The Body and Military Masculinity in Late Qing and Early Republican China: The Art of Governing Soldiers 1498531687, 9781498531689

In 1894-1895, after suffering defeat against Japan in a war primarily fought over the control of Korea, the Qing governm

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The Body and Military Masculinity in Late Qing and Early Republican China

The Body and Military Masculinity in Late Qing and Early Republican China The Art of Governing Soldiers

Nicolas Schillinger

Lexington Books

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Lexington Books An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB Copyright © 2016 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Control Number: 2016951462 ISBN: 978-1-4985-3168-9 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-1-4985-3169-6 (electronic) ∞ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Printed in the United States of America

To my parents and grandparents




1 Forging the Male Body: Drill in the New Armies


2 Body, Space, and Daily Life


3 Dressed to Kill: Uniforms, Masculinity, and Military Culture


4 Making Real Men: Military Professionalism and Martial Spirit


5 All Men Are Soldiers: Citizenship and Military Service


6 School Reforms and the Education of Citizen-Soldiers




Appendix: Chinese Character List


List of Abbreviations


Bibliography353 Index403 About the Author




This book is the result of many years of research and writing and represents the revised version of my doctoral dissertation (originally titled “Governing New Armies. Body and Masculinity in the Chinese Military, 1895–1916”) at the History Department of Heidelberg University in Germany. First and foremost, I thank my supervisor Susan Richter, who made me a member of her research group “The Fascination of Efficiency: Migrating Ideas and Emerging Bureaucracies in Europe and Asia since the Early Modern Era” at Heidelberg University’s Research Cluster “Asia and Europe in a Global Context” and thus made this book possible in the first place. Moreover, she gave valuable guidance at each stage of research and writing. I also thank Barbara Mittler, my second supervisor, for her help and advice, and introducing me to numerous other scholars and experts in the field of Chinese history. Along with the invaluable financial and intellectual support of the Cluster “Asia and Europe,” its staff and researchers, the Graduate School for East Asian Studies at Freie Universität Berlin enabled me to finish this book. Many others deserve my gratitude for their ideas, suggestions, comments and encouragement, introducing me to their contacts or simply having a beer together. I cannot mention all of them, but special thanks goes to my brother Henrik, my parents and the whole family as well as Sebastian Meurer, Peter Trummer, Thomas Maissen, Barend Nordam, Klaus Mühlhahn, Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Kai Filipiak, and Elisabeth Kaske. I particularly thank Susan Brownell for helping me with the book proposal and Ayako Kominee, Zara Barlas, Steve Bahn, and Yi Jiajia for proofreading parts of the manuscript. I am also indebted to the small but growing community of Chinese military historians in the United States, Germany and elsewhere in Europe, many of whom I know and met personally.


x Acknowledgments

I would also like to thank my editors Brian Hill and Eric Kuntzman as well as the anonymous reviewer for their comments and suggestions. Last but not least, I thank Anny for her loving support and constant encouragement, and for the baby.


The beginnings of modern physical education came with the training of the Chinese army by the Germans several tens of years ago, and the introduction at that time of German gymnastics in the army, even among the officers. This was followed with a type of Swedish gymnastics— diluted by passing through Japan—which came with the introduction of the Japanese military system following the Russo-Japanese war. Both have stuck in the army, though in somewhat emasculated shape, ever since, and one still sees dignified army officers in uniform and boots mount the high bar and do the giant swing and a somersault. It has all taken on some of the flavor of the “Military Art” with the resulting deterioration of form and posture.1 —Charles H. McCloy, Physical Education in China, 1923

The First Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895 ended with the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which forced the Qing government to recognize the independence of Korea and de facto Japanese control over the Korean peninsula and to cede Taiwan to the Japanese Meiji Empire.2 This outcome of the war surprised and shocked most Chinese government officials and scholars, who experienced an unprecedented sense of crisis and insecurity. In the years to come, many of them felt like living in uncertain, “difficult and dangerous times” (shiju jianwei) and in a world which was undergoing “drastic transformations” (shibian).3 Prior to the war, both sides had invested in upgrading their military technology for decades but most observers in China, Japan, and abroad considered the Qing forces to possess the slightly more advanced weapons and battleships and recognized a much larger navy and army. However, due to the lack of training with new weapons, insufficient preparation, a lack of cooperation among various regional forces, and deficient logistics and 1

2 Introduction

coordination, the Qing troops were defeated by the Japanese military and its superior navy, which was equipped with faster, more maneuverable ships and more quick-firing guns, compared to the Qing navy.4 In the contemporary perception, however, other factors played a more significant role. In the years that followed the Sino-Japanese War, members of the imperial court and civil officialdom, who constituted the Qing Empire’s political and social elite, attributed the defeat to the cowardice, systematic incompetency, and widespread lack of morale among Qing troops. They diagnosed a culturally determined physical backwardness of Chinese men and criticized prevalent corrupt practices among the military forces of the Qing Empire, such as the abuse of office, embezzlement, negligence, obscure hierarchies, and a general lack of interest in war and military glory. An increasing number of members of the elite started to question “Chinese culture,” referring to societal customs, practices, and institutions. In particular, the late Qing society’s allegedly negative attitude toward its armed forces and martial values in general came under scrutiny. Intellectuals, government officials, and military leaders criticized the pacifist and civil orientation of Confucian high culture, which, in their eyes, had resulted in a lack of interest in martial deeds, valor on the battlefield, and military achievements among men in China. They viewed literature and art-oriented Confucianism as the reason for the tremendous neglect of physical culture and exercising, which had allegedly resulted in the bodily degeneration of the Chinese people and the effeminateness of Chinese men. After the turn of the century, a few Chinese scholars and writers adopted the phrase “sick man of East Asia” (dongya bingfu), which foreign observers occasionally used to describe China as a backward country with an ailing and incompetent government. In China, however, the term began to refer to physically weak Chinese men, who lacked courage, military spirit, martial aspiration, and true masculinity.5 To be sure, this Chinese self-degradation was strongly influenced by contemporary European, American, and Japanese ascriptions. While women represented either sexually desired objects of conquest or civilizational backwardness, Chinese men counted as feeble, effeminate, and devious people, who lacked vigor, honor, and competiveness.6 The physical bodies of both Chinese women and men became objects of mockery and exoticism. Governments and the public in Britain, France, or the United States viewed Chinese women with their bound feet and Chinese men with their long gowns, queues, and fingernails as unhealthy and diseased. The image of feminized men became representative of China as a whole, where oriental despotism suppressed men and robbed them of any sensitivity, morale, and manliness.7 In order to set themselves apart from their formerly close neighbor, the Japanese adopted the European and American views about allegedly feeble



and feminine Chinese men. Similar to hundreds of other woodblock prints that depicted the Sino-Japanese War from a propagandistic Japanese perspective, a picture by Mizuno Toshikata from 1895, for instance, showed the surrender of the Chinese military commander Ding Ruchang to the Japanese Admiral Itō Sukeyuki (Figure I.1). The depiction was fictitious as Ding himself never surrendered and committed suicide after being defeated in the decisive battle of the Sino-Japanese War at Weihaiwei Bay. Nevertheless, the woodblock print tells much about the perceptions and aspirations of both the Japanese and the Chinese during and after the war: broad-shouldered and long-legged Japanese officers, standing upright, wearing body-hugging European-style uniforms, flanked by well-disciplined soldiers presenting their riffles, were accepting the surrender of crouching Chinese military officials, who, to the non-Chinese viewer, looked more like civilian scholar-bureaucrats than soldiers. The Japanese men, on the other hand, had the appearance of European men, including both their facial features and their dress, triumphing over disarmed, gowned, queued, and emasculated Chinese men (and their European advisors behind them). This display of martial strength and manliness in pictures like the one by Mizuno Toshikata indicated the Japanese claim to be part of the family of great “Western” powers. After the war, an increasing number of Chinese elites viewed restoring the martial spirit and military aptitude of Chinese men as the order of the day to face the humiliation of disempowerment. This book, therefore, deals with the military reforms in late Qing and early Republican China, and I argue that these reforms not only transformed military culture in a complex process of cross-cultural appropriation and adaptation but also led to the epistemological reconceptualization of both the physical body and masculinity in China.

Figure I.1  Woodblock Print by Mizuno Toshikata, 1895.

4 Introduction

In the course of the military reforms that started in 1895, new military organizations developed, and the self-understanding of military men, as well as the inclination of society toward its armed forces, changed profoundly. New ideas, representations, and practices related to the male body, as well as new notions about male identity, disseminated from the reformed army to larger segments of the Chinese population at the turn of twentieth century. The war was the final waking call and reform-minded officials, led by the influential scholars Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, demanded to follow Japan’s lead and “modernize” and “westernize” China’s political, legal, and institutional structures, the forms of social and economic organization, and even the systems of thinking and knowledge. They emphasized that Japan had thoroughly adapted to the “West” politically, culturally, and socially and was therefore able to defend Japan’s suzerainty against foreign encroachment and claims. They attributed the Japanese victory in 1895 to the superior coordination and organization as well as the better constitution, greater skill, and morale of Japan’s German-style military, compared to the Qing forces. Kang and Liang were ousted in 1898 for being too radical in their reform agenda but many of their ideas enjoyed a new lease of life after the turn of the century.8 Repeated foreign military intrusion during the Boxer War in 1900–1901 and the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905 prompted the implementation of profound government reforms, which were called “New Policy” (Xinzheng) and tackled the political, administrative, legal, economic, educational, and military systems of the country. In many respects, these reforms were unfinished before the downfall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Nevertheless, they were seminal for the further development of society and still affect China today, including the structure of the army, the role of military men, and perceptions and practices concerning the physical body. Against this background of a “crisis of masculinity” and political reform, Qing officials started to establish military forces based on the German model, the so-called “New Armies” (Xinjun). Ever since the unification of the German Empire in 1871, the German army enjoyed, transnationally, the reputation of being the most advanced, most disciplined, best organized, and best managed military force in the world. Unsurprisingly, Chinese military reformers9 drew on this successful and reputable model. And although their focus of orientation switched to the Japanese military after the turn of the century, Germany retained its status as the archetypical “militarized country” (junguo) and repeatedly reappeared as a major military role model. The first of the New Armies were established under the direction of Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong, who both hired German military instructors and prompted the production of military manuals and military regulations based on German examples. Yuan and Zhang were among the most important officials during the late Qing and were major actors in the entire New Policy reform process.



Together with Yikuang, a member of the imperial clan and bearer of the title Prince Qing, they represented not only the most important figures in the military reform process in late Qing China but also the most powerful men in the empire.10 They established new model armies which became the nucleus of an entirely reformed military system, including a national army established in 1904, the Lujun (“Army”). And they adopted German- and Japanese-style schemes of organization, methods of training, military academies, administrative institutions, and command structures. The purpose of this book is not to present in detail the extensive history of late Qing and early Republican military reforms, as previous scholarship has done, but to examine their specific, albeit central and hitherto neglected role for the history of body and gender in China. It deals with the straightforward question that preoccupied Chinese military reformers after the war against Japan in 1895: how to find a more effective way or art of governing soldiers (zhi bing zhi dao). In other words, the book is about military men as objects of governance. It addresses how, after the Sino-Japanese War, military reformers sought to overcome the alleged physical weakness and lack of martial spirit and military skill attributed to Chinese officers, soldiers, and men in general. How did they adopt foreign techniques to influence the conduct and motivation of men? How did they eventually focus on governing the entire population for military reform purposes? The late Qing government longed for a more effective and competitive army, and for more military clout, compared to the foreign armies that increasingly frequented Qing territory. After 1895, military reformers realized that improving the technical skills of soldiers and the technological and organizational condition of the military were far from enough. The empire needed a new type of well-trained and well-disciplined soldier, as well as a professional, self-confident, and institutionally autonomous officer corps. Particularly young men from the wealthy, educated, and politically potent elite were called on to “throw away the brush and pick up the sword” (toubi congrong)—to pursue a military career instead of one in the civil bureaucracy and strive for martial glory instead of scholarly refinement.11 Military reformers sought to elevate the social status of officers and common soldiers as well as introducing a martial consciousness and positive inclination toward the army, physical education, and military values through all levels of society. In the book, I argue that military reforms and the emergence of the New Armies after 1895 strongly contributed to the reconceptualization of the physical body and led to the introduction of new body practices in Chinese society. The New Armies propagated ideas of optimized, homogenized, physically strong, and well-regulated male bodies that eventually disseminated across society. Moreover, military reformers sought to govern soldiers and officers by promoting new ideals of male appearance and conduct, as

6 Introduction

well as characteristics such as professionalism, martial valor, and patriotism. The army reforms transformed both the identity of military men and their standing in society by recreating and propagating a version of masculinity that stressed martial values, military glory, and other attributes linked to war and service in the army. Eventually, the physical and masculine ideals of the New Armies were propagated through the iconic figure of the “citizen-soldier” (junguomin), which emerged after the turn of the century in the discussions concerning schools, education, and population governance. Throughout the book, I examine various sources such as drill manuals, military regulations, laws and codes, textbooks for soldiers and cadets, readers for citizens and school students, instruction books for physical exercise and other daily physical routines, photographic volumes, general newspapers and periodicals, and professional military journals. The book consists of six chapters, which deal with the education of common soldiers, officers, and citizens-soldiers between the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and the beginning of the civil war period in 1916. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the basic training and drill of military men and the techniques to discipline and align their physical bodies. Chapter 1 deals with the introduction of German military gymnastics and tactical drills, while Chapter 2 addresses the meticulous regulation of time and space with regard to the everyday life of soldiers, including aspects such as hygiene and punishment. In Chapters 3 and 4, I mainly examine the techniques to cultivate a new officer corps and type of “military man” (junren). The chapters deal with the ways of directly and indirectly appealing to the manliness of soldiers and officers and with the performance of military culture as a source of motivation. Chapter 3 tackles the introduction of German-style military uniforms, rituals, and etiquettes, as well as the height of late Qing foreign-style military pomp and circumstance. Chapter 4 is concerned with the construction of military masculinity through the promotion of traits such as professionalism, possessing a martial spirit, and the willingness to practice self-sacrifice. Chapters 5 and 6 address the military education of citizens, which reformers viewed as the basis for a fitter, healthier, manlier, obedient, more motivated, and militarily better-prepared population. In Chapter 5, I explore the link between military service and citizenship and discussions among military reformers about introducing universal conscription. Chapter 6 deals with the military and physical education of students, which had the purpose of preparing children for a life as citizen-soldiers. In the remainder of this introduction, I will briefly discuss the role of military culture in China and the significance of the German-Japanese role model as well as the methodological, conceptual, and theoretical approaches of the book, including the concept of governmentality and ideas of masculinity in late imperial China. Finally, I will outline the military reforms and the establishment of New Armies between 1895 and 1916 in China.



The Chinese Military Cross-Cultural The reorganization of the military and the emergence of the New Armies after the Sino-Japanese War not only affected the military as an organization but also the status of military men, martial values, physical culture, soldierly discipline, and warfare in society. In other words, the military culture of twentieth century China was very different from that of earlier periods, because of intense cross-cultural interactions with the military cultures of Europe, the United States, and Japan. The term military culture has multiple meanings: broadly speaking, it refers, first, to the military as an organization, including its value system, conduct, way of thinking, and “mission” or purpose as inherent in written and unwritten rules, laws, practices, rituals, and symbols.12 Second, military culture refers to strategic culture or the process of decision-making by both civilians and military personnel on the political level. The concept of strategic culture includes the formation of military doctrines and views on tactics, logistics, and principles of organization and operation among the armed forces. Third, military culture deals with the role of military organizations and perception of war within society, the relationship between civilians and the military, the acceptance or denial of military ethos and way of life, and the social standing of common soldiers and the officer corps. In particular, it includes the esthetic and literary production dealing with military events, battles, and army life.13 Historically, military organizations, strategic cultures, or the perception and status of armies and military personnel in society change strongly. Isabell Hull suggests concentrating less on what military culture is and more on the question how military culture is produced in a specific context. Her aim is to make military culture a universal term that can be used for comparisons over time and space.14 Studying military culture is not just important for gaining knowledge about army organization, war, or the lives of soldiers, but for unfolding wider, historically changeable, social discourses and cultural practices, and uncovering the mutual interaction between civilians and the military. A military uniform, for instance, might imply discourses on discipline, gender, fashion, hygiene, or nation and community. The aim of this book is not to postulate the development of a “modern,” “Western-modeled” Chinese military culture but to examine in detail elements such as physical culture and masculinity that governed the military culture of both the armed forces and larger segments of the civilian population in China at the turn of the twentieth century. Historians and Sinologists, time and again, referred to a specific, singular Chinese military culture or “way of warfare.”15 In 1939, the historian Lei Haizong coined the term “a-military culture” (wu bing wenhua) and strongly reinforced the notion that Chinese culture is at its core

8 Introduction

pacifist.16 His description, which resembles the post-1895 self-critique of Qing scholars and officials, was not merely an apologetic assessment made in the context of the Second World War, but originated in the political influence of the Confucian civil bureaucracy, particularly since the Song Dynasty (960–1279), and its power to define high culture and social values through its dominance over written records and texts. As a result, there is a lack of epic accounts celebrating military heroism and deeds on the battlefield.17 In the twentieth century, European and American scholars such as Max Weber adopted the notion of the Confucian civilian elite, arguing that Chinese culture essentially despised the military and only waged war as a last resort. Pacifist rituals, in this view, were much more important for rulership and state formation than military success.18 Both Chinese and Euro-American intellectuals frequently quote the proverb “emphasize culture, de-emphasize the military” (zhong wen qing wu), allegedly prominent since the Song Dynasty, as a proof. However, this is a serious oversimplification and never represented official state policy or the social norm.19 The notion that the Chinese were pacifist people which was ruled through peaceful rituals by the most virtuous and honest persons, is cultural essentialism and was a “utopia” of Confucian scholars and officials.20 The civilian bureaucracy in late imperial China successfully managed to control the military by centralizing the administration of military affairs, establishing an imperial monopoly on warfare, and by distributing command structures.21 However, neither the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) nor the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) were “landlocked,” hiding behind a great wall and minding their own business, as John Fairbank argues,22 but applied military force offensively to check enemies and conquer new territories. Warfare was never just a ritual affair and military strategy did not simply follow the doctrines of the eminent Art of War by Master Sun (Sunzi bingfa) and other military classics, which viewed military issues in the larger context of maintaining social order and mostly idealized avoiding battle.23 Moreover, although a number of academics sought to extract an essential “Chinese strategic thinking,”24 every dynasty adopted and adjusted its own agendas and premises.25 Joanna WaleyCohen, for instance, has shown that military culture was fundamental for the Qing when building an Inner-Asian Empire. During the eighteenth century, Qing emperors not only conquered large areas but also strongly promoted military success, military rituals, and visual representations of martial heroism and glory.26 Arguing that the Qing were not Han Chinese but Manchu, who simply imposed their martially oriented nomadic culture and way of warfare upon the pacifist Chinese also misses the point: being “Chinese,” in the sense of a national identity, only really developed in the nineteenth century, and as much as the Qing absorbed cultural elements from the previous (Han-Confucian) Ming, they added elements of (Inner-Asian) religious



practices, social organization, and political and military culture to the new empire. In other words, there was only a Qing military culture, which was the combination of both long existing and newly developing institutions, concepts, and practices, and which transformed itself over the course of two and a half centuries.27 Moreover, the military sphere is a prime example of constant cross-cultural interaction and reinventions. Throughout Chinese history, constant security threats made it necessary to adjust the organization of armed forces, adapt to techniques of warfare, and import, copy, or invent new military technology and weapons. Richard Smith emphasizes that the “Middle Kingdom in practice had to make almost continual use of foreign military talents” and “this was true not only of conquest dynasties and periods.”28 At the turn of the twentieth century, Chinese military reformers sought to emulate foreign military cultures on a large scale, both by reorganizing the armed forces and militarizing society. William C. Kirby even states that, in the first half of the twentieth century, “Western militarism (in its Soviet, German and American national forms) was undoubtedly the single most successful cultural export from the West to China.”29 The central question, however, is not whether and to what degree late Qing and early Republican China militarized, but how military culture in China transformed through cross-cultural interactions, perceptions, selective appropriation and adaptation, and historical reinterpretations.30 In the medium and long term, it is more significant how cross-cultural entanglement in the military sphere affected systems of knowledge as well as social and cultural practices than how subsequent political regimes resurrected Chinese military strength and succeeded or failed to secure their own survival. The establishment of the New Armies did not prevent the abdication of the Qing, but notions of professionalism, physical culture, and masculinity had a lasting effect on the twentieth and twenty-first century. After 1895, Chinese military reformers did not blindly adhere to one role model, but were up to date with current military-related debates and developments all over Europe, the United States, Japan, and other parts of the world. After the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905, they recognized that the Japanese Army was not just mimicking the German and other European armies and navies but was actually a leader in fields such as military sanitation. Consequently, late Qing and early Republican military reforms were not limited to one single role model and the New Armies followed an alleged international standard and the example of “various countries” (geguo).31 Nonetheless, the establishment of the New Armies and military institutions followed what Chinese military reformers sometimes called the “GermanJapanese rut” (de ri chenggui): established practices and rules in Germany and Japan that were viewed as actually setting the standard of “modern” (jindai) military organization and culture.32 Moreover, in order to successfully

10 Introduction

appropriate foreign military cultural elements, Chinese military reformers often referred to an allegedly ancient Chinese military culture, to established military writings and theories, and to iconic military heroes. In combination with neologisms, which in many cases came from Japan, they used established language and terms to talk about military reforms and label the New Armies. Titles and nomenclature of the regular Qing armies, the Green Standard Army, and the Banner forces, for instance, were reused and given new meaning. And almost every military reformer and army officer acknowledged the significance of eminent, ancient military writers, and their strategic principles. However, they, usually implicitly, deemed these writing as insufficient to establish a truly “modern,” efficient, competitive army as they lacked the tactical, organizational, technical, and instructional depth of foreign military theory and practice. The Franco-Prussian or Franco-German War in 1870–1871 and the resulting foundation of the German Empire established the German military’s reputation of being one of the best, if not the best, land armies in the world. Various governments and armies inside and outside Europe sought to emulate Prussian military organization, tactics, and training, including the leaders of the Meiji Japanese Empire. Already in 1871, the cosmopolitan Chinese literatus Wang Tao wrote a book titled Record of the Prussian-French War (Pu Fa zhanji), which deeply influenced late Qing military reformers and which established, in China, the good reputation of German weapons technology, military organization, and tactical and strategic skill. Moreover, Chinese official-scholars received the impression that the military pervaded every aspect of life among the German people.33 Subsequently, Li Hongzhang, Zhang Zhidong, Yuan Shikai, and other powerful officials employed German military instructors and advisors, imported German arms, and encouraged translations of German military literature. By 1895, Chinese military reformers and officers considered the German army as epitomizing “modern” or “Western” military organization, war preparation, and conduct of war. The German army became the outstanding role model for army reforms in late Qing China, but also for reorganizing society along military principles: Chinese reformers viewed and described the German Empire as a young and vibrant nation that strongly adhered to military values and virtues, where virtually “everyone was a soldier” (jinmin wei bing). The interest in the German military initially focused on purchasing weapons (particularly Krupp canons), strengthening coastal defense, and acquiring naval technology and ironclad battleships.34 Apart from the general admiration for the German army and German military technology, Li Hongzhang emphasized a number of political reasons for seeking German help for improving Qing military prowess: there were no German missionaries and merchants selling opium in China, and Germany was far away and thus not



a threat for the Qing Empire.35 After 1895, the focus on German and other foreign military technology and ships was replaced by an interest in military culture, and Chinese military reformers systematically began to model the organization, drill, education, and regulation of new model armies on German principles.36 The German influence peaked between 1895 and 1899, when more German officers than ever before served as drillmasters in the New Armies and as teachers in the newly founded military academies. Between 1870 and 1914, Chinese military leaders employed around 130 Germans, who had a profound and lasting impact on military culture in China. None of these advisors and instructors, who came to China individually or as members of groups, was part of an official mission backed by the German government. Rather, they were privately hired soldiers of fortune, retired officers or officers on temporary leave, who went to China on their own initiative or on behalf of the Krupp Company.37 The influence of German military culture on the New Armies was not limited to military advisors; it was most tangible in translations as well as in books based on German originals, which were produced in increasing numbers after the Sino-Japanese War. Before the war, translations in the military sphere focused on instruction manuals for cannons and guns as well as on works on coastal defense, such as Victor von Sheliah’s Treatise on Coastal Defense (Haifang xinlun). Generally, translations were produced by official facilities such as the Tongwenguan, a school for the study of foreign languages in Beijing, or at the Jiangnan and Tianjin Arsenals (see below).38 After the Sino-Japanese War, book translations started to be produced semiofficially by individual bureaucrats or privately with official approval. Instead of mere operating instructions, a large number of translations of German books and German-influenced manuals dealt with various, state-of-the-art elements of preparing for war, such as close unit drill, tactical formations, physical exercise, combined deployment of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, logistics of organizing an army, or the use and maintenance of weapons and other equipment. Overall, German military books accounted for a large proportion of translations into Chinese at the turn of the century. Out of 160 books translated by the Jiangnan Arsenal, 33 were on military topics, including 19 of German origin.39 The historian Shi Duqiao states that the translations of “Western” military books, which increased dramatically after 1895, had a significant effect on military technology, thought, drill, and everyday army life in China. Shi counts 64 books produced between 1867 and 1894 and over 250 books between 1895 and 1911. After 1895, these translated military books as well as drafts or notes by foreign military instructors covered all kinds of military-related topics such as organization, education and training, military theory, and infantry drill and warfare. According to Shi, the translated literature was very comprehensive and detailed, concentrated

12 Introduction

on the land army, originated mostly from Germany and Japan (before 1895: France and Britain), and introduced entire new fields such as logistics, engineering, construction, and geography.40 Numerous German military books were translated from the Japanese, including the famous work On War (Vom Kriege, Zhanzhenglun) by Carl von Clausewitz, which was translated by the Baoding Army School in 1911 from a Japanese source produced in 1903.41 A third channel for gaining knowledge and learning from the German military consisted of Chinese envoys, observers, and particularly military students, who were sent to Germany to study and receive a military education. Between 1876 and 1912, at least seven groups consisting of 47 men altogether, as well as a few individuals who probably went on their own, studied with the German army.42 One of the students sent to Germany from the Tianjin Military Preparatory School (established in 1885) in 1888 was Duan Qirui, who was educated in gunnery at the Military Academy in Berlin and at the Krupp Company in Essen. Duan later became one of Yuan Shikai’s most important lieutenants, subsequently holding various leading positions within the command of the New Armies. He was not only responsible for the artillery and armory of the Beiyang Army (the most powerful of the New Armies under Yuan’s command) but was also involved in creating drill and training regimes for soldiers. In 1906, he served as director of the officer college of the Beiyang Army located in Baoding. In 1912, he became minister of war and, after Yuan’s death in 1916, he served several times as prime minister.43 A few military students went to other European countries, such as France, as well as to the United States because Chinese military reformers emphasized the importance of sending men there to “study the [respective] academic situation.”44 Potential cadets had to fulfill high intellectual and physical requirements, including minimums for weight and chest girth, fluency in the language of the respective country, or excellent knowledge of the Chinese language. However, the great majority of military students went to Japan. In 1899, Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi sent the first two groups, consisting of 39 and 27 students, who mostly came from Hubei province.45 Yuan Shikai dispatched 35 cadets and officers to Japan in 1902, and, subsequently, the Beiyang Army became the biggest sponsor of military students going abroad. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, a veritable wave of enthusiasm for the Japanese Army developed in the Qing Empire and, in the following years, hundreds of students, who were either supported by official stipends or paid privately, enrolled at military academies in Japan.46 The New Armies followed the general trend among late Qing reformers to emulate the Japanese Meiji Empire, which had reinvented itself as a “Western-style” nation-state.47 Chinese military reformers switched their focus to the Japanese army after the turn of the century because they realized that it was easier and quicker to gain the necessary knowledge via Japan



and the Japanese army, which they considered as a German-style force.48 In their view, the Japanese army had already appropriated German military organization, tactics, and practices, and successfully adapted them to a quasiChinese social, cultural, and political environment. With the help of French and German advisors, Japanese reformers had created a successful Europeanstyle army from scratch during the early Meiji era (1868–1912). Whereas the French military mission in Japan started in 1865, the German engagement began only in 1884, after much struggling between pro-German and proFrench factions within the Japanese government and army.49 The German influence lasted less than a decade, until 1893, but it was very intensive and transformed the Japanese Army significantly. In particular, the Prussian officer Jacob Meckel was instrumental in rebuilding the Meiji Empire’s Army according to German structures and preparing the Japanese successes in both the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War. Meckel was a specialist in tactics, logistics, and general staff operations, and, during his time in Japan, from 1885 to 1888, he effectively reorganized the Japanese Army’s command and administration structures, including the General Staff, War Ministry, and General Inspectorate. Under his guidance, the Japanese army introduced a flexible system of military divisions and organization, and implemented universal conscription. Furthermore, Meckel contributed to the overhauling of military logistics, mobilization schemes, and medical care structures and helped to create a national defense plan.50 There were mainly two reasons for the practical reorientation of the Chinese military from the German to the Japanese army: on the one hand, issues with both the German advisors and the German government made a continuation of the cooperation difficult after 1900. The contracts of most of the instructors ended in 1899 and were not extended because the Germans had difficulties in adjusting to both Chinese soldiers and military leaders. Moreover, the German government seized control over Qingdao and the Jiaozhou Bay in Shandong province in 1898 and established a colony and naval base.51 On the other hand, as Zhang Zhidong emphasized in his widely circulated piece Exhortation to Study in 1899, Japan was culturally and geographically closer, instructors and learning materials were cheaper and better available, and the Japanese language was much more accessible for Chinese officers. It was much easier for Chinese cadets to study at military academies in Japan than in Germany or elsewhere in Europe or the United States, making the Japanese army the more reasonable choice as direct role model for the New Armies. After the turn of century, Japanese military instructors and teachers began to replace the Germans as the dominant foreign group in both Chinese military academies and the New Armies.52 Yet, although the Japanese army replaced the German as a direct role model after the turn of the century, the latter still counted as an ideal. Many leading

14 Introduction

Chinese military reformers, army generals, and political leaders continued to view the German army and German military culture as the very archetype of a “modern” military. They continued to admire the German way of governing an army and militarizing society, including military training, notions of professionalism, martial spirit, and the general military education of the male population. Consequently, German military culture received a new wave of attention in 1909, when the Xuantong Emperor and a group of germanophile Manchu princes ascended to power. The renewed enthusiasm lasted until the end of the First World War, before military failure, Allied propaganda, and the excessive display of German-style military culture in China by Chinese generals led to an increasingly negative view of German “militarism.”53 Military theorists and officers, such as the Nationalist Party military leader Jiang Jieshi, however, continued to admire the German military. The Nationalists resumed Sino-German military cooperation in the 1920s and 1930s, including the employment of German military advisors, the purchase of German weapons, and translations of German military literature, but this is beyond the scope of the current study.54 Governing Men and their Bodies Chinese military reformers at the turn of the twentieth century sought to govern the bodies of men, aiming at deploying fitter, more disciplined, and more motivated troops. In 1904, the newly established Bureau for Military Training (Lianbingchu), declared that, together with national uniformity of organizational principles and equipment, training or “methods and rules for military drill and physical exercise” were the crucial goals of military reforms.55 Therefore, this books deals with the governance of the male physical body and the technologies to govern bodily practices. Rather than examining individual and subjective experiences, I ask how the physical body was imagined, represented, and produced through discourses and practices linked to the military reforms in late Qing and early Republican China.56 These reforms and the establishment of the New Armies were predominantly concerned with the bodies of men and boys (but not exclusively, as Chapter 6 will show), and not only led to the reconfiguration of notions about the physical body but also to the reconceptualization of masculinity. While the issues of body and masculinity in Chinese history are discussed in more detail below and in the individual chapters of this book, the paragraphs below offer some more general theoretical and methodological remarks and observations. The human body is not a biological or anthropological constant, but is enmeshed in a web of cultural codes, images, experiences, norms, and



representations, which vary strongly over time and space, by social class, and by gender. Even within one social and cultural environment, various ways of conceptualizing the body are possible. The way humans perceive, interpret, and act upon their bodies is not natural but constituted through social interaction and discourse, and through constantly repeated bodily practices and their presentation or “performance.” Bodily performance strongly contributes to the production of gender concepts of femininity and masculinity, which are inseparably linked to physical characteristics. In other words, body and gender are “done” through social practices and are fluid and relational categories.57 What are body practices and what or who governs and produces them? According to Marcel Mauss, different societies have their own “art of using the human body”: bodily practices and habits, which he calls body techniques.58 These body techniques, he argues, do not vary so much between individuals but between groups with different mental and physical dispositions, notions of propriety, fashion, or prestige, or social and educational backgrounds. The way we walk, sit, sleep, consume, reproduce, dress, exercise, and keep healthy and clean are shaped by our degree of education and training and differ according to age and gender. Mauss’ example is the variety of military marching styles, including, for instance, the German goose-step, which is viewed as “one of those idiosyncrasies”59 made up by the assemblage of psychological, physical, and social conditions.60 The ideas of body techniques later informed Pierre Bourdieu’s more elaborate concept of habitus, which he defines as a system of predispositions and permanent practices. Habitus (in plural) express certain worldviews and are internalized by education and upbringing, which depend on specific social structures. They are the outcome of collective and durable systems of socialization that are transmitted from generation to generation and produce the possible spectrum of perception and action of an individual. The physical body is essential in Bourdieu’s concept, because the habitus embodies or incorporates social structures.61 Although the body literally epitomizes habitus, Bourdieu mainly deals with knowledge and belief systems and less with the actual micro-techniques of the body, as Susan Brownell points out, or with the factors governing and producing body practices.62 Michel Foucault, in his life-spanning analysis of conceptualizing power in European history, addresses these factors in much more detail. Three concepts that are central in his thinking, disciplinary power, government, and biopolitics, particularly deal with the epistemological construction or production of the physical body. Disciplinary power is connected to the question of how to govern an individual, control its behavior, assess its qualifications, and increase its capacities and skills. Through institutions such as schools, factories, hospitals, asylums, prisons, and armies, disciplinary power acts

16 Introduction

upon the physical body, which is drilled, “dressed,” and optimized to fulfill a specific function in an organic unity. It aims at arranging and combining individuals in a given regime of space and time. The prime example for the emergence of disciplinary power in eighteenth-century Europe is the army, which underwent a “military revolution” during that period.63 New tactical formations, connected to the rising significance of the fire-armed infantry, demanded elaborate systems of conditioning, training, and exercising as well as control, inspection, and strict hierarchies. Extensive military drill was intended to increase the bodily performance, speed, and precision of soldiers and turn them into effective closed formations. Foucault calls the precise and meticulous micro-techniques used to form the bodies of individuals and create docile subjects technologies of the body.64 Foucault’s concept of discipline has been criticized as too narrow and deterministic, because it only offers a very oppressive and “negative” notion of power wielded by a repressive state and its institutions, excluding any form of individual choice or subversion.65 Foucault views power as only existing in power relationships and as a productive force, in the sense that it epistemologically creates the subject (and the body) and is reciprocally connected to the formation of knowledge. The emergence of disciplinary power is thus closely linked to the development of scientific disciplines in the eighteenth century. However, the criticism that both the subject and the physical body are relatively powerless and merely created by external forces, namely discourses, practices, and institutions, is legitimate and was accepted by Foucault. He later developed the idea of government (gouvernement) to enhance his original conception of power. Government, here, does not only refer to national governments or the government of a state, but to all “more or less calculated means of the direction of how we behave and act.”66 For the sake of clarity, the term governance is used instead of government throughout this book, to indicate its independence from state government. Foucault himself defined government as “conduire des conduites” (conduct of conduct)67 or, in other words, as the regulation of personal bearing and deportment or way of governing the behavior of individuals through structuring their possible fields of action.68 Most importantly, it also refers to self-conduct or the self-governance and self-control of individuals, often assisted by the state or professional experts and institutions.69 Foucault defines the tools and knowledge that make self-governance possible, and enable individuals to produce and constitute their own self-understanding and to transform themselves by their own means, or with the help of others, to achieve the state of being to which they aspire as technologies of the self (or practices of self).70 Technologies of the self can affect and operate on the “body, soul, thoughts, and way of being” of individuals, who seek to influence their “happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.”71



Foucault views discipline and government (or governance) as different forms of power. In his late years, he sought to merge these concepts into the theory of governmentality, loosely defined as historically and spatially specific conceptions, rationales, regimes, or arts of government. Studies in governmentality emphasize the question of how something is governed.72 In European history, according to Foucault, the triangle of sovereignty, discipline, and government (governance) aggregated without replacing each other to bring about a specific “modern” form of government or governmentality.73 Sovereign power, thought of as disposition of things and direct intervention by the state rulers and bureaucracy, was subsequently supplemented by disciplinary power and finally by government to produce a governmentality concerned with governing economic, social, psychological, and biological processes, with the aim of increasing the wealth, strength, health, or happiness of the state and its inhabitants.74 Direct state intervention was rapidly replaced by the actions of increasingly elaborate and complex institutions as well as by the knowledge production and professional guidance of scientific disciplines.75 In particular, the administration and management of all aspects that affect the biological lives of all members of a community, and the regulation and control of the quantity and (subjective) quality, welfare, strength, longevity, or purity of entities such as the “population,” “nation,” “society,” “citizenry,” “race,” or “species” became a central element of government, which Foucault calls biopolitics. As political strategy, it deals with the governance of issues related to health, hygiene, sanitation, nutrition, sexual behavior, reproduction, birth and death rates, and age patterns. It resorts to a variety of technologies of government such as statistics, census surveys, and cartography to govern the development of the population. The Birth of Biopolitics, as Foucault calls it, began in Europe with the recognition of the “population” as an economic and political concern.76 While discipline acts upon individual physical bodies, biopolitics acts upon processes concerning the bodies of the entire population. Together, discipline and biopolitics constitute biopower in Foucault’s thinking. In this book, I use the theory of governmentality as an analytical framework, because the focus is on the question of how reformers governed soldiers, officers, and citizens. Military reformers sought to discipline soldiers by meticulously regulating their bodies. After the turn of the century, they were increasingly concerned with governing the entire population for military purposes. Arguably, the late Qing and early Republican military reforms mark the beginning of biopower in twentieth century Chinese politics. Military reforms and the newly introduced technologies to govern military men and their bodies affected the conceptualization of masculinity within the specific setting of military culture. Neither Mauss nor Bourdieu nor Foucault deals substantially with the issue of gender or analyze body

18 Introduction

practices according to different genders. However, it is fruitful to broaden their approaches to include the category of masculinity for the purpose of understanding the impact of late Qing and early Republican military reforms. Despite certain specific concepts such as the “crisis of masculinity” or “hegemonic masculinity,” there is no strict boundary between men’s studies and gender studies and they share basic theoretical principles. Gender concepts are fluid and depend on ongoing, historically, socially, and culturally varying discourses, representations, and constantly repeated practices. Socially performed practices are constructed around the human body and its biological sex, which, according to Judith Butler, itself becomes indistinct because of the complex matrix of social perceptions and ascriptions superimposed on it.77 Gendered behavior is not genetically predetermined, and neither do people simply enact sex roles, which are socially imposed from birth and analog to the biological sex. People do perform roles but these are not immutable.78 “Gender,” Raewyn Connell remarks, “is social practice that constantly refers to bodies and what bodies do, it is not social practice reduced to the body.”79 Bodily practices and bodily experiences, as well as discourses about the body, are essential for the process of conceptualizing gender. In turn, gender concepts affect how individuals construe the physical body, and what they “do” with it. In summary, gender concepts are instable and depend on performativity or, in other words, on bodily practices in social interactions. “True masculinity,” Connell writes, “is almost always thought to proceed from men’s bodies—to be inherent in a male body or to express something about a male body.”80 Jürgen Martschukat and Olaf Stieglitz suggest considering masculinity as a category that is “relational in multiple ways.” On the one hand, they argue, masculinity has to be understood in terms of gender arrangements and its relationship to femininity. Ideas about what is manly depend on the manifold social and sexual interaction between men and women, different role allocations, dualistic ascriptions, and the attribution of physical attributes. On the other hand, a given concept of masculinity exists through the differentiation from other concepts of masculinity.81 According to Connell, there is generally one hegemonic form of masculinity. Men who do not adhere to this dominant form or concept of masculinity are marginalized, socially segregated, and excluded from political authority and access to cultural and economic resources. Generally speaking, marginalized men are in a similar position to women in a patriarchal order.82 Different concepts of masculinity or masculinities can coexist simultaneously within one social or cultural environment. Such masculinities often exist only as idealized and normative models, discursive representations, and iconic figurations that, in fact, influence the far more complex reality of individual behavior and identity. Take, for example, the Japanese soldiers and



officers in Toshikata’s woodblock print described above: the Japanese admiral represented martial masculine strength and triumph over the effeminate Confucian scholar-official, but he existed more in the imagination of the artist’s audience than in reality.83 Masculinity is only one aspect of identity formation, which is also constructed through similarly fluid but entangled factors such as social class, ethnicity (or an alleged “race”), sexuality or sexual orientation, religion, and locality. It is hardly possible, Martschukat and Stieglitz argue, to analyze all these relationships in one singly study. In this book, I do not aim to deconstruct the complex amalgam of individual or collective identity formation but to examine the factors contributing to a self-perception and ascription of military men as truly masculine or “real” men.84 In particular, this book deals with the production of a masculinity concept from the perspective of governmentality and the idea of “conduct of conduct”: through their interest in reshaping the social standing and governing the bodily conduct, physical appearance, physically performed behavior, selfunderstanding, motivation, and attitude of military men, military reformers and army leaders facilitated the emergence of a new concept of masculinity. Vis-à-vis a perceived “crisis of masculinity,” military reforms engendered the recreation of a concept of martial or military masculinity informed by both foreign and historical “Chinese” representations of masculinity. Newly promoted ideals, concepts, and values that referred to the behavior and identity of men in a military setting, coalesced into a concept of masculinity through bodily performance. The emulation, which was initially imposed on soldiers and officers by military reformers, and gradual internalization of new patterns of self-conduct and behavior influenced the formation of a specific, military habitus, which drew on European-style military cultures as well as on the repertoire of existing social structures and bodily practices.85 Masculinity and the Military in Late Imperial China Masculinity in late imperial China was, in the first instance, defined in terms of patriarchy and the hierarchical difference between men and women (nan nü you bie, zhong nan qing nü).86 On the other hand, according to Kam Louie and Louise Edwards, masculinity in China was also constructed around the two normative poles wen (cultural/civilian) and wu (martial/military), mirroring the deeply rooted relational and dialectical structure of early Chinese thought. Manhood could be expressed through either “culture” or “martiality,” but ideally wen and wu were harmoniously balanced, similar to the cosmological principles yin and yang. The ideal of an equilibrium between wen and wu was transferred to the state level, where governments and rulers were supposed

20 Introduction

to apply and embody harmoniously balanced civilian and military qualities. The Qing emperors presented themselves as both scholar-kings and warriorgenerals.87 This was the Confucian masculine ideal, described, for instance, in the Mengzi: a man possessed both wen and wu, which was emulated by the Japanese warrior elite, the Samurai. In contrast to the quintessential wen man, Confucius, Guan Yu embodied the archetype of ideal wu masculinity. Guan Yu was a general who lived during the Three Kingdoms period (ca 208–280) and who became a legendary figure with superhuman features characterized by his height, strength, and a distinctive, bearded red face. He was deified in the sixth century and is, until today, often referred to as Chinese god of war. In the fourteenth century, he achieved great popularity through the popular novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo yanyi).88 Kam Louie further elaborated the wen-wu model and emphasized that wen, despite variations over the course of Chinese history, was mostly preferred over wu in intellectual discourse, expressing the claim to power of the educated civilian elite.89 Arguably, this exaltation of wen over wu contributed, at the same time, to fulfilling civilian dominance in late imperial China and to the relative demotion of the military that started during the late Tang (618–907) and Song (960–1279) dynasties. Wen masculinity and qualities such as cultural refinement, self-improvement, self-discipline, and strong mental capacities became the dominating (or hegemonic) concept of masculinity in the normative elite discourse, which redefined wu masculinity as low class, coarse, or even barbaric and foreign. However, Louie argued, both types were generally “desirable” and “sexy.”90 Wu qualities, in the model outlined by Louie, comprised physical strength, military spirit, or martial arts skills. Real wu, however, is not about the application of brute and uncontrolled force. Under the impression of wen and the idealized balance between the two, wu men are supposed to restrain themselves, and only use their physical strength as a last resort and only in a deliberate and controlled fashion. Other qualities attributed to wu men were loyalty, honor, righteousness, and self-discipline when it came to resisting female attractiveness and (heterosexual) austereness. The relationship to other men, however, whether in the sense of a hierarchical patronage-protégé connection, the fraternity or comradeship between equals, or even an erotic or emotional homosexuality was accepted and was part of the wu ideal. Wen men, on the other hand, were supposed to be competitive and their relationships to other men always appeared to be asymmetric and hierarchical, regardless of whether referring to friends, teacher and student, superior and subordinate, or homosexual lovers.91 Although there certainly were literati men serving as politically powerful scholar-officials who despised actual warfare and established the narrative of an essentially peaceful Chinese Confucian culture, the notion that wen



became hegemonic and continuously dominated wu since the Song Dynasty is an oversimplification. During the Song period, despite the establishment of a professional standing army, a distinct and independent military upper-class or warrior caste was missing or, at least, strongly marginalized. Wealthy landowning families (the “gentry”) replaced the old military-oriented aristocracy as the political and social elite, expressing manhood through cultural capital, literary and artistic achievements, and positions in the bureaucracy.92 Civil officials controlled the military and literati men, who collected and edited ancient military classics from the Spring and Autumn (771–476 BC) and Warring States (475–221 BC) periods, were absorbed in military affairs. This tendency already started in pre- and early imperial times because autocratic rulers sought to disempower the battle-tested military aristocracy, which adhered to heroic and valiant ideals, and to political independence. They were superseded by clever military strategists, who possessed only theoretical knowledge about warfare and directed infantry troops from afar, without engaging in battle themselves. Marc Lewis pointed out that, already during the early imperial period, warfare conducted by a trained infantry under a professional commander was associated with feminine qualities, whereas the chariot warfare of the nobility was considered heroic and masculine.93 Song civilian officials and literati turned military strategy into a theoretical subject of scholarship and styled themselves as military “strategists” or “military experts” (bingjia). They rarely touched a weapon and their strategies or military technological inventions were almost never put into practice. Martial arts performances were common and popular, and civilian officials acknowledged skills in military arts such as archery, boxing, and horse riding. However, they increasingly looked down on military men. They considered individual heroism, as well as other wu qualities, as unfit for ruling and governing, and only necessary in times of conquest. Even equating wen and wu would bring instability. By the end of the Song, military people neglected martial practice and emulated the lifestyle and appearance of the civil elites. Nevertheless, there were also countertendencies and some writers criticized the feminine tendencies of court and politics, referring to corrupt Confucians (furu), effete intellectualism, and the influence of women and eunuchs at court. They called for stalwart military masculinity, which emphasized courage, heroic vigor, loyalty, honor, youthfulness, and physical strength (as opposed to delicate wen men), to save the dynasty from feminine yin forces that brought instability and chaos.94 During the Ming Dynasty, military and civilian elites were closely connected, and they understood both spheres as complementary. Civilian elites from the well-off, literati families had much interaction with military families and cultivated an affinity to military objects. The Ming was a period of almost obsessive collecting activities. Swords and other weapons were very much

22 Introduction

in vogue among the literati.95 The same was true for military literature, and literati men, as bingjia, produced a great number of eclectic military treatises, compilations, and re-editions of military writings and military technology manuals, whose content, however, was rarely implemented.96 At the same time, physical activities such as fencing and riding were common among men. While not entirely the same as Tang men, who often adopted a fierce and martial guise with plenty of facial hair and a strong physique, the ideal male body was imagined as young and athletic, muscular and slender during the Ming Dynasty.97 Popular martial romantic novels, such as the Romance of the Three Kingdoms and the Water Margin (Shuihuzhuan, also translated as All Men are Brothers or Outlaws of the Marshes) from the early Ming period, depicted romantic wu type men. The Water Margin described an archetypical lower class martial masculinity: the tough guy, or haohan, was a tattooed, violent, and vengeful heavy drinker who was contemptuous of women and adhered to a brotherly code.98 A number of romantic or erotic stories, on the other hand, idealized the figure of the young and talented but fragile scholar (caizi), who was romantically in love with a woman. This sensitive man was yet to develop into a disciplined scholar (wenren or even junzi) who was only interested in his official wives and concubines. Even before the Qing conquest of the Ming Empire, the self-perception of being effeminate and powerless proliferated among scholars because of the increasingly authoritarian Ming regime. The transition of dynasties, thus, left many of the literati with the impression of having forsaken dynasty and polity and thus having failed in their manhood. Their strategy was to revert completely to the wen type, empowering themselves again by refusing “feminine” chastity (i.e., being loyal to the Ming) and regarding wu masculinity as barbaric and inferior.99 From the mid-sixteenth century onward, the physical ideal of the elite literati class was a frail, sensitive, tender, and beardless “beautiful” male.100 Louie has argued that the wen-wu concept applied only to Han Chinese men—and might thus actually define them—and not to men from other ethnic backgrounds in China or to foreigners. Women could possess wen or wu only by assuming the disguise of a male body, that is, by wearing men’s clothes and emulating male behavior and demeanor.101 Peter Zarrow criticized this approach as an over-generalization that relies only on the examination of literary or other cultural products and is sometimes inconsistent.102 Taken as a normative concept communicated in Confucian and other texts, it is useful as a framework, at least for understanding and examining the self-perception, identity, and practices of elite scholars as men. However, instead of limiting the wen-wu concept only to Han Chinese men and using it in strict concordance with a hegemonic-marginal model (Louie does not use these terms though), it should be viewed as a matrix in which various figurations of



masculinity were located. Depending on the social, historical, geographical, ethnical, or other context, a certain figuration would have been the predominant representation, or model, of a masculine identity; the assumption of a hegemonic concept of scholarly wen masculinity in a holistic China is rather inaccurate. Literati and officials looked down on wu qualities among their peers only during certain periods in history. The interest in theoretical military strategy or military officialdom, for instance, counted less, compared to other activities that an educated man could undertake. And they looked down upon lower class perceptions of masculinity, but this does not deprive masculine figurations with wu qualities of their status, relative power, or even dominance in certain contexts. Throughout Chinese history, from the Zhou Dynasty (1046–256 BC)up until today, masculinity was and is conceptualized and expressed in myriad ways, and it is necessary to speak of multiple masculinities instead of masculinity in the singular.103 Moreover, so-called ethnic minorities, such as Tibetans, Mongols, and Uighurs, played an important role for the construction of masculinities and gender arrangements in China.104 Wen masculinity came in different forms and manifestations, including the caizi, the accomplished scholar, the official-bureaucrat and, perhaps, even the eunuch.105 However, instead of differentiating between wen figurations on the one hand and wu figurations on the other, it might be more to the point to analyze different historical masculine figurations with either wen or wu qualities or both. Late imperial figurations with strong wu attributes included the rebellious “hooligan” (liumang) and the underdog-like “tough guy” (haohan) as well as the valiant and virtuous “hero” (yingxiong, literally “outstanding male”) and the chivalric “knight-errant” (youxia), which appeared mainly in popular literature and had existed in previous periods.106 They all shared an emphasis on physical strength or skill, such as in martial arts, and stressed (self-) righteousness (yi or yiqi), a “true heart,” and honor. And they often shared the ideal of self-discipline, particularly sexual discipline concerning women, as well as male bonding in general with wen figurations. From the late eighteenth century onward, stories about chivalric martial heroes (called xiayi or wuxia) became increasingly popular and anticipated the boom of kung fu stories in the twentieth century.107 Popular literature was usually written by members of the educated class, often low-ranking clerks or scribes. However, the masculinity figurations in these books were not only romanticizing fantasies about some simple, low-class life but played a major role in people’s perception of themselves and influenced their identity formation. Young men outside the patriarchal family-based order, for instance, aspired to being haohan, which not only contributed strongly to individual identity formation but also offered alternative social structures within a brotherhood. In the form of secret societies or other criminal and illegal organizations, these brotherhoods developed tangible political and social influence.108

24 Introduction

Another important masculine figuration with strong wu attributes, which contests the hegemonic wen/marginal wu dichotomy even more strongly, is the Manchu warrior or Bannerman. If there was a sense of emasculation among the literati men of the Ming and reorientation toward wen, then this was only possible because they relinquished military or martial masculinity entirely to the Qing conquerors, who constructed their identity around an alleged Manchu or Inner-Asian warrior tradition. The Qing even controlled scholarly works on strategy and military theory and the number of publications produced on military subjects was substantially lower as compared to the Ming period. Although the Qing quickly reestablished the system of military examinations, military officials played a minor rule in commanding troops in action. They remained in the sphere of wen and wen masculinity, as officials or literati encompassing wu. But they were secondary to both civilian officials and true military figurations such as the Manchu Bannerman or the Mongolian warrior. The Banner elites were educated in special schools in Beijing and in the Banner garrisons throughout the empire. These schools originally had the purpose of providing enough able men for the government apparatus, and they emphasized the learning of Mandarin and literary Chinese. The Qianlong Emperor, however, feared the total assimilation of the Banner people into Han Chinese customs and therefore admonished them to preserve the Manchu cultural heritage and martial spirit, including the Manchu language, a frugal lifestyle, and military skills such as riding and shooting.109 According to Pamela Kyle Crossley, the notion of a distinctive Banner identity and education even “created the foundation for the reprofessionalized military of the late nineteenth century and the emergence of technical, vocational and professionalized education in the languages, sciences, and military arts.”110 And, as Chapter 3 will demonstrate, the notion of a martial Manchu identity also influenced the revival of military masculinity in the early twentieth century, at the level of the imperial family. According to Winston Lo, central control of military affairs, standardization of making war, and bureaucratization of the military class had all existed in China since the Song Dynasty. But the necessary conditions for a professional military, he argues, also have to include internal “occupational autonomy” (i.e., autonomy in military operational and tactical matters) and, related to this, professional pride. Although a popular notion of martial heroism and appreciation of martial arts existed, this did not enter the realm of the military and army, Lo further claims. The figuration of wuren (warrior) was little admired or considered an ideal worthy of emulation.111 However, as Jane Elliot notes, at least in the nineteenth century, commoners such as peasants, peons, or petty thieves were strongly influenced by widely circulating woodblock prints that depicted historical-fictitious yingxiong and haohan figures.



It was these commoners, she emphasized, who made up the rank and file of the army, bringing with them a romantic notion of heroic, righteous martial deeds.112 Nevertheless, the martial masculine identity of these common fighting men still clashed with the increasingly negative picture of soldiers held by both commoners and members of the elite in the second half of the nineteenth century, which was caused by war and seemingly arbitrary war atrocities. Haohan was associated more with cruel bandits, criminals, and villains bringing disorder and destruction.113 As Elliot points out, the romantic martial heroism found in popular literature and prints did not entail the production of an image of a proud and self-confident army leader.114 And this was also true for the legendary military heroes Zhuge Liang, Guan Yu, and Yue Fei, who represented martial qualities such as strategic genius, prowess, discipline, and loyalty that were promoted in the eighteenth century by the Qing emperors.115 Common soldiers were not considered as members of the family-based, law-abiding good people (liangmin), who were the foundation of social order, stability, and morality. The opportunities for soldiers to marry and reproduce were limited, although they were not completely lacking. Green Standard Army soldiers were recruited according to registers listing military families (i.e., with a record of military service over generations) and the government was interested in both sustaining this system and stabilizing the men at arms socially, through familial bonds. Nevertheless, upward mobility through marriage was nearly impossible and common soldiers were located beyond the normal social order, although they were also supposed to be the protectors of this order and the liangmin.116 The proverb “good iron is not used for nails, good men do not serve as soldiers” (hao tie bu da ding, hao nan (ren) bu dang bing), which came into existence during the Song Dynasty, reflects the low standing of common soldiers in the (gendered) social order. Both nan (man, male) and ren (person, people) were used in the proverb and it makes sense to translate either term as “men.”117 Although it is not clear how common the proverb actually was, it seems to have been increasingly used in times of crisis and military breakdown, as a lamentation against marauding soldiers and rebels on the loose in the nineteenth century and during the civil war periods in the 1910s and 1920s. In the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War 1894–1895, the proverb was used as an expression of criticism against the social and cultural neglect of the military and against the preference for the cultural and literary sphere at the level of the elites.118 New Armies The condition and form of organization of the armed forces of the Qing Empire on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War was relatively complex because

26 Introduction

it had undergone major changes since the seventeenth century. There were two distinct regular military organizations, the Banner troops and the Green Standard Army (Lüying). The Banners were a form of social-military organization established in the early seventeenth century by the Manchu, who founded the Qing Dynasty in 1636, conquered the Ming Empire in 1644, and subsequently subdued extensive sections of Inner Asia. Originally, there were the Eight Banners (Baqi) made up mostly of Manchus, but also of people with other ethnic origins, such as Mongols, Han (or, rather, people from Ming China), and Koreans. After the conquest, they mostly lived secluded from the rest of the population in the capital of Beijing and in garrisons or “Manchu cities” that were located in strategically important areas and large cities throughout China proper (virtually the old Ming territory) and Manchuria. Every adult male of the Eight Banners was theoretically supposed to join the military but, in total, only about five to ten percent were warriors. Even before 1644, the number of Banners was expanded to 24: eight Banners consisted solely of Mongols and another eight were made up of Han (called Han Martial or Hanjun). The Han Martial Banners were disbanded by the end of the eighteenth century and their members reclassified as civilians or Green Standard Soldiers.119 After the conquest was completed, the Qing reorganized the surrendering Ming units into the Green Standard Army, which became, in fact, an extremely fragmented provincial and local constabulary, organized in thousands of relatively small units throughout China proper. Although centrally administered by different government institutions in the capital, the command over regional and local detachments was deliberately distributed among military and civilian officials, to avoid a concentration of power. The main duty of Green Standard Army soldiers was maintaining order, defending borders, collecting revenues, escorting prisoners, protecting tombs, guarding waterways and granaries, and carrying out postal functions. In general, they were paid less and their equipment and arms were inferior, compared to those of the Banner forces.120 In the eighteenth century, the Qing conducted extensive military campaigns, which led to the expansion and stabilization of the empire’s borders. For these campaigns, troops from both the Green Standard Army and the Banners were deployed.121 However, starting at the end of the century, Qing military prowess declined and, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the regular Qing armies were, by and large, incapable of coping with the many disruptions from foreign powers and the social-religiously motivated uprisings within the empire. Although cultural, social, and technological factors mattered in his view, Hans van de Ven argues that the de facto uselessness of the regular Qing armies in the nineteenth century mainly derived from fiscal problems and the changing (meaning more peaceful) security environment of



the Qing Empire.122 Fiscal problems occurred due to the expensive campaigns in the eighteenth century, the embezzlement of military funds by military officials, and the large stipends allocated for the Banners. However, stipends and salaries for soldiers were not adjusted adequately over time, which contributed to the impoverishment of many soldiers, who were officially forbidden to pursue another occupation. Moreover, apart from military campaigns, the eighteenth century was a largely stable, peaceful, and prosperous era for most of the inhabitants of Qing China. For these and other reasons, such as cultural adaptation and demographic and social-economic change, at least parts of the Banners lost their interest in martial deeds and turned to careers in the prestigious civil bureaucracy or in business.123 Starting in the middle of the nineteenth century, new military organizations developed due to the Taiping Rebellion—a large-scale syncretic anti-Qing movement that counted millions of followers and which controlled large areas in the Jiangxi region.124 Between 1851 and 1864, the Taiping movement established a Heavenly Kingdom with the capital Nanjing, which was eventually overthrown by mercenary armies raised by officials loyal to the Qing: Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Zuo Zongtan. They were supported by troops led by French, American, and British officers, notably, the Ever Victorious Army (Changshengjun) under the command of Frederick Townsend Ward and Charles George Gordon.125 In 1853, Zeng Guofan established the Hunan Army (Xiangjun) and organized it along strict Confucian moral doctrines and personal relationships. The Anhui Army (Huaijun), established in 1861 by Li Hongzhang, followed the same principle. The Hunan Army was disbanded in 1863 but the Anhui Army basically existed until the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and its offshoots provided the major fighting force during the war.126 The Hunan and the Anhui Army, together with other regionally and nationally operating mercenary armies, were called Brave Battalions (yongying) and had their origin in local militia units (tuan or tuanlian) that increasingly developed after 1800. Although these mercenary armies were based on personal relationships to individual commanders, the Brave Battalions depended financially and logistically on the government and remained loyal to the Qing.127 The deployment of the Brave Battalions was accompanied by the establishment of arsenals and shipyards by officials such as Li Hongzhang, who saw the need for military and economic reforms. These officials and their measures, subsequently called the Self-Strengthening Movement (Ziqiang yundong), were opposed by more conservative and anti-foreign elements within the Qing government centered around the increasingly powerful Empress Dowager Cixi, mother of the ruling Tongzhi Emperor (1861–1875).128 As a result, the Self-Strengthening projects lacked central coordination and were chronically underfunded. They were, however, not inevitably doomed to failure. Scholars often employ the iconic slogan “Chinese learning as substance,

28 Introduction

Western learning for practical application” (zhongxue wei ti, xixue weiyong) to describe the narrowness of thought and limitation of the movement, which concentrated only on military technology and ignored the necessity of social and institutional reforms. However, in terms of industrial, scientific, and technological innovations, it was quite remarkable and significant for further developments.129 Most arsenals and dockyards employed foreign engineers and navy officers to acquire technical knowledge and included translation departments and schools to train technicians and sailors. Among the most important facilities was the Jiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai, established in 1865 by Li Hongzhang and Zeng Guofan, as well as the Fuzhou Arsenal and Navy Yard, founded by Zeng Guofan in 1866. Later, in 1891, the governor-general of Huguang, Zhang Zhidong, founded the Hanyang Arsenal, which became one of around forty arsenals and shipyards that existed in the Qing Empire at that time.130 After the Sino-Japanese War, the focus of military reorganizing efforts shifted from the manufacturing of weapons and battleships to the training of new land armies, collectively called the New Armies.131 Already in 1894, Constantin von Hanneken, a German entrepreneur and military advisor in the service of Li Hongzhang and Sheng Xuanhuai, designed an army based on German organizational principles. It was initially named the Pacification Army (Dingwujun) and led by Hu Yufen. Command soon moved over to Yuan Shikai, a military official and former Imperial Resident of the Qing in Korea, and it was renamed as the Newly Created Army (Xinjian lujun). In 1895, the Newly Created Army consisted of over 7000 common soldiers and officers, stationed and trained in Xiaozhan, near the treaty port city of Tianjin. It was organized into several battalions of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, as well as auxiliary troops, including engineer units responsible for construction, surveying, mines, or maintenance work. German officers were hired as drillmasters, instructors, or teachers for officers. The Newly Created Army was funded centrally by the central government through the Board of Finance, but administered itself, mainly through the bureaucratic apparatus at Yuan’s disposal.132 For Yuan Shikai, this was the beginning of a stellar career as one of the most important and powerful political figures in late imperial and early Republican China. In 1899, he was appointed governor of Shandong province and, two years later, he became governor-general of Zhili province. In 1902, he became Superintendent of the North (Beiyang dachen). Owing his rise to his political skills, military influence, and closeness to the Empress Dowager Cixi, he prestigiously joined the eminent but insignificant Grand Council in 1907 and was appointed Foreign Minister. He was dismissed after Cixi’s death in 1909, but returned to the political stage in 1911 and became President of the Republic in 1912. De facto a dictator, he briefly declared himself Emperor of China in 1915. Opposed even by some of his closest



lieutenants, he was forced to abandon this title after only a couple of month, shortly before he died in June 1916.133 Also in 1894 and 1895, Zhang Zhidong, started organizing the SelfStrengthening Army (Ziqiangjun) and established a military academy in Nanjing to train officers. Zhang was a career scholar-bureaucrat, who served as governor of Shanxi province, as governor-general of Huguang, Lianguang, and Liangjiang, and, in the same year as Yuan Shikai, eventually became a member of the Grand Council. The Self-Strengthening Army was stationed in Wuchang and Wusong near Shanghai and eventually consisted of 13 battalions with 2500 men, which was actually only a quarter of the originally envisioned number. More than 30 German commissioned and noncommissioned officers served as teachers and instructors, who, unlike the Newly Created Army, were also included in the command structure and hold leading positions. After being transferred to Wuchang where he resided as governorgeneral of Huguang, Zhang took parts of the troop and its German advisors with him to establish a new force. And he continued to be involved in the training of the Self-Strengthening Army, which was now officially supervised by the new governor-general of Liangjiang, Liu Kunyi.134 Apart from the Newly Created Army, the Qing government supported the establishment of other new military organizations in the vital Shandong and Zhili areas around the capital Beijing, which, from late 1898 on, were jointly called Guards Army (Wuweijun). Among them, only the Tenacious Army (Wuyijun) commanded by Nie Shicheng, originally a civil official who pursued a military career since the Taiping Rebellion, employed German instructors and copied German tactics and organization. Like the Newly Created Army, the Tenacious Army was stationed near Tianjin, but it never reached the same quality and significance.135 In 1900–1901, the uprising of the antiforeign Righteous Harmony Society (Yihetuan) or Boxer Movement, led to the intervention of an allied force from eight countries. The foreign powers made the Qing government responsible for the uprising and, apart from territorial concessions, it had to pay reparations and lost certain sovereign rights. The foreign invasion not only sparked a lasting discourse about “national humiliation” (guochi), it also resulted in the annihilation of most of the Guards Army and sparked new discussion on the Empire’s military strength.136 On January 29, 1901, the Guangxu Emperor issued a decree that called for suggestions concerning political and military reforms. Subsequently, the government abolished the military examination system for military officials and started to establish a national military school system. Moreover, it began disbanding the Green Standard Army and the Brave Battalions and created a new standing national army.137 In early 1902, Yuan Shikai, who had managed to keep the Newly Created Army out of the Boxer War, started expanding the forces under his command

30 Introduction

into a Standing Army (Changbeijun), which was also called the Zhili or Beiyang Army (Beiyangjun). Yuan also gained control over the Self-Strengthening Army and incorporated it into the Beiyang Army, which had almost 20,000 soldiers by the end of 1902. New recruits, as well as Bannermen from the capital, were trained to further enlarge the army: in June 1904, there were three full divisions and by autumn 1905, the deployment of six divisions, each possessing over 10,000 soldiers, was officially completed. A seventh division located in Jiangsu was completed in 1907. Although some divisions or brigades operated in the Manchurian provinces (later called Fengtian) or in Henan, the Beiyang Army’s basis was in Baoding near Tianjin, where Yuan acted as the governor-general of Zhili. Funds for the Beiyang Army came mainly from the government in Beijing and from Shandong and Zhili provinces.138 In 1902, Zhang Zhidong also started organizing troops into the Hubei New Army (Hubei xinjun), which was commanded by Zhang Biao. Initially, it consisted of Zhang Zhidong’s personal bodyguard of 1000 soldiers, trained according to German principles, but by 1904, it consisted of over 11,000 men, including around 1000 Bannermen. Both the Hubei New Army and the Beiyang Army increasingly relied on Japanese instructors, who were cheaper and better available than Germans.139 Spurred by the imminent Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria, in December 1903, the Qing government created the Bureau for Military Training (Lianbingchu, also translated as Commission for Army Reorganization), which announced a scheme for establishing a new national army in the following year.140 The plan stipulated deploying an army of 36 divisions with a total of 450,000 men, called Lujun. Similar to the previously newly established forces, it was often still referred to as Xinjun—New Army or, in the plural, the New Armies (to indicate the provincial quasi-autonomy of the divisions, despite national standards). The metropolitan area around Beijing was to train four divisions, Sichuan province was supposed to raise three divisions, and Zhili, Jiangsu, Hubei, Guangdong, Yunnan, and Gansu were supposed to deploy two divisions each. All other provinces in China proper, as well as the three Manchurian provinces, each had to raise one division. Both the Beiyang Army and the Hubei New Army became part of the Lujun,141 whose organization was derived from the German- and Japanese-modeled Beiyang Army: two divisions formed a corps or army (jun). The division (zhen or, from 1912 on, shi) was hierarchically divided into brigades (xie/lü, around 3000 men), regiments (biao/tuan, around 1,500 men), battalions (ying, 500 men), and further into smaller units such as companies (dui/lian), platoons (pai), squads (peng/ban), and fireteams (wu). A division had 12,512 officers, noncommissioned officers, common soldiers, and auxiliary personnel. It consisted of two infantry brigades, one artillery and one cavalry regiment, one engineer and one transport corps battalion as well as other auxiliary units, including a band



of around 45 people.142 Although the Lujun was supposed to be completed in 1912 (1916, according to the original plan), no more than twenty divisions plus several so-called mixed brigades (hunxie) were fully ready by the end of the Qing Dynasty.143 Furthermore, the government put much emphasis on the education of a new generation of officers.144 Military schools, which employed German and other European instructors and which emulated the German military school model, had existed in the Qing Empire since the 1880s and they had a formative influence on New Armies officers.145 In 1885, Li Hongzhang established the first Military Preparatory School in Tianjin (Tianjin/Beiyang wubei xuetang), which initially attracted over 100 students. They were instructed in “military science” as well as in physics, astronomy, math, engineering, surveying, geography, strategy, and the use of weapons.146 In 1887, Zhang Zhidong founded the second new-style military school for naval and army officers in Guangdong (Guangdong shuilushi xuetang). It hired Germans and other Europeans and offered language courses in English and German as well as the option of specializing in artillery, cavalry, or engineering. Zhang subsequently established a number of civil and military schools, including a school for noncommissioned officers (Jiangbian xuetang), as well as arsenals and iron works in Nanjing and Wuchang. Graduates from these schools increasingly assumed office in the New Armies. A few of them, such as Duan Qirui, Feng Guozhang (President of the Republic 1917–1918), or Cao Kun (President of the Republic 1923–1924), who had graduated from the Tianjin Military Preparatory School, played an important role in the subsequent military reform process.147 Starting in 1901, Yuan Shikai began to set up several schools in Zhili province under the umbrella term Beiyang Army Military Preparatory College (Beiyang lujun wubei xuetang). They were designed to produce officers for the Beiyang Army, trained in “international military science” (geguo bingxue) according to standards in “East and West.” Yuan and his staff developed a hierarchical system in which young cadets started at a military primary school that focused on general intellectual and physical education rather than on military training. Students received a more specialized military education only after entering the middle and high schools of the college. Additionally, a “quick-learning” school (sucheng xuetang) was supposed to respond to the urgent need for officers.148 By 1903, six schools for educating staff officers, as well as commissioned and noncommissioned officers, had been established, including one school specialized in re-training old-style military officials. The schools provided a general military education as well as training in languages, trigonometry, ballistics, topography, and other relevant disciplines. The curriculum was constantly extended and improved, and new specialist schools focusing on ordnance, logistics, military administration, medicine,

32 Introduction

and veterinary medicine were subsequently added. Until 1907, over 4000 students were enrolled in the Beiyang military college.149 The Qing government ordered all provincial governors and governor-generals to establish military schools based on the model of the Beiyang college and instructed Zhang Zhidong and Yuan Shikai to share their experiences with the German–Japanese-style military school system.150 In September 1904, the Bureau for Military Training promulgated a plan for a multilevel military school system: on the elementary level, every province and every Banner garrison should create (and fund) at least one army primary school (lujun xiaoxuetang) that provided general education for students from the age of 15 to 18. Military training and physical education were only one part of the curriculum and graduates should be able to choose between a military or civilian career.151 Students were taught the (Confucian) classics, history, literature, foreign languages (usually Japanese, German, and English; also French in Yunnan province; and Russian in the Northeast), as well as hygiene, math, geography, and natural sciences or physics (gezhi). However, the inculcation of loyalty, courage, and obedience were nevertheless central and, in comparison to the original Beiyang primary school, more emphasis was placed on military drill, discipline, protocol, and correct behavior.152 By 1905, most provincial governments had launched army primary schools, with many more on the way, which led to a rapid increase in the number of students. The schools employed a few German teachers but most instructors were either Japanese officers or Chinese graduates from a military school in Japan or China. The Bureau ordered that all military preparatory schools established before 1904 had to be transformed into army primary schools and adjusted to the new national standards. However, the requirements were not easily met and regulations, as well as the quality and content of the courses, varied markedly between the schools.153 The army middle or secondary school, the second level of the military career ladder, offered advanced courses and practical training with troops. The proposal of the Bureau stipulated the establishment of one middle school each in Zhili (Baoding), Hubei (Wuchang), Jiangsu (Nanjing), and Shaanxi (Xi’an). A fifth school in Guangzhou (Guangdong) was added to the plan one year later. The school in Baoding was later abandoned in favor of a school in Qinghe, a city close to Beijing. The schools were all opened in fall 1909 except for the one in Xi’an. During the revolution in October 1911, many military schools were forced to suspend their activities, with the result that the schools in Nanjing and Xi’an remained closed and were never again reopened. Although general school subjects were still important, the curriculum of the middle schools concentrated much more on actual military education, compared to the military primary schools. Subjects included fortification, topography, military organization, administration, weaponry, strategy, cavalry,



artillery, and (natural) sciences. Other disciplines were hygiene and cartography, which were sometimes taught in attached specialist schools.154 Finally, according to the Bureau’s plan, after graduating from the middle school, officer candidates could formally apply for admission to the Army Officer School (Lujun bingguan xuetang), which was to be established in Beijing. After eighteen months in school, the cadets would serve as officers on probation or as trainee officer (xuexiguan, lianxi guanbian) for six month. After passing the examination, they were qualified to be appointed to a post with the Lujun and become fully commissioned officers. After two years of service, these officers were able to enter the Army Staff Academy (Lujun canmou daxue), which represented the final level of higher military education. The concept and design of the officer school and the staff academy were based on the Japanese Imperial Army Academy (Rikugun Shikan Gakkō), established in 1874, and the Japanese Army Staff College (Rikugun Daigakkō), established in 1882. Whereas the Japanese Imperial Army Academy was based on the French model, the Japanese Army Staff College was designed along the lines of the Prussian War Academy (Kriegsakademie).155 Although the government actively supported the original plan to establish a central officer school and a staff academy in 1909, neither of them came into existence as planned, due to the 1911 Revolution. Instead, a number of officer schools were established in several provincial capitals, including one each in Tianjin, Wuchang, and Nanjing. In 1906, the Beiyang divisions opened an officer college in Baoding (Beiyang lujun xingying junguan xuetang) that was headed by Duan Qirui and offered a fast-track education for staff officers. It was a staff college in all but the name. After the college had been renamed several times and had witnessed multiple changes of leadership, Yuan Shikai moved it to Beijing in July 1912, where it became the Army Staff Academy (Lujun daxue).156 In Baoding, a new Army Officer School (Lujun junguan xuexiao) that was designed to train junior-rank (pre-staff) officers opened in October 1912. It incorporated cadets from Nanjing, where the officer school was closed for political reasons. The school became one of the most influential military academies in the history of Republican China. It had an enormous impact on military education in China and served as the model for the Nationalist’s Whampoa Military Academy, founded in 1924. The Baoding Army Officer School terminated in 1923 because of the civil war, after more than 6000 officers had graduated from it.157 Despite many efforts, the content, structure, and quality of the schoolbased education of officers varied enormously and depended on the cooperation and interest of provincial officials. Due to the urgent need for officers in the New Armies, Yuan and other military reformers implemented short-term programs or crash courses to train military instructors. Following the example

34 Introduction

of quick-learning schools in Hubei and Zhili, a number of military lecture halls (jiangwutang) in selected provincial cities provided fast-track training for officers. Some regiments and divisions even had their own schools, which had the purpose of commissioning officers as fast as possible.158 Between 1895 and 1904, approximately 20 Military Preparatory Schools were created throughout the Qing Empire, with more than 2600 enrolled students.159 By 1911, a total of approximately 70 new military schools existed, including 27 primary schools and various specialist training facilities such as schools for engineering, telegraphy, surveying and topography, ordnance, veterinary and human medicine, logistics and administration.160 An estimated number of 7000 cadets were enrolled in the new military schools, whose mere existence was generally praised as an improvement, despite many shortcomings, by foreign observers.161 Moreover, in an agreement with the Japanese government, the Bureau for Military Training fixed a quota of 100 cadets to be sent to Japan every year. In 1908, approximately 1000 out of more than 8000 Chinese students in Japan were military students enrolled at a Japanese Army military preparatory school, officer school, and staff college or specialist school.162 Although the popularity of the new military schools and the number of students increased steadily, it took many years and very extensive resources to create a new officer corps. There was still a lack of qualified men within the New Armies, particularly at the staff level. In 1910, an article in the Beiyang Military Journal, entitled The General Staff Urgently Calls for Talented Men, noted that the old habit of “emphasize culture, de-emphasize the military” was still not “rooted out.”163 After the abdication of the Qing Emperor in 1912, some military schools did not reopen due to the lack of funds, which resulted from the change of political and bureaucratic power.164 Subsequently, in order to produce more highly qualified officers, Yuan Shikai and his regime continued their efforts to standardize national military education and reemphasized most of the previously formulated goals. However, the increasing political tension and the lack of influence of Yuan’s government in the southern part of China made this a nearly impossible undertaking.165 Finally, the establishment of New Armies, military education, and the cultivation of a professional officer corps that met foreign standards was linked to the reformation of the administrative and command structure of the army. In the wake of the Hundred Days Reform in 1898, the scholar Kang Youwei demanded the rationalization of the bureaucracy by both eliminating unnecessary branches and superfluous posts and reorganizing the education of officials.166 With the establishment of the Lujun, the Bureau of Military Training introduced a nationally standardized organizational structure. However, military reformers considered reforming the administration and command of the army itself as crucial for increasing professionalism, standardization, and



occupational autonomy. In the context of the New Policy governmental and administrative reforms, the government created new institutions that were characterized by the attempt to centralize and compartmentalize at the same time.167 After the turn of the century, Yuan Shikai and the Beiyang Army created the Department for Military Administration (Junzhengsi), which was divided into three bureaus: military supplies (Bingbeichu) led by Duan Qirui, planning (Canmouchu) led by Feng Guozhang, and training (Jiaolianchu), led by Liu Yongqing.168 The Department for Military Administration later served as a blueprint for the Bureau for Military Training, founded in late 1903. Many staff members of the former institution also worked for the Bureau for Military Training, which consisted of a Department of Administration (Junzhengsi) led by Liu Yongqing, a Department of Command (Junlingsi) headed by Duan Qirui, and a Department of Education (Junxuesi) under Wang Shizhen.169 Each of the three departments encompassed four to six subsections that were, in turn, exclusively responsible for one aspect of establishing a uniform national army, such as personnel, quarters, supplies, legal and medical matters, strategy, cartography and reconnaissance, communication, education, and drill. Furthermore, the Bureau for Military Training sought to gain exclusive, centralized control over the manufacture, procurement, distribution, and maintenance of weapons and military technology.170 Yikuang and his two deputies, Yuan Shikai and Tieliang, a Manchu Bannerman, headed the Bureau.171 In 1906, the government created the Army Ministry (Lujunbu), which absorbed the old Board of War (Bingbu), the Imperial Stud (Taipusi), and the Bureau for Military Training. Although it did not include or replace all the various administrative bodies (such as the Banner Office) that had hitherto shared responsibility for different kinds of troops stationed in the metropolitan area or the provinces, the Army Ministry had exclusive and supreme authority over the New Armies.172 Tieliang became its first director. Two other Manchu, Shouxun and Yinchang, became vice-directors, and Yikuang acted as comptroller. It included a Council (Chengzhengting), a Secretariat (Canyiting), and ten departments (si), which were further subdivided into sections (ke) with specialized responsibilities.173 Because it was in charge of education and training of the army, the Army Ministry was responsible for all military schools, including the more general military preparation schools that already existed throughout the country.174 During the Qing Dynasty, military command was decentralized and separated from military administration. This was partly deliberate, to avoid the concentration of military strength, but also a result of the failure to establish a permanent central and exclusive military commanding institution. In 1733, the Yongzheng Emperor created the central Office for Military Secrets or Grand

36 Introduction

Council (Junjichu), but it quickly evolved into a privy council consisting of accomplished senior civilian officials.175 The new Army Ministry, on the other hand, included a Naval Council (Haijunchu) as well as a General Staff (Junzichu/Junzifu), which were supposed to function as the high command for the navy and the army, respectively.176 Already in 1901, Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi suggested establishing a General Staff based on the German and Japanese models. Initially, in 1906, it was only introduced as a minor bureau headed by Feng Guozhang, but in July 1909, the General Staff was removed from the jurisdiction of the Army Ministry and placed directly at the disposal of the emperor. It gained a considerable range of responsibilities such as military planning and strategic decision, education of staff officers, command over all staff and field officers, and the appointment of generals and other officers. However, the General Staff never had the same prominent status as its German or Japanese equivalents, due to the power struggles between Yuan Shikai and various other factions and individuals. According to James Hevia, the failure of the late Qing to establish a German-style General Staff was a significant reason why the Chinese military reforms were much less successful than the Japanese.177 Hevia and most other researchers deem the late Qing and early Republican military reforms as inadequate and I will return to the question of whether the reforms were a success or failure in the conclusion. notes 1. McCloy 1923, 2–3. At the time he authored these lines, Charles Harold McCloy was a secretary of the Department of Education of the National Council of YMCAs in China. He later became a professor for physical education at the University of Iowa. See Todd 1991. 2. On the First Sino-Japanese War or Jiawu War (Jiawu zhangzheng) 1894–1895, generally see Lone 1994 and Paine 2003. In Japan, the war is today referred to as the Japan-Qing War. In China, the term Second Sino-Japanese War is used for the conflict in 1937–1945 between the Nationalist and the Communist party on the one side and the Japanese Empire on the other. 3. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1. Zhang [1898] 1998, 9704 (the translation is taken from Hon 2002, 86–7). 4. See Elman 2004, 318–22. Scholars have long attributed the Qing defeat to scientific, technological, and institutional backwardness, including the lack of systematic military education, ineffective central command, insufficient internal communication, and particularism as, for instance, only troops and ships based in the northern coastal area participated in the war. See Rawlinson 1967, 198–204; Smith 1976; Smith 1978, 25–9. Chinese authors still share this perception. A recent book calls the war “the original defeat” and declares that it was the waking call for true modernization, which is still unfinished today. Shi and Zhang 2011. See also Han 2008. According to Allen



Fung, the guns and ships of the Qing and the Meiji Japanese forces were at least on the same level and the crucial factors for the Japanese victory were logistics and training, because the Qing soldiers were badly drilled, unskilled with their weapons, and lacked discipline and morale. See Fung 1996. An early Republican account sharing most of these arguments, emphasizing the lack of knowledge and organization in the field of naval warfare, is LX 1912, 2: Jiawu zhong ri zhanyi shuhou, 13–17. 5. Louie 2003, 9–11. Liang Qichao was the first to adopt the term “sick men” to describe Chinese men and their lack of physical qualities in 1903. See Xinmin congbao 1903, 29 (chapter 17). In the same year, the revolutionary Chen Tianhua similarly used the expression “sick men of East Asia” in his book An Alarm to Awaken the Age (Jingshizhong). In 1905, the author Zeng Pu chose the pseudonym “sick man of East Asia” when publishing his novel The Flower in the Vicious Sea (Niehaihua), which became very popular and contributed to the dissemination of the self-derogatory expression in China. See also Wagner 2011b, 57. 6. See Mann 2011, 169–85. 7. For surveys on this topic see Hinsch 2013, 6–7, chapter seven; Mann 2011, 99–117; King 2014, 12. See also Brook, Bourgon, and Blue 2008, 1–34; Ko 2005; Heinrich 2008; and Moskowitz 2013, chapter three. Many perceptions about “Chinese men” (and “Chinese culture”) seem to linger on in twenty-first century China, see Song and Hird 2014, 1–2. See also Vukovich 2013, chapter 1. 8. See Karl and Zarrow 2002. 9. I define military reformers broadly to include government officials, dynasty members, scholars, literati, writers, officers, and, to some extent, foreign advisors, who were interested in and dealt with the reorganization of the military and the governance of the New Armies. This group was in no way unanimous and involved people of various backgrounds and very different political intentions and associations. However, they all had a vested interest in rebuilding the military power of the state and in infusing society with military values, at least to a certain degree. 10. On late Qing domestic political struggles see Bays 1978 and Ma 1989. See also Xie 2009; Li and Zhong 1999; and Feng 1985. 11. The idiom derived from the fifth century Book of the Later Han (Houhanshu), which hinted at literati joining the army. A less literal, more common translation is “forsake the brush and enlist in the army.” See also McCord 1996, 798–99. 12. In this regard, military culture involves questions such as how are new members educated and trained, how are the specific mores and beliefs imprinted on soldiers and officers, and what is the social base and gender composition of the military? In this context, the term also represents the internal structure and hierarchies of the military as well as its relationship to other institutions, organizations, and social-economic structures. 13. On the definition of military culture see Wilson 1980; Hull 2005, 93–8; Wilson 2008; and Di Cosmo 2009a, 3–4. See also Lipp 2000 and Lorge 2005b. 14. Hull 2005, 98. 15. See particularly Fairbank 1974. Generally see also Porter 2009, who warns against resorting to “military orientalism” and discusses works such as Victor Hanson’s Carnage and Culture, which promote the idea of a “Western Way of Warfare.” See Hanson 2001.

38 Introduction

16. Lei [1939] 2001. 17. See Wang 1975. 18. Weber, Gerth, and Mills 1991, 422. Weber [1915] 1951, 30–2. 19. Lorge 2005a, 429–30. Early English-language participants in the debate, who already put forward many of the basic arguments for and against the idea of an a-military culture, include Creel 1935, Kotenev 1937; Lang 1939; Michael 1946; Fried 1952. On the debate see Di Cosmo 2009a; Kuhn 1970, 10–13; and Swope 2005, xi–xxxv. 20. Creel 1935, 338. 21. Dreyer 1972; Dreyer 2002. 22. Fairbank 1974, 9. 23. The pre- and early imperial classics were canonized as the Seven Military Classics (Wujing qishu) in the eleventh century. See Sawyer 2002. 24. See for instance Adelman and Shi 1993; Zhang and Yao 1996; Mott and Kim 2006. 25. Alastair Iain Johnston argues that the Ming leaders employed both a “parabellum approach” (the proactive preparation for war) and a “Mencian approach” (avoiding war through good government, after the doctrines of the Confucian philosopher Mengzi). Johnston 1998. For the strategic culture of the Qing period see Perdue 2009. 26. Waley-Cohen 2006. 27 On the idea of “Chineseness,” see for instance Yeh 2000 and Mitter 2008, 6–11. On the emergence of nationalism and the construction of a concept of nation in China at the turn of the century see also Duara 1995; Karl 2002. 28. Smith 1975, 113. First attempts to theorize “intercultural learning” in the military sphere are Kundrus and Walter 2012; Füssel 2012; and, for Europe, Aust and Schönpflug 2007a. 29. See Kirby 1997, 451. 30. In the case of Chinese history, few works explicitly theorize cross-culturality, biculturality, or transculturality, but see Huang 2000; Cohen 2009, 228–40; and Leutner 2006. 31. This formulation is used, for instance, in the Organization Plan for the New Army (Lujun zhilüe) from 1904, see Lianbingchu 1904, 1. Other examples are XBB 1905, 8: Geguo bingshuji; JJ 1908, 1: Geguo lujunkao. 32. See for instance, NBZ 1908, 27: Han Yingsu shang lujunbushu, 15. 33. Ven 1996, 747–48 (fn 26 and 27); Kirby 1984, 9. Wang Tao’s book manuscript was already widely known before it was printed in 1873. See Jing 2002, 66. Ever since, the Franco-Prussian War was referred to in military journals, memorials, and other writings as proof of German military strength and quality, even after the fall of the Qing Dynasty. See for instance NBZ 1908, 23: Geguo junshi, 22–3. LX 1912, 2 and 1913, 3: Jin Duo, Pufa zhanshi jieyao. 34. Guo and Yi 1994; You 1998; Jing 2002; Cui and Bai 2009. 35. Meng 2005, 48. 36. To be sure, it is an oversimplification, often used by Chinese military reformers, to speak of a German way of warfare or a German military style. After 1871, the German army consisted of the armies of the larger German states Prussia, Bavaria,



Wurttemberg, and Saxony as well as the Imperial Guards Corps. Efforts were made to align them along Prussian guidelines, yet “German military culture” was never static or uniform. On military culture in nineteenth-century Europe and the commonalities and difference between Germany and other countries see Hull 2005, 98–103. See also the contributions in Aust and Schönpflug 2007b. 37. Kaske 2002b, 83; Pi 1990, 38. On German military instructors and the German impact see also Kaske 2002a and Eberspächer 2008. There is still a lack of detailed research on individual Germans instructors and their experiences in China, particularly for the period from 1895 to 1911. In many cases, even the full names of these men are unknown. On the German engagement see also Zhang 1991; Wang 2004; Yu and Sun 2007. Case studies, biographies, or writings of the three Germans Gustav Detring, Constantin von Hanneken, and Georg Baur, who were close to Li Hongzhang or Yuan Shikai, are Schmidt 1984; Hanneken and Falkenberg 1998; and Baur and Kaske 2005. On the diplomatic and cultural relations between Prussia, the German Empire, and Qing China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century see Leutner and Mühlhahn 2001; Leutner 2006; Schrecker 1971; Ratenhof 1987; Lee 1966; Yü 1981; Eberstein 2007. 38. See for instance Su 1985. 39. Sun 2007, 66. 40. According to Shi, the manuals written by late Qing military reformers and officers, which were based on German and Japanese military doctrines, demonstrate the fusion of Chinese and “Western” military culture. Shi 1996, 47–48. 41. Reynolds 1993, 160. On War was subsequently retranslated many times and the first Chinese-German translation appeared in 1913, see Bauer and Hwang 1982, 439–40. Bauer provides an extensive list of translated (as well as Chinese authored, Germany-related) monographs and articles up to the 1980s. Ibid., 438–76. Generally, on the transfer of “Western” knowledge at the turn of the century, see Lackner, Amelung, and Kurtz 2001. See also Ch’en 1979a and Huters 2005. 42. Harnisch 1999, 48–59, 87–93; Gütinger 2004, 158–75; Meng 2005, 48–52. 43. Bonavia 1995, 40–59. 44. NBZ 1906, 5: Lianbingchu zi gesheng dufuwen, 2–4. Generally, see Huang 1994. 45. In late 1898, Zhang already send a group to inspect the Japanese army and attend its grand military exercise in Osaka. Li 2004b, 48, 51–2. 46. Many Chinese military students in Japan were influenced by the revolutionary ideas of Sun Yat-sen and his allies, which they secretly promoted among the New Armies and thus contributed to the downfall of the Qing in 1911. See Fung 1980. 47. In general, see Harrell 1992; Reynolds 1993, esp. 151–60; Fogel 1995; Fogel and Chung 2004. On the Japanese military during the Meiji era and its effects on Japanese society, see Hackett 1964; Fukushima 1965; Hackett 1971; Harries and Harries 1991; Shoji 2003. 48. The German public, too, viewed the Japanese army as Prussian-style army and sympathized strongly with the Japanese side during the war. See Wippich 2005. 49. Eventually, the reasons for switching to the German model were mostly political. The pro-German factions with the prominent and powerful statesman Itō

40 Introduction

Hirobumi gained the upper hand and this resulted in a short but extensive cooperation between Germany and Japan in various fields such as law and medicine. Legal advisors from Germany, for instance, were crucial in reworking the Japanese constitution. See Martin 1995. On the period in general see Jansen, Hall, and Shively 1989; and Kornicki 1998. 50. Presseisen 1965. 51. Although the majority of German instructors left the Qing Empire by the end of the century and were replaced by Japanese officers, a small number of Germans stayed in the service of the New Armies as academy teachers. In 1906, for instance, Zhang still had two German officers in his service. See Powell 1955, 231. 52. O’Brien 1979, 159–160; and Zhang [1898] 1998, 9738. 53. Bailey 1990, 146; Waldron 1991. In 1915, the German sinologist Otto Franke complained about the disturbing effect of allied propaganda on the Sino-German relations, see Franke 1915. 54. See Martin 1981; Sutton 1982. Generally on Sino-German relations before 1949, see Kirby 1984. 55. Lianbingchu 1904, 1. 56. Two concise discussions on the different approaches are Furth 2009 and Netzwerk Körper 2012. 57. To be sure, the body and physical experiences do not only exist as symbolical and cultural construction, but they possess a distinct and immediate materiality, which, however, can hardly be separated from discourse. See Sarasin 1999. The experience and interpretation of physical violence, pain, and pleasure, for instance, are subject to specific historical conditions and cultural codes. See for instance Tanner 1994 and Hommen 2000. On violence in early China, see Lewis 1990. Generally, on the history of the body see Foster 1995; Lorenz 2000; Porter 2004; and Alloa 2012. 58. Mauss 1979, 101. 59. Ibid., 115. 60. Ibid., 99–123. 61. See Bourdieu 1993 and Bourdieu 2002. 62. Brownell 1995, 11–13. 63. See for instance Parker 1996. Compare also DiCosmo 2004. 64. On disciplinary power and technologies of the body see Foucault [1975] 1979; Foucault and Gordon 1980, 158–59; and Ruoff 2007, 102–05,143–45. 65. For a critique of Foucault’s disciplinary power see, for instance, Certeau 1984; Furth 2009, 6; Lorenz 2000, 94–8. 66. Dean [1999] 2009, 1–8. 67. Foucault 1994, 237. 68. Kracht 2006, 2. 69. Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005, 22–3. 70. Martin 1988. 71. Foucault 1988, 18 (both quotes). 72. Michel Foucault first introduced the concept in a series of lectures held at the Collège de France in 1977 and 1978, and further developed it until his death in 1984. He never completed a comprehensive book on the topic. See Foucault 1991. On the



“analytics of government” or the question of “how we govern and are governed” see Dean [1999] 2009, 20–38, especially 23. Mitchell Dean pointed out that there is no one governmentality paradigm and Foucault’s original, but unfinished, concept has been extended in many directions and applied to numerous different fields. Dean [1999] 2009, 4. For two short articles on how to apply the concept to historical studies in different ways see Martschukat 2006 and Möhring 2006. 73. Foucault 1991, 102–3. 74. Foucault understood governmentality not only generally as the art of governance or organized practices and rationalities to govern the behavior of others or oneself. He also used it to refer to a specific modern European governmentality, which developed from the sixteenth century onward. The history of this governmentality, or governmentalization of the state, describes the evolution of modern state government in Europe since the late eighteenth century: from the changing sovereign power of a prince, the emergence of disciplinary power, to the development of biopower. See Gordon 1991 and Dean [1999] 2009, 98–112. 75. Dean [1999] 2009, 98–112; Miller and Rose 1990. 76. Foucault et al. 2010. 77. Butler 1993. 78. The Chinese case is a prime example of the gendered performance of roles. See Mann 2011, 113. 79. Connell 1995, 72. 80. Ibid., 45. Generally see also Laqueur 1990; Kühne 1996; Mosse 1996; Kimmel and Aronson 2004; Tosh 2004. 81. Martschukat and Stieglitz 2008, 42–3. 82. Connell 1995, 67–86. Connell argues that there is still “complicity” among all men, which secures patriarchal dominance. 83. See Frühstück and Walthall 2011a, 10–13. 84. Martschukat and Stieglitz 2008, 51. 85. A cross-cultural perspective on gender only recently became a topic for historians. See for instance; Connell 2009; Ineichen 2009; Yarrow 2011. See also Gilmore 1990. 86. Similar to earlier periods, gender arrangements during the Qing period strongly depended on family structures and perceptions of social roles rather than on notions about biological or natural sexes, which, at the most, were part of medical discourses. In the social realm, sexuality did not serve individual pleasure but the reproduction of the lineage. The access to marriage, which was necessary to produce legitimate offspring, was determined by social status. Within this framework, before the Republican period, women were usually regarded as daughters, wives, or mothers, and likewise, the social gender of men was defined by their roles either as son, husband, father or family head. The virtue of married and nubile women was highlighted by their seclusion from the public and their confinement to the “inner chamber” (nei). Men were expected to engage with the outside world (wai) to prove their virtue, establish bonds with other men, and continue the male line of their family. The strict spatial separation of the sexes, which had its roots in the division of labor established in antiquity (“men plow, women weave,” nangeng nüzhi), became a strong social ideal in the ritualized

42 Introduction

cosmos of the imperial period. The equivalent of the extreme “cloistered lady” (guixiu) was the figure of the “bare stick” (guanggun): a man unable to get married, establish a household, and maintain or extend his kin. Marriage and reproduction were essential for a man to fulfill his obligations toward his parents and to demonstrate his filial piety. The study of historically constructed concepts of masculinities in China is still a markedly neglected topic and little effort has been made to understand the social practices and representations of men as men. An increasing number of English-language studies seek to close this gap: generally, see Wasserstrom and Brownell 2002, 1–41; Mann 2011; Hinsch 2013; Song and Hird 2014, 1–27. For this paragraph, see also Barlow 1994; Furth 1999; Hinsch 2003. 87. Louie and Edwards 1994, 143. 88. Louie 2002, chapters 2 and 3. On Japan, see Hackett 1964, 329–31. 89. Louie 2003, 5. See also Wang 1975. 90. Louie 2003, 6. 91. Louie 2002, chapters 4 and 5; Kutcher 2000. Because sexuality was socially connoted with reproduction, homosexuality among men was less morally charged, compared to Europe and, generally speaking, tolerated as long as it remained a private matter. See, for instance, Hinsch 1990; Sommer 2002; Wu 2004. Samurai considered male love as “purer” and “more refined” than heterosexual love and sex, which was viewed as impaired by the need to reproduce. See Buruma 1984, 128. 92. Hinsch 2013, 92–4. 93. Lewis 1990, 112. See also Graff 2003, 165–66. 94. Davis 1996, chapter 5; Lo 1997; Lorge 2005a; Wyatt 2009. 95. Ryor 2009. See also Brook 2010, 186–212. 96. See Needham and Gawlikowski 2002, 1–100. 97. Gulik 1961, 294–96. 98. Jenner 1996. 99. Huang 2006, 1–9; Louie 2003, chapter 4. See also Furth 1988; Edwards 1994; Song 2004. 100. Wu 2003. 101. See also Mann 2011, 112–13. For cross-dressing and unstable gender boundaries, in general, see Connell 2009, 6. 102. Zarrow 2003. 103. Bret Hinsch introduces chosen concepts of masculinity in China from the Zhou period to the present. See Hinsch 2013. 104. For present-day China, see Hillman and Henfry 2006; Dautcher 2009. 105. On the gender of eunuchs, see Jay 1993. 106. See Liu 1967b; Louie and Edwards 1994, 138; Louie 1999, Hinsch 2013, 115–16. 107. Huang 2006, 15; Rowe 2009, 176–177. See also Hamm 2005, 11–23. 108. Boretz 2011, 47–57; McIsaac 2000; Jenner 1996. 109. Waley-Cohen 2009, 283. 110. Crossley 1994, 365. 111. Lo 1997, 1–2. Lo refers to Gerke Teitler to define professionalism among military officers, see Teitler 1977. The most important theoretical literature on the



topic includes Huntington [1957] 2002; Janowitz 1960; Finer and Stanley 2002. Honesty and the lack of corruption likewise were important indicators for professionalism. One strategy of military reformers to argue in favor of establishing New Armies was to denounce the established troops as corrupt. 112. Elliott 2002, 118, 121, 130. 113. See Meyer-Fong 2013, 67–8, 78; Hinsch 2013, 135. 114. Elliott 2002, 205–09. 115. Waley-Cohen 2006, 4–5. 116. Mann 2011, 7. 117. Investigating concepts of masculinity is complicated by the fact that they are “often elided in the equation of man with human and mankind, which conceals masculinity behind discourses of general interests and universality.” Dudink, Hagemann, and Tosh 2004, xii (emphasis in the original text). The same is true for Chinese history in which the signifier for people, a person or human beings is often reserved for men, whereas women are the “other.” See Hong 2004. 118. Lo 1997, 4; Lary 1985, 19, 83. See also Lary 2010, 54–5. 119. On the Banners, see Wu 1969; Crossley 1990; Rhoads 2000; Elliott 2001. 120. Unlike the Banners, little research has been done on the Green Standard Army, which might be the result of its fragmented structure. It is difficult to obtain accurate numbers of soldiers for either the Banners or the Green Standard Army but estimates are between 130,000 and 250,000 and around 600,000 men, respectively. The Green Standard Army, in any case, was nominally about three times larger than the Banner forces. See Luo 1984, Smith 1974; and still Wade 1851. 121. See Lococo 2002 and Di Cosmo 2009b. 122. Ven 2003. See also Pi 1991 and Michael 1949. 123. A huge problem appeared to be the fact that the actual number of Green Standard Soldiers was far below the fixed quotas and numbers that officers and military officials transmitted to the government. See Michael 1964, 39. See also Smith and Liu 1980 and Powell 1955, 3–19. 124. The Taiping were, at least initially, quite resourceful concerning military organization and superior to the Qing armies they encountered. See Yu 2002, which also includes a comprehensive analysis of the structure of the Hunan Army discussed below. 125. Spence 1969, 53–92. 126. The Hunan and Anhui Armies derived their name from the native province of most of their original officers. Their successors supplied a considerable part of the military force of the Qing Empire during several campaigns in the second part of the nineteenth century, including the Nian Rebellion (1851–1868) and the Sino-French War (1884–1885). See Luo 1939; Spector 1964; Smith 1974, 145–57; Wang 1987; Luo 1997a. Note that the different overall designations for regular and newly formed troops were not always consistent and clear. See Powell 1955, 38 (fn 51). 127. Kuhn 1970; Wang 1972; Liu 1974; McCord 1988. Since the 1860s, not only were Brave Battalions created, but both Banner and Green Standard troops were also reorganized. Selected Banner troops were transformed into the Divine Mechanism Battalion (Shenjiying), responsible for defending the capital. Based on the model of

44 Introduction

the Hunan and Anhui Armies, Green Standard Army troops were retrained and called Disciplined Forces (Lianjun). These forces, however, proved to be less reliable and effective than the Brave Battalions. See Rhoads 2000, 27; Powell 1955, 37–38. 128. The Self-Strengthening Movement is also labeled as the Westernization Movement (Yangwu yundong) and the period is referred to as the Tongzhi Restoration. See Wright 1962. 129. Elman 2004, 326. 130. While the Jiangnan Arsenal was strongly influenced by British instructors, the Fuzhou docks were dominated by French naval specialists. On the development of arsenals, military technology production, and a navy in nineteenth century China see Rawlinson 1967; Kennedy 1968; Kennedy 1969; Kennedy 1973; Hacker 1977; Pi 1993; Chu and Liu 1994; Luo 1997b, volume 2; Luo 1999, volume 6. For the significance of the arsenals as transmitters of knowledge see for instance Wright 1995; for their role in military education see Ayers 1971. The adoption of European military technology and interest in hiring European gunners in China already started in the fifteenth century. Even the Qianlong Emperor, famous for his allegedly ignorant rejection of the British ambassador Lord McCartney and his gifts, had a strong liking for astronomy, math, and military science introduced to him by Jesuits. See Waley-Cohen 1993 and Elliott 2002, 141–42. See also Lorge 2008. 131. Fung 1980, 1. See Horowitz 2002 for an analysis of the differences between the periods before and after 1895. See also Liu 2000 and Shi 2003. The first comprehensive examination of the New Armies in English was Ralph L. Powell’s The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895–1911. Powell served as a United States military analyst in China in the 1940s and his detailed study also counts as a seminal study on the late Qing military among Chinese-language researchers. Powell’s Chinese name is Laerfu Baoweier and the title of the book in Chinese is Zhongguo jun(shi) li(liang) de xingqi. See Powell 1955; and Zhang and Han 2006, 177. Other seminal studies include Fung 1980; Liu 1980; Luo 1997a; Luo 1997b; Luo 1999; Lai 2000; and Shi 2003. See also Hatano 1968; Wang 1995; Ven 1999. Early studies are Jiang 1923 and Wen 1932. One of the most important collections of official documents is Qingmo xinjun bianlian yange 1978. After 1895, the development of the navy was limited to the purchase of four sea-going ships from Germany and Britain. Only in 1909 did the Qing government start to revive the fleet. See Zhang 1982; and Rhoads 2000, 149–50. 132. On the Newly Created Army see Liu 1967a; Li 1992; and Zongli Yamen [1895–1900] 2005. Powell points out that the major innovations, compared to previous military organizations, were the centralized administration and supervision of vital issues such as the payment of salaries, supply of equipment, and more elaborate specialization of troops and staff officers as well as the training under combat conditions. See Powell 1955, 75–9. Yuan controlled a second army, the Vanguard Troops (Xianfengdui), stationed in Jinan, Shandong province, which consisted of 10,000 soldiers, less well-trained and less well-equipped than the Newly Created Army. See MacKinnon 1980, 28. 133. Biographies on Yuan include Ch’en 1972; Young 1977; and MacKinnon 1980. See also Young 1983. There are numerous collections of Yuan’s memorials and writings, for instance, an extensive 41-volume edition published by Shen Yunlong.



