. T here is a danger th at the governm ent of the state or o f the capital city m ay interfere w ith the p roper functioning of the organs o f th e central governm ent. Also, the state is certain to subject the capital to its own legal and cultural dom inance. T his is th e com plaint that F rench-C anadians m ake about O ttaw a. F urtherm ore, the central governm ent does not have sufficient control over the planning and developm ent o f its own capital. A lthough a federally governed district solves these problem s, at the sam e tim e it presents the danger o f too m uch central control over the local residents. T hey m ay not be granted local self-governm ent o r the norm al political rights enjoyed by the citizens o f the states. W e are well aw are th at the residents o f W ashington and C anberra have no locally elected governm ent. T his is also true o f M exico City, Buenos A ires, and Brazil’s new capital, Brasilia. O f these capitals, Brasilia and W ashington are the m ost extrem e cases. N o t only do they have no locally elected governm ent but they elect no representatives to the national Congress. In Brasilia, the residents have no vote o f any kind. T his was also true o f W ashington’s residents until 1964. They ‘ Frank Flaherty, “G ift Suggestion for Canada’s 100th Birthday: M ake Ottawa O ur 11th Province,” W eeken d M agazine (June 29, 1963), 1-4, 23; see also A. R. K ear, “Provincial Status for the National Capital Region,” a brief to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Aug. 19, 1964, pp. 16 mimeo.
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now have the right to vote in presidential elections, b u t still have no representatives in Congress. In all other federal districts, however, the residents elect m em bers to the national legislature. In C anadian discussions of the question, W ashington and C an b erra have been referred to so exclusively as the typical exam ples o f federal districts that the absence o f political rights and o f self-governm ent are often assum ed to be necessary requirem ents of a federal district. Y et even in the U nited States and A ustralia there has been strong opposition, particularly in recent years, to the absence o f self-governm ent in the federal capital. T here are special reasons why self-governm ent has not been granted to W ashington. M ost o f the W hite population have moved into the surrounding m etropolitan area in M aryland and V irginia, leaving a N egro m ajority in the city. T he southern D em ocrats in control of the Congressional com m ittees which govern the federal district are reluctant to create an elected city council having a N egro m ajority. On the other hand, C anberra has had a locally elected Advisory Council fo r m any years, aDd the A ustralian governm ent is at present considering greater self-governm ent for the capital territory.5 T h e newly built federal ca p ita ls-C a n b erra , Brasilia, and Islam abad—had to be planned and constructed by the central governm ent and a t first had no local population. It is therefore n ot surprising th at the first residents were not given self-govern m ent. Islam abad, how ever, is being constructed beside an existing city, Raw alpindi, w hich contains m uch of the new capital’s population and w hich has its own elected governm ent. P akistan’s form er capital, K arachi, had a high degree o f selfgovernm ent as a federal district, as did Brazil’s form er capital, R io de Janeiro; so did Lagos before the civil w ar broke o ut in N igeria. D uring the long periods when A rgentina was governed under a constitutional regime, Buenos A ires always h ad an elected city council. Local elections have been suspended under the present dictatorship, but when A rgentina returns to con stitutional governm ent Buenos A ires will no doubt again have an elected local governm ent. T hese cases show th at the absence o f self-governm ent is by no m eans a necessary characteristic o f federal districts. In addition, there are two examples o f federal districts which have a considerable degree o f self-governm ent. These are C ara cas and Delhi. C aracas has a fully elected governing council w hich chooses its own m ayor. A t the sam e tim e, the president of V enezuela appoints a governor fo r the district, and the division o f pow ers between the governor and th e elected council rep re
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sents an interesting balance betw een national and local interests in the federal capital. T he m ayor and a m ajority o f the district’s council usually belong to a different party from th a t which dom inates the federal governm ent, and this is so a t the present tim e. Clearly then, it is quite possible to have a considerable degree o f self-governm ent w ithin a federal district. F ro m our point o f view, the U nion T erritory of D elhi is perhaps the m ost interesting o f all the federal districts. I t is m ore relevant to C anadian experience because India inherited the British system of parliam entary governm ent and because it has a relatively decentralized federation. O f course the p ro portions are vastly different from C anada’s; India has a popula tion o f 500 m illion, w ith a com plex federation of seventeen states and ten territories, o f which the U nion T erritory o f D elhi is only one. C reated in 1956, the U nion T erritory has a popula tio n o f about three million, and includes three separate cities: D elhi (w ith a population o f over two m illion), N ew Delhi, the official capital (w ith a population o f 3 0 0,000), and the canton m ent (about 80,000) w hich, as elsewhere in India, is a m ilitaryresidential-com m ercial area governed by the local m ilitary com m ander on th e advice of a council m ainly appointed by him but also partly elected by the local residents. T he territory also includes a large rural area w ith about 300 villages. N early all o f these urban and ru ral units have their own elected councils. T h e largest o f them , D elhi, resembles British cities in having a huge governing council (106 m em bers); however, on the executive side it has a com m issioner, an office resem bling that o f city m anager, appointed by the central governm ent. Before 1966 the U nion T erritory was governed for federal and state purposes by a C hief C om m issioner and his Advisory Council, who w ere responsible to the M inister o f H om e Affairs. T h e A dvisory Council consisted o f the m em bers o f P arliam ent from the T erritory, the m ayor of Delhi, the chairm an o f the N ew D elhi m unicipal com m ittee, and fo u r m em bers appointed by the federal governm ent. In 1966 a M etropolitan Council was created fo r the whole U nion T erritory, w ith five m em bers appointed by the federal governm ent and fifty-six directly elected. T he term C hief Com m issioner was changed to A dm inis trator, and the holder o f this office now chairs an Executive Com m ission o f five m em bers w ho are also appointed by the BSee J. D. Miller, “Self-Government for C anberra?” P ublic A d m in is tration (A ustralia), 26 (September, 1967), 218-26; also, Australia Ministry of Interior, S elf-G o vern m en t fo r th e A ustralian C apital T erritory: A P relim inary A ssessm en t M a y 1967 (Canberra, 1967).
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federal governm ent but from am ong the members o f the C oun cil. T hus a second tier of m etropolitan governm ent has been created above the existing local governm ents, as in the new system of regional governm ent for O ttaw a. H ow ever, it p ro vides for federal participation, in recognition of th e facts that the T erritory is the seat o f governm ent and that the m etro politan governm ent m ust exercise federal and state-level func tions. T h e experience of D elhi dem onstrates th at within a capital territory under the exclusive jurisdiction o f the federal govern m ent it is possible to have a num ber o f self-governing m unici palities and also an elected m etropolitan council for the whole territory.6 A lthough the creation o f federal districts has helped to solve the problem o f m etropolitan governm ent fo r federal capitals, it has by no m eans solved this problem com pletely. Except for Brasilia, the federal districts in N orth and South A m erica were created near the tu rn of the century or earlier. A lthough they w ere m ade large enough to contain expected urban grow th, no one at that tim e could conceive of the trem endous pace of urbanization that the world has experienced since the Second W orld W ar. T he result has been that the urban population of these four federal districts (Buenos A ires, Caracas, M exico City, and W ashington) has spread well beyond their boundaries, and a serious problem o f m etropolitan governm ent has devel oped. T he m ost extrem e case is W ashington, w here two-thirds o f the population o f the m etropolitan area live outside the boundaries o f the district in about sixty separate municipalities governed by the states of M aryland and V irginia. T he obvious lesson is that a federal district m ust be m ade large enough to include any conceivable future urban growth. 4. Solutions fo r Ottawa L et us now turn to the problem s o f C anada’s federal capital. In recent years it has been widely adm itted that the O ttaw a-H ull m etropolitan area has developed serious problem s of planning, transportation, m etropolitan governm ent, bilingualism, and biculturalism . T he question facing us is w hether these problem s can be solved under existing constitutional arrangem ents or w hether instead a federal district has now becom e desirable. O n N ovem ber 29, 1967, the prim e minister, M r. Pearson, said during a television interview that he thought a federal district should be created for O ttaw a. T he next day, in reply
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to a question in the H ouse o f Com m ons, he stated th at the governm ent was discussing, the im plem entation of this project w ith the two provinces concerned. A few weeks later, on Jan u ary 31, he and the prim e m inisters of O ntario and Q uebec jointly announced that they had appointed a com m ittee of officials to m ake proposals for the O ttaw a area. But their p ro posals w ere n o t to involve “changing basic constitutional juris dictions o r existing provincial boundaries.” Since a federal district could not be created w ithout such changes, why did M r. P earson agree to this restriction on the com m ittee’s study? By this tim e he had already received the first of the final reports o f the Royal Com m ission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which had stressed the far-reaching changes required to solve the problem s of the federal capital area. O n the language question, the com m issioners had recom m ended: 1. that the English and French languages should have fu ll equality o f status throughout the area; 2. that all services should be available at all levels o f public adm inistration in the two languages; 3. that the use o f both English and French should be per m itted in the deliberations o f all local governm ent bodies; that all by-laws and regulations should be recorded and printed in the two languages; 4. that all courts should p erm it pleadings in the two lang uages, and that the low er court should be equipped to function in both; 5. that publicly supported education should be as available in French as in English and should be o f the sam e quality; 6. that the two provincial governm ents concerned and the federal governm ent should discuss and negotiate the necessary measures.7 In th eir supporting com m entary the com m issioners had de clared: “But in o u r view the fact th at it is the federal capital m eans that m ore than the establishm ent o f a linguistic regim e is required. W e shall devote a later Book to the other aspects of th e problem and to the concerted action w hich we envisage on the p a rt of the provincial and federal governm ents.”8 A lthough 8 See my suggestion of this kind of arrangement for Ottawa in “The Proposal for a Federal Territory for C anada’s Capital,” 268-74. 7 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, R ep o rt: Book I, T h e Official L anguages (Ottawa, 1967), 119. 8 Ibid., 117.
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th e ir first report did not specifically recom m end a federal district, this statem ent could easily have been taken as implying th a t their later book m ight do so. A lso, M r. P earson knew th at the Com m ission’s staff w ere conducting a costly and com prehensive study of the capital area that had not yet been com pleted. In view o f these facts, one wonders why he did not insist on keeping the question o f a federal district open. M eanwhile, the governm ent o f O ntario has taken some action designed to im prove the situation. O n M ay 1, 1968, it introduced a bill to create a new regional governm ent fo r O ttaw a, and the new schem e w ent into operation a t the begin ning o f 1969. Like the governm ent for m etropolitan T oronto, this is a second tier of governm ent, w ith a council m ade up of representatives from the m unicipalities which the region con tains. A s w ith m etro T oronto, the first council chairm an was appointed by the provincial governm ent but thereafter will be appointed by the regional council itself. T his first “superm ayor” is M r. D ennis M. Coolican, a form er w arden o f C arleton C ounty and form er m ayor o f the “em bassy” village o f Rockcliffe P ark (w hich, like the city o f V anier, is actually inside the boun daries of O ttaw a). H e was appointed in m id-1968 for a term o f fo u r and a half years, a t a salary o f $30,000 a year. In addition to the chairm an, the council has thirty m em bers, of w hom sixteen, a m ajority, are from O ttaw a’s council, and the rem aining fourteen are from the other sixteen municipalities, four o f w hich are so sm all th at their councils m ust choose representatives jointly. A lthough the regional council’s powers are rath er lim ited, additional functions will probably be added as the new regional governm ent gains experience. N o doubt this schem e will help to solve the problem s of planning, transportation, and m etropolitan governm ent in the national capital area. But the difficulty is th at it tackles only p art of these problem s. A large p art o f O ttaw a’s m etropolitan area lies on the Q uebec side o f the O ttaw a river and includes H ull and its surrounding m unicipalities. A sim ilar m etropolitan authority is needed on th at side of the river, but as yet no move has been m ade by the governm ent o f Q uebec to create one. Even if one w ere created, there would still be the problem of co-ordinating the activities o f the federal governm ent, two provincial governm ents, two m etropolitan governm ents, and num erous m unicipalities in w hat is really a single m etropolitan area. T h e governm ent of O ntario has also announced th at bilin gualism will becom e official in the legislature, the civil service,
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the courts, and m unicipalities w hich desire it. In addition, O ttaw a’s Collegiate Institute B oard has arranged to take over the financing and operation o f the seven private French-speaking high schools in O ttaw a. But these m easures are a fa r cry from w hat will be needed to m ake O ttaw a genuinely bilingual and bicultural. T here is a vast difference betw een the m ere right to speak one’s m other tongue before official bodies and the creation o f a genuine bilingual-bicultural environm ent. This would require a com plete re-orientation and re-organization o f the educational systems o f the O ttaw a-H ull area, and long term policies to' encourage and develop bilingualism and bicul turalism in business, the arts, and every-day life. In the statem ent jointly issued by the three prim e m inisters announcing their appointm ent o f the study com m ittee, the objectives fo r the federal capital w ere defined as follows: T h a t the necessary steps should be taken fo r the further developm ent o f the capital region o f Canada, within appro priate geographic boundaries, w hich w ould extend on both sides o f the O ttawa river, and include the cities o f Ottawa and H u ll and suitable neighbouring areas; that the capital region o f Canada should be so constituted and developed as to reflect fully the linguistic and cultural values o f the two fo u n d ing peoples and the contribution o f Canadians o f other origins, and thus encourage in all Canadians a feeling o f pride and participation in, and attachm ent to, their capital.0 T he question is w hether these objectives can be fully achieved w ithout creating a federal.district. It is often argued th at a federal district would be difficult to create because it w ould require the agreem ent an d co-operation of the governm ents o f O ntario and Quebec. Y et to achieve the above objectives w ould in any case require agreem ent am ong the participating governm ents, and also their continuous co operation indefinitely into the future. T he creation of a federal district, on the other hand, w ould require only one m aster agreem ent at a single point in tim e. In view o f the im portance of the objectives, as agreed by the three prim e m inisters, one w onders why they w ould not w ish to m ake a thorough study o f the problem s of the O ttaw a area and o f the sixteen o ther federal capitals o f the w orld, before deciding to exclude the idea o f a federal district. 0 O ttaw a Jo u rn a l (Feb. 1, 1968).
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W hat light, then, does ou r brief com parative survey throw upon the problem s o f the O ttaw a area? Is O ttaw a’s situation so different from the others that experience elsewhere is n ot very relevant? All of the federal capitals are unique in some respects, and none is a perfect parallel to O ttaw a. Y et all, by definition, share the basic qualities of being capital cities in a federation, and in all o f them taken together the m ain characteristics of O ttaw a’s situation may be found. O ne im portant way in w hich O ttaw a is nearly unique is that it is on the borderline between two provinces, and p art o f its u rban area is in Quebec. T his com pounds the area’s problem s of divided jurisdiction, financial support and m etropolitan govern m ent. T he sam e condition m akes the creation of a federal dis trict m ore difficult. But O ttaw a is not quite unique in this respect, and there is even precedent for creating a federal district under such circum stances. W ashington is on the borderline between M aryland and V irginia, and the D istrict o f Colum bia was cre ated by both states ceding land to the federal governm ent. Because W ashington’s population has by now overflowed so far into these two states, the problem s o f governm ent in W ashing to n ’s m etropolitan area are m uch like those in O ttaw a’s. If an attem pt is to be m ade by the three governm ents concerned to solve O ttaw a’s problem s w ithout creating a federal district, they could learn m uch by studying W ashington’s problem s. A lthough the im portant bilingual elem ent is missing, the negro-white situation is som ew hat parallel to ou r bicultural problem . In surveying the governm ental arrangem ents for oth er fed eral capitals, one cannot help but be im pressed by the fact that only five o f the other sixteen are like O ttaw a in com ing under the jurisdiction o f a single state. Also, it can be argued that these five are all exceptional in som e way. T hree o f th e m Belgrade, M oscow, and Y a o u n d e -a re in centralized federations w here the central governm ent has no difficulty in exerting its influence over the capital city. A federal district for Bonn is not thought to be desirable because W estern G erm any wants Bonn to be regarded as only a tem porary capital. Bern is the only o th er federal capital for which the absence o f a federal district cannot be easily explained. A reason m ay be th at Bern is in a sm all, neutral country w here the trappings o f a national capital are considered unim portant. From the view point of a capital of w hich the nation can be proud, Bonn and Bern are am ong the least impressive o f all federal capitals. W e can conclude that, w here a federal capital is governed under th e laws of one state in a relatively decentralized federation, the capital is likely to
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suffer from problem s of divided legal jurisdiction, inadequate financial support, unsatisfactory planning controls, ineffective m etropolitan governm ent, and cultural dom ination by the state. T u rning now to the question o f w here a federal district is appropriate, some negative, though useful, generalizations can be stated. F o r instance, one cannot say that a federal district is inappropriate for C anada because it exists only in centralized federations. Som e federations with federal districts are relatively decentralized, like the u.s. and A ustralia; o th er federations, like the u . s . s . r . and C am eroun, are centralized b u t do not have federal districts. N o r can one say that a federal district is inap propriate because it exists only in countries which have huge capitals. Several federal districts, like those in A rgentina and M exico, contain by far the largest city in the country, but others, as in A ustralia, contain a relatively small city. A federal district certainly seems desirable for the creation o f new capitals, since the federal interest is direct and there is from the very beginning no local population with pre-existing state loyalties. But one cannot conclude from this that a district is desirable only for the construction o f new capitals. M ost of the federal districts were created around existing old cities. If a federal district were to be created for the O ttaw a-H ull area, w hat lessons may be learned from experience with federal districts elsewhere? A n obvious conclusion is that, because a federal district m ust be provided for in a constitutional am end m ent which would be difficult to change, the district m ust be m ade large enough to accom m odate any conceivable future grow th of the capital city. A second conclusion is th at there is a real danger of local interests being disregarded in a federal district. O n the other hand, the experience o f C aracas and Delhi indicates that it is possible to provide a balance between national and local interests and even to preserve local m unicipalities w ithin the district. H istory shows th at w hen a federal governm ent built a new capital, it did not ordinarily provide the inhabitants w ith any locally elected governm ent. T he only exception was W ashing ton in the early years. On the o th er hand, w here a federal district was created around an old city w hich already had an elected council, at least some self-governm ent was provided. Certainly if a capital is large and a large proportion o f its inhabitants are not w orking for the governm ent, a considerable degree of selfgovernm ent seems desirable. W here no self-governm ent is p ro vided, a serious problem of co-ordinating the activities of the various federal departm ents and agencies concerned with gov
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erning th e district seems to develop. A single, m ulti-purpose governing authority for the district w ould no doubt help to solve this problem . Such an authority could be m ade responsible fo r all federal and state-level services in the area. V ery few countries having a federal district have provided the local residents w ith very m uch self-governm ent. In a federal district, because o f the predom inant legal, financial, and political pow er of the central governm ent, the balance betw een local and national interests tends to be tipped in favour o f national inter ests. T herefore experience elsewhere strongly suggests that, if a federal district w ere to be created for the O ttaw a-H ull area, provisions for local self-governm ent and political rights should be laid dow n in the constitutional am endm ent creating the district. A m ore general conclusion is that, if a federal district seems desirable, there is m uch to be learned from exam ining carefully an d fully the experience of capitals such as C aracas and D elhi, w here a desirable balance betw een national and local interests seems to have been w orked out. A t the sam e tim e the OttawaH ull area is in som e ways unique. It has a special problem of balancing the interests o f the populations on each side o f the O ttaw a river. These populations have not only different dom i n an t languages and religions but also different traditions and systems of law. W e would therefore have to design a schem e of district governm ent suited to the special needs o f the area.
P A R T S IX : P R O P O S A L S F O R M U N IC IP A L R E G IO N S
1: The Case for Municipal Regions s o u r c e
:
Revision of a section from N o v a Scotia R ep o rt, 64-73.
I t is probable th at today, because of specialization of equip m ent, knowledge, and personnel, m any existing m unicipal services would be perform ed m ore efficiently in the technical sense a t the provincial level. O n the other hand, in the broader sense of efficiency-in the sense o f effectiveness- t h e participa tion o f citizens in governm ent is keener and governm ental services are likely to be m ore responsive to local needs and desires w hen these services are perform ed at the local level.. T h ere is therefore a conflict in a m odern dem ocratic com m unity betw een the need fo r m ore technically efficient service and the need fo r participation and responsiveness. T h ere are, o f course, various ways in w hich provincially adm inistered services may be m ade responsive. O ne w ay of m aintaining local contact is to decentralize the adm inistration, and have a province’s adm inistrative offices situated in local com m unities. A nother device, which places less stress on central control, would be fo r a province to appoint regional adm inis trators and at the sam e time create representative com m ittees as th eir advisors. N either o f these m ethods, how ever, can achieve the co-ordination of local services and the responsiveness to local needs that is characteristic of direct adm inistration by locally elected general-purpose councils in an area. O n the other hand, there is a com pelling reason why in creased financial aid to support local services does not provide as efficient a system of adm inistration as the by-passing of m u nicipal governm ent and the fu rth er developm ent of services at th e provincial level. M ost of the existing units o f local govern m ent are too small, and the provisions fo r joint action are too inadequate, for them to adm inister services efficiently, regard less o f w hat additional sources of m unicipal revenue they are granted o r how great the provincial aid. T his has been w ithout doubt one o f the m ain reasons why im portant health and wel
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fare services have been developed by the provinces alone and not in co-operation w ith the m unicipalities. O ne cannot expect citizens to endure patiently either the non-supplying o r the inefficient supplying o f im portant social services m erely fo r the sake o f the theoretical and intangible objective o f keeping dem ocracy at hom e. N o r should provincial aid be used as a device fo r unnecessarily perpetuating uneco nom ic and inefficient m unicipal units. Local governm ent should therefore be strengthened in such a w ay that it can efficiently carry a large share of the expanding social and educational services. W hat is needed to m eet the m odern challenge o f the g reater technical efficiency o f central adm inistration is new agencies o f local governm ent which w ould adm inister these services, and levy taxes to pay for them , over a m uch w ider area. This is the kind o f reorganization the existing m unici palities m ust be prepared to accept if local control is to be preserved and strengthened. T he Proposal E xplained T he proposal m ade here is that the provinces should set up regional local governm ent authorities to adm inister those serv ices th at require large areas for efficient adm inistration. It w ould n ot be necessary to uproot or alter the existing institu tions o f local governm ent. Instead, a second tier of local govern m ent would be created to adm inister only certain of the trad i tionally m unicipal services, such as health, w elfare, education, and secondary roads, and certain regional services for which inadequate provision is at present being m ade, such as regional planning, the adm inistration of justice, public institutional care, and the control o f w ater supply and disposal. T he m ain effect upon the m unicipalities w ould be the raising o f responsibility fo r social services to a higher level o f locally elected regional governm ent. Taxes to pay the local share o f the cost o f these services w ould then be levied a t a uniform rate over a whole region, and the province would contribute a substantial share of the cost on an equalized basis. T he provinces have already found it necessary to decentral ize the adm inistration of m any o f their health, w elfare, and education services into regions. It would therefore seem logical for the sake of co-ordination and efficiency to tie in the boun daries o f the proposed m unicipal regions w ith these adm inistra tive divisions, and to integrate the activities of both.
