The Balancing Act. A History of Modern Thailand 9748206629

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THE BALANCING ACT A History of Modern Thailand Joseph J. Wright Jr.

ASIA BOOKS

THE BALANCING ACT

THE BALANCING ACT A History of Modern Thailand

Joseph J. Wright, Jr. r i *

ASIA BOOKS

Distributed by Asia Books Co. Co, Ltd. 5 Soi 61 Sukhumvit Rd. SukhumvitRd. Bangkok, Thailand Tel. 391-2680 Fax (662) 381-1621

© Joseph J. Wright, Jr., 1991 All rights reserved

Published by Pacific Rim Press; Oakland, California; USA

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Cover photograph of Democracy Monument by Luca Invemizzi Tettoni

Printed in Thailand

ISBN 974-8206-62-9 for all The authorand PacificRim Press takefullresponsibility takefull responsibilityfor the information contained herein and in no way hold Asia Books liable for any controversies arriving from the contents.

Contents Acknowledgments .................... 7 Author’s Introduction ........................................................................ 9 Chapter 1 Thai Social Order and the Role of the Elites........... 17 Chapter 2 The Consequences of Modernity ............................. 33 Chapter 3 The Climate of Political Change.............................. .46 Chapter 4 The ‘New Era’ Begins................................................ 59 Chapter 5 Coalition, Rebellion and Abdication ........................ 69 Chapter 6 Once More a Kingdom.............................................81 Chapter 7 Reign of The Leader................................ 94 Chapter 8 Phibul the Warrior................................................... 105 Chapter 9 The Alliance With Japan ......................................... 116 Chapter 10 Pridi and the Underground Elite ............................ 132 Chapter 11 From One Nightmare to Another ........................... 150 Chapter 12 Into the Ninth Reign ............................................... 166 Chapter 13 New King, New Kingship ....................................... 184 Chapter 14 To Touch Politics . ................................................. 197 Chapter 15 Promise and Polarization ........................................ 212 Chapter 16 The Consequences of Dictatorship................. 228 Chapter 17 Another Hot Day in October.................................. 243 Chapter 18 A Vicious Cycle of Politics and Coups................... 262 Chapter 19 The “Light Government Revolution”. ........... 283 Chapter 20 The Conspiracy of Interests....................................297 Conclusion .................................................. 311 Appendices Appendix A A Chronology of Coups D’Etat in Modern Thailand............................................................ 320 Appendix B Prime Ministers Since 1932 .............................. 324 Appendix C Elections Since 1932................................... 325 Appendix D Kings of the Chakri Dynasty............................ 326 Notes .............................................................................................. 327 Bibliography................................................................................... 375 Index .............................................................................................. 381 About the Author........................................................................... 399

Map of Thailand

Acknowledgments

Though largely an independent undertaking, the present work began at Ohio University under the supervision of Dr. William H. Frederick. That I focus on elites and examine the question of continuity versus change was Dr. Frederick’s suggestion. For that and for all his support and advice, I thank him. I must also, acknowledge the input of Dr. Bruce Steiner and Dr. Donald Jordan, whose comments and suggestions were most helpful. Thanks also to the Pacific Rim Press and Asia Books, to Christopher Burt, Richard Lair and Edward M. Stauffer who shared the responsibility and should share the credit for putting the book in its final form. Above all,lit all,it must be said that this book would never have come to to, pass encouragement, and support of my wife,.Mary wife,,Mary Jo, if not for the unflagging encouragement the most patient woman alive.

“You are not alone in the world. Even in a family, neither the husband nor the wife can say he or she is 100 per cent free. We must compromise. What for?" should we fight one another for?" Prime Minister Anand Panyarchun March 6, 1991 March

“Lake Woebegone is not a democracy, except sometimes; and then everyone is very relieved when it’s over." over.” Garrison Keillor 1991

Author's Introduction

History, it has been said, is little more than the accumulated biographies of rich, powerful, usually armed people, who from time to time shoot at and kill one another. Indeed, history tends to be that, though in all fairness it is not only that Often in history the rich and powerful few are pitted against the powerless masses, and while the masses usually suffer the worst of it, they have been known to shoot back. The best sort of history acknowledges this; it also discusses what occurs between such events, taking into account the situations of both the powerful and the powerless. Nevertheless, rich and powerful elites do seem to occupy more than their fair share of the historian’s attention. There must, it seems, be a reason for that. The Fascination with Elites Histories of Southeast Asia have been no exception. Social history notwithstanding, elites and the various ways that power changes hands among them are persistent topics. For some time, in fact, a crucial test to determine the significance of a specific event in Southeast Asia’s history was to look and see whether power changed hands as a result of that event. The historian had to ask: what group or groups were in control before the event? And what new groups, if any, emerged thereafter? Harry Benda, for one, placed a great deal of importance upon such questions. He was particularly interested in World War II which he labeled a turning point in modern Southeast Asian history. Benda's Benda’s so-called transformation thesis contended that the war years constituted a break in Southeast Asia’s historical continuum, a watershed disruption of the traditional pattern of authority.The Japanese, having removed the European colonial powers, had allowed new indigenous elites to replace the traditional ruling classes whose place in Southeast Asian societies had for generations been underwritten by imperial foreign overlords.

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the post-war revolution Benda’s model was Indonesia, where the war and rhe society’s middle had provided access to elite status for young men from that society's and lower classes, and he assigned his students the task of applying the paradigm to the other countries of the region. Benda influenced a generation of Western students of Southeast Asia. He set a scholarly trend wherein his students and colleagues researched and debated the significance of such changes as occurred in Indonesia and how these compared to similar upheavals in Vietnam, the Philippines, Burma and elsewhere. Thailand, however, was shoved aside in this thesis.Though geographically part of Southeast Asia, the Thais, it was posited, had not been part of the major historical watersheds otherwise common to the region. Thailand had never endured direct colonial rule by Europeans and had, in fact, maintained its political independence throughout the age of imperialism. Thailand was again the odd man out when it became the only independent Asian country to willingly ally with Japan and declare war on the Allies. And, unlike its neighbors, Thailand experienced no popular revolution after the war, and Thai elites experienced no startling transformations. In 1980, Alfred W. McCoy and several other of Benda’s former students took it upon themselves to reexamine the transformation thesis. McCoy and his colleagues found that, in many cases, political elites who came to prominence during the war years already had influence in the decade decide before the war. Where Benda had discerned a pattern of significant change, McCoy saw continuity, discerning, in his words “evidence for what might be called an elite continuity thesis." thesis.”'1 This was quite a contradiction. Within the thirty-year scope of McCoy’s project most Southeast Asian countries, it seemed, had experienced no significant power shifts after all, or at least none on the same order of magnitude as the Indonesian revolution. Thus the very society that had provided Benda's Benda’s paradigm now, ironically, became the new misfit of modem Southeast Asian history. Meanwhile, Thailand—where elites who had governed before the war remained in charge during and after it—was suddenly made to fit into the scheme of regional history. Though McCoy had found some holes in his mentor’s thesis, he seemed unwilling to tear down the transformation thesis. Despite the continuity he found, McCoy felt that his project indicated the need for new research to look for other watersheds or “major events that did produce a ‘transformation’ in the structure of Southeast Asian history....” history...."2 McCoy proposed looking back as far as the nineteenth century to evaluate changes over time in “the quality and character of national elites.” elites."5 The implication was that there had to be some major turning point, some historical punctuation mark to replace the one he had just erased, the one that Professor Benda had spent so long putting into place. And so the new history of the countries of Southeast Asia was to become a study of watersheds, a search for the commas and semicolons in a

Author’s Introduction

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historical narrative of the rise and fall of elites. Then, presuming these watersheds could be found, the historian had now to determine whether such landmark events marked continuity or transformation among regional leaders. In light of the trend, it did not seem unreasonable to consider that question in the research and writing of a new history of modern Thailand.

The Thai Case Taking up McCoy’s McCoy's suggestion, the present author examined the major events of the last century including any alterations in the makeup of Thailand's ruling elite, changes that might indicate detours in the course of the country’s history. As McCoy noted, considerable work focusing on Thai elites had already been done. But there did not appear to have been any work of the chronological scope he suggested; no single existing work had yet examined the changes within Thailand’s national leadership from the turn of the century through the 1970s and beyond, and nothing that had already been done asked how such changes occurred or what significance they held. The present work was intended to fill that gap. In the process, however, the relevance of the continuity-versustransformation question seemed to get lost. Though that question and the search for a pattern in the rise and fall of Thai elites dominated the first stages of the research, the author found neither conspicuous change nor seamless consistency in the progress of That Thai elites and was at a loss to describe the patterns he found in such terms. It became apparent that if this book were to approach the history of Thai elites with the sole purpose of revealing traumatic events and transformations, the result could .only be either disappointment or distortion. Therefore, instead of simply trying to determine the composition of the Thai elite before and after specific events, a range of factors was examined to account for both change and continuity within the elite over a considerable period. What emerges from this study is a pattern of rhythmic alternation between elites who either proposed political and social innovations, or who resisted change preferring to maintain order and stability. In this rhythmic pattern, no truly striking transformation is revealed, nor is real continuity demonstrated. On the contrary, continuity and change appear alternately and with such frequency that they seem to go hand in hand and become nearly inseparable. Though the history of modem Thai elites is rife with internecine power struggles, such infighting has either had effects too subtle to be seen at first, or has produced very abrupt and dramatic events without any lasting consequence. From the very start of Thailand’s constitutional monarchy, its architects argued bitterly over how to achieve their goals; as a result, the past half century in Thailand has been punctuated not by historical watersheds marking significant change, but by squabbles and skirmishes over the need

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social realities. The cyde cycle of coups and to reconcile political dreams with soda! constitutional reforms may constitute a series of elite transformations or it cloud a pattern of continuity wherein power alternates among may simply doud members of the same class.The dass. The question of continuity-versus-transformation thus persists. To satisfy the inquiry, some scholars might stretch the definition of continuity and seek to apply the term here despite the fact that elite status and political power have changed hands time and again by coercion. To describe such instability as somehow means of treachery and coerdon. ‘continuity* would be quite a stretch, however, and one supposes a having ‘continuity’ better term could be found. Despite the lack of meaningful historical breaks, Thailand, since the 1930s, has endured long periods of political and sodal instability. Since 1932 andsocial there have been more coups than elections, and, in the same half century, there were more prime ministers than there were kings during two-hundred years of the Chakri Dynasty. Even in the absence of traumatic transformation, therefore, continuity is hardly an apt description. Searching far and wide for a more appropriate term, one may find it in the works of Vilfredo Pareto. An Italian thinker who is perhaps better known for his economic theories than for his studies of historical elites, Pareto nonetheless wrote at length defining political elites and describing a cyclical pattern in their rise and fall throughout history. His language has become part of the vernacular of the sodal social sdences. sciences. Though Pareto may never have given a thought to Thailand or Southeast Asia, his concept of a “drculation “circulation of elites” provides a convenient and useful model for describing the seeming paradox of coincidental change and persistence in modem Thai history. Pareto and the sodal social sdences sciences that nowadays use his terminology describe the circulation drculation of elites as a universal phenomenon which is not unique to any particular culture or region. It does not seem unreasonable, societies and to see therefore, to apply Pareto’s paradigm to Southeast Asian sodeties whether it fits. In the case of Thailand, at least, it would seem that it does. As for the rest of Southeast Asia, there should be no reason why other countries’ elites would not follow such a general model. Past Politics

Another fault generally attributed to history is that history is simply the politics of the past. Nevertheless, there are certain aspects of Thai political behavior that often confound the foreign observer, and since complaints about the apparent contradictions of Thai politics are not uncommon, a history of modern Thailand for a Western audience can hardly avoid considering past politics. The present view of Thai politics, however, policies. The present view concerns more than just who rules and with what polities. concerns politics in its simplest state, which can be defined as the art of ordering relationships between individuals and groups, of resolving the

Author's Introduction Author’s

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conflicts between members of a given society and between leaders and nonleaders in an organized community. This book, therefore, begins with a consideration of Thai social structure and the relationship between elites and the masses. The first chapter examines the theories and findings of social scientists as well as the perceptions of more casual observers who lived in the time and place under discussion. Next the book looks at thestate the state of elite society as it developed from the late nineteenth century into the early twentieth and makes a case for describing that development in terms of Pareto’s circulation of elites model. From the perspective thus established, subsequent chapters attempt to determine the causes and significance of such dramatic events as the political “revolution" of 1932 and the student uprising of 1973. Wherever political behavior are appropriate, the norms and customs of social and politicaldiscussed. Changes in the political culture are examined, in particular: the development of mass constituencies for Thai elites, the changing role of the monarchy, and the rise and decline of the coup d’etat as an acceptable mechanism for transitions of political authority.

A Royal Conundrum More than any one aspect of modem Thai history, the seeming paradoxes of political behavior have been a source of fascination for the author. The desire to resolve such seeming contradictions led finally to the writing of this book. Among the more fascinating contradictions of Thai politics, perhaps the most salient is the unique position of the king. Despite his constitutional mandate to remain above politics and under the law, the present king’s immense popularity and prestige would appear to lend the to be the mere figurehead that throne too much influence for His Majesty to.be Thai elites make him out to be. As the omnipresence of royal portraits on the walls wails in government offices, restaurants, shops, and even in the humblest of homes will attest, the king of Thailand enjoys the unflagging loyalty and deepest reverence of over fifty million people. Significantly, Thais often use the same word (phra chao) to refer to the king that they use to refer to God. Visitors to Thailand are warned that even the most casual of quips about the king or his family will deeply offend most Thais and that lese majeste is a serious offense punishable by long jail terms without benefit of public trial. Reverence for the king has ancient roots, datingback dating back to a time when only those of royal blood could touch the king and none but a chosen few could even look at him. Even today, this modem king—who was raised and educated in Europe, who plays the saxophone and has jammed with Benny Goodman and written songs for a Broadway show —is still officially held to be an incarnation of the Vishnu. Commoners still will not address him feet directly but rather will speak to the dust beneath his feet.

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Despite his kingdom’s plague of coups and the infighting among his apparently power-hungry military, the king has enjoyed a long and stable reign. It is as if the royal aura shields the throne and makes the king invulnerable to coups. In mid-1978, less than a year after the bloodless coup that handed the Royal Thai Government over to General Kriangsak Chomanan, the author began a four-year residence in Thailand. As the month of October approached the author began to hear of the tradition of October coups. There had been three of them in the last five years, all in that particular month. Each time generals and politicians had fallen and been replaced, but the king had always retained his throne, and royal prestige was unscathed. It seemed uncanny that Thais could be so unanimously loyal to their king, and, yet allow coups against his government to be so common as to be seasonal. There was a curious popular perception at the time that coup leaders generally had to seek the king’s permission before overthrowing the government The author’s research lent some credence to that perception; the fact But, indeed, coup-makers had, on occasion, consulted the king before lhefact. the question arose: If it is necessary to seek the king’s permission in such matters, how can it be said he has no power? And, just as interesting: Had His Majesty ever denied permission to would-be coup makers? If not, then why did the military perceive it as necessary to ask for His Majesty’s blessings? Similar contradictions about the monarch’s role crop up in accounts of the coup that changed the form of the Thai government in 1932, the socalled revolution against absolute monarchy. Popular accounts make the revolution out to be little more than a misunderstanding and paint the subsequent abdication of King Prajadhipok (Rama VII) as the result of the monarch’s declining health and desire for retirement. In this case, aging monarch's however, research did not bear the story out and suggested, instead, that popular accounts and schoolroom renditions of Thai history sometimes suffer from the teller’s undiluted reverence for the throne. It is as unthinkable to disparage past kings as to speak casually of the incumbent, and to discuss the old king’s falling out with the early constitutional regime might imply some criticism of him. Thus, many Thais—even teachers and other educated professionals—would rather avoid certain historical details for fear of committing blasphemy, one supposes. Yet, once again, this very reverence for the throne suggests contradiction and begs a question: How had the change of government in 1932 been justified at the time? It could hardly be claimed that a coup at that time— against what was then an absolute monarchy—was not directed against the crown. This suggests conflicting attitudes toward the throne and belies the assumption of royal invulnerability to coups. Perhaps that is the secret reason why nobody likes to talk about 1932. In April 1981, the author experienced his first coup d’etat and found in it some dues to the royal conundrum. When elements of the Bangkok-

Author’s Introduction Author's

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based First Army moved to oust the Prem regime, the king decided to leave the capital with the defending prime minister. Thereafter the coup began to crumble. The plotters had failed to obtain royal support for their attempt, and it was obvious that the government’s ultimate victory stemmed from the king’s silent gesture of approval for the standing government. The king’s decision to support Prem did not seem like the act of a figurehead, nor did the final resolution of the coup in Prem’s favor seem the result of mere moral authority; the king’s intervention was more like the decisive act of a powerful arbitrator. At the time, the point was not lost to newspapers and magazines, which took pains to remind the public that the king was above politics and that his support was not specifically for the prime minister but for the constitutional process. This explanation might subtle contradictions it seem reasonable if not for the additional, albeit subde implies: namely, that a monarch should be a champion of democracy and that the king himself should be seen as a silent power behind his own throne. The author’s fascination notwithstanding, the consideration of paradoxes has a certain intrinsic value. While the riddles themselves may not all be dues can prove serendipitous. The process can reveal solved, the search for clues the unexpected and provide new insights, even if the source material has been used before. Exploring the general rise and fall of Thai elites, for people’s example, produces surprisingly more than an accumulation of rich people's biographies. Not only does the presentsuch present such exploration find the importance of a strong but reserved monarch in an aspiring democracy, it also discovers the role of the common people, the citizens or subjects whose influence over elites is the best measure of a nation’s progress toward democratic government

About Endnotes and Romanization For each chapter in this book, there is an abundance of endnotes. More casual readers may be tempted to overlook them, perhaps being less interested than an academic might be in source materials. It is recommend, however, that the reader take a few minutes and quickly examine the endnotes anyway. A good number of the notes are more elaborative than attributive and in many cases amount to substantial asides, much like the side bars to a magazine article. Often the commentary made in a footnote darify or expand upon a point made in the main text. will help to clarify As for rendering the Thai language in Roman script, that is never a simple matter. Although the Thai alphabet has very precise phonetic rules, no single, dominant system of romanization has ever emerged to accurately reproduce it, though many have tried. The system devised by Mary Haas for her dictionary comes closest, but it requires a knowledge on the reader’s part of the International Phonetic Alphabet as well as special characters

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which are hard to produce even using some of the better word processing software. The Thai government has long utilized the system developed by ■its own Royal Academy, but linguists differ about its usefulness, and few “English-language works have faithfully followed the Royal Academy 'English-language -system. ■system. Consequently, the spelling of proper nouns, both personal and place names, is rarely consistent from one work to another. Arguments abound for all the variations and are often the source of heated debate. For example, the wartime prime minister whose name is herein given as Phibul Songkhram is represented elsewhere as ‘Phibun’ and in some sources as ‘Pibun’ ‘Pibun* or even ‘Piboon.’ A concise explanation of why this is would be difficult to write and probably harder to comprehend. However, it may suffice to say that, except for Thai speakers who know the difference between aspirated and nonaspirated consonants, the H’s that frequently follow P’s and T’s in romanized Thai are best ignored. Also, the final L is always pronounced as N. Thus, as one would not say Thighland for Thailand, neither should one say Feeble for Phibul. (In any case, the correct, neithershould full name of the person in question is Plaek Phibulsongkhram, but that is another story.) Other peculiarities of romanized Thai can help to account for the many possible spelling variations one finds in English-language source materials. Such peculiarities include final J’s and S’s that sound like T’s, vowels that need not be pronounced, sanskritic values that do not transfer into spoken Thai let alone into Latin-based languages, and so forth. Consequently, researchers must use their imaginations when looking up certain Thai names in indexes and bibliographies.

Chapter 1 Thai Social Order the'Role and the Role of the Elites The year 2475 of the Buddhist era (1932 A.D.) was supposed to have been a glorious one for the House of Chakri. The Thai dynasty’s benevolent and unchallenged supremacy over the people of the Menam Valley was to enter its sesquicentennial that April, and the nation had planned to celebrate festivals andelaborate and elaborate ceremonies commemorating the occasion with grand grandfestivals the accomplishments of this most revered line of kings. Great achievements had been the norm in the century and a half since the first Chakri king (Rama D founded the capital at Bangkok. During those years the loose association of Thai principalities that stretched along the Chao Phraya River coalesced to form a nation which, under a unified leadership, gradually entered into the international economy dominated by the Western imperialist powers. While the elites in other Southeast Asian nations had suffered and fallen, the Thai elite had prospered and grown all the more powerful, entering into a commercial partnership with Western imperialism instead of trying to resist and being destroyed by it. In the 1890s, the members of Thailand’s ruling elite consequently committed themselves to the path of progress, a course which took the form of gradual conformity to encroaching Western standards. During the reign of King Chulalongkorn the Great (1868-1910), an infrastructure of railways, roads and canals had been built; the institution of slavery was abolished, and the machinery of state centralized. From being dominant power in a community of interdependent principalities, simply the dominantpower Bangkok had been transformed into the sovereign seat of a modern bureaucratic state. Under Chulalongkorn the ruling caste had become “urbanized”; his centralizing reforms had caused the power elite to consolidate, not only geographically but also socially and politically, in a city whose name means “city of heavenly beings." By the turn of the century, regional elites had become subordinate to the centralized elites of the city, and whoever ruled Bangkok also ruled all the Thais and commanded the natural wealth of the Menam Valley and a lucrative trade with the West.

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The Hie Thais' strategy of accommodation and modernization had protected them from foreign domination and had, at least in the short run, enhanced their power. But, ironically, the very same progressive policies with which the Thai kings neutralized the Western imperialist threats eventually created an altogether new threat to the power of the Chakri dynasty. Because the formation of a national bureaucracy required bureaucrats, a pool of literate and skilled personnel had to be trained. The first step was to modernize the existing elite by sending young princes and the sons of the nobility off to Europe to acquire Western educations. Eventually, however, the demands of modern government for manpower proved insatiable, and the king found it necessary to promote higher education for bright young men from classes outside that of the traditional rulers. Access to higher learning was expanded through royal patronage of Buddhist temple schools throughout the land. Young commoners who graduated from temple schools could, if they qualified, enter schools founded by the king at the capital; such palace-sponsored, British-style schools then trained the young men for the king’s service. If they showed sufficient promise, certain young men were granted royal scholarships to study abroad at the and universities attended by the sons of royalty and same European colleges anduniversities noblemen? In this way, a wider cross section of Thai society was enabled to enter kharatchakan, a term for those in the service of the king. the ranks of kharatcbakan, Consequently, a nascent intelligentsia began to form outside of the classes that had traditionally governed. Over the next two generations, the newlyelevated bureaucrats coalesced to become what one king came to regard as “the HATED official dass.” class."2 Ironically, this emergent “counter-elite,” bom of one king’s thirst for progress, was to prove the undoing ofhis of his successors. By the late 1920s and early 1930s, these educated moderns came to challenge the dominance of the ruling caste that had created them. Animosity between the traditional elite and the rising counter-elite finally came to a head in the reign of King Prajadhipok (Rama VII, r. 1926-1935). At that time it appeared that all the hopes and dreams of the late King Chulalongkorn had been fulfilled, that the shining achievements .of the Chakri had brought the Thai nation close dose to economic and technological parity with some Western countries. But it was not enough for the counterelite to simply watch the king and his relatives enjoy these achievements— the newcomers wanted to share in the glories of progress. On June 24, 1932, the counter-elite seized control from the king and his ministers, and the powers of state were, for the first time, in the hands of commoners.

The Rulers and the Ruled "Except during short intervals..., peoples are always governed by an elite.” With this somewhat tautologous pronouncement, the early twentieth

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century political philosopher Vilfredo Pareto set out to justify his study of elites.3 Pareto did not much concern himself with the history of historical elites.’ the masses; social change, he observed, occurred more frequently and more quickly among the upper strata of society. Furthermore, the actions and decisions of the elites usually had the greatest impact on the course of a nation’s history. His critics have argued that, on the contrary, the masses are the only true source of social history because it is from the masses that revolutions erupt. Pareto, however, notes that the result of revolution is not elite.4 "Hence," “Hence,” Pareto to empower the masses but merely to produce a new elite/ writes, “the history,of history- of man is the history of the continuous replacement of certain elites: as one ascends, another declines.”5 Much of Thai historiography seems to reflect Pareto’s perceptions. The Thai chronicles make almost no mention of the common people and concentrate instead on the rise and fall of the elites. The masses exist in Thai historical writings, but only as background, adding literary color to highlight events at the pinnacle of society.6 The virtues of the peasant soldier in times of war are extolled by court poets, and the way of life of the common folk is mentioned by some of the scribes; the chroniclers’ perspective, however, is invariably that of the elite. It can be said that in the recorded history of Thailand, the masses are mute. This, the Thai elite would have us understand, is because the masses have nothing to say. The early twentieth century Thai writer Phra Sarasas explains, “we have seen dynasty come and dynasty go, but not the people....” people...,”7 Is this neglect just because of undue self-interest on the part of the elite? Or is there some irresistible social force that draws the attention of history to the circulation of elites in Thai society? A contemporary Thai scholar describes the constant search for strong elite dilemma," and suggests leadership as “the core of the modem Thai political dilemma,” that in hard times Thais instinctively seek the solutions to their collective problems not in mutual cooperation and shared effort but in a masterful and decisive leader, “an individual with the personal capabilities, status and Icharisma]... [to] engender trust and respect on the part of his followers.”8 [charisma]... Indeed, the venerable anthropologist and Thai specialist Lucien M. Hanks believed that even at the simplest levels of Thai society, the first and most essential component for the formation of a community is the presence of a patron to whom a coterie of clients or followers can attach themselves. Groups form only when a man has gathered resources and can distribute them as benefits to others.... By accepting these benefits, one enters into an explicit or tacit service.... Such a transaction with its connotation agreement to reciprocate with some service..., existence.9 of inequality is the indispensable condition for group existence.’