See Shen 1966. In both Chinese academia and the public, Yuan is usually depicted as a villain with political cunning, which largely neglects his role as a modernizing reformer. See for instance the novel Sandalwood Death by Mo Yan originally published in 2004, see Mo 2013. For an academic Chinese-language biography of Yuan Shikai see Hou 1994. 134. Zhang 1997. 135. Powell 1955, 82–85; Liu 1978. 136. See Thompson 2000; and Elliott 2002, chapter 7. 137. Powell 1955, 129–37; Fung 1980, 13–14. In 1907, some of these troops were transformed into the Patrol and Defense Force (Xunfangdui), see Fung 1980, 30–32. 138. On the organization and development of the Beiyang Army see Lai 2000; Wu 1987; MacKinnon 1973. For the original organizational plan see Yuan 2005. On financing the army, see Wou 1983 and Ven 1999. The splitting of the Beiyang Army was the result of power struggles and the attempt of Yuan’s political enemies within the Qing government to deprive him of influence. On Yuan and his political struggles with other factions at court and in the government see MacKinnon 1980, here chapter 5; Bays 1978; and Rhoads 2000. 139. Su 1976; McCord 1993, 40–41; Rhoads 2000, 188; Tong 2005. 140. On the perception of the Russo-Japanese War in China see also Müller 2008. 141. The (more or less) completed Beiyang divisions were assigned the numbers one to six. The Hubei New Army became the eighth division (the seventh division was to be the unfinished one in Jiangsu). Fung 1980, 20–21; Wang 1995, 81. 142. A division was supposed to have approximately 12,500 men, because this was the ideal size of an army, as bequeathed by the Zhou Dynasty (1046–256 BC). According to Edward L. Dreyer, not only this number but also the denomination of military units derived from the Zhou ideal. Dreyer 2002, 20. The names of Lujun units were also similar to the Green Standard Army. See also Zhang and Duanfang [1902] 2005, 217–18. 143. There is some debate about how many divisions existed by the end of the dynasty and whether these divisions reached their fully designated strength, especially since desertion became a substantial problem for the New Armies toward the end of the Qing period. See Ch’en 1960, 436; Worthing 2007, 80; Ven 1999, 45–48; Luo 1997b, 213–16. On the Lujun see also Cameron 1974, 88–99; Collier and Lai 1969. See also Liu 1980, whose book is a comprehensive account of the organization of the institutions involved in the late Qing military reform process. See also Kapp 1973 and Sutton 1980. Two general contemporary accounts are the short article titled The New Armies published in a military journal (selected from an unspecified newspaper) and a longer one titled The Army of My Country published in a general journal. NBZ 1907, 6: Lun xinjun, 18–22; and Guofengbao 1910 (1), 21: Zhu Wu, Wo guo de lujun, 47–74. 144. Other scholars have outlined the establishment of military academies and the military educational reforms during the late Qing in some detail and I will thus only summarize them briefly here. See Powell 1955, 180–84; Smith 1978; O’Brien 1979; Fung 1980, 62–76; Xue and Zhang 1991, 186–98; Su 1994; Wang 1997, 93–130. On Zhang Zhidong’s role see also Li 2001.

46 Introduction

145. Sun and Fan 2007. For the Naval Schools established during this time see Biggerstaff 1961, 200–51; Elman 2004. 146. Xue and Zhang 1991, 188–89. See also Hua and He 2009. 147. Ayers 1971, 106–21. See also Li 2001. 148. The entire educational process, from primary to high school, could be completed in 12 years. The quick-learning course took two years. Beiyang lujun wubei xuetang [c. 1902] 2005, 1–5. 149. MacKinnon 1980, 96–7; NBZ 1907, 6: Baoding shetong guo wubei xuetang, 6. See also Wang 1976 and Li 2008. A discussion (translated from the Japanese) of the importance of noncommissioned officers with regard to Germany and the PrussoFrench War is NBZ 1909, 30 (31): Liang xiashi yangchengfa, 5–13. 150. O’Brien 1979, 161; Dreyer 1995, 22. 151. See Powell 1955, 236; Fung 1980, 64. 152. Luo 1999, 69–70. 153. The requirements for entering a military primary or preparatory school resembled the regulations for the New Armies with respect to physical standards and background. The cadets should also have engaged in a certain amount of previous education, should be literate and genuinely inclined toward military affairs. There were no tuition fees and students were supposed to receive a small allowance but, due to the lack of funds, they usually only enjoyed free room and board, clothing, and school materials. See, for instance, Beiyang lujun wubei xuetang [c.1902] 2005, 23. 154. NBZ 1908, 23: Lujunbu zouding lujun zhongxuetang zhangchengzhe. The term used for natural sciences here was bowu. 155. Jacob Meckel, the Prussian officer who helped to rebuild the Japanese Army in the 1890s, had served as a professor at the Japanese Army Staff College. Like his books, which were all translated into Japanese, his numerous lectures had a profound and lasting impact on the Japanese officer corps. See Saaler 2005, 24; Presseisen 1965, 45–7, 96–7; Hevia 2012b. 156. Xue and Zhang 1991, 216–19. It continued to exist throughout the Warlord Period (1916–1928) and was taken over by the Nationalists in 1928. After the staff academy moved to Nanjing in 1932, German military officers served again as instructors there. See Sutton 1982, 390; Liu 1956, 84–89. Jiang Jieshi went to the Baoding school in 1906, before continuing his military education in Japan. 157. See O’Brien 1979, 175–78; Xue and Zhang 1991, 216–25; Luo 1999, 91–97. See also LX 1913, 3: Lujun junguan xuexiao tiaolie; Zhang and Sun 1987, 325–31. 158. Fung 1980, 66–68, 179; Luo 1999, 103–10; NBZ 1909, 34: Nanyang lujun jiangwutang zhangcheng. Most notable is the school in Yunnan, which existed from 1907 to 1927. Zhu De, later commander of the Communist People’s Liberation Army, was among its graduates. 159. Luo 1999, 24–25; Wang 1995, 82. 160. See Jiang 1987, 20 and Xu 1997, 83. For a collection of the most important decrees and regulations concerning military education and schools see the jiaoyu section in GX, chapter 8 (junzheng). 161. Powell 1955, 299. 162. Dreyer 1995, 34; Fung 1980, 69, 74–75; Huang 1994.



163. BZB 1910, 1: Junzichu jiqiu rencai. 164. After 1911, as was the case with other institutions, the nomenclature of military units, ministerial departments, and military schools changed. O’Brien 1979, 164; Fung 1980, 250. 165. For instance, ZBZ 1915, 21: Lujun jiaoyuling zhi chengxu. 166. Will 2004, 38. 167. On the reforms in general see Morrison 1959; Ichiko 1980; Liew 1985; Thompson 1995; Rankin 1997; Horowitz 2003; Rankin 2008. See also Cameron 1974; Reynolds 1993. On the role of leading intellectuals see Levenson 1959; Chang 1971; Chang 1987. 168. Powell 1955, 141–42; Fung 1980, 38–9; MacKinnon 1980, 91. 169. The Department of Military Organization was then renamed as Bureau for the Supervision of Training (Xinjun Beiyang Dulianchu or simply Dulianchu) and served as the role model for similar bureaus in other provinces, which were called Dulian gongsuo. See Fung 1980, 38–40. The Bureau for the Supervision of Training overshadowed and engrossed the new Bureau for Military Training, because the same people, mostly Yuan’s lieutenants and confidants, were responsible for similar functions in both departments. The former chief of staff of the Newly Created Army, Xu Shichang, acted as a senior supervisor, making Yuan Shikai’s influence on the new Bureau and military reforms all the more obvious. See MacKinnon 1973, 408; Rhoads 2000, 82–3. Note that some Brave Battalions already had their own bureaucracies, often congruent with the staff of the officials who led them. See Porter and Tseng 1972. 170. On the arms production see also Luo 1999, volume 6; Wang 1963. 171. Tieliang was one of the first military students sent to Japan in 1900, and he was originally a protégé and close ally of Yuan. Their children were married to each other and, together, Yuan and Tieliang were in charge of turning selected Banner soldiers into a Lujun division. However, the power struggles between the two later turned their friendship into enmity. In 1904–1905, Tieliang and his German advisor, Heckmann, a former employee of the Krupp Company, made a tour to inspect the status of the Lujun. At the time, the demands for a stronger military as well as a more efficient government taking care of national security were at their height, especially due to the Russo-Japanese War that took place at the same time. Therefore, the Chinese media covered the tour, as well as Tieliang’s criticism of the slow progress of implementation, extensively. See Fung 1980, 56; Rhoads 2000, 102. 172. An account introducing, among other aspects about Germany, the system of military schools in Prussia, is Yang 1907. The creation of the Army Ministry was linked to the power struggles between Yuan Shikai and his rivals around Tieliang, who unsuccessfully sought to deprive him of his influence. See Ichiko 1980. 173. On the new military bureaucracy and command organization see Brunnert and Hagelstrom 1910, 138–47; Liu 1980, 224–28; Luo 1997b, 243–47. For the institutional organization of the army prior to the reforms see also Mayers 1897. 174. NBZ 1907, 6: Wubei xuetang bu li xuebu, 11. 175. Smith 1974, 126–30. On military administration and command in late imperial China see also Dreyer 1972, 4–7.

48 Introduction

176. Because, after 1895, there was hardly a navy to speak of, the Naval Council played a very minor role. 177. Hevia 2012b. Other contemporary accounts on the creation of staff officers according to German and Japanese role models include NBZ 1907, 14: Canmou fuwu and JJ 1908, 1: Canmouguan zhiwu de yi ji.

Chapter 1

Forging the Male Body Drill in the New Armies

[For] governing soldiers, discipline comes first.1 Detailed and Illustrated Manual for Instruction and Drill, 1899

The regulations governing the army in the early Qing and previous dynasties as well as most classical military treatises and manuals emphasized that observing strict discipline (jilü or junji) was the foundation of leading an army successfully. After the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895, the notion of discipline and the technologies available to discipline men changed dramatically. Military reformers such as Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong increasingly focused on conditioning and improving the physical bodies of soldiers and viewed physical drill as essential for military discipline and the source of a powerful and effective army. They viewed a strong, well-disciplined and well-regulated body as essential for developing a new kind of military man and new Western-style armies. Following German role models, they systematically introduced German drill methods (caofa) to train and align soldiers, including military gymnastics, the meticulous regulation of individual posture and gait, group exercises, and collective movement. Military gymnastics or ticao, which included apparatus gymnastics, “free exercises,” and group calisthenics, became particularly significant in the emerging New Armies for training soldiers to be both fit and obedient. Exercise was thought to strengthen group cohesion and increase the courage, self-confidence, morale, and martial spirit of the troops. It prepared the soldiers for marching in step and assuming closed tactical formations, which military reformers considered as vital for modern warfare. Besides German and other foreign instructors, Chinese military reformers drew on a large number of newly produced drill manuals to introduce new drills and exercises to govern both the physical 49


Chapter 1

constitution and mental attitude of rank and file soldiers. Along with photographs of exercising soldiers, these manuals, and other military texts, such as drill codes and military journal articles, created an image of fit and disciplined men as opposed to the “sick men of East Asia.”

German Military Gymnastics in China In his comprehensive, strongly German-influenced New Book on Military Science (Bingxue xinshu), published in 1899, Xu Jianyin demanded that the military reject men who were “not familiar with discipline” and whose “mind and physique are not stable” (xin li wei qi).2 Concerning those who had been weighed, measured, and found wanting, he wrote: Recruits joining the army [must] first train the strength of their hands and feet, to make the feet quick, the body light, and prevent the arms from trembling when holding a gun. Firstly, without a weapon, [recruits should] move their arms and legs frequently up and down, flex the body, and use dumbbells to work out.3

Xu was an official concerned with establishing an army modeled on foreign forces and improving basic military training. In 1878, he became an attaché at the embassy in Berlin and, during his time in Germany, he traveled to Britain, France and other European countries to learn how their military forces were organized and about the military industry in general. In 1898, he became head of the military administration of Hubei province under Zhang Zhidong and he began to write down his experiences and knowledge of European military affairs. His book broadly dealt with all aspects of soldiering, including recruitment and military gymnastics.4 Apart from introducing exercises at the horizontal bar (muzha), Xu offered few precise descriptions of how exactly soldiers were supposed to train to improve their strength or “jump over walls and ditches, nimble and light like a monkey,” as he described the goal of such exercises.5 However, the physical exercises he referred to were part of a range of exercises originating mostly from German gymnastics, with and without apparatuses, as well as less rigorous Swedish calisthenics. Generally referred to as ticao, these forms of physical exercises were introduced rather haphazardly to the Qing Empire by Christian missionary schools and military organizations from the 1870s onward. The term ticao (literally physical drill) was adopted from the Japanese term taisō, which was coined in the early Meiji period (1870s) to encompass the English expressions “gymnastics” and “physical exercise.”6 Effectively, ticao was associated with military drills and military discipline almost from the beginning and it is reasonable to translate it here as “military

Forging the Male Body


gymnastics.” The first Chinese soldiers to have contact with these Europeanstyle exercises were soldiers from some of the Brave Battalions as well as the men serving in the newly-raised mercenary armies under foreign command in the 1860s and 1870s, such as in the Ever Victorious Army.7 Although the Qing scholar Wang Tao had promoted the introduction of “Western” military training as early as the 1840s, the mercenaries were the first to be exposed to different forms of foreign military drills, which included physical exercises and were conducted by British, French, American, Japanese, and German instructors. Physical exercises were introduced more systematically at the first military academies such as in Tianjin, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, and Shanghai, which were founded in the 1880s and early 1890s. Military gymnastics at these academies were an important part of the curriculum and taught mostly by Germans and Japanese, but also by other European drillmasters. After the Sino-Japanese War, when German military organization became standard in the New Armies, German military gymnastics was used as the foundation of military training. It became the dominant form of ticao exercises and thus facilitated the adaptation of the concept of disciplining both body and mind through physical exercise.8 In the German army, gymnastics were considered to be a “purposeful” and “indispensable instrument for the military education of both the individual and the physique and spirit of the masses.”9 Military instructors, doctors, and theoreticians viewed the drilling of close-order formations as fundamental to infantry training. Formation drills depended on individual physical education, which was based on exercises without a weapon as well as the sufficient development and preparation of the physical constitution or “muscles and bones.” Martin Kirchner, for instance, argued that the whole body of a recruit had to be strong enough to endure a military drill before he was capable of starting active service. He referred particularly to the expression “muscles and bones,” which was also used by many German-influenced Chinese military manuals produced after 1895 (Chinese: jingu, similarly meaning “physique”), to emphasize the organic wholeness of the body and the link between build, strength, and perseverance.10 Already in 1869, Carl Kirchner, chief staff surgeon in the Prussian army, noted that gymnastics not only improved the strength and dexterity of a soldier and thus enabled him to observe his duties but also equipped him with confidence in his own abilities. He called this the “moral element” of exercise.11 The German Gymnastics Regulation for the Infantry (Turnvorschrift für die Infantrie) from 1895 stated that gymnastics would both “improve strength, agility and perseverance” and “arouse and increase courage, determination and self-confidence.”12 According to Colonel Gustav von Dresky, head of the Prussian Military Institute for Gymnastics (Militär-Turnanstalt) in Berlin, gymnastics gradually gave the soldiers self-assurance and an energetic will.13


Chapter 1

Some years earlier, another Prussian military doctor, Max Rudeloff, noted in the same vein that any muscle activity was governed by volition, which increased with the physical constitution and agility of a man. He claimed that military gymnastic exercises enhanced the ambition and drive of soldiers but also taught them to pace themselves and become used to obeying orders.14 German military doctors viewed the physical constitution of a soldier, including strength and stamina, to be directly linked to individual health and hygiene. For this reason, military gymnastics and drills were an important topic in both drill books and military hygiene manuals. The latter dealt with any aspect concerning the body, from the medical examination and natural physical disposition of a recruit to the all-embracing hygiene and medical regulations of the army, which were concerned with the environment, barracks, nutrition, uniforms, bacteriology, mycology (the science of fungi), and any imaginable kind of infectious disease.15 Military doctors considered physical exercises as essential for the development and maintenance of military preparedness because they strengthened the body and kept it healthy. According to Carl Kirchner, gymnastics could help overcome or at least lessen the physical shortcomings of new recruits and easily redress their lack of “muscularity.”16 He argued that the best and quickest way to increase individual physical capabilities was systematic, constant and scientifically guided exercise that acknowledged the organic nature of the body and took into account the blood circulation, respiration, and metabolism.17 Moreover, he claimed that the invention of gunpowder and the ascendancy of the rifle had caused bodily fitness to be neglected. Stamina and a strong constitution could only be achieved with physical exercises, which were “now essential for military training in every army.” Thus, in the Prussian army, Kirchner pointed out, gymnastics with and without weapons had been practiced since 1842 and originated from the physical exercises developed and practiced by the popular gymnastics movements in Sweden and Germany, which were in vogue from the early nineteenth century on.18 Following the ideas of German gymnastics educators, military doctors and army instructors, late Qing military reformers adopted German physical exercises to improve both the physical constitution and vigor of soldiers.19 They particularly considered group calisthenics (“free and order” exercises, free exercises, or Freiübungen) as an effective instrument to discipline men physically and mentally, and make them receptive for internalizing tactical formations and doctrines. In their view, German military gymnastics was “modern,” globally in vogue, and superior to any other known form of physical exercise and military basic training. Fighting techniques or martial arts, which were known in China as “boxing” (quan) since the twelfth century, were considered as a basic skill of soldiers during the Qing era to train hand and foot coordination, agility, and the use of weapons. However,

Forging the Male Body


for establishing New Armies, foreign training and exercise methods seemed much more effective, complete, and integrated. Military gymnastics indeed had an enormous potential to discipline, align, and prepare men for tactical drills. It combined individual self-discipline and self-improvement with the cohesiveness and effectiveness of the military unit in an unprecedented way. “Chinese martial arts,” on the other hand, only started to become a factor in the 1910s, as Chapter 6 will show in more detail.20 Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong were the first to systematically apply German military gymnastics for basic military training. In both the Newly Created Army and the Self-Strengthening Army, the first New Armies established after the Sino-Japanese War, group calisthenics and apparatus gymnastics were first taught by German drillmasters. Instructions for and explanations of the various exercises were collected in drill codes and manuals so that they could be studied and led by Chinese instructors and officers. Military reformers supported or initiated the publication of numerous such manuals and drill codes, which were based on German military knowledge or were partial translations of German military books and which offered practical guidance and precise instructions on physical exercises. The purpose of these manuals was standardizing and disseminating new German-style military gymnastics and drills among the New Armies and promote the idea of linking the physical and mental constitution, exercise, and military discipline.21 For Zhang Zhidong, who was masterminding the establishment of the Self-Strengthening Army, improving the physical aptitude of the soldiers was one of the fundamental goals of military drill.22 German instructors should train the men in the “different kinds of ticao from Europe, which [would] invigorate the muscles and bones and increase the mental vigor.”23 The collection Western Drill of the Self-Strengthening Army (Ziqiangjun xifa leibian), a comprehensive military manual strongly influenced by German drill methods and military theory and first published in 1898, introduced “various gymnastics exercises” (ticao ge fa), such as free exercises for flexing and stretching of the head, arms, legs, and upper body.24 One chapter, entitled the Six Rules of German Military Training (Deguo lianbing zhangcheng liu tiao), emphasized that only after physical exercises and a few other basic lessons had been internalized, should soldiers start with gun drill and the training of close unit formations.25 The Western Drill of the Self-Strengthening Army was compiled by Shen Dunhe, a native of Zhejiang province, who graduated in political science and law at the University of Cambridge and later served in the administrative section of the Self-Strengthening Army. After returning from England, Shen became an instructor at the language college and the naval school in Nanjing and subsequently joined the armament department of the Self-Strengthening


Chapter 1

Army in Wusong.26 Between 1895 and 1898, he published numerous military books that were based on or directly introduced the German role model. The topics of these books included military organization, regulations, tactics, and training methods as well as the latest developments in Germany concerning weapons technology, military engineering, intelligence, geology, and other related sciences. Notable among Shen’s various publications was the Description of the German Military System (Deguo junzhi shuyao), which was originally written by the head of the German advisory group to the Self-Strengthening Army, Albin von Reitzenstein, a lieutenant-colonel of the artillery in the Prussian army. Reitzenstein was employed by Zhang Zhidong to head of the largest contingent of German military advisors in the Qing Empire, which consisted of 35 commissioned and noncommissioned officers.27 The Description of the German Military System introduced the organization, command structure, financial administration, academy education, general logistics, weapons, military intelligence, engineering, recruitment practices, food and clothing, living conditions, and sanitary regulations of the German military. Shen cotranslated the book with the Chinese-speaking German Heinrich Hildebrandt, an engineer temporarily in the service of Zhang Zhidong, who was involved in various railway construction projects throughout China for both the German and the Qing government. Although the Description of the German Military System did not include a detailed account of training methods, the book emphasized the substantial importance attributed to military gymnastics in German military academies for providing the bodies of cadets with “completely healthy and strong muscles and bones.”28 Similar to the Self-Strengthening Army, the Newly Created Army under the command of Yuan Shikai employed German advisors and drillmasters to instruct the troops in German army drill and military gymnastics. “For training troops,” Yuan wrote in the memorial presenting the Record of Military Planning to throne, “[it is necessary] to systematically copy German regulations.”29 The Record of Military Planning combined the German-modeled Newly Created Army’s statutes, organization scheme, and drill manual and included instructions on physical exercises that should “invigorate the muscles and bones” (huodong jingu) and strengthen all individual parts of the body.30 The most detailed instruction on military gymnastics for the New Armies were included in the extensive Detailed and Illustrated Manual for Instruction and Drill (Xunlian caofa xiangxi tushuo, henceforth: Detailed and Illustrated Manual), which emphasized that, although new recruits had to already possess a strong physical constitution, their bodies were still expected to be “stiff.” For this reason, they should “use all kinds of methods of stretching and extending to invigorate the limbs (zhiti). […] When the limbs are agile

Forging the Male Body


[only then] can other methods [of drill] be learnt,” as the manual stated at the beginning of the section on gymnastics.31 As in the case of Xu Jianyin’s New Book on Military Science, the gymnastics (or calisthenics) exercises in the Detailed and Illustrated Manual were strongly influenced by Prussian/ German military gymnastics and it was the single most important drill manual produced for the New Armies during the late Qing and early Republican military reforms. It was originally edited by Yuan Shikai in 1899 for the Newly Created Army and co-authored by some of his most trusted lieutenants, including Feng Guozhang, Wang Shizhen, and the German-educated Duan Qirui. Showing the influence of both German military advisors and other German-influenced military writings, it was the first comprehensive manual designed for practical use, comprising twenty-two volumes dealing with infantry, cavalry and artillery drills, gun drills, tactics, cantonment, engineering, construction, intelligence, cartography, and military gymnastics in detail.32 The Detailed and Illustrated Manual emphasized that improving both the vigor and stamina of soldiers was an essential and fundamental component of military training. An individual soldier represented the smallest unit of the military and his body was viewed as the constitutive substance of the army and of the overall military strength. The body itself was described as a weapon that should not be neglected in favor of mere gun practice and the use of technology. The manual stated: The soldier is like a sword. The value of the soldier’s body lies in its strength, the value of the sword lies in its hardness. Soldiers train to become strong; swords are forged (duanlian) to become hard.33

The sword-like forging of the body should be from “head to toe.” Physical exercise should increase the strength of the soldier, relax his muscles (jin shu), and make his movements brisk and nimble. Similarly, the senses should be trained to improve the soldier’s vision and hearing—not only to increase his effectiveness on the battlefield but also to make him quicker in responding to commands. Drill should enable the men to withstand wind and weather, endure hardships, and bear hunger and thirst. According to the manual, “everyone’s body (renren shenti) has to be prepared well for hard fighting.”34 Not only the body but also the will should be “steeled” by physical exercises.35 Apart from enhancing the physique of soldiers, the Detailed and Illustrated Manual emphasized that “ordering heart and will” (qi qi xin zhi) was crucial and as important as physical strength for individual discipline. Enduring hardships, for instance, could not only be mastered by a robust body alone, but by an inseparable linking of mental and physical prowess. Gymnastics should increase both the strength and self-confidence of the men


Chapter 1

and combine individual achievement and self-control with military discipline and national military power. In the eyes of Yuan and other military reformers, drilling the physical body always went hand in hand with the inculcation of loyalty, obedience, and a martial spirit: “Transforming the body and mind of common soldiers (shizubing shenxin) opens up endless advantages. The benefits are without limits.”36 Calisthenics or free exercises were performed in relatively smaller groups and the soldiers moved and changed postures according to the commands of the drill instructor. This way, the exercises were synchronized and the discipline and cohesion of the group would be guaranteed. The Detailed and Illustrated Manual described a full choreography of various exercises, including illustrations to visualize the individual postures and motions (see Figure 1.1): independent of the size of the group, everyone had to stand one step apart from the next person. In the basic, upright standing position, both hands were placed on the hips. The feet had to be positioned at a ninetydegree angle to each other, forming the inversion of the Chinese character for the number “eight” (ba 八), similar to the letter “v.” Following the command of the instructor or group leader, the soldiers had to slowly stand up on their toes, while keeping their eyes straight and their legs steady. Subsequently, the legs had to be bent downward and the knees moved away from each other to reach a squatting position. After the knee bends, the manual explained in detail the exercises that followed. These included, successively, the lifting and bending of the upper left and right legs, the full stretching of each leg in the air as well as various other exercises for the legs, thighs, the complete upper body, neck and head. Special exercises for the arms and hands were also part of the group calisthenics: first, the arms had to be fully extended forward, the elbows then bent so that the forearms pointed upward, the hands turned with the palms facing each other, and then the arms had to be moved back to the original constellation in reverse order. This was followed by similar exercises in which the arms were drawn out to the side or completely stretched upward. Finally, the soldiers had to perform jumps from a squatting position. All these exercises followed a leader-directed call and response routine.37 Once new recruits were well versed in free group calisthenics, corresponding exercises with the gun followed, the wuqiang (rifle brandish), which also included several exercises for two people. These exercises did not involve shooting and aiming practice, which followed later, but were supposed to strengthen hands, arms, legs, feet, and the backs of the soldiers to prepare them for carrying and using a gun in general. Instructors admonished the recruits to view the gun as both an extension of the body and the ultimate instrument to protect it. The soldiers should thus make themselves well acquainted with their rifles.38

Forging the Male Body

Figure 1.1  Squat, Lunge, Stretch, Lift. Source: Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 289–297.



Chapter 1

According to the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, every new recruit was supposed to complete three month of basic preparatory drill before joining the regiment. The first ten days were exclusively scheduled for physical exercises in order to improve the physical shape of the new recruits. Afterward, the soldiers learned basic steps, movements, and commands for the close unit drill. All soldiers had to exercise with the horizontal bar every three days, and, in their spare time, they were to also work out “regularly to improve the strength of their arms and legs.”39 Xu Jianyin similarly suggested that new recruits should constantly practice with the dumbbells for the first fifteen days after they enlisted and subsequently train with them every three days. For a period of three years, which was later taken as the basic time of active service for any soldier, they should exercise and especially train the one arm they used mostly for handling and using their gun.40 In the beginning, the Detailed and Illustrated Manual noted, the bodily drill of new soldiers should not be too severe and demanding, and instructors should be lenient toward recruits, albeit without allowing them to act at will or violate the army regulations. Leniency at this stage of physical exercise was important “to prevent [the training] from being too excessive and harming the limbs.”41 Apart from group calisthenics or free exercises, rifle exercises, and apparatus gymnastics, other forms of exercises that were part of the German military gymnastics were added to the basic training curricula of the New Armies. In the German army, physical education included exercises which made use of various machines and apparatuses (Rüstübungen or Gerätübungen) as well as the so-called applied gymnastics (angewandtes Turnen), which consisted of running, jumping, climbing, and various techniques for overcoming obstacles such as walls, fences, or ditches. Applied gymnastics was performed either without or with weapons or equipment.42 In 1900, Theodor H. Schnell (Ruinai’er) and Xiao Songfen published the highly illustrated Methods of German Military Gymnastics (Deguo wubei ticaofa), which comprised instructions on weapons drill, techniques to overcome any kind of obstacle, exercises at the horizontal bar, as well as explanations and illustrations of various other training devices.43 This manual was a translated compilation, with Schnell being responsible for the verbal interpretation (kouyi), while Xiao put the content down in proper written Chinese (bishu). It was, at least partly, based on one or more unspecified German sources, which probably included the German Gymnastics Regulations for the Infantry. The manual included a second, attached volume titled Common Japanese Gymnastics (Riben putong ticaoxue) that introduced exercises with the dumbbells and other equipment, as taught in Japanese middle schools. It was the translation of a Japanese manual for schoolteachers and instructors.44 Apart from a stand-alone version, which appears to have been published by the Tianjin Military Academy in 1900, both volumes were

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incorporated into a collection of translated books on German military knowledge released by the Hubei Military School in the same year. Both the Hubei New Army and the Beiyang Army used Schnell’s manual for instructing German military gymnastics.45 Schnell was a Prussian artillery sergeant who arrived in the Qing Empire in the early 1870s as an advisor for the Krupp Company, the world’s leading heavy artillery gun manufacturer. He was subsequently employed as an instructor at the Tianjin Military Academy, where he became a teacher of Duan Qirui. Schnell took Duan to Germany in 1889, together with a group of Chinese military cadets. Both Schnell and Duan were artillery officers and together they wrote an Illustrated Description of the Krupp Canon (Kelubupao tushuo), which was published in 1890. Apart from other books on guns and artillery, Schnell authored, in Chinese, a book on German military organization, titled Planning the Formation of China’s Military Preparedness (Niqing Zhongguo yanzheng wubeishuo), which was published in 1897.46 Physical drill, Schnell emphasized at the beginning of the Methods of German Military Gymnastics’ first part, “make the bodies (shen) of the weary and weak tough, and the four limbs and one hundred bones of the tough strong[er].”47 He went on: [All] vigor derives from it, and a nimble body can endure hard work […]. Moreover, [ticao] bolsters the courage and steadies the heart […]. If the soldiers get into difficulties, they will be more self-confident, and won’t have any doubts and fears.48

In other words, bodily exercises not only served to increase the physical but also the mental strength of the soldiers, by stabilizing and increasing their will power, spiritedness, and self-confidence. Schnell’s notion of exercising mirrored the approach of German military doctors and instructors who acknowledged gymnastics’ extremely positive psychological effects. He demanded constant and regular training that soldiers should not neglect at any point. Only when they exercised frequently could they (and the army) fully benefit from ticao. New recruits should be introduced to military gymnastics carefully, by gradually increasing the exercises’ intensity and level of difficulty. Similar to the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, he warned against overly excessive drill. After completing a fixed period consisting of the basic, daily drill exercises—which, Schnell stated, was twelve weeks for new recruits in Germany—he recommended that both the physical and mental strength (shenli and xinli) of every soldier be tested and to arrange the recruits into three qualitative levels accordingly.49 For the exercises themselves, Schnell recommended wearing tight-fitting clothes, to make the body more flexible and faster.50 Basic, “empty-handed


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calisthenics” (kongshou ticao) included stretching and flexing exercises for the head, upper body, arms and legs. Furthermore, the manual offered instructions on how to jump and run. First, the new recruits should practice individually before they participated in guided group calisthenics. Schnell stipulated that only one part of the body should be trained at a time, stressing the systemized, controlled, and non-erratic sequence of the training. Apart from basic military training, ticao should be the “foundation” for all those who studied at a military preparatory school. “How can one not [want to] invigorate his muscles and bones,” he rhetorically concluded, “[as it] means to clear one’s vital energy and blood?”51 The second part of the Methods of German Military Gymnastics covered basic lessons on gun drill. The exercises described were supposed to increase the strength of the shoulders and back, and were designed for using either one or both arms.52 The third part introduced the horizontal or high bar, which was made popular in Germany by the spearhead of the popular gymnastics movement, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, and which was favored by German military educators and instructors who considered it as a relatively safe apparatus.53 Schnell described and illustrated chin-ups, upswings, various balance-improving exercises and many others gymnastics techniques, which could all be performed at the horizontal bar in order to “daily increase […] the strength of arms and legs.” The exercises, he wrote, were especially important “to influence the flexibility and health of the soldiers, [and increase their] self-assurance, courage, and determination.”54 The third part, moreover, introduced climbing and other exercises that made use of a rope. This led to the next part of the manual, dealing with overcoming any kind of obstacle such as walls and slopes, which could be crossed by jumping, using ropes, or with the assistance of one or more other soldiers.55 Finally, Schnell provided illustrations and explanations of various gymnastic apparatuses, from the springboard to huge wooden constructions with bars and cables. These constructions could be either used to perform gymnastics or simply serve as obstacles or climbing devices.56 Sometime after the publication of the Methods of German Military Gymnastics, the Education Bureau of the Beiyang Army Department for Training and Instruction (Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu xuewu) launched a small handbook on military gymnastics with the simple title Gymnastics Methods (Ticaofa). It represented a catechism of 398 articles that summarized the Chinese military reformers’ knowledge of military gymnastics, including instructions on both light calisthenics (rouran ticao) and apparatus gymnastics (qixie ticao).57 Every exercise, including those using gymnastics apparatuses and equipment, was illustrated by drawings similar to those in the Detailed and Illustrated Manual. “Ticao,” the authors of the book initially stated, “is an excellent method to boost drill and is the way to protect the soldier’s life.”58 In other

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words, the well-being and further education of the men depended on military gymnastics, which was viewed as the key to both achieving a strong physique and keeping healthy. According to the handbook, light calisthenics not only “strengthens the body, develops the four limbs and invigorates the organism, [but] its purpose is [also] to free the vital energy and blood (shuchang qixue) and create a valiant and heroic demeanor (sashuang yingzi).” New recruits would suffer from “strained hands and legs” and “sluggish muscles and bones” but, with instruction and training, any physical ailment (tipi) could be rectified at any point.59 The light calisthenics section introduced exercises such as knee bends, the bending of the upper body or stretching of the limbs, as well as guidelines and time/distance tables for running exercises. Furthermore, it specified the commands for leader-directed group exercises and recommended performing these with a maximum group size of five soldiers.60 Apparatus gymnastics, which was detailed in the second part of the handbook, aimed at “increasing the soldiers’ muscular strength, making their bodies nimble, nurturing their vivacity (yangcheng qi huopo) and endowing them with a courageous spirit (yonggan zhi qi).”61 Furthermore, gymnastics would open the blood vessels (mailuo changshu). Soldiers should always exercise with their full heart and, ideally, group calisthenics and apparatus gymnastics should be combined in the training schedule. Similar to German manuals, the Beiyang Army’s Ticaofa included a tabular schedule for a period of three years, which specified the time when new recruits had to start with a certain apparatus gymnastics exercise. Included were climbing, jumping, and balance exercises on apparatuses such as the horizontal bar and double bars, the balance beam, the vaulting horse, or the still rings. A section on “special exercises” (tebie yanxi) additionally explained acrobatic postures such as handstands on different apparatuses.62 These special exercises were not necessarily part of the regular training of the soldiers but were performed at special occasions to demonstrate the skill and achievements of the New Armies. For instance, the annual national war games of the Lujun, which were first organized in 1905, did not only consist of a joint army training but also of gymnastics and drill performances, turning them into large “sport tournaments,” according to the historian Li Ning.63 This practice, however, was contested by an article in the Nanyang Military Journal in 1906, which criticized that apparatus gymnastics had become a merely “decorative training exercise” (zhuangshi de jiaolian). The author admitted that gymnastics exercises surely strengthened the body of the soldiers, rectified their posture, caused their movements to become agile and made them persevering and courageous. But too much emphasis on individual apparatus gymnastics at the expense of tactical combat drill resulted in the neglect of the idea of a cohesive unit, which military leaders generally viewed essential for contemporary warfare.64


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Figure 1.2  “Light Calisthenics” (rouran ticao). Calisthenics was considered to be the best way of making the bodies of soldiers more flexible and counted as an excellent tool for creating group cohesion and discipline. The picture shows a relatively small group, which seems to be divided further, under the watchful eyes of instructors and officers. Source: Zhu 1911.

Figure 1.3  “Infantry Light Calisthenics” (bubing rouran ticao). Source: Zhu 1911.

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Figure 1.4  “Apparatus Gymnastics” (qixie ticao). Soldiers performing handstands on the vaulting horse. Acrobatic exercises were not recommended by German military doctors and were usually only used in the New Armies to demonstrate the excellent physical shape and body control of the men. Source: Zhu 1910.

Figure 1.5  “Infantry Apparatus Gymnastics” (budui qixie ticao). Zhu 1910. Soldiers in drill uniforms exercising on some kind of high bar apparatus. Aesthetic performances were part of the special exercises practiced for tournaments, reviews, or the camera. In a way, gymnastic performances replaced the “burlesque” (Emory Upton) drill parades of the Banners forces (see Chapter 3). To the far right: soldiers receiving instructions for the uneven bars. Source: Zhu 1910.


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Recruitment In the view of late Qing military reformers, physical exercises and the meticulous drilling of soldiers should be preceded by the careful selection of new recruits. They propagated strict standards for the recruitment of rank and file soldiers for the New Armies and emphasized the importance of an excellent physical constitution. Acceptance into the established regular forces of the Qing Empire, the Banner troops and the Green Standard Army, in contrast, was based more on ethnical or hereditary criteria than on actual skill or disposition. In theory, members of the Eight Banners automatically became soldiers or officers in the Banner’s military organizations when they reached adulthood. Recruits to the Green Standard Army were selected according to district registers, which listed families with a military background. The ranks were often filled by incorporating members of armed rebel, or criminal gangs, who would otherwise pose a threat to security. The late Qing military reformers denounced the Green Standard Army soldiers, in particular, as being unskilled, decadent and physically weak, and leveled responsibility for the low social standing of military men in China at them.65 For all intents and purposes, the bodily constitution and strength of new recruits enlisting for an army had been taken into consideration by military theorists in the past, such as the Ming general Qi Jiguang, whose military manuals were still respected to some degree during the Qing period. The scholar-official Zeng Guofan, who commanded the Hunan Army and was involved in the Self-Strengthening Movement, similarly emphasized physical fitness. However, affiliation with the Hunan Army or other, similar latenineteenth century mercenary troops (Brave Battalions) mostly depended on the place of origin and personal contacts. Officers, who were originally civil officials, selected their own sub-commanders, who likewise chose their own lieutenants. The removal of one level in this pyramidal hierarchy, through the death or defection of an officer, could result in the loss of an entire regiment. The extent to which these criteria of selection were applied appears to have decreased over time, with the result that men were drafted indiscriminately into the Brave Battalions when needed. Certainly, whether in the regular Qing armies or the Brave Battalions, all soldiers had to prove they were capable of handling a weapon and lifting a prescribed minimum load at the time they enlisted. But there was neither a comprehensive system of physical and psychological requirements nor any thorough medical examination before enlisting and no monitoring afterward. Soldiering was usually a lifelong occupation, regardless of whether or not a soldier was actually too old or for some other reason unable to fulfill the tasks required of him.66 The leaders of the New Armies, at least in theory, set limits on the length of service for common soldiers and sought to recruit only socially and mentally

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stable healthy young men. The idea of narrowing admission to the army and restricting the length of military service derived from European, particularly German models, which emphasized the enormous strain and stresses that soldiers faced. A German handbook on training and military medicine, authored by the Prussian military doctor Martin Kirchner, even stated that overly long service could lead to drinking, insubordination, desertion, and suicide.67 In 1894, Constantin von Hanneken and Sheng Xuanhuai, who were initially in charge of organizing what later became the Newly Created Army (Xinjian Lujun), presented an organizational model based on the German conscription system to the government. According to their plan, selected men would serve for three years in the army and then retire consecutively to the first and second reserve, where they would serve for three years in each. After that, they would spend five years as members of a militia.68 In 1902, Yuan Shikai reintroduced this multistage model for the Beiyang Army. According to him, it had proved its worth not only in Germany but also in other European countries and in Japan. Instead of four levels and altogether 14 years of service, including service in the militia, Beiyang soldiers were supposed to serve for three years in the standing army (changbeijun), followed by three years in the first (xubeijun) and second (houbeijun) reserves. About two years later, in 1904, the Organization Plan for the New Army, drafted by the Bureau for Military Training (Lianbingchu), demanded that the “regulations of various Occidental countries concerning the conscription of soldiers” be copied and adopted the German-style service model of the Beiyang Army for all divisions of the Lujun. The only minor change to Yuan’s original design was to increase the length of service in the second reserve to four years, up to a total of ten years. A system consisting of active and reserve forces was supposed to provide flexibility by limiting the number of soldiers the state had to equip and provide for. On the other hand, this system still allowed the army to draw on a larger contingent of well-trained men if necessary. In the case of war, the Lujun was supposed to be able to double its strength to over one million armed men by combining the first reserve and standing army.69 Following Yuan’s measures in Zhili province, where the Beiyang Army was based, the Bureau for Military Training stipulated that local magistrates or village headsmen should provide lists of the most qualified candidates in the areas under their jurisdiction. New recruits to the Lujun had to prove that they came from that particular area when they enlisted and that their family had lived there for at least three generations. Moreover, a respectable person had to vouch for the recruit. This idea of thorough registration was inspired by German military registers, which were the basis for the system of universal conscription that already existed in the German Empire at the time. As I will examine in more detail in Chapter 5, the introduction of universal


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conscription was widely debated among military reformers and its advocates not only referred to foreign examples but also to comparable institutions in China’s history, such as the militia systems used during the Han and Tang dynasties.70 The implementation of strict requirements for recruiting common soldiers proved to be difficult. Since no reliable census statistics existed, the New Armies had to use the military registers of the Green Standard Army. Initially, military leaders were unable to find sufficient qualified men who conformed to the high demands of the New Armies and they often had to draw on veterans from the Sino-Japanese War. Moreover, the establishment of reserve forces was never fully put into practice and only some divisions actually possessed reserve units: because the number of new, qualified recruits was limited, men were allowed to reenlist or join police forces after completing their service in the standing army.71 After the Sino-Japanese War, the most urgent issues were not long-term, systematic considerations but the “quality” and disposition of men actually available for the New Armies. The collected regulations of Yuan Shikai’s first German-trained forces, the Record of Military Planning of the Newly Created Army (Xinjian Lujun binglüe lucun, henceforth Record of Military Planning), stipulated that “[men] whose five senses are not intact, and who have weak hands and feet, poor physiques, and bad eyesight cannot be accepted.”72 Recruits should be young, strong, and committed; “the old, weak, weary, and infirm” (lao ruo pi long) should be excluded. Only “excellent” (you), well-educated, and “obedient” (xun) men should be accepted into service.73 Yuan Shikai and his lieutenants strongly criticized the malpractice of making up numbers with ineligible men (lanyu chongshu), which was common among the established troops and demanded that only “able-bodied men” (jingzhuang), capable of mastering the hardships of contemporary drill and combat, be selected.74 Similarly, the regulations for Zhang Zhidong’s Self-Strengthening Army ordered the “use of Western medicine to examine whether the bodies [of recruits] are robust (jianzhuang), and free from any ‘hidden diseases’ (yinji), and to check whether the men are far-sighted.”75 The Lujun adopted the requirements for new recruits as stipulated by the Newly Created Army and the Beiyang Army. A healthy body free from any medical conditions was seen as essential and, apart from emphasizing good eyesight, the 1904 Organization Plan for the New Army demanded that those with “unmentionable diseases” (anji), a phrasing which indicated either an internal or a sexual ailment, be rejected as recruits.76 New recruits were expected to have an unscathed and fully developed body and fulfill a set of above-average prerequisites. The enlistment age was set between twenty and twenty-five years because this was supposed to be the age at which men reached their full physical capability.77 At the time of enlistment, recruits should be able to lift 100 jin or pounds (50 kilograms) and run

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20 li (10 kilometers or 6.2 miles) in one hour. They were required to possess a sturdy nature and a good physical appearance as well as be a minimum of four chi and eight cun, or approximately 157 centimeters (5ft 1 inch) tall. “Southerners” were allowed to be two cun (6 centimeters or 2.36 inches) shorter.78 According to contemporary German sources, the minimum height for recruits to the German army in 1887 was also 157 centimeters although the actual average height was 169 centimeters (5ft 5 inches). The latter figure was about the same in most other European countries. Japanese recruits were approximately 156 centimeters tall on average.79 Besides purely physical requirements, the New Armies considered the behavior and manners of recruits to be important, emphasizing in particular that only men who had never smoked opium were eligible for service. The consumption of opium was known to dull the mind, influence the spirit, and having a lasting negative effect on the body. The ban on opium-smokers linked physical with mental requirements for soldiers, as opium smoking was viewed as being harmful to people’s “character and conduct” in particular. The ideal soldier was not only supposed to be strong and healthy but also well-behaved and respectful toward officers and the civilian population, the “good people” (liangmin). Recruits had to have a clean criminal record, and to come from a decent and respectable family. They should not only be “well-nourished, tall and slender” but also “well-mannered and vigorous.”80 Accordingly, after being admitted to the army, the basic military training of soldiers not only dealt with their general physical fitness and technical skills but also with their behavior, motivation, and psychology. Posture The inculcation of bodily postures and gaits were part of the basic military training of soldiers. In fact, the degree of individual discipline was attributed to and measured by a man’s ability to assume, hold, or conduct postures and movements such as standing at attention and marching. Chinese military reformers, army leaders, and drill instructors adopted the German notion of absolute control over the body and they sought to impose uniformity and strict discipline upon both the outer and inner bearing of every soldier. Drill manuals determined every movement of the body and the position of every body part. Through the scrupulous training of postures, the recruits were “dressed” and drilled to react and obey to commands. Officers and instructors sought to achieve the automated submission of the soldiers and the highest possible degree of order and discipline. The basic position for all soldiers was standing to attention (lizheng). According to the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, which precisely defined


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how to assume the posture, it symbolized strength and perseverance: on command, the soldiers had to put both feet together and distribute the weight from one leg to both legs. The feet were supposed to be at a ninety-degree angle (v-shape), the legs and knees fully extended. The chest should be pushed out and the stomach drawn in, resembling the German slogan Brust heraus, Bauch hinein, which was cited by German military instructors and military doctors to define this posture (German: Stillstand).81 Moreover, a soldier’s shoulders had to be steady and at the same height. The arms should hang down close to the upper body and the elbows should be slightly flexed in a way they would fit naturally to the body. The hands should rest flat on the hips, but not be too tight. The neck had to be fully straightened and the head held in an upright position. The chin should be pulled back, the eyes looking straight ahead. The slightest shaking or moving of the body, as well as speaking, was strictly forbidden. The soldiers should stand upright and firm like a “clay sculpture” (nisu, see Figure 1.6, left).82 The Record of Military Planning contained an explanation of this posture directed at Chinese officers and instructors and written by one of the Newly Created Army’s German instructors, who went under the Chinese name Boluo’en. It is an insightful account of how German military culture and notions of physical discipline were adopted in late Qing China.83 “Standing to attention,” the instruction started, “is the fundament of all drill. If it is not appropriate, it is very difficult […] to get rid of any kind of defect.” It goes on: Standing at attention is the most fundamental skill [literally first level of gongfu]. Don’t be afraid of being overly pedantic, take time to check whether the posture is correct or not. The body has to be trained in order to achieve [standing and moving with] facility. Do not overstretch, twist too much or make any errors. Otherwise, energy is wasted. The body must be forced to avoid the disease of slanted shoulders and a slanted waist. The position of the feet is most crucial […], it must be proper without any exception. When the legs move, [the position of the feet] influences whether legs and body are crooked or straight. If the position of the feet is not correct, the whole [posture] of the body is wrong. For instance, if one has a splayfoot on the right side, then the right arm is hanging back and the movements are not straightforward. The arm cannot swing forward and [the soldier does not] move in line [with the others], [and he moves] in a very unnatural way. If the lines are not closed evenly, it is because the position of the feet must be wrong.84

The report continued to emphasize the importance of getting rid of even the slightest error at the earliest possible stage, as it would be increasingly difficult later and any “unevenness” (cenci) would become worse. The head and arms should be absolutely straight, the nape should be stiff, the chin

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Figure 1.6  Goose Step (zhengbu) and Standing at Attention (lizheng). Source: Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 250, 260.

should not be stretched out, and the gaze should be straight ahead. The report went on: After standing at attention, the whole body is calm, the four limbs do not move the slightest, even the facial features and the fingertips do not shake. The arms are in a natural position […], the hands rest on the legs, the fingers are stretched and stiff, the thumb is placed between the middle finger and the forefinger, the small finger and the wrist touch the trousers.85

During breaks, the body and legs were allowed to rest, but standing at attention should never be stopped without leave. Soldiers were not supposed to talk, fool around, or laugh. Finally, the account deals with the physical constitution of soldiers who suffered from inadequate drill methods. The


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author criticizes that, in the case of some recruits, the bodily posture was very bad, and their way of moving was tiring and they were wasting a lot of energy. While exercising to “invigorate muscles and bones” (huodong jingu), the soldiers should conscientiously pay attention to moving their legs and feet correctly. They should be carefully instructed and inculcated to assume postures.86 The Detailed and Illustrated Manual went further and explained how to stand at ease (shaoxifa), which, it claimed, was important to rest the exhausted spirit after the hard drill. Putting both hands at the hip was supposed to enable the soldier to straighten his body and carry out other moves and postures. Moreover, it depicted various ways of moving (zhuanfa) and footwork (bufa), including the basic goose or parade step (zhengbu), slow walking, trotting, and running. Every step was exactly regulated. For the everyday walking style (bianbu), for instance, a soldier should lift a foot only one to two cun (three to six cm) above the ground and walk at a speed of around 120 steps a minute, without using too much energy or becoming exhausted.87 The New Armies attributed special importance to the goose step, which was the iconic symbol of Prussian-German soldiering, discipline, and militarism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.88 The goose step, or literally “piercing step” (Stechschritt) was tactically obsolete since the midnineteenth century but was practiced for drill and ceremonial reasons (And still is in some parts of the world, including China). As the standard march during regular drill, it was supposed to strengthen the feet and legs but the psychological effects were even more important. The New Armies’ recruits should start making ninety-six steps and then 114 steps a minute, which was exactly the same as the prescribed speed of ordinary marching in the German army.89 Every step should have a length of 80 centimeters (ca 2ft 7 inches), and the arms should be swinging appropriately back and forth in a natural way without using energy. The swings should not be too high or overextended (see Figure 1.6).90 The number of steps per minute was also defined for other gaits such as trotting (kuaibu, 140 steps) and running (paobu, 160 to 170 steps), which was used when engaging the enemy in battle. Furthermore, the Detailed and Illustrated Manual determined the position of the elbows, feet, and the head when moving, as well as the direction of the eyes when the company stopped after marching. Finally, it described how to correct position of one’s feet if becoming confused and making mistakes during the drill.91 Another chapter introduced instructions for postures and moves with the gun, teaching soldiers exactly how to present the gun, carry it while marching or running, or how to hold it while aiming at a target in a standing, squatting, or lying position.92 In comparison, the German army used even more detailed guidelines for marching and posturing, including not only regulations concerning the

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number of steps per minute but also the length of a step, depending on the type of movement. Instructors particularly considered marching as essential for every soldier and described it as “standing at attention put into motion.”93 They gave precise instructions on the position of the head, upper body, and other body parts, as well as the position of the feet and techniques of moving.94 German military drill doctrines emphasized that exercising individual postures and ways of walking, along with gymnastics, prepared the soldier for drill in a closed tactical formation. Only after soldiers automatically assumed the right postures and moved and marched correctly, could they start with gun drill and shooting exercises.95 A man first had to “master his own body, develop and train his muscularity, and systematically increase his natural abilities and stamina,” before he could learn to work in a team, become part of the regiment, and fully start to prepare for battle.96 Late Qing military reformers absorbed these ideas. They were intended to develop the soldiers’ physique and martial spirit, and improve their skills at arms and combat behavior. But more than that, the New Armies aimed at total control over body and mind, to govern the conduct of an individual soldier, and completely assimilate him into the collective of the army corps. Recruitment, military gymnastics, postures and movements were only the first, albeit fundamental, disciplinary technologies that were applied to govern the New Armies. Following German tactical doctrines, the ultimate aim was forging the bodies of individual soldiers into a cohesive unit or formation: literally, into “one single body.” Marching in Step and the “Cult of the Offensive” In the war against France in 1870–1871, the Prussian army demonstrated its superior speed and effectiveness, particularly of its infantry. The underlying tactical doctrine emphasized aggressive offensive warfare conducted, at its very core, by a disciplined, well-drilled and machine-like infantry that simply overwhelmed or shocked the enemy by its speed, deep concentration, and intensive gun-salvos. This, however, was the tactical doctrine of Frederick II and the eighteenth-century Prussian army. It became obsolete because technological innovations such as smokeless powder, the percussion cap, the breechloader, the recoil mechanism, and rifled guns, which allowed for rapid fire over greater distances, turned closed-unit infantry attacks into suicide missions. In the late nineteenth century, the leadership of the Prussian and then German army became aware of this problem and developed new tactics that emphasized flexibility, undulation, the breaking of ranks and spreading out (also called line warfare), as well as the use of ground and terrain as cover. Supporters of the closed-unit tactics within the German military leadership warned that the new tactics would result in a defensive deadlock.


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They sought to reinforce established tactics by enforcing strict discipline, which should ensure cohesion and prevent fear and panic during the attack. To be sure, neither group considered abandoning the doctrine of aggressive attack or “cult of the offensive,”97 which eventually proved to be disastrous in the First World War.98 In Japan, military leaders and officers were strongly influenced by Jacob Meckel’s ideas on tactics, as evidenced, for instance, in the infantry drill regulation of the Japanese army from 1886. The Prussian officer Meckel played a major role in reorganizing the Japanese military in the Meiji period, and he was a proponent of the doctrine of massive and concentrated infantry assault, for which he was strongly criticized in Germany. Meckel favored close-order drills, which were necessary to prepare the soldiers for battle formations able to produce a concentrated shock and, in the Japanese army, he promoted the idea that a unit should fight like “one man,” which was later adopted by Chinese military reformers. Several of Meckel’s books were translated in 1900 by different German-Chinese teams from the Hubei Military Schools in Wuchang, including the Principles of Tactics (Zhanfa jiyao) and other books and book chapters on the tactics of battery, cavalry, infantry, and squad operations.99 Although the Japanese army later translated and followed the revised German drill regulations (from 1889 and 1902, which were improved versions of the code from 1888) that were a compromise between competing tactical doctrines, they generally applied Meckel’s approach in the Sino-Japanese War and in the Russo-Japanese War. Only after suffering heavy casualties during the latter, particularly within the officer corps, did the Japanese military leadership modify this doctrine.100 In Germany and Japan, the success of the Japanese troops was generally taken as a confirmation of the German offensive doctrine and the role of the infantry as a major branch of the military. The German army leadership considered basic ideas fixed in the drill code from 1888, such as flexible decision-making by officers during battle, to be still valid and only in need of enhancement. A new drill code was released in 1906 that highlighted the interaction between artillery and infantry as well as the fact that attacking foot soldiers, like defensive units, had to entrench themselves, if necessary. Notwithstanding, precision marching or marching in line remained the basis of military training because it was viewed to be the most useful technique of group bonding and inculcating soldiers with the essential qualities for battle: strict discipline and a high morale.101 In Germany and elsewhere in Europe, the infantry was viewed as the foundation and most important part of any “modern” army and gradually replaced the cavalry as the decisive element in battle in the nineteenth century.102 In China, even in pre-imperial times, infantry units increasingly constituted the mass of soldiers and represented the backbone of any army. Chariots

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and, later, cavalries could only be deployed under certain circumstances and most of the time played a minor role in battle.103 Although the Qing’s military success in the seventeenth century had depended on mounted archers, cavalry units quickly became less important in the mountainous and hilly lands of central and southern China. However, even in the nineteenth century, mounted archery still enjoyed the highest prestige. After 1895, Chinese military reformers acknowledged the crucial role of a disciplined infantry for what they perceived as high-tech warfare in the late nineteenth century. The New Armies emulated the German and German-based Japanese drill codes and tactical doctrines, which emphasized the significance of the infantry, closed formations and decisive strikes to “shock” and overwhelm enemy troops. Chinese military reformers and military leaders closely observed contemporary debates among military circles in Japan, Germany, and other European countries, particularly the discussions on infantry attacks and offensive warfare following the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905. They incorporated notions about flexible infantry deployment or the use of covers and trenches. However, similar to their German and Japanese role models, they persisted with the idea that the infantry was most efficient if it eventually formed a concentrated closed unit in front of the enemy. To be sure, the intention of improving individual fighting skills and the effectiveness of an army through drill was neither new to the armies of the Qing period nor to any military organizations of previous dynasties. In his two manuals New Book Recording Effective Techniques (Jixiao xinshu, first version written in 1560/1561)104 and Record of Military Training (Lianbing shiji, first published in 1571), the Ming general Qi Jiguang emphasized the necessity of physical fitness and rigorous training, with and without arms.105 For Qi, small and strictly disciplined units of carefully recruited men constituted the backbone of the army on the battlefield. Physical exercise and the inculcation of courage were equally important for achieving unanimous discipline and preparing both body and mind for battle. Qi’s books were widely received both during the late Ming and the Qing periods and even studied in Korea and Japan.106 However, although these military writings were acknowledged classics of strategy, military organization, and drill, they were hardly used in reality by the Qing regular armies. In fact, there were no established standards for the Green Standard Army involving drill exercises and only occasionally did detachments practice the visually pleasing but virtually obsolete battle formations from the Ming period.107 Only Zeng Guofan rediscovered and implemented Qi’s designs when raising the Xiang Army in the 1850s, particularly the idea of an army structured by personal loyalties, but also those for drill and discipline. While the Xiang and Huai Armies exercised daily, most Banner troops only drilled a couple of times during one month and usually focused on archery, which remained the most prestigious


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military skill, even in the nineteenth century. The Qianlong Emperor’s famous dictum, that a “soldier cannot spend a day without training” seems to have been largely neglected by them.108 Only after the Sino-Japanese War did military reformers emphasize the idea of concerted deployment of infantry, cavalry, and artillery units and introduce the European doctrine of closed-unit infantry formations, which demanded incessant drill and alignment. From 1897 on, numerous manuals and translations introduced European, particularly German, principles of closed-unit drills, infantry formations, and marching in step.109 Subsequently, Chinese drill codes strongly emphasized that the aim of all military drill exercise had to be the creation of a cohesive and mechanical unit, which required well-disciplined individuals with optimized and homogenized physical bodies. Drill codes described the individual (danren) as the very foundation of success in both drills and battle. Only when the body of an individual soldier was fit enough and he behaved according to the rules, could he form a unit with others. Small units, after sufficient training, were combined to larger units until the army constituted a cohesive entity. The original source for the infantry drill codes and manuals of the New Armies was the annotated translation of an unspecified German drill code authored by Li Fengbao, which strongly influenced the Detailed and Illustrated Manual from 1899.110 Li Fengbao was a protégé of Li Hongzhang and head of the translator’s section of the Jiangnan Arsenals and Wusong Armory, where he co-translated manuals for Krupp canons and books on various other topics. Between 1878 and 1885, he subsequently served as Qing minister to Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, and France. In Germany, he was the superior of Xu Jianyin, the author of the New Book on Military Science.111 Li’s book New Ways of Military Drill (Lucao xinyi), which had the parallel title New Book on German Military Training (Deguo lianbing xinshu), was produced in Berlin and first published in 1884. It comprised explanations, diagrams, and tables concerning German infantry drill. The most important thing in modern battle, according to the book, was fighting in formation and the firing of guns in salvos. Because the infantry represented the most important part of the army, its drill had to be perfect and the training of simultaneous shooting was essential. “The German infantry has the most refined troops,” Li stated.112 They were the absolute role model and Chinese soldiers should be trained accordingly. To underscore the German emphasis on the homogenous and corporate infantry unit, Li quoted the famous military strategist Zhuge Liang: “If the army does not drill, one hundred [men] cannot become one. With drill and experience, one becomes as strong as one hundred. The value of a soldier lies in his training.”113 In the Western Drill of the Self-Strengthening Army, Shen Dunhe explicitly praised the skills of the German infantry in a manner similar to Li Fengbao.

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In particular, he viewed the ability of breaking up a formation, spreading out, and forming up again as highly valuable for contemporary warfare, which increasingly involved rapid gun and canon fire and demanded extreme tactical flexibility. The German army, Shen stated, was praised for having a perfectly organized and well-disciplined infantry that maintained closed formations during both drill and battle.114 Other manuals and codes of other New Armies, which considered infantry drill as the basis for military training of both common soldiers and officer cadets, shared the same perception. They also described the infantry as the backbone of the army, and the ultimate tactical task was the well-balanced combination of infantry, artillery, and cavalry in battle. According to the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, the first step was to bring the physical bodies of new recruits into shape. Afterward, the men could start to practice shooting and learn the techniques of forming a unit, and attacking and retreating as a formation. Every soldier had to understand and internalize the movements for fighting in a formation, the authors of Detailed and Illustrated Manual emphasized.115 Already in the Record of Military Planning, Yuan and his lieutenants explicitly demanded putting more weight on daily drill on a high level, because all previous Chinese armies had effectively neglected practical drill. During the instruction and drill of the common soldiers, the rigidity of formation (suzheng or zhengsu) had to be observed. All drill exercises were to be carried out with united strength (tongli hezuo) and even the slightest unevenness in a formation (cenci) had to be eliminated. If ten people could be instructed and accomplish the highest level of sophistication, then a hundred, a thousand or even ten thousand men could also, the authors of the Record of Military Planning announced. The soldiers had to drill regularly to become nimble and well versed in moving their bodies, hands, feet, and guns, and gain skills in using their eyes and ears. Perfectly trained and disciplined bodies were essential for keeping a closed formation and facing the enemy with the necessary speed. Similar to gymnastics, formation drill aimed at mental indoctrination and influencing the soldier’s mind to make him react physically to commands, obey, and “lay down his life on the battlefield” (jiangchang xiaoming).116 The Detailed and Illustrated Manual additionally emphasized that soldiers were no longer only men who fought bravely in battle. Now, soldiering was much more sophisticated as every step (bu), drill (yan), and line-up (pai), was strictly regulated and synchronized. All these (new) elements of soldiering had to be trained to a degree of excellence. Unlike in the past, according to the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, many should act and fight “like one man” (he qianwan ren ru yi ren) to overcome all enemies and achieve certain victory.117 Shen Dunhe similarly stated that, by using foreign drill, “many men become one [man]” (qianbai ren jie neng zhengqi ru yi).118 The authors of the


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Detailed and Illustrated Manual described and illustrated various modes of formation drill, with and without weapons. The basic units for the drill were the platoon (pai or dapai) or the squad (xiaopai), consisting of 8 to 14 men. A soldier had to internalize the exercises for both squad and platoon with all of its various movements and regulations, because they were viewed as the skeleton of the basic army unit: the company (dui).119 Formation drill in small squads or platoons was considered essential for tactical flexibility during battle because it trained soldiers how to form lines, disperse, seek shelter, hide, retreat, advance, and regroup again. According to the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, formations should be like waves (literally “undulate,” ifu), implying that individual soldiers should coalesce like drops of water to form a powerful homogeneous mass but, if necessary, break apart to elude enemy fire and eventually conjoin again and form a unit.120 Like group calisthenics, formation exercises of small units were strictly regulated in the Detailed and Illustrated Manual. At the beginning of the basic platoon drills, soldiers were to stand one step apart from each other and put one hand on the shoulder of a neighbor. After an instructor issued the respective command, the head and eyes had to turn to the announced direction and the chest had to be stretched. The eyes should always be focused and look straight ahead. The soldiers were then instructed in different methods of forming a company, dispersing into squads, regrouping, and rearranging to compose new formations. They were instructed to move, turn, and line-up as a squad.121 Every movement, posture, and position of every part of a soldier’s body was meticulously determined. Moreover, the soldiers were indoctrinated to know their precise position while being part of a unit, no matter what size the unit assumed. Even the exact position of the officers involved was fixed according to their individual rank, determining where they had to stand when a squad, company, or battalion stood at attention, exercised, paraded, or engaged in battle (see Figures 1.7 and 1.8).122 The Detailed and Illustrated Manual was a thick manual with over a thousand pages and composed in the classic written language. Its intended readership was government officials and those among the educated elite who considered a military career as well as officers in the New Armies and cadets attending a military academy. For the purpose of inculcating common soldiers and less educated, lower-ranking officers, and drill instructors with the German infantry drills, all units of the Newly Created Army received a copy of the Introductory Manual of German Army Drill (Deguo lujun caodian rumen), which contained basic explanations on formation and close-order drill. It was reproduced for the Self-Strengthening Army and, together with copies of the Western Drill of the Self-Strengthening Army (including the Six Rules of German Military Training), distributed to every battalion.123

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Figure 1.7  Formation Drill without Weapons. Source: Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 286.

Figure 1.8  “Infantry Line Instructions” (budui yipai jiaolian). Source: Zhu 1911.



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For the same reason, the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers, published in 1905, included in every issue a section on frequently asked question regarding infantry drill. Using simple language, basic ideas and questions concerning postures and drill were explained in chronological order. Questions concerned individual or danren drills as well as shooting postures, specific commands, or the movements of units. The first question was: From which point should a new recruit start to learn the drill code? Answer: Start with learning the training methods (jiaolianfa). These methods are the fundament of military drill. Without learning these methods by heart, lining-up (chengpai chengdui) is later impossible. It is like someone who does not understand characters. How can he read a book?124

In 1906, the Bureau for Military Training decided to issue a drill code effective for all Lujun divisions. The reason was not only to further standardize military practices throughout the country but also the revision of infantry drill codes in Japan, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe, following the RussoJapanese War in 1904–1905.125 Military publications such as the Nanyang Military Journal included reports on these revisions and analyzed the latest tactical innovations.126 One article, co-written by the Japanese Sakata Toranosuke and entitled Evaluation of the German Correction on the Infantry Drill Code (Du Deguo gaizheng bubing caodian yougan), quite accurately assessed the new German drill and combat regulations from 1906. Prior to the war of 1904–1905, which had made the development of firearms and the need for tactical innovations obvious, the German army had wasted a lot of time and energy on the drill grounds. Instead of exercising combat relevant issues, too much attention had been given to closed horizontal lines. Now the Germans emphasized practical training for the battlefield, particularly concerning the coordination of artillery and infantry, and raising the spirit and morale of soldiers. “The German infantry is among the best in the world,” the authors of the article underlined, and “with the recent drill code changes, its quality will be doubtlessly without comparison in the world.” However, one flaw remained, according to the article. The drill code still emphasized precision lockstep marching (fenlieshi), which was world famous in its German version and viewed to be the most effective way to inculcate discipline. But it was old-fashioned and in two years, recruits should better receive combat relevant training instead of learning to look good.127 The strongly German-influenced Military Studies Magazine included comprehensive accounts and translations of the latest (infantry) tactics and drill regulations. One translation, for instance, of unspecified origin by Fan Chongwang, included illustrations from a German source, supposedly from

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a version of the drill regulation from 1906 (see Figure 1.9). In particular, the article dealt with defense tactics, trenches, and the entrenching of attacking infantry soldiers, which was a tactical innovation emphasized after the Russo-Japanese War. The journal also included articles on infantry warfare by Wang E, who was a cadet in Germany, as was the editor of the journal, Chen Zongda.128 In 1907, the Chinese military finally released an infantry drill code whose publication had been decided on in the previous year. In charge was still the Bureau for Military Training (more precisely, its Department for Military Education), which had officially merged with the Board of War into the Army Ministry (Lujunbu) in November 1906. The 1907 Temporary Infantry Drill Methods (Bubing zanxing caofa) was a small and handy booklet, which reiterated the organic principle of the previous Chinese drill regulations published after 1895. It emphasized the importance of the individual soldiers (danren) and the careful step-by-step training which was supposed to form them into increasingly larger tactical units. In particular, the individual’s physical body was viewed as the foundation of all further military drills. According to the Temporary Infantry Drill Methods, “the basis of infantry training is the individual; [and] military gymnastics completes this training.”129 Only when the soldiers were disciplined, sufficiently physically fit, and knew how to handle a weapon, could the implementation of simultaneous movements be successful. Although the Temporary Infantry Drill Methods did not state explicitly that it was a translation from the Japanese, it strongly resembled previous translations and Chinese manuals that followed the same principles.130 Both the Beiyang Army and Nanyang Army published infantry drill codes in 1903 and 1904, respectively, that were structured in a similar way.131 Around the same time, a Chinese student in Japan, called Meng Sen, who later was a co-founder of the popular journal Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi) and became a professor of history at Peking University, translated the Japanese drill code from 1898. In the foreword of the translation, he pointed out that the Japanese original was based on German principles. The translation was called Infantry Drill Code (Bubing caodian) and structured along 344 articles (plus 14 in the appendage) and, as always, starting with regulations for instructing individual soldiers and continuing with instructions for increasingly larger units. Similarly, the Temporary Infantry Drill Methods consisted of altogether 351 consecutive articles. The articles in the two books were by and large the same, though not identical.132 In 1909, Tieliang, the director of the Army Ministry, ordered all division commanders to Beijing to discuss and draft official drill codes for all branches of the army, including cavalry, artillery, and infantry.133 In the following year, the Army Ministry issued a booklet titled Revised Infantry Drill Methods


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Figure 1.9  This illustration derived from an unspecified German source and shows, among other things, German infantry soldiers with the iconic spiked helmet as they entrenched themselves during an attack. Source: JJ 1908, 2: Fan Chongwang, Bingfa luyao, 14.

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(Xinding bubing caofa), which was similar to and based on the Temporary Infantry Drill Methods from 1907. In fact, the Revised Infantry Drill Methods was a translation of the latest Japanese infantry drill code. According to its preface, it was produced to replace all other previous drill codes, end the confusion of simultaneously existing codes and, finally, to achieve national standardization. It was circulated widely and was still used after the downfall of the dynasty. One edition, for instance, was published in Wuhan for the troops in Hubei in November 1911.134 Like its predecessor, the Revised Infantry Drill Methods was a small and handy, easily accessible booklet that was structured into about 350 articles. Both the Temporary Infantry Drill Methods and the Revised Infantry Drill Methods followed the simple idea that first the individual had to be instructed, undergo strict physical training, and learn basic postures and movements. After completing his individual education, the soldier could participate in close-order drill and successively join larger formations and exercises. Fundamental for preparing the soldiers for drill and war, both drill codes highlighted, was the observance of “strict military discipline and correct sequences.”135 Rigid instruction was considered the key to enhancing soldiers physically and mentally and achieving absolute discipline, which made them “skilled and sophisticated” and allowed them to “fight unanimously with other branches of the army.” The Revised Infantry Drill Methods emphasized that “discipline is the lifeblood [or pulse, mingmai] of the army.”136 Similar to the German army, the Japanese army revised its drill regulations after the Russo-Japanese War. The Chinese New Armies adopted the tactical adjustments their role models made, including the emphasis on better coordinating the different branches of the army and flexible formations and extended lines. However, following their role models, the emphasis on strict discipline, determination, and concentrating strength for decisive offensive strikes even increased among Chinese military reformers.137 During the war in 1904–1905, the Japanese army had, for the first time, made use of sandbags and entrenching as tactics for attacking infantry soldiers, but most observers attributed the Japanese victory to the martial spirit, audacity, and cohesiveness of their troops. Correspondingly, the infantry drill codes released by the Lujun leadership did not deal with entrenching but underscored the crucial role of combining spirit and morale (jingshen shiqi) with physical fitness and military skills (tili, nengli, wuyi) for creating a forceful and effective unit. Discipline would ensure the homogeneity of this unit, which should ultimately be held together by patriotism and loyalty to the emperor (aiguo zhongjun).138 Chinese military reformers and the leaders of the New Armies were, by and large, up to date with current transnational debates concerning infantry tactics. Similar to the prevailing German and Japanese tactical doctrines built around concentrated infantry attacks, they adopted flexible tactics


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and loose formations but they also emphasized closed order drills and strict discipline as the basis for military training. Starting in Europe during the First World War, the crucial impact of the machine gun and technological innovations such as tanks finally made these established infantry tactics obsolete.139 Conclusion: Performing Muscular Bonding Gymnastic exercises as well as posture and movement drills were the basic disciplinary technologies to govern the bodies of all military men in the New Armies and prepare them for tactical drills. According to German drill doctrines, only once soldiers automatically assumed the right postures, and marched in the correct way, could they start with gun drills and shooting exercises.140 Exercises and drills were not only supposed to optimize the physical bodies of soldiers. Military leaders also considered them as excellent disciplinary technology to mold the minds of soldiers, raise their morale and martial spirit, and govern their behavior and obedience. Body and mind were perceived to be reciprocal because manuals, drill codes, and other military texts emphasized that will, morale, virtue, and the right spirit were indispensable for physical perseverance and military drill. This idea was not entirely new and drew on established notions about the body in late imperial China; there was a tendency in philosophical, religious, medical, and literary accounts to associate visible physical deficiencies with flaws in one’s personality. Those with a weak and disreputable character were often expected to bear outward signs of corruption or disease. In classical European and Judeo-Christian thinking, the Cartesian paradigm was predominant, which assumes a dualism of essentially distinct mind and body. The mind, representing culture or civilization, was linked to the intellect and the immortal soul. It was favored over the body, which represents nature, ephemeral matter, and carnal drives.141 In classical Chinese thought, however, the relationship between body and mind was not viewed in terms of dualism but was interpreted as two poles that constituted a complementary psychosomatic unity.142 Marc Elvin examines the connection between heart-mind (xin) and body-person (shen) in a variety of stories from the Imperial, Republican, and Communist periods and concluded that, in these stories, the body is driven by the heart-mind. At the same time, the body represents and reveals the nature of the heart-mind. Outer changes were interpreted as changes of the inner life of an individual and outward defects were viewed as corresponding to character deficiencies. Elvin defines the heart-mind as “a concept than can be interpreted as the psychological field of force that is attempting to control the body, and which reveals itself in physical structure and posture or […] beauty in the sense of prettiness [emphasis in the original text].” The role of

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the body was to be the mere “carrier of corporal and/or sartorial attributes,” which were an outward expression of the heart-mind.143 Arguably, this concept of body and mind facilitated the adoption of the prevalent psychosomatic oriented philosophy that accompanied German gymnastics and military training. In the eyes of German military instructors, the physical constitution, mental self-control, behavior, and attitude of an individual were strongly entangled. They considered the physical health and psychological capacity of new recruits as essential criteria for joining the army and enduring its disciplinary regime. Through the physical body of an individual, the army leaders would be able to gain access and control over the “heart-mind.” This, in fact, is a reversal of the idea that the heart-mind controls the body-person, whereas a person’s character was still thought to be visible through external physical appearance.144 While shen refers to the individual person, personality, or the self, and stands for the connection between body and the spirit, the psychosomatic entity or someone’s physical identity, there is also another central term for body in Chinese: ti is usually used for the physical body, the limbs, the flesh, and the bones and can also mean “embodiment.” It represents the organism, the body as an organic whole system or unit, and its individual parts.145 As a term and as a concept, ti became increasingly important in the beginning of the twentieth century for military reformers, educators, and intellectuals and began appearing in phrases such as tiyu (physical education), ticao (physical exercise), and tizhi (physique). Yet, shen and ti were increasingly thought of as a unit, forming the present-day Chinese term for “body” and the phrase duanlian shenti (“exercising” or “doing sports”) refers to the training of both the “flesh-body” and the “body-person.”146 In his seminal book Keeping Together in Time—Drill and Dance in Human History, William Hardy McNeill argues that shared rhythmic movements create a sense of community and cohesion. Coordinated movements, such as marching in step, evoke visceral and emotional sensations and a euphoric feeling of “muscular bonding,” which enables human groups to cooperate and even contributes to evolutionary survival.147 In the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War, Chinese military reformers and army leaders paid increasing attention to the idea of uniting particularly infantry soldiers into a fast, effective, and perfectly aligned tactical formation. For the first time in history, Chinese common soldiers began to march in lock step and conduct choreographed physical exercises in unison.148 The New Armies absorbed German drill doctrines, which, with Foucault, might be traced back to notions about institutionalized (military) discipline developing in Europe since the seventeenth century. Drill exercises aimed at inculcating total discipline upon the soldiers and homogenizing their bodies and minds to form them into a cohesive unit. Following German-Japanese tactical doctrines, the ultimate


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aim was to combine the bodies of individuals into a cohesive unit or formation: literally, “one single body.” Soldiers were subjected to meticulous and constant conditioning and dressing, which aimed at assimilating them into the collective army corps and producing a more powerful army than ever before. Numerous images produced and circulated by the New Armies should underline the progress of military reforms and the success of adopting German military training and doctrines. Illustrations and photographs of soldiers performing gymnastics and drills promoted exercise and discipline among troops. Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, they also demonstrated the newly acquired skills of soldiers and the “modernity” of the New Armies to the national and international public. Illustrations contained in the Detailed and Illustrated Manual and other manuals, first of all, helped instructors and soldiers to visualize various body techniques, postures, and moves and showed what an exercising body was supposed to look like. Illustrations of gymnastics exercises, showing one or more soldiers in simple drill uniform (see Figures 1.1, 1.6, and 1.7), were excellent tools to help the often illiterate or near-illiterate men to memorize postures, movements, and formations after they had been instructed by drillmasters and officers. Cadets, as well as drill and gymnastics instructors, were the main target groups for reading and using manuals but common soldiers, too, were admonished to study the manuals along with army codes and military journals. The text-embedded illustrations used in the manuals of the New Armies strongly resembled similar images of much older military manuals, which showed formation diagrams as well as individuals in a specific fighting posture or manipulating a specific weapon, including short descriptions.149 To borrow Jane Elliot’s formulation, there was an “unbroken visual tradition” linking images in the military context from around 1900 with prior depictions of military training and war.150 The content, however, differed. Text and image in the New Armies’ manuals now described German drill exercises and formations, and depicted men wearing “Western-style” uniforms. The new appearance of soldiers and officers, including uniforms and posture, was even more obvious in photographs. Whereas illustrations contained in drill manuals had a practical purpose, the army used photographs of soldiers performing German or “Western” gymnastics for display. Presenting the capabilities and accomplishments of the Lujun, for instance, were the purpose of two photographic volumes, published by the Army Ministry in 1910 and 1911, which were both edited by Zhu Kegeng (see Figures 1.2 to 1.5, and 1.8). The books included pictures of men performing apparatus gymnastics, calisthenics, and other military drill exercises as described and illustrated in the manuals examined above. They also contained photographs of a variety of army-related situations such as field maneuvers, formation drill,

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canon drill, paramedics and doctors in action, soldiers presenting equipment and weapons, reviews, and officers posing for the camera.151 Photographs, particularly those depicting exercising soldiers, showed fit and healthy male bodies that literally embodied the European and American notion of absolute discipline. Like texts, photographs (and other images) facilitated governing both body and behavior of military personnel. By way of example, for instance, by depicting various postures, images contributed to the production of disciplined objects and a new concept of military masculinity performed through the body.

notes 1. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 4. 2. Xu [1899] 1992, 1051. In his book, Xu frequently refers to German drill regulations (Deguo caolian zhangcheng). 3. Ibid., 746–47. 4. See the Introduction to Zhongguo bingshu jicheng bianweihui 1992, volume 49, 3. See also Wright 1995, 75–90. Xu had started his career as an official and interpreter at the arsenals in Jiangnan, Tianjin and Shandong. Together with the educator and missionary John Fryer, he translated numerous scientific works on chemistry, physics and other subjects into Chinese. He was well versed in foreign languages, interested in science, and highly knowledgeable about arms production. After returning to the Qing Empire from Europe, he held leading positions at the Jiangnan Arsenal, the Hubei Railway Department, and the Fuzhou Dockyards. He translated two books about Germany from unknown or not clearly identifiable sources: Deguo yiyuan zhengzheng (The Constitution of the German Parliament, 1882) and Deguo hemeng jishi benmo (A Full Account of the German Federation 1897). See Wright 1995, 78. On Fryer and the translation of “Western” scientific terms to China see Lippert 2001 and Spence 1969, 129–60. 5. Xu [1899] 1992, 747. 6. Gao and Liu 1958, 97. 7. Smith 1976. 8. On the beginning of ticao and German military gymnastics in China, see Morris 2004, 6–9; Li 1984; Gimpel 2006, 325. Other forms of physical exercise did not go completely unnoticed among military circles after the turn of the century. A military journal article from 1907, for instance, reported that the British army had started using Swedish-style gymnastics for military training. See NBZ 1907, 11: Gaiyong Rudianshi ticao, 13. Another article reported the story of the German emperor Wilhelm II, who was so impressed by the Judo performance of Japanese sailors during a goodwill visit of Japanese ships to Kiel that he ordered that German navy cadets be instructed in this martial art. See NBZ 1908, 21: Caiyong Riben zhi roudao. The visit already took place in 1906. 9. Dresky 1896, 7–8.


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10. Kirchner 1896, 1106. 11. Kirchner 1869, 375. 12. Cited in Kirchner 1896, 1136. 13. Dresky 1896, 11–12. Dresky served as physiotherapist for the young Wilhelm II. See Röhl 1998, 44–6. 14. Rudeloff 1873, 20, 25–30. 15. The manuals and readers on military training and hygiene addressed officers and noncommissioned officers, instructors, and drillmasters. The authors were military doctors, who referred to or included official regulations for the Prussian and the German army (before and after 1871, respectively). Apart from the examples used in this chapter to illustrate the specialist discourses on the body in the German military profession, various other manuals on Militärhygiene or Militärmedicin [sic] were written by doctors, many of which are mentioned in the preface of Martin Kirchner’s book from 1896. See Kirchner 1896, VI. 16. Kirchner 1869, 365. 17. Ibid., 369. 18. Ibid., 375–76. Carl Kirchner additionally mentioned several apparatuses such as the parallel bars and horizontal bar, and described balancing, head, and chest exercises. He warned against excessive training and acrobatic performances. Martin Kirchner dates the introduction of gymnastics to the Prussian army to 1851, and to the public as early as 1844. See Kirchner 1896, 1136. According to Daniel Kirn, gymnastics were highly appreciated by the Prussian military since the beginnings of the nationalist romantic Turner Movement in the early nineteenth century, which I will address in more detail in Chapter 5. See Kirn 2009, 59. 19. Cycling and swimming, which were increasingly popular for training purposes in the German army, were not part of the drill of the Chinese New Armies. Mao Zedong later strongly promoted swimming as embodying physical fitness, will power, and perseverance. Accompanied by extensive media coverage, propaganda output, and thousands of spectators, he publically swam in the Yangzi River many times. See Kirn 2009, 59; Spence 1998. 20. Particularly the sixteenth century Ming general Qi Jiguang emphasized the necessity of exercising without weapons in order to strengthen the body and inculcate the men with discipline and courage. As it had been the case for centuries, certain forms of martial arts similar to those described by Qi were still practiced in the Qing military. However, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, novels and other popular accounts began to attribute martial arts styles to Shaolin mysticism and heretic secret societies such as the anti-foreign Boxer Movement in 1899–1901. This attribution continues in present-day academia, which misperceives the origins of martial arts as purely secretive, quasi-religious, and unsystematic popular cultural body techniques. The New Armies did not so much dismiss existing forms of martial arts techniques because of an alleged link to obscure and dissenting movements but because military reformers and officers viewed foreign drill as much more effective. On Qi Jiguang see Huang 1981, 156–88 and Millinger 1968. On martial arts see Henning 1999 and Lorge 2012. 21. Apart from the manuals and drill books examined in more detail below, other military manuals based on the German role model include the German Infantry Drill

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Code (Deguo bubing caodian), the Essence of the German Conscription Law (Deguo zhengbingfa dayao), and the New Book on Military Training in the West (Xiyang lianbing xinshu). Most military writings produced between 1895 and 1899 had a strong German imprint, even if they mentioned the German role model only indirectly and referred to “international” (geguo) standards and practices. See Bauer and Hwang 1982, 438–76; Shi 1996, 47–8; Sun 2007, 65. 22. Shen 1897c, 2. For the Hubei New Army see Zhang and Duanfang [1902] 2005, 205–6. 23. Shen [1898] 1992b, 553. 24. Ibid., 550–53. 25. Ibid., 660. 26. From 1902 to 1906, Shen Dunhe was director of the newly founded Shanxi University. Together with Sheng Xuanhuai, he established the China section of the Red Cross Society in 1904 and opened public hospitals and medical schools in Shanghai and Tianjin. For a contemporary biography in English, see also Shen 1903. 27. Eberspächer 2008, 63–7. For another translation by Shen of a book written by Reitzenstein, dealing with coastal defense, see Shen 1897b. 28. Shen 1897a, 7–8. Together with another book produced by Shen, the Foreign Drill of the Self-Strengthening Army (Ziqiangjun yangcao kecheng), the Description of the German Military System was published in a collection, edited by Liang Qichao, of translations of European and American reference works on all kinds of topics, such as politics, law, or constitutionalism, which also included independent works drawing on foreign knowledge. See Liang 1897. Shen’s translation already appeared in a bibliography on translated books by Liang Qichao from 1896 and was reprinted separately at least once in 1901, as the holdings of the library of the Peking University suggest. See Liang 1896. 29. Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 5. 30. Ibid., 182–85. 31. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 289. 32. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992. The manual, or at least parts of it, was republished in 1908 by the Beiyang Army’s administration under the title Succinct and Practical Instructions for Soldiers (Xunbing yaoyan). See MacKinnon 1980, 98. The Detailed and Illustrated Manual drew on previous translations of German drill codes such as Li Fengbao’s Lucao xinyi, discussed below, or the German Infantry Drill Code, but it was the first manual based on German principles for practical application. Chinese authors usually consider the manual as a blend between Chinese and “Western” training principles. Accordingly, “traditional” Chinese military culture aspects included the inculcation of respect for superiors and regiment regulations as well as the encouragement of loyalty, diligence, and bravery in battle. “Western” military culture aspects would be rather “technical” matters such as tactics, strategy, and drill. See Lai 2000, 136–37; Shi 1996, 49; Ven 1999, 59. 33. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 108. Today, the term duanlian is used exclusively for exercising and doing sports (duanlian shenti). However, the original meaning of duan is “to forge” and lian meant “to smelt.” Like ticao, the contracted form duanlian was coined in Japan. The literal translation of duanlian shenti is “forging the body,” which is, arguably, how late Qing reformers understood the term.