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T h e creation o f regional authorities should be guided by the following considerations. 1. A s a rough criterion, the population o f none o f the new regions should be below 30,000. In densely populated or urbanized areas a population considerably larger than this is desirable fo r efficient adm inistration, and can still be effective in term s o f responsiveness and citizen participation. 2. T hey should encom pass natural geographic, social, and econom ic regions w herever possible and each should have a town, preferably the largest tow n in the area, serving as its adm inistrative centre. 3. T hey should tie in with the provincial health, welfare and school regions or districts. 4. E xcept fo r com pelling reasons the structures o f the existing m unicipal units should not be disturbed, and existing m unicipal boundaries should in general be m ade the basis o f the new units. 5. So that they will be truly dem ocratic organs o f local governm ent, the regional councils should be m ade up o f representatives either directly elected or chosen by the councils o f the m unicipalities which the regions contain. 6. In view o f the im portance o f efficient adm inistration by well-trained m unicipal officers, the provinces should require qualified officers, and either provide fo r or assist in their training. A rgum ents in F avour T h e following is a brief review of the m ain argum ents in favour o f the proposed regional system. 1. PERFORM SERVICES OF GREATER-THAN-LOCAL CONCERN
It is extremely difficult to prescribe the ideal area o r popula tion for any particular governm ental function o r service. In addition, it is clear th at different functions require different areas and populations, and th at even for a single function the ideal adm inistrative u nit changes through tim e. This m akes it practically impossible to fix upon an all-purpose self-governing unit w hich will be ideal for both carrying the adm inistration of widely differing functions and services and at the sam e tim e m eeting their costs. Evidence o f this in the past is th at no single all-purpose unit has been able to m eet the need for the varied
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range of services required o f m unicipal governm ent. In the rural areas various “districts” for fire, education, poor relief, village im provem ents, etc., existed below the level o f the rural m unicipalities while county governm ents o r special-purpose authorities have had to be created above this level to adm inister services which required an area, and financial support from a population greater than, the all-purpose m unicipality. Since it is well known that the existence of sm all rural school and p o o r relief districts has had the effect o f starving and cram ping services, it is logical to ask w hether the sam e forces which m ade the consolidation of these districts necessary, do n o t dem and for m any functions even larger units than the present municipalities. M any governm ental activities which logically fit in at the regional level have been either assum ed by the provinces o r neglected alm ost entirely, simply because they have no cham pion. In recent years both the burden of services w hich govern m ents are being called upon to supply and the consequent need fo r increased participation by the citizens have been rapidly increasing. T his m eans th at a second tier o f governm ent could lift a growing adm inistrative burden from both the provinces and the m unicipalities and, at the sam e tim e, open up a valuable training ground for representatives and officers for the higher levels o f governm ent. 2 . EFFIC IEN T ADMINISTRATION.
T he real benefit of a second tier of governm ent w ould con sist in the m ore efficient and effective adm inistrative organiza tion, from the point of view o f the citizen, of m any m unicipal and provincial services, especially education and the social services. It is in these fields th at governm ent touches the lives of its citizens directly. H ere the necessity fo r close and constant contact between adm inistration and citizen, and for citizen co-operation and participation, is essential. T he trend tow ard increasing provincial adm inistration of health and welfare services runs the danger o f not m eeting this requirem ent. A t the sam e tim e, the present units o f local governm ent are n ot large enough to m eet the need fo r specialized service and trained personnel in the educational and social services, o r to benefit from the econom ies o f large-scale organization. It is because of this fact, and the realization th at the provinces were in a favourable financial position after the w ar, th at w elfare experts have recom m ended com plete provincial assum ption of m any health and w elfare services. A t th e sam e tim e, however,
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they have seen the need for decentralizing adm inistration on a regional basis. H . M. Cassidy, an em inent w elfare expert, spe cifically favoured local control of the general health and w elfare services. His reluctant acceptance of increasing provincial ad m inistration was based on the assum ption that the structure of local governm ent will rem ain as it is.1 I t is notable that several expert studies have recom m ended decentralization of provincial h ealth and w elfare services on approxim ately a county basis. E xperienced w elfare authorities estim ate that an adm inistra tive area for w elfare services, if it is to be adequately staffed, should have a population above 30,000.2 F o r health services, while the ideal num ber would vary directly with population density, generally speaking a regional health unit should contain over 50,000 people. A t the sam e tim e, for purposes o f taxation and staffing, an adequate general-purpose unit of local govern m ent requires about 50,000 people. F o r this reason, m unicipal regions with populations o f over 50,000 are proposed. A province could then lift the m unicipal burden o f adm inis tering social services to this level, and could delegate im portant provincial health and w elfare powers, under adequate super vision, to such units. F o r instance, the new authorities could be m ade responsible for planning a co-ordinated developm ent of public health, w elfare, and p enal institutions in a region in order to achieve the m ost efficient arrangem ent o f institutional serv ices. Similarly, m uch o f the adm inistration o f education m ight be lifted to this level through the creation of regional school boards having both rural and urban representation. G reat benefits w ould flow from having these boards responsible for planning and adm inistering integrated urban-rural school pro gram m es. G ranting taxing pow ers fo r education to the regional unit would m ean a uniform education tax and a high m inimum standard o f educational services in a whole region, while grant ing some control over education policies to the regional councils through their appointm ent o f the regional boards and approval o f the regional school budget w ould increase their power, pres tige and hence their effectiveness as units of governm ent, level is obvious: uniform boundaries for th e social and educa tional services w ould m ake it possible to co-ordinate and educational services w ould m ake it possible to co-ordinate and 1 P ublic H ealth a n d W elfare O rganization in C anada (T oronto, 1945), 208, 427. a F o r example, G. F. Davidson, R e p o rt o n P ublic W elfare Services, fo r Nova Scotia Royal Commission on Provincial Development and Rehabilitation (Halifax, 1944), 52.
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integrate these services and to approach the peculiar problem s o f individual regions from an over-all point of view. A nother com pelling consideration is th at the creation of m etropolitan regions w ould m ake possible the elim ination o f the complex an d overlapping special-purpose districts and authorities that are always created in large m etropolitan areas. 3.
S IM P L IF IE D FIN A N C E
I t is in the field of finance th at the inadequacies o f the present m unicipal system show up m ost clearly. All provinces have a m uch higher concentration o f im provem ents and general wealth relative to population in some areas and m unici palities than in others. It would, of course, be impossible to draw the boundaries of local units so th at each w ould take in an equal per-capita share o f the taxable w ealth o f the province. O n the other hand, the C anadian m unicipal system presents the problem in an extrem e form : cities and tow ns have been sepa rated from the ru ral m unicipalities w ith w hich they are con tiguous. Since the rural units do not have business assessments, th eir services have suffered. Similarly, sm all m unicipalities in w hich industries happen to locate are w ealthy relative to others. T h e result has been extrem e variations in taxable w ealth per capita and hence in standards o f service. It is m ainly this situ ation th at has caused the provinces to set up elaborate equaliza tio n schemes o f provincial aid, and to look sym pathetically upon the argum ent th at they should pay the cost o f the social and educational services, if not adm inister them directly. T h e argum ent has been th at the provinces should pay for these services because they are not directly beneficial to real property and th at a local property tax should pay only for services that are. B ut this argum ent is largely fallacious. To attem pt thus to m easure benefits to property is “to engage in a ‘w ill-o’-the-wisp’ search.”3 H ence, the justification for a tax on real property m ust rest m ainly on other grounds: (1 ) real p ro p erty is a tangible, inescapable evidence o f w ealth; (2 ) a uniform tax-rate is a convenient way o f requiring those w ho own m ore to pay m ore for services in which the whole com m unity shares. H ence, that p o rtion of the tax rate which helps to support services of greater-than-local concern should apply uniform ly over a wide enough area to include large blocks o f taxable property which will help pay for the services in th at area. A second tier o f governm ent, including both urban and ru ral m unicipalities, w hich was responsible for services of greater-than-local concern and which was financed by a uniform
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tax rate on all the m unicipalities w ithin each region could achieve this objective. Taxes paid by a-larg e and prosperous industry, for exam ple, w ould benefit a w hole region rath er than m erely the m unicipality w ithin whose borders it happened to be. In other w ords, there w ould be an autom atic and direct equalizing o f costs between rural and urban, large and small, and w ealthy and poor m unicipalities for those services w hich th e regional governm ent supplied. This w ould be a m uch m ore equitable w ay of distributing th at portion o f the cost of the social and educational services w hich local governm ent and the property tax w ould be called upon to share. T h ere would, o f course, still be some variation in taxable assessm ent-per-head am ong regions, and the equalization of regional tax burdens through provincial grants to th e regions would still be necessary. But it w ould be accom plished m uch m ore easily and successfully because these w ould be so few units to deal with. Existing schemes o f provincial equalization are rarely successful because the variations am ong the local units in w ealth and standards of service are so extrem e. 4.
M O R E E Q U IT A B L E A SSE SSM E N T
U nder a regional system, leaving the standards o f assessment under the control o f the local units w ould be too m uch of a tem ptation fo r them to low er their valuations in order to reduce their tax paym ents to the regions. H ence, the success o f the regional scheme itself w ould be conditional upon a uniform standard of assessment. G iving the regional governm ents con trol over assessm ent w ould ensure uniform and equitable as sessment throughout all the m unicipalities within a region. This w ould m ake it unnecessary for the provinces to assum e the assessm ent function directly, as some have done a lre a d y -a n undesirable centralization th a t this entails. 5.
S IM P L IF IE D PR O V IN C IA L SU PE R V ISIO N
W e are rapidly moving into a period in w hich the activities o f governm ent a t all levels m ust be closely co-ordinated. A l though the strengthening o f the provincial departm ents of m unicipal affairs is a clear recognition of this need, the hundreds o f units o f local governm ent th at exist in som e provinces are obviously too m any for a province to have to deal with directly. A second tier o f local governm ent would m ean th at m any of the problem s and m uch of the supervision and co-ordination could 3 Alberta, Royal Commission on Taxation, R e p o rt (1948), 33.
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be cleared at the second-tier level. T hus the leadership and supervision o f these provincial departm ents could be m ade m ore effective by constant contact w ith the adm inistrative officers o f the proposed regional units, w hose influence, again through close association, would spread to the existing m unici pal level. Because the jurisdiction o f these officers would be of greater-than-local concern, a province could justifiably be ex pected to provide fo r their training and to give them advice. A t the sam e tim e, their jobs would be o f sufficient im portance to attract m en o f ability. Conclusion M ost m unicipal councillors are unaw are o f the need for such a far-reaching reorganization as that proposed. In ord er to prevent any feeling o f coercion, the legislation setting up the new units should be perm issive, allowing the m unicipalities w ithin the defined regions to enter a regional arrangem ent volun tarily. This procedure would also have the advantage th at p ro b ably only one or two regional governm ents would be created at the start, and these w ould becom e experim ental areas w here difficulties could be ironed out before the scheme becam e applicable to a w hole province. A t the sam e tim e, the financial advantage to m unicipalities that join regions should be m ade so great th at no group o f m unicipalities could afford to rem ain unorganized for very long. By this m eans the rapid establish m ent of regions throughout the whole of a province w ould be ensured. Since m ost o f the present m unicipalities are so patently illequipped to adm inister services requiring large units fo r effi cient adm inistration, local governm ent is gradually losing con trol over these services to the higher levels o f governm ent. In several provinces the functions o f rural school sections have been lifted to a regional level. A t the sam e tim e, the provinces have been decentralizing their own health and w elfare services in to regions. Clearly the trend has been tow ard a regional ad m inistration o f services. N ow would be a logical tim e, therefore, to create a thorough-going system o f locally elected regional governm ent. Since it is only natural for provincial governm ents to be unwilling to give up any of their own pow ers and services, this objective cannot be achieved unless the public are prepared to m ake their wishes crystal-clear.
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2: The Concept of Regional Government : Reprinted, with m inor revisions, from N. H. Lithwick and Gilles Paquet (eds.), U rban Studies: A C anadian P erspective (Tor onto: M ethuen, 1968), 240-56. By permission. s o u r c e
In the research and w riting on the concept o f the “region,” it is h ard to see a connecting link betw een the w ork that is being done by the econom ic geographers and the political scientists. I t is also h ard to find a focus fo r discussion, because those who use the term “region” often m ean different things by it. T hey use it indiscrim inately for a geographic area o f any size and at any level o f governm ent, all the way from world regions to m unici pal regions. M any geographers and econom ists seem to be searching for sets of clearly defined geographic areas that are in som e way “n atural.” I w onder w hether there is such a thing. It seems to m e th at the m eaning of “region” varies with the use to w hich the concept is going to be put So the obvious questions fo r a political scientist to ask are: Is “region” a useful concept fo r governm ent? A re there such things as natural political regions? Looking back historically, if there has been any basis for n atural political boundaries, it seems to have been that o f com m unity of interest. This, in turn, seems to have been based on two m ain factors. O ne has been urban concentration. T hrough o ut history, from the earliest city-states, the urban area has been a basis for political organization. T he other factor is geography. F o r political organization beyond the city, natural geographic boundaries have had considerable influence.They created differ ences of language, culture, econom ic conditions, and so on, w hich form ed the basis for political boundaries. But the prob lem is that, through the ages, these boundaries have been illdefined, unstable, and frequently shifting. It is only the m odern nation-state, really, w hich has had sharply defined geographic boundaries. H ow “natural” are the geographic boundaries of m odern nation-states? N o doubt there has been some influence of geog raphy, language, culture, and econom y in the creation o f these boundaries. Y et there are trem endous variations in area and population am ong the nations o f the world, ranging all the way from several sm all nations of less than one m illion to the huge geographic area o f C hina, containing 700 m illion people. And
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m any nations contain a great variety of languages, cultures, and econom ic resources. Also, if one looks at a map of the world, one will find that m any of the boundaries dividing nations are straight lines, obviously draw n arbitrarily on a m ap, and in no sense “n atural.” Look a t the dividing line between the u . s . s . r . and Eastern Europe, or at a m ap of A frica or N orth A m erica. T h e lines between the U nited States and Mexico, and between the U nited States and C anada, are m ainly straight lines, arbi trarily imposed. Obviously, there is little that is “natural” about the boundaries of m any nation-states other than an em otionally based “feeling of com m unity” am ong the population within those boundaries. A nd the intensity of their feeling m ay vary from one nation to another, from one individual or area within the nation to another, and from one period to another. T his arbitrariness of boundaries is also true w ithin federa tions. T here is little logic in the size, population, or boundaries o f the states o r provinces in a federation. It is true that the state boundaries in India, Switzerland, and the u . s . s . r . seem to be based mainly on geography, language, history, and oth er “ na tu ral” factors. But the state boundaries in W estern G erm any, the U nited States, A ustralia, and C anada are for the m ost part arbitrary straight lines o r squares. In C anada, geography is the m ain basis for the boundaries o f the M aritim e Provinces and British Colum bia, but not of the other provinces. T ake N ew foundland and L abrador, for example; not m uch logic there. T he prairie provinces are arbitrary rectangles, while O ntario and Quebec are a queer m ixture of geographic boundaries and arbitrary lines. Even adm itting that geography has played a considerable p art in defining these boundaries, it has not dic tated the size o f provinces. As we all know, there are enorm ous differences in size and population am ong the provinces. If boundaries are dictated by geography, then one should ask: W hy is Prince Edw ard Island a province, but not M ontreal Island o r V ancouver Island? Clearly, there is not m uch logic, not m uch that is “natural” in a geographic sense about m ost of ou r provincial boundaries. Moving down to the m unicipal level, in most provinces one finds the sam e arbitrariness of boundary and geographic area fo r the rural m unicipalities. In keeping with the concept of the city-state, m unicipal boundaries are o f course draw n around urban concentrations. But they vary trem endously in popula tion, all the way from M ontreal, with about one million, to the smallest village. A fu rth er com plication is the tw o-tier system of m unicipal units in O ntario and Quebec. T hese provinces have a
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double layer o f m unicipalities, the top level being the county governm ents. Some county areas no longer fit m odern social and econom ic conditions. A nother com plicating characteristic o f this tw o-tier system is that the cities have been excluded from the boundaries o f the county m unicipalities. T his is not true, for instance, of m ost cities in G reat B ritain or in m any states o f the U nited States. N ow, given these illogical boundaries and differences in size and population for nations, for states or provinces w ithin federa tions, and for m unicipalities, w hat sense can be m ade o f the concept of “natural region”? W hat political level are we talking about when we refer to the region? A re we talking about the supra-national level (e.g. W estern E u ro p e ), the sub-national level (e.g. the prairie provinces), o r the sub-provincial level? A t the sub-provincial level, are we talking about urban m etro politan areas, counties, o r areas larger than counties (e.g. E astern O n tario)? Because I question w hether there are such things as “n atural” regions ap art from political units, I see no easy w ay of answering these questions. A re the econom ic geographers looking for a single set or level of natural regions? If so, these regions may cross-cut the political boundaries o f any level because the political units are so “u n n atu ral.” T o deal with such regions m ight involve w ork ing with several existing levels o f governm ent. In term s of po litical reality then, is it of m uch use to “discover” such regions? O r, do the econom ic geographers conceive o f a hierarchy of n atural regions, one set within another? If so, it is clear th at these regions would not coincide a t all with the “unnatural” political boundaries a t any level. It is very unlikely, therefore, that one would conveniently find a hierarchy o f natural regions w ithin political b o u n d arie s-o n e set at the sub-national level and another set below this at the sub-provincial level. Y et econom ic geographers and others often talk as though it is possible to do so. W e speak o f the five sub-national eco nom ic regions o f C anada, and M essrs. C am u, W eeks, and Sam etz have recently “discovered” sixty-eight regions at the sub-provincial level.1 But have we not simply created these two concepts of the region because it has been adm inistratively useful to do so? W hy would it not be just as logical and “n atural” to find between these two extrem es of five and sixty-eight, a set 1 P. Camu, E. P. Weeks, and Z. W. Sametz, E co n o m ic G eography o f C anada, W ith an In tro d u ctio n to a 68-Region System (Toronto, 1 9 6 4 ).
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of about tw enty regions, based on the middle-sized provinces, w ith O ntario and Q uebec each divided into four o r five regions? T h e answer, I think, is th a t such regions are not as badly needed fo r purposes of econom ic and social analysis; several provincial governm ents o f this size already exist, and full statistical infor m ation is regularly collected on a provincial basis. Similarly, at the lowest level, local governm ents and census districts already exist. So it is “natural” to find larger geographic-econom ic regions w hich provide fo r a level o f analysis betw een the m unicipality o r census district and the province. F ew people realize how arbitrarily defined the Cam uW eeks-Sametz regions are. In the first place, they are restricted to provincial boundaries and often follow illogical county and census district boundaries. M ore surprising is th at the num ber o f regions for O ntario and Quebec, ten each, was determ ined by the coding system developed for autom atic data processing. T h e num ber was limited to ten because there w ere only ten integers between thirty-nine and fifty in the case o f Q uebec, and forty-nine and sixty in the case of O ntario. T his m eans that the regional econom ic planning councils in O ntario seem to have been set up for areas w hich w ere m ainly created to suit the convenience o f the com puter. Sim ilarly, the num ber o f eco nom ic zones w ithin a region is restricted by the coding system to ten. It is hardly likely th at natural regions would be m ade up o f groups o f no m ore than ten econom ic zones, and it is there fore no m ore likely that O ntario and Q uebec have ten econom ic regions than th at they have fifteen, tw enty, or five. M oreover, sociological and other factors w ere given a weight of only ten p er cent, and the authors them selves tell us th at “ the m ain prin ciple of operation has been to obtain approxim ate conjunctions o f recognized econom ic units w ith com binations o f statistical units.”2 In short, artificial regions were created of a convenient but arbitrary size for the purpose o f aggregating d ata and analyzing econom ic activity below the provincial level. They cannot claim to be truly “n atural” regions fo r purposes of econom ic planning, adm inistration, o r governm ent. A re there, then, such things as “all-purpose” natural regions? I t seems to be true th at econom ic activity and cultural influence spread out in increasing concentric circles from urban centres. Using the analogy o f waves created by stones dropped in a scattered fashion over w ater, some econom ic geographers there fore believe th at the w ay to find natural regions is to find the limits of the “waves” o f influence by draw ing boundaries along the lines w here the waves from different urban centres collide.
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B ut there are two criticism s o f this easy analogy. U rban centres vary greatly in size, so th at the strong waves from a large city (“stone”) m ay override the w eak waves from a tow n (“pebble”), an d it becomes difficult to find the lines w here the waves collide. A m ore serious criticism is th at urban centres send out a great m any waves o f different kinds and intensity. T hese travel differ ent distances and m eet the corresponding waves from other u rban centres at different points. So it becom es impossible to draw a single line around an urban centre’s area o f influence, and one is left with a com plex overlay o f regions representing the boundaries o f influence o f different econom ic and social factors. T he difficulty is th at real social and econom ic life is a com plex continuum o f interrelationships. I therefore conclude that, except possibly for m etropolitan areas, there is little prospect of finding within a country a single set, or a hierarchy of sets, o f regions which represent a “n atu ra l” bunching of social and econom ic activities in areas other than politically defined ones. H ow ever, once a set of regions has been decided upon (e.g. their general num ber and size), the w ork of the econom ic geographer can be valuable in deciding precise boun daries by trying, so far as possible, to group together natural factors. Criteria fo r Political R egions H aving taken this gloom y view of the prospect o f finding n atural regions, I now ask w hat sense or use political scientists can m ake o f the idea o f a political region. In other words, how does one know w hether a regional level o f governm ent is needed? W hat criteria should be used to answer this question? This is certainly a difficult problem . All I can offer are w hat I th in k are fo u r o f the m ain criteria for choosing governm ental areas in a dem ocracy. O ne o f these I have already m entioned. T he area chosen m ust encom pass people who have a feeling of com m on interest. T his seems to have been the basis for political boundaries throughout history. But it is a very vague concept. If one is thinking o f creating a new regional governm ent, how does one m easure “com m unity o f interest”? How does one know w here it begins and ends? Indeed, how does one even identify it? Secondly, the adm inistrative ease and efficiency with w hich one level o f governm ent can deal with another level is an 3 Ib id ., 265.
