The British Labour Party, Transnational Influences and European Community Membership, 1960–1973 3515107754, 9783515107754

Citation preview

Kristian Steinnes

The British Labour Party, Transnational Influences and European Community Membership, 1960–1973

SGEI – SHEI – EHIE

EI SGEI HEI SHEI HIE EHIE Geschichte

Franz Steiner Verlag

Kristian Steinnes The British Labour Party, Transnational Influences and European Community Membership, 1960–1973

Studien zur Geschichte der Europäischen Integration (SGEI) Études sur l’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne (EHIE) Studies on the History of European Integration (SHEI) ––––––––––––––––––––––– Nr. 24 Herausgegeben von / Edited by / Dirigé par Jürgen Elvert In Verbindung mit / In cooperation with / En coopération avec Charles Barthel / Jan-Willem Brouwer / Eric Bussière / Antonio Costa Pinto / Desmond Dinan / Michel Dumoulin / Michael Gehler / Brian Girvin / Wolf D. Gruner / Wolfram Kaiser / Laura Kolbe / Johnny Laursen / Wilfried Loth / Piers Ludlow / Maria Grazia Melchionni / Enrique Moradiellos Garcia / Sylvain Schirmann / Antonio Varsori / Tatiana Zonova

Kristian Steinnes

The British Labour Party, Transnational Influences and European Community Membership, 1960–1973

Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. ISBN 978-3-515-10775-4 (Print) ISBN 978-3-515-10826-3 (E-Book) Jede Verwertung des Werkes außerhalb der Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. Dies gilt insbesondere für Übersetzung, Nachdruck, Mikroverfilmung oder vergleichbare Verfahren sowie für die Speicherung in Datenverarbeitungsanlagen. © 2014 Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Satz: DTP + TEXT, Eva Burri Druck: Bosch Druck, Ergolding Printed in Germany

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This book is the result of a long-standing interest in modern European history, postwar European integration and transnational political party relations. It is also the result of years of brooding over Britain’s role in Europe integration and in particular the British Labour Party’s relations with the integration process. To a considerable extent the work differentiates existing accounts of the Labour Party’s European policy up until Britain joined the European Community (EC) in 1973. While demonstrating greater continuity in the party’s European policies than existing studies have allowed, it also establishes a correlation between intensified and restructured transnational social democratic networking and evolving perceptions of EC membership within the party leadership. Deepened transnational networking is singled out as an important factor when explaining changed perceptions of joining the European Community during the period. The book also demonstrates that cross-border networking is an important and often neglected strand in analyses of policy formulating processes of the British Labour party, and also the Scandinavian and other European social democratic parties. Yet pondering does not inevitably lead to a book. Therefore, I am deeply indebted to a large number of people and institutions that have made the study possible. I would like to thank the Faculty of Humanities, the Department of Historical Studies and the Department of Language and Literature at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) whose support in different ways has contributed to the completion of the work. The same applies to the Centre for European and International Studies Research (CEISR) at the University of Portsmouth, UK. Moreover, my search through libraries and archives in many countries has been smoothened by a large number of very helpful and professional people. Without their generous help and guidance this study would have been impossible to complete. In the same vein, I am truly thankful to friends and colleagues at the NTNU for their support and advice. I also remember with pleasure the great group of people I shared office with at the CEISR. All of you are people from whom I have profited intellectually and whose friendship I deeply appreciate. The work has also profited from comments and discussions at international workshops and conferences. An important source of motivation stems from my life outside the office – from friends and family. I always think of Maria, Anna, Malvin and Dina, and my wonderful wife Marianne, with joy and gratitude. Yet despite generous support and advice, I am fully and solely responsible for content and assessments in this book.

CONTENT Acknowledgements ........................................................................................... Content .............................................................................................................. Abbreviations ....................................................................................................

5 7 9

Chapter 1 The British Labour Party and Europe ............................................................... Continuity and change – and transnational networks ....................................... Analytical approach .......................................................................................... Empirical foundation ........................................................................................ Argument and structure.....................................................................................

13 14 21 27 29

Chapter 2 The British Labour Party and European integration, 1945–59 ......................... The ECSC, the postwar Labour government and a planned economy ............. Revisionism, economic planning and Europe on the eve of the sixties ............

33 33 36

Chapter 3 In Search of a European Policy ......................................................................... A challenging task: defining a consistent European policy .............................. Divided – and undecided .................................................................................. Restructured and intensified transnational cooperation .................................... Transnational cooperation and the prospects for socialist policies ................... Policy-making and electability ......................................................................... Early European policy formulation reconsidered .............................................

41 41 44 49 51 55 56

Chapter 4 Moving Towards a European Policy ................................................................. Conditional support: Labour’s response to the EEC application ...................... Gaitskell and European socialists ..................................................................... The logic of wait-and-see.................................................................................. Transnational activities and tactical manoeuvring ............................................ The Labour Party: moving towards a conclusion ............................................. Gaitskell’s position reassessed ..........................................................................

59 59 63 66 68 72 75

Chapter 5 An Empowered Party ........................................................................................ The first Wilson government and Europe ......................................................... Transnational efforts to bring Britain closer to the EEC................................... Further efforts and obstacles ............................................................................. Wilson’s first year in office and the EEC issue .................................................

79 79 82 86 88

8

CONTENT

Chapter 6 Preparing an Application................................................................................... Transnational contacts with core Europe socialists .......................................... The general election and EEC-membership ..................................................... Tactics and timing .............................................................................................

91 91 95 98

Chapter 7 Application and Veto......................................................................................... A deliberate approach ....................................................................................... Mobilising transnational networks.................................................................... Probing the French ............................................................................................ Membership bid and veto.................................................................................. Efforts to save the application...........................................................................

105 106 108 111 115 120

Chapter 8 Not Taking No for an Answer ........................................................................... The application left on the table........................................................................ Labour’s leadership, the Five and Germany ..................................................... All or nothing .................................................................................................... The end of the British European policy impasse ..............................................

123 123 124 127 133

Chapter 9 The Veto Years, EFTA and a Socialist Policy for Europe ................................. The French non, EFTA and Britain ................................................................... A social democratic programme for Europe: initiatives and developments ..... Socialism on a European level: dispersal of an idea .........................................

139 139 144 148

Chapter 10 Opposition, Enlargement and the European Policy .......................................... Preparing for negotiations ................................................................................. British European policy: continuity .................................................................. Maximising socialist policies: policy formulation and networking .................. Cross-border endeavours for more European socialist policies ........................ Harmonised socialist understanding of an enlarged Europe .............................

155 155 156 160 163 166

Chapter 11 Wilson and the Fate of Labour’s European Policy ........................................... No accession on Tory terms .............................................................................. A political life raft: renegotiation and referendum ........................................... Member of the club – postponed Labour participation in the EP .....................

171 171 176 179

Chapter 12 Labour and Europe Reassessed ......................................................................... Explaining the Labour Party’s European policy ............................................... Greater continuity and evolving perceptions .................................................... Transnational networking, interest maximising and socialisation ....................

183 184 186 192

List of Archives ................................................................................................. 195 Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 197

ABBREVIATIONS AAB ABA ACUE AEU AMS ARAB ARENA BL BT CAP CBE CBI CDS CDU CGIL CGT CISC CISL CLP CMSC CND COMISCO CSPEC DEA DGB DNA EC ECFTO ECSC EDC EDM EEC EESC EFTA ELB EMU EP EPC EPLP EPU ERP ESC EU

The Norwegian Labour Movement’s Archives and Library, Oslo The Danish Labour Movement’s Library and Archives, Copenhagen Action Committee for the United States of Europe (“Monnet Committee”) Amalgamated Engineering Union National Labour Market Board, Sweden The Swedish Labour Movement’s Archives and Library, Stockholm Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-state (Norway) Bodleian Library, Oxford Board of Trade Common Agricultural Policy Order of the British Empire Confederation of British Industry Campaign for Democratic Socialism Christian Democratic Union, Germany (Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands) Italian Confederation of Labour (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro), affiliated to the WFTU French Confederation of Labour (Confédération Générale du Travail), affiliated to the WFTU European Confederation of Christian Trade Unions Italian (Catholic) Labour Confederation (Confed. Italiana Sindicati Lavoratori) Constituency Labour Party Common Market Safeguards Committee Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Committee of the International Socialist Conferences (1947–51, later SI) Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the EC (former ELB/LBSDEC) Department of Economic Affairs, Britain Deutsche Gewertschaftsbund (German Confederation of Trade Unions) Norwegian Labour Party (Det norske Arbeiderparti) European Communities (the merged EEC, ECSC and Euratom from 1967) European Confederation of Free Trade Unions European Coal and Steel Community European Defence Community Early Day Motion European Economic Community European Economic and Social Committee (former ESC) European Free Trade Association European Liaison Bureau, formally LBSDEC (from 1971 OSDEC, 1974 CSPEC and 1992 PES) Economic and Monetary Union European Parliament European Political Community European Parliamentary Labour Party European Payments Union European Recovery Program European Social Committee (see EESC) European Union

10 EUA EUI EURM FBM FCO FDI FDP FGTB FMA FO FRD FSDP FTA GATT GBBLO GDP GNP GSEP HMG HPC HWBLO IC ICFTU IDU IISH ILU INGO INGO IR ITO JCCM JOKA LACR LAM LBSDEC LCE LCMC LO LS MEP MGE MP NHS NA NAFTA NATO NEC NECC NGO NIA NORDEK NTNU NUGMW

Abbreviations European Union Archives, Florence European University Institute, Florence Committee on the approach to Europe Forward Britain Movement Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Foreign Direct Investments German Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei) Belgian General Federation of Labour Finn Moe papers, AAB Foreign Office Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland) Finnish Social Democratic Party European Free Trade Area General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade George Brown papers Bodleian Library, Oxford Gross Domestic Product Gross National Product Socialist Group, EP (Group Socialiste, Parlement européen) Her Majesty’s Government Home Policy Committee (of the British Labour Party) Harold Wilson papers Bodleian Library, Oxford International Committee (of the British Labour Party) International Confederation of Free Trade Unions International Democrat Union International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam Italian Labour Union International non-governmental organisations International Non-governmental organisations International Relations theory International Trade Organisation Joint Committee on the Common Market (of the British Labour Party) Jens Otto Krag papers, ABA Labour Party Annual Conference Reports National Museum of Labour History, Manchester Liaison Bureau of the Social Democratic Parties of the European Community Labour Committee for Europe Labour Common Market Committee Confederation of Trade Unions Luxembourg Socialist Labour Party Member of the European Parliament Mouvement Gauche Européenne, see LBSDEC Member of Parliament National Health Service National Archives, London (see PRO) North Atlantic Free Trade Area North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Executive Committee Nordic Economic Cooperation Committee Non-governmental organisation National Insurance Act Nordic Economic Cooperation (1968–70) Norwegian University of Science and Technology National Union of General and Municipal Workers

Abbreviations NUM OECD OEEC OPA OSDEC PCF PES PHA PKA PLP PM PREM PRIO PRO PSB PSDI PSF PSI PSU PvdA QMV Quai d’Orsay R&D RS SAMAK SAP SD SEA SFIO SHAPE SI SII SILO SMA SP SPD SPÖ TEA TG TGWU TSO TUC UK UN USSR VS WEU WFL WFTU

11

National Union of Miners (Britain) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Organisation for European Economic Cooperation Olof Palme papers, ARAB Office of the Social Democratic Parties of the European Community (former ELB, and from 1974 CSPEC and 1992 PES) French Communist Party (Parti communiste français) Party of European Socialists, former LBSDEC Per Hækkerup papers, ABA Per Kleppe papers, AAB Parliamentary Labour Party Prime Minister Prime Minister ’s Office Norwegian International Peace Research Institute Public Record Office (National Archives, London) Belgian Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Belge, also SP) Italian Democratic Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano) French Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste), until 1969 SFIO Italian Socialist Party Italian Unified Socialist Party Dutch Labour Party (Partij van der Arbeid) Qualified majority voting The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research and Development Reiulf Steen papers, AAB The Cooperation Committee of the Nordic Labour movement Swedish Labour Party (Sveriges Arbetarparti) Danish Labour Party (Socialdemokratiet) Single European Act French Socialist Party (Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière) till 1969 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO) Socialist International Socialist International Information (from 1971 Socialist Affairs) Socialist Information and Liaison Office (1946–47, later COMISCO and SI) Sicco Mansholt papers, IISH Belgische Socialistische Partij (also PSB) Social Democratic Party, Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) Austrian Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratischen Partei Österreichs) Tage Erlander papers, ARAB Tribune Group Transport and General Workers’ Union Her Majesty’s Stationery Office Trades Union Congress United Kingdom United Nations Soviet Union Victory for Socialism Western European Union World Federation of Labour Communist World Federation of Trade Unions

CHAPTER 1 THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY AND EUROPE As noted by Kevin Featherstone, few political parties have “been troubled by questions concerned with European integration as much as the British Labour Party”.1 Since the formation of the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950–52, which the Labour government declined to join, the party showed little enthusiasm for deeper involvement with the European integration process during the fifties.2 Although initially being reluctant to involvement with core Europe integration (EEC/ EC/EU), the party’s position evolved.3 When the Conservative government led by Harold Macmillan re-evaluated its European polices from 1960 onwards, eventually leading to the mid-1961 application for EEC membership, the process accelerated. In 1967, a Labour government headed by Harold Wilson submitted an application to join the EC. Despite being vetoed by French president Charles de Gaulle, who had also blocked the 1961 Macmillan application, Wilson continued his efforts to achieve British EC membership. In the wake of the 1969 Haag meeting, at which the heads of the Community countries agreed to enlarge the club, Wilson prepared for membership negotiations. Because Labour surprisingly lost the 1970 general election, it was the new Tory government headed by Prime Minister Edward Heath who negotiated entry and subsequently obtained British membership in 1973. Following the election defeat, intra-party tensions and Eurosceptic sentiments rose in the Labour Party, eventually resulting in demands for renegotiations of the terms and promise of a referendum. As a result, only two years after Britain joined the EC, the new Labour government in office from March 1974 renegotiated the terms and called a referendum on continued membership. In contrast to the British Labour Party, the fifties had been essential in defining party attitudes towards the European integration process for the Socialist parties of the six Community member states. The French socialist party (SFIO) had been among the protagonists of European integration in the postwar years, and it had played a major part in creating core Europe and equipping it with institutions that would bring it into being. It could also claim it was a socialist-led government that negotiated the Treaties of Rome.4 The German Social Democratic Party (SPD) had both in exile, while underground during the Nazi regime, and after World War II, advocated a European system designed to weaken the position of the nation states and reduce national sovereignty. Although the party voted against concrete integration projects in the early fifties, it was an integrative force in the sense that it fa1 2 3 4

Featherstone 1988: 41. Newman 1993: 163. In this work, core Europe, the Common Market, the Six and the Community has been used interchangeably to describe the European integration process. Loth 1993: 25 and Lefebvre 1993: 56.

14

The British Labour Party and Europe

voured policies involving reduced national sovereignty. The party could also explain its shifting attitudes towards the European integration process as both a symptom and cause of the fundamental change in its ideological stance and national role in those years. In 1957, it supported the setting up of the Rome Treaties and West Germany’s membership of the EEC. Subsequently, party representatives engaged in efforts to further core Europe integration.5 In much the same way, the Italian, Dutch and Belgian socialist parties, although approaching the issue in different ways during the early fifties, supported the Rome Treaties and the creation of the Common Market.6 Hence, on the eve of the 1960s core Europe socialist parties explicitly supported the integration process, although it had chiefly been brought about by conservative and Christian social parties. Compared with these parties, the British Labour Party and the Scandinavian labour parties made up a group of reluctant northern European socialist parties during the period.7 It “is no accident”, Denis Healy pointed out in the early fifties, “that in their approach to European unity since 1945 the socialist parties of Britain and Scandinavia have been most conservative – for they have most to conserve”.8 An important reason, he argued, was that economic planning reinforced the trend towards nationalism in a governing socialist party. In a predominantly capitalist world, national economic planning often would be inconsistent with forms of international cooperation an economic liberal government would be inclined to accept. Roy Jenkins, recognising the importance of economic planning, argued at the 1961 Annual Conference that joining the EEC would not inhibit “social progress”.9 Putting emphasis on economic planning Healy and Jenkins drew attention to a key ideological strand of the British Labour Party and a core component of the party’s discussions on British membership of the EEC/EC during 1960–73. The leadership of the British Labour Party and the Scandinavian labour parties considered their parties’ ability to carry out socialist policies in a national and wider European context vital throughout the period. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE – AND TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS What does existing research tell about Labour ’s relations with the European integration process in the 1960s? And what are the main deficiencies in this research body? A large number of studies have tried to explain why successive British governments from the early sixties opted for EEC/EC membership.10 Yet the debate on 5 6 7 8 9 10

Hrbek 1993: 63, 74 and Bellers 1993: 78–89. Nolfo 1993: 90–98, Brusse 1993: 106–134 and Mommens and Minten 1993: 140–61. Thomsen 1993b, Robins 1979, Gstöhl 2002, Gowland and Turner 2000, Jowell and Spence 1975, Miljan 1977, George 1990. Quoted from Dell 1995: 190. LAM, Report Labour Party Annual Conference 1961: 216. Camps 1966, Kitzinger 1973, George 1990, George 1991, Young 1993, Kaiser 1996, Beloff 1996, Tratt 1996, Morgan 1997, Young 1998, May 1999, Gowland and Turner 2000, Broad and Preston 2001, Milward 2002, Kaiser 2002, Daddow 2004, Mullen 2007 and Wall 2013.

Continuity and change – and transnational networks

15

the British Labour Party’s relations with core Europe suggests that it is a history of ambiguity. The party’s European policies seemed to vacillate between whether to oppose, support or even apply for membership during the sixties and early seventies. The predominant interpretation of the party’s European policies is that of a reluctant and divided party excluding itself from early core Europe integration in 1950, when it declined the invitation to join the ECSC, subsequently remaining aloof from the process during the fifties and early sixties. Profoundly shaken by the prevailing economic and political realities, however, it gradually and reluctantly reassessed its European policy at some point in the mid-sixties. From the early seventies it slipped back into opposition. Due to the perceived aloofness and ambiguity, the Labour Party’s response to the Macmillan government’s 1961 application was “ambivalent, uncertain, vague and cautious”, Robins notes in his study of the Labour Party and the EEC.11 Initially, party leader Hugh Gaitskell is believed to have been indifferent and even unenthusiastic towards core Europe integration.12 Lieber, Robins and Rippingale hold that Gaitskell did not make up his mind on the issue until the late summer and autumn of 1962.13 When the Conservative government reappraised its European policies in the early sixties, Gaitskell allegedly hesitated and kept the party on the fence for over a year. After vacillating between making pro- and contra-European statements, he suddenly turned against entry in a highly emotional speech at the party’s 1962 annual conference at Brighton. He declared, in a statement that also forms the basis for the argument in the research literature, that membership of the EEC would mean “the end of Britain as an independent European state. I make no apology for repeating it. It means the end of a thousand years of history. You may say, ‘let it end’, but my goodness, it is a decision that needs a little care and thought.”14 In keeping with Stephen George, Brian Brivati is among those who argue that Gaitskell united the party behind his leadership in a single speech, and that its effects were tremendous.15 Apparently, a small minority of devoted EEC supporters, grouped around Roy Jenkins and George Brown, became largely isolated after the speech as the overwhelming majority of the party united against EEC membership.16 Phillip Williams claims that the party leader never outright opposed British membership of core Europe but rejected the particular terms secured by Macmillan in his bid for entry and not membership in principle.17 Yet as recently demonstrated by Mullen, Meredith and Gowland, Turner and Wright, the impres-

11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Robins 1979: 16. Young 1998: 148–71. Hugh Gaitskell was party leader during 1955–63 Lieber 1970: 175–77, Robins 1979: 27–28, 41–42, Rippingale 1996: 243–63. This is also in keeping with Featherstone. Featherstone 1988: 53. Report of the 61st Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Brighton, 1–5 October, 1962: 159. Brivati 1996: 404 pp, 416, Brivati 1999: 112, George 1991: 74–75, Delaney 2002: 125 and Featherstone 1988: 53–54. See also Meredith 2012: 333–34. Among them: Anthony Crosland, Fred Mulley, Nicholas Kaldor, Robert Neild, Thomas Balogh, Shirley Williams, Charles Pannell, Douglas Houghton, John Hynd, Sam Watson, Ray Gunter and others. Williams 1979: 702–29. See also Broad and Daddow 2010.

16

The British Labour Party and Europe

sion of a reluctant party leader dominates interpretations of Gaitskell’s attitude towards EEC membership.18 In keeping with this line of reasoning, Labour ’s opposition to entering the EEC eventually was overturned by the 1966–67 Labour government’s membership bid. The bulk of the literature dealing with Harold Wilson and his position on the issue argues that he realised – albeit unenthusiastically – that Britain had to enter core Europe in the mid-sixties.19 In his PhD dissertation, Simon Rippingale believes that shadow chancellor and former President of the Board of Trade Harold Wilson, then commonly associated with the centre-left of the party, was reluctant about British involvement in the European integration process in the mid-fifties.20 When discussions on the Free Trade Area (FTA) were underway during the second half of the decade, he rhetorically asked, “can we afford to stand out? … I am sure the answer is that we cannot”, but he later pointed out that there was “no suggestion that Britain should join the Common Market”.21 By the sixties he reportedly acknowledged there was “a strong desire for a really effective and intimate basis of association between Great Britain and Scandinavian countries on the one hand” and core Europe on the other.22 In June 1960, he wrote a paper on behalf of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) carefully outlining arguments for and against joining the EEC. He took no definite position himself. Yet according to Wilson’s biographer Ben Pimlott, it was evident from his conclusions that the arguments against outweighed the pros.23 Apparently, he approached the question in a pragmatic way, weighing up the costs and benefits. John W. Young suggests that Wilson was largely in keeping with Gaitskell’s handling of the EEC membership issue in the early sixties.24 The Labour government elected in 1964 demonstrated “little overt interest in European integration”, Rollings observes.25 Anne Deighton refers to Wilson in a debate in the House of Commons in April 1965 in which he “made it clear that ‘there is no question whatever of Britain either seeking or being asked to seek entry into the Common Market in the immediately foreseeable future’”. Allegedly, she argues, his position was “consistent with the stance taken by Labour when in opposition”.26 In keeping with this tradition, Wilson’s biographer, Austen Morgan, believes Wilson “made up his mind” in favour of joining the EEC in January 1966. During the spring of 1965 “pressures began to build up, which resulted in the application two years later”, John Young suggests.27 In line with Lord Beloff, he maintains that Wilson’s attitude to the EEC was “clearly of enormous importance”, 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Mullen 2007: 75–76, Meredith 2012: 333–36, Gowland, Turner and Wright 2010: 63. Harold Wilson was party leader during 1963–76. Rippingale1996: 217. Foot 1968: 220, quoted from Pine 2007: 15. Pine 2007: 15. Pimlott 1992: 246. Young 1993: 88. Rollings 2007: 143. Deighton 2001: 392. See also Deighton 2003: 39–41. See Hansard, Vol. 711, 1965: 623. See also Rasmussen 2004. He purports the conventional wisdom claiming that with “the victory of Harold Wilson at the British election in October 1964, it was not likely that Britain would apply for EC membership in the near future”. Rasmussen 2004: 150.

Continuity and change – and transnational networks

17

indicating that “evidence points to Wilson becoming more ‘pro-European’ in 1964– 66”, but obscured his intentions for domestic political reasons. “Exactly why he became better disposed to the EEC is even more difficult to assess,” he claims.28 Thus, Young as Delaney suggest that Wilson only reluctantly realised in 1966 that Britain had to enter core Europe.29 Parr corroborate him, arguing that the decision to develop a new approach to the EEC was pragmatic and a result of the July 1966 sterling crisis.30 In his memoirs, George Wigg, Wilson’s adviser on security issues, compared Wilson’s “conversion” to the EEC to St Paul’s on the road to Damascus with the difference “that, judged by subsequent actions, Paul’s conversion was sincere”.31 Yet in a study of the Foreign Office (FO), John Dickie claims that Wilson privately had “come to the conclusion before he won the 1964 election that Britain’s future lay inevitably with the European Community”, though without enthusiasm.32 Building on this understanding, Wolfram Kaiser suggests that Wilson’s objectives for launching the 1967 application were in part tactical, denying the Conservatives “one important policy platform on which to attack the government”, appeasing the pro-Europeans within the government and the Labour Party and conveying “the impression of activity and decisiveness to the electorate”.33 Oliver Daddow has put forward similar arguments. He claims that the bid can be seen “as a ‘successful failure’ for the Prime Minister”, soothing both the pro- and anti-European factions in the Labour Party and the government and demonstrating Britain’s willingness to seek a European solution to its problems, “smoothing the way for the UK’s accession to the Community in 1973”.34 If there was a “fundamental reason” why Labour turned towards EEC/EC membership, John Young claims, it was “probably the fact that there seemed no viable alternative”, thus implying, in line with Reynolds, there was “never any doubt that Edward Heath would press for membership with greater vigour than Wilson”.35 Of late, Gowland, Turner and Wright have emphasised that Wilson “possessed none of the European interests … and none of the pro-EEC convictions of Edward Heath”, confirming that this still is a prevalent perception of Wilson’s European credentials.36 Following the general election defeat in June 1970, Wilson apparently soon reverted to his former reluctance vis-à-vis entanglement with core Europe. Conventional wisdom also suggests that from 1971 onwards the Labour Party moved from a position of support for joining to one of scepticism of the EC.37 Thus, the Labour government’s 1967 application, which was left on the table and picked up again at 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

Beloff 1996: 71. Young 1993: 88–89, 93, Young 2003: 142–60, Delaney 2002: 128–29. Morgan 1992: 295, Parr 2006: 62–64, 185, 190–94 and 2002: 23, 334, see also Furby 2010: 19. Wigg 1972: 338–39. Dickie 1992: 98. Kaiser 2001: 71–72. Daddow 2003: 17–18. Young 1993: 102, 107, Reynolds 1991: 241. Gowland, Turner and Wright 2010: 63–64. Mullen 2007: 7, 97, Morgan 1992: 404.

18

The British Labour Party and Europe

the end of the decade, has been interpreted largely in terms of party-political considerations, its position vis-à-vis the electorate and the lack of alternatives. In this literature Wilson, like Gaitskell, is portrayed as largely unenthusiastic about British membership. His turning to Europe has been interpreted in terms of tactics: hold on to power, fend off internal challenges, keep the Labour Party united, outwit Heath and the Conservatives and, importantly, win elections.38 The conventional wisdom arguing that the Labour Party elite only reluctantly turned to Europe in the mid-sixties has been challenged. Pine has put forward an argument that Wilson pursued a long-term strategy of joining core Europe during the veto years, and, contrary to most scholars, portraying Wilson as genuinely interested in European policy and claiming that he wholeheartedly tried to take Britain into the Community.39 In keeping with Kitzinger, she maintains there was a high degree of continuity between Wilson’s application and its success.40 Kitzinger suggests that Wilson “is almost certainly one of those few men for whom Britain could not have entered the Community”, thus to a far extent attributing him the credit of obtaining British membership of the EC.41 While emphasizing the ‘huge complex of issues and factors with which all political leaders have to juggle’, Stephen Wall suggests that Wilson, ‘once persuaded of the advantages of membership … held to that view, both in Government and in Opposition’.42 Along such lines, Newman also indicates that Wilson resisted the increasing pressure from early 1971 to abandon support for the policy of entry, although being more circumspect in his attitudes. When the bulk of the negotiated terms became known and the Heath government launched a major propaganda effort in favour of entry, Wilson, following the July 1971 special party conference on the issue, apparently distanced himself from the pro-membership faction.43 A close review of the existing literature on the Labour Party’s relations with core Europe unearths three deficiencies. First, archive-based historical studies of the Wilson government’s application to join the Community chiefly operate within the chronological frames of the 1964–70 Labour governments. These works are defined by and confined to the period when the party was in power. Consequently, they are inappropriate when assessing continuity and change in the party leadership’s relations with core Europe. Implicitly this approach suggests that the policy formulated before taking office was of limited importance while in government and vice versa. The inherent corollary is that little or no continuity existed in the party’s 1960–63 attitudes to the EEC and the Wilson government’s 1967 application, and between attitudes in the late sixties and the opposition years from 1970 onwards.44 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

Pimlott 1992: 435–37, Heath 1998: 355, Wrigley 1993: 123–35, Morgan 1997: 254, Birch 1998, Lieber 1987: 184–85, Featherstone 1988: 57, Robins 1979: 72–74, Young 1993: 102–03, Kitzinger 1968: 13 and Gowland and Turner 2000: 180–97. Pine 2007: 182 and 2003: 298, Parr 2006: 186. See also Furby 2010: 122–155. Pine 2007: 1, 175–82 and Kitzinger 1968: xi. See O’Neill 2000: 9. Kitzinger 1973: 276. Wall 2013: 2. Newman 1983: 220–21. See also Robins 1979: 118–31. See for instance Deighton 2001, 2003, Daddow 2003, Young 2003, Parr 2006 and Dorey 2006.

Continuity and change – and transnational networks

19

Second, existing accounts have made only marginal use of material from non-British archives, thus largely overlook and underestimate sources produced by the Labour elite’s party contacts and collaboration across national borders. Third, the present historiography takes account of many national and intergovernmental processes and contexts within which Labour ’s attitude to membership of core Europe developed, while transnational features that often overlap with and complement national and intergovernmental cooperation are largely missing. Relying to a great extent on governmental and diplomatic material located at the British National Archives (NA) and released according to restrictions imposed on them by the authorities, studies defined by Labour ’s years in government have in decisive ways directed the selection of material on which these works are based. Non-British material is largely missing, and they lack the chronological and empirical foundation to assess continuity and change in the party’s European policy. Studies that do focus on Labour and the EEC covering more than the 1964–70 period, notably Robins’ study of Labour and the EEC during 1961–75, but also the work of Featherstone, Newman and Lieber on British socialism and European unity, were unable to access primary sources located at the Public Record Office (PRO) at the National Archives. In addition, they did not make use of non-British sources. Consequently, the foundation for these studies is contemporary British official and accessible material (Hansard, speeches, newspapers and reports), secondary sources, party material and interviews.45 Mullen’s work on the British Left’s debate on Europe, which does not deal exclusively with the Labour Party, relies on similar material.46 To the present author, one of the distinguishing characteristics of the historiography of the Labour Party’s relations with core Europe is the striking absence of studies combining a close examination of the leadership’s perceptions of joining core Europe during 1960–73, the many transnational processes and contexts in which attitudes to core Europe developed, and the application of non-British sources. As a result, the book is based on the assumption that ambivalence and ambiguities apparent in the current understanding of Labour ’s relations with the European integration process need to be complemented by bringing in perspectives covering the whole period 1960–73, exploring transnational processes and contexts, and incorporating non-British material to supplement British archives and official documents. Consequently, the key undertaking in this work is to analyse the British Labour Party’s European policy during 1960–73 in the light of these observations. European policy is in this study defined as the question of British membership of the EEC/EC. The connection between the European policy formulated during the 1960–62 opposition years and the one pursued in government from 1964 onwards, in particular the one leading to the 1967 application, is, as demonstrated by reviewing the existing archive-based historiography, often underestimated or even overlooked. This also is the case for studies focussing on the 1967–69 veto period and the early seventies. Analyses covering longer periods have been carried out without 45 46

Robins 1979, Newman 1983, Lieber 1987 and Featherstone 1988. Mullen 2007. Secondary sources, party publications and interviews.

20

The British Labour Party and Europe

having access to relevant archive-based material. Neither approaches bring in nonBritish sources, nor do they explore the significance of the Labour Party elite’s transnational relations for the party’s European policy in these years. Based on these observations, the analyses of the British Labour Party’s European policy are operationalised by addressing two issues of a more general character. These issues relate to the current deficiencies in the historiography: the confinement of archive-based historical studies to the years when Labour was in government and the limited use of transnational approaches and non-British sources. The first questions arise from concerns dealing with continuity and change in the party elite’s attitudes to British involvement with the European integration process. To what extent was there continuity in Labour ’s European policy between the early sixties, the second membership application, the veto years, and the policy ultimately leading to renegotiations and referendum in the early seventies? What was the Labour leadership’s position on, and in particular the party leaders’ attitude to, British membership of the EEC during the crucial years of 1960–73? Was Gaitskell undecided and ambivalent prior to his 1962 annual conference appearance, or did he reject only the particular terms secured by Macmillan in his bid for entry rather than membership in principle? Did Wilson only reluctantly turn to Europe in the mid-sixties, as suggested by conventional wisdom, or did he access power in 1964 with a pro-active ambition? Did he pursue a policy aiming at EC membership in the wake of de Gaulle’s second “non” as suggested by Pine, indicating consistency and continuity, or did he prepare for membership negotiations out of tactical reasons or in order to maximise vital British interests, please the electorate and soothe the factions in the party? What does the analysis of the party leaders’ position on the issue tell us about the party’s dilemmas vis-à-vis the European integration process? The second set of questions relates to transnational processes and contexts. Dealing with the party elite’s motives and actions concerning British participation in European integration, not only national and intergovernmental but also transnational perspectives have to be integrated into the research. Exploring transnational socialist networks also brings in non-British and thus largely unexploited sources. What was the significance of the Labour elite’s transnational socialist network for the membership issue? Did the Macmillan government’s re-evaluation of British European policy from 1960 onwards influence the structure and nature of transnational socialist networks and agendas? What was the implication of socialisation and utility maximisation within the networks? And what do non-British sources add to the understanding of the British Labour Party’s European policy during 1960– 73? Socialist party networks were ideational aiming at similar political objectives that also raise the question of ideology. To what extent did assessments of the party’s ability to carry out socialist policies as an integral part of a wider European framework influence the party leadership’s attitude to core Europe membership?

Analytical approach

21

ANALYTICAL APPROACH While this work is motivated by a wish to understand the British Labour Party’s European policy during 1960–73, it is undertaken with the awareness that it is impossible to grasp all aspects of policy formulation. Policy formulation in a political party is a complex process. It is affected by the party’s position within the polity and consists of an array of inputs and contexts emerging at different times and as responses to different challenges. However, the sum of these impulses constitutes the prevailing climate within which party policies are modeled. This study is based on the observation that the party leadership, in particular its leaders, was crucial to the party’s European policy formulation process during these years.47 It focuses on the party elite, and it is thus not a broad examination of the party and its structure. As a result, the focus throughout the study is on motives and actions of the Labour Party elite, on the reasons for these and how they were pursued and influenced in national, intergovernmental and transnational arenas. Although the main focus is on the party elite’s role when defining a European policy, it should not be interpreted as an ignorance of other actors and aspects of the party’s policy-making process. Indeed, a focus on the elite has limited explanatory power for motives and actions in other parts of the party. However, the strength of this approach is that it offers insight into the motives and actions of agenda-setting individuals of the party during the period with the power to shape policies. It was the party leaders, in close cooperation with their aides, who conducted and substantially influenced policy formulation and ultimately decided on tactics, strategies and policies on whether to join core Europe. As demonstrated in the following chapters, the leadership was dominated by the revisionist centre-right of the party during 1960–73, and it was substantially stronger networked than the fundamentalist left. These individuals were the ones involved in transnational networks and thus met with other socialist leaders in transnational arenas. Yet by bringing in transnational contacts and thus material produced by these networks, the work does not fail to notice the importance of the domestic context for policy formation. General elections and by-elections are called and fought in a domestic arena. The election of parties and politicians thus takes place in a national framework. Political power is anchored in national parliaments and to a great extent moored to national structures. Politics are carried out in a national context. Consequently, analyses of motives and actions by politicians and parties pay attention to the domestic context, and expressions and activities are gauged against the presence of a domestic audience. The same applies to challenges produced by intra-party tensions and factional conflicts. Hence, an important part of the study deals with policy formation in a domestic context. Yet a main proposition in this work is that analyses of Labour ’s European policy during 1960–73 cannot provide satisfactory explanations by focussing either on a national, intergovernmental or transnational 47

This is in keeping with observations made by other studies of Labour ’s policy towards the European integration process. See Featherstone 1988: 53, Rippingale 1996: 214–16, Robins 1979: 1, 3, 27–28, Lieber 1970: 175–76, Young 1993: 87–89, Young 2003: 142–48 and Beloff 1996: 71.

22

The British Labour Party and Europe

arena only. They were complementary and mutually interconnected platforms upon which policies were formulated and were thus important preconditions for policymaking. The analysis pays special attention to transnational socialist networks, which have been underestimated or even overlooked. By focussing on contacts and cooperation between the British Labour Party elite and its counterparts in Europe the study compensates for deficiencies in existing accounts of Labour ’s relations with core Europe.48 A challenge while examining transnational party relations is that it involves on the one hand socialisation and the exchange of ideas, policies and strategies, and on the other hand rational strategic assessments of utility maximisation and coalition formation. As a result, inquiries into the significance of cross-border socialist party contacts necessitate additional theoretical positions and methodological approaches than those proposed by International Relations (IR).49 They have to be applicable for non-governmental actors, agencies and organisations, and include concepts exploring mutual influence and socialisation in addition to rational choice approaches. Such analyses are embedded in concepts of institutionalism, which is important because of the ways in which institutional configurations have an impact upon political outcomes. Definitions of institutionalism vary substantially between different schools of institutional theory, and do not constitute a single research programme. Institutionalism is often subdivided into rational choice, historical and sociological variants.50 They are linked together by a renewal of interest in institutions in several areas of the social sciences, but of course dependent of what is meant by institutions. The fact that institutions may be defined as systems of norms gives the institutionalist approach a fairly wide remit, giving it congruent features with policy 48

49

50

A transnational network is defined as regular cross-border interactions when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organisation. By this definition, political parties, even if state funded and in close contact with state institutions, are transnational actors. Despite their national basis their functional role and political behaviour is largely independent of the state. As of late, transnational network approaches have increased their focus on functions at the cost of structural frameworks. While overlapping the areas between intergovernmental and transnational activities, transnationalism in this conception does not refer exclusively to a level, but rather to social phenomena that link different functions. See Kaiser and Starie 2005: 5. Those who have studied policy-making and policies in the European integration process before but also after 1973 have typically conceived of them as the product, in varying degrees, of two forces: on the one hand supranationalism (institutionalism) and on the other intergovernmentalism – largely disciplinary terms derived from IR theory. See for example Lindberg 1963, Haas 1958 and Schmitter 1969, and on the other hand Milward 1992 and Moravcsik 1998. Historical and sociological institutionalism tends to define institutionalism more broadly than rational choice variants. The latter assumes that actors will undertake the rational pursuit of self-interest. Institutions are in this context a decisive constraint on self-interested action. The rationalist position on institutions holds that institutions are created by states because states see benefits that in turn will yield them fruit from the functions performed by those institutions. A particularly important function is the reduction of “transaction costs”, which are risks and penalties that arise when actors engage in negotiation with one another. Rational choice tends therefore to treat institutions as if they lack any autonomy from the states by which they were set up in the first place. See Pierson 1996 and 2004.

Analytical approach

23

network research and transnational approaches.51 An important point is the mutual constitutiveness of social structures and agents.52 It is obvious that agents make structures, but it is as clear that they also are subject to the behavioural modifications that are imposed by those very structures. From this point of view, interests and identities do not exist externally to a context of interaction between structures and agents.53 This insight is important while applying policy- and transnational network analyses. Policy networks are usually understood as meeting places for the accumulation and exchange of information and resources in which personal relations are central.54 They give actors and agencies access to information and resources that they could not otherwise obtain, and membership is usually more or less exclusive.55 To this study, the value of networks is their ability to provide knowledge of policy formulating and policy transfer processes in national, intergovernmental and transnational arenas. The usefulness resides in their ability to capture ideas of complexity, include multiple public and private actors, and deal with interdependence.56 In keeping with the multi-level governance (MLG) view, policy network analyses suggest that power has become dispersed as the complexity of governance has increased. Governments are ultimately responsible for governance, but prior to turning ideas and conceptualisations into practical policy adopted by elected politicians, policy choices have been shaped and redefined in bargains between a range of actors and agencies, in which some are transnational networks.57 The common denominator is that all have an interest in what policy eventually is implemented. To this work, these insights contribute to the analyses of the British Labour Party’s policy formulation, because a focus on transnational networks stimulates analyses of the generation of political ideas and utility maximisation in a broader context.58 Thus, two broad conceptions underpin this study. The first leads towards applying constructivist and interpretative approaches, because one underlying theoretical foundation of transnational networks relies on the roles of “soft factors” as ideas and culture in policy-formulating processes. The links between being part of a net51

52 53

54 55 56

57 58

See for example the definition of institutionalism put forward by K. Armstrong and S. Bulmer as “formal institutions; informal institutions and conventions; the norms and symbols embedded in them; and policy instruments and procedures”. Armstrong and Bulmer 1998: 52. See also Rosamond 2000: 114. Risse 2004: 161. These debates are heavily inspired by and even amalgamated in the works of Anthony Giddens and his development and elaboration of structuration theory. Structuration theory attempts to show how social structures are both constituted by human agency and at the same time the very medium of this constitution. See for instance Giddens 1976 and Giddens 1984. Peterson 2004. See also Salm 2013a. Gidlund 1992: 16–26. See for example Heidar and Svåsand 1997, especially chapters 1, 2 and 3. In several of his studies, Wolfram Kaiser has introduced transnational networks approaches as an analytical tool. See for example Kaiser 2007, Gehler and Kaiser 2001: 773–98, Gehler and Kaiser 2004, Kaiser and Elvert 2004 and Kaiser and Starie 2005. Heard-Lauréote 2005, Rhodes 1997. See for example Kaiser 2009b: 235–36.

24

The British Labour Party and Europe

work and adaptation and internalisation of new or changed perceptions is the subject of socialisation theories.59 In this book, socialisation theory is a concept brought in to facilitate understanding of the relationship between close cross-national contacts and changed perceptions. Frank Schimmelfennig defines international socialisation as “the process of inducting actors into adopting the constitutive schemata and rules of an international community”.60 This corresponds with Alastair I. Johnston’s claims while suggesting that “socialization aims at creating membership in a society where the intersubjective understandings of the society become taken for granted”. Perceptions and roles held by a group that constitutes the network of which the actor becomes a member have to be internalised. He suggests internalisation means that values, perceptions and ideas take on “taken-for-grantedness” such that they are not only “hard to change, but that the benefits of behaviour are calculated in abstract social terms rather than concrete consequential terms”. Moreover, he argues that the degrees of internalisation should be taken into account.61 Not all actors are always exposed to exactly the same configuration of social pressures, nor do they enter into a social interaction with exactly the same prior identifications. Hence, pro-social behaviour because of its “appropriateness” may be the ideal, yet at the opposite end of the spectrum, one might find pro-social behaviour because of its material (dis)incentives. A key point is to identify why, under which circumstances and to what extent perceptions and polices are transferred and internalised. Robert M. Axelrod and Jeffrey T. Checkel have set out conditions or critical mechanisms for reinforcing pro-norm behaviour, and listed preconditions as to why agents comply with norms embedded in regional and international institutions. The former lists identification (the degree of identification with the group), authority (the degree to which the norm is seen as legitimate), social proof (which applies to what people decide is correct behaviour), and voluntary membership in a group working together for a common end (defection from group norms carries costs in self-esteem).62 The latter puts emphasis on five conditions under which agents should be especially inclined to comply by preference change: first, when an actor is in a novel and uncertain environment (generated by the newness of the issue, a crisis or serious policy failure); second, has few prior ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the group norm; third, acknowledge the authority of in-group members; fourth, interacts with 59 60 61

62

See for example Johnston 2001: 487–515 (especially 494–96), Axelrod 1997: 58–59, Schimmelfennig 2000: 109–39, Checkel 2001: 553–88, Schimmelfennig 2005 and Habermas 1987. Schimmelfennig 2005: 63. Johnston 2001: 495. This is a point elaborated by Hall who argues that “orders” of learning are an adequate way of dealing with the degree of internalisation. Dividing learning into three orders, he argues that first order learning takes place when actors adjust policy techniques and settings while holding policies constant, that second order learning occurs if policy goals and instruments are altered and that third order learning is present if an organisation’s or a group’s paradigm of worldview and overarching goals are changed. Hall 1993. A fourth order learning is sometimes added, which takes place when members of an organisation or a community consciously reflect upon their learning experience and thus enhance their ability to learn. Brown 2006: 25. Axelrod 1997: 58. See also Johnston 2001: 495.

Analytical approach

25

group members who “acts out principles of serious deliberative argument” instead of lecturing or demanding; finally, when interaction occurs in less politicised and more insulated, private settings.63 The speed, uniformity and effectiveness of socialisation and the transfer of values, ideas, norms and roles in transnational networks might thus largely depend on the kind of institutional and social environment to which actors are exposed. Generally, socialisation and compliance seem to be more likely to occur if an actor is a new member of a transnational network and/or strongly identifies with the group or network norms, has common policy goals, and subscribes to the authority of the institutional settings. Socialisation is, moreover, expected to be facilitated if the group environment allows for voluntary membership in “privatised” settings. The second implication underpinning the transnational network approach pulls in the opposite direction, emphasising that transnational networks are structure and agents in which rational choices and coalition formation takes place.64 Throughout social science, a dominant form of modelling is based upon a rational choice paradigm.65 The basic idea of both rational choice and coalition formation theory is that patterns of behaviour in societies and networks reflect the choices made by individuals as they try to maximise their benefits and minimise their costs. Allingham suggests that choosing rationally “becomes equivalent to maximising utility”.66 Komorita and Chertkoff define coalition formation as a “situation in which a subset of a group agrees to cooperate in the joint use of resources so as to maximize reward”.67 These theories seek to explain choice as utility maximisation within the constraints imposed upon actors by the choice situation and those imposed by the interdependent choices of others. Choices are made on expected rather than actual utility since decisions often take place under uncertain, complex and opaque conditions. In other words, multifaceted and complicated choices rely on calculation of the probability of outcomes. Rational choice theory does provide empirically adequate explanations of certain social phenomena, Bohman argues, but such explanations are adequate “only under precise conditions, and many of the unresolved problems of rations choice theory as a research program result from extending its explanations beyond the proper, restricted scope”. Therefore, he suggests that rational choice theory is “neither a candidate for comprehensive social theory nor even a ‘benchmark’ for extending sociological explanation”.68 Although rational choice theorising has grown substantially in prestige and influence, Green and Shapiro claim that the conclusion to be drawn is that the empirical contributions of rational choice theory “are few, far between, and considerably more modest than the combination of mystique and 63 64 65 66 67 68

Checkel 2001: 562–63. The most prominent accounts of rational choice approaches to the study of the European integration process are the theories of Alan Milward and Andrew Moravcsik. See for example Milward 1992 and Moravcsik 1998. Axelrod 1997a: 4. Allingham 1999, Green and Shapiro 1994: 13–32. Komorita and Chertkoff 1973. Bohman 1992: 207–08.

26

The British Labour Party and Europe

methodological fanfare surrounding the rational choice movement would lead one to expect”.69 As proposed by Axelrod, a research programme has to take in that the main alternative to the assumptions of rational choice is some form of adaptive behaviour, which might be both at the individual level through learning and socialisation and at the population level through differential survival and reproduction of the more successful individuals. Yet the “consequences of adaptive processes are often very hard to deduce when there are many interacting agents following rules that have non-linear effects”, he admits.70 This observation underlines a major challenge in complex historical studies. Adaptive processes and socialisation cannot be deduced from sources, either directly or explicitly, nor is it possible to isolate them from rational choices or coalition formation. Although socialisation influences individual choices and actions, decisions are founded on rational calculations of expected outcomes. Thus, this work includes both adaptive and rational aspects of interactions. The transnational approach draws on these apparently contradictory approaches, and builds on the assumption that individuals are not only rational but are subjected to socialising processes in institutionalised settings. Finally, as emphasised earlier in this chapter, a core consideration when studying motives and actions of the Labour Party elite and how the European issue was formulated in national, intergovernmental and transnational arenas is the importance of the domestic context. The significance of considering the domestic framework when analysing party political policy formulation and political behaviour builds on insights and constraints derived from rational choice approaches as outlined above. Much the same way as in transnational networks, decisions and expressions in the decisive domestic environment are founded on rational calculations of how to behave in order to achieve strategic political objectives. A distinct feature of public choice theory, which is a branch of rational choice theories, pertains to the study of institutions or rules “for arriving at a collective choice or ranking of alternatives … on the basis of the choices of preferences of the individuals making up the collective unit”.71 As collective actors make such choices all the time, the theory supplements examinations dealing with the domestic context. Like the economic model of rational behaviour, on which the public choice approaches rests, it explores the behaviour of individuals as driven by the goal of utility maximisation, thus being applicable for this study dealing with motives and actions of the Labour Party elite. A corollary is greater awareness when exploring how diverse and often conflicting individual preferences are expressed when decisions are made collectively in the context of a domestic audience. In most rational choice accounts, political parties and politicians try to maximise their chances of electoral victory rather then any particular ideological agendas, largely the same way as voters seek to maximise their individual interests through the political process.72 It does not

69 70 71 72

Green and Shapiro 1994: 179. Axelrod 1997a: 4. Russell 1979. See also Buchanan and Tullock 1962, and Tullock 1979. Green and Shapiro 1994: 4.

Empirical foundation

27

mean that ideological agendas are unimportant, however.73 The main implication for a study bringing in transnational networks is to emphasise the role of the domestic context while dealing with policy formation, thus focussing on the relationship between strategic objectives and tactical decisions in policy-making processes. EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION The empirical foundation for this book is put together as a result of the research agenda stated in the above sections. The bulk of the material is documents held in private archives, i. e. documents collected from relevant labour movements, social democratic parties and actors who participated in discussions in national, intergovernmental and transnational arenas. A fair amount of these sources is non-British. Yet official and governmental documents are also part of the grounding structure on which this work is founded. An important body of documents generated by transnational socialist networks and individuals has been gleaned from the International Institute of Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam. The IISH holds collections of private papers from a range of individuals, political parties and institutional actors.74 These collections have provided the analyses with a broad range of documents from the Socialist International (SI), which was a key arena in which the labour parties in Britain, Scandinavia and other European (and non-European) countries acted. The SI also appointed committees and working groups, whose work has been instrumental in this context. Moreover, the IISH has supplied the study with material from other European party archives and core individual actors and politicians, of which Sicco Mansholt’s archive has to be emphasised. Extensive work has also been undertaken in the Labour movement’s archives in Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm.75 These archives hold papers of the Scandinavian labour parties and parliamentary parties. To a certain extent, governmental papers and working papers have also been filed in these archives when these parties were in power. They also hold vast collections of private records of politicians and individuals in the labour movement. Dealing with individuals and parties operating in transnational networks, documents from these archives have provided the study with perspectives difficult to trace in national and intergovernmental contexts. The British Labour Party and PLP archives in Manchester have moreover provided the study with wide-ranging material which has been important in order to explore ideological considerations, policy-making processes, transnational network participation and collaboration taking place in the party, the party leadership and in

73 74 75

Maoz argues that decision-making is a problem-solving process by which an individual, group or organisation chooses between alternative courses of action (or inaction) designed to solve a particular problem or set of problems. Maoz 1990: 38. http://socialhistory.org/. Retrieved on 01 February 2014. See the homepages of the Scandinavian labour movements’ archives: http://www.arbark.no/, http:// http://www.arbark.se/ and http://www.arbejdermuseet.dk/. Retrieved on 01 February 2014.

28

The British Labour Party and Europe

the PLP.76 In addition, material held in private archives at the Bodleian Library’s special collection at Oxford has broadened the analyses of the party leadership’s motives and actions in national, intergovernmental and transnational arenas and thus deepened the study of Labour ’s European policy-making process.77 These papers have been complemented by archival material held at the British National Archives in London.78 Since the division between official and private records is often blurred, governmental papers have supplemented private sources especially when the party was in power during the years of the Wilson-governments. Finally, papers from the Historical Archives of the EU in Florence, especially the socialist group of the EP, have contributed to the study of transnational activities.79 Material has also been consulted from online sources, as for instance records produced by the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP).80 Although not systematically, also British, French, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish newspapers and periodicals have been anlysed, which have supplemented archival material and informed the study at important junctures. In addition, a substantial number of secondary sources, all of which are listed in the attached bibliography, have been consulted. The strength of the material is its comprehensiveness and the inclusion of nonBritish material and sources arising from transnational collaboration. It has the capacity to explore meetings, agendas, positions and actions in national, intergovernmental and transnational contexts in which the Labour elite were involved. Papers from non-British deposits have provided the book with sources largely absent from British official and private material. The selected archives and sources have also made it possible to explore motives and actions in arenas not present in existing literature. It also sheds light on the policy-formulating processes as seen by different actors and parties and from different perspectives. Yet not all aspects of the policy-formulating process can be found in the written sources. Activities and discussions within and between parties and transnational networks are probably underexposed as the semi-private labour movements not have been subject to the same systematic and statutory requirements to keep records and archives as governments and governmental bodies. Thus, important records are missing. The most prominent example is the lack of minutes from the SI’s conferences of party leaders. Despite intensive searches through relevant archives, generous help from archivists, inquiries to academics working in the field and consultations with the political parties in question, it has been impossible to trace the minutes of these conferences. Besides, the archival material does not “spell out” motives and attitudes in punctilious minutes, and impact of national, intergovernmental and transnational discussions cannot just be quoted or simply 76 77 78 79 80

http://www.phm.org.uk/. Retrieved on 28 January 2014. http://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/bodley/finding-resources/specialcollections. Retrieved on 04 February 2014. http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/default.htm. Retrieved on 28 January 2014. http://www.eui.eu/Research/HistoricalArchivesOfEU/Index.aspx. Retrieved on 27 February 2014. http://www.eurolabour.org.uk/; http://www.pes.org/. Retrieved on 07 January 2014.

Argument and structure

29

extracted from written sources. To a certain extent, therefore, conclusions in this work are based on circumstantial evidence and by analysing and comparing contacts, actions, agendas, national party policy preferences and policy outcomes in national, intergovernmental and transnational arenas, which, as indicated, include a complex mix of interactions between socialisation and rational choices by and between actors. ARGUMENT AND STRUCTURE The book has a mainly chronological structure, which is chosen to deal with the questions set out above – issues pertaining to continuity and change and the significance of transnational networks. Being a backdrop to the study, chapter two argues that the Labour Party’s stance towards postwar core Europe integration until 1960 was influenced not only by British self-perception at the time – Britain at the heart of three spheres of influence – but by its ideological posture. Its adherence to economic planning and socialist policies made the party refrain from an enthusiastic embrace of European integration, which was perceived as initiated and carried out largely by conservative parties. Chapters three and four focus on the European policy and policy-making process of Labour and Gaitskell while in opposition during 1960–63. Chapter three covers the period from 1960 to mid-1961. Three points are made. It demonstrates that due to its unenthusiastic position during the fifties, Labour had no coherent European policy when it became evident that the Conservative government was about to reassess British European policy. Second, yet having recognised the need to draw up a European policy it also shows that the party leadership was unable to conclude this work by the time the Macmillan government submitted its mid-1961 membership application. Finally, transnational networking changed and intensified from 1960 onwards. When realising that British European policy was in the melting pot, the chapter demonstrates that the scope and importance of the issue strengthened cross-border collaboration, eventually leading to the creation and subsequent institutionalisation of some of these networks, while at the same time changing the character and composition of others. These changes precipitated evolving intersubjective perceptions of joining the EEC/EC. A core consideration inside these networks was to what extent it would be able to reconcile their ambitions to carry out economic planning with membership of the Community. Chapter four deals with the 1961–62 policy formulation period, and focuses on party leader Hugh Gaitskell. Intensified transnational contact, as shown in chapter three, reassured Gaitskell that joining did not entail abandoning economic planning. The argument put forward is that he regarded British EEC membership in fairly positive terms, and that his position evolved during the formative period up to the end of 1962. Gaitskell’s long-term strategic aim developed into facilitating a possible membership bid by a future Labour government. However, as proposed by rational choice reasoning, domestic and intra-party constraints officially made him adopt a conditional wait-and-see stance. Thus, his alleged decision and U-turn in mid-1962, and his manoeuvring before and at the Brighton conference, were tacti-

30

The British Labour Party and Europe

cal so as to keep the party united and strong under his leadership while maximising the party’s chances at the next general election. Chapters five to seven explore how Wilson and the Labour leadership handled the membership issue from entering government in October 1964 until the December 1967 veto. Chapter five explores Wilson’s first year in power. The argument is twofold. First, there was greater continuity between Labour ’s European policy in 1962 and the first Wilson government than suggested by current accounts. As opposed to existing accounts arguing that Whitehall officials pushed the prime minister to re-evaluate the government’s EEC policy, it demonstrates that Wilson took early initiatives to bring about a policy aimed at finding a way to join the Community, and that he duly activated the transnational conference of socialist party leaders. Wilson obviously did not believe joining would frustrate the ambitious economic planning programme with which the government entered office. Second, Wilson’s “bridge-building” initiative only was a tactical step in order to implement a strategic objective at first elaborated and facilitated by Gaitskell and the Labour Party while in opposition, subsequently adopted and developed by the new prime minister. Dealing with the bulk of his second year in office, chapter six demonstrates that in January 1966 Wilson activated a transnational socialist network across the EEC– EFTA divide in order to facilitate British accession. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it illustrates that Wilson had made up his mind on an earlier stage that only membership of the EEC/EC was a satisfactory long-term solution for Britain, substantiating that he believed it would be in keeping with economic planning as set out in his government’s National Plan. Empirically, it shows that in January 1966 he instructed officials to undertake studies on the possibility of accession, and not the other way around as argued by Parr. Misguidedly, she maintains that a group of interested officials, supported by foreign secretary Michael Stewart, pushed Wilson to undertake such studies.81 These observations strengthen the continuity argument. Theoretically and methodically, they also confirm the advantages obtainable from transnational approaches to the study of Labour ’s policy formulation, providing a more detailed and nuanced picture than the one obtainable from national and intergovernmental approaches, which mainly draws on British sources and to a greater extent alluded to the tactical, electoral and rhetorical dimensions of party policies. Chapter seven covers the period from the end of 1966 to the end of 1967. It raises the question of why Wilson pressed ahead with the membership application despite being aware of de Gaulle’s scepticism. It argues that Wilson acted in accordance with a long-term strategy. It was based on an evolving understanding that joining the EEC/EC rather would further national economic planning. The abandonment of the National Plan during the year displayed the challenges linked to carrying out indicative economic planning independently of regional and international developments. Joining a growing European market as compared with the Commonwealth was likely to increase prospects for economic growth and indicative planning. Besides, membership had the capacity to strengthen the socialist al81

Parr 2006: 62.

Argument and structure

31

liance across the EEC–EFTA divide. Once he had decided in principle to enter core Europe Wilson used all the tools at his disposal to bring about this objective. It is argued that despite being aware of a possible French veto threatening to prevent his policy, Wilson was not reacting passively to international developments where no viable alternative existed: the application was a proactive, deliberate planned step carefully elaborated by the prime minister, designed to stretch beyond de Gaulle’s period in power. Chapters eight and nine examine how Wilson and the Labour leadership dealt with the membership issue during the veto years of 1967–69. Chapter eight focusses on the period from the end of 1967 to the end of 1969, during which Wilson and his aides grappled with the French non. As opposed to most studies dealing with the Wilson government’s second bid, which broadly indicates that Wilson only reluctantly and without enthusiasm turned to Europe, it demonstrates that Wilson ruled out solutions short of full membership while wholeheartedly pursuing a strategy of joining the club despite the temporary setback caused by the veto. This observation strengthens those made in previous chapters, confirming the argument presented that Wilson’s decision to enter core Europe was genuine, and that he regarded membership to be fully in accord with the principles and objectives of the Labour Party, and thus consistent with economic planning. He did not take no for an answer, and the application was left on the table. By doing so, it dominated council meetings and slowed down internal developments in the Community while demonstrating the sincerity of the bid. Chapter nine, also focussing on the veto years, explores how the Wilson government and its socialist network partners perceived the situation and acted during this period. At the end of the sixties, the context within which European socialists operated had changed. The chapter indicates that the Wilson governments’ unsuccessful economic planning programme, EFTA’s exhausted role and an evolving political consensus inside the transnational socialist network in favour of joining the Community only reinforced Wilson’s determination to carry out his long-term objective of British entry. The argument presented is that these developments produced proposals to coordinate and strengthen socialist policies in an enlarged core Europe at a time when core Europe was believed to be at a crossroad and thus more open to influence than in the early sixties. The Luxembourg compromise, de Gaulle’s departure and the pending enlargement all contributed to this perception. Chapters ten and eleven examine the way in which Wilson and the Labour leadership handled British EC membership while in opposition during 1970–1972. Chapter ten, focussing on the 1970–72 period, demonstrates a high degree of continuity between the Wilson and Heath European policies. It argues that EC membership was no longer believed to at odds with economic planning, welfare provisions and social equality. Rather, the idea to introduce economic planning at a European level had become embedded in the networked revisionist centre-right leadership of the British and Scandinavian labour parties. It indicates that socialisation had taken place and that networked socialist politicians sought to maximise their common policy objectives through concerted efforts. Once enlargement became a realistic

32

The British Labour Party and Europe

alternative new initiatives were taken in order to strengthen core Europe socialist policies. Covering the period from mid-1971 to the end of 1972, chapter eleven argues that Wilson’s persistence and eventual tactical concessions prevented the Eurosceptic faction from blocking the British entry, while at the same time facilitating increased socialist cooperation and influence at Community level. However, after going into opposition, intra-party and tactical considerations reappeared, and Wilson, trying to please the electorate, oppose the government, balance the factions and keep the party united under his leadership, was eventually forced to accept that an incoming Labour government would renegotiate the terms and put them to the people in a referendum. Although the Eurosceptic majority in the PLP refused to nominate the members in the European Parliament (EP) to which it was entitled until after the 1975 referendum, Wilson’s deft and persistent tactical manoeuvring since first taking office in 1964 ultimately secured both British membership of the EC and full Labour Party participation in core Europe. By his manoeuvring, Wilson played a decisive role during the process until and after Britain joined the EC. Crucially, he paved the way for Heath, who pursued a policy largely elaborated by his predecessor. The conclusion in chapter twelve discusses the questions set out in the above sections. It argues that the predominant depiction of the British Labour Party leadership as largely unenthusiastic or even negative about joining core Europe and reluctantly opting for membership in 1966–67 is incomplete. By incorporating transnational networks and non-British material, the conclusion demonstrates that the party leaders were more positively disposed towards integrating Britain into core Europe than current accounts acknowledge and that there was greater continuity in the party elite between the opposition years before 1964 than the existing literature recognises. Despite having realised that accession to the Community was the preferred way to serve Labour and British interests, intra-party and domestic constraints made both Gaitskell and Wilson use all their tactical skills while grappling with European policy. The conclusion also suggests that intersubjective socialist understanding of joining core Europe evolved during the sixties. The parallelism between intensified participation in transnational socialist networks and increased support for joining the EC, perceiving it to be in keeping with economic planning domestically and also at European level, indicates that socialisation took place and that increasingly it was regarded as an adequate arena in which socialist policies could be maximised.

CHAPTER 2 THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1945–59 This chapter deals with the Labour Party’s policy vis-à-vis European integration up to the end of the 1950s. It explores why the party was reluctant in its approach to European unity during these years. As such, it also contextualises the changes taking place in the party elite in the following chapters. The widespread perception across the political landscape of Britain as a world power at the intersection of three spheres of influence explains the lack of enthusiasm. Yet it does not clarify the particular reasons for the reluctance within the Labour Party about the European integration process. Forming a backdrop to the study, the chapter shows that the party’s ideological posture helped to keep it at a distance from closer entanglements with the integration process during the fifties.1 Healy’s claim in the early fifties, as highlighted on the first pages of this book, that economic planning reinforced the trend towards nationalism in a governing socialist party, was illustrative and helped to keep enthusiasm for the integration process in the party elite to a minimum for most of the decade. National economic planning, it was believed, was largely inconsistent with international cooperation preferred by economic liberal governments, as in the case of core Europe integration.2 Thus, the reluctance within the British Labour Party, as within the Scandinavian labour parties, towards closer involvement with the integration process during the fifties has to be understood in the light of their ideological positions: the introduction of planning, expanding welfare measurements and maintenance of full employment. The Labour elite shared a general perception, prevalent across the party, associating core Europe integration with the political right, a tendency only reinforced by Churchill’s early involvement with the process. THE ECSC, THE POSTWAR LABOUR GOVERNMENT AND A PLANNED ECONOMY The Labour Party showed modest interest in the European integration issue during the period from the departure of the Attlee government in October 1951 until the Macmillan government’s reappraisal of British European policies on the eve of the 1960s.3 The lack of enthusiasm as well as the complexity of the issue partly explains the absence of a consistent party response to core Europe developments. Yet it does not indicate why the Labour Party leadership was reluctant and divided in its approach to European unity. Although in the late autumn of 1939, the Labour leader 1 2 3

See for instance Featherstone 1988 and Griffiths 1993. Cf. Dell 1995: 190. Newman 1993: 162–63, Robins 1979: 14.

34

The British Labour Party and European Integration, 1945–59

Clement Attlee had stated that “Europe must federate or perish” in order to make the European states effective in both the political and economic spheres, the party’s attitude toward European integration during the fifties was largely in keeping with the reluctance Labour felt towards the Briand proposals in 1929.4 Attlee’s statement was a result of the outbreak of World War II and cannot be interpreted as a genuine ideological expression in favour of a European federation. He later admitted that bringing such an idea into “the region of the practical is a very difficult proposition”.5 However, by declining to join the ECSC the party leadership in effect defined their policies towards the European integration process for years to come. Although the Attlee government rejected the ECSC it was not isolationist. The government adopted a positive attitude to the economic reconstruction of Western Europe by re-establishing a liberal-democratic capitalistic order creating and joining the Bretton Woods system, the European Recovery Program (ERP), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the European Payments Union (EPU). Moreover, foreign secretary Ernest Bevin had been instrumental in setting up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Britain joined the United Nations (UN) as a permament member of the UN Security Council. The party also defended the Commonwealth connections and cultivated the so-called special relationship with the USA. Supranationalism was at the core of Schuman’s proposal, and accepting it in principle was a precondition for joining. The Attlee government strongly opposed moves towards supranationalism, particularly those that were believed to involve influence over the sterling area or Britain’s domestic economy. If Britain accepted the invitation, the Attlee government feared, sovereignty would be relinquished to an authority responsible to nobody, and ultimately dominated by conservative political forces. As a consequence, it believed, joining would curb Britain’s autonomy and its ability to bring about its ambitions of planning the economy. Yet to a fair extent, the decision to stay aloof from the ECSC was an expression of British self-perception at the time – Britain as a long-standing, democratic and sovereign power at the epicentre between three spheres of influence, staunchly defending the Commonwealth links and in close contact with the USA – and thus an expression of sentiments across parties and peoples.6 In 1948, Hugh Dalton was in keeping with broad sentiments across Britain when stating “that we are very much closer, in all respects except distance to Australia and New Zealand than we are to Western Europe”.7 Yet keeping the ECSC at a distance was also an expression of the party’s ideological posture. The ability to control the economy, especially those aspects related to full employment and the distribution of wealth, was crucial to Labour ’s leadership. In a 1950 statement by the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC), it was emphasised that “no socialist party with the prospect of forming a government, could accept a system by which important fields of national policy were surrendered to a supranational European representative authority, since such an authority would have 4 5 6 7

Daily Herald, 9 November 1939. See also Workers’ International News, Vol. 2, 12/1939: 4–7. Attlee 1954: 172. On Britishness, see for example Ward 2004: 108–12. Quoted from Newman 1993: 130.