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34. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 105. 35. The expressions of “steeling the will” and “raising the courage” in the context of gymnastics are used, for instance, in Martin Kirchner’s book. See Kirchner 1896, 1136. 36. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 108. 37. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 289–97. 38. Ibid., 297–307. 39. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 247. 40. Xu [1899] 1992, 748. 41. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 247–48. 42. See, for instance, Kirchner 1896, 1136–137; Dresky 1896; Leitenstorfer 1897, 58–66. 43. Schnell and Xiao 1900a. 44. Schnell and Xiao 1900a, volume two. 45. Schnell and Xiao 1900b. Inside the manual, the authors alternatively used the slightly different titles Deguo wubei ticaoke and Deguo wubei ticaoxue. The collection of the Hubei Military School was compiled with the help of German advisors and contained works on a variety of topics such geography and engineering. Schnell’s manual was here simply called Methods of Gymnastics (Ticaofa) and described as “original German military training,” comprising volume one of eight, or chapters one to five of the collection. The Japanese textbook bore the title Common Gymnastics (Putong ticao) and was part of volume two (chapter 6). The fact that the manual was published only three years after Schnell died might indicate that he already used a manuscript of the book as teaching material at the Tianjin Military Academy, where he taught until 1894 or 1895. 46. Schnell 1897. On Schnell, see Kaske 2002a, 24; Gütinger 2004, 166; Eberspächer 2008, 58. See also Hanneken and Falkenberg 1998 and Bauer and Hwang 1982, 460. 47. Schnell and Xiao 1900a, 1. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid., 1–4. 50. Ibid., 2. 51. Ibid., 3–4. 52. The second part was in fact co-interpreted by another German-Chinese team, which I could not identify more closely. 53. For instance Kirchner 1869, 376. 54. Schnell and Xiao 1900a, juan 3. 55. Ibid., juan 4. 56. Ibid., juan 5. 57. Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu xuewu 1901–1911. The book was edited by the Education Bureau but published by the Beiyang Military Research Institute (Beiyang wubei yanjiusuo). An exact publication date was not given. 58. Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu xuewu 1901–1911, 1. 59. Ibid., 1–3 (here and previous citation). 60. Ibid., 3–26.

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61. Ibid., 1–3. 62. Ibid., 27–87. 63. Li 1984, 8. 64. NBZ 1906, 2: Lun qixie ticao zhi jiaoyu, 15–16. The article was a translation by Qi Guohuang, probably from the Japanese. Military journals rarely included discussions or detailed description of gymnastics. 65. See for instance Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 4, 62. See also Michael 1964, 39 and Tian 2006. 66. The recruitment practices of the established forces did not necessarily mean that all soldiers were incompetent. Parts of the Banners or Brave Battalions certainly consisted of quite capable, courageous, and fit men, but in the long run, they were de facto not able to master the military challenges that the Qing Empire faced in the nineteenth century. See Luo 1984, 229–35; Lococo 2002; Ven 2003. See also Pi 1991 and Michael 1949. For insightful contemporary observations in English, see also Cavendish 1898, 717; Lamprey 1868, 413. 67. Kirchner 1896, 1106. Kirchner was a student of the famous bacteriologist Robert Koch and, at the peak of his career, a professor for social medicine and head of the medical department of the Prussian ministry of the interior. 68. Ch’en 1972, 30. 69. According to the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers, this system also followed ancient Chinese examples. See XBB 1905, 2: Changbeijun yanshuo. Another installment of the article explained the pioneering role of the foreign-modeled Beiyang Army for the Lujun. See XBB 1905, 3: Changbeijun yanshuo. 70. Lianbingchu 1904, 6–7. See also Fung 1980, 28–30 and Li 1912, 53–4. The Organization Plan for the New Army was reprinted in the Eastern Miscellany in 1905, making it known to a wider public almost immediately after its publication. See DFZZ 1905 (3), 53–76. 71. Ven 1999, 63; Fung 1980, 26–27. 72. Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 46. See also Zongli Yamen [1895–1900] 2005, 448. 73. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 4. Concerning education, Zhang Zhidong in particular required that at least some of the common soldiers were literate. The Lujun leaders later envisioned that a fifth of the men should be literate and constitute the nucleus of noncommissioned officers. See Powell 1955, 63, 176. Soldiers were lectured on the importance of reading skills for the wealth of their country and informed about China’s backward literacy rate, compared to foreign countries. See XBB 1905, 5: Bing yi xiangxueshuo. 74. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 105. On the inflation of numbers in military statistics throughout Chinese history see also Wilkinson 2012, 319. 75. Shen [1895/1896] 1992a, 265. Although there are references to medical examinations during the process of recruitment, I was unable to find any specific and detailed regulations or reports. The reason might be that the recruitment plans were never fully implemented and the New Armies lacked enough qualified men to rigorously carry out the original plans. Moreover, the education of military doctors and awareness of European military medicine only emerged after the turn of the century. 76. Lianbingchu 1904, 7.


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77. In the Self-Strengthening Army the age of new recruits should range from 16 to 20 years. See Shen [1895–1896] 1992a, 265. 78. Lianbingchu 1904, 7. See also Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 45. A chi nowadays is an equivalent to the third of a meter or a foot. A cun is a tenth of a chi. During the Qing Dynasty, the exact value of a chi varied strongly, allowing it to be between 31 and 36 centimeters (12 to 14 inches). Assuming a chi was between 32 and 33 centimeters at the beginning of the twentieth century, we obtain a minimum height between 154 and 160 centimeters (5ft to 5ft 2 inches). According to Diana Lary, the Ministry of War demanded, in 1916, a minimum height of 5ft 6 inches (5ft 4 inches for “southerners”) and the ability to lift 133 jin or pounds. Lary 1985, 29–30. The adjustment made for “southerners” only appeared in the regulations of the Lujun. See Wilkinson 2012, chapter 38. 79. Kirchner 1896, 1111. The minimum height for recruits in the German empire in 1887 was only 157 centimeter, compared to the older Prussian standard of at least 165.9 centimeter (5ft 4 inches), according to Franz Hermann Froelich, a military doctor in the service of the Saxon army. Overall, the physical requirements for conscripts in the German army were much stricter, demanding not only a minimum height but also defining size spectra for the chest, head, neck, belly, limbs as well as a minimum and a maximum body weight. Froelich 1887, 185–87, 212. A comprehensive assessment of the recruitment regulations and practices in the German empire, 1871–1914, can be found in Kirn 2009, 24–39. Note that the German requirements were for the draftees of a conscript army, whereas the late Qing military reformers rather sought to create a showcase new model army. Requirements concerning chest girth, weight, diopter, and urine (for protein and sugar data) were only introduced in 1935, according to Zhu, Gao, and Gong 1996, 119. 80. Here Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1035. 81. See Kirchner 1869, 377–78. 82. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 248–49. See also Shen [1898] 1992b, 539–41; Xu [1899] 1992, 748; Schnell and Xiao 1900a, 4. 83. I was not able to identify the real name of this person. Another, rather bizarre account of German military discipline is given by Anton Leitenstorfer, a medical officer with the army of Württemberg, who included a series of so-called Kephalogramme or “spiked helmet drawings” in his book on the physiological and practical aspects of military training. To measure the discipline of a soldier, Leitenstorfer injected paint into the spike of his helmet. He then had to stand at attention under a screen, which touched the tip of the spike. The screen showed even the slightest movement, allegedly demonstrating the degree of discipline, strength, and perseverance of the respective soldier. See Leitenstorfer 1897. Such a test of discipline was not common in the German army and apparently not adopted by Chinese military reformers. 84. Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 277. 85. Ibid. 86. Ibid. Dresky also emphasized the correct position of the feet. See Dresky 1896, 14. 87. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 248–65. 88. See Mauss 1979, 114.

Forging the Male Body


89. Exercir-Reglement für die deutsche Infanterie, cited in Kirchner 1896, 1129. All the following numbers likewise exactly match those in the German regulations. Ibid., 1132–136. 90. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 260–61. 91. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 261–62. For the Self-Strengthening Army see also Shen [1898] 1992b, 545. See also NBZ 1907, 7: Lun yuejin. 92. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 309–68. 93. Kirchner 1869, 378. 94. Martin Kirchner’s study included details and statistics on distances and marching regulations concerning aspects such as breaks and provisions. Kirchner 1896, 1128–130. 95. Dresky 1896, 25. 96. Leitenstorfer 1897, 67. 97. Hull 2005, 100. 98. Storz 1992, 25–51, 115–28; See also Schulte 1977, 148–161; DeLanda 1991; Walter 2003. Observers from France and the United Stated criticized the German infantry for being too mechanical, stiff, slow, and inflexible long before the war. See Schulte 1983, 246. 99. See Bauer and Hwang 1982, 451. The basis for these translations was probably Meckel’s Elemente der Taktik (later re-edited as Grundriß der Taktik), written in 1877. 100. See Presseisen 1965, here 89–149 and also Saaler 2005. Stefan Zimmerman notes that the German military did not learn much from the Russo-Japanese War (most European states had military observers on the ground) and, like most other national armies, failed to realize the full effect of the machine gun and entrenching on the offensive doctrine. Instead, the Japanese victory was viewed as confirming the success of attack warfare conducted by a mentally superior infantry. The result, however, was the trench warfare of the First World War, already foreshadowed during the Russo-Japanese War and in earlier conflicts such as the American Civil War (1861–1865). See Zimmermann 2010. The reception of the Russo-Japanese War by German military theoreticians was also noted in China: see LX 1913, 3: Deguo bingxuejie yu ri e zhanyi hou zhanshu zhi qushi, 119–22. On the role of the machine gun on warfare see also Ellis 1993. On the global impact of the Russo-Japanese War see Steinberg and Wolff 2005–2007; Sprotte, Seifert, and Löwe 2008; Krebs 2012. 101. Storz 1992, 167–70. 102. Ralston 1990, 3–4. 103. Kolb 1991, 267–68. 104. An alternative translation is New Book on Effectual Discipline. 105. Qi [1560/1561] 1994a and Qi [1571] 1994b. 106. Parts of Qi’s books were incorporated into the Wubeizhi (Treatise on Armament and Provision), a military encyclopedia compiled at the beginning of the seventeenth century and both books were later included in the Siku quanshu, the mammoth book collection carried out under the Qianlong Emperor between 1773 and 1782. See Sawyer 2002, 110–111; see also Siegmund 2014. 107. Luo 1984, 257–61.


Chapter 1

108. See Li 2002. Most metropolitan Banner soldiers were not obliged to train their weapon skills more than six times a month and during various annual war games, which included precision marching and mounted archery. These drills, however, were “highly formalized and ritualistic,” according to Richard Smith. See Smith 1974, 140, 150, 154. See also Di Cosmo 2004. 109. See Liao 1897; Shen 1897c; Chen 1897; Huaijun wuyi ge jun kecheng ca 1897; Xu [1899] 1992. 110. Shi 1996; Pi 1990, 39. 111. During his time in Germany, Li Fengbao was also in charge of negotiating the purchase of battleships on behalf of Li Hongzhang, including the Dingyuan and the Zhenyuan, which entered service during the Sino-Japanese War. See Kaske 2002a, 11, 31; Chen 2001, 22, 177. 112. Li [1884], 2–6. Li’s translation was based on an original book authored by a German general with the Chinese name Kang Bei. 113. Ibid., fulu (appendix). Li also cites the Confucian philosopher’s emphasis on military training for fighting and defending. 114. Shen [1898] 1992b, 519–23. 115. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 243–88. 116. Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 178 and 287–322. These parts are basically similar in the Record of Military Planning and the Detailed and Illustrated Manual. 117. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 103. 118. Shen [1898] 1992b, 541. 119. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 265. 120. Ibid., 106. 121. Ibid., 265–88. 122. Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 190; Shen [1898] 1992b, 539–49. 123. Wang 1995, 70; Yu and Sun 2007, 222. I was not able to get hold of any copy of the Deguo lujun caodian rumen and the exact content of it is unknown to me. 124. XBB 1905, 1: Bubing caodian wenda, 1. The section was called caodian wenda in the following issues. 125. See NBZ 1907, 6: Lujunbu zi cui gaiding caodian, 5; Tongwenbao 1906 (184): Lianbingchu bianzuan caodian, 6. 126. For Japan see NBZ 1906, 5: Dayu, Xin jiu bubing caodian zhi kao’an, 1–4 and NBZ 1907, 10: Shuomin xin caodian, 26–8. For a comparison between the new drill codes in Germany, Russia, Austria, and France see NBZ 1907, 15: Tao Shumao, De E Ao Fa caodian zhenji fangyu zhanfa zhi bijiao, 5–7. 127. NBZ 1907, 13: Sakata Toranosuke (zhuzhuan), Du Deguo gaizheng bubing caodian yougan, 1–3 (another author is not given). 128. JJ 1908, 1 and JJ 1908, 2: Fan Chongwang, Bingfa luyao. The explanation of the image is included in another part of the article published in a later issue of the journal, which is no longer available. JJ 1908, 1 and 1908, 2: Wang E, Bubing bingfa. See also Harnisch 1999, 90. 129. Lianbingchu junxuesi 1907, 4–5. 130. The Beiyang Army’s Translation Bureau (Beiyang wubei bianyiju) participated in the publication of the code by printing the copies.

Forging the Male Body


131. Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu 1903, ce 1–4; Nanyang jiangbei xuetang 1904. The Nanyang Army was supposed to be the southern equivalent of the Beiyang Army, and supposed to include the New Armies of Jiangsu and the coastal provinces to its south. However, it never reached the same strength and importance as the Beiyang Army and the term Nanyang Army was much less common. 132. Nanyang gongxue yishuyuanyin [1898–1908]. The exact publication date of Meng’s translation is not known. The copy held by the Peking University Library is dated between 1898 and 1908. Meng Sen went to Japan in 1901 and in 1906, the same year that the Japanese army revised its drill code. The German infantry drill code (Exerzier-Reglement für die Infantrie) was structured very similarly. The code from 1906, for instance, was a small booklet containing more than 500 articles. It started with drill exercises for individual soldiers and then introduced tactical drills for smaller and, subsequently, larger units. It also included guidelines for military etiquette and, unlike the Chinese codes, songs. See Exerzier-Reglement für die Infantrie 1906. 133. NBZ 1909, 35: Lujun caodian shixing gailiang, 16–17. See also Datongbao 1909 (2): Junjie xinwen, 33. 134. Lujunbu bianyiju 1910; Wuhan shebian 1911. According to Hans van de Ven, who bases his statement on the multi-volume Chinese Military History edited by the People’s Liberation Army Publishing House, this drill code was directly translated from a Japanese one. See Ven 1996, 748. 135. Lianbingchu junxuesi 1907, 1–3. 136. Wuhan shebian 1911, zonggang. 137. See also NBZ 1909, 34: Lun bingli zhi jijie 9–11 (translation from a not specified source). 138. NBZ 1909, 34: Lun bingli zhi jijie, 9–11. For accounts on actual field tactical regulations and reports see for instance Shou [1906] 2005 and Ying [1907] 2005. 139. The New Armies released new drill codes for all its branches in 1916. See ZBZ 1916, 22: Ge bingke caodian jiang jian shixing, 10–11; ZBZ 1916, 22: Dayuanshuai miancui ge bingke caodian, 5–6. The Zhejiang Military Journal, first published in 1915, frequently reported about the war and introduced the latest war machines, including tanks, planes and submarines. 140. Dresky 1896, 25. 141. Crane and Patterson 2000, 1–12. 142. Ames 1984, 39–44. 143. Both quotes in Elvin 1989, 267. 144. Elvin 1989, 267. 145. Instead of the classic character ti, which is a compound of the characters gu (bones) and li (vessel), a simplified version was sometimes used to write ti, which consisted of the character ren (human being, person, man) and ben (root) and that is currently used as a simplified Chinese character in the People’s Republic. Apart from shen and ti, xing (literally “form”) was used in classical Chinese writings, but referred more to the body as an outline or shape than to physical aspects. There are various other characters to describe the body or parts of it, such as shi (corpse) or qu (human body). These terms are often paired with the three root words xing, shen, and ti. See Ames 1984; Sivin 1995, 12–14; Unger 2000, 101–02 and 114; Cheng 2003.


Chapter 1

146. Both shen and ti stand for the whole person. According to Susan Brownell, they more or less refer to each other in a similar way as the German terms Leib and Körper do. Leib refers to the body as a subjective, experiential category and Körper to objective matter. She describes Leib as the “body that one is” and Körper as “the body that one has.” However, she points out that the German and the Chinese concepts are different in so far as shen and ti do not constitute a subject-object dualisms and both terms can be connected to personal experience. Neither has the connotation of a lifeless container per se. In the European context, only at the turn of the nineteenth century did Körper replace Leib as object of cultivation, when discourses on health and fitness started. Only with the introduction of European and American concepts of science and physical education in the late nineteenth century, Brownell assumes, did ti become more dissociated from its subjective implications and gained a more objective, rather physical, meaning. See Brownell 1995, 15–17. On the body in Chinese history see also Linck 2001; Martin and Heinrich 2006; Heß 2006. 147. McNeill 1995. I particularly thank David A. Graff for pointing out this reference to me. 148. See Wilkinson 2012, 326. Wilkinson is wrong, though, in his assessment that calisthenics only became a standard element of army training “after the Nationalists came to power.” 149. For instance Qi [1560/1561] 1994a, 323. Military journals also contained images resembling nineteenth century woodblock prints that depicted battle scenes between Qing and foreign armies. These images were produced and arranged in very similar ways. 150. Elliott 2002, 121. Elliot refers to the link between martial arts depicted during the Boxer War in 1900–1901 and today’s kung fu movies. 151. Zhu 1910; Zhu 1911. The pictures of exercising soldiers were apparently taken in the military camps of the Fifth Lujun Division, then stationed in Shandong.

Chapter 2

Body, Space, and Daily Life

In 1906, an article in the recently launched Nanyang Military Journal emphasized the importance of clear regulations and procedures for disciplining and “molding” (taozhi) new recruits. Men had different personalities as well as different occupational, educational, and social backgrounds, and the purpose of military training was to bring them in line with each other and with the standards of the army.1 In the perception of Chinese military reformers at the turn of the century, strict military discipline translated directly into effectiveness and military strength. However, discipline could not simply be established by the threat of severe punishment for those misbehaving, or the promise of rewards for those who complied, as had been the practice in previous centuries. Instead, physical exercise and tactical drills became the new technologies to govern the discipline of the men of the New Armies. But more than that, the soldiers were enmeshed in an environment specifically designed to control, regulate, and monitor their daily life (qiju) and daily routines at all times. Following the German archetype, Chinese military reformers introduced an all-embracing form of military-industrial discipline, which linked the male body to the meticulous organization of time and space, and provided the foundation of a new concept of military masculinity. The healthy and disciplined military man became the very antithesis of the “sick men of East Asia.” What did this German model look like? In 1867, the Prussian military doctor Nütten explained in a lecture to an audience of officers that military drill strengthened the body and boosted morale. However, he emphasized that military service not only meant physical toughening-up but also introducing young men to a well-ordered and healthy way of living, in which every aspect of their lives, including nutrition, housing, and clothing, were taken care of by empathic instructors. In many cases, Nütten argued, serving as a soldier was 95


Chapter 2

a “physical and moral cure” for the young men, who would return to society as morally better persons.2 In reality, however, military service worked much more drastically on men joining the army. According to Ute Planert, the civilian identity of new recruits was transformed into a military identity and they were turned into over-disciplined and docile soldiers:3 initially, a new recruit was isolated from his familiar environment, experienced psychological regression and lost his autonomy and maturity. Intimidation, degradation, and constant disposability demanded from the individual soldier aimed at breaking his will and absorbing him entirely into the military corps. Privacy and individuality dispersed gradually as joint unit drills, lockstep marching and uniforms brought the men into line. Physical exercises, drill, and clearly defined postures “dressed” the body and led to the internalization and automation of commands and respective reactions. Outward behavior correlated directly with a mental attitude. The body became the prime object of governance through which instructors and officers gained access to the mind and were able to create a demeanor of habitual submission. The civilian ego was replaced by a military personality. The individual imagined itself as member of the military corps and part of a group that was outwardly represented by the uniform. Membership in the military organization endowed the individual with feelings of solidarity, comradeship, and security and with a symbolic share of the power of a higher force, such as the state or king. Soldiering fulfilled the desire for unanimous rules, simplicity, and pure physicality, providing an ideal of masculinity that transcended the military institution and became powerful throughout society.4 In the Army Now: Life and Times in the Barracks In Europe, only in the nineteenth century were most soldiers actually stationed in barracks and even then only for a limited period. Moreover, it is a matter of debate when standardized drill and time schedules were actually introduced to the Prussian and other early modern European armies. Over time, these armies increasingly turned into “total institutions,” where the management of time was part of effectively controlling and governing soldiers and their bodies, behavior, and identity.5 Time and timing played a tremendous role in military training and was a major technique to enforce regimentation, strict discipline, and uniformity. The modes of industrial production changed the perception of time and the organization of everyday life of the broad masses in industrializing countries in Europe and the United States. Train traffic, Fordian assembly-line work, and faster means of communication demanded strict adherence to time tables and schedules, and forced upon the body a temporal and spatial discipline connected to both work and scarce leisure

Body, Space, and Daily Life


time. Among the first industrial factories in the Qing Empire were military arsenals, iron and steel works, and shipyards, which were established from the 1860s onward to supply the Qing military forces with modern weapons. The workers in these arsenals were the first to be exposed to the time and space management of efficiency-seeking industrial production.6 Whereas most Green Standard Soldiers either housed in small camps or with their families, Banner forces lived secluded from the rest of the population in Beijing or in garrisons throughout China proper. They too lived in “Manchu cities,” together with their families and other Manchu, not in gender secluded military barracks.7 Soldiers in the Green Standard Army and the Banners only drilled a few times during a month and were not subject to the strict time schedules and meticulous regulation of daily life in barracks, as the New Armies later were: after getting up in the morning, the usual day of the soldiers in the Beiyang Army started with personal hygiene, including face and hand washing, and with preparing personal items for the day. After dressing, the soldiers had to clean up inside and in front of their tents (or shacks) by sprinkling water and sweeping the floor, according to the regulations. Twenty minutes after getting up, the chief or platoon leader inspected the tent and its cooking space and checked whether the soldiers, their uniforms, boots and bags were neat and orderly. Then, the company officer on duty again inspected both sleeping places, and instructed the men, who were lined up in front of their beds, about the further activities of the day. Finally, he examined whether all soldiers were ready to report for service and whether anyone was missing, on leave, or sick. The morning roll call concluded with a small breakfast. The whole procedure of inspections and eating was to be completed within thirty minutes.8 After breakfast, the soldiers had ten minutes to receive their weapons appropriate to the branch (infantry, cavalry, and artillery) they belonged to. They were obliged to check whether the weapons had any damage or defects. The morning drill session that followed consisted of two hours of “following commands and marching in lock-step” (zun haoling fu) on the drill grounds. Soldiers who violated the regulations or disobeyed their superiors could be sentenced to additional exercising. After the morning drill, before having lunch, the soldiers had ten minutes to examine their rifles and report any damage. After lunch, they were given two hours for private matters or self-studying the drill codes and regulations. The afternoon started with two hours of training in military etiquettes and protocols. This was followed by target practice, which included rifle maintenance, shooting exercises, and instructions concerning firing and aiming. The evening drill began almost seamlessly, after a thirty-minute break for refreshments, and consisted of two intense hours of rehearsing orders and verbal commands. Finally, twenty minutes prior to dinner, an officer inspected the rifles, collected them, and returned them to


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the armory. After dinner, soldiers had one and a half hours at their disposal, which could be used for studying drill instructions.9 The men then gathered for one hour to recite and study military theories or to receive instructions or hear a lecture by their commander. They eventually returned to their tents or rooms to rest until the lights were turned off, usually around ten o’clock or earlier, depending on the time of year.10 Every tent had to provide one man for guarding the walls or gates of the camp during the night.11 The daily routine regulations summarized above were designed for battalion camps of around 500 men during peacetime but could be customized to other occasions, for instance, when the battalion was on the move or on a campaign. Most military camps of the New Armies consisted of much more than only one battalion, because brigades (ideally half a division, around 6250 men) usually stayed together.12 Apart from this daily routine, the regulations of the New Armies stipulated two different seasonal routines, one for the summer and autumn and one for the winter and spring months. There were no days off, apart from one to two holidays every month. Each day had assigned to it a special task, such as joint battalion or army drills, the evaluation of shooting skills, field exercises, defense maneuvers, or night fighting simulations. On the first day of the month, soldiers received their salaries, which was viewed as a very sensitive matter.13 Embezzling salaries had been a common method of misappropriating military funds among the officers and military officials of the Green Standard Army. After the Sino-Japanese War, military reformers introduced a system of centralized money allocation that required the physical presence and facial check of every man. The soldier would receive his salary directly from an officer of the military administration, bypassing any intermediate agents who might pocket it.14 The condition of military barracks, where soldiers spent most of their time, was a highly important matter to Chinese military reformers. The Bureau for Military Training, the predecessor of the Army Ministry, considered the condition of barracks and military camps essential for creating a new, European-style national army, and every province was supposed to reorganize and enlarge military garrisons according to “international standards” (geguo guimo). It defined them as nearly self-sustaining microcosms, consisting (at least ideally) of dorms for the rank and file and rooms for the officers, sanitary and medical facilities, mess halls, reading and recreational rooms, prisons and detention rooms, storage space for food and supplies, as well as arsenals and armories. Outdoor facilities included cooking and washing places, barns and stables, parade and drill grounds, shooting ranges and training grounds for practicing sword fighting and calisthenics, workplaces to repair weapons, and workshops for carpenters, ironworkers, tailors, shoemakers, and other artisans.15 Soldiers were usually not allowed to move freely or behave at will while in the barracks. The regulations for the first infantry brigade of the Lujun

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division in Guangxi, for instance, offered a short, but explicit guide on how to behave in various places.16 When entering either the lecture room or the mess hall, the soldiers were supposed to line up and, in single file, enter one after the other, without shoving or loitering. In the classroom, men first had to stand at attention and salute the instructor before they were allowed to sit down. They had to sit upright and were forbidden to lean on the table, to rest the chin in their hands, to put up their legs, to turn their heads, to rest upon the elbow with one hand at the ear, or to stretch and yawn. Spitting, smoking, or drinking tea was not allowed. If questioned by the commander, a soldier had to stand up and assume an upright posture.17 In the mess hall, every man had a fixed seat, which could not be changed. Tables and chairs were always to be well arranged and orderly. Silence was required, and speaking, laughing, coughing, or spitting was forbidden. Spoiled or unclean food had to be reported back to the officer in charge, but the soldiers should not be too fussy. No one was allowed to bring his own food or cutlery. Sick soldiers were not allowed to take part in the common meals in the mess hall and had to eat someplace else or, if necessary, got food delivered to their sleeping places. The mess hall had to be kept strictly clean and swept regularly. Finally, the soldiers were admonished to wash their hands before eating.18 Yuan Shikai and his generals considered barracks not only as army accommodations and fortresses but also as places of “recreation,” where the men could regain their strength.19 The main purpose of the barracks, however, was providing the environment where ordinary civilians assumed a military masculine identity. Barracks became spaces of drill and indoctrination, where every procedure was exactly determined and scheduled. Here, the men were admonished to serve the country, obey their officers, and be loyal to their supreme commander. In the case of the Beiyang Army, this was Yuan Shikai, who paid much attention to directing the faith and loyalty of the soldiers toward both himself and the dynasty. Reportedly, a picture of him hung in every classroom and mess hall (at least in the barracks of the sixth division), projecting an image of him as a nourishing father. The soldiers of the Eighth Lujun Division (Hubei) sang songs dedicated to Zhang Zhidong, who was their supreme commander. An article in the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers reminded the soldiers, in a similar manner, that the emperor, like a strict father, knew when they were not training diligently.20 In addition to the roll call, which summoned the soldiers to report for duty, the New Armies introduced German military music to increase the coherence of the collective, and lift the morale of the troops.21 Zhang Zhidong, for instance, established a German-style musical corps as part of the Self-Strengthening Army that played German military music with the corresponding instruments. Following the relocation of the troops to Wusong near Shanghai in 1896 and after acquiring brass instruments, drums, and


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other musical instruments in Germany, the corps consisted of eleven soldiers and three civilians. At about the same time, two German officers were hired to instruct and conduct the music corps. Moreover, the Self-Strengthening Army started the translation of “Western military music books” (xiguo junyue geshu).22 The Newly Created Army, similarly, had a brass band and, later, every division of the Lujun was supposed to have a small band of around 50 men.23 Music, songs, and sounds were used to drill the soldiers, coordinate and standardize their motions and conduct, and strengthen the bond between them. Military music supported a group of soldiers to keep together in time while moving. Military regulations emphasized a correct and serious attitude on the drill grounds. All training methods had to be centrally authorized. In the case of the Beiyang Army, the Bureau for the Supervision of Drill (Ducaochu), a section of Yuan’s military bureaucracy under the powerful Bureau for the Supervision of Training (Dulianchu) in Tianjin, was in charge of approving drills and exercises. Instruction and drill should be in accordance with the latest “occidental methods” (xitai xinfa) and should be deeply internalized by all soldiers step by step. The foreign-style drill (yangcao) was divided into three sections. One hour before the actual exercise started, the men had to get ready, clean their faces and hands, put on their training clothes and hat and, for gun drill or target practice, prepare their rifle. After thirty minutes, they had to line up next to their tents and were inspected by an officer. Finally, the company would move, in strict formation, over to the drill grounds, where their uniforms and weapons were inspected again. Any changes in the number of men or any other irregularities were recorded by an officer from the Bureau for the Supervision of Drill.24 German instructors acted as overall supervisors and looked for bad practices and deficits, and inspected the general appearance of the men, including the orderliness of uniforms and weapons. They checked whether the regiment’s roster was complete and fulfilled the standards.25 Soldiers were particularly admonished to take care of their own weapon because their lives depended on it. The weapon would “protect the body” (hushen) in battle.26 According to a textbook used for instructing staff officer cadets, the drill grounds itself should be sufficiently large and located within a suitable environment. There should not be any obstacles such as trees or bushes or any adjacent civilian settlement, which might be the source of unwanted spectators.27 The Detailed and Illustrated Manual emphasized that soldiers should exercise whole-heartedly and observe the drill guidelines strictly. If anyone was not fully committed or unskilled, he could be punished with additional exercising. The performance and behavior of the men was recorded daily and they were only excused in the case of a severe injury. The drillmasters should not be lenient or hold back when reprimanding slow, slacking, or uneager

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recruits. Those who were too clumsy could be degraded and those who were either frequently ill, had bad eyesight or chronic hand and foot diseases, or suffered from an “unmentionable disease” (anji) could be dismissed at any time. New recruits had to train at extra times to catch up with the level of the company. Twice a month, the strength and skills of every soldier were to be assessed. Moreover, battalion commanders instructed noncommissioned officers on the latest drill styles and weapons technology.28 Foreign observers, such as British or American military attachés who examined the New Armies in person stated that the drill was extraordinarily tough, “to a degree that might have caused even a German recruit to revolt.”29 When soldiers were not actively exercising while their comrades did, they had to stand at attention next to the drill ground. Before starting, the unit had to stand uncluttered in file. During breaks, the posture of the men was not be crooked or tilted and they should not loll or appear to be lazy. Sitting down or squatting was not allowed. Speaking, laughing, and joking were strictly forbidden. Instructions and inquiries by the officer in charge had to be received in an upright posture, but questions and suggestions were allowed. After the drill exercises, the soldiers had to tidy up the weapons and other equipment.30 However, according to the Temporary Infantry Drill Methods, the spirit and strength of soldiers would easily wear out if the drills were not diverse and adjusted to individual abilities. If new recruits were quickly tired and unable to work hard, the army’s discipline would be harmed.31 Cadets even learned that drillmasters and instructors should pay attention to individual traits, preferences, habits, and the development of any new recruit: in this way, they would gain control over both the individual’s physical body and his mind, and the soldier would assimilate into the army corps more easily.32 In 1911, the Nanyang Military Journal published the translation of one of the most thorough (originally Japanese) accounts of various aspects of a soldier’s everyday life in the barracks. Apart from discussing how to “cultivate” military discipline and mental strength (yangcheng junji, yangcheng qili), it dealt with forming a physically healthy and fit individual, and with creating a cohesive unit of “comrades” (qinmi tongxue), who shared a room and who died together.33 Furthermore, the article discussed basic military training (such as gymnastics) but also included less common topics such as general education, language, and diary-writing: military language was supposed to be simple and brief, mirroring the frugal and fast-paced life of soldiers. Regional dialects had to be eliminated in the army. The translator of the original Japanese text remarked that men born in the south of China had to pay particular attention to the way they spoke. Diaries not only had the purpose of teaching soldiers to write but also to keep their thoughts and mood under surveillance. Moreover, a step-by-step career path explained how a man proceeded from being a simple recruit to becoming an officer.34


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The account also contained a paragraph on cleanliness and addressed the issue of health care and hygiene regimens of soldiers, which became one of the most crucial disciplinary techniques of the military in the twentieth century. In Germany, military barracks were designed and maintained according to strict scientific guidelines. The condition of the barracks and camps, the hygienic standards of military buildings, and the general environment where military men lived and operated were a prime concern for German military doctors and hygiene specialists.35 The New Armies copied these common hygiene standards and adopted German and Japanese military medicine and hygiene practices for individuals, which were linked with the purpose of both keeping military men healthy and disciplining them. Military Hygiene and Military Medicine Medical care and the services of physicians were poor and played a minor role in the Qing armies prior to the twentieth century. Although a few doctors accompanied armies during campaigns, similar to European armies until the mid-nineteenth century, only officers enjoyed treatment when injured or sick. Doctors from the Imperial Academy of Medicine (Taiyiyuan) in Beijing were dispatched to take care of high-ranking officers, who were sent back to the capital to be cured, if necessary.36 During the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864), the foreign-trained battalions started to employ European doctors, who set up a hospital near Shanghai. In 1856, the Qing government appointed Guan Tao, who had been trained at the American missionary Boji hospital in Guangzhou, as head of military medicine, but he did not manage to set up structures for the education of military doctors, military hospitals, or military medical departments.37 Foreign military observers who reviewed Chinese troops before the turn of the century, stated that “this service [i.e., the medical service] being non-existent, the Chinese soldier and sailor, when sick or wounded, has to shift for himself.”38 Another observer warned that “the science of surgery and medicine are at a low ebb,” with soldiers tending to each other or going to a civilian physician.39 From the 1860s onward, American and European doctors and missionaries were increasingly active in medical work in China. They opened hospitals and medical colleges to educate Chinese doctors in their science-based medical techniques, including anatomy. However, European and American doctors had to compete with established indigenous medical practices and ideas, and the overall acceptance of their medical concepts among the Qing Empire’s elite was relatively slow.40 By the end of the century, however, military reformers began to realize the value of “Western” medicine and surgery. In his widely received treatise Exhortation to Study, published in 1899, Zhang Zhidong emphasized that

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the “Western medical arts (xiyi zhi yi) are especially useful for the military” and those who studied military matters should pay attention to them.41 The leaders of the New Armies recognized the tremendous possibilities of “Western,” science-based medicine for the army on the whole, particularly in the fields of sanitation and hygiene. They became increasingly aware of the link between the physical and mental health of soldiers and its effects on the overall strength and effectiveness of the army. Hygienics (weishengxue), the study of practices performed for the preservation of health, received particular attention among military reformers, and the New Armies were among the first institutions in China to implement strict regimes of daily hygiene, following the German and Japanese models. Hygiene was not only useful for preserving physical health but was also an efficient technique to control bodies and govern the conduct of military men.42 The well-being of the individual was secondary and, as a Prussian textbook on military hygiene clearly stated, the aim of preserving the health of soldiers was producing a disciplined army and sustaining military strength.43 German doctors were leaders in the field of hygiene, which was a relatively recent scientific discipline that emerged in the context of discoveries about contagious and epidemic diseases. In the nineteenth century, armies in Europe, the United States, and Japan had vested interests in limiting contagious diseases, which were often the result of battle injuries and the closeness of soldiers both stationed in barracks and in the field. The military thus played a pioneering role in the development of practical surgery and hygiene. Military medicine made significant progress during and after the Crimean War (1853–1856), which caused the British army, in particular, to implement an advanced organization of sanitation and medical care.44 From the 1860s on, however, the armies of Prussia and the other German states stood at the forefront in the field of military medicine and military hygiene. German doctors gained substantial experience and new knowledge during the Unification Wars (1864–1871), leading to the steady improvement of military surgery and hygiene based on bacteriology and epidemiology. Hygiene was a very new scientific discipline—Max Joseph von Pettenkofer became the first professor for hygiene in the German states in 1865—and the Prussian army quickly adopted the new knowledge about health care and sanitation. In April 1869, it published the Instruction Concerning Military Sanitation on the Battlefield (Instruktion über das Sanitätswesen der Armee im Felde), which was standardized and extended for the whole German Empire in 1878.45 In 1869, the Prussian military doctor Carl Kirchner, who was one of the pioneers of military medicine, published the first German textbook on military hygiene. In his opinion, sickness prevention was essential for military success because “diseases are much more dangerous to armies than the weapons of the enemies, and mere healing is not sufficient to fight them.”46


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Subsequently, research in bacteriology and pathology by internationally recognized experts such as Rudolf Virchow and Robert Koch lead to decisive scientific breakthroughs in the field of contagious diseases, epidemics, and military hygiene.47 Koch was himself a Prussian military doctor à la suite, enabling him to study medical conditions within the army and advising its leaders in questions of hygiene. Apart from the scientific foundations of the discipline, including bacteriology, germ theory, and research on contagious diseases, German military hygienists were concerned with various issues such as air quality, ventilation and breathing, the environmental condition of water, ground, and light, barracks and housing, waste management, clothing, food, beverages, and tobacco. At the same time, the field of surgery was improving fast and military surgeons gained increasing acknowledgment among medical specialists. In 1895, the Kaiser Wilhelm Academy for the Education of Military Doctors (Kaiser-Wilhelm-Akademie für militärärztliches Bildungswesen) was founded in Berlin. Koch, Virchow, and many other leading medical scientists of the time were members of the academy. Although the German armies had difficulties in finding enough qualified doctors willing to serve in the army, the status of military doctors increased and the systems of peace and wartime sanitation improved considerably. During battle, every doctor was advised by a military hygienist, and every German soldier was issued a small first aid field kit, which contained antiseptics. Generally, the main responsibilities of military sanitation and health care officers, during peacetime, was to supervise the general sanitary conditions as well as the health of the soldiers, including housing, nutrition, water, the examination and dismissal of new recruits, measures to prevent diseases and epidemics, and smallpox vaccination.48 German doctors were convinced that “the strong health of our young soldiers is recognized everywhere”49 and praised the “celebrated improvements in military hygiene” made possible by the discoveries in bacteriology by Koch and others.50 During the Boxer War in 1900–1901, not one soldier of the German expeditionary corps in China was infected with tetanus, which was a very common infectious disease in Northern China at the time. Doctors and military leaders viewed this as confirmation of their successes in the field of prophylaxis.51 Knowledge about medicine and hygiene was transferred from Germany to the Qing Empire and the New Armies via Japan. As early as 1869, the Japanese government decided to officially adopt the world-leading German medicine, employing German military and civilian doctors to educate Japanese medical students.52 German-trained Japanese doctors subsequently contributed to innovative medical research and to the establishment of public hygiene administration as a fundamental part of national governance in Japan. In 1872, the physician Nagayo Sensai visited Berlin, where he was impressed by the political influence and involvement of leading physicians

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in public debates on hygiene and the link between medicine and a strong nation. Nagayo later coined the term eisei for hygiene in Japanese, which was later adopted in China (pronounced weisheng).53 One of the most influential Japanese doctors responsible for the adoption of German military medicine and hygiene by the Japanese and Chinese New Armies was Mori Ôgai, a graduate of the Tokyo Medical School and officer in the Japanese army medical service. He studied military hygiene under Robert Koch at the University of Berlin’s Institute of Hygiene. Mori’s work on hygiene was later crucial for the education of Chinese military doctors, who were taught courses in contagious diseases, bacteriology, military hygiene administration and other fields modeled after those of the Japanese military.54 Already in 1888, Li Hongzhang took over a medical school in Tianjin founded by British missionaries eight years earlier, and turned it into the Beiyang Navy Medical Academy. Foreign doctors were employed to educate Chinese students in “Western” medicine. Among one of the first groups of German military instructors and advisors, hired by Li Fengbao on behalf of Li Hongzhang, was at least one military physician with the surname Bahr, an assistant doctor in the German army reserve.55 As the number of graduates of the Tianjin medical academy was still low at the time of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895, the Qing troops had to rely on a few foreign doctors.56 Medical care was highly limited and, according to one Japanese observer, the use of “Western” medicine was the reason for the victory of the Japanese troops.57 In 1903, the Bureau for Military Training drafted an organizational scheme for the emergency treatment of soldiers wounded in battle that resembled similar plans of European armies. According to these schemes, wounded men were first treated in medical tents close to the front line and then, if necessary, transferred to a larger, better-equipped medical station or facility further away from the battlefield. If a soldier’s injuries were too severe, he could be transferred to an army hospital.58 The Bureau for Military Training emphasized that injured men had to be taken care of and allowed to rest and recuperate. If they could not resume their duties they would be repatriated or reassigned: “with many [new] ways to protect the injured or sick, all the brave [men] devoting their lives [to service] (yong yu xiaoming) need not be abandoned.”59 Following the example of European, American, and the Japanese armies, the Bureau for Military Training established a Section for Medical Service (Yiwuke) to supervise medical care and hygiene. At least every second division was to have its own Department for Military Medicine (Bingyiju) in charge of administering medical care and supervising the implementation of hygiene regulations. The Army Ministry, in 1906, included a Department of Military Medicine (Junyisi) consisting of Sections for Medical Service, Hygiene, and Veterinary Medicine.60 Moreover, He Shouren, the head of the


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Lujun Department of Logistics, was sent to the United States in 1907 to participate in the sixteenth International Congress of Military Doctors. He subsequently traveled to Europe, visiting Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and other countries to examine the state of the art in medicine as a scientific discipline, particularly military medicine.61 The International Red Cross also played a role in the implementation of hygienic and medical standards in the Lujun according to European models, and the Bureau for Military Training recognized its importance early on.62 A few weeks after the start of the Russo-Japanese War in Northern China in February 1904,63 Shen Dunhe, who had previously been in the service of the Self-Strengthening Army, founded the Shanghai Branch of International Red Cross Society (Wanguo hongshizihui Shanghai zhihui) to help Chinese civilians in the war zone. Following the war, the Red Cross continued to provide relief for natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, or epidemics, and many more branches were established all over the country.64 In 1906, the Qing government signed the Geneva Convention and in 1907, the Shanghai Branch became the Qing Red Cross Society (Da Qing hongshizihui) under the supervision of the Army Ministry. It was first headed by Lü Haihuan, who was followed by Sheng Xuanhai, one of the first commanders of the Newly Created Army and founder of the Beiyang University in Tianjin.65 After the Qing government issued provisional regulations for the Red Cross Society in February 1910, the General Staff of the army suggested expanding its responsibilities further and linking it more firmly to official and military structures. A central office should be established in Beijing and branch offices should be opened in all provincial capitals and in ports open to foreign trade. A copy of the Red Cross Statutes in Chinese should be provided for every military school, provincial governors, and general-governors. Following international models, the Red Cross and doctors of the Navy and Army should work together and consult mutually. But during war, the latter should be in charge to prevent the Red Cross from interfering with military affairs. Furthermore, the General Staff recommended jointly establishing a national military medicine school, a corps of physicians, the Brothers and Sisters of Mercy (kanhuren), and pharmaceutical laboratories to produce “Western medicine” (xiyao) and medical equipment. The purpose was to make the country more independent of foreign imports, especially during war.66 Although Chinese military reformers acknowledged the medical work of foreign missionaries and foreign doctors,67 the New Armies needed a much larger number of doctors and their education became a crucial issue. In 1902, Yuan Shikai founded the Beiyang Army Medical Academy (Beiyang junyi xuetang), which was renamed in 1906 as Lujun Medical Academy (Lujun junyi xuetang). The school was initially headed by the Japanese military medical officer Higara Seijirô as senior physician and by Xu Huaqing as

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director. Xu had studied medicine in Hong Kong, where he had also worked as an English and German instructor at the Queen’s College. Because of his outstanding course achievements and good command of German, he was later dispatched to Germany to study medicine. After his return to the Qing Empire in 1889, he gained the favor of the court for healing the Empress Dowager Cixi from an ailment.68 In the beginning, medical instruction at the Army Medical Academy was conducted by four Japanese military and civilian doctors, including one pharmacist. The academy initially had only 40 students but the number increased every year. In 1907, the first class of graduates had 35 doctors, who were all appointed to positions within the Beiyang divisions and became full military doctors after a few years of service. The academy was fully equipped with labs and a translation bureau, and had a hospital, a pharmacy, and a diseases prevention center attached to it. The four-year curriculum consisted of courses in the natural sciences, math, languages (Chinese, Japanese, English), and every existing medical discipline, including physiology, surgery, bacteriology and epidemiology, general and military hygiene, psychiatry, ophthalmology, and dermatology. The school also had a gymnastics or ticao instructor and students attended special seminars for analyzing physical exercises in the army.69 Subsequently, other medicals academies were founded to provide the Lujun with surgeons and hygienists. By 1911, there were six such schools in the Qing Empire. Moreover, a number of schools for paramedics, including the Nanyang Military Paramedics School (Nanyang lujun weisheng xuetang), were established for educating assistant surgeons, paramedics, and “hygiene teams.” Other schools, so-called mayi xuetang or shouyi xuetang, specialized in training military veterinarians, usually focusing on horses.70 Despite the increasing number of doctors, finding enough qualified men was difficult and the medical sections of the Lujun divisions were permanently understaffed.71 However, as Ruth Rogaski points out, the impact of the medical doctors on the hygienic education of thousands of New Armies soldiers was immense.72 In the late nineteenth century, hygiene became a major concern of state governments and public administrations, particularly in Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States. Hygiene regulations enabled state bureaucracies to exercise influence over the population and slogans such as Gesundheitslehre, santé publique, and public health, were propagated as comprehensive national programs. Hygienic standards became an indicator of wealth, civilization, enlightenment, and modernity. Both in Japan and China, government officials and educators adopted the European concept of hygiene and started public hygiene programs. The implementation of hygiene standards was a way to create a healthier population and fight epidemics, which had partially been introduced by foreigners, as in the case of cholera.


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Moreover, hygiene standards were instruments that increased the authority, grasp, and control of the state and Chinese officials and intellectuals viewed them as necessary to regain the status of a civilized and advanced country, in the eyes of Europeans and Americans. Japan and Germany, which had the most sophisticated programs and institutional structures concerning hygiene regulations, served as direct examples for the Chinese.73 Sarah Stevens points out that, in the context of colonial discourse and contemporary evolutionary thought, the idea of hygiene facilitated the emergence of the dichotomy of “masculine-hygienic-colonizer” versus “feminine-dirtycolonized” and the self-rendering of Chinese intellectuals as “sick men of Asia.”74 In colonial Tianjin, hygiene became an indicator of modernity for urban, educated Chinese, who imagined the Chinese people as less clean, less healthy, and, therefore, less disciplined and organized than Europeans, Americans, and the Japanese. Hygienic standards were first introduced by the administrations of the foreign concessions in Tianjin, but under the pressure of the foreign powers, the city also served as experimental ground for testing public health and sanitation programs by the Qing government. Early twentieth century Tianjin, which was under the administration of Yuan Shikai, was the first place to have a health administration bureau modeled after similar institutions in Japan and Germany.75 Like the city of Tianjin, the army became a testing ground for hygiene standards, regulations, and regimens. It was a well-structured and closed organization, where new techniques and policies could be tried: not for the well-being of individuals but in order to discipline physical bodies for the greater good of nation and society, as Nagayo Sensai defined hygiene.76 After the Sino-Japanese War, military reformers such as Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong particularly sought to fight transmittable diseases and widespread vices such as opium addiction, which they viewed as a serious and common health issue among the old Qing forces and in the same league as infectious diseases. Reform-minded intellectuals, such as Liang Qichao and Yan Fu, who first introduced “Western” ideas such as liberalism and Social Darwinism to China, criticized opium smoking as one of the major obstacles for China and the Chinese people to becoming a strong nation. Along with the custom of foot binding, these intellectuals viewed the physically weak bodies of (usually male) opium addicts as a symbol for and an indicator of the weakness of the entire society. In accordance with scientific medical discourses, they considered consumption of opium as an addiction, and not, as before, a moral character flaw and indulgence of an individual. After 1900, the Qing government signed a series of bilateral agreements to restrict and finally ban the opium trade. It successfully fought against the consumption and cultivation of opium within the Qing Empire, including an anti-opium campaign by Yuan Shikai in Zhili province. Smoking opium was declared illegal in 1906

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but the problem of habitual smoking persisted.77 Opium addiction was no more prevalent in the army than elsewhere but it still posed a serious threat for the military strength of the state. New recruits were checked for addiction to opium during their initial physical examination. In the army, smoking opium was strictly forbidden and was severely punished because it made the soldiers dizzy, slow, and dull. Like excessive drinking and gambling, military reformers rejected opium because it was highly addictive and because of its weakening effects on body and spirit. In their eyes, it not only encumbered the fitness and skills of the men but also impinged on their mood, disturb their minds, and negatively affected their comportment. The weak and listless body of the male opium smoker represented the exact opposite of the disciplined, strong, and healthy body of the new military man.78 Military reformers, moreover, hoped to increase the acceptance of soldiers among society by inculcating the men with respect for the property of the common “good people” (liangmin) and the sexual integrity of their wives and daughters. The soldiers of the New Armies were admonished not to harass and steal from civilians and, in particular, to refrain from raping. Controlling the sexual desires of common soldiers was a disciplinary technique that aimed at protecting civilians and at turning common soldiers into a compliant, patriotic, and national army.79 The Self-Strengthening Army’s Department for Foreign Drill (Yangcao yingwuchu), for instance, warned against being “frivolous” and “philandering (with) women” (tiaoxi funü). Romantic and physical contact to women was banned and the men were urged to be disciplined and focused on their drill exercises. On the other hand, sexual discipline was also viewed under the aspect of protecting the health of the soldiers. Military reformers, without possessing exact scientific knowledge of the matter, feared the weakening effects of sexually transmissible diseases on the strength of the armies. Sexual intercourse, the leaders of the Self-Strengthening Army warned, might led to a sick body, which, in turn, might be an indicator for the “crime of lusting for women.”80 Although there are no detailed reports or statistics available, some Lujun divisions had to deal with the spread of venereal diseases, according to Ralph Powell. The frequently used term “unmentionable disease” (anji) also hints at the fact that transmittable venereal diseases were an issue in the New Armies.81 From the end of the nineteenth century, the awareness of contagious diseases (chuanranbing) grew steadily in China and military reformers paid increasing attention to hygiene and medical care.82 In 1896, Liu Kunyi reported that a large number of soldiers of the Self-Strengthening Army stationed in Wusong became ill with the summer flu or had ulcers and scabies, because of the damp and hot weather. There would be no other choice than hiring “Western-trained” doctors from Hong Kong and buying “Western” medicine, he stated in a request for the necessary funds. According to his


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report, 300 outof 2700 men suffered from external diseases and wounds, which impeded their training. Consequently, the establishment of new hospitals for internal and external treatment according to “Western medicine” would be necessary.83 The responsibility of doctors in the New Armies included not only taking care of the wounded and sick, but also instructing paramedics and orderlies, observing general hygienic standards, and, together with drill instructors, monitoring the physical constitution of individual recruits. Doctors decided whether or not a sick soldier was able to attend to his duties and, most importantly, whether there was a threat of infection for the whole regiment. They should personally attend to every patient and see a sick soldier at least once a day. Furthermore, military doctors were in charge of supplying medicine and responsible for its quality. They oversaw the regimental hospitals or sick bays, and were responsible for bookkeeping, medical files, prescription lists and counterfoils, medical records, and guidelines concerning medical care. At the end of each month, doctors observed the physical check-up of the soldiers (shenti jiancha) and passed a statement to the officer in charge for reviewing. The doctors could recommend dismissing soldiers who had a “frail constitution,” were “overly sick,” or “unable to endure military service.”84 Military reformers and leaders particularly admonished doctors to be attentive to contagious diseases, and to prevent the spread of infection diseases and epidemics by any means necessary. Li Renxuan, a doctor at a military school in Guangdong, even linked the prevention of contagious diseases through hygiene to the survival of the entire “human race.” In the past, he emphasized, all kinds of disasters had been perceived as heavenly punishments. But now, with the findings in bacteriology, medicinal scientists and doctors were able to identify and describe in detail the cause of epidemics and pandemics. According to Li, hygiene was a task for the entire society and “Westerns” were much ahead. Without studying hygiene, he argued in a journal article, China, the “sick man of East Asia,” could not be cured and would die.85 Weisheng, referring to both hygiene and sanitation, became a major focus of Chinese military reformers after the turn of the century.86 The plans for the Lujun by the Bureau for Military Training from 1904 offered guidelines for medical care as well as hygiene regulations and highlighted the crucial significance of hygiene and medical work: “the prosperity of the country is connected to the army. The quality of the army is connected to soldiers. The strength of the soldiers is connected to weisheng. It is the imperative when truly maintaining an army.”87 The Bureau for Military Training warned against the four most common causes of pain and sickness in the army: shoes, saddles, cold, and heat, and pointed to the disastrous effects of lacking sufficient sanitation, because untended injuries and diseases would disintegrate and undermine military strength during battle. International sanitary

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standards should be copied and inculcated upon the men. Hygiene should be observed everywhere and always, on the drill ground and in everyday life. Rooms should be spacious, clothes and food should be clean, and the soldiers should wash regularly. To prevent epidemics, special examination rooms should be built and every battalion was supposed to have medical facilities, and every division its own hospital.88 Military journals frequently addressed the issue of hygiene in the military. In accordance with its usual style of using very simple and basic language, the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers emphasized the importance of hygiene and explained that it consisted of eight elements, which were addressed in more detail in subsequent issues: breathing, everyday life, nutrition, drill, uniforms, barracks, healing, and emergency medical care.89 From its very first issue, the Nanyang Military Journal included a rubric titled the science of hygiene (weisheng zhi xueshu), where different authors dealt with various aspects of hygiene such as environmental hygiene, skin care, cleaning habits, and “horse hygiene.” The first contribution in the rubric proclaimed that a wealthy and strong country needed a complete army, which, in turn, depended on the cultivation of qualified soldiers. Attention should be paid to understanding the use of hygiene regimens and observing hygiene in the regiment. The article stated: “the countries in East and West that emphasize the physique of soldiers, seek valiant and mighty warriors (jiuhuan zhi shi), […] [who] possess a martial spirit (shangwu zhi jingshen) and patriotic feelings.”90 The health of military men was the foundation of a strong army and, therefore, a strong country. According to Li Dehua, a prolific writer for the Nanyang Military Journal, the field of hygiene was concerned with the quality of air, light, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages and drinking water, food, as well as dental hygiene, clothing, and space, including ground, construction, and vegetation. Soldiers depended on their intellectual and physical capabilities, he argued. Whereas the first was linked to the study of tactics, the development of the later depended on hygienics. More soldiers died from malnutrition, excessive work, and diseases than from enemy fire on the battlefield. “Dying on the battlefield is glorious for men,” he stated, but all the other ways of dying could and should be prevented by observing hygiene.91 Apart from personal hygiene, which should help to prevent infections among soldiers, the correct diet and food safety, and particularly clean water, was central to hygiene measures. Li Dehua, for instance, explained in detail how to clean water and included illustrations showing how to arrange layers of different stones and minerals to filter dirty water.92 The Guangxi Lujun Division directed its cooks to make the kitchen a particular clean place. They should tidy up the shelves daily and wash the water tanks, food baskets, and the cutlery. Leftovers and waste should be disposed of at the designated


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places instead of being emptied out randomly. The soldiers were not allowed to take bowls, mugs, chopsticks, or plates to places outside the kitchen and dining room. The number of people preparing food should be fixed and the number of staff working in the kitchen should never deviate from this number. Only those people actually working in the kitchen were allowed to enter it. Food, however, was a common good and no one, including cooks and kitchen staff, was allowed to take anything without permission.93 Despite the lack of qualified doctors, an increasing number of soldiers were trained as paramedics and able to serve as assistants in military hospitals and sanitary facilities, thus helping to improve the overall situation of medical treatment and hygiene in the army. In 1903, the Beiyang Army Department for Training and Instruction (Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu) issued a multi-volume textbook covering five different topics, including one volume on Elementary Emergency Measures for Soldiers (Jundui jiuji jianfa).94 It was not only designed for paramedics but for all rank and file soldiers, giving them detailed hygienic advice and explaining first aid procedures. “Everything one does in life,” the volume stated at the beginning, “depends on the spirit. If the body is not healthy and strong, how can work and duties be endured? [Thus], the soldiers must not neglect weisheng” (hygiene and sanitation). According to the textbook, soldiers suffered from the hardships and bitterness of fighting but also from the climate, imponderable terrain, and “unsuitable diseases and wounds” (shiyi jitong shangyi).95 Therefore, it was necessary to possess the techniques to cure these maladies and be able to apply basic first aid help until a wounded soldier could receive treatment from a doctor.96 The first part of the book summarized fundamental hygienic rules for the army, referring to topics such as nutrition, clothing, personal hygiene, and housing. Camps, for instance, should ideally be erected on elevated, dry, and spacious grounds, not on valley-like and wet places, which were overgrown with wild plants and offered only foul and contaminated water. The air there was bad and harmful for people, and, in case many people were present, it became smelly and stifling. If dirty water was used in kitchens, washing places, stables, living quarters, public baths, toilets, and other locations, toxic vapors would easily concentrate. Moreover, soldiers should regularly sweep the floors to clean every facility and open the windows to ventilate the rooms. Dirty water should be poured away outside the living quarters. The textbook also paid great importance to food and drinking hygiene. Food should always be fresh; rotten food had to be thrown away. Grain, meat, and vegetables should best be consumed together, to ease digestion. For the same reason, after conducting physical labor, the soldiers should rest before having something to eat. Water should be kept clean and cold, and thrown away if it had a strong odor. The textbook emphasized repeatedly that soldiers should only

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drink boiled water. “Drinking unboiled water can easily make a person sick, it must never be drunk, great caution is necessary.” Regarding clothing, soldiers should wear uniforms that fitted perfectly and were not too tight because otherwise the blood circulation would be impeded. The coat, which the soldiers wore outside, should be adjusted to the weather conditions. Shirt, belt, and socks had to be neat and shoes of good quality, soft, and not too small. In summer, when the men were sweating at work, they should not try to cool down too quickly by pulling off their clothes. Instead they should rest and wait until the sweat dried. However, when the clothes got wet from rain, they should be changed immediately. The textbook further posited that “not washing the body was the easiest way to get sick.” After marching or drilling, the soldiers were required to wash their face, gargle, and wipe clean their hands and feet. Every morning they should brush their teeth and clean their mouth. After a meal, the men should use toothpicks “to remove all the matter between the teeth.” Fingernails should have a suitable length and be cleaned regularly. Furthermore, the whole body had to be washed diligently, but the limit of fifteen minutes should not be exceeded. The temperature of the water could be adjusted individually but should be neither too hot nor too cold, the textbook warned. Having a bath after a meal was not recommended and was even regarded as potentially harmful to the body. In the morning, the soldiers should wash their whole body with a clean wet towel instead of bathing. The time of sleep was also fixed. Every night, the soldiers should sleep at least six, but no more than eight hours.97 All these rules and guidelines seem trivial and extremely patronizing but they underscore the fact that the bodies of military men were exposed to a scrupulous disciplinary regime. Personal hygiene was a serious matter and viewed as essential for maintaining the strength of both army and nation-state. At the same time, hygiene affected the understanding of soldiers and officers as disciplined, clean, healthy, and fit men. The second, much longer part of the textbook dealt with emergency medical care, including first aid measures and the treatment of external injuries, critical afflictions, infections, and common diseases as well as techniques of sterilization, bandaging, and emergency medication. Illustrations at the end of the book showed the exact size and proportions of the emergency kit and also explained how to administer first aid. As in the case of individual gymnastics postures, these illustrations were easily accessible guides for both instructors and common soldiers and helped them to remember their first aid training (see Figure 2.1). Soldiers were taught the crucial importance of preventing any delay in helping their wounded comrades. An appendix specified the equipment and drugs of a standard first aid kit (jijiuxiang): chemical disinfectants, antiseptics, ointments, mustard (to improve blood circulation), alum powder (against infections), antipyretics, analgesics, menthol (against


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itching), bandages, tissues, dressing rolls, adhesive tape, cotton wads, and menthol tissues. A smaller field kit, which contained most of the equipment of the larger one but in smaller amounts plus safety pins, tissues, and yarn instead of real bandages, was also depicted.98 These pharmaceuticals, equipment, and techniques were ascribed to “Western medicine” and had not been used by any Chinese army previously. An article in the Nanyang Military Journal from 1911 underlined that the Lujun had been established according to “Occidental scientific and technical criteria” and thus also had to copy the “Western” scientific discipline of weisheng. According to the article, “Western” medicine possessed the drugs to fight contagious diseases and epidemics and was thus superior to Chinese medicine.99 Only some years ago, opium, which had been brought to China by Europeans and Americans, was viewed as a threat to (Chinese) physical bodies and (Chinese) civilization. However, the article argued, other drugs from the “West,” based

Figure 2.1  First aid in case of injuries through falls or blows as well as drowning. Source: Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu 1903, volume 5, p. 16.

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on medical science, were now used to preserve the health of both individuals and the population, and counted as an indicator for discipline and civilization. In the fields of hygiene and medicine, the New Armies assumed a pioneering role and served as a laboratory to test governance practices of disciplining and regulating the population. The discourse on hygiene and transmittable diseases particularly contributed to the reconceptualization of the physical body in China, which the social elite increasingly perceived as a biological organism subject to the laws of nature, instead to cosmological interpretations. The health and strength of the bodies of both military and civilian men became a major focus for government and army, which sought to secure the existence of the state by improving the “quality” of its (male) human components. This perspective on the male body altered the perceptions, representations, and practices that referred to men as men and masculinity. Punishment and Prison in the New Armies The rationale of preserving the health and physical body of soldiers fundamentally changed the way they were punished, compared to previous periods in Chinese history. Severe corporal punishment, which was aimed at retaliation and deterrence by inflicting torment on the body, was mostly replaced by the practice of imprisonment, which aimed at reforming and rectifying the mental attitude of the culprit. Imprisonment or incarceration became the standard practice of punishment in Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and resulted in the “birth of the prison” (Michel Foucault) as a potentially more efficient model of disciplining people.100 In the late nineteenth century, this led European and American observers to condemn Chinese penal practices as brutal and inhumane, particularly the way in which the death sentence was performed. Although a few Chinese scholars had criticized the excessive punishment of the body prior to the foreign intrusions in the nineteenth century, it was not until the early twentieth century that the opportunity arose to abolish practices such as the “death by a thousand cuts”: the complete dismemberment of the convict.101 Following foreign pressure and criticism, the Qing government reformed the law, criminal jurisdiction, and practices of punishment from 1905 on. For late Qing military reformers, however, other factors than humanity played a more important role: much time and effort was invested in the training, disciplining, integrating, and aligning of new soldiers and their physical bodies, which became too precious to be more or less arbitrarily harmed or exterminated. Military reformers and leaders no longer viewed corporal punishment as the most effective form of disciplining military men. On the contrary, physical punishment and torment threatened the strength of the army as a whole.


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Criminal justice in imperial China was dispensed by the civilian bureaucracy and, like other dynasties before them, the Qing promulgated a code at the very beginning of their rule, modeled after the code of the preceding Ming Dynasty. The Qing Code (Da Qing lüli) regulated the penologic relationship between the emperor and various branches of state and government, including the army. The catalog of offenses and the corresponding punishment procedure relevant for the military in the code were listed under the Board of War, which was in charge of administering the military.102 The code was gradually supplemented by various statues of military orders, which later became part of the Collected Statutes of the Qing (Da Qing huidian). The Qing military laws were more detailed, compared to the Ming military laws, but the character of punishment was the same and always stipulated corporal punishment. It was based on the Five Punishments (wu xing), outlined at the very beginning of the Qing Code, which had existed in this form since the Sui Dynasty (589–618). The Five Punishments included beating with a light bamboo stick, beating with a heavy bamboo stick, penal servitude, exile, and the death penalty. Other forms of punishments, such as the cangue, or tattooing, were also stipulated in the code and used as supplements or substitutes. According to the Five Punishments, the death penalty was to be carried out by strangulation and decapitation. In the case of severe offenses, the culprit could also be sliced and dismembered, and in some cases the head would be hung up for public exposure (this was called xiaoshou). Fines or imprisonment were not considered as penalties, although in most cases money could be used to redeem oneself from punishment, and people accused of a crime could spend a long time in detention awaiting final judgment.103 During most of the imperial period, draconian corporal punishment was generally used for the purpose of determent, exposure, and retribution. Inflicting damage on the body was not only agonizing; it also had effects on the afterlife. Death by strangulation was more tormenting, but decapitation destroyed the “somatic integrity” of a person:104 only a whole body could receive offers by the progeny of the deceased or, in folk-Buddhist or Daoist thinking, could be reborn. Removing the head or, worse, complete dismemberment, was pure horror in the popular belief system and the cosmological universe.105 In the regular Qing armies, corporal punishment for misconduct was the most important means of implementing discipline and meting out rewards served only as a supplement.106 Apart from the Five Punishments, military laws very often stipulated the piercing of one ear or the nose of the culprit with an arrow (called chajian) and marching him through the camp. In the Collected Statutes of the Qing, a difference between members of the Green Army and Bannermen was made: the latter were beaten with a whip instead of being caned with a stick. Bannermen generally received preferential

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treatment before the law and were more often able to commute sentences into a lighter form of punishment.107 As part of the common criminal law administered by the civilian bureaucracy, and because of the scattered organization of the army, several provincial and central institutions were involved in the process of criminal jurisdiction and punishment. The first level of jurisdiction was the provincial authorities, headed by the civilian general-governor or the Banners. In the capital, the Board of Punishment usually revised every case of a person sentenced to penal servitude, exile, or death. The last two cases could also be passed on to the Censorate (Duchayuan), the Court of Revision (Dalisi), or other higher institutions.108 Between 1895 and 1904, before the foundation of the Lujun, the idea of military criminal justice did not change substantially, including the practice of and reasoning for punishment. The threat of severe corporal punishment remained one of the most important techniques to enforce discipline. The SelfStrengthening Army proclaimed a simple carrot and stick philosophy not unlike the statutes announced under the Qianlong Emperor in the eighteenth century. Its codes stated, that “the wicked and sly should be punished and the honest rewarded.”109 The Detailed and Illustrated Manual similarly instructed officers that “the way of governing soldiers lies between leniency (kuan) and severity (yan).”110 Imposing punishment should be severe but fair in the case of malpractices, crimes, and violation of the army code, whereas good performance, obedience, and loyalty should be rewarded. Officers and instructors should not be cruel, brutal, or excessive when punishing but lead with a firm hand, to discipline and encourage their subordinates. Military discipline had to be “precise without ambiguity,” otherwise reward and punishment would be “turned upside down and discipline become slack.”111 The penal codes for the Newly Created Army and the Beiyang divisions stipulated beheading for a multitude of offenses such as cowardice, not following orders or acting without orders, feinting illness, erratic and slow behavior during drill and battle, failure to protect a commanding officer in battle, losing or abandoning weapons and equipment, betraying secrets, harassing and stealing from the people or—in the case of officers—commanding or allowing soldiers to steal, abuse or rape women, “aligning with an organization which deludes the masses” (i.e., a secret or revolutionary society), causing an uproar and fighting with other soldiers, opposing officers, smoking opium, and leaving the regiment without permission. Lesser wrongdoings, such as excessive drinking, gambling, or “being undisciplined” could be punished by putting arrows through one or both ears or the nose but were usually subject to the officer’s discretion. Any violation of the regulations a man committed would be noted down.112 When the establishment of the Lujun was promulgated in 1904, the Bureau for Military Training announced that even light punishment for common soldiers should imply the idea of


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“bending the body (quti zhi yi), so the person knows self-respect and that the law is never lax.”113 For officers, however, salary cuts were stipulated as the standard penalty.114 Legal reforms initiated in the early twentieth century affected the perception and enforcement of punishment and its role in disciplining men in the army. The death penalty, as such, was not abolished but in 1905, the Qing government banned all penal practices that were considered brutal and uncivilized, including slicing and the public exhibition of the head of a beheaded. Five new punishments were adopted, replacing the previous ones: fines, custody (from one day to up to two months), prison sentences (ranging from two months to fifteen years), life sentence, and the death penalty.115 In the latter case, the gallows were used for executions. All these forms of punishment counted as more “humane,” however, these new techniques and practices of punishment also offered new possibilities for disciplining people. While prisons had hitherto only been used as a limbo, where criminals or suspects were confined to await trial, execution, deportation, or penal servitude, it became the core of the new crimina l law in early twentieth century. After Qing delegations to the United States, England, and other European states had inspected the latest model prisons in those countries, a powerful movement developed to promote imprisonment as a method to stimulate repentance. In 1908, a new criminal code was proclaimed that was modeled on the German and Swiss-based Japanese juridical systems, and new, innovative model prisons were constructed, for instance the Beijing Number One Prison. Overall, the focus of punishment and penal practices shifted from the body to the mind. The physical body became the means to an end, rather than being the object of punishment itself. The ideas of reeducation and redemption of the mind and heart of the criminal replaced retribution and public exposure.116 For many military reformers, military-strategic considerations added to the general reasoning for reforming the criminal law and the penal regulations of the Lujun. The notion of “dispensing rewards and punishment impartially” (xinshang bifa), which implied the threat and infliction of severe corporal punishment, was gradually replaced by new codes that aimed at curbing old practices and limiting the death penalty. The male physical body increasingly counted as a precious resource, or even weapon, and harming it disrupted the strength of the army and military power as a whole. Discipline should less be improved through the pain of corporal punishment and the death penalty but more by imprisoning a soldier and affecting his mind and psyche. Beheading and penal servitude remained the sentences for particular heavy breaches of regulation, such as the betrayal of secrets and desertion, but could often be transformed into prison sentences from one month to a lifetime, depending on the degree and circumstances of the crime, and whether martial law was in effect or not.117 From 1907 on, the Army Ministry issued several

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new regulations, such as the Army Punishment Regulations (Lujun chengfa zhuanzhang), which introduced salary cuts and confinement as standard penalties. Moreover, the regulations denounced arbitrary corporal punishment and uncontrolled violence inflicted by officers and demanded that the victims concerned report its occurrence.118 In September of the following year, the Army Ministry issued a compendium of comprehensive penal regulations. Among them was the Army Punishment Regulation for Misconduct (Lujun chengfa guoshi zhangzheng), which listed over thirty possible offenses, including “unmotivated drill” and “dirtying one’s room and [thus] obstructing hygiene.” The standard penalty was confinement for up to 30 days, depending on the rank and position of a common soldier or officer. All confined soldiers experienced salary cuts during their time in prison and were only allowed to leave their cells for exercising. Cadets were allowed to attend lectures while serving a sentence.119 A supplementation issued later specified prison procedures and the requirements for prison cells, emphasizing that the prisoners had to be treated and supplied well. This military prison regulation determined precisely the size, design, and furnishing of the small single-person cells, as well as the daily routine prisoners had to follow. The cells should be approximately four meters high, but only two meters in width and one and a half meters in length, containing nothing else but a pallet, a small window, and a door with a small hole to pass food through. It was forbidden to drink, smoke, sing, be noisy, or talk to prisoners in adjacent cells. In addition to food, hot water, and salt, convicts received medical treatment when they were sick, and, if necessary, they were relocated to a military hospital. Prisoners such as army artisans and cooks who could not exercise with their platoon, had to clean the cells and other facilities during their penalty time. Prisoners were allowed to receive other soldiers as visitors but could not get any gifts. The prison staff and director should be specially trained and have their tasks and responsibilities outlined in detail.120 Another regulation from 1908 (Lujun jianyu zhangcheng) formulated a two-level system of military prisons for soldiers who committed capital crimes. Every division should have one prison for convicts who had to serve sentences from more than a month up to ten years under the direct supervision of the division command. On the second level, the prison of the Department for Military Law of the Army Ministry (Junfasi) housed convicts sentenced to more than ten years, as well as other felons. The staff of military prisons should be specially trained, with fixed responsibilities, conditions of employment, and equipment. It is not apparent whether the jailors and overseers had to be soldiers, but it seems that they were not part of the military police (Lujun jinchadui), which was the highest authority concerned with the observance of discipline and the investigation of violations against the regulations.121


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In case of wrongdoings, the prison personnel were subject to the army’s regulation on misconduct. They were strictly forbidden to mistreat the convicts and should be monitored by the prison director and by independent prison inspectors. The medical personnel of troops stationed nearby were in charge of the hygiene in the prisons. Every ten days, the military doctors should inspect whether the rooms were clean and examine and treat prisoners who had been transferred to the medical station of the prison, the army camp, or a military hospital, if necessary. At the beginning of their sentence, prisoners underwent a physical check-up. In prison, they had to shower every five days, their heads were shaved every ten days, and they had to wear a blue and red prison uniform, which visibly turned them into criminals and convicts. If a prisoner died, a doctor had to examine the body and friends of the dead could claim and repatriate the corpse, which would otherwise be buried at a military burying ground (junyong zangdi) close by.122 Apart from other general rules concerning standard procedures in cases such as visits or how to deal with prisoners sentenced to death, the regulations precisely outlined the (possible) design of the prison building itself.123 There should be cells for convicts with determined and undetermined prison time, death rows, different cells for officers (or cadets) and common soldiers, an indoctrination room, a tool room, a sick bay, a bathroom to wash and cut hair, a visitors’ room, storage rooms, and a dark cell for solitary confinement. The jailors had separate rooms to store equipment, to cook, work, and rest, as well as bathrooms. Prisoners had to strictly follow the prison regulations and the instructions of the jailors, and could be awarded a badge for good conduct. Finally, the prisoner’s daily nutrition was precisely regulated.124 An article by Zhang Liangyuan in the Nanyang Military Journal, entitled Investigation Report on Army Prisons, discussed the general meaning of prisons, their implication for the military, and their role in the relationship between soldiers and citizens. Referring to the idea of a citizen’s state and citizen-soldiers, Zhang emphasized that the old practice of focusing on the flesh as an object of punishment was insufficient. Criminal punishment should instead concentrate on the spirit of the offender and the “handcuffing of his mind” (zhigu qi jingshen) by restricting his freedom and imprisonment. He argued that the introduction of prisons depended on the living standards and the degree of political and military participation of the citizenry, for whom freedom was the most important issue. “The Germans often say that the army is the representative of the people.”125 However, he claimed, China had not yet fully transformed itself into such a citizen’s state and the practice of imprisonment thus had its limits. Only temporarily conscripted citizensoldiers, who cherished their freedom, should receive a prison sentence, particularly because the most common offense was desertion. For mercenaries, on the other hand, prison sentences were not required.126

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Changing perceptions of discipline and punishment accompanied the institutional reorganization of the military and the introduction of military jurisdiction modeled on the German and Japanese examples. In 1910, Zaitao, a young uncle of the Emperor Puyi, who was strongly involved in military affairs, demanded ceding military justice entirely to the army and the Army Ministry. He listed four points to justify his claim: first, if the army alone was to judge over offenses committed by soldiers, the unity within the military and its autonomy from the civil bureaucracy would be strengthened. Second, legal professionals could be involved in military trials but a member of the military should always preside over the proceedings. This way, the prestige of the whole army would increase. Third, the chairman of a military trial (Junfa huiyichu) should have a higher rank than the defendant, in order to maintain the military hierarchy. Fourth, he argued that a person without military training could never understand the particular context of a soldier committing an offense. Any crime perpetrated by a member of the army should be judged according to military law and not according to the general criminal law.127 Zaitao, citing “international practices of military organization,” viewed military jurisdiction as essential for establishing a truly autonomous military that was independent of the civilian bureaucracy. In a supplement to his demands, he underlined that the Supreme Court of Justice (Daliyuan), which replaced the old imperial Court of Revision in 1906128, did not have the competence to handle cases involving military law. For the sake of the cohesiveness and unity of the army, military law should be independent, following internationals standards of punishing soldiers.129 In October 1910, the Army Ministry promulgated the Pilot Scheme Regulation for Military Trials (Lujun shenpan shiban zhangcheng). It emphasized: “In every military organization in East and West, crimes committed by soldiers occupy a special place. Thus, they are not tried by regular courts but by special councils for military justice.”130 According to the scheme, only these military courts, staffed by professionals trained in military justice, were able to take into account the particular martial spirit of soldiers.131 The principal jurisdiction over soldiers was now placed in the hands of the military itself; civilian legal authorities were only allowed to assist.132 Overall responsibility for military law proceedings and supervision of military prisons lay with the Department for Military Law of the Army Ministry. The military penal code was supplemented or revised several times between 1910 and 1915 and new, more detailed prison regulations were implemented under Yuan Shikai’s government.133 In 1913, for instance, it promulgated a preliminary Order Concerning Punishment in the Army (Lujun chengfaling), and in 1915 a systematic Army Penal Regulation (Lujun xingshi tiaolie) as well as a Military Trials Regulation (Lujun shenpan tiaolie).134


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The preface of the original Pilot Scheme Regulation for Military Trials from 1910 stated that both old customs and international (geguo) practices had been carefully deliberated for devising this preliminary regulation. As stated above, Japanese and German laws again played a major role as examples. German military criminal law and military jurisdiction counted as among the most advanced in the world and influenced the military law and practice of punishment in the New Armies.135 In the military criminal codes of the German states, corporal punishment was increasingly replaced by imprisonment during the nineteen century. Moreover, the scope of the military criminal law was limited to include only disciplinary violations and it was adjusted to the civil law. The purpose was to attract a larger social variety of people to the army and, on the other hand, preserve the army’s fighting strength.136 Chinese military reformers emulated foreign ideas and practices, but they were also able to draw on the quite detailed regulations concerning military-related offenses in the eighteen and nineteenth century Qing statutes, which already differentiated between peacetime and wartime, or intentional and unintentional offenses. The introduction of an independent military jurisdiction to strengthen the autonomy of the military, on the other hand, was entirely new and contributed strongly to the professional pride of the New Armies.137 Conclusion: Li Jishen and the Molding of Men In the army, the death penalty continued to be carried out by decapitation, although the new general law codes stipulated using strangulation or the firing squad as the standard form of execution, which was also the practice in the German and other European armies.138 But overall, the perception and use of corporal punishment in the context of discipline and governance changed strongly among military reformers and officers. A textbook for staff cadets, published during the early years of the Republic, stated: “corporal punishment is the most extreme form of punishment” and should therefore only be used as a last resort.139 Whereas the death penalty had always counted as an extreme punishment, which should not be administered thoughtlessly, this textbook denounced any form of corporal punishment. Soldiers had to be punished for their wrongdoings but arbitrary physical punishment created hard feelings and resentment, the textbook emphasized. Instructors and educators should take into account the motives, personality, disposition, and intellect of a man as well as the specific circumstances under which an offense or crime was committed. Officers should not lose their temper, remain calm and serious, and never punish in rage or for personal reasons.140 The author of the textbook, Li Jishen, was a graduate of the Army Staff Academy, who later became an academy instructor and subsequently held

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various posts in the Military Education Department of the Army Ministry (Lujunbu junxuesi).141 He advocated a middle way between reward and punishment to “cultivate” (yangcheng) and “mold” (taoye) common soldiers. Instructing and exhorting men consisted of “active” or “positive” and “passive” or “negative” techniques of governance. The active techniques included guidance and encouragement as well as physical exercise. Coercion, restriction, the observance of strict personal hygiene, and punishment were passive techniques. Li emphasized that punishment and praise, as well as rewards, should only be meted out with hesitation. Awarding too many certificates of merit, medals, and souvenirs, as well as preferential treatment, was harmful because it caused vanity, suspicion, and a feeling of inequality among the men. As in the case of severe and immoderate corporal punishment, resentment toward the instructors arose and the consequence could be a “depression of the collective spirit” of the regiment.142 According to the textbook, control over body and spirit were central to the philosophy of military instruction, which aimed at completing the development of the individual and its transformation into a compact unit. Military education had to focus on “nourishing a firm military spirit (junren jingshen) and strict military discipline.” Skills with weapons and physical strength, and the “comprehension of military discipline” (junjixin) were equally important for modern troops.143 Li’s notions about military drill summarized the state-of-the-art knowledge and understanding of military discipline and drills, including the relationship between individual physical exercise and closed-unit drill. Referring to various, but not specified military regulations from Japan, Germany, Austria, Russia, France and Italy, Li demanded paying strong attention to the assessment of the individual soldier, particularly his psychosomatic condition. When supervising and observing common soldiers, educators should take into account the individual differences of personality and disposition, including “pre-birth” qualities such as gender, physical constitution, and psyche, as well as “after-birth” qualities such as age, education, and other factors that might affect a person’s personality and spirit.144 Instructors should comprehend and govern the body of a soldier through physical exercise and moral and intellectual education (deyu zhiyu). Without a healthy body, Li argued, there would be no morale and no knowledge, because both were “stored” within the body. Because the mandatory medical examination at the time of recruitment could not fully determine whether a body was sick, the new soldier should be observed permanently and closely: healthy men were patient, perseverant, and never behaved erratically or overstepped the regulations. Bodily development should be monitored closely. The physical status of the soldiers had to be scrutinized constantly by inspecting their physique, diagnosing their physical constitution, and observing and conditioning their movements during drill and work. Men should also be observed when


Chapter 2

eating, drinking, and sleeping. In addition, the color of their hands and hair should be checked regularly. Educators and instructors should determine a soldier’s character by monitoring his friends and acquaintances, his preferences, the books he was interested in, his daily behavior, respect for his teachers and other people, and his general ability to judge specific situations. The military spirit of an individual soldier should be evaluated by examining his knowledge and interests.145 For Li, the concept of “reward and punishment” was unsatisfactory and he considered the close control and regulation of the physical body to be far more effective.146 He and other military reformers, leaders, and instructors started to turn away from administering harsh and draconian corporal punishment as a deterrent and enforcement of discipline. They increasingly perceived a military man and his body as a resource, which had to be managed and tended, to improve the quality of the army and military preparedness. The aim was not to break the physical body but to discipline the mind and govern the conduct of military men by drilling their bodies. Imprisonment as new standard of punishment, for instance, aimed at repentance and mental submission. Military prisons as well as military laws and courts, however, interacted mutually with common societal developments and referred to spheres such as military autonomy and professionalism, civil-military relations, military service and citizenship, which will be addressed in the following chapters. To be sure, strict discipline remained the nucleus of military training but the way it was perceived and enforced changed fundamentally. Physical exercise and drills were combined with the close regulation, control, and literal regimentation of every aspect of the soldiers’ lives, aligning them physically and psychologically and transforming them into a depersonalized, homogenous group. The regulation of spaces such as barracks and prisons played a tremendous role in preserving the life of soldiers. But establishing strict order, daily routines, hygiene regimens, as well as limiting the death penalty and the threat of transmittable diseases were, more than anything else, disciplinary techniques. Following the German, Japanese and other foreign role models, the Chinese army turned into a “total institution,” which carefully arranged, supervised, and governed daily life in the army and surrounded the exclusively male soldiers with a space of permanent conditioning and meticulous regulation of the body and its functions. Military reformers believed this to be the very way to create better soldiers and, physically and morally, better men. notes 1. See NBZ 1906, 3: Tao Junbao, Lun lujun lishi, 18–21. 2. Cited in Ulrich, Ziemann, and Vogel 2001, 62–3. Nütten particularly referred to conscripted soldiers, who could become full citizens by doing military service.

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3. This is a summary of the article Wie man aus Menschen Soldaten macht (How to turn humans into soldiers) by the historian Ute Planert. The article is an idealtypical analysis of the particular technologies of military discipline and considers the nineteenth century Prussian army, by far the predominant force in the German Empire 1871–1918, as the prime example for systemized methods of forming, conditioning, and dressing rank and file soldiers. Planert 1994. For an account of discipline in the British army in the nineteenth and twentieth century, see French 2005, esp. chapters 3 to 5. This chapter is strongly informed by Michel Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power and his notion of “docile bodies” in his book Discipline and Punish, see Foucault [1975] 1979, 135–69. 4. Planert 1994. Planert also argues that the army is central for perpetuating social hierarchies outside the military, particularly with respect to gender inequalities in a patriarchal society. See Planert 1994, 84. 5. Wilson 2008, 30. The term “total institution” was coined by Ervin Goffman to describe the almost absolute grasp of institutions such as the military on its members. See Goffman 1961. 6. Hwang 2001, 38. 7. See Elliot 2001, 89–132. On the Green Standard Army see also Luo 1984. 8. See Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 53–5 and Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1047. 9. Having breaks after meals before starting with physical exercise was viewed as important for health reasons. See also Kirchner 1869, 373. 10. The times to get up and go to sleep were given in the old wugeng-system, which divided the day in five day and five night watches of unequal duration, depending on the time of the year and the hours of daylight. See Wilkinson 2012, chapter 40. 11. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1048–049. 12. An overview of the Lujun divisions and brigades is provided by Ch’en 1960. 13. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1055–062. 14. See for instance Yuan 1980, 808; Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 126; Zhang and Duanfang [1902] 2005, 195. 15. Lianbingchu 1904, 17–18. Stephen R. MacKinnon argues that the loyalty and morale of the Beiyang soldiers were rather low because of the poor living conditions they experienced including, among other things, the severe enforcement of discipline and forced conscription. See MacKinnon 1973. Nevertheless, military reformers recognized that excellent accommodations and training facilities were important for introducing European-style army organization and discipline. For an early Republican account on barracks (translated from the Japanese) see also ZBZ 1916, 30: Wu Qintai, Jundui shenghuo, 41–9. 16. According to Ch’en, the Lujun division in Guangxi province had no number assigned to it. According to Powell this was officially the twenty-fifth division. See Ch’en 1960. 17. Guangxi changbeijun budui [1907] 2005, 412. 18. Ibid., 415–16. A detailed account about supplying and feeding soldiers (probably a translation from the Japanese) is NBZ 1908, 26 and 27: Zuozhan geiyanglun. The article also discusses food rations and compares them to the nutrition of the German and Austrian armies. 19. Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 294.


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20. Powell 1955, 229, 277. See also Zhao 2001, 75. XBB 1905, 1: Gong du zheng yue ershi ri. 21. Military music as such, to be sure, was no novelty and part of most armies and wars in former dynasties. See for instance Graff 2002, 148. 22. Zhang 1987. For a detailed purchase order of musical instruments such as trumpets and pipes for the Self-Strengthening Army in Germany see Shen [1895/1896] 1992a, 420. The Western Drill of the Self-Strengthening Army included a chapter on military music studies (junyuexue). See Shen [1898] 1992b, 522, juan 14. 23. Fung 1980, 21; Powell 1955, 76. On the role of military music in Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth century, see Heidler 2010. 24. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1049–054. 25. Ibid., 1083. See also Shen [1895/1896] 1992a, 325–35. 26. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1054. 27. Li 1912, 61–3. 28. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1051–055. 29. MacKenzie 1907, 215. See also Powell 1955, 227–28. 30. Guangxi changbeijun budui [1907] 2005, 413–14. 31. Lianbingchu junxuesi 1907, 1–3 . 32. Li 1912, 47–54. German military educators emphasized a similar careful attitude toward the so-called “untrained material.” See Leitenstorfer 1897, 67. 33. NBZ 1911, 55 and 56: Lujun ruwusheng zai ying zhi xunyulun. 34. NBZ 1911, 57: Lujun ruwusheng zai ying zhi xunyulun, paragraphs 12 and 16. 35. See for instance Kirchner 1869, 247–68; Froelich 1887, 284; Kirchner 1896, chapter 8; Bischoff 1910. See also Hladík 1914, chapter 12. Kirn argues that the barracks and drill ground were central spaces for the everyday life of German soldiers. See Kirn 2009, 115, 124. For a short account in Chinese on the housing and supply of the German army see Shen 1897a, 9–10. A military journal article from 1914 addressed the importance of maintaining hygienic standards in field camps to prevent infectious diseases, which “extraordinarily consumed” the physical health and morale of soldiers. LX 1914, 6: Muying zhi yanjiu, 13. 36. Zhu, Gao, and Gong 1996, 88. 37. Ibid., 89. Sun Yat-sen later also studied at Boji. 38. Cavendish 1898, 717. This assessment by Alfred Cavendish, British military attaché to the Qing Empire, was published in 1898 but did not take into account the developments after 1895. Instead, he examined Banner forces, the Green Standard Army (including the retrained Disciplined Forces), and the Brave Battalions. 39. Lamprey 1868, 418. J. Lamprey, a British military surgeon who apparently was in the temporary service of Charles Gordon, also had much cause for complaint about the hygienic conditions in the military camps of the “Chinese army.” It is not clear whether he was referring to Green Standard Army soldiers or to the Brave Battalions. Although the camps he visited were well organized, the tents were “dirty,” “untidy,” the “ground was not swept,” and he reported “filthy water” and “bad sanitary conditions.” The “latrine arrangement” was “very defective” and “in a horribly filthy state.” He also described the helplessness of Chinese doctors during a cholera epidemic. See Lamprey 1868, 411, 418–19.

Body, Space, and Daily Life


40. Hillier and Jewell 1983, 21–2; Ma 2009. See Iris Borowy’s introduction for a brief juxtaposition of “Western” and “Chinese” medicine, Borowy 2009. See also Scheid 2007. 41. Zhang [1898] 1998, 9740. 42. According to Ivan Crozier, healthiness became a “paradigmatic form of discipline.” See Crozier 2010, 4. 43. Kirchner 1896, III-IV. 44. Hedinger points out that the Japanese government consciously decided against England and the Netherlands, and in favor of Germany as the role model for medical reforms in the early 1870s. See Hedinger 2008. Concerning medicine and hygiene, Chinese (military) reformers were predominantly influenced by Japan. Nevertheless, a few articles in military journals took into account the practices and regulations of the British army. See for instance NBZ 1907, 12: Yingguo lujun ma pao gong bu zizhong weisheng ge dui zhi bianzhi and NBZ 1908, 18: Yingguo lujun weisheng zhidu. 45. This was then called Kriegssanitätsordnungen, which was revised in 1907. See Pilster 1981. On Britain see also Harrison 2010. 46. Kirchner 1869, III. 47. See also Virchow’s own lecture on the topic of military medicine and infectious diseases from 1874, Virchow 1874. 48. Ring 1962, 191–213. See also Linton 2010. 49. Cited in Ulrich, Ziemann, and Vogel 2001, 63. 50. Kirchner 1896, III. 51. Ring 1962, 203. 52. Käser 2008; Hedinger 2008. 53. Literally, weisheng means “protecting life” and originally, in Daoist medicine, stood for the idea and practices of prolonging one’s life to ultimately reach immortality. See Rogaski 2004, 1–2 and Schulte 2008a, 144–49. 54. Rogaski 2004, 136–44, 189; Hedinger 2008, 129–31. Koch visited Mori and other former students in Japan in 1908. 55. Kaske 2002a, 39, 41. 56. Cavendish reported of foreign doctors attending to the many wounded in Yantai, Niuzhuang (Yinkou), and Tianjin in overly crowded hospitals during the Sino-Japanese War. He referred to the hospital under Li Hongzhang in Tianjin and other hospitals run by missionaries of various foreign confessions. Cavendish 1898, 717. 57. Rogaski 2004, 157–60. 58. Ren 2003, 6–7 . See also the image in BBZ 1910, 2: Fangshoushi ji weishengdui zhi jiuhu. For the German example see Ring 1962, 203–13. 59. Lianbingchu 1904, 15–16. 60. Brunnert and Hagelstrom 1910, 145; Lianbingchu 1904, 15–16; Luo 1997b, 243–44. Hygiene and medical care for horses was frequently addressed in military journals. See for instance NBZ 1910, 42 and 43: Lujun bingma kanhufa and NBZ 1911, 56: Riben lujun mapi chuanranbing yufang guize. 61. I believe the congress took place in Jamestown, New York. The outcome of He’s mission is not clear. Available reports only deal with his travel expenses


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from China to San Francisco, Washington, Jamestown, New York City, and Europe. See NBZ 1907, 11: Paiyuan ru wanguo junyihui; Ha 1999b. 62. Lianbingchu 1904, 15. 63. The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in Northern China in February 1904 fueled the debate of medical care in the military around the globe. According to an article in the Nanyang Military Journal, the Russo-Japanese War offered an excellent opportunity to study the impact of new weapons and the damage they inflicted on human bodies. In 1907, an international conference of surgeons convened in Berlin to discuss precisely this issue, the article reported. See NBZ 1908, 18: Ri E zhanyi zhong zhi waike yishu. On the New Armies’ later engagement in Manchuria concerning health care see Ha 1999a. Japanese colonizers viewed Manchuria as particularly disease ridden and in 1910 the bubonic plague killed more than 60,000 people. See Rogaski 2010 and Summers 2012. 64. Reeves 2011. On earlier attempts to establish a Red Cross Society in order to introduce international notions of civilization, and its connection to the Hague Conventions of 1899, see also Reeves 2005. 65. After 1911, Lü served a second term as director. The society was then renamed into Chinese Red Cross Society. See also NBZ 1907, 13: Wanguo chishizi zonghui. 66. XT, chapter 19, 26–7. See also Brunnert and Hagelstrom 1910, 146–47. 67. For instance, in 1913, Yuan gave a speech full of praise during the national conference of missionary doctors in China. See Eckart 1989, 186. 68. For a short review of the development of the school see Ha 1999c and, for the time after 1911, see Zhang and Sun 1987, 353–55. 69. Hou 1986, 316–17. Hou’s text is a translation from a Japanese newspaper article of 1909. See Rogaski 2004, 343. Psychology was also taken into account by military doctors and reformers. One rather odd, although scientifically based suggestion from 1916 by a certain Yue Zhang was to use hypnosis to improve the performance of soldiers. ZBZ 1916, 31: Yue Zhang, Cuimianshu yu junshi shang zhi yingyong. Observing gymnastic exercises was also part of the responsibilities of German military doctors. Max Rudeloff states in his book that “every military doctor can be expected to know the details of military gymnastics and to be able to offer advice, if necessary.” Rudeloff 1873, 30. 70. Brunnert and Hagelstrom 1910, 320–21. There are numerous short reports on newly established military hospitals, schools for military doctors and medics, military pharmacies, and regional departments administering medical care throughout the country in the Nanyang Military Journal. A more comprehensive account of a school offering a short, intensive program to educate “hygiene teams” is NBZ 1907, 9: Ben gongsuo xiang qing kaiban sucheng weishengdui xuetangwen, 12–31. 71. Both Ralph Powell and Edmund Fung, who base their studies on contemporary foreign observers, criticize the health care as the “most backward” (Fung) part of the Lujun, in particular for treating wounded soldiers and for surgery. The lack of up to date equipment and foreign-educated doctors was only partly compensated by foreign missionary doctors. They agree, however, that the quality of sanitation generally increased significantly. Powell 1955, 293; Fung 1980, 231. Edward Dreyer comes to

Body, Space, and Daily Life


the same conclusion, stating that medical services were insufficient “despite elaborate proposals.” Dreyer 1995, 34. 72. Rogaski 2004, 189. 73. Schulte 2008a, here 148–49; Hedinger 2008, 116; Bu 2009. 74. Stevens 2004, 665–66, Heinrich 2008, 15–37. 75. Rogaski 2004. 76. Ibid., 153. 77. Dikötter, Laamann, and Xun 2004, 104–11. 78. See for instance Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 59; Shen [1895/1896] 1992a, 347–48. For a memorial by the Army Ministry from 1909 addressing the issue of opium addicts among old and new troops, see XT, chapter 10, 50–2. On the role of male opium addicts as strong visual embodiment of the “sick man of East Asia,” see Paulès 2008. 79. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 55, 67, 1145–146. 80. Shen [1895/1896] 1992a, 379. 81. Powell 1955, 235. Further research might be able to shed more light on the issue of sexuality in the Chinese military. Venereal diseases were also an issue in the German army. See Kirn 2009, 280–81. 82. On the ideas of “contagion” and epidemics in China see Leung 2010 and Hanson 2011. 83. Shen [1895/1896] 1992a, 407–11. 84. Guangxi changbeijun budui [1907] 2005, 439–41. See also Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1085. Military doctors were probably also in charge of controlling the use of harmful and addictive substances such as alcohol and opium, but drug abuse was usually a topic for the punishment section of manuals and regulations. 85. NBZ 1908, 24: Li Renxuan, Chuanranbing zhi weisheng yu renzhong cunwang zhi guanxi. 86. Note that in the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, the issue of medical care was not very prominent and the term weisheng did not appear, although hygiene regulations were included. 87. Lianbingchu 1904, 15. 88. Ibid. 89. XBB 1905, 8: Jundui weishengxue qianshuo. 90. NBZ 1906, 1: Zuo Qiqing, Weisheng zhi xueshu, 1. See also NBZ issues 1906, 2; 1907, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, and 15 for other contributions for the rubric. From its inception in 1914 on, the Zhejiang Military Journal frequently reported about hygiene in the field, including examinations of the experiences of the German and other armies during the First World War. In 1916, it started a series called Bingshi zhi weisheng. See for instance ZBZ 1914, 2: Li Jiafu, Zhanzheng yu weisheng zhi guanxi. 91. NBZ 1907, 13 and 14: Li Dehua, Junren weisheng zhi yanjiu. 92. Ibid. (13), 5–8 . 93. Guangxi changbeijun budui [1907] 2005, 417–18. 94. Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu 1903, volume 5. The volume was co-produced by the Medical Care Section (Yiwuyi) of the Military Logistics Department of the Beiyang Army (Bingbeichu). The other volumes dealt with infantry drill, weapon instruction, defensive fortification, and reconnaissance.