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im p o rtant criterion. This, in turn, depends upon the num ber of units a t the low er level. F o r instance, in O ntario there are nearly 1,000 m unicipalities. This m eans th at the provincial govern m ent in its dealings with the local governm ents has, in adm inis trative jargon, a “span of control” of about 1,000 units. T hirdly, and this is the criterion stressed m ost frequently in studies of local governm ent, the governm ental unit m ust en com pass enough p opulation and wealth to finance and adm inis te r efficiently the m odern battery o f services expected o f it. T h e fourth criterion, w hich I consider the m ost im portant, is w h at you m ight call a purely political one: decentralization. T h e political system m ust avoid excessive centralization. I t may therefore be desirable to create units of governm ent at a lower level to increase the num ber o f centres a t w hich political deci sions are m ade, thus keeping the political system “pluralized.” If real political decisions are to. be m ade by these units, how ever, they cannot be m erely adm inistrative divisions; they m ust have elected representatives and they m ust be relatively independent o f the higher level. A s a convenient shorthand, I shall refer to these four criteria as the interest, inter-governm ental, efficiency, and decentralization criteria. L et us exam ine the first criterion at greater length, because it is so vague and perhaps the m ost difficult to understand. In attem pting to apply this criterion to the possible need for regional governm ent at any level, one m ust ask: Is there a com m unity o f interest which is going unexpressed? T his com m unity of interest may be based on geographic, econom ic, or cultural factors. O ne exam ple is the post-w ar move tow ard the integration of W estern Europe. A com m unity of interest seems to exist there which has no corresponding political organization. Sim ilarly in C anada, there m ay be a com m unity o f interest in the A tlantic o r P rairie regions which is not adequately expressed because there is no corresponding regional unit of governm ent. T h ere are also identifiable regions o f this kind in the U nited States, like the S outh and the C orn Belt. A serious problem in attem pting to apply this criterion is th at the existing political system m ay p revent the expression of these “other-based” interests—interests which are geographically based, but not on the boundaries of the existing political units. P rofessor J. E. H odgetts has suggested th at in C anada the par liam entary system o f governm ent m ay have had this effect at both levels o f governm ent.3 T he strictness o f party discipline m ay prevent the adequate expression o f other-based interests through the existing party system. In federal politics one thinks
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o f the break-aw ay political parties based on the prairies. A t the provincial level, the strictness o f party discipline in O ntario, for exam ple, may be preventing the expression o f strong interests based on Eastern O ntario o r N orth-E astern O ntario. T he exist ing political system, then, may obscure other-based com m unities o f interest. But the research problem s are: H ow do we know w hen o r w here such com m unities exist? W hat are their geo graphic limits? Is the com m unity of interest based only on centre of econom ic influence, o r is it based m ainly on a strong, subjective feeling o f com m unity? H ow clear-cut m ust these facto rs be to w arran t a regional unit o f governm ent? O ne can easily see th at the concept o f com m unity o f interest is alm ost im possible to apply operationally. A n o th er com plicating point is that over a period of tim e a political u nit will create its ow n com m unity o f interest. T h e nation is the m ost obvious exam ple. T he national governm ent reinforces the concept o f the nation and the feeling o f national ism. Sim ilarly in a federal system, the provincial boundaries m a rk o ut and create com m unities of interest w ithin those boundaries. So, although one can provide fo r an existing com m unity o f interest by creating a political u nit for it, one can also create a com m unity o f interest by creating a political unit. Is the latter type of com m unity feeling any the less genuine? R egions at the Sub-Provincial L evel In thinking about regional governm ent, since there is not m uch hope of joining provinces to create m ulti-purpose regional governm ents, let us concentrate ou r attention on the level below the province. T his is also the level that is m ainly related to the city, and to the problem o f how far the city’s influence extends beyond the built-up area. H ere it is difficult to confine one’s attention w ithin the boundaries o f a single province. A m etropolitan area m ay cross provincial boundaries. O ttaw a-H ull is a prim e example. T his exam ple is fu rth er com plicated by the fact th at it is also the federal capital, and therefore gets into problem s o f constitutional jurisdiction between the federal and provincial levels o f governm ent. M etropolitan areas m ay even cross international boundaries. W indsor-D etroit is a good ex am ple. Indeed, th e G reek planner, D r. Doxiadis, w ho was 3 J. E. Hodgctts, “Regional Interests and Policy in a Federal Struc ture,” C anadian Jo u rn a l o f E co n o m ics a n d P olitical Science, 32 February, 1966), 1-14.
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attached to a planning group in D etroit, claim s th at the whole G re at Lakes area is one gigantic international megalopolis centred on D etroit, w ith the C anadian extension including T o ronto, M ontreal, and Q uebec City.4 In thinking ab o u t re gional governm ent in relation to urban concentration, then, one sees that econom ic and social influences do not stop at provin cial boundaries. B ut the attendant problem s can be solved only by intergovernm ental, even international, co-operation. A n im portant consideration regarding the need for regional governm ent at the sub-provincial level is the size and population o f a province. T he need will also be greater in a province w ith a large num ber o f sm all rural m unicipalities. So we m ust start analyzing this problem w ith som e of the elem entary facts about the structure o f local governm ent in C anada. T he table in the Introduction reveals the great variations in the size and num ber o f ru ral m unicipalities from one province to another. Prince E dw ard Island and N ew Brunsw ick have none. But even before N ew Brunswick abolished them in 1966, N ew Brunsw ick and N ova Scotia had a relatively sm all num ber o f ru ral m unicipal ities in proportion to provincial population (fifteen and twentyfour, respectively). T his com pares w ith over 550 in O ntario and about 1,100 in Quebec. H ow ever, these large num bers are partly com pensated fo r by the existence of the second-tier counties. M anitoba and Saskatchew an, too, have a very large num ber of sm all ru ral m unicipalities in proportion to popula tion (about 100 and 300, respectively). It is in the large, populous provinces and in those which have the largest num ber o f rural m unicipalities th at the case fo r a regional level of governm ent is likely to be strongest. H ow ever, I think a con vincing case can also be m ade fo r regional governm ent in those provinces th at have relatively large rural m u n ic ip a lities-as I tried to do for N ova Scotia m any years ago (see previous e ssay ). Even though some o f m y criteria do not apply as neatly there, the others (especially “decentralization”) are im portant enough, I believe, to carry the argum ent. C om paring w ith the n um ber of states in a typical federation, one cannot help but be impressed w ith the trem endous num ber o f units o f local governm ent in each province. P rince E dw ard Island, with the smallest num ber, h ad thirty in 1968, while Saskatchew an, w ith the largest num ber in a province not having county governm ent, had nearly 800. Y et the federation w ith the largest num ber o f states, the U nited States, has only fifty states, and the largest federation, India, has only seventeen states. Sw itzerland has twenty-two, but the typical num ber is smaller.
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T hus C anada and W estern G erm any have ten each, w hile N i geria h ad only fo u r and its new federation has twelve. A ustralia has only six, In short, a m uch greater gap exists betw een the m unicipal and provincial levels o f governm ent in C anada than betw een the state and central levels in m ost federations. A pplication o f the Criteria fo r Regions H aving looked briefly at the m unicipal structure across C anada, let us now try to apply my four criteria to the subprovincial level to see w hether there is a need fo r regional governm ent. M y first criterion w as: A re there com m unities o f interest going unexpressed? Considering the num ber o f local units and the consequent gap th at may exist between the provin cial governm ent and the m unicipalities, one could conclude, but rath er vaguely, th at probably there are com m unities o f interest at the regional level w hich have been unable to express them selves in O ntario, Q uebec and the four w estern provinces. Now th a t N ew Brunsw ick has abolished its rural m unicipalities, I believe that there will also be regional com m unities o f interest going unexpressed in that province. A special problem in applying the interest criterion is that there are m etropolitan areas nearly everyw here in Canada w hich have spilled over the boundaries o f th e central city. Each is a single, built-up area with a com m unity o f interest w hich can no longer be expressed through the existing governm ental m a chinery, except w here m etropolitan governm ents have been created, such as those for T oronto and W innipeg. T he difficulty is th a t the speed o f urban grow th in the tw entieth century has out-dated the old-fashioned w ay o f draw ing a boundary around the com m unity of interest represented by the built-up area. One now has the problem o f potential built-up areas th at will a t a predictable fu tu re tim e become urban. W here does the m etro politan area stop? N ow adays it seems to shade into the country side. N o t only that, but cities are growing into other cities, resulting in galaxies o f cities in certain p arts o f the world, such as the N orth-E astern U nited States and the L os Angeles area. In C anada, South-C entral O ntario is a good example. So it is often difficult now to draw a line around the com m unity of interest of even an urban area. Considering now the second criterion, ease o f inter-govern m ental com m unication, let us try to apply the idea o f the span * T im e (November, 1966).
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o f control or attention, w hich is a convenient sort o f rubric o r rule of thum b in public adm inistration. A dm inistrative w riters claim that, because the num ber of possible relationships rises w ith the num ber of units in geom etric progression, it is difficult fo r any superior unit to deal w ith m ore than a sm all num ber of inferior units. T he num ber th at early w riters tended to favour ranged from six to twelve units. L ater w riters have agreed that th ere are m any situations w here the span of attention can be m uch larger than this and w ork successfully.5 But if there is any sense to this idea, it seems clear that nearly 1,000 and over 1 ,7 0 0 -th e num ber o f municipalities in O ntario and Quebec, resp ectiv ely -are simply too m any units for a higher level of governm ent to deal with. O ne extenuating circum stance is the existence of the second-tier counties. H ow ever, the counties are n o t a real buffer between the provinces and the municipalities. I t is not a system in which the province delegates pow er to the county and then the county delegates pow er to the m unicipality; it is a system in which the province deals directly w ith both levels. In the other provinces, which do not have this second tier, even though they have sm aller total num bers o f units, one could still argue that these num bers are far too large for effective inter-governm ental com m unication. T his argum ent probably does n ot apply to P rince E dw ard Island o r N ew Brunswick. N o r does it apply with m uch force to N ova Scotia, which has only sixty-six units. L et us now take the third criterion, and ask: A re the existing m unicipal units big enough to finance and provide governm en tal services efficiently? T he prior question, of course, is: W hat population is “ big enough” ? It is clear that the m inim um effi cient size for financing and providing local services has grown in th e tw entieth century for a num ber o f reasons. F irst, the efficient size has increased w ith the rise in the standard of services provided and the consequent increase in cost, which sm all units cannot afford. Second, it has grown with the devel opm ent of specialization. M any people advance the principle th at a unit should be big enough to hire at least one full-time expert in each service being provided. Certainly some services req u ire far m ore than that. F o r instance, a fully-m anned health unit would require at least one full-tim e doctor and probably several full-tim e nurses. So the question can be asked: Is the unit big enough to enjoy the full benefits o f specialization? It is clear th at m ost rural and small urban m unicipalities in C anada are too sm all to m eet this criterion. T hird, the trem endous im provem ent in transportation makes it m uch easier to travel
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and com m unicate from one side of a large geographic u n it to the other. T he old school district was based on the size th at a young child could conveniently w alk to school. It was also based on the one-teacher, one-room school before the days of specialization in teaching. T hus, one could go through a whole range o f services that have in the past been provided o r could in the fu tu re be provided by a local level of governm ent, and con clude th at m ost existing units sim ply are not large enough to finance and adm inister them efficiently. W hat then, is the m inim um efficient size? A great deal of argum ent goes on about this. It no doubt varies from one service to another. M y present view is that the m inim um effi cient size fo r a m ulti-purpose unit o f local governm ent in set tled areas is a population of about 50,000,6 with an absolute m inim um in sparsely populated areas o f about 30,000. It is tru e th at som e o f the existing m unicipalities, especially am ong the cities, are beyond these m inim a. But m ost m unicipalities are not, and the result has been provincial centralization of services. Since the local units have been unable to finance o r provide m any services efficiently, the province has felt duty-bound to supply the services. It has therefore tended either to provide them directly o r to control local standards. T he result has been a w eakening o f the local units as real decision centres, since the vital decisions are now being m ade at the provincial level. U nfortunately, this works directly against the decentralization criterion. In trying to solve this problem , the im m ediate answ er th at com es to m ind is, why not enlarge the m unicipalities? T he diffi culty here is th at a very large num ber o f the m unicipalities are sm all u rban centres. T hey are villages, tow ns, o r sm all cities w ith clear-cut com m unities of interest. It w ould be undesirable to abolish their councils in order to create larger units because this w ould be contrary to the criterion th at there should be gov ernm ental units corresponding to and reinforcing com m unities of interest. T he alternative solution, which I offered in my re p o rt to the governm ent of N ova Scotia, is to create a second tier o f regional governm ents w hich w ould include the urban m u n i 6 Luther Gulick, “T he Division and Coordination o f W ork,” in Don ald C. Rowat (ed.), Basic Issues in P ublic A d m in istra tio n (New Y ork, 1961), 55. “ The most recent expert support for the 50,000 figure comes from the U.S. President’s Commission on Law Enforcem ent and Adminis tration of Justice, for administering police forces; see T im e (M arch 24, 1967), 22.
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cipalities. In accordance w ith the decentralization criterion, these governm ents m ust have elected councils w ith considerable independence from the provincial governm ent. T hey m ust not be m ainly units o f provincial adm inistration w ith the regional council only advisory, as in the M ichener proposal fo r M anitoba (see A p pendix). Even w here there is no obvious com m unity of interest a t the regional level, I believe this solution to be desirable. M ost m unicipalities are so clearly ill-equipped to finance and adm in ister m any m odern governm ental services that, using the inter governm ental, efficiency and decentralization criteria alone, one could argue fo r the creation of regional units. W here there were also clear regional com m unities of interest, this would o f course be an added strong factor supporting the creation o f regional governm ents. But I do not think it a necessary factor. Because o f the separation o f cities from the surrounding m u nicipalities in C anada, one runs up against a special problem : Should cities be included in the regions? Clearly cities below 50,000 in population are not large enough to finance and ad m inister som e existing o r potentially local services efficiently. But w hat o f the larger cities? G re at Britain has carved out only the very largest cities as one-tier county boroughs, and even quite large cities are in a tw o-tier system w ith strong county governm ents sitting above them . Som e experts in Britain feel th at even the largest cities should com e un d er a reorganized system o f regional governm ent based on the counties.7 U nfor tunately, O ntario and Q uebec long ago m ade the decision to carve o ut all cities from th e second-tier counties. In the past, this m ay have been satisfactory for cities o f over 50,000. But even this is no longer desirable. T he reason is the m odern speed o f growth o f such cities. T he need for controlling grow th beyond th eir existing boundaries is nowadays too great, and they need som e kind of controlling authority w hich encom passes the grow th areas, not only fo r planning but also for governm ental purposes. In the past, annexation by the city has always been “too little and too late.” F o r u rban areas with populations bigger than about 150,000, I do n ot think annexation o r consolidation are desirable solu tions fo r another reason. W hen an urban area grows beyond 150,000, it is nearly always m ade up o f a central city and several satellite centres w hich represent geographically based com m unities o f interest w ithin it. T o consolidate such an area u nder a single city governm ent w rongly assumes that the are a is an undifferentiated blob; it prevents these com m unities o f in
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terest from being adequately expressed. T his is the great virtue o f the tw o-tier m etropolitan system, as evidenced by T o ro n to and W innipeg. Such a system also fits the criterion o f decen tralization. U nfortunately, because of the gigantic size of some o f o u r m odern cities, it is possible to have even local govern m ents that are too highly centralized. L arge urban areas should therefore have their own tw o-tier structures o f local and m etropolitan, o r regional, governm ent. Assuming, then, th at a regional level of governm ent which includes cities is desirable, w hat size should the regional units be? H ow m any should there be? H ere it is extrem ely difficult to m ake any clearly rational decision. Because my criteria are so vague, they do n o t provide a firm guide. O ur only clear guide, as I have suggested, is that the m inim um efficient population is about 50,000. If in any province one were to create regional governm ents w ith an average population of 50,000, and one found th at there w ould be few er than ten o f them, then I doubt w hether, except possibly for its m etropolitan areas, a regional level o f governm ent is needed. It is probable that, instead, poten tial regional services could be satisfactorily provided by a single tier of strong, provincially aided m unicipalities o r by the pro vincial governm ent itself. T his is no doubt the case in Prince E dw ard Island, for example. So m y conclusion is th a t a prov ince w hich is below about 500,000 in population probably does n ot need a second tier of regional governm ent. A m ong the other C anadian provinces, N ew Brunswick and N ew foundland are ab o u t in this range. H ow ever, in N ew foundland even at the lowest level the system of rural m unicipalities is weak. A s m en tioned, N ew Brunswick actually abolished its one-tier rural c o u n tie s -a m ove w hich seems to fly in the face of the decen tralization criterion. It is am ong the other provinces, then, th at the best prospects fo r th e adoption of regional governm ent lie. N ova Scotia and the prairie provinces have decentralized m any o f their provin cial services into adm inistrative regions, so th at it would be relatively easy to delegate these to a regional level of m unicipal governm ent. British C olum bia has already created the begin 7 See, for example, W. A. Robson, L o ca l G o vern m en t in Crisis (L on don, 1966); and Derek Senior, “The City Region as an Adminis tration Unit,” P olitical Q uarterly, 36 (January-M arch, 1965,), 82-91. 8 W. H. Palmer, “Concepts of Regional Government,” M unicipal W o rld , 75 (Novem ber 11, 1965), 343-4; M unicipal Association of Ontario, “A Model Regional Government,” M unicipal W orld, 75 (Decem ber 12, 1965), 372-78.
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nings of a regional system o f governm ent, and the idea has been discussed in recent years fo r Q uebec and O ntario.8 T he time seems ripe fo r action.
3: A Proposal for Ontario : Like the previous essay, reprinted with m inor revisions, from Lithwick and Paquet, U rban Studies: A C anadian P erspective, 256-61. By permission. s o u r c e
Because Q uebec and O ntario are so large and so populous, it is in these provinces that the problem o f the desirable size (above the m inim um of 50,000) fo r m unicipal regions is most puzzling. I shall take O ntario as an exam ple and try to arrive at a tentative proposal based upon the guidelines advanced in the previous essay. U sing the m inim um efficient size o f 50,000 as the average population, one finds th at there would be m ore than 100 re gional governm ents in O ntario. T his is obviously too many. T h ere w ould be too m any units for the province to deal with even afte r the regional level o f governm ent h ad been created. A nd at a population of only 50,000 the regional governm ents w ould be too close to their constituent units in densely-popu lated areas; the services at the two levels w ould likely overlap too m uch. Also, it is very likely th at between the regional level and the provinces there w ould be interests based on larger regions, such as E astern o r N orthw estern O ntario, w hich would go unexpressed. So I conclude th a t the units should probably be few er and larger. But how m uch larger, and how m any fewer? G oing to the o th er extrem e, supposing there w ere only ten regions, how big would they be? Roughly, they would average about 700,000 in population. T he reason I fix on this figure is th at O ntario has created ten econom ic planning regions, so one naturally w onders if this w ould be an appropriate level for regional governm ents. M y own view is th a t 700,000 is a tre m endous population for a regional unit o f governm ent. T here w ould no doubt be a gap in com m unity interests below that level. K eep in m ind that unless one is proposing a third tier of governm ent above the counties, regional governm ent a t this level assumes th at the county governm ents w ould be obliterated. Y et their century-and-m ore existence has in m any cases created strong county-based com m unities o f interest. T he obliteration
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o f these units w ould be likely to leave a serious gap in the representation o f com m unities o f interest below the regional level. F u rth er, from the point o f view o f political pow er, ten pow erful regional governm ents would be very likely to rival the provincial governm ent seriously. H ence th e latter w ould be chary about creating regional governm ents w ith any real inde pendence. It w ould not have the sam e fears about sm aller units. I t appears, then, that the num ber o f regions should fall som ew here between our two extrem es o f 100 and 10. L et us now consider the existing county system as a potential base for regional governm ent. T h eir num ber, thirty-eight, is large b ut perhaps not excessive. In the past, the counties have not been a suitable level o f regional governm ent m ainly because they have been weak, w ith few services to perform . T hey have very few powers, and practically none over the local units w ithin them . Could they not be strengthened enough to m ake them corre spond to the regional governm ents th at we are talking about? A difficulty w ith this proposal is that the counties exclude all the cities and even some o f th e largest tow ns (seven “sepa rated tow ns” ) . Only about half o f the people in the province live w ithin the m unicipal counties, an d their average population is only about 75,000. Even if the thirty-eight county governm ents w ere streng thened enough so that the province did not have to deal directly with the m unicipalities within them , it w ould still have to deal directly w ith the counties plus the forty-odd cities and towns, about eighty units in all. T his com es close to o u r previous figure of 100, and would probably be an excessive n um ber for efficient inter-governm ental com m unications. M ore serious, m any inde pendent u rban units would still be below o u r m inim um efficient size o f 50,000. A lso, cities are natural regional centres o f serv ice and influence for their surrounding counties, and, as m en tioned previously, large cities now adays expand and shade into the countryside. Clearly then, if the counties are to be m ade the basis fo r regional governm ent, they m ust be reorganized to include the cities.1 1 Others who have recently made o r supported a similar proposal are: the Ontario Committee on Taxation (see A ppendix); the Bureau of Municipal Research, “Regional G overnm ent-rThe Key to Genuine Local Autonomy,” in its C ivic A ffa irs (M ay, 1968); the Ontario legislature’s Select Committee on the Municipal Act and Related Acts (see its F o u rth a n d F inal R ep o rt o f M arch, 1965, Part II; and Ralph W. Krueger, “Tangled Adm inistration: Organization for Regional Development,” in John B. Fotheringham (ed.), Transition: Policies f o r Socia l A c tio n (Toronto, 1966), 96-8.
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T his reorganization would, of course, create a trem endous change in the character o f the county governm ents. It would give them jurisdiction over the cities as well as over the towns, villages and townships. Since their councils w ould include a large proportion o f representatives from the cities, the councils would become m uch m ore conscious of the urban need for controlled developm ent. A t the sam e tim e, m any of the services provided in the big urb an centres could a t last be m ade available, through regional adm inistration, to the surrounding countryside. But w hat should be done about the large m etropolitan areas, o f w hich there are several in O ntario? F o r reasons already given, I do n ot believe th at those over about 150,000 in population should be consolidated into one city. N o r do I believe that they should be carved out o f the surrounding county if this can be avoided, because in m ost cases the rem ainder o f the county w ould be too truncated to m ake a viable unit. Also, large urban areas tend to spread out m ore than the sm aller cities, and are therefore m ore in need o f controlling the developm ent of their potential suburbs. Y et they soon grow beyond any boundary th a t is draw n around the existing built-up area. A county level o f regional governm ent, then, seems ideal fo r them . T hey would becom e, in effect, urban o r “m etropolitan” counties, m uch like m etro T oronto, and consolidation o f the whole built-up area would be unnecessary. In m ost cases, the large m etropolitan areas in O ntario are surrounded by a single county w hich is sm all enough to be an effective planning and governm ental unit fo r the built-up and potentially urb an area w ithin it. This seems to be true of the H am ilton, W indsor, L ondon and K itchener areas. In the case of O ttaw a, the province has created a regional governm ent based on C arleton county but also taking in p art of Russell county to the east. T he rem ainder o f Russell is too sm all to be viable and should be joined w ith a neighbouring county. A m etropolitan county governm ent for the N iagara area would require joining the counties o f Lincoln and W elland, and one fo r the BurlingtonOakville area w ould require joining H alton and Peel. In addition, there may be a case for carving out the BurlingtonOakville area as a separate urban county and joining the n o rth ern portions of Peel and H alton into a single county, as the Peel-H alton study has proposed.2 In order to create a m etro politan county for the O shaw a-W hitby area, the northern p art o f O ntario county could be joined w ith Victoria, having Lindsay
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as its regional centre. Sim ilar m etropolitan governm ents m ight also be created for the L akehead and Sudbury. T hus it can be seen th at w ith only relatively m inor adjust m ents of boundaries, the m ain m etropolitan areas could easily be included w ithin the regional-county system o f governm ent. Since their population would be overw helm ingly urban, they could be separately designated as “m etropolitan” o r “urb an ” counties o r regions, and given special pow ers o f urb an govern m ent. T here would thus be about 10 such m etropolitan regions. Som e of the counties are sm all in size and especially popu lation, and have no city centre. In several cases, therefore, one cbuld join together contiguous counties to form regional units. T h u s one m ight reduce the num ber of non-m etropolitan units to about twenty-five. A s an added refinem ent, but a t considerable political cost, one could relocate boundaries that seem to cut across closely integrated social and econom ic areas. I do n ot think 35 units would be an unm anageable num ber, because, in accordance w ith the decentralization criterion, the regional governm ents should be relatively independent and not closely supervised by the province. T hey in tu rn should deal w ith the municipalities below them . Sum m ing up, then, my proposal is th at the counties and cities should be joined together as the basis for a new system o f regional governm ent in Ontario. Let m e conclude with a general question about the proposal: A re the needs and situations o f the various areas o f the province now so different th at one can no longer apply a uniform system such as county governm ent o r the regional system I have pro posed? Should one have a quite different structure o f local governm ent fo r each area? O ntario’s provincial governm ent seems to be going at the problem in this way. A t local request it has been com m issioning studies of individual areas. These areas have been based m ainly on urban centres, b u t the size o f the area studied has depended on local requests fo r inclusion. E ight such studies have been initiated, and fo u r o f them have been co m p leted -th e Jones study of the O ttaw a area, the M ayo study of Lincoln and W elland counties, the P lunkett study o f Peel and H alton counties, and the H ardy study of the L akehead.3 T he Jones report proposed a strong regional govern m ent w ith w eak district councils to replace the existing m unici palities, th e M ayo rep o rt proposed a second tier o f m etropolitan 3 See footnote 3. 3 Fo r details, see Bibliography under “M etropolitan Areas.”