The ECSC, the postwar Labour government and a planned economy

35

a permanent anti-socialist majority”.8 The statement illustrated how the party’s ideology was used to justify its rejection of the ECSC and the low expectations it nurtured of the prospects for socialist policies to evolve inside core Europe. Its programme of nationalisation, economic planning and major social legislation was heavily at the core of the party’s postwar policies, which were the instrument through which the welfare state as envisaged by the Beveridge Report was to be realised. It was believed to be at odds with continental conservative policies and kept the party away from involvement with core Europe integration. An ideological consensus had been established in the Labour Party, which since 1918 had been built upon nationalisation and subsequently supplemented by new ideas on economic management developed throughout the thirties.9 Labour ’s 1945 election manifesto, emphasising welfare measurements and full employment – very skilfully formulated by Herbert Morrison – struck a chord that allowed the party to profit from the general sentiments across the electorate. It placed nationalisation and state economic planning at the centrepiece of the party’s state collectivist conception of socialism.10 It managed to capture the electorate’s radicalised mood and the political shift towards the left, and gave Labour a majority government for the first time. As far as the general popularity was concerned, the most acceptable measures of the Attlee government were in the sphere of the social services. The school leaving age was raised to fifteen, and state scholarships to the universities were increased. Social insurance proposals were implemented by the enactment of the National Insurance Act (NIA) and the National Health Service (NHS), which involved free medical treatment, free drugs, and the nationalisation of hospitals. The party’s programme and policies appeared as a guiding light and a huge inspiration for other socialist parties, not least in Scandinavia. According to Gøsta EspingAndersen, the Labour Party and the Beveridge Report were a signpost, but reforms went even further in Scandinavia.11 Yet by the 1950s the party’s ideological consensus started to dwindle.12 The government had achieved most of its pledges and appeared to have run out of steam. The general election in 1950 reduced the party’s majority in Parliament to only five. When the government called another election in October 1951, paradoxically – due to the British electoral system – it won fewer seats than the Conservatives and lost office despite its highest ever share of the vote (48.8 per cent). The following years, in which the party lost three successive general elections, have been labelled the “wilderness years”, the “traumas of opposition”, “dissension and decline” and so forth.13 During these years, internal wrangling and public dissension about the fu8 9 10 11 12 13

Quoted from Featherstone 1988: 49. The new 1918 Constitution was complemented by the Labour and the New Social Order programme that committed the party, albeit vaguely, to “socialism” – i. e. full employment, progressive taxation, a minimum standard of living and not least to public ownership (Clause IV). Let us Face the Future. Esping-Andersen 1985: 157. See for example Harrison 1999: 301–08. See for example http://www.labour.org.uk/history_of_the_labour_party2. Retrived on 27 February 2014 and Pelling 1993: 105.

36

The British Labour Party and European Integration, 1945–59

ture of “socialism” threatened the party’s integrity, and potentially its popularity with the electorate. Internal disagreement over European integration also existed. For example, Morrison and Attlee were at odds over the move to incorporate Germany into the European Defence Community (EDC). While the former would have welcomed British links with the EDC, Attlee was deeply sceptical of such an association. REVISIONISM, ECONOMIC PLANNING AND EUROPE ON THE EVE OF THE SIXTIES By the mid-fifties the perceived growing discrepancy between new economic and social realities and old programmatic dogmas surfaced in the advent of Labour “revisionism”.14 It suggested that capitalism had changed to the extent that a new and relevant programme had to be based on an analysis of the radically changed economic and social state of affairs.15 The revisionists sought to reformulate socialist principles and revise the party’s policies through analyses of the postwar society. The ideas dated back to the 1930s, and were mainly the result of informal discussions by Oxbridge-educated and London-based intellectuals.16 Among its leading members were Hugh Gaitskell, Douglas Jay, Evan Durbin and James Meade. The new ideas were first outlined in the Fabian publication New Fabian Essays in 1952, and further elaborated by Anthony Crosland in The Future of Socialism in 1956.17 It corresponded with Gaitskell’s accession to the party leadership in December 1955, and revisionism became, with the danger of oversimplification, a “Gaitskellite” position, as the new leader was committed to its ideas and policies. Its staunchest opponents, the “Bevanites”, did not form a coherent group. The faction was named after Aneurin Bevan who both symbolised and was a forceful defendant of fundamentalist party views and ideologies, arguing that nationalisa14

15 16 17

Bernstein first applied the term revisionism in his redefinitions of Marxism at the end of the nineteenth century. While his revisionism involved a reappraisal of social, economic and political problems in the light of major changes within European capitalism, it is suggested that the same tendencies were evident in British society and in the Labour Party during the fifties. Haseler 1969, Howell 1980 and Jones 1996. Jones 1996: 25–26. For development of Labour Party thought and ideas in the 1930s, see Ellison 1994: 1–27. Among the contributors to the Essays were Anthony Crosland and Roy Jenkins. In The Future of Socialism Crosland maintained that a substantial change in patterns of economic power had taken place in postwar Britain, a transfer of economic power away from the pre-war capitalist class in three directions; towards the state, towards organised labour and towards salaried managers in private industry. In his conception of the post-capitalist society, the ownership of the means of production had become an increasingly irrelevant question, thus the traditional association of socialism with the public ownership of the means of production embodied in Clause IV was both obsolete and inadequate. His ideal was a “society with a diverse, diffused, pluralist and heterogeneous pattern of ownership, with the State, the nationalised industries, the Cooperatives, the Unions, Government financial institutions, pension funds, foundations, and millions of private families all participating”, (quoted from Jones 1996: 34). It was plainly a description and defence of a mixed economy. See Durbin 1940.

Revisionism, economic planning and Europe on the eve of the sixties

37

tion and state economic planning should continue to be the centrepiece of the party’s socialism. Disagreement on the left became apparent when the group split in the mid-fifties. Centre-left individuals like Wilson, Balogh and Crossman then separated planning from public ownership, while arguing that an efficient planned economy was the means to achieve greater social equality.18 Revisionism involved two major and controversial departures from traditional orthodox Labour Party socialism. First, it rejected the fundamentalist view that socialism basically centred on public ownership of the means of production, and thus questioned the party’s established commitment to public ownership as the road and means towards a socialist society. Second, the restated socialism was defined by ethical values and ideas instead of public ownership, such as social welfare, personal liberty and social equality, with particular emphasis on the last point. Public ownership was therefore reduced to one means among others by which a socialist society would be brought about. This was a highly contestable position. Generally, when socialist parties entered liberal, parliamentary politics, its corollary was a long-term commitment to managing the capitalist economy. With the adoption of the mixed economy and Keynesian doctrines, it was difficult to claim that the policy advanced socialism. It forced socialists to justify the conflict between parliamentary majority and ideological purity, i. e. the potential tension between short-term economic policies and a future socialist society. Both John Strachey and Anthony Crosland sought to solve the dilemma.19 Strachey claimed that a Labour government easily could find itself in the position where it had to impose restraints on its own working-class electorate in times of economic stagnation.20 Managing the business cycle, in other words how to ensue stable growth and full employment by indicative economic planning, became vital for socialist parties as a means of policy mobilisation and society formation agencies. The party’s lack of a coherent European policy and the internal tension between revisionists and fundamentalists had different expressions. It was accentuated in mid-1956 when the Conservative government decided to pursue the formation of the FTA. At the time Gaitskell apparently had not made up his mind, as indicated in the first chapter, yet he accepted that closer contact with the continental countries was inevitable. In keeping with this, Wilson seems to have approached the questions in a pragmatic way, weighing up the costs and benefits. When discussions on the FTA were underway, Wilson asked the rhetorical question whether Britain could afford to stand out. “I am sure the answer is that we cannot”, was his rejoinder, but he later pointed out that it did not imply that Britain should join the Common Market.21 Yet the party leadership was prepared to support the government’s attempt to create an intergovernmental Free Trade Area as long as the British government controlled the economy. As such, Labour ’s European policies in many ways reflected those of the government, giving conditional support for the FTA yet making it clear that it the government’s ability to plan the economy was essential. Labour 18 19 20 21

Ellison 1994: 52. See Crosland 1967. Strachey 1932. Foot 1968: 220, quoted from Pine 2007: 15.

38

The British Labour Party and European Integration, 1945–59

also contributed to the discussions in technical respects, and eventually regarded the faltering FTA negotiation process with increasing anxiety.22 Even so, the simple fact that the influential NEC did not outright dismiss the FTA proposals outright provoked a substantial response from the left. In 1957, Bevan stated that socialists could not call for economic planning and simultaneously accept the verdict of a dogmatic free market economy.23 The sharp response came at a call to set up a purely intergovernmental arrangement that did not involve supranationalism. Against the Bevanites, pro-Europeans led by Roy Jenkins and George Brown increasingly emphasised the advantages of closer economic and indeed political collaboration with the six core Europe countries.24 In Jenkins’ view Britain had no alternative but to join the Community, if not it would run the risk of being isolated and its relatively modest growth would be put in even greater jeopardy.25 Jenkins and Brown belonged to a small faction who did not believe joining was inconsistent with economic planning.26 From 1957, revisionism gained the upper hand in the Labour Party, but was challenged after the party’s electoral defeat in 1959. The defeat also was the final blow to the party myth. Until then it had been possible to argue that Labour was the party of the future, that 1950 and 1951 had been temporary setbacks and that 1955 was the result of weak organisation and internal disputes. In the post-1959 period the fundamentalist wing of the party was able to inflict two serious blows on the revisionist leadership, on two highly contentious issues. First, they defeated the moderate 1959 Clause IV amendment proposals of Gaitskell and the revisionists, and second, managed to pass a 1960 party conference motion in support of unilateral nuclear disarmament, by which the fundamentalists achieved no less than the reversing of traditional Labour defence policy. From the conference platform Gaitskell promised to “fight and fight and fight again” against this decision, and within a year the vote was reversed, but at considerable political cost. The 1960 annual conference severely weakened the leadership and threatened the unity of the party.27 However, in the aftermath of the Clause IV and disarmament debates, a truce or even a spirit of compromise began to spread. Thus, during the second half of the fifties, debates on the Suez crisis, disarmament, the H-bomb and Clause IV to a certain extent diverted attention away from the European issue. 22 23 24

25 26 27

Yet, the National Executive Committee did not make any effort to carry motions on the FTA proposal at the 1957 and 1958 annual conferences, nor was there any reference to the proposed EFTA in the Labour manifesto in 1959. Rippingale 1996: 221 and Newman 1993: 169. Bevan in Tribune, 30 August and 14 October 1957. From Newman 1993: 171, and Rippingale 1996: 219. See for example Roy Jenkins in the Sozialistische Europa-Korrespondenz, Autumn 1960. The Sozialistische Europa-Korrespondenz was published in Luxembourg by the Liaison Office of the Socialist Parties of the Member States of the European Communities. IISH, SI, SII, vol. x, 1960. Rippingale 1996: 222. Autumn 1960. Sozialistische Europa-Korrespondenz. IISH, SI, SII, vol. x, 1960. See Jenkins’ account at Labour ’s 1961 annual conference. LAM, Report Labour Party Annual Conference 1961: 216. The Clause IV and disarmament debates are studied thoroughly for example in Haseler 1969: 158–236 and Jones 1996: 41–64.

Revisionism, economic planning and Europe on the eve of the sixties

39

On the eve of the sixties, a two-tier socialism existed in the British Labour Party with a competing set of ideas and policies. If the revisionists agreed on what they disliked about Labour ’s socialist doctrine – how to get rid of the old shibboleths of public ownership – they were less sure about the precise nature of what should replace it. Yet it comprised an ethical reformulation of socialist aims, a policy commitment to greater equality and social justice, sustained economic growth and full employment. Keynesian interventionist techniques were the economic foundation of the model in which high social expenditure and redistributive taxation were the means of promoting social welfare and achieving greater equality. As a result, greater emphasis was put on fiscal policies and budgetary intervention. Thus, the mixed economy with its emphasis on private and public coexistence was recognised at the expense of dogmatic beliefs in public ownership. A core feature of their ideas involved indicative economic planning, yet severe economic problems in the shape of recurring balance of payments crises during the sixties undermined the key strategy of economic planning. Besides, discussions on whether joining core Europe would promote or impede the party’s ability to redefine its ideological basis were challenging to the revisionists. Although Labour lost office in 1951, the legacy of nationalisation, economic planning and introducing welfare measurements was largely interpreted as a success story. As such, the majority of the Labour Party found it neither necessary nor appropriate to modernise its ideology during the fifties, unlike, for example, the Western German Social Democratic Party (SPD). While the latter ’s intra-party processes were concluded by getting rid of its most antediluvian ideology at its 1959 Bad Godesberg conference, Labour was unable to do away with its much-contested 1918 Clause IV (nationalisation) until the Blair era in the mid-1990s. In part, this might be explained by ideology and the Attlee government’s standing and relative success. Although an alternative ideological foundation was under construction by a new generation of Labour leaders headed by Gaitskell and some of his contemporaries, it was not in their hands to change the party constitution.28 This may also indicate why no major revision of the party’s European policy took place during the fifties. Yet the re-evaluation of British European policies and intensified focus on the European issue from 1960 onwards challenged the party’s ideological and political discussions on economic planning and the ways in which it should carry out its policies. On both sides of the divide, the assumption during the fifties was that core European integration was not merely counterproductive to British interests: it was at odds with socialist planning objectives as defined by Bevanites and Gaitskellites alike. Joining the club only would make it increasingly difficult to bring about the party’s policies. Besides, in keeping with attitudes in the Conservative Party, large segments in the Labour Party also considered Britain’s place to be at the centre of its three spheres of influence, and that joining the ECSC/EEC would come at the cost of its links with two of them: the Commonwealth and its special relationship with the USA. It is in this context that the highly divisive and complex Euro28

Haseler 1969.

40

The British Labour Party and European Integration, 1945–59

pean issue is examined. While Labour ’s ideological posture during the fifties kept it at a distance from closer entanglements with core Europe, the revisionist, centreright leadership challenged this perception the following decade.

CHAPTER 3 IN SEARCH OF A EUROPEAN POLICY By early 1960 the Labour Party realised that the Conservative government was in the process of revising its European policy. This chapter deals with Labour ’s responses to this development up until mid-1961 when Prime Minister Macmillan submitted Britain’s first membership bid. Three points are made. First, because of reluctance and ambiguities during the previous decade, the chapter demonstrates that Labour had no coherent European policies of its own when it realised that the Conservative government was about to change its European policy. Yet awareness of the European policy shift resulted in the undertaking of an ambitious and demanding policy formulation process. Second, although having realised the need to bring about a consistent European policy from 1960 onwards, Labour was unable to fulfil this task by the summer of 1961. Acknowledging the complexity of the membership issue and the undesirability to hammer out definite conclusions until the terms of membership were known after the negotiations, party leader Gaitskell advised not to commit the party either way. Finally, transnational socialist networking intensified from the early 1960s and developed into an important component of the party’s policy formulating process. Strengthened focus on the membership question led to the creation and subsequent institutionalising of some of these networks, as in the case of the conference of party leaders, while others were reconfigured according to the changed context in which the issue evolved. This development was instrumental and proved to be a framework in which intersubjective perceptions of joining the EEC/EC evolved during the sixties. A key consideration inside these networks was the parties’ prospects for and thus a future Labour government’s ability to carry out (reformist) socialist policies as a member of the Community. A CHALLENGING TASK: DEFINING A CONSISTENT EUROPEAN POLICY On the eve of the sixties, the Labour Party was still influenced by the perceptions and positions with which it had rejected the 1950 Schuman proposal and thus participation in core Europe integration. In a report to the Labour Party’s 1960 annual conference, the PLP emphasised that there was a case for joining.1 Yet the party’s spokesman stated, in a parliamentary debate on the EEC on 25 July 1960, that the party should not commit itself to an organisation that might limit its “ability to carry out appropriate economic and social policies”. If a future Labour government should be able to implement a model in which high social expenditure and redistributive taxation were the means of promoting social welfare and equality, the prospects for economic planning were pivotal.2 1 2

LACR 1960: 75. LACR 1960: 75.

42

In Search of a European Policy

Arguably, the leadership had become more flexible, although ambivalent, in its attitudes towards EEC membership. More flexible did not mean more coherent, however. Early in May 1960, Harold Wilson, H. Earnshaw and J. Clark attended a meeting in the SI Contact Committee on European Free Trade Area issues. At the meeting, Wilson bluntly stated that Labour had no fixed European policy.3 This is also apparent from a joint meeting of the foreign affairs and economic groups of the PLP held in the House of Commons, summoned to prepare Wilson and his colleagues for the upcoming meeting. Wilson concluded that the time had come “for the Party to clarify its policies”.4 So far, the party and its policy-making machinery had undertaken no thorough and coordinated study of the European issue. Reponses to core Europe developments had been handled largely by the party elite, although influenced by the PLP. Therefore, the Labour leadership recognised the need for a coherent European policy. At least five developments had led to this conclusion. First, the party realised that the government “itself is rapidly revising its own policy in this whole field”, which would eventually influence the opposition party.5 Second, the very creation of core Europe, the failure of the FTA negotiations and the setting up of the EFTA from 1960 strongly contributed to the need for coherent policy responses. Third, as the government was about to revise its policies the internal tensions over the question inside the party also pushed the issue up the agenda. Fourth, electoral considerations strongly pulled in the same direction, as the party had to be able to present a consistent policy on Britain’s relations with Europe to the electorate well ahead of the next general election. Finally, if the government came out in favour of closer association with or even membership of the EEC and thus embarked on negotiations, the labour parties in Scandinavia and on the continent would certainly look to the British Labour Party. Thus, the Conservative government’s reappraisal of its British European policy created a new and urgent situation, which eventually led the party to take actions on two fronts. First, the NEC restructured its internal policy-making machinery to cope with the challenges early in 1960. The European issue had of course been discussed in the policy-making bodies, but no systematic deliberations had yet been undertaken.6 The European Cooperation Sub-Committee was replaced by a working party (European Co-operation Working Party).7 However, it was never activated. On 7 3 4 5 6

7

LACR 1960, 7–9 May 1960. Rippingale 1996: 223. LAM, International Dept., PLP meeting at the House of Commons, 4 May 1960. LAM, International Dept., “Problems of European Unity”, 25 May 1960. For example, in July 1959 the British Labour party had put together a Commission on European Integration and Disengagement in order to prepare a report on the relationship between the movement for European Integration and the various proposals for disengagement in Europe. The work of the Commission was sub-divided into three committees (Disarmament and Defence, Economic questions and Political questions) in order to produce a report before a possible general election in October. LAM, Box Common Market 1962, 21 July 1959. The European Co-operation Working Party was composed of Mr. H. Earnshaw, Miss M. Herbison, M. P., and Mr. A. Skeffington, M. P. (NEC). The co-opted members were Mr. D. Healey, MP, Mr. A. Robens, MP, Mr. R. Jenkins MP, Mr. J. Hynd, MP, Mr. F. Mulley, MP, Mr T. Steele, MP, and Mrs. Shirley Williams.

A challenging task: defining a consistent European policy

43

November, the Home Policy Sub-Committee decided to ask the Finance and Economic Policy Sub-Committee to consider the question of Britain’s relationship with the Common Market.8 The Finance and Economic Policy Sub-Committee was then reconstituted and joined by representatives from the International Sub-Committee and co-opted members from the PLP.9 After a series of seven meetings it delivered its draft report in March 1961, well ahead of the Conservative government’s public statement – on July 31 – of its decision to apply for membership of the EEC. The draft report had then been revised twice in the light of discussions in the Committee. Although sparking controversies, it was decided that the draft report should be circulated as a basis for further discussion in the important Home Policy Committee (HPC), in the International Committee (IC) and in the NEC itself.10 Second, the Labour Party’s International Department issued a report in May 1960 in which the urgent need for a well-defined policy on the European integration process was emphasised. It was recognised that the creation of the European Communities (ECSC, Euratom and the EEC) had been treated mainly as the set up of economic bodies. Increasingly it had become apparent that long-term political and strategic considerations were involved. The report emphasised both the need for a coherent policy and that the formulation of such a policy had to take into account Britain’s posture in Western Europe as a whole. If not, the Labour Party would run the risk of being faced with important new policy developments in which it could be caught unaware and unprepared. Hence, from 1960 onwards Labour requested a carefully worked out European policy in which not merely the economic, but also the party’s political, tactical, ideological and strategic aspects were taken into account. The leadership also undertook necessary steps in order to deal adequately with these objectives. It initiated a process of defining a policy and explore if it was possible to make any forecast of the likely effects the integration process would have on Britain. In particular, it was to examine whether the drawbacks of membership, seen from a British point of view, were likely to be balanced in the future by equally serious dangers resulting from aloofness and non-membership. It also involved considering what the likely 8

9

10

LAM, International Dept., Box EEC memoranda etc. Home Policy Sub-Cmmttee, (RD 152), June 1961. According to Rippingale the Working Party was never activated, largely on the advice of Wilson and Healey and supported by David Ennals, the Secretary of the International Dept. They found the new body, actively encouraged by the pro-European Sam Watson, the chairman of the International Sub-Committee, to be too dominated by pro-Europeans like Roy Jenkins, John Hynd, Fred Mulley and Shirley Williams. Rippingale 1996: 222. I. Mikardo (Chairman), R. Crossman, D. H. Davies, H. Gaitskell, F. Mulley, H. R. Nicholas, H. Wilson (all NEC). Co-options: T. Balogh, D. Houghton, D. Jay, N. Kaldor, F. Lee, G. R. Mitchison, L. Murray and R. R. Neild. Repr. from the International Sub-Cmmttee: B. Castle, D. Healey, R. Jenkins and W. Padley. LAM, International Dept., Box EEC memoranda etc., RD 152/June 1961. Thomas (Tommy) Balogh, Nicholas Kaldor, Roy Jenkins and Robert R. Neild submitted dissenting and commenting notes. The last two explicitly wanted the Labour Party to come out in favour of Britain joining the Common Market. LAM, International Dept., Box EEC memoranda etc. June 1961, (RD 151, RD 150).

44

In Search of a European Policy

direction of future US policy in Europe was to be, what Britain’s interests were in this respect, and what steps should be taken to safeguard these interests. In short, founded on the party’s ideological structure the leadership’s intention was to undertake an ambitious explorative process within which the full implications of Britain’s relations with core Europe would be addressed. Labour ’s International Department considered the choice for involvement or non-involvement with core Europe vital to the country’s future. Middle course solutions were considered unlikely to prove practicable, either in the field of economics or politics. It was one of the lessons learnt from the FTA negotiations. By May 1960, the conclusion was clear: “The Party has to decide which course it should now follow”.11 DIVIDED – AND UNDECIDED Defining a European policy was a complex, dynamic and difficult process. Overall, the party was bitterly divided over the issue, largely along right–left lines. The revisionist centre-right was more positive in considering closer links with continental Europe and thus the socialist parties of the Six than the fundamentalist left who saw the Community created largely by conservative and capitalist forces. The positions were not divided solely along traditional factionist lines, however. Although the revisionist right on the whole was more inclined to support closer links with core Europe than the fundamentalist left was, parts of the right wing opposed while some left-wingers favoured British entry. It should nevertheless be noted that the right wing did not hesitate to criticise core Europe if it felt criticism was justified, but did not dismiss the EEC bluntly as reactionary, anti-planning and capitalist per se. Besides, positions were flexible. The interpretation of the Rome Treaty and its implications certainly had the capacity to influence the perception of possible British membership. Robins suggests that the internal discussions seem to have been ready for both the right and left factions to compete for support of the more indecisive centre. He argues that the factions were committed from the outset of the EEC debate to support opposing policies, whilst members of the centre placed less importance on the issue.12 The policy-formulating machinery proved unable to unite the leadership behind a coherent European policy. Rather it demonstrated the divergence and uncertainty of positions within the party’s elite, stressing the need for further clarification of intentions.13 The process seriously threatened to disunite the party at a time when the leadership was about to regain the support it had lost, and the party was about to recover its shattered unity after emotionally charged debates over Clause IV, disarmament, defence policy and nuclear weapons. Internal pressure groups were ready to influence the party from the inside, and thus threatened to make a split fatally 11 12 13

LAM, International Dept., “Problems of European Unity”, 25 May 1960: 5. Robins 1979: 16. See N. Kaldor, R. Jenkins, R. R. Neild, and T. Balogh. LAM, International Dept., Commonwealth Dept., Minutes from a joint meeting of the International Sub-Committee of the NEC and the Commonwealth Sub-Committee, 13 June 1961.

Divided – and undecided

45

damaging. On the left established groups like the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Victory for Socialism (VS), the Tribune Group (TG) and the newly formed Forward Britain Movement (FBM) opposed British membership of core Europe. On the right of the party the Campaign for Democratic Socialism (CDS) and the Labour Common Market Committee (LCMC), the latter led by Roy Jenkins, supported the government’s membership initiative.14 According to Crossman, any attempt to lay down conditions for entry would have split the movement from top to bottom.15 Thus, the initial deliberations only highlighted the far-reaching implication of a new damaging split. If this were allowed to happen, it could seriously affect the party’s chances at the next general election. Therefore, the expected statement by the government to apply for membership of core Europe was perceived either as a great leap in a wrong direction, in particular from the fundamental left that tended to emphasise that the government was rushing headlong into the application, or as too hesitant, especially by the revisionist right that accused the government of airing too many reservations and not going far enough in accepting the rules of the game, and thus putting British interests at peril. When the Finance and Economic Policy Sub-Committee submitted its draft report in March 1961, it was not able to make an unambiguous statement on what course should be followed.16 As to the economic and social aspects it stated that “joining the Six would be unlikely to have important” disadvantages. Rather it “would probably be beneficial to trade … and would be more likely to help than to hinder the achievement of a faster ratio of growth in Britain … Thus, provided adequate safeguards can be provided, it would seem that the balance of economic and social advantage probably lies in joining the Six. The margin is, however, uncertain”.17 Dealing with the political considerations, “which in the long run may well be more important”, the conclusions did not point the same way. The revised report of the Committee’s work went a long way to describe the EEC as a first and important step towards the establishment of a “European Community”. The task was to define the pace and extent of the envisaged changes, it was emphasised, and whether there would be a rapid progression towards a “full federal European superstate” or whether the aims were limited to much looser forms of association. If the early establishment of a “federal state” was planned, the report did not expect the Commonwealth to survive British membership, nor would Britain’s independent 14

15 16 17

A few individuals from the left supported the CDS. The CND, which called for unconditional unilateral abandonment of nuclear weapons by Britain, was set up by a handful of intellectuals and pacifists in 1958. The movement grew rapidly out of the control of its founders, and at Easter 1960 and 1961 about a hundred thousand people took part in the marches from Aldermaston – most of them were young and a significant proportion was working class. In 1963 the LCMC was renamed the Labour Committee for Europe (LCE). Crossman Diaries, 13 July 1961, quoted from Rippingale 1996: 227. Robins 1979: 31–34. LAM, International Dept., “Britain and Europe”, RD 126/1961. LAM, International Dept., “Britain and Europe: A draft report”, Revised (RD 126), March 1961. This report and subsequent revised versions laid the basis for discussions between the International Sub-Committee of the NEC and the Commonwealth Sub-Committee on 13 June 1961: 4.

46

In Search of a European Policy

role in world affairs. If a slower and more uncertain pace was likely, the objections to British membership were less clear-cut. If that was likely to be the case, it had to be decided how far the Labour Party and Britain were prepared to merge its identity with the continent in a foreseeable future. A vital part of that identity clearly was the Commonwealth, which the Party wished to strengthen as a “bridge between the races and a positive force in securing world peace”.18 The draft report also disclosed that the postwar self-perception of Britain as the epicentre between three interlocking circles of influence still dominated large parts of Labour ’s policy-making bodies. While the Conservative Party had realised that Britain’s role in world affairs was changing rapidly, and thus redefined British foreign and European policies, Labour ’s deliberations to a lesser extent were marked by Britain’s retreat from empire and Europe’s increased economic and political role.19 Parts of the draft report were structured around Britain’s role as a founding member of the Commonwealth and the special relationship with North America, arguing “that Britain’s position and that of the members of the Six” were not the same. “[H]istory has given us a wider choice of our future role than it has our continental neighbours … [and] the proponents of Britain’s membership of a single West European state may well both over-estimate the future importance of Europe in world affairs and under-estimate the importance of other non-European arenas”.20 From Gaitskell’s communication with the Party’s International Department secretary, David Ennals, it is evident that he did not approve the overall conclusions of the draft report. He found them too negative. In particular, he perceived the “political consequences somewhat biased”, which “was probably inevitable when one is picking out quotations from different people”. A good deal of the confusion arose, according to Gaitskell, from the use of such words as “integration”, “cohesion” and “unity”, without any clear interpretations of what they meant.21 This indicates that Gaitskell had developed fairly positive perceptions of core Europe integration at the time, especially seen in the light of the draft report’s wording, which was not altogether negative. It emphasised that joining would probably be advantageous seen from an economic and social point of view, but the political implications purported a more negative tone. In this respect the report was ambiguous, emphasising that the margins were uncertain, and eventually would be influenced by developments related to various factors such as economic growth, agriculture, social issues, the EFTA, Commonwealth economic interests, and of course the long-term political considerations.22 Gaitskell mainly agreed with the positive assessments while disapproving of the conclusions emphasising the negative political consequences of 18 19 20 21 22

LAM, International Dept., “Britain and Europe”, RD 126/1961. Steinnes 1998. LAM, International Dept., “Britain and Europe: A draft report”, Revised (RD 126), March 1961. LAM, International Dept., box Common Market, EEC memoranda etc, Letter from Ennals to Gaitskell, 11 July 1961, from Gaitskell to Ennals, 12 July 1961, and from Ennals to Gaitskell, 20 July 1961. LAM, International Dept., Draft Report, 2nd revision (RD 126), March 1961.

Divided – and undecided

47

joining the EEC. Apparently, his view appears to be closer to that of Roy Jenkins and Robert Neild than the Eurosceptic views on the left. Jenkins and Neild submitted a dissenting note on the revised draft report, emphasising “that both on political and economic grounds it would now be the right course for Britain to apply for full membership of the European Economic Community”.23 Since the initial clarifications in the March 1961 draft report were unable to give clear recommendations as to which course Labour should follow, additional background papers were produced in June and July. The purpose was to shed additional light on some core aspects of British EEC membership, covering political implications, the structure of the Community, the Commonwealth, social services, labour, agriculture and trade.24 At the same time the HPC, assuming that the government had taken the major decision whether to apply for membership, submitted a comprehensive report – The European Commitment.25 Its purpose was not primarily to answer the question whether Britain should join core Europe, but rather to produce more information than was provided in the draft report and the background papers on the scope and implications of joining. Moreover, it was to facilitate the decision for the members of the HPC and provide the Party’s policy-making bodies with as much information on the implications of joining as possible. The HPC report was largely a processed summary of the Labour Party’s efforts during 1960–61 to work out a consistent European policy. Although warning that the Rome Treaty was complex, its long-term implications “obscure and its meaning inevitably open to different interpretations”, the report nevertheless suggested three broad conclusions. First, it indicated that membership of the EEC did imply a “very deep commitment”. At the end of the transition period, member countries would probably be more “closely interlocked economically with each other than with any other group of nations”. Close economic ties would eventually involve closer cooperation in the political field. The Rome Treaty moreover had created “a number” of supranational institutions, and had laid the foundation for further supranational developments. Whether they would lead to federal integration of Western Europe, however, was “a matter for speculation”. Second, membership of the EEC was expected to involve “the progressive weakening of national economic control” as the majority of the committee held the opinion that the basic doctrine of the Treaty was firmly opposed to national planning. However, how serious this would prove to a Labour government would depend on the balance of political forces in the community, and the pace at which the economic integration would proceed. The HPC report’s claimed it was “reasonably obvious that the habit of co-operation, and the process of eliminating ‘distortions’ is going to lead to far greater political unification in Europe”. Much would therefore depend on the political complexion of the club. It had been set up and was still 23 24 25

LAM, International Dept., Box EEC memoranda etc. RD 151, June 1961. Note by Roy Jenkins and Robert R. Neild. LAM, Research Dept., Background papers. July 1961. LAM, International Dept., Home Policy Committee, “The European Commitment”, RD 162/ July 1961: 5.

48

In Search of a European Policy

dominated by conservative and Christian democratic parties, but as stated by the report, this would not necessarily be so in the future, “especially if the EEC is joined by Britain, Denmark and Norway”.26 Therefore, much would hinge upon if and to what degree core Europe social democratic parties would gain power, and if the Scandinavian countries would follow Britain into the Community if it joined. If Danish and Norwegian social democrats joined alongside Britain, and socialist parties in the Community managed to increase their power base, a new situation would emerge. It would create the basis for increased socialist coordination, influence and control at a European level. A reinforced arena would emerge in which strategic alliances could make sure that the Community did not develop policies at odds with socialist party objectives, and that member countries would be able to carry out socialist policies by facilitating economic planning designed to increase social security and equality. Core Europe should therefore develop along social democratic ideological paths so as to build a European arena for socialist planning. If this were to happen, it would have the capacity to change perceptions of the EEC in the Labour Party. European socialists recognised that it would be increasingly difficult to plan for example full employment solely in the national arena.27 Social democratic strongholds in Scandinavia were in this context an important factor or even precondition for the policy-making processes within the British Labour Party. Third, the effects on the Commonwealth, both political and economical, were “bound to be far-reaching”, the report concluded. If Britain joined core Europe, and did not make any special provisions for the Commonwealth countries, the system of imperial preference would end. This would have a huge impact on both the Commonwealth countries and Britain. The former ’s exporters would either face competition from core Europe commodities, or if and when an external tariff would be imposed, they would “lose both their privileged position in the UK market and be faced with a tariff, while Common Market members would obtain duty free entry for their products”. Britain ran the risk of losing the preferential position in exporting to Commonwealth markets, at a time when more than 40 per cent of British foreign trade was with the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the main impact, the conclusions stressed, would come from the fact that Britain would enter into a closer economic and political relationship with core Europe than it presently had with the Commonwealth. This was expected to cause a reorientation of political connections and trade patterns.28

26 27 28

LAM, International Dept., Home Policy Committee, “The European Commitment”, RD 162/ July 1961: 5. See for example LAM, Finance and Economic Policy Sub-Committee. Report from SI, Meeting of the Contact Committee on European Cooperation and Economic Integration, 2 July 1961: 5 and 10, Circular No. 49/61, 27 July 1961. LAM, International Dept., Home Policy Committee, “The European Commitment”, RD 162/ July 1961.

Restructured and intensified transnational cooperation

49

RESTRUCTURED AND INTENSIFIED TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION Through various settings, the party elite was involved in cross-border networking during the early European policy formulating process. The revisionist centre-right leadership, being the more networked part of the Labour elite, stayed in close contact with fellow socialists in both core Europe and EFTA countries. The patterns and institutional structure of these contacts evolved and changed, however, according to the scope and content of issues on the agenda, eventually materialising in new settings and configurations. Some were institutionalised through the SI and others kept active by party visits. Participation in these networks brought individuals in the party’s elite, directly as well as indirectly, into contact with processes of deliberation in core Europe and EFTA socialist parties and labour movements. Both implicitly and explicitly, information and impressions from these encounters were subsequently channelled into intra-party policy-making processes. Being core participants of policy-making bodies in the Labour Party, the party elite was exposed to perceptions and positions held by other individuals and parties. A core consideration was to what extent it would be possible to carry out socialist policies as members of the club. These contacts are likely to have involved socialisation. According to theoretical propositions set out in the first chapter, participation in the networks had the capacity to influence both individuals and ultimately party policies and politics.29 Yet Labour ’s policymaking machinery explicitly stated that while defining European policies, discussions and perceptions in transnational networks should be taken into account.30 Thus, changes were not only effects of transnational activities through socialisation. Utility maximising and coalition building also figured in the equation, thus indicating an instrumental coordination of interests in order to achieve the party’s objectives. At the eve of the sixties, the European economic and political landscape was changing rapidly. The EEC had been in operation for two years, and was progressing faster than expected. The EFTA had emerged out of the remains of the failed FTA, and its secretariat was scheduled to be in full operation from September 1960. Although having been an active partner in creating EFTA, the British government was apparently in the process of redefining its European policies. These processes spurred the SI to initiate high-level talks between leading socialists and thus led to the formation of new transnational cooperation patterns in which the British Labour Party was an integral and active part. Some were institutionalised, as in the case of the SI conference of party leaders, while others were of a more informal ad hoc character.31 The setting up and institutionalisation of the conference of party leaders established a core arena in which the leadership in the socialist parties debated

29 30 31

Schimmelfennig 2000, 2005, Kaiser 2008b. LAM, International Dept., Commonwealth Dept., Minutes from a joint meeting of the International Sub-Committee of the NEC and the Commonwealth Sub-Committee, 13 June 1961. As indicated in the first chapter, despite intensive research it has been impossible to trace archival material (minutes etc.) from SI’s conferences of party leaders.

50

In Search of a European Policy

the European issue.32 The first conference of party leaders took place in Salzburg in January 1961.33 The point to be made is that the changing context created by the setting up of the EEC and the subsequent redefinition of British European policy led to restructured and, importantly, intensified transnational socialist networking from the early sixties. The reconfigured transnational cooperation demonstrated by the creation of the conferences of party leaders was reinforced by reduced intra-Scandinavian socialist collaboration. As cooperation brought about by the SI intensified, the changing European economic and political context redirected the attention of the Scandinavian socialist parties towards a wider northern European framework. As a result, the close regional network in the Scandinavian Cooperation Committee of the Nordic Labour movement (SAMAK) changed and entered a less intensive phase. The Scandinavians actively contributed to the setting up and institutionalising of the conference of party leaders, thus redirecting their attention towards a European arena at the expense of the Scandinavian network. SAMAK had been a vibrant and effective network with a broad agenda involving the European integration issue during the late forties and fifties. Yet its activities declined significantly during the sixties.34 The socialist parties of core Europe and EFTA also agreed to intensify their transnational collaboration through the SI to bridge divisions between the two organisations. A Working Party, put together by three core Europe and three EFTA socialist parties, was set up at a July 1960 meeting of the SI Contact Committee. The latter had been created by the SI Bureau to study issues of European integration. Wilson represented the British Labour Party and Per Hækkerup the Scandina-

32 33

34

This appears from the meeting agendas. The second conference met in Elsinore, Denmark, in July 1961, and the third in Marseilles in October 1963. The fourth took place at Chequers in London on 12 April 1964 and the fifth in Salzburg, 9–10 January 1965. The sixth convened in London in April 1965. Subsequent conferences were held on 24–25 October 1965 (Paris), 4–5 January 1967 (Rome), 9 December 1967 (Chequers, London), 30 March 1969 (Vienna), 6–7 July 1969 (Harpsund, Sweden), 21–22 March 1970 (Brussels) and 2–4 September 1971 (Salzburg). An extraordinary conference of party leaders was convened in February 1963 (Brussels), in the wake of the breakdown of the British membership negotiations during the previous month. The most intense cooperation at the conference of party leaders corresponds with the period in which Britain and the other applicants sought to join the EEC before the first enlargement, and to some extent with the period in which the revisionist centre-right dominated the Party leadership. A striking observation when comparing SAMAK’s activities and cooperation patterns during the fifties with the sixties, is significantly decreased interest, intensity and frequency of these meetings during the sixties as compared with the fifties. Seen in the light of the increased transnational activities in a wider (northern) European context, the explanation largely resides in the changed economic and political landscape in Europe. New challenges, combined with the setting up of new European institutions and altered cooperation patterns, forged new cooperation patterns. AAB, DNA: Da 1945, box 5, Da 1946, box 11, Da 1947, box 17, Da 1948, box 21, Da 1949, box 28, Da 1950, box 37, Da 1951, box 47. ABA, Socialdemocratiet, SAMAK: Ks, 326, Ks 327–28 (1952–54), Ks 329–30 (1955–58), Ks 331 (1959–62). ABA, PHA, Ks 653. ARAB, TEA/SAP/OPA.

Transnational cooperation and the prospects for socialist policies

51

vian parties in the Working Party.35 It also included Albert Carthy, the Secretary of the SI. The purpose was to examine a range of specific suggestions emanating from discussions in the SI Contact Committee.36 The Working Party emphasised the urgency of reaching a solution of the problems stemming from the present division, and, in the short-term, reaching interim arrangements of a pragmatic character.37 Hence, there is correlation between the economic and political changes taking place in Europe on the eve of the sixties, and the changing pattern of transnational socialist networking within the framework the SI and SAMAK. Scandinavian socialists apparently found a wider transnational framework a more appropriate arena for cross-border cooperation than a limited Scandinavian network. The same applied for leading British Labour Party politicians. In keeping with the Scandinavian socialists, they actively contributed to the restructuring and creation of new networks. Also contacts across the EEC–EFTA divide were strengthened so as to keep up with developments. Traditional contacts in the form of visiting each other ’s parties and participating in conventions and conferences continued, however. An important point is that reconfigured socialist network structures established and strengthened a framework in which transnational intersubjective perceptions of joining the EEC/EC had the potential to evolve during the coming years. Thus, reconfigured and intensified transnational networking in the early sixties makes it instrumental to explore these networks when analysing Labour ’s European policy formation. Transnational cooperation and the prospects for socialist policies TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR SOCIALIST POLICIES The British Labour Party’s decision to work out a European policy and embark on a policy-formulating process had direct repercussions for the Scandinavians. The Danish, Swedish and Norwegian governments were all led by social democrats at the time. Following the breakdown of the FTA negotiations, the creation of EFTA and the British revision if its European policy, the Scandinavian socialist parties also began a painstaking search for a European policy. In line with the British Labour party, they instructed their policy-making machineries to keep up with the developments. The Danish Labour Party soon decided to follow the British government and apply for membership of the EEC, while the Norwegian Labour Party (DNA) remained divided on the issue but eventually decided to apply for full membership in the early summer of 1962. Due to its non-alignment policies, the Swedish Labour Party (SAP) applied for associate membership. 35 36 37

Henri Fayet (Belgium), Per Hækkerup (Denmark), Henri Barbier (France), Willi Birkelbach (Germany), Harold Wilson (Great Britain) and Albert Carthy, Secretary of the SI. IISH, SI, SII vol. X, 1960. IISH, SI, SII vol. X, 1960: 472. See also the Working Party’s House of Commons meeting on 27 February 1961. IISH, SI, 590, European Cooperation and Economic Integration Contact Committee 1960–61, 27 February 1961.

52

In Search of a European Policy

By the early summer of 1961, the British Labour Party’s policy-making machinery had produced carefully elaborated reports on possible implications of joining core Europe, providing the leadership with extensive information on the issue.38 At the same time, the relevance of the European issue increased as it became all the more likely that the Macmillan government had, in principle, decided to apply for membership. With the expectation of a clear statement by the government, cross-border discussions intensified.39 On 2 July, Harold Wilson, David Ennals and Peter Shore attended a meeting of the SI Contact Committee in Paris.40 Prior to the meeting, they had a confidential conversation with the Belgian socialist and associate deputy foreign minister and member of the Committee’s Working Party, Henri Fayet. This is illustrative, as transnational contacts often worked that way. Individuals involved in different networks or institutional settings abroad informally discussed current issues with people in the networks, either within or in connection with other meetings. To Fayet, Wilson explained the position of the Labour Party on British EEC membership and the various trends of opinion in the party. He focussed on three points: first, to what extent accession to core Europe implied political as well as economic commitments. Second, he wanted to know to what extent there was “an identity of views on the future structure of European political organisations” in the Belgian party. Finally, he was curious as to what extent the Community would welcome a British approach, and accepting its economic commitments, if it “clearly said it was the Rome Treaty and nothing but the Rome Treaty”. The latter implied that if Britain submitted an application, and explicitly stated that the British government did not intend to change the Rome Treaty but accept it as the framework for membership negotiations, it would want to know whether it would be possible to maintain its economic commitments, especially regarding the Commonwealth. Fayet reiterated what had been the position of the socialist parties of core Europe since before the ratification of the Rome Treaty. Although the Rome Treaty was a treaty establishing an economic union it was “in the nature of things that economic union led to political union”. Second, he stressed that except for France all EEC countries wanted to see the establishment of a European Parliament elected by universal suffrage with supranational powers. Yet nothing could be done without the support of all six countries. Third, he maintained that if Britain decided to join 38 39

40

See for instance LAM, Research Dept., Background papers. July 1961; International Dept., “Britain and Europe”, RD 126/1961 and Home Policy Committee, “The European Commitment”, RD 162/July 1961. In the context of this work, it is not necessary to the overall argument to list all cross-border meetings and contacts, as for instance the first meeting in the SI conference of party leaders in March, George Brown’s visit to DNA’s annual conference in April or Labour ’s general communication with the Swedish Labour Party during the spring of 1961. The first meeting of the SI conference of party leaders took place in Salzburg on 3–7 March 1961. Brown attended the DNA annual conference on 8–10 April, see LAM, International Dept., Box LP/ID/NOR/1–7 (1947–1967). For contacts with the SAP, see LAM, International Dept., Box LP/ID/SWE/1–6 (1948–1967), Swedish Press Digest’s, letters etc. Ennals headed the Labour Party’s International Department and Shore the Research Department.

Transnational cooperation and the prospects for socialist policies

53

core Europe, it had to do so wholeheartedly. If that would be the case, the six would want to facilitate her entry. There was no question of re-negotiating the Treaty.41 If Britain were prepared to enter the EEC there would be a drop in the flow of certain Commonwealth goods into the European market, but such a decline, he indicated, was already happening.42 Finally, Fayet stated that the longer it took before Britain applied, the more difficult it would probably be. Fayet’s position clearly corresponded with the views of Paul-Henri Spaak, the former socialist Prime Minister of Belgium and well-known European.43 The following day Wilson, Ennals and Shore met with the SI Contact Committee for further talks on European integration issues.44 Whilst drawing attention to the aim of the NEC to get a joint decision agreed by the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the party on core Europe, Wilson explained Labour ’s position. He was unsure whether it would be possible to carry out socialist planning as set out by the Labour Party.45 The concern was largely shared by the future Danish foreign minister, Per Hækkerup. However, the SPD’s Willi Birkelbach downplayed these concerns. Even as a full member of the EEC, he pointed out, national economic planning would still be possible. As he said, “We do not think one can plan” independently using only a national plan. Consequently it would be necessary to “shape a form of supra-national planning, guaranteeing continuing expansion”. Proposing planning on a European level at this point was an uncertain first step towards new ways of coping with planning in a new institutional regime. “We would like to strengthen the Socialist influence in Europe, not only influence in individual countries,” he added.46 On behalf of the SPD, and with reference to the policy-making 41

42 43 44

45

46

IISH, SI, 590, European Co-operation and Economic Contact Committee 1960–61, and LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda etc., Finance and Economic Policy Sub-Committee, 1 July 1961. Note on conversation between Harold Wilson, David Ennals, Peter Shore and the Belgian associate deputy foreign minister Henri Fayet. LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda etc., Finance and Economic Policy Sub-Committee, 1 July 1961. This is supported by research: see for example Milward 2002. See for example expressions on SI Conference in October, where Spaak made it absolute clear that the Rome Treaty was a political document with political aims. IISH, SI, SII, vol 12, 1962: 326. IISH, SI, 590, 2 July 1961, and report from SI: LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda etc., Finance and Economic Policy Sub-Committee, 27 July 1961. Attended: H. Wilson, P. Shore, D. Ennals, Per Hækkerup, H. C. Vos (NL), K. Czernetz (Austria), Max Weber (Switzerland), G. Wickman (Sweden), Pauli Burman (Finland), H. Morat (Israel), Willi Birkelbach (Germany), R. E. Barbier, P. Herbaut (chair), G. Jaquet, E. Cazelles, R. Pontillon (France) and Albert Carthy (SI). In a meeting of the European Cooperation and Economic Integration Contact Committee in July 1960, Wilson had pointed out that “all efforts” must be made to end the division, and that Britain welcomed political integration within core Europe. He claimed that previous British arguments against joining core Europe “seemed weaker now than two years ago”. This indicates that Wilson’s perception of EEC membership was moving closer to that of the pro-Europe faction. LAM, Finance and Economic Policy Sub-Committee. Report from SI, Meeting of the Contact Committee on European Cooperation and Economic Integration, 2 July 1961: 10, Circular No. 49/61, 27 July 1961.

54

In Search of a European Policy

process taking place within the British party, he welcomed what he saw as greater readiness by Labour to explore what was involved in core Europe membership. He hoped his British brethren in a not too distant future would “agree to join” the Community.47 Wilson, Ennals and Shore were also indirectly brought into contact with the close and well-established Scandinavian social democratic network in SAMAK. Only two days before the Paris SI Contact Committee meeting, Hækkerup had attended a special SAMAK meeting in Oslo at which the labour movements in Norway, Denmark and Sweden, both parties and unions, had discussed the European issue.48 At this meeting, SAMAK had emphasised the need to exchange information on current and future studies of the complex. Evidently, the Scandinavian parties had not yet undertaken the task of formulating consistent European policies, as the British Labour Party had done, nor had they examined the long-term implications of the Rome Treaty. If they exchanged information in their endeavour to draw up a common negotiation position towards the Six, they thought their strength would be greatly enhanced, and the risk of being played off against each other reduced. Staying together would enhance their position and give strength whatever would happen.49 Hækkerup’s statements at the SI meeting reflected the doubts the Scandinavians had discussed at Oslo, namely that full membership, even associate membership, of the Community would compel the governments concerned to revise their economic policies, and consequently be forced to give up essential parts of their socialist economic policies, and “follow the capitalist line which is characteristic of the Common Market”. This would have meant, as Hækkerup reiterated, “abandoning the Socialism we have followed hitherto”. The most important thing was, in his view, the anxieties about the control of the flow of capital and investments. Joining core Europe might force the Scandinavian countries, “and to a certain extent Great Britain”, to revise their economic policy in an anti-socialist direction. That would be a high price to pay for entry. The most important task for socialist parties would therefore be to formulate a common economic policy “which we can apply within” core Europe, and thus “permit our Governments to continue” their socialist policies.50 This was a key point that had been explicitly emphasised in Labour ’s March 1961 draft report. It had also been underlined by Hendrik Fos of the Dutch Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) and the SPD’s Willi Birkelbach at the July SI Contact Com47 48

49 50

LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda etc., 27 July 1961, report from meeting on 2 July 1961. ARAB, International unit (International Enhet), SAMAK, box 9. Report from a meeting between the Labour Movements in Scandinavia (Sweden, Norway and Denmark) on 30 June 1961. Participants: S. Aspling, H. Blomgren, E. Brofoss, Per Hækkerup, E. Jensen, D. Juel, K. Nordahl, J. Riksvold. ARAB, International unit (International Enhet), SAMAK, box 9, 30 June 1961, and AAB, DNA’s archive, box 245, 30 June 1961. LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda etc., Finance and Economic Policy Sub-Committee, 2 and 27 July 1961.

Policy-making and electability

55

mittee meeting. However, Hækkerup added that if “Britain, Scandinavia and Austria were to join” the Community, both socialism and democracy would be furthered, which was of “the utmost importance in the European framework”.51 Consequently, he put forward the idea to formulate a common economic policy on a European level to make it possible to carry out socialist policies. In 1961, the Labour Party’s policy-making machinery emphasised, supported by Dutch, German, Danish and other socialists, that the formulation of European level socialist policies ought to be a core objective for socialist parties, which if successful would allow socialist governments to pursue socialist policies in an enlarged core Europe.52 POLICY-MAKING AND ELECTABILITY The opinion of the electorate was a core consideration while Labour was formulating its European policy during 1960–61. The party had lost three successive general elections, and winning the next was paramount. A fourth successive defeat at the polls could prove disastrous. Opinion polls suggested a close race between Labour and the Tories, and Gaitskell had managed to close the gap between himself and Macmillan in terms of personal ratings.53 As the balance was apparently turning in Labour ’s favour, the leadership sought to avoid controversial issues, not least whether Britain should be “entering into a federal Europe”, as Gaitskell eventually expressed himself in the House on 2 August – clearly with reference to the electorate. “British opinion is not ripe for this,” he argued.54 It was of overriding importance not to do anything that could jeopardise the party’s chances at the polls. Taken together, the 1960–61 policy-formulation process produced only an agreement that the NEC should not make any statement committing the party either way until more information was available. One way of expressing this was to emphasise the complexity of the problem and that the terms of membership could not be accurately known until after the negotiations. It gave the different sections of the party – the elite, the right- and left-wing factions, the rank and file, the policymaking machinery, pressure groups and transnational partners – the opportunity to influence future developments. In mid-June Gaitskell cracked down on both factions and emphasised that neither the party nor the Shadow Cabinet or the PLP would commit itself publicly one way or another. As pointed out by Rippingale, Gaitskell even instructed MPs to refrain from any pro- or anti-Market Early Day Motions (EDM), as the party yet had to resolve its European policy.55 The leader 51 52 53 54 55

LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda etc., 27 July 1961, report from meeting on 2 July 1961: 5. LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda etc., Finance and Economic Policy Sub-Committee, 2 and 27 July 1961. Wybrow 1989: 64–66. Hansard, Vol 645, 2 August 1961, Col. 1501–06. Rippingale 1996: 226. Early day motions are a colloquial term for a notice of motion given by a Member of Parliament (MP) for which no date has been fixed for debate. They exist to allow Members to put on record their opinion on a subject and canvass support for it from fellow

56

In Search of a European Policy

also asked TUC representatives, who had consistently favoured closer economic association with Europe, to remain silent until the position was clarified. The latter was in line with the conclusions reached by the TUC. The prime role for the party was of course to rally support for its policies and return to power. Therefore, defining a European policy proved tremendously difficult, even undesirable, not least since the terms of membership could not be known until after the negotiations had been completed. The timing of the difficult, farreaching and potentially divisive European issue was inconvenient. The party had just recovered from emotional debates over nationalisation and defence policies. It had also been made increasingly clear that if Britain was to join the EEC it had to accept an unabridged Rome Treaty, as Fayet had stated. On 29 June the Commission president Hallstein had reiterated the point emphasising that any new member would have to accept the Rome Treaty “with all [its] obligations and duties”.56 Thus, if Britain were to join the EEC, the British government would have to accept the acquis communautaire – the legal and political body of Community treaties, legislation and established norms. Therefore, the party leadership regarded it as vital to map out very carefully the likely consequences of joining. EARLY EUROPEAN POLICY FORMULATION RECONSIDERED It was a delicate issue to define a coherent European policy. A range of considerations had been taken into account, from the terms of membership, party unity, electoral concerns, and transnational contacts to the much debated and emotional Commonwealth connections, the EFTA obligations and the future ability to conduct an independent foreign policy. Importantly, matters of more direct socialist concern played a vital role, in particular the overall prospect of carrying out economic planning, pursuing full employment policies and broadening welfare measures. By the summer of 1961, the Labour Party had provided itself with systematic information and clarifications on the issue, but had not reached clear and unequivocal conclusions. The process had highlighted the content of the Rome Treaty, and the party elite had increased their knowledge of core Europe. The leadership had also been provided with increased awareness of the possible implications of joining. The process had been influenced by deliberations in a domestic arena and by being part of a changing and intensified transnational network. The party’s examination of the issue influenced individuals and organisations participating in the process. One example is David Ennals, the head of the Labour Party’s International Department, who in July 1961 emphasised that if he “had any bias, it was towards membership

56

Members. In effect, the primary function of an EDM is to form a kind of petition that MPs can sign. The tabling of an EDM is a device to draw attention to an issue and to elicit support for it by inviting other MPs to add their signatures. EDM can attract a great deal of publicity, and many people regard them as a gauge of opinion. Although the majority of EDMs are never considered for debate, they might be. http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/ business-papers/commons/early-day-motions/. Retrieved on 24 Feruary 2014. LAM, International Dept., Finance and Economic Policy Sub-Committee. RD 162/July 1961.

Early European policy formulation reconsidered

57

of the EEC”. However, following discussions in the Finance and Economic Policy Sub-Committee, in the PLP and otherwise, he claimed his “views have certainly moved”.57 Yet, at this stage Gaitskell apparently took a balancing approach in order to embrace as large a section of the party as possible.

57

LAM, International Dept., box Common Market, EEC memoranda etc, Letter from Ennals to Gaitskell, 11 July 1961.

CHAPTER 4 MOVING TOWARDS A EUROPEAN POLICY The 1960–62 policy-formulating process was ultimately concluded by the National Executive Committee’s policy document Labour and the Common Market, adopted at the Party’s 1962 annual conference in Brighton. This chapter focuses on how the Labour leadership, in particular party leader Hugh Gaitskell, dealt with the European issue in the wake of the Conservative membership application of July 1961. It explores domestic and intra-party aspects of the process, the significance of transnational networks and Gaitskell’s actions and motives. Contrary to conventional wisdom, suggesting he was indifferent and undecided, or even negative, towards deeper involvement with core Europe integration, the argument put forward is that Gaitskell’s position was slightly positive and that his attitude evolved during the intensive policy-formulating period up to 1963.1 Transnational contacts reassured Gaitskell that EEC membership would not impede social and economic planning. His long-term strategic objective appears to have developed into facilitating a future UK membership bid. However, intra-party and domestic political cleavages and tactical considerations largely account for his public statements and the more negative tone in his speech at the 1962 party conference. His alleged U-turn, eventually his “coming off the fence” in mid-1962 as well as his manoeuvring before and at the Brighton conference were tactical moves in keeping with theoretical deliberations put forward in chapter one so as to keep the party united and strong under his leadership while maximising the party’s chances at the next general election. CONDITIONAL SUPPORT: LABOUR’S RESPONSE TO THE EEC APPLICATION When on 31 July 1961, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced his government’s decision to apply for membership of the EEC and undertake negotiations, the issue suddenly received far greater attention among the public as well as in the wider labour movement. The Labour Party’s response was, as Robins commented, “ambivalent, uncertain, vague and cautious”.2 Although the party’s history would suggest that it would be reluctant to support the application, the internal deliberations carried out by the policy-making machinery had not been able to produce a firm conclusion either way. On the contrary, it had demonstrated the importance of continued efforts, and at the same time drawn up an adequate way to deal with all aspects of the issue. The cautious response also reflected the internal divisions and the uncertainty harboured by many people. 1 2

Williams argues that Gaitskell was consistent throughout. Williams 1979: 702–29. Robins 1979: 16.

60

Moving Towards a European Policy

Having debated the government’s decision to apply for British membership on 3 August, the House of Commons formally approved a motion supporting the decision. Despite the government’s insistence in the motion, and Macmillan’s statement that this was an exploratory move “to see if satisfactory arrangements can be made”, and although important qualifications were included with respect to the interests of the Commonwealth, EFTA and British agriculture, the PLP was unable to support the motion and accordingly abstained. Instead a Labour motion was tabled, not only repeating the government’s own reservations, but insisting that entry should be approved only if the “conditions negotiated are generally acceptable to a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference and accord with our obligations and pledges to other members of the European Free Trade Association”.3 In their speeches, Labour frontbenchers made it clear they had anxieties about the Rome Treaty, in particular how its provisions would affect the balance of payments and existing controls over capital movements. Moreover, the inherent divisions soon became evident. In the response to the conditions Harold Wilson laid down in the debate as being essential to the party’s acceptance of membership, underlining that no definitive response would be possible until the results of the negotiations were known, Roy Jenkins resigned from the front bench. Although the conditions could be justified with a view to this stage of the party’s European policymaking process, and being in keeping with Gaitskell’s manoeuvring, they could neither disguise the internal disagreements nor gloss over their apparently negative tone. The party’s annual conference, held at Blackpool in October 1961, approved the party’s conditional approach towards British membership. Although Roy Jenkins, Shirley Williams and others at the conference argued that the objections voiced by the Labour movement were misconceived, a resolution was carried on the issue restating and elaborating the main points from the House of Commons debate.4 Having rejected a pro-joining resolution by Jenkins and a proposition unconditionally opposing entry, the conference adopted a composite motion. It stated that satisfactory arrangements had to be made for British agriculture and horticulture, the EFTA countries and the Commonwealth. In addition, it yet again emphasised that Britain must retain “the power of using public economic ownership and planning as measures to ensure real progress within the UK”.5 Thus, Labour ’s position was largely in keeping with Gaitskell’s line not to commit the party either way before knowing what conditions the government could negotiate. The resolution passed at the conference explicitly called on the NEC to engage in transnational activities and convene “a meeting of Socialist leaders of Western Europe” to discuss the effects of core Europe.6 Transnational networking was thus

3 4 5 6

LAM, NEC, Home Policy Sub-Committee, RD 192, January 1962 and LAM, The Labour Party. Report of the 60th Annual Conference, Blackpool, 2–6 October 1961: 65. LAM, Report, annual conference, 2–6 October 1961: 215–16. LAM, The Labour Party. Report of the 60th Annual Conference, Blackpool, 2–6 October 1961: 65, and NEC, Home Policy Sub-Committee, RD 192, January 1962. LAM, NEC, File 131.

Conditional support: Labour’s response to the EEC application

61

explicitly considered part of the policy-making process on which future decisions would be based. Labour ’s conditions, laid down in the House of Commons and at the October annual conference, did not appease the factions. Rather, they intensified the internal debates. An important point of contention was whether and how it would be possible for a future Labour government to use public ownership and planning as tools with a view to safeguarding full employment and welfare provisions if Britain joined the EEC. In December 1961 the pro-European Newsbrief of the Labour Common Market Committee referred to an assessment from the European Labour Bulletin as to the question of further nationalisation if Britain joined the Community. It emphasised that the Common Market countries had a higher proportion of public ownership than Britain. As a result, they “would certainly be opposed” to obstructing its extension. Moreover, the Rome Treaty could not prevent further nationalisation taking place, as France and Italy already had a large degree of public ownership in the motor, steel, engineering, aircraft, shipbuilding and oil industries, as well as in public utilities such as railways. Germany and the Netherlands also had substantial public sectors. The only instance where the Treaty did refer to publicly owned industry, it was underlined, was in Article 90, which made clear that it should be subject to the same conditions of fair competition as privately owned industry.7 In January 1962, the left-wing Victory for Socialism group issued a manifesto demanding that Labour oppose joining core Europe on the grounds that membership would reduce the level of public ownership and impede economic planning. If it did, Jenkins warned Gaitskell, severe upheavals would inevitably occur within the party.8 In March the staunch opponent of membership in the Common Market, Barbara Castle, attacked the EEC as the “anti-socialist Community” in the New Statesman. In her view the Labour Party would be debarred from carrying out its policy and be unable to pursue even the “cautious and experimental Socialist policy to which the whole of the Labour party is committed”. There would be no policy for full employment, no provisions for a planned economy with grave consequences for balance of payments, she argued, as the government would not be allowed to maintain exchange or import controls. In response to Castle, Fred Mulley saw nothing in the Treaty or in the operation of the Community that would prevent Labour from implementing its policy as set out in the policy document Signposts for the Sixties, aimed at boosting the British economy.9 Hence, nothing indicated that the internal divisions were ebbing. A small and well-articulated faction to the left of the party still fought ferociously against joining. International Secretary David Ennals, at the time himself sceptical of British EEC entry, tried hard to avoid sending people like Barbara Castle and Tom Driberg as party representatives abroad. Although chosen as visitors to the Conference of

7 8 9

LAM, International Dept., box, EEC memoranda etc. Newsbrief of the Labour Common Market Committee, no 2, December 1961. Lieber 1970: 171–72. See also Sunday Telegraph, 14 January 1962. Barbara Castle in New Statesman, 13 March 1962, and the response by Fred Mulley, “Planning and the Common Market”, LAM, Home Policy Sub-Committee, May 1962.

62

Moving Towards a European Policy

the Socialist Parties of the Six in November 1962, Ennals emphasised before their departure that they represented the “extreme anti-case”.10 The case for joining apparently deteriorated among rank and file Labour voters. How much effect public opinion had on Gaitskell at this point is difficult to assess, but by mid-1961 Labour ’s lead over the Tories had steadily increased. While a Gallop Poll claimed 52 per cent of Labour voters would have approved a government decision to join in December 1961, with only 20 per cent opposed, the corresponding figures for April 1962 had slipped to 38 and 33 per cent, and deteriorated further as the 1962 annual conference approached, only to rise and fall again before the veto.11 The same tendency was apparent in the PLP, although the numbers differ. While Robins suggests that one third opposed entry in the summer of 1961, and two-thirds did so by the autumn of 1962, Rippingale estimates, referring to the Economist and in keeping with Williams, that 75 MPs favoured entry by mid-1962, 80 were against and the rest, about 100, would follow the leader ’s line.12 Although the wider movement was beginning to express interest in the issue in the wake of Macmillan’s July announcement, only thirteen resolutions were submitted to the 1961 annual conference at Blackpool.13 Eleven opposed while two supported entry. In 1962, the numbers were substantially higher, with 38 motions of unconditional opposition, six of conditional opposition and three of conditional or unconditional support.14 Most of the Labour press, like the Daily Mirror and Daily Herald, the liberal and progressive Guardian and the Observer, and the highly respected periodicals like the Economist were pro-market, while the left-wing Tribune, the Daily Worker and New Statesman all opposed entry. Moreover, close allies of Gaitskell like Sam Watson, Bill Carron and Alan Birch were all pro-European. Generally, the TUC, with the exception of left-wingers like Frank Cousins and Ted Hill, welcomed Macmillan’s announcement. In Parliament, important members of the Shadow Cabinet supported entry, while the individuals who would have had substantial influence on European policy had Labour come to power opposed membership – Shadow Chancellor James Callaghan, Shadow Colonies Spokesman Denis Healy, and Shadow Secretary of the Board of Trade Douglas Jay.15 Besides, the anti-EEC lobby gained influence in the NEC, when the matter had been transferred to the Home Policy Sub-Committee. The opponents dominated both the Research and International departments too. Moreover, Macmillan’s popularity was decreasing, and his reshuffling of the cabinet, dismissing a third of the ministers, did not help at a time when public opinion seemed to be turning against the EEC. 10 11 12 13 14 15

LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda etc., Letter from Ennals to Gaitskell on 9 October 1962. Gallup Political Index, no 24 (December 1961): 8, and no 28–29 (April–May 1962): 68, from Lieber 1970: 171. See also Robins 1979: 37 and Lieber 1970: 229–32. Robins 1979: 33, Williams 1979: 720, Rippingale 1996: 241. Lieber refers to the 1961 Scarborough Conference, which is incorrect. The 1961 Conference took place in Blackpool. Lieber 1970: 171. Robins 1979: 33, Lieber 1970: 172, The Times, 27 July 1962. Brown, Gunter, Houghton, Mulley and John Strachey were in favour. Rippingale 1996: 240–41.