In the words of Phra Sarasas: “The people are the brick and mortar which the king architect uses to build up his empire.”10 It is therefore no surprise

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that Thai people should be so fascinated by the fortunes of the elites who are so instrumental in directing their lives, and no wonder the tenor of their historical writing should reflect this fascination. Hanks suggests that Thai society is constructed from the top down, or rather its basic components are. He contends that local communities, around individual, strong, and responsible microcosms of society, are builtup aroundindividual, benefactors. These local patrons, in turn, look to regional patrons, and regional patrons seek national patrons. The elite of Thai society are therefore those supreme patrons to whom the vast majority of the population look, through a chain of intermediate benefactors, for the resources and support needed to sustain their communities. A man rises to elite status if he can. make clients of powerful patrons. Conversely, if he can .make alienates his clients or fails to meet their requirements, a member of the elite can easily tumble to obscurity. The arrangement is always reciprocal, almost symbiotic, and, truly, to rule in Thailand is to serve. This societal symbiosis generates the fundamental cohesive force that binds Thai society together. By tracing the resultant links, the observer discovers the pattern of Thai social structure to be an intricate web of interdependencies. Some writers, however, endeavor to simplify the pattern into a system of classes, whereby Thai social strata are defined and categorized by economic and occupational criteria. In the 1930s, Kumut Chandruang, a young Thai student in the United States—and a prolific writer in English—discussed the Thai social order in terms of such class distinctions. Kumut believed that the Thai “class system” had a character quite distinct from that of Western societies. Kumut’s opinion was that, except for the royal family itself, “Siam is a country without hereditary class distinctions: any man regardless of his social background, may through his own merit rise to wealth and high position;” position;" In an article inspired by a 1938 conference of young Thai Thai’- scholars at Cornell University, Kumut discussed the divisions he and his colleagues saw in Thai a model ofThai of Thai society society. Kumut and his colleagues attempted to create amodel based on the “family conditions" and the occupations of the parents of members of their own generation.” generation.11 Among the conferees Kumut found that more than 60% were sons of government officials while another 25% were merchant’s sons; the rest “had no important family background." But their group, they decided, was not a representative sampling. “But if all the youths of Siam were called upon to assemble in one large hall," Kumut proposed, one would be able to discern six distinct groups. The first group, composed of the children of government officials, living with their parents in cities where good schools and modem accommodations are attainable, 11

brilliant.11 would be small, of course, but most brilliant.

Not surprisingly, Kumut, like most of his fellow conferees, was the son of a high government official and a member of that small but “most brilliant" brilliant” group.

Thai Social Order and the Role of the Elites

21

He listed the five remaining categories in a not-necessarily descending order of social status. Group two comprised the children of merchants— “Many would be of Chinese parentage, though themselves of Siamese birth." Group three were the sons of peasants, “the backbone of the nation.” The fourth comprised the sons of skilled and unskilled laborers, and the fifth folks,” presumably group was made up of an amorphous aggregate of “idle folks," beggars, a class for whom Kumut had no apparent use. The sixth group comprised those youths who become monks or novices and commit themselves to the discipline of the Buddhist sangha, sangba, or the monastic order; this group enjoys high respect but no material wealth. Kumut’s classifications, however, seem to be based almost purely on intuition and casual observation. Perhaps the only verifiable information given by Kumut is that, of the six “classes” he describes, only the top two were significantly represented among the Thai student community in America, and that most of these were sons of civil servants, the “most 15 Otherwise, Kumut’s brilliant”—in other words, the elite—of Thai society.13 vision of a stratified Thai social order is merely one man’s subjective perception, though it certainly helps us to understand how the Thai intelligentsia of that era perceived the structure of their society. Contemporary Western scholars, on the other hand, most often try to interpret the formation of classes in Thai society as a recent phenomenon brought on by urbanization and by economic changes resulting from Thailand’s adoption of the Western capitalist system in the late 1800s. Skinner’s statistical research, for example, sought to determine the extent of social stratification in Bangkok after World War II and, specifically, to identify the place of the Sino-Thai merchant class which was his focus. Skinner’s data, compiled in 1958, appears to support his contention that urban Thai society is divided into distinct socioeconomic classes. He sees two groups at the top of society, a traditional elite and a “new elite." The traditional elite comprises the royal family and the old noble families whose is based on real estate and who have traditionally enjoyed a high wealth Is degree of prestige. The “new elite" comprises politically and economically dominant persons whose wealth derives from business activities and access to the state coffers. Below the stratum of the elite, Skinner finds two middle classes, one ethnically Thai and the other of Chinese extraction. The ethnic Thais tend to rely on the civil service for their livelihood while the Chinese tend to dominate commerce. The next lower stratum (composed of craftsmen, artisans, and skilled manual laborers) is linked vertically to the middle classes, presumably through an exchange of labor and services in return for money. Skinner observes, however, that “the city’s lower-class elements seem less clearly divided either vertically or horizontally into distinct social groupings.”14 This assumption may be where Skinner’s model betrays a fatal flaw. If Thai society divided itself into classes—that is if class structure were an

22

The Balancing Act

inherent characteristic of Thai society—would not stratification remain constant from the elite down through the lowest social classes? It may well be that no class structure model of the sort traditionally used to describe the Western social fabric is applicable to the social structure of Thailand. Indeed, Sharp suggests that while class divisions can be found, they are not necessarily important: First the class divisions should be viewed with full awareness that they are the analytic divisions of an observer rather than basic deeply felt divisions which Bangkok

residents make in orderingtheir ordering their social life. It is not that many Bangkok residents would residentsmake necessarily disagree with such a picture of their social structure, but rather that this

structure is not as rigid or highly organized as a diagram might suggest.15

Skinner’s data prove that it is possible to discuss Thai society in terms of class structure—but only up to a point Because stratification falls apart below the middle-class level, it may be that such models are not altogether useful in providing an accurate picture of the dynamics which govern Thai society. Skinner himself admits that “Any attempt briefly to define the major stratification system inevitably gives social groups and place them in a rough stratificationsystem 16 us an impression of more rigidity than the real situation warrants.”1< ButHanks felt that, “Efforts to depict social classes in Thai society founder because of misconstruing the nature of this social order, which resembles a military society.”17 Hanks pictures organization more than an occidental class-type society.”” Thai social structure not as a stratified system of classes but rather in the image of a great spreading tree. A path can be traced from the heartwood to any branch, twig or leaf; the various parts of the tree receive varying nourishment depending on their respective proximity to the heart. Unlike Skinner’s class model, Hanks’s model does not emphasize horizontal links forged by shared economic circumstances. In Hanks’s model, Thai society is arranged more as a hierarchy of individuals where the social bonds extend vertically from dependent clients to resourceful patrons. Ax At the top stands the gracious king meeting withhis with his courtly officials. Below them, with mounting uncertainties and smaller benefits to distribute, follow the ranks of deputies and assistants down to the clerks and sweepers. Some of the merchants and artisans may surpass the lower governmental positions in In wealth and power, but in the paddy

fields, existence becomes more isolated and precarious. At the bottom is Is the forest uncouth hunter, deserted by his wife and children, stalks his prey.1’* where some lone, uncouthhunter,

Even in Hanks’s model, however, society has a top and a bottom. At both ends of the scale there are persons who stand distinct from the rest of society either because they have no clients, as at the bottom, or because they have no patrons, as at the pinnacle, where the king stands alone: alone; (The CThe solitary hunter is essentially outside of society because he has neither patron nor

Thai Social Order and Elites and the Role Role of the Elites

23

client.) Hanks’s analysis suggests that while there is no neat pattern of social stratification, there nonetheless remains a distinction between the elite and the masses. The elite control the most resources and purvey the most patronage; they are the small minority that that,look look up to the fewest superiors and down to the highest number of subordinates. The masses are those who rely on the largesse of the elite; they are the majority who have only their wives and children beneath them and who look upward to almost everyone else. There is a gulf between the elite and the masses but so long as the reciprocal patron-client bonds are maintained, the gap is bridged and society holds together.

Social Mobility Traditionally, there has been little inclination for individuals at the bottom to covet the higher places on the social scale. A client anxious to improve his lot is more likely to seek a wealthier or more generous patron than to independently seek a higher station for himself. Sociologists have found that cultural values inculcated in Thai children and reinforced throughout their upbringing, both at home and in school, emphasize selfconstraint and self-limitation. The “well-adjusted” “well-adjusted" Thai is expected to know his place and to be content with it.” But, even within this value system, advancement is possible for those with sufficient “merit." “merit.” Social mobility is an important factor in Hanks’s model; he contends that the hierarchy he describes “depends on a composite quality called ‘merit’ (buri) or ‘virtue’ (khwam dib” or sins (baap) diD" and a contrastingseries of graded penalties orsins (baa ) which together measure an individual’s worth and relative social rank. Hanks notes that “Peasants have become ministers of state, just as powerful kings have become slaves."20 The lowly man can rise to the top if his store of merit—gained either in this life or the last—is sufficient, while the exalted man can fall from grace because of past or present sins. If stripped of its mystical or religious symbolism, the “merit" “merit” system Hanks discusses simply harks back to Kumut Chandruang’s assertion that because Thai society lacks hereditary class distinctions, social mobility, either up or down, is always possible. Any individual who rejects or transcends the fatalistic values of his parents and teachers can change his social station, provided he is resourceful and imaginative. As Hanks points out, “At any moment the lowest man may catapult himself to a position effectively superior to the king; he need only take the vows of the priest. As long as he submits to the discipline of selflessness required by the rules of the order, he may remain in this lofty position." “On the other hand," Hanks cautions, “there are limits to movement.”21 fanner or laborer could conceivably become a village chief or town A lowly farmer mayor through the social status, knowledge, and influence gained through a few years in the monkhood; he could even subsequently become rich as

24

The Balancing Act

a result of his political office and then use that wealth to rise even further. But men’s lives are short and the lengthy process of ascending the social hierarchy through accumulation of merit naturally imposes limitations. The farmer-turned-priest-turned-mayor could send his son to school in Bangkok whence the son could enter the civil service, perhaps even become a high official, but the son would soon learn that barriers still remained despite the advantages his father had earned for him. Buddhism would have him accept such limitations, offering the consolation that if he acquired enough merit in this life he could be reborn to an even higher station in the next. But if he encounters these barriers while still young, it will be harder for him to await reward in the next life. Such frustration was the situation facing the emerging counter-elite of the 1920s and ’30s. '30s. They came to see that the choicest positions were unattainable by men of common birth, and so they came to perceive their society as divided into two classes; to the commoners, there were only the rulers—the blood kin of His Majesty the King and his chosen noble clients— and there were the ruled. The counter-elite, so engrossed in the situation, did not see the complex network of client-patron ties which the lens of history reveals to today’s social historians. The new Thai intelligentsia saw only the barriers that separated them from power. It became the counterelite’s ambition to tear down these barriers and to gain access to the status of ruler. As we shall see, while they successfully achieved their goal, their success failed to increase social mobility for the rest of society. Such change occurred only long after the 1932 coup d’etat, and even then not so much “revolution," but rather in spite of it. as a result of the “revolution,” By the late 1950sand ’60s, social change had become extremely rapid, especially in Bangkok and the smaller urban centers where increased foreign capital and American military spending were drawing more and more people away from the countryside to join an urban sub-culture which had once been limited to the power elite and their immediate clientele. For this reason, the “real situation" of the Thai social order, the nexus that eluded Skinner, was extremely difficult to pinpoint Writing in 1958, Skinner was analyzing a society in a state of flux but proposing a static model to describe it. This is not to say that at some earlier time Thai society would have been stable enough to justify such a model, and by 1966 the “realsituation" “realsituation” was no clearer. In that year, Evers suchamodel, wrote about the contrasting depictions of Thai social order offered by Skinner and Hanks. Evers felt that while Hanks had some interesting points, they were that used by Skinner. Evers suggested still not based on verifiable data such as thatusedby that even though there was still insufficient statistical data to determine whether or not Thai society was divided into distinct classes, he was willing that a class structure of some sort was to venture, on the basis of existing data, ihata in the process of evolving.22 The “lower-class elements" that Skinner saw as Tess “less clearly divided ... into distinct social groupings” likely comprised those transplanted peasants

Thai Social Order and the Role of the Elites

25 25

who, at that time, swelled Bangkok’s work force. Such newcomers were just beginning to work their way into the new wage-earning economy of urban life and were just starting to attach themselves to the new urban patrons around which their new communities were developing. During the late 1950s and the 1960s, resources and clients changed quickly and frequently. Even if Skinner’s picture of the Thai social order had been a sharp photograph taken under ideal conditions, by the time the-film had been developed and printed, the subject would have changed so much as to be unrecognizable from the photograph; Hanks’s model, on the other hand, was constructed from his long-term observation of a peasant village, Bang Chan, and from his reconstruction of the village’s history through the testimony of informants and an examination of the village’s administrative records; he was not trying to ‘snap’ a rapidly evolving social order but rather to comprehend the traditional pattern. The history of Bang Chan clearlyshows clearly shows how reciprocal, vertical relations characterize the societal links between the Thai elite and their “lower-class" clients.23 Other socio-historical studies have reached similar conclusions emphasizing patron-client ties that cross “class” lines. In a study that traces the evolving Thai social order from the Ayudhyan period (1350-1767) to the late nineteenth century, M.R. Akin Rabibhandana found that Hanks’s spreading tree analogy had deep historical roots. Akin’s research delves back as far as the mid-fourteenth century when, in his view, two categories of people emerged: clients (called phrai) and patrons (called nai). Clients were required, in times of war, to register with the king’s government as dependents of a specific patron. The patrons then registered separately and all "the clients registered under them. 24 took responsibility for alTthe Over the following centuries, a complex system of administrative ranks and titles developed to define status differences among clients and among patrons, and such designations tended to give the appearance of statusbased stratification. Upon close analysis, however, Akin discovered that these official designations were too ambiguous to be the basis of a class structure. Akin ultimately concluded that there are only two “classes" in Thai society: the governed and those who govern them. “The question whether ‘class’ can be applied to them,” Akin writes, “depends on what one the term ‘class' means by that term in its association with Western societies, so differently 25 organized from Thai society of the Early Bangkok period.” period. n2S Akin preferred to describe the social order of ancient Thailand in terms of vertical interdependencies: The nature of the relationship between phrai and nai, deprived of its legal trappings, was that of client and patron.... Control over [peasants] was held by the government in the city, where decisions that affected their lives were made. The only channel assistance from the government could through which their voices could be heard, and assistancefrom be given, was through their nai. The relationship was a dyadic and contractual one

The Balancing Act

,26 .26

nai) in return in which one party (a pbrai) offered gifts and services to the other (his nai) for aid and protection. protection,224*

“class struggle” in traditional In this interpretation it would seem that “dass sodety was minimized by two factors. First, there were only two Thai society dasses, if that term is appropriate to be used at all. Second, the relations classes, classes were kept smooth and mutually beneficial between those dasses benefldal by a timehonored ..tradition . tradition of redprodty. reciprocity. Sodal Social mobility was possible but not essential to the smooth and peaceful operation of sodety. society. For centuries this arrangement survived without history recording any major dissatisfaction on the part of either patrons or clients. Only in recent years has sodal social and political change brought the efficacy of the long-standing division into question. Social Change The Pattern of Sodal

Though, prior to the second half of this century, it is not particularly meaningful to speak of "dass” “class" distinctions as such in Thailand, it is indisputable that throughout the 1920s and ’30s a frustrated intelligentsia perceived such a distinction. At that time there were .educated educated men in in Thailand 7especially among the rising counter-elite, who perceived a dear Thailand, clear inequity in the Thai social system, attributing their inability to attain powerful positions (then reserved for princes and noblemen) to a conflict of dass class interests. The reasons for such a perception are worth considering because they bear heavily on the subsequent formation of the modem Thai class dass structure as it developed in the two decades following the 1932 “revolution.” Phra Sarasas, whose anti-monarchical writings stirred the political consdousness consciousness of the counter-elite in the pre-revolutionary period, described the Thai class dass divisions in terms of intellectual, intellectual characteristics: Intellectually the Thai can be divided into two distinct dasses, Imellecmally classes, the upper class and the masses. The first are cunning,without cunning without being intelligent, quick of apprehension, keen,

willed, shrewd,,., acute, ...bright, sharp wined, shrewd,... frivolous, mendacious, inconsistent, wily and. indolent. These characteristics are not natural,to the Thai but [have been] acquired through generations under despotic rule..,.. The masses still retain their original through, character, being clever, intelligent, industrious and progressive, with a strong sense 27

of gratitude.27

■

Sarasas’s intent was to portray the traditional Thai elite as corrupted by power and contaminated by alien values. He and his contemporaries class isolated from the rest of sodety society and viewed the old elite as a dass unresponsive to the needs of their clients. dients. In Phra Sarasas’s interpretation of the Thaisodal Thai social structure, only two classes are in contention, the rulers and the ruled.28

Thai Social Order and the Role of the Elites

27

Among his audience of Thai students in Paris in the 1920s, however, complicated models. Pridi PridiBanomyong, other dissident thinkers devised more complicatedmodels. Banomyong, the chief architect of the 1932 constitution, also pictured Thai society in terms of class divisions. His was a confusing model attempting to synthetically mesh elements ofof two antithetical philosophies—Buddhist spirituality and order. Marxian dialectical materialism—into a unified theory of Thai social order, Pridi seemed to believe he could reconcile the dialectical view of history— a perpetual conflict between classes—-with classes—with the Buddhist values of nonviolence and interpersonal harmony.29 In attempting this synthesis Pridi violated one of his own caveats for the study of the social sciences; as he once- wrote, “Nothing is more important in understanding a society than consideration of the realities of time and place. One philosopher advised students in developing societies to ‘cut the shoes for the feet, not the feet 1 50 for the shoes! ” But Pridi’s conception of Thai class structure seems to do forthe shoes!’" be a very forced fit. He began by defining terms. First, he traced the etymological origins of Marxian terminology, applicable to social progress in European society. Next he translated these into Thai words with Sanskritic roots, creating new Thai words derived from Vedic expressions descriptive of the Hindu caste system. For example, Pridi determined that Thai society under the old absolute monarchy was feudal. He explicitly stated that for the word ‘feudal’ one could use sakdina, the Thai name for the ancient system of ranks and titles conferred by kings upon their subjects to differentiate status and power from the highest social station to the lowest. But his translation using the word sakdina is erroneous. Feudalism in Europe was a system that bound peasants to the land and through the land to the lord who owned it; the sakdina system, after reforms in the fifteenth century, codified a direct and reciprocal link between peasant and noble that was not based on control of land but rather allowed the Thai peasant to move from place to place and from patron to patron, thus limiting the power of the patron over his 51 clients.31 Pridi did not ask whether Thai society was intrinsically divided into classes; he simply assumed it was and decided to make the divisions himself. “From the division of society according to status, occupation, and 32 soaety emerge.”52 other considerations,” he wrote, "the “the symbols of that society If, however, Pridi were actually “cutting the shoe for the. foot," foot,” he would instead have examined the "symbols,” “symbols,” or characteristics of his society first and only then decided if Thai society were actually divisible according to the same criteria that stratified other societies. Both Pridi’s perception of Thai social history and his examination of the modern Thai social order were colored by his desire to explain the disparity in political influence between the emerging counter-elite and the obstructive old guard. In the dialectical approach to history he found a theory which justified his convictions that absolute monarchy must and inevitably would be abolished. Like many

28

The Balancing Act

among the counter-elite, Pridi wanted Thai society to progress beyond the “more advanced" advanced” European absolutist stage, following the path of the "more countries. In order to make Thailand’s future as bright as that of the West, Pridi refashioned Thailand’s present in the image of Europe’s feudal past. Curiously, at that point he abandoned Marx and conceived for Thailand a utopian future based on religious values that gave a new dimension to revisionism. If Pridi’s perception of earlier Thai social development was colored by misapplied European preconceptions, at least his vision for Thailand’s future was based on fundamental Thai values. Thailand's According to Marx’s dialectic, European feudalism had given way to bourgeois capitalism as the result of inevitable and irresistible forces. Pridi’s dialectic saw the bureaucratic counter-elite as the inevitable successors of sakdina “feudalism.” In the Marxian model, unending class conflict continued to thrust society forward, but Pridi’s dialectic proposed an alternative to class struggle in the virtues of Buddhism. While Pridi itaa parallel acknowledged Marx’s view of perpetual social change, he saw in it to the Buddhist principle of impermanence. Because the material world was always changing, it was ephemeral and therefore, from a Buddhist point of view, an illusion. Pridi therefore determined that the one way to transcend the slow progression of class struggle was simply to reject materialism to focus instead upon spiritual values. Marx would not have followed this leap in Pridi’s logic, for Marx never denied the value of material wealth. Pridi, however, felt compelled to see an end to class struggle; his personal religious convictions would not allow him to believe that humanity could be interminably locked in class warfare. He therefore proposed that the ruling class (by his definition the class which controls the state) abdicate its predominance and share state power with all other classes. If members of the government come from all al! classes of ... society, then their disputes and controversies, particularly in the legislature, may bear fruit. But if they represent only the upper, more powerful classes, it will be difficult to devise and enact policies which benefit all, unless the leaders and legislators are saints! But most men are not saints....”

Members of the counter-elite of the 1930s were certainly not saints, for they proved either unwilling or unable to follow Pridi’s Buddhist dialectic. Written in 1957, a quarter of a century after Pridi led the formation of the constitutional regime, the above quotation restates a- message he had perpetually tried to convey to his contemporaries throughout the troubled years following the 1932 “revolution.” From Pridi’s 1957 vantage, after twenty-five years of vicious power struggles and internecine squabbles, there was still no sign of any social progress: Pridi’s revolutionary colleagues had simply replaced one absolute regime with another. They had ignored his warnings and become entrenched and isolated, creating a

Thai Social Order and the Role of the Elites

29

gap between themselves and the rest of society, a gap that had not existed powers *of state but before. They had usurped the royal monopoly on the powers*of it Phra Sarasas’s perception of a two-class had failed to share access to it. society was as a self-fulfilling prophecy, for after the 1932 coup the new elite consolidated into a closed ruling class which restricted access to state power even more than had the absolute monarchy. eventhough Before 1932, even though the royal family had monopolized the highest positions in government, at the lower levels the government actively continued to recruit bright young commoners. After 1932, however, this avenue of access to elite status was cut off as competition for government jobs intensified. According to a study by Evers in 1963, for people of rural origin and those of “low family background,” obtaining a civil service fall of the absolute monarchy became increasingly appointment after the fall “revolution," difficult.54 Evers hints that this closure is partly due to the 1932 “revolution,” but economic hardships associated with the global depression had already forced the royal government to curtail civil service appointments long before the coup. In fact, civil service staff reductions have often been seen as an important motivation for the coup. However, even though the new elite had not inaugurated the cutbacks, it was their policy to maintain them. In so doing, Evers concludes, the new elite closed ranks and began to 1z consolidate. Because the birth rate in Bangkok exceeded that in the countryside, the urban population mushroomed and the need to recruit new personnel from outside the ranks of the bureaucratic elite decreased. After 1933 access to power and wealth was increasingly restricted to the offspring of government servants who, as Kumut Chandruang observed, had better educations and more advantages than rural youth. Whereas the leaders of the 1932 coup had come largely from peasant backgrounds, and therefore more representative of roughly 85% of the Thai population, their heirs were to be city people. In the second generation of constitutional government (according to Evers’ interpretation of a I960 census) sixty per cent of the highest ranking government officials were recruited from families with occupational 55 backgrounds which comprise less thanfour than four per cent of the total population. population 35 backgroundswhich Thus, the group that appeared as a “counter elite” in the 1920s and ’30s and which despised the restricted upper class, itself became a restricted, hereditary class. Instead of dismantling class barriers, as Pridi had wanted them to do, they began to create new barriers—not as a matter of conscious policy, of course, but rather because such factors as differential population growth, unequal educational opportunities, and unequal access to wealth led them that way. This dislocation was the start of the new class system that Evers felt was still evolving in the 1960s, a development of the phenomenon that had produced the dichotomy between the traditional model of social order described by Hanks and the more stratified system observed by Skinner.