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governm ent, while the Plunkett study proposed consolidation of the southern half of Peel and H alton into a single city, w ith the northern half becom ing a single rural m unicipality except fo r elected com missions in four “ urban service areas.” T he H ardy study recom m ended the consolidation o f F o rt W illiam, P o rt A rth u r and two adjacent townships into the city o f Lakehead, and the creation o f a district governm ent for T hunder Bay consisting of the fourteen councillors for the new city plus ten elected directly from the rest of the district. As a result, legisla tion has been passed creating the new city, effective from Jan u ary 1, 1970. T he other studies are of the B rantford, H am ilton, M uskoka and W aterloo areas. T he eight study areas take in 122 m unicipalities and nearly a third o f the province’s total population. A lthough the provincial governm ent keeps talking about regional governm ent, it is rath er vague about w hat it m e a n sw hether it m eans the county, a new level above the county, a uniform pattern for the whole province, o r m erely selected twotier m etropolitan governm ents.4 Recently it has changed the term fo r m etropolitan governm ent to regional governm ent. F or exam ple, the governm ent proposed for the O ttaw a area by the M inister of M unicipal Affairs in F ebruary, 1967 was described as a regional governm ent. Y et, except th at it takes in la large ru ral area which is only potentially urban, it is not very different from the m etro T oronto scheme. Because of local opposition to the Plunkett proposal, the provincial governm ent is also likely to fav o ur a tw o-tier system for Peel-H alton. If the governm ent continues to initiate area studies and one by one sets up secondtier m etropolitan o r regional governm ents for the areas studied, it m ay eventually arrive at som ew hat the sam e general p attern o f regional governm ent as I have proposed. But it will be a very expensive and tim e-consum ing process. It w ould be far cheaper and m uch faster to study the whole schem e of regional and m etropolitan governm ent at one tim e. T he result would be a less com plex and m ore logical scheme o f regional governm ent throughout the province.
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CONCLUSION s o u rc e :
[See first essay, page 1.]
Political scientists are now saying th at the way to find out how a political unit can be best governed is to study not struc tures and form s but politics and the political system. This in cludes elections, voter preferences, com m unity attitudes, and interest groups and their place in the pow er structure of the com m unity. M any sociological studies in the U nited States, for exam ple, have dealt with the local structure of political pow er in A m erican cities.1 T hey are concerned to find out w hether there is a centralization of pow er in an elite group at the top, or w hether pow er is decentralized am ong several interest groups in a kind of balance of power. This sam e approach has been taken by an A m erican-trained political scientist, H arold K aplan, who has m ade a study of interest groups in T oronto.2 O ne o f his interesting conclusions w as th at organized interest groups in the T oronto m etropolitan area play a relatively m inor role in the decisions m ade by the m etropolitan council. C om pared with interest groups in A m eri can cities, those in T oronto are “low -pressure” groups. H e concludes that, in fact, the m ost im portant group influencing the decisions o f the m etropolitan council are the perm anent officials. T his leads one to w onder w hether the sam e is true o f other large cities in C anada, and if so, why our citizens are content to leave policy recom m endations to an oligarchy of officials. Is it because of our traditional deference to authority in C anada in contrast to attitudes in the U nited States? Certainly the lack of interest in policy decisions by groups in the com m unity does not seem to be a healthy sign of local dem ocracy. N o r does the lack o f interest shown by the voters in local elections. O ften only twenty-five percent o f the eligible voters tu rn out at a city * See especially Prem ier R obart's speech in the debate on the Speech from the Throne, Ontario Legislature D ebates (February 2, 1967), 166-9. 1A good survey of these studies is Lawrence D. M ann's “Studies in Community Decision M aking,” Journal o f the A m erican In stitu te o f P lanners, 30 (February, 1964), 58-65. 3 “Politics and Policy-Making in M etro T oronto,” C anadian Journal o f E co n o m ics a n d P olitical Science, 31 (Novem ber, 1965), 538-51.
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election com pared w ith seventy to eighty percent at the higher levels of governm ent. W e also com plain about the poor quality o f o u r urban representatives, about their secret meetings,3 questionable private deals, and even corrupt practices.4 H ow can these ills be rem edied? T o im prove the perform ance of our locally elected representatives, m ore stringent pro vincial laws could be passed to prohibit undesirable activities. F o r instance, the provinces could pass laws requiring all local governing bodies, including their com m ittees, to hold meetings open to the public and the press. In the U nited States the press conducted a successful cam paign for such “open-m eeting” laws, and by 1965 tw enty-nine states had them .5 T he provinces also need to w ork out and enact a strict code o f ethics against the use of public office for private gain, and should set up m ore effective auditing requirem ents to prevent the misuse of public funds. In B ritain the elected councillors are held personally liable fo r financial losses resulting from any illegal action they m ay have taken. A provision such as this seems also to be required in C anada. Provincial laws regulating the perform ance o f councillors will not be enough, however. Som ething m ore drastic m ust be done to im prove the quality o f local representatives. M any of o u r m ost capable citizens do not ru n for local office. Som ething m ust also be done to stim ulate the citizens’ interest in local politics so th at they will w atch w hat their representatives are doing, and if necessary discipline them for wrong-doing by refusing to re-elect them . W hat steps should be taken to accom plish these objectives? M any people now argue th a t one im portant step w ould be the open participation o f political parties in local elections.® C an ad a is perhaps unique in the world in the extent to w hich its local elections are non-partisan. In nearly all other dem ocracies, including G re at Britain and m ost o f the U nited States, the national parties run candidates in local elections. O ne reason for som e o f ou r ablest m en’s not running for local office is the high personal cost o f conducting a cam paign. In large cities, especially if election is at large, the cost often am ounts to thousands o f d o llars-som etim es even m ore than the salary paid fo r the office! So only w ealthy m en, and dishonest m en who expect large financial gains in return, can afford to run . One proposed reform th at m ight solve this problem would be to pay necessary election costs o f candidates out of the m unicipal treasury, provided th at they gained a m inim um q uota o f votes in the election. B ut political parties w ould help to solve the
PART
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problem autom atically. A p arty w ould choose good local candi dates since its reputation w ould be blackened if it did not. It would also provide voluntary w orkers and financial support for the election cam paign. Political parties w ould also provide the sam e advantages as at the higher levels o f governm ent: the stim ulation o f voter interest, strong political leadership, clearer issues in the election, a co-ordinated program m e o f activity, and a sm ooth-w orking executive team who nevertheless can be throw n out o f office w hen they displease the voters. Some of these advantages, however, are due to the com bina tion o f the p arty system w ith the responsible cabinet in a parliam entary form of governm ent. Indeed, it can be argued th a t the party system does not w ork as successfully w ithout the cabinet system; but also vice-versa. H ence, a cabinet form of local governm ent for large cities may not be fully successful w ithout local parties. In fact, however, the need for a cabinet to be supported by a stable m ajority in the city council w ould probably encourage either the form ation o f local parties like those already existing in M ontreal, or the participation of national parties in local elections. T his shows the close relation betw een the structure and process o f governm ent, between form s and politics. A nother reason why the citizens’ interest in local elections is so low and w hy som e o f the best people are not attracted to local politics, is th a t local councils have so little real decision m aking pow er and m ust share w hat little pow er they do have with innum erable boards and commissions. R ecent years have seen a steady centralization o f power to the provincial level. T here has been an increasing provincial supervision and control o f local services and finance, and an increasing tendency by the provinces to take over local services. Indeed, this process of centralization has gone so far th at in 1966 the G overnm ent of New Brunswick not only abolished its rural m unicipalities but 3 See “Press Secrecy in Municipal Governments,” Press Journal, 7 (November-December, 1963), 8-16. * See A. Philips, “A M odem M anual of M unicipal C orruption,” M a c lea n ’s (M arch 10, 1962); and for an older piece on corruption in M ontreal area see M aclean’s (Decem ber 1, 1954). “ Freedom of Inform ation Center, University o f Missouri, “Com parative Digest of Access (Open Meetings, Records) Laws,” 7 (M arch, 1965), 1. ®B. Keith-Lucas, “Party Politics in English Local Governm ent,” Q ueen’s Q uarterly, 68 (Autum n, 1961), 467-72. See also W alter Young, “We Need Political Parties in Civic Govem m entt" M aclean's September 26, 1959), 53-4.
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also took away from the rem aining urban governm ents all assessment, justice, education, health, and w elfare services.7 T hese are vital services directly affecting the lives of local citizens. If we believe in local dem ocracy, som ething m ust be done to stem the tide o f centralization. Local governm ent m ust som ehow be reorganized so th at it can run its own affairs effectively w ithout too m uch interference from above. A nd it m ust be pow erful enough to attract able representatives and to stim ulate the voters’ interest. It is for these reasons th at students o f the problem have been advocating a second o r regional level o f m unicipal governm ent. N ow that British Colum bia has crea ted the skeleton fo r such a system, I hope that the o th er prov inces in C anada will seriously consider this solution to the p ro b lem. T he undesirable alternative is a continuation of provincial centralization and a progressive sapping o f local dem ocracy.
APPENDICES
1: Proposals of Byrne Commission New Brunswick Royal Commission on Finance and M uni cipal Taxation, (Byrne) R e p o rt (Fredericton, 1963), 3-6. By per mission of the D epartm ent o f M unicipal Affairs, New Brunswick. s o u rc e :
1. Som e o f o u r m unicipalities are relatively prosperous. O thers are p o o r and have a very restricted tax base. In the present circum stances steps taken to im prove the standard o f services in o u r richer m unicipalities often serve to increase the fiscal pressure on the less fortunate ones. Even w here there is a desire to restrain local expenditures this is often frustrated by the inclination of senior governm ents to offer superficially attractive cost-sharing arrangem ents fo r new services. M any o f these cost-sharing arrangem ents benefit the rich and penalize the poor. 2. A fter due consideration the Com m ission concluded th at a patch-w ork approach would be inappropriate to present needs. W e could not see how serious structural difficulties could be solved m erely by raising grants to m unicipalities. Instead we h a d to go to the heart o f the m atter and recom m end a com plete functional rationalization o f provincial and m unicipal govern m ent activities. I t is ou r view th at N ew Brunsw ick w ith a sm aller population than either M ontreal o r T oronto should be able to arrange its affairs w ithout m aking it impossible to fix the blam e for poor perform ance. Y et just such a m uddled situation regularly occurs under th e needlessly involved and often illogical procedures which are in use at the present time. 3. T h e services which we now expect from o u r m unicipalities are o f two quite different kinds: First, there are services o f a local nature, which benefit 7 This scheme o f reorganization is based on the Byrne Report (see Appendix). However, the Robichaud Governm ent did not accept the Report’s proposal that these services should be administered by semi-autonomous provincial commissions. Also, the school boards in the greatly enlarged school districts, which have a majority of elected members, are still responsible fo r hiring teachers and for general administration.
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m ainly the residents o f a small, well-defined geographic area. Elsewhere in the province the benefits o f these services are fe lt only indirectly, if at all. Second, there are the general services, such as education, hospitals, and public health, social welfare, the adm inistra tion o f justice and civil defence. These general services affect a m uch larger population and w hen they are poorly p erform ed the consequences spread throughout the entire province. 4. A t present neither local no r general services are perform ed adequately in every instance. O ur objective, therefore, has been to ensure that responsibility for each kind o f service is placed on the level of governm ent best qualified to perform it, and that each level o f governm ent has the financial resources required to carry out its responsibilities. 5. U nder the structure o f governm ent w hich we propose, the general-service program m es w hich are o f province-w ide signi ficance and w hich require large units fo r efficient operation will be perform ed directly by provincial governm ent agencies. These provincial agencies will bring together centralized form ulation o f policy and a clear responsibility for m aintaining service standards, but they will provide also fo r continuing the present decentralized adm inistrative offices as required to take proper account o f local circum stances. U nder o u r schem e there will be autom atic province-w ide equalization o f the burden of m aintaining adequate standards in such vital areas as education, public health, hospital services, social w elfare, and justice. N o longer shall children be lim ited to the quality o f education which their own neighbourhood can afford; henceforth they shall be entitled to that standard o f education w hich the province as a whole can support. As one means o f bringing about greater uniform ity we propose th at the province set and pay all teacher salaries and th at local school boards be prohibited from supple m enting these am ounts. A t the sam e tim e we propose m aking m ore efficient use o f our educational resources by reducing the num ber o f school districts from m ore than 400 to approxim ately 60. W e intend, however, th at school boards in these new districts shall continue to control the hiring and firing o f teachers and the various other m atters w hich are their p roper concern. 6. T he level o f services w hich are deem ed to be o f local benefit only shall continue to be determ ined solely by local option.
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T hese services will be adm inistered by cities and towns as in the past and by a new com bination o f villages and local service districts in the other areas o f the province. A single, com pre hensive m unicipalities act will replace the scores o f statutes w hich now control m unicipal activities. A lthough the county adm inistrative u nit as presently constituted will disappear as a consequence o f the province assum ing responsibility for the services now perform ed by the counties, th e recom m ended new system of local governm ent will m ake it possible fo r ru ral areas to provide local services as justified by local circum stances. In other w ords we propose to elim inate the functional distinctions w hich now exist betw een urb an and ru ral m unicipalities. 7. F o r m etropolitan areas containing different b u t contiguous m unicipalities, we recom m end th at com bined councils be estab lished to adm inister those services w hich are jointly required. This system o f m etropolitan governm ent will allow the co n stituent m unicipalities to retain their individual identity and to exercse sole authority over th e services w hich are not o f com m on concern. 8. A m ajor source o f discontent w ith real property taxes is the exceedingly poor standard o f assessm ent w hich now prevails. To ensure uniform assessing we propose th e establishm ent o f a central agency to determ ine the value of all real property in the province. This assessing agency w ould be staffed by com petent personnel and be subject to an effective appeals procedures in the case o f error. A s another p a rt o f its activities, this agency will collect property taxes in the am ounts w hich have been authorized by the appropriate taxing authorities. Such a collec tion service will reduce adm inistrative costs w ithout in any way im pinging on local freedom to set the level o f real property taxes. 9. W e propose a system of equalizing grants fo r local services w hich will reflect differences in ability-to-pay rath er than the irrelevant factor o f m unicipal status as is presently the case. T he new grants will prom ote uniform ity in tax rates am ong m unici palities o f equal efficiency. T hey will also allow tax rates to fall with greater efficiency and to rise w ith less, thereby ensuring that local ratepayers have a better indication o f how w ell their m oney is being spent. 10. In the case o f local services, debenture issues fo r capital projects will continue to be initiated and paid for a t the local
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level, but they shall be m arketed centrally and over a longer term , thereby reducing the annual cost of m unicipal borrowing. L ocal ratepayers are to have m ore control over m unicipal indebtedness through a requirem ent that issues beyond a certain am ount be approved by plebiscite. A fu rth er statutory limit will be placed on the total am ount of debt which a m unicipality m ay have outstanding under any circum stances. In the field of general services, the province will assum e com plete responsi bility for all capital projects, both past and future. 11. W e have not been able to reduce the total level of taxation. T o do so w ould have required the abolition of services which are now considered to be necessities. Indeed we have reached the inevitable conclusion th at spending for certain vital services, especially education, should be increased. A t the sam e tim e we have attem pted to propose procedures to ensure that the province receives greater value for each tax dollar. A t latest count the province had 547 local taxing and tax-supported a u th o ritie s -o r one for every 1,093 residents. Surely the ineffi ciency resulting from such proliferation is m ore o f a danger to dem ocracy than rational public adm inistration responsive to local needs. W e have therefore suggested ways to stream line various im portant adm inistrative procedures. In addition, we have a num ber o f cases sought to create independent adm inis trative com missions which will be protected from undue politi cal p re ssu re s -a cause o f m uch extravagance in the past. M ore generally we see an urgent need to raise the skiils of those engaged in the public service. A dditional em phasis on attracting and retaining capable adm inistrative personnel would bring greater efficiency and lead to significant savings over the long run. T he low salaries now p aid to fill certain key public offices cannot be justified as a saving even in the short run! 12. G iven the legitim ate revenue needs o f our provincial and m unicipal governm ents, we have proposed a tax structure which is m ore equitable and m akes m ore econom ic sense than the one now being used. T he m unicipal tax structure will be greatly simplified, so th at each m unicipality will be em pow ered to levy real property taxes only. T he outm oded poll and personal property taxes will both be elim inated. W e also envisage a substantial reduction in the average levels of real property taxation. A m ong the general services the taxation of real pro perty will contribute only to the financing of education, and this contribution shall be uniform throughout the province. The
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provincial education tax will be the only levy m ade on property in rural areas w hich do not have local services. 13. Industry will benefit from the restriction o f real property taxes to land and buildings, thereby exem pting all fixed m achinery from local and provincial levies. T he taxation of business enterprises shall also be p u t on a uniform basis, so th at the selection o f business locations will no longer be influ enced by the present unhealthy com petition am ong m unici palities to offer greater and greater tax concessions. All existing municipal tax agreem ents are to be term inated: in their place there is to be a ceiling on the tax rate w hich m ay be imposed on any business property in the province, giving all firm s the sam e degree o f protection from the effects o f m unicipal extra vagance o r a restricted local tax base. W e also propose a provincial governm ent program m e designed to attract m ore industry to the province as a whole, rather than just to some com m unities at the expense o f others. A special form ula is proposed for m ore equitable taxation of tim berlands. 14. T h e revenue lost by these reform s and the additional revenue required to im prove vital public services, such as education, will be obtained through imposing a new tax on m otor vehicles and through raising the retail tax to five percent and extending the base to include certain purchases which are now exem pt. 15. W e wish also to m ake clear a t this point th at our recom mended province-w ide equalization of general services will not now er the high standards which now exist fo r these services in certain areas. On the contrary it is intended to bring the over-all level of general services up to the highest standards w hich now exist and which m ust be m aintained if N ew Brunswick is to prosper in the years ahead. 16. W e regret that circum stances com pel us to transfer to other levels of governm ent the functions so long carried out by county governm ents. T hese rural adm inistrations have a long history and perform ed invaluable services during the decades when they could thrive on a reasonable level o f property taxation. H ow ever, the growing com plexity and the increasing costs of the general services historically provided by the county units, together with the irresistible but understandable desire of senior governm ents to have greater control in retu rn fo r bearing a m ajor share o f the cost of these program m es, have m ade it
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im possible for the county u n it to operate today as effectively as it did in the past. Y et we have not been unm indful o f the dem ocratic needs of our rural residents. W e have recom m ended th at w here they are desired local services should be provided in ru ra l areas by setting up villages o r local service districts. Simi larly, school boards serving ru ra l areas shall have precisely the sam e authority as those serving cities and towns. In addition, we have recom m ended that election to the legislative assembly be by single-m em ber rath er than m ultiple-m em ber constituencies, so th a t on average each m em ber would be directly responsible fo r the interests of roughly 12,000 residents. T his reform would benefit urban as well as ru ral residents by bringing the form ula tion o f provincial policies closer to the people. In a field as com plex as m odern governm ent there are no easy an s w e rs -n o perfect solutions. W e certainly m ake no claim to having found any. Y et it is ou r belief that there will be wide support for a bold, imaginative carefully thought-out plan to escape from the present m orass. T he w ay we have show n will n ot be easy, but we urge the province to take it. T he only alter native w hich we can see is a progressively higher level of property taxation and consequently the bankruptcy of a num ber o f local governm ent units, and worse, a com plete collapse of the services w hich local governm ent is now called upon to provide.
2: Criticism of Byrne Report BY TH O M A S J . P L U N K E T T
“R eport of the Royal Commission on Finance and M uni cipal Taxation in New Brunswick: A Review and Commentary,” C anadian P u b lic A d m in istra tio n , 8 (M arch, 1965), 17-23. By per mission o f the editor and author.
s o u rc e :
In sum m ary, the C om m ission’s m ajor proposals include (1 ) a radical reallocation o f functions as between the province an d m unicipalities; (2 ) a uniform tax levy on the assessed m arket value o f real property for education and local services w hich is not to exceed 2 percent; (3 ) a system o f unconditional
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grants to m unicipalities to m eet their expenditure requirem ents fo r local services at a standard rate o f expenditure; and (4 ) an increase in the provincial sales tax and the tax on m otor vehicles. T h e whole arrangem ent is apparently clear and logical to the Com mission. M oreover, its estim ates of revenues and ex penditures necessary to im plem ent the recom m endations p ro vide fo r a balancing of these accounts. T his m akes for the ap pearance o f neatness. But the package o f proposals p u t forw ard by the Com m ission is neither neat, clear, no r logical from the point of view of the m aintenance o f political and adm inistrative responsibility and accountability. In a num ber o f sections o f the R eport, the Byrne Com m is sion expresses grave concern at the possibility o f m inisters of th e governm ent being subjected to what, it term s “im proper” pressures. F o r exam ple, the R eport em phasizes the desirability o f ensuring th at “m inisters not be subject to im proper but som e tim es irresistible pressures o f particular interests in the estab lishm ent o f departm ental policies and their adm inistration. T h e R ep o rt approaches this topic in another way by pointing out the need to “insulate m inisters from irresponsible but pow erful pressures to subvert departm ents’ program m es in favour of selfish private interests. I t is these “im proper” pressures to which politicians m ay be subject w hich are the cause o f poor adm inistration and the developm ent o f irresponsible spending program m es. N o t surprisingly, th e R eport fails to provide any illustration o f w hat constitues “im proper” pressure. N o r is there any recognition by the Com m ission that attem pts by individuals o r groups to influence the developm ent o r course of public policy is a legitim ate right o f dem ocratic citizenship. T h e transfer of responsibilities for hospitals, w elfare, and education to the province is not to be a sim ple transfer to the ap propriate departm ent of the provincial adm inistration. In the view of the Com m ission, “it w ould be folly to give the responsi bility fo r developing and executing the new program m es in ed u cation, health, and w elfare to the respective governm ental departm ents as they are presently constituted.” In order to avoid this folly and to ensure th at m inisters of the governm ent are insulated from im proper pressures, w hatever th a t may m ean, the Com m ission recom m ends th a t the developm ent and adm in istration o f program m es in the field of health, w elfare, and education be entrusted to adm inistrative com m issions w ith considerable operating autonom y. C onsequently there would be three com missions esta b lish e d -a Public Schools Com m ission, a Social W elfare Com m ission, and a H ospitals Com mission.