Gaitskell and European socialists

63

During the first part of 1962, the party leadership realised the time to reach a decision on core Europe was approaching. The Six had completed stage I of the transition period established in the Rome Treaty and entered stage II on 1 January.16 They had also agreed on a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) framework on 14 January 1962. Several detailed regulations were drawn up as the transition period for agriculture was set to start in June and was scheduled to last for seven years. Consequently, the Six had successfully finished a difficult and time-consuming internal struggle and real negotiations with Britain could start. This meant that deliberations and discussions in the Labour Party intensified. So did the challenges to party leader Gaitskell. Having to decide which course it should follow, the party leadership took action on two fronts. First, it instructed policy-making bodies to carry out further studies and clarifications of various aspects of the membership issue. During the spring a range of detailed studies on different aspects of Britain joining core Europe were produced. Second, a series of party meetings took place in the PLP as well as in the Home Policy Sub-Committee to prepare the party for the approaching decision.17 The process only confirmed its conditional support for entry yet emphasised that no definitive decision could be made before the negotiating terms were known. In addition to the three conditions tabled by the government on agriculture, the EFTA and the Commonwealth, Labour would add another two. Thus, in keeping with the conditions approved by the 1961 annual conference, the party would require assurance that Britain would be free to conduct an independent foreign policy and have freedom to carry out economic planning. In short, the position in which the NEC would conclude prior to the 1962 annual conference was crystallising. In the final PLP meeting, Gaitskell emphasised the importance of the arrangements by which the leadership would be able to consult Labour leaders in core Europe, EFTA and the Commonwealth. GAITSKELL AND EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS Featherstone, Rippingale, Robins and Lieber argue that Gaitskell’s position on the EEC question was crucial.18 It is a good and interesting observation. A large faction in the PLP was likely to follow the leader, and his choice had the capacity to unite or split the party. His seemingly indecisive and vague response to the Conservative government’s application was deliberate and tactical. The preliminary results of the 16

17 18

Article Eight of the Treaty of Rome stated that the common market should be progressively established during a transitional period of twelve years, and that this transitional period should be divided into three stages. Initially these stages should be four years each, but the length of each stage could be altered in accordance with the provisions set out in the treaty. The first stage was completed by the end of 1961, one year ahead of schedule. LAM, PLP, meeting on 16, 22, 29, 30 May 1962. Home Policy Sub-Committee, “Planning and the Common Market”, RD 268, May 1962. Featherstone 1988: 53, Rippingale 1996: 214–16, Robins 1979: 1, 3, 27–28, Lieber 1970: 175– 76.

64

Moving Towards a European Policy

party deliberations appearing in June 1961 indicated that Gaitskell had consistently focussed on conditions and advocated that the Party should not commit itself either way. He was also careful to include transnational collaboration as a part of his and the party’s policy-formulation process. In the August 1961 House of Commons debate, Gaitskell underlined that the problem of whether to enter core Europe was “a matter of balance”. Dealing with all main implications of the issue, two points are of particular interest in this context. First, he emphasised that the important and much-debated political consequences of entry would not be “as dangerous or profound as they are sometimes made out to be”. He supported the Prime Minister claiming, “I do not think we are necessarily bound for federalism in Europe.” The people taking an intermediate position, he maintained, must know the conditions before making up their minds.19 Very much would depend on the negotiations. “At least, then we shall have eliminated some of the elements of doubt.” Second, he stressed that it would be very important that Denmark and Norway followed Britain if it joined. Noting they were “close friends”, he added, “if they go in – it removes some of the doubts which many people have”. As demonstrated, this was an assessment shared by many core Europe socialists too.20 Gaitskell also pointed to the fact that the EEC Council of Ministers would soon make more decisions by qualified majority, and the voting balance would be all the more important.21 This has also to be regarded in the context of enlargement. If Danish and Norwegian social democratic strongholds joined core Europe alongside Britain, the voting power of the centre-left was likely to increase. It was not only the Scandinavian socialist parties that mattered to Gaitskell and the British Labour Party: so did the continental socialist parties and the SI. In October, shortly after the Blackpool annual conference, a Labour Party delegation headed by Gaitskell went to the 1961 SI Congress in Rome, which was dominated by the European issue.22 The Labour leadership was aware that core Europe socialists favoured the creation of the EEC. They also argued in favour of deepening the integration process, while emphasising that close and direct consultation would be conducted with the British and Danish socialist parties.23 Paul-Henri Spaak reiterated that the Rome Treaty “n’est pas uniquement, n’est même pas principalement, un traité économique”. It is “un traité économique avec une base politique et le Traité de Rome n’est dans notre esprit, dans l’esprit de ceux qui l’ont fait, qu’une 19 20 21 22 23

Cf. Broad and Daddow 2010. See, for example, Henrik Fos at the July 1961 SI Contact Committee’s meeting. LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda etc., 27 July 1961, report from meeting on 2 July 1961, and previous chapter. IISH, SI, SII, vol. 11, 1961: 505. Extracts from Gaitskell’s speech in the House of Commons on 2 August 1961. Gaitskell was accompanied by Richard Crossman, Miss A. Bacon, Sam Watson, Miss M. Sutherland and David Ennals. The socialist group of the European Parliament, meeting at Frankfurt am Main on 5–6 September, invited the British and Danish socialists as observers, assuring that direct contacts between core Europe socialist parties and the British and Danish fraternal parties would continue. IISH, SI, SII, vol. 11, 1961: 580.

Gaitskell and European socialists

65

étape qui doit nous amener à une Europe politique unie et à une Europe beaucoup mieux organisée du point de vue économique”.24 Thus, Spaak forcefully emphasised the Treaty’s political basis. Similar views were expressed by the French representative and former Minister for Overseas Territories and executive member of the SFIO, Gérard Jaquet, who maintained that the “Marché Commun n’est pas pour nous une entreprise commerciale … nous n’avons jamais caché que notre but était politique”.25 The 1961 SI congress resolution, strongly supporting the European integration process, explicitly welcomed the British, Danish and Irish applications for membership and the intention of other countries to apply for (associate) membership in the EEC, which together, the SI hoped, might lead to a wider European structure. The latter had been a long-term aim for European socialist parties, thus reaffirming the 1959 Hamburg Congress resolutions, stressing the concern for socialist parties that the objectives for European cooperation should be the creation of forms of integration that would strengthen economic, financial and monetary policies directed towards the achievement of economic expansion, full employment and social progress. An integrated Europe should moreover be outward-looking making an effective and increasing contribution towards the solution of the problems of developing countries.26 Finally, recognising the difficulties involved in accepting “the political obligations undertaken by the members” of core Europe, the 1961 SI congress urged all countries taking part in the membership negotiations to make realistic efforts to overcome obstacles, so as to open the way to greater solidarity between all countries of Europe.27 The British Labour Party fully supported the resolution. On the whole, the SI, the socialist parties and trade unions of core Europe supported the European integration process and welcomed the membership applications. In November 1961, the TUC met with core Europe trade unions and representatives of EFTA trade unions. The EEC trade unions emphasised their continuing support for the Community and for the development of common policies by its member countries. Moreover, they looked forward to the prospect of Britain, and possibly other EFTA countries, becoming members because it would strengthen the trade union influence within the community as a whole. The issued communiqué stated that the TUC and some other EFTA countries had reservations about their countries’ ability to accept the Rome Treaty’s provisions for freeing the movement of labour, “but took the view that in practice, and in a context of full employment, implementation of these provisions should not impose severe burdens on any of the countries involved”. Also on the part of the trade unions, the importance of close cross-border contact was restated. Further meetings and an “early exchange of doc-

24 25 26 27

IISH, SI, 252, 7th Congress, Rome, 23–27 October 1961, P. H. Spaak: 15. IISH, SI, SII, vol. 12, 1962: 326, and SI, 252, 7th Congress, Rome, 23–27 October 1961, G. Jaquet: 2. LAM, NEC, Resolutions passed by the Congress of the SI, Rome, 23–27 October 1961, and Hamburg 1959. IISH, SI, 7th Congress, Rome, 23–27 October 1961.

66

Moving Towards a European Policy

uments” and views “on this and other matters of common interest” would be important to future developments.28 From the outset, the Socialists on the continent had embraced the European integration process. Also the Socialist Group of the European Parliamentary Assembly explicitly expressed satisfaction regarding the British application to join the Community, even though it had been submitted by a Conservative government.29 Moreover, since the creation of the EEC, the socialist parties of the Community had put considerable efforts into developing an effective common programme of action, eventually setting up a liaison office in member countries. One of the most important tasks for the liaison office during the winter of 1961–62 was to get a more precise picture of the attitudes of socialist parties in the states requesting admission to or association with core Europe.30 Strikingly, while large factions within the British and in the Scandinavian labour parties were reluctant to joining the EEC, believing it would be difficult or even impede their ability to carry out socialist policies, the SI and core Europe socialist parties and trade unions called for deeper integration as it, according to their view, would facilitate planning and socialist policies and increase living conditions. Although socialists argued their policies would increase welfare provisions and equality, the Christian Democratic movement no doubt was more committed to social security and equality than contemporary socialist politicians acknowledged. Christian and conservative parties on the continent had committed themselves to provisions largely in accordance with pledges offered by socialist parties and governments. An indication to that end was that the SI did not turn down the EEC outright, but endorsed it believing that greater integration had the capacity to bring about better employment and social conditions for its population. THE LOGIC OF WAIT-AND-SEE Gaitskell continuously emphasised that the party remained undecided. In a conversation with the Swedish Press Attaché, Gunnar Fagrell, who subsequently conveyed his impressions to Foreign Minister Östen Undén, the Labour leader stressed that the most important aims for the British Labour Party was to prevent as many Labour MPs as possible from committing themselves on the EEC question.31 In principle, he maintained, the Labour Party welcomed close cooperation with core Europe, yet it depended on the final outcome of the current negotiations. From a tactical point of view, his fear was that the staunch anti-marketeers – whom Gaitskell labelled lunatics in the conversation – should renounce member28 29 30 31

LAM, International Dept., Newsbrief by the Labour Common Market Committee, no 2, December 1961. LAM, International Dept., Newsbrief by the Labour Common Market Committee, no 2, December 1961. IISH, SI, SII, Vol. 11, 1961: 515. See letter from G. Jaquet to D. Ennals on 25 January 1962. LAM, International Dept., EEC memoranda. ARAB, TEA, box 075, Fagrell to Undén, Secret, 9 March 1962.

The logic of wait-and-see

67

ship of the Community even if the government succeeded in getting a good result.32 It would present the Labour Party as anti-European whatever the outcome of the negotiations. The Conservative government would then be able to call for a general election and profit from a divided opposition party. Referring to the next general election, he emphasised that if the people in Britain denounced the government’s results of the negotiations, Labour should oppose joining.33 Yet again, this indicates that Gaitskell was slightly pro-European, but that tactical considerations made him take up a “wait-and-see” and “terms-of-entry” attitude. At present, as he admitted to Fagrell, he had “no other option”, adding it was unfortunate for an opposition party to not be able to unite on such an important issue.34 In a party political broadcast on prime-time TV on 8 May 1961, wholly devoted to the EEC question, Gaitskell underlined it would be “silly to say yes or no to this thing until we know the conditions under which we’re going to go in”. The Community was a reality, and the member countries would go ahead with it, irrespective of what Britain did. What “we can do”, he continued, “and what we have done in the Labour Party, is to lay down the conditions that we think ought to be met”. The question of whether Britain would be better off outside than inside depended on whether the conditions Labour had laid down would be met. His conclusions were balanced. To go in on “good terms would, I believe, be the best solution to this difficult problem. And let’s hope we can get them. Not to go in would be a pity, but it would not be a catastrophe. To go in on bad terms which really meant the end of the Commonwealth would be a step which I think we would regret all our lives, and for which history would not forgive us.”35 More than anything, his appearance confirmed his tactical considerations, fixed on the next general election. In principle, he said nothing that indicated he would oppose joining, exactly as he had told Jenkins in advance he would not do.36 The broadcast was praised by the press for its “objective assessment and balanced judgement”, and for Gaitskell’s “obvious devotion to truth and principle”.37 Yet the balance was contested. Both the LCMC and the conservative press concluded that he was in favour of entry. The Daily Telegraph noted that he “tipped a finely balanced scale in favour … he is obviously determined not to let [Labour] be branded as the anti-Common Market party”.38 In the final discussion on core Europe in the PLP at the end of May, Gaitskell played his cards in the same fashion. The government’s obligation to enable all EFTA countries to participate in an integrated Community from the same date, he claimed, 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

ARAB, TEA, box 075, Fagrell to Undén, Secret, 9 March 1962. In Gaitskell’s opinion, the leftwingers were not only guided by rational thinking but by deep anti-American sentiments. Author ’s italicisation. ARAB, TEA, box 075, Fagrell to Undén, Secret, 9 March 1962. Shortly before Fagrell’s meeting with Gaitskell, Gunnar Lange had met with Harold Wilson. ARAM, TEA, box 075, Fagrell to Undén, Secret, 9 March 1962. LAM, box Common Market 1962. The Rt. Hon. Hugh Gaitskell, CBE, MP, “A Party Political Broadcast on behalf of the Labour Party, 8th May 1961”. See Williams 1979: 719. Quoted from Williams 1979: 719. Quoted from Williams 1979: 719.

68

Moving Towards a European Policy

supported Labour’s interests. Three of the EFTA countries had socialist governments, and in Austria, socialists held half the important posts. “It would be of interest to a Labour Government to have these countries in association with us if we went into the Community.” Moreover, it would be important that these countries sought full membership, “giving them voting powers”, which would be difficult for the neutral countries. In this respect, Gaitskell referred to consultations with the Norwegian Ambassador, and to discussions shortly scheduled to take place in Oslo.39 As to the political implications, he reiterated, there were “no specific political commitments” contained in the Rome Treaty, and thus no far-reaching political implications of joining core Europe. However, this argument was deliberately at odds both with statements made in the SI by socialist members of the Community and the views held by many within the Labour Party. There are “active Federalists” in the Community, he continued, and perhaps “this aspect of the problem” had been deliberately emphasised “in an effort to keep us out”.40 Finally, in principle it was impossible for the Party to object to a giving up of sovereignty, he argued, as it would be inconsistent with traditional policies. Loss of sovereignty merely arose in connection with economic and commercial policies, he claimed, and Britain had already made such concessions for instance by signing the GATT agreement. Most important decisions in the EEC were taken only by a unanimous vote, he continued, yet in cases of decisions calling for a qualified majority there would be “need for greater care”. Obviously, Gaitskell deliberately played down the political implications of British membership, again indicating that he aimed to facilitate EEC membership in the long run, while simultaneously keep the party strong and united.41 TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND TACTICAL MANOEUVRING Having completed the spring series of party meetings, Gaitskell went to the SI Council conference in Norway. In Oslo, he also had separate conversations with the Norwegian Labour Party elite and the SI representatives. The timing of these talks is interesting. Up to that point, Gaitskell officially insisted on not having made up his mind. Many commentators believe that he “came off the fence” in June–July, while individuals on both sides of the divide assumed that up to that point he had 39

40 41

In early June, Gaitskell maintained in parliament that the Scandinavian countries were important, calling on core Europe to admit “neutrals”, meaning Sweden, as associates. Failure to do this, he argued, would alienate Norway and Denmark because of their reluctance to erect tariffs against their neighbour, Sweden. This in turn would be detrimental to British interests as the Scandinavians were “our most likely allies” if they joined. Without their inclusion, EFTA would remain a competitive bloc. Hansard, Vol. 661, 6 June 1962, Cols. 513–27. While some interpreted Gaitskell’s speech as a willingness to oppose the government, others have argued that it showed pro-Europe sentiments. See Williams 1979: 720, Camps 1964: 449. LAM, PLP, meeting on 30 May 1962. Discussions raged about whether to issue a Motion on the subject. The anti-marketeers argued for tabling a Motion, while the pro-European argued against. As the party was trying to remain united, the Parliamentary Committee’s recommendations were agreed to without a vote. LAM, PLP, meeting on 30 May 1962.

Transnational activities and tactical manoeuvring

69

followed a slightly pro-European line.42 Hence, his alleged coming off the fence became apparent before the government presented its White Paper on the issue in August, i. e. before knowing the conditions. If he had followed his rhetoric of having to know the conditions before any decision could be made, he would not have been able to make up his mind at this time. Thus, the trip to Scandinavia apparently took place at a crucial point. He also knew the government would issue its preliminary negotiating results in August and that the NEC had to finalise its policy-making process before the October annual conference. Before the SI conference, he met with the Norwegian Labour Party politicians, foreign minister Halvard Lange and minister of trade Oscar Gundersen.43 In these conversations, Gaitskell got the impression that the Norwegian party harboured mainly the same dilemmas as the British party. Yet Norway had its special problems if it was to enter the EEC, related to agriculture and especially fisheries, of which 90 per cent of the latter products were exported.44 The Common Market issue had been a very difficult one for the DNA. Its mouthpiece Arbeiderbladet had raised the question of whether it would be possible to continue what the newspaper deemed a “successful and forward-looking policy” if Norway joined the EEC.45 Prime Minister Gerhardsen answered the question in the affirmative. After a four-day debate in late April, the Norwegian parliament had approved a proposal by the majority in the Foreign Affairs Committee to take up membership negotiations.46 In the debate, the Norwegian PM emphasised that it would certainly be possible to continue, even develop, “our economic, social and cultural policy”. The well-regarded economist and finance minister, Petter Jakob Bjerve, pointed out that within the Community, Norway would still have the opportunity to use the means necessary to achieve its economic and social objectives; i. e. economic planning to further social welfare and equality. The conclusion in the Norwegian Labour Party leadership was that those “who believe that as a member of the EEC Norway must draw a line between the policy it had pursued so far can therefore feel confident that this will not be necessary”.47 The conclusion appears to be in keeping with Gaitskell’s perceptions of British membership of core Europe. To Norwegian labour politicians the tension between national planning and international constraints was a familiar dilemma as the postwar liberal regime consistently had challenged national planning ambitions.48 At the Oslo SI meeting, Gaitskell emphasised that the British Labour Party appreciated the strong support given by the socialist parties of the Six to Britain’s 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

Rippingale 1996: 234–35, Brown 1971: 211–12, Camps 1964: 424, Robins: 27–28, Lieber 1970: 177, Jenkins 1991: 144. LAM, International Dept., box Norway and Sweden, Point from discussion between H. Gaitskell and Halvard Lange, Mr. Engers and Mr. Gundersen, 1 June 1962. On Norway, fish and EC accession, see Almlid 2008. Arbeiderbladet, 30 April 1962. The debate was concluded on 28 April 1962. 113 out of 150 parliamentarians voted for negotiations. Arbeiderbladet, 30 April 1962. IISH, SI, SII, 14, vol. 12, 1962. Øksendal 2007.

70

Moving Towards a European Policy

membership application. To him it was both a comfort and a reassurance that these parties regarded the Common Market as a good thing. He also touched upon the Rome Treaty’s possible interference with Britain’s freedom to conduct its own foreign policy, and its capacity “to carry out socialist planning effectively”, on which point he found the reassurance given by the socialists on the continent to be “most helpful”. The EEC socialists’ positive attitude to the Community was well known. Gaitskell also expressed the hope that the EEC should be outward looking, lowtariff, progressive, democratic, and radical in its international outlook. If Britain joined core Europe, he continued, Labour attached the “greatest possible importance” to the other countries in the EFTA coming in as well, “especially the Scandinavian countries … where the influence of democratic socialism is so strong”. He took care to underline that he “would regard it as essential, if we go in, that they should come in too, as full members”.49 Once again, Gaitskell regarded the Scandinavians as strategic partners in an enlarged core Europe.50 Gaitskell also underlined that it was very important that the neutral EFTA members were associated with the EEC in whatever manner was most appropriate.51 The social democratic influence in the Community was likely to increase if they were able to join as associate members. The resolution from the conference stated unambiguously that the SI “salue avec plaisir les demandes d’adhésion au Marché commun de la Grande-Bretagne, du Danmark, de la Norvège et de la république d’Irlande et leur acceptation des principles et des modalités contenus dans le Traité Rome”.52 The Scandinavian countries were not the single most influential factor in Gaitskell’s mind, but perceptions of core Europe in large parts of the Scandinavian countries in many ways confirmed the perceptions dominating the reformist centreright faction of the Labour Party. They were uncertain as to whether it would be possible to carry out a planned economy within a Community built on the provisions in the Rome Treaty, consisting of countries that apparently seemed more concerned with monetary stability than full employment. They were also sceptical towards the Christian Catholic Democratic Movement, which was often perceived to be both reactionary and conservative. On the other hand, core Europe socialists repeatedly assured that membership would not impede economic planning and welfare provisions: rather the opposite would happen. In mid-July, after having been to Oslo, Gaitskell, accompanied by Harold Wilson and Peter Shore, attended a Brussels meeting called by the SI in order to bring 49 50

51 52

LAM, International Dept., box Norway and Sweden, Point from discussion between H. Gaitskell and Halvard Lange, Mr. Engers and Mr. Gundersen, 1 June 1962. The German SPD also emphasised the urgent need for the “extension and development of the existing European Communities”. It stressed “Everything must be done to bring into the Community as soon as possible” the applicants for full and associate membership. The SPD explicitly welcomed the Scandinavians and other EFTA countries into the EEC, while at the same time calling for the organs of the Communities to be “strengthened and their competences increased”. Resolutions adopted by Congress of the German SPD, Cologne 26–30 May 1962. IISH, SI, SII, vol. 12, 1962: 404. IISH, SI, 270, Council, 2–4 June 1962, Speech by Gaitskell. IISH, SI, 270, Resolution on the Common Market adopted by the Council of the SI, 2–4 July 1962.

Transnational activities and tactical manoeuvring

71

together leading socialists of the EEC and the applicant countries. Although the Oslo resolution was largely confirmed, Gaitskell managed to upset his colleagues in the EEC countries, especially the Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak. In his speech, Gaitskell presented five conditions that had to be met if Labour was to endorse the membership conditions, declaring that at the moment “Britain could not possibly enter a European federation”.53 Although much fuss turned on demands for full safeguards for the Commonwealth, the political implications lay at the heart of the dispute. The Norwegian representative, the chairman of the Committee of Foreign and Constitutional Affairs of the Norwegian Parliament, Finn Moe, was anxious to underline that he, in line with Gaitskell, found it important not to give up the right to carry out national social and economic planning. He also was worried about the free movement of capital and investments. In an emotional speech, Spaak regretted that no enthusiasm was to be found among the three applicants. In his address, Wilson suggested that he got the impression, listening to Spaak, that the application was not so much a negotiation to join an economic club. “It sounded at times almost like an application to join a church in which we have to pass a doctrinal examination in the Church’s theology before we are allowed to join.”54 Spaak replied that the EEC was a political idea, and asked rhetorically how the neutrals imagined what Europe would look like in the future.55 The clash was widely reported in the papers, above all in France and Britain. Spaak was reported to have suggested that Gaitskell’s approach was “very disturbing and very sad”.56 He was supported by the French representative and chairman of the conference, Gérard Jaquet, who stated: “Je suis tout à fait d’accord avec Paul H. Spaak lorsqu’il affirme que nos perspectives, lorsque nous avons commence la construction de l’Europe ètaient essentiellement politique.”57 In Le Populaire he wrote that affirming “comme certains l’ont fait, que les travaillistes refusent systématiquement toute construction politique, serait une erreur grossière”.58 The Community was, in Spaak’s opinion, faced with a dilemma. Either to “accept Great Britain, which I wish, or to see the political progress of Europe stopped, which we cannot accept. Mr. Gaitskell seems to think it possible to create a Common Market without any political community. If that is so we had better go ahead with the political union of the Six.”59 However, Gaitskell was not as categorical as the impression given by the papers and his clash with Spaak. At the conference, he reiterated: “Most of us think that if we can come in on reasonably good conditions, that on balance is the best 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

IISH, SI, 280, Conference of European Socialist Parties, stenographic minutes of speeches. Daily Express, 16 July 1962. IISH, SI, 588, Conference of European Socialist Parties, 15–16 July 1962. Transcribed minutes from Wilson’s speech. Author ’s italicization. ARAB, TEA, box 038, Report from SI Conference in Brussels, 15–16 July 1962. Daily Express, 16 July 1962. IISH, SI, 588, Conference of European Socialist Parties, 15–16 July 1962. Le Populaire, 18 July 1962. Daily Express, 16 July 1962.

72

Moving Towards a European Policy

thing to do.”60 Nonetheless, the Daily Express wrote that Gaitskell emerged from the meeting “flushed and embarrassed”, and was reported to be “astonished at the outburst his speech had provoked”.61 Despite the dispute and exchange of views at this meeting, the socialist parties of the Six nevertheless warmly welcomed the applicant countries into the Community. Hence, the outspoken language in this meeting should not be overemphasised, which, to a certain degree, has been the case. Rather it was as a frank exchange of views. Besides, Gaitskell’s emphasis that Britain could not possibly enter a European federation at the time was a precise expression. What the future would bring was another chapter, about which Gaitskell, strictly speaking, said nothing. Besides, he had to appear in a way that appealed to both sides in the party at home. His expressions, although given in an international arena, also had domestic and intra-party audiences. Thus, the conference does not support Robins’s suggestion that Gaitskell’s meeting with his colleagues was a formative experience in a negative direction and thus the beginning of a turning point.62 Rather, it was a tactical manoeuvre intended to secure his leadership while considering electoral and long-term strategic considerations. As such, it demonstrates the tension between his tactical and strategic objectives. THE LABOUR PARTY: MOVING TOWARDS A CONCLUSION In August 1962, a year had passed since the government decided to enter into accession talks, and the government presented an outline agreement of the negotiations. Primarily it was intended for presentation to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in September, thus in particular dealing with the Commonwealth issue. However, the report made it possible for Labour to assess the general direction in which the negotiations in Brussels were heading. To many, the preliminary report constituted a major retreat from the commitments made in 1961. Moreover, early in August the French had laid down strict conditions for import levies on all external foodstuffs entering the EEC. Because the British government had consistently stressed that the Commonwealth had to be protected, the immediate effect had been a suspension of the negotiations until October. Labour lost little time in presenting the government’s predicament as a betrayal.63 The Research Department soon capitalised on the implications. In a lengthy document, it perceived and portrayed the proposed settlement as a “grave disappointment”. The Commonwealth connection was of first importance “for reasons of strong national sentiment”. It warned that the “Commonwealth attitude” would be a major factor in determining the policy of the Labour Party.64 Clearly, electoral considerations were present.

60 61 62 63 64

IISH, SI, 588, Conference of European Socialist Parties, 15–16 July 1962. Transcribed recordings from the Speeches. Daily Express, 16 July 1962. Robins 1979: 27–28. Rippingale 1996: 245. LAM, NEC, RD 325, August 1962.

The Labour Party: moving towards a conclusion

73

During the Commonwealth conference, Gaitskell seized the opportunity and met with the Commonwealth labour leaders, emphasising that the Commonwealth had a unique role as a “multi-racial community of 700 million peoples, with influence in every continent”.65 At the same time, the SI arranged a special meeting in London giving representatives of core Europe socialist parties and the British and overseas Commonwealth labour leaders the opportunity to discuss the issue, facilitating cross-border contacts. According to the outline agreement, Britain was to give up imperial preferences by 1970 in return for vague offers to discuss other agreements in the future. “We do not believe”, the British Labour Party and the EEC socialist party leaders subsequently concluded, “that Britain should enter the Common Market unless and until the present vague promises and assurances have been converted into precise agreements”.66 German and Dutch representatives strongly emphasised that British and Scandinavian membership would strengthen both progressive and democratic forces in the EEC.67 Williams argues that Gaitskell made up his mind at the end of the three days of talks, claiming when he did so, “he did not do so half way”.68 However, in view of the present situation, Gaitskell had no other option but to consider the present political climate. Too much was at stake, and he could not risk stirring up strained internal relations in the party. A week before the NEC submitted its defining European policy statement and a fortnight before a crucial annual conference in Brighton, Gaitskell went on television to address the issue.69 Although his appearance broadly confirmed his deliberations in the May broadcast, he had, during the last four and a half months, developed and improved his language, as became evident at the conference at Brighton. His arguments had also been sharpened by Prime Minister Macmillan’s appearance on the screen the night before, recommending full membership based on the negotiated terms. Arguing the Commonwealth links still were important, Gaitskell admitted there were many uncertainties, and that the balance was hard to draw. “I do not believe it is more than fifty-fifty either way.” He appealed to national sentiments, underlining that Australia, New Zealand and Canada were “British countries, with our traditions, with our political institutions, with our literature and our language”. Neither was the economic case for entry proven, he maintained. The political implications still were complex. He asked the rhetorical question whether Britain, by becoming a member, would be ultimately joining a European federation and would lose its independence in terms of foreign policy. If so, he told the British people, it meant the “end of Britain as an independent nation; we become no more than Texas and California in the United States of Europe. It means the end of a thousand years of history. It means the end of the Commonwealth.” Yet in the light of previous statements, it is very unlikely that he expected core Europe 65 66 67 68 69

LAM, NEC, News Release, 8 September 1962. LAM, NEC, News Release, 8 September 1962. ARAB, TEA, box 038, Report from the British Labour Party’s and SI’s conference in London, 7–8 September 1962. Williams 1979: 726, 729. BBC Television broadcast delivered on 21 September 1962. IISH, SI, SII, 14, vol. 12, 1962: 583.

74

Moving Towards a European Policy

to turn into a European federation. Thus, he turned down something he did not believe would materialise. Rather, his appearance was rhetoric over substance. His speech at Brighton echoed his broadcast jargon, and his much-cited speech at the annual conference should neither have come as a big surprise nor created such bold headlines. There is, however, a case “for our entry on political grounds”, he concluded, being fully aware that he had to attack the government effectively while not being pushed into opposition on reasons he could not later defend. The terms had to be met if he was to recommend membership, he underlined, as was the need to “persuade” core Europe to let in others; i. e. the Scandinavians, Austria and Switzerland. Electoral considerations still were important, and served as an argument against the preliminary terms. “It is utterly wrong”, he proclaimed, that a decision “of this importance – tremendous historical importance – which determines our whole destiny as a nation” should be taken before the people had their say a say in a general election.70 On 29 September the NEC, on behalf of the party, at long last issued the policy document Labour and the Common Market, partly fulfilling its 1960 intentions to work out a coherent European policy in which not only the economic, but also the political and strategic problems were taken into account. The annual conference adopted the document and thus formalised Gaitskell’s tactical approach. Although a vital part of the text consisted of the five conditions that had to be met before Britain could join the EEC, it stated that insularity and parochial isolationism were not the prime determinant of the party’s decisions.71 “The Labour Party regards the European Community as a great and imaginative conception. It believes that the coming together of the six nations which have in the past so often been torn by war and economic rivalry is, in the context of Western Europe, a step of great significance. It is aware that the influence of this new Community on the world will grow … It is these considerations … and not the uncertain balance of economic advantage – that constitute the real case for Britain’s entry.”72 Gaitskell’s speech to the conference on 3 October is well known. However, nobody knew exactly what course he was about to take, even as late as the evening before he delivered his speech. George Brown, anxious to avoid being embarrassed (again), and set to wind up the debate, repeatedly asked him if he could have a look at the speech the evening before – but in vein. Gaitskell nonetheless assured him that the line taken in the NEC statement would not be changed.73 Yet apparently, the tone of his speech went beyond the remit of the statement on the Common Market. The question is why. As Rippingale has pointed out, Gaitskell faced the dilemma that while many of his closest allies wanted his support in their struggle for 70 71

72 73

BBC Television broadcast delivered on 21 September 1962. IISH, SI, SII, 14, vol. 12, 1962: 583. The five conditions were: (1) “Strong and binding safeguards for the trade and other interests of our friends and partners in the Commonwealth”, (2) “Freedom as at present to pursue our own foreign policy”, (3) “Fulfilment of the Government’s pledge to our associates in the EFTA”, (4) “The right to plan our own economy”, and (5) “Guarantees to safeguard the position of British agriculture”. LAM, NEC, “Labour and the Common Market“, 29 September 1962. LAM, NEC, “Labour and the Common Market”, 29 September 1962: 1. Brown 1971: 212.

Gaitskell’s position reassessed

75

British membership and against the anti-marketeers, also in the TUC, many of his strongest critics shared the same sceptical view as his policy advisers, the PLP and the Shadow Cabinet.74 GAITSKELL’S POSITION REASSESSED Williams, Lieber, Robins and Ellison all suggest that Gaitskell made up his mind at the Commonwealth and SI conferences in London, while Brivati, largely in keeping with this view, maintain that his position hardened towards September.75 His meetings with the Commonwealth and SI socialists – called upon by Labour ’s annual conference in October 1961 – allegedly made him move progressively closer to opposition.76 Yet, none has explicitly examined the role of cross-border contacts. Robins argues that there was “a definite change in the political atmosphere after Gaitskell’s meeting with the Commonwealth socialists”. He also refers to a newspaper article in which Gaitskell was reported to indicate that the meetings with European and Commonwealth socialists had been “critical in his opposition to entry”.77 Rippingale, on the other hand, argues that Gaitskell did not come off the fence towards the 1962 Annual Conference, but adopted a strategy that appealed to both sides of the party until he was strong enough to head off any potential challenge.78 On balance, interpreting Gaitskell’s position on the issue is far from straightforward. The “coming off the fence” argument is not supported by this analysis. It is right that his meetings with European and Commonwealth socialists were important. Yet not because he changed his mind and went against entry, but first because they were crucial in shaping his perceptions of British EEC membership and the possibility to carry out socialist planning as members of the EEC, and secondly because they formulated his tactics so as to serve his long-term strategy. On a personal level, Gaitskell apparently increasingly favoured British membership, but tactical considerations in accordance with rational choice considerations set out in the introductory chapter seem to have determined his public statements. Being fixed on the next general election, he was anxious to keep the door open to a possible membership bid by a future Labour government. His statements and actions at transnational meetings indicate that his position was fairly positive yet evolving. He was aware that appearances at SI conferences and congresses would be reported in the domestic press, so he had to choose his wording very carefully. It was a delicate task trying to meet the wishes of enthusiastic core Europe socialists on the one hand, and please the electorate, soothe the party factions, influence undecided Labour MPs and sway reluctant Scandinavian parties on the other. 74 75 76 77 78

Rippingale 1996: 262. Williams 1979: 726, Lieber 1970: 176, Robins 1979: 28, Brivati 1996: 410, Ellison 1994: 107. LAM, NEC, Resolution on the Common Market of the Labour Party Annual Conference, 5 October 1961. Robins 1979: 28 and the Guardian, 1 November 1962 (from Robins 1979: 42). Rippingale 1996: 262–63.

76

Moving Towards a European Policy

In private conversations, as for instance with the Swedish Press Attaché, Gunnar Fagrell, he felt free to distance himself from the people who opposed membership, which he even branded lunatics, thus indicating his personal preferences. Neither would Gaitskell have achieved strategic short-term tactical gains from upsetting the anti-marketeers. Nor was the domestic audience decisive when conducting confidential private conversations. Gaitskell also constantly tried to make sure that the Scandinavians would follow suit if Britain entered core Europe, and preferably the Austrians and the Swiss too. His long-term strategy would be facilitated if these countries joined alongside Britain. This would take care of the EFTA obligations and at the same time enhance the prospects for more socialist powers and policies within core Europe. Thus, transnational contacts and collaboration also aimed at facilitating Scandinavian membership as it would facilitate British entry. In order to do so, he needed their trust and was anxious to address their concerns as regards core Europe. He apparently believed that if the Scandinavians joined, it would increase the possibility of tipping the internal balance in a socialist direction. In public, he was anxious not to rule out membership. Obviously, he had no alternative but to balance the arguments. Moreover, as the electoral wind was blowing his and Labour ’s way at the same time as the case for entry seemed to deteriorate, it was all the more important to be careful. Yet his arguments were not wholly consistent. They had rhetorical loopholes. In the August 1961 Commons debate he explicitly underlined that he did not believe that core Europe was bound for federalism. Yet in his September 1962 broadcast, he argued that the political case was difficult, and if it meant joining a federation – which he allegedly did not believe was the case – it meant the end of Britain as an independent nation and the end of a thousand years of history. Hence, his statements were largely rhetorical, carefully drawn up to leave the door open for a future Labour government bid, while at the same time not endangering the party’s chances at the next general election. Hence, Gaitskell’s speech at the October 1962 annual conference was tactical. His arguments were finely tuned, but the performance and effect appeared to be anti-EEC.79 His speech did not rule out joining on favourable terms. He did not go beyond the remits of the NEC statement, which was overwhelmingly supported by the conference. Douglas Jay called Gaitskell’s speech an “intellectual massacre” and “historic”.80 The left was apparently satisfied, and the pro-marketeers on the right disappointed. Bill Rodgers, the organiser of the CDS, remained seated with his arms folded during the standing ovation following the speech, while Roy Jenkins stood without applauding. The Danish delegates to the Conference concluded that the Labour Party had in effect taken a decision to oppose membership.81 However, a remarkable observation is that made by Gaitskell’s wife, Dora, who is reported to

79 80 81

In keeping with received wisdom, Stephen Meredith maintains that Gaitskell’s speech was an “emotional anti-Community speech”. Meredith 2012: 333. For instance Wilson. Rippingale 1996: 254. ARAB, SAP, E5, International Secretary’s Archive, Report from Labour ’s 61st Congress, 1–5 October 1962: 4.

Gaitskell’s position reassessed

77

have said to Charles Pannell during the ovation that “all the wrong people are cheering”.82 Therefore, Gaitskell’s position has to be understood and explained in tactical terms. First, he anticipated that the issue was unlikely to materialise. Yet if so, secondly, he had to reassure that the party would remain united and strong under his leadership. Finally, long-term considerations were decisive. If Labour lost another general election, the situation would be dramatic, both for the party and for its leadership. If the increasingly unpopular Tories should win the next general election, the road back to power could prove to be very long. Besides, if Labour lost once more the Conservatives would still be in charge of the European issue. Therefore, this chapter argues, he spoke as he did at the conference in order to please the electorate, oppose the government, satisfy the left, consolidate his position and unite the party. After the conference, Robins maintains, it was now “a matter of historical ‘fact’” that Gaitskell was more or less back “on the fence” and anxious to stress the “wait and see” attitude.83 Rippingale has made the same observation.84 Strikingly, in a few months Gaitskell seems to have moved from an uncommitted, slightly positive attitude towards EEC membership, to highly emotional opposition at the Brighton conference, and back to a balanced position in the PLP and elsewhere. One of his closest friends and allies for a decade, Roy Jenkins, was estranged by his performance at the conference, but soon their personal relations were healed.85 Hence, based on a broad assessment of Gaitskell’s perceptions of the European issue during 1960–62, taking national and transnational arenas and sources into account, his position on the issue was on the positive side. His long-term strategy evolved into one of facilitating future British EEC membership, despite his shortterm tactical manoeuvring and the tone of his conference speech.

82 83 84 85

Quoted from Jenkins 1991: 146. Robins 1979: 29. Rippingale 1996: 257–63. Jenkins 1991: 145–48.

CHAPTER 5 AN EMPOWERED PARTY In February 1963 Harold Wilson replaced Hugh Gaitskell as leader of the Labour Party.1 In October 1964, Labour won the general election and Wilson formed his first government. This chapter examines how Wilson and his government dealt with the European issue during the first year in office. The argument presented is twofold. First, there was greater continuity in Labour’s European policies between 1962 and the first Wilson government’s European policies than previous studies have acknowledged.2 Once in government Wilson soon activated the transnational network to bring about his objective. The argument supports suggestions elaborated in chapter one assuming that transnational socialist networks and non-British sources have the capacity to complement existing accounts that are largely dominated by domestic and intraparty considerations. Despite having been portrayed as a virulently anti-European strengthening his opposition to Europe when becoming prime minister, Wilson’s ambitions rather was to arrange in some way Britain’s accession to the EEC, largely in keeping with Gaitskell’s long-term strategy and the policy adopted at the 1962 annual conference. Nor did he believe joining would frustrate Labour’s economic planning and technological modernisation programme with which it entered office.3 Thus, secondly, the concept of “bridge-building” or “closing the gap” intended primarily to facilitate the road towards membership, rather than bring about some undefined closer cooperation between the Community and EFTA. Wilson’s ambition was not initiated early in 1965 by the Foreign Office, as suggested by Parr. Neither did he exhaust other options before turning towards core Europe, as argued by Lieber.4 Nor was his turning to Europe a response to EFTA’s resentment at the imposition of the import surcharge in November 1964, although it is likely to have reinforced Wilson’s belief that the only viable solution was EEC membership as neither EFTA nor bridge-building between the blocs were considered long-term solutions. THE FIRST WILSON GOVERNMENT AND EUROPE Having spent thirteen years in opposition losing three successive general elections, Labour narrowly won the mid-October 1964 general election with a majority of five seats, only to see this reduced to three within three months as a result of lost byelections. It came to power with an ambitious economic programme, presenting it1 2 3 4

Wilson defeated George Brown on the second ballot by 144 votes to 103. Only Labour MPs took part in the election process. Parr 2006: 62–64, 185, 190–94, Deighton 2001: 392, Deighton 2003: 39–41, Kaiser 2001: 71, Daddow 2003: 1–25. See for instance Foot 1968: 224. Parr 2006: 41, 46–53, Lieber 1970: 263.

80

An Empowered Party

self as the party of modernisation ready to remedy Britain’s misfortunes at home and abroad. To improve long-term growth, a new Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) was set up. It was to undertake long-term planning and coordinate economic policy and industry, while the Treasury would determine short-term revenue raising and financial management. The DEA was therefore tasked with the preparation of a National Plan for the economy, which was published in September 1965. Through the issuing of the National Plan well-directed indicative economic planning was to solve domestic challenges.5 In the foreign policy arena the government set out to reduce East-West tension and establish a role for the Commonwealth, outlined in the election manifesto The New Britain. The victory gave the new Prime Minister both governmental power and substantial influence on the party’s European policies. After de Gaulle’s veto the question of British entry into the EEC was dead for some time.6 It had taken political courage to apply for membership and enter into negotiations, and as long as the Conservatives remained in office the European question was scarcely discussed. In the aftermath of the French veto, both the Conservatives and Labour temporarily wanted to keep the contested European issue at bay. Thus in the long run-up to the general election in 1964, nobody seriously invoked the question. Both parties were divided over the issue fearing dissensions in their own ranks, and the leaderships expected few advantages in turning core Europe into an election issue. Besides, no remedy had been proposed as to how to overcome the veto. Thus the fate of another bid was uncertain. Uncertainty also existed as to how British opinion would respond to the terms if and when they were negotiated. Therefore, the European question had little or no impact on the long run-up to the important 1964 general election. It was largely fought on domestic issues – except for the question of the nuclear deterrent. Neither was the EEC issue central to the 1964 Labour Party general election manifesto. It only emphasised that the party would seek to achieve closer links with Europe.7 Once in office the new government faced huge challenges. The Commonwealth was in relative decline. British exports to the European Community and the EFTA countries had doubled since 1958, while exports to the Commonwealth had remained largely at the same level. Rather than being a contribution, the Commonwealth was becoming a waning asset for the UK. The National Plan was frustrated especially by the inherited difficult economic situation with a large balance of payments deficit and an associated sterling crisis. Shortly after taking power the government realised it had to deal with a balance of payments deficit of almost 800 million pounds. The government rushed into a decision to impose a 15 per cent surcharge on imports in order to cope with the damaging balance of payments situation, which of course produced sharp reactions from abroad. The decision was 5

6 7

The National Plan was issued on 16 September 1965. It set the annual rate of growth at 3.8 per cent. The decision to fight devaluation forced the government to deflate and effectively scuppered the plan, which was abandoned in the crisis of July 1966. See also the 1964 Labour Party election manifesto. This was also the case in other countries. For Denmark see Rasmussen 2004: 150. The New Britain, the 1964 Labour Party general election manifesto.

The first Wilson government and Europe

81

apparently taken by Wilson, Brown and Callaghan. Instead of pursuing an expansive economic policy to stimulate economic growth and modernise the economy it sought to safeguard Britain’s interests in a way that created an immediate and loudly outcry especially – and with the greatest justification – from its partners in EFTA.8 The British government was taken aback by the sharp reactions, bringing the EFTA to the brink of collapse. The surcharge decision was against both the letter and spirit of the Stockholm Convention, and was a unilateral move by the new Wilson government – a Labour government – at a time when the Scandinavian countries were governed by fraternal socialist governments. Stormy meetings followed on 19–20 November 1964 and on 22–23 February 1965.9 From a Scandinavian point of view it was agreed that neither threats nor retaliatory measures would be considered as the British economy could be further undermined and could lead the EEC to take defensive action.10 The response should come as no great surprise to the British government. The surcharge had been presented as a temporary measure, but the Swedes found it difficult to believe that the circumstances would change sufficiently to allow it to be scrapped within six months.11 They were to prove right. The surcharge was eventually reduced to 10 per cent in 1965 and finally abolished in late 1966. Apparently, in its first weeks in office the Wilson government did little to change the impression on the continent and in Scandinavia that it largely was uninterested in the European issue. However, soon after the new government had been installed the Conservative front bench began to advocate EEC membership quite openly, a move that was boosted by the election of Edward Heath as party leader. He was known as a committed “European”, and had been Harold Macmillan’s chief negotiator back in 1961–63. Moreover, leading industrialists in Britain increasingly questioned future developments outside the EEC. The European market had in recent years been the most promising, yet deteriorating exports caused considerably anxiety. Rollings has demonstrated that attitudes of British business to core Europe integration developed considerably in the wake of the 1963 veto.12 These developments reintroduced the question of Europe to the political agenda. Although partly overshadowed by other salient economic and political issues, deliberations as to how to approach core Europe and under what conditions developed steadily. Early in 1965 the new government presented its European policies in new terms, and appeared to be on the verge of reassessing its stance towards core Europe. On 11 February 1965, the new Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart took up the more positive policy line in keeping with Gaitskell’s long-term strategy and the tone of the 1962 policy document, by stating in Brussels that there was “no reason at all to think that we can go less far than the members of the Community together in promoting Euro-

8 9 10 11 12

See for instance Rasmussen 2004: 151. The Times, 22 February 1965, Report from EFTA Geneva meeting. ARAB, TEA, box 079, secret memo concerning EFTA and British balance of payments crisis, 5 February 1965. ARAB, TEA, box 079, Gunnar Hägglöf to Torsten Nilsson, 27 December 1964. Rollings 2007: 144–66.

82

An Empowered Party

pean unity and common policies”.13 The attitude was reported in the British press.14 The EFTA members also noticed the change. On 9 February, the British Ambassador in London, Gunnar Hägglöf, sent a confidential memo to Torsten Nilsson, the Swedish Foreign Secretary, believing that attitudes towards the EEC were changing. Market issues were increasingly discussed in all parts of society, he noted, adding: “I am convinced that these ideas eventually will result in new attempts at arranging in some way Britain’s relationship with the European common market. It may take time, yet my assumption is that it will take place sooner than generally believed.”15 At the same time, the Norwegian Prime Minister, Einar Gerhardsen, went to London. He had conversations with the Labour leadership headed by Wilson, the PLP, and George Woodcock in the TUC.16 According to the Swedish Ambassador in Oslo, Wilson promised the government’s continued support for EFTA, and despite the difficult market situation, it was unlikely that membership negotiations with the EEC would be taken up in near future.17 His language thus differed from the signals Stewart aired in Brussels, and his own speeches delivered later that month.18 However, as soon as the surcharge crisis cooled, Wilson’s language was more reconciliatory. In April he even surprised the Danish prime minister Jens Otto Krag by suggesting that resuming membership negotiations with the EEC was likely in the not too distant future.19 One month later, Barbara Castle, a left-wing member of the cabinet and passionate Eurosceptic, recorded in her diary that Douglas Jay, another leading sceptic, warned: “We must watch the Party’s drifting into the Common Market. The pressures that way were unrelenting.” She also referred to George Brown, the deputy party leader, who had told the Guardian newspaper “revisions of policy were going on”.20 TRANSNATIONAL EFFORTS TO BRING BRITAIN CLOSER TO THE EEC From February 1965 Whitehall officials had suggested the Prime Minister should re-evaluate his policies towards core Europe.21 As the EEC increasingly developed into a more coherent and assertive unit, they emphasised, Britain risked being iso13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Quoted from Camps 1966: 166–67. See for example The Times, 12 February 1965, Stewart’s speech in Brussels, and editorials in leading newspapers. ARAB, TEA, box 079, Gunnar Hägglöf to Torsten Nilsson, 9 February 1965. Author ’s translation. In addition to Wilson, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, deputy party leader and head of DEA George Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan, Minister of Trade Douglas Jay and Minister of Disarmament Baron Chalfont participated. ARAB, TEA, box 079, secret dispatch from Rolf Edberg to UD, 11 February 1965 and TEA, box 079, confidential memo, 16 February 1965. See leading newspapers on the weekend of 20–21 February 1965. Speech by Wilson, see The Times, 22 February 1965. ABA, JOKA, box 76, Talks Krag–Wilson, 23 April 1965: 2. Castle Diaries 1984: 18, quoted from George 1990: 36. Parr 2006: 41–42.

Transnational efforts to bring Britain closer to the EEC

83

lated accelerating its relative decline. Yet exactly how this task should be brought about was unclear. Although apparently emanating from Whitehall, the initiative to re-evaluate the government’s EEC policies seems to be well anchored in Wilson’s thinking at the time. Wilson and his colleagues soon took initial steps towards clarifying Britain’s relationship with core Europe in a transnational political arena. Invited by Wilson, in his role as party leader, a carefully selected group of socialist leaders held detailed discussions at Chequers on 24 April 1965. Twelve party leaders dined together at the PM’s official country residence outside London after having attended a meeting of the SI in London.22 The main topic at the conference was European integration, and Wilson discussed the government’s European policies in great detail with his socialist partners. The issue was initially debated in general terms by the whole group. A smaller group of mostly northern European socialist leaders was invited to stay overnight.23 In addition to Wilson, this group consisted of the Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander, the Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag, the former Norwegian Finance Minister, leader of the parliamentary party and future Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli, the leader of the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and President of the SI Bruno Pittermann, and the Mayor of Berlin, leader of the SPD and future German Foreign Minister and Chancellor Willy Brandt.24 The conference thus was a “privatised” arena for the frank expressions of views. It consolidated the SI’s conference of party leaders and thus contributed to enhancing the role of transnational networks during the sixties. In addressing the selected group, Krag emphasised “the full cooperation of the UK in European political and economic integration is as important for Europe as it is for the UK herself.” Limited cooperation in industrial production, patents and standards between EEC and EFTA would not in itself pave the way for the ultimate goal of comprehensive cooperation in Europe. The Danish expected the UK “to tackle this important problem”. Krag added that Denmark was ready, as in 1961, to support Britain in ending the split in Western Europe and joining the EEC. This “should be constantly on our minds”, he emphasised. Krag believed that a new bold approach was not doomed, “as long as it is well prepared and properly timed”. His proposed strategy was to move forward gradually “through the elimination of restrictions and tariffs, through increasing liberalisation … and through frequent political conferences at high level”. Thus, his suggested approach was largely in accordance with Wilson’s tactics of closing the gap by building bridges between the

22

23 24

Socialist leaders from UK, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Canada participated in the full meeting. The British delegation was composed of Harold Wilson, Anthony Greenwood, Colonial Secretary, Walter Padley, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Alan Williams, Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. ABA, JOKA, box 76, 22 April 1965, Camps 1966: 172, Dagens Nyheter, 25 April 1965 and ARAB, OPA, box 002, Chequers meeting, 24 April 1965. ARAB, OPA, box 002, Chequers meeting, 24 April 1965, Camps 1966: 172.

84

An Empowered Party

EEC and EFTA. This is likely to have been cleared in a private conversation between Krag and Wilson on the evening before the whole group met.25 Following Krag’s call for a renewed attempt to join the EEC, the SI called the meeting an “outstanding success”. Although it received wide attention from the press, “the confidential character of the Conference was preserved”.26 The impression of the meeting was clear. Swedish newspapers reported that European socialists “agree on a vibrant future” and that Wilson was “cautiously” moving towards closer relations with core Europe.27 By this time, the former frictions between social democrats in the EEC and EFTA had been reduced, improving conditions for future relations between the two blocs.28 Tensions between core Europe integrationists and reluctant northern European intergovernmentalists apparently had run high both at the SI’s Congress in Rome in October 1961 and in Brussels in July 1962. Besides, the illegal imposition in November 1964 of the British import surcharge had brought relations to the verge of collapse. The latter is likely to have confirmed Wilson’s ambitions to find some way to gain access to core Europe, thus strengthening his belief that the only viable solution was full membership as neither EFTA nor the bridge-building initiatives between the blocs were considered to be lasting solutions. British newspapers also reported extensively on the meeting at Chequers, being as explicit as Swedish media in confirming that new signals were emerging from the Labour elite on possible British EEC membership. The Sunday Times argued that such meetings served important purposes. The pattern of European socialism was indistinct, it claimed, but added: “These gatherings do still serve a purpose, and in the case of the Chequers meeting, a specific purpose, for if there is one single linking thread running through the ill-knit fabric of European Socialism, it is that of the wish for a more united Europe, and in particular a closer British association with that Europe.”29 The left-leaning Guardian portrayed the meeting as an important factor in Britain’s future diplomatic relations with core Europe. One delegate was reported as saying his “cynicism took a beating”, adding “this was the kind of frank, practical meeting of mind which I had heard happens at the summits of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, but had never seen myself until now … Mr. Wilson’s use of the magic of Chequers appears to have been deft and effective.”30 If Western Europe were to be led by socialists, The Times noted, the meeting at Chequers “may prove to have been a very useful beginning”.31 A week later, Labour ’s Sir Geoffrey de Freitas recalled that he was “certain that what had happened at the Chequers weekend was that the leaders present had simply decided 25

26 27 28 29 30 31

Krag and Wilson held private conversations on the evening before the whole group met. However, despite thorough research in archives, and searches in memoirs and biographies, it has not been possible to find minutes or records of these conversations. In fact, they had met several times since Wilson had become prime minister in October 1964. Lidegaard 2001b: 191. IISH, SI, Circular to member parties 1965. Dagens Nyheter, 25 April 1965 and Aftonbladet, 26 April 1965. Author ’s translation. Dagens Nyheter, 25 April 1965. Sunday Times, quoted from IISH, SI, SII, 1965: 108. Guardian, quoted from IISH, SI, SII, 1965: 108. The Times, 26 April 1965.

Transnational efforts to bring Britain closer to the EEC

85

they wanted to try to find links between the two groups, and that they would study what policies or organisation were needed for this purpose”.32 As Wilson later recalled, “Chequers is the ideal place for contemplative discussion, particularly on long-term strategic questions.” He noted that “with a break for a buffet lunch and a stroll round the rose-garden” those attending could “discuss major problems in depth and at a greater length” than would be possible elsewhere. He added: “In the 1960s I used it for our first discussions on our contemplated application for membership of the European Economic Community.”33 Several participants confirmed these observations. The present deadlock had to be overcome, Bruno Pittermann concluded on his return to Vienna, and that the “time for such an initiative seemed near”. He believed that the forthcoming EFTA heads of government conference to be held in Vienna on 24–25 May might serve as a forum for concrete discussions of new initiatives in this field: “Suggestions for this were put forward at Chequers.”34 Arriving Bonn, Willy Brandt suggested that Germany should “be ready to make its contribution towards bridging the gap between the Common Market and EFTA”. The British Prime Minister was now the “keenest” among the European socialist leaders, he continued. According to Brandt the British government no longer regarded the EEC as a “hindrance to greater unity in Europe”, adding that the Labour government had “formed their own conclusions about the likelihood of political progress and were chiefly interested in practical problems”.35 The EEC no longer “involves insurmountable problems for Britain”, Olof Palme declared in his report of the meeting. The biggest challenge was possibly agricultural policy.36 Britain was “now poised to take a new initiative in European economic cooperation”, Wilson declared after the meeting, less than six months after becoming Prime Minister.37 Apparently, by the spring of 1965 the British Labour Party had changed considerably, emerging, as indicated by Brandt, as a driving force to bridge the division between EEC and EFTA. Although Wilson had not yet figured out how Britain should approach core Europe, the meeting indicates that his ultimate goal was finding a way to take Britain into the EEC. The Chequers configuration was a network by which Wilson took an early initiative to reduce the EEC–EFTA divide while trying to facilitate a long-term strategy of taking Britain into core Europe. The impression was substantiated by confidential information during the run-up to the EFTA meeting in Vienna. Information picked up by the Swedish diplomatic service in Geneva indicated that the British were largely preoccupied with external 32 33 34 35 36

37

LAM, box Common Market 1962, Fifth meeting of EFTA Parliamentarians, 2 May 1965. Wilson 1976: 60. IISH, SI, SII, 1965: 120. IISH, SI, SII, 1965: 120. ARAB, OPA, box 002, Chequers meeting, 24 April 1965. Author ’s translation. Palme did not attend the smaller group discussing the issue in greater detail. Yet he had been at Chequers and discussed the issue with the participants. In the report, he especially gives an account of Wilson’s address to the group and takes Brandt’s views into consideration. Most likely, his report was coordinated with Erlander ’s perceptions of the meeting. IISH, SI, SII, 1965: 134. See also “When Six into Eight won’t go, the Answer is a Summit”, Daily Mail, 24 May 1965.

86

An Empowered Party

aspects of EFTA, i. e. relations with core Europe at the expense of EFTA’s organisational structure and strength. Consequently, in Sweden there was uncertainty in governmental circles as to in what direction British European policies were moving. If the British were preparing an “initiative” towards acceding core Europe, it was important that the other EFTA governments were given notice early enough to prepare adequate steps, the Swedish Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Nils Montan, noted. In this situation, he arranged a meeting with the British Ambassador in Stockholm, Sir Moore Crosthwaite, in which he gave an account of the Swedish view, arguing that only a “strong EFTA could fulfil its role in European cooperation”.38 In a conversation with the Swedish Ambassador Hägglöf in London, Wilson had emphasised that he was not concerned about the French position. He intended to go to Vienna with an “open mind” to discuss substance rather than procedures.39 “I think we were all agreed at Chequers that it is important to take steps” to arrange relations with core Europe, Wilson wrote to Erlander.40 In a dispatch to the Scandinavian governments, he hoped that the Vienna meeting would be a step forward “against the background of the wider European unity to which I know we are all striving”.41 The immediate need, he emphasised, was to consider, “as was urged at Chequers, proposals or initiatives to create new links and to start” a dialogue with core Europe.42 His plan was to put forward two suggestions. First, to establish a Joint Consultative Council of the member countries of the EEC and EFTA to consist of Ministers, which might provide for discussions of questions of general economic and commercial policies to avoid divergence between the two groups and remove obstacles to mutual trade. Second, he proposed an exchange of ambassadors between core Europe and EFTA that could reinforce the work of the Council and serve to maintain momentum on discussions on substantive proposals. Finally, at Vienna he would put forward ideas for wider European cooperation, “which we might discuss with the Six”.43 The Danish government supported Wilson’s thrust for organised contact between the two organisations, while the Swedish appeared to be somewhat reluctant.44 FURTHER EFFORTS AND OBSTACLES “If we can’t build a bridge, we will dig a tunnel,” Wilson declared on his arrival at the EFTA meeting in Vienna in May 1965, indicating his determination to find solutions to the present situation.45 He added that Britain saw the “advantages of join38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

ARAB, TEA, box 080, to PM from Nils Montan, 12 May 1965. ARAB, TEA, box 080, secret information to the PM from Ambassador Hägglöf, 18 May 1965. ARAB, TEA, box 080, message from Wilson to Erlander, 19 May 1965. ARAB, TEA, box 080, memo by Göran Ryding, 18 May 1965. ARAB, TEA, box 080, message from Wilson to Erlander, 19 May 1965. ARAB, TEA, box 080, memo by Göran Ryding, 18 May 1965. ARAB, TEA, box 080, secret memo concerning the Vienna meeting on 24–25 May, from Göran Ryding, 18 May 1965. Daily Mail, 24 May 1965.

Further efforts and obstacles

87

ing” the EEC, but that there was no question of signing on the dotted line, as “there was no dotted line there to sign on”. As he explained, “that was why he was proposing bridge building, for the situation was too urgent for sitting down and waiting for the French to change their attitude.”46 This indicates that Wilson’s preferred solution seemed inaccessible at that time due to French, i. e. de Gaulle’s opposition, but that he worked hard trying to overcome the obstacle. At Chequers, the socialist leaders had agreed to raise the Vienna talks from ministerial to prime ministerial level, an initiative taken by Krag and supported by Wilson and Erlander.47 As indicated, at Vienna Wilson put forward different short-term practical suggestions as how to proceed. The first move was to cut tariffs on products in which there was exceptionally significant trade between the groups, although making sure nothing would complicate the Kennedy Round of tariff talks. Second, create a single car market embracing the EEC and the EFTA countries, similar to that set up by Canada and the USA. Third, as pointed out before the meeting, both groups should appoint a special ambassador representing all member states, conferring on ways of solving problems between them. Fourth, he was prepared to accept a common gradual reduction of tariffs. Finally, he proposed collaboration between the two groups in the field of research and development and the harmonisation of regulations and standards important for manufacturers and for the movement of goods. To demonstrate goodwill on the part of the British government, he also announced that Britain was to adopt the metric system. Krag very much welcomed Wilson’s bold initiatives. The Danes, who alongside Britain wished to approach the EEC, supported Wilson, while the Swedes and Norwegians feared that the British government was using EFTA as an instrument for getting closer to, or preferably joining, the EEC but leaving other countries in the lurch.48 Erlander even warned of the dangers of inviting a rebuff from core Europe. All the same, the participants at the Vienna meeting agreed that the EFTA Council should prepare a report on Wilson’s proposals to be submitted at a ministerial meeting in Copenhagen in October 1965. Tentative core Europe reactions to Wilson’s proposals were cautious and sceptical, however, not least because there were no indications of any change in French policy on British membership.49 Erlander and Krag discussed the EEC membership issue again in June, just after Krag’s return from Bonn and discussions with Ludwig Erhard, the Christian Democratic Chancellor. The secret minutes from the meeting confirm that the Prime Ministers of Denmark and Sweden openly discussed challenges on a variety of topics. While Denmark opted for a wide European market solution, the Swedish government hesitated. Yet the Swedish industry regretted that Sweden was not a member of the EEC. In his conversations with Erhard, who was traditionally interested in the creation of a larger western European market, Krag had tried to persuade him

46 47 48 49

IISH, SI, SII, 1965: 134 and Guardian, 25 May 1965. See ARAB, TEA, box 080, to PM from Ambassador Hägglöf, 18 May 1965. Prime Ministers/ Chancellor present in Vienna: the Nordic, British and Austrian. ARAB, TEA, box 080, Report EFTA meeting Vienna, 24–25 May 1965. See Parr 2006: 54 and Daily Telegraph, 28 May 1965.

88

An Empowered Party

to support the Vienna initiative. According to Krag, Erhard had assured him that he would make no further concessions to de Gaulle.50 Talks continued at Harpsund, the Swedish prime minister ’s country house outside Stockholm, at the end of July. Like previous meetings in 1963 and 1964, this meeting resembled the SI conferences of party leaders. It was private in character and thus offered an opportunity for socialist leaders with different political functions to discuss sensitive issues, including European unification, in an open atmosphere. In the same fashion as the conference of party leaders, these meetings were initiated and intensified during the early sixties. The Harpsund meetings were mainly attended by leading northern European socialists. Apart from Wilson, who was prevented from attending at the last moment and was replaced by Brown, the participants were largely those who had been at the Chequers meeting, although they also included a British, a German and an American trade union leader.51 At Harpsund, the participating social democrats reaffirmed their determination to pursue Wilson’s Chequers initiative intended to overcome the European deadlock.52 The issue was further discussed in September when Brown visited Krag in Denmark.53 Although the EFTA states agreed on the need for intensified dialogue with core Europe, no real progress had been made by the time they convened in Copenhagen in October.54 Overcoming the impasse was deemed increasingly urgent, as trade within core Europe would be fully liberalised in less than 18 months completing the customs union and the CAP. At the same time, the internal EEC stalemate of the so-called “empty chair crisis”, with France boycotting the Council of Ministers, made it difficult for the EEC to engage in complex external matters. All the same, as the Danish foreign minister Per Hækkerup emphasised, EFTA had to be ready to take swift action when core Europe eventually sorted out the impasse.55 The undecided issue of financing the CAP and de Gaulle’s opposition to the introduction of majority voting from 1 January 1966 thus impacted on the western European periphery, too. WILSON’S FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE AND THE EEC ISSUE Wilson’s strategy of closing the gap and trying in some way to arrange for Britain to accede to the EEC did not pay off during his first year in office. Ambassador Gunnar Hägglöf ’s impressions were that Wilson, who under Gaitskell largely had 50 51 52 53 54 55

ARAB, TEA, box 080, secret summary Krag–Erlander talks, 20 June 1965: 2. Gerhardsen, Krag, Erlander, Brandt, Brown, Pittermann, and the Chairman of the United Automobile Workers of America, Walter Reuther, the General Secretary of the British TUC, George Woodcock and the General Secretary of the German TUC, Ludwig Rosenberg. IISH, SI, SII, 1965: 200. Lidegaard 2001b: 241. ARAB, TEA, box 081, messages from the Swedish foreign ministry to Prime Minister Erlander, 10/1965: 3–4. ARAB, TEA, box 081, confidential from Erik von Sydow, Geneva, to the Swedish FO, 16 September 1965.

Wilson’s first year in office and the EEC issue

89

been associated with the centre-left wing of the party, was steadily moving closer to Gaitskell’s reformist strategy.56 Although traditionally perceived as a reluctant European, his primary objective soon after taking office in 1964 was to arrange in some way Britain’s accession to core Europe. Apparently, he did not believe EEC membership would frustrate the ambitious economic and technological planning programme with which Labour entered office. To bring about his ambitions, he developed a tactical rhetoric of “closing the gap” and “bridge-building” from early 1965. He also actively sought to downplay former reluctance towards joining core Europe, as demonstrated by the Chequers and Vienna meetings. Overall, these developments took place at a time when EEC socialist parties were on the electoral rise. When the Community was set up in 1958 conservative parties dominated government formation. By the time Wilson took office socialist parties had strengthened their position both in the EFTA and in the EEC countries.57 It was a stated ambition to strengthen these forces.58 Yet as the gradual tactics did not produce results, not least due to French resistance, Wilson soon once again activated a transnational socialist network across the EEC–EFTA divide to prepare a British application for Community membership, which is the focus in the following chapter.

56 57 58

ARAB, TEA, box 081, Gunnar Hägglöf to Torsten Nilsson, 23 October 1965. The Finnish and German social democrats also stood a good chance of winning their next general elections. See for example AAB, FMA, box 009, statement by DNA, European Cooperation (Europasamarbeidet), January 1967.

CHAPTER 6 PREPARING AN APPLICATION One of the arguments presented in the previous chapter was that Wilson’s strategy once in office was to secure Britain’s accession to core Europe. Dealing with most of his second year in office, this chapter substantiates this observation by demonstrating that in January 1966, realising that his “bridge-building” initiative had born little fruit, Wilson activated a transnational socialist network across the EEC–EFTA divide to facilitate British accession. Economic realities also pushed in this direction as for British exports the European market was becoming increasingly important compared with the Commonwealth.1 This observation strengthens the continuity argument and underscores the fact that Wilson had become pro-membership at an earlier stage than existing approaches acknowledge, as they argue that the decision to develop a new approach to core Europe was pragmatic and evolved during 1965–66, or rather was a result of the sterling crisis of July 1966.2 It also substantiates the suggestion that Wilson believed it would be possible to carry out economic planning in accordance with his government’s ambitious National Plan as member of the Community. Besides, it demonstrates that Wilson turned to a transnational network in order to bring about his policy. Empirically, it shows that in January 1966 Wilson and his aides instructed officials to undertake studies on the possibility of accession. Parr on the other hand, drawing on national and intergovernmental sources only, misguidedly suggests that a group of interested officials, supported by foreign secretary Michael Stewart, pushed Wilson to undertake such studies.3 Theoretically and methodically, it also supports the argument outlined in the first chapter dealing with advantages obtainable from transnational approaches to the study of Labour ’s policy formulation. Accounts of Wilson and his colleagues’ discussions of Labour ’s European policy in private transnational socialist settings differ from and are more detailed and nuanced than those obtainable from material produced in national and intergovernmental arenas, which to a greater extent alluded to the tactical, electoral and rhetorical dimensions of party policies. TRANSNATIONAL CONTACTS WITH CORE EUROPE SOCIALISTS During his first year in office, Wilson’s economic ambitions had been frustrated by the “stop-go” economic cycle and recurring balance of payments deficits.4 Foreign policy had been tormented by the Rhodesian crisis and the conflict between India 1 2 3 4

Rollings 2007: 17–42. Deighton 2001, 2003 and Daddow 2003, Shore 200: 70–71, Parr 2006: 62–64, 185, 190–94, Parr 2002: 23–24, 334 and Pine 2007: 16–18, 25. Parr 2006: 62. Childs 1992: 138–39, 164–67.

