The British Legation in Prague: Perception of Czech-German Relations in Czechoslovakia between 1933 and 1938 9783110651454, 9783110647112

Citation preview

Lukáš Novotný The British Legation in Prague

Lukáš Novotný

The British Legation in Prague

Perception of Czech-German Relations in Czechoslovakia between 1933 and 1938

ISBN 978-3-11-064711-2 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-065145-4 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-064721-1

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover image: map: © akg-images / Peter Palm; photo: © ČTK (Joseph Addison) Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Contents Introduction

1 13

I

A Brief Overview to 1933

II

The Start of Change

III

A Problem of Growing Significance

IV

A Landmark Year

V

Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

VI

New Minister, new Line

VII

A Fast and Efficient Agreement

Conclusion The Epilogue

261

282

63

79

251

Sources and literature Name index

39

267

143 181

113

Introduction In 1918, the First World War ended, and Europe found itself having to recover from the bloodiest conflict in its history. Ten million men had died on the battlefields. The old European order had collapsed; the outcome of the rivalry between the participants in the war meant the start of a new era. The war resulted in huge changes to the map of Europe – old “established” monarchies were extinguished and new so-called successor states appeared. Czechoslovakia, a new state whose final borders were confirmed in the peace treaties concluded in Versailles, Saint-Germain-en-Laye and Trianon, found itself in a complex position inherited from its predecessor – specifically the diverse multiethnic composition of its population. Almost a third of the population rejected their new homeland and could not easily identify with it; these were mainly Germans, Hungarians, and Poles who had become citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic through events they had been unable to influence. The remaining two-thirds (Czechs and Slovaks), in contrast, were euphoric and celebrated the country’s creation as something they had desired for hundreds of years. Under these circumstances, it was almost impossible for these two groups to agree on the principles and working of “their” state. Due to the different nationalities which made up the First Czechoslovak Republic, it is no surprise that national minorities, their integration within the working of the state and issues regarding the approach of public and regional authorities to representatives of national minorities, their relations and identification with the new state were all crucial issues which the country had to confront. In this regard, it was not particularly different from Austria-Hungary where nationality issues had been amongst the most important aspects of domestic policy developments and other areas. The question was whether the new and significantly smaller state would be able to confront this problem, specifically whether it would be able to find a way to address the issue in the best possible way based on the construction of a modern civil society with significant individual rights. While historians consider the 1920s, especially its second half, as a period of calm backed by political stability and based on economic growth, the end of the decade and the beginning of the 1930s represented a major and in many regards fateful turnaround. The economic crisis which arrived in Europe from the United States of America did not arouse great alarm in Czechoslovakia to begin with; the crisis factors which appeared at the turn of 1928 – 1929 merely caused domestic problems through overproduction with the supply of goods exceeding actual demand. But from mid-1931, the country entered the second phase of the crisis https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110651454-001

2

Introduction

which was much more destructive, and which did not reach its culmination until 1933. The third and final stage of the economic crisis in Czechoslovakia occurred between March 1933 and spring 1934, when the Czechoslovak economy moved into a phase of prolonged depression. The economy began to revive from 1936, but it was insufficient to reach pre-crisis levels. Political developments naturally went hand in hand with economic developments. Following the initial negativism of the German minority expressed in its rejection of the Czechoslovak state as an entity which had been formed against its will and in which they felt they had no space, in 1926 two German political parties joined the Czechoslovak Government, and although this was mainly a political calculation (farming tariffs and congrua portio), the very fact the Government was of mixed nationality signalled the start of a new stage in Czech-German relations for many. The arrival of the economic crisis’s second phase in particular began gradually to affect the stance of the First Czechoslovak Republic’s largest minority towards the country. The idea began to take root amongst its representatives, very slowly and almost imperceptibly at first, that activism would not bring about a solution to its problems, whether in regard to language, minority schools or other matters. In January 1933, Adolf Hitler was named Reich Chancellor and although his appointment to the office initially had only a partial direct impact on the change in dynamics of Czech-German relations, the new Nazi regime in Germany was a factor which could not be ignored in future in regard to the German minority in Czechoslovakia. Great Britain, as one of the war’s victors and (still then) a global empire, was only interested in the European continent to a limited extent; after centuries of pursuing a policy of “splendid isolation”, this was modified after 1918 such that it had a specific relationship to Europe. Britain’s main foreign policy objectives remained maintaining its empire and free trade. Political elites held discussions over the whole of the first half of the 1920s on whether and what stance to take in regard to the rest of the continent. In October 1925, the Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain (his brother Neville was later to become the Prime Minister during the period which sealed Czechoslovakia’s pre-war fate) signed the Locarno (Rhineland Security) Pact, in which London and Rome undertook to guarantee the German-French and German-Belgian borders. Its strategic plans did not include Central Europe. Following the end of the Paris Peace Conference and the easing of political turbulence, the First Czechoslovak Republic’s relations with Great Britain settled down into standard mode and were unremarkable until 1930 when Joseph Addison became British Minister to Prague. Shortly after arriving in his post, the new diplomatic representative began informing his superiors that the Czechoslovak authorities were breaching their obligations contained in the so-called Minority Treaty and that the German minority in Cze-

Introduction

3

choslovakia were in a poor situation. Nevertheless, at this time his opinions did not meet with a sympathetic ear in the Foreign Office. The combination of the economic crisis and Nazi Germany’s ever-more aggressive policies, however, meant that Addison’s thoughts gradually and progressively gained more attention, something which was not so much the result of Czech-German relations but rather the fear of senior Foreign Office officials that a marginal ethnic conflict in a country in which London had no vital interests could cause a “tsunami” in the form of European (and world-wide) upheavals; these fears subsequently acquired real foundations in the Foreign Office’s perception and practical policies in 1938. The objective of the submitted monograph is to analyse the perception and approach of British Legation in Prague, and through its reports also those of the Foreign Office, towards the issue of Czech-German relations, specifically the relations between Czechs and Germans within Czechoslovakia between 1933 and 1938; Czech and even foreign professional public have not carefully analysed this topic yet (see below); the author has focused only on the historic lands of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, leaving aside so-called Carpathian Germans in Slovakia. As such, the objective of this monograph is not to analyse Czechoslovak-British bilateral relations over the given period, nor the Statute of Nationalities, the attempt of the Czechoslovak Government at achieving a comprehensive solution to the status of national minorities (1938), nor theoretical aspects of the appeasement policy, nor the petitions which the national minorities in Czechoslovakia submitted to the League of Nations. In terms of the timeframe, this is a period following Adolf Hitler’s accession to the office of Chancellor when the German minority in Czechoslovakia began to progressively mobilise and gradually also radicalise such that the majority of them supported the Sudeten German Party in the 1935 elections, and played a large part in the end of the First Czechoslovak Republic three years later. Although there were of course some exceptions, the German Social Democrats remained loyal until their party was disbanded. The book is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter gives an outline of British diplomacy’s perception of the newly created Czechoslovak state during the politically turbulent period of autumn 1918 and spring 1919, and gives a brief summary of British Ministers’ perspective on the position of the German minority in Czechoslovakia during the 1920s. The chapter demonstrates that London, specifically George Clerk and Ronald Macleay as Ministers to Prague, viewed Czechoslovakia as a democratic country which observed its international obligations regarding minorities and provided its minorities (here not just Germans, but also Hungarians and others) with everything needed for them to develop. This did not change until Joseph Addison’s arrival, a man undoubtedly in-

4

Introduction

fluenced by his work in Berlin during the 1920s, who began a qualitative shift in the British Legation’s assessment of Czech-German relations, which eventually led to accusations of the Czechoslovak Government and Edvard Beneš of breaching their minority treaty obligations and deliberately oppressing the largest minority in the country. The second to seventh chapters contain analyses of 1933 – 1938, with each looking at one particular year in terms of the perception of the British Legation in Prague, and thus also the Foreign Office, of Czech-German relations. This period can be divided into two parts – the first covering 1933 – 1934 and part of 1935 when the British Legation in Prague reflected mainly on local problems of CzechGerman co-existence (economic affairs since the crisis was still ongoing, the newspaper war, the battle over Charles University insignia). Nevertheless, the first signs of growing unease began appearing amongst British diplomats caused, for example, by the dissolution, or specifically outlawing, of two negativist German political parties, and the establishment of the Front of Sudeten German Homeland. In 1934, the Foreign Office officials first indicated the importance of Czech-German co-existence in a shared state. The campaign for the parliamentary elections of May 1935 represents an important turning point. The questions which the author has attempted to find an answer in this regard are the following: What did high-level Foreign Office officials think about Czechoslovakia and its minorities policy during the period from Adolf Hitler’s rise to power and before the 1935 parliamentary election? What prevailing opinions did the reports from the Prague Legation create within the Foreign Office? How did the Legation perceive the ever-more active policy of the Front of Sudeten German Homeland (Sudeten German Party) leader Konrad Henlein before the election, and how did it assess the election results? Parliamentary election of May 1935 brought a turnaround in the British Legation’s thoughts on Czech-German relations. The same year also saw Konrad Henlein visit London twice, and although the first visit (in August) was exploratory in nature, the second December visit was instead of a much more significant nature – being received by important Foreign Office officials. The subsequent evolution of Czech-German relations and its perception by the British Legation in Prague began to be dangerously influenced from 1936 by foreign policy events with the ever-more aggressive policy of Nazi Germany forcing London to pay greater attention to the region, which had not previously been particularly in Britain’s focus of interests. The key questions which the author has posed are – What were the consequences of Konrad Henlein’s second and third visits to the British capital? How did British diplomats in Prague and London perceive the foreign policy changes made by Nazi Germany and their impact on the position of minorities in Czechoslovakia? What were the consequences of the change in

Introduction

5

the diplomatic post in Prague in 1936 and the arrival of the new British Minister? How did the Legation’s approach to the perception of the German minority change over the course of 1937? The final section of the monograph comprises an analysis of Czech-German relations and the reflections of the British Legation in Prague and Foreign Office representatives on this in 1938, a fateful year in Czechoslovak history. After careful consideration, the author decided not to include the events leading to the Runciman Mission and the subsequent Munich Conference for two reasons – 1) both phenomena have already been subject to much academic attention; 2) in roughly mid-1938, British political elite had essentially already formed an opinion on the potential solution to the minorities problem in Czechoslovakia. The author has attempted to answer the following questions in this section of the paper: What options did the British diplomats and politicians responsible consider in regard to satisfying the German minority in Czechoslovakia? What relationship was there between British foreign policy and considerations of the Czech-German relationship in a country which was not one of the British Empire’s vital interests? How significant was Konrad Henlein’s fifth visit to London and the declaration of partial mobilisation in Czechoslovakia in May 1938? What ideological space did British politicians provide the Czechoslovak Government to create their minorities policy? When did London formulate its stance in regard to the discussions underway between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten German Party? For any researcher investigating British interwar history, the starting point has to be the National Archives in London (Kew). The archive provides an inexhaustible number of documents and material on British politics during the 1920s and 1930s. For this study, the author studied a number of principle series. The socalled Foreign Office Papers, materials sourced from the Foreign Office and naturally also from the Legation in Prague proved to be the key collection. The author studied Series FO 371, which contains general ministerial correspondence from 1906 divided up into many separate files and collections sorted by the departments which produced the documents. The author attempted to extract as much as possible from this collection, as it became fundamental to his study. Within the Foreign Office Papers, the author also studied Series FO 608 (correspondence relating to the Peace Conference in Paris) and FO 800 (containing the papers of various British politicians and diplomats such as Nevile Henderson, Lord Halifax, and Viscount Cranborne). The second main group of records the author worked from in his studies was the so-called Cabinet Office Papers, i. e. official Government material. These documents are an important source for investigating debates on basic inclinations within British foreign policy. The Cabinet Secretary produced the minutes and conclusions for the vast major-

6

Introduction

ity Cabinet meetings. In his study, the author focused on official records of British Cabinet meetings (CAB 23) and memoranda circulated to the Cabinet (CAB 24), and to a lesser extent also touched on events relating to Czechoslovakia in 1938 (CAB 21). Papers stored in the series of individual British Prime Ministers’ records, the so-called Prime Minister’s Papers, marked by the PREM reference, were a fascinating, but unfortunately less extensive and less systematically ordered collection. The author also conducted the research to a lesser extent in Oxford, namely in the University of Oxford, Bodleian Libraries (Weston Library), where he studied the papers of the British Minister to Vienna Sir Walford Selby and long time Editor of The Times Geoffrey Dawson. In the Magdalen College Archives (Oxford) the author studied the slight amount of the preserved papers of the British Minister to Prague in the 1930s Sir Joseph Addison. In his study, the author also investigated collections in other foreign archives in order to acquire the fullest possible perspective on the issue being studied. In Berlin, this involved the Foreign Office Political Archive (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes) and collections of records from the Foreign Ministry and German Legation in Prague,¹ in Vienna the author studied the records of the Austrian Legation in Prague where Ferdinand Marek was Minister over the whole interwar period in the Austrian State Archives (Österreichisches Staatsarchiv), specifically within the Archive of the Republic (Archiv der Republik). Also researched were the collections of French Foreign Ministry stores in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères), were he looked at the records of the French Legation in Prague. Czech archives were naturally also investigated, and due to the nature of the topic, the most important of these was the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the author focused on political reports from London, Berlin and Paris, while not neglecting other collections, such as the foreign offices and the Krofta Archive. Most important here should have been the political reports of the Czechoslovak Minister to London, Jan Masaryk, but their frequency could not be compared to Berlin or Paris; it was also clear that the son of the first Czechoslovak President was not a trained diplomat. To a lesser extent, the author did research in the National Archives, looking at the collection of the Ministry of the Interior Presidium, the Ministerial Council Presidency, the SdP and the Foreign Office in Berlin, the National Museum Archives where he researched the records of Karel Domin, Milan Hodža and Vojtěch Mastný, and

 The author’s task was somewhat simplified here, as there is an edition of Legation reports from the German Legation in Prague.

Introduction

7

the Presidential Office Archive, where he became interested in the Collection of the Presidential Office, protocol T (tajné – secret). Of published sources, to a limited extent the author used the now classic series, Documents of British Foreign Policy 1919 – 1939, Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932– 1939 and Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918 – 1945, in which documents of the foreign ministries and British, French and German Embassies and Legations were important. These, however, were additional material, with archival sources of prime importance. The author did also look at later editions relating to Czechoslovak foreign policy which were prepared for publication by Jindřich Dejmek in collaboration with other colleagues,² and reports from the German Legation in Prague;³ and he also analysed newspapers to a limited extent. Of published resources, the Collection of Laws and Decrees of the Czechoslovak State from 1918 – 1938 should also be mentioned. There are a number of memoirs and diaries of various figures on British policies during the 1920s and 1930s, and these give invaluable help when studied. In his work, the author studied in particular the memoirs and diaries of Foreign Secretaries Anthony Eden⁴ and Samuel Hoare,⁵ Permanent Under-Secretaries of State at the Foreign Office Robert Vansittart⁶ and Alexander Cadogan,⁷ British Ambassador to Berlin Eric Phipps,⁸ as well as the memoirs of Edvard Beneš⁹

 Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1936, svazek I (1. leden – 31. srpen 1936) [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1936, Vol. I, January 1– August 31, 1936], Dejmek, J., (ed.), Praha 2003; Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1936, svazek II (1. září – 31. prosinec 1936) [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1936, Vol. II, September 1– December 31, 1936], Dejmek, J. – Němeček , J. (ed.), Praha 2003; Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1937, svazek I (1. leden – 31. červenec 1937) [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1937, Vol. I, January 1– July 31, 1937], Dejmek, J. (ed.), Praha 2007; Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1937, svazek II (1. srpen – 31. prosinec 1937) [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1937, Vol. II, August 1 – December 31, 1937], Dejmek, J. (ed.), Praha 2008; Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1938, svazek I (1. leden – 30. červen 1938) [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1938, Vol. I, January 1– June 30, 1938], Dejmek, J. – Němeček , J. – Nováčková et al. (ed.), Praha 2000.  Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag. Innenpolitik und Minderheitenprobleme in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik [German Legation Reports from Prague. Internal Policy and Minorities Problems in the First Czechoslovak Republic], Vols. I – IV for years 1918 – 1935, München 1991– 2009; Vol. V has not been published yet.  Eden, A., Facing the Dictators. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, Boston 1962.  Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), Nine Troubled Years, London 1954.  Vansittart, R., Lessons of My Life, London 1943.  The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938 – 1945, Dilks, D. (ed.), London 1971.  Johnson, G. (ed.), Our Man in Berlin. The Diary of Sir Eric Phipps, 1933 – 1937, Basingstoke 2008.  Beneš, E., Mnichovské dny [Munich Days], Praha 1968.

8

Introduction

and Kamil Krofta.¹⁰ Unfortunately, none of British Ministers to Prague wrote memoirs,¹¹ and neither are there any academic monographs on any of them with the exception of a single study.¹² Secretary at British Legation in Prague, and a man who along with Joseph Addison played a major part in creating a negative impression of Czechoslovakia at the Foreign Office, Robert Hadow, was at least the subject of an academic monograph.¹³ Private papers stored at the National Archives in London (see above) were of invaluable help to the author. Besides unpublished and published sources, there are no major monographs directly about the issue of British Minister to Prague and Foreign Office considerations of Czech-German relations over the period looked at which look comprehensively at the phenomenon. British sources rarely deal with the issue investigated, although it is naturally mentioned in relation to wider aspects of the appeasement policy, always as a by-product of British foreign policy. Studies by Zara Steiner,¹⁴ Michael Hughes,¹⁵ Mark Cornwall,¹⁶ Andrew Roberts,¹⁷ Paul Vyšný,¹⁸ and by Andrea Orzoff,¹⁹ are such examples. The Foreign Office’s position on the Sudeten German problem in Czechoslovakia has not previously been investigated. Although there are studies on British perceptions of the issue looked at, these mostly deal with the whole 1918 – 1938 period and with one exception were written some time ago; a detailed analysis of the 1930s in particular is lacking.²⁰ Some papers deal with the British perception of the whole Central Europe.²¹

 Krofta, K., Z dob naší první republiky [From the Times of Our First Republic], Praha 1939.  Papers of Joseph Addison in the Magdalen College Archives in Oxford contains only fragments and the period in question is not available at all.  There is one exception, George Clerk. Protheroe, G., Sir George Clerk and the Struggle for British Influence in Central Europe, 1919 – 26, in: Diplomacy & Statecraft, 12, 3, 2001, pp. 39 – 64.  Michie, L. W., Portrait of an Appeaser. Robert Hadow, First Secretary in the British Foreign Office, 1931 – 1939, Westport 1996.  Steiner, Z., The Lights that Failed. European International History 1919 – 1933, Oxford 2005; Steiner, Z., The Triumph of the Dark. European International History 1933 – 1939, Oxford 2011.  Hughes, M., British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World, 1919 – 1939, London 2006.  Cornwall, M., The Devil’s Wall: The Nationalist Youth Mission of Heinz Rutha, Cambridge (Mass.), London 2012.  Roberts, A., The Holy Fox. The Life of Lord Halifax, London 2015.  Vyšný, P., The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938. Prelude to Munich, Basingstoke 2003.  Orzoff, A., Battle for the Castle. The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914 – 1948, Oxford 2009.  Cf. for example Cornwall, M., A Fluctuating Barometer: British Diplomatic Views of the Czech-German Relationship in Czechoslovakia, 1918 – 1938, in: Schmidt-Hartmann, E. – Winters, S. B. (hrsg.), Groβbritannien, die USA und die böhmischen Länder 1848 – 1938 [Great Britain, the USA and the Bohemian Lands 1848 – 1938], München 1991, pp. 313 – 333; Cornwall, M.,

Introduction

9

In terms of Czechoslovak (Czech) history writings, there are no academic monographs available which look in detail at the phenomenon discussed.²² On the other hand, there are publications which helped the author in investigating the chosen topic and in formulating some of his conclusions. These include the as-yet only attempt at analysing Czechoslovak-French relations in the second half of the 1930s by renowned historian Robert Kvaček,²³ the work of Jindřich Dejmek based on extensive archival research and looking at Czechoslovak-British relations,²⁴ and the figure of Edvard Beneš,²⁵ along with his English-language monograph on Vít Smetana.²⁶ Entirely missing is an academic publication on Czechoslovak-German relations in the interwar period, with even Czechoslo-

‘A Leap into Ice-Cold Water’: The Manoeuvres of the Henlein Movement in Czechoslovakia, 1933 – 1938, in: Cornwall, M. – Evans, R. J. W. (ed.), Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe 1918 – 1948, Oxford 2007, pp. 123 – 142; Franke, R., Die Tschechoslowakei in der politischen Meinung Englands 1918 – 1938 [Czechoslovakia in the Political Opinion of England 1918 – 1938], in: Bosl, K. (hrsg.), Die demokratisch-parlamentarische Struktur der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik [Democratic-parliamentary Structure of the First Czechoslovak Republic], München 1975, pp. 247– 269; Zorach, J., The British View of the Czechs in the Era before the Munich Crisis, in: The Slavonic and East European Review, 57, 1, 1979, pp. 56 – 70.  Cf. for example Bátonyi, G., Britain and Central Europe, 1918 – 1933, Oxford 1999 (there is a PhD thesis with a modified title Britain and Central Europe, 1918 – 1932, University of Oxford, 1994); Bakić, D., Britain and Interwar Danubian Europe: Foreign Policy and Security Challenges, 1919 – 1936, London, New York 2017 (there is a PhD thesis with a modified title Britain, the Little Entente and Security in Danubian Europe, 1919 – 1936, The University of Leeds, 2010).  Mention should be made of the author’s sub-study, which has been elaborated where necessary to comprise certain chapters of the submitted monograph. Cf. The Sudetendeutsche Problem in 1936 in Reports of the British Legation in Prague, in: Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, 2, 2010, pp. 161– 181; British Legation in Prague and the Sudeten German Issue in Czechoslovakia in 1937, in: Nuova Rivista Storica, 99, 3, 2015, pp. 227– 250.  Kvaček, R., Obtížné spojenectví. Politicko-diplomatické vztahy mezi Československem a Francií 1937 – 1938. I [Difficult Alliance. Political-diplomatic Relations between Czechoslovakia and France 1937– 1938. I], Praha 1989.  Dejmek, J., Nenaplněné naděje. Politické a diplomatické vztahy Československa a Velké Británie (1918 – 1938) [Unfulfilled Hopes. Political and Diplomatic Relations of Czechoslovakia and Great Britain (1918 – 1938)], Praha 2003.  Dejmek, J., Edvard Beneš. Politická biografie českého demokrata. Část první. Revolucionář a diplomat (1884 – 1935) [Edvard Beneš. Political Biography of a Czech Democrat. Part One. Revolutionary and Diplomat (1884– 1935)], Praha 2006; Dejmek, J., Edvard Beneš. Politická biografie českého demokrata. Část druhá. Prezident republiky a vůdce národního odboje (1835 – 1948) [Edvard Beneš. Political Biography of a Czech Democrat. Part Two. President of the Republic and Leader of the National Resistance (1835 – 1948)], Praha 2008.  Smetana, V., In the Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from the Endorsement to the Renunciation of the Munich Agreement (1938 – 1942), Praha 2008.

10

Introduction

vak-Austrian relations at least being partially investigated recently.²⁷ One should mention the excellent analysis of 1938 from the perspective of Sudeten Germans written by Detlef Brandes.²⁸ The overall issue of national minorities in interwar Czechoslovakia which partially relates to the phenomenon of the submitted monograph is looked at by René Petráš²⁹ and in the extensive publication of Andrej Tóth, Lukáš Novotný and Michal Stehlík,³⁰ with the British response to the Statute of Nationalities looked at by Jan Kuklík and Jan Němeček.³¹ Undoubtedly, mention must also be made of former Vice-President of the Austrian Academy of Sciences Arnold Suppan’s monumental three-part monograph, Hitler – Beneš – Tito. Konflikt, Krieg und Völkermord in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa, which was published in 2014 and which provided the author with a broad range of essential information.³² The author also considers it necessary to explain the use of certain terms or compounds. Two expressions are used in the text to refer to interwar Czechoslovakia which do, however, mean the same thing – the First Czechoslovak Republic and Czechoslovakia. If the compound term Czech-German is used in the text, this always refers to the relationship between Czechs and Germans, and not the relationship between Czechoslovakia and Germany; in that case the term Czechoslovak-German would be used. Acknowledgements should be made at the end of an introduction. First of all, I should thank my teacher, Prof. Dr. Aleš Skřivan, to whom I owe a lot. Also deserving of thanks is my dear friend and colleague, Ass. Prof. Dr. Andrej Tóth, Ph.D., and my colleagues at the Department of Historical Sciences (Faculty  Konrád, O., Nevyvážené vztahy. Československo a Rakousko 1918 – 1933 [Unbalanced Relationships. Czechoslovakia and Austria 1918 – 1933], Praha 2012.  Brandes, D., Sudetští Němci v krizovém roce 1938 [Sudeten Germans in the Crisis Year 1938], Praha 2012.  Petráš, R., Menšiny v meziválečném Československu. Právní postavení národnostních menšin v první Československé republice a jejich mezinárodněprávní ochrana [Minorities in Interwar Czechoslovakia. Legal Status of National Minorities in the First Czechoslovak Republic and Their International Legal Protection], Praha 2009.  Tóth, A. – Novotný, L. – Stehlík, M., Národnostní menšiny v Československu 1918 – 1938. Od státu národního ke státu národnostnímu? [National Minorities in Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1938. From the Nation-State to the National State?], Praha 2012.  Kuklík, J. – Němeček, J., Od národního státu ke státu národností? Národnostní statut a snahy o řešení menšinové otázky v Československu v roce 1938 [From the National State to the State of Nationalities? National Status and Efforts to Address the Minority Issue in Czechoslovakia in 1938], Praha 2013.  Suppan, A., Hitler – Beneš – Tito. Konflikt, Krieg und Völkermord in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa. Teil 1 – 3 [Hitler – Benes – Tito. Conflict, War and Genocide in East Central and Southeastern Europe. Part 1−3], Wien 2014.

Introduction

11

of Arts, University of West Bohemia in Plzeň) Roman Kodet, Ph.D., Ass. Prof. Dr. Miroslav Šedivý and Jaroslav Valkoun, Ph.D.

I A Brief Overview to 1933 With the end of the First World War in the autumn of 1918, the old European order collapsed. The start of this new era in European history also radically transformed the political map in Central Europe. The Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed, and the so-called successor states were established on its foundations.¹ Besides Austria and Hungary, these also included Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The establishment of the successor states was affirmed in the peace treaties signed with the defeated states, representing an end to the war from an international law perspective. The victorious successor states gained the most from the Treaty of Versailles. For Austria-Hungary’s defeated successor states, i. e. for Austria and Hungary themselves, the new system meant a radical curtailment of their political powers, and not just within the Central European region itself. On 28 October 1918, the “Czechoslovak National Committee’s Proclamation of the Independence of the Czechoslovak State” was issued, formally declaring the establishment of a new state.² At the end of November 1918, the first Czechoslovak President, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (TGM) sailed to Great Britain to meet with leading British politicians on the future borders of the new state; although the peace conference which was to determine the Czechoslovak borders did not begin until 18 January 1919.³ TGM thought that Britain, alongside France, would play an important role in shaping the new state of affairs in Central Europe.⁴ National minorities represented a particular problem in the First Czechoslovak Republic. The new state found itself in a complex position inherited from Austria-Hungary – specifically the diverse multiethnic composition of its popu Kural, V., Konflikt místo společenství? Češi a Němci v československém státě (1918 – 1938) [Conflict instead of Community? Czechs and Germans in the Czechoslovak State (1918 – 1938)], Praha 1993, p. 7.  As yet, the form of the new state had not been determined. The official declaration of the Republic occurred on 14 November 1918 at the first meeting of the Revolutionary National Assembly.  Czechoslovak borders were determined by the Treaty of Versailles (on 28 June 1919, with Germany), the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (on 10 September 1919, with Austria) and the Treaty of Trianon (on 4 June 1920, with Hungary).  Cf. Dejmek, J., Nenaplněné naděje. Politické a diplomatické vztahy Československa a Velké Británie (1918 – 1938) [Unfulfilled Hopes. Political and Diplomatic Relations of Czechoslovakia and Great Britain (1918 – 1938)], Praha 2003, pp. 15 – 16. The first Czechoslovak President, however, was wrong. London very soon made clear to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that its interests in Europe ended at the Rhine. Cf. for example Johnson, G. (ed.), Locarno Revisited. European Diplomacy 1920 – 1929, London 2004. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110651454-002

14

I A Brief Overview to 1933

lation. A third of the population did not want to live there; these were mainly Germans, Hungarians, and Poles, who had become citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic through events they had been unable to influence. The remaining twothirds (Czechs and Slovaks) in contrast celebrated Czechoslovakia as something they had desired for hundreds of years. Under these circumstances, it was almost impossible for these two groups to agree on the principles and working of “their” state.⁵ Following representatives of the new state’s contacts with the Sudeten Germans (October, November 1918) who were an important entity as the second largest group in the country (after Czechoslovaks), Czechoslovak political leaders came to the conclusion that they would manage “their” own state themselves. The end of October 1918 was marked by turbulent domestic political developments in Austria-Hungary, as recorded, for example, in a report from Richard Acton,⁶ a British diplomat in Switzerland.⁷ At the beginning of that month, British Government offices were considering whether to recognise Czech, or Czechoslovak, nationality or not (this was a query from the Board of Trade); according to a statement from the Foreign Office, however, an agreement had already been signed between His Majesty’s Government and the Czechoslovak National Council on 3 September 1918, Article 9 of which stated, “that His Majesty’s Government will recognise and will treat as alien friends and as members of an Allied nation, all persons who may be certified to them as Czecho-Slovaks by the Czecho-Slovak representative in London […]”.⁸ This was a further step following the August recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council as the provisional Government of the future state acknowledged by London in response to the newly emerging state of affairs in Central Europe. The establishment of the Czechoslovak state at the end of October 1918 was a reality which British politicians, or rather diplomats at the Foreign Office, would have to learn to work with.⁹ As such, when the press published an article entitled

 Suppan, A., Hitler – Beneš – Tito. Konflikt, Krieg und Völkermord in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa. Teil 1 [Hitler – Benes – Tito. Conflict, War and Genocide in East Central and Southeastern Europe. Part 1], Wien 2014, p. 334. Cf also Cornwall, M., The Devil’s Wall: The Nationalist Youth Mission of Heinz Rutha, Cambridge (Mass.), London 2012, pp. 79 – 80.  Richard Maximilian Lyon-Dalberg-Acton, 2nd Baron Acton.  Cf. The National Archives, London, Kew (hereinafter TNA), Foreign Office (hereinafter FO) 371/ 3134, Telegram from Lord Acton (Berne), Registry No. 179471, October 22, 1918, f. 2; ibid., Telegram from Lord Acton (Berne), Registry No. 181289, October 31, 1918, ff. 26 – 28.  TNA, FO 371/3136, Registry No. 167264, October 9, 1918, f. 222. The Foreign Office’s position mainly applied to recognising companies as Czechoslovak companies.  “Until the spring of 1918, the break-up of Austria-Hungary into separate national states did not constitute a definitive aim of British policy.” Hoffmann, R., The British Military Representative in

I A Brief Overview to 1933

15

All Bohemia for the Czechs on 7 November 1918 which stated that the representatives of the Entente Powers had promised Karel Kramář and the future state the whole of historical Bohemia, the professional diplomat (at the time he was head of the Political Intelligence Department) and future Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, William Tyrrell, had to ask whether that meant that the matter of the German areas in Northern and Western Bohemia had been definitively settled; he considered this to be of fundamental importance, and events were soon to prove him right.¹⁰ In mid-November 1918 in the Revolutionary National Assembly, the first Czechoslovak Prime Minister declared that the new state would not restrict its German citizens in any way in their cultural and language rights, but also added: “Our state, however, will be a Czech state […] such as we have earned it through blood and suffering. […] Yet it would be our pride and desire that nobody here who is not Czech should feel oppressed or confined.”¹¹ His declaration clearly reflected the mood at the time. According to his words, the new state should be a state of Czechs and Slovaks; other citizens were to have the status of national minorities and should be awarded proportionate rights.¹² British politics had to acquaint itself with this stance of Czechoslovak politicians’ and subsequently respond to it adequately. In early November 1918, British Minister to Switzerland, Sir Horace Rumbold, supplied detailed information to Foreign Secretary, Sir Arthur James Balfour,¹³ on the opinions of Czechoslovak leaders on important issues within Central Europe; this information was based on a report on discussions in Geneva between representatives of domestic and foreign resistance, which future Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš had sent to Rumbold.¹⁴ The very first

Vienna, 1919, in: The Slavonic and East European Review, 52, 127, 1974, p. 252. The Czecho-Slovak National Council was recognised as an allied belligerent power in August 1918. Ibid.  TNA, FO 371/3136, Registry No. 186232, f. 370.  Těsnopisecké zprávy Národního shromáždění, 1, 1918 – 1919, I. Schůze Národního shromáždění československého dne 14. listopadu 1918 [Stenographical Reports of the National Assembly, 1, 1918 – 1919, I. Meeting of the Czechoslovak National Assembly on November 14, 1918], p. 5.  Vyšný, P., The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938. Prelude to Munich, Basingstoke 2003, p. 4.  When he was not there, George Nathaniel Curzon, who eventually replaced Balfour in the role of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in October 1919, played an important role in foreign policy. Cf. Johnson, G., Preparing for Office: Lord Curzon as Acting Foreign Secretary, January – October 1919, in: Contemporary British History, 18, 3, 2004, pp. 53 – 73.  Konrád, O., Nevyvážené vztahy. Československo a Rakousko 1918 – 1933 [Unbalanced Relationships. Czechoslovakia and Austria 1918 – 1933], Praha 2012, p. 55.

16

I A Brief Overview to 1933

sentence gave a clear signal of changes in the political map of Central Europe: “The Czecho-Slovak state considers itself as a sovereign and independent state whose capital is Prague. It does not recognise any connection whatsoever with the Austrian monarchy.”¹⁵ Beneš’s report had stated that the Czech and Slovak people could not imagine their further existence under the “sceptre” of the Habsburg dynasty. The document continued with a requirement that the historical border of the Kingdom of Bohemia be kept to, to which it would be necessary to add the territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary where Slovaks lived. There was also important information regarding the nature of the new state: “The character of the new state will be essentially Czech [meaning Czechoslovak here, but in the spirit of the Czechoslovakism idea just Czech was written – author’s note]. But all Germans within its borders will be absolutely free.”¹⁶ Beneš’s work is also seen in passages which wrote of establishing any possible alliances in Central Europe at the League of Nations, or of attempts at nurturing good friendly relations with all neighbours.¹⁷ The memorandum stated that the new state had its most positive relations with its South Slavic kin, going on to say that Prague had not yet established formal contact with the Polish Government, although it had expressed its sympathy towards Polish territorial claims against Germany. In terms of relations with Hungary, the despatch’s author stated that this could be improved, or rather normal co-operation could be ensured only after a certain time had passed, and he then added: “The most important point at the present time is to prevent any union between the Magyars and the German Austrians.”¹⁸ Rumbold’s information for Arthur Balfour represented a summary of the emerging Czechoslovak political programme, specifically expressing the line of thinking of TGM and Edvard Beneš – to have good relations with all, in particular the South Slavs; not to allow an alliance between German-Austria and Germany, confront any Hungarian revisionism and contribute to creating a stable and peaceful Central Europe. This last point was likely of most interest to British politicians. The collapse of Austria-Hungary, if an imperfect formation, threatened to engulf the Central European region in chaos, which might have a negative impact on stabilising the whole continent following the war, putting the triggering of normal economic development under threat, something London perceived as fundamental. Furthermore, after signing the armistice with Austria (on 11 Novem TNA, FO 371/3136, Registry No. 193197, Sir H. Rumbold to Mr. A. Balfour, November 7, 1918, f. 386.  Ibid.  Ibid.  Ibid., f. 387.

I A Brief Overview to 1933

17

ber 1918), the British Government made clear that “it could not be directly engaged in Central or South-Eastern Europe”.¹⁹ At the end of November 1918, Foreign Secretary Balfour received information via neutral Sweden and its Legation in London (from a letter from the Swedish Minister to Vienna to his Foreign Minister) from the Austrian capital regarding a violation of the armistice by Czechoslovak units which allegedly, at least based on the claims of the report, involved incidents at the border with German-Austria.²⁰ A few days later, German-Austria’s “ministry” of Foreign Affairs wrote to the neutral countries to draw its attention to a series of border incidents in which it accused Czechoslovak soldiers of targeting Austria’s territorial integrity and the personal security of its German population. “There are a number of areas in southern Bohemia and Moravia which have been subjected to military incursion by Czechoslovak units,” the report continued.²¹ It also contained information on the dismal state of supplies and the hunger which had broken out which the attackers apparently failed to notice of, and abductions of innocent people. The Government of German-Austria endeavoured to lodge its protest and called on the Czechoslovak diplomatic representative in Vienna (Vlastimil Tusar), to ensure these aggressions ended. It further declared that it wanted a lasting peace established and peaceful coexistence with all its neighbours. The document concluded with a call that the information should be sent to American President Woodrow Wilson and the Governments of the Allied Powers.²² The Swedish Legation in London (the report was sent on behalf of the Swedish Government and the Government of German-Austria) contacted Arthur Bal Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 18. There was, however, an exception and at this time it was Vienna, which London still considered the centre of the Central European region according to Jindřich Dejmek.  This occurred in November 1918 in response to the end of the First World War. Following signature of the peace treaty in Saint-Germain, its name changed to the Austrian Republic; the peacemakers forbade unification with Germany. Cf. Konrád, pp. 37– 38. Propaganda pamphlets were produced after the end of the war which looked at the issue of unification of German-Austria with Germany or Czechoslovakia, and most of these pamphlets were designed to be used during peace conference negotiations. Cf. for example Přibram, E., Die wirtschaftliche Lage des Sudetenlandes. Anschluß an das Deutsche Reich oder den tschecho-slowakischen Staat? [The Economic Situation of the Sudetenland. Anschluss to the German Reich or the Czechoslovak State?], Wien 1919 or Dopsch, A., Die historische Stellung der Deutschen in Böhmen [The Historical Position of the Germans in Bohemia], Wien 1919.  TNA, FO 371/3136, Registry No. 198195, Swedish Legation in London, November 30, 1918, f. 400.  Ibid., ff. 400 – 401. Cf. Dejmek, J., Edvard Beneš. Politická biografie českého demokrata. Část první. Revolucionář a diplomat (1884 – 1935) [Edvard Beneš. Political Biography of a Czech Democrat. Part One. Revolutionary and Diplomat (1884– 1935)], Praha 2006, p. 223.

18

I A Brief Overview to 1933

four again in December, when it informed him of the occupation of Austrian territory by Czechoslovak armed forces; specifically occurring in the Sudeten German regions in southern Bohemia and around Znojmo in Moravia. The document stated that, “the terms of the armistice have removed the option of resisting this invasion from the Government of German-Austria”.²³ The author went on to say that Government administration could not be performed within the occupied territory, adding that such a situation was not sustainable in the long-term.²⁴ This was a fundamental dispute in the perception of the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy and the establishment of the new states in its ruins. Representatives of German-Austria thought that it would be possible to create an essentially non-viable state formation from part of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown with a majority German population and then join it to Germany. This, however, would result in Czechoslovakia having borders which could not be defendable. The subsequent establishment of four separatist territories which joined the Czechoslovak state at the turn of 1918/1919 seriously undermined any attempts at establishing German-Austria. The Treaty of Saint-Germain brought a definitive end to such hopes in September 1919. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Beneš decided to respond to the activities of the German-Austrian Government and he visited British Ambassador to Paris, Edward Stanley, 17th Earl of Derby. He submitted his own memorandum to him in regard to this problem, and the response of the French Government. “I understand that this reply from the French Government has been transmitted to you officially through the French Embassy in London, but Dr. Benes begged me to represent to you,” wrote Derby to Foreign Secretary Balfour.²⁵ Edvard Beneš was naturally aware of the fragility of the post-war situation; the peace conference had not yet begun and thus its outcome was logically unforeseeable, and at the same time the positions of Paris and London were of great importance and should ideally concur. As such, he responded by contacting the Foreign Secretary through Lord Derby. He began his memorandum by stating that Mr Bauer and Mr Renner’s Government (Karl Renner was Chancellor from 1918 to 1920) was demanding a plebiscite which would determine the border between Czechoslovakia and German-Austria. Beneš wanted to draw Balfour’s attention to the following points: in his opinion, the problem of Czech Ger-

 TNA, FO 371/3136, Registry No. 211213, Swedish Legation in London, December 23, 1918, f. 480. The document’s author further stated that the Czechoslovak armed action did not respect the right of self-determination of the German population of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Ibid., f. 481.  Ibid.  TNA, FO 371/3136, Registry No. 211328, Derby to Balfour, December 21, 1918, f. 485.

I A Brief Overview to 1933

19

mans had appeared overnight, or rather Foreign Minister Otto Bauer was exploiting it artificially; the Czech German population had apparently “peacefully accepted their integration into the Czechoslovak state”; the German-Austrian Government had in contrast focused solely on provoking and discrediting Prague in recent weeks in the eyes of the Allied Powers.²⁶ The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister then vilified Bauer, writing that he had participated in the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917. The second part of Beneš’s memorandum was his defence of the existence of the new state, and an attack on Vienna’s policy.²⁷ It also proposed the adoption of certain measures which would, in his opinion, make the situation calmer. He did not neglect to add that the Czechoslovak Government was the only partner in Central Europe which would be able to restore order in its territory, which was one of the Allies’ fundamental arguments for supporting Prague. Already in the memorandum, Beneš proposed that the victorious Powers recognise the Czech border as it was for its historic lands (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia). He cleverly supported his claim by referring to their loyal and real support of Allied actions during the war which claimed the lives of many Czech and Slovak legionaries.²⁸ On 30 December 1918, a document was produced at the Foreign Office which criticised the Czechoslovak state’s exaggerated claims for German territory: “The frontiers demanded by the Czechs extend considerably further than those proposed in our Peace Conference memoranda,” wrote the author,²⁹ going on to request a revision of the borders in favour of the Germans, specifically in Silesia, South Bohemia, and South Moravia. He also came to the conclusion that the large number of Germans who were to be integrated into the new state meant that Czechoslovakia should not be permitted to demand further territory at the expense of Lower and Upper Austria or Prussian Silesia. The document’s author correctly warned that the prevailing situation demanded the utmost care and that anything of essence should be left to the decision of the upcoming peace conference.³⁰ He also added that the prevailing circumstances, if imperfect, did not permit London to take any other position than to accept the current administrative units as given. As such, he recommended London affiliate itself with France’s position regarding Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia forming part

 TNA, FO 371/3136, December 20, 1918, f. 486. Cf also Hájková, D. – Horák, P. (ed.), Edvard Beneš, Němci a Německo: edice dokumentů [Edvard Beneš, the Germans and Germany: an Edition of Documents]. Vol. 1, Praha 2014, pp. 329 – 331.  TNA, FO 371/3136, December 20, 1918, f. 487.  Ibid., ff. 487– 488.  Ibid., f. 483.  Ibid.

20

I A Brief Overview to 1933

of the Czechoslovak state.³¹ As such, the position of the despatch’s author was ambivalent – on the one hand it should be noted that he was correct in warning of the excessive territorial claims of Czechoslovak politicians, but on the other hand he was aware of the necessity of a joint approach with Paris, which was why he favoured concurring with the French position. The Foreign Office, whose officials could not have known the Central European region in detail, nor its nature following the end of the war, accepted all such suggestions and complaints with reserve, and essentially proposed waiting for the peace conference to begin, which was to deal with it all.³² The end of the First World War and the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy brought about the redrawing of the political and state maps of the Central European region. Great Britain, as one of the main victors of the war, had to respond to the prevailing situation. The tradition and established scheme of British political elites’ foreign policy considerations came face to face with a new political constellation. Austria-Hungary, which had been a stable factor in Central Europe for many years, had collapsed and a new approach to the region had to be found. One of the successor states was Czechoslovakia, which immediately following its establishment faced disintegration attempts by four separatist formations; by the turn of 1918/1919, however, the problem had been solved.³³ Its representatives (TGM and Edvard Beneš in particular) had claimed from the very beginning that the new state needed natural borders and that it would provide its German population with appropriate rights; whether and how these were appropriate became a subject of contention over almost the whole duration of the First Czechoslovak Republic.³⁴ British diplomats responded to the establishment of Czechoslovakia, or to the events which had occurred, with calm. Reports from its diplomatic representative in Switzerland suggested that it had got used the new balance of power. While some reports naturally reflected relations between nationalities in Czechoslovakia above all, and gave differing information on the situation in the CzechAustrian border region, they all remained within a kind of provisional frame-

 Ibid, f. 484.  Cf. Hoffmann, p. 254.  Suppan, pp. 347– 348.  Cf. in general Tóth, A. – Novotný, L. – Stehlík, M., Národnostní menšiny v Československu 1918 – 1938. Od státu národního ke státu národnostnímu? [National Minorities in Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1938. From the Nation-State to the National State?], Praha 2012; Kuklík, J. – Němeček, J., Od národního státu ke státu národností? Národnostní statut a snahy o řešení menšinové otázky v Československu v roce 1938 [From the National State to the State of Nationalities? National Status and Efforts to Address the Minority Issue in Czechoslovakia in 1938], Praha 2013.

I A Brief Overview to 1933

21

work before the beginning of the Paris Peace Conference. As such, on the one hand politicians and diplomats in London did not take a fundamental and clearcut position regarding determination of the Czechoslovak borders, but on the other hand they were aware they could not go against the interests of France, which considered Central Europe as an important factor of the post-war order;³⁵ as such they indirectly advocated Edvard Beneš’s demands. A key problem which British diplomats had to deal with at the turn of 1918/ 1919 was setting up the Czechoslovak borders, specifically the struggle for the right to self-determination, which the German population had decided to take on,³⁶ considering themselves to have become a part of the nascent Czechoslovakia against their will. Various representatives of the emerging German minority in the Czechoslovak Republic contacted British politicians, informing them of their stance and justifying their objection to the current status. A good example of this is the Mayor of Karlovy Vary, Hermann Jakobi’s request of January 1919, when he wrote a letter to the Foreign Office in which he stated that the upcoming peace conference would also decide on the fate of his city. He said the Czechoslovak state did a great injustice in demanding its establishment with its historic borders while not taking account of the opinions of its German-language regions, going on to say that the current claims were based on the past and if that they were met it would place significant restrictions on the development of the German nation.³⁷ Jakob’s letter was naturally of anti-Czech sentiment in its contents and gave information, including statistical data, in support of the city’s German nature, and thus logically also the impossibility of it being integrated into the new state.

 Cf. a material of Walford Selby, the Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, entitled The policy of co-operation with France and its effects in Europe. A very brief review of the twelve years, 1920 – 1931, October 5, 1931. University of Oxford, Bodleian Libraries (Weston Library), Selby Papers, MS. Eng. c. 6585, f. 84.  In time, the expression Sudeten Germans caught on, replacing the previously used Czech, Moravian and Silesian Germans. More in detail cf. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 32– 34. International context of the German minority cf. Leoncini, F., Das Problem der deutschen Minderheit in Böhmen in der internationalen Politik der Jahre 1918/1919 [The Problem of the German Minority in Bohemia in the International Politics of the Years 1918/1919], in: Bohemia, 13, 1972, pp. 306 – 335.  TNA, FO 608/5/16, Registry No. 2224, February 17, 1919, ff. 437– 438. Jakob further stated that Karlovy Vary was a purely German city. It was important that George Nathaniel Curzon, who sent the despatch on to Arthur Balfour, stated that the Foreign Office had not yet taken any steps in regard to this matter. Ibid., f. 436.

22

I A Brief Overview to 1933

Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, governor of the province of Deutschböhmen, and Robert Freissler, governor of the province of Sudetenland,³⁸ contacted the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (specifically Sir William Tyrrell) in mid-February 1919 through George Herron. They listed their demands in a long memorandum in whose introduction they stated that roughly 3.5 million Germans would be incorporated into a state in which about 6 million Czechs resided. They went on to state that there were a number of reasons to reject the inclusion of lands with a majority German population into Czechoslovakia. In the face of American President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, they considered it unacceptable to refer to the historical borders in creating state borders, and especially so when this did not apply for Slovakia. In forming Czechoslovakia, the historical borders principle could not be applied in its eastern section, but rather an ethnic principle instead. “The conduct of the Czechs since the collapse of Austria appears to have destroyed the last prospect of an understanding,” the memorandum authors wrote, going on to say that German schools were closing, the language rights of Germans were being suppressed, and more.³⁹ Lodgman von Auen and Freissler also rejected the political structure of the Czechoslovak state, which they perceived as a continuation of the dualism from the period prior to 1914, but now with the Czech and Slovak nation governing. “For that reason there is a great danger that this State situated in the heart of Europe must become a centre of unrest and discord and an ‘Irredenta’ will extend from all boundary-territories to all neighbouring states, a hearth of contagion will be created for the further peace of Europe,” they predicted of the new republic’s future.⁴⁰ Later, during the 1930s, Czechoslovakia would find itself in a position where certain groups would accuse it of similar things again.

 Cf. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 35 – 36.  TNA, FO 608/5/16, Registry No. 2946, February 27, 1919, ff. 443 – 444.  Ibid., f. 448. Finally, the memorandum’s authors also spoke of the economic problems which the current situation would bring about. Ibid., ff. 450 – 453. A few days earlier, a British Legation official Cecil Gosling had spoken with President Masaryk who had apparently expressed his optimism in regard to the German minority’s position regarding Czechoslovakia and promised that equal rights would be assured in the language and education field. More important than Masaryk’s words, however, was the British diplomat’s impression, who did not see the situation as positively as TGM: “I regard the question of German Bohemia as the most serious problem that confronts the new State.” TNA, FO 608/7/6, Registry No. 3106, Mr. Gosling to Earl Curzon, February 4, 1919, f. 243. The British diplomat correctly guessed the sticking point the existence of Czechoslovakia would become, and was also well aware of the ideas of certain leaders of the German minority whose objective in his opinion was to get back the lost power they had had prior to 1914. Gosling also perceived the diverse nationalities which made up the new state, being aware of the existence of other minorities. Cf. ibid., ff. 243 – 244.

I A Brief Overview to 1933

23

The above discussed statements of the Karlovy Vary mayor, and both governors, logically rejected joining the German border territory to Czechoslovakia, and appealed for assistance to the British representative at the Paris Peace Conference. Their stance was not without basis, as it was undoubtedly true that a section of the new state’s population rejected it and did not want to be a part of it, and British diplomats admitted as such, which was an important factor in formulating their positions; they did not have enough relevant information on the life of “Germans in Bohemia”.⁴¹ As such, they needed data from other sources. In April 1919, a report from Prague was received by the Foreign Office from Cecil Gosling, who was forwarding a telegram from Vienna from Sir Thomas Montgomery-Cuninghame,⁴² whom London had sent to Austria prior to the end of 1918 and whom Jindřich Dejmek describes as someone who “viewed Bohemia in particular with marked disapproval, and sympathised with the Pan-German Movement,”⁴³ and he attempted to get his superiors to support some form of co-operation with the new successor states.⁴⁴ According to the telegram, published in Prager Tagblatt, MontgomeryCuninghame spoke of the possible “neutralisation” of the German parts of Bohemia in a discussion with Lodgman von Auen, essentially its de facto independence, which he was prepared to present in Paris.⁴⁵ Cecil Gosling contacted the counsel at the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, Bedřich Štěpánek, asking him to deny these rumours and express his regret that such information was appearing in the local press.⁴⁶ It was true that Montgomery-Cuninghame was not an advo-

 TNA, FO 608/5/16, Registry No. 2946, February 17, 1919, f. 439.  Sir Thomas Andrew Alexander Montgomery-Cuninghame of Corsehill, 10th Baronet (1877– 1945). He was the British Military Representative to Austria (1919 – 1920) and British Military Attaché in Vienna (1920 – 1923). Cf. more in detail Hoffmann, pp. 252– 271. “The most remarkable feature of the Cuninghame mission was that it covered the whole territoty of the former Habsburg Empire, with special attention to the triangle of Vienna, Budapest and Prague.” Bátonyi, G., Britain and Central Europe, 1918 – 1932, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1994, p. 24. Cuninghame had no sympathy towards Czechoslovakia, it “was created ‘contrary to all the lessons of history, geography, economics, morality and common sense’”. Ibidem, pp. 24– 25.  Cf. also Hoffmann, pp. 260. 261.  Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 19. His opinions of Czechoslovakia, however, did not resonate with leaders at the Foreign Office. Ibid.  TNA, FO 608/5/16, Registry No. 7514, April 17, 1919, f. 457. “Cuninghame supported the demands of the Bohemian Germans for political autonomy and fiercely criticised the excesses of Czech nationalism.” Bátonyi, p. 238.  TNA, FO 608/5/16, Registry No. 7514, April 17, 1919, f. 458.

24

I A Brief Overview to 1933

cate of the new state,⁴⁷ but there was an immediate denial of the inappropriate information, which while it did avoid undesirable consequences, did not contribute to a clear position for British diplomacy in regard to the German areas of Czechoslovakia. One can say, then, that in the first half of 1919 when the final peace treaties had not yet been signed for Czechoslovakia, Austrian German politicians were attempting to get British support for some form of alliance with Austria, or later with Germany, but certainly not a connection with the Czechoslovak Republic, following the failure of their secessionist attempts at the end of 1918. To a certain extent, British diplomats were finding their feet in regard to the new situation which had arisen in Central Europe, and even though some such as Thomas Montgomery-Cuninghame, were pursuing the independence of the German areas of Bohemia, the Foreign Office’s official policy rejected this and followed its own line in Paris. This was seen as early as in February 1919 when British technical delegate at the Paris Peace Conference recommended the British mission leaders recognise the future borders of Austria, writing in regard to Czechoslovakia that: “It is recommended that the present administrative boundaries of Bohemia and Moravia be maintained. The Tchech claims for exceeding this administrative boundary at Gmünd and Themenau do not merit support.” He justified this recommendation saying that the benefits of the current administrative border outweighed the disadvantages of the secession of the large German minority.⁴⁸ This solved one of British diplomacy’s major problems in terms of its policy in Central Europe. Prague was to receive London’s support in its demands on border determination, and although some of its claims were rejected, overall it represented a success for Czechoslovak diplomacy. In his despatch for Arthur Balfour, Edvard Beneš repeated his argument from the end of 1918 that Czechoslovakia was the only power in Central Europe which was able to restore and maintain order.⁴⁹ There were also people in Great Britain who supported the Czechoslovak solution to the minorities problem, and who explained it to others. A typical exam-

 He “disliked the new and fledgling order in Central Europe”. Bakić, D., Britain, the Little Entente and Security in Danubian Europe, 1919 – 1936, Ph.D. Thesis, the University of Leeds 2010, p. 15. Cf. also Bátonyi, p. 26.  TNA, FO 608/5/19, Registry No. 1645, February 8, 1919, f. 494. In May, Arthur Balfour was able to state in a telegram to Lord Curzon that the top representatives at the Paris Peace Conference were looking at the proposed borders and had no reservations about them. Cf. TNA, FO 608/5/19, Registry No. 9829, May 13, 1919, f. 506.  “Of all the successor states Czechoslovakia was the most consolidated in respect of both her internal and external standing in the immediate years after the war.” Bakić, p. 53.

I A Brief Overview to 1933

25

ple of one such person is historian and political activist Robert William SetonWatson (1879 – 1951), whose studies contributed to support for the idea of Czechoslovakia’s establishment, and who in May 1919 contacted his fellow historian and someone who knew the Foreign Office well (he became the Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office in 1920), James Wycliffe Headlam-Morley. He informed Headlam-Morley that he had spoken to many people and on that basis was able to reliably state “that the Czechs fully realise the difficulty of the German problem and are very anxious to find a satisfactory basis, and that the intransigeant [sic!] current is losing steadily”.⁵⁰ He then said he was somewhat surprised that Karel Kramář had been very much sidelined and there was no doubt his influence was fading. But on the other hand, he stressed Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk’s unshakeable position and subsequently focused on his position within the interim constitution. In terms of national minorities, Seton-Watson was sure that the majority of the population would support Masaryk’s “policy of absolute Gleichberechtigung for the Germans”, in all areas of public life.⁵¹ The British historian also thought it would not be wise to give the Germans their own regional parliament, and on the other hand was pleasantly surprised at the progress which had been made since autumn 1918 when the new state had been set up.⁵² Although Robert Seton-Watson was not a diplomat, his stance found sympathy within the Foreign Office, and in a certain sense it balanced out the opinions of Thomas Montgomery Cuninghame and similar diplomats.⁵³ As such, Czechoslovakia had its supporters when it was established and moulded, and besides Seton-Watson these included journalist and publicist Henry Wickham Steed (1871– 1956), editor of The Times from 1919 to 1922. These supporters provided a certain balance to the somewhat more reserved approach of some British diplomats.⁵⁴

 TNA, FO 608/6/7, Registry No. 10641, May 18, 1919, f. 423.  Ibid., f. 426. Seton-Watson was somewhat carried away here, because even the first Czechoslovak President had spoken somewhat more sharply on the issue of the Germans, only to soon correct his stance. Cf. Masaryk, T. G., Cesta demokracie, I. Projevy – články – rozhovory, 1918 – 1920 [The Path of Democracy, I. Speeches – Articles – Interviews, 1918 – 1920], Praha 2003, pp. 29 – 30. Cf. also Wiskemann, E., Czechs & Germans. A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, London 1967, p. 123.  TNA, FO 608/6/7, Registry No. 10641, May 18, 1919, f. 426. Cf. also Bátonyi, p. 235.  Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 19.  Zorach, J., The British View of the Czechs in the Era before the Munich Crisis, in: The Slavonic and East European Review, 57, 1, 1979, p. 57; Hanak, H., British Views of the Czechoslovaks from 1914 to 1924, in: Schmidt-Hartmann, E. – Winters, S. B. (hrsg.), Groβbritannien, die USA und die böhmischen Länder 1848 – 1938 [Great Britain, the USA and the Bohemian Lands 1848 – 1938], München 1991, p. 87.

26

I A Brief Overview to 1933

On 19 June 1919, Edvard Beneš contacted influential British diplomat Sir Eyre Crowe in order to lay out certain facts about the actual status of the German minority within the Czechoslovak Republic; this was in response to the material which the peace conference had received from Karl Renner.⁵⁵ The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister first of all denied that there was any purely German region in the Czech lands, and subsequently described to Crowe the proposal he was sending and left it entirely up to him whether to submit it to the appropriate people as part of the peace conference discussions; it was clear to him that London’s support would be necessary for the definitive ratification of the Czechoslovak borders.⁵⁶ He focused in particular on TGM’s declaration regarding Czech and Moravian Germans, from which Beneš claimed it was clear that members of the largest minority had expressed their satisfaction with the proposed solution to their status within the nascent Czechoslovakia.⁵⁷ The documents enclosed provided full support for the idea of the new state, and showed according to Foreign Minister that the minority had nothing to complain about. In autumn 1919, once the Treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain-en-Laye had established the Czechoslovak border,⁵⁸ representatives of the German sides were forced to change their stance and express their willingness to hold discussions with the Czechoslovak Government. They demanded the co-operation of minorities in making the constitution. Now, however, it was no longer about reaching out to the new state, but rather a last resort. The Czechoslovak Government rejected this, stating that the parliament would first have to ratify basic laws, and only then would an election be able to take place with the participation of minorities. They referred to the “right of revolution” which was behind the genesis of the new legislature.⁵⁹ Furthermore, British diplomacy, whose representatives had finally affirmed the current Czechoslovak border at peace negotiations, had closed one chapter in post-war developments. Now London was focusing on other issues. For Czechoslovakia, however, this did not mean that the young Republic had won in terms of being assured of Great Britain’s

 Beneš was unable to prevent representatives of the German minority in Czechoslovakia from taking places within the Austrian delegation. Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 25.  TNA, FO 608/6/7, Registry No. 14183, le 19 Juin 1919, f. 440. Cf. also Hájková – Horák, p. 385.  More in detail cf. TNA, FO 608/6/7, Registry No. 14183, le 19 Juin 1919, ff. 444– 449.  There was still as yet no peace treaty with Hungary. Nevertheless, Sudeten German deputies had to leave the Austrian Parliament. Suppan, pp. 359 – 360.  Petráš, R., Menšiny v meziválečném Československu. Právní postavení národnostních menšin v první Československé republice a jejich mezinárodněprávní ochrana [Minorities in Interwar Czechoslovakia. Legal Status of National Minorities in the First Czechoslovak Republic and Their International Legal Protection], Praha 2009, p. 180.

I A Brief Overview to 1933

27

support, or specifically its interest in ensuring events in Central Europe did not threaten Czechoslovakia. British engagement had its limits, and its diplomatic representatives in Vienna and Budapest were sending the Foreign Office reports documenting the unfair approach of Czechoslovak bodies towards minorities. Last but not least, one needs to note that there were individuals in the Foreign Office who had a critical view of the Republic’s existence, and whose opinions would always have to be taken into account. Jindřich Dejmek is right to claim that this critical approach shaped the reports of British diplomatic representatives in Prague to some extent from the autumn of 1919; some of Cecil Gosling’s despatches mentioned above confirm this.⁶⁰ As such, Prague had to be prepared for an atmosphere which was far from an unqualified support of its minority policy. On the other hand, it should be noted that despite some diplomats’ certain detachment, the First Czechoslovak Republic was taken as a given, and the approach of official British diplomacy confirmed its consent to the borders, being aware of the necessity of a strong Czechoslovakia acting as a stabilising factor in Central Europe under the prevailing circumstances. In September 1919, George Clerk (1874– 1951) became the new and first ever British Minister to Prague; he arrived for his new role and submitted his credentials in early 1920.⁶¹ The definitive confirmation of the Czechoslovak borders came with the peace treaty with Hungary signed on 4 June 1920 in Trianon, which also finalised the borders of states in Central Europe. From a British diplomacy perspective, this meant the end to the creation of a new political order formed after the collapse of Austria-Hungary. As such, in his report of July 1920 on events in Czechoslovakia in May, new Minister George Clerk was able to confirm political developments had taken place in a standard manner in regard to Cieszyn Silesia, Slovakia and the position of German Social Democrats who refused to take

 See, for example, his proposal to the Foreign Office of an exploratory mission abroad in order to ascertain how things really stood. Lord Curzon himself saw military attaché Montgomery-Cuninghame’s influence in this and did not support such a mission because of the Czechoslovak Government’s displeasure and bad timing. TNA, FO 608/8/2, Registry No. 18716, September 6, 1919, ff. 119 – 120. Cf. also Bakić, pp. 26 – 27.  Cf. Protheroe, G., Sir George Clerk and the Struggle for British Influence in Central Europe, 1919 – 26, in: Diplomacy & Statecraft, 12, 3, 2001, pp. 39 – 64. The author claims that Clerk was more sympathetic towards Czechoslovakia than any of his successors. Harry Hanak adds that Clerk had very good relations with TGM and Edvard Beneš. Hanak, p. 97. Cf. also Bátonyi, p. 252. Bruce Lockhart described him as a man able to maintain a balance between quarrelling parties in Czechoslovakia and as a capable and effective official. Bruce Lockhart, R. H., Ústup ze slávy [Retreat from Glory], Praha 1935, pp. 66, 68, 94. According to Zara Steiner, Clerk was heavily influenced by Robert Seton-Watson. Steiner, Z., The Lights that Failed. European International History 1919 – 1933, Oxford 2005, p. 269.

28

I A Brief Overview to 1933

part in the activities of the German Parliamentary Association (der Deutsche parlamentarische Verband).⁶² He sent London similar sentiments a few months later when he wrote to Lord Curzon about the conflict within Czechoslovak Social Democracy and the collapse of the so-called Red-Green Coalition.⁶³ Both papers contain no information on conflicts between nationalities any larger than ordinary skirmishes, of which there were of course many,⁶⁴ and no significant information on Czechoslovakia’s largest minority, merely giving the outline of internal political developments within the First Czechoslovak Republic. When, at the end of the year, Liberal MP Sir Thomas Bramsdon asked a question in the House of Commons about the situation of the national minorities in Czechoslovakia and their suffering, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Cecil Harmsworth was able to answer with a clear conscience: “The rights of minorities in Czecho-Slovakia are fully safeguarded by the Treaty signed at St. Germain on 10th September, 1919 […].”⁶⁵ As such, the position of this high-ranking British diplomat was clear – Prague was respecting and meeting the obligations which it had agreed to through its signature of the above mentioned treaty. At the beginning of the 1920s, the reports of Minister Clerk and other British diplomats in Prague had settled down into providing updates on the occasional clashes or disagreements between the majority Czech (Czechoslovak) nation and the German minority,⁶⁶ but these were essentially routine with the Minister ac-

 TNA, FO 371/4721, C 1968/1968/12, Clerk to Curzon, July 16, 1920, f. 4.  TNA, FO 371/4721, C 6473/1968/12, Sir G. Clerk to Earl Curzon, September 10, 1920, ff. 16 – 17.  Cf. for example TNA, FO 371/4721, C 11495/1968/12, Telegram from Sir G. Clerk, November 16, 1920, f. 43; ibid., C 11958/1968/12, Sir G. Clerk to Earl Curzon, November 19, 1920, f. 62; ibid., C 12450/1968/12, Sir G. Clerk to Earl Curzon, November 26, 1920, f. 73.  TNA, FO 371/4720, C 13978/1639/12, December 14, 1920, f. 134. The diplomat was referring to the so-called Minority Treaty, officially known as the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United States) and Czechoslovakia, signed at St Germain-en-Laye (1919, 10 September). “Czecho-Slovakia undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Czecho-Slovakia without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. All inhabitants of Czecho-Slovakia shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.” Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, p. 202.  In the 1920s, the British considered Czechoslovakia a rationally administered state, “with enlightened leaders headed by Tomáš Masaryk”. Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 311. Cf. also Bátonyi, p. 187; Cornwall, The Devil’s Wall, p. 104. Minister Sir Ronald Macleay, for example, wrote in 1928 that, “despite various daily disputes between Czechs and mainly Germans, there are no serious disputes in the country on political matters”. Dejmek, J., Britská diplomacie, Československo a Sudetoněmecká strana [British Diplomacy, Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten German Party], in: Moderní dějiny. Sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století, 9, 2001, p. 162.

I A Brief Overview to 1933

29

knowledging some legitimate objections of the largest minority, but adding on the other hand that they too could do more towards reconciliation, that the Czechoslovak Government was acting within the constraints set by the Minority Treaty, and that problems generally occur any time a constitutional change this large occurs;⁶⁷ the Foreign Office used this same argument in its response to the above mentioned parliamentary question. One should also note, however, that George Clerk held a certain level of disdain towards the successor states,⁶⁸ something not in contradiction to a particular school of thinking within the Foreign Office, something expressed, for example, in 1923: “The whole lot, Czechs, Magyars, Poles, Jugos, Roumanians, should be put in a bag and shaken up and then handed over to a decent Briton to administer.”⁶⁹ While this undoubtedly unorthodox opinion revealed a certain level of contempt from the British diplomat, on the other hand it demonstrated his perception of the new order in Central Europe. London had decorous relations with Prague, respected the Czechoslovak state as a given, and George Clerk respected TGM and later also Edvard Beneš, but British perception of itself as a Great Power and its foreign policy’s traditional approach meant that it was unable to acknowledge Czechoslovakia as an equal partner such as France, or Germany after it joined the League of Nations in 1926, were.⁷⁰ The early parliamentary election, which was considered in summer 1925 and took place on 15 November 1925 and which transformed the balance of power in

 The Minister saw the only problem in Czechoslovakia’s approach to the German minority in the execution of land reform. In June 1921, for example, he wrote to Foreign Secretary Curzon: “Nobody, not even a landowner, questions the right of the State to take over landed property from its present possessors, if such is considered to be in the general interest, but there is much legitimate complaint over the methods actually adopted” [land reforms – author’s note]. TNA, FO 371/5824, C 13721/1239/12, Sir G. Clerk to Earl Curzon, June 24, 1921, f. 89.  Cf. Bátonyi, p. 13.  Cornwall, M., A Fluctuating Barometer: British Diplomatic Views of the Czech-German Relationship in Czechoslovakia, 1918 – 1938, in: Schmidt-Hartmann, E. – Winters, S. B. (hrsg.), Groβbritannien, die USA und die böhmischen Länder 1848 – 1938 [Great Britain, the USA and the Bohemian Lands 1848 – 1938], München 1991, p. 315, footnote 7.  From 1924, London focused, or rather was forced to focus, on a more active policy in regard to collective security. Germany played a greater role following the signing of the Locarno (Rhineland Guarantee) Pact in October 1925. Cf. for example Johnson, G. (ed.), Locarno Revisited. European Diplomacy 1920 – 1929, London 2004; Novotný, L., Great Britain and the Journey to the Rhineland Pact (March–July 1925). A Contribution to the Issue of Collective Security in the 1920s, in: Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, 2011, 2, pp. 132– 147; Novotný, L., Great Britain and the Journey to the Rhineland Pact (July–August 1925). A Contribution to the Issue of Collective Security in the 1920s, in: West Bohemian Historical Review, 2012, 2, pp. 59 – 72.

30

I A Brief Overview to 1933

Czechoslovak politics, appeared to be a turning point in terms of the relationship between Czechs and Germans in Czechoslovakia and potential German political activism. Before the election took place, George Clerk had said a number of times that the German minority needed to finally accept the current situation and become a loyal opposition and he thought they should listen to people such as Bruno Kafka.⁷¹ He also criticised the single-nationality Government which appeared to show signs of discord and which was only sustained by its inability (here a mutual inability) to make an agreement with part of the German political spectrum.⁷² The British Minister did not understand why the German political parties did not unite before the election to create a single candidate which he thought would give them a greater opportunity for electoral success, as he wrote to Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain.⁷³ Clerk perceived the single candidate list option as a simple step which only required the agreement of the political parties. The spectrum of German political parties in the First Czechoslovak Republic, however, prevented such a situation from occurring; although a joint candidate for two parties was possible, as confirmed by some candidate lists in interwar Czechoslovakia. On the basis of the election outcome, the so-called All-National Coalition of Prime Minister Antonín Švehla was formed on 9 December 1925, which only lasted until the following spring and following the early departure of the Social Democrats and National Socialists was replaced by the technocratic Government of Jan Černý on 18 March 1926, during which time a new coalition of civic parties was formed. For the first time since the end of the war, the option of forming a Government without the participation of socialist parties was available, which would be based on the co-operation of non-leftwing parties, including representatives of the German and Hungarian minorities. Previous Governments had al-

 Kafka was a politician from the German Democratic Liberal Party (Deutsche demokratische Freiheitspartei), which as early as 1923 was considering political activism. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, p. 58.  Cornwall, A Fluctuating Barometer, p. 318. In June 1925, George Clerk spoke to TGM, who confirmed to him that the German minority lacked a true political leader who would be able to bring the Germans into Government. The President added that Franz Křepek did not speak Czech well, and Bruno Kafka was a Jew whom some Germans would never respect. TNA, FO 371/10674, C 8043/256/12, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, June 11, 1925, p. 2.  TNA, FO 371/10675, C 13944/256/12, Sir G. Clerk to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, October 26, 1925, f. 79. The Minister wrote that following the conference in Locarno, there were new constraints for minorities in all states, adding that the best advice for the German minority in Czechoslovakia was: “God helps those that help themselves.” Ibid.

I A Brief Overview to 1933

31

ways been composed of only Czechoslovak parties, parties whose programmes naturally differed and which did not offer a natural coalition.⁷⁴ In mid-1926, an unprecedented situation occurred when Czech and German agrarians found common ground, something the British Legation in Prague noted. George Clerk was able to inform Austen Chamberlain that the socialist parties had launched an intense campaign which had even led to street demonstrations.⁷⁵ Although he did not directly say it, his report suggests that this was a unique opportunity for political groupings to form who shared similar politics. The Legation reaffirmed this opinion a month later when it informed the Foreign Office of the Farmers’ League (Bund der Landwirte; BdL) congress in which words were spoken which confirmed growing co-operation with Czech agrarians and

 Already at the end of February 1926, representatives of German activism (Franz Spina, Robert Mayr-Harting, and Franz Jesser) met German Minister to Prague, Walter Koch, informing him that the previous negativist policy of German parties was counterproductive and that as representatives of authoritative political parties they had decided to continue to perform the role of standard parliamentary opposition and loyal minority. The German politicians, however, decided to consult Berlin on their position, specifically with Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann. Should they express their support, they were willing to continue in the course they were taking. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag. Innenpolitik und Minderheitenprobleme in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik, Teil II. Vom Kabinett Beneš bis zur ersten übernationalen Regierung unter Švehla 1921– 1926, Berichte des Gesandten Dr Walter Koch [German Legation Reports from Prague. Internal Policy and Minorities Problems in the First Czechoslovak Republic. Part II. From the Cabinet Beneš to the First Supranational Government under Švehla 1921– 1926, Reports of the Minister Dr Walter Koch]. Ausgewählt, eingeleitet und kommentiert von Alexander, M., Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum, Band 49/II, München 2004, Bitte der Aktivisten um Unterstützung durch das Deutsche Reich, Deutsche Gesandtschaft an das Auswärtige Amt, Prag, den 27. Februar 1926, Doc. No. 186, p. 483. It is true that Berlin was keeping its distance from the Sudeten Germans, only supporting them in cultural matters. Cf. Wiskemann, p. 129; Kučera, J., Minderheit im Nationalstaat. Die Sprachenfrage in den tschechisch-deutschen Beziehungen 1918 – 1938 [Minority in the Nation State. The Language Question in Czech-German Relations 1918 – 1938], München 1999, p. 99.  Cf. TNA, FO 371/11227, C 7008/83/12, Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain, June 16, 1926, ff. 44– 45. A few days later, Austrian Minister Ferdinand Marek confirmed the establishment of a Czechoslovak-German-Hungarian majority in Parliament which ratified a law on tariffs: “The adoption of the tariffs law in the Czechoslovak National Assembly is an historic moment. For the first time since the establishment of the Czechoslovak Parliament, a law has been ratified through the votes of Czech, German and Hungarian parties, and against the will of a number of ‘statist’ groups (the Czechoslovak Social Democrats and the National Socialists).” Novotný, L., Cesta ke vstupu německých ministrů do československé vlády v roce 1926. K problému vnímání německého aktivismu v Československu ze strany rakouského vyslanectví v Praze [The Road to the Entry of German Ministers to the Czechoslovak Government in 1926. The Issue of Perception of German Activism in Czechoslovakia by the Austrian Legation in Prague], in: Moderní dějiny. Časopis pro dějiny 19. a 20. století, 23, 1, 2015, pp. 165 – 166.

32

I A Brief Overview to 1933

gave the party leadership free hand in further negotiations. Charles Dodd wrote that Franz Spina’s speech was truly statesmanlike, adding that it gave hope to all friends of Czechoslovakia and that an opportunity to begin a new era in the country’s history was emerging.⁷⁶ In October 1926, two German ministers joined the Czechoslovak Government, Franz Spina as Minister of Public Works and Robert Mayr-Harting as Minister of Justice.⁷⁷ The atmosphere at Locarno,⁷⁸ with Berlin forced to accept the prevailing state of affairs, if only regarding its borders with France and Belgium, meant a transformation in the Foreign Office’s perception of Central Europe. British politicians made it clear to the Czechoslovak delegation in the Swiss town that London was not going to guarantee the Czechoslovak-German or Polish-German borders, something which only confirmed its unwillingness to engage any more in the region than the situation required.⁷⁹ This was also expressed symbolically in the replacement of the British Minister to Prague. George Clerk left in November 1926 for his new position in Constantinople, where he held the office of Ambassador until 1933. Both the Czech and German press gave a positive assessment of his time in Prague, and as he left he praised Czechoslovak politicians for the great progress which had been made since the country was established in 1918, and said Czechoslovakia was a factor for stability in Central Europe. Clerk’s successor, Sir Ronald Macleay (he was Minister from 1927 to 1930) was an experienced diplomat, but he lacked any experience in Central Europe or indeed Continental Europe in general, and according to Jonathan Zorach his naming was an expression of the relative unimportance of Prague in the eyes of the Foreign Office. He is of the opinion that Czechoslovak-British relations were cordial at the end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s, but were damaged by mistrust between the two countries when two incidents occurred.⁸⁰

 TNA, FO 371/11227, C 8579/83/12, Mr. Dodd to Sir Austen Chamberlain, July 27, 1926, f. 67.  TNA, FO 371/11226, C 12007/82/12, November 17, 1926, f. 132. “The inclusion of two German politicians in the Svehla government met with the full approval of Britain.” Bátonyi, p. 315.  Cf. for example Johnson, G. (ed.), Locarno Revisited. European Diplomacy 1920 – 1929, London 2004; Novotný, L. – Kodet, R., Velká Británie a konference v Locarnu. Příspěvek ke studiu kolektivní bezpečnosti ve 20. letech 20. století [Great Britain and the Locarno Conference. Contribution to the Study of Collective Security in the 1920s], Plzeň 2013; Feriancová, A., (Ne)nájdená bezpečnost. Československo, Nemecko a úpravy medzinárodného systému v Európe 1922 – 1926 [(No) Security found. Czechoslovakia, Germany and the International System in Europe 1922– 1926], Nitra 2010.  Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 149; Novotný – Kodet, pp. 184– 185. “Consequently, by 1925 Czechoslovakia barely figured at all in British designs for European security.” Bátonyi, p. 311.  Zorach, p. 58. On the incidents, see pp. 58 – 60, with the second related to the British Legation Secretary, Kenneth Gurney. “From the time that George Clerk left the Legation in 1926, his

I A Brief Overview to 1933

33

The second half of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s is considered by some to be a period when British-Czechoslovak relations lacked dynamism, with the Foreign Office focused on other regions and other countries in Central Europe.⁸¹ Once German ministers had joined the Czechoslovak Government, politicians in London concluded that this step had definitively dealt with the German minority’s situation. They maintained this approach over the whole period Ronald Macleay was Minister, when first German Agrarians and Christian Socials were involved in the Government, followed by German Social Democrats in 1929. According to Mark Cornwall, the new Minister had the same positive view of the Czechoslovak Republic as Clerk had had, but lacked a friendly relationship with the President. His reports also suited the Foreign Office’s line, with the head of the Foreign Office’s Central Department Orme Sargent even speaking of Czechoslovakia as “an unimportant country”.⁸² It is true that there was less Czech-German antagonism since most voters of the largest minority supported a policy of activism and co-operation with Czechoslovak parties while negativist parties were suffering losses.⁸³ But involvement in managing the country did not mean a bold resolute approach to dealing with minority problems: “One must realise that even now [on joining the Government in 1926 – author’s note] German parties had not made their joining the Government conditional on nationality concessions, since at that time ‘participation in Government affairs and a related faith in securing certain social interests […]’ were the decisive factors for them.”⁸⁴ Gradually, very slowly and almost invisibly to begin with, the opinion began to be expressed within the German minority that activism was not bringing a solution to their problems, whether in terms of the language issue, minority education or other matters.⁸⁵ As the 1930s approached, an external factor occurred which complicated Czech-German relations and resulted in their radicalisation, moving them onto another level with growing conflicts and precipitous political developments – the global economic crisis which also affected Great Britain, log-

successors had showed a strong distaste for the voluble Beneš, the ‘Littler Jack Horner’ of European politics, and for the ‘lumpy’ and ‘bourgeois’ Czechs.” Steiner, Z., The Triumph of the Dark. European International History 1933 – 1939, Oxford 2011, p. 364.  Cf. for example Zorach, p. 60.  Cornwall, A Fluctuating Barometer, p. 320.  Wiskemann, p. 132.  Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, p. 48.  In May 1929, Ronald Macleay was still able to assert that the German population in Czechoslovakia had almost nothing to complain about. Cf. TNA, FO 371/13579, C 3559/119/12, Macleay to Chamberlain, May 16, 1929, ff. 176 – 178. Cf. Bátonyi, p. 317.

34

I A Brief Overview to 1933

ically weakening its attempts at foreign policy engagement in national minorities within Czechoslovakia and at the same time focusing it on domestic economic problems;⁸⁶ National Government was formed in 1931 with the aim of dealing with the economic crisis.⁸⁷ Following his arrival in Prague, the new British Minister, Sir Joseph Addison,⁸⁸ someone who would in later years accuse the Czechoslovak Government and Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš in particular of improvident policies towards the Sudeten Germans, spoke of the deteriorating position of the German minority, very soon after taking up his position sending an “indictment against alleged breaches of the minority obligations in St. Germain by ‘Czech’ authorities” to London.⁸⁹ To begin with, the Foreign Office took a somewhat cautious approach to his reports,⁹⁰ but as the reports continued over the

 Walford Selby came in his material The policy of co-operation with France and its effects in Europe. A very brief review of the twelve years, 1920 – 1931 (October 5, 1931) to the conclusion that the British Goverment “have lost their influence on the Continent while the Continent itself is reduced to a state of political uncertainty unknown since the days of the Ruhr occupation”. University of Oxford, Bodleian Libraries (Weston Library), Selby Papers, MS. Eng. c. 6585, f. 87. Despite of that, he believed that only the cooperation of Britain and France can ensure the peace. Ibid., f. 88.  Two Governments were formed, with the first running from August to October, then the second established in early November when an election took place in which James Ramsay MacDonald’s Labour Party was roundly defeated, although Ramsay MacDonald remained in power as Prime Minister until 1935 when he was replaced by Stanley Baldwin. “Although proclaimed on its foundation to be only a temporary response to an unprecedented emergency, events during the following month transformed it instead into a permanent coalition which became the dominant governing force of the next decade.” Ball, S., The National Government, 1931: Crisis and Controversy, in: Parliamentary History, 12, 2, 1993, p. 184. Cf. also Ball, S., Democracy and the Rise of Labour: 1924 and 1929 – 1931, in: Ball, S. – Seldon, A. (ed.), Recovering Power. The Conservatives in Opposition since 1867, Basingstoke 2005, p. 155.  He was Minister from 1930 – 1936. During the 1920s, he had served at the Embassy in Berlin, and this had affected his opinions. He soon gave the impression in his new role that the Sudeten Germans’ poor situation was the fault of Prague. Cornwall, A Fluctuating Barometer, p. 321; more in detail cf. ibid., pp. 321– 324. His anti-Czech stance was not unique amongst British diplomats; the feeling “that Germany had been punished too severely after the First World War” became ever-stronger during the 1920s in Great Britain. Smetana, V., Old Wine in New Bottles? British Policy towards Czechoslovakia, 1938 – 1939 and 1947 – 1948, in: Cornwall, M. – Evans, R. J. W. (ed.), Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe 1918 – 1948, Oxford 2007, p. 145. Cf. also Bakić, p. 186.  Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 186. As yet, his superiors rejected his opinions and did not take them into account.  Until the mid-1930s, Central Europe was not an area which Great Britain was particularly interested in. Czechoslovak Minister to London, Jan Masaryk, confirmed this in early 1928 when he wrote: “As I have already stated mutatis mutandis a number of times, London is much closer to Shanghai than it is to Košice […].” Dejmek, J., Československo, jeho sousedé a velmoci ve XX. sto-

I A Brief Overview to 1933

35

years, they could not help but affect officials at the Foreign Office, contributing somewhat to the shaping of British foreign policy in the region.⁹¹ In terms of the Foreign Office itself and its relations with Central Europe, its most influential figure in the 1930s was undoubtedly Sir Robert Vansittart, who held the post of Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office from 1930 to 1937. Another important figure at the ministry whose work involved Central Europe was the head of the Central Department at the Foreign Office, a department whose agenda covered Germany and also Czechoslovakia for a certain period of time, Orme Sargent, Vansittart’s deputy from 1933 and someone who shared Vansittart’s fears about Germany. From 1933, however, Czechoslovakia was transferred to the Southern Department.⁹² This was headed by Owen O’Malley,⁹³ then Maurice Ingram from 1937 (until 1939). The situation at the Foreign Office developed in the following way – although Robert Vansittart feared a restoration of Germany’s military forces, he refused to term himself anti-German⁹⁴ and was certainly not a proponent of British

letí (1918 až 1992). Vybrané kapitoly z dějin československé zahraniční politiky [Czechoslovakia, its Neighbors and Powers in XX. Century (1918 – 1992). Selected Chapters from the History of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy], Praha 2002, p. 236. This situation began to change post-1933. Zorach, p. 60.  Robert Henry Hadow, the British Legation Secretary in Prague between 1935 and 1937, should be mentioned in this regard. Hadow had not guessed Hitler’s intentions, trusted Henlein implicitly, supported the German minority in Czechoslovakia and further did not like Czechoslovak politicians. He was strongly influenced by his previous post in Vienna in these opinions. The Austrian capital had been his sole previous experience of Central Europe. Cf. for example Michie, L. W., Portrait of an Appeaser. Robert Hadow, First Secretary in the British Foreign Office, 1931 – 1939, Westport 1996, pp. 9, 11, 23.  This department was set up in 1933 and its agenda covered Italy, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Balkan states.  O’Malley could be described as belonging to the group of Foreign Office officials who favoured a policy of greater concessions to Germany. Neville, P., Rival Foreign Office Perceptions of Germany, 1936 – 1939, in: Diplomacy & Statecraft, 13, 3, 2002, p. 140. This was confirmed by Vilém Černý from the Legation in London in his report of August 1936. Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí České republiky [The Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic], Praha (hereinafter AMZV), Politické zprávy (hereinafter PZ) Londýn, 1936, běžná zpráva č. 14, 21. srpna 1936, p. 1.  Neville, p. 138. Cf. also Keene, T. H., Sir Robert Vansittart and the British Foreign Office, 1930 – 1938, in: Proceedings and Papers of the Georgia Association of Historians, 2, 1981, pp. 83 – 84. It should be noted that the image of Sir Robert as a passionate Germanophobe does not stand scrutiny. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State was building on the work of his predecessor in the 1920s, Sir Eyre Crowe with both men perceiving Germany as a threat to the current order in Europe; Crowe expressed this opinion even before 1914. Cf. for example Roi, M. L., Sir Robert Vansittart, the Global Balance of Power and Nazi Germany, 1934 – 1937,

36

I A Brief Overview to 1933

engagement in Central Europe.⁹⁵ Responsible Foreign Office officials had to follow the official policy formulated by the Foreign Secretary or Government. 1932 was important in this regard, with the cancellation of war debt payments to the Allies.⁹⁶ The end of these reparations meant the removal of one of the principal characteristics of the post-war order. Furthermore, the decision was made to give Germany equal status in military matters. The year 1933 changed everything. “When the conference was to meet again in spring 1933 with German participation, assured by the December recognition of equal status, the international situation had changed again.”⁹⁷ Despite the new circumstances, however, the British Government decided to co-operate with Berlin;⁹⁸ although London claimed that a more permanent détente between the West and Germany would only be possible if certain injustices Britain considered had been committed after 1918 were corrected.⁹⁹ In terms of Central Europe, this meant greater interest from the Foreign Office on the nationality situation in the Czechoslovak Republic, es-

Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, Toronto 1996, pp. 11– 14; McKercher, B. J. C., The Foreign Office, 1930 – 39: Strategy, Permanent Interests and National Security, in: Contemporary British History, 18, 3, 2004, p. 87. “Van” [an abbreviation of his surname often used by Robert Vansittart and those around him – author’s note] did not agree with German plans, but from autumn 1937 he was more afraid of the absorption of Austria. Douglas, R., Chamberlain and Eden, 1937 – 38, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 13, 1, 1978, p. 104. In his memoirs, marked by a strong aversion towards Germany, he criticised concessions made towards the country with hindsight, also regretting that Britain essentially received nothing in return for them. Vansittart, R., Lessons of My Life, London 1943, p. 24.  Until 1932, he was an advocate of revising the Treaty of Versailles in Germany’s favour. He changed his opinion after Adolf Hitler took power. Cf. Ellinger, J., Neville Chamberlain. Od usmiřování k válce: britská zahraniční politika, 1937 – 1940 [Neville Chamberlain. From Reconciliation to War: British Foreign Policy, 1937– 1940], Praha 2009, pp. 54– 55.  The payment of German reparations was also cancelled. These had already been put on hold in 1931 by American President Herbert Hoover, and they were never restored.  Ellinger, p. 47.  “The year 1933 provided an opportunity for Britain to find new foreign policy priorities and to recognise new threats. Instead, however, the British continued to perceive the preservation of their world position as their major priority and therefore continued in their search for European settlement based upon four-power agreement.” Smetana, V., In the Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from the Endorsement to the Renunciation of the Munich Agreement (1938 – 1942), Praha 2008, p. 41.  Even some Labour politicians had sympathy for Germany, for example the Foreign Secretary in the period of 1929 – 1931, Arthur Henderson. According to the Principal Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Walford Selby, Henderson thought that the peace in Europe can be ensured only through the cooperation of London and Berlin. Cf. University of Oxford, Bodleian Libraries (Weston Library), Selby Papers, MS. Eng. c. 6584, f. 51.