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T h e R eport points out th at “ there is nothing new o r untried about the com mission form o f adm inistration.” I t is endow ed w ith the virtue of possessing “m uch greater independence from the executive than a departm ent.” M oreover, “ the m em bers of an adm inistrative com mission are appointed for their integrity and ability.” But the Byrne Com m ission does not intend to give the executive a free hand in appointing the m em bers o f these proposed Commissions. A n illustration o f the restrictions on executive responsibility fo r the appointm ent of com mission m em bers may be found in the proposed provisions for the H ospitals Com m ission. The six m em bers of this C om m ission will be appointed by the L ieutenant-G overnor in Council on the recom m endation of the M inister o f H ealth. H ow ever, the M inister is really only given freedom to recom m end the appointm ent o f two o f the six m em bers. W ith respect to the other four these m ust be “nom i nated by a group o f citizens w ithout interest in political and hospital affairs o r in the irrelevant aspirations o f local com m unities. F o r exam ple, such a group w ould be the m em bers of the Suprem e C o u rt.” H ow ever, the M inister of H ealth will be perm itted to be a m em ber o f the Com m ission ex officio. Sim ilar provisions govern the establishm ent o f the Public Schools Com mission and the Social W elfare Com m ission, al though the nom inating bodies differ. In the case of the form er, the universities established in N ew Brunswick will nom inate m ost of the Com m ission m em bers while the P rotestant M inis terial Association and the R om an C atholic bishops o f New Brunsw ick are entrusted w ith the responsibility o f nom inating the m em bers o f the Social W elfare Commission. T he Byrne Com m ission envisages the m em bers o f these Com m issions as being dedicated to the public service and “terribly enthusiastic about the tasks to be perform ed and w holly in sym pathy with the policy objectives.” “T he Com m is sioners will therefore always be pressing ahead to raise the standards o f service, the efficiency o f perform ance and the realization of policy objectives. T hey will always be pressing the executive for m ore funds than have been appropriated to them in previous years.” H ow ever, it rem ains the responsibility of the C abinet to control them by deciding how m uch should be spent for the different functions and services. A ny executive m ight find this a form idable undertaking w hen confronted by th e “terribly enthusiastic” m em bers o f these com m issions whose appointm ents were m ade under the conditions already indicated. T h e Com m ission is also greatly concerned w ith controlling
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w hat it term s m unicipal extravagance. T he only evidence offered in support of extravagance by m unicipalities is a statistical table o f per capita expenditures by m unicipalities on local services. M easurem ent o f spending on a p er capita basis is apparently accepted w ithout any regard fo r the effects o f population den sity and the pace o f developm ent. T o curb this extravagance the C om m ission recom m ends that “the operation o f all m unicipali ties should be narrow ly and statutorily prescribed. T here should be a statutory prescription o f any activity or expenditure by a m unicipal body other than those enum erated in a new, single, com prehensive m unicipalities act.” S tatutory prescription will not be enough to control the activities o f m unicipalities. A ccordingly, the Byrne R eport advocates the establishm ent o f another Com m ission to have jurisdiction over m unicipal affairs throughout the province. This M unicipal Affairs Com m ission w ould take over th e duties o f th e present D epartm ent o f M unicipal Affairs as well as additional ones. It would also be required “to tighten up the supervision and control over the activities of m unicipalities.” O th er controls m ust also be placed on m unicipal spending. A m ong the controls proposed by the Byrne Com m ission are (1 ) lim itation o f total m unicipal borrow ing to 6 percent o f the m arket value of assessed real property; (2) lim itation of aggre gate debt flotation in any one year to 1 /5 o f 1 percent of the m arket value of assessed real property, except w ith the approval of 60 percent of the eligible ratepayers who vote in a plebiscite; (3 ) no long-term borrow ing to be undertaken directly by a m unicipality and all debentures to be m arketed by a M unicipal D ebt C orporation to be established fo r this purpose; and (4 ) a requirem ent th at any proposal to increase property taxes be approved by at least 60 percent of the ratepayers who vote in a plebiscite. A s is the case w ith the o th er com missions, the provincial governm ent is n o t to have a free hand in the appointm ent of m em bers to the proposed M unicipal Affairs Commission. It is to consist o f six m em bers one of w hom w ould be the M inister of M unicipal Affairs. T he other five m em bers are to be chosen by “ a nom inating com m ittee w hich is to be com posed o f m em bers appointed by such organized representative groups as the U nion of N ew Brunswick M unicipalities, the N ew Brunswick F edera tion of A griculture, the N ew Brunsw ick C ham bers of C om m erce o r Boards o f T rade, the N ew Brunswick Federation of L abour, the N ew Brunswick Bar Society, the N ew Brunswick Section of th e C anadian M anufacturers Association, the N ew
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Brunswick M edical Society and the N ew Brunsw ick Institute of C hartered A ccountants.” A p art from elim inating the county as a unit o f governm ent, the Byrne Com mission has not proposed any really radical changes in the rem aining m unicipal structure in term s o f boun daries. T he real transform ation is in term s of reallocation of responsibilities, fo r w hich there is considerable justification. H ow ever, the local service responsibilities left to the m uncipalities are so restricted and hem m ed in w ith controls th at there is som e doubt as to w hether any responsible local decision-making pow er remains. W hile the R eport dwells at length on the need for radical change, it is passionately devoted to the m aintenance o f the status quo w ith respect to m unicipal boundary adjustm ents and m unicipal consolidation. O n this subject, the Com mission dis courses in a m ost confused m anner w hich reveals little u nder standing o f the problem s confronting m unicipalities w ith de veloping fringe districts. B ut the Com m ission does have a positive solution. In expanding urban areas w here there m ay exist two or m ore m unicipalities with contiguous boundaries the Com m ission is opposed to any form al m unicipal consolidation o r am algam a tion. In such circum stances the Com mission recom m ends th at the new m unicipalities act m ake it m andatory that the five services o f water, fire protection, sanitary sewage disposal (excluding the local and branch sewerage) and tow n plan ning, be com m unally provided in all m ulti-m unicipality com m unities. There is no doubt, and we have never know n the contrary to be seriously argued, that the joint provision o f the services just m entioned is the m ost economical. M andatory joint provision is recom m ended to save m unici palities fro m their ow n fo ll y - a type o f folly fou n d ed in hum an nature itself. T he recom m ended joint adm inistration of these services would be adm inistered through a m etropolitan council m ade up o f all the m em bers of the councils o f the m unicipalities involved. How ever, the Com mission conveniently overlooks the difficul ties w hich w ould inevitably be encountered in the way of decision-m aking under such an arrangem ent. U nder the proposed joint adm inistration of certain services, the only responsibilities left to the individual m unicipalities w ould be parks, recreation, street lighting, and local access
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roads. Ju st why separate m unicipalities m ust be m aintained fo r these purposes defies understanding. H ow ever, the Com mission feels that they should be m aintained for apparently sentim ental reasons. “W e see no reason,” states the Com m ission, “why m unicipalities need always surrender their historic identities or lose th eir feeling of com m unity by being swallowed by a larger w hole.” M unicipal am algam ation is apparently a real evil in the eyes o f th e Com mission. If it m ust be resorted to it should only take place with “the approval of 60 percent of those ratepayers who vote in each o f th e m unicipal units in a plebiscite conducted to consider the m atter.” T h e Com m ission’s confusion as to the real problem s con fronting contiguous m unicipalities in w hat is essentially one m unicipal area led it to recom m end against adoption o f the proposals fo r the m unicipal am algam ation o f the City o f Saint John, the C ity o f L ancaster, and p a rt o f the P arish of Symonds. T his was recom m ended by a Royal Com m ission on M etropoli tan Saint John w hich subm itted its report in July 1963. It should be noted th at the total population o f the three m unicipalities involved is only 80,000. Similarly, the Com m ission’s R eport strongly advocated the repeal of legislation to extend the boun daries o f the T ow n of Bathurst and to provide the enlarged area w ith C ity status. T he boundary extension involved the inclusion o f certain unincorporated territory and two local im provem ent districts and the total population o f the new city would be only 13,301 persons. In support of its opposition to the B athurst am algam ation, the R eport furnished a detailed review o f local m atters, all o f w hich conveniently ignored the real problem this com m unity was trying to resolve. In contrast to its ill-founded opposition to m unicipal am al gam ation, the Com m ission strikes a m ore reasonable attitude tow ard the necessity o f school district consolidation. Evidence of this can be found in its recom m endation to reduce the present 422 school districts to 60. H ow ever, these consolidated school districts are to be so denuded of responsibility th at there is doubt if they can perform any real function at all. T h eir only responsi bilities are to be the following: (1 ) engagem ent o f teachers, tru an t officers, and building m aintenance personnel in such num bers and at such salaries as m ay be determ ined by the new Public Schools Com m ission; (2 ) submission o f proposals to the Public Schools Com m ission fo r any supplem ent to the standard educational program which it desires be introduced in a district, which, however, the Public Schools Com m ission cannot approve
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until approval in a plebiscite by sixty percent of the resident property ow ners who cast their ballots. T h e Byrne Com mission evidently envisages the role of school boards to be a kind of legally recognized Parent-T eachers Association for the R eport states that “ Relieved of their present budgetary and adm inistrative problem s, the local boards would be free to concentrate on m aintaining and improving the quality o f the local program m es and upon harm onizing the endeavours o f the parent and teacher.” T h e underlying them e o f the R eport of the Byrne Com m is sion is an obsessive concern with cost as the criterion for the reorganization of governm ental adm inistration. But the m eas u rem ent of pubilc service costs m ust take note of m any factors, som e of them elusive and intangible. In the case of m unicipal expenditures on services, the Com m ission has been satisfied with a p er capita basis of m easurem ent to the exclusion o f any other considerations. T his has led to many dubious conclusions re garding m unicipal ex travagance-som e of w hich are m ore im aginary than real. A lack of any basic theory o r philosophy regarding the role of m unicipal governm ent in the modern w orld has led the C om mission to propound rem edies and recom m end solutions which m ake the continuance o f m unicipal governm ent in N ew Bruns w ick of doubtful value. A n unrestrained passion for a uniform property tax rate coupled with a cost criteria of doubtful validity has undoubtedly inspired the proposal for a ceiling on the rate at which this tax may be levied. The proposed use o f the bulk of the yield o f this tax to finance an expanding education function, w ith m unicipal governm ents dependent on provincial grants for the m ost substantial proportion o f their funds, would, when coupled with the rigid controls on m unicipal spending, leave m ost com m unities with a local governm ent devoid of any real significance. T he Byrne Com m ission’s recom m endations with respect to adm inistration o f public services such as education, welfare, health, and m unicipal affairs by sem i-autonom ous adm inistra tive com missions leaves unresolved the future role of m any of the most im portant provincial governm ent departm ents. This proposal, w hen com bined with the insignificant and ill-defined role left to M inisters and the dubious basis upon which com mission m em bers are to be appointed, raises im portant questions w ith regard to ministerial and cabinet responsibility for public adm inistration. It would also seem to the Com m ission th at gov ernm ent, w hether it be provincial or local, has no value and
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should be judged by no other considerations except to provide public services at the lowest possible cost. Im portant as this objective m ay b e - a n d it is im p o rta n t-th e re may well exist oth er criteria o f equal im portance to the public. T h e failure of the Com mission to com prehend the n ature of the problem confronting a single urban com m unity with two o r m ore m unicipalities w ith contiguous boundaries is inexcusable. Its contribution to the resolution of this problem will appear both naive and incom prehensible to any serious student. D espite these critical observations the R eport contains m uch that is enlightening and inform ative. Included in this category is an excellent chapter on the developm ent of local governm ent in N ew Brunswick. T h e objective o f functional rationalization of the various levels o f governm ent w ithin the province is indeed valid. It is a pity, therefore, th a t the Com mission was led off this goal by conclusions based on shibboleths stem m ing from the nineteenth century. H ow ever, the possibility o f salvaging m uch that is of value is within the realm o f possibility. T his could be accom plished by ignoring the exhortation which crops up repeatedly th at the R eport m ust be considered as a com plete package. T he Com mission considers that its “principal recom m enda tions are interdependent and one o r m ore should not, and in fact could not, be im plem ented w ithout the com plete im plem entation of all if the full benefit is to be obtained. It is to be particularly noted that w ithout com plete im plem entation o f the principal recom m endations the Com m ission’s cost and revenue estimates will be w ithout foundation.” A ny provincial governm ent en dowed w ith a norm al am ount o f prudence, wisdom, and some concern for responsible public adm inistration w ould have to approach the im plem entation of Com m ission’s proposals in the opposite direction to this exhortation. T his w ould involve a consideration o f each proposal on its merits. In this way these recom m endations of value could be im plem ented while those found im practicable o r ill-founded could be ignored.
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3: Proposals of Michener Commission s o u r c e : The M anitoba Royal Commission on Local Government Organization and Finance, (M ichener) R ep o rt (Winnipeg, 1964), 254-6, 247-9. By permission o f the Queen’s Printer for Manitoba.
1. T he Province should assume the rem aining financial respon sibilities of the m unicipalities for social w elfare and personal health services and should also assume m ost of the adm inistra tive responsibility for these services. 2. T he Province should assum e com plete financial and adm in istrative responsibility for the construction and m aintenance of a larger and defined mileage o f the roads and of m ain bridges, leaving as the exclusive responsibility o f m unicipalities a residue o f local streets, side roads and m inor bridges, the costs o f con struction and m aintenance o f which will not require the expen diture by m unicipalities o f a greater proportion of their resources on the average than they are now spending on this account. 3. T he Province should assum e a greater share of the cost of public schools by paying all of the costs o f the foundation pro gram m e rem aining afte r a levy on real property, uniform throughout the province, o f approxim ately 13 mills. By “foun dation program m e” is m eant the acceptable m inim um standard o f public school education, defined in term s o f instruction, supplies, library m aterial, adm inistration, m aintenance and transportation, which should be m ade available in all settled p arts of the province. 4. Public school costs in excess of the foundation program m e should continue to be levied against real property by division school boards at uniform rates throughout the school division (this includes both elem entary and secondary education). 5. M unicipalities, relieved of these general services, and with greater access to the real property and business tax, should be able to provide their other traditional and local services inde pendently o f all provincial subsidies. 6. Conversely, the tax on real property is, and should continue to be, the appropriate and only m ajor m unicipal source of tax revenues.
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7. T h e rate of tax on real property fo r all purposes should be reduced by this program m e to an average for the province of about two per cent annually of the capital o r m arket value of the p ro p erty taxed, but of course will be below this level in some and above it in other m unicipalities, including som e w hich are not econom ic in size o r resources. T his rate, plus a business tax on com m ercial and industrial property o f not m ore than 45 percent of the real property tax, should be regarded as a target m axim um level for the real property tax. D eterrents to exceed ing the proposed lim it should be considered and if the real property tax should again rise generally throughout the province above this level, the Provincial G overnm ent will have to re exam ine local fiscal arrangem ents. F o r this purpose we regard as essential the review com m ittee o f provincial, m unicipal and school representatives, reporting every two o r three years on the public school “foundation program m e” in relation to curren t costs. 8. In taxing real property for m unicipal purposes m ost o f the existing exem ptions, including the exem ption of farm buildings and the one-third exem ption o f o th er buildings, should be w ith draw n so th at each property will be assessed fo r taxation as a unit o f value com prising land and im provem ents w ithout de duction. If, after reassessm ent o f farm properties, the w ith draw al o f the present exem ption o f farm buildings is m ade at the sam e tim e as the rem oval o f the one-third exem ption from o ther buildings, the change in the incidence of taxation as between rural and urban tax-payers will be negligible. 9. T h e P rovince should pay to the m unicipalities the equivalent of the norm al real property tax on Crow n property and the properties o f Crow n agencies, w ith a lim it o f the grant to any one m unicipality o f an am ount equal to five percent of its total tax revenues. 10. Assessment staff should be increased and procedures im proved. T h e entire cost of assessm ent and planning should be borne by the municipalities. 11. T h e consequential relief to real property taxpayers and the additional charge on provincial revenues, afte r adjusting ac counts between the Province and m unicipalities in accordance w ith the foregoing recom m endations, is estim ated to be about
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$14 million fo r the calendar year 1965, which is presum ably the first year in which effect could be given to these proposals. 12. Assum ing that the present revenues of the Province are only sufficient to m eet its present responsibilities, such additional sum could be raised equitably and w ith better econom ic effect by a provincial tax on consum ption and use, com m only called a retail sales tax, than by increasing any other existing tax. N o o ther unused source for such additional revenues is practicable a t this time. A ppropriate exclusions and exem ptions from a general tax on the consum ption and use of goods is necessary to m ake such a tax equitable. 13. Provincial departm ental services now adm inistered locally, together w ith the adm inistrative responsibilities to be taken over from the m unicipalities, should be co-ordinated and rationalized by the establishm ent of approxim ately eleven regions, each region having its adm inistrative centre. 14. These regional divisions should also be used for: a. the better organization of inter-m unicipal w orks and co operation; b. liaison between the m unicipalities and the departm ents of provincial adm inistration; and c. co-ordination of joint provincial-m unicipal activities such as hospital and health units and joint federal-provincialm unicipal activities. 15. Division school boards should be given financial responsi bility for elem entary public school education and m ost o f the adm inistrative responsibility, leaving the school district boards w ith advisory powers only, except fo r m aintenance and use of school property, the selection o f teachers and the statutory supervision o f religious instruction. 16. T he M unicipal Board is proposed as a suitable perm anent Com m ission to supervise and provide a ready m eans of re adjusting boundaries o f m unicipalities and school districts and divisions, w ith a view to a m ore rational territorial organization of local governm ent and the elim ination o f over-lapping juris dictions and boundaries between m unicipalities and school divisions.
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Regional Ideas PROVINCIAL DECENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATION
T h e regional p lan is perhaps the m ost novel and experim en tal [of o u r proposals]. It m ay have the greatest significance in the future. R egionalization o f provincial services is already a fact. E ach departm ent has its ow n adm inistrative regions, b ut departm ents are n ot separate governm ents, although they som e tim es give that appearance. T hey are p arts o f a constitutional w hole w hich has its focus in the P rem ier and in the solidarity o f the C abinet. In theory, at least, the adm inistration serves under one direction. In practice, vertical divisions tend to separate each m inister and his departm ent from each other m inister and departm ent. E ach moves out separately into the province. T h e ideal, and it m ay be too am bitious, is to have the whole o f the outside provincial service flowing out to the people in one channel and un d er one control, rath er than in separate and possibly conflicting courses. Som e reorganization of adm inistra tion, on horizontal rath er than vertical lines, will be necessary. It can only be done, if at all, by the authority of the head o f governm ent and w ith the sustained co-operation o f the heads of departm ents. T he idea of having an inter-departm ental officer in each regional centre, reporting to the P rem ier (or C abinet) instead o f to a departm ental head, is an experim ental idea fo r th e establishm ent in the branches o f th at unity o f supervision w hich exists at the centre o f governm ent in the office of the P rem ier and the E xecutive Council. U nder present organization, each civil servant w orking o ut o f a regional centre w ould be responsible to the deputy m inister and m inister o f his own departm ent. T here are obvious p ro b lem s in trying to impose another line of supervision, running through the regional adm inistrator to the P rem ier and Executive Council. It m ay be that policy could continue to be departm en tal and th at the adm inistrative practices and organization a t the regional centre could be inter-departm ental. In any event, it is clear th at provincial services, w hich will be dispensed through the regional office, group themselves naturally across the verti cal division o f departm ental jurisdictions. F o r exam ple, services to individuals and families, w hich would have to be related to be effective, w ould include services rendered by the separate D epartm ents o f H ealth, W elfare and E ducation, as well as specialties such as physical fitness and athletic program m es, recreational services, etc. Services to the econom ic grow th o f the region w ould involve the separate D epartm ents o f A gri
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culture, Industry and C om m erce, M ines and N atu ral Resources, an d others. O ther related services include such w orks as high w ays and drainage and conservation projects. A lthough it would be difficult, it should not be beyond the ingenuity o f the Provin cial G overnm ent to develop new channels o f control and direc tion o f decentralized provincial services w hich would m ake out o f the regional centre a significant and independent source of all the provincial services w hich are required locally, w ithout th e necessity o f travelling to the provincial capital. PR O V IN C IA L -M U N IC IP A L C O -O PER A TIO N
A second novelty in the regional plan is the suggestion that the regional centre can be m ade a place fo r co-operation be tw een the provincial adm inistration and m unicipal adm inistra tions in carrying o u t their separate responsibilities. W e have proposed a com plete separation o f function between the Prov ince and m unicipalities. E ach will have its own exclusive field. N evertheless, provincial experts at the regional centre will be able to help m unicipalities, particularly those who do not m aintain regular professional advisors. It is clear also th at the regional council, representing th e m unicipalities of the region, will bring together a fund of local knowledge which would be of great assistance to the provincial regional adm inistrator in planning and carrying out the adm inistration of provincial services in the region. W e have not attem pted to forecast in detail how this potential liaison can be developed and used. It seems to have such a potential th at in tim e it m ight grow into an im p o rtant aid to the P rovince in carrying out its constantly developing responsibilities. W here definite m achinery of provincial-m unicipal adm inis tration is required, such as in the proposed regional hospital com m ittee, it will be easy to set up such m achinery fo r any particular service because o f the existence of the regional coun cil, representative as it will be of all m unicipalities in the region. T his kind o f regional com m ittee could be form ed not only for th e adm inistration o f services provided by the Province alone, b u t also for services provided by the F ederal G overnm ent o r by the Federal and Provincial G overnm ents in co-operation. IN T E R -M U N IC IP A L F U N C T IO N
T he third potential o f regional organization is equally novel and im portant. In the absence of county organization, there has been no m achinery for co-operation in carrying out inter m unicipal w orks and projects. O f course, the proposed region is
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n o t a county; it has no pow er to levy on the m unicipalities and we do not expect o r hope th at it should becom e an extra level of governm ent w ith taxing pow ers. H ow ever, the regional council will provide a forum in which two o r m ore m unicipalities can develop and agree upon joint w orks. In the absence o f agree m ent, m achinery is provided to bring in the advice and judge m ent o f the M unicipal B oard. These plans, o f course, will be carried out, not by the regional council, w hich is not an execu tive body nor even an initiating body, but by the m unicipalities concerned and at their expense in proportions settled by agree m ent, o r by the M unicipal Board. REO R G A N IZA TIO N W IT H IN R EG IO N S
!