92

Preparing an Application

and Pakistan. Yet although the media readily focussed on these aspects of Britain’s foreign relations, Wilson and his close aides continuously worked on the unsolved European question. In mainland Europe, the EEC countries advanced towards reconciliation early in 1966, compromising over CAP funding and majority voting. In these circumstances, British Labour Party politicians arranged for contacts with Dutch and German social democrats to discuss Britain’s future relations with the EEC.5 They first met in Amsterdam on 15 January 1966 under the leadership of the Dutch Labour politician, EEC Agriculture Commissioner and Vice-President of the European Commission, Sicco Mansholt.6 Participants concentrated on two core aspects: first, how to conduct future negotiations between Britain and the EEC and, second, how to deal with the agricultural question.7 The PvdA was part of the coalition government in The Hague, while the SPD was still in opposition but would join the grand coalition led by the Christian Democrats later in 1966. The Commissioners representing Germany at the time were Commission President Walter Hallstein (CDU) and the diplomat and scientist Hans von der Groeben. Both the Netherlands and Germany were founding member states of the EEC. While the Netherlands was a major agricultural exporter, Germany was Britain’s main European trading partner. As member states, they had access to Community expertise and policy-making. Mansholt was the leading expert on agricultural issues in the EEC and the Netherlands had vested interests in this field. As agricultural commissioner and vice-president, Mansholt had first-hand knowledge of policies, strategies and position papers in this area. He had been instrumental in setting up the CAP, and substantially influenced agricultural policy-making. According to the agreed timetable, the CAP would be fully in place by July 1967.8 In the context of realising Wilson’s European policies, the Dutch and German socialists were essential. Trying to overcome the present deadlock, their information on core Europe was crucial and they were in possession of first-hand knowledge and, not least, internal political influence. Although the French socialists, who had no governmental role, were not involved, the transnational framework appeared promising for Wilson. If the British government entered into formal membership negotiations with the EEC, Britain would not only accede to an existing customs union, but would also have to subscribe to the CAP set up and institutionalised by the six founding member states. As a general election was expected in Britain – though Wilson had not yet given any signal as to when it would be announced – difficult questions like agriculture had to be handled with subtlety. Yet the informal Luxembourg compromise, which settled 5 6

7 8

Arranged by the LCE, the SPD and the PvdA. Sicco Mansholt was appointed Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in the Netherlands in 1945, at the age of 36. In 1958 he became the Commissioner for Agriculture and VicePresident of the newly established EEC Commission. He was appointed President of the Commission for 1972–73. IISH, SMA, box 121. Address by Mansholt, 15 January 1966. ARAB, TEA, box 082. Memorandum (translated into Swedish) presented to the social democratic parties of Germany and UK, 10 February 1966. See Knudsen 2001 and 2008.

Transnational contacts with core Europe socialists

93

the empty chair crisis at the end of January 1966, appeared to imply that each member state retained the right to exercise a veto on matters it felt could have an adverse effect on its vital national interests. Anyhow, it would be necessary to adjust the CAP for an enlarged EEC of ten member states, as it was considered likely by the British that Denmark, Norway and Ireland would follow Britain into the Community. Thus, as the empty chair crisis was about to be resolved and the CAP had to be modified if the EEC were enlarged, there also appeared to be scope for reforms in line with British preferences. As a result, a core feature of the meeting was dedicated to discussing solutions to the agricultural issues outlined in a detailed memorandum produced by Mansholt.9 Accordingly, the negotiating procedures would be important “if not decisive”, and had to differ substantially from the failed negotiations in 1962–63.10 “When we are all agreed that a great united and integrated Europe is needed”, Mansholt emphasised, we “have to solve” the agricultural problem.11 Technical arrangements in one policy area, albeit a very important one, should not, according to Mansholt, be allowed to jeopardise other and more important objectives. Over a transition period of five to six years, Mansholt argued, Britain would make budgetary savings through the reduction and abolition of its direct deficiency payments to farmers and by imposing levies on imports from third countries, especially Commonwealth states that until then had enjoyed tariff-free access to the British market. By using these sums for social policy measures, especially for assisting families on lower incomes, Mansholt believed that the British government would be able to compensate for the increased costs of living if Britain joined the CAP.12 Agriculture, he emphasised, “is indeed a knotty problem”, but concluded that “when the political will exists, on both sides, it can be solved in the interest of us all”.13 He encouraged all parties to have patience, resolution and respect for each other ’s difficulties. Yet, evaluating Mansholt’s proposals, the British still found the agricultural issue very problematic due to the knock-on effects of CAP participation on the British balance of payments and cost of living, patterns of domestic agriculture and overseas suppliers from the Commonwealth. Besides, Douglas Jay and other opponents of British membership within the Labour Party in part based their opposition on arguments about rising food prices. The prospects of resolving these difficulties “in renewed negotiations” would certainly depend “on there being on both sides the necessary understanding and political will to succeed”, the British emphasised.14 9 10 11 12 13 14

IISH, SMA, box 121. Address by Mansholt, 15 January 1966. ARAB, TEA, box 082. Memorandum (translated into Swedish) presented to the social democratic parties of Germany and UK, 10 February 1966. Address by Mansholt, 15 January 1966: 2. ARAB, TEA, box 082. Memorandum presented to the social democratic parties of Germany and UK, 10 February 1966. IISH, SMA, box 121. Address by Mansholt, 15 January 1966: 11–12. IISH, SMA, box 121. Address by Mansholt, 15 January 1966 and ARAB, TEA, box 082. Personal and secret letter from Lindh, Brussels, to Montan, Stockholm, 10 February 1966. IISH, SMA, box 166. Comments on Mansholt’s proposals of 15 January 1966.

94

Preparing an Application

Information concerning the meeting was kept strictly confidential within selected socialist circles. The Swedish Ambassador in Brussels, Sten Lindh, was duly informed, and eventually discussed the initiative with Mansholt himself on 27 January 1966.15 The question was highly sensitive and Lindh’s report to Stockholm was classified as personal and secret, emphasising that the “letter and its enclosures [must not] be distributed outside ministerial circles”.16 Lindh knew that Mansholt had initiated the talks in a private capacity, not in his role as commissioner. The deliberations had been carried out “strictly along social democratic party lines”.17 Officially, the Commission and its secretariat had no knowledge of the contact and talks, although some commissioners and Hallstein were probably au courant. Likewise, no official documents were produced, which underlines the informal character of this meeting. Mansholt’s proposals are the first documented written account of contacts between British Labour politicians, while in government, and socialist leaders from EEC countries concerning the highly sensitive issue of how to deal with future British membership negotiations including the agricultural issue.18 Hence, the first moves on how to deal with future British membership negotiations were made in a transnational socialist network arena. Although the British government’s European ambitions had gradually been identified during 1965, there is no indication of previous formalised contacts between the British government and core Europe countries and institutions on future negotiations since the French veto. Thus, the meeting of January 1966 is pivotal, being a unique and integral part of Wilson’s and the inner circles of the government’s strategy for dealing with the EEC issue. Mansholts initiative should not, as explisitly stated in Lindh’s report to Stockholm, be considered merely an informal exchange of ideas or a prognosis, but rather a plan on how Britain should join the EEC.19 One important dimension of this strategic plan was to take advantage of the transnational party network in which policy formulation was dealt with on a subgovernmental, cross-border and cross-institutional level. At a crucial moment for both Britain and the EEC, the mid-January meeting demonstrates that the transnational socialist party network initiated a policy while trying to facilitate its implementation. Accounts of the Wilson government’s European policies based on British government records suggest that Wilson reluctantly endorsed independent and secret studies on the possibility of accession on 19 January 1966, claiming that this step was initiated by “a group of interested officials” and pushed for by foreign secretary Michael Stewart.20 This interpretation fails to grasp the sequence of events. By 15 16 17 18 19 20

ARAB, TEA, box 082. Secret letter from Lindh to Montan, 10 February 1966: 1. ARAB, TEA, box 082. Secret letter from Lindh to Montan, 10 February 1966: 3. Author ’s translation. ARAB, TEA, box 082. Secret letter from Lindh to Montan, 10 February 1966: 2. Author ’s translation. IISH, SMA, box 121. Address by Mansholt, 15 January 1966 and ARAB, TEA, box 082. Translated memorandum, enclosed in letter from Lindh to Montan, 10 February 1966. ARAB, TEA, box 082. Secret letter from Lindh to Montan, 10 February 1966: 2. Parr 2006: 62.

The general election and EEC-membership

95

taking transnational networks and non-British sources into account it is demonstrated that the initiative was taken by Wilson and some of his government colleagues, rather than the civil service. The Whitehall initiative has to be seen in the context of the Amsterdam meeting after which Wilson instructed officials to look into technical policy issues of EEC accession, not the other way around. Hence, Wilson did not react to the FO’s call for “an initiative to strengthen the hand of the Five against France”, as proposed by Parr. Rather, in keeping with the Amsterdam talks, the FO reacted to Wilson’s instructions. The initiative also demonstrates that Wilson tried to arrange Britain’s accession to core Europe, addressing the full implications of membership. Besides, interpretations suggesting that the reduction of supranationality made acceptance of core Europe membership easier appear insufficient.21 The government’s important European policies thus have to be seen in a longer and wider perspective, substantially influenced and largely carried out by prime minster Harold Wilson.22 THE GENERAL ELECTION AND EEC-MEMBERSHIP Due to his narrow parliamentary majority, reduced to only three within three months after the 1964 election as a result of lost by-elections, Wilson called the expected election for 31 March 1966 and secured a comfortable majority of 96. Both the government’s victory in a by-election in Kingston upon Hull North and the improved economic situation since the late autumn of 1965 made the government sufficiently confident to call for a general election. The election campaign confirmed the Wilson government’s European ambitions. It was the first election campaign ever in Britain in which the European issue played an important part. The election manifesto Time for Decision stated that the Labour government “has taken the lead” in overcoming the stalemate in western Europe. Labour believed, it carried on, that Britain “should be ready to enter the European Economic Community, provided essential … interests are safeguarded”.23 Wilson’s first term had demonstrated that he sought accession to core Europe. After the 1966 election he reshuffled the government to achieve that objective. A significant move was to replace Oliver Wright with Michael Palliser as the Prime Minister ’s Private Secretary. Palliser, who was married to the daughter of PaulHenri Spaak, was an ardent supporter of core Europe.24 He later recalled that by the time he “joined Number Ten, Europe had become a particularly important item on the Prime Minster ’s agenda”.25 When called to the post, he told Wilson that he was “a tremendous believer of entry into Europe and I would not want you to take me on under a misapprehension”. Wilson chuckled and assured him “you’ll see, we 21 22 23 24 25

See for instance Wallace 1975. Cf. Parr 2006: 64. Time for Decision, the Labour Party manifesto for the 1966 General Election. See for example IISH, SI, SII, vol. 14, 5/1966. Author ’s italicisation. See for example Shore 2000: 71. Foreword in Parr 2006: x.

96

Preparing an Application

won’t have any problems on that front”.26 “And sure enough we didn’t have any problems over Europe,” he told Pine in an interview.27 Shortly after having appointed Palliser, Wilson revealed that some of his comments on joining core Europe had been tactical. “You seem to be more interested in the European Community than I expected,” Palliser told Wilson. “I’ve been interested for quite a long time. You’ve got to realise that the Labour Party is pretty hostile, and I can’t sort of go out on a limb, without having the Party behind me. So it’s difficult,” Wilson replied. Palliser commented that he had given a speech just before the election that most perceived to be anti-European. “Oh, well I only made that speech to anticipate a far more anti-European one which I knew Barbara Castle was going to make,” was Wilson’s response.28 Hence, despite being portrayed as a strong anti-European once the Tories entered negotiations back in 1961–62, declaring that Britain was not entitled to “sell our friends and kinsmen down the river for a problematical and marginal advantage in selling washing machines in Dusseldorf” only to sharpen his critique after becoming party leader, he took care to stress it was the Tory terms and not core Europe he opposed.29 Seen in a longer perspective, and in the context of the argument in this study, it is reason to believe Wilson was frank when arguing that he had been tactical in the speech he gave before the election. This assessment is further substantiated by his government reshuffles. Another step at ministerial level was to move George Thomson, a strong European, to the Foreign Office with special responsibility for European affairs.30 The government’s position was additionally illuminated in the Queens Speech at the opening of Parliament on 21 April, emphasising that the government would “continue to promote the economic unity of Europe”, and that it “would be ready to enter the European Economic Community provided essential … interests were safeguarded”. At this time Wilson did not reiterate the conditions Labour would seek. He stated only that the Conservative terms would be unacceptable. He declared that the government’s intention was “to probe in a very positive sense the terms on which we would be able to enter the European Economic Community and its related organisations”.31 Shortly after, Wilson and a Labour Party delegation left for the SI’s 10th Congress in Stockholm on 5–8 May 1966. The congress was predominantly occupied with the European issue. George Brown, who was to become foreign minister in August, outlined British European policy as defined by the government. He stated that Britain was ready to join the EEC provided that essential interests were safeguarded. The political will to join existed, and the government did not only want to join because of the benefit that membership would bring both to Britain and to the Community, but also “because we believe that the creation of a wider Common 26 27 28 29 30 31

Quoted from Parr 2006: 70. Quoted from Pine 2007: 17. Quoted from Pine 2007: 17. Foot 1968: 224, quoted from Pine 2007: 15. He later became Commissioner of the EC from 1973 to 1977, with responsibility for regional policy. Hansard, 21 April 1966.

The general election and EEC-membership

97

Market would greatly re-enforce the impulses working towards the goal of European unity. The question then is not whether we should join the EEC but when and on what terms.” The five conditions “never were”, according to Brown – largely justified by this book – “and are not now five reasons why we should not join the Community”. He went on to emphasise that a particular concern had been the ability to carry out economic planning, which yet again demonstrates the importance of this linking thread running through Labour ’s European policy formulation process during the sixties. Apparently, what was about to take root in the Labour leadership was the idea that economic planning was not only a national concern, but also that it probably would be possible to implement it on a European level. This corroborated signals aired by the respected, former long-serving Norwegian foreign minister Halvard Lange, who had suggested that in core Europe social democratic forces were on the rise, “perhaps with the exception of France”, and had a substantial influence on political and social life. The Six, he emphasised in a parliamentary debate, had increasingly implemented “a mixed economy with strong elements of societal control in economic life and a highly developed system of social legislation and social security”.32 There was nothing in the Treaty of Rome, Brown claimed at the SI Congress, that “inhibits the approach set out in our own National Plan”. The longer the EEC and EFTA travelled along different roads, the more difficult it could be to bring them together. No opportunity should therefore be lost for probing and determining the way in which Britain could move forward, so when the time was ripe, the British response could be quick and positive. As he said bluntly, “We want an expanded EEC, we want to be a member of it and we want to find the basis on which this would be possible.”33 The northern European socialists largely welcomed Brown’s statement. It was particularly well received by Prime Minister Krag. He called it a great speech, “an almost historical declaration”.34 Krag stressed that the strategy for rapprochement between core Europe and the EFTA should be pursued energetically, ultimately he hoped, leading to British, Danish and possibly Norwegian EEC membership. Negotiations would “not be very difficult if Britain and other EFTA countries, in one form or another, join the Market at the same time”.35 In the context of this work, it is interesting to note that Krag emphasised that the idea of rapprochement had been “born at Chequers” in April 1965, discussed at the EFTA ministerial meeting in Vienna and adopted in Copenhagen in October. Yet as pointed out by Morten Rasmussen, the Danish arguments for joining core Europe were largely economic.36 The Swedish Minister of Trade, Gunnar Lange, acknowledged the rationale behind the ambitions of Brown and Krag. The main reason for the rapid postwar economic growth, he emphasised, with increasing incomes, rising standards of living and a continuous progress of industrialisation, was to be found in international 32 33 34 35 36

ARAB, TEA, box 082, Halvard Lange, Parliament, 23 February 1966. Author ’s translation. IISH, SI, 10th Congress, Stockholm. Speech by Brown, 6 May 1966. IISH, SI, 258, Krag’s speech, 10th Congress, May 1966. IISH, SI, 258, Krag’s speech, 10th Congress, May 1966. Rasmussen 2004.

98

Preparing an Application

trade. However, as he acknowledged, “at the same time, we realise that the future does not look altogether bright. We have already taken out most of the benefits that we could derive from EFTA and EEC.” He emphasised that the market division increasingly affected both the EEC and EFTA, “slowing down progress and the rate of economic growth”. There was no time to lose. It would also be impossible for the industrialised countries to fulfil their obligations and responsibilities towards the developing countries, he maintained, if “we were not able to develop our own economic potential to the maximum”. There is only one answer, he concluded: “We must work to bring Western Europe economically closer together.”37 In his report from the Congress, the Deputy Chairman of the DNA, Reiulf Steen, stated that the British were “on their way from distant skies to Europe”. He also stressed that his report “could not, of course, reproduce the atmosphere at a Congress”. It could not even give “an adequate account of all contacts established on a personal level, which in the end might be as important as the formal discussions altogether”.38 The Swedish newspapers’ perceptions of the British position were unambiguous. “England ready to approach the EEC with a sound economy and strong balance of trade,” the Swedish Aftonbladet noted, while the Dagens Nyheter stated that the UK “struggles to join the EEC”, yet reckoned that it would take some time until negotiations could start.39 The Stockholm Congress also agreed to set up a transnational working group. Its aim was to discuss security challenges faced by socialist parties in the wake of the internal NATO crisis. Although preoccupied with NATO, this is another example of a network in which high-level northern European socialist party politicians met and discussed core challenges, yet in this case foreign and security policies.40 TACTICS AND TIMING Despite Wilson and his government’s ambition to accede to the EEC, no initiatives were taken during the spring and summer of 1966. Timing was a delicate issue, and at least four factors may explain why no official move was taken until October. First, the Community still had to sort out internal matters in the aftermath of the empty chair crisis, which had been settled by the so-called Luxembourg compromise concluded on 31 January. In this situation it would be challenging for Britain to undertake time-consuming and complex membership negotiations. President de Gaulle had clearly indicated that the Six had to agree on the political content of the Community before even contemplating enlargement.41 37 38 39 40

41

IISH, SI, 258, Lange’s speech, 10th Congress, May 1966. AAB, FMA, box 008, report from 10th Congress May 1966, 20 July 1966. Author ’s translation. Aftonbladet, 7 May 1966 and Dagens Nyheter, 7 May 1966. Author ’s translations. AAB, FMA, box 008 minute meeting, 30 August 1966. The group, which met on 30 August 1966, consisted of the former Norwegian Foreign Secretary Halvard Lange (chair), the UK’s Frederick Mulley, Germany’s Helmut Schmidt, Denmark’s Niels Matthiasen and the Belgian Jos van Eynde. ARAB, TEA, box 082, Halvard Lange to Stortinget, 23 February 1966.

Tactics and timing

99

Second, the Six had still not solved the agricultural question. This had been another victim of the empty chair crisis. Yet the Community still adhered to the January 1962 schedule by which, in principle, an integrated market of agricultural products was to be in place by mid-1967. However, in order to uphold the adopted timetable, negotiations over CAP would have to be completed by the spring of 1966 at the latest. The decision to set up a common agricultural policy was not concluded until July 1966, however. The accord created a common market for agricultural products with harmonising prices to be implemented in July 1968. Besides, a system of common financing of the CAP on the basis of its own sources – levies on imports and duties – was to be accomplished by 1 January 1970.42 Although British membership and indeed agriculture had been discussed at the transnational 15 January Amsterdam meeting, the complicated CAP issue influenced considerations as to when to launch a membership bid. Third, the NATO crisis had a profound affect on western European defence and security policies.43 On 9 March, de Gaulle informed the American president of his intention to pull France out of the Allied Command Structure of NATO and force all non-French NATO troops to leave France. This precipitated the relocation of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) from Paris to Brussels by October 1967. Parr suggests that the Foreign Office was anxious that an initiative by Britain to join the EEC could lead Britain into difficult negotiations with de Gaulle, “providing him with ample opportunity for extracting concessions from the UK or from the Five”.44 Although Michael Stewart made it clear that France’s NATO policy enhanced the imperative that Britain must eventually join the EEC, the FO was afraid, according to Parr, that a British initiative could drive a wedge into NATO and thus provide de Gaulle with valuable arguments in the pursuit of his policies.45 The priority for the FO and Stewart was accordingly to ensure the continued functioning of NATO, and thus to delay an early initiative. Niels Matthiasen and Halvard Lange, in the SI’s Working Group on Security Issues, also underlined the complicated link between core Europe and NATO.46 Finally, in the spring a seamen’s strike, which lasted from mid-May to early July, led to reduced exports and a loss of confidence in sterling in the international capital markets. This sparked an economic crisis.47 During the first three weeks of July, the Bank of England spent the equivalent of 400 million dollars to shore up the pound. The issue of whether to devalue or deflate surfaced again, and it was settled in favour of deflation. In effect, this was the end of the National Plan too. A package – the July measures – was introduced. It included an increase in bank rate, a call for special deposits, further hire-purchase restrictions and cutbacks in the investment programmes of the nationalised industries and local authorities. At the same time 42 43 44 45 46 47

See Knudsen 2008. Wright 1995: 417f and Urwin 1997: 160–64. Parr 2002: 109. Parr 2002: 109–10. AAB, FMA, box 008, Social Democratic Parties Working Group on Security Issues, 30 August 1966. Woodward 2004: 96–101 and Neal 2004: 277–85.

100

Preparing an Application

the incomes policy was strengthened through the introduction of a six-month statutory wage freeze, which was to be followed by a period of severe restraint during which there would be a zero wage norm.48 In this situation, issuing a membership bid to join core Europe seemed difficult. It was widely believed that if Britain entered core Europe, it could only be carried out at a reduced exchange rate. From relative economic weakness, Britain’s negotiating position would be sub-optimal, and a lot of energy had to be put into tackling the crisis, which certainly would distract a difficult negotiating process. In order to bring about his ambition of British accession to the EEC, Wilson arranged for a ministerial meeting at Chequers on 22 October. The formal purpose was to discuss the issue in depth, exploring advantages and disadvantages of possible membership. Should the government declare publicly that it accepted the Treaty of Rome in principle? What would be the economic implications if it were decided that British policy would be to make conscious, deliberate and sustained efforts to approach the EEC? If the outcome of the discussions approved an imminent bid, it would be necessary to explore alternative solutions to the main problems and to keep up the momentum of an approach, without becoming involved in negotiations that would be politically and economically embarrassing to the government. The meeting was not intended to be a series of detailed decisions but to “survey in the widest strategic terms the prospects of our politico-economic position in the world over the next decade or even generation”.49 However, according to Wilson’s long-term strategy the real agenda of the Chequers convention was to secure support for further action. Prior to the meeting, the Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag once more had appealed for renewed efforts to bring about European unity.50 He emphasised that France and Britain had the key to Europe’s future. Their arguments regarding the EEC and the conditions for Britain’s admission were not, in his view, incompatible. However, he stressed: “We cannot go on waiting. We must find means by which to restart developments towards European unity and cooperation.” It was of vital importance to Denmark that the European deadlock was brought to an end, “the sooner the better”. He suggested that the Scandinavian countries could possibly make a contribution that would set things in motion again. The admission of Denmark alone into the EEC would not be of service to the cause of cooperation or solve Denmark’s problems. Recently he had discussed “the possibilities of a new initiative” with Erlander and he would in the near future discuss the question with the Norwegian Prime Minister. A united Europe would “not just happen, those responsible must act in a constructive manner”.51 The Fabian Society’s Britain & Europe Group had circulated discussion papers in the PLP on the possible implications for Labour ’s policies if Britain joined core

48 49 50 51

Woodward 2004: 99. PRO, PREM 13/908, To PM by Burke Trend, 21 October 1966. IISH, SI, SII, vol. 14: 245. Speech by Krag in Brussels on 12 October. IISH, SI, SII, vol. 14: 245.

Tactics and timing

101

Europe.52 A report by Geoffrey Robinson and Tom Muir set out to discuss “factually” the implications of membership, while John Bowyer ’s A socialist Economic Policy for Europe advocated membership, arguing that large-scale modern technological exploitation and efficient research and development activities could not be dealt with adequately on a purely national level. Bowyer ’s important account precipitated the undertaking of the transnational socialist network’s ambition to set up a “socialist programme for Europe” at the end of the decade. The argument was that the more one wished to preserve the management of the economy, and even ownership of the means of production and distribution and finance in public hands, the more essential it was to press forward with the creation of (supranational) political and economic institutions in Europe through which the goals of the organised working class could be made effective. The alternative view, that it was better to cling to elements of socialist strength existing within some nation states than hazard their achievements for a wider goal, was dismissed as chauvinist and opportunist and inconsistent with fundamental socialist thought. Interestingly, from a tactical point of view the paper argued there was a unique opportunity at that time for European public enterprises.53 As a concrete basis for discussions at Chequers, a range of studies had been produced.54 Yet only a memorandum by Foreign Secretary Brown and First Secretary of State Stewart, and a top-secret paper by the government’s economic adviser Thomas (Tommy) Balogh had been written specially for the occasion. The former argued that it would be to Britain’s advantage in the near future to make a public declaration accepting the Rome Treaty in principle, while the latter was reluctant. Balogh’s document, dealing with Britain’s long-term economic strategies “and our relations with Europe”, argued that Britain’s international political and economic strategy had to be judged against the background of its long-term economic prospects for 1970 and after. “The impact of the great decisions – whether to join Europe, whether to strive to link up with a wider Atlantic combination which might or might not subsequently establish closer relations with the European Continental Economic Bloc, or do neither and remain aloof … – on our future survival as a politico-cultural entity are so overwhelming, that full consideration is essential.”55 Although the economic prospects had improved with a better balance of payments position and a return of confidence, it proved to be temporary. Balogh maintained that the economy was too weak to attempt to enter the EEC. The balance of payment problems persisted, and analysis showed that the annual growth in total 52 53 54

55

LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda, Fabian Society, 21 and 22 October 1966. A paper by Geoffrey Robinson and Tom Muir, and A socialist Economic Policy for Europe by John Bowyer. LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda, A socialist Economic Policy for Europe, 22 October 1966. Ministerial papers produced by the President of the Board of Trade, the Foreign Secretary and First Secretary of State and economic adviser Thomas Balogh, and reports by officials on economic implications, legal and constitutional implications and politico-military implications. Wilson did not submit any paper outlining his views. PRO, PREM 13/908, Top Secret by the economic adviser to Thomas Balogh, 15 October 1966.

102

Preparing an Application

output from the second half of 1967 would only be 2.5 per cent to 3.5 per cent. Thus the total rise in the GDP over the plan period of 1964–70 would not be 25 per cent as originally stated but only 12–15 per cent.56 According to Balogh the implications would be very tangible. Inevitably, it would lead either to sharp rises in taxation in order to prevent personal consumption per head from rising too much, or the government’s public expenditure plans would have to be cut substantially. Neither looked very attractive. The more negative tone of Balogh’s study was supported by ministers of the left, such as Richard Crossman, Tony Benn, Richard Marsh, Barbara Castle and others.57 On the other hand, it was obvious that an EEC Ten – the Six plus UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway – would create a huge commercial power, accounting for about 22 per cent of all industrial trade worldwide. If it came about, it would have a larger population than the USA or the Soviet Union (USSR), and it would come within striking distance of the US output of cars and steel. It would be a major trading group, and its merchant fleet would be three times the size of that of the USA. Within such a grouping British industry would have the home market that would be necessary to launch the expensive and complex technological industries on which the future was thought to depend. Britain would have the capacity to contribute substantially in the field of technological and science-based industries. In 1963 the UK had spent over two billion dollars on research and development, equal to 63 per cent of the total expenditure of the core six countries combined, whilst in the same year the number of scientists it employed was 59 per cent of the total employed in the whole of the Community. In the field of peaceful development of atomic energy, Britain could contribute a potential as large as the rest of core Europe. From inside the EEC there would be a real opportunity with the combined facilities, know-how and economic backing, to get ideas from the drawing board and the laboratory and into industrial production. Besides, Britain’s efforts in research and development (R&D) as a percentage of its total national income approached that of the USA. Yet there was a growing technology gap between Europe and the USA. The combined R&D effort in core Europe and the UK figures was equal to about a quarter of that of the USA. The real gap was considered to be even greater since much of Europe’s research was duplicated due to the lack of close cooperation.58 Brown and Stewart argued for an early initiative in the form of a declaration of intent to sign the Rome Treaty, continuing with bilateral discussions to establish the main areas of difficulty and possible solutions. Surprisingly, and to the dismay of Crossman and his like, they were supported by Wilson, who at the end of the meeting proposed that he and Brown should visit the capitals of the EEC countries to establish whether the conditions existed under which Britain could seek to enter. According to Crossman this was more than Brown and Stewart had asked for, and he “begged” the Prime Minster to have second thoughts. “As always Harold had 56 57 58

PRO, PREM 13/908, Balogh’s analysis, 15 October 1966. Crossman 1979: 259–65. Douglas Jay and Fred Peart were also firmly opposed to joining core Europe. LAM, box Common Market 1962, Correspondence etc. 1955–66, letter from P. Stephenson to George Brown, 27 August 1969.

Tactics and timing

103

made up his mind. There was no going back,” however. According to Peter Shore, Wilson made his decision despite the unanimous advice of his economic advisers, and reportedly only to persuade Brown that membership was impossible.59 At the end, Wilson warned that there must be no leaks, that any suggestion committing “us either for or against entry” could “be fatal”. “All of us must show absolute discretion about this,” he stressed.60 Parr argues that Brown was disappointed as it fell short of his proposal for a declaration, but he “was forced to accept because the probe suggestion at least committed the Prime Minister to a European initiative”.61 Yet although Wilson did not give way to Brown’s and Stewart’s suggestion to make a public acceptance of the Rome Treaty, his tactical choice to tour Europe also harnessed his government firmly to his long-term strategy, and backsliding from an approach after this would be very difficult. Like Gaitskell, Wilson had to balance the arguments while furthering his strategy of entering the club. Although being determined to secure in some way British accession to the EEC, he also aimed at building a consensus, keeping the party and the government united and officially undecided under his firm leadership. As such the tour served his strategy well. The Chequers meeting not only demonstrates that Wilson’s wish to see whether the conditions existed for fruitful discussions on the possibility of joining, but also how this could be achieved, and that rather than frustrate it would promote ways and means to carry out economic planning and socialist policies.

59 60 61

Shore 1993: 96. Crossman 1979: 262–63. Parr 2006: 94.

CHAPTER 7 APPLICATION AND VETO This chapter discusses Wilson’s manoeuvring over the European issue at home, within transnational networks and vis-à-vis the French President de Gaulle from the end of 1966 to the end of 1967. As demonstrated in chapter one, the turn towards Europe has been interpreted as the only viable British foreign policy alternative.1 Wilson has been portrayed as a shrewd tactician approaching Europe in order to maximise his and his party’s interests, “reluctantly and without enthusiasm at any stage”, in Peter Shore’s wording.2 Conversely, this work holds that since entering office in 1964, Wilson sought in some way to take Britain into the EEC/EC. Rather than being a man who preferred tactics to strategy, and thus never being genuinely pro-Europe, Wilson acted in accordance with what his close adviser Palliser later labelled a “very carefully thought-out strategy”. The ultimate evidence, Palliser maintained, was that when de Gaulle delivered his veto Wilson stated that the application would remain on the table: “We want to get in.”3 In accordance with this, this chapter claims that rather than being a passive reaction to international developments to which Wilson had surrendered and no viable alternative existed, the application was a pro-active, deliberate planned step carefully elaborated by the prime minister and largely in keeping with Labour ’s European policy formulation process during the early sixties. Despite being aware of a possible French veto threatening to thwart his policy, Wilson used all tools at his disposal to bring about his objective, which included drawing on the transnational network. Reinforced by the undermining of the government’s National Plan during the year, he believed joining the Community would rather support the government’s national economic planning ambitions. He also believed it had the capacity to strengthen the socialist alliance across the EEC–EFTA divide and demonstrate the sincerity of the British bid. Thus, the application went beyond tactics. It was even designed to stretch beyond de Gaulle. Moreover, it was based on an evolving understanding that core Europe membership would not obstruct national economic planning.

1 2

3

Young 1993: 102, 107, Reynolds 1991: 241. Shore 2000: 72, Young 1993: 102, Daddow 2003: 1–25. US President Johnson showed little interest in treating Wilson as a real partner, and the importance of the Commonwealth continued to decline. The British government’s 1967 decision to abandon its bases east of Suez meant a de facto acceptance of the demise of the UK as a world power. Quoted from Pine. Pine 2007: 20.

106

Application and Veto

A DELIBERATE APPROACH On 10 November 1966, Wilson – in keeping with his 1965 endeavours, the Amsterdam meeting, the Queen’s speech, Brown’s statements in Stockholm and the October Chequers meeting – announced to the House of Commons his government’s intention to undertake a “high-level approach” to see whether suitable conditions existed for fruitful discussions on the possibility of joining the EEC. According to the well-informed Swedish Ambassador, Gunnar Hägglöf, internal discussions in the Cabinet before the statement had been both protracted and lively. While some ministers argued for accepting the Rome Treaty in principle, others – especially the President of the Board of Trade, Douglas Jay, the Minister of Transport, Barbara Castle, and the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Fred Peart – had voiced their opposition. According to Hägglöf, Wilson had reassured the cabinet that in addition to making a tour around Europe he would also consult the EFTA countries before making any decision. Hägglöf ’s impression was that ministers across the divide from Jay to Stewart were surprised by Wilson’s sudden determination. Personally, the Swedish Ambassador had come to the conclusion that Wilson’s initiative was not merely a tactical move – i. e. denying the Conservatives an important policy platform on which to attack the government, securing the leadership while conveying the impression of activity and decisiveness to the electorate – but that the British PM “sincerely opted for Britain’s accession” and that he would, circumscribing Gaitskell, “fight, and fight, and fight again” for UK membership.4 At a PLP meeting later in the afternoon, Wilson was accused of making a “profound change in party policy”. The Prime Minister emphasised that the government was “probing” the subject of Britain joining the EEC “in depth”, and added that there would be full discussion within the party on every aspect of the problem. He assured the PLP that the government was not yet committed, and no final decision would be taken without consulting them. Before any decision, the issue would also be discussed with the EFTA partners. Besides, he would undertake a European tour to engage in a series of discussions with the leaders of the Community countries, and these would explore under which conditions would it be possible to carry out his government’s European policy. He urged members to study his statement in detail before coming to hasty conclusions. In the course of further remarks, Wilson said he could not be expected in forthcoming debates to “spell out” Britain’s conditions for entry. It would only weaken the government’s position in the delicate negotiations ahead.5 As to the accusations of changing party policy on Europe, Foreign Secretary Brown told a subsequent PLP meeting that the government’s statement “had not been a hasty decision”. On the contrary – and in accordance with Wilson’s strategy, and as demonstrated by this work – it was the “culmination of probing initiated well before the 1966 General Election”, implicitly making reference to activities since 4 5

ARAB, TEA, box 083, Hägglöf to Torsten Nilsson, 15 November 1966. Author ’s translation. LAM, PLP, meeting in Westminster Hall Grand Committee Room, 10 November 1966.

A deliberate approach

107

early 1965, including the January 1966 Amsterdam meeting. He also referred to the election manifesto. These discussions, he maintained, had now reached a position where it was felt that they must move to a higher level if they were to retain their momentum. This was “the only way to obtain the answers to the outstanding questions”. The time had come when “we either had to go forward or drop the idea altogether”. There had been certain changes in the international scene too, he continued. The EEC had not developed into a federation and “once inside the Community we could influence things even more”. He asked the party to bear in mind that it would not be a case of Britain joining alone. Fellow EFTA countries would be joining at the same time. Thus the Community would be much wider and the balance within it would be changed.6 Thus, he indicated implicitly that he believed enlargement would lead to more socialist policies in a core Europe context and that joining would not have significant impact on domestic economic planning. Brown claimed that anxieties about interference in Britain’s economic planning were unfounded. At the May SI Congress in Stockholm he had explained this by quoting Article 104 of the Rome Treaty, arguing that it was very close to the government’s economic objectives and in accordance with its National Plan. It required the member states to pursue the “economic policy necessary to ensure equilibrium in its overall balance of payments and to maintain confidence in its currency, while ensuring a high level of employment and the stability of price levels”.7 Thus, Brown’s arguments in the PLP and elsewhere should be viewed in the light of the party’s ability to carry out economic planning and thus its socialist policies on a national and European level if Britain signed the Rome Treaty. He knew he enjoyed the support of core Europe socialist parties. At the November 1966 Congress of the EC socialist parties the Dutch PvdA had forcefully argued that a more coherent approach by the social democratic parties had the capacity to introduce more social policies at Community level.8 The most serious problems affecting Britain’s position were, in Brown’s view, not the party’s ability to carry out socialist policies, but the effects on the Commonwealth and especially British agriculture. In the short term the UK would also face challenges with regard to its balance of payments. Yet if an acceptable formula could be found for joining, he concluded, “the balance of advantage would lie with our joining the EEC”.9 In the two-day debate on Europe in the House of Commons on 16–17 November, Brown forcefully argued for British membership of core Europe. There had never been a time in the troubled history of the European continent, he said, when Britain had not been called upon to play a decisive and costly part in its affairs. Far too often these situations had arisen because Britain had not been sufficiently involved to affect the events that had led up to them. Thus, he continued, the “issue today is not do we want to join Europe – we have always been there. The issue is can we play such a role that from here on the Continent shall be unified and we shall

6 7 8 9

LAM, PLP, meeting, 15 November 1966. IISH, SI, 10th Congress, Stockholm. Speech by Brown, 6 May 1966, II: 3. EUA, GSEP 51, Vers un Parti Européen Progressiste, PE/GS/21/1970. LAM, PLP, meeting Committee Room, 14, 15 November 1966.

108

Application and Veto

be effectively a leader of it?”10 Although expressed in a domestic context, Brown’s statement indicates the government’s political ambitions. As to the economic arguments, the potential market was very prosperous, Brown emphasised. At the time, Britain had about 54 million inhabitants. The membership of EFTA had doubled the size of that market to about 100 million, while an expanded EEC would amount to about 280 million.11 Moreover, the market would embrace essentially rich and advanced industrial communities with a combined GNP of about 125 billion pounds. Through production of scale, British industry would be presented with new opportunities that had the potential to increase its sales not only in Europe but outside too. Domestically Wilson’s statement was well received. Leaders of the TUC and CBI supported the government’s move, as did public opinion according to the polls. Before concluding, Brown touched upon a core issue, by rhetorically asking whether there still was a French veto, and if so, “how we propose to get around it”. Yet no solutions were proposed. Brown concluded his statement echoing Wilson, emphasising that the government meant business.12 In the wake of Wilson’s statement, Le Monde suggested that the British government’s initiative was “une opération intérieure”. The British government continued “en effet de poser à l’adhésion britannique à la C. E. E. les conditions souvent répétées de ‘sauvegarde des intérêts essentials de la Grande-Bretagne et du Commonwealth’”. The newspaper suggested Wilson’s statement was prompted by two reasons: first “au vœu de l’industrie britannique … remonter sérieusement le moral de tous les chefs d’entreprise actuellement affectés par la politique de deflation du gouvernement,” and secondly “un but de clarification politique intérieur”. However, it still needed to be known “dans quel esprit le premier ministre lui-même et ses collègues se sont lancés dans cette nouvelle entreprise européenne. Tout semble indiquer qu’une marge importante subsiste entre les positions britanniques et celles de certaines capitales au moins.”13 Certainly, this was the case. Pompidou’s July visit to London had effectively demonstrated that there was, in the wording of Le Monde, a long way to go before “Français et Britanniques trouvent sur le sujet de l’Europe un langage commun”. Yet Wilson’s statement cannot be seen in the context of domestic policies only, as the French newspaper had argued. He was, as observed by the Swedish Ambassador, deeply committed to secure in some way Britain’s accession to core Europe. It was his ultimate objective. Yet Le Monde pointed to the big question of whether de Gaulle had changed his mind, or if a possible new application would be vetoed. Apparently, there had been no contacts on the issue between the British and the French between Pompidou’s visit to London and Wilson’s statement.14

10 11 12 13 14

IISH, SI, 589, speech in Commons on Europe by Brown, 16 November 1966. The total population of the EEC and EFTA countries and the Irish Republic. IISH, SI, 589. Brown’s speech to the House of Commons on 16 November 1966. Le Monde, 12 November 1966. See ARAB, TEA, box 08, Gunnar Hägglöf ’s memo on 15 November 1966.

Mobilising transnational networks

109

MOBILISING TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS In keeping with repeated statements by Krag, the Danish government, supported by the Danish parliament, declared that it would resume negotiations with the EEC no later than “at the same time” as the British government.15 Sweden’s non-alignment policies prevented its government from applying for full membership at the same time as Britain. Sweden’s policy towards core Europe had been defined by Prime Minister Erlander in his so-called “Metal Speech” (Metall-talet) in 1961. It was highly significant as it defined the Social Democratic government’s policy towards European integration for almost thirty years. Sweden’s freedom from alliances, he had pointed out, “must be supplemented by a persistent effort to avoid any commitment, even outside the sphere of military policy, which would make it difficult or impossible for Sweden, in the event of conflict, to choose a neutral course and which would make the world around us no longer confident that Sweden really wanted to choose such a course.” When the British government submitted its 1961 bid to join the EEC, Sweden had subsequently applied for associate membership.16 This application had not been withdrawn. Yet it was still considered premature for the Swedish government to make any definitive statement on Sweden’s formal relationship with core Europe. Sweden was, as pointed out by Prime Minister Erlander, “heavily dependent on foreign trade”, and thus interested in participation in an integrated European market “on the widest possible basis”.17 Wilson’s European policy was challenging to the Norwegian centre-right government. The DNA, now in opposition, and its International Committee agreed to establish contacts both on governmental and transnational party level in order to deal with the issue. Intensified contacts with the SI were an explicit part of the strategy.18 The Committee concluded that Norway’s relationship with the EEC would emerge again, and they had to prepare themselves. “In principle, our position is clear: We want to commit ourselves to take part in the development of an ever closer cooperation among the European countries.” The consequences of the divided market in Europe had become more tangible, and the political implications of membership had changed. “France has declined to accept the principle of supranational decisions, while the social democratic parties have worked hard to strengthen the parliamentarian bodies of the Community.”19 As a result, encouraged by the International Committee, the NEC of the DNA, supported by the Trade Union Organisation (LO), unanimously adopted a statement urging the Norwegian prime minister, the Centre Party leader Per Borten, to express the government’s unequivocal intention to “support vigorously the British initiative”. 15 16 17 18 19

See for example PRO, PREM 13/903, Krag’s speech at Heads of Fin/EFTA’s meeting, 5 December 1966. Erlander made his speech on 22 August 1961. Quoted from Gstöhl 2002: 100. See also ARAB, TEA, box 038, 29 June 1967. PRO, PREM 13/903, Heads of Fin/EFTA’s meeting, 5 December 1966: 5. AAB, FMA, box 008, minutes meeting International Committee, 15 November 1966. AAB, FMA, box 008, International Committee, Norwegian Foreign Policy, autumn 1966. Author ’s translations.

110

Application and Veto

The Norwegian labour movement’s position was built on the wish to contribute to the development of a “new Europe that will leave behind nationalistic rivalries and build its future on fellowship and cooperation between nations”. The NEC stated their wish for socialist ideas to form the basis “for our future work in Europe … Socialist parties are already playing an important role and it is vital to ensure that these forces are strengthened.”20 Unlike the arguments put forward by Hans Otto Frøland, the DNA’s position on the issue was not only tactical but contained carefully elaborated party policies that committed the party to work for closer collaboration across the EEC–EFTA divide. As demonstrated in the following chapters, the NEC of the DNA put substantial efforts into establishing a European socialist programme during the latter part of the sixties, believing it had the capacity to introduce more socialist policies and planning on a European level.21 This was supported by core Europe socialist parties, which stated that the geographical extension of the Community should be carried out in accordance with political objectives shared by the socialist parties of the Six.22 As announced in his 10 November address, Wilson met with the EFTA leaders in early December in order to discuss the government’s decision to enter into negotiations with the EEC. The calling of the conference was according to Wilson a “logical step” in carrying forward the British government’s policy on relations with core Europe. The aim was to consider the attitudes within the EFTA governments towards closer British relations with the Community. Wilson believed the situation had changed considerably since the previous British application for membership, and that the provisions of the Rome Treaty “must be considered in the context of the way in which they were being implemented in practice”. The government had already carried out “probing operations”, he stated – making implicit references to intergovernmental and transnational contacts since entering office – aimed at ascertaining the terms on which Britain might be able to enter.23 In the immediate aftermath, he portrayed the discussions with the EFTA countries as “most successful”, emphasising that Britain’s initiative to negotiate with core Europe had generally been welcomed. The EFTA members had recognised that Britain must secure satisfactory terms, while maintaining that they would enter the probing from a position of strength. If EFTA joined the EEC, the argument was, it would bring to it a market

20 21

22 23

IISH, SI, SII: 71. AAB, FMA, box 008, meeting International Committee, 19 January 1967. Hans Otto Frøland has argued that changes that appeared in DNA’s attitudes and actions during the sixties were largely tactical. He suggests that transnational contacts largely were channels for outlet rather than tools for importing new ideas. However, this study demonstrates that the observed changes in the Norwegian, and to a certain degree the Swedish, socialist party implied new and more positive perceptions of core Europe. The efforts put into establishing a European socialist programme and subsequently incorporating the policy into the party’s programme, were deliberate and systematic efforts, this study argues, to implement more social democratic policies in an enlarged core Europe. Frøland 1997: 199–200, Frøland 2001: 448–49. IISH, SI, SII, Resolutions of the 10th Congress of EEC Socialist Parties, 17–18 November 1966. PRO, PREM 13/903, Meeting of Heads of Fin/EFTA Governments, 5 December 1966.

Probing the French

111

of about 100 million consumers and some of the most highly skilled peoples in Europe and the world.24 At the conference of party leaders on 4–5 January in Rome, Brown put British EEC-membership in this wider context. Enlargement, he emphasised, would change the Community. If Britain joined others would also join. It was important if Europe should not fall further behind the USA and the Soviet Union. Besides, if Ireland, Denmark, Norway and possibly Sweden could go along, the internal balance could shift in a centre-left direction. Thus, the Labour leadership emphasised the importance of increased socialist influence in an enlarged Community. The economic argument for joining was not Britain’s economic weakness, he stressed, but the potential combined strength of an enlarged market. The objective was to get involved in such a way that Britain would be part of the decision-making processes, Brown claimed, declaring that “Harold and I have decided that the time has come to get this over and to get in”.25 PROBING THE FRENCH When Wilson and Brown toured the capitals of core Europe countries in early 1967, even the enthusiastically pro-European Brown was surprised by Wilson’s “firm line in favour of Britain’s applying to join”.26 Yet as indicated by Le Monde and other observers, the big question was whether de Gaulle would veto a new application. In Scandinavia the Norwegian diplomat and future foreign secretary, Knut Frydenlund, believed that if de Gaulle let Britain into the EEC this time, the DNA “would be as surprised as when he said no in 1963 … Little or nothing indicates that de Gaulle this time is adopting a more friendly-minded attitude towards the British.”27 At home, Michael Foot was convinced the approach was doomed to fail since Britain’s relationship with the United States had not changed in any significant way since de Gaulle’s 1963 “non”. The economic adviser Balogh had told Wilson that if he wished to enter the Community Britain must “renounce the special relationship with the US and accept the French attitude towards becoming European, i. e. putting Europe first”.28 However, the Wilson–Brown tour prompted pro- and anti-EEC forces within the party to take action. In February 1967, 107 Labour MPs signed an EDM reaffirming the five conditions set out in the 1962 NEC statement Labour and the Common Market. In May 74 Labour MPs signed a statement in Tribune setting 24 25 26

27 28

LAM, PLP, minute meeting, 7 December 1966. See also PRO, PREM 13/903, Meeting of Heads of Fin/EFTA Governments, 5 December 1966. Brown to Conference in Rome. IISH, SI, 345, Party Leader Conference, Rome, 4–5 January 1967. Brown 1971: 214–15. They visited Rome on 15–17 January, proceeded via Strasbourg, stayed in Paris on 23–25 January, stayed in Brussels on 31 January–1 February and then paid visits to Bonn, The Hague and Luxembourg respectively. For Wilson’s accounts of the trip, see Wilson 1971: 327–44. AAB, FMO, box 009, Introduction Knut Frydenlund, 19 January 1967. PRO, PREM 13/908, Top Secret, to Wilson from Cabinet adviser Thomas Balogh, 20 October 1966.

112

Application and Veto

out the case against entry while 25 Labour MPs signed a statement in the Europe Left in favour of a socialist Europe.29 At the January 1967 Rome conference of party leaders, Brown told his fellow socialists that he recently had been in touch with de Gaulle. Normally he did not quote statesmen to other statesmen, he claimed, but he would quote something the French president said, on the understanding that it was kept confidential. “He looked straight into my eyes when I was saying ‘look I’m answering all your questions could I have an answer from you’ and he said, ‘But I have no problem. I am part of the Common Market. You have a problem, you want to join’, and I say to you as I said to him, this cannot be regarded, must not be regarded as a British problem.”30 The conversation had been arranged while Brown was in Paris on an official visit to attend a NATO ministerial meeting. He had discussed the European issue with the French Foreign Secretary, Couve de Murville, suggesting that it was futile putting all the questions to him, because he could not give the answers. “To my surprise, he said, ‘Would you like to see the chap who can give the answers?’ I said, ‘Yes, rather ’, though I still thought that he was joking.”31 Yet the next morning Brown was invited to the Élysée Palace for an hour-long talk with de Gaulle, with only his interpreter present, and no minutes were taken. According to his memoirs Brown argued as strongly as he could about all that Britain meant to Europe and the great part that it could play in Europe, “but it was very clear that de Gaulle was adamantly against us. He regarded the Continent as France’s place and the Atlantic Ocean and the United States as Britain’s place.” According to Brown, de Gaulle suggested it was impossible having two cocks living in one farmyard with the hens. He had “a lot of trouble getting the five hens to do what France wanted, and he wasn’t going to have Britain’s coming in and creating trouble over again, this time with ten.”32 There was “no shaking de Gaulle’s opposition to having Britain in the Common Market”, Brown recalled while he and Wilson met de Gaulle on 24 January 1967, “but again he was friendly and he went out of his way to say how impressed (as he put it) he had been by his meeting with me in the previous month”.33 However, back in London, they ultimately persuaded the cabinet to recommend to Parliament that a formal application to join the EEC should be submitted. Wilson also urged the PLP to enter into immediate detailed discussions on the challenges arising out of Britain’s possible entry. Preferably, they should be carried out concurrently with discussions in the cabinet, as it would be of great value to the government to know the thinking of the party on specific issues.34 Consequently, three meetings, all attended by Wilson, where arranged in the PLP in order to decide on

29 30 31 32 33 34

Mullen 2007: 78. IISH, SI, 345, Party Leader Conference, Rome 4–5, January 1967. Brown 1971: 214. Brown 1971: 214–15. Brown 1971: 215. LAM, PLP, minutes meeting, 16 March 1967.

Probing the French

113

future actions.35 Several studies on joining core Europe were also produced.36 In the PLP meetings, Brown argued that Britain was dependent on the strength coming from economic and political unity, and therefore needed a “strong place in a strong continent … We must join up with the others in Europe so that together we create the resources and scale we need.”37 Taking everything into consideration, he emphasised, none of the challenges were “incapable of solution”. The “Gaitskell conditions” were less relevant, as the interpretation of federalism was “far different” and the problem of EFTA was “very different indeed”. Wilson argued that the industry would benefit from membership in a two-fold way, first from a leap forward in both production and investment, which would greatly benefit Britain and continental Europe. Second, far bigger markets were needed to exploit the advantages in technology where the UK was thought to be in the lead. As for agriculture, Wilson underlined that if the government decided to apply for membership, “we have to come to terms with the agricultural policy of the community”. Dealing with capital movements, FDIs and portfolio investments, he argued that the unquantifiable effects of a new dynamic within an enlarged Europe would be a “real boost”, as would the equally unquantifiable consequences of the creation of a powerful technological community within Europe.38 However, Wilson regarded the political arguments as decisive. Despite the problems that had followed the “empty chair crisis”, Wilson believed that Europe was possibly on the verge of a great move forward in political unity and argued that “we can – and indeed must – play a part in it … the role of Britain is on the field and not on the touch-line, casting praise, blame, or even bottles at those who are doing a job in which we should be involved as full participants.” Besides, a possible British EEC membership had to be seen in the wider context of the relationship between East and West. The decision must, therefore, he concluded, be taken more as a “balanced judgement of all that is involved, economic and political”, rather “than on the basis of a computerised calculation of probabilities”.39 Still, the core challenge was how to deal with de Gaulle. Was he likely to veto an application, and should the British government be deterred from making a bid for fear that he would? To the PLP, Brown argued the situation in 1967 was markedly different from what it had been in 1963. He thought it would be difficult for the French president to impose a second veto, as there were considerable interests in France – farmers and large sectors of business – that depended on the Community. They had vested interests in seeing it widened to include Britain and stood to gain from the inclusion of the UK. In their conversations with de Gaulle, he and the PM had seen “nothing so far” that should “make us believe they would resist our entry,

35 36 37 38 39

The three meetings were held on 6, 20 and 27 April 1967. LAM, PLP, box PLP minutes 1962– 71. On 2 May the Prime Minister announced that the government had decided to apply for membership of the EEC. LAM, International Dept., PLP/1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, spring 1967. GBBLO, box c. 5015/161: 2. LAM, PLP, box PLP minutes, 1962–71. LAM, PLP, box PLP minutes, 1962–71.

114

Application and Veto

and the other Five have a general desire that we should go in”.40 France was not “nearly so reserved” as the press had reported, he stressed. Later Wilson confirmed these claims, arguing that their discussions with de Gaulle were “essentially of a more transcendental character, though by no means discouraging”.41 This is in sharp contrast to what apparently had taken place while meeting de Gaulle, clearly demonstrated in Brown’s memoirs where he admitted that de Gaulle had not changed his mind about British membership.42 Although arguing in his address to the PLP that the situation was different this time, Brown’s adviser urged him to “clear the exact form of words”, recommending that he delete the sentence: “In any event I do not think France will apply the veto again.”43 This might indicate that the pending application had instrumental objectives. The Labour leadership had to consider the possible adverse effects of a renewed veto. Yet, such a veto would also “make clear where the responsibility for the division” lay, as the Financial Times put it.44 Even if Brown and Wilson sincerely believed the situation in 1967 to be markedly different, and that it would be difficult for de Gaulle to exercise a second veto, they also knew that if the French President did do so, he risked becoming further isolated both internationally and domestically. The most important thing was to put him under pressure by applying for membership, once more making Britain’s long-term objective of joining more likely. Second, when he left office Britain’s case would be strengthened by Wilson’s perseverance, which clearly had displayed Britain’s sincerity in turning towards Europe. Simultaneously, a second veto could strengthen the socialist alliance across the EEC and EFTA divide and thus increase social democratic influence on an enlarged EEC. Indeed, the growing socialist strength and influence in Western Europe had been an important consideration in Labour ’s European policy-making since 1964. As earlier pointed out, Christian democratic parties still dominated government formation when core Europe was created. In the mid-sixties, socialist parties were in power alone or in coalitions in a majority of the EFTA countries and on the electoral rise in core Europe. Enlargement was likely to strengthen European socialism relative to Christian democracy in the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the EP.45 Thus, “speaking as Socialists”, Brown told the conference of party leaders in Rome, “it will have tremendous effect on what we want” if Britain, Denmark, and possibly Norway were to join the EEC, and Sweden and Austria were brought into closer association with the Community.46 In keeping with this, Eugene Melville suggested in a confidential and personal letter to Con O’Neill at the Foreign and

40 41 42 43 44 45 46

GBBLO, box c. 5015/161. IISH, SI, 263, 12th Congress, Vienna 26–29 June 1972, speech by Wilson, 28 June 1972. Brown 1971: 214. GBBLO, box c. 5015/16, P. M. Kelly, “Your speech to the PLP on Europe” [on 6 April 1966]. Financial Times, 25 May 1965. Kaiser 2007: 314. IISH, SI, 345, Conference of party leaders, Rome, 4–5 January 1967.

Probing the French

115

Commonwealth Office that the EC was “much more likely to proceed on the right lines henceforth if the other EFTA countries are also inside”.47 It was widely believed that an early decision by the British to submit an application for membership was imminent.48 The Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet even suggested that Wilson “thinks that the EEC has changed its character and direction so that membership for a neutral country is now possible”.49 On 28 April, the British government informed the EFTA countries in a Council meeting in London of its intentions vis-à-vis the EEC, promising to “take their views fully into account”.50 No decision had yet been made, Brown emphasised, but the cabinet was to hold further meetings in the coming days for the purpose. If they decided to apply he would “like to learn” what they would “propose to do on this hypothesis”. In general, the EFTA leaders supported the British move. Whichever country first entered into negotiations with the EEC, Brown summed up, there must still be a “full exchange of information and consultation”, and ways must be found to overcome the problems arising without EFTA partners damaging one another ’s interests.51 An important change to British European policy should be noted, however, as the 1961–63 promise to maintain EFTA until acceptable arrangements had been found for all member countries was abandoned at this meeting.52 In Scandinavia, policy-making bodies within the DNA believed Wilson had succeeded in persuading his conversation partners that Britain meant business by wanting to join the EEC. They also believed France’s five partners would support British membership, as long as it did not jeopardise the future existence of the EEC. However, it was believed that European independence vis-à-vis the United States played a more prominent role to them than in 1961–63. Even the special Committee set up by the SI in order to deal with European integration issues found it impossible to judge what would be the result of the Wilson–Brown tour of the Six.53 Thus, it was impossible to guess whether de Gaulle would catch the British hawser.54 Conventional wisdom suggests that the French president was the main obstacle to British membership of core Europe, while the other five did not actively support him.55 However, in January 1967 Palliser warned that even the new German Foreign Secretary Willy Brandt, although a Social Democrat, was concerned with German interests “and not necessarily, as firmly on our side” as his political credentials should indicate.56 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

PRO, FCO 30/33, Personal and Confidential, Melville to O’Neill, 17 March 1967. PRO, FCO 30/35, Stockholm to FO, 27 April 1967. PRO, FCO 30/35 122258, Stockholm to FO, 27 April 1967. PRO, FCO 30/36, Record EFTA meeting, 28 April 1967. PRO, FCO 30/36, Record EFTA meeting, 28 April 1967. PRO, BT 241/2158, 29 October 1969. AAB, FMA, box 008, Report SI Bureau meeting, 17–18 March 1967. AAB, FMA, box 008, The situation after Wilson’s round trip, March 1967. Milward 1984 and Bossuat 1996. Quoted from Parr 2007: 111. In his study of Christian Democracy and the origins of core Europe, Wolfram Kaiser argues that the founding members actively sought to keep Britain out of the European integration process. The consensus on the concept of a supranational core Europe “excluding Britain continued to grow within transnational Christian democracy between 1947

116

Application and Veto

MEMBERSHIP BID AND VETO On 2 May 1967, after having decided to submit a formal application to join the EEC according to article 237, Wilson informed the House of Commons of the British government’s decision. The bid, facing minimal outright opposition within the cabinet, was unconditional, and virtually free of any mention of prior safeguards.57 Contrary to Macmillan’s announcement in 1961, he did not balk at the consequences Britain would face upon membership, especially with regard to the CAP’s impact on the cost of living and structure of agriculture. He frankly stated that food prices and costs of living would rise, and it probably would have negative effects on the balance of payments. The reasons for the application, given in the White Paper Membership of the European Communities, included both economic and political arguments. Britain envisaged joining a core Europe that would not be narrow or inward looking. A coherent Community could ensure that Europe would play a part in world affairs the present Europe was not playing. Only by putting forward its full economic strength would it have the political influence it was believed it could and should exert within the UN, the western alliance, in contributing to East–West détente and the solution of the world’s north–south problems according to the needs of the developing world. Against this background, the application received overwhelming support on 11 May, at the end of a three-day debate in the Commons, passing by 488 votes to 62. Only one Liberal, 25 Conservative and 36 Labour MPs voted against the measure. About 10 per cent of the respective parliamentary parties opposed the application. Despite a three-line whip another 50 Labour MPs abstained. Six parliamentary private secretaries who defied the whip were dismissed, but Wilson ignored the MPs who voted no. The second membership application assembled for the first time, Hugo Young stresses, a “critical mass of support among the political class for the proposition that Britain should become a European country”.58 The government had decided, the opposition and industry agreed and the people did not disagree. Wilson had to a great extent managed to create a consensus on his long-term strategy on the need to join core Europe. The Danish (and neutral) Irish governments followed Britain and applied for full membership immediately. “Denmark’s dearest wish is to find herself under one roof with her main markets – the UK, Germany, Sweden and Norway,” Brown’s political advisers noted. “What Krag would like to hear, is that HMG would not be deflected by temporary setbacks – i. e. a French veto – from a European policy whose objective is membership of the EEC.”59 The Norwegian Prime Minister and Centre Party leader Per Borten took up a wait-and-see stance.60 Following further deliberations, and after having being pushed by the DNA and the trade unions (LO),

57 58 59 60

and 1950”, Kaiser argues, and by May 1950 the creation of “such a core Europe without Britain had become a central objective for transnational Christian democracy”. There is no study that indicates that similar attitudes existed by the mid-sixties, however. Kaiser 2007: 231–40, 304. See for instance the Economist’s verdict on 6 May 1967. Young 1998: 197. GBBLO, box c. 5019/165: 188. Frøland 2001: 450–53.

Membership bid and veto

117

the Norwegian government submitted a membership application. As pointed out above, in the wake of a discussion on the EEC question between the NEC of the DNA and the LO secretariat at a special conference on 24 November 1966, the DNA and LO had issued a joint statement strongly encouraging the government to apply. The specific intension was to push the government to support the British government at a special meeting in London on 5 December 1966. When the application was eventually submitted, the Norwegian Parliament overwhelmingly approved it on 13 June 1967 by 136 votes to 13.61 The Swedish position was even more complex. It is evident from deliberations in the Swedish government in mid-1967 that the British application for membership of the EEC on the one hand came at a wrong time and on the other that it seriously considered applying for full membership.62 The European Commission’s Opinion also clearly implied that Sweden must choose between full membership without political reservations and nothing.63 The overall argument in the Swedish government was that it would be easier to change a bid for full EEC membership with an application for associate membership than the other way around. Moreover, the trade policy of the SAP government was “based on one very firm and simple principle: free trade to the largest extent possible”.64 The exact nature of Sweden’s future affiliation with the EEC was, in other words, left open. Future negotiations would make clear what sort of membership would serve Swedish interests. As a consequence, the Swedish government sent a rather elusive application to the EEC for negotiations on 26 July 1967. It was accompanied by a “verbal addendum”, presented by the Swedish ambassador who expressed Sweden’s willingness to consider any form of participation, including membership.65 It intended to allow Sweden to participate in the Common Market while retaining neutrality. Only to a certain extent were the reservations from 1961–62 reiterated. Sweden was a European country and duly an important part of the European cultural heritage, and wished to play an active role on the continent. Yet Swedish non-alignment policies still applied. Any change in Sweden’s relations with other countries had to comply with this fundamental feature of Swedish foreign and security policy. Fundamental changes in this policy were considered hazardous to postwar European stability, in the same way as stability in Scandinavia was considered fundamental to stability in northern Europe and thus Europe as a whole.66 The SAP emphasised Sweden’s right to enter into autonomous trade agreements with third countries, the right to decide on regulations on the import and export of essential goods in times of international crisis, the right to terminate the agreement and the right to reserve Sweden’s position on future decisions within the EEC that might be contrary to its pol61 62 63 64 65 66

DNA biennial reports, 1965–66, 1967–68, minutes DNA biennial conferences, 27–29 May 1965, 21–23 May 1967. See for example ARAB, TEA, box 038, 29 June 1967. GBBLO, box c. 5019/165: 187. Minister of Commerce, Gunnar Lange, to Aktuelt, 30 October 1968, IISH, SI, SII 1968. See also Karlsson 2001: 105–124. ARAB, TEA, box 083, memos, 16 and 29 June 1967. See ARAB, TEA, box 083, memos, 16 and 29 June 1967.

118

Application and Veto

icy of non-alignment and neutrality. Yet, governmental papers clearly indicate that subject to certain conditions and reservations – non-alignment and neutrality – Sweden’s application should appear as positive and include as much as possible.67 At a meeting of the Council of the Western European Union (WEU) on 4 July at The Hague, George Brown, with the full support of the government and with reference to the White Paper Membership of the European Communities, stated that Britain was aiming at something far greater than material prosperity. He emphasised that the British government saw this as leading to a greater political purpose for Western Europe. If that purpose was to be realised, he suggested, Britain must share it. “We want, as soon as we can, to develop really effective political unity with our fellow West Europeans … Britain now asks to join you. We share your objectives. We want to link our efforts with yours. So do other European countries. We are convinced that this is the right road forward.”68 At home, the NEC of the Labour Party released a statement on the issue, Labour and the Common Market, at its October 1967 Annual Conference in Scarborough. It endorsed the government’s 2 May statement by emphasising the benefits of a market of about 280 million people, both in relation to global competition and economics and the technology of scale. “The major attraction of EEC membership in the economic and technological fields is that it offers Britain the prospect of integration in conditions of partnership rather than of subordination to any single large market.” On the political side, the NEC considered the uniting of Europe in the context of the Cold War, and regarded the enlargement of the Community “as a first step towards the creation of a wider and more unified continent … We believe that the British Government has sought membership of the EEC in a manner fully in accord with the principle and objectives of the Labour Party. That is why the Labour Party fully supports Britain’s application to enter the EEC.”69 While explaining the government’s decision, Brown emphasised the political over the economic and technological arguments, referring to Britain’s role in Western Europe and in the world, and the significance of economic planning. This position was later corroborated by Oliver Wright at the British Embassy in Copenhagen, stating that during the turmoil in the wake of the second veto that the Danish membership application, “unlike ours”, had been primarily commercial and economic.70 The consequences of staying out and trying “to go it alone” were “much more likely” to lead to unemployment, he claimed, “than going in” would. He also emphasised that socialist parties and trade unions in the EEC countries had not found that being members had in any way hampered the kind of social policies and trade union activities they wanted.71 On the other hand, what he did not explain in detail was that the socialist parties of the Six had opted for deeper core Europe integration 67 68 69 70 71

ARAB, TEA, 038, memo, draft EEC-negotiations application, 13 July 1967. LAM, International dept., box memoranda 1959–61, 1963, 1966, 1970–73. Correspondence, 1957–62. The Labour Party and Europe: 4–5. IISH, SI, Great Britain 1967–69. LAM, NEC, Labour and the Common Market, October 1967. PRO, FCO 30/32, Secret letter from Oliver Wright to Pat F. Hancock, British FO, 1 February 1968. IISH, SI, SII 1967: 231–33.

