The Battles of Zojila, 1948 9788124105092, 812410509X

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THE BATTLES OF ZOJILA, 1948

THE BATTLES OF ZOJILA, 1948

Dr. Sudhir S. Bloeria //

HAR-ANAND PUBLICATIONS PVT LTD

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1*17 ^hAR-ANAND p u b lic a tio n s p v t l t d 364-A, Chirag Delhi, New Delhi-110 017

Copyright © Dr. Sudhir S. Bloeria, 1997

All rights reserved. No part o f this publication may be reproduced in any form vfithout the prior written permission o f the publishers.

PRINTED IN INDIA___________________________________________ . Published by Ashok Gosain & Ashish Gosain for Har-Anand Publications Pvt Ltd and printed at Printline, New Delhi.

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Foreword

During the First Indo-Pak War of 1947, many important battles were fought in Kashmir, which have become part of Indian military folklore. Amongst these, the Battles of Zojila hold pride of place. Our breakthrough at Zojila ensured the security of Ladakh which was gravely threatened by the hostiles at that time. The battle was a memorable display of courage, determination and ingenuity fought by the Indian Army against a determined foe in hostile high-altitude terrain and adverse weather conditions. These initial military operations by the Indian Army in 1947/48, in Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere to preserve and protect the newly independent Union of India have not received due attention from our military historians. In the present study, the author has examined questions of strategy and tactics in a succinct, readable style with insight and imagination and, also thrown light on an hitherto unexplored subject based on primary sources. The book deserves to be widely read by the general public as well as specialists of Indian military history in the postIndependence period. The author, Dr SS Bloeria, Additional Chief Secretary, Govt of Jammu and Kashmir has served in the Indian Army as an officer in the Jammu and Kashmir Rifles. To him the book has been both an academic achievement, and his own personal tribute to that remarkable individual—the Indian Soldier. GENERAL S. ROYCHOWDHURY Chief o f the Army Staff

Preface

Zojila, I heard this name for the first time in July 1965 while undergoing pre-commission training in the Officers Training School Madras. We cadets were grouped in four companies, each named after a famous battle. Mine was Zojila Company. Our Company Commander belonged to 4th RAJPUT, one of the battalions which had taken part in the famous operations in that area in November 1948. He gave us a talk on those operations, but being raw soldiers we understood very little of it. Seven years later, I left the army and joined the civil service, and got my first posting as Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kargil. Before taking up the new assignment I read a number of books on Ladakh which provided sufficient information about the region, including the campaigns of Zorawar Singh and the battles fought in that area during 1947-48. My first journey over Zojila, on the way to Kargil, was memorable. Awe-inspiring massive cliffs rising sharply on both sides of the defile almost cast a spell on the travellers passing through the Zojila. Over the years I have had the experience of traversing over this fabled pass in different modes of transport and also on foot; in extremely pleasant weather and under very difficult conditions of snow blizzards and howling winds. Each visit to that area renewed admiration for the courage and fortitude of the soldiers who fought and won under extreme climatic conditions and adverse tactical situation during 1948. This study is a modest tribute to their hard struggle and indomitable spirit.

8

The Battles of Zojila, 1948

The Ladakh and Gilgit areas of the Jammu and Kashmir State, generally referred to as the Northern Sector, is of great strategic importance due to its geographic location touching the borders of a number of countries. The British, as long as they remained in India, realized its significance, and ensured their control over the region through various stratagems. With the independence of India, creation of Pakistan and inability of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir to make up his mind regarding accession of the State to either of the two Dominions, the stage was set for turbulence in the region. Tribal raiders, hostiles and personnel of Pakistan Army clashed with the State Force and elements of the Indian Army for over a year, starting from the middle of 1947 till the UN sponsored cease-fire on 1 January, 1949. During this period of armed conflict, some heroic battles were fought. In defensive operations, the garrisons of Skardu and Punch withstood long sieges against very heavy odds and a much larger enemy force. Their performance could do proud to any army. Of the offensive actions launched by the Indian forces, the breakthrough at Zojila would probably rank amongst the three most important battles of the J&K Operations. The battle of Shaltang resulted in stemming the advance of the tribal raiders, and pushing them back from the very outskirts of Srinagar city to Uri and beyond. The battle of Jhangar resulted in the re-capture of an important military objective and securing the lines of communication of the Indians in that sector, further paving the way for the liberation of Rajouri, leading to the breaking of the siege of Punch. The third crucial engagement pertains to the breakthrough at Zojila. The struggle for the Himalayan heights there was not only the most difficult; the stakes were also extremely high. Failure at Zojila would have meant the loss of the entire Ladakh region of strategic importance, deprivation of the only Buddhist population and a constant threat to the Kashmir valley from the east. It is to the great credit of the Indian Army, its officers and Jawans, that a catastrophe of such magnitudes was averted. Even almost after half a century, not enough has been written on the Operations of 1947-48. The official version was

Preface

9

published, by the Ministry of Defence, only in 1987. This, along with a very limited number of books mostly written by the officers who took part in the war, do not throw sufficient light on the important battles of the period. Most of these accounts, being in the form of memoirs or regimental histories, suffer from the inherent element of subjectivity. It is in this context that the present study has been undertaken; with a view to bring out a detailed and objective account of the battles of Zojila. The sequence of incidents has been pieced together in the background of events then taking place in the J&K State in general and the Northern Sector in particular. Attempt has been made to present in greater details the valiant efforts of Indian soldiers who overcame the harsh elements of nature and a determined adversary to register probably the most important success of the 1^47-48 Operations. These events need to be studied carefully also because J&K is still an "unfinished agenda". As mentioned earlier, not much recorded material is available on the subject. Therefore, most of the information had to be collected from primary sources. This was, no doubt, more laborious process but it has enhanced the authenticity and the credibility of the facts recorded. A few years ago, the records of the Historical Section of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, pertaining to the 1947-48 Operations were made accessible for research purposes. These include War Diaries, Reports, Policy Directives and routine papers. Unfortunately, not many of the units and headquarters had taken sufficient care to record details of the incidents taking place and their reports are very brief and sketchy. Some of the units, on the other hand, do make up for this deficiency by comprehensive recording of the events. In " this context a mention may be made of 1 Patiala. Their War Diaries are a delight to any reader, for these not only provide detailed account of day to day happenings but also include collateral information and documents. Another notable source has been the survivors of those battles. Fortunately, a number of veterans are alive and have

10

The Battles of Zojila, 1948

been, almost to the last man, kind enough and willing to share their experience. They dug out old diaries and papers, as also from memory provided a fund of information through interviews, personal notes and correspondence. They were extremely cooperative, and, in fact, only too willing to share their experiences and considerable knowledge of not only the events that had taken place in their immediate vicinity, but also the overall background in which these were happening. I was, however, not so lucky with Maj. Gen. Rajinder Singh Sparrow, MVC and Bar (Retd). When I called on him, during the first week of March, 1993, at his residence in Jalandhar Cantt. He extended all the courtesy and expressed happiness on the project, but refused to grant interview or make available his papers. He said that he was writing a book and would, therefore, not be able to help till it was published. He, however, graciously wrote some times later, offering his support. "Next time when you will meet me", he wrote, "I will show you the pertinent facets of the ZOJILA operation." To my great regret, when I contacted for the purpose, he was hospitalized with a serious ailment, where he died later. Thus I lost the opportunity of interacting with the man who had planned the crucial tank push during the Zojila breakthrough. Very few Pakistani books and publications are available regarding these operations. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, not much has been written about the military matters during that period which could throw light on the Pakistani version of the war. Even whatever little material is available, that too lacks credibility requiring thorough evaluation. Two representative samples of their version are as follows: "Since September 1948, only 400 Azad soldiers had foiled two Indian attempts to capture Zojila." and, "The GHQ chronicle says about these operations: The battle of Zojila was one of the most brilliant operations of the Kashmir campaign. A small force of about two companies' strength of irregular Militia, armed with nothing but their personal weapons, had withstood

Preface

11

repeated attacks by some of the best units of the Indian Army for nearly two months and inflicted nearly 1000 casualties on the enemy." All the same the lack of sufficient and credible material on the 1947-48 Operations, from Pakistan is a handicap which would be felt by anyone attempting to present a complete account of the events that had taken place. Considerable encouragement and contributions have been made available by the surviving veterans of the Zojila Operations, in compilation of this work, most notable amongst them being Brig. Sukhdev Singh, MC, Vr. C., the then Commanding Officer of 1 Patiala. Mention need also to be made, amongst many others who helped, of Dr. U.P. Thapliyal, Director and Shri G.B. Singh, Deputy Director of the Historical Section of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, for their assistance and cooperation in making available the relevant records and documents. Within the constraints of the organisation, their contribution has been substantial. Shri S.P. Sahni, a veteran journalist and formerly Director General of Information, J&K Government, has always been helpful and encouraging. A living encyclopedia of 1947-48 Operations in Kashmir, he was a constant reference point. Thanks are due to Shri Ashok Magotra who willingly and diligently carried out the laborious typing work; as also to Shri S.K. Sinha who provided expertise in computerizing this document. My wife, Rani, is probably the only lady to have crossed Zojila on foot. She traversed from Captain Morh to Gumri with me braving snow and blizzard on a cold April morning over twenty years ago. Her grit and indomitable spirit has been a constant source of strength and inspiration to me. I owe her a lot. The greatest help has been received from Dr. A.C. Bose, formerly Head of the History Department and Dean of Social Sciences, University of Jammu. His deep knowledge of the modem history, and keen eye for details have immensely helped in converting this work into a finished product. Sudhir S. Bloeria

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Adm ASC Bde. Brig. Bty. Capt. Cmde. C.O. Col. Coy. Det. DSO Engrs. Fd. FST Ft. Hav. HQ/Hqrs. IAF Inf. JCO Jem. KI L/Nk.

Administration/ Administrative Army Service Corps. Brigade Brigadier Battery Captain Commodore Commanding Officer Colonel Company Detachment Distinguished Service Order Engineers Field Field Surgical Team Feet Havildar Headquarters Indian Air Force Infantry Junior Commissioned Officer Jemadar Kashmir Infantry Lance Naik

14

Lt/Lieut. Lt.Col. Lt.Gen. LMG L of C Maj. Maj.Gen. MMG Mtn. NCO Nk. Offr. OO Op Instr. ORs PI. Pt. Rds Regt. C a /* i? C v «

Sep. Sig. Sitrep. Sqn. Sqn.Ldr. Sub. Tac. Tp(s) Wg.Cmdr. Wksp

The Battles of Zojila, 1948

Lieutenant Lieutenant Colonel Lieutenant General Light Machine Gun Line or Lines of Communication Major Major General Medium Machine Gun Mountain Non Commissioned Officer Naik Officer Operation Order Operation Instructions Other Ranks Platoon Point Rounds Regiment Section Sepoy Signal Situation Report Squadron Squadron Leader Subedar Tactical Troop(s) Wing Commander Workshop.

Contents

1. Introduction

17

2. Overall Situation

34

3. Zojila—The Indian Response

79

4. Abortive Attempts of the Indian Army

105

5. Planning and Preparations for ZojilaOperations

130

6. Capture of Zojila and Advance to Kargil

150

7. Post Link-up Assessment

177

8. Role of Air Force

198

9. Conclusion

215

Appendices

237

Bibliography

243

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

GEO-POLITICAL CONTOURS Jammu and Kashmir, the crown of Indian Union, is situated in the north of India. It comprises three divisions, viz. Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh. The State of Jammu and Kashmir occupies a pivotal position on the political map of Central Asia. Strategically, Kashmir is vital to the security of India. India's only window to the Central Asian Republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (erstwhile USSR) in the north, China and Tibet on the east and Pakistan and Afghanistan on the west. Indian State of Punjab is located in the south-west. The entire State is hilly excepting the Kashmir valley and the plains of Jammu and Kathua districts. Kashmir valley is predominantly inhabited by the Muslims. Hindus are dominant in Jammu division whereas Buddhists have a slight edge over Muslims in the Ladakh region. The Vale of Kashmir, approximately in the centre of the State, runs north and south in the valley of the River Jehlum. It is about 130 kilometres long and 50 kilometres wide. The State's summer capital, Srinagar, is in north-east of the Valley's centre. The only airport of the valley is situated at Damodar Karewa, near Srinagar. In 1947, the runway was un-metalled and was fit for light aircrafts only and was seldom used. It was meant for the private aeroplanes of the Maharaja. Railways was and still is nonexistent and all movement to the Valley was, therefore, by vehicles and animals.

18

The Battles of Zojila, 1948

The approaches to the Valley by road, from Domel and Jammu were through the then western Punjab (now Pakistani Punjab) starting from Rawalpindi and Sialkote, respectively. There was, however, a fair weather 102 kilometres long track from Pathankot to Jammu via Madhopur, Kathua and Samba. This was the only road link with eastern Punjab (now Indian State of Punjab). There were a number of rivers and nullahs on this route without bridges. Unbridged rivers of Ravi, Ujh and Basantar were major obstacles; Ravi being the most formidable. There used to be a motor ferry over Ravi from October to June; it was affordable to motor transport for two to three months only. The Ujh and Basantar rivers could be crossed by motor transport during dry months only. This road was un-metalled and used to be extremely dusty when there were no rains and became marshy even after a slight rain. It was quite a difficult task to take vehicles over this route. Due to bad state of this road, a vehicle normally took upto three days for its trip from Pathankot to Jammu and back. It also ran close and parallel to the border with undivided India and became very vulnerable throughout its length when the State shared that border with Pakistan after the independence. As opposed to India, which had the Banihal road as the only route for reaching the Valley, that too via the very difficult and hazardous Madhopur route, Pakistan had a much easier roadway access to the State. In the Valley through a good metalled road via Domel; to Mirpur, in the centre, via Jehlum and also to Jammu from Sialkote. Not only the roads connecting western Punjab were fairly good but were also shorter. The only rail link between the undivided India and the J&K State was from Sialkote to Jammu; of which a major portion—18 miles out of the total length of 27 miles—was in the western Punjab of the undivided India and only 9 miles in the State territory. The nearest railway station in the then eastern Punjab was Pathankot, and that too through the difficult Jammu-Madhopur route. It was a small station with very limited siding and control facilities, grossly inadequate to be used as a base for handling bulk

Introduction

19

stores and large bodies of troops in transit. There was an airfield at Satwari, near Jammu, which too was used for the private planes of the Maharaja. The runway of this airfield too was un-metalled and fit for only light aircrafts. This was the status of communications and the various links existing between the State of Jammu and Kashmir—except for Ladakh—Gilgit regions—and the two dominions of India and Pakistan on 15th August 1947. The dice was heavily loaded against India, which advantage was fully exploited by Pakistan in its nefarious designs of annexing Jammu and Kashmir by force. The third region of the State, Ladakh, had traditionally been under the influence of Tibetan rulers. It was only in 1834, following the successful invasion by Zorawar Singh, that it became a part of Maharaja Gulab Singh's possessions. After Kashmir came under the control of the Dogra ruler in 1846, with the Treaty of Amritsar, the administrative amalgamation of this region with Jammu and Kashmir became complete. Ladakh, the cold arid desert, is a plateau located between the Kashmir Valley and Tibet in the extreme north-east of the State. Population of the Leh part is predominantly Buddhist while in Kargil, Muslims are in majority. Culturally, it has close links with Tibet. Leh, which is at the height of 11,554 ft. above sea level, is the principal town of Ladakh and used to be an important commercial focal point between India and Central Asia. In the north, eastern side, Ladakh has common borders with China and Tibet. It has always played an important part in the Central Asian affairs. Gilgit is in the north-west part of the State. It has predominantly Muslim population and common borders with China, Afghanistan and Pakistan. There was no network of roads to and within Ladakh and Gilgit. The traffic to and from this area was only on foot or by horse, yak, etc. over bridle tracks which were narrow, rough and hazardous. No wheeled traffic was possible. Gilgit was connected with Ladakh by a mule track which ran over passes 12000 to 14000 ft. above sea level, Leh to Gilgit was 480 kms. From Leh, this track went west to Kargil, turned