Finally, the existence o f regional organization will com pen sate to some extent fo r the im m ediate deficiencies of sm all m unicipalities, and m ake it possible for the process of reorgani zation o f m unicipalities into larger units to go forw ard in a deliberate and orderly m anner under the jurisdiction of the M unicipal Board. It will be unnecessary to force the pace. D esirable changes can be m ade w hen they becom e acceptable. T he Byrne R eport W e have read w ith interest the R eport of the N ew Bruns wick Royal Com m ission on F inance and M unicipal T axation w hich was published last February. W hile we agree w ith m any o f its principal recom m endations and particularly its assign m ent to the Province o f adm inistrative and financial responsi bility for the general services o f health, w elfare and public school education, we differ in regard to the role o f local governm ent. Instead o f a Public School Com m ission under indirect con trol o f the Legislature, we favour direct control of public schools by the Provincial D ep artm ent o f E ducation, assisted by re form ed local school boards. T he latter are preferable to provin cial district adm inistrators. Instead of the establishm ent o f a Social W elfare C om m is sion, also under indirect control o f the L egislature, we favour direct adm inistration by provincial departm ents u nder the politi cal responsibility o f the Provincial G overnm ent and operating through regional offices a t w hich the assistance and advice of local authorities can be utilized. T h eir proposed H ospital Com m ission and health service adm inistration by the D epartm ent o f H ealth seem to be m ore
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in line w ith ou r views except th at we place m ore value on local participation in regional hospital adm inistration. W e also reject their proposal of a M unicipal Affairs C om mission to collect real property taxes and to tu to r and support residual m unicipal institutions, in favour o f reconstituted and enlarged m unicipalities w ith exclusive functions and independ ent tax resources, co-operating with each other and w ith the Province through regional centres. T h eir decision to increase the retail sales tax to relieve real p ro p erty taxpayers is in line w ith our views. M unicipal Councils and School Boards In suggesting the need fo r reorganization of the functions an d boundaries o f m unicipalities and school boards, we have n ot intended to be critical of the m any devoted men and w om en w ho are serving as councillors and trustees. O n the contrary, th e willingness o f so m any public-spirited citizens to give their tim e and energy to m unicipal o r school adm inistration, w ith inadequate com pensation, if any, for their tim e and expense, and w ith no other rew ard than the satisfaction o f a job well done, has m ade it possible for an outdated system to function w ith reasonable success. Some of the m unicipalities, w hich in principle are too small to be viable, have done very well. M any isolated district school boards have provided educational serv ices, even if they did not reach the highest standards. T h e transfer to the school division o f financial responsibility fo r elem entary schools should not be difficult nor take long. On th e other hand, the consolidation of sm all school districts need n ot move in advance o f local opinion. Consolidation will be easier and m ore attractive u nder the new scheme, and all district trustees w ould do well to consider the application of this R eport to th eir own circum stances and to becom e advocates o f any consolidation w hich will im prove the educational services available to their children. T h e enlargem ent o f boundaries by am algam ation o f rural m unicipalities is long overdue. It need n o t be hurried if the regional organization is established, b u t every m unicipal coun cillor should give serious thought to the cause o f better local governm ent, even at the expense of his own personal interests, by giving a lead to public opinion. It will take initiative o f this kind to establish larger m unicipalities and to bring m unicipal and school boundaries into line.
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4: Criticism of the Michener Report BY D E N N IS A. Y O UNG
“Report o f the M anitoba Royal Commission on Local Gov ernm ent Organization and Finance,” C anadian P ublic A d m in istra tio n , 8 (M arch, 1965), 33-5. By permission o f the editor and author. s o u rc e :
W hile the M ichener Com m ission has developed a very forthright case fo r the preservation o f the so-called “grass roots” o f dem ocracy and has given us an outline of how the m em bers th ink it can be done, I cannot help but feel a little uneasy about som e of the adm inistrative problem s w hich have been over looked or which will arise. F irst, as to the proposed regional adm inistrative officer, I have no idea w here the Province of M anitoba will find the “superm en” to staff this position. T he regional adm inistrative officer’s m ajor task in the w ords o f th e Com m ission is to p ro m ote “the m axim um possible integration o f all related provin cial services.” If this w ere not enough in itself, it is also sug gested th at he act in a liaison capacity between the provincial and local governm ents and, presum ably, in a staff capacity to the regional council. T o handle the first function he will have to be a diplom at, well versed in the art o f com prom ise, a generalist rath er than a specialist, posing no th reat to the various service arm s w ho will be m ost suspicious of this m an from “head office.” Y et, on the other hand, the regional council will inevi tably look to him fo r professional advice and guidance since there is no one else available. In this capacity he will have to be the initiator and the catalyst who will “suggest” and “encourage” courses o f action. Such a m anipulator is not likely to be found even in the upper echelons o f governm ent service, and it will be difficult to induce professionals from other fields to accept a position w hich would require them to live in ru ral areas. T h e M ichener R eport reviews in considerable detail the factors which lead to the establishm ent o f the various adm inis trative regions. A lthough the Com m ission states that principles, rath er th an political expediencies, guided their recom m enda tions, I cannot help b u t w onder if they have not in som e in stances rendered their proposed regional organization inoper able w here they have related their reorganization strictly to existing m unicipal boundaries rath e r than natural geographic o r drainage areas.
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T he m atter o f joint adm inistrative responsibilities can only have received a very cursory review. A lthough the Com m ission tends to regard the anticipated result as a significant benefit to be achieved by regional organization, the report indicates that this activity will encom pass both health and w elfare m atters. Since the financial stake of the m unicipalities is either negligible o r non-existent, my experience has led m e to believe that, w ithin a relatively short period o f tim e, local councillors will be urging th at their so-called “responsibilities” be rem oved, since they have no real control over policy form ulation. T h e only benefit to the Province from w hat is, in effect, a cum bersom e adm inistrative tool is the possibility th at it has its finger on the local pulse. Surely this can be achieved by o th er m ethods than this rather subtle subterfuge. O ne o f the C om m ission’s o ft stated purposes is to elim inate duplication and overlapping jurisdictions. I find it curious, therefore, th at the Com m ission considers boundary reorganiza tion for m unicipal governm ent and school districts as two dis tinctly separate entities and recom m ends th at two staff positions in different departm ents be established to deal with the problem . Surely, this is one m atter w hich could be integrated into one departm ent such as the M unicipal B oard, with th e necessary professional consultants brought in as required. T he R eport m akes a strong case fo r the equalization of assessments by m eans of the establishm ent o f a single provincial assessment departm ent yet it condones and even recom m ends the establishm ent of single-purpose boards and com m issions at the local level. A t the risk of antagonizing any assessors in o u r m idst, I cannot help but feel th a t this is one function which could well be rem oved from the arena o f politics and placed under an independent commission. T he M ichener C om m ission’s stand on m oney by-laws seems indefensible since its entire case fo r the preservation o f local governm ent is based upon accountability to the electorate. Y et apparently w ithout the slightest hesitation, the Com mission rem oves the only effective m ethod by which the average tax payer can m ake his wishes k n o w n -th e referendum vote. T here are other queries which suggest themselves on such m iscellaneous item s as, fo r exam ple, unorganized territory. W h at about Region 10 w hich contains no units o f local govern m ent? A lm ost three-quarters o f the land area o f the province lies in this region and will require som e attention, if only to ensure th at provincial field services are co-ordinated yet the R eport sim ply states th at their recom m endations do n ot apply
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to this area. A gain, is “m arket value” a valid criterion fo r setting the assessm ent base o r sim ply an easily explained answer? T ru e m arket values m ay be difficult to ascertain in som e rural areas since none m ay exist and could result in the developm ent of an arb itrary “rule-of-thum b” form ula in certain localities. A bout the w ard system o f election o f representatives, is this good, bad, or indifferent? It seems to m e th at it could encourage the inci dence of election by acclam ation in some ru ra l areas w here there m ay be little o r no controversy. T he deferred paym ent of taxes also raises questions. T he decision to g ran t deferm ent of taxes will have to b e m ade a t th e local level. Since the m atter cannot be legislated precisely, each case will have to be decided upon its own m erits and such decisions are, unfortunately, subject to bias. T he assum ption th a t the tax is to be recovered eventually may well lead to a lenient attitude tow ards exem p tions an d result in serious distortions o f the tax base particularly w ith regard to the School Levy in sem i-rural areas. I t m ay even encourage land speculation by m eans of options w hich w ould only be taken up w hen econom ically advantageous. A s to pro vincial field service reorganization, the R eport did not deal with this m atter except to h int at it rath er vaguely. Y et its fram e of reference relating to purpose, objects and duties could be inter preted to cover this point.1 1 cannot help b u t feel th at the suc cess o f the regional organization will depend to a large extent on the type and degree of services m ade available by the Province and the m ethods o f adm inistration. T h e one factor th at is com m on to, yet unstated in, both the Byrne and M ichener reports is the underlying em phasis on the need fo r the specialist in public adm inistration. T he Byrne R eport, w ith the establishm ent o f sem i-independent com m is sions, clearly establishes the professional as the dom inant, if not the sole, arbiter o f services in local areas. In contrast the M ichener R eport sets up a partnership betw een the specialist and the lay representatives o f the people w orking tow ard the com m on goal o f “good governm ent.” F o r this reason the M ichener R eport is likely to be m ore acceptable to the politi cians and the people and in m y opinion has a better chance of being im plem ented.
J Sec. 9 (f) The division o f responsibilities between the Province p id local governments including the functions perform ed and the services provided by the Province in local government areas. The effect of such provincial activities on local powers and responsibilities.
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5: Regional Government for Ontario Ontario Committee on Taxation, (Sm ith) R ep o rt (Toronto, 1967), Vol. 2, 515-23, 543-4, 550. By permission of the Queen's Printer for Ontario.
s o u rc e :
L et us begin by recapitulating the five criteria th at we form ulated as the basis of our scheme. W e shall label each with a short nam e th at will serve fo r purposes o f reference in the discussion th at follows: W e have first a com m unity criterion. 1. A governm ental region should possess to a reasonable degree a com bination o f historical, geographical, eco nom ic and sociological characteristics such that som e sense o f com m u n ity already exists and show s prom ise o f further developm ent subsequent to the creation o f the region. N ext, we have a balance criterion. 2. A region should be so structured that diverse interests within its boundaries are reasonably balanced and give prom ise o f rem aining so in the foreseeable future. W e com e now to a financial criterion. 3. E very region should possess an adequate tax base, such that it will have the capacity to achieve substantial service equalization through its ow n tax resources, thereby reducing a n d sim plifying the provincial task o f evening o ut local fiscal disparities. Closely linked to the financial criterion is a functional cri terion. 4. E very region should be so constituted that it has the capacity to perform those functions that confer regionwide benefits w ith the greatest possible efficiency, effi ciency being understood in term s o f econom ies o f scale, specialization and the application o f m odern technology. Finally, there is a co-operation criterion. 5. R egions should be so delineated and their governm ents so organized that the co-operative discharge o f certain functions can readily becom e an integral part o f their over-all responsibility.
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Because we regard an equilibrium between access and serv ice as the basic foundation o f truly viable regional governm ent, we have sought a regional schem e th a t w ould, as far as possible, satisfy all five o f the criteria th at proceed from a consideration of the nature o f these twin objectives. W e have concluded that just as access and service can, in fact, strongly buttress one another, so also o u r five criteria can all be accom m odated w ithin one governm ental system. T he N e e d fo r M etropolitan Regions In analysing the m ap of O ntario, considerations stem m ing fro m o u r com m unity and balance criteria led us quickly to realize th at large m etropolitan centres require special treatm ent. W ith respect to com m unity, we could not but recognize th at the basic m etropolitan p h e n o m e n o n -a com m on pattern o f living, com m uting and w orking w ithin an urban-suburban environm ent -reflects econom ic and sociological forces w ith dom inant centri petal tendencies. A t this juncture, the quest to fulfil the balance criterion introduced th e follow ing p ro b le m -th a t m etropolitan areas by reason of sheer population size could tend to dom inate any larger region w ithin w hich they m ight be placed. It was obvious th at the relation o f T oronto to Y ork County, of O ttaw a to C arleton, o f L ondon to M iddlesex, fo r exam ple, w ould be such that those inhabitants o f the respective counties who did n ot form p art o f the im m ediate m etropolitan com m unity w ould have virtually no voice in any dem ocratically representative regional governm ent. T he indicated solution thus appeared to be a segregation o f m etropolitan centres un d er their own form of regional governm ent, and this in order both to give expres sion to their ow n com m unity o f interests and to preserve the balance o f the rem aining regions. T his conclusion is fu rth er reinforced by the application of the next two criteria, the financial and the functional. M etro politan areas cover a sm aller geographical territory than other regions, and are o f course m uch m ore densely populated. T hey display a m uch higher tem po in th e m ovem ent of people and goods, and consequently require m ore elaborate and com plex services. O n balance, tax pooling and service unification in m etropolitan areas can be taken fu rth er w ith beneficial results. In developing ou r scheme fo r regional governm ent, we have been concerned w ith the fact that the p roper accom m odation of m etropolitan areas entails a substantial disruption o f existing county boundaries. T his is precisely the difficulty that was faced
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in a lim ited sphere w hen the M unicipality of M etropolitan T o ro n to was being created. In southern O ntario, it is natu ral to w ant to recognize the position o f the adm inistrative counties in any new regional developm ent. T he Select C om m ittee on T he M unicipal A ct was properly conscious o f this point. U nfortu nately, that C om m ittee’s preoccupation with the counties seems to us to have coloured its judgm ent w ith respect to one of its regional recom m endations. T h e Beckett C om m ittee noted that the delineation o f suit able regional boundaries w ould require careful study in which account was taken of a variety of pertinent conditions. They cam e to the conclusion, also, th at O ntario’s cities and separated tow ns could not be excluded from the regional units o f an effective regional governm ent schem e. Y et despite these reiter ated points, the Com m ittee’s recom m endations suggested “T hat as a practical start the county in whole o r in p art o r w ith addi tions thereto, be adopted as the basic unit o f regional govern m ent.” 1 O ur concern is with the m anner in which this dictum m ight be interpreted. We see the units that provide the practical start fo r regional governm ent rem aining as these units w ith very little possibility o f fundam ental change. If particular counties, singly o r in com bination, are given the status o f regional units despite inadequate qualification from the balance criterion or any oth er standpoint, they are likely nevertheless to rem ain part o f the system and to detract from its effectiveness fo r as long as the regional governm ent arrangem ent rem ains in being. We believe that before the lines are draw n, the p roper relationship o f m etropolitan and rem aining regions has to be w orked out. It cannot be built in later. W herever a two-level m unicipal system is deemed desirable w ithin a m etropolitan environm ent, the functions appropriately discharged at the regional level m ay be expected to differ som e w hat from those so exercised elsewhere. A m etropolitan area m ust cope w ith far m ore com prehensive planning and have m ore concern for urban renewal than other regions. Its respon sibility in the dom ain of arterial roads is technologically far m ore com plex; and it is m uch m ore involved also w ith traffic control, parking and mass transit. T he m etropolitan region m ight perform the policing function in its entirety, as M etro T o ro n to now does, and it m ight have sim ilarly com prehensive duties with regard to fire protection as in England, in M etro politan L ondon. W hereas other regions will probably have lim ited involvem ent, a m etropolitan region is quite likely to becom e responsible for w ater supply, sewage treatm ent and
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storm drainage including at least trunk distribution and collec tion systems. T here is also a case, which was m ade by the Royal Com mission on M etropolitan T oronto, for integrating m ost and perhaps all aspects o f prim ary and secondary education at the m etropolitan level. T hen too, the provision of library services m ight be m ade subject to different degrees o f co-ordination, even to the extent o f full m etropolitan responsibility. T h e above functions are singled out because they are gener ally m ore likely than the others to be directly affected in scope by a m etropolitan environm ent. But it should be noted th at all governm ental functions tend to be transm uted by the techno logical possibilities and the scope for specialization th at a m etropolitan setting affords. W e do not deem it our responsi bility to define the extent to w hich unification of individual services m ight appropriately be carried in particular m etro politan regions o r to suggest the areas over w hich single-tier governm ent w ould be satisfactory. Separate m etropolitan regions are necessary, w hether from considerations of com m unity and balance, or o f finance and functions. A nd they have other points of distinction from the rem aining regions. F o r the county and district regions, we seek tc m ake use of rural territory in delineating boundaries. O ur objective is to create dividing lines that exhibit the greatest possible certainty and stability. W hen we com e to m etropolitan regions or, for th at m atter, to urbanizing regions, how ever, the problem is m ore com plex. Even if rural land can be selected in the first instance as the point of separation, there is no guarantee that it will rem ain so, short o f a com pletely inflexible and hence quite unacceptable form o f land-use control. T he technological forces that together act upon a m etropolitan com m unity have been accelerating throughout this century. A m etropolitan area is never static; rather it is ever changing, ever in the process o f becoming, ever knitting itself m ore closely together, ever spilling over its own boundaries. A ccordingly, the territory and population th at abut a m etropolitan region m ust be the object o f special concern. A t the very least, every m etropolitan region should be so structured that it will m eet ou r co-operation criterion as fully as possible. In our view, fo u r regional functions in p a rtic u la rplanning, roads, hospital facilities planning and w ater supply -d e m a n d governm ental m achinery that will facilitate w hat m ust 1 Select Committee on The Municipal Act and Related Acts, F ourth a n d F inal R ep o rt, 185.
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be m andatory co-operation between m etropolitan regions and the areas beyond. We suggest that som e such) device as com m it tees o f elected representatives from the m etropolitan regions and those abutting them is w orthy o f detailed attention. The Case fo r U rbanizing Regions T h ere will be situations w here co-operative devices m ay be insufficient o f themselves to encom pass the peculiar problem s that beset areas directly beyond a m etropolitan region. It is for this reason that we have chosen to designate three areas so situated as urbanizing regions. W hy in these three instances did we forsake interregional co-operation and instead create a new class of region? A nd why are all three located in one general area? A brief explanation is required: A m etropolitan area differs from sm aller urban areas in that the form er has a m ore com plex pattern o f land use. The traditional urban centre o f sm aller size fans out from a single business district; the typical m etropolitan area contains a dow n tow n core and a num ber o f lesser business districts o f varying com position and strength. A round the western end o f Lake O ntario, however, we find a growth p attern that is still m ore com plex. Several m etropolitan regions have grown up in close proxim ity. Consequently, in addition to the com petitive inter action o f the several com m ercial and residential areas w ithin each region, we witness the further econom ic interplay of one m etropolitan region upon another and upon the lands between. T he urban belt that extends with few interruptions from N iagara Falls to beyond Bowmanville, a distance of 125 miles, is unique in this country. It contains between one-third and one-half the population of the province and considerably m ore o f its urban developm ent. T he mixed urban, suburban and rural areas that lie outside the solidly m etropolitan regions have been subject for some years to rapid and constant change. H ere we face particular problem s of transportation, urban land servicing, school population changes and inadequate tax base. H ere also we can witness new industrial, com mercial and residential developm ents on a larger scale than w ould be possible w ere it not for the influences that em anate from a broad belt of m etropolitan developm ent. It comes, therefore, as no great surprise that the M inister o f M unicipal Affairs has already singled out the C ounties of O ntario, Peel and H alton for special study. N o r is it startling to read in the Royal Com mission
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R eport on M etropolitan T oronto that “consideration m ight well be given to the creation o f a sm aller ‘M etro’ on the western fringe o f M etropolitan T oro n to .”2 A gain, we note the concern expressed in th at R eport over the problem of supplying services in the areas im m ediately north of the M etropolitan T oronto boundary. A s we envisage them , the urbanizing areas m ay be expected to require the pooled m anagem ent o f certain functions that w ould not be a m atter o f concern in m ost county regions. Exam ples w ould include serious involvem ent with large-scale com m unity w ater supply and sewage disposal. Again, urbanizing regions w ould have no conceivable interest in providing oth er services that necessarily constitute a key responsibility in m etro politan regions, fo r exam ple m ajor aspects of traffic m anage m ent, including transit. Finally, we would expect urbanizing regions to display still fu rth e r distinguishing characteristics including m ore flexible boundaries, m ore fluid service require m ents and close ties with adjacent m etropolitan regions. T he N ature o f C ounty R egions Let us now turn our attention to the county regions. H ere the com m unity criterion on w hich considerable stress was laid in o u r theoretical exposition poses certain problem s. T o begin w ith, the designation of m etropolitan regions has perforce m eant the partitioning o f certain counties and has precluded a delineation o f county region boundaries that would take full advantage of the historical ties th at attach to the traditional counties. F urther, in order to fulfil other requirem ents fo r w ell-balanced and closely-m atched regions, it has been essential to cut across a few county lines. In fact, some need for adjust m ent in county boundaries is surely not surprising inasm uch as the present counties can claim continuous existence for m ore th an one hundred years. Finally, we have thought it advanta geous to rem ove from the new regions direct responsibility for certain m ore rem ote territory w here through the decades growth has been notably slow o r non-existent. T he reader will none the less note that our scheme, w hile grouping counties to produce units o f sufficient size and strength, preserves thirteen adm inis
3 Royal Commission on M etropolitan Toronto, R ep o rt (Toronto, 1965), 168.
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trative counties intact3 and m aintains the developed portions of six m ore.4 In addition to the historical sense o f com m unity thus preserved, we believe th at distinct enhancem ent in com m unity sentim ent throughout ou r county regions will be made possible through the exclusion from the regions of m etropolitanoriented areas. Each county region offers a blend o f urban and rural settlement. This brings us to the balance criterion, which our county regions appear to fulfil rath er well. T he m ost cursory exam ina tion will indicate that in no region does an urban, urban fringe, o r farm ing o r other resource interest predom inate. T he conse quent potential of every group to influence the political process of its region should strongly prom ote w idespread public parti cipation in governm ent and consequently nurtu re the growth of a sense of political com m unity. We believe that the balance which the new county regions possess should m ore than offset any loss of historical com m unity that their creation incurs. The strength of our regions in term s o f the balance criterion should, in oth er words, fully correct through time w hatever historical deficiencies they mal possess a t the outset w ith respect to the com m unity criterion. W e suggest also that a conscious effort could be m ade to help the new loyalties to take root, for exam ple, by the transfer and dedication o f present county build ings to new regional purposes and by the careful selection of nam es for each region.5 N ow the financial criterion. A pooling of certain local service responsibilities throughout any given region m ay be expected to substantially reduce the financial inequalities exist ing between m unicipalities w ithin that region. It will not prove possible, of course, to elim inate discrepancies in taxable capacity am ong regions, as ou r long experience w ith county governm ent proves. But regions, by the very fact that they involve a pooling o f the financial resources w ithin, greatly reduce the range of extrem es that exists am ong individual m unicipalities on a prov ince-wide basis and sim plify the achievem ent of equalization through provincial grants. . . . A s between our county regions then, sufficient sim ilarity in fiscal capacity will m ake it possible for all to shoulder substan tially identical responsibilities. T he fiscal discrepancies th at do appear can be offset by relatively sim ple grant form ulas. W ithin the respective regions, m oreover, there appears to exist a gener ally good balance on the one hand, and com m ercial and industrial assessm ent on the other. . . . T h e financial capacity o f the county regions leads directly
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to a consideration o f their functional responsibilities. W ithout claim ing th at our suggestions are in any w ay sacrosanct, we none the less believe th a t it is possible to discuss the assignment of specific functions m uch m ore definitively for county regions than fo r m etropolitan or urbanizing regions. This is to not only because the county regions enjoy rath er sim ilar fiscal capacities, but also for three o th er reasons. F o r one, the county regions are n o t subject to the bew ildering pace of change that besets m etropolitan and urbanizing regions. F o r another, their terri torial size and population are relatively uniform , the latter varying between 100,000 people in the U pper O ttaw a Valley Region and 175,000 in the R ideau Lakes Region. Finally, the county regions com prise generally sim ilar num bers of low er-tier governm ents. W e shall now attem pt to sketch the allocation o f functional responsibilities th at we w ould project for the county regions, following a four-fold classification o f functions: exclusively regional, shared betw een regions and the Province, shared betw een regions and the low er-tier governm ents, and exclusively local. A. EXCLUSIVELY REGIONAL
1 A ssessm ent for regional and local tax purposes; 2 tax collection on behalf o f the region and all low er-tier authorities; 3 levying, collecting o r receiving any non-property taxes; 4 capital borrow ing o n behalf of the region and all-lower-tier authorities; 5 arterial roads; 6 public health; 7 public welfare; 8 secondary schooling; 9 regional parks and recreation; 10 conservation; 11 co-ordination of protection services, including m inim um standards and em ergency m easures organization. B. SHARED BETW EEN REGIONS AND THE PROVINCE
1 H ospital facilities planning; 2 regional planning.
3 The Counties of Kent, Lambton, H uron, Perth, Bruce, Grey, Oxford, Brant, Haldimand, Peterborough, Prince Edw ard and the United Counties o f Leeds and Grenville and of Dundas, Stormont and Glengarry. In addition, the County of N orthum berland, which is now united with D urham , would lie within a single region. ‘ The Counties of Victoria, Hastings, Lennox and Addington, Frontenac and Renfrew and the United County of Prescott and Russell. s We have attached a name to each region for purposes of identifica tion and illustration only. The final selection m ight well be left to the inhabitants concerned.