30

The Balancing Act

The 1932 coup had, in fact, little effect on this development. Rather the coup was but the next progression—after King Chulalongkorn’s bureaucratic bureaucraticreformation—in the evolution of an isolated urban elite. If, for example, the king had lifted the prohibitions on commoners in high office and in that way had obviated the motive for the coup, there would still have, been no long term need to continue recruiting bright rural lads for his service. The trend toward urbanization of the elite would have proceeded proceeded, apace at any rate. In the decades following the demise of absolute monarchy, then, the elite became progressively inward-looking, more concerned with their own special requirements even at the expense of the rest of society. Luckily,, the them, tfor the most part rest of society was able to get along all right without them,,for Population, pressures and problems of food supply did not pose as big a problem before the 1950s as they do today, and rural life in the first half of time mass political, the century, though primitive, was bearable. At that timeconsciousness simply did not exist and, even in Bangkok, popular opinion did not become a concern for the elite, until about 1957, the year that mass rallies and popular demonstrations brought to power General Sarit Thanarat's regime and with it a limited restoration of the monarchy. The Circulation of Elites From 1932 to 1957 the new Thai elite elite, lived as if in a world of their own, dealing with each other and with foreign powers in a manner thatsuggested that suggested little or-no awareness of the conditions, and aspirations of the rest of Thai ,the only people that society. Indeed, the elite, behaved as if they *were -were .the mattered in the. whole of Thailand. As Pridi had predicted, their “disputes controversies" were frequent but fruitless. Despite coups and counterand controversies” coups, successive assassination attempts and political purges, they were unable to “devise and enact policies which [could] benefit all.” The new elite had taken the place of the royal family. As long as they played the.role place.of the role well and no forces outside their restricted class emerged to challenge them, they classemerged however, an elite group can prosper only so survived. According to Pareto, however, long- as it provides an opportunity for the best persons from other social strata to enter its ranks and share in its privileges.356* Failing to follow this precept, the royal elite had been brought down in 1932, and the same failure the new elite came to threaten their own survival in the 1950s. on the part of thenew societies' experienced a cyclical alternation of Pareto observed that all societies’ elite groups, a kind of rhythm in the process of change. According to this cycle—which he termed “the circulation of elites”—leadership alternates at intervals between groups that are adaptive and innovative and groups that are conservative and regressive. Innovative groups Pareto likened to foxes, because of their flexibility and their cunning propensity for adaptation to “environmental orsituationalexigencies."Theconseryatives orsituational exigencies." Thecpnseryatives Pareto compared and to lions; they tended to be entrenched and rigid, committed to stability and.

Thai Social Order and the Role of the Elites Elites

31

the persistence of institutions.37 In Pareto’s model of social change, the key to any one social group’s predominance in a ,given given society is that group’s ability to maintain a balance between its own “foxes” “foxes" and “lions.” “lions."38 In his own words: “The more an elite consists of innovators alone, or consolidators alone, the less it is able to meet normal exigencies.” exigencies."39 If an elite.closes elite closes ranks and deprives itself of new blood, it will not only stagnate but it will arouse other segments of society that may feel they could do a betterjob.of better jobof running the country. On the other hand, if the elite is too open and too innovative, if they become too concerned with the needs of other classes and neglect their own fundamental requirements, they become vulnerable and weak, soon losing power. The obvious applications of this theory to early twentieth century Thai society are both both’ tempting and misleading. One is tempted to see the reformers of King Chulalongkorn’s days as “foxes" adapting cunningly to counter Western dominance, and to view their heirs in the 1920s and ’30s *30s as conservative “lions” “lions” to whom the earlier reforms now appeared as institutions. The emerging counter-elite of the ’20s '20s and '30s, therefore, could be seen as a new breed of “foxes” “foxes” ready to stimulate further change. As Pareto described the cycle, however, in any one group seeking power or dominance in a society, “foxes" “lions” cooperate toward a common “foxes” and “lions” goal. In a successful revolution or coup d’etat, for example, “lions” “lions" tend to be the ones to seize power; they have the requisite strength of conviction and the willingness to use force to accomplish the task. But in concert with them, “foxes” are required, by dint of their cunning and intellect, to plan the strategy and tactics to carry any action off. Once power is obtained, however, the proportion of “lions" and “foxes” gradually changes within the new elite group. Another new group then emerges with a proper balance of “foxes” “foxes" and“lions" to tosupplant supplantersof ancienregirne 40 supplant the earlier supplanters of the ancienregime. It is crucial to understand, therefore, that within the royal elite of the Chakri Dynasty, as well as within the counter-elite that replaced them, “foxes" “foxes” and “lions” co-existed in varying proportions at different times. “lions” As one examines the circulation of elites in Thai society during the first half of this century one is impressed by the extremes to which elites will go in attempts to maintain the critical equilibrium between consolidators and innovators. From time to time, violence is the only way to achieve such a balance but it is most often violence within the elite: a coup d’etat, an assassination, or a purge and jailing jailing of political opponents. More often, however, the balance is maintained by compromise, and one is constantly amazed by the strange bedfellows produced by Thai politics. Even during such dramatic developments as the 1932 “revolution,” the elites have tended to keep their differences to themselves, often spouting democratic rhetoric and claiming a popular mandate, but never actually rallying mass support for their cause. As we shall see, even when the 1932 coup leaders did try to stir the masses, the masses remained uninterested.

32

The Balancing Act

Though the introduction, introduction of democratic institutions in 1932 did not have the revolutionary effect some of the new elite had anticipated, it did stimulate certain elites to look for popular support and to be more aware of the potential power to be tapped from within the other “class.” “class." By 1957 the circulation of elites had finally become dependent upon mass politicization, but even then it was more a case of certain elites manipulating urban masses as tools to force rival elites to step aside. Not until the 1970s were the masses actually making their own demands upon the elite. Nevertheless, that which transpired within the Thai elite between 1932 and 1957 did lay the groundwork for the eventual development of mass politics in the 1970s.

Chapter 2 The Consequences of Modernity

Thailand’s adaptation to the world capitalist economy was so striking Thailand's and rapid that it is very difficult to find an account or study of late nineteenth century Thailand that does not contain the word “modernization” or some synonym. Many among the Thai elite embraced-the ways of the West so zealously that it often seems they had established a cult of modernity in which anything and everything Western was honored. As early as the 1840s the study of Western culture and technology had become something of a fad. For example, the young half-brother of King Rama III, who later reigned beside King KingMongkut Mongkut as his uparat, a kind of “deputy king," king,” was the darling of the Western trading community largely because of his reputation as a Westernized “modernist." “modernist.” Select members of the European community often enjoyed visiting the prince’s English-style residence in Bangkok, where they could browse through his extensive library of Western books at length on all the philosophical and and converse with His Royal Highness atlength scientific matters then current among the intellectuals of Europe. His design and construction of a steam engine in 1848 drew the praise of a Singapore newspaper, which called the workmanship “admirable" “admirable” and declared that the project “reflects the greatest credit on its royal constructor, who had every portion of it made under his immediate superintendence and constant inspection...."1 inspection....” The Thai admiration for things modem was rather more than a matter of fashion, however. Up until the mid-nineteenth century the Thais had been lucky to avoid Western domination, but witnessing the force with which Europeans colonized Thailand’s neighbors, the Thai elite were aware they would soon have to fortify the nation in new ways in order to fend off the rising foreign threat. Seeking to acquire the strength of the West, they andLits institutions. began to adopt and adapt its technology and.its ofKingMongkut During the reign of King Mongkut (Rama IV, r. 1851-1868), great changes began. Mongkut accelerated modernization by tearing down the old barriers to trade with the West, and the city of Bangkok was transformed

34

The Balancing Act

into a cosmopolitan center. Western governments established consulates, missionaries built churches, and the Thai elite built customs houses to cash in on the increased exchange of wealth. Steam engines revolutionized the milling of rice and lumber, both of which began to be exported in huge quantities for the first time. As one scholar described it, Bangkok had burst suddenly into the “race for ‘civilization’." 'civilization’.”2 Modernists, i.e., the admirers of new technology and Western culture introduced by overseas visitors, abounded at the court of King Mongkut. Indeed, the king himself was regarded as one of the high priests of the cult of modernity. His ministers, for example, wrote volumes on the subject of Western astronomy and its implications on the traditional reasons for natural phenomena as explained in the Buddhist scriptures. Mongkut and his advisors proposed adaptations of the scriptures to preserve the moral messages they contained while at the same time rejecting their fantastical, unscientific cosmology.3 To prove the validity of Western science to his more skeptical contemporaries, Mongkut, in August 1868, organized an expedition to southern Thailand to observe a total eclipse of the sun, which he himself predicted through his own calculations using Western astronomical methods. Unfortunately, he and several of his party contracted malaria on the expedition, and King Mongkut died two months later. King Mongkut's Mongkut’s sons, in particular his heir, King Chulalongkorn (r. 18681910), were all consummate modernists. The numerous photographs for which Chulalongkorn posed in top hat and tails or similar Western garb brought European clothing into fashion, to a limited extent, among the Thai elite. During his reign a new Royal Grand Palace was erected combining traditional Thai and modem Western architecture. Basically a European-style structure with a Thai-style roof, the palace came to be known as “the farang in a Thai hat." Of greater consequence were Chulalongkorn’s innovations and reforms in statecraft. statecraft Throughout his reign, Chulalongkorn traveled widely, to neighboring colonies of the Europeans as well as to Europe. He used these journeys not only to cement good relations with the imperialist countries, but also to study their systems of public administration, knowledge which he then applied in the course of his bureaucratic reforms at home. During the early decades of the twentieth century the cult of modernity had become so popular among the elite that it seemed, at least to one Thai historian, that “the Thai upper class was like a dragon capped by a European crown....” crown...."5 The adoption and adaptation of Western institutions and some Western cultural forms seemed to serve the elite’s purposes, especially their goal of attaining national economic prosperity. Despite the temporary setback of a fiscal crisis in the 1920s, Thailand’s economic good health was apparent enough, by the beginning of 1930, to prompt observers in the West to call Thailand “the most conspicuously solvent [nation] in the East"6 Thanks to such progress, the Thais could now regard themselves as respected members of the world community. Having sent aviators to aid the

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Allies in France during the Great War,7 they had earned membership in the League of Nations and since then had looked forward to a new status of full legal equality with their colonial neighbors, the French and the British.8

Thoroughly Modem Bangkok During the twilight of the absolute monarchy, in the late 1920s and early ’30s, '30s, Bangkok was a bustling cosmopolitan center of about half a million inhabitants. Its sanitation system and abundant public water supply were considered, even by Englishmen, superior to those of British-administered Singapore? Singapore.’ Its “well paved and metalled" streets were lined with utility poles bearing electric wires as early as 1912,10 and visitors often remarked at the continual flow of “traffic of all kinds, thousands of jinrickshaws, hundreds of horsed carriages and motor vehicles..." 11 By 1929 the use of public transportation had become so common that one guidebook’s author noted a dearth of pedestrians: There is little incentive to walk, and no necessity to do so for anyone with a few cents to spare.There are numerous privatelyowned motor cars, motorcycles and pushbikes, besides most forms of public conveyance. Almost every road has its electric tram and motor omnibus running, besides taxicabs and jinrickshaws. 12

This “unforgettable combination of ancient and modern transport" was regulated by white lines painted down the middle of the streets and Thai trafficislands, traffic police who stood on “raised concrete traffic islands, which prevented] them from being run over...." Maugham, visiting in 1925, extolled over....”15 Somerset SomersetMaugham, the charm of the broad, well-shaded avenues and canals of the Thai capital but complained that on the whole it was a “strange, flat, confused city" city” comprising a “conglomeration of sordid streets” with clusters of Chinese merchant communities that continued to spring up haphazardly.14 Nevertheless, Maugham found the traditional architecture striking and exotic: “It makes you laugh with delight to think that anything so fantastic could exist on this sombre earth."15 The streets were flanked by “huge structures of reinforced concrete" concrete” alongside teak houses and countless Buddhist temples with colorfully tiled roofs, soaring peaks and glittery, 14 gilded spires.16 Medical facilities in the city were “probably the finest... in the Far East"; “themost recentappliances” Chulalongkorn Hospital, which housedsome of “the most recent appliances” as well as facilities for extracting antidotes from snake venom, was considered, as were Bangkok’s other modern hospitals, a boon not only to the Thais who built, staffed and maintained them, but also to the residents of the neighboring European colonies.17 Thai urban society in the Roaring Twenties was as thoroughly modem as Bangkok’s impressive infrastructure—or at least the Thai elite and their

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foreign guests thought so. One indicator of this perceived social progress may be seen in the relative freedom of women and the amount of social mobility they enjoyed in modem Thai urban culture. After 1925, educational opportunities for women rapidly increased. Women began to enter Chulalongkorn University and to train for professions—such as law—that had previously been reserved for men. Women also became eligible to receive the prestigious King’s Scholarships,’ Scholarships,188 enabling a number of young Thai women to study abroad. Then, as now, however, a woman’s condition varied with her class and social station. For instance, one contemporary observation was that “Siamese ladies of the upper class give the impression of being fragile,” a “[wlorking condition attributed to a lack of physical exertion; contrarily, “[w]orking women...," the laborers and the vendors punting their boats and pushing their handcarts, are described as having "remarkably “remarkably strong physiques... [with] fine skins and happy temperaments.... Some of them [even] look like men....”19 The contrast between the conditions of women at either end of the social spectrum would seem to indicate a wide gap between social classes and also that no great progress had been made toward narrowing it, but there was a clearly growing middle class of professional women in the twenties. “Girls of what are usually termed the lower middle class...” appear to have had considerable latitude in their choice of lifestyles.20 They could be seen wearing either the “Siamese national garb” or “fanciful foreign costumes...[including! costumes...[including] in the case of the more modern or affluent giris, girls, silk 21 stockings and shoes." shoes. ” These so-called lower middle-class women could be found at work “in offices, shops, and hospitals, and others, of higher social enteifed] the professions.”22 standing occasionally enterfed] During those days “women of all ranks enjoy[ed] enjoyled] greater liberty in Siam than is usually the case in Asia, and from all accounts they have always done 2 so." so.” 23 ’ The freedom of choice in dress, education and occupation enjoyed by Thai women was not so much a reflection of Western influence or “modernization" as it was a logical progression of traditional Thai values. Of course, Thai women were (and still are) a long way from enjoying full equality with men. Nonetheless, the relative freedom of women in Thailand was remarkable for an Asian culture in the 1920s. Foreign observers certainly seemed to feel that, in this regard at least, the Thais were on a par with the West. One consequence of the evolving modernization was the assignment of prestige to certain European values, especially those regarding marriage customs. Aware that Western society considered polygamy to be barbaric and primitive, Thai elites who traveled to the West or mingled with the occidental community of Bangkok became sensitive to the image of backwardness that their “harems” gave to them. Wanting to be modern, and therefore as Western as they could, princes and nobles began to enter monogamous marriages. An unexpected result of monogamy was that the

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composition of the ruling class gradually began to change. Historically, the Chakris had shared power with a small circle of noble families with whom they intermarried,24 thus propagating a pool of princes from which the kings of Thailand and their lieutenants would be chosen. When monogamy came into vogue, however, the pool of potential kings began to shrink. The smaller pool resulted from a change in fashion and not from a calculated policy change. Had the change occurred consciously, perhaps the rules governing royal succession might have been altered to compensate. Traditionally, the right of succession followed a rule of “declining descent,” descent," by which the status, and thus any right to the throne, of a king’s king's offspring declined one level with each generation until, in the fifth generation, even direct descendants of kings became mere commoners.25 But the rule of declining descent was kept unchanged despite the gradual decline of polygamy until eventually the pool of potential kings and qualified princes 26 began to dissipate.25 The relatively sudden paucity of young princes and noblemen available to fill administrative roles in the royal government was an important factor in the ascendancy of commoners in the bureaucracy. King Chulalongkorn, who had, by one count, thirty-six wives and seventy-seven children27 was the last polygamist king. Not only were most of his sons monogamists, but the two sons who succeeded him on the throne died without producing male heirs. The adaptation of European, specifically British, concepts of monarchy affected the earlier flexibility in selecting a king. As Anderson points out, before the acceptance of “succession determined in European-style legal-genealogical terms" a candidate for the throne could be barred from succession on grounds of political inexperience, physical frailty, or a variety of other such defects.28 In the twentieth century, however, succession came to be seen as a matter of birthright with no qualifying restrictions, an alien practice which coupled with the limited choice of successors allowed less than ideal candidates to ascend the throne. Even King Prajadhipok once complained that there should be some mechanism to prevent unfit kings from reigning; though he saw the problem primarily as an inherent flaw in the general concept of absolute monarchy, it in fact resulted from adopting an inappropriate Western idea. Problems of succession actually stemmed more from the decline of the traditional Thai source of elite recruitment, the polygamous family structure. Aeroplanes and White Elephants By the 1930s, Thailand’s urban elite had an up-to-date city and modem social habits to which they could point as examples of their parity with the Western countries they envied. In no aspect of their culture would the Thais allow themselves to feel inferior to Europeans. Not even in the arcane field of aviation was Thailand allowed to lag behind the “more advanced"

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countries of the West; we have already noted the contingent of Thai aviators sent to France in 1918 to fight the Germans. By 1932 the science of flight had progressed to such an extent that certain Thais became interested in establishing control of an air route between Bangkok and that hub of Asian commerce, Hong Kong. Under the sponsorship of the “Siamo-Chinese Cooperative Club of Bangkok," a young Thai pilot named Nai Luen Bhongsophontook off from Bangkok’s DonMuang airfield on June 19, 1932 on a round trip to Hong Kong that was planned to take twenty four days. Reports of his progress appeared daily in the Bangkok papers untilJune 24, when political news distracted the press and the public. Then, on June 27, the Bangkok Times announced Nai Luen’s triumphant arrival in Hong Kong 29 and apologized for having lost track of him. 25 On July 8 they published an account from the Hong Kong Daily Press of his arrival in the British Crown Colony; Nai Luen had received a hero’s welcome and the admiration of all: Our visitor is the first of his countrymen to come to Hong Kong by air and the record of his journey shows him to be a man of exceptional courage, persistence and resource. Fog and storm were encountered, also engine trouble and the attentions, well meant but uncouth, of a crowd of nearly a thousand Chinese peasants and 30 fishermen after a forced landing on the coast.50

Upon his return to Bangkok, Nai Luen remarked “...that it was the most [thatl he would adventurous and risky flight he had ever experienced and [that] 31 not take this route again even if he were offered 100,000 Ticals.” Ticals." Nai Luen’s courage and pioneering spirit represented all that was progressive and forward-looking in elite Thai society in those days—but there were still many people who were not quite as bold and untraditional as he. Despite the glitter and sophistication of twentieth century Bangkok, there remained in Thai society much that was strikingly inconsistent with its striking modernity. Tradition still linked the political culture of the Thais with its ancient roots, and the elite still clung to the absolutism exercised by kings and princes for many centuries past While high positions in government service were available to more people than ever before, the traditional rights and privileges of princes and nobles created an artificial barrier to the upward mobility of an aspiring counter-elite, many of whom had spent their formative years absorbing foreign cultures and alien democratic ideas while at school in France and England. This counter-elite resented the persistence of absolute monarchy and the continuance of privileged status for senior members of noble families and relatives of the king, practices which they had come to regard as impediments to their own advancement, impediments which frustrated the high aspirations which education had fostered in them. For these young men, Thailand possessed the external trappings of modernity but was at its heart a political fossil; and the privileged elite that

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suppressed them and excluded them from any significant role in shaping past In the minds of national policies was a corrupt remnant of a feudal past. many of the counter-elite the only way to ensure true progress—and to share in its blessings—was to seize control of the state and remove the royal dinosaurs from power. Such was the thinking of a growing clique of civil servants and military officers in 1932, a time when the best laid plans of the Chakri dynasty seemed about to disintegrate with the coming to Thailand of the Great Depression. elite’s links to the ancient past had Not long before, in 1927, the Thai elite's been dramatized by its response to an auspicious birth. In the hills of the northern province of Chiang Mai, great excitement greeted the birth of Phra Savek Gajadej Dilok, and when news of the event reached the king, he commanded that the infant and his mother be brought straight away to Bangkok and that the people throughout the kingdom should rejoice.32 Adorned in rich ceremonial trappings, leading a procession of chanting priests and dancing maidens, mother and babe were escorted to the Chiang Mai railway station. They and an entourage of servants, royal officials, and priests boarded a special train and embarked on a thirty-hour journey to their new home at the Royal Grand Palace in Bangkok, where the mother and child were to receive honors and privileges normally reserved for the highest ranking members of the royal family. They were met at the station in Bangkok by the king and a throng of thousands thousands.33 “The entire city dty seemed to have turned out to see the pageant,” wrote one Bangkok newspaper editor, who estimated that half a million people crowded the three-mile route from the station to the palace. There the guests of honor were escorted to their opulent accommodations where “...electric lights burned, electric fans whirred and there were shower baths waiting to refresh them.” All evening long, multitudes poured into the palace grounds. Dancers, downs clowns and acrobats entertained the infant Phra Savek and his mother, and all the spectators made merry and rejoiced.334* Next morning, in the presence of princes, foreign diplomats, and other costumes—Mis Majesty the King dignitaries—all dressed in full ceremonial costumes—His formally christened Phra Savek with lustral waters. No doubt the newborn would remember this fabulous experience forever, having, as do those of his kind, a fabled gift of recall. For Phra Savek, born in a logging camp in 35 Chiang Mai, was a ‘white elephant'. elephant’.33 Since the days of Ayudhya, the forests of ChiangMai, the birth of an albino elephant had augured good fortune for the reigning king and prosperity and good harvests for the kingdom. The more white elephants a king owned, the more his people prospered. Even as late as 1927 such symbolism genuinely enhanced the king’s legitimacy: This great pageant cost the government 80,000 deals. ticals. But the king did not consider it ill spent; for he well knew the value of such a journey and such a reception in bringing the millions of people living in isolated sections of the kingdom in closer

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The Balancing Act touch with the government No other event, doubtless, could have had more appeal for their untutored minds than the royal reception to an elephant which symbolized the good luck of the nation M

Though by all accounts Bangkok appears to have been a model Asian city of the 1920s, it also remained the capital of one of the world’s few had strode into the twentieth surviving absolute monarchies. While Thailand hadstrode century with its best foot forward, the other foot still dragged behind, shackled to the past and bound by traditions, beliefs, and institutions of a bygone day. Three times a year one could still witness the king, dressed in the gilded regalia of ancient days, being carried forth upon a jewelencrusted palanquin over the well-paved streets of modern Bangkok to the Temple of the Emerald Buddha, where custom required His Majesty seasonally to change the bejeweled robes of the sacred Buddha image, Phra prosperity,37 And every Kaeo, thereby ensuring the kingdom’s safety and prosperity. year at planting time the king, in the company of the court Brahmins, plowed a ceremonial furrow in the ground outside the palace walls and sowed it with specially blessed seed rice to invoke the blessings of Mae Thorani, the Earth Goddess, for a bountiful harvest.38 Despite the king’s European education and worldly sophistication, he remained aware that these were more than mere ceremonies; they were the essence of his legitimacy. He was the Lord of Life, Lord of all the Earth, who inspired awe among his subjects; the nation looked to him for protection and support in times of hardship. At times the king would complain that the people even held him responsible for inclement weather,39 hence the prescribed seasonal rites of propitiation. Such stewardship was an awesome responsibility which he and his predecessors had tried to fulfill' in increasingly modern ways down through the generations. But the king’s role as the patron of patrons had been only slightly modified by the modernizing state reformation. Before the reforms instituted by King Chulalongkorn, the king’s patronage trickled down to the common folk through the auspices of his elite clients, but towards the end of the nineteenth century the king’s own hand became people,400 The modern Lord more visible in providing for the needs of his people/ of Life, though still honoring his ritual duties, also gave his subjects more tangible insurance against the vagaries of nature. In 1917, for instance, when floods ravaged the central plains and destroyed crops and livestock, the royal patron rushed to succor his peasant clients. Government relief workers were despatched to the provinces to help move cattle and stores of grain to places of refuge on high ground or in Buddhist monasteries. Remunerative employment, as the king phrased it, was provided to help destitute farmers getback on their feet, and relief funds were doled out for the purchase of emergency foodstuffs and seed rice for replanting. When influenza and plague struck in the wake of the floods, the Lord of Life

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dispatched his own court physicians to the villages “to instruct the people disease....”41 in the prevention of disease.. Such emergency aid was only one of many ways in which the king provided for his people, and Thai society came to take the throne’s granted 422 In return for his patronage, the king, having protection for granted? abandoned the customary practice of annual corvee service, called on the young men of the villages to serve in his army and police force and asked all his subjects to pay new taxes. The king provided training for the brightest young commoners and then rewarded them with status and relative wealth when they reciprocated by giving their service and loyalty to the crown. Thus, the Chakri kings maintained a reciprocal social contract with a nation of clients. When the Great Depression hit Thailand in mid-1930, however, the king was poorly equipped to respond to the plight of his clients. The largesse that had come to be expected from the royal patron was no longer forthcoming. pare down the Beset by a fiscal crisis of his own, the king was forced to pare personnel of his government bureaus and to increase the taxes on his retainers. Many people who had entered the king’s service in search of patronage now tried to return to their former way of life or to find new livelihoods in the private sector—but, once outside government service, they could find no new niches to fill. As the bottom dropped out of the world market price for rice, the private sector (comprising primarily agriculture and trade in farm produce) had no place for the dislocated kharatchakan. kharatcbakan. The peasant economy was in tatters, and despite the king’s genuine concern when he sent his agents into the countryside in the spring of 1932 to assess the plight of farmers, farmers/435 he was unable to help. In the face of such hardships, many among the disaffected counter-elite, especially those most damaged or threatened by cut-backs, wondered why desperately needed revenues could not be raised by taxing the wealth of royalty and the nobility.44 The king’s failure to take this step was one of several factors which engendered great resentment toward the ruling class among the counter-elite. Gradually the counter-elite began to regard the traditional system of absolute monarchy as the source of all their troubles. They soon resolved to overthrow it and install a better, more modem regime. The Pattern of Royal Decline Attempting to trace the roots of the 1932 coup d’etat, Vella stressed the importance of the Western political ideas which members of the emerging non-royal intelligentsia brought back from the universities of Europe.45 Indeed, the rhetoric of those who seized power in 1932 reflects a deep dissatisfaction with the outmoded form of government they overthrew and a preference for the parliamentary systems of France and England. In a decade when battle lines were being drawn between the forces of

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democracy and such revolutionary forms as “national socialism" and “corporate nationalism,” Thailand’s paternal god-king struck the rising counter-elite as decidedly out of step with the march of progress. The coup plotters, who called themselves the “Promoters of Political Change”—men like Pridi Banomyong and Phibul Songkhram—had returned from their schooling in France with a melange of ideas mirroring the array of ‘-isms’ which had set Europe aflame between 1914 and 1918, and which threatened to re-ignite the .Western '30s. Yet one must Western world in the ’20s and ’30s. distinguish between the challenge presented by this group’s Western aspirations and the very different type of threat posed by a nascent communist group (which will be discussed below) that briefly emerged in “Promoters" were a fully co-opted segment of 1929. The French-educated “Promoters” the established order; they merely sought a larger share in a political and economic scheme in which they already had a stake. And they wanted a chance to apply to the decaying system of government the remedies that only their modem knowledge could initiate. Their new ideas were, however, held in low esteem by the Thai establishment and were strongly resisted by the members of the royal family. Prince Charoonsakdi, an unde uncle of the king and his minister at Paris, dosely supervised the community of Thai students in France during the had closely 1920s. Of these students he once remarked in a letter to the king that “...they dass that I consider the danger of Siam in the future, namely, the are of a class class....”46 The missing half of their education was, was., perhaps, half educated class,...” a knowledge of the world they came from, something which even the finest schools in Europe could not teach them. At about the same time, a close dose confidant of the king complained that Thai students returning from abroad seemed “...to know even less about Siam and Thai customs than Westerners who had been in Siam a mere six months. Whether this is due to changed habits or stupidity, in either case it is unbecoming.”47 The king, on the other critidze the students’ parents, who in many cases had hand, sought rather to criticize themselves been educated abroad, for failing to inculcate traditional Thai family values.48 The king’s estimate of the problem hit closer to the heart of the matter. The challenge that the rising counter-elite presented did not spring from some sudden, rude assault by strange and alien influences upon the minds of Thai youth; the challenge was the logical consequence of the cult of modernity pursued by previous generations from the mid-nineteenth century on. The ruling caste449’ had set the stage and introduced the dramatic theme in which they would ultimately have to play the roles of typical Shakespearean tragic heroes. In the denouement they would meet their demise not through the designs of outsiders but rather through a tragic flaw own —their stubborn resistance to the inevitable and progressive of their own—their changes which they themselves had set in motion.