Membership bid and veto

119

with federal features, which was probably at odds with the kind of Europe most pro-EEC Labour Party politicians opted for. Yet he emphasised that the Community had not developed into what many had feared in 1962. On the contrary, whether it would develop into a federal system was yet to be decided, and it would be better to be there when that debate was going on and be able to influence the outcome, he argued. “The British Labour Party and our sister parties on the Continent and the Labour Parties of Scandinavia can in fact play a very great part in the future development. I believe we can influence the development of Europe in a way that we want it to develop.”72 The European Commission’s opinion on enlargement in September strengthened British objectives. Although stressing the British balance of payments problems, it concluded that the accession of the four applicant countries had the potential both to strengthen the Community and afford it some opportunity for further progress, “provided the new members accept the provisions of the Treaties and the decisions taken subsequently”.73 In effect, this was the case as the applications were practically unconditional. Being enthusiastic about the principle of enlargement, the Rey Commission recommended that negotiations should begin. Yet the fate of the application was in the hands of the French president. Shortly after Wilson’s statement French intransigence soon became apparent. First, France and de Gaulle refused to table the application before the Commission, and the Commission could not discuss an application that it was not allowed to see. The British had to apply some diplomatic creativity in order to hand over the application to the Commission. Second, on 16 May de Gaulle offered his first opinion on the British application. He stressed that there was no question of a French veto, yet he claimed that even if Britain accepted the Treaty the balance of interests between the member states would be difficult to maintain, especially with four new applicants. He also stressed that Britain’s balance of payments problems would render the UK incapable of accepting core European obligations. If Britain accepted the agricultural agreements, he stated, it would further squeeze its balance of payments. Although the five stated their support for British accession in a July Council meeting, Wilson’s hopes for short-term success had been weakened after his talks with de Gaulle on 19 June. They were further reduced when the British Ambassador in Paris, Patrick Railly, was urged to convince the British to drop the whole venture in a private conversation with de Gaulle.74 At a Council of Ministers meeting on 23–24 October the French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville stressed that four new members would mean a fundamental change of the EEC.75 Taken together, these indicated what would eventually be the French president’s final verdict on the application. In the meantime, both Wilson and Brown did their utmost to save the application by persistently demonstrating Britain’s sincerity while encouraging the other five to stand up against de Gaulle and force him to accept the applicants. Yet

72 73 74 75

IISH, SI, SII 1967: 231–33. Pine 2007: 22. Parr 2006: 156–60, 166–67. Pine 2007: 23.

120

Application and Veto

if de Gaulle eventually vetoed the application, they would make life as difficult as possible for him. Despite intensive British efforts to elicit a change in de Gaulle’s attitude, he ultimately delivered his veto at a press conference on 17 November 1967, turning down Britain’s – and thus Denmark’s, Norway’s and Ireland’s – bid to join the EEC for the second time. He listed several problems between Britain and core Europe: Britain’s inherent balance of payments problems, food supplies, capital movements, the role of sterling, working conditions etc. As it would be impossible to make necessary exceptions for all this, it would mean breaking up the Community if Britain joined. There was definitively no room for manoeuvre in this “very clear rejection of any negotiations for our entry”, as Palliser wrote to Wilson.76 Hence, the membership process prepared by and elaborated by Wilson since shortly after taking office in October 1964 was apparently brought to an end. Although de Gaulle’s statement was not a formal Community decision, as it had to be confirmed by the other five in the Council of Ministers, it effectively put an end to Britain’s and the other applicants’ bids to join in the short term. EFFORTS TO SAVE THE APPLICATION Initially, however, the British still hoped that the application could be saved, and in this context the Germans held a key position. After the veto, Brown and Wilson immediately activated their well-established networks to get an overview of the situation and influence the fate of the application. In a background note produced to provide Brown with information on a meeting with the German Social Democratic Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, the Belgian Ambassador obtained an account of a conversation the Belgian Foreign Minister had had with his German counterpart on 2 December.77 Brandt had stated that there would be further discussions on the fate of the British application at the decisive Council of Ministers meeting on 18–19 December. Apparently, Brandt had raised the issue of whether the Council should try to carry a majority vote on the British application as a matter of procedure. This would, however, undoubtedly lead the French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, to declare that the decision was of “vital” interests for France, activating the “Luxembourg compromise” and thus veto the proposal. On the other hand, the British government had got a report obtained by the Americans indicating what they had been told by the German foreign ministry, diverging from the Belgian Ambassador ’s account. According to this information, German policy aimed at finding a middle way between the French position, which was to “avoid” negotiations altogether, and the British, which insisted on taking up negotiations as soon as possible. According to this information, the Germans were anxious not to imperil the Franco-German relationship. Rather, Germany would try to keep talks going while asking the British to moderate their pressure and consider 76 77

Pine 2007: 27 and footnote 3. GBBLO, box c. 5019/165: 179–80, 194–98.

Efforts to save the application

121

some form of association. However, the German Cabinet had not yet discussed the issue in detail.78 In line with these signals, O’Neill had received secret information from Bonn indicating the Germans had three possibilities in mind. First, that there should be negotiations with Britain for full membership, which would provide for Britain to have, for a transitional period, consultative rights in the decision-making bodies of the EEC. Second, that there should be negotiations with Britain for full membership, but with less than full voting rights in the Council of Ministers during a transitional period, and third, that a new Community of ten should be founded with exactly the same scope as the existing one; while the existing EEC continued and that the new Community would catch up with it.79 Thus, at this stage the British had no full knowledge as to how Germany would eventually deal with de Gaulle’s veto. In socialist circles, the British emphasised that they were determined to press on with the application for full membership. “We are definitely not interested in association.” It would only put Britain in a position of having to accept obligations affecting every aspect of economic and social life and international relationships without having any voice in the formulation of future rules or future changes in those rules. Moreover, the key to enlargement lay in the success of the British bid, and that the chances of that bid succeeding will be “much improved if all EFTA countries maintain the pressure of their own bids for participation, in one way or another, in an extended EEC. This is one way in which EFTA should maintain its unity and demonstrate its strength.”80 Thus, this was not the time to strengthen EFTA. Neither did they believe that multilateral negotiations would work. The only way EFTA’s power could be activated, the British claimed, was if the member countries stayed together to produce the maximum influence on France and the Community. Inside the PLP, frustration and humiliation prevailed. At a meeting on 6 December dealing with the veto, it was stressed that Britain was “not a weak country and our Government was not unworthy, and we must apply our energies to increasing trade elsewhere in the world”. Nor had the application in any way endangered EFTA, the PLP maintained, because one of the objects of that organisation had been to bridge the gap in Europe. It was concluded that the government “had been right to probe; right to apply for membership; right in its response to President de Gaulle’s Press Conference; now we must await the decision of the Council of Ministers to our application” at their 18–19 December meeting.81 In this situation, Wilson again looked to his northern European network, calling for a conference of socialist party leaders at Chequers on 9 December. In addition to Wilson, Brown, Gwyn Morgan, Jennie Lee and A. L. Williams, it was attended by Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Jens-Otto Krag, Trygve Bratteli, Tage Erlander and Olof Palme. The British application was on the agenda and the message unambigu78 79 80 81

GBBLO, box c. 5019/165: 179. GBBLO, box c. 5019/165: 197. GBBLO, box c. 5019/165: 185. LAM, PLP, minutes meeting, 6 December 1967.

122

Application and Veto

ous. The British application was not a short-term measure. It was an indispensable part of a great and general movement towards European unity. Brown bluntly declared that the “first and most important reasons for our application are political … We see the widening of the Common Market to include us and other Western European countries as the means of bringing about [the increasing need for] closer political unity [in Europe].” The application “is in and it will remain in. We do not propose to withdraw it.” The essential first step was to join core Europe, and Britain “shall not be deflected from this course”. The devaluation of sterling would “not in any way affect our firm resolution to pursue our declared European policy. On the contrary it has put beyond doubt our ability to sustain the obligations of membership.”82 The participants supported the British move, but could do little to overcome de Gaulle’s opposition. When talking to Brandt at a NATO ministerial meeting on 13–14 December, Brown pushed the point that the only basis for pursuing Britain’s relations with core Europe after the meeting of the Council of Ministers would be a clear statement on where the other five stood on the British application for full membership under article 237. No solutions short of full membership would be acceptable to the British.83 However, despite intense diplomatic activities and transnational networking, in the short term de Gaulle’s 17 November veto proved to be the end of Britain’s second attempt to join core Europe. On 18–19 December the Council of Ministers confirmed de Gaulle’s “non”. Talking to the Swedish Ambassador in Paris, Gunnar Hägglöf, de Gaulle later emphasised that he had not been responsible for the set up of the European Community.84 If he had created it, he suggested, it would have been different. He reiterated what he had stressed at his 17 November press conference. He had accepted it, however. He claimed there were still several internal issues to settle, and expressed “great concern” over the “agricultural policy”. As far as the UK was concerned, he said, “we have to remember Britain in almost every respect is different from continental Europe. At present she is midway between Europe and the United States, attached to the United States, to an extent making it difficult to spot a separate British pole.” Scandinavia was a different and easier problem, he suggested. “However, it would have been the more unwise trying to incorporate Scandinavia into the Community, as the Community still needs some time to settle its own matters.”85

82 83 84 85

GBBLO, box c. 5019/165, European Integration, Socialist International Party Leaders’ Conference. Item 2(a) European Integration. GBBLO, box c. 5019/194. Hägglöf was Sweden’s Ambassador to Paris during 1967–71. ARAB, TEA, box 085, memo, Hägglöf to de Gaulle, 22 April 1968. Author ’s translation.

CHAPTER 8 NOT TAKING NO FOR AN ANSWER This chapter examines how Wilson and his government dealt with the French non during the veto years from the end of 1967 to the end of 1969. As opposed to most studies dealing with the Wilson government’s second bid, which broadly conclude that Wilson only reluctantly and without enthusiasm turned to Europe, it demonstrates that he ruled out solutions short of membership and that he was committed to do his utmost to take Britain into the Community despite the temporary setback caused by the veto.1 The prime minister and his close aides did not take no for an answer, and decided not to withdraw the application. They worked hard to convince their European counterparts of the sincerity of the British bid. This observation is in keeping with observations made in previous chapters, confirming the argument presented that Wilson’s decision to enter core Europe went beyond tactics. He believed it was fully in accord with the principles and objectives of the Labour Party, and thus consistent with its planning objectives. The Wilson government did not have to leave the application on the table, nor did the Danish and Norwegian governments. If the applications had been withdrawn the situation could have been different. Instead of dealing with the applications and veto, both core Europe and Britain would, to a greater extent, have been able to focus on their own affairs and timetables, and membership negotiations could not have started as early as they did. It is in this respect imprecise or even wrong to contend the veto was a “disaster” for Wilson, as suggested by Young.2 During 1968 and the first part of 1969 there were less transnational activity, which also reflects that the European question was less prevalent during this period and that the level of activities in transnational arenas was influenced by the intensity of the European issue at the time.3 THE APPLICATION LEFT ON THE TABLE After the veto, the British government immediately declared that the application would not be withdrawn. Foreign Minister Brown told the Commons that the government would not be diverted from its European policy. Only accession to the EEC 1 2 3

This observation is in keeping with the studies of Wilson and Europe by Kitzinger, Pine, Furby and Wall. Kitzinger 1968: xi, Pine 2007, Furby 2010 and Wall 2013. Young 1993: 101. The next SI congress would not take place until June 1969 (at Eastbourne). The conference of party leaders did not meet between December 1967 and 30 March 1969. The SI Council got together in Copenhagen on 21 August 1968 to open in the afternoon, but was abruptly ended by the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia early that morning. The conference concluded the following day to issue a strong condemnation of the invasion. As a result, the planned discussion on “Changing Europe: A Challenge to Democratic Socialism” was cancelled. Also reduced volumes of SI material at the IISH reflect the temporarily decreased transnational activity.

124

Not Taking No for an Answer

would be a satisfactory long-term solution.4 In keeping with this view, the FO made it clear that the main plank of policy – collaborative action with the five and the other applicants – was founded on “the firm conclusion that any kind of halfway house is ruled out”.5 Alternatives – such as a North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA), for which the US government nurtured no enthusiasm and something that was deemed unattainable in the foreseeable future, “going it alone”, or some form of association or trading arrangements with core Europe – were incompatible with the government’s strategic objective of joining core Europe.6 Thus the longterm policy aim was not frustrated, but the Labour leadership acknowledged it would be difficult to accomplish as long as de Gaulle stayed in power. Following the 18 December Council of Ministers meeting confirming the veto, the British government agreed that UK policy aims in the post-veto period were threefold. First, the application for full membership would be left on the table maintaining the longer-term objective of full membership. Second, in the meantime it should ensure that the Communities made minimum progress, particularly in those fields of primary interest to Britain, so that problems of future EC membership should increase as little as possible. Finally, the government should seek to preserve its freedom of action in the economic field pending full membership.7 The first two of these objectives remained a top priority throughout the veto period, while the third, according to Brown, was to apply for as long as it did not conflict with the others.8 The British government received strong encouragement from core Europe socialists in the Liaison Bureau of the Social Democratic Parties of the European Community (LBSDEC) and the Mouvement Gauche Européenne (MGE). While expressing their unqualified support for the British application, they pushed for moves that could bring Europe closer together and reduce the effects of the French veto. They claimed Britain and the other applicant countries “eligible and willing to” accept the Rome Treaty constituted a pre-requisite for the development of a democratic politically unified Europe. Consequently, they urged the member governments of core Europe to enable negotiations with Britain as quickly as possible.9 LABOUR’S LEADERSHIP, THE FIVE AND GERMANY The British government was not ready to consider regular consultation with France, but intended to undertake regular consultation and examine the scope of joint action between Britain and other applicants and the Five, “or as many of the five as wish”, 4 5 6 7 8 9

PRO, FCO 30/38, Anglo–Danish Liaison Committee 8th meeting, European Economic integration: Action after the veto, 11 January 1968. PRO, BT 241/1704, Europe after the veto, 3 January 1968. See for example Wilson’s address to the House of Common on 21 March 1969. LAM, box EEC memoranda etc. 1959–61, 1963, 1966, 1970–73. Correspondence, 1957–62, Arrangement of material, 1969. PRO, FCO 30/38, Background note, 11 January 1968. See also Pine 2007: 38. IISH, SI, SII 1968–69: 52, 119.

Labour’s leadership, the Five and Germany

125

to achieve the long-term objective of full membership.10 After the Council of Ministers meeting Brown sought to arrange a confidential “high level meeting” with the Five in order to exploit the resentment he believed they felt towards de Gaulle. Wilson supported moves that would strengthen the determination and position of the Five, and actions that would facilitate a high level meeting between the Five and the other applicants to deal with the French veto. Brown met with the Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani in Rome shortly after Christmas and Brandt on 19 January. Early in December, Brown had proposed to the Italians that high-level talks would be useful. Although the Italians, the Benelux governments and even the Commission – provided that it did not undermine the Community itself – supported a highlevel meeting with the Five, it proved difficult to carry out. The obstacle was Germany and the position of the German government. While supporting the British application up until the Council of Ministers meeting, the German position and in particular that of Brandt apparently changed during the turn of the year. At the end of the Council meeting Brandt had stated that it was not in the interests of France, nor did de Gaulle have any right, to block the entry of Britain and other countries into core Europe.11 Yet shortly after his tone had changed, as Kiesinger and Brandt were anxious to safeguard the crucial French– German axis and needed time to sort out how to deal with the situation.12 The disappointing feature of the situation, Brown told the cabinet on 18 January, was “a change in the attitude” of the German government, and “especially that of Herr Brandt who had supported us strongly at the Ministerial Council” on 18–19 December. Thus, despite support from four of the Five, the solidarity of the Five was significantly undermined shortly after the Council meeting. The German loyalty to France meant that the initial solidarity of the Five in support of Britain soon was replaced by a division between France and Germany on the one hand and Italy and Benelux on the other. This indicates that although perceptions of core Europe were changing within the British and Scandinavian socialist parties, the socialising power did not at this juncture have the capacity to smooth the progress of an AngloGerman agreement.13 To Brandt and the SPD leadership, the Franco-German axis was still instrumental to the integration process, and thus to future developments in Europe. It did not imply that Brandt would not try to bring Britain into the club, however, nor that he and the German socialists did not seek influence at the Community level. Brown believed it was likely that the Germans were determined, before considering any form of collaboration or consultation with Britain, “to explore with the French a series of propositions which were quite unacceptable to us”. These would involve a relationship with core Europe that would not “amount even to association”.14 With reference to undertaking high-level consultations, Brandt had informed the British Ambassador in Germany, Frank Roberts, at the end of Decem10 11 12 13 14

PRO, FCO 30/38, Background note, 11 January 1968. IISH, SI, SII 1968–69: 9. Allers 2009: 170–73. Cole 2001. PRO, CAB 128/43, Cabinet meeting, 18 January 1968: 4.

126

Not Taking No for an Answer

ber that he thought it premature to think in terms of “such rapid or demonstrative developments”.15 Although Brandt wanted to help Britain, he was careful not to imperil Germany’s relations with France.16 Unfortunately, Pine argues, Brown’s “pursuit of these plans for consultation with the Five pushed Germany towards France and broke the solidarity of the Five”, while suggesting that his “aggressive diplomacy for a ‘high-level meeting’ between the Five and Britain alienated Britain’s strongest supporter in Germany, Brandt”.17 This appears to be a reasonable assessment of the situation. Kiesinger and Brandt had been “put out by the reports of our consultations with the Four”, Burke Trend emphasised in a memo to Wilson in mid-January.18 British policies might have influenced German European policies, yet German European policies at this crucial stage should rather be gauged in terms of the instrumental Franco-German axis and the wish to further European integration rather than policies pursued by the British.19 The situation changed somewhat during the first part of 1968. First, there was a shift in the way in which Wilson and Brown pursued their objectives. While Brown’s immediate reaction had been to instigate high-level talks between Britain and the Five, the next phase saw core Europe seizing the initiative by learning that the British seemed willing to consider any proposal coming from the Six. Second, and in keeping with the latter, core Europe began to make proposals for interim arrangements in order to deal with the French veto. Brandt seemed to show greater readiness to admit that there were opportunities for collaborative action between the Five and Britain in parallel with the German discussions with the French, amounting to some sort of a trading arrangement between the Six and Britain and other European countries. Even if the Germans perceived these as a prelude to eventual British membership of the Community, Michael Stewart rather believed the French saw them in terms of a substitute for UK membership. Also the Benelux countries presented a set of interim proposals on how to deal with the situation, aiming at achieving cooperation between Britain and as many of the Six as would participate in fields outside the scope of the EEC Treaties and therefore not subject to the French veto.20 The Benelux countries also sent a com15 16 17 18 19 20

Pine 2007: 41–42. See also Allers 2009: 170–76. Pine 2007: 39 and 26, 43. PRO, PREM 13/2110, Trend to Wilson, 17 January 1968: 1. For British–German relations see Deighton 2002 and Smith and Edwards 2002. These included four main proposals. First, the Commission was to continue its study of the difficulties and advantages of accession of the candidate states; second, a precise procedure for consultation between the Community, the member states and the applicants on issues covered by the Treaties of Rome and Paris was to be established; third, common actions between those states that desired it in fields not covered by the treaties should be set up, and finally, the Benelux governments had decided to strengthen their political cooperation with a view to harmonising their positions on such matters as relations with third parties, hoping that the other “European states” would associate themselves with the experiment. If these proposals were implemented the British believed they would be involved in core Europe affairs without being forced to search for alternatives to full membership, thus inhibiting “the development of political union among the Six without us”. PRO, CAB 134/2823, Cabinet meeting, 24 January 1968: 1–2.

All or nothing

127

munication to the Germans trying to discourage them from compromising with the French while proposing a meeting between the Five. Despite their efforts, and the fact that the proposals rejected solutions short of full membership, they had limited effects due to French pressure. ALL OR NOTHING In mid-January 1968, Erlander wrote to Wilson emphasising that he had given his full support for the British application throughout, while at the same time asking for economic solutions to the present situation. He looked with considerable concern at a situation where the present deadlock could last for an indefinite period. The EEC countries, he underlined, were of “a decisive and growing importance to Swedish exports”, and it was increasingly essential to remove the discrimination in the EEC market in order to secure economic expansion in Sweden. He feared on the one hand that Sweden, Britain and others faced a long deadlock pending a solution to the question of their relations with the EEC, “for which we all are striving”, and on the other a less ambitious arrangement covering essential problems of a practical economic nature. “I would not like to conceal to you that I have considerable sympathy for the latter as a first step towards the broad solution.” He appealed to Wilson, praising his “constructive thinking, from which I have benefited so much in the past”. It is “my hope that you will give further thoughts to the possibilities of intermediate arrangements which would at last bring us nearer our final goal”.21 In accordance with previous discussions between the head of the Swedish mission to Geneva and the British on the Benelux proposals, Erlander asked the British government to stay away from an “all or nothing” approach.22 This was at odds with Wilson’s long-term strategy. He argued that the veto situation was highly critical, “not only for each one of us individually, but for the future of our continent, and we are much more likely to find the right way out if we keep in touch with each other ’s thinking”. He acknowledged the Swedish understanding of the long-term British aim for full membership. The question was, however, what should be done in the interim period so as to obtain the long-term objectives for European integration. “What courses really are open to us in the short and medium term? Are there any intermediate arrangements possible which would bring us nearer our final goal? … How ought we to conduct ourselves in public in the immediate future so as to enhance our chances or reaching the right solutions? Both of these matters I find peculiarly difficult to decide at the moment, and I think we should be wise to suspend judgment.” With reference to Chancellor Kiesinger ’s forthcoming visit to Paris and the reception of the Benelux proposals he hoped the situation would become clearer.23 Acting in keeping with an “all or nothing” approach, Wilson could not agree with the Swedish wishes. 21 22 23

PRO, BT 241/2048, letter from Erlander to Wilson, 16 January 1968. ARAB, TEA, box 084, talks with Con O’Neill in Geneva, 2 February 1968, Geneva to Stockholm, 6 February 1968. PRO, BT 241/2048, letter from Wilson to Erlander, 31 January 1968.

128

Not Taking No for an Answer

On 16 February Kiesinger and de Gaulle met for the first time after the veto. It confirmed the impression that Kiesinger and Brandt primarily sought to safeguard Franco-German relations. In their joint declaration they reaffirmed their determination to further core Europe integration and complete the common market while fusing the three communities. They envisaged enlargement “once the applicants are in a position, either to enter effectively into these Communities, or as the case may be, to link themselves with them in another form”.24 Brown suggested the French government wanted a trade arrangement covering industrial products on the condition that Britain was prepared to buy substantial quantities of agricultural products from core Europe. He believed the declaration itself was empty and devoid of substance, and that it could not be developed in any satisfactory sense. Rather it confirmed that there had been no significant change in France’s policy regarding Britain’s relations with core Europe. It appears that de Gaulle agreed to the declaration with the express intention of avoiding any further development of the Benelux proposals. For the moment, the British concluded, there were no new proposals to consider. Besides, French government representatives had gone out of their way to make clear that the declaration represented no change whatever in their previous views.25 Until he resigned in mid-March, Brown continued to hope that the Five would force de Gaulle to change his mind. However, no progress was made. At a meeting in the Council of Ministers, a week before Brown’s resignation, the Germans proposed an eight-point paper stating that the Six had a common wish to complete and enlarge the Community by including other European countries, particularly those that had applied for membership, but it received little support.26 Either it was seen to be insufficiently ambitious, or, as the French saw it, too tightly linked to enlargement. Even if the EFTA countries welcomed the German plan, they doubted that the French would ever be brought to accept it. Brandt was disappointed at the reactions to his proposals. There was still no agreement among the Five on the best way to deal with the issue. Inside the British government Brown wanted to pursue the Benelux proposals, yet Wilson decided that the British government should not publicly express a view on any proposal until it had the support of all member states.27 Despite Brown’s impatience, no breakthrough seemed possible as long as de Gaulle and Couve were in charge in France. To the Swedish Ambassador in Paris, Gunnar Hägglöf, de Gaulle maintained that enlargement would be “unwise and even irresponsible”. However, he said he would very much it if the Scandinavian countries made official moves to support trading arrangements between the Six and other European countries.28 This indicates that de Gaulle saw the “interim proposals” not as a prel24

25 26 27 28

The latter alluded to trading arrangements incompatible with Britain’s long-term European policies, largely designed to facilitate the exchange of agricultural and industrial products between the two parties. PRO, PREM 13/2107, Franco–German Declaration after talks de Gaulle–Kiesinger, 16 February 1968. PRO, CAB 128/43, Cabinet meeting, 27 February 1968: 7. See also Allers 2009: 172 and Schwarz 1999: 159–86. Pine 2007: 63. ARAB, TEA, box 085, conversation Hägglöf–de Gaulle on 19 April, 22 April 1968.

All or nothing

129

ude to eventual British membership of core Europe, as indicated by the Germans, but rather in terms of a substitute for British membership. Moreover, being aware of the Scandinavians’ wishes and needs for market accession and apparent reluctance to accept federal developments, he wanted them to give public support to proposals for cooperation short of membership. If the Scandinavians accepted, it was likely to further undermine Wilson’s long-term strategy of joining the club. If the Scandinavians secured full access to the market, incentives for joining would decrease. In turn, this had the potential to influence Wilson’s strategy of joining the Community as the British had repeatedly argued that if Denmark, Norway and possibly Sweden followed Britain into the Community it would alleviate the costs and maximise the gains in an enlarged EC. Although the Five did not agree on how to deal with the British application, it still had broad support within socialist circles. A May meeting of the Mouvement Gauche Européenne, organised in London by the British Labour Committee for Europe, expressed unanimous and unqualified support for British EC entry. The conference reiterated that the admission of the UK and other applicant countries constituted a pre-requisite for the development of a democratic and politically unified Europe. The participants promised to take all possible steps to enable negotiations regarding British entry to be started as soon as possible.29 The British Labour representatives emphasised that they were encouraged by the support of their socialist friends on the continent, and expressed the hope that they could “continue to rely on that support today, and that we shall win through together”.30 The new Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, who had previously served in the post during 1964–66, expressed the view that the socialist movement was nothing if it did not “transcend national boundaries to work for the wider benefit of humanity”.31 However, in the present situation the socialist network proved unable to facilitate membership negotiations between core Europe and Britain. By October there had been but two initiatives to overcome the veto following Brown’s efforts for a high-level meeting with the Five. First were the proposals for a trading arrangement – between core Europe and the UK and some other European countries – that the Germans had seen as a prelude to eventual British membership of the EEC and the French probably as a substitute for British membership. It had thus never been attractive to the British as it could lead down the “blind ally of associate membership”.32 Second were the Benelux proposals that aimed to achieve cooperation between Britain and as many of the Six as would participate in fields outside the scope of the Rome Treaty and therefore not subject to the veto. Neither initiative had produced results. October saw two new developments. First, the Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel proposed on 3 October to continue talks at the margins of the NATO, in the WEU, outside the framework of core Europe.33 The Brussels Treaty (WEU) pre29 30 31 32 33

IISH, SI, SII: 119, Conference of the Mouvement Gauche Européenne, 24–25 May 1968. IISH, SI, SII: 119, Lord Chalfont’s address to the Conference, 25 May 1968. IISH, SI, SII: 119, personal message from Stewart to the Conference, 25 May 1968. PRO, FCO 30/33, EFTA: Can we get more out of it?, 19 December 1967. PRO, CAB 128/43, Michael Stewart in Cabinet meeting, 17 October 1968: 5.

130

Not Taking No for an Answer

scribed greater cooperation among the signatory powers, especially in the area of foreign policy.34 Harmel had proposed solutions to the impasse since de Gaulle’s 17 November veto.35 The failure of Brandt’s eight-point proposals pushed Germany towards accepting it, and the Five agreed in principle to the plan.36 Stewart maintained that the proposal required ministerial consideration, yet he did not want to involve the ministerial Committee on the approach to Europe (EURM) as Harmel’s initiative dealt with cooperation outside the remit of the Rome Treaty.37 Therefore, an ad hoc group was set up to decide whether to report to cabinet – MISC 224. Stewart discussed the proposal with Brandt, Luns, Harmel and Medici – the German, Dutch, Belgian and Italian foreign ministers – and the group agreed that Harmel’s WEU initiative could be a means of pulling Europe back from the “blind alley down which it has gone in the last year”. But the MISC 224 group found it more realistic to think of the proposals as a tactical move designed “to prevent Europe from developing in ways which are contrary to our interests”.38 Despite some positive developments, the initiative did not come to much due to French resistance and – despite the successful completion of the customs union in July, eighteen months ahead of schedule – a difficult financial situation in Europe in the autumn. The second development came in October 1968 when the Labour Party joined the so-called Monnet Committee, the Action Committee for the United States of Europe (ACUE).39 Soon, it set to work on reports intended to facilitate British membership of core Europe and to maintain interest in British membership of the Communities and, “conceivably”, to assist the task of for achieving membership “when the time comes for negotiations”.40 It had been set up in October 1955, and by the end of the sixties the majority of political parties in Western Europe had joined, duly represented either by their leaders or deputies. Jean Monnet saw the role of the Action Committee as that of a pressure group working for wider European unity on a high political level. The Committee met at irregular intervals to discuss current issues of importance. It also commissioned reports on major problems as well as providing confidential information to members on key topics.41 34

35 36 37 38 39 40 41

The proposals thus resembled the 1961–62 French Fouchet Plan, proposed by de Gaulle in 1961. It was drawn up by Christian Fouchet, at the time France’s ambassador to Denmark. The idea was to form a new “Union of States”, an intergovernmental alternative to core Europe. The General feared a loss of national influence in the EEC. Due to the success of the Communities and the lack of enthusiasm for this idea outside France, the Fouchet Plan never became a serious alternative. See for instance Araujo 1967 and Soutou 1997. See for example GBBLO, box c. 5019/165: 175–176. PRO, CAB 128/43, Cabinet statement by Michael Stewart, 17 October 1968. EURM’s remit was the application for membership. PREM 13/2627, MISC 224 – European Policy, 15 October 1968. The Italian government later drew up a paper embodying the Harmel proposals. LAM, International Dept., ID/1970–71/15, Report Tom McNally, 3 November 1970. The British Conservative Party also joined the Action Committee. PRO, RREM 13/2628, Palliser to Stewart, 1 February 1969. On 18 January 1956, the first meeting of the Action Committee was held in Paris. The Committee was founded by Jean Monnet on 13 October 1955 after he had announced his decision to resign as President of the High Authority of the ECSC in November 1954. At the end of the first meeting, the Committee adopted its first resolution, in which it welcomed the work being car-

All or nothing

131

Tom McNally at the Labour Party’s International Department maintained Labour had benefited from membership by being in contact with high-level individuals in core Europe, and also by obtaining expert opinion on major problems and gaining access to confidential briefings. Monnet himself had been a source of information for the British government. The wide range of contacts Monnet and his colleagues enjoyed made the Secretariat of the Action Committee a unique source of “inside information” not only from within core Europe, but also from inside the various governments and parties. Besides, the opportunities for such informal exchange were “invaluable” in opposition “with many channels closed”, as was the case for Labour in the wake of the June 1970 general election defeat. Thus it was seen as an important source of information and high-level research, and membership did not involve any commitments or propaganda functions, as did for example the Common Market Safeguards Committee and the Labour Committee for Europe. Consequently, by participating the party would not be financing one side only.42 Despite these initiatives, no major changes or breakthrough occurred during 1968. Wilson frequently reiterated that Britain’s long-term ambition to join the Communities remained top priority, however, and would continue to do so. Other alternatives did not exist.43 Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart shared Wilson’s ideas on policy and strategy. The veto was an “unnecessary, profitless and harmful pause on the road towards the goal of unity”, he claimed in May 1968.44 After his appointment he immediately wrote to his European colleagues, emphasising his commitment to the British application. The change allowed for a new style, however, and his less abrasive approach allegedly eased relations with his European colleagues.45 Although the reshuffle did not have the capacity to shake de Gaulle’s position, it is likely that the replacement of Brown with Stewart had such effects due to the former ’s handling of the immediate post-veto debacle. Labour ’s 1968 Annual Conference, held in Blackpool in October, emphasised, according to Gwyn Morgan, that the “problems of Europe and the problems of Britain are identical”, underlining the urgency and importance of Britain’s membership bid.46 Likewise, the Queen’s Speech at the opening of parliament at the end of October stated the government would maintain its application for membership of the EC and that it would promote measures of cooperation in keeping with this.

42 43

44 45 46

ried out in Brussels by the Intergovernmental Committee established by the Messina Conference. See Pisani 1969 and http://www.ena.lu/meeting_action_committee_united_states_europe_pathe_18_january_1956-022500127.html, retrieved on 4 March 2014. LAM, International Dept., ID/1970–71/15, Report Tom McNally, 3 November 1970. See for instance PRO, PREM 13/2104, talks Wilson–Commission president Rey, 25 June 1968, PREM 13/2090, Monnet’s visit to UK, 12 July 1968, RPEM 13/2443, Conversation Stewart– Governor Scranton, 5 October 1968 and CAB 128/43, minutes Cabinet meeting, secret, 17 October 1968. PRO, FCO 9/276, Talks Michael Stuart–Danish foreign minister Nyboe Andersen, Copenhagen, 14 May 1968. According to Pine, he was more sensitive to the needs and anxieties of friends on the continent. Pine 2007: 64. LAM, International Dept., Report Gwyn Morgan from Labour ’s 31 September–4 October 1968 annual conference, 25 October 1968.

132

Not Taking No for an Answer

Having obtained cabinet authority to pursue his policy, Wilson also used all tools at his disposal to keep the fervent Eurosceptics at bay. Moreover, the impatience of the Five was growing, which in the longer run probably would serve Britain’s membership ambitions, as de Gaulle would not be in position ad infinitum. Two independent events during 1968 had the potential to undermine the conditions on which the veto rested. First, the May 1968 events in France had the potential to weaken de Gaulle’s authority and thus his grip on foreign policy. Second, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August boosted British hopes for changes in Germany’s European policies.47 The invasion reinforced a sense of vulnerability about German security, and this seemed likely to lead to intensified work for the cause of European unification. The possible weakening of de Gaulle’s authority could also be amplified by French foreign policy, with its focus on rapprochement with the USSR. Yet as the year was drawing to an end, these events did not undermine the veto. While minor changes in German perceptions of the British application became apparent, the French and de Gaulle doggedly adhered to their European policy, in effect obstructing UK membership of core Europe.48 The year 1969 started by pursuing existing proposals that could facilitate Wilson’s ultimate objective of joining the Community, especially plans for intensified cooperation between Britain and the Five in various forms. Although they had caused considerable confusion, the efforts made during 1968 had produced some signs of progress, as Germany seemed increasingly to be helping the Five to overcome the veto. Yet the positive signs were abruptly overshadowed in February when UK–French relations reached a new low as a result of the so-called “Soames affair”.49 However, both the British and French authorities soon sought to play 47 48 49

Schwarz 1999: 159–86. See for example Swedish assessments of the situation. ARAB, TEA, box 085, viewpoints Swedish FO, 5 December 1968: especially pages 5–9. Brown had appointed Christopher Soames, a former Conservative cabinet minister and Churchill’s son-in-law, ambassador to Paris to improve bilateral relations with France. On 4 February de Gaulle received Soames and his wife at lunch at the Elysée Palace, in which the French president presented the British ambassador with new ideas on cooperation between France and Britain. The French president proposed that Britain and France should work towards a looser form of cooperation. The EEC would be transformed into a looser but at the same time a wider, economic association, in what could be perceived as an updated European free trade area including agricultural products, within which there would be a core political association consisting of France, Britain, Germany and Italy. This created a delicate situation for the UK. The problem was that de Gaulle could harm British objectives whether they accepted or rejected his proposals. Had it accepted, the British government would have betrayed the trust of the other Five, as argued by Young, while had it refused the proposition de Gaulle could argue that the British declined an invitation to start talks through which the problems related to European integration could be settled (Young 1993: 104). Wilson told Chancellor Kiesinger the gist of the approach, strongly against Soames’ advice as the latter had considered this a betrayal of de Gaulle’s trust. Just to make things worse, the Foreign Office decided to circulate an account of Soames–de Gaulle talks to relevant British embassies. After a short while the story leaked to the press, and as it unfolded in the French media, the British followed by publishing the full version of the talks. This enraged the French. They first challenged the British version and later rejected the claim that an account of the conversation had been sent to

The end of the British European policy impasse

133

down the whole affair. It is difficult to assess to what extent the episode caused serious damage to Franco–British relations. On the one hand, de Gaulle was soon to resign, duly changing UK–French relations. On the other hand, the unfortunate affair spread and appeared in newspapers and media all over Europe, largely presenting Britain’s European intentions as genuine, and media comments tended to acknowledge the European ambitions of Wilson and the British government.50 Thus, to down-to-earth Europeans, Wilson and his close colleagues increasingly appeared sincere in their determination to join core Europe. The German position also seemed to have shifted, now focussing on the need for both France and Britain in the process of bringing about European integration. The maintenance of the British application is likely to have slowed down developments in the Community. The British still focused on going as far as possible as long as de Gaulle stayed in power, preparing for positive developments after his departure. They did not have to wait long. General de Gaulle’s days in power was drawing to an end. THE END OF THE BRITISH EUROPEAN POLICY IMPASSE In April 1969 the Wilson government’s EEC application had stayed on the table for almost two years, and had been effectively blocked by de Gaulle’s veto for almost 16 months. In the meantime Wilson and his colleagues had demonstrated their commitment to joining the Communities, although for long periods the issue had had a low profile in British political life. Yet de Gaulle’s resignation on 28 April 1969, following the defeat of his referendum to transform the Senate, changed the situation.51 Suddenly, Wilson’s long-term strategy came within reach, and it was bound to increase expectations in Britain about UK entry into the EEC – and also alarm the

50 51

de Gaulle’s office for verification and subsequently dismissed the idea of UK–French talks altogether. France also decided to boycott WEU activities. See PRO, CAB 128/44, meeting 20 February, PREM 13/2628, Soames’ talks with General de Gaulle, and telegram from Paris to FCO, 5 February 1969. PREM 13/2628, telegram Paris–FCO. Secret discussions about a full leak of de Gaulle’s proposals were held at the FCO on 21 February, PRO, FCO 30/415, 21 February 1969. For French press leaks, see Figaro and France-Soir, Friday 21 February 1969. According to Hugo Young an account of the conversation had been sent to de Gaulle’s office for verification (Young 1998: 202). However, on 24 February the Quai d’Orsay insisted that Soames’ account “n’a reçu, à aucun moment, sous aucune forme, l’approbation ni du secrétariat général de la présidence de la République, ni du Ministère des Affaires Étrangère”, quoted from Pine 2007: 120. See also Pine 2004: 59–76. See for example reactions to de Gaulle’s proposals in the German press. PRO, FCO 30/416, telegram Bonn to FCO, 25 February 1969. General de Gaulle resigned the presidency on 28 April 1969, following the defeat of his referendum to transform the Senate (upper house of the French parliament, wielding less power than the National Assembly) into an advisory body while giving extended powers to regional councils. Some said this referendum was a self-conscious political suicide committed by de Gaulle after the traumatising events of May 1968. As in 1946, de Gaulle refused to stay in power without widespread popular support. Yet the resignation has to be seen in the wider context of the student riots of the previous spring followed by widespread strikes. See for instance Ludlow 2006.

134

Not Taking No for an Answer

Eurosceptics. The General’s resignation “opened a new page in European history”, Italian President Giuseppe Saragat told Wilson, during a stay in London at the time of the French referenda and de Gaulle’s resignation.52 Speaking at the SI Congress at Eastbourne on 17 June 1969, deputy leader George Brown, declared that “just as it seemed that the road to European unity was blocked for years to come … history made one of its abrupt turns and brought us face to face with a new prospect”. To his socialist friends he pondered what strategy should be adopted to bring about an “ever closer union among the European people”.53 Unity in Europe had been blocked by a political decision, Willy Brandt maintained, claiming the decision on the applications for membership of Britain, Eire, Denmark and Norway could “no longer be postponed indefinitely”. He suggested that following core Europe clarifications, a summit conference should be held with Britain “before the end of the present year to work out the basic lines for future western European development”. He added: “We must get out of this state of stagnation once and for all … We must hope that … the French election yesterday will enable us to move forward.”54 Thus, as soon as de Gaulle was out of the way, Brandt told his fellow socialists that he would work for a summit conference towards the end of the year. It had to be discussed and coordinated with the other EEC members. Besides, he had to be careful until the pending German general election had taken place. On 15 June George Pompidou was elected de Gaulle’s successor, yet French European policies appeared undecided even after he entered office. Nobody knew the new president’s position on the issue, although he did not oppose British entry in principle.55 Neither did the new French Prime Minister, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, nor the new Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann, who was known to be a convinced European and even an Anglophile.56 In his speech, Wilson informed the SI Congress that he had sent congratulations and his best wishes to president-elect Pompidou the day before, expressing the hope that both governments could “work more closely for the unity of Europe”. It was his belief, he continued, that even greater than the economic arguments for an early and vigorous advance in Europe “is the need for a greater political unity in this continent – as indeed in others”. Valuable time had “been lost – in economic terms, in technological terms, in terms of the political unity and cohesion of this continent”. We are determined, he concluded, that to the “full extent of our possibilities we shall work to make up for lost time”.57 Brown added that there was “no time to be lost in starting to enlarge the community”.58 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

PRO, PREM 13/2629, meeting Saragat/Nenni–Wilson, 30 April 1969. IISH, SI, 259, 11th Congress Eastbourne, 16–20 June 1969, Brown’s speech, 17 June 1969: 8–10. IISH, SI, 259, 11th Congress Eastbourne, 16–20 June 1969, Brandt’s speech, 16 June 1969. For a Swedish assessment of the situation, see ARAB, TEA, box 086, Swedish FO, Promemoria, 5 June 1969. PRO, CAB 128/44, Cabinet meeting, 25 September 1969: 6. IISH, SI, SII, Harold Wilson, 16 June, Eastbourne 11th Congress of the SI, 16–20 June 1969. IISH, SI, SII, George Brown, 17 June, Eastbourne 11th Congress of the SI, 16–20 June 1969.

The end of the British European policy impasse

135

Soon after the French election, a meeting of the EEC Council of Ministers on July 22–23 approved a French proposal that a Heads of Government Conference should be convened to examine Community affairs in The Hague, including the enlargement issue. The only condition was that there should be no weakening of the Community. Conditional optimism returned. In a speech in The Hague on 4 July George Brown emphasised with reference to the British application that the UK aimed “at something far more than material prosperity. We see this leading to a greater political purpose for Western Europe. And if that purpose is to be realised, Britain must share it. We want, as soon as we can, to develop really effective political unity with our fellow West Europeans … We see it, in short, as power for peace.”59 On 22 July Stewart told cabinet that the “possibilities that negotiations might be opened for Britain’s entry … were now considerably higher than before”.60 In two well-prepared articles in the Guardian, Brown argued that on economic and especially on political grounds Britain would greatly benefit from joining the EC.61 In the meantime, the German general election scheduled for 28 September delayed progress on the enlargement issue, as did internal debates within the Six on how to consolidate the community and discussions over the CAP. There would be no progress without a Germany firmly involved in the process, and France hoped to exchange agreements on the financing of CAP and enlargement.62 In the German election the SPD and the CDU received 42.7 % and 36.6 % of the popular vote respectively. The former chose to leave the grand coalition with the CDU/CSU, and form a coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) instead. Willy Brandt became Chancellor, and this had the capacity to facilitate Wilson’s European ambitions and the socialists’ ambitions for core Europe. In his first statement to the Bundestag, Brandt maintained that enlargement of core Europe must come. “The Community needs Great Britain as much as the other applicant countries. In the chorus of European voices the voice of Britain must not be missing.”63 Brandt’s Ostpolitik raised anxiety in France, however, which only added to the drive for enlargement.64 On the other hand, for Brandt it would be difficult to carry out his policies towards the east without being firmly anchored in the west. By strengthening the Community institutions and enlarging the club, Brandt would be able to embed Germany more firmly into the EC framework while at the same time increasing the prospects of pursuing his Ostpolitik. Finally, Germany had become powerful in economic terms, adding greater weight to its core Europe policies.65 Opening the day after the German elections, the 1969 Brighton Annual Conference reaffirmed the 1967 NEC statement Labour and the Common Market, wel59 60 61 62 63 64 65

LAM, box EEC memoranda etc. 1959–61, 1963, 1966, 1970–73. Correspondence, 1957–62, Arrangement of material, 1969. PRO, CAB 128/44, Cabinet meeting, 22 July 1969: 3. LAM, box Common Market 1962/EEC Correspondence etc. 1955–66, Political and Economic Planning, 28 August 1969. PRO, CAB 128/44, Cabinet meeting, 25 September 1969: 6. Quoted from Pine 2007: 138. For Brandt’s Ostpolitik, see Geyer and Schaefer 2004. See Wilkens 1999.

136

Not Taking No for an Answer

coming the government’s “decision to apply for membership of the EEC and to negotiate satisfactory terms for British entry”. In keeping with the 1967 and 1968 conferences, it reiterated that the application was fully in accord with the “principles and objectives of the Labour Party”. The next decade, it stated, “offers a real prospect of wider European unity, and the political and economic institutions of Europe must continue to develop in keeping with this trend”. It assured that a final decision to enter into core Europe would be taken only after the detailed results of the negotiations had “been made known to the British public and have been subjected to the ultimate will of the British Parliament”. The statements did not intend to be a final declaration of party policy on core Europe, however. The question “of Britain’s application continues to evolve”, it emphasised, and “so must Party policy”.66 Yet, the conference approved Wilson and his closest colleagues’ policy of entering membership negotiations as soon as possible with a view to joining the EC. After the Conference, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart said he did not believe it was beyond the capacity of the British people to survive outside the European Communities. The economic position was stronger than it was in 1967. Yet that was not the reason why the British government should throw away an opportunity for a still faster progress that it wanted and needed if it was to fulfil the aspirations of the British people for a “higher individual standard of life, for better social services and for greater power to help mankind”. Nor could Britain rely on EFTA and the Commonwealth. The world would not stand still if Britain chose to be short sighted. “When EFTA was created it avowed as its purpose the wider economic integration of Europe. Several of its members wish either to enter or associate themselves with the Community and regard our application as a pioneer.”67 Stewart maintained the government would negotiate in good faith and in good hope. “It is not a policy of blind entry. We are resolute applicants.”68 In October 1969, the British European policy was influenced by four developments. First, during the British ambassador ’s first audience with Pompidou on 10 October, the new president told Soames that he was optimistic about the future. On the “big and important question of Europe”, Pompidou said he neither desired nor intended to use the veto. He was “convinced that negotiations should open with us”. On the whole, the British ambassador concluded, “I found this … an encouraging interview”.69 Second, between April and June, it had frequently been suggested in the press that the prime minister could not survive until the election. However, just as his leadership seemed to be in danger, his position began to recover, thanks to the 66

67 68 69

LAM, Report Labour Party Annual Conference, 29 September–3 October 1969. As de Gaulle’s veto still applied the issue was not explicitly discussed at Labour ’s 1968 Annual Conference at Blackpool. See Report of the 67th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 30 September–4 October 1968. LAM, box EEC memoranda etc. 1959–61, 1963, 1966, 1970–73. Correspondence 1957–62, Arrangement of material, 1969, 10 October 1969. LAM, box EEC memoranda etc. 1959–61, 1963, 1966, 1970–73. Correspondence 1957–62, Arrangement of material, 1969, 10 October 1969. PRO, PREM 13/2630, telegram Paris–FCO, 10 October 1969.

The end of the British European policy impasse

137

government’s handling of the crisis in Northern Ireland and not least by significantly improved economic developments. Third, on 6 October Wilson reshuffled the cabinet by bringing pro-Europeans into key positions while consolidating ministries dealing with the European issue. The president of the Board of Trade, Anthony Crosland, who had approached the Eurosceptic faction, was replaced by Roy Mason, while the ardent European George Thomson became Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster for the second time and took over responsibility for European affairs.70 The moribund Department of Economic Affairs, the prestigious 1964 instrument of national planning, was finally wound up, and the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, the Eurosceptic Peter Shore, was made minister without portfolio. After the reshuffle Wilson, Stewart, Thomson and partly Alun Chalfont teamed up in a forceful unit working for the European case at home and abroad. Finally, at a press conference on 14 October, the Commission President Jean Rey presented the Commission’s updated Opinion, reiterating that negotiations should open as soon as possible and that he anticipated a deal by the end of the year on the “linked problems of completing, strengthening and enlarging the Community”.71 However, the British candidature could not be considered separately from that of the other three applicants, he underlined. The member states were to increase “from six to ten rather than from six to seven”. The Swedish application would be considered only if the Swedish government was prepared to accept “without restriction” the political objectives of core Europe as set out in the preamble to the Rome Treaty.72 “Door now open”, The Times concluded after the 1–2 December Hague summit.73 The summit, in effect lifting the veto, was a significant event in the history of the development of the present EU. It was agreed to settle CAP finances according to French wishes and to extend the Community to Britain and others, as the other five wanted. It not only lead to the enlargement of the Community and agreement on financing the CAP, but also to proposals for deeper political cooperation and the creation of an economic and monetary union, by the so-called Davignon and Werner reports respectively.74 On 3 December the German Deputy UnderSecretary for European Affairs informed Stewart about the results of the summit. He said that the EC’s preparation for negotiations with the candidates should be finished before 1 July 1970, and that negotiations should begin immediately thereafter. Pompidou had given his “word of honour” to ensure that negotiations would

70 71 72 73 74

Thomson later became the British Commissioner of the EC from 1973 to 1977, with responsibility for regional policy. PRO, BT 241/2158, Background note, 5 November 1969 and BT 241/2158, European Integration, Brief B, Part 1, 29 October 1969. The updated Opinion had been set out on 1 October 1969. PRO, PREM 13/2630, telegram Brussels–FCO, 2 October 1969 and BT 241/2158, Background note, 5 November 1969. The Times, 5 December 1969. The political cooperation envisaged in the Hague communiqué, was substantiated by setting up of a committee led by the Belgian Davignon, in a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Six in Brussels on 6 March 1970.

138

Not Taking No for an Answer

begin by then, although no fixed date had been written into the communiqué.75 On the other hand, enlargement negotiations were closely linked to the ratification of the financial agreement on CAP. Brandt had made it clear that there was close relationship between the three points of completion, strengthening and enlargement.76 The Council of Ministers agreed in principle at its 19–22 December meeting on new financing arrangements for the Community budget and the CAP. Although it was not immediately perceived as a turning point, British hopes for entry were boosted substantially after The Hague summit.77 Negotiations did not automatically imply a successful outcome, of course, but for Wilson the promise to open negotiations by mid-1970 brought his ultimate objective of bringing Britain into core Europe definitively closer.78 His perseverance over many years was about to bear fruit.

75 76 77

78

PRO, PREM 13/2631, Communiqué, The Hague Summit, 2 December 1969. PRO, FCO 30/273, Conversation Frank–Stewart, 3 December 1969. The budgetary agreement had three implications. First, the Community would for the first time be provided with its “own resources”. Secondly, these provisions could be changed only by a unanimous vote, and, finally the introduction of “Community resources” would be accompanied after 1974 by an extension of the budgetary powers of the European Parliament. None of this, however, changed the British attitude towards joining. PRO, CAB 134/2826, Draft White Paper on Europe, 23 January 1970. On EC’s “own resources”, see Knudsen 2009: 167–88. See Ludlow 2005.

CHAPTER 9 THE VETO YEARS, EFTA AND A SOCIALIST POLICY FOR EUROPE This chapter examines how the Wilson government and its socialist network partners in Scandinavia dealt with the situation during the veto years. At the end of the sixties the context within which European socialists operated had changed. During the fifties joining the European integration project had been regarded an option largely at odds with socialist policies and economic planning. In the early sixties the centre-right leaderships increasingly saw it as compatible with economic planning at a national level, while in the post-veto period there was a growing understanding that planning also could be established at the Community level. This coincided with increased socialist strength in the EC, in particular demonstrated by Willy Brandt’s rise to power in Germany. In the domestic arena, Wilson’s ambitious economic programme for socialist planning had foundered as the government’s National Plan had been abandoned during the crisis of July 1966, anticipating the definitive abolition of the prestigious Department of Economic Affairs in October 1969. Developments within the Community – the Luxembourg compromise, de Gaulle’s departure and the pending enlargement – produced a perception that core Europe was at a crossroads and thus more open to influence than at the beginning of the decade. Besides, EFTA’s role was largely exhausted. The argument presented in this chapter is that a political consensus had been established within the transnational socialist network that membership was no longer perceived to be at odds with national planning and that planning could be introduced even at the Community level, thus indicating that socialisation had taken place. Ultimately, this produced plans for a joint socialist programme for Europe.

THE FRENCH NON, EFTA AND BRITAIN As soon as the British application was effectively vetoed, EFTA fell back on its initial framework. In the short term, with the application left on the table, the Wilson government examined if and how they could exploit EFTA. On 19 December 1967 the British authorities issued a long memorandum dealing with the role of the organisation. Its aims were to look into subjects that “might be worth looking at in the next few months, even if they have been considered before with a negative result”. Yet, it underlined, nothing should be done that could endanger Britain’s future chances of entering the EEC. Britain should take part in discussions affecting Europe’s future and thus influence to the greatest extent possible EEC decisions of concern to Britain. The intention was to build up the habit of cooperation with the EEC. In accordance with Wilson’s long-term strategy, it should also strengthen convictions in core Europe that Britain’s objective to join was sincere and that Britain was necessary to it.

140

The Veto Years, EFTA and a Socialist Policy for Europe

Such assurances should not imply showing too many good cards. Arguments for enlarging the Community might be weakened if the barriers between the EEC and Britain were further reduced and know-how pooled while Britain was still stuck in the “waiting room”. If Britain worked for and succeeded in reducing or altogether eliminating tariffs between the EEC and EFTA in sectors of trade where it would pay off, it could be the first step towards the unwanted solution of associate membership.1 This might amount to sacrificing good bargaining counters without getting anything in return. Thus, exploiting the EFTA platform was potentially a double-edged sword. Britain wanted to join core Europe, yet the admission was delayed indefinitely as it was explicitly assumed that it would probably be impossible to enter the EEC as long as general de Gaulle was in power in France.2 Meanwhile, Britain had to cooperate and trade with its neighbours both in the Community and in the EFTA, but not to an extent that reduced the incentives for enlarging the former. In economic terms, EFTA had been a mixed experience. Thanks to EFTA Britain’s home market doubled from about 50 to 100 million people. With the progressive elimination of barriers to trade within EFTA, British politicians expected a considerable expansion of UK exports to that area. Despite the tariff barriers, France increased its share of Britain’s EFTA partners’ imports from 4 % in 1959 to 5 % in 1965, while Germany succeeded in maintaining its position with 24.4 % in 1959 and 24.5 % in 1965. In spite of the advantages to UK trade within EFTA, Britain’s share fell back from 12.5 % in 1959 to 11.3 % in 1965. In 1966 the UK proportion had dropped even further. One possible explanation for these figures was that British exporters had concentrated on the EEC market rather than that of EFTA, despite Britain’s EFTA membership. British businessmen were, according to Eugene Melville, head of the UK permanent EFTA mission in Geneva, “only mildly impressed by the argument that EFTA is now little more difficult to sell in than the United Kingdom”. Yet the economic dilemmas were but one part of the argument. Melville also admitted that nothing should be done in EFTA that would make the attainment of full membership of core Europe any more difficult.3 Thus, in political and not least economic terms the EFTA era was over. The British acknowledged that the situation was “extremely delicately balanced” and that a push in the wrong direction, or over-eagerness, could all too easily arouse suspicions of British motives or even prejudice the success of Britain’s longterm European policies.4 The other applicants largely adopted a passive role, and were reluctant to press for collective talks with the Five lest this be regarded by de Gaulle as a hostile act. The Norwegian centre-right government was cautious in its reactions to the original British initiative with the Five in early 1968, and seemed to reconsider the possibility of doing more in EFTA, contemplating some sort of association with core Europe. The Danes were ready to support the British initiative with 1 2 3 4

PRO, FCO 30/33, EFTA: Can we get more out of it?, 19 December 1967. PRO, FCO 30/38, European Economic Integration: Action after the veto, Anglo–Danish Liaison Committee, London, 11 January 1968. PRO, FCO 30/33 122258, Melville to FCO, 28 December 1967. PRO, CAB 147/83, memo by Thomas Balogh, 15 February 1968.

The French non, EFTA and Britain

141

the Five, though they were not optimistic about the results. The Swedes were opposed to any attempt to put pressure on France through the Five, and were frustrated that the British were not keeping them fully informed about their intentions after the veto. As the Swedish government had not explicitly applied for full membership it feared it could be excluded from any arrangements or discussions involving more than the EC countries. The British regarded the Swedes as the “really delicate case”, yet not an isolated one.5 The UK authorities knew that the three Scandinavian countries worked in close cooperation on the issue. Economic advisor Balogh did not dismiss the possibility that they would rather focus on closer Scandinavian cooperation if they saw no prospect of a European solution within a reasonable time.6 Frustration was prevalent among the EFTA partners as Britain paid little attention to its EFTA commitments. The British government had, before launching the 1967 application, concluded that EFTA’s potential had been exhausted both in terms of trade and “bridge-building”. During the 1961–63 entry negotiations, the British government had committed itself to maintain EFTA until “satisfactory arrangements have been worked out in negotiation to meet the various interests of all members of EFTA”. This undertaking had been abandoned at the EFTA Ministerial meeting in London in April 1967, stating that this undertaking was no longer “appropriate in present circumstances”.7 When negotiations became increasingly likely, the British authorities were less concerned about preserving EFTA than they had been during the previous negotiations. It might prove necessary to discount the interests of the other EFTA countries “to a great extent if we are to achieve our own objective”, Melville had suggested in a confidential and personal letter to O’Neill.8 In the wake of the Soames affair, Britain directed more activities through WEU, which Wilson apparently hoped had greater potential than EFTA. In 1968–69, the British government’s attitude towards EFTA was, according to the Swedish authorities, “unenthusiastic, even negative”.9 Partly, this can be explained by pointing to the efforts made to deal with the French veto, as outlined in the previous chapter. Yet the Danish and Norwegian authorities, as well as the Irish, feared that Britain would enter unilateral negotiations with the EC.10 The British admitted that the positions of the EFTA countries were so diverse that it would take some time before links with core Europe would be achieved for everyone. “Our aim”, therefore, “is that reaching these agreements should not delay our own application”. British objectives should ensure that discussions did not “involve us in giving any further commitment to our EFTA partners beyond that which exists at the moment”.11 It has been argued that this indicates that Wilson and 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

PRO, CAB 147/83, memo by Thomas Balogh, 15 February 1968: 13. PRO, CAB 147/83, memo by Thomas Balogh, 15 February 1968: 13. PRO, BT 241/2158, Brief B, Part 1 for upcoming EFTA ministerial meeting in Geneva on 6–7 November, 29 October 1969: 3. PRO, FCO 30/33, Personal and Confidential, Melville to O’Neill, 17 March 1967. ARAB, TEA, box 085, Swedish FO, 5 December 1968: 8 and TEA, box 086, memorandum, 5 June 1969. ARAB, TEA, box 086, memorandum, 5 June 1969: 8. PRO, BT 241/2158, Efta ministerial meeting Geneva 6–7 November, 29 October 1969.

142

The Veto Years, EFTA and a Socialist Policy for Europe

the British government made a u-turn as compared to the “bridge-building” policy carried out during 1965.12 Yet as demonstrated in preceding chapters, rather than being an end in itself the bridge-building policy was a tactical move to take Britain into core Europe. The British government’s moves neither completely reversed the Wilson government’s previous European polices nor were they at odds with EFTA’s raison d’être. Even if Britain did reach an agreement with the Community before its EFTA partners did so, the British believed the others would follow suit and thus contribute to the strengthening of socialist influence in the Community. In keeping with British views, the Danes did not opt for the strengthening of EFTA. Neither did they see any point in pursuing plans for association with core Europe or any other arrangements short of membership. Visiting Copenhagen, Michael Stewart stressed that the gap between the Six and the four applicant countries should not widen. Besides, “we must search out and promote every kind of joint action between European countries which will assist us towards our objective of European unity”.13 The Danish government realised it could not just sit down and do nothing in the wake of de Gaulle’s veto. Either Denmark would enter core Europe or search for alternatives, economic under-secretary in the Danish Foreign Office Jens Christensen maintained in a conversation with Sir Con O’Neill at the British Foreign Office on 12 January 1968. According to Christensen, the Danish government was willing to consider far-reaching actions, as some positive proposals were required. That was the reason their thoughts had turned towards a “Nordic alternative”, even creating a Scandinavian union, Christensen argued.14 They considered putting forward a proposal either at a meeting of Scandinavian trade ministers in late January, alternatively on 11 February when the Nordic prime ministers were scheduled to meet at Harpsund, or at the Nordic Council meeting on 17 February.15 As suggested by Balogh in mid-January, an initiative for closer Nordic economic cooperation and integration (NORDEK) was eventually proposed by the new Danish centre-right Prime Minister, Hilmar Baunsgaard, at the Nordic Council’s session in Oslo on 17 February 1968.16 It was supported by the Scandinavian labour movement, as demonstrated by the 8–9 February 1969 SAMAK meeting at Harpsund.17 The Norwegians Reiulf Steen and Per Kleppe believed NORDEK

12 13 14 15 16 17

Parr 2006. PRO, FCO 9/276, record of meeting between the British Foreign Secretary and the Danish Foreign Minister, 14 May 1968. PRO, FCO 30/32, Europe: possible Scandinavian Union, conversation between Con O’Neill and J. Christensen, 11 January 1968. See also Sonne 2007 and Hecker-Stampehl 2009. The planned meeting at Harpsund was postponed at the request of Krag because of the coming Danish general election. At the 23 January 1967 general election, the Krag government was replaced by a centre-right government (Social Liberals, Liberals and Conservatives) headed by Hilmar Baunsgaard. Cf Sonne 2007 and Hecker-Stampehl 2009. AAB, DNA, box 455, Nordic Cooperation, Per Kleppe, “Our attitude to enlarged Nordic cooperation” (Vår holdning til et utvidet nordisk samarbeid), 27 January 1969 and AAB, DNA, box 455, Nordic Cooperation, Mentsen and Bratteli, 14 February 1969.

The French non, EFTA and Britain

143

would reinforce the “societal principles of social democracy”.18 In keeping with what the Nordic prime minsters had maintained, pro-Europe centre-right Scandinavian socialist leaders repeatedly stated that the proposed NORDEK treaty was no alternative to closer integration with core Europe, rather the contrary.19 A Norwegian report, elaborating the point, argued that in the short run intensified Nordic cooperation would strengthen the region’s negotiating power and in the long term be a “necessary condition” to safeguard regional interests in an enlarged core Europe.20 The Norwegian LO claimed the labour movements in Scandinavia welcomed NORDEK because of its political implications in an enlarged core Europe. SAMAK reiterated support for NORDEK at its 21 December 1969 meeting.21 The Wilson government considered the proposed plans to create a Nordic Union to have limited effects on the UK.22 EFTA had been created in order to bridge the market split between EEC and EFTA while keeping “Britain at the head of the queue as far as relations with the Community were concerned”. At the end of 1968 it was made clear that the British had got all they could hope to get out of EFTA, and that Britain was at the head of the queue.23 The unilateral attempt to join the EEC in 1961 and 1967, the 1964 surcharge unilaterally imposed by the new Labour government, its waiving of its EFTA obligations, indicated that Britain’s top priority was to join the Community. Moreover, the veto years clearly demonstrated that Wilson’s long-term European ambitions were membership of core Europe. The proposed Nordic Union would not change Britain’s economic and political standing, nor would it frustrate the UK’s long-term objective of joining the EEC. The British government had no objections in principle to the Nordic initiative. The impact of a Nordic union on the UK would, according to British officials and Labour’s leadership, be limited.24 18 19

20

21 22 23 24

AAB, DNA, box 455, letter to Olof Palme from Reiulf Steen and Per Kleppe, 24 October 1969. See also the chapter on NORDEK in the DNA manifesto adopted at the May 1969 DNA Congress. See for example expressions by the Swedish Trade Minister Gunnar Lange (Lange was not the foreign secretary as claimed by Pine. Pine 2007: 77), PRO, PREM 13/2112, FO to Geneva, 10 May 1968: 2 and discussion on Norwegian long-term policies within the DNA. AAB, FMA, box 0008, DNA’s long-term planning, 4 May 1968: 7–8, The World and the Norwegian society, 4 May 1968: 4, 18–19. The report emphasised that extended Nordic cooperation was “not an alternative to membership of the EEC”. AAB, DNA, box 455, Nordic Cooperation, Per Kleppe, Our attitude to enlarged Nordic cooperation (Vår holdning til et utvidet nordisk samarbeid), 27 January 1969. Mentsen and Bratteli, 14 February 1969. AAB, DNA, box 455, communiqué SAMAK, 21 December 1969. PRO, FCO 30/343, EFTA’s current activities, meeting EFTA parliamentarians, 28 September 1969. PRO, FCO 30/345, Britain in EFTA, 4 December 1968. In April 1969 Michael Stewart told his Norwegian colleague that “we favoured the idea of closer economic cooperation” in Scandinavia, and in June, Wilson explained to Erlander that “Our attitude was friendly and neutral. We would only be concerned if Nordic union involved significant discrimination against the UK”. PRO, FCO 33/827, talks Lyng–Stewart, 10 April 1969: 2 and PREM 13/2639, talks Wilson–Erlander, 5 June 1969. BT 11/6968, Meeting with Norwegian Officials in London 10–11 February, 30 April 1969 and FCO 30/343, 122258, Council of Europe Consultative Assembly, 28 September 1969.