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C. SHARED BETW EEN REGIONS AND LOW ER-TIER GOVERNMENTS
1 Levying property taxes; 2 library services; 3 w ater supply and distribution; 4 sewage collection and disposal; 5 garbage disposal. D. EXCLUSIVELY LOCAL
1 Local planning, zoning, and building by laws; 2 licences and perm its; 3 police; 4 fire; 5 parking; 6 weed and pest control; 7 street lighting; 8 traffic control 9 local roads and streets; 10 sidewalks; 11 storm drainage; 12 garbage collection; 13 elem en tary schooling; 14 local parks and recreation; 15 com m unity centres and arenas; 16 m arkets and weighscales; 17 cemeteries; 18 electricity; 19 transit; 20 other utilities. T h e m ost casual perusal of the above list will reveal that we have a t once allocated significant functions to the regional level while retaining highly im portant responsibilities fo r the low er tier. As to the effects o f our schem e upon the latter, the reader will note th at no few er than twenty-one m ajor functions rem ain exclusively local and that low er-tier m unicipalities have substantial responsibility for five others in co-operation with th e region. T hus county regions that are capable o f meeting o u r objectives can exist side by side with local units of strength and significance. . . . Im plem enting a Regional A rrangem ent O u r analysis of the desirability o f regional governm ent led us to reach back to the fundam ental values that local govern m ent in a constitutional dem ocracy is expected to fulfil: access and service. F rom an abstract consideration o f these tw in objec tives, we were able to construct a set o f criteria that, if met, could lead to the achievem ent of these objectives in equilibrium . U sing the criteria as our basis, we thereupon proceeded to draft a full-fledged regional arrangem ent for O ntario, and endeav oured to dem onstrate, at least to ou r own satisfaction, th at the proposed arrangem ent m eets the dem ands im posed by our criteria. O u r illustrative exercise, while convincing us o f the benefits th at attach to regional governm ent, has also impressed upon us the need for a sense o f proportion. W e are hardly prepared to recom m end th at ou r schem e be im plem ented w ithout some fu rth e r study. W e sim ply suggest that this plan provides a
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needed foundation for provincial policy. T h e m ere existence o f a concrete outline of how regional governm ent can be m ade viable throughout O ntario can help to guide those w ho m ake practical studies of any given area, and can give an added sense o f direction in the on-going process o f structural adjustm ent. M ore particularly, it can aid in answering the vexing question th at haunted the T oronto and O ttaw a com missions of inquiry: w hat becomes o f the territory beyond this particular govern m ental region? W ithout im plying that we have overcom e every dilfficulty, we shall presently proceed to m ake certain recom m endations. F irst, how ever, we wish to m ake a point th at we consider vital if regional governm ent is to m atch the fiscal responsibility an d status o f other levels of governm ent. It is this: w hatever the actual boundaries or functions o f a regional governm ent, the representative officials o f th at1governm ent should be directly elected. We are at one w ith the following declaration by the Legislature’s Select Com m ittee on T he M unicipal A ct and R elated A cts: D em ocracy in its best fo rm em anates fro m the direct elec tion o f representatives at all levels o f governm ent. This m eth o d is adopted in elections a t the federal, provincial and local m unicipal level. I f the regional governm ent is to adhere to this pattern, the regional councils should be elected directly by the people, as nearly as practical on the principle o f representation by population. T his should be accom plished by the use o f a ward system . W ard boundaries should follow as nearly as possible the boundaries o f constituent m unicipalities, although it will som etim es be necessary to com bine or divide local m unicipalities to achieve equality o f representation.° H ow can the Province of O ntario set about im plem enting a regional scheme of governm ent? W e believe th at a good start has already been m ade through the local governm ent review program m e o f the D epartm ent o f M unicipal Affairs, and through the recent study and revision of the m etropolitan gov ernm ent system in T oronto. All existing studies under the local governm ent review program m e have been com m issioned by the M inister o f M unicipal Affairs at the form al request o f the m unicipalities th at form ed the focal point o f each study. T he 6 Select Committee on the M unicipal Act and Related Acts, F ourth a n d F inal R ep o rt, 174-5.
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cost o f these studies is being equally divided betw een the P rovince and the m unicipalities concerned. If the Province accepts the general approach to regional governm ent th a t is im plicit in ou r fram ew ork, the local governm ent review p ro gram m e, with its em phasis on m unicipal initiative, will have to be integrated into an over-all study program m e originated entirely by th e Province and therefore, presum ably, financed fully by provincial funds. A prim e requirem ent o f th e new p rogram m e will be the com pletion of detailed consideration of m etropolitan and urbanizing areas. Coupled w ith this, systema tic attention m ust be given to the precise delineation of the boundaries, functions and form o f organization of the county and district regions. In ou r view, it w ould be reasonable to expect com pletion o f the total program m e w ithin five years of the publication o f this R eport. In light o f the. involvem ent of several departm ents o f governm ent, such a project cannot be left to the sponsorship o f any one departm ent but should be an undertaking of the cabinet w ith the prim e assistance of the D ep artm ent o f M unicipal Affiairs, which has the predom inant interest, in conjunction w ith the other departm ents concerned. Because it is ou r considered opinion that the fullest rationaliza tion o f local finance in term s o f today’s requirem ents dem ands a fundam ental readjustm ent and strengthening of local govern m ent in this province, we recom m end th a t: T he provincial governm ent plan and schedule the detailed studies o f boundaries, functions and fo rm s o f m unicipal organization needed to establish a com prehensive system o f regional governm ent w ithin five years o f the publication o f this R eport. . . . Conclusion: L ocal A u to n o m y and Provincial Responsibility T h e m easures we have suggested in this chapter w ould have far-reaching effects on O ntario’s tim e-honoured m unicipal structure. W e place th e im m ediate onus fo r bringing o ur recom m endations to fruition on the provincial governm ent, and this is as it should be because th a t governm ent alone has the consti tutional authority to alter the fact o f m unicipal institutions. Local autonom y has ever been a co rn er stone of m unicipal institutions in this province. W e consider ourselves second to none in o u r espousal o f this principle w hich has served so long and so well in prom oting dem ocratic values w ithin a fram ew ork o f decentralization. B ut if local autonom y is to rem ain a reality,
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th e institutions it fosters m ust be w orthy o f its challenge. Local autonom y, precisely because it stresses the im portance o f strong m unicipal institutions, is not a haven for m unicipalities and school boards so sm all and w eakly organized that they cannot discharge their functions in acceptable fashion. A gain local autonom y, w hich is a bastion o f responsive and responsible governm ent, cannot condone the m ultiplication of ad hoc special service authorities rem oved from the im m ediate arena o f the political process. T h rough the m edium o f a rationalized regional governm ent system, we believe we offer a dynam ic opportunity fo r the m aterial enhancem ent of local autonom y throughout O ntario. W e look to provincial action th a t will augm ent, not curtail, local initiative. T he Province has a constitutional responsibility for the structure o f m unicipal and school authorities. It has an even deeper responsibility to foster, through local institutions, the dem ocratic values we cherish.
6: A n Analysis of the Smith Proposal s o u r c e : Canadian Tax Foundation and Bureau of Municipal R e search, R ep o rt o f P roceedings o f the Special T a x C onference o n the R ep o rt o f the O ntario C o m m ittee on T axation (T oronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1968), 312-16. By permission of the C anadian Tax Foundation. Reprinted in M u n icip a l W o rld (June, 1968), 169-70.
I intend to defend the Sm ith C om m ittee’s proposal for regional governm ent, but I will do so in a peculiar w ay—by criticizing the C om m ittee’s R eport. I will criticize ilot only the logic o f som e o f its argum ents but also the weakness o f the case it presented. I am very m uch in favour of the m ain p ro p o sa l-th a t there should be a second-tier of regional govern m ents in O ntario, w ith separate ones fo r m etropolitan areas. B ut I am less enthusiastic about the large size o f the so-called “county” regions proposed for southern O ntario. T he Tw o-Tier Idea L et us consider first the m ain tw o-tier idea. T he C om m ittee based its case on the two prim ary values o f access a n d se rv ic e -
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easy access to governm ent by the citizens and efficient govern m ental services. Its m ain argum ent is th at a second-tier of regional governm ent would give a better balance between access an d service than does a single tier of local governm ents and the use o f a separate ad hoc authority for each service that requires a large area for efficient adm inistration. But the values o f access and service m ake a w eak defence fo r regional governm ent. Regionally adm inistered services w ould obviously be more efficient than locally adm inistered ones, but regional govern ments would be further from the citizens and access would be m ore difficult. T hus, the argum ent seems to give m ore weight to technical efficiency than to access and participation by the citizens. Also, the case against “ad hockery” - t h e creation of num er ous ad hoc au th o rities-w as an easy one for the C om m ittee to m ake. T he im portant alternatives are not regional governm ent versus ad hoc authorities, but regional versus provincial adm in istration. T he real point is that the adm inistration o f local services under O ntario’s existing system o f m unicipal govern m ent is so unsatisfactory that m any services are perform ed either badly o r not at all. T here is therefore an increasing tendency for them to be taken over and adm inistered directly by the provincial governm ent. A nnexation by the urban m uni cipalities can never be a com plete solution because o f the division between urban and rural m unicipalities in O ntario. A great m any local services require m uch larger areas for efficient adm inistration, yet ad hoc authorities have been created fo r only a very sm all num ber o f them and often for an area that is too small. If too m any ad hoc authorities are organized, the result is confusion for the citizens, as the Sm ith Com m ittee has pointed out. F o r all of these reasons, the citizens become dissatisfied w ith local adm inistration and dem and direct provin cial adm inistration and control. T he result is centralization at the provincial level. W e have seen this happen recently in New Brunswick, w here the centralization was so drastic that not only were m any im portant local services taken over by the province b u t also all of the rural m unicipalities were abolished. In short, an im portant dem ocratic value was ignored by the Sm ith C om m ittee: the value o f decentralization. A system of locally elected regional governm ents is necessary in ord er to keep the political system decentralized. It w ould preserve the existing local governm ents and a t the sam e tim e increase the num ber and strength o f the points at which political decisions are m ade in our society.
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A n o th er criterion missing from the Sm ith C om m ittee’s argum ent is the ease w ith w hich one level o f governm ent can deal w ith another in a m ulti-level system. T he governm ent of O ntario has nearly one thousand m unicipalities w ith w hich to contend. A second-tier o f regional governm ent, w hich dealt w ith the m unicipalities beneath it, w ould reduce to m anageable proportions the num ber of units o f governm ent w ith w hich the province would be required to com m unicate. Y et this could be done w ithout abolishing the existing m unicipalities. U n d er the new system one could expect a great im provem ent in inter-governm ental com m unications. A n im portant recent developm ent that the C om m ittee failed to m ention has been the creation o f regional governm ent in British Colum bia. In 1965 the governm ent o f British Colum bia initiated a plan fo r second-tier regional districts with governing boards representative o f the m em ber m unicipalities. L ike the C om m ittee’s proposal for O ntario, these districts include cities. T h e first district boards only had the pow er to finance regional hospitals, but boards can be given added powers upon local request, and by now m ost of them have additional functions, one o f the m ost im portant being regional planning. It is expected th at in m any regions, especially urban ones such as V ancouver and V ictoria, their pow ers will expand rapidly. Because o f the sim ilarity o f this system to th e Sm ith C om m ittee’s proposal, one w ould have expected th e C om m ittee to discuss it fully. A side from these serious omissions in presenting its case fo r regional governm ent, the C am m ittee did not present a positive enough statem ent of the argum ent in favour o f its proposal. M uch larger and m ore populous areas of local govern m ent could give m any obvious advantages. T he m ost im portant of these w ould be the ability to provide m any services o f greaterthan-local concern w hich are now either being provided inade quately at the local level o r are being adm inistered by the provincial governm ent because no regional unit a t present exists w hich could take them on. A nother great advantage w ould be a trem endous im provem ent in the efficiency with w hich m any m unicipal services are adm inistered. L arge regional govern m ents w ould enjoy the benefits o f large-scale organization and specialization o f equipm ent and personnel. T he vast m ajority o f o u r existing m unicipalities are too sm all and financially too w eak to provide w ith reasonable efficiency the battery o f ser vices now expected o f m odern governm ent. Regional govern m ent w ould com bine strong m unicipalities w ith w eak ones, large ones w ith sm all ones, and u rb an w ith ru ral ones. T his w ould
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shore up the services of greater-than-local concern in the weak, the small and the rural m unicipalities. T he autom atic pooling of property tax revenues and o f adm inistrative talent and equipm ent w ould result in a spectacular im provem ent in the standard o f such services in these municipalities. In the realm o f taxation and finance, giving the regional governm ents control over the assessm ent o f property would result in a uniform and equitable standard o f assessment within and am ong m unicipalities. T his would m ake it unnecessary for the province to assum e the assessment function directly, as some other provinces have been forced to do. T h e strong financial position o f regional governm ents w ould also enable them to float loans for their m em ber m unicipalities a t low rates of interest; and the tim ing o f local capital expenditures could be m ore easily scheduled to tie in with a national fiscal policy to control econom ic inflation o r recession. T h e C ounty R egion Let us now m ove on to the C om m ittee’s proposal for twelve “county” regions outside the m etropolitan areas. Again, my view is that the Com m ittee did not justify this proposal suffi ciently. In particular, it did not explain fully enough w hy it thought these regions should not be sm aller o r larger. All but one o f the five criteria presented in support of its detailed proposal w ould equally well justify regions o f a m uch greater population and area. F o r instance, larger regions could easily be m ade to contain a balance o f diverse interests (th e balance criterio n ), w ould achieve tax equalization (th e financial criter io n ), would provide services with great efficiency (the func tional criterio n ), and could just as easily co-operate w ith one another (the co-operation criterio n ). So the only one we are left w ith is the com m unity criterion - t h a t the region m ust possess some sense o f com m unity. T he Com m ittee says th at the region m ust also show prom ise of developing that sense fu rth e r after the region’s creation. But how can anyone tell beforehand w hether an area “shows prom ise” o f developing a com m unity sense after the creation o f a region? A nyw ay, there is no doubt that the counties possess a sense of com m unity because of their long history of local governm ent. Som e of them even have a strong sense of com m unity. So this criterion in itself m ay be enough to justify county-based regional governm ent. F o r this reason I thin k the C om m ittee’s regions should have coincided m ore w ith county
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boundaries and should have been sm aller. T hey are actually m ore th an double the area o f counties, and th e Com m ittee has led us astray by calling them “county” regions. T hey do not even fit th e C om m ittee’s own criterion o f having a sense of com m unity. O n the o th er hand, it is clear th a t some o f the counties are too small and should be joined together. In m y own proposal I suggested about twenty-five county regions (versus the C om m ittee’s twelve, and th e thirty-eight existing counties), plus ab o u t ten m etropolitan regions. It ca n be argued th at the creation of a governm ent fo r any area can also create a sense o f com m unity. If this is true, w ouldn’t even larger regions than the C om m ittee proposed b e better? If regional governm ents w ere created fo r them , w ouldn’t they develop a strong sense o f com m unity? T he Com m ittee should have addressed itself directly to these questions because ten econom ic regions already exist in O ntario fo r purposes of statistical analysis and econom ic planning. People are bound to ask: “W hy shouldn’t there be a regional governm ent of this size, in order to coincide w ith the econom ic regions?” T he Sm ith Com m ittee deals w ith this question, b u t only indirectly and alm ost incidentally by including a tw o-paragraph section at the end o f its proposal, in w hich it explains the unsuitability of the boundaries of th e econom ic regions fo r governm ental purposes. But it does n o t dwell upon the artificiality o f these regions as com m unities. T here is no reason to believe th a t there is any n atu ral com m unity o f feeling am ong the people o f these regions. A n o th er argum ent against regions of this size as a basis for regional governm ent is th at they w ould be too large and popu lous. T heir governm ents w ould be too distant from their inhabi tants. In other words, they w ould not m eet th e Com m ittee’s “access,” o r citizen participation, criterion nearly as well as county-size units. In m y view they w ould also be too close to the provincial level of governm ent. Since they w ould be entirely new, they would have no previous history o f independence. Y et the province w ould fea r the political pow er o f such large units. F o r these reasons it w ould be tem pted to create weak, provincially-controlled governm ents. I believe th at county-based units w ould have m uch m ore independence. T hey w ould not be too sm all because they w ould include all towns and cities, and would contain over twice the population and w ealth o f our existing county governm ents. L et m e sum up by saying th a t I agree heartily w ith the Sm ith C om m ittee’s proposal fo r a second tier of regional
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governm ent, but I feel that, generally speaking, it should be based on the existing counties. A nd I d o n ’t think th at the Com m ittee presented as strong a case for its proposals as it could have, o r should have. I also agree w ith the Com m ittee’s proposal th at the pro vincial governm ent should proceed a t once to prepare and im plem ent a com prehensive system o f regional governm ent w ithin five years. Its present policy o f financing separate studies o f u rb an regions as defined by local request is costly and tim e-consum ing. I t m ay also result in a set of unco-ordinated regions. A lthough the principle o f local variations to fit local needs is persuasive, equally persuasive is the principle th at too m uch variation for no good reason leads to confusion. A twotier system is com plex enough w ithout having a different one fo r each region. A reasonably uniform system throughout the province w ould be not only m ore efficient, b u t also m ore com prehensible to the average citizen.
Bibliography
Because published m aterials on local governm ent in C anada are so scattered and inadequate, I have prepared this extensive bibliography, w hich includes m any foreign references, as an aid to serious students o f the subject. F o r convenient reference the m ain subject-headings are, except for the first one, the sam e as the chapter-headings o f the book. F o r the benefit o f readers on the run, I have in m ost cases placed first in the list beneath each sub-heading a group o f brief, single-chapter surveys w hich are separated from the rem ainder by a space. I have indicated highly recom m ended item s by starring them. Item s available in paperback editions are indi cated by a P . F o r the benefit o f lazy researchers, the L ibrary of Congress call-num ber has been added a t the end o f the list ing fo r any recent publication to w hich m ost university libraries would have assigned this num ber.
G E N E R A L C A N A D IA N A N D C O M P A R A T IV E , h . l . Local G overnm ent in Canada (T oronto: Ryerson Press, 1951). b r o w n , g . w . (ed.) Canada (Berkeley: U niversity of California Press, 1950). See chapter 13. Canadian Public A dm inistration. See special issue on local gov ernm ent (M arch, 1960). c o r r y , j . a . E lem ents o f D em ocratic G overnm ent (N ew Y ork: O xford U niversity Press, 1964). JF201.C 6. F ou rth edition. See chapter 7, on local governm ent. c r a w f o r d , k . g . Canadian M unicipal G overnm ent (T oronto: U niversity o f T oronto Press, 1954).* P d o n n e l l y , m . s. The G overnm ent o f M anitoba (T oronto, U ni versity o f T oronto Press, 1963). See chapter on local gov ernm ent. H a r r i s , g . m . C om parative Local G overnm ent (L ondon: H u t chinson’s U niversity L ibrary, 1949). h u m e s , s a m u e l The Structure o f Local G overnm ents Through o ut the W orld (T he H ague: M. Nijhoff, 1961). P i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i t y m a n a g e r s a s s o c i a t i o n M unicipal Year B o o k (Chicago, an n u a l).
b r it t a in
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THE CANADIAN M U NICIPAL SYSTEM
long , n
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T he P olity (C hicago: R and-M cN ally, 1962). Parts
3, 4. m i c h a e l (ed.) Social Purpose fo r Canada (T oronto: U niversity of T oron to Press, 1961). See chapter on m uni cipal governm ent by K. B. Callard. ROBSON, w . A. Great Cities o f the W orld; Their G overnm ent, P olitics and Planning (L ondon: A llen & Unw in, 1968). 3rd edition. ROGERS, I. M . The L aw o f Canadian M unicipal Corporations (T oronto: Carswell C om pany, 1959). F irst Supplem ent, to D ecem ber 31, 1963 (T oronto: 1964). M unicipal Councillor’s H andbook (Toronto: Carswell, 1965). ROW AT, D. c. Y o u r Local G overnm ent; A Sketch o f the M u n i cipal System in Canada (T oronto: M acm illan, 1955).* P
Ol iv e r ,
T he M unicipal System s in Canada . l . L ocal G overnm ent in Canada. See above. A p pendix i, province by province. c a l l a r d , k . b . “T he Present System of Local G overnm ent in C an ada,” Canadian Journal o f E conom ics and Political Science 17 (M ay, 1951), pp. 204-217. Canada Y ear B ook (O ttaw a: Q ueen’s P rinter, an n u a l). Section on m unicipal governm ent. C r a w f o r d , K. G. Canadian M unicipal G o ve rn m en t* See above. C hapters 1-3, especially 3. r o w a t , d . c. Y o u r Local G o ve rn m en t* See above. C hap ter 1 and first h alf o f 2. b r it t a in , h
E. j . L ocal G overnm ent in A lberta (T oronto: M c Clelland and Stew art, 1956). M UNRO, w. B. A m erican Influences on Canadian G overnm ent (T oronto: M acm illan, 1929).* o n t a r i o . Laws, Statutes, etc. T he M unicipal A ct. R evised Sta tutes o f O ntario (T oronto: Q ueen’s P rinter, 1965). Q u e b e c (Province) D epartm ent o f M unicipal Affairs. In fo rm a tion Service. L e R egim e M unicipal de la P rovince de Que bec (Quebec, 1964). By Roger Bussieres. r o s s , r . k . Local G overnm ent in Ontario (Toronto: C anada Law Book Com pany, 1962). Second edition. Sa s k a t c h e w a n . D epartm ent o f M unicipal Affairs. T he M u n i cipal System o f Saskatchewan (R egina, 1955). T hird edi tion. By G . F . Dawson. h a n so n ,
BIBLIOGRAPHY -
211
. J . The D evelopm ent o f Local G overnm ent in N e w B runsw ick (1 9 6 3 ).
w halen, h
See also for each province: D epartm ent o f M unicipal Affairs. A nnual report of m unicipal statistics. L ocal G overnm ent in Britain Br i t a i n . C entral Office o f Inform ation. R eference D ivi sion. Local G overnm ent in Britain (L ondon: H er M ajesty’s Stationery Office, 1965). Scottish H om e D epartm ent. Local G overnm ent in Scotland (L o n d on: HMSO, 1950). l o f t s , d . “F uture P attern of Local G overnm ent in E ngland and W ales,” Public A dm inistration 37 (A utum n, 1959), pp. 275-292.* s e n , b i s w a n a t h A Short Sketch o f English Local G overnm ent A dm inistration (L ondon: Stevens, 1947), 51 pages. s h a r p , e v e l y n “Local G overnm ent O rganization in E ngland,” Canadian Public A dm inistration 10 {Septem ber, 1967), pp. 265-281.* s t o u t , h . M. British G overnm ent (N ew Y ork: O xford U niver sity Press, 1953).* See chapter 16. w a r r e n , j . h . The English Local G overnm ent System (London: A llen & Unw in, 1965). JS3111.W 3. Eighth revised edition. See chapters 2, 10. w h i t e , l . w . G overnm ent in G reat Britain, the E m pire and the Com m onw ealth (C am bridge: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 1965).* See chapters 13, 14. great
benham
, H.