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The King's Response No member of the ruling class50 was more aware of the challenges facing the Chakri Dynasty in the 1920s and ’30s than was His Majesty King Prajadhipok (Rama VII), who ascended the throne in 1925 upon the death Educated in Englandand England and France, Prajadhipok of his brother, King Vajiravudh. Educatedin was a man of the world and acutely aware of the currents of history. The ancient social contract which legitimized his absolute sovereignty was, he knew, about to expire as a logical consequence of modernization. Seeing change as inevitable, King Prajadhipok resolved, true to Thai cultural form, not to resist and perhaps be destroyed by it, but instead to survive by becoming part of the change, much as his ancestors had survived by absorbing the changes brought to Southeast Asia by the Europeans. Though he realized what had to be done, he was also aware of the implicit limitations on his power to act and saw that, for several reasons, he might not be equal to the task. He deduced, as had King Chulalongkorn, that the only way to retain power was to alter the mechanism through which power was exercised and to then control the new device. Hoping to pre-empt any move by the counter-elite to unseat the dynasty, he conceived a new form of Thai government, a constitutional monarchy which he himself would head. Before he could move to establish the parliamentary regime he envisioned, however, Prajadhipok knew he would have to overcome considerable resistance from among the ruling class, the traditional constituency of Thai kings since the days of Ayudhya. When Prajadhipok came to the throne in 1925, he inherited a number of administrative dilemmas which he seemed to attribute to the arbitrary and of his predecessor, King Vajiravudh (r. 1910-1925). Prajadhipok capricious rule ofhis was concerned that future kings might rule as unwisely as had his brother, or might be technically incompetent from other causes. The introspective for kingship. monarch even entertained doubts about his own qualifications forkingship. Prajadhipok had no specific training in the art of government and, until the into year before Vajiravudh’s death, he had never been expected to come Into the line of succession. Aware of his own limitations which, in addition to his lack of experience, included an almost perpetual state of poor health, Prajadhipok had, before his coronation, offered the crown to his unde Boriphat, a high statesman of long experience. Boriphat refused the throne, however, for it had been Vajiravudh’s specific wish that Prajadhipok should succeed him. 551’ As king, Prajadhipok sought a means to prevent an unwise or untalented king—as he believed his brother had been in the previous reign—from ruling absolutely. “As you well know,” he wrote to an advisor early in his reign, “the king has absolute power in everything. The principle is very good and suitable for the country, as long as we have a good king [emphasis in

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52 original].”53 original]." It was plain that the only way to protect the kingdom was either powerto to see “...that the king’s power to take arbitrary action would be lessened...,” or to ensure that only able kings would come to power.55 To these ends he solicited from his advisers suggestions for a variety of innovations, including the establishment of a parliament and a possible system for the election of future kings by a council of princes. The details, however, were never fully worked out.554* As early as 1926, King Prajadhipok had begun to consider the merits of parliamentary government55 and by 1931, both in public addresses and in private consultation with his advisers, he had begun to speak of the prospects of granting a written constitution.556* Privately, he discussed the possibility of experimental democracy at the municipal level,57 and at the highest levels of government he had instituted two councils of princely advisers in which he supervised the drafting of national policies through group decision making, much as an elected leader chairs his cabinet meetings.58 Such innovations reflected the king’s determination that Thailand should maintain the pace of modernization set by the nations of the West, and that the anachronism of absolute rule by a single individual must, as a prerequisite tomodemization, to modernization, give wayto way to some form of limited constitutional monarchy. In this way, according to the king’s aspirations, the dynasty could change with the times and preserve itself from obsolescence and extinction. Prajadhipok’s apprehensions of dynastic decline were partially inspired by events abroad. Recently the world had witnessed powerful, destabilizing forces which had eliminated absolute monarchy in Europe, China, and Japan. Closer to home, nationalist uprisings were threatening the absolute rule of colonial regimes which controlled Thailand’s Southeast Asian neighbors. Now, within the Chakri domain, revolution appeared imminent. A communist organization of Chinese immigrants was uncovered in Thailand in 1929; and though they had been stopped before they could cause any serious damage, they had already distributed much potentially damning propaganda which urged the overthrow of the royal government 59 by the “propertyless classes,” dasses,” and the establishment of a “Siamese Republic."55 Though subsequent laws suppressed communism in Thailand, there remained an equally ominous threat from the right. When the effects of the Great Depression forced Prajadhipok to drastically cut defense expenditures, his princely Minister of War, Bowaradet, resigned in anger, one result of which was that the king, in 1931, expressed anxiety over a possible mutiny military.60 from members of the military.® Fearing attacks from both the left and the right, Prajadhipok was thus compelled, early in 1932, to request two of his advisers to draft a constitution proclaim to the nation on April 6, 1932, the which he planned to prodaim 61 Chakri.81 sesquicentennial of the founding of Bangkok and the House of Chakri Though a draft of die constitution was ready on March 12, somehow the April 6 celebrations passed without its presentation. Why the king changed

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his mind is not exactly clear, but there are indications that senior princes on his high advisory councils pressured him to reconsider. Perhaps, lacking Prajadhipok’s insight, they failed to see how a limitation on royal power could help to preserve the dynasty/2 Certainly if Prajadhipok had followed his own inclination and seized the opportunity to grant a constitution on his own terms when he had the chance, Thai history and the state of presentday Thai politics would be very different. By bowing to the pressure from his aged, backward-looking uncles, however, he left the way open for the coup of June 24, 1932. Thai newspapers made no mention of how the aviator Nai Luen reacted to the news of the “revolution” that had occurred while he was making his record-breaking flight to Hong Kong. One can only wonder if, in his excitement as he flew in on July 12 between the monsoon clouds and the rain-washed rooftops of Bangkok, he gave any thought to the changes that had taken place below. It may be safe to assume that he was optimistic, for such men are not easily daunted. Once he had landed his friends would have assured him that the new government was composed of reasonable men and that, despite the coup, life went on as usual. Yet it must have seemed strange when the president of his club proposed the toast at his reception. On the night before his departure Nai Luen had doubtlessly ended a bon voyage dinner with a toast io the king’s longevity and to that of his dynasty. Now, at his homecoming, he found himself drinking not only ofhis to the king, but also to a new sovereign, an entity that called itself the 63 “People's “People’s Party." Party.”65

Chapter 3 The Climate of Political Change

April is the hottest month of the year in Bangkok. No rain falls between the end of November and the middle of May, so the sky remains hazy blue cloudless. From mid-February through March, dry afternoon breezes and doudless. swirl up the dust of Sanam Luang, the royal funerary ground outside the Grand Palace. Between the deaths of senior royalty, Sanam Luang serves as a public park where people come to fly kites in the gusty, spring-like days heralding the dry season. But by April even the most casual sport is taxing; the air becomes thirsty and dust-laden. From mid-morning until day’s end all non-essential activity ceases. Ifone must go out of doors, one tries to stay in the shade. Only at sunrise and sunset does the faint hint of a cooling breeze coax people out into the city streets to socialize and go to the market. It would require an event of great importance for a crowd to gather beneath the midday sun. Such an event was the celebration of Chakri Day in 1932, the year when the sixth of April marked the 150th anniversary of the reigning dynasty and of the city’s founding. To commemorate the occasion a great bridge had been built, the first to span the Chao Phraya River and link the cities of Bangkok and Thonburi. Thonburi, Nearly half a million people gathered thatscorching that scorching day to witness the opening of the bridge and perhaps to catch a glimpse of their king, the Lord of Life, as he cut the ceremonial ribbon and named the structure in honor of his ancestor King Rama I, whose likeness, cast in bronze, sat upon a granite throne at one end bridge?1 of the bridge. But despite the bright skies and festive decorations, an uneasy gloom hung over the festivities. Many of the onlookers had come to the river anticipating the possibility of an unscheduled drama, perhaps a tragedy like that foretold in rumors that had been spreading for weeks. As the economy declined, so did confidence in the crown, and the capital was rife with gossip that the king’s enemies were plotting his demise. Talk of impending doom abounded, inspired partly by the economic crisis and partly by superstition. Prince Chula Chakrabongse, the king’s nephew, wrote:

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47

Superstitious pessimists were reminding one another of the alleged prophesy of Rama impending revolution I that his line would last only 150 years. Others were talking of Impending personages?2 or at ar least of the assassination of high personages.

Other sources describe “rumors of the wildest nature” and reports of ghostly apparitions at the new bridge: Some people peoplesaid said they saw a nun, in white clothes, scurrying across the bridge at night. Others said that they had seen Chao Tak [the 18th century King of Thonburi, overthrown by Rama fl... U... cross the bridge at night. All agreed that blood would be shed. shed.’9

for at the opening of More substantial portents must have been known, for of the bridge the king presided under very heavy guard. “As the king passed, ...[the guards] suddenly wheeled, turning their backs toward the king and their faces toward the people.” But nothing further happened then.4

The Promoters of Political Change In Bangkok the time between April and June is laden with anticipation. By the end of May the dryness gradually gives way and the air slowly grows heavier. One’s skin becomes sticky, and the dust in the air adheres. Frequent baths provide the only relief, and as the bottom of the earthen rain barrel comes ever closer, a person begins to long for the first cloudburst of June and an end to the anxious wait for rain. It is part of living still, such tension is part of living in the tropics, and the Thais will rarely complain about it In 1932, however, political anxieties exacerbated the natural tensions of the season. To ease the strain, in early June the king and his retinue adjourned to his seaside residence at Hua Hin, four hours by train to the south of Bangkok. On the white beach at Hua Hin the sand is so clean and fine it squeaks when walked upon, and a cool and soothing salt breeze comes in off the Gulf of Siam. It is little wonder that the king and queen had named their summer palace “Far from Worry," Worry,” and often retreated there to indulge in their shared hobby, golf. In 1932, however, neither sea breezes nor golf would suffice to distance them from the worries they left behind in the capital. On the morning of June 24, Their Majesties were on the links when a message from Bangkok informed them that combined forces of their own army and navy had converged upon the throne hall and declared a coup d’etat. In her memoirs the queen relates that when the king heard this he remained calm andunafraid, and unafraid, and she quotes his response as, “I told you so.”5 Up to this point we have referred to the ascendancy of an amorphous counter-elite which had grown out of the expanded state bureaucracy and had been molded by shared experiences of higher education, often abroad,

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and government service under the absolute monarchy. It now becomes necessary to examine this group more closely and to explore the origins of some key individuals who led the counter-elite to national power. One particular clique of Thai students who studied together in Paris between 1920 and 1927 formed a secret association, calling themselves phu kokankanpliankanpokkrong, or the ‘Promoters of Political Change’. They dedicated themselves, in the words of their leader Pridi Banomyong, “...to Thailand] in which the king is above the law to one change the system [in Thailand! law.”6 Coming from a variety of differents different social in which the king is under the law." pcial backgrounds, each one of them had his own reason to resent the king’s regime. By 1924, it seems, they had found a common ground on which to build the framework for a revolution. That year they discussed plans to “People’s Party,” the expand their group into what they soon called a “People's “sudden seizure of power” and replace objective of which was to stage a "sudden the royal government with one based on parliamentary principles and a written constitution. The “Promoters,” as the core group of conspirators came to be called later on, served as the Central Committee of the People’s Party and secretly worked to increase its membership.7 As Pridi explained: “Each member of the committee was to be the leader of a network...[and would]... select trustworthy persons...” to swell their ranks.8 The group grew would].,.select eight years, planning, recruiting, and biding their time. secretly over the next eightyears, Upon the Promoters’ return to Bangkok, most of them took junior positions in the civil service and the military, where they found the political climate conducive to recruiting fellow conspirators. Most of their colleagues belonged to the emergent intelligentsia who had been quietly expressing frustration with the persistence of the absolute monarchy and who had foundin found in the continuing dominance of royalty and noblemen in government an unremitting obstacle to their own advancement The Promoters were thus able to convince a good number of their colleagues to join their cause, and they gradually made contacts in higher places, carefully and patiently gathering the influence they would need to seize power once the time was right. In the weeks preceding the 1932 coup, a Thai police colonel reported that while travelling by train in the provinces, he had overheard a group of students discussing plans to overthrow the government. They were students of a law professor named Luang Pradit Manudham, also known as Pridi Banomyong.9 The police colonel’s report resulted in the issuance of warrants for the arrests of five persons including Professor Pridi and two junior army officers, Luang Phibul Songkhram andPrayoon and Prayoon Phamonmontri, all of whom had studied under royal patronage in France. But when this news reached Prince Boriphat, the king’s right hand and heir apparent, he objected that these persons were well known to him and could not possibly be involved in such a plot. He ordered the arrests be postponed pending further investigation.10

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had formed the focus of the Paris group In fact, Pridi, Phibul and Prayoon Prayoonhad and eventually came to be regarded as the chief leaders of the coterie of educated young men that finally unseated the absolute monarchy. Yet, although they shared a common perspective on the monarchy and the common experience of a foreign education, they came from such diverse backgrounds that, if not for the ironic intervention of the Lord of Life and the royal scholarships he provided to send them all to France, they might never have found the common grounds on which they built their revolutionary scheme. Of the three, Pridi was regarded as the most intellectual and the one most motivated by ideology. Before meeting the others in Paris, Pridi had little in common with them. Though a branch of his paternal lineage boasted a provincial governor of Ayudhya, the ancient capital of the Thai, Pridi Banomyong’s background was essentially that of a prosperous family of commoners, descended from a long line of rice farmers. His father, Siang Banomyong, married a half-Chinese girl named Lukchandra who on May 11, 1900 gave birth to Pridi, the first-born son. There is some confusion 11 Siang’s occupation: Vichitvong presents him as a rice farmer about Siang's farmer”,, Kruger 12 says he was a merchant while Morell states he “...was a public health officer, apparently the first man in Ayudhya to give smallpox vaccinations 13 and teach modem health habits...." All observers seem to agree, however, that the family was of solid peasant stock, well-off and influential. Pridi was apparently a child prodigy, finishing the prestigious Suan Kulab College and entering the Ministry of Justice’s Justice's law school at the age of seventeen. He was called to the bar two years later. In 1919 he tried and won his first and only court case as a defense lawyer, that of an elderly Chinese merchant held liable by the crown for damages to royal property during a boating accident on the Chao Phraya River near Ayudhya. He appealed the case three times and finally won it by citing as precedent an ancient judgement from the Ayudhya period. By the age of nineteen Pridi had already earned a reputation for legal and rhetorical skill.14 The following year he received a scholarship through the Ministry of tn France. Before his departure, Pridi was honored by Justice to study law in an audience with His Majesty King Vajiravudh, as was customary for those awarded the prestigious royal scholarships. Following the audience, the king remarked to Pridi’s superiors that this young man would undoubtedly “...return as an asset to the country.”15 Upon his return in 1927, Pridi was assigned to the Ministry of Justice’s secretariat where he acquired extensive experience in the drafting of laws. He also wrote a compilation of Thai laws from antiquity to modem times which was published in several volumes and which, according to Vichitvong, became a best seller.16 No doubt these experiences helped to prepare Pridi for a future of national significance, for it was to be his destiny to pen not only Thailand’s first constitution, but two others as well.

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Perhaps Pridi’s most intimate friend in Paris was Phibul Songkhram, ironically a man whose name would one day come to be paired with Pridi’s only as ‘right’ is paired with ‘left’. Later in life they came to head opposing political camps and to struggle bitterly for control of the country, in spite of the fact that their origins were more alike than any other two members of the Paris group. Like Pridi, Phibul’s family were commoners, proprietors of orchard lands in the Bankhen district just outside Bangkok, where he was born on July 14, 1898. In her memoirs, Phibul’s widow stresses that Phibul’s family were commoners and that Phibul’s early achievements of first-place honors at the Cadet School and his winning the King’s Scholarship to study in France were remarkable because “...in that period few commoners indeed could afford the expenses of sending their children to study abroad, and a very limited 17 number of scholarships was available to their likes." likes.” While studying in Paris, his keen interest in military history won Phibul the nickname “Captain” among his friends, one of whom, Pridi, bore the nickname “Professor."18 Phibul’s widow regrets the tendency of most writers to describe her husband “...simply as a military strongman... [Flundamentally, Phibul had a scholarly disposition, and even his rapid ascendancy in the army was Isfc] largely the product of the respect he commanded as an out-standing [sic] student, teacher and writer in military science.”’ science."’9 Among the young officer’s students, at one point, was none other than the king. Himself a soldier by training and an admirer of Phibul’s expertise in modem artillery, His Majesty 20 chose to honor him by attending some of his lectures on the subject. The differences that developed between Phibul and Pridi were obviously not rooted in the soil from which both sprang, nor was it that the “Captain” was a man of action while the “Professor” was more bookish. Both were decisive, and both were intellectuals. There was, however, a distinct difference in intellectual tastes and philosophies of life reflected in the course of study each pursued, and (as Thawatt has noted) in their personalities: [Phibul] [Phibull was extremely handsome, and had a very polite and modest manner that won men.... [P]eople [Pjeople came to like him because of his personal charm and tended to forgive him for whatever mistakes he had made. In contrast to Luang Phibul, people liked Pridi because they respected his noble principles. Once they disagreed with him, that 21 personal friendship would be completely broken.11

The third core member of the “Promoters” was Prayoon Phamonmontri, who was neither a peasant nor an intellectual but came to have much in common with both Pridi and Phibul when the three became friends in Paris. Not quite as common a commoner as either Pridi or Phibul, Prayoon came from a household with close ties to the royal family. His father, a middle level official at the Thai Embassy in Berlin,22 was apparently an intimate of

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the king’s uncle, Prince Boriphat, and Boriphat was like a godfather to Prayoon.23 Though Prayoon’s mother was German, and though Prayoon was born in Berlin, he received his early education in Thailand.24 He was later admitted to the Thai military academy in the same class as Phibul.25 Unlike Phibul, however, Prayoon elected to leave the army not long after his graduation and eventually went to Paris to study political science, not soldiering.26 He later returned to military service as a career officer and eventually become a lieutenant general in the Royal Thai Army, surviving both Phibul and Pridi and waltzing through a long sequence of political traumas without missing a beat. Fifty years after the 1932 coup d’etat Prayoon commented on his coups," he career in the military and in politics: “I have taken part in five coups,” told National Geographic, adding, with apparent pride, “and none with bloodshed."27 Prayoon’s interests in bringing about political change were more basic than Phibul’s or Pridi’s, and perhaps more honest He wrote in his memoirs of the humiliation he felt as a young man in Thailand, working under a system he described as paternalistic and based on strict gradations of status and deference to authority. He also complained of the complacency of his countrymen, whom he saw as fatalistic and unaware of the indignity of their situation.28 Those Thais who had knowledge of the West, he maintained, felt differently. Prayoon once wrote that after having travelled abroad, he and many of his contemporaries, impressed with the prosperity of progressive and democratic countries in the West, had become increasingly distressed by the elitism and status consciousness of Thailand. Prayoon remarked that it seemed that “our country remained ‘buried 'buried in mud.’" While young men in Western societies enjoyed a high degree of equality (presumably with their seniors) and appeared free from the stifling status criteria that ranked the Thai social hierarchy, Prayoon was expected to kowtow in exaggerated deference to his princely superiors and to endure their "derogatory speech” “derogatory speech" “Moreover," he wrote, “we felt slighted and and demeaning attitudes. "Moreover,” 29 looked down upon like slaves in a colony. colony."M2? Prayoon, therefore, saw the revolution as a means to overcome the barriers of status in elite Thai society. But despite his bitterness toward the system, there were some aspects he wished to preserve. Foremost among these was the institution of kingship, which he wanted to limit but not to destroy. Prayoon also made it clear to Pridi, who in 1924 was more than a little interested in the ideas of Marx and Lenin, that he would not support the revolution if it intended to impose a communist system in Thailand.30 He claimed that Pridi had contactwith contact with “communist groups” in Paris, and that he, Prayoon, had asked Pridi "... to cease communicating with the communist organization and agree to democratic principles in which the majority opinion should prevail. But if the majority of the people are interested in communism, then I must withdraw."31

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After the formation of the Promoters’ pact in 1924, Prayoon became the most energetic recruiter for their People’s Party, both while they were still in Paris and once they had returned to Bangkok.52 He succeeded in attracting some of the group’s most important members, including senior officers of the army and navy, and it is doubtful whether Pridi and Phibul could have done Prayoon’s drive, his enthusiasm, and, most importantly, as well without him. Prayoon's his connections, brought the coup of June 24, 1932 to reality. Yet when the seems final victory was at hand, Prayoon see ms to have felt more than a twinge of regret—perhaps even shame. On the day of the coup Prayoon was stationed at the king’s throne hall, where the People’s Party had set up its headquarters. About mid-morning one of the rebel colonels Prayoon had himself recruited entered the throne hall bringing a hostage for Prayoon and his men to hold while awaiting word from the king that he would recognize their “revolution.” The hostage, bare-footed and still wearing pajamas, had obviously been dragged from his bed. Prayoon recognized him immediately as his late father’s BoriphaL The prince, perhaps remembering his own patron and friend, Prince Boriphat. misguided loyalty which had prevented Prayoon’s arrest only the week before, confronted Prayoon with the memory of his father, rebuking him as disloyal and disrespectful of the crown his father had so faithfully served. Then he reminded Prayoon that it was he, Prince Boriphat, who had chosen Prayoon’s name and performed the auspicious rites at Prayoon’s birth. Prayoon sighed 33 and replied simply, “If my father knew of this he would be very sad.”35 Of the additional Promoters recruited by Prayoon in Paris at least two deserve some mention. Thawee Bunyaket and Khuang Aphaiwong both joined the conspiracy within a year of its conception. Their reasons for opposing the system of absolute monarchy are illustrative. Like Prayoon, they came from privileged environments and ostensibly had some sort of stake in the status quo, yet they seem to have concluded, as a result of their Western educations, that Thailand was in a state of arrested development and could never attain European standards so long as it clung to its backward system of government. Thawee was the son of a provincial governor in the south who eventually rose to the post of regional governor of three northeastern provinces. Thawee’s father made sure that his son attended the best schools in Thailand. As a boy he was enrolled at the prestigious King’s College in Nonthaburi. Later he was sent to England and France for university training resulting in a degree in agriculture.534* Thawee later wrote that his European education, just as that of the friends he made at school, was instrumental 35 in shaping the course of the 1932 “revolution.”55 Though Thawee’s actual role in the events of June 24, 1932 was peripheral, he assumed a prominent place in post-coup politics and eventually rose to the post of prime minister. Khuang Aphaiwong admits that his part in planning the conspiracy was minimal because he did hot enjoy the complete trust of his friends among the Promoters, a situation he readily accepted because he was related by

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marriage to royalty, being the brother-in-law of one of the king’s uncles, 36 Prince Charoon.34 Indeed, Khuang himself was also descended from nobility. His father was the last in a line of Bangkok-appointed governors of Battambang, the urban center of the western Cambodian territories taken 57 from Thailand by the French in 1907.37 Khuang’s father was once described as "... a fine man to look at, a real 38 grand seigneur and feudal lord of the old type, dignified but courteous."30 Rather than serve under French colonial rule, Khuang’s father elected to leave Cambodia when the French took possession; he evacuated the entire contingent of the Thai administration in Battambang overland through treacherous terrain to Thailand. The long and arduous exodus traversed hundreds of miles of swamps and mountains, employing a train of over one thousand bullock and buffalo carts. Many of the party were taken ill with fever and died before reaching Thailand, but at the end of their four month trek the governor’s family, including the young Khuang, arrived safely to settle anew in the village of Krabin in Prachinburi province.39 Thus Khuang came to be raised as a Thai in an independent country. One might expect that the memory of his father’s actions in 1907, a stirring example of loyalty to Thailand, would have discouraged someone like Khuang from joining a plot to overthrow the dynasty. One must bear in mind, however, that despite Khuang’s noble status, he could never have hoped to achieve his country’s highest office under the absolute monarchy, while under the new system he would help to inaugurate in 1932, he was eventually able to achieve the rank of prime minister ... not once, but three limes. times. Though not made privy to the details of the plot until the very last moment before it was executed, Khuang did know some of what his friends intended while they were still in Paris. In later life he would claim that he went along with the revolution out of personal loyalty to his close friends among the Promoters.40 He proved his loyalty to them on the day of the coup; one of the conspirators came to his home in Bangkok unannounced and asked that Khuang go early to his job at the telephone and telegraph exchange to disrupt the city’s communications so as to block a coordinated defense by the royalists. Khuang complied without question and was forever after a trusted member of the dub. club.41 Prayoon’s most significant recruits, however, were not from the youthful ranks of the counter-elite, but rather from the bastions of the old guard. Although the Promoters of Political Change were well organized and had great plans for their future regime, they had no idea how they would actually install that regime until Prayoon became aware of the designs of four disaffected colonels and then arranged an alliance with them. A generation older than the Paris group—but equally eager to replace the archaic system of government—the colonels became known to the younger rebels as the “Four Tigers.”