I A Brief Overview to 1933

37

pecially following the formation of the Sudeten German Party (Sudetendeutsche Partei, SdP) in April 1935.¹⁰⁰

 Cf. Luh, A. Grossbritannien, die Sudetendeutsche Partei und das Dritte Reich [Great Britain, the Sudeten German Party and the Third Reich], in: Schmidt-Hartmann, E. – Winters, S. B. (hrsg.), Groβbritannien, die USA und die böhmischen Länder 1848 – 1938 [Great Britain, the USA and the Bohemian Lands 1848 – 1938], München 1991, p. 353. Over the course of the 1930s, the Foreign Office began to see ever more evidence which confirmed London’s opinion of Czechoslovak politicians’ paralysis in regard to the prevailing problems. Cf. Franke, R., Die Tschechoslowakei in der politischen Meinung Englands 1918 – 1938 [Czechoslovakia in the Political Opinion of England 1918 – 1938], in: Bosl, K. (hrsg.), Die demokratisch-parlamentarische Struktur der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik [Democratic-parliamentary Structure of the First Czechoslovak Republic], p. 252.

II The Start of Change The appointment of Adolf Hitler as the Reich Chancellor (30 January 1933) had a partial impact on the change in dynamic of Czech-German relations,¹ which had primarily been influenced by the events of the previous year. The second phase of the economic crisis under way, which reached its peak in Czechoslovakia over the course of 1933, meant not just rising unemployment, but also problems related to industry and transport. Although it did not follow as stormy a course as it did in Germany and Austria, it was rather lengthier and for a short time it overshadowed the events taking place in Czechoslovakia’s neighbouring countries.² Internationally, discussions were being held at a disarmament conference in Geneva, where Berlin managed to improve its position, de facto preventing implementation of the so-called Herriot Plan, with which Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš agreed. The responses to the new Nazi (if officially coalition) Government taking office differed in Prague and London due to their differing perceptions of Germany as a potential partner for negotiation.³ From the perspective of British interests on the Continent, a tendency not to worry about events taking place there and focus on the interests of the Empire soon predominated. In contrast, Czechoslovak Minister to London, Jan Masaryk, stated in March 1933 that the Nazis’ anti-Semitic policies and their expressions were alien to the island’s population.⁴

 Dejmek, J., Edvard Beneš. Politická biografie českého demokrata. Část první. Revolucionář a diplomat (1884 – 1935) [Edvard Beneš. Political Biography of a Czech Democrat. Part One. Revolutionary and Diplomat (1884– 1935)], Praha 2006, p. 547. French Minister to Prague Léon Noël even wrote that Hitler’s appointment had surprised his supporters in Czechoslovakia. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Paris (hereinafter AMAE), Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 116, Politique étrangère, Allemands de Bohême, Noël à Paul-Boncour, Prague, le 8 février 1933, f. 57. Two months later, however, he said that the new German leader had affected the German minority. Ibid., le 20 mars 1933, ff. 59 – 60.  More in detal cf. for example Kárník, Z., České země v éře první republiky (1918 – 1938). Díl druhý. Československo a české země v krizi a v ohrožení (1930 – 1935) [Czech Lands in the Era of the First Republic (1918 – 1938). Part Two. Czechoslovakia and the Czech Lands in Crisis and Threat (1930 – 1935)], Praha 2002, pp. 34– 116; Lemberg, H., Die Tschechoslowakei im Epochenjahr 1933 [Czechoslovakia in the Epoch Year 1933], in: Bohemia, 25, 2, 1984, p. 317.  Cf. Dejmek, J., Nenaplněné naděje. Politické a diplomatické vztahy Československa a Velké Británie (1918 – 1938) [Unfulfilled Hopes. Political and Diplomatic Relations of Czechoslovakia and Great Britain (1918 – 1938)], Praha 2003, pp. 212– 213.  Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí České republiky [The Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic], Praha (hereinafter AMZV), Politické zprávy (hereinafter PZ) Londýn, 1933, běžná zpráva č. 3, 21. března 1933, pp. 1, 2. Minister Masaryk warned of the severity of the situahttps://doi.org/10.1515/9783110651454-003

40

II The Start of Change

Czech-German relations experienced a difficult period from 1932.⁵ Although a coalition Government had been ruling the country with the involvement of two German ministers (Franz Spina as Minister of Public Health and Physical Education, and Ludwig Czech as Minister of Social Care) since the 1929 election, the economic crisis under way and in particular the court process with the Volkssport organisation, an entity under the control of the German National Socialist Workers’ Party (Deutsche nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei; DNSAP), significantly complicated mutual co-existence. The leaders of Volkssport made sure that they copied Germany’s SA in almost everything: exercises, organisations, etc.⁶

tion: “In general, it is believed that the situation since the end of the war has never been as dangerous as it is today, and that the smallest of incidents could ignite the whole of Europe in flames.” Ibid., p. 2. Minister to Paris, Štefan Osuský, informed Prague that the French public had taken Hitler’s arrival as calmly as they could and were aware of the clarification of the situation. AMZV, PZ Paříž, 1933, běžná zpráva č. 10, 4. února 1933, p. 1.  One can concur, however, with the idea that there had been no serious dispute between Prague and Berlin during the 1920s and early 1930s. Vyšný, P., The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938. Prelude to Munich, Basingstoke 2003, p. 6.  More in detail cf. Breitfelder, M., Volkssport a jeho proces [Volkssport and its Process], in: Dějepis XXIII: sborník katedry historie napsán a sestaven k šedesátým narozeninám katedry 1948 – 2008 [History XXIII: Proceedings of the Department of History written and compiled for the Sixtieth Birthday of the Department 1948 – 2008], Plzeň 2008, pp. 48 – 60; Burian, M., Sudetoněmecké nacionalistické tělovýchovné organizace a československý stát v letech 1918 – 1938 [The Sudeten German Nationalist Physical Training Organizations and the Czechoslovak State in 1918 – 1938], Praha 2012, pp. 139 – 170. The court process itself began in August 1932 in Brno, and was “marked by pompous court hearings over national socialist ideology in Czechoslovakia. The verdicts were all in favour of the Czechoslovak state, and ranged from one to three years”. Majewski, P. M., Sudetští Němci 1848 – 1948. Dějiny jednoho nacionalismu [Sudeten Germans 1848 – 1948. The History of One Nationalism], Brno 2014, p. 304. The process was also monitored by the German Legation in Prague. Walter Koch informed Germany of the prohibition of Volkssport in March 1932, and of the verdicts in September. Cf. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag. Innenpolitik und Minderheitenprobleme in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik (hereinafter Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte), Teil III. Von der Regierung unter Švehla bis zum Vorabend der nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung in Deutschland 1926 – 1932, Berichte des Gesandten Dr. Walter Koch [German Legation Reports from Prague. Internal Policy and Minorities Problems in the First Czechoslovak Republic. Part III. From the Cabinet Švehla until the Eve of the National Socialist Seizure of Power in Germany 1926 – 1932, Reports of Minister Dr. Walter Koch]. Ausgewählt, eingeleitet und kommentiert von Alexander, M., Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum, Band 49/III, München 2009, Verbot des “Volkssport-Verbandes”, Deutsche Gesandtschaft an das Auswärtige Amt, Prag, den 3. März 1932, Doc. No. 126, p. 287; ibid., Das Urteil im “Volkssportprozess”, Deutsche Gesandtschaft an das Auswärtige Amt, Prag, den 25. September 1932, Doc. No. 136, pp. 304– 308. Koch spoke of a poorly prepared process and its poor management. In a discussion with Czechoslovak Minister Vojtěch Mastný, Adolf Hitler naturally rejected any Volkssport inspiration in the SA. Cf. AMZV, PZ Berlín, 1933, běžná zpráva č.

II The Start of Change

41

The court process itself certainly signified Czechoslovak justice’s readiness to act against radical Nazi forces, but on the other hand it put German activists (Agrarians, Social Democrats, and some Christian Socials) into an unenviable position. According to a report from the Austrian Legation in Prague of March 1933, German negativist parties had decided to put pressure on activists to leave the Government following the Volkssport process; the document also clearly suggests that the events in Germany had affected Sudeten Germans and that Franz Spina in particular had become a target for personal attacks from nationalist MPs. The Austrian Minister, Ferdinand Marek⁷ then correctly stated he could see that the Sudeten German political camp felt under stress and “that it appears that Czech-German relations, which have stagnated in recent years, have entered a new phase”.⁸ In early 1933, the British Legation in Prague and the reports of Minister Joseph Addison and others focused more on negotiations over the national budget and economic matters than on Czech-German relations. Reports did add, however, that the current situation abroad demanded greater attention from Prague; at this time, however, this involved the transport of weapons from Italy via Austria to Hungary. A report from 23 January also implies there was a potential of disloyalty from some of the conscripts in the Czechoslovak Army in the event of military conflict (Germans, Hungarians, and Poles).⁹ A month later, the Legation repeated this position when it informed London of a theoretically balanced Cze-

9, 9. února 1933, pp. 1– 2. As early as July 1932, Franz Spina visited the Office of the Czechoslovak President where he complained of the “Hakenkreuzler movement” and spoke of his fears of its influence within his party. He also proposed the Government make some concessions towards Germany. Archiv Kanceláře prezidenta republiky [The Archives of the President’ Office] (hereinafter AKPR), f. Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protokol T (tajné), sg. 12/25, kt. 135, mikrofilm č. 110, T. 1136/32, Praha, July 13, 1932.  Marek had become a diplomatic representative in the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, first as head of the Austrian Mission, with the official receipt of his credentials and a change in diplomatic rank to Minister taking place on 11 April 1922 at the Lány Castle. Steiner, H. První rakouský vyslanec v Praze FERDINAND MAREK. Jeho osudy v letech 1938 – 1947 [First Austrian Minister to Prague FERDINAND MAREK. His Fates in 1938 – 1947], Praha 1995, p. 15. Marek spent the whole of the interwar years in Czechoslovakia, something which was and still remains unprecedented in the diplomatic service.  Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien, Abteilung Archiv der Republik [Austrian State Archives, Archives of the Republic] (hereinafter OeStA/AdR), Auswärtige Angelegenheiten 1918 – 2005 (hereinafter AAng), Österreichische Vertretungsbehörden im Ausland 1. Republik, 1893 – 1945 (hereinafter ÖVB), Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 30, Berichte, Weisungen 1933 (I – VII), Zl. 44/Pol, Prag, am 17. März 1933.  The National Archives, London, Kew (hereinafter TNA), Foreign Office (hereinafter FO) 371/ 16658, C 965/36/12, Mr. Gurney to Sir John Simon, Prague, January 23, 1933, ff. 95 – 95 A.

42

II The Start of Change

choslovak budget for 1933 while also implying a complex economic situation and a deteriorated international and domestic political climate, which would result in increased spending. The report’s author did not deny “that the army authorities will be obliged, in the national interest, to exceed their allowance for this year”.¹⁰ At the start of 1933, the British Legation in Prague was interested in the state of the Czechoslovak budget, something which was not unusual due to the economic crisis throughout the whole of Europe, and it was also no surprise that they stated that Prague would have to get ready for increased spending, not just because of internal political circumstances, but also international circumstances; logically the Legation did not particularly focus on Czech-German relations as it was a report sent before 30 January. One month later, National Defence Minister Bradáč was promoting the creation of a strong army due to domestic and foreign events. According to Jan Masaryk, the British public were following the events on the continent and the Nazis’ rise to power with fear, although the Czechoslovak Minister had to add that the political elite did not anticipate any stronger engagement in Central Europe. The British Legation reflected in more detail on Czech-German relations for the first time on 20 February 1933 when they sent a report to London on the economic situation in Czechoslovakia. In the introduction, they noted the disputes between the agrarian and industrial lobbies and the Government’s attempts at reducing the influence of the German minority by ignoring their economic needs. The report’s author, the Legation Commercial Secretary Herbert Kershaw, wrote that the Czechoslovak economy had to face up to the tough reality and fears of future developments, adding the curious note: “The issue is peculiarly complicated in a country where policy is dictated by the representatives of 6½ to 7 million Czechs in a total population of nearly 15 million, for the influence of the Slovaks and Germans in general policy is not commensurate with the value of their stake in the republic.”¹¹ Kershaw added that the situation demanded careful negotiation and only time would tell whether the Czechs would be able to reconcile the conflicting interests within Czechoslovakia.

 TNA, FO 371/16658, C 1751/36/12, Mr. Gurney to Sir John Simon, Prague, February 17, 1933, ff. 108 – 110. National Defence Minister Bohumír Bradáč declared to the Senate’s Budget Committee that internal and foreign policy circumstances required a strong army. TNA, FO 371/16658, C 1752/36/12, Mr. Gurney to Sir John Simon, Prague, February 20, 1933, f. 121.  TNA, FO 371/16658, C 1753/36/12, Prague, February 20, 1933, Encls. in No. 1, Memorandum Respecting the General Economic Situation in Czechoslovakia, f. 124.

II The Start of Change

43

The Commercial Secretary, never mind his incorrect population figures,¹² was probably unaware of the official Masaryk-Beneš argument that there was just one Czechoslovak nation composed of two branches – Czech and Slovak – instead counting Slovaks amongst the minority. This idea would crop up more frequently later, especially around 1935, amongst British diplomats in Prague and elsewhere, where it would be used to give a negative picture of the Czechoslovak Republic as a state where the Czechs controlled other minorities. Even at the Paris Peace Conference, some British diplomats were uncomplimentary of the establishment of the new states, and rejected French hard-line approach towards Germany.¹³ The 1930 census had used Czechoslovak as a nationality, and as such Kershaw’s comments in this regard were erroneous. The British diplomat went on to accuse the Czechoslovak Government of trying to Czechize banks and industry, while also adding that the Czechs lacked sufficient capital. He then added that the Cabinet was openly pursuing a deflation policy, thus damaging German-Czech exports; Kershaw blamed the corrupting influence of the Agrarian Party for this. He then pondered the whole system of successor states, saying that tariff barriers were threatening economic recovery. He claimed that the prevailing economic crisis was revealing the weakness of the Czechoslovak economy, and thus the whole state body. In the next passage, he was again critical of Czechoslovakia, repeating his message about the Czechization of the state and criticising the provision of agricultural land “to hordes of necessitous legionaries” and the filling of the civil service “with the vast number of incompetent, inexperienced and underpaid officials in an attempt to dominate the highly accomplished German element,” all of which in his opinion reduced the ability of the state to deal with the consequences of the crisis. Kershaw then rejected the Czechoslovak Government’s economic policy and finally complained that the crisis had revealed the Cabinet’s weakness in ruling a country where

 According to the 1930 census, 7,308,900 people lived in the Czech lands, and 2,346,005 people in Slovakia. There were 3,231,688 Germans. Cf. Tóth, A. – Novotný, L. – Stehlík, M., Národnostní menšiny v Československu 1918 – 1938. Od státu národního ke státu národnostnímu? [National Minorities in Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1938. From the Nation-State to the National State?], Praha 2012, pp. 626 – 627.  Cf. for example Johnson, G., The Berlin Embassy of Lord D’Abernon, 1920 – 1926, Basingstoke 2002, p. 17; Watt, D. C., Chamberlain’ Ambassadors, in: Dockrill, M. – McKercher, B. (ed.), Diplomacy and World Power. Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890 – 1950, Cambridge 1996, p. 149; Steiner, Z., The Lights that Failed. European International History 1919 – 1933, Oxford 2005, p. 53; Smetana, V., In the Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1942, Praha 2008, p. 42.

44

II The Start of Change

there were a number of nationalities, and further when it was from amongst the German minority that wealth and educated people were to be found.¹⁴ Kershaw’s report did not make a secret of his sympathies with the German minority and criticised the Czechoslovak Government for its deliberate Czechization of German banks and businesses (or at least its attempt at doing so); Herbert Kershaw was thus a member of the group of British diplomats which considered not just the national set-up in the Czechoslovak Republic as mistaken but also more generally the whole system of successor states.¹⁵ However, Czechoslovak democracy had other threats to deal with at the start of 1933 than the Nazi Government being set up. British Minister to Vienna, Eric Phipps, got his hands on material received from the Legation’s Military Attaché which they had received from their Austrian informer and which contained the Czechoslovak Army’s mobilisation plan in the event of a war with Hungary and Italy. The document envisaged that in the event of conflict then all bridges across the Danube from Linz to Bratislava would be occupied (using small mobile groups) the day following declaration of mobilisation. At the same time, a strip of land between Bratislava and Lake Neusiedl was to be occupied, a strip which would play a key strategic role in any military operations. It should be noted that the material did not see this mission as unfeasible; rather it considered the occupation of the bridges across the Danube as a difficult to implement operation, especially in the Austrian capital. The Military Attaché concluded its report with the claim that it did not consider this plan to be feasible.¹⁶ The mobilisation plan which British Military Attaché in Vienna received showed that at the beginning of 1933, some British diplomats considered a potential alliance of Hungary and Italy, and possibly Austrian policy, as a greater threat for Czechoslovakia than Germany. This was a logical result of foreign policy developments; the new German (Nazi) Government needed to consolidate its position and try to ease the fears of its neighbours, and as such at the time there was no place (yet) for strong anti-Czechoslovak rhetoric. The document dis-

 TNA, FO 371/16658, C 1753/36/12, Prague, February 20, 1933, Encls. in No. 1, Memorandum Respecting the General Economic Situation in Czechoslovakia, f. 124 A.  David Lloyd George can serve as an example here, having never acknowledged Czechoslovak demands for border territory and not hiding his distaste towards Edvard Beneš at the Paris Peace Conference. Hattersley, R., David Lloyd George. The Great Outsider, London 2010, p. 626. Future Ambassador to Berlin, Nevile Henderson, also expressed his sympathy for German demands of 1919. Neville, P., Rival Foreign Office Perceptions of Germany, 1936 – 1939, in: Diplomacy & Statecraft, 13, 3, 2002, p. 142.  Cf. TNA, FO 371/16660, C 1832/1832/12, Czechoslovak Mobilisation Scheme, February 19, 1933, ff. 124– 125.

II The Start of Change

45

cussed above also shows that Prague assumed Austrian territorial integrity would be breached in the event of conflict. At the end of February 1933, people working for the British Legation¹⁷ in Prague produced a summary report on events in Czechoslovakia which had taken place over the previous year. The report’s introduction contained an analysis of the reconstruction of the Danube region states, going on to discuss the conference in Lausanne and the disarmament conference in Geneva. In the section looking at mutual relations with selected countries, Great Britain is first mentioned with the authors stating that relations between Prague and London are excellent and that: “The comments of the press and conversations with Czechs and the members of the various minorities show that British institutions are held in high esteem in this country.”¹⁸ According to Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš, relations with Germany had settled down on a “correct” and “gentlemanly” basis. However, the report also pointedly noted that the lamb said the same in the fable of the Wolf and the Lamb. “The German bogey looms large on the frontier, and the political changes in Germany and its attitude at the Disarmament Conference and at the Stresa Conference were not such as to allay the apprehensions of Czechoslovakia,” the despatch noted of the slowly changing atmosphere in Czech-German relations.¹⁹ Part of the 1932 summary report looking at foreign policy by employees of the British Legation in Prague was correct in defining the slow but gradual transformation of Czechoslovakia’s strong neighbour’s relations with it. Although Edvard Beneš continued to claim that Berlin and Prague enjoyed good relations, the reality was somewhat different. The arrival of the new Nazi Government and the economic crisis under way which made the conditions objectively worse for the German minority in Czechoslovakia did not go unnoticed by British diplomats, and influenced their perception of the coexistence of different nationalities within the First Czechoslovak Republic. The report went on to say that young Sudeten Germans were gravitating ever more towards Nazi Germany as a result of the poor economic situation and unfavourable political climate,²⁰ calling DNSAP the main driver of this dynamic. It did not neglect to mention the prohibition and court process involving the Volkssport organisation. It described the process and verdict as somewhat odd.

 Colonel Daly on military affairs, Herbert Kershaw on economic issues, Mr Allen on certain internal political issues and Mr Kadlčík on matters relating to Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia.  TNA, FO 371/16660, C 2177/2177/12, Mr. Gurney to Sir John Simon, Prague, February 25, 1933, f. 130.  Ibid., f. 131.  Parliamentary democracy, which did not suit them and which they rejected.

46

II The Start of Change

The accused were first interrogated by police forces, and the report’s authors claimed that their confessions were made under duress and the translation of the text from German to Czech made it more disadvantageous to the accused. The defence was apparently unable to prepare sufficiently, etc. The report states that reasonable people in Czechoslovakia consider the accused more as hotblooded romantics whose ideas were behind the NSDAP’s success, rather than real criminals.²¹ As such, the 1932 summary report gave a clear outline of the development of Czech-German relations, or relations between Czechs and Germans in Czechoslovakia, as perceived by the British Legation in Prague. Although it was essentially correct in its assessment of foreign policy events, recognising the changing climate following Adolf Hitler’s rise to power, in its passages looking at the Czechoslovak domestic political scene, it was more of a one-sided interpretation unfavourable towards the Government. The Legation’s position on the process with Volkssport, for example, matched that of Germany’s Minister to Prague, Walter Koch, to a large extent. In early March 1933, the British Legation returned to the Volkssport process when the Legation Secretary Kenneth T. Gurney informed Foreign Secretary John Simon²² of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies’ decision to waive parliamentary immunity from four DNSAP MPs – Hans Krebs, Rudolf Kasper, Leo Schubert, and Rudolf Jung; the case of the fifth accused, Hans Knirsch, had been deferred due to a request for further evidence.²³ Faced with possible arrest, the report’s authors wrote, MP Jung gave a speech as early as January in which he rejected the idea the party was linked to the Nazis in Germany, adding that the DNSAP’s objective was to secure full autonomy for the German minority: “they [the party –

 TNA, FO 371/16660, C 2177/2177/12, Mr. Gurney to Sir John Simon, Prague, February 25, 1933, ff. 135– 136. The report’s authors added that German activitist government parties would not take the DNSAP’s side. Cf. f. 137. It should be noted, however, that the process itself did not take place in the standard manner and was even criticised by the German Social Democratic press. BREITFELDER, p. 52.  Cf. for example Hughes, M., Sir John Simon at the Foreign Office (1931 – 35), in: British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World, 1919 – 1939, London 2006, pp. 86 – 106.  The Chamber of Deputies began discussions on waiving parliamentary immunity two days earlier. According to a 4 November 1932 request from the Regional Criminal Court in Prague, the MPs mentioned broke Sections 2 and 17 of the Protection of the Republic Act. The Immunity Committee and parliamentary plenary then granted the request (120 votes for, 44 against). Cf. http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1929ns/ps/stenprot/250schuz/s250003.htm [cit. 2017– 06 – 24]; http:// www.psp.cz/eknih/1929ns/ps/stenprot/251schuz/s251013.htm [cit. 2017– 06 – 24]; http://www. psp.cz/eknih/1929ns/ps/tisky/t2160_00.htm [cit. 2017– 06 – 24].

II The Start of Change

47

author’s note] had no belief in Hitler’s ‘Drittes Reich’”.²⁴ Hans Krebs repeated these words one week later, adding that during discussions with Adolf Hitler they always agreed on the independent status of the NSDAP and DNSAP. Gurney logically went on to note that both the Czech press and leaders of the German National Party (Deutsche Nationalpartei; DNP) had rejected such declarations, terming such a step an expression of fear and avoidance of responsibility. Rudolf Jung rejected such reasoning at a plenary of the Parliament on 1 February and accused his critics of misinterpreting his words. He declared that they would never accept a policy of loyalty as an activist Government party, adding that the DNSAP was a separate and independent political party whose objective was to transform the German-Czech issue according to the principles of full equality and national self-governance and that in foreign policy it was striving to link all Central European states with the German Reich in a customs and economic union.²⁵ According to Gurney, the actual vote on waiving the immunity of the MPs took place without the involvement of the two German coalition parties (the Social Democrats and Agrarians), although the National Democrats wanted them to take part. His information was that all opposition parties with the exception of the Czechoslovak Traders’ Party were against waiving their immunity. The explanation of the German Social Democrats focused not on defending the accused legislators, but rather against political persecution as that was how a large section of German MPs and senators saw it. The behaviour of the two coalition parties triggered a Government crisis with the National Democrats demanding the

 TNA, FO 371/16660, C 2260/2260/12, Mr. Gurney to Sir John Simon, Prague, March 4, 1933, f. 151. Gurney writes that Jung spoke in the Parliament, but this is impossible as no sessions took place on 10 January 1933. Cf. ibid., f. 150. Both MPs (Jung and Krebs) spoke at a session of the Budget Committee. German Minister Koch had better information than Gurney, correctly stating the Jung had spoke at the Budget Committee. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin [Political Archives of the Foreign Ministry] (hereinafter PA AA), Tschechoslowakei, R 73840 (Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker), Prag, den 11. Januar 1933.  TNA, FO 371/16660, C 2260/2260/12, Mr. Gurney to Sir John Simon, Prague, March 4, 1933, f. 152. The Austrian Minister, however, did not believe what he said, instead informing Vienna that the DNSAP was acting against the Republic. AT-OeStA/AdR/AAng ÖVB 1Rep Prag, kt. 30, Zl. 67/Pol, Prag, am 14. April 1933. Minister Léon Noël informed Paris a month later that: “Hitler’s grasp of power throughout Germany could not remain without effect on the mood of Germans in Czechoslovakia.” M. Léon Noël à M. Paul-Boncour, Prague, 20 février 1933, in: France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932 – 1939: (1932 – 1935): (17 mars – 15 juillet 1933) [French Diplomatic Documents 1932– 1939: (1932– 1935): (March 17– July 15, 1933)], (hereinafter DDF), Ire Série, T. III, Paris 1967, Doc. No. 22, p. 45.

48

II The Start of Change

German ministers be dismissed and the Cabinet become Czechoslovak once more. In the end, however, no such thing occurred.²⁶ The British diplomat took his report objectively, in contrast to Herbert Kershaw, and his memorandum of 20 February 1933 did not slip into a one-sided interpretation of the German MPs’ declaration, merely conveying the turn of events to the Foreign Office in regard to the deteriorating Czechoslovak-German relations due to the request for the waiving of immunity of the four MPs. It was obvious, and Gurney’s report suggests this between the lines, that the Nazis’ rise to power had affected Czech-German co-existence, specifically the German minority’s relations towards the Czechoslovak authorities. Requests to waive immunity had often been made in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, almost since the state had been established, and these mostly applied to national minority MPs and communists, each time accompanied by heated debate. Subsequent to 30 January 1933, however, this was added to by the possibility of links to Germany and the potential influence of legislators in the Czechoslovak Parliament by foreign authorities. The situation was deteriorating at an international level too. In Jan Masaryk’s previously discussed March report, he wrote that nervousness was prevailing in British domestic politics, whether over the corridor in Poland, events in Austria or the behaviour of Italy. The Czechoslovak Minister further noted polit-

 TNA, FO 371/16660, C 2260/2260/12, Mr. Gurney to Sir John Simon, Prague, March 4, 1933, f. 154. In early February, German Minister Koch had pointed out that surrendering the DNSAP MPs might have a negative impact on Czechoslovak-German relations, at the very least due to the naming of a new German Government. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte, Teil IV. Vom Vorabend der Machtergreifung in Deutschland bis zum Rücktritt von President Masaryk 1933 – 1935. Berichte des Gesandten Koch, der Konsuln von Bethusy-Huc, von Druffel, von Pfeil und des Gesandtschaftsrates von Stein [German Legation Reports from Prague. Internal Policy and Minorities Problems in the First Czechoslovak Republic. Part IV. From the Eve of the Seizure of Power in Germany to the Resignation of President Masaryk 1933 – 1935. Reports of Minister Koch, the Consuls von Bethusy-Huc, von Druffel, von Pfeil, and the Legation Council von Stein]. Ausgewählt, eingeleitet und kommentiert von Dolezel, H. – Dolezel, S., Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Karolinum, Band 49/IV, München 1991, Politische Rückwirkungen des tschechisch-faschistischen Putschversuchs in Brünn (Tschechische Faschisten und sudetendeutsche Nationalsozialisten), Deutsche Gesandtschaft an das Auswärtige Amt, Prag, den 3. Februar 1933, Doc. No. 4, p. 27. The Minister also correctly assessed the difficult position German Government parties were in, finding themselves stuck between a rock and a hard place. Ibid., Auslieferung der deutschen nationalsozialistiscen Abgeordneten, Deutsche Gesandtschaft an das Auswärtige Amt, Prag, den 25. Februar 1933, Doc. No. 6, pp. 29 – 30 (cf. also PA AA, Tschechoslowakei, R 73840, Prag, den 25. Februar 1933, E643565 – E643567).

II The Start of Change

49

ical circles’ positive reception of the Little Entente Pact of Organisation,²⁷ and informed Prague of Prime Minister James Ramsay MacDonald and Foreign Secretary John Simon’s trip to Rome; the first such trip since the end of the war. Masaryk said that the local press were of the opinion that the Prime Minister’s initiative and Mussolini’s proposal could help to ease the tensions of recent weeks, adding that Berlin had not yet had its final say on the European order. “[…] and regarding the English, one should always reckon with the fact that they are often open to revisionist tendencies and that many of the groupings here are convinced that without a revision to the peace treaties peace cannot be secured in Europe,” noted Masaryk correctly of Conservative political elites in particular.²⁸ The Czechoslovak Minister to London had hit upon an important factor in the reasoning of some British politicians. Although not just they, but also public opinion, did not like some of the steps being taken by the new regime in Germany, whether in regard to persecution of the opposition and Jews or demands to end arms restrictions, there was a general principle that the Versailles arrangement contained weak points which had to be removed through revising the peace treaties or some of the paragraphs within them which certain British politicians and diplomats considered unfair, mainly towards Berlin. The first quarter of 1933 was not a momentous period for the British Legation in Prague, and nor consequently for the Foreign Office, in terms of Czech-German relations. The Legation reflected on the main problems which Czechoslovakia had to face at home and abroad – the consequences of the economic crisis, the continuing Volkssport court process, the rise of Adolf Hitler to power – and took a position on them which corresponded to the thinking of the previous period, although this depended on which of the Legation’s officials prepared the despatch for London. Secretary Kershaw took the side of the German minority, although this was not an uncommon thing to do, while Kenneth T. Gurney

 Signed on 16 February 1933 in response to the rise of Nazism and Italy’s further international activities. Cf. for example Dejmek, Edvard Beneš, pp. 551– 552.  AMZV, PZ Londýn, 1933, běžná zpráva č. 3, 21. března 1933, p. 6. British politicians did accept the option of revising the peace treaties, something which fundamentally affected Czechoslovakia, as Masaryk’s report of 18 April 1933 responding to a debate in the House of Commons illustrates. The Minister claimed that the speakers made it absolutely clear that everything must occur on the basis of an agreement between the parties involved. On the other hand, Masaryk expressed his fear that the issue of revising the treaties and the related borders question were not a closed chapter for His Majesty’s Government. Cf. ibid., běžná zpráva č. 10, 18. dubna 1933, pp. 1– 2.

50

II The Start of Change

gave impartial reports on discussions within the Chamber of Deputies on waiving the immunity of the four MPs. A very specific problem within the minorities issue which had a major impact on internal political affairs in the Czechoslovak Republic, and through them thus also Great Britain, was the option during the interwar period for any national minority to appeal to the League of Nations and use a petition to draw attention to breaches of its rights, regardless of whether the complaint was justified or not.²⁹ The establishment of this new international legal guarantee system based on the League of Nations, an international organisation whose objective was to eliminate as far as possible escalation of disputes between nations and prevent their solution by war, gave national minorities a space to air their proposals and complaints at an official international forum. The option of appealing to the League of Nations on behalf of the rights of minorities was the result of the system of international protection for minority rights based on the peace and minority treaties as guaranteed by the League of Nations. As such, it was not through the Covenant of the League of Nations in which the rights of minorities were not enshrined, since it did not apply to all member states. The protection of minorities was primarily based on the peace treaties. By signing these treaties and incorporating them into their legislation, the successor states were at the same time saying that they “accept and agree to the embodiment of such measures within the treaty with the Allies and Associated Powers which the said powers would consider necessary to protect the interests of the citizens (of the state) who differ from the majority population through race, language or religion”. Czechoslovakia affirmed its obligation through signature of the peace treaty with Austria in Saint-Germain-en-Laye on 10 September 1919.³⁰ The largest numbers of national minorities were assigned to Germans (7,674,000), followed by Ukrainians (5,210,000) and Hungarians (3,112,000).³¹ Thus national minorities undoubtedly represented a potential threat to the stability of the system securing the peace. As such, protection of the new order and neutralisation of the danger of possible radical escalation of ethnic problems required a specific guarantee and assurance. The primary objective of the international protection of minorities in the interwar period was to eliminate

 The petition in which the minority in Czechoslovakia complained of Government policy represents a separate research problem, which is why it is only given the limited space in this work necessary to illustrate the main topic.  Cf. Moravcová, D., Menšinový problém v meziválečném Československu [Minority Problem in Interwar Czechoslovakia], in: Střední Evropa, 15, 92/93, 1999, p. 179.  Galántai, J., Trianon and the Protection of Minorities, Boulder 1992, pp. 17– 19.

II The Start of Change

51

the negativism of the minority population towards the new states and to secure as much of their loyalty as possible.³² The question remains, however, as to what extent the declared objective could be reached. One must surely come to the conclusion that: “in the end, the system of international protection of minority rights did not lead to the consolidation of the established foundations and rules, but rather the opposite.”³³ The position of the German minority in Czechoslovakia and its options of appealing to the League of Nations underwent major transformations; three phases can be perceived: the period until 1926 when German parties were not part of the Government coalition, followed by an intermediate phase until 1935 when Germans could not fairly complain about Government policy when some of its activist parties were part of it, and then the period following the establishment of the SdP, specifically following the presidential election at the end of 1935 when the minority Germans again began making appeals to the League of Nations, but now in a transformed atmosphere marked by a more aggressive policy from the Sudeten German Party and with the clear objective of internationalising their problem and forcing the Government to make concessions. As such, during 1933 the British Legation only made statements on the complaints of the Hungarian minority, or on petitions which came from Carpathian Ruthenia. The issue of the submitted petitions resonated in the Foreign Office through the Prague Legation because the Great Britain representative was sometimes a member of the committee which was to assess a particular complaint sent to Geneva. Thus, Czechoslovakia came into the Foreign Office’s eye and although a large proportion of complaints did not get to the League of Nations Council plenary, not passing the Committee of Three / Minority Commission as the Council almost always satisfied itself with the explanation of the particular state’s Government, the very fact there was such a “presentation” did not help Prague in the perception of its policy towards its minorities within the United Kingdom. While the internationalisation of the minority problem in Czechoslovakia was not a threat due to the participation of German Agrarians and Social Democrats in the Government in 1933, the country had to face up to a different form

 One can concur with the idea that “the protection of minorities was perceived as a kind of compensation for their unrealisable right to self-determination, a right which could not be awarded to everyone”. Scheuermann, M., Minderheitenschutz contra Konfliktverhütung? Die Minderheitenpolitik des Völkerbundes in den zwanziger Jahren [Minority Protection versus Conflict Prevention? The Minority Policy of the League of Nations in the 1920s], Marburg 2000, pp. 22– 23.  Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, p. 228.

52

II The Start of Change

of propaganda, specifically the import of printed material mainly from Germany and Austria which contained radical opinions on how to deal with the minority issue. The British Legation informed the Foreign Office in mid-May 1933 that the Czechoslovak Government had banned the import of certain printed material on the basis of recent developments in its neighbouring states, and that it had also decided to restrict radio broadcasts. Both these cases were designed to suppress extremist influences on the forming of political opinions within the state’s territory. In the radio case, this involved spreading ideas standing in opposition to the republican form of Government, public order or central authority. Any licence owners which broadcast such material would lose their licences. The Cabinet had also decided to ban the import of 334 periodicals espousing radical political opinions. Most examples were from Germany and Austria, but they also included papers from Hungary, the United States of America and Latin America.³⁴ Some of those affected included, for example, Völkischer Beobachter, Angriff and Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte,³⁵ Der Weltmarkt, Der Tschechenspiegel and Deutscher Turnerhorst.³⁶ According to the report’s author, the printed material from the USA and Latin America found themselves on the list because of their positions hostile “towards the régime of political and administrative centralization at Prague”.³⁷ The British Legation in Prague was focused on the Czech-German newspaper war at the end of June 1933, and according to the report’s author, it appeared that no side was willing to back down. The report stated that Berlin had proceeded to ban the import of anti-Nazi print with mainly socialist or communist content,  TNA, FO 371/16662, C 4579/4579/12, Restrictions on Foreign Publicity in Czechoslovakia, Prague, May 15, 1933, f. 5.  Press representatives from Germany. “Several newspapers published in Germany and dealing with the affairs of the German minority in Czechoslovakia are also prohibited.” Ibid., f. 6.  Press representatives from Austria. Ibid.  Ibid. In conclusion, the report added that further restrictions were being prepared in arrangements for a new press law. The situation regarding press law in Czechoslovakia did not develop in the way the British Legation’s report predicted. The draft of the so-called Great Press Law was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies by Minister of Justice Alfréd Meissner in April 1932, but in the end the domestic and foreign political situation amongst other factors meant it was not ratified and the solution was held back for a more convenient time. As such, the previous laws regulating the press in Czechoslovakia were merely updated in June 1933 (Act no. 126/1933). Cf. Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého [Collection of Laws and Regulations of the Czechoslovak State] (hereinafter Sb. z. a n.), Vol. 1933, pp. 709 – 714. More in detail cf. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 297– 305. French Minister to Czechoslovakia, Léon Noël, also noted Nazi Germany’s greater agitation towards the German minority. AMAE, Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 102, Politique intérieure, Noël à Paul-Boncour, Prague, le 16 mai 1933, ff. 20 – 23.

II The Start of Change

53

while Prague had restricted newspapers which advocated radical positions threatening the republican and democratic form of Government, and went on to add that the German Minister to Czechoslovakia had protested against this approach, reasoning that it was contrary to the spirit of the economic agreement between both states.³⁸ The Austrian Legation also looked at the nascent newspaper war between Germany and Czechoslovakia. At the end of June 1933, it informed Vienna of the prohibition in Germany of 66 Czechoslovak newspapers, mostly written in German. The Czechoslovak Government said in response that it had to defend itself from attacks on Czechoslovak democracy wherever they came from. The report’s author added that the German Legation in Prague did not even wait for instructions from Berlin and protested against this kind of blanket approach.³⁹ Press and radio propaganda were a natural part of the Nazi regime’s outward discourse, which it used to influence the opinions and ideas of German minorities in neighbouring states; this was no different in the case of Czechoslovakia. The prohibition of the import and distribution of such media was the Czechoslovak Government’s natural response to the radical negative campaign targeting the country. Berlin took a similar position, and reciprocally restricted some Czechoslovak publications written in German. The British Legation in Prague informed London of the authorities’ approach, although the report’s diction makes it seem somewhat negative towards Prague. The Legation similarly informed London of Czechoslovakia’s 1930 census results, focusing on the numbers of different nationalities within its historic lands of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. The report’s author paid particular attention to the German population, adding that in 1930 Minister Joseph Addison had come to the conclusion that Czechoslovak authorities had artificially redrawn borders so that the numbers of the German minority within them fell below 20 %, which meant they could not use their own language when contacting the authorities.⁴⁰ Kenneth T. Gurney then gave three examples which used a simple method for redrawing borders to secure the desired effect – Brno, Moravská Ostrava and Olomouc, although the first example did not work out since the percentage of the German minority population did not fall below 20 % (it came to 20.28 %). In conclusion, he outlined a pessimistic vision for minority language rights having

 TNA, FO 371/16660, C 6078/2260/12, Czechoslovak-German Newspaper War, Prague, June 26, 1933, ff. 157– 158.  AT-OeStA/AdR/AAng ÖVB 1Rep Prag, kt. 30, Zl. 135/Pol, Prag, am 26. Juni 1933.  Cf. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 278 – 279.

54

II The Start of Change

come to the conclusion that by the next census the authorities would succeed in reducing population numbers to below the 20 % clause in many places.⁴¹ Determining nationalities for the census really was a problem in interwar Czechoslovakia.⁴² While under Austria-Hungary, censuses were based around colloquial language (the language the population used in standard situations), while subsequent to 1918 nationality was the basic data and this was ascertained mainly according to mother tongue; the First Czechoslovak Republic legislation tended to determine nationality using objective signs rather than subjective declarations of nationality.⁴³ National minorities repeatedly complained, including to the League of Nations, about how censuses took place and not being able to declare “their” nationality. All submitted petitions, however, were closed after satisfactory explanations from the Czechoslovak Government. For the British Legation in Prague, the above case was probably another case of a simplistic and generalising perception of the complex and multi-layered issue of Czech-German coexistence, something which was to reoccur a number of times in future. In mid-1933, it became clear that Czech-German relations had become an important issue in the British Legation’s agenda. This was proven by the newspaper war, the issue of adjusting borders because of the option of using their language and the aftermath of the Volkssport process. Minister Joseph Addison informed Foreign Secretary John Simon of the arrest of 42 young people (10 of whom were Germans from the Reich living in Czechoslovakia) during March 1933 in Aš; according to the Minister, over-active participation in demonstrations accompanying the March election in Germany was to blame. The German Legation spoke in defence of the citizens of German nationality, demanding their immediate release in May.⁴⁴ This did not occur, and a trial took place on 12 July in

 TNA, FO 371/16662, C 5038/5038/12, Mr. Gurney to Sir John Simon, Prague, May 27, 1933, ff. 15 – 16.  Cf. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 212– 216; Bubeník, J. – Křestˇan, J., Zjišťování národnosti jako problém statistický a politický: zkušenosti ze sčítání lidu za první republiky [Identifying Nationality as a Statistical and Political Problem: Experience from the First Republic Census], in: Paginae Historiae. Sborník Státního ústředního archivu v Praze, 3, 1995, pp. 119 – 139.  Petráš, R., Menšiny v meziválečném Československu. Právní postavení národnostních menšin v první Československé republice a jejich mezinárodněprávní ochrana [Minorities in Interwar Czechoslovakia. Legal Status of National Minorities in the First Czechoslovak Republic and Their International Legal Protection], Praha 2009, p. 286. More in detail cf. Kadlec, P. – Kladiwa, P. – Gawrecki, D. et al., Národnostní statistika v českých zemích 1880 – 1930. Mechanismy, problémy a důsledky národnostní klasifikace. Vol. I – II [Ethnic Statistics in the Czech Lands 1880 – 1930. Mechanisms, Problems and Consequences of National Classification. Vol. I – II], Praha 2016.  TNA, FO 371/16660, C 6079/2260/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir John Simon, Prague, June 14, 1933, ff. 160 – 161. Cf. also AMAE, Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 102, Prague, le 16 juin 1933, ff. 42– 43.

II The Start of Change

55

Plzeň. Addison wrote that according to reports in the local press, calls for demonstrations in Selb, Bavaria, appeared at the end of February and early March 1933, such as in the Ascher Zeitung newspaper. At these demonstrations, speeches were made criticising the Czechoslovak Republic and demanding “the liberation of the Germans of Czechoslovakia from the Czechoslovak yoke”.⁴⁵ According to the Minister, the accused based their defence on the claim that they had crossed the border out of curiosity and that the finance guard did not stop them. They were unsuccessful and were sentenced on the basis of breaking Section 17 of the Protection of the Republic Act (an association hostile to the state), and Laurenz Trapp, an Ascher Zeitung employee, was further sentenced for breaking Section 15 (calling for legal obligations not to be met or for criminal acts to be performed). Trapp was sentenced to six weeks’ imprisonment, with the other convicts sentenced to punishments of between one month’s and five weeks’ imprisonment. Since the punishment included any time in custody, most of the convicts were immediately released, stated Addison. As his relationship towards Czechoslovakia was a negative one, he did not neglect to add that the whole affair, and the severity of the verdict, which he considered unnecessary, was sure to make current Czech-German relations worse.⁴⁶ The Minister made a similar complaint a few days later when he again informed Foreign Secretary Simon of tensions in Czech-German relations as a result of a propaganda war and the process in Plzeň. He criticised the Czechoslovak authorities’ retaliatory measure, the prohibition of the import of almost all German-language publications, including sports and satirical newspapers.⁴⁷

 TNA, FO 371/16660, C 6079/2260/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir John Simon, Prague, June 14, 1933, f. 161.  Ibid., f. 162.  TNA, FO 371/16660, C 6080/2260/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir John Simon, Prague, June 26, 1933, f. 164. Thus, the Minister confirmed a similar report on material entitled Czechoslovak-German Newspaper War. In the first half of July, another aspect of relations between Prague and Berlin was looked at when the activities of German refugees from Nazism who had escaped to Czechoslovakia were discussed. According to his information, these refugees were Social Democrats, Communists, Jews and former politicians who had all fallen victim to the Nazi’s first wave of persecution. Although Addison did not state so directly, Maurice Hankey’s hand-written note mentioned it as another reason for the deterioration in Czech-German relations. Cf. TNA, FO 371/16660, C 6342/2260/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir John Simon, Prague, July 11, 1933, ff. 168 – 169, Hankey’s words cf. f. 167. German Minister Walter Koch commented on the above events from his own perspective when he wrote about the deteriorating conditions of Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918 – 1945. Aus dem Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (hereinafter ADAP), Serie C: 1933 – 1937, Das Dritte Reich: die ersten Jahre [Files to the German Foreign Policy 1918 – 1945. From the Archive of the Foreign Office, Series C: 1933 –

56

II The Start of Change

Thus, Addison sent London two reports in mid-1933 in which he made statements about the status of Czech-German relations, which he termed tense, indirectly alluding that the Czechoslovak Government was to blame for their deterioration. Prague and Berlin were undoubtedly experiencing a period of difficulty, but it should be acknowledged that it was the new German Government which began the offensive campaign and the Czechoslovak Government was merely responding to it and its negative intensity. For the British Minister, however, the situation appeared somewhat different; his fears of the future development of Czech-German relations were focused on the over-rigorous policy of the Czechoslovak Government. On the other hand, at the time British Central European policy was not focused primarily on Prague or the mutual relations between Czechs and Germans within Czechoslovakia, but rather on Vienna; London and other Governments feared an Anschluss of Austria.⁴⁸ Other states also experienced similar problems with the atmosphere which reigned throughout the continent. In mid-1933, the situation in Europe became somewhat tenser when German diplomacy made it clear that it was not interested in disarmament plans and that in contrast, Berlin was aiming to strengthen its position. Domestic British politics responded with some irritation to Germany’s unwillingness to reach a consensus. This was merely confirmed by the response of former Foreign Secretaries Edward Grey and Austen Chamberlain.⁴⁹ In December, British Ambassador to Berlin, Eric Phipps, discussed arming and disarmament with Adolf Hitler, with the Chancellor informing him that Germany would demand the boosting of its army, specifically its air force, along with other concessions, but referring to the advice of experts when asked for clarification; 1937, The Third Reich: the First Years], Bd. I/2, Göttingen 1971, der Gesandte in Prag Koch an das Auswärtige Amt, Doc. No. 326, Prag, den 19. Juni 1933, pp. 577– 579.  This was confirmed by Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Robert Vansittart, in a memorandum for Foreign Secretary John Simon, in which he wrote that the two fundamental issues for London were Austria and disarmament. TNA, Cabinet Office (hereinafter CAB), 24/243/12 (War Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda), August 28, 1933, A Memorandum on the Present and Future Situation in Europe, f. 70. In regard to the potential power of the Little Entente, Vansittart wrote that the only real force was Yugoslavia, as the Czechoslovak Army was weakened by its composition of various nationalities. Ibid., f. 71. The Czechoslovak Army command itself considered its main enemy to be Hungarian revisionism until early 1934; the situation changed following Adolf Hitler’s rise to power. Because there was no consultation between Army command and the Foreign Ministry between 1925 and 1934, the Czechoslovak Army’s mobilisation plans were drawn up in isolation within the Headquarter. Straka, K., Československá armáda, pilíř obrany státu z let 1932 – 1939 [Czechoslovak Army, Pillar of National Defense from 1932– 1939], Praha 2007, pp. 16, 34.  Cf. for example Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 219; Steiner, Z., The Triumph of the Dark. European International History 1933 – 1939, Oxford 2011, pp. 23, 32– 40.

II The Start of Change

57

Hitler also mentioned Czechoslovakia a number of times, although as yet only along with France and Poland.⁵⁰ At the beginning of September 1933, the British Legation in Prague had to make a statement on an event which affected one of the problems the Legation was looking at at the time – German refugees who had fled Nazism. Philosopher and journalist Theodor Lessing, who had had to leave his home country because of the Nazi regime, was assassinated while residing in Mariánské Lázně on 30 August. In his report for London, Kenneth T. Gurney said that Lessing had been subject to hate attacks because of his faith in Hannover where he had taught and this had led him to leave Germany. According to Gurney, he had been warned to leave Mariánské Lázně and move further inside Czechoslovakia, because there were people living in the border region who secretly, or even openly, supported the Nazi regime. Lessing, however, fatally refused to do so.⁵¹ Gurney then described how the assassins shot the professor. The Legation Secretary continued that the gendarmerie had been unable to capture the culprit, although he was of the opinion that suspicion had fallen on a Czech-German, “poacher” Rudolf Eckert, whom it was assumed had fled to Germany. The police had also detained a number of DNSAP members from the district. The party’s head, Rudolf Jung, called a meeting in which he rejected the idea that the murder was politically motivated, and according to the report’s author he repeated his January claim that the DNSAP and NSDAP were different and denied that Rudolf Eckert had any links to the DNSAP. “As was to be expected, the tragedy has caused great emotion in this country and the Czechoslovak newspapers are demanding that the most severe measures should be taken to prevent the repetition of such a crime,” said Gurney of the atmosphere following the assassination, continuing: “They [newspapers – author’s note] consider it time that the German minority in this country should listen to other words than those of Messrs. Göring and Goebbels and the German Government should be forced to respect their international obligations and to cease to attempt to introduce into neighbouring countries the ‘Balkan’ method which they practise at home.”⁵²

 Johnson, G. (ed.), Our Man in Berlin. The Diary of Sir Eric Phipps, 1933 – 1937, Basingstoke 2008, pp. 33 – 34. In October, German representatives first left the Geneva disarmament conference negotiations, and then they also left the League of Nations.  TNA, FO 371/16660, C 8085/2260/12, K. T. Gurney to Sir John Simon, Prague, September 4, 1933, ff. 182– 184.  Ibid., ff. 185 – 186. The Legation Secretary wrote that according to Lidové noviny, France and Britain were on Czechoslovakia’s side, and even Mussolini was monitoring what was happing north of Brenner. Ibid., f. 186. Cf. also AMAE, Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 102, Noël à Paul-Boncour, Prague, le 5 septembre 1933, ff. 58 – 59.

58

II The Start of Change

The Jewish philosopher’s murder naturally fanned anti-German sentiment within Czechoslovakia, with almost nobody in doubt as to the circumstances framing the act,⁵³ and it contributed to the decisive judicial process against German Nazis in Czechoslovakia, and specifically their organisation. As such, the British Legation in Prague informed the Foreign Office again of the process against the young people which Minister Addison had given information on in mid-June. The public prosecutor appealed because he did not agree with convicts from the Reich not being deported from Czechoslovakia. The Supreme Court concurred and ordered that the ten Germans be deported. The German Legation decided to protest and hoped that no deportation would occur, stated Gurney.⁵⁴ He went on to give information on the arrest of a further 17 DNSAP members in Aš and a search of their homes which took place in late August, and which even included the deputy mayor. He added that the police in Moravská Ostrava had taken a similar approach.⁵⁵ Thus, in late summer 1933, the British Legation had to look seriously into the radicalisation of the Czechoslovak authorities’ approach, in particular against DNSAP members, whether in terms of investigating Theodor Lessing’s murder or the arrest of party members; mostly on the basis of breaching the Protection of the Republic Act. In early October, the High Court in Brno upheld the verdict in the process with the Volkssport organisation, making the atmosphere grow tenser in the country, as even the German Legation in Czechoslovakia noted. Walter Koch informed Berlin of the action against DNSAP and DNP mayors and against student organisations.⁵⁶ In July 1933, the deterioration of relations between Czechs and Germans and the growing conviction that various organisations from the Reich were actively engaging in events in Czechoslovakia forced the Government to postpone coun-

 Some said the DNSAP were expecting to be banned over the whole of the summer of 1933. Breitfelder, p. 57.  TNA, FO 371/16660, C 8086/2260/12, K. T. Gurney to Sir John Simon, Prague, September 4, 1933, ff. 188 – 189. Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry was willing to waive deportation for three or four people, but only those “whom Minister Koch particularly depends on,” added the despatch a few days later. Cf. AKPR, f. Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protokol T (tajné), sg. 12/25, kt. 135, mikrofilm č. 110, T. 1662/33, Praha, November 29, 1933.  TNA, FO 371/16660, C 8086/2260/12, K. T. Gurney to Sir John Simon, Prague, September 4, 1933, f. 189.  Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte, Teil IV. Verschärfung der tschechoslowakischen Massnahmen gegen das national bewusste Sudetendeutschtum – Nichtbestätigung Bürgermeistern – Verfolgung und Verhaftung von Nationalsozialisten, Deutsche Gesandtschaft an das Auswärtige Amt, Prag, den 21. August 1933, Doc. No. 25, pp. 59 – 61. His conclusion, naturally enough, was that this was baseless persecution.

II The Start of Change

59

cil elections which were to take place in 1935 to 1937 or 1938.⁵⁷ The fact that the Ministry of the Interior confirmed some mayors meant that the Government had acquired the right to take action against mayors of political parties which appeared, and de facto were, hostile to the state; such mayors were simply not confirmed in their role. The political situation developing in neighbouring Germany also posed the question of what entity was going to defend and promote the objectives of Sudeten Germans. Both so-called negativist parties, the DNSAP and the DNP, had found themselves in danger of being banned by the authorities.⁵⁸ The endangered parties felt that the only way out of the emergency was to “create a united partisan national front through a merger of the DNSAP and the DNP with the other German bourgeois parties and which would be opposed to Marxism. It remained simply to find a not overly-strong but sufficiently influential patron”.⁵⁹ This person would be Konrad Henlein, who became the leader of the new movement – the Front of Sudeten German Homeland (Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront; SHF), which was established in October 1933. The new entity had not a clear political programme and its sole objective was to unite all Sudeten Germans.⁶⁰

 This took place based on a law of 12 July 1933 which extended the term for municipal councils from the current four years to six years, and which required that mayors of municipalities where district authorities were based should be approved by the Ministry of the Interior, with the provincial authority sufficient for other municipalities. Cf. Sb. z. a n., Vol. 1933, pp. 687– 691.  While the DNSAP dissolved itself, the DNP did not do so and after it had been suspended it practically fell apart. Cf. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte, Teil IV. Selbstauflösung der D. N. S. A. P., Telegram, Prag, den 5. Oktober 1933, Doc. No. 31, pp. 73 – 74. There were considerations of resuming the DNP’s activities before the 1935 election. Cf. ibid., Die Frage der Widerzulassung der Deutschen Nationalpartei, Deutsche Gesandtschaft an das Auswärtige Amt, Prag den 17. April 1935, Doc. No. 114, pp. 237– 240. The action against these parties was strongly criticised in Germany, “which was expressed particularly in the press,” wrote Vojtěch Mastný from Berlin. Officials, however, were not overly worried about his report. AMZV, PZ Berlín, 1933, periodická zpráva č. IV, 12. ledna 1934, p. 41.  Vymazalová, M., Sudetoněmecká strana 1935 – 1936 [Sudeten German Party, 1935 – 1936], Master Thesis, Praha 1999, p. 19.  The SHF, however, intended to take a different path to national socialism. It was ready to recognise the Czechoslovak Republic and formed clear objectives – the spiritual development of Sudeten Germans, an emphasis on traditional orders, etc. Cf. Cornwall, M., The Devil’s Wall. The Nationalist Youth Mission of Heinz Rutha, Cambridge – Mass., London 2012, pp. 159 – 162; Burian, M., Deutscher Turnverband a československý stát v letech 1918 – 1933 [Deutscher Turnverband and the Czechoslovak State, 1918 – 1933], in: Waic, M. (ed.), Češi a Němci ve světě tělovýchovy a sportu [Czechs and Germans in the World of Physical Education and Sport], Praha 2004, pp. 65 – 66; César, J. – Černý, B., Politika německých buržoazních stran v Československu v letech 1918 – 1938. Díl II. (1930 – 1938) [Politics of German Bourgeois Parties in Czechoslovakia in 1918 – 1938. Part II. (1930 – 1938)], Praha 1962, pp. 196 – 202; Tóth – No-

60

II The Start of Change

The Czechoslovak Government came to the conclusion roughly three-quarters of the way through 1933, although in some respects and in certain areas it had already come to the conclusion in mid-1933, that the democratic and republican form of Government in the country had to be protected, and that one of the key phenomena which were putting this in danger was certain German minority political parties who had taken on the radical rhetoric of the Third Reich against the Czechoslovak Republic. As such, the Cabinet decided to submit a law to the Parliament which would allow it to prohibit certain political parties from taking actions, or even dissolve them directly. As such, probably the most discussed piece of legislation was added to the acts of 10 July – the Act on Stopping and Dissolving Political Parties (Act no. 201/1933 Coll. of 25 October 1933). Before this act was adopted, neither the constitution nor any other legislation recognised political parties as a legal entity. According to its creators, the objective of the law was to protect the independence, constitutional unity, integrity and security of Czechoslovakia, as well as its democratic and republican nature.⁶¹ Problems arose, however, first of all in the definition of a political party (Section 20) which included not just “a political party duly organised, but also any kind of political group, association or movement”, and also in the ambiguous term “security of the Republic”, which was not explained anywhere and not even jurisprudence could infer the legal definition necessary. As such, any activity from a political party could be termed as threatening the “security” of the Republic and the Government, not the courts, would then be able to stop such an entity from taking actions, or directly dissolve it. Thus, the Cabinet had a powerful weapon at its disposal to use against the opposition, mainly against communists and the political parties of the national minorities, in this case against German negativists. The fact is, however, that the only parties ever to have been banned in the Czechoslovak Republic, specifically through having their activities stopped, were the DNSAP and DNP, and they had ceased to exist three weeks before the law was definitively adopted. As such, the legislation was, amongst

votný – Stehlík, pp. 64– 66; Luh, A., Der deutsche Turnverband in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. Vom völkischen Vereinsbetrieb zur volkspolitischen Bewegung [The German Turnverband in the First Czechoslovak Republic. From the Volkisch Club Operation to the National Political Movement], München 1988, pp. 199 – 216. In October 1933, the Czechoslovak Government decided to dissolve the DNSAP. Many DNSAP members, however, immediately became members of the newly established SHF. Kvaček, R., K historii Henleinovy Sudetoněmecké strany, díl I. [The History of Henlein’s Sudeten German Party, Part I], in: Dějepis ve škole, IV, 5, 1957, p. 198.  According to Section 2, a newly established party which was a mere replacement to a party already shut down or dissolved could be shut down or dissolved under the same conditions.

II The Start of Change

61

other matters, meant to prepare a legal basis for the Government’s administrative measures. The establishment of the new movement (SHF)⁶² and the action against negativist parties in autumn 1933 was an important moment for Czechoslovakia. The British Legation in Prague monitored events in Czechoslovakia with concern. Although Minister Addison did not attack the Czechoslovak Government or its politicians directly in his reports, he did support the idea that a settlement with Germany would only be possible if territorial changes were to occur in Central Europe. Although for the moment this was a marginal opinion which nobody (yet) paid much attention to in the Foreign Office and which did not affect British foreign policy, it was to become a serious problem for Prague in future.⁶³ As time went by and the approach of the SHF, which became the SdP subsequent to 1935, became ever more forceful, particularly internationally, the Minister’s opinions found much greater resonance at the Foreign Office than it had at the end of 1933. For the moment, however, London was focused above all on events in Germany, something Jan Masaryk also confirmed.⁶⁴

 “Establishment of the Front of Sudeten German Homeland in October 1933 set up – compared to the traditional parties – a political force different in many aspects which from its beginning represented a foreign element within the First Czechoslovak Republic parliamentary democratic system.” Eschenbächer, J.-H., Zwischen Schutzbedürftigkeit und Alleinvertretungsanspruch: Die Beziehungen der Sudetendeutschen Heimatfront zu den traditionellen bürgerlichen deutschen Parteien in der Tschechoslowakei 1933 – 1935 [Between Vulnerability and Exclusive Claim: the Relations of the Sudeten German Homeland Front to the Traditional German Bourgeois Parties in Czechoslovakia 1933 – 1935], in: Bohemia, 39, 1998, p. 323. The heads of many parties apparently contacted Henlein, calling on him to become the leader of a “great Sudeten German Party”. He apparently resolved to establish the SHF with a heavy heart. Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei 1933 – 1947 [The Germans in Czechoslovakia 1933 – 1937]. Dokumentensammlung. Zusammengestellt, mit Vorwort und Anmerkungen versehen von Král, V., Praha 1964, Doc. No. 6, pp. 64– 65.  Cf. for example Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 222.  AMZV, PZ Londýn, 1933, běžná zpráva č. 14, 3. listopadu 1933, pp. 1– 3. Even the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Robert Vansittart, promoted a focus on Germany as British policy’s main area of concern, and in this regard, he rejected Maurice Hankey’s position that Germany and Japan were of similar importance. Keene, T. H., Sir Robert Vansittart and the British Foreign Office, 1930 – 1938, in: Proceedings and Papers of the Georgia Association of Historians, 2, 1981, p. 83.

III A Problem of Growing Significance In terms of Czech-German relations, 1933 ended somewhat tensely. The establishment of the SHF and the shutting down and dissolution of the two negativist political parties had worried the British Legation in Prague and Minister Joseph Addison had begun slowly, but ever more openly, to take the view that territorial reviews would have to be made in Central Europe. Because of where he was working, he was thinking here mainly of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, for the Czechoslovak Government it was a positive sign that his opinions had almost no influence on those managing affairs at the Foreign Office.¹ A summary report for 1933 noted the increased attention that the Czechoslovak officials had decided to pay to Czech Germans, and above all those who displayed any kind of links to Nazi Germany. Minister Addison further added that “they [the state – author’s note] arrested many persons in various parts of the country”.² He had also concluded, this would reoccur in future, that German political parties had been unable since 1918 to form a united front defending the interests of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. As such, he spent some time looking at the establishment of the SHF and commenting on its political objectives.³ The British Legation in Prague began the new year, as in 1933, monitoring the situation in Czechoslovakia and commenting on the economy. This was not an illogical step, as the crisis was still underway and some said that its end remained as far away as ever. This was confirmed in a short comment from January 1934 from the pen of Owen O’Malley (the head of the Southern Department at the Foreign Office) when he stated that Germany was heading for a possible collapse of its domestic market, Austria for a civil war and that Czechoslovakia was facing growing inflation.⁴ This was indeed a bleak prognosis, much  The Foreign Office still considered Austria its priority issue. If Germany were to engage here to a greater extent, then Foreign Secretary John Simon believed that this would undoubtedly have an effect not just on its position in Central Europe, but also on the situation in Europe in general. The National Archives, London, Kew (hereinafter TNA), Cabinet Office (hereinafter CAB) 24/247/ 19 (War Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda), January 22, 1934, f. 146.  TNA, Foreign Office (hereinafter FO) 371/18383, R 1574/1574/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir J. Simon, February 26, 1934, p. 17.  Ibid., pp. 17– 18.  TNA, FO 371/18380, R 193/14/12, January 19, 1934, ff. 37– 38. In January 1934 the British Minister to Vienna Walford Selby wrote about the necessity to keep Austria independent. University of Oxford, Bodleian Libraries (Weston Library), Selby Papers, MS. Eng. c. 6587, f. 93. At the end of his report he confirmed the fact of independent Austria as “a direct British [underlined in the original – author’s note] interest”. Ibid., f. 94. Even the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office Robert Vansittart agreed with this notion. Ibid., MS. Eng. c. 6588, f. 28. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110651454-004

64

III A Problem of Growing Significance

of which was to be proved right. The Legation Commercial Secretary, Herbert Kershaw, wrote a memorandum around the second week of January on the state of the Czechoslovak economy, and in its introduction, he noted the failure of attempts at stopping the collapse in trade and the necessity of improving the country’s international economic situation. He then indicated that the gold standard belonged to the past and that in Czechoslovakia’s case it was a fundamental problem, because the value of its banknotes was pegged to gold and foreign exchange reserves which were subject to market fluctuations. In conclusion, he dared to claim that the problems the country was afflicted with could not be satisfactorily solved with some form of artificial support for exports.⁵ In regard to the economic crisis, the British Legation also had to reflect upon the establishment of a new, or rather restored old, Government in mid-February 1934, which had been set up on the basis of a previous Government following the departure of the National Democrats due to their opposition to the Cabinet’s plan to devalue the currency.⁶ In his report, Addison gave a sober assessment of the new Government and described its position in the Parliament, which had naturally deteriorated as its majority had fallen both in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate.⁷ The problem of political coexistence of the German minority with the Czech majority, however, could not remain long out of the gazes of British diplomats. Orme Sargent, Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, wrote as early as February 1934: “We have had a little recent information about the position and sentiments of the German minority in Czechoslovakia,” adding: “[…] the subject is […] to become one of such importance.” Sargent logically enough concluded that Addison should be asked to prepare a memorandum on the current state of affairs. Owen O’Malley expressed his agreement, adding that such a report would be very important for further study of Czech-German relations.⁸ This

 TNA, FO 371/18380, R 193/14/12, Memorandum, January 8, 1934, ff. 39 – 40.  Cf. Ježek, F., Mnichovská krize. Memoárové poznámky na okraj tragických dnů utrpení a hanby [Munich Crisis. Memoir Remarks on the Tragic Days of Suffering and Shame], Praha 2016, p. 41.  TNA, FO 371/18382, R 1070/1070/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir J. Simon, February 15, 1934, ff. 185 – 186. “And there are still 33 German deputies on the Govt. side, and 2 German Ministers,” commented one Foreign Office official. Ibid., f. 184. Similarly, the Minister informed London two months later of the approaching Czechoslovak presidential election, stating quite fairly the facts which the Czechoslovak parties found themselves facing. Following Antonín Švehla’s death (1933), the Agrarians could not find a suitable candidate and because the election of Edvard Beneš was impossible at the time, Addison said there was no other option than electing TGM, whose candidature “should meet with no opposition”. Ibid., R 2411/1070/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir J. Simon, April 17, 1934, f. 199.  TNA, FO 371/18381, R 1060/237/12, ff. 17– 18, quotation f. 17.

III A Problem of Growing Significance

65

was a very important opinion. Sargent admitted, unsurprisingly, that the Foreign Office knew very little about the minority issue in Czechoslovakia and that it needed to prepare a summary report to make up for this lack of knowledge. It was not without logic that the base material should come from the pen of the British Minister to Prague. Who other than Addison, someone who had been operating in Prague since 1930 and knowledgeable, at least from London’s perspective, of the Central European situation, should prepare a document like this? Yet this was someone who at the same time considered the Czechoslovak Government’s position on the German minority to be wrong. During the same period, Foreign Secretary John Simon received a report from Berlin in which Ambassador Eric Phipps informed him of an article which had been published in Völkischer Beobachter which looked at the threats faced by members of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. It was no surprise considering the newspaper that the author of the article (Figures which Accuse) criticised Prague for breaching the Minority Treaty and stated that the three-and-ahalf-million strong minority had become a part of the new state against their will. He continued by stating that the Czechoslovak Government was not fulfilling its obligations since the number of civil servants of German nationality was not in proportion to the share of Germans within the total population in the country. He also added that it was surprising this approach had not resulted in protests abroad.⁹ The author criticised the Czechoslovak Government because of the elimination of Germans from the civil service and the army, which the Cabinet was allegedly justifying by accusing Germans of civic unreliability. He concluded his article emotively, writing that a state which so frivolously breached the terms of the peace treaties had no right to criticise others for not observing any other agreements.¹⁰ The article mentioned was, of course, merely propaganda and contained information which was distorted or deliberately misinterpreted. Looking at figures in a strictly mathematically way, it is true that the percentage of Germans in the civil service did not correspond to their proportion of the total population; this was in any case true over the whole period of the First Czechoslovak Republic. In the context of a national state such as Czechoslovakia, if officially declared as a nation state of Czechs and Slovaks, a simple mathematical calculation or bare statistics could not be applied. When the state was established, the vast majority of members of the German minority rejected the state and did not want to live there; as such they either did not want to be in the civil service or they did

 Ibid., Eric Phipps to Sir J. Simon, February 9, 1934, ff. 18 – 19.  Ibid., f. 19.

66

III A Problem of Growing Significance

not meet the basic requirements – they could not speak Czech. Subsequently, from at least the first parliamentary election in 1920 when the new political order was clearly set up, some Germans began to demand greater share of power. Again, however, there was a problem with not knowing the majority language, something essential for civil servants. In relation to the economic crisis and radicalisation of the younger Sudeten Germans in particular, the problem arose of their negative relationship to the country; people with such a relationship could not be accepted into the civil service. As such, Owen O’Malley wrote to Joseph Addison at the beginning of March 1934, warning him that Phipps’ report, specifically the information on the article in Völkischer Beobachter had aroused “a certain amount of interest” in London. On the other hand, he had to admit that the lives of the German minority in Czechoslovakia did not have much effect on recent events in Austria and that the minority as a whole had been very calm for a long time, adding: “Official Czech spokesmen lose, as you know, no opportunity of expatiating on the exemplary loyalty of their German minority.”¹¹ O’Malley asked the British Minister to Prague to compose a report on the opinions of the German minority in Czechoslovakia and determine the strength of Nazi conviction amongst them. Addison was also to evaluate the position of German activist parties represented in the Government. The Foreign Office official had come to the conclusion based on information available that a demand to revise the borders did not particularly resonate amongst Czech Germans, but he nevertheless mandated the Minister to investigate this phenomenon too.¹² In early March 1934, Owen O’Malley assigned Minister Addison the complex task of trying to compose more an extensive report on the condition of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. The assignment the Foreign Office official gave him implied that it was likely not just him, but also other responsible officials of the Foreign Office who did not have reliable and up-to-date information on Czech-German relations. O’Malley’s thinking did not go beyond the standard limits of perception of the Central European region, although this cannot be criticised. London was not particularly interested in Central Europe (except for Germany),¹³ as its interests lay elsewhere.¹⁴ As such, it was logical that the Foreign

 Ibid., Mr. O’Malley to Sir J. Addison, March 1, 1934, ff. 20 – 21.  Ibid., f. 21.  This is confirmed in a report entitled The Future of Germany, made in April 1934 by Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Robert Vansittart. Cf. TNA, CAB 24/248/40, April 7, 1934, ff. 250 – 256. He and the Ambassador to Germany, Eric Phipps, were of the opinion that Berlin did not trust the League of Nations, nor diplomatic negotiations, and was promoting Austria’s annexation and changes to its eastern borders. Ibid., f. 251. Vansittart, however, also

III A Problem of Growing Significance

67

Office would ask for up-to-date information from Minister Addison, someone they considered knowledgeable, even if, as is acknowledged, he took a markedly critical position on Czechoslovakia. British interest in events in Germany and its future foreign policy approach were entirely in line with the traditional thinking of politicians in London, who considered it an important cornerstone of developments not just in Central Europe; already in Locarno in October 1925 the German border with France and Belgium had represented a point beyond which Great Britain was unwilling to go, and as such this was where their interests in Europe ended. Following Adolf Hitler’s rise to power and his record of over a year in office, Robert Vansittart came to the conclusion that a memorandum should be made in regard to Germany’s future policies. In the introduction, this summarised the opinions of British Ambassadors to Berlin from the 1920s, and it then moved to the present in which Berlin was rejecting unfair sections of the Treaty of Versailles, and was demanding territorial revision even at the cost of military threats. The document said that if these methods were to break down then the German “fair” demands would lead to a war whose outbreak Berlin would consider to have been caused by Germany’s enemies, just as had happened in 1914.¹⁵ The Permanent Under-Secretary of State was also aware of Prague’s complicated position, terming such a large minority in the state as worrying. His whole memorandum is written in the spirit of aiming to grasp the importance and growing strength of the new Germany, with whom an agreement must be made, or at least attempted. On the other hand, “Van” took the liberty of predicting that Berlin would nevertheless end up resorting to a policy of making threats or using force regardless. Here he makes quite clear his distrust of the new Nazi regime’s peace plans.¹⁶ The Permanent Under-Secretary of State also showed this by claiming that in future it would be difficult to predict how Germany would act towards its neighbours.

stated: “Czechoslovakia is obviously threatened. The country is frightened, and Dr. Benes has no policy.” Ibid., f. 252.  In this regard, Jan Masaryk informed Prague of the opinion of the British press and London’s wish that Germany should rejoin the League of Nations. Cf. Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí České republiky [The Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic], Praha (hereinafter AMZV), Politické zprávy (hereinafter PZ) Londýn, 1934, běžná zpráva č. 2, 1. února 1934, p. 5; ibid., periodická zpráva č. I, 11. června 1934, p. 57.  TNA, CAB 24/248/40, The Future of Germany, April 7, 1934, f. 251.  The Permanent Under-Secretary of State added that complex combinations were unnecessary; Germany was publicly and openly arming. Ibid., ff. 252– 253. He then gave specific example which showed how and in what fields Berlin was arming. Ibid., ff. 253 – 254. Vansittart also expressed his clear criticism of Hitler’s regime: “[…] Hitlerism has been based on nothing but false history; without this conscious distortion, it would have been impossible.” Ibid., f. 255.

68

III A Problem of Growing Significance

He thought that London would have to prepare in the long-term for the fact that Berlin would become its principle opponent, while also acknowledging the Nazi regime as a fact to work with. “Van” predicted that some form of conflagration would occur once his domestic position was consolidated, and he rejected the idea of any immediate threat. If anyone wanted to overthrow the regime, they would have to prepare for a large number of victims, possibly including some of our own, stated Sir Robert. At the end of his report, he rejected the terming of certain officials at the Foreign Office as pro- or anti-German, adding that an official always had to be impartial: “It is his responsibility to record and present facts, however unpalatable, nor it is his fault or desire that the facts should point in one direction.”¹⁷ Robert Vansittart was one of the people at the Foreign Office who were aware of the prevailing circumstances and although he did not call for war and his opinions cannot be termed strongly anti-German, in his memorandum he did nevertheless warn against self-righteousness and drew attention to the potential foreign policy threat posed by Germany, which he predicted following the domestic consolidation of the Nazi regime. It took the British Legation in Prague more than five months to prepare the above-mentioned despatch and send it to London. Comments by some Foreign Office officials over its wording testify on the one hand that they came as a surprise, and on the other hand that they were unaware of Addison’s critical opinions on Czechoslovakia.¹⁸ The Minister began his report by stating that the complexity of the German question in the Czechoslovak Republic went beyond the frame of his memorandum. He then took a trip into history, stating that there had been hatred between Czechs and Germans since at least the Middle Ages, such as during the Hussite Wars. “Another factor which complicates the task [an analysis of Czech-German relations – author’s note] is that, as already indicated in previous communications, the past history and present situation are so dependent upon what has occurred and is occurring outside the borders of Czechoslovakia, that no report with any pretence of completeness could avoid references to, and discussion of, events and tendencies in foreign countries in which I do not reside and as to which I am consequently not competent to express any

 Ibid., f. 256.  “This is a very interesting despatch. Sir J. Addison maintains his view that the overwhelming majority of the Germans in Czechoslovakia are Nazis.” This opinion is based on the conviction that the minority’s stagnation of opinion is caused by the measures of the Czechoslovak Government and not support for the German Government. TNA, FO 371/18382, R 4479/237/12, f. 57. “Three quarters of this despatch is devoted to Sir J. Addison’s dislike for the Czechs but pp 14– 18 contain the information for which we asked,” added another official. Ibid.

III A Problem of Growing Significance

69

opinion,” he added.¹⁹ The British Minister wrote that he was not considering Czech-German relations for the first time, as he had investigated it to varying degrees in previous years. As such he was repeating his opinions. He wrote, for example, that the Czechoslovak Government had undertaken measures in the past which had led to increases in the Czech population at the expense of other nationalities, substantiating this suggestion with a baseless claim that roughly half a million people wanted to be German but were officially listed as Czechs.²⁰ The introduction to Addison’s despatch clearly indicates to which side his sympathies lay. His excursions into history were over-simplified and made somewhat unorthodox conclusions in favour of the German population. Thoughts on who first settled the historic lands of the Kingdom of Bohemia and whom it was first home to were along the lines of the ideas of Bohemian, Moravian and Silesian Germans from the second half of the 19th century, rather than an investigation of relevant facts and were entirely inappropriate for a British diplomat whose opinion was meant to be independent. The subsequent passage looks at the attempts of Czech elites to create their own exclusively Czech state, something the Minister describes as done in vengeance for the previous endeavours of Germans within the Habsburg Monarchy. He then made a very serious accusation against the Czechs: “They found a country in which every good doctor was (and still is) a German, where the only chemist who could make up a prescription properly was a German, where most shops were German, where every industry and bank was (and still is to 90 per cent.) officered and managed by Germans. Only by injustice, partiality, and favouritism, only by what, for want a better term, I must call persecution and oppression, could these conditions be altered.”²¹ Adding to this incredible statement, Addison went on to say that this policy had been carried out by the governing elites for 15 years and it was still going on. The governing nation had apparently become accustomed to the almost invisible form of tyranny (in this context more a policy of slights) at which it excelled.²²

 Ibid., Sir J. Addison to Sir J. Simon, August 7, 1934, f. 58.  Ibid. Addison then stated clearly as fact that the historical lands had always been perceived more as German provinces settled by Czechs amongst others.  Ibid., p. 3.  Ibid. He claimed Czech policemen and officials were based on mainly German territory, did not speak German and did not understand the population there. German was a suppressed language and Czech schools and authorities were being built everywhere on German territory. He then presented some figures which he thought clearly showed the Germans were being suppressed. Ibid., p. 4.

70

III A Problem of Growing Significance

The British Minister had made a truly galling attack on Czechoslovak democracy and Government. The above quoted statement reveals his absolute ignorance of the situation, and is consistent with his previous (and unfortunately also subsequent) statements on Czechoslovakia as a country which was deliberately suppressing its national minority. On the other hand, it should be noted that the considerable leeway awarded to individual Government authorities and regional Government bodies can in a certain regard be considered as probably the greatest weakness of Czechoslovak constitutional law and its administrative regulations dealing with the protection of national minorities. Although German minority representatives complained of various injustices from officials, in most cases these were not deliberate acts of Government policy, not even in the increasingly tense atmosphere of the end of the first half of the 1930s. No law could regulate in detail all situations which might occur day by day, and because laws are made by people and it is mainly up to people to observe them, goodwill and a willingness to live together was above all what was needed. Addison then informed the Foreign Office that “the German minority hate the Czechs as intensely as it is possible for human beings to hate others, and they would welcome any upheaval which would bring about Czech discomfiture”.²³ Once again, this is a biased and entirely untrue statement. There was no doubt that some German citizens were resistant to Czechoslovakia, and some even hated it, but there were also others who had adjusted and were adjusting to Czechoslovakia’s existence; one need simply recall the activist parties, or at least certain politicians (Franz Spina would serve as a good example here).²⁴ These Germans perceived Czechoslovakia as a guarantee of the democratic development of Central Europe. The Minister then described all Sudeten Germans as Nazis. He did add, however, that there were two or perhaps ten thousand Germans in the historic lands who were not Nazis, saying that they were Social Democrats, Jews and some others who welcomed the prevailing state of affairs. But he thought this did not change anything in regard to the fact that most Germans wanted change.²⁵

 Ibid.  Cf. Novotný, L., Franz Spina (1868 – 1938), in: Acta Fakulty filozofické Západočeské univerzity v Plzni, No. 2, 2013, pp. 99 – 123.  TNA, FO 371/18382, R 4479/237/12, p. 4. He was of the opinion that any German would rather be bullied by members of the SA than Czech policemen. According to Addison, it was not necessarily about the Germans’ sympathy for Hitler or Goebbels, but rather support for the Nazi movement. “The minority would all exclaim ‘Heil Hitler!’, because they cannot well say ‘Heil Beneš!’ or ‘Heil Malypetr!’”, he added. Ibid., pp. 5 – 6. Addison’s opinions were not confirmed in Ferdinand Marek’s report for Vienna, and instead he wrote of the resolve of the German Social

III A Problem of Growing Significance

71

In the final passage of his despatch, the British Minister wrote that the German minority in their endeavours were not primarily supporting the Berlin Government, but rather that it was more of a spontaneous and natural process.²⁶ He thought that outwardly Czech-German relations were decorous, but there was infighting going on under the surface. At the very end, he made sure to criticise Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš for his uncompromising position towards the German minority.²⁷ The British Minister to Prague’s August despatch contained potentially explosive information. The allegations that the governing majority was unable to produce a single doctor, that Czechoslovakia was governed through targeted persecution and suppression of the German minority and that all Germans hated Czechs were not true and, in most cases, related in no way to reality. The Minister was unable to move on from his previous experience (including his position in Berlin) and he included objective lies in his despatch. More important, however, was the fact that some Foreign Office officials considered his information to be relevant, despite being aware of Addison’s aversion towards Czechoslovakia. Although it was true that Czech-German relations had not been ideal when the state was established and that even after the passage of time some Sudeten Germans had been unable to rid themselves of their opposition to the state, this did not give the British Minister the right to make such generalisations and simplifications. As such, his despatch was not primarily important because of the information it contained, but rather because of the concept which it helped to foster amongst the Foreign Office officials; a concept of two enemy camps; Czechs Democrats to defend the Republic. Cf. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien, Abteilung Archiv der Republik [Austrian State Archives, Archives of the Republic] (hereinafter OeStA/AdR), Auswärtige Angelegenheiten 1918 – 2005 (hereinafter AAng), Österreichische Vertretungsbehörden im Ausland 1. Republik, 1893 – 1945 (hereinafter ÖVB), Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 33, Berichte, Weisungen 1934 (IV – VI), Zl. 162/Pol, Prag, am 3. April 1934. He repeated his opinion a few months later when he wrote that the vast majority of Czechoslovak Germans were glad, based on the latest reports from Germany (for example the Night of the Long Knives), to be living in Czechoslovakia and that the pro-Republic stance of most German political parties was fundamental for the Czechoslovak public. Ibid., kt. 34, Berichte, Weisungen 1934 (VII – IX), Zl. 491/Pol, Prag, am 28. August 1934.  Even the Minister to Berlin, Vojtěch Mastný, had to admit that Hitler appeared outwardly to be refusing to engage in Czechoslovakia’s internal affairs. AMZV, PZ Berlín, 1934, běžná zpráva č. 25, 2. března 1934, p. 1. A few weeks later, however, even he had to note the deterioration in Czech-German relations. Ibid., periodická zpráva č. I, 1. května 1934, pp. 51– 53.  TNA, FO 371/18382, R 4479/237/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir J. Simon, August 7, 1934, p. 6. Even Czechoslovak politician Kamil Krofta had to declare in April 1934 that, “the Czechoslovak Government was not losing its nerve and would continue implementing its current policies”. AT-OeStA/AdR/AAng ÖVB 1Rep Prag, kt. 33, Zl. 183/Pol, Prag, am 11. April 1934.

72

III A Problem of Growing Significance

who were deliberately suppressing Germans and Germans who were naturally building up a real and deep hatred of the Czechs. Czech-German relations once more became a focus for the British Legation in Prague at the end of October 1934 when Joseph Addison informed Foreign Secretary John Simon of the endeavours of Konrad Henlein and his Front of Sudeten German Homeland to unite all Sudeten Germans within one political camp. The Minister looked back to October 1933 when the SHF was established and gave a relatively brief assessment of its year of operating. He believed it had already been clear to Henlein in March 1934 that his attempt at creating a united front of German parties would not succeed. Addison put forward an interesting idea that already then the SHF leader had decided to transform the movement into a political party and submit an independent candidate list for any future elections.²⁸ The Minister went on to claim that from that moment onwards, Henlein endeavoured to find rapprochement with some German parties; although he naturally did not contact the Social Democrats. Although it was generally known of Franz Spina of the BdL’s sympathy towards the SHF,²⁹ along with some Christian Socials, no political collaboration took place, he added. Nevertheless, Addison claimed that the SHF could boast of one success; a large growth in membership. Of the SHF leader’s future plans, the British Minister estimated that Henlein’s principal objective was at that time to organise a large public gathering, but he had to add that he had already failed twice – the Government had not permitted his political rallies in Karlovy Vary and in Jablonec nad Nisou.³⁰ Konrad Henlein was successful the third time when the Cabinet approved a rally in Česká Lípa, which occurred on 21 October 1934. The British Minister described his triumphal arrival, apparently followed by the frenetic applause of his

 TNA, FO 371/18382, R 6108/1070/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir J. Simon, October 29, 1934, f. 227.  Novotný, L., “Na pana Špínu profesora si dejte v Praze též pozor, jest to Čech rozený, ale škodlivý teď Němec.” K činnosti čelného představitele německého aktivismu v první Československé republice Franze Spiny [“Also, be careful about Mr. Špina, who is born in Prague, but German is harmful now.” The Activities of the Leading Representative of German Activism in the First Czechoslovak Republic, Franz Spina], in: Historica Olomucensia (Sborník prací historických XXXII), 44, 2013, pp. 107– 108. At the end of 1934, however, the BdL’s sympathies cooled markedly and the German Agrarians later strongly condemned the SHF’s activities. Ibid., p. 108.  TNA, FO 371/18382, R 6108/1070/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir J. Simon, October 29, 1934, f. 227; cf. also Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Paris (hereinafter AMAE), Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 116, Politique étrangère, Allemands de Bohême, Noël à Barthou, le 3 octobre 1934, ff. 119 – 120; ibid., Noël à Barthou, le 16 octobre 1934, ff. 125 – 126. Novotný, L., Kameradschaftsbund. A Contribution to the History of the Czech-German Relationship. (Part two), in: Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, 13, 2009, p. 392. Bund der Landwirte deputy Wolfgang Zierhut had vouched the rally would go smoothly.

III A Problem of Growing Significance

73

supporters who believed in him totally and who would follow him everywhere, he added. He went on to describe the social status of the crowd, saying that they mainly comprised the middle classes (clerks and others), with only a few workers making an appearance in Česká Lípa according to the Minister. Addison informed the Foreign Office that in his speech, the SHF leader stressed his desire to co-operate with the Czechoslovak Government and rejected war as a threat both for Germans and Czechs, and Addison quoted what he considered were important words from Henlein: “We are neither Fascists nor National Socialists, […] neither of these movements could be applied to our special conditions.”³¹ But Henlein’s declaration was just smoke and mirrors. A large section of the membership worked for the DNSAP and the movement received funding from Germany. In fact, according to some the SHF leader had taken Nazi ideas as his own and was ready to stand alongside Adolf Hitler when the time was right.³² It remains true, however, that the Česká Lípa rally was held in a conciliatory spirit towards the Czechoslovak Republic. Some Foreign Office officials were aware of this and concluded that if the Government didn’t want to lose face, then it could not significantly oppose the wording of Henlein’s speech. As such, British politicians and diplomats at this time perceived the SHF as a movement which stood firmly within Czechoslovakia. Minister Addison, however, also informed John Simon of the opposing position of German minority representatives in Czechoslovakia to that maintained by the Front of Sudeten German Homeland. In the second week of November, he sent a report to London in which he described a political meeting of German Social Democrats in which the following rallying cry was made: “Against Hen TNA, FO 371/18382, R 6108/1070/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir J. Simon, October 29, 1934, p. 2. The SHF leader later rejected the restoration of the Habsburg Monarchy, and outlined the importance of the language issue, which should not, however, became a means of political struggle but rather clear evidence of an agreement between the state and its citizens, he added. Ibid. According to Nicolas J. A. Cheetham of the Foreign Office, the Czechs could not criticise anything Henlein had said, but on the other hand Prague suspected the SHF of pro-Nazi sympathies, and this appeared closer to the truth, he added. “In the circumstances, the German minority in Czechoslovakia has been relatively […] loyal to the Govt.,” concluded Cheetham. Ibid., f. 226. This time, the British Legation’s report was in agreement with Ferdinand Marek’s information, which confirmed Henlein’s rejection of the return of the Habsburgs and also focused in on his propagandistic words: “The fate of the Sudeten Germans can only be formed and decided in Prague,” repeating Henlein’s declaration of commitment to Czechoslovakia. AT-OeStA/AdR/AAng ÖVB 1Rep Prag, kt. 35, Berichte, Weisungen 1934 (X – XII), Zl. 600/Pol, Prag, am 11. Oktober 1934.  Novotný, Kameradschaftsbund, p. 393; Suppan, A., Hitler – Beneš – Tito. Konflikt, Krieg und Völkermord in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa. Teil 1 [Hitler – Benes – Tito. Conflict, War and Genocide in East Central and Southeastern Europe. Part 1], Wien 2014, pp. 465 – 466; AT-OeStA/AdR/ AAng ÖVB 1Rep Prag, kt. 35, Zl. 676/Pol, Prag, am 8. November 1934.