Chapter 2

95. This can either be understood as “improper,” “inappropriate” illness, which possibly referred to sexual diseases, or rather as “weakening,” “impeding” nuisance, which reduced the fitness of the soldiers. 96. Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu 1903, volume 5, 1. 97. Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu 1903, volume 5, 1–3 (including all previous citations). A journal article explained that every battalion of 500 men (ying) had one bathroom (yushi). Shower time was after the afternoon drill exercises. See ZBZ 1916, 30: Wu Qintai, Jundui shenghuo, 44. 98. Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu 1903, volume 5, 25–26. See also XT, chapter 15, 43. For a short explanation (for soldiers) of the field dressings men carried during the war games in 1905, see XBB 1905, 9: Xingjun dacao xu zhi, 3. 99. NBZ 1911, 57: Jundui weisheng jiujifa xin bian. 100. Foucault [1975] 1979. 101. On the “death by a thousand cuts,” see Brook, Bourgon, and Blue 2008. 102. Although the Qing law represented more than just a penal code, it was exclusively concerned with matters of the state, the emperor, and the bureaucracy, and contained no civil law that regulated the matters between individuals, such as contracts, or only when they concerned the state, for instance, marriage. Personal rights and individual protection were only indirectly regulated. For a complete translation and introduction of the code, see Jones 1994. 103. Bodde and Morris 1973, 76–112. 104. The term was coined by Macauley 1998, 216. See also Brook, Bourgon, and Blue 2008, 11. 105. Theoretically, there was one more level, the complete dissolution of the body, including the pulverizing of the bones. See Brook, Bourgon, and Blue 2008, 13. 106. Robin Yates suggested that law in China resulted from military codes, and the military’s notion of ensuring discipline. See Yates 2009, 23–4. 107. Wade 1851, 399–402; Smith 1974, 136. For an eyewitness account from the mid-nineteenth century see Lamprey 1868, 420–21. Together with decapitation, chajian was known at least since the Spring and Autumn period (722–481 BC). See Kolb 1991, 237. 108. Ji 1997, 247–52. 109. Shen [1895/1896] 1992a, 347. 110. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 53. 111. Ibid., 1033. 112. Ibid., 1041. Similar regulations for the Self-Strengthening Army can be found in Shen 1897c, 4–6 . 113. Lianbingchu 1904, 12–13. 114. Ibid. 115. Kroker 1970, 49. 116. Dikötter 2002, chapter 2; Bourgon 2003; Mühlhahn 2009, chapter 2. 117. GX, chapter 8, 110–13. 118. Kong 2006, 1–6 . See also NBZ 1906, 5: Tao Junbao, Lun lujun xingfa, 4–6 . 119. GX, chapter 8, 113–15. 120. XT, chapter 21, 513–14. The regulations were reprinted in NBZ 1909, 30.

Body, Space, and Daily Life


121. The responsibilities, size, equipment, and wages of the military police were first detailed in the Pilot Scheme Regulation for the Army Police (Lujun jingchadui shiban zhangcheng) from May 1908. The introductory memorial of the regulation emphasized the importance of the military police in European barracks to uphold discipline and to assist the local police. The scheme contained a military police office in the capital, as well as provincial offices in charge of the respective division. See GX, chapter 8, 81–3. See also NBZ 1907, 7: Zhu Guangkui, Ouzhou xianbing zhi yange. 122. This is one of the few hints that such a thing existed at all. 123. The appendix to the Army Prison Regulations included a possible panoptic design for an army prison. See NBZ 1909, 30: Lujun jianyu zhangcheng. 124. GX, chapter 8, 115–19. 125. NBZ 1907, 7: Zhang Liangyuan, Kaocha lujun jianyu baogaoshu, 7. 126. Ibid., 1–15. Zhang outlined prison regulations and included a prison floor plan in his report. Concerning the shape of prisons, see also Chen 2012, 30. 127. BBZ 1910, 3 Junfa ying gui duli qing jiang lujun fanzui renyuan yilü jiao lujunbu banlizhe, 3–4 . 128. Brunnert and Hagelstrom 1910, 79. 129. BBZ 1910, 3 Junfa ying gui duli qing jiang lujun fanzui renyuan yilü jiao lujunbu banlizhe, 4–5 . 130. Yinchang [1910] 2005, 323. 131. Yinchang [1910] 2005, 324. Emil Dangelmaier, an Austrian Major-Auditor who wrote numerous books on military law in Europe in the nineteenth century, similarly stated that “military law […] has to be based on a military spirit.” See Dangelmaier 1893, VII. 132. Yinchang [1910] 2005, 323–26. See also NBZ 1908, 28: Hanying su shang lujunbushu, 17. 133. Kong 2006, 24–7, 42. See for instance LX 1913, 3 Lujun jianyu fushe kanguansuo zanxing guize. 134. Ji 1997, 334–43. Military jurisdiction was effective throughout the Republican period and still is in China today. 135. Contemporary legal professionals considered the German military law as very advanced, compared to other European countries. See Dangelmaier 1893. Since 1872, the military jurisdiction in Germany was based on the Militärstrafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich (Military Criminal Code for the German Empire), which was officially effective until 1945. The Reichsmilitärgericht, installed in 1900 in BerlinCharlottenburg, was the highest court and headed by an admiral or general, who presided over violations against the military disciplinary code and the military legal code. See Königlich Preußisches Kriegsministerium 1900 (includes the military court regulations from 1898 and the Criminal Code from 1872). 136. Kesper-Biermann 2010. 137. See also Fung 1980, 48. 138. GX, chapter 8, 110; Mühlhahn 2009, 61. 139. Li 1912, 40. 140. Li 1912, 38–40. See also an article by Huang Chongyun that examined the causes for soldiers becoming “bad.” ZBZ 1915, 16: Yu buliang bing zhi yanjiu, 20–30.


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141. After studying at the Liangguang Military Middle School in Guangzhou, Li transferred to Beijing in 1907 to receive higher military education. In 1921, he joined the Army of the Nationalist Party in Guangdong and, in 1924, became deputy dean of the Whampoa Military Academy that replaced the recently closed Military Academy in Beijing. During the subsequent Northern Expedition (1926–1928) and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), he held important military commands and political offices and worked toward the reconciliation between Communists and Nationalists. In the newly founded People’s Republic, he served for some time as vice-chairmen for the new government and later for the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, besides other political posts. Li was also involved in hiring a new group of German military advisors for the Nationalist army in the 1920s. See Martin 1981, 311; Kirby 1984, 38; Jiang and Jiang 2001. 142. Li 1912, 38–40. 143. Ibid., 1–5. 144. The Prussian-German military doctor Leitenstorfer similarly demanded from the instructors to “know” the individual soldiers. See Leitenstorfer 1897, 67. See also Dresky 1896, 12. 145. Li 1912, 47–54. 146. Corporal punishment slowly vanished, at least as an official penalty, but rewards for good performances remained an important incentive to encourage soldiers to improve their skills and risk their lives in battle. For instance, target practice contests were organized regularly. See Kong 2006, 15.

Chapter 3

Dressed to Kill Uniforms, Masculinity, and Military Culture

A New Look Although the Qing and Meiji Japanese armies were not at a fundamentally different technological level during the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895, as both possessed state-of-the-art ironclad battleships and guns, they gave quite a different visual impression. On the Qing side, common soldiers wore bright blue, ornamented, and red-brimmed dresses with conical hats or turbans. They mainly wore similar dresses, with variations from squad to squad. Like every man in the Qing Empire, each soldier had a shaved forehead and braided hair. In contrast, the Japanese soldiers were clothed in black, European-style uniforms with brimmed hats and short hair. Japanese propaganda woodblock prints strongly emphasized and exaggerated the great difference between the two armies. Compared to the neat and fierce-looking Japanese, the Qing soldiers appeared outmoded and oriental, though not necessarily weak, which would have undermined the Japanese victory. The difference was even more obvious when it came to the depiction of officers. Woodblock prints show Qing commanders in their long official garbs surrendering to tall, upright, broad-shouldered, bearded and Caucasian-looking Japanese generals. The images clearly contained the message that the Japanese victory was a natural consequence of a modern-Western and masculine Japanese nationstate triumphing over a backward, effeminate Qing Empire.1 In the nineteenth century, foreign military observers encountered Qing soldiers, who did not meet their expectations and standards regarding the appearance of troops. To them, the Qing soldiers contradicted the notion of manliness. Convinced of their own military and cultural superiority, the foreign observers ridiculed and emasculated the Qing soldiers particularly for their (un)military livery and bearing. The rank and file of the Green Standard 133


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Army usually wore a long shirt, loose linen trousers, sandals or cloth shoes, a jacket and sometimes a waistcoat, in colors such as blue, green, red, and black, with different trimming and borders. This varied between units and regions. For the head, they used a headscarf or turban. Banner soldiers wore a single-colored garb on top of trousers combined with a round black felt hat with a turned-up brim and a red tassel. In summer, soldiers from both armies commonly wore a conical straw or bamboo hat. Officers of the Green Standard Army wore the same embroidered robe as civilian officials, although various details, such as a different set of animal symbols stitched on the front, marked them as military officials. They possessed a combat or drill outfit consisting of a shortened garb, as well as an armor made of leather plates and a helmet. As military officials seldom engaged in actual drill or fighting, this outfit was rarely seen in the second part of the nineteenth century. Banner commanders and elite troops had their own, distinctive Manchu-style armor in the colors of their respective Banners.2 Foreigners describing Qing soldiers rarely made any distinction between the actual type of military organization they encountered and many reports and depictions, such as the Japanese woodblock prints of the war in 1894–1895, referred only to the Brave Battalions.3 Major Alfred Cavendish, serving as a British military attaché to the Qing Empire at the end of the century, described in an article the “peculiar” and “picturesque” sight of Chinese soldiers marching through the capital with the bayonets fixed on their rifles: […] a small teapot slung to the muzzle and a birdcage to the triggerguard, and fending off the rays of the sun with a foreign lady’s parasol; but after a time these picturesque variations seem quite natural. The dress of officers is much the same, except that their servants carry the teapot. The plastrons are squares of embroidery, and Banner officers wear yellow jackets. They hardly ever carry any weapons.4

The British military surgeon J. Lamprey cynically reported on “a loose jacket of a peculiar form and colour,” which new recruits had already worn before becoming soldiers and made them look like coolie laborers. “Curious” to him was that the soldiers adapted their clothes to every circumstance without order, went bare-foot, and used umbrellas and fans whenever it suited them.5 Most striking to the Euro-American observers was the white, round patch of about 20 to 30 centimeters (8 to 12 inches) in diameter, sewed to the front and the back, showing Chinese characters that either stated the bearer’s name, his unit affiliation, or both. The army livery was therefore called haoyi or “marked dress.” In the eyes of foreigners, this “bull’s-eye”6 symbolized that Qing soldiers were no better than dummies for target practice. In his report from 1878, the American officer Emory Upton noted the following,

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based on his observations on soldiers in Zhejiang province: “the uniform, too, is a great obstacle to military pride. It consists of a cotton jacket, usually blue, with trousers so loose and flowing as to completely conceal the figure. […] In no two provinces are troops armed and equipped alike […].”7 Adding to this image were the huge and colorful flags carried by the Qing troops, which gave them a “very gay and even gaudy appearance,” according to Lamprey.8 Obviously, the perception of an appropriate military and masculine appearance differed from place to place. Foreign observers mocked the non-martial, effete manner of Chinese military officials, who were carried around in a sedan. And they wondered about the clothes of these men: the long gown (changyi), which was the standard dress of eminent officials and men of status and which concealed everything of the physical body but the head. On the other hand, for both commoners and elite members of the Qing Empire, soldiers from Britain, France, Germany, or the United States offered a similarly strange and absurd picture. Chinese elites considered the clothes of foreigners as unseemly and inappropriate, revealing too much of the physical shape of the body. Chinese woodblock prints, which were highly popular among commoners, depicted foreign soldiers in tight uniforms, comically long-legged, and sometimes almost grotesque.9 In late imperial China, dress was strongly influenced by Confucian notions of ritual and propriety. The physical body had to be concealed—not simply out of sheer prudishness but because attire was regarded as a marker for civilization and social hierarchy.10 As an expression of social relations, clothing shaped gender arrangements and concepts of masculinity and femininity. Fashion changed greatly over time and, in relation to that, gender concepts were also fluid and had transgressive boundaries. Dress and adornment transformed the mere potential of the natural body into an organized system of cultural signs.11 Attire alone gave the human form a meaning, a status, and a gender, and thus inappropriate clothing was viewed as barbaric and savage. Shen, the body-person, was the bearer of sartorial aspects, which therefore indicated an individual’s character, morality, and social standing. The naked body or exposed parts of the body, such as bound feet without shoes, were considered meaningless, and also a neglected topic in the visual arts.12 A popular example of how clothing had a gendering effect on the bearer is the story of Hua Mulan, a young girl pretending to be a man to save her old father from being conscripted to the army. Only by putting on a military dress consisting of armor, boots, and trousers was she able to be recognized as a man and could fight and bond with other men.13 During the Qing period, dress styles for both men and women were strongly influenced by the Inner-Asian origins of the dynasty. Like all preceding dynasties, the Qing issued an official dress code, which strictly regulated attire and adornment according to gender, social sphere, office, rank,


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seasons, and general status, even including the male hairstyle. After the Qing had assumed control over the Ming Empire in 1644, they forced every man to assume the Manchu hairstyle of a shaved forehead and long braided hair at the back of the head on pain of death.14 During the early years, the queue (bianzi) was a sign of subjugation to the Manchus, strongly contested by the (Han) population and even more brutally enforced. A common saying during the time was: “keep your hair and lose your head, keep your head and lose your hair.” However, in the Confucian ritual world, hair counted as an integral part of the physical body, which was viewed as a gift from one’s parents. Shaving off one’s hair was considered an offense to filial piety and a shame for adult men. While some men such as Ming loyalists and secret society members never stopped to detest the queue as a symbol of foreign rule and emasculation, it nevertheless became the accepted male hairstyle and a token of masculinity and status. Unless they belonged to certain groups exempted from the rule such as monks or some non-Han ethnicities, men without a queue were punished, ridiculed, and considered as outsiders to the customary social order. A long and well-groomed queue signified status and prestige. Conversely, convicted criminals had to remove their queue. Moreover, in popular culture, it was even associated with magical and sexual powers.15 As Karl Gerth points out, the Qing hairstyle cannot be separated from Qing clothing “because these two aspects shared a common history and formed a mutually reinforcing semiotic system.”16 The same importance was attributed to other components of male appearance, including shoes, hats, adornment, and facial hair. Men with ample facial hair were usually associated with wildness, martiality, and with foreign barbarians, such as Portuguese sailors. Long beards were only tolerated among scholars-bureaucrats as a symbol of seniority. According to official Qing regulations, men older than 45 years were allowed to grow a goatee (which was possibly combined with a horseshoe or walrus mustache). A full beard was only permitted to men who reached the age of 65.17 By the end of the nineteenth century, the appearance of Chinese men and women, in terms of dress styles and embellishment, was not so much a symbol of loyalty to the Qing but rather represented “Chinese” identity. In particular for elite men, a long gown, a queue, and (little) facial hair were part of their masculine identity—an identity, which became increasingly contested at the turn to the twentieth century due to the encounter with foreign conceptions of appearance, masculinity, and military culture. Foreigners ridiculing and insulting their dress and hairstyle as effete disturbed Qing officials and scholars who traveled abroad or came across foreign perceptions in textual or visual form, such as caricatures.18 After the war in 1894–1895, progressive intellectuals such as the scholar-official Kang Youwei proposed to abandon the conventional official dress style, especially the long gown. Instead,

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Chinese men should adopt the “Western” fashion, as the Japanese had already done. Kang also called for removing the queue or pigtail, which foreigners considered as the very sign of backwardness, inferiority, and femininity of the Chinese civilization.19 An increasing number of intellectuals and politicians followed Kang’s plea after the turn of the century and fiercely attacked the customary and allegedly backward appearance of Chinese men and women. A change of dress styles would fuel reforms, trigger the end of outmoded customs and rituals, and propel a martial spirit and the determination to modernize in China, they argued. The Qing court initially ignored such demands but foreign-style dresses became increasingly popular among the urban population in the final years of the dynasty and the early years of the republic. This was a long-lasting struggle in which fashion ostensibly served as a proxy for conservative, reformist, or even more radical social and political agendas. Foreign dress and short queueless hair became a symbol for anti-Qing revolutionaries, who emphasized ethnical identities and the alleged suppression of the Han by the Manchu. However, the link between politics and appearance was much more complex as not only radical republican revolutionaries but also reformers, government officials, and even some members of the dynasty advocated new dress styles and short hair. The reasons for either advocating or opposing changes in dress and appearance were manifold and included social and cultural paradigms as well as political and economic objectives. The new fashion was strongly inspired by military uniforms (junfu, junzhuang, rongfu, or zhifu) and military-style clothing, with narrow cuts and body-hugging shapes, which gave the bearer a more dynamic appearance. The customary Qing period dresses began to change under the influence of the new style and the clothes of both urban men and women increasingly included elements like the high collar adapted from the uniforms of the New Armies. Wearing a military dress was forbidden for civilians but the bodyhugging military uniform became the desired and imitated prime symbol for a “Western” or “modern” attire. It represented masculine vigor and energy and, at the same time, demanded and emphasized a well-trained, strong, and healthy body. Early Communists such as Chen Duxiu and Mao Zedong, for instance, viewed both the body and attire of Chinese men as representing weakness, sloppiness, and femininity. The new fashion they wanted to prescribe for everyone was linked to the changing perception of the body and the increasing popularity of physical culture. It emphasized a disciplined male body and emerged from the military reforms and the introduction of Prussianstyle military uniforms at the turn of the century.20 Military uniforms convey a variety of meanings. They can represent distinct symbols of the state or any other political authority, a social order, or ideological allegiance. They are a means to discipline individuals by bodily alignment and homogenization.21 Military uniforms embody and produce a


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specific military identity as well as a concept of military masculinity. Military styles and dresses are adopted outside the army to allude to this masculinity, and the values and ideals attached to it.22 For instance, as Evelyn Rawski emphasizes, the Manchu dress was originally “made synonymous with martial vigor” as clothes and queue were designed to be convenient for fighting and horse riding.23 Civilian fashion, on the other hand, can influence dress styles in the military, which happened during the Ming and Song periods, and changing societal notions of gender and masculinity can affect the military and the dress of military people.24 Although military clothing is connected to the changing needs of the battlefield, serving as protection or the identification of friend or foe, what counts as a soldierly appearance and represents the military (symbols, attire, and accessories) depends on different historical-cultural contexts and respective fashions. Every place and period in history had a distinct military “dress code.” In Europe, the introduction of standardized, properly defined, and regulated uniforms started in the seventeenth century out of tactical needs and a socio-political desire for order, which led to the development of regimental and even national uniforms.25 However, the argument for pragmatism is also determined by ephemeral contemporary perception and fashion. Since the first appearance of uniforms in Europe, styles changed constantly and this often depended on the personal taste of monarchs and lords. In the eighteenth century, the uniforms of some European armies were so tight that soldiers could not move certain parts of their body at all. Long hair was viewed as disruptive and even dangerous since firearms were introduced. However, as they could be bound, coiled, or trimmed, close-cropped hair expressed the need for discipline and order rather than a real military and tactical need. By the end of the nineteenth century, Europeans viewed queues as a sign of Oriental backwardness and effeminateness, even though armies such as the Prussian had only cut off their own braids barely a century earlier. Prussian uniform regulations from the eighteenth century not only focused on the design, color, and material of clothes but also on hairstyle, height, and other physical aspects, thus standardizing the bodies of soldiers.26 Appearance, clothing, and hairstyle were strictly regulated in imperial and early Republican China. The introduction of new military uniforms at the beginning of the twentieth century not only had sartorial and politically symbolic effects but was also linked to the perception of the male body, to governance technologies, and to the reconceptualization of masculinity. The original military Manchu dress, which included pants and influenced the civilian garment of men during the Qing Dynasty, did not reveal much of the body. Physical strength and endurance were not unimportant for military people but there was no need, generally, to emphasize the physical body. Late Qing military reformers, however, viewed uniforms in relation to physical

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exercises, drills, and fighting; as a means to work upon and discipline the body of military men. Uniforms influenced the demeanor, posture, and gestures of an individual and they were essential to impose martial values and military-professional ideals. Chinese military reformers realized that military men had to change their appearance to count as both real men and real soldiers. Uniforms were essential for governing the performance of soldiers and officers as military men. They influenced their masculine identity, and produced and stabilized a military masculine figuration. The introduction of German-style military uniforms to the New Armies affected and interacted with the appearance, self-presentation, and gender performance of “military men” or junren. The soldiers and officers of the New Armies not only dressed in a new way but also behaved and presented themselves differently, drawing on various body techniques, military rituals, and parades based on German and other foreign examples. Moreover, officers increasingly posed in front of the camera, thus facilitating the circulation of the image of military men in “Western-style” uniforms and the renewed concept of military masculinity. Eventually, members of the imperial family adopted the new military style, with the aim to rekindle a unifying national military culture. Subsequently, the leaders of the new Republic continued this agenda, contributing to the dissemination of the junren icon. Dressing the New Armies German instructors at Tianjin Military Academy (founded in 1885) were the first to introduce “Western-style” (xishi) uniforms to the Qing Empire. The academy’s cadets had to wear light khaki clothes with straw hats during the summer, and black cotton dresses and hats during the winter.27 Although the Brave Battalions already looked somewhat different from the regular Qing armies and some of them had adapted foreign uniform styles, they looked slovenly and untidy compared to the neat and uniform looking Japanese soldiers, who were wearing German-style uniforms. After the Sino-Japanese War, Chinese military reformers repeatedly and vehemently addressed the inconsistent and heterogeneous look and the lack of functionality of the customary military dress. For the New Armies to be accepted as a “modern” equal to the armies of the imperialist powers of the early twentieth century, “everyone [had] to be uniform” (dazhong yilü) and comply with the standards of military fashion and appearance of foreign powers.28 The Self-Strengthening Army, the Newly Created Army, and the Tenacious Army (commanded by Nie Shicheng) gradually adopted the German uniform style, because of the strong influence of German instructors, military organization, and drills before 1900.29 The new uniforms should, above all,


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be close-fitting and convenient. The soldiers of the Newly Created Army initially still looked very much like their predecessors, wearing a version of the haoyi with huge characters indicating their unit affiliations. Eventually, the first comprehensive manuals of 1898 and 1899 required that all soldiers wore black boots and simple black uniforms in winter, and khaki-brownish (literally “earth-colored”) uniforms in summer. They were prompted to take good care of their clothes, and keep them clean and orderly. The uniform should never be unheeded and always ready. Most important was a tidy and plain appearance, especially in public outside the barracks. Both in the Newly Created Army and the Self-Strengthening Army, German drillmasters inspected the condition of the soldiers’ uniforms, shoes, and hats, and their general appearance, which had to be soldierly and disciplined. Officers were not allowed to wear the long gown anymore. Only the highest military commanders, such as Yuan Shikai, were still allowed to choose between the new-style uniform and the customary official’s dress, which they were still required to wear when dealing with the court or the civilian bureaucracy.30 The image of the disciplined German military men became the desired ideal. Every German soldier, Shen Dunhe reported in his Description of the German Military System, had four sets of uniforms provided by his regiment and he was thus properly equipped for every circumstance.31 More than one uniform set seemed to be the best way to end the established practice of arbitrarily putting on and off different layers of clothes, which created the impression of uneven and sloppy troops. The soldiers of the New Armies eventually possessed at least two different sets of uniforms, one for summer and one for winter, which also had hygienic reasons.32 They were no longer responsible for acquiring their own clothes, as it was the case in the established regular Qing armies: a standardized outfit was provided by the centrally organized procurement and made possible by the beginning industrial manufacture of fabrics and clothes. Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi as well as Shen Dunhe and other officials in the service of the Self-Strengthening Army were particularly concerned with the financing of new drill uniforms and the acquisition of new-style outfits, paying great attention to details, such as embellishments and badges, the color of the uniforms, and the material of trousers (“dark blue foreign twill”) and hats. The Self-Strengthening Army most directly copied the style of German armies and even sought to emulate the Prussian-blue uniforms. The German instructors in its service even requested to acquire German military bags, satchels (mantoubao), and leaden drinking bottles.33 The uniforms of the Beiyang Army, which evolved from the other early New Armies after the Boxer War, consisted of a grayish-brown cotton jacket, sateen-brimmed brownish felt hat, and simple cloth boots or puttees, which common soldiers usually had to acquire themselves. Officers possessed a drill uniform as well as a full dress uniform. They emulated the appearance

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of German officers and wore leather boots and a knee-length “German-style coat.”34 Moreover, the uniforms indicated individual ranks by colored stripes on the sleeves. The Beiyang Army introduced a color scheme modeled after the German army, which assigned a color to every branch of the army. The color red stood for the infantry, white for the cavalry, and yellow for the artillery. The worker’s corps (gong) was assigned to the color blue and the supply and equipment units (zizhong) had the color purple, indicated on the shoulder epaulets. The uniform style of the Beiyang Army served as a model for the Lujun, which basically kept the color classification system and added new colors for other units, such as green for the medical corps.35 In 1904, the Bureau for Military Training (Lianbingchu) highlighted the functional aspect of military clothing and demanded perfectly tight-fighting uniforms. It emphasized “particularly avoiding resplendent and flamboyant colors which easily attract the eye of the enemy.”36 According to the Bureau, “modern drill” (jinri caofa) required speed, flexibility, taking cover, and concealing oneself in battle. The uniform of the men thus had to correspond to these needs and had to be “tight-fitting to the body, flexible, and suiting.” In addition, the men should wear forage caps, which protected them from wind and sun, and thus made it easier to aim at targets.37 In early 1905, the Bureau for Military Training issued the Distinct and Illustrated Manual for Uniforms of the Army (Lujun yizhi xiangxi tushuo). It was compiled by senior military reformers, such as Yikuang, Tieliang, Yuan Shikai, and Xu Shichang, and introduced the design for the uniforms of the Lujun, including images and descriptions of jackets, trousers, hats, rank badges, shoulder emblems, insignia, ornamentation, and belts.38 The manual explained that “in East and West, military uniforms are more or less the same.” China, however, had avoided contact to the rest of the world. When students were sent abroad to study foreign armies or when foreigners military advisors and observers came to China, they became aware of the “mixed and uneven” look of Qing soldiers and their sloppy, negligent, undisciplined, and unorganized appearance (fa yanzheng zhi xiang). “Having our own practices makes us a laughing stock (xiaobing),” the authors of the manual noted.39 Therefore, the soldiers should adopt the international style and put on tight clothes (duanfu) instead. Only when the “old look [was] washed away,” would foreign soldiers and officers respect the Chinese military men and consider them as equals. This would be the only way, the manual concluded, to make foreigners respect the Chinese “national essence” (guoti zhi dao). No item of the old-style military dresses should be kept, apart from certain objects, such as the marten hat for ceremonial functions. Officers were supposed to wear their uniforms all the time, even when off duty, and never mix it with another attire or embellishment. Adopting foreign military dress codes


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was a way of “self-strengthening,” the manual declared, and would help stir the martial spirit of the men and strengthen military power.40 The new uniforms consisted of a tight and well-fitting (heti) dress of “Western-style cut,” which allowed full mobility during drill and combat. Waist and hip measurements as well as the length and width of sleeves were all taken into account. The design and material as well as the size of the various parts of the uniform, such as sleeves, shoulder emblems, and hat, were prescribed exactly. Trousers should be tight and well-fitted, not loose or wrinkly.41 The primary function of the new, German-style uniforms was to “protect [the] body-hull” (hu er shenwu)42 and thus had to be cleaned regularly and be bright and shiny.43 While officers were wearing leather boots, common soldiers usually used slippers and puttees. The colors of the combat and drill uniforms of both officers and common soldiers were dark blue in winter and “earth-colored” (tuse/huangtuse) or khaki in summer. By the end of the nineteenth century, khaki uniforms, probably the first camouflage uniforms ever used on a standard basis, became fashionable among European armies, particularly among colonial troops. Originally, British troops copied the color from local warriors in India in the 1840s and khaki uniforms subsequently became the commonly used dress of British soldiers in the Second Boer War (1899–1902). The term khaki (kakese) derived from the Persian language and described both a fabric and its color. According to the Shanghai-based journal The Continetal (Dalu), it derived from the name of a river in Southern Africa. The journal reported how the Japanese Army had found the dying method for khaki and successfully introduced the new uniforms during the war against Russia, underlining their indispensability to soldiers and to warfare.44 The Russian army, on the other hand, only changed the color of their uniforms to “yellowish grey” after the war, as the Nanyang Military Journal reported.45 Khaki uniforms, however, were not the only sartorial novelty and trend that the late Qing military reformers closely followed. After the turn of the century, many European armies started to introduce gray-colored uniforms. In 1907, the German army began to replace their customary blue with graycolored uniforms. It started to experiment with different shades of gray until a compromise was officially found in 1910. Fan Xueqing argues that although the late Qing New Armies increasingly turned to the Japanese military as role model for military education and organization, the German military remained the benchmark for style and dress.46 In 1907, the New Armies also switched to gray cloth for both their summer and winter uniforms. Eventually the Army Ministry decided to follow the Japanese style when it came to the uniforms, which was originally modeled after the standard German military dress, and the German style when it came to the headdress.47 In reality, the Lujun adopted elements from both the Japanese and German armies and combined

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them with Chinese elements in terms of embellishment. Generally speaking, while the rank and file soldiers, wearing puttees and a simple hat instead of a helmet, more resembled Japanese common soldiers, the officers emulated the look of their German counterparts. Both officers and common soldiers possessed not only a common drill or combat uniform (changfu) but also a full dress uniform (lifu). The dress uniform of officers consisted of an azure-colored uniform jacket and, from 1907 on, black pants with red stripes, looking quite similar to the German full dress uniform. It included adorned sleeves, a sash, and a high collar decorated with a golden or, for officers of auxiliary units, silver dragon (feimang), which was introduced as the official emblem of the Qing Empire during the Taiping Rebellion. High-ranking officers additionally possessed a ceremonial uniform (da lifu) for imperial audiences, which consisted of the embroidered robe of officials, a peacock feather, and the customary round sable hat.48 In 1906, Xu Shaozhen, commander of the Ninth Division in Jiangsu, criticized that many officers still neglected wearing the correct new uniforms and used their old hats. He was concerned about the negative effects of a flawed and inaccurate demeanor on the attitude and morale of the troop.49 The highranking official Duanfang, at the time governor-general of Liangjiang, issued a similar communiqué emphasizing the significance of a uniform appearance and its direct effect on discipline. Spirit, he wrote, was a characteristic trait of qualified soldiers, which was expressed by an appropriate and correct appearance (yirong). Other countries (geguo) had regulations on military etiquette, which insisted on a serious appearance, including both hair and dress, he emphasized.50 Li Jishen later summarized the meaning of correct uniforms in his manual for the army academy. If the clothing was not correct, it was difficult to assume the right posture and carry out orderly movements, and, furthermore, the “spirit could not flourish.” The uniform should also be adapted to the current kind and level of training. According to Li, uniforms aroused the martial spirit of soldiers and inured them to the discipline in the army. They conveyed not only the “beauty of the regiment” but also a “reputation based on (martial) spirit.” He argued that orderly clothes, like personal hygiene, were the responsibility of every individual man and part of their self-conduct. Uniforms were thus a technology to “cultivate the soldier’s selfgovernance abilities” and to organize his own body (shen) or the body of their comrade in arms (zhanyou).51 Chinese military reformers untiringly highlighted the utilitarian and functional aspects of the “Western” or German uniforms and pointed out that military dress had to adapt to new tactical and bodily requirements. The body had to be both protected and be able to move without any impediment. Most importantly, military reformers viewed uniforms as a tool to discipline men and stir their martial spirit. Correct and orderly uniforms were necessary


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for the correct movement, posture, and behavior of individual soldiers and important for the appearance of the army (junrong). The neat and tight-fitting uniforms of the Lujun emphasized physicality and thus influenced the social perception of the body and increased the popularity of exercising in the late Qing and early Republican China. Nevertheless military uniforms retained the gendering and socializing function generally attributed to clothing and fashion. Clothes conveyed status and prestige and, in this respect, Europeanstyle military uniforms were not different from the vesture of Qing bureaucrats. Since the new military men sought appreciation not only from foreign powers but also from the late Qing court, members of the elite, as well as common people, uniforms had to express reputation and social distinction, particularly in the case of the new officer caste. A translation of a German text in the Nanyang Military Journal, titled On the Duty of Military Men, thus emphasized: “for German men, the uniform means honor.”52 The Bureau for Military Training stipulated that the new uniforms clearly showed the rank of any soldiers and made officers easily recognizable as such.53 Rank and dress were closely connected and together with new uniforms, the Lujun introduced a new rank and command structure. This newly established hierarchy combined both the traditional nine ranks systems for civilian and military officials and the trisection of military ranks into commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers, and common soldiers, which was the standard in Europe, the United States, and Japan.54 Based on the rank system of the Beiyang Army, the Qing government separated the Lujun officers into three different grades: senior, ordinary or middle, and lower or junior. Every grade was further divided into three levels, constituting altogether nine different ranks (the system was called sandeng jiuji). Although the new rank system was modeled after foreign patterns, the actual naming followed the titles of the Banner troops. Senior officers were called dutong, middle grade officers were called canling, and the lower ranks were referred to as junxiao. Consequently, the highest-ranking officer in the Lujun was called zhengdutong, which was originally the title of the head of a single Banner (often translated as “Tartar General”) and, in both cases, officially corresponded to the rank of governor-general. Similarly, canling was originally the designation for the commander of a Banner unit of approximately 1500 men.55 In addition to the three officer grades, there were three different grades each of noncommissioned officers and common soldiers. Like lower grade officers, they had the color of their respective military branch stitched on their uniform. Auxiliary and specialist units, such as medical, veterinarian, logistics, survey, and musical corps as well as armorers, juridical personnel, inspectors, secretaries, civilian officials, and clerks, were given supernumerary ranks, which were later fitted into the regular rank structure.56 In November 1909, the government decreed the ranks of Lujun officers to be equal to the corresponding

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civil ranks, thus strongly upvaluing the newly emerging military elite within the ritual universe of Qing society and polity. Military men increasingly became desirable men, symbolizing power, and representing and performing a concept of masculinity that idealized martial spirit, professionalism, and discipline through their appearance. Military Etiquette The New Armies not only adopted foreign-style military clothing but also ways of individual bearing, comportment, and movement and established new rules of military etiquette and conduct based on foreign models. Generally speaking, social and ceremonial etiquette largely determine how someone behaves and moves under certain circumstances. Like uniforms, etiquette or rules of behavior were important for performing military masculinity. The author Jianfei emphasized in the Nanyang Military Journal that “etiquette (liyi) indicate the status of a person.” He continued: Military men act as representatives of the citizens and are the essence of the nation. […] Foreign military observers often pay attention to whether the [Chinese] troops comply with [military] etiquette and judge the strength of the army and the prosperity of the nation accordingly. If the [rules of] etiquette are not observed, then the quality of the people is not correct. If one does not [behave] correctly, he affects his whole regiment.57

Apart from general good behavior, New Armies soldiers and officers were expected to fulfill the “international” standards of military courtesy and conduct to be accepted as real military men. Uniforms were a decisive element (re-)producing a concept of military masculinity in early twentieth century China. But besides uniforms, the New Armies adopted verbal commands and other military usage, rituals, gestures, and etiquettes from German and Japanese military culture. Military reformers propagated the use of verbal drill commands (kouling), postures, salutes, and other elements of military courtesy as an essential part of the new foreign-style drill and military culture, and absolutely necessary for establishing a functioning military organization and hierarchy.58 Tao Shumao punned that orders (mingling) were the lifeblood (mingmai) of commanders during war.59 Enlisted men were obliged to greet or stand at attention when meeting a superior officer. The uniform, indicating the position in the military hierarchy, engendered clearly defined behavior and gestures, such as salutes or bows.60 For instance, an early manual for Howitzer canons, the Key to the German Army Officers Drill (Deguo lushi caofa rumen yaojue) written by Bian Changsheng for Yuan Shikai and the


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Newly Created Army, paid much attention to the verbal commands used to instruct the members of a gun team.61 Although the New Armies did not use German as everyday language, commands and orders were fashioned after the succinct and sharp speech of the German military, as was the case in Japan.62 In 1905, the Bureau for Military Training issued a Code of Conduct in Army Quarters (Lujun xingying lijie), which regulated manners and etiquette between military men.63 The code detailed the so-called four categories (sigang), the etiquettes that applied (1) when a common soldier beheld an officer, (2) when a soldier and an officer actually met, (3) when a military unit encountered another unit, (4) when military men drilled. The code, moreover, dealt with the right order of courtesy, called list of five points (wumu): (1) fixing the eyes on another person, (2) standing at attention, (3) saluting, and (4+5) presenting the gun or sword. Only officers paying respect to a superior or a foreigner, which involved a kowtow or shaking hands, were exempted from this sequence. Concerning uniforms, the code stated that, apart from specific circumstances, officers always had to wear the appropriate military dress.64 The four categories of interaction or sigang regulated every imaginable circumstance of encounters. For instance, a common soldier had to stop five to six foot in front of an officer when entering a room. Moreover, it was strictly regulated when he had to salute, depending on the place he met an officer. For officers, the code included regulations concerning the drawing and sheathing of the sword, as well as the right posture and look when meeting a superior. When facing an officer, all men should have a “vigorous spirit” (zhenfen jingshen) in their eyes. When standing at attention, both officer and common soldiers had to put their weight on the left foot. Only generals should put their weight on the right foot. While saluting, the index and middle finger touched the hat, the palm pointing outside. Similarly, the code meticulously regulated how officers had to draw their sword and how soldiers had to present their gun, including the exact position of all body parts.65 Similar but more concise rules of military courtesy were listed in the small drill booklets distributed among soldiers in the final years of the Qing Dynasty. The Revised Infantry Drill Methods emphasized that “the way of saluting and facing [other] soldiers must be trained frequently and cannot be taken lightly.” For officers, the booklet detailed the use of the sword (in fact a saber), including explanations on when to draw it, how to hold and wield it, and how to position various parts of the body and one’s posture while operating it. Saluting with the sword could be done by holding it in front of the body or by stretching one’s sword arm with the blade pointing down. No differences were made in this case between the different ranks of commissioned and noncommissioned officers.66 Another drill book, the Temporary Infantry Drill Methods commanded that all officers had to wear a sword, apart from those working in administration. Furthermore, it described the correct

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presentation of a unit’s flag.67 The army flag or military banner (junqi) was very important for the morale of troops but its significance had been ignored by “East Asian soldiers,” Tang Zhongyong explained in an article. According to him, martial spirit was the “lifeline (mingmai) of building the state (liguo)” and the flag represented the honor and reputation (and the martial spirit) not only of the army or a regiment but also of the entire nation, its citizens, and the emperor. It was the emperor, who conferred the regimental flag to the soldiers and to whom they had to return it. This was the case, for instance, in Japan as well as in France during the Franco-German War 1870–1871. Losing the flag therefore, Tang concluded, was the biggest shame for any soldier.68 Military reformers were anxious to appropriate aspects of foreign military culture such as codes of courtesy and etiquette to fit into the standards of foreign armies and diplomats. For instance, the failure to behave properly toward foreign navy or army commanders was punishable for Chinese officers.69 More importantly, military reformers recognized that, in order to successfully introduce entire new forms of military organization and improve the social standing of the army, the behavior and conduct of Chinese military men had to be in accordance with “Western” military etiquette and appearance. Apart from uniforms, gestures and objects had to be acculturated and used in the right way. Horse riding and sword fighting, for instance, alluded to ideal of man-to-man combat and signified rank as well as an honor, military masculine, and noble manliness. Already in 1896, Liu Kunyi requested the introduction of the European-style saber (waiyang madao, literally an “overseas horse blade”) produced by the German company Carlowitz and Co.70 An article in the Nanyang Military Journal later explained that “today, the education of both common soldiers and the officer corps include lessons in swordsmanship (jianshu).” According to the author, Qi Guohuang, the (intangible) advantage of sword training was, that, once the students mastered sword fighting, they would have the “will and mettle to take on [every] enemy. [Their] spirit will be calm and their demeanor (juzhi) composed.”71 The other, more tangible advantage was the positive effect on the physical education of those practicing with the sword. For this reason, swordsmanship was not only suitable for military men but also for (ordinary) citizens. “Our East Asian race,” Qi wrote, “has an inferior physique compared to Western Europeans.” Lifestyle and habits prevented the body from developing, he argued, but swordsmanship, riding, (military) gymnastics, and other physical exercises would help atone for this lack and militarize the citizenry (jun guomin).72 High boots, as part of the military uniform, were a particularly iconic symbol embodying military masculinity. Shen Dunhe and the leaders of the Self-Strengthening Army viewed the persistent and water-resistant “Western-style leather-boots” (xishi quanpixue) as indispensable for implementing the foreign-style drill.73 While common soldiers were equipped


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with simple, sometimes half-leather, walking boots, the officers of the New Armies adopted the knee-length black leather riding boots worn by Japanese and German officers. These high boots were originally designed for the cavalry but as an allusion to mounted nobility, they symbolized an exalted or even aristocratic status and were popular among high-ranking officers in Europe, the United States, and Japan. As Chinese officers emulated the style of foreign military elites, knee-length leather boots became a distinctive marker for officers and leaders. They represented a clear counter piece to the scholar-official’s robe and stood for military preparedness and martial spirit. Compared to the dresses of military officials, the New Armies officers looked plain and simple. In 1902, Zhang Zhidong explicitly banned the old robe entirely from the Hubei New Army (the later Eighth Division). Officers should represent and visibly embody the break with the figure of the customary military official, who rode in a sedan chair, was accompanied by grooms, and not even bearing weapons.74 Instead, the ideal new military man was a disciplined officer, who exercised and took care of his sword and horse himself, and whose appearance demonstrated his willingness and eagerness to fight in an honorable and noble way. Horsemanship was viewed as one of the most sophisticated martial skill during the Qing and earlier dynasties, and horses often symbolized the military, wu masculinity, and imperial authority.75 In Europe, since the First World War, horses no longer played a significant role in actual battle but the mastery of horse riding was still a significant matter for military elites. The use of the cavalry was criticized as outdated and militarily worthless but horses and riding were a way for Chinese officers to link themselves to both European military elites and a past martial tradition. Horses symbolized martial heroism and were regularly depicted in military journals (see, for instance, Figure 3.1).76 Cutting Old Queues The introduction of the new military look, including uniforms and hairstyles encountered much resistance. Apart from economic difficulties to supply and provide standardized uniforms in times of early industrial production and financial shortage, various factions strongly opposed the introduction of “Western-style” uniforms. Already in 1900, as a sign of allegiance with the Righteous Harmonious Society (Boxer Movement) and to avoid confusion with foreign armies, Empress Dowager Cixi and the court commanded the New Armies to return to the “old” drill and clothing style. While most officials and military leaders, such as Nie Shicheng and Zhang Zhidong complied to the order, Yuan Shikai as well as many high officials in the south

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Figure 3.1  “Dress Style of European Officers, Image No. 6 (German).” Source: NBZ 1909, 32: Ouzhou bingguan junfutu zhi liu (deyizhi).

of the Qing Empire simply ignored it. They sought to continue the military reform process and also wished to preserve their good relations with foreign diplomats and representatives. After the end of the Boxer War, the return to the old military livery was officially cancelled but many conservative officials continued to disapprove of the foreign military dress style.77 They viewed the uniforms as empty and poor, and a few demanded to go back to the allegedly more magnificent dress of the past. Cixi rebuked the introduction of new uniforms and a change of dress regulations for officials and military officers, at least during official ceremonies and occasions. In 1905, the monthly newspaper Wanguo Gongbao quoted her saying: “changing to Western clothes is absolutely not possible now. When I am gone, you can do what you want and change what you want.”78 New uniforms for both common soldiers and officers were introduced nevertheless and the style eventually became part of the understanding of the new military circles. Military uniforms also became a popular attire and symbol desired by the civilian elite since foreign clothing styles became increasingly fashionable


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in urban Chinese cities after the turn of the century, including “Western” suits and military-style clothing. Still, “people outside of military circles,” were prohibited from wearing military uniforms. Although the government, military reformers, and the New Armies promoted military values and sought to increase the social standing of military men, they strictly controlled and restricted the use of army insignia and clothes. The main concern was that men who misbehaved while wearing military uniforms and pretending to be soldiers could harm the reputation of the army, as was reported in a case in Hunan in 1908.79 The army leadership sought to preserve the positive image of the junren, who, by 1911, widely counted as highly qualified men who valued a “strong will and heroic heart, appearance, strength, sternness” and were “filled with the spirit to conquer rivers and mountains” (qitun heyue).80 Furthermore, restricting the use of military uniforms had deep political implications: anti-Qing revolutionaries increasingly wore uniforms as a symbol against the seemingly outmoded and old-fashioned dynasty. For many progressive military reformers and (Qing loyal) officers this posed a dilemma as they also viewed particularly the queue as a sign of effeminacy, similar to revolutionaries. After the foundation of the Lujun and the promulgation of an official military dress code, an increasing number of officers and cadets became uncomfortable with the customary hairstyle and perceived it as unhygienic, unmanly, and unfitting to the appearance of the new military men. Along with policemen, they were gradually allowed to shorten their queues but not to entirely remove it.81 Cadets and officers in the cities of Hangzhou, Guangzhou, and Anqing as well as in Yunnan province reportedly cut off their queues without being severely punished. Others made efforts to conceal their queue by coiling it and cramming it under a cap. Many Chinese students, who were enrolled in military academies in Japan, sought to copy their Japanese instructors and fellow students, and removed their queues completely. In 1907, however, the Ministry of Education and Army Ministry jointly announced to punish students returning without a queue or, in the case of civilians, wearing “Western-style” clothes, such as suits or military-style student jackets.82 The army leadership, while showing understanding for cadets in Japan and other foreign countries cutting their hair, still ordered all officers to refrain from removing their queues. Military leaders were afraid of mutual mockery and discord between those who had cut off their queues and those who had not. In order to upkeep uniformity and discipline, all Lujun officers, cadets, and soldiers should thus follow the original order of the Bureau for Military Training to keep the queue.83 The majority of officers followed the regulations and kept their customary hairstyle, which many viewed as a symbol of loyalty to the Qing and token of their identity as Chinese men, despite the affinity to the new military fashion.

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A Japanese report on the Zhangde war games, published in the Nanyang Military Journal, remarked that the queues of the officers were well visible under their black hats.84 In photographs, it is usually difficult to see whether military men had cut off or clipped their queues, as the pictures either showed a person’s front or the person’s hair was concealed under a hat. In some pictures, however, the queue was deliberately visible: one photograph (Figure 3.2) shows the command staff of an entire division standing around a Kriegsspiel table for a tactical operations simulation (see Chapter 4). They are dressed in the regular combat uniform, wearing not only black boots and a saber but also quite openly displaying their untrimmed queues. Such a hybrid form of “Western” military professionalism and “Chineseness” might have been regarded as an unmilitary appearance by a European observer. Still, a few Chinese army officers refused to completely abandon the established clothing style and proudly wore their queues as a sign of loyalty to the Qing.85 Furthermore, in the case of civilians within the army bureaucracy, it was almost impossible to mandate the wearing of military uniforms. In 1910, the head of the Army Ministry, Yinchang, ordered the entire civilian staff in his department to wear military uniforms but he encountered much resistance.86 The Datongbao reported on shamefaced civilian officials, who had to

Figure 3.2  The Banner in the Background Reads: “Division Officers Kriegsspiel Exercise” (Quan zhen guanzhang bingqi yanxi). Source: Zhu 1910.


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welcome Yinchang at the train station in Beijing wearing military uniforms.87 Yinchang repeatedly demanded that all military men or those involved with “military circles” got rid of their queue to “strengthen military power and appear homogeneous.”88 In the same vein, the Tokyo-based military journal Martial Studies (Wuxue) published a lengthy article by Huang Fu, in which he demanded that members of the army should always wear their uniforms to stir up the martial spirit of both soldiers and civilians.89 Huang was a military cadet in Japan and a member of Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui), who later became an intimate friend of Nationalist Party leader Jiang Jieshi and, in 1924, served as a short-term president of China. In his article, he criticized the “bad habit of valuing letters and neglecting the military” (zhong wen qing wu zhi e’xi) among Chinese people, which was responsible for the deeply rooted idea that “good men do not become soldiers” (hao nan bu dang bing), an idea which was strongly ridiculed abroad. Military men themselves, he argued, were responsible for perpetuating a negative image as they indulged in luxury, lavishness, and squandering. Instead, a military man had to be modest and frugal, accept and suffer the hardships of soldiering, and be brave and loyal as he should become an ideal and model for the people. He also referred to the Japanese emperor, who admonished the Japanese military men to adhere to the five virtues faith (zhongjie), propriety (liyi), honor (xinyi), valor (wuyong), and “character” (zhisu).90 Huang based his criticism of individual lavishness on “not changing the costume” (bu gaizhuang). Quoting from a Japanese book whose title translates as Genuine Sincerity, he demanded to prescribe the “Western clothing style” (yangfu) to the army, the police, teachers, officials, students, bankers, and other professions. “Although there is a new hair fashion and different clothes, [people] still follow the old bad habits, live in the traditional (literally Japanese) houses and wear the traditional dress.”91 According to Huang, the same applied to China and, in the case of the Lujun, adherence to the old style financially ruined many officers, hurting their pride, and causing shame and the decline of morale and discipline. Therefore, the qualification of the soldiers was inferior and the value of the army decreased. To solve this problem and prevent the recurrence of old ideas, the government should domestically mass produce military dresses and order military men to constantly wear their uniforms. The result would be a unified and modest military appearance and bearing (junrong). The soldiers would demonstrate to foreign observers their discipline, orderliness, and readiness. Admired by the people, they would “arouse the martial spirit of the entire citizenry and [the country would] recover from its long-standing weakness.”92 After returning to China in 1910, Huang joined the office of the General Staff where he was in charge of the bureau of the military gazette. In the

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same year, the Army Ministry issued a decree, which commanded officers to constantly wear their army uniform in public, as Huang demanded earlier.93 The decree particularly aimed at officers who held a rank in the old regular Qing forces prior to joining the New Armies. The only exception was an audience with the emperor where they had to wear the customary official’s dress and decorations, such as the richly ornamented, red-and-black cone hat (dingdai). Otherwise, they had to wear their Lujun uniforms, which indicated their actual rank within the new military hierarchy. The Liangjiang Office for Supervision and Training, in charge of the Nanyang or southern divisions, reiterated this regulation after observing that many officers of the middle ranks did not wear their uniforms on the drill grounds. For the sake of “establishing the discipline and appearance of the army” (li junrong), officers of all levels and areas of specialization had to wear their uniforms to both secure their authority and provide a role model for common soldiers.94 The General Staff, in charge of appointing division commanders and provincial staff officers, was particularly anxious about the appearance of higher-ranking and staff officers. Already in 1909, the military regulations stated: “the style and insignia of uniforms of staff officers must express a difference [to other officers]. Everywhere in the world, [staff officers’] uniforms look imposing (zhuangguan) and respectable.” While (staff) cadets, that is their bodies, should already appear to be of “strong physique and healthy nature, free from injuries and diseases,” the uniform of staff officers in particular should emulate the “international style.”95 Visualizing Military Masculinity The image of the junren was circulated widely, as both a mental representation and an actual photographical picture. Numerous photographs of officers produced after the turn of the century contributed to the staging of both the New Armies and the figure of the military man.96 Photographs depicted officers wearing German-Japanese uniforms, winter coats, hats, and leather boots, often holding European-style sabers, which were demonstratively placed in front of the body. At first sight, such photographic portrayals of Chinese officers, including posture and body language, were rather unusual, as their appearance resembled foreign officers.97 Eventually, however, these images reproduced the emerging concept of military masculinity and disseminated it to a wider audience. The large majority of photographs showed Chinese New Armies officers posing in front of the camera for a group photograph, or during overseeing drills as well as counsel and instruction sessions. In the latter case, they were arranged in a half-circle around a map, table, or a commanding officer, so the


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camera could get an unobstructed view (see for instance Figure 3.2). Most officers were photographed in smaller groups, which was supposed to express a certain esprit de corps. Other reasons for group pictures were the high costs of individual photographs and the generally low standing of portraiture pictures (for instance, as paintings or drawings), which became popular in China only with the introduction of photography in the nineteenth century.98 Individual portraiture photographs became also more popular with officers and symbolized military heroism and exemplary leadership. Despite the New Armies’ emphasis on unity and coherence, officers aspired after the European ideal of the valiant and outstanding officer rather than the mass of soldiers and presented themselves accordingly in photographs. This self-presentation is most tangible in photographs that included both new-style officers and men wearing old-style garments (often, though, with an already altered, narrower cut). In one photograph (Figure 3.3), two men, possibly scribes or secretaries, are wearing civilian “Chinese-style” dresses and displaying an entirely different posture than the military men.99 In an exemplary manner, such photographs recorded and juxtaposed not only two competing clothing styles, with all their political implications, but also two correlating concepts of masculinity. The New Armies used photographs to convey an image as well as a particular idea of soldiering and manliness in accordance with the “international” style, which should testify to the resurrection of military strength. The potential audience of these photographs included foreigners as well as Chinese civilians and military men, who should be inspired and mobilized by soldiers performing calisthenics or apparatus gymnastics and by officers proudly presenting their disciplined and self-confident demeanor. Although the number and volume of print media started to rocket in the final days of the Qing Dynasty, there is no exact data on the actual access to photographs of the New Armies men. However, for the large urban areas and the officer corps and army divisions themselves, the degree of circulation was, assumedly, still significant. More importantly, while photographs had the purpose to influence a wider audience, they were also an active form of self-staging and self-performing, particularly in the case of individual and group portraitures pictures of military men. Imitation and mimicry of the German-Japanese military style influenced the identity and self-presentation of New Armies soldiers and officers. The performance of the body and the self in front of the lens contributed to the formation and expression of the identity of these men (and those who wanted to be like them) and their conception of masculinity. Leading military reformers, whether military officers or civilians, such as Yuan Shikai, Tieliang, Yinchang, Dunfang, and Shen Dunhe had their portraiture photograph taken dressed in a military uniform. During the large war games in 1905 and 1906 (see Chapter 4), foreign observers explicitly noticed

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Figure 3.3  “Chinese Army Officers.” Probably around 1910. Source: Bain Collection, Library of Congress Prints & Photographs Division [LC-B2- 2089–15].

that Yuan and Tieliang appeared exclusively in military uniforms instead of the robes of officials, which would have been appropriate according to established customs. Early on, Yuan was conscious of the significance of images and photographs and he reportedly had his portrait (probably in military clothing) hanging in every barrack.100 The germanophil reformer Yinchang almost entirely appeared in military uniform (see also Figure 3.5).101 He had received a German language education at the Translator’s College in Beijing, which he continued in Berlin from 1877 on. He also attended a military academy in Germany, where he was trained in military drill and technology. After returning to China, he became part of the faculty of the Beiyang Military Preparatory School in Tianjin, first as head of the language program, later as the head director. During the Boxer War, he supported Yuan Shikai and Li Hongzhang in dealing with the Germans in Shandong. In 1901, he accompanied the young Zaifeng, brother of the Guangxu Emperor and father of the future Xuantong Emperor, on an atonement tour to Germany, where he became a Chinese ambassador in the same year. In 1906, he was appointed vice-president of the Army Ministry and, subsequently, also commander of the Seventh Lujun division. He served again as minister to the German Empire from 1908 to 1910, before he became head of the Army Ministry and first bearer of the title minister (dachen) of the same institution. During the Wuchang Uprising, Yinchang was appointed commander of the forces, which


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unsuccessfully tried to quell the revolution. After 1911, he served as a staff officer in the military administration of Yuan Shikai. Although he was criticized for only having very theoretical knowledge of military affairs, Yinchang was very engaged in the reorganization of the military administration and reformed the New Armies’ military legal structures during his tenure as Army Minister. However, his efforts to give the government and military bureaucracy a more martial character received greater attention. Yinchang was very sympathetic to Germany, in particular its military culture, and he was very eager to promote a German-style patriotic and militaristic society, in which soldiers and officers were given great respect and kudos. He preferred wearing German-style military uniforms and even grew a mustache in the same trademark-style of the German emperor Wilhelm II, whose personal favor he reportedly enjoyed. Yinchang was fluent in German and married to a German woman, who he brought with him to China. Upon becoming Minister of the Army, he announced he would assume office in uniform and ordered that everyone working for the ministry, including all civilians, had to wear one. Old ways of greeting and gestures were replaced by the military salute. Yinchang furthermore supported basic military education in schools for all levels and campaigned to increase the military character of both the government and the imperial clan.102 The Princes’ New Clothes Eventually, the highest dynastic circles among Prince Regent Zaifeng supported the aim of military reformers such as Yinchang, who aimed at militarizing society and endowing the government with a more martial—and by implication more “Western” masculine—appearance. After the death of both the Guangxu Emperor and his aunt, the Empress Dowager Cixi, in November 1908, a group of young princes installed an “Imperial Kinsmen’s Cabinet” or “Manchu Cabal,” led by Zaifeng, who inherited the title of Prince Chun and who was also the father of the new child emperor Puyi.103 As the old guard vanished—Zhang Zhidong died in 1909 and Yuan Shikai was forced to retire—the Manchu Cabal distributed most high government offices, including the administration and command of the army, to members of the imperial family (Aisin Gioro) and loyal Bannermen. Only Yikuang remained in office and became the first prime minister of the newly created government cabinet in 1911. Reforming the Qing state and its bureaucracy continued, but there was an even stronger tendency to promote military values and martialize culture. Zaifeng and his advisors returned to emphasize the German army as the ultimate military role model, for instance, by using the General Staff to secure

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central control over the army and make the command structure more efficient. They sought to elevate the status of military culture at court by adopting the image of military masculinity embodied by the German emperor Wilhelm II and by referring to the martial tradition of the Qing Dynasty and the Eight Banners.104 Zaifeng himself was deeply impressed by German military culture since he visited the German Empire in 1901 on an official mission to apologize for the alleged atrocities of the Boxers committed against the Germans.105 He was the first member of the imperial family ever to leave the Qing Empire and he recorded both his schedule and impressions in a travelogue. Already on the ship to Germany, Zaifeng adored the discipline and diligence of the German soldiers aboard, who exercised twice a day and cleaned their gun every afternoon, as he noted. Impressed by the neat and “flawless” weapons and uniforms, which were closely inspected and paraded once a week, he concluded: “one can really see why the spirit of the German army is the most acknowledged in Europe.”106 Zaifeng’s schedule in Germany included visiting galleries, the zoo in Berlin, the Krupp iron works in Essen, various shipyards, the Rhine valley, and ore mines. During his journey, he was exposed to the meticulously performed military splendor of both the German military and the imperial German court. Only 18 years old, he and his escorts Zhang Ji and Yinchang attended small drill exercises, large war games, military music performances, and parades, and visited military academies and arsenals. After observing an exercise of 1200 men near Potsdam, Zaifeng remarked: “when I arrived, I was shown respect with drawn swords. Although this was not a big exercise, one could see the condition of the German army from their shiny uniforms and their orderly march.”107 Near Danzig, the group attended a large-scale, joint war game over several days, involving infantry and cavalry troops as well as music, hunting, provisioning, and naval units. Zaifeng also met Prince Heinrich, Wilhelm’s brother, who was responsible for showing the Qing prince around. Although Heinrich was actually a navy commander, he was in charge of the cavalry during the exercise.108 During his time in Germany, Zaifeng was deeply impressed by Wilhelm II, who, in the martial tradition of the Prussian imperial house, was pursuing a military career and usually wearing a military dress uniform that he designed himself. Wilhelm II was obsessed with parades and war games, which he often attended with his sons or other members of his extended family.109 Full of awe, the Qing prince described the German emperor as a great huntsman, who owned a personal stud with about 200 “stout and spirited horses.” Later, after having dinner with Wilhelm II and his generals, Zaifeng was granted the Order of the Red Eagle, which was usually bestowed upon members of foreign troops.110 In Germany, Zaifeng not only personally experienced what many in the Qing Empire viewed as a powerful nation-state, with a highly


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cherished military culture, but he also encountered an imperial family, which emphasized and displayed that military service was the most important tradition of their dynasty. Its members assumed important roles in the command of both the army and navy, and emperor Wilhelm II himself was a popular and notorious symbol of military masculinity and the glorification of military culture in Germany. On his return trip to the Qing Empire, Zaifeng met the Siamese king Chulalongkorn’s son, along with his entourage, who received a military education in Germany and were “able to drill in German.” The group was on its way back home for vacation, after which they would return to Germany to continue their training and studies. Zaifeng commented: “this, one can call determination!”111 After assuming power in late 1908, he, his brothers, and advisors sought to emulate the military splendor of the Prussian-German court and German notion of military masculinity to demonstrate strength toward inner and outer enemies and to show their readiness to lead the New Armies. They established a new imperial guard, took over the leading positions of military command and administration, underscored the role of the emperor as commander-in-chief over all armed forces, and promoted martial values and “Western-style” military uniforms, which many members of the “Manchu Cabal” were wearing themselves. Probably inspired by Wilhelm II and Prince Heinrich, who were both obsessed with warships and naval warfare, Zaifeng even planned to reestablish a fleet, which military reformers had completely ignored since the defeat of the Beiyang fleet in 1895. In July 1909, the government installed a Commission to Reorganize the Navy (Chouban haijun shiwuchu), which was transformed into a full Navy Ministry (Haijunbu) at the end of the following year. Zaifeng’s half-brother Zaixun and Sa Zhenbing, who undertook several tours together to Japan, Europe, and the United States to study the organization of naval forces, were in charge of the new ministry.112 Central to (re-)establishing the martial image of the Qing government and propelling military culture (and linking it, at the same time, to the Qing Dynasty) was the physical body of the emperor. In 1898, Kang Youwei suggested that the emperor should set an example by cutting his hair and changing his dress, so that both officials and commoners would follow his example. Short hair and clothes, he argued, would inspire the country’s martial vigor and create a new spirit. In the United States and in Europe, people had cut off their queues a long time ago, which had the effect that everyone (theoretically) became a soldier and the countries were able to cope with the rapid development of technology and military science of the last decades. Similar to the Japanese, the Chinese had to adapt this fashion to prevent them from being mocked at and invaded. “To change the senses of the people, [one has to] lead them to martial vigor, similar to [the martial vigor of] Europeans and Americans,” he stated.113

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Kang did not directly call on the emperor to wear a military uniform but the insinuation was obvious. The image of foreign rulers in military uniforms, which underpinned the martial tradition of foreign imperial houses and their claim to rule, was known throughout the Qing Empire. For instance, against the background of the Russo-Japanese War, one of the most influential and wildly circulated Chinese periodicals of the first half of the twentieth century, the Dongfang zazhi (Eastern Miscellany), opened its first issue in 1904 with photographs of the Japanese Tenno Mutsuhito and the Russian Tsar Nicholas II, both wearing full dress military uniforms. The sixth issue contained a similar picture of Wilhelm II (Figure 3.4).114 Picturing these three emperors not only served the purpose to inform the readers but also presented to them an alternative male role model that symbolized military culture and political power. Each emperor was, officially, the commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the respective state. Wilhelm II was formally the Oberster Dienstherr (supreme commander) of all German armed forces and had indeed enjoyed a military education from early childhood. Photographs of him were omnipresent in Germany and conveyed an ideal and iconic military “hyper-masculinity.” Wilhelm II and his court carefully controlled all photographs and in most pictures—predominately portraits in the style of military paintings—he was dressed in uniform or military gear, assuming a stalwart and firm pose and displaying a self-possessed and patriarchic charisma. During the First World War, photographs of Wilhelm II were distributed widely to soldiers to increase their fighting spirit. However, while many Germans idolized him and his image, this almost religious worship115 and Wilhelm’s vanity and pretentiousness became the object of mockery and satire in both Germany and other European countries.116 In Japan, a similar image of Mutsuhito was depicted in photographs and woodblock prints, showing his transformation from a delicate and frail person into a hypermasculine “Western-style” military man. The previously noble and androgynous image of the emperor changed in the 1880s, as he was portrayed in the pose and attire of European monarchs, wearing a ceremonial military uniform, saber, mustache, and beard.117 The military image of Mutsuhito served the aim of promoting military values, spiritual unity, and “Western-style” military culture and established a link between the army, the ruling dynasty, and the nation-state. Moreover, through schools and the army, the emperor in uniform impressed upon men and boys a Euro-American concept of military masculinity. Like the German emperor, he was viewed as a patriarchic role model and the soldiers were conceived as his “sons.”118 With the establishment of conscription armies in both Japan and Germany, this metaphorical father-son relationship between emperor and soldiers was extended to all male citizens. The Meiji oligarchy around Itō Hirobumi planned to give the Japanese emperor a military education so he would be able to actually


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assume the supreme command of the military. However, unlike the German Kaiser, the Japanese Tenno remained to be a symbolic figure and had no real political or military power.119 From 1906, a movement to introduce a constitutional monarchy in China demanded that the Qing emperor assumed a similar military masculine role. Duanfang, one of five senior officials who traveled to Japan, the United States, and Europe in 1905–1906 to inspect different political and administrative systems, recommended in a memorial that the Qing should copy the martial appearance and spirit of the German imperial family.120 He spent most of his time in Germany during his journey and recommended adopting the German military organization as a model for the Qing Empire, including the administration of army and navy as well as the system of training soldiers. Duanfang was a Chinese Bannerman, who, typically for a high Qing official,

Figure 3.4  Wilhelm II in a Full Dress Uniform. For another picture of Wilhelm II in military full dress (and one of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck), see Wu and Pan 1902. Source: DFZZ 1904 (6), 1.

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successively held several high posts throughout his career, including the office of governor-general of Liangjiang. Moreover, he was particularly engaged in foreign policy and education, establishing schools and libraries and encouraging students to study abroad. Military strength, he argued, was not only the result of technical skills but also of “promoting morale” (chang shiqi). “Even if one possesses good technology and refined machines—how can these develop craft and science […], and discipline the army and utilize morale?” To boost troop morale, the emperor and his family should wear military dress (rongfu). In East and West, Duanfang wrote, whether monarchy or democracy, all the heads of state wore a military dress. They were the supreme commanders of army and navy and supervised and lead everyone serving in the military. “Real [control] over the military administration is the right of the monarch. No official can interfere. For instance, [this is the case in Germany, where] the imperial family leads the army and oversees the conduct of war games.” The Russian Emperor, he continued, was similarly putting himself in danger, reviewed new soldiers, and encouraged his officers. As a sign of esteem, other countries and their leaders also honored their soldiers with banquets. “The monarch is bound to wear a uniform and take care of things!” If the monarch of a country complied with this, then the martial esteem of the people would rise and glory would be attributed to those joining the army. The strength and prosperity of the country would increase, he concluded.121 Duanfang’s memorial, reprinted in the Nanyang Military Journal, went on evoking the (lost) martial tradition of the imperial clan, including the affection for horse riding, archery, and hunting. His journey to the United States and Europe left him with the strong impression that the Chinese had to militarize and become manlier in the eyes of foreigners. He remembered how bystanders in military uniforms had chuckled during an audience with a foreign monarch, because he and his companions were wearing the customary long gown of Qing officials as well as queues. Only with the help of the emperor and the imperial family, he argued, could this shame and ridicule be stopped and the urgently needed militarization of all aspects of culture and society be truly implemented. The challenges from within and from outside made it necessary to revive the martial spirit and military preparedness of the imperial clan, which had to be exhibited to inspire the people and intimidate foreign enemies. The Qing emperor had to assume an active role within the military by becoming the supreme commander of the army and navy. This should also be fixed in a future constitution. Moreover, the emperor should always wear a military uniform and, together with his kinsmen, regularly review the army. He would then receive the revere of officials, commoners, and foreign diplomats, and add respect to the military profession.122 Duanfang emphasized that the implementation of a martial culture was not the emperor’s responsibility alone, but lay also with the sons of the (Banner)


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nobility and the imperial family. For a thousand years, the Chinese had possessed culture but no martial spirit, he argued. Cadets studying abroad experienced the respect military men received from the people in their countries. However they were not able to truly grasp the glamour, pride, and heroism of the foreign military men. The Banner noblemen, with their aristocratic and martial Manchu background, should be the first to go to Germany, Japan, or another powerful country to learn everything about the different military units, study a specialist subject within military science, and even join a regiment there. Upon their return, they could hand down their knowledge to young cadets. The imperial family, Duanfang wrote, particularly had the obligation to be engaged in military affairs and embrace martial culture. In Germany, he emphasized, all princes as well as the sons of the noble families joined the military. The emperor’s brother Heinrich was a fleet admiral and two of the emperor’s sons were generals in the Prussian army. The members of the imperial Qing clan, on the other hand, had lost their martial skills of the past and their morale was corrupted for almost a hundred years. They should go abroad and join a foreign army, so that they would gain power as well as the respect of foreigners.123 Other reformers echoed Duanfang’s plea for reviving the Qing or Manchu martial tradition under foreign parameters. In an article on military education, Tao Shumao similarly emphasized the role model function of the emperor. “Every country’s monarch,” he wrote, “must in person be the commander-inchief. [He should] furthermore graduate from a military academy and attend the autumn war games.”124 Other articles demanded that the Qing imperial clan needed to emulate the members of the Japanese imperial family, who were attending war games and reviewed troops.125 Zaifeng, after becoming Prince Regent in late 1908, adopted the idea to turn the emperor and his kin into martial role models. Strongly influenced by his visit to Germany and attendance at military parades and exercises, he decided to emulate the German Empire and imperial family as early as 1905. In the same year, Prince Friedrich Leopold, a relative of the German emperor, who was assigned to counsel the Russian side during the Russo-Japanese War, officially visited the Qing Empire and brought gifts for Cixi, including a photograph of Wilhelm II. But more importantly, Friedrich Leopold and Zaifeng discussed the “issue of arming the imperial clan,” referring to the establishment of a new imperial or palace guard, the martial image of the Qing Dynasty, and central imperial control over the military.126 In July 1909, Zaifeng declared the emperor commander-in-chief to all troops (dayuanshuai), as it was outlined in the draft for the future constitution promulgated by Cixi shortly before her death. Zaifeng himself would assume the function as commander-in-chief until his son, the child emperor Puyi, would come off age.127 Moreover, the court created the new rank of

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general (dajiangjun or jiangjun), which was equal to the rank of a grand secretary. From now on, the court directly appointed all officers from the rank of fucanling (Lieutenant-Colonel, the fifth overall rank) or higher. The next step was the reorganization of the military bureaucracy and the further centralization of military command at the government. Zaifeng removed the General Staff Council (Junzichu), previously a mere counseling agency, from the jurisdiction of the Army Ministry and made it an independent institution directly at the service of the emperor, which was renamed into General Staff Office (Junzifu) in 1911. Copying the German and Japanese model, the General Staff was no longer only in charge of developing long-term strategic planning but also responsible for appointing, overseeing, and educating staff officers. The idea was to develop it into a full-fledged supreme army command after the model of the German General Staff. Yulang, a young imperial prince, and Zaitao were appointed to head the General Staff Office. Two more seasoned (and actual) generals, Feng Guozhang and Ha Hanzhang, who had received his military education in Japan, assisted the two princes.128 Moreover, the government hired three new German military advisors, including Major Richard Dinkelmann, to instruct Chinese military academy instructors and thus improve the education of staff officers.129 By making the emperor the explicit supreme commander of all forces and by creating and controlling an ultimate command institution, the General Staff, Zaifeng and the “Manchu Cabal” sought to reclaim imperial sovereignty and central authority.130 In theory, the emperor was already the supreme commander of all military forces, but reconfirming this role was an attempt to represent and constitute political power. By turning the emperor into the prime example of a military masculine man, Zaifeng and his entourage sought to bind the loyalty of military men to the dynasty, impressing both foreigners and the Chinese, and re-unifying the disintegrating multi-ethnical empire. Restoring the image of the emperor and the imperial clan as military masculine figures would turn them into role models, awaken the martial spirit of the people, increase the social appeal and prestige of the army, and earn the respect of foreigners. In September 1909, repeating the earlier proposals by Kang Youwei and Duanfang, Zaitao and Yulang submitted a memorial concerning the emperor wearing a new-style military uniform: Except for donning special clothes at a sacrificial ceremony, all the leaders of the countries with a constitution usually wear a military uniform. When receiving other sovereigns, [the Qing emperor should] wear a full dress uniform, when meeting officials [he should] wear an ordinary military uniform, [thus] emphasizing military uniforms on every official occasion. [Then] the respect for the martial spirit and the expression of militarism (junguo zhi zhuyi) will go deep and far.131


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Returning to the martial origins of the dynasty, as the Guangxu Emperor already demanded in the early phase of the Xinzheng or New Policy reforms, would redefine the emperor as the ultimate power center and legitimate his claim to rule the vast and culturally diverse empire. The concept of imperial rule during the Qing Dynasty differed markedly from the previous Ming as it contained multiple facets surrounding the person and body of the emperor, who was particularly depicted as a martial ruler. The Qing emperors performed the role of a wise Confucian sage-ruler observing the idea of the impartial heavenly mandate and its most important elements wen, li (ritual or propriety), and xiao (filial piety). However, in addition, they assumed the modes of a Buddhist Bodhisattva, a Mongolian Khan (or Buddhist warriorkhan), and a Manchu beile or prince. Each role addressed a specific audience such as the “Han” literati, Tibetan Buddhists, or Mongolian and Manchu warriors.132 From the early days of the dynasty, fighting skills and martial spirit were declared an innate aspect of Manchu identity by the Qing rulers, who, starting with the second Qing emperor Hong Taiji, feared the loss of this “Manchu way,” which included shooting, horse riding, a frugal life, and the Manchu language.133 All emperors were taught riding as well as fighting with weapons and some were known to be skilled archers, even the late Qing emperors such as the Daoguang Emperor. They were educated in military history and theory, and officially had the supreme command over the army during campaigns, though the Kangxi Emperor was the last to lead troops into the battle. During the eighteenth century, the Qing expanded the empire by successfully mobilizing resources and funds for military purposes.134 The Qianlong Emperor styled himself “Old Man of the Ten Completed Great Campaigns” (shi quan laoren) referring to the great wars between 1747 and 1789. He pursued an imperial project and used, as Joanna Waley-Cohen has shown, military culture to link the different peoples together under his rule. At least for some time, not Confucianism but military ritual in a broad sense was the strongest bound holding the Qing Empire together.135 Military rituals included troop reviews, victory celebrations, and ceremonies as wells other demonstrations of martial prowess such as inspections tours and hunting parties. Multilingual steels, elaborate paintings, and copper prints partly produced in Paris during the Qianlong period should bear witness to the martial power and splendor of the dynasty and its rule over a vast empire. According to Waley-Cohen, the Qianlong Emperor intended to militarize culture: “beyond the actual conduct of war, [he initiated] a wide-ranging campaign to propel military success, and the military values that underpinned it, on the center stage of cultural life.”136 He sought to elevate wu over wen, or at least restore the idealized equilibrium of the two as guiding principles. Civilian institutions were infused with martial values, as experience in war and a record of military service were

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favored when appointing civil officials. Art, architecture, literature, and other forms of aesthetic production depicted war and insinuated martial values. Even actual defeats such as the failed campaign in Burma (1765–1769) were presented as success.137 Within the wen-wu matrix, the emperor embodied an ideal and a role model for others, owing to the fact that he was not divine but only a (privileged) mortal man. “He was a man among other men (and the perfection of yang masculinity), he provided the model of how to model for others who would emulate him.”138 Contemporary portraiture paintings by Giuseppe Castiglione show the Qianlong Emperor in full military armor or as a hunter shooting animals with his bow. He staged himself as a “real man,” embodying the Manchu or Inner-Asian habit of qishe, riding and shooting. One of the characters in his reign name Qianlong contained the meaning “(heavenly) male principle” (qian). Unlike his grandfather, the Kangxi Emperor, who sought to provide a model of perfectly harmonizing wen and wu that Bannermen could emulate, the Qianlong Emperor exhorted the Manchu to emphasize their martial heritage and identity, and to leave cultural and literal endeavors to the Han scholars.139 The Imperial Kinsmen Cabinet’s project to restore the martial image of the emperor and the dynasty was opposed by different political factions. Zhang Zhidong had already feared a power accumulation at the court and the loss of provincial autonomy. Meng Sen, an editor of the Eastern Miscellany, compared Zaifeng to the Ming Emperor Wuzong, who was notorious for his childlike affinity for battles and warfare.140 Lu Chuanlin, a member of the Grand Council and Puyi’s warden, was a proponent of moderately adapting “Western” structures and institutions in fields such as education, but he was against the idea of the commander-in-chief wearing a military uniform.141 Support, however, came from the newly established National Assembly. While it merely had consultative functions and no real power to make any decisions, it was a first success for those struggling to achieve the introduction of a constitution and the separation of powers in China based on European and American models. The National Assembly first convened on October 3, 1910 and in December, it passed a resolution requesting that officials, students, soldiers, and policemen cut their queues. Furthermore, they demanded changing the dress code for official events and ceremonies. Both regent and emperor should henceforth follow the example of the Meiji Emperor and wear a military dress uniform.142 However, Puyi, the Xuantong Emperor, was only three years old. Zaifeng was unable to style himself as a military leader and military masculine role model, probably due to the pressure at court to maintain the established role and dress. He officially assumed the supreme command of the military and sought to emulate the military style of Wilhelm II but there is no evidence that


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he ever publically wore a military uniform.143 Thus, the members of the imperial family had to step up and adopt the military conduct of the Prussian royal house. Zaitao, Zaifeng’s younger half-brother, particularly styled himself like Prince Heinrich and publicly wore a military uniform. His sole experience in the military, however, was two years of attending classes at the Nobles Military School (Lujun guizhou xuetang), which was opened in 1906 based on recommendations from eminent officials such as Duanfang and Liang Cheng, a diplomat who had accompanied Zaifeng on his trip to Germany. According to Ralph Powell, the Nobles Military School added prestige to the new military schools in general. It was headed by Feng Guozhang and had 120 students in 1908, of which 70 belonged to the imperial family. Zaifeng and Zaitao regularly attended classes at the school, but did not complete the full three-years program. It largely resembled the new colleges for educating officers at the middle (zhong) level, including theoretical classes and practical drill. Like other military schools, the Nobles Military School’s program was purely based on foreign models but no foreign instructors were engaged.144 Zaitao compensated his lack of actual military experience with enthusiasm for German military culture. Together with Yulang, he supported a dress reform for the whole population. Not only did he frequently appear in military uniform himself, he was also reported to have his queue cut off. During a military inspection tour in spring and summer 1910, which led him to Japan, the United States, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, Zaitao’s fervor for “Western” military culture and technology deepened further. On this trip, Liangbi, another member of the wider imperial family and a graduate from the Japanese Army Officers School, accompanied him as an advisor. They observed military drills and, in Paris, inspected airships. Zaitao even took a ride in a balloon, during which he was so relaxed that the French were reportedly impressed by his courage. In London, Zaitao attended the funeral of the British king, Edward VII, where he rode together with the new king, George V, and Wilhelm II. Both the “English and German emperors” were very impressed since they did not expect the Qing prince to be able to ride a horse and therefore had reserved a car for him. The next day, the French and English press also praised Zaitao’s riding skills. After his return to China, various journals and newspapers discussed whether or not Zaitao had removed his queue, triggering what probably became the Qing Empire’s first royal celebrity media affair.145 The Beiyang Military Journal, for instance, reported of various events during Zaitao’s journey, including an encounter with well-trained, shorthaired foreign officers that urged him to cut off his queue. According to the report, this was only prevented in the last moment.146 Despite the support from prominent figures such as Zaitao and Yinchang to introduce a new hairstyle within the army and navy, Zaifeng and the Qing

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government did not issue any clear order or decree concerning the matter. More than his brother, Zaifeng was facing the dilemma of being trapped between his own enthusiasm for “Western-style” military culture and the wish to preserve the Qing rule and its symbols. In September 1910, the Army Ministry, together with the Ministry of the Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, advised the removal of the queue and many officers, cadets, and common soldiers followed the example of Army Minister Yinchang. Zaifeng, however, did not openly militate against the queue, which, more than ever, became the very symbol of Qing power in the public discourse. In December, he ordered that all public servants except soldiers and policemen had to keep the customary clothing fashion, but without explicitly mentioning the queue.147 Zaitao was not the only member of the Imperial Cabinet who was publicly wearing a German-style military uniform and performing military masculinity.148 Other princes and high-ranking noble Bannermen not only took over most of the leading government and ministry positions, but also occupied commanding positions within both the army and the navy. Correspondingly, they displayed new-style military uniforms and staged themselves in portraitures photographs, emulating typical foreign military masculine postures. Journals and newspapers printed photographs of members of the imperial family and their entourage in full dress uniforms. One photograph in the Eastern Miscellany from 1911, for instance, was titled Important People from the Navy and Army (Figure 3.5) and showed, from left to right, the Minister of the Army, Yinchang; Palace Guard Commissioner Zaibo; the Minster of the Navy, Zaixun; the director of the Nobles Military School, Zairun; Zaitao; Lingguang; a Mongolian called Paleta; and the Vice-Minister of the Navy, Tan Xueheng. Another photograph in the same journal, titled Group Photograph of Recent Princes and Ministers, showed the same people mixed with civilian officials in their respective dress (Figure 3.6). A major part of the Imperial Kinsmen Cabinet’s project to resurrect the military glory and martial image of both the Qing Dynasty and the Qing Empire was to establish a new elite regiment, responsible for guarding the emperor and his family. The creation of such a guard had been discussed during Cixi’s final years but only Zaifeng eventually established a new Palace Guard (Jinweijun) in December 1908.149 It should not only consist of crack troops but also underline the new, German-style martial splendor of the dynasty.150 The Palace Guard was organized similarly to a Lujun division and reached its full strength of two brigades in September 1911, shortly before the Wuchang Uprising caused the Qing Dynasty’s downfall. The Palace Guard was designed “after the latest fashion of international modes of organization,” referring to the German and Japanese imperial guards.151 It was directly controlled by Zaifeng, instead of the Army Ministry, and was overseen by a special commission headed by Zaitao, Yulang, and Tieliang. The latter was


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Figure 3.5  “Important People from the Navy and Army.” Source: DFZZ 1911 (1). Original photograph probably by Albert Harlingue.

Figure 3.6  “Group Photograph of Recent Princes and Ministers.” Zaitao is no. 1, Yinchang is standing behind no. 4 and no. 5. Source: DFZZ 1911 (7). Original photograph by Albert Harlingue.

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then the president of the Army Ministry and the only one with substantial experience in military affairs. Zaibo, the son of Yikuang, later replaced him as the commissioner of the Palace Guard. Originally, Zaifeng and his advisors wanted the new Palace Guard to consist only of Manchu. Following protests, Han Chinese and Mongols were also admitted, but the soldiers were still predominantly Manchu, recruited from the First and Sixth Lujun divisions and from regular Banner troops.152 The leadership was almost entirely in the hands of members of the imperial clan or Banner noblemen, who, in many cases, had attended either the Nobles Military School or a military academy abroad. Liangbi and Wang Tingzhen, a Han and a graduate from a Japanese military school, each commanded one of the two brigades.153 The men of the new Palace Guard should be the best soldiers available and had to fulfill the same minimum requirements expected of Lujun recruits, such as literacy, a strong physique, and shooting skills. Moreover, Zaitao emphasized that the Palace Guard had to stand out visually as it accompanied the emperor and guarded the imperial palace: “because of this huge responsibility and [the necessity of] a solemn appearance, their coat, shoes, and uniforms have to be scrupulously straight and accurate.”154 They should be “easy to distinguish, and make a strong and manly impression (zhuangfu guanzhan).”155 The uniform of the Palace Guard followed the basic design of the Lujun and each soldier possessed a khaki drill uniform for summer and a gray uniform for winter. However, there were small differences, which made it possible to distinguish the elite Palace Guard men from ordinary Lujun soldiers. The uniform regulations of the guard stated that “every country in East and West has its own dress code for [their respective] palace guard. More decoration is used to show their greater quality.”156 Nevertheless, the uniform style followed the “Western-style” military fashion, which was plain, compared to the traditional robe of a civilian or military official, and avoided an overly extravagant appearance. Every detail was precisely regulated, including the footwear, belts, the sword hilt and sheath, the spurs, and a Germanstyle coat with six buttons. The regulations concluded: “if the appearance is orderly, [the uniforms will always] look like new, and this aggrandizes military strength.”157 Besides the imperial dragon, the Palace Guard used an eagle symbol on uniforms and badges, which was probably another allusion to Prussia and the German Empire, where the eagle served as heraldic animal. An eagle medal was introduced to award the best shooters among the Palace Guard soldiers. The most striking artifact of the influence of German military culture, however, was the iconic spiked helmet (Pickelhaube). Designed for the Prussian infantry in 1842, the spiked helmet came to symbolize German militarism, subservience, and warmongering, in particular due to British propaganda during the First World War, although it was replaced by a more sophisticated


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steal helmet from 1915 on. In 1911, Army Minister Yinchang introduced a richly ornamented, high, black helmet with a hexagonal spike on the top and a silver or golden dragon on the front. There were two versions, one for the full dress uniform and one for the ceremonial dress, which also included a plume of feathers.158 The Imperial Kinsmen Cabinet introduced medals to reward achievements, based on foreign models. Acknowledgment in the form of medals, orders, and decorations was viewed as an important incentive to encourage men and a visible sign of prestige. Peacock feathers, on the other hand, a customary token of high honor and prestige awarded to civil officials, did not fit in with the new uniforms and military style. Zaifeng received an order of merit from Wilhelm II, which probably inspired him to introduce “Western-style” orders of merit to China to demonstrate the imperial clan’s appreciation of the new military men, particularly their appearance in close-fitting and body-hugging German-style uniforms. Henceforth, enlisted men received rewards such as badges for being good shooters or for their committed and enthusiastic drill performance. Cadets and officers were decorated with orders of merit for their study achievements and distinguished services. Already in 1882, the Zongli Yamen, the bureau in charge of foreign affairs between 1861 and 1901, had created a foreign-style order, the star-shaped Double Dragon Order (Shuanglong baoxing xunzhang), which was to be bestowed upon foreign dignitaries for reasons of diplomatic exchange. In 1909, it was extended to include Qing subjects and introduced to the New Armies, following an initiative from a group around Zaitao.159 “Regrettably, soldiers only wear military uniforms and a sword at the waist, but no orders of merit. [But] those have miraculous effects on inspiring people and should be adopted in China,” they stated in a memorial.160 Orders for meritorious military services and achievements on the battlefield should not be conferred lightly though, as they were “outwardly visible ornaments, which also include a stipend.” The Foreign Ministry under Yikuang, officially dealing with the issue, considered orders as a special form of appraisal, which was credited for “instilling loyalty and courage” into recruits and officers during war. Orders, another memorial from 1911 declared, acknowledged military success and “showed praise and honor.”161 Eventually, orders became a substantial part of full dress uniforms, and were supposed to represent the high importance admitted to military men in late imperial and early Republican China. By 1911, five orders of merit, separated into a total of 19 different grades, existed. The highest grade (Yellow Dragon Order) was reserved for the emperor only, the second grade (Yellow Dragon) for members of the imperial family, and the third grade (Red Dragon) for high ministers, ambassadors, fleet admirals, and field marshals. All other orders (eight different grades each of Blue and Black Dragon Orders) could be awarded to officials, members of

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the gentry, peasants, workers, businessmen, and others for outstanding work or performance for the country and for society.162 Awe-inspiring military culture and military rituals had been an effective way in the eighteenth century to hold the Qing Empire together and secure the loyalty of various peoples. Zaifeng, Zaitao, and other Manchu nobles sought to revive the lost martial identity and heritage of the Qing Dynasty, the Aisin Gioro house, and the Banners. Therefore, the Imperial Family Cabinet attempted to directly control the New Armies and sought to legitimize this claim by mimicking the military masculine style of the German and Japanese imperial houses. In the end, the Manchu princes did not manage to become military masculine icons as others, such as anti-Qing revolutionaries or Yuan Shikai, had already co-opted “Western-style” military culture for political purposes. Moreover, the Manchu princes and their supporters encountered too much resistance from conservative, yet influential elites, who refused the ritual and sartorial transition to a German- and Japanese-style military monarchy. Republican Men on Parade The struggles over appearances, clothing, and hairstyle, gained a new quality with the revolution in late 1911. After the abdication of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic on January 1, 1912, the new government under Sun Yat-sen promulgated a new dress code and issued booklets illustrating the new mandatory formal wear for both men and women. The “Western” suit and hat replaced the customary garb and headgear. Short hair and an unshaven forehead became the commonly accepted hairstyle and queue cutting became a national project strictly enforced among both civilians and military men throughout the country.163 As already planned by Sun and his fellows before the revolution, an Order Concerning the Uniforms of Military Men (Junshi zhifuling) from February visually turned the Qing New Armies into a Republican army.164 Both the uniforms and the rank system of the army were reformed. The use of Eight Banner titles for officers was abandoned and all insignia of the perished dynasty were removed. The Qing dragon, for one, was replaced by the five-colored star, which symbolized the new Republic. The color of the common drill uniform was changed to tarnished green (chaqingse), though equipping the whole army with the new dress was rather problematic financially and logistically.165 Besides the suit and the military uniform, the student suit or the Sun Yat-sen suit (Zhongshanzhuang, also known as Mao suit) was the third vestiary novelty emerging in the final years of the Qing Dynasty, which came to symbolize modernization and an anti-Qing stance. A few historians argue that


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the new student suit that emerged during the final years of the Qing period originally stem from Japanese student uniforms, which were influenced by European, probably Prussian, student uniforms.166 This is not wrong but the German- and Japanese-style military uniforms also directly influenced the development and growing popularity of the new civilian male clothing, including a trimmer fit and the high collar. Moreover, the student uniforms both in Germany and in Japan were also based on military uniforms. Sun Yat-sen publically appeared in all three different dress styles, thus strongly impressing them with a revolutionary image. Although he was closely linked to the student suit, which was later named after him, Sun wore a “Western” suit most of the time. Yet, during many occasions, he sought to embody military strength and stern leadership and put on an officer’s military uniform.167 The old style, however, did not disappear and was mixed with European fashion, leading to various hybrid clothing styles in China. Not only the design but also the material (i.e., the type and origin of the fabric) was crucial for clothing and fashion. As Karl Gerth demonstrates, the powerful silk industry successfully lobbied for preserving a (adjusted) Chinese-style dress for strengthening the national economy. As some officials and intellectuals had suggested during the final years of the Qing, the silk industry lobby managed to decouple and dissociate the customary fashion style from the Qing Dynasty and the Manchu and render it as essentially Chinese, representing nationalist and patriotic sentiments.168 After assuming power and becoming the president of the Republic of China in 1912, Yuan Shikai revised the official dress code accordingly. However, although Yuan only removed his queue a few days after the formal abdication of the Qing Dynasty in February 1912, after becoming president, he initiated campaigns against the queue to demonstrate his progressive and republican stance.169 Moreover, he continued to militarize society, political culture, and the male appearance by generating an image of himself as a supreme military leader, by securing loyalty through military honors, and by enhancing the status of his regime through ritualistic military spectacles such as reviews and parades. While Yuan reorganized the Army Ministry, a newly created military secretariat attached to his presidential office (Zongtongfu junshichu) was, in fact, in charge of administering and commanding the army. Yuan modeled himself and his political role after the German and Japanese emperors and presented himself as a stern and strong military leader. He assumed the title of dayuanshuai (Commander-in-Chief or Generalissimo), which had originally been created by Zaifeng during the final years of the Qing. The Office of the Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, established in 1914, centrally controlled military affairs and decision-making. The German Richard Dinkelmann served Yuan as his military advisor.170 Yuan also sought to restructure the bureaucracy within the military, and after dissolving the parliament and

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evicting his one-time partner Sun Yat-sen, the provincial administration was turned over to military governors (dudu) in order to increase the centralization of power.171 Like the German emperor, Yuan usually wore a military uniform in public and surrounded himself with men in uniform. Newly published encyclopedias and readers for citizens as well as newspapers and journals thus presented to the people a president in military uniform.172 Furthermore, Yuan again revised and subsequently refined the system of military ranks promotion.173 The early Nanjing government under Sun was the first to issue a distinct regulation for decorating outstanding service and achievements exclusive to military personnel, which the late Qing government and the Manchu princes had failed to accomplish. The early Republican government approved of a Decoration Regulation (Xunzhang zhangcheng) replacing the Qing dragon orders with three different new orders, the Order of the Nine Tripod Cauldron, the Order of the Tiger and Bear, and the Order of the Awakening Lion. Only members of the army and navy were eligible for the first two medals and only the Order of the Awakening Lion could also be awarded to civilians for outstanding services to the country. Yuan’s government subsequently refined the system of medals, and issued several instructions concerning military decoration.174 The new Beiyang government under Yuan introduced three new military orders of merit, the Order of the White Eagle Order, the Order of Wen Hu (Wen Hu was a general of the kingdom Cao Wei during the Three Kingdoms period), and the Order of the Golden Lion. For Yuan and his regime, awarding military decoration was an important means to secure the loyalty of officers and the army. Yuan generously conferred orders of merit, honorary military ranks, and titles—particularly, after he had secured his rule against Sun Yat-sen and the Nationalist Party in 1913.175 Every year, Yuan’s regime conducted a military parade and a troop review to commemorate the beginning of the Wuhan Uprising in 1911. The tenth of October became the National Day and the people were ordered to celebrate, fly flags, hang up lanterns, and bear the colors of the Republic, while the government evoked Republican ideals in proclamations and speeches. The National Day was a holiday and the festivities should include sacrifices, rewards for the successful, alms for the poor, and amnesties for prisoners. In the capital, a large military parade (dayue) was conducted (see also Figure 3.7).176 In other cities and towns military reviews were held as well or, in other cases, sports meetings for school children took place, which similarly emphasized military strength and individual physical fitness.177 During the parade, Yuan usually moved through several gates of the Imperial City. Troop reviews took place in front of the newly erected New China Gate (Xinhuamen), which formed the entrance to his new headquarters, the Zhongnanhai compound adjacent to the Forbidden City.178 In 1913, he presided


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over a ceremony in the Hall of Supreme Harmony (Taihedian), which was preceded by a short ceremonial procession from the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen). There, Yuan mounted a ceremonial sedan carried by four men, which was accompanied by a hundred or so other people leading the way and a “squad of warriors in exceptionally shiny uniforms carrying silver spears with both hands.” Important foreign guests and high state officials followed. The procession, which was “flanked by soldiers forming a guard of honor in neat formation,” then went through Duanmen, Niumen, Taihemen, and other gates. After several breaks, it finally reached the Hall of Supreme Harmony, where the main ceremony took place.179 In 1915, Yuan, clad in the military uniform of the commander-in-chief of navy and army, mounted a “chrysanthemum-colored horse” and rode from the New China Gate to the Gate of Heavenly Peace to review troops, together with his “pretty wife.”180 The troops marched orderly in file. First came four brigades of infantry, then a regiment of each artillery and cavalry, followed by engineers, logistics, and music battalions. Altogether, two full divisions (more than 24,000 men) were present, according to one report. In overall charge was division commander Lu Yongxiang, the divisions were led by Zhang Jingyao, and Liu Jinbiao, respectively. The military parade was followed by a procession of 1200 primary school students, who were grouped in 24 groups.181 After the procession, Yuan talked to the primary school students, stressing their education as loyal Republican citizens. He told them about the history of the founding of the Republic and exhorted them to be patriotic and faithful to it. In particularly, they should pay attention to morality and the martial spirit, since the strength of the country depended on the physical and mental power of the citizens.182 Yuan died in June 1916 and therefore could not participate in the National Day celebrations in the same year, but commemoration festivities and military parades on October 10 continued to take place every year. In 1916, Yuan’s direct successor as president Li Yuanhong, who had been a high-ranking officer in the Lujun and appointed the military leader of the revolutionaries in 1911, participated in a military review taking place at the Nanyuan drill grounds in the south of Beijing.183 In the presence of government officials, parliament members, foreign dignitaries, and journalists from inside and outside China, Li attended a ceremony, which strictly followed protocol. His entry into the parade grounds was accompanied by music, followed by the salute of officers as well as cavalry and infantry men, who drew their swords or presented their guns. Various troop units then marched by Li and his generals, and after an officer announced the regiment number, the respective soldiers saluted on command their president, who came closer to review the soldiers.184 For the first time, planes also took part in a military review.185 More troop reviews took place in the following days, on October 12 and 15,

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on which day Li inspected infantry and other units by horse. Afterward, the presidential headquarters ordered to distribute documentary photography prints of these reviews to all government institutions in great numbers.186 In the early Republic, politicians and military men continued the late Qing Imperial Kinsmen Cabinet’s project to re-militarize and, under Yuan, to reimperialize the government and society of China. Military parades were a way to perform, legitimize, and constitute authority and they tied in with the large-scale war games in the final years of the Qing Dynasty, as well as the efforts of Zaifeng and his allies to stage the imperial family as military masculine icons. This staging of military culture was supposed to impress inner and outer enemies with the military strength of the new government, and most importantly, to promote a martial spirit and a sense of unity among the new Republican citizens. Particularly during the reign of the Qianlong Emperor in the eighteenth century, military rituals were part of the imperial project to absorb new territories and tighten the cohesiveness of a multi-ethnical and multi-cultural realm. The Qing employed military rituals centering on

Figure 3.7  “Commemoration Day of the Revolution in the North.” See also DFZZ 1914 (4), which includes illustrations from the 1914 review. Source: Zhenxiang huabao 1912 (10), 4.