20

The Battles o f Zojila, 1948

northwards from Kargil toSkardu-Gilgit and then onwards led to Wakhan province of Afghanistan and also to Sinkiang over the Pamirs. This route was followed by Zorawar Singh who conquered Baltistan in 1839-40. Leh was connected with Srinagar, Jammu and Himachal Pradesh by three different routes—Central Asian trade route, south-western and southern route. The south-western route linked Jammu with Leh via Kishtwar and Zanskar. The total distance of this route was 368 kms. It was primarily a foot track. However, horses or ponies could be used for short stretches. The southern route ran from Leh to Himachal, going east from Leh, it went over Taglang La 17,400 ft. and Bara Lacha La 17,000 ft. through Keylong to Rohtang Pass and then to Kulu. The Central Asian Trade route is an age old passage connecting Srinagar and Leh. The total distance was 365 kms. (now the road distance is 432 kms)1. From Leh there are routes to Tibet, Chinese Turkistan, Yarkand and Baltistan. These have been described by Alexander Cunningham as2: a. The south-eastern road from Lhasa to Garo and the Indus to Leh. A branch from India, via the Niti pass joins this road at Garo; b. The eastern road from Chinese Territory, through Rudok and the valley of Chushul and Sakti to Leh; c. The northern road from Yarkand and Kotan, over the Karakoram mountains and down the Shyok and Nubra rivers to Leh; and, d. The north-western road from Balti, via the Shyok and Indus rivers to Leh. One of the most striking contrasts in nature manifests itself in the valley of Kashmir and Ladakh being set next to each other. The lush green verdant valley, dotted with blue lakes and capped with glacier topped mountains, is adjacent to barren, wind swept cold desert highland region of Ladakh. The principal towns of Srinagar and Leh are connected by a traditional trade route running west to east. The most important land mark, on this route, also being the watershed and dividing line between the two regions, is Zojila. In the native language "Zojila" means "Path of Blizzards/' a

Introduction

21

befitting name for the pass, as would be sufficiently evident after studying its topography. The Zojila is known by other names also, such as Seojila, Baltal Kotal, Dras Pass3, Zogila and Zwaje La, etc.4 In the great Himalayan mountain range starting from Mount Everest in the east to Nanga Parbat in the west, Zojila is the lowest depression being 11,578 ft. above sea level. All other passes are over 14,000 ft. Though such a low pass and a simple walk under summer conditions, the Zojila is also one of the most dangerous. It accounts for a large number of animal and human lives, taking its deadly toll by means of sudden avalanches or engulfing its victims in bottomless drifts5. For the major part of a year all these passes including Zojila remain closed due to snow and avalanches. Zojila, at a distance of 102 kms. east of Srinagar is the gate­ way to the Ladakh region. From Srinagar to Sonamarg, a distance of 84 kilometres, a fairly good road existed in 1947; though in parts only one way traffic was possible. About 14 kms. east of Sonamarg lies Baltal, which was connected by a good, but not motorable track. Baltal,6 height 9,600 feet, is in the shape of a basin, a large flat ground. It is located on the right bank of the river Sind and enveloped by a stream draining into Sonamarg valley from Zojila; the pass being on the mountain range rising sharply in the east. The route from Baltal to Zojila was just a mule track going up the steep slope of the hill overhanging the gorge of the Sind river and was usable only from May to December. In winter this was impassable and a temporary pathway, rarely traversed, road was used to be made over the snow which filled the gorge below Zojila until the snow melted and the summer route became available. Right from December to June the stretch between Baltal and Gumri was so dangerous and hazardous that any traveller could lose his life and belongings on account of snow storms or avalanches, since there was no place to take shelter in the inhospitable climate. The gradient of this track from Baltal to Zojila was considerable. The ascent from the Kashmir side of the track was the most dangerous part of the pass during winter. The 9 km. section

22

The Battles o f Zojila, 1948

between Baltal and Gumri, devoid of habitation and plantation was too long for the safety of individuals. After the snow had fallen, only the very brave could venture to walk through, ignoring the howling winds, blinding blizzards and thunderous hurtling of avalanches. The minimum temperature there became sub-zero from mid-October and could be as low as -50 degrees centigrades during winter months.7 There was hardly any proper track over Zojila. The only passage was through the nullah bed hugging the hill side, crossing a number of small streams of freezing temperature even during summer. The descent on the Ladakh side was easier than on the Kashmir side, leading down to the Dras river and along its banks to Matayan crossing several tributaries flowing into it. The pass opened into Gumri which is a basin of over a kilometre wide and about three kilometres long. The terrain was very difficult. There were snow bridges and steep gradients which were slippery. Until November 1948 no wheel or track ever defiled the paths of this mountain fastness. Matayan was the first village on the Ladakh side of Zojila. A group of ramshacked huts, Matayan was inhabited by the people of Kashmiri stock and, like Dras, was second only to the coldest inhabited place in the world Verkhoensk in Siberia. Zojila lay isolated in the semi-arctic and barren zone. Life in that area was at a stand still during the six months of winter. Crossing of the pass was always hazardous on the Central Asian Trade Route. This link was, however, effectively used by intrepid traders and adventurous warlords. King Sikander of Kashmir followed this route to conquer Baltistan in 1405 A.D. and forced conversion on the Buddhist population with violence. His son, the great Zain-ul-Abidin also invaded Ladakh, twice, forcing the local king to acknowledge Kashmiri supremacy. The reverse traffic started in 1533 when Kashmir was successfully invaded by the Kashgari army of Sultan Abu Sayed Kashgiri, under his general Mirza Haider Dughlat. Mirza Haider as the then ruler of Kashmir reconquered Ladakh and Baltistan and annexed these to his possessions in

Introduction

23

1545.8 The next recorded military confrontation with forces from the plains took place in 1680s, when the troops of Aurangzeb, from Kashmir, moved into Ladakh and defeated the Tibeto-Sokpa invaders, pushing them to the traditional Ladakhi-West Tibet border at Tashigong.9 This was the last time, till 1948, when a large body of troops had traversed across Zojila for combat and conquest. However, it was not the final struggle for supremacy in the Ladakh-Balti region, for the campaigns of Zorawar Singh were still to follow. But this Dogra general took the more arduous southemly routes to the northern highlands, than over Zojila. His forces had no access to this traditional approach, as Kashmir was not then a part of the territories of his master, Raja Gulab Singh. However, Zojila is so strategically located that the one who controls it acquires a, decisive role to influence events in the Kashmir Valley as well as in the Ladakh region. This was fully realized by the Pakistani invaders and the Indian forces in 1947-48. CAMPAIGNS OF ZORAWAR SINGH Background The military campaigns of Zorawar Singh across the lofty mountains and snow covered high plateaus, of BaltistanLadakh-Westem Tibet area, form an amazing chapter of India's military history. Notwithstanding the internal political situation in this region, as also the interplay of the ambitions and strategic formulations of the two dominant forces in India, viz. Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the British, military exploits and political achievements of Zorawar Singh in these Himalayan heights were truly remarkable. From the summer of 1834 till the day of his death on 12th December, 1841 Zorawar Singh spearheaded a relentless campaign, subduing his adversaries in battlefield as also braving the severely harsh elements of nature and climate of the terrain of his operations. His last battle at To-Yo, which had cost him his life was fought under extremely adverse conditions. To quote Cunningham, "The Indian soldiers of Zorawar Singh

24

The Battles o f Zojila, 1948

fought under very great disadvantages. The battlefield was upwards of 15,000 feet above the sea level and the time mid­ winter, when even during the day the temperature never rises above the freezing point and the intense cold of the night can only be borne by people well-covered with sheep skins and surrounded by fires. For several nights the Indian troops had been exposed to all the bitterness of the climate. Many had lost the use of their fingers and toes; and all were more or less frost-bitten—on the last fatal day not one-half of the men could handle arms."10 Zorawar Singh was bom in 1786, in a Dogra Rajput family in Kahlur, Bilaspur a small erstwhile state, now part of Himachal Pradesh. Young Zorawar Singh joined service as a private soldier with the Kiladar of Riasi, an officer of Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu.11 Due to his soldierly qualities, grasp on administrative matters and impeccable honesty, he won the admiration and confidence of Gulab Singh. One successful appointment followed another in quick succession and he became Governor of Kishtwar in 1821, with the title of Wazir. The topography of Kishtwar, a plateau at 5,500 ft. above sea level and surrounded by lofty mountains, rugged terrain and cold climate, gave Zorawar Singh an ideal opportunity to train his troops for operations at high altitude. He also perfected the tactics of mountain warfare and, equally important, the art of managing the supply requirements of large bodies of troops in difficult areas separated by considerable distances from their base. The conquest of Kishtwar and its acquisition by Gulab Singh had "opened the gateway to further conquests across the Inner Himalayas which were to follow soon after. In a way Kishtwar served as a springboard from which Zorawar Singh leapt on to his career of military exploits which marked him as one of the greatest generals and military strategists, India has ever produced. It was through Kishtwar that he advanced towards Ladakh, Baltistan and Tibet and made a history in the annals of warfare."12

Introduction

25

The Conquests: The first campaign of Zorawar Singh started in the summer of 1834, when at the head of an army of four or five thousand troops, he set off from Kishtwar and entered Ladakh at the head of the Suru valley, probably near the village Panikhar. A major engagement with the Ladakhi army of about five thousand men took place on 16th August, 1834 at Sankoo, in which the Ladakhis were defeated. He halted at Sankoo, built a small fort and resumed cautious advance to Pashkum, through Lankarchey and Minji. Pashkum was occupied after overcoming a spirited defence by the local forces. By November a stalemate ensued when both sides opened negotiations for a settlement. However, Zorawar Singh's emissaries were killed in the Ladakh camp and his rear attacked. He realized the difficulty of his position in tactical terms as also envisaged problems which the oncoming winter would impose, and retreated to Lankarchey, taking shelter in the fort. Dogra forces remained billeted there for the winter. In the spring of 1835, probably in the month of April, a large force of Ladakhis, under Banka Kahlon marched on Lankarchey. Zorawar Singh pre-empted their plan to siege his fort and instead attacked them while they were preparing their evening meal. In the battle that ensued, Kahlon's force was decisively defeated and his troops fled the battlefield. This led to the unopposed entry of the Dogras to Pashkum, for the second time. There from his force embarked on a long march towards Leh, practically on the heels of the fleeing Ladakhi troops. From Pashkum, the invaders crossed Shergol, Mulbek and Kharbu. At Lamayuru, a letter suing for peace was received from Tsepal, the king of Ladakh, whom Zorawar Singh met at Bazgo. After the terms had been settled Zorawar Singh went up to Leh and installed Tsepal as a ruler holding power on behalf of Gulab Singh. He was asked to pay an annual tribute of Rs. 20,000 and a war indemnity of Rs. 50,000. After making peace Zorawar Singh returned to Lamayuru.13

26

The Battles o f Zojila, 1948

This treaty did not ensure a lasting peace in the region. Zorawar Singh spent the next five years, leading his armies over difficult passes and under inhospitable conditions, suppressing revolts in various parts of Ladakh and periodically changing kings in an effort to find a satisfactory local ruler. A number of Sikh officials—the Governor of Kashmir being most active amongst them constantly instigated Ladakhis to rise against the Dogras. K.M. Panikkar has succinctly described subsequent operations of Zorawar Singh as follows:14 "The Sikhs who were jealous of Gulab Singh's growing power, looked upon Zorawar Singh's conquest with envy. At the instigation of Mihan Singh, the Governor of Kashmir, the Ladakhis rose in revolt, and the Dogra garrison in Suru was put to death. The cold season had set in and snow had closed the passes. But Zorawar Singh was not the man to wait. By forced marches he arrived at Leh to the utter surprise of his enemies.15 The Gyalpo expressed remorse at what had taken place, but Zorawar Singh inflicted exemplary punishment on the rebels. Placing sufficient garrisons in the forts and leaving an agent, Daya Ram, with the king, Zorawar Singh returned to Jammu for the winter. The next year Zorawar Singh returned to Leh to find Tsepal at the head of a rebellion engineered by the Sikhs in Kashmir. Tsepal was deposed, sent to the village Stok, and in his place Ngroub Stanzan, a relation of the old king, was made Governor of Ladakh. This time, however, Zorawar Singh did not want to take anything on trust. He fortified Leh and placed a garrison there. Next year Zorawar Singh again appeared on the scene, deposed Ngroub Stanzin, who was accused of rebellion, and reinstalled Tsepal at an increased tribute." "The country, though conquered, had not yet settled down. By the end of 1840 the Ladakhis found a leader in a man called Sukamir.16 Before the rebellion could mature Zorawar Singh again appeared with a sufficient force. The rebel leader was caught and publically executed." He arrested several potential trouble-makers and sent them to Jammu;

Introduction

27

annexed Ladakh to Jammu dominions and appointed Magna as administrator (Thanedar) of the area. Gyalpo was granted a pension and allowed to retain his palace and the nominal title of royalty. After the pacification of Ladakh, Zorawar Singh diverted his attention towards Baltistan. The Raja of Skardu, most important of Balti principalities, had—by helping the last Ladakhi revolt and by disinheriting his eldest son—provided sufficient grounds for invasion by the Dogra general. Drew has described Baltistan as being, "Composed of enormous mountain-chains, or masses of mountains. While 18,000 and 20,000 feet is common height, there are in the north-eastern parts, 25,000 and 26,000 and one above 28,000 feet. These give rise to the largest known glaciers, out of the Arctic regions. Of the valleys, the most important are -the Indus Valley, and the valley of the Shyok, that joins it, and that of Shigar.17 It was this countryside which Zorawar Singh set out to conquer with his troops, which included a Ladakhi army commanded by its own officers. King Tsepal also accompanied the invading force. The Balti forces were defeated after putting up a fight at a number of places. Their initial resistance was indeed stubborn and effective and the results would have been disastrous for the Dogra forces but for the famous crossing over a make-shift snow bridge over the freezing Indus at the height of the winter season. The enterprise and undaunted spirit of the Dogras triumphed in the end and by June 1840, Zorawar Singh was back in Leh, having completed his mission. He was careful enough to leave a strong Dogra garrison in a newly constructed fort at Skardu to ensure his authority. The old King Tsepal died during the campaign and his grandson of about 10 years age was acknowledged as the new Gyalpo. Zorawar Singh was not satisfied with these conquests. Political expediency, economic factors and an insatiated appetite for military adventure made him undertake expedition into Tibet, which "during the long history of India no army from Hindustan had attacked. No Indian ruler had

The Battles of Zojila, 1948

28

thought of conquering it and no Indian general accustomed to the heat of the plains had ever dared to face the rigour of the Tibetan climate."18 The combatants of his force did not exceed 5000. Only 2000 of these were Dogras from Jammu and Kishtwar and the rest were from Ladakh and Baltistan.19 On 5th June, 1841, he conquered Rudok, then moved south and occupied Gartok during the beginning of August, after overcoming the local forces. Further advance was made to take over Karing and Takalkot, the latter being on the Nepal frontier. His bold foray into Tibetan land met with expected success. The occupation of Tibet west of Mayum Pass was completed by the middle of September and his troops occupied about 550 miles of Tibetan territory in less than four months. Zorawar Singh had not expected that any serious attempt to dislodge him would be made by the Tibetans, but in this he was proved wrong and the Tibetans reacted with promptitude. In November, when the cold had become unbearable, he heard that a Lhasa force was approaching to meet the invaders. Two probing detachments were badly mauled by the Tibetans. In a desperate attempt to stem the tide, Zorawar Singh advanced with his whole available force to meet the enemy. The final show down took place at To-Yo on 10th December, 1841 and continued for three days. On 12th December, he fell fighting on the battle field. Thus died Zorawar Singh, a soldier of whose achievements India could justly be proud, "To have marched an army not once or twice, but six times over the snow-clad ranges of Ladakh and Baltistan, 15,000 ft. above the sea level where the air is so rarefied, people from the plains can hardly live with comfort, is a wonderful achievement. To have conquered that country after successive campaigns and reduced it to a peaceful province is an exploit for which there is no parallel in Indian History."20 Importance and Lessons Learnt: During the six years of victorious campaigns in the

Introduction

29

Himalayan heights, Zorawar Singh added Ladakh and Balti regions to the Jammu territories, extending it right up to the borders of China and Tibet. These territories yielded revenue to Gulab Singh and also added to his stature as a powerful local ruler of a status important enough for the British to take note of. But for this extension to his domain, it is doubtful if the British would have acquiesced to Gulab Singh's control over Kashmir in the Treaty of Amritsar, 1846. These campaigns also laid the foundations of and became precursor to the subsequent additions of Gilgit, Chilas and Chitral areas to the Jammu and Kashmir territories. These areas are a direct gate way to the North-West province of Pakistan and are India's only window to Afghanistan in the west, Central Asian Republics in the north and China in the east. The strategic importance of such a region can hardly be over emphasized. If any further proof was required, it was amply provided by the interest and machinations of the Western Powers during the Cold War period. Unfortunately, in India, at least during the early years of Independence, the essential relevance of this region was not fully appreciated. The entire Himalayan tableland from Gilgit to Damchok21 and Karakoram Pass to Zojila is crucial to the defence of this country and geo-strategic indivisibility of this vast tract as an integral part of this premise. The impact of Zorawar Singh's conquests also resulted in the formation of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi­ lingual Jammu Kingdom. Bringing together people of such diverse characteristics under one flag and making this the foundation of a strong and stable kingdom spacing three agro-dfcnatic zones was an extremely commendable enterprise. He used his considerable political skill in bringing about the pacification of the conquered people. His treatment of the Ladakhis and Baltis provides a lesson in how to manage and win over a people proud of their heritage and conscious of their cultural identity. He never harassed the public, looting and pillaging were unknown to his soldiers and he enforced