74

III A Problem of Growing Significance

lein’s Masked Fascism – for Democracy.”³³ The leaders of the German Social Democratic Workers’ Party in the Czechoslovak Republic (Deutsche sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik; DSAP) and speakers at the meeting rejected not just the claim of the SHF leadership that it was the strongest political formation in the country, but also the gesture and outward form of Henlein’s speech, and through the words of its leader, Ludwig Czech, clearly declared itself as a party constructive towards the state.³⁴ Both reports on the SHF and DSAP gatherings showed there was a growing polarisation of the Sudeten German political spectrum in the Czechoslovak Republic. The Front of Sudeten German Homeland began to act outwardly as if it was the only representative defending the interests of the German minority. DSAP, in contrast, rejected its proclamation. The British Legation in Prague was fair and impartial in its reports on both affairs. Considering Minister Addison’s sympathies, there was no clear preference for the SHF in his reports, which corresponded to the trend of his opinions at the time. For the moment, the Legation if anything recommended the Government co-operate with the largest minority as a whole. The British Legation did not reflect only on the growing division between the German political parties (although the SHF was officially a movement), but also on the occasional “pin pricking” of Czechoslovak authorities towards the German minority. This is confirmed in Minister Addison’s report on the decree of the President of the Regional Court in Cheb to all judges, court officials and other employees to use only the official language in official communications. In his circular, the President of the Regional Court complained that the 1926 language regulation was not being adhered to, and that certain judges who were exempt from the requirement of speaking Czech due to their age were acting as if Austria-Hungary continued to exist. “It is thus not surprising that official intercourse between German judges is exclusively conducted in German, a circumstance which tempts even Czech employees to use the German language in their intercourse with their superiors,” criticised the President of the Regional Court the situation.³⁵ He then added that the whole matter gave him the impression of a pre-prepared act whose consequences were not just damage to the state’s prestige, but also creating the impression that the whole Cheb region was German. As such, it was essential that the state ensured its regulations

 TNA, FO 371/18382, R 6408/1070/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir J. Simon, November 10, 1934, f. 240.  Ibid.  TNA, FO 371/18382, R 6732/237/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir J. Simon, November 26, 1934, f. 90.

III A Problem of Growing Significance

75

were observed, he declared and ordered thorough observance of the language regulation of 1926.³⁶ Joseph Addison called the above event a trivial incident which did not have a major impact, but which essentially illustrated the typical image of “tyranny in miniature” as he wrote himself. The Minister criticised such an approach saying that forcing a German judge in a substantially German district to speak to his colleagues in a language he had almost no command of seemed not just unfair to him, but also absurd, and he compared it to a demand that two English school pupils speak French to each other. In conclusion, he expressed his fears of a further deterioration in Czech-German relations.³⁷ Addison’s fears were not unfounded. As will be seen below, the end of 1934 really did bring with it a certain heightening of tensions between both nationalities. The case of German communication between two German-speaking judges would have undoubtedly been a trivial matter which the British Legation would not have reported on a decade earlier. But 1934– 1935 was different; Addison himself did not dare to judge whether a breach of the language regulation had occurred; the response of the President of the Cheb Regional Court was clear and in a way responded to the context of the time, influenced by the foreign policy climate. Geography played a role here too; a situation like this would be very unlikely to have occurred in Central Bohemia. On 21 November 1934, the Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment ordered the German University in Prague to return the ancient insignia to the Czech University, as it was this university which had been declared the successor to the ancient Charles University in 1920.³⁸ The German University, however, refused to recognise this law and had kept hold of the insignia since the act had been passed. In 1933, the new Rector of the Czech University, Karel Domin,³⁹ took

 Ibid., ff. 90 – 91.  Ibid., ff. 91– 92.  Act no. 135/1920 Coll. on the relationships of Prague Universities, named after its submitter, university professor and Rector of the Charles University and National Democrat, František Mareš, as Lex Mareš, which was passed in February 1920, stated: “The Czech University is the successor of the ancient Charles teachings. The name of both Prague Universities determined by the Act of 28 February 1882, no. 24: ‘Czech Charles-Ferdinand University’ and ‘German Charles-Ferdinand University’ are abolished. The name ‘Charles University’ will be returned to the Czech University. The name of the German University will be determined in a separate act.” Sb. z. a n., Vol. 1920, p. 319. In Section 5, the act also awarded the Czech University all insignia and seals. The Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment was to decide on the method by which they would be transferred. Ibid., p. 320.  The Rector of the Czech University wrote: “[…] the Senate considers it its urgent duty to expend all efforts to ensure the named objects [insignia, sceptres and other objects – author’s

76

III A Problem of Growing Significance

an interest in the matter, and his complaint was upheld by the Regional Civil Court in Prague in February 1934. Once the Academic Senate and rectorate of the German University had made the decision not to recognise the judgement, Minister of Education and National Enlightenment, Jan Krčmář, decided in November that the insignia should be handed over (somewhat paradoxically at a time when the role of Rector was being performed by lawyer and economist Josef Drachovský). Thus, began an affair called insigniáda in Czech history, which had a major impact both on Czech-German relations and relations between the two universities. The British Minister termed the whole affair a sad demonstration of the current state of Czech-German relations. He told London that when the German University management had acquainted themselves with the Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment’s decree, the Academic Senate met and determined that the Czechs’ current conduct was unacceptable for the German University and they asked the Rector to immediately begin discussions with his Czech colleague to resolve the whole dispute. Addison then referred to the incident regarding observance of the language regulation at the Regional Court in Cheb (see above), which resulted in a feeling of grievance amongst German politicians. He also referred to the requested manner that the insignia be handed over, which he termed humiliating. He had received information that Prime Minister Jan Malypetr had refused to change anything in the Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment’s decree, instead telling German politicians who spoke to him that he would ensure that the form of handover of the insignia was satisfactory to both sides.⁴⁰ Some German opposition parties (for example the Christian Socials and the Traders) also sent delegations to the Prime Minister to warn him of the danger of an upturn in Czech-German ethnic conflict. Students also began to be radicalised, on both the Czech and German sides. Some Czech students even chanted anti-Jewish slogans. According to the British Minister, it was not clear why this had happened, but it may have been related to the fact that most Prague Jews spoke German. Addison also accused the National Democrats and Stříbrný’s League of having used anti-German and anti-Semitic rhetoric for many years. On the other hand, he added that the Social Democratic and National Socialist press

note], if they are in the hands of the German University in Prague, are submitted for the purposes of the University Museum […].” Cf. Archiv Národního muzea [Archives of the National Museum], Praha, fond Karel Domin, kt. 38, No. 379, 1933/34, October 30, 1933. Karel Domin spoke again to the Ministry in March 1934. Ibid., No. 379/2 – B 8/2– 1933/34.  TNA, FO 371/18382, R 6735/237/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir J. Simon, November 27, 1934, ff. 96 – 98.

III A Problem of Growing Significance

77

gave sober assessments of the events and regretted the excesses of Czech students.⁴¹ The insignia affair lasted around three days and contributed to a deterioration not just in Czech-German relations, but also relations between both universities and in particular it inflamed students on both sides. Nationalist groupings also influenced the position of the British Legation, whose officials perceived such events negatively. They considered it excess provocation from the Czechs at a time when universities and serious academics should rather be endeavouring to find an amicable solution. The dispute over the ancient insignia itself was not just about which university would have it, because at this period it was rather a product of the increased atmosphere of hostility which was reigning between Czechs and Germans and which divided the Czech political camp into two fronts – democratic and extreme nationalist. The British Legation in Prague came to a similar conclusion, considering it an incomprehensible conflict of marginal importance.

 Ibid., ff. 98 – 99. In the end, the insignia was handed over at the Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment, with the German University Rector giving it to the minister who then gave it to the Rector of the Charles University. Other Foreign Office officials also considered the events around the handing over of the university insignia to be provocative and damaging to Czech-German relations at a time when seeking reconciliation was most needed. Ibid., f. 95. Minister Addison informed Foreign Secretary John Simon of the protest of the Rector of the Friedrich Wilhelm University in Berlin, Professor Eugen Fischer, and students from Germany who stood fully behind their colleague in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak press, however, strongly condemned such declarations. Cf. ibid., R 7104/237/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir J. Simon, December 8, 1934, ff. 103 – 105. Vojtěch Mastný also informed Černín Palace of heightened protests, writing that around 300 youths had gathered in front of the Czechoslovak Legation building, with members of the SA and SS standing amongst them. Some threw stones at the windows and chanted offensive slogans against Czechoslovakia, he added. AMZV, PZ Berlín, 1934, běžná zpráva č. 91, 29. listopadu 1934, pp. 1– 3.

IV A Landmark Year The year 1934 confirmed the continuing and in a certain sense ever slowly ratcheting up tension in Czech-German relations. The Foreign Office’s policy line, with a clear preference for Germany in Central Europe as confirmed by Robert Vansittart’s April memo, had to acknowledge the increasing importance of Czech-German relations for the development of the Czechoslovak Republic, if as yet locally limited with no impact on the behaviour of surrounding states. Although at this time British diplomats did not see a visible and clear connection between the Sudeten German issue and Berlin’s politics, and the Foreign Office believed its solution lay in an agreement between the Czechoslovak Government and the largest minority as a whole, those at the British Legation in Prague, in particular Joseph Addison, repeatedly gave the impression that there was hatred and a lack of understanding between the two ethnic groups, or they were sympathetic to the Sudeten Germans’ position on Czechoslovakia. In early 1935, Robert Hadow¹ at the British Legation in Prague informed London of Germany’s proposal to the Czechoslovak Government in regard to a nonaggression pact lasting fifteen years, something the Legation Secretary considered a positive step which had also been confirmed to him in a discussion with Jan Masaryk in Lány (5 January). Hadow said that the Czechoslovak Minister to London, who was at home at the time, thought acceptance of the proposal should be discussed, but only with the active support of France. On the other hand, Masaryk and Beneš both considered Mussolini, not Hitler, as Europe’s main villain at that time.² The British Legation Secretary then suggested there was a possibility that Prague could agree with Berlin, and this was a very important moment in his perception of the Czech-German issue; until that time he had sided more with the German minority.³ The proposal for a pact comprised a two-

 “Hadow was not a significant figure in the 1930s as he did not hold a high position in the diplomatic service, but his recommendations, from Czechoslovakia especially, did serve to influence British policy regarding Germany and that country, and his despatches of the 1930s give a very clear and detailed account of his increasingly enthusiastic support of the policy associated with Neville Chamberlain.” Michie, L. W., Portrait of an Appeaser. Robert Hadow, First Secretary in the British Foreign Office, 1931 – 1939, Westport 1996, pp. 1– 2.  The National Archives (hereinafter TNA), Foreign Office (hereinafter FO) 371/19492, R 210/210/ 12, Hadow to O’Malley, January 7, 1935, f. 25.  Ibid. Hadow related Masaryk’s position to Italian support for endeavours to restore the Habsburgs. He even thought, although he admitted he might be wrong, that an agreement with Germany was preferable for Masaryk to any restoration of the Habsburg dynasty. Ibid., f. 26. The British Legation Secretary had now admitted there would be a future parliamentary election https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110651454-005

80

IV A Landmark Year

page plan which spoke in its introduction of the German Nationalist Party, something which was nonsensical in terms of the composition of the Czechoslovak Parliament since no such party existed. It can be inferred from a more detailed study of the proposal that this meant the German Electoral Coalition (Deutsche Wahlgemeinschaft), a formation which had stood in the 1929 election, since its introduction mentions deputy Alfred Rosche, 16 deputies and 9 senators and this corresponds to the electoral results of the coalition. According to the document, Jan Masaryk began discussions with Rosche, with his father’s consent, to go through options for Czechoslovak-German co-operation, and specifically Rosche’s idea of a future non-aggression pact to apply for fifteen years, “which would guarantee the status quo and the absolute loyalty of the German minority in Czechoslovakia towards the Czech Government”.⁴ Foreign Office officials’ positions in response to Robert Hadow’s report on the possibility of a Czechoslovak-German pact oscillated between cautious scepticism and a belief that Czechoslovakia had realised Germany’s growing importance and was willing to come to some kind of agreement with it. The proposal of the pact itself, however, was only an ambiguous outline, lacking a clear timetable (its delay until after the Saar status referendum suggests it may have been of little importance) and lacking a clear and identifiable author, the only name on it being Alfred Rosche, a member of the Czechoslovak Parliament of German nationality. Furthermore, reliable reports from Vojtěch Mastný in Berlin attested

in Czechoslovakia, and he thought that either spring or autumn were under consideration. He admitted he did not know much about domestic policy, “but I have a feeling that the Government will go some way in an endeavour to placate or win over German sentiment in this country prior to the elections,” he added. Ibid, f. 28. Robert Hadow’s above estimation of the election date was confirmed by Prime Minister Jan Malypetr, declaring on 11 January 1935 that an election would most likely take place in September and that any parties advocating a cult of leader would be disqualified. Cf. TNA, FO 371/19492, R 388/234/12, Hadow to Simon, January 12, 1935, f. 80. The French Legation in Prague also stated in early February 1935 that the election was approaching, although it was unaware of the precise date. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Paris (hereinafter AMAE), Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 103, Politique intérieure, chargé d’affaires Monicault à Laval, le 3 février 1935, f. 52.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 210/210/12, Hadow to O’Malley, January 7, 1935, f. 31. Germany was to undertake to help improve Czechoslovak-Polish relations. In return it asked for a free hand in Austria and assistance in isolating Italy. A detailed plan of negotiations was to become clear after the Saar status referendum was complete. Ibid., ff. 31– 32. Nicolas J. A. Cheetham from the Foreign Office, referring to Hadow’s report, asked himself whether it was currently in Germany’s interest to isolate Italy, and Owen O’Malley came to the conclusion that Prague, like Belgrade, had decided that it was beneficial to come to an agreement with Germany before it was too strong and any pact would no longer be so beneficial to it. Ibid., ff. 24– 25.

IV A Landmark Year

81

to Hitler’s plans to expand to the east and destroy Czechoslovakia, thus suggesting that the signature of this agreement was more of a diplomatic game than proposal of serious intent.⁵ The Saar status referendum which took place on 13 January 1935 ended with clear victory for proponents of rejoining Germany (this occurred officially on 1 March). Its outcome had a natural impact on the situation in Czechoslovakia, with reports from the British Legation which was monitoring the daily press stating that there was a threat of German action in Austria, and Právo lidu claiming there was a danger of Nazi propaganda transferring to Czechoslovakia. Joseph Addison, the author of the report, paid greater attention to the situation in Austria in line with the Foreign Office’s prevailing foreign policy line,⁶ with only a little mention made of Czechoslovakia. He thought that up until February 1934 there had been a clear majority in Austria in favour of preserving the country’s independence, but now he was not so sure.⁷ Amongst other matters, the Legation also monitored the activities of the SHF, with an SHF meeting taking place at the end of January 1935 in Mariánské Lázně. A key speaker at the meeting was Walter Brand,⁸ who declared that fifteen years had already passed, which is a long time for fulfilling promises, and added: “For

 Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí České republiky [The Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic], Praha (hereinafter AMZV), Politické zprávy (dále jen PZ) Berlín, 1935, běžná zpráva č. 8, 27. ledna 1935, p. 1. A memorandum which the British Government had in March 1936 and whose author was Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, suggests that the offer of non-aggression pacts came about during the winter of 1933 – 1934 and that Hitler presented it in his speech of 21 May 1935. Cf. TNA, Cabinet Office (hereinafter CAB) 24/261/3 (War Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda), March 8, 1936, f. 189. However, at the end of February 1934 Berlin rejected the idea of concluding a pact with Czechoslovakia similar to its arrangement with Poland. Cf. Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918 – 1945. Aus dem Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (hereinafter ADAP), Serie C: 1933 – 1937, Das Dritte Reich: die ersten Jahre [Files to the German Foreign Policy 1918 – 1945. From the Archive of the Foreign Office, Series C: 1933 – 1937, The Third Reich: the First Years], Bd. II/2, Göttingen 1973, das Auswärtige Amt an den Gesandten in Prag Koch, Doc. No. 293, Berlin, den 27. Februar 1934, p. 537.  The British Minister to Austria Walford Selby wrote in 1934 that the independence of Austria is essential for the maintenance of peace. University of Oxford, Bodleian Libraries (Weston Library), Selby Papers, MS. Eng. c. 6587, f. 85.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 459/234/12, Addison to Simon, January 18, 1935, ff. 82– 83. According to the German Legation, however, the vast majority of the German minority had felt impacted by the Saar status referendum, and most of the press, except the Marxist press, welcomed it. Cf. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes [Political Archives of the Foreign Ministry], Berlin (hereinafter PA AA), Tschechoslowakei, R 73841 (Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker), Prag, den 23. Januar 1935, E643669.  Walter Brand (1907– 1980) was a leading Sudeten German politician.

82

IV A Landmark Year

us, too, election time is near. It will be another case of a Saar plebiscite. I know that a certain press will say ‘Ah you want to go to Germany’, but I declare that the election will be a Saar plebiscite either for status quo of party division or for ‘new flags’ and a union which shall lead the German parties out of the present chaos. A short time ago, a Czech writer⁹ declared ‘we do not desire to Czechify you – we wish to Czechoslovakise you.’ Well, we are Czechoslovak citizens but will never become Czechoslovaks.”¹⁰ This was confirmation of the line which the Front of Sudeten German Homeland had set when the movement had been established, the idea that all Sudeten Germans had to be joined in one subject and that political parties and their arguments were not effective. Konrad Henlein later added that Sudeten Germans would never give up and that the SHF was expressing their will.¹¹ It can be observed the British Legation in Prague thought that the Saar status referendum had influenced the mood amongst the Front of Sudeten German Homeland, favouring calls for unity and overcoming the chaos of Government by political parties. The opinions of Foreign Office officials differed, however – some supported the idea of the plebiscite’s influence while others rejected it and confirmed instability in the operation of German political parties.¹² The British Legation’s January report on the Sudeten German issue in Czechoslovakia showed signs of the standard approach, disregarding Robert Hadow and

 This writer was Karel Čapek, who was writing in Lidové noviny. Wiskemann, E., Czechs & Germans. A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, London 1967, p. 251.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 839/234/12, Addison to Simon, January 30, 1935, f. 85.  Ibid., f. 86. According to Henlein, some were calling for the movement’s prohibition, or for it not being permitted to stand in the election, but the SHF leader added that they would see. Austrian Minister to Prague, Ferdinand Marek, wrote to Foreign Minister Egon Berger-Waldenegg to say the situation in the German camp was sufficiently known about with one exception, that being Konrad Henlein, and that it was not clear whether he would manage to achieve his proposed objective. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien, Abteilung Archiv der Republik [Austrian State Archives, Archives of the Republic] (hereinafter OeStA/AdR), Auswärtige Angelegenheiten 1918 – 2005 (hereinafter AAng), Österreichische Vertretungsbehörden im Ausland 1. Republik, 1893 – 1945 (hereinafter ÖVB), Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 36, Politische Korrespondenz 1934– 1935 II, Berichte, Weisungen 1935 (I – II), Zl. 20/Pol, Prag, am 11. Jänner 1935.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 839/234/12, Addison to Simon, January 30, 1935, f. 84. British Ambassador to Berlin, Eric Phipps, however, had to confirm the undoubted impact of the status referendum on the Third Reich’s domestic and foreign policies and the boosting of Hitler’s position. Cf. TNA, CAB 24/259/13, Sir E. Phipps to Sir John Simon, Berlin, January 22, 1935, f. 65. He also thought that the German Chancellor was on a high and it would be difficult to discuss anything with him and he was not averse to the idea that events might also influence the German minority in Czechoslovakia. Ibid.

IV A Landmark Year

83

his position regarding a Prague-Berlin agreement, and it was also lacking, besides repeated statements, any clear opinions which might somehow resonate in London. As such, it is no surprise that Foreign Office officials often came up with conflicting opinions which revealed their uncertainty over the issue. Robert Vansittart himself declared in a discussion with Jan Masaryk that the British Government did not trust Hitler and that as long as his plans were unclear, there was no point in formulating a British policy towards Central and Eastern Europe.¹³ The end of January 1935 saw one event in the British Legation’s agenda which Joseph Addison had to mention and which indirectly related to Czech-German relations in Czechoslovakia – the 23 January murder of German engineer and refugee from Hitler, Rudolf Formis. The British Minister informed Foreign Secretary John Simon in full detail of the planning, execution and subsequent successful escape of the culprits, and finally criticised both Berlin and Prague. He considered Formis’s murder as further proof of the “Balkanisation” of German foreign policy which didn’t even baulk at killing even on the territory of a foreign state, and he was also convinced that certain employees of the German Legation in Prague knew of the act. He also thought the Czechoslovak Government had made an error when it allowed anti-German propaganda on its territory, something which might be acceptable from a moral perspective, but which certainly did not contribute towards positive neighbourly relations, stated Addison, adding that this time it was suspicious that border inspection had failed, as he said it was normally very thorough. He also criticised the Czechoslovak Government indirectly for a misguided policy regarding German refugees from Nazism.¹⁴ It was the opinion of the British Minister that Rudolf Formis’s death would not affect relations between Czechs and Sudeten Germans, or rather he did not even mention this as a possibility in his report; the document sounded more like an indictment of the poor relations between two neighbours with one deciding to murder someone on the other’s territory. At the beginning of March 1935, Minister Addison contacted Orme Sargent to inform him that the discussions between Sudeten Germans and Czechs (see

 AMZV, PZ Londýn, 1935, běžná zpráva č. 3, 6. února 1935, p. 1.  TNA, FO 371/19494, R 841/841/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir John Simon, January 31, 1935, pp. 1– 2. In early February, German Minister Walter Koch met with Kamil Krofta, with the Czechoslovak politician referring to Formis’s death as an “unfortunate act”. According to the Minister’s words, the deed was of no importance for him, with the whole affair to be investigated by the Attorney General. Cf. ADAP, Serie C: 1933 – 1937, Das Dritte Reich: die ersten Jahre, Bd. III/2, Göttingen 1973, der Gesandte in Prag Koch an das Auswärtige Amt, Doc. No. 477, Prag, den 2. Februar 1935, pp. 881– 883.

84

IV A Landmark Year

above), in which Jan Masaryk had played an important role, had collapsed and now the Czechoslovak Minister saw no other option than to attempt to initiate direct discussions between German and Czech military leaders. Logically enough, the Minister did not understand what the Czechoslovak Minister to London meant and what he expected from any discussions because if it was about the non-aggression pact then politicians had a role to play besides soldiers, and Addison’s information did not mention them.¹⁵ The Minister went on to say that Czech officials had finally realised that Henlein’s Front of Sudeten German Homeland, which he himself for a lack of an appropriate term called a “Nazi” movement, was growing in strength and that something had to be done. The German Agrarians were increasingly alarmed, continued Addison and were afraid of election losses to the SHF, adding: “[…] the Czechs are hesitating between suppressing the Henlein Party officially and attempting, in some manner or other, to conciliate, by public utterances, the German population of this country.” The British Minister had very accurately described the atmosphere around the Front of the Sudeten German Homeland; Czech officials truly were considering the two options mentioned above. He himself considered the first option inadvisable and the second hopeless, belying his scepticism regarding a possible broad agreement between the Czechoslovak Government and the largest minority in the country.¹⁶

 TNA, FO 371/19492, R 1517/234/12, Addison to Sargent, March 5, 1935, f. 93. In August, Minister of Agriculture Milan Hodža confirmed in an interview with Italian journalist Italo Zingarelli that Prague could not accept the offer of a pact with Berlin, because it was an attempt to break the Little Entente. Cf. ibid., R 5118/234/12, Hadow to Wigram, August 9, 1935, f. 34. Furthermore, in March 1935 John Simon travelled to Berlin where he spoke with Adolf Hitler, who dismissed the idea of war between Germany and Czechoslovakia because of the arbitration treaty. Cf. TNA, CAB 23/81/18 (War Cabinet and Cabinet: Minutes), Notes of Anglo-German Conversations, held at the Chancellor’s Palace, Berlin, March 25 and 26, 1935, p. 6. Otherwise, the discussions confirmed the idea that Czechoslovakia was not an important point in the agenda of both states at that time, with almost no mention being made of the country. Instead, the talk focused on Austria, the League of Nations and, of course, British-German mutual relations.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 1517/234/12, Addison to Sargent, March 5, 1935, f. 94. It was the opinion of one Foreign Office official in early April that it was clear from Addison’s next report of 19 March that Prague had decided to support the prohibition of the SHF. He then added, however, that he had spoken with some trader from Liberec who thought that, “there was no real desire among the Germans in Czechoslovakia for a return to Germany”. In terms of their business interests, the diplomat continued, it was better to stay where they were rather than face competition from German industry. Ibid., ff. 90 – 91. The SHF had become a major domestic problem for Czechoslovakia, as a well organised group organised according to the NSDAP strong leadership principle, noted Austrian Minister Ferdinand Marek. AT-OeStA/AdR/AAng ÖVB 1Rep Prag, kt. 37, Berichte, Weisungen 1935 (III – VII), Zl. 112/Pol, Prag, am 4. März 1935. His French

IV A Landmark Year

85

Fourteen days later, Joseph Addison sent Foreign Secretary John Simon¹⁷ a report in which he had to correct Hadow’s information from January about the holding of a parliamentary election as mentioned above; it now looked as if it was going to take place in spring, most likely in May, he added. This shift had occurred because of the SHF and its potential prohibition, the British Minister thought, and not so much because of an actual direct prohibition in this regard, but rather to make things more difficult for political movement; it was still a political movement and this meant it could not stand for parliamentary election. Although both agrarian parties (Czech and German) supported some kind of agreement with Henlein’s movement, the other political parties did not, continued the Minister, adding that prevailing circumstances were certain to weaken the BdL in future.¹⁸ The British diplomat was unable to estimate how much rumours of the Front of Sudeten German Homeland’s objectives’ links to National Socialism corresponded to reality, but he thought that for reasons related to Edvard Beneš’s candidature for President of Czechoslovakia the existence of such a grouping was unacceptable to him, and equated to an attack on the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister.¹⁹ Thus, Joseph Addison corrected his estimate as to when the parliamentary election would take place in Czechoslovakia; his findings were that the original date had to be changed because of the actions of the SHF and their still impending prohibition, and at the same time from March there was now an open assumption that Edvard Beneš would succeed TGM as President. The succession was not a surprise; it was generally known that the first Czechoslovak President had requested the Foreign Minister of many years as his successor, but it is surprising that the British Legation knew as early as mid-March that Beneš would be a candidate and his wish because of this to prohibit the Front of the Sudeten German Homeland. Undoubtedly the disregard which the British Legation staff held the Foreign Minister to also played a role here.

colleague Léon Noël agreed in principle when he referred to potential Government reach in relation to the Henlein movement. M. Léon Noël à M. Laval, Prague, 19 février 1935, in: France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932 – 1939: (1932 – 1935): (16 janvier – 23 mars 1935) [French Diplomatic Documents 1932– 1939: (1932– 1935): (January 16 – March 23, 1935)], (hereinafter DDF), Ire Série, T. IX, Paris 1980, Doc. No. 241, p. 378.  The official of the Czechoslovak Legation in London Vilém Černý termed him pro-German along with Prime Minister James Ramsay MacDonald, although he thought his opinion had somewhat changed recently, while Stanley Baldwin, Anthony Eden and Robert Vansittart were pursuing co-operation with France and Italy, he added and noted Lord Beaverbrook and his isolationist politics. AMZV, PZ Londýn, 1935, běžná zpráva č. 14, 10. dubna 1935, p. 3.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 1929/234/12, Addison to Simon, March 19, 1935, f. 97.  Ibid., f. 98.

86

IV A Landmark Year

With the approaching fourth election to the National Assembly, the situation in Czechoslovakia accelerated somewhat, bringing increased attention from the British Legation in Prague. As such, in early April 1935, once again Joseph Addison informed John Simon on the political situation in the country and events around the SHF.²⁰ The Minister stated that the Front of Sudeten German Homeland was becoming a subject of passionate coalition debates, going on to say that within the governing coalition the National Socialists and Czech Social Democrats had said they were in favour of its prohibition.²¹ He had heard that Edvard Beneš had supported a ban in discussions with Austrian Minister Ferdinand Marek, “but others, including M. Malypetr, who is believed not to look with equanimity upon Dr. Beneš᾿ Presidential aspirations, are not sure of the wisdom of so drastic a measure,” added Addison.²² His analysis of the situation around the SHF continued with an overview of the possible election result, naturally on the assumption that Henlein’s grouping avoided a ban. The Minister saw an increase of around 19 seats in the Chamber of Deputies as likely and estimated that the BdL would lose around 9 seats and Henlein’s party would become the largest

 The movement became the Sudeten German Party (Sudetendeutsche Partei; SdP) on 19 April 1935. The new party made careful preparations for the election with funding available to it from Sudeten German entrepreneurs and Germany. More in detail cf. Kučera, J., Mezi Wilhelmstraße a Thunovskou. Finanční podpora Německé říše Sudetoněmecké straně v letech 1935 – 1938 [Between Wilhelmstraße and Thun Street. Financial Support from the German Reich to the Sudeten German Party in 1935 – 1938], in: Český časopis historický, 95, 1997, 2, p. 392. Friedrich Stieve from the German Foreign Ministry wrote of a sum of 300,000 Reichsmarks to support its election campaign. Cf. ADAP, Bd. III/2, Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats Stieve, Doc. No. 509, Berlin, den 27. Februar 1935, p. 947.  The German Social Democrats and people’s party also supported the ban. The Government, however, was unable to come to an agreement and the thorny issue was handed over to the Czechoslovak President, T. G. Masaryk. In the end, the President decided that the SHF would not be banned. According to Maria Vymazalová, there was not enough evidence to do so. Vymazalová, M., Sudetoněmecká strana 1935 – 1936 [Sudeten German Party, 1935 – 1936], Master Thesis, Praha 1999, p. 32. TGM said of Henlein that he had a schoolmaster character, “for whom honour is important […]”. César, J. – Černý, B., Politika německých buržoazních stran v Československu v letech 1918 – 1938. Díl II. (1930 – 1938) [Politics of German Bourgeois Parties in Czechoslovakia in 1918 – 1938. Part II. (1930 – 1938)], Praha 1962, p. 273. The President also considered such a step as “political suicide for Czechoslovakia”, and thought that it would not be democratic. Kuklík, J. – němeček, J., Národnostní problematika v Československu očima americké diplomacie (1933 – 1938) [Ethnic Issues in Czechoslovakia through the Eyes of American Diplomacy (1933 – 1938)], in: Moderní dějiny. Časopis pro dějiny 19. a 20. století, 19, 2, 2011, p. 191.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 2305/234/12, Addison to Simon, April 2, 1935, f. 101. Jan Malypetr’s unwillingness to ban the SHF was also confirmed by Austrian Minister Marek. Cf. AT-OeStA/AdR/ AAng ÖVB 1Rep Prag, kt. 37, Berichte, Weisungen 1935 (III – VII), Zl. 119/Pol, Prag, am 12. März 1935.

IV A Landmark Year

87

opposition party in the Chamber of Deputies, although he acknowledged that this was pure speculation and personal estimation at the moment.²³ In the end, the Czechoslovak Government decided not to ban the SHF/SdP, with President Masaryk’s position playing an important role in this, as another of Addison’s reports to Foreign Secretary Simon confirmed. Konrad Henlein wrote a long personal telegram to TGM²⁴ and according to the Minister, the Cabinet’s moderate position was assisted by fear of a “bad reputation” abroad if any political entity were to be banned shortly before an election.²⁵ The diplomat also said that Henlein had recently declared his movement could only succeed in the election if it became the mouthpiece for all Germans in Czechoslovakia. Addison, however, also wrote of the impossibility of achieving this objective since German Agrarians and Social Democrats would never accept Konrad Henlein’s leadership. He was not wrong on this point, with both principal German minority parties relying on their voters and rejecting co-operation with SHF/SdP; although BdL had been attempting co-operation with Henlein since autumn 1933.²⁶ The British Legation in Prague’s perception and assessment of the pre-election situation in Czechoslovakia and Czech-German relations was correct in not-

 TNA, FO 371/19492, R 2305/234/12, Addison to Simon, April 2, 1935, f. 102.  In it, he assured him of his complete loyalty to the Czechoslovak Republic and his sincere wish “for activist politics” and protested against the policy which his political opponents were leading against his movement. Cf. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag. Innenpolitik und Minderheitenprobleme in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik (hereinafter Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte). Teil IV. Vom Vorabend der Machtergreifung in Deutschland bis zum Rücktritt von President Masaryk 1933 – 1935. Berichte des Gesandten Koch, der Konsuln von BethusyHuc, von Druffel, von Pfeil und des Gesandtschaftsrates von Stein [German Legation Reports from Prague. Internal Policy and Minorities Problems in the First Czechoslovak Republic. Part IV. From the Eve of the Seizure of Power in Germany to the Resignation of President Masaryk 1933 – 1935. Reports of Minister Koch, the Consuls von Bethusy-Huc, von Druffel, von Pfeil, and the Legation Council von Stein]. Ausgewählt, eingeleitet und kommentiert von Dolezel, H. – Dolezel, S., Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Karolinum, Band 49/IV, München 1991, Telegramm Konrad Henleins an Staatspräsident Masaryk, Doc. No. 112a, pp. 231– 233.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 2516/234/12, Addison to Simon, April 11, 1935, f. 106.  Ibid., f. 107. Addison then referred to the opinion of a section of the press in regard to the creation of a new Government with the involvement of only Czech parties and Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party. He did not consider this a good idea, because the public exclusion of the most important minority in the country from the Government could cause it to rally together and take a more offensive approach following the Saar status referendum. Ibid. Diplomat Edward Carr thought that Masaryk’s position regarding the SHF/SdP was a kind of conflict between Edvard Beneš’s pro-French position and TGM’s pro-German thinking, although this is a simplification and misunderstanding of the President’s decision. Nevertheless, he along with Owen O’Malley correctly deduced that the President’s decision was an important domestic policy milestone. Cf. ibid., f. 105.

88

IV A Landmark Year

ing the ever more acrimonious atmosphere in the country,²⁷ supported by debates on the prohibition or not of the Front of Sudeten German Homeland, and anticipated the electoral success of Henlein’s grouping and put the Government’s moderate approach to them down to fears of a poor reputation abroad through influencing political competition amongst other factors. Joseph Addison also interpreted Edvard Beneš’s endeavour to prohibit the SHF/SdP as an attempt at eliminating a potential strong parliamentary opponent, highlighting his personal animosity over what the SHF might do. At the end of April 1935, Joseph Addison sent Foreign Secretary Simon a memorandum from the British Vice-Consul in Liberec,²⁸ Sydney P. Elliot, on the Front of Sudeten German Homeland’s strengths and prospects, since he thought there were particular conditions in northern Bohemia which suited it for observing the German element in Czechoslovakia, these being the strength of Henlein’s movement here. The material sent to London included a short report from the Vice-Consul in Brno, W. V. Neumark on speculation about Henlein’s possible success in uniting all German votes in the election. The British Minister himself no longer considered the SHF/SdP’s hopes in the upcoming election as highly as he had just ten days previously, he wrote, going on to say that this was due to Beneš’s partial success in managing to break down TGM and Jan Malypetr’s resistance and the Government’s decision that only “parties” could take part in elections, and not “movements”; as such the Front of Sudeten German Homeland had to be renamed. It was the British Minister’s opinion that the upcoming election would show how much Konrad Henlein would succeed in fulfilling his declaration and becoming the mouthpiece for the almost three-and-a-half million strong German minority in Czechoslovakia.²⁹

 Elizabeth Wiskemann claims that the SdP had “borrowed” the whipping up of emotions in pre-election campaigns from Germany. Wiskemann, p. 206.  Jindřich Dejmek states that the paid British Vice-Consulate was restored in 1936, with Peter Pares becoming its head. Dejmek, J., Nenaplněné naděje. Politické a diplomatické vztahy Československa a Velké Británie (1918 – 1938) [Unfulfilled Hopes. Political and Diplomatic Relations of Czechoslovakia and Great Britain (1918 – 1938)], Praha 2003, p. 338.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 2886/234/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir John Simon, April 29, 1935, f. 116. He estimated the election result for Henlein’s grouping at 30 to 35 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The British Minister then informed the Foreign Secretary that a small but important group which was beginning to look at the SHF was professors and other teaching staff at universities, as funding for their research had recently been reduced and, “that they and their institutions are already in a severe predicament”. Ibid., p. 2. According to the German Minister to Prague, Walter Koch, the Czechoslovak Government hoped that pressure to change its name would create problems for the SHF. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte. Teil IV. Gründung einer neuen nationalen,

IV A Landmark Year

89

The Vice-Consul in Liberec’s memorandum, written in mid-April 1935, called the May election a landmark because a new political party would be taking part representing the interests of the German minority. The Vice-Consul was somewhat acerbic in his defence of his memorandum: “Sixteen years of political impotence, due to being split up into many political parties, have led the majority of the 3½ million Sudeten Germans within the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic to recognise the fact that, if they are ever to have a voice in guiding their own destiny and co-operating in directing the destinies of the Czechoslovak Republic, the party system must disappear and they must unite as nation under one banner,”³⁰ and he then went on to claim that Adolf Hitler’s success had shown the Sudeten Germans how far they could go if they were united and that the SHF had nothing in common with Nazism. This was followed by a description of the history of the Front of Sudeten German Homeland and its political objectives which merely repeated facts already known.³¹ At the end of his memorandum, Sydney Elliot estimated the election result for them, anticipating they would get half of all current seats taken by German parties, i. e. 33, but did not exclude a surprise either, looking into his crystal ball to say that on the basis of his own observations in northern Bohemia it was not impossible that Henlein’s party might become the largest party in the National Assembly.³² The Vice-Consul in Liberec was somewhat harsher in his assessment of the German minority’s situation in Czechoslovakia than the Prague Legation. The introduction and conclusion to his report suggest that he had taken on the rhetoric of the more radical Sudeten Germans targeting the Czechoslovak Government and had been unduly influenced by his location; Liberec had been the centre of Germans in Bohemia since the Habsburg Monarchy. He said that the Cabinet’s inaction and apathy towards their problems had damaged German industry and thus the largest minority within the Czechoslovak Republic had no option other than place their faith in improving their position in Konrad Henlein. The British Vice-Consul in Brno supported his colleague from northern Bohemia and his conclusions on the dissatisfaction of the Sudeten German population and the crisis within other German political parties, and predicted the SHF would gain 25 seats. He then gave a number of examples of “political desertions”

oppositionellen Sudetendeutsche Wahlgruppe, Deutsche Gesandtschaft an das Auswärtige Amt, Prag, den 2. Mai 1935, Dok. No. 117, pp. 243 – 245.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 2886/234/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir John Simon, April 29, 1935, Memorandum on the S.H.F (‟Sudetendeutsche Heimatsfront [sic]”) and the Prospects of this Party at the Forthcoming General Election on May 19, 1935, p. 2.  Ibid., p. 3.  Ibid., p. 4.

90

IV A Landmark Year

with, for example, members of the BdL or the German Christian Social People’s Party (Deutsche christlichsoziale Volkspartei; DCV), going to become SHF candidates. He ended his short report with a summary of figures from a Czech source which predicted a massive victory for Henlein.³³ As can be observed, the assessment of the pre-election situation in Czechoslovakia somewhat differed in the regions to that in the capital. Joseph Addison and through him Robert Hadow were more moderate in their assessments than Sydney Elliot in Liberec who criticised the Czechoslovak Government and somewhat sided with the idea some held of the “impotence” of party politics of recent years. The Sudeten Germans’ dissatisfaction was well known, but its roots were not in a simple condemnation of the inertia and apathy of the Government in Prague. Officials at the Foreign Office were also ambivalent in their assessments of the political situation in Czechoslovakia, oscillating between criticising and praising Elliot’s memorandum. It was clear, however, that British diplomats both in Czechoslovakia and in London were aware of the importance of the approaching election and that those in Czechoslovakia were anticipating great electoral gains for Konrad Henlein’s party. The election result went beyond British diplomats’ expectations, with complete success for the SdP and Henlein at the pinnacle of his political career.³⁴

 TNA, FO 371/19492, R 2886/234/12, April 15, 1935, ff. 128 – 129. Nicolas J. A. Cheetham from the Foreign Office thought that if Henlein were to succeed, it would be difficult for the Czechoslovak Government to find common ground with him. He said Elliot’s memorandum was interesting but pro-German and not based on the principle that Henlein’s movement was just badly dressed-up Nazism. Edward Carr, in contrast, considered the document the best report on Henlein’s movement and Beneš’s policy short-sighted. Ibid., ff. 114– 115.  The party won in Bohemia, and ended up second in Moravia and Silesia. René Petráš terms the SdP a party which even when it was founded was “negativist towards Czechoslovakia”. Petráš, R., Menšiny v meziválečném Československu. Právní postavení národnostních menšin v první Československé republice a jejich mezinárodněprávní ochrana [Minorities in Interwar Czechoslovakia. Legal Status of National Minorities in the First Czechoslovak Republic and Their International Legal Protection], Praha 2009, p. 229. This is contentious, because in 1935 the party was still controlled by the so-called Spannist wing, Kameradschaftsbund, which aimed to achieve some kind of agreement with the Czechoslovak Government. Cf. Cornwall, M., ‘A Leap into Ice-Cold Water’: The Manoeuvres of the Henlein Movement in Czechoslovakia, 1933 – 1938, in: Cornwall, M. – Evans, R. J. W. (ed.), Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe 1918 – 1948, Oxford, New York 2007, pp. 133, 138. To the Kameradschaftsbund cf. Novotný, L., Kameradschaftsbund. Contribution to the History of the Czech-German Relationship (Part one), in: Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, 12, 2008, pp. 291– 309; Kameradschaftsbund. Contribution to the History of the Czech-German Relationship (Part two), in: Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, 13, 2009, pp. 387– 405; Haag, J., ‘Knights of the Spirit’: The Kameradschaftsbund, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 8, 3,

IV A Landmark Year

91

The political influence of the hitherto dominant German parties had markedly weakened (the Agrarians lost 60 % of their votes, the Social Democrats 50 % and the Christian Socials 40 %).³⁵ The Sudetendeutsche Partei became the strongest German party with 1,249,530 votes, corresponding to 15.18 % of the vote.³⁶ This was more than even the Czech Agrarians (they received around 73,000 less votes), although this converted into one more seat for them than the SdP.³⁷ The election result also signified a certain social revolt, “and not just against Czech domination, but also against previous Sudeten German party politics, and activism in particular”.³⁸ Henlein and other SdP leaders hoped that their political success would be reflected in domestic political developments within Czechoslovakia. They thought that the Sudetendeutsche Partei would be asked to take part in the new Government and thus gain a real opportunity to influence the country’s domestic and foreign policy. They based this hope on

1973, pp. 133 – 153; Cornwall, M., The Devil’s Wall: The Nationalist Youth Mission of Heinz Rutha, Cambridge (Mass.), London 2012, pp. 123 – 130.  Olivová, V., Kameradschaftsbund, in: Z českých dějin. Sborník prací in memoriam prof. Dr. Václava Husy [From Czech History. Proceedings in memoriam of prof. Dr. Vaclav Husa], Praha 1966, p. 253. According to Jörg Kracik, there was another striking fact about the election: “A detailed examination of the gains and losses of different parties suggests that around 8 % of the high percentage of SdP votes – roughly 66 % – must have come from former voters of Czech parties, since besides the other German parties and Communist party, all Czech parties also saw a loss in votes.” Kracik, J., Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus in der Tschechoslowakei 1920 – 1938 [Politics of German Activism in Czechoslovakia, 1920 – 1938], Frankfurt am Main 1999, p. 304.  Československá statistika – Svazek 134. Řada I. (Volby, sešit 5) [Czechoslovak Statistics. Vol. 134, Series I. (Elections, Fascicle 5]. Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v květnu 1935, Praha 1936, p. 9.  Cf. Národní archiv Praha [The National Archives], fond (hereianfter f.) presidium ministerstva vnitra (fond č. 225 bývalého Studijního ústavu Ministerstva vnitra, dále jen PMV), sg. 225 – 918 – 4. “It was only thanks to election mathematics and the fact that the electoral code meant that votes for unsuccessful Czechoslovak parties, specifically the Clerical and Orderlies Party and the Debtors’ Party, were awarded to the strongest Czechoslovak party’s votes (i. e. not a minority party) that the second-place Czechoslovak Agrarians acquires one more seat.” Klimek, A. – Hofman, P., Velké dějiny zemí Koruny české, svazek XIV., 1929 – 1938 [Great History of the Czech Lands, Vol. XIV, 1929 – 1938], Praha, Litomyšl 2002, p. 313. The SdP acquired 44 deputies and 23 senators. “The Czechs were so surprised that night-time radio broadcasts announcing the election results were suddenly stopped,” noted long-term DCV deputy, Felix Luschka. Cf. Luschka, F. von, Im Parlament der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. Erinnerungen eines sudetendeutschen Abgeordneten 1920 – 1938 [In the Parliament of the First Czechoslovak Republic. Memoirs of a Sudeten German MP 1920 – 1938], in: Bohemia, 4, 1963, p. 263.  Beran, L. J., Odepřená integrace. Systémová analýza sudetoněmecké politiky v Československé republice 1918 – 1938 [Denied Integration. System Analysis of Sudeten German Politics in the Czechoslovak Republic 1918 – 1938], Praha 2009, p. 285.

92

IV A Landmark Year

the fact that the party had become the strongest political party and that the previous activist parties had lost badly in the election.³⁹ Following the announcement of the preliminary election results, the British Legation could only report on the SdP’s major success, the significant loss of the other German political parties⁴⁰ and an essentially unchanged situation for the Czech coalition parties and the communists. Robert Hadow informed London that the previous Government coalition could count on a comfortable majority with almost 190 seats after being joined by the Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party and the Traders’ Party (after the official results were announced, they had 188 seats), and went on to say: “New Government must however – unless Sudetendeutsche Partei be suppressed – face a German party whose success has exceeded expectations and which will claim to represent more voters than any other in the country.”⁴¹ Orme Sargent added to Hadow’s supposition a few  In the end, the SdP was not invited into the Government. It had made it clear that small concessions would not suffice and it was going to insist on more fundamental reforms of the country’s system regarding nationalities. But for Czechoslovakia’s political representatives, this demand was unacceptable. Klimek – Hofman, p. 318. This opinion was confirmed by French chargé d’affaires de Monicault, who spoke with Edvard Beneš who informed him that the proportional representation system would allow the current coalition to remain in power, while Henlein would be in opposition. M. de Monicault à M. Laval, Prague, 21 mai 1935, 21 h. 55, in: DDF: (24 mars – 31 mai 1935), Ire Série, T. X, Paris 1981, Doc. No. 428, p. 640. In regard to the election, Minister to Berlin Vojtěch Mastný said that it seemed all the German papers were celebrating Henlein’s victory but had not realised that they had not acquired an absolute majority. More in detail cf. AMZV, PZ Berlín, 1935, běžná zpráva č. 49, 27. května 1935, pp. 1– 3.  The Government coalition lost a total of 25 seats, with Prime Minister Jan Malypetr not predicting a major change in Government policy since 17 of those 25 seats had been for the pro-Government German parties. Tóth, A. – Novotný, L. – Stehlík, M., Národnostní menšiny v Československu 1918 – 1938. Od státu národního ke státu národnostnímu? [National Minorities in Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1938. From the Nation-State to the National State?], Praha 2012, p. 335.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 3285/234/12, Telegram from Mr. Hadow, May 21, 1935, f. 134. On the same day, The Times published an article entitled Czechoslovak Election. German Nazis’ Success, in which it said that Henlein’s party was generally considered Nazi. The article’s author was correct in their estimation of the SdP’s desire to take part in Government, but also correctly predicted that previous conflicts within coalition parties would be overcome in order not to negotiate with Henlein’s party. Ibid., f. 133. Some of The Times’ articles played a role in shaping the policy of appeasement; in this regard one need only look at the paper’s editor between 1923 and 1941, Geoffrey Dawson. Cf. for example Foster, A., The Times and Appeasement: The Second Phase, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 16, 3, 1981, p. 444. Dawson also maintained contacts with the German Embassy in London. Cf. for example University of Oxford, Bodleian Libraries (Weston Library), Papers of Geoffrey Dawson, MS. Dawson 79, March 22, 1937, ff. 124– 125; ibid., October 7, 1937, f. 181. He was convinced that there should be no disputes between Britain and Germany. Ibid., May 11, 1937, ff. 129 – 130. Several days later he literally wrote: “I do my utmost, night after night, to keep out of the paper [The Times – author’s note] anything that might

IV A Landmark Year

93

days later when he wrote that the unification of the German minority under Konrad Henlein represented a “direct challenge to the Czech governing majority” and that it would likely weaken the Czechoslovak Government’s position both domestically and internationally.⁴² He then argued logically that the Czechoslovaks had previously been able to claim that German ministers engaged in Government showed the majority co-operating with the German minority, but now, despite the fact that the German ministers were remaining in the Government, this involvement could no longer be considered a symbol of co-operation with the largest minority, “since the latter from now onwards can only be represented by Henlein and his party and nobody else”. The Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs thought it should be standard policy to negotiate on the SdP’s involvement in the Government, but he thought this unlikely because of Edvard Beneš’s position on the party.⁴³ British diplomats in Prague and London were right in their assessment of the election result as above all a loss for the established German political parties which in a wider context also meant a defeat of their previous policy of activism,⁴⁴ and it sent a clear signal to the Government coalition to try engaging

hurt their [German – author’s note] susceptibilities.” In this case author speaks about publishing information concerning the Spanish Civil War. Ibid., May 23, 1937, f. 131. The Times’s management also corrected uncomplimentary articles from its correspondent in Berlin, Norman Ebbutt (he was principal correspondent between 1927 and 1937), who, for example, as early as 1933 had guessed Hitler’s intentions. Cf. McDonough, F., The Times, Norman Ebbut, and the Nazis, 1927 – 37, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 27, 3, 1992, p. 407.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 3285/234/12, f. 132.  Ibid. Sargent even thought there was a possibility the Czechoslovak Government would try to ban the SdP entirely, though he did not consider such wilfulness likely. He was also curious as to whether Berlin would begin a campaign to transform the SdP into a purely Nazi party, which in his opinion could impact on the Czechoslovak Government’s approach to Henlein and his party. Ibid. The semi-official Deutsche Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondenz said that Henlein’s voters wanted agreement with the Czechoslovak Government and that Prague must now realise that the Germans no longer wanted to be a minority but rather a second state nation. Cf. TNA, FO 371/19492, R 3308/234/12, Phipps to Simon, May 22, 1935, ff. 136 – 137. One part of this stance, however, did not reflect reality, something which can be understood since it was expressed by a German semi-official medium. The issue of wanting an agreement with the Government was contentious for SdP voters, as it would naturally depend on what any agreement would look like. For Prague, there were limits beyond which they were unprepared and unable to go and furthermore the thinking of some SdP supporters contradicted the democratic concept of the Czechoslovak state.  “It should be noted, however, that interpreting the election results offered in no way a soothing image in terms of the general mood in the border regions, in particular in comparison to the parliamentary election of 1929 when the pro-Government German Social Democratic Workers’ Party had been the strongest of the German parties running for the Chamber of Deputies with

94

IV A Landmark Year

more actively with minority representatives, and above all, of course, with the Sudeten Germans. They were not wrong either in their forecast of the Czechoslovak Government’s future difficult position in terms of the Sudeten German Party’s strength, and the method of negotiation with Konrad Henlein on the nationality arrangements of the First Czechoslovak Republic; the nationalisation of the German minority by the SdP which had found strong support in the ever more powerful Nazi Third Reich and boosted by the state’s poor economic situation as a result of the global economic crisis, was inevitably heading towards their radicalisation on an anti-state platform. In evaluating the election results, one can also note that the only politician which the British Minister to Prague mentioned as a potential obstacle to SdP participation in Government was Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš; not the President, and not the Prime Minister nor other ministers. An important role was also played by the fact that the Parliament’s new opposition (the SdP and growing Slovak autonomists) was slowly but surely becoming an “opposition to the state”, or opposition to the Masaryk/Beneš concept of the First Czechoslovak Republic. Robert Hadow returned to an assessment of the election one more time at the end of May 1935. He repeated the literally meteoric rise first of Konrad Henlein’s movement and then his party which last autumn few had known about, but he thought in contrast to Orme Sargent that the election result was more of a domestic political complication for the Government rather than an international problem. He supported his stance with an overview of electoral gains which revealed that a Government without the Traders or Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party would not have a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The British Legation Secretary even discussed a rather unlikely option of tacit Government support from the Czechoslovak communists, although he then termed it impossible. Logically enough, he considered the two now smaller German parties (the Social Democrats and Agrarians) to be in a very poor position and their role in the next Government as more or less static.⁴⁵ He also thought that the election

a total of 21 seats. The pro-Government German Christian Socials and German Agrarians received a total of 30 seats in 1929. Thus, activist German parties gained a total of 51 seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the 1929 parliamentary election, 7 seats more than the Sudeten German Party in the 1935 election. In contrast, the German nationalist opposition parties received just 15 seats in the 1929 election.” Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, p. 335. France, where Henlein was generally considered Hitler’s puppet, monitored the election result with great concern, wrote chargé d’affaires, Čeněk Ibl. AMZV, PZ Paříž, 1935, běžná zpráva č. 19, 24. května 1935, pp. 1– 2.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 3478/234/12, Mr. Hadow to Sir John Simon, May 28, 1935, pp. 1– 2. Hadow also made the interesting observation that Henlein’s party had acquired 15 % of votes and that the majority of the remaining 85 % were anti-German for one reason or another if

IV A Landmark Year

95

had created a chasm within the German minority itself through Konrad Henlein supporters and critics being pitted against each other. In conclusion, he stated that he thought the events in Czechoslovakia would also boost the Pan-German movement in neighbouring Austria.⁴⁶ His estimation was confirmed by British diplomatic representative in Vienna, William H. B. Mack (Walford Selby was Minister), who declared that control of public opinion in Austria meant it was very difficult to get any relevant commentary on the results of the Czechoslovak parliamentary election. He went on to say that there was no doubt, however, that Henlein’s rise had caused some concern amongst official authorities, and he then went on to describe the analogy of a Czech worker of German nationality and his Austrian counterpart, with the former upon rejecting Social Democratic thought able to support either Christian Socials or National Socialists (meaning the SdP), whereas the Austrian worker had just one option. One can consider, said the diplomat, that he would do the same as his Czech colleague. “The analogy is all the more unwelcome owing to the fact that the Sudetendeutscher is historically not a German but an Austrian,” added Mack.⁴⁷ He then came to the clear and, considering the turn of events, logical, conclusion that the election in Czechoslovakia would trigger new activity from Austrian Nazis.⁴⁸ Nicolas J. A. Cheetham from the Foreign Office, however, did not concur with this, noting: “The result of the Czechoslovak elections cannot seriously affect the Austrian situation.”⁴⁹ Within the context of other British diplomat positions, however, this was a minority opinion; there was no doubt that the Czechoslovak election would have an impact on

not directly pro-Government. It was his opinion that Edvard Beneš’s political objective should be to demonstrate the impossibility of Henlein’s promises. Ibid., p. 2.  Ibid., p. 3.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 3506/234/12, Mack to Simon, May 31, 1935, f. 148.  Ibid., f. 149. Subsequent commentary in the Austrian press attributed the Sudeten German Party’s success to economic problems (Wiener Tagblatt), Henlein’s character and his unrealistic promises and the undemocratic policy of the Czechoslovak Government over the previous 15 years (Sturm über Österreich) or the hysteria of other political parties (Wiener Neueste Nachrichten). This last newspaper also wondered whether Prague would change its previous approach to the German minority. Most Austrian newspapers, added Mack, gave the same assessment of the collapse of the other political parties and believed it would be difficult for Henlein to ensure his supporters remained loyal to the Czechoslovak Republic. Ibid., ff. 149 – 150.  Ibid., June 1, 1935, f. 147.

96

IV A Landmark Year

events in neighbouring countries, at the very least purely due to geographical proximity and tourism.⁵⁰ The post-election situation in Czechoslovakia and its subsequent resolution required that the British Legation in Prague pay it greater attention, and as such on 18 June 1935 Joseph Addison informed new Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare⁵¹ of Prime Minister Jan Malypetr’s speech in the Chamber of Deputies on domestic and foreign affairs. In terms of Czechoslovak foreign policy, the Minister said that the Prime Minister had said nothing of great importance, merely repeating the necessity of friendly relations with Poland and Germany, but there was no doubt he made allusions to possible SdP treasonous acts and ensuring an adequate response from the authorities.⁵² As such, Addison thought that the Government was offering its voters moderate optimism, an unwillingness to make clear promises and particular reference to the country’s economic problems, while defiant opponents outside the constitutional framework threatened a clear and vigorous response.⁵³ The British Minister considered that post-election events and Jan Malypetr’s speech were correct from his perspective; the new Government had to focus on economic issues and it had no choice but to put forward a clear stance on the strongest political party representing the German minority in Czechoslovakia. In assessing the Government’s foreign policy intentions, however, Addison did not take account of a climate which was slowly but surely changing – Malypetr’s speech on friendly relations with Berlin was meant both for Berlin and representatives of Sudeten Germans. As such, the domestic situation in Czechoslovakia had begun responding to events abroad, if only subtly at first.

 Cf. for example Štemberk, J., Fenomén cestovního ruchu. Možnosti a limity cestovního ruchu v meziválečném Československu [Tourism Phenomenon. Possibilities and Limits of Tourism in Interwar Czechoslovakia], Pelhřimov 2009, p. 244.  He was in office from 7 June to 18 December 1935. Jan Masaryk described him as a hard-working and exuberant man who had confessed to him a number of times he wanted to be Foreign Secretary. “He does not have Simon’s legal mind it is interesting how we, members of the diplomatic corps, all feel a sense of relief,” he added. AMZV, PZ Londýn, 1935, běžná zpráva č. 19, 12. června 1935, p. 5. Vansittart and Eden also felt relieved. Ibid., p. 6. Finally, Masaryk concluded that in terms of Czechoslovakia, British politicians appeared to be calm and should any changes occur under Hoare, “it will occur smoothly as far as we are concerned”. He had no information on the German minority or Henlein. Ibid., p. 8. More in detail cf. Hughes, M., Sir Samuel Hoare at the Foreign Office (1935), in: British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World, 1919 – 1939, London 2006, pp. 107– 123.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 3956/234/12, Addison to Hoare, June 18, 1935, f. 158.  Ibid., f. 161.

IV A Landmark Year

97

Discussions in the new Parliament were the subject of another British Legation report sent to London a few days later. This reported on the logically poor relations between deputies from the Sudeten German Party and their German Social Democratic colleagues (it speaks of a small group of socialists) who had remained part of the Government coalition. Addison then described a statement from Antonín Hampl, whom he wrongly described as a German Social Democrat, who refused to believe in Konrad Henlein’s loyalty and that of his supporters. Karl Hermann Frank responded by rejecting this and referred to the fact the party represented two thirds of the German minority, something SdP representatives repeatedly spoke about, and then declared that the SdP would respect the laws of the land but in return demanded that the Government stop marginalising and slighting the German population and demanded, like the German parties in 1919, autonomy over their own affairs.⁵⁴ In the second week of July 1935, the British Legation in Prague found itself dealing with a problem indirectly related to Czech-German relations – the presidential election. Joseph Addison had discovered “from a reliable source” that Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk himself was beginning to feel he was no longer able to carry out his office. The Minister thought that the country’s needs demanded a healthy and strong figure who would be able to confront the complex challenges of the time, and added that it was assumed Edvard Beneš would be elected. He then, however, produced a somewhat surprising fact – that Henlein’s party had apparently decided to vote for Beneš. This might change, but current circumstances suggested it.⁵⁵ These words were of great interest. Although it was an open secret that TGM wanted the Foreign Minister as his successor, suggesting that Edvard Beneš was going to be elected in mid-1935 was rather unconvincing. The complex domestic political situation instead reduced his chance of success. As such, at first sight his suggestion of the Sudeten German Party’s support for the presidential election appears to be unverified speculation. Its deputies and

 TNA, FO 371/19492, R 3957/234/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir Samuel Hoare, June 20, 1935, f. 163. A few days later, the British Minister informed Samuel Hoare on the extension to the Exceptional Statutory Powers Act which SdP deputies had strongly condemned and attacked as a Government tool used against Sudeten Germans. Addison then discussed an incident which had occurred in Karlovy Vary when the Czech police had clashed with Sudeten German Party demonstrators. Cf. ibid., R 4325/234/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir Samuel Hoare, July 9, 1935, f. 171. The incident itself was marginal and was not different from other skirmishes between the police and political actors, and the British Minister referred to it in the standard manner. What was important, however, was that it aroused some concern within the Foreign Office, if as yet only at a lower level. Nicolas J. A. Cheetham wanted to know why Czechs didn’t realise it was not a good idea to constantly and unnecessarily provoke the German minority. Ibid., f. 170.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 4368/234/12, Addison to Sargent, July 8, 1935, f. 177.

98

IV A Landmark Year

senators were rather strong opponents of Beneš and it was highly unlikely their votes could be counted on. Joseph Addison, however was able to give a logical and plausible explanation for his opinion – by supporting Beneš, the SdP would eliminate their great parliamentary opponent who would move to the Prague Castle. He then repeated that the election of the long-standing Foreign Minister was almost sure, “more especially as there is no other candidate who could be put up against him enjoying anything like the same reputation, or indeed any particular reputation at all in political circles”.⁵⁶ He went on to predict how events would pan out, telling London that Kamil Krofta was to be the new Foreign Minister, which he thought clearly implied that Beneš was highly focused on acting as his own foreign minister, endeavouring to play a greater role on the international political stage than is appropriate for a head of state.⁵⁷ Addison demonstrated not just his excellent predictive skills as he was correct about both major posts, but also a good knowledge of Czechoslovak domestic politics when at the end of his report he referred to the desire of the Czechoslovak Minister to Paris, Štefan Osuský, to become Foreign Minister.⁵⁸ For the British Legation in Prague, the end of spring and early summer 1935 was an important period. Its representants (Addison and Hadow to a lesser extent) were obliged to provide regular updates to the Foreign Office on the preelection and post-election situation in Czechoslovakia, to interpret the election results and to predict future political alliances. Its reports and telegrams were marked by fairly sober comment and it was not unusual for them to correctly predict future events, whether in terms of their estimation of the Sudeten German Party’s election success, the complex domestic political climate in Czechoslovakia after the election, and who would take up the role of President and Foreign Minister. The first half of the year represented a new situation in terms of CzechGerman relations, with the previously fairly stable spectrum of German political parties disrupted by the clear dominance of the SdP which had begun to claim the right to speak for all Sudeten Germans. The British Legation was also aware that the domestic political situation in Czechoslovakia at the time was undoubtedly reflected in foreign policy, with the Legation in Vienna, for example, declaring that the outcome of the Czechoslovak election had affected the situation in Austria.⁵⁹  Ibid., f. 178.  Ibid.  Ibid., f. 179.  Minister to Berlin, Vojtěch Mastný, also spoke of the continuous deterioration in Czechoslovak-German relations, adding that, “the issue of Czechoslovak-German relations occupies and

IV A Landmark Year

99

The post-election situation in Czechoslovakia didn’t just concern diplomats in Prague and through their opinions their colleagues in London too. British Minister to Yugoslavia at the time and future Ambassador to Germany between 1937 and 1939 and later “great” appeaser, Nevile Henderson, also spoke about it, stating in his personal notes in a letter to Robert Vansittart: “How far Czechoslovakia is really a viable State as at present constituted is a very hard question to answer, though I fancy Joseph Addison would give you a definite expression of opinion.”⁶⁰ Henderson, who would later give quite an inaccurate assessment of events in Germany, was entirely unfamiliar with the situation in Czechoslovakia, doubting the First Czechoslovak Republic’s viability. The importance of his note is in his advice to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State to trust Minister Addison; yet his stance lacked the necessary perspective in its analysis of the postelection situation in Czechoslovakia. As can be seen, Prague did not have support from other British diplomatic posts, and Henderson’s stance was going to express itself again in future. Mid-September 1935 proved that a change had occurred after the election. Robert Hadow confirmed to Edward Carr information from the Military Attaché regarding the possible transfer of businesses of “national importance” away from German-speaking areas of Czechoslovakia. The Legation Secretary said that because preparations involved were primarily military in nature, he did not mention them in his material in explaining why he did not look in more detail at the issue.⁶¹ He then named the businesses which the measure was meant to apply to – the Škoda factory, munitions factories in Bratislava and chemical factories in Ústí nad Labem; Hadow termed these three businesses as fundamental from a military and national perspective and added that a fourth plant within this category was the Vitkovice metalworks, although here a transfer was not possible since mines could not be moved and supplies from Sweden were transported most cheaply along the Oder River. In conclusion, he suggested that there was still a significant number of businesses whose importance was undeniable for Czechoslovak industry and that some politicians, though he did not say which, thought they needed to be moved away to break the economic power of Czechoslovakia’s German regions.⁶² Hadow’s report only added to information

concerns even impartial observers far more than it did in the past”. AMZV, PZ Berlín, 1935, běžná zpráva č. 66, 17. července 1935, p. 1.  TNA, FO 800 (Private Offices: Various Ministers’ and Officials’ Papers), 268 (Miscellaneous Correspondence, Vol. 5), Sir Nevile Henderson, June 24, 1935, f. 139. A few lines below, Henderson wrote that Nazism might be a passing phenomenon, but Germanism was not. Ibid.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 5674/234/12, Hadow to Carr, September 16, 1935, f. 200.  Ibid., f. 201.

100

IV A Landmark Year

received by War Secretary which confirmed a change in the perception of Czech and German relations from Czech officials who had begun to seriously consider weakening the industrial potential of certain regions within the country where the German minority was dominant. International events led the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister and Foreign Secretary to hold talks on 12 September which took place in Geneva in regard to Abyssinia (officially the Ethiopian Empire) and Central Europe. According to Hoare, Edvard Beneš gave a positive assessment of Czechoslovakia’s position which was apparently going through a difficult period. The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister said that the mood in the army was good, but there was one matter which could undermine the political scene, specifically the death or sudden abdication of the President. The Foreign Secretary said Beneš relayed the fact that nobody was in any doubt that he was to be the successor, thus confirming Addison’s prediction, and he added that Czechoslovak foreign policy would not change even following signature of the treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union.⁶³ At the end of discussions, the Foreign Secretary repeated Beneš’s words on the reduction of Nazi influence in Czechoslovakia and the weakening of Hitler’s Germany.⁶⁴ The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister’s statements on the minimisation of SdP influence in the country and reducing influence of the Third Reich lacked any factual basis on specific deeds; it is very hard to conclude Germany was getting weaker in the year the Saar status referendum took place and Berlin restored conscription. Some Foreign Office officials either thought Beneš’s statements were absurd⁶⁵ or did not take them seriously.⁶⁶ British diplomats all rejected the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister’s claims. They also suggested his opinions were losing a basis in reality, something which certainly was not true, although they did consider it an error and somewhat naïve to declare that Germany was becoming weaker. For the moment, however, this was an opinion of secondary Foreign Office ranks, with Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare and Permanent Under-Secretary of State Robert Vansittart avoiding such a judgement (for now).

 Cf. Dejmek, J., Edvard Beneš. Politická biografie českého demokrata. Část první. Revolucionář a diplomat (1884 – 1935) [Edvard Beneš. Political Biography of a Czech Democrat. Part One. Revolutionary and Diplomat (1884– 1935)], Praha 2006, pp. 606 – 608.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 5886/234/12, Sir Samuel Hoare to Foreign Office, September 13, 1935, f. 208.  For example Nicolas J. A. Cheetham or Rodney A. Gallop. Cf. ibid., f. 207.  Edward Carr, for example, wrote that Beneš was becoming ever more self-deluded in believing he understood everything. Cf. ibid.

IV A Landmark Year

101

In the mean time, the British Legation in Prague was continuing to monitor events in regard to the Sudeten German Party and its relations with the Czechoslovak Republic. Joseph Addison reported at the end of October 1935 on a gathering of SdP supporters, with 80,000 to 100,000 meeting on 21 October in Teplice-Šanov to listen to speeches by Konrad Henlein and Walter Brand. The former complained to those present, “that his repeated offers for co-operation with the Czechoslovak parties had either not been taken seriously or had been rejected”.⁶⁷ He then added that the SdP was striving to promote honesty and truth in the country’s politics and desired to operate within the nation state, and that Sudeten Germans felt that they were treated as second-class citizens, something which was extremely humiliating for them. The Sudeten German Party leader naturally spoke of their electoral success which had not been reflected in involvement in the Government with the party being sidelined, something he termed an anti-democratic approach.⁶⁸ This was an argument which found resonance for some time after the election amongst SdP representatives since the winning party had previously always been in Government in the First Czechoslovak Republic; although it had also never happened before that the party with the most votes had the second largest number of seats as occurred in 1935. As such the SdP had not strictly won the election since the winner was the party with the largest number of seats in the Parliament, i. e. the Agrarians. On the other hand, it should be noted that under the context at the time Henlein’s party would have been unable to be involved in Government and it would have been almost impossible to find an effective parliamentary majority under the circumstances. The SdP leader’s speech also contained criticism of Edvard Beneš’s foreign policy, in which he logically opposed co-operation with the Soviet Union while promoting the normalisation of relations with Germany; in recent years, there had not been good relations between the two countries, he added. Walter Brand supported Henlein in his criticism of Prague’s focus on Moscow, terming Bolshevism a threat to European culture and stating that the Sudeten German Party was warning against this foreign policy focus.⁶⁹ The British Legation did not take a particular position on the above discussed gathering and the tone of its speeches, or at least Addison’s report did not give any. A closer look at the words on damaging co-operation with the Soviet Union and the focus on im TNA, FO 371/19492, R 6516/234/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir Samuel Hoare, October 24, 1935, f. 212. The French Legation estimated crowd numbers of over 50,000. AMAE, Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 116, Politique étrangère, Allemands de Bohême, le 22 octobre 1935, f. 274.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 6516/234/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir Samuel Hoare, October 24, 1935, f. 212.  Ibid.

102

IV A Landmark Year

proved relations with Germany when it was undoubtedly primarily Berlin to blame for their deterioration as events in previous years had shown, suggest according to the British Legation that Henlein and Brand had adopted the arguments of the Third Reich.⁷⁰ This was one reason why SdP involvement in Government could not be considered. Its representatives, and potential ministers, would attempt to direct Czechoslovak foreign policy away from the Little Entente and the focus on France towards co-operation with authoritarian states, and in particular with the German Reich. In early November 1935, Jan Malypetr, taking on the role of the President of the Senate, was replaced as Czechoslovak Prime Minister by Slovak Agrarian Milan Hodža (from 5 November).⁷¹ In Joseph Addison’s report on this change of roles and the new Prime Minister, he said that Hodža was an experienced man whose appointment would undoubtedly lead to greater emphasis on the Agrarian Party’s programme priorities, and that he spoke English fluently and was considered an Anglophile. He then listed some of his positive traits and praised his frequent visits to the British Legation. On the other hand, Addison did not appraise Milan Hodža in terms of his opinions or potential standpoints in regard to issues of domestic and international policy.⁷² On 5 November 1935, Edvard Beneš spoke in Parliament (for the final time as Foreign Minister) about foreign policy, and logically the event which was then most impacting on Europe, the Abyssinia Crisis. But he also gave a lot of space over to Great Britain, speaking of a “change in British policy”. He called  Before Addison’s report is a hand-written comment, unfortunately unsigned, giving the initials L. C. It can be assumed that this must be the head of the Northern Department, Laurence Collier, who states: “The words are the words of Henlein, but the voice is the voice of Hitler!” Ibid., f. 211.  Beneš had to get long-resistant President Masaryk on his side for this appointment. Luschka, p. 263. More in detail cf. Harna, J., Vládní prohlášení Milana Hodžy z prosince 1935 [Milan Hodža’s Government Declaration of December 1935], in: Pekník, M. (ed.), Milan Hodža a agrárne hnutie [Milan Hodža and Agrariant Movement], Bratislava 2008, pp. 142– 157; Kvaček, R., Milan Hodža jako premiér. (Glosy k prvnímu vládnímu období 1935 – 1937) [Milan Hodža as Prime Minister. (Glosses for the First Government Period 1935 – 1937)], in: Pekník, M. a kol. (ed.), Milan Hodža. Štátnik a politik [Milan Hodža. Statesman and Politician], Bratislava 2002, p. 235. Great Britain also saw a change in Government, with an election taking place there on 14 November 1935 which was won by the candidates of the National Government, but dominated by the Conservative Party. Stanley Baldwin became Prime Minister for the third time in his life. More in detail cf. Robertson, J. C., The British General Election of 1935, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 9, 1, 1974, pp. 149 – 164.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 6785/234/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir Samuel Hoare, November 6, 1935, f. 216.

IV A Landmark Year

103

the United Kingdom “a faithful friend of Czechoslovakia”, which had given it significant help during the war, but after this personal statement he spoke more generally about Britain’s importance for assuring peace in Europe.⁷³ An important section of Beneš’s speech was about minorities, with the British Minister in response to it saying he had the opportunity to see for himself, “that the minorities in this country do not, to say the least, enjoy most-favoured-nation or national treatment, that they are discontented and their discontent, so far from abating, is increasing”.⁷⁴ Addison added that the minorities in Czechoslovakia were an insurmountable obstacle to the unity of the country and its defence at a time of danger, and they would remain so. At the very end, Addison essentially contested the current post-war arrangements, responding to Beneš’s statement that Czechoslovakia was key to the post-war structure of Central Europe thus: “The accuracy of this statement cannot be denied, but it may at least be open to doubt whether the maintenance of this post-war structure is conducive to peace.”⁷⁵ These final words of the Minister were brave indeed and suggested his approach to Czechoslovakia’s territorial integrity, in correlation to its policy towards its largest minority, was lacking perspective and objectivity and that he was heading along a path favouring just one side. A fundamental matter which increased Czechoslovakia’s importance for the Foreign Office in terms of its perception of Central Europe mainly because, “your country is coming increasingly into the limelight”, as Owen O’Malley wrote to Joseph Addison, occurred in around the second week of November 1935 in the domestic political action of the Sudeten Germans. According to O’Malley, the Foreign Office contacted the British Legation in Prague and offered to establish a paid Vice-Consul, suggesting Liberec as their base. This was to be a political appointment without any specifically determined duties which would focus on acquiring important information for the Legation’s needs. O’Malley said that a similar situation had occurred in Austria, also in a similar manner.⁷⁶ He then suggested, however, that it wouldn’t be easy to get funding for another official post for Czechoslovakia. The head of the Southern Department asked Minister Addison whether they would manage without a new Vice-Consul at the Legation,

 TNA, FO 371/19495, R 6800/1470/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir Samuel Hoare, November 11, 1935, p. 1. The British Minister also repeated his certain conviction that Beneš would be elected President.  Ibid., p. 2.  Ibid.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 6812/234/12, O’Malley to Addison, November 11, 1935, f. 223.

104

IV A Landmark Year

but instead exploit the transferral of an official, perhaps appointing a selected member of the Legation staff as Pro-Consul.⁷⁷ This was indeed an important matter; the Foreign Office had conceded the words of the head of the Southern Department that the Sudeten German issue was beginning to take on great domestic importance which meant that a special employee would have to be appointed whose task would be to collect information on Czech-German relations and supply it to their superior who would then transfer it to London following assessment. Owen O’Malley made it clear that the sentiment and acts of Sudeten Germans presented a reason for the Foreign Office to take a greater interest. On the other hand, it remained unstated that the domestic problem of one country could impact on events in surrounding states. It nevertheless represented a major qualitative shift in the perception of the existence of one minority, if large, and its potential impact on events in other countries. A memorandum was produced during this same period by Orme Sargent and Ralph Wigram which anticipated as early as November 1935 the possibility of the absorption of Austria, Memel (Klaipėda) and part of Czechoslovakia by Germany, adding that: “[…] it is not certain that, should this ever come to pass, it will necessarily be effected by force.”⁷⁸ The Foreign Office diplomats continued their prediction, stating that one day a “people’s” movement might declare the joining of selected parts of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany.⁷⁹ Sargent and Wigram were high officials in the Foreign Office and their prognosis, although it seemed unlikely at the time, nevertheless signalled the direction of thinking of some British diplomats. The end of 1935 didn’t just see an emerging change in the British Legation in Prague and part of the Foreign Office’s reflection on the Sudeten German issue in Czechoslovakia, but also the end of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk’s many years as President. In the second half of November, an ill TGM decided to withdraw from his office at the initiative of Edvard Beneš, who had convinced the ill president at a visit to Lány on 18 November that the current situation was favourable in that “with no complications, it is evident that a presidential election and my

 Ibid., f. 224. O’Malley then implied that he anticipated Addison’s consent.  Documents of British Foreign Policy 1919 – 1939, 2nd Series, Vol. XV, The Italo-Ethiopian War and German Affairs, October 3, 1935 – February 29, 1936, ed. by Medlicott, W. N. – Dakin, D. – Lambert, M. E., London 1976, Appendix I, Memorandum by Messrs. O. G. Sargent and R. F. Wigram on ‘Britain, France, and Germany’ with an Annex by Mr. F. T. A. Ashton-Gwatkin on Germany’s Economic Position, November 21, 1935, p. 721.  Ibid.

IV A Landmark Year

105

[Beneš – author’s note] election to the role could take place”.⁸⁰ The public, however, were not to be informed of the step as politicians wanted time and space to negotiate support for the only coalition candidate. The public found out about the first Czechoslovak President’s abdication in the newspapers on 14 December, the day on which his abdication ceremony was planned to take place in Lány.⁸¹ The British Legation in Prague sent a telegram informing of Masaryk’s resignation to London on the afternoon of 23 November 1935, although the telegram referred to the previous day; as such, the Legation found out about the resignation four days after Beneš’s visit to Lány. Joseph Addison, however, also said that the Foreign Minister had asked that they be discreet and not inform the press for at least a fortnight for domestic political reasons.⁸² But before the president’s abdication was made public, the Sudeten German issue in Czechoslovakia once again took on more significance. In December 1935, Konrad Henlein made a second visit to London (the first occurred in August but was preparatory in nature⁸³).⁸⁴ It was centred on a talk in Chatham House⁸⁵

 Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, p. 102. The French Legation informed Paris on 19 November of Masaryk’s deteriorating health; the report also rejected the idea of Jan Malypetr’s becoming a candidate for President, and named Edvard Beneš the only candidate capable of getting the majority required. AMAE, Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 104, Politique intérieure, le 19 novembre 1935, f. 44.  More in detail cf. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 102– 106.  TNA, FO 371/19492, R 7004/234/12, Telegram from Sir J. Addison, November 23, 1935, f. 226. On 18 December, George V sent a personal telegram to TGM in which he expressed his admiration for the way he had carried out his duties as president since the birth of the country, and wished him good health in the years to come. Cf. TNA, FO 371/19493, R 7607/234/12, George R. I. to President Masaryk, December 18, 1935, f. 277.  Dejmek, J., Britská diplomacie, Československo a Sudetoněmecká strana [British Diplomacy, Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten German Party], in: Moderní dějiny. Sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století, 9, 2001, p. 166. The official of the German Legation in Prague, Otto Freiherr von Stein zu Nord- und Ostheim, mentioned Henlein’s visit. He thought that some circles in London were “against the oppression of the German minority in Czechoslovakia […]”. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte, Teil IV, Reise Henleins nach England, Deutsche Gesandtschaft an das Auswärtige Amt, Prag, den 21. August 1935, Doc. No. 132, pp. 289 – 290. Cf. also PA AA, Tschechoslowakei, R 73842, Prag, den 21. August 1935, E643723. Colonel Malcolm Christie, who worked for the intelligence service and who was also an agent for Robert Vansittart, helped him prepare for the visit. As such, leading SdP figures were copying Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and Edvard Beneš in taking their problem beyond their borders, first to Italy and Austria, “before fixing their gaze on Great Britain”. Orzoff, A., Battle for the Castle. The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914 – 1948, Oxford 2009, p. 175. About the effort to publicize the Sudeten German cause cf. Cornwall, The Devil’s Wall, pp. 190 – 191. Heinz Rutha “stressed” on 10 November “that Britain had become the predominant European power […].” Ibidem, p. 192.

106

IV A Landmark Year

where Henlein presented himself as the leader of a loyal opposition party⁸⁶ and strongly denied any relations with Berlin.⁸⁷ He held a meeting with Lord James Richard Stanhope, who held the office of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1934 to 1936 (from 1935 to 1936 he shared this role with Lord Cranborne⁸⁸), Orme Sargent and Sir John Clifford Norton (Private Secretary to Sir Robert Vansittart from 1930 to 1937) on 10 December in which Henlein gave the impression of a serious politician. The memorandum’s author (John Clifford Norton) did not hide his sympathies for the SdP leader, highlighting his two years of work and condemning the “Czech oligarchy” which had deliberately pitted the German parties against each other in recent years.⁸⁹ Henlein said that he saw the success of his party in a general feeling of resistance to the pressure from Czechoslovak authorities placed on the SdP, the continuing economic crisis and its course in the German-speaking areas and in the failure of

 The SdP leader did not visit London just four times as claims Paul Vyšný, for example, but rather at least five times – in August and December 1935, in July 1936, in October 1937, and in May 1938. Vyšný, P., The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938. Prelude to Munich, Basingstoke 2003, pp. 8, 20, footnote 30.  The headquarters of The Royal Institute of International Affairs.  Henlein’s talk was “loyal, full of goodwill and understanding, faith in a peaceful resolution of the Sudeten German issue”. Biman, S. – Malíř, J., Kariéra učitele tělocviku [Physical Education Teacher Career], Ústí nad Labem 1983, p. 129; cf. also Cornwall, The Devil’s Wall, pp. 193 – 194. A copy of Henlein’s talk remains in the SdP collection in the National Archives in Prague in both German and English, incorrectly stated as dating to 1936, unfortunately without any further specifications. In the German version, Henlein discusses the elections of “May this year”, i. e. 1935. In his introduction, the SdP leader gives an historic overview of Czech-German relations from the 19th century and complains very diplomatically of the German minority being kept out in the cold, rejects the policies of activist parties and promotes a dialogue between the different nationalities in Czechoslovakia. Cf. NA, f. SdP, kt. 2, sg. Konrád Henlein (řeči a projevy), 1936, 3.  Völkischer Beobachter also criticised some of his statements, writing that rejecting relations with Germany only played to the lies about Berlin’s alleged meddling in Czechoslovakia’s internal affairs. To conclude, the article’s author states that the SdP leader has no experience of commenting on foreign policy. TNA, FO 371/19493, R 7521/234/12, Phipps to Vansittart, December 12, 1935, ff. 269 – 270. Cf. also Robbins, K. G., Konrad Henlein, the Sudeten Question and British Foreign Policy, in: The Historical Journal, 12, 4, 1969, p. 683. The Czechoslovak Legation in Vienna, however, had information on SdP contacts with Germany and Austria, although it remains uncertain whether the British Legation also knew about this. Srov. AMZV, f. Zahraniční úřady, vyslanectví Vídeň 1918 – 1939, kt. 8, “Sudetendeutsche Partei”, styky s Německem a Rakouskem, 5. prosince 1935, pp. 1– 2.  Robert Arthur James Gascoyne-Cecil, 5th Marquess of Salisbury (1893 – 1972), known as Viscount Cranborne from 1903 to 1947.  TNA, FO 371/19493, R 7511/234/12, Minute by John Clifford Norton, December 10, 1935, f. 260.

IV A Landmark Year

107

previous political activism. Norton further stated that the SdP leader’s objective was, “one of conciliation and co-operation within the limits of the present Czechoslovak State and within the framework of the present Czechoslovak constitution, and he has, contrary to rumours spread by his Governmental opponents, no connections or affiliations with the German Nazi party”.⁹⁰ The memorandum’s author, however, could not have known that the Sudeten German Party had received money from the Third Reich for its election campaign, otherwise he would not have written such a manifest falsehood. The document continues with a criticism of the policy of Edvard Beneš, who it claimed hoped that unless the SdP’s promises were met very soon then it would naturally implode just as fast as in the year in which it had formed, then as the SHF. As reasons for his visit to London, Henlein gave a desire to study how British institutions work, an endeavour to inform the British public on the objectives of his policies and last but not least, but what in fact was Norton’s conjecture, the desire to put pressure on the (still) Foreign Minister that the SdP was a real political force which had to be taken account of.⁹¹ The change of climate in the Foreign Office also occurred at the very top. Robert Vansittart recommended to the designated Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, that he informally advise Beneš or his successor to attempt to retrieve the poor trend of CzechGerman relations.⁹² These empty words meant nothing less than the application

 Ibid., f. 261.  Ibid., f. 262. The author of another material, an official of the Southern Department, also heard Henlein’s talk in Chatham House and noted that the SdP leader was a moderate and quiet man. Henlein’s speech began with an excursion through history on the establishment of Czechoslovakia, and the SdP leader even stated that errors were made by both parties. But the Prague Government had failed to meet its obligations from the Minority Treaty and implement it within its legislature, said Henlein, adding that although members of the German minority were tolerated, they were not respected. He then moved on to define the role of his party, which he saw in being a moderator between Czechoslovakia and Germany, rejecting the suspicion that the Sudeten German Party had become an offshoot of the German Nazi Party, and lying when he denied receipt of financial support from Berlin. Cf. ibid., ff. 263 – 264. The purpose of the visit was apparently to ascertain the opinion of the English elite on the position of Sudeten Germans towards Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Legation in Vienna thought that the trigger for the trip itself had apparently come from Berlin, and that London was concerned about the survival of Austria, something which, according to some British diplomats, was appearing ever less likely. AMZV, f. Zahraniční úřady, vyslanectví Vídeň 1918 – 1939, kt. 14, č.j. 8276/III3b-1936, v Praze dne 24. ledna 1936.  “Van” said he would try the same with Jan Masaryk. TNA, FO 371/19493, R 7511/234/12, December 16, 1935, f. 259. Cabinet Secretary Sir Maurice Hankey, however, had to write that Eden would not have the opportunity to do anything; in the end, Beneš did not go to Geneva due to the presidential election. Ibid., December 21, 1935.