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the emperor as a technology of governance to perform martial grandeur and utilize rituals and text (civilian wen culture) to promote military culture.187 Military rituals (junli) included peacetime troop review (grand inspections), dispatching generals and welcoming victorious armies as well as the presentation of captives.188 After the turn to the twentieth century, politicians again viewed military culture, including military rituals, military appearance, and military conduct as a way to bridge ethical divides and resolve ethnical tensions.189 Already in 1907, for instance, the Nanyang Military Journal had issued a note titled Inside Military Circles the Boundary between Han and Manchu Does Not Exist, and Yuan Shikai later explicitly explained his soldiers that all the five major peoples were citizens of the Republic.190 Eventually, in 1915, Yuan had proclaimed himself emperor (his era name was Hongxian or “constitutional abundance”), declared his own imperial dynasty, and renamed the state into Empire of China. Even many of Yuan’s closest confidants opposed this step, which met opposition throughout the country and was reversed only after a couple of months. It seemed like a megalomaniac conservative backlash when Yuan ordered to return to emphasizing Confucian writings and moral teachings in school and reintroducing some of the obsolete imperial rituals and etiquettes. On the other hand, Yuan’s monarchic project was in line with the scheme to establish a constitutional monarchy that emphasized military culture based on the German and Japanese models. Yang Du, who accompanied the official mission to the United States, Japan, and Europe in 1906, was Yuan’s advisor and responsible for preparing his investiture. For this purpose, he wrote an essay titled Constitutional Monarchy to Save the Nation (Jun xuan jiuguo), in which he argued that the strength of Germany and Japan stemmed from the fact that they were constitutional monarchies. Neither country would exist today without the emperor and his chancellors, Wilhelm I and Bismarck as well as the Meiji Emperor and Itō Hirobumi and Katsura Tarō.191 Yuan would be a strong monarch and the first of his line, which would be continued by his son Yuan Keding, himself a major supporter of his father becoming emperor. Yuan Keding had studied in Germany, personally met with Wilhelm II, and was frequently wearing the uniform of a German prince. Similar to his father, he had his own freelance German military advisor, Major Max König.192 The legitimacy of Yuan’s regime was strongly built on the promotion of military culture and the display of military pomp. Though Yuan continuously spoke of a nation-state, which belonged only to its citizens (and which they had to defend), he sought to create continuity and legitimacy by emulating imperial rituals and staging himself in the space of the imperial city as the reinvented military masculine ideal and the leader reminiscent of foreign emperors, such as the German Kaiser and the Japanese Tenno as well as the perished Qing Emperor. Although Yuan’s desire to emulate Wilhelm II or

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the Japanese Emperors was never made explicit, there were many references exemplified by the style of military reviews, which were obviously modeled after parades in Japan, Germany, or other European countries. While he performed imperial harvest rituals, for instance, soldiers in dress uniforms that resembled a German honor guard, flanked Yuan, who was himself clad in the customary imperial gown.193 Moreover, reports and photographs of military reviews and parades in Germany and elsewhere appeared regularly in the Chinese media, whether in specialized military journals or the general press.194 Conclusion Chinese military reformers, at the transition to the twentieth century, sought to cultivate a new class of military men and, therefore, the issue of governing the behavior, motivation, self-understanding, and identity—the conduct of conduct, to use Foucault’s concept—of military men became the most pressing issue regarding military reforms. Governing the self-discipline indirectly through uniforms, rituals, and codes of conduct, added to the more direct and coercive governance and disciplinary technologies described in the previous chapters. With the promotion of “Western-style” military culture by the Imperial Family Cabinet and the early Republican government, the New Armies’ concept of military masculinity arrived at the center stage of politics in China. The public performance of soldiers, officers, and politicians in formfitting German–Japanese style uniforms, along with a new set of corresponding ways of conduct, in photographs and during military exercises, reviews, and parades contributed to the circulation and increasing popularity of Westernized military masculinity. The appearance and behavior of military men— embodying and somatically constructing military masculinity—generally affected the appearance of men and the conceptualization of masculinity in China throughout the twentieth century by affecting fashion, political culture, and social hierarchies. However, gender concepts are unstable and subject to change: Yuan Shikai, and the numerous officers who became warlords and military rulers over limited territories after his demise, were not only criticized for being cruel and dictatorial but were also mocked for displaying too much military pomp and circumstance. The icon of the professional, disciplined, frugal, and devoted military man was not discredited though and, more than ever, intellectuals and the media called for a military leader to appear as national savior and re-unify the country.195 After 1916, political and military leaders such as Sun Yat-sen, Jiang Jieshi, and Mao Zedong did no longer wear the overblown military ceremonial attire with medals, epaulets, and braids to express their claim to rule. As Louise Edwards argues, within the increased militarization of clothing in China, the political elite appeared


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in simplified military attire to demonstrate their down-to-earth approachability and connection to the common people.196 Nevertheless, during the late Qing and early Republican period, the ostentatious display of disciplined, uniformed male bodies demonstrated both the professionalism and martial spirit of the New Armies and, above all, they contributed to the performance of military masculinity. Uniforms conveyed a distinctive idea of soldiering, soldierly conduct and appearance, and facilitated the staging of a foreign-inspired concept of military masculinity. Military men could not simply become professional experts by applying the “modern Western” way of warfare, they also had to emulate the military habitus and style of European, American, and Japanese officers. In other words, the technologies introduced to educate and cultivate military men according to foreign models created the masculine figuration of junren. Reformers addressed masculinity less consciously and less explicitly than the physical body but the transformation of the identity of military officers was pivotal for the military reforms. Professionalism and other martial traits and ideals attributed to military men coalesced, as the following chapter will show in more detail, into a concept of masculinity through the repeated performance of military men and their bodies. notes 1. For a collection of Japanese war woodblock prints see the MIT Visualizing Cultures project: index.html (Accessed December 12, 2014). 2. Minguo junfu tuzhi 2003, 2–4; Zhang 1999a; Kao and Chou 1987, items 356–59. 3. The Brave Battalions wore clothes similar to the regular troops but avoided the colors green and red, which were associated with the Green Standard Army and the Banner forces. The Xiang and Huai Armies mostly wore blue with red facings to distinguish themselves from the Green Standard Army. Blue as color for military uniforms was quite common and accepted in Europe and the United States and worn by British sailors and marines as well as by German, French (partly), and American soldiers. Some troops in China before 1895, taking the Ever Victorious Army as a model, wore a sort of blue British/American uniforms, looking very much like European soldiers at the time. See Wang 1972, 26; Smith 1974, 155; Fan 2007a, 1. 4. Cavendish 1898, 714. 5. Lamprey 1868, 417–18. 6. Cavendish 1898, 714. 7. Upton 1878, 28–29. 8. Lamprey 1868, 423. The image of a ragged and clownish Qing soldier was quite persistent and also perpetuated in the academic literature. Ralph Powell

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considered the late nineteenth century Braves as “caricatures of soldiers.” Powell 1955, 31. A strongly biased but nevertheless valuable contribution to unmask the orientalism of both nineteenth century observers and latter researches is Jane Elliot’s book on the Boxer War. See Elliott 2002, 180–93, 381–85. 9. Elliott 2002, 109–238; Harrist Jr. 2005, 179. 10. Mann 2011, 103–5. 11. See also Calefato 2004, 1–2. On clothing and its cultural significance in China see also Hua, Hong, and Lei 2008. Mark Elvin controversially states that “fashion,” as a complex and systematic marker of social difference, hardly existed in imperial China. See Elvin 1989, 268. 12. Mann 2011, 99, 103–20. See also Ko 1997 and Meyer-Fong 2013, chapters 3 and 4. 13. See Allen 1996. 14. See Rawski 1998, 40. 15. Kuhn 1990, 12. 16. Gerth 2003, 75. 17. Dikötter 1998a, 52–5; Gerth 2003, 77. 18. Generally, see Godley 1994; Cheng 1998; Gerth 2003, chapter two. See also NBZ 1909, 29: Shangmou xiangguoshu. 19. Kang [1898] 1961, 263–64. See also Rhoads 2000, 64; Wang 1981. 20. Harrist Jr. 2005; Finnane 1999. 21. See Unterseher 2011; Joseph 1986, 55–6, 65–84. 22. See for instance, on the role of military uniforms in the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) in China, Finnane 2008, 227–56; Honig 2002, 257. 23. Rawski 1998, 40. See also Kuhn 1990, 243fn6. 24. See, for instance, on Britain, Miller 2007. 25. Galster and Nosch 2010, 1–5. 26. Wiggerich 2011, 161–74. 27. Fan 2007a, fn5. 28. Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 121–22. 29. Fan 2007a, 101. 30. Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 121–22; Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 60, 1083–085; Shen [1898] 1992b, 543. See also Wu and Pan 1902, chapter 2, paragraph 4; Minguo junfu tuzhi 2003, 5; Zongli Yamen [1895–1900] 2005, 454 and the same passage in Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1038. Libian (usually in reversed order: bianli) and especially zhai are repeated frequently as essential characteristics of “Western-style” uniforms in regulations and manuals. 31. Shen 1897a, 9–10. 32. Liu 1967a, 127. 33. Shen [1895/1896] 1992a, 495–98. 34. Shenbao 1903, October 4: Baoyang chisu. 35. Yikuang [1905] 2005a, 296; Fan 2007a, 102–03. 36. Lianbingchu 1904, 17–18. 37. Ibid. 38. Yikuang [1905] 2005a.


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39. Ibid., 204. 40. Ibid., 205–06 41. Lujun mubing yimao tushuo (1910) in GX, chapter 8, 103–04. 42. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1145. Shenwu can be translated as “body-material,” “individual matter,” or “hull-substance.” 43. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1145. 44. Dalu 1904, 2 juan, 6: Kakese zhi junfu, 15. 45. NBZ 1907, 15: E guo lujun fuse zhi gaizheng, 25. After the Russo-Japanese War, the German military leadership noted with great interest that the Japanese troops changed their dark-blue uniforms against more nature-colored uniforms already after the first battle. See Zimmermann 2010, 218. 46. Fan 2007a, 105. 47. NBZ 1907, 9: Junyi mao zhidu yizhun. 48. Yikuang [1905] 2005a. Uniforms of cadets were defined in separate regulations such as the Regulations and Illustrated Explanations on Style and Color of Army School Uniforms (Lujun jundui xuetang fuse zhangji tushuo). See Ma 2004, 163. 49. NBZ 1906, 3: Lujun di jiu zhen Xu tongzhi tongxia ge biaoying zhengqi fuzhuangwen, 10–12. 50. NBZ 1907, 6: Jiangsu Duan tonglun ge biaoying jiangxiao mubing ji ge xuetang xuesheng tu zhengchi fuzhuangwen, 1. 51. Li 1912, 59–61. 52. NBZ 1906, 5: Huang Cong, Lun junren zhi yiwu, 13. The author of the original was rendered as Beilaifa, but I was not able to identify the man. 53. Lianbingchu 1904, 17–18. 54. From March 1905, the Army Regulation for Uniforms of Officers (Lujun guanbian fu zhang) and other subsequent regulations codified the rank structure for officers and the corresponding uniforms and badges proposed earlier in the Distinct and Illustrated Manual for Uniforms of the Army. See Ma 2004, 163. 55. For the titles and positions in the Eight Banners see Elliott 2001, 413. 56. For the development of the military rank system in the twentieth century see Zhuang 1994 and Ma 2004, who also deals with the translation process and different translation strategies concerning military ranks. See also Vissière 1914. 57. NBZ 1906, 1: Jianfei, Lun junren zhi jinsheng, 4–6. See also NBZ 1906, 3: Tao Junbao, Lun lujun lishi. 58. See for instance Shen [1898] 1992b, 539–40 and Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 243. 59. NBZ 1907, 13: Tao Shumao, Zhandou zhihui zhi gailun. 60. Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 108. 61. Bian 1895. Bian was the student leader of the first group of cadets who went to Germany in 1876. See Meng 2005, 50. 62. Low 2003, 83. Even after most German instructors left China in the early twentieth century, German was still spoken by some graduates of the Tianjin military academy. See Kaske 2002b, 91. 63. Yikuang [1905] 2005b. 64. Ibid., 379. 65. Yikuang [1905] 2005b, 380.

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66. Lujunbu bianyiju 1910, 100–104; Nanyang gongxue yishuyuanyin [1898– 1908], 136–40. 67. Lianbingchu junxuesi 1907, 114–17. 68. ZBZ 1916, 22: Tang Zhongyong, Shuo junqi, 10–14. 69. GX, chapter 8, 114–15. 70. Shen [1895/1896] 1992a, 428–30. 71. NBZ 1906, 3: Qi Guohuang, Lun jianshu jiaoyu zhi biyao, 12–14 (quotes on page 12). On the positive effect of swordsmanship on the fighting spirit and courage, including a survey on its practice in different countries, see also ZBZ 1915, 16: Wu Qintai, Baibing zhi shensui 43–54 (The Pureness of Swords, translation from a not specified Japanese text). 72. NBZ 1906, 3: Qi Guohuang, Lun jianshu jiaoyu zhi biyao, 13. 73. Shen [1895/1896] 1992a, 412–15. 74. Powell 1955, 154. 75. See for instance Chang 2007, 178–86; Allen 1996, 351; Creel 1965. 76. See for instance NBZ 1909, issues 33, 34, and 35. See also NBZ 1907, 6: Qi Guohuang, Qibing zhi xueshu, 1–3. Among the many articles and manuals on horses in the military, see for instance chapters 15 to 17 in the Detailed and Illustrated Manual; NBZ 1908, 27: Zengjia junma zhi jiage, 20; NBZ 1909, 33: Buzhuang, Shiyan shang zhi mashutan, 7–14. 77. Fan 2007a, 101; Minguo junfu tuzhi 2003, 5. 78. Wanguo Gongbao 1905 (201): Zhongguo jiefa wenti, 22. 79. Datongbao 1908 (9): Shi jin mao chuan junfu, 37. Although not mentioned by name in the report, the governor of Hunan at the time was Cen Chunxuan. See also Shenbao 1906, March 25: Shi jin mao chuan junfu. Apart from soldiers, police officers in Zhili were increasingly wearing “Western-style” uniforms. See MacKinnon 1980, 153. 80. See BG 1911, 2768: Shangtuan zhi zhuyi junfu, 11. 81. Rhoads 2000, 113–14. See also WG 1905 (201 qi): Zhongguo jiefa wenti, 22. 82. Fung 1980, 79; Dreyer 1995, 25; DFZZ 1907 (7), 347–52. 83. NBZ 1907, 7: Xu tongzhi michi ge biao ying guanchang quanyu wu jian fabianzha, 7–9. The order actually downplayed the role of appearance and emphasized that content and learning were more important than form and style. This resembled the arguments of officials and intellectuals who were loyal to the dynasty but nevertheless supported the introduction of “Western” dress codes and sought to disassociate the dynasty from the customary robe and queue. See Gerth 2003, 85–7. 84. NBZ 1907, 14: Nanbei da yanxi zhi piping, 7. 85. During the early Republican years, Zhang Xun, a general who attempted to restore the Qing Dynasty, and his troops never changed their hairstyle and were called the “Queue Army.” Zhang, who wore a “Western-style” military uniform, was called the “Queue General.” See Zarrow 2012, 262–63; Gerth 2003, 84. 86. Shenbao 1910, October 30: Jingshi jinshi. 87. Datongbao 1910 (4), 27. 88. Zhenguangbao 1911 (10, 2), 64. 89. WX 1910, 14: Huang Fu, Wu you wang yu Lujun bu zhe yi, 112–19. 90. Ibid., 113.


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91. According to the Nanyang Military Journal, the Japanese army regulated in 1907 that both common soldiers and officers had to wear their drill or full dress uniform almost anytime. See NBZ 1907, 6: (Riben) Lujun fuzhuang guize gaizheng. 92. WX 1910, 14: Wu you wang yu lujunbu zhe yi, 118. 93. XT, chapter 17, 4. The decree is dated from March 27, 1910, before Huang’s own journal article appeared. Nevertheless, Huang was likely instrumental in drawing up the decree or at least one strong voice advocating the new-style guidelines. 94. NBZ 1910, 51: Gongdu, 1. 95. Junzichu zou zhou ni lujun canmou zhangcheng zhe and Junzichu zou junguan xueyuan xu xuan banfapian, see XT, chapter 7, 37–9. 96. According to Bourdieu, photographs simultaneously represent popular mass culture and contain an element of snobbishness. See Bourdieu 1990. On the history of photography and visual culture in general see also Mitchell 1984; Jäger 2009; Rice 2010. Generally, for the history of photography in China, see Cody and Terpak 2011; Henriot and Yeh 2013. For photography as ritual staging in twentieth century China, see also Borthwick 1980, 135. Photographs of military men from the New Armies can be found in Lea 1907; WX 1908, 1 and 2; WX 1910, 12; Zhu 1910; Zhu 1911; Qingmo lujun xiaoyuetu n.y.; Liu and Xu 1994, 224–31; Lai 2000; Lao zhaopian bianluobu 2001, 19; Lu and Stafford 2009. 97. Kühnel 1982. 98. See Elliott 205–09. On the beginnings of portrait photography in China see Thiriez 1999 and Wue 2005. 99. Their dress is itself already held in a new-style fashion, substantially different from the old scholar-official’s long gown, which, apart from the headgear and the long sleeves, remained common and accepted as formal wear throughout the Republican period. See Finnane 2008, 75–7. 100. Powell 1955, 206, 227. 101. Lu and Stafford 2009, 72 contains a photograph with Yinchang and the later president Li Yuanhong overseeing troop movements. According to Lu (i.e., the Stafford collection) it was taken during the 1911 Revolution. However, I believe it dates back earlier and was taken during a military exercise in 1908, where both men were actually on the same side, unlike 1911 when they lead the imperial and revolutionary forces, respectively. One of the men in the picture wearing the official’s robe might be Duanfang. For a portrait of Yinchang, see also DFZZ 1911 (3), 1. 102. Fung 1980, 47–8; Powell 1955, 272–81; Rhoads 2000, 72–3, 152, 164, 265. 103. The best description of the political struggles of this “Manchu Ascendancy” between 1908 and 1911 is Rhoads 2000, 121–72. See also Ch’en 1972, 60. 104. The (lost) martial heritage of the Manchu or the Banners was an occasional topic before 1908. See, for instance, an article in the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers, which called for combining the martial spirit of dynasty and Banners with the patriotism of the New Armies men. XBB 1905, 5: Guochao longxing wugongji juan yi, 1. 105. See Zaifeng [n.y.] 1989. 106. Zaifeng [n.y.] 1989, 145–46. 107. Ibid., 154.

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108. Ibid., 158. 109. Rogasch 1991, 95–6. 110. Zaifeng [n.y.] 1989, 154, 156, 159. Before traveling to Germany, Zaifeng was appointed army inspector, which made the bestowal formally possible. 111. Ibid., 163. Upon his return to Shanghai, Zaifeng visited the Jiangnan Arsenal and the Nanyang Public School before returning to Beijing. For a general comparison between Qing and Siamese “Western-modeled” reforms see Petersson 2000. 112. See Zhang 1982. 113. Kang [1898] 1961, 263–64. See also Wang 1981, 62–3. 114. DFZZ 1904 (1) and (6). Later issues of the Eastern Miscellany contained portrait pictures of other important head of states. Not all of them complied with the image of a martial emperor but they were similarly presented as men strongly concerned with military affairs. This included particularly the presidents of the United States (at the time, Theodore Roosevelt) and reports on them as commander-in-chief of all armed forces were frequent. See for instance BBZ 1910, 1: Zongtongqi zhi gexin, 114. 115. Pohl 1991, 13–14. Klaus-Dieter Pohl compared the worship of Wilhelm’s photographic portrait to a religious cult. 116. See Rogasch 1991, 95–6. Although Wilhelm II desperately attempted to present the image of youthful, dynamic, and martial manhood, he was increasingly criticized for lacking manly qualities such as mental firmness, assertiveness, and the cold rationality of a true leader. The famous Daily Telegraph Affair, involving a case of homosexuality among his closest advisors, damaged his masculine image lastingly. On the image of Wilhelm II and the crisis of masculinity in the German Empire, see Dahlke 2006, 1–15; Rebentisch 2000; Winzen 2010; Clark 2009, chapter 6; Petzold 2012, 126–31. 117. Taga 2005, 132. See also for images (Accessed July 20, 2012). 118. Low 2003, 81–3; Kitaoka 1993, 70. See also Khan 1998. For Germany, see Frevert 1997a. 119. Shoji 2003, 190–93. 120. On Kang Youwei’s indirect influence on Duanfang concerning military and other aspects of reform through Liang Qichao, see Horowitz 2003, 782–83. 121. NBZ 1907, 7: Zou junzheng zhongyao qing ze yao qufa geguo zhiduzhe, 5–6. 122. Ibid., 6–7. Xu Shichang, who was originally a part of the mission abroad but who did not join in the end, was a military officer. Wearing his military uniform, as he was explicitly supposed to do, he might have left the foreign hosts with a different impression about Chinese men. See Dalu 1905, 3, 17: Chuyang dachen yubei junfu, 2. 123. NBZ 1907, 8: Zou junzheng zhongyao qing ze yao qufa geguo zhiduzhe, 2–3. Duanfang, however, was no militarist and he viewed the power of the German nobility as a mixed blessing. Their great reputation and professionalism served the whole country but their warmongering tendencies endangered peace, he argued. 124. NBZ 1907, 10: Tao Shumao Jundui jiaoyu yu xuexiao jiaoyu, 26. 125. See for instance NBZ 1908, 15: Ri huangqin yue lujun dacao. In 1911, an article proudly reported that Qing princes and nobles attended military drills and demonstrated their martial spirit. NBZ 1911, 57: Guizu shangwu jingshen.


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126. Zaitao [n.y.] 1989, 237. According to Zaitao, it was Prince Heinrich who visited China in 1905, but he apparently confused him with Friedrich Leopold. See Rhoads 2000, 318fn75. See also Schütz 1994. Heinrich was in China from 1897 to early 1900 as commander of a German squadron and, eventually, the German East Asia Fleet. He was, as first European prince of a ruling dynasty ever, received at the Qing court by the Guangxu Emperor and Cixi. See Eschenburg 1989, 65. 127. DFZZ 1909 (7), 331. 128. For the whole part see Fung 1980, 45–7, 88; Rhoads 2000, 144; Powell 1955, 265; Dreyer 1995, 27–8. 129. Because of security concerns, the three Germans, together with one other German and seven Japanese officers, were the only foreign instructors in China by the time the revolution started. See Fung 1980, 85. 130. Rhoads 2000, 171; Bays 1978, 213. 131. Cited in Fan 2010, 51. 132. Zito 1997, 1–9. 133. Elliott 2001. 134. Perdue 1996, 763–82; Dai 2005b; Dai 2009. 135. Waley-Cohen 2006, 1–22, 66–88. See also Perdue 1998. 136. Waley-Cohen 2009, 278. 137. Ibid., 280–82. See also Li 2002 and Dai 2005a. 138. Zito 1997, 6. 139. Wright 1959, 74–5; Kahn 1971, 138–43; Smith 1974, 126; Crossley 1994, 360–61; Zito 1997, 17–26; Elliott 2008, 61–5. 140. DFZZ 1909 (7), 332–33; Rhoads 2000, 144. 141. Datongbao 1909 (12): Guonei jinyao xinwen, 31. 142. Rhoads 2000, 165. 143. Ibid., 287. 144. Powell 1955, 183, 300. See also Lujun guizhou xuetang xuelu 1909; DFZZ 1905 (12): Lianbingchu bingbu hui zou shiban guizhou xuetang niding zhanchengzhe, 321–22; Fung 1980, 69–70; Luo 1999, 90–1. 145. Guofengbao 1910 (6), 67–70. The whole affair is described in detail in Fan 2010, 51–61. 146. BBZ 1910, 2: Fa jing laihan, 91–3. 147. Rhoads 2000, 163–66; Fung 1980, 79. Some soldiers of the Palace Guard were against queue cutting, while others at the Noble School favored it. 148. See also Dreyer 1995, 33. 149. NBZ 1908, 21: Lujunbu yi fu yushi Zhao Binglin zou qing ding Jinweijun zhiduzhe. 150. On the Palace Guard in general see Wu 1985, 12; and Wang, Shi, and Fan 1994. 151. XT, chapter 1: Jinweijun yingzhi xiangzhang, 13; XT, chapter 6: Jinweijun dachen zou ni qing biantong ben jun zanxing zhangchengzhe. 152. See also NBZ 1909, 29: Xuan lian jinweijun zhu banfa, 5. 153. Although designed as a loyal and “private” army of the imperial clan, the Palace Guard could not do much to prevent its dynasty’s demise. After 1911, it was commanded by Fei Guaozhang and thus controlled by Yuan Shikai.

Dressed to Kill


154. NBZ 1910, 43: Jinweijun junfuse zhangjizhe, 1. 155. Ibid. 156. Ibid., 2. 157. Ibid., 3. 158. The illustrated encyclopedia Minguo junfu tuzhi wrongly describes the helmet as a conservative backlash because it allegedly emulated the traditional helmet of military officials. See Minguo junfu tuzhi 2003, 9–10. 159. On the history of the order of merit in China see Ha 2000; Wang 1988a; Gritzner 1962, 60–9. 160. Xunlian Jinweijun dachen Zaitao deng wei qingni banxing ge xiang xunzhangshi zouzhe, reprinted in Ha 1999d, 73–74. 161. Waiwubu zongli dachen Yikuang deng wei zunzhi huiyi ge xiang xunzhang shiyi bing niding zhangcheng shi zouzhe, reprinted in Ha 1999d, 75. 162. Waiwubu zongli dachen Yikuang deng niding xunzhang zhangcheng, reprinted in Ha 1999d, 75–6. 163. Finnane 2008, 95. 164. DFZZ 1911 (10): Zhongguo dashiji, 9; Ma 2004, 164. 165. Anhui Gongbao 1912 (16): Lujun guanzuo lifuzhi, 50–2 and Lujun fuzhi, 52–55. See also Minguo junfu tuzhi 2003, 17–27. 166. Wilson 2002, 610; Gerth 2003, 116; Wilkinson 2012, 184. 167. Wilson 2002, 609–14. On the political meaning and symbolism of clothes as well as the evolution of military uniforms as leadership attire from the late Qing to the Mao era, see also Edwards 2007. 168. Gerth 2003, chapter 2. See also Panagiotopoulos 2013 on material and design in cross-cultural perspective. 169. Rhoads 2000, 209, 252–54; Young 1977, 78. 170. Baur and Kaske 2005, 55–6, 666. 171. Generally, on Yuan’s rule, see Young 1977. 172. Young 1977, 65. See for an example ZBZ 1914, 1 or the early Republican Wanbao quanshu. 173. Zhuang 1994. 174. See Wang 1996a; LX 1913, 3: Luhaijun xunzhangling, 12–14. 175. Kong 2006, 30–32; ZBZ 1914, 4: Zhongyang mingling, 1–25. 176. Jingwu congbao 1912 (26): Dazongtong mingling, 15; Jingwu congbao 1913 (33): Ben ting jiedian zhengsidian zhi dazongtong yu guoqingri xing jiu renliwen, 22; Tangwenbao yesu jiao jiating xinwen 1912 (522): Guoqing dazongtong xuanyanshu, 15; Dangbao 1913 (7): Dazongtong zhi xuanyan, 183–84. 177. Harrison 2000, 107–09. 178. Osnos and Barmé 2009. 179. Dangbao 1913 (7): Dazongtong liren dianli, 181–83. 180. Yuxing 1915 (11), 100 (Gedi zashi). 181. Shishi huibao 1915 (8): Shi ri juxing yuebing dianli bing chuanxun xiaoxuesheng, 15–16. 182. Jiaoyu yanjiu 1913 (17): Dazongtong yueshi ge xiaoxuexiao xuesheng zhuhe guoqing xunci, 1–2; Jiaoyu zhoubao 1914 (60): Zhejiang xun’an shi gongshu chi ge daoyin yinfa guoqingri dazongtong xun ge xiaoxue ciwen, 35–6.


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183. Li Yuanhong nanyuan yuebing 2011 includes photographs from the review. 184. Xinghua 1916 (42): Ji guoqingri zhi yuebingshi, 29. Xinghua 1916 (41): Dazongtong guoqingri yuebingshi zhi lijie, 30. 185. Li Yuanhong nanyuan yuebing 2011, 23. In the German Empire, aircrafts were first used in such a context during the autumn maneuvers of 1911. 186. ZBZ 1916, 22: Fensong dayuanshuai qinyue mofantuan jishi, 3. 187. Waley-Cohen 2006, chapter 4. 188. Waley-Cohen 2006, 69–71; Elliott 2008, 102–6. Drawing on Joanna Waley-Cohen’s work on the Qianlong Emperor’s imperial project, Jane Eliott argues that Qing military culture (as well as the widely circulated woodblock prints depicting battles against Europeans of the nineteenth century) anticipated Chinese nationalism in the twentieth century. Elliott 2002, 117–18; Waley-Cohen 1996. 189. At the beginning of the twentieth century, junli was used to refer to protocols of correct behavior and interaction between common soldiers, officers, and civilians—in other words, to military etiquette or military courtesy. 190. NBZ 1907, 13: Junjie bufen Man Han zhi jianduan, 5–6. Some authors even referred to the Asian yellow race and the importance of the Chinese army for its survival. NBZ 1910, 51: Huancun; ZBZ 1916, 28 (29): Zhong Haosheng, Wo guo junshi zhi wan yu guanxi yazhou cunwang. 191. Yang 1915. 192. Yuan 1995; Wang 1994; Zhao 1994. Yuan’s monarchical attempt is treated in more detail in Zarrow 2012, chapter 8. 193. Lu and Stafford 2009, 129. 194. Young 1977, 202–03. Photographs of Wilhelm II participating in military parades and reviewing troops appeared, for instance, in the Dongfang zazhi, see DFZZ 1913 (9): Dehuang yuebing, and in the Zhejiang Military Journal: See ZBZ 1916, 2. See also NBZ 1908, 15: Ri huangqin yue lujun daco, 24 for a short report taken from the North China Herald on the Japanese Prince reviewing troops and military exercises of the Japanese Army. 195. See Waldron 1991. 196. Edwards 2007, 55–6.

Chapter 4

Making Real Men Military Professionalism and Martial Spirit

War is a discipline for experts.1 Bureau for Military Training, 1904

The German army’s regulation concerning field duties and military exercises from 1908 stated at the very beginning that not only “Manneszucht” (severe military discipline, obedience) but also strong-mindedness, and an inspiring and exemplary demeanor were essential for officers when leading soldiers into battle.2 Chinese military reformers, adopting ideas and practices from the German and other European armies, considered the cultivation (yangxiu or yangcheng) of a new generation of military leaders adapted to “modern” warfare and “Western” military culture as the most important issue for reforming the Qing Empire’s army and regaining its military strength. In order to attract the most qualified and capable people, and direct them to immerse themselves in a yet foreign assemblage of rules, thinking, and behavior, military reformers had to find other “sources of motivation” and apply instruments other than the disciplinary technologies described in the previous chapters. They sought to form officers according to the German and Japanese models, including not only practices of conduct, demeanor, self-expression, and appearance but also notions of professionalism, heroism, and patriotism.3 The emphasis of late Qing military reforms lay on professionalization and specialization (which, in China, were not, per se, distinct) and on the establishment of a military elite independent of both the civil bureaucratic stratum and of the Banners, with their restrictive ethnical-hereditary setup. In the eyes of military reformers, the emulation of German-style military professionalism was essential, which included expert knowledge, the rational planning and conduct of war, and the internal autonomy and pride of the 187


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military as a professional group. Moreover, military professionalism became a fundamental part of a “new form of military masculinity based on technological expertise and rational material practices.”4 Chinese military reformers emphasized technical and practical skills, and promoted military academies, systematic education, professional conduct, and “military science,” which led to the construction of a new masculine icon: the professional military man. Instead of evaluating the actual degree of professionalism of the Chinese New Armies, this chapter focuses on how military men performed and were staged as professional soldiers, and how this was linked to the idea of a martial spirit. Joining the New Armies as an officer became increasingly popular among young members of the elite after the turn of the century, particularly during and after the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905. The war, which took place in Northern China, and the final abolition of the civil service examinations in 1905, resulted in a growing popularity of military academies in the Qing Empire among young men with an elite background, who enrolled into military schools because of a mixture of pragmatism and patriotism. Despite the strong emphasis on professionalism that was supposed to differentiate the Chinese New Armies from the established Qing military, ideas of heroic deeds, valor, and a patriotic willingness to sacrifice played an important role in the military reform discourse and the conceptualization of military masculinity. Military reformers and New Armies leaders propagated the idea of martial spirit (shangwu zhuyi or shangwu jingshen), often simply referring to “spirit” (jingshen), to inspire and stage various alleged martial qualities attributed to men, such as will, perseverance, and honor. In the end, the attractiveness of the New Armies rested on the recreation and re-elevation of a concept of masculinity, which drew on pre-existing military or martial masculine models in China, but focused predominantly on contemporary European elements, concepts, and icons of masculinity. Notions about military professionalism were adopted from Germany and other European countries, the Unites States, and Japan. But both foreign examples and legendary Chinese figures and ancient tales of bravery, sacrifice, and loyalty inspired ideas of a heroic martial spirit and patriotism. Professionalizing Military Men In July 1901, the governor-generals Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi petitioned for the introduction of both civilian and military schools based on the “Western” and Japanese model, with the goal of fundamentally overhauling the education and the selection system of all those in the direct service of the Qing Empire. China, they argued, was neither poor nor was there a lack of soldiers. What was missing were “talent” (rencai) and “aspiration” (zhiqi),

Making Real Men


which were essential for avoiding certain doom and disintegration.5 They demanded the reform of the structures of military and civilian education in order to improve the efficiency of both army and administration and, at the same time, to bring balance to the continuum of civil culture (wen) and military (wu). Zhang and Liu criticized that the cultural sphere, which was based on written texts and ritual, had been strongly favored over the military sphere. Even more, wen had absorbed wu and turned it into a theoretical, scholarly field. Both wen and wu, as well as other “paths” such as agriculture, commerce, or manufacturing, should become independent, specialized disciplines (zhuanmen zhi xue).6 Furthermore, Zhang and Liu demanded that the old military examination system should be abolished and replaced by foreign models of military academies, which trained real military experts. They envisioned a new type of military men, different from the established military officials who were, in fact, similar to scholarly civilian officials. Rather, military men should be professionals who focused on practical matters and specialized skills instead of generic knowledge and Confucian doctrines. Academy-based training would equip them with these skills but also enhance their prestige, which was necessary to contest the supremacy of wen within society and to equalize wen and wu men. The eminent role model for military and other specialized schools was Germany, which, according to Zhang and Liu, possessed the best educational system in the world.7 The old system, which Zhang and Liu sought to abolish, dated back to the year 702, when the Tang government introduced examinations to select officers for military posts. These military examinations were systematized, transformed, and refined during the following dynasties and although they were discontinued during certain periods, they were eventually reinstalled. However, military examinations neither gained the same social appreciation and relevance as the civil service examinations nor did they reliably produce able and, among troops, accepted commanders. In 1644, the Qing followed the model of the preceding Ming Dynasty and reinstalled military examinations parallel to the civil examination system.8 They consisted of several stages, starting at the district level, and ending with the metropolitan and palace examinations, which were usually held every three years. Successful candidates were awarded titles and ranks equivalent to their civilian counterparts, became military officials, and were eligible for posts in the Green Standard Army. Other common ways of attaining a higher military position were advancement and promotion within ranks, inheritance, or through a special appointment by a superior official or the emperor. Except for schools for high-ranking members of the Eight Banners, military academies or any kind of systematic education for officers did not exist. Banner members were, at certain times, allowed and sometimes even encouraged to participate in the military examinations and were subject to favorable quotas. Officers for the


Chapter 4

Banner companies or the special military organizations within the Banners were appointed according to provenance and separate examinations exclusive to them. Commanders-in-chief and leaders during military campaigns were appointed ad hoc and, ideally, impermanently, in order to avoid the concentration of power outside of the imperial court.9 The examinations itself consisted of the demonstration of martial skills such as marksmanship, riding, and weight lifting, as well as the testing of the candidate’s knowledge in the corpus of canonized military writings, including the Sunzi bingfa.10 Being aware of the overly theoretical and outdated character of these classics, examiners allegedly never placed much emphasis on the literary skills and abilities of candidates to memorize the texts. For the metropolitan and palace examinations, the Kangxi Emperor ordered the addition of a discussion of the military thoughts expressed in the fundamental Confucian works Mengzi and Lunyu. Additionally, candidates participating in the civil administration examinations were confronted with questions on how to deal with military affairs. And all candidates who passed the provincial examinations of either the civil or the military systems were subsequently allowed to continue with the other examination system. The Yongzheng Emperor reversed these reforms, which aimed at both improving military education and raising the standing of military culture in general.11 Similar to the civil service examinations, anyone was theoretically allowed to participate in the military examinations on the lowest level. However, candidates were usually members of the wealthy gentry class, who were not only able to afford the preparations and education but also derived an inherent claim to titles and posts from their elite social background. Although the military exams emphasized martial skills, they often served as a safety net for unsuccessful civil examination candidates. In the late nineteenth century, an increasing number of military officials reportedly used their titles and military assignments as a stepping-stone for a civilian appointment.12 Late Qing military reformers did not necessarily intend to bypass the established elites. Before a new military education system was established, Zhang Zhidong sought to recruit examination degree holders as troop commanders and academy instructors. Bannermen enlisted in the New Armies and were at least one entire division strong. Literacy and a certain degree of education were necessary to enroll in one of the newly established military preparation schools, implying that most new cadets were supposed to be members of the established wealthy elite. Moreover, the curricula for prospective New Armies officers included elements of the classical education, which aimed at strengthening the acceptance and prestige of a military career.13 Social background and personal connections remained to be important for a career in the New Armies, but military reformers were anxious to eliminate these factors.14

Making Real Men


Most late Qing military reformers, such as Zhang Zhidong, sought to balance wen and wu and were rethinking the category of rencai (or simply cai, meaning talent, ability, capability, and qualification) within the wen-wu matrix, instead of pursuing the reactivation of Manchu or Banner martial values. Throughout their petition, cited above, Zhang and Liu used the term shi, which originally signified military people but which increasingly referred to both warriors and scholars, and eventually more closely represented the latter.15 They demanded that cai or talent should be redirected toward the military (and other sectors). Ultimately, with the challenges and the new ideas from abroad, cai was redefined to include expert and technical knowledge. It became an important device to call for professionalism, both in the civilian and the military sector.16 In late 1901, the Qing government issued a series of decrees ordering the immediate end of the established military examinations as well as the introduction of a national system of military education. Military preparatory schools (wubei xuetang) were to be established in every province as a basis for higher military education in academies and specialist schools for artillery, surveillance, or logistics.17 A general education, however, was not to be replaced but, instead, complemented by practical, hands-on experience, acquired tactical knowledge, and leadership skills. The new-type officer was expected to possess both “technical” skills (shuke) as well as “scientific” skills (xueke). The former included abilities such as riding, shooting, sword fighting, and apparatus gymnastics, while the latter comprised tactics, strategy, logistics, and fortification, as well as “cultural” proficiencies such as knowledge of foreign languages, history, the classics, and natural sciences. Military reformers agreed that officers and military education had to adapt to the scientific form of warfare. Therefore, it was not only important to possess the latest military technology but also to be able to master the use of weapons and acquire related skills and techniques of warfare. Europe—in particular Germany, France, and Britain—and Japan repeatedly served as references for the significance of a systematic, professional military education and the successful establishment of military academies.18 A military journal editorial from 1907—probably produced by the New Armies administration office in Liangjiang province—highlighted the significance of military education for implementing standards in the army. “Through their military, Western European [states] are recognized as manly countries (xiong zhi guo). To select their officers, they draw on military schools. The level of education is viewed as decisive for appointments. [Moreover,] the curricula for the primary level must be uniform for the whole country. In order to unify the new soldiers of the country, everyone must receive the same education.” The basic purpose of military education, the article argued, was standardization and the streamlining of command structures. The


Chapter 4

Japanese army had successfully implemented uniform military education and therefore achieved victory during the Russo-Japanese War.19 In 1905–1906, two official missions were sent abroad to examine the political systems and bureaucratic organization of Japan, the United States, and several European countries.20 Duanfang, a member of the commission, published a report on reforming the military organization, which reinforced the set course to emulate international military standards, but argued for focusing (again) on the example of the German military. In accordance with the reform plans to introduce a ministerial form of government, Duanfang sought to establish a competent European-style ministry for military affairs, the later Lujunbu, with clear top-down hierarchies and responsibilities that was staffed with specialists. His request detailed an Army Ministry with functionally divided subdepartments in charge of the most important aspects of military administration: management, staff advice/command, and education. Although the commission recommended, overall, to follow the model of Meiji Japan, Duanfang’s report on military systems (junzheng zhidu) was strongly in favor of the German model, which he studied extensively during the commission’s stay abroad. According to him, the German army had been improved and perfected over centuries and had therefore secured decisive victories over Austria and France in the late nineteenth century. Consequently, Germany was acknowledged as a strong or “manly country” (xiongguo) by the rest of the world and its military system was the “role model for all under heaven,” that is, the entire world. Furthermore, Duanfang stated, Japan, which was developing rapidly, used Germany as a role model and, by combining education and patriotism, had achieved a decisive victory over Russia. After having examined the military organization of many countries, he concluded that the German system was the most superior and that in no other country was the military considered to be more important. Therefore, Germany should be the main role model for China’s military, while other nations should merely be considered as supplements.21 The success of the German army, Duanfang emphasized, was rooted in its military administration and organization, as well as in its military school structure. The military administration or “system” provided the basis for “scientific preparedness” (kexue yubei), which was essential for “modern” warfare. It included highly specialized and comprehensive institutions such as an Army Ministry and a General Staff, which was responsible for logistics, meticulous planning, fixing objectives, and the largely autarkic production of supplies and weapons. However, Duanfang noted that it was most important to organize professional academies for the education of military elites. The education at German army’s schools was profound at all levels. China, which was not making any use of its “talent,” needed military academies based on the German example to “form” qualified staff officers, he argued.22

Making Real Men


The German General Staff was a highly efficient, extremely specialized military command institution responsible for war planning and military operations, which served as a model for the Japanese General Staff advised by Adolf Meckel. Both historians and contemporary military experts attributed the German victory against France in 1870 to the Prussian General Staff, which led the German armies to success, despite their somewhat outdated tactics on the ground. Created in the beginning of the nineteenth century by Prussian military reformers, the General Staff gained fame under its chief Helmuth Graf von Moltke the Elder for its achievements in the AustroPrussian War of 1866. In 1870–1871, learning from the American Civil War, the General Staff made use of railways to transport troops to the battlefront, which decisively contributed to the German victory. Subsequently, it centralized military command, operational planning, communications, logistics, mobilization, deployment, and decision-making in a uniquely effective way. One historian even called it “a genius for war.”23 The General Staff was also responsible for the institutionalized education of professional military leaders and the training of the officer corps. The selection of staff officers was highly competitive and advancement was based on merit alone. Only a very small proportion joined the General Staff permanently; most staff officers later served as regular commanders in the army. In this way, an ethos of rational technocratic planning and analysis, individual initiative, and learning from past military experiences disseminated among the entire officer corps.24 Duanfang and other military reformers sought to professionalize both the military bureaucracy and military education with the goal of producing expert military managers with technical and “scientific” knowledge for administering, organizing, and commanding the Lujun. Duanfang, however, was aware that the propagation of professionalism would not be sufficient to either arouse a broad martial spirit among the people or to create a new, distinct military elite that considered fighting and dying as a source of pride and prestige. Rational, scientific military organization and military education, he argued, with the German model in mind, should ultimately facilitate inculcating military men with a sense of patriotism and the willingness to physically sacrifice in order to protect the country (yi shen xuguo).25 Duanfang’s report brought together two iconic masculine figurations that coexisted in the German army at the turn of the century. Paradoxical at first sight, these figurations, when taken together, generated an almost mythical fascination with the German army among military reformers in China and elsewhere around the globe. On the one hand, Chinese military reformers viewed the army as the most prestigious institution in the German Empire, which consisted of a hereditary warrior class that valued and took pride in its martial skills, knightly traditions of sacrifice, heroism, loyalty, and chivalry as well as its noble deportment. On the other hand, this martial spirit


Chapter 4

and aristocratic prestige was amended in the nineteenth century by rational and systematic military education in specialized academies, which adapted war-making and military organization to scientific, social, and economic developments. These academies for educating military elites became popular in Germany, Britain, France, and the United States only in the middle of the nineteenth century.26 Specialist schools to train gunners and engineers had existed since the late sixteenth century in the Netherlands and the German territories, but the training of officers was barely formalized and usually a matter of private upbringing within certain noble families. Practical experience, social background, and conduct were favored, among military elites, over a school-based education. However, during the nineteenth century, the ideal of the charismatic, heroic, honor-driven, and self-sacrificing aristocratic “fighting man” was increasingly challenged by the figure of the intellectual, technocratic, and rational military manager.27 Although the originally aristocratic, monarchist officer corps sought to limit the access of “lower” bourgeois and proletarian classes to the army, the emerging concept of the knowledgeable and scientifically educated officer or “military manager” contested the established perspective.28 Military masculinity increasingly rested not only on honor and an uninhibited martial spirit but also on professional expertise. In Europe, the conflict between old and new military elites was also a conflict between these different but interacting concepts of military masculinity, and involved generational and class issues. It lasted at least until the First World War, after which the nobility eventually lost most of its former political and military significance.29 Similarly, in Japan, officers were influenced by the German notion of rational technocracy and professional specialization, including academy and staff officer education. At the same time, the military became the only source of true manliness, where Japanese men were able to comply with the notion of sacrifice for nation and emperor.30 Chinese military reformers often referred to “international standards” or the situation in “all countries in East and West” for military education but, in fact, they had the German-Japanese system in mind. Military academies and “scientific training” became increasingly popular throughout Europe and the United States in the nineteenth century and the education of staff officers was channeled through a single, national academy in Britain (Sandhurst), France (École militaire), and the USA (West Point).31 In Germany, however, despite the existence of the Prussian War Academy, military education was more decentralized. Young cadets started much earlier than elsewhere and passed through various consecutive levels. A broad general education, furthermore, was part of the military school education, though this was sometimes viewed as counterproductive for strengthening the status of (bourgeois) military academies, compared to an upbringing within aristocratic warrior clans.32

Making Real Men


The German military education system had been adapted in Japan and seemed suitable for the large Qing Empire. Chinese military reformers viewed a general primary education for officers as the foundation, which was followed by scientific and technical instructions for military specialists. And they considered the inculcation of martial values and a martial spirit to be linked to military professionalism and “talent.” Military academies, as well as military institutions, with absolute authority and discretion regarding administration (including education and recruitment) and command were the foundation of occupational autonomy and a truly professional army. Duanfang reinforced the enthusiasm for German military organization and education prevalent before 1900, but he also emphasized the importance of martial values. Chinese military reformers believed that both professionalism and a martial spirit were necessary to become an excellent military officer. If one aspect was neglected, the military reforms would end in failure and would be like “drawing a tiger and ending up with a dog.”33 War Games Military science and scientific warfare, as well as professional military education and the professional organization of administration and command, were discussed widely in journal articles and other publications, and practically implemented through military academies and new institutions. However, professionalism was also performed and it was precisely this performance that solidified ideas about the mindset and behavior of military men into a concept of military masculinity. One way the men of the New Armies performed military professionalism and demonstrated that they adhered to what they perceived as standards of universal, modern, and scientific military culture involved War Games, referring to both large-scale military exercises and, more literally, to an actual tactical board game. The Kriegsspiel (wargame) was the iconic device of the professional military manager for the rational, technocratic yet flexible conduct of war. It was a tactical battle simulation, on a tabletop, which made use of maps and dices to reproduce a three-dimensional territory and the element of chance. Originally developed by the Prussian war councillor, Georg Leopold von Reiswitz, and his son, Georg Heinrich Rudolf Johann, in the early nineteenth century, the Kriegsspiel was introduced by Carl von Müffling (Chief of the General Staff from 1821 to 1829) and Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (Chief of the General Staff from 1857 to 1888) for the education of staff officers in Prussia. The game, including many variations on the initial design, was not only highly popular among German officers—even the military theorist Clausewitz was a passionate player—but was also adopted by many other armies, including


Chapter 4

the ones of the Ottoman Empire, Russia, France, and the United States.34 The Kriegsspiel contributed to the fame of Prussian-German officers as effective master strategists and military managers. Jacob Meckel, the expert on military tactics who substantially contributed to the reorganization of the Japanese Army in the 1880s and 1890s, wrote several books on the Kriegsspiel, and the Japanese Army reportedly used it during the Russo-Japanese War.35 Therefore, it was more than just a tool for training tactical skills or a mere symbol for planning and organization on the battlefield. Rather, it represented the desire for dissociating warfare from aristocratic traits and heroic valor, and turning it into a controllable, predictable, and projectable undertaking that could be learned and taught. According to Corelli Barnett, “[t]he Kriegsspiel was a great gift to modern professional [military] education.”36 Zhang Zhidong was among the first in China to mention the Kriegsspiel (Bingqi). In his piece Exhortation to Study (1898), he included a chapter on “Western” (and Japanese) military science (bingxue) and the importance of combining academy learning, drill, and experiences in the field. Together with war maps (zhantu), which were used to study historical battles, Zhang realized that the Kriegsspiel was the most valuable tool to teach officers strategy and tactics.37 Subsequently, the Qing government considered Bingqi as a part of the “international standard” of military education and ordered that it be included in the curriculum of the higher officer schools and the staff college.38 Zhang Renjun, governor-general of Liangjiang from 1909 to 1911, emphasized that Bingqi was a distinct and important subject at military schools “in the countries in East and West.” At the time, he was in charge of the Ninth Division (Jiangsu) and suggested that 5000 maps should be printed for the division’s officers to practice the game.39 Li Jishen, army instructor and military theorist, compiled a textbook on the Kriegsspiel for the staff academy, entitled Guideline for the Wargame (Bingqi zhizhen), in which he summarized the origin, development, and use of the game in the German Empire. Li introduced several modes of the game, such as tactical, strategic, or defense simulations, and how to prepare the various elements of the game, including maps, dice, and tokens.40 According to Li, the benefits of the Kriegsspiel were immense, enabling officers to practice at any time, to learn to make decisions, and to rehearse the transmission of commands. They would learn to be flexible and adapt to changing conditions. Junior officers could use it to familiarize themselves with the duties and tasks of their superior officers. Furthermore, he noted that “the Bingqi is the only method to develop a diligent heart.” Moreover, the wargame would make it possible to study military tactics, gain an overall picture, and allow for comparability.41 The game was also an occasional topic in the military journals. The Nanyang Military Journal, in particular, published a few articles specifically on the Kriegsspiel or Bingqi. One article, from 1906, presumably

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written by He Gongxia, a military primary school student in Hubei who later joined the anti-Qing revolutionaries, praised the game as the very best way to instruct officers in tactics and key to military victories. By using simple rhetoric and deductions, the author argued that tactical maps were vital to understand the battle situation and changes occurring in the army of the enemy. Comprehension and knowledge were important for making decisions and commanding. He also noted that the Kriegsspiel was based on the ancient Chinese board game Weiqi (better known under its Japanese name Go).42 According to He, Weiqi had traveled via Tibet and India to Europe, where the French had used its principles to create the Kriegsspiel. However, only the Germans had perfected the game and turned it into a new field of learning (xin xuewen). Under von Moltke, they had started to use it for the training of officers, and Germany eventually became the leader among Europe’s “grand manly powers” (changxiong). Therefore, He concluded, the Japanese officer corps sent people to Germany to specifically learn the Kriegsspiel.43 Another article on the game appeared in the same journal two years later. It not only gave a more accurate and detailed account on the origin of the Kriegsspiel than the article by He, but also provided rudimentary graphic illustrations of game tokens, similar to Li’s textbook. According to the article, the Kriegsspiel became immensely popular with the German military and was particularly beneficial for the education of young officers, because they became more confident in making decisions and gained a feeling for real troop maneuvers.44 To further understand the significance of Bingqi for the construction of military masculinity, it is worth looking at Marc L. Moscovitz’s anthropological study on Weiqi in contemporary China. He finds that both women and men, both old and young, view Weiqi as a game for men as it, at the same time, requires and trains allegedly masculine qualities and virtues such as rational and logical thinking, discipline, commitment, aggressiveness, and competitiveness. Although Weiqi has its origins in and is still associated with military strategy, the large majority of these manly qualities are ascribed to scholarly wen rather than to martial wu masculinity, including, in particular, cognitive abilities and a competitive spirit. Guan Yu, the heroic “god of war,” was sometimes depicted playing Weiqi while a doctor treated his battle wounds.45 A strategic (or rather tactical) game such as the Kriegsspiel or Bingqi, then, was both a tool and symbol for adding wen qualities to the education and cultivation of new officers. These wen qualities were perceived as much more relevant for the military than studying classics of strategy. But the Bingqi was also exclusive for the military, not only revaluing but also helping junren (“military man”) to become a distinct military masculine figuration that was attractive for the elite. Whereas the Kriegsspiel was used to teach tactical skills to staff officers, large-scale military exercises aimed at enabling military leaders to study the


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actual military preparedness of their armies, from the individual infantryman to the overall logistics, planning, and strategy.46 Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong, moreover, were eager to showcase the success of the Beiyang and Hubei New Army and sought to inspire other provincial officials to follow their model. The Beiyang Army conducted an initial, relatively small military exercise in 1904.47 After launching the Lujun in 1904, the Bureau for Military Training under Yikuang, Yuan Shikai, and Tieliang, planned to organize annual autumn war games, similar to those in Germany and Japan. These were to be carefully orchestrated, to impress both foreign observers and Qing subjects, and dishearten enemies of the dynasty. Duanfang considered war games as essential for rousing the martial spirit of the people. Recalling how foreigners mocked him for not wearing a military uniform, he emphasized that (grand) military exercises were important to convince the world of the redeveloped military capabilities and strength of China.48 On the other hand, Feng Yuxiang, who started off as a self-made low-ranking soldier and later became one of the most powerful warlords in the 1920s, described the intention behind the early twentieth century war games as “intimidating” revolutionary forces and impressing the increasing opposition against the Qing Dynasty.49 In 1905, 1906, and 1908, three large war games, which included several divisions from the North and South, were held. Attempts to conduct war games in 1907, 1909, and 1910 failed, either due to lack of funds or the problematic political situation and internal power struggles during those years, particularly between Yuan Shikai and the Manchu nobility.50 Some divisions or provinces, however, conducted smaller military exercises in and after 1907.51 In early 1911, the Army Ministry and the General Staff scheduled a military exercise with multiple divisions that was to take place near Luanzhou, along the Beijing-Shenyang railway line in October. However, it was cancelled because of the outbreak of the uprising in Wuchang, which eventually led to the revolution and the end of the Qing Dynasty. The troops, which already assembled for the military exercise, were sent to Wuchang to quell the revolt.52 Large military exercises or war games were conducted by European armies and served to provide soldiers with true-to-life combat experience, and to test and demonstrate military strength. Like Kriegsspiel, the nineteenth and twentieth century conduct of military exercises can be traced back to the Prussian-German army. The German war games were emulated in Japan, and both inspired the war games held by the Chinese New Armies. Manöver (war games) were held in autumn every year in Germany. If the emperor attended, the scale of such a war game was usually larger, and they were then called Kaisermanöver (emperor’s war game). Particularly Zaifeng, Puyi’s father and regent, was deeply impressed by the huge Kaisermanöver in Danzig, which

Making Real Men


he attended while visiting the German Empire in 1901. Between 1893 and 1913, the Kaisermanöver were supposed to enable German military leaders to study the strength, the drill tactics, and the movements of the army. These war games, however, turned into a mere display of pomp and pageantry—to a large degree because of the active involvement of the German emperor, Wilhelm II, who insisted on personally leading a cavalry attack as the highlight of every war game. French and American observers, as well as German critics, agreed that the Kaisermanöver reflected the backwardness and fixation on outdated tactics of the German army, including the use of cavalry. By contrast, Chinese military reformers and the late Qing government were impressed by the Kaisermanöver.53 Chinese military observers attended Japanese military exercises as early as 1898 and Tieliang himself led a delegation in 1903.54 In spring 1905, Yuan Shiki also sent a delegation of Beiyang cadets, led by Zhang Yongzheng, to the autumn military exercise of the German Second Army. A general chosen by Zhang Zhidong, whose name is unknown, as well as “a few Manchu military officers,” who represented the Huguang New Army and the Bureau for Military Training, respectively, accompanied the delegation. This episode, reported in the English-language newspaper North China Herald, revealed that there was still organizational disunity within the New Armies. But it also demonstrated that Chinese military reformers still ascribed great importance to the German army and that every faction was strongly interested in studying military exercises in Germany and Japan.55 In 1906, the Bureau for Military Training issued guidelines for Chinese military observers who were sent abroad to study foreign military science, including war games in particular. They were told to immediately telegraph any information to the Bureau, which would exclusively decide how to process and centrally administer the intelligence. The guidelines also instructed the observers to report deficits of the relevant foreign army and to send copies of their travel diary to the Bureau upon their return.56 In the autumn of 1905, the “first but large-scale” (Duanfang) military exercise of the New Armies, which lasted five days, took place in Hejian, Zhili province.57 It only involved Beiyang divisions and battalions, and the Chinese commanders relied strongly on the advice and planning of Japanese instructors, though this fact was treated discreetly.58 Japanese advisors were also involved in organizing the military exercise in the following year, which were hold at Zhangde (today called Anyang), Henan province. The Zhangde war games in 1906 included the Eighth Division (Hubei New Army), under the command of Zhang Biao, as well as Beiyang troops under the command of Duan Qirui, who had already commanded one of the armies during the exercises in the previous year.59 In both cases, tens of thousands of troops participated: 45,000 men mainly from the Second and Fourth Divisions in


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1905, and over 33,000 men from the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Divisions in 1906. Yuan, in his function as supreme commander of the Beiyang Army, co-director of the Bureau for Military Training, and imperial commissioner, was ultimately responsible for the success of the war games. In Zhangde, he shared this responsibility with Zhang Zhidong.60 In 1908, a third, national military exercise was conducted in the mountainous Taihu District, Anhui province. It was smaller in scale than the previous two exercises and included the Eighth and Ninth Divisions of the Southern, or Nanyang, Army. Yinchang, Duanfang, and the two senior generals, Feng Guozhang and Ha Hanzhang, were in charge of the exercise, which they conducted without the help of any Japanese or other foreign advisors.61 The war games in 1905 and 1906 were supposed to impress the world and demonstrate China’s resurrected military strength. Both events, but particularly the war games at Zhangde in 1906, received widespread attention inside and outside the Qing Empire. In Zhangde, the Qing government allowed three official military observers each from Italy, the United States, Russia, Japan, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, France, and the United Kingdom to attend, all of whom were mentioned by name in the Nanyang Military Journal.62 Every province or protectorate of the Qing Empire, apart from Mongolia and Tibet, sent observers to report back to their respective governors with the aim of improving the quality of the respective provincial Lujun divisions in the making. The domestic and international media coverage was similarly extensive. The Beijing correspondent of the British newspaper The Times, George Ernest Morrison, reported on-site, together with journalists from Russian, German, American, and Japanese newspapers and magazines. Chinese media reporting on the war games included the Shenbao, Shibao, Dagongbao, Huazi huibao, and Dongfang zazhi, as well as the Shanghaibased, English-language weekly North China Herald. Altogether, almost 500 Chinese and foreign observers were present.63 Both the Guangxu Emperor and the Empress Dowager Cixi paid great attention to the war games. Like Yuan Shikai and other military observes, they were, to a large extent, satisfied with the performance of the troops in both years.64 However, there was also criticism concerning, for instance, the actual military-tactical usefulness of the cavalry. According to the unique eyewitness account by Feng Yuxiang, many things were amiss at the war games. Feng was a soldier from the age of 14. He joined the Beiyang Army as a young man and gradually moved up the ranks. After Yuan Shikai’s death in 1916, he became a powerful warlord who tried to implement his notions of a disciplined, social, and Christian society in the territories under the control of his troops. He proved to be quite flexible in terms of political alliances, because he subsequently cooperated with other warlords, the Nationalists, and the Communists.65 Feng participated in the war games in 1905 and 1906.

Making Real Men


In his biography, he shared some of the observations of the foreigners present concerning the good discipline of the troops and the overall progress of Chinese military reforms. However, he also reported on poor planning and coordination, lack of communication and information, and chaos caused by rain and bad weather.66 According to Feng, Duan Qirui was extremely frustrated with his subordinate officers, who refused to exercise out of fear their uniforms could get wet. Feng quoted him as saying: “you are afraid that your uniforms will get soaked? So, when it is raining, then you do not go to war?”67 Moreover, Feng wrote, many soldiers looked sloppy, their boots and clothes were in a bad condition and, more often than not, their uniforms were either too big or too small.68 In order to impress the rest of the world and demonstrate military strength, the Qing government and army command were anxious to present the image of engaged and spirited professional military men on all levels of rank. An article in the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers reminded the soldiers in a Have-to-know for the War Games survey that “various countries are sending envoys to observe the autumn exercises.”69 Although the New Armies had existed for some time by then, foreigners did not possess detailed knowledge about the soldiers’ qualities, the article argued, and “if this war game goes well, then the foreigners will respect us. Our China will be strong. But if the war game does not go well, our China will be despised by the foreigners even more.”70 Therefore, mistakes were not allowed. Furthermore, the article urged the men to approach the war game with the “mind of real battle” (zhenzhan de xin) because, otherwise, there was no courage and spirit, and everything would end up being “child’s play.” Moreover, the soldiers received information on how to take care of their medical kits and other equipment, and were exhorted to take good care of their uniforms and observe discipline.71 In order to increase the morale and appearance of the men, provisions were increased in quality and quantity during the war games.72 The soldiers were instructed to behave well toward civilians and reminded to buy food instead of simply requisitioning it.73 In 1906, the Bureau for Military Training issued a small booklet with guidelines for staff officers involved in the planning of the war game, including personnel from the Bureau’s own departments as well as officers from the participating provinces and Lujun divisions. Because foreign observers had praised the elaborate organization of the previous war game, the booklet noted, the responsibility was even greater now. If the military exercises, and the subsequent troop review, were not well prepared, the troops would not move perfectly. Accordingly, the full effort of everyone involved would be necessary to complete the sophisticated preparations.74 Tieliang and Yuan Shikai were officially appointed to evaluate both the war games and the troop review (yuebing dachen). Together with the other main organizers, they


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took great pains to perform well before, during, and after the actual exercises. Already in 1905, Yuan established a special Bureau for Troop Review (Yuebingchu), which included departments for the reception of Chinese and foreign guests. For the war game in the following year, he ordered that the city of Zhangde should be polished up: shops on the main street were repainted and they were decorated with lanterns and flags. Yuan reportedly brought in hundreds of men from Tianjin to patrol and clean up the streets, and get rid of dirt and unwelcome people.75 Both the war games in 1905 and 1906 were concluded with a full-day final ceremony, for which the soldiers lined up neatly in units, “martially gallant and ready for battle on the review ground,” according to Yuan’s own report.76 Valiant riders (mashi xiongjiu) and all officers appeared in ceremonial dress. Under the pompous sound of military music and with their swords drawn, they waited to be reviewed by Chinese and foreign observers.77 Large “bustling” banquets with “more than 1000 people” concluded the war games.78 Foreign military attachés were, overall, positive about the war games, and they were less critical concerning the Zhangde war games in 1906, compared to the one in Hejian in 1905.79 Yuan and the other military leaders also succeeded in impressing the foreign and Chinese press, which enthusiastically celebrated the rising military strength of the Qing Empire.80 Chinese journals and newspapers, moreover, were satisfied by the positive coverage of the foreign-language press. The Shenbao, for instance, reported that the Hejian war games were praised by various foreign observers and viewed as “xiongzhuang,” meaning majestic, full of grandeur, manly and strong, heroic. Citing the North China Herald, the Shenbao report continued that, according to the German and Russian official observers, the Chinese New Armies were now comparable to the Japanese Army.81 Military journals were also content with the acknowledgment by foreigners. The Nanyang Military Journal published the translation of an overwhelmingly positive report from a Japanese correspondent, which included quotes from The Times, as well as positive remarks on the uniforms and appearance of the soldiers.82 The war games, to be sure, were not just a mere spectacle to stage military pomp and circumstance but useful events to perform and, therefore, to promote and create military professionalism and learning in the military sector. According to Yuan Shikai, the war games were supposed to “inspire the martial spirit of everyone and combine the skill of everyone […] to turn weakness into strength, [and were] not just for a decorative appearance.”83 But Yuan was highly anxious about being ridiculed by foreigners for any mistake that might occur during the war games. He knew that observing a certain military style and habitus was intertwined with what other Chinese military reformers and foreigners regarded as a professional “modern” army. Successful military reforms were not merely a question of actual firepower or, for that matter,

Making Real Men


training and discipline, but a question of adhering to predominant epistemological categories and notions of military culture. Chinese military men had to perform individually and collectively according to the standards of EuroAmerican military professionalism, including ideas and practices about professional military men. Military exercises should no longer appear as a “mere burlesque” as the American military observer, Emory Upton, remarked about an allegedly foreign-style drill he attended in Beijing in 1878. According to him, during the drill, superior officers were “comfortably seated under tents arranged along the line of battle” and the soldiers were wearily “[wandering] back to the city” after the exercise had concluded.84 Being “revered by foreigners” and giving a “strong appearance” (zhuang guanzha) also remained the prime purpose of military exercises in the early Republic. One military journal article, for instance, viewed the impossibility of providing such an appearance as reason for postponing a planned exercise in 1916.85 In the end, political and military struggles during Yuan’s presidency impeded the conduct of any larger war games. Yuan’s regime, however, resorted to another way of staging military culture: parades and troop reviews, which, unlike military exercise, were more a spectacle or military show, as described in Chapter 3.86 Professional Men and “Military Science” The notion of “military science” and the scientific academic education of military officers were also propagated by a number of emerging military journals that were established from 1905 onward, either by the New Armies and their respective administrative arms or by scholars and students more indirectly linked to the army. Irrespective of the contents of the numerous articles and reports published in these journals, the unprecedented creation of military journals itself speaks for the increasing self-awareness, internal autonomy, occupational independence, and self-governance of the army in late Qing and early Republican China.87 The journals contributed significantly to the construction of the figure of the professional military man and influenced the formation of a military masculine identity particularly of officers and cadets. The very first military journal was the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers (Xunbingbao), which was edited by the Beiyang Bureau for the Supervision of Training and under the aegis of the Bureau for Military Training. First published in 1905, the journal was supposed to be issued three times per month. Unlike other journals, which followed shortly after, it used simple, vernacular language and addressed common soldiers in particular.88 The Nanyang Military Journal (Nanyang bingshi zazhi) was published on a monthly basis between 1906 and 1911 and mainly reported on the developments of


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the Lujun divisions in the southeastern (Nanyang) part of the Qing Empire. It explicitly addressed all ranks of the military but it was actually directed toward a much more educated readership, that is, officers, in particular those of the Ninth Division stationed in Jiangsu Province.89 In 1910, the Beiyang divisions started publishing the Beiyang Military Journal (Beiyang bingshi zazhi), which emulated the Nanyang Military Journal. In both cases, the Education and Training Departments (Jiaolianchu) of the respective army supervision bureaus (Nanyang/Jiangnan and Beiyang/Zhili) were in charge of the journals.90 The successor of the Nanyang Military Journal was, presumably, the Hangzhou-based Zhejiang Military Journal (Zhejiang bingshi zazhi, often simply referred to as Bingshi zazhi), which appeared from 1914 to 1926. Another journal was the Military Studies Magazine (Junxue jikan), which was established in 1908 by the Shanghai-based Commercial Press (Shangwu yinshuguan), the largest Chinese publishing house at the time. Its chief editor was Chen Zongda, a graduate of the Jiangnan Army School and former military cadet in Germany.91 A journal called Martial Studies (Wuxue) appeared monthly and was published by the Society for the Translation of [Works on] Martial Studies (Wuxue bianyishe) in Tokyo that consisted of cadets studying in Japan.92 Finally, Zhang Feng, a Lujun officer in Shaanxi Province and member of Sun Yat-sen’s Tokio-based, anti-Qing Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui), founded the Army Learned Society (Lujun xuehui), which published a military journal, the Military Monthly (Lujun xuehui junshi yuebao).93 The military journals dealt with topics related to military culture, such as military organization and administration, technology, military history, general military affairs and wars, tactics, and training. Besides exploring the latest developments in the military field, they had a strong educational orientation targeting both officers and common soldiers.94 The Beiyang Military Journal, for instance, summarized its main purpose in three points: “instill a martial spirit,” “examine all kinds of military sciences,” and “discuss the military preparedness (junbei) of all countries.”95 The other journals shared the international orientation and included articles on the military organizations of the major European countries, the United States, Russia, Japan, and, occasionally, on the developments in less influential countries such as Turkey, Spain, or the Netherlands. Reports on the German and Japanese army and navy were most common and the Nanyang Military Journal even employed two full-time translators, one for German and one for Japanese.96 These journals were modeled on similar journals in Europe and their proclaimed goal was to facilitate the coalescence of the Chinese military and, in some cases, the nation.97 Moreover, they frequently addressed and discussed the relationship between the state, the military, and civilians as well as the role of “military science.”98

Making Real Men


The foundation for establishing the New Armies and pursuing societal reorientation toward martiality was the idea of professionalism, including streamlined institutions, academy training, and a new notion of “military learning” or “military science” (bingxue), which replaced the established military examination system and its fixed canon of strategic classics as iconic selection criteria. The emergence of bingxue (today rather rendered as junshixue) has to be understood in the context of the complex process of appropriating the idea of “science” as a system for obtaining and organizing knowledge in China and the epistemological and political struggles that accompanied this process. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, foreign translators (mostly Jesuits and Protestant missionaries) and Chinese scholars used customary frameworks to mesh the idea of science with Chinese scholarship. The initially common term to describe the European and American concept of scientific knowledge and experimental science was gewu zhizhi (or, in short, gezhi), which translates as “investigation of things and extension of knowledge.” The term originally included classical learning and “natural studies” but increasingly referred to natural sciences and sometimes, confusingly, only to physics. Another, less frequently used term was bowu, meaning “broad learning about things.” Using these established terms was a strategy to adapt “modern”/European-American science and render it as concepts and practices of learning with Chinese origins. However, after 1895, Chinese students began to use the Japanese neologism kagaku (kexue, literally meaning “organized fields of learning”) to completely break with the past and emphasize the fundamental methodological and classificatory differences between science and classical learning. This led to massive numbers of translations, the division of science into distinct disciplines such as social sciences (shehui kexue), medicine (yixue), chemistry (huaxue), physics (wulixue), or agriculture (nongxue), and the implementation of a public school system from 1904 onward, which included, and increasingly was based on, science education.99 Eventually, science even became a mystified symbol for national salvation and modernization among Chinese intellectuals, administrators, and politicians. As Bret Hinsch indicated, it became a totem representing masculine rationality and knowledge, which were building on and replacing the customary prestige of Confucian doctrines. Masculinized science became the means for a man to serve the nation and its resurrection, superseding classic learning and civil service examinations as career paths to public office.100 Bingxue was a case in point. Although it certainly never developed into a distinct field similar to other scientific disciplines with well-defined content, methods and theories, or a community of academics and scientists, the term developed along the lines of science, and military reformers applied the same claims to authoritative knowledge and truth.101 Military reformers occasionally used terms such as gezhi and bowu in documents and articles but, after


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the turn of the century, science/kexue and a concept of bingxue, which was defined accordingly, gained increasing currency: professional military men should be educated according to scientific standards and be prepared for “modern” warfare. A number of articles in the military journals dealt directly with the question of promoting scientific education and “military science” itself—a term which actually could include everything from military organization, strategy, and tactics to certain areas of the natural sciences, mathematics, technology, construction, and equipment. One article in the Nanyang Military Journal, for instance, authored by Tao Shumao in 1907, highlighted the relevancy of specialized military academies for teaching all kinds of technical military courses (shuke) as well as scientific research in military subjects. According to Tao, “military science,” offered through military academies, and studying and learning in these academies were essential for educating officers of all levels. The “way to victory,” he argued, was founded in “scientifically conducting military science on a large scale” (kexue daxing bingxue). The “spirit of military science in strong countries can even [bridge the gap between] the five continents,” he emphasized euphorically and demanded that even the emperor should attend a military school.102 Military reformers and journal authors regarded the ability to command and lead (zhihui) as well as a good, scientific education as the essential qualities for high-ranking officers. Li Duo, an officer who later joined the Nationalist army, emphasized that these qualities were complementary and one had to possess both to become an accomplished officer.103 The new military leaders were supposed to be analysts and organizers and, unlike the military strategists (bingjia) of the Song Dynasty, also tacticians with a thorough military school education and real hands-on experience.104 Through military education, and tactical simulations in particular, officers gained the ability to be flexible, adequately judge any situation, and make quick and, if necessary, independent decisions. A contribution in the Nanyang Military Journal by the “Jiangsu military training administration” argued that these competences depended on the individual; however, teaching and transmitting them could be standardized to a certain degree. Besides presenting obscure theories about the influence of the climate on the decisiveness or decision-making mentality of entire nations (guomin zhuanduanxin), the article underlined that military education was important to counter alleged national deficiencies and inculcate officers with a firm and decisive attitude.105 Similarly, an article by Zhong Haosheng in the Zhejiang Military Journal argued in favor of (scientific) learning. Officers had to be educated in order to suppress superstition and mysticism among the enlisted soldiers. Reason and rationality should be the foundation on which an officer based his decisions.106 Wan Dezun, a Japanese military school graduate, stated that a military commander is “like the brain,

Making Real Men


which controls all parts of a body (shenti).” And, the “will of a man decides on the movements of the body.” A firm will and quick decision-making, he emphasized, were crucial for leading soldiers.107 Young officers, in particular, were to be trained in both academies and the regiments. An anonymous author, claiming to quote “Western philosophy,” wrote: “when the military power [of the countries of the world] is about the same, the strategy to improve the officers makes the difference.”108 Zhou Yinren, a cadet at the Japanese Army Academy and a future Beiyang brigade commander, complained in an article on the education of officers published in the Japanese-based journal Wuxue that China was merely a drill ground for foreigners. Emphasizing the need for officers, he noted: “without science/ academic learning (xueshu), the technologies for warfare cannot be used, without knowledge [about warfare], tiger and jaguar cannot be unleashed.”109 The early Republican Military Monthly was particularly concerned with the issue of “scientific” military education and training as well as with teaching and instruction methods. Miao Qianshan, who later became a general under Jiang Jieshi, argued that judging from historical experience, the strength of armies depended on the ability to qualitatively improve military education. According to Miao, unlike elsewhere, many low-ranking officers in China were still uneducated: a dangerous condition anticipating chaos.110 In the same vein, another article in the same journal emphasized the importance of mastering military science, which developed rapidly and offered many innovations for military affairs and warfare.111 Learning was based on the pace and quality of scientific developments, a certain Yue Zhang argued in another journal, and the outcome of battle was increasingly dependent on intelligence and the mastery of machines, rather than on courage.112 Likewise, the early Republican military governor of Zhejiang, Zhu Rui, believed that both school education and service in the regiment were complementary. During the convocation ceremony at a provincial officers’ school, he emphasized in a speech that “knowledge” and “experience” were absolutely necessary for a good officer. After all, because they had the better officers, Prussia had defeated France and Japan had overcome Russia, Zhu reminded the graduates.113 The school’s director added that academic attainments (xueshi) and technical skills (jineng) as well as spirit were the main principles for a military man. Learning never stopped and had to be constantly extended, he concluded.114 The Spirit of Military Men Although training military specialists and professionals was the goal of the new military education program developed by military reformers at the beginning of the twentieth century, the appeal of the German and Japanese


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armies, and the preoccupation to emulate them, lay in the self-perception and self-conduct of the military elites: the officer class in these countries was not simply a product of instruction but of cultivation. For Duanfang, the very reason why Germany was acknowledged as a powerful and “manly” country was the combination of technical skills with spirit and aristocratic prestige, which was symbolically connected to the authority of the emperor. The Prussian military nobility had, by and large and despite many conflicts, managed to adapt to the conditions of the nineteenth century and combine their alleged chivalric traditions of sacrifice and loyalty with new perceptions of professionalism and scientific-technological warfare.115 Studying military science and acquiring specialist military knowledge was necessary to obtain the insights and abilities (caishi) to become an officer. But a perfect military leader, a journal article On Generalship argued, also had to possess “passion” (qing) and “ideals” (yi), including a sense of righteousness, courage, and endurance.116 A comprehensive military education, particularly of young officers, had to include the cultivation of non-technical qualities, a number of other articles argued: spirit, not form, determined the outcome of battle when everything else—the number of troops, weapons, and the quality of strategy—was equal. “The strength of [one’s] spirit instantly decides over victory and defeat (cixiong, literally female and male).”117 The success of the Prussian army in the three wars between 1864 and 1871 against Denmark, Austria, and France, respectively, cemented its role as a symbol for national self-assertion and “blood and iron” unification within the emerging German nation-state. The army was viewed as creator and protector of the nation and masculine qualities associated with the army, such as comradeship and esprit de corps, epitomized the national gemeinschaft. The military represented masculine heroism, modernization, and national integration,118 and, virtually exclusively, defined masculinity: military men, particularly officers, were viewed as the embodiment of true manhood. They enjoyed an immense social prestige and serving in the army was thus very attractive.119 The military counted as “the school of masculinity,” where men became real men through drill, companionship, and the baptism of fire. Military virtues such as courage, discipline, as well as physical and mental strength, became socially predominant male characteristics.120 Attributes ascribed to the male body and to masculinity also included stoicism, phallocentricity, competitiveness, domination of weaker individuals, and heroic achievements. In the military, the display of these attributes and values was encouraged, and men (and boys) were best able to affirm their masculinity in this way. Honor, in the sense of adhering to a fixed but necessarily codified set of rules while interacting, at the least, with like-minded men, as well as a strong sense of camaraderie und esprit de corps were important masculine values for the military.121

Making Real Men


Not only in Germany but also everywhere in Europe and the United States, traits attributed to military masculinity were reinforced and even “eroticized” through the political and social elevation and glorification of military culture and success in battle. According to Paul Higate and John Hopton, masculinity in Victorian Britain, for instance, was ideologically defined in terms of strength, courage, determination, and patriotism.122 This concept of manhood was “performed bodily, in military parades, imperialist rituals, and patriotic songs, and imaginatively, representations of bodies, in Rudyard Kipling novels, engravings, celebratory verse, and so forth. […] Uniform dress-ups, military postures, metaphors, militarist sentiments, and cultural production circulated.”123 According to a late nineteenth century German military hygiene manual, military education and training should not only produce “able-bodied and healthy soldiers but also [cultivate] manly defenders of the fatherland, undaunted by death.”124 This idea of linking home defense with inculcating battle courage as well as a “manly martial spiritedness” (xiongwu huopo zhi jigai) became part of the basic training of recruits of the late Qing and early Republican New Armies.125 Chinese military reformers and army instructors considered bodily discipline the source of spirit and bravery and were well aware of the connection between physical exercise, health, and the cultivation of a martial spirit, which they viewed as the “easiest way to transform the disposition of good soldiers” and turn them into loyal men.126 An author writing under the pseudonym Jianfei argued that “the posture of standing at attention reflects the spirit of military men.”127 Instilling a vivid martial spirit was essential for governing common soldiers but it was even more important for the cultivation of officers and generals, who would lead the troops if their spirit should fail them.128 The idea of “martial spirit” was repeated and explained endlessly and, explicitly or implicitly, pervaded texts such as military journal articles and manuals and appeared in songs, poems, stories, legends, and speeches. These “texts” conveyed to officers and soldiers a role model of military heroism as well as a mystical, almost religious, idea of valor, which linked war with sacrifice. The new military man, moreover, was supposed to adhere to comradeship and possess a sense of brotherhood or esprit de corps, which linked martial spirit with professional pride. Military spirit and esprit de corps, eventually, extended to patriotism and faith in the nation, and rendered the willingness to sacrifice one’s physical body pro patria into the ultimate trait of a martial hero and military masculinity.129 Military reformers were aware of the importance of texts to circulate their notion of a foreign-style new Chinese army and to influence the behavior and attitude of officers and soldiers. In 1907, the Nanyang Military Journal reported that Tieliang, who, at the time, headed the Army Ministry, planned


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to establish a weekly paper, written in the vernacular, for soldiers. The purpose was to reach even common soldiers with only basic literacy skills and promote military ideas and values in every soldier. Specially appointed officers should read and explain the paper to the gathered soldiers. According to the journal, this would “greatly benefit the task of the military.”130 Moreover, the army sought to strictly control the quantity of all military books and the army leadership was anxious to keep their contents in accordance with army protocol.131 Written and spoken texts and textual performance, that is, the interpretation and use of texts as both representations and enactments of social reality, were crucial for the construction and conceptualization of military masculinity. The written word, in particular, counted as the foundation of civilization in China; it was almost synonymous with “culture” and constituted the perception of a civil and pacifist wen essence. Nevertheless, as Joanna Waley-Cohen shows for the Qing in the eighteenth century, texts could be put to the service of wu or military culture and be utilized to produce a concept of military masculinity.132 Through texts, early twentieth century military reformers, instructors, intellectuals, and army leaders completed the figuration of the military man, literally animating the image of the professional soldier with martial spiritedness and fervent patriotism. Quoting the Sunzi bingfa and other military classics, the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, in a chapter on the Instruction of Generals (Xun jiang yaoyan), emphasized that a general essentially had to possess both wen (cultural) and wu (martial) qualities. These qualities should be used to repay the kindnesses of the dynasty and to serve the nation. Without dwelling much on the wen aspects, merely mentioning the quality of “wisdom” more than once, the manual emphasized that generals should be “valiant martial men” (jiujiu wufu) with an “imposing masculinity” (chenxiong), loyal to king and country, and dedicated to resisting foreign aggression. After discussing the issue of leadership, expressed in the relationship of leniency (kuan) and strictness (yan), the manual examined the role of courage. In battle “brave, young, vigorous, and brawn [men], who do not yield to the cowardice of the old and weak,” were needed. The manual introduced various forms of courage, among which the one resulting from loyalty and righteousness (zhongyi zhi yong) was the most profound and unchanging. Courage from “blood and breath” or “vigour” (xueqi zhi yong), from “emotions” or “temperament” (yiqi zhi yong) and from “force” (mianqiang zhi yong), on the other hand, were only temporary.133 Yuan Shikai, co-author of the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, repeatedly announced, in declarations, correspondence, poems, and speeches, the importance of courage and “bravely engaging the enemy” (fenyong, fenwu) without fearing for one’s own life.134 He incessantly promoted courage, the ability to face death undauntedly, and even recklessness as the fundamental qualities of

Making Real Men


any good military man. In a speech delivered to officers and soldiers, which was subsequently published in a collection, he narrated how he himself had faced death many times without being harmed or feeling threatened. He announced that “every soldier must believe firmly: I can kill a person. No one can kill me. That’s a tough guy (haohanzi). Soldiers must engage bravely. If they do not, they are not qualified to be soldiers. That would be a shame.”135 The “tough guy” was a popular cultural male figuration of an audacious, violent, yet honorable and chummy Robin Hood-like outsider. The new military man, thus, was not just a professional rationalist but also a passionate and spirited fighter, yet someone who acted honorably and comradely. In the Nanyang Military Journal’s first issue (1906), Jianfei defined spirit as “fealty” (zhongjie), “etiquette” (liyi), “honor” (xinyi), “valor” (wuyong), and “character” (zhisu).136 According to him, military men must obey and, emulating the loyalty of legendary martial heroes such as the Song Dynasty general Yue Fei, sacrifice their lives for emperor, country, family, and people. The “idea” and “spirit” of patriotism were boundless sources for inspiring a strong, manly (xiongzhuang) will and a firm spirit, leading men to the “way of the warrior” (Wushidao, from the Japanese Bushido) and to a “militarist soul” (junguohun). The Chinese civilization was at its weakest point, he wrote, its martial spirit had vanished completely, and men were sick and “delicate like women” (nüxing xianxian). Therefore, starting with the military, courage and valor had to be instilled in men and their weak bodies had to be trained and drilled. At the basis of all valor, steadiness, and spirit, he emphasized, lay “character.”137 Jianfei’s article was followed by a short piece on Training the Soul (Lianhunpian) and a longer essay on the education of officers, written by two other authors who both emphasized that technical skills only and the “training of hands, legs, ears, eyes, and the brain” were not enough.138 “Spirit education,” implying qualities such as courage and loyalty, was central for training new recruits and essential for cultivating a new class of military leaders. The Nanyang Military Journal consecutively published an entire series called Lectures on Spirit (Jingshen jianghua), based on the argument that “spirit” was a crucial element for the coherent and congruent military education of officers, who passed through very different educational tracks such as provincial and foreign academies or short-term programs.139 Numerous other articles in various military journals were concerned with the “education of the spirit” (jinshen jiaoyu) or what was called the nontechnical qualities of officers and common soldiers.140 In 1907, the Nanyang Military Journal printed an order of Xu Shichang, Yuan Shikai’s close lieutenant and, at the time, imperial military commissioner of Manchuria, to incorporate “lectures on spirit” into the education of low-ranking generals. He argued:


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Everyone experiences ups and downs, but good and bad depend on what one makes out of it. If something is understood as fortunate, then it will be fortunate even if it is something bitter. If something is understood as bitter, then it will be bitter even if it is something fortunate. […] The power of lecturing on spirit is that it can change the character and habits of a person.141

Xu’s order included a list of questions that served as the basis for “spirit education” and focused on the inculcation of military men with patriotism, on raising their prestige among society, and the issue of instilling obedience, bravery, and endurance.142 According to Li Dehua, endurance or perseverance (jianren) was a “key element” in educating soldiers and officers and raising their martial spirit.143 Yuan Shikai declared that the ability to endure hardships was like an “ultimate magic elixir” (wushang miaoxiao) when training and steeling the body.144 According to another article, perseverance was a precondition for shaping the physical body of men and preparing them for their roles as soldiers. At the same time, a healthy and strong body was important for maintaining an enduring fighting spirit. Perseverance was a part of educating the spirit of military men. Their very lives depended on their spirit.145 “Spirit,” many authors and military reformers agreed, was essential for the New Armies and the new military men and particularly important for generals and other officers. However, the understanding of this term differed widely between texts and included various individual qualities such as bravery, heroism, valor, perseverance, honesty, honor, righteousness, and loyalty. Texts repeated the common practice of the past, and referred to idealized historical and legendary figures such as the heroes from the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Yue Fei, or Sun Sike (a Han Bannerman and general under the Kangxi Emperor), to describe the ideal martial qualities a man needed to possess. Manuals and regulations constantly reiterated the bequeathed notion of a general who was not a brute but righteous and combined wen and wu aspects. Cai E, an early Republican military governor of Yunnan who supported the Guomindang against Yuan Shikai, strongly promoted the military philosophy of Hu Linyi and Zeng Guofan. Both Zeng and Hu were high Qing officials and successful army generals during the Taiping Rebellion who embodied the ideal combination of civilian and military leaders. They modeled themselves on the Ming general Qi Jiguang and his ideas, for instance, by implementing a command hierarchy based on personal relationships and obligation.146 Cai’s book Record of Zeng and Hu on Governing Soldiers (Zeng Hu zhibing yulu), which was reprinted many times and also received great attention from Jiang Jieshi and the Communist’s Red Army, concentrated on “spirit” aspects such as “bravery and steadfastness,” “will,” “honesty,” “benevolence,” and “diligence.”147 According to the book, commanding troops required one to be a great leader, undaunted by death, selfless, and “able to suffer hardships.”148

Making Real Men


The Nanyang Military Journal included a rubric called Legends of Loyalty and Bravery (Zhongyong meitan) that was used by authors and translators to elaborate on topics connected to martial spirit and heroic deeds.149 Other articles in the journal reported on the “soul and spirit” of soldiers in the SinoJapanese War 1894–1895 or introduced “famous generals of the Occident.”150 The Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers similarly published a series entitled Biographical Sketches of Famous Historical Generals, introducing legendary Chinese generals, starting with Zhuge Liang and the Romance of Three Kingdoms heroes.151 Chinese and European military history also became part of the newly established military academies’ curricula, following the strong emphasis by the German General Staff on the systematic study of military history and historic battles for practical learning and application. However, academic essays on martial spirit and military leaders were not necessarily the most effective text genre to inculcate men with a martial spirit and the respective qualities. Much more memorable and palpable were the many tales and images of legendary role model generals or heroes from both the Chinese and European past, which military journals presented in poems, songs, and short stories and which aimed at attracting educated men to join the army. Citing and following historical models was an established practice, particularly among the educated elite in imperial China and, with regard to the New Armies, they remained to serve as inspiring exemplars rather than as subjects for tactical analysis. Military journals contained easily accessible pictures of legendary warriors, military leaders, contemporary Chinese and foreign officers, and common soldiers, as individuals or in groups. Photographs and lithographic prints presented an enthusiastic image of fighting and showed ideal-type incarnations of martial spirit, courage, regimental unity, and comradeship (see, for instance, Figure 4.1).152 For the same purpose, most military journals featured a “culture” rubric. The Zhejiang Military Journal had an “arts and literature” section, the Beiyang Military Journal, the Wuxue, and the Military Monthly all included a “literary circle” with poems or short prose pieces.153 Some journals frequently printed “military short stories” (junshi xiaoshuo) with titles such as Company of Heroes,154 Sacrifice for the Homeland (“a patriotism story”), Record of China’s War Future, The Righteous and Brave Army (about Prussian soldiers defending Prussia against the French), “Long live the Army—Long live the Empire,” Heroes of a Dying Country, or Love and the Hatred for the Enemy (a story about a young officer and a girl).155 These stories depicted a romantic ideal of soldiering, drawing on both legendary Chinese and adopted foreign notions about martialness and military masculine traits, emphasizing heroism, righteousness, self-sacrifice, loyalty, and patriotism.156 And more than any other textual source, they directly addressed the male identity and manliness of the reader or audience, frequently referring to them directly as “man”


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Figure 4.1  “Using the Human Ladder to Climb the Walls of the Enemy.” Source: NBZ 1909, 33.