30

The Battles o f Zojila, 1948

the code of conduct ruthlessly. Zorawar Singh did not convert the subject population, nor destroyed their religious places and institutions. He showed consideration towards his opponents and administered the conquered areas through local rulers, making them partners in further conquest of Baltistan and later Tibet. In fact, very soon the Ladakhis came to consider themselves as an integral part of Gulab Singh's dominion. The planning, preparation and execution of these campaigns hold useful lessons in high altitude and mountain warfare, which are equally valid even today and would remain so as long as man is unable to overcome the forces of nature. The basic requirements for troops to operate effectively in high altitude and cold areas is proper acclimatization and training. The Dogra troops were trained hard for many years in Kishtwar at a height of five and six thousand feet, before they undertook operations in Ladakh and Baltistan. It is only after they had become used to conditions in these difficult terrain that, Zorawar Singh embarked on the expedition into the Tibetan plateau, a higher and colder region. Military commanders who ignored the value of these lessons have invariably come to grief. The mountains and elements at these heights are unrelenting in their wrath on those who approach them with disdain. Adequate recce and detailed planning were two other essential ingredients of success in the campaigns of Zorawar Singh. Before he marched on to a territory he would obtain all relevant information about the target area. For this he employed many methods, "He took full stock of the strength, fighting ability and disposition of the enemy—he gathered full information on the nature of the country and the character of the Chief and his army he was about to attack. He used to meet people who were conversant with that country, talk to them and collected from them all relevant information which could help him to make a true assessment of its military power, the characteristics of the people as well as the land."22

Introduction

31

Such exhaustive collection of information helped him to plan his operations in great detail. No force can operate, leave aside win battles, in these areas unless adequate administrative back up is available to it. The task of clothing, feeding and equipping a force of thousands, of soldiers moving over high passes and operating far away from their bases pose logistic problems of considerable magnitude, requiring very careful planning and, an efficient and resourceful provisioning establishment. His forces also made good use of local resources in men, horses and rations. Securing lines of communication (here-in-after referred to as L of C) was another significant aspect of Zorawar Singh's military genius. He invariably deputed an adequate force to guard important bridges and strengthened the L of C by stationing small garrisons along his route of advance. These were self-sufficient bodies of troops capable of keeping the local uprisings under control and withstand a siege, if required. Old forts were used and new ones constructed to station such detachments. These forts proved invaluable in keeping his rear secure and open; and, also served as fall back positions in case of reverses in operations. Boldness, pluck and daring displayed by a commander, especially under adverse conditions, brings triumph even against heavy odds. This was amply proved by Zorawar Singh on a number of occasions. His attack on a much larger Ladakhi force during the spring of 1835 in Suru area, ten days forced march through Zanskar to Leh during the winter months of the same year, and the crossing of the Indus in the extreme cold of February 1840 by his forces were turning points in his string of conquests. It was the exertions of Zorawar Singh and military leaders like him which made Cunningham record in 1853, "The neighbouring districts of Gilgit and Chalas have been added to the Maharaja's kingdom; and the same prince, whose dominions only twenty years ago were limited to the petty state of Jammu, now rules undisputed master of Kashmir and Western Tibet, from the sources of the Shyok to the head

The Battles of Zojila, 1948

32

of the Gilgit river."23 This was the logical end result of the military campaigns and politico-administrative settlements of Zorawar Singh. The points which emerge out of his expeditions, strategic thinking and tactical use of forces, are equally valid to modem warfare. A study of operations, during 1947-48, in the mountainous and high altitude areas of Jammu and Kashmir, Would amply prov^ the point. And nowhere was this more true than in the battles7which took place over and around Zojila, from May to November 1948. REFERENCES

1. Alexander Cunningham who visited Ladakh in 1846-47 has calculated the distance between Srinagar and Leh to be 228 miles. The journey was covered in 23 stages with well defined stop overs. The shortest stage was 7-1/8 miles between Sonamarg-Baltal and the longest being 15-7/8 miles from Baltal to Matayan. 2. Alexander Cunningham, LADAKH, (London -1853), p.148. 3. Gazetteer of Kashmir and Ladakh, p.868. These names also find mention in Alexander Cunningham's "LADAKH". 4. Its Kashmiri name is also Zojibal. A Reeve Heber called it Zogila and William Moorcraft as Zwaje La. 5. Marco Pallis, Peaks and Lamas (Cassels - London, 1939), p.220. 6. Baltal, situated 2,000 ft below Zojila, is also a camp for pilgrimage to the holy shrine of Amamath, from where the return trip can be performed in a single day. 7. The lowest temperature has not been measured at Zojila. The figure -50° C is only an estimate, based on the corresponding reading at Dras where the mercury falls as low as -45° C. 8. S.D.S. Charak, Indian Conquests of Himalayan Territories (Jammu - 1978), p.67. 9. L.Petech in “The Tibetan - Ladakhi - Mughal zoarcf 1681-83" Indian History Quarterly XXIII(1947). Alexander Cunningham, however, estimates this having taken place in 1687-88 (Ladakh, p.328). 10. Cunningham, n.2, p.353. 11. Charak, a 8 , p.43. 12. Ibid, p.53. 13. K.M. Panikkar, The founding of the Kashmir State, (George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London, 1953), p.78. 14. Ibid, pp.78-79. 15. According to S.D.S. Charak, the uprisings in Suru and Leh were two different revolts. The former was led by Chief of Sod and it was ruthlessly crushed in September 1835 AD. The Leh revolt was spearheaded by the Gyalpo (king of Ladakh). To meet this eventuality Zorawar Singh,

Introduction

16.

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

33

who by then had come to Jammu to report his successes to Gulab Singh, set out for Leh vigorously towards the end of November 1835. Notwithstanding heavy snow in the higher reaches, he forced inarched his troops and crossing through Zanskar, appeared at Gya near Indus, utterly surprising the Gyalpo and his men. This might have taken place in the Spring of 1839, as Panikkar himself mentions Zorawar's advance into Western Tibet to have started in May 1841. Obviously the year 1840 was the one in which he conquered and subdued the Balti region. This is confirmed by S.D.S. Chaiak who mentions, "Wazir Zorawar Singh had attained the occupation and submission of all the valley and heights of Baltistan by summer of 1840." (p. 102). Frederic Drew, The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories (London, 1875). p.360. Panikkar, n.13, p.80. Charak, a 8 , p. 118. Panikkar, op dt, p.82. Damchok is the easternmost village of Ladakh. Charak, n.8, p. 186. Cunningham, n.2, p.355.

Chapter 2

OVERALL SITUATION

A. GENERAL Background The State of Jammu and Kashmir came into being by the Treaty of Amritsar, concluded on 16th March, 1846, between Maharaja Gulab Singh and the British Government. Gulab Singh became ruler of the State comprising Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh. Within a few years of the creation of the State, some territorial adjustments were made between the British and the Maharaja. Subsequently, more territory was added with the conquest of Gilgit, Chitral, Hunza and Nagar, in the northern region. After territorial adjustments and conquests, the State covered an area of 2,22,870 Sq.Km. the largest of the Indian princely States in the pre-independence era. In terms of latitudes and longitudes, the State lay between 32° 17 and 36° 58' north and 73° 26' and 80° 30' east. The population in 1947 was about four million, living in 39 towns and 8903 villages1. This large area was divided into three political and administrative provinces of Jammu, Kashmir and Gilgit and Frontier Areas of Skardu, Ladakh and Kargil. The territorial extent of the State, stabilized towards the end of the Nineteenth century, did not undergo any change for the next half a century, except, technically, in respect of Gilgit which was transferred to British control on lease for a period of 60 years from 1st August, 1935. The sole responsibility for the administration and defence of Gilgit was transferred to the British Government, which raised an irregular force, the Gilgit Scouts, commanded exclusively by

Overall Situation

35

the British officers. As a result of this agreement, all troops of the J&K State in Gilgit area were withdrawn. Consequently, the number of outpost on the frontier required to be maintained by the State Force was reduced to just four, viz. Bunji (one company), Leh (one platoon), Kargil (one section) and Skardu (one platoon). Troops for these outposts were to be provided by the battalions located at Srinagar by rotation.2 The lack of military presence of the State troops in Gilgit was to become a critical factor in the sequence of events which took place there after twelve years. With the announcement of the Mountbatten Plan on 3rd June, 1947, the British paramountcy over the J&K State was to lapse on 15th August, 1947 and with that the lease deed over Gilgit became redundant. The arrangements for handing over the province back to the State were finalized by the two governments. The State Government appointed Brig. Ghansara Singh to be the Governor of Gilgit. He flew to Gilgit on 30th July, accompanied by Maj. Gen. H.L. Scott, Chief of Staff of the J&K State Force, and took over the administration from Lt. Col. Bacon, the British Political Agent, on 1st August, 1947. Maj. Gen. S£ott on his return made a report to the Maharaja. He informed the ruler that the British officers of the Gilgit Scouts had decided to join Pakistan. Thus the boundaries of the State there were being protected by personnel whose loyalties lay elsewhere. However, no steps were taken by the authorities to remedy the situation. Shorn of military and material support, efforts of the Governor to assert his authority and integrate Gilgit with the rest of the State did not produce the desired results. In fact, in view of prevailing circumstances, these were doomed to fail. The process of subversion had been set in motion even before 15th August, 1947. The military set up in J&K comprised an Army Headquarters at Srinagar and four brigades. The Army H.Q. was headed by a Chief of Staff, who normally used to be a retired British officer, Maj. Gen. H.L. Scott, CB,DSO,MC, was the last British Chief of Staff and was succeeded, after Indian independence, by Brigadier Rajinder Singh of the J&K State

36

The Battles of Zojila, 1948

Force.3 The Army H.Q. also had an Adjutant General and a Quarter Master General. The four brigades were the Jammu Brigade, the Kashmir Brigade, the Mirpur Brigade and the Punch Brigade. These four brigades, between them, had only eight infantry battalions, with some garrison police companies and animal and mechanical transport. Medium Machine Guns were an integral part of an infantry battalion. The State Force had no artillery or armour.4 The army was dependent on local contractors for supplies, and on the arsenals in the then Northern Command Headquarters, Rawalpindi, for arms, ammunition and equipment. There was a wireless link with Rawalpindi but none with New Delhi.5 Lapse of British Paramountcy The Forces The decision to partition British India into two sovereign States, set the stage for the lapse of British Paramountcy in the Indian sub-continent; with the creation of Pakistan on 14th August and grant of independence to India on 15th August, 1947. The whole process was set to be completed in less than two-and-half months, starting from the unveiling of the Mountbatten Plan on 3rd June, 1947. Like all other possessions of the erstwhile Government of India the division of the army also took place, with roughly two-third assets, including about 2,80,000 personnel of all categories, coming to India's share. The fighting component of this army consisted of: i. Fifteen infantry regiments, including the Gorkha Rifles comprising 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th and 9th Regiments. ii. TWelve armoured regiments. iii. Eighteen-and-half regiments of artillery of all types. iv. Sixty-one engineer units organised into Madras, Bengal and Bombay Engineer Group.6 Delhi and East Punjab (DEP) Command was created on 15th September, 1947, to be later renamed as the Western Command. Lt. Gen. Sir Dudley Russel, KBE, CB, DSO, MC took over as its first GOC-in-C.

Overall Situation

37

The old Northern Command Headquarters at Rawalpindi, after being suitably augmented by staff arriving from the General Headquarters at Delhi, became the Pakistan Army headquarters or GHQ/ and eventually moved to Karachi. Lt. Gen. Sir Frank Messervy, KCSI, KBE, DSO, was nominated as the first Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan on 30th July, 1947. In addition to Headquarters and formations, Pakistan received following combat and supporting Arms7: i Six armoured regiments. ii. Eight infantry regiments accounting for thirty-three battalions. iii. Eight artillery regiments of all types. iv. A major portion of one engineers group. Any comparison of relative strengths of the armies of the two countries, especially in the context of the operations that took place in J&K, would be misleading. The two armies were not fully involved in any struggle for supremacy and only segments, proportionately much smaller in the case of Indian Army, of the forces took part in the fighting during 1947-48. Also whereas, the strength of India's armed forces fighting in J&K is known, a quantification of Pakistan Army's involvement in terms of total effort involved is not possible. Grouping of hostiles, deserters of the State forces, Pak troops operating as hostiles and irregular forces like the Gilgit Scouts, etc. into military units and sub-units is not possible. No such effort has been made in India for lack of authentic details and in Pakistan for obvious reasons. What is certain, though, was the alacrity and professionalism with which the Pakistani higher command set about to reorganize their army, and convert it into an efficient fighting machine. The results were, "a most commendable performance by any standard."8 The Blockade Unlike most of the rulers of the princely states in India, Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir found it difficult to decide on the issue of accession before the formal lapse of British paramountcy. He, instead made an offer of a

38

The Battles of Zojila, 1948

Standstill Agreement to both India and Pakistan on 12th August, 1947. Whereas, no agreement was signed with India prior to the State's accession on 26th October, 1947, the same was executed with Pakistan. The postal and telegraph facilities in the State were placed under the control of Pakistan Government,9 which promised to continue the existing arrangements by which the State imported rice, wheat, cloth, ammunition, kerosene oil and petrol from West Punjab. However, soon after Pakistan came into existence, its rulers put into operation plans to force the Maharaja to accede to/ Pakistan. The strategy for achieving this was a multi-pronged approach based on armed invasion, subversion of Muslim population—including the military personnel— and economic blockade of the State. The economic strangulation was carried out effectively, and in a well planned manner. Against four month's quota of rice indented for only one month's stocks were released. TWo months requirement of wheat were withheld. Bales of cloth lying at Rawalpindi were not allowed to be moved. The stocks of salt, petrol and kerosene oil were also placed under embargo. By mid-September railway service from Sialkot to Jammu, the only rail link the State had with outside world, was suspended. Soon enough post offices, under Pakistani control, refused to make cash transactions. Similar restrictions were placed on the banking activities and remittances of money from the Lahore Currency Office for the Srinagar branch of the Imperial Bank were stopped.10 Repeated requests and remonstrations by the State Government to Pakistan's highest authorities brought no relief. Pakistan initially feigned innocence and expressed inability to send supplies due to, "reluctance of drivers and it is impossible for us (Pakistan) to spare troops for this escort."11 Shortly afterwards Pakistani response to the State's communications became offensive, protesting against alleged atrocities by State forces against the Muslims of Punch, and even threatening. Due to this economic and commercial blockade the people of the State suffered considerable hardships and the normal

Overall Situation

39

economic activities came to a standstill. Shortage of essential commodities also adversely affected the efficacy of the State administration. Conditions were made even more difficult by the communal disturbances which broke out in the two Punjabs after the announcement of partition. There was a large influx of refugees into the south and south-west parts of the State. This area became a channel for the passage of Muslim refugees moving from east to west and for nonMuslims moving in the opposite direction.12 Though the local population of the State was by and large free from any communal virus, the stream of refugees brought harrowing tales of suffering and inhuman treatment meted out by members of the other community. This put an unbearable strain on the fabric of communal amity. Pakistan mounted a very effective propaganda campaign, ably assisted by elements of Muslim Conference in Mirpur-Punch belt. The Muslims in the frontier areas and in the State army were incited to rebel against the Hindu Maharaja and to murder their neighbours of the minority community. Their efforts started proving successful. The communal problem actually started at Rawalakot in Punch area on 22nd August and soon 'Jathas' Qf Muslim population set about attacking non-Muslims in the BaghRawalakot area, as also engaging detachments of the State forces with arms and ammunition sent from Pakistan. Similar incidents took place in Mirpur, Bhimber, Kotli towns and the villages around in a coordinated and sequential manner. On 29th August, the Maharaja received a telegram from Raja Yaqub Khan, on behalf of the public of Hazara, alleging attacks on Muslims in Punch and informing him that the Hazara Muslims were much perturbed. Through this telegram he also threatened to enter the State fully equipped with arms to fight the State forces. The British Chief of Staff of the State, Maj. Gen. H.L. Scott, gave his assessment of the situation to the Maharaja in a note on 22nd September. The gravity of the ground conditions and