108

IV A Landmark Year

of gentle pressure to come to an agreement with the German minority. Orme Sargent also informed Minister Addison of Konrad Henlein’s visit to London, adding that he essentially could write nothing more than that detailed by John Clifford Norton, but that he would be interested in Addison’s opinion of how far the SdP leader could be trusted. The official of the Czechoslovak Legation in London, Vilém Černý, had told him that Henlein was “as slippery as an eel” and you couldn’t believe anything he said.⁹³ Henlein’s December visit was an important milestone in terms of the Foreign Office and British Legation in Prague’s perception of Czech-German relations.⁹⁴ The SdP leader’s performance had succeeded in creating the impression that he was a direct and honest politician who simply wanted an agreement with the Czechoslovak Government on the basis of Czechoslovak law, and that the party had no links with Berlin; commentary in Völkischer Beobachter even stated that because of his party, Henlein was trying to impress the Czechoslovak authorities. If before British authorities both in Prague and London had written in neutral terms of the Sudeten German Party and had perceived Henlein as an average politician, now their flow of thoughts began to turn in a direction dangerous to Czechoslovakia in assessing Henlein as a serious man who was striving for national reconciliation despite the disapproval of officials and who spoke for himself, not Adolf Hitler. Somewhat oddly, Czechoslovak diplomacy did not perceive Henlein’s second visit to London as particularly dangerous at the time.⁹⁵ Furthermore, the Italo-Abyssinian War dominated bilateral BritishCzechoslovak relations during this period.⁹⁶  Ibid., Sargent to Addison, December 12, 1935, f. 265.  Cornwall, ‘A Leap into Ice-Cold Water’, p. 138.  This was also influenced by the fact that the Czechoslovak Minister to London, Jan Masaryk, was staying in Czechoslovakia in December 1935, where presidential election were taking place. Jindřich Dejmek also writes of a certain underestimation of the effect of Henlein’s visits to London. Apparently Minister Jan Masaryk reassured his superiors even after Henlein’s second visit to the British capital (December 1935) that “Henlein’s trip has not damaged us politically, but rather has helped us in many areas […]”.Dejmek, J., Velká Británie v zahraniční politice Československa 1918 – 1938. (Náčrt hlavních problémů) [Great Britain in Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1938. (Outline of Major Issues)], Valenta, J. – Voráček, E. – Harna, J. (uspoř.), Československo 1918 – 1938. Osudy demokracie ve střední Evropě [Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1938. The Fate of Democracy in Central Europe], Praha 1999, p. 537. Even in a periodical report for August to December 1935, Masaryk had to state that Henlein had acted moderately and had rejected contact with Germany. Cf. AMZV, PZ Londýn, 1935, periodická zpráva č. III, 10. února 1936, pp. 85 – 87.  The Austrian Legation had noticed an interesting fact in Henlein’s relations with Czechoslovakia – pre-election promises could not be met under the prevailing circumstances, and as such the hopes of the SdP leader and those around him could only be placed “in foreign policy circumstances alone”. The report’s author added that the Italian-Abyssian events demonstrated the

IV A Landmark Year

109

On 21 December 1935, the British Legation in Prague sent Samuel Hoare a document summarising four milestones in the history of the German minority from the establishment of Czechoslovakia up to 1936.⁹⁷ It termed the first period, ending in 1933, as a period of co-operation from German Social Democrats and Agrarians, if each party separately, with the Czechoslovak Government, although an ever-larger part of their national compatriots were beginning to look with contempt at the Cabinet. The second period spanned 1934 to 1935 and was characterised by Konrad Henlein’s meteoric rise, ending with his overwhelming success in the May election when he managed to unite a large proportion of Sudeten German voters, something Addison thought he had achieved by referring to a unity in which he saw strength and hope rather than theories of racial affinity. He saw the third milestone as the period from May to autumn 1935 when Henlein managed to travel to London for the first time (although he went there in August, i. e. summer). According to the Minister, this short period was marked by the SdP’s expectation that the Czechoslovak Government would realise how strong it was and begin negotiations with it to offer a relevant and acceptable solution to the nationalities issue within Czechoslovakia. “But the latter [the Government – author’s note] had no liking for ‘outsiders’ who might, as they thought, provide Germany with an excuse for interfering, in traditional fashion, on behalf of this Cinderella of the Czechoslovak household,” said the author.⁹⁸ The Legation Secretary went on to say that because he had failed to come to an amicable agreement with the Czechoslovak Government, Henlein had to move on to the fourth milestone, that being an endeavour to focus on gaining support for putting pressure on Prague from abroad, specifically from Great Britain, the only democracy

option of using a similar approach, which should have been a warning for Czechoslovakia. ATOeStA/AdR/AAng ÖVB 1Rep Prag, kt. 38, Berichte, Weisungen 1935 (VIII–XII), Zl. 457/Pol, Prag, am 20. September 1935. Minister Masaryk logically enough noted that British interest in Czechoslovakia could not be assumed unless it involved the country’s primary interests, but he then immediately added: “On the other hand, many groups in England consider it their duty to work hard to look after national minorities in all those states which appeared after the war and which are also persecuted, where complaints from these minorities are heard, and especially amongst those groups who are not particularly favourably disposed to these new countries these often find a willing ear.” AMZV, PZ Londýn, 1935, periodická zpráva č. III, 10. února 1936, p. 85.  At the end of the report, however, the name Robert Hadow is given, who sent the material in the Minister’s name, with Foreign Office officials themselves unsure as to whom to ascribe the document to.  TNA, FO 371/19493, R 7759/234/12, Sir J. Addison to Sir Samuel Hoare, December 21, 1935, f. 287.

110

IV A Landmark Year

in Europe which Henlein thought had until then enjoyed an almost jealous admiration and respect in Central Europe.⁹⁹ Addison acknowledged the success of Henlein’s trips to London, with his second visit in December confirming the interest of certain officials in the Sudeten German Party’s position and the situation of the German minority in Czechoslovakia, while also implying the Czechoslovakian Government was unwilling to negotiate when he wrote that according to Prague the time for miracles had already passed. He then discussed the sophisticated pressure the Cabinet was executing in German areas (Czech policy, suppressing student associations, censorship, intensifying internal colonisation, etc.) and which was only making the position of Sudeten Germans worse, and ever more desperate.¹⁰⁰ In around the second week of December 1935, the British Legation in Prague decided to respond to Sargent’s letter to Addison. Robert Hadow referred to the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the above memorandum and on behalf of the Legation rejected any hidden contacts, prejudices, or preferences for one or other side, instead affirming to an attempt at presenting the true facts of the historic “fraternal dispute” (he uses the German term “Brüder-Zwist” in his response) which was now beginning to endanger Central Europe. The Legation Secretary went on to say: “Any student of history knows that fear is the main motive underlying the Czech repression of the German minority […].”¹⁰¹ He then expressed his regret that there was no politician with a clear vision for the future, or who could resist the temptation to succumb to a simple solution based on national intolerance. He saw another drawback in the lack of opportunities to speak with Sudeten German Party representatives, since their headquarters was in northern Bohemia and any attempt at contact in the capital immediately aroused the unwanted attention of Czechoslovak authorities, he said.¹⁰²

 Ibid.  Ibid., p. 2. Foreign Office officials began to see the whole affair in a similar manner. One opinion was that Henlein only wanted a fair agreement with the Czechoslovak Government, in line with Addison’s idea that following failure in Prague and Geneva the SdP leader had had to turn for help to London. Ibid., December 31, 1935, ff. 283 – 284. Edward Carr did not understand the sudden transformation from one “milestone” to the next, as the material presented it. He explained it with four logical points – 1) a worsening economic situation; 2) moral and material inspiration in the Nazi victory; 3) increased discrimination measures against the German minority; 4) the pro-Soviet and anti-German focus of Beneš’s foreign policy. Ibid., December 31, 1935, ff. 284– 285. This was an attempt to explain logically what Addison had not done and it can be acknowledged that each point played a role in boosting support for the SdP.  TNA, FO 371/19493, R 7847/234/12, Hadow to Sargent, December 21, 1935, f. 318.  Ibid., f. 319.

IV A Landmark Year

111

The above-mentioned reports confirmed a change in the perception of Czech-German relations by the British Legation in Prague. It seems as if Henlein’s December visit to London had triggered a different approach from the Legation towards this complex and multi-layered issue. The whole report is marked by inaccuracies and shortcuts, all favouring the Sudeten German Party. The elections of 1925 and 1929 had brought German activist parties (the Social Democrats, Agrarians, and Christian Socials) significant gains and their voters had realised that Government engagement would have to play out within the framework of the Czechoslovak Constitution; as such it was untrue to speak about the contempt of a large section of Sudeten Germans. One should, of course, acknowledge that the BdL and DCV joining the Government in 1926 was mainly the result of similarity in programmes rather than a more widely conceived agreement over the nationalities programme, that German activism had been under great pressure since the early 1930s as a result of the economic crisis and Adolf Hitler’s subsequent rise to power, and that the 1935 election demonstrated that they had failed in the eyes of German voters. The Legation had also aligned itself more towards Henlein’s idea, and over time this position would grow in strength and take on an ever clearer shape, such that they took the position that the Czechoslovak Government’s unwillingness to negotiate with the SdP after the May 1935 election as equals had forced the SdP to turn abroad, specifically to London, to find supporters. As such, it was the Legation’s opinion that the SdP leader would naturally have to hold discussions with Foreign Office representatives because Prague had closed the door to discussions with them. This was untrue, however; the statements of some radical SdP members suggested that they were refusing to accept Czechoslovakia’s existence, and this meant that a potential agreement was highly unlikely. Even the conclusion to Hadow’s report deliberately distorted Czechoslovak Government policy and assessed the complex situation in the mainly German areas of the First Czechoslovak Republic in a one-sided manner.

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue Konrad Henlein was aware of the success of his second visit to London. He had seen that there was minimal knowledge of the problem of minorities in Czechoslovakia and as such decided to intensify contacts with British politicians. He wrote to Orme Sargent, thanking him for the warm welcome he had received in the British capital, and suggested that they correspond with each other.¹ Sargent thanked him for his letter, and while he did not reject further meetings should the SdP leader travel to London he said that entering into correspondence would be unwise and continued: “As a matter of principle, all of us in the Foreign Office have to be exceedingly careful to give no grounds whatever for letting it be supposed, […] that we had gone behind the backs of the foreign Governments with whom we are on official relations.”² Czechoslovak officials did not perceive Henlein’s second visit to London as particularly dangerous. Furthermore, the Italo-Abyssinian War dominated Prague-London relations at the time.³ British diplomats in Prague, however, continued to lean on the side of unfavourable reports about the Czechoslovak Government which Minister Addison had begun and which did not hide their proGerman sympathies. Legation Secretary Robert Hadow was particularly notable in this regard.⁴

 The National Archives, London, Kew (hereinafter TNA), Foreign Office (hereinafter FO) 371/ 20373, R 32/32/12, Herr Konrad Henlein to Mr. Sargent, December 19, 1935, f. 181.  Ibid., f. 180. Sargent suggested to Henlein that he would certainly get the opportunity here and there to meet with the British Minister to Prague, “or Mr Hadow, the First Secretary there”. The SdP leader was to inform the Foreign Office via these information channels of what was happening in Czechoslovakia. The British Ambassador to Berlin, Eric Phipps, suggested at this same time, that the full cultural autonomy of Sudeten Germans was becoming one of Hitler’s demands. At the same time, certain British “travellers” [Phipps himself used quotation marks – author’s note] were to be assured of a lack of interest in territorial exchanges. The Ambassador later wrote, however, that from a long-term perspective he did not think that Berlin would be satisfied with anything less than the full Nazification of Germans in Czechoslovakia. Cf. Johnson, G. (ed.), Our Man in Berlin. The Diary of Sir Eric Phipps, 1933 – 1937, Basingstoke 2008, p. 157.  Robert Vansittart wrote in his memoirs that since France had not stood alongside Britain against Italy in December 1935, it could be expected it would not support Czechoslovakia in a war with Germany. Vansittart, R., Lessons of My Life, London 1943, p. 54.  “The fact that it was this official who managed the British Legation for a large part of 1936 following Addison’s recall is also key in terms of the development of Henlein’s party policy, and was also to have far-reaching consequences for Czechoslovakia and London’s policy towards it.” Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje. Politické a diplomatické vztahy Československa a Velké https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110651454-006

114

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

Jan Masaryk sent an interesting report on the direction of British foreign policy right at the start of the new year in which he said there was an excitable atmosphere in London (following the disclosure of the Hoare-Laval Pact⁵) and that it was very difficult to get one’s bearings in foreign policy issues. The Czechoslovak Minister wrote that there were groups of politicians which preferred the League of Nations, even though they were aware of its growing weakness, and there were other groups which rejected it. He said there was a particular grouping of top officials at the Foreign Office and other governmental offices which also did not hold a single line and added that Robert Vansittart promoted, like Pierre Laval who had withdrawn, collaboration with France and Italy against Germany. This was not currently possible, however, and Prime Minister Baldwin ordered an anti-Italian policy be pursued, said Masaryk.⁶ At the end of January 1936, Robert Hadow met with the recently elected President Beneš, who used the opportunity to inform him of his position on the Sudeten German problem. According to Hadow, it bothered him more than he was willing to admit publically. Beneš began by naming the Sudeten German Party’s four “sins” – 1) the SdP had included many members of the former DNSAP in its ranks; 2) although their members declared themselves “good Czechoslovak citizens”, they allowed themselves to be indirectly supported by Berlin; 3) the SdP was exaggerating in its complaints about an alleged famine in northern Bohemia; 4) the President did not think Henlein acted correctly when he refused to run in the election.⁷ Beneš claimed that the SdP leader needed to speak with

Británie (1918 – 1938) [Unfulfilled Hopes. Political and Diplomatic Relations of Czechoslovakia and Great Britain (1918 – 1938)], Praha 2003, p. 316. Cf. Cornwall, M., A Fluctuating Barometer: British Diplomatic Views of the Czech-German Relationship in Czechoslovakia, 1918 – 1938, in: Schmidt-Hartmann, E. – Winters, S. B. (hrsg.), Groβbritannien, die USA und die böhmischen Länder 1848 – 1938 [Great Britain, the USA and the Bohemian Lands 1848 – 1938], München 1991, p. 325. Hadow’s sympathy for the German minority in Czechoslovakia was almost absolute; his faith in the SdP seemed without limit. Michie, L. W., Portrait of an Appeaser. Robert Hadow, First Secretary in the British Foreign Office, 1931 – 1939, Westport 1996, p. 29.  Cf. for example a letter from the papers of the editor of The Times Geoffery Dawson, where he writes about the shame and fortune that the whole case did not happed before the parliamentary elections. University of Oxford, Bodleian Libraries (Weston Library), Papers of Geoffrey Dawson, MS. Dawson 78, December 17, 1935, f. 146.  Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí České republiky [The Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic], Praha (hereinafter AMZV), Politické zprávy (hereinafter PZ) Londýn, 1936, běžná zpráva č. 1, 6. ledna 1936, pp. 1– 2. He then added, however, that Vansittart had not exploited the Government’s inability to agree on sanctions against Italy and that the country was gradually returning to a pro-Italian policy. Ibid., p. 3.  TNA, FO 371/20373, R 675/32/12, Mr. Hadow to Mr. Eden, Prague, January 31, 1936, f. 189. Austrian Minister to Prague Ferdinand Marek also confirmed the SdP’s links with NSDAP in

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

115

many voices in order avoid the dissolution of his party. Henlein, for example, had attempted to force the Agrarians to co-operate against Czechoslovak leftwing parties using “smooth words”, “but this manoeuvre Dr. Benes had easily defeated”, wrote Hadow.⁸ According to the British Legation Secretary, the Czechoslovak President had decided for the moment to keep the SdP “at arm’s length” and make it clear to its leadership that if the party did not start to co-operate with the official Czechoslovak authorities and observe the laws of the land, then it could not expect to be negotiated with. According to what he said, Beneš naturally wanted to be President of the whole Republic and do everything to show German-speaking citizens that if they were loyal, then they could “attain equality of privilege of the other constituent parts of this State”.⁹ Understandably, Hadow did not agree with this position, although he know that the SdP was a conglomerate of very diverse elements. From an interview with Professor Seton-Watson¹⁰ he realised that neither Beneš nor Prime Minister Milan Hodža intended to stop co-operating with those of the German minority who were loyal, “led by such men as Dr. Spina”, and that Henlein’s party did not figure in their plans to reconcile Czechs and Germans. The British Legation Secretary accused Beneš of trying to attain “complete mastery over the political machinery of this country” and that he was endeavouring for the unification of “Slav elements” in Czechoslovakia, and this was laying the groundwork for “solving” problems with the German minority. “Yet in this farsightedness and inflexible resolution of Dr. Benes there is at least ground for hope,” noted Hadow at the end of his report.¹¹

his January report to Vienna. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien, Abteilung Archiv der Republik [Austrian State Archives, Archives of the Republic] (hereinafter OeStA/AdR), Auswärtige Angelegenheiten 1918 – 2005 (hereinafter AAng), Österreichische Vertretungsbehörden im Ausland 1. Republik, 1893 – 1945 (hereinafter ÖVB), Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 40, Politische Korrespondenz 1935 – 1936, Berichte, Weisungen 1936 (I – III), Zl. 13/Pol, Prag, am 11. Jänner 1936. A month later, he described the new German Minister to Prague, Ernest Eisenlohr, as completely devoted to the “National Socialist worldview” and someone who believed that Prague’s approach to the German minority was mistaken. Cf. ibid., Zl. 87/Pol, Prag, am 18. Feber 1936.  TNA, FO 371/20373, R 675/32/12, Mr. Hadow to Mr. Eden, Prague, January 31, 1936, f. 189.  Ibid.  Hadow spoke to him on another occasion. Cf. Seton-Watson, Ch., R. W. Seton-Watson and the Czechoslovaks, 1935 – 1939, in: Schmidt-Hartmann, E. – Winters, S. B. (hrsg.), Groβbritannien, die USA und die böhmischen Länder 1848 – 1938 [Great Britain, the USA and the Bohemian Lands 1848 – 1938], München 1991, p. 336.  TNA, FO 371/20373, R 675/32/12, Mr. Hadow to Mr. Eden, Prague, January 31, 1936, pp. 2– 3, quotation cf. p. 3. Hadow also accused Beneš of trying to be master of the country’s domestic policy just as he had directed its foreign policy for many years.

116

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

One can surmise from the comments of the then-officer for Czechoslovakia, Edward Hallett Carr, on the report from Prague that such information was not lost at the Foreign Office, and in contrast it left an indelible impression within its ranks, in particular since President Beneš did not enjoy much popularity there.¹² On the last day of January 1936, Robert Hadow wrote to Owen O’Malley, head of the Southern Department (Foreign Office), to inform him that he had asked President Beneš whether he or Dr Hodža would have any issue if he established contact with the SdP in order to acquire first hand information on Henlein. Hadow complained to the President that the whole time he had been stationed in Prague he had never met any Sudeten German MP. A good diplomat should not rely merely on second-hand information, he said, which is why he asked Beneš for his opinion on, “whether he preferred that we [the British Legation – author’s note] should give Henlein a wide berth or whether he [Beneš – author’s note] agreed that we might establish contact”.¹³ The British Legation Secretary had come to the conclusion at the beginning of the year that he should very carefully and as discreetly as possible establish contact with Henlein’s party and with Henlein himself, unless London recommended otherwise. Hadow saw only benefits from this approach – gaining a greater understanding of the SdP leadership’s positions and providing the assurance that Great Britain believed in the loyalty of Sudeten Germans to their own country and democracy, and not a faith in “false gods”. It was essential in his opinion to show both sides that London was interested in the Sudeten German problem, but would also remain an impartial observer.¹⁴ As such, at the end of January 1936, Hadow proposed a tactic which was meant to result not just in the standard establishment of relations between the

 Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 316. Carr also said of the President that: “[…] all Dr. Benes’s professions of his intention to deal in a conciliatory manner with the German minority are eyewash or, at any rate, that there are wrapped up with so many impossible conditions that they will never be translated into practise.” Cf. TNA, FO 371/20373, R 675/32/12, February, 11, 1936, f. 187. Beneš’s unpopularity at the Foreign Office was further increased following the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of May 1935. Cornwall, A Fluctuating Barometer, p. 326. Some British political circles furthermore believed the German propaganda that there was a Soviet airport in Czechoslovakia from which attacks could be made on Germany. In mid-March 1936, this problem was even discussed at a meeting of His Majesty’s Government. Cf. TNA, Cabinet Office (hereianfter CAB) 23/83/20 (War Cabinet and Cabinet: Minutes), March 16, 1936, f. 318.  TNA, FO 371/20373, R 706/32/12, Mr. Hadow to Mr. O’Malley, January 31, 1936, f. 200, quotation f. 201. The President had no objections to establishing contact. He apparently had nothing to hide and his position on the SdP was generally known, Hadow told O’Malley.  Ibid., f. 202 A.

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

117

official representative of the British Legation in Prague and one of many political parties in Czechoslovakia, but in particular a second important step following Henlein’s December visit to London, to increase awareness of the SdP amongst Foreign Office representatives.¹⁵ He would now be able to write his negative reports on Czechoslovak Government policy on the basis of direct contact with Sudeten German Party representatives. As such, in a certain sense his proposal corresponded to a general attempt by the Foreign Office not to annoy Germany and to endeavour to find agreement with it.¹⁶ Hadow was not going to change the tone of his reports in any way as events progressed, and he intensified his complaints of the Prague Government’s minority policy even more. In early March 1936, he wrote to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden of “the increased bitterness between Sudetendeutsche and Czech elements in this country, which is turning the Sudetendeutsche question into a ‘fight for existence’ between Germanic and Czech culture”.¹⁷ The British Legation Secretary even made two short visits to the border region (as he wrote himself) and these made him conclude that the mentioned problem, meaning the Sudeten German issue, was becoming ever more delicate. He also began listing what he considered deliberate discrimination of the Germans from Czechoslovak authorities, beginning with insufficient unemployment support, through race, cultural and language discrimination of the Germans to pervasive policing.¹⁸ Naturally, Hadow’s reports did not reflect reality, even simply for the reason that they were made on the basis of just two visits to the border regions alone. At the end of January 1936, he was still complaining that he had never met even one  Some of the Foreign Office were not convinced by Beneš’s arguments for his inaction towards the SdP, specifically that he was not negotiating with its representatives. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Stanhope, even said it reminded him of Sophocles: “Let me remind you of one saying: Whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad. In my opinion this applies to the actions – or rather inaction – of Dr Beneš who is not dealing with the German minority while there is still time.” Franke, R., Die Tschechoslowakei in der politischen Meinung Englands 1918 – 1938 [Czechoslovakia in the Political Opinion of England 1918 – 1938], in: Bosl, K. (hrsg.), Die demokratisch-parlamentarische Struktur der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik [Democratic-parliamentary Structure of the First Czechoslovak Republic], München 1975, p. 259.  “[…] should the Germans decide to intervene, it will be the Czechs who will have to bear the chief responsibility for the dangerous situation thereby created,” wrote Nicolas J. A. Cheetham. Cornwall, A Fluctuating Barometer, p. 326.  TNA, FO 371/20373, R 1302/32/12, Mr. Hadow to Mr. Eden, Prague, March 3, 1936, f. 223.  Ibid. Hadow wrote in conclusion that over the course of the last two years a feeling of racial belonging had markedly built up on both sides, and that a struggle for cultural and economic survival was gradually taking place. For Hadow, the problem of the Sudetenland had become the Alsace and Lorraine of the new era. Ibid., p. 3.

118

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

Sudeten German MP while he had been in post in Prague. And now, a month later, he was speaking about the Sudeten German issue as a delicate problem; as such he had succumbed to a fabrication made by the Sudeten German Party. Nevertheless, the British Legation Secretary continued in his unflattering pronouncements. On 9 March 1936, he wrote once more to Owen O’Malley, again informing him, “that the Sudetendeutsche question seems to be boiling up in an unpleasant fashion”. Hadow told the head of the Southern Department that since his last report (3 March), the campaign against the Sudeten Germans had further intensified. Although he indicated that nothing had happened as yet, he warned O’Malley that something might occur very shortly.¹⁹ On 23 March 1936, Hadow contacted Foreign Secretary Eden. He began with essentially an apology for again writing about a problem “which must appear to be a minor importance in the present state of Europe”. But he warned Eden that Czechoslovak and Sudeten German circles were becoming ever more convinced that the future of Czechoslovakia depended on British understanding of the current dangers in the Sudeten German issue.²⁰ With information and references such as these, furthermore being repeated at lesser or greater intervals,²¹ they could not but influence the Foreign Office. Foreign Office officials were forced to undertake certain measures on the basis

 TNA, FO 371/20373, R 1469/32/12, Mr. Hadow to Mr. O’Malley, March, 9, 1936, f. 240. In this regard, Hadow noted the German action in the demilitarised zone the previous weekend, referring to the Rhineland occupation. The British Legation Secretary also mentioned a report from the Austrian Legation in Prague which warned of the fact that apparently “North Bohemia is now becoming 100 % pro-Henlein” and that German voters who had previously not been particularly united, were beginning to turn to Henlein as their only hope. Ibid., ff. 241– 242. The Austrian Legation also informed Vienna that a distrust of London was beginning to grow in certain circles, while at the same time there was an ever-greater faith in Paris as the only true friend of Czechoslovakia. OeStA/AdR, AAng, ÖVB, Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 40, Politische Korrespondenz 1935 – 1936, Berichte, Weisungen 1936 (I–III), Zl. 135/Pol, Prag, probably am 19. März 1936.  TNA, FO 371/20373, R 1819/32/12, Mr. Hadow to Mr. Eden, Prague, March 23, 1936, f. 248. Hadow wrote of Czechoslovakia as a “vain building upon sand which, sooner or later, must crumble and so endanger the peace of Europe”. In his report, the British Legation Secretary again listed the injustices which Czechoslovak officials were committing on the Sudeten Germans. In conclusion, he asked the Foreign Secretary to consider his information, meant for His Majesty’s Government, as confidential. Ibid.  Hadow contacted Eden again on 28 March 1936. He informed him of a draft bill the Czech Government had introduced which gave it extensive powers in the event of a sudden emergency. The British Legation Secretary did not mince his words in criticising the Czechoslovak Government, terming its measure “racial discrimination”. Cf. TNA, FO 371/20374, R 1891/32/12, Mr. Hadow to Mr. Eden, Prague, March 28, 1936, f. 262.

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

119

of these unflattering reports from the Legation in Prague. The dangerous situation in Europe had been exacerbated by Germany’s occupation of the Rhineland²² and Great Britain could not stand idly by while national disputes of little importance from their perspective grew into wider-scale conflict. As such, an important task for the Foreign Office was to prevent the escalation of tensions in Czechoslovakia and ensure Hitler was not given a pretext for attack.²³ The first Foreign Office representative to respond to the reports from Prague was Orme Sargent. On 7 April 1936, he invited Czechoslovak Minister Jan Masaryk to see him. Both men spoke mainly about the Sudeten German issue. According to Sargent, the Minister was in a good mood and acknowledged that his Government had learned of not particularly flattering facts. The British politician then informed his superior (Vansittart) that when he saw Masaryk the next day, “you will find the ground prepared, and will be able to impress upon him not merely the fatuity, but the actual danger, of the present policy of the Czech Government in regard to the Sudetendeutsche problem”.²⁴ The next day, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart, met Minister Masaryk. The fact Masaryk was received by the second highest official in the Foreign Office at a time when the situation in Europe had become

 London, however, made it clear that German occupation of the Rhineland was not casus belli. Furthermore, the British public did not see why the country should “countenance the danger of war or at the very least make enemies of a large nation when nothing more had happened than the nation had procured the right to fully exercise its sovereign rights on its own territory”. Klimek, A. – Hofman, P., Velké dějiny zemí Koruny české, svazek XIV., 1929 – 1938 [Great History of the Czech Lands, Vol. XIV, 1929 – 1938], Praha, Litomyšl 2002, p. 408. Edvard Beneš himself thought the position of Britain and others on the Rhineland occupation was a clear signal of a greater willingness to “accede from the end of summer this year to a secret German probe […]”. Dejmek, J., Edvard Beneš. Politická biografie českého demokrata. Část druhá. Prezident republiky a vůdce národního odboje (1835 – 1948) [Edvard Beneš. Political Biography of a Czech Democrat. Part Two. President of the Republic and Leader of the National Resistance (1835 – 1948)], Praha 2008, p. 17.  Cf. Cornwall, A Fluctuating Barometer, p. 326. The German Chancellor himself spoke of his willingness to conclude a non-aggression pact with Austria and Czechoslovakia for propaganda purposes. Ward Price, G., I Know these Dictators, London 1938, pp. 81, 95.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 2126/32/12, Foreign Office Minute (Mr. Sargent), April 7, 1936, f. 276. Mainly on the basis of information from Robert Hadow, Sargent considered Czechoslovak Government policy towards the Sudeten Germans to be “narrow-minded and short-sighted”. He also ascertained from Minister Masaryk that President Beneš “was very despondent and foresaw war in two years’ time”. Ibid.

120

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

acute following Hitler’s occupation of the Rhineland is evidence of the weight which the Foreign Office attributed to the Sudeten German issue.²⁵ Vansittart was in no way one of the convinced Germanophile officials at the Foreign Office,²⁶ yet even he warned Jan Masaryk that, “his Government was giving most unwise hostages to fortune”. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State warned the Czechoslovak Minister that the German Government had managed to exploit difficulties around the Sudeten German issue in the past and it was certainly going to continue to do so.²⁷ Vansittart thought that the Government in Prague could consolidate its domestic position if it observed his recommendations and he trusted there was still a way to come to an agreement with the Sudeten Germans. The British diplomat predicted that this would involve an agreement with Sudeten Germans;²⁸ and not just an agreement with Konrad Henlein and the SdP. Jan Masaryk asked Vansittart if he could convey this to Beneš as a personal message, and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State concurred.²⁹ The Czechoslovak Minister must have been surprised by the course of discussions. There would undoubtedly have been nothing out of the ordinary during the discussion itself if Robert Vansittart had not got involved in Czechoslovakia’s domestic affairs. The British Legation in Prague had achieved its objectives – the second top man at the Foreign Office was taking a serious interest in the Sudeten German problem, although for the meantime Vansittart wanted an agreement with the Sudeten Germans, and not just with the SdP. For the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, and for British foreign policy, it was important that the situation in Central Europe simmer down.³⁰ “Van”, like some other diplo-

 As such, a memorandum on the Sudeten German issue was written on 8 April 1936 by the Foreign Office, authored by Geoffrey Lyster McDermott which ended with the following words: “It seems evident, then, that the best chance for the peaceful survival of the Czechoslovak Republic lies in a policy of going half-way to meet Herr Henlein’s claims in their present reasonable form.” Cf. TNA, FO 371/20376, R 971/971/12, The German Minority in Czechoslovakia, Foreign Office, April 8, 1936, p. 14.  Cf. chapter Brief Overview to 1933. His opinions were not led by an attempt to satisfy Berlin’s demands at any cost, but rather the simple assertion that appeasing Germany meant a gradation of the problem of the German minority in Czechoslovakia would be impossible.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 2128/32/12, Czechoslovak Minister (Conversation), April, 8, 1936, f. 279.  Vansittart literally said: “[…] the Sudetendeutsche could be conciliated.” Ibid.  Ibid.  Ever more British politicians were coming to the opinion that peace in Central Europe, and peace throughout Europe would depend on friendship between London and Berlin. Cf. Smetana, V., In the Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1942, Praha 2008, p. 42. On the other hand, “Van” rejected German hegemony in Europe, which he thought would mean the end of the British Empire. Roi, M. L., Sir Robert Vansittart, the Global Balance of

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

121

mats, had succumbed to the impression that if Henlein could be reached out to, then his demands would be reasonable. Konrad Henlein, however, thought otherwise and continued to escalate his activities. In mid-April 1936, the Foreign Office looked into an extract from a letter from Henlein to one British correspondent. The SdP leader wrote that the situation in the country was becoming ever more critical and hopeless, and went on to say: “We are beginning to think that any understanding with the Czechs is impossible.” Henlein alleged in his letter that Czechoslovak representatives wanted to destroy the SdP and were rejecting any proposals from the party.³¹ At the end of April 1936, Minister Addison wrote to Foreign Secretary Eden to inform him how the Machník Decree³² had become “the subject of a complaint to the League of Nations by the Sudetendeutsche party”.³³ More specifically, this involved a call to eighteen companies (of 24 and 28 January) which conditioned the awarding of Government contracts on the basis of the nationality composition of the companies. Although it was likely not a personal decree from the Minister of

Power and Nazi Germany, 1934 – 1937, PhD. Thesis, University of Toronto, Toronto 1996, pp. 206 – 207.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 2219/32/12, Foreign Office Minute (Mr. Norton), April, 16, 1936, f. 282. Henlein complained saying if only Sudeten Germans could have their Hyde Park, referring to Speaker’s Corner. Ibid. A few days later, the official of the Czechoslovak Legation in London Vilém Černý informed the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry that the British public was unwilling to support any engagement of London in Central Europe: “In the atmosphere which dominates here, one cannot doubt that public opinion would not allow even a single British soldier be sent to protect the security of any of the countries in Central or Eastern Europe.” AMZV, PZ Londýn, 1936, běžná zpráva č. 7, 23. dubna 1936, p. 3.  “Written invitations for bids which were sent at the end of January 1936 to companies interested in Government contracts for the Ministry of National Defence, headed by František Machník at the time, came to be known as the Machník Decree.” Petráš, R., Menšiny v meziválečném Československu. Právní postavení národnostních menšin v první Československé republice a jejich mezinárodněprávní ochrana [Minorities in Interwar Czechoslovakia. Legal Status of National Minorities in the First Czechoslovak Republic and Their International Legal Protection], Praha 2009, p. 235. The SdP also issued its complaint as a propaganda brochure entitled Sudetendeutsche Beschwerde an den Völkerbund über den Erlaß des Ministeriums für Nationale Verteidigung der Tschechoslowakischen Republik betreffend die Vergabe staatlicher Lieferungen, which was published in April 1936 in Karlovy Vary by Karl Hermann Frank. Cf. AMZV, f. Kroftův archiv, Box 11. Since January 1936, the Minister of National Defence had “sent written invitations to businesses which wanted to bid for Government contracts, especially regarding arms. These required certain measures regarding nationalities be undertaken within the companies”. Kopecký, L., František Machník, život agrárního politika a ministra národní obrany [František Machník, Life of an Agrarian Politician and Minister of National Defense], Master Thesis, České Budějovice 2011, p. 51.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 2430/32/12, Sir J. Addison to Mr. Eden, Prague, April 27, 1936, f. 286.

122

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

National Defence, Agrarian František Machník, the minister’s name was to remain linked to the problem always. Were companies not to agree with the established rules, the Ministry of National Defence was to immediately remove their contract. Businesses were meant to adjust the proportion of nationalities within their workforce such that “1. the number of officers of Czechoslovak nationality is at least equal to the percentage of Czechoslovak nationality workers employed in the business, 2. The number of workers of Czechoslovak nationality is at least equal to their proportion within the population of the region in which the business was headquartered.” The document continued: “You should replace foreign employees with a domestic Czechoslovak nationality workforce as soon as possible and you should not employ staff (officers or workers) who support political parties hostile to the state.”³⁴ According to the British Minister, leading SdP representatives had come to the conclusion that this decision of the Minister of National Defence breached the rights of minorities contained within the peace treaty and were counter to the Czechoslovak Constitution. Addison said in his report³⁵ that as such the League of Nations should send an observer to examine the complaint.³⁶ The British Minister, however, informed the Foreign Secretary that all German parties were protesting against the decree, including the Social Democrats, Agrarians, etc. He said that all the sides had declared in unison that it threatened the continued existence of the German-speaking minority in Czechoslovakia. The beleaguered population in the Sudeten German parts of the country would apparently all look to Great Britain for an impartial assessment of the complaint, added Addison.³⁷ Minister of National Defence František Machník’s decree was poorly worded. It spoke of an obligation within the shortest possible time to replace “foreign employees with a domestic Czechoslovak nationality workforce”.³⁸ As such, even representatives of German parties involved in Government also spoke up. On the other hand, the requirement that no-one be employed who supported parties hostile to the Czechoslovak Republic was entirely fair. The Government in Prague merely wanted to ensure that any businesses securing military supplies took care

 Tisky poslanecké sněmovny [Prints of the House of Deputies], IV. volební období [IV Election Period], 2. Zasedání [Session 2], 1936, tisk 288, p. 1.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 2430/32/12, Sir J. Addison to Mr. Eden, Prague, April 27, 1936, f. 286.  Due to ambiguity over the use of specific legal terms from both the complainants themselves and “due to the fickle practice of the L of N” regarding the assessment of national minority complaints, it is hard to differentiate between the “complaint” and “petition” terms, and as such both these terms mean one and the same thing in the text. More in detail cf. Petráš, p. 104.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 2430/32/12, Sir J. Addison to Mr. Eden, Prague, April 27, 1936, f. 286.  Klimek – Hofman, p. 419.

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

123

to ensure they employed a representative sample of citizens of different nationalities within their region. This was to ensure that Germans did not work on the construction of fortifications on the border with Germany, as they could without realising it, or perhaps rather deliberately, inform Germany.³⁹ The situation became ever more difficult for Czechoslovakia. Not only were Foreign Office officials (Vansittart) meddling in the country’s domestic affairs and the British Legation in Prague ever more frequently criticising the Czechoslovak Government’s inaction, but now the SdP was taking its complaints about nationality disputes to the League of Nations. According to the Foreign Office, Great Britain was unable as yet to make a statement on the complaint because it was not a member of the committee looking into it.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the ministerial official responsible did note without having seen the complaint that the document was undoubtedly “well founded” and that “the Czech Government know already what our view is”.⁴¹ In the mean time, the British Legation in Prague, and Robert Hadow specifically, continued to criticise the Czechoslovak Government and its approach to the Sudeten German issue. According to the British Legation Secretary, President Beneš and those working with him had decided for disintegration “of the Henlein movement by encouragement of the German minority parties, as you [Hadow was writing to O’Malley – author’s note] will remember, represent in all about one-third of the Sudetendeutsche electorate”.⁴²

 Cf. TNA, FO 371/20374, R 2430/32/12, Sir J. Addison to Mr. Eden, Prague, April 27, 1936, f. 286. The Ministry of National Defence in particular insisted on checking the “state and civic reliability” of those taking part. Evidence had been uncovered that “Nazis (and now SdP supporters) are working for the benefit of Hitler’s Germany as spies, voluntary agents, etc.”. Kárník, Z., České země v éře První republiky (1918 – 1938). Díl třetí. O přežití a o život (1936 – 1938) [Czech Lands in the Era of the First Republic (1918 – 1938). Part Three. Survival and Life (1936 – 1938)], Praha 2003, p. 77.  This changed in May 1936 however: “From May of this year until September, [Foreign Secretary] Eden will chair the League of Nations Council, and the Chair of the Committee of Three will thus be the Englishman, Malkin.” Petráš, p. 113. Sir Herbert William Malkin was the Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office in the years 1929 – 1945. Statements from British politicians also make it clear they were hoping to conclude the whole affair during London’s presidency.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 2430/32/12, April 27, 1936, f. 285. Foreign Office officials hoped they would at least be able to get their hands on a copy of this complaint. The Sudeten German Party leadership itself was not hopeful of the petition’s success from the beginning. OeStA/ AdR, AAng, ÖVB, Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 41, Berichte, Weisungen 1936 (IV – IX), Zl. 214/Pol, Prag, am 27. April 1936.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 2789/32/12, Mr. Hadow to Mr. O’Malley, May 9, 1936, f. 297.

124

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

Hadow informed the Foreign Office of negotiations which were meant to lead to the DCV joining the Czechoslovak Government.⁴³ Hadow declared this form of Czech and German co-operation, however, to be obsolete. It was his opinion that the Sudeten German electorate looked at “the Spina, Czech and Mayr Harting groups” with suspicion and bitterness and considered them traitors of the Sudeten German problem. Characteristically for the British diplomat, he did not fail to make accusations of President Beneš, whom he considered was trying “to make his Czech National Socialists absolute masters of the internal politics of this country, whereas hitherto the Agrarians have called the tune”.⁴⁴ According to Hadow, the Czechoslovak political scene was disordered. He thought Prime Minister Hodža had been sidelined by the President, the Agrarian Party were showing signs of disgruntlement, “Slovak cooperation with the Czechs, as I have already said, has suffered a set-back” and attempts at dissolving the SdP had moved the Sudeten German movement “to extreme and underground Pan-Germanism”. Hadow thought that the current coalition was not as unified as it used to be.⁴⁵ Although Hadow informed the Foreign Office that Beneš was the master of the situation in Czechoslovakia, the way he said it gave it an entirely negative connotation. The diplomat considered that the President’s unshakeable position represented a fundamental obstacle to possible agreement with the Sudeten Germans; in Hadow’s thought process he meant here the Sudeten German Party. Although Owen O’Malley, the head of the Southern Department, thanked Hadow for his interesting information on the political situation in Czechoslovakia, he also added that it was not complete. The Foreign Office would welcome, for example, Hadow finding out what the sources of the SdP’s income were, or giving a more detailed description of the methods and objectives of the party, wrote O’Malley.⁴⁶ As such, he called on the Prague Legation to add and refine its reports on the SdP. Hadow’s criticism of the circumstances in Czechoslovakia and its President were being met with ambivalence from the Foreign Office. The head of the Southern Department neither rejected nor supported them. Instead,

 The party had not been in Government since 1929, and remained in opposition after the 1935 election although Prime Minister Jan Malypetr had offered them a place in the Cabinet.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 2789/32/12, Mr. Hadow to Mr. O’Malley, May 9, 1936, ff. 298 – 299. Hadow came to this conclusion on the basis of information from the Agrarian Party.  Ibid., f. 301. According to Hadow, it was important that there was no evidence that President Beneš had lost any of his cunning, “and he is today perhaps more than ever before the director of Czechoslovakia”, he added. Ibid., f. 302.  Ibid., June 11, 1936, f. 303.

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

125

he called on the Prague Legation Secretary to look into the matter more and try to gain further information. The next report on the political situation in Czechoslovakia came not from Robert Hadow, but from Minister Addison himself. In his report, he informed the Foreign Office of the situation in the neighbouring countries, whom he said were monitoring the current political circumstances in Czechoslovakia with concern. The British Minister wrote that the Government, aware of the unwanted publicity the publication of the Sudeten German complaint addressed to the League of Nations had brought, had decided to demonstrate a further example of co-operation with the Sudeten Germans.⁴⁷ According to his sources, the Government in Prague had also decided strictly not to enforce the Machník Decree, because the Act on the Defence of the State⁴⁸ which had been approved by both chambers of Parliament that month gave it similar and in fact more effective powers, wrote Addison.⁴⁹ The British Minister was shocked by the provisions of the law and accused the Government of acting as judge and jury.⁵⁰ At the end of May 1936,⁵¹ Czechoslovak Minister to London Jan Masaryk turned up at the Foreign Office seeking Owen O’Malley. The two men then spent an hour and a half speaking about the Sudeten German issue. According to O’Malley, Masaryk had been prompted by concern that the new British Minister to Prague, Charles H Bentinck, would not continue in the policy of putting pressure on the Government in Prague over concessions to the Sudeten Germans. Masaryk appeared at least very open during the discussion when he claimed that “he had, all along, strongly disagreed with Dr. Benes’s repressive policy”.⁵² The Czechoslovak Minister recommended that the head of the Southern Department ensure the British Government was more precise and certain in its criticisms of Prague. O’Malley himself, however, had to admit that any kind of criticism of

 TNA, FO 371/20374, R 3118/32/12, Sir J. Addison to Mr. Eden, Prague, May 23, 1936, f. 305.  The Act of 13 May 1936 on the Defence of the State (no. 131/1936) stipulated that persons unreliable to the state should not be employed within businesses important for the defence of the state. Business owners were obliged to immediately dismiss any employees once they received information that said employee had been established as a person unreliable for the state in an official decision which had come into force. More in detail cf. Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého [Collection of Laws and Regulations of the Czechoslovak State], Vol. 1936, pp. 479 – 541.  The Minister was mistaken. The Chamber of Deputies had already ratified the law on 30 April 1936, followed by the Senate on 13 May. The law took effect on 23 June 1936.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 3118/32/12, Sir J. Addison to Mr. Eden, Prague, May 23, 1936, f. 305.  The meeting took place on 25 May, although at the start of his report, O’Malley erroneously dated it 22 May.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 3290/32/12, Czechoslovak Minister (Conversation), May 25, 1936, f. 319.

126

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

Czechoslovakia from London was very difficult because if there was no breach “of the Minorities Treaties, the repression of the Sudetendeutsche was a very delicate subject for us to handle, seeing that it was essentially a question of Czechoslovak internal administration”.⁵³ The head of the Southern Department was exactly right – in regard to minorities policy in Czechoslovakia, London had only given advice without giving the least outline of the steps to take to achieve the hoped-for agreement. On the one hand London called for action, but on the other hand when it suited it, it claimed it could not interfere in the domestic policies of another country. In May 1936, a year after the Sudeten German Party was founded and following the parliamentary election, its representatives were able to say that they had undergone a period of success in terms of presenting their problem to Great Britain. They had succeeded in continuing to convince leading Foreign Office representatives that Czechoslovak policy towards the German minority was unfair, although it must be said they received solid support in doing so from the British Legation in Prague. Edvard Beneš in particular was the joint target of criticism from both British diplomats in Prague and Sudeten German leaders. The SdP had also managed to internationalise its problem when it had complained about the so-called Machník Decree to the League of Nations. For London, this was fundamental – what had been for Britain an uninteresting and marginal problem within one state in Central Europe which had been an “island of tranquility” during the 1920s for Britain was beginning to grow in severity and intensity, and alongside the international political situation this could bring complications in promoting Great Britain’s interests since one of its cornerstones involved stability in the Central European region.⁵⁴ During the second week of June 1936, the British Legation Secretary, Robert Hadow, again spoke up. In a memorandum for Owen O’Malley, he described Konrad Henlein as more of a “moderate” than a “Pan-German” and warned that the SdP was gradually getting into difficulties. According to Hadow, there were two wings within the party, moderate and radical, and he thought it

 Ibid. O’Malley promised Masaryk that the British Government would attempt to persuade President Beneš that his approach was unreasonable. Ibid.  This stability had allowed Great Britain to focus on its real interests. Cf. Franke, R., London und Prag. Materialien zum Problem eines multinationalen Nationalstaates 1919 – 1938 [London and Prague. Materials on the Problem of a Multinational Nation State 1919 – 1938], München 1982, p. 278. In May 1936 the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden admited upcoming difficulties in Central Europe in his letter to the British Minister to Vienna Walford Selby. For this reason, he decided not to transfer him to Stockholm and keep him in Vienna. Cf. University of Oxford, Bodleian Libraries (Weston Library), Selby Papers, MS. Eng. c. 6587, ff. 256 – 258.

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

127

would be difficult to reach agreement between them.⁵⁵ The British Legation Secretary also returned to the discussion with Jan Masaryk (who was visiting Czechoslovakia at the time), who was apparently shocked by the intensity of Britain’s negative perception of the Czechoslovak treatment of Sudeten Germans. The Czechoslovak Minister reminded Hadow that Britain was exaggerating, and according to the British diplomat, “he [Masaryk – author’s note] suspected this Legation”.⁵⁶ In his memorandum, Hadow made not just his own position clear, but also the generally applicable direction of British foreign policy at the time when he wrote: “I realise how little our country is really [underlined in the original – author’s note] interested in Czechoslovakia […].” Yet he then warned against underestimating the situation if the state’s policy in regard to the German minority did not change, adding: “[…] I see only the end to a bitter and unbalanced fight: which end will I fear be very much a British concern.”⁵⁷ The British diplomat’s assessment of the situation was unusually accurate. Although he acknowledged, in full keeping with the Foreign Office’s thinking, that Czechoslovakia was of almost no interest at the time for Great Britain in terms of its foreign political interests, or at least was of little importance, if there was to be no solution to the nationality issue then this would very soon change in his opinion. As such, he recommended a focus on Konrad Henlein and concurrent pressure on the Czechoslovak Government to meet with him, and above all that an acceptable solution to the minorities problem be found.⁵⁸ For the first time, the opinion was expressed that the minorities policy

 TNA, FO 371/20374, R 3417/32/12, Mr. Hadow to Mr. O’Malley, June 9, 1936, f. 332. Hadow feared that if Henlein failed, the SdP could radicalise and join the “Pan-German movement”. He thought that Czech Agrarians also shared his fears. Ibid., f. 333.  Ibid. Hadow rejected this suspicion. But he thought that Masaryk saw the danger in the current course of Czechoslovak policy. At the end of June, the Czechoslovak Minister to London wrote that there had been somewhat less agitation around Henlein in recent weeks, but lots of people were worried of a possible German attack on Czechoslovakia, “and a lot of consistent work was needed to explain the reality”. Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1936, svazek I (1. leden – 31. srpen 1936) [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1936, Vol. I, January 1– August 31, 1936], Dejmek, J., (ed.), Praha 2003, Doc. No. 273, zpráva vyslance ČSR ve Velké Británii J. Masaryka ministerstvu zahraničních věcí, týkající se situace vlády ministerského předsedy S. Baldwina, Londýn, 27. června 1936, p. 531.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 3417/32/12, Mr. Hadow to Mr. O’Malley, June 9, 1936, f. 336.  A few days later, Hadow spoke again about Henlein’s situation, describing it as serious and did not rule out his fall. Should this occur, his position would be taken by a radical. According to Hadow, this would put Czechoslovakia’s stability under threat, which could lead to a general uprising in northern Bohemia. But of particular importance, it could threaten the stability of

128

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

in Czechoslovakia should prioritise the SdP leader on the German side; it was no surprise that this idea was expressed by Robert Hadow. In early July 1936, the Sudeten German complaint about the so-called Machník Decree returned to the table. William Strang, head of the League of Nations section at the Foreign Office, received a letter from the League of Nations Secretariat containing information that the Czechoslovak permanent representative at the League of Nations had requested an extension to the deadline by which the Prague Government was to respond to the complaint. As such, the writer of the letter asked Great Britain to state its position, or that of its representative, on the request.⁵⁹ The one-sided information from British Legation in Prague in regard to the development of Czech-German relations, along with events surrounding the Sudeten German complaint, influenced the Foreign Office to Czechoslovakia’s disadvantage. Robert Vansittart even assigned Robert Hadow to write a memorandum on the latest information on the status of the Sudeten German issue. The British Legation Secretary produced a document whose focus and opinions were no different from the Prague Legation’s previous reports, claiming that the future of the Sudeten German movement would depend “upon a proper and impartial investigation by the ‘Committee of Three’”. Hadow further added that Konrad Henlein’s fate would depend on the outcome of the investigation.⁶⁰ The memorandum continued with a discussion of the so-called Machník Decree which the Sudeten Germans had complained about to Geneva. Apparently, the Government had decided to defer the time the decree was to come into force, but the British diplomat thought that it had now been amply replaced by the Act on the Defence of the State which gave it wider powers. As such, Hadow fully endorsed the beliefs of Minister Addison, who had taken a similar position at the end of May 1936.⁶¹ The British Legation Secretary was also rather sarcastic about Czechoslovak democracy and accused the Government of deliberately isolating the SdP to show its voters how helpless it was. He repeated his fear of radicals influencing its opinions, and as such said it was of the utmost imperative to

the whole region, which was not in Great Britain’s interests, he concluded. Cf. TNA, FO 371/20374, R 3560/32/12, Mr. Hadow to Mr. O’Malley, June 17, 1936, ff. 345 – 349.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 3852/32/12, Mr. Strang (at Geneva) Communicated, July 1, 1936, f. 389.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 3946/32/12, Foreign Office Memoradum (Mr. R. H. Hadow), July 8, 1936, f. 11. Hadow repeated his opinion that Henlein was willing to co-operate with Czechoslovakia, but made his traditional criticism of President Beneš, writing: “Since Beneš became President, the position of the Sudeten Deutsche has become infinitely worse.” Ibid.  Cf. ibid., ff. 11– 12.

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

129

take “every possible step to strengthen the moderate wing of the Sudeten Deutsche Partei, led by Henlein, by (a) informing the Czechoslovak Minister in London and the Czechoslovak Government in Prague of our intention to look into the Sudeten Deutsche petition ‘with great care’; (b) letting the Czechoslovak Government know privately that the Committee of Three will examine the petition in September whether or not the Czechoslovak observations have previously been circulated”.⁶² The memorandum’s author promised that examining the complaint by mid-September would see a weakening in Czechoslovak pressure on the SdP, a party which had been shifting towards more radical positions, while improving Konrad Henlein’s reputation. According to Hadow, these measures would see “a very considerable diminution of the danger of a German coup-de-main in North Bohemia”.⁶³ It should be noted that heads at the Foreign Office, affected by negative reports from Prague, came to the conclusion in July 1936 that they must put pressure on the Czechoslovak Government to improve the status of Sudeten Germans. Orme Sargent pulled no punches in this regard, writing openly of the Czechoslovak Government mocking the League of Nations, and the necessity of forcing Prague to “eliminate the injustices” done on the Sudeten Germans. Although the British diplomat acknowledged there was a danger of the creation “of a fully organised Nazi party which would be an imperium in imperio [underlined in the original – author’s note], and as such would fundamentally undermine the stability of the Czechoslovak State and assist in the penetration of German influence,” he did not neglect to add that such an event could be prevented through a generous pol-

 Ibid., f. 13. Examination of the petition in September was of fundamental importance for London. In the second half of the month, presidency of the Committee of Three was to transfer from Great Britain to Chile. At the Foreign Office’s request, the Legal Advisor Sir Herbert William Malkin spoke of the British approach in Geneva on 9 July 1936. He was of the opinion: “In the first place, what the committee has to consider is not whether the Germans in Czechoslovakia are being badly treated and have grievances, but whether what the Czech Government have done constitutes a violation of the Minorities Treaty”. Delay of the so-called Machník Decree, however, meant that the subject of the Sudeten German complaint had expired. Cf. TNA, FO 371/20374, R 3946/32/12, July 9, 1936, f. 6.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 3946/32/12, Foreign Office Memoradum (Mr. R. H. Hadow), July 8, 1936, f. 14.

130

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

icy from the Czechoslovak Government. In this regard, not just Great Britain, but France in particular, was to put pressure on Prague.⁶⁴ In the second half of July 1936, Henlein’s third visit to London also occurred. Here, the leader of the Sudeten Germans met the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart, making “a most favourable impression”. Henlein appeared to the British diplomat to be a moderate, honest and prescient man.⁶⁵ The Sudeten German leader informed the Permanent Under-Secretary of State of the poor economic situation in the Czech border region and acknowledged that part of the problems were the result of the global crisis under way at the time. He also, however, added, “that much of what they [the Sudeten Germans – author’s note] are suffering now is quite unnecessary […]”.⁶⁶ Henlein did not neglect to inform Vansittart what he undoubtedly knew the British diplomat wanted to hear when he declared that Sudetan Germans were not, and he believed never had been “German subjects, nor did they ever wish to be. […] They had no desire whatever to join Nazi Germany, but they would certainly be driven in this direction if the present state of affairs lasted very much longer”.⁶⁷ The Permanent Under-Secretary of State was of the opinion following his discussion with Henlein that the Sudetan German leader represented a moderate option  Sargent did not forget to add with a touch of sarcasm that London was able to provide advice when it didn’t directly affect it. TNA, FO 371/20374, R 3946/32/12, July 21, 1936, f. 10.  The meeting took place on 20 July 1936 and Foreign Secretary Eden informed the British Legation in Prague of its occurrence a week later. Cf. TNA, FO 371/20374, R 4395/32/12, Mr. Eden to Sir J. Addison, Foreign Office, July 27, 1936, f. 25. The official of the German Legation in Prague, Otto Freiherr von Stein zu Nord- und Ostheim, also informed Berlin of the meeting, writing that the discussion took three hours and that Henlein was well aware of Vansittart’s pro-French and reserved towards the German stance. “Van” revealed to the SdP leader that he was quite well informed of the Sudeten German problem and that the British Government was ready to advise and assist Sudeten Germany. Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei 1933 – 1947 [The Germans in Czechoslovakia 1933 – 1937]. Dokumentensammlung. Zusammengestellt, mit Vorwort und Anmerkungen versehen von Král, V., Praha 1964, Doc. No. 54, Die Henleinpartei sucht Unterstützung bei englischen der Befriedungspolitik ergebenen Kreisen. Deutsche Gesandtschaft Prag an das Auswärtige Amt Berlin am 21. Juli 1936, p. 107. Cf. also Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (hereinafter PA AA), Tschechoslowakei, R 103652 (Rassenfrage, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker), Prag, den 21. Juli 1936, ff. 72– 75. Two days later, an article was published in The Times entitled Czech German Claims. Herr Henlein’s Visit to London, which spoke of Henlein as the leader of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, something which was not entirely true as he merely led their largest political entity. The article’s author stated that the largest minority wanted to remain within Czechoslovakia, but that the Republic should adopt a Swiss model. The Times, July 23, 1936.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 4395/32/12, Record of an Interview between Sir. R. Vansittart and Herr Konrad Henlein, July 27, 1936, f. 25.  Ibid.

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

131

compared to the Nazis, and promised him support in the SdP’s negotiations with the Czechoslovak Government. In his discussions with Vansittart, Henlein did not surprise in any regard. He acted as a moderate representative of a large ethnic minority which the Czechoslovak Government was persecuting. He even termed himself a defender and main representative “of the movement for reconciliation with the Czechoslovak Government”.⁶⁸ According to Eden, Robert Vansittart concluded his memorandum with the claim that Henlein “is speaking the truth, but I have no doubt whatever that is speaking what he believes to be the truth”.⁶⁹ Although Jindřich Dejmek considers the conclusion of the experienced Permanent Under-Secretary of State to be surprising and shocking,⁷⁰ it should be noted that this was the first meeting of both men together, and in particular that almost all the information Vansittart had and had received on the Sudeten German problem came either directly from the British Legation in Prague, or from relevant officials in the Foreign Office. Czechoslovakia and its favourable policy towards the German minority was not amongst any of these sources; and so the Permanent Under-Secretary of State’s opinions were influenced as such.⁷¹ “Van” above all wanted developments in Central Europe to occur peacefully. A few days later, another representative of the Sudeten Germans – Heinz Rutha⁷² – had the opportunity to speak to another high-level Foreign Office offi-

 Ibid. Henlein told Vansittart that members of his party were already seeking tangible results. If the Czechoslovak Government was unable to show a reasonable and accommodating face, then he would have to face his “his people” with empty hands, and “they would then throw him over”. And at that moment, it was possible that Germany would intervene, added the Sudeten German leader. Ibid., p. 2.  Ibid.  Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 319.  This is confirmed, for example, by the Czechoslovak Minister to Berlin, Vojtěch Mastný, who had an opportunity to speak to Vansittart on 10 August 1936. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State “strongly advised us to improve our relations with the Sudeten Germans, clearly influenced by the idea that our Germans suffer injustice,” wrote Mastný. Cf. Mastný, V., Vzpomínky diplomata. Ze vzpomínek a dokumentů československého vyslance [Memories of the Diplomat. From the Memories and Documents of the Czechoslovak Minister], Kubů, e. – Luňák, P. – Novák, O. (ed.), Praha 1997, p. 65. Some, however, think that “Van” was drifting ever further from the Government in his opinion on formulating policy towards Central Europe. “Many Cabinet members believed that British insistence on guarantees for Eastern Europe would only anger Hitler and thus put an end to any chance for a European settlement.” ROI, p. 207.  In May 1935, Henlein “appointed him as his unofficial ‘foreign minister’”. Cornwall, M., ‘A Leap into Ice-Cold Water’: The Manoeuvres of the Henlein Movement in Czechoslovakia, 1933 – 1938, in: Cornwall, M. – Evans, R. J. W. (ed.), Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe 1918 – 1948, Oxford 2007, p. 138; cf. Cornwall, The Devil’s Wall, p. 182.

132

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

cial (Viscount Cranborne). He repeated, like Henlein, that the situation in Czechoslovakia was serious and declared “that the position of the German minority was progressively deteriorating”. Rutha added that the solution to the current desperate situation was a federal system, as existed in Switzerland.⁷³ Rutha’s and in particular Henlein’s third visit to London in July 1936 differed significantly from his previous stay in the UK capital at the end of 1935. Whilst on earlier occasions Czechoslovakian diplomacy had not undertaken any official steps (furthermore, Minister Masaryk had been staying in Prague at the time), the situation had changed in summer 1936 – Geneva had received a complaint about the Czechoslovak Government, Henlein was received by Robert Vansittart, and Jan Masaryk had to explain his Government’s position in a letter to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State.⁷⁴ The Foreign Office found itself in a paradoxical situation in summer 1936; the fact that its high-level officials had provided an audience to SdP representatives essentially contributed to a position which they had tried to avoid for a long time – the internationalisation of the Sudeten German issue.⁷⁵ Eden’s report in which he informed Minister Addison of Rutha’s visit to London, also included information on Robert Vansittart’s meeting with Jan Masaryk which occurred on 28 July 1936. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State informed the Czechoslovak Minister that when Konrad Henlein came to visit

 The meeting took place on 23 July 1936. Cf. TNA, FO 371/20374, R 4460/32/12, Mr. Eden to Sir J. Addison, Foreign Office, August 5, 1936, f. 51. At its conclusion, Rutha tried to ascertain what His Majesty’s Government’s position was regarding the complaint currently lodged in Geneva. Ibid. Viscount Cranborne himself described the meeting in his personal documents. Cf. TNA, FO 800 (Private Offices: Various Ministers’ and Officials’ Papers), 296 (Correspondence of Robert Arthur James Gascoyne-Cecil, Vol. 1), July 23, 1936, ff. 211– 212. Cf. also Cornwall, The Devil’s Wall, p. 200.  He wrote to Prague, however, that Henlein was received by minor parliamentarians. He termed Henlein’s lunch with Robert Vansittart an unfortunate fact for Czechoslovakia, with the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office declaring that the SdP leader was partially right and that the Czechoslovak Government could do more in regard to its German minority. Cf. AMZV, PZ Londýn, 1936, běžná zpráva č. 12, 24. července 1936, pp. 1– 2. A few days later, Masaryk protested against London’s interference in Czechoslovakia’s internal affairs on behalf of the Czechoslovak Government. Vansittart replied only that a private lunch could not be considered interference in the sovereign rights of another country. Ibid., běžná zpráva č. 13, 29. července 1936, p. 1.  The Czechoslovak Minister to Berlin, Vojtěch Mastný, was also aware of this, noting that the Sudeten German problem had moved from being a “minority domestic issue […] to a European problem”. He was of the opinion that Great Britain had lost interest in maintaining the status quo in Central Europe. Mastný, p. 64.

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

133

him, “he had talked no politics at all, but only of his economic difficulties and those of his supporters”.⁷⁶ Through his meeting at the Foreign Office, Masaryk naturally attempted to dilute the outcome of Henlein and Rutha’s visits to London, and in his subsequent letter to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State to elucidate the further steps of the Czechoslovak Government regarding the German minority. He informed him that the best solution to the current situation had to be the co-operation of both parties “without any arrière-pensée”. The Czechoslovak Minister then targeted his arguments, because according to Britain’s official declaration, they had not spoken with Henlein about political matters except on economic issues.⁷⁷ Masaryk warned in the next section of his letter to the British diplomat that Henlein and his colleagues were not as moderate in their opinions when they spoke with their compatriots. The Minister also warned against their plans, which were in no way friendly towards the Czechoslovak Republic. Masaryk expressed his fears “that the opinion is being circulated in England and abroad that Great Britain is ready to fight Mr. Henlein’s battle in Geneva […]”.⁷⁸ In the conclusion to his letter, Masaryk expresses his conviction that a solution to the Sudeten German issue would also depend on Germany’s willingness to agree on fundamental European issues with France and Russia. He noted that it was only in this way that war could be avoided.⁷⁹ If Masaryk thought that he had at least partially corrected the Foreign Office’s positive position regarding the Sudeten German leaders, he was “deceiving himself and his superiors”.⁸⁰ For a large section of the Foreign Office, there was already a decisive reason to place pressure on the Czechoslovak Government. Henlein’s July visit to London caused much furore in the Czechoslovak press. There was a report, “that Henlein has visited England at the invitation of the Foreign Office and that Great Britain intends to see Sudetendeutsche petition is

 TNA, FO 371/20374, R 4460/32/12, Mr. Eden to Sir J. Addison, Foreign Office, August 5, 1936, f. 51. On the basis of Addison and Hadow’s previous information, Anthony Eden had come to the conclusion that the truth was more on the side of the Sudeten Germans. It was his opinion that His Majesty’s Government should be careful in giving advice infringing on the internal affairs of foreign states. Ibid., p. 2.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 4705/32/12, Czechoslovak Minister (Letter), July 28, 1936, ff. 74– 74 A.  Ibid., f. 76. Masaryk also feared British public opinion, which considered Czechoslovakia an outpost of communism and Bolshevism within Europe. One well-known French journalist had apparently called the Minister and informed him that the British delegation in Geneva was going to support the Sudeten German complaint. Ibid.  Ibid., f. 77.  Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 320.

134

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

dealt with thoroughly at Geneva in September”.⁸¹ Minister Addison noted that the Foreign Office had naturally denied it all, only arousing the suspicion the report was true. He added in conclusion that the Czechoslovak Government was apparently considering sending Social Democrat Wenzel Jaksch to London as a counterbalance.⁸² While Foreign Secretary Eden was advising for caution in early August 1936 regarding the Sudeten German issue, the diplomats at the British Legation in Prague saw it otherwise. In his report, Robert Hadow noted that the British Government had come to the conclusion “that the state of the minorities in Czechoslovakia constituted a very real danger to the peace of Central Europe […]”.⁸³ The British Legation Secretary also repeatedly denied that the Foreign Office had invited Henlein to London and stressed that the British authorities recognised the indivisibility of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, he did not neglect to criticise Prague, accusing it of continuing its pressure against the SdP. He recommended the Czechoslovak Government take reasonable measures to deal with the problem, redistributing officials within the Sudeten German areas and ending their economic discrimination.⁸⁴ In the case of official positions, this suggests the British diplomat’s unfamiliarity with the occupation of these positions, with a systemisation operating within public administration and it not being easy to name, for example, dozens of German-speaking officials with the “wave of a magic wand”. Hadow’s superior, the outgoing Minister Joseph Addison, wrote an extensive memorandum on the Sudeten German issue before he left Czechoslovakia in which he predicted a deterioration in mutual Czech-German relations. In the introduction, the Minister complained of his difficult task, noting: “Nothing can be more distasteful to a diplomatic agent than to be obliged, out of a sense of duty, to issue continual warnings and indulge in constant criticism of the policy of the Government of the country in which he resides.”⁸⁵ Addison was also sceptical about Czechoslovakia’s future, which he thought no liberal politician could secure, and which “still enjoys, so far as I am aware, the unenviable position of

 TNA, FO 371/20374, R 4579/32/12, Sir J. Addison, July 28, 1936, f. 64.  Ibid., ff. 64– 65.  TNA, FO 371/20374, R 4743/32/12, Sir J. Addison to Mr. Eden, Prague, August 3, 1936, f. 81. Hadow signed the report on Addison’s behalf.  Ibid., pp. 2– 4. Hadow feared, however, that Slavic pride and an apparently persistent racial antagonism stood in the way of a reasonable solution to the problem.  TNA, FO 371/20375, R 5216/32/12, Sir J. Addison to Mr. Eden, Prague, August 25, 1936, f. 99. Addison added that a diplomatic representative should not let any personal feelings dissuade him from telling the truth.

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

135

being the only country in the world where the ‘minorities’ constitute the ‘majority’.” In this evaluation, the Minister was including Slovaks as a minority.⁸⁶ He also spoke broadly about the German minority. He repeated his accusation against the Government in Prague and its policy towards the German population, sharply criticising not just President Beneš,⁸⁷ but in particular the form of Government in Czechoslovakia which “presents to the outside world the semblance of a bulwark of democracy, freedom and liberty, whereas it is in fact a ‘Polizeistaat’, similar to other States where arbitrary rules prevail”.⁸⁸ Addison ended his report with the hypercritical view of the Czechoslovak Republic he had been repeating ever since arriving in Prague in which he concluded that sooner or later Germany “will annex, or otherwise draw within her orbit, those communities of Germans which are now outside her political boundaries”. The Minister even predicted that the situation would lead to a war in which Great Britain and France would have to get involved.⁸⁹ Addison’s thoughts, which appear realistic in hindsight, did not fit with Britain’s foreign policy concept in 1936. His suggestions that Germany might annex part of Czechoslovakia and war might occur were quickly rejected at the Foreign Office. At the time, Great Britain had clearly focused on a policy of reaching agreement with Berlin.⁹⁰ The Minister’s often one-sided opinions on possible developments in Czechoslovakia were in contrast to information from other sources, and as such Foreign Office officials including the Foreign Secretary were crit-

 Ibid., p. 2. Addison termed the creation of the Czechoslovak language an illusion.  In his opinion, Beneš was “a pure Czech, imbued with all the prejudices of a man who has risen by the power of speech, assisted by luck”. Cf. ibid., p. 7.  Ibid., p. 4. Addison compared the Germans’ financial and economic status within Czechoslovakia to the fate of the helots. Ibid., p. 5.  Ibid., p. 9.  Anthony Eden responded very critically to Addison’s report, writing that “Sir J. Addison is certainly entertaining, but offers no constructive advice even on the immediate issue of the petitions in Geneva”. The Foreign Secretary also noted he was unsure whether the Minister had evaluated the situation in Czechoslovakia correctly and whether he understood the true danger to peace in Europe. Cf. TNA, FO 371/20375, R 5216/32/12, September 15, 1936, f. 98. Nicolas J. A. Cheetham at the Foreign Office was also luke-warm on Addison’s rhetoric. He said Addison was well known for his constantly repeated reports from Prague on the poor situation of the German minority. Cf. ibid., September 5, 1936, f. 95. Alexander Cadogan confirmed an attempt at an understanding with Germany in a letter to the British Ambassador to Paris, Eric Phipps, in which he wrote that that reforms of the League of Nations (in which Germany was not a member at the time) and other European matters besides would all be better dealt with in co-operation with Berlin. Cf. TNA, FO 800 (Private Offices: Various Ministers’ and Officials’ Papers), 294 (The Private Papers of Sir A. Cadogan, Vol. 2), Cadogan to Phipps, August 28, 1936, ff. 8 – 9.

136

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

ical of them.⁹¹ More precisely, they did not concur with Addison’s prediction of possible war. On the other hand, however, they did not a priori reject his negative assessment of the Czechoslovak Government and President Beneš. One should not forget either that Addison remained in his position for six years without his superiors ever having tried to replace him; as such they were indirectly approving his actions and opinions. Only George Clerk stayed in the post for a similar period of time. Issues of League of Nations reforms and London’s position regarding such reforms were the subject of a memorandum from First Lord of the Admiralty Samuel Hoare in August 1936 which gave interesting thoughts on the willingness of public opinion to support the country’s war policy. If the crisis of 1914 had not begun with a flagrant violation of sovereignty in a state of vital interest for us, Hoare wrote in reference to Belgium, but rather one of local interest and an essentially obscure battle, he did not believe the public would have supported going to war. As such, he proposed clearly defining London’s specific interests at points “at which the Government and the country will be both willing and able to stand by their word”.⁹² Hoare realised that if Britain made it absolutely clear it had no interests in Central Europe this would increase German pressure. The First Lord of the Admiralty considered that Germany and Japan returning to the League of Nations was an essential step to increase the effectiveness of the organisation. On the other hand, however, he stated fairly clearly that the inviolability of ports in the south of the country and the Locarno Pact must remain in Britain’s vital interest, and he then recommended including the Mediterranean within these points; he did not include Central Europe in this list.⁹³ At the start of September 1936, the Sudeten German complaint to the League of Nations regarding the so-called Machník Decree once again came to the fore of events.⁹⁴ Nicolas J. A. Cheetham from the Foreign Office assessed the Czecho-

 Not just Eden, but also Vansittart, came to the conclusion, “that Addison was hardly contributing to the improvement of Czech-German relations because of his negative attitude towards the Czechs”. Zorach, p. 61.  TNA, CAB 24/263/43 (War Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda), August 10, 1936, f. 291.  Ibid. In October 1936, the British Government received material from army command which clearly stated that should a war break out in 1939 with Germany, then London would be facing a prepared enemy with superior air and ground forces and initiative on its side. If allied with Italy, the pessimistic assessment went on, Britain’s victory in war would be doubtful. Douglas, R., Chamberlain and Eden, 1937 – 38, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 13, 1, 1978, p. 97.  The petition, which was lodged in Geneva in April 1936, was a complaint from the Sudeten German and Carpathian German Party (the party had been formed through a merger of the SdP and the Carpathian German Party in November 1935; Konrad Henlein had become leader of the new party) regarding the so-called Machník Decree which the party considered breached the mi-

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

137

slovak Government’s response⁹⁵ to the complaint, dividing it into two parts – factual and legal. He termed the former “a very lame attempt to prove that the Machnik Decree did not necessarily involve discrimination against Sudetendeutsche employees and to justify it on grounds of national security”.⁹⁶ According to Cheetham, the legal arguments were based on a disagreement over whether it was actually a petition or not, because the Czechoslovak Government thought⁹⁷ that the subject of a petition could be a “law, decree or official regulation, but not a letter from a ministry to a company”. The Foreign Office, however, came to the conclusion on the basis of the available information, that the letters were an official measure of the Czechoslovak Government.⁹⁸ London took this position as the basis for discussion of the whole affair, which had an unpleasant undertone for it. Although Great Britain, specifically its representative, held the post of president of the Committee of Three, it had anticipated from the beginning that the League’s rigid minorities procedure meant it would not be possible, “to contend that the Minorities Treaty had been violated, particularly since the Czechs argued that the Machník decree had been withdrawn and Henlein brought forward no new petition to demonstrate, as Addison believed, that the Machník decree has simply been replaced by other equally discriminatory measures”.⁹⁹ As early as May 1936, Minister Addison informed London that the Government would not put the so-called Machník Decree into practice because the Act on the Defence of the State gave it similar, and in fact even more effective, powers. The petition nevertheless became a subject of discussion by the Committee of Three and Foreign Office diplomats held lively discussions about it. The impact of the Sudeten German complaint¹⁰⁰ to the League of Nations on

nority rights contained in the peace treaty and contravened the Czechoslovak Constitution. The Czechoslovak representative at the League of Nations received the complaint in May and sent it to Prague for the Government’s response. The Czechoslovak Government sent its response to the complaint on 31 August 1936.  Cf. AMZV, f. Kroftův archiv, Box 11, Prague, le 31 août 1936.  TNA, FO 371/20375, R 5296/32/12, September 8, 1936, f. 154.  The Government claimed that it was not a normative decree of the Ministry of National Defence, as the letters which comprised the “decree” were in Prague’s opinion neither a law nor another regulation. Petráš, pp. 239, 240.  TNA, FO 371/20375, R 5296/32/12, September 8, 1936, f. 155.  Cornwall, A Fluctuating Barometer, p. 329. The SdP lost interest in further complaints to the League of Nations during the following year.  In the end, the complaint fell by the wayside when the complainants themselves held discussions on its deferral. The League of Nation’s Committee for Minority Issues eventually stated in May 1937 that the complaint had been dealt with by the Czechoslovak Government’s expla-

138

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

Czech-German relations was ambivalent. Discussions over it did not really change current conditions in Czechoslovakia,¹⁰¹ but on the other hand it did internationalise the whole problem and the Sudeten Germans managed to get Great Britain more engaged in their problem.¹⁰² The Times presented the Foreign Office’s position on October 1, 1936, printing an article inspired by Robert Vansittart on the Sudeten German petition at the League of Nations. In it, the author underlined not just the importance of Sudeten Germans for Czechoslovakia, but also the SdP’s moderate position. He used careful words to refer to the discrimination against the German minority and President Beneš’s promise to eliminate it.¹⁰³ The article author added that with goodwill, the rivalry of both nations could be overcome.¹⁰⁴ London, as we see,

nation. The German governing parties distanced themselves from the submitted complaint. PA AA, Tschechoslowakei, R 103653 (Rassenfrage, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker), Prag, den 7. Oktober 1936, ff. 049 – 050.  Even though the so-called Machník Decree never came into force and the SdP did not lodge any further complaints with the League of Nations.  Henlein and other SdP representatives hoped more, “that the petition might end up on the agenda of the League Council, and result in major international pressure upon Prague”. Cornwall, ‘A Leap into Ice-Cold Water’, p. 139. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in an interview with his Czechoslovak equivalent Kamil Krofta said “they should not act harshly against the German minority and that he would recommend concessions as of tactical benefit”. Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1936, svazek II (1. září – 31. prosinec 1936) Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1936, Vol. II, September 1– December 31, 1936], Dejmek, J. – Němeček , J. (ed.), Praha 2003, Doc. No. 354, zápis o rozhovoru ministra zahraničních věcí ČSR K. Krofty s ministrem zahraničních věcí Velké Británie A. Edenem, týkajícím se problému reformy Společnosti národů a německé menšiny v Československu, Ženeva, 29. září 1936, p. 50. In his memoirs, Anthony Eden admits that he first heard of the Sudeten Germans’ complaints about Czechoslovakia in autumn 1936 in London, though he is no more specific than this. He had been aware of the problem before, but it was then that he began to be active, no doubt encouraged by Berlin, notes the Foreign Secretary. Eden, A., Facing the Dictators. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, Boston 1962, p. 568. He acknowledged himself, entirely in accordance with British policy, that London was not in the position to be arbiter in the matter and added that it was enough merely to provide general advice. Ibid., p. 569. The Foreign Secretary did not believe it was just a minority issue, because Prague was dealing with its minorities better than most states in Europe, he stated. Ibid.  In early September 1936, Edvard Beneš travelled to northern Bohemian towns and cities, something which according to a report from the Police Presidium, aroused “great response from the local citizens. The response to his speeches impressed itself on the opinions of the Sudeten Germans, in particular it terms of its relations with the Czechoslovak state”. Archiv Kanceláře prezidenta republiky [The Archive of the President’s Office], f. Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protokol T (tajné), sg. 12/25, kt. 135, mikrofilm č. 110, KT 1695/36, September 7, 1936.  Franke, London und Prag, p. 282.

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

139

continued to perceive the SdP as a moderate political party and preferred it if it could reach an agreement with the Czechoslovak Government. In autumn 1936, there was a change at the British Legation in Prague. After almost six years working there, Joseph Addison left Thun Palace. Charles Bentinck, a man who “excelled in no activity” took over his position after many deferrals.¹⁰⁵ The new Minister had no experience of Central Europe, having last worked in the Balkans. As a result, he was unable to fully grasp the complete context of the historical development and realities of the state in which he had arrived and this expressed itself in the working of the office; as such he left Robert Hadow to play the decisive role in formulating the Legation’s positions on the Sudeten German problem.¹⁰⁶ In mid-November 1936, the new Minister met with President Beneš, who presented him with his perspective on Czechoslovakia’s complex nationality problem and referred to the Sudeten German issue’s links to Berlin’s policies.¹⁰⁷ At the end of the month, Bentinck had the opportunity to speak with Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta. They both spoke of the press campaign in Germany targeted against Prague and highlighting the dismissal of German railway and postal service employees. Krofta accused Joseph Goebbels of launching the campaign and he said that when the Czechoslovak Minister to Berlin made a complaint, he had been cut down to size with the claim that it was merely a response to anti-German propaganda organised by German emigrants in Czechoslovakia.¹⁰⁸ In early December 1936, the British Minister was heard from again, having sent Foreign Secretary Eden Robert Hadow’s memorandum on the Sudeten German issue. Hadow had met with the Secretary of the French Legation, who had  Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 322.  Ibid. According to Mark Cornwall however, Hadow’s criticism of Czechoslovakia was tempered by his new superior. Cornwall, A Fluctuating Barometer, p. 329.  Cf. Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 323. According to a report from the Austrian Legation in Prague, furthermore the SdP was primarily demanding autonomy for the Sudeten German areas. OeStA/AdR, AAng, ÖVB, Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 42, Politische Korrespondenz 1936, Berichte, Weisungen 1936 (X – XII), Zl. 527/Pol, Prag, am 4. November 1936.  TNA, FO 371/20375, R 7382/32/12, Mr. Bentinck to Mr. Eden, Prague, November 28, 1936, f. 318. When Bentinck and Krofta parted company, the Foreign Minister informed him that like President Beneš, he remained an optimist. Bentinck answered that nothing could be achieved without optimism, going on to say: “[…] we must not adopt the policy of the ostrich and aviod facing the danger.” Ibid., p. 2. Krofta expressed himself similarly in a discussion with France’s chargé d’affaires, de Monicault, when he spoke more widely on London’s policy towards Czechoslovakia. M. de Monicault à M. Delbos, Prague, 18 novembre 1936, in: France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932 – 1939: (1936 – 1939): (19 juillet – 19 novembre 1936) [French Diplomatic Documents 1932– 1939: (1936 – 1939): (July 19 – November 19, 1936)], (hereinafter DDF), 2e Série, T. III, Paris 1966, Doc. No. 505, p. 797.

140

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

informed him it would be a good idea to keep the German issue out of sight and that any concession from Prague might be perceived as a sign of weakness.¹⁰⁹ Bentinck had had the opportunity to speak to his French colleague at around this same time, and he thought he perceived the Sudeten German problem “from a different perspective than that which this Legation has perceived it for some time”. French Minister, Victor de Lacroix, declared that the Czechoslovak Government was apparently doing everything it could to improve the situation.¹¹⁰ In his report, the British Minister informed London of his discussion with Minister Krofta, on whose basis he had come to the conclusion that an essential precondition for Prague – Berlin negotiations was “a better understanding on both sides of the need of concessions,” and as such London should continue to place pressure on the Czechoslovak Government, which would secure “a real and speedy betterment of the conditions of the German-speaking minority of this country,” he added.¹¹¹ Czechoslovakia’s growing importance amongst British political circles was confirmed in early December 1936 by Ernst II, Prince of Hohenlohe-Langenburg, who on a visit to London had the opportunity to speak to leading politicians (Eden, Hoare, and Churchill) and Robert Vansittart, who he claimed even termed “Czechoslovakia the most dangerous point in the European system at this moment”. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State later asked the Prince as someone who knows President Beneš well to meet with him and warn him of the necessity of solving the Sudeten German issue as quickly as possible. The conclusion to a report by Walter Keudell, the Permanent Secretary at the Imperial Forestry Department (Reichsforstamt), on Hohenlohe’s visit to the British  TNA, FO 371/20375, R 7445/32/12, Mr. Bentinck to Mr. Eden, Prague, December 5, 1936, f. 334.  Ibid. Thus, the French Minister confirmed his words from early December when he informed Paris that the Prime Minister would invite German ministers to a meeting on normalising relations between the Czech and German ethnic groups. M. de Lacroix à M. Delbos, Prague, 1er décembre 1936, in: DDF: (20 novembre 1936 – 19 février 1937), 2e Série, T. IV., Paris 1967, Doc. No. 72, p. 101.  TNA, FO 371/20375, R 7445/32/12, Mr. Bentinck to Mr. Eden, Prague, December 5, 1936, p. 3. According to Hadow’s memorandum on the Sudeten German issue, however, a large number of Czech politicians and a certain percentage of the press had come to the conclusion that, “it is now too late to co-operate with the Sudetendeutsche”. Ibid., p. 5. The document also includes a report from Owen O’Malley, in which he somewhat condescendingly evaluates the new British Minister to Prague. According to the head of the Southern Department, his information on Czechoslovakia did not contain anything new, although having only been there for a short time this was to be expected. O’Malley also expressed doubts as to whether President Beneš would be able to negotiate with German citizens of the country. He also said he had indications that, “the French Government are not likely to make any important contribution towards an amelioration of the situation”. Ibid., December 18, 1936, f. 333.

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

141

capital sent to Germany’s Foreign Ministry contained an interesting point, claiming that the political elites in the Great Britain had no clear idea of who should guarantee Czechoslovak borders and that they dreamed of a return of the Austria-Hungary political system.¹¹² The German nobleman was repeating an idea which was heard now and then from politicians and diplomats in London. After a few weeks in Prague, then, Charles Bentinck came to the conclusion that the only hope for avoiding a crisis in Czech-German relations was not just a mutual understanding for the necessity of concessions, but above all an improvement in the living conditions of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. In this regard, the British Government was to pressurise Prague to get this process started. As such, the British Legation’s fundamental line of thought did not change with the arrival of its new head; and nor could it change in any case. In around the third week of December 1936, Bentinck informed Foreign Secretary Eden of Kamil Krofta’s speech at a political rally in Karlovy Vary in which the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister had described Czech-German relations. He had rejected amongst other things, copying the Swiss model, “since this country had evolved on quite different historical lines”. Krofta added that Germans should become the second state nation “and their recognition as such should not be dependent on any formal act of loyalty”.¹¹³ The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister also suggested to the British Minister that it might help him to grasp the entire problem if he met with leaders of the German opposition. Krofta informed Bentinck that he would likely find Henlein and Rutha to be “moderate and reasonable”, exactly as they had presented themselves during their visits to London, but he immediately added: “Unfortunately, Herr Henlein had not always been so reasonable in the speeches which he delivered in this country.”¹¹⁴ At the end of his report, Bentinck states he has not lost hope in an improvement in the situation. In contrast to the critical Addison, he trusted that President Beneš was aware of the gravity of the situation and he also trusted the Foreign Minister, whom his colleagues had assured him was an honourable and reason-

 Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918 – 1945. Aus dem Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Serie C: 1933 – 1937, Das Dritte Reich: die ersten Jahre [Files to the German Foreign Policy 1918 – 1945. From the Archive of the Foreign Office, Series C: 1933 – 1937, The Third Reich: the First Years], Bd. VI/1, Göttingen 1981, das Auswärtige Amt an die Botschaft in London und die Gesandtschaft in Prag, Doc. No. 96, Berlin, den 17. Dezember 1936, Anlage, pp. 192– 193.  TNA, FO 371/20375, R 7695/32/12, Mr. Bentinck to Mr. Eden, Prague, December 19, 1936, f. 344. According to Krofta, it was important that the Germans themselves felt like a second state nation. Ibid.  Ibid., p. 2.

142

V Internationalisation of the Sudeten German Issue

able man with the best of intentions. He also trusted the Czechoslovak Minister to London, Jan Masaryk.¹¹⁵ Robert Hadow, however, did not identify with his superior’s position. On the same day Bentinck wrote to Anthony Eden, Hadow informed Owen O’Malley that President Beneš had told the General Secretary of the Catholic Association (Katholisches Volksverein), “that so long as he was President of Czechoslovakia he would never recognise or come to term with the Henlein party.” The British Legation Secretary accused Beneš of doing everything possible to make the situation worse.¹¹⁶ Hadow ended his report, and also from the perspective of the British Legation in Prague also the year 1936, with the claim that he fully sported Charles Bentinck’s policy of British support “for the initiation of negotiations between Czechoslovakia and Germany while yet there is time”.¹¹⁷ Thus, at the end of 1936, Bentinck and Hadow both agreed that London had to put pressure on Prague to negotiate either with representatives of the German minority or directly with Berlin. But their positions differed in their opinions of President Beneš. While the new Minister basically trusted him, Hadow perceived him and his policy in a negative light. Furthermore, the Czechoslovak Minister to London, Jan Masaryk, came at this time to the conclusion that British public opinion was gradually, if under the pressure of foreign political complications, beginning to realise Czechoslovakia’s growing importance amongst London’s many spheres of interest.¹¹⁸

 Ibid., p. 3. At this time, aware of the growing importance of the German issue in Czechoslovakia, Masaryk asked that funding for propaganda be increased in order to influence British public opinion, because Germany and other revisionist states were progressing in this regard with a clear anti-Czechoslovakia focus. Cf. AMZV. PZ Londýn, bežná zpráva č. 25, 18. prosince 1936, pp. 1– 2.  TNA, FO 371/20375, R 7727/32/12, Mr. Hadow to Mr. O’Malley, December 19, 1936, f. 355. Hadow, however, did acknowledge Beneš was a realist and if necessary pressure from the Agrarians would force him to make a compromise, he added. Ibid., f. 356.  Ibid., f. 357.  AMZV, PZ Londýn, bežná zpráva č. 26, 19. prosince 1936, p. 2.