Making Real Men


(nan’er). One contribution in the Nanyang Military Journal, for instance, announced: Men I love, listen to me! Men I respect, listen to me! Men, men, do you know the value of being drafted into the army? . . . Those who love the homeland (zuguo) quickly enlist! . . . Without martial spirit, it is hard to compete in the world.157

Moreover, common soldiers were supposed to study songs and poems during their spare time and take them as guidelines for correct behavior and ideological instruction. In order to stir up a martial spirit and “encourage” men, these so-called quanbingge were supposed to teach soldiers how to behave in any possible situation, whether in the barracks or in the field, and exhort them to carefully learn the German (or “foreign-style”) drill exercises, to be courageous, and bravely engage the enemy. From songs, for instance, they learned to take good care of their uniforms as it “protects the body.”158 Military journals contained lyrics and rhymed texts, as well as discussions of the role of music and songs for the spirit, conduct, and performance of the army. The Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers and military journals included simple songs that aimed at disciplining common soldiers and inculcating them with basic rules and routines. While songs (or, if only recited, poems) such as the Gun Learning Song (Qiangxuege), Training Soldiers Poem (Xunbing siyange), Cultivating Soldiers Song (Jiaoyangge), and the Military Discipline Song (Junjige) had the purpose of drilling men, others, such as the Encouragement to Join the Army Song (Quan congjunge), were intended to advertise and popularize the army.159 An article series on the basic military training of new recruits from 1916 emphasized the significance of singing songs, which should be simple to understand and, most of all, highlight “heroism” (xiongzhuang).160 In 1907, Wan Dezun, who studied at the Lianghu Academy of Classical Learning (set up by Zhang Zhidong in 1890) and later attended various military schools in Japan and eventually became a secretary of president Li Yuanhong, published an article On the Need of Military Music for the Regiment. Like primary school students, the troops must not be without singing, he wrote. Singing songs was essential for the “spirit education,” “cultivated a sense of beauty,” and increased morale and passion. Singing caused “emotional self-uplifting” and “surging ahead with one’s body.” Accordingly, a “national anthem that startled the world and moved the gods” would be needed to inspire the spirit and arouse the ambition of soldiers, who should “know that one can die but the country cannot be disgraced” and that “the family can be extinguished, but evil cannot be allowed to roam freely.”161 The link between service in the army, masculine traits such as will, perseverance, diligence, courage, and spirit, as well as patriotism was a frequent


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theme in military songs.162 Zhang Zhidong himself wrote a Military Song (Junge) in 1905 that emphasized loyalty to the dynasty, the unity of the “yellow” peoples, and the protection of the nation-state and “race” (bao guojia, bao zhongzu). Songs such as this one were tools to motivate, discipline, and govern military men by creating a sense of connection and belonging among them. The Love the People Song (Aimin’ge), for instance, urged soldiers to view themselves as representatives and part of the people and behave accordingly. Zeng Guofan, in the mid-nineteenth century had already used similar songs to instill into his mercenaries respect for the lives and goods (and daughters) of the common people, which should be regarded as the soldier’s own family.163 Yet, after the turn of the century, songs and poems (and “texts” in general) emphasized an increasingly abstract idea of “nation,” most tangible in the term “patriotism,” and the notions of joyful soldiering and glorious sacrifice in the service of the fatherland. A number of articles dealt with the “joy of military men” in general, arguing that military service should convey a positive self-image. The Nanyang Military Journal published the article On the Joy of Military Men written by Sakata Toranosuke, an academy instructor for the Japanese army who later taught at the Nanyang Officers Preparatory School. Sakata rhetorically asked what anyone would be without experiencing joy (yule, meaning also amusement, entertainment, and fun) in their actions. He argued that military men were no different from ordinary people in this. However, as they performed very different actions than ordinary people, they needed a different sort of joy: taking pleasure in immersing themselves in the art of war (yanjiu zhanshu). According to Sakata, martial men (wufu) had been despised in the past, but now the people respected them for the brave, grand, and heroic (haozhuang) manner with which they engaged in battle. Sakata emphasized that, with “joy,” military men were able to channel their emotions toward their duties. Generals would be able to command over the life and death of countless men and send them roaring to the battlefield. “Pure military men’s joy” was to view soldiering as a vocation and source of happiness. True heroes enjoyed leading armies because, as generals, they were never fed up, never tired, but addicted to learning the arts of war.164 In the following issue of the Nanyang Military Journal, Tao Junbao, a graduate of the Jiangnan Officers School who worked in the conscription, policing, and staff sections of the Nanyang military administration (responsible for the provinces Jiangsu and Zhejiang), commented with praise on Sakata’s article. Moreover, Tao sought to specify what “joy” of military men actual meant. Directly addressing the reader, he presented two lists, one for officers and one for common soldiers, which asked rhetorically how certain issues connected to soldierly life could not be joyful. How, for instance, could playing the Kriegsspiel or participating in large war games involving two armies

Making Real Men


not be joyful for officers? And, in the case of common soldiers, how could singing songs during marches not be joyful?165 Elsewhere, Tao particularly emphasized the importance of singing and dancing for the martial spirit and courage of military men. “In the past, the lyrics of military music had to carry on [the warrior’s] grandeur and heroism (xiongzhuang), making people beam with joy,” he wrote. But at the same time, Tao criticized that singing Chinese military songs was a lost tradition as only European instruments would be used now. If one wanted to promote military music, China’s national essence had to be preserved within the current music, he demanded.166 Music and songs were only one way to joyfully encourage the martial esteem of military men. Chen Zan argued in an article in the Zhejiang Military Journal that barracks must not be grim places because, if they were, they would impede the army’s strength. Joining the ranks meant leaving one’s old social circles and the barracks became the place where soldiers were “meticulously aggregated into a [new] class and thoroughly disciplined into a unit of able-bodied men (zhuangdingtuan).” But military service, he argued, was only supposed to consist of three fully active years and, in order to keep some sort of connection to their former civilian life and to maintain the morale of the soldiers, elements of joy and distraction should not be left out. “Ways of solacing soldiers” (weijie shibing zhi fangfa) could include “entertainment rooms” (yuleshi), where soldiers played cards and other games, read journals and newspapers, eat snacks, or simply rest. Such rooms would also display orders from the president and portrait pictures of high generals and thus also had an “educational advantage.” Other measures included building little parks or gardens within the barracks, as well as organizing martial arts boxing tournaments, which would not only increase strength, coordination, and courage but also represent “China’s thousands of years-old national essence of martial bravery.”167 Finally, two issues of the Nanyang Military Journal of 1909 included a series of “new jokes” (xin xiaohua), which seemed to have a similar purpose as songs, poems, or the recreational measures suggested by Chen Zan. Distinct military jokes were shared between military men and could thus help to create a distinct New Armies’ military identity, contribute to group cohesiveness, and raise morale and spirit. The explanation to the jokes in the Nanyang Military Journal stated that scholars and generals were not alike and that martial men (wuren) had always forsaken learning in the past. The fact that men (ding) today were expected to be different and could not afford not to be “valiant” (jiujiu) had resulted in many jokes. This explanation probably referred to jokes mocking those who insisted on a strict dichotomy between civilian culture and the military.168 One of the jokes, called Good New Soldiers (Hao xinjun), seemed to suggest that discipline did not necessarily make good fighters:


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Some important guy bragged about his new army (xinjun), saying: “the soldiers I am in charge of sleep and eat at a fixed schedule. Is that good or bad?” Everyone laughed upon hearing this.169

A Spiritual Bond Telling stories and singing songs about military life, bravery, and loyalty enabled military men to bond and collectively assure themselves of their manliness, as songs with titles such as Real Men (Nan’er hange), which was included in a Compilation of Military Songs (Junyuegao) from 1909, demonstrated.170 Common soldiers and officers perceived military service as a shared experience and military reformers and leaders promoted comradeship and esprit de corps, which virtually became a substantial part of the desired martial spirit. Susan Mann emphasizes that, in imperial China, various male bonds on different social levels were important for defining masculine identity and perpetuating a patriarchal, male homosocial society which confined women to the “inner chambers” and excluded them from public life, at least in terms of full political, social, and economic participation.171 Male bonds were defined by a common background or organizational connection, as men from “same trade” (tongye), same educational form (tongxue), or same age group (tongnian) were thought to feel particularly close. Before and after the late Qing military reforms, common soldiers were linked to the notion of tongwu, being part of the same unit that, ideally, was composed of men from the same region or at least province. Moreover, common soldiers were linked by a shared inclination toward the masculine figuration of the “tough guy” in popular culture, which emphasized a strong commitment toward brotherhood, camaraderie, and the preference for friendship between men over the (romantic or sexual) relationship with women. Generally, camaraderie, friendship, and male bonding were ascribed more to martial wu types than to intellectual wen men. Military reformers sought to mold the New Armies into a new homosocial organization in which pride and prestige were not solely dependent on outside views but also on an internal sense of coherence and commonality that went beyond tough guy camaraderie. In particular, they viewed the cohesion of the officer corps (jiangxiaotuan), significant for developing an effective and professional army, as being dependent on the cultivation of spirit.172 The first issue of the Zhejiang Military Journal, which focused on Germany as a role model, particularly dealt with the “spirit” and discipline of the military. Nowadays, the editor Zhu Duan wrote in the opening statement of the journal, there was no difference in “conduct and discipline” (junji fengji) between “Western” and Chinese armies, which were inspired by both ancient Chinese and foreign role models.

Making Real Men


The famous generals of the past absolutely respected martial virtue (shangwude). For governing an army there was no one who did not value and examine all the historical records of killing and war. Like the scholars in robes, they conducted themselves in noble ways.173

In order to create a powerful army, Zhu demanded the merging of all the different “martial ways” (wu zhi dao): the Japanese Yamato spirit (Dahehun), the French “espritdecops” (sic) (tuandui jingshen), and the German “Corpsgeist” (jundui shensui). Both the French and the German terms were given in their original language and in the Chinese translation, and referred to the self-consciousness and community spirit of military circles.174 The idea of the Japanese Yamato spirit (or soul, Yamato-damashii) was also mentioned in other military journal articles.175 It stemmed from the Heian period (794–1185) and was used to signify allegedly essential Japanese cultural values, in contrast to those important from Tang China. From the Edo period onward (1603–1868), politicians, intellectuals, and military people employed the Yamato spirit time and again to endow military-political doctrines with a mythical charging, referring to an essentialist Japanese valor and martial spirit closely linked to Bushido (Way of the Warrior).176 Yuan Shikai and the Beiyang army leaders aimed at creating a corporate Lujun, in which comradeship and esprit de corps became an essential part of the male identity of military men. Although Yuan tried to bind both officers and common soldiers to his own person—by resorting to the specific system of personal obligations common in late imperial China or by inculcating filial loyalty to him as a general and father figure—the Lujun and particularly the Beiyang officer corps consisted of men loyal to their profession, the army as organization and, at least as an ideal, to the nation. As Stephen MacKinnon points out, professional relationships were more important in the officer corps than personalized hierarchies, in which men were only loyal to their direct commanders.177 The idea of military esprit de corps aimed at infusing the New Armies with professional pride independent of any political connections and obligations. The foundation of the concept of esprit de corps was the idea of comradeship. As president of the Republic, Yuan stressed in a speech the importance of comradeship, of helping each other, and of the harmonious affection between comrades and fellow soldiers of one’s unit (tongwu dangbing). “At home,” Yuan explained the value of companions in the army as follows: “we rely on our father and brothers, [but] abroad we rely on our friends.” Yet, what a man found in the army went deeper than normal friendship because comrades in arms were “friends in the most troublesome times” (huan’nan pengyou) and one’s own life depended on this relationship. According to Yuan, this friendship was “not much different from the flesh and blood [connection to the] family (jiazhong gurou).”178 “Furthermore, the


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relationship between a military man and his comrades is like sharing the same body.”179 In another speech, Yuan repeatedly emphasized that soldiers must “join forces” (qixin xieli), evoking the transcendental interpretation of new tactical formation and discipline introduced after 1895, which should make soldiers fight like one man or one body.180 In addition to the tongwu or military comradeship propagated by Yuan Shikai, military journals praised the homosocial bond between military men. An article entitled Soldiers Must Give up Brawling in the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers underlined that young soldiers must not misuse their vigor and fight and quarrel in public. A “remarkable man” (yi ge qi nanzi) restrained himself and did not harm the reputation of the army. Among “brothers in the barracks” (yingshe xiongdi), however, brawling was not a problem, implying their special, amicable relationship.181 The idea of a special friendship or connection between military men was picked up by various military journals, dealing, for instance, with accompanying friends home, with the relationship between officers and the ranks, and with the role of noncommissioned officers for the esprit de corps of the New Armies.182 Du Huaiyong, for instance, discussed this issue in his article The Feelings Between Generals and Soldiers.183 In the past, he argued, generals were “beasts in human attire” (guanshou), who viewed common soldiers as cannon fodder, literally as “oxen and horses.” Ten thousand men had ten thousand hearts, he proclaimed, but the strength of the army (and, thus, the country) depended on the bond between officers and common soldiers. With respect to education and training, the relationship between the upper and lower decks should be like the one between father and son. Regarding exhortation and advice, it should be like the one between teachers and friends, Du demanded. The honor of officers depended on treating the soldiers from the ranks well. And cultivating qualified military men and arousing a martial spirit, in turn, depended on this balanced and fair relationship.184 Only then could the country be “washed clean form the shame of the last decades” because only then were the soldiers more than just “monkeys wearing hats” (muhou er guan), he warned.185 Spirited Away Martial spirit and esprit de corps were essential for cultivating a new officer class and its military masculine identity. In military texts, the bond between military men, particularly officers, was depicted as a part, or pre-stage, of a yet larger connection between military men and the nation. Eventually, military men came to epitomize true patriotism because they were expected to perform the ultimate heroic act of physically sacrificing themselves for the nation. According to Xu Jianyin, author of the New Book on Military

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Science, “German officers exert all their strength for their country, [for which] they give their lives and destroy their bodies (xioaming sunqu).”186 A few years later, in 1906, Huang Shilong, who was a general in a Lujun brigade in Guangdong and later became a member of the Revolutionary Alliance, claimed that the strength of the Prussian and German armies was no coincidence because it was derived from the unity of mind and purpose of the military men. The German emperor/Prussian king, he wrote, embodied this “iron and blood” ideology (tiexue zhuyi), which ultimately demanded from everyone a sacrifice (xisheng) for the “fatherland” (zuguo).187 In a Christian context, sacrifice is linked to the “joy” and “beatitude” of the martyrdom and redemption of Jesus Christ. According to a study by Timothy Brook and his co-authors, this notion was alien to China and, consequently, the idea of dying for one’s home country, as the ultimate patriotic duty, did not exist.188 Patriotism is linked to nationalism, which was a phenomenon or ideology novel to China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when the idea of an imperial universalism, which had been reinvented by the Qing using a strong military imprint, transformed into a particularistic, militant Han nationalism. This particularistic nationalism was still relatively inclusive and multi-ethnical, because the heritage of the Qing imperial state could not simply be washed away. The terms guojia (country, land, state, nation) or simply guo (originally a walled city), now used to signify the nation-state, both existed and were actively used before they increasingly expressed an abstract concept—a specific historically, geographically, culturally, and ethnically constructed community of people—that was evoked through media, rituals, dress, monuments, myths, and other historical narratives. According to these narratives, the Chinese nation was fundamentally different from other, competing peoples and nations, and a multitude of current, socially relevant issues, such as governance, political structure, state and citizenship, science, the military, and even concepts of body and gender were linked to its fate.189 The idea that men serving in the army should be patriotic and sacrifice themselves for their nation-state became a central idea of the higher military education for officers in China. Li Jishen emphasized, in his academy textbook, that the guojia is formed by iron and blood; with iron it must be protected. Military men must give their lives for their country, they must view dying as returning home […].”190 He was also of the opinion that the strong countries in “East and West” had all established a state religion and, therefore, military men could rely on real faith. Indeed, the Japanese military (and civilian) leadership propagated the almost religious faith in the idea of sacrifice pro patria and for the monarchy that originally stemmed from Europe, in particular from the German warrior nobility of the nineteenth century. In Japan, these notions were adapted to reinvent the Samurai “way


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of the warrior” and, later, Shinto, the indigenous Japanese spirituality/religion that became a major reference point of Japanese militarism from the 1920s up to the 1940s.191 According to Ernst Presseisen, through Jacob Meckel’s influence, Japanese officers combined the heritage of their alleged Samurai martial spirit (Bushido) with the alleged ruthlessness and decisiveness of the Prussian officer. This concept of a courageous military man undaunted by death, self-sacrificing for king and “fatherland,” in turn, influenced the selfunderstanding of the Chinese soldiers and, in particular, officers. Emerging ideas of the nation conflated with ideals of masculinity and femininity and perceptions of male and female bodies, which, from the late Qing period on, reformers and various Chinese governments sought to direct and exploit.192 Military reformers linked military masculinity with the nation-state/home country to give a transcendental element to the mission of the army (the self-definition of its purpose, legitimizing its existence): a higher course, worthy of forfeiting one’s life and committing physical selfsacrifice.193 The male body, which was sacred in Confucian thinking and had to be kept from harm so that it could fulfill its filial duties (similar to the female body), was discursively detached from the family and put to the service of the nation. The home, linked to the lineage, became the home country or fatherland, linked to nation and people. The body was rendered “the shield and wall of the nation,” because a true military masculinity was defined by the willingness to sacrifice for the fatherland. This idea of pro patria mori was central to the conception of patriotism, masculinity, and heroism in an age of nationalism and national competition. It was diametrically opposed to gender conceptions centering on piety and sustaining the family or lineage. Chinese military reformers, ultimately, sought nothing less than to turn the Chinese populace into a European-style “heroic society” whose self-perception rested on real or imagined manly martial heroes.194 In an article on Second World War memory in China, Arthur Waldron points out that martial heroism and martyrdom had a meaning throughout Chinese history that was different from that prevailing in the “West” and expressed a different kind of loyalty. According to Waldron, not the particularistic patria, the home country of a community or group, is central in Chinese thinking, but rather a human relationship, such as the one between emperor and subject, or a universalistic moral principle such as the Confucian “benevolence” (ren). The legendary general Yue Fei, who allegedly had the phrase jinzhong baoguo (which Waldron translates as “exhausting loyalty in the dynasty’s service”) tattooed on his back, was the ideal typical embodiment of this different conception of loyalty. In the twelfth century, Yue Fei had successfully fought the Jurchen Jin Dynasty to defend the Southern Song Dynasty. However, he was ordered back by the Song emperor who feared an internal strife in case Yue Fei succeeded against the Jurchens. Being aware of a possible civil war,

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Yue Fei accepted to return to the capital where he was imprisoned and put to death. Established notions such as “loyalty to dynasty/emperor” (zhongjun, zhongguo), “dedication to the country/dynasty” (baoguo, not to be confused with the more neutral term baoguo, protecting the country), and “love for the people” (aimin) appeared in abundance in the military reform discourse.195 And the idea of dying for a universal principle rather than for the patria was still widespread in the 1940s, as Waldron demonstrated by referring to the case of General Zhang Zizhong, the highest-ranking Chinese officer to die in the Second World War. At least until the 1990s, Zhang was depicted more as a Yue Fei type of hero, who sacrificed himself for moral ideals and interpersonal values, than as a patriotic national hero.196 On the other hand, at the beginning of the twentieth century, military journals, drill manuals, and army textbooks increasingly depicted the transcendent guojia as the ultimate source of martial spirit and invoked patriotism (aiguo) to protect the country as the essential duty of military men. In the early twentieth century, the construction of national heroes served the purpose of creating a national Chinese identity: partly as an anti-Manchu, Han nationalist identity but, after 1911, as a Chinese identity regardless of ethnic categories. National or rather “state” heroes such as Yue Fei had been used as a figure and source of collective identity (representing loyalty to state and dynasty) much earlier, during the Ming Dynasty and particularly during the eighteenth century.197 As Waldron indicates, aiguo or patriotism was a neologism coined in Japan that was increasingly used in China at the beginning of the twentieth century and bespoke a new quality regarding nationalism and patria, centering on the nation-people (minzu) and their historic-geographically defined fatherland (zuguo).198 In fact, it is hardly possible to distinguish when the term guo changed meaning and what it stood for exactly at a certain time for certain people. After all, patriotism is a concept bound to historical and linguistic circumstances in Europe and difficult to transfer to the Chinese context, where it can only be interpreted through compound words, specific contexts, and medial dissemination. Guojia (jia meaning family) was increasingly used instead of guo, because of its different meaning and the increasing use of disyllabic words in written texts. In the case of military writings, it appears that there was a concomitance of different concepts of nation-state and meanings of guo and guojia. Military reformers attempted to instill into the new military men the “Western” notion of a quasi-religiously exalted death on the battlefield—a notion that according to Waldron had hitherto not existed in China—either in the name of the dynasty or the nation. In both cases, they increasingly emphasized patriotism.199 However obscure the term guo might be, it is most significant that military reformers supported a concept of masculinity that promoted patriotic physical sacrifice rather than universal Confucian virtues. With the metaphor “real


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men are wrapped in horsehide after death” (dazhangfu mage guoshi), Li Duo emphasized in an article on Four Principles for Instructing Soldiers in the Common Language that real men died on the battlefield.200 Furthermore, he stressed that among the four, socially well-established principles: loyalty (zhong), piety (xiao), righteousness (yi), and courage (yong), loyalty was the essential quality of military men, which no one must neglect. Li referred to the loyalty to the nation-state, which military men had to defend with their “blood and flesh” and whose shame they courageously had to avenge at any cost. Soldiers should be both “loyal to the emperor and patriotic” (zhongjun aiguo).201 Chen Qi repeated that the New Armies had to “avenge the national shame” (xue guochi). He quoted from Confucius and other eminent sources but the emphasis was on patriotism, the awakening of the “national soul” (guohun), and on “race” (zhongzu): “if there is a guo there is a family, if there is a race there is a clan (jiazu). Without avenging national shame, the race cannot thrive.”202 The New Armies were not only supposed to save the dynasty or state but also rescue the nation from being feminized and emasculated. It was the manly duty of the new iconic figuration of the military man to stand up and prevent the carving-up of the country. “Inner emigration,” the withdrawal to a feeling of cultural and moral superiority despite military inferiority, as it had occurred, for instance, during the Qing conquest of the Ming Empire, was presented as impossible and would only lead to total extinction. According to Cheng Fengzhang, an army of “intrepid soldiers” (pixu baiwan) was necessary to protect the land (tudi) and citizens (guomin) and stop foreigners from “killing our people and raping our women.”203 He went on: When I grieve for my fatherland, and pity all living creatures, I look to the iron and blood men (tiexue nan’er) to form a new troop and prepare for battle without any delay.204

The idea of the new military men as national protectors was expressed in the recurring term “shields and walls of the country” (guo zhi gancheng), which stemmed from the Book of Songs (Shijing, the oldest collection of Chinese poetry, dating from the eleventh to seventh centuries BC) and referred to dauntless, noble, military men (jiujiu wufu) who protected their domain. The expression occurred in it its shortened version (gancheng) in the Instruction for Generals section of the Detailed and Illustrated Manual, which emphasized the “soothing effect” of reliable “valiant and martial (yiyi huanhuan) shields and walls.”205 Other examples included articles in journals such as the first issue of the Nanyang Military Journal in 1906, artistic calligraphies in the Military Monthly, photographical volumes published by the Army Ministry in 1911, or Li Jishen’s book on military education that also used the formulation.206

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Military reformers sought to establish and underline the fundamental link between (centrally commanded) military (jun), state (guo), and people (min), culminating in the idea of the citizen-soldiers, which is the subject of Chapters 5 and 6 of this book. The idea was that the state and people provided for the military, which in turn protected and kept harm from them.207 A calligraphy included in Zhu Kegeng’s 1911 photographical volume illustrated this concept: The fruits of the people’s labor are used to cultivate soldiers. The military’s strength is used to protect the people. The people cannot do without soldiers. Soldiers cannot do without the people. The mutual dependence, the mutual respect, and the familial relationship between the two make the state system [or “body politic,” guoti] firmer, extend state power (guoquan), and raise the martial spirit of military men.208

The inculcation of respect and esteem for the people was part of the basic training of common soldiers and many articles in military journals addressed the issue. Drill books and journals often explained that any solider was part of a family and thus defending China was equal to defending one’s own home and family.209 For instance, Yang Yaonan argued that “places where people live are not battlegrounds. Men know this.”210 The presence of the term patriotism (aiguo) and the frequent appeal to defend the patria, however, were omnipresent in military writings after the turn of the century, whether they were anti- or pro-Qing. Frequently, patriotism was mentioned in the same breath as “loyalty to the emperor” (aiguo zhongjun), particularly in official journals such as the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers and the Nanyang Military Journal.211 Other articles sought to explain the idea in more depth, appealing to the “patriotic heart” (aiguoxin) of soldiers.212 “Nowadays,” an article in the Zhejiang Military Journal on The Patriotic Heart of Military Men of 1916 proclaimed, “everyone can say the two characters ai and guo,” and explained that the meaning of being patriotic includes love for the land (aituxin), love for the language (aiyanyuxin) and love for customs and institutions (ai fengsu zhiduxin). Because of these shared commonalities and one-heartedness (tongxin), it was the responsibility of military men to protect the people (renmin, minzu). Personal loyalties and returning favors (bao de bao en) were “brotherly manly” (nan yu han), but it was also a selfish kindness of an individual person and nothing like the collectively oriented righteousness (gongyi) of the nation-state. Military men should not protect one single person (such as the emperor) but the nation-state. The author, Zhong Zisheng, argued that it was no longer the age of independent individual heroes (yingxiong geju zhi shidai) but the age of competing nations (minzu jingzheng zhi shidai): people were proud of their military. Soldiers drew their strength


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from patriotism, which raised their “valiant spirit” (wuyong zhi qipo), and urged them to train their bodies (duanlian shenti), refine their skills, sharpen their swords, and to be patient and perseverant.213 Another article, entitled Legends of Military Patriotism and published a few years earlier in the Beiyang Military Journal, tried to explain patriotism by narrating the tales of role model patriots. Like many other military writings, it referred to the Prussian-French War of 1870. But instead of praising Prussian military skills and successes, the article reported on a patriotic French town and its garrison resisting its enemy against all odds.214 Patriotism and guojia, other articles also argued, should be the driving forces for the army and the foundation of military education, particularly for the cultivation of officers.215 One article in the Tokyo-based Wuxue stated that the purpose of military education was both cultivating complete soldiers and complete citizens.216 Instilling patriotism and linking military men to the nation and vice versa was a project started in 1904 with the establishment of the Lujun and the burgeoning discussion about universal military conscription and the nurturing of citizensoldiers. Jiang Baili (also known as Jiang Fangzhen), director of the Baoding Military Academy in 1912 and 1913 and one of the initiators of the citizensoldiers debate, emphasized patriotism as well as the unity of the nationstate’s citizens and the military when lecturing to the academy’s cadets. He became famous for attempting to commit suicide because of an argument over funds with the Army Ministry, which, if anything, demonstrated to his men the idea of physical sacrifice for the army corps and, ultimately, the nation.217 Similarly, Yuan Shikai who, as president of the Republic, appealed to patriotism and martial spirit to fill the legitimacy void left after the removal of the imperial dynasty, promoted the idea of a patriotic nation able to defend itself—led by military men as patriotic role model citizens. Yuan was a prolific promoter of patriotic military manliness and a martial spirit directed toward the defense of the new republic against internal and external enemies. He pledged to “carry on the republican spirit” and “comply with the wish of the people to strengthen the nation’s security.”218 Shortly after becoming president, he wrote a Soldier’s Song, which appealed to the soldier’s patriotism and the unity of soldiers and civilians: “soldiers and citizens are as one in the nation’s great family.” The song emphasized the link between patriotism, nation, esprit de corps, manhood, and physical sacrifice, announcing that “he who bears arms for his country is a patriot” and “to rob or assail one’s own is against human nature and manhood.” Moreover, with the song, Yuan sought to increase the prestige of military men, who were “honorable, obedient, frugal and brave” heroes dutifully fighting and dying for their home and the reputation of their regiment.219 Intellectuals and politicians increasingly emphasized the idea of defending the nation as the patriotic duty of everyone, helping the New Armies and the

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newly established military schools to achieve great popularity. The RussoJapanese War, waged in Northeast China, decisively triggered this new patriotism and the idea of “defending the nation” in journals and newspapers, particularly among Chinese elites.220 Military journals not only strongly promoted patriotism but also attributed prestige deriving from their role as patriotic vanguard and example to military men and the army. The Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers, for instance, reminded its readers to always keep in mind the reputation of the entire army and act accordingly.221 A series in the form of question-and-answer, published over several issues, examined the standing of the army and military men in Japanese society: “men, women, old, and young all know the duty of soldiers. All the parents and wives of soldiers do not dare to forget the duty of all over their personal relationship. […] In Japan, the common people all have a national consciousness (guojia sixiang).”222 The journal Wuxue published a series of articles titled Today Soldiers Should be Valued, which emphasized the prestige armies enjoyed in foreign countries, concluding that power and wealth for country and people were not possible without appreciating military men.223 A translated Japanese article in the Nanyang Military Journal on The Responsibility of Young Officers was most explicit in emphasizing the responsibility of young officers to observe their reputation and honor, which was based on patriotism and protecting the nation. The guojia should become a place like Mount Taishan: the most sublime and grave thing. According to the article, every soldier had to contribute to this goal but it was false to call this “utmost loyalty” (jinzhong) and “dedication to the dynasty” (baoguo). Like Mount Taishan, which consisted of large amounts of soil (and like a palace made of a large amount of wood), the military rested on its smallest element, the company or regiment (zhongdui). Analog to the regiment was the family, the smallest element of the nation, which was the congregation of brothers, sisters, and parents. Patriotism or “love for the country” was nothing else than the “love for the family” and not possible without the latter. Defending the patria, the article argued, began with forming and strengthening the prestige of the corps, which was the foundation of a respected army. The corps should be understood in terms of familial bonds and consequently be infused with patriotic sentiments. The duty of defending the country-family (or nation) would eventually evoke the respect of the people.224 Yuan Shikai pointedly referred to the aggregation of patriotism, loyalty to the ruler, self-sacrifice, military culture, and military men/New Armies, particularly after becoming president. In a speech, he compared the state to a body of which soldiers were the hands and feet, while the state leader was the head, literally the head of state. Hands and feet protected the body, like soldiers protecting the state. In doing so, both the limbs and soldiers focused on protecting the head, which was not only the most important part


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and control center but also the symbolical and virtual essence of the whole physical or political body. Protecting the head was, pars pro toto, the same as protecting the nation, which also included every soldier.225 Yuan emphasized personal loyalty and Confucian values rather than patriotism, and praised Yue Fei as a martial role model hero famous for his loyalty to the ruling dynasty. In another speech, he depicted the failure of military men to protect the guojia as lack of filialness and loyalty.226 Nevertheless, he repeatedly referred to the idea of physical sacrifice in the name of the country: “Military men give their lives for the country (yi shen xuguo). […] military men should never be part of a faction and only serve the nation-state.”227 Yuan repeatedly used the phrase xuguo, which literally means to promise himself/his body (shen) to the country. One of his presidential orders demanded: “Military men should be patriots. The Republic is established with iron and blood and must be protected with iron and blood. Military men give their lives and view death as returning home (shi si ru gui).”228 Yuan explicitly connected the idea of sacrifice to the concept of military masculinity by invoking established martial figurations such as the “tough guys” (haohanzi) and “real men” (dazhangfu). Referring to the historiographic classic Book of the Later Han from the fifth century, he announced that “a real man joins the army to fight. He should die on the battlefield [and] return to his funeral wrapped in horsehide. Under no circumstances must he die at home in the arms of his wife. A real man does not fear death! Not only does he not fear death but dying on the battlefield is the greatest glory of a real man.”229 The concept that real men died heroically in battle certainly existed previously in China, but it was rediscovered and conflated with patriotism and sacrificing pro patria in the early twentieth century. In 1899, Liang Qichao published two essay articles titled Qizhansi and What constitutes the Chinese National Soul?, in the periodical Qingyibao, which he edited in his Japanese exile. The essays, written after Liang had fled to Japan after the failed Hundred Days Reform, praised the martial spirit of the Japanese culture (literally national customs, guosu) and lack of the same in the text-oriented Chinese culture. The title of the first essay, Qizhansi, can be translated as “pray to die in battle” or “sacrificial death in battle,” as the term qi originally referred to ritual prayer or sacrifice, in the sense of an offering to heaven. In Japan, he emphasized, soldiers reported for duty without delay when their time was due and were proudly lauded by friends and kin, who waved red and white flags. Songs praised those joining the army, while in China songs only lamented the hardships of soldiering. Moreover, even Chinese scholars were rarely appreciated with the same enthusiasm as Japanese soldiers and only received lukewarm approval from their emperor, Liang lamented. No fervent eulogy and prayers were sung. Japanese newspapers, on the other hand, were full of poems when soldiers went to war, all congratulating them that they

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did not have to live anymore, meaning that they would die a glorious and worthwhile death. This was what the term qizhansi meant, he concluded.230 Liang’s second essay further illuminated the idea by reflecting on the national souls of Japan (Ribenhun) and China (Zhongguohun). The Japanese were essentially affected by the Bushido, which was the reason for their national renewal. Martial spirit (shangwu zhi feng), Liang argued, came from patriotism and self-respect (zi’aixin) of the people. What China needed was a national soul similar to Japan’s, constituted by a “soldierly soul” (binghun). If the soldiers had a soul (i.e., were patriotic, had self-respected, and viewed protecting nation and people as their responsibility), then China would have a soul. Liang concluded that martial spirit was thus the very “tool” to “turn the Chinese state into a people’s state [i.e., a nation, remin zhi guojia].”231 In the final years of the Qing, qizhansi and sacrifice (xisheng) or the “Japanese national soul” and Bushido were a frequent and emotional topic in the military reforms discourse.232 Li Duo, for instance, opened his treatise on Qizhansi with a rallying cry: Die! Die in battle! Sacrifice in battle! (si! zhansi! qizhansi!). Everyone loves life and loathes death but I say Sacrifice in battle. May I ask the military men of our country: who is willing to sacrifice his life (xisheng shengming) and give his body to save the country (yishen jiuguo)?233

After explaining further details about the idea of qizhansi, including wives cheering for their soldier husbands, he vividly described how “great chaps (dahao nan’er) […] resolutely throw their bodies (qu) into the ashes and their blood and fat splashes (gaoxue) on smoke and dirt.”234 The “great military men,” absolutely “firm, heroic, and strong,” used their “patriotic thoughts and their martial spirit to cultivate a deep sincerity to the nation against enemies and avenge the great shame.”235 Li’s text, more like a war cry, if anything, employed the full vocabulary that referred to patriotic military men—including the expression “real men die wrapped in horsehide” and terms such as hero (yingxiong) and fatherland (zuguo)—and concluded that the idea of qizhansi had to be energetically pursued by military men to make the country “became one of the world’s strong countries.”236 The idea of qizhansi was also picked up in non-army or military periodicals. A poem, written by Shaocha in the journal Jingye Xunbao, linked masculinity and sacrifice in a way that was similar to the examples cited above: “dying fast is truly living. Among [all the] sick men, I [i.e., China] count as the most famous. The sword is the only good medicine.” The sick man of China, this effeminate and weak man who lacked martial vigor, would be cured and regain his manhood by fighting undaunted by death. “When he dies, he becomes a man. When a man falls to the ground, his memory ascends


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to heaven.” Wives and families would be taken care of, Shaocha emphasized, as those would be cherished “who give their bodies like taking off a shoe.” The nation was the ultimate reason for this sacrifice: if one compatriot sacrifices on the battlefield, a thousand others will find shelter.” The following verses of the poem, finally, referred to father and mother as well as the ruler and generals, who were the “arms and fingers” of the nation. He concluded that qizhansi would wash China clean from its shame.237 In 1921, about twenty years after Liang Qichao published his essay on “sacrificial death in battle,” an article by Han Zhou in the Shanghai-based newspaper Republican Daily (Minguo Ribao) asked: “does qizhansi still need an explanation?” During the final years of the Qing, many praised the patriotism of the Japanese and how they bid farewell to their family members and friends and went to serve as soldiers, all holding banners saying “Joy of Joining the Army” or “Sacrificial Death in Battle,” and wishing them to come back to their funeral wrapped in horsehide. Even wives sending their husbands were like that. Therefore, the Japanese patriotism and martial spirit really included everyone and was at the forefront in the world.238

A conversation with a friend, however, the author Han reported, revealed to him that Japanese women indeed hoped that their men would not return and all the cheering was all faked.239 Although he had but one informant, Han admitted, the whole idea of qizhansi was a real product of militarism. If there was still anyone praising these Japanese slogans and notions in schools or elsewhere, he should see the crippled bodies of Japanese men, after which, becoming a soldier was certainly no longer an option.240 Han’s report was published around five years after Yuan Shikai’s death but it was literally from another time, in which the Japanese were regarded as treacherous enemies and soldiers were not viewed as patriotic heroes but as part of a militaristic system called Warlordism.

Conclusion: Professional Patriots In his Exhortation to Study, Zhang Zhidong stressed that educating loyal, expert military officers was more important than drilling common soldiers. Although his polemic stemmed from the post-1895 military crisis and associated attempts at reform, his ideas about grooming officers for an exclusive career as tactical specialists, war-making practitioners, and rationally acting military leaders exemplify the agenda of the New Armies, particularly after the turn of the century. The new military man or junren combined theoretical,

Making Real Men


standardized “scientific” knowledge, hands-on technical skills, and the meticulously trained ability and understanding to apply tactical doctrines. Most importantly, the junren was enmeshed in a system of new institutions such as military academies, bureaucratic departments, and strictly hierarchical command structures, which embodied streamlined effectiveness, specialization and professionalism, standardization, and scientification. The new-type professional officers replaced both the customary military official and the hereditary Banner warrior, although not without drawing on certain elements associated with these figurations, such as rationality or the emphasis on martial skill. Generally speaking, professionalism is a mental attitude expressed and reinforced through appropriate conduct that is performed repeatedly and thus influences the self-perception and conceptualization of military men as men. In late Qing and early Republican China, the creation of a professional military identity depended on the public staging of professionalism and military men through the promotion of military science, widely reported military exercises, as well as photographs and other visual images, which were often published in military journals. Furthermore, professionalism strongly depends on the autonomy of an occupational group with respect to its internal organization, recruitment, and authority over its tricks of the trade. An important example for more independence of the army in China was military jurisdiction, addressed in Chapter 2, which contested the equation of military personnel with civilian officials. Occupational pride and societal acknowledgment are essential for forming a distinct professional identity, which is necessary to attract the most qualified people, claim resources and, in this case, link the military to a higher mission: the defense of state and nation. In military journal articles, manuals, and other military publications, military reformers depicted defending the nation and, ultimately, sacrificing one’s physical body and life as the patriotic duty of every military man. The quality of being ready to sacrifice made them a symbol, or embodiment, of patriotism. At first glance, fervent patriotism was a highly emotional quality and contradictory to the ideas of rationality and technocracy, which were promoted as the foundation of a new professional military. However, soldiers and particularly officers ideally were both rational experts and spirited patriots. What happened to men who actually yielded to their martial spirit and sacrificed their life, body, or health? As noted in Chapter 2, the “somatic integrity” or wholeness of the physical body was very important in Chinese cosmology. The battlefield was probably one of the most dangerous places to lose one’s head, placing military service among the rather unattractive occupations, at least from the perspective of folklore. According to the Jade Register (Yuli), a nineteenth century book on the mythological Chinese hell, purgatory overseers could reverse the dismemberment of a soldier’s body,


Chapter 4

but only if the damage was not the soldier’s own fault and only if he had not harmed any innocent people.241 Such cosmological considerations might have only played an indirect role with regard to the actual treatment of war veterans but, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, army statutes included regulations for compensating those who suffered injuries in battle. Wounds were divided into three categories and several subcategories, according to which officers or common soldiers received compensation money. Moreover, families received financial compensation (according to rank) if a man died in battle.242 Still, disbanding armies and discharging soldiers was a serious problem, because it was very difficult for veterans to reintegrate into civilian society after many years of military service and they often had no other options than being military men their whole life. Qing Bannermen, furthermore, were forbidden to do business and depended on a fixed and thus increasingly inadequate pension. In the early twentieth century, the Army Ministry introduced a much more detailed and sophisticated compensation system for soldiers who had suffered physical damage or died in action. It designed a consistent preferential treatment system for disbanded and disabled (ex-)servicemen and their family members, which was part of the larger scheme to improve the general condition and attractiveness of military service, including a clearly defined, limited period of service, a standardized retirement procedure (tuiwu), better pay conditions and, at least to a certain degree, legal protection.243 Similar to the meticulous regulations concerning hygiene and medical care, the Regulation on the Rewards for Invalids or Bereaved Family Members (Xuyin enshang zhangcheng), released in 1910, considered the physical bodies of the soldiers as the most precious resource of the army.244 According to the regulation, taking care of wounded and invalid soldiers or the families of the dead was the responsibility of the army and a matter of both pity and praise for those who were maimed or died in battle. It stated: The historical records clearly show that the dynasty has taken military accomplishments to determine greatness and merit. All those who are united by their hatred for the enemy and those who sleep on their shields and spears to maintain combat readiness deserve sympathy for dying in battle, for being slain and meeting their death in the course of duty, or becoming sick due to overexertion. Thus, the maimed and disabled must be relieved by rewards, according to their rank.245

According to the regulation, compensations, along with rewards for excellent performance during battle, would cause unanimity (zhongzhi chengcheng) and unity (tongxin yide) among soldiers and strengthen troop morale (junxin). It argued that, because of the fierceness of present-day land warfare technology, no country in the world could afford to be ungenerous

Making Real Men


or ungrateful to its soldiers and their families. Despite the Hague peace conventions, the regulation stated, was there a looming dark threat of an “international war” (guoji zhanzheng), implying that the country not only needed men willing to sacrifice but also that government and army had to take care of those who actually did. Compensating and rewarding those maimed or slain in battle (and, in fact, all veterans), motivated others to risk their lives and indeed sacrifice themselves for the nation. Combining “practices in East and West” with arrangements existing for the Eight Banners and the Green Standard Army, the regulation listed in great detail the different categories, levels, and modes of compensation for being killed or wounded in battle, for sacrificing one’s life during service, for suffering fatal injuries, and for dying of an illness caused by excessive stress. Possible compensation included hereditary offices or titles, single payment rewards, a lifelong pension, or compensation for the bereaved. Compensation depended on the degree of soldier’s invalidity, the circumstances of injury or death, or the rank of the soldier or officer. Listed battlefield injuries, which were classified into several types, included the complete loss of the ability to see, the loss of both hands or feet, the partial damage of either both hands or both feet to a degree that made them entirely useless, the loss of one hand or one foot (causing the victim to require help from another person to lift objects or to move), and other “similar injuries.” Invalids unable to fight or fulfill other secondary tasks in the army were usually sent home. In the case of death, parents or children were eligible for compensation either in the form of a one-time payment or a perpetual stipend, depending on the time of service of the men or his rank. If he had a—not further specified—criminal record, the pension was cancelled, his widow had to marry again and the children were adopted, if they were under eighteen years old.246 Special housing for disabled veterans, such as institutions that existed in Europe and the United States, was not provided. In Germany and other countries participating in the First World War, governments only started providing systematically and sustainably for disabled and invalid veterans from 1914 onward.247 In China, the New Armies were not involved in any major war and did not produce a large number of veterans or invalids. This only became a problem after 1916, but, due to the long period of war, it seems that only from 1949 onward was there a systematic acknowledgment of and provision for veterans. According to Neil Diamant, there is critical difference between paying lip service to a however imagined and represented nation or patria and the actual actions and practices of commitment, and he even questions the mere claim of willingness to commit and act accordingly. Not arbitrary, highly emotional pledges and sentiments express patriotism but sustained behavior that actually accepts self-sacrifice or at least truly appreciates those who sacrifice their physical bodies for the nation. Based on his unique study on the very


Chapter 4

poor societal standing of veterans in the People’s Republic of China since 1949, he argues that twentieth century Chinese society has never been really militarized, in the sense of a deep-seated identification with China as a nation linked to a positive perception of the nation’s military and its truly patriotic practice of sacrifice pro patria. Despite multiple efforts and campaigns by various regimes and governments to promote military culture since the late Qing, most segments of the population considered armies and military men as the forces of a political faction and viewed military culture as part of a political ideology, independent of the more profound and transcending patriotism and nationalism.248 To be sure, it is hard to judge whether the proclaimed (or at least demanded) willingness to sacrifice actually translated into actual physical sacrifice. There is evidence that many military men fighting in the Nationalist army or against it actually considered patriotism and sacrificing pro patria as their raison d’etre. In any case, the notion of sacrifice was an important component to govern the motivation and conduct of military men, strongly shaping their military masculine identity. As Diamant himself points out, patriotism does not exist per se but is something that can be taught and learned. According to him, the period of Yuan Shikai’s rule offered a rare but wasted chance to inculcate patriotism into both Chinese military men and ordinary citizens and truly militarize society without any ideological (e.g., Guomindang or Communist) deformation. He argues that the Chinese failed to adequately and comprehensively define or translate citizenship and failed to link it to military service in the early twentieth century. While it does not resolve the debate on the nature of Chinese patriotism (which actually indicates an obsolete and conservative focus on the historiography of the nation-state249), the following chapters of this book show that there actually was lively debate as well as reform measures to create citizen-soldiers and introduce universal military service during the late Qing and early Republican military reforms.

notes 1. GX, chapter 8: Yinzhi xiangzhan, 55. 2. Kleine Felddienst- und Manoever-Ordnung 1908, 1–2. 3. In his study on the French Army 1800–1808, Michael Hughes identified five sources of motivation for officers: honor, patriotism, a martial and virile masculinity, devotion to Napoleon, and coercion. Hughes 2012, 1–15. In this study, I argue that honor, patriotism, a martial spirit, professionalism, and other elements became part of the conceptualization of military masculinity. 4. Hevia 2012a, 34. James Hevia, drawing on Timothy Mitchell’s concept of “rule of experts,” refers to the British army in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, particularly in a colonial context. See also Mitchell 2002.

Making Real Men


5. Zhang and Liu [1901] 1961, 47–48. 6. Ibid., 57. 7. Ibid., 47–8. 8. Xu 1997, 60–70. 9. For the complex rules and conditions of appointment for both Banner troops and Green Standard Army, see Wade 1851, 391–97. 10. Zi [1896] 1975; Miyazaki 1976, 102–06; Dai 2006. 11. Gilbert 2009. See also Elman 2000, 222–23; Waley-Cohen 2006, 4. 12. Kuhn 1995, 322. 13. See Fung 1980, 62–5; Hatano 1968, 373–75. 14. In 1910, for instance, the Army Ministry introduced a Performance Evaluation Form (kaojibiao) to record the individual accomplishments of officers, making it an essential tool for appointments, promotions, and transfers. This record referred exclusively to achievements and performance during service in the army. See XT, chapter 27, 29. 15. Lo 1997, 5–6. 16. See also Schulte 2008b, 12 and Strauss 2003, 834–38. 17. On late Qing military logistics see Gao 2002. 18. O’Brien 1979, 164; Fung 1980, 62–4; Lary 1985, 49–50. 19. NBZ 1907, 8: Ben gongsuo xiangqing kaiban wubei xuetang, 6. 20. The missions were part of a commission established by the Qing government to investigate the introduction of a constitution. The members of this Government Reform Commission recommended establishing a constitutional monarchy in China. But, more importantly and less controversially debated, they initiated the seminal restructuring of the bureaucracy. Subsequently, the Qing pressed ahead with the creation of ministries based on foreign models. These ministries possessed full authority in their field and were at the top of a strictly hierarchical structure running from the center all the way down to the regions. They were to replace established central institutions, such as the Six Boards (or Six Ministries), which customarily had to compete with each other and the provincial bureaucracies. The ministries, moreover, were to be staffed with “talented” specialists instead of “virtuous” generalists, who often were in the service of more than one of the Six Boards. They were also expected to have a clear internal hierarchy. Instead of two senior officials, only one minister or departmental director headed one of the new foreign-style ministries and a minister could only occupy this one, single position. See Horowitz 2003. 21. NBZ 1907, 7: Zou junzheng zhongyao qing ze yao qufa geguo zhiduzhe, 4–5. Other countries, such as Russia, were also called xiongguo in other texts. See, for instance, NBZ 1908, 15: Junren jingshen jiaoyu jiangyi, 1. 22. NBZ 1907, 8: Zou junzheng zhongyao qing ze yao qufa geguo zhiduzhe, 1–3, 5. 23. Dupuy 1977. 24. See Hull 2005, 111–17. Fundamental accounts of the General Staff include Görlitz [1950] 1953; Craig 1955; and Ritter [1954–1968] 1988. On the General Staff as a model for other countries, see Wilson 2008, 33–34; Ralston 1990, 169–73. 25. NBZ 1907, 8: Zou junzheng zhongyao qing ze yao qufa geguo zhiduzhe, 6. 26. Wilson 2008, 37–8.


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27. Barnett 1967, 16–19. 28. Funck 2002a. Generally, on the German officer corps between 1860 and 1914 see Kitchen 1968; Ostertag 1990; Geyer 1990; Messerschmidt 1995. 29. For a cross-cultural comparison of iconic warrior figures in Europe and East Asia see the contributions in Deist 2003. 30. For the concepts of martial masculinity in Japan during that time, see Mason 2011. 31. Wilson 2008, 38. 32. Bald 1977, 16–33. 33. A variation of this saying is used in ZBZ 1916, 2: Jin ri zhi zhi bing zhe yi yan, 34. See also NBZ 1907, 6–8: Bingzu jiaoyu lüeshuo. 34. Hilgers 2000. See also Hilgers 2008. 35. Poundstone 1993, 38. 36. Barnett 1967, 29. See also DeLanda 1991, 87–96. 37. Zhang [1899] 1998, 9757–761. This passage is discussed and partly translated in Ayers 1971, 166. In the eighteenth century, the term zhantu referred to battle paintings. 38. Luo 1999, 18, 41, 97, 103, 107. See also Junzichu zou zhou ni lujun canmou zhangchengzhe (1909) and Junzichu zou junguan xueyuan xu xuan banfapian (1909) in XT, chapter 37, 37–9. 39. NBZ 1909, 41: Ben gongsuo xiang qing gouban xinshi bingqi fenfa ge biaoying lianxiwen, 4–5. 40. Li [n.y.]. The textbook contains no more than twenty folio pages and presents very few details on the procedure of the game. The first book by Georg Heinrich Rudolf von Reiswitz on the Kriegsspiel (1824) had sixty pages of rules and guidelines only. See Hilgers 2000, 59. 41. Li [n.y.], 2. See also WX 1908, 3: Shuo jiangcai, 1. Besides the Kriegsspiel, military reformers and New Armies leaders attached great importance to surveying, mapping, and cartography (cehui or celiang). The Detailed and Illustrated Manual, for instance, included a substantial chapter on military maps (cehui tushuo). Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 991–1022. A central Military Survey and Mapping Academy (Cehui xuetang) was officially set up in February 1906, and numerous articles in a variety of military journals discussed the advantages of cartography and reprinted regulations concerning surveying and the gathering of military intelligence. See for instance, NBZ 1906, 1: Celiang zhi xueshu, 1–6; Luo 1999, 114–15. See also Elliott 2002, 186. Moreover, after 1904, the New Armies and the Army Ministry produced a wide range of other visual material, such as sketches for military school buildings and military prisons, or tables documenting shooting test results of individual soldiers or of tactical formations. See, for instance, Lujun diyi zhongxuetang jiangtang zheng ce xuesheng zhushi zheng ce shitu 1905–1908 and Lujun biaotu [n.y.]. The latter also contains a number of strategic maps. 42. This was true to what Benjamin Elman calls the “Chinese-origins approach to Western learning” used to create acceptance for the sciences in China. Elman 2014, 27. 43. NBZ 1906, 4: Bingqi, 21–2.

Making Real Men


44. NBZ 1908, 18: Bingqi yaolan, 19–23. 45. Moscovitz 45–7. See also Chen 1997. 46. The interest and importance attached to practical military field exercises is reflected in many contemporary military publications, which discussed field tactics and analyzed the experience from such exercises, including the large-scale war games. See for instance Ying 2005. 47. Powell 1955, 204. 48. NBZ 1907, 7: Zou junzheng zhongyao qing ze yao qufa geguo zhiduzhe, 6. 49. Feng 1947, 88. 50. See in NBZ 1909, 29: Yuebing dachen Yin Duan huizou xiaoyue Jiang E liang jun huicao qingxingzhe, 7–31. See also NBZ 1909,7: Canmouchu zongbanxiang Zhang duxian qingshi qiucao banfawen, 9–12 and Datongbao 1907 (20): Yinchang yuecao, 29. 51. NBZ 1907, 12 and 13. See also Rhoads 2000, 104. 52. Fung 1980, 216; Rhoads 2000, 175; Michael 1946, 86. 53. Schulte 1983. 54. Li 2004b, 47–8. 55. North China Herald 1905, July 14, 84. See also Cameron 1974, 90. 56. NBZ 1906, 3: Lianbingchu xinding pai wang geguo guancao renyuan jianming guize, 13–14. For reports on German military exercises, see NBZ 1908, 24 (the section diaochalu included the translation of a report by a Japanese officer who attended a maneuver in Germany); NBZ 1909, 32: Yuding dacao, 14; NBZ 1909, 24 (see the section diaochalu for the translation of a report on the use of bicycles during a military exercise in Germany). 57. NBZ 1907, 7: Zou junzheng zhongyao qing ze yao qufa geguo zhiduzhe, 6. 58. Fung 1980, 83. 59. The other one was commanded by Wang Yinkai. See also Wang 1995, 79; Rhoads 2000, 103. 60. Zhang 1998, 76–7, 81–2. Zhang Huateng details the course of events during both the 1905 and 1906 war games and lists exact numbers of people and horses involved. Zhang Cheng notes that both the Japanese and German instructors of the Beiyang Army observed the Zhangde war games. See Zhang 2009, 61. 61. NBZ 1908, 23, 24, 27; Fung 1980, 84, 155; Powell 1955, 205–09. 62. NBZ 1906, 3: Geguo guancao renyuan. The Nanyang Military Journal published various reports on the 1906 maneuver (NBZ 1906, 3; NBZ 1906, 4). The more detailed reports usually included an analysis of discipline, communication, movement, accommodation, supply, lodging, equipment, treatment of horses, weapons, and uniforms. 63. Zhang 1998, 80. 64. For instance Powell 1955, 207; Fung 1980, 109. 65. See Sheridan 1966. 66. Feng 1947, 88–95. 67. Ibid., 89. 68. Ibid., 91. 69. XBB 1905, 9: Xingjun dacao xuzhi, 1.


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70. Ibid. 71. Ibid., 1–3. Similarly: NBZ 1906, 3: Yuebing dachen pingpan chang xunci, 28–30. 72. Huazi huibao 1906 (8, 8): Xinzhi qiucao xingjun zhengmi. See also Zhang 1998, 82. 73. Lujun huicao ge xiang tiaogui qingdan, in Lai 1988, 577–78. In 1905, the local population was successfully reassured that soldiers would behave well and it seems that subsequent military exercises were rather welcomed. See Fung 1980, 109–10. 74. Lianbingchu 1906, 5 zhang. 75. Shibao 1906, October 27: Dacao zhong zhi Zhangdecheng. 76. Yuebing dachen Yuan Tie zou chen xiaoyue xiangxi qingxingzhe, reprinted in NBZ 1906, 4 (zouyi), 6. 77. Ibid., Lianbing dachen Yuan Shikai deng wei chen xiaoyue lujun huicao qingxing shi zouzhe, in Lai 1988, 566. 78. Lai 1988, 566; NBZ 1906, 4 (zouyi), 6. 79. Powell 1955, 214. 80. Zhang 1998, 91–3. 81. Shenbao 1905, November 4: E de zanyang quizao, 3. 82. NBZ 1907, 14: Nanbei dayanxi zhi piping, 1. On the role of the foreignlanguage press in Qing and Republican China in general, see also Wagner 2012. 83. NBZ 1906, 4: Yuebing dachen Yuan Tie zou chen xiaoyue xiangxi qingxingzhe, 1–2. 84. Upton 1878, 20–21. Upton’s book on the armies of Japan, India, Persia, China, Russia, Austria, Germany, France, and Britain was translated into Chinese by Young John Allen. The translation did not include the report on the Chinese army, at least not in the first print from 1896 (it was reprinted at least once in 1902). See Oupodeng 1896. 85. ZBZ 1916, 22: Lujun huicao gaiqi zhi yuanyin, 3–4. See also ZBZ 1916, 22: Jundui you mei nian huicao yi ci zhi shuo, 3. 86. See, however, Lujun daxue 1913, which is the record of a smaller military exercise in 1913 of Beiyang Army contingents. 87. On the development of the press and its impact on societal transformation in late Qing China see Britton [1936] 1966; Lee 1985; Judge 1996; MacKinnon 1997; Vittinghoff 2002; Mittler 2004. 88. See XBB 1905, 2: Quan du Xunbingbaoshuo. It is unknown to me when it ceased to exist and only issues from 1905 were available for this research. Note that, in almost all the journals examined for this study, individual articles or rubrics start again with the page number one. Another journal, the Junhua, published in 1911, was discovered too late to be included in this study. Moreover, only a few copies of the Junhua seem to have survived the passage of time. 89. See NBZ 1906, 1: Yuanqi, 7, 9. Two Japanese editors wrote notes congratulating the journal on its publication but it is not sure whether they were actually part of the editorial staff of the Nanyang Military Journal. See NBZ 1906, 1: Zhu bingshi zazhi zhi faxing.

Making Real Men


90. See BBZ 1910, 1: Liao Yuchun, Beiyang bingshi zazhi fakan zhuci; BBZ 1910, 1: Beiyang bingshi zazhi fakanci; BBZ 1910, 1: Jiaolianchu xiang duxian chuanban bingshi zhazhiwen. 91. Chen indicated that he wrote the foreword for the journal in the barracks of the 27. German Infantry Brigade. JJ 1908, 1: Chen Zongda, Fakanci. Apparently, he was a cadet at the Berlin School of Artillery, together with six other Chinese graduates from the Jiangnan Army School. See Harnisch 1999, 90. The length of publication is unknown and only two issues were available. On the Commercial Press, which became famous for publishing textbooks as well as the journal Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi) see the references on the printed press above. 92. WX 1908, 1: Liu Jiyan, Wuxue fakan zhi yijianshu. The Wuxue was first published in 1908 but it is unknown when it ceased publication. See also WX 1908, 1: Li Shirui, Zhu Wuxue chenglishu; WX 1908, 1: Li Jiaju, Zhu wuxue fakanxu. Li Jiaju was the Chinese ambassador to Japan. 93. LX 1914, 6: Zhang Feng, Zhi junshi yuebao she zhuci. The exact publication dates of the journal are unknown and only copies dating from 1912 to 1914 are still available. Zhang Feng was also co-founder of at least one other society dedicated to exploring military science, which was called Junshi yanjiushe and which was a secret group within the Revolutionary Alliance. 94. Military journals included reports about the training of common soldiers but overall addressed a more educated audience and the general focus was on the cultivation of a new military elite. Still, along with manuals, officers frequently read military journal articles to the less educated rank and file. For a series of texts dealing with the basic training of new recruits, see for instance the serial article Xibing jiaoyu cao’an in NBZ 1909, issues 36, 37, 39, and 41. 95. BBZ 1910, 1: Jiaolianchu xian niding kaiban bingshi zazhi zhangcheng bing qing bodian jingfeiwen, 23. The term junbei refers to military personnel, facilities, and equipment. 96. See NBZ 1907, 6: Ben gongsuo xiangqing jiang yinshuasuo ji bingshi zazhishe gai wei junshi shubao yinshuasuowen, 13. 97. See for instance WX 1910, 13: Junshi zazhi fakan yijianshu; NBZ 1906, 1: Yuanqi, 6. 98. Military journals generally promoted the ideas of the “people in arms” and “citizen-soldier,” and ultimately aimed at propagating a martial spirit and martial orientation among the people. The Nanyang Military Journal, for instance, reprinted an imperial decree in this same spirit in its first issue, as the foreword. See NBZ 1906, 1: Xuyan. See also LX 1914, 6: Zhi junshi yuebaoshe zhuci. 99. Elman 2014. All translations in this paragraph are Benjamin Elman’s, who also offers a second, alternative literal translation for kexue in the same article: “knowledge organized by field.” Ibid., 23, 24. 100. Hinsch 2013, 143. See also Amelung 2014; Lam 2011, 14. 101. Note that Foucault points out that the conceptual analogy between scientific disciplines and discipline in the sense of drill, training, or punishment is not coincidental. Foucault [1975] 1979, 223. 102. NBZ 1907, 10: Tao Shumao, Jundui jiaoyu yu xuexiao jiaoyu, 25.


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103. NBZ 1908, 27: Xinbing jiaoyu zhaiyao, 1. 104. NBZ 1906, 2: Jiangxiao jiaoyulun, 10. 105. NBZ 1907, 11: Jundui jiaoyu zhuanduanlun, 4–5. See also NBZ 1906, 2: Zhanshu yanjiu zhi yaoling. 106. ZBZ 1916, 28: Zhihuiguan zhi xindeshuo. On the issue of science and superstition in Republican China, see also Nedostup 2009, 1–4. 107. NBZ 1908, 21: Lun jundui zhi zhihui yu tongshuai. 108. NBZ 1911, 57: Qingnian jiangxiao zhi zhizexu, 1. 109. WX 1910, 12: Jiangxiao zhi jiaoyu ji yanjiu, 19. 110. LX 1914, 6: Miao Qingshan, Lian jiaoyu yaoling, 1. See also LX 1914, 6: Miao Qingshan, Jundui jiaoyutan, 1–13. 111. LX 1913, 3: Junxue congtan. 112. ZBZ 1916, 30: Lun baibing zhuyi zhi jianglai, 28. 113. ZBZ 1914, 4: Jiangwutang xueyuan biye zhisheng, 3–4. 114. Ibid., 4–5. 115. Funck 2002b; Barnett 1967, 20–1. 116. WX 1908, 2: Shuo jiangcai, 1–6. See also WX 1908, 1: Song Banghan, Yancheng junji fucong ganglingshuo, 37–41. 117. BBZ 1910, 2: Lun junshi jiaoyu dang yi peiyang jingshen wei ben, 13. See also ZBZ 1916, 27, 30: Lun qingnian jiangxiao zhi dang xiuyang. 118. Becker 2003. On the role of the military for state formation in Europe in general, see Finer 1975. For Japan see Hackett 1964, 332–35. 119. See Theweleit 1987; Theweleit and Turner 1989, chapter 4. 120. See Frevert 1997b; Planert 2000; Hagemann 2004; Hagemann 2008. 121. Higate and Hopton 2005, 433; Horne 2004, 22; Hämmerle 2000, 237–38. Although armies were viewed as male domains, they were not always pure all-male, homo-social organizations. Women and families were often a part of the baggage train and lived in or close to military camps. Moreover, the concept of military masculinity, emphasizing physical strength, heroic behavior, and bonds between men only became important and arguably dominant in Europe in the nineteenth century, replacing, to a certain degree, other qualities such as procreative fitness and the ability to provide for a family. See Martschukat and Stieglitz 2008, 93, 123. See also Hull 2005, 101. On the development of masculinities in Europe see also Dutton 1995; Budd 1997; Schmale 2003; Dinges 2005. On military masculinities see particularly Higate 2003. 122. Higate and Hopton 2005, 434. See also Hull 2005, 104, 108. 123. Sappol 2010, 11. This British masculinist military culture was linked to the global British Empire, through which British men affirmed their manliness and constructed the idea of racial superiority, expressed through physically robust and handsome bodies, over allegedly weak, imbecile, and effeminate non-Europeans. On the relationship between concepts of masculinity, body, and imperialism see also Hevia 2012a, 50–2; Stoler 2002; Pesek 2008; Amidon 2009. 124. Kirchner 1896, III. 125. NBZ 1908, 23 and 27: Xinbing jiaoyu zhaiyao, 1. 126. NBZ 1909, 36: Xinbing jiaoyu cao’an, 1. 127. NBZ 1906, 2: Lun lizheng zhi jingshen, 2. See also NBZ 1907, 7: Xu zongzhi chi xiaji jiangxiao xuanni jingshen jianghua chenghezha, 9. See ZBZ 1916, 2: Junji

Making Real Men


for an example of how bravery and heroism were connected to discipline, which the author compares to the human nerve-system. See also Li 1912, 3. 128. NBZ 1906, 3: Bubing zhi xueshu, 1. 129. Li Jishen, for instance, closely linked military spirit and patriotism. See Li 1912, 47–54. 130. NBZ 1907, 7: Lunjun baihuabao banfa, 10. The Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers already used the vernacular but it apparently only existed in 1905. 131. ZBZ 1916, 23: Dayuanshui zhuyi junshi shuji. During the Xuantong era, the Army Ministry promulgated regulations concerning the reproduction of army books. XT, chapter 33: Fanyin lujun shuji guitiao, 34–5. The General Staff, furthermore, set up a military guanbao (official bulletin), see XT, chapter 18: Junzichu zouni she junshi guanbaopian, 19. 132. Waley-Cohen 2009. See also Perdue 1996, 782–88. 133. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 51–5. Note the term qi was cosmologically associated with men and masculinity, while blood was associated with women and femininity. See Chen 2002 and Furth 1999. 134. Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 150 (Quanbingge). See also Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 56. 135. Yuan 1912–1916, speech no. 5. The speech and those cited further below are taken from a collection entitled (Instruction) Speeches by the Generalissimo for Soldiers (Dayuanshuai xun junshi ci yanshuo), published between 1912 and 1916. 136. NBZ 1906, 1: Jianfei, Lun junren zhi jingshen. 137. Ibid., 3, 6–8. 138. NBZ 1906, 1: Chenfei, Lianhunpian, 9–12; Jiangxiao jiaoyulun, 12–16 (here 14). 139. NBZ 1906, 3: Jingshen jianghua, 1 (xuyan). See also NBZ 1906, 6–9. The last article in the series was titled Consolidating the Officer Corps (Jiangxiaotuan zhi gujie). 140. For more examples, see NBZ 1906, 5: Junshi ge yan; ZBZ 1914, 2: Shuo jingshen jiaoyu; ZBZ 1915, 16: Yi Jingshen jiaoyu xun junguan. 141. NBZ 1907, 7: Xu zongzhi chi xiaji jiangxiao xuanni jingshen jianghua chenghezha, 9. 142. NBZ 1907, 7: Jingshen jiaoyu wenti, 10–12. 143. NBZ 1907, 7: Lun jianren wei junren yaosu, 9. 144. Yuan 1912–1916, speech no. 6. 145. NBZ 1908, 15: Junren jingshen jiaoyu jiangyi, 1. 146. Qi Jiguang stressed the need of personal loyalty between an officer and his direct subordinates. As a consequence, every officer chose his junior officer who in turn chose his juniors. This way, formal authority was combined with personal obligation, creating a very delicate command hierarchy in which no one was replaceable. The principle was used by Zeng Guofan, Feng Yuxiang and other warlords as well as Jiang Jieshi. Kiermann and Fairbank 1974, 25. 147. Cai [1911] 1992, 1173–174. 148. Ibid., 1175. See also the regulations for the Zhejiang Military Preparatory School set up by Lianyu, which emphasized “rectifying a person’s heart” as fundamental task of military education. See Lianyu [n.y.] 2005, 66.


Chapter 4

149. See for instance NBZ 1907, 13; 1908, 21, 25 and issues 28–41 (1908 and 1909). 150. NBZ 1907, 13: Beiyang haijun sandeng zhonghunlun, 5–10; NBZ 1909, 37: Taixi geguo mingjiangkao, 13–23. 151. XBB 1905, 1, 2: Gu shi mingjiang shilüe xiaoshuo. 152. For examples of drawings and woodblock prints see for instance BBZ 1910, 2 and 3; NBZ 1909, 36; NBZ 1910, 43 and NBZ 1910, 51 (Zhongxing mingjiangtu). Note that some journals, the Nanyang and Zhejiang military journals in particular, included pictures of weapons or military technology such as canons or planes. 153. See for instance ZBZ 1915, issue 16 and 21 and ZBZ 1916, issues 22, 26, 27; BZB 1910, issues 1–3; WX 1908, 1 and WX 1910, 12 and 14; LX 1912, 2 and LX 1914, 6. Rubrics were called wenyi, wenyuan, wenlu, or shilu, respectively. 154. WX 1910, 12: Chunhui, Yingxiongshe, 69–76. Chunhui’s story included the British and German struggle for naval power. Chunhui was a pseudonym, the term meaning “parental love” or “spring sun.” The latter meaning also has sexual connotation, with chun standing for the desire of men for women. The story thus might express the idea that men lust for heroic deeds and power as they lust for women. 155. NBZ 1909, 40: Li Duo, Guoshang, 1–6; NBZ 1909, 36: Yang Yuling, Zhongguo zhanzheng weilaiji, 1–5 (see also NBZ 1909, 39 and 41); NBZ 1908, 23 (24): Yang Yuling, “Lujun wansui” “huangguo wansui,” 1–4 (1–2); NBZ 1909, 34; Yang Yuling, Yiyongjun, 1–7; ZBZ 1916, 25: Lu Xianglin, Wangguo zhi ying, 1–10 (see also Zhan zhi qian by the same author in ZBZ 1916, 24); ZBZ 1916, 25, 27: Tang Zhongyong, Aiqing yu dikai, 10–14, (1–3). Particularly the Zhejiang Military Journal included many more similar stories. 156. See also NBZ 1909, 30 (35): Yang Yuling, Wushidao chuanqi, 1–5 (1–4). 157. NBZ 1908, 25: Li Duo, Ying zheng yu huansong, 1. 158. See Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1145–154. See also Fung 1980, 78. 159. XBB 1905, issues 3–8; XBB 1905, issues 4–8. The “poem” included passages on appearance, character, and conduct, politeness, and responsibility. XBB 1905, 1, 2; XBB 1905, 9. See also XBB 1905, 2: Join the Army Song (Congjunge). 160. ZBZ 1916, 25: Lin Zhixia, Xinbing jiaoyu zhi shiyan. 161. NBZ 1907, 13: Lun jundui junge zhi biyao, 5–7. All quotes on page 5. 162. See for instance BBZ 1910, 2: Song to Encourage Military Men (Junren lizhige), 121; BBZ 1910, 3: Good Soldiers Song (Hao junrenge), 113. The Nanyang Military Journal had a rubric on poetry (shige), which included songs as well as short and long prose. 163. Chen 1897, chapter 1; Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1145–154; Smith 1974, 154. 164. NBZ 1906, 1: Lun junren zhi yule, 1–3. 165. NBZ 1906, 2: Tao Junbao, Junren zhi yule guanglun, 19–23. Tao later supplemented the list in NBZ 1907, 6. 166. NBZ 1907, 13: Lun junle zhi biyao, 9–12. 167. ZBZ 1914, 2: Chen Zan, Yingnei zhi yule, 9–13. 168. NBZ 1909, 30: Xin xiaohua, 1. Generally, on jokes and “the history of laughter” in late Qing and Republican China, see also Rea 2015. 169. NBZ 1909, 31: Hao xinjun, 3. 170. Li 1909.

Making Real Men


171. Mann 2011, 1–7; Mann 2000. 172. NBZ 1911, 57: Zuzhi wanshan jiangxiao tuanyi, 1. See also NBZ 1907, 9: Yangbing wuliu yu guxi. 173. ZBZ 1914, 1: Fakanci, 2. 174. Ibid. 175. See, for instance, the first issue of the Nanyang Military Journal. NBZ 1906, 1: Lun junren zhi yule, 1–3; WX 1908, 1: Song Xi, Junhun, 68–9. 176. See Guo 2002. 177. MacKinnon 1973 178. Yuan 1912–1916, speech no. 9. 179. Ibid., speech no. 10. 180. Ibid., speech no. 2. See also NBZ 1908, 28: Yan jie bingxin. 181. XBB 1905, 7: Bingding yi jie dou’oushuo, 1–2. 182. WX 1910, 14: Song youren zuye guiguo. 183. NBZ 1907, 6: Du Huaiyong, Jiangxiao yu bingshi zhi ganqing ying ruhe yanjiushuo, 9–12. See also NBZ 1907, 6: Lun xiashi yu jundui zhi guanxi. 184. NBZ 1907, 6: Du Huaiyong, Jiangxiao yu bingshi zhi ganqing ying ruhe yanjiushuo, 10–11. 185. Ibid., 12. 186. Xu [1899] 1992, 1019. 187. NBZ 1906, 5: Huang Shilong, Deguo junshi mingyan jilüe, 8–9, 11. 188. Brook, Bourgon, and Blue 2008, 21. See also Frühstück 2011. 189. See, for instance, Karl 2002; Dabringhaus 2006; Zhao 2006; Zarrow 2012. 190. Li 1912, 4. The “iron and blood” slogan many texts used was correctly attributed to former German chancellor Bismarck. See NBZ 1907, 7: Tao Shumao, Lun xingzheng yi xian zhi bing, 21. 191. Hardacre 1989. 192. See for instance Fitzgerald 2008; Schneider 2012. 193. Wilson 2008, 18–22. 194. On the term “heroic society,” see Münkler 2007. 195. See Zongli Yamen [1895–1900] 2005, 449; Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 127–45; Lianbingchu 1904; Shen [1895/1896] 1992a, 377–80. See also Smith 1974, 154. To be sure, the idea of loving and caring for the people was part of the universalistic moral-ideology of Confucian scholar-bureaucrats. 196. Waldron 1996, 956–63. Generally, on the utilization of “heroes” and martyrs for ritual construction of the nation see Schreiner 2001. 197. This is Marc Andre Matten’s argument, see Matten 2011. 198. Waldron 1996, 962. 199. Ibid., 956–57. 200. NBZ 1907, 11: Xunbing baihua si ze, 1. The quote is originally from the Biography of Ma Yuan in the Book of the Later Han (Houhanshu, compiled in the fifth century). 201. NBZ 1907, 11: Li Duo, Xunbing baihua si ze, 1, 5. 202. NBZ 1908, 23: Chen Qi, Lun junren dang fada qi zhi jue lie er xue guochi, 13, 15. 203. NBZ 1909, 36: Cheng Fengzhang, Junshi chuyan, 5.


Chapter 4

204. Ibid. 205. Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 56. 206. NBZ 1906, 1: Jianfei, Lun junren zhi jingshen, 3–4. Li used guojia zhi gancheng, see Li 1912, 3; Zhu 1911. 207. See GX, chapter 8, 100. 208. Zhu 1911, n.p. 209. See, for instance, XBB 1905, 1: Qiangguoshuo, which instructed soldiers that China was the biggest and most populous country and should therefore be strong. However this would only happen if the commoners (baixing) understood that protecting China was their business and not (only) the duty of the imperial family. 210. NBZ 1907, 11: Yang Yaonan, Zhumindi zhi zhandou, 15. Between 1912 and 1916, military journals increasingly addressed the question of soldiers turning against the country and people, reemphasizing the importance of patriotism among soldiers. See for instance LX 1914, 7: Bohao, Lun bingbian (On Military Mutiny); and ZBZ 1916, 28: Zhong Zhisheng, Lun guojia neiluan zhi yuanyin (On the Reason for Chaos in the State). 211. See for instance XBB 1906, 6: Quanbing dang cun yao haoxinshuo, 2; and NBZ 1909, 30: Duban dachen Duan xuanyu junren jiaoyu daode yiwu jieshi yaoyiwen, 3. The latter was a reprint of a memorial by Duanfang on morale and duty in military education, which emphasized loyalty to the dynasty and patriotism as foundation for military men. See also the Baihua (Common Language) article/instruction by Feng Fengming, which repeatedly emphasis the phrase zhongxin baoguo (loyal heart and dedication to the country/dynasty) in connection with the imperial family. BBZ 1910, 2: Feng Fengming, Baihua, 123–26. Similarly, an article in the Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers reported of Xu Shichang reminding the soldiers to be loyal to the imperial family and treat the affairs of the state (guoshi) like one’s own. XBB 1905, 4: Yinchai kaoyan lujun jishi. 212. For instance WX 1908, 1: Fang Rizhong, Dui Zhong Ri ji zhaiyao. 213. ZBZ 1916, 27: Zhong Zhisheng, Junren zhi aiguoxin, 6–9. The article, with its attacks on individual loyalties, might possibly be directed toward Yuan Shikai and his dictatorship, which ended with his death in June of the same year. 214. BBZ 1910, 3: Li Heng, Junshi aiguo meitan, 105. 215. See for instance BBZ 1910, 2: Lun junshi jiaoyu dang yi peiyang jingshen wei ben; ZBZ 1915, 21: Huang Jialian, Junzhi zhi yuandongli, 1–3; ZBZ 1916, 28: Zhong Zhisheng, Junren jinri zhi keyoushuo, 8. 216. WX 1908, 4: Zhang Shouxi, Bubing jiaoyu zhi xulun, 31. 217. O’Brien 1979, 177–78. 218. LX 1912, 2: Yuan dazongtong liren shici. 219. The song was originally printed in the New York Times edition of November 4, 1912. The full translation can be found in Cheng, Spence, and Lestz 1999, 214–15. 220. Müller 2008; Powell 1955, 190–93; Fung 1980, 15–16. See also Ven 1999, 38. 221. XBB 1905, 9: Junren yao gu quan mingyushuo, 2. 222. XBB 1905, 4: Ribao zhanshi zhaiyao, 2. The series ran from XBB 1905, issues 3 to 5.

Making Real Men


223. WX 1908, 1: Tan Liuqin, Lun jinri dang gui junren; and the serial article by Tiancun, Lun jinri dang gui junren in WX 1908, 5; WX 1910, 12, and WX 1910, 14. 224. NBZ 1910, 51: Qingnian jiangxiao zhi zhize, 1–10 (esp. 2–4). 225. Yuan 1912–1916, speech no. 3. 226. Yuan 1912–1916, speech no. 1, 1–2. 227. Yuan 1912–1916, speech no. 8. In the same spirit: ZBZ 1916, 27: Lin Zhixia, Wu zhi quanguo junren tongde huiguan, 14–18. 228. LX 1913, 3: Gaoxie junren xunling, 42. 229. Yuan 1912–1916, speech no. 5. 230. Qingyibao 1899 (33), 2–3. Liang also published a book with the title Zhongguo zhi wushidao (China’s Way of the Warrior or China’s Bushido), where he argued that Chinese cultural tradition actually possessed an inherent martial spirit, which only needed activation. See Fung 1980, 286. 231. Qingyibao 1899 (33), 2–3. See also Benesh 2011, 267–68; Friday 1994. 232. See NBZ 1906, 1: Jianfei, Lun junren zhi jingshen; NBZ 1906, 1: Lun junren zhi yule, 1–2; NBZ 1907, 13: Tao Junbao, Lun junyue zhi biyao, 11; NBZ 1908, 23: Chen Qi, Lun junren dang fada qi zhi jue lie er xue guochi, 23; WX 1908, 2 and WX 1908, 4: Riben liguo zhi Jingshen zai wushidaolun, 12–24 and 1–21, respectively (this particular long article deals mostly with the Russo-Japanese War). 233. NBZ 1908, 25: Li Duo, Qizhansi, 5. 234. Ibid., 6. 235. Ibid., 5, 6. 236. Ibid., 6, 7. 237. Jingye Xunbao 1908 (13), 52. 238. Minguo Ribao 1921, (4, 22), 3. 239. The reason is not entirely clear. It was not only for the—limited—compensation for widows, according to Han, but also because “Japanese women […] are secretly sold.” (mimai, which might also refer to illicit prostitution, mimi maiyin). Han either vilified Japanese women, accusing them of lax sexual morale or implied that the women were forced into marriage and had no love for their men. 240. Minguo Ribao 1921, 4, (22), 3. 241. Brook, Bourgon, and Blue 2008, 14. 242. Wade 1851, 398. 243. Ren 2003; Pi 1997. After the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the number of soldiers rose dramatically because of political and social turmoil in the eve of the revolution, confronting every government after 1912 with the issue of how to disband superfluous men at arms. See Lary 1985, 98; Fung 1980, 236–37. 244. XT, chapter 24, 4–12. 245. Ibid., 4. 246. For the further refinement after 1911 of these regulations see LX 1913, 3: Lujun xushang jianzhan, 33–5, 43–57. 247. See for instance Osten 2012; Demps 2010; Kelly 1997. 248. Diamant 2010, 1–41. See also Edwards 2010. 249. See for instance Duara 1995. While Neil Diamant, similar to Arthur Waldron, puts forth many plausible arguments and evidence for the relatively low standing of


Chapter 4

the veterans, the military in general, and patriotism in China, it might go too far and be a strongly biased US-American perception to use this as foundation (as Diamant suggests) to doubt China’s status as “modern nation-state” and debate whether “older terms such as realm, ritual, subject, and empire […] are more relevant to understanding Chinese contemporary (not modern) Chinese politics.” Diamant 2010, 419.

Chapter 5

All Men Are Soldiers Citizenship and Military Service

Everyone says serving as a soldier is hard but I say: it is not. I say: soldiers represent military citizenship. They must serve patriotically. They must be loyal to the emperor. They must sacrifice their body, for the peace of their compatriots. They must be the tooth and claw of the state, take soldiering as a blessing and dying in battle as an honor. They bear responsibility for all citizens.1 —Lu Tong, The Pleasure of Soldiers, 1910

The question of how to govern soldiers and create a better and more efficient army led Chinese military reformers to target society as a whole and take into consideration the military potential of the entire nation, particularly the male population. Together with a broad coalition of politicians, intellectuals, and educators, military reformers transferred ideas of physical exercising and discipline, masculinity, and self-conduct from the governance of military men to the governance of citizens. Virtually every male member of the population, reformers reasoned, could theoretically serve in the military and should thus, physically and psychologically, be prepared to take up arms and go to war and, ultimately, sacrifice for the sake of the greater good: the state. Consistently, military reformers particularly debated the German and Japan models regarding universal conscription and military training, as well as the link between nationalism, citizenship, state, physical education, and military service. Late Qing reformers adopted the European figuration of the “citizensoldier” and the concept of military citizenship (junguomin)2, making the defense and protection of the nation-state the responsibility of every male adult. The idea of “citizen-soldiers” stemmed from the “people in arms”concept of the French Revolution but Chinese reformers and intellectuals particularly viewed Germany as a country in which “everyone is a soldier” 247


Chapter 5

(jin min wei bing)3 and interpreted German society as the present-day reincarnation of the ancient Greek city-state Sparta, where political participation and full citizenship depended on military service and the personal ability to defend the polity against external threats. Citizenship and Military Service in Germany In the German Empire, military service, citizenship, and military masculinity were entwined in such a way that the army proverbially counted as both “school of the nation” and “school of masculinity.” By serving in the military young men were fully recognized as citizens aware of their duties toward the state and nation. And, moreover, they were nurtured from boyhood with the goal of achieving true and real manhood.4 Citizenship was linked to the capacity to fight, which was attributed to the male body. In the German Empire, the ideal of citizen-soldiers (and general national military preparedness) was realized, if only theoretically, through a system of compulsory, universal subscription for men, which originally was not an idea of the Prussian military nobility but part of the aspiring bourgeoisie’s claim to political participation. The intention of the bourgeoisie was actually containing war by “democratizing” the army and, at the same time, bourgeois men could prove their manhood through military service, as they contributed to the defense of the emerging nation-state. However, as Thomas Hippler points out, universal conscription implied a contradiction: while serving one’s time implied access to full citizenship in the eyes of the non-noble middle class, for the authoritarian government and the professional and conservative military leadership, conscription was the means of disciplining the citizenry and inculcate it with military values such as obedience and alignment to produce an unlimited supply of Menschenmaterial (human material) for the rank and file.5 “The efficiency of an army in war,” a Prussian military manual emphasized, “is essentially linked to the quality of the material it is made of and thus closely linked to the military preparedness of the people.”6 After the foundation of the German Empire in 1871, the government established a system of compulsory military service in all German states, replacing the existing Landwehr, a militia system established in 1813, which had already been viewed as a manifestation of the citizen-soldier ideal among members of the upper-class German bourgeoisie. Theoretically, every adult male German was obliged to serve in the army for several years, including three years (reduced to two years in 1890) of active service, followed by five years in the first reserve, and another four years as member of the second reserve force. For selection, the army registered every male between 17 and 45 years, who could be drafted between the ages of 20 and 39 years. Mostly

All Men Are Soldiers


for financial reasons—but also out of political concerns, as the government and military leadership sought to keep the army free from undesired groups such as workers and social-democrats—only a selection of all available men was actually drafted.7 For the German bourgeoisie, military service stood for political participation and they conceived universal conscription as similar to universal franchise and equated political freedom with military preparedness. Through popular participation in the army, the liberal bourgeoisie hoped to actually limit the danger of war breaking out. Universal conscription linked these claim of the bourgeoisie or middle class with the demand for uncontested leadership by the aristocratic and military establishment, which was aware of the potential of military service for creating a mass army. In both ways, the military was viewed as the “school of the nation,” where young men fully comprehended selflessness, patriotism, and camaraderie, and where they trained their bodies and “manned up.” However, as Rebecca Claire Snyder points out, these civic virtues could easily turn into vices: selflessness became homogeneity, patriotism became chauvinism, and camaraderie became exclusion (of those not involved).8 In other words, an individual’s inability to conform to the military habitus could deprive him of his (socially attributed) masculinity and restrict his ability to participate in the political process. During the reign of Wilhelm II, the prominence of military culture fueled the militarization of large parts of society and at least facilitated an aggressive and militaristic chauvinism. Military service became a marker of manhood and a patriotic duty implying the defense of the nation-state. Although universal conscription was never entirely enforced, it contributed to a profound endorsement of military values and styles and a broad consent to warfare, which were also stimulated through military education in schools, public ceremonies and rituals celebrating the “fatherland” and the monarchy, an aggressive imperialist foreign policy, and through military and physical education associations, veterans’ clubs, and nationalist interest organizations with millions of members.9 The military’s penetration of German Wilhelminian society was allegedly so strong that contemporary observers within and outside of Germany referred to it as “militarism.” The term “militarism” can be defined broadly as a biased orientation toward military culture in society and politics or, in other words, the transfer (and domination) of norms, values, and ways of thinking and behavior associated with the military organization to civilian life. Contemporaries as well as later historians and sociologists viewed Prussia as the prime example for a society pervaded by a military spirit and soldierly habitus, which emanated from the aristocracy and the monarchy and which was mimicked by the bourgeoisie.10 Although the strong influence of Prussian military culture on large parts of German society is undeniable, its prevalence has often been strongly exaggerated by both the contemporary


Chapter 5

media and post-Second World War scholars. Media coverage of the topic both by the German and the foreign press at the time was often highly satirical. In fact, Wilhelminian and Prussian society were far more complex, with many other socio-cultural value systems competing with Prussian military culture, including social-democratic or religious ideas, which affected and formed large parts of society. Furthermore, there were multiple other concepts of the state that were not predominantly rooted in the mythical manifestation of the nation through war.11 While universal conscription gained center stage in the negotiation process of political participation, franchise, and citizenship, the war of 1870– 1871 also anticipated prevalent gender arrangements in imperial Germany, which derived from a bourgeois ideal: while men went to war to defend the nation-state, women were assigned the role of caring wives and mothers.12 The German case was not unique. In other countries with movements demanding the (re-)creation of a nation-state, such as France, Italy, Japan, and the United States, concepts of military masculinity and the image of citizens as manly warriors, who freely chose to sacrifice for their “fatherland,” gained currency. Prominent non-aristocratic figures such as the president of the United States, Theodor Roosevelt, and the British author Rudyard Kipling promoted physical exercise and a soldierly habitus as masculine qualities.13 Disciplining bodies for the sake of the nation particularly informed the conceptualization of citizenship. In Germany and other emerging nationstates or republics male and female bodies were understood as “individual cells of the body politic” and included in the consolidation and expansion of the nation-states, according to Maren Lorenz. Bodies were homogenized, particularly through military service, military education in public schools, and physical education movements. While women’s bodies were discussed in terms of motherhood and the “quantity and quality” of the population, men’s bodies were viewed under the aspect of soldiering, for which they needed a minimal of physical and psychological robustness.14 In Germany, military service and physical exercise were increasingly influenced by the idea of homogenizing, aligning, and disciplining individual bodies.15 Originally, apparatus gymnastics and calisthenics were promoted by early nineteenth century (romantic nationalist) popular movements, such as the Turner Movement, against the will of the governments of the various German states. The Turner Movement was initiated by the educator Friedrich Ludwig Jahn during the time of Napoleon’s occupation in Germany. The Turners, as the members of gymnastics clubs were called, demanded the foundation of a united German nation-state. They propagated the use of apparatus gymnastics to increase individual physical strength and emphasized the link between physical fitness, morality, alleged masculine qualities such as courage and audacity, and the strengthening and rejuvenation of the nation. At the same

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time as Jahn, Adolf Spiess developed his own form of apparatus gymnastics exercises, as well as the so-called “free” and “order” exercises (Freiübungen, Ordnungsübungen), which became part of the school curricula of Prussia and other German states in the 1840s. Spiess’ exercises emphasized obedience and discipline and were considered as particularly useful for the military education of both students and soldiers. Both apparatus gymnastics and free exercises had a strong influence on military gymnastics and calisthenics in Prussia and elsewhere in Germany.16 In the eyes of popular physical exercise movements, which also informed the ideology of male homosocial associations and the masculine connotation of bodybuilding, physical exercise, and strengthening were always supposed to have a military aspect, with the purpose to establish a liberal republic. Following the failed bourgeois revolution in 1848 and even more after 1871, gymnastics and calisthenics associations increasingly focused on collective exercises and the alignment of bodies.17 Most popular physical exercise movements followed the political project of the conservative aristocratic and military elite, which sought to link nation, body, masculinity, and military preparedness and conflate military and civic practices. While they similarly focused on building the physical body, counter movements such as nudism (Freikörperkultur), on the other hand, sought to escape and subvert the military-like disciplining of the body and promote self-awareness and the individual’s independence regarding body and mind.18 In summary, although universal conscription, military education in schools, military and veterans’ clubs, and the positive public image of military values, heroism, and military masculinity were influential, the perception that German society was thoroughly militarized and everyone was, in fact, a soldier was an exaggeration. Nevertheless, the idea of an all-pervasive German military culture was strong among many Chinese and Japanese reformers and influenced military reforms in both countries. Chinese military reformers were impressed by an image broadcasted by specific groups in Germany, which sought to organize society along military lines. On the other hand, Chinese military reformers might have deliberately overemphasized the situation in Germany to promote military and physical education, facilitate the formation of a martial spirit and a nation-state, and develop the foundations for a strong army in China. State and Body in Early Twentieth Century China The popular ideas, movements, and practices regarding “citizenship” that emerged in Germany and elsewhere in Europe affected the renovation of governance practices in China and influenced intellectual debates about the “state,” “nation,” “people,” and “society.” Central to these debates was


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the issue of citizenship and the question of what the relationship between citizens and state should be: what rights and duties toward the state should an individual have? What was the nature and role of the emperor or sovereign, particularly in a constitutional state, whose creation was on the official political agenda of the Qing government from 1905 onward? And finally, how should the people be educated to become worthy citizens? Following the Russo-Japanese War, Cixi and the Qing government yielded to the demands for a constitution and, in 1906, established a commission, led by Zaifeng, to plan and organize the introduction of a constitutional monarchy in Qing China. However, only after Cixi and the Guangxu Emperor both died in 1908 did the government announce a precise time schedule, stipulating the promulgation of the constitution and elections for 1916. The government later advanced this date to 1912 because of the increasing pressure of constitutionalist officials and intellectuals. The first assemblies on the provincial and national levels convened in 1909 and 1910, respectively, and can be considered the antecedents of provincial legislatures and the parliament.19 While citizenship in China and elsewhere was and is conceptualized and practiced in many different ways across time and space,20 the prevalent twentieth century idea of citizenship (guomin, literally, state people or nation people) in China was closely entwined with the central state and defined topdown. There was virtually no independent civil society that formulated and represented interests other than those of the government or administration and the citizenship discourse developed along the question of turning subjects into dutiful citizens.21 It was guided by the political project of utilizing the population against the foreign imperialistic threat, as Chinese media, intellectuals, and politicians developed a strong rhetoric that demanded everyone’s engagement in the national struggle against foreign encroachment. They employed widely circulated slogans demanding participation in “saving the nation” (jiuguo) and redeeming the burden of “national humiliation” (guochi) imposed by the foreign imperialists. Following the Japanese example, late Qing intellectuals, such as Kang Youwei, Tan Sitong, Yan Fu and, particularly, Liang Qichao, “conceptually transformed” the empire into a Chinese state at the beginning of the twentieth century, as they began to view the state as a “human secular construct” rather than a celestial empire.22 According to Peter Zarrow, three European strands of state theories influenced the debate about the form of state and the nature of the relationship between people and state: social contract theory, the concept of the sovereign territorialized state according to international law, and the idea of the state organism. Moreover, Chinese intellectuals adopted Japanese neologisms such as guoti (“state system” or “state organism”) and zhengti (“form of government”) as they discussed the form and origin of the state; Chinese versus “Western” singularities; the role of sovereignty, law, ruler, and

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“people;” and the nature of rights and the “body politic.”23 While Zarrow and other scholars examine in detail the intellectual foundations of this transformation process and the intellectual debates about renovating the state and its citizens, they neglect the importance intellectuals and reformers assigned to military service as a crucial element involving both citizenship and the conceptualization of the state, particularly concerning ideas of an organic state.24 Following the concept of the organic state developed by the Swiss-German political theorist Johan Caspar Bluntschli, Liang Qichao re-imagined the state as an organism comparable to the human body: whereas the sovereign or head of state was like the literal head of a physical body, various state institutions were like the limbs or organs of the body.25 Bluntschli viewed the state as a living organism that was not just the sum of its individual parts and functioned like a machine, but a complex entity consisting of institutions which had to function harmoniously to fulfill the purpose of the state: the freedom of the citizens. State institutions such as the bureaucracy had to be organized in a hierarchical fashion and officials selected strictly on meritocratic principles. Serving the state as an official should be, as was the case in Germany, characterized by a sense of loyalty toward the head of the state, a sense of obligation toward the community, patriotism, and professionalism. According to Bluntschli, the army was only one state institution, yet one that was quite specific and important. It was more strict and hierarchical than any other organ because of its use of violence and its central role for the survival and existence of the state. As part of the state organism, it was the “arm that had to serve the head.”26 Concerning the organization of the army, he again considered the German case as ideal because of its well-balance mixture of professional officers, who were in the service of the state and thus had an “honorable” profession, and conscripted soldiers. A limited service period allowed the latter to reenter civilian life quickly and retain their freedom. At the same time, because it included the majority of the young men, this system guaranteed the military education of the people, added to its “physical strength,” developed its “masculine virtues” and fulfilled it with a “state spirit.”27 Under the impression of Bluntschli’s writing, Liang Qichao completely turned to the idea of the organic state and statism, which placed the state above the individual and society. Even partially embracing despotism, he conceived of the state as the bodily unity of emperor and people: as “one body” or organic whole (yiti), paternalistically represented and headed by the emperor.28 The people had to be formed into worthy servants of the state or, in other words, into worthy citizens.29 While Liang—probably owing to the fact that it took up only little space in Bluntschli’s original texts—did not particularly refer to the military as an institution of the organic state, he, starting in 1902, published a series of articles called the Renovation of the


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People (Xinminshuo), in which he referred to the Social Darwinian notions of the “survival of the fittest” and emphasized the significance of physical, moral, and intellectual strength for a nation to be competitive.30 In the series’ part On Martial Spirit (Lun shangwu), he blamed the absence of a military disposition for the lack of physical culture and the weak and docile bodies of Chinese people. Liang claimed that the Chinese needed a national spirit that worshiped martial exploits and what the former German chancellor Bismarck had called an “iron and blood” ideology. The ancient city-state Sparta possessed such a martial cult, but today, the Germans with their “unyielding vigor” (yingrui buqu zhi jingshen), “heroic, dashing appearance” (xiongwu zhi yingzi), and self-exhortation were the prime example of how to become a global military power and empire. In fact, many other nations had a similar spirit. The Russian had Pan-Slavism and the Japanese had Bushido (way of the warrior) and Yamato-damashii (Japanese spirit). The European nations strongly favored calisthenics, fencing, marksmanship, swimming, and other physical activities that increased an individual’s physical strength, courage, perseverance, and martial spirit. The Chinese people, however, lacked these qualities, in particular a fundamentally healthy and solid physique. To underline his notion of the new citizen, Liang reproduced a speech the German emperor Wilhelm II delivered during a visit to a primary school in Berlin: All my German subjects must pay attention to physical education. Otherwise, the men cannot perform military service and the women cannot give birth to tall, sturdy (kuiwu), and imposing (xiongwei) infants. If the race is not strong, what can the country rely on?