40

The Battles of Zojila, 1948

Pakistan's involvement in the disturbances clearly become evident from the following excerpts of the report: "A survey of the recent tendencies and events leaves little doubt that the Muslim Conference leaders intend to push forward their policy of the union of the State with Pakistan by force, if necessary. There can be little doubt that a close ' alliance is intended, if not already formed between Muslim Conference leaders and the excited and fanatical agitators across the State borders to the west. "On the southern borders of the State, the Muslims have massacred, driven out and looted the Sikhs and Hindus—are likely to be ready for fresh adventures. Even more dangerous than these are the many thousands of Muslim refugees that have passed into the districts of Jehlum, Gujarat and Sialkot from the east. These have lost much and no doubt are prepared to recoup themselves at the expense of anyone they are in a position to attack. Revenge and fanaticism must be equally strong motives. 'There are few indications that the Pakistan authorities are making efforts to restrain their people. In fact, the contrary may be said to be true. There can be little doubt that the Pakistan Police and troops are not reliable'."13 A series of measures were undertaken to meet the situation by Brig. Rajinder Singh, soon after taking over as Chief of Staff of the State Force. Orders were issued for evacuation of all civilians living within 4-8 km. of the border and for the troops to take up a defensive line based on strong positions in Bagh, Rawalakot, Punch, Kotli, Mirpur, Jhangar and Nowshera.14 As these orders were being implemented, Pakistanis attacked the small garrisons of the State forces at Thorar, Tain and Mang, in Punch sector on 1st October. Chirala was also besieged simultaneously. The offensive activities started in Mirpur sector on the night of 8/9 October. Raids by Pakistanis also took place, at the same time, in Jammu sector with attack on Babiya post on the night of 8/9 October. These soon spread all along the southern borders from Akhnoor to Kathua. However, here the attacks were contained by the State troops and the

Overall Situation

41

damage by attackers was limited to nuisance of raids from across the border. The situation in Mirpur-Punch area deteriorated rapidly. The State forces were now pitted against well armed raiders all along this belt. The hostiles were not only better armed now, but were frequently assisted by batches of men in Pakistan Army's uniform. Light Machine Guns and communi­ cation by wireless had begun to appear in hostiles ranks. Fort Owen had to be evacuated on 15th October, Kotli - Punch axis was cut off and large concentrations of raiders and heavy exchanges of fire were going on around Bhimber, Mirpur and Kotli. The Pakistani attacks over a wide area of this frontier succeeded in splitting up the State Force in penny-pockets. The State's army was being gradually immobilised, and its capacity for coherent strategic action destroyed.15 The stage was then set for the entry of raiders into the valley, and execution of the final phase of the plan, ie. capture of Srinagar. Raiders in Kashmir The invasion of Kashmir by the tribals was meticulously planned, carefully timed and competently executed. By the middle of October, the economic blockade had stifled the State's economy and paralysed its administration. Civil Strife and turmoil were effectively engineered in the south and south-western borders of the State by instigating the Muslim population inhabiting these areas. Armed raids engineered on the State forces garrisons had effectively neutralised their military capabilities and had also succeeded in drawing the reserves, located in Srinagar, away from the valley. The main attack was planned and launched by the Army Headquarters of Pakistan and was called 'Operation Gulmarg'. Orders were personally signed by the British C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, within a few days of Pakistan's coming into existence. The main force consisted of tribals from North West Frontier and were organised into units of about 1000 each, called Lashkar (force), under the command of their respective Chiefs, called Maliks. Pakistan Army personnel

42

The Battles o f Zojila, 1948

joined these tribals as stiffeners. Each lashkar was provided with an army Major, a Captain and ten JCOs. The entire force was to be commanded by Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan, who was given the code name Tariq,16 assisted by Brig. Sher Khan. The operational plan envisaged six Lashkars to advance along the main road from Muzaffarabad to Srinagar via Domel, Uri and Baramulla. Two Lashkars each were to make subsidiary moves from Haji Pir Pass to Gulmarg and Tithwal to Handwara, Sopore and Bandipur, with the twin objectives of securing large chunks of territory, as also to protect the flanks of the main column. The D-day for Operation Gulmarg was fixed as 22nd October, 1947. The 7 Infantry Division of Pakistan Army which was to concentrate in MurreeAbbotabad by 21st October was ordered to be ready to move into J&K territory to back up the Lashkars and consolidate their hold on the valley.17 The defences on the Muzaffarabad-Srinagar axis were based on Domel where two approach roads from Murree and Abbotabad met before leading towards Srinagar along the Jehlum gorge. 4 J&K Infantry, composed of Dogras and Muslims in equal proportions, was defending this locality with their battalion headquarters at Domel. The main force of tribesmen led by Khurshid Anwar18 of Muslim League National Guards, crossed the border as planned, on the night of 21/22 October and attacked Muzzaffarabad on the morning of 22nd October. The Muslim troops manning Lohargali and Ram Kot posts, which were key to the defences of Domel, joined the raiders—forgetting their oath of loyalty and betraying the confidence of their C.O. Lt.Col. Narain Singh.19 After putting Muzzaffarabad to the worst kind of arson and carnage, the raiders captured Domel. Amongst those killed were Lt. Col. Narain Singh and his Adjutant Capt. Ram Singh.20 Soon after Domel was attacked, Narain Singh was able to contact the Duty Officer at Army Headquarters Srinagar, and inform him of what was happening, along with his assessment of the situation. After the defences of Domel had been neutralised by the raiders, there was practically nothing between them and

Overall Situation

43

Srinagar city. Realizing the imminent danger, Brig. Rajinder Singh, Chief of Staff of the State forces, rushed to Domel at 18.30 hrs. at the head of a heterogeneous force comprising about 150 men, a section of Medium Machine Guns and a detachment of 3" Mortars. He selected Uri as his main defensive position and made preparations, accordingly. He moved ahead with a small force and made contact with enemy on the morning of 23rd October, a kilometre short of Garhi. After a sharp exchange, when they were in the danger of being outflanked by the overwhelming number of invaders, Rajinder Singh and his depleted group withdrew to another position ahead of Uri. The first engagement set a pattern for clashes between the raiders and defenders. The latter were holding the attacking force for as long as possible and then withdrawing to the next fall-back position for another block. Brig. Rajinder Singh was forced back to his main position at Uri by the night fall of 23rd October. There he was joined by the reinforcement of one platoon, one section MMG and one section of 3" mortars, sent from Srinagar. The next morning, 24th October, the enemy in large number swarmed over Uri. The bridge was demolished on time by the defenders. Having withstood the attack for the whole day and seeing the enemy by-passing Uri, next defensive position was taken at Mahura by late night. After denying the capture of Mahura to the hostiles during the day long battle on 25th October, Brig. Rajinder Singh was forced to withdraw to Buniyar. This position was attacked in strength on the morning of 26th October. During the hours of darkness the defenders moved towards Seri, short of Baramulla. But this time the hostiles had already succeeded in getting behind the withdrawing force, and had established a number of road blocks. There almost the entire force, including Brig. Rajinder Singh, died fighting the enemy. He and the tiny force under his command had successfully held Aip thousands of raiders for four very valuable days and had saved the entire valley of Kashmir. The raiders entered Baramulla on the night of 26th October. The town was put to

44

The Battles c f Zojila, 1948

sword and fire, plunder and rapine. Brig. Rajinder Singh's determined rearguard action and the hostiles lust for plunder in Baramulla gave a critical breathing space to the Indian forces which started landing in Srinagar from 27th October, 1948, to fill the breach and stem the advance of hostiles towards Srinagar. Role of the State Force The J&K State Force has often been criticised, sometimes by very eminent personalities, for its inability to stop the marauding hostiles from entering the State and meeting the military threat that they had posed to the territorial integrity of the State. Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru, in his letter to Sardar Patel dated 30th May, 1948, wrote: "The State troops in Ladakh and Skardu had behaved in a most cowardly manner."21 Sardar Patel's reply of 4th June, 1948 echoes similar views. Its para 4 reads, "You speak of the desertion of the State troops in Ladakh and Skardu. This is not surprising as it is in keeping with the traditions of the State troops since the struggle commenced."22 The Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister would not form an extreme opinion of this kind, unless they were briefed accordingly by their advisors and confidants; both military and civilians. It is necessary to examine the performance of the State Force during this period, keeping in view the circumstances under which they had to operate. As has already been brought out, the State Force comprised only eight infantry battalions, without any supporting arms like artillery or armour. This small force was charged with the responsibility of looking after over 500 kilometres long mountainous border from Gilgit in the north to Suchetgarh in the south. Troops were stretched all along this frontier in penny packets occupying nodal points in varying strengths ranging from a week battalion to a platoon. They also did not have the backing of a readily available reserve, except for one battalion in Srinagar. Therefore, once the thin crust of resistance along the border was pierced, there were neither plans nor units to form a second line of defence.

Overall Situation

45

Even this small force was not entirely available for being deployed on the borders. Following the anti-Maharaja agitation in 1931 in Srinagar, State forces were also being deployed increasingly for internal security duties. These inadequacies in the State's military apparatus were known to the Pakistani planners who created civil disturbances and engineered armed attacks on the State garrisons in the most sensitive areas, tying down the detachments and also forcing deployment of reserve battalion, before entering the valley. The quantum of army deployed and resources committed later by the Government of India, in J&K, is a definite proof of the woeful shortage of manpower and material with the State forces. Also at a number of places tactical manoeuvres of the troops were hampered as they had to take care of nonMuslim refugees who had taken shelter with them. The other constraint facing the State Force was shortage of ammunition. After Pakistan, on which State was dependent for all supplies, had virtually closed the border, the State Force was eating into its fast depleting reserves. An indent placed with Government of India for supply of arms, ammunition and other military hardware was not met till the accession, even though the request was made on 1st October, 1947 and supplies were approved by the Home Minister and Defence Minister. The supplies were presumably stopped by British Officers.23 The shortages were so acute that the Maharaja's plan to destroy Domel bridge, by the middle of October, to prevent any sudden attack could not be carried out, as no demolition set was available, the bridge remained intact and facilitated the raiders advance. The behaviour of the Muslim troops was another very serious impairment, "The State forces, an excellent force, were further weakened by subversion of their Muslim elements. This was to be the proverbial last straw which broke their back, and weakened them irreparably, specially when the Pakistan tribal hostiles entered the State from Abbotabad."24 This treachery, which took place in the critical areas of Domel and Bunji (Gilgit), made matters even worse.

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The Battles o f Zojila, 1948

Thus over-stretched, devoid of reserves and supporting arms, running short of arms, ammunition and equipment and faced with betrayal of comrades-in-arms, the State forces were literally fighting with hands tied behind their back. Still, inspite of such handicaps and against overwhelming attacking hordes, State forces fought hard and well and held tenaciously at all important defensive positions like Punch, Kotli, Bhimber, Mirpur and Skardu. During the entire Operations, this small force lost 1990 men; the corresponding figure for the Indian Army was 1103.25 British Complicity Right from the beginning of the twentieth century the British policy in India carried the unmistakable strains of being pro-Muslim. Adept in the art of statecraft and with deep understanding of international developments, they must have foreseen the inevitability of granting independence to India sooner or later and, therefore, had set about making the best possible bargain. During the three year period, from August 1942—when leading Congress leaders were behind bars following the Quit India Movement—the British provided tacit support and a conducive environment to Muslim League to grow so much that they could drive a hard bargain with the Congress leadership. This was done on the assumption that Pakistan, more than India, would serve the strategic interests of Britain and the Western World. As events unfolded later, their calculations were not off the mark. Once Pakistan came into being on 14th August 1947, the senior British functionaries in the Sub-continent, especially those belonging to the military, were more favourably disposed towards Pakistan. The British had cast their eye much earlier on Kashmir in general and on the strategic region of Gilgit in particular, ever since the early period of Maharaja Ranbir Singh's time (1856-1885). When Maharaja Pratap Singh ascended the throne in 1885, the British mounted pressure on him and, through machinations, involving the brother of the ruler, virtually deposed the Maharaja and gained effective control

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47

over the affairs of the State in 1889. The Gilgit Agency was established under a British Political Agent and British officers supervised military and civil administration of that area.26 Their control over Gilgit became absolute when the British secured 60 years lease of Gilgit from Maharaja Hari Singh on 1st August 1935. However, with the Mountbatten Plan in operation for a division of the country, Gilgit was handed back to the State on 1st August 1947. But the British managed to safeguard of their interests through British Officers posted in Gilgit Scouts till October 1947 and by proxy through Pakistan thereafter. Within a few days of the formation of Pakistan, plans were prepared for an invasion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, code named "Operation Gulmarg". Orders were issued through Demi Official letters marked, 'Personal/Top Secret' and signed personally by the British C-in-C of the Pakistani Army, General Messervy. One such letter bearing the name of Brig. C.P. Murray, Commander Bannu Frontier Brigade came in the hands of Maj. O.S. Kalkat on 20th August, 1947. Major Kalkat (now a retired Major General) was then serving as the Brigade Major. The officer was practically put under house arrest. However, he managed his repatriation to India and after reaching Delhi on 19th October, 1947, disclosed the details to S. Baldev Singh, the then Defence Minister, Maj. Gen. Kalwant Singh and Maj. Gen. Thapar, the officiating Director Military Operations.27 It is a different matter that no credence was given to a timely information of such vital nature. It is reasonable to believe that at least the C-in-C of Indian Army, Gen. Lockhart and Field Marshal Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander were kept informed of the invasion plans by Gen. Messervy, who was in constant touch with both of them. The matter was too serious, having bearings on the British Foreign Policy, to have been kept close to his chest by Gen. Messervy. Neither of the two British Commanders made timely disclosure to Indian political leaders or military commanders.28 Sir George Cunningham, the then Governor of North West Frontier Province was certainly aware of what was happening;

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The Battles of Zojila, 1948

with thousands of tribals coming to Peshawar from across the Durand Line and getting armed there. He would certainly have reported these developments, through the British channels to responsible British officers in Delhi. He is also believed to have dropped a hint of this to General Lockhart.29 That the top British Commanders on both sides were consulting each other on important matters is also confirmed by the fact that when Jinnah ordered the move of Pakistan Army to Kashmir on the evening of 27th October, 1947, Lt. General Gracey, the acting C-in-C of Pakistan Army, sought intervention of Field Marshal Auchinleck. The latter reached Lahore next day and persuaded Jinnah to cancel his orders, and immediately reported his success to Lord Mountbatten.30 The reminiscences of one of the Indian officer serving in the Army Headquarters is worth mentioning. He records, "The division of war equipment between the two countries , had become the most unpalatable affair. Whatever arms and ammunition we sent to Pakistan was being used against us in J&K. While we were sending train loads of it to Pakistan, each one of us was painfully conscious that we were indirectly helping Pakistan to kill our own men. We were helpless, for the C-in-C insisted that we continue to send Pakistan's share to her. I implored him to stop or at least slow down this movement as Pakistan had done, but all I received in return was a stem warning that notwithstanding what Pakistan did, we were to fulfil our obligations faithfully."31 There is also the evidence "that at Kohala two British officers had come from Pakistan and tried to persuade the State troops to surrender before the hostiles attacked."32 Involvement of British officers at lower levels with Pakistani units operating within the boundaries of Jammu and Kashmir has also been put on record.33 The role of senior British officers has been aptly summed up by two defence analysts, "While on the Indian side the British commanders were truant with the war, the role of British officers in Pakistan was quite reverse. It was really they who had made the bold and ingenious plan to capture J&K by using Pathan tribals as well as regular Pak forces in

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49

mufti."34 Also, "The overall advice and encouragement by the British military establishment, both in Pakistan and in the UK, was unstinted. The Chief of Staff in London were convinced in the rather far fetched belief that India's long term policy was to subjugate and incorporate Pakistan, which demanded every assistance to Pakistan Armed Forces. This was also the view of Field Marshal Montgomery, the then chief of the Imperial General Staff."35 It was not only the active role of British officers in Pakistan, which was detrimental to Indian interests. Their counterparts in India also contributed, towards the same end by keeping the Indian political and military leadership on the desired course. This was achieved through a very effective mixture of advising, prodding, cajoling and cautioning. The British in the sub-continent were not driven by any altruistic motives or mercenary designs. Their actions were very carefully crafted to fit into the grand designs of the British imperialism. Britain had not yet come to terms with its diminishing power status in the international power structure that was emerging after the Second World War. In consonance with their geo-strategic perceptions, the Gilgit province continued to be of vital importance. If this area could not remain under British control, which obviously it would not after 15th August 1947, then it should be part of a more friendly and pliant State. For this the ideal solution would be for Jammu and Kashmir to become a part of Pakistan. If that was not possible, at least Gilgit should be under Pakistan's control with communications to the area secured. The British complicity in the affairs of the Indian sub-continent, following independence, achieved this objective successfully. Little wonder, Gilgit never became part of the so called "Azad Kashmir"; but has always been administered as a Federal Territory by Pakistan. Accession and arrival of Indian Army Early Operations The economic blockade, civil strife and armed raids, engineered by Pakistan, made Maharaja Hari Singh request