144

The Veto Years, EFTA and a Socialist Policy for Europe

However, on 24 March 1970 the Finnish government declared that it would not sign the agreement, and NORDEK never came into being. It is not clear why the Finns, after having participated in lengthy and intense negotiations, declined to sign the treaty. According to Lasse Sonne Finland’s ambivalent relationship with the USSR, domestic political disagreements and the momentum brought into the European integration process by the Hague summit have to be taken into account.25 Yet the NORDEK initiative was not considered to threaten British European policies, because Wilson doubted whether it would materialise and even if it did it would not directly influence Labour ’s European aspirations. Yet, as repeatedly stated, if Denmark and Norway did not join at the same time as the UK, a British Labour government would possess less leverage to influence an enlarged Community, and this factor did possibly have the capacity to influence Labour ’s European ambitions. Initiatives with a view to intensify Nordic cooperation emerged at a time when efforts to produce a socialist programme for Europe also gathered headway. It is possible to view these developments as complementary parts of a broader development grounded on a joint belief in cross-border cooperation so as to carry out socialist policies in an enlarged core Europe. The foundering of the British government’s planning programme indicated that in an increasingly international economic environment – the inevitable consequence of the setting up of the liberal postwar regime – it would be difficult if not impossible to carry out economic planning and broaden welfare measures at a national level independently of what took place in a regional and international context. A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PROGRAMME FOR EUROPE: INITIATIVES AND DEVELOPMENTS While declaring support for extended Nordic cooperation, Scandinavian labour politicians, in particular in the DNA, undertook work to develop plans to strengthen socialist influence in an enlarged Europe. These plans were motivated by at least four developments. First, at this point the British and the Scandinavian parties no longer believed membership of the EEC to be at odds with planning, full employment and social security. Core Europe socialists had persistently and programmatically been in favour of deeper integration. Especially through the SI network, they had repeatedly insisted that instead of preventing socialist policies in the Community, membership actually contributed to upgrading welfare provisions. Although nothing was profoundly changed in the latter part of the sixties, the perception of the Community in the British and Scandinavian parties had certainly changed. Second, the EC was also perceived to be less supranational and more open-ended.26 In 25 26

Sonne 2007: 207–10. Federalist aspects were de facto if not de jure played down by the January 1966 Luxembourg compromise and de Gaulle’s concept of Europe de Patries, although the Rome Treaty remained unabridged. To reluctant socialists, this mitigated fears of deepened integration. DNA policy makers believed core Europe would change in a “desired direction seen from our point of view”, while the role and influence of the Commission would eventually, according to the

A social democratic programme for Europe: initiatives and developments

145

keeping with Swedish perceptions, Norwegian policy-makers declared that they were facing “a Community that does not really know where to go”.27 As a consequence, the likelihood of influencing an enlarged EC in a desired direction could be increased if socialist influence in core Europe were strengthened. Third, socialist influence inside core Europe had risen since the setting up of the EEC, and still had the potential to be reinforced. President de Gaulle would not be in power indefinitely, a fact that motivated socialist politicians and parties to strengthen processes of increased socialist alliance and cooperation across the EEC–EFTA divide in an enlarged Community. Possible socialist influence on the Community level was taken into consideration by Labour ’s centre-right leadership and increasingly by Scandinavian socialist leaders when dealing with European policy formulation.28 Thus, on the eve of the seventies socialist parties, trade unions and the transnational socialist network believed it would be possibly to carry out socialist policies in an enlarged core Europe. According to the former Norwegian foreign secretary Halvard Lange, by the mid-sixties core Europe had increasingly implemented “a mixed economy with strong elements of societal control in economic life and a highly developed system of social legislation and social security”.29 Finally, the abolition of the National Plan and the DEA implied that the ambitious national planning programme had largely failed. On the one hand it directed the British Labour elite’s attention to prospects of an enlarged core Europe and on the other indicated that it had become increasingly difficult to bring about national economic planning independently of what was taking place regionally and internationally. As demonstrated in previous chapters, the Macmillan government’s changed European policy in the early sixties in effect intensified transnational contacts and cooperation between socialist parties and trade unions in the northern European periphery, ultimately influencing perceptions of and policies towards EEC/EC membership. On the eve of the seventies, these processes and the prospects for enlargement produced plans on how to strengthen democratic socialism in core Europe. Initially, the work had been initiated by Norwegian labour politicians during the process leading up to the 1967 applications. Yet signs of a more active approach to this end can be traced back to the 1961–63 membership debate. As mentioned above, at a meeting of the SI Contact Committee on European cooperation and Economic Integration in mid-1961, Willy Birkelbach had declared that socialists would like to strengthen the socialist influence in Europe, pointing out that he aimed at shaping a socialist policy on a European level.30 Eventually, larger parts of the

27 28 29 30

views of the Swedish Ambassador to Brussels, be reduced. AAB, PKA, box 44, Per Kleppe, 30 December 1971. ARAB, TEA, box 086, memorandum by Grönwall, 16 June 1969. DNAs International Committee explicitly pointed to reduced supranational decision-making powers. AAB, FMA, box 0008, 12 October 1966: 10. See for instance AAB, FMA, box 0009, Our relationship with EEC, 19 January 1967, and ARAB, TEA, box 4, memo, Integration issue, 15 August 1966. Steinnes 2009. ARAB, TEA, box 082, Halvard Lange, Parliament, 23 February 1966. Author ’s translation. LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda etc., 27 July 1961, report from meeting on 2 July 1961: 10.

146

The Veto Years, EFTA and a Socialist Policy for Europe

transnational community became involved in the process as the likelihood of enlargement increased. The DNA leadership’s objectives were to seize what they regarded a historical opportunity to strengthen socialist policies in an enlarged core Europe. During the latter part of the sixties, an important strand of the Norwegian labour party’s European policies was devoted to developing a socialist programme for Europe. International developments, particularly the evolving Community, would influence whether Norway and other countries would join or not. One reason conservative and Catholic social parties and politicians had managed to dominate core Europe policy formulation, it was believed, was the lack of cooperation and coordination on the part of the labour movement and the socialist parties. Prompted by Wilson’s November 1966 decision to probe whether conditions existed for British EEC membership, the Norwegian DNA and the LO declared their support for membership and criticised the centre-right government’s indecisiveness and lack of support for the British initiative.31 While building a platform on which to attack the centre-right coalition government, the declaration also initiated a process to formulate a “social democratic programme for Europe”. Although the nitty-gritty on how to deal with agriculture and fisheries was important, it did not hamper the DNA’s efforts, during the 1965–71 opposition years, to develop plans on how socialists could “influence the European integration process” so as to achieve their objectives.32 This amounted to more than superficial tactical moves, as demonstrated in chapter seven.33 The situation had made it imperative to develop an understanding of “what kind of Europe we want to be integrated into”, the future long-serving DNA foreign minister Knut Frydenlund maintained in January 1967. He argued that the defensive statement that “we cannot remain on the outside” had to be replaced with the pro-active argument that we “want to join”. This would require “a political programme for our European policy”, in which examinations of the principle of supranationalism, the democratic structure of core Europe, the future relationship with the UK and global commitments had to be carried out.34 In April, the deputy chairman of the DNA Reiulf Steen emphasised to Arbeiderbladet that the party currently sought to establish contacts “in all directions in order to adjust to the demands of our time”. An important part of that endeavour was to engage in “the development of an international community”.35 While drafting DNA’s 1969–73 foreign policy programme, Knut Frydenlund, in line with Steen’s suggestions, pointed to political 31 32 33 34 35

AAB, FMA, box 0009, European Cooperation (Europa-samarbeidet), resolution by the DNA, January 1967 and DNA biennial reports, 1965–66: 98. See also DNA report 1967–68, and minutes DNA biennial conferences 27–29 May 1965, 21–23 May 1967. AAB, FMA, box 0009, statement DNA, European Cooperation, January 1967 and FMA, box 0008, International Committee, European Cooperation, 18 January 1967. Author ’s translation. Cf. chapter seven and arguments put forward by Hans Otto Frøland that DNA’s increasingly pro-Europe rhetoric and polices were tactical moves. Frøland 1997: 199–200, Frøland 2001: 448–49. AAB, FMA, box 0008, Report on Cooperation in Europe, 18 January 1967, FMA, box 0008, minutes Inernational Committee, FMA, box 0009, Introduction Knut Frydenlund, 19 January 1967. Author ’s translation. Arbeiderbladet 18 April 1967.

A social democratic programme for Europe: initiatives and developments

147

party networks as an important arena in which to influence the international community.36 The NEC of the DNA adopted a statement expressing the importance of binding international obligations, which “provides us with the best opportunities to influence future developments”.37 If Norway joined core Europe, DNA’s strategy was to cooperate closely with groups sharing its values and policy objectives.38 As a result, transnational cooperation explicitly had to be intensified both on the Scandinavian and European level.39 British Labour policy-makers agreed. In the wake of George Brown’s talks with DNA’s international secretary Haakon Lie in Oslo, Labour ’s Overseas Secretary Gwyn Morgan emphasised that private conversations were the optimal way to maintain “essential links and exchanging valuable information between fraternal parties and between those responsible for leading them”. These were to be carried out as regularly and effectively as possible, especially while dealing with major issues as whether to join the European integration process. In such cases there was need for a “fuller discussion” than one obtainable by traditional correspondence. Morgan proposed to lay down a schedule for meetings in the context of the SI Contact Committee covering “the next six months”. This would “guarantee the kind of systematic exchange of views on this subject”.40 While forging cross-border social trust, such contacts also were well suited to facilitate activities and coordinate information in order to achieve common objectives.41 In Sweden, SAP’s socialist aspirations and aims reflected those proposed by DNA. An often-recurring argument against membership of core Europe, the longserving Swedish Minister of Trade Gunnar Lange told Aktuelt in 1968, had revolved around the fact that it was dominated by conservative forces. It was, he argued, “too pessimistic and unimaginative an opinion about the ability on the Left in the EEC member states to assert itself”.42 In general terms he pointed to prospects for increased socialist influence in an enlarged Community, and the need for a strategy to bring about such objectives.43 The DNA’s initiatives, carried out in the broad context of activities inside the SI, resulted in concerted efforts to set up a social democratic programme for Europe during 1969. In Norway, Trygve Bratteli, who had been elected chairman of DNA in 1965, decided to set up a policy-planning unit headed by Per Kleppe to examine and ad-

36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

AAB, FMA, box 008, DNA working programme 1969–73, 4 May 1967. AAB, FMA, box 009, statement DNA, European Cooperation, January 1967. Author ’s translation. AAB, PKA, box 44, Knut Frydenlund, introductory speech, joint meeting NEC (DNA) and LO secretariat, 31 October 1970. AAB, FMA, box 008, The global society and the Norwegian society (Verdenssamfunnet og det norske samfunn), spring 1967. LAM, International Dept., box Norway/Sweden, Letter Morgan–Lie, 21 August 1967. On instrumental and social trust, see Kramer and Tyler 1996. Aktuelt, 30 October 1968, quoted from IISH, SI, SII, 1968: 268. Gunnar Lange served as minster of trade during the years 1955–70. Having scrutinised Swedish archives, the idea of a socialist programme for Europe appears to have been of a more general character in Sweden than in the case of DNA.

148

The Veto Years, EFTA and a Socialist Policy for Europe

vance these ideas.44 Kleppe was instrumental to DNA’s European policy-making during these years, and travelled across Europe talking to other socialist leaders while carrying out his task. In keeping with expressions and views prevalent among core Europe and leading Scandinavian and British socialists, Kleppe saw no contradiction between joining the EEC and the parties’ ability to carry out planning and social democratic policies.45 Developing more socialist policies, Kleppe claimed, summing up the unit’s position in February 1969, included promoting societal changes by applying adequate political tools, which in turn required intensified research so as to obtain increased knowledge of power structures and policy-making processes in the Community. Achieving such knowledge made it necessary to participate in “international research cooperation and in channelling research results from other countries into our system” and vice versa. In collaboration with socialists and related groups in other countries, “we must … develop new forms of international cooperation and policies furthering our basic values”. DNA had to take the initiative in approaching other socialist parties in Western Europe, “suggesting that the parties should formulate a common European programme” with a view to establishing a common basis “for proposing a reform of European institutions and politics”. Only by joint action could western European socialists become an important alternative to liberal and conservative politics.46 SOCIALISM ON A EUROPEAN LEVEL: DISPERSAL OF AN IDEA Although not formalised within policy documents, the objective of facilitating socialist policies on a European level was becoming widespread inside the SI network.47 Recent developments, as was the case with the DNA initiative, must surely have reinforced such ideas. At its June 1969 Congress in Eastbourne, the SI discussed how to strengthen socialist policies in an enlarged core Europe. Although it had become an important objective for the parties and their leaders, socialist parties still worked on a national basis, as Sicco Mansholt emphasised. If “we as Socialists want to control and have an influence on the development of Western Europe, can we go on like this?” While encouraging stronger Community institutions, his answer was to increase socialist influence by establishing a European social democratic party.48 In keeping with proposals consistently put forward during the sixties, George Brown emphasised that it was “of the greatest importance that all the applicant 44

45 46 47 48

Kleppe was appointed Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Finance 1957 to 1962. He was head of the economic department of the EFTA secretariat during 1963–67. He served as minister of trade and shipping 1971–1972, finance minster 1973–1979 and head of the Secretariat for long-term planning until 1981. During 1981–88 he was general secretary of EFTA. See also Kleppe 2003. AAB, PKA, box 44, Per Kleppe, speech, 21 April 1970. AAB, PKA, box 25, Policies for the 1970’s, 10 February 1969. Author ’s translations. See for example article by Bruno Pittermann, chairman of the SI in SII, 1969: 4. IISH, SI, SII, Sicco Mansholt, Eastbourne 11th Congress of the SI, 16–20 June 1969.

Socialism on a European level: dispersal of an idea

149

countries should be admitted”. His fellow core Europe socialists argued that “political and economic unity should advance side by side”. They believed the European Parliament should be given greater powers vis-à-vis the Commission, and that “members of the European Parliament should be chosen by direct elections”.49 Wilson supported these views by declaring that even greater than the economic argument for an “early and vigorous advance in Europe is the need for greater political unity” founded on socialist ideas and societal ambitions.50 Wilson and his government thus clearly demonstrated the importance they attached to socialist planning and instruments by which this could be brought about on a European level. In line with policy-making in the DNA, the socialist community should “immediately and seriously” start to realise the idea put forward at the conference “in forming a socialist programme … for Europe”, Reiulf Steen declared in Eastbourne. It should spell out some of the basic socialist principles in the European context. European integration was sometimes met with scepticism, he maintained, particularly among young people, because they found it difficult “to see the socialist aims for a united Europe as distinct from the aims of the liberal and conservative parties”. He urged the Bureau to establish a working group with the task of working out a “socialist programme for Europe”, with a view to define what should be “the place and tasks for the socialist movement in Europe”.51 SI chairman Bruno Pittermann emphasised that it was up to the socialists of Europe, working with the SI, to “recapture the initiative towards the transcendence of national sovereignty”, implying a more politically unified Europe founded on socialist ideas and policies. After the SI Congress, Kleppe underlined the urgent need for a socialist programme in an enlarged Community.52 He supported core Europe reforms which aimed at strengthening supranational solutions buttressed by a European Parliament with real influence, which was in keeping with EC socialist objectives that had persistently advocated the merging of the three communities, strengthening the European Parliament and introducing direct elections and increased qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers. In conversations with Willy Brandt, Herbert Wehner and Sicco Mansholt’s Cabinet Secretary in the Commission, Alfred Moser, at Brandt’s home in Bonn, a DNA delegation discussed both the possibility and desirability of drawing up a social democratic programme for Europe, and how to intensify collaboration with core Europe socialists.53 49 50 51 52 53

IISH, SI, SII, George Brown, 17 June, Eastbourne 11th Congress of the SI, 16–20 June 1969. IISH, SI, SII, Harold Wilson, 17 June, Eastbourne 11th Congress of the SI, 16–20 June 1969. IISH, SI, SII: 196, Reiulf Steen, Eastbourne 11th Congress of the SI, 16–20 June 1969. AAB, PKA, box 25, Policies for the 1970’s, 18 July 1969: 29–31. The delegation was headed by Finn Moe. It consisted of representatives from the party leadership, the parliamentary party, youth organisations, the trade unions, the workers’ educational society (Arbeidernes Opplysningsforbund) and the Labour press. Moe, who was genuinely interested in European integration and one of the few people in the DNA who had broad knowledge of developments in core Europe, was foreign policy editor in the Labour daily Arbeiderbladet from 1949 onwards, UN Ambassador 1948–49, member of the important Foreign policy Committee in the Norwegian parliament and vice-chairman of the Council of Europe during 1951–52 and 1963–64. Herbert Wehner was in 1966 named Federal Minister for All-German Affairs in the CDU–SPD Kiesinger coalition government. When the SPD assumed power in

150

The Veto Years, EFTA and a Socialist Policy for Europe

Brandt was sympathetic and suggested that “Norway should lead the way”. Yet he emphasised that SPD’s role must be seen in the context of Germany’s relationship with France and the pending German general election. Moser argued that international theory, internationalism as a core feature of socialism, had turned into national practice, which had to change. In line with Mansholt’s observations at Eastbourne, Moser opted for more socialist policies to be carried out on a European level. He encouraged initiatives that would strengthen such policies in core Europe, and therefore promoted enlargement so as to include Britain and the Scandinavians with their “strong democratic structures”.54 The idea of drawing up a socialist policy for Europe became embedded within DNA’s party policy. Its 1970–73 manifesto, adopted at the Party’s May 1969 Congress, explicitly stated that the objective was to “initiate cooperation between Western European social democratic parties to prepare a European programme” on which a “Europe characterised by democratic socialist principles” could be built. Also, it unanimously approved maintaining the Norwegian EEC application and the taking of initiatives to influence future development in desired directions.55 Core Europe should be based on domestic policy preferences in the different countries, yet with a view to bringing about social democratic principles and policies on a European level.56 On the eve of the seventies, a social democratic programme for Europe had developed into a main plank of DNA’s European policy.57 Drawing up a socialist alternative for an enlarged Europe was not naïve “but realistic”, Reiulf Steen argued when preparing for the June 1970 parliamentary debate on whether to enter membership negotiations.58 Ultimately, a large majority of the DNA MPs endorsed the decision to enter negotiations.59 In the early sixties, few in the DNA believed it would be possible to carry out socialist policies as members of the EEC. By the end of the decade, the networked

54 55 56

57 58 59

1969 under Willy Brandt, Wehner became chairman of the SPD parliamentary fraction. Like Brandt, Alfred Moser was well known to the DNA, and was regarded a “friend of Norway”. AAB, PKA, box 43, report from travel to Bonn and Brussels, Kaare Sandgren, 11 August 1969. Author ’s translations. DNA, EEC issue, 43rd Congress, Oslo 9–11 May 1971: 329. See also AAB, PKA, box 44, The need for a European policy, (Behovet for en Europapolitikk), 7 March 1970. For a fuller account see: AAB, PKA, box 45, The labour movement and Europe, 57 pages, (Arbeiderbevegelsen og Europa, 1970–71), A Socialist Programme for Europe (Et sosialistisk europaprogram), 23 November 1970, and letter to Reidar Hirsti from Kleppe with attachment, 27 November 1970. See AAB, PKA, box 45, EEC questions to DNA’s leadership, by Helge Hveem at the Norwegian International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), 26 November 1970. AAB, PKA, box 44, minute joint meeting International Committee, DNA members of the Foreign Committee and PLPs EEC committee, 12 June 1970. Parliamentary debate on Nordic and European marked issues on 24 June 1970. 67 out of 74 DNA representatives endorsed the party’s decision to enter into negotiations with a view to join the EEC under article 237. The Norwegian Parliament had overwhelmingly approved the application on 13 June 1967 by 136 votes to 13. When Norway was invited to open membership negotiations with core Europe the decision was confirmed by 132 to 17 votes by parliament. AAB, DNA, biennial reports, 1965–66, 1967–68, minutes DNA biennial conferences 27–29 May 1965, 21–23 May 1967.

Socialism on a European level: dispersal of an idea

151

centre-right leadership believed membership had the capacity to facilitate national planning. They even believed in the plan to introduce a socialist programme on the EC level. Seen in the light of socialising factors as set out in the first chapter, it is likely that continuous cross-border socialist cooperation throughout the decade influenced the party’s leadership and subsequently the party’s programme. Policymaking on the issue carried out by Norwegian party’s planning unit had included transnational networking. Yet if British Labour Party policy-makers had argued that membership of core Europe would have got in the way of Labour ’s ability to carry out economic planning and its socialist policies, it is unlikely that the DNA would have incorporated such ambitions into its programme. Moreover, it is unlikely that Wilson and his colleagues would have opted for membership had they believed it would hinder the party’s prospects to carry out its policies. Implicitly, it demonstrates that changes had taken place in the revisionist British Labour Party leadership, largely comparable to observable changes in the DNA leadership. During the spring of 1970, two important events influenced developments. The veto was likely to be lifted and the NORDEK plan collapsed. Both directed the Scandinavian governments’ attention towards the EC. Alongside the British, the Norwegian and Danish applications still remained on the table, and both Danish and Swedish governments were active lobbyists in European capitals.60 Sparked by the NORDEK breakdown, representatives from the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian labour parties met in Stockholm, where Palme made it clear that any diluted version of NORDEK was ruled out. Sweden would not sign without Finland. Danish and Norwegian representatives realised that Palme had turned his attention towards making arrangements with the EEC.61 By the time, it was considered likely that the UK would enter membership negotiations with core Europe. The Swedish government intended to conduct future negotiations on the basis of the 1967 application, Palme maintained, which did not rule out applying for full membership provided the non-alignment policy could be maintained.62 During the spring of 1970, Palme repeatedly stated that Sweden explicitly kept the door open to full membership as far as it complied with Sweden’s neutrality.63 60

61 62

63

Palme had visited Bonn, Paris and London, while the Danish government seized every opportunity to encourage Danish membership. AAB, DNA, box 479, report by the Norwegian LO, 8 May 1970. The economic developments in core Europe were vital to the Scandinavians. See ARAB, TEA, box 038, The Swedish EEC policy is stable, 1970. In the early seventies, about 80 per cent of Norway’s trade would be with an enlarged core Europe. Approximately 60 per cent of the merchant fleet was dependent on the same market and almost 45 per cent of Norwegian exports of piscatorial products. AAB, PKA, box 44, Financial Times Conference in Oslo 24–25 May 1971. AAB, DNA, box 479, report by Thorvald Stoltenberg, meeting with Palme in Stockholm, 13 April 1970. They met on 13 April 1970. AAB, DNA, box 479, report Thorvald Stoltenberg, Norwegian LO, 8 May 1970. Palme repeated that Sweden intended to probe whether conditions allowed full membership in a speech in Bonn on 12 March 1970 and in the Swedish government’s foreign policy statement to the Riksdagen (parliament) on 29 April 1970. AAB, DNA, box 479, 1970/Nordic cooperation, speech by Palme in Bonn on 12 March 1970, 8 May 1970 and DNA, 1970/Nordic cooperation, talks Stoltenberg–Palme, 13 April 1970: 2.

152

The Veto Years, EFTA and a Socialist Policy for Europe

Whether Swedish membership of the EEC was compatible with its non-alignment policy was unclear. “So far, we have been unable to get a clear answer from the EEC on this point”, SAP’s former international secretary Kaj Björk emphasised in a speech to the Council of Europe.64 Yet in keeping with policy formulation since the early sixties, the 1970 election manifesto, the Kramforsmanifest, stated that Sweden’s relations with the EC should not deflect the SAP from carrying out socialist policies, including a commercial policy favouring economic growth in developing countries.65 According to the DNA, Sweden’s perception of and its position vis-à-vis core Europe and the EC countries’ perception of Sweden had changed substantially compared with the 1961–63 period. To many people, these changes and Palme’s bold expressions and activities across Europe had come as a surprise.66 In keeping with socialist planning, Palme, talking to his Scandinavian socialist fellows, emphasised the hope that the Scandinavian labour parties would jointly be able to prepare a programme “for the social democratic parties within the EEC” built on socialist principles. Turning the ideas into politics was crucial. Individuals in and on the margins of core Europe labour movements took part in preparations to bring about plans for introducing more socialist policies in an enlarged Community.67 According to Per Kleppe, possible partners covered socialist parties, trade unions, the Liaison Bureau of the Social Democratic Parties of the European Community (LBSDEC) and the SI. Neither did he rule out close cooperation with left-wing Catholic forces, which in political terms were “fully in accordance with our point of view”.68 In line with British Labour leaders’ views, he did not see anything in the Rome Treaty that prevented economic planning. Although the work was in its infancy, the Scandinavian labour parties decided to put together a study group including representatives from the parties’ research departments.69 The DNA and SAP, moreover, had arranged conferences in continental Europe during 1969 in order to elaborate the idea to set up a socialist programme for Europe.70 From 1970 onwards, Scandinavian socialists intensified this work, arranging conferences in Germany, France, Norway, Austria and Britain with a view to defining European socialist policies and drawing up a socialist programme for an enlarged EC.71 Overall, these activities indicate that 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71

ARAB, TEA, box 086, speech by Kaj Björk, 28 January 1970, and memorandum, Kaj Björk, 6 February 1970. ARAB, TEA, box 038, The Swedish EEC policy is stable, 1970. AAB, PKA, box 44, Speech Per Kleppe, Oslo Arbeidersamfunn, 21 April 1970: 4. Speech by Per Kleppe to Oslo Arbeidersamfunn. AAB, PKA, box 44, 21 April 1970: 10. AAB, PKA, box 45, Kleppe, answer to Helge Hveem, 26 November 1970: 3. Author ’s translation. The study group – consisting of Per Kleppe, DNA, K. B. Anderson and Søren Hansen, SD, Bo Elmgren, SAP and Ulf Sundqvist and Paavo Lipponen, FSDP – first met on 16 March 1970. AAB, PKA, box 25, report, 23–24 April 1970. In Germany and France. AAB, PKA, box 44, European Socialist Policy (Sosialistisk Europapolitikk), 12 May 1970. The material does not spell out the content of these talks, however. Yet the activities indicate that Scandinavian socialists actively worked hard to realise a socialist programme for Europe. Moreover, the idea of such a programme was disseminated through publications. See for exam-

Socialism on a European level: dispersal of an idea

153

the idea to coordinate socialist policies on a European level had become established. Growing out of the foundered British Labour government’s planning ambitions and increased pro-Europe sentiments in the transnational socialist network, combined with a Community believed to be susceptible to influence and EFTA’s depleted role, the transnational socialist network increasingly opted for Europeanlevel planning and socialist polices.

ple Per Kleppe, Ny Politik, no 10, November 1971. Also the Scandinavian social democratic ideological journals, Sweden (Tiden), Denmark (Ny politik) and Norway (Sosialistisk perspektiv), intensified contact and cooperation over European integration. The editors encouraged articles to be circulated on the different countries’ EEC debates. They also agreed on the need for more transnational cooperation, exchange of articles, information and cartoons to be circulated. Tiden, Ny politik and Sosialistisk perspektiv circulated between 4000–5000 copies each. The FSDP was about to publish a similar journal called Aikamekki. See ARAB, SAMAK, box 10, report meeting of editors in the social democratic parties journals, Copenhagen, 15 January 1971, 1 February 1971.

CHAPTER 10 OPPOSITION, ENLARGEMENT AND THE EUROPEAN POLICY With de Gaulle out of French politics, this chapter deals with the enlargement process, Labour ’s return to opposition and the membership issue. It examines Labour ’s and British European policy with a view to determining to what extent the change of government influenced the membership issue, and explores the transnational socialist community’s policies for an enlarged Community. As opposed to most accounts, it argues that there was no discontinuity between the European policies of Wilson and Heath, and that Labour ’s European policy did not change in the immediate wake of the general election. In keeping with arguments presented in previous chapters it shows that Wilson and the party’s networked centre-right elite maintained their membership efforts, still aiming at introducing more socialist policies in an enlarged Europe. The chapter also confirms that the idea of bringing about a socialist programme for Europe had become embedded in large parts of the established transnational socialist community, and that once enlargement became a realistic alternative it took new initiatives in order to strengthen core Europe socialist policies. The European Community was no longer believed to be a conservative club implacably opposed to economic planning, welfare provisions and social equality. The time had come, it was believed, for European socialists to work together to create a common platform upon which socialist policies and economic planning within an expanded Community could be coordinated and carried out. PREPARING FOR NEGOTIATIONS With real prospects for enlargement, both core Europe and Britain had to prepare before entering negotiations. The British position was set out in a lengthy white paper Britain and the European Communities: An Economic Assessment, which Wilson presented to the House of Commons on 10 February 1970. It did not deny that the costs in economic terms would be considerable, but relied on the arguments that joining would simulate growth to enable Britain to bear the cost and that the political considerations would outweigh the economic. When the white paper had been discussed in the cabinet on 3 February, Barbara Castle recorded in her diary that despite the modifications that had been made in the document, “the cost of entry stands out in all its stark unpleasantness”.1 Denis Healey claimed that the argument of growth was the key to the question, yet calculations showed that membership was not necessarily synonymous with growth since some EFTA countries had done better outside core Europe than those inside. Displaying the economic costs through the white paper also had instrumental aims seen in the light of the 1

Castle 1990: 383.

156

Opposition, Enlargement and the European Policy

upcoming negotiations. If the economic impact proved to be severe, the British negotiating position would be strengthened. Wilson maintained that all the paragraphs in the white paper were a matter for debate, but concluded that “nothing here changes the grounds on which we decided to go in”.2 Again, Wilson underlined his determination while emphasising the political incentives for joining. In the Community two issues were important. First, all member countries were determined that “completion” should be reached within the Community before enlargement negotiations began.3 Second, the Six had to agree on the form that negotiations should take. The British government agreed to refrain from suggesting how the Six should “conduct their negotiations with us”, as the Germans, Dutch and Italians were fully aware of their negotiating preferences. It was agreed to discuss the issue with Brandt during his forthcoming visit to Britain and at “other suitable occasions”.4 UK–German relations were reported to be as good as ever. Socialist politicians, who had risen to power in Bonn and London respectively, had for many years cultivated close contacts and cooperation inside an increasingly bonded transnational network. “For the first time in history”, Stewart confided to Wilson, “we have a German Government about whose attitude towards Britain there are no lurking doubts and to whose Chancellor we can talk pretty well without inhibitions”.5 Procedures were but one aspect of the challenges, but the most important was to get into the Community. One dilemma was related to the question whether negotiations should be held with the four applicants at the same time. The EFTA countries expected consultation to be as full as in 1961–63, yet the British government had lowered its ambitions vis-à-vis EFTA. By the spring of 1970, when negotiations appeared a realistic prospect, the government rather wished to be in “particularly close touch with Denmark and Norway who were also candidates for full membership”.6 The Danish, along with the Irish, were anxious that they should enter at the same time or as soon as possible when Britain joined. Either Danish or Norwegian authorities viewed the negotiated plan for closer Nordic cooperation an alternative to membership. BRITISH EUROPEAN POLICY: CONTINUITY The veto years had been tough for the British Labour Movement. The economic difficulties faced by the Wilson government since it took office had placed great strains on traditional loyalties. The trade union movement had had to accept a num2 3

4 5 6

Castle 1990: 383. It meant agreeing on future budgetary powers of the European Parliament and arrangements for a future European Agricultural Fund expenditure, and that agreement should be reached on issues like a common commercial policy, the introduction of VAT, the size of the Commission and monetary cooperation. PRO, CAB 134/2826, Official Committee on the Approach to Europe, 16 February 1970. Quoted from Pine 2007: 166. PRO, CAB 134/2826, Negotiations with the EC: Consultation with other governments, 16 February 1970: 9.

British European policy: continuity

157

ber of restraints, particularly in the field of wage bargaining. The party had seen some old established areas of Labour support melt away as the country protested against the tough measures the government had taken to cope with Britain’s economic problems. In local government elections, town and cities that had been controlled by the Labour Party for many years had elected Conservative councils. Public opinion polls and parliamentary by-elections had showed similar patterns. Despite the current trends for the party, Tage Erlander, in his address to the Labour ’s 1968 Annual Conference, emphasised that two years would be “enough” to win the next general election.7 He recounted how the Swedish social democrats had been forced to take hard decisions, how they had been defeated in the local government elections two years before the general election and how they had ultimately succeeded.8 His prognosis was close to how the 1970 campaign and general election would eventually unfold. The general election was announced on 18 May with voting to take place on 18 June 1970, nine months earlier than necessary. Much had changed since the autumn of 1968. The local elections in May had gone Labour ’s way, and opinion polls gave the government a good lead. Wilson had sailed through the campaign “radiating presidential bonhomie”, as noted by Castle.9 Wilson seemed set to win another term for Labour. Yet all was not well. For loyal party supporters, however, the previous years had brought frustration and failure. None of the great plans for reform had come off, and the National Plan and the DEA had been abandoned. Individual membership had fallen every year since Labour entered office in 1964. The PLP was divided and in May many Labour MPs had once again demonstrated their disagreements over the government’s support for American policy in Vietnam. Wilson tried to appeal to the voters over the heads of the Labour MPs and rank and file party members. To make things worse, just before the election unexpectedly bad trading figures proved damaging for Wilson. To everyone’s amazement, the ardent pro-European Edward Heath, who had had an unsympathetic press, won the election with the lowest turnout since the war. Although the Conservatives had fewer votes than in 1951, 1955 or 1959, they gained a majority of 43 over Labour, and Wilson and his party returned into opposition. The election had raised concern in core Europe about the predictability and the sincerity of British European ambitions. Seen from this perspective, it would be better for the negotiations to start after the election when the EC could expect to deal with the same British government throughout. However, since both the main parties supported British entry at the time, and Heath was a passionate European, a change of government was unlikely to entail substantial changes in British European policy, which was clearly demonstrated soon after the election. There was a high degree of continuity between the Wilson government’s preparations and the Heath government’s conducting of Britain’s negotiations. By the day of the elec7 8 9

LAM, International dept., Labour Party Conference in Blackpool 31 September–4 October 1968, report by Gwyn Morgan October 1968. ARAB, TEA, box 085, report, Labour Party Congress, Blackpool, Gunnar Fagrell, 31 September–4 October 1968. Castle 1990: 407.

158

Opposition, Enlargement and the European Policy

tion, the opening of the negotiations was set only twelve days after Election Day. Besides, the British negotiating team had been put together and the negotiating position largely set out. Thus, in the short term, British European policy was marked by continuity both at national and Labour Party level. Almost immediately after the Conservatives won the 1970 general election, Heath picked up the application from “the table” and made entry his chief foreign policy aim. Negotiations opened in Luxembourg on 30 June. The Conservative government’s White Paper, arguing that entry would benefit Britain, was published on 7 July.10 It dismissed the idea that entry would undermine parliamentary sovereignty, yet conceded that Commonwealth trade would be harmed, that the CAP would increase food prices and that Britain’s contributions to the EC budget may become a burden unless the CAP was reformed.11 In October 1971 the government introduced a motion in favour of entry in the House of Commons.12 The government signed the Treaty of Accession in January 1972 and Britain joined on 1 January 1973.13 The continuity between the Wilson government’s application and preparations and the negotiations carried out by the Heath government was obvious. The draft opening briefs prepared for George Thomson were adopted by his Conservative successors Anthony Barber, and soon Geoffrey Rippon, Heath’s ministers with special responsibility for Europe.14 Heath also inherited his predecessor ’s timetable and negotiating team and proceeded on that basis until January 1972, indicating that there was “no discontinuity” between Wilson’s application and its successor, as claimed by Heath’s chief negotiator Sir Con O’Neill.15 Due to Wilson’s perseverance and his decision to leave the application on the table, the veto had been lifted before the Conservatives took office, making it possible for Heath to pick up where Wilson left and fulfil his predecessor ’s dedicated work.16 If Wilson and the Scandinavians had withdrawn their applications, negotiations would probably have been delayed so as to give each side time to prepare, as noted by Pine. Given the emerging economic crisis, such a delay conceivably could have disrupted a Conservative application altogether.17 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

TSO, The United Kingdom and the European Communities, Cmnd. 4715, July 1971. LAM, International dept., box EEC memoranda etc. 1959–61, 1963, 1966, 1970–73. Correspondence, 1957–62. 18 pages selected texts indicating the Heath government’s policy on entry: 13. See also TSO, The United Kingdom and the European Communities, Cmnd. 4715, July 1971. It was carried by a comfortable majority of 356 votes to 244. After signing the Treaty of Accession the government published the European Communities Bill, which received the royal assent on 17 October 1972. Barber, who became Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster on 20 June 1970, was replaced by Geoffrey Rippon on 28 July following the death of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Iain Macleod, and Barber was moved to succeed him. O’Neill 2000: 9. This is also in keeping with arguments presented by Kitzinger, Pine and Furby. Kitzinger 1968: xi, Pine 2007: 1, 175–82 and Furby 2010: 28–29, 156–68, 289–99. This view contradicts a prominent strand in existing literature on British EC entry, including Heath’s memoirs. In his memoirs, Heath emphasises his personal role in the successful accession process. Heath 2007: 364–66. Pine 2007: 182.

British European policy: continuity

159

Nor was there a clear breach in the Labour Party’s European policy or rhetoric over the issue in the immediate aftermath of the general election. The party’s 1970 general election manifesto had stated that the negotiations “will be pressed with determination with the purpose of joining an enlarged Community”.18 The 1970 Blackpool Annual Conference reaffirmed the 1969 Brighton Conference statement concerning Britain’s application to join core Europe, yet emphasising the need for full consultation both with the party in the country and with socialist colleagues abroad in countries affected by Britain’s proposed entry into the Community.19 Against the advice of the NEC, a resolution altogether opposing entry received considerable support, however, but was rejected, albeit narrowly. As demonstrated, the reaffirmed 1969 statement in turn made references to Labour ’s 1967 Conference statement by which the Wilson government’s membership application had been adopted.20 To many Labour constituents, the conservatism of Macmillan, with considerable achievements during his years in office, contrasted with Heath’s extreme “Selsdon Man” conservatism, which according to the NEC showed “ruthless disconcern for the welfare and living standards of millions of British people”.21 Combined with disenchantment with the economic, industrial and international policies of the Wilson government, a shift towards the left was reinforced by closer links between the Labour left and trade union interests as a result of their common opposition to the Heath government’s industrial relations legislation and also Heath’s European policy. Eventually, the Labour left was able to capitalise on this by increasingly portraying the European issue in black and white terms. A statement by a party ac18 19

20

21

LAM, Labour Party 1970 General Election Manifesto, and box EEC memoranda etc., 1959–61, 1963, 1966, 1970–73. Correspondence 1957–62, Common Market – Draft Statement, NEC, 30 June 1971. Members of the NEC of the British Labour Party met with leading members of the socialist parties in and outside core Europe, including Willy Brandt, President Saragat (PSDI) and Pietro Nenni (PSI), Tygve Bratteli and other leading EFTA and EEC socialists. Besides, the party participated in discussions inside the SI and the Monnet Committee, as well as sending observers to the ELB. LAM, Report Labour Party Annual Conference 28 September–2 October 1970 and box EEC memoranda etc., 1959–61, 1963, 1966, 1970–73. Correspondence, 1957–62, Common Market – Draft Statement, NEC, 30 June 1971. LAM, Report Labour Party Annual Conference 29 September–3 October 1969, appendix 3: 379. As indicated, Labour ’s 1968 Annual Conference at Blackpool did not explicitly deal with the European issue. Report of the 67th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, 30 September–4 October 1968. As a general election was expected from late 1969, Heath arranged for a meeting of the shadow cabinet at Selsdon Park Hotel, supposedly a brainstorming session to shape the platform for the coming election. It was Wilson who came up with the term “Selsdon Man”, with its allusion to some kind of archaeological discovery, to describe what he chose to portray as a Conservative Party wishing to take the country back to a less civilised age. As he claimed, “Selsdon Man is not just a lurch to the right. It is an atavistic desire to reverse the course of twenty-five years of social revolution. What they are planning is a wanton, calculated and deliberate return to greater inequality.” This policy was marked, among other things, by raising NHS charges and rents for many council tenants, the ending of school milk for children over seven years of age, and high unemployment and high inflation. LAM, International dept., box EEC memoranda etc. 1959–61, 1963, 1966, 1970–73. Correspondence 1957–62, NEC 30/6/71, 29 June 1971.

160

Opposition, Enlargement and the European Policy

tivist demonstrated this by declaring that, if “the Tories are in favour of it, if Ted Heath is in favour of it, I am against it”.22 Disagreement over positions and policies increasingly became apparent among the Shadow Cabinet’s pro- and anti-marketeers too.23 The internal squabbling and tactical manoeuvres that would eventually emerge did not take root during that autumn, but the resolution opposing entry and increased disagreement in the Shadow Cabinet were early omens for the Europhile faction of the party leadership. MAXIMISING SOCIALIST POLICIES: POLICY FORMULATION AND NETWORKING In order to advise the NEC on the problems that were bound to arise when the negotiations to join core Europe culminated and terms would be known, probably by mid-1971, the Labour Party appointed a joint committee from the Home Policy department and the International department – the Joint Committee on the Common Market (JCCM).24 Its purpose was to reflect and inform rather than set out definite positions and answers, thus initiating further studies on a range of topics.25 A prioritised issue was to analyse the prospects for socialist policies and socialist party and trade union cooperation in an enlarged Community, indicating that the idea that had been initiated and elaborated within the transnational network also had struck root in the Labour Party.26 The JCCM emphasised that cooperation between the socialist parties inside core Europe at present took place mainly in two arenas: first through the means of the European Liaison Bureau (ELB) and secondly in the European Parliament, where the socialists formed a fairly cohesive, close-knit group.27 Labour was already represented on the ELB as an observer. The Committee empha22 23 24

25

26 27

Quoted from Robins 1979: 82 Ziegler 1993: 371. The JCCM met for the first time on 9 February 1971. Members of the Committee were D. Healey (chairman), J. Callaghan, F. Allaun, J. Chalmers, Lady White, W. Simpson, E. Padley, A. Cunningham, J. Gormley, Mrs L. M. Jeger, H. Wilson, H. Lever, R. Jenkins, I. Mikardo and A. W. Benn; Miss J. Quinn and Mr P. Walker joint secretaries. See for example RD. 59 on further studies on the topic, RD. 89 on Trade Unions and the Free Flow of Labour (and revised version), RD. 90 on the effects of the EEC on the social services, RD. 91 on the effects on trade with the outside world, RD. 93 on the effects on regional policy, RD. 89 dealing with low tariffs and the economics of what it offered to British industry, RD. 98 on the movement of capital, and papers on political implications for entry, the relations of an enlarged core Europe with Comecon and the US, and the effects on the public sector. LAM, JCCM, spring 1971. LAM, JCCM, Minute & Papers, 1 March 1971. The ELB (formally the Liaison Bureau of the Social Democratic Parties of the European Community) was a body set up in 1957 among the social democratic and socialist parties of the EEC. Initially, it consisted of the German SPD, the Netherlands PvdA, the Belgian PSB/SP, the Luxembourg Socialist Labour Party POSL/LSAP, the French SFIO and the Italian PSDI. Its first chairman was Pierre Comin, acting general secretary of the SFIO. In 1974, in the process of incorporating the socialist parties of the enlarged Community, the ELB was renamed the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community (CSPEC).

Maximising socialist policies: policy formulation and networking

161

sised that socialist cooperation within core Europe was dependent, to a great extent, on the success of the socialist parties in elections, both at national and regional level. “If a majority of the member countries of the EEC had social democratic governments”, the JCCM stated, “the effectiveness of socialist cooperation would be greatly enhanced”.28 The ELB’s overall ambition was to coordinate collaboration among socialist parties in core Europe so as to facilitate the implementation of more socialist policies in the Community. Yet a socialist agenda for Europe had slim prospects for success as long as de Gaulle was able to block any institutional change, as demonstrated by the empty chair crisis. Frustrated by the Luxembourg compromise, the ELB had turned its attention to the internal evolution of party coordination during the latter part of the sixties. It had called for greater cooperation between national parties and for the establishment of regular contacts between the national parties’ research bodies to see whether a revision of the ELB’s structure could enable it to “give a positive lead to socialist policy at a community level”.29 As long as de Gaulle stayed in power, blocking further core Europe political integration and enlargement, there were insufficient incentives for national parties to be interested in closer party cooperation. During 1969, however, in the wake of de Gaulle’s resignation in April, the October victory of Willy Brandt and the SPD and the December Hague Summit – the latter opening the door to enlargement, renewing core Europe’s commitment to political integration and agreeing to examine the question of direct elections to the EP – not only did the process of European integration enter a new era, but also the transnational socialist network planned for more socialist policies at the Community level. Trigged by the French president’s departure, a special meeting arranged by the ELB in Brussels with the bureau of the Socialist Group in the EP, the socialist members of the European Commission and several leading national party figures, agreed to pursue a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand the objective was to democratise the EC, and on the other to implement a new wave of transnational party cooperation. Democratisation in this context implied implementing direct elections to the EP. Leading members of the PvdA had put together a European Political Action Group to work for the creation of a Progressive European Party, and socialist Commissioners Sicco Mansholt (PvdA) and Lionello Levi-Sandri (PSI) had advocated the formation of a European Socialist Party. They argued that if no direct election were introduced, core Europe democracy would only come about by the creation of a “Common Market of Political Parties”.30 Besides, the president of the ELB, Lucien Radoux, and the chairman of the socialist group of the EP, Francis Vals, proposed to reform the ELB to give it a more appropriate structure.31 The political developments during 1969 induced the ELB to draw two conclusions. First, it agreed to expand its activities, holding six meetings of the bureau in 28 29 30 31

LAM, JCCM, Minute & Papers, 27 April 1971. Statement by the Berlin ELB Congress on 17–18 November 1966. Hix and Lesse 2002: 17. Hix and Lesse 2002: 17. See also EUA, GSEP 51, Vers un Parti Européen Progressiste, PE/ GS/21/1970. EUA, GSEP 50, PE/GS/125/69.

162

Opposition, Enlargement and the European Policy

1970 rather than the statutory four per year, while stating that the bureau’s objectives could not be achieved without a supranational structure for the social democratic forces. Consequently, the ELB decided to change its name to the Office of the Social Democratic Parties of the European Community (OSDPE), which only was altered to the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community (CSPEC) in 1974, while eventually incorporating into the organisation’s structures the British and Danish labour parties.32 Secondly, an important consideration, as declared by the ELB’s eighth Congress in June 1971, was the “conviction that the cause of democratic socialism will be greatly advanced” if Britain and the other applicant countries joined the Community. Enlargement was the “surest guarantee” that the integration process already started would “move towards its ultimate goal”, assuring the wouldbe members that entry did “not imply obstacles to Socialist activities in the important areas which continue to remain a national responsibility”. Once enlarged, the socialist parties “would be able to work more effectively to improve the social order by implementing fairer income and distribution policies and organise a system of democratic control of concentration of economic power within the EEC”. The ELB delegates found the idea and practical objectives shared by the socialist parties in the Community could “best be carried into effect through the most comprehensive form of European Integration”.33 In line with this, a JCCM study emphasised that core Europe and the applicants had systems that made internationalism in an enlarged Community an immediate practical possibility.34 Thus, as repeatedly stated by British – and Scandinavian – pro-Europe labour politicians, British, Scandinavian and Community socialists all believed that enlargement would strengthen core Europe socialist policies. The JCCM also took into account trade union collaboration. European trade unions, the Committee maintained, had achieved “a fairly successful degree of cooperation” within the framework of core Europe. First, there were representatives of the various European trade unions on the Economic and Social Committee of the EC (EESC). Although the EESC only had a consultative role it had to, according to the Rome Treaty, be consulted on certain matters by the Council and the Commission.35 Second, and more importantly, the socialist unions were affiliated to the In32

33 34 35

The CSPEC, which was founded on the basis of a document approved by the ninth Congress in Bonn entitled Towards a Social Europe – adopted to incorporate British and Danish wishes for core Europe socialist objectives – stated that its objectives were: the development of the social dimension of the EC; the right to work, through safeguarding full employment, the equality of opportunity, and a Community industrial policy; a more human environment, through common health and safety standards; social security in Europe, through the standardisation of social benefits; the democratisation of the European economy, through the common provisions for workers participation; and income distribution and asset utilisation, through a common incomes policy. An important departure from previous practice was the adoption of new rules of procedure providing for decisions to be taken by QMV. LAM, International Dept., General Resolutions, ELB’s eight Congress, 28–30 June 1971, SI July 1973. See also Hix and Lesse 2002: 20. LAM, LCCM, Political implications of the EEC, Minute & Papers, 27 April 1971. Of the trade union members on the EESC in 1966–70, 23 were from free unions – affiliated to the ICFTU, 10 from the Christian unions – which formed the World Federation of Labour

Cross-border endeavours for more European socialist policies

163

ternational Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) with headquarters in Brussels, to which the British and Scandinavian unions were also affiliated.36 According to the JCCM, the different union confederations had cooperated successfully in recent years. The ICFTU and WFL unions (Christian unions), having been in favour of core Europe integration since its inception, had worked together in their efforts to influence Community institutions and Community decisions. In keeping with the ELB’s renewed activism in 1969, built on its assessment of the prospects for more Community-level socialism, core Europe ICFTU unions – actuated by the same contextual developments – decided in April 1969 to set up a new liaison organisation, the European Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ECFTO).37 Its prime aim was to coordinate the activities of the ICFTU unions in the Community, and maintain close links with the ICFTU unions in the applicant countries and other non-member countries.38 Even the Italian Confederation of Labour (CGIL), affiliated to the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), supported core Europe integration because of the benefits it had brought in terms of the standard of living and working conditions in Italy. Also the French Confederation of Labour (CGT), which was also affiliated to the WFTU, although less positive, participated in the institutions of the Community. In line with the political branches of the labour movement, trade unions in Europe aimed at a greater influence in core Europe institutional life. They were very much in favour of direct elections to the EP and the strengthening of its powers.39 Finally, as the Community progressed the JCCM believed the various unions would have more interests in common, and this would “act as a pressure for greater cooperation and unity”. Ultimately, there would be increasing pressure, especially in the view of the growth of multinational corporations and European companies, for the trade unions to be organised on similar multinational and European levels in order to create an effective counter-force to these developments.40 Cross-border endeavours for more European socialist policies CROSS-BORDER ENDEAVOURS FOR MORE EUROPEAN SOCIALIST POLICIES As the membership negotiations progressed and the labour movement in the applicant countries became more positive about the prospects for socialist policies in an enlarged core Europe, dialogue continued within the transnational socialist net-

36 37 38 39 40

(WFL), and two from the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) – which was affiliated to the WFTU. From September 1970 three members of the CGIL were included on the EESC, as were two from the French Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), which was also affiliated to the WFTU. The core Europe ICFTU unions had approximately 11 million members, while the Christian unions (WFL) had about two million members. The altered international context: President de Gaulle’s resignation, the rise of socialist parties in general and SPD’s election victory in particular, and the Hague Summit. LAM, JCCM, Minute & Papers, 27 April 1971: 12. LAM, JCCM, Minute & Papers, 27 April 1971. LAM, JCCM, Minute & Papers, 27 April 1971: 13.

164

Opposition, Enlargement and the European Policy

work. At the same time as the JCCM took up its work, Labour ’s secretary at the overseas department, Gwyn Morgan, visited Paris and Scandinavia.41 In Paris Jean Monnet informed Morgan that he recently had been in “very close contact” with his many friends in the Commission and the Quai d’Orsay, and he was confident that the British membership negotiations would succeed. Through contacts with Monnet and his network, Wilson and the Labour Party were informed about details of the membership negotiations, for instance the likely level of British contributions to the finances of an enlarged EEC. In a long private conversation with Morgan, partly attended by the minister of commerce, Kjell-Olof Feldt, Prime Minister Palme confirmed that Sweden had considered applying for full membership of the Community but that full membership had become difficult.42 Even so, both Palme and Feldt strongly underlined that Sweden would have to seek the closest possible form of association with the EC if Britain entered.43 After Britain’s entry, they believed there inevitably would be a reassessment of Sweden’s future prospects. Morgan thought Feldt was under heavy pressure from Swedish business and industry, which were very much in favour of close association with the Community.44 Palme also claimed that among the Scandinavian countries suspicion and distrust about membership intentions prevailed, something that had been exacerbated by the NORDEK failure. However, this might be attributed to the fact that the Norwegian and Danish labour parties were out of power at the time. Palme claimed the French government, on the other hand, appeared to be very encouraging and friendly towards Sweden and Swedish interests. In Oslo, Reiulf Steen and the shadow spokesman on Europe, Knut Frydenlund, reported that since 1969 membership had been the dominant political issue in Norway, and that intra-party disagreement over membership was growing. They were uncertain as to whether the planned referendum on whether to join the EC would be successful.45 In the immediate aftermath of the May Heath–Pompidou Paris summit, Jens Otto Krag told the SI Helsinki council conference he “believed” the people in the EEC countries were “generally in favour of the idea of extending membership to England, Ireland, Norway and Denmark” with their traditions of democracy and “social outlook”, which they hoped would strengthen “the forces of social democracy on the Continent”. Nevertheless, Krag was aware of a “certain timorousness” towards core Europe in Denmark and Norway, “not least among those who profess democratic socialism”. He appreciated DNA’s recent congress statement maintain41 42 43 44 45

On 10–16 February 1971. Feldt was in charge of the EC matters. Morgan’s visit to Sweden included talks with Swedish parliamentarians, staff in the Swedish Foreign Office and with individuals in the Prime Minister ’s private office. However, the biggest weight was attached to his talks with the PM. HWBLO, box c. 1017, report from Gwyn Morgan on visit to Paris and Scandinavia, 10–16 February 1971. Letter to Wilson on 25 February 1971. At the time, the DNA was doing extremely well in the opinion polls, enjoying the support of 50 per cent of the electorate, and it returned to power after the centre-right Borten government fell in March. HWBLO, box c. 1017, report from Gwyn Morgan on visit to Paris and Scandinavia, 10–16 February 1971. Letter to Wilson on 25 February 1971.

Cross-border endeavours for more European socialist policies

165

ing that an important condition for participation in the European project was “the possibility of developing a democratic socialist society”, claiming the Danish Labour Party (SD) wished to adopt a similar decision.46 He reiterated that in his opinion it was a mistake to regard core Europe as a “capitalistic conspiracy that has as its chief objective the aim of preventing the social democrats in England, Norway and Denmark from carrying out their policies”. He felt it was just as mistaken to believe that core Europe “is a levelling machine that will ensure that the Scandinavian level of social legislation, education and wages is beaten down to that of, say, southern Italy. No such thing is built into the purposes or methods of the EEC.” On the contrary, he argued forcefully that enlargement and deepened European integration, in line with the resolution carried by the DNA, “will involve the strengthening of European social democracy”.47 This position differed from interpretations of core Europe on the eve of the sixties, which emphasises how perceptions had evolved considerably during the decade. In keeping with deliberations carried out by the DNA and the transnational network, Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli elaborated Krag’s argument, suggesting that it was essential to make clear that the labour movement had the capacity to increase its imprint on an enlarged core Europe. He noted that as a member of the Community, “we will pursue a coordinated policy, towards the same economic, social and cultural aims” – preferably “through a common programme”. European social democracy had been far more determined and dynamic domestically than in foreign policy, he emphasised, rarely finding its strength in a concerted and constructive policy for the shaping of Europe. He stressed that socialists must effectively eliminate the suspicion that well-organised cooperation on a European level meant the “abandonment of parts of the long-term objectives which our parties have formulated for the individual countries”. A policy of full employment, economic growth and fair income distribution had gradually been accepted all over democratic Europe, he claimed. “Today such a policy is supported far beyond the socialist parties and it has acted as a decisive incentive to the progress” of the postwar era, he noted, adding that a “socialist policy for Europe” should aim at an effective strengthening of the democratic influence on economic and political decisions taken by common institutions.48

46

47 48

In May 1971 the DNA stated that joining should offer “real possibilities of carrying out our programme for a democratisation of all parts of society, our new social policy, a profound reform within education and extensive improvements to the environment. It may be the opportunity for far-reaching social equalisation … greater security and enjoyment at work and a steadily improving human and material standard distributed with greater justice than today”. DNA, resolution on the market issue, approved by 212 to 71 votes, 43rd Congress, Oslo 9–11 May 1971: 330. IISH, SI, 572 Denmark, Jens Otto Krag, at the Helsinki 12th council conference of the SI, 25–27 May 1971. IISH, SI, 572 Denmark, Trygve Bratteli, at the Helsinki 12th council conference of the SI, 25– 27 May 1971.

166

Opposition, Enlargement and the European Policy

HARMONISED SOCIALIST UNDERSTANDING OF AN ENLARGED EUROPE Gradually, the idea initiated by the Scandinavians of a socialist programme for Europe had become embedded inside leading circles of the European socialist network. In addition, the appointment of the first social democrat, the PvdA’s Sicco Mansholt, to the presidency of the Commission added to the sense of an increased thrust for socialist influence.49 As it was generally assumed that the Community would be enlarged, maximising socialist policies became increasingly urgent, which in turn spurred cross-border cooperation. At a meeting of the SI Bureau in mid-November 1971, the SPD President of the European Parliament, Walter Behrendt, emphasised that enlargement was a “major political event” after which the Community would need a “completely new political dimension”. As a result the socialists would “be compelled to redefine its ultimate objectives”. He stressed that in the internal policy sphere there should be an equitable social development for the population safeguarded by a progressive economic policy – i. e. more indicative planning. In the external policy sector the Community should make its presence actively felt on a whole range of vital international issues. What he looked for was a “Community identified with peace and a Community identified with social justice and progress”.50 A socialist programme for an enlarged Community would involve not only specific policy issues but also the challenge of organisation. Only if the socialist parties could manage to “create the structures” enabling a socialist programme to be implemented in Europe, would it be “worthwhile elaborating such a programme in the first place”.51 The Scandinavian labour parties also intensified their discussions and collaboration on the issue.52 While making reference to the May SI Helsinki conference, at which it had been insisted that the labour movement had the capacity to increase its power and influence in an enlarged core Europe, SAP’s party secretary, Sten Andersson, reminded his colleagues that their influence had been greater on issues carefully coordinated by the Scandinavian parties. Therefore, the Scandinavian labour party secretaries agreed, it was of overriding importance to be in continuous close contact while dealing with future European integration.53 In line with this, SAMAK stated that satisfactory arrangements for all candidate countries were very important in order to maintain or even increase Scandinavian social democratic collaboration. In order to facilitate such cooperation and “future cooperation in Eu49 50 51 52 53

Mansholt was Commission president 22 March 1972–5 January 1973. Hix and Lesse 2002: 20–21 and ARAB, SAP, E5, box 055, Walter Behrendt, meeting Bureau SI, 15 November 1971. ARAB, SAP, E5, box 055, Walter Behrendt, meeting Bureau SI, 15 November 1971. Early August 1971, the DNA had decided to support the ongoing EC membership negotiations by 212 votes to 70. ARAB, SAMAK, box 11, report meeting Oslo, 3–4 August 1971, 23 August 1971 and SAP, E5, box 051, minutes meeting Oslo, 24–25 November 1971. ARAB, SAMAK, box 11, report meeting Oslo, 3–4 August 1971, 23 August 1971. It was agreed to set up transnational socialist working parties on a range of issues and to exchange informative material and individuals to facilitate the dissemination of information. ARAB, SAP, E5, box 051, minutes meeting Oslo, 24–25 November 1971.

Harmonised socialist understanding of an enlarged Europe

167

rope”, SAMAK decided to set up a liaison group composed of Scandinavian labour parties and trade union representatives.54 The British Labour Party and the SPD also agreed to deepen future cooperation on Europe. At a meeting in Bonn, the SPD suggested to Callaghan to establish a Labour–SPD party expert study group on Labour ’s position on core Europe. Having explained the nature of Labour ’s position on the terms negotiated by the present Conservative government, Callaghan emphasised that if the Conservative government succeeded in taking Britain into core Europe under the present conditions, an incoming Labour government would certainly demand a renegotiation. He thought it would be prudent for the EEC to prepare itself for such a contingency. Chancellor Brandt assured Callaghan that his government would “receive with interest any recommendations or proposals which the SPD might make to the Federal government” in the light of the expert study group’s work.55 At a meeting in Copenhagen, the Labour Party and the Danish SD agreed that enlargement would lead to more cooperation inside the labour movement, which eventually, it was believed, would increase their general influence. Crucially, however, was to what extent the Labour Party itself could agree on a coherent policy.56 “We believe that the time now has come for the European socialists to work closer together in order to create a common programme for action within an expanded Community”, Ivar Nørgaard, the Danish minister responsible for European affairs, told the June 1972 SI Congress in Vienna, “so that we are prepared” to push forward a Europe “built upon democratic rights for everybody and human equality and social justice”. A socialist policy for Europe was one of the main items on the meeting’s agenda. However, it had to be a pragmatic approach, Nørgaard emphasised, focussing inter alia on employment, industrial democracy, a better education policy, improved relations with the Third World and adequate environment policies.57 Before the Vienna Congress, the Scandinavian transnational socialist network had, in keeping with its previous decisions, coordinated positions.58 Thus Palme, in line with Nørgaard, stressed that a socialist policy for Europe “must give solu54

55 56

57 58

ARAB, SAP, box 051, SAMAK, 23–24 January 1972. Preparations to set up the group were carried out at a party secretary meeting on 6 April 1972. ARAB, SAMAK, box 11, report party secretary meeting, 6 April 1972. It was also discussed whether to resume the Nordic Labour Congresses. LAM, International Dept., SPD/Labour Party Expert Group on Labour Party’s Objections to Membership of the EEC, 7 June 1972. The British delegation led by former minister for European affairs George Thomson, and former foreign secretary Michael Stewart, included Lord Diamond and former deputy foreign minister Maurice Foley. The Danish delegation was headed by Krag and included foreign minister K. B. Andersen, economic minister Per Hækkerup, minister of European affairs Ivar Nørgaard, minister of trade Erling Jensen, finance minister Grünbaum and SD party secretary Ejner Hovgård Christiansen. The discussions dealt with developments in British European politics, attitudes towards an enlarged Europe and European regional policies. ARAB, SAP, E5, box 051, minutes Danish–British discussions, Copenhagen, 19 June 1972. IISH, SI, Ivar Nørgaard, 12th Congress, Vienna, 26–29 June 1972, 28 June 1972. ARAB, SAP, E5, box 051, minutes Nordic labour party secretaries meeting, 5 June 1972.

168

Opposition, Enlargement and the European Policy

tions to the problems that confront ordinary people in the industrial societies of Europe”. Social democracy was the only alternative to capitalism and had to include full employment, improved conditions for work, more focus on environmental problems, the extension of democracy to new areas of society and greater control over multinational companies.59 Other prominent delegates, such as François Mitterand and Bruno Kreisky, fully supported these ambitions.60 Mansholt reiterated his request for a socialist European programme of action, emphasising that “a programme of principles is not enough”.61 Brandt suggested that core Europe enlargement, “its progress towards an economic and monetary union, its increased political cooperation – all this has its own intrinsic value”. Yet no one could predict with any certainty how the future Community would look, he maintained, but the socialist parties and the trade unions would be faced with major tasks. Therefore, they should bring their ideas “into closer accord in order to complement the economic dynamism of the Community with the improvement of social democracy”.62 Moreover, Brandt maintained, the German government’s policy of reaching an understanding with the East was certainly not “at the expense of ‘Westpolitik’”. “It is no mere coincidence”, he continued, “that the Summit Conference at The Hague at the end of 1969 stood at the beginning of my term of office as Federal Chancellor”.63 In his closing address to the Congress, Bruno Pittermann stressed the obvious, emphasising: “An integrated Europe should be a socialist Europe and not one that would be lead by monopoly capitalism or by a powerful economic bureaucracy.”64 Left-wing Labour politicians opposed to British membership did not agree, of course, with the predominant views held by the ELB, the ECFTO, the transnational socialist network or the pro-Europe faction of the Labour Party. According to them, neither British nor Scandinavian membership had the ability to swing the balance towards socialism, either in the present or an enlarged core Europe. It was “breathtaking in its assumptions – and its political arithmetic”. If Britain joined, “electing a Labour Government in Britain would be immensely difficult”, they argued, “and it would only have the importance of a County Council election”. The argument was substantiated by pointing to the fact that only 28.4 per cent of the electorate of core Europe had voted for social democracy in recent elections, and if a core Europe of Ten was created the proportion would rise to a mere 31.9 per cent. Besides, joining meant abandoning the “socialist comrades in EFTA”.65 Yet neither the par59 60 61 62

63 64 65

IISH, SI, 263, Summary of Palme’s speech, SI Congress, Vienna, 26–29 June 1972, 28 June 1972. IISH, SI, 263, Mitterand’s speech, SI Congress, Vienna 26–29 June 1972, 28 June 1972: 8–10 and Kreisky, report of the SI Congress: 33. IISH, SI, 263, Mansholt, report, SI Congress, Vienna 26–29 June 1972: 41. As demonstrated by Bernadini, SPD’s Westpolitik also implied taking the political instability and economic backwardness of the Spanish, Portuguese and Greek dictatorships more closely into consideration by pursuing a twofold strategy of ensuring a democratic evolution while at the same time favouring the success of local social democratic factions. Bernadini 2009: 99. IISH, SI, 263, Brandt, Report of the 12th Congress of the SI, Vienna, 26–29 June 1972. IISH, SI, 263, 12th Congress, Vienna 26–29 June 1972, 28 June 1972. See IISH, SI, 637, Great Britain. LCE, 1968–75, Has Labour a future in Europe?, autumn 1971.

Harmonised socialist understanding of an enlarged Europe

169

liamentary systems in the different countries nor the strength of the larger parties versus the smaller were incorporated into the equation. Nor did it mean abandoning the EFTA partners, as several of them were likely to follow the British and enter the Community. As a rhetorical act it did serve a purpose, however. In mid-1972, when enlargement had become a realistic and likely outcome, the transnational network explicitly agreed on the need for concerted efforts in order to bring about more socialist polices. A majority of the centre-right elite in core Europe and northern European social democratic parties now believed it would be possible to introduce more economic planning, social equity and welfare provisions in keeping with the parties’ stated objectives in an enlarged Community. Nobody believed it would be easy, as repeatedly emphasised by Brandt, as it was impossible to predict how an enlarged core Europe would look. Yet, ideas largely dismissed on the eve of the sixties as utopian, had become entrenched within the very same network by the early seventies. Core Europe was, by large segments of the transnational socialist establishment, no longer believed to be a conservative club resolutely opposed to economic planning, socialist equality and welfare provisions. Rather, pro-Europe socialist leaders all over Western Europe united in confidence that an enlarged Community was an arena in which socialist policies had a potential to thrive and develop.

CHAPTER 11 WILSON AND THE FATE OF LABOUR’S EUROPEAN POLICY This chapter examines how Wilson and the Labour Party leadership handled the membership issue from 1971 onwards. It demonstrates that Wilson’s persistence and eventual tactical concessions prevented the Eurosceptic faction from blocking British entry, while at the same time facilitating increased socialist cooperation and influence at the Community level. In the wake of the defeat at the June 1970 general election, tactical, party political and electoral considerations reappeared, increasingly influencing rhetoric and policies on Europe. According to Hugo Young, “oppositionism” to British entry asserted itself again.1 The process resembled intra-party developments and priorities before entering office in 1964. Yet as oppositionism gained influence in the party, Wilson, trying to strike a balance between the factions, was eventually forced to accept that an incoming Labour government would renegotiate the terms and put them to the people in a referendum. Because the eurosceptic majority in the PLP had refused in 1973 to nominate the members in the European Parliament to which it was entitled until after the 1975 referendum on whether the UK would leave the EC, the decision initially frustrated the advancement of Community-wide socialist policies.2 Yet Wilson’s deft and perseverant tactical manoeuvring ever since taking office in 1964, as demonstrated by this work, ultimately secured both British membership of the EC and full Labour Party participation in core Europe. NO ACCESSION ON TORY TERMS When the Heath government published its White Paper on British membership on 7 July 1971, the NEC of the Labour Party, well in advance of the October annual conference, promised to publish a detailed analysis of the terms negotiated and circulate it to all Constituency Labour Parties (CLP) and affiliated organisations along with a definitive NEC statement on the party’s attitude to those terms. The statement was to be fully debated at the party conference. Yet in December 1970, the NEC, in response to a TGWU resolution calling for a referendum, decided by a large majority – in Wilson’s absence – there should be a special conference before any parliamentary decision. At the June 1971 NEC meeting, this was carried out by approving a motion from Barbara Castle to call for a special one-day conference on the EC question.3 It was only to discuss the government’s proposals and not make any firm decision on the entry question. 1 2 3

Young 1999: 260. Communication with Brian Duggan at the European Parliamentary Labour Party (EPLP), 1 April 2009. The motion was approved by thirteen votes to eleven.