T w o Cheers fo r T ow n Hall (L ondon: H utchinson,
1964). O utlines o f L ocal G overnm ent in the U nited K in g d om (L ondon: Pitm an, 1962). N ineteenth edition. f i n e r , H e r m a n English Local G overnm ent (London: M ethuen, 19 5 0 ). F ou rth edition. P arts I and n. g r e a t Br i t a i n . Scottish D evelopm ent D epartm ent. Reorgani zation o f Local G overnm ent in Ecotland; First R eport (E d inburgh: H er M ajesty’s Stationery Office, 1964). Royal Com mission on Local G overnm ent in E ngland R eport (L o n d on: HMSO, 1969), 3 vols. J a c k s o n , R. M . The M achinery o f L ocal G overnm ent (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’s Press, 1965). JS3111.J28. Second edition. CLARKE, J . J .
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THE CANADIAN M U NICIPAL SYSTEM
T he Structure o f Local G overnm ent in England and W ales (N ew Y ork: Penguin, 1959). JS3113.J3. Second edition. m a u d , s i r j . p . Local G overnm ent in England and W ales (L on don, N ew Y ork: O xford U niversity Press, 1953). Second edition. r o b s o n , w . a . T he D evelopm ent o f L ocal G overnm ent (L o n don: A llen & Unw in, 1954). T hird edition. J a c k s o n , w . E.
Local G overnm ent in the U.S. “C ounty G overnm ent in T ransition,” Public A dm inistration R eview 16 (Sum m er, 1956), pp. 223-231. i n t e r n a t i o n a l u n i o n o f l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . L ocal G overn m ent in the U nited States o f A m erica; R ecent Trends and D evelopm ents (T h e H ague: Nijhoff, 1961). Especially chapter 1 on structure. OGG, F . A. and P . o . r a y Essentials o f A m erican G overnm ent (N ew Y ork: A ppleton, 1969).* C hapters on local govern ment. s m i t h , r . g . Public A uthorities, Special D istricts, and Local G overnm ent (W ashington: N ational Association of C oun ties Research F oundation, 1964). JS425.S6. s n i d e r , c. F . “A m erican C ounty G overnm ent; a M id-Century Review,” A m erican Political Science R eview 46 (M arch, 1952), pp. 66-80. U .S. B ureau of the Census. Local G overnm ent Structure in the U nited States (W ashington: U.S. G overnm ent P rinting O f fice, 1954). JS331.U 5. See Introduction.
Ca s s e l l a , w . N .
Local G overnm ent Elsewhere H. F . Local G overnm ent in D eveloping Countries (N ew Y ork: M cG raw -H ill, 1964). c h a p m a n , b r i a n The Profession o f G overnm ent; T he Public Service in E urope (L ondon: Allen & Unw in, 1959).* R e regional and local in E urope, pp. 65-73. H U M ES, SAMUEL The Structure o f L ocal G overnm ents Through out the W o rld * See above. M e y e r , P a u l A dm inistrative Organization; A Com parative S tudy o f the Organization o f Public A dm inistration (Lon don: Stevens, 1957).* R e E urope, chapter 16, i. s u s k i , J . G. M unicipal G overnm ent in E urope and Canada; A Com parative Study. Prelim inary R eport Prepared fo r the alderfer,
BIBLIOGRAPHY - 2 1 3
E dm o n ton C ity Council (E dm onton: 1964).* R eprinted in Canadian Public A dm inistration (Septem ber, 1965). R e Britain, France, N etherlands, D enm ark, Switzerland. R. M unicipal G overnm ent in India (A llahabad: A garwal Press, 1960). Second edition. C a m p b e l l , m . J . , b r i e r l y , a n d b l i t z The Structure o f Local G overnm ent in W est A fric a (T he H ague: NijhofT, 1965). JS7525C36. c h a p m a n , b r i a n Introduction to French L ocal G overnm ent (L o n d o n : A llen & Unw in, 1953). c o w a n , l . g . L ocal G overnm ent in W est A frica (N ew Y ork: Colum bia U niversity Press, 1951). d a v ie s , a . f . Local G overnm ent in Victoria (M elbourne: M el bourne U niversity Press, 1951). g r e a t Br i t a i n . C olonial Office. S um m er C onference on A frican A dm inistration, 8th, Cam bridge, 1957 (L ondon: 1957). g r e e n , l . p . H istory o f L ocal G overnm ent in South A frica; A n Introduction (C ape T ow n: Juta, 1957). h i c k s , U. K. D evelopm ent F rom Below; L ocal G overnm ent and Finance in D eveloping Countries o f the Com m onw ealth (O xford: C larendon Press, 1961). JS4495.H 5. i n t e r n a t i o n a l u n i o n o f l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s . Local G overn m en t in the 20th century . . . 35 N ational R eports (The H ague: NijhofT, 1963). l a n g e n f e l t , p e r “Principles for a New Division of Sweden’s M unicipalities,” Local G overnm ent Throughout the W orld 1, no. 4 (O ctober, 1962), 43-46. M A A L A ISK U N T IE N , l i i t t o L ocal Self-governm ent in Finland, and the Finnish M unicipal L aw (H elsinki: T he Finnish U nion of Royal M unicipalities, 1960). Second edition. p o l a s c h e k , R. J . (ed.) Local G overnm ent in N ew Zealand (W ellington: N ew Zealand Institute o f Public A dm inistra tion, 1956). r e t z l a f f , R . H . Village G overnm ent in India: A Case Study (L o n d on: A sia Publishing H ouse, 1962). r o m a n i , J . H . A Survey o f Local G overnm ent in the Philippines (M anila: Institute of Public A dm inistration, U niversity of the Philippines, 1954). r o y a l i n s t i t u t e o f p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . D evelopm ent o f L ocal G overnm ent in the Colonies; R eport o f a Conference at Cambridge, 22nd A ugust-2nd Septem ber, 1955 (London: 1955). Especially appendix on British G uiana, Java, K enya, argal,
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b . C o m m unity Planning; A Casebook on L aw and A dm inistration (T oronto: U niversity o f T oronto Press, 1963). m i l n e r , J . b . “T ow n and Regional Planning in T ransition,” Canadian Public A dm inistration 3 (M arch, 1960), pp. 5975. r o w a t , d . c. Review o f R. A. W alker, “T he Planning F unction in U rb an G overnm ent,” C om m unity Planning R eview 2, num ber 3 (A ugust, 1952), pp. 89-90. z i n k , h a r o l d R ural L ocal G overnm ent in Sw eden, Italy and India. See above. See chapter 31.
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Royal Com m ission on the M etropolitan D evelopm ent o f C algary and E dm onton. R eport. See above. b a c o n , m . j . “B eauty o r C haos: the Challenge o f P lanning,” in J. B. F otheringham (ed.) Transition (T oronto: M cClel land & Stew art, 1966). c a r v e r , h u m p h r e y Cities in the Suburbs (T o ro n to : U niversity o f T oronto Press, 1962). c l a r k , d o u g l a s “ U rban R enew al and M unicipal T axation,” Canadian T ax Journal 10 (N ovem ber-D ecem ber, 1962), pp. 387-394. c o l e a n , m . l . R enew ing O ur Cities (N ew Y o rk : Tw entieth C entury F und, 1953). CONANT, J . B. S lum s and Suburbs; A C om m entary on Schools in M etropolitan A reas (N ew Y o rk : M cG raw -H ill, 1961). LC 5115.C 6. DUBE, y v e s H ousing and Social Capital (H u ll: Q ueen’s P rinter, 1 9 5 7 ). See chap ter 2, on urbanization. alberta.
FALUDI, E . G. AND ASSOCIATES TOW N PLANNING CONSULTANTS l i m i t e d . A F ifteen Year Program m e fo r the Urban R e
new al o f the C ity o f W indsor and its M etropolitan A rea, 1959, Prepared fo r the City o f W indsor (T oronto, 1959). See also library subject catalogue under urban renew al (by place) fo r o th er studies by consultants. F ortune. T he E xploding M etro p o lis* See above. See especially chapter 5 on urban sprawl. g a t h e r c o l e , g . “Som e O bservations on Regional P lanning,” M un icipal P lanning 27, num ber 1 (A ugust, 1954), pp. 15-
20
.
. o. “Som e Econom ic and Social Influences on R e gional Planning in A lberta,” Plan 1, num ber 2 (June, 1960), pp. 115-121; and Blum enfeld “News, Views and Reviews; Regional P lanning,” pp. 122-124.
gertler, l
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THE CANADIAN M U NICIPAL SYSTEM
Urban R enew al Politics; Slum Clearance in N ew a rk (N ew Y ork: Colum bia U niversity Press, 1963). H T 177.N 54K 2. MACE, R. L . M unicipal C ost-Revenue Research in the U nited States; A Critical Survey o f Research to M easure M unicipal Costs and R evenues in Relation to L and Uses and Areas; 1933-1960 (C hapel H ill: Institute o f G overnm ent, U niver sity of N orth C arolina, 1961). H J9145.M 3. m i l n e r , j . b . “Introduction to M aster Plan Legislation,” Cana dian B ar R eview 35 (D ecem ber, 1957), pp. 1125+ . n a s h , h . L. “C oordination o f P lanning and D evelopm ent A m ong Contiguous M unicipalities,” Institute of Public A dm in istration o f C anada, Proceedings (1 9 5 6 ), pp. 99-105. o w e n , w i l f r e d Cities in the M o to r A g e (N ew Y ork: Viking Press, 1959). H T 123.09. Plan, June 1964. Special Supplem ent. “ Planning E ducation for U rban an d Regional P lanning in C anada.” Inquiry by John Willis. r e p s , j . w . T he M aking o f Urban A m erica; A H istory o f City Planning in the U nited States (P rinceton: P rinceton U ni versity Press, 1965). H T 164.U 5R 4. RODWIN, l l o y d T he British N ew T ow ns Policy; Problem s and Im plications (C am bridge, M assachusetts: H arvard U niver sity Press, 1956). H T 164.G 7R 63. ROSE, a l b e r t R egent Park; A S tudy in a Slum Clearance (T o r on to: U niversity o f T oronto Press, 1958). s e l f , P . Cities in Flood; the Problem s o f Urban G row th (L o n don: F ab er & Faber, 1957). H T 384.G 7S4. 1961. Second edition. VANCOUVER. Planning D epartm ent. V ancouver R edevelopm ent S tudy. P repared fo r the H ousing Research Com m ittee. (V ancouver, 1951). w a l k e r , R. A. T he Planning Function in Urban G overnm ent (C hicago: U niversity o f Chicago Press, 1951). Second edi tion. w e b s t e r , d . h . Urban Planning and M unicipal P ublic Policy (N ew Y ork: H arp er & Row, 1958).* H T 164.U 5W 4. R e viewed by D. C. Row at, Canadian Journal o f E conom ics and Political Science 26 (N ovem ber, 1960), pp. 657-658.
k a pla n , harold
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R ep o rts and D ocum ents . m . T he G overning o f M etropolitan W ashington (W ash ington: U .S.G .P.O ., 1958). 98 pages. Ca n a d a . D epartm ent o f N orth ern Affairs and N ational R e sources. The N orthw est Territories T oday, a R eference Paper fo r the A dvisory C om m ission on the D evelopm ent o f G overnm ent in the N orthw est Territories (O ttaw a: Q ueen’s P rin ter, 1965). 136 pages. C a n a d a . N ational C apital Com m ission. A Propos o f the Capital o f Canada (O ttaw a: Q ueen’s P rinter, 1964). 72 pages. A nnual R eports (O ttaw a: N ational C apital C om m ission). Statistical R eview w ith E xplanatory N otes; N ational Capital R egion (O ttaw a: N ational C apital Com m ission, 1964), 156 pages. Ca n a d a . N ational C apital Planning Service. Plan fo r the N a b a in , h
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THE CANADIAN M U NICIPAL SYSTEM
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6. M U N IC IP A L R E G IO N S A N D R E O R G A N IZ A T IO N A B lueprint fo r L ocal G o v ernm ent Reorganization (T oronto, 1967). 22 pages. P ro poses counties as regions. b e e c r o f t , e r i c “A genda for Region'll G overnm ent,” Canadian P ublic A dm inistration 5 (Ju n e, 1962), pp. 219-228. b u c k n a l l , d . J . “T he F uture o f the C ounty” and com m ents by F indlay, M unicipal W orld 70, num ber 12 (D ecem ber, 1 9 60), pp. 383-384. c a m u , p i e r r e E conom ic G eography o f Canada, with an Intro duction to a 68-Region System (Toronto: M acm illan, 1964). c a r p e n t e r , w . s. P roblem s in Service L evels (L ondon: M il fo rd , 1940). U nited States. C h e s t e r , d a n i e l C entral and L ocal G overnm ent (London: M acm illan, 1951). Britain. c o l e , g . d . h . L ocal and Regional G overnm ent (L ondon: C as sell, 1947). Britain.
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P E R IO D IC A L S D E A L IN G W IT H LOCAL G O V ER N M EN T Canadian Civic A ffairs, Canadian T ax Journal, Civic A dm inistration, C o m m u nity Planning R eview , E ffective G overnm ent, Local Finance, M unicipal W orld, O ntario H ousing Plan. A m erican M unicipal Finance, N ational Civic R eview (form erly National M unicipal R e v ie w ), Public A dm inistration R eview .
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T H E C A N A D IA N M U N I C I P A L S Y S T E M
British L ocal G overnm ent Chronicle, L ocal G overnm ent Finance, M unicipal R eview , Parliam entary A ffairs, Public A d m in is tration, P ublic Law. International Journal o f Local A dm inistration Overseas (form erly Journal o f A frican A d m inistration) , Local G overnm ent Throughout the W orld (form erly IU L A Q uarterly), Studies in C om parative L ocal G overnm ent.
The Author A graduate of the U niversity o f T oronto and Colum bia U niversity, D onald C. Row at has gained a reputation as a lead ing expert on m unicipal governm ent. His earliest and perhaps best known w orks are The Reorganization o f Provincial-M uni cipal Relations in N ova Scotia, a report done fo r the govern m ent of th at province, and Y our Local G overnm ent (M acm il lan, 1955). O ther works include T he O m budsm an (U . o f T., 1958) and Basic Issues in Public A dm inistration (M acm illan, 1961). D r. R ow at has recently com pleted an assignm ent as a co com m issioner on the Com m ission on Relations between U ni versities and G overnm ents and is at present a t w ork on a book on the governm ent o f federal capitals.
THE 1.
lord
CARLETON
D u r h a m ’s
repo rt
,
LIBRARY
edited and with an Introduction by
Gerald M. Craig 2.
t h e c o n f e d e r a t io n d e b a t e s in t h e p r o v in c e o f
CANADA, 1 8 6 5 ,
edited and with an Introduction by P. B. Waite 3.
l a u r ie r
:
a st u d y in
Ca n a d i a n
p o l it ic s
by J. W. Dafoe, with an Introduction by Murray S. Donnelly 4.
C H A M P L A IN : T H E L IF E O F F O R T ITU D E
by Morris Bishop, with a new Introduction by the author Book I, edited and with an Introduction by Donald V. Smiley 6. t h e u n r e f o r m e d s e n a t e o f C a n a d a by Robert A. MacKay revised and with an Introduction by the author 7. T H E J E S U IT RELATION S AND A LLIED D O C U M E N T S : A SELE C TIO N , edited and with an Introduction by S. R. Mealing 8. l o r d D u r h a m ’s m i s s i o n t o Ca n a d a by Chester New, edited and with an Introduction by H. W. McCready 9. T H E r e c i p r o c i t y t r e a t y o f 1854 by Donald C. Masters, with a new Introduction by the author 10. p o l i t i c a l u n r e s t i n u p p e r CANADA, 1815-1836 by Aileen Dunham, with an Introduction by A. L. Burt 1 1 . a h i s t o r y o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n i n C a n a d a , Volume I, by G. P. deT. Glazebrook, with a new Introduction by the author 1 2 . a h i s t o r y o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n i n C a n a d a , Volume II, by G. P. deT. Glazebrook 13. T H E EC O N O M IC BACKGROUND O F D O M IN IO N -PR O V IN C IA L RELATION S by W. A. Mackintosh, with an Introduction by J. H. Dales 14. t h e f r e n c h - c a n a d i a n o u t l o o k by Mason Wade, with a new Introduction by the author 5 . T H E R O W E L L /S IR O IS R E P O R T ,
1 5 . T H E W E S T E R N IN TER IO R O F CANADA: A RECORD O F G EOGRAPHICAL DISCOVERY,
1612-1917, compiled and with an Introduction by John Warkentin
1 6 . T H E C O URTS AND T H E CANADIAN C O N S T IT U T IO N ,
compiled and with an Introduction by W. R. Lederman 17.
M O N E Y AND BANKING IN CANADA,
compiled and with an Introduction by E. P. Neufeld FREN CH-CA N AD IA N S O C IE TY , Volume I, compiled and with an Introduction by Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin 19. T H E CANADIAN C O M M ER C IA L R E V O L U T IO N , 1845-1851 by Gilbert N. Tucker, edited and with an Introduction by Hugh G. J. Aitken 18.
2 0 . JO S E P H H O W E : VOICE O F NOVA SCOTIA,
compiled and with an Introduction by J. Murray Beck L IF E AND L E T T E R S O F SIR W IL F R ID L A U R IER , Volume I, by O. D. Skelton, edited and with an Introduction by David M . L. F arr 22. L IF E AND L E T T E R S O F SIR W IL F R ID LA U RIER, Volume II, by O. D. Skelton, edited by David M .L .F arr 21.
23. LEADINGCONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS, compiled and with an Introduction by Peter H. Russell 24. f r o n t e n a c : t h e c o u r t i e r g o v e r n o r byW .J.Eccles 25. INDIANS O F T H E N O RTH PA C IF IC COAST, compiled and with an Introduction by Tom McFeat 26. L IF E AND T IM E S O F SIR ALEXANDER T IL L O C H GALT by O. D. Skelton, edited and with an Introduction by Guy MacLean 27. A H ISTO RY O F CANADIAN EX TERN A L R EL A T IO N S, Volume I, by G. P. deT. Glazebrook, revised by the author 28. A HISTORY O F CANADIAN EX TERNA L R EL A T IO N S, Volume 11, by G. P. deT. Glazebrook, revised and with a Bibliographical Essay by the author 29. t h e r a c e q u e s t i o n i n C a n a d a by Andre Siegfried, edited and with an Introduction by F. H. Underhill 30. n o r t h a t l a n t i c t r i a n g l e by J. B. Brebner, with an Introduction by D. G. Creighton 31. a p p r o a c h e s t o C a n a d i a n e c o n o m i c h i s t o r y , compiled and with an Introduction by W. T. Easterbrook and M. H. Watkins 32. CANADIAN SOCIAL S T R U C T U R E : A STATISTICAL P R O F IL E , compiled and with an Introduction and Commentary by John Porter 33. C H U RCH AND STA TE IN CANADA, 1627-1867: BASIC D O CU M EN TS, compiled and with an Introduction by John S. Moir 34. w e s t e r n o n t a r i o a n d t h e a m e r i c a n f r o n t i e r by Fred Landon, with a new Introduction by the author 35. H ISTORICAL ESSAYS O N T H E A TLANTIC PRO V IN C ES, compiled and with an Introduction by G. A. Rawlyk 36. a h i s t o r y o f j o u r n a l i s m i n C a n a d a (an original publication) by W. H. Kesierton, with an Introduction by Wilfrid Eggleston 37. t h e o l d p r o v i n c e o f Q u e b e c , Volume I, by A. L. Burt, with an Introduction by Hilda Neatby 38. t h e o l d p r o v i n c e o f Q u e b e c , Volume II, b y A. L. Burt 39. g r o w t h a n d t h e C a n a d i a n e c o n o m y , edited and with an Introduction by T. N. Brewis 40. D O C U M EN TS ON T H E C O N FED ERA TIO N O F BRITISH N O R T H AM ERICA, edited and with an Introduction by G. P. Browne 41. E C , edited and with an Introduction by Victor F. Valentine and Frank G. Vallee 42. T H E CO LO NIA L R E F O R M E R S AND CANADA, 1830-1849, edited and with an Introduction by Peter Burroughs. 43. Anarrative, by Sir Francis Bond Head edited and with an Introduction by S. F. Wise 44. J O H N s t r a c h a n : d o c u m e n t s a n d o p i n i o n s , edited and with an Introduction by J. L. H. Henderson 45. T H E N EU TRA L YANKEES O F NOVA SCOTIA by J. B. Brebner, with an Introduction by W. S. MacNutt 46. R O B ER T LAIRD B O R D E N : H IS M E M O IR S , Volume I, edited and with an Introduction by Heath Macquarrie 47. R O B ER T LAIRD B O R D E N : H IS M E M O IR S , Volume 11, edited by Heath Macquarrie 48. T H E CANADIAN M U N IC IP A L S Y S T E M : ESSAYS O N T H E IM P R O V E M E N T O F LOCAL G O V E R N M E N T b y D. C. Rowat s k i m o
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