VI New Minister, new Line The Sudeten German Party and its leader Konrad Henlein had experienced a successful year 1936 – the party had managed to internationalise the problem of the Sudeten Germans (the petition against the Machník Decree at the League of Nations) and establish important contacts with one of the leading British foreign policy representatives, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart. The first success mentioned above was helped significantly by the British Legation in Prague, specifically Minister Sir John Addison and Legation Secretary Robert Hadow who informed London of Czechoslovak policy towards its largest national minority in a negative light and also criticised President Edvard Beneš. Although the Minister was replaced in autumn 1936, the new Minister, Charles H Bentinck, did not change the Legation’s position in regard to the Sudeten German problem; he thought the only hope in avoiding a crisis in Czech-German relations was a mutual realisation of the necessity of concessions, and above all an improvement in the living conditions of the German minority in Czechoslovakia.¹ In January 1937, Charles Bentinck sent London a report in which he informed the Foreign Office (specifically Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden) that Edvard Beneš had made a Christmas Day speech on radio in Czech and subsequently also in German. The Minister said it mainly touched on the League of Nations, Czechoslovak security, and the problem of the German minority. The President had termed the previous year, “as perhaps the most agitated since the years of war”.² He did not neglect to also declare, however, that Czechoslovakia was ready for all possible future developments, and then added: “Everything would be done to maintain peace in the year 1937.”³ According to Bentinck, Beneš declared in regard to the German minority that the Government had undertaken successful steps towards dealing with the problem, which the President preferred to term a “nationwide problem” rather than a “minority problem”, and the British Minister added that according to Beneš the Czechoslovak Government would be ready to co-operate with all the country’s citizens in the coming year. At the end of 1936, specifically 28 December, the Ger-

 Cf. Suppan, A., Hitler – Beneš – Tito. Konflikt, Krieg und Völkermord in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa. Teil 1 [Hitler – Benes – Tito. Conflict, War and Genocide in East Central and Southeastern Europe. Part 1], Wien 2014, pp. 465 – 467.  The National Archives, London, Kew (hereinafter TNA), Foreign Office (hereinafter FO) 371/ 21125, R 154/154/12, Bentinck to Eden, December 29, 1936, f. 2.  Ibid., f. 3. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110651454-007

144

VI New Minister, new Line

man Minister to Prague, Ernst Eisenlohr, had met with Bentinck, about whom it was already known he was leaving to take up a new position in Chile. During their conversation, both men spoke of Beneš’s Christmas speech, with the German Minister saying that nothing had happened apart from words and pressure had to be put on Prague to set things in motion.⁴ At the end of Bentinck’s report, the problem of the German activist parties was mentioned; the Czechoslovak Government would apparently never sacrifice them, the Minister claimed, because they had supported the Czechoslovak state for many years. Bentinck added that following Minister of Justice Ivan Dérer’s statement (17 December 1936), the SdP must have realised that the solution to the Sudeten German problem lay in their co-operation with activist parties. According to the British Minister, the words of the Slovak politician, a member of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats and a leading proponent of Czechoslovakism, were important in that they represented a change in the Social Democrats’ position which had until then firmly rejected negotiations with the SdP.⁵ Around three weeks into January 1937, the Czechoslovak President received an audience from the British Minister. When the discussion turned to the problem of the German minority, Edvard Beneš apparently spent a long time lecturing Bentinck on the history of the phenomenon and defended previous Government policy. He also referred to the position of national minorities in other European states, adding that Prague had always espoused a liberal minorities policy.⁶ Following the discussion, the British Minister expressed his conclusion that: “It was true that the Government were trying gradually to ‘Czechise’ the country, but this was a voluntary process and there was no compulsion.” The President acknowledged that the percentage of Germans in the civil service in German districts did

 Ibid., ff. 3 – 4. Eisenlohr complained to his British colleague of the oppression of Sudeten Germans by Czechoslovak authorities. “It was evident to me from Dr. Eisenlohr’s conversation that he holds the view that once Dr. Beneš ceases to fear Germany he will cease to seek a solution of the Sudeten German problem,” Bentinck told London. But the British Minister was not convinced of his German colleague’s optimism regarding reaching an agreement between Berlin and Prague. Bentinck added that although Prime Minister Milan Hodža and Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta were attempting to reach an agreement with the Germans, Eisenlohr doubted their success due to the President’s influence on foreign policy formation. Cf. ibid., f. 5. In January 1937, Eisenlohr spoke with Franz Spina and declared that “an attempt at reconciling the Sudeten German Party with the other parties should be made”. Archiv Kanceláře prezidenta republiky [The Archive of the President’s Office] (hereinafter AKPR), f. Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protokol T (tajné), sg. 12/25, kt. 135, mikrofilm č. 110, T. 238/37, January 26, 1937.  TNA, FO 371/21125, R 154/154/12, Bentinck to Eden, December 29, 1936, ff. 6 – 7.  TNA, FO 371/21127, R 685/188/12, Bentinck to Eden, January 20, 1937, f. 138.

VI New Minister, new Line

145

not reflect their total size, but he added that there must be people on whom the Government could rely.⁷ A few days later, Minister Bentinck met with Prime Minister Milan Hodža; the topic of their discussion was naturally the German minority in Czechoslovakia. The start of 1937 was marked by real attempts at preparing for a settlement between nationalities. At the beginning of January, the Government had discussed how to achieve a settlement with active German politicians, and on 24 January 1937, Prime Minister Hodža outlined the principles for an agreement with the Germans on radio.⁸ Three days later, the Minister of Health and Physical Education Ludwig Czech declared on behalf of three German ministers and following agreement with activist German parties that an agreement appeared realistic from the perspective of German activist political forces. In a joint memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister on 27 January 1937,⁹ which contained the national political proposals of the German coalition parties, they declared

 Ibid. At the end of the discussion, Bentinck wished Beneš and the country much luck in the future. The Czechoslovak President expressed his wish for enough time so everything could be solved in a peaceful manner. In this regard, the Czechoslovak Minister to London, Jan Masaryk, spoke of the British Parliament and public’s favourable outlook on Prague, while also warning against excessive optimism and a reliance on London’s automatic assistance in the event of war. Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí České republiky [The Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic], Praha (hereinafter AMZV), Politické zprávy (hereinafter PZ) Londýn, 1937, běžná zpráva č. 2, 22. ledna 1937, pp. 1– 2.  Cf. Archiv Národního muzea, Praha [Archives of the National Museum] (hereinafter ANM), f. M. Hodža, kt. 8, IV. Veřejná činnost (materiály k polit. situaci, projevy 1937, 1938). Návštěva Tataresca v Praze, sg. 408, projev předsedy vlády dr. M. Hodži v čsl. rozhlasu 24. ledna 1937. The Prime Minister declared that the minority policy was a matter for Czechoslovakia and nobody else, adding: “The Government’s position on minorities has been, is and will remain very clear and simple: We do not want and directly reject the Czechisation and Slovakisation of minorities just as we prevent the Germanisation and Magyarisation of Slavs in their own state.” Ibid. The Prime Minister then repeated his speech in Slovak, then broadcast it an hour later in German. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin [Political Archives of the Foreign Ministry] (hereinafter PA AA), Tschechoslowakei, R 103653 (Rassenfrage, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker), Prag, den 26. Januar 1937, f. 157.  There were three main areas looked at: “1) Government contracts and the proportion of Germans employed in the civil services; 2) education; 3) the language question.” Kuklík, J. – němeček, J. Národnostní problematika v Československu očima americké diplomacie (1933 – 1938) [Ethnic Issues in Czechoslovakia through the Eyes of American Diplomacy (1933 – 1938)], in: Moderní dějiny. Časopis pro dějiny 19. a 20. století, 19, 2, 2011, p. 197. Cf. also PA AA, Tschechoslowakei, R 103653, Anlage zum Bericht vom 20. Januar 1937, ff. 152– 155.

146

VI New Minister, new Line

their willingness to communicate on a democratic basis using democratic methods and in a democratic spirit.¹⁰ The British Minister met Hodža on the same day the German activists submitted their memorandum to the Prime Minister. According to Bentinck, the Prime Minister was to meet with the opposition German parties the next day – at the time this mainly meant the Sudeten German Party, with other entities of only marginal importance. The British diplomat thought that while the activists’ demands did not go beyond the Constitution, this was not the case for the opposition parties (the SdP). Hodža declared that as a member of the Slovak minority in pre-War Hungary he could well understand the Germans’ position in Czechoslovakia and he added that Austria-Hungary had collapsed because it could not deal with the problems of its minorities.¹¹ Hodža, like President Beneš, acknowledged that the number of Germans in the civil service did not correspond to their percentage within the country and declared that this should change, although he did not propose any specific solutions. He also agreed that districts with German majorities were not doing well economically, but rejected the idea the Government was responsible; he thought it was the economic crisis which was clearly to blame.¹² Minister Bentinck informed London that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were genuinely interested in dealing with the minority problem, but he also added: “It is to be hoped that they will be given time to do so before it becomes an official matter.” Hodža also resented foreign states interfering in Czechoslovakia’s domestic affairs; but the Minister claimed that London’s friendly advice did not fall within this category.¹³  More in detail cf. Tóth, A. – Novotný, L. – Stehlík, M., Národnostní menšiny v Československu 1918 – 1938. Od státu národního ke státu národnostnímu? [National Minorities in Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1938. From the Nation-State to the National State?], Praha 2012, p. 353; Brandes, D., Sudetští Němci v krizovém roce 1938 [Sudeten Germans in the Crisis Year 1938], Praha 2012, pp. 35 – 36.  TNA, FO 371/21127, R 691/188/12, Bentinck to Eden, January 27, 1937, f. 153.  Ibid., f. 154.  Ibid. In this context, a parliamentary question put by Conservative MP Samuel Vyvyan Adams is of interest. Adams asked Anthony Eden whether any violation of Czechoslovakia’s territorial integrity and independence would represent an act of hostility for His Majesty’s Government. The Foreign Secretary was evasive in his response, merely referring to his statement of mid-1936. Adams did not receive a more precise answer in the next debate either. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21127, R 759/188/12, Parliamentary Question, Mr. Adams, February 1, 1937, f. 164. On 23 January 1937, an interesting debate took place in Geneva in which the participants discussed the possibility of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. French diplomat René Massigli thought it was possible, although he ruled out an attack on the USSR. Cf. Documents of British Foreign Policy 1919 – 1939 (hereinafter DBFP), 2nd Series, Vol. XVIII, European Affairs, January 2 – June 30, 1937, ed. by Medlicott, W. N. – Dakin, D. – Lambert, M. E., London 1980, Doc. No. 109, Record

VI New Minister, new Line

147

At the end of January 1937, before his departure to Chile, the British Minister met with the two highest Czechoslovak constitutional representatives. Both men confirmed to him that the status of Germans in the state could improve, but neither of them could outline any specific solution; Beneš and Hodža also rejected the accusation that they were deliberately damaging Sudeten Germans economically. An important desire was expressed at both the meetings – to have enough time so everything could be dealt with in a peaceful manner. The following months, however, were to show that this desire would not and could not be met.¹⁴ In early February 1937, British Legation Secretary, Robert Hadow, attempted to summarise the Sudeten German question after what he claimed was two years of observing the problem, something he described as the key to maintaining peace in Central Europe. He believed that progress could not be achieved without unbiased coercion of “the true friends of democracy and peace”. He also concluded that the Czechoslovak President was trapped within Czechoslovak legal norms and racial prejudices. As such, Hadow had not changed his opinion of Edvard Beneš (one need only recall his diatribes of the previous year) and he continued to perceive him as one of the main causes of the escalation of the Sudeten German problem. The British diplomat nevertheless thought that Great Britain’s efforts would be able to improve the situation.¹⁵ He was of the opinion that Britain should demonstrate its will in aiming to force Prague and Berlin into direct negotiations, with Prague acknowledging Sudeten Germans’ full rights as Czechoslovak citizens and Germany acknowledging Czechoslovakia’s right to territorial integrity and loyalty from all its citizens.

by Mr. Strang of a Conversation on Matters Connected with the Locarno Negotiations, January 23, 1937, pp. 141– 142.  Following his return to London, Charles Bentinck met in early February 1937 with Viscount Cranborne, who asked him for his personal opinion of the situation in Czechoslovakia. Bentinck stated that, “we must not rule out the possibility of a direct agreement between Czechoslovakia and Germany”. TNA, FO 800 (Private Offices: Various Ministers’ and Officials’ Papers), 296 (Correspondence of Robert Arthur James Gascoyne-Cecil, Vol. 1), February 7, 1937, f. 234. The former Minister to Prague then clarified that Beneš had revealed to him the timetable for an eventual agreement between Prague and Berlin which in the end did not occur. He then added that in the event of any negotiations, Germany would demand a guarantee for the German minority and a relaxation of Czechoslovak relations with the USSR. Ibid., f. 235. Bentinck had had the opportunity to speak with Heinrich Rutha and agreed with the Viscount that he was a sincere man who wanted to reach agreement with the Czechoslovak Government. Ibid., f. 236.  TNA, FO 371/21127, R 839/188/12, Hadow to Eden, February 2, 1937, f. 175. Hadow’s report also included an extensive memorandum on Sudeten Germans summarising the beginnings of the problem and the current state. Cf. ff. 179 – 192.

148

VI New Minister, new Line

Hadow repeated that London should privately suggest to Czechoslovak representatives that His Majesty’s Government was willing to play its part in reaching an agreement; as he put it, however, this offer of help sounded like subtle pressure on President Beneš in particular to try to come to an agreement with Germany. Hadow called on the Foreign Office to take action sooner before it was too late (pushing for an agreement between Germany and Czechoslovakia) to avoid the victory “of pusillanimous ‘waiting upon the inevitable’”.¹⁶ A few days later (5 February), Hadow wrote to Owen O’Malley, head of the Southern Department (Foreign Office), informing him that an important representative of the German Social Democrats in Czechoslovakia, Wenzel Jaksch, was planning to come to London, travelling to France and Great Britain in order, Hadow said, to support German activism and criticise the Sudeten German Party and Konrad Henlein. The British diplomat then wrote that Jaksch was trying to gain support from Liberals and Labour politicians, in which he had support from the Czechoslovak Legation in London, “but no mention should be made of my information to Masaryk” [underlined in the original text – author’s note], added Hadow.¹⁷ He was also convinced that Jaksch was underestimating the danger of the SdP’s opposition to the prevailing situation and that activists would prefer to risk confrontation between Czechoslovakia and Germany than attempt to reach agreement with Henlein; the British Legation Secretary typically went on in this context to criticise the inflexible policy of “experienced activists” Robert Mayr-Harting and Franz Spina. In contrast, he described Jaksch as an accessible more modern concept of minority policy, involving defending the interests of the German minority as a whole. Hadow then gave two points which Jaksch had mentioned to him – 1) current Czech-German discussions overseen by Prime Minister Hodža had come to an end because of the selfish policy of certain Czechoslovak politicians who rejected any kind of concessions to the loyal German minority; 2) Beneš and Hodža realised that something had to be done and both sides had to make concessions. Hadow thought that Jaksch was travelling to

 Ibid., f. 177. Cf. also Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien, Abteilung Archiv der Republik [Austrian State Archives, Archives of the Republic] (hereinafter OeStA/AdR), Auswärtige Angelegenheiten 1918 – 2005 (hereinafter AAng), Österreichische Vertretungsbehörden im Ausland 1. Republik, 1893 – 1945 (hereinafter ÖVB), Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 43, Politische Korrespondenz 1936 – 1937, Berichte, Weisungen 1937 (I–III), Zl. 53/Pol, Prag, am 4. Februar 1937.  TNA, FO 371/21127, R 903/188/12, Hadow to O’Malley, February 5, 1937, ff. 215 – 216.

VI New Minister, new Line

149

France and Great Britain with the awareness of the Czechoslovak President and Prime Minister.¹⁸ O’Malley did end up meeting Jaksch on 20 February 1937.¹⁹ Jaksch described the situation within the minority political scene in Czechoslovakia. In his opinion, Henlein was a rogue on the Nazi payroll who wanted to join the Czechoslovak border territory to the Third Reich. He said that activists were stronger than the results of the previous parliamentary election suggested. Jaksch also mentioned the so-called February Agreement²⁰ to O’Malley, which he had discussed by telephone with Prime Minister Hodža.²¹ He informed him that the Sudeten

 Ibid., ff. 216 – 218. Jaksch allegedly declared that only international pressure, in particular from Great Britain, would protect Czechoslovakia from itself. Hadow saw only two possibilities – either to help Beneš and Hodža or to watch Europe as it heads for war. As such, he recommended that Jaksch meet with someone from O’Malley’s department. Cf. ibid., f. 219.  Vansittart refused to meet him. Franke, R., London und Prag. Materialien zum Problem eines multinationalen Nationalstaates 1919 – 1938 [London and Prague. Materials on the Problem of a Multinational Nation State 1919 – 1938], München 1982, p. 289.  An agreement of 18th February 1937. In this agreement, the Czechoslovak Government promised economic assistance to German areas, an improvement in their social and health situation and an adjustment in numbers of officials in accordance with nationality. More in detail cf. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 352– 355, 380 – 383. British MPs were also interested in the agreement. In early March, Labour MP Arthur Henderson, for example, asked the Foreign Secretary whether the agreement between the Czechoslovak Government and Sudeten Germans could expect any support from the British Government. Eden replied that he was awaiting more detailed information. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21128, R 1430/188/12, Parliamentary Question (Mr. A. Henderson), March 1, 1937, f. 2. In an interview with the President on 22 February, his office head, Přemysl Šámal, warned of problems in regard to the agreement which the document caused for the individual authorities which were to follow it. “I fear from the experiences coming to us that many officers will not have a wide enough perspective to avoid doing something stupid,” wrote the office head. He then added clearly that there should be some directives to avoid provoking the SdP unnecessarily. AKPR, f. Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protokol T (tajné), sg. 12/25, kt. 135, mikrofilm č. 110, T. 344/37, February 22, 1937. According to German Christian Social Peoples’ Party MP Felix Luschka, the Prime Minister pathetically declared: “This work must succeed.” Later, however, the delegation of activist politicians found out that Hodža was to receive a three-member group of Sudeten German Party representatives the next day. Luschka, F. von, Im Parlament der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. Erinnerungen eines sudetendeutschen Abgeordneten 1920 – 1938 [In the Parliament of the First Czechoslovak Republic. Memoirs of a Sudeten German MP 1920 – 1938], in: Bohemia, 4, 1963, p. 268.  German Minister Ernst Eisenlohr also sought out the Prime Minister, asking him whether he considered the concluded agreement as final or the starting point for further negotiations between the Government and the German minority. In his answer, Hodža prevaricated diplomatically and then indirectly accused the activist parties of having previously lacked enough energy to exploit all opportunities. He then added that he considered the concluded document as the beginning of further steps and that he would certainly invite the SdP to negotiations. PA AA,

150

VI New Minister, new Line

Germans were now getting what they had always wanted. O’Malley wrote that Jaksch had said that Henlein, however, would not give up and would protest even against this agreement. According to O’Malley, the German Social Democrat went on to praise Czechoslovakia which as a democratic state could never reach an agreement with Nazi Germany.²² It should be noted that Jaksch was rather harsh in his discussions with the British diplomat, which offers a certain contrast to the objectivity and moderation which Henlein pretended to display during his visits to London. Jan Masaryk built on Wenzel Jaksch’s activities, meeting with the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Sir Robert Vansittart. The Czechoslovak Minister sought out Vansittart on his own initiative, wanting to discuss the Sudeten Germans with him. Masaryk alluded to Vansittart’s support from certain political circles within the Sudeten German Party and its leaders (Konrad Henlein or Heinz Rutha). The Permanent Under-Secretary of State rejected any special treatment and declared that he had only ever seen Rutha twice in his life and that he had informed him that politically London prioritised the preservation of Czechoslovakia in its current form. He added, however, that many economic areas could be improved.²³ Tschechoslowakei, R 103654 (Rassenfrage, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker), Prag, den 21. Februar 1937, ff. 017– 019.  TNA, FO 371/21127, R 903/188/12, February 20, 1937, f. 209. O’Malley only referred to the meeting, and did not give his own position. Völkischer Beobachter strongly denounced Jaksch’s visit to London, writing that Jaksch was a member of a small Marxist group (meaning the German Social Democrats) on the Czechoslovak Government’s payroll. TNA, FO 371/21128, R 1649/188/ 12, Telegram from Sir E. Phipps, March 8, 1937, f. 56.  TNA, FO 371/21127, R 1086/188/12, Czechoslovak Minister (Conversation), February 16, 1937, ff. 256 – 257. Masaryk thanked Vansittart for these words, who then added that he trusted the ability of the Czechoslovak Government to deal with the whole matter satisfactorily. He did emphasis to the Czechoslovak Minister, however, that certain people in Great Britain regarded the fate of the German minority in Czechoslovakia to be unfortunate, but those “who knew the details did not either think or insinuate that Czechoslovakia was treating her minority worse than minorities were treated in other countries in Europe. On the contrary”. Ibid., f. 257. This was confirmed in the 26 February edition of Daily Telegraph in which an interview with Milan Hodža was published where the article’s author wrote that the Czechoslovak endeavours to solve the minority issue “gives the impression of part of the solution to maintaining peace”. ANM, f. M. Hodža, kt. 9, IV. Veřejná činnost. Zprávy ČTK 1937, sg. 449, ČTK, 20. II. (menšinová politika), p. 23. Cf. also Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1937, svazek I (1. leden – 31. červenec 1937) [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1937, Vol. I, January 1– July 31, 1937], Dejmek, J. (ed.), Praha 2007, Doc. No. 69, dopis vyslance ČSR ve Velké Británii J. Masaryka Stálému podsekretáři britského ministerstva zahraničních věcí R. Vansittartovi, týkající se činnosti a orientace SdP, Londýn, 16. února 1937, pp. 162– 163; ibid., Doc. No. 70, aide-mémoire vyslance ČSR ve Velké Británii J. Masaryka Stálému podsekretáři britského ministerstva zahraničních věcí R. Vansittartovi, týkající se postoje čes-

VI New Minister, new Line

151

In mid-February 1937, both German (Jaksch) and Czech (Masaryk) politicians in Czechoslovakia had reason for satisfaction. Their meeting with British politicians and diplomats suggested that if Prague were to proceed prudently and try to come to an agreement with the Sudeten Germans (see the February Agreement),²⁴ then London would appreciate it. On the other hand, their partners in the debates (O’Malley and Vansittart) avoided clear declarations and merely repeated diplomatic phrases on the necessity to come to an agreement, naturally with all Sudeten Germans. Robert Hadow informed London in a similar manner, promoting support for Beneš and Hodža on the surface, but because of an agreement with the Sudeten Germans (naturally including the SdP) did not hide the necessity for unofficial pressure on Prague. Slowly, however, the idea of agreement primarily with the SdP came to the forefront.²⁵ The duplicitous approach of the British Legation Secretary was seen in early March when he informed Anthony Eden that the February Agreement was careful to ignore the Sudeten German Party “and its ‘disloyal’ following”. Hadow wrote that Konrad Henlein would naturally reject such an agreement, going on to say that the SdP leader’s words of dismissal were more conciliatory in nature than confrontational.²⁶ The British diplomat also said that while Henlein demanded full rights for members of the German minority, the activist parties satisfied themselves with their demands being half-met in the hope that, “time heals wounds and the Sudetendeutsche Partei […] loses its sting by reason of the Government’s concessions”. He also pointed out that even the German activists would very soon encounter the resistance of Czech chauvinists who would force the Government to stall the fulfilment of their promises contained in the koslovenské vlády k problému sudetských Němců v Československu, Londýn, 16. února 1937, pp. 164– 166.  In regard to negotiations with German activists, the Czechoslovak Government rejected the SdP’s demands for the Switzerlandisation of Czechoslovakia. TNA, FO 371/21128, R 1525/188/12, Hadow to Eden, February 25, 1937, ff. 21– 23.  Karl Hermann Frank and Konrad Henlein rejected the February Agreement on the party’s behalf. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, p. 356. Henlein began by declaring that the Government had not solved the Sudeten German problem up to that day, describing the German parties in Government as tiny, described the minority policy in place as a huge failure, warned the governing elites that Czechoslovakia was not just their country and also spoke briefly about bills proposed by the SdP. Národní archiv, Praha [National Archives] (hereinafter NA), f. SdP, kt. 2, sg. Konrád Henlein (řeči a projevy), 1937, 4, Aussig, February 28, 1937.  TNA, FO 371/21128, R 1528/188/12, Hadow to Eden, March 2, 1937, f. 35. SdP representatives visited Milan Hodža on 28 January and informed him that, “the SdP does not see the possibility of guaranteeing a satisfactory solution to minority relations in the country in the established negotiations between the Government and political representatives of the activist German parties regarding national political matters”. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 353 – 354.

152

VI New Minister, new Line

February Agreement.²⁷ In his assessment of Czech-German relations at the end of the first four months of 1937, Hadow positioned himself ever more on a platform of unilateral support for the SdP. In mid-March 1937, the British Government made a statement on the agreement concluded between the Czechoslovak Government and the German activist parties, in so doing also responding to Henderson’s parliamentary question.²⁸ Viscount Cranborne, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, declared that the agreement had been concluded with small German parties and that it gave hope for an improvement in the poor economic situation in Sudeten German regions. “His Majesty’s Government naturally welcome any action likely to promote the internal well-being of a friendly State,” concluded Cranborne in his essentially empty declaration.²⁹ In this regard, officials at the Foreign Office wrote in correspondence that the new Minister to Prague, Basil Newton, had already received oral instructions regarding the relations between Czechs and Germans in Czechoslovakia. Orme Sargent, Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, declared that Prague had concluded an agreement with insignificant German parties, and that the SdP had rejected it as insufficient.³⁰

 TNA, FO 371/21128, R 1528/188/12, Hadow to Eden, March 2, 1937, f. 37. Hadow informed the Foreign Secretary that he had spoken to German Minister Ernst Eisenlohr in private and he had revealed that he had held discussions with Milan Hodža and promised him Berlin would be conciliatory regarding any quarrel between Czechs and Sudeten Germans. The British Legation Secretary did not say what Hodža’s response was but said that the Czechoslovak Prime Minister was ready to acquaint himself with His Majesty’s Government’s position. Ibid., f. 39. Cf. Also Michie, L. W., Portrait of an Appeaser. Robert Hadow, First Secretary in the British Foreign Office, 1931 – 1939, Westport 1996, p. 34.  Cf. footnote 20.  TNA, FO 371/21128, R 1800/188/12, Parliamentary Question (Mr. A. Henderson), March 15, 1937, f. 73. According to French Minister, Leopold Victor de Lacroix, Edvard Beneš was pleased and welcomed the British Government’s satisfaction regarding Prague’s approach to the German minority. M. de Lacroix à M. Delbos, Prague, 2 mars 1937, in: France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932 – 1939: (1936 – 1939): (20 février – 31 mars 1937) [French Diplomatic Documents 1932– 1939: (1936 – 1939): (February 20 – March 31, 1937)], (hereinafter DDF), 2e Série, T. V, Paris 1968, Doc. No. 52, p. 78.  “We must not, therefore, suggest that this agreement has necessarily solved the Sudetendeutschen problem.” TNA, FO 371/21128, R 1800/188/12, March 10, 1937, f. 74. Cf. also OeStA/AdR, AAng, ÖVB, Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 43, Politische Korrespondenz 1936 – 1937, Berichte, Weisungen 1937 (I – III), Zl. 108/Pol, Prag, am 1. März 1937. According to Lindsay Michie, Czechoslovakia became at this time a subject of interest for the Foreign Office, and some diplomats in Prague apparently believed an agreement on the Czech-German question was possible. Michie, pp. 43 – 44. The French press, however, praised the Czechoslovak Government’s endeavours to find agreement with the German minority and also saw hidden orders from Berlin in

VI New Minister, new Line

153

The agreement between the Czechoslovak Government and German activist parties was not just an empty gesture for Prague. The Cabinet undertook to provide more effective economic assistance to the border areas and to improve the social and health situation there. It insisted, however, that loyalty to the state should play a major role in the recruitment of officials within the civil service. A disadvantage of the February Agreement and the whole concept of the Czechoslovak Government’s minority policy, however, was the absence of a clear timetable; as such, implementation of the arrangements took place at quite a sluggish pace. The position of the British Minister to Prague and through it also the Foreign Office on this attempt at a Czech-German agreement was distrustful from the very beginning; as such London looked at the negotiations taking place during the first month of 1937 with a level of interest corresponding to the importance of the activist parties, thus considering the proposed document to be insufficient. In the middle of the second week of March, Minister Basil Newton³¹ and Prime Minister Milan Hodža held their first discussion. The British diplomat vis-

Henlein’s rejection of the agreement. AMZV, PZ Paříž, 1937, běžná zpráva č. 10, 3. března 1937, pp. 1– 2.  Newton, then still Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin before his arrival in Prague, in a discussion with Vojtěch Mastný in July 1936 had already come to the conclusion that, “German complaints in this regard [authorities’ behaviour towards Germans – author’s note] were not justified and that Germans here are poorly led”. AMZV, PZ Berlín, 1936, běžná zpráva č. 73, 20. července 1936, p. 2. It was clear to the Czechoslovak Minister to Berlin that negative information about Czechoslovakia was getting to London through the British Legation in Prague. Ibid. Jan Masaryk wrote of Newton that he was: “a reasonable person, an aristocrat (Lord Eltisley’s brother), but it would be, I think, pointless to expect him to be any particular friend to us. He won’t be as negative as Addison, but nor as positive as Bentinck.” AMZV, PZ Londýn, 1937, běžná zpráva č. 5, 26. února 1937, p. 3. “Prague did not have much luck this time either in regard to Britain’s representative when the relatively young Basil Cochrane Newton was chosen to replace Bentinck, as a diplomat who was experienced but – traditionally – more familiar with the Far East and China in particular, where he had worked for a number of years.” Dejmek, J., Nenaplněné naděje. Politické a diplomatické vztahy Československa a Velké Británie (1918 – 1938) [Unfulfilled Hopes. Political and Diplomatic Relations of Czechoslovakia and Great Britain (1918 – 1938)], Praha 2003, p. 325. Newton had worked for a long time in Berlin, and so he had good German. Bruce Lockhard described him as a smart and tactful man of unbiased judgement. Cornwall, M., A Fluctuating Barometer: British Diplomatic Views of the Czech-German Relationship in Czechoslovakia, 1918 – 1938, in: Schmidt-Hartmann, E. – Winters, S. B. (hrsg.), Groβbritannien, die USA und die böhmischen Länder 1848 – 1938 [Great Britain, the USA and the Bohemian Lands 1848 – 1938], München 1991, p. 329. On the other hand one might doubt he was unbiased. Newton found himself in an environment in which his predecessors had stood on the side of the Sudeten Germans, and more specifically the SdP. Steiner, Z., The Triumph of the Dark. European International History 1933 – 1939, Oxford 2011, p. 364. It is also true that he had serious doubts

154

VI New Minister, new Line

ited the Prime Minister on the day he submitted his credentials to the Czechoslovak President (11 March).³² Although he was only expecting mere courtesies, Hodža spoke for two hours on the Sudeten German problem. On the basis of this discussion, the Minister came to the conclusion that Hodža understood the problem better than Krofta and Beneš.³³ During the meeting with Newton, the Prime Minister declared that he had realised the importance of the Sudeten German question as early as 1926 and that mutual relations between the two groups had been good until 1933 when the Nazis came to power in Germany. He also added that by not putting himself forward as a candidate in the election, Henlein was expressing his distrust in the Czechoslovak Republic’s parliamentary system. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister acknowledged that the Government must respect the national sentiment of all its citizens, but that the strength of Henlein’s party, “ought not to be fed by social and economic grievances”.³⁴ In his discussion with Newton, Hodža accused Henlein of blocking the Czechoslovak Government’s attempts to reach agreement. He gave the rejection of the February Agreement as an example, but added that it was unclear whether this approach was sensible or whether it undermined Henlein’s position in the Sudeten German Party. The Prime Minister also informed the British Minister that the Government would continue to eliminate social and economic problems and that the German minority could also expect schools improvements. Although he acknowledged that the percentage of German nationality officials was less than the overall percentage of Germans within the population, he promised this state would gradually be corrected. The Prime Minister requested, however, that the Germans could speak Czech and referred to Austria-Hungary which also requested that its officials be multilingual.³⁵

about the long-term sustainability of the Czechoslovak state and he did not think Czechoslovakia should be an important aspect of British foreign policy. Hughes, M., Lord Halifax at the Foreign Office (1938 – 39), in: British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World, 1919 – 1939, London 2006, p. 146.  At this occasion, Foreign Secretary Eden informed him that His Majesty’s Government was not ready to take responsibility for providing advice to Dr. Beneš to negotiate for such an agreement whose ambiguous provisions may be humiliating in nature. Eden, A., Facing the Dictators. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, Boston 1962, p. 569.  TNA, FO 371/21128, R 1845/188/12, Newton to Eden, March 15, 1937, f. 84. Newton termed his receipt by Beneš as purely formal.  Ibid., f. 85.  Ibid., ff. 85 – 86. Hodža spoke a few days later to Czechoslovak journalists. In his speech he called for tolerance between the nationalities living in Czechoslovakia. TNA, FO 371/21128, R 2028/188/12, Newton to Eden, March 19, 1937, f. 114.

VI New Minister, new Line

155

Newton made mention of a certain criticism he had heard in Great Britain and Germany in regard to Czechoslovakia. He said that while the country’s leaders, the Prime Minister, and the President, had truly grasped the situation of the Sudeten Germans, some of the political elite lacked this vision and were confounding any attempts at agreement. According to the Minister’s words, Hodža rejected this and added that President Beneš had the situation under control. The Prime Minister did, however, reject autonomy for the German areas as unfeasible and termed National Socialism an ideology incompatible with the Czechoslovak Republic’s democratic order. At the end of his message, the Minister wrote that while he had not yet managed to get a clear impression of the domestic situation within Czechoslovakia, he did acknowledge that the Czechoslovak Government could be persuaded to conclude an agreement which would improve relations with Germany.³⁶ As such, the new British Minister’s first meeting with the Prime Minister occurred without any extended formalities; the subject of discussion between the two men was logically Czech-German relations. The Prime Minister promised he was willing to improve the situation of the Sudeten Germans and emphasised Prague’s willingness to come to an agreement with them, while on the other hand strictly rejecting Nazism and autonomy for German areas which would naturally lead to the end of a unitary Czechoslovak state. The British diplomat in contrast confirmed British diplomacy’s baseline in regard to Central Europe, or more specifically to Czechoslovakia and Germany, in confirming London’s intention to push for mutual understanding between the two states. The British Minister’s next important message from Prague in regard to the Sudeten German problem came at the end of April 1937. He informed Foreign Secretary Eden that the Sudeten German press had recently been writing about a deterioration in the political situation in North Bohemia. Newton wrote, for example, of the harsh treatment of Sudeten German Party members who had visited a German Social Democrat meeting, and the shooting of SdP deputy Franz May, adding: “I quote these two instances as symptomatic of increasing violence in

 TNA, FO 371/21128, R 1845/188/12, Newton to Eden, March 15, 1937, ff. 87– 89. In this regard, it is interesting that the Foreign Office criticised Foreign Minister Krofta’s Liberec speech which it was claimed did not help Hodža and Beneš in their endeavours to improve relations with Germany. Newton was to inform the Prime Minister of this at the earliest opportunity. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21128, R 1845/188/12, March 30, 1937, f. 83. Newton himself, however, had to concede to his French colleague Lacroix in early April that he had had no instructions from London in regard to the German minority in Czechoslovakia and confirmed the traditional disinterest of Great Britain in the affairs of Central and Eastern Europe. M. de Lacroix à M. Delbos, Prague, 4 avril 1937, DDF, T. V, Doc. No. 217, p. 347.

156

VI New Minister, new Line

the campaign between the Sudetendeutsche Partei and the ‘Activist’ German minority.”³⁷ The Minister also informed the head of the Foreign Office of the SdP meetings which the local authorities had banned over fears of a disruption to public order. He further added that there was an asymmetrical approach taken by state authorities towards activists and the SdP in terms of the approval of party meetings. Newton also noted the cases of Sudeten Germans arrested for breaching the ban of private teaching implemented the previous year.³⁸ He continued with a list of criticisms of Czechoslovak officials whom he thought were not doing enough to improve the situation for all Sudeten Germans. Finally, he noted there was a possibility that the Sudeten German Party’s position might improve after the municipal elections, although he thought President Beneš did not think it would occur and did not believe the SdP would be successful.³⁹ The beginning of Government co-operation with German activists in order to ameliorate the German issue in the first months of 1937 put the Sudeten German Party in a difficult position, and not just in the eyes of British diplomacy. In order that the SdP did not find itself in the position of being a party which only talks about the minorities issue and its demands without trying to constructively solve the situation, it was forced to compensate for this handicap, or at least to appear to do so. The outcome of its attempts at finding a counterbalance to the February Agreement was a package of six draft bills which essentially represented constitutional amendments and which it submitted to parliament on 27 April 1937. This step was meant to demonstrate Henlein’s party’s readiness to deal with the mi TNA, FO 371/21128, R 2886/188/12, Newton to Eden, April 27, 1937, f. 176. Edvard Beneš and German Minister Ernst Eisenlohr also discussed the anti-Czech propaganda in the German press in mid-April 1937. PA AA, Tschechoslowakei, R 103655 (Rassenfrage, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker), f. 231.  TNA, FO 371/21128, R 2886/188/12, Newton to Eden, April 27, 1937, f. 177. This was the so-called Lex Uhlíř. There was a dispute as to whether the private teaching of German children could lead to their being infected by Nazi ideas. The act was proposed by National Socialist deputy František Uhlíř and his colleagues (Alois Neuman, Alois Bábek and Vladimír Polívka) and they intended it to ensure “education during compulsory school age be focused within schools administered and sufficiently controlled by the state”. Those proposing the bill justified it though a relic of Austria-Hungary in which the nobility supported private teaching so that their children did not have to come into contact with children of lower social classes. “This bill does not prevent the further growth of private institutions enjoying public rights, but it does prevent privileges which are inappropriate today,” added the act’s writers. Cf. http://www.psp.cz/eknih/ 1935ns/ps/tisky/t0049_00.htm [cit. 2017– 07– 04].  TNA, FO 371/21128, R 2886/188/12, Newton to Eden, April 27, 1937, ff. 178 – 180. The Minister did not comment on the President’s words. In the end, the Government postponed the municipal election until May 1938.

VI New Minister, new Line

157

nority question in the country, and not just at the level of administrative measures, but directly at a legislative level.⁴⁰ In this regard, the British Embassy in Berlin informed the Foreign Secretary that the German press considered the Czechoslovak Government’s concessions towards the Sudeten Germans to be temporary measures which could be rescinded at any time. As such, their requirements had to be put on a legal basis, something which the six bills worked on by the SdP represented within the Czechoslovak Constitution. Discussion of them could test Czechs’ sincerity in aiming to reach an agreement with Germany, said the Embassy worker at the end of his report summarising the position of the German press.⁴¹ It should be noted that in contrast the draft bills for the much part ran counter to the Constitution for a number of reasons. What the SdP deputies proposed in April 1937 was nothing less than national collectivist autonomy for national minorities in Czechoslovakia, above all for Sudeten Germans, evidently separating the minority from the Czechoslovak nation. This would not be limited just to the cultural or educational sphere, but would also include economic matters and other areas of the public agenda. If these bills were ratified, they would lead to the disintegration of state power and disruption to the administration of multiple state agendas. Basil Newton and Milan Hodža met once again at the end of April 1937. According to the Minister’s account, the Prime Minister was less satisfied than during their meeting six weeks previously. The Prime Minister said that while the Government and party leaders were supporting his policy, there was opposition amongst rank and file officials, adding that his contacts with Konrad Henlein

 César, J. – Černý, B., Politika německých buržoazních stran v Československu v letech 1918 – 1938. Díl II. (1930 – 1938) [Politics of German Bourgeois Parties in Czechoslovakia in 1918 – 1938. Part II. (1930 – 1938)], Praha 1962, pp. 395 – 398. “They were conceived [the acts – author’s note] from insufficient time and aimed to fall within the constitutional framework [underlined in the original – author’s note].” PA AA, Tschechoslowakei, R 60491, May 27, 1937. The author of the talk stressed that the Czechoslovak Republic was comprised of a number of “Volksgemeinschaften”. “Justice and equality [underlined in the original – author’s note] are the foundations on which minorities’ legal status must be built,” he added. Ibid. He further complained that there was a difference in Czechoslovakia between the constitution’s words and reality. He then introduced the individual bills proposed in detail. Cf. ibid. More in detail cf. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 356– 367. According to some historians, these draft bills can be termed the “swansong” of moderates in the SdP. Cornwall, M., ‘A Leap into Ice-Cold Water’: The Manoeuvres of the Henlein Movement in Czechoslovakia, 1933 – 1938, in: Cornwall, M. – Evans, R. J. W. (ed.), Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe 1918 – 1948, Oxford 2007, p. 140.  TNA, FO 371/21128, R 2895/188/12, Telegram from Mr. Ogilvie Forbes, April 28, 1937, f. 182.

158

VI New Minister, new Line

were limited.⁴² Newton also spoke to German Minister, Ernst Eisenlohr, who he thought was not so dissatisfied with the current situation and who welcomed the endeavour to deal with the Czech-German problem. Eisenlohr had spoken to President Beneš,⁴³ whom he claimed had declared that Czechoslovakia must not become a “nation” state, but rather a state “of nationalities”, something the German Minister said was a major step forward.⁴⁴ Newton, however, warned his German colleague that the Sudeten German territory formed a kind of bridge to its powerful neighbours, which made any kind of agreement very difficult, and he asked him what he considered to be the basis for good relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany. Eisenlohr did not answer, justifying this because of his idea’s secrecy, but he did declare that both states could not continue in permanently poor relations. He also added that he was unable to speak to Czechoslovak representatives about many things, as he was not authorised to do so. Newton felt that the German Minister knew about the Yugoslav and Romanian Governments’ friendly advice to the Czechoslovak Government that Prague improve relations with Berlin and he hoped that the British Government would make a similar declaration.⁴⁵ Minister Newton made a statement around the third week of May 1937 on the SdP’s proposed six bills. He believed that the documents had been presented in

 TNA, FO 371/21128, R 2993/188/12, Newton to Eden, April 28, 1937, f. 190.  Newton also met with him on 28 April. Naturally, the subject of their discussion was the Sudeten German question. According to the Minister’s account, Beneš had fought against Czech becoming the official language in 1919. Both men then discussed the use of German in public spaces. More in detail cf. TNA, FO 371/21128, R 2994/188/12, Newton to Eden, April 28, 1937, ff. 196 – 199.  TNA, FO 371/21128, R 2993/188/12, Newton to Eden, April 28, 1937, f. 191.  Ibid., ff. 191– 192. To the direct question of whether Berlin demanded autonomy for the Sudeten Germans, he answered, “that autonomy, which was a vague and far-reaching term, had never been claimed”. Ibid., f. 193. Lloyd George’s former personal secretary and proponent of appeasement, Philip Henry Kerr, the 11th Marquess of Lothian, who held the opinion that Germany had been punished too much at the Paris Peace Conference, had the opportunity to speak to Adolf Hitler in May 1937, who revealed to him in regard to Czechoslovakia that he was not responsible for the current problems in Central Europe, that the German population suffered from various forms of harassment which had now been going on for too long, and that Berlin had direct interests in Central Europe just as London had, for example, in Egypt. Hitler declared that his offer of a non-aggression pact still applied, but Prague must deal with the issue of its German minority. TNA, FO 800 (Private Offices: Various Ministers’ and Officials’ Papers), 268 (Miscellaneous Correspondence, Vol. 5), Sir Nevile Henderson, Interview with Hitler, May 4, 1937, ff. 161, 164. This was, of course, Hitler’s standard rhetoric about Czechoslovakia, but Lothian nevertheless, although he had no Government function, listened attentatively to his conclusions.

VI New Minister, new Line

159

order to protect national minorities from political and economic discrimination, which was what the SdP most complained about. Essentially, the British diplomat merely reworded the reasoning given for the proposed standards, thus taking on the arguments of those presenting it to Parliament. He also stressed the Sudeten German Party argument that the February Agreement was one-sided and not binding for further Government formations. In the conclusion to his report, Newton stated that no Czech newspapers had published the wording or at least extracts from the proposed bills and that the Czechoslovak elites were protesting most strongly against the collectivist concept of protecting minority rights. Naturally, one cannot predict the fate of the bills, Newton wrote, but he added that their submission had undoubtedly strengthened the SdP’s position in its battle against the activist parties.⁴⁶ The British Minister’s comments on the proposed six bills to the Sudeten German Party representatives suggested some sympathy for the party. Newton essentially criticised the fact that the Czech press were uninterested in the bills and stated the SdP’s position was strengthened in negotiations with Czechoslovak officials compared to the German activists. Thus, through his words, the British Legation in Prague clearly demonstrated its indirect support for Henlein’s party; in London, a conviction began to germinate that Prague would have to be pressurised to come to an agreement with the SdP in particular.⁴⁷ The Czech press, however, came to the opposite conclusion, one which at the time was not based on the reality. According to a report from the British Legation in Prague, České slovo for example included commentary stating the Sudeten German Party and its policies were losing support in London. According to  TNA, FO 371/21129, R 3705/188/12, Newton to Eden, May 19, 1937, ff. 227– 229. Heinz Rutha spoke about the proposed six bills to Lord Cranborne in mid-July 1937. He informed him that Parliament should be discussing the bills in autumn, but it was possible the Czechoslovak Government would prevent this. If it decided to do so, Rutha said, the SdP would lodge a complaint with the League of Nations. He also revealed to Cranborne that he had met with Kamil Krofta who had asked him whether the SdP was prepared to join the Czechoslovak Government. Rutha had to admit to the British diplomat that this would never occur. On the other hand, he did praise Krofta and Prime Minister Hodža for their reasonable position. At the end of the discussion, Cranborne advised Rutha that the SdP should co-operate with the Government. TNA, FO 371/21130, R 4896/188/12, Foreign Office Minute. Lord Cranborne, July 16, 1937, ff. 165 – 167. Orme Sargent, and Owen O’Malley in early August, also welcomed Cranborne’s recommendation. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21130, R 4942/188/12, July 27, 1937, f. 169; ibid., f. 174.  Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 326. According to Ferdinand Marek, Kamil Krofta was also aware that Prague would never be able to force London to sign a mutual pact and that it only remained to hope, “that at the key moments our interests will align with those of England”. OeStA/AdR, AAng, ÖVB, Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 44, Berichte, Weisungen 1937 (IV– IX), Zl. 215/Pol, Prag, am 22. Mai 1937.

160

VI New Minister, new Line

the paper, Heinz Rutha’s visit to the British capital could create an ambivalent impression and fears of radicalisation of the German minority in Czechoslovakia, which could end with peace in Central Europe being threatened.⁴⁸ Minister Newton deliberately selected an article from České slovo because he considered it clearly demonstrated the general opinions promoted in the Czechoslovak press in terms of its approach to minorities, expressed through the ignoring of SdP claims.⁴⁹ The British diplomat also added that the Government was dragging its feet somewhat in fulfilling its promises of 18th February, and suggested that disputes were occurring within the Czechoslovak Government coalition with Catholic and socialist parties accusing the Agrarians of wanting to come to agreement with the SdP and that, “no Government party will lay itself open to the loss of the Czech vote [municipal elections were planned – author’s note] by sponsoring the Activist German cause at the expense of Czechs”;⁵⁰ this fear along with resistance from local authorities was preventing official posts from being occupied by Sudeten Germans as promised, added the Minister. This was an interesting argument because the minorities policy in interwar Czechoslovakia really was wrestling with a centre and periphery phenomenon with central authorities determining policy which was not always respected lower down the line, never mind effectively executed; Czechoslovak and German politicians themselves did not agree on whether the February Agreement was being fulfilled.⁵¹

 Czechoslovak representatives saw hope for a fall in SdP support from Great Britain during the coronation celebrations of George VI. TNA, FO 371/21129, R 3706/188/12, Newton to Eden, May 21, 1937, f. 240. České slovo also wrote that the Czechoslovak Government was doing a lot to deal with the minorities issue, certainly more than other European states and that the SdP was acting as a nuisance not just in Czechoslovak domestic politics, but throughout the whole Central European region. Ibid., f. 241.  Orme Sargent repeated this opinion at the start of June 1937, writing that Minister Masaryk should be informed, “that we are not satisfied with the present situation and are very disappointed that the February agreements have not been followed up by agreements with the Sudetendeutsche”. TNA, FO 371/21129, R 3707/188/12, June 4, 1937, ff. 244– 245. A few days later, Sargent added that it would counterproductive to put direct pressure on the Czechoslovak Government, so it would be better, “to give advice through the diplomatic channel”. TNA, FO 371/21129, R 3857/188/12, June 8, 1937, f. 271.  TNA, FO 371/21129, R 3706/188/12, Newton to Eden, May 21, 1937, f. 242. As such, wrote Newton, the idea that the February Agreement was merely a written foreign propaganda sop was becoming ever more prevalent.  See Šámal’s words of 22 February; footnote 20. Furthermore, Wenzel Jaksch declared in May that the Sudeten Germans’ position was strongly linked to international circumstances and complained that their economic situation was not improving. AKPR, f. Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protokol T (tajné), sg. 12/25, kt. 135, mikrofilm č. 110, T. 944/37, May 16, 1937. A month earlier,

VI New Minister, new Line

161

Confirmation that the Czechoslovak Government was not sufficiently defending the principles of the February Agreement was seen in the Ministry of Trade’s bill which according to the British Consul in Liberec, Peter Pares, was meant to regulate the chamber of commerce there, or reduce its importance which in his opinion was in direct contradiction to the proclamation of being willing to come to an agreement with the Germans.⁵² Thus, this bill represented a proven method for weakening Germans by creating new administrative units and electoral regions which would be more beneficial for Czechs. “President Beneš at Reichenberg last August promised a ‘vernünftige Regionalismus’ but this bill seems in flat contradiction to his promise,” added Peter Pares in conclusion.⁵³ The notional peak of the British Minister to Prague’s activities in seeking a solution to Czech-German relations at the end of the first half of 1937 was its proposal for a meeting of British Ministers in Prague, Vienna, and Budapest in order to consult on this complex problem together. The Foreign Office had no objections to the idea if it was purely a private trip which would not trigger any response. If it was to be a trip with official subtones even to a minimal extent, the Foreign Office officials did not consider it appropriate because it could give an impression of a more active British policy in Central Europe.⁵⁴ Some were of the opinion that such a project also demanded a visit to Berlin, because

he had met with Emil Sobota and informed him that some ministers, specifically the National Defence, Interior and Schools Ministers were slowing down implementation of the February Agreement, and that those who were promoting it were being slowed down by bureaucracy. Mejdrová, H. (ed.), Trpký úděl. Výbor k dokumentů k dějinám německé sociální demokracie v ČSR v letech 1937 – 1948 [Bitter Fate. Committee on Documents on the History of German Social Democracy in Czechoslovakia in 1937– 1948], Praha 1997, Doc. No. 5, p. 19. In contrast, Prime Minister Milan Hodža stated on 21 May that: “Implementation of the measures contained within the Government declaration of 18 February is going well.” ANM, f. M. Hodža, kt. 8, IV. Veřejná činnost (materiály k polit. situaci, projevy 1937, 1938). Návštěva Tataresca v Praze, sg. 419, odpovědi dr. M. H. na otázky novinářů politické redakce pražského denního tisku (zmocňovací zákon, volby, provádění vládního prohlášení z. 18. února, rakouský tisk o ČSR, Londýn a střední Evropa, akční program vlády, ČSR a Sovětské Rusko), p. 2. Milan Hodža also declared that Prague could not expect London to guarantee its borders, but that Great Britain was beginning to understand the importance of Central Europe for Europe-wide peace, and positive progress should be seen here. Ibid., pp. 6 – 7.  TNA, FO 371/21129, R 3707/188/12, Newton to Eden, May 24, 1937, f. 248. The Consul claimed that the bill was designed to administratively weaken the Liberec chamber of commerce, while boosting the Czech element; in future Czech was to be used more than German. Ibid., f. 249.  Ibid.  TNA, FO 371/21129, R 3857/188/12, June 10, 1937, f. 272. The Foreign Office issued a similar objection in regard to the Balkans.

162

VI New Minister, new Line

the British Ministers in Prague, Vienna and Budapest were looking at the German problem more than mutual relations between neighbouring countries.⁵⁵ Newton’s proposal for discussions between British Ministers in certain countries of Central Europe represented certain progress in the perception of the Sudeten German issue within Thun Palace. His predecessors, Addison and Bentinck, had not come up with this idea, although they each had a different reason for not doing so – Addison blamed the Czech majority as clearly responsible for deteriorating Czech-German relations, while Bentinck had worked in Prague for too short a period to consider such a concept. The response of the Foreign Office was typical – not to reject anything directly, while on the other hand not wishing to create the impression they were planning any kind of diplomatic offensive in the Central European region.⁵⁶ According to Foreign Office officials, Germany should not be ignored either. On the other hand, one should bear in mind that Newton’s “Danube” concept was more of a diplomatic probe that did not represent a proposed official policy line for the Foreign Office. At the start of June 1937, Professor Arnold Toynbee, a director at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, visited the Sudeten German area. The British Minister to Prague said in his report that Professor Toynbee was coming to Prague with instructions from the Czechoslovak Minister to London and that his visit to the border regions had not taken place under Government auspices, but rather on the basis of chance meetings with a number of Henlein’s friends he had had in Vienna. The British historian had apparently been most affected by the poverty prevalent in the Sudeten German regions.⁵⁷ Toynbee further complained about the “Czechisation” of the Sudeten German economy and German children being forced to visit Czech schools. When he spoke to local citizens, he criticised the fact that SdP membership prevented them from finding employment, while membership of the activist Social Democrats had the opposite effect. He also met Konrad Henlein, “and was struck by his apparently reasonable attitude”.⁵⁸  Ibid., June 24, 1937, ff. 280 – 281.  In mid-July 1937, Anthony Eden wrote to Nevile Henderson that the problem of the German minority in Czechoslovakia required London’s careful attention, and London must force Prague to improve its position while preserving the country’s current sovereignty. TNA, CAB 24/271/2, July 15, 1937, f. 47. London had been responding in a similar manner for some time, requiring the recognition not just of SdP demands, but also the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. In the context of the time, however, it was beginning to seem an insurmountable task.  TNA, FO 371/21129, R 4023/188/12, Newton to Eden, June 3, 1937, f. 289. At home, the people were apparently more concerned about food and clothing than politics.  Ibid. Henlein said he wished the February Agreement had turned out differently and that direct discussions between the SdP and the Government would begin. Also see Toynbee’s thoughts

VI New Minister, new Line

163

Naturally, Profesor Arnold Toynbee heard and saw what he was supposed to hear and see. Minister Newton’s report says nothing about whether he met representatives from activist parties; he did talk to figures from Czechoslovak political parties and President Beneš, however. He came to Czechoslovakia at the invitation of Henlein’s friends and they gave him their version of the current situation. There is no doubt, however, that his impressions of his travels through the German border region, which the British Minister conveyed to London, made an impact at the Foreign Office.⁵⁹ At the start of the second week of June 1937, the British Legation sent the Foreign Office⁶⁰ a report in which it informed them of Henlein’s trip to Italy. The SdP leader had said that he was only going there for relaxation, but it was more than clear that it wasn’t an ordinary holiday. The Prager Presse newspaper had conveyed the information, according to the report, that Henlein had met with the leader of the Austrian Nazis, Josef Leopold⁶¹ and had apparently discussed the option of setting up a united front of Austrian Nazis and the Sudeten German Party with him.⁶² This was probably unsubstantiated rumour, however, as at that time the SdP was only receiving instructions from Berlin. In regard to the status of the German minority in Bohemia, a document produced by Arthur Pillans Laurie⁶³ for delegates of the dominions is of interest (an

on poverty and the poor state of the Sudeten German lands as confirmed by a Mr Catchpool who visited him. British Consul in Liberec Pares termed Catchpool’s depiction of the situation as balanced. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21130, R 5051/188/12, Newton to Eden, July 14, 1937, f. 185. According to Newton, Catchpool was a quaker from Germany who had gone to Britain. His thoughts mainly concerned the poor economic situation of the Sudeten Germany. Ibid., ff. 186 – 187.  Two articles by Toynbee were published in The Economist (10 and 24 July) entitled Czechoslovakia’s German Problem, in response to his trip through Central Europe. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21130, R 5361/188/12, ff. 248 – 251.  On 28 May 1937, a new British Government of Neville Chamberlain was appointed. Although its foreign policy has been and is subject to much criticism, at the time it had few opponents. More in detail cf. Crowson, N. J., Conservative Parliamentary Dissent over Foreign Policy during the Premiership of Neville Chamberlain: Myth or Reality?, in: Parliamentary History, 14, 3, 1995, pp. 315 – 336.  Josef Leopold was a leading member of the Nazi Party in Austria.  TNA, FO 371/21129, R 4026/188/12, Prague Chancery to Southern Department, June 7, 1937, f. 296. The report also warned of the impossibility of verifying this information. The document continues with a declaration that there is no evidence that the leader of the Sudeten German Party had held discussions with the Italian Government. Ibid., f. 297. Furthermore, Austrian officials did not have evidence of any closer contact between Henlein and Leopold either. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21130, R 5356/188/12, Vienna Chancery to Southern Department, July 24, 1937, f. 226.  Laurie was a Scottish chemist, who published the book The Case for Germany. A Study of Modern Germany in 1939.

164

VI New Minister, new Line

Imperial Conference took place from 14 May to 15 June 1937 in London). In its introduction, he states that any enemy of Germany which governed Bohemia could bomb it from the air. Laurie did not distinguish between Czechs and Slovaks, considering them as one entity but he thought that the country was getting rich mainly as a result of the work of its German population, and even added: “Since the war the Germans have been in a most unhappy position. The glass factories are in ruins, the trade is gone, and what work is going is given to Czechs.”⁶⁴ Laurie continued by stating further falsehoods, claiming that the living conditions of Sudeten Germans were appalling and their children were dying of hunger. He stated unsubstantiated facts and vilified the Czechoslovak authorities. He thought that Bohemia was replacing Alsace and Lorraine as an issue of sensitivity in the relations between Berlin and Paris. Laurie feared that Jews like Blum and Litvinov could trigger war and weak British diplomacy would be unable to prevent it. He also described the country’s involvement in the Crimean War and the First World War as a weakness. He states in the conclusion of his somewhat surprising memorandum that strategically Bohemia should belong to Germany and that the dominions should ask themselves whether they are prepared to get involved in a war because of 20,000 square kilometres in Central Europe. Laurie ended his document stating: “It is for the Dominions to save Great Britain from this terrible blunder.”⁶⁵

 TNA, FO 371/21129, R 4101/188/12, Mr. Laurie, June 10, 1937, f. 3.  Ibid., f. 6. The dominions themselves had a clear negative perspective on Great Britain making any kind of commitment within Central Europe, according to Vojtěch Mastný. AMZV, PZ Berlín, 1937, běžná zpráva č. 27, 30. května 1937, p. 1. The Czechoslovak diplomat also met with Nevile Henderson, whose arrogance and questioning on the situation of the German minority in Czechoslovakia made a very poor impression on him. Mastný’s French colleague had a similar impression of Henderson. Ibid., běžná zpráva č. 30, 30. května 1937, pp. 1– 2. The Czechoslovak Minister to Berlin also had to state that according to The Times’ correspondent, “there were alarming endeavours in London to be more favourable towards Germany”. Ibid., běžná zpráva č. 31, 30. května 1937, p. 1. Nevile Henderson himself has not been evaluated particularly positively by historians, and even Anthony Eden wrote that naming him Ambassador was an international error. Cf. Neville, P., The Appointment of Sir Nevile Henderson, 1937 – Design or Blunder?, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 33, 4, 1998, s. 609. Cf also Eden, p. 590. Robert Vansittart arranged Henderson’s positing to Berlin. Neville, P., Rival Foreign Office Perceptions of Germany, 1936 – 1939, in: Diplomacy & Statecraft, 13, 3, 2002, p. 142; Ellinger, J., Neville Chamberlain. Od usmiřování k válce: britská zahraniční politika, 1937 – 1940 [Neville Chamberlain. From Reconciliation to War: British Foreign Policy, 1937– 1940], Praha 2009, p. 128. Antipathy between the two men, however, was mutual. When Eden resigned from his post in 1938, Henderson commented that his presence at the Foreign Office would not permit reconciliation with Germany. TNA, FO 800 (Private Offices: Various Ministers’ and Officials’ Papers), 269 (Miscellaneous Correspondence, Vol. 6), Sir Nevile Henderson, Henderson to Halifax, February 27, 1938, f. 35.

VI New Minister, new Line

165

Although the above opinion was entirely divorced from reality, the fact it was presented by a non-politician and a respected chemist and it was designed for the dominions meant that it created the impression in the overseas territories that Central Europe was some sort of sensitive issue between Germany and France which could escalate into military conflict. Laurie gave the Government a clear recommendation not to be swayed to enter into war and posed the dominions the suggestive question as to whether they really wanted to risk armed conflict over a tiny country; his document is almost a foretaste of future influential politicians’ later positions on the escalating situation which culminated in Munich in September 1938. On the other hand, one must also do one’s best to understand the thinking of someone who had almost no information on Czechoslovakia and whose entire knowledge of the country had only come from others. The Marquess of Lothian expressed a similar opinion on engagement in Central Europe in his May memorandum on Great Britain’s policy towards Germany, having come to the conclusion that Berlin did not represent a threat to London, because it never crossed British interests. He further recommended that Paris be compelled to try to find a modus vivendi with Germany, something which would indirectly mean abandoning its allies in Central Europe, and thus also Czechoslovakia. The British politician and journalist then described the absorption of the Czechoslovak border areas by Germany as not damaging to London’s interests, and neither did he oppose German dominance in the region. He attacked Czechoslovak minority policy thus: “As regard the Sudetendeutsche and the other numerous German minorities in Europe, the best prospect for a peaceful solution lies firstly in a greater political wisdom than the Czechs themselves have hitherto displayed […].”⁶⁶

 TNA, FO 800/268, Memorandum on British Policy towards Germany, May 10, 1937, ff. 181– 184, quotation f. 186. One month later, his political sympathies caused a certain discomposure to the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, who expected a visit from German Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath. Therefore Eden asked Lothian to postpone publishing of his articles for The Times and publish them after Neurath’s departure from London. The copy of this letter was sent to the editor of The Times, Mr Dawson. University of Oxford, Bodleian Libraries (Weston Library), Papers of Geoffrey Dawson, MS. Dawson 79, June 16, 1937, ff. 124– 136. On the other hand, the editor of The Times Geoffrey Dawson was conviced that Lothian’s opinions might help the British Government because Marquess Lothian just came back from his visit to Berlin, where he had met Adolf Hitler. Ibid., June 17, 1937, ff. 139 – 140. This affair showed Eden’s concernes about the possible misinterpretation of the British policy even to Central Europe, should the articles be published prior to Neurath’s arrival to London. For this reason Eden insisted the publication of the articles be postponed. Foreign Secretary considered the situation on the European Continent to be very tight. Ibid., June 18, 1937, ff. 141– 144.

166

VI New Minister, new Line

The Marquess of Lothian, known for his pro-German sentiment and unwillingness to support British commitments in Europe unless absolutely necessary, was one of the circle of well-known appeasers who considered German territorial demands the logical outcome of the humiliation which Berlin had received from Versailles. As such, although he had no Government function, he exploited the acquaintances and influence he had to suggest to active politicians that they accommodate Berlin and influence dominial politics in the sense of rejecting Central European engagement.⁶⁷ At the end of June 1937, Robert Hadow wrote a memorandum describing the current status of the Sudeten German issue. A few days later, Czechoslovak Minister to London, Jan Masaryk, asked the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Robert Vansittart, for a meeting; he wanted to give him a personal message from President Beneš. According to Orme Sargent, this was a great opportunity to speak about Hadow’s memorandum.⁶⁸ In the introduction to his document, Hadow summarised the Czechoslovak Government’s concessions within the February Agreement, but then added his objections – it was generally perceived in the country that the document could only be fulfilled in co-operation with the activist parties, “who together make up only one-third of the German speaking electorate”; it was unclear how the next Government was going to act in regard to the policy.⁶⁹ The British Legation Secretary asked in his memorandum that Prague finally acknowledge the SdP’s importance, represented by its two-thirds electoral support. He described two contrary tendencies which he thought could be observed. The first of these was growing political tension because of the approaching municipal election which was to take place in September. The activist parties had decided to convince voters that only they could secure concessions from the Government, said Hadow, and he added that their endeavours rung hollow because Czechoslovak organisations (for example Národní jednota/National Association) were threatening to withdraw support for Government parties if they did not sufficiently support the Czech element. The

 Cf. for example Cushner, A., Fighting Fire with Propaganda: Claud Cockburn’s The Week and the Anti-Nazi Intrigue that Produced the ‘Cliveden Set,’ 1932 – 1939, in: Ex Post Facto. Journal of the History Students at San Francisco State University, XVI, 2006 – 2007, pp. 57, 67. After the war, it was believed that the so-called Cliveden Set was mainly in control of directing British foreign policy towards appeasing Germany, although later research has not confirmed this. Perman, T., Příspěvek ke studiu historiografické diskuse o politice appeasementu v anglicky psané odborné literatuře [Contribution to the Study of Historiographical Discussion on Appeasement Policy in Professional Writing], Doctor Thesis, Praha 2006, p. 30.  TNA, FO 371/21129, R 4408/188/12, June 28, 1937, f. 89.  TNA, FO 371/21129, R 4408/188/12, Foreign Office Memorandum, June 23, 1937, ff. 90 – 91.

VI New Minister, new Line

167

British diplomat stated that the policy of 18th February had collapsed and its declaration was only made to reassure foreign nations. On the other hand, and Hadow had to acknowledge this to be true, the economic situation in the Sudeten German areas had improved, in particular as a result of increased orders for certain types of goods.⁷⁰ He also welcomed the fact that Prime Minister Hodža was trying to improve relations with Germany. He was less appreciative of the continuing bureaucratic obstacles placed on Sudeten Germans from officials. “If risk of a sudden incident, leading to a conflagration, is to be diminished it is therefore important that Czechoslovakia should set her house in order […],” wrote Hadow in conclusion.⁷¹ At the end of the first half of July 1937, Minister Newton met Foreign Minister Krofta, who told him President Beneš was willing to co-operate with the SdP, but that they must acknowledge two key matters – the Government and President would continue to count on the German activist parties, and it must be clear that SdP leaders were not taking orders from Berlin. Krofta further declared that the Sudeten German Party’s six proposed bills were for the most part unacceptable. Newton then asked about the Czechoslovak press’s position, which generally described the Sudeten Germans as traitors, something which he thought could have a marked impact on the formation of public opinion. The Minister also tried to promote co-operation between official authorities and the SdP.⁷² While Newton was waiting for Krofta to receive him, French Minister Leopold Victor de Lacroix walked out of the minister’s study and went straight over to his British colleague. He informed him that the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister had announced the Government’s intention to hold discussions with the Sudeten German Party. The French Minister did not conceal his fears that if they joined the Government it would be a disaster, and he added that it could result in a change of Czechoslovak foreign policy.⁷³

 Ibid., ff. 92– 93. Hadow also wrote about the continuing Czechisation of the border areas.  Ibid., f. 94. He also increasingly perceived Edvard Beneš as an obstacle to a serious agreement between the Czechoslovak Government and the SdP. Michie, p. 49. DCV deputy Felix Luschka also termed him “our most dangerous opponent”. Luschka, p. 274.  TNA, FO 371/21130, R 4942/188/12, Newton to Cadogan, July 12, 1937, ff. 170 – 171. According to the Austrian Legation in Prague (from a report from the Austrian Minister to The Hague), the British Minister held a favourable position of Germany, something made clear both in Prague and Vienna. OeStA/AdR, AAng, ÖVB, Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 44, Berichte, Weisungen 1937 (IV–IX), Zl. 293/Pol, Prag, am 15. Juli 1937.  TNA, FO 371/21130, R 4942/188/12, Newton to Cadogan, July 12, 1937, f. 172. Newton did not share his French colleague’s fears. A few days later, Newton wrote to Cadogan again, again in regard to Czech-German relations. The Minister said that Berlin was trying to isolate Prague diplomatically, and added that the Czechoslovak Government was demonstrating signs of willing-

168

VI New Minister, new Line

Krofta’s, or rather the Government’s demands of the SdP not to expect the activists to be sacrificed and that their leaders not take orders from Berlin were not received well. The activist parties had long been a thorn in the Sudeten German Party’s side and their leaders had to follow instructions from the Third Reich, not being able to do otherwise in the atmosphere of the time. The French Minister’s opinion clearly demonstrates how poorly informed he was of CzechGerman relations in mid-1937 and his fear of a possible turnaround in Czechoslovak foreign policy was entirely ungrounded. At the beginning of August 1937, Robert Hadow sent London a report with information from the British Consul in Liberec which contained a description of the state of the economy in the Sudeten German regions around Liberec and Jablonec nad Nisou. The British Legation Secretary rejected Jaksch’s pessimism, instead claiming “that the hopes engendered in Prague by the February concessions persist in the provinces”. According to Hadow, Consul Pares had confirmed a certain improvement in the economic situation in the border regions mentions, but Hadow did not agree that the reasons for the deteriorating relations between the Czechoslovak majority and minorities were merely economic in nature.⁷⁴ Pares himself in his report wrote about decreased feelings of bitterness amongst citizens compared to the previous summer when President Beneš had visited the region. He gave information on numbers of Germans employed in the civil service, information he had received from activists, but added that the results of the February Agreement were still perceived to be insufficient. As an example, he gave the long-vacant post of an important official in Liberec.⁷⁵

ness to agree with the Sudeten Germans, specifically with Konrad Henlein. Both countries were relying on support from London in their steps, he concluded. Cf. DBFP, 2nd Series, Vol. XIX, European Affairs, July 1, 1937 – August 4, 1938, ed. by Medlicott, W. N. – Dakin, D. – Lambert, M. E., London 1982, No. 42, Letter from Mr. Newton (Prague) to Sir A. Cadogan, July 15, 1937, pp. 72– 74.  TNA, FO 371/21130, R 5360/188/12, Hadow to Eden, August 3, 1937, f. 233. At the end of August, Wenzel Jaksch repeated that the situation in northern Bohemia was desperate, and the German activists had no successes to show for their policy. AKPR, f. Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protokol T (tajné), sg. 12/25, kt. 135, mikrofilm č. 110, T. 1409/37, August 28, 1937. The German Social Democrat politician presented his position again a month later in a discussion with Emil Sobota when he declared that “blaming the lower executive for insufficient implementation of 18th February was like treating the symptoms rather than the cause of a disease,” and repeated allegations of shortcomings at the Ministries of Education and National Enlightenment and of the Interior. Mejdrová, dok. č. 12, p. 25.  TNA, FO 371/21130, R 5360/188/12, British Consulate Liberec, July 29, 1937, f. 235. Pares further wrote about young Germans leaving to work in Germany, and about activists profiting from the political concessions of officials. Ibid., f. 236.

VI New Minister, new Line

169

In mid-August, the British Legation in Prague (Hadow) informed the Foreign Office of allegations of German parents being forced to send their children to Czech schools, for which they were apparently rewarded with soup and clothing. The report further made similar claims about handouts of cheap sugar. According to the Die Zeit newspaper (the SdP’s party paper), the coalition parties were allegedly giving out a kilo of cheap sugar for 2 crowns to their supporters (the unemployed and poor), although the actual market price was 6 crowns per kilo. According to Hadow, this was a clear example of discrimination because of political opinion. He claimed that the Czech press were silent on the SdP’s accusations, instead saying that the assistance was for everyone.⁷⁶ Robert Hadow again demonstrated his somewhat implausible “objective” approach to Czech-German relations. He merely regurgitated the unverified reports from Professor Toynbee and the SdP’s party paper while also keeping quiet about the party’s tactic of boycotting its ideological enemy. The British Legation Secretary, however, had one objective he was aiming for, and that was to force the Czechoslovak Government to meet with the SdP, specifically to acknowledge its primacy amongst German political parties and further to eliminate the activist parties. In the final week of August 1937, Robert Hadow sent Anthony Eden a memorandum summarising Czech-German relations from a purely British perspective. To begin with, he described the situation as entirely different from that presented by the individual parties which were trying to gain London’s support, and added that an attack on Czechoslovakia would threaten peace throughout Europe. Hadow relativised the situation and ahistorically found a parallel with the Thirty Years’ War when the Czechs pushed the rest of the continent into war, “and such is President Beneš᾿ firm determination if Czechoslovakia be attacked today”.⁷⁷ According to the British Legation Secretary, it was evident that the maintenance of peace between Czechoslovakia and its neighbours was in London’s vital interest. The question remained, however, at whose expense the much-desired peace was to be preserved.⁷⁸

 TNA, FO 371/21130, R 5661/188/12, Hadow to Eden, August 13, 1937, ff. 279 – 280. According to Hadow, this practice demonstrated the “political methods in this country”.  TNA, FO 371/21130, R 5854/188/12, Hadow to Eden, August 24, 1937, f. 311.  On the other hand, there were also positive signs – in August 1937 Robert Vansittart refused to meet with Heinz Rutha and other SdP figures who were taking part in the Minorities Congress in London. He acknowledged that Prague treated its minorities well, but according to Masaryk he repeated the trite phrase that it could do more. AMZV, PZ Londýn, bežná zpráva č. 11, 7. srpna 1937, p. 2.

170

VI New Minister, new Line

Hadow wrote of the existence of general fears of German dominance in Central Europe, but on the other hand added that he was not aware of such plans and was not qualified to speak about it. He did not suspect Hitler of invasion plans and accused Edvard Beneš of merely frightening Europe about a German attack on Czechoslovakia. He made clear he thought that the main threat to peace in Europe was an “unexpected incident” which would trigger an angry Germany to respond to the Czechoslovak Government’s policy towards the Sudeten Germans. Hadow rejected the Czechoslovak Government’s policy, which termed any expression of opposition to it as “disloyal” to the country and accused Beneš of threatening democracy for the minorities in Czechoslovakia and not being capable of reaching agreement with Germany.⁷⁹ Hadow warned against being lulled into a false sense of security by Beneš’s words which he thought would represent a disservice both to Czechoslovakia and the whole of Europe. He thought the Czechoslovak President should be informed privately and in a friendly manner that Prague could only gain the moral support of British public opinion if the 1919 Minority Treaty’s provisions were observed. The British diplomat strongly urged that a compromise be reached with the SdP. Hadow wrote that without friendly advice from London, Beneš would continue to listen to his poor advisors, and added that this could damage his country which could find itself in the same situation as in 1618 (see above). He made mention of putting their own house in order again.⁸⁰ Hadow’s memorandum at the end of August 1937 clearly demonstrates the British Legation in Prague’s perception of Czech-German relations. The Legation Secretary was in no doubt about who had to make concessions, demonstrate a statesmanlike perspective and reason and attempt to come to an agreement at any price, and who merely needed to look on and wait for a proposal from the opposing side, which it would then still reject anyway. Edvard Beneš was cast in the role of the Bohemian opposition of 1618 which had apparently plunged the whole continent into war, and as such, Hadow thought he had to think carefully as to whether to stay on the same course as they had done in 1618, or whether to show enough willingness to come to an agreement, for which British public opinion would be grateful. At this point in time, the way

 TNA, FO 371/21130, R 5854/188/12, Hadow to Eden, August 24, 1937, ff. 312– 313. According to Hadow, Beneš was merely looking for support for his policy. When it didn’t work with France and the USSR, he turned to Britain and the USA. Hadow wrote that the fight for democracy was a constant topic coming from the Czechoslovak President, and he constantly repeated it every time he spoke with someone from Great Britain. Ibid., f. 314.  Ibid., f. 315.

VI New Minister, new Line

171

the British diplomat saw the situation in terms of Czech-German relations was not just unambiguous, but also one-sided and erroneous.⁸¹ After a long period of silence, Minister Basil Newton made a declaration during the second week of October 1937. He spoke about Czech-German relations with Minister Krofta, who informed him that both the President of the Republic and Government wanted them to improve, although this was only occurring slowly. He added that the Cabinet could not betray the German activists and he doubted the loyalty of Konrad Henlein and his fellow party members. Responding to Krofta’s complaint that the SdP’s confidence was growing in no small part due to Great Britain’s support, Newton said that London had merely given good advice to Sudeten German Party figures.⁸² The Foreign Minister perceived SdP figures’ frequent visits to London and discussions with top Government and Foreign Office officials as important and also certainly worrying. The British Minister, in contrast, perceived them as entirely standard and essentially courtesies. The claims of Czechoslovak public officials disputing the oppression of Sudeten Germans were not helped by reports from the second half of October 1937, with Basil Newton informing London of an incident which had occurred during Henlein’s visit to Teplice. When the SdP leader had left, there had been a clash between his supporters and policemen who then arrested a number of people, including deputies, claimed the Minister, adding that according to Czech sources the police were only making space for Henlein’s car.⁸³ This was naturally a typical SdP event during which slanderous comments against the country were made and where the slightest spark could cause an eruption. The mutual accusations of brutality and provocation were not unlike

 Suppan, p. 478. “Hadow’s final statement on Czechoslovakia in 1937 was a reiteration of the contention that the Sudeten Germans were the key to the continued existence od Czechoslovakia and that without proper treatment of this minority, this country was destined to go under.” MICHIE, p. 50.  TNA, FO 371/21130, R 6802/188/12, Newton to Eden, October 8, 1937, f. 58. Krofta also revealed to Newton that the German activists did not want the general municipal elections to occur in their autumn timeframe and hoped that time would demonstrate the benefits of the February Agreement. Ibid., f. 59.  TNA, FO 371/21130, R 6968/188/12, Telegram from Mr. Newton, October 19, 1937, f. 74. German Minister Eisenlohr informed Berlin that the Czechoslovak press thought the SdP merely wanted to distract attention from their actions when they were trying to internationalise the domestic issue of the Czechoslovak Government’s approach to minorities. PA AA, Tschechoslowakei, R 103656 (Rassenfrage, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker), Prag, den 22. Oktober 1937, f. 095. Karl Hermann Frank described the whole incident in great detail and complained about the approach of the authorities. Cf. NA, f. Zahraniční úřad Berlín, kt. 75, sg. 136 – 75 – 2, ff. 80 – 87.

172

VI New Minister, new Line

similar incidents which had already taken place a number of times. The SdP naturally complained to Prime Minister Hodža and tried to turn it into a major incident. This time, the British Minister did not make a one-sided assessment and merely provided information on what had happened; he referred both to Czech and German sources.⁸⁴ The situation in terms of Czech-German relations also became subject of debate between Robert Vansittart and Konrad Henlein in the second half of October 1937.⁸⁵ Both men met up over dinner and had the opportunity to speak together for roughly three hours. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State repeated that the SdP leader was, “a decent, honest and moderate, or anyhow relatively moderate, man.” Henlein gave an angrier impression according to “Van” than when the two men had last seen each other, and he immediately complained to the British diplomat that the situation had deteriorated for the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, and that 90 % of them wished to be joined to Germany immediately.⁸⁶ In the discussion, Henlein further suggested that in one way or another the remaining two options meant a war which Great Britain would be involved in. He repeated that he was ready to pursue the peaceful coexistence of Czechs and Germans, but he criticised the Czechoslovak Government’s poor efforts at contributing towards an understanding between both nations. Vansittart noted during the discussion that the SdP leader praised Hodža for his realistic approach to the German issue and rejected the efforts of President Beneš and Foreign Minister Krofta.⁸⁷ Once again, Henlein managed to give the impression of being a moderate and reasonable politician who wanted to achieve agreement with Czechoslovak leaders in his discussion with the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the For-

 Henlein then sent an open letter to the Czechoslovak President in which he complained of police brutality which he thought threatened peace in Europe. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21130, R 6969/188/ 12, Telegram from Mr. Newton, October 19, 1937, ff. 76 – 77.  According to information from the German Embassy in London, Henlein spoke in front of a selected group of around 25 people. PA AA, Tschechoslowakei, R 103656, London, den 14. Oktober 1937, f. 149.  TNA, FO 371/21131, R 6982/188/12, Foreign Office Memoradum, October 18, 1937, f. 83. According to Henlein, there were three options for the future of the Sudeten German areas – autonomy within Czechoslovakia, autonomy within Germany and joining Germany. Naturally, the SdP leader informed Vansittart that he was ready to work for the first option. Although Jan Masaryk reported to Prague, “that Henlein was not particularly successful in London, this opinion was really more of a wish”. Kvaček, R., Obtížné spojenectví. Politicko-diplomatické vztahy mezi Československem a Francií 1937 – 1938. I [Difficult Alliance. Political-diplomatic Relations between Czechoslovakia and France 1937– 1938. I], Praha 1989, p. 21.  TNA, FO 371/21131, R 6982/188/12, Foreign Office Memoradum, October 18, 1937, ff. 84– 85.

VI New Minister, new Line

173

eign Office. And once again, the opposite was true. At the time of the discussion, the SdP leader no longer supported an agreement; he proved this a month later with his “Report to the Führer and Reich Chancellor on Current Questions of German Policy in the Czechoslovak Republic”⁸⁸ where he clearly espoused the above mentioned third option he discussed with “Van”, i. e. the Sudeten German area joining Germany. Henlein also managed to instil an atmosphere of fear of possible Europe-wide conflict amongst the high-level ranks within Foreign Office, with the responsibility for its potential outbreak assigned to the Government in Prague because it did not want to come to an agreement, or specifically it did too little to strive for one. And it was this impression which intensified not just for Vansittart, but also for the leadership of the British Legation in Prague – the Czechoslovak Government must do more to achieve an understanding with the Sudeten Germans.⁸⁹ Edvard Beneš and Basil Newton met at the end of October 1937 at an official reception held for the occasion of a public holiday. The Czechoslovak President informed the British Minister that he would like to speak with him one-on-one during the week beginning 8 November; as such, Newton asked for any instructions to be sent in a telegram to London. He also said that both the Foreign Minister and press resented the support the SdP was receiving from Great Britain. He then wrote about the President’s speech to the diplomatic corps. Beneš had acknowledged that the Czechoslovak majority’s relation with its minorities remained a problem. He had praised the German parties joining the Government in 1926 and the February Agreement, added Newton.⁹⁰ It should be noted that 1926 and the two German activist parties joining the Government was long past at that time and neither the British Legation nor the SdP leadership were interested in such matters. And the Sudeten German Party had immediately rejected the attempt at an agreement at the beginning of 1937, thus minimising its potential impact.

 Cf. Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918 – 1945. Aus dem Archiv des deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes, Serie D: (1937 – 1945), Deutschland und die Tschechoslowakei (1937 – 1938) [Files to the German Foreign Policy 1918 – 1945. From the Archive of the Foreign Office, Series D: 1937– 1945, Germany and Czechoslovakia (1937– 1938)], Bd. II, Baden-Baden 1950, pp. 40 – 51.  Kvaček, Obtížné spojenectví, pp. 21– 22. Of interest, here is an exchange of information between two Foreign Office officials, in which the opinion is expressed that the German minority is one of the best supported minorities in Europe. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21131, R 7036/188/12, October 21, 1937, f. 113.  TNA, FO 371/21131, R 7308/188/12, Telegram from Mr. Newton, October 30, 1937, f. 199. Robert Vansittart responded to Newton’s words on Czechoslovak officials’ displeasure over Great Britain’s support for the SdP, writing to the Minister that he should not wait to be received by the President, and rather try to meet with the Foreign Minister and explain to him the reason for his meetings with Henlein. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21131, R 7309/188/12, November 3, 1937, ff. 204– 205.

174

VI New Minister, new Line

At the beginning of November 1937, Orme Sargent provided a summary of British policy regarding Czech-German relations. He unambiguously rejected French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos’s⁹¹ policy of the time, which he thought was too supportive of the Czechoslovak Government, and instead came to the conclusion that London and Paris needed to put pressure on President Beneš to negotiate with the SdP. According to Sargent, it was in Britain’s interest to promote the creation of a moderate form of autonomy for Sudeten German regions. The Assistant Under-Secretary further did not recommend direct or indirect contact with Henlein, and did not trust that he could be discreet. Finally, he expressed his opinion that Minister Newton’s information channels should be relied upon.⁹² As can be seen, the Foreign Office had decided to take a further step in its policy towards Czechoslovakia and its problem with ever-increasing pressure from the German minority to deal with its status – to influence the French foreign policy position. At the end of 1937, the idea of autonomy for the Sudeten German areas had crystallised, which according to the Foreign Office would unite Britain, France, and Germany. For the moment, Prague’s position was not taken into particular account. At the beginning of November 1937, Czechoslovak Minister to London, Jan Masaryk, made a statement on Henlein’s visit to the British capital,⁹³ condemning the reception Henlein had received from British diplomats and making no secret of the fears of the Czechoslovak public who perceived such an acceptance as an expression of support by London for SdP policies. Masaryk wrote that he had lost all confidence in Henlein and that his policies were causing Czechoslovakia  Delbos appeared to be a “soft, hesitant, compromising figure”. According to Robert Kvaček, the French Government, established at the end of June 1937, had decided to focus on improving relations with Italy and Germany. Kvaček, Obtížné spojenectví, p. 15.  TNA, FO 371/21131, R 7357/188/12, Orme Sargent, November 8, 1937, ff. 224– 225.  Jan Masaryk also wrote a memorandum about Henlein’s visit to London in which he referred to an interesting statement from Robert Vansittart who alleged that he had spoken to the SdP leader: “When your Prime Minister can speak with him for four hours, why can I not speak to him for two minutes? I’m glad to have seen him and I have a very poor opinion of him […].”ANM f. V. Mastný-2, kt. 28, IV. Veřejná činnost. Přehledy událostí – Berlín 1934– 1938. Berlínský mezinárodní komitét, sg. 1989, podklady z jednání s Konrádem Henleinem v r. 1937, p. 2. The Czechoslovak Minister to London added that he hoped that now it was clear to everyone just what kind of person Henlein was. Ibid., p. 3. Cf. also Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1937, svazek II (1. srpen – 31. prosinec 1937) [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1937, Vol. II, August 1 – December 31, 1937], Dejmek, J. (ed.), Praha 2008, dok. č. 447, memorandum vyslance ČSR ve Velké Británii J. Masaryka pro prezidenta ČSR E. Beneše, ministerského předsedu M. Hodžu a ministra zahraničních věcí K. Kroftu, týkající se návštěvy vůdce Sudetoněmecké strany K. Henleina ve Velké Británii, Londýn, 27. října 1937, pp. 250 – 252.

VI New Minister, new Line

175

to be put under threat. In conclusion, he asked whether the friends or potential “friends” of the man could think an understanding between the Czechs and Germans was possible and this would help to secure peace, or whether they thought that Prague would allow part of its country’s territory be administered in a totalitarian manner. He also added that the Czechoslovak Government would do everything it could to improve its minorities policy.⁹⁴ Masaryk’s bitterness and protest were justified and understandable. The SdP’s leader and other figures had publicly expressed criticism of the Czechoslovak Government’s policies and endeavours to deal with the minorities problem, had already secretly abandoned the idea of a single state and had taken the side of the Third Reich.⁹⁵ The favourable reception which Henlein had got in London, and not for the first time, worried the Czechoslovak public who perceived it as an expression of support for the ever-more aggressive policies of the Sudeten German Party. In contrast, the response of British diplomats did not part from their previous thinking on the problem – Prague must try to reach agreement with the Sudeten Germans. At this same time, Konrad Henlein wrote to Colonel Malcolm Christie in order to explain some of his party’s steps and confirm SdP’s objectives, which he said were autonomy of the Sudeten German regions, which should take place as soon as possible, along with the provision of self-Government and increased numbers of German officials, which would help to bring the domestic political crisis in Czechoslovakia to an end. He then added that his policy could only be fulfilled with specific successes and it was no longer sustainable for Sudeten Germans to put up with empty promises as it had until then.⁹⁶ In his letter, the SdP leader tried to explain to Christie that his party was still making the same demands and that nothing had changed since his last visit to London. At the end of the first half of November 1937, Wenzel Jaksch spoke about German activist policy in Czechoslovakia in Chatham House. Thus, he had the opportunity, as Henlein had had in December 1935, to tell listeners his perspective of the Czech-German problem. The external context had changed, however, for Jaksch’s speech. While the leader of the newly formed SdP had previously presented himself as a moderate and loyal opposition politician standing behind its country, at the time the German Social Democrat leader made his speech,

 Cf. TNA, FO 371/21131, R 7574/188/12, Aide Mémoire, November 5, 1937, ff. 266 – 268.  Suppan, p. 479.  Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei 1933 – 1947 [The Germans in Czechoslovakia 1933 – 1937]. Dokumentensammlung. Zusammengestellt, mit Vorwort und Anmerkungen versehen von Král, V., Praha 1964, Doc. No. 78 d), Konrad Henlein an M. I. Christie am 3. November 1937, p. 135.