While Europeans possessed the qualification to be citizen-soldiers (junguomin), Liang continued, the Chinese did not even care much for hygiene, married too early, and produced weak and fragile offspring. Everyone was sick and therefore the whole country was sick. “I hope,” he concluded, “my fellow countrymen train their physique and learn to be brave […].”31 Other military reformers took up body metaphors to emphasize the value and importance of military men and the army. Already in 1898, Zhang Zhidong wrote that “soldiers are to the state (guojia) like the breath to the body. The blood from the liver enables breathing, thus, for the ‘inner meridians,’ the liver is the general among the organs. Without breathing men cannot live, without soldiers the state cannot exist.”32 Some years later, in a Nanyang Military Journal article, Li Dehua declared that “common people (changren) are like the limbs of the body, soldiers are like clothes. Common people are like newborns (chizi), soldiers are like loving mothers.” Since soldiers were so valuable, they were highly appreciated by common men. They enjoyed

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acknowledgment, esteem, and respect in “East and West” and their parents were proud of them.33 In another article, Li Duo compared the whole army to a body. The commander was the head, battalions and squads were ears and eyes, mouth and nose, and the individual soldiers were arms and legs. All parts were linked together and every part had its role and task. Yet, in the end, the body depended on a functioning head, which was in charge and control of the rest.34 Political theories such as Bluntschli’s concept of the organic state also influenced Yuan Shikai, who was counseled by Liang Qichao and other intellectuals after 1911. While Liang was strongly opposed in reinstating the imperial system, he initially was a member of Yuan’s Republican cabinet and had high hopes for him as a strong, authoritarian president. Yuan referred to the body state metaphor to create a tangible image of the new Republic with himself as controlling head of state and the military as an essential institution. Speaking to military men, he emphasized that soldiers were like the “hands and feet” of the body (the state), which protected it from harm. Head and brain were naturally the most important part of the human body and therefore soldiers had to protect, first and foremost, the head of the state, that is, Yuan himself. Officials, military men, their leader (the president and generalissimo in one person), and the citizens had to become like “one body.” Every institution and every citizen was part of the body, which, pars pro toto, was represented and epitomized by the head of state.35 Furthermore, he declared in a poem, “soldiers and citizens (minren) are born as one body.”36 Citizen-Soldiers Most influential among military reformers was the idea of the “citizensoldier” or junguomin. Initially, Cai E and Jiang Baili (or Jiang Fangzhen), two military cadets well acquainted with Liang Qichao, each published an article in Liang’s New Citizen’s Journal (Xinmin congbao) concerning the issue of citizen-soldiers. Both authors demanded changes in the general shape of education in China and argued for the urgent need of a instilling a martial spirit in the Chinese people.37 Cai E was a protégé of Liang and an anti-Qing revolutionary who joined Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Alliance while studying as a cadet in Japan. After graduating from the Japanese Imperial Army Academy (Rikugun Shikan Gakkō) in 1904, he joined the Lujun. During the Revolution in 1911, he became the military leader of Yunnan province and, together with Jiang Baili, part of Yuan Shikai’s entourage and military advisory circle during the first years of the Republic. However, alienated by Yuan’s attempt to establish himself as emperor, Cai subsequently became one of his leading opponents. His article Citizen-Soldiers (Junguominpian),


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published in February 1902 under the pen name Fen Gesheng, was the first lengthy discussion of the concept of junguomin. Cai anticipated most of Liang Qichao’s views and demanded that all citizens join the army. The lives of all citizens, particularly their bodies and mindset, should be organized along military lines. He argued that China lacked the doctrine of the citizen-soldier for eight reasons: archaic ideas concerning education, scholars and literary culture, anti-soldierly customs, the weak physique of the people, antiquated weapons, the lack of a solemn attitude toward war, and national strength. The citizen-soldier idea meant giving every citizen military-style physical education and military training for the sake of a prosperous nation-state. The first step to create citizen-soldiers was to “mold a national soul” (taozhu guohun) similar to the Japanese Bushido and Yamato-damashii and the German idea of “fatherland” (zuguo), which derived from their Germanic (Ri’erman) ancestors, and from the idea of “blood and iron.”38 Cai E’s friend Jiang Baili also studied at the Japanese Imperial Army Academy with the help of Liang Qichao and became a member of the Revolutionary Alliance. After his graduation and a short interim period in China, Jiang went to Germany in 1905, where he assumed the position of company commander in training with the German army.39 He studied German and German literature, including works by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Together with Yinchang, he returned to China in 1910 and was appointed principal of the Baoding Military Academy in 1912. Subsequently, he served both Yuan Shikai and later Jiang Jieshi as a strategic advisor but rarely commanded troops himself. His intellectual interest was directed toward the reinterpretation of the Sunzi bingfa, which he compared to the work of Clausewitz and the Prussian general Wilhelm Hermann von Blume. In his early piece on The Education of Citizens-Soldiers (Junguomin zhi jiaoyu), published some months after Cai E’s essay in late 1902, Jiang stressed the necessity of physical exercise and military education in schools. He viewed military drill and general military education at home and in school as a preparation for all students to become useful citizens who were able to fulfill their duties toward the state. The entire society and all its institutions should eventually be run like a military organization and everything should be directed toward warfare, as had been the case in ancient Sparta. Military virtues such as patriotism, perseverance, character (sushi), and honor should penetrate society and unite army and people.40 Jiang later developed his ideas further and his publications on strategy and other military matters earned him the reputation, among historians, of being the greatest military thinker in twentieth century China. In the 1920s and 1930s, influenced by German and French military theories, he developed a doctrine of mass or total war, which considered the military’s enmeshment within society and took into account social-military

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relations. In 1938, Jiang translated the book Das Volk in Waffen (The People in Arms) by the German general Colmar von der Goltz, which had been originally published in 1883.41 His ideas later influenced Mao Zedong’s military thinking and notions on people’s war.42 In the context of growing anti-Russian sentiments among Chinese students, Cai and Jiang participated in the foundation of the Society for the Education of Citizen-Soldiers (Junguomin jiaoyuhui) in Tokyo in May 1903. Only a few weeks earlier, the Russian army had expanded its presence in Northern China, triggering massive Chinese protest gatherings in Shanghai and Tokyo. A charter described the purpose of the Society for the Education of CitizenSoldiers to be the “cultivation of a martial spirit and the implementation of patriotism.”43 The society organized target practice classes and study courses, as well as physical and military drill exercises. The almost two hundred members mainly consisted of anti-Qing revolutionaries such as Huang Xing, who later became one of Sun Yat-sen’s most important military advisors and the first supreme commander of the Nationalist Party Army. In 1905, the Society for the Education of Citizen-Soldiers merged with Sun’s Revolutionary Alliance.44 Apart from Liang Qichao, Cai E, and Jiang Baili, other strong proponents of the citizen-solder idea were leading educators such as Cai Yuanpei, Zhang Jian, and Yang Du, who later supported Yuan Shikai’s attempt to establish his own dynasty. Furthermore, between 1902 and 1919, numerous journals and newspapers dealt with the term junguomin, universal military service, and general education along military principles, including leading educational journals such as the Educational Weekly (Jiaoyu zhoubao) and the Journal of Education (Jiaoyu zazhi), as well as many progressive Japan-based student periodicals such as Foreign Students’ Translations (Youxue yibian), Hubei Student Circle (Hubei xueshengjie), and Zhejiang Wave (Zhejiangchao).45 In fact, the term junguomin conveyed a variety of meanings and some authors had more far-reaching intentions and ideas in mind than others. Essentially, it was based on the view that all political and military powers possessed some sort of conscription system. A pronounced martial spirit and the admiration of a military masculine ideal, which emphasized heroic deeds, self-discipline, and physical exercise, allegedly pervaded the societies of these countries and were inculcated in every citizen from childhood on. In this view, powerful countries were nation-states that drew their strength and competitiveness from a patriotic citizenry and every man’s willingness to sacrifice his life to defend the nation. Citizenship and full participation in the political process of these nation-states were based on military service. The preface of the first issue of the Nanyang Military Journal from 1906, for instance, announced:


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In various Western countries, all citizens are soldiers, all men at the age of 20 are mustered and [everyone] till the age of 45 is obliged to do military service. The East must imitate the Western countries. Early, the Meiji Empire has enacted a law which obliges all male subjects from the age of 17 until the age of 40 to serve as soldiers.46

Lan Tianwei, who was also a military cadet in Japan, called for the establishment of an “iron and blood” hero cult and for the worship of military men, who were both savage and civilized, both brutal and honorable when defending the country.47 Lan and other authors viewed Germany as the prime example of a modern nation-state that had successfully implemented the ancient Spartan citizen-soldier ideal: in Sparta, boys were raised in barracks where they received military training from an early age. After completing their school education, they had to serve for ten years in the military to become full citizens. In Germany, Chinese reformers believed, similarly “everyone was a soldier” (jin min wei bing)—a phrase attributed to the Prussian King Frederick Wilhelm I by the officials Wu Zonglian and Pan Yuanshan in their book The German Army System (Deguo lujunzhi), published in 1902 by the Jiangnan Arsenal.48 Numerous authors in specialist military and general publications, particularly in the New Citizen’s Journal, referred to Sparta (and sometimes Rome) as the very origin of a militarized citizen-state. Even Lu Xun, who later became one of the most influential Chinese fiction writers, published one of his first articles, the Soul of Sparta (Sibada zhi hun) on the topic. In this story, he described the heroic resistance of the Spartan King Leonidas and his men against the invading Persians, which offered parallels to the Chinese situation.49 A comprehensive and representative article bearing the title On the Army Implementing Schools for the Young emphasized that, in ancient Sparta, children were educated after the principle of “all citizens are soldiers.” They left home at the age of seven and were raised in schools where they lived, ate, drilled, and worked with thousands of other healthy children. Following the ideal that the “whole country is an army” (guo jie bing wei zhuyi), they received their education neither at home nor in school but in the army, which focused on physical education. “Governing a country is like governing an army” (zhiguo ru zhijun)50 and both country and army demanded “ultimate discipline,” the author, under the pseudonym Wu Wo, proclaimed: there was no difference between citizens and soldiers in Sparta and, as everyone possessed the ability of self-governance (zizhi) and had an independent spirit, Spartan soldiers dominated the whole of Greece.51 Referring to the Beiyang Standing Army (Changbeijun) system, he claimed that China had some sort of conscription system, which, however, was not sufficient. Military education should become a project of the entire

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society; “everything [should] follow military statues and arrangements” and “become part of the national defense scheme.”52 Schools in general should have a “military outlook” (junshi zhi yanguang) and stress physical exercise. Germany was most advanced in this regard, as primary schools students were already prepared for military service in a way that ensured positive and “most joyful” connotations with the army. In the same vein, schools in China should be organized along military lines, following the Spartan archetype. Young people, first, would learn patriotism, be prepared to sacrifice their lives, protect the country, and become its true “shields and walls” (guojia zhi gancheng). Second, through companionship and joint activities in the army, they would learn a sense of community, public spirit, and morality. Third, they would learn about reputation and honor, which were the foundation of courage and discipline, and about cleanliness and hygiene, physical drill, and exercise. Furthermore, military songs would deepen the martial inclination of young people.53 Nowadays, the author concluded, the social standing of the army had changed, citizens sacrificing for the country (guomin zhi xisheng) were loved and respected, and the old saying that “good men do not become soldiers” was disappearing. The next step was to embrace the Spartan idea of the citizen-soldier and follow the example of Europe, the United States and, particularly, Japan, which had become powerful nation-states by creating citizen-soldiers. Finally, he emphasized again, to realize the idea of “the whole country being an army,” the military should establish schools.54 Universal Conscription Like Wu Wo, many Chinese authors pointed out that the Japanese army and the transformation of military culture in Japan had a profound impact on the development of the Japanese society and facilitated a “modernization” quite similar to that in the German Empire after 1870. Universal conscription and international conflicts gave rise to a strongly militarized nationalism, at least among parts of society. As in the German case, some historians therefore refer to the term “militarism.”55 After the turn of the century, the alleged militarization of society made the German and Japanese models attractive to many Chinese reformers, who perceived the German Empire’s system of conscription and the German people’s allegedly deeply rooted Prussian militancy and cultic appreciation of military culture as an ideal of national military preparedness. They viewed the German Empire as the archetype of a nation-state in which all male citizens united to defend emperor and homeland. However, the idea of universal conscription only became popular in late Qing China because it had been adopted earlier by Japanese reformers. In 1873, following


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the German example, the Meiji government had implemented compulsory military service for every male citizen over 23 years of age. Japanese law stipulated seven years of active service followed by four years in the reserve. The creators of the conscription law in Japan viewed military service as essential for educating the people and turning them into citizens. The Japanese government understood conscription as a tool for national integration, equality, and “democracy” that eliminated the social difference between the samurai class and the peasantry, because now both served the state as soldiers and officers. Moreover, universal conscription was the logical perpetuation of the nation-in-arms and, in Japan, praised as resurrection of an ancient ideal of community and service.56 The notion that, in the German Empire, everyone was at least potentially fulfilling some sort of military service, as well as reports about the German universal conscription system were already popular in the post-1895 books and manuals on German military organization in China. Shen Dunhe outlined both the general draft system for the army and the wartime conscription system in Germany in his Description of the German Military System. During war, he explained, every person was made use of to defend the state—even the old and the disabled, who could, for instance, bake bread. “There is not one citizen who is not in the service of the state. There is not one citizen who is not considered for the military,” he stated.57 Theodore H. Schnell similarly declared that, in Germany, “every man has to serve as a soldier.”58 Xu Jianyin, whose book was strongly informed by his observations of German military organization, suggested introducing a militia system (minbing) based on ancient Chinese and modern German models. He argued, conversely, that “if not everyone is a soldier, every family may suffer from war.”59 His idea was to raise one out of two hundred able-bodied men for the army and train these men for three years. The militia-soldier would be collectively financed and the whole system would facilitate the dissemination of “loyalty to the emperor and patriotism” (zhongjun aiguo).60 A translation by the American missionary Young John Allen and his Chinese assistant Fan Yi, titled The German Empire of Today (Deguo zuijin jinbushi) and originally published under the pseudonym Veritas, declared that “under the laws of the German Federation, all German citizens have the duty to serve as soldiers” and were not allowed to have a substitute. The book explained the lottery system every male at the age of 20 had to participate in and that selected candidates had to serve seven years in the regular army and an additional five years in the reserve forces. It emphasized that, in Prussia, which provided the largest contingent of conscripts, “all citizens are on the army register (junji).” Finally, the book introduced the Landwehr (Lantewei’er), the militia force based on volunteers and established in 1813, which not only made sure that the people could fulfill their duty but also

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ensured that the army’s strength would be maintained. The book explicitly stated that “all men (fan nanzi) have the duty to serve as soldiers.”61 Duanfang suggested emulating the conscription systems of Germany and Japan. Particularly, and in the name of the Bureau for Military Training, he demanded the introduction of the Beiyang Standing Army model of a total of ten years of service in the first and the second reserve forces in every province of the empire. This structure, he argued, originated from Germany and allowed for easily increasing the number of soldiers many times during war. The Qing Empire should entirely follow the German and Japanese models and the government should “make everyone know that serving as soldier is the duty of citizens” (dang bing wei guomin yiwu).62 A journal article by Chen Qi in the same spirit attributed the Prussian victory over France in 1870 to the fact that Prussian citizens had received military training that enabled them to comply with the king’s call to arms.63 It was not only the duty of every (male) citizen to defend the country; some Chinese military reformers even interpreted the war-like nature of the German people to be the reason for the existence of the German nation-state in the first place. An article titled Song of the Citizen-Soldiers (Junguominge) by Yang Yuling introduced and included a song modeled on the “Germanic patriotism song” (Ri’erman aiguoge), which German elites allegedly had used to enthuse people in the nineteenth century and inspire sentiments in favor of a German national-state. Following the legacy of German patriotism, Yang’s Song of the Citizen-Soldiers would, similarly, make China’s soldiers and people rise up. Each line of the song ended with the programmatic sentence “the new national army [consists of] citizen-soldiers” (xin guominjun xi junguomin).64 The interest in militarizing society and creating citizen-soldiers after an assumed German model eventually lost its appeal after the First World War because of the Allied propaganda against “German militarism” and the emergence of more liberal views on citizenship and education in China after the war. At its peak in 1916, however, an unequivocal article in the Zhejiang Military Journal called again for radically copying the “ideology of allGerman-citizens-are-soldiers” (Deyizhi guomin jie bing zhuyi).65 The goal of the author, Lin Zhixia, a member of the Revolutionary Alliance and the Nationalist Party, was to promote the idea that “all citizens are soldiers.” “If China’s citizens all serve as soldiers, there will be no [more] shame in the face of danger,” he stated.66 Lin praised the “perfect preparation” of the German army for the war, because the education of every common citizen in Germany included sufficient military training to make him perseverant and “be of one heart and mind” (yide yixin) with everyone else to defend the “fatherland” and “win a hundred battles.”67 China should emulate this unique ideology of the “pure Germans” (chuncui deren). Besides organizing weapons, supplies,


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and clothing for the army, the education of the citizens should be broadened. Special attention should be paid to the “molding of the mind and the forging of muscles and bones,” which lead to “forming complete military citizens.”68 The responsibility to achieve this goal did not only rest with the government or educators but with all citizens, who had to be educated to know their duty toward the nation-state, across all social classes.69 An article in the same issue, on Germany’s war economy and entitled The Economy of German Militarism, concluded that the major German characteristic was the idea of “one for all, all for one” which it cited in both German (Einer für Alle für einen [sic]) and Chinese (ge ren wei quanti, yi quanti wei ge ren).70 To be sure, Germany was not the only country Chinese observers considered as a nation-state with citizen-soldiers.71 Knowledge of the levée en masse during the French Revolution also strongly shaped the idea of a people or “race” collectively standing up to defend their very existence, although the concept itself only became popular in China in the 1920s with the translation of Jean Jaurès’ book L’Armée Nouvelle.72 Furthermore, an article by Yang Yuling from 1911 emphasized that not only Prussia and France promoted the citizen-soldiers ideology but that it had been an important factor during the American Revolution against England, when Italy stood up against Austria, or when the Netherlands fought for independence from Spain. And the most recent case was Japan, “three trifling islands,” which had managed to get rid of foreign encroachment and establish itself as an integrated state.73 Implementing universal conscription in the Qing Empire or the Republic of China was logistically difficult but, from the perspective of the government, arming and training the masses was also frightening. Like the German government and its military leadership, Chinese military reformers were afraid of subversion and rebellion. As early as 1902, Yuan Shikai introduced a German-style conscription system that obligated a soldier to a period of active service in the Standing Army or Changbeijun, which was followed by a few years in the first and second reserve troops. This system theoretically provided Yuan and the Beiyang Army with enough fresh and capable recruits, because every district—originally in Zhili province, where Yuan was governor at the time –selected and sent only the strongest young men to the army. However, he was not interested in universal conscription or arming the entire population and unleashing something like a people’s war. In the preface to the Record of Military Planning of the Newly Created Army, Yuan explained that he was assigned to commanding and improving the army according to “Western” ways because the people of the “occident” understood military affairs quite well, very much like their own Chinese ancestors. But neither the ancient Chinese practice of “ten thousand soldiers from the people” (wan bing yu min) nor the “Western” notion that “everyone is a soldier” should be copied. Soldiering was a “refined art” and the army should only invest in the

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training of the best men. In conclusion, he rejected the sentence, attributed to Confucius: “not to teach the people how to fight is to abandon them.” For Yuan, such a view only instilled fear among the people.74 The regulations and outlines for the Army from 1904 repeated Yuan’s opinion, stating that organizing and supplying an army were complex matters, requiring military experts and a great deal of strategic planning. Particularly under the impression of the Boxer War and the uncontrolled uprising of parts of the population in Shandong and other provinces, Yuan Shikai and other military reformers sought to prevent an increase of men at arms and to become independent of mercenaries. Militarizing the entire population was counterproductive to this goal and not on Yuan’s military reform agenda. However, after he was exiled in 1908, the Army Ministry planned to conduct a national census with the aim of establishing a conscription system, first in 1909 and again in 1911. It joined forces with the Ministry of Education to complement the education of citizen-soldiers with a system of military service.75 The idea of installing a nationwide conscription system after foreign models at that time went back to an initiative of Yinchang.76 In 1910, the general-governor of Liangguang, Yuan Shuxun, also petitioned to introduce a conscription system by 1914 or 1915, after the “occidental model,” stating that only men with permanent residence should serve. As in Germany and Japan, vagabonds, rapscallions, and criminals were to be excluded.77 As president of the Republic, Yuan gradually adjusted his position on the issue of conscription. In a speech, he emphasized that it was the duty of all citizens to serve as soldier and protect the nation-state. Without soldiers, a nation-state could not be established and thus all the countries in East and West had some sort of conscription system (zhengbing de zhidu), which supplied soldiers for both the standing army and the reserve troops. Departing from his original position, he suggested taking the German conscription system as an example and promoted military education and physical exercise for all citizens, to turn them into citizen-soldiers.78 In 1915, he promulgated a model which stipulated eight to thirteen years of service, depending on the performance of the soldier and the needs of the army. It included three to five years in the standing army, three to four years in the first reserve, and two to four years in the second reserve. All reserve forces should be called guominbing (national guard or national militia). At the same time, every county should be separated into 14 recruitment districts, which would facilitate the implementation of a compulsory military service system.79 In the end, neither the Qing nor any Republican government managed to implement military conscription. Only the government of the People’s Republic introduced universal military service in 1949, which, due to the sufficient number of volunteers, has never been enforced.


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Nevertheless, the introduction of universal conscription was an important topic in military circles throughout the late Qing and early Republican period and was linked to the more general debate about the duty of men as citizens. “What does military service mean?” Tao Shumao asked rhetorically in a Nanyang Military Journal article in 1908. “[It means] that all men have the responsibility to defend the nation-state. From the sons of kings and lords to the common people, [all] men have the duty to join the army and serve as soldier.”80 Another article in the same journal, called Examination of the Issue of Conscription, praised the idea that every citizen was a soldier as the best one to “establish the state and strengthen the race.” The alternatives to conscription, drafting soldiers only from specific social (or ethnical) groups or recruiting men arbitrarily, were harmful for society. The Prussian model was perfect, the article argued, and China should learn from Japan, which had copied the Prussian system and become a “first class power” (or “manly country,” yideng xiongguo).81 Compulsory military service for men and its significance for citizenship education became an even more urgent question after the end of the Qing. An article in the Military Monthly declared that the establishment of a strong new state depended on the readiness of all men older than 24 to die. The nation’s army was an organization made up of citizens and the army’s strength was based on the education, particularly the physical education, of the citizens.82 A translated Japanese article in the same journal even stated that “whether old, child, or woman, all have the duty to serve as soldiers.” However, soldiers had to be physically and mentally strong and therefore, it concluded, only men between the ages of 17 and 40 actually could fulfill military service.83 Numerous articles in the military press similarly treated the issue of the relationship between the education of citizens and soldiers. From the beginning, the Nanyang Military Journal frequently emphasized that military service and defense of the country were the obligation of citizens. One of its first articles stated that war concerned the entire citizenry (guomin quanti) and it was essential that service in the army transformed the bodies, hearts, and strength of the “millions” into one body, one heart, and one moving being (wu). The army represented the citizens and, thus, military education represented the education of citizens. Physical education was the most important element and should follow the model of Japanese gymnastics and sports societies, as well as the spirit of Bushido and Yamato-damashii, to promote military education and turn citizens into citizen-soldiers. The comprehensive education of a citizen would shorten military service time, reduce military expenditures, promote military thinking (junshi sixiang fada) among society, and generally improve the physique of the soldiers. In Germany, the article stated, military service lasted (only) two years, due to the comprehensive general military education and preparation of citizens.84

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According to a certain Zhuang E, educating soldiers and citizens were essentially identical, because both aimed at the comprehensive cultivation of body, morality, and intellect. The best and most “egalitarian” place for a citizen to receive this education was the army.85 “The army is the place of citizenship education,”86 he stated, closely echoing the German perception of the army as “school of the nation.” Zhuang argued that, while victory or defeat in battle depended on the physical strength of soldiers, victory or defeat during “placid war” (pinghe zhanzheng), understood as agricultural, industrial, and economic competition, equally depended on the physical strength of the citizens. This strength was formed nowhere else than in the army, which was also responsible for the moral education of the citizens. Military discipline and obedience were essential for any citizen’s sincerity and spirit, Zhuang claimed. This spirit was the “backbone of the national idea” (goujia guannian wei gugan).87 To be sure, the author reassured his readers, military-like obedience among citizens did not aim at the creation of slaves who had lost their freedom, but could rather be compared to the loyalty of a minister to the emperor, or the duty of a son toward his father. It was the responsibility of military education to “mold the character of the future citizen.” Finally, three years of service would also complete the intellectual development of citizens. In his conclusion, Zhuang repeated his demand to adopt “the idea that in the whole country everyone is a soldier” (juguo jie bing zhuyi) and to “unite the essence” (benzhi zhi heyi) of military and citizenship education. The responsibility of generals—“with the sword in the right hand and the brush in the left hand”—was to instruct both soldiers and citizens, and not only to produce perfect soldiers but also to nurture “eternally good” citizens for the empire within the three years of military service.88 According to an article published under the pseudonym Qi Yu, military service was the initiation ceremony of becoming a citizen (dang guomin jiguan).89 Another article similarly argued that military discipline and the military sense of duty should be the foundation of the citizenry, as it would reinforce the social fabric: “all things military [lead to] respect for those above, love for those below, and to trust among friends.”90 According to an article that compared the training of new recruits in China with that in other countries, the only problem in China was that most citizens were not aware of their duty.91 The relationship between the army as organization, the civilian population, and universal military service was also a topic frequently addressed in the new military academies. In 1908, the translation department of the Beiyang Army published the Chinese version of a Japanese textbook on military organization by a certain Saga Tadayoshi. It mostly dealt with military organization in Germany, Japan, and China and emphasized the interdependence of state, army, economy, and the physical strength, intellect, and mental disposition


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of the citizenry. When establishing a national army, not only internal organization of personnel and management had to be taken into account but also global factors such as infrastructure, arms production, and education were important. Moreover, Saga stressed that the state should register the entire population by age to set up quotas for men who had to serve in the army.92 Li Jishen emphasized that, if the state implemented a system of conscription, it would be the duty of the citizens to serve in the army. Military education was not just a supplement of citizenship education; the two were closely intermingled, he stated. Without military education, a citizen could not complete his physical, moral, and intellectual training. Starting with military exercises only after joining the army might cause problems. To receive military training, the citizen’s education—which he did not define in detail—had to be completed first. The army itself was the “cream” or “essence” of the citizenry, Li concluded.93 Similarly, Liu Yiren discussed in his textbook Military Organization (Junzhi xue jianyi), published in 1917, the relationship between the army, the state and its institutions, as well as the “quality” of soldiers and the population. He closely examined the development of the German and Prussian conscription systems since the Seven Year’s War (1756–1763) and claimed that, with the introduction of compulsory military service, the Germans ushered in a new era in the history of military organization.94 Military journals were similarly concerned with the question of how to actually implement a society of citizen-soldiers. An extensive article in the Nanyang Military Journal on the education of spirit, intended as teaching material, started with a comprehensive summary of the idea of the citizen-soldier, including references to Sparta and Germany, and a discussion on the necessity of a martial spirit and military preparedness for defending the country.95 For some authors, the very survival of nation and “race” depended on the junguomin idea and its endorsement by all people.96 One article demanded that men, women, old people, and children all had to acknowledge and honor military service and the significance of conscription. The foundation for the “whole country becoming soldiers” and “militarism” (junguo zhuyi), it stated, were gymnastics, military-style games, and textbooks teaching competitiveness.97 Another article announced that “everyone [should] possess the quality and mind of a citizen-soldier to become shield and wall [of the country].”98 One very rare rejection of the junguomin idea during this period was expressed in article by Huang Fu and appeared in the Tokyo-based journal Wuxue. For Huang, the terms “citizens” (guomin), “new citizen” (xin guomin), and “citizen-soldier” (junguomin) were as old-fashioned as the eight-legged essay Confucian scholars had to produce during the imperial examinations for the selection of officials, and essentially revealed the lack of a real concept of nation-state. The junguomin idea was simply used to discipline and exploit ignorant ordinary people. As a matter of fact, Huang

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remarked, not the people had to protect the state but the state had to protect the people.99 However, he was virtually alone with his opinion. The majority of military reformers and those concerned with resurrecting military power in late Qing and early Republican China, across political factions, embraced the idea of turning every man into a potential soldier.100 Through education, they sought to nurture and form new citizen-soldiers whose bodies and minds were directed toward military service and whose lives were organized along the lines of military values and military discipline. Citizen-Soldiers Must-Read In order to instruct people about their duties as citizens, including military service and exercising, the late Qing government approved of and ordered the publication of a large number of widely circulated textbooks and readers. Either referring generally to “citizens” or more specifically to “citizensoldiers,” these books detailed, among other things, how people should take care of their bodies, how and why they should exercise, and how they could keep up their health. Although the main audience was students and children, these citizen’s readers targeted virtually every person in the empire and aimed at turning them into worthy citizens. Readers constituted an entire newly emerging genre of easily accessible vernacular texts whose number increased further after the promulgation of the Republic.101 One of the first such readers was the two-volume Citizen’s Reader (Guomin duben), edited by Zhu Shuren in 1903, co-founder of the Jiaotong University in Shanghai and author of the very first Toddler Education Reader (Mengxue keben) in 1897.102 Education, the foreword of the Citizen’s Reader declared, was essential for the governance and survival of the nation-state. Citizenship education, which meant the cultivation of loyalty and patriotism, determination, and self-governance and autonomy, was a matter of utmost urgency in “Western” schools. Any nation and any government based on a constitution needed citizens, not just “people” (renmin), for self-preservation. The reader, the authors stated, thus captured the essence of “Occidental educational books” to explain, particularly to children, everything that they needed to know about the state and its citizens including, for instance, the political and legal system, as well as the state’s military organization and system of military service.103 In simple “lessons,” the book explained that a strong country was based on strong citizens. Lesson 18, for example, compared the state to a human body. The people were like the limbs of the body, which was of no use without arms and legs. Similarly, the state was powerless without the agency of the people. Lesson 27 dealt with “valiance” (yongwu) and declared that the country was strong if there were many valiant citizens; even strong countries


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perished when the people were only cultured but physically weak. Ancient Athens, for instance, was inclined toward culture and thus extinguished by martial Sparta. To prevent other countries from descending upon China’s soil, the people had to overcome their restrained temper, cultural refinement, and lethargy.104 Lessons 46 to 49 explained and discussed the organization of China’s military forces and the Japanese conscription system. The country, the reader announced, had to be defended by soldiers. East and West followed the dictum that “in the whole country everyone is a soldier” (tong guo jie bing), which had also been the “old way” in China. Back then, all people were obliged to go to war and leave the field when hearing the call for duty. “How can one not love to give his life for the nation?” “If I do not defend it, [then] who will?” the reader asked. The armies China currently possessed were all useless and corrupt, it argued. In order to face the challenges now presented by other countries, universal conscription had to be implemented and everyone had to serve in the army. “The way to [create] strong soldiers” the reader announced, were patriotism and nationwide enthusiasm toward joining the army.105 More influential and far-reaching than the Citizen’s Reader was a book published in 1905, written by Chen Baoquan and Gao Buying, who both studied together in Japan and worked for the Board of Education in Zhili province. Chen, originally from Tianjin, later became the department director of the central government Ministry of Education. Gao, who had gained a juren degree in the imperial examinations in his native province Hubei, also joined the Ministry during the early years of the Republic. Their reader, Guomin bidu (literally What Citizens Must Read), was endorsed by Yuan Shikai (at the time, incumbent general-governor of Zhili province) and printed 100,000 times in the first edition and distributed among all students of the province.106 It was later used as a textbook in public reading schools, which were set up to inculcate citizens’ virtues and duties into a wider audience, including adults and those too poor to send their children to schools.107 Similar to Zhu Shuren’s reader, Chen and Gao’s Guomin bidu was divided into several lessons. Each lesson consisted of short sentences no longer than half a line. Throughout the multi-volume reader, the role of and care for the individual body, as well as the significance of the army and of compulsory military service after the German-Prussian and Japanese models, were emphasized. The first volume contained 13 chapters and discussed the inseparable relationship between citizens and the nation-state and highlighted the duty of citizens to protect the nation-state. Education was essential to create awareness of the current political situation, the need for universal military conscription, and a martial spirit. Chen and Gao cited the allegedly totally martially oriented education in ancient Sparta as the archetype that had been adopted and extended by Prussia and Japan. They argued that even

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contemporaries such as Bismarck attributed important military victories to universal education: common citizens’ military service had enabled Prussia’s victory over France and secured its very survival. Japan had followed this example and introduced universal military service. In ancient times, Chen and Gao announced, China had possessed something similar and now must resurrect its military spirit or would otherwise fall prey to other, more martial nations. The volume closed by presenting four points citizens had to observe to help China to regain prosperity and power. First, poor and rich, “above and below” had to unite because all were sons of the same nation. Second, one should not cling too much to life. The soldiers of the German and Japanese army enlisted and sacrificed their lives for the country, despite other personal obligations. If the citizens understood their relationship to the nation-state they would not hesitate to do the same, the reader explained. Third, the people should unleash their energy and not be idle, and fourth, they should not be concerned with money and riches.108 The more general first volume of the reader was followed by more concrete advice and indoctrination in the subsequent volumes, which included lessons on physical exercise, the respect for and self-esteem of soldiers, “public courage” (gongyong), steadfastness, autonomy, and hygiene. The human body was presented as the very fundament of the education of all citizens: “to qualify as a complete citizen (wanquan guomin), the body must first be healthy and strong.”109 Every country stressed physical education and all intellect and morality were useless without a healthy body. According to a “Western” saying, the reader quoted, “a sound mind is in a sound body.”110 A strong body was the foundation for meeting any kind of challenge and everyone, whether scholar, farmer, or artisan, had the duty to serve as a soldier and protect the nation-state, which was not possible with a weak body. Not just men but also women, the reader explicitly noted, should value physical education and stop binding their feet because only physically strong women produced strong children.111 Other sections of the reader dealt with the social standing of (professional) soldiers and the considerable harm caused in the past by the saying “good people do not serve as soldiers, good iron is not used for nails.”112 One lesson dealt with the idea and different aspects of hygiene, which was fundamentally significant in many respects: the strength of the body, the prosperity or decline of the state, the thriving or corruption of society, and the success or decline of one’s family. For a strong body, readers had to pay attention to hygiene every day, including different aspects such as air and breathing, food consumption and smoking, and clothing, cleaning, sleeping, working, and resting.113 Apart from the Guomin bidu, Chen and Gao published at least one other reader in 1906 called Citizen’s Mirror (Guominjing), which concentrated on loyalty and patriotism (zhongyi aiguo) and the role model of other


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nations. It emphasized that the nation was established through the unity and combined strength of all people.114 Although the concept of citizenship Chen and Gao introduced was based on universal conscription and the obligation to prepare one’s body for military service, they did not use the term junguomin in their readers. However, other readers used it and were directed exclusively at educating citizen-soldiers and preparing those who would be conscripted. An article in the Nanyang Military Journal, which discussed different aspects of a conscription army such as legal matters, education, and finance, emphasized the need for a Citizen-Soldiers-Must-Read booklet (Junguomin biduben) for new recruits. Arguing that only few who joined the ranks possessed an education, it was essential to impart knowledge about China’s military history, the current political situation, and China’s “national shame.” Such a reader would provide the conscripts with the information necessary for developing their abilities and qualifications.115 In 1908, Lin Wanli, an educator, journalist, and promoter of patriotism and women’s education, published a three-volume Citizen-Soldier’s Reader (Jungguomin duben). Lin, like Jiang Baili and Cai E joined the Society for the Education of Citizen-Soldiers while spending time in Japan, was a strong advocate of using vernacular Chinese (baihua) in written texts. The first two volumes of the textbook thus included short, easily accessible explanations of important writings throughout Chinese history, including military texts such as the Sunzi bingfa and the Simafa as well as classics such as the Record of the Grand Historian (Shiji) or the Book of the Han (Hanshu). The first volume dealt with the period up to the Tang Dynasty and the second volume included the periods up to the Ming Dynasty. They were intended to be teaching materials for teachers and instructors in military primary schools. However, anyone with a normal school education should be able to understand the text summaries in the volumes, which were much easier to read than the originals. The first two volumes summed up all the great and glorious military deeds and heroic stories in Chinese history, with the aim of stirring the ambition and “heroic spirit” (yingxiongxin) of the citizens. The military events in history should facilitate “cultivating a valiant character among citizens” and raise the martial spirit of students.116 Like the first two, the third volume included 36 sections. Each section addressed one specific aspect and had the purpose of promoting and teaching loyalty to the emperor and patriotism (zhongjun aiguo). It contained general explanations about military service and instructions on the proper conduct, attitude, and behavior demanded from a citizen-soldier during his time in the army. Similar to other readers, textbooks, or articles on universal conscription, the volume presented military service, along with paying taxes, as one of the essential and defining duties of all citizens. More explicit than any other text, Lin declared that “those who do not serve as soldiers cannot be called

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citizens.”117 And those who obliged and served but were not able to fulfill all the requirements expected of a soldier did not deserve to be classified as human beings. The state was not a matter that concerned only a few individuals; it was a “public product” (gongchan). Citizens had a responsibility for the public and thus had to serve as soldiers. Not defending it and not possessing the martial qualities to do so was not an option. The section ended with the resolute rejection of the proverb “good boys do not serve as soldiers,” using “boys” (er) instead of the usually used terms “men” (nan) or “person” (ren). He exclaimed: “alas, know that those who do not serve as soldiers are bad boys!”118 According to Lin, the conscription system was the chance for this generation to make their own luck and achieve merits that had been denied to men (dazhangfu) before. Those who were selected as conscripts had to follow this call of duty and should be admired and cheered by others, because only strong and healthy men (jian nan’er) would be chosen.119 When joining the army (for are limited period), the conscript should give up his freedom and independence and commit himself entirely to the corps and his superiors. Only when he protected the country could he be truly free and independent. Even writing letters home should be reduced to a minimum. He should be fully committed to training, drill, and his duties and find joy in comradeship and in the service. However, the men should not be proud and not embrace death, for their duty was defending the country. In great detail the reader then explained the daily regimen of conscript soldiers and emphasized the importance of appearance and order. Personal bodily hygiene had to be as painstakingly observed as the cleanliness of rooms, dorms, sleeping places, or other facilities.120 “The German and Japanese soldiers are the cleanest and their weapons are the brightest,” the reader explained and continued that it was no wonder that the Russians, with their rusty guns, had lost against the Japanese in 1905.121 Discipline, an orderly and neat appearance, order and cleanliness were attributes military reformers viewed as essential to govern the New Armies and were no less important for conscripts who served for a limited period of time. Most textbooks and readers targeting citizens or citizen-soldiers emphasized hygiene and health and sometimes included instructions on physical exercise for individuals. A citizen was not only obliged to strengthen his body for the sake of national defense but he also had to keep it sound and safe and emulate the healthy body of the soldier. Huang Zan explained the importance of hygiene from the perspective of the army in an article entitled Citizen-Soldier Book (Junguominshu). The Chinese people lacked knowledge of hygiene and thus could not acquire a soldier’s strong intellectual, as well as mental and physical capacities. Once they possessed this knowledge, ordinary people could first become citizens and then citizen-soldiers who sacrificed the “blood and flesh of their bodies for the nation.” While everyone loved to live and


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pursued happiness, citizen-soldiers loved to die and pursue hardships for the sake of the nation. They needed spirit, courage, and a healthy physique and mind. Therefore, “how could one abandon hygiene?” Huang asked, explaining that hygiene included an eating and drinking routine, a daily life routine, and an exercising routine. Breathing fresh air, replacing old air, and eliminating objects harmful to one’s health were part of these routines and contributed to forming one into a complete citizen-soldier. Huang claimed that “Westerners” highly valued hygiene, their streets were clean and there were no loitering or “places drowning in spit.” There was no “contagious air” and if a man was sick, he was brought to a hospital to prevent the disease from spreading. Looking at the global death rates of one year, he wrote that most people died in China and fewest in the West. “If one citizen is weak, then the nation is [also] a bit weaker. If there is one citizen-soldier less, the nation lost one member. Citizens are citizen-soldiers, they cannot abandon themselves.”122 After the turn of the century, military reformers and army leaders introduced strict regimes of hygiene into the New Armies. Along with physical exercise, hygiene became the fundament of governing the bodies of soldiers and consequently also became a focus of the education of citizen-soldiers. Already in 1905, a small, easily accessible booklet only on hygiene, titled Hygienics for Citizen-Soldiers (Junguomin weishengxue), was published by the Shanghai-based New Citizens Publishing House. It was organized in six chapters on clothing, food, housing, soldiering (literally the job as soldier, bingye), marching, and preserving health (yangsheng). Additionally, it provided instruction on first aid methods, including the treatment of wounds and acute diseases (jibing) as well as images that strongly resemble those in military handbooks (compare Figures 5.1 and 5.2 with the figures in Chapter 1 and 2). Similarly, like military manuals, the booklet explained that clothes served to protect the body and keep it warm—a description in stark contrast to the established notion of clothes as a marker of class and status.123 The food section explained that fish and meat had to be fresh and the housing section dealt with ventilation, light, and temperature in buildings. The soldiering section gave advice on the routine in the army and the use of physical exercise such as calisthenics, swimming, and other form of physical education. The final part emphasized that, in terms of hygiene and health, one should always rely on oneself, not on others. After the drill, it was important to wash hands, feet, and the face. Finally, it gave instructions on controlling and stopping the spread of diseases.124 Physical education and hygiene were also the focus of a book titled The Education of Citizens (Guomin jiaoyulun) by the Japanese Ukita Kazutami, translated into Chinese and published in 1906. Progress, Ukita emphasized, was made through two things: great inventions and war. An example of the latter was Bismarck’s and Prussia’s victory over France.125

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Figure 5.1  Exercise for Citizen-Soldiers. Source: Junguomin weishengxue 1905, cover, back side.

National strength and military power depended on a country’s citizens and the Japanese would benefit greatly by learning from the special characteristics and skills of the English, French, German, Russian, and American citizens. Physical education and hygiene were important to keep the body strong and


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Figure 5.2  First Aid for Citizen-Soldiers. Source: Junguomin weishengxue 1905, 15–17.

healthy, Ukita stated. Only with a healthy body could the people be happy and courageously face challenges. Life expectancy was much higher in countries such as England, France, and Germany. Even the Chinese, he argued, were more robust, which was related to meat consumption.126 Bodily health achieved through exercising and hygiene, furthermore, influenced morality and spirit and included unhindered movement, breathing, digestion, and the development of all limbs. “Exercising is the goal of life,” he declared. Particularly children, whom he described as “automatic machines” (zidong zhi qixi), had to be stimulated by physical education from early on.127 Infusing citizenship education with military culture became even more important after 1911 and included the production and distribution of readers and textbooks demanding a lifestyle geared to military discipline and prescribing, for instance, military posture for all citizens.128 Republican citizens’ readers aimed at cultivating disciplined and organized citizens who would serve the Republic and included the depiction of military elements and explanations of the army or military-style physical education in schools.129 Furthermore, citizenship education included military-style civic ceremonies such as parades and National Day celebrations, as well as new military-style republican symbols and dress codes. As the propagation of the citizen-soldier image intensified, military and educational reformers increasingly focused on school education and raising children and students to become worthy citizen-soldiers. Sporting events for school children emphasized military strength, fitness, and patriotism to the Republic. During the Nanjing decade (1927–1937), Nationalist Party leaders employed student military training

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less for actual military purposes than for inculcating a “martial form of cultural citizenship.”130 Conclusion At the beginning of the twentieth century, late Qing and early Republican politicians, military reformers, educators, and other intellectuals sought to create a citizenry that fulfilled the needs of the state and that was more actively involved in political processes and current challenges. However, neither the Qing and Yuan Shikai government nor military circles and most intellectuals desired liberal, participating citizens but rather aimed at a new form of self-governing yet obedient subjects, who could be put to the service of the state. The discourse on citizenship and citizenship education interlaced with military reforms and the establishment of the New Armies, as the issue of universal military service and the iconic figure of the citizen-soldier gained currency. Military reformers, as well as other government officials and intellectuals, viewed universal military service not only as essential for increasing national military preparedness but also for disciplining the male segment of the population through the army. While the Qing and all subsequent Republican governments failed to implement a system of universal and compulsory conscription, military physical exercises and military values such as a martial spirit, discipline, and military masculinity became part of citizenship education and inspired attempts to organize society along military lines. Influenced by German and Japanese examples, and the image of a deeply militarized German people, citizenship in China was discursively linked to military service or, at least, to the intrinsic potential of every man to fight as a soldier. Every man should receive military training and be equipped with the mental and physical qualities of a soldier, which were essential requirements to become a real man and a full citizen. Soldiers or “military men,” on the other hand, were portrayed by military reformers and state theoreticians as ordinary citizens in arms. In contrast to their previous status as pariahs at the margins of society, they were now depicted as the epitomization of that society, as role models of loyalty and patriotism, as masculine ideal-types always ready to sacrifice for the state and (other) citizens. Military men became male role models, embodying health, strength, discipline, and martial vigor and their physical bodies became “normal” and desirable. Whereas the army as a whole was imagined by intellectuals as an essential part of the body politic and described as “arms” or “breath,” military reformers and leaders inculcated soldiers with the idea of forming “one body” in tactical formations and drill exercises. They transferred this idea of homogenous unity to the wider society through the citizen-soldier concept. Military service should be the


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duty of all male citizens. Only by fulfilling this duty could they become a part of the body politic. It created a bond between ruler and people, which intellectuals perceived as the essence of the state. The strength of an individual body epitomized the strength of the body politic and all men had to be physically capable of ensuring the preservation of its existence. While the terms guomin and junguomin were gender neutral and military reformers—besides occasional explicit references to “men”—used inclusive expressions such as “all people,” “all citizens” (jinmin), or “everyone” (renren), only men would be liable for military service. Only men were viewed as being qualified for warfare and military discipline and thus only men had access to full citizenship. Within the citizenship discourse, the government assigned another role to women—that of caring wives and mothers (see Chapter 6), thus recreating a clear gender arrangement based on inequality that nevertheless sought to include the population as a whole into military reforms. Chinese reformers did not necessarily advocate copying the German or Japanese example one-to-one but they adopted the notion of the state as a powerful shaper and maker and increasingly perceived the state as an active actor131, who, in the case of the military, was able and obliged to govern the military preparedness of the entire nation. The government considered it as a crucial issue for establishing a competitive army and state to regulate not only individual discipline but also the physical and mental constitution of the entire population. In early twentieth century China, regulating the population for tangible military purposes started to become a major focus of politics, including attempts to manage the reproduction and quality of the people. Together with campaigns against foot binding and opium smoking, militarystyle physical exercises, hygiene, as well as military values aimed at improving the bodily and mental condition of the people and turning them into a disciplined and obedient citizenry.132 A functional and effective army had to be embedded in society, from which it drew its most important resource: the soldiers. An army was only as strong as its soldiers and the government sought to ensure their physical disposition by managing the fitness of the entire population. The physical constitution of the individual human body was linked to the quality of “race” and “nation” and its strength became a metaphor for the strength of the nation-state. In the context of military reforms and the citizenship discourse, “population” emerged as an important political category, which remained a central issue for governance in China throughout the twentieth century. notes 1. BBZ 1910, 1: Lu Tong, Junrenle, 123.

All Men Are Soldiers


2. Historians such as Edmund Fung, Robert Culp, or Andrew Morris (as cited in this book) usually translate the term as “military/martial/militarized citizen(s),” “military/militarizing citizenship,” or even as “militant/militaristic citizens.” In my opinion, “citizen-soldier,” best expresses the European ideas behind the term and the fact that military service was intrinsic to the concept of republican citizenship. While Arthur Waldron argues that the case of China is somewhat special and “we don’t find the idea of the ‘citizen-soldier’ with the first role defining the second; instead we find the idea of the soldier as the model for citizenship,” I will argue that the latter idea was already often dominant regarding the conceptualization of citizen-soldiers in nineteenth and twentieth century Germany as well as other European countries and Japan. See Waldron 2006, 207. 3. Alternative formulations of this phrase in Chinese such as “in the whole country all are soldiers” (quan guo jie bing) were also used frequently in military writings. 4. Martschukat and Stieglitz 2008, 123–30; Hämmerle 2000, 238. Linking military masculinity and physically defending nation and state is still common practice in most countries with a conscript army such as South Korea. See Tikhonov 2009. 5. Hippler 2008, 1–9. See also Jansen 2004, 9–13. 6. Kirchner 1869, 357. 7. Pommerin 2010, 455–58; see also Frevert 1996; Frevert 1997a; Frevert 2001, esp. chapter 2. Note that similar to Imperial China common soldiers were long disrespected in the German states before the Landwehr was introduced. On military service in other states in nineteenth century Europe see Foerster 1994. 8. Snyder 1999, 1–13. 9. Berg 1991, 501–02. 10. On the term and debate on “militarism,” see Vagts 1959; Geyer 1978; Berghahn 1981; Förster 1985; Hull 2005, 93; Wilson 2008, 39; Wette 2008. 11. Ziemann 2002. See also Verhey 2000. 12. Becker 2003, esp. 131–32, 139. Women, Becker argues, were nevertheless not free from militaristic attitudes, as the membership in respective political clubs suggests. Women serving as soldiers and arming themselves, however, was perceived as “uncontained war.” 13. Jansen 2004, 10, 22–23; Hau 2010, 157–59. On the trope “national defense” in the German context see also Bergien 2010. 14. Lorenz 2000, 119. For Japan see Gainty 2013. 15. Generally, on the link between nationalism, mass movements, nation building and gender, physical exercises, and sports, see Mayer 2000; Hobermann 1984; Mosse 1975. 16. Goltermann 2004. See also McMillan 1996; Krüger 1996; Vogel 1997. 17. Dencker 2001. On male homo-social associations or men societies (Männerbünde), see Reulecke 1990. 18. See Möhring 2004; Ross 2005. 19. Ichiko 1980, 396–401. See also NBZ 1910, 43: Zhu Peng, Lun jundui yu lixian zhi guanxi (On the Relationship of the Army and Constitutionalism). 20. Citizenship does not merely designate the legal affiliation of an individual to a particular state including specific rights, freedoms, and duties but can also express


Chapter 5

the membership in a—however define or imagined—national community. Apart from “political citizenship,” which implies participation in the political process, Thomas Humphrey Marshall and others have emphasized “social citizenship” as a further development of the concept of citizenship, taking into account how the socioeconomic situation of individuals affects their role as citizens within a nation-state. Recently, additional dimensions of citizenship have been distinguished by scholars, notably the idea of “cultural citizenship,” which examines how cultural beliefs and practices such as dress codes and rituals interact with the political and social sphere and the construction of nation-state and citizenship. See Marshall and Bottomore [1949] 1992; Turner 1993; Steenbergen 1994; Ong 1996. On the role of dress for citizenship and gender in general, see Parkins 2002.For a recent “transcultural” perspective on citizenship, see also Mitra 2013. 21. Culp 2007, 1–17 (esp. 7); Goldman and Perry 2002. Besides the term guomin, intellectuals used gongmin (“public people”) and shimin (“city people”) in the debate on the role of the people in a constitutional state. Kang Youwei, for instance, published a piece with the title Gongmin zizhipian (Citizen Self-government) in 1902, which is discussed in Ma 1997. On citizenship discourses in early twentieth century China, see also Rowe 1993; Fogel and Zarrow 1997; Shen 2006. For an extensive discussion of terms and concepts such as “state” and “nation,” see Wagner 2011b; particularly for the term “society” (shehui), see Saitō 2015. 22. Zarrow 2012, 89. 23. The term body politic was coined by the seventeenth century English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who emphasized the collective unity of the “body politic” personified by, and coming into existence through, the sovereign. Hobbes, along with Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Johan Caspar Bluntschli, became of major interest to Liang Qichao and other intellectuals at the beginning of the twentieth century. On Hobbes and “body politic,” see Malcolm 2002, 224. See also Harvey 2007. 24. Zarrow 2012, chapter 3. 25. For Liang’s partial translation and discussion of Bluntschli’s theory, see Liang Qichao, Zhengzhixue dajia Bolunzhili zhi xueshuo in Liang [1902] 1995, 67–89. See also Zarrow 2012, chapter 3; Lei 2010; Li 2004a; and Bastid-Bruguiere 2004, 105–24 on Bluntschli’s influence on Liang. 26. Bluntschli 1885, 271. 27. Bluntschli 1885, 276. 28. Zarrow 2006, 72–6. 29. Zarrow 2012, 104. 30. An alternative translation is New Citizens. The series comprises 20 chapters and was published between from 1902 to 1906 in the New Citizen’s Journal (Xinmin congbao), edited by Liang himself in Yokohama (Japan). Chapter 17, Lun shangwu, appeared in 1903 (number 29). For discussions see also Fung 1980, 95–6; Morris 2000, 881; Ly 2010; Zarrow 2012, 77, 111–12, 154. There is no room here to discuss Liang’s theories on citizenship and the people in detail but it is important to consider his ideas on a new, militarily prepared and physically exercising citizenry, which influenced the military reform discourse. 31. Xinmin congbao 1903 (29): Lun Shangwu, yiyue tili, 7–8.

All Men Are Soldiers


32. Zhang [1898] 1998, 9767 (emphasis in the original). Whereas Bluntschli systematically redeveloped the concept of the state as an organic unity, which had existed in Europe since the Middle Ages, Chinese intellectuals also drew on the analogy between the human body and the secular and cosmic order, which had existed in China since the third century B.C. Daoist texts imagined the body as a divine “replica of the universe” and a number of state theoretical treatises depicted a well-ordered empire as the image of a well-ordered universe. The state was compared to a body, which had to be kept healthy by ministers or physicians, respectively. Furthermore, the body of the emperor represented cosmic order by correctly performing imperial rituals. See Lévi 1990, 105; Sivin 1995; Wagner 2011a; Zito 1997, 1–9. 33. NBZ 1907, 8: Li Dehua, Lun jianren wei junren yaosu, 9. 34. NBZ 1908, 18: Li Duo, Bingjiayan, 1. 35. Yuan 1912–1916, speech no. 1 and no. 3. 36. Yuan [1912] 2013: Xunbingge, 555 (20–1271). For a full translation, which originally appeared in the New York Times on November 4, 1912, see Cheng, Spence, and Lestz 1999, 214–15. 37. Both articles are only summarized here in short as they have been discussed in detail elsewhere. See Fung 1980, 95–7; Morris 2000, 881–82; Hwang 2001, 45–7. 38. The article was published as a series in several issues. See Xinmin congbao 1902 issues 1, 3, and 11: Fen Gesheng, Junguominpian. The complete article was reprinted in 1904 in the selected articles edition of the New Citizen’s Journal, see Xinmin congbao huibian 1904, 565–77. Other examples for a national soul or guohun were, according to Cai, the Monroe Doctrine of the United States or Russian PanSlavism. The idea of guohun was taken on by a few other writers, including Jiang Baili. See Zhejiangchao 1903 (3): Feisheng, Guohunpian. See also Xie 1988, 77. 39. According to Thomas Harnisch he joined the Seventh Army Corps led by Paul von Hindenburg, who later became field marshal during the First World War and president of the Weimar Republic. Hindenburg, however, never commanded the Seventh Army Corps but the Fifth. See Harnisch 1999, 92. 40. Xinmin congbao 1903 (22): (Jiang) Baili, Junguomin zhi jiaoyu. 41. Harnisch 1999, 93. Goltz later gained a reputation as a military advisor to the Ottoman army. Jiang was obviously aware of Goltz’s much older work long before he published his translation. 42. Waldron 2006, 200–04. On Cai’s and Jiang’s military thinking see Xue and Zhang 1991, 234–44. On Jiang see also Lu 2004 and his memoires, Jiang 1967. 43. Cited in Xie 1988, 74. 44. Xie 1988, 73–5. 45 See for instance Youxue yibian 1902 issues 1, 2, 4: Minyoushe, Wubei jiaoyu and Zhejiangchao 1903 (3): Feisheng (Jiang Baili), Zhen junren. For an overview over the discussions about junguomin see Fung 1980, 87–99 and Hwang 2001, 45–57. 46. NBZ 1906, 1: Xuyan, 2. 47. See for instance the essays by Lan Tianwei published in Hubei Student Circle: Hubei xueshengjie 1903 (1): Junjie; Hubei xueshengjie 1903 (3): Junguomin sixiang pujilun; Hubei xueshengjie 1903 (4): Junshi yu guojia zhi guanxi. See also Fung 1980, 92–4.


Chapter 5

48. Wu and Pan 1902, foreword. The book was a translation from a French book. During his career, Wu served as translator, official, and ambassador at the Qing and Republican embassies in Russia, England, Spain, Italy, and other European states. 49. Zhejiangchao 1903, issues 5–9: Zi Shu (Lu Xun), Sibada zhi hun. Other examples include Xinmin congbao (xuanbian) 1902: Sibada xiaozhi, 22–36; Jiaoyu zazhi 1904 (70): Sibada zhi shangwu jiaoyu, 1–6; Guominbao (huibian) 1904 (6): Lishi shang you ming zhi shangwuguo, 196–98; Xuesheng zazhi 1915 (3): Tian Min, Sibada wushi, 63–70. 50. NBZ 1906, 3: Wu Wo, Lun jundui wei qingnian zhi shixing xuexiao, 5. The title can also be translated as The Army as School of the Young. 51. Ibid., 5–6. 52. Ibid., 7. 53. Ibid., 8–10. 54. Ibid., 10–12. Other examples in the same spirit, which refer to the Spartan citizen-soldier ideal, include BBZ 1910, 2: Li Renlin, Lun junshi jiaoyu dang yi peiyang jingshen wei ben; ZBZ 1915, 16: Li Erkang, Mujin jundui zhi jiaoyuguan; ZBZ 1916, 28: Tang Zhongyong, Junri zhu zhibing zhe jin yi yan. 55. See for instance Hackett 1964; Fukushima 1965; Hackett 1971; Harries and Harries 1991; Shoji 2003. 56. As in Germany, exemptions and exclusions were made: criminals, for example, were banned from military service. Hackett 1964, 335–37. An example for the circulation of the idea of the citizen-soldier is the translation of a book by the Japanese expert in constitutional law Inoue Kowashi. His Examination of Public and Private Rights of the Citizens of Various Countries was published in China by the Commercial Press in 1902 and introduced the Chinese-Japanese rendering of the French and German terms droit civil (civil law, translated as gongquan), Staats burgerrecht (sic) (citizen’s rights, siquan), Offentlich recht (sic) (public law, gongminquan). Gongquan or civil law, the book noted, included the duty of the people to sacrifice their lives for the nation-state and countries with a civil law always had some sort of military service. Inoue 1902, 6. 57. Shen 1897a, 10 58. Schnell 1897, 5. 59. Xu [1899] 1992, 724. 60. Ibid., 725–31. 61. Lin and Fan 1904, chapter 4. On Allen and his translations see also Lu 2010. 62. NBZ 1907, 7: Zou junzheng zhongyao qing ze yao qufa geguo zhiduzhe, 11. 63. NBZ 1907, 12: Chen Qi, Lun zhengbing yi ling mingzhao. 64. NBZ 1909, 21: Yang Yuling, Junguominge, 2–3. Yang probably referred to the Song of the Germans/Germany (Lied der Deutschen/Deutschlandlied), which became the German national anthem in 1922. Another such piece of art, which were quite common in the Nanyang Military Journal and other military periodicals, was Wan Dezun’s poem Junguomin. See NBZ 1907, 14 (shige). Cai E also referred to a Song of the Fatherland (Zuguoge) to describe the German “national soul.” 65. ZBZ 1916, 26: Lin Zhixia, Deyizhi guomin jie bing zhuyi zhi shouguo yu wu guo fangxing fangfa, 20–4.

All Men Are Soldiers


66. Ibid., 21. 67. Ibid., 22. 68. Ibid., 23. 69. Ibid., 23–4. 70. ZBZ 1916, 26: Yu Songhua, Deyizhi junguo zhuyi zhi jingji. 71. On the idea of people’s war in Prussia see Rink 2010 and for Germany, Britain, and the United States see Leonhard 2004. 72. See for instance NBZ 1907, 8: Huang Jialian, Lun jinshi zhi jun yi quan guomin bing biancheng zhi yiyao; Waldron 2006. 73. NBZ 1911, 56: Yang Yuling, Jingshen jiangshuo, 3. Similar to Cai E some years earlier, another article surveyed the actual number of people serving in the army in Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, and Russia. NBZ 1908, 25: Bingzhilun, 27–34. 74. Yuan [1895/1898] 1988, 5. See also Qingmo xinjun bianlian yange 1978, 48–9. 75. Ven 1999, 62–3 (esp. fn.77). 76. NBZ 1908, 25: Tuixing quanguo zhengbing zhidu, 12. 77. BBZ 1910, 2: Mubing banfa zhi hezhun, 106. This report also discussed whether the term zhengbing or mubing should be used. 78. Yuan 1912–1916, speech no. 11. 79. Zhang 1999b, 83. 80. NBZ 1908, 24: Tao Shumao, Shuo bingyi, 35. In the article, Tao briefly examined military service in Japan, England, ancient Rome, and Russia. 81. NBZ 1907, 7: Fang Xianwu, Yanjiu zhengbing wenti, 15, 20. The author probably referred to men from outcast male groups such as bandits and gangs, who were recruited on an ad hoc basis during the Qing period. 82. LX 1914, 6: Lin Li, Gexinshuo, 1, 8–9. 83. LX 1912, 2: Jundui jiaoyu yu guomin jiaoyu zhi guanxi, 10. 84. NBZ 1906, 2: Yuren, Jundui jiaoyu, 6–7. 85. NBZ 1906, 4: Zhuang E, Jundui jiaoyu yu guomin jiaoyu, 1–5. 86. Ibid., 1. 87. Ibid., 4 (here and following citation). 88. Ibid., 5. 89. NBZ 1907, 8: Qi Yu, Jundui xunlian, 1. 90. NBZ 1907, 11: Junjipian, 13. 91. NBZ 1906, 2: Du Zhunyong, Xianzai zhongguo dui xinbing zhi jiaoyu yu geguo dui xinbing jiaoyu bijiao, 6. 92. Saga [1908] 2005, 459–62. Saga noted that the Chinese army was the only one to lack a commander-in-chief, referring not to the nominal leadership by an emperor but to a highest general or general staff in charge. 93. Li 1912, 2, 6–7. Although there is no direct evidence or reference, these military theoreticians were presumably at least indirectly influenced by Carl von Clausewitz’s ideas and conceptualization of the triadic relationship between state/ ruler/government, people/citizens, and the military. See also Trummer 2012. 94. Liu 1917 (1.1), 1–21. 95. NBZ 1908, 24: Jinshen jiaoyu jiangyi, 13–18.


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96. See for instance NBZ 1909, 30: Zhong Shi, Shi nian hou zhongguo zhi ganyan. 97. BBZ 1910, 3: Wan Dezun, Zhongguo jinri she junshi wai ji bu neng shencunlun, 15–16. 98. NBZ 1909, 30: Jiang wutang zu ye xueyuan liu bie mou jiaoxi jinianwen, 7. 99. WX 1910, 12: Huang Fu, Junguominjie, 105–07. 100. See also Fu 1994. 101. Judge 2002a, 30. These readers were mostly commercial publications by publication houses based in Shanghai. According to Judge, the Ministry of Education sought to produce its own reader in 1908. On the role of history textbook for the education of citizens, see also Hon and Culp 2007. 102. Zhu 1903. The Citizen’s Reader contained advertisement for books about the education of toddlers, including one on physical exercises (ticao) and one on hygiene. 103. Zhu 1903, Bianji dayi, 1–3 and Xinbian guomin duben, 1–2. 104. Ibid., 20–1, 40. 105. Ibid., 35–39. 106. Lyon 1905; Peake 1932. 107. Borthwick 1980, 113. 108. Chen and Gao 1905, pian 1; Lyon 1905. 109. Chen and Gao 1905, pian 2, 3. 110. Ibid. This is probably a translation of the Latin proverb mens sana in corpore sano, a widely used slogan used in Germany in the context of education. 111. Chen and Gao 1905, pian 2, 3–4. 112. Ibid., pian 3, 1–4. 113. Ibid., pian 3, 27–9. 114. Chen and Gao 1906. 115. NBZ 1908, 28: Han Yingsu shang lujunbushu, 12–13. See also the first part of the article, which discusses universal conscription in respect to the German-Japanese practices the Chinese army now followed. NBZ 1908, 27: Han Yingsu shang lujunbushu, 15–17. 116. Lin 1908, 1–3. 117. Ibid., ce 3, 5. 118. Ibid., 6. 119. Ibid., 3, 17. Lin does not provide the full proverb. 120. Ibid., 14–15, 17. 121. Ibid., 15. 122. NBZ 1907, 8: Huang Zan, Junguominshu, 13–14. The first part of the article referred to the idea of the citizen-soldier in Japan (including the Yamato-damashii idea) and Sparta and discussed the aspects reputation and public morality. See NBZ 1906, 2. 123. See also Yuan et al. [1899] 1992, 1145–154. 124. Haidong 1905. 125. Ukita 1906, 1–6. 126. Ibid., 13–19. 127. Ibid., 19–28. The quotations are on page 25 and 26, respectively.

All Men Are Soldiers


128. Harrison 2000, 80–1. 129. See for instance Yan 1913; Guomin kuailan 1914. The latter depicted both the flag of the army and of the Republic on the cover and the first page. It included the current school regulations, which stipulated military gymnastics on all school levels, and included detailed explanations and drawings of military uniforms, insignia, colors, badges, and ranks. Guomin kuailan 1914, 44–7. 130. Culp 2007, 197. See also Shao 2004, 162–68; Harrison 2000, 107–09. 131. Borthwick 1980, 65. 132. Anagnost 1997, chapter 5. See also Fitzgerald 1996.

Chapter 6

School Reforms and the Education of Citizen-Soldiers

In his article, the Renovation of the People (Xinminshuo), Liang Qichao pointed to the great significance that the German emperor, Wilhelm II, attributed to the physical education of students for military purposes.1 Indeed, Wilhelm II was the prominent voice of political and military circles in the German Empire, which promoted early military education of children and viewed it as indispensable for the military preparedness and defense of both monarchy and nation. Moreover, he generally described schools (as well as theaters) as his “weapons” with which people would be drilled along military lines and disciplined to become obedient and loyal subjects.2 Because they faced an increasing social-democratic influence among the urban population and the reduction of compulsory military service from three to two years in 1890, Wilhelm II and the conservative German government and military leadership promoted military education in schools to increase the number of both fit and politically compliant army recruits. The Berlin School Conference on higher education set the agenda for introducing military education into schools, intensifying physical exercise, and promoting hygiene to increase the military preparedness of the nation. In his opening statement, Wilhelm II emphasized that a good physical constitution was the fundament of mental fitness and pre-military training was essential for patriotism and loyalty. Subsequently, militaristic and nationalistic associations, writers, educators, and military officers such as Friedrich von Bernhardi highlighted the threat of a coming people’s war, which made it necessary that every man served as soldier.3 A special commission on military preparedness (Wehrkraftausschuss) repeatedly pronounced the significance of physical and military education in schools for the sake of national military preparedness.4 Military-style physical exercises and the idea of rearing citizen-soldiers also became central aspects of the new multilevel, age-graded civilian school 285


Chapter 6

system launched by the Qing government in 1904. Chinese school reformers took into account different role models and, following individual preferences, argued in favor of the German, French, or Japanese role models.5 However, during the two decades after the turn of the century, the new educational system was strongly geared toward national defense and military preparedness and informed by conservative German educational doctrines. The late Qing and early Republican government directly adapted the Japanese school system, where, based on German and other European examples, military elements such as uniforms and the emphasis on strict obedience and physical discipline were common.6 Chinese reformers increasingly treated children as a resource that could be regulated and harnessed. And they viewed school education as the principal way of cultivating a martial spirit as well as physically strong and disciplined future citizen-soldiers. The education of citizensoldiers (junguomin jiaoyu) in schools became a central aim of schooling and nurturing children and, indirectly, eventually encompassed the education of girls and women.7 Reforms in Education Education in Qing China centered on the civil service examination, which tested knowledge of Confucian classical writings and their prevalent interpretations, official annotations, and commentaries as well as sophisticated skills in language and writing. The examination system was hierarchically structured and consisted of four levels. While at the lowest (county) level, in principle, any man could participate, at the subsequent levels (provincial, metropolitan, imperial palace) permission to attend the exams was only given to candidates who had passed all previous levels. Successful candidates were ranked and earned titles, which enabled them to gain a corresponding office within the metropolitan bureaucracy or, much more popular and remunerative, in the provinces. Although examinations had existed since the Han Dynasty, the Sui Dynasty established the system of examination in 605 and began to turn them into the most major path to office. During the Song Dynasty it finally became by far the most important institution to select employees for government positions. During the late Ming and Qing Dynasties, the imperial Board of Rites administered the examinations but education was not formally institutionalized and learning and teaching were organized privately. Theoretically, any male adult could become a scholar-official but, in fact, the access to teachers, academies, and learning material of all kinds, as well as the freedom to prepare for and participate in the time-consuming exams strongly depended on wealth and social background. Through the civil service examinations, learning became enormously prestigious in late

School Reforms and the Education of Citizen-Soldiers


imperial China but not all studying served the purpose of becoming an official and cultivating ideal Confucian gentlemen (junzi). Scholars studying in academies (shuyuan), for instance, were interested in various fields of knowledge such as mathematics and medicine. Moreover, a large number of various family, lineage, community or charity schools existed, which provided elementary moral education and basic literacy. Estimations suggest that the degree of literacy in Qing China was relatively high compared to Europe, with up to 30 percent of the population possessing basic writing and reading skills. However, while the notion of educating or “enlightening” common people was quite central in Confucian thinking, a public school system and the idea of universal education did not exist.8 In the early twentieth century, the established examination system was increasingly viewed as backward and failing to produce enough qualified people who were able to cope with the challenges of the time, including foreign pressure, economic and financial crises, or “Western” thinking, science, and technology. Already in 1895, intellectuals such as Kang Youwei demanded the establishment of new structures for education and he linked broad school education to “turning the people into soldiers” (yi min wei bing), as all “occidental powers” did.9 In 1896, Li Duanfen, an official and reformer, proposed the establishment of a new school system. These suggestions, however, went unheeded and the attempts at reform failed with the coup of 1898, which led to the expulsion of the first cohort of reformers after 1895.10 Only after the Boxer War in 1901, did the government reform the contents of the civil service examinations, which then included essays on contemporary issues and history. Finally, in late 1905, the examinations were abolished once and for all and replaced by an age-graded, consecutive school system that consisted of both government and privately run schools and which corresponded to the military school system established a few month earlier.11 The new educational system included kindergarten, primary school, middle school, college (or specialized higher schools), and university and was modeled after European, American, and Japanese examples. Primary schools were broken down hierarchically into lower primary school and higher primary school that students, starting from the age of seven, should attend for five and four years, respectively. Middle school lasted five years and was followed by the higher school or college, which lasted three years. After graduating, students could then attend university for three or four years and subsequently become researchers.12 The basic subjects in all schools were Chinese language, history, geography, arithmetic, physical exercise, and “moral education” (xiushen, literally maintaining the body, self-improvement, or self-cultivation).13 On the one hand, the new system was supposed to create specialized officials who could replace the Confucian scholar-bureaucrat generalists. The established official degrees were therefore supposed to be awarded to the


Chapter 6

graduates of higher education within the new system. On the other hand, the educational reforms aimed at broad mass education and mirrored the growing interest in governing the physical development of the entire population. Ageappropriate physical education should be conducted on every level, which, in the case of kindergartens, started at the age of three. As examined in more detail below, male children were first introduced to playful exercises (youxi ticao) and, as they became older, to common (military) calisthenics (putong ticao). Eventually, older boys performed military-style physical drills (bingshi ticao or bingcao), and apparatus gymnastics (qiju ticao), which aimed at preparing them for military service and true manhood. In 1901, Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi suggested introducing a hierarchical school system, which was followed by a draft for the first School Regulation (Xuetang zhangcheng or Renyin Educational System) for civilian schools presented by Zhang Baixi, a high central government official and later founder and president of the Peking University. Zhang Baixi later participated in the formulation of an Outline of Educational Principles (Xuewu gangyao), which he published together with Zhang Zhidong and the senior official Ronglu in January 1904 and which determined the direction of education until 1911.14 The Outline of Educational Principles emphasized that the establishment of a universal national school system was essential for creating “citizens loyal to the nation-state” (guomin zhong guojia). For this reason, it forbade private schools to offer any classes in law and political sciences, as well as calisthenics and military drill. The government feared that students would misunderstand “Western” ideas such as “democracy” and that revolutionaries might learn about military drill. The initial suspicion toward military and physical education was mirrored in the order to use wooden guns only, instead of real ones, during military drill in school. Nevertheless, physical drill and basic military education were at the top of the government’s educational agenda. High schools and universities were supposed to incorporate various military subjects such as army organization, war history, and tactics into their curriculum. At the university level, students should also attend courses in military governance and administration (junzhengxue) to give them a rough idea of war planning and strategy, teach them the main points of military preparations, and enable them to become supervisors in military schools or army inspectors. From the start, the new school system had a strong underlying military purpose. Explicitly, schools were supposed to cultivate citizen-soldiers and, implicitly, they should provide the “human material” that met the physical and mental requirements of the army. The School Regulation from 1904 emphasized that the purpose of primary schools was to enlighten every citizen from the age of seven onward about the basis of patriotism (ai guojia) and to take care of the children’s physical development. Boys should conduct ticao

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to correct their—not further specified—vices, stimulate the flow of qi and blood, encourage their spirit, cultivate an orderly social behavior, and internalize a gracious way of walking and standing. “Useful” games and exercises, furthermore, would guide the students to “extend their thoughts.” Regular calisthenics (putong ticao) was added to these game-like exercises in the final years of lower primary education.15 In December 1905, the government installed a new Ministry of Education (Xuebu) to oversee the implementation of the new school system.16 In the following year, in 1906, the Ministry proclaimed five Aims of Education (Jiaoyu zongzhi): “loyalty to the emperor” (zhongjun), “veneration for Confucius” (zun Kong), and the development of a “public spirit” (shanggong), a “martial spirit” (shangwu), and a “spirit of practicality” (shangshi). “In various countries in East and West,” the specifications of “martial spirit” stated, “the whole country serves as soldiers. From the sons of the head of state to the common people, everyone has the duty to serve as a soldier. […] In these countries soldiering is called the blood tax of the people.” In China, the universal duty of military service would create a bond (tongxin) between the son of heaven and the common people. Exercising soldiers inspired the people and, braving the hostile elements, “old, young, men, women happily become soldiers, [and] die in battle for glory (zhansi wei rong).” The dynasty, the text continued, was now determined to make defensive preparations (wubei) and training soldiers was imperative. Military discipline should be included in schools across the whole country to cultivate vigorous (gangjian) children who could endure hardship. In order to increase the sense of loyalty and to strengthen the idea of the nation-state over the self-interest and urge for self-preservation among the people, school textbooks should promote the concept of citizen-soldiers (junguomin zhuyi). Literature, history, geography, and other disciplines should include military elements, give historical accounts of the heroic deeds of Chinese troops in naval and land battles, and include illustrations of canons, ships, and flags. Children should learn songs and poems about the military exploits of the Qing Dynasty for inspiration and encouragement. In calisthenics classes, strict discipline should be observed, although primary school students were allowed a more playful version of military-style physical exercises (youxi ticao), so that children’s bodies could develop gently. Finally, the authors of the Aims of Education asked: “three generations ago, everyone knew the meaning of soldiering, can we not revert to this?”17 Although the implementation of the ambitious national school program was slow in terms of absolute numbers, the government and the provincial bureaucracy was relatively successful. In 1904, a national total of over 4200 schools with approximately 92,000 students existed officially. According to the annual report of the Ministry of Education published in early 1911, over 1.5 million students attended more than 50,000 schools, including


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13,000 girls. Although previously existing private village or lineage schools were often simply renamed and integrated in the new school system, and although teachers for the new subjects were in short supply, a soaring number of children received the new type of age-graded education in accordance with the new directives. Most significantly, an increasing number of children performed physical exercises and was inculcated with a martial spirit and the idea of becoming militarily prepared citizens.18 Drill and Military Education in the New Schools General gymnastics were first introduced to Qing China by missionary schools in the 1870s. Missionaries from Europe or the United States viewed Chinese boys as weak and effeminate and introduced gymnastics as a part of the general education in the schools they founded and operated. They employed physical exercise not only to impose their notions of body and gender on the children but also to bridge cultural differences and make their own values, such as diligence or self-discipline, more accessible. Popularizing gymnastic exercises, however, was difficult in China at this point, particularly among members of the elite, who regarded Christianity skeptically.19 In 1890, although he was not a missionary, Henry Paul King, an Englishmen serving as a commissioner for the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, wrote one of the first textbooks on physical exercise for school beginners, called Body Exercises for the Elementary School (Youxue caoshen).20 King’s book introduced 32 illustrated exercises, including exercises for the different parts of the body, explanations about how to breathe while exercising, and instructions on how to use various pieces of equipment, such as the dumbbells or chairs and tables, which could be used to do push-ups and other specific movements. Similar to military training books, physical drill was depicted as a means to train both mind and spirit. According to King, it not only helped to achieve a strong and healthy body, including a long life and a constant flow of blood and qi, but also bolstered courage and will. Young children should be introduced carefully and playfully to simple exercises to prevent them from refusing physical education in general. Ultimately, according to King, the purpose of exercising consisted in strengthening the body and all the senses, which was essential to defend the country (as “shields and walls”) and withstand foreign aggression (gancheng yuwu).21 Physical education in missionary schools and other early school projects— the first Chinese school not under missionary auspices was created by Kang Youwei in Guangzhou in 1891—anticipated some of the directions late Qing reformers implemented for the new education system at the beginning of the twentieth century: the physical education of large segments of the population,

School Reforms and the Education of Citizen-Soldiers


starting from early childhood in order to be maximally effective, had the purpose of increasing the military preparedness of the entire nation by targeting individual bodies and minds. Both in Germany and Japan, education had the very same purpose, at least to a large degree. Knowledge of German educational organization and philosophy was theoretically accessible to Chinese elite members since the German missionary and sinologist Ernst Faber published his book in Chinese on Germany’s schools (Deguo xuexiao lunlüe, in German: Die Schulen Deutschlands) in 1873. After the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895, the interest of Chinese elites in European and American educational structures increased as they viewed learning as one of the most important and fundamental factors for regaining national strength. German schools were among those studied most intensely and Faber’s book was reprinted at least once in 1897. Publications and reports on education in the German Empire, such as the book Summary by an Envoy to Germany (Shide shulüe) by Yang Sheng or the translation of The German School System (Deguo xuexiao zhidu), originally penned by the Japanese Kato Komaji, confirmed the idea that, in Germany, boys from an early age onward received physical training. Yang started his career as a Zongli Yamen officer and later studied military affairs and law at the Humboldt University in Berlin in 1896. He later served as an aide to Yinchang on Zaifeng’s tour of atonement to Germany after the Boxer War in 1901. He subsequently served Yuan Shikai in Shandong and later become Qing ambassador to Austria, the Netherlands and, in 1905, to Germany. Upon his return to China, he held a variety of administrative offices and was later engaged in the Red Cross Society. He retired from his career in the bureaucracy in 1928 and henceforth engaged himself in commercial affairs in Shanghai. In his book, he emphasized that, in Germany, calisthenics instructions were already given in primary school and that military schools took young boys at the age of eight or nine years.22 Kato, who was an advisor to the Commercial Press, similarly reported that primary school boys in Germany performed calisthenics, while girls attended handicraft classes.23 Other publications, such as the Chinese-language periodical Xiehebao, published by Germans in Shanghai, occasionally reported on education and schools in German and thus stabilized existing views; one article in 1910, for instance, reported on the introduction of new forms of gymnastics at primary schools in Berlin.24 Furthermore, in Jiaozhou, Shandong province, the German navy established a protectorate in 1899, which included German-style schools for Chinese students. The curriculum included calisthenics as it was taught in the German Empire and the Chinese students were among the first to be exposed to this kind of military discipline.25 In Dalian, which was under Japanese control after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the Japanese colonial administration introduced military-style group calisthenics to schools because it


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aimed at inculcating discipline into the Chinese students. While the Chinese students in Dalian increasingly turned to sports, particularly soccer, as a form of resistance to regain control over their bodies,26 German calisthenics and gymnastics nevertheless became part of the new school curricula promulgated by the Qing government. Like the military reforms, educational reforms were centrally initiated and regulated while implementation mainly remained in the responsibility of the provinces. In 1905, Tang Jingchong, for instance, the official in charge of education in Jiangsu Province, published a textbook catalog for the upper primary schools of the province that described the different subjects and curricula for this level. Concerning ticao, the catalog introduced a book on regular calisthenics (putong ticaofa) as well as Theodore H. Schnell’s and Xiao Songfen’s military manual German military gymnastics (Deguo wubei ticaoxue), which was used by the New Armies. Regular calisthenics was supposed to introduce students to simple calisthenics without weapons as well as exercises with the dumbbells, “pole ball” (qiugan, probably tetherball), stick, and rings. With Schnell’s gymnastics manual, upper primary school students then received the full military calisthenics and drill, with and without weapons.27 After the proclamation of the Aims of Education in 1906, the Ministry of Education produced book catalogs that standardized the use of textbooks and course materials for both students and teachers. Physical education of primary school children should be playful, not endanger the students, and there should be “no lack of enthusiasm.” For the lower primary school, the ministry stipulated that teachers and instructors used the textbook Calisthenics for the Elementary School (Youxue ticaofa), issued by the Zhili (Province) Department of Educational Service.28 This textbook, reprinted by the Ministry of Education, contained instructions on “light calisthenics” (rouruan ticao) and, in a second volume, descriptions of more advanced exercises.29 The first volume explained how to line up and position when starting calisthenics, and described exercises for the head, shoulders, the upper body, and the legs, as well as techniques for running, racing, and jumping. The instructions emphasized that the exercises should aim at providing elementary school students with a systematic introduction that focused on joy and that should not overstrain the children. Only later should the exercises become more complex and demanding. Generally, exercises should “activate physical strength, regulate the bearing, and inculcate commands.” According to the textbook, the physical development of the children was important to “turn the weak into robust, the robust into strong” because training the “four limbs and hundred bones provides daily vigor. It does not only make the body healthy and enables it to endure hard work but also affects virtue and intellect.”30 Calisthenics for the Elementary School repeated many times that young children should start exercising carefully and slowly, to avoid both injuries

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and resentment among the students. They should begin with only one hour of training and only perform calisthenics in a group after practicing the movements individually. However, the whole set up was very military-like and the exercises aimed at nothing less than disciplining the body and mind in the military fashion. The children performed group calisthenics after a simple call and response routine, with an instructor uttering a simple command, which provoked a reaction by the group, just like in the army. Both exercises and commands were no different from those in the military. The students were arranged according to age and height and had to wear close-fitting, neat uniforms, which were supposed to make them more nimble and flexible. They should be reminded to drill with their full heart and body. Moreover, instructors should also take care of hygiene, including the environment and general conditions: drill grounds, for instance, should be surrounded by trees that protected students from wind and heat and provided them with fresh air.31 While the first volume aimed at teaching students basic postures and moves correctly, the second volume introduced more advanced exercises, which were not only suitable for children but also for adults. Constant support for those training at home should be given, meaning that people had to be reminded all the time not to neglect exercising. The volume focused extensively on breathing techniques and introduced simple stretching exercises but also pointed out that military-style apparatus gymnastics would be very beneficial for older people.32 Similar to military manuals, Calisthenics for Elementary School contained illustrations of people performing the exercises it described, which hardly look different from those in the Detailed and Illustrated Manual; they are wearing a close-fitting, new-style drill uniform with boots and a high collar and with allegedly traditional Chinese elements such as the conical hat. A pigtail is sometimes visible and, probably following the idea that exercising should be joyful for children, the figure in the illustration appears to be smiling and happy.33 Apart from military gymnastics, other elements taken from the army made education and schooling reminiscent of military drill and the meticulous regulation of the physical body in the army. One such element was school uniforms whose introduction, however, was a very controversial issue, and part of the struggle between the advocates of “Chinese-style” and “Western-style” clothes. Zhang Zhidong, for one, was the first to order the use of close-fitting military-style uniforms for students in Hubei while exercising and conducting gymnastics. However, he insisted that they otherwise had to maintain the established long-gown style and refrained from cutting their queues. Duanfang was initially indifferent toward school uniforms but later pointed out the advantages for the children’s discipline. Other officials, on the other hand, were completely against introducing “Western-style” uniforms because of the high costs, which were usually imposed upon the parents.34 Although


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the central government and the Ministry of Education sought to standardize the dress of students, the responsibility for regulation and providing uniforms remained with the schools. As a result, simple military-style drill clothes were commonly used as uniforms in many places. In 1905, the Government Reform Commission petitioned to standardize school dress on the provincial level according to the different types and grades; this was divided into formal dress and drill clothes. Zhang Zhidong consequently issued regulations for Hubei that stipulated new uniforms with a design based on the established “Chinese” style. This way, the student’s loyalty to the Qing and their identity as Chinese citizens should be strengthened. The Ministry of Education officially followed this arrangement and ordered that middle and high school students must not wear close-fitting dress in public but only the unlined long gown. However, many officials felt that the Hubei uniforms were neither Chinese nor “Western” in style. Eventually, many schools followed the example of Japanese regular school uniforms, which were originally modeled after the Prussian army uniform for boys and after English naval uniforms for girls.35 Another major military disciplinary technology adopted for general schools was the strict regulation of hygiene. In 1903, a translation of a book titled School Hygienics (Xuexiao weishengxue), originally written by the Germaneducated Japanese doctor and hygiene pioneer, Mishima Michiyoshi, was published. It quoted six books written by German doctors or published by medical facilities in Berlin that were highly popular among medical instructors and architects who constructed school buildings, according to Mishima.36 The book highlighted the development and health of the body as the foundation of the nation. School hygiene was linked to the strength of the citizenry, and thus the strength of the nation. Europe and the United States had strong soldiers because they took physical education very seriously. A crooked body and wrong posture, lack of light and warmth all harmed the body, Mishima argued, and a physically weak race consumed all the strength of a nation. Therefore, hygiene could not be emphasized too much: if it was not taken care of, “those who must sacrifice their lives cannot fulfill their task.”37 On the following pages, he detailed at great length virtually every aspect of hygiene and health education, including the construction of dorms as well as play and exercising grounds, air circulation, furniture, equipment, or the medical supervision of students.38 Influenced by both foreign educational examples and the New Armies, hygiene education subsequently became a part of the new school curricula in China and was viewed as an important element for educating and preparing the physical body. School uniforms, hygiene, and physical drill all had an inherent military direction. Similarly, singing songs in schools, particularly while conducting physical exercises, became effectively militarized. While performing group calisthenics, students often sang or reproduced songs especially written for

School Reforms and the Education of Citizen-Soldiers


drilling that were supposed to help them to concentrate and coordinate. Zhang Zhidong himself composed a lengthy School Song (Xuetangge) in early 1905 for the schools in Huguang, where he served as governor-general. The song contained over 130 lines of thirteen characters each and was supposed to stir the martial spirit of the children and teach them loyalty and courage. According to the accompanying instructions, they should conduct six steps while slowly reciting the first six of thirteen characters of one line and another four steps while quickly saying the final seven characters. According to the song, physical education and hygiene “make the people strong.” And through ethical education (deyu), the following line emphasized, everyone becomes a patriot and people become good. The song was supposed to make exercising easier, but it also helped to instill ideas and knowledge into the students. Basically, it dealt with every current political topic. “Learn from the Army,” one line explained, “[it] consists of two schools, tactics and strategy, to eliminate crudeness and rashness.” Prosperity, another line emphasized, depended on exercising, which made “everyone worthy to become a soldier and [made] the country flourish.” The song also included lines which were supposed to explain why one should learn a foreign language: English was the language of commerce, French the language of diplomacy, Japanese the language that made foreign books accessible in translation, and German was the “meticulous” military language. Germany, another line added, was strong because of Bismarck and the fact that “everyone was a soldier” (renren dang bing).39 In Germany, and later also in Japan, educators and politicians viewed singing and music as very useful for the military education of students.40 Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei had already pointed out, before 1898, the importance of music and singing for the physical, moral, and intellectual education of citizens. They and other intellectuals identified military music, marches, and songs as part of the allegedly deeply militarized German culture. A book called The German Army System by the officials Wu Zonglian and Pan Yuansha introduced both the German national anthem, written by August Heinrich Hoffman von Fallersleben in 1840, and the song Die Wacht am Rhein (Laiyinjiang xunbingxing), a chauvinist, anti-French song, which became famous after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 and which developed into a popular, unofficial hymn in the German Empire.41 After the turn of the century, educational reformers such as Duanfang, Tan Sitong, Yang Du, and Huang Zunxian regarded military songs and martial music, along with poetry and other works of literature and art, as useful media for the cultivation of citizen-soldiers at an early age. Liang Qichao who, like Tan Sitong and Yang Du, himself wrote military songs and even translated the national anthems of Germany and France into Chinese, was very enthusiastic about the use of marches and songs to raise patriotic feelings and the martial spirit among the people. He was particularly in favor of the marches


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and songs written by his friend Huang Zunxian, a prolific writer and poet who also had served as a Qing diplomat to Japan, England, the United States, and Singapore. Influenced by Cai E’s idea of citizen-soldiers, he wrote a number of songs to encourage military service for the nation. In Liang Qichao’s eyes, Huang’s military marches and songs, which “undeniably possessed an imposing manly (xiongzhuang), lively, profound, and far-reaching spirit,” inspired masculinity in the listeners: “anyone who reads these verses without starting to dance cannot be a [real] man” (bi fei nanzi). In Liang’s view, military songs and martial music had led the ancient Spartans to great victories and, generally, helped to overcome fear and cowardice.42 The use of songs to inculcate specific ideas and behavioral patterns in children was quite popular among many Chinese educators after the turn of the century. Numerous song textbooks for students circulated that offered easily accessible and catchy introductions to the new school subjects.43 One of the most ardent promoters of songs in schools for these practical reasons was Shen Xingong, who was motivated by Liang’s promotion of military music. After receiving an education at Shanghai Polytechnic and at St. John’s College (also located in Shanghai), Shen went to Japan, where the use of songs and music as a source of inspiration and motivation deeply impressed him. Although he did not receive a formal education in music, he soon started to write his own songs, which were strongly informed by Japanese songs, melodies, and military music. His first piece, Boys Must Have High Aspirations (Nan’er di yi zhiqigao), published in 1903 and originally bearing the title Ticao—Bingcao (Physical Exercise—Military Drill), became hugely popular. Apart from compiling and publishing school song books, Shen, between 1904 and 1937, wrote over one hundred and eighty school songs, often with melodies adopted from Christian songs. According to Gong Hongyu, he is today sometimes referred to as the “father of school songs” in China. Shen, who himself taught singing in schools, as well as other educators, intellectuals, and song writers increasingly viewed music and physical exercise as closely linked. A few normal schools started to offer specialist courses for teachers in music and calisthenics (yinyue ticao zhuanxiuke) from 1906 onward and music as a subject was added to the official school curriculum as an optional subject in 1909. In the following year, singing became mandatory in primary schools. During the early years of the Republic, Shen and others edited schools song anthologies dedicated to the education of the Republican citizenry. In 1913, Feng Liang, who had previously studied in Japan, for instance, published a Collection of Songs for the Education of Citizen-Soldiers (Junguomin changeji).44 Military journals also included songs as well as short stories, poems, and images that promoted the idea of citizen-soldiers, patriotism, and values linked to military masculinity among students and children. The Nanyang

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Military Journal had a series called Heroic Boys and Girls (Ernü yingxiong) in its “military short stories” (junshi xiaoshuo) rubric. The contributions in the series often repeated—sometimes through child characters—typical military phrases such as “dying in battle is honorable” or “helping my compatriots makes me happy.” One story by Yang Yuling, published in 1909 and titled Account of China at War in the Future (Zhongguo zhanzheng weilaiji), contained a picture that epitomized the significance assigned to the military education of children and the cultivation of citizen-soldiers (Figure 6.1). In the picture, common soldiers say goodbye to their wives, parents, and

Figure 6.1  “Seeing off the Soldiers.” Source: NBZ 1909, 39: Junshi xiaoshuo, Zhongguo zhanzheng weilaiji.