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The Battles of Zojila, 1948

Indian Government for assistance and help. The latter was also keeping in touch with the developments in the State. However, the news of hostiles having entered the valley and made advance towards Srinagar reached New Delhi only on 24th October and that too in the form of a message from Pakistan Army Headquarters to Field Marshal Auchinleck. The same night Maharaja Hari Singh requested for despatch of Indian troops to the Valley to save Kashmir from the invaders. In view of the gravity of the situation V.P. Menon, Secretary, Ministry of States was flown to Srinagar the next day to assess the situation. He returned on 26th October along with M.C. Mahajan the Prime Minister of the State and apprised the Government of the critical situation in the Valley and that hostiles might reach Srinagar any day. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet, decided that Indian troops would be sent to the State only after its formal accession to India. V.P. Menon flew to Jammu the same afternoon and returned with the Maharaja's request for the troops as well as the Instrument of Accession, duly signed by him. With the acceptance of the request for accession by the GovernorGeneral, during the night of 26th October 1947, the State of Jammu and Kashmir became an integral part of India. The first batch of Indian troops consisting of Tactical Headquarters and C Coy of 1 Sikh under the command of Lt. Col. Dewan Ranjit Rai, landed at Srinagar on 27th October, with Dakotas touching down Srinagar airfield from 08.30 hours onwards. The Sikhs took up defensive positions east of Baramulla on the night of 27/28 October. The next day Col. Rai went forward with two more companies. This position came under heavy attack by the hostiles and Col. Rai decided to fall back and occupy a more appropriate defensive position near Pattan, about 8 km to the rear. While fighting rearguard action this gallant commander got killed by enemy fire. The build up of forces in Srinagar continued at a feverish pitch and incoming troops secured the airfield as well as shored up defences of the city, while also fanning out in the country side as far as possible. Simultaneously, army units

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51

were being brought to Jammu, by road, from Pathankot. By the end of October, in a matter of five days, the following units had been airlifted to the Valley: i. 161 Brigade Headquarters. ii. 3 Infantry Battalions (1 SIKH, l(Para) Kumaon and elements of 4 Kumaon and 1 Mahar). iii. One Battery. iv. One Field Ambulance and administrative units. About 2,000 men and 124,207 kg. load were airlifted in this period.36 Apart from the planes of the Air Force, civilian aircrafts were also used for the purpose. Brigadier L.P. Sen, DSO, arrived in Srinagar on 2nd November and took over command of 161 Brigade. The next day, a heavy engagement took place in Badgam area, not for away from the airfield, between a company of 4 Kumaon and the hostiles. The Kumaonis fought valiantly against a much larger force. Amongst those killed was Major Som Nath Sharma, who was posthumously awarded Param Vir Chakra. He became first recipient of the highest gallantry award of independent India. On 4th November, Sardar Patel and Sardar Baldev Singh flew to Srinagar to make on the spot study of the situation. The next day, 5th November 1947, Maj. Gen. Kalwant Singh reached Srinagar and assumed command of the newly created J&K Division. By then the Indian force had increased in strength to more than five infantry battalions. In support were one Squadron of 7 Cavalry, one coy of 1 Mahar MMG Battalion and one battery of artillery. The decisive battle of Shaltang took place on 7th November. That morning a large force consisting of thousands of raiders, with hundreds of lorries nearby, started heavy firing on 1 Sikh position, at Shaltang about 8 kilometres north of Srinagar, with the objective of entering the dty. By noon Brig. Sen put his troops in position and launched a two pronged attack on the enemy. The hostiles were badly trapped. In front were 1 Sikh, the right flank, was effectively rolled up by 1 (Para) Kumaon and from the left flank heavy fire was brought down by a troop of armoured cars and a rifle troop of 7 cavalry. The fighter aircrafts strafed from the air. Within a

52

The Battles o f Zojila, 1948

short period the hostiles were routed and forced to flee towards Baramulla leaving behind 500 dead, their lorries, dumps of ammunition and supplies.37 The battle of Shaltang shattered the dreams of the invaders of reaching Srinagar, which went beyond their grasp for ever. The fleeing hostiles were pursued and Baramulla re­ occupied on 8th November. After overcoming enemy resistance at Rampur, the Indian troops captured Uri on the 13th and thus cleared the valley of the raiders. After consolidating the defences of the Uri bowl, 161 Brigade was ordered to undertake relief of Punch by moving on the Uri-Punch road over the Haji Pir Pass. The relief force comprised of: i. 1 (Para) Kumaon. ii. 2 Dogra less two companies. iii. TWo troops 7 Cavalry. iv. 17 Mountain Battery. v. One MMG Platoon of 1 Mahar. The operation, launched in the afternoon of 20th November got bogged down due to the destruction of the bridge at Kahuta, by a small State force detachment which mistook their advancing column to be that of the enemy. Simultaneously, the vehicular column of the force, which was some kilometres behind, was ambushed. Brig. Sen, ordered l(Para) Kumaon under the command of Lt. Col. Pritam Singh to cross over and join the Punch garrison while he, along with rest of the force, returned to the relief of ambushed vehicle column. The force, less Pritam Singh's troops, returned to Uri on 26th November. Thus the effort, with all possible chances of relieving Punch, failed. However, some success was achieved as Lt. Col. Pritam Singh and his troops could reach Punch. This proved crucial during the successful defence of the town for the next twelve months. The decision of Brigadier Sen to get the bulk of his column from Kahuta bridge back to Uri was probably not correct. He could have advanced on to Punch and returned only after successfully securing it and the surrounding areas. In any case, the Indian Army failed to take advantage of the rout of

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53

the raiders at Shaltang on 7th November. Had the hostiles been pursued determinedly/ and right across Uri, the capture of Domel and Kohala would not have been difficult With Muzzaffarabad in hand, the Indians could decisively influence further operations towards the south, right up to Mirpur. If 161 Brigade had been asked to move on to Domel and beyond, even after halting at Uri for a few days, instead of heading towards Punch, their chances of a successful breakthrough would have tfeen much better. By diverting their efforts south towards Punch, instead, the Indians 'lost the momentum of their drive on die Jehlum Valley road towards Domel. The bewildered Pakistanis noted with great relief the manner in which the Indians were squandering away surprise and momentum. They promptly rallied the fleeing irregulars, their own personnel and tribals and sent them back to man the heights of the Jehlum Valley. The heights of the Uri bowl were to remain the furthest points of gain for die Indian Army in Jehlum Valley. Winter was now setting in and the Indian efforts were switched to Jammu sector. Here too it appeared to Pakistan that the operations were largely aimed to relieve beleaguered State forces garrisons and hapless non-Muslim population surrounded in these outposts/'3* An appraisal of the extent of operational advance made by the Indian Army till die end of December 1947 indicates that the valley was cleared of the hostiles beyond Uri, and in Jammu division, relief operations were carried out effectively in Nowshera and Kotli. Chhamb was cleared of the hostiles and die Air Force ferried enough arms, ammunition and supplies to enable the Punch garrison to continue their holding operation. On the debit side was the failure to secure the relief of Mirpur which fell into enemy hands, on 25th November, and was put to flames on 26th November, die day Indian troops reached Kotli.39 Jhangar having been recovered was lost again on 24th December, thus posing a threat to Nowshera and jeopardising all operations to the north towards Rajouri and Punch. Another significant development during this period was the decision of the Defence Committee

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The Battles o f Zojila, 1948

of the Cabinet, on 5th December, taken largely at the insistence of the Prime Minister Nehru, to hold Punch at any cost. By the year end the level of force build up in J&K had reached three brigades in Jammu area, 50 Para Brigade, 268 Inf. Bde. and 80 Inf. Bde; while in the Valley only 161 Inf. Bde was operating. Nothing of much military significance happened during the first two months of 1948, except for top level changes in the command structure of both the armies. Lt. Gen. Sir. Roy Bucher took over as C-in-C of the Indian Army, from Lt. Gen. Sir. Rob Lockhart on 1st January 1948. Lt. Gen. Dudley Russel handed over the D.E.P. Command to Lt. Gen. K.M. Cariappa on 18th January. Cariappa was the senior-most Indian officer at that time and was holding the rank of a Maj. Gen. In Pakistan, Lt. Gen. Sir Douglas Gracey was made the C-in-C of the army on 16th February 1948, replacing Lt. Gen. Sir Frank Messervy. Reorganization and Summer Offensive: In the month of January 1948, the enemy threatened the main line of communication near Samba-Jasmergarh area in Jammu-Kathua sector. Little later, in the first week of February, information was received that a large force of hostiles had infiltrated into the Kupwara sector and had occupied the Tregham Valley, thereby threatening Handwara and Sopore towns, these developments necessitated induction of more troops to J&K. On 28th January 1948, 77 Para Bde. was brought to Jasmergarh and 19 Inf. Bde. Group was inducted to Nowshera on 8th February. A new brigade headquarters called Z Bde. later named 163 Inf. Bde. was raised in the second week of February and was stationed at Srinagar to take charge of operations in Handwara-BandipurSkardu-Leh areas. Indian troops met the new challenges successfully. The threat to the valley from Trehgam axis was contained by vigorous operations against the raiders gaining an upper hand on a number of occasions. Two significant achievements were made in Jammu area during March and April 1948. On 18th March Jhangar was recaptured, this time

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55

for good. Rajouri was liberated on 13th April. With these two tactically important objectives in hand, Indian efforts to link up with and relieve the Punch garrison received fresh impetus. By now almost eight brigades of Indian forces were operating in J&K. Keeping in view the quantum of troops, the vastness of the area of operations and also the fact that, during summer months, operational activities would substantially intensify requiring the personal supervision and closer command and control of the Divisional Commander, the Command structure in J&K was reorganized in the beginning of May 1948. The JAK (J&K) DIV,40 under Maj. Gen. Kalwant Singh was bifurcated into two divisions, namely Jammu Div. and Srinagar (Sri) Div. Maj. Gen. Atma Singh was appointed GOC of Jammu Div. with headquarters at Jammu and Maj. Gen. K.S. Thimaya, DSO as GOC Sri. Div. headquartered at Baramulla,41 after staying for some time in Srinagar. A L of C Sub Area was created under Brig. Jai Singh to be responsible for the maintenance of the forces in J&K, to secure the Ls of C from Pathankot to Srinagar and from Jammu to Nowshera and for the administration of the Pathankot base. Also, with the opening of Banihal Pass in the first week of May, 77, Para Bde. was inducted into the valley. The Sri. Div. now had three brigades, with usual supporting arms and ancillary units. Soon after his arrival Gen. Thimaya planned a two-brigade offensive for the capture of Domel. 77 Para Bde. was asked to take over the defensive tasks in Uri area from 161 Inf. Bde. by 13th May, relieving it for the capture of Chinari, Garhi and Domel. D-day for this operation was fixed on 20th May 1948. Before launching of main attack, 163 Inf. Bde. was ordered to develop a diversionary thrust towards Hthwal, on 18th May. While planning and preparations were being made by Indian forces for a major summer initiative, the Pakistani army was also gearing up for such anticipated engagements. The strategic planning, operational build up and military efforts of the Pakistani forces were based on the appreciation prepared by the Army C-in-C, General Gracey towards the

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The Battles o f Zojila, 1948

end of April 1948. He had promised, on reasonably substantive indications, that India would not enlarge the area of conflict outside J&K, as also made assumption of the Indian offensive to capture Bhimber, Mirpur, Punch, and Muzzaffarabad. Based on these parameters and taking into consideration various political and military factors, he recommended, "It is imperative that the Indian Army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Punch-Nowshera."42 The Pakistani preparations for the summer campaign were, to continue personnel and material back up to the hostiles and irregular forces as well as induction of two infantry divisions in J&K. The 7 Inf. Div. commanded by Maj. Gen. F. J. Loftus— Tottenham, joined the battle surreptitiously in March-April 1948. In June, the 9 Frontier Division commanded by Maj. Gen. Nazir Ahmad, was inducted in Uri-Tithwal sector. These two divisions comprised five brigades, besides thousands of 'Azad-Kashmir' troops, fully equipped and trained by Pakistan.43 With two forces thus arrayed against each other, Indian Army's summer offensive in the valley opened on 18th May 1948, with diversionary push by 163 Inf. Bde. under Brig. Harbaksh Singh. The attack, launched simultaneously from Dragmula and Handwara, overcame considerable enemy resistance and captured Chowkibal on 20th May. His troops moved further on over 10,000 ft. Nastachun Pass and secured Tithwal on 23rd May. As compared to the impressive results achieved by this force, the efforts of 161 Inf. Bde. to capture Domel floundered after achieving some initial success. Gen. Thimaya's decision to launch 77 Para Bde. too in pursuit of his Domel objective did not improve matters. He also asked Commander 163 Inf. Bde. to plan for the thrust from Tithwal to Muzzaffarabad. However, this operation could not be carried out due to the paucity of troops. By the middle of June a stalemate had set in. Indian gains in Uri sector were limited to capturing important positions of Chhota Kazinag, Pandu, Pir Kanthi and Ladli gali. However, in a major upset Pandu was again occupied by Pakistani forces on 23rd July 1948.

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Thus ended India's summer offensive, without achieving its aim of capturing Domel which once again eluded the Indians. According to S.K. Sinha, "We would perhaps have done better to undertake this offensive with a bigger force, despite difficulties of maintenance. A reserve brigade to exploit the success at Tithwal and turn that operation from a diversionary thrust into an outflanking manoeuvre may have got us to Domel before the enemy's reinforcements came to his rescue."44 The speed of advance of 163 Inf. Bde. to Tithwal had caught the Pakistanis very badly off the guard, and, given sufficient troops and resources, an advance from there to Muzzaffarabad was well within the realm of possibility. Lord Birdwood, in his assessment of these operations, has postulated even greater success. He maintains that after the loss of Tithwal, "Pakistan's situation was now grim, and had India only used air supply more aggressively to maintain the impetus of this outflanking success her forces would so severely have threatened Muzzaffarabad as to force Pakistani withdrawal from the whole of northern sector. Luckily for Pakistan they paused."45 The situation prevailing in the valley at this time, was to continue, with minor changes, till the end of the conflict. In Jammu area also, except for the capture of Mendhar and link­ up with Punch in November 1948, nothing else of significance was to take place till the declaration of cease-fire on 1st January 1949. However, in the Northern Sector where significant developments had been taking place since the end of October 1947, considerable territory had been lost to Pakistan and Indian troops were faced with heavy odds in the entire vast, desolate and strategically important region. The Pakistan backed hostiles had gained a string of successes in the region and unless urgent and effective steps were taken to stem the tide of their encroachments into the Himalayan highlands, the entire area would be lost by India with all its attendant ramifications.

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The Battles of Zojila, 1948

B. THE NORTHERN SECTOR The Backdrop The high, mountainous and rugged terrain forming the northern segment of the Jammu and Kashmir State included the areas of Gilgit, Gurez, Skardu, Dras, Kargil and Leh. Though the entire area experienced inhospitable climate and living conditions were difficult, the middle and western portions were of a moderate altitude than the eastern Ladakh plateau. While Leh was at an altitude of 11000 ft., the Indus gorge near Kargil was about 8000 ft. and at Bunji, the river flowed only at an altitude of 4000 ft. Gilgit also commanded one of the two main caravan routes from Srinagar, via Gurez, Burzil Pass and Mintaka Pass to Kashgarh. An equally important route led eastward, upstream Indus to Skardu, Kargil and onwards to Leh. Kargil was also linked to Srinagar via Dras and Zojila. Apart from these major routes, there were other tracks of military value in the region. These included a good track from Burzil Pass to Skardu, as well as to Dras and Kargil; Gurez to Dras via TUel valley and along Mashko Nala; from Kargil northward to Skardu along Suru and Indus rivers, passing through villages of Bagicha, Tolti, Parkutta and Gol—a comparatively fertile belt. From Gol a route led eastward along Shyok river to Nubra Valley and thence to Leh. Thus the area between Gilgit, Kargil, Zojila and Gurez offered great advantages to a commander possessing initiative and drive. Anyone controlling this segment could effectively influence events in the rest of Ladakh district towards the east and seriously threaten Srinagar from the north and the east.