172

Wilson and the Fate of Labour’s European Policy

The National Executive distanced itself from the policy pursued by the Tory government. Rather it emphasised that British membership of an enlarged Community would be an historic step “influencing profoundly the future political and economic development” of the country, and therefore had to be carried out from a position of strength and national unity. “A government elected by deception and clinging to office against repeatedly demonstrated wishes of the electorate cannot provide the national leadership necessary at this time.” The NEC acknowledged there were “differing views on how far any given set of EEC terms” would be acceptable to Britain. Yet a democratic movement “need have no fear of a public debate on these issues”.4 The NEC argued the special conference would serve as the launch pad for “the great debate we have called for, not only within the Party but within the nation as a whole”.5 Thus, in the three remaining months until the parliamentary decision on membership at the end of October, the whole labour movement would have the opportunity to participate in the debate on the membership issue. Apparently, the Scandinavian socialists did not fully grasp Wilson’s tactical manoeuvring at the time, as the nuance between opposing the terms and opposition in principle was hard to discern. Given the intensified internal strife over the issue, resulting in a tactical move to oppose the terms, observers felt the Labour Party was about to take a negative stance in principle towards British membership of the Community.6 Obviously, it was difficult to shake off this perception. Wilson repeatedly emphasised how, in his view, the Labour Party’s position on core Europe was “totally misunderstood”.7 Referring to what had increasingly been established within socialist party networks, the German SPD regarded British membership of core Europe “a vital step forward to orientate European integration towards social democratic goals”, the deputy chairman of the SPD, Helmut Schmidt, emphasised in a letter to George Brown. “We know that the present strength and the future of social democracy in Europe rest upon the close and fraternal cooperation of us continental socialists with you British Social Democrats.” He referred to the “stormy years” of the early fifties when the SPD had rejected joining the ECSC and “by that decision” had missed “the train to Europe” and became isolated for nearly a decade within the Federal Republic of Germany (FRD). The German labour movement had, he argued, by its strong participation in core Europe been able to bring about “very decisive social and economic reforms thus making, together with our sister organisations in the other member countries of the Six”, socialism a dominant political

4 5 6 7

LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda etc., 1959–61, 1963, 1966, 1970–73. Correspondence 1957–62/EEC 1971, NEC Draft Statement, 30 June 1971. LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda etc. 1959–61, 1963, 1966, 1970–73. Correspondence 1957–62, NEC, 30 June 1971. See for example Per Kleppe’s speech to the Nordic Prime Ministers’ meeting in Oslo on 8 June 1971. “A Labour Party Congress must now be expected to vote against membership by a large majority”, AAB, PKA, box 44, 8 June 1971. See for instance IISH, SI, Wilson’s speech at the 12th SI Congress, Vienna, 26–29 June 1972, 28 June 1972.

No accession on Tory terms

173

factor for transforming the Community “into a progressive body”.8 In keeping with the perceptions of Schmidt and the SPD, the Dutch PvdA also greeted the special conference wishing the leadership strength. It looked forward to cooperating with its “British comrades within the Community” while referring to the resolution carried by the ELB’s June congress, stating that the socialist cause would be greatly advanced by enlargement and British membership of the Community.9 The special conference, which was the second in Labour ’s history, met on Saturday 17 July. More than a thousand delegates, visitors and journalists attended. In his closing address to wind up the discussions, Wilson, in accordance with his longterm membership ambitions, said he did not oppose membership in principle but launched a harsh attacked on the Heath government’s policies and criticised the terms it had negotiated. Although a resolution opposing membership on the terms negotiated was proposed, calls for the conference to make an immediate decision on the issue were rejected.10 Per Kleppe, who attended the conference, noted that an essential part of the discussions, which he regarded as well informed and of a high standard, was if and to what extent it would be possible to carry out social democratic policies if Britain joined core Europe. Kleppe’s impression, which he discussed with other delegates, was that for tactical reasons Wilson adopted a semianti stance in order to fend off leadership challenges and keep the party united. Immediately after the conference, a pro-European faction invited the foreign guests to a dinner hosted by George Thomson. At this event, everybody anticipated that the government’s motion would be approved by parliament in October, Kleppe noted, as a number of Labour MPs would defy the party whip and vote for entry. There was no need for the foreign guests to be confused by what was happening at the conference and within the British Labour Party at the time, especially since Wilson, they maintained, was “emphatically guided by tactical considerations”.11 The pro-Europe factions thus seemed to be confident with Wilson’s tactics favouring membership in principle while opposing the terms. At the end of July, the NEC adopted a motion drafted by Wilson, which was to be put to the October annual conference. In accordance with party attitudes expressed at the special conference, it did not oppose membership in principle, but needed to incorporate some form of opposition to please a substantial minority of the party. If the NEC motion did not take sufficient account of the ruthless demands of the left, the leadership feared that the annual conference would not accept it and then carry on passing a resolution opposing entry in principle. While stating that it opposed membership of core Europe “on the terms negotiated by the Conservative Government”, the motion connected the negotiated terms with the government’s 8 9 10 11

LAM, International Dept., box memoranda etc/EEC 1971, Schmidt to George Brown, 7 July 1971. LAM, International Dept., box memoranda etc/EEC 1971, telegram to the British Labour Party from PvdA, 16 July 1971. LAM, Labour Party Annual Conference 4–8 October 1971, appendix 1: 312, Report of the special conference on the Common Market. AAB, PKA, box 44, report from Labour Party Special Conference 17 July 1971, 4 September 1971. Author ’s translation.

174

Wilson and the Fate of Labour’s European Policy

lack of information while attacking its economic and social policies. Referring to Heath’s statement during the election campaign that no British government “could possibly take this country into the Common Market against the wish of the British people”, it called for a “democratic judgement of a General Election”. Finally, it encouraged the PLP wholeheartedly to vote against the government’s policy.12 Having organised the special conference and issued the NEC motion, interim party policy until the October annual conference was that of opposition to the terms obtained by the Conservative government, but not to membership in principle. Until the conference members of the party were free to campaign for or against membership, Wilson pointed out.13 However, after the annual conference had made its decision, the PLP would have to decide its position, as the conference could not instruct MPs how to vote in the House of Commons. An articulated Eurosceptic faction increasingly made the complicated and potentially divisive issue difficult. Yet public opinion had, according to various polls, opposed membership of core Europe until the summer of 1971. After the publication of the government White Paper, opinion allegedly swung towards entry, although this enthusiasm, according to the polls, proved to be relatively short-lived.14 In this period, the networked centre-right elite of the party still actively participated in the cross-border socialist network while elaborating its European policy. At the conference of socialist party leaders in Salzburg in early September 1971, Wilson emphasised that the party was bitterly divided on the question while arguing that the terms negotiated by the Conservative government were unacceptable.15 Regretting the position taken by the majority of the Labour Party, while making references to the ELB’s June congress that had invited Britain into core Europe, the PvdA’s Joop den Uyl emphasised that Mansholt and the EC socialist parties had fought hard to change the CAP and modernise farming. He argued that a stronger socialist influence within the Community would have a good chance of altering developments. Clearly, the NEC’s July motion alarmed the ELB and the transnational network, as Uyl, Kreisky and Frydenlund all feared that Labour contemplated pulling Britain out of core Europe when it returned to power.16 Yet Kreisky appreciated the freedom of debate on the question that was allowed within the party, and Frydenlund appealed to Wilson to argue against the terms and not the EEC in principle. At the Helsinki SI conference in May 1971, Wilson explained that Labour ’s position on the European issue had been made clear in successive statements by his government from 1967 to 1970, and recently had been confirmed by the October 12 13 14 15

16

LAM, Labour Party Annual Conference, Brighton, 4–8 October 1971: 381/appendix 6. IISH, SI, 346, Wilson at the SI Conference of party leaders, Salzburg 1971: 2. Robins 1979: 112. IISH, SI, 346, SI Conference of party leaders, Salzburg, 3 September 1971. According to Wilson, the terms was unacceptable because they “would put an intolerable burden on the balance of payments and that the import and agricultural levies which Britain will have to pay to Community funds are grotesque and unfair compared with what other EEC countries will have to pay”. He added there was “also the question of Commonwealth sugar”. Ibid: 2. IISH, SI, 346, SI Conference of party leaders, Salzburg, 3 September 1971: 3–4, 6.

No accession on Tory terms

175

1970 annual conference. A full discussion and vote at a party conference would be held before the PLP made a definitive decision whether or not to support the terms negotiated. The requirements on which the party needed to be satisfied had been set out in a July 1967 WEU meeting by the foreign secretary.17 At Salzburg he reiterated that no suggestion for withdrawal had been made either by the leadership of the PLP, the NEC or the party, adding that the Rome Treaty had no provision for withdrawal by a member state, thus implicitly informing his fellow socialists that his position was guided largely by tactical considerations.18 Speaking to the SI, George Brown picked up on the strengthened role of the socialist parties. In the immediate postwar world the SI could only “concentrate on theoretical debates and morbid reminiscing over a rather tragic past”, as most of the major parties were a long way from power and responsibility. By the early seventies, on the other hand, democratic socialism had established itself in the “mainstream of democratic politics”, and member parties were either in power or were major opposition parties in a score of countries. Hence, it was an appropriate time, he claimed, to make a careful examination of socialist strategies in order to plan how the movement should develop over the coming decade. A vital feature was the prospects offered by core Europe enlargement, which not only had the ability to offer increased prosperity, security and influence for Britain, but also offered social democracy as a whole “a unique opportunity”, Brown maintained. “No other political movement is better equipped, both in philosophy and organisation, than we ourselves to grasp the political leadership of Europe.” Talking of Britain entering a capitalist organisation was ridiculous, and he bitterly regretted the timidity of those of his colleagues who had recoiled from this historic challenge. A core Europe Ten “should be a matter of encouragement to us. Those who oppose Britain’s entry have either ignored or denigrated the strength of the European Left.”19 By his statement Brown demonstrated the ingrained belief that by concerted efforts European socialists were in position to influence political developments in Europe. Internally, the Labour Party machinery continued to produce information papers on several aspects concerning membership of the Community, including a thorough study of the Heath government’s White Paper dealing with core Europe.20 Thus, after having dealt with the issue in different ways in various arenas, the 1971 Annual Conference ultimately adopted the July NEC motion by a large majority. Only a minority spoke in favour of the negotiated terms or opposing membership in principle. “Jenkins, Brown, Stewart and Thomson and other pro-Marketeers were disposed towards finding the terms acceptable to the same degree as Shore, Jay, Castle, Peart and the anti-Marketeers were disposed towards viewing them as to17 18 19 20

These included British contributions to the financing of the CAP, Commonwealth trade and the settlement of problems related to New Zealand. IISH, SI, 572 Denmark, Harold Wilson, 25 May, at the Helsinki 12th council conference of the SI, 25–27 May 1971. IISH, SI, 346, SI Conference of party leaders, Salzburg, 3 September 1971. GBBLO, box c. 5111, What is socialist internationalism?, 30 September 1971: 221–23 (1–4). LAM, International Dept., box memoranda etc/EEC 1971. See for example Information paper nr. 12, 14, and Some reflections on the White Paper Dealing with the Common Market, August 1971.

176

Wilson and the Fate of Labour’s European Policy

tally unacceptable,” Robins notes.21 Wilson and Jenkins did not participate in the membership debate. A resolution demanding “total opposition to entry under any terms” was defeated by a huge majority.22 Resolutions in accordance with the NEC motion were also endorsed by the TUC at its 1972 Congress, opposing the terms but not EC membership in principle. According to Swedish observers, the left-wing gained ground at the expense of the pro-Europeans in the 1971 conference elections, however, since Ian Mikardo increased his vote to the NEC while Shirley Williams saw her share fall.23 In a broader perspective, Labour ’s position over the issue was close to that formulated by the NEC in 1962, which favoured entry although subject to certain conditions, and had thereafter been adopted as official party policy. The October 1971 Congress was unable to unite the party behind a single European policy. Therefore, a pact was drawn up, whereby pro-Europeans would be allowed to “fly the flag for Europe”, i. e. vote with the government on 28 October, on the understanding that afterwards they would be expected to oppose the huge volume of legislation that would follow.24 A POLITICAL LIFE RAFT: RENEGOTIATION AND REFERENDUM Tensions rose in the Labour Party as it became clear that the Conservatives would allow a free vote at the end of the debate in the House of Commons. Calculations indicated that Heath could not guarantee a Parliamentary majority from his own party. As a result, his survival could depend on the support of rebel Labour MPs, greatly increasing the pressure on the pro-Europeans in the Labour Party. In this situation, the chairman of the PLP, Douglas Houghton, reminded the party of the pact Wilson had offered at the congress a few weeks earlier. MPs were allowed to vote in accordance with their conviction on the government’s motion, yet on the subsequent legislation the government had to rely on its own supporters.25 Heath ideally wanted to maintain party discipline and impress core Europe with a strong vote in favour of entry. Yet the Conservative Chief Whip, Francis Pym, believed the opponents of membership would defy the government even if strong pressure were put on them. Therefore, he argued, it would be better to allow a free vote, which would put pressure on Wilson to follow suit and encourage the proEuropeans in the PLP. The Labour Left, as part of its power struggle, forced Wilson to maintain a three-line whip, however. At the end of the six-day debate, the longest 21 22 23 24 25

Robins 1979: 103. It was lost by 3.082.000 votes to 2.005.000. LAM, Labour Party Annual Conference, Brighton, 4–8 October 1971: 144. ARAB, SAP, E5, box 043, report Labour Party Congress Brighton, 3–8 October 1971, 14 October 1971. Bernt Carlsson, Annika Nilsson and Jörgen Linder attended the Conference, while Kjell-Olof Feldt and Jan O. Karlsson were appointed but did not attend. LAM, PLP, meeting, 12 April 1972: 2. See also Robins 1979: 105–07. According to Thomson, in talks with the Danish SD, it would “be impossible” for Parliament to stop the ensuing legislation. ARAB, SAP, E5, box 051, 19 June 1972.

A political life raft: renegotiation and referendum

177

since the war, the margin in favour of joining was larger than expected, carried by 356 to 244. Led by Roy Jenkins, 69 Labour Europeans defied the whip and voted in favour of entry, while 20 abstained. Only 38 Tories joined Enoch Powell in the no lobby and voted against. The sixty-nine had with them “the good wishes of those who abstained”, Kitzinger notes, “and also another twenty or so who bitterly wished that they could have voted for entry or abstained”, but who feared that their situation might have become intolerable.26 Of 23 cabinet ministers in the outgoing Labour cabinet, only nine voted against entry. The rebels angered a substantial faction of the party. If every Labour member had voted against entry, the government would have been defeated and a general election would have been called, they believed, which would have resulted in the return of a Labour government. Consequently, harsh left-wing attacks on the MPs “saving” the government and clashes in the PLP were unavoidable, eventually undermining the pact Wilson had offered. At a meeting of the PLP, Ian Mikardo moved a Motion stating that the Labour Party “requires the Parliamentary Committee to ensure that one of its amendments to the Address shall be concerned with the Party’s intention to oppose the legislation consequential on the Government’s proposed application to join the European Communities”. Although a strong Eurosceptic, Bruce Douglas Mann maintained that he could not support Mikardo’s motion “as he felt it would only exacerbate the situation in the Party at the moment”. Yet he still hoped that the pro-Europeans who had voted with the government would vote with the party against the consequential legislation, while pointing out that the Eurosceptics had to reflect a wide spectrum of opinion in the party. The vote was over, and “if we attempted to isolate the rebels now it would only destroy the Party and destroy our chances of winning the next General Election”.27 In these circumstances, Wilson stressed the absolute necessity to keep the party united, emphasising “he would do all in his power to that end, without fear of favour”. In the end he would not “seek instructions or advice as Leader of the Party. He could not be told what assurance he could or could not give”.28 On several occasions the deal offered by Wilson made government majorities on the enabling legislation very slim. Heath showed signs of worry and consequently warned Conservative Eurosceptic rebels that a government defeat on the Second Reading of the EC Bill would result in the resignation of the cabinet. In these circumstances, Labour MPs saw a real chance to force a general election on the issue, or even calling a referendum. A Labour Party working group had been established to consider a range of issues related to the procedure.29 Discussions raged within the PLP as it had to decide on the line to be taken in the debate.30 As it 26 27 28 29 30

Kitzinger 1973: 317. LAM, PLP, minute meeting, 3 November 1971. See also PLP, minute meeting, 2 February 1972. LAM, PLP, minute meeting, 9 November 1971. The Labour Party Working Group on the Common Market Bill, chaired by Michael Foot. LAM, Working Group on Common Market Bill, minute meetings, 3 February 1972, and report RD 259/February 1972. See LAM, PLP, meetings 2 February 1972, meeting Working Group on the Common Market Bill, 3 February 1972, meeting PLP, 16 March 1972.

178

Wilson and the Fate of Labour’s European Policy

became known that President Pompidou intended to hold a referendum on whether core Europe should be enlarged, demands for a referendum were reinforced in the PLP too.31 At the end of 1970, Tony Benn and others had attempted to outflank both the Labour and Tory leadership with a demand for a referendum.32 The NEC voted down the proposal at the time, though James Callaghan described it as a life raft into which the whole party might one day have to climb.33 Benn pursued a campaign for calling either a general election or a referendum over the issue. At the October 1971 conference, he pleaded for a vote in principle whether Britain should adhere to the Treaty of Rome.34 In March 1972, he argued it was the duty of the Parliamentary Committee to interpret Conference decisions in the light of changing circumstances and the NEC. He would ask the matter to be looked at “in the light of Pompidou’s statement” at the next NEC meeting. The party problems could not be solved by a vote in the House alone, he argued, but if “the Party could agree not to go forward without the consent of the people we might discover a means of uniting all shades of opinion”.35 At a PLP meeting in April, two amendments were proposed to the Order Paper. First, the official Opposition Amendment demanding a General Election on the issue, and second, a backbench Tory Amendment calling for a referendum. The Parliamentary Committee recommended the two Amendments should receive Labour support, and Chief Whip Robert Mellish intended to issue a three-lined whip on the official Amendment and a two-lined whip on the backbench Tory Amendment.36 After intense debates, the PLP fought the EC Bill on two fronts, as Wilson argued at the Nottinghamshire Miners’ Demonstration in June.37 First, it was considered an outrage against Britain’s Parliamentary institutions, as it blatantly provided that the acquis communautaire, or even decisions taken at any time in the future, automatically became the law of Britain, without due Parliamentary processes. Second, it would give effect to terms that were inimical to Britain’s interests. If the Bill was forced through Parliament, Wilson maintained, an incoming Labour government would insist on “renegotiating the terms and treaties”. Should renegotiations be refused, or should the negotiations fail to produce an acceptable outcome, Wilson promised a Labour government would rigidly pursue British interests until “we had secured our terms”. He emphasised that the next general election would be fought on many issues – rising prices, inflation, unemployment, the divided and unequal society the Tories had created – yet the electorate would also have to 31 32 33 34

35 36 37

On the French referendum, see Time, ‘GUI’ to the EEC’, 1 May 1972. Anthony Wedgwood Benn, who preferred to be known as Tony Benn. Kitzinger 1973: 296. See LAM, International Dept., box EEC memoranda etc. 1959–61, 1963, 1966, 1970–73. Correspondence 1957–62/EEC 1971, Private and Confidential letter from Anthony W. Benn and Draft Passage for NEC Statement to the Special Conference on the Common Market by Benn, 29 June 1971. LAM, PLP, meeting, 12 April 1972, no 101. In the PLP, intense debates followed the call for a referendum. See especially PLP, meeting 12 April 1972, no 107. LAM, PLP, meeting, 12 April 1972. The recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee were carried by 129 to 96 votes. LAM, PLP, meeting, 12 April 1972. See Jenkins 1991: 327–49, Robins 1979: 117 and LAM, PLP meetings, 12 and 13 April 1972.

Member of the club – postponed Labour participation in the EP

179

choose, too, between Heath’s European policy and the policy set out by the Labour Party. He had stated to the NEC that in his view the people should have the right to “decide the issue of principle involved” when the outcome of the negotiations was clear, and to decide by “a national free vote, a national referendum on this issue and this issue only”. What was not the issue, he stressed, was the party’s stand on core Europe. “We reject the Tory terms. We shall insist on renegotiating them. That is our policy. Opposition to the terms negotiated by the Conservatives, not to the principle of entry on the right terms. I stand by it.”38 If such re-negotiations “are to be fruitful and effective”, Labour ’s McNally emphasised in a letter to his Dutch colleague, the party “feels it is necessary to have the fullest possible consultation with our fraternal parties”.39 Eventually, therefore, as the divisions within the party continued, also threatening his leadership, Wilson was forced to accept what he had previously tried to avoid, adopting Benn’s demand for renegotiation and a referendum on the EC as official party policy. He tried hard to strike a balance between pro-Europeans who accused him of a lack of principles by putting party before country and the Eurosceptic faction who opted for more radical socialist policies believed to be at odds with membership of the Community. Yet his unequivocal commitment of 1967 in favour of joining, and his refusal to adjust until a year after the election, ultimately managed to head off “any really massive organized political opposition to entry”, as noted by Kitzinger, “until after it was too late for that opposition to become effective”. When he opposed the terms, it was a tactical move that also appeared to have been “a very useful factor in making the bulk of the Conservative Party fall into line behind their leader”.40 Member of the club – postponed Labour participation in the EP MEMBER OF THE CLUB – POSTPONED LABOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE EP When Britain entered the EC on 1 January 1973 it marked the end of a long process in which Britain’s international role had been scaled down from being a global actor to a European great power. The process had accelerated in the wake of World War II and took a twist in early 1960 when the Macmillan government changed British policies towards Europe. For Heath it marked the success of a long-term commitment. For Labour it was a complicated issue. While for Wilson it was a long-term tactical and strategic success, for the party at large it was another matter. Despite having sought entry while in government, disagreement over the issue intensified by the end of 1970. The opposition years coincided with a deepening international recession, marked by surging unemployment and rising inflation. Tudor Jones argues 38 39 40

LAM, News Release, Issued by the Labour Party Information Dept., Speech by Harold Wilson to a Nottinghamshire Miners’ Demonstration, 10 June 1972. LAM, International Dept., EEC Correspondence 1971–73. Letter from Labour ’s International Secretary Tom McNally to PvdA’s Harry van den Bergh. In October 2004 McNally was elected Liberal Democrat leader in the House of Lords. Kitzinger 1973: 276.

180

Wilson and the Fate of Labour’s European Policy

the period witnessed a “severe ideological reaction within the Labour Party against revisionist social democracy and the policies and strategy which it had engendered in the 1960s”.41 In these circumstances, it became apparent that the Labour left increasingly managed to put pressure on the party, which eventually reformulated its policy towards Europe. Eurosceptic sentiments were henceforth on the rise in the party. Mullen claims the party’s support for joining the club had reached its zenith.42 The internal strife did not end with the 1972 adoption of the EC Accession Bill. In the short term disagreement arose over whether to join the House of Commons Select Committee to deal with EEC legislation and whether the party should join the European Parliament. In the long term, the issue would become very difficult for the party. As to the Select Committee, it was agreed to participate. As to the EP, declining the invitation to join, the Eurosceptics argued, was as an opportunity to demonstrate to the people in Britain that the party did not only talk against membership but also acted accordingly. The Europhile faction argued the party should participate in the EP to influence events, as there would be, as Geoffrey Rhodes claimed, “an invasion of democratic elements from the Northern European countries” and the parties should take advantage of those changes.43 In a letter to the chairman of the PLP, Douglas Houghton, the Chairman of the Socialist Group of the EP emphasised that “I need not tell you how pleased we would be” if the PLP “finds it possible to take up the places in the European Parliament which await it. Such is the unanimous and comradely wish of the group over which I preside”.44 Ultimately, however, the Eurosceptic faction prevailed and the PLP decided to suspend participation until renegotiation and the vote of the British people. While stressing at a conference of socialist party leaders in Paris in mid-January 1973 that a future Labour government would not accept the present terms of Britain’s entry, Callaghan regretted that “the British Labour Party did not share the vision of its European comrades for the future of European unity”. A disappointed Bruno Kreisky declared that the British Labour Party’s decision to “boycott” the EP meant that the socialists in that body would be only the second strongest group instead of the strongest. Developments were under way, he argued, that “needed to be influenced by the British labour movement”. In the broader context, Kreisky’s assessment was that “social democracy as a political force was on the upsurge in Europe”.45 Britain’s accession to core Europe, therefore, taking place on the harmonized understanding within the transnational network that concerted efforts on a Euro41 42

43 44 45

Jones 1996: 88. Mullen argues that the labour movement’s first tectonic policy shift, moving from a position of disinterest or neutrality to one of support for European integration, reached its zenith in the late 1960s, and that the second shift, starting in 1970/71, when most sections of the British Left moved from a position of support to one of scepticism and hostility, reached its zenith in the early eighties. Mullen 2007: 7. LAM, PLP, meeting 8 November 1972 and PLP, special meeting, 13 December 1972. LAM, PLP, letter from the Chairman of the Socialist Group of the European Parliament to the Chairman of the British Labour Party, 12 October 1972. IISH, SI, 347, Conference of party leaders 1973–74, Paris, 13–14 January 1973.

Member of the club – postponed Labour participation in the EP

181

pean arena had the potential to put a stronger socialist imprint on core Europe, would be somewhat limited until the British Labour Party joined the EP Socialist group after the 1975 referendum on whether the UK should remain in the EC. In the referendum, in which party and government representatives were free to campaign either for or against the renegotiated terms and continued membership of the EC, prime minister Harold Wilson fought hard for a yes vote. In accordance with his acts since entering office in 1964, he believed membership of the EC was the optimal way to deal with Britain’s challenges at home and abroad and that joining was in keeping with transnational socialist objectives and indicative economic planning at a national and possibly European level.

CHAPTER 12 LABOUR AND EUROPE REASSESSED This work has been guided by a desire to understand the British Labour Party’s European policy during 1960–72. Up till now studies of Labour ’s relations with core Europe have been marked by two striking deficiencies. First, archive-based historical studies have been defined by and confined to the years when Labour was in government and, second, transnational approaches and non-British sources have only marginally been integrated into the research. As a result, this book is based on the hypothesis that ambivalences and ambiguities apparent in the current understanding of Labour ’s relations with the European integration process can be complemented by bringing in perspectives covering the whole period 1960–73, exploring transnational processes and contexts and incorporating non-British material to supplement British archives and official documents. This research agenda was motivated by four observations. First, a distinct feature of early European integration was the divide between the original core Europe and other western European countries, in particular Britain and Scandinavia. Before 1973, the latter did not actively participate in the process of postwar supranational European integration, indicating similarities in perceptions. When the EEC was set up in 1958, the British and Scandinavian labour parties made up a group of reluctant northern Europeans compared with the pro-EEC core Europe socialist parties. Second, conventional wisdom suggests that the British Labour Party’s position vis-à-vis core Europe integration during 1960–73 was ambiguous. The party leadership apparently remained aloof from the integration process during the fifties and early sixties, and vacillated in its response to the application of 1961. Yet after coming to power it changed its attitude and applied for membership in 1967, only to move from a position of support for joining to one of scepticism of the EC from 1971 onwards. Third, studies of postwar European integration have largely focused on core Europe, successively widening their scope in line with the EU’s progressive geographical expansion. Yet as demonstrated by this work, interaction between the northern European countries and core Europe was far-reaching long before they joined the Community. Labour participated in a number of well-established cross-border socialist networks within which issues of European integration were debated intensely. Documents generated at these meetings have provided the study with unexploited non-British archival material, substantially supplementing national and intergovernmental records. Finally, social democracy emerged as a core societal formative force in postwar Europe. In Britain a postwar consensus was put in place by the Attlee government, lasting until the Thatcher era. It was based upon the assumption that full employment would be maintained by Keynesian policies and social benefits introduced according to ideas set out in the Beveridge Report. For Labour, it involved a commitment to economic planning with a view to bringing about greater equality and social justice, sustained

184

Labour and Europe Reassessed

economic growth and full employment. Similar concepts lay at the heart of the Scandinavian postwar consensuses. EXPLAINING THE LABOUR PARTY’S EUROPEAN POLICY The book set out to assess the formation and implementation of the British Labour Party’s European policy in a time of changing UK European policies. A core undertaking was to analyse motives and actions of the Labour Party elite, the reasons for these and how they were pursued and influenced in national, intergovernmental and transnational arenas. The operationalisation of this research agenda comprised two main sets of questions. The first arose from issues dealing with continuity and change in the Labour elite’s attitudes to British involvement with the European integration process, and the second from approaches and insights related to transnational processes and contexts. Throughout, the analysis has dealt with the party leadership’s ostensibly unenthusiastic and vacillating motives and actions regarding British EEC/EC membership. It has also focussed on a core ideological aspect pertaining to economic planning and the party’s ambition to carry out socialist policies in a national and European context. Finally, it has sought to illustrate the ways in which socialisation and strategic assessments of the European issue interacted in transnational and domestic arenas. The work does not fundamentally contradict existing accounts, but differentiate them considerably. It offers two new broad conclusions. First, it demonstrates greater continuity in the British Labour Party’s European policies than existing studies have allowed.1 By stretching the perspective so as to encompass policymaking processes before and beyond the Wilson government years, this study argues that the Wilson government’s European policy and the 1967 application were founded on deliberations carried out from 1960 onwards and subsequently developed during the ensuing years.2 Wilson’s European policy became apparent soon after taking office in October 1964 and was rather consistently carried out until leaving Number 10 in 1970, and he did not depart from this position when he passed into opposition. Actions undertaken by Wilson and his predecessor were crucial in creating an environment conducive to the strategic objective and eventual success of the Wilson government’s application and thus its long-term European policy. Due to Wilson’s perseverance and his decision to leave the application on the table, the veto had been lifted when the Conservatives took office, making it possible for Heath to pick up where Wilson left off and fulfil his predecessors’ dedicated work. If Wilson had not been fully committed to take Britain into core Europe and the application had been withdrawn, it would have been even more challenging to prevent an increasingly vocal Eurosceptic faction from blocking British entry and facilitate increased socialist cooperation and influence at the Community level. Moreover, if 1 2

See in particular Deighton 2001, Delaney 2002, Parr 2002 and 2005, Daddow 2003 and Dorey 2006. Deighton, Parr, Daddow and Dorey analyse the second British membership application within the remits of the 1964–70 Wilson governments.

Explaining the Labour Party’s European policy

185

the application had been withdrawn the negotiations would probably have been delayed, as Pine has pointed out.3 Second, perceptions of joining the EEC became increasingly positive during the sixties. The work has established a correlation between intensified and restructured transnational networking spurred by the British Tory government’s re-evaluation of its European policy from the early sixties onwards and evolving intersubjective perceptions of EEC/EC membership within the British and also the Scandinavian socialist party leadership. In particular, it implied that core European integration would not impede economic planning and the parties’ ability to carry out socialist policies. Rather the opposite. At the end of the decade it had developed into an understanding that socialist policies and planning were not only compatible with joining the club, but that joint socialist policies could possibly be introduced in an enlarged Community. Thus, intensified discussions in the networks on how to deal with the European issue went hand in hand with evolving perceptions of joining the EEC/EC and the parties’ ability to carrying out socialist policies at a national and possibly at an enlarged EC level, eventually producing concerted efforts to draw up a socialist programme for the Community.4 Deepened transnational networking is, in this book, singled out as an important factor when explaining changed perceptions of joining the Community during the sixties. Adjusted and harmonized transnational perceptions of core Europe indicate that Wilson and his close aides did believe that socialist influence and policies would continue to be strengthened both domestically and in the Community if Britain joined, and preferably if Denmark and Norway followed the British lead and Sweden was brought closer to the EC.5 The introductory chapter raised the question of to what extent assessments of the party’s ability to carry out such policies in a wider European framework influenced the leadership’s attitude to joining the EEC/ EC. The study has demonstrated that this was at the heart of the debate during the period covered by this work. Besides, the analysis suggests that cross-border networking was an important and often neglected strand of the policy formulating process of Labour, and the Scandinavian and other European socialist parties, which made it necessary to extend the archive-based research focus beyond the years when Labour was in government and incorporate transnational socialist networks and non-British sources. Although socialist parties operated in a national context, this work also shows that European policy formulation processes were more reciprocally informed than previously established.6 Regular contacts provided the participants with knowl3

4 5 6

Pine 2003: 298. Correctly, she points to the evolving economic crisis that possibly could have overturned the membership project altogether. Although Heath maintains he would have applied immediately after taking office, it would not have been possible to start negotiations only twelve days after he became prime minster. Steinnes 2013: 363–84. In fact, the enlarged Commission had only two Christian democratic Commissioners, following EC enlargement, and in 1975, for the first time the Socialist parties formed a larger parliamentary block in the EP than the Christian democrats. Cf. Salm 2013, 2013a and 2013b.

186

Labour and Europe Reassessed

edge and formed bridges between parties and politicians when a ruling party was rejected by the electorate.7 On the eve of the sixties, there was less general understanding of core Europe integration in the British and Scandinavian labour parties than at the end of the decade. In 1966 the Norwegian foreign minister Halvard Lange stated that “we have not paid sufficient attention to … [and] have not kept ourselves adequately informed about the political and economic development” in core Europe, which also applied to most British and other Scandinavian politicians.8 In contrast, on the eve of the seventies socialist politicians and parties were well informed of processes and policies taking place in the Community, and moreover had different and more positive perceptions of the process than a decade earlier. GREATER CONTINUITY AND EVOLVING PERCEPTIONS Labour ’s ideological posture largely explains the reluctance towards joining core Europe integration during the fifties. To a large extent, the reluctance in the British as in the Scandinavian labour parties has to be understood in view of their policy objectives, such as the introduction of planning, expanding welfare measures and the maintenance of full employment. While the Labour Party’s ideological outlook kept it at a distance from closer entanglements with core Europe during the fifties, as pointed out in chapter two, the revisionist, centre-right leadership challenged this position during the following decade. Conventional wisdom explains the changes by pointing to the pragmatic and unenthusiastic steps taken by the party leadership from the mid-sixties, or rather the changes occurring as a direct consequence of the 1966 economic crisis. Thus, existing archive-based research tend to deal with the second application as if a new European policy had eventually emerged under Wilson and his governments. This interpretation, it is argued, is an oversimplification of a long and complex process. This work demonstrates that changes were evident at an earlier stage by taking into account Labour ’s policy-making process while in opposition from 1960 onwards rather than merely focussing on the Wilson governments’ policy in the wake of the 1964 general election. Chapter three shows that no coherent European policy existed in the British Labour Party on the eve of the sixties. Yet when it became evident that the Tory government was about to reappraise its European policy, Labour undertook an extensive policy-making process with a view to developing its own coherent policy on the European integration process. Similar processes took place in the Scandinavian parties. Although Labour was unable to conclude this work by the time the Tory government submitted the mid-1961 membership bid, the scope and importance of the issue induced the creation and subsequent institutionalising of transnational socialist networks, as demonstrated in the case of the Socialist International’s conference of party leaders, the SI Contact committee and the 7 8

As was the case for instance when the Norwegian DNA was voted out of power in 1965. ARAB, TEA, box 082, Halvard Lange, parliamentary debate, 22 February 1966. Author ’s translation.

Greater continuity and evolving perceptions

187

SI EFTA–EEC Working Group, while changing the character and composition of others, illustrated by the Cooperation Committee of the Nordic Labour movement’s (SAMAK) embracing of a wider network. A core consideration inside these networks was to what extent it would be possible to carry out economic planning as members of the Community. Driven by developments and the dynamism of the European issue, Scandinavian socialist parties thus extended their cross-border contacts from the early sixties so as to embrace a wider northern European network, to a certain extent at the expense of the well-established regional SAMAK cooperation. Likewise, the British Labour Party elite increasingly chose to get involved in a wider northern European transnational socialist framework. A main point is that the changed network configurations from 1960 onwards facilitated evolving and harmonized socialist perceptions of joining the EEC/EC. Or put in a different way, the correlation between reconfigured and new transnational socialist networks and evolving perceptions of joining core Europe indicates that strengthened transnational socialist networking is a core explanation of the process demonstrated by this work. Gaitskell’s position on the EEC question was crucial, as pointed out in chapter four, and on the whole he soon became more positively inclined towards Britain joining the EEC than hitherto believed.9 Although emphasising that neither the Party, the Shadow Cabinet nor the PLP should commit itself one way or another, Gaitskell in some contexts, especially in transnational arenas, presented British membership of the EEC in slightly positive terms. This observation appears to be in keeping with those of Newman, while suggesting that Labour ’s attitudes towards European issues evolved throughout the latter part of the fifties.10 Yet Newman’s observations are based on general trends rather than material pointing specifically to Gaitskell’s position and transnational contacts. In keeping with Rippingale, it also contests the suggestion that Gaitskell made up his mind during summer and early autumn of 1962.11 Rippingale argues that Gaitskell did not come off the fence in the run-up to the 1962 annual conference, but adopted a strategy that appealed to both sides of the Party until he was strong enough to head off any potential challenge. It is reasonable to suggest that Gaitskell acted tactically, chiefly in keeping with rational choice approaches as set out in the first pages of this book, in order to achieve a strategic political objective. Yet socialising processes have to be taken into consideration in order to explain his increasingly positive perception of joining 9 10 11

Featherstone 1988: 53, Rippingale 1996: 214–16, Robins 1979: 1, 3, 27–28, Lieber 1970: 175– 76. Newman 1993: 169–70. It is also largely in keeping with Broad and Daddow 2010. During the 1960–62 policy-formulation process, Robins argues there was a definite change in the political atmosphere after Gaitskell’s meeting with the Commonwealth socialists. Robins 1979: 28 and the Guardian, 1 November 1962, where Gaitskell insinuates that the meetings with European and Commonwealth socialists had been critical in his stance towards entry (from Robins 1979: 42). See also Lieber 1970: 176. Indeed, his meeting with Commonwealth socialists was important, not because it led the party leader to go against entry, but rather because it helped to formulate his tactics so as to achieve his long-term objective of facilitating a future membership bid by a Labour government.

188

Labour and Europe Reassessed

the EEC. As such, there was little continuity between the Attlee government’s rejection of the ECSC in 1950 and Gaitskell’s “end of a thousand years of history” speech at the Party’s October 1962 annual conference, as sometimes suggested. Gaitskell’s speech was perceived substantially more negatively than his position on the issue indicated. An important observation is that the 1960–62 policy-making process, concluded in the NEC policy document adopted at the party’s 1962 conference in Brighton, outlined a framework for Labour ’s European policy that became instrumental to the party’s attitude to EEC/EC membership in the following decade, largely in the same way as the Attlee government’s decision to stay away from the ECSC effectively defined Labour ’s approach towards core Europe during the fifties. Changes in Labour ’s European policy, apparently emerging from 1964–65 onwards, have to be seen in the light of its changed position within the polity – i. e. its accession to power and the responsibilities of office – and tactical moves deliberately carried out by the party’s leadership, in particular by Gaitskell and Wilson. Policy changes occurred not only because a year had elapsed since Gaitskell had been replaced by a new leader. Besides, no new major debates or deliberations over the subject had been carried out during 1963–64. When Labour took office in October 1964, chapter five points out, Prime Minister Wilson’s long-term European policy aim was to take an early initiative to arrange Britain’s accession to core Europe, which he did not believe would frustrate the government’s economic planning programme with which Labour had taken office.12 He soon activated the transnational network to work out a strategy to bring about his objective. In May 1965 he stated that he saw the advantage of joining the Community, yet there was no question of “signing the dotted line”, for there was no dotted line there to sign. This work confirms Wilson’s words when stating that it was the reason why he proposed “bridge-building”. The great challenge was how to achieve accession as long as de Gaulle stayed in power in France.13 The bridge-building initiative was in this context a first tactical step towards implementing a long-term strategic objective elaborated by his predecessor and leading individuals since before entering government rather than trying to achieve some undefined closer arrangements between the two entities. Despite persistent efforts, Wilson’s strategy did not produce tangible results during 1965 as de Gaulle’s veto still prevailed. Chapter six demonstrates how Wilson’s Labour government proactively sought to facilitate British accession to core Europe in January 1966 by activating transnational contacts with core Europe socialists. It differs considerably from Parr ’s study, which is based on national and intergovernmental sources only. She misguidedly suggests that Wilson reluctantly endorsed studies on the possibility of accession initiated by Whitehall officials, allegedly pushed for by foreign secretary Michael Stewart.14 On the contrary, this examination – building on non-British, transnational sources – shows that Wilson 12 13 14

This was also indicated by the Financial Times as early as 25 May 1965. IISH, SI, SII, 1965: 134. See also the Guardian, 25 May 1965. Parr 2006: 62.

Greater continuity and evolving perceptions

189

took the initiative. Thereafter, he and his closest colleagues instructed officials to look into the technical details of accession, not the other way around. Importantly, it also demonstrates that in January 1966 Wilson sought to arrange British accession to core Europe addressing the full implications of membership, which included dealing with the complicated agricultural question. By May the British government’s ambition to join the EEC was made clear to the public when George Brown, soon to become foreign secretary, told a transnational audience the government wanted to join core Europe and find the basis on which this would be possible. At this point, the Labour government’s main challenge – how to achieve membership while de Gaulle still ruled France – was expressed more explicitly. Despite being aware of de Gaulle’s attitudes, Wilson pressed ahead with his long-term strategic aim of joining the club. He apparently believed it had the capacity both to strengthen the socialist alliance across the EEC–EFTA divide and make Britain’s membership objective more likely by displaying the sincerity of the application. Rather than being a passive reaction to international developments to which Wilson had resigned himself as no viable alternative existed, chapter seven maintains that the application was a proactive, deliberately planned step carefully elaborated by Wilson and largely in keeping with how the party had formulated its European policy during the early sixties. It was designed to look beyond de Gaulle’s stint in power and was based on an evolving understanding that core Europe membership would not get in the way of domestic economic planning. Moreover, due to harsh economic realities, the government’s economic planning ambitions were about to founder. Joining a growing European market and an increasingly important outlet for British exports as compared with the Commonwealth was likely to increase prospects for economic growth, indicative planning and social security measures. Wilson’s decision to enter core Europe was a deliberate and carefully considered strategy. The Prime Minister and his government did not take no for an answer, and decided not to withdraw the application. By leaving it on the table, as did the Norwegian and Danish governments, the government made it difficult for the Community to disregard British interests altogether. The UK application dominated council meeting agendas, diverting and slowing down intra-Community developments while demonstrating the seriousness of the British bid.15 Chapter eight demonstrates that Wilson ruled out solutions short of full membership and that he was wholeheartedly committed to do his utmost to take Britain into the Community despite the temporary setback caused by the veto. While corroborating his commitment, it also supports suggestions put forward in previous chapters that he believed joining was fully in accord with the objectives of the Labour Party, its policies and planning ambitions. Wilson’s unsuccessful economic planning programme, coinciding with EFTA’s exhausted role and an evolving political consensus inside the transnational socialist 15

There were less transnational activities during 1968 and the first part of 1969. It reflects that transnational activities to a certain extent were influenced by the intensity of the European issue which was less prevalent during this period.

190

Labour and Europe Reassessed

network in favour of joining the Community, only reinforced his determination to carry out his long-term policy of British entry. Within the transnational network, it was increasingly believed that an enlarged core Europe would not mean an end to socialist policies. On the contrary, nothing in the treaties ruled out policies related to economic planning, full employment and social security. The work demonstrates that core European socialists inside the transnational socialist community staunchly and repeatedly stressed that membership would not frustrate socialist policy objectives, and if Britain and possibly the Scandinavians joined the club, prospects for socialist policies in an enlarged core Europe could only increase. This understanding prompted networked socialist politicians to seize the opportunity and prepare ways in which an enlarged Community could be influenced. Eventually, chapter nine emphasises, these processes produced proposals to coordinate and strengthen socialist policies at a European level at a time when core Europe was believed to be more open to influence than in the early sixties.16 In keeping with the suggestion of O’Neill, Heath’s chief negotiator, chapter ten demonstrates that there was no discontinuity between Wilson’s application and the Heath government’s membership policies.17 Thus, it does not support claims by Young and Reynolds that there was never any doubt that Heath would press for EEC membership with greater determination than Wilson.18 This book argues that EC membership was no longer believed to be opposed to economic planning, welfare provisions and social equality, and that the idea to introduce a socialist programme for an enlarged Community had become embedded in the networked centre-right leadership of the British and Scandinavian labour parties. It also suggests that through concerted efforts networked socialist politicians sought to maximise their common policy objectives. Accordingly, in the wake of de Gaulle’s departure, the Hague summit and Brandt’s electoral victory in Germany, it is demonstrated that further initiatives were taken to strengthen and coordinate socialist policies in an enlarged Europe. In the wake of the 1970 general election, party political and tactical considerations reappeared. Labour ’s changed position within the polity once again influenced rhetoric and policies on Europe. Having sought to somehow bring Britain into core Europe since soon after taking office in 1964, Wilson again adjusted to the rules of the game adopting a tactic still aiming for British membership. Yet his persistence and eventual tactical concessions, chapter eleven suggests, prevented an ever more vocal Eurosceptic faction from blocking British entry, and eventually facilitated increased socialist cooperation and influence at the Community level. As the less networked left gained influence in the party, Wilson, trying to strike a balance between the factions, was eventually forced to accept that an incoming Labour government would renegotiate the terms and put them to the people in a referendum. To 16 17 18

The Swedish appraisal was that the undecided state of core Europe made it almost impossible to work out reliable predictions of future developments. ARAB, TEA, box 4, memo, Integration issue, 15 August 1966. See O’Neill 2000: 9. This is also in keeping with arguments presented by Kitzinger and Pine. Kitzinger 1968: xi and 1973: 276 and Pine 2007: 1, 175–82. Young 1993: 107, Reynolds 1991: 241.

Greater continuity and evolving perceptions

191

a certain extent, it resembles tactics resorted to by Gaitskell and the Party during the 1960–62 policy-making process. By his dodgy manoeuvring Wilson managed to head off any substantial organised political opposition to entry until after it was too late for such opposition to obstruct Britain’s entry into the Community.19 Inside the transnational network, Wilson persistently maintained that the party did not oppose entry in principle but only the terms negotiated by the Tories. Labour ’s European policies since 1962, he repeatedly stressed, were a story of consistency and he rebutted what he saw as “systematically misinterpreted” perceptions of Labour ’s European policy, reiterating that the party did not oppose entry in principle. In mid-1972 he staunchly argued that Labour ’s EEC/EC policy had been consistent since 1962–63.20 As opposed to most accounts dealing with Labour ’s European policy, this work largely supports his claim. Soon after taking office he sought to arrange in some way accession to the EEC. His position did not alter after de Gaulle’s second veto. He was intensely interested in European policy, as demonstrated by Pine, and used every tool at his disposal to bring about his long-term strategic aim.21 The centre-right faction of the Labour Party continued to cultivate transnational contacts in the early seventies, arguing that if renegotiations were to be fruitful and effective it was necessary to have the fullest possible consultation with fraternal parties.22 When renegotiations were eventually conducted and the renegotiated conditions put to the people in the 1975 referendum, Wilson, in keeping with his endeavours for more than a decade, fought for a yes vote. Greater continuity in Labour ’s European policies appears to correspond with underlying currents in British politics and national interests as defined by the Macmillan, Wilson and Heath governments, although motivated by different factors and actions. To a certain extent, thus, the work is in keeping with Camps’ observations while arguing that once the tide in Britain had “turned towards Europe – as it did in 1960–61 – [it] could not easily be reversed … All British governments are subject to similar domestic pressures and face the same problem of how to match their resources to their responsibilities and aspirations. There is very little real room for maneuver and far less scope for choice than there appears to be. In the end all British governments seem likely to reach much the same conclusions about the main thrust of British policy.”23 Based on the examinations carried out in this book, this appears to be a too deterministic a view of political choices as they unfolded at the time. In principle, political actors were free to make their own choices although being subjected to structural constraints and socialisation processes. Yet it illustrates, more explicitly than suggested by existing studies, that national, intergovernmental and transnational institutional frameworks and sources have to be taken into account when 19 20 21 22 23

This argument is in line with Kitzinger. Kitzinger 1973: 276. See for instance Wilson’s speech at the SI Congress in Vienna in 1972. IISH, SI, Harold Wilson, 12th Congress, Vienna, 26–29 June 1972, 28 June 1972 and LAM, PLP, box, News Release, Minutes 1971–75, 10 June 1972. Pine 2007: 182 and 2003: 298. LAM, International Dept., EEC Correspondence 1971–73. Autumn 1971. Camps 1966: 157, 194.

192

Labour and Europe Reassessed

trying to assess Labour ’s European policy in general and the 1967 membership application in particular.24 The question is not whether to take structural and institutional frameworks into account. Rather the question in this context is to what extent British Labour governments acquiesced in structural and tactical pressure and constraints domestically and abroad in the sixties and to what extent and how transnational networks informed perceptions and policy formulation. TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKING, INTEREST MAXIMISING AND SOCIALISATION The introductory chapter pointed out two sets of theoretical implications underpinning this work. The first alluded to “soft factors” such as perceptions, conceptualisations, ideas, values and culture and their role in policy-formulating processes. The other referred to rational choices, coalition formation and interest maximising. This study does not explicitly aim at, nor has been able to, identify whether socialisation or instrumental objectives were the most influential. Yet based on circumstantial evidence, the analysis indicates that socialisation and thus increased trust took place and influenced policy-formulation processes explored by this work. In this context not only did instrumental trust develop so as to achieve certain policy objectives, but so did social trust.25 At the same time, it is equally obvious that instrumental choices directed motives, actions and policies. The most appropriate would thus to conceive of them as mutually reinforcing processes. It is a delicate task to determine the relationship between socialisation and instrumental utility maximisation. While the study demonstrates greater continuity in the British Labour Party’s European policy than put forward by existing studies, it also argues that perceptions of EEC/EC membership evolved during the sixties, and that these changes cannot be explained by pointing to rational choice explanations only. It is likely that greater emphasis on the European issue within the revisionist Labour elite, which was followed by restructured transnational cooperation patterns during the first part of the sixties, were rational by pointing to the increased focus and altered context within which the issue developed in the wake of the Macmillan government’s re-evaluation of its EEC policy from 1960. Socialisation does not explain the setting up and institutionalising of socialist network configurations, as in the case of the SI conferences of party leaders and the Harpsund meetings. Nor does it adequately explain why Wilson and others chose to activate networks. Yet once established, transnational networks constituted an intellectual framework conductive to socialisation and changed perceptions. Intensified transnational socialist networking, to a great extent embedded in similar ideological traditions by shared values, worldviews and policy objectives, was a structure within which ideas and conceptualisations of Europe were extensively discussed and elaborat-

24 25

Cf. Parr 2002: 333 and Parr 2005. For a discussion of social versus instrumental trust see Kramer and Tyler 1996.

Transnational networking, interest maximising and socialisation

193

ed.26 In these arenas strategic coalition formation also took place in order to bring about adopted policy objectives. They thus constituted the framework from which rational calculations of expected outcomes emerged. The theoretical assumptions set out in chapter one indicate that choices were made on expected rather than actual utility since decisions often take place under complex and opaque conditions. Yet it is hard to explain the emerging consensus on the desirability of joining the European integration process as such and the socialist politicians’ changed perceptions of the prospects for carrying out socialist policies and economic planning domestically and eventually at a European level, only by pointing to rational choice reasoning. Transnational socialisation, as defined in the introductory chapter, emphasises the difficulties trying to specify the conditions under which and to what extent networks contribute to and facilitate the transfer of perceptions and policies. Accordingly, the empirical and methodological approach upon which this study rests does not unambiguously clarify either the conditions under which or to what extent the transfer of ideas or socialisation occurred within transnational socialist networks. Yet conditions in transnational socialist arenas to a large extent met the specific criteria pointed out by Axelrod and Checkel under which socialisation was likely to take place – the actor strongly identifies himself or herself with norms of the group or network, has common policy goals, and subscribes to the authority of the institutional structure. It is expected that these processes are facilitated if the group environment allows for voluntary membership and “privatised” settings. The conditions in transnational networks also corresponded with processes of socialisation as defined by Schimmelfennig and Johnston, normally associated with internalising norms embedded in regional and international organisations.27 This indicates that according to established theories of socialisation it is likely that perceptions and ideas were being transferred and internalised inside the identified networks. It also indicates that the likelihood of new perceptions and ideas becoming internalised increased in accordance with intensified transnational networking. Yet to some extent it varied along with the importance of the policy under consideration and the party’s position within the polity. The argument put forward is that the transnational institutional setting is likely to have given rise to increased trust among socialist leaders and thus facilitated an evolving consensus on the desirability of core Europe membership. This process was reinforced by common ideological policy objectives and the prospects for carrying out socialist policies in an enlarged core Europe. Thus, changed perceptions of joining core Europe in the revisionist Labour Party elite are, in this work, largely explained by pointing to close transnational contacts and discussions carried out inside socialist networks. On a personal level Wilson, like Gaitskell, is believed to have been reluctant towards deeper involvement with and showed modest interest in core Europe during the fifties. Yet as they increasingly became integrated into 26 27

Cf. Peterson 2004, Rosenau 1980: 1, Checkel 2001: 553–88, Djelic 2001, Granovetter 1983, Heard-Lauréote 2005 and Risse-Kappen 1995. Axelrod 1997: 58, Checkel 2001: 562–63, Johnston 2001: 495 and Schimmelfennig 2005: 63.

194

Labour and Europe Reassessed

reinforced transnational networks, their attitude towards joining the EEC/EC evolved. Likewise, changes in the Scandinavian labour party elites, in particular the DNA but also the SAP, may be explained with reference to transnational contacts. Sharing, to a large extent, common values and political objectives, a relatively stable group of the parties’ elite participated. Eventually, younger politicians were incorporated into the networks when they assumed key positions in their national parties. These are also likely to have adopted and internalised prevalent values and policy objectives. Thus, the correlation between participation in intensified transnational socialist networks and evolving support for joining the EEC/EC is put forward as a core explanation of the changed perceptions of core Europe membership, which increasingly included regarding the Community an adequate arena in which socialist policies and economic planning could be maximised. While recognising that attitudes towards joining the European integration process evolved inside the transnational network, the approach applied in this work has also demonstrated greater continuity in the Labour Party elite’s European policy during 1960–73 than the received wisdom has suggested.

LIST OF ARCHIVES The Norwegian Labour Movement’s Archives and Library Finn Moe’s Archive Norwegian Labour Party’s Archive Per Kleppe’s Archive Reiuld Steen papers Scand. Cooperation Cttee/Nordic Labour movement

AAB FMA DNA PKA RS SAMAK

The Danish Labour Movement’s Library and Archives Danish Labour Party’s Archive Jens Otto Krag’s Archive Per Hekkerup’s Archive Scand. Cooperation Cttee/Nordic Labour movement

ABA SD JOKA PHA SAMAK

The Swedish Labour Movement’s Archives and Library Olof Palme’s Archive Scand. Cooperation Cttee/Nordic Labour movement Swedish Labour Party’s Archive Tage Erlander ’s Archive

ARAB OPA SAMAK SAP TEA

Bodleian Library, Oxford (Special Collections) George Brown’s Archive Harold Wilson’s Archive

BL GBBLO HWBLO

International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam Sicco Mansholt’s Archive Socialist International Information/Socialist Affairs Socialist International’s Archive

IISH SMA SII SI

National Museum of Labour History, Manchester Labour Party Annual Conference Reports Labour Party archive Parliamentary Labour Party’s archive

LAM LACR Labour PLP

Public Record Office/British National Archives Board of Trade Foreign and Commonwealth Office Prime Minister ’s Office

PRO/NA BT FCO PREM

Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (UK)

TSO

The European Union Archives, Florence Group Socialiste, Parlement européen

EUA GSEP

BIBLIOGRAPHY Aardal, Ronny: Stereotyper av Tyskland hos norske utenrikspolitikere, 1950–1970, unpublished MA thesis, NTNU, Trondheim 2002. Abelshauser, Werner: “The Re-Entry of West-Germany into the International Economy and Early European Integration”, Wurm, Clemens (ed.): Western Europe and Germany. The Beginning of European Integration 1945–1960, Berg Publishers, Oxford 1995. Abrahamson, Peter: Welfare States in Crisis: The Crumbling of the Scandinavian Model?, Forlaget Sociologi, Sociologisk Institut, København 1988. Acharya, Amitav: “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism”, International Organization 58, 2004: 239–275. Adler, Emanuel and Peter M. Haas: “Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective research program”, International Organization, vol. 46, 1/1992: 367–390. Adler, Emanuel: “The emergence of cooperation: national epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control”, International Organization, vol. 46, 1/1992. Allardt, Erik and Stein Rokkan (eds.): Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology, The Free Press, New York 1970. Allers, Robin M.: “Alternatives to Membership or Temporary Solutions? The German Proposal for a Commercial Arrangement and the EEC’s Attitudes towards Nordek (1967–1970)”, in HeckerStampehl, Jan (ed.): Between Nordic ideology, economic interests and political reality: new perspectives on Nordek, The Finnish Society of Science and Letters, Helsinki 2009. Allers, Robin M.: “The Federal Republic of Germany and Norway. Bilateral relations in the context of European integration (1966–1973)”, Nordeuropa forum, 1/2001: 51–77. Allingham, Michael: Rational Choice, Macmillan, London 1999. Almlid, Geir K.: Negotiating for EC membership, 1970–72. A Comparative Study of the Approach Taken by the British and Norwegian Governments, unpublished PhD thesis, University of East Anglia, Norwich 2008. Almlid, Geir K.: Storbritannia mellom EEC og EFTA 1967–69: Persepsjoner og politikk, unpublished MA thesis, Dept. of History, NTNU 2000. Andersen, K. B. and Jens Otto Krag: Kamp og fornyelse. Socialdemokratiets indsats i dansk politik 1955–71, Fremad, København 1971. Anderson, Karen M.: “Pension Politics in Three Small States: Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands”, Canadian Journal of Sociology, vol. 29, 2/2004. Andrén, Nils and Yngve Möller: Från Undén till Palme. Svensk utrikespolitik efter andra världskriget, Norstedt, Stockholm 1990. Apeldoorn, Bastiaan van: “Transnational business: power structures in Europe’s political economy”, in Kaiser, Wolfram and Peter Starie (eds.): Transnational European Union. Towards a common political space, Routledge, London 2005. Araujo, Braz José de: “Le plan Fouchet et l’union politique européenne”, in Centre européen universitaire de Nancy, Université de Nancy, Nancy 1967. Armstrong, Kenneth A. and Simon J. Bulmer: The Governance of the Single European Market, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1998. Attlee, Clement: As It Happened, William Heinemann, London 1954. Aunesluoma, Juhana: “An Elusive Partnership: Europe, Economic Co-operation and British Policy towards Scandinavia 1949–1951”, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 8, 1/2002: 103–119. Axelrod, Robert: “Promoting Norms: An Evolutionary Approach to Norms” in Axelrod, R. (ed.): The Complexity of Cooperation, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1997.

198

Bibliography

Axelrod, Robert: The Complexity of Cooperation. Agent-based models of Competition and Collaboration, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1997a. Bealey, Frank (ed): The Social and Political Thought of the British Labour Party, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1970. Bell, David S. and Eric Shaw (eds.): Conflict & Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties, Pinter, London 1994. Bell, Patrick: The Labour Party in opposition, 1970–1974, Routledge, London 2004. Bellers, Jürgen: “The German Social Democratic Party, II”, Richard T. Griffiths (ed.) Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950’s, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1993. Beloff, Max: Britain and European Union: Dialog of the Deaf, Basingstoke, Macmillan, London 1996. Benn, Tony: The Benn Diaries, Selected, Abridged and Introduced by Ruth Winstone, Arrow, London 1996. Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann: The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, Penguin, London 1967. Bergh, Trond: “Storhetstid (1945–65)”, Arbeiderbevegelsens historie i Norge, bd. 5, Oslo 1987. Bergquist, Mats: “Sweden and the European Community”, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. IV, 1969. Bernadini, Giovanni: “Stabiltiy and socialist autonomy: the SPD, the PSI and the Italian political crisis of the 1970s”, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 15, 1/2009: 95–114. Bille, Lars and Claus Christoffersen: “De danske partiers internasjonale forbindelser” Knut Heidar and Lars Svåsand (red.): Partier uten grenser?, Tano Aschehoug 1997. Birch, Anthony H.: The British System of Government, Routledge, London 1998. Bitsch, Marie-Thérèse, Wilfried Loth, Raymond Poidevin (eds.): Institutions Européennes et Identités Européennes, Bruxelles 1998. Bitsch, Marie-Thérèse: “Le sommet de la Haye. La mise en route de la relance de 1969”, in Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–69, in series HistorikerVerbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Brussels 2001: 539–565. Blair, Tony: “My Kind of Britain”, New Statesman Special Selection, London 1996. Blair, Tony: New Britain. My Vision of a Young Country, Boulder, Westview Press, 1997. Blidberg, Kersti: Just good friends. Nordic social democracy and security policy 1945–50, Forsvarsstudier 5/1987. Blidberg, Kersti: Splittrad gemenskap. Kontakter och samarbete inom nordisk socialdemokratisk arbetarrörelse 1931–1945, Stockholm studies in history, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm 1984. Boehm, Lasse Michael: “Our Man in Paris: The British Embassy in Paris and the Second UK Application to Join the EEC, 1966–67”, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 10, 2/2004: 43–58. Boer, Monica den: “Cobweb Europe: venues, virtues and vexations of transnational policing”, in Kaiser, Wolfram and Peter Starie (eds.): Transnational European Union. Towards a common political space, Routledge, London 2005. Bohman, James: “The Limits of Rational Choice Explanation”, in Coleman, James S. and Thomas J. Fararo (eds.): Rational Choice Theory. Advocacy and Critique, Sage Publications, London 1992. Boix, Carles: “The Process of European Integration and Spanish Social Democracy”, ARENA, Working paper 17/99. Börzel, Tanja: States and Regions in the European Union Institutional Adaptation in Germany and Spain, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001. Bossuat, Gérard: “De Gaulle et la seconde candiature britannique aux Communautés européennes (1966–1969)”, in Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963– 69, in series Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Brussels 2001: 511–538. Bossuat, Gérard: L’Europe des Français, 1943–1959. La IVe République aux sources de l’Europe communautaire, Sorbonne, Paris 1996.

Bibliography

199

Branner, Hans and Morten Kelstrup (ed.) Denmark’s Policy towards Europe after 1945. History, Theory and Options, Odense University Press 2000a. Branner, Hans: “The Danish Foreign Policy Tradition and the European Context”, in Branner, Hans and Morten Kelstrup (eds.) Denmark’s Policy towards Europe after 1945. History, Theory and Options, Odense University Press 2000b. Branner, Hans: Danmark i en større verden. Udenrigspolitiken efter 1945, Columbus, Copenhagen 1995. Brivati, Brian: “Hugh Gaitskell”, in Jeffreys, Kevin: Leading Labour. From Keir Hardie to Tony Blair, I. B. Tauris, London 1999. Brivati, Brian: Hugh Gaitskell, Richard Cohen, London 1996. Broad, Matthew and Oliver Daddow: “Half-Remembered Quotations from Mostly Forgotten Speeches: The Limits of Labour ’s European Policy Discourse”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol. 12, 2/2010: 205–222. Broad, Roger and Virginia Preston (eds.): Moored to the Continent? Britain and European Integration, Institute of Historical Research, University of London, London 2001. Broad, Roger: Labour ’s European Dilemma: From Bevin to Blair, Palgrave, London 2001. Brown, George: In My Way. The Political Memoirs of Lord George-Brown, Victor Gollancz, London 1971. Brown, Leann M.: “Learning and Food Security in the European Union”, in Brown, Leann, Michael Kenndey and Michael Zarkin (eds.): Organizational Learning in the Global Context, Ashgate, Hampshire 2006. Brown, Leann, Michael Kenndey and Michael Zarkin (eds.): Organizational Learning in the Global Context, Ashgate, Hampshire 2006. Brusse, Wendy Asbeek: “The Dutch Socialist Party”, in Richard T. Griffiths (ed.) Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950’s, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1993. Buchanan, James and Gordon Tullock: The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, Michigan 1962. Budge, Ian et al.: The Changing British Political System: Into the1990s, Longman, London 1988. Callaghan, James: Time and Chance, Collins, London 1987. Calleo, David: The German Problem Reconsidered. Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1978. Camps, Miriam: Britain and the European Community 1955–63, Oxford University Press, London 1964. Camps, Miriam: European Unification in the Sixties. From Veto to Crisis, McGraw-Hill Book Company, London 1966. Castle, Barbara: The Castle Diaries, 1964–70, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 1984. Castle, Barbara: The Castle Diaries, 1964–76, Papermac, London 1990. Castles, Francis G.: The Social Democratic Image of Society. A Study of the achievements and origins of Scandinavian Social Democracy in comparative perspective, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1978. Catala, Michel (ed.): Histoire de la construction Européenne, Colloque international de Nantes 11, 12 et 13 mai 2000, Ouest editions, Nantes 2000. Charlton, Michael: The Price for Victory, British Broadcasting Corporation, London 1983. Checkel, Jeffrey T.: “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change”, International Organization 55, 3/2001: 553–588. Childs, David: Britain since 1945. A Political History, Routledge, London 1992. Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd 1908, Penguin Books, London 1968. Clavin, Patricia: “Defining Transnationalism”, Contemporary European History, vol. 14, 4/2005: 421–439. Coates, David: The Labour Party and the Struggle for Socialism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1975. Cole, Alistair: Franco-German Relations, Longman, Essex 2001. Coleman, James S. and Thomas J. Fararo (eds.): Rational Choice Theory. Advocacy and Critique, Sage Publications, London 1992.