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The colonels’ names were Phya Bhahon Yothin, Phya Song Suradej, Phya Ritti Arkhane, and Prasas Pittayayudh.42 Because none of the original Promoters had any authority to order the mobilization of troops necessary to implement their plans, the “Four Tigers” became the masterminds of the 45 Prayoon’s high actual seizure of power.43 The alliance was made possible by Prayoon's social connections. Bhahon, it seems, was a friend of Prayoon’s family; he had studied with Prayoon’s mother in Germany. Prayoon personally recruited Bhahon into the conspiracy and thus brought together the two forces that made the “revolution” possible.44 As Thawee recalls, “When Prayoon succeeded in establishing contact with Bhahon’s group, the tempo of events leading to the coup began to accelerate." accelerate.”45 Impatient with what they perceived as gross inefficiency in the king’s administration and irked by its inability to cope with the special economic problems of the 1930s, the colonels were motivated to act by more pressing concerns than the ideals and ambitions of the Paris group. Each of the four had his own specific complaints. Bhahon was “extremely dismayed and of his princelysuperiors. princely superiors. One disappointed” by the stupidity, in his estimate, ofhis of his pet complaints was the decision by higher-ups, against his adamant advice, to purchase from France obsolete artillery which was then being discarded by the French army. Prasas often complained of the injustice of his royal superiors and the severe punishments inflicted on officers who dared to disagree with them.46 The colonels had been contemplating a military takeover for at least two years before Prayoon and Bhahon first discussed each other’s plans,47 but they either did not know what they would do with power once it was achieved, or they were waiting for dissent to ferment in other sectors. Upon learning that a network of dissidents was already forming within the bureaucracy and that they had already formulated an alternative government system based on modem and efficient European practices, the soldiers seized the moment and prepared to move. Surveying this sampling of the leadership of the 1932 coup, one notices great diversity in both motive and social class among a group we have convenience’s sake, the “counter-elite.” Certainly hitherto labeled, purely for convenience'ssake, they had experiences in common, most notably their European educations— even the Four Tigers had all received training in Germany before the First World War—but in their origins, their social environments, and in their thinking, the participants fit neatly into no convenient sociological classification. Only after the coup would their common membership in the new power elite mold them into anything like a class in the usual sense, a phenomenon which will be considered later.

The Causes of Political Change Certain royal policies intensified the bureaucratic frustrations found by the Promoters when they entered government service. A staggering budget

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deficit, a result of the over-burdened government payroll and other extravagances of the previous regime, was chief among the liabilities King Prajadhipok had inherited when he took the throne in 1925. To combat the deficit, the new king instituted a program of austerity, and through a drastic reduction in the civil service he managed to balance the budget by the 1926.48 Though this retrenchment was unpopular with the summer of 1926* threatened civil service, its fiscal success prompted the king to a repeat performance in 1930, when the Great Depression started to take its toll and the king felt that further cuts in staff and expenditures were mandated. Various interpretations of the events leading to the 1932 coup have portrayed the king’s retrenchment schemes of 1926 and 1930 as somehow pivotal to the change of government. Because of the enmity it created amongst officials, the king’s austerity policy was criticized by historians like JohnCady,who JohnCady, who labetedPrajadhipok labeled Prajadhipok ,'...a .a weak personalitylackingintellectual personalitylacking intellectual capacity...[who] offended the nobility, the army and the bureaucracy by a capadty...[who] measures.”4’ Cady fails to note, however, thatPrajadhipok’s series ofeconomy ofeconomymeasures.”*Cady bold actions averted national bankruptcy in 1926, a great feat for any national leader but especially for one with Prajadhipok’s minimal training and negligible experience in statecraft and economics. And the question remains whether the two retrenchments (and the resultant alienation of the official class and the military) can rightfully be depicted as the primary catalysts which lead to the overthrow of the absolute monarchy. Thawatt Mokarapong, who provides the most detailed scholarly treatment of the coup and anditscauses, interpretation.Thawatt acknowledges itscauses, challenges this thisinterpretation.Thawatt the retrenchment as the most immediate cause, but he endeavors to portray it as simply part of a longer sequence of developments. He emphasizes the ideological motivation of the Promoters and stresses that the original impetus for their coup existed before the economic crisis, when Pridi’s group was still contemplating alternatives to the anachronisticabsolute monarchy and in Paris contemplatingaltematives considering ways in which to replace it it. The retrenchment scheme, Thawatt concludes, affected only the timing of the coup.50 Batson, on the other hand, finds Thawatt’s analysis inadequate. Batson points out that Thawatt’s arguments fail to address the question of whether People’s Party— the senior military officers who eventually joined the People's coup—would providing the necessary clout to pull off the coup —would have agreed to join the French-educated ideologues had it not been for the economic problems of 1930-1932 and the ensuing second wave of retrenchment. leaders’ "... most frequently expressed reasons Batson notes that the military leaders’"... coup] was the ’inefficiency’ ‘inefficiency’ of the existing government, and for [backing the coupl the most visible proof of inefficiency was the economic situation....” If not for the retrenchment scheme, he asks, would the coup have been attempted succeeded?511 at all? And, if so, would it have succeeded” Indeed, many of the coup makers regarded the retrenchment as the straw that broke the camel’s back. As many as 10,000 bureaucrats were -

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sacked in 1926 alone. Many of those who lost their jobs had received university educations for the express purpose of serving in government, and they felt there was no other field in which they could put their training to good use.52 Of these over-educated and unemployed men, a Singapore newspaper commented that “every one of them is a potential revolutionary and each can secure a faction.”53 Additional economic measures ensured the ire of many people who did remain in the king's king’s service. The military budget was drastically cut, for example, after Prajadhipok found it to be greatly overgrown for the country’s actual defense needs. Further and deeper cuts came with the Depression.54 In April 1932, around the time of the sesquicentennial celebrations, the government further exacerbated dissent by inaugurating a tax on salaries.55 Unlike an income tax, which might have been better received, the new tax effected the incomes of neither businessmen (whose earnings were not classified as salaries but as profits) nor the income of nobles (which derived primarily from rents on farm lands and other enterprises). The salary tax was paid primarily by middle class government functionaries, and their reaction was predictable. Newspapers swelled with letters and commentaries attacking the inequity of the tax, and some editors even went as far as to 5 suggest that representation be given to the taxpayers.54*The The king later claimed that although he had preferred an income tax, he had lacked the bureaucratic machinery to administer such a complex system.57 In any event, by April 1932 the enemies of the crown included not only a mass of unemployed bureaucrats but also many malcontents still within the bureaucracy. Some observers tended to link the mass firings to Prajadhipok’s coincidental establishment of two councils of princely advisors and the resultant intensification of royal preeminence in the administration. British diplomat Sir Josiah Crosby, for one, commented that this policy seemed an imprudent departure from the previous king’s king's practice of granting commoners a greater share in managing the affairs of state.58 Thus, it was widely perceived that the king’s aim was to purge the government of commoners and to replace them with his relatives. At least one contemporary commentator regarded the retrenchment as wise and constructive. The editor of the Bangkok Daily Mail saw the release ofso of so many educated and experienced men into the private sector as a potential boon to Thailand’s future economic development development. Writing in 1931, Andrew Freeman noted that it was the common expectation of most Thai young men “...above “.,.above the peasant class to enter government service and hold some minor post...” while the princes, for whom the lhe higher offices were generally reserved, often used civil service jobs as patronage to dispense to their numerous “dependents.” The status quo thus funneled all of Thailand's “dependents." Thailand’s talent and youthful enthusiasm into unproductive token occupations, leaving the country’s trade and commerce to fall into the hands of immigrant Chinese.59

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King Prajadhipok’s retrenchment effort, Freeman continued, “...met with anything but approval from certain Siamese families whose male members, desks.” The honored by titles, drank tea all day long as they sat at government desks." mass dismissals caused “...something .something of a social upheaval...” as it was felt that Chinese competition in the private sector would prevent the fired officials from obtaining other work. But Freeman disagreed, believing that increased competition could only be good for Thai society: “...King Prajadhipok had done something even more constructive than to reduce the government budget He had opened the way for the growth of a strong prosperous middle class of Siamese—a class much needed if the country is to play its part among the nations ofthe of the modem world.”60 Subsequent history, of course, has disproved Freeman’s estimates of the economic potential of the new dass. class. Chinese dominance of the Thai economy was never fully supplanted. Though some scholars, in retrospect, acknowledge the emergence of a new class at about this time, there is significant doubt over whether it can civil servants. It might be more be directly attributed to the firing of 10,000 dvil accurate to depict the 1926 retrenchment as a response to an already emergent new class rather than as the cause of that class’s emergence: that is, the rise of the counter-elite, whose growing numbers represented a fiscal strain as well as a potential political threat to the monarchy, impelling the king to impose limits upon it it. Sometime during the reign of King Vajiravudh (1910-1925) the demand for well-trained bureaucrats created by the earlier centralization of government ceased to keep up with the ever-increasing civil service and supply.61 Both Vajiravudh’s continued expansion of the dvil Prajadhipok’s reduction in force can, therefore, be seen as addressing, in opposite ways, the problem of the long-term growth of an intermediate dass, class, somewhere between the rulers and the ruled, which the traditional Thai sodal social and economic milieu could not accommodate. Whereas Vajiravudh felt the dvil civil service could absorb the growing intelligentsia and that they could best be handled by co-opting them into his system, clearly the limits of the system’s resources and dedded, decided, Prajadhipok saw dearly instead, to let the newcomers fend for themselves in the private sector. The most obvious flaw common to the interpretations of Cady, Thawatt, Batson, and especially Freeman, is that each tends to depict the coup of 1932 policies of the royal government as an arbitrary response to the arbitrary polides associated Each writer presents the retrenchment (and the other cutbacks assodated with it) as an isolated cause and the coup as an isolated effect when, in fact, both were part of a continuum of interrelated changes dating back to the nineteenth century. Freeman, of course, is writing just before the coup, but that he sees the retrenchmentscheme retrenchment scheme as the inadvertent his error is similar in thathe class, something which in fact seems to have begun to creator of a middle dass, closest to the mark in explaining that arise long before. Thawatt comes dosest retrenchment simply exacerbated a pre-existing condition, but he falls short in going back only as far as Paris in 1924 to seek its roots.

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One must lake take care not to mistake drama for trauma. Drama is merely a kind of diversion, an amusement, while trauma implies a significant shock which leaves a lasting scar on the body or the mind. The excitement and surprise of the 1932 coup d’etat—and the rhetoric of its leaders with their dramatic, high-sounding talk of democracy and the will of the people— have caused many observers to mistake this event for a traumatic watershed in Thai history, the point at which “old Siam” ends and modern Thailand begins. It is too often assumed that the Western political ideas brought home by Pridi and company, or the fiscal crises of the Depression years, were traumatic shocks to the Thai political system, and that the 1932 coup was a sudden convulsion resulting from them. Taken in their proper historical context, the challenges posed by new ideas and economic instability become less strikingly determinative. As for the coup, it may indeed have been the start of a transition as yet incomplete, perhaps the beginning of a long process toward developing a democratic society, but it did not spell the end of anything. The dynasty, was only temporarily eclipsed, and would later reemerge with only slight alterations. The drama of the 1930s, when seen from this perspective, becomes simply another act—and not the climax—in the epic play of Thailand’s political and social development. The coup becomes the central scene in this act, and the king’s fiscal policies are but the backdrop against which the action unfolds.

Chapter 4

Era' Begins The 'New Era'

Fifty years after the demise of absolute monarchy in Thailand, Prayoon Phamonmontri, an eighty-four year old retired lieutenant general of the Royal Thai Army and a revered elder of the Thai power elite, looked back through a romantic fog upon the “revolution” he had helped to orchestrate. On the occasion of Bangkok’s bicentennial, he briefly sketched the events of the coup for National Geographic, describing a mass of revolutionaries with tanks and guns marching up to the palace walls where the king stood waiting for them on the front steps? He welcomed us, but he said "The “The king cannot talk to you under tanks or machine

guns.” So we pulled the tanks away and presented our new constitution. The king guns." cleaned his glasses and began to read.12

Geographic correspondent added, “And thus royal So informed, the Geographic’s began.”3 absolutism ended and a new era of Thai history began." This is the popular myth learned by every Thai schoolchild and believed by many otherwise well-informed Thai adults to this very day. The myth serves to reconcile traditional reverence for the throne with modern aspirations to Western-style democracy. With this myth the unpleasantnesses of history is smoothed over and the bitter power struggle between the emergent counter-elite and the once omnipotent royal caste is reduced to an awkward but minor misunderstanding gracefully resolved by the wisdom of an enlightened ruler and the patience of a respectful opposition. Thais prefer to remember this interpretation because it creates the illusion of consensus, an ideal of Thai culture reflected in the art of “conflict avoidance” practiced by well-mannered Thais at all levels of society? The myth also creates an illusion that the way things are today is the way things have always been and so should remain in the future. Today the Icing is a force that spiritually binds the Thais together as a nation and links their heritage with their future. The supreme national

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symbol, his prestige attaches to him the aura of legitimacy. No longer above the law, though required to remain above politics, the modern Thai monarch is popularly held to be a kind of guardian of the people, watching out for their well-being and monitoring government activities without stooping to meddle in the nasty business of its day-to-day operations or to take sides in the petty squabbles of politicians and bureaucrats.5 There is much truth in this popular perception of modem Thai kingship, however, the myth which claims that in 1932 King Prajadhipok and the revolutionary cohorts of PrayoonPhamonmontrx Prayoon Phamonmontri simply shook hands and agreed that this was the proper role for the throne exaggerates history and obscures some important aspects of elite behavior in the post-revolutionary period.6 The conflict which, despite everyone’s best manners, permeated the transition to constitutional government was inescapable. One full generation would pass before the elite could even give the appearance of consensus again. And though Prajadhipok was resigned to the inevitability of a constitutional monarchy, he and his family were to endure a series of rude shocks over the years before accommodation could be reached with the new elite and prestige restored to the crown. in fact There was a brief moment Still, the myth does have some foundation infact.There after the coup, a “honeymoon period," during which members of the old guard seemed to accept the changes imposed upon them; indeed, some even appeared to welcome the change of administration. Beneath the surface, however, old resentments simmered, and it was not long before the public handshakes and appeals for national unity that followed the coup were revealed to be merely political gestures designed to mask behind-the-scenes maneuvers by those who wished to use the “revolution” to their own advantage.

The "Revolution" •“Revolution" Perhaps the most intriguing account of the events of June 24, 1932 comes from one of the Four Tigers, Phya Song Suradet. Universally acclaimed as the military brains behind the takeover, Phya Song, because of his lack of high-sounding, ideological rhetoric, offers the best first-hand description of shouldseem the planning and execution of the coup. Why Phya Song’s tone should seem so cynical will become apparent when we discuss his subsequent fallingout with the rest of file the Promoters’ Promoters' group, but a dash of bitterness may be just the spice needed to counteract the syrupy sweetness of Thai historical mythology. Song recalls in a memoir that much of what the Promoters preferred to remember distorts the reality of the coup. In particular, he joints out that coup, in though revolutionary rhetoric claimed that the coup was staged in the name ! of “the people," the populace showed little interest in it/ i

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Hie understanding that the revolution occurred because of the tax increases and the people’s poverty was not correct.The Thai people were afraid of the Princes and their masters like rats are afraid of cats. The people by themselves had no ability to discard yoke.... If they had to starve to death because of their poverty, they would let that the yoke.,.. happen.... The lack of understanding and the apathy on the part of our people could happen,,,. be easilyseen on the day when the constitution was proclaimed.... It took a lot of effort to herd the people in to sit in the Throne Hall; but even so, only a handful of them were rounded up, and they stood listening blankly to what was being said. If there were to be a lakhan[folk lakhon [folk play] with the rhe Chinese selling noodles, more people would 7 definitely turn out. out?

The Promoters had designated Phya Song to be their military director and left him to plan the actual seizure of power and to delegate tasks to the others. He kept the details of the plan completely secret, revealing to the others only as much as each needed nee Jed to perform his specific duties. At their last meeting before launching the putsch, Phya Song told the Promoters only that on the morning of the 24th he would mobilize and assemble all troops in the capital to gather in front of the king’s Throne Hall and declare the change of government a fait accompli. The leaders of the conspiracy were told to bring their followers to a railroad crossing near Phya Song’s home at 5:00 A.M. on the morning of the 24th and there to await his orders. Phya Ritti, the only one of the Four Tigers with any actual authority to mobilize Ritii, troops, was to summon his artillery regiment to the Throne Hall at 6:00 A.M., while at the same time Luang Sin, a senior naval officer and a late-comer to the conspiracy, would gather all the naval officers and men possible, together with ammunition, and assemble them there.8 On the 23rd, Phya Song visited three military units in the city and requested the commander of the Army Academy, the commander of the Engineers Battalion, and two commanders of different infantry battalions to bring their men to the throne hall on the following day to participate in drills of anti-tank combat. Phya Song writes that his requests went unquestioned by these commanders because of his senior rank and his position as director of the Military Academy.9 The next morning at the railroad crossing Phya Song gave out assignments to each of the conspirators. Some were to surround the homes of critically important princes and military officers and, if they should come outside, take the occupants under guard to the Throne Hall, Hall. Phya Bhahon was assigned to break into the arsenal of the cavalry regiment to load weapons and ammunition onto trucks and to requisition tanks and armored cars.’ cars,100 When Song, Bhahon and Prasas arrived at cavalry headquarters, Song summoned the duty officer and “...pretended to scold him for sleeping without knowing that a rebellion was taking place in Bangkok.’’ Bangkok.” Song simply said that he had orders from “the field army commander” to muster all officers and men immediately. The duty officer complied. Bhahon had

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the arsenal opened according to plan and instructed the guards to load ammunition onto trucks. The guards complied, and Song ordered all trucks, tanks, cars and foot soldiers to move out, and they did.11 Phya Song explains the ease of his deception as follows: Was it because the N.GO.'s N.C.O.'s and officers agreed with the revolution? No! No! None of the officers, N.GO.’s N.C.O.’s and Privates knew anything. Since their birth they had never witnessed or known how a revolution was staged and for what purpose. They were

a military all puzzled, full of curiosity. And this was the main reasonfor the success!...If success!...Ifa officer from another unit gave them orders claimed to be those of their superior they

comply.,.Each and everyone of them was afraid to do anything for fear would simply comply...Each of committing mistakes; it was natural for them to follow what others were doing because they thought that since all others did it so it had to be right; or if it turned out 11

wrong, all would be wrong.12

Song also points out that he was well known to the officers because he had taught them at the academy and because they respected him and were afraid to offend him because of his seniority.” seniority.13 All were assembled at the Throne Hall as planned when Phya Song arrived with the cavalry at six o’clock. Once Bhahon had herded all the troops inside the iron gates, he read an announcement declaring a new political system, and a cheer arose from the men. But, Phya Song comments, “...the majority of the Military officers who heard the announcement...did not know what actually happened."14 There is considerable doubt as to why notknowwhat exactly the assembly cheered the announcement. Perhaps they simply felt they should. Simultaneously, under Phya Song’s direction, armored units moved in on the city's city’s police stations, surrounding each and seizing its arms and ammunition, pre-empting any possible interference from civil authorities.15 All morning long, parades of armored cars and troop-laden trucks swept the city to bring, with similar tactics of deception, the remaining scattered troop units to the throne hall. Influential princes were “invited” to come along for their “protection." Among these special guests “invited" was Prayoon’s god-father, the king’s right hand Prince Boriphat. Since the king and queen were away at the seashore, Boriphat was the highest personage in the capital. With him in their custody, the Promoters’ coup was almost complete. All that remained was to wait and see whether the king would fight or accede to their demands. The coup group presented an ultimatum to the king: he must return to Bangkok and grant a constitution or they would select a minor prince to be put upon the throne in his stead.16 The Coast Guard ship Sukholhai Sukhothai was dispatched to Hua Hin to retrieve the king and queen, but when it arrived His Majesty ordered orderedit it away and, in a stubborn display of royal prerogative, returned to the capital by train.17 Much has been written of the king’s courage in returning to Bangkok and of his concern that the spilling of Thai

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blood be avoided at all costs—even at the cost of losing his throne. Still, Still, one wonders what other options were left open to the king. If the soldiers gathered under the Four Tigers’ illegal command at the Throne Hall were so easily influenced by figures of authority and high rank, as Phya Song had demonstrated they were, could not the king have avoided both bloodshed and loss of power by simply ordering that they lay down their arms? Thawee suggests that such a move might have been disastrous for the Promoters. “It was lucky for us,”.he wrote of the king’s decision not to resist, “and for the country. For he might have issued an order to the soldiers and the people to fight us, and there could have been much bloodshed.” bloodshed."18 The risk to the princely hostages might have dissuaded the king from such defiance, but it is more likely that resistance had simply not occurred to him. The king hadhad had had hopes of presenting a constitution of his own and nowthose now those hopes had been dashed by opposition from the princes. We have also seen that the police had been observing key members of the Promoters’ group for some time before the coup, and that they had some knowledge of the scheme. It is not unlikely that Prajadhipok, having anticipated the coup, decided not to oppose it but rather optimistically resolved to abet it, in hopes of directing the transition himself. Whatever his reasons, Prajadhipok arrived in Bangkok shortly after midnight on the 26th accompanied by the queen and several of his entourage. According to the press, Their Majesties were greeted by “...a big crowd of the general public...but complete silence was observed. No troops 19 king’s party proceeded by motorcade were visible.” From the depot the king's to Sukhothai Palace where, at eleven o’clock that morning, His Majesty received seven members of the People’s Party, led by Pridi Banomyong and Lt. Colonel Prasas Pittayayudh. They were taken to His Majesty, who gave the order for those present with Him to stand as an honor to the representatives of the People’s Party. Thereafter [Pridi] People's Party had no intention to bring about addressed His Majesty saying that the People’s strife, but only wished to effect a change in the administration of the land such as the King Himself had also under consideration.20

Then, not unlike the story Prayoon told the National Geographic fifty years later, the king took from Pridi a copy of the draft constitution, promising to study it and deliver his opinion of it by five o’clock the following afternoon. The coup makers later made a public act of contrition, apologizing to the king not for the result of their action but for the implied toward the crown. The king then issued a proclamation irreverence it itimplied officially absolving the members of the People’s Party of any criminal officially liability in overthrowing his government He then ordered that the royal standard, the traditional dynastic flag bearing the Chakri coat of arms which normally flew over the throne hall, be replaced by the Thai national flag,21

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thereby symbolizing the transference of sovereignty from the king to his people. Thus the honeymoon began. His Majesty approved the constitution as it was drafted by Pridi without alteration but only with the stipulation that it was to be considered a provisional document to be replaced by a permanent constitution drafted by a committee over the next few months.22 A comparison of Pridi’s draft 25 constitution23 and the one drafted by Prajadhipok’s advisors earlier that 24 year reveals some striking similarities. Among their shared aspects were an appointed cabinet headed by a prime minister and a legislative assembly with half its members appointed and half elected indirectly. The June 27th constitution, however, limited the king’s participation to a basically consultative role, while the king’s own draft constitution would have authorized him to propose legislation and to veto decisions of the cabinet and assembly. Despite the strictures, the king was reportedly enthusiastic about the new constitution’s possibilities.25 But in the two years following the coup it became evident to Prajadhipok that the new regime was going to prove no less absolute than the old, and that neither he nor the so-called People's People’s Assembly could hope to have any real effect in guiding the nation’s course toward democracy.

The Unlikely Coalition An unavoidable conflict arose during the transition between absolute rule and constitutional government. It was a conflict that had long seethed beneath the surface of bureaucratic politics but which, until the 1932 coup brought Thai politics into a more-or-less public arena, could be kept within the confines of the palace. It was a conflict between commoners and princes, bom as much of the former’s former's envy and desire for status as it had been of the latter’s jealous protection of power and privilege. After.the After,the coup, once the tables were turned, the conflict could no longer be suppressed. At first, given the king’s co-operation and given the efforts by the coup leaders to co-opt selected officials of the old government, it appeared that the two sides were committed to a joint venture. But the divisions between the old guard and the usurpers were too deeply rooted and too emotional to simply be set aside for the sake of civility and the good of the nation, as both the king and the leading Promoters had once hoped. Even the democratically inclined King Prajadhipok had once decried the 26 class.”25 creeping influence “of the HATED official class.’ Among the royal family and their higher constituents, contempt for the ambitious counter-elite ran deep and may be traced in part to certain peculiarities under Prajadhipok’s predecessor. As Prayoon once recalled, there had been two distinct trends in class relations under Vajiravudh and Prajadhipok. Many among the old guard believed that commoners in government service had enjoyed a higher governmentservice 27 decline.”37 status under the former king, while “...the royalty were in decline."