Treachery at Gilgit As mentioned earlier, the sixty year lease of Gilgit was terminated on 31st July 1947 and the province handed over to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Brig. Ghansara Singh was appointed the Governor and he took over his assignment on 1st August 1947, having flown to Gilgit on 30th July along with Maj. Gen. Scott, Chief of Staff of the State Force. Gen.

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Scot, on his return gave his report to the Maharaja, which included the decision of the two British officers of the Gilgit Scout, Major W.A. Brown and his Second-in-Command, Captain A.S. Matheison, to opt for Pakistan. Gilgit Scouts had, for all purposes, become a force of the State Government from 1st August and the services of these officers were retained to help in the process of integration with the State Force. Having been informed of their determination to serve Pakistan, the Maharaja did not take the logical step of dispensing away with the services of these officers. Had he done so, the disaster in Gilgit-Ladakh area might never have taken place.46 On assuming the reins of administrative and military set­ up in Gilgit, Brig. Ghansara Singh tried to establish his authority in the region. While most of the local chiefs and the population in general had welcomed the return of Maharaja's rule, the Governor's efforts were hamstrung by lack of support from Srinagar. On the other hand, "Brown and Matheison agreed that if the Maharaja did accede to India they, with the help of the Scouts, would stage a coup d'etat and hand it over to Pakistan. Details of the operation were planned and the code word fixed for putting it into operation was Datta Khel."47 The deployment of State forces in GilgitLadakh area was as under: i. Battalion less two companies = Bunji ii. Company less platoon = Leh iii. TWo platoons = Kargil iv. Company less platoon = Skardu The troops belonged to the 6th Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Majid Khan, and was composed of Sikhs and Muslims. The Muslims belonged to Punch area, whose loyalties had been subverted. Of the two companies at Bunji, one was a Muslim company and the other, a Sikh. But the Sikh troops were still raw recruits and hence not fit to be employed operationally.48 The coup d'etat took place on 31st October 1947, after the accession of the State to India a few days earlier. By next morning the Governor who offered personal resistance had

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The Battles o f Zojila, 1948

been taken into custody. Apart from Brown, other leaders of the coup were Lt. Haider Khan and Sub-Major Babar Khan of the Scouts.49 The Muslim company earlier sent by Col. Majid Khan to Gilgit, on the requisition of the Governor, also joined the rebels. The Sikh company in Bunji was attacked, while their route of withdrawal was blocked at Astor by Capt. Matheison. They were either killed or taken prisoners. A provisional government was formed of which the leaders were Major Brown, Capt. Ehsan Ali, Capt. Mohamad Khan, Capt. Sayeed, Lt. Haider and Sub-Major Babar Khan. Interestingly, no local Raja or any member of the public was included in this set up. Major Brown held a formal flag hoisting ceremony on 3rd November in the lines of the Gilgit Scouts. The purpose and intention of Major Brown's actions becomes even more clear from his post take-over exertions. He stoutly resisted attempts of the local Liberation Front, aiming for complete independence, and sent messages to the premier of NWFP as also to Roger Bacon, the political agent at Khyber, asking for immediate appointment of an authority from Pakistan.50 A third message was sent to Peshawar on 13th November. On the 16th, Khan Sahib Mohammad Alam of Provincial Civil Service of NWFP arrived on Gilgit air strip and took over as the political agent. Regular air service between Peshawar and Gilgit was started which brought in a steady flow of Pakistani civil and military officials. By the end of November, Pakistan was in complete control of the administration of the Gilgit region. Thus Gilgit was lost to Pakistan, practically given to her on a platter. This opened up the way for subsequent Pakistani incursions into Ladakh, Gurez and Tilel valleys, Zojila and the capture of Skardu. Skardu Reinforced After the fall of Gilgit and Bunji, loss of two companies and imprisonment of Lt. Col. Majid Khan in Gilgit, the Second-in-Command, Major Sher Jung Thapa, based at Leh, took over the reins of the 6th Battalion. He now had one Muslim Company less platoon in Skardu with one platoon of

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this company in Kargil. At Leh there was one Sikh Company less one platoon, which was positioned in Kargil. The State Army Headquarters ordered Major Thapa to move to Skardu immediately with one platoon from Leh and one from Kargil. He collected two Sikh platoons and reached Skardu on 3rd December 1947 with a small force of 2 officers, 2 JCOs and 75 men, including 3 operators of the only wireless set available with the battalion. On conducting a detailed recce of the Skardu area, Major Thapa found that his garrison of four platoons was too insufficient to undertake any meaningful defence of the area. He sent messages to Srinagar requesting immediate reinforcements, if Skardu was to be saved. Although, by this time the Indian Army had arrived in strength in the valley, their priority was to drive out the hostiles from there. The responsibility of providing help to Skardu garrison continued with the State Force. After making all out efforts to collect available men, a force of one company plus was organized under the command of Capt. Prabhat Singh, assisted by Lt. Ajit Singh and Lt.Bhagat Singh. This column left Srinagar on 13th January 1948.51 Due to heavy snow enroute, the troops had to traverse the distance on foot right from Kangan itself, 40 kms. ahead of Srinagar. At Sonamarg the force was split into three groups, one under each officer, to cross the Zojila separately due to limited accommodation enroute. It was sheer grit, determination and endurance which enabled these soldiers to cross Zojila in the middle of winter. The column collected at Kargil on 1st February. March to Skardu was resumed on 5th February, in three groups, the first leaving on that day under Capt. Prabhat Singh. These troops reached Skardu on 10th February, to the intense relief of Maj. Thapa and his troops as well as of the civilians of Skardu. Unknown to the Skardu garrison, the hostiles had attacked two platoons of the State force at Tsari on the night of 9/10 February. As part of his defensive plan, Thapa had deployed these platoons at Tsari, 32 kilometres downstream from Skardu, to act as a screen of the main defensive position. On the right bank was a Muslim platoon under Capt. Nek Alam,

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while the left bank was held by a Sikh platoon under the command of Capt. Krishan Singh. In the attack on this position the Muslim platoon joined hands with the hostiles. The Sikh soldiers either died fighting or were killed after being captured, including Capt. Krishan Singh. The Skardu garrison did not get any news of the debacle at Tsari as its only means of communication with this position was through runners. After over-running Tsari the hostiles went on to Skardu and launched an attack on the garrison on the early morning of 11th February, with a force of 600, made up of tribals, Chitralis and about 80 deserters of the State Force. They were equipped with modem rifles, 2" and 3" Mortars.52 The Skardu garrison, having been just reinforced by Capt. Prabhat Singh's troops, was able to put up a spirited fight lasting nearly six hours. The hostiles retreated leaving behind 10 dead, one wounded—taken prisoner, some arms and ammunition including one medium machine gun and a 2" Mortar, but not before slaughtering the non-Muslims including Wazir Wazarat Amar Nath53 and ransacking a major part of Skardu town, which was out side the defensive perimeter. This retreat by hostiles enabled the second batch of Lt. Ajit Singh and 70 men to reach Skardu, safely. The third group of same strength entered Skardu on 15th February, raising the number of Thapa's force to 285. Still, the size of this force was much too small for undertaking a meaningful defence of Skardu garrison, which also included 229 non-Muslim refugees, 19 Muslim refugees and 22 Muslim civil prisoners. On the night of 14/15 February 1948, the hostiles occupied a hill feature called Point 8853, followed later by deployment on other tactical features around the garrison. The siege of Skardu had begun. Major Thapa continued his exertions to stall efforts of the hostiles to achieve a breakthrough of his defences, at the same time he kept on requesting his superiors for more supplies and man-power, keeping them informed of a difficult situation turning precarious. He also suggested withdrawal to Kargil so as to present a much stronger and more compact front. This move was supported by HQ 161

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Inf. Bde. to JAK DIV, on administrative as well as tactical considerations. The supplies and ammunition stock of Skardu were running low and were getting depleted further with each passing day. It was a small garrison in an isolated position, only trying to defend itself, and not capable of seriously harassing the enemy or denying him access to the east, should he desire to proceed in that direction. Moreover, from Kargil this force could be a thorn in the enemy's flank with his L of C stretched.54 However, the proposal was not approved by HQ JAK DIV. The Skardu garrison continued a gallant defence against heavy odds. In the meanwhile events were taking a serious turn, from the Indian point of view, in Gurez and Ladakh sectors. Having failed to make any headway in Uri and Jammu areas, the hostiles opened new fronts in the summer 6f 1948. The capture of Gilgit, followed by the containment and isolation of the Skardu garrison, enabled them to extend their encroachments towards east and south with the intention of capturing Leh and posing serious threats to Srinagar from Gurez in the north and Zojila in the east. The Pakistanis called it a driving away attack by them.55 This summer campaign of the hostiles had three objectives aimed at the dispersal of Indian forces, opening two more fronts—through Gurez and Zojila—and 'bagging' as much territory as possible in Baltistan and Ladakh.56 The Gurez Ingress The Gurez area is primarily the valley of upper Kishanganga57river, in the north of Srinagar. The Kishanganga is formed of two major streams, the Tllel coming from the east and the Burzil flowing from the north, meeting at Gurez or Dawar, flowing westwards to Tithwal and then joining the Jehlum at Muzzaffarabad. In the east the valley was closed by high mountains, across which lay Dras. From Srinagar, the Gilgit road ran besides the Wular lake to Bandipur, climbed through Tragbal to 11586 feet Rajdhani Pass,58 down to Kanzalwan and then along the Kishanganga to Gurez. From Gurez it crossed the river and over the Burzil

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pass to Astor on the other side; then followed the Indus river to Gilgit. Gurez could also be approached from Muzzaffarabad up the gorge of Kishanganga. Rough tracks also led to Sonamarg and via Mashko Nullah to Dras. Gurez was thus an important communication centre and a place of considerable strategic importance. Although there were reports of hostiles presence in Gurez valley, Tragbal and even Bandipur during October-November 1947,59 it was perceived as a military threat to the valley, only in the early summer of 1948 when considerable reinforcements arrived there from Gilgit, over the Burzil Pass. The build up of Pakistani forces in this sector had reached up to 1000 troops comprising the Frontier Constabulary, Chitral Scouts and Gilgit Scouts, led by regular officers of the Pakistan Army and deserters from the State Force.60 The capture of Gurez by Indian forces was important for them as it removed the threat to Srinagar from the north and also helped in developing operations towards Skardu, over the Burzil Pass, where the garrison was holding out. Tragbal was cleared of the hostiles and occupied, on 25th April 1948 in a well-coordinated operation by infantry, artillery and the air force. The motorable road from Srinagar to Bandipur was extended, by army engineers, as a Jeepable track up to Tragbal and the first Jeep was driven up on 21st May. Tragbal was then developed as the base for further operations towards Gurez. A force, comprising 1 Grenadiers, and 2/4 Gorkha Rifles and Patiala Mountain Battery, was placed under the command Lt. Col. Rajindera Singh, Commanding Officer 1 Grenadiers and was given the task of capturing Gurez. The D-Day was fixed as 25th June 1948. By 22nd June concentration of the force was completed at Tragbal. As per plan, the 2/4 GR carried out a diversionary attack on Charpathar on 24th June. The advance to Gurez commenced on the D-Day. The Grenadiers, on crossing the Rajdhani Pass advanced to Gurez via Viji Gali. Their operations entailed capturing of high features of Menon Hill (12857 ft.), Shete Hill (11978 ft.)61 and culminated in the conquest of the forbidding Kesar peak (14218 ft). This peak

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was assaulted by Grenadiers during a blizzard in the middle of the night. The Grenadiers reached Gurez during the night of 28/29 June 1948, whereas the 2/4 GR captured Kanzalwan on the evening of 28th June. Patrols of both the battalions met the next morning. Thus with the hostiles driven out of Gurez valley, the threat to Srinagar from north was removed. Leh Threatened The operations in the eastern half of the Northern Front revolved around Leh, which was the headquarters of Ladakh district. It stretched from Kargil to beyond Chushul and from the Himalayan Range to the Karakoram. In the north, the Shyok river separated the Karakoram Range from the Ladakh Range, which was bounded in the south by the main Indus Valley. South of Indus Valley was Zanskar Range. All these ranges ran east to west representing the grain of the country. There were important tributary streams flowing in northsouth direction, namely Suru, Zanskar and Nubra rivers. Zanskar met Indus a little below Leh at Nimmu. The Suru Valley was more fertile and populated. The river's confluence with Indus was at Marol. The Nubra was bom in the giant Siachin Glaciers of the Karakoram and joined the river Shyok after a short run, above Diskit village in the Nubra Valley. Leh was an important communication centre. To it came caravans from Chinese Turkistan over the Karakoram Pass. Skardu and Gilgit could be reached over the Ladakh Range and down the Shyok river as also via Kargil. The western route to Kargil also led to Srinagar through Dras and over Zojila. Eastward from Leh, tracks went along Indus and over a few passes to Tibet. Another important approach was towards Keylong-Manali. The entire region had never seen an automobile or an aeroplane before 1948. However, there was a telegraph line joining Leh with Srinagar via Kargil and Dras. Before moving on to Skardu, Major Sher Jung Thapa had left behind only one platoon at Leh, which meant only one section each could be deployed at Nubra, Khaltsi and Leh. This was a very unsatisfactory arrangement, more so afier

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The Battles of Zojila,'1948

the presence of some infiltrators was noticed in the Nubra Valley a month before Skardu was surrounded. 161 Inf. Bde. had picked up wireless intercepts emanating from Gilgit area, indicating increased activity of "Operation Sledge". This operation was planned in Pakistan Army Headquarters and launched from Gilgit in mid-February 1948, for the capture of Leh. The force employed was a strong contingent of Gilgit Scouts, defectors from State forces and tribals. On 3rd March, the Skardu garrison reported by signal that about five hundred armed men and two hundred porters had arrived from the direction of Gilgit, and had set off in an easterly direction, towards Kargil. "Operation Sledge" was now under way.62 To meet the impending threat to Leh, HQ 161 Inf. Bde. arranged to despatch a strong platoon of Lahaul-Spiti soldiers of 2 Dogra, under the command of Maj. Prithi Chand and Capt. Khushal Chand.63 This small force, closely followed by two platoons of the State Force under Capt. Badri Singh, left Srinagar on 16th February and after hazardous crossing over Zojila, reached Leh on 12th March 1948. Some extra arms and ammunition was also sent with the troops. The task given to Maj. Prithi Chand and his force was to beef up the defences of Leh and to raise, organize and train local militias. The three platoons of State force were also put under the command of Major Prithi Chand. By 15th April 1948, 300 Ladakhi Home Guards had been armed and were trained to form the 7th Battalion of Jammu and Kashmir Militia64 with Prithi Chand as its first C.O.65 The months of March and April passed without any untoward incident. During the first week of May, hostile activity was noticed near Bogdang village in Nubra Valley. The fall of Kargil on 10th May cut off Leh's L of C with Srinagar and it now lay open to attacks from north and west. On 11th May two platoons blocking the Shyok Valley route clashed with a strong contingent of hostiles. Oil 22nd May, the vital bridge over the Indus at Khaltsi on Kargil-Leh route was attacked by a large number of hostiles supported by MMG and Mortars. The weak detachment defending the bridge was forced to withdraw. It destroyed the bridge before

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it fell into enemy hands. Leh was now being threatened from Nubra and Khaltsi-Saspul axis. Only more and timely reinforcements, arms and ammunition could save it from an imminent debacle. The only way to achieve this was to establish an air-link with Leh. Sonam Narboo,66 a young energetic Ladakhi engineer, had accompanied Major Prithi Chand's column to Leh as a guide. On arrival in Leh, he set about constructing a make-shift airfield on the outskirts of the town, with a grant of Rupees thirteen thousand only. A 2300 yards runway was made ready for landing by the first week of April 1948.67 HQ 163 Inf. Bde, then looking after the Ladakh sector, was informed accordingly.68 With the hostiles' pressure on Leh increasing, the gamble of landing unpressurised Dakota aircraft on Leh airfield was taken in hand. On 24th May Air Commodore Meher Singh, DSO, Air Officer Commanding No:l (Ops) Group, himself pilotted the aircraft, accompanied by Maj. Gen. Thimaya, GOC, Sri Div. and made the historic landing at Leh. The visit of two senior commanders and the establishment of an air link raised the morale of the troops as well as of the civilians of the area. One Company of 2/4 GR was airlifted to Leh on 1st June 1948. It was immediately rushed to stop the advancing hostiles along the Khaltsi route. The situation was stabilized around Saspul village 39 Kms. from Leh. The hostiles had failed to exploit their advantage with requisite swiftness and Leh was saved literally by the gong. It took, though, few more months and some hard fighting before the hostiles were driven out of all the Buddhist populated area in this sector. Fall of Kargil and Dras With Skardu garrison in dire straits, the State Force Headquarters made a desperate bid to despatch relief. The commander of Kashmir Brigade, Brig. Faqir Singh was ordered to proceed to Skardu with whatever force could be mustered. He left, on 16th February 1948, at the head of a column of a weak company of assorted troops with two MMGs and two 2" Mortars. In the traditions of the British