176

VI New Minister, new Line

the Sudeten German Party was already in open opposition to the existence of Czechoslovakia and demanding autonomy. Furthermore, this approach was being supported by diplomatic elites in the Foreign Office. Thus, Jaksch had a difficult task ahead of him, made worse by the fact that according to Robert Hadow’s report he was speaking in front of a small and unimportant audience, with only Professor William Seton-Watson an exception. In his introduction, the German Social Democratic leader declared that the activists had achieved success in dealing with the Czech-German issue. He gave as an example the increased percentage of German-speaking officials from 4 to 10 % (these were only German activists).⁹⁷ Jaksch tried to excuse the Czechoslovak Government for the reduced number of Germans in the civil service, but according to Hadow in private he acknowledged that Prague was acting in an unfortunate manner in many respects and was only providing space for SdP attacks. The British Legation Secretary did not hide his admiration for Jaksch’s frankness in not hiding the growth in radicalism amongst the Czech majority, although he also believed that President Beneš would manage to keep such sentiments in check. In his speech, Jaksch also stressed that German activists in Czechoslovakia had gained a lot more in regard to minorities than Hitler had gained from the Polish Government.⁹⁸ In his talk, the leader of the German Social Democrats tried to provide balance in regard to Britain’s one-sided perspective of the Czech-German problem in Czechoslovakia, and to present a different view of a representative of the German minority to the single line taken by Sudeten German Party figures who during their visits to London and elsewhere portrayed Czechoslovakia as a country which breached national minority rights en masse. The composition of his audience, however, along with the official Foreign Office position, did not give him much hope for success. Newton’s report to London of November 11, 1937 to which he attached a report from Consul Pares in Liberec shows how differently Wenzel Jaksch and the British Legation in Prague perceived the fulfilment of the February Agreement. Where Jaksch saw progress, the British diplomat wrote that according to Hadow there was growing dissatisfaction amongst the German activists with

 TNA, FO 371/21131, R 7634/188/12, Foreign Office Minute (Mr. Hadow), November 13, 1937, f. 6. Jaksch’s talk took place on 12 November. According to the Czechoslovak Government, Jaksch was to represent the whole of German political activism in London. OeStA/AdR, AAng, ÖVB, Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 45, Politische Korrespondenz 1937, Berichte, Weisungen 1937 (X – XII), Zl. 384/Pol, Prag, am 4. November 1937.  TNA, FO 371/21131, R 7634/188/12, Foreign Office Minute (Mr. Hadow), November 13, 1937, ff. 7– 8.

VI New Minister, new Line

177

the implementation of the 18 February policies.⁹⁹ Consul Pares confirmed Hadow’s message, adding that the chairman of BdL, Gustav Hacker, thought the failure to carry out the promises of the February Agreement meant the end of German activism. The Consul also stated that the declarations of certain activists were beginning to approach the sharp tone of SdP member statements.¹⁰⁰ This was fairly understandable at the time. An ever greater proportion of German activists had seen that their moderate approach was not bringing success, while the Sudeten German Party’s aggressive policy was to a certain extent bearing fruit. During the third week of November 1937, Basil Newton informed London of a speech of Prime Minister Hodža about the minorities issue in Czechoslovakia which he made in the Parliament. Although it was a moderate speech, the SdP responded strongly, wrote the Minister, and said that it was caused by a declaration of National Socialist deputy Jaroslav Stránský the day previously in which Stránský attacked SdP policy.¹⁰¹ Deputy Ernst Kundt rejected Government policy and declared that his party still demanded the same thing – self-Government and German officials in German territory – and added: “[…] that the Government appeared to consider that Czechoslovakia’s real enemies were not without, but within her borders.”¹⁰² Hodža responded appropriately. He called on the SdP to understand the situation and their duties. He rejected Kundt’s theory, however, that the President had acted unconstitutionally.¹⁰³ At the start of December 1937, Newton compiled a report on the situation within the SdP. He claimed that there were certain disagreements within the party which were seen, for example, in the departure of two deputies from the party, and even the dismissal of a number of people from the SdP. The British Minister, however, immediately added that he did not think such steps could

 TNA, FO 371/21132, R 7835/188/12, Newton to Eden, November 11, 1937, f. 84. Deputy Rudolf Böhm confirmed Hadow’s information on behalf of BdL, declaring that if the sabotage of the February Agreement by Czechoslovak authorities did not end, then current activist policies would need to be revised. PA AA, Tschechoslowakei, R 103656, Prag, den 24. November 1937, f. 225.  TNA, FO 371/21132, R 7835/188/12, Newton to Eden, November 11, 1937, ff. 85 – 89. Pares admitted (5 November 1937) that although activists had so far been cautious in their public statements, this was now beginning to change, and they too were being sharper in their criticism of the Czechoslovak Government. In his report, he also gave examples of Government policy sabotage by local Czechoslovak officials.  Newton also noted that Edvard Beneš often used Stránský to proclaim his opinions. TNA, FO 371/21132, R 7840/188/12, Newton to Eden, November 20, 1937, f. 94.  Ibid.  Ibid., f. 95.

178

VI New Minister, new Line

weaken the Sudeten German Party itself.¹⁰⁴ What Newton saw as disagreements were more the aftermath of an internal party struggle which had broken out in mid-1936. These were not a sign of any basic disunity of the party, and the Minister was aware of this. The position held by the Foreign Office on the German minority issue, and the Central European region at the end of 1937 is demonstrated in a memorandum produced by the Foreign Office at the end of November which gives an extensive summary of the issue of Czech-German relations. The document’s authors stated that London would have to guarantee not just Czech independence, but also what the Czechs provided to the Sudeten Germans, and as such in the same breath added: “A double guarantee of this kind on the part of His Majesty’s Government would entail a new and extremely important commitment in Central Europe. In the present state of public opinion it seems in the highest degree unlikely that such a commitment would be acceptable.”¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, the dominions also opposed such a guarantee, added the document’s authors. The British dominions had already presented themselves as disinterested in their parent country’s European commitments during the 1920s,¹⁰⁶ and they said as such at the Imperial Conference. A few days later, a British and French delegation met in the British capital and one topic which could not be avoided was Czechoslovak minorities policy. “Chamberlain himself presented Britain’s position – it sounded curt and harsh and was an expression of a de facto lack of interest in the fate of the country,” wrote Robert Kvaček, adding that the British Prime Minister rejected the escalation in poor Czechoslovak-German relations and was ready to make extensive concessions to ensure their amicable settlement.¹⁰⁷

 TNA, FO 371/21132, R 8201/188/12, Newton to Eden, December 7, 1937, f. 143.  TNA, FO 371/21132, R 8248/188/12, Foreign Office Memorandum, November 26, 1937, f. 154.  Cf. for example Novotný, L., Die Britischen Dominions und der Vertrag von Locarno. Der Prüfstein für eine einheitliche Außenpolitik des Empire in der Zwischenkriegszeit [The British Dominions and the Treaty of Locarno. The Touchstone for a Uniform Foreign Policy of the Empire in the Inter-war Period], in: Jahrbuch für Europäische Überseegeschichte, 10, 2010, pp. 163 – 188; Valkoun, J., Na cestě k Westminsterskému statutu. Velká Británie, dominia a proměna Britského impéria v letech 1907 – 1931 [On the way to the Westminster Status. Great Britain, Dominions and Transformation of the British Empire in 1907– 1931], Praha 2015, chapter 4. Cf., for example, Howard, M., The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of Two World Wars, Harmondsworth 1974 or Peden, G. C., The Burden of Imperial Defence and the Continental Commitment Reconsidered, in: The Historical Journal, 27, 2, 1984, pp. 405 – 423.  Kvaček, Obtížné spojenectví, s. 27. In July, Prime Minister Chamberlain declared that although Germany and Italy were unfathomable countries, he did not expect them to provoke a war. Douglas, R., Chamberlain and Eden, 1937 – 38, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 13, 1, 1978, p. 98.

VI New Minister, new Line

179

Shortly afterwards, another memorandum was produced at the Foreign Office on the British Government’s position on the Sudeten German problem in Czechoslovakia.¹⁰⁸ Minister Newton was to inform President Beneš of British Government fears regarding recent developments in Czech-German relations. He was also to add that His Majesty’s Government had no commitments other than those within the Minority Treaty. The British Government was aware, however, that any unrest within Czechoslovakia might threaten peace in Central Europe, and the whole continent, and as such, wrote the memorandum’s author, it must be in everyone’s interest to ensure peace in the region.¹⁰⁹ He went on to say that Prague need not change its foreign policy, but that it should abandon its policy of “taunting” the Sudeten German Party and try not to provoke disagreements. Basil Newton also received clear instructions not to mention autonomy for the Sudeten Germans.¹¹⁰ The memorandum continued with a summary of Newton’s discussion with Edvard Beneš (8 November), in which the president had expressed his hopes for progress in Czech-German relations, but also added that 300 years of Austrian pressure when Czechs and Germans were victims of Habsburg policies were also at fault. Apparently Beneš himself raised the issue of autonomy for the Sudeten German regions, but did not wish for the moment to debate it, saying that he always refused to discuss vague and ambiguous terms. It should be noted that the President was right here. On the other hand, the second Czechoslovak President expressed his willingness to continue to negotiate with SdP representatives;¹¹¹ although it is true that he had no other option left at this point in time.  These were instructions from early November 1937. According to these Newton met President Beneš a few days later.  TNA, FO 371/21132, R 8249/188/12, Foreign Office Memorandum. Mr. Nichols, November 26, 1937, f. 158. At a Government meeting at the start of December, it was made clear that London supported a conciliatory solution in regard to the issue of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. The members of the British Government also agreed that Yvon Delbos was to impress as such upon Edvard Beneš in his forthcoming visit to Prague. Cf. TNA, CAB 23/90 A/7, December 1, 1937, f. 215.  TNA, FO 371/21132, R 8249/188/12, Foreign Office Memorandum. Mr. Nichols, November 26, 1937, ff. 158 – 159. In contrast, the German Embassy in London informed Berlin in December that certain circles at the Foreign Office supported autonomy for the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. PA AA, Tschechoslowakei, R 103657 (Rassenfrage, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker), London, den 6. Dezember 1937, f. 042.  TNA, FO 371/21132, R 8249/188/12, Foreign Office Memorandum. Mr. Nichols, November 26, 1937, f. 159. The memorandum also said that France and Britain should put pressure on Prague to come to an agreement with the SdP. Ibid., f. 161. Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta confirmed their willingness to negotiate in an interview for the newspaper, Kurjer Warszawski. PA AA, Tschechoslowakei, R 103657, Prag, den 15. Dezember 1937, f. 072.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement At the beginning of the year 1938 it was obvious that the hope of activist parties and the Czechoslovak Government for improvement of the situation in border territories was not completely fulfilled. What is more, President Edvard Beneš “denied the majority of demands of the SdP, especially the territorial autonomy during his discussion with German Minister Ernst Eisenlohr in mid-February; on the other hand, he accepted the agreement from 18th February 1937, ‘which was a matter of duty and conscience for him’”.¹ It was also more and more apparent that the Sudeten German matter is ceasing to be a Czechoslovak internal affair in the eyes of the British Legation. This was evident through its opinions as well as those of the Foreign Office and it is why the Legation tried to influence this matter more than before. Its officials were convinced that the Czechoslovak Government is not proceeding correctly with the resolution of the problem of the largest minority, which was to a certain extent “thanks to” the long-term activities of Joseph Addison. Still at the end of the year 1937, the British Government was first seriously concerned about the discussion concerning the German minority in Czechoslovakia.² Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden referred about the meeting with the French delegation, which was staying in the British capital at the end of November and whose representatives stated that there are two possibilities as to the matter of Central Europe and London’s approach – polite disinterest or interest about the policy aimed at maintaining peace. During the debate about the situation in Czechoslovakia, British politicians asked the French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos to use his next visit to Prague to determine how far is President Edvard Beneš willing to go in terms of the Sudeten Germans; in other words which concessions is he willing to accept, which would in turn have consequences for

 Tóth, A. – Novotný, L. – Stehlík, M., Národnostní menšiny v Československu 1918 – 1938. Od státu národního ke státu národnostnímu? [National Minorities in Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1938. From the Nation-State to the National State?], Praha 2012, p. 380. The second Czechoslovak President himself did not see any deficiencies in the minority policy. Cf. Beneš, E., Mnichovské dny [Munich Days], Praha 1968, pp. 7– 20. French Minister Leopold Victor de Lacroix had to admit certain changes in the approach to the German minority connected with the February Agreement, but he admitted that they may seem insufficient or slow at the same time. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Paris (hereinafter AMAE), Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 119, Politique étrangère, Allemands de Bohême, de Lacroix à Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Prague, le 7 février 1938, ff. 23 – 24.  On the previous meeting, there were only references in the connection with Halifax’s visit in Germany in November 1937. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110651454-008

182

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

the British approach to Berlin.³ His Majesty’s Government granted only a minimal amount of space to this Czechoslovak problem, however, it was still a significant shift in its perception by the political elites of the country. Until the autumn of 1937, Czech-German relations, that is to say their assessment by London, were quite logically primarily a Foreign Office matter; the turn of year 1937 meant a change in this respect.⁴

 The National Archives, London, Kew (hereinafter TNA), Cabinet Office (hereinafter CAB) 23/ 90 A/7 (War Cabinet and Cabinet: Minutes), Meeting of the Cabinet held on Wednesday, December 1, 1937, f. 215. In November 1937 French delegation listened to the opinion of British partners to affect Prague to suppress the threatening dispute between the Czechoslovak Government and Berlin because of the German minority at the beginning. Watt, D. C., Chamberlain’ Ambassadors, in: Dockrill, M. – McKercher, B., Diplomacy and World Power. Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890 – 1950, Cambridge 1996, p. 149. Anthony Eden mentioned in its memories that Chamberlain denied the participation in possible war because of Czechoslovakia, which was far and with which London did not have any allied agreement. Eden, A., Facing the Dictators. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, Boston 1962, p. 586. While Chamberlain and Eden emphasised the necessity to pressure President Beneš on this meeting to reach an agreement with the SdP, the French Prime Minister Camille Chautemps and Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos enforced the reduction of German pressure on Prague. Vyšný, P., The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938. Prelude to Munich, Basingstoke, New York 2003, pp. 15 – 16.  Cornwall, M., A Fluctuating Barometer: British Diplomatic Views of the Czech-German Relationship in Czechoslovakia, 1918 – 1938, in: Schmidt-Hartmann, E. – Winters, S. B. (hrsg.), Groβbritannien, die USA und die böhmischen Länder 1848 – 1938 [Great Britain, the USA and the Bohemian Lands 1848 – 1938], München 1991, p. 331, footnote 73. No less important is the fact that the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden concluded in December 1937 that it is necessary to change the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Vansittart, whom he considered to be arrogant and too condescending. “Van” was forced to accept prestigious, but de facto little influential office of the Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Government; Alexandr Cadogan substituted him in his office and his opinions were much closer to Prime Minister’s opinions. Steiner, Z., The Triumph of the Dark. European International History 1933 – 1939, Oxford 2011, pp. 328 – 329; Neville, P., Rival Foreign Office Perceptions of Germany, 1936 – 1939, in: Diplomacy & Statecraft, 13, 3, 2002, p. 143; Ellinger, J., Neville Chamberlain. Od usmiřování k válce: britská zahraniční politika, 1937 – 1940 [Neville Chamberlain. From Reconciliation to War: British Foreign Policy, 1937– 1940], Praha 2009, p. 144. He was then answerable directly to the Foreign Secretary. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938 – 1945, Dilks, D. (ed.), London 1971, p. 27. However, some opinions are considering Vansittart as “really charming man” and they respect his analytical skills despite the fact that he became unwanted because of its obsession with Germany at the end of the year 1937; they were even talking about the “vansittartism” in this connection in Whitehall. Keene, T. H., Sir Robert Vansittart and the British Foreign Office, 1930 – 1938, in: Proceedings and Papers of the Georgia Association of Historians, 2, 1981, pp. 81, 85; Eden, p. 504.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

183

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, undoubtedly influenced not only by the November visit of the Lord President of the Council Earl Halifax⁵ in Berlin⁶ but also by its approach to the potential threat to peace because of matters, which could have been solved amicably in his opinion, mentioned at the government meeting that France demands a more active approach of Great Britain in Central Europe. “No encouragement had been given them,” he declared and continued that the French side finally agreed “that appropriate concessions might be made by Czechoslovakia and that an attempt should be made to reach a general settlement with Germany.”⁷ As one can see, the British Prime Minister supported the thesis, which was maintained by the British Legation in Prague and which consisted of putting pressure on the Czechoslovak Government to concede to the Sudeten Germans; however his attempt to reach an agreement with Berlin manifested once again when he added that Paris and London should try to form a wider-scope agreement with Adolf Hitler.⁸ The Czech-German problem did not stop to interest British politicians and diplomats in Prague even at the beginning of the year 1938. Minister Basil Newton did not show any signs of satisfaction, because he came to the conclusion that the Czechoslovak Government is insufficiently and only rigidly fulfilling its promises about the increase of the number of German officers. Much in line with instructions from London, he decided to increase his pressure on the President and Foreign Minister, because he thought that Beneš and Krofta do not have such an accommodating approach to the problem of minorities as does Prime Minister Hodža. During the meeting with Newton on January 24, 1938, Edvard Beneš tried to explain the difficulty of the multilayered problem with the German minority. He also rejected territorial autonomy because it would threaten the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic.⁹ Even the scene of domestic policy reflected the complexity of cohabitation of both nation-

 Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, 3rd Viscount Halifax, from 1946 1st Earl of Halifax (1881– 1959).  Cf. for example Ellinger, pp. 132– 135; Roberts, A., The Holy Fox. The Life of Lord Halifax, London 2015, chapter 9.  TNA, CAB 23/90 A/7, Meeting of the Cabinet held on Wednesday, December 1, 1937, f. 219.  London rightfully assumed that Paris will eventually decide to coordinate its steps with the British Government. Dejmek, J., Nenaplněné naděje. Politické a diplomatické vztahy Československa a Velké Británie (1918 – 1938) [Unfulfilled Hopes. Political and Diplomatic Relations of Czechoslovakia and Great Britain (1918 – 1938)], Praha 2003, p. 345; Kvaček, R., Obtížné spojenectví. Politicko-diplomatické vztahy mezi Československem a Francií 1937 – 1938. I [Difficult Alliance. Political-diplomatic Relations between Czechoslovakia and France 1937– 1938. I], Praha 1989, pp. 31– 36.  More in detail cf. Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, pp. 347– 348.

184

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

alities, for example, chairman of the Agrarian Party, Rudolf Beran, suggested in an article printed in the Venkov newspaper in January 1938 that the government should be negotiating with the Sudeten German Party instead of the activists. He justified his opinion by stating that if so many people voted for such a party, then “we have to take it into account and deduce relevant conclusions from it”. Beran refused to ignore this fact and added that only one solution is possible: “Germans have to acknowledge this state. They cannot covetously look towards our borders and they have to allow for Czech representation in places, where Germans are a majority – and must also allow Germans their participation in state administration. It is not possible to consider all Germans to be traitors, if they are declaring allegiance to a particular party.”¹⁰ Newton and Beran both expressed their opinions on the problem of the German minority at a moment when general debates about the efficiency or pointlessness of the February Agreement from 1937 were taking place at the beginning of 1938; in other words when this Agreement was attacked by the Sudeten German Party because of its absolute failure, while activist parties supported the Agreement and demanded that it be extended. However, even among the activists, skepticism was growing stronger. On the one hand, the party’s representatives admitted that the agreement stopped the “denationalization wave,” but on the other hand, they saw a big danger in the ideology of the Czechoslovak National state.¹¹ When assessing February 1937, long-term opinions about the possibilities of satisfying the SdP, which of course was what the British Legation in Prague was primarily interested in, were discussed as well as short-term judgments as to the matter of whether the text of the document was fulfilled. At the turn of January 1938, there were several changes made to important posts in Germany,¹² which according to the British Legation in Prague should have increased Berlin’s pressure on Czechoslovakia in connection with SdP’s de-

 Kracik, J., Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus in der Tschechoslowakei 1920 – 1938 [Politics of German Activism in Czechoslovakia, 1920 – 1938], Frankfurt am Main 1999, p. 391.  Krofta, K., Z dob naší první republiky [From the Times of Our First Republic], Praha 1939, p. 246. More in detail cf. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 381– 383.  Cf. Dejmek, J., Edvard Beneš. Politická biografie českého demokrata. Část druhá. Prezident republiky a vůdce národního odboje (1835 – 1948) [Edvard Beneš. Political Biography of a Czech Democrat. Part Two. President of the Republic and Leader of the National Resistance (1835 – 1948)], Praha 2008, p. 97; Straka, K., S cílem jednotného usměrnění všech sil. Činnost vlády a Nejvyšší rady obrany státu v letech 1932 – 1938 [With the Aim of Uniforming All Forces. Activities of the Government and Supreme Council of State Defense in 1932– 1938], PhD Thesis, Praha 2007, p. 416; TNA, FO 800 (Private Offices: Various Ministers’ and Officials’ Papers), 269 (Miscellaneous Correspondence, Vol. 6), Sir Nevile Henderson, Henderson to the King, February 10, 1938, ff. 16 – 22.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

185

mands. “However, officials in the Thun Palace did not expect that measures planned by the government and President could ‘impress’ the SdP in any way and they expected that the realization of six bill drafts from the previous year would be demanded as the minimum,” remarked Jindřich Dejmek.¹³ The situation concerning the approach of the Czechoslovak Government as to the demands of the Sudeten German Party developed into the decision made by British diplomats in Prague to increase pressure on the government in mid-February 1938, so that it would begin to solve the unhappy situation of the largest minority in the country according to their opinion; in other words he attempted to reach an agreement with the SdP even at a cost of significant concessions. It was most likely this moment, when the idea of vast concessions by the Czechoslovak Government in relation to the SdP first manifested in the Legation’s considerations. Already on March 4, 1938, the new Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax¹⁴ received Jan Masaryk and informed him that the policy of London is not changing, which, however, meant the confirmation of the current effort to pressure Prague because of the German minority. The new head of the Foreign Office himself noted: “The more forthcoming you will be to your Germans, the better will your international position be.” At the same time, he did not forget to emphasize the unfavorable geographical location of the First Czechoslovak Republic.¹⁵

 Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 348.  He began his service on 21 February 1938 after the abdication of Anthony Eden, who was led up to this point by increasing disputes with Prime Minister Chamberlain because of the way London approached Germany and especially Italy. Eden himself mentioned this in his memories. Eden, p. 678, more in detail cf. pp. 666 – 689. “Chamberlain’s personal attention to foreign policy, which Eden had begun by welcoming, became increasingly irksome to the ultra-sensitive Foreign Secretary […].” Dutton, D., Neville Chamberlain, London 2001, p. 20. Cf. also Hutt, A. – Schaffer, G. – Darling, G., “Peace for Our Time”. Mr. Chamberlain and Munich. The Truth about a Policy, London 1938, p. 6; The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, pp. 51– 55; Douglas, R., Chamberlain and Eden, 1937 – 38, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 13, 1, 1978, pp. 97– 116. On the other hand, it must be added that Eden was not followed by anyone from the Cabinet. Both the elder and newest works are awarding Eden’s decision especially to Chamberlain’s effort to make an agreement with Italy and dispute related to the initiative of American President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roberts, pp. 113 – 116; Steiner, p. 562; Ellinger, pp. 146 – 148, 152– 159. Samuel Hoare is even stating in its memories that the problem of relation of Britain to Italy itself did not lead to the dissension of both men. Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), Nine Troubled Years, London 1954, pp. 262– 263. “Withdrawal and resignation of Eden and Cranborn was honest and beautiful,” declared Jan Masaryk and then he added that Halifax is not a person from his world. Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí České republiky [The Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic], Praha (hereinafter AMZV), Politické zprávy (hereinafter PZ) Londýn, 1938, běžná zpráva č. 1, 24. února 1938, pp. 2, 3.  Dejmek, Nenaplněné naděje, p. 352.

186

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

The effort of the British Legation to actively influence the responsible Czechoslovak authorities corresponded not only with domestic policy events in the Czechoslovak Republic, when Prime Minister Milan Hodža tried to negotiate with the SdP even “at a cost” of the future of German activists in the government, but even with foreign-political affairs, which were represented by the speech made by Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler in the Reichstag on February 20, 1938, which in effect eliminated the pro-activist or rather new-activist political camp.¹⁶ In his speech, Hitler for the first time openly declared his interest in the ten million or so Germans separated from the collective national community, who are living in two neighboring countries of the Reich, and declared the protection of those German citizens. It was very clear that these two countries are Czechoslovakia and Austria. Several weeks later on March 12, 1938, German troops began to occupy the Alpine state, which meant the loss of its sovereignty and incorporation into the Third Reich. Adolf Hitler thereby fulfilled a part of his promises made on February 20. It was obvious that the international political situation of Czechoslovakia thus significantly worsened.¹⁷

 Jörg Kracik is right, when he states: “Same as the stability of Czechoslovakia, even European status quo depended on the activism.” Kracik, p. 391. At the beginning of the year 1938, German activism ended up in the hopeless situation, “when it was more or less ignored not only by Czech circles, but even by foreign countries, especially by both Western Powers”. Ibid., p. 392.  The British Government itself accepted the fact of Anschluss as a given fact and it only formally protested, but its consequences perceived as the deterioration of tension in Central Europe and according to Paul Vyšný the agenda of minorities in Czechoslovakia became the main agenda of the government. Vyšný, p. 18. On the other hand, Prime Minister Chamberlain was refusing to change the basic line of British foreign policy, which was its effort to make an agreement with Germany. Hughes, M., Lord Halifax at the Foreign Office (1938 – 39), in: British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World, 1919 – 1939, London 2006, p. 150. Journalist Sydney Morell admitted that London does not care about Sudeten Germans and that it is indirectly supporting them. Morell, S., Viděl jsem ukřižování. Sudety 1938 – 39. Svědectví anglického novináře, který byl přitom [I Saw the Crucifixion], Praha 1995, p. 11. Already in the mid-March, French authorities acknowledged that it is impossible to directly help Czechoslovakia. Adamthwaite, A. P., Le facteur militaire dans la prise de decision franco-britannique avant Munich [The Military Factor in Franco-British Decision-making before Munich], in: Revue des études slaves, 52, 1– 2, 1979, p. 59. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State noted, that as for Austria, the Britain is powerless. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, p. 62. Orme Sargent marked the Anschluss as the first step to the “achievement of German hegemony in Central Europe”. Kuklík, J. – Němeček, J., Od národního státu ke státu národností? Národnostní statut a snahy o řešení menšinové otázky v Československu v roce 1938 [From the National State to the State of Nationalities? National Status and Efforts to Address the Minority Issue in Czechoslovakia in 1938], Praha 2013, pp. 125 – 126. The atmosphere after the Anschluss of Austria is well depicted in a letter received by Winston Churchill who resent it to the editor of The Times, Geoffrey Dawson. University of Oxford, Bodleian Libraries (Weston Library), Papers of Geoffrey Dawson, MS. Dawson 79, March 23, 1938, f. 178.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

187

Even the British Legation in Prague was aware of this. Through diplomatic channels its officials received a message from Neville Henderson from Berlin, which reproduced the article from the Völkischer Beobachter. It mentioned that members of activist parties are switching to the Sudeten German Party on a massive scale, which resolved the further functioning of those parties; this message did not mention the reason for this change in party affiliation, but it hinted that it was because of the events in Austria. The author of the article subsequently criticized Edvard Beneš, when he described his steps as just a small movement forward and then added: “As long as all important State posts in the German areas are held by Czechs and so long as Czech police and gendarmerie maintain an alien régime, there can be no talk of national justice.”¹⁸ The offensive policy of Berlin against Czechoslovakia was confirmed by Eric Phipps’s message from Paris, who informed the Foreign Office that a reliable source has provided information about the conversation between Pierre Laval and Štefan Osuský during which the Czechoslovak Minister learned confidential information (Joachim von Ribbentrop disclosed it to French journalist Fernand de Brinon), that if France will be intervening in Spain, then Germany will attack Czechoslovakia. Laval asked Osuský to immediately report everything to Prime Minister León Blum, Foreign Minister Joseph Paul-Boncour and Édouard Herriot, who did not have any governmental function, however. According to Phipps’s source the Czechoslovak Minister was shocked and promised Laval that he will follow his instructions. However, the British Ambassador immediately put the whole matter right, when he stated that Laval emerged from two-year anonymity and that the journalist Brinon is publicly known for his pro-German views, if he is not a German agent downright, added Phipps.¹⁹ On the one hand, both of the above-mentioned telegrams suggested higher activity of German policy aimed against Czechoslovakia, but on the other hand, they showed the origin of the at first disturbing information thereby somehow lessening their significance. The first telegram brought a short analysis of the article in Völkischer Beobachter, which was the party newspaper of the NSDAP, and the second covered the statement made by the German Foreign Minister to a proGerman foreign journalist in Paris. Eric Phipps himself admitted that it is not possible to believe similar rumors and that Laval is trying to return to high pol-

 TNA, Foreign Office (hereinafter FO) 371/21713, C 1977/1941/18, Telegram from Sir N. Henderson, March 22, 1938, ff. 7– 8. Willliam I. Mallet noted, that if it is true, then the authority of the government in Sudeten territories is ceasing to exist. Ibid., March 24, 1938, f. 6.  TNA, FO 371/21713, C 2002/1941/18, Telegram from Sir E. Phipps, March 23, 1938, f. 18. Fernand de Brinon belonged between leading French collaborators with Germany during the World War II.

188

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

itics after his forced departure in 1936, which was confirmed by a note of one officer of the Foreign Office.²⁰ The Anschluss of Austria did not only affect the international political position of Prague, but also the domestic policy climate of the First Czechoslovak Republic.²¹ The incorporation of Austria into the Third Reich basically internally dismantled even German activist parties, which had difficulty resisting the strong pressure of the German Sudeten Party²² as of the autumn of 1937. The Czechoslovak Government realized the gravity of the situation and it tried to reverse it at least in part. Almost immediately, on 18 March 1938 it adopted the resolution “on the new division of civil servant positions, while it was complying with German demands on a large scale”.²³ This step, however, was not met with the desired response. On March 22 and 24 the BdL and the DCV merged with the Sudeten German Party and its representatives, ministers without a portfolio Franz Spina²⁴ from the BdL and Erwin Zajicek from the DCV, left the government. Their MPs and Senators (with exceptions, such as Franz Spina or Erwin Zajicek) became members of both clubs of the SdP. Both parties justified their reaction through the failure of the “policy of 18th February”.²⁵ On March 25, Ludwig Czech, a representative of the German Social Democratic Workers’ Party and the Minister

 Ibid., f. 17.  Cf. for example Brandes, D., Sudetští Němci v krizovém roce 1938 [Sudeten Germans in the Crisis Year 1938], Praha 2012, pp. 64– 66; Beneš, pp. 25 – 29; AMAE, Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 119, de Lacroix à Paul-Boncour, Prague, le 17 mars 1938, ff. 65 – 69.  Party leadership decided to subordinate its tactics to instructions of the German Legation in Prague. Cf. Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei 1933 – 1947 [The Germans in Czechoslovakia 1933 – 1937]. Dokumentensammlung. Zusammengestellt, mit Vorwort und Anmerkungen versehen von Král, V., Praha 1964, Doc. No. 94, Abkommen Eisenlohr – Henlein. Die SdP unterstellt sich in Fragen der politischen Taktik vorbehaltlos den Weisungen der deutschen Gesandtschaft in Prag. Prag, den 16. März 1938, pp. 156 – 157.  César, J. – Černý, B., Politika německých buržoazních stran v Československu v letech 1918 – 1938. Díl II. (1930 – 1938) [Politics of German Bourgeois Parties in Czechoslovakia in 1918 – 1938. Part II. (1930 – 1938)], Praha 1962, pp. 435 – 436. Germans should occupy 22 % of all positions in the Czechoslovak Republic and 33 % in Bohemia itself. However, Basil Newton informed London that it is an insufficient step from the perspective of the SdP. TNA, FO 371/21713, C 2030/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, March 22, 1938, f. 37.  President Beneš condemned this step of both parties and quite strongly scolded Franz Spina. Cf. Archiv Kanceláře prezidenta republiky [The Archives of the President of the Republice Office], Praha (hereinafter AKPR), f. Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protocol T (tajné), sg. 12/25, kt. 135, mikrofilm č. 110, T. 545/38, March 17, 1938.  Brandes, pp. 66 – 69. Cf. also Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin [Political Archives of the Foreign Ministry] (hereinafter PA AA), Tschechoslowakei, R 103658 (Rassenfrage, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker), Prag, den 23. März 1938, ff. 019 – 021.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

189

of Public Health and Physical Education resigned because of the pressure of the right wing within the government and fights within the Social Democratic Party.²⁶ The German Social Democracy left the government and nobody was called to replace Ludwig Czech, but it was still supporting the government and remained at activist positions. However, the departure of the last two remaining parties resulted in a serious crack in the national-legal line of Masaryk’s Republic. “With the termination of the BdL and DC, responsible governmental officials lost constructive partners from the ranks of the German minority representation who were willing to accept the resolution of the German matter within the established constitutional limits of the Czechoslovak Republic.”²⁷ The March events in Central Europe then forced some British MPs, particularly the Conservative MP Samuel Vyvyan Adams, to raise the question, if the Prime Minister will provide any special guarantee of the independence of Czechoslovakia in other words if the statement of the member of its government about the pointlessness of such a guarantee is valid. Neville Chamberlain replied that he has nothing to add at this moment and that he already replied to a similar question several days earlier (16 March 1938). Then a debate broke out, if the MP had a right to ask the Prime Minister a question, when it was a question outside of the agenda.²⁸

 PA AA, Tschechoslowakei, R 103658, Prag, den 29. März 1938, f. 044. The German Social Democracy was weakened by the fight between the old leadership represented by Ludwig Czech and young generation with Wenzel Jaksch in the lead, who replaced Czech in the end of March 1938. Cf. Schaffrannek, Ch., Poslední fáze sociálně demokratického boje proti Sudetoněmecké straně na jaře a v létě 1938 [The Last Phase of the Social Democratic Struggle against the Sudeten German Party in the Spring and Summer of 1938], in: Kokoška, S. – Oellermann, T. (ed.), Sudetští Němci proti Hitlerovi. Sborník německých odborných studií [Sudeten Germans against Hitler. Proceedings of German Studies], Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, v. v. i., Praha 2008, p. 45.  Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, p. 391. The transfer within governmental ranks was recorded even by the British Embassy in Berlin, however Nevile Henderson incorrectly marked Christian Socials as an industrial party and he also incorrectly counted the number of mandates, which the SdP should have had. Because it was an analysis of comments of German press, there were quite strong words spoken about Czechoslovakia. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21713, C 2007/1941/18, Telegram from Sir N. Henderson, March 23, 1938, ff. 21– 22.  TNA, FO 371/21713, C 2014/1941/18, Parliamentary Questions, March 21, 1938, ff. 26 – 27. Basically, it was about the matter, if the member of the British Government (the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour Alan Lennox-Boyd) made a certain statement, however it was not mentioned within the debate, and Adams asked the Prime Minister, if his words expressed the opinion of the government, or not. The Prime Minister stated that the press changed words of the Parliament Secretary and that he was not speaking on behalf of the government. LennoxBoyd then apologized that some MPs may have thought that he is speaking on behalf of the gov-

190

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

The interpellation mentioned above, which had its sequel in the procedural debate, demonstrated the line of thinking of less significant members of the British Government. Despite the fact that Neville Chamberlain denied that it was an opinion of the entire government, a bad feeling from the disdainful approach in relation to the potential guarantee of borders of an independent state remained. It is important to mention that the Prime Minister did not confirm Lennox-Boyd’s words and stated that it is his private opinion, but the Prime Minister’s distaste for vigorous statements concerning Central Europe was sufficiently known. Even British Dominions²⁹ were informed about Chamberlain’s statement thereby indicating that under the current situation, the following obligations exist for His Majesty’s Government with respect to Czechoslovakia – the Covenant of the League of Nations; although, as the document stated, the current ability of this organization to enforce anything is significantly minimized, but London will do all it can to fulfil its obligations according to its possibilities, as it was stated at the end of the first sub-section; and obligations arising from the Rhineland Pact and confirmed in March 1936; however, they were not directly related to Prague, because Britain and Italy guaranteed only French and Belgian borders and the agreement was de facto terminated after the occupation of demilitarized Rhineland. An important part of the letter continued with the announcement to politicians from the Dominions that the government will not accept other obligations in Europe because of the domestic policy situation and the impossibility to make decisions on behalf of overseas territories “beyond those embodied in the Covenant of the League and the Treaty of Locarno which in our view are no mean contribution to the maintenance of peace in Europe”.³⁰ ernment. It is clear from his subsequent words that he denied the rush guarantee of Czechoslovak borders. Cf. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1938/mar/21/czechoslovakiaministers-speech#S5CV0333P0_19380321_HOC_433 [cit. 2017– 07– 25]. Issue of The Glasgow Herald from 22nd March 1938 then brought the final explanation of the whole case. On the assembly in Biggleswade the Parliamentary Secretary stated that he cannot imagine anything more ridiculous, than the guarantee of inviolability of borders of Czechoslovakia, country, which cannot rely on the loyalty of half of its citizens. The Glasgow Herald, March 22, 1938.  Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, Union of South Africa and Irish Free State, however London denied to use this term and marked is as the Éire.  TNA, FO 371/21713, C 2017/1941/18, Circular Telegram, March 23, 1938, f. 34. London would act only in the case of German attack on Czechoslovakia. British Empire went through a difficult constitutional development after the World War I and the adoption of the Statute of Westminster was at its end. More in detail cf. Valkoun, J., Na cestě k Westminsterskému statutu. Velká Británie, dominia a proměna Britského impéria v letech 1907 – 1931 [On the way to the Westminster Status. Great Britain, Dominions and Transformation of the British Empire in 1907– 1931], Praha 2015, pp. 102– 247. Some dominion politicians, for example James Barry Munnik Hertzog, the Prime Minister of the South African Union between 1924– 1939, were not hiding their resistance

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

191

The material clearly indicated that the Anschluss of Austria militarily weakened the Czechoslovak Republic and it continued with the expression of doubts, if the help of France and the Soviet Union would be effective in such case. It also stated that the current military position of Great Britain does not allow for the country to quickly and efficiently intervene or to deploy necessary forces for a quick victory. “Our main contribution in the early stages would be exercise of economic pressure by means of sea power […],” stated the author.³¹ Even the conclusion of the document sounded interesting, because it assumed that Paris and London would join to eliminate possible epicenters of conflict and to help the Czechoslovak Government with the solution of problem with the German minority within current borders of the country, if possible.³² The telegram designated for the British Dominions basically summed up the current approach of the government and it indicated the limits of its future considerations and potential actions. The only document, which could force London to intervene, was the Covenant of the League of Nations, an organization, which lacked the necessary authority at the moment; what was more, Germany, Italy, and Japan left it. The elaborate further clearly indicated that Britain does not have the military capacity to immediately intervene against an aggressor and that it would rely on the economic pressure at the beginning (as was the case with Italy, when this approach proved to be inefficient). The conclusion of the document then anticipated the joint action of London and Paris and their pressure on Prague to solve the problem with the largest minority in Czechoslovakia; at this moment, there could be no doubt that Konrad Henlein and his Sudeten German Party was what was meant. Concerns of some British politicians, who thought that increased participation in Central Europe and especially Czechoslovakia could lead to the disintegration of the Commonwealth,³³ remained unspoken. All mentioned reports and information were focused on Czechoslovakia and its problem with minorities, especially with Sudeten Germans, although they were not created by the British Legation in Prague (with one exception), they in-

to the support of France and they supported the idea of revision of peace treaties. Cf. FO 800 (Private Offices: Various Ministers’ and Officials’ Papers), 309 (Viscount Halifax, Miscellaneous Correspondence, Vol. 1), 1938, ff. 157– 158.  TNA, FO 371/21713, C 2017/1941/18, Circular Telegram, March 23, 1938, f. 35.  Ibid.  Vyšný, p. 26. Britain’s willingness to help Czechoslovakia based on the Covenant of the League of Nations was however welcomed by the French Foreign Minister, which was prove of the unhealthy belief in this institution. Cf. AMAE, Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 117, Politique étrangère, Allemands de Bohême, le 9 avril 1938, f. 2.

192

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

cluded important information related to the perception of the country by British diplomats and other countries and they predicted London’s approach to subsequent expected events. It is without a doubt, that the Anschluss of Austria influenced the situation in Central Europe and it posed the question – not only to British politicians – what will be next. Neville Chamberlain had decided to not allow another war conflict and he as well as other British politicians reiterated that Prague should concede in the matter of the German minority or it would be forced to do so. Even the Dominions received information of such nature, which, as it is known, were not interested in the situation in Central Europe. At the end of March 1938, the British Legation in Prague was repeatedly reflecting on events around the development of activist parties, two of which had already left the position of governmental activism and most merged with the Sudeten German Party with only a few exceptions. Basil Newton was, however, working with partially outdated information, when he reported on the meeting of the DCV leadership on March 22, which called for the accelerated solution of the German minority problem or it had threatened to reassess its governmental participation;³⁴ however, it is clear from the above that the DVC and BdL had already left the governmental coalition at that time. On the other hand, the situation in the Czechoslovak Government was changing so quickly that the minister was not able to react with adequate speed. An essential event related to the future destiny of Czechoslovakia occurred at the March session of British Government,³⁵ which faced conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee and governmental Foreign Policy Committee (Foreign Policy Committee or Committee on Foreign Policy³⁶), which clearly stated that in the case of a German attack on the Czechoslovak Republic, “no pressure which this country and its possible allies could exercise would suffice to prevent to defeat Czechoslovakia”.³⁷ In the subsequent debate, Lord Halifax stated that

 TNA, FO 371/21713, C 2031/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, March 22, 1938, f. 39. British Minister also described the conflict of opinions in the leadership of German Social Democrats. Below he mentioned that part of members of German Agrarians was already accepted to the SdP. Ibid.  It was being decided, which statement about its obligations on the continent will make the Government in the House of Commons. Day before the meeting of the Government, Alexander Cadogan was relieved that it decided to not do anything significant because of Czechoslovakia. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, p. 64.  Committee was conveyed irregularly and during various occasions. It was acting as a forum for preliminary discussions about matters, which were then finally solved by the Government. Anthony Eden initiated the establishment of this body during the spring of 1936.  TNA, FO 371/21713, C 2040/1941/18, Extract from Cabinet Conclusions, March 22, 1938, f. 106. The British Government considered, how many of its considerations it will disclose to Paris.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

193

the Anschluss of Austria redrew borders in Central Europe and that Britain has two options at this moment – 1) to guarantee Czechoslovak borders and 2) to guarantee support of France, if it will decide to meet its obligations in relation to Prague. After much deliberation, the Foreign Secretary continued that he himself is leaning towards the idea of a guarantee, but he failed to mention, which guarantee he had in mind; he immediately added, however, that it is necessary to carefully assess Britain’s military possibilities. Conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff were to help with this, stated Halifax to all those present, and tried to clarify these conclusions by stating that the Chiefs of Staff are excluding the option to protect Czechoslovakia, the existence of which may only be restored through war with Germany if it is defeated by Germany. He added that the current situation as it is contained in the materials suggests, that it should be expected that Italy and Japan will join Berlin, leading to a not-only European, but rather a World war.³⁸ Under such circumstances, I am not in the position, despite all sympathies and concerns, “to recommend a policy involving a risk of war,” stated the Foreign Secretary.³⁹ Halifax therefore unequivocally and according to the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff, refused military conflagration because of Czechoslovakia in case of war with Germany. He thus also indirectly indicated that the epicenter of potential conflict, the problem with the German minority, cannot be the reason for war.⁴⁰ Minutes from the meeting of the government continued with the list of reasons, why London cannot force Berlin to terminate its policy against Czechoslovakia despite all its sympathies for Prague. Even if we were to guarantee anything, we cannot fulfil it were we to be required to do so, was written in the document. The British Cabinet admitted that the current situation requires thorough rearmament, which however requires a sufficient amount of time and it was even growing attached to the idea of an agreement with Italy, which was mainly Chamberlain’s idea. Based on conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff, the government came to the conclusion that the current military situation represents a

 Ibid., ff. 107– 108.  Ibid., f. 108. He “was deeply influenced by the Chiefs of Staff’s report entitled ‘Military Implications of German Aggression Against Czechoslovakia’”. Roberts, pp. 129 – 130.  “[…] we should endeavour to induce the Government of Czechoslovakia to apply themselves to producing a direct settlement with the Sudeten-Deutsch. We should also persuade the French to use their influence to obtain such a settlement,” stated exactly. TNA, FO 371/21713, C 2040/ 1941/18, Extract from Cabinet Conclusions, March 22, 1938, f. 108. Participants of the meeting also agreed that the best communication channel with Paris will be personal conversation and not note verbal.

194

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

negative rather than a positive for small countries in Central Europe.⁴¹ Suggestions for statements in front of the House of Commons oscillated from general statements that with regards to new circumstances, foreign policy cannot be formulated in a matter of days through the establishment of contacts with the Czechoslovak Government and an announcement to Berlin that London will guarantee Czechoslovak borders for 12 months during which it will find a solution to the problem with the German minority, to the expression of verbal support of Paris and Prague. Those involved in the discussion agreed that under current circumstances, the best option is the policy suggested by the Foreign Secretary and supported by the Prime Minister.⁴² Already at this point, at the end of March 1938, the British Government came to the conclusion that Britain, France and the USSR cannot help Czechoslovakia on time because of its geographical location, which sounded considerably negative and pessimistic with regard for the future of Czechoslovakia.⁴³ The government faced with information, which it had obtained from the Chiefs of Staff, and also based on its current policy in relation to the continent or rather to Central Europe, decided that London would not adopt any new obligations, which could lead it to a war and that the French Government will be informed of this. It indirectly meant that Britain will want an amicable resolution of the Czech-German problem, which in its understanding means significant concessions by Prague in relation to the largest minority. It was further obvious from some statements that several British politicians do not believe in the proposed compromise, but that that they will do anything to avoid a possible war with Germany. At the same time, when the British Government came to its essential decision, Minister Basil Newton was negotiating with Milan Hodža, because he wanted to know his opinion on the German minority in those – as he felt them to be – critical days. According to Newton, the Prime Minister showed a greater understanding for Sudeten Germans and their demands than Beneš or Krofta did but on the other hand, he denied full autonomy for their territories because of technical and political reasons. Then he added that part of the problem, the number of state officials, could be resolved, if the SdP would meet the require-

 Ibid., f. 112. Today, Germany is insufficiently prepared for a war, but the situation may be turned around in two years, stated another conclusion. Ibid.  Ibid., ff. 113 – 114. Suggested procedure will be supported even by the Parliament and public opinion, added the minutes. It was eventually adopted by the government. Ibid., ff. 118 – 119.  Cf. Dutton, p. 21. According to results of Gallup’s institute from March 1938 (after the Anschluss), the possible British help to Czechoslovakia was supported only by 33 % of respondents, while 43 % was against. Ibid., p. 47. For comparison, on 22 September 1938 Chamberlain’s policy was approved only by 22 % of inhabitants. Ibid., p. 50.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

195

ments for admission into government. Even though President Beneš had originally rejected it but according to the Prime Minister’s confidential statement, he was now leaning towards this solution.⁴⁴ On March 24, 1938 Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain spoke in the House of Commons, where he presented the statement of the government to the recent events in Europe and where he also presented several important facts concerning Czechoslovakia. The Prime Minister stated that the Anschluss of Austria created a new situation in Central Europe and that the main task is the return to the atmosphere of trust and rule of international law. One of the questions, which was raising concerns at this time, is the relationship of the Czechoslovak Government with the German minority, he stated and continued that the resolution of this delicate matter, “if it could be achieved, would go far [to] re-establish a sense of stability […]”.⁴⁵ Chamberlain then reiterated in his own words the conclusions of the government from previous days and he refused any special help to the Czechoslovak Republic.⁴⁶ Even Czechoslovak politicians reacted to his speech and their attitudes were mediated to London by Basil Newton and who welcomed the Prime Minister’s words or rather there was a general consensus, “that no tears should be spilt over his refusal to give Czechoslovakia a military guarantee since such a guarantee could not reasonably have been expected in view of the traditions of British foreign policy”.⁴⁷ In other words, Czechoslovak politicians did not show any big surprise concerning the Prime Minister’s statement.⁴⁸ It was no wonder, since the British Government only confirmed the current trend of its effort to achieve an amicable solution of all neuralgic points in Europe, which according to its opinion included even the problem of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. The situation in the country after the Anschluss of Austria and the factual end of German political activism seemed exciting for the British Minister to a certain extent; he even expected slogans against Czechoslovakia and against the government at the meeting of the Sudeten German Party in Liberec. Newton also reported to London of the opinion of a part of the political elites about the possible rearrangement of

 Cf. TNA, FO 371/21713, C 2114/1941/18, Newton to Halifax, March 22, 1938, ff. 161– 163.  http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1938/mar/24/foreign-affairs-and-rearma ment [2017– 07– 21].  Cf. Ellinger, pp. 170 – 173.  Cf. TNA, FO 371/21713, C 2139/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, March 25, 1938, f. 194.  According to Robert Kvaček, they even did not assess them realistically and they succumbed to their subjective self-deceit. Kvaček, Obtížné spojenectví, p. 84. Jan Masaryk concluded its message about Chamberlain’s speech with words: “We have reasons to be satisfied with Chamberlain’s Thursday speech.” AMZV, PZ Londýn, 1938, běžná zpráva č. 6, 25. března 1938, p. 7.

196

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

the governmental coalition or rather about an interim caretaker government, so that the cabinet will be in a better position to negotiate with the SdP, which was still getting stronger.⁴⁹ The British Minister perceived the March events with great sensitivity, because after the reading of Sudeten German daily press, he came to the conclusion that the way of thinking of the Sudeten German Party is turning away from the broad autonomy⁵⁰ to the direct incorporation of Sudeten German territories into the Third Reich. He based his opinion on the argument from newspapers, when authors of a particular article claimed that a similar requirement for merging with German Austria (and then with Germany) was expressed in 1918 and that Great Powers (together with Czechoslovakia) betrayed German inhabitants, when they denied to acknowledge their right to self-determination.⁵¹ If Basil Newton based his conclusions on the reading of daily press, then of course he could not have come to a different conclusion. The Anschluss of Austria naturally caused a feeling of hope, certain satisfaction and a possible repetition of the year 1918 in some circles, which could now have another outcome than the defeat of four German regions and confirmation of Czechoslovak borders as it was proposed by the Czechoslovak delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. The “Eastern Mark” (Austria) fell into Berlin’s arms so according to the press it could not be denied that the same may happen to the German inhabitants in the Czechoslovak Republic. On March 28, 1938 Prime Minister Milan Hodža was speaking on the radio and his conciliatory tone and honest effort to reach an agreement with the largest minority was welcomed by leading French journals as the Ambassador to Paris, Eric Phipps, informed London. However, some opinions sounded a bit strange. For example, Petit Parisien believed that the internal organization of the state and moral support of Great Britain will allow Czechoslovakia to overcome all difficulties. Other commentaries sounded similar. Basil Newton confirmed the positive reception of Hodža’s speech by important Czechoslovak newspapers; on the contrary, the press body of the SdP Die Zeit criticized the Prime Minister’s ambiguous words, which did not offer any clear steps as to the minority policy.⁵² However, according to his own words, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister did not intend to significantly modify the policy from 18th Febru-

 TNA, FO 371/21713, C 2179/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, March 26, 1938, f. 223.  Sudeten German leaders themselves rather avoided this term and they were talking about the self-government.  TNA, FO 371/21713, C 2222/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, March 19, 1938, f. 237.  Cf. TNA, FO 371/21714, C 2293/1941/18, Telegram from Sir E. Phipps, March 31, 1938, ff. 11– 12; ibid., C 2294/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, March 30, 1938, f. 14.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

197

ary, but he was considering the codification of already existing minority rights. In his speech, he announced to the public that the cabinet decided to proceed with the resolution of minority issues in a legislative manner and he emphasized (besides other things) that: “today is the time, when we should summarize all already valid minority measures by one aggregate legislative act, which may be contained in the Constitution or in the language law and in various other legislative or administrative measures. We are rightfully stating that we have created a relatively perfect system of minority rights in Czechoslovakia. Because we have not created a codified system from them, then ill will may give the impression in the uninformed world that minorities cannot breathe freely in our country and when they can, then only as of 18th February 1937. So it is the order of purposefulness and order to complete the valuable work of our minority policy formally. This is why the Czechoslovak Government is negotiating about the minority status of the republic. This is how we will end the propaganda conducted by so many parties against our good will and against our honest work.”⁵³ Efforts of leading Czechoslovak politicians to solve the issues of minorities at the end of March 1938 represented an attempt to communicate with all minorities, although naturally primarily with Sudeten Germans. The President of the Republic decided to focus on the matter of minority schools, on the appointment of officials, on measures, which would terminate sometimes arbitrary interpretation of lower bureaucratic instances in the field of administration, and on the language law. On the other hand, it must be noted that the intended steps were not only aimed at Sudeten Germans, but even at other minorities – only the founding “stone” on which other “pebbles” of the revision of the minority policy of the Czechoslovak Government should be built. The President and the Prime Minister agreed on the direction of how to proceed with this policy, but not the government itself, as the British Minister to Prague had to admit at the beginning of April 1938. The right wing of the Agrarian Party surrounding Rudolf Beran, who met with German Minister Eisenlohr several times on his own, could imagine the cooperation with the Sudeten German Party, if its leaders would slightly tone down some of their statements. Leftwing parties of the governmental coalition of course rejected such progress. I suppose that the Czechoslovak Cabinet has not yet agreed on its approach to the German minority, stated Newton and he presented the same notion to the Su Krofta, pp. 265 – 266. For more details about the effort of leading Czechoslovak politicians to solve the problem of minorities cf. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 401– 412. Hodža’s speech, which was reflected even by The Times and which wrote that the Czechoslovak Government will almost certainly proceed in a conciliatory manner in relation to the German minority. The Times, March 29, 1938.

198

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

deten Germans, who were surprised by the sudden political twists according to his opinion.⁵⁴ During this turbulent period for Central Europe the Central Department of the Foreign Office decided to create a more extensive memorandum related to main problems in the region and called it characteristically The German-Czech Problem. The first part summarized statements of German politicians about Czechoslovakia⁵⁵ and the second part already focused on opinions of members of the German minority in the Czechoslovak Republic. It begun with the summarization of points of the February Agreement from the year 1937, it continued with the presentation of six drafts of acts created by the SdP and it ended with speeches of the party’s representatives, for example Karl Hermann Frank from March 15, 1938, when he declared in the Parliament that Sudeten Germans are fighting against the arbitrary oppression by governmental officials since the year 1919 and he denied the “illusion” of 18 February 1937.⁵⁶ The final part of the memorandum contained a list of statements by members of the Czechoslovak Government related to the issue of minority; it begun in the year 1919, but a leap to November 1937 followed. The authors of the material quoted Jan Masaryk, who refused to provide the autonomy to Henlein and his companions, because it would cause the establishment of a totalitarian territory inside the Czechoslovak Republic. He added, however, that if the great powers wish to provide autonomy to Sudeten German territories, then Prague will have to subdue.⁵⁷ The memorandum of the Central Department of the Foreign Office presented one of the important points of its agenda in detail – concerning the increasing pressure of national minorities on the arrangement of the status of minorities in the First Czechoslovak Republic⁵⁸ – but on the other hand, it lacked any assessment of the complex problem and did not offer any proposal for its solution. It was only a summary of selected statements of German and Czechoslovak politicians and members of the German minority in Czechoslovakia the purpose of

 TNA, FO 371/21714, C 2314/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, April 1, 1938, f. 16.  Cf. TNA, FO 371/21714, C 2315/1941/18, Foreign Office Memorandum (Central Department), April 1, 1938, ff. 21– 25.  Ibid., ff. 26 – 28. The material continued with Henlein’s statement from 17th March in which the leader of the SdP claimed that events in Austria showed the decisive power in the fight for rights of Sudeten Germans – unity. Ten days later, Hans Neuwirth demanded the self-autonomy and he added that the Sudeten German Party respects the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia, as the elaborate stated. Second part was finished by the statement that even other minorities in the country demand concessions. Ibid., ff. 28 – 29.  Ibid., f. 31.  The Anschluss of Austria activated even other minorities in Czechoslovakia. Cf. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 394– 399.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

199

which might have been the creation of a complex foundation for further needs of the Foreign Office. Matters of the largest minority in the Czechoslovakia and wider Czechoslovak-German relations forced Jan Masaryk to find Home Secretary Samuel Hoare to explain some matters from the perspective of Prague to him. The British politician sent a message about this to Lord Halifax, but he immediately added that he does not think that the Czechoslovak Minister and his old friend,⁵⁹ as he wrote, disclosed anything, which the Foreign Secretary would not already know. From the perspective of the established rules, it was quite strange, that a Minister of a foreign state was discussing foreign policy problems with the Home Secretary and not with his departmental colleague. The content of the document really did not offer any significant or new information as to the matter of Sudeten Germans in the Czechoslovak Republic. In the context of time, it was rather a form of propagation of the effort of Prague to solve this tricky problem amicably and to satisfy all minorities. Masaryk was also probing Hoare’s opinions about the current status of Czech-German relations and he asked him for advice, which he would offer his government. If in the position of the president of the republic, Samuel Hoare would ask Paris and London for help, as he wrote himself; as a member of the British Government, he could not go against the official line, which did not count on a diametrically different approach at this moment.⁶⁰ London was slowly losing its patience with respect to what it felt to be an unresolved problem of Sudeten Germans at the beginning of April 1938. Minister Jan Masaryk informed Basil Newton about the relatively precipitous suggestion, which was presented to him in London: “that Czechoslovak Government on their own initiative should inform British and French governments of utmost they

 Hoare himself mentions in his memories that he was interested in the Czechoslovak question already during the First World War and how he maintained close contacts with TGM and also with Edvard Beneš. Templewood, pp. 285 – 286.  Cf. TNA, FO 371/21714, C 2359/1941/18, Hoare to Halifax, March 25, 1938, ff. 79 – 81; TNA, FO 800/309, Hoare to Halifax, March 25, 1938, ff. 146 – 149. Lord Halifax responded to the Home Secretary that he considers his advices to Masaryk to be “admirable”. TNA, FO 371/ 21714, C 2359/1941/18, Halifax to Hoare, March 28, 1938, f. 82; TNA, FO 800/309, Halifax to Hoare, March 28, 1938, f. 150. Even Basil Newton was immediately informed about the conversation of Hoare with Masaryk and he should have used its result during the communication with Czechoslovak politicians. Halifax was interested even in the possible reaction of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry. TNA, FO 371/21714, C 2359/1941/18, Foreign Office to Newton, April 2, 1938, f. 83. Even Neville Chamberlain confirmed the unchanged statement of the British Government, when he responded to the interpellation of Labour MP, Benjamin Riley. TNA, FO 371/21714, C 2397/1941/18, Parliamentary Question (Mr. Riley), March 31, 1938, f. 94.

200

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

could do to meet wishes of German minority and at the same time should invite British and French good offices to take part.”⁶¹ Several days later, Prime Minister Hodža confirmed to Newton that the government is really preparing a vast plan to solve the matter of minorities in the country and that it is acting as quickly as possible, of course; the Prime Minister expected its completion within a week or maybe ten days.⁶² At the beginning of April 1938, it was basically clear that the Sudeten German Party was already not willing to accept the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic at the moment; its significant members were more frequently and more loudly talking about the protection of the Reich and the desire to be included in it. The Czechoslovak Government was really forced, especially by outer circumstances, to accept more fundamental modification of the status of minorities in the country via legislation. In fact, at the end of winter of 1938 it was clear that the administrative solution (for example the February Agreement) would no longer satisfy members of minorities: “In the case, if the status of minorities will not be modified legally, there was a threat that the matter of minorities will grow to an uncontrolled ‘fission reaction,’ which could cause a definitive domestic policy collapse of the Republic and provide the cause for the Great Powers to intervene in the internal affairs of the state.”⁶³ So, the beginning of April 1938 brought the decision of the Great Powers (primarily Great Britain) to force Czechoslovakia to stop solving the problem of minorities using administrative measures and to start perceiving it as a special category, which have to be handled in a comprehensive manner using the vast modification of legislation because of its overlap to foreign policy. Prague was reaching a position, when outer circumstances forced it to proceed differently to what leading Czechoslovak politicians had envisioned or rather that the resolution of problems with minorities was not entirely in their hands; especially Britain assessed this matter with great sensitivity with respect to relations with Germany. It was strange that London was so vehemently interested in events in Central Europe, but facing the accelerating situation, it had no other choice in fact. Although British politicians added that they wished that everything would happen within domestic policy rules of the Czechoslovak political

 TNA, FO 371/21714, C 2471/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, April 2, 1938, f. 102.  Ibid., ff. 102– 103. Newton stated that this suggestion came from Samuel Hoare, when he was talking with Jan Masaryk. Ibid., Telegram from Mr. Newton, April 2, 1938, f. 104.  Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, p. 400. Messages from Berlin confirmed that the SdP should have exhausted Czechoslovakia with its repeated requests and then Berlin should have raised its other demands. AMZV, PZ Berlín, 1938, běžná zpráva č. 66, 7. dubna 1938, p. 1.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

201

scene, their progress and above-standard interest in events concerning the German minority in Czechoslovakia testified to the contrary.⁶⁴ At the beginning of April 1938, London really showed its increased interest in the progress of the Czechoslovak Government in relation to national minorities. The main requirement was as quick as possible and constructive steps leading to the discovery of modus vivendi within the Czechoslovak Constitution.⁶⁵ Orme Sargent was wondering, why the President of the Republic had not met with Konrad Henlein yet, which the Chargé d’Affaires in London Legation, Karel Lisický (at this time, Masaryk was in Prague) explained to him, because the leader of the SdP is not a deputy and this is why it is not easy to arrange such meeting.⁶⁶ Several days later, Orme Sargent wrote a memorandum on behalf of the Foreign Policy Committee related to the German minority in Czechoslovakia in which he stated that he does not consider it reasonable to contact Berlin before Edvard Beneš and Konrad Henlein agree. If that were the case, then the Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs expected that Adolf Hitler will show great impatience and this will create three possibilities for the British Government – 1) to get into a dispute with Germany; 2) to not issue any statement and to indirectly get into a dispute with Berlin again; 3) to do something specific and push Beneš, so Prague will make further concessions to the German minority.⁶⁷ Sargent repeated that under the current circumstances he is not recommending to contact Germany; however, he did not exclude later discussions, on the contrary, he supported them. In his further considerations, he was counting on the fact that London will be providing advice to Prague during its negotiations with Henlein. The representative of the Foreign Office expected that only in such case would Britain be in a position, when it would be able to push Germany.⁶⁸ So through Orme Sargent as its mouthpiece, the Foreign Policy Committee assumed that London would lead Prague to its agreements with the Sudeten German Party and when this will be achieved, it will inform Berlin of such circumstances. Berlin will have no other option but to accept it as status quo. Also, at this time, no one was counting on an agreement with German Social Democrats who were the

 Similar progress was expected even by the memorandum of the Foreign Office called The German Minority in Czechoslovakia. The Next Step. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21714, C 2510/1941/18, Foreign Office Memorandum, March 31, 1938, ff. 130 – 144.  TNA, FO 371/21714, C 2534/1941/18, April 1, 1938, f. 161.  Ibid., April 5, 1938, f. 162. Although Sargent demanded concessions from President Beneš, he denied potential German hegemony in Europe. Hughes, p. 146.  TNA, FO 371/21714, C 2581/1941/18, Revised Memorandum Regarding German Minority in Czechoslovakia, April 5, 1938, ff. 178 – 179.  Ibid., f. 179.

202

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

only ones, still maintaining loyalty to the Czechoslovak Republic; on the other hand, it was no wonder since it was a small group, which was not even in the government. Under outside pressure, the Czechoslovak Government came to understand that it will not be possible to avoid negotiations with both Western Powers during the resolution of the minority problem. Kamil Krofta confirmed this during his discussion with British Minister Newton, when he stated that Prague will hand over its suggestions to London and Paris and it will wait for their response. If the reaction will be positive, Krofta expected support during negotiations with Berlin and he assumed that both countries will mark Henlein’s demands as too far-reaching, “if they in fact came to that conclusion,” added the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister.⁶⁹ The basic problem, which the Foreign Office was now dealing with, was if Prague will discuss its plan with representatives of the Sudeten German Party first or if it will officially present it as the initial point of negotiations. After Newton’s report, Orme Sargent expressed his concern that option number two will apply. In such a case, he suggested that the Czechoslovak Government be informed that it is not the best solution, which however meant direct interference of the negotiations. Already at this moment, the option to send one person to investigate the entire matter directly in Czechoslovakia was seriously mentioned for the first time.⁷⁰ The British Government probably for the first time in the history of the Czechoslovak Republic (if we are not considering the turning events of autumn 1918) began to significantly reflect on events in a country, which thanks to its minority policy was slowly getting to the forefront of its foreign policy agenda. According to Ambassador to Berlin Henderson the Sudeten German Party itself denied Hodža’s ideas about the progress of the government in relation to minorities already at its leadership meeting on April 5, 1938. Representatives of the party came to the conclusion that the Prime Minister’s “recent statement could by no means form a basis for discussion”.⁷¹ The SdP also did not like that the

 TNA, FO 371/21714, C 2634/1941/18, April 5, 1938, f. 240. Krofta also denied the potential direct contact between His Majesty’s Government and leader of the SdP. Ibid., f. 241.  Ibid., April 8, 1938, f. 239. British diplomacy truly assumed that in the case of an independent progress of the Czechoslovak Government, London will have a role of an adviser about further development. Although representatives of the Foreign Office themselves admitted that they (or the British Government) do not have enough information about the problems with nationalities in Czechoslovakia. “To do so would require His Majesty’s Government to send out a special investigator to take evidence on the spot – a course which in present circumstances I do not favour,” stated author of the telegram. Ibid., Telegram to Mr. Newton, April 9, 1938, f. 242.  TNA, FO 371/21715, C 2722/1941/18, Telegram from Sir N. Henderson, April 7, 1938, f. 4.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

203

public could not understand legitimate requirements of the largest minority and this is why under current circumstances there is no opportunity or not even a possibility that the party will terminate its current negativistic policy against the government, as Ambassador Henderson concluded in his telegram.⁷² Two days later, the meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee took place, where the problem of Central Europe and the closely connected matter of the German minority in Czechoslovakia were discussed. From the meeting minutes it is clear that Lord Halifax was not able to provide any new information about the progress of negotiations between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten German Party. The specification of the British statement about London’s further progress during the monitoring of the main problem in Central Europe and an explanation of such progress to Paris became a key part of the meeting. His Majesty’s Government planned to monitor everything closely and react at a convenient moment and according to circumstances, as was stated in the minutes.⁷³ As to the Prime Minister’s question, if the Foreign Office is planning to negotiate with Berlin now, Halifax answered that it is not and that it will be done at a convenient moment. “Great care would, however, have to be taken to avoid giving Germany the impression that we were actively supporting any particular proposals made by the Czechoslovak Government,” added the Foreign Secretary.⁷⁴ As you can see, London was supposed to maintain seeming neutrality, but Halifax’s words show that there was a partial concern about Berlin’s reactions, if it were to discover that Czechoslovakia has Britain’s support. The Foreign Office and British policy in general were also trying hard to achieve mutual progress with France. In this sense, William Strang⁷⁵ clearly instructed the Ambassador to Paris, Eric Phipps, and added that he himself considers

 Ibid. Only several days before, Henderson informed Alexander Cadogan about the meeting with Vojtěch Mastný, who asked him about his opinion on the future of Czechoslovakia. British Ambassador replied to his colleague that time is changing turbulently, and that each reasonable Czechoslovak politician must perform policy, which is not leading to war, but to peace. TNA, FO 800/269, Henderson to Cadogan, March 30, 1938, ff. 71– 72.  Cf. TNA, FO 371/21715, C 2770/1941/18, Foreign Policy Committee, April 7, 1938, ff. 10 – 11. Halifax repeated that the only progress, which can be nowadays approved by London, is the support of Prague to conclude an agreement with the SdP.  Ibid., f. 11. Subsequent debate was focused on questions of other members of the committee, for example, the Chancellor of the Exchequer John Simon was interested in Adolf Hitler’s opinion, when the Czechoslovak Government will present a reasonable plan to solve the matter of minorities. The Foreign Secretary was not able to answer exactly, which was logical, so he only repeated that Germany does not want any war according to its statements. Ibid., ff. 12– 13.  He was the head of the Central Department at the Foreign Office in the years 1937– 1939.

204

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

the current situation in Czechoslovakia “to be one of considerable danger”.⁷⁶ The head of the Central Department repeated that the Anschluss of Austria added self-confidence to the German minority and that it was united under Konrad Henlein. In his opinion, Berlin got a feeling of satisfaction and it will want more; its willingness to risk a war because of it will grow, assumed Strang. This is why Britain together with France must do everything possible, so that the continent will avoid general conflagration, as he stated.⁷⁷ It was obvious that no one in the Foreign Office or not even in the British Government doubted that in order to avoid war, Prague must do everything to not provide Germany with any pretext for aggressive steps, which could cause an avalanche reaction such as a war conflict.⁷⁸ At the beginning of April 1938, British politicians and diplomats on various levels of the administration anticipated the bad situation in Czechoslovakia and they created an impression that Prague must yield to the requirements of the SdP, so as not to threaten European peace;⁷⁹ that there is no other possibility for Prague because such a small country does not have capacities for an effective defense. British Military Attaché in Prague, Colonel H. C. T. Stronge, perceived the current situation similarly as Lord Halifax or William Strang. He had the chance to check the fortification in northern Bohemia and came to the conclusion that only sufficient space for the completion of fortification will allow Czechoslovakia to efficiently withstand an eventual German attack; he therefore considered Czechoslovak defense weak in the short-term. However, the attaché also warned against the big number of Sudeten Germans, who wished for only one thing, i. e. integration with the Third Reich. Even Basil Newton, who was sending Strang’s information to London encountered similar opinions.⁸⁰

 Cf. TNA, FO 371/21715, C 2770/1941/18, Strang to Phipps, April 11, 1938, f. 17.  Ibid. Strang wrote to Phipps to warn the French Foreign Minister that London needs to consider everything thoroughly and that it is not preferring the escalation of the situation. Ibid., f. 19. The unwillingness to risk a war conflict was based also on the fact that British Army and political elites considered the defence of Czechoslovakia to be militarily unreal. BenArie, K., Czechoslovakia at the Time of ‘Munich’: The Military Situation, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 25, 4, 1990, p. 431.  Even British Minister to Prague Basil Newton received instructions in the similar nature. The Czechoslovak Government should have been negotiating directly with Konrad Henlein or his representatives. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21715, C 2770/1941/18, April 12, 1938, f. 31.  Nevile Henderson considered the problem with minorities in Czechoslovakia as the only point, which can potentially cause a war. TNA, FO 800/269, Henderson to Halifax, April 7, 1938, f. 92.  TNA, FO 371/21715, C 2805/1941/18, Newton to Halifax, April 6, 1938, f. 91. In his message, Stronge also express his pessimist opinion about the possibility to solve the problem with the

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

205

Because of the necessity and swiftness, which were required by London during the progress of the conclusion of an agreement between the Czechoslovak Government and Sudeten German Party, the British Minister contacted Milan Hodža and asked him for a meeting. The Prime Minister informed him that the situation was escalated by the Sudeten German Party, but that the government is ready to continue in the negotiations. He then accused Konrad Henlein that he is weak and going back and forth between the restrained and the radical wing of the party. The Prime Minister then informed Newton that Prague is preparing a vast communiqué, which will be sent to London and Paris, and he also hinted at the planned Statute of Minorities, later renamed to the Statute of Nationalities – an act, which would extensively modify the status of minorities in Czechoslovakia.⁸¹ It was therefore obvious at the beginning of April 1938 that the Czechoslovak Government agreed to the wide modification of its minority policy. On April 8, 1938 the Prime Minister announced at the meeting of the government that he assigned legislative departments of the Ministerial Council Presidency and Ministries of the Interior, Justice and for the Unification of Acts to execute a draft on the Statute of Nationalities, i. e. the aggregate minority law, which would significantly change the status of minorities in the Czechoslovak Republic.⁸² At the beginning of April, Basil Newton informed the Foreign Office that Henlein and his party are making a claim of one representative of the German minority in Czechoslovakia, which he documented by several examples of various organizations, which voluntarily or forcibly acknowledged the leadership of the Sudeten German Party in its efforts related to rights of Sudeten Germans. He then added that two MPs from the SdP left the party in the end of the year 1937 and that they

German minority amicably, because its opinions became relatively more radical lately. Cf. ibid., April 5, 1938, f. 92.  TNA, FO 371/21715, C 2844/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, April 8, 1938, ff. 122– 124. Objective of the publication is not the history of the Statute of Nationalities, which was recently analysed in detail in Czech historiography. Cf. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 400 – 529; Kuklík – němeček, Od národního státu, pp. 122 – 211. The author will further in the text try to reduce analysis of actions around the Statute of Nationalities to the minimum, because this document is not subject of his interest. As an interesting thing may be a fact that French diplomats have talked about the document incorrectly, because they have marked it as the “Statute for the German minority” or “Statute for Sudeten”. AMAE, Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 117, le 15 mai 1938, f. 83; ibid., le 19 mai 1938, f. 168.  Národní archiv Praha [National Archives] (hereinafter NA), f. Předsednictvo ministerské rady (hereinafter PMR), kt. 4396, protokol o schůzi ministerské rady, konané dne 8. dubna 1938, bod III. Menšinový statut.

206

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

already resigned from their mandates and the party replaced them with loyal members.⁸³ During these days, the British Minister to Prague perceived the events in the country where he was accredited with great sensitivity. On April 12, 1938 he sent a document to Lord Halifax where he mentioned that when he was appointed to his office, he was instructed by the former head of the Foreign Office Anthony Eden to push the Czechoslovak Government to far-reaching concessions as to the matter of the minority policy, “but for its own sake and not because it might facilitate an agreement with Germany”.⁸⁴ Newton further summarized the situation that currently reached the phase when based on good advice, the Czechoslovak Government was preparing a draft of the modification of the Statute of Nationalities, which he marked as a great success. However, he also expressed his concern that the subsequent development will show if the matter of minorities is the only problem in Czechoslovak-German relations, which was also expressed by Czechoslovak politicians themselves. He continued: “There are in fact grounds for believing, as every Czech believes that for the Reich the German minority is a useful instrument for bringing pressure to bear upon the Czechoslovak government for the benefit of the Reich.”⁸⁵ The Minister then logically added that not even the positive development in the minority policy will calm relations between Prague and Berlin. This is why he come to the conclusion that Czechoslovakia now has three options for anchoring its position in Europe – 1) to remain in its current position of a nominally independent state, which is however de facto kept alive by France and in a certain regard by Great Britain; 2) to be a neutral country and 3) to get into the sphere of influence of Germany. Newton supposed that Czechoslovakia cannot remain in the first option long-term and this is why he suggested the second option to the Foreign Office. The third option remains, which is the worst for Prague.⁸⁶ So the idea of neu-

 TNA, FO 371/21715, C 2964/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, April 11, 1938, f. 198.  TNA, FO 371/21715, C 3045/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, April 12, 1938, f. 201.  Ibid., f. 202.  Ibid., ff. 202– 203. Basil Newton then questioned the sustainability of existence of the Czechoslovak Republic, when he suggested its modification in the Central European Switzerland or Belgium. Ibid., f. 204. His opinions were denied by the Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Orme Sargent, because the position of both examples mentioned by Newton was different from the position of Czechoslovakia according to his opinion, because the country does not have the luck to create a buffer state, “she is merely a barrier between Germany and her ambitions”, stated Sargent. Ibid., April 22, 1938, f. 200. He marked even other Newton’s suggestions for the transformation of mutual guarantees between Prague, Paris and Moscow as unenforceable. Even Robert Vansittart rejected Minister’s conclusions, because he thought that they can threaten prestige of Great Britain. Cf. ibid., April 27, 1938.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

207

trality of the Czechoslovak Republic was manifested here and it would appear more frequently in the future. Newton’s memorandum was rejected as unjustified, wrong and ultimately by high representatives of British diplomacy for the time being, threatening not only the position of Czechoslovakia but the prestige of Great Britain as well. Although the Minister to Prague was right in that the position of Prague was worsened in terms of international politics following the Anschluss of Austria and that Berlin does not like its focus on France and USSR, he did not, however, realize or he did not want to realize that there was no other foreign policy concept for the Czechoslovak Government and not even for President Beneš (of course, the Little Entente must be mentioned). Of course, London pushed its interests, which was absolutely logical. These were based on maintaining peace event at the cost of pressuring Prague to conclude an agreement with the Sudeten German Party. Some diplomats still assumed, however, that the Czechoslovak Republic would fall within the sphere of influence of Germany. The Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Government Robert Vansittart also presented his view of the difficult situation and he unequivocally preferred the policy of putting pressure on the Czechoslovak Government to reasonably agree with the Sudeten Germans. He also added that it is necessary to strongly emphasize the word “reasonable,” because, and he was clear here, “we shall on no account and at no time allow ourselves to drift into pressing Czechoslovakia into making unreasonable [underlined in the original – author’s note] concessions,” which means anything that could threaten its independence and integrity, which could lead to a conflict for which Britain is not militarily prepared. “Van” considered anything similar to be incorrect, immoral and threatening the position of his country in the world to a certain extent. In conclusion, he expressed his feeling of concern for which I do not have grounds, but I feel it regardless, he added.⁸⁷ On April 12, 1938, Edvard Beneš decided to inform London, Paris and Berlin or rather the Czechoslovak Legations in these cities about the main directives of the statutory modification of the position of national minorities, which he was describing as the “far-reaching action in our minority matters”. The President announced that the government and political parties discussed problems, which burden national minorities with him and they decided to prepare a special document summarizing all current rights and legal guarantees of minorities as a whole. “A group of new provisions, which would mean further significant

 TNA, FO 371/21715, C 3065/1941/18, Foreign Office Minute (Sir R. Vansittart), April 8, 1938, f. 274.

208

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

steps to expand rights of our minorities and especially Germans, was added to them,” as the President continued.⁸⁸ Then he listed, what the government is planning to present in Parliament concerning minorities (prevention of denationalization, language law, appointing officers, educational matters etc.) and in conclusion he added that: “These are the main lines. These matters will be improved and added. The Ministerial Council decided that the statue will be quickly executed in the Ministries of the Interior, Justice and for Unification of Acts and that there will be further contact and discussion with German parties, SdP and even with German Social Democrats, who are not in the government but are still a part of the governmental majority.”⁸⁹ Edvard Beneš also informed London and Paris that: “In the coming days, there will be a more detailed memorandum executed concerning all these issues, which may then be handed over to the local government as a confidential and official statement of the Czechoslovak Government. Such a memorandum shall inform the local government about Czechoslovakia’s efforts and its good will and the option, if Germany will take further action against the Czechoslovak Republic then both countries under the agreement with Czechoslovakia may eventually intervene in Berlin, would be left on the table.”⁹⁰ The government was working quickly on the memorandum. It was making efforts, so the main basics of the new nationality program of the government would be available during the British-French negotiations, which were to take place on April 28 and 29 in London. So the document titled the Memorandum on Nationality Policy in the Czechoslovak Republic, which is usually marked as the First Plan of correction of position of minorities within the project of the national state, was delivered to Paris and London by plane on April 26⁹¹ and even Berlin was informed about its content through Czechoslovak Minister to Berlin Vojtěch Mastný. However, the statute did not become the subject of BritishFrench negotiations because of its late delivery⁹² even though British Minister Basil Newton informed London already on April 19 that the Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta handed over the Czechoslovak Government’s proposal for the resolution of minority issues translated into French. Newton was really careful and

 Beneš, p. 352.  Ibid., pp. 353 – 354.  Ibid., p. 354.  Robert Kvaček is mentioning that Jan Masaryk picked up the document personally in Prague. Kvaček, Obtížné spojenectví, p. 132.  Štefan Osuský informed Prague that according to his messages, officials of the Foreign Office will not have enough time to study it. AMZV, PZ Paříž, 1938, běžná zpráva č. 57, 27. dubna 1938, p. 2.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

209

he informed Lord Halifax, that if President Beneš were to ask him for his opinion on the document, then he shall reply that he does not have any instructions from the Foreign Office. “Should he, however, press me further, I would propose, with all reserve, […] to offer my purely personal and preliminary comment […],” added Newton.⁹³ An important comment for the sent material was made by the official of the Foreign Office William Ivo Mallet, who noted with concern, “that it is clear that in their present form the Czechoslovak proposals will not satisfy the German minority”.⁹⁴ Although we do not know what the largest minority in Czechoslovakia is demanding exactly, continued Mallet, but according to the drafts of six acts from April 1937, Henlein’s letter to the president from October 1937 and his speech in Carlsbad, plans of the SdP can be reasonably estimated, as he added, and then he indicated three areas, which play a major role – acknowledgment of Sudeten Germans as an equal nationality; proportional division of positions in the state administration, self-government based on new communal elections; economic matters, such as the return of taken German land.⁹⁵ According to Mallet’s opinion, the Czechoslovak proposals were trying to meet the demands of the Sudeten German Party only on the second point albeit significantly. Conversely, he missed any remarks about concessions in the economic area. He felt that the basic flaw is that Prague is not willing to acknowledge German nationals as equal to Czechs and Slovaks, which he considered as rather strange with respect to President Beneš’s statement about the impossibility of future functioning of the Czechoslovak Republic as a national state. In conclusion, he stated that it is too early to form a detailed opinion and even if we do not want to advise Prague to take actions, which will commence the disintegration of the country, we have to warn them that currently, Mallet wrote his elaborate under the influence of SdP’s congress in Carlsbad, its offer for the German minority is unacceptable, he added.⁹⁶ The conclusion of Mallet’s text revealed his skepticism about the feasibility of a nationalities settlement in Czechoslovakia. Reference to the Carlsbad congress of the Sudeten German Party, where the requirements were presented

 TNA, FO 371/21716, C 3315/1941/18, Newton to Halifax, April 19, 1938, f. 51. He was enforcing meaningless statements according to which everything will be based on the Czechoslovak response. Ibid., f. 52. Newton was further suggesting to Halifax that he would recommend possible changes of the text to Beneš, for example the term “minorities” was substituted by the term “nationalities”. Ibid., f. 53.  TNA, FO 371/21716, C 3315/1941/18, April 25, 1938, f. 49.  More in detail cf. ibid., ff. 49 – 50.  Ibid., f. 50.

210

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

and remained basically still autonomist, however not on the personnel principle, but rather a territorial principle, showed that he was influenced by SdP policy in terms of domestic policy in the Czechoslovak Republic; the required autonomy should have been more in compliance with the federal arrangement of the state, which would however mean the beginning of crumbling of the territorial integrity of the country. At a congress in Carlsbad, Konrad Henlein rejected the solution of the minority issue based on the Statute of Nationalities as an insufficient attempt.⁹⁷ The first reaction of British diplomats on the published proposal of the Czechoslovak Government related to the resolution of the status of minorities in the First Czechoslovak Republic did not show signs of trust or positive assessment. Newton did not want to make any particular assessments and Mallet marked the document as imperfect and unacceptable for the SdP. The leader of the Sudeten German Party Henlein himself directly rejected Prague’s attempt for the provision of concessions; at this time, it was a purposeful effort for disagreement, because Henlein was accepted by Adolf Hitler at the end of March, who instructed him to make such demands that the Czechoslovak Cabinet will not be able to meet; demands incompatible with the current political and legal structure of the First Czechoslovak Republic.⁹⁸ On the outside, the leader of the SdP still had to maintain the impression that he of course wants to reach an agreement. He confirmed this, for example, during his conversation with Conservative politician Victor Cazalet (on April 19, 1938), when he admitted to ties with Berlin, but he denied any instructions or orders for the Sudeten German Party from Chancellor Hitler. In answer to the question of why he does not already announce clear contours of his party’s requirements, which could accelerate the potential agreement according to Caza-

 Of course, his speech was monitored even by the British Legation, which informed London even about opinions of German and even Czechoslovak press. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21716, C 3458/ 1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, April 25, 1938, ff. 120 – 121; ibid., C 3459/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, April 26, 1938, f. 123. Karl Hermann Frank’s publishing house obviously published Henlein’s speech in print under the title We Want to Live as Free Men among Free Men, Speech, Delivered before the Annual Congress of the Sudetendeutsche Partei on April 24th, 1938 at Karlsbad, Karlsbad, Leipzig 1938. TNA, FO 371/21716, ff. 176 – 201. Sydney Morell marked Henlein’s demands as the beginning of process of integration of Sudeten German territories with the Reich. Morell, p. 21.  Kvaček, R., Jednání o československý národnostní statut v roce 1938 [Negotiations on the Statute of Nationalities in 1938], in: Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Philosophica et Historica 1, Studia Historica XVI, Praha 1977, p. 118; Kural, V., Konflikt místo společenství? Češi a Němci v československém státě (1918 – 1938) [Conflict instead of Community? Czechs and Germans in the Czechoslovak State (1918 – 1938)], Praha 1993, p. 171.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

211

let, Heinlein stated that he has to proceed carefully so as not to lose influence in the party; his buck-passing words, however, only masked Hitler’s directions to not agree to anything and to continue to make new demands. It would be also reasonable for the government to present its suggestion to the SdP before making them public, so as to avoid negative statements on its account, said the leader of the Sudeten German Party.⁹⁹ The impression of temperance and willingness to negotiate was expected even by Jan Masaryk, who handed this information over to Minister Newton. The Czechoslovak Minister to London also presumed that there would be peace as to the matter of the German minority during the subsequent three or four months and that Henlein would appear as a moderate politician who wants to reach an agreement at the upcoming congress in Carlsbad. The British Minister agreed with Masaryk and added that a satisfactory solution has to be found, otherwise I see it quite negatively, he stated.¹⁰⁰ In the second half of April 1938, British Ambassador to Paris Phipps confirmed that the French Government received Beneš’s plan for the solution of minority issues (he actually wrote Beneš’s plan) that he is studying it and that he hopes that it will be a subject of discussions in London next week (as we know, this did not happen). Quai d’Orsay also instructed the French Minister to Prague de Lacroix to proceed in close cooperation with his British colleague. However, it was also confirmed that Paris was currently not able to form its policy in relation to Czechoslovakia itself. The French Government “will however be glad to consider immediately any further suggestion which His Majesty’s Government may wish to put forward,” was also in the conclusion of Phipps’s telegram.¹⁰¹ The situation after the congress of the Sudeten German Party in Carlsbad forced Basil Newton to inform the Foreign Office that it is not keeping any direct

 Cf. TNA, FO 371/21716, C 3316/1941/18, Account of Captain Cazalet’s Interview with Konrad Henlein at Carlsbad, April 19, 1938, ff. 66 – 67. Orme Sargent noted that after reading of Cazalet’s report, he cannot resist the impression that the presence of an independent mediator in Czechoslovakia would be really desired at this period. Ibid., April 30, 1938, f. 62. Wenzel Jaksch truly handed over the memorandum called A Peace Plan for Central Europe in which he rejected the possibility of agreement of the Czechoslovak Government with Konrad Henlein because of his influence by Nazi ideology on one side and Prague’s short-sighted policy on the other side, to one friend of Robert Hadow, as the former the British Legation Secretary expressed himself about this man, at the beginning of the first half of April. The leader of the German Social Democracy also suggested the creation of platform of Czechs and Germans with restraint opinions, which should have helped with the solution of escalated nationality situation in Czechoslovakia. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21717, C 3818/1941/18, May 4, 1938, ff. 94, 96 – 97.  TNA, FO 371/21716, C 3341/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, April 22, 1938, f. 75.  TNA, FO 371/21716, C 3342/1941/18, Telegram from Sir E. Phipps, April 22, 1938, f. 77.