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Batson, for one , concurs, noting that Vajiravudh’s specific policy was to Batson “middle-class" promote to positions of authority intelligent, well-educated, “middle-class” functionaries from outside the traditional elite.28 This policy did not mean, however, that Vajiravudh had opened the way to the top for the emergent counter-elite. Even though many commoners entered the bureaucracy at lower or middle levels during his reign, the king’s personal favor was still essential for significant advancement The numbers of commoners admitted io threaten the egos of many to Vajiravudh’s inner circle, though sufficient to of the royal elite, were not enough to constitute a takeover by the counter-elite. Significantly, many writers attribute Vajiravudh’s policy not to any egalitarian ideal, but rather to his friendship and ties to certain companions outside traditional royal circles.29 As a result, Vajiravudh alienated many members of his own family and created a bitter rivalry between the traditional elite and the select commoners he allowed to vie for privilege; This competitive milieu likely caused princes to regard any commoner in high office with disdain. In Prajadhipok's Prajadhipok’s reign the trend was reversed as the new king resolved to replace his late brother’s sinecured favorites with seasoned statesmen such as his uncles, the younger brothers of King Chulalongkorn. Though members of the royal family may have regarded such replacements as a prudent clearing away of dead wood and a purge of undesirables from high office, many of the frustrated counter-elite saw it as a deliberate regression to the feudal practices of former times. Prayoon, for one, believed that the royalty and nobility were consolidating their position to protect class privileges, and he wrote that the improvement of the traditional elite’s position under Prajadhipok had "...led “...led to the emphasis of outdated class divisions....” which the counter-elite duly resented.30 In this atmosphere of mutual dislike the coup was launched, and one marvels at the naivete of the king and of the coup’s lop top leaders in believing that they could effect a coalition between the two groups, utilizing the experience of certain old guard technocrats under the political direction of the People’s Party. Yet at the outset there seems to have been great confidence in the prospects of such a reconciliation. Despite a pronounced policy of removing political power from the hands of the princes and their clients, the new regime seems to have felt a need to maintain a degree of continuity with the previous administration. Perhaps, as Wyatt suggests, they sought to “minimize internal resistance and avoid the dangers of foreign intervention that they thought civil strife 31 might invite....” They were also concerned that none of the members of invite...."51 32 and that because the Promoters’ group had any experience in high office,52 of this they might not enjoy the confidence of the public. A letter to the editor of one Bangkok newspaper is indicative of one side of public concern:

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The Balancing Act Siam will create one of the wonders of the world if she can dispense with the service Slam of experienced men and employ only young men direct from the universities to run the state successfully, successfully. Surely those who are in power must know that they depend much mote more on their experienced and careful colleagues. Time will show dearly clearly the 83 fundamental truth of this statement.53

According to Vichitvong there were even, at first, some doubts as to whether members of the royal family should be allowed to receive political appointments and to run for office. He claims that it was at the advice of exclude princes and the king that the new government decided to exdude princesses from public office and to legislate the doctrine of royalty 54 remaining “above politics." politics.”5* Indeed, when it came time to name a prime minister, Phya Bhahon even suggested the king’s former minister of war, Prince Bowaradet.55 But continuity was achieved without resorting to such a potentially regressive measure. The final choice for prime minister, nominated by Pridi, was a man who it appeared would enjoy the support of both the new elite and the old one, a commoner who had strong sympathies for the Promoter’s cause (or so Pridi thought) even though he had taken no part in their conspiracy and had long enjoyed the confidence of the king. The new prime minister was Phya Manopakon Nithithada (usuallyreferred to as Phya Mano), a former senior judge of the Court of Appeals 56 and a member of the Royal House of Councilors.54 His British legal training 37 and “progressive attitude” had long impressed Pridi and his colleagues.57 Mano’s career had been typical of the older, more successful—and thus more complacent—members of the counter-elite. Though born a commoner, he had advanced through a competitive system of education, examinations, ladder; a predetermined route and gradual promotion up the bureaucratic ladder: to a position of some respectability but with no chance of further advancement.58 By the age of forty-five he had reached the highest point the “revolution” he old system would allow him to achieve, and if not for the "revolution” would have remained there throughout his life. Not that such limitations had ever distressed Mano. He was apparently content with his station in life and his association with the king. Because of Mano’s entrenched role in the established order, he hadnotbeen had not been asked to join the People’s Party until after the coup’s success, but his apparent sympathy for the Promoter’s constitutional goals and his evident lack of personal ambitions made him seem a wise choice for the premiership. Unfortunately, power has a way of changing people. On June 28th Phya Bhahon, who had been acting as military governor since the coup, appointed an interim National Assembly of seventy-two members, in accordance with the provisional constitution approved by the king the previous evening. A majority of the new deputies had been officials 39 in the previous regime, including three former cabinet ministers.59 A former

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minister of education appointed to be president of the Assembly was of na. Thepatsadin, the son of a prince royal extraction; mommchaw&ngseS mommcbawongse Sana (but under the system of diminishing descent not himself a prince) therefore presided over the legislature while Mano, a former confidant of the king, was chief executive.40 Thus did the new elite seek to consolidate their power base while leaving the day-to-day chores of government in experienced and, presumably, sympathetic hands. If one of the reasons for attempting this unlikely coalition was to assuage the anxieties of foreigners, the desired effect appears to have been achieved. most likely to first express concern for their status in Thailand The foreigners mostlikely belonged to the corps of Western advisors who had been in the employ of Thai kings since the mid-nineteenth century to oversee certain aspects of the bureaucratic modernization. Though King Prajadhipok had eliminated many of the foreign advisor positions during the 1926 retrenchment, there was as yet some lingering feeling among the Thai counter-elite that farangs within the government held higher status than Thai officials of common birth. Being thus identified with the feudalistic attitudes of the royal family, those advisors who remained in the king’s service had cause for concern after the coup. Raymond B. Stephens and Francis B. Sayre, both American lawyers, had served as foreign affairs advisors to King Prajadhipok and King Vajiravudh, respectively. Sayre had represented Thailand in negotiations with several European powers over the revision of unequal treaties made in the nineteenth century. Stephens had assisted Prajadhipok in drafting his neverreleased April 1932 constitution. The two Americans shared an intimate understanding of Thai politics as well as a profound concern for Thailand’s political future. In the summer of 1932 they conferred by mail on the developments which Stephens had witnessed in Bangkok while Sayre was teaching law at Harvard. “You must have been disturbed by the news from Siam,” Stephens wrote to his predecessor in July. He explained that the new regime was in the hands of reasonable men, though he feared the influence of a fringe element within the coup group, members of which Stephens described as “real radicals." whomare At present [the new constitution] is being redrafted by a committee, most of whom are experienced and named officially from the former government. For the moment the real power lies' lies’in in an Executive Committee of 15 men, all except two being from the group that carried out the coup d'etat. Fortunately they requested Judge Mano to be chairman and also Sri Vasara [former deputy foreign minister]. These two—both men of integrity and wisdom—are guiding the new party...They have changed all members position/1 of the cabinet—and no prince is left in a [prominent] position?

Stephens told Sayre that he was confident the new regime would extend his contract and encourage a dose working relationship with the new

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minister of foreign affairs. His tone throughout the letter is optimistic, as was the tone of many other commentators in the heady months immediately following the coup. He was particularly pleased that the new elite had taken pains not to tear down too many of the old institutions: “The new party also realizes the value to them of the Monarchy—at least in name.” Stephens old friends in the royal family hadlosttheir had lost their informed Sayre that many of their oldfriends jobs. Inthatregardjhefeltjithadbeen In that regard, he felt, it had been "... “... atragictime—and a tragic time—and of course there are still great uncertainties." Nonetheless, Stephens felt high hopes were in order.42 All these things are re-assuring. I really have hope that Siam can do what has been seldom [accomplished ?] in the world—change an old unlimited Dynasty by force and seldom[accomplished 45 keep the unruly and wilder elements in check.43

Sayre’s reply in October expressed some concern, however, that Stephens’ optimism might have been too great. Sayre posed some questions that Stephens, being closer to the heart of the matter, may have hesitated to consider. I keep asking myself whether or not the King acted wisely in choosing to submit to it all and what the future of the story is going to be. Will it be possible for the present

leaders to retain their power, or have they started a movement which will in time grow counter-revolution?*414 beyond them and breed a counter-revolution?

Despite this almost oracular warning, Sayre did encourage Stephens to channel his enthusiasm into constructive efforts. DJC]ill you stay on for a longer period and possibly come into an advisorship which "... [WJillyou will extend its scope beyond the Ministry or Foreign Affairs? If a strongly nationalistic and anti-foreign movement has not been bred I wonder whether you may not have a rare and very unique opportunity to guide the new crowd along the paths of 45

wisdom." 45 wisdom.*

But Sayre’s first conjecture would prove the more accurate, and though no farang would come to harm or even be threatened, the peaceful progress toward democracy for which both Stephens and Sayre had hoped was not to materialize. Soon the violence and bloodshed that all had. dreaded would indeed erupt and shatter the anomalous coalition of conservative royalists and revolutionary democrats.

Chapter 5 Coalition, Rebellion and Abdication

By the end of 1932, after six month’s of the new order’s efforts to merge the best of the old and new elites, the unlikely coalition of intra-class antagonists had begun to splinter into factions, each vying for control of the government. For the sake of discussion one can identify three dominant groups, though it should be understood that overlapping loyalties and frequent switching back and forth across party lines by many individuals hinders any categorization of the competing cliques. Nonetheless, it is useful to have some notion of the forces in contention as the year 1933 began.

The Coalition's Demise Consider first the group that one Thai scholar has labeled the “royalists.”1 These comprise the princes and their closer associates or clients who found d’etat Though the themselves suddenly disenfranchised after the coup d’etat. highest-ranking members of the royal family were officially excluded from participation in politics, there were those who endeavored to ingratiate themselves with the new regime. The provincial governor of Nakhorn Prathom was one of these. Whether out of sincere enthusiasm or simple political expediency, the governor, Prince Aditya Dhibabha, publicly People’s Party within days of the coup. When announced his support of the People's other princes were removed from their provincial governorships, Prince Aditya was left in place. 2 Another exception was Prince Wan, whose long diplomatic experience and whose willingness to work with Pridi in the years withPridi following the coup proved invaluable at the 1935 treaty revision talks in 3 Europe. Europe? The most prominent prince within the coalition was, of course, the king himself, and it was his lead that Wan and Aditya sought to follow. There were, however, members of the royal family who could not have emulated the king even had they wished to do so, and, being unable to enjoy even the trappings of authority, they became deeply embittered. Chief

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among these malcontents was Prince Boriphat, the most powerful member the of the old elite after the king himself. Boripats’ open contempt for die Promoters threatened the unlikely coalition. He made no attempt to conceal his low opinion of the new regime and invited other elites to dissent dissent. Shortly after -the coup therefore he and several other princes were “allowed” to leave the country. Within days of the takeover, Boriphat and his immediate family were escorted to the Malayan border and bid good riddance by representatives of the People’s Party.4 Other princes, those who had held high rank in the armed forces and police, were removed from the active duty rosters, and their commands were given to commoners. Even Prince Bowaradet, who had been on bad terms with the king before the coup and who was at one time perceived by Phya Bhahon as a potential ally, had been left without an official position by the change of administration. Bhahon, who had served under Bowaradet (the prince being a general and a former Minister of War), nominated his former commander for the premiership shordy shortly after the coup. Thawatt suggests that the prince had indicated to he_wpuld forgive him his disloyalty if Bhahon would put him in Bhahon he_would charge of the new government. When Mano was given that role instead, Bowaradet vowed revenge.5 Eventually most royalists came to realize, as had Bowaradet, that there was no place for them in the new order. Thus more and more royals came to seek a means of undoing what the Promoters “royalist” faction grew up around them. had brought about, and a “royalist" A.second faction within the uneasy coalition consisted of those oldguard government functionaries, such as Phya Mano, whom the Promoter’s group had hoped to co-opt. Many of the cabinet members selected by the People’s Party to run the interim government had been the deputies of those — princely ministers they replaced. This continuity would suggest a close association of royalists and members of this second group, but though some residual loyalty may have remained, the new cabinet ministers now held power in their own right and no longer required the patronage of princes. The usurpers therefore came to be a new source of patronage and were able to form their own independent power bases responsible to no prince. The elite .were instead, beholden to the patronage of the prime minister, new elitewere Phya Mano. During the months of interim government, while the country awaited the “permanent” constitution, Phya Mano and his cabinet ~ completion of the “permanent" displayed an unexpected indifference towards the aspirations of the men surprisingly adept at political who had placed them in power.6 Mano proved provedsurprisingly manipulation and used his new position to steer the "revolution” “revolution" his own way. Instead of being co-opted by the Promoters, he engineered a split in their ranks, in the hope of transforming his titular leadership into real political power. While his nominator and admirer, Pridi, was distracted by his work on the constitution, Mano formed an alliance with Phya Song Suradet, the military mastermind of the coup. Song had begun to feel—as

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had two of the other Four Tigers, Prasas Pittayaudh and Phya Ritti—that Pridi’s liberal inclinations were gaining too much momentum. In an effort to deflect what they perceived as a left-leaning trend in the developing People’s Party, they andMano consolidated into a conservative policies of the People's faction dedicated to opposing the younger, more reform-minded members of the new elite.7 There may also have been an element of petty jealousy involved since Phya Song, despite having led the coup, had subsequently Bhahon’s subordinate in the reorganized hierarchy of die the been made Bhahon'smilitary. For discussion’s sake Mano’s and Song’s faction can be labeled the “conservatives.” Phya Song’s alliance with Mano effectively splintered the Promoters’ group and gave rise to a third faction. Song’s members of the new elite joined the conservatives, while others remained loyal to the original Promoters’ liberal aspirations. The liberals soon became a common enemy Promoters' of both the conservatives and the royalists. Pridi’s-ideological leadership of this group drew heated opposition from the other two. But Pridi soon attracted a powerful ally in the person of Phya Bhahon, now the commanderin-chief of the Army. Bhahon and those clients who followed him into Pridi’s clique could not rightly be called liberals, thus “reformists” is perhaps the best label for the third group. The scramble to dominate of the new order began in earnest with the promulgation of the “permanent” constitution on December 10, 1932 and grew violent in the first half of 1933. Elections to fill the lower house of the Assembly were scheduled for the end of that year, and at first it seemed that the various political rivals would seek to settle their differences legitimately gamering votes. It soon became apparent, by wooing public support and garnering however, that the contestants were prepared to resort to any means, constitutional or otherwise, to gain or retain power. Early in the year the conservative faction launched a disinformation and propaganda campaign against the reformists, manipulating the Bangkok press and coaxing the reading public into believing that while Phya Mano was striving to promote the public welfare there were certain “hard-boiled youngsters” trying to obstruct him in the Assembly. Mano also employed his relationship with the king, who trusted Mano implicitly, to create the same impression in His Majesty’s mind. At the same time, unknown parties assaulted the royalists by launching an assassination attempt against one of their more prominent members, army general Phya Sena, who had been a close associate of Prince Boriphat8 By March the political atmosphere was as hot as the sun that beat down on the crowded Assembly Hall where, at the end of the month, the deputies gathered to hear the reading of an important proposal from the reformists’ chief ideologue. Since December, his work on the constitution completed, Pridi had been working, at the request of the Assembly, on a proposal to help formulate a new national economic policy. The proposal’s proposal's

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recommendations exceeded the government’s initial expectations, and a preliminary review of what had become Pridi’s National Economic Plan59 convinced Mano’s cabinet that it should not be adopted. Arguing that the plan was “communistic," “communistic,” Mano’s State Council (a committee of the executive branch comprising selected cabinet members and other advisers to the prime minister) blocked the plan's scheduled presentation to the demanded a chance to debate and vote legislature. The Assembly, however, demandeda on it.10 Though much has been written elsewhere about Pridi’s plan, before one can appreciate the uproar it generated in March and April of 1933 it is necessary to examine, at least briefly, the essence of the plan’s content. Largely as a result of this one document, Pridi was ever afterward doomed to carry the unwarranted stigma of the label “communist" “communist” Perhaps the most threatening aspect of Pridi’s proposal, in the eyes of the royalists and the conservatives, was his concept of nationalizing the productive forces of the economy, both industrial and agricultural. The threat, as perceived by his opponents, was perhaps exaggerated since Pridi’s scheme had tried to sugar-coat nationalization and make it easier, he thought, for capitalists to swallow. He explicitly rejected the methods used by the Bolsheviks to achieve the same end in Russia, and instead of the outright expropriation of private property, Pridi’s approach sought to compensate private owners with interest-bearing government bonds. Pridi’s plan would have left control of nationalized resources in the hands of the former owners, who would manage them on behalf of the state." state.” He also sought to form cooperatives and make all citizens employees of the state. Pridi reasoned that this role should not seem objectionable to his countrymen because, he explained, the highest aspiration of mostThais had countrymenbecause, service.13 always been a job in the civil service.” Pridi also denied that his plan was fashioned to adhere to any specific ideology, claiming an eclectic approach derived from such varied sources Frederick List’s doctrine of economic nationalism and the policies of the as Frederich 13 Ramsay MacDonald government in England. England.” Though Pridi did espouse a form of socialism, it was unlike that imposed upon Russia by Lenin and bore Livelihood” espoused a closer resemblance to the “Principle of the People’s Livelihood" by China’s Sun Yat-sen. Indeed, elements of Sun’s own eclecticism can be recognized not only in Pridi’s National Economic Plan, but also in his original draft of the provisional constitution of June 1932.14 Pridi insisted that his fundamental concern in drafting the plan was not to establish communism in Thailand but rather to bring about national economic self-sufficiency and to eliminate the dangers posed by the vagaries of the international market domination.15 and by foreign economic domination.” When the plan was read to the Assembly, the conservative reaction was predictably negative while liberal assemblymen greeted it with a wild cheer. The debate following the reading quickly degenerated into acrimony. As

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Thawatt points out, Pridi’s detractors were not competent to challenge the soundness of his economic theory and so they resorted to “...making sweeping accusations that it was based on the principles of communism— a word they feared and hated but hardly understood." Thus began a fierce confrontation that quickly turned violent, with some members of the Assembly brandishing pistols to better emphasize their points.16 In timeMano stepped in and attempted to cut off debate by issuing an executive order forbidding the implementation of Pridi’s plan, but liberal assemblymen challenged the order. Khuang Aphaiwong, the son of a royal governor turned revolutionary and now a member of the National Assembly, took the floor to voice his opposition to Mano: I feel that the State Council is going to use dictatorial power. It is well known to all of us that the supreme power in the country belongs, not to the State Council, but to the Assembly... The Government in taking such action today does not seem to take into account the honor of the members of the Assembly. We'll see whether you can establish dictatorship or not.17

The next day, under Mano’s authority, Phya Song ordered a platoon of soldiers into the Assembly Hall to enforce an end to the angry debate and thus pre-empt any effort to overturn the government’s ban on Pridi’s plan. On the following day, April 1, 1933, the government issued a decree, in the name of the king, dissolving the Assembly, and Mano handed Pridi a oneway ticket to France to rid himself —or so he thought—of thought—-of the source of his I8 statementsupporting Mano and denouncing troubles.18 Next, the king issued a statementsuppoitingMano the liberal opposition. “I do not know whether Stalin copied Luang Pradit [Pridi] or whether Luang Pradit copies Stalin," Stalin,” Prajadhipok declared. “The only difference is that one is Russian and the other is Thai."19 Throughout the month of April the Mano government flexed its muscles, reorganizing the army according to a pet plan of Phya Song's Song’s and reshuffling the cabinet to remove ministers loyal to the reformists. Mano, however, made one particular miscalculation that would ultimately prove his undoing. Because Bhahon and Phibul had kept silent during the uproar over Pridi’s plan, Song andMano and Mano assumed they were staying politically neutral and, like good soldiers, would proffer their loyalty to the prevailing party. Bhahon and Phibul therefore survived Song’s military house-cleaning to retain the commands they had acquired since the “revolution.” Phibul, in fact, was promoted to lieutenant colonel during this period. But by June, with their positions secure, Bhahon and Phibul were ready to show their true colors. They had become convinced that Mano would never reconvene the Assembly unless drastic actions were taken to force him to do so. Therefore, on June 20, 1933, in a replay of the year before, they led their troops in a coup d’etat against Mano and seized control. This time there was no need for bluff or deception as Bhahon had true command of all the men and

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weapons he needed to thwart Mano. 20 Mano, who promptly stepped down, was allowed to leave the capital quietly. On June 22, just two days before the first anniversary of the “revolution,” Phya Bhahon assumed the office of prime minister and appointed Phibul to be Deputy Commander-in-chief of the Army, replacing Phya Song, who had prudently opted to resign from office and take an extended vacation abroad. The Assembly was immediately reconvened and word was sent to Pridi that he should return at once to take up a post in Bhahon’s cabinet. Upon his return on September 29, Pridi was greeted by a throng of wellwishers including his old friend Phibul Songkhram, who publicly proclaimed, "Here “Here is the hope of democracy. He is the brain and we [the army] are the force."21 But privately, in conference with Bhahon and Phibul, Pridi agreed force.” that another quarrel over his proposed economic plan could only perpetuate dissent, and so the idea was shelved—temporarily, he thought. As he had done the year before, Bhahon made every effort to allow the king to save face. Though Bhahon’s reasons for ousting Mano centered on fears that the first prime minister intended to transfer to the king the functions constitutionally assigned to the Assembly,22 Bhahon still believed in the principle of a constitutional monarchy. Though he was unwilling to offer His Majesty the same powers Mano might have granted, he nonetheless hoped to regain at least nominal'support from the king by convincing him that such support was in the best interests of the country. On the day of the 1933 coup, Bhahon sent a telegram to the king’s personal secretary explaining his position. The intention of the coup, he wrote, was merely to convene the Assembly. The telegram concluded: “...[Ilnform “...Ulnform His Majesty, that the Army and Navy are as always filled with respect and have faith in 23 His Majesty.”25 Bhahon also made several public statements to demonstrate that his motives for overthrowing the government were neither self-serving nor, as some feared, to force Pridi’s plan upon the country. In statements reported by the press Bhahon promised that “[n]o element of communism shall ever creep into Siam so long as I possess any influence in the government. I will devote my life to protect the Constitution under our ourMost Majesty."24 He additionally promised Most Gracious Majesty. to step down within fifteen days and to pledge his allegiance to a new government appointed by the king. The king, however, wisely declined to accept Bhahon’s resignation and charged him with the formation of a then unanimously confirmed new cabinet and State Council. The Assembly thenunanimously Bhahon’s appointment and passed a resolution declaring his coup to have 23 been lawful.25

Royalists" Last Gasp The Royalists' The policies of the Mano regime that had sparked fear in Bhahon had conversely represented hope for the royalists, who at the time seemed to

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be on the verge of a comeback. Lacking any legal pretext for his actions, Mano had been forced to fall back upon the traditional but now dim aura of the monarchy to legitimize his government. For eighty days, until Bhahon intervened, Mano’s Mano's State Council had governed by royal decree, a device prescribed neither by law nor by the constitution but in the past a standard feature of the absolute monarchy. To many people it seemed as if Mano intended a restoration of the monarchy, albeit reserving a pivotal role for himself. The king’s public statements hailing Mano and condemning Pridi had convinced many participants that the conservatives and the royalists had joined forces to reverse the course of the "revolution." “revolution.” In fact, the distinction between the two groups blurred at this point and it was difficult to discern whether the king was manipulating Mano or vice versa, though from a historical perspective the latter appears to have been the case. Nevertheless, because of the king’s avowed support of Mano and because of the government’s use of the king’s name to back its actions, when the conservatives fell they dragged the royalists down with them. Despite Bhahon’s efforts to mend his relations with the king—and thereby neutralize the royalists’ royalists' indignation over their second defeat in one year—some princes began to consider their futures separately from that of the king. Though His Majesty grew progressively more docile as political developments slipped further out of his hands, there were, apparently, members of his family who were not content to stand idly by. In July information to the effect that certain royalists were organizing a “counterrevolution” reached Lt. Col. Phibul Songkhram, now Deputy Commanderrevolution" in-Chief of the Army. In a letter to some of the plotters, Phibul elected to exposed, Phibul’s warn the parties concerned that their scheme had been exposed. message was unusually frank, and considering the rank of the addressees, decidedly provocative: It appears from our investigations that you are planning to destroy the peace of the country by attempting to overthrow the present government. Such a move would interfere with the orderly progress of the nation. In our position position of responsibility as gu ardians of the peace we advise you to desist. If you insist upon causing trouble, our guardians group will use strong measures to assure the peace of the country. This is not a threat 24 designed to intimidate you, but is advice hopefully given.14

This letter was conveyed to a number of high princes, some of whom had been cabinet ministers under the absolute monarchy. Some of the recipients’were recipients were so incensed with the author’s impertinence that they sent their copies to the editors of some Bangkok newspapers. Suddenly, editorial pages were aflame with the public’s reaction to the letter’s threats, both the alleged threat of revolt and the “advice hopefully given” to back down.27 grew,-.bringing Once again tempers flared and political tension grew, bringing the growing possibility of violence.