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days, an officer of the Indian Army Maj. Victor Coutts of 6th Battalion, the Rajputana Rifles, was attached with Brig. Faqir Singh.69 This column reached Kargil on 1st March. After a few days rest and making arrangements for porters and animals, it commenced march towards Skardu on 8th March. On 17th March the troops left Gol, on the last stage to Skardu. Enroute, at the gorge of Thurgo the column, moving without tactically securing the flanking heights, was effectively ambushed by the hostiles. The column fell back in confusion after suffering heavy casualties of 26 men killed, 7 missing and 18 wounded. Heavy baggage, MMG, substantial arms and ammunition were also looted by the hostiles. Brig. Faqir Singh too was injured and he left for Srinagar after handing over command of the remainder of the force to Maj. Coutts at Kargil. The misfortune of this column, which had almost succeeded in reaching Skardu, was that Brig. Faqir Singh as well as Major Coutts did not employ the elementary tactics and field crafts so essential for any force operating in an area believed to be under enemy control. They were also not getting along well with each other.70 Having badly mauled the relieving force, the hostiles mounted a well prepared attack on Skardu Garrison on 28th March. It was beaten back by the defenders. Another determined attempt on 7th April too was effectively foiled. During these two engagements, each lasting over four days, the Skardu troops stuck to their defences against a much larger force and very heavy odds. Yet another attempt was made to send reinforcements to Skardu. This time, learning from earlier mistakes, a much stronger force was organized. It comprised two Dogra companies of 7th J&K Infantry at Srinagar and 5th J&K Infantry to be moved from Jammu. The two companies of 7th Battalion were moved immediately to Kargil, reaching there by the first week of April, 1948. These were placed under the command of Major Coutts. This force, called 'Biscuit Column' was asked by 163 Inf. Bde. to move to Parkutta and wait there for 5th Battalion to join up.71 Three companies of this

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unit were airlifted to Srinagar and the fourth moved by road. On 3rd April the first batch of 5th Battalion left Srinagar under the command of Lt. Col. Sampuran Bachan Singh of the Indian Army (1 SIKH). Lt. Col. Kripal Singh, CO of the battalion followed in the third batch and the tail comprised A and C Companies, moving in the last group. This force, though a large contingent for Ladakh area, was very widely spread in a tactically unsound manner, and ceased to be of much effect. In fact, the dispersal itself was a recipe for disaster. On 14th April, while Maj. Coutts' party was 14 km. beyond Bagicha, the first batch from Srinagar was just entering Kargil, the second batch was near Dras, the third at matayan and the fourth and fifth at Gumri. The sixth batch was just leaving Srinagar.72 To make matters worse, a lot of friction existed between S.B. Singh and Kripal Singh, the two Lt. Cols, with the force, as 163 Inf. Bde. was simultaneously dealing with both. This confusion was cleared on 4th May when HQ 163 Inf. Bde. ordered that Lt. Col. Kripal Singh would be in command of the entire column. But by then, a lot of damage had been done as the force was too much dispersed for any effective control. There is also evidence available suggesting that Maj. Coutts did not have the inclination to fight.73 On 17th April Maj. Coutts' column reached Parkutta and was engaged by hostiles, made immobile till joined by Lt. Col. S.B. Singh on 28th April. On 30th April Lt. Col. Kripal Singh reached Kargil. By now the hostiles had realized the actual strength of the column and their commander embarked on a bold and ingenious plan to deal with the scattered bodies of troops of the relief force as also to strike at the L of C simultaneously. By first week of May the Indian troops were scattered between Sonamarg and Parkutta. The commander of the hostiles had about 800 men at his disposal. Leaving 200 men to continue the siege of Skardu and prevent any Indian advance from Parkutta, the rest of the force was sent by different routes to strike simultaneously at Gund, Pindras, Dras and Kargil. The date for all attacks was fixed on 10th May 1948. On that day Guild was attacked

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and several bridges were damaged on the Sonamarg road. The Pindras column could not reach its target. The third column attacked Dras, where the troops of 5th K.I. repulsed it but they could not move towards Kargil. The hostiles' attack on Kargil was successful and it was captured on 10th May itself. The hostiles also got in between batches of Indian troops strung at different points on the Kargil-Parkutta route and attacked them. In the following few days Lt. Col. S.B. Singh and Major Coutts fell back from Bagicha saving their lives by swimming across the Indus and reached Khaltsi on 13th May. Lt. Col. Kripal Singh was now left with 600 men in different locations. He was ordered by Sri. Div. to concentrate all his forces at Marol and make a bid to recapture Kargil. Due to shortage of porters, he destroyed his heavy baggage and heavy weapons, etc. and marched towards Marol. On 19th May, when the column was near Kharmang bridge short of Bagicha, it was ambushed by the enemy.74 The column was severely mangled with about 200 men killed, wounded and missing. Kripal Singh, however, managed to slip through with about 400 persons during the night and headed for Dras, which he believed still to be in the hands of his troops. They were again ambushed while crossing the Shingo river, splitting the column into two. The portion which made a bid towards Dras got decimated, only few survivors made to safety. The body with Lt. Col. Kripal Singh crossed Shingo further upstream and headed for Sonamarg, via Kaobal Gali (13,590 ft.). This group, consisting of 5 officers and 145 ORs, reached Sonamarg in the evening of 7th June 1948.75 Thus ended in a fiasco, the last effort by the Indian troops to relieve the beleaguered garrison of Skardu. The mission failed not because of shortage of manpower or paucity of arms, ammunition or equipment. The resources were more than adequate. Dispersal of forces, absence of a tactical approach, confusion in command and control, uninspiring leadership and less than competent handling by the Commander of 163 Inf. Bde, were the factors responsible for the misery and calamity which befell this force.

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By ending May 1948, a weak company of 5 K.I. under Capt. Kashmir Singh was holding on in Dras, having been surrounded on 10th May, and a company plus of the same battalion, under the command of Capt. Rachpal Singh was at Machoi. Kashmir Singh held on for almost a month. Then with his supplies and ammunition almost exhausted, he and his troops slipped out of Dras on 6th June at 23.00 hrs,76 in an effort to join with the troops at Machoi. An engagement with the hostiles followed at Pindras in which Capt. Kashmir Singh and all his JCOs got killed. The remnant broke up in small groups; most of them got killed or captured. Only very few could make it to Machoi. Thus Dras also fell into the hands of the hostiles. Between the hostiles and Zojila, was only a company plus of 5 KI deployed around Machoi and one Company of 1 Patiala, recently sent up, dug in at Gumri. The doughty defenders of Skardu were still holding on. Appraisal of Pakistani Forces Mid-June 1948 represented the high tide of Pakistan's success in the Northern Sector. Within a period of about eight months and with only about two battalions of troops, the invaders had occupied a vast and strategic region, from Gilgit to Nubra, and from the Karakoram to the Zojila and Gurez. As a result of these successes, the line of communi­ cation to Leh was cut, and the Kashmir valley itself was surrounded from the north and east also.77 The hostile commanders plan of four column strike at Gund, Pindras, Dras and Kargil on 10th May 1948 has been rightly described as "a brilliant and daring stroke" and "the great plan."78 Their entire force operating in this sector comprised Gilgit Scouts, Chitral Scouts, Frontier Constabulary, deserters of the State forces, tribals and stiffeners from the Pakistani Army, in the form of officers, men and heavy weaponry. It goes to the credit of their commanders that such desparate elements were welded together effectively in pursuance of a defined objective of strategic importance and not merely for the greed of loot and pelf. The commanders realized the fighting potential and combat qualities of their men. They were hardy,

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war-like, mountain people, used to hit-and-run type of warfare since ages. Instead of organizing them into a disciplined force and making them fight set-piece battles, the tribal strength of guerilla operations was successfully exploited by officers who were themselves good military commanders and led their men well. "Raiders" is the term by which the hostiles have normally been referred to and this appellation has been owned by Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan who was, for a period, commander of all raiders operating in J&K State. He wrote, "raiding is, now a days, an accepted and very highly developed branch of the art of war. So we can, I think, without indignity, retain the name "raiders"—particularly so when the fighting technique of the Frontier tribesmen does, in the military sense, make him indeed a very competent and daring type of raider."79 Another tribal trait of loyalty to the Chief and to the family of the Chief, was also effectively utilized by the Pakistanis. Reference has already been made of Sub-Maj Babar Khan of Gilgit Scouts and his ties with the Mir of Hunza and Mir of Nagar. Similarly, the commander of the troops around Skardu, Col. Shahzada Mata-ul-Mulk, was the son of the Mehtar of Chitral. The tribal loyalties of generations were effectively weaved into the command structure of the raiding groups. However, the greatest asset in Pakistan's armoury was religion, which the leaders of the newly created State used with telling effect. In the name of religion passions were aroused, lawlessness created and communal hatred spread in the J&K State. Loyalty of the Muslim troops of the State Force was subverted and war-like tribals within and outside the State incited, in the name of Islam, to invade the State. The hostiles were also lured with the prospects of unchecked loot and arson. In fact, "It was part of their agreement with Major Khurshid Anwar of the Muslim League National Guards, who was their leader, that they would loot non-Muslims. They had no other remunerations."80 The motivation to the hostiles was thus provided by a heady mixture of the excitement of combat, aroused religious

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fanaticism channelized into a perceived 'holy war' and lure of the loot. They were employed in the kind of warfare that the tribes excelled in; guerilla raids and battles of attrition. Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan assessed this potential as, "The performance of the tribal lashkars had been excellent where the ground was suitable for their sniping and hit and nm tactics."81 The hostiles and their commanders exhibited a firm grasp of irregular warfare, qualities of a keen tactician and an eye for the ground. In the northern sector, their planning of operations was excellent, exhibiting resource­ fulness of a high order. Once the initiative came into their grasp in Gilgit, it was never allowed to slip out of hand and every opportunity that presented itself was fully exploited. It is also a fact that the hostiles were operating under certain favourable conditions which put them in an advantageous position as compared to their adversary. The control over Gilgit gave them a head start. Their campaign started with a great prize and high morale. Their line of communication was shorter and more secure. The troops were used to moving light and hence were more mobile. Most of them, being locals, had no problem of acclimatization which the Indian troops faced operating in these oxygendeficient heights. And, lastly, large quantities of arms, ammunition, equipment and supplies fell into their hands in Gilgit, handed over by the defectors of 6th Battalion of the State forces, and looted from the two relief columns of Brig. Faqir Singh and Lt. Col. Kripal Singh. At the same time they were also fighting under some constraints. The administrative back-up at the disposed of regular army units was not available to them. They were operating without any air support, whereas their adversary enjoyed complete air superiority. Although the hostiles had achieved highly successful results by undertaking the type of operations which suited them, they were not able to achieve any breakthrough where the opponent put up resistance from prepared defensive positions. Skardu held on in the face of repeated assaults by forces far superior in numbers. Even the tiny group of

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74

defenders at Dras refused to give in their defences for almost a month till they ran short of food and ammunition. As has been brought out, mid June represented the zenith of Pakistan's success in the Northern Sector. Then by tj*e month end, advance towards Leh was checked, Gurez and Tllel valleys recaptured by Indian troops and 1 Patiala made their presence felt at the Zojila. The Indian response in the Himalayan Heights had begun to appear credible. REFERENCES

1. S.N. Prasad and Dharam Pal, ed. History of Operations in Jammu and Kashmir (1947-48), Ministry of Defence, Government of India (New Delhi-1987), p.l. 2. Maj. K. Brahma Singh, History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles (1820-1956), (Lancers International, New Delhi -1990), p. 165. 3. Maj. Gen. Scott, was commonly known as "Buddu Sahib" in the State, due to his advanced age. He was relieved of his duties on 24th September to be sent on leave till the termination of his term on 1st November 1947. He was Chief of Staff for nearly 11 years. 4. The two mountain batteries of the State Force were transferred to the Indian Army in 1942. 5. Prasad, n.l, p.ll. 6. Lorve J. Kavic, India's Quest for Security: Defence Policies, 1947-1965 (EBD Publishers, Dehradun -1967), p.241. 7. Lt. Gen. Vijay Madan, Jammu and Kashmir Operations, 1947-48: The other Version, USI Journal July-September 1992, pp.302-303. 8. Ibid, p.304. 9. The postal services being under that country, the Pakistani flag was hoisted atop the GPO building in Srinagar on 14th August 1947. 10. Prasad, n.1, pp. 14-15. 11. Pakistan Foreign Minister's telegraphic reply to State Government on 2nd October 1947. 12. By 13th September 60,000 Hindu, Sikh and 10,000 Muslim refugees had passed through Kathua. The civil and army authorities were, to their credit, able to keep the two streams apart. 13. Brahma Singh, n.2, pp.222-223. 14. Ibid, 224. 15. Prasad, n.1. p.14. 16. Tariq is the name of a legendry military commander who led Arab forces into Spain in seventh century. On landing on the coast of Spain he had burnt his boats to spur his troops to fight for victory. As is evident in his book, "Raiders in Kashmir", General Akbar Khan (he was, in fact, a brigadier then) relished his code name. 17. Prasad, n.l, ppl7-19.

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18. Khursid Anwar was an emergency commissioned officer in the Supply Corps of the Indian Army during Second World War. He had become Major before he left the army to join Muslim League, and became commander of its National Guards. He was instrumental in organising tribal raiders and was made commander of the Northern Sector. 19. Lt. Col. Narain Singh had complete confidence and faith in the fighting capabilities and loyalty of all his troops including Muslim companies. Somedays before the attack on Muzaffarabad, he had firmly turned down a suggestion to replace the two Muslim companies with Dogra soldiers. 20. Capt. Ram Singh lost his life in the early phase of attack on Domel. The small garrison there, under Lt. Col. Narain Singh fought tenaciously during the entire day. By nightfall only CO and 15 men had survived. Taking advantage of the cover of darkness, they slipped into the hills, probably to fall back on another defensive position. They were never heard of again. 21. Durga Dass (ed), Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50 Vol-l, (Navjivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad -1971), p.191. 22. Ibid, p.192. 23. Brahma Singh, n.2, pp 223-224. 24. Madan, n.7, p.306. 25. Prasad, n.1., p.379. 26. K. Brahma Singh, British Diplomacy in Kashmir 1925-1935 (Thesis submitted to Jammu University for Ph.D. in 1988), pp 12,13. William Digby commenting on Maharaja Partap Singh's deposition mentions, "It was Gilgit the Government wanted." (William Digby, Condemned Unheard, London, 1890, p.103). 27. Maj. Gen. O.S. Kalkat (Retd), The Far Flung Frontiers, (Allied Publishers, New Delhi-1983), pp.29,30 & 36. 28. Lt. Gen. L.P. Sen (Retd), Slender was the Thread (Orient Longman, New Delhi -1969), p.21. 29. Ibid. 30. Alan Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (Robert Hale, London -1951), p.226. 31. Lt. Gen. S.P.P. Thorat (Retd), From Reveille to Retreat (Allied Publishers, New Delhi -1985) p.100. 32. Prasad, n.1, p.22. 33. Madan, n.7, p.318. 34. Maj. Gen. Rajindra Nath (Retd), Military Leadership in India—From Vedic Period to Indo-Pak Wars. (Lancer Books, New Delhi-1990), p.266. 35. Madan, op dt, p.318. On 28th September 1947, Auchirdeck wrote to his superiors in London that: "I have no hesitation whatever in affirming that the present Indian Cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis. In this I am supported by the unanimous opinion of my senior officers, and indeed by all responsible British officers cognizant of the situation." (John Connell, Auchinleck London, 1959, p.920).

76 36. 37. 38. 39.