212

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

relations with Konrad Henlein and that it would not be suitable, unless the Czechoslovak Government knew about it. The diplomat admitted that it would not make much sense and that the SdP is acknowledging only the Third Reich as a foreign authority.¹⁰² William Strang wrote to Newton that he was talking with Orme Sargent about the possibility of establishing direct contacts with the strongest German political party, who came to the conclusion, “that Henlein now has no will of his own and is only Hitler’s puppet,” but immediately he did not exclude the possibility that the leader of the SdP will realize that when the events escalate, then Sudeten German territories may become a battlefield.¹⁰³ The Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs clearly stated that Henlein is only a puppet in the hands of the Reich Chancellor, but he still naively hoped that would perhaps come around. Almost at the end of April 1938, the Minister to London Jan Masaryk began with the more extensive assessment of Czechoslovak policy of nationality rights, when he presented the Memorandum on the Nationality Policy of the Czechoslovak Republic at the beginning of which (The Present Nationality Policy of Czechoslovakia) he stated that the Czechoslovak Government realized from the beginning that it would not be possible to create a national compact state of Czechs and Slovaks in Czechoslovakia where the rights of remaining ethnic groups would be oppressed. Then he outlined the development towards the establishment of a democratic state with equal rights for all citizens, which he divided into three phases – 1) adoption of a constitution, which ensured equal rights for all citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic regardless of their nationality, and other connected acts; 2) period of a majority agreement with minorities, where pre-war Austria-Hungary failed in its internal policy – education,¹⁰⁴ removal of privileged status of Germans and Hungarians, which, quite logically, led (for example) to the reduction of the number of German schools. According to Masaryk, this policy was supported by reasonable Germans and Hungarians; 3) era of cooperation, which meant especially German political activism, which he felt lasted

 TNA, FO 371/21716, C 3441/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, April 25, 1938, f. 109.  Ibid., Strang to Newton, May 6, 1938, f. 110. Strang then recommended to Newton to consider establishment of certain contacts with Henlein, so he could potentially warn him about consequences of his ill-considered steps, as the head of the Central Department wrote. Ibid., f. 111.  Sudeten Germans could rely on the broadly conceived and differentiated educational system in Czechoslovakia. Suppan, A., Hitler – Beneš – Tito. Konflikt, Krieg und Völkermord in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa. Teil 1 [Hitler – Benes – Tito. Conflict, War and Genocide in East Central and Southeastern Europe. Part 1], Wien 2014, p. 379.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

213

from 1926 to this day.¹⁰⁵ However, the Czechoslovak Minister was wrong in this last sentence, however, because the policy of activism was already dead at this point and not even one German politician was a member of the Czechoslovak Cabinet. According to Masaryk’s opinion, there was no doubt as to the fact that Czechoslovak nationality policy provided wide civil and political rights to all inhabitants, which allowed them to lead a full life and have proportionate representation in legislative bodies. It was followed by a list of schools, because, according to his opinion, minorities did not have anything to complain about even in this area. This is why the Czechoslovak Minister to London had to state that the Czechoslovak Republic was comparable to any other state with respect to its minority policy and that it has nothing to be ashamed of.¹⁰⁶ The second part of the document focused on the preparation of drafts of acts, which would treat nationality minorities better and create a legislative environment in which the minority policy could be better enforced.¹⁰⁷ In response to Masaryk’s memorandum, Frank K. Roberts from the Foreign Office noted that it will be difficult to harmonize Czechoslovak advancement in the area of minority policy with requirements of the SdP, but he did not explicitly express disagreement with Masaryk’s opinions on his statement, rather he shared his skepticism about the likelihood of reaching an agreement with the Sudeten Germans.¹⁰⁸ In the turbulent time, the Czechoslovak Minister tried to summarize the position of Prague, which had to face not only the pressure of the Sudeten German Party, now fully under instruction from Berlin, but even diplomatic pressure from London and Paris, when the Western Powers demanded the calming of a “rocking ship” called Central Europe. The record of British diplomat Roberts did not indicate much on how to achieve this, because it only repeated what British politicians were already stating for some time – the Czechoslovak Government must come to an agreement with the Sudeten Germans. It seemed, however, that British diplomacy did not at all consider Czech public opinion and its growing reluctance as to the increasing demands and arrogance of the SdP at this moment.¹⁰⁹

 TNA, FO 371/21716, C 3460/1941/18, Czechoslovak Minister (Communicated), April 26, 1938, ff. 126 – 128.  Ibid., ff. 128 – 131. However, the economic crisis and rise of the National Socialism changed current limits for the continuation of this policy, as Masaryk added.  Ibid., ff. 134– 137.  Ibid., April 27, 1938, ff. 124– 125.  Cf. TNA, FO 371/21716, C 3466/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, April 26, 1938, f. 149.

214

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

In connection with the congress of the SdP, the end of April 1938 whipped into a frenzy the domestic policy situation in Czechoslovakia to a certain extent. It also provided confirmation of Sargent’s opinion about Henlein’s connection to Berlin mentioned above when Basil Newton wrote that he does not believe the leader of the SdP when he states that he is acting independently from Berlin.¹¹⁰ However, British diplomats (Sargent and Newton) further enforced an agreement between Prague and Henlein, even though they considered him to be Hitler’s puppet and they had no illusions about his successors. In addition, the Minister to Prague trusted the leader of the SdP in that his requirements will grow. Newton confirmed his doubts about the hope for an agreement between the Czechoslovak Government with the Sudeten German Party in another telegram in which he wrote about the thorough analysis of President Beneš’s speech at the National Assembly and Henlein’s Carlsbad speech. Sudeten Germans are now claiming their allegiance to Nazism, he continued, which was according to his opinion in contradiction to the statement, which the leader of the SdP made during his speech in Česká Lípa in October 1934. Nevertheless, the British Minister still believed in the possibility of an agreement if Prague would acknowledge members of the largest minority to be equal with Czechs and Slovaks. He informed the Foreign Office about the requirement of the party for the fundamental transformation of the state “on the basis of self-governing racial groups administering their own territory according to their own principles […]”.¹¹¹ At this point it was only an acknowledgement of SdP’s demand for territorial autonomy, which was in direct opposition to the current concept of the unitary Czechoslovak state. This is why Basil Newton came to the conclusion that the gap between what the Czechoslovak Government offers under the Statute of Nationalities and what the Sudeten German Party demands is indeed significant. The Minister believed that Henlein’s postulates seem exaggerated under current circumstances and they are most likely implying a potential disagreement. “Finally lurks in the background the demand for the self-determination which can of course mean nothing else than secession,” he stated in conclusion.¹¹² Events around the development of demands of the Sudeten German Party in Czechoslovakia even affected Robert Vansittart, who wrote a memorandum to Foreign Secretary Halifax in which he mentioned that Henlein’s British friends advised him some time ago to follow the program established at the party con-

 TNA, FO 371/21716, C 3470/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, April 26, 1938, f. 157.  TNA, FO 371/21716, C 3478/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, April 26, 1938, f. 161.  Ibid., f. 163.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

215

gress in Česká Lípa in 1934 and repeated during his lectures in Chatham House to maintain the sympathy, which he enjoyed in certain political circles – no territorial autonomy, no Pan-German “outbursts” and no policy of force. “Now a great change had taken place in regard to the Sudetendeutsch cause,” stated “Van.”¹¹³ According to the Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Government, President Beneš presented a plan of true concessions (the Statute of Nationalities), but the SdP is modifying its objectives, which are however exceeding the framework of the Czechoslovak Constitution, he added. If that was Henlein’s objective then he will lose his support which he received from London, predicted Vansittart.¹¹⁴ He was also convinced that British public opinion is starting to support official Czechoslovak representatives more than before and on the contrary, it is turning away from the verbal support of the Sudeten German Party. He considered Henlein’s speech in Carlsbad to be an answer to British advice and factual proof of his clear connection to the policy of Berlin.¹¹⁵ Robert Vansittart, former Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office and current Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Government supported the opinions of Basil Newton and Orme Sargent and marked the Carlsbad Program as basically impossible for the Czechoslovak Government and he considered it to be confirmation of the line of thinking of the SdP leader and his companions, who were working for Berlin now and were heading towards threatening the territorial integrity of the First Czechoslovak Republic. “Van” appreciated the seriously intended concessions of President Beneš and the Czechoslovak Government and on the other hand he found it regretful that Henlein diverted from the reasonably sounding demands from 1934. It was even stranger that everyone including “Van” himself still enforced an agreement with the SdP. At the end of April 1938, the issue of internal arrangement of the Czechoslovak Republic became the subject of the meeting agenda of the British Government. Lord Halifax introduced this agenda item by stating that the Czechoslovak problem represents the trickiest point for the upcoming negotiation between representatives of His Majesty’s Government and the French Cabinet and that he is supporting everything, which will help to maintain European peace. He further

 TNA, FO 371/21716, C 3510/1941/18, Foreign Office Minute (Sir R. Vansittart), April 25, 1938, f. 224.  Ibid. “Any policy other than his previous reasonable line of constructive co-operation with the State against the irredentists and Radicals must lead to a European or world war,” as “Van” indicated a dark future. Ibid.  Ibid., ff. 225 – 226.

216

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

stated that neither Great Britain nor France are ready¹¹⁶ for a war with Germany and that not even a long-term war automatically means that Czechoslovakia will be restored within its current borders. The Foreign Secretary took a buck-passing stand from the Central European point of view when he stated that the policy of London is based on the conviction that Berlin cannot do what it wants and on the warning of Edvard Beneš that he has to work hard. His sentences expressed the opinion of the majority of the government, including the Prime Minister, who did not want a war at any price. The head of the Foreign Office was aware of the fact that the immediate military help of Britain to Prague is not an option. “[…] neither the French nor we should place ourselves in a position of being humiliated by a German rejection of Czechoslovak proposals: in other words, we should avoid sponsoring those proposals,” he added.¹¹⁷ The British Government’s statement, which preferred the Foreign Secretary’s opinion, was not surprising. London was willing to support all efforts, which would avoid a war and it intended to pressure Prague to make concessions for this purpose. On April 28 and 29, 1938, representatives of the British and French Governments met in London to dedicate the second conference day to the tricky problem of national minorities in Czechoslovakia. At the beginning of negotiations, Lord Halifax presented the generally known fact that the current situation in Czechoslovakia is a crucial matter for the British Government, which gained importance because of events in Austria, among others. The German minority is becoming more and more united under the leadership of Konrad Henlein and its dissatisfaction with the Czechoslovak Government’s policy is growing, stated the Foreign Secretary and added that current events in Central Europe can explode on a much bigger scale than a month ago (the Anschluss of Austria).¹¹⁸ Then he repeated that London is aware of French obligations in relation to Czechoslovakia, but it perceives current events with great concerns for the future and that both countries must do everything to avoid the break out of general conflagration. The head of the Foreign Office also warned French colleagues about  Coutts, M., The Political Career of Sir Samuel Hoare during the National Government 1931 – 40, PhD. Thesis, University of Leicester, Leicester 2010, p. 216. The author proves here, as was surprising at the time that Hoare did not support Czechoslovakia, but he more likely supported the mutual advancement with France.  TNA, FO 371/21716, C 3642/1941/18, April 27, 1938, f. 270. Then he announced to present persons that German public opinion in Czechoslovakia fully supports Konrad Henlein, which was not absolutely true and that the leader of the SdP is getting more and more under the influence of Adolf Hitler, which was more than clear. In the conclusion, Halifax estimated that both parties basically cannot reach an agreement. Ibid., f. 271.  TNA, FO 371/21717, C 3730/1941/18, Extract from Record of Conversations between British and French Ministers on April 28 and 29, 1938, f. 30.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

217

the complexity of military operations in the case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia because London asked the Chiefs of Staff to provide a statement from the Army after the Anschluss of Austria. It described a complicated and a very difficult defense of Czechoslovakia.¹¹⁹ The Foreign Secretary again emphasized the necessity of warning both sides to do everything to keep the peace and he indicated that especially Edvard Beneš must try to do so. He also announced to those present that materials prepared by the Czechoslovak Government (plan of the Statute of Nationalities) and the Sudeten German Party (the Carlsbad Program) are giving insight as to how difficult it will actually be to reach an agreement.¹²⁰ The French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier then took a stand and he informed those present that Paris wishes to solve the Czechoslovak problem like London, when real possibilities of reaching an agreement must be taken into account. He then stated that Prague is trying to provide sufficient rights to its minorities. On the one hand, the Prime Minister agreed with putting pressure on President Beneš but he admitted that Konrad Henlein does not want a real compromise, but rather he wants the destruction of Czechoslovakia, which was apparent from his Carlsbad speech. Edvard Beneš is a true democrat and he prefers the continuance of mutual negotiations even under the current difficult circumstances, added Daladier. If the Sudeten German Party will not accept the offered concessions from the Czechoslovak Government, which it will offer under pressure from both Western Powers, the French Prime Minister thought it was polite to add that Paris will support Prague in such a case and that it will not allow the division of Czechoslovak territory.¹²¹

 Ibid., f. 31. After the consideration of military and political aspects, His Majesty’s Government came to the conclusion, “if the German Government decided to take hostile against the Czechoslovak State, it would be impossible, in our present military situation, to prevent those steps from achieving immediate success,” stated Halifax. Ibid.  Ibid., f. 31. The Foreign Secretary then repeated that President Beneš is aware of unsustainability of Czechoslovakia as a national state. Ibid. Secretary of State for War Leslie Hore-Belisha even stated later on the press conference that the destiny of Czechoslovakia is sealed. Kvaček, Obtížné spojenectví, p. 135; Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1938, svazek I (1. leden – 30. červen 1938) [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1938, Vol. I, January 1– June 30, 1938], Dejmek, J. – Němeček , J. – Nováčková , H. et al. (ed.), Praha 2000, Doc. No. 239, telegrafická zpráva vyslance ČSR ve Velké Británii J. Masaryka ministerstvu zahraničních věcí o postoji britského ministerstva války k postavení ČSR, Londýn, 28. dubna 1938, p. 375.  TNA, FO 371/21717, C 3730/1941/18, Extract from Record of Conversations between British and French Ministers on April 28 and 29, 1938, f. 32. Daladier also understood that the current escalated situation in Europe is intentionally supported by Germany. Ibid.

218

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

Neville Chamberlain made his appearance after Daladier and he stated that he is willing to believe his words about the great concessions of Prague in relation to national minorities. He immediately added, however, that some of his friends already visited Czechoslovakia (but he did not mention who) and they came to the opposite view, meaning that the Czechoslovak Government promised more than it in fact did. Konrad Henlein did not request autonomy in his Carlsbad speech even if the majority of Sudeten Germans wished for such a step, said the British Prime Minister and he continued that it is necessary to realize, who wants what and what can be done to keep the peace in the current situation. We have to pressure President Beneš into an agreement but not under such circumstances, which could threaten the existence of the Czechoslovak Republic, stated Chamberlain.¹²² It was his typical statement based on the unwillingness to engage in a possible conflict because of the German minority in Czechoslovakia and this is why he was repeating phrases about the necessity of an agreement but not at the price of the destruction of the Czechoslovak Republic. The meeting of both representations continued well into the afternoon and the Foreign Secretary again took a stand first. He stated that both delegations agreed on the provision of advice to Edvard Beneš and if he accepts it and acts accordingly and if Berlin refuses, then Prague can rely on London’s full support, he added. According to Halifax, it was unacceptable for the British Government to go beyond the limits of the Prime Minister’s statement in the House of Commons on 24 March 1938 and the a priori rejection of the Dominions against any new obligations in Europe had to also be taken into account. Again, the head of the Foreign Office repeated its earlier words that Germany should be satisfied with 60 – 70 % of concessions by the Czechoslovak Government, because if it will require 100 %, then London will come to the conclusion that it is not trying to achieve any agreement at all, as Halifax concluded his appearance.¹²³ The fundamental dispute, which was now present between both delegations, was whether the suggestion of the Statute of Nationalities represents the limit mentioned by Halifax, which if it is rejected by Germany and the Sudeten German Party directed by it, then it will be considered to be a confirmation for the British Government of Berlin’s unwillingness to make an agreement and therefore a decisive step to provide clear aid to Czechoslovakia in case of a German attack. While France perceived it this way, Britain felt that its Foreign Sec-

 Ibid., ff. 32– 33.  Ibid., ff. 35 – 36. Alexander Cadogan mentioned in his diary that he absolutely agreed with Prime Minister’s and Foreign Secretary’s opinion. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, p. 73.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

219

retary did not, which was not a surprise. Sentences according to which Britain should turn to Germany through the diplomatic channel and inform it that London will do everything to achieve an agreement in the Sudeten German issue and that it will pressure Edvard Beneš to concede were selected as the final communication. The British Government, however, should have required a clear statement about this matter from Berlin. At the same time, both governments should have contacted Prague and declare the importance and significance of achieving an amicable solution of the minority issue at the price of maximum concessions. If the threat of an armed conflict continued, then the British Government would in such a case notify Germany that it had done everything for the conciliation and that if force will be used in spite of this and if France stands on the side of Czechoslovakia, then “His Majesty’s Government could not guarantee that they would not do the same,” as was recorded in the meeting minutes.¹²⁴ Negotiations of the French and British delegation at the end of April 1938 demonstrated London’s unwillingness to bind itself to anything specific in terms of guaranteeing Czechoslovak territorial integrity. Chamberlain and Halifax only repeated phrases about the necessity to reach an agreement, the complexity of the whole problem and the need to pressure Edvard Beneš, so that he would understand the seriousness of this situation and act accordingly. The unclear promise of joint advancement with France if the situation escalates did not contain clear provisions but was only a phrase to satisfy Paris. British politicians, however, were aware of the interconnection of Berlin’s policy and the actions of the SdP in Czechoslovakia, but still they had hoped that Hitler and Henlein under his guidance have a limit, which they will not dare to cross. Several days after the negotiations of both governments, Jan Masaryk asked for a meeting with Lord Halifax, who granted it and immediately informed the Czechoslovak Minister what was discussed. He also indicated that if Prague will be determined to resolve the problem with minorities then there is still a long way to go. The Foreign Secretary then stated that it would be favorable, if Berlin had presented the contours of its ideas about the German minority in Czechoslovakia, because it would help London’s negotiations. He also repeated the words about the need to take all possible steps to prevent the outburst of war to Masaryk. The Czechoslovak Minister thanked him for his sincerity, which did not surprise him, and he stated that if the German minority will join the Third Reich

 TNA, FO 371/21717, C 3730/1941/18, Extract from Record of Conversations between British and French Ministers on April 28 and 29, 1938, f. 37. Cf. also Dejmek, Edvard Beneš, pp. 110 – 111; Kuklík – Němeček, Od národního státu, pp. 158 – 161.

220

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

in the future, he does not expect a similar scenario for Polish or Hungarian minorities.¹²⁵ The memorandum of the former Minister to Prague Joseph Addison (from April 21, 1938) related to Czechoslovakia caused interesting reactions at the Foreign Office; Addison¹²⁶ left it with the Ambassador to France Eric Phipps, who supposed that the opinions of a man, who spent six years in Prague, may help with the resolution of the current difficult problem; even though he also admitted that Addison’s statements are “violently anti-Czech”.¹²⁷ Subsequently, a live debate ensued at the Foreign Office. While Michael J. Creswell admitted that the conclusions of the former Minister to Prague are one-sided, he considered them to be largely true. William Ivo Mallet labelled them outright wrong and arising from bad assumptions.¹²⁸ Unsurprisingly, Robert Hadow, former Secretary of the British Legation in Prague and the inseparable co-creator of the negative image of the First Czechoslovak Republic in eyes of the Foreign Office, supported Joseph Addison, when he wrote that Mallet is wrong in considering Addison’s conclusion to be incorrect. Hadow noted that Czechs are in fact the minority in their own state, allegedly there is 48 % of them; here he used the good old practice of counting Slovaks as a separate nationality. In the conclusion of his note, as he did when serving in Prague, he attacked Edvard Beneš and accused him of avoiding responsibility for a clear solution of the minority issue.¹²⁹ In his essay, Joseph Addison did not bring any new opinion to the table as compared with his activity as Minister. He posed a suggestive question at the be-

 Cf. TNA, FO 371/21717, C 3738/1941/18, May 2, 1938, ff. 44– 48. Masaryk agreed that he will help with the phrasing of British dispatches to Prague. Basil Newton then received the instruction to negotiate in parallel with the French Minister during the communication with Czechoslovak politicians and not together with him. The British Minister should have asked Krofta or Hodža to meet him, but not later than on May 6. Ibid., Telegram to Mr. Newton, May 4, 1938, f. 49. William Strang mentioned on the same day that Krofta is out of Prague, so Newton will have to meet the Prime Minister. Everything should have been done in a coordinated manner, because according to the course of Newton’s negotiation, Neville Chamberlain should have met Hermann Göring. Ibid., May 4, ff. 43 – 44.  Joseph Addison was the Ambassador to Chile for a short time in 1936 and then he left diplomatic services. However, it is stated in his papers in the Magdalen College Archives in Oxford that “he resigned from his appointment as Ambassador to Chile because he felt he could do more by being in London. Unfortunately, he was mistaken. The government of the day paid as little attention to the views of heads of mission abroad and the Foreign Office as the government had in the years before 1914”. The Archives of Magdalen College, University of Oxford, Papers of Sir Joseph Addison, MC: P214/MS5/1, undated, p. 2.  TNA, FO 371/21717, C 3745/1941/18, Phipps to Sargent, April 25, 1938, f. 52.  Ibid., May 5, 1938, f. 50; May 6, 1938, ff. 50 – 51.  Cf. ibid., May 31, 1938, ff. 51– 52.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

221

ginning asking if Czechoslovakia even has a right for its unchanged existence under the current conditions. After giving a negative answer, he continued with a list of flaws, which Czechoslovakia suffered according to this opinion (composition of nationalities, insufficient consideration of significance of the German minority, intentional Czechization of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia etc.). The former Minister did not forget to mention all the wrongs, which affected the largest minority in connection with the foundation of the state and he repeated his former statement that the majority of Sudeten Germans will prefer to be kicked by any SA member rather than by a Czech policeman. Finally, like Halifax, he came to the conclusion that Czechoslovakia cannot defend itself militarily and he intentionally lowered the quality of the Czechoslovak Army, when he indirectly identified it as secondary.¹³⁰ As for contained opinions, Addison’s memorandum really stalled in the first half of the 1930s and at the end of April 1938 it did not offer any comparable alternative to the main ideological stream of British politics and through the milieu of the Foreign Office. On the other hand, it contained some formulations close to the leadership of the office and it offered the support for the selected approach to the issue of minority policy in Central Europe to a certain extent. As it was mentioned above, Basil Newton should have asked for the meeting with Czechoslovak authorities and he should have informed them about the results of the British-French negotiations as well as the necessity to find a solution to the minority problem in the country. Although he did not have to cooperate directly with his French colleague, he should have coordinated his actions with him according to “cunningly” prepared instructions, he should have known, what Leopold Victor de Lacroix wants to express (he could have known it also), and “although the two communications may not be identical, they shall not be in conflict,” which was also written in the telegram to Prague.¹³¹ The Foreign Office truly “lived” by how and what exactly Minister Newton

 Ibid., April 21, 1938, ff. 53 – 63.  TNA, FO 371/21717, C 3837/1941/18, Telegram to Mr. Newton, May 4, 1938, f. 113. It should have been a verbal communication and the first recipient should have been Kamil Krofta. According to Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office Alexander Cadogan, the main line of Newton’s statement should have described the dangerous situation in Europe, indicated the militarily unsuitable time for the efficient defence of Czechoslovakia for Britain and France and it should have especially repeated to Czechoslovak representatives that London cannot go and that it will not go beyond limits of the statement of Prime Minister Chamberlain presented in the House of Commons on 24 March 1938. Cadogan did not admit any other option, but to find common ground of the Czechoslovak Government and Sudeten German Party “in the interest of Czechoslovakia’s survival, as well as of European peace”. Ibid., May 2, 1938, ff. 114– 115,

222

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

has to tell to Czechoslovak politicians. According to Orme Sargent, there was no doubt that the whole matter about Czechoslovakia is really simple. President Beneš has to be told, “that he must do his damnedest to settle with Henlein, because if he fails he cannot count on any assistance from us (or the French),” added the deputy of Alexander Cadogan.¹³² A similar statement clearly expressed the opinion of the Foreign Office and it did not provide Prague much maneuver space or rather space for finding a meaningful and long-term resolution of the minority issue. Sargent demanded further unspecified concessions from the Czechoslovak President, which were only expressed by succinct words “first last,” and on the other hand he threatened the refusal of aid if consensus is not found; but consensus according to British propositions as could be read between the lines. The British diplomat further recommended that instructions be provided to the Ambassador to Berlin Henderson to ask the German Government for patience with Edvard Beneš, because he is doing everything that he can. The Ambassador then should have warned Berlin against its desire to achieve 100 % success, which was in compliance with the abovementioned advice of the British and French delegation in London. All of Sargent’s material is filled with concern about the German Chancellor’s reaction and with the effort to achieve the solution at any price and even at the price of precipitous development the consequences of which cannot be predicted. Finally, he presented four possibilities of Hitler’s reaction to the British initiative – 1) to ignore it; 2) to declare that he will not be discussing the matter of Sudeten Germans with foreign states; 3) to present an outright unacceptable scheme of a solution; and 4) to outline a reasonable itinerary of progress. According to Sargent, the first two options meant insulting London, the third meant conflagration and all together the deterioration of British-German relations without the possibility of calming the situation in Central Europe. The Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs then described the last option as improbable, but if it were to occur, then it would provide London with an opportunity for its support rather than for enforcing Beneš’s concept (which probably meant the Statute of Nationalities).¹³³ At the turn of April 1938, the leading representatives of the Foreign Office were showing each other up with pessimistic assessments of the possibilities for resolving the minority issue in Czechoslovakia. Cadogan considered the dequotation f. 115. According to his previous statement, he did not consider the defence of Czechoslovakia worth the price of bones of any British grenadier. Vyšný, p. 28.  TNA, FO 371/21717, C 3837/1941/18, April 30, 1938, f. 108.  Ibid., ff. 109 – 110. This is why Sargent did not recommend to demand a clear answer for the question, which are its intentions in Central Europe, from Berlin.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

223

fense of the Czechoslovak Republic to be unreal and he required that a suitable modus vivendi be found to maintain peace in Europe. At the same time, Sargent was describing the possibilities of Adolf Hitler’s reactions in depressing colors and he suggested that if the Chancellor were to decide for a separate action, then Britain will not have an adequate answer at its disposal.¹³⁴ Both men did not doubt the absolute necessity to hear out the postulates of the Sudeten German Party. According to messages of the British Legation in Prague, the Carlsbad Program of the SdP had a normative significance for Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia because they accepted it as themselves, even though they admitted in private that they are in fact demanding more, i. e. plebiscite, according to information of the Consul in Liberec Peter Pares. However, the diplomat also added that the majority of them wish that all their demands are met, but it is not willing to risk a war for them. At this moment, all the Germans think that this is a suitable time for their wishes to be heard, continued the consul, but immediately added that the only thing, which will satisfy them is the approval of absolute parity with Czechs.¹³⁵ Pares had to admit that the willingness of the largest minority for concessions is getting smaller in direct proportion to the improvement of their strategic position during negotiations with the Czechoslovak Government. He forgot to add, however, that Sudeten Germans were able to get to this position (besides other things) thanks to the policy of London, which was pushing too much pressure on President Beneš to make an agreement with them. The British Consul in Liberec then continued with his considerations about the Nazi tendencies of Konrad Henlein, when he stated that his opinions are governed by the attitude of the Sudeten German Party majority, which does not tend to have awareness of the National Socialist ideas but is more affected by the admiration of and loyalty to Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich. Pares then briefly summarized the initial influence of the Kameradschafsbund on Henlein’s opinions, while he subsequently came to the conclusion that it is not the leader of the SdP who is leading the whole movement, but it is the movement which is leading him.¹³⁶ On May 7, 1938, the meeting between Minister Basil Newton and Foreign Minister Krofta took place exactly as per instructions sent to the British diplomat

 At the beginning of May 1938, the memorandum related to the possibility of German attack on Czechoslovakia appeared at the Foreign Office. More in detail cf. TNA, FO 371/21718, C 4139/ 1941/18, Foreign Office Memorandum, May 5, 1938, ff. 175 – 179.  TNA, FO 371/21718, C 3966/1941/18, Mr. Newton to Viscount Halifax, Encls., May 4, 1938, ff. 54– 55.  Ibid., f. 54.

224

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

from London. This meeting began at four o’clock in the afternoon and according to Newton’s messages, the French Minister should have arrived one hour later. Newton was quite brief in his telegram and only informed the Foreign Office about the fact that he has prepared arguments for the Foreign Minister. Even Leopold Victor de Lacroix will hopefully add, how serious the situation is for Paris, added the British Minister in conclusion.¹³⁷ On the same day, again exactly according to the instructions, Nevile Henderson found Ernst Woermann, head of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, to make a prepared statement about the British attitude on the issue of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. The German diplomat was able to provide only a meaningless statement that the whole matter relates to direct negotiations between the Czechoslovak Government and Konrad Henlein. The debate that ensued was concerned with assuring the British diplomat that Berlin is not governing the SdP and Henderson’s answers on how London is going to solve everything amicably. Nevertheless, the British Ambassador did not refrain from expressing a few words of warning about the difference between Czechoslovakia and Austria. Prague has a treaty of alliance with France and if there will be a war nobody knows where it will end, he stated.¹³⁸ On the second day, Basil Newton wrote in more detail about the meeting with Kamil Krofta. According to his words, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister was already prepared for the gravity of the subject based on information from Jan Masaryk,¹³⁹ but because he had returned from Romania,¹⁴⁰ he was able to provide only a preliminary and personal statement, which did not represent the opinion of the Czechoslovak Government. Krofta thanked the Minister for London’s interest in Central Europe, he marked his conclusions about the military readiness of Prague as too pessimistic and he did not refrain from irony when he noted that His Majesty’s Government did not have to work so hard

 TNA, FO 371/21718, C 4010/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 7, 1938, f. 76.  TNA, FO 371/21718, C 4011/1941/18, Telegram from Sir N. Henderson, May 7, 1938, ff. 79 – 80. Nevile Henderson then in his message to Alexander Cadogan stated that the only way out, if there should not be a war, is the immediate announcement of the intent to commence conversations with Konrad Henlein and subsequent pressure on Edvard Beneš, so he will understand, what he should do, otherwise Britain would leave him. Ibid., Henderson to Cadogan, May 11, 1938, f. 86.  Already on 6 May, Jan Masaryk met with Alexander Cadogan, who indicated limits, which should be followed by Basil Newton (his instructions cf. TNA, FO 371/21717, C 3837/1941/18, Telegram to Mr. Newton, May 4, 1938, ff. 118 – 121). TNA, FO 371/21718, C 4159/1941/18, May 6, 1938, ff. 199 – 200. The British Minister was then informed about Cadogan’s meeting with Masaryk. Ibid., Strang to Newton, May 12, 1938, ff. 204– 205.  From the meeting of the Little Entente in Sinaia.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

225

on the repeated explanation of Prime Minister Chamberlain, which he presented on March 24. The Foreign Minister then assured Newton that the Czechoslovak Government will do what it can and he complained that London is underestimating the problems that his government is facing. Then he added that he himself is not optimistic because the Sudeten German Party is getting more aggressive and greedier in its requirements, which could eventually lead to requirements for the absolute surrender of the Czechoslovak Government.¹⁴¹ Surprise and certain disappointment of British diplomats at the Foreign Office caused by Basil Newton’s message about the conversation with Kamil Krofta signalized the incorrect perception of the current status of Czecho-German relations, which was however in line with the current perception which the Foreign Office created and was already enforcing. Of course, the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry assessed the March speech of Prime Minister Chamberlain, it understood the seriousness of the situation, it had regular reports from the Czechoslovak Minister to London and the government itself and the President then clearly indicated that Czechoslovakia is ready to seriously negotiate with Sudeten Germans or rather with the SdP; this is why work on the Statute of Nationalities still continued. However, any expectations that this will be happening under expressions of verbal enthusiasm were not in place. Not only Krofta, but even other Czechoslovak politicians were getting sensitive about the growing foreign political pressure (it must be noted that especially from London) directed against the integrity of the First Czechoslovak Republic and supporting the more and more aggressive steps of the Sudeten German Party. Basil Newton was not hiding his sympathies for the SdP even after there were Labour Day celebrations held in Sudeten German territories with demonstrations against Konrad Henlein. The British Minister labeled them as positive for the Czechoslovak Government and he admitted to the existence of the antiHenlein opposition (which was not a staggering discovery), he immediately added, however, that such information does not have much significance in his eyes, because much of the Czech population got to the borderlands artificially after the war, which was one of traditional arguments of the SdP. He then added that left-wing oriented Germans will never support Henlein anyway.¹⁴² Of course, Basil Newton did not discover anything new, members of the German

 TNA, FO 371/21718, C 4035/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 8, 1938, ff. 94– 95. Krofta’s words terrified some British diplomats. William I. Mallet supposed that the Czechoslovak Government is not any more willing to consider concessions. Ibid., May 9, 1935, ff. 93 – 94. Whereas William Strang believed that Newton will find a greater understanding with Milan Hodža and Edvard Beneš. Ibid., May 9, 1938, f. 94.  TNA, FO 371/21718, C 4056/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 6, 1938, f. 126.

226

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

Social Democracy and several other Sudeten Germans were denying ideas of the Sudeten German Party from the beginning. The abovementioned demonstrations had rather a symbolic significance for Prague because they showed that the SdP does not have unconditional support in German regions as it claimed. On May 9, 1938, the British Minister informed London about the press communiqué from the previous day, which was related to his meeting with the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister and which mentioned that first Newton and then de Lacroix assured the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry about the readiness for their countries to help the Czechoslovak Government with its effort to meet reasonable requirements of the German minority on behalf of their governments; Newton specified that within the intentions of Chamberlain’s March speech, de Lacroix insisted that the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic must be maintained. According to the press, both Ministers then expressed hopes of their governments that the solution will be found as quickly as possible.¹⁴³ Two days later, Basil Newton had a meeting with Prime Minister Hodža to whom he not only repeated what he had presented to the Foreign Minister, but he was also able to describe the dissatisfaction of London with Krofta’s reaction and even with the content of the press communiqué about his demarche. The Prime Minister replied to the Minister that Krofta was certainly not talking on behalf of the whole government and this is why there is no reason for British disappointment. Hodža himself “accepted our démarche as a basis for action and his government had decided really to do everything in their power to ensure appeasement as far Czechoslovakian policy is concerned,” stated Newton.¹⁴⁴ He felt that it could lead to a change in the way the civil servant positions are divided and to complete self-government for Sudeten Germans within the Czechoslovak Constitution, as the Minister stated explicitly. Hodža then described the unwillingness of some Czech political parties to concessions in relation to Henlein and he added that they will hopefully be convinced by President Beneš. Although he was not able to provide the exact date to me, continued the British Minister, the Prime Minister is counting on inviting a representative of the Sudet-

 TNA, FO 371/21718, C 4072/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 9, 1938, f. 146. One day later, Newton received a telegram from the Foreign Office in which his author described Kamil Krofta’s reaction as unsatisfactory and he added that the Minister must find a greater understanding with the President and the Prime Minister. Author of the telegram did not find any words of understanding even for the commentary on reactions of the Czechoslovak press to demarches of the British and French Minister, which he marked as self-satisfying. He was not satisfied even with the press communiqué about which Newton informed the Foreign Office the day before. Ibid., Telegram from Foreign Office, May 10, 1938, f. 147.  TNA, FO 371/21718, C 4191/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 11, 1938, f. 219.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

227

en German Party to negotiations next week, he added.¹⁴⁵ However at this time, the SdP leadership was more and more adamant that their problem has been internationalized, that the Czechoslovak Government must finally understand what it has to do and that civil servants must stop with the oppression of Sudeten Germans.¹⁴⁶ Milan Hodža tried to remedy the unfavorable impression, which was caused by the first reaction of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister to the mutual British and French démarche in London and he promised Basil Newton that his government will do everything in its power to agree with the Sudeten Germans; he backed up his statement by planning to invite SdP representatives to discussions about the future nationality settlement. Minister Newton then repeated over and over the repetitive contradiction about the full autonomy for Sudeten Germans and its conformity with the Czechoslovak Constitution; every time, when British politicians and diplomats talked about the necessity of far-reaching concessions of the Czechoslovak Government, they added that it shall be done within the Constitution. Several days later, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister called the British Minister and informed him that he informed members of the government about their conversation and that there will be a written response soon. Newton replied that he was speaking verbally but that he has no objections to a written response. Then he asked Hodža, if the response will include a mention of the “nationality state,” to which the Prime Minister reacted with reluctant silence and informed him that he can expect the written response at the beginning of next week.¹⁴⁷ Newton did not like the procedure selected by Hodža because he was objectively  Ibid., f. 220. Of course, the discussion with the Czechoslovak Prime Minister caused even the positive reaction of officials of the Foreign Office. Cf. ibid., May 12, 1938, ff. 218 – 219. Newton then sent other telegram to London in which he admitted that Milan Hodža was impressed by British disappointment. Then he used a very unusual comparison, when he described the policy of London: “While His Majesty’s Government are carefully and in my humble opinion rightly, limiting their own responsibilities, they are forcing some very unpalatable medicine down the throats of the Czechoslovak Government. The medicine may be absolutely necessary […], it can hardly be expected that the Czechoslovak Government will at the same time be willing either publicly to eat humble pie or themselves to proclaim the desperate state of their health.” TNA, FO 371/21718, C 4195/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 11, 1938, f. 223. The British Minister then added that it is important that Prague will not do anything, which could threaten the forthcoming negotiations with the SdP. Ibid.  TNA, FO 371/21718, C 4204/1941/18, Newton to Halifax, May 10, 1938, f. 238. The British Minister also informed the Foreign Office about the deteriorating situation with members of the SdP because of the steps of state authorities. He even described the mentioned steps as the main obstacle for the continuation of serious discussions.  TNA, FO 371/21719, C 4287/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 13, 1938, f. 44.

228

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

extending the period during which the Czechoslovak Government should have expressed itself at a time when London would have preferred quick and clear steps. In mid-May 1938, Konrad Henlein visited London which again resulted in much attention from the Czechoslovak press and the political scene according to Basil Newton. There were even alleged opinions that the leader of the SdP was invited by the British Government itself. “Official circles too were not wholly happy about the affair,” added the Minister.¹⁴⁸ Then he admitted that he heard about the visit during the afternoon on May 12 for the first time and he suggested that Henlein’s trip should be presented as an opportunity to provide valuable and suitable advice on the Czechoslovak problem.¹⁴⁹ An officer of the Foreign Office Frank Kenyon Roberts noted that Permanent Under-Secretary of State Cadogan met Jan Masaryk on May 13 and he informed him that Konrad Henlein did not travel to London at the invitation of the Foreign Office and that it was a surprise for the whole office.¹⁵⁰ During his visit, Henlein met Archibald Sinclair, leader of the Liberal Party and perhaps surprisingly he also met with Winston Churchill who informed Foreign Secretary Halifax about the meeting. He also informed him that he saw Jan Masaryk later as well to whom he did not say anything beyond the framework of the March statement of Prime Minister Chamberlain.¹⁵¹ The meeting of the SdP leader and the abovementioned British politicians begun with Henlein stating that his party is not receiving any instructions from Berlin, which was an obvious lie. He further announced to those present that the situation in Czechoslovakia is becoming unbearable and in return he was assured that the British side is supporting his effort about the improvement of living conditions of Sudeten Germans. The leader of the SdP believes that Prague must realize that the time of a national state is over and that the time when all nationalities will be absolutely equal is here, as the written minutes from the meeting continued.¹⁵² Konrad Henlein then outlined three possibilities of the future development, which he believed existed – 1) some form of autonomy for Sudeten Germans within the Czechoslovak state; 2) a plebiscite leading to the probable Anschluss by the Third

 TNA, FO 371/21719, C 4317/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 14, 1938, f. 62.  Ibid.  Ibid., May 16, 1938, f. 61.  TNA, FO 371/21719, C 4386/1941/18, Churchill to Halifax, May 15, 1938, f. 113.  TNA, FO 371/21719, C 4386/1941/18, Note on the Conversations between Mr. Churchill, Sir Archibald Sinclair and Herr Henlein, undated, f. 114. Of course, British politicians were interested, because of the negative relation with Moscow, about Henlein’s opinion as for the CzechoslovakSoviet Pact, which was naturally rejecting. Ibid., ff. 114– 115.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

229

Reich; 3) a war. He himself, as it was written in the material, made a last attempt to achieve option number one, but it has to be carried out fast because his companions are impatient, and they prefer to be integrated with Germany. The leader of the SdP also complained that none of the representative of the Czechoslovak Government met with him to discuss the Statute of Nationalities.¹⁵³ Even Basil Netwon in Prague was informed about the meeting between Henlein and Churchill and Sinclair. The introductory part of the telegram summarized the abovementioned points of the agenda. In the second part, the British Minister to Prague was informed about Robert Vansittart’s opinions because he had also met the leader of the SdP¹⁵⁴ and who in compliance with other leading representatives of the Foreign Office pushed for a quick agreement at the price of concentrating on domestic Czechoslovak problems (complaints of the SdP) and postponing the perspective of foreign policies. The Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Government then raised an objection to Henlein that the emphasis of Nazi opinions in a democratic state may crush into insurmountable obstacles and he recommended not to insist on the compensation of damages from 1918 as required by the party. Allegedly, the SdP leader accepted Vansittart’s advice and behaved reasonably, though he repeated the time pressure and his more and more difficult position.¹⁵⁵

 Ibid., f. 116. In the case of plebiscite, Henlein suggested the supervision of Great Powers and asking of three questions – 1) keeping the status quo; 2) autonomy; 3) Anschluss. When Churchill and Sinclair asked him under which conditions it is possible to achieve an agreement and to not violate the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic, Henlein replied that Prague must agree that all political parties will be allowed to present their opinions that there will be a local autonomy in all territories of minorities, so the Parliament in Prague will be able to control only the foreign policy, money, defence, and communication that there will be established local representative bodies, which will be deciding about local matters and that there will be appointed German-speaking officials. Ibid., ff. 116 – 118.  Consent with the meeting was expressed by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, so “Van” was not acting on his own. TNA, Record of the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) 1/265, May 10, 1938, f. 284. Vansittart’s request for Prime Minister’s opinion cf. ibid., May 9, 1938, ff. 286 – 289. The Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Government explained that it would not be far-sighted to reject meeting with the leader of the SdP, nota bene, when he was meeting with him regularly before. He was also ready to warn Henlein that the escalation of situation in Czechoslovakia is not wise and to advise him to contribute to the calming and to negotiate with Czechoslovak representatives.  TNA, FO 371/21719, C 4386/1941/18, Telegram to Mr. Newton, May 16, 1938, ff. 120 – 123. With the thesis that if Henlein’s moderation came out, then it could worsen his position of the leader of the Sudeten German Party, operated even the next telegram to Newton from London. His author clearly indicated that Henlein’s possible removal would not fulfil the wish of His Majesty’s Government. Newton should have advised Edvard Beneš with whom he should have met that the

230

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

Henlein’s subsequent stay in the British capital only strengthened the conviction of the Sudeten German Party and Berlin to a certain extent, that Britain will not support Beneš. The London visit convinced the leader of the SdP that the Czechoslovak problem and the Sudeten German problem is not a primary issue for London because its only aim is to maintain peace, whether it be with Czechoslovakia on the map of Europe or without it. Based on his London experience, Henlein was now sure that if a war broke out between Germany and Czechoslovakia, London would not send even one fighter plane to help Prague.¹⁵⁶ Basically, at the same time as when Henlein’s visit in London took place, the British Minister to Prague received the Czechoslovak Government’s statement, which in diplomatic words expressed honest thanks for the increased interest in events in Central Europe, about how pleasing it is that Britain and France are dealing with the problem of cohabitation of minorities in the Czechoslovak Republic and that Prague is not perceiving similar steps as intervention in its in-

Czechoslovak side should make an offer arising from the Carlsbad Programme to the SdP, while everything should have been done without the mentioning of Vansittart’s three points. The necessity of the quickest possible offering of fundamental concessions by Prague was repeated again. Ibid., May 16, 1938, ff. 126 – 127. At the end of May, Edward Halifax informed Basil Newton about the meeting of Ernst Kundt with Milan Hodža and he referred to Henlein’s stay in London and to requirements, which he should have raised in relation to the Czechoslovak Government according to it. The Foreign Secretary supposed that similar postulates represent the reasonable basis for the future agreement. “In these circumstances we must leave Dr. Beneš in no doubt that if such a failure to reach an early settlement should result from the unwillingness of the Czechoslovak Government […], this would exercise an immediate and adverse effect upon the interest taken in the problem in this country and upon the sympathy felt for the Czechoslovak Government in their treatment of it,” added Halifax. TNA, FO 371/21723, C 5234/1941/18, Telegram to Mr. Newton, May 31, 1938, f. 6. However, the meeting caused the absolutely incorrect assessment by Edvard Beneš, who stated according to Přemysl Šámal that “England will stand up for us in any case”. AKPR, f. Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protokol T (tajné), sg. T 139/34, kt. 179, T. 1052/38, May 17, 1938. In connection with the Anschluss of Austria. Robert Kvaček is writing about Beneš’s so-called “optimism without realism”, when the President perceived some matters more optimistically than they appeared in reality. Kvaček, Obtížné spojenectví, p. 50.  German Minister to Prague Eisenlohr, for example, “stated after Henlein’s May visit in London in front of Temporary Hungarian Chargé d’Affaires in Prague János Vörnle that certainly no one wants a war, but ‘it can happen to anyone that it will find itself in it regardless of its will’”. Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 419 – 420. On May 22, British Ambassador to Paris Phipps received the telegram from Alexander Cadogan, who clearly indicated to him that Britain will follow its obligations and it will help France, if Germany will attack it, but it will never help it, if there will be the matter of defence of Czechoslovakia against German attack. Cf. TNA, FO 371/ 21720, C 4695/1941/18, Telegram to Sir E. Phipps, May 22, 1938, f. 243. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State added that under current circumstances, it is not real to militarily defend Czechoslovakia against Germany. Vyšný, p. 57.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

231

ternal affairs. The Czechoslovak Government prefers such an arrangement, which will ensure peace in the Central European region and peaceful coexistence of all nationalities in the First Czechoslovak Republic, of course within the current constitution, as Newton’s report continued.¹⁵⁷ Prague also hoped for the good will of all interested parties, including the Sudeten German Party, and it announced that it is not intending to delay anything and that on the contrary, it is preparing a draft of an agreement.¹⁵⁸ On May 13, 1938, the Czechoslovak Government approved the report of the governmental committee dedicated to discussions about the Statute of Nationalities and other steps in the area of the minority policy. According to Basil Newton, the Cabinet declared that basic outline of the nationality settlement concept is completed and that it is prepared to commence the realization of its plans and suggestions through negotiations with interested parties and also in terms of legislation.¹⁵⁹ So, on May 13, Milan Hodža informed members of the government about the results of parliamentary inter-party consultations concerning issues connected with the modification of the Statute of Nationalities and the preparation of other measures of the nationality-political character. The Prime Minister further stated that “preparations are generally completed and that their result is providing a wide basis for the integral solution of current problems or rather that the government is ready to begin the realization of its projects and suggestions through negotiations with interested parties as well as through legislation. The press was informed of the same and on May 14, 1938 the SdP delegation was personally informed of the matter by the Prime Minister, when Hodža provided information about the intention of the government to discuss the nature of the nationality settlement with it during the following days. Several days later, the Prime Minister confirmed the continuing effort of the government to achieve an institutional, permanent and amicable solution of the nationality issue in the state to representatives of coalition press. He informed journalists that the nationality matter will be based on two principles, which are based on ‘our democracy’: self-government and proportionality”.¹⁶⁰ Four days later, Beneš received the British Minister and both men spoke about the minority policy for more than three hours. Basil Newton informed the Czechoslovak President right at the start that it is difficult to persuade Lon-

 TNA, FO 371/21719, C 4319/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 14, 1938, ff. 66 – 67.  Ibid., ff. 67– 68.  TNA, FO 371/21719, C 4320/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 14, 1938, f. 70.  Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 411– 412. Several days later, works on the frame structure of the Statute of Nationalities were terminated, the government approved the document on 19 May.

232

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

don about the honest effort of the Czechoslovak Government to resolve the Sudeten German issue. Beneš of course responded with a statement that Prague is doing everything for a true agreement with the largest minority and it is planning to proceed with significant reforms without any hesitation. However, the President could not have been more specific, because negotiations about the Statute of Nationalities were stagnating and Newton along with the Foreign Office did not like that of course, but he confirmed Milan Hodža’s intention to negotiate with Konrad Henlein. However, the British Minister got the impression that the objective of proposed negotiations with the leader of the SdP will not be an announcement of what the Cabinet is planning to do but only a simple statement that it will commence negotiations.¹⁶¹ Newton felt that he somewhat shocked Edvard Beneš with this clear statement and that he thus perhaps forced him to have a change of his lax attitude as to the resolution of the problem; the President acknowledged that it will not be possible to continue to maintain the concept of the national state. On the other hand, according to the Minister’s words, he denied any discussions about the Carlsbad Program and he described at least two or three points as incompatible with the constitutional order of the Czechoslovak Republic. At the end of the meeting, Newton emphasized the unique opportunity to find a reasonable modus vivendi with the German minority once again.¹⁶² Not only the British Minister to Prague but even some officials at the Foreign Office supposed that the Czechoslovak President does not in fact want to negotiate with Henlein at all. According to William I. Mallet, Edvard Beneš showed himself as a person, who does not want to or cannot accept current circumstances even though he understood the necessity of reaching an agreement with the Sudeten Germans. “The trouble, of course, is that what Dr. Benes thinks will constitute an agreement does not necessarily agree Herr Henlein’s ideas,” as Mallet provided his important finding.¹⁶³ In the second half of May 1938, British diplomats (Newton, Mallet, Cadogan) began to come to the conclusion that Czechoslovak President Beneš is not understanding the nature of the situation, that he does not want a true and far-reaching agreement with the Sudeten German Party and that because of his inflexibility, it is possible that a reasonable agreement, from their perspective, will not be

 TNA, FO 371/21719, C 4466/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 18, 1938, ff. 190 – 191.  Ibid., f. 192.  Ibid., May 20, 1938, f. 188. Mallet also began to doubt about the possibility to achieve the desire results without the accompanying modification of the Czechoslovak Constitution and he blamed Beneš that he is not will to modify it for that reason. If there will not be any modification, then I am afraid that the Sudeten Germans will have a recourse outside of the Czechoslovak borders for help, as he added in conclusion. Ibid., f. 189.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

233

achieved. Such a reasonable agreement, however, meant only the fundamental transformation of the current Masaryk-Beneš concept of the unitary state in the country where individual nationalities, with Germans in the first place, of course, would enjoy vast autonomy and where the central government would only be administering foreign policy (however, Henlein had objections even to the current course), finances, defense and communications. However, the Foreign Office and Basil Newton did not know that Konrad Henlein did not want any agreement already since the autumn of the year 1937 and that he only pretended his desire to conclude one. London (and Paris under its influence), however, pressured Prague all the more to realize what must be done and to then do it.¹⁶⁴ Meanwhile, the situation in Czechoslovakia before the announced municipal elections¹⁶⁵ began to escalate;¹⁶⁶ the SdP was performing its pre-election campaign and it expected its absolute victory. On the meeting of the special collegium of political ministers on May 18, 1938, the Minister of the Interior, Agrarian Jan Černý, reported on incidents in the borderlands and about measures implemented to restore order to which senators from the Sudeten German Party responded by accusing the Czech police of brutality and discrimination.¹⁶⁷ Two days before the elections, the government with the participation of the President decided that because of the increasing number of conflicts in the border areas of the republic and based on messages about the movement of German troops in Saxony and Silesia in the direction to Czechoslovak borders, one year of reserves as well as some trained specialists were called to arms.¹⁶⁸  It was confirmed even by another Newton’s telegram to London on 18 May 1938. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21719, C 4475/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 18, 1938, ff. 194– 195. On the other hand, he was informed by Milan Hodža on the same day that he is in contact with the parliamentary leaders of the SdP and that he is planning to request meeting with Konrad Henlein really soon. TNA, FO 371/21719, C 4477/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 18, 1938, f. 199.  Despite the significant success of the SdP in the municipal elections in 1938, the party did not achieve the absolute victory, as it was expecting. In first two rounds on 22 and 29 May 1938, the SdP received 88 % of German votes, however on 12 July, the amount of those votes dropped to 81 %. Cf. César – Černý, Vol. II., p. 463; Brandes, pp. 170 – 180.  The German Legation in Prague reported already on May 12, to Berlin that the situation in Czech borderlands got worse. PA AA, Tschechoslowakei, R 103659 (Rassenfrage, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker), Berlin, den 12. Mai 1938, f. 083. Cf. also AMAE, Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 117, le 17 mai 1938, ff. 129.  TNA, FO 371/21719, C 4513/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 19, 1938, f. 226.  Cf. Kárník, Z., České země v éře První republiky (1918 – 1938). Díl třetí. O přežití a o život (1936 – 1938) [Czech Lands in the Era of the First Republic (1918 – 1938). Part Three. Survival and Life (1936 – 1938)], Praha 2003, pp. 524– 525; Brandes, pp. 146 – 149; Roberts, pp. 138 – 139. “Beneš showed by the partial mobilization in May to Chamberlain that he is not going to

234

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

On May 20, 1938,¹⁶⁹ Lord Halifax invited Jan Masaryk to a meeting, who disclosed to the Foreign Secretary that the Czechoslovak Government is aware of the necessity of direct negotiations with Konrad Henlein and that they will be commenced immediately after the municipal elections. The head of the Foreign Office repeated the importance of acknowledgement of the leader of the SdP as an equal partner to the Czechoslovak Minister and he did not recommend that future negotiations be lead in the style of simple presentation of the governmental offer as something that cannot be changed. He then suggested that it would be suitable to publish Henlein’s invitation to the negotiations and grant him the publicity.¹⁷⁰ One day later, Kamil Krofta informed Basil Newton that the Prime Minister through the Minister of the Interior invited Konrad Henlein to conversations about the Statute of Nationalities, but at the same time he had to add that the Sudeten German Party declined to negotiate until the current oppression is stopped, which meant measures connected with the partial mobilization.¹⁷¹ The May crisis caused by border incidents to which the Czechoslovak Government decided to respond with the call of one year of reserves and the defiant reaction of the Sudeten German Party truly frightened the Foreign Office and it confirmed its conviction that the Sudeten German problem is not only a matter of internal Czechoslovak policy. It resulted in telegrams sent to Nevile Henderson in which London offered that if Berlin will consider it suitable, then he will ask the Czechoslovak Government if the British Legation in Prague could send an observer to the Sudeten German areas; who will not be able to get an overall view, but it could make a good impression. The second of Halifax’s telegrams instruct-

back up. It meant only troubles – for Beneš,” as Sydney Morell wrote. Morell, p. 45. The British Legation informed London about military measures immediately after it received the announcement of the Main Staff of the Czechoslovak Army. Basil Newton added that the press remains silent about everything and that the atmosphere is tense. TNA, FO 371/21720, C 4671/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 21, 1938, f. 177.  Already on this day, there appeared messages about the movement of troops near the Czech-German border and ongoing incidents. TNA, CAB 21/550 (Czechoslovakia: Diary of Events, March – October, 1938), f. 3.  TNA, FO 371/21720, C 4589/1941/18, Strang to Newton, May 20, 1938, f. 10. The British Government and based on instructions from London even the British Legation in Prague forced Prague to make concessions in relation to the German minority, but when Labour MP George Russell Strauss asked in the House of Commons, if His Majesty’s Government will enforce a similar policy even in the relation to the Czech minority in German territory, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Office Richard Austen Butler replied that there is not a numerous Czech minority in Germany and this is why the same principle does not have to be used. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21720, C 4597/1941/18, Parliamentary Question (Mr. Strauss), May 18, 1938, f. 34.  TNA, FO 371/21720, C 4678/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 21, 1938, f. 196.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

235

ed the British Ambassador to Berlin to inform Joachim von Ribbentrop that His Majesty’s Government will to everything possible to calm the current crisis.¹⁷² London was truly afraid of the escalation of tension, which, in its view, could turn into a wider conflict and this is why London was willing to do nearly everything to calm the situation. Offers of one foreign country (Great Britain) to mediate an internal political dispute (when the Czechoslovak Government called a year of reserves in compliance with valid laws) made to another foreign country (Germany) only highlighted the seriousness of the matter and in a certain sense the absurdity around the German minority in the Czechoslovak Republic. The second result of the May crisis was the strengthening of the conviction of highly ranked officials at the Foreign Office that Konrad Henlein must be received by some official Czechoslovak authority as quickly as possible.¹⁷³ On May 23, 1938, Neville Chamberlain spoke in the House of Commons to react to Clement Attlee’s inquiry, if His Majesty’s Government is planning to issue a statement related to the current situation in Czechoslovakia. Immediately at the outset, the Prime Minister noted that events in the Czechoslovak Republic took a dangerous turn and then he summarized events leading to the declaration of partial mobilization. Under current escalated circumstances the only objective of the British Government had to be and must be the contribution to the finding of a peaceful solution, which will satisfy both parties of the dispute, declared the Prime Minister.¹⁷⁴ Then he repeated that the Czechoslovak Government must do everything to reach an agreement with representatives of the Sudeten German Party and that London will be proceeding in conformity with Paris. To conclude his appearance, Chamberlain notified present MPs that the situation in the Czechoslovak borderlands was slightly calmed and that the municipal elections occurred without incidents.¹⁷⁵ However, the internal political circumstances in Czechoslovakia did not help the effort of the British Government. Konrad Henlein stated after his meet-

 TNA, FO 371/21721, C 4774/1941/18, Telegram to Sir N. Henderson, May 22, 1938, f. 40; ibid., C 4775/1941/18, Telegram to Sir N. Henderson, May 22, 1938, f. 42. Cf. also Wallace, W. V., The Making of the May Crisis of 1938, in: Slavonic and East European Review, 41, 97, 1963, pp. 368 – 390; Dejmek, Edvard Beneš, pp. 114– 117.  Sir Robert Vansittart expressed himself in this sense. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21721, C 4851/1941/18, Foreign Office Minute (Sir R. Vansittart), May 23, 1938, ff. 167– 168. “If, however, M. Benes does not come forward quickly, the crisis may boil up again if Germany feels that her face is not [underlined in the original – author’s note] being saved,” as the Chief Diplomatic Advisor to the British Government mentioned exactly. Ibid., f. 168.  TNA, FO 371/21721, C 4847/1941/18, Prime Minister’s Statement in the House of Commons, May 23, 1938, f. 160.  Ibid., f. 161.

236

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

ing with Milan Hodža¹⁷⁶ that he will not be negotiating under pressure and that if the cabinet will not retract its measures, then it is not possible to even think about the continuance of seriously intended conversations. According to messages of Basil Newton, Hodža responded clearly, when he stated that the military measures with the objective to restore state authority do not concern the leader of the SdP and that they worked well in calming the situation in the country. He therefore urged Henlein to stop making demands and to start negotiating to which he received an answer in the negative; however, the leader of the SdP promised to publish his demands in writing within several days.¹⁷⁷ At the end of May, the situation in Czechoslovakia began to slowly calm down not only according to messages of the British Legation in Prague but also according to opinions of leading representatives of the Foreign Office. It was confirmed, for example, through the conversation of Alexander Cadogan¹⁷⁸ with French Ambassador Charles Corbin, when both men agreed that the crisis already culminated and that events are slowly returning to normal. The French diplomat then asked the Permanent Under-Secretary of State on rumors about the plan to send an observer to the Sudeten German areas in Czechoslovakia, who would assess the situation directly on the spot. “I said that the idea had indeed been examined but that no decision had been taken,” noted Cadogan.¹⁷⁹ It was mentioned in the debate between the two diplomats that it is important to examine all possibilities to find an appeasement but that the issue of sending an observer would cause a lot of problems, at least in terms of the territory of the area within which such person would have to travel. According to Cadogan, Corbin supported a similar plan, but it is not clear, if he was speaking only on his behalf or if he was authorized by his government, as the Permanent Under-Secretary of State added in conclusion.¹⁸⁰

 On 23 May 1938, Hodža negotiated with Henlein and Frank. At the end of this meeting, Henlein stated that there will not be any negotiations until the normal conditions will be restored. Cf. Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei 1933 – 1947, Doc. No. 140, Protokoll über die Unterredung Konrad Henleins und Karl Hermann Franks mit Milan Hodža am 23. 5.1938, pp. 210 – 211.  TNA, FO 371/21721, C 4872/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 25, 1938, f. 177.  Cadogan noted it in his diary on 25 May. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, p. 80. On 28 May, Prime Minister Chamberlain wrote to his sister Ida the interesting summary of the Czechoslovak events in which he stated that Berlin realized all necessary preparations for a coup and that the warning from London forced him to back up from the escalation of action. ELLINGER, p. 180.  TNA, FO 371/21722, C 5006/1941/18, May 24, 1938, f. 59.  Ibid. Minister Basil Newton himself then suggested in the discussion with Edvard Beneš that he could meet Konrad Henlein, which could contribute to the finding of suitable solution of the Czechoslovak problem according to his opinion. The President stated that foreign diplo-

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

237

At the end of May 1938, the idea of sending an independent observer who would examined and assess possibilities of establishing new relations between the majority and minorities (of course, primarily with the largest German minority) materialized again. This observer was considered as an option during the May events when border incident caused by members and supporters of the Sudeten German Party evoked the resolute response of the Czechoslovak Government that resulted in the calling of one year of reserves. Although official French policy did not mention this possibility yet, Ambassador Charles Corbin supported it in his conversation with Alexander Cadogan. The Foreign Office, however, began to feel that Prague must immediately commence active negotiations with the leader of the SdP because according to his opinion a lot of time has passed since the end of March without any significant progress on the matter. It also believed that delays will force Henlein to return to his strategy of political obstructions (even he himself started to use it) and that they will radicalize his opinions thereby implying the minimization of possible success. London, however, admitted that it would be better if the leader of the Sudeten German Party presented his demands in writing.¹⁸¹ It was a clever and quite logical observation. Written demands would obviously make the latter modification and expansion of Henlein’s postulates more difficult. Even Basil Newton had a similar opinion and was supplying London with messages at this time according to which now was the right moment to increase pressure on Prague with the objective to make an agreement with the SdP – he felt that this pressure must not let up. He was trying to persuade even French Minister de Lacroix to join in his effort and he indirectly attacked Edvard Beneš, when he wrote that he is of course not suspecting him of the intentional delay of the whole matter but that it would be best to sit down behind a confer-

matic representatives may, of course, meet who they want, but “he gave me the impression that he would prefer that I should not see Henlein during the next few weeks,” stated Newton. TNA, FO 371/21722, C 5007/1941/18, Newton to Strang, May 24, 1938, f. 62.  TNA, FO 371/21722, C 5008/1941/18, Telegram to Mr. Newton, May 26, 1938, f. 66. Even George Ward Price, British journalist and man, who was regularly meeting Hitler since 1934, expressed his support to the Sudeten German Party in the Daily Mail. Cf. Daily Mail, May 26, May 27, 1938. His memories (Ward Price, G., I Know these Dictators, London 1938) cannot hide sympathies for Germany. For all examples, compare, for example, page 95, where he writes about the undeniable German nature of Czech borderlands, or page 168, where he is criticising the May partial mobilization and where he adds that London cannot militarily or economically prevent Germany from its aspirations in Central and South-East Europe.

238

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

ence desk and start negotiating, which the SdP is currently refusing to do, he had to add.¹⁸² On May 30, 1938, Alexander Cadogan wrote to Ambassador to Paris Phipps that despite the fact that negotiations between the Czechoslovak Government and the SdP finally began, “I think we shall be wise to be prepared for a possible breakdown in these negotiations,” mentioned the Permanent Under-Secretary of State exactly.¹⁸³ He stated that London did not want to become an arbitrator between both arguing parties but if conversations between Prague and the SdP were to come to a dead end then it will be necessary to find a solution quickly so the SdP and Berlin will have no reason for a direct action, in other words a violent action. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State no longer concealed his conviction that Great Britain and France would then have to offer to establish an international committee to the Czechoslovak Government, which would duly investigate everything, and which would define further progress. In terms of the possible composition of the committee, the British diplomat counted on the participation of representatives of smaller countries as well in order to give it an “international character,” as he stated.¹⁸⁴

 TNA, FO 371/21722, C 5083/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, May 27, 1938, f. 129. In eyes of some diplomats at the Foreign Office, the Czechoslovak President was becoming a person, who is blocking any progress in negotiations with Sudeten Germans for almost two years. Ibid., Telegram to Mr. Newton, May 30, 1938, f. 131. On its meeting on 18 May 1938, the British Government came to the conclusion, based on messages from Robert Vansittart that Konrad Henlein is not acting according to any instructions from Berlin and that Edvard Beneš must act quickly to reach a reasonable agreement. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21722, C 5115/1941/18, Extract from Cabinet Conclusions 24 (38), May 18, 1938, f. 185. Several days later, Robert Vansittart informed Lord Halifax about the message, which he received from the leader of the SdP and which mentioned meeting of the Czechoslovak Government and ongoing mobilization. The Statute of Nationalities is already completed, but Hodža did not show it to me and he did not even discuss it with me, continued Henlein with his complaints. However, significant was that the Chief Diplomatic Advisor to the British Government came to the conclusion that the leader of the SdP must be exaggerating, which is not good, he stated. So, Vansittart came to the conclusion that both sides must calm down, the SdP and Prague and that they must negotiate, and that London and Prague should not criticise Prague too much for the calling of one year of reserves. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21723, C 5260/1941/18, May 26, 1938, ff. 20 – 23.  TNA, FO 371/21722, C 5211/1941/18, Cadogan to Phipps, May 30, 1938, f. 235.  Ibid. At first, Phipps had to discuss this suggestion with French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet. Ibid., f. 236. According to some opinions, his appointment was enforced by London, which was not satisfied with Joseph Paul-Boncour. Cf. for example Lacaze, Y., Daladier, Bonnet and the Decision-making Process during the Munich Crisis, 1938, in: Boyce, R (ed.), French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918 – 1940. The Decline and Fall of a Great Power, London 1998, p. 215. Even Ernst Eisenlohr war informed, from a trustful source, about the potential committee, which would arrive to Czechoslovakia to examine the problem of cohabitation of the majority

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

239

At the end of May 1938 Alexander Cadogan no longer hid the skepticism of British diplomacy about the possibility of a possible agreement of the Czechoslovak Government with representatives of the Sudeten German Party and as well as the intention of London, if this really occurred. He did not see any problem with the establishment of the international committee as its activity should overcome any possible blocking of conversations between Prague and the SdP. The British diplomat was absolutely clearly anticipating international intervention into internal political matters of the Czechoslovak Republic. The May events in the Czechoslovak Republic also forced British military elites to consider current war plans in relation to extraordinary events, which London would have to face. Soldiers were asking if they should perform any special measures in terms of the arrangement of British units at the moment and what is necessary to do in order to increase their readiness. Right at the beginning, there was a clear statement that the British naval units are expecting the primary deployment to be in the Mediterranean Sea or in the Far East, but not against Germany; in that case Italy and Japan would have to maintain neutrality, as authors of the memorandum stated.¹⁸⁵ Even other parts of the document suggested that current events were forcing British military elites to consider possible changes to military strategy because the current one was not counting on Central Europe or rather on Germany in its contours (see the issue of the deployment of naval units).¹⁸⁶

with minorities. Cf. PA AA Tschechoslowakei, R 103660 (Rassenfrage, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker), Prag, den 1. Juni 1938, f. 160. Charles Corbin informed Paris about the possibility of some committee already on 25 May. AMAE, Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 118, Politique étrangère, Allemands de Bohême, le 25 mai 1938, f. 47; cf. ibid., le 26 mai 1938, f. 61.  TNA, FO 371/21722, C 5222/1941/18, May 31, 1938, f. 242. In the next phase of the document was mentioned that Britain has bombers with a limited reach, which would have to start in France in case of a war. Ibid., f. 243.  The commentary of one official at the Foreign Office proved that the material left an alarming mark at the office. There is a lot of serious troubles with which we have to deal to be able to react to the sudden aggression, as he noted. Ibid., f. 241. At the beginning of June 1938, there was even the work material created at the Foreign Office, which counted with the option of neutralising of Czechoslovakia and which was theoretically working with the possibility to force Prague to cancel its treaties with Paris and USSR and guarantee it the combined protection for the case of an unprovoked attack as compensation. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21723, C 5235/1941/18, The Possibility of Neutralising Czechoslovakia, undated, ff. 15 – 17. It was the British attempt to eliminate the orientation of the Czechoslovak Republic on Paris and Moscow and to satisfy Germany, which did not like this alliance line; any combined guarantee in case of a future conflict worked with the option of an “unprovoked attack”, which with respect to recent events in the Czech borderlands was hiding a danger of at least twice explication. Britain itself was not considering any guarantee in this sense. Kvaček, Obtížné spojenectví, p. 192.

240

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

The abovementioned memorandum showed that London was not even counting on a massive use of its units in Central Europe in its military plans. There was a simple reason behind this, however. London did not have a sufficient amount of troops available large enough to threaten Germany – at least that is what military experts thought. The foreign political concept was quite logically set to British life interests that were located in the Mediterranean, Egypt, India or in the Far East, but that certainly did not include the escalation of mutual relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany to a form of military conflict. In combination with the growing conviction of the Foreign Office that President Beneš and the Czechoslovak Government must do everything to conclude an agreement with the SdP and if they will fail, then not even the international committee can be excluded, things were not looking too favorable for Prague with respect to the eventual support of London in case of a war with Germany. Similarly, unfavorable were Lord Halifax’s words that under current circumstances, Edvard Beneš must understand that the delaying the agreement may cause the loss of Britain’s sympathies for Czechoslovakia. From the perspective of Great Britain, it was understandable that it is trying to avoid the escalation of conflict at any cost, aware of its own militarily unreadiness, but the British approach (and gradually even the French one¹⁸⁷ jointly with it) was getting Czechoslovak politicians to a position where they stood not only against the Sudeten German Party governed from Berlin but even against both Western Powers. There was therefore only one solution to the current events – satisfying the largest minority in the Czechoslovak Republic. The escalated situation in the relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany was slowly calming down at the end of May and beginning of June 1938. It was confirmed through information Robert Vansittart received from a trustful source in London, which stated that the threat of a war which reached its maximum on May 25, was now decreased. On the other hand, there is a lot of people with Göring or Himmler among them, wrote the Chief Diplomatic Advisor to the British Government, who are championing the attack on the Czechoslovak Republic with the justification, “that the annexation of Austria would lose its real meaning without the further occupation of Czechoslovakia”.¹⁸⁸ According to his opinion, these people worked under the assumption that Great Britain and France are merely bluffing and that they will not come to help Prague in case of any conflict. The material continued with the statement that according  Cf. for example TNA, FO 371/21724, C 5629/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, June 9, 1938, f. 42.  TNA, FO 371/21723, C 5342/1941/18, Foreign Office Minute (Sir R. Vansittart), June 1, 1938, f. 78.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

241

to some radical circles, Hitler suffered a certain loss of prestige, when he got “frightened” by the strict Czechoslovak response of partial mobilization. “Competent observes are of the opinion that the prestige of the German Nazi government received from the successful operations against Austria was to a very large extent cancelled out by the humiliation of May 21st,” wrote “Van”.¹⁸⁹ The French Ambassador to London confirmed the improvement of the conditions for negotiations between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten German Party in his conversation with Lord Halifax who indicated that Paris hopes that the solution of the minorities’ problem will be found. Charles Corbin, however, correctly pointed out that the leadership of the SdP is having trouble defining its demands and specifying them, which naturally requires more time. The Foreign Secretary, however, saw the problem of the agreement between Prague and the SdP in a different way. He acknowledged that Henlein can make unreasonable requests, but added that the Czechoslovak Government could start thinking that their advancement in May showed their power, and act accordingly from now on. London therefore has to put pressure on Edvard Beneš and request Paris to act likewise, Halifax stated.¹⁹⁰ The beginning of June 1938 showed the restoration of trust of British politics in finding a conciliatory solution for the minority problem in Czechoslovakia. The concerns caused by the partial mobilization in May, or rather the possibility of escalation of Czech-German relations turned out to be groundless according to both the reports of Robert Vansittart and the conversation between Halifax and Corbin, and London could once more fully concentrate on putting diplomatic pressure on Edvard Beneš and the Czechoslovak Government to find and enforce a consensus with the representatives of the Sudeten German Party and pacify the situation in Central Europe. On June 1, 1938, the British Government held a meeting and one of the points of the session program was naturally the events in Czechoslovakia. The Foreign

 Ibid., f. 80. Diplomat Frank K. Roberts wrote that the great threat for the current situation is posed by the wish of the German Government to gain back the lost prestige after the failed action against Czechoslovakia as soon as possible. Ibid., June 7, 1938, f. 77.  TNA, FO 371/21723, C 5368/1941/18, Halifax to Phipps, June 3, 1938, f. 98. Cf. also TNA, FO 371/21723, C 5376/1941/18, Telegram from Sir E. Phipps, June 3, 1938, f. 100. The Czechoslovak President then in a conversation with Basil Newton on 3 June confirmed Prague’s interest in serious negotiation and repeated that the government is interested in reaching an agreement. Then according to the British Minister, he pulled out of his pocket a typewritten text with the demands of the SdP, which mostly described as acceptable; he refused only the idea of the separate parliaments, which threatened the constitutional order and the territorial integrity of the country, stated the president, according to Newton. TNA, FO 371/21723, C 5391/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, June 3, 1938, ff. 106 – 107.

242

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

Secretary introduced to his colleagues from the Cabinet the written outcome of the journey the chief of the Central Department at the Foreign Office William Strang took to Prague, Berlin and Paris. Strang stated that Germany currently does not desire a “surgical operation,” as Germany could obtain what it wished for without it and continued that both Basil Newton and Nevile Henderson agreed on the substance of the foreign policy aspect of the Czechoslovak problem and that if this question of foreign policy was resolved, meaning the definition of Czech-German relations, the problems with the Sudeten Germans will disappear on their own. “For the moment we had stopped the [possible – author’s note] German aggression, but all depended on the [finding – author’s note] Czechoslovak settlement,” stated the British diplomat.¹⁹¹ During the meeting of the government, Halifax repeated the necessity of the largest pressure possible on Edvard Beneš and he indicated that it is the only way how to be successful.¹⁹² At the beginning of June 1938, material that focused on the possibilities of British help to Czechoslovakia in case of German aggression was created. It clearly outlined the conclusion of military elites that if Germany decides to attack, London and Paris do not have a force powerful enough stop it. The subsequent words therefore sounded unfavorable to France, because they were clearly stating that Britain does not have any formal obligation to help France “and still less, Czechoslovakia”. With respect to the weakness of ground and air forces, the document recommended to help France with naval forces in the case of an attack.¹⁹³ The unwillingness to formal obligations was apparent in the material as well as a clear dislike to massive military participation in Central Europe and the recommendation to use the biggest British weapon – economic pressure. The mentioned elaborate directly stated that Britain does not have military ca-

 TNA, FO 371/21723, C 5424/1941/18, Extract from Cabinet Conclusions 27 (38), June 1, 1938, f. 158. William Strang then indicated in France the abovementioned idea of the international committee, if current discussions would fail. Ibid., f. 159. However, Ambassador Nevile Henderson expressed his disagreement with the idea of committee and he justified it with German’s dislike of international organizations. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21724, C 5617/1941/18, Henderson to Cadogan, June 2, 1938, ff. 31– 32.  TNA, FO 371/21723, C 5424/1941/18, Extract from Cabinet Conclusions 27 (38), June 1, 1938, f. 159.  TNA, FO 371/21723, C 5491/1941/18, Czechoslovakian Crisis – The Form of British Assistance, June 1938, f. 230. Authors of material were then clearly talking about the more suitable option to not declare war formally, but to help France in the same manner as Germany and Italy were acting in Spain. Ibid. Subsequently, there were listed political and military circumstances of the possible conflict in Central Europe. Ibid., ff. 231– 234.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

243

pacities to stop Germany if it were to march against Czechoslovakia and it showed to politicians that the country cannot even efficiently help France.¹⁹⁴ At the same time, negotiations between the Czechoslovak Government and representatives of the Sudeten Germany Party commenced again. Milan Hodža informed British Minister Newton about this and he stated that currently it is a discussion of legal experts from both sides (Emil Hácha and Rudolf Schicketanz). The Czechoslovak Prime Minister added that the only serious obstacle is the demand of the SdP to have a local representative body.¹⁹⁵ One day later, the British Minister informed London that representatives of the Sudeten German Party handed over the written summary of their demands arising from the Carlsbad Program to the Czechoslovak Prime Minister.¹⁹⁶ However, the basic problematical point was the fact that while Prague intended to base its negotiations on the prepared Statute of Nationalities, the SdP had its own ideas. In compliance with instructions from London the British Legation in Prague perceived the upcoming times during negotiations between the Czechoslovak Government and representatives of the Sudeten German Party as a critical period when tangible results must be achieved and when it is necessary to support restrained voices on both sides; unfortunately, the Legation assumed that on the side of the SdP, Konrad Henlein is one of them. Basil Newton had the opportunity to talk with Edvard Beneš, who disclosed to him that he sees the publication of the demands of the Sudeten German Party as a good sign for finding a possible solution of the difficult situation. He described some demands as easily feasible, but he perceived others as unworkable, added the British Minister.¹⁹⁷

 Officials of the Foreign Office were not denying the idea of neutrality in the case of war between Germany on one side and France and Czechoslovakia on the other, but in compliance with the tradition of the balance of powers they assumed that London would have to help Paris eventually, so it will not be defeated. However, other ones were not considering the thesis about the formal non-declaration of war as technically feasible. Cf. ibid., June 9, ff. 228 – 229; ibid., June 13, f. 229.  TNA, FO 371/21724, C 5579/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, June 8, 1938, f. 23.  Cf. TNA, FO 371/21724, C 5587/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, June 9, 1938, f. 25.  TNA, FO 371/21724, C 5692/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, June 12, 1938, ff. 73 – 74. As an example of the impossible demand of the SdP, Beneš mentioned the establishment of the Volkstag (people’s representative body), which would be composed of members of the National Assembly of a given national group and it would create a curie in the Parliament, it would represent certain national groups in the whole state regardless of territorial districts of lower selfgoverning elements. Ibid., f. 75. On the other hand, the Czechoslovak President also complained about the atmosphere of accusations, especially from London, but partially even from Paris during his conversation with Basil Newton that Prague and he himself in the first place is delaying negotiations and that he is postponing the potential agreement with the SdP. If there should be a

244

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

While there was no other option for Great Britain than to put pressure on Prague to retract its current minority policy and take it back to a level suitable under the constitutional order and the unitary nature of the country, France preferred or rather it at least tried to prefer a slightly different attitude. This was apparent in the conversation between Charles Corbin and Edward Halifax on 13 June 1938, when the French Ambassador to London informed the Foreign Secretary of the opinion of the French Government, which assumed that Prague is doing everything possible to conclude an agreement with the SdP and that it is not suitable to pressure it too much in order to find consensus because it is possible that Czechoslovak elites will decide to ignore further advice and they will let events pass regardless of British and French opinions. Although the head of the Foreign Office generally agreed to work with the ambassador, on the other hand, he objected, “if we did not press them [the Czechoslovak Government – author’s note] hard enough, it might be a temptation to some elements in Czechoslovakia to feel that, in view of the promise of French support and the definition of the British attitude given in Parliament in March, they might try to go more slowly than the facts of the situation warranted”.¹⁹⁸ One day later, the Foreign Secretary created a memorandum for the Foreign Policy Committee¹⁹⁹ in which he indicated the possibility of modifying the Czechoslovak alliance treaties with France and USSR. “Even if a settlement is reached between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten Germans within the framework of the Czechoslovak State, it is to be feared that this will not in itself be a settlement of the Czechoslovak problem,” began Halifax in his memorandum.²⁰⁰ According to his opinion, Paris was in a situation where it would be happy, of course without losing its prestige, to redefine its obligations in relation to the Czechoslovak Republic established under different circumstances and at a different time. This is why the head of the Foreign Office suggested in his material that London could contribute to the solution of finding a compromise or

consensus, then the elementary trust between all parties must exist, added Beneš. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21724, C 5786/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, June 13, 1938, f. 101.  TNA, FO 371/21724, C 5783/1941/18, Halifax to Phipps, June 13, 1938, f. 98. Corbin replied to Halifax that Prague is in a difficult situation and that Milan Hodža is doing everything he can for the agreement with the Sudeten Germans. AMAE, Tchécoslovaquie 1930 – 1940, T. 119, Corbin à Bonnet, le 13 juin 1938, f. 165.  Cf. TNA, FO 371/21725, C 6061/1941/18, June 16, 1938, ff. 66 – 80. Here, Lord Halifax presented his memorandum from 14th June.  TNA, FO 371/21724, C 5870/1941/18, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, June 14, 1938, f. 132. According to messages of the British Minister to Prague, Berlin in reality does not care about the Sudeten Germans, but about the invalidity of alliance treaties with France and USSR, informed Halifax members of the committee. Ibid.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

245

rather to help revise the current treaties, which were concluded by Czechoslovakia. He assumed that the ideal solution could be the guarantee of neutrality of Czechoslovakia, as in the case of Switzerland or Belgium.²⁰¹ However, Lord Halifax realized in the second half of his memorandum the difficulty and de facto unfeasibility of his plan since the neutrality of Czechoslovakia would not satisfy Germany and it would create a problem for the functioning of the Little Entente, nota bene in the current situation, he added. Despite of that he was convinced that he will be able to present a sensible suggestion related to the possible neutrality of the Czechoslovak Republic, but I will present it when other less radical options will fail, he stated.²⁰² In mid-June 1938, the Foreign Secretary took another step in his line of thinking towards an amicable solution of the Czechoslovak problem at any cost, when he repeated considerations of some representatives of the Foreign Office from the beginning of the month related to the pressure on Prague to modify its basic line of foreign policy oriented on cooperation with France lasting from the origin of the state in 1918. The proposed neutrality according to the example of Switzerland, as Lord Halifax prepared it, did not represent a comparable option for Czechoslovakia as to the guarantee of the security of the country in comparison with current treaties also making it a less acceptable option. The Czechoslovak Republic quite logically did not respond to the abovementioned suggestion, stated British Minister to Prague Newton informed William Strang of this matter. I have only heard from the Czechoslovak Minister to Berlin that Prague cannot commence negotiations by stating it will give up its current orientation and get closer to Germany with a noose around its neck, wrote Newton. Then he suggested to Strang, if it would not be suitable if an official at the Foreign Office would ask Jan Masaryk what the government’s opinion about the possible neutrality of Czechoslovakia is.²⁰³

 Ibid. At the beginning of June 1938, the Foreign Office was considering the similar option. Even Conservative MP Victor Alexander Cazalet wrote about possible neutrality of Czechoslovakia in The Times. Cf. The Times, June 10, 1938.  TNA, FO 371/21724, C 5870/1941/18, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, June 14, 1938, f. 133.  TNA, FO 371/21725, C 6010/1941/18, Newton to Strang, June 16, 1938, ff. 23 – 25. It is true that some representatives of the Foreign Office considered the plan of Czechoslovak neutrality as a spare solution, if negotiations between Milan Hodža and the Sudeten German Party would fail. Cf. ibid., June 24, ff. 22– 23. Alexander Cadogan expressed it similarly in his telegram to Eric Phipps – the danger of war in Europe, which now exists, must be eliminated. His Majesty’s Government will do everything it can to calm down the situation, wrote Cadogan and added that even the consideration about the new setting of foreign political limits within which the Czecho-

246

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

At the end of June 1938, the Foreign Office felt itself compelled to draw Minister Basil Newton’s attention to the dissatisfaction of the Sudeten German Party leaders with the process of negotiation with the Czechoslovak Government, based on which the position of national minorities in Czechoslovakia was supposed to improve. According to Alexander Cadogan who drafted the telegram most of the dissatisfaction was expressed towards President Beneš who, according to the SdP, insufficiently cultivated the Czechoslovak press not to attack the German minority and its leading representatives. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State, on the other hand, rejected accusations of the Czechoslovak President that he wishes for a failure of negotiations and admitted that reform of state administration in a cultivated state needs patience and time. Despite these facts, however, I do not find pleasure in the slow advancement of the negotiations, Cadogan added.²⁰⁴ The slow pace of negotiations with the representatives of the Sudeten German Party in the eyes of British politics and diplomats made Basil Newton indirectly deny Edvard Beneš’s complaints of an unacceptable pressure put on by Great Britain and France in a telegram sent to London. In it he also agreed with the continuation of putting pressure on the Czechoslovak President, which was meant to force him into a compromise acceptable for the Sudeten German Party, particularly in a situation when Foreign Minister Krofta is not currently helping in solving the fundamental problem, as the British Minister to Prague stated.²⁰⁵

slovak Republic is moving, will be in place. TNA, FO 371/21725, C 6039/1941/18, June 9, 1938, ff. 38 – 41, fair copy ff. 45 – 48.  TNA, FO 371/21725, C 6200/1941/18, Cadogan to Newton, June 22, 1938, ff. 130 – 131. Newton was not meant to disclose, where from the British Government has his information, he was meant to make a reference to general whispers. Cadogan as well acknowledged that suggesting a British mediator is premature, “but as it may come suddenly you should watch the situation with a view to warning me as soon as you think you see the moment approaching,” he wrote to Newton. Ibid., f. 132. Eric Phipps then had to communicate to the French Foreign Minister Bonnet that the French minister to Prague should support his British colleague. Ibid., Cadogan to Phipps, June 22, 1938, f. 133. Basil Newton wrote about a possibility of dispatching a British mediator at the beginning of July, mentioning that this possibility does not have President Beneš’s great support. TNA, FO 371/21726, C 6664/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, July 4, 1938, f. 154. Lord Halifax as well complained to Jan Masaryk about the slowness of the negotiations. Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1938, Doc. No. 379, telegrafická zpráva vyslance ČSR ve Velké Británii J. Masaryka ministerstvu zahraničních věcí o rozhovoru s ministrem E. Halifaxem, týkajícím se jednání s československými Němci, Londýn, 27. června 1938, p. 582.  TNA, FO 371/21725, C 6232/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, June 23, 1938, f. 141. Therefore, he wished to meet the President again and explain to him the importance of his negotiations. The necessity of escalating the pressure on Edvard Beneš was suggested to Lord Halifax

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

247

Both Cadogan and Newton assessed the advancement in the negotiations between the SdP and the Czechoslovak Government as being very slow. Even though the Permanent Under-Secretary of State denied some of the accusations against Edvard Beneš both diplomats supported the continuation of concentrated pressure on Czechoslovak leaders in order to make them come to an agreement with the largest minority. Basil Newton did not consider London’s and Paris’ policy towards Prague as overstepping some politically correct limit. At the June session of the British Government Foreign Secretary Edward Halifax suggested that London send “a wise British subject” to Central Europe, who would inconspicuously make both sides reopen negotiations in case previous dialogue failed.²⁰⁶ A thought of a mediator slowly emerged based on his words as well as from doubts expressed by Alexander Cadogan and Basil Newton of the potential success of the current negotiations. This mediator would step up in case the SdP and Prague could not come to an agreement. It was obvious from the actions and proclamations of British politicians and diplomats that the word “failure” in the negotiations about Czechoslovak minorities policy did not exist and if one method were to fail (a dialogue of both sides), they would be ready to apply another (a politically experienced mediator). The end of June 1938 indicated that His Majesty’s Government however considers it impossible for the situation of national squabbles in Czechoslovakia to escalate into a potential armed conflict. As was previously indicated, London repeatedly put pressure on Paris for French diplomacy to also draw Prague’s attention to the necessity of an agreement with the Sudeten German Party. At the end of June 1938, for example, a memorandum was created at the Foreign Office, which repeated that France has to influence Czechoslovak politicians to step back; in the opposite case, the material stated, it should be indicated to Edvard Beneš that Paris would be forced to reevaluate their previous policy towards Czechoslovakia. Georges Bonnet²⁰⁷ agreed with instructing Victor de Lacroix but insisted on arranging a

also by Robert Vansittart. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21725, C 6236/1941/18, Foreign Office Minute (Sir R. Vansittart), June 21, 1938, ff. 146 – 148.  TNA, FO 371/21725, C 6272/1941/18, Extract from Cabinet Conclusions 29 (38), June 22, 1938, f. 161. The very same day Halifax received a list of names, which should be alternatively considered as emissaries in Czechoslovakia. Apart from Lord Runciman there was, for example, historian Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher, Sir Norman Raeburn or the former Ambassador to Germany Horace Rumbold. TNA, FO 800/309, June 22, 1938, ff. 194– 196.  “Bonnet was a keen advocate of appeasement; […] Bonnet’s desire to maintain peace, inspired by a visceral pacifism borne out of his experiences by Great War, naturally aligned him with the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain.” Hucker, D., Public Opinion between Mu-

248

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

separate meeting between him and the Czechoslovak President. In the first half of June, according to the memorandum, a certain difference of opinions of the two Western Powers emerged because while Britain repeatedly demanded a French agreement with the advancement, which consisted of forcing Prague into a consensus with the SdP and if this policy failed, London did not intend to help Czechoslovakia, France still counted on helping Czechoslovakia, in case the situation escalated, and an armed conflict were to start. A couple of days later the French Foreign Minister announced to Štefan Osuský that the unreasonable attitude of the Czechoslovak Government could cause a reevaluation of French support in the case of conflict with Germany.²⁰⁸ At the end of June 1938, there was already no doubt that London essentially formulated its attitude towards the proceeding negotiations between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten German Party. London considered significant compromises of Prague based on the Carlsbad Program²⁰⁹ to be a conditio sine qua non, and if both parties would not reach an agreement, London intended to suggest a transformation of a base line of Czechoslovak foreign policy and its following away from the alliance with France and USSR to a highly uncertain neutrality of Czechoslovakia.²¹⁰ London would participate in this neutrality guarantee in the existing political situation but such a neutrality would not solve the problem of future Czechoslovak security. British politicians also decided to gain support of their French colleagues for this course of action, even though French policy from the beginning preferred providing more space for the Czechoslovak authorities, necessary for reaching an agreement with the SdP. Under pressure from London on the verbal level, French politicians began inclining towards London’s attitude.²¹¹ The First Czechoslovak Republic got into a situation, when the foreign policy took the government down a blind alley, at the end of

nich and Prague: The View from the French Embassy, in: Contemporary British History, 25, 3, 2011, p. 408.  TNA, FO 371/21725, C 6300/1941/18, Foreign Office Memorandum, June 23, 1938, ff. 186 – 188. Cf. also TNA, FO 371/21727, C 6914/1941/18, July, 1938, ff. 39 – 42.  Lord Halifax confirmed it at the Government meeting on 13 July 1938, where he repeated his speech on the necessity of pressure on the Czechoslovak President, either directly or through the French Government. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21727, C 7072/1941/18, Extract from Cabinet Conclusions 32 (38), July 13, 1938, f. 201.  See, for example, a memorandum by Lord Halifax for the Foreign Policy Committee from 24th June 1938 and a note by the Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office Sir William Malkin. TNA, FO 371/21725, C 6347/1941/18, June 24, 1938, ff. 212– 213.  As early as at the end of June, there were complaints at the Foreign Office about the softness of the French advancement in the pressure on President Beneš. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21727, C 6915/1941/18, Foreign Office Memorandum, June 29, 1938, ff. 46 – 49.