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To appreciate the tension this incident caused it is necessary to understand the grave nature of direct and open confrontation among Thais. Normally, no matter what the context, overt challenges, even to political adversaries, are consideredinexcusableinThaisociety. considered inexcusable in Thai society.28 Discretion, subtlety, and at least a veneer of manners are the only acceptable tools for resolving differences at any level of society, and even in the most adverse situations civility requires avoidance of open conflict. In the Thai language there is no way to say “Let’s talk openly” and still convey the same warmth that phrase can relay in English; any Thai term for “speaking frankly" frankly” always carries a degree of negative connotation. Even in casual conversation the expression of personal feelings requires a delicacy and finesse that often frustrates foreigners new to Thai society. As one Thai social scientist puts it, “While many Western scholars interpret such evasion as an avoidance of conflict, the avoidance itself is a conflict."29 He also explains the consequences of abandoning the course of conflict.” subtlety and discretion: Direct or public confrontation implies that both sides have openly declared themselves enemies to each other. And when the conflict is publicly known, no one will be likely to yield because of “losingface.” They will have to strive for victory over the other side. If one is triumphant, the other would attempt to reverse the result whenever he can revengewhenever the opportunitypresents itself. Furthermore, confrontation or to take takerevengewhenevertheopportunitypresents peaceful?500 is more likely to be violent than peaceful.

For these reasons, Thais would generally prefer to avoid “direct 31 businesslike confrontations ala the West" West” Though the quotation describes the phenomenon in the context of the parliamentary politics of the 1970s, the rules of conflict resolution in Thai society are timeless. In light of these rules, it is easier to comprehend how the public exchange between Phibul and the princes might lead both sides to prepare for armed confrontation. One of the persons who received a letter from Phibul was one of the original Promoters, Prayoon Phamonmontri, the German-bom son of a Thai diplomat and the "godson" “godson” of Prince Boriphat. When the Promoters’ group became divided under Mano’s first government, Prayoon had become identified with the conservative faction. He had been appointed Secretary to the State Council under Mano and later became closely associated with government policies. The first presentation of Pridi’s economic plan must have alarmed Prayoon, whose memoirs reveal much ambivalence toward his old. Paris schoolmate (as related in Chapter 3). Though enamored of old.Paris Pridi’s Pridi’s democratic ideals, Prayoon feared his socialist views and depicts these aspects of Pridi’s thinking as, respectively, the good and bad sides of his philosophy. Consequently, during the debate over Pridi’s plan, when allegations of communism filled the air, Prayoon saw the “bad side" of Pridi emerging and so sided with Mano. It is not clear whether Prayoon deserved

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Phibul’s accusations that he was plotting with the royalists to “destroy the peace of the country," but it is apparent that Phibul at least by this time considered him an enemy to the revolution. Early in October 1933, within days of Pridi’s return from exile, Prayoon was called to Mano’s Mano's summer residence at Cha-am, on the gulf shore between Bangkok and Hua Hin, where Mano had retreated after his ouster in June. There Prayoon found the former prime minister packing his bags for what appeared to be a long trip. Mano had summoned Prayoon to warn him that civil war was about to break out and to give him a chance to flee the country with him.32 Rumors to that effect had been circulating since Phibul’s letter first appeared, but when the news of the recall of Pridi became known early in September, new fuel was added to the fire. Royalists and conservatives began to charge that Pridi was being brought regime."33 Mano confirmed for back to help “prepare for a communist regime.” Prayoon that provincial troops in the northeast were being secretly mobilized to march on Bangkok under the command of the former war Prince.Bowaradet. had been frustrated in his ambition minister, Prince Bowaradet. The prince hadbeen to be named prime minister after the 1932 coup; he then vowed revenge upon the Promoters for nominating Mano in his stead. Now the combined catalysts of Phibul’s letter and Pridi’s recall stirred Bowaradet to fulfill his vow. Prayoon declined the invitation to flee, leaving Mano to depart alone for Penang, never to return to Thailand. Prayoon then returned to Bangkok to pass the warning on to Bhahon and Phibul, perhaps a gesture to demonstrate his loyalty to the duly appointed government, or perhaps, as Vichitvong prefers, because “...in [al [a] time of crisis like this, he had to stay with his old party.”334* warning'was welcomed. Reports had begun to come in of a Prayoon’s warningwas mutiny at the provincial garrison at Khorat. Then one after another the garrisons of Ubol, Saraburi, Nakhom Sawan, and Ayudhya to the north of Bangkok, Prachinburi to the east, and Phetchaburi to the south-west, all rose up in what soon turned into a general insurrection. On October 11, Bhahon received an ultimatum from the mutineers’ leader demanding the government’s immediate resignation. It was signed by Prince Bowaradet. The prince, with the backing of a number of princes and nobles who had retained commands in the military under the erstwhile coalition, warned that if Bhahon should fail to resign, then provincial army units under royalist leadership would march on the capital and take power by force. The ultimatum cited as the rebels’ chief motive their concern that Bhahon and King...."35 The ultimatum Pridi had “encouraged the people to despise the King....” set into motion military preparations that, according to one witness, “...turned the city into an armed camp, bristling with artillery, machine guns, armored cars, soldiers and marines."3* On the following morning, October 12, the rebels were poised on the city’s doorstep. Having captured the

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military air field at Don Muang they now began to enter the suburbs of Bangkok. Bhahon’s forces were ready for them: The area around the Throne Hall, Grand Palace and other important places was closely guarded by armed soldiersand soldiers and absolutely cut off from vehicular and pedestrian traffic. All telegraph lines out of Bangkok were cut, off and no passenger trains arrived or departed. On the river, the Navy was busy with war preparations, and gun boats were ready for any emergency.„.In emergency....In the outlying suburbs, village folk sat on their front 57 soldiers.’ porches and watched._..the welter of military trucks and marching soldiers. ’

For thirty hours Bhanon tried to negotiate a peaceful resolution, and when that failed he appealed to the "vacationing" Phya Song, then on a visit to Ceylon, to return and reason with the royalists. Understandably bitter after his recent defeat, Colonel Song cabled back: “For such a small matter, you can handle it yourself.”38 Bhahon therefore ordered Phibul Songkhram to take command of all government field operations and charged him with the speedy defeat of the rebels. Phibul launched a counterattack at 5:00 p.M. on Friday the thirteenth, an unlucky date for the rebels. For days the suburban district of Bang Sue was aflame as the battle raged. Then, low on supplies and exhausted, the rebels retreated. Government forces recaptured the Don Muang airfield on the afternoon of the sixteenth and then pursued the retreating insurgents by troop train. Desperate to escape, the rebels sent an empty locomotive down the track at top speed to collide with the government troop carrier. The resultant crash killed a number of government soldiers and gave the Khorat?9 rebels time to reach their base in Khorat.” By now the other provincial garrisons had been contacted and their -allegiance to the Bhahon government confirmed. With their help, several of the rebellious provinces were brought quickly under government control. The government broadcast a radio appeal to rebel troops to capture-of surrender and offered a ten thousand baht reward for the capture of Prince Bowaradet A statement from the king, once again in seclusion at Hua Hin, was read on the air. His Majesty denounced the rebellion, and the government used this denunciation to intimate that the revolt was the result of Bowaradet’s ambition to mount the throne himself.40 Following this skillful blend of force and propaganda, the rebellion began to crumble. By the end of October the rebels were finished. Though their battlefield casualties had not been crippling, the rebellion’s aftermath saw the collapse of whatever power base the royalists had been able to retain following the 1932 coup. When it was dear that the revolt had failed, Prince Bowaradet accompanied by twenty-two of his followers, fled by plane to French Indochina to spend the next fifteen years in exile. Those followers who did not escape were tried by a “spedal court” and sentenced to long prison terms 41 For the next twelve years neither the royalists nor the conservatives terms.

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posed any real danger to the new establishment under Bhahon and Phibul. Though the royalists continued to lurk in the shadows and make occasional stabs in the dark, the new leaders of Thailand were firmly in control. Lacking even the semblance of an organized opposition, the ruling party now enjoyed unchallenged authority and confidently announced that the scheduled national elections could go ahead as planned. Predictably, Bhahon’s supporters won a clear mandate and were thus assured, barring the unforeseeable, a four-year term of office. The elections were, as prescribed by the constitution, indirect; that is, the elected half of the Assembly was chosen by electors who had been chosen by delegations from provincial constituencies. The remaining half of the legislature, occupying seventy-two seats, was appointed by the government in the name of the king.42 Democracy, clearly, was still not quite in effect in Thailand. Given the difficulties of conducting parliamentary debate in the context of Thai social custom, and the Thais’ demonstrated distaste for public confrontation, it would seem that Thai elites preferred a smooth-running, oppositionless Assembly dominated by a single-minded government party. Such unanimity, however, defeated the proclaimed purpose of the 1932 revolution, and as we shall see, served only to replace the institution of the absolute monarch with that of an absolute oligarchy. Ironically, the end result of the struggle between those who supported the king and those who stood behind the ideals of Pridi Banomyong was that the shared goal of both lost. Pridi did leaders, that of a democratic constitutional government, was lost not come to realize this for quite some time, but the king soon knew it. Because of Prajadhipok’s denunciation of the revolt, the king was now estranged from the remnants of both the royalists and the conservatives, but his rejection had brought him no closer to a position of influence in the Bhahon government. His long-held dream of leading his country into the promised land of democracy and political freedom had now finally and irrevocably vanished. He knew that if the Thai were destined to realize that dream, then they would do so without his help. Citing his worsening eyesight and a need to seek treatment in England, 4 King Prajadhipok left Thailand in late January 1934 1934.43 ’ In correspondence from abroad, he chastised the government for diminishing his role in the affairs of state and for emasculating the institution of the monarchy. His Majesty complained that he was “thoroughly tired of politics," and insisted that his various demands for a more active role for the king were not intended to restore his personal power. The king simply could not endure the burden of responsibility for a government that acted in his name yet allowed him no real authority.44 Aware that the king was still greatly revered by the Thai people and knowing that his blessing was still a valuable source of legitimacy, the government tried to persuade His Majesty to return home and not to

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abdicate. They would not, however, accept his demands for improved OnMarch status.45 King Prajadhipok never returned to his kingdom. On March 2, 1935, having failed to win his case with the constitutional regime, the king finally abdicated, sending his letter of abdication from England. In it he gave his reasons for stepping down, noting that 'the “the new leaders failed to establish real political freedom," and that despite the constitution, “power to carry out Peopled Party... who now hold various policies rested solely with the People’s absolute power."46 He also cited the government’s policy of suppressing all political opposition and denying due process to political prisoners who were tried by secret committees, “a procedure which I never used even when I had absolute powers.”47 He could not allow such a government to carry on in his name, and he therefore renounced all his kingly privileges, asking only to retain the rights which were his before ascending to the throne.48 I am willing to surrender the powers I formerly exercised to the people as a whole, but I am not willing to turn them over to any individual or any group to use in an 4

autocratic manner without heeding the voice of the people.4’

Prajadhipok waived his right to name an heir, and the government proclaimed his nephew, Prince Ananda Mahidol, ten years old and at school in Switzerland, to be King Rama VIII. Prajadhipok, now simply the Prince of Sukhothai, retired to a house at Virginia Water in Surrey, where he lived quietly with his wife Ramphai until his death from heart failure in May, 1941. By that year the optimistic coalition for which Prajadhipok once held such high hopes was no more.

Chapter 6 Once More A Kingdom

The twelfth lunar month of the Buddhist year overlaps the Western months of October and November, November By the full moon of that month, the rivers and canals of Thailand reach their peaks and overflow their banks. Outside every home, large earthen water jars brim with the final rain drops of the season, and people across the land—whether peasant, peddler, or politician— Krathong. make ready to celebrate the festival of Loy Kratbong. Rooted in Brahmanism and first celebrated by Thai Buddhists in the ancient kingdom of Sukhothai, it is essentially a salute to Kong Ka, the goddess of water whom on this day the Thai give thanks for their abundant rivers and ask for a bountiful harvest and for other blessings over which man has no control. On the night of the full moon, amid singing and dancing and the laughter of children up past their bed time, people kneel by the banks of the rivers and canals and set their prayers and wishes afloat in the form of a tiny ornate krathong, kratbong, a tiny raft fashioned from banana leaves folded in the shape of a lotus and then festooned with sweetsmelling flowers, joss sticks, and a candle. If the candle stays lit as one’s kratbong krathong floats away, it is a sign that the supplicant’s prayers will be answered. Standing on the Rama I Memorial Bridge this night one can themoonlight count thousands of answered prayers, wafted downstream in the-moonlight as the River Chao Phraya carries them to the Gulf of Siam and into the waiting arms of Kong Ka. in November 1938, most of the hopefully On the night of Loy Kratbong Krathongio. flickering prayers floating on the Chao Phraya asked only for fulfillment of the mundane, predictable wants of the common folk. Among the nation’s new ruling class, however, there were far more critical boons to pray for. Despite having crushed the royalists and conservatives in 1933, the new elite were still under attack, and even now the capital seethed with rumors of impending assassinations and coups d’etat. No doubt, the prayers set adrift that night by the Thai power elite contradicted each other on many counts, but all of them must have shared at least one common hope. It had been

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five years since the Lord of Life had walked among his people, and the nation was lonely for its king. No doubt many krathongs carried a prayer that the Lord of Life’s imminent return would heal the country and unify its leadership. As in 1927, the year when King Prajadhipok brought the baby white elephant to Bangkok amid pomp and ceremony to revitalize the nation, so now did Bhahon’s government welcome home the boy king, Prajadhipok’s thirteen-year-old nephew, Ananda Mahidol. After the confusing and divisive reign of colonels, cabinets and squabbling assemblymen, it would be comforting to have a king again and to come together, even if just for a moment, as a kingdom once more.

The Boy on the Throne S. 5. S. Meonia arrived at Pak Nam on the fifteenth of November, 1938 The 5. with a precious cargo from far-off Switzerland. For centuries this sea port estuary, where the waters of the River Chao Phraya mingle with those of the Gulf of Siam, has been the gateway through which foreign ships pass en route to the Thai capital, trading imports for the riches of Thailand. On that day, however, a foreign vessel was returning to Thailand its most precious national treasure, on loan to the West-for the last five years. It was a living treasure of immeasurable worth, embodying the essence of the Thai nation and representing the soul of its people. This was the king, Ananda Mahidol, a boy of thirteen. Though every bit a Thai, he had been born in Germany. His brother and sister had each been born in a different country, and they had been raised successively in America, Thailand and, after their father’s death, in Switzerland. Their father was Prince Mahidol of Songkhla, a son of King Chulalongkorn born of a lesser consort, and therefor ineligible for the throne. Prajadhipok, his halfbrother, had been the last surviving son of Chulalongkorn’s queen and had stepped down without having produced an heir. Not until then did Prince Mahidol's sons come into the line of succession. Mahidol’s Three high emissaries from Bhahon’s government went to Lausanne, one momentous day in 1935, to ask the young Prince Ananda to wear the Chakri crown and become the Lord of Life. He seemed unsure as to how to respond, and sought his mother’s guidance: “I want to do whatever you say is right, Mama.” Mama."1 His mother told him gently that the decision was his alone, but also reminded him that he had obligations to consider. “Then,” the prince replied, “I must.”2 Three years passed, however, before his mother and the government felt the time was propitious for Ananda to come home and test the weight of the mantle he had accepted. Now, in 1938, the little family was returning to Bangkok where, whether by an inscrutable whim of destiny or simply an improbable sequence of coincidences, Ananda was to receivethe crown of his ancestors and to become Lord of Life, Lord of All the Earth, the King of the Thai.

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It was an unlikely succession, not only for the set of coincidences which Ananda’s decidedly unregal upbringing. Although preceded it, but also for Ananda's the son of a prince, he had not been raised as a prince, at least not while his decidedly unprincely father was alive. Mahidol, the boy king’s late father, was a most rare sort of prince. Though he had never had any reason to hope he could rule, it is still remarkable that he did not follow the course of most other princes, who had often used their royal privileges to accrue personal wealth and power. Chulalongkorn had sent the young Prince Mahidol to Europe to study the science of modem naval warfare. Instead, Mahidol took an interest in medicine and public health and, contrary to his father’s plans, pursued these subjects in England, Germany, and the United States. Thus, at a time when the counter-elite of Thailand was aspiring to position and privileges parallel to those of the royal caste, Prince Mahidol self-consciously pursued a middle class standard of living and even at M.I.T. and masqueraded as a commoner. While doing pre-medical studies atM.I.T. studying medicine at Harvard, Mahidol was known to his classmates and friends simply as ‘Mr. Songkhla’. While abroad Mahidol met and fell in love with a commoner, aaThai Thai nurse named Sangwalya. He married her and made her a princess, only to make the princess, in turn, a housewife and mother in a modest apartment in Brookline, Massachusetts. A Thai student once visited the prince and princess in Boston and, as he had learned to do at school in London, at night the student put his shoes outside his bedroom polish. The next morning the student was embarrassed to for the valet to .polish. servants,3 find his shoes being shined by his host, for Prince Mahidol kept no servants.’ The prince’s only form of self-indulgence seems to have been a fondness *nie Paris,- London, and the for travel. He and his wife enjoyed frequent visits to Paris,* other great capitals of the world, but they wasted no money on posh accommodations. Prince Chula Chakrabongse, whom Mahidol often visited “immensely rich" rich” on his trips to London, notes that although Mahidol was "immensely he was also “economical” and, while in London, he “stayed in a cheap Cromwell-Road.”4 Yet, despite Mahidol’s eccentricities apartment house in Cromwell-Road." and frugality, he possessed a charming personality and amusing wit that endeared him to everyone, especially to the Thai expatriates he met while abroad. Among these were the Thai students in Paris in the 1920s, the future revolutionaries, who found in Mahidol’s unique blend of princely charm, middle-class virtue, and egalitarianism a refreshing exception to the despotism of his princely counterparts back in Thailand.5 Mahidol’s graduation with honors from Harvard In 1928, following Mahidol’s and Mrs. Songkhla closed up their Brookline apartment Medical School, Dr. arid and returned to Thailand. Their children, two princes and a princess, were eventually enrolled at a Catholic convent school in Bangkok where the nuns were instructed to treat them no differently than the other children. Mahidol turned down a position at the prestigious Siriraj Hospital, preferring instead to work at a provincial missionary clinic. Though this position might mean

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long separations from his family, who stayed in the prince’s Bangkok palace, Mahidol was determined to put his skill and knowledge to use where they were most needed. Besides, at the American-run McCormick Hospital in Chiang Mai, Mahidol was free from all the obeisance and protocol he would have had to endure in Bangkok. Even at such distance as he had placed between himself and the royal family, however, reports of Mahidol’s work soon reached the capital and scandalized the palace. Apparently His Royal Highness had taken to treating peasants and was even bathing his patients!6 Sadly, after a few short months as an upcountry doctor, Mahidol was forced to return to Bangkok with medical problems of his own. Despite the best efforts of the finest American physicians at court, Prince Mahidol died of an amoebic liver abscess late in 1929. He was thirty-seven. His widow and children remained in Bangkok under the care of the crown for the next four years, a trying time for the princess housewife from Brookline. As had her late husband, she felt stifled by. by the palace environment, but unlike him she was not free to cast it off. Only after the eruptions of 1932 and 1933 did King Prajadhipok agree to let her take his niece and nephews overseas. In May 1933 the four left for Switzerland, where they enjoyed two brief years of the simple life that Prince Mahidol had taught them to cherish. Then, became’ king and again the palace beckoned.7 suddenly, Ananda became' Upon their arrival in 1938 at Pak Nam, the young King Ananda Mahidol, were saluted by twenty-one guns his brother, sister, andthe princess mother motherweresaluted as their ship anchored near the mouth of the river. There they were boarded and welcomed by Prime Minister Bhahon and the three-member council of regents who had represented Ananda in the government since the Navy's abdication of his unde. Next, they were transferred to the Royal Thai Navy’s flagship Ayudhya, Ayudbya, which led a proud regatta up river to the capital. One hundred aircraft of the King’s air force flew in formation above the palace as His Majesty’s ship docked at Rachavoradit Landing and the king and his entourage disembarked. Surely the young king must have known what to expect; he had witnessed such pageantry while his uncle was monarch. But in those earlier days he had not been in line for the succession and so had never been die the attention.The center of such lavish atte ntion.The king’s cousin, Prince Chula Chakrabongse, implies that His Majesty was unaccustomed to the role imposed on him during his 1938 homecoming, but adds that he seemed to adapt to and accept his duties. “The king struck me as rather young in his way for a boy thirteen,” the prince writes, “yet he could sit patiently through religious of thirteen," ceremonies and played his part well."8 During the trip up river, His Majesty’s regents had dressed him in the royal robes of office, certainly clothing unlike any he had ever worn before. The regents accompanied him ashore, holding over him the nine-tiered umbrella that had for centuries shaded the heads of Southeast Asian kings. Costumed brahmins, chanting monks, and

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robed dignitaries of the highest station stood at the fore of the vast crowd that turned out to greet him, and soldiers in full-dress ceremonial uniform stood symbolically on guard. guard.’9 And so Ananda set foot upon Thai soil for the first time as his people’s king. For almost five years, since Prajadhipok’s departure early in 1934, there had been no king in Thailand, a situation unknown since the fall of Ayudhya. Now the Lord of Life was returning in a new and youthful incarnation to fill the vacuum and perhaps, as many hoped, to heal the ruptures that six years of public politics had wreaked among the national leadership. His Majesty was escorted directly to the Temple of the Emerald Buddha, there to prostrate himself before the most sacred image, PhraKaeo, PbraKaeo, to pray for the well-being of his realm and subjects. Afterwards he was seated in a splendid horse-drawn carriage and paraded in a most regal fashion up the broad, tree-lined Rachadamnem Avenue, hailed along the way by throngs of cheering subjects come to welcome home their sovereign.10 Throughout the king’s two-month visit, wherever his busy itinerary took him, his adoring rasadom, the king’s subjects, flocked to see him. Indeed, the skinny little boy attracted far more public attention than either the People’s Party or its much flaunted constitution had in the whole six years since the revolution. In His Majesty's Absence Among the power elite, however, the king’s homecoming was far less significant. They were, of course, glad to bask in the warmth of his legitimizing aura, but his ascension to the throne seemed to be of minimal political importance. To the usurpers it mattered little who wore the crown so long as whoever it was did not interfere in political matters. The new king’s youth and his residence abroad perfectly suited the goals of the new government. The boy’s uncle had created some stumbling blocks for the new nevy elite; though never successful in blocking legislation, Prajadhipok had caused frequent delays by challenging the constitutionality of certain government acts. Prajadhipok’s abdication, therefore, though initially troublesome to Bhahon’s regime, proved ultimately advantageous.11 The boy king’s regents, hand-picked by the government, served as “rubber stamps” and helped to make up for time lost during the last years of Prajadhipok’s reign. Ananda’s present visit was primarily intended to boost national morale, which had suffered since Prajadhipok’s abdication and had been harmed further by political intrigues and scandals. Otherwise, it seemed inconsequential that this child should become king. Matters of power politics had preoccupied the new elite since the first national elections at the end of 1933. In spite of the fact that Bhahon’s coup against the conservatives in June 1933 and his subsequent defeat of the royalists effectively destroyed his rival factions, the elections generated a /

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new source of opposition and conflict Where previously Bhahon and his reformist colleagues could rely on near-unanimous support from their appointed clients in the Assembly (the reason Mano had chosen to dissolve the legislature), the arrival of the elected representatives posed a challenge, apparently unanticipated, to Bhahon’s clique. Whereas the appointed half of the Assembly members championed the interests of those who appointed them, the elected representatives were responsible to provincial constituencies. There were now as many elected representatives as appointed ones, and the’ Assembly was no longer the exclusive instrument of the Bhahon group. The provincial interests of the representatives often clashed dashed with those of the Bangkok government government. The first major clash occurred within ten months of the elections, when the Assembly refused to ratify a treaty signed by Bhahon that would have committed Thailand to an international rubber cartel and would have placed constrictions on the price and production of rubber from the southern provinces. Bhahon’s motives were challenged by implications that he stood to profit financially from the cartel. A vote of no confidence followed, resulting in his resignation. This appears to have been a circuitous maneuver by the opposition designed less to remove Bhahon than to emasculate him, for he was re-appointed the next day with a reshuffled cabinet. The most significant result of this incident was that it forced Bhahon to relinquish his control of the military’s purse strings, a power he had reserved by retaining for himself the war minister’s portfolio. This power was now delegated to his one-time protege, Phibul Songkhram.12 This was only the beginning. Between the announcement of King Prajadhipok’s abdication and the homecoming of his successor, the Bhahon government endured a tumultuous series of resignations and reinstatements, amid incessant tales of scandal and accusations of corruption voiced by the elected assemblymen. In November 1937, the Assembly was outraged by reports that the government was abusing its custodianship of young King Ananda’s real estate holdings and was dividing up the crown properties among the original members of the People’s Party. The scandal cast shame even on the boy king’s regency council, the president of which, Prince Aditya; had been aligned with the People’s Party since the first days of the Adityaj revolution. The evidence was strong enough to force both the government and the council of regents to resign, but the threat of a coup d’etat by Phibul, now Minister of War as well as Army Commander-in-Chief, encouraged the legislature to reinstate both bodies.13 In 1938, just two months before King Ananda’s visit, the Assembly challenged Bhahon, demanding that a detailed accounting of the government budget be presented to the legislature for appraisal. The government resisted, claiming the right to control its own spending, spending. Frustrated, Bhahon must have begun to understand his predecessor Mano’s desire to eliminate the legislature. The business of democratic government may work nicely in

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the West; farangs seem to thrive on this sort of public confrontation, and nothing embarrasses them. But in Thailand democracy can bring too much loss of face for any self-respecting leader to suffer. Having already endured more than his share, Bhahon told the Assembly he would sooner resign than submit to this latest humiliation. The Assembly, however, failed to take the ofaa detailed government hint and passed a bill requiring legislative approval of budget. To regain whatever face he could, Bhahon changed his mind and instead of resigning he dissolved the Assembly, calling for new elections to be held within ninety days. This go-around, however, Bhahon made it quite dear that whatever the outcome, he would not again accept the vulnerable post of premier. Though he would remain in a caretaker role until the new Assembly chose its prime minister, he dedared that he would not form another government14 They would not have Bhahon to kick around anymore. In addition to the unseemly politidans’ bickering, other events cast even darker palls on the national morale. For the years between Prajadhipok’s abdication and Ananda’s homecoming, the press reported a string of misfortunes that had befallen certain popular public figures. In August 1935 King Ananda’s chief regent, Prince Anuvat, was accused of malfeasance. He was popular with the People’s Party for his democratic leanings and consequently became alienated from the royal family.15 When the government consequentlybecame accused him of both secretly treating with royalists and misusing the regency For his own finandalgain, he committed suicide.16 The news-reading regency7for public was shocked and scandalized. Suidde, Suicide, to the Thais, seemed sudi such a shameful way to die, and among royalty it was unheard of. On two occasions the government rounded up groups of hithertorespected public figures on charges of plotting to assassinate cabinet members and to overthrow the government. In 1934, while watching a game of soccer Phibul Songkhram was wounded by alleged royalist gunman. including two princes and six army officers, were arrested Fifteen people, induding and imprisoned in connection with the attempt. In 1935, twenty more people were rounded up, including two of the old Four Tigers, Prasas Pittayayudh and Phya Song Suradet. Though the charges against Song and Prasas were dropped, they were instructed by their old revolutionary closely watched.” watched." The comrades to “...retire to a ‘quiet life’ and were dosely special court in which no defense remaining detainees were convicted by a spedal counsel was allowed. One was sentenced to death, the others imprisoned for life.18 Even good news seemed to have its dark side during that period. Pridi Banomyong, who upon his triumphant return in 1933 had been hailed as “the hope of democracy” and who had long enjoyed great public respect, now became known as a “man of mystery.” Though his economic program had been shelved, he continued to devote himself to the cause of reform. As Bhahon’s interior minister Pridi had busied himself with the reformation

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of Thailand’s penal code and spearheaded a program for the rapid modernization of the whole legal system. Additionally, he founded a new university to train young lawyers in what Pridi called the “moral and political andpolitical 19 sciences."1’ Thammasat University, as he named it, has ever since remained the bastion of progressive thinking in Thailand. Then, in August 1935, the government once more sent Pridi abroad, this time to renegotiate a series of important treaties in Europe, America, and Japan. But because of the concurrent scandals and intrigues, it was rumored that Pridi was once again being exiled by would-be autocrats who opposed his democratic philosophy. The Straits Settlements Press labelled Pridi a mystery" and described his overseas mission as “mysterious.”* “mysterious.”200 “man of mystery” Despite the rumors, there was nothing sinister about Pridi’s departure. There was a logical connection between his legal work and his diplomatic mission. The revisions in the old unequal treaties—which Francis B. Sayre Thailand’s behalf a decade ago—were about to expire. had renegotiated on Thailand's A condition of their renewal had been that Thailand must update its legal system, and it was Pridi’s mission to convince Thailand’s treaty partners that 21 this had been accomplished.31 But while Pridi’s work was not secret, he had not publicized it either. Having had his fill of publicity in the last fewyears, he had elected to avoid the political limelight and to work quietly toward his goals for the nation. An unanticipated consequence of this selfeffacement was that he once again became the object of suspicion.