200

Bibliography

Cooper, Robert: “Britain and Europe”, International Affairs 88, 6/2012: 1191–1203. Coopey, R., S. Fielding and N. Tiratsoo (eds.): The Wilson Governments 1964–1970, Printer, London 1993. Criddle, Byron: Socialists and European Integration. A Study of the French Socialist Party, Routledge, London 1969. Crosland, Anthony: A Social Democratic Britain, Fabian Society, London 1971. Crosland, Anthony: Social Democracy in Europe, Fabian Society, London 1975. Crosland, Anthony: The future of Socialism, Jonathan Cape, London 1964. Crossman, Richard: The Crossman Diaries. Selections from the Diaries of a Cabinet Minister 1964– 1970, Magnum Books, London 1979. Crossman, Richard: The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Hamish Hamilton, London 1975. Crowles, Maria Green: “Non-state actors and false dichotomies: reviewing IR/IPE approaches to European Integration”, Journal of European Public Policy, 10, 1/2003: 102–120. Daddow, Oliver J.: (ed.): Harold Wilson and European Integration. Britian’s Second Application to join the EEC, Frank Cass, London 2003. Daddow, Oliver J.: Britain and Europe since 1945. Historiographical perspectives on integration, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2004. Dahl, Svein: “West European Integration and the Rise of a New Germany. A Short Outline of the Adenauer Policy 1950–1963”, ARENA, Working paper 21/96. Deighton, Anne and Alan S. Milward (eds.): “Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957–1963”, in series Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden/Bruxelles 1999. Deighton, Anne: “British–West German Relations, 1945–1972”, in Larres, Klaus (ed.): Uneasy Allies. British-German Relations and European Integration Since 1945, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002. Deighton, Anne: “The Labour Party, Public Opinion and ‘the Second Try’ in 1967”, in Daddow, Oliver J.: (ed.): Harold Wilson and European Integration. Britian’s Second Application to join the EEC, Frank Cass, London 2003: 39–55. Deighton, Anne: “The Second British Application for Membership of the EEC”, in Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–69, in the series HistorikerVerbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Brussels 2001: 391–405. Delaney, Erin: “The Labour Party’s Changing Relationship to Europe. The Explanation of European Social Policy”, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 8, 1/2002: 121–138. Dell, Edmund: The Schuman Plan and the British Abdication of Leadership in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995. Deutsch, Karl et al: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton 1957. Dickie, John: Inside the Foreign Office, Chapmans, London 1992. Djelic, Marie-Laure: “Social Networks and Country-To-Country Transfer: Dense and Weak Ties in the Cross-National Diffusion of Ideas and Practices”, EBHA Conference 2001: Business and Knowledge, E4: Diffusion of Organisational Knowledge, 2001. Dolowitz, David and David Marsh: “Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making”, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 13, 1/2000: 5–24. Dolowitz, David and David Marsh: “Who Learns What from Whom: a Review of the Policy Transfer Literature”, Political Studies, XLIV 1996. Donoughue, Bernard: Downing Street Diary. With Harold Wilson in No. 10, Jonathan Cape, London 2005. Dorey, Peter (ed.): The Labour Governments 1964–1970, Routledge, London 2006. Due-Nielsen, Carsten and Johan P. Noack, Nikolaj Petersen: Danmark, Norden og NATO 1948– 1962, Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut, Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, København 1991. Durbin, Evan F. M.: The Politics of Democratic Socialism, The Labour Book Service, London 1940.

Bibliography

201

Duverger, Maurice: Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, Methuen, London 1954. Einhorn, Eric S. and John Logue: Modern Welfare States: Politics and Policies in Social Democratic Scandinavia, Praeger, London 1989. Ellison, James: “Accepting the inevitable: Britain and European Integration”, in Kaiser, Wolfram and Gillian Staerk (eds.): British Foreign Policy, 1955–64: Contracting Options, Macmillan in association with the Institute of Contemporary British History, Basingstoke 2000. Ellison, James: “Britain and the Treaties of Rome 1955–59”, in Broad, Roger and Virginia Preston (eds.): Moored to the Continent? Britain and European Integration, Institute of Historical Research, University of London, London 2001. Ellison, Nicholas: Egalitarian Thought and Labour Politics. Retreating visions, LSE, London 1994. Elvander, Nils: Skandinavisk Arbetarrörelse, Liber Förlag, Stockholm 1980. Eriksen, Knut Einar and Helge Ø. Pharo: “Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949–1965” Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie bd. 5, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1997. Eriksen, Knut Einar and Helge Ø. Pharo: “The Common Market Issue in Norway”, in Griffiths, Richard T. and Stuart Ward (ed.): Courting the Common Market. The First Attempt to Enlarge The European Community 1961–1963, London 1996. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta: Politics against Markets. The Social Democratic Road to Power, Princeton Universtiy Press, Oxford 1985. Featherstone, Kevin: Socialist Parties and European Integration. A Comparative History, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1988. Feld, Werner J. (ed.): The Foreign Policies of West European Socialist Parties, Praeger, New York 1978. Fevang, Guttorm: Norge – “nissen på lasset”. En studie av beslutningsprosessen som fant sted forut for Norges første søknad om medlemskap i EEC, unpublished MA thesis, University of Trondheim, Trondheim 1995. Fielding, Steven: The Labour Governments, 1964–1970: vol 1: Labour and cultural change, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2003. Finer, Samuel E. (ed.): Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform, Anthony Wigram, London 1975. Fink, Troels: Deutschland als Problem Dänemarks, Flensburg 1968. Flora, Peter and Heidenheimer, Arnold J. (eds.): The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America, Transaction Publishers, London 1990. Floud, Roderick and Johnson, Paul (eds.): The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain. Vol. III. Structural Change and Growth, 1939–2000, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004. Foot, Paul: The Politics of Harold Wilson, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth 1968. Frey, C. W.: “Meaning business: The British Application to Join the Common Market, November 1966–October 1967”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 6, 3/1967–68. Frøland, Hans Otto: “Ambiguous Interests. Norway and the West-European Market Formations 1959–62”, ARENA, Working paper 25/1998. Frøland, Hans Otto: “DNA og Vest-Europa 1945–1995: kontakter, samarbeid og utsyn”, in Knut Heidar and Lars Svåsand (eds.): Partier uten grenser?, Tano Aschehoug 1997. Frøland, Hans Otto: “Misstrauische Freundschaft. Die Haltung nowegischer Außenpolitiker gegenüber der Bundersrepublik Deutschland zwischen 1947 und 1967”, Nordeuropa forum, 1/2001b: 27–49. Frøland, Hans Otto: “Nordisk samarbeid under den vesteuropeiske integrasjonsprosessen – bare samarbeid til besvær?” Gudmund Moren (ed.): Historikerens rolle i samfunnet. Rapport fra Norske historiedager 99, Høgskolen i Lillehammer, Lillehammer 1999b. Frøland, Hans Otto: “The Second Norwegian EEC Application, 1967: Was There a Policy at all?”, in Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–69, in series Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Brussels 2001: 437–458. Frøland, Hans Otto: “Tysk–norske forbindelser etter 1945. Økonomi og sikkerhetspolitikk innen rammen av vestlige samarbeidsorganisasjoner”, in Simensen, Jarle (ed.): Tyskland–Norge. Den lange historien, Tano Aschehoug 1999.

202

Bibliography

Frøland, Hans Otto: “Unbalanced Burden Sharing and European Integration. Benelux and Scandinavian Reactions to Trade Liberalization in the OEEC 1950–1956”, in Timo Myllyntaus and A. M. Klemann (ed.): Conciliators and Lonely Riders. Small Countries, Economic Interests and International Organisations, n. d. Frøland, Hans Otto: “Une perspective sur la politique allemande de la Norvège de 1945 à 1960”, Revue d’Allemagne, 2/1993: 145–151. Furby, Daniel Edwin: The revival and success of Britain’s second application for membership of the European Community, 1968–71, unpublished PhD dissertation, Queen Mary, University of London, London 2010. Gaffney, John (ed.): Political Parties and the European Union, Routledge, London 1996. Gamble, Andrew M. and Stuart A. Walkland (eds.): The British Party System and Economic Policy 1945–1983. Studies in Adversary Politics, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1984. Gehler, Michael and Wolfram Kaiser (eds.): Christian Democracy in Europe Since 1945. Vol. 2, Routledge, London 2004. Gehler, Michael and Wolfram Kaiser: “Transnationalism and early European Integration: the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales and the Geneva Circle”, The Historical Journal, 44, 3/2001: 773–98. Gehler, Michael: “Facing a Range of Obstacles: Austria’s Integration Policy 1963–69”, in Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–69, in the series Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Brussels 2001: 459–487. George, Stephen: An Awkward Partner. Britain in the European Community, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990. George, Stephen: Britain and European Integration since 1945, Blackwell, London 1991. Geyer, David C. and Bernd Schaefer (eds.): “American détente and German Ostpolitik, 1969–1972”, Bulletin of the German historical institute Supplement 1, German Historical Institute, Washington 2004. Geyer, Robert: “Traditional Norwegian Social Democracy and the Rejection of the EU. A Troublesome Victory”, Scandinavian Studies, vol. 69, 3/1997: 322–345. Giddens, Anthony: New Rules of Sociological Method. A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies, Basic Books, New York 1976. Giddens, Anthony: Sociology. A brief but critical introduction, Houndmills, Macmillan Basingstoke 1986. Giddens, Anthony: The Constitution of Society. Outline of the theory of structuration, Polity Press, Cambridge 1984. Gidlund, Gullan: Partiernas Europa, Natur och Kultur, Stockholm 1992. Gillingham, John: Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955, Cambridge 1991. Gillingham, John: European Integration 1950–2003, Cambridge 2003. Gillis, John R. (ed.): Commemorations. The Politics of National Identity, Princeton University Press. Princeton 1994. Goldman, Ralph M.: “The Emerging Transnational Party System and the future of American Parties” in Maisel, Louis and Joseph Cooper (eds.): Political Parties: Development and Decay, Sage Publications 1978. Gore-Booth, Paul: The memoirs of Paul Gore-Booth. With Great Truth and Respect, Constable, London 1974. Gowland, David and Arthur Turner: Reluctant Europeans. Britain and European Integration, 1945– 1998, Pearson Eduacation Ld, Essex 2000. Gowland, David, Arthur Turner and Alex Wright: Britain and European Integration since 1945, Routledge, London 2010. Gran, Bernt: Vest-Tyskland – Norge – EEC. Momenter til forståelse av hvorfor Vest-Tyskland ønsket norsk medlemskap i EEC – 1966–1972, unpublished MA thesis, NTNU 2002. Granovetter, M.: “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited”, Sociological Theory, Randall Collins, 1983.

Bibliography

203

Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro: Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. A Critique of Applications in Political Science, Yale University Press, London 1994. Griffiths, Ricard T.: “A la recherche des débus de l’integration européenne”, Revue de Synthèse, 3/1990. Griffiths, Richard T. (ed.): Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950’s, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1993. Griffiths, Richard T. and Stuart Ward (eds.): Courting the Common Market. The First Attempt to Enlarge The European Community 1961–1963, London 1996. Gruner, Wolf D.: “‘Les Europe des Européens’. The Perception of Europe in the Debates of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe 1949–1951”, Bitsch, Marie-Thérèse, Wilfried Loth, Raymond Poidevin (eds.): Institutions Européennes et Identités Européennes, Bruxelles 1998: 89–122. Gruner, Wolf D.: Die deutsche Frage in Europa 1880–1990, München 1993. Gstöhl, Sieglinde: Reluctant Europeans. Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the Process of Integration, Boulder, London 2002. Gueldry, Michel: “La Grand-Bretagne et L’Europe: du pragmatisme insulaire au partenariat sceptique”, L’Europe an formation, no 353–354, automne–hiver 2009. Gussarsson, Maria: “The Swedish Social Democracy, the Plans on West European Economic Cooperation, and International Party Cooperation, 1955–58”, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 7, 2/2001: 85–101. Gussarsson, Maria: En socialdemokratisk europapolitik. Den svenska socialdemokratins hållning till de britiska, västtyska och franska broderpartierna, och upprättandet av ett västeuropeiskt ekonomiskt samarbete, 1955–58, Santérus förlag, Stockholm 2001. Haahr, Jens Henrik: “Between Scylla and Charybdis: Danish Party Policies on European Integration” in Branner, Hans and Morten Kelstrup (eds.) Denmark’s Policy towards Europe after 1945. History, Theory and Options, Odense University Press 2000. Haahr, Jens Henrik: Looking to Europe: the EEC policies of the British Labour Parties and the Danish Social Democrats, Aarhus University Press, Aarhus 1993. Haas, Ernst B.: Beyond the Nation State. Functionalism and International Organisation, Stanford University Press, California 1964. Haas, Ernst B.: The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–57, Stanford Universtiy Press, California 1958. Haas, Peter M. and Haas, Ernst B.: “Learning to Learn: Improving International Governance”, Global Governance, 1/1995: 255–284. Haas, Peter M.: “Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination”, International Organization, vol. 46, 1/1992: 1–35. Habermas, Jürgen: The Theory of Communicative Action, Lifeworld and system: A critique of functionalist reason, translated by Thomas McCarthy, vol. 2, Polity, Cambridge 1987. Hägglöf, Gunnar: Engelska år, 1950–1960, Norstedts, Stockholm 1974. Hägglöf, Ingemar: Drömmen om Europa, Norstedts, Stockholm 1987. Hajer, Maarten A.: The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995. Hall, Peter: “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain”, Comparative Politics, vol. 25, 1993: 275–296. Hall, Peter: Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, Polity Press, Oxford 1986. Hansen, Halle Jörn and Kaare Sandegren: “Norway and Western European Economic Integration”, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. IV, 1969: 47–62. Hansen, Peter: “Denmark and European Integration”, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. IV, 1/1969. Hansen, Peter: “Die Formulierung der dänischen Europapolitik”, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, 1/1973. Hansen, Svein O.: Det norske EFTA-sporet i 1950-åra. En studie av Norges Europa-politikk, med særlig vekt på perioden 1956–60, unpublished MA thesis, University of Oslo, Oslo 1990.

204

Bibliography

Hanson, Albert H. and Walles, Malcolm: Governing Britain. A Guidebook to Political Institutions, Fontana Press, London 1990. Harrison, Brian: “The Rise and Fall of Political Consensus in Britain since 1940”, The Historical Association, Oxford 1999. Harryvan, Anjo G. and Jan van der Harst: “For Once a United Front. The Netherlands and the ‘Empty Chair ’ Crisis of the Mid-1960s”, in Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–69, in the series Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Brussels 2001: 173–191. Haseler, Stephen: “Europe: The Collapse of the Social Democrats”, Commentary, 64, 6/1977: 42–46. Haseler, Stephen: The Gaitskellites. Revisionism in the British Labour Party 1951–64, Macmillan, London 1969. Healy, Denis: The Time of My Life, Norton & Company, London 1989. Heard-Lauréote, Karen: “Transnational networks: informal governance in the European political space”, in Kaiser, Wolfram and Peter Starie (eds.): Transnational European Union. Towards a common political space, Routledge, London 2005. Heath, Edward: The Course of my Life. My Autobiography, Hodder & Stoughton, London 1998. Heath, Edward: The Course of my Life. My Autobiography, Politico, London 2007. Hecker-Stampehl, Jan (ed.): Between Nordic ideology, economic interests and political reality: new perspectives on Nordek, The Finnish Society of Science and Letters, Helsinki 2009. Heffernan, Richard: “Leaders and followers: the politics of the parliamentary Labour party”, in Brivati, Brian and Richard Heffernan (eds.), The Labour Party: a Centenary History, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2000. Heidar, Knut and Lars Svåsand (eds.): Partier uten grenser?, Tano Aschehoug 1997. Heidar, Knut and Lars Svåsand: “Internasjonale partisammenslutninger: partier eller organisasjoner?”, Knut Heidar and Lars Svåsand (eds.): Partier uten grenser?, Tano Aschehoug 1997. Heidar, Knut, Hanne C. Pettersen and Lars Svåsand: “Norske partiers internasjonale forbindelser” Knut Heidar and Lars Svåsand (eds.): Partier uten grenser?, Tano Aschehoug 1997. Herrmann, Richard K. and Vaughn P. Shannon: “Defending International Norms: The Role of Obligation, Material Interest, and Perception in Decision Making”, International Organization 55, 3/2001: 621–654. Heurlin, Bertel: Danmarks udenrigspolitik efter 1945. Kilder til belysning af Danmarks udenrigspolitiske mål 1945–1970, Gyldendal, København 1971. Hix, Simon and Urs Lesse: Shaping a Vision. A history of the Party of European Socialists 1957– 2002, http://www.pes.eu/en/document/imagesdownloadshistorypesenpdf, PES 2002. Retrieved on 11 February 2014. Hoffman, Stanley: “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe”, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2/1966. Hollowell, Jonathan “From Commonwealth to European Integration” in Hollowell, Jonathan (ed.): Britain since 1945, Blackwell, Oxford 2003. Howell, David: British Social Democracy. A Study in Development and Decay, Croom Helm, London 1980. Hrbek, Rudolf: “The German Social Democratic Party, I”, in Richard T. Griffiths (ed.), Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950’s, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1993. Huldt, Bo and Klaus Misgeld (eds.): Socialdemokratin och svensk utrikespolitik. Från Branting till Palme, Utrikespolitiska institutet, MH Publishing, Stockholm 1990. Ichilow, O. (ed.): “Introduction”, in Political Socialization, Citizenship Education and Democracy, Teachers College Press, New York 1990: 1–8. Jeffreys, Kevin: “Labour in opposition, 1951–1964”, in Dorey, Peter (ed.): The Labour Governments 1964–1970, Routledge, London 2006: 4–23. Jeffreys, Kevin: Leading Labour. From Keir Hardie to Tony Blair, I. B. Tauris, London 1999. Jenkins, Roy: A Life at the Centre, Macmillan, London 1991. Jenkins-Smith, Hank C. and Paul A. Sabatier (eds.): Policy Change and Learning. An Advocacy Coalition Approach, Westview Press, Boulder 1993.

Bibliography

205

Jerneck, Magnus: “De svenska partiernas utlandsförbindelser”, in Knut Heidar and Lars Svåsand (eds.): Partier uten grenser?, Tano Aschehoug 1997. Jerneck, Magnus: “Internationalisering och svensk partidiplomati”, in Hansson, Göte och LarsGöran Stenelo (eds.): Makt och Internationalisering, Carlsson Bokförlag, Stockholm 1990. Jessen, M: “Den svære begyndelse – Socialdemokratiet og Europa 1945–1950”, Den jyske Historiker, 93, 2001: 12–31. Johansson, Karl Magnus: “The alliance of European Christian Democracy and Conservatism. Convergence through networking”, in Kaiser, Wolfram and Peter Starie (eds.): Transnational European Union. Towards a common political space, Routledge, London 2005. Johnston, Alastair Iain: “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments”, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 45, 4/2001: 487–515. Jones, Tudor: Remaking the Labour Party. From Gaitskell to Blair, Routledge, London 1996. Jowell, Roger and James Spence: The Grudging Europeans: A study of British Attitudes towards the EEC, The Social and Community Planning Research, London 1975. Jølstad, Anders: Det tyske problem. Norsk sikkerhetspolitisk samarbeid med Vest-Tyskland 1955–65, Forsvarsstudier 5, Oslo 1995a. Jølstad, Anders: Norsk sikkerhetspolitisk samarbeid med Vest-Tyskland fra 1955 til 1965, unpublished MA thesis, University of Oslo, Oslo 1995b. Jørgensen, Knud Erik, Johnny Laursen and Henrik D. Høyer: Made in Denmark. Essays on Danish legal, historical, and political research on the European Community and the European Union, Dept. of Political Science, Aarhus n. d. Kaiser, Wolfram, Brigitte Leucht and Michael Gehler (eds.): Transnational Networks in Regional Integration: Governing Europe, 1945–83, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2010. Kaiser, Wolfram and Brigitte Leucht, “Informal Politics of Integration: Christian Democratic and Transatlantic Networks in the Creation of ECSC core Europe”, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 14, 1/2008: 35–49. Kaiser, Wolfram and Gillian Staerk (eds.): British Foreign Policy, 1955–64: Contracting Options, Macmillan in association with the Institute of Contemporary British History, Basingstoke 2000. Kaiser, Wolfram and Jan-Henrik Meyer (eds.): Societal Actors in European Integration. PolityBuilding and Policy-Making 1958–1992, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2013. Kaiser, Wolfram and Jürgen Elvert (eds.): European Union Enlargement. A comparative History, Routledge, London 2004. Kaiser, Wolfram and Peter Starie (eds.): Transnational European Union. Towards a common political space, Routledge, London 2005. Kaiser, Wolfram, Brigitte Leucht and Morten Rasmussen (eds.): The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72, Routledge, London 2009. Kaiser, Wolfram: “A never ending story: Britain in Europe”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol. 4, 1/2002: 152–65. Kaiser, Wolfram: “Beyond Governments and Supranational Institutions: Societal Actors in European Integration”, in Kaiser, Wolfram and Jan-Henrik Meyer (eds.): Societal Actors in European Integration. Polity-building and Policy-making 1958–1992, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2013: 1–14. Kaiser, Wolfram: “Bringing History Back In To the Study of Transnational Networks in European Integration”, Journal of Public Policy, vol. 29, 2/2009b: 223–39. Kaiser, Wolfram: Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007. Kaiser, Wolfram: “Culturally Embedded and Path-Dependent: Peripheral Alternatives to ECSC/ EEC ‘core Europe’ since 1945”, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 7, 2/2001a: 11–36. Kaiser, Wolfram: “Party Games: The British EEC Applications of 1961 and 1967”, in Broad, Roger and Virginia Preston (eds.): Moored to the Continent? Britain and European Integration, Institute of Historical Research, University of London, London 2001.

206

Bibliography

Kaiser, Wolfram: “Polity-building and Policy-making: Societal Actors in European Integration”, in Kaiser, Wolfram and Jan-Henrik Meyer (eds.): Societal Actors in European Integration. Polity-building and Policy-making 1958–1992, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2013: 244– 262. Kaiser, Wolfram: “The Political Reform Debate in Britain since 1945: The European dimension”, Contemporary British History, vol. 12, 1/1998: 48–76. Kaiser, Wolfram: “The Successes and Limits of Industrial Market Integration: The European Free Trade Association 1963–1969”, in Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–69, in the series Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Brussels 2001b: 371–390. Kaiser, Wolfram: “Transnational European Integration: Network Governance 1945–72”, in Kaiser, Wolfram, Brigitte Leucht and Morten Rasmussen (eds.): The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72, Routledge, London 2009a. Kaiser, Wolfram: “Transnational Mobilization and Cultural Representation: Political Transfer in an Age of Proto-Globalization, Democratization and Nationalism 1848–1914”, European Review of History, vol. 12, 2/2005a: 403–424. Kaiser, Wolfram: Transnational Western Europe since 1945: integration as political society formation, in Kaiser, Wolfram and Peter Starie (eds.): Transnational European Union. Towards a common political space, Routledge, London 2005. Kaiser, Wolfram: “Transnationalism and early European Integration: the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales and the Geneva Circle”, The Historical Journal, 44, 3/2001: 773–98. Kaiser, Wolfram: Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans. Britain and European Integration, 1945– 63, Macmillan, London 1996. Karlsson, Birgit: Att handla neutralt. Sverige och den ekonomiska integrationen i Västeuropa 1948– 1972, Rapport från ekonomisk-historiska institutionen Handelshögskolan vid Göteborgs Universitet, Göteborg 2001. Karvonen, Lauri and Jan Sundberg: Social Democracy in Transition. Northern, Southern and Eastern Europe, Dartmouth, London 1991. Karvounis, Antonios: An Analysis of the Labour Party’s Discourse on Europe 1961–2000, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle 2002. Keating, Michael: The Politics of Modern Europe. The State and Political Authority in the Major Democracies, Edward Elgar, Aldershot 1993. Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink: Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, NY 1998. Kelstrup, Morten (ed.): European Integration and Denmark’s Participation, Political Studies Press, København 1992. Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds): Transnational Relations and World Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1971. Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye: Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1977. Kerr, C: Industrialism and Industrial Man: the Problems of Labour and Management in Economic Growth, Heineman 1962. Kirschheimer, Otto: “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems”, in LaPalombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner (eds.): Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1966: 177–200. Kitschelt, Herbert: The Transformation of European Social Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994. Kitzinger, Uwe: “Entry and Referendum”, in Broad, Roger and Virginia Preston (eds.): Moored to the Continent? Britain and European Integration, Institute of Historical Research, University of London, London 2001. Kitzinger, Uwe: Diplomacy and Persuasion. How Britain joined the Common Market, Thames and Hudson, London 1973. Kitzinger, Uwe: The Second Try: The Labour Party and the EEC, Pergamon, London 1968.

Bibliography

207

Kleppe, Per: EFTA–NORDEK–EEC: analys av de nordiska ländernas integrationsproblem, Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle, Stockholm 1970. Kleppe, Per: Kleppepakke: meninger og minner fra et politisk liv, Aschehoug, Oslo 2003. Kleppe, Per: Norges vei til Europa, Aschehoug, Oslo 1989. Knudsen, Ann-Christina L.: “Delegation as a political process: the case of the inter-institutional debate over the Budget Treaty”, in Kaiser, Wolfram, Brigitte Leucht and Morten Rasmussen (eds.): The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950– 72, Routledge, London 2008 Knudsen, Ann-Christina L.: Defining the Policies of the Common Agricultural Policy. A historical Study, unpublished doctoral thesis, EUI, Florence 2001. Knudsen, Ann-Christina L.: Farmers on Welfare: the Making of Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy, Cornell University Press, London 2009. Knutsen, Torbjørn L.: A history of International Relations theory, 2nd ed., Manchester University Press, Manchester 1997. Komorita, S. S. and Jerome M. Chertkoff: “A Bargaining Theory of Coalition Formation”, Psychological Review, vol. 80, 3/1973. Kramer, Roderick M. and Tom R. Tyler: Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, Sage Publications, London 1996. Kristoffersen, Dag Axel: “A Social Democratic Vision for Europe? Trygve Bratteli and Norwegian Labour ’s European Policy (1966–1972)”, paper presented at the RICHIE-IV conference, National cultures and European common identity, Science Po, Paris, 11–13 December 2008. Kristoffersen, Dag Axel: “Norway’s Policy Towards the EEC: the European Dilemma of the Centre Right Coalition (1965–1971), in Rücker, Katrin and Laurent Warlouzet (eds.): Quelle(s) Europe(s)?: nouvelles approaches en historie de l’intégration européenne, Peter Lang, Bruxelles: 209–224. Labour Party: The EEC and Britain. A Socialist Perspective, Labour Party, London 1977. Ladrech, Robert: Social Democracy and the Challenge of European Union, Boulder, London 2000. Lahlum, Hans Olav: Haakon Lie. Historien, mytene og mennesket, Aschehoug, Oslo 2009. Lamb, Richard: The Macillan Years 1957–1963. The Emerging Truth, John Murray, London 1995. Lammers, Karl Christian: “Danmark og Tysklandsspørgsmålet. Hovedlinier i dansk Tysklandspolitik fra 1945 til ca. 1973”, in Dethlefsen, H. and H. Lundbak (eds.): Fra mellemkrigstid til efterkrigstid, København 1998. Lammers, Karl Christian: “Das Deutschlandbild in Dänemark unde die Entwicklung der politischen Beziehungen zu den beiden deutschen Staaten”, in Bohn, Robert (ed.): Die Deutsch-Skandinavischen Beziehungen nach 1945, Wiesbaden 1999. Lammers, Karl Christian: “Denmark’s Relations with Germany Since 1945”, in Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (ed.) Denmark’s Policy towards Europe after 1945. History, Theory and Options, Odense University Press 2000. Lang, Arnim: “Von der Okkupation zur Koperation. Ausgewählte Aspekte der deutsch-norwegischen Beziehungen vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis zur deutschen Wiedervereinigung” Revue d’Allemagne, 2/1993: 153–163. LaPalombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner (eds.): Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1966. Larres, Klaus (ed.): Uneasy Allies. British-German Relations and European Integration Since 1945, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002. Lasswell, Harold D.: Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, Peter Smith, New York 1950. Laursen, Johnny et al (eds): Danmark i Europa 1945–1993, Munksgaard, København 1994. Laursen, Johnny N. and Thorsten Borring Olesen: “A Nordic Alternative to Europe? The Interdependence of Denmark’s Nordic and European Policies”, Hans Branner and Morten Kelstrup (eds.) Denmark’s Policy towards Europe after 1945. History, Theory and Options, Odense University Press 2000. Laursen, Johnny: “Denmark, Scandinavia and the Second Attempt to Enlarge the EEC, 1966–67”, in Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–69, in series

208

Bibliography

Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Brussels 2001: 407–436. Laursen, Johnny: “Fra nordisk fællesmarked til Helsingfors Konvention – nordisk økonomisk samarbejde 1945–62”, De Nordiske Fællesskaber. Myte og realitet i det nordiske samarbejde, Den jyske Historiker no. 69–70/1994. Laursen, Johnny: “The Great Challenge. Denmark and the first Attempt to Enlarge the European Community 1961–63”, Paper presented at the Conference The Brussels Conference. The first Attempt to Enlarge the European Community 1961–63, Florence, 16–19. February 1994. Lefebvre, Denis: “The French Socialist Party, 1954–1957”, in Richard T. Griffiths (ed.): Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950’s, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1993. Levsen, Dirk: “‘Til Tyskland for freden’. Skandinavien und das Nachkriegsdeutschland” Historiche Mitteilungen, vol. 3, 2/1990. Levsen, Dirk: Eine schwierige Partnerschaft. Ausgewählte Kapitel zur Entwicklung der politischen, militärischen und rüstungstechnischen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem Königreich Norwegen von 1949 bis 1966, Dissertation, Universitetet i Kiel 1993. Lidegaard, Bo: Jens Otto Krag 1914–1961, bind I, Gyldendal, Copenhagen 2001. Lidegaard, Bo: Jens Otto Krag 1962–1978, bind II, Gyldendal, Copenhagen 2001b. Lie, Bjarne: A Gulliver among Lilliputians … A History of the European Free Trade Association 1960–1972, unpublished MA thesis, University of Oslo, Oslo 1995. Lie, Haakon: … Slik jeg ser det, Tiden Norsk Forlag, Oslo 1975. Lie, Haakon: Skjebneår 1945–1955, Oslo 1955. Lie, Ragnar: Demokratiske sosialister. Vestorienteringen i Internasjonalen og i Det norske Arbeiderparti 1945–1951, unpublished MA thesis, Bergen 1986. Lieber, Robert J.: British Politics and European Unity. Parties, Elites, and Pressure Groups, University of California Press, London 1970. Lindberg, Leon N.: The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1963. Lindström, U., Euro-konsent: Euro-Contract or Euro-Coercion? Scandinavian Social Democracy, the European Impasse, and the Abolition of Things Political, Scandinavian University Press, Oslo 1993. Lipgens, Walter (ed.): “Documents on the History of European Integration”, vol. 2, Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile 1939–1945, European University Institute Series B1.2, Berlin 1986. Lipgens, Walter and Wilfried Loth (eds.): “Documents an the History of European Integration”, vol. 3, The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945–1950, Berlin 1988. Lipgens, Walter: “A History of European Integration 1945–1947”, vol. 1, The formation of the European Unity Movement, Oxford 1982. Logue, John: Socialism and Abundance. Radical Socialism in the Danish Walfare State, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1982. Lorenz, Einhart: “‘Moralische Kalorien’ für deutsche Demokraten. Norwegische Ansichten über Deutschland am beispiel der Arbeiterbewegung” in Bohn, R. und J. Elvert (eds.): Kriegsende im Norden. Vom heissen zum kalten Krieg, Franz Steiner verlag, Stuttgart 1995: 267– 280. Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–69, in series HistorikerVerbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Brussels 2001. Loth, Wilfried and Walter Lipgens: Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik 1945–1950, Klett, Stuttgart 1977. Loth, Wilfried: “The French Socialist Party, 1947–1954”, in Richard T. Griffiths (ed.): Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950’s, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1993. Loth, Wilfried: Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der europäischen Integration 1939–1957, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1990.

Bibliography

209

Ludlow, N. Piers: “A Welcome Change: The European Commission and the Challenge of Enlargement, 1958–73”, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 11, 2/2005: 31–46. Ludlow, N. Piers: “The Eclipse of the Extremes. Demythologising the Luxembourg Compromise”, in Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–69, in series Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Brussels 2001. Ludlow, N. Piers: Dealing with Britain: the Six and the First UK Application to the EEC, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997. Ludlow, N. Piers: The European Community and the Crisis of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaullist challenge, Routledge, London 2006. Lundestad, Geir: Norske holdninger overfor Vest-Tyskland 1947–51, MA thesis, University of Oslo, Oslo 1970. Lyngstad, Arne: Europa – debatt i Den Sosialistiske Internasjonale 1955–1963, unpublished MA thesis, University of Trondheim, Trondheim 1992. Mair, Peter (ed.): The West European Party System, Oxford University Press, New York 1990. Maisel, Louis and Joseph Cooper (ed.): Political Parties: Development and Decay, Sage Publications 1978. Malmborg, Mikael af and Bo Stråth (eds.): The Meaning of Europe. Variety and Contention within and among Nations, Berg, Oxford 2002. Malmborg, Mikael af: “Divergent Scandinavian Responses to the Proposed first Enlargement of the EEC”, in Deighton, Anne and Alan S. Milward (eds.): “Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957–1963”, in series Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden/Bruxelles 1999. Malmborg, Mikael af: “Gaullism in the North? Sweden, Finland and the EEC in the 1960’s”, in Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–69, in series Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Brussels 2001: 489–508. Malmborg, Mikael af: Den ståndaktiga nationalstaten. Sverige och den västeuropeiska integrationen 1945–1959, Lund University Press, Lund 1994. Maoz, Zeev: National Choices and International Processes, Cambrige University Press, Cambridge 1990. Markovits, Andrei S. & Reich, Simon: The German Predicament. Memory and Power in the New Europe, Cornell University Press, London 1997. Marsh, Richard: Off the Rails. An Autobiography, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1978. Maurhofer, Roland: “Revisiting the Creation of EFTA: the British and the Swiss Case”, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 7, 2/2001: 65–82. Maurseth, Per: “Ambiguities of Solidarity. Class, Nation and Transnational Communities: The Case of Labour Movement in Norway”, in Bericht über das 6. deutch-nowegiche Historikertreffen in Leipzig, Leipzig 1993: 97–130. May, Alex: Britain and Europe since 1945, Longman, London 1999. McDermott, Geoffrey: Leader Lost. A Biography of Hugh Gaitskell, Leslie Frewin, London 1972. Meredith, Stephen C.: “A catalyst for secession? European divisions on the parliamentary right of the Labour party 1962–72 and the schism of British social democracy”, Historical Research, 85, 228/2012: 329–351. Mikardo, Ian: Back-Bencher, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1988. Miles, Lee: Sweden and European Integration, Centre for European Union Studies, University of Hull, Ashgate, Aldershot 1997. Miljan, Toivo: The Reluctant Europeans. The Attitudes of the Nordic Countries towards European Integration, London 1977. Milner, Henry: Social Democracy and the Rational Choice. The Scandinavian experience and Beyond, Routledge, London 1994.

210

Bibliography

Milward, Alan S., Frances M. B. Lynch, Frederico Romero, Ruggero Raneri and Vibeke Sørensen (eds.): The Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and Theory 1945–1992, Routledge, London 1993. Milward, Alan S.: “États Nations et Communauté: le paradoxe de l’Europe”, Revue de Synthèse, 3/1990. Milward, Alan S.: The European Rescue of the Nation-State, Routledge, London 1992. Milward, Alan S.: The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51, Routledge, London 1984. Milward, Alan S.: The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy 1945–1963, Whitehall History Publishing, London 2002. Misgeld, Klaus och Karl Molin, Klas Åsmark (eds.): Socialdemokratins samhälle. SAP och Sverige under 100 år, Tiden, Stockholm 1988. Misgeld, Klaus: “As the Iron Curtain Descended. The Co-ordinating Committee of the Nordic Labour Movement and the Socialist International between Potsdam and Geneva (1945–1955)” Scandinavian Journal of History, 1/1988. Misgeld, Klaus: “Den svenska socialdemokratin och Europa från slutet av 1920-talet till början av 1970-talet”, in Huldt, Bo and Klaus Misgeld (eds.): Socialdemokratin och svensk utrikespolitik. Från Branting till Palme, Utrikespolitiska institutet, MH Publishing, Stockholm 1990a: 195– 210. Misgeld, Klaus: “Deutschland – immer wieder ein Problem. Die schwediche Socialdemokratie, die SPD und die Deuschlandfrage im ersten Nachkriegsjahrzehnt”, in Neuanfang. Beziehungen zwischen Schweden und Deutschland 1945–1954, Umeå Studies in Economic History 13, Stockholm 1990b. Misgeld, Klaus: “Europadebatten i Sverige på 50- och 60-talen”, Signum, vol. 15, 4/1989. Misgeld, Klaus: Den fackliga europavägen. LO, det internationella samarbetet och Europas enande, 1945–1991, Atlas, Stockholm 1997. Misgeld, Klaus: Sozialdemokratie und Aussenpolitik in Schweden. Sozialistische Internationale, Europapolitik und die Deutschlandfrage 1945–1956, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt 1984. Mishra, R.: Society and Social Policy. Theoretical Perspectives on Welfare, Macmillan, London 1977. Mitchell, Austin: The Case for Labour, Longman, London 1983. Mitrany, David: A Working Peace System. An argument for the functional development of international organization, National Peace Council, 1946. Mommens, Thierry E. and Luc Minten: “The Belgian Socialist Party”, in Richard T. Griffiths (ed.): Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950’s, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1993. Moravcsik, Andrew: The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Cornell University Press, Cambridge 1998. Morgan, Austen: Harold Wilson, Pluto Press, London 1992. Morgan, Kenneth O.: “Socialism and Social Democracy in the British Labour Party, 1945–1989”, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, Band XXIX, 1989: 297–325. Morgan, Kenneth O.: Callaghan. A life, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997. Mousson-Lestang, Jean-Pierre: La Scandinavie et l’Europe de 1945 à nous jours, Presses universitaires de France, Paris 1990. Mullen, Andrew: The British Left’s “Great Debate” on Europe, Continuum, London 2007. Nairn, Tom: The Left Against Europe?, Penguin, Harmondsworth 1973. Navari, Cornelia: Internationalism and the State in the Twentieth Century, Routledge, London 2000. Neal, Larry: “Impact of Europe”, in Floud, Roderick and Johnson, Paul (eds.): The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain. Vol. III. Structural Change and Growth, 1939–2000, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004. Nedrebø, Tore: Den tyske utfordringa. Tyskland, Noreg og det nye Europa, Samlaget, Oslo 1995. Nelsen, Brent F. (ed.): Norway and the European Community, Praeger, London 1993. Newman, Michael: “The British Labour Party”, in Richard T. Griffiths (ed.): Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950’s, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1993.

Bibliography

211

Newman, Michael: Socialism and European Unity. The Dilemma of the Left in Britain and France, Junction Books, London 1983. Nielsen, Fritz v. Nordheim: “The Welfare State Projects of the Scandinavian Labour Movements – Models for a Reformist Road to Socialism or Dead End Streets?”, in Abrahamson, Peter: Welfare States in Crisis: The Crumbling of the Scandinavian Model?, Forlaget Sociologi, Sociologisk Institut, København 1988. Nielsson, Gunnar P.: Denmark and European Integration. A small Country at the Crossroads, unpublished PhD-dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles 1966. Nissborg, Agnete: Danmark mellan Norden och Väst, Almqvist & Wiksell, Uppsala 1985. Nolfo, Ennio di: “The Italian Socialists”, in Richard T. Griffiths (ed.): Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950’s, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1993. Notermans, Ton: “The German Social Democrats and Monetary Union”, ARENA, Working paper 23/98. Oatley, Thomas H.: “Multilateralizing Trade and Payments in Postwar Europe”, International Organization 55, 4/2001: 949–969. Olesen, Thorsten B. (ed.): Interdependence Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 1945–1960, Odense University Press, Odense 1995. Olesen, Thorsten B. and Karl Molin: “Security Policy and Domestic Politics in Scandinavia 1948/49”, in Olesen, Thorsten B. (ed.): Interdependence Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 1945–1960, Odense University Press, Odense 1995. Olesen, Thorsten B.: “The Dilemmas of Interdependence: Danish Foreign Policy 1945–1972”, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 7, 2/2001: 37–63. Olesen, Thorsten B.: “Jagten på et sikkerhedspolitisk ståsted. Socialdemokratiet og holdningerne til sikkerhedspolitikken 1945–1949”, in Thomsen, Birgit Nüchel: Temaer og brændpunkter i dansk politisk historie efter 1945, Odense Universitetsforlag, Odense 1994. Olsen, Johan P. and Bjørn O. Sverdrup: “Samarbeid og integrasjon – i Norden og i Europa”, ARENA, Working paper 20/97. Olssen, Ulf: “Sweden and Europe in the 20th Century. Economics and Politics”, Scandinavian Journal of History, 1/1993b. Olssen, Ulf: “The Swedish Social Democrats”, in Richard T. Griffiths (ed.): Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950’s, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1993a. O’Neill, Sir Con: Britain’s Entry into the European Community: Report on the Negotiations of 1970–72, Whitehall History Publishing in association with Frank Cass, London 2000. Ovendale, Ritchie (ed.): The English Speaking Alliance. Great Britain, the US, the Dominions and the Cold War, Allen & Unwin, London 1985. Padgett, Stephen and William E. Paterson: A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe, Longman, London 1991. Parness, Diane L.: The SPD and the Challenge of Mass Politics. The Dilemma of the German Volkspartei, Westview Press, Oxford 1991. Parr, Helen and Melissa Pine: “Policy towards the European Economic Community”, in Dorey, Peter (ed.): The Labour Governments 1964–1970, Routledge, London 2006: 108–129. Parr, Helen: “Saving the Community: The French Response to Britain’s Second EEC Application in 1967”, Cold War History, vol. 6, 4/2006b: 425–454. Parr, Helen: Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community. Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role, 1964–1967, Routledge, Abingdon 2006. Parr, Helen: Harold Wilson, Whitehall and British Policy towards the European Community, 1964– 67, PhD dissertation, Queen Mary, University of London, London 2002. Parr, Helen: Response to Melissa Pine’s review of Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community. Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role, 1964–1967, Routledge, Abingdon 2005, http://www. history.ac.uk/reviews/review/544 at http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/544/response. Parsons, Craig: “Showing Ideas and Causes: The Origins of the European Union”, International Organization 56, 1/2002: 47–84. Pasture, Patrick: “The Interwar Origins of International Labour ’s European Commitment (1919– 1934)”, Contemporary European History, 10, 2/2001: 221–237.

212

Bibliography

Pasture, Patrick: “Trade unions as a transnational movement in the European space 1955–65: falling short of ambitions?”, in Kaiser, Wolfram and Peter Starie (eds.): Transnational European Union. Towards a common political space, Routledge, London 2005. Paterson, William E. and Alistair H. Thomas: Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe, Croom Helm, London 1977. Paterson, William E. and Ian Campell: Social Democracy in Post-War Europe, Macmillan, London 1974. Pearce, Edward: Denis Healey. A Life in Our Times, Little Brown, London 2002. Pedersen, Ole Karup: “Socialistisk Internationale, Socialdemocratiet og dansk udenrigspolitik”, Økonomi og politik, vol. 57, 4/1983: 301–308. Pelinka, Anton: “European Christian Democracy in Comparison”, in Gehler, Michael and Wolfram Kaiser (eds.): Christian Democracy in Europe Since 1945. Vol. 2, Routledge, London 2004. Pelinka, Anton: Social Democratic parties in Europe, Praeger, New York 1983. Pelling, Henry: A Short History of the Labour Party, St. Martin’s Press (tenth ed.), London 1993. Perron, Régine: “Le discret projet de l’intégration monétaire européenne (1963–1969)”, in Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–69, in the series Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Brussels 2001: 345–367. Peterson, John: “Policy Networks”, in Wiener, Antje and Thomas Diez: European Integration Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004. Pharo, Helge Ø.: “Arbeiderbevegelsen og integrasjonsproblemet”, Arbeiderhistorie, AAB, Oslo 1992: 5–28. Pharo, Helge Ø.: “Norge, EF og europeisk samarbeid”, Internasjonal Politikk, 6/1988. Pharo, Helge Ø.: “The Norwegian Labour Party”, in Richard T. Griffiths (ed.): Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950’s, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1993. Pharo, Helge Ø.: “The third force, Atlanticism and Norwegian attitudes towards European integration”, EUI working paper, no. 86/255, Florence 1986. Pharo, Helge Ø.: Norge, Norden og europeisk integrasjon som etterkrigshistorisk forskningsfelt, LOS-senteret Notat 91/26, Bergen 1991. Pierson, Paul: “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis”, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 20, 2/1996: 123–63. Pierson, Paul: Politics in Time. History, Institutions, and Social Analysis, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2004. Pimlott, Ben: Harold Wilson, Harper Collins Publishers, London 1992. Pine, Melissa: “British personal diplomacy and public policy: the Soames Affair”, Journal of European Integration History, vol. 10, 2/2004: 59–76. Pine, Melissa: Application on the Table: The Second British Application to the European Communities, 1967–1970, PhD dissertation, University of Oxford, Oxford 2003. Pine, Melissa: Harold Wilson and Europe: Pursuing Membership of the European Community, Tauris Academic Studies, London 2007. Pine, Melissa: Review of Helen Parr ’s: Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community. Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role, 1964–1967, Routledge, Abingdon 2005, http://www.history. ac.uk/reviews/review/544. Pisani, Edgard et al: “Problems of British entry into the EEC”, in Reports to the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, Research Publications Ltd, Chatham House, London 1969. Pontusson, Jonas: The Limits of Social Democracy. Investment Politics in Sweden, Cornell University Press, London 1992. Pridham, Geoffrey and Pippa Pridham: Transnational Party Co-operation and European Integration. The process towards direct elections, George Allen & Unwin, London 1981. Pridham, Geoffrey: Transnational Party Co-operation and European Integration. The process towards direct elections, George, Allen and Unwin, London 1981. Przworski, Adam E.: “Social democracy as an Historical Phenomenon”, New Left Review, 122/1980.

Bibliography

213

Ramberg, T.: “Sovereignty and Cooperation”, Ørvik, N. (ed.): Fears and Expectations, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1972: 49–125. Rasmussen, Morten and Johnny Lausen: Denmark’s Road to the EEC, 1945–72. The State of the Art, Arbejdspapirer, historisk institut, Aarhus Universitet 2002. Rasmussen, Morten: Joining the European Communities – Denmark’s Road to EC-membership 1961–1973, unpublished PhD thesis, EUI, Florence 2004. Reynolds, David: Britannia Overruled. British Policy and World Powers in the 20th Century, Longman, London 1991. Rhodes, Rod: Understanding governance: policy networks, governance, reflexivity and accountability, Buckingham, OUP 1997. Rippingale, Simon: Hugh Gaitskell, the Labour Party and Foreign Affairs 1955–63, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Plymouth, Plymouth 1996. Risse, Thomas et al (eds.): The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999. Risse, Thomas: “Ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the cold war”, International Organization, 48, 2/1994a: 185–214. Risse, Thomas: “Social Constructivism and European Integration” in Wiener, Antje and Thomas Diez: European Integration Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004. Risse-Kappen, Thomas (ed.): Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995. Ritter, Gerhard: The German Problem: Basic Questions of German Political Life. Past and Present, Colombus, Ohio State University Press 1965. Robins, L. J.: The Reluctant Party: Labour and the EEC, 1961–1975, G. W. & A. Hesketh, Ormskirk 1979. Rollings, Neil: “Modernisation by Consensus: The Impact of the Policy Process on British Economic Policy 1945–64”, Discussion Paper Series A, No 412, The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University and University of Glasgow, Glasgow 2001. Rollings, Neil: British Business in the Formative Years of European Integration, 1945–1973, Cambridge University Press, New York 2007. Rosamond, Ben: Theories of European Integration, Palgrave, New York 2000. Rose, Richard: “Introduction. Lesson-Drawing across Nations”, Journal of Public Policy, 11, 1/1991: 3–30. Rose, Richard: Lesson-drawing in Public Policy. A Guide to Learning across Time and Space, Chatham House Publishers, New Jersey 1993. Rosenau, James N.: The study of Global Interdependence. Essays on the Transnationalization of World Affairs, Frances Pinter, New York 1980. Rostow, W. W.: The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto, CUP, Cambridge 1960. Rothstein, Bo: The Social Democratic State. The Swedish Model and the Bureaucratic Problem of Social Reforms, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1996. Russell, Clifford S. (ed.): Collective Decision Making. Applications from Public Choice Theory, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London 1979. Rye, Lise: The Rise and Fall of the French Demand for Social Harmonization in the EEC, 1955– 1966, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Trondheim, Trondheim 2004. Røhne, Nils A.: De første skritt inn i Europa, Forsvarsstudier, 5/1989. Sabatier, Paul A.: “An Advocacy Coalition Model of Policy-Making and Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therin”, Policy Sciences, 1/1988. Sabatier, Paul A.: “Policy Change over a Decade or More”, in Hank C. Jenkins-Smith and Paul A. Sabatier (eds.): Policy Change and Learning. An Advocacy Coalition Approach, Westview Press, Boulder 1993. Salm, Christian: “‘Come Together’, Transnationale Geschichtsschreibung und politikwissenschaftliche Netzwerkforschung am Beispiel politischer Parteien und europäischer Integration”, Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen, 46, 2013: 131–152a.

214

Bibliography

Salm, Christian: “Shaping European Development Policy? Socialist Parties as Mediators from the International to the European Level”, in Kaiser, Wolfram and Jan-Henrik Meyer (eds.): Societal Actors in European Integration: Polity-Building and Policy-Making 1958–1992, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2013: 38–58b. Salm, Christian: Transnational Socialist Networks in the 1970s: The Cases of European Community Development Aid and Southern Enlargement, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth 2013. Sanders, David: Losing an Empire, Finding a Role. British foreign policy since 1945, Macmillan, London 1990. Sartori, Giovanni: “The typology of Party Systems: Proposals for Improvement”, in Allardt, Erik and Stein Rokkan (eds.): Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology, The Free Press, New York 1970. Sassoon, Donald: One Hundred Years of Socialism, I. B. Tauris Publishers, London 1996. Schimmelfennig, Frank: “International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment”, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 6, 1/2000: 109– 139. Schimmelfennig, Frank: “Transnational socialization: community-building in an integrated Europe”, in Kaiser, Wolfram and Peter Starie (eds.): Transnational European Union. Towards a common political space, Routledge, London 2005: 61–82. Schmitter, P. C.: “Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about European Integration”, International Organization, vol. 23, 1/1969. Sciller, B. A. and M. Peterson: “The Scandinavian and international labour movement after 1945”, in Arbeiterbewegung in Nord- und Mitteleuropa zwischen nationaler Orientierung und Internationalismus, Sankelmark 1976: 104–113. Sebenius, James K.: “Challenging conventional explanations of international cooperation: negotiation analysis and the case of epistemic communities”, International Organization, vol. 46, 1/1992: 323–365. Shaw, Eric: “The problem of party management”, in Dorey, Peter (ed.): The Labour Governments 1964–1970, Routledge, London 2006: 34–52. Shaw, Eric: The Labour Party since 1945. Old Labour – New Labour, Blackwell, Oxford 1996. Shore, Peter: Leading the Left, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1993. Shore, Peter: Separate Ways. The Heart of Europe, Duckworth, London 2000. Simensen, Jarle (ed.): Tyskland–Norge. Den lange historien, Tano Aschehoug 1999. Sitter, Nick: “The Politics of Opposition and European Integration in Scandinavia: Is Euro-Scepticism a Government-Opposition Dynamic?” West European Politics, vol. 24, 4/2001: 22–39. Smith, Julie: “The European dividing line in party politics”, International Affairs, 88, 6/2012: 1277– 1295. Smith, Julie and Geoffrey Edwards: “British–West German Relations, 1973–1989”, in Larres, Klaus (ed.): Uneasy Allies. British-German Relations and European Integration Since 1945, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002. Smith, Martin J. and Joanna Spear (eds.): The Changing Labour Party, Routledge, London 1992. Sogner, Ingrid: “The European Idea: The Scandinavian Answer. Norwegian Attitudes Towards a Closer Scandinavian Economic Cooperation 1947–1959”, Scandinavian Journal of History, 4/1993. Sonne, Lasse: Nordek. A plan for Increased Nordic Economic Co-operation and Integration 1968– 1970, Commentationes Scientiarum Socialium 68, The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters, Helsinki 2007. Soutou, Georges-Henri: “Le General de Gaulle et le Plan Fouchet d’union politique Européenne. Un projet stratégique”, in Revue d’Allemagne, vol. 29, 2/1997: 211–220. Spaak, Paul-Henri: The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1971. Steininger, Rolf: “1961: Europe ‘at Sixes and Sevens’. The European Free Trade Association, the Neutrals, and Great Britain’s Decision to join the EEC”, The Journal of European Economic History, vol. 26, 3/1996.

Bibliography

215

Steinnes, Kristian: “Northern European Social Democracy and European Integration, 1960–1972. Moving towards a New Consensus?”, in Preda, Daniela and Daniele Pasquinucci (eds./dir.), Consensus and European Integration. An Historical, Perspective/Consensus et integration européenne. Une perspective historique, P. I. E. Peter Lang, Bruxelles 2012: 107–122. Steinnes, Kristian: “Socialist party network in northern Europe. Moving towards the EEC application of 1967”, in Kaiser, Wolfram, Brigitte Leucht and Morten Rasmussen (eds.): The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72, Routledge, London 2009. Steinnes, Kristian: “The European Challenge: Britain’s EEC Application in 1961”, Contemporary European History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7, 1/1998: 61–80. Steinnes, Kristian: “The European Turn and ‘Social Europe’. Northern European Social Democracy 1950–1985”, in Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 53, J. H. W Dietz Nachf., 2013. Stelandre, Yves: “Les pays du Benelux, l’Europe politique et les négociations Fouchet”, in Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–69, in the series Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Brussels 2001. Stewart, Michael: Life and Labour. An Autobiography, Sidgwick & Jackson, London 1980. Stone, Diane: “Non-Governmental Policy Transfer: The Strategies of Independent Policy Institutes”, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 13, 1/2000: 45–62. Stone, Diane: “Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the ‘transnationalization’ of policy”, Journal of European Public Policy 11, 3/2004: 545–566. Strachey, Evelyn John St. Loe: The Coming Struggle for Power, Victor Gollancz, London 1932. Stråth, Bo (ed.): Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other, P. I. E. Peter Lang, Series Multiple Europes no. 10, Bruxelles 2000a. Stråth, Bo (ed.): Myth and Memory in the Construction of Community. Historical Patterns in Europe and Beyond, P. I. E. Peter Lang, Series Multiple Europes no. 9, Bruxelles 2000. Stråth, Bo and Øystein Sørensen (ed.): The Cultural Construction of Norden, Scandinavian University Press, Oslo 1997. Stråth, Bo: “Methodological and Substantive Remarks in Myth, Memory and History in the Construction of a European Community”, German Law Journal, vol. 06, 2/2005: 255–271. Stråth, Bo: “The Illusory Nordic Alternative to Europe”, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 15, 2/1980: 103–114. Stråth, Bo: Folkhemmet mot Europa. Ett historiskt perspektiv på 90-talet, Tiden, Stockholm 1992. Sverdrup, Bjørn O.: “‘Odysseus and the Lilliputians?’ – Germany, the European Union and the Smaller European States”, ARENA, Working paper 27/97. Swienty, Tom: Danmark i Europa 1945–93, Munksgaard, København 1994. Sørensen, Vibeke: “Between interdependence and integration. Denmark’s shifting strategies”, in Milward, Alan S., Frances M. B. Lynch, Frederico Romero, Ruggero Raneri and Vibeke Sørensen (eds.): The Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and theory 1945–1992, London 1993a. Sørensen, Vibeke: “Den skandinaviske model og Europa – dilemmaer i dansk arbejderbevægelses holdning til europæisk integration 1950–1980”, Årbog for Arbejderbevægelsens Historie, København 1991. Sørensen, Vibeke: “How to Become a Member of a Club without Joining: Danish Policy with respect to European Sector Integration Schemes 1950–57”, Scandinavian Journal of History, 2/1991. Sørensen, Vibeke: “Nordic Cooperation – A Social Democratic Alternative to Europe?”, in Olesen, Thorsten B. (ed.): Interdependence Versus Integration. Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 1945–1960, Odense University Press, Odense 1995. Sørensen, Vibeke: “The Danish Social Democrats”, in Richard T. Griffiths (ed.) Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950’s, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1993b. Sørensen, Vibeke: “The Politics of Closed Markets: Denmark, the Marshall Plan, and European Integration, 1945–1963”, The International History Review, XV, 1/1993c: 23–45.

216

Bibliography

Tamnes, Rolf: “Oljealder 1965–1995”, bd. 6, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1997. Thompson, Noel: “The Fabian political economy of Harold Wilson”, in Dorey, Peter (ed.): The Labour Governments 1964–1970, Routledge, London 2006: 53–72. Thomsen, Birgit Nüchel (ed.): Temaer og brændpunkter i dansk politisk historie efter 1945, Odense Universitetsforlag, Odense 1993a. Thomsen, Birgit Nüchel (ed.): The Odd man out. Danmark og den europæiske integration 1948– 1992, Odense Universitetsforlag, Odense 1993b. Tilton, Tim: The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy. Through the Welfare State to Socialism, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991. Tratt, Jacqueline: The Macmillan Government and Europe: A study in the Process of Policy Development, Macmillan, Basingstoke 1996. Tullock, Gordon: “Public Choice in Practice”, in Russell, Clifford S. (ed.): Collective Decision Making: Applications from Public Choice Theory, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1979. Urwin, Derek W.: Western Europe since 1945, Longman, Lonon 1997. Utne, Tormod: Brobygging dømt til å feile. EFTA i britisk Europa-politikk, 1958–1961, unpublished MA thesis, NTNU, Trondheim 1996. Veggeland, Noralv: Regionenes Europa. Innføring i teori og praksis, Spartacus forlag, Oslo 1996. Verheyen, Dirk: The German Question. A Cultural, Historical, and Geopolitical Exploration, Westview Press, Oxford 1991. Villaume, Poul: Alliert med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949–1961, unpublished PhD dissertation, Københavns universitet, Copehagen 1994. Villumsen, Holger: Det danske Socialdemokratis Europapolitik 1945–1949, Odense 1991. Vredeling, Henk: “The Common Market of Political Parties”, Government and Opposition, vol. 6, 4/1971: 448–461. Wahlbäck, Krister och Kersti Blidberg (eds.): Samråd i kristid. Protokoll från den Nordiska arbetarrörelsens samarbetskommitté 1932–1946, Stockholm 1986. Walker, Patrick Gordon: Political Diaries 1932–1971, THP, London 1991. Waltz, Kenneth N.: Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, London 1979. Wall, Stephen: The Official History of Britain and the European Community. Vol. II. From Rejection to Referendum, 1963–1975, Routledge, London 2013. Ward, Paul: Britishness since 1870, Routledge, London 2004. Warner, Geoffrey: “The Labour governments and the unity of Western Europe”, in Ritchie Ovendale (ed.): The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments 1945–51, Leicester University Press, Leicester 1984. Wendt, Frantz: Cooperation in the Nordic Countries. Achievements and Obstacles, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm 1981. Wendt, Frantz: The Nordic Council and Co-operation in Scandinavia, Munksgaard, Copenhagen 1959. Wiener, Antje and Thomas Diez: European Integration Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004. Wigg, Lord: George Wigg, Joseph, London 1972. Wiggershaus, Norbert: “The Decision for a West German Defence Contribution”, in Riste, Olav (ed.): Western Security. The Formative Years. European and Atlantic Defence 1947–1953, Norwegian University Press, Oslo 1985. Wilkens, Andreas: “Ostpolitik allemande et commerce avec l’est: objectifs politique et enjeux economique d’Adenauer a Brandt (1949–1974)”, Revue d’histoire diplomatique, vol. 113, 2/1999: 205–241. Williams, Marcia: Inside Number 10, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1972. Williams, Philip M.: “Interviewing Politicians: the Life of Hugh Gaitskell”, Political Quarterly, vol. 51, 3/1980: 303–316.

Bibliography

217

Williams, Philip M.: Hugh Gaitskell, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1982. Willis, Roy F.: France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945–1967, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1968. Wilson, Harold: Final Term. The Labour Government 1974–1976, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1979. Wilson, Harold: Memoirs. The Making of a Prime Minister 1916–64, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1986. Wilson, Harold: Purpose in Politics. Selected Speeches by Harold Wilson, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1964. Wilson, Harold: The Governance of Britain, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1976. Wilson, Harold: The Labour government 1964–1970: A Personal Record, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, London 1971. Winand, Pascaline: “United States–European Relationship 1961–1963”, in Loth, Wilfried (ed.): Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963–69, in the series Historiker-Verbindungsgruppe bei der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Brussels 2001. Woodward, Nicholas: The Management of the British Economy, 1945–2001, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2004. Wrigley, C: “Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Harold Wilson and Labour ’s Foreign Policy 1964– 70”, in Coopey, R., S. Fielding and N. Tiratsoo (eds.): The Wilson Governments 1964–1970, Printer, London 1993. Wurm, Clemens (ed.): Western Europe and Germany. The Beginning of European Integration 1945– 1960, Berg Publishers, Oxford 1995. Wybrow, Robert J.: Britain Speaks Out 1937–87. A Social History as seen through the Gallup Data, Macmillan, London 1989. Wyller, Thomas Christian: “Refleksjoner over ‘politisk innflytelse’”, Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift, 2/1988. Young, Hugo: This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair, Macmillan, London 1998. Young, John W.: Britain and European Unity, 1945–1992, Macmillan, London 1993. Young, John W.: The Labour Governments, 1964–1970: vol 2: International Policy, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2003. Ziegler, Philip: Wilson. The Authorised Life, HarperCollins Publishers, London 1995. Zilliacus, M. P.: Labour and the Common Market, The New Gladiator Book and Pamphlet Publishing Co, n. d. Øksendal, Lars Fredrik: “Multilateralism and domestic policy in the early 1950s: explaining the case of Norwegian ambiguity”, Review of international political economy, vol. 14, 4/2007. Östling, Johan: “The Limits of the Wahlverwandtschaft. Images of Germany in the Main Swedish Conservative Organs 1945–48”, Nordeuropa forum, 1/2001: 3–25.

ZUR REIHE „STUDIEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION“ Mit zunehmendem Abstand zum Beginn des europäischen Integrationsprozesses nimmt die Bedeutung der Geschichtswissenschaften im Spektrum der wissenschaftlichen Erforschung des Europäischen Integrationsprozesses zu. Auch wenn die übliche dreißigjährige Sperrfrist für Archivmaterial weiterhin ein Hindernis für die Erforschung der jüngeren Integrationsgeschichte darstellt, werden die Zeiträume, die für die Wissenschaft zugänglich sind, kontinuierlich größer. Heute können die Archive zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl bis hin zur ersten Erweiterung eingesehen werden; in einem Jahrzehnt wird ein aktengestütztes Studium der Rahmenbedingungen der Mittelmeererweiterung und der Entstehung der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte möglich sein. Darüber hinaus ist der Beitrag der Geschichtswissenschaften auch heute schon Rahmen der Erforschung der jüngsten Integrationsgeschichte nicht mehr zu übersehen. Ihre Methodenvielfalt hilft dabei, die durch Sperrfristen der Archive entstandenen Probleme auszugleichen. Allerdings findet der einschlägige geschichtswissenschaftliche Diskurs in der Regel immer noch im nationalstaatlichen Kontext statt und stellt damit, so gesehen, gerade in Bezug auf die europäische Geschichte einen Anachronismus dar. Vor diesem Hintergrund haben sich Forscherinnen und Forscher aus ganz Europa und darüber hinaus dazu entschlossen, eine Schriftenreihe ins Leben zu rufen, die die Geschichte der Europäischen Integration nicht nur aus einer europäischen Perspektive beleuchtet, sondern auch einem europäischen Publikum vorlegen möchte. Gemeinsam mit dem Verlag Franz Steiner wurde deshalb die Schriftenreihe Studien zur Geschichte der Europäischen Integration (SGEI) gegründet. Ein herausragendes Merkmal dieser Reihe ist ihre Dreisprachigkeit – Deutsch, Englisch und Französisch. Zu jedem Beitrag gibt es mehrsprachige ausführliche und aussagekräftige Zusammenfassungen des jeweiligen Inhalts. Damit bieten die Studien zur Geschichte der Europäischen Integration interessierten Leserinnen und Lesern erstmals einen wirklich europäischen Zugang zu neuesten geschichtswissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen auf dem Gebiet der Geschichte der Europäischen Integration.

CONCERNANT LA SÉRIE » ETUDES SUR L’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE « L’importance des recherches historiques ne cesse d’augmenter au sein de l’éventail qu’offrent les recherches scientifiques sur le processus d’intégration européenne, et ce à mesure que le recul par rapport au début du processus d’intégration européenne se fait de plus en plus grand. Même si le délai d’attente habituel de trente ans pour la consultation des archives constitue encore un obstacle pour les recherches sur l’histoire récente de l’intégration, les périodes accessibles à la recherche se révèlent de plus en plus étendues. A l’heure actuelle, les archives datant de la fondation de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier jusqu’au premier élargissement peuvent être consultées ; d’ici dix ans, une étude documentée des conditions générales de l’élargissement méditerranéen et de la conception de l’Acte unique européen sera possible. La contribution des recherches historiques dans le cadre de la recherche sur l’histoire toute proche de l’intégration est dès à présent remarquable. La diversité de méthodes utilisées permet en effet de régler des problèmes engendrés par le délai de blocage des archives. Toutefois, le débat historique s’y rapportant s’inscrit encore généralement dans le contexte de l’Etat-nation et représente, de ce point de vue, un anachronisme par rapport à l’histoire européenne. C’est dans ce contexte que des chercheuses et chercheurs de toute l’Europe et au-delà ont décidé de lancer une série d’ouvrages qui mettent en lumière l’histoire de l’intégration européenne non seulement dans une perspective européenne, mais qui se veut également accessible à un large public européen. Cette série d’ouvrages, intitulée Etudes sur l’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne (EHIE), a été créée en collaboration avec la maison d’édition Franz Steiner. Le caractère trilingue de cette série – allemand, anglais et français – constitue une particularité exceptionnelle. Chaque contribution est accompagnée de résumés plurilingues, détaillés et éloquents sur le contenu s’y rapportant. Les Etudes sur l’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne offrent pour la première fois aux lectrices et lecteurs intéressés un accès réellement européen aux avancées historiques les plus récentes dans le domaine de l’histoire de l’intégration européenne.

ABOUT THE SERIES “STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION” With increasing distance to the process of European integration, there is a growing significance of the historical sciences within the range of the scientific research on the European integration process. Even if the usual blocking period for archive sources is still an obstacle for researching the more recent history of integration, the periods which are accessible for the sciences are continuously becoming more extended. Today, the archives on the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community are accessible as far as to the first extension; in one decade it will be possible to gain access to the appropriate files for studying the history of the prerequisites of the Mediterranean extension and the development of the Single European Act. Furthermore, already today the contribution of historic sciences in the context of researching the most recent history of integration cannot be overlooked. Their variety of methods helps with balancing problems resulting from the blocking periods for archives. However, usually the relevant historic discourse still happens in the context of national states and is thus, if we like to see things this way, rather an anachronism in respect of European history. Against this background, researchers from all over Europe and beyond have decided to found a series of publications which intends not only to shed light on the history of European integration from a European point of view but also to present this to a European audience. For this reason, together with the Franz Steiner Publishing House the series of publications Studies on the History of European Integration (SHEI) was founded. One outstanding feature of this series will be its trilingualism – German, English and French. For every contribution there will be extensive and telling summaries of the respective contents in several languages. Thus, by Studies on the History of European Integration interested readers will for the first time be offered a really European approach at most resent historic insights in the field of the history of European integration.

Current studies of the British Labour Party and the question of European Community (EC) membership are characterized by a striking absence of approaches combining the many transnational processes and contexts in which attitudes to the post-war European integration process developed, the application of non-British sources, and a close and archive-based analysis of the leadership’s perceptions of joining the EC during the whole period 1960–73. As a result, this book addresses issues arising from processes and contexts in transnational arenas and questions related to continuity and change in attitudes to British EC membership.

To a considerable extent it differentiates existing accounts of the British Labour Party’s European policy up until Britain joined the EC in 1973. While establishing a correlation between intensified and restructured transnational social democratic networking and evolving perceptions of EC membership within the party leadership, it also demonstrates greater continuity in the party’s European policies than existing studies have allowed. The book also clearly demonstrates that cross-border networking is an essential and often-neglected factor when explaining changed perceptions of supranational European integration during the period.

SGEI SG SHEI SH EHIE E www.steiner-verlag.de

Franz Steiner Verlag

ISBN 978-3-515-10775-4

9

7835 1 5 107 754