VII A Fast and Efficient Agreement

249

which they would meet, according to British and partially French policy, either an agreement (really more a significant compromise of the Czechoslovak Republic²¹²) with the Sudeten German Party, leaving other national minorities aside, or in a position of a state, which is not capable of agreement and therefore has to end up alone in the subsequent confrontation with Germany.

 At the half of July 1938, Basil Newton stated that there was only small progress in the negotiations, or rather criticized insufficient, according to him, willingness of the Czechoslovak Government and President Beneš to compromise. Cf. TNA, FO 371/21727, C 7139/1941/18, Telegram from Mr. Newton, July 16, 1938, ff. 244– 250.

Conclusion The existing European order ceased to exist with the end of the World War. New states came into existence and, on the contrary, some old existing monarchies fell apart, Austria-Hungary among them. Reports of British diplomats (at the beginning these came from Switzerland for example) described the establishment of the Czechoslovak state, a new fact, with which the Foreign Office had to learn to work with. Because of that, the Foreign Office accepted all the reports with reservations and inclined to the conclusion that it would be best to wait for the results of the Paris Peace Conference. At the same time, British diplomats admitted that in this region they would have to rely on cooperation with France and as a result of this indirectly supported the French claims and demands. Even though some British diplomats (Thomas Montgomery-Cuninghame) supported disintegrational efforts of the German regions, the official lines of foreign policies denied it and already in February the British delegation in Paris got a recommendation to accept current administrative borders of arising Czechoslovakia; this policy was supported by influential historians (Robert William SetonWatson) and publicists (Henry Wickham Steed). At the beginning of the 1920s, the British diplomatic representation in Prague stabilized and the first Minister George Clerk reported of Czech-German cohabitation inside Czechoslovakia objectively and in a way recognized the claims of both sides (he understood some of the German claims), on the other hand, however, he definitely recognized the new state and saw its minorities policy as obliging and abiding to international obligations. An important moment for Czech-German relations was October in 1926 and the joining of two German ministers Czechoslovak Government, when even the British Legation reported on the qualitative change in the relations of the two ethnic groups; a “numbing” of the Czech-German antagonism also occurred. Another essentially important point was the atmosphere of Locarno, where Germany’s position improved and where London clearly indicated that the fate of the states in Central Europe is of no interest to them. The decline of importance of Prague for the Foreign Office was also declared by the change of the Minister – Ronald Macleay did not have any experience with Central Europe. The beginning of the 1930s and the arising economic crisis changed the political atmosphere inside the First Czechoslovak Republic, which in the eyes of the British Legation, Joseph Addison specifically, worsened the status of the largest minority in the country. Shortly after his arrival, the third British Minister quickly arrived at the conclusion that Czechoslovak authorities are violating the minorities treaty and that they are not doing enough for their German inhabitants. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110651454-009

252

Conclusion

The year 1933 was an important turning point for Czech-German relations, for several reasons at least. The appointment of the new government led by Adolf Hitler, the resonance of the Volkssport organisation process, vigorous advancement of Czechoslovak Government in the field of legislature (amendments for the Press Law and the Act on the Protection of the Republic, passing of the Law on Suspending of Activities and Dissolution of Political Parties) and the formation of the Front of Sudeten German Homeland (SHF) confirmed that British Legation paid close attention to all of this and continuously informed the Foreign Office; information on the national conflicts, however, did not quite make it into their reports. Quite logically, they were overshadowed by the economic issues. That did not mean, however, that the officials of the Legation did not comment on the Czech-German relations (for example, Herbert Kershaw). A summary report in 1932 then correctly described the radicalization of the young Sudeten Germans and their inclination to nondemocratic views on solving not only the economic crisis. Starting approximately in May 1933, the Legation reflected a starting press war between Prague and Berlin, where both states commenced a ban on imports and distribution of, in their opinion, harmful printed materials; while Czechoslovakia reacted to the increased and aggressive campaign of some of the German newspapers, Germany’s reaction fell under the category of retaliatory measures. Czech-German relations came to the attention of even the British Minister Joseph Addinson in the middle of the year. He described them as tense and indirectly through insinuations accused the Czechoslovak Government of causing the deterioration, which was not at all surprising due to his negative attitude towards Prague. The Minister projected his fears for the future development of the Czech-German relations into, according to him, overly rigorous politics of the Czechoslovak Government. The last quarter of the year 1933 brought an escalation of the situation in Czechoslovakia, the exterior characteristic of which was the formation of the SHF and the liquidation or banning of the two negativistic political parties. The British Legation perceived the existing situation with concern. In his reports for the Foreign Office Joseph Addison did not directly attack the Czechoslovak Government or their policies, on the other hand he did hold the view that making peace with Germany would be possible only through territorial changes in Central Europe. In the context of the place of his function, he meant primarily Czechoslovakia. The year 1933 clearly demonstrated that the Sudeten-German problem did not yet escalate to international dimensions, the British Legation therefore reflected just partial and, from London’s point of view, local problems. The year 1934 started, from the point of view of the British Legation in Prague, with an important discovery when Orme Sargent appealed to Joseph Addi-

Conclusion

253

son to prepare a memorandum on the state of Czech-German relations; from the high-ranking representative of the Foreign Office, for the first time in the monitored period, words were heard about the importance of cohabitation of both nationalities in a common state. The responsible officials of the Foreign Office did not have trustworthy and current information and therefore for the time being considered Central Europe to be the same as always, the first place being held traditionally by Germany or Austria. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office Robert Vansittart prepared a memorandum in April 1934, in which he described the difficult position of Czechoslovakia, or rather of its government, which in their policies had to count on numerous German minorities. On the other hand, he did not refrain from criticizing Edvard Beneš. The document by Minister Addison from August 1934, which in certain passages rather inaccurately and biasedly judged Czech-German cohabitation, was important not so much for the information it contained, but for the atmosphere, which it helped create between the officials of the Foreign Office – an atmosphere of hatred between the Czech (Czechoslovak majority) and the German minority. The end of the year 1934 was marked with escalated tensions in CzechGerman relations (insigniáda), which the British Legation in Prague considered a secondary and in a way pointless matter but on the other hand it perceived these tensions’ negative effect on the cohabitation of the two nationalities. Compared to the previous years, the year 1935 meant an important and in some ways a crucial turning point in the perception of the Czech-German cohabitation by the British Legation and through them by the Foreign Office as well. This shift was caused not so much by discovering utterly new truths about common life of Czechs and Germans in Czechoslovakia but had more to do with their intensity and the direction which the opinions of the British diplomats in Prague took. While the year 1933 employed economic experts of the Legation and a press campaign between Czechoslovakia and Germany emerged causing a certain escalation of mutual relations (governmental advancement against the two parties, formation of the SHF and so forth), 1934 was marked with the acquisition of relevant information about the German minority in Czechoslovakia (see Addison’s memorandum from August) – a heightened tense because of insigniáda – and the following period began to differ in several respects. The rigorous commencement of Henlein’s SHF (since April 1935 the SdP) caused British diplomats to send to London several reports with important content even before the actual elections took place. In these reports, Addison and other diplomats provided information on the situation before the elections and on the prospects of the SdP, and mostly predicted a high electoral gain. Addison himself estimated it to be around 30 – 35 mandates. Both Prague and London were aware of the significance of people’s voting for the future development of the Czechoslovak Repub-

254

Conclusion

lic, or rather in a broader context even the development of Central Europe. Actual victory of the Sudeten German Party started a wave of comments and evaluation of the new circumstances all of which were in consensus that it would narrow down the maneuver space for the Czechoslovak Government. Orme Sargent even claimed that the reunion of the German minority under Konrad Henlein’s leadership threatens the governmental majority and weakens it in both domestic and foreign policy. Post-electoral analyses of British diplomats for the first time also evaluated the personal aspect of the matter, when critics of Edvard Beneš appeared, describing him as the only serious potential hindrance to SdP’s presence in the government. The British Legation was also aware that the existing domestic political situation would for sure be reflected in the foreign policy of the country, citing their reaction in neighboring Austria as an example. In November, Owen O’Malley wrote to Minister Addison that Czechoslovakia was getting in the spotlight of Great Britain’s attention and supported his statement with an offer of establishing a vice consul in Liberec; even though it was not yet known where funds could be procured for this location, the fact that it was even considered meant a shift in the perception of Czechoslovakia. London did not reflect on the events in the country until this point, on the contrary more attention in this region was given to Austria or Hungary in certain instances. The end of the year 1935 was marked by Konrad Henlein’s second visit to London, where this time he was accepted by the important representatives of the Foreign Office – the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs James Richard Stanhope, the Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Orme Sargent and the Personal Secretary of Sir Robert Vansittart John Clifford Norton – who became convinced of his honesty and willingness to solve the Sudeten German problem on Czechoslovak soil. This was Henlein’s first foreign policy success, which at the same time represented a threat to the internal integrity of Czechoslovakia. The very same act that every British politician would have vigorously rejected, i. e. negotiating about the Irish problem with a foreign diplomat, what is more in a foreign capital, did not outrage anyone at the Foreign Office in this case. The British Legation in Prague did not help to solve the complicated problem with their somewhat one-sided and concise reports concerning the Sudeten German Party. While the British Legation in Prague unambiguously inclined to the side of the Sudeten Germans (both Minister Joseph Addison and the First Secretary of the Legation Robert Hadow; both were biased against Czechoslovakia through their former places of work, Addison by Berlin and Hadow by Vienna) and blamed the Czechoslovak Government and President Beneš for the worsening

Conclusion

255

of the situation, the Foreign Office understood the national conflict in Czechoslovakia in the broader context of Central Europe. For Great Britain in the year 1936, and most importantly after the German occupation of the Rhineland in March, the agreement with Berlin became one of the fundamental axioms of its foreign policy. A more permanent détente between the West and Germany was, however, according to London, possible only under the condition of rectification of certain, from the British point of view, injustices carried out after 1918. From the point of view of Central Europe this meant an increased interest of the Foreign Office in the national situation in Czechoslovakia, particularly after the formation of the Sudeten German Party in April 1935. It became most clear in the summer of 1936, when Konrad Henlein was also received by Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office Sir Robert Vansittart. He cared, however, primarily about the agreement of the Czechoslovak Government with the Sudeten Germans as a whole and not only the SdP; for Vansittart (for example for Orme Sargent, as well however), or rather for Great Britain, it was impertinent for the situation in Central Europe to calm down. In the eyes of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State the pressure on the government in Prague was meant to help it to find an acceptable solution to the minority problem. By agreeing to meetings with representatives of the SdP, highly ranked officials at the Foreign Office generally speaking contributed to the very condition that they had attempted to avoid for a long time – the internalization of the Sudeten German question. When in autumn of 1936 the British diplomatic representation in Prague changed, it did not inflict a fundamental change in the way the Sudeten German question was regarded. This was primarily caused by two reasons – 1) the new Minister, Charles Bentinck, did not have any experience with Central Europe, and that is why the decisive role in formulating the office’s statements was left to Robert Hadow (who did not leave Prague until 1937); 2) after a few weeks in Prague, Bentinck himself came to the conclusion that the only hope for averting the crisis in the Czech-German relations was not only mutual understanding of the necessity for compromise, but also an improvement of living conditions of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. The British Government was meant to put pressure on Prague in this regard to make the desired process happen. Based on the reports of the Legation in Prague, the leading representatives of the Foreign Office arrived at the conclusion that the key to solving the CzechGerman conflict was an agreement between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechoslovak Government while they felt that the way to reach this agreement rests on putting pressure on Prague to be accommodating to the German minority. The Foreign Office was concerned that if consensus is not reached, it would mean the

256

Conclusion

radicalization of the Sudeten Germans and their increased desire for integration with Germany, which would end up threatening the peaceful organization of Central Europe. British politicians and diplomats thus convinced themselves that the situation could only be saved through a positive attitude of the Czechoslovak Government towards the German minority. The year 1937 meant an important shift in the perception of the Sudeten German problem both from the point of view of the British Legation in Prague and the Foreign Office itself. The previous period was marked with the promotion of an agreement of the Czechoslovak Government with the German minority as a whole, with which Prague was meant to comply, even though signs of Konrad Henlein’s preference emerged here and there. The Foreign Office was in fact concerned that if both sides would not be able to reach an agreement, it could in the end threaten the peaceful organization of Central Europe. During the year 1937, however, the opinion on the Czech-German cooperation gradually changed. Both the Prague Legation and London started to assume that the primary solution of this problem has to be an agreement of the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten German Party and not the German minority as a whole. British diplomats assessed the previous policy of support for the activist parties in the Czechoslovak and British capital as surpassed and unproductive; their opinion of the February Agreement also supports this idea for that matter. Already the fifth British Minister was posted in Prague as of March 1937 – Basil Newton, who during the year slowly but surely reached the same conclusion as Joseph Addison (Charles Bentinck worked in Prague only briefly); that the solution of the Czech-German problem lies in the satisfaction of the claims of the German minority at the expense of Czechoslovakia, even though it is important to emphasize that he saw it in a somewhat different way than Addison. It may be said that more and more, London gained the conviction that the Sudeten German question ceased being an entirely Czechoslovak internal matter, and it therefore attempted influencing it more (attempts at coordination with France, stronger pressure on the Czechoslovak politicians to reach an agreement with the SdP) than previously. The year 1937 also meant an unambiguous parting of Konrad Henlein with the Czechoslovak Republic, which the leader of the SdP demonstrated with his “Report to the Führer and Reich Chancellor on Current Questions of German Policy in the Czechoslovak Republic,” in which he described the cohabitation of Czechs and Germans as impossible. With this so far concealed opinion, Henlein negotiated with British politicians and assured them of the effort to reach an agreement with President Beneš and other Czechoslovak representatives. With this statement he entered the year 1938 in a situation, when London was more

Conclusion

257

and more inclined to putting pressure on Prague to reach an agreement with the SdP. The year 1938, the last year of existence of the First Czechoslovak Republic, brought a couple of fundamental aspects into the British Legation’s in Prague perception of Czech and German relations. If before the autumn of 1937 CzechGerman relations, or rather the perception of them from London’s point of view, were entirely logically a matter for the Foreign Office, the turn of the years 1937/1938 meant a change in this regard. The mentioned problem was starting to be more accented by His Majesty’s Government. The British Legation reached a conclusion in mid-February of 1938 that in the interests of an agreement with the Sudeten German Party it would be necessary to increase the pressure put on the government in Prague to reach an agreement with the strongest German political subject; the same conclusion was also reached by key members of the British Government. The Anschluss of Austria in March significantly worsened the position of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, however, it did not change the fundamental political line of Neville Chamberlain, which remained an agreement with Germany. Adverse consequences of the Anschluss of Austria by Germany also implied an increase of doubts of the responsible politicians in London as to the effectiveness of Czechoslovak defenses in case of a German attack, but also in their own abilities and possibilities of engaging in the possible conflict. The unquestionable fact of the year 1938 is also the submission of the internal political development in Czechoslovakia to the foreign political events, which besides other things manifested in a loss of creativity in the agenda of the British Legation in Prague; their reports, or rather the person of Basil Newton fully identified with the statement of His Majesty’s Government; the Minister did not attempt to suggest an alternative solution. Already in March 1938, the British Government admitted that it could not and would not guarantee to Czechoslovakia more than he was obliged to under the Covenant of the League of Nations and this was the way responsible officials acted (primarily the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary) during negotiations with French representatives for example. Concurrently with the British disinterest in a meaningful solution of the German minority in Czechoslovakia, the increasing pressure on the government in Prague and President Beneš to reach an agreement with the SdP, really could not be considered a far-sighted advancement in absence of any fundamental solution of this complicated problem. The dismissiveness of London towards the complicated situation of the Czechoslovak Government and the president of the republic became more and more obvious even though it was barely visible at first sight. Therefore Prague was slowly getting into a position, in which exterior circumstances made them advance in a different way, than the leading pol-

258

Conclusion

iticians had imagined, or rather they already did not have the solution of the minorities problem entirely in their hands; primarily Britain considered this question with regard to relations with Germany rather sensitively. The political representation of the First Czechoslovak Republic therefore got itself into a situation, when during the solving of an internal political problem they could not avoid consulting with Great Britain and France. In London and as a result of their influence also in Paris they reached a conclusion that Prague has to comply with the claims of the SdP at any cost, because if it did not, there was a threat of war and Prague thus does not actually have any other choice. The project of the Statute of Nationalities, through which President Beneš and the government made an attempt at a comprehensive solution of the minorities’ position, was from the very beginning met by the British with doubt and criticism in a sense of it being an imperfect document combined with a lax attitude; London demanded more and more speed and effectiveness during the search for an agreement with the SdP. After the proclamation of the Carlsbad Program some British diplomats (Sargent or Vansittart) were aware that their implementation would have meant the end of a unitary Czechoslovak state, on the other hand, however, there was no alternative to putting pressure on Prague among the British political elites. Since the end of April 1938, when the British and the French delegations met, it was clear that Paris was more and more inclined towards London’s line of action and that they cared for a joint advancement. This was manifested a few days later when Foreign Minister Krofta met with Basil Newton and Victor de Lacroix who presented their demarches. In mid-May 1938, the fifth visit of Konrad Henlein to London took place, when the SdP leader became convinced that Great Britain would not support Beneš. The visit to London solidified his opinion that for the British elites the primary task was neither the Czechoslovak problem nor the Sudeten German question but the attempt to maintain peace was; be it with Czechoslovakia on the map of Europe or without it. Approximately at the same time some of the British diplomats (Newton, Mallet or Cadogan) started reaching an opinion that Czechoslovak President Beneš does not understand the essence of the situation and that he does not want a real and far-reaching agreement with the Sudeten German Party. The summoning of reservists and declaring partial mobilization petrified both the British Legation and the Foreign Office and at the same time confirmed their conviction that the Sudeten German problem was not just an internal problem of Czechoslovakia; London was ready to do anything to pacify the situation, including recommending Prague to change their existing foreign policy oriented towards France and the Soviet Union, while at the same time giving a vague promise to guarantee their neutrality. Even though the situation was still nowhere near being pacified by the end of May, British politicians started using

Conclusion

259

the word “observer,” who was, in their opinion, meant to travel to Czechoslovakia and judge the situation directly on site. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office Alexander Cadogan anticipated a potential failure of the negotiations between the Czechoslovak Government and the SdP at the end of May and mentioned the dispatching of an international commission, which would examine everything thoroughly. The events of May in Czechoslovakia made the British military elites reconsider existing military plans with regard to special extraordinary events which London could encounter in the future. They therefore prepared a memorandum which showed that London did not even count on a massive deployment of armed forces in Central Europe in their military plans for the simple reason that they did not have them available in a sufficient quantity to pose a threat to Germany. The turn of May and June of 1938 at the same time showed a change in British policy with regard to finding reconciliation of the problem of minorities in Czechoslovakia. Concerns induced with the partial mobilization in May or rather the possibility of escalation of Czech-German relations turned out to be groundless, and London could once more fully concentrate on putting diplomatic pressure on Edvard Beneš and the Czechoslovak Government to find and enforce a consensus with the representatives of the Sudeten German Party to pacify the situation in Central Europe. It is necessary to add that the British politicians did not inquire about their opinion. By the end of June 1938, there were already no doubts that London essentially formulated its approach towards the ongoing negotiations between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten German Party. London considered significant compromises of Prague based on the Carlsbad Program to be a conditio sine qua non; the alternative of this opinion was resting in the change of Czechoslovak foreign political orientation, which, however, did not solve the future security of the country. For Prague there now existed two options – either an agreement, rather a vast compromise, with the Sudeten German Party, or a position of a country, which is not capable of making an agreement and therefore has to end up alone in the potential conflict with Germany. The First Czechoslovak Republic could start the preparations for the mission of Walter Runciman, the 1st Viscount Runciman of Doxford with this dire outlook.

The Epilogue “Exactly on time the express train from Paris to Prague crossed the German border and entered the station in the frontier town of Cheb. It was the 3rd of August, quarter past eleven, and the sunrays shone through the foggy summer morning in Central Europe. A small elegantly clothed man was curiously looking around from the first-class carriage watching everything very closely. He was wearing a light grey suit and a shirt with a high wing-collar, which was a bit conspicuous for such a warm day.”¹ The British politician Walter Runciman, the 1st Viscount Runciman of Doxford, had travelled to Czechoslovakia to take charge of an uneasy matter – to mediate, if possible, an optimal agreement between the government in Prague and the Sudeten Germans, which would pacify both the German minority in Czechoslovakia and Berlin itself. The press all around Europe depicted the British politician as a man who bore on his shoulders a hard task and who decided to contribute to the resolution of an almost unsolvable conundrum. Reality, however, had a second side. Runciman actually belonged among those people, who knew close to nothing about Central European region and he himself perceived his task with reservation. Already at the end of July 1938 during his speech in the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax de facto distanced himself from his mission by declaring that his status was entirely independent of His Majesty’s Government and that the Viscount was not negotiating on its behalf. The idea of a mediator who would directly on-site attempt to find a solution of conciliation of the Czech-German relations already appeared among British politicians in the spring of 1938. However according to London, the constant delaying of meaningful and clear measures made His Majesty’s Government declare their intention to President Beneš in the second half of July to send an independent observer whose independence existed, however only formally. It cast significant doubt on the ability of leading Czechoslovak politicians to successfully manage the situation but Prime Minister Hodža accepted it after a few days. France also reacted positively to the mission, anticipating more activity of Britain in the Czechoslovak issue. The negative attitude of Germans denouncing the willingness of Prague to communicate with the Sudeten Germans and somewhat exaggerated activity of the British foreign policy, however, practically ended an attempt on new national policy of the government, which was meant to lead to a complete legislative correction of the status of minorities in Czechoslovakia.  Faber, D., Mnichov. Krize appeasementu 1938 [Munich. The 1938 Appeasement Crisis], Praha 2015, p. 195. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110651454-010

262

The Epilogue

Even though the effort of the government to resolve the national issue with new and comprehensive legislation on minorities’ rights continued in the form of the so-called Third and the Fourth Plans, time and primarily the foreign political events worked against the government and the Republic itself.² It remained true that Prague’s consent with Lord Runciman’s mission allowed the Western Powers to increase their pressure on the Czechoslovak Government and President Beneš thereby increasing their interventionist potential; Czechoslovakia definitively lost its right to freely make decisions on its future and the organization of its territory. It was mainly London which more and more vigorously demanded that a solution is found for the complicated situation and if it were not, it threatened to lose interest in the fate of a small state in Central Europe, as the British politicians repeatedly stated. After his arrival to Czechoslovakia, Walter Runciman met with representatives from both sides (he did not take the German Social Democrats too seriously) and also negotiated with the representatives of other minorities. From the very beginning of his mission, he was relatively dependent on the Foreign Office for information and also let himself be influenced by his visits in the residences of some of the aristocrats.³ As time advanced, the British emissary became aware that finding the solution acceptable for both sides would be almost impossible, or rather the representatives of the Sudeten German Party rejected every attempt at an agreement as insufficient. On August 22, 1938 during a meeting with Frank Ashton-Gwatkin,⁴ representatives of the SdP formulated demands of their party, which they considered a starting point for continuation of the negotiations with the Czechoslovak Government. The demands were, among others, establishing three self-governing German regions, a change of state officials, i. e. transferring Czech officials to Czech regions and appointing German officials in German regions, establishing an independent budget for the three aforementioned German

 Tóth, A. – Novotný, L. – Stehlík, M., Národnostní menšiny v Československu 1918 – 1938. Od státu národního ke státu národnostnímu? [National Minorities in Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1938. From the Nation-State to the National State?], Praha 2012, pp. 534– 535.  The castle Červený Hrádek of Max Egon Hohenlohe-Langenburg can serve as an example. More in detail cf. Jelínková, D., Transformace životní reality Alfonse Clary-Aldringena v postimperiálním světě: postoje, strategie, konsekvence [Transforming the Life Reality of Alfons Clary-Aldringen in the Post-imperial World: Opinions, Strategies, Consequences], in: Hazdra, Z. – Horčička, V. – Županič, J. (eds.), Šlechta střední Evropy v konfrontaci s totalitními režimy 20. století. Der Adel Mitteleuropas in Konfrontation mit den totalitären Regimen des 20. Jahrhunderts [Nobility of Central Europe confronted with Totalitarian Regimes of the 20th Century], Praha 2011, pp. 121– 122.  The British diplomat, economics expert of the Foreign Office and a man, who, de facto, ran the Runciman Mission and who did not withhold his sympathies towards the Sudeten Germans.

The Epilogue

263

regions and negotiating a truce in the propaganda and press between the two parties. Runciman then asked President Beneš for the mentioned points to be used as the basis for the subsequent dialogue between Prague and the SdP. Beneš agreed but wished for them to be specified further.⁵ At the end of August, Edvard Beneš handed the representatives of the British mission a draft of the so called Third Plan (he demanded an answer from the Sudeten German Party before September 2), where he expressed willingness to meet almost every demand of the SdP suggestion. He was not willing, though, to doubt the sovereignty and unity of Czechoslovakia. For Runciman that was not a step in the right direction. His colleagues even assumed that Prague wants to delay the negotiations; the British emissary himself was disappointed with Beneš’s attitude.⁶ The Foreign Office, under the impression of Runciman’s information and in the interest of keeping peace in Central Europe decided that the Czechoslovak Government has to reach agreement with the SdP at any cost, which confirmed the trend of their previous policies towards the increasingly serious problem of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. Lord Halifax even spoke of the necessity to make President Beneš accept a reasonable attitude. British diplomatic elites likewise arrived at the conclusion that the escalation of tensions could only be prevented by accepting the Carlsbad Program as the future foundation for the negotiations between Prague and the Sudeten German Party. The British Government also decided that the pressure on President Beneš should be increased for him not to take back his willingness towards the SdP.⁷ In this sense, British Minister to Prague Sir Basil Newton influenced him on September 1, 1938 already. Lord Runciman also received instructions from London that if the parties do not come to an agreement, his mission is to propose their own suggestion for how to solve this complicated question.⁸ The direct interference of a foreign country into the internal matters of a sovereign state, even fundamentally influenced by foreign political events, only completed the paradox of the whole situation. After denying the so-called Third Plan not only the SdP, but also members of Runciman’s mission demanded a new offer. If Edvard Beneš did not want to get

 Beneš, E., Mnichovské dny [Munich Days], Praha 1968, p. 176.  Dejmek, J., Edvard Beneš. Politická biografie českého demokrata. Část druhá. Prezident republiky a vůdce národního odboje (1835 – 1948) [Edvard Beneš. Political Biography of a Czech Democrat. Part Two. President of the Republic and Leader of the National Resistance (1835 – 1948)], Praha 2008, p. 135, footnote 105; VYŠNÝ, pp. 222– 224, 243.  Cf. The National Archives, London, Kew (hereinafter TNA), Cabinet Papers (hereinafter CAB) 23/94/10 (War Cabinet and Cabinet: Minutes), August 20, 1938, ff. 285 – 318.  Dejmek, pp. 136 – 137.

264

The Epilogue

himself into a position of an unconstructive politician and a man who does not want a successful end of the negotiations, he had to continue in the diplomatic game, which was beginning to look more and more like a farce. He invited the representatives of the Sudeten German Party to outline their specific suggestions. On September 3, the document called The Draft Protocol of the Agreement concerning the Way in which the Questions of Organization of National Matters would be negotiated between the Czechoslovak Government and the Sudeten German Party saw the light of day, which fulfilled the Carlsbad Program of the Sudeten German Party.⁹ Now, President Beneš had to face the pressure of the Western Powers, who demanded that he behave in a “stately” manner and not turn the offer of the SdP down. During this time, Walter Runciman acted rather unusually, diplomatically speaking, when he met with the Cardinal Karel Kašpar and the leading representatives of some political parties to convince them that the proposed offer of the SdP has London’s support and refusing it could end in a tragedy in the form of a military conflict. The Czechoslovak President therefore drafted a document, the so-called Fourth Plan (A Record of Advancement Concerning Legislation for National Questions, negotiated between the Czechoslovak Government and the Representatives of the Sudeten German Party) through which he wished to demonstrate to Great Britain and France his willingness to reach an agreement. The material brought far-reaching compromises and fulfilled almost every demand of the SdP.¹⁰ The draft of the so-called Fourth Plan of the Czechoslovak President represented a far-reaching compromise in the national question, with some of the provisions, mainly in the area of self-government, being almost on the borderline of the viability of Czechoslovakia. If implemented, territories would be created, which would still formally be a part of the state but would in fact be governed in a completely different way to the rest of the Republic. An updated version of the Statute of Nationalities appealed to Lord Runciman, who allegedly stated that the Czechoslovak Government did everything that was possible and no one in the world could ask more of them, and added: “there is no other such reasonable nation in the world as the Czechoslovak nation and the refusal of this offer will surely move the British Government to support Czechoslovakia with all of its force and the power of all of its population.”¹¹ The Foreign Office was also satisfied with Beneš’s plan; one official even stated that it was “approximating the Carlsbad Program even more than

 Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, pp. 544– 545.  Ibid., pp. 546 – 548.  Krofta, Z dob naší první republiky [From the Times of Our First Republic], Praha 1939, p. 311.

The Epilogue

265

could be expected”.¹² Now the representatives of the Sudeten German Party had to demonstrate how seriously they took their own words concerning an agreement with the Czechoslovak Government. As it has often happened throughout history, however, coincidence played a part. An incident occurred in the city of Ostrava in Moravia on September 7, 1938, which according to Lord Runciman provoked the Sudeten Germans. During a demonstration a conflict between the police and the deputies of the SdP took place. The mentioned events served not only as excuse to delay the expression of the opinion of Henlein’s followers towards the so-called Fourth Plan, now the results of the congress of NSDAP under way in Nuremberg were expected as was Adolf Hitler’s speech (the Chancellor delivered the speech on September 12), but the incident also created evidence of an “awful situation” in Czechoslovakia. On the night of 12th September several incidents occurred throughout the country (north-western Bohemia, northern Moravia), during which dozens of people were hurt or killed. Their purpose was to create an excuse for an intervention of the German Army to defend Sudeten Germans. The result was a declaration of martial law in eight of the frontier districts¹³ and an increased activity of the Czechoslovak Army. Now it had to be clear even to Runciman’s mission that the policy of the SdP was aimed against the integrity of Czechoslovakia and that the leadership of the party is acting under orders from Berlin. One day later the leader of the SdP Konrad Henlein relieved the negotiators of the party of their duties and proclaimed that the Sudeten Germans wish to become a part of the Third Reich. In mid-September 1938, the possibility of an agreement between the Czechoslovak Government and the SdP about the legislation regarding the nationality question in Czechoslovakia was definitively off the table. The representatives of the Sudeten German Party refused all of the suggestions of the Czechoslovak President, stating that these measures were insufficient as the reason. At the same time, the task of Lord Walter Runciman was therefore finished as was his mission. The British emissary officially ended his activity on September 16, 1938. Five days later, he wrote a personal letter to Edvard Beneš, in which he confirmed that the draft of the so-called Fourth Plan could have been the foundation for an agreement between the German minority and the government under certain circumstances, and that the responsibility for the failure of the negotiations definitely falls on “Mr. Henlein and Mr. Frank, and those of their followers inside and outside of the state borders, who made them start extreme and unconstitutional activities”. He

 Dejmek, p. 140; cf. also Vyšný, p. 265.  The districts of Cheb, Nejdek, Loket, Kadaň, Bezdružice, Karlovy Vary, Falknov and Krumlov.

266

The Epilogue

did not, however, refrain from a personal note, which demonstrated not only his attitude towards the mission he led, but also the attitude of the whole Conservative government regarding the Sudeten German problem: “Nevertheless, I sympathise greatly with the Sudeten Germans. To be governed by a foreign race itself is an injustice and I hold an opinion that Czechoslovak administration in the Sudeten regions may have not been suppressing and for sure has not been ‘terroristic,’ but still in its nature showed a lack of tact, lack of understanding, animosity and intolerance in small things to such an extent that dissatisfaction of the German population inevitably led to a revolt.”¹⁴ That same day Runciman wrote to British Prime Minister Chamberlain. In the letter the emissary twice repeated, “that the negotiations failed because of the ‘Sudeten German extremists’ and that the direct and indirect contacts of leading negotiators with the government of the Reich were the deciding factor at the moment”.¹⁵ Judging retrospectively, it is not a surprise that the success of the Runciman Mission was doomed to fail. It depended, in fact, on finding a solution, meaningful and acceptable for both sides, while the will of the SdP to reach an agreement was absent. The British Government itself distanced itself from Runciman’s task, which was emphasized by the fact that they were staying at the hotel Alcron, not at the British Legation. Neville Chamberlain announced even before the end of the mission that he himself would visit Adolf Hitler and make an attempt to deflect a military conflict;¹⁶ he took the governance of the British politics towards Czechoslovakia in his own hands with the help of his consultants. During the whole Runciman Mission and the crisis days of September the role of the British Legation was only secondary, Basil Newton was “degraded” to a mere translator of views of His Majesty’s Government and an instrument of the British pressure on Edvard Beneš and the Czechoslovak Government to make agreement with the Sudeten German Party. The following development of events, processed thoroughly in historical literature, merely confirmed the hopelessness of the situation for the second Czechoslovak President and the government. After the failure of this possible agreement regarding a newly defined position of national minorities in Czechoslovakia, the steering wheel of the situation was definitively in the hands of the great powers; at the end of this path, however, there were conferences in Munich (September 29 – 30, 1938) and the Second World War.

 Tóth – Novotný – Stehlík, p. 552.  Ibid.  TNA, CAB 23/95/2, September 14, 1938, f. 36.

Sources and literature Unpublished sources 1) The National Archives, London (TNA) Cabinet Office Papers (CAB) CAB 21 – Cabinet Office and Predecessors: Registered Files (1916 to 1965) CAB 21/550 – Czechoslovakia: Diary of Events, March – October, 1938 CAB CAB CAB CAB

23 – Cabinet Office: War Cabinet and Cabinet: Minutes 23/81/18 23/83/20 23/90 A/7

CAB CAB CAB CAB CAB CAB CAB

24 – Cabinet Office: War Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda 24/243/12 24/247/19 24/248/40 24/259/13 24/263/43 24/271/2

Foreign Office Papers (FO) FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO

371 – Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906 – 1966 371/3134 371/3136 371/4720 371/4721 371/5824 371/10674 371/10675 371/11226 371/11227 371/13579 371/16658 371/16660 371/16662 371/18381 371/18382 371/18383 371/19492

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110651454-011

268

Sources and literature

FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO FO

371/19493 371/19494 371/19495 371/20373 371/20374 371/20375 371/20376 371/21125 371/21127 371/21128 371/21129 371/21130 371/21131 371/21132 371/21713 371/21714 371/21715 371/21716 371/21717 371/21718 371/21719 371/21720 371/21721 371/21722 371/21723 371/21724 371/21725 371/21726 371/21727

FO FO FO FO FO FO

608 – Foreign Office: Peace Conference: British Delegation, Correspondence and Papers 608/5/16 608/5/19 608/6/7 608/7/6 608/8/2

FO FO FO FO FO FO

800 – Foreign Office: Private Offices: Various Ministers’ and Officials’ Papers 800/268 – Henderson, Sir Nevile: Miscellaneous Correspondence: Volume 5 800/269 – Henderson, Sir Nevile: Miscellaneous Correspondence: Volume 6 800/294 – Cadogan, Alexander: The Private Papers of Sir A. Cadogan: Volume 2 800/296 – Gascoyne-Cecil, Robert Arthur James: Correspondence: Volume 1 800/309 – Viscount Halifax: Miscellaneous Correspondence: Volume 1

Unpublished sources

269

Record of the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) PREM 1 – Correspondence and Papers, 1916 – 1940 PREM 1/265 – Foreign Policy: Possible Measures to avert German Action in Czechoslovakia. Runciman Mission

2) University of Oxford, Bodleian Libraries (Weston Library) Papers of Geoffrey Dawson, MS. Dawson 78 Papers of Geoffrey Dawson, MS. Dawson 79 Selby Papers, MS. Eng. c. 6584 Selby Papers, MS. Eng. c. 6585 Selby Papers, MS. Eng. c. 6587

3) The Archives of Magdalen College, University of Oxford Papers of Sir Joseph Addison, MC: P214/MS5/1

4) Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes [Political Archives of the Foreign Ministry], Berlin (PA) Tschechoslowakei, Tschechoslowakei, Tschechoslowakei, Tschechoslowakei, Tschechoslowakei, Tschechoslowakei, Tschechoslowakei, Tschechoslowakei, Tschechoslowakei, Tschechoslowakei, Tschechoslowakei, Tschechoslowakei, Tschechoslowakei,

R R R R R R R R R R R R R

60491 73840 73841 73842 103652 103653 103654 103655 103656 103657 103658 103659 103660

5) Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Wien (OeStA), Abteilung Archiv der Republik (AdR) [Austrian State Archives, Archives of the Republic] Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 30 Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 33 Prag, Gesandtschaft, 1919 – 1938, kt. 35

270

Prag, Prag, Prag, Prag, Prag, Prag, Prag, Prag, Prag,

Sources and literature

Gesandtschaft, Gesandtschaft, Gesandtschaft, Gesandtschaft, Gesandtschaft, Gesandtschaft, Gesandtschaft, Gesandtschaft, Gesandtschaft,

1919 – 1938, 1919 – 1938, 1919 – 1938, 1919 – 1938, 1919 – 1938, 1919 – 1938, 1919 – 1938, 1919 – 1938, 1919 – 1938,

kt. kt. kt. kt. kt. kt. kt. kt. kt.

36 37 38 40 41 42 43 44 45

6) Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris (AMAE) [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Tchécoslovaquie Tchécoslovaquie Tchécoslovaquie Tchécoslovaquie Tchécoslovaquie Tchécoslovaquie Tchécoslovaquie

1930 – 1940, 1930 – 1940, 1930 – 1940, 1930 – 1940, 1930 – 1940, 1930 – 1940, 1930 – 1940,

T. T. T. T. T. T. T.

102, Politique intérieure 103, Politique intérieure 104, Politique intérieure 116, Politique étrangère, Allemands de Bohême 117, Politique étrangère, Allemands de Bohême 118, Politique étrangère, Allemands de Bohême 119, Politique étrangère, Allemands de Bohême

7) Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí, Praha (AMZV) [The Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic] Politické zprávy Berlín, 1933 – 1938 Politické zprávy Londýn, 1933 – 1938 Politické zprávy Paříž, 1933, 1935, 1937 – 1938 Zahraniční úřady, vyslanectví Vídeň 1918 – 1939, kt. 8, 14 Kroftův archiv, Box 11

8) Národní archiv, Praha (NA) [National Archives] Prezídium ministerstva vnitra (fond č. 225 bývalého Studijního ústavu Ministerstva vnitra), sg. 225 – 918 – 4 Předsednictvo ministerské rady, kt. 4396 SdP, kt. 2 Zahraniční úřad Berlín, kt. 75

9) Archiv Národního muzea (ANM) [Archives of the National Museum] Karel Domin, kt. 38

Published sources

271

Milan Hodža, kt. 8 Vojtěch Mastný-2, kt. 28

10) Archiv Kanceláře prezidenta republiky (AKPR) [The Archive of the President’s Office] Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protokol T (tajné), sg. 12/25, kt. 135 Kancelář prezidenta republiky, protokol T (tajné), sg. T 139/34, kt. 179

Published sources Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918 – 1945. Aus dem Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Serie C: 1933 – 1937, Das Dritte Reich: die ersten Jahre [Files to the German Foreign Policy 1918 – 1945. From the Archive of the Foreign Office, Series C: 1933 – 1937, The Third Reich: the First Years], Bd. I/2, Göttingen 1971. Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918 – 1945. Aus dem Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Serie C: 1933 – 1937, Das Dritte Reich: die ersten Jahre [Files to the German Foreign Policy 1918 – 1945. From the Archive of the Foreign Office, Series C: 1933 – 1937, The Third Reich: the First Years], Bd. II/2, Göttingen 1973. Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918 – 1945. Aus dem Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Serie C: 1933 – 1937, Das Dritte Reich: die ersten Jahre [Files to the German Foreign Policy 1918 – 1945. From the Archive of the Foreign Office, Series C: 1933 – 1937, The Third Reich: the First Years], Bd. VI/1, Göttingen 1981. Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918 – 1945. Aus dem Archiv des deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes, Serie D: 1937 – 1945, Deutschland und die Tschechoslowakei (1937 – 1938) [Files to the German Foreign Policy 1918 – 1945. From the Archive of the Foreign Office, Series D: 1937 – 1945, Germany and Czechoslovakia (1937 – 1938)], Bd. II, Baden-Baden 1950. Beneš, E., Mnichovské dny [Munich Days], Praha 1968. Bruce Lockhart, R. H., Ústup ze slávy [Retreat from Glory], Praha 1935. Československá statistika – Svazek 134. Řada I. (Volby, sešit 5) [Czechoslovak Statistics. Vol. 134, Series I. (Elections, Fascicle 5]. Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v květnu 1935, Praha 1936. Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1936, svazek I (1. leden – 31. srpen 1936) [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1936, Vol. I, January 1 – August 31, 1936], Dejmek, J., (ed.), Praha 2003. Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1936, svazek II (1. září – 31. prosinec 1936) [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1936, Vol. II, September 1 – December 31, 1936], Dejmek, J. – Němeček, J. (ed.), Praha 2003. Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1937, svazek I (1. leden – 31. červenec 1937) [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1937, Vol. I, January 1 – July 31, 1937], Dejmek, J. (ed.), Praha 2007.

272

Sources and literature

Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1937, svazek II (1. srpen – 31. prosinec 1937) [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1937, Vol. II, August 1 – December 31, 1937], Dejmek, J. (ed.), Praha 2008. Československá zahraniční politika v roce 1938, svazek I (1. leden – 30. červen 1938) [Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in 1938, Vol. I, January 1 – June 30, 1938], Dejmek, J. – Němeček, J. – Nováčková, H. et al. (ed.), Praha 2000. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag. Innenpolitik und Minderheitenprobleme in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. Teil II. Vom Kabinett Beneš bis zur ersten übernationalen Regierung unter Švehla 1921 – 1926, Berichte des Gesandten Dr. Walter Koch [German Legation Reports from Prague. Internal Policy and Minorities Problems in the First Czechoslovak Republic. Part II. From the Cabinet Beneš to the First Supranational Government under Švehla 1921 – 1926, Reports of Minister Dr. Walter Koch]. Ausgewählt, eingeleitet und kommentiert von Alexander, M., München 2004. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag. Innenpolitik und Minderheitenprobleme in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. Teil III. Von der Regierung unter Švehla bis zum Vorabend der nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung in Deutschland 1926 – 1932, Berichte des Gesandten Dr. Walter Koch [German Legation Reports from Prague. Internal Policy and Minorities Problems in the First Czechoslovak Republic. Part III. From the Cabinet Švehla until the Eve of the National Socialist Seizure of Power in Germany 1926 – 1932]. Ausgewählt, eingeleitet und kommentiert von Alexander, M., München 2009. Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag. Innenpolitik und Minderheitenprobleme in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. Teil IV. Vom Vorabend der Machtergreifung in Deutschland bis zum Rücktritt von President Masaryk 1933 – 1935. Berichte des Gesandten Koch, der Konsuln von Bethusy-Huc, von Druffel, von Pfeil und des Gesandtschaftsrates von Stein [German Legation Reports from Prague. Internal Policy and Minorities Problems in the First Czechoslovak Republic. Part IV. From the Eve of the Seizure of Power in Germany to the Resignation of President Masaryk 1933 – 1935. Reports of Minister Koch, the Consuls von Bethusy-Huc, von Druffel, von Pfeil, and the Legation Council von Stein]. Ausgewählt, eingeleitet und kommentiert von Dolezel, H. – Dolezel, S., München 1991. Die Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei 1933 – 1947 [The Germans in Czechoslovakia 1933 – 1937]. Dokumentensammlung. Zusammengestellt, mit Vorwort und Anmerkungen versehen von Král, V., Praha 1964. Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932 – 1939: (1932 – 1935): (17 mars – 15 juillet 1933) [French Diplomatic Documents 1932 – 1939: (1932 – 1935): (March 17 – July 15, 1933)], Ire Série, T. III, Paris 1967. Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932 – 1939: (1932 – 1935): (16 janvier – 23 mars 1935) [French Diplomatic Documents 1932 – 1939: (1932 – 1935): (January 16 – March 23, 1935)], Ire Série, T. IX, Paris 1980. Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932 – 1939: (1936 – 1939): (19 juillet – 19 novembre 1936) [French Diplomatic Documents 1932 – 1939: (1936 – 1939): (July 19 – November 19, 1936)], 2e Série, T. III, Paris 1966. Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932 – 1939: (1936 – 1939): (20 février – 31 mars 1937) [French Diplomatic Documents 1932 – 1939: (1936 – 1939): (February 20 – March 31, 1937)], 2e Série, T. V, Paris 1968.

Published sources

273

Documents of British Foreign Policy 1919 – 1939, 2nd Series, Vol. XV, The Italo-Ethiopian War and German Affairs, October 3, 1935 – February 29, 1936, ed. by Medlicott, W. N. – Dakin, D. – Lambert, M. E., London 1976. Documents of British Foreign Policy 1919 – 1939, 2nd Series, Vol. XVIII, European Affairs, January 2 – June 30, 1937, ed. by Medlicott, W. N. – Dakin, D. – Lambert, M. E., London 1980. Eden, A., Facing the Dictators. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, Boston 1962. Hájková, D. – Horák, P. (ed.), Edvard Beneš, Němci a Německo: edice dokumentů [Edvard Beneš, the Germans and Germany: an Edition of Documents], sv. 1, Praha 2014. Hutt, A. – Schaffer, G. – Darling, G., “Peace for Our Time”. Mr. Chamberlain and Munich. The Truth about a Policy, London 1938. Johnson, G. (ed.), Our Man in Berlin. The Diary of Sir Eric Phipps, 1933 – 1937, Basingstoke 2008. Krofta, K., Z dob naší první republiky [From the Times of Our First Republic], Praha 1939. Luschka, F. von, Im Parlament der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. Erinnerungen eines sudetendeutschen Abgeordneten 1920 – 1938 [In the Parliament of the First Czechoslovak Republic. Memoirs of a Sudeten German MP 1920 – 1938], in: Bohemia, 4, 1963, pp. 228 – 274. Masaryk, T. G., Cesta demokracie, I. Projevy – články – rozhovory, 1918 – 1920 [The Path of Democracy, I. Speeches – Articles – Interviews, 1918 – 1920], Praha 2003. Mastný, V., Vzpomínky diplomata. Ze vzpomínek a dokumentů československého vyslance [Memories of the Diplomat. From the Memories and Documents of the Czechoslovak Minister], Kubů, e. – Luňák, P. – Novák, O. (ed.), Praha 1997. Mejdrová, H. (ed.), Trpký úděl. Výbor k dokumentů k dějinám německé sociální demokracie v ČSR v letech 1937 – 1948 [Bitter Fate. Committee on Documents on the History of German Social Democracy in Czechoslovakia in 1937 – 1948], Praha 1997. Morell, S., Viděl jsem ukřižování. Sudety 1938 – 39. Svědectví anglického novináře, který byl přitom [I Saw the Crucifixion], Praha 1995. Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého – ročníky 1920, 1933, 1936 [Collection of Laws and Regulations of the Czechoslovak State, Vols. 1920, 1933, 1936]. Těsnopisecké zprávy Národního shromáždění, 1918 – 1919 [Stenographical Reports of the National Assembly, 1918 – 1919]. Tisky poslanecké sněmovny, IV. volební období, 2. zasedání, 1936, tisk 288 [Prints of the House of Deputies, 1936]. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938 – 1945, Dilks, D. (ed.), London 1971. Vansittart, R., Lessons of My Life, London 1943. Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), Nine Troubled Years, London 1954. Ward Price, G., I Know these Dictators, London 1938.

Newspaper Daily Mail Daily Telegraph The Economist The Glasgow Herald

274

Sources and literature

The Times

Internet sources http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1938/mar/21/czechoslovakia-ministersspeech#S5CV0333P0_19380321_HOC_433. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1938/mar/24/foreign-affairs-and-rearmament. http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1929ns/ps/stenprot/250schuz/s250003.htm. http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1929ns/ps/stenprot/251schuz/s251013.htm. http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1929ns/ps/tisky/t2160_00.htm.

Theses Bakić, D., Britain, the Little Entente and Security in Danubian Europe, 1919 – 1936, Leeds, 2010. Bátonyi, G., Britain and Central Europe, 1918 – 1932, Oxford 1994. Coutts, M., The Political Career of Sir Samuel Hoare during the National Government 1931 – 40, Leicester 2010. Kopecký, L., František Machník, život agrárního politika a ministra národní obrany [František Machník, Life of an Agrarian Politician and Minister of National Defense], České Budějovice 2011. Perman, T., Příspěvek ke studiu historiografické diskuse o politice appeasementu v anglicky psané odborné literatuře [Contribution to the Study of Historiographical Discussion on Appeasement Policy in Professional Writing], Praha 2006. Roi, M. L., Sir Robert Vansittart, the Global Balance of Power and Nazi Germany, 1934 – 1937, Toronto 1996. Straka, K., S cílem jednotného usměrnění všech sil. Činnost vlády a Nejvyšší rady obrany státu v letech 1932 – 1938 [With the Aim of Uniforming All Forces. Activities of the Government and Supreme Council of State Defense in 1932 – 1938], Praha 2007. Vymazalová, M., Sudetoněmecká strana 1935 – 1936 [Sudeten German Party, 1935 – 1936], Praha 1999.

Literature Adamthwaite, A. P., Le facteur militaire dans la prise de decision franco-britannique avant Munich [The Military Factor in Franco-British Decision-making before Munich], in: Revue des études slaves, 52, 1 – 2, 1979, pp. 59 – 66. Ball, S., The National Government, 1931: Crisis and Controversy, in: Parliamentary History, 12, 2, 1993, pp. 184 – 200. Ball, S., Democracy and the Rise of Labour: 1924 and 1929 – 1931, in: Ball, S. – Seldon, A. (ed.), Recovering Power. The Conservatives in Opposition since 1867, Basingstoke 2005, pp. 134 – 168.

Literature

275

Ben-Arie, K., Czechoslovakia at the Time of ‘Munich’: The Military Situation, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 25, 4, 1990, pp. 431 – 446. Biman, S. – Malíř, J., Kariéra učitele tělocviku [Physical Education Teacher Career], Ústí nad Labem 1983. Brandes, D., Sudetští Němci v krizovém roce 1938 [Sudeten Germans in the Crisis Year 1938], Praha 2012. Breitfelder, M., Volkssport a jeho proces [Volkssport and its Process], in: Dějepis XXIII: sborník katedry historie napsán a sestaven k šedesátým narozeninám katedry 1948 – 2008, Plzeň 2008, pp. 48 – 60. Bubeník, J. – Křesťan, J., Zjišťování národnosti jako problém statistický a politický: zkušenosti ze sčítání lidu za první republiky [Identifying Nationality as a Statistical and Political Problem: Experience from the First Republic Census], in: Paginae Historiae. Sborník Státního ústředního archivu v Praze, 3, 1995, pp. 119 – 139. Burian, M., Deutscher Turnverband a československý stát v letech 1918 – 1933 [Deutscher Turnverband and the Czechoslovak State, 1918 – 1933], in: WAIC, M. (ed.), Češi a Němci ve světě tělovýchovy a sportu [Czechs and Germans in the World of Physical Education and Sport], Praha 2004, pp. 53 – 66. Burian, M., Sudetoněmecké nacionalistické tělovýchovné organizace a československý stát v letech 1918 – 1938 [The Sudeten German Nationalist Physical Training Organizations and the Czechoslovak State in 1918 – 1938], Praha 2012. César, J. – Černý, B., Politika německých buržoazních stran v Československu v letech 1918 – 1938. Díl II. (1930 – 1938) [Politics of German Bourgeois Parties in Czechoslovakia in 1918 – 1938. Part II. (1930 – 1938)], Praha 1962. Cornwall, M., A Fluctuating Barometer: British Diplomatic Views of the Czech-German Relationship in Czechoslovakia, 1918 – 1938, in: Schmidt-Hartmann, E. – Winters, S. B. (hrsg.), Groβbritannien, die USA und die böhmischen Länder 1848 – 1938 [Great Britain, the USA and the Bohemian Lands 1848 – 1938], München 1991, pp. 313 – 333. Cornwall, M., ‘A Leap into Ice-Cold Water’: The Manoeuvres of the Henlein Movement in Czechoslovakia, 1933 – 1938, in: Cornwall, M. – Evans, R. J. W. (ed.), Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe 1918 – 1948, Oxford 2007, pp. 123 – 142. Cornwall, M., The Devil’s Wall: The Nationalist Youth Mission of Heinz Rutha, Cambridge (Mass.), London 2012. Crowson, N. J., Conservative Parliamentary Dissent over Foreign Policy during the Premiership of Neville Chamberlain: Myth or Reality?, in: Parliamentary History, 14, 3, 1995, pp. 315 – 336. Cushner, A., Fighting Fire with Propaganda: Claud Cockburn’s The Week and the Anti-Nazi Intrigue that Produced the ‘Cliveden Set,’ 1932 – 1939, in: Ex Post Facto. Journal of the History Students at San Francisco State University, XVI, 2006 – 2007, pp. 55 – 68. Dejmek, J., Velká Británie v zahraniční politice Československa 1918 – 1938. (Náčrt hlavních problémů) [Great Britain in Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1938. (Outline of Major Issues)], Valenta, J. – Voráček, E. – Harna, J. (uspoř.), Československo 1918 – 1938. Osudy demokracie ve střední Evropě [Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1938. The Fate of Democracy in Central Europe], Praha 1999, pp. 526 – 541. Dejmek, J., Britská diplomacie, Československo a Sudetoněmecká strana [British Diplomacy, Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten German Party], in: Moderní dějiny. Sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století, 9, 2001, pp. 161 – 237.

276

Sources and literature

Dejmek, J., Československo, jeho sousedé a velmoci ve XX. století (1918 až 1992). Vybrané kapitoly z dějin československé zahraniční politiky [Czechoslovakia, its Neighbors and Powers in XX. Century (1918 – 1992). Selected Chapters from the History of Czechoslovak Foreign Policy], Praha 2002. Dejmek, J., Nenaplněné naděje. Politické a diplomatické vztahy Československa a Velké Británie (1918 – 1938) [Unfulfilled Hopes. Political and Diplomatic Relations of Czechoslovakia and Great Britain (1918 – 1938)], Praha 2003. Dejmek, J., Edvard Beneš. Politická biografie českého demokrata. Část první. Revolucionář a diplomat (1884 – 1935) [Edvard Beneš. Political Biography of a Czech Democrat. Part One. Revolutionary and Diplomat (1884 – 1935)], Praha 2006. Dejmek, J., Edvard Beneš. Politická biografie českého demokrata. Část druhá. Prezident republiky a vůdce národního odboje (1835 – 1948) [Edvard Beneš. Political Biography of a Czech Democrat. Part Two. President of the Republic and Leader of the National Resistance (1835 – 1948)], Praha 2008. Douglas, R., Chamberlain and Eden, 1937 – 38, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 13, 1, 1978, s. 97 – 116. Dutton, D., Neville Chamberlain, London 2001. Ellinger, J., Neville Chamberlain. Od usmiřování k válce: britská zahraniční politika, 1937 – 1940 [Neville Chamberlain. From Reconciliation to War: British Foreign Policy, 1937 – 1940], Praha 2009. Eschenbächer, J.-H., Zwischen Schutzbedürftigkeit und Alleinvertretungsanspruch: Die Beziehungen der Sudetendeutschen Heimatfront zu den traditionellen bürgerlichen deutschen Parteien in der Tschechoslowakei 1933 – 1935 [Between Vulnerability and Exclusive Claim: the Relations of the Sudeten German Homeland Front to the Traditional German Bourgeois Parties in Czechoslovakia 1933 – 1935], in: Bohemia, 39, 1998, pp. 323 – 350. Feriancová, A., (Ne)nájdená bezpečnost. Československo, Nemecko a úpravy medzinárodného systému v Európe 1922 – 1926 [(No) Security found. Czechoslovakia, Germany and the International System in Europe 1922 – 1926], Nitra 2010. Franke, R., Die Tschechoslowakei in der politischen Meinung Englands 1918 – 1938 [Czechoslovakia in the Political Opinion of England 1918 – 1938], in: Bosl, K. (hrsg.), Die demokratisch-parlamentarische Struktur der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik [Democratic-parliamentary Structure of the First Czechoslovak Republic], München 1975, pp. 247 – 269. Franke, R., London und Prag. Materialien zum Problem eines multinationalen Nationalstaates 1919 – 1938 [London and Prague. Materials on the Problem of a Multinational Nation State 1919 – 1938], München 1982. Foster, A., The Times and Appeasement: The Second Phase, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 16, 3, 1981, pp. 441 – 465. Galántai, J., Trianon and the Protection of Minorities, Boulder 1992. Hanak, H., British Views of the Czechoslovaks from 1914 to 1924, in: Schmidt-Hartmann, E. – Winters, S. B. (hrsg.), Groβbritannien, die USA und die böhmischen Länder 1848 – 1938 [Great Britain, the USA and the Bohemian Lands 1848 – 1938], München 1991, pp. 87 – 105.

Literature

277

Harna, J., Vládní prohlášení Milana Hodžy z prosince 1935 [Milan Hodža’s Government Declaration of December 1935], in: Pekník, M. (ed.), Milan Hodža a agrárne hnutie [Milan Hodža and Agrariant Movement], Bratislava 2008, pp. 142 – 157. Hattersley, R., David Lloyd George. The Great Outsider, London 2010. Hoffmann, R., The British Military Representative in Vienna, 1919, in: The Slavonic and East European Review, 52, 127, 1974, pp. 252 – 271. Howard, M., The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of Two World Wars, Harmondsworth 1974. Hucker, D., Public Opinion between Munich and Prague: The View from the French Embassy, in: Contemporary British History, 25, 3, 2011, pp. 407 – 427. Hughes, M., Sir John Simon at the Foreign Office (1931 – 35), in: British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World, 1919 – 1939, London 2006, pp. 86 – 106. Hughes, M., Sir Samuel Hoare at the Foreign Office (1935), in: British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World, 1919 – 1939, London 2006, pp. 107 – 123. Hughes, M., Lord Halifax at the Foreign Office (1938 – 39), in: British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World, 1919 – 1939, London 2006, pp. 144 – 166. Jelínková, D., Transformace životní reality Alfonse Clary-Aldringena v postimperiálním světě: postoje, strategie, konsekvence [Transforming the Life Reality of Alfons Clary-Aldringen in the Post-imperial World: Opinions, Strategies, Consequences], in: Hazdra, Z. – Horčička, V. – Županič, J. (eds.), Šlechta střední Evropy v konfrontaci s totalitními režimy 20. století. Der Adel Mitteleuropas in Konfrontation mit den totalitären Regimen des 20. Jahrhunderts [Nobility of Central Europe confronted with Totalitarian Regimes of the 20th Century], Praha 2011, pp. 107 – 130. Ježek, F., Mnichovská krize. Memoárové poznámky na okraj tragických dnů utrpení a hanby [Munich Crisis. Memoir Remarks on the Tragic Days of Suffering and Shame], Praha 2016. Johnson, G., The Berlin Embassy of Lord D’Abernon, 1920 – 1926, Basingstoke 2002. Johnson, G. (ed.), Locarno Revisited. European Diplomacy 1920 – 1929, London 2004. Johnson, G., Preparing for Office: Lord Curzon as Acting Foreign Secretary, January – October 1919, in: Contemporary British History, 18, 3, 2004, pp. 53 – 73. Kadlec, P. – Kladiwa, P. – Gawrecki, D. et al., Národnostní statistika v českých zemích 1880 – 1930. Mechanismy, problémy a důsledky národnostní klasifikace. Vol. I – II [Ethnic Statistics in the Czech Lands 1880 – 1930. Mechanisms, Problems and Consequences of National Classification. Vol. I – II], Praha 2016. Kárník, Z., České země v éře první republiky (1918 – 1938). Díl druhý. Československo a české země v krizi a v ohrožení (1930 – 1935) [Czech Lands in the Era of the First Republic (1918 – 1938). Part Two. Czechoslovakia and the Czech Lands in Crisis and Threat (1930 – 1935)], Praha 2002. Kárník, Z., České země v éře První republiky (1918 – 1938). Díl třetí. O přežití a o život (1936 – 1938) [Czech Lands in the Era of the First Republic (1918 – 1938). Part Three. Survival and Life (1936 – 1938)], Praha 2003. Keene, T. H., Sir Robert Vansittart and the British Foreign Office, 1930 – 1938, in: Proceedings and Papers of the Georgia Association of Historians, 2, 1981, pp. 80 – 90. Klimek, A. – Hofman, P., Velké dějiny zemí Koruny české, svazek XIV., 1929 – 1938 [Great History of the Czech Lands, Vol. XIV, 1929 – 1938], Praha, Litomyšl 2002.

278

Sources and literature

Konrád, O., Nevyvážené vztahy. Československo a Rakousko 1918 – 1933 [Unbalanced Relationships. Czechoslovakia and Austria 1918 – 1933], Praha 2012. Kracik, J., Die Politik des deutschen Aktivismus in der Tschechoslowakei 1920 – 1938 [Politics of German Activism in Czechoslovakia, 1920 – 1938], Frankfurt am Main 1999. Kučera, J., Mezi Wilhelmstraße a Thunovskou. Finanční podpora Německé říše Sudetoněmecké straně v letech 1935 – 1938 [Between Wilhelmstraße and Thun Street. Financial Support from the German Reich to the Sudeten German Party in 1935 – 1938], in: Český časopis historický, 95, 1997, 2, pp. 387 – 410. Kučera, J., Minderheit im Nationalstaat. Die Sprachenfrage in den tschechisch-deutschen Beziehungen 1918 – 1938 [Minority in the Nation State. The Language Question in CzechGerman Relations 1918 – 1938], München 1999. Kuklík, J. – němeček, J., Národnostní problematika v Československu očima americké diplomacie (1933 – 1938) [Ethnic Issues in Czechoslovakia through the Eyes of American Diplomacy (1933 – 1938)], in: Moderní dějiny. Časopis pro dějiny 19. a 20. století, 19, 2, 2011, pp. 183 – 218. Kuklík, J. – Němeček, J., Od národního státu ke státu národností? Národnostní statut a snahy o řešení menšinové otázky v Československu v roce 1938 [From the National State to the State of Nationalities? National Status and Efforts to Address the Minority Issue in Czechoslovakia in 1938], Praha 2013. Kural, V., Konflikt místo společenství? Češi a Němci v československém státě (1918 – 1938) [Conflict instead of Community? Czechs and Germans in the Czechoslovak State (1918 – 1938)], Praha 1993. Kvaček, R., K historii Henleinovy Sudetoněmecké strany, díl I. [The History of Henlein’s Sudeten German Party, Part I], in: Dějepis ve škole, IV, 5, 1957, pp. 193 – 200. Kvaček, R., Jednání o československý národnostní statut v roce 1938 [Negotiations on the Statute of Nationalities in 1938], in: Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Philosophica et Historica 1, Studia Historica XVI, Praha 1977, pp. 105 – 143. Kvaček, R., Obtížné spojenectví. Politicko-diplomatické vztahy mezi Československem a Francií 1937 – 1938. I [Difficult Alliance. Political-diplomatic Relations between Czechoslovakia and France 1937 – 1938. I], Praha 1989. Kvaček, R., Milan Hodža jako premiér. (Glosy k prvnímu vládnímu období 1935 – 1937) [Milan Hodža as Prime Minister. (Glosses for the First Government Period 1935 – 1937)], in: Pekník, M. a kol. (ed.), Milan Hodža. Štátnik a politik [Milan Hodža. Statesman and Politician], Bratislava 2002, pp. 235 – 243. Lacaze, Y., Daladier, Bonnet and the Decision-making Process during the Munich Crisis, 1938, in: Boyce, R (ed.), French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918 – 1940. The Decline and Fall of a Great Power, London 1998, pp. 214 – 232. Lemberg, H., Die Tschechoslowakei im Epochenjahr 1933 [Czechoslovakia in the Epoch Year 1933], in: Bohemia, 25, 2, 1984, pp. 313 – 332. Leoncini, F., Das Problem der deutschen Minderheit in Böhmen in der internationalen Politik der Jahre 1918/1919 [The Problem of the German Minority in Bohemia in the International Politics of the Years 1918/1919], in: Bohemia, 13, 1972, pp. 306 – 335. Luh, A., Der deutsche Turnverband in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. Vom völkischen Vereinsbetrieb zur volkspolitischen Bewegung [The German Turnverband in the First Czechoslovak Republic. From the Volkisch Club Operation to the National Political Movement], München 1988.

Literature

279

Luh, A. Grossbritannien, die Sudetendeutsche Partei und das Dritte Reich [Great Britain, the Sudeten German Party and the Third Reich], in: Schmidt-Hartmann, E. – Winters, S. B. (hrsg.), Groβbritannien, die USA und die böhmischen Länder 1848 – 1938 [Great Britain, the USA and the Bohemian Lands 1848 – 1938], München 1991, pp. 353 – 376. Majewski, P. M., Sudetští Němci 1848 – 1948. Dějiny jednoho nacionalismu [Sudeten Germans 1848 – 1948. The History of One Nationalism], Brno 2014. McDonough, F., The Times, Norman Ebbut, and the Nazis, 1927 – 37, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 27, 3, 1992, pp. 407 – 424. McKercher, B. J. C., The Foreign Office, 1930 – 39: Strategy, Permanent Interests and National Security, in: Contemporary British History, 18, 3, 2004, pp. 87 – 109. Michie, L. W., Portrait of an Appeaser. Robert Hadow, First Secretary in the British Foreign Office, 1931 – 1939, Westport 1996. Moravcová, D., Menšinový problém v meziválečném Československu [Minority Problem in Interwar Czechoslovakia], in: Střední Evropa, 15, 92/93, 1999, pp. 174 – 192. Neville, P., The Appointment of Sir Nevile Henderson, 1937 – Design or Blunder?, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 33, 4, 1998, pp. 609 – 619. Neville, P., Rival Foreign Office Perceptions of Germany, 1936 – 1939, in: Diplomacy & Statecraft, 13, 3, 2002, pp. 137 – 152. Novotný, L., Kameradschaftsbund. A Contribution to the History of the Czech-German Relationship. (Part one), in: Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, 12, 2008, pp. 291 – 309. Novotný, L., Kameradschaftsbund. A Contribution to the History of the Czech-German Relationship. (Part two), in: Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, 13, 2009, pp. 387 – 405. Novotný, L., Die Britischen Dominions und der Vertrag von Locarno. Der Prüfstein für eine einheitliche Außenpolitik des Empire in der Zwischenkriegszeit [The British Dominions and the Treaty of Locarno. The Touchstone for a Uniform Foreign Policy of the Empire in the Inter-war Period], in: Jahrbuch für Europäische Überseegeschichte, 10, 2010, pp. 163 – 188. Novotný, L., Great Britain and the Journey to the Rhineland Pact (March–July 1925). A Contribution to the Issue of Collective Security in the 1920s, in: Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, 2011, 2, pp. 132 – 147. Novotný, L., Great Britain and the Journey to the Rhineland Pact (July–August 1925). A Contribution to the Issue of Collective Security in the 1920s, in: West Bohemian Historical Review, 2012, 2, pp. 59 – 72. Novotný, L., “Na pana Špínu profesora si dejte v Praze též pozor, jest to Čech rozený, ale škodlivý teď Němec.” K činnosti čelného představitele německého aktivismu v první Československé republice Franze Spiny [“Also, be careful about Mr. Špina, who is born in Prague, but German is harmful now.” The Activities of the Leading Representative of German Activism in the First Czechoslovak Republic, Franz Spina], in: Historica Olomucensia (Sborník prací historických XXXII), 44, 2013, pp. 99 – 113. Novotný, L., Cesta ke vstupu německých ministrů do československé vlády v roce 1926. K problému vnímání německého aktivismu v Československu ze strany rakouského vyslanectví v Praze [The Road to the Entry of German Ministers to the Czechoslovak Government in 1926. The Issue of Perception of German Activism in Czechoslovakia by

280

Sources and literature

the Austrian Legation in Prague], in: Moderní dějiny. Časopis pro dějiny 19. a 20. století, 23, 1, 2015, pp. 155 – 178. Novotný, L. – Kodet, R., Velká Británie a konference v Locarnu. Příspěvek ke studiu kolektivní bezpečnosti ve 20. letech 20. století [Great Britain and the Locarno Conference. Contribution to the Study of Collective Security in the 1920s], Plzeň 2013. Olivová, V., Kameradschaftsbund, in: Z českých dějin. Sborník prací in memoriam prof. Dr. Václava Husy [From Czech History. Proceedings in memoriam of prof. Dr. Vaclav Husa], Praha 1966, pp. 237 – 268. Orzoff, A., Battle for the Castle. The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914 – 1948, Oxford 2009. Peden, G. C., The Burden of Imperial Defence and the Continental Commitment Reconsidered, in: The Historical Journal, 27, 2, 1984, pp. 405 – 423. Petráš, R., Menšiny v meziválečném Československu. Právní postavení národnostních menšin v první Československé republice a jejich mezinárodněprávní ochrana [Minorities in Interwar Czechoslovakia. Legal Status of National Minorities in the First Czechoslovak Republic and Their International Legal Protection], Praha 2009. Protheroe, G., Sir George Clerk and the Struggle for British Influence in Central Europe, 1919 – 26, in: Diplomacy & Statecraft, 12, 3, 2001, pp. 39 – 64. Roberts, A., The Holy Fox. The Life of Lord Halifax, London 2015. Robertson, J. C., The British General Election of 1935, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 9, 1, 1974, pp. 149 – 164. Robbins, K. G., Konrad Henlein, the Sudeten Question and British Foreign Policy, in: The Historical Journal, 12, 4, 1969, pp. 674 – 697. Schaffrannek, Ch., Poslední fáze sociálně demokratického boje proti Sudetoněmecké straně na jaře a v létě 1938 [The Last Phase of the Social Democratic Struggle against the Sudeten German Party in the Spring and Summer of 1938], in: Kokoška, S. – Oellermann, T. (ed.), Sudetští Němci proti Hitlerovi. Sborník německých odborných studií [Sudeten Germans against Hitler. Proceedings of German Studies], Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, v. v. i., Praha 2008, pp. 45 – 60. Scheuermann, M., Minderheitenschutz contra Konfliktverhütung? Die Minderheitenpolitik des Völkerbundes in den zwanziger Jahren m[Minority Protection versus Conflict Prevention? The Minority Policy of the League of Nations in the 1920s], Marburg 2000. Seton-Watson, Ch., R. W. Seton-Watson and the Czechoslovaks, 1935 – 1939, in: SchmidtHartmann, E. – Winters, S. B. (hrsg.), Groβbritannien, die USA und die böhmischen Länder 1848 – 1938 [Great Britain, the USA and the Bohemian Lands 1848 – 1938], München 1991, pp. 335 – 352. Smetana, V., Old Wine in New Bottles? British Policy towards Czechoslovakia, 1938 – 1939 and 1947 – 1948, in: Cornwall, M. – Evans, R. J. W. (ed.), Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe 1918 – 1948, Oxford 2007, pp. 143 – 167. Smetana, V., In the Shadow of Munich. British Policy towards Czechoslovakia from the Endorsement to the Renunciation of the Munich Agreement (1938 – 1942), Praha 2008. Steiner, H. První rakouský vyslanec v Praze FERDINAND MAREK. Jeho osudy v letech 1938 – 1947 [First Austrian Minister to Prague FERDINAND MAREK. His Fates in 1938 – 1947], Praha 1995. Steiner, Z., The Lights that Failed. European International History 1919 – 1933, Oxford 2005.

Literature

281

Steiner, Z., The Triumph of the Dark. European International History 1933 – 1939, Oxford 2011. Straka, K., Československá armáda, pilíř obrany státu z let 1932 – 1939 [Czechoslovak Army, Pillar of National Defense from 1932 – 1939], Praha 2007. Suppan, A., Hitler – Beneš – Tito. Konflikt, Krieg und Völkermord in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa. Teil 1 [Hitler – Benes – Tito. Conflict, War and Genocide in East Central and Southeastern Europe. Part 1], Wien 2014. Štemberk, J., Fenomén cestovního ruchu. Možnosti a limity cestovního ruchu v meziválečném Československu [Tourism Phenomenon. Possibilities and Limits of Tourism in Interwar Czechoslovakia], Pelhřimov 2009. Tóth, A. – Novotný, L. – Stehlík, M., Národnostní menšiny v Československu 1918 – 1938. Od státu národního ke státu národnostnímu? [National Minorities in Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1938. From the Nation-State to the National State?], Praha 2012. Valkoun, J., Na cestě k Westminsterskému statutu. Velká Británie, dominia a proměna Britského impéria v letech 1907 – 1931 [On the way to the Westminster Status. Great Britain, Dominions and Transformation of the British Empire in 1907 – 1931], Praha 2015. Vyšný, P., The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938. Prelude to Munich, Basingstoke 2003. Wallace, W. V., The Making of the May Crisis of 1938, in: Slavonic and East European Review, 41, 97, 1963, pp. 368 – 390. Watt, D. C., Chamberlain’ Ambassadors, in: Dockrill, M. – McKercher, B. (ed.), Diplomacy and World Power. Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890 – 1950, Cambridge 1996, pp. 136 – 170. Wiskemann, E., Czechs & Germans. A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, London 1967. Zorach, J., The British View of the Czechs in the Era before the Munich Crisis, in: The Slavonic and East European Review, 57, 1, 1979, pp. 56 – 70.

Name index Acton, Richard 14 Adams, Samuel Vyvyan 146, 189 Addison, Joseph 2, 3, 6, 8, 34, 41, 53 – 56, 58, 61, 63 – 77, 79, 81, 83 – 88, 90, 96 – 105, 108 – 110, 113, 121, 122, 125, 128, 132, 134 – 137, 139, 141, 143, 162, 181, 220, 221, 251 – 254, 256 Ashton-Gwatkin, Frank 262 Auen, Rudolf Lodgman von 22, 23 Baldwin, Stanley 34, 85, 102, 114 Balfour, Arthur James 15 – 18, 21, 24 Bauer, Otto 18, 19 Beneš, Edvard 4, 7, 9, 15, 16, 18 – 21, 24, 26, 27, 29, 34, 39, 43– 45, 64, 71, 79, 85 – 88, 90, 92– 95, 97, 98, 100 – 105, 107, 110, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 123, 124, 126, 128, 135, 136, 138– 149, 151, 152, 154 – 156, 158, 161, 163, 166 – 168, 170, 172 – 174, 176, 177, 179, 181 – 183, 187, 188, 194, 195, 199, 201, 207 – 209, 211, 214 – 220, 222 – 226, 229 – 233, 236 – 238, 240 – 244, 246 – 249, 253, 254, 256 – 259, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266 Bentinck, Charles H. 125, 139 – 147, 153, 162, 255, 256 Beran, Rudolf 183, 184, 197 Berger-Waldenegg, Egon 82 Bonnet, Georges 238, 246, 247 Bradáč, Bohumír 42 Bramsdon, Thomas 28 Brand, Walter 81, 101, 102 Bruce Lockhart, Robert Hamilton 27, 153 Cadogan, Alexander 7, 135, 167, 182, 192, 203, 218, 221, 222, 224, 228, 230, 232, 236 – 239, 245 – 247, 258, 259 Carr, Edward 87, 90, 99, 100, 110, 116 Cazalet, Victor Alexander 210, 211, 245 Chamberlain, Arthur Neville 163, 178, 182, 183, 185, 186, 189, 190, 192, 195, 199, 218 – 221, 225, 228, 235, 236, 257, 266 Chamberlain, Austen 2, 30, 31, 56 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110651454-012

Chautemps, Camille 182 Cheetham, Nicolas J. A. 73, 80, 90, 95, 97, 100, 117, 135 – 137 Christie, Malcolm 105, 175 Churchill, Winston 140, 186, 228, 229 Clerk, George 3, 8, 27 – 33, 136, 251 Collier, Lawrence 102 Corbin, Charles 236, 237, 239, 241, 244 Crowe, Eyre 26, 35 Curzon, George Nathaniel 15, 21, 24, 27– 29 Czech, Ludwig 40, 74, 145, 188, 189 Čapek, Karel 82 Černý, Jan 30, 233 Černý, Vilém 85, 108, 121 Daladier, Édouard 217, 218 Dawson, Geoffrey 6, 92, 114, 165, 186 Delbos, Yvone 174, 179, 181, 182 Dérer, Ivan 144 Dodd, Charles 32 Domin, Karel 6, 75, 76 Drachovský, Josef 76 Ebbut, Norman 93 Eden, Anthony 7, 81, 85, 96, 107, 117, 118, 121, 126, 130 – 136, 138 – 143, 146, 149, 151, 154, 155, 162, 164, 165, 169, 181, 182, 185, 192, 206 Eisenlohr, Ernst 115, 144, 149, 152, 156, 158, 171, 181, 197, 230, 238 Elliot, Sydney P. 88 – 90 Fischer, Eugen 77 Formis, Rudolf 83 Frank, Karl Hermann 97, 121, 151, 171, 198, 236 Freissler, Robert 22 Gallop, Rodney A. 100 Gascoyne-Cecil, Robert Arthur James, Viscount Cranborne 5, 106, 132, 147, 152, 159 Goebbels, Joseph 57, 70, 139

Name index

Gosling, Cecil 22, 23, 27 Grey, Edward 56 Gurney, Kenneth 32, 46 – 48, 49, 53, 57, 58 Hadow, Robert 8, 35, 79, 82, 90, 92, 94, 98, 99, 109, 110, 113 – 119, 123 – 129, 134, 139, 142, 143, 147 – 149, 151, 152, 166 – 170, 176, 211, 220, 254, 255 Hampl, Antonín 97 Hankey, Maurice 55, 61, 107 Harmsworth, Cecil 28 Headlam-Morley, James Wycliffe 25 Henderson, Arthur 36, 149 Henderson, Nevile 5, 44, 99, 162, 164, 187, 189, 202 – 204, 222, 224, 234, 242 Henlein, Konrad 4, 35, 59, 61, 72, 73, 82, 84 – 96, 101, 102, 105 – 110, 113 – 116, 118, 120, 121, 123, 126 – 134, 136 – 138, 141 – 143, 148 – 151, 154, 157, 162 – 164, 171 – 175, 191, 198, 201, 204, 205, 210 – 212, 214 – 219, 222 – 226, 228 – 230, 232 – 238, 241, 243, 255, 256, 258, 265 Herron, George 22 Hitler, Adolf 2 – 4, 35, 36, 39, 40, 46, 47, 49, 56, 57, 67, 70, 71, 73, 79, 81 – 84, 89, 93, 94, 100, 108, 111, 113, 119, 120, 158, 165, 170, 176, 183, 186, 201, 203, 210, 211, 214, 216, 219, 222, 223, 237, 241, 252, 265, 266 Hoare, Samuel 7, 96, 97, 100, 109, 136, 140, 185, 199, 200, 216 Hodža, Milan 6, 84, 102, 115, 116, 124, 144 – 155, 157, 159, 161, 167, 172, 177, 183, 186, 194, 197, 200, 202, 205, 220, 225 – 227, 230, 231 – 233, 236, 238, 243 – 245, 261 Hohenlohe-Langenburg, Ernst II. 140, 262 Hoover, Herbert 36 Ingram, Maurice

35

Jakobi, Hermann 21 Jaksch, Wenzel 134, 148 – 151, 160, 168, 175, 176, 189, 211 Jesser, Franz 31 Jung, Rudolf 46, 47, 57

283

Kafka, Bruno 30 Kasper, Rudolf 46 Kerr, Philip Henry, 11th Marquess of Lothian 158, 165, 166 Kershaw, Herbert 42 – 44, 48, 49, 64, 252 Keudell, Walter 140 Knirsch, Hans 46 Koch, Walter 31, 40, 46 – 48, 55, 58, 83, 88 Kramář, Karel 15, 25 Krčmář, Jan 76 Krebs, Hans 46, 47 Krofta, Kamil 8, 71, 83, 98, 138 – 141, 144, 154, 155, 159, 167, 168, 171, 172, 179, 183, 194, 202, 208, 220, 221, 223 – 226, 234, 246, 258 Křepek, Franz 30 Kundt, Ernst 177, 230 Lacroix, Victor Léopold de 140, 152, 155, 167, 181, 211, 221, 224, 226, 237, 247, 258 Laurie, Arthur Pillans 163 – 165 Laval, Pierre 114, 187 Leopold, Josef 163 Lessing, Theodor 57, 58 Luschka, Felix 91, 149, 167 MacDonald, James Ramsay 34, 49, 85 Mack, William H. B. 95 Macleay, Ronald 3, 28, 32, 33, 251 Machník, František 121, 122 Malkin, Herbert William 123, 129, 248 Mallet, William Ivo 187, 209, 210, 220, 225, 232, 258 Malypetr, Jan 76, 80, 86, 88, 92, 96, 102, 105, 124 Marek, Ferdinand 6, 31, 41, 70, 73, 82, 84, 86, 114, 159 Mareš, František 75 Masaryk, Jan 6, 34, 39, 42, 48, 49, 61, 67, 79, 80, 83, 84, 96, 107 – 109, 114, 119, 120, 125 – 127, 132, 133, 142, 145, 148, 150, 151, 153, 160, 166, 169, 172, 174, 175, 185, 195, 198 – 201, 208, 211 – 213, 219, 220, 224, 228, 234, 245, 246

284

Name index

Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue 13, 16, 20, 22, 25, 27, 29, 30, 64, 85 – 88, 94, 97, 102, 104, 105, 199 Mastný, Vojtěch 6, 40, 59, 71, 77, 80, 92, 98, 131, 132, 153, 164, 203, 208 Mayr-Harting, Robert 31, 32, 124, 148 McDermott, Geoffrey Lyster 120 Meissner, Alfréd 52 Monicault, Louis de 92, 139 Montgomery-Cuninghame, Thomas 23 – 25, 251 Mussolini, Benito 49, 58, 79 Newton, Basil Cochrane 152 – 160, 163, 167, 171, 173, 177 – 179, 183, 184, 188, 192, 194 – 197, 199, 200, 202, 204, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210 – 212, 214, 215, 220, 221, 223 – 234, 236, 237, 241 – 243, 245 – 247, 256 – 258, 263, 266 Noël, Léon 39, 47, 52, 85 Norton, John Clifford 106 – 108, 254 O’Malley, Owen 35, 63, 64, 66, 80, 87, 103, 104, 116, 118, 123 – 126, 140, 142, 148, 149 – 151, 159, 254 Osuský, Štefan 40, 98, 187, 208, 248 Pares, Peter 88, 161, 163, 168, 176, 177, 223 Paul-Boncour, Joseph 187, 238 Phipps, Eric 7, 44, 56, 65, 66, 82, 113, 135, 187, 196, 203, 204, 211, 220, 230, 238, 238, 245, 246 Renner, Karl 18, 26 Ribbentrop, Joachim von 187, 235 Rosche, Alfred 80 Rumbold, Horace 15, 16, 247 Runciman, Walter 5, 247, 259, 261 – 266 Rutha, Heinz 105, 132, 133, 141, 147, 150, 159, 160, 169 Sargent, Orme 33, 35, 64, 65, 83, 92 – 94, 104, 106, 108, 113, 119, 129, 130, 152, 159, 160, 166, 174, 186, 201, 202, 206, 211, 212, 214, 215, 222, 223, 252, 254, 255, 258

Schubert, Leo 56 Selby, Walford 6, 21, 34, 36, 63, 81, 95, 126 Seton-Watson, Robert William 25, 27, 115, 176, 251 Simon, John 46, 54 – 56, 63, 65, 72, 73, 77, 83, 84 – 88, 203 Sinclair, Archibald 228, 229 Spina, Franz 31, 32, 40, 41, 70, 72, 144, 148, 188 Stanhope, James Richard, 7th Earl Stanhope 106, 117, 254 Stanley, Edward George Villiers, 17th Earl of Derby 18 Stein, Otto 105, 130 Strang, William 128, 204, 212, 220, 225, 242, 245 Stresemann, Gustav 31 Šámal, Přemysl 149, 160, 230 Štěpánek, Bedřich 23 Švehla, Antonín 30, 64 Toynbee, Arnold 162, 163, 169 Tusar, Vlastimil 17 Tyrrell, William 15, 22 Vansittart, Robert 35, 36, 56, 61, 63, 66 – 68, 79, 83, 85, 96, 99, 100, 105 – 107, 113, 114, 119, 120, 123, 128, 130 – 132, 136, 138, 140, 143, 149 – 151, 164, 166, 169, 172 – 174, 182, 206, 207, 214, 215, 229, 230, 235, 238, 240, 241, 247, 253 – 255, 258 Wickham Steed, Henry 25, 251 Wigram, Ralph 104 Wilson, Woodrow 17, 22 Wood, Edward Frederick Lindley, 3rd Viscount Halifax 5, 181, 183, 185, 192, 193, 199, 203, 204, 206, 209, 214 – 219, 221, 228, 230, 234, 238, 240 – 242, 244 – 248, 261, 263 Zajicek, Erwin 188 Zierhut, Wolfgang 72 Zingarelli, Italo 84