The Battles o f Zojila, 1948

Prasad, rtl, p.35. L.P. Sen, a28, pp 90,98. Madan, n.7, pp.309,310. By 28th November Indian force evacuated Kotii and fell back to Jhangar, bringing with them the refugees and State force garrison at Kotli. This was said to have been done to reduce the line of communications as also to project more compact defensive position. 40. Sometimes JAK DIV was also referred to as JAK Force. 41. S.N. Prasad mentions at page 154, "Gen. Thimayya arrived in Srinagar with his headquarters on 4 May 1948." 42. Madan, n.7, p.315. A part of this appreciation has been reproduced by Lt. Gen Vijay Madan, quoting from Defence journal - Volume 3-4, 1992 (Karachi), as well as by Maj. Gen (Retd.) Akbar Khan in his book, "Raiders in Kashmir". It is an impassioned plea which would have done proud to any Pakistani national, and reads as, "An easy victory of the Indian Army, particularly in the Muzaffarabad area, is almost certain to arouse the anger of tribesmen against Pakistan for its failure to render them more direct assistance and might well cause them to turn against Pakistan — . If Pakistan is not to face another problem of about 2,750,000 people uprooted from their homes; if India is not to be allowed to sit on the doorsteps of Pakistan to the rear and on the flank, at liberty to enter at her will and pleasure; if civilian and military morale is not to be affected to a dangerous extent; and if subversive political forces are not to be let loose within Pakistan itself, it is imperative that the Indian Army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Punch-Nowshera." 43. Prasad, rtl., p.377. This is based on Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan's book, The Story of Pakistan Army, Karachi-1963. 44. Maj. S.K. Sinha, Operation Rescue, (Vision Books New Delhi -1977), p.77. 45. Lord Birdwood, Tm Nations and Kashmir, (Robert hale Limited, London 1956), p.71. 46. L.P. Sen, a28, p. 190. 47. Madan, n.7, p.311. In fact, the author strongly feels that in all probability this task was spelt out by the Political department of the British. 48. Brahma Singh, n.2, p.244. 49. Sub-Major Babar Khan was an uncle of Mir of Nagar and had married the sister of the Mir of Hunza. 50. Madan, op cit, p.313. 51. Brahma Singh, n.2, p.258. 52. Prasad, n.1, p.285. 53. Brahma Singh maintains that Amar Nath and many other members of the minority community were able to reach defensive perimeter safely. 54. L.P. Sen, n.28, pp.192,193. The author, who was then Commanding 161 Inf. Bde, called Skardu as, "Nothing other than a Flag Flying Outpost, which would one day be forced to surrender through starvation and inability of the garrison to strike back in self-defence." 55. Fazal Maqeem Khan, the Story c f Pakistan Army, (Oxford University Press, Karachi -1963), p. 106.

Overall Situation

77

56. Prithvi Nath Kaul Bamzai, History of Kashmir (Metropolitan Books, New Delhi -1962), p.755. 57. Kishanganga river is called Neelam by Pakistanis. 58. Also called Rajdiangan Pass. 59. Prasad, n.1, p.309. 60. S.K. Sinha, n.44, p.79. Bamzai estimates this force to be five companies of Frontier Constabulary, 250 Chitral Scouts and 300 Gilgit Scouts. 61. These two peaks were named after major Menon and Capt. Shete, the company commanders of A and B Company, respectively. 62. L.P. Sen, n.28, p.p.188,194. 63. The composition of this group has been shown as 40 men, including a signal detachment, by Lt. Gen. L.P. Sen, who was then commanding 161 Inf. Bde. He also refers to Maj. Prithi Chand as a captain. Maj. Brahma Singh gives out strength of Dogras as 2 officers, one JCO and 18 other ranks; whereas S.N. Prasad mentions it to be composed of 2 officers, 1 JCO and 13 other ranks. 64. The most famous veteran of this lot is Lt. Col. C. Rinchen, MVC and Bar, SM, (Retd). When the word 'Bar" succeeds a decoration it denotes second conferment of the same award. In this case Col. Rinchen was awarded MVC in 1948 and 1971. 65. Brahma Singh, n.2, p.264. 66. Padam Shri Sonam Narboo had the distinction of being the first Ladakhi engineer. He rose to the rank of a Superintending Engineer in the Public Works Department of J&K State, before joining the Border Roads Organization as a Chief Engineer. In his eventful career, he was associated with a number of important projects. He considered the survey and construction of Kargil-Leh Road as his proudest achievement. Shri Narboo became the Works Minister in the Cabinet of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in 1975 and remained in that post till his death in 1980. 67. The Wireless message, dated 6th April 1948 from "Narboo Engineer to HQ 163 Inf. Bde", reads as: "2300 yds. long runway serviceable (.) remainder 500 yds need enormous cutting and filling which will be done if found necessary on landing (.) Small Igloo hut can be constructed out of savings out of thirteen thousand grant already sanctioned for landing ground (.) send planes immediately (.) weather most favourable between early morning and noon." However, the sanction for construction of Igloo hut for guards was not received in time and Sonam Narboo deposited Rs. 2109 into the Treasury as savings. 68. File of Historical Division, Ministry of Defence. 69. Brahma Singh, n.2, p.261. 70. In file of Historical Division of Ministry of Defence, there is a hand written letter of Major Coutts, from Bagicha dated 13th March 1948, addressed to "General Lakhinder Singh" (Brig. Lakhinder Singh was then commanding 163 Inf. Bde). Excerpts of this letter are reproduced:

78

71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

The Battles o f Zojila, 1948 "I regret to inform you that the whole move is going forward without prior planning and coordination and difficulties are allowed to crop up first before, they are tackled. The lack of intelligent anticipation amazes me— I have the greatest respect and admiration for Brig. Faqir Singh as a gentleman but have to admit of no such sentiments regarding his operational ability— Brahma Singh, rt2, p.263. Prasad, n.1, p.291. Ministry of Defence, n.70. There is a signal from HQ J&K Force to 163 Brigade, dated 14th April 1948, ordering amongst others, "Maj. Coutts will NOT return back as he states." Brahma Singh, n.2, p.265, based on the notes of Lt. Col. Kripal Singh (Retd). War Diary of 1 Patiala for June 1948. Prasad, n.1, p.298. Also confirmed by the statements of the survivors of Dras garrison, as recorded in the War Diary of 1 Patiala. Prasad, n.1, p.305. Ibid, p.293. Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir, (Pak Publishers Karachi-1970), p.68. Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan's interview published in the Defence Journal (Karachi, June-July, 1985). Ibid.

~v

tirit Gamre 1 Mahar (MMG).

15 Nov 1948

Village Barsud, Ratnagiri, Maharashtra.

12.

Nk. Chet Singh 1 Patiala.

29 Jun 1948

Patiala

Nov 1948

(Punjab).

Appendices

241 Ratnagiri, Maharashtra.

13.

Nk. Babu Rewane 6 Sep 1948 5 Maratha (Posthumous).

14.

L/Nk. Sajjan Singh 1 Patiala.

23 May 1948

Village Dhanaula, Phul, Bamala (Punjab).

15.

L/Nk. Chand Singh 1 Patiala.

23 May 1948

Village Bhagwan, Kalanaur, Gurdaspur, (Pb).

16.

L/Nk. Dhani Ram, 5 J&K Inf.

23 May 1948

Village Sarore, Tehsil Bishnah, Jammu (J&K).

17.

L/Nk. Aba Kiratkunde 1 Mahar (MMG).

28-29 Jun 1948

18.

L/Nk. Dharam Singh Thapa 14 Nov 1948 1/5 GR.

Village Khagitar, Dailekh, Nepal.

19.

L/Nk. Hanuman Ram 4 Rajput.

Village Chirani, Khetri, Rajasthan.

20.

Sep. Jagat Ram 23 May 1948 5 J&K Inf. (Posthumous)

Village Nalagharani, Tehsil Ramnagar, District Udhampur (J&K).

21.

Sep. Bachan Singh 1 Patiala.

23 May 1948

Village Bamana, Sangrur, (Punjab).

22.

Sep. Gajan Singh 1 Patiala.

8 June 1948

Patiala (Punjab).

23.

Sep. Zaila Singh 1 Patiala (Posthumous).

1 July 1948

Village Sangat Kalan, Bhatinda (Punjab).

24.

Sep. Hazura Singh 1 Patiala (Posthumous).

3 July 1948

Village Ramgarh Bhundar, Bhatinda (Punjab).

25.

Sep. Teja Singh 1 Patiala (Posthumous).

6 July 1948

Patiala (Punjab).

15 Nov 1948

Maharashtra.

The Battles of Zojila, 1948

242 26.

Sep. Jai Pal 3 Jat.

14 Sep 1948

Village Radiau, Rohtak, Haryana.

27.

Sep. Mange Ram 3 Jat (Posthumous).

14 Sep 1948

Village Nahri, Sonepat, Haryana.

28.

Sep. Jai Dutt Joshi 83 Fd. Amb (AMC).

20 Oct 1948

Village Bhakunda, Pithoragarh, U.P.

29.

Rfn. Sher Bahadur Gurung 2 Nov 1948 1/5 GR.

30.

Sep. Jagan Nath Singh 4 Rajput.

4 Nov 1948

Village Matiara, Shahbad, Bihar.

31.

Sep. Choti Singh 4 Rajput.

15 Nov 1948

Village Bari Bond, Karauli, Rajasthan.

Village Dhungre, Namakot, Nepal.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTERVIEWS 1. Notable personalities who took part in the Operations: a. Maj. Gen. A.S. Pathania, MVC, MC (Retd), Jammu, 6th April 1991. b. Maj. Gen. Virendra Singh (Retd), New Delhi, 18th July 1994. c. Maj. Gen. Niranjan Singh, AVSM, MC (Retd), New Delhi, 7th May 1994. d. Brig. Sher Jung Thapa, MVC (Retd), Jammu, 18th January 1992. e. Brig. Sukhdev Singh, Vr.C., MC (Retd), Jammu 1st November 1991 and Patiala 11th July 1994. f. Col. Rao Ram Singh (Retd), New Delhi, 6th May 1994. g. Lt. Col. Shamsher Singh (Retd), Srinagar 20th May 1993 and Chandigarh, 10 July 1994. h. Lt. Col. Sharak Dev Singh Jamwal (Retd), Jammu, 7th June 1994. i. Lt. Col. Rachpal Singh (Retd), Jammu, 4th June 1994. j. Maj. Rasal Singh,Vr.C (Retd), Jammu, 25th June 1994. k. L/Nk. Dhani Ram, Vr.C. (Retd), Jammu, 23rd May 1994. 2. Shri S.P.S. Sahani, retired Director General of Information, J&K Government, who was a war correspondent covering the J&K Operations, Jammu December 1994.

244

The Battles of Zojila, 1948

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES: 1. Written notes from: a. Maj. Gen. Dalbir Singh, PVSM (Retd), October and November 1991. b. Brig. Sukhdev Singh, Vr.C., MC (Retd), June, July & August 1991. c. Lt. Col. Shamsher Singh (Retd), June, July & September 1991. d. Maj. Rasal Singh,Vr.C (Retd), July 1991. e. Hony. Lt. Kartar Singh Gill, Vr.C. and Bar (Retd), December 1994. 2. Regimental History of: a. 3 JAT, b. 4 RAJPUT, c. 5 Maratha, d. 7 CAV, e. 51 Para Fd.Bty. 3. War Diaries of: a. 1 Patiala, b. 1/5 GR, c. 3 JAT, d. 4 RAJPUT, e. 5 Maratha, f. HQ.77 Para Brigade, g. 7 CAV, h. 51 Para Fd. Bty. i. 30 Fd.Bty, j. J&K Mtn.Bty. k. 13 Fd.Coy, 1. 433 Fd.Coy, m. 682 Fd.Park Coy, n. 313 Med.Bn. o. 4 AT Regt. p. Sri.Div. Sitreps. 4. War diaries of the IAF in respect of: a. 7 Sqn. b. 8 Sqn.

Bibliography

5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

245

c. 10 Sqn. d. 42 Sqn. e. No.l Wing, Records of the Historical Section, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi. Records of the Historical Section, IAF, New Delhi. Papers from India Office, London (Commonwealth Relations Office). Records of the J&K State Archives, Jammu. British Diplomacy in Kashmir 1925-1935 (Thesis submitted to Jammu University for award of Ph.D. in 1988 by K. Brahma Singh).

PUBLISHED SOURCES: 1. Lessons from J&K Ops, (October 1947-June 1948) Western Command Training Publications - Command Press, New Delhi- August 1948. 2. Lessons from J&K Ops, (July 1948-January 1949) Western Command Training Publication - Command Press New Delhi, 1949. 3. Speech of Shri R.K. Shanmukham Chetty, Minister of Finance, Government of India, while introducing the Budget for the year 1947-48. 4. Speech of Shri R.K. Shanmukham Chetty, Minister of Finance, Government of India, while introducing the Budget for the year 1948-49. 5. Jammu and Kashmir Operations, 1947-48. The other Version - Lt. Gen. Vijay Madan, PVSM, VSM, USI Journal, New Delhi, July-September, 1992. 6. Selected writings and speeches from officers of Western Command on Operations in J&K; Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1950. 7. Bamzai, Prithvi Nath Kaul, History of Kashmir Metropolitan Book Ltd. New Delhi, 1962. 8. Birdwood, Lord, Two Nations and Kashmir, Robert Hale Limited, London, 1956. 9. Brecher, Michael, The Struggle for Kashmir, Toronto, 1953.

246

The Battles of Zojila, 1948

10. Charak, S.S. Conquests of Himalayan Territories, Ajaya Prakashan, Jamntu, 1978. 11. Chaturvedi, Air Marshal, M.S. History of the Indian Air Force Vikas Publishers, New Delhi, 1978. 12. Cunningham A, Ladakh, London, 1853. 13. Drew, Frederick, Jammu & Kashmir Territories, London, 1875. 14. Durga Deis, Sardar Patel's Correspondence, 1945-50 Vol-I, Ahmedabad, 1971. 15. Evans Humphry—Thimaya of India-A Soldiers' Life, Harcourt Brace and Co, New York-1960. 16. Gazetteer of Kashmir and Ladakh, Vivek Publishing House, Delhi, 1974 17. Johnson, Alan Campbell, Mission with Mountbatten, Robert Hale, London-1951. 18. Kalkat, Maj. Gen (Retd), O.S, The Far Flung Frontiers, Allied Publishers,' New Delhi-1983. 19. Kavic, Lorve.J, Indias Quest for Security : Defence Policies 1947-1965, EDB Publishers, Dehradun, 1967. 20. Khan, Maj. Gen (Retd) Akbar, Raiders in Kashmir, Karachi, 1970. 21. Khan Maj. Gen. F.M., The Story of the Pakistan Army Karachi, 1963. 22. Lai, Air Chief Marshal (Retd) P.C., My years with the IAF, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1986. 23. Nath, Maj. Gen, (Retd) Rajindra, Military Leadership in India, From Vedic Period to Indo-Pak Wars, Lancers Books, New Delhi, 1990. 24. Pallis, Marco, Peaks and Lamas, Cassels-London, 1939. 25. Paloskar, Col. (Retd) R.D., MC - History of 5 Gorkha Rifles Vol-Ill 1858 - 1991, Shillong - 1991. 26. Panikkar, K.M, The Founding of the Kashmir State, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London, 1953. 27. Prasad, S.N. and Dharam Pal, History of Operations in Jammu and Kashmir (1947-48), Thomson Press, New Delhi, 1987. 28. Proudfoot, Lt. Col (Retd) C.L. We Lead - 7th Light Cavalry 1784-1990, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1991.

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29. Pushpinder Singh, Ravi Rikhye and Peter Steinmann— 'FIZA'YA' - Psyche of the Pakistani Air Force - Society for Aero Space Studies, New Delhi, 1991. 30. Raghavan, Brig. V.R.—By land and Sea (History of Punjab Regt 1947-86) Friends Printers and Consultants Delhi, 1986. 31. Rao, Gen. (Retd), K.V. Krishna, PVSM, Prepare or Perish, Lancers International, New Delhi, 1990. 32. Sen, Lt. Gen. (Retd), L.P., Slender was the Thread, New Delhi, 1969. 33. Sharma, Lt. Col. Gautam, The Jat Regiment, Vol.III, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1979. 34. Sinha, Maj. S.K. Operation Rescue, Vision Books, New Delhi, 1977. 35. Singh Lt. Col. (Retd) Bhupinder, Indo-Pak Conflicts over Kashmir, Patiala, 1983. 36. Singh, Maj. K. Brahma, History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1990. 37. Singh Pushpinder—The battle of Axes - No. 7 Squadron, New Delhi, 1993. 38. Thorat, Lt. Gen. (Retd) SPP, From Reveille to Retreat, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1985.