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children, who are encouraged by their mothers and grandparents to cheer and rejoice. Outside the window, another soldier is rushing away, probably to his regiment or into battle. At the window a slogan reads: “sacrifice to save [your] compatriots” (xisheng jiu tongbao). The whole picture represented a military culture that was deeply seated in society. Serving as soldier, it conveyed, is an honorable duty of men for family, nation, and state.45 The Education of Citizen-Soldiers in the Early Republic Universal conscription was never implemented during the late Qing and Republican period, but Chinese educational and military reformers increasingly considered training and preparing students directly for military service. Apart from the Ministry of Education’s aim to cultivate citizen-soldiers, military training was introduced on the upper levels of school education toward the end of the dynasty. In Late 1910, Yinchang and the Army Ministry, aiming at elevating the status of military men and persuading more men to join the army, demanded the inclusion of basic military training in the curriculum of all schools.46 Others repeated this demand, including the governor-general of the three Northeast provinces (Manchuria) Xiliang and the National Education Conference convened by the Jiangsu Education Association. In April 1911, the Ministry of Education eventually ordered that all schools from the middle school level and above should copy military training from the Lujun. The great disparity between calisthenics in schools and the training in the army, a memo by the Ministry noted, were the reason for the failure to instill a martial spirit and “cultivate strong and firm talent.” Hence, to fulfill the aim of educating citizen-soldiers, military drill, field exercises, the “general idea of military science” (bingxue dayi), and particularly target and gun practices should be included in the curricula of all middle and higher schools. Once a week, the students should practice shooting with real ammunition, supervised by graduates from military schools.47 The late Qing plan to establish a constitutional monarchy stipulated teaching students about their obligations as citizens: the payment of taxes and military service. Schools should prepare boys for military service, which reformers and educators envisaged as the duty of every male citizen in a future constitutional state. The cultivation of citizens-soldiers, including the inculcation of a martial spirit, military drill, firing practice with live ammunition, physical exercise, and military science was supported by numerous provincial education associations independent of the central government. Zhang Jian, an entrepreneur and vice-chairman of the Jiangsu Education Association, for instance, viewed popularizing a martial spirit as one of the main goals of

School Reforms and the Education of Citizen-Soldiers


education.48 The project of education for citizen-soldiers was further pressed ahead by the Central Education Council (Zhongyang jiaoyuhui), which was created by the Ministry of Education and convened in July and August 1911. The Central Education Council, including over 130 educators, school inspectors and supervisors, and education association members from the whole country, demanded an explicit imperial endorsement of military education from the higher primary school onward. It demanded that the Qing officially acknowledge and promulgate military education as a fundamental goal of general education and make it mandatory at both private and public schools. Most importantly, the Central Education Council promoted the expansion of physical education to include all levels of education.49 For a variety of political, cultural, financial, and logistical reasons, the Qing were not able to implement these demands of increasing military education in general schools, but the reorganization of the school and educational system continued in this direction. Soon after the foundation of the Republic, in January 1912, the Nanjing government under Sun Yat-sen appointed Cai Yuanpei as Minister of Education. Cai, who had studied philosophy, psychology, and art history at the University of Leipzig in Germany and became chancellor of the Peking University in 1917 and the first president of the Academia Sinica in 1928, adjusted the national school curricula to the republican ideology.50 Basically, the new curricula promulgated by the government resembled those from 1904 but included a number of modifications. The Qing Dynasty and the emperor were removed from their place as highest authority and replaced by the Republic, which now should receive the loyalty of the citizens. Confucian thought and writings were entirely eliminated and official degrees were no longer awarded to graduates from primary and middle schools. Organizationally, the government shortened the time a student had to spend in school and, moreover, boys and girls should hence be able to attend the lower primary school together. Military drill and physical exercises were still of great importance and should be reinforced, along with courses teaching manual skills, above the primary school level. In addition to the reorganization of the formal school system, Cai’s preliminary outline stipulated measures to expand universal education (so-called shehui jiaoyu and tongsu jiaoyu), including public lectures, libraries, and “moving pictures” (huodonghua). The overall aim of education should be the creation of a new, republican citizenry, familiar with its responsibilities and rights, knowledgeable about the economic and military needs of the Republic, and endowed with a sense of public virtue and martial spirit. Cai, who had been a member of the Revolutionary Alliance, resigned in July 1912 and went to Germany and France because of dissension between him and the new president Yuan Shikai. However, Cai’s ideas and designs were integrated into the new Aims of Education and school system


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promulgated by the Ministry of Education (now renamed into Jiaoyubu) in September of the same year. The emphasis of education should be on “moral and virtue”—a rather vague concept open to interpretation, which was complemented by utilitarianism, the idea of citizen-soldiers, and aesthetics.51 While it was not mentioned in the educational directives, inculcating patriotism was another major aspect of education that had already been stressed by Cai and became an element of subsequent regulations. Children should express their patriotic sentiments, for instance, by singing the national anthem and flying the Republican flag during National Day on October 10.52 The basic patterns of the school system introduced in 1912 remained intact until 1922.53 From 1913 until his death in 1916, education was, however, overshadowed by Yuan Shikai’s views and political goals. Yuan early discovered the importance and potential of public schools and, while acting as the governor of Zhili province, he undertook wide-ranging efforts to establish schools with foreign-style curricula and increase the number of students. According to a survey by the Ministry of Education in 1907, more than 8000 schools of different types existed in Zhili, attended by over 160,000 students.54 Military drill was part of the school curricula from the level of the lower primary school upward.55 Yuan’s approach to education was anti-elitist and his goal was implementing nationwide primary education. He shared this view with Sun Yat-sen and many educators in late Qing and early Republican China but it was ultimately opposed to the views of Cai Yuanpei, who favored higher education, cosmopolitanism, and aestheticism and who aimed for the establishment of universities after the German model. Yuan, however, rather than pursuing a social agenda opposed to Cai’s allegedly reactionary ideas, sought after the best way to create patriotic, obedient, dutiful, and militarily prepared citizens. Yuan promoted general education, but he envisioned a double-track system after the German model to separate common from better-off children. This scheme, which was rejected by many educationalists as strongly elitist and feudalistic, was supposed to provide the foundation for highly educated military men and other specialists.56 For reasons of moral indoctrination, Yuan first reintroduced the cult of honoring Confucius and, in 1915, Confucian classics again became part of the school curriculum, with the aim of teaching students virtues such as loyalty and piety. These concepts deliberately referred strongly to the late imperial legacy. In Yuan’s view, presented in the Promulgation of the Aims of Education in January 1915, education above all had to fan patriotism, raise the martial spirit, and produce sincere, honest, and eager citizens with the ability to self-govern (zizhi) and to enrich the state.57 Concerning patriotism, he used the same rhetoric as when addressing soldiers and employed terms such as fatherland (zuguo), iron and blood (tiexue), and sacrifice (xisheng).

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According to Yuan “true patriotism cannot be destroyed.”58 He emphasized that state (guo) and people (ren) were linked and interdependent: “with the skin gone, what can the hair attach itself to?”59 A strong state rested on strong citizens (min), who in turn depended on a strong body, and a strong body resulted from martial spirit. Protecting the body/oneself (shen) was like protecting the state. And how would one protect oneself? Yuan asked. Today, there existed “strong and healthy men” (zhuangjian zhi fu) and “gentle and frail scholars” (wenruo zhi shi). Only the latter got sick of bad weather, because they did not possess a martial spirit like the strong men. And, for that reason, everyone talking about the education of citizens agreed, he claimed, that physical education was the most important element, more important than virtue and knowledge. Children should play to “activate the spirit” and, when they were older, conduct military gymnastics and improve their physique. How would that help the state? Physical exercise and martial spirit were the manifestation of the ancient idea that “the whole country served as soldier,” Yuan argued. Everywhere, in “East and West,” particularly where systems of conscription were enforced, every citizen had the duty to serve as a soldier. There was “no citizen who was not a soldier, no soldier who was not a citizen.” Soldiering was joy, and dying in battle was glorious, he emphasized.60 “Martial spirit is the quality [one needed] to prepare for becoming a soldier.”61 In the decade after the fall of the Qing, citizenship and school education remained strongly influenced by the idea of the citizen as soldiers. Although competitive sports and the idea of free development of a child began to emerge in China, most educators, reformers, and politicians, like Yuan Shikai, favored and promoted military gymnastics, military discipline, and military values. Military gymnastics remained an important part of the school curriculum and military circles demanded that military-style physical exercises should not be neglected in schools. In 1915, the government renamed lower primary schools to citizen schools (guomin xuexiao) and decreed that all schools must have a training ground for gymnastics (ticaochang). Like other subjects such as drawing, singing, sewing, or handicrafts, gymnastics should always be taught by specialists and not by regular schoolteachers. Furthermore, considering the significance of healthy physical bodies for the state and military, the government banned corporal punishment for school children.62 Eventually, after the First World War, Chinese educators and intellectuals increasingly rejected German military gymnastics because of its alleged “militaristic” connections. While military gymnastics or ticao was still practiced in the army, after the 1910s, other forms of physical education became more popular among Chinese urbanites. Particularly Anglo-American competitive team sports and track and field, subsumed under the terms yundong or tiyu (deriving from the Japanese terms taiiku and undō, respectively), proliferated in urban China. As a wide-ranging discourse on physical education in


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newly emerging general and specialist periodicals enfolded, the purpose and meaning of exercising became less tangible (for military service) and increasingly abstract (for the “nation”) and widespread.63 Similar struggles between military-inspired forms of gymnastics and competitive sports, which were connoted as “peaceful,” also occurred in Europe at the same time. In Britain, sport was only added officially to the school curriculum in 1906; the emphasis in state elementary schools had previously lain on military-style drill.64 By 1910, Andrew D. Morris argues, the link between physical exercise, individual health, and fitness for the survival and development of the Chinese nation-state seemed obvious to large parts of the population. Military gymnastics and other forms of physical education became increasingly popular among the wider society and were promoted strongly by military and educational reformers. Physical education was increasingly in vogue in urban China and politicians and intellectuals, among others, viewed it as a means of overcoming the image of “the sick man of East Asia” and the (self-) attribution of Chinese men and women as being weak and spiritless for cultural reasons.65 Apart from schools, the Scouting Movement, which gained an increasing foothold in China after 1911, contributed to citizenship education with a military orientation. The Boy Scouts, a number of similar organizations and their respective journals, such as the Boy Scouts Monthly (Tongzijun yuekan), promoted a male body ideal along the lines of military discipline, masculinity, and values.66 Together with student military training groups, boy scouts engaged in large military-style reviews and parades in the 1910s and 1920s that were supported by political leaders such as Jiang Jieshi.67 As physical education became more nationalistic in the early years of the Republic, allegedly traditional martial arts experienced a renaissance. A strong movement consisting of practitioners and politicians started promoting “Chinese martial arts,” then termed Wushu, as a national cultural heritage. Practitioners created a few, clearly identifiable and defined styles out of the manifold and piecemeal forms of martial arts that existed throughout the country. They created fixed sets of techniques, regulations, and rules, and organized contests. However, as in the case of other, long-existing forms of bodily practice systems such as Yoga or Jujutsu, Wushu absorbed elements from European sport and exercise regimen at the beginning of the twentieth century, including military-style gymnastics.68 As president of the Republic, Yuan Shikai became one of the most important patrons of Wushu training in schools that aimed at the toughening-up of young people for potential military service—similar to German military gymnastics but with a strongly traditionalist and nationalist undertone. In 1915, martial arts became part of school curricula without replacing gymnastics or other forms of exercise. Two years later, in 1917, the government in Beijing made Wushu, at least officially, part of the basic training in the army. Ticao, however, was still in use

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and later also practiced by the Nationalist army and the Communist People’s Liberation Army.69 Mother of Citizen-Soldiers The educational system outlined in 1904 neither stipulated the establishment of public schools for girls nor the introduction of coeducation. Instead, the authors of the educational outlines, Zhang Zhidong, Rongqing, and Zhang Baixi, argued that women’s education should solely take place at home and follow the idea that girls should be brought up to be “good wives and worthy mothers” (xianmu liangqi). Following established customs, they feared that too much education for women ultimately led to moral decay, including free marriage and promiscuity. However, private schools, missionary schools, nursery schools, and kindergartens, which often accepted girls older than the nominally allowed age, already existed. In 1907, on order of Empress Dowager Cixi, the Ministry of Education finally promulgated the Regulation for Girls’ Schools (Nüzi xuetang zhangcheng) and the Regulations for Girls’ Normal Schools (Nüzi shifan xuetang zhangcheng) and introduced public primary and normal schools for female students. In 1912, the government installed secondary education for girls as well as co-education in primary school and, in 1919, it sanctioned the establishment of higher normal schools for women and allowed them to enter Peking University.70 The major issue related to the education of girls or women was not a general social or cultural rejection but the exposure of female bodies in public schools. Generally spoken, the higher the social standing and reputability of a woman, the more she was confined to her own chambers. Confucian orthodoxy endorsed education and emphasized its transformative potential and positive influence on both men and women. In the late imperial era, women usually were taught proper behavior, their position as wife or daughter in the family, and certain skills they needed for the household. Although they were not eligible to participate in the examinations for officials, women from wealthy and educated families often learned to write and read to a quite sophisticated degree. In any case, the education of girls and women had to happen at home behind closed doors and no woman was supposed to display her knowledge and learnedness. Moreover, as mothers, they were largely responsible for the moral upbringing of their children and teaching them basic writing and reading skills.71 After the turn of the century, the notion that female education should aim at fostering worthy (or wise) mothers and good (or virtuous) wives prevailed. The term was first introduced in the translation of a Japanese article in the Educational Miscellany (Jiaoyu congshu) journal, whose founding was


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backed by Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong. The idea of good wives and worthy mothers, formulated after European examples, was the principle idea around which debates concerning the education of women in Japan had centered since the start of the Meiji era. After 1895, it became the official leitmotif of educational politics in Japan. After the turn of the century, it was then appropriated by Chinese educators and soon became the focal point of an ambiguous debate about women’s rights, their political and social role, and feminism. A consequence of the aim to educate women to be good wives and worthy mothers was a concentration on household education, which was depicted as an issue of national importance: women had to be primarily taught to make the home run smoothly and give their husbands the space to accomplish great deeds of national importance.72 Household duties of women were sometimes viewed as similar to the patriotic duty of men serving in the military.73 Good wives and worthy mothers had an active responsibility for the condition of Chinese society and the nation as a whole. From the perspective of military reformers, the idea of “worthy mothers” was essential. Military leaders and reformers viewed women not only as central for the basic pre-school education of toddlers and small children but also for the prenatal and biological preconditions of citizen-soldiers. They directly related the fitness and health of prospective mothers to the military preparedness of the people and the “race.” Concepts of femininity and the social roles of women in China changed dramatically at the beginning of the twentieth century. On the one hand, these changes occurred due to the radical repositioning of women through successful feminist agendas of equality and liberation. On the other hand, both a newly developing governance rationality and nationalist ideology modified established gender roles and concepts. Military reforms not only produced new concepts and practices of masculinity but also strongly facilitated the conceptualization of “women as mothers of citizens” (guomin zhi mu). The idea that women were themselves not citizens but only mothers of (male) citizens became the “applied gender ideology” depicted in textbooks.74 Women were denied citizenship but construed as “progenitors” of citizens, who were responsible for the biological quality of the race and the strength of the nation. This quality, Joan Judge argues, was perceived as physical rather than intellectual or moral and, as a consequence, girls should receive physical and hygiene education to become strong, robust, and healthy.75 While educators usually insisted strictly on women as schoolteachers for girls, in the case of physical exercise classes, men were admitted as instructors.76 Among the first to advocate both a broad and systemized education for women and the reconfiguration of gender arrangements were post-1895 intellectuals such as Liang Qichao, Kang Youwei, and Tan Sitong. In his influential essay Discussion of Women’s Education (1897), Liang argued that women needed to be educated to become economically independent from men.

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Although this would certainly increase the status and improve the treatment of women, his aim was to turn them into producers who were able to support the family and reduce the husband’s burden of providing. He did not necessarily question the established family and gender arrangement and demanded that education should serve practical purposes. The purpose of educating women was to make the interaction in family and household smoother and to prepare women to instruct their children in the right way. Finally, Liang emphasized, physical education of women was crucial to ensure the fitness of the offspring and the survival of race and nation.77 After the turn of the century, an increasing number of intellectuals and politicians followed the argument that educating women made them productive contributors to China’s economic recovery. However, they usually had training in handicraft skills in mind and only a few, such as Zhang Zhidong, actually considered women as a potential workforce for the emerging industrial sector.78 While the New Armies virtually never considered the employment of women as “human resources” in any way, one article by Wan Ao in the Nanyang Military Journal from 1909 suggested developing the working skills of the female members of military households and establishing handicrafts schools where they learned sewing, weaving, or needlework. They would not only be able to help the family economically, particularly if a soldier died in service, but they would also support the army by producing military equipment such as uniforms and shoes. Consequently, military dress no longer needed to be imported from abroad and this, implicitly, strengthened the national economy. Wan concluded that handicraft schools and women sewing uniforms would strengthen the bond between people and the military and raise the status of soldiers.79 The idea of women being the mothers of future citizens became much more important. Educators, intellectuals, and military reformers considered the education of women as essential for the development of boys into healthy and worthy citizens. In 1902, Zhang Yingxu, an architect and official educated in Japan, and Yang Du, Yuan Shikai’s later advisor who also went to university in Japan, published their translation of an essay on the educational situation of women in China, originally written by the Japanese educator Shimoda Utako. Shimoda was a woman who strongly promoted the ideology of “good wives and worthy mothers” and herself established the Jissen Women’s School near Tokyo (in 1899), which had a large number of female Chinese students. Her ideas on women’s and girls’ education influenced important political figures such as Zhang Zhidong, Cixi, and Sun Yat-sen.80 In essence, the translation argued that “the education of women is the source of men’s education, [because] education at home is the foundation for school education.”81 According to Shimoda, the education of prospective mothers had, in fact, two dimensions: a biological and a moral one. As in Korea, Annan (Vietnam),


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Burma, or Turkey, everyone in China was weak because women did not receive an education, Shimoda argued. Unlike Japanese women, Chinese elite women all had bound feet and were fragile and docile. The result was that the “Chinese race” was weak. On the other hand, she emphasized, “if the bodies of women of one country are strong, then the bodies of men will be even stronger!”82 The physical, intellectual, and moral education of women, through schools, educational societies, or periodicals, was the very foundation of a strong nation. Apart from the reproductive responsibility of their bodies to produce healthy and fit children, women were in “charge of observing the conduct of men.”83 Finally, for the sake of balance and harmony, women also had to be taught patriotism, “the beautiful gist of citizenship and strongest foundation of the nation.” According to Shimoda, it would do the country no good if one-half of the citizens was patriotic and the other half was not. The shame foreigners inflicted on the country also concerned women and thus, she demanded, they had to participate in protecting it.84 Until the 1910s, the debate about school education of women and girls, particularly their physical education, was strongly dominated by the idea of “women as mothers of citizens” and promoted in periodicals, school publications, and official regulations.85 The underlying goal of politicians and reformers was breeding fitter children who would become more capable and stronger soldiers, compared to the weak and sickly men of the past. Physical exercise and hygiene prepared women to give birth to sturdy men, whose rights and duties as future citizens were linked to their ability to physically defend the nation and ensure the survival of the race. Particularly hygiene, Sarah Stevens argues, was an instrument to “co-opt” women for the project of founding a strong nation.86 In 1905, Yuan Shikai himself published an article with the title Women are the Mothers of Citizens in the Shuntian Shibao, a Japanese newspaper based in Beijing.87 Yuan polemically underlined the importance of girls’ schooling and repeatedly described girls as the foundation of the wealth and strength of country and race. “A stupid and clumsy cow—can she give birth to a unicorn?” Yuan asked.88 First, he pronounced, the bad habit of foot binding had to be abolished and girls should participate in gymnastics. Second, they would learn arithmetic, geography, science, and other subjects. Learning and exercise made them strong and if girls were strong they would become strong mothers, resulting in a stronger race. Before citizens could be cultivated, women had to be cultivated, Yuan declared and observed that talents (rencai) did not fall from the sky but they were born by women (and not from men). “Without women, there are no citizens!”89 After the Qing government officially decided, in 1907, to establish staterun schools for girls, specific textbooks on virtue of education for girls followed that emphasized the role of women as mothers and wives as well as the significance of physical education, patriotism, and martial spirit.90 In many

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ways, these textbooks embodied the attempt to comprehensively regulate women’s bodies. One richly illustrated volume from 1909, the Reader for the Self-Cultivation for Female Students (Nüxue xiushen duben), edited by Zhang Renan, strongly followed the idea that “women are the mothers of citizens.” While it frequently referred to established Chinese notions on the conduct of women, such as filial piety, the reader also emphasized motherhood and placed it in an international context: “in China and the West, everyone says that women are the mothers of citizens. The backwardness of the [Chinese] citizens is connected to the decline of mothers’ education [because] women’s education is the foundation of the nation [...].”91 The Ministry of Education published similar educational materials that repeated the same message. The Self-Cultivation Textbook for Girls’ Lower Primary Schools (Nüzi chudeng xiaoxue xiushen jiaokeshu) from 1910, a book consisting completely of illustrations, emphasized hygiene, orderliness, discipline, appearance, and respect for teachers and other people. For instance, one picture showing a girl sitting upright and attentive at a desk is contrasted with a picture of an obviously bored girl who idly hunches over her desk. Other illustrations show girls on the “exercise ground” (ticaochang), playing hoopla, or ball games.92 Moreover, early in 1910, the Ministry Education issued a regulation concerning the style and color of girls’ school uniforms, which should be a simple blue or light blue dress covering the knees and made of home-produced linen or cotton. Primary school students, however, should generally simply wear what they wore at home. Bound feet, the regulation explicitly stated, were forbidden.93 The first magazines for women, issued during late Qing and early Republican years, such as the Nüzi shijie (Women’s World), Funü Shibao (The Women’s Eastern Times) and Funü zazhi (The Ladies’ Journal), similarly promoted physical education and gymnastic exercises for women and often repeated the designation of women as mothers.94 An article on Women’s Gymnastics (Shuo nüzi zhi ticao) by Tang Jianwo, published in the Funü Shibao in 1911, argued that there were not many big differences between men and women apart from the fact that men had the duty to serve as soldiers.95 Women’s bodies were frail compared to the bodies of men but they still needed to exercise. She stated that the Berlin medical society, in 1864, had announced that the bad health of a mother affected her offspring. “Thus, the weak body of a woman might become a calamity for the citizenry,” she declared.96 According to Tang, women were only slightly different than men, but this small difference became in fact decisive in the discourse on citizenship: men could become soldiers; women could not. However, for the sake of the military preparedness of the nation, they had to take care of their bodies and were responsible for producing strong prospective soldiers and citizens. The idea derived from Europe and was particularly prevalent in the German educational system at


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the turn of the century. A volume on military preparedness through education, published by the late nineteenth century Wehrkraftausschuss, included an article by the teacher Hermann Randt with the title The German Woman and Military Preparedness (Die Deutsche Frau und die Wehrkraft). In Randt’s opinion, the main duty of women was to give birth to heroes. They had to be physically and mentally healthy because “brave men are begotten by the brave” and the most important source for the military preparedness of a nation was the abundance of healthy and strong offspring. In ancient Sparta, he argued, gymnastics for girls was mandatory by law and, in fact, the very reason for the existence of Sparta’s heroic and manly warriors. Therefore, a German woman should exercise, be broad-hipped and healthy, and rear her child herself with her own breast milk instead of leaving it to a wet nurse. According to Randt, the mother was the most significant attachment figure for a child and the father was rarely of any importance. Similarly, he argued, adult men relied on the council, assurance, and support of their good wives.97 Chinese journals such as the Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi) embraced these ideas and, for instance, praised German and British women for enthusiastically welcoming home their soldier husbands, thus expressing both the high status of the military as well as women’s ability to be a positive influence on society.98 Furthermore, military reformers did not forget to mention the role of women in Sparta in their debates about citizenship and women’s education. An article by Tang Zhongyong, published in the Zhejiang Military Journal in 1916, dealt with the heroic story of the Spartan king Leonidas I and 300 warriors, who allegedly died while heroically defending their country during the Battle of Thermophylae (480 BC). Tang pointed out that, according to Spartan law, a man had either to win or die in battle. Spartan warriors sacrificed themselves for their country, lived or died together, suffered together in battle, and enjoyed glory together. In the second part of the article, however, he praised the Spartan women—wives and mothers—for giving birth to such heroic men and patriotically enduring the death of these men for the “fatherland.” The women (nü zhangfu), thus, were the real heroes and the real representatives of the citizenry (guomin zhi daibiao).99 There were also counter-narratives questioning the dominant notion about women being only mothers of citizens and soldiers. During the late imperial period, as numerous stories document, it was not uncommon to imagine women or girls wearing the clothes of men or boys and thereby assuming male roles such as officials, teachers, and soldiers. As the story of Hua Mulan exemplifies, who put on her father’s armor and went to war in his stead, the narrative of cross-dressing warrior women was supposed to demonstrate filial piety and virtue, not heroism and courage. After returning home, Hua Mulan switched back to her female role to take care of her father. Whereas the way of telling stories about women warrior did not differ significantly from other

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martial stories, which often spared the reader details about fighting and the battlefield, twentieth century women activists nevertheless drew on martial female figures such as Hua Mulan, along with social heroines, to demonstrate their feminist or nationalist conviction. For instance, one early Republican version of the Hua Mulan theme was packed into a report about the First World War in Europe: according to the Zhejiang Military Journal, many Russian men had died and so women, dressed in men’s uniforms, took over their duties. Although it was a violation of international military law, some of these Russian woman soldiers even went to the battle line, disguised as men. These “brave female soldiers wearing men’s uniforms,” the report declared, “really possess a spirit of public service and loyalty, and willingly sacrifice themselves (xisheng qi shen) without reward.”100 The moral of this cross-dressing story was not filial piety and virtue, but sacrifice and struggle for the nation-state. Joan Judge points out that this recoding was common in numerous stories about past Chinese and European martial heroines such as Hua Mulan, or the French medieval iconic warrior Jean d’Arc that were published in women’s magazines at the turn of the twentieth century. Along with social heroines such as Florence Nightingale, these martial heroines symbolized the empowerment of women and were supposed to encourage women to take responsibility for their own lives and for the nation.101 The popularity of martial heroines, and the emphasis on their martial valor, demonstrated how military masculine characteristics became, in turn, important for citizenship. One exemplary rendering of the Mulan story by the (male) author Liu Yazi appearing in the Women’s World in 1904, emphasized her martial spirit, her patriotism, and her qualification as citizensoldier (junguomin zige). In the story, Mulan says: “although I am a girl, I am also a member of the citizenry.”102 A few female activists fighting for gender equality claimed the same rights for women by actively emulating male (military masculine) connotated behavior and appearance. The most notable figure was Qiu Jin, who joined the Revolutionary Alliance in Japan and became a martyr after the Qing government executed her in 1907. She practiced shooting and fencing and learned how to use explosives. She studied physical education and, as the principal of a normal college in Hangzhou, drilled her own students in military gymnastics. As many photographs documented, she experimented with many kinds of Chinese or foreign male clothing styles, with the declared intention of achieving a mind like that of a man. Qiu Jin, who admired Hua Mulan, herself became an ideal of martial devotion for other women.103 In the wake of the revolution of 1911, a number of progressive and educated women claimed and fought for equality in the new Republic beside male revolutionaries, particularly by aspiring to the military masculine values now increasingly popular among elite men. Inspired by stories and tales of


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brave women warriors such Hua Mulan, women formed army companies to reinforce the anti-Qing troops and joined the fights in Nanjing and Hankou. For a few months, young women in cities often wore uniforms to express their support for the revolution.104 Related to this issue, Zhang Zhujun, a woman who, like Sun Yat-sen, was a graduate from the Boji Medical College in Guangzhou and later joined the Revolutionary Alliance, published an article in the Dongfang zazhi with the title On the Establishment of a Women’s Army. Men and women, she argued, all shared the duty to fight and hence deserved the same rights. No matter who, she claimed, is “spilling blood and dying in battle [for the Republic, he or she] becomes honorable.”105 Fighting and physical sacrifice were the ultimate source of honor that could not be reserved only for men, Zhang demanded. Eventually, however, on order of the provisional Republican government in Nanjing, all army corps consisting of women had to be disbanded and the parliament in Nanjing, after rejecting fierce protests by feminist groups, subsequently confirmed that “citizen” stood for men only. Although Sun Yat-sen was a supporter of women’s education and fought against the practice of foot binding, he was reluctant concerning the introduction of women’s suffrage or equal treatment as citizens. Yuan Shikai eventually even prohibited the emerging women’s rights movement.106 Conclusion The overall aim of educational reformers in late Qing and Republican China was to transform society away from kinship and family-based organization into a state populated by participating and responsible citizens.107 For most educators, intellectuals, politicians, and military people, this almost always implied physical and military education, because the new citizens should be citizens-soldiers who were able to fulfill their civic duties and defend the state, as well as the people or nation. Leading military reformers, such as Yuan Shikai and Zhang Zhidong, were involved in educational reforms and were industrious promoters of universal physical and military education based on the German and Japanese models. Thus, the idea of the citizensoldier became part of the new official age-graded school system that was to prepare boys and their bodies for the transition into adulthood. Military-style exercises and drill, martial songs and stories, as well as military uniforms became important elements of civilian schools at all levels and were supposed to increase the martial inclination of children and prepare boys for military service. Education and the new school system were geared to produce physically strong and brave men with a pronounced martial spirit. Intellectuals and politicians increasingly thought of these men as citizens instead of subjects and thus citizenship was strongly linked to the male body and defined

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according to the ability to fight. As military service became an issue of both manliness and civic obligations toward the state, education had to prepare boys for this duty. Women were not supposed to serve as soldiers and, consequently, could not obtain full citizenship. However, their gendered social role in the re-conceptualized postimperial state also changed, because they were defined according to their role as mothers of citizens and, explicitly or implicitly, citizen-soldiers. A few early twentieth century feminists sought to recreate and emulate legendary women warriors, who had acted as men and crossed (actually unstable) gender boundaries. They copied manly behavior and appearance, which was increasingly militarized at the beginning of the twentieth century. But although they influenced many elite urban women, they were not able to prevent the large-scale reduction of women to their biological bodies as “Republican mothers.” Education for girls, including physical education, had the main purpose of preparing them for their role as mothers of future citizens. If they gave birth to boys, these were able to qualify for citizenship by being, at least theoretically, able to serve in the army. Girls, on the other hand, were excluded from active military service and, being reduced to their biological sex, only could hope to become mothers of strong boys. Although a few women in urban centers such as Shanghai were able to develop a different, more self-determined and independent lifestyle, the mainstream idea that a woman had primarily to serve the family and nation as a mother only began to erode in the 1950s, arguably without ever vanishing completely. Educational reforms, Sally Borthwick points out, were crucial for the development of an “understanding of the center as initiator, as activator, with powers of compulsion and regulation unknown in China.”108 The idea of state and government as active shapers, responsible for educating and cultivating citizens, derived from Germany and Japan. New technologies of gathering and creating knowledge enabled new practices of governing the entire population through education and schooling. In 1907, for the first time ever and still with many deficiencies, the Ministry of Education conducted a national population survey to explore the conditions of the school reform programs. Regular inspections, furthermore, constantly examined the implementation of the new school policy.109 Education no longer only referred to the potential to enlighten an individual—a central notion in Confucian thought—but also the power to discipline and direct, physically and psychologically, the entire population. Disciplining the body and mind of an individual, and uniting these disciplined individuals into groups was the new, central governance rational of the New Armies. Through educational reforms and the agenda to cultivate citizen-soldiers, this form of disciplinary power was extended beyond the military and combined with the idea to govern the biological quality of the population for the sake of national military preparedness.


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notes 1. Xinmin congbao 1903 (29): Lun Shangwu, yiyue tili, 7–8. 2. Matthes and Arntzen 1976, 64. Sympathizing educators viewed the purpose of school education to be “breaking the will of children.” See Lilge 1997, 3. 3. Bernhardi was an officer and military historian, who started promoting his ideas about a war between peoples in 1901. His book Deutschland und der Nächste Krieg (Germany and the Next War) from 1911 was widely received in Germany and abroad. It was translated into Chinese in 1915. See Bauer and Hwang 1982, 438. 4. Schubert-Weller 1991. The special commission on military preparedness (Ausschuss zur Förderung der Wehrkraft durch Erziehung or, in short, Wehrkraftausschuss) was a subcommittee of the Central Committee for the Promotion of Popular and Youth Games (Zentralausschuss zur Förderung der Volks- und Jugendspiele) created in 1891 in the wake of the Berlin School Conference. In 1904, it published a volume whose title translates as Military Preparedness through Education (Wehrkraft durch Erziehung), which included the short version of the book The People in Arms (Das Volk in Waffen) by Colmar von der Goltz, which was translated into Chinese by Jiang Baili. See Goltz 1904. Already in 1841, Adolf Spiess, the creator of the free and order exercise style, had declared that gymnastics should prepare young people for war. See Lilge 1997, 21. 5. Bailey 1990, 146. 6. Borthwick 1980, 127–29. 7. This idea is particularly pointed out by Chinese authors. See Han 1987; Fu 1994; Xu 1999; Chen 2004; Lu and Chen 2007. 8. Rawski 1979; Elman 1994; Lee 2000. On the education of children in Chinese history see also Kinney 1995. 9. Kang [1895] 1961, 138. 10. Borthwick 1980, 44. 11. Franke 1960; Fan 1995. 12. For tables see Shu 1961, 229; Kuo 1915, 79. 13. Xiushen was a basic Confucian moral principle and viewed as foundation of the social order but, during the initial reform period, it was accommodated to the new, foreign-style school system: Already in 1895, Song Yuren noted in a book that “Western countries use xiushen to govern the country.” Song 1895, introduction. 14. For the full version of the Outline of Educational Principles (Zouding xuetang zhangcheng—Xuewu gangyao), also called Guimao Educational System, see Chen 1986, 532–51 and Shu 1961, 199–220. There is a substantial body of research on the late Qing and early Republican educational reforms that, however, fails to highlight the centrality of military education. See Biggerstaff 1961; Ayers 1971; Borthwick 1980; Bastid and Bailey 1988; Bailey 1990; Sang 2007. More recently, scholars have turned their attention to new aspects such as the professionalization of teachers’ education, domestic science, and childhood development. See Tillman 2012, 32–43; Cong 2007; Schneider 2012. A number of insightful and still useful contemporary English-language publications have already examined the changes of the educational system in China and sometimes included statistics and lists or

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introduced textbooks and educational materials in Chinese and English. See Lyon 1905; Sites 1905; Graybill 1911; King 1911; Kuo 1913; Kuo 1915; Edmunds 1919. Somewhat later but with the benefit of hindsight are McCloy 1923 and Peake 1932. Edited primary source collections include Shu 1961; Gu and Chen 1991; Zhu 1993. 15. GX, chapter 7, Xuetang zhangcheng, 1, 5. 16. On the Xuebu see Guan 2000. See also Brunnert and Hagelstrom 1910, 131–38 and Kuo 1915, 88, 94–96. 17. Xuebu zouqing xuanshi jiaoyu zongzhi in Shu 1961, 223–24. Kuo translated shangshi as “respect for industrial pursuits,” see Kuo 1915, 89. On the emergence of textbooks, led by private initiatives, see Schulz Zinda 2004. 18. For the numbers, see, for instance, Ichiko 1980, 375. The same numbers are already given by Kuo 1915, 107. 19. Graham 1994. 20. King’s Chinese name was Qingpi. See Qingpi and Di 1895. The book was first published in 1890 and reprinted at least twice in 1895 and 1896. Note the use of shen instead of ti, the former rather representing a person or the self and the latter for the physical body. 21. Qingpi and Di 1895. 22. Yang 1907. 23. Kato 1903, 3. See also Schulz Zinda 2004, 694. 24. Xiehebao 1910 (8): Bolin xiaoxuetang xinshi ticao, 8. 25. Kim 2004. 26. Zheng 2007. 27. Tang 1905, 15. 28. Ministry of Education 1906. On the certification and control of textbooks by the ministry see Kuo 1915, 105–06. 29. Ministry of Education [after 1906]. 30. Ibid., juan 1, 1. 31. Ministry of Education [after 1906], juan 1, 2. 32. Ibid., juan 2, 1. The individual exercises were called gongfu in this volume. Interestingly, not only new, foreign-inspired textbooks were used but, sometimes, old Chinese material for children’s education was also reprinted. In 1908 and in 1916, the textbook Youxue xu zhi jujie (also Youxue qionglin) by the Ming scholar Cheng Dengji was republished. It contained no guidelines for physical exercise but only explanations about the body (shenti). See Cheng 1908. 33. For instance Ministry of Education after 1906, juan 1, 9. 34. See Bailey 1990, 30, 163. 35. Fan 2007b. Fan argued that Zhang Zhidong’s notion on school uniforms strongly followed his inclination toward using Chinese ideas as a substantial core and anything “Western” for practical use. Ibid., 136–37. 36. Mishima 1903. 37. Ibid., 1–4. 38. The book also emphasized the need of physical education for girls because “according to a Western saying, when the girls are healthy, then the nation is healthy.” Mishima 1903, 50.


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39. Zhang 1905. At the same time, Zhang also wrote an Army Song, probably for the same purpose. Another example of such a song, called School Song for Elementary Students (Younian xiaoge), can be found in BBZ 1910, 1. 40. See Lemmermann 1984. 41. Wu and Pan 1902, appendix. Traditional German military song collections were also found in a translation by Yao Shouxiang (Stephen Yao) of an American book on physical education from 1904, published by the Shanghai-based Commercial Press, which addressed a general readership rather than soldiers. The book explained that knee bends, push-ups, dumb bells, and other exercises were best to be done with music. Besides a few English songs, it introduced a German military song entitled Soldaten Lieder (sic, Soldiers’ Songs). See Yao and Luokesi 1904. 42. Liang Qichao, Yinbingshi shihua, 42–3. See Liang [1902–1907] 1959. Liang’s text has attached three of Huang’s songs. See also Mao 2012, 65; Gong 2011; Schmidt 1994, 56. 43. See for instance one of the earliest such books by Zhang Yipeng, see Zhang 1900. 44. See Gong 2006, 302–12, 322–34 (esp. 330); Mao 2012. On the Communist Party’s later use of songs and music for military and political purposes, see also Hung 1996. 45. NBZ 1909, 39: Yang Yuling, Zhongguo zhanzheng weilaiji, 1–4. Another example is NBZ 1911, 56: Cheng Fengzhang, Ernü yingxiong. 46. Powell 1955, 279. 47. XT, chapter 32: Xubu zunyi dong du zou zhongxue yishang xuetang bingshi ticao fangzhao lujun lianxizhe, 16–17. 48. Bastid and Bailey 1988, 138; Bailey 1990, 136. See also Shao 2004, 162–68. On Zhang, see also Chu 1965. 49. Fung 1980, 99–100. 50. On Cai see Wang 1996b; Cai 1998, 278–322; Duiker 1977. Cai established five fundaments of education: virtue, intellect, body (ti), collective, and aesthetics, which have still some value in Taiwan, Macao, and Hong Kong. 51. Jiaoyubu gongbu jiaoyu zongzhi. In Shu 1961, 226. 52. Bailey 1990, 152. 53. See also Chow 1960, 259–62 and Weston 2004. 54. Liu 2001, 98. 55. MacKinnon 1980, 147. 56. Young 1977, 192–210. See also Bailey 1990, 146, 151–62. 57. Yuan Shikai, Promulgation of the Aims of Education (Yuan Shikai, Banding jiaoyu yaozhi), January 1915. See Yuan [1915] 1961. 58. Ibid., 250. 59. Ibid., 251. 60. Ibid., 251–52. 61. Ibid., 249. 62. Guomin xuexiaoling 1915 [1916], see articles 13, 29, 35. See also ZBZ 1915, 21: Yu junmin, 9, which also emphasized the importance of ticao for educating citizen-soldiers.

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63. Morris 2004, 1–46. See also Morris 2000; Brownell 1995, 37–57; Gao 2003; Xu 1996, 47–122; Zhang 2010. The history of physical education has received increasing interest from young Chinese academics, leading to a number of recently published Master’s and doctoral theses. See Liu 2009; Liu 2007; Tang 2008; Wu 2006; Zhang 2010. 64. Some teachers, however, organized team games and competitions before their official introduction. See Mason 1989, 2. See also Mason and Riedi 2010. On the link between sports and the military in Japan, see Guttmann and Thompson 2001, 70–1, 153–54. 65. Morris 2004, 17. 66. Tongzijun yuekan 1919. See also Xin qingnian 1917 (2, 5), which included several articles on the Boy Scouts. 67. The British army general Robert Baden-Powell started the Boy Scout Movement in 1907. See Rosenthal 1986. On the Boy Scouts in China see Hwang 2006 and Culp 2007, 178, 234. 68. Singleton 2013. 69. Filipiak 2008, 198–204. Culp 2007, 198. See also David A. Palmer’s work on qigong, a form of physical and mental self-cultivation consisting of breathing techniques, meditation, and exercises that, similarly, is an “invented tradition,” created by Communist officials after 1949. See Palmer 2007. 70. Duanfang and the Japanese educator Shimoda Utako reportedly influenced Cixi. The most comprehensive recent account on women’s education is Bailey 2007. For an overview see McElroy 2001. A useful contemporary survey is Lewis 1919. The regulations are reprinted in Shu 1961, 800–18. 71. Cheng 2000; Judge 2005; Judge 2008a; Chen 2008. Generally, see also Mann 1997 and Wolf, Witke, and Martin 1975. 72. Judge 2002b, 218–32. See also Barlow 1994; Wang 2012; Schneider 2012. More generally on women in twentieth century China see Ono, Fogel, and Bernhardt 1989; Luo 1996; Bailey 2012. 73. Bailey 2001, 333. 74. Judge 2002a, 26. 75. Judge 2002a. See also Luo 1996, 145–55. 76. Bailey 2007, 2. Before the first Chinese schools, such as the Women’s Gymnastics School (Nüzi ticao xuexiao) in Shanghai, founded in 1908, trained female physical education instructors, Japanese women were also hired to conduct classes. See Judge 2002b, 232. See also Gimpel 2006. 77. Liang Qichao, Bianfa tongyi—Lun nüxue, in Yinbingshi heji (Volume 1), 37–44. See Liang [1897] 1988. See also Judge 2002a, 28, 36. 78. Borthwick 1985, 72, 80. 79. NBZ 1909, 40: Wan Ao, Yi she nügong xuetang yi shan junren zhi jiashi, 1–7. An early article in the Wangguo gongbao, titled Nüzi congjun, from 1894 expressed the concern that women (as nurses in the battlefield) affected the morale of the soldiers negatively. Reprinted in Li and Zhang 1975, 292. 80. See Judge 2002b, 221, 228, 230–35 and Judge 2001. 81. Youxue yibian 1902 (1): Huazu nü xuexiao xuejian Xiatian Gezi lun xing zhongguo nüxueshi, 13.


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82. Ibid., 15. 83. Ibid., 16 (here and following citation). 84. Ibid., 17. 85. On the development of physical education in China until the 1930s, see also Yu 2009a. 86. Stevens 2004, 679. 87. Yuan Shikai [1906], Nüzi wei guomin zhi mu. Reprinted in Li and Zhang 1975, 606–08. 88. Ibid., 606. 89. Ibid., 607. 90. Judge 2002a, 31–5. 91. Zhang 1909, foreword. 92. Xuebu bianyi tushuju 1910. 93. XT, chapter 11: Xuebu zou zun ni nüxue fuse zhangchengzhe, 32–3. See also Yu 2009a, 106–07. On foot binding in general, see Ko 2005. A detailed study on the affect of women’s physical education on the practice of foot binding and in the twentieth century is Hong 1997. 94. Examples include Nüzi shijie 1904 (7): Liu Rui’e Ji nüxue ticao; Nüzi shijie 1904 (10): Ya Hua, Nüzi jianyi de tiyu; Nübao 1909 (2): Jinyuancunzi, Nüzi yu tiyu; Nübao 1909 (2): Chen Yiyi, Nan zun nü bei xianmu liangqi; Funü Shibao 1911 (5): Suzhou nüxuesheng zhi ticao (image of eight girls performing group calisthenics); Funü zazhi 1915 (1): Shen Weizhen, Lun xiaoban bi yu nüzi tiyu; Funü zazhi 1915 (9): Maikefeidun, Ertong tiyu zhi yanjiu. See also Yu 2005; Chiang 2007. From 1914 on, for the same reasons, fetal education increasingly became a political topic. See Richardson 2012. 95. Funü Shibao 1911 (3): Tang Jianwo, Shuo nüzi zhi ticao, 7–10. 96. Ibid., 9. Tang concluded her article by remarking that clothes, too, were responsible for the crooked posture of women but announced that this should be the topic of a separate article. She published another article in the previous issue, Funü Shibao 1911 (2), introducing Rope Exercises for the Home (Jiating yundong sheng ticao) and one article on Exercises to cure gynecological problems and other illnesses (Furenbing ji ta zhong jibing zhi yundong liaofa) in Funüe Shibao 1911 (4). See also Finnane 2008, 82–90. 97. Randt used two authoritative Latin slogans to underline what the direction of women’s education should be: Mens sana in corpora sano (a sound mind in a sound body) and fortes creantur fortibus (brave men are begotten by the brave). Randt 1904, 255, 258. 98. Bailey 2007, 53–4. 99. ZBZ 1916, 24 (25): Tang Zhongyong, Sibada zhi nüzi, 10–15 (6–10). Tang used the expressions mageguoshi (“men die wrapped in horsehide”) and the term xunguo (“sacrifice for the country”), which were both used frequently in military journal articles on the duties and character of military men. See also Judge 2002a, 35. On the broad reception of the battle throughout European history, see Albertz 2006. 100. ZBZ 1916, 31: Zhong Zhisheng, Eguo zhi nanzhuang nübing, 34. 101. Judge 2007, 16–17.

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102. Nüzi shijie 1904 (3): Yalu [Liu Yazi], Zhongguo diyi nii haojie niijunrenjia Hua Mulan zhuan, 1, 4. 103. Finnane 2008, 88–91; Fan and Mangan 2001. 104. Inspiration for this came from Mulan-like stories of brave women warriors such as Nü junrenchuan in the Nüzi shijie. See Nüzi shijie 1904 issues 1–3. See also Borthwick 1985, 81; Judge 2008b, 155–58. 105. DFZZ 1912 (10): Zhang Zhujun Lun zuzhi nüzi jundui, 7. 106. Borthwick 1985, 81; Li 1988; Luo 1996, 340–65. On the development of women’s political rights see also Edwards 2006; Fitzgerald 2008 and particularly Edwards and Zhou 2011. 107. Borthwick 1980, 82–3. 108. Ibid., 65. 109. Kuo 1915, 91.


China’s national strength is exhausted and its martial spirit is low. The physical constitution of the people deteriorates further every day.1 —Mao Zedong, A Study of Physical Education, 1917

In 1917, the young Mao Zedong, working as a librarian at Peking University, published his first article in the avant-garde journal New Youth (Xin qingnian). In this rather eclectic article, titled A Study of Physical Education, he claimed that the only way to overcome the weakness of the nation was to make everyone regularly do physical exercise, ideally, twice a day in the nude. Exercising, Mao emphasized, enhanced physical fitness as well as mental, intellectual, emotional, and moral capacities. Toughening-up the body unleashed a man’s “martial valor” and made him “fierce,” “dauntless,” “fearless,” and “perseverant.” He demanded that it was everyone’s responsibility to become strong and healthy, and prepare body and mind for the greater good of the Chinese nation and “race.” In China, he argued, wen had always been favored over wu. Although exercising and military gymnastics had increasingly been promoted and even incorporated into the official school curriculum, physical education was only carried out halfheartedly and was still considered second to moral and intellectual education. Citing the Ming scholar Gu Yanwu, Mao asked: “to lack either wen or wu—how can that be the right way?” Students, he complained, were not encouraged enough to exercise and thus disdained it. Flowing garments, a slow gait, and an earnest and calm gaze were still considered to be fine deportment, and generated awe and respect. Exposed limbs and the bending and stretching of arms and legs, on the other hand, were viewed as shameful. As a result, the bodies of students were often crooked and their heads hung low. Bodily development, Mao demanded, should become the 319

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most important goal of education and take the physical and martial culture of both the “West” and Japan as an example. While in Japan the spirit of Bushido (Way of the Warrior) enjoyed a high reputation, fencing was very popular in Germany. Physical culture flourished in both countries and was strongly represented in Germany by the famous bodybuilder, Eugen Sandow, and in Japan by the founder of Judo, Kano Jigoro. Moreover, in the United States of America even the president, Theodore Roosevelt, was an outspoken devotee of boxing and exercising. All these men, Mao emphasized, should be taken as examples and be emulated.2 Like most of his contemporaries who were concerned with the critical political and military situation of late Qing and early Republican China, Mao absorbed European and American notions about the governance of the physical body in terms of both an individual and collective social dimension.3 His essay dealt with the most pressing issues the Chinese state and its people were confronted with and, at the same time, it typifies the central themes of this study: first, body and discipline; second, military culture and the conceptualization of masculinity; and, third, the governance of soldiers and officers, military units, citizens, students, and the entire population, for the sake of the state. The body as an object of governance was not only the central topic of Mao’s essay, it has also served as the staple of this book—regardless of whether it deals with the dress and drill of new soldiers, the motivation and masculine identity of new officers, or the physical constitution and military preparedness of new citizens. In late imperial China, people referred to ethical, religious, and medical texts to make sense of their bodies and ascribe meaning to them.4 Similar to Daoists, Confucian thinkers emphasized that the body was not one’s own property but a gift from the parents. It was the obligation of an individual to take good care of his (or her) body out of filial piety, to protect it from damage or harm, and to put it to good use by fulfilling its reproductive function. Both Confucianism and Daoism idealized a long life (shou). Daoists even pursued immortality through various body practices, exercises, and diets. They believed that humors, demons, and spirits affected the body and that all kinds of medical, sexual, and dietary practices would prolong its existence. While the Daoist practice of yangsheng (to keep in good health, nurturing life) was actively trying to influence the longevity of the physical body, the Confucian notion of “maintaining the body” (xiushen) had an explicitly ethical connotation and referred more to moral self-cultivation.5 However, the Confucian ideal was far from being contemptuous of physical exercise as an ideal and a truly virtuous literatus was supposed to refine both his intellectual and martial skills. Mark Elvin objects to the image of Qing scholar-officials shunning and despising any kind of physical activity, whether working or exercising, which they allegedly viewed as unseemly and inappropriate for men of their



standing. According to Elvin, this is a misinterpretation by Western scholars and he claims that the late imperial educated (male) elite of the Ming and Qing periods was not only “obsessed” with diets and medicine but also valued physical exercising.6 Nevertheless, these existing techniques to cultivate and exercise the body differed strongly from the European physical culture of the nineteenth century, which did not aim at sexual virility, mental energy, and moral discipline but at physical strength, control, subordination, and alignment. The European form of physical exercise and discipline was intrinsically military and aimed at conformation and clout, ultimately serving the exclusive unity of the nationstate and not individual health or universal moral enlightenment, as in the Chinese case. Standard Chinese convention dictated that, apart from the face, no other part of the body should be exposed to the eyes of others. Members of the educated elite would never perform any physical exercise in front of others. Preventing illness and, at best, staying agile and nimble were central to strenuous physical activities. European physical culture, on the other hand, aimed at optimizing the body and increasing physical strength, constitution, collective efficiency, discipline, and homogenization. At least for the latter, exposure or visibility was essential.7 Instigated by the late nineteenth century New Armies, the perception and practices of physical culture common in Europe, the United States, and Japan influenced a similar physical education movement in twentieth century China. Late Qing military reforms therefore had a lasting and significant effect on the reconceptualization of the human body in twentieth century China. Military reformers appropriated European disciplinary techniques, which they adopted directly from the reputedly archetypical German army or indirectly from Japan, where these techniques were allegedly customized for a Chinese context. Military reformers and the New Armies first and foremost sought to create physically and mentally strong and healthy soldiers. German-style physical exercise, including group calisthenics, apparatus gymnastics, as well as the rigorous training of posture, gait, and motion, prepared soldiers for marching in step, close unit drill, and tactical formations. The aim was forming individuals into a cohesive unity or, in other words, conjoining a number of bodies into one collective body. Moreover, exercise should motivate the soldiers and increase their morale, self-confidence, and spirit. In order to achieve a total grip, the New Armies closely regulated and scheduled life in the barracks. Soldiers were literally “incorporated” into a well-defined environment to further deepen their group discipline and align their bodies. Strict hygiene regimens among soldiers aimed at regulating their everyday routines through their bodies. Ultimately, military reformers and the army leadership viewed the body as some sort of container of intellect and morale. Military instructors such as Li Jishen viewed physical education as useless or empty

322 Conclusion

without a matching development of spirit and mind.8 Reforms in penal law and punishment reflected this idea as the prison replaced corporal punishment as the standard penalty. Incarceration should keep the individual body undamaged and was directed more at disciplining the mind than inflicting physical pain. In the end, the new, foreign-style military training served to govern the physical body, spirit, and behavior of soldiers. The late nineteenth and early twentieth century military reforms and the establishment of the New Armies did not stop there. Starting in the final years of the Qing Dynasty, military circles, intellectuals, politicians, and educators began to consider the entire population as a potential source of new recruits. They sought to create “citizen-soldiers” through a mixture of physical exercise and citizenship education, which were modeled after military training and permeated with military values. While a system of universal military service was never implemented, the newly established school and civic education system had the purpose of militarizing citizens from early childhood onward, preparing their bodies and minds for military service, and endowing them with manly qualities such as valor, perseverance, and a martial spirit. Yet, militarizing society had a further dimension apart from preparing men for military service. It also aimed at creating a more dutiful, loyal, and controllable citizenry, whereby men and boys should be inculcated with the responsibility of protecting the state and sacrificing their lives for the nation. While women were excluded from military service and thus denied acknowledgment as full citizens, their patriotic duty lay in fulfilling their role as mothers of citizen-soldiers. Women and girls had to keep their bodies in good shape by exercising and observing hygiene rules so that they could give birth to healthy and sturdy children.9 Exercising the body for the nation subsequently became a recurrent theme in Republican China and in the People’s Republic,10 including not only sports but also the military training of society in general, particularly school and university students. While military training was mandatory for both male and female students during the 1950s and 1960s, it was somewhat neglected in the 1970s and then resumed in 1985 with the reintroduction of military drill for college freshmen, including goose stepping and standing at attention.11 Throughout the twentieth century, there were recurrent attempts to organize society along military lines. Rarely were these attempts top-down political projects as various agents and institutions and multiple processes of negotiation were involved. During the late Qing and early Republican period, the introduction of military education outside the army was already demanded and welcomed by the educated urban elite, who wished to contribute to “saving the nation.” However, because of the rise of warlord armies, civil war battles, and the news from the atrocious war in Europe, the idea of the citizen-soldier lost its appeal by the end of the 1910s. Yet, after the Nationalist



Party established the Nanjing Republic, it sought to govern the people by organizing society according to military values and discipline. The climax of this project was when Jiang Jieshi initiated the New Life Movement in 1934, which consisted of a mixture of anti-Communist, Confucian, Christian, and nationalist elements and which aimed at inculcating citizens with military discipline and frugality. However, according to Robert Culp, there was “in no sense a unified and uniform system of disciplinary power.”12 Civic education was multidimensional and the product of an intricate interaction among the party, state officials, educators, and students. Citizenship education, furthermore, included scouting (for both boys and girls), and competitive sports as well as moral cultivation along late imperial patterns.13 While the Nationalists revived the concept of women as “republican mothers,” female students received classes in the militarily useful skill of nursing.14 The army itself, whether the late Qing New Armies, the Nationalist army, or the Red Army/People’s Liberation Army, was supposed to represent a role model for society. The (male, brotherly) comradeship and esprit de corps upheld in the army epitomized the community of all people. Although this idea was not as strong in China as in Germany before the First World War, many politicians viewed the nation as the army writ large. Despite the fact that Communists and Nationalists fought the “militaristic” warlords, they both viewed the military as essential for establishing a modern state because it offered a blueprint for governing the country and the population at large.15 In the 1950s, Mao Zedong and other Communist Party leaders evoked the early twentieth century slogan “everyone a soldier,” to speed up the formation of mass movements driven by a martial spirit and by collectivism.16 Reminiscent of the early twentieth century emphasis on will and morale in Germany and Japan, this mass movement was actually used for military purposes during the Korean War (1950–1953), where millions of Chinese volunteers were sent out to overwhelm the enemy by numerical superiority and sheer will power.17 Echoed by Mao in his essay of 1917, late Qing military, educational, and state reformers began to think of “people,” “citizenry” or “nation-race”18 in terms of a governable “population.” In 1901, the Qing government launched the New Policy reforms, which addressed and dealt with the reorganization of the bureaucracy and state administration, foreign affairs, internal (police, penal law, prisons) and external (military) security, law and legal affairs, economic and social policies, education, and even the political system. These reforms did not simply produce new organizations and institutions but they did contribute to the emergence of a governance rationale that was informed by European governmentality.19 Apart from disciplinary techniques focusing on the body, the Qing and successive Republican Chinese governments began to become interested in demographic developments and the management of the population. They increasingly viewed “population” as a major factor for

324 Conclusion

national prosperity and strength that needed to be measured, categorized, and classified to an unprecedented degree. After 1949, the management of all aspects of population development became one of the most crucial concerns of the Communist governments.20 The final years of the declining Qing Dynasty already anticipated the political focus on governing sexuality, reproduction, hygiene, health, and “race,” and the use of population statistics and social surveys as well as the huge “passion for facts.”21 To be sure, this argument is not made to propagate the existence of an inexorable and unilinear process of progress that leads to “modernity.” Frederick Cooper emphasized that the concept of governmentalization is connected to an idea of modernity that is inextricably linked to European history. The fluctuating definition of what “Europe” is, he points out, reveals that terms such as “modernity” and “modernization” are misleading and suggest dichotomies and general developments that do not exist in such clear forms. Moreover, assuming that there are different forms and strategies of reacting to modernity or arguing for the existence of multiple modernities still perpetuates the problem of an allegedly consistent Europe.22 In China, the transformation of governance rationale and governance practices was highly complex and influenced by long-term developments and reinterpretation within China and the alternately syncretic and selective adaptation of foreign elements. Confucian ideas of self-cultivation and self-discipline, the interest in population statistics during the Ming and Qing Dynasty, or new ideas on statecraft that developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, for instance, contributed to new ways of governing and discipline China’s population in the twentieth century.23 Starting with military reforms, which represented perceptions, generalizations, and adaptations of European, American, and Japanese military and political cultures as well as indigenous developments, ideas and practices of governing in China shifted toward biopower. Governing the bodies and minds of people through institutionalized discipline and individual self-discipline conjoined with the biopolitical concern of regulating and managing the demographic developments. The late nineteenth and early twentieth century military reforms, thus, had wider social implications and affected not only the attitude of Chinese society toward its armed forces but also the way society was itself governed, disciplined, and aligned to an alleged “norm.”24 Changing bodily practices, as well as discourses, perceptions, and representations related to the body affected the conceptualization of gender and masculinity in the twentieth century. Gender concepts depend on how humans perform as men and women, on the way they use their bodies and the multiple gendered practices or techniques related to the body. Bodily performance essentially defines the way gender is “done.” Under the impression of foreign influences, the perception, imagination, and representation



of men, male roles, and manliness as well as the way men behaved and thought changed dramatically in China in the twentieth century. As women demanded and gained more rights and the nature of families began to change, men’s role in relation to women increasingly differed from imperial times. The cultured literatus, the iconic wen figure, was replaced by the intellectual who engaged in professionally structured scientific research and higher education. The successful businessman emerged as another powerful wen figuration, as material wealth increasingly became the decisive marker for power and masculine potency. And, to be sure, the new military man became a potent icon of martial wu masculinity, forcefully existing alongside and in relation to other concepts of masculinity, without replacing or dominating them.25 Like many emperors in earlier times, Mao, for one, sought to represent both scholarly wen and martial wu masculinity by appearing, at times, as a diligent intellectual and Marxist theoretician or by regularly swimming through the Yangzi River as part of a widely publicized event. Or by being depicted as either wearing the blue late Qing and early Republican scholar’s robe or the military-style “Mao suit.”26 Although the concept of military masculinity did not become hegemonic, military reformers and army circles created a powerful iconic masculine figuration that motivated an increasing number of men. One of the major goals of the late Qing and early Republican military reforms was the cultivation of a new class of military leaders, an officer corps based on the Euro-American, particularly German, and Japanese role models. Military reformers implemented a system of military schools and officer education to promote specialization and professionalism that encouraged officers to become rational technocrats and war managers. At the same time, they sought to raise the martial spirit, particularly in elite men, by invoking qualities such as courage, heroism, valor, perseverance, honor, comradeship, savageness, and audacity. Finally, they linked serving in the army to sentiments of patriotism and loyalty and to the willingness to sacrifice one’s physical body pro patria. Sacrifice and death implied the destruction or damage of the physical body but the body was also decisive for this emerging concept of military masculinity in many other ways. Probably more than in any other case, emphasis on wu masculinity and military culture affected the physical appearance of men, who had to demonstrate the suitability and qualification for their occupation with the fitness and strength of their bodies. At least as much as the bodies of common soldiers, those of officers had to express strict discipline, which became manifest in every gesture, movement, or posture. Physicality, moreover, was strongly expressed through the newly introduced close-fitting European-style military uniforms, which challenged established customs of clothing, general appearance, and demeanor. Following Euro-American stereotypes and ascriptions, many reformers and most military people viewed

326 Conclusion

the customary long gown of elite men as effeminate and promoted bodyhugging uniforms, which represented physical strength, stern discipline, martial spirit, as well as affiliation and loyalty to army and state. In effect, officers literally embodied military masculinity. The introduction of new uniforms influenced male and female fashion throughout almost the entire twentieth century, but it met much resistance in the beginning. Particularly at the level of officers and military leaders, uniforms represented a tremendous break with established bodily and cultural norms. Indeed, the truth was that military reformers aimed at nothing less than changing the demeanor and conduct of men through governing their (dressed) bodies. This could not simply be achieved by applying oppressive and coercive disciplinary techniques but by allowing for much more subtle and “liberal” technologies of self-conduct, self-governance, and selfdiscipline. Military men chose to commit to the army’s codes of conduct and raison d’être and therefore, at least on the level of superficial consciousness, accepted the influence of the emerging military culture on their own identity formation. After the death of the Empress Dowager Cixi, even the imperial family changed to the new military clothes and publically fostered a martial style in line with the New Armies. Despite the gathering anti-Manchu momentum, this endorsement at the highest political level facilitated the dissemination of the military masculinity concept. Subsequently, every state leader, from Yuan Shikai, Sun Yat-sen, and Jiang Jieshi, to Mao Zedong and his successors, appeared at least occasionally in a military uniform or a uniform-like dress.27 Historians usually view the late Qing military reforms against the demise of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, in which case they are, by and large, a failure.28 Moreover, similar to early Republican observers, they make the New Armies responsible for the emergence of the militaristic warlords, who plunged China into a devastating and ferocious era of civil war. Following the National Protection War (Huguo zhanzheng) in 1915–1916 that saw various contingents of Lujun troops fighting either for or against Yuan Shikai and his attempts to establish a dictatorship, the civil war that started in 1916 witnessed numerous former Lujun officers or military school cadets becoming rivaling provincial or regional warlords.29 In 1917, a Chinese newspaper worryingly stated that China had become a “military men’s world” (wuren shijie) and, indeed, military men influenced politics and society for the most of the Republican period.30 According to the historian Zhang Cheng, the Zhangde military exercise in 1906 was already a preview ceremony of the future early Republican political elite, because many participating officers later became president, ministers, and military leaders.31 The positive image of military men created in the early twentieth century began to destabilize as common soldiers were increasingly perceived as pillaging, raping, and murdering social outcasts and



were depicted (again) in terms of the proverb “good iron is not used for nails, good men do not serve as soldiers.” The iconic figure of the “Warlord” was ridiculed as a self-aggrandizing character from an operetta, wearing a shiny uniform and lusting for power and admiration.32 Nevertheless, neglecting simple categories such as failure or success (to copy European models, to secure the survival of a regime or the state of peace), the late nineteenth and early twentieth century military reforms had tremendous, lasting effects on Chinese society and culture, in terms of the conceptualization of military men. The idea of a highly skilled, professional army was revived by Jiang Jieshi and the National Army, who were driven by the self-perception of being national saviors and, at least publicly, adhered to strict codes of conduct, to discipline, and maintained a stern appearance. According to Henrietta Harrison, “Chiang’s [Jiang Jieshi’s] ramrod straight posture was one of his trademarks and was associated by him with moral integrity.”33 The Pacification Army (Anguojun), a consortium of three larger warlord armies fighting against Jiang in 1927–1928, was led by officers who similarly understood themselves as professional soldiers and patriotic defenders of the Chinese culture and nation against a foreign, infiltrating enemy. The Communist People’s Liberation Army, was also guided by the principles of professionalism propagated among the New Armies. The doctrine of professionalism had to compete with Communist ideology as the guiding principle of military organization throughout the history of the People’s Liberation Army. Yet, in the twenty-first century, it is again the driving force of the army, which also increasingly seeks to promote physical discipline, military masculinity, and other aspects of military culture among society in general.34 notes 1. Mao 1917, 47. For a partial English translation of Mao’s essay see Schram [1963] 1969, 152–60. 2. Mao 1917, chapter 4. Sandow, whose real name was Friedrich Wilhelm Müller, at the turn of the century helped bodybuilding and weightlifting achieve a hitherto unparalleled popularity in Europe and the United States. He was famous for his shows, called “muscle displays,” where he lifted heavy objects such as a horse. Sandow founded one of the first gymnasiums for bodybuilders in 1897 and launched the monthly magazine Sandow’s Magazine of Physical Culture in 1898. Later he was also known for the movie “Sandow” and for organizing the first bodybuilding competition in London in 1901. In 1905, Sandow traveled to Burma, Java, Japan, and China, where he performed for a large audience in Shanghai. See Chapman 2006, 156 and the North China Herald from August 4 (258) and August 11 (315–16).

328 Conclusion

3. Mao was particularly influenced by the German philosopher Friedrich Paulsen, who emphasized diet, hygiene, physical education, and Social Darwinism. Another major influence was his father-in-law Yang Changji, a philosophy professor who had traveled to Germany, Scotland, and Japan and who strongly advocated physical exercise. See Wakeman 1973, 157, 163, 165, 203–04. 4. See for instance Lévi 1990 and Kohn 2008. See also Gulik 1961; Kuriyama 2002; and Mann 2011, 39, 84, 118–19. For an account on how ancient ideas about the body survived in present-day China, see Farquhar and Zhang 2012. 5. Unger 2000, 101–02. 6. Elvin 1989, 277. 7. See also Mechikoff 2010. 8. Both Li and Mao argued that military spirit and physical exercise ultimately should serve the nation. Initial instruction by others should be followed by the mastery of one’s own body through a strong will and strict self-discipline. Li and Mao were connected through a long political relationship over 30 years. In turns, they were either companions or enemies. They did not meet before 1924, which was seven years after Mao published his article, and it is not clear whether and how Li influenced Mao or whether the two men had a common source of inspiration. See Jiang and Jiang 2001. 9. Schneider 2012. 10. Brownell 1995. 11. Honig 2002, 255–68; White 1989, 205–08, 213–16. 12. Culp 2006, 547. 13. Ibid. 14. Graham 1994, 41. 15. Ven 2000. See also Dreyer 1995. On the link between the military, war and nationalism in the Republican period see Waldron 1993; Ven 2005. 16. Powell 1960. 17. Zhang 1995. On the role of “will” in Mao’s thinking, see Wakeman 1973. See also Zimmermann 2010, 227. 18. This is Andrew Morris’ translation of the term minzu, see Morris 2000, 883. 19. See Dutton 1992; Dikötter 2002; Zarrow 2006. 20. See White 1994; Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005; Jeffreys 2009. 21. See Bréard 2008; Lam 2011. See Dikötter 1994, esp. chapter 4; Sigley 1996; Dikötter 1998b; Rogaski 2004, 300–06. On “race” see also Pusey 1983; Dikötter 1992. 22. Cooper 2005, 113–49. See also Wong 1997, 153–77. 23. The Confucian ideas of self-cultivation and moral edification of the people through education can be compared to the idea of “conduct of conduct” but it is limited to the elite and its moral leadership. See, however, Miller 2000. The use of population statistics in imperial China was well established by the Ming Dynasty but it rather resembled a dispositional mode of governance because interest in demographic developments did not exist. On the issue of population statistics in imperial China, see Osterhammel 2009, 58 and Ho 1959. See also Kuhn 1995. 24. See also Möhring 2004, 11–34.



25. Louie 2002, chapters 6 and 7; Hinsch 2013, chapter seven. For a brief description of ideal, “typical” male characteristics in China in the 1980s, see Gilmore 1990, 169–75. 26. Edwards 2007, 42, 59. 27. Wilson 2002. 28. This is, for instance, the general tenor of the seminal works of Ralph Powell and Edmund Fung. 29. Zhang 1986. Generally, on the military history of this period, see Zhang and Sun 1987; Jiang 1987. A large amount of research has been done on both individual warlords and the period, much of which tends to view the late Qing military reforms as mere foundation of a devastating militarism in the post-Yuan Shikai period. See Sheridan 1966; Gillin 1967; Ch’en 1968; Ding 1972; Sheridan 1975; Chi 1976; Ch’en 1979b; Sutton 1980; Lary 1985; Forbes 1986; Zhang and Li 1990; Waldron 1991; Bonavia 1995; Ven 1996. On the Guomindang military in the early Republic see also Wang 1988b. 30. Shibao from June 1, 1917, cited in McCord 1996, 811. 31. Zhang 2009. 32. McCord 2001; Waldron 1991. 33. Harrison 2000, 81. On the professionalism (or lack thereof) of the Nationalist army see also Sutton 1982 and Liu 1956. 34. Its commander, Zhu De, graduated from the military academy in Yunnan in 1908. See Dreyer 1972; Jordan 1972; Mulvenon 2003. For the aspects of gender and martial spirit in the People’s Liberation Army see also Hung 1996 and Spakowski 2009.


Chinese Character List

ai fengsu zhiduxin aiguo xiaoshuo aiguo zhongjun aiguoxin aimin Aiminge aituxin aiyanyuxin Anguojun Anji ba baihua ban bao de bao en bao guojia/bao zhongzu Baoding baoguo baoguo Baqi Beiyang dachen Beiyang junyi xuetang Beiyang lujun jiaolianchu xuewu Beiyang lujun wubei xuetang Beiyang lujun xingying junguan xuetang Beiyang wubei bianyiju Beiyang wubei yanjiusuo

愛風俗制度心 愛國小說 愛國忠君 愛國心 愛民 愛民歌 愛土心 愛言語心 安國軍 暗疾 八 白話 班 報德報恩 保國家/保重族 保定 報國 保國 八旗 北洋大臣 北洋軍醫學堂 北洋陸軍教練處學務 北洋陸軍武備學堂 北洋陸軍行营軍官學堂 北洋武備編譯局 北洋武備研究所 331

332 Appendix

Beiyangjun ben bi fei nanzi bianbu bianzi biao Bingbeichu Bingbu binghun bingjia Bingqi bingshi ticao/bingcao bingshi zhi weisheng bingxue dayi bingye Bingyiju bishu bowu bu bu gaizhuang bubing rouran ticao budui qixie ticao bufa caizi canling Canmouchu Canyiting caofa cehui tushuo Cehui xuetang cehui/celiang cenci chajian chang shiqi Changbeijun changfu Changshengjun changxiong changyi chaqingse chengpai chengdui

北洋軍 本 必非男子 便步 辮子 標 兵備處 兵部 兵魂 兵家 兵棋 兵式體操/兵操 兵士之衛生 兵學大意 兵業 兵醫局 筆述 博物 步 不改裝 步兵柔軟體操 步隊器械体操 步法 才子 參領 (fucanling 副參領) 參謀處 參議廳 操法 測繪圖說 測會學堂 測繪/測量 參差 插箭 倡士氣 常備軍 常服 常勝軍 長雄 長衣 茶青色 成排成隊


Chengzhengting chenxiong chizi Chouban haijun shiwuchu chuanranbing chuncui deren cixiong Congjunge da lifu Da Qing hongshizihui dahao nan’er Dahehun/Yamato dajiangjun/jiangjun Dalisi Daliyuan dang bing wei guomin yiwu dang guomin jiguan danren dapai (or pai) dayuanshuai dayue dazhangfu dazhangfu mage guoshi dazhong yilü de ri chenggui Deyizhi guomin jie bing zhuyi deyu diaocha lu dingdai Dingwujun dongya bingfu duan duanfu duanlian shenti Ducaochu Duchayuan dudu dui Dulian gongsuo er Ernü yingxiong

承政廳 沉雄 赤子 籌辦海軍事務處 傳染病 純粹德人 雌雄 從軍歌 大禮服 大清紅十字會 大好男兒 大和魂 大將軍/將軍 大理寺 大理院 當兵為國民義務 當國民及冠 單人 大排 大元帥 大閱 大丈夫 大丈夫馬革裹屍 大眾一律 德日成規 德意志國民皆兵主義 德育 調查錄 頂戴 定武軍 東亞病夫 鍛 短服 鍛鍊身體 督操處 都察院 都督 隊 督練公所 兒 兒女英雄


334 Appendix

fa yanzheng zhi xiang fan nanzi feimang fenlieshi fenyong/fenwu fulu furu gancheng yuwu gangjian ge nanren ge ren wei quanti, yi quanti wei ge ren geguo geguo bingxue geguo guimo gewu zhizhi gezhi gong gongchan gongfu gongmin gongminquan gongquan gongyi gongyong goujia guannian wei gugan gu Guangdong shuilushi xuetang guanggun guanshou guixiu guo jie bing wei zhuyi guo zhi gancheng guochi guogan guohun guoji zhanzheng guojia guojia sixiang guoli guomin quanti

乏嚴整之象 凡男子 飛蟒 分列式 奮勇/奮武 附錄 腐乳 乾城御侮 剛健 各男人 個人為全體, 亦全體為個人 各國 各國兵學 各國規模 格物致知 格致 工 共產 工夫 公民 公民权 公权 公義 公勇 國家觀念為骨幹 骨 廣東水陸師學堂 光棍 冠兽 閨秀 國皆兵為主議 國之乾城 國恥 果敢 國魂 國際戰爭 國家 國家思想 國力 國民全體


guomin xuexiao guomin zhi daibiao guomin zhi mu guomin zhi xisheng guomin zhong guojia guomin zhuanduanxin guominbing Guomindang guoquan guosu guoti guoti guoti zhi dao Haijunbu Haijunchu Hanjun hao nan bu dang bing hao tie bu da ding, hao ren bu dang bing haohan/haohanzi haoyi haozhuang he qianwan ren ru yi ren Hejian heti Hongxian houbeijun hu er shenwu Huaijun huan”nan pengyou Hubei xinjun Huguo zhanzheng hunxie huo shenti huodong huodonghua jian nan’er Jiangbian xuetang jiangchang xiaoming jiangwutang jianshu

國民學校 國民之代表 國民之母 國民之犧牲 國民忠國家 國民專斷心 國民兵 國民黨 國權 國俗 國軆 國體 國體之道 海軍部 海軍處 漢軍 好男不當兵 好鐵不打釘, 好人不當兵 好漢子/好漢 号衣 豪壯 合千萬人如一人 河間 合體 洪憲 後備軍 護爾身物 淮軍 患难朋友 湖北新軍 護國戰爭 混協 活身體 活動 活動畫 健男兒 將弁學堂 疆場效命 講武堂 劍術


336 Appendix

jianzhuang Jiaolianchu jiaolianfa Jiaoyangge Jiaoyu zongzhi Jiaoyubu Jiawu zhanzheng jiazhong gurou jiazu jibing jijiuxiang jilü jin jin shu jindai jineng Jingshen jianghua jingshen shiqi jingu jingzhuang jinmin wei bing jinri caofa jinshen jiaoyu Jinweijun jinzhong baoguo jiuguo jiuhuan zhi shi jiujiu jiujiu wufu ju jueduan juguo jie bing zhuyi jun Junchengsi jundui shensui junfa junfa huiyichu Junfasi junfu junguo junguo zhi zhuyi

健壯 教練處 教練法 教養歌 教育宗旨 教育部 甲午戰爭 家中骨肉 家族 急病 急救箱 紀律 斤 筋舒 近代 技能 精神講話 精神士氣 筋骨 精壯 盡民為兵 近日操法 精神教育 禁衛軍 盡忠報國 救國 赳桓之士 赳赳 赳赳武夫 局 決斷 舉國皆兵主義 軍 軍乘司 軍隊神髓 軍閥 軍法会议處 軍法司 軍服 軍國 軍國之注意


junguohun junguomin junguomin jiaoyu Junguomin jiaoyuhui junguomin zhuyi Junhengsi Junhua junji junji junji fengji Junjichu Junjige Junjisi junjixin junli Junlingsi Junmusi junqi junren junren jingshen junrong junshi sixiang fada junshi xiaoshuo Junshi yanjiushe junshi zhi yanguang Junshisi junshixue junxiao junxin Junxuesi Junxusi Junyisi Junyisi junyong zangdi junyuexue junzheng zhidu Junzhengsi junzhengxue Junzhisi junzhuang junzi

軍國魂 軍國民 軍國民教育 軍國民教育會 軍國民主義 軍衡司 軍華 軍紀 軍籍 軍紀風紀 軍機處 軍紀歌 軍計司 軍紀心 軍禮 軍令司 軍牧司 軍旗 軍人 軍人精神 軍容 軍事思想發達 軍事小說 軍事研究社 軍事之眼光 軍實司 軍事學 軍校 軍心 軍學司 軍需司 軍醫司 軍醫司 軍用葬地 軍樂學 軍政制度 軍政司 軍政學 軍制司 軍裝 君子


338 Appendix

Junzichu Junzifu juzhi kakese kanhuren kaojibiao ke kexue yubei kongshou ticao kouling kouyi kuaibu kuan kuiwu Laiyinjiang xunbingxing Lantewei’er lanyu chongshu lao ruo pi long li li lian lian Lianbingchu liangmin Lianjun lianli lianxi guanbian lifu ling lingjian liumang liyi lizheng lü Luanzhou Lucao xinyi Lujun Lujun bingguan xuetang Lujun canmou daxue Lujun chengfa guoshi zhangzheng Lujun chengfa zhuanzhang

軍咨處 軍咨府 举止 卡克色 看護人 考續表 科 科學預備 空手體操 口令 口譯 快步 寬 魁梧 來因江巡兵行 蘭特威尔 濫竽充數 老弱皮癃 里 豊 鍊 (煉) 連 練兵處 良民 練軍 練力 練習官弁 禮服 靈 靈健 流氓 禮儀 立正 旅 灤州 陸操新義 陸軍 陸軍兵官學堂 陸軍參謀大學 陸軍懲罰過失章程 陸軍懲罰轉章


Lujun chengfaling Lujun daxue Lujun guizhou xuetang Lujun jianyu zhangcheng Lujun jinchadui Lujun jingchadui shiban zhangcheng Lujun junguan xuexiao Lujun junyi xuetang Lujun shenpan shiban zhangcheng Lujun shenpan tiaolie lujun xiaoxuetang Lujun xingshi tiaolie Lujun xuehui Lujunbu Lüying mailuo changshu mantoubao mashi xiongjiu mayi xuetang mianqiang zhi yong mimai minbing mingmai mingyu minzu minzu jingzheng zhi shidai mubing muhou er guan muzha nai donglao Nan geng nü zhi nan yu han nan’er Nan’er hange Nan nü you bie Nanyang lujun weisheng xuetang Nanyuan nei nengli nisu Nü junrenchuan

陸軍懲罰領 陸軍大學 陸軍貴冑學堂 陸軍監獄章程 陸軍警察隊 陸軍警察隊試辦章程 陸軍軍官學校 陸軍軍醫學堂 陸軍審判十班章程 陸軍審判条列 陸軍小學堂 陸軍刑事条列 陸軍學會 陸軍部 綠營 脈絡暢舒 饅頭包 馬士雄赳 馬醫學堂 勉強之勇 密賣 民兵 命脈 名譽 民族 民族競爭之時代 募兵 沐猴而冠 木栅 耐動勞 男耕女織 男于漢 男兒 男兒漢歌 男女有別 南洋陸軍衛生學堂 南苑 內 能力 泥塑 女軍人傳


340 Appendix

nü zhangfu nüxing xianxian Nüzi ticao xuexiao pai paobu peng pinghe zhanzheng pixu baiwan putong ticao qi qi qi xin zhi qianbai ren jie neng zhengqi ru yi Qiangxuege qifu qigong qiju qiju ticao qilin qing Qinghe qinmi tongxue qishe qitun heyue qiugan qixie ticao qixin xieli qizhansi qu quan Quan zhen guanzhang bingqi yanxi Quanbingge Quancongjunge quanguo jie bing Quanxuepian quti zhi yi remin zhi guojia ren ren rencai renmin renren dang bing

女丈夫 女性纖纖 女子體操學校 排 跑步 棚 平和戰爭 貔貅百萬 普通體操 祈 齊其心志 千百人皆能整齊如一 槍學歌 起伏 氣功 起居 器具體操 麒麟 情 清河 親密同學 騎射 氣吞河嶽 球竿 器械体操 (體操) 齐心协力 祈戰死 軀 拳 全鎮官長兵棋演習 勸兵歌 勸從軍歌 全國皆兵 勸學篇 曲體之意 人民之國家 人 仁 人才 人民 人人當兵


renren shenti Ri’erman aiguoge Ri’erman ribenhun Rikugun Daigakkō Rikugun Shikan Gakkō rongfu rouran ticao sandeng jiuji Sanguo yanyi sashuang yingzi shanggong shangshi shangwu shangwu jingshen (shangwu zhi jingshen, shangwu zhuyi) Shangwu yinshuguan shangwude shaoxifa shehui jiaoyu shen Shenjiying shenli shenti jiancha shi shi shi shi min qiangzhuang shibian shige shiju jianwei shilu shimin shi si ru gui shiyi jitong shangyi shizubing shenxin shou shouyi xuetang shuang shou chayao fa shuchang qixue shuke


人人身體 日耳曼愛國歌 日耳曼 日本魂 陸軍大學校 陸軍士官學校 戎服 柔軟体操 (體操) 三等九級 三國演義 颯爽英姿 尚公 尚實 尚武 尚武精神 (尙武之精神, 尚武主義) 商務印書館 尚武德 稍息法 社會教育 身 神機營 身力 身體檢查 尸 師 士 使民強壯 世變 詩歌 時局艱危 詩錄 市民 视死如归 失宜疾痛傷痍 士卒兵身心 壽 獸醫學堂 雙手叉腰法 舒鬯氣血 術科

342 Appendix

shuyuan si si sigang siquan sucheng xuetang suzheng suzhi Taihu Taipusi Taiyiyuan taoye taozhi taozhu guohun tebie yanxi ti Tianjin wubei xuetang tiao tiaoxi funü ticao ticao ge fa ticaochang tiexue nan’er tiexue zhuyi tili tipi tiyu tizhi tong guo jie bing tongli hezuo Tongmenghui tongsu jiaoyu Tongwenguan tongwu tongwu dangbing tongxin tongxin yide tongxue/tongnian tongye toubi congrong tuan

書院 司 死 四鋼 私权 速成學堂 整肅 素質 太湖 太僕寺 太醫院 陶冶 陶治 陶鑄國魂 特別演習 體/体 天津武備學堂 條 調戲婦女 體操 體操各法 体操场 鐵血男兒 鐵血主義 體力 體癖 體育 體質 通國皆兵 同力合作 同盟會 通俗教育 同文舘 同伍 同伍當兵 同心 同心一德 同學/同年 同業 投筆從戎 團


tuandui jingshen tuanlian tuiwu tuse/huangtuse wai waiyang madao wan bing yu min Wanguo hongshizihui Shanghai zhihui wanquan guomin weijie shibing zhi fangfa Weiqi weisheng weisheng zhi xueshu weishengxue wen wenlu wenren wenruo zhi shi wenyi wenyuan wu wu wu wu bing wenhua wu xing wu zhi dao wubei xuetang Wuchang wufu wugeng wumu wuqiang wuren shijie wushang miaoxiao Wushidao Wushu Wusong Wuweijun wuxia Wuxue bianyishe

团隊精神 團練 退伍 土色/黃土色 外 外洋馬刀 萬兵與民 萬國 紅十字會上上海支會 完全國民 慰藉士兵之方法 圍棋 衛生 衛生之學術 衛生學 文 文錄 文人 文弱之士 文藝 文苑 伍 物 武 無兵文化 五刑 武之道 武備學堂 武昌 武夫 五更 五目 舞槍 武人世界 無上妙藥 武士道 武術 吴淞 武卫軍 武俠 武學编译社


344 Appendix

wuyi Wuyijun wuyong wuyong zhi qipo Xianfengdui Xiangjun xianmu liangqi xiao xiaobing xiaopai xiaoshou Xiaozhan xiayi xie xin guominjun xi junguomin xin li wei qi xin xuewen xing Xinjian lujun Xinjian lujun binglüe lucun Xinjun Xinjun Beiyang dulianchu xinli xinshang bifa xinyi Xinzheng xioaming sunqu xiong zhi guo (xiongguo) xiongwei xiongwu huopo zhi jigai xiongwu zhi yingzi xiongzhuang xisheng xisheng jiu tongbao xisheng shengming xisheng yishen (qishen) xishi xishi fengren xishi quanpixue xitai xinfa xiushen

武藝 武毅軍 武勇 武勇之氣魄 先鋒隊 湘軍 賢母良妻 孝 笑柄 小排 梟首 小站 俠義 協 新國民軍兮軍國民 心力未齊 新學問 形 新建陸軍 新建陸軍兵略錄存 新軍 新軍北洋督練處 心力 信賞必罰 信義 新政 效命损驱 雄之國 雄偉 雄武活潑之氣概 雄武之英姿 雄壯 犧牲 犧牲救同胞 犧牲生命 犧牲一身 (其身) 西式 西式縫紉 西式全皮靴 泰西新法 修身


xiyao xiyi zhi yi xubeijun xue guochi Xuebu xueke xueqi zhi yong xueshi xueshu xuetang Xuewu gangyao xuexiguan xun Xunbing siyange Xunfangdui yan yan Yangcao yingwuchu yangcao yangcheng yangcheng junji yangcheng qili yangcheng qi huopo yangfu yangsheng Yangwu yundong yangxiu yanjiu zhanshu yanxi jian guanzhang lijie yaodao yi yi ge qi nanzi yi min wei bing yi shen xuguo yi/yiqi yide yixin yideng xiongguo Yihetuan yin yang ying yingrui buqu zhi jingshen

西藥 西藝之醫 續備軍 雪國恥 學部 學科 血氣之勇 學識 學術 學堂 學務綱要 學習官 馴 訓兵四言歌 巡防隊 演 嚴 洋操營務處 洋操 養成 養成軍紀 養成氣力 養成其活潑 洋服 養生 洋務運動 養修 研究戰術 演習見官長禮節 要道 意 一個奇男子 以民為兵 以身許國 義/義氣 一德一心 一等雄國 義和團 陰陽 營 英銳不屈之精神


346 Appendix

yingshe xiongdi yingxiong yinji yingxiong geju zhi shidai yingxiongxin yinyue ticao zhuanxiu ke yiqi zhi yong yirong yishen jiuguo yiti Yiwuke Yiwuyi yiyi huanhuan yong yu xiaoming zhe yonggan zhi qi yongwu yongying you youxi ticao youxia yuebing dachen Yuebingchu yuleshi yundong Zhangde (Anyang) zhansi zhansi wei rong zhantu zhen zhenfen jingshen zhengbing de zhidu zhengbu zhengdutong zhengti zhenzhan de xin zhibing zhi dao (fa) zhifu zhigu qi jingshen zhiguo ru zhijun zhihui zhiqi

營舍兄弟 英雄 隐疾 英雄割據之時代 英雄心 音樂體操專修科 意氣之勇 儀容 以身救國 一體 醫務科 醫服股 仡仡桓桓 勇於效命者 勇敢之氣 勇武 勇營 優 游戲體操 游俠 閱兵大臣 閱兵處 娛樂室 運動 彰德 (安阳) 戰死 戰死為榮 戰圖 鎮 振奮精神 徵兵的制度 正步 正都統 政體 真戰的心 治兵之道 (法) 制服 桎梏其精神 治國如治軍 指揮 志氣


zhisu zhiti zhongguo zhongguohun zhongjie zhongjun zhong nan qing nü zhong wen qing wu zhong wen qing wu zhi e’xi zhongxue wei ti, xixue weiyong Zhongyang jiaoyuhui zhongyi aiguo Zhongyong meitan zhongzhi chengcheng zhongzu zhuamen zhi xue zhuanfa zhuang zhuangdingtuan zhuangfu guanzhan zhuangguan zhuangjian zhi fu zhuangshi de jiaolian zhuanmen zi’aixin zidong zhi qixie Ziqiang yundong Ziqiangjun zishi zizhong Zongtongfu junshichu zuguo Zuguoge zun haoling fu zun Kong

質素 肢體 忠國 中國魂 忠節 忠君 重男輕女 重文輕武 重文輕武之惡習 中學為體, 西學為用 中央教育會 忠義愛國 忠勇美譚 眾志成城 種族 專門之學 轉法 壯 壯丁團 壯夫觀瞻 壯觀 壯健之夫 裝飾的教練 專門 自愛心 自動之器械 自强运动 自強軍 自恃 輜重 總統府軍事處 祖國 祖國歌 遵號令赴 尊孔


348 Appendix

Character list of works and official texts mentioned in the book Banding jiaoyu yaozhi 颁定教育要旨 Bianji dayi 编辑大意 Bubing caodian 步兵操典 Da Qing huidian 大清會典 Da Qing lüli 大清律例 Daqing tongli 大清通禮 Deguo bubing caodian 德國步兵操典 Deguo caolian zhangcheng 德國操練章程 Deguo hemeng jishi benmo 德國合盟紀事本末 Deguo lianbing xinshu 德國練兵新書 Deguo lianbing zhangcheng liu tiao 德國練兵章程六條 Deguo lujun caodian rumen 德國陸軍操典入門 Deguo wubei ticaofa德國武備體操法 Deguo wubei ticaoke (xue) 德國武備體操課 (學) Deguo xuexiao lunlüe 德國學校論略 Deguo yiyuan zhengzheng 德國議院章程 Deguo zhengbingfa dayao 德國征兵法大要 Fanyin lujun shuji guitiao 翻印陸軍書籍规条 Gongmin zizhipian 公民自治篇 Haifang xinlun 海防新論 Houhanshu 後漢書 (Hanshu 漢書) Jiaoyubu gongbu jiaoyu zongzhi 教育部公布教育宗旨 Jingshizhong 警世鐘 Jinweijun yingzhi xiangzhang 禁卫軍营制饷章 Jun xuan jiuguo 君宪救國論 Jundui jiuji jianfa 軍隊救急簡法 Junguomin biduben 軍國民必讀本 Junguomin changeji 軍國民唱歌集 Junshi zhifuling 軍士制服令 Junzichu zou junguan xueyuan xu xuan banfapian 軍咨處奏軍官學员续选 办法片 Junzichu zou zhou ni lujun canmou zhangchengzhe 軍咨處奏酌拟陸軍参谋 章程摺 Junzichu zouni she junshi guanbaopian 軍咨處奏拟设軍事管報片 Kelubupao tushuo 克鹿卜砲圖説 Lianbing dachen Yuan Shikai deng wei chen xiaoyue lujun huicao qingxing shi zouzhe 練兵大臣袁世凱等為陳校閱陸軍會操情形事奏摺 Lujun guanbian fu zhang 陸軍官弁服章 Lujun huicao ge xiang tiaogui qingdan 陸軍會操各項條規清單 Lujun jundui xuetang fuse zhangji tushuo 陸軍軍隊學堂服色章記圖説



Lujun mubing yimao tushuo 陸軍目兵衣帽圖説 Lun nüxue 論女學 Lunyu 論語 Mengxue keben 蒙學课本 Mengzi 孟子 Naner di yi zhiqigao 男兒第一志氣高 Niehaihua 孽海花 Nüzi shifan xuetang zhangcheng 女子师范學堂章程 Nüzi xuetang zhangcheng 女子學堂章程 Pu Fa zhanji 普法戰紀 Riben putong ticao xue 日本普通體操學 Shiji 史記 Shijing 詩經 Shuihuzhuan 水滸傳 Siku quanshu 四庫全書 Simafa 司馬法 Sunzi bingfa 孫子兵法 Waiwubu zongli dachen Yikuang deng niding xunzhang zhangcheng 外務部 總理大臣奕劻等擬定勳章章程 Waiwubu zongli dachen Yikuang deng wei zunzhi huiyi ge xiang xunzhang shiyi bing niding zhangcheng shi zouzhe 外務部總理大臣奕劻等為遵旨 會議各項勳章事宜並擬定章程事奏摺 Wanbao quanshu 萬寶全書 (Qixin shuju 启新書局) Wubeizhi 武備志 Wujing qishu 武經七書 Xiguo junyue geshu 西國軍樂各書 Xinbian guomin duben 新编國民讀本 Xiyang lianbing xinshu 西洋練兵新書 Xubu zunyi dong du zou zhongxue yishang xuetang bingshi ticao fangzhao lujun lianxizhe 學部遵議東督奏中學以上學堂兵式體操仿照陸軍練習 摺 Xuebu zou zun ni nüxue fuse zhangchengzhe 學部奏遵擬女學服色章程摺 Xuebu zouqing xuanshi jiaoyu zongzhi 學部奏清宣示教育宗旨 Xunjiang yaoyan 訓將要言 Xunbing yaoyan 訓兵要言 Xunlian Jinweijun dachen Zaitao deng wei qingni banxing ge xiang xunzhangshi zouzhe 訓練禁衛軍大臣載濤等為清擬頒行各項勳章事奏摺 Xuyin enshang zhangcheng 恤廕恩賞章程 Yinzhi xiangzhan 營制餉章 Yuli 玉曆 Zhanfa jiyao 戰法輯要 Zhanzhenglun 戰爭論

350 Appendix

Zhengzhixue dajia Bolunzhili zhi xueshuo 政治學大家伯倫知理之學說 Zhongguo jun(shi) li(liang) de xingqi 中國軍(事)力(量)的興起 Zhongguo zhi wushidao 中國之武士道 Zouding xuetang zhangcheng – Xuewu gangyao 奏定學堂章程 – 學务纲要

List of Abbreviations


Beiyang bingshi zazhi 北洋兵 事雜誌 Dongfang zazhi 東方雜誌 (Da Qing) Guangxu xin faling 光緒新法令 Junxue jikan 军学季刊 Lujun xuehui junshi yuebao 陆军学会军事月报 Nanyang bingshi zazhi 南洋兵 事雜誌 Wuxue 武學 Xunbingbao 訓兵報 (Da Qing) Xuantong xin faling 宣統新法令 Zhejiang bingshi zazhi 浙江兵 事雜誌


Beiyang Military Journal Eastern Miscellany New Laws and Regulations of the Guangxu Period Military Studies Magazine Military Monthly (of the Army Learned Society) Nanyang Military Journal Martial Studies Journal for the Instruction of Soldiers New Laws and Regulations of the Xuantong Period Zhejiang Military Journal


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Periodicals2� Anhui gongbao 安會公報 Beiyang bingshi zazhi 北洋兵事雜誌 Beiyang guanbao 北洋官報 Dalu 大陆 Dangbao 讜報 Dagongbao 大公報 Datongbao 大同報 Dongfang zazhi 東方雜誌 Funü Shibao 婦女時報 Funü Zazhi 婦女雜誌 Guofengbao 國風報 Guominbao huibian 國民報彙編 Huazi huibao 華字匯報 Hubei xueshengjie 湖北學生界 Jiaoyu congshu 教育叢書 Jiaoyu yanjiu 教育研究 Jiaoyu zazhi 教育雜誌 Jiaoyu zhoubao 教育週報 Jiaoyujie 教育界 Jingwu congbao 警务叢報 Jingye xunbao 兢業旬報 Junxue jikan 军学季刊 Lujun xuehui junshi yuebao 陆军学会军事月报 Minguo ribao 民國日報 Nanyang bingshi zazhi 南洋兵事雜誌 North China Herald Nübao 女報 Nüzi Shijie 女子世界 Qingyibao清議報 Shenbao 申報 Shibao 時報 Shishi huibao 時事畫報 Tiyu jikan 體育季刊 Tiyu zazhi 體育雜誌 Tiyu zhoubao 體育周報 Tongwenbao 通問報 Tongzijun yuekan 童子軍月刊 Wanbao quanshu 萬寶全書 Wanguo gongbao 萬國公報 Wuxue 武學 Xin qingnian 新青年

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