The Rise of Phibul Songkhram “The most dominant characteristic of the Bhahon regime was that Bhahon, in most matters, was a Prime Minister in name only,” writes Thawee Bunyaket, a cabinet officer in Bhahon’s government and, after the 1938 elections, in that of his successor. “Real power rested with Phibul who 22 Now, in November 1938, dictated [to] Bhahon on all possible matters.”33 Phibul’s supporters in the newly re-elected Assembly were campaigning to give him the title of Prime Minister, though many people, like Thawee, saw this elevation merely as the formalizing of a de facto situation. But not all in the assembly were Phibul’s allies. Many Thais, in various circles, preferred to see him dead. Phibul Songkhram’s rise from a captain just before the 1932 coup to commander-in-chief and Minister of War in the six following years was meteoric—and he had not risen to such heights without making enemies along the way. His blunt and public challenge to the royalists in 1933 was a case in point. Its fruit was the Bowaradet Rebellion, against which Phibul himself led the loyal government forces to victory. His boldness had brought him power and patronage, and these in turn had won him abundant clients and strong allies. An admiring journalist who covered the Bangkok beat in 1936 explained Phibul’s then growing popularity in the most glowing terms:

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[Phibul] Songkhram is a striking model of the Siamese patriot—a man who stands for justice and righteousness, reason and equality, a soldier who lent himself to the cause

vision and of establishing and safeguarding the National Constitution.... A man of dear visionand practical policies, [Phibul) [Phibul] is a staunch believer in the maintenance of efficient national defenseforces and with him at the head of these forces, Siam is virtually insured against defenseforcesand insuredagainst 23

unrest. internal disorder and unrest.”

In those uncertain and conflict-ridden days, Phibul represented the sort of strong and principled leader to whom the Thai elite had historically turned to arbitrate their differences. He offered them the hope of rabiab, order. Within certain circles, however, particularly among the shattered royalist faction, submission to the likes of Phibul was far too high a price to pay for rabiab. Already, in 1935, an alleged royalist gunman had shot and wounded rabiab.Already, Phibul, but even that failed to deter his accrual of power. Despite the subsequent arrest of many royalists, when Phibul’s election to the premiership seemed imminent, another attempt was made. On the night of the Loy Krathong festival of November 1938, another daring attempt was made against the life of this “striking model of Siamese patriotism.” At about seven o’clock that moonlit night, as the city’s waterways came alive with the light of a thousand candles and festive music filled the air, Colonel Phibul was dressing for a late holiday dinner. According to one trousers...."24 and was source, he “...had just put on his boots but not his trousers....” combing his hair before a mirror, when a gunshot shattered the glass. He fled from the room pursued by the assassin, who had been hiding under the bed. He passed through his wife’s room closely followed by the assassin. A second shot nicked his arm just below the elbow. The wild footrace continued from room to room until servants captured the would-be murderer. To their astonishment he was Phibul’s 25

Aree. valet and trusted personal servant, Arce.”

Clearly there were desperate and resourceful persons bent on preventing Phibul’s appointment as chief executive. Phibul’s enemies hoped instead to rehabilitate their old conservative, royalist ally, Phya Song Suradet. Bhahon and Phibul had tried to keep Song out of their way the last five years, but Song retained sufficient influence, despite his ouster in 1933 and his forced “retirement” “retirement" in 1935, to continue to challenge them. He managed to regain his commission in the army in 1936, but Phibul assigned him to the largely ceremonial post of director of the provincial military academy in distant Chiang Mai, too far from the capital to re-enact his tactics of June 24, 1932. Then, in 1937, Song won appointment to the Assembly where he could participate in, if not dominate, the legislative harassment of Bhahon’s government Then, as the contest for

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the premiership was underway, Song once again challenged Phibul for 26 control of the government.24 Another candidate for premier was Pridi Banomyong, who enjoyed the support of the elected Assemblymen of the Lower House but lacked the clout and the political will of the other candidates. From 1935 to late 1938, Pridi was busy reorganizing the nation’s legal code and traveling the world on crucial diplomatic missions, and his attentions had not focused on accruing political power. Nonetheless, many in the Assembly felt Pridi would be the best man to head the government.27 The opposition to Phibul was so divided between these two other candidates that, to his desperate rivals, there seemed to be no legal way to prevent his ultimate success. Having tried and failed to remove Phibul with the aid of bullets—including some fired by his personal manservant— Phibul’s royalist enemies next enlisted the aid of his cook and a generous portion of poison. Within a month of the valet’s November 1938 attempt, a dinner party at commander-in-chiefs plush Bangkok residence ended with all the the commander-in-chiePs guests being rushed to the hospital to have their stomachs pumped. Everyone recovered, except the cook, who was arrested when it was found 28 that the poison had been introduced in his kitchen. The incident may not have derailed Phibul politically, but it did upset his social life. Prince Chula Chakrabongse relates of Phibul that for quite some time after his release from the hospital he would take no food or drink outside his home. The prince recalls an awkward incident around that time when he and his wife entertained Phibul, and the prince’s wife “...kept asking ifshe if she could pour iPhibul] some tea and passing him things...” to eat As the guest of royalty, it was something of a challenge for Phibul to keep refusing the princess and still be polite.29 Conversely, others were also challenged to find sufficiently courteous ways to turn down invitations to Pliibul’s home. Thawee Bunyaket tells of trying to excuse himself dinner at Phibul’s from such an invitation; afraid of being poisoned, as Phibul’s earlier guests had been, Thawee ate at home before calling on him: I met [Phibul] at his house and told him that I had already dined. ‘Why?’ "Why? he asked. 'I ' dare not take dinner with you. Perhaps some people are trying to poison you and I may also be poisoned. I don't want to die yet. Moreover, you have probably procured food today from a good hotel, given some of it to a person in order to find out the reaction and detect whether it is poisoned. In order to study the reaction you have to wait for an hour or so, and food gets cold. What is the use of taking that food?* I 50

replied.3®

Having narrowly survived three bold assassination attempts since his appointment as minister of war in 1934, Phibul was now rumored among some superstitious -Thais 'Thais to be in possession of “magical powers” that

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to physical harm.” harm.31 Shortly after the poisoning rendered him invulnerable io incident Phibul worked his magic once again; on December 15, 1938, despite bullets, poison and political opposition, the National Assembly elected Phibul to be prime minister and the regents of the boy king called on him to ask that he form a new government. The Man Who Would Be King When King Ananda and his family returned to Switzerland on January 13, 1939, a throng of thousands thousandscame came to the royal landing to bid him bon voyage. Considering the intrigues that went on during his two-month stay, Ananda’s visit, it would appear, had failed to heal the wounds of the revolution. Certainly the elite had continued to claw for power despite the king’s presence. The general populace may have been soothed to see their king again, and to that extenrthe extenfthe boy king’s visit had a reassuring affect, but historically the king’s role had been far more. Not only was the Lord of Life the patron of the people, he was also the patron of patrons. The elite relied on the king to arbitrate their differences and to delegate authority and status. The thirteen-year old Ananda was not capable of mediating between adults, and his regents certainly had not been chosen to do this for him. Publicly it was explained that King Ananda could not remain in Thailand because his schooling was not yet finished, but there were other reasons why he could not stay. No doubt Ananda and his mother were relieved to get away from the fuss of palace protocol and to return home to their private lives in Lausanne. Young and unprepared for the role he was fated to play, it was just as well that Ananda did not remain to become embroiled in the political passions unleashed by the revolution. It was better that another step in to take up the traditional staff of leadership, but it is doubtful that Ananda, with the example of his father as a yard stick, would have approved had he realized the inclination and designs of his newly appointed prime minister, who now, quite literally, took took, up that staff of authority. Almost immediately after the king’s departure Phibul launched a purge of his royalist enemies. January 29, 1939 saw the arrest of fifty-one persons in connection with the two recent assassination attempts. A link was made— perhaps contrived—between the murder attempts and aa.supposed supposed plot to overthrow the government. The charge was given as treason. Twenty-one persons were eventually sentenced to death by another “special court’’ court” in which the defendants, all closely associated with the royalist faction, were denied legal counsel. Three of the condemned men, a prince and two nobles, had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. The remaining eighteen men were shot by an army firing squad. So began the rule of Premier Phibul Songkhram. Songkhram 32 Of the fifty-one men arrested, two of the survivors are worth noting. One was Phya Song Suradet. His arrest marks the last time his name appears in

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any significant political context. Phibul was convinced that Song was directly responsible for at least one of the attempts on his life, but despite this belief, perhaps out of some sort of residual loyalty for his former revolutionary comrade, he allowed Song to leave the country and go into exile in French-held Cambodia? Cambodia.355 Another notable survivor of the purge was Prince Rangsit, an uncle of King Ananda and adored by all the children of Prince Mahidol. He had been visit His arrest shocked the by the boy king’s side throughout the recent visit. capital for, as Chula Chakrabongse relates, he “never gave tis us any sign that he was remotely interested in politics...."54 Whether Rangsit actually played a part in the plots against Phibul cannot be determined, but it is possible that by singling outsuch out such a venerated prince Phibul was simply demonstrating the range of his power. Rangsit’s relatives were relieved when Phibul commuted his sentence to life, but they endured lasting distress as the prince suffered through long years of confinement among common 35 criminals.55 Certainly this was a signal from Phibul that while mercy was not beyond him, he would tolerate no further threats to his rule. By the end of 1939, the last vestiges of opposition to Phibul had either been removed from office, Jailed, jailed, or exiled. Subsequently, fear alone was sufficient to intimidate any opponents who might have remained. Even such staunch liberals as Pridi Banomyong, who became Phibul’s minister of finance, fell in line behind the new premier and thus gave tacit approval to his methods. It is as if the remnants of the People's Party decided the revolution had been a mistake, and it was time now to return to more reliable, traditional patterns of government—though, of course, none of them would say so. Accounts left by the participants tend to attribute the changes at the top to Phibul’s personal idiosyncrasies or to the changing tide of world politics. But after seven years of public politicking and its resultant disorder, Phibul had restored rabiab among the elite and restored the appearance of consensus. He had assumed the role of arbitrator, which in former times had been played by the monarch. On another level, Phibul’s handling of the distribution and exercise of power kept the more distasteful to abandon aspects of democracy in check while not forcing the new elite io the constitutional facade they had erected, and self-styled democrats could rationalize their acceptance of an autocrat above them. Among those who disapproved of Phibul but nonetheless collaborated with him was Thawee Bunyaket. Thawee claimed he was reluctant to join Phibul’s government in 1939 and agreed only after the prime minister 56 insisted.36 He characterized Phibul’s regime as a dictatorship and has accused Phibul of Napoleonic delusions. According to Thawee, Phibul disliked it when his aides expressed opinions that contrasted with his own. Thawee said Phibul surrounded himself with "yes-men" and “dummies," “dummies,” which may cast unintentional light on his choice of Thawee as administrative chief of staff.

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The way Phibul Phibu1consulted smacked of full-blasted authoritarianism.... consulted with his colleagues smackedof [In meetings, Phibul] would talk and talk, trying as it were to make others chew his views, and then ask what views others held. By that time, others had lost all appetite for healthy debate. Moreover, any expression of difference of opinion was dangerous 57 and sometimes likely to draw retaliation, especially from the police.37

Phibul had appointed an old classmate to head the police force. General Chief,” and Adun Decharat, according to Thawee, “behaved like a Gestapo Chief," assigned his men to spy on and harass politicians and bureaucrats suspected 'Ihawee of disagreeing with Phibul. Despite this totalitarian atmosphere, Thawee distanced himself from Phibul by claiming he was able to exercise a reasonable level of autonomy while serving as the secretary general of the prime minister’s office.38

Pridi, despite accepting the finance ministry’s Thawee also indicated that thatPridi, portfolio, grew apart from his old comrade after 1939. Relations between Pridi and Phibul became strained, and Phibul began to voice frequent criticisms of Pridi in conversations with their mutual friends. Pridi, on the 35 other hand, never spoke ill of Phibul, at least not to Thawee.39 Nevertheless, Pridi did take a stand against Phibul from time to time. Though he did not at first challenge Phibul on substantive policy matters, he was brave enough, at least, to challenge him on symbolic matters. In July 1941, for example, tide of Field Marshal (an unprecedented promotion when Phibul took the title that skipped over the usual steps in rank of lieutenant general and general), Pridi balked at the premier’s intention to array himself with the royal scepter of the late King Vajiravudh as a symbol ofPhibul’s of Phibul’s enhanced authority. In Thawee’s words: Pridi argued that this baton was meant for the king only, and not for ordinary persons; Phibul could order for himself as good and as novel a baton as he liked, but not the build king's baton. Perhaps Pridi was alarmed by the aura of royalty Phibul wanted to bu ild around himself.40

Indeed, from as far back as his appointment as war minister in 1934, Phibul had tried to build an “aura of royalty” around himself. Shortly after his inauguration in 1939, Phibul ordered a ban on the display, even in private homes, of pictures of ex-King Prajadhipok.41 Instead of ordering that pictures of the new king be displayed in Prajadhipok’s place, Phibul had portraits of himself distributed to the public. At cinemas his picture was projected on the screen before each feature, and the audience was required 4z to rise before it and sing the national anthem.42 Phibul increasingly tried to io offer himself to the kingdom as its surrogate monarch, and if events had not turned against him, he might well have succeeded.

Chapter 7 Reign of the Leader As Phibul’s Phibul's power became more entrenched, his aura of royalty intensified. “By 1939,” observed one Thai scholar, “he had emerged as uncrowned monarch in Thailand.”1 Phibul personally controlled more governmental power than King Prajadhipok had ever claimed, maintaining the portfolios of four ministries and the direct command of the three armed services? As Landon observed at the time, “To many it seems a step backward ... The country is placarded with the picture of a soldier shaking his fist in the air. It bears the announcement that the kingdom is home, and 3 the military is the fence about the home.” home.”’ In newspapers and on the radio, Phibul was called Phu Nam, ‘The Leader’, as if ‘Prime 'Prime Minister’ no longer sufficed, and his critics translated the title into its German equivalent, fuehrer, implying that the field marshal was aping Hitler? Hitler/ It appeared that Phibul was developing a form of leadership new to Thailand, a style patterned after the totalitarianism then current in Europe. Certainly, he was notunaware not unaware of political trends abroad, and his style of rule had some obvious borrowings from fascism. But these were superficial in nature, serving only as European—and therefore modern— garnishes on a traditional Thai recipe for leadership. When one considers Phibul’s style of leadership in the context of Thai history, one begins to see that his aim was not so much to be like contemporary European dictators but rather to become more like Thai monarchs of ancient times. Phibul clothed his aspirations to be king in the tunic of the modem autocrat but had he been bom born in a different century he might simply have seized the throne to found a new dynasty. As the head of a twentieth century “democracy," Phibul could hardly designate himself aking-=yebhe kingpanddieTvas a-king =yethe could become as a king and hewas determined to achieve this end.

A Recipe for Leadership of a new dynasty in Thailand was usually a general Historically, the founder ofa who built a power base among the military and then offered strong leadership

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to a Thai elite disillusioned with a weak and divided existing order. The traditional dynastic founder possessed, as did Phibul, both the fox-like guile to undermine his enemies and the lion-like strength to destroy them. Balance was the key to obtaining and retaining power, and the greatest of Thailand’s rulers maintained a delicate equilibrium between the use of force and cunning. Thai scholars refer to the ruler’s use of pbra phra def defend and phra khun, two kinds of power that must be exercised together and in precise With phra define dejlhe patron can extract loyalty and obedience as proportions. 'With phra kbunthe patron entices a consequence of his clients’ fear, while with phrakbunthe his clients, ingratiating himself with them by using bribes and favors to generate a sense of obligation. In other words, there is a stick and a there is a carrot. The formula for blending the two techniques dates back to the 13th century kingdom of Sukhothai and has been perfected down through successive generations of kings and ministers. According to one authority, “Pradej must be used discreetly and only when it is necessary. Phra khun, of course, must be exercised at all times and unproportionately much more than phra dej. def.”nS5 Though neither will suffice on its own, an injudicious mixture of the two will bring disaster for the would-be Lord of Life just as surely as a proper mixture will bring success. Phra khunhas been described as a form of synergism,6 i.e., the opposite of antagonism, and its proper employment enables the ruler to appear as the benefactor of a wide range of disparate interest groups among the elite. Because Phibul’s primary support came from the military, he had to make it appear that by patronizing the army he was patronizing the nation. He therefore launched a campaign to militarize society. Of course, as the patron of the army Phibul also commanded the necessary force to exercise pradej, but that power was to be held in reserve, to be unleashed only after the best ,x efforts at pbra khun had failed. The successful ruler must know when he has exhausted the resources of pbra phra khun and can no longer purchase the cooperation of opposing phra def groups. In such cases the use of pbra dej to enforce cooperation must be swift, decisive and, if necessary, ruthless. Often, the simple knowledge that the ruler possesses such force—and the will to use it—will be enough to stifle significant dissent.7 Phibul’s formula for leadership was as old as the Thai nation, and Phibul’s modem touches did little to alter its distinctive flavor. For over six centuries Thai kings had studied and bequeathed a pattern of social organization and leadership perfectly suited to the culture and economy that developed in parallel with it. From the nineteenth century, Thai leaders began to flavor the traditional dish with a variety of Western ingredients, superficially imposing aspects of Western political culture on deeply-rooted Thai institutions. KingMongkut (r. 1851-1867) occasionally signed letters to Western heads of state with the dual title of "King “King and President,” President," but that usage in tn no sense made him a Republican. By the same token, Phibul’s

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choice of the title “The Leader”, does not mean he was a European-style fascist More likely, this nomenclature was merely a compromise Phibul made with his generation’s fetish for Western modernity.

Phibul the Nation Builder of June 24, 1932 had sought to change the ancient pattern, but The coup ofJune Phibul, even though one of the group that staged the coup, was among the People's Party to lose faith in the parliamentary system first members of the People’s which replaced the old order. So long as the changes produced by the coup were to his advantage, Phibul defended them, but when the balance tipped in favor of his opponents, Phibul found it convenient to reassess his commitment to democracy. In the beginning, Phibul had defended the Assembly against the regressive designs of Mano and his royalist allies. At that time the Assembly consisted entirely of deputies appointed by the Promoters’ group, of which Phibul was a member. After the elections of 1933 introduced elected assemblymen to the system, however, the previous hegemony of the coupmakers wavered, and Phibul, among others, began to see parliamentary politics as a challenge to the stability of his own interest group. Many who had hailed the 1932 “revolution” as progress soon began to show a preference for a more traditional type of leadership. As time passed, Phibul came to believe that the wisdom and strength of a benevolent autocrat was preferable to the chaotic exigencies of the parliamentary system. Not surprisingly, he saw himself as the man best suited for the role. Although Phibul took upon himself the task of leading Thailand into the modern world, always emphasizing the theme of progress and the need to catch up with and exceed the achievements of the West, he seems to have always kept one eye on the past. He took the greatest kings of Thai history citing similar policies enacted by past as his model and Justified justified his methods by citingsimilarpolicies precedent In 1941, for example, when critics dared to label national leaders as precedent. the Leader a dictator, he defended himself by evoking both the thirteenth King Ramkhamhaeng, and a more recent monarch, century ruler of Sukhothai, KingRamkhamhaeng, King Chulalongkorn the Great He reminded his critics that these great leaders had used absolute power to enforce tough policies and to urge the Thai people forward, often in spite of themselves.8 Though Phibul had faith in the nation’s potential, potential, he seems to have had little faith faith in the will of the people people to realize it Thai history had demonstrated to Phibul what strong-willed leadership it. could contribute to the nation. His first goal, therefore, was to inject the nation with a dose of his own will, just as past kings had done. King Taksin (r. 1767-1782), for one, provided a good mentor for Phibul. Like Phibul, Taksin was also of humble origins and had risen to importance through military service. Taksin had been a general in the last days of Ayudhya, and when the capital was sacked by the Burmese and the royal

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family destroyed, Taksin had taken up the staff of leadership and rebuilt the nation. By organizing and mobilizing Ayudhya’s survivors into a loyal and determined military constituency, he was able to first reunite the network of Thai principalities that Ayudhya had governed and then to lead them to victory over the Burmese invaders. His constituents rewarded the general by crowning him their king, after which he sat upon a new throne in a new capital near present day Bangkok, from where he directed the expansion of the kingdom and the subjugation of neighboring territories as a barrier against future attacks. In the span of only fifteen years, Taksin had managed to rebuild the Thai nation and to expand its domain. Phibul emulated Taksin in many of his methods and policies. Though Phibul did not have the same dean clean slate as a starting point, like Taksin he decided to rebuild the nation beginning with the military and also by dedded instilling a warrior spirit among the people. Like Taksin, Phibul promised his followers freedom from foreign domination (in Phibul’s case, freedom from the economic domination of the immigrant Chinese community and freedom from aggression by the neighboring colonial powers); Phibul offered the Thais the chance to once again take charge of their own national Samrnai Sangchat, ‘The destiny. He decreed the dawn of Sammai The Era of Nation Building’, and the government proceeded to promote an air of nationalism throughout the land. Phibul had begun to set the stage for this “new" nationalism while he was sstill till only a power behind the scenes. In a radio speech in 1934, he tried to justify the greater emphasis on military spending of the Bhahon government by insisting that a strong army and navy were essential to maintain Thailand’s independence; he warned that neighboring powers would attempt to bully Thailand unless the nation could demonstrate its will and its ability to retaliate.9 The long decades of stability along Thailand’s borders with its colonized neighbors make this statement seem exaggerated, perhaps. However, it is well to consider the foreign policy dimensions of the speech, made at a time when Thailand was preparing to renegotiate its unequal treaties with the Western powers. At the same time that Phibul was trying to convince the Thai nation that militarization was for the benefit of all, he was also signalling to France and Britain that it could become more difficult to maintain the status quo in Southeast Asia if some compromise were not made at the conference table. France was particularly concerned about Phibul’s frequent assertions that territories once ceded to France should eventually return to Thai control. In 1937 a French newspaper in Saigon queried, “Is the new Constitutional Government in Siam dreaming the dreams of her ancient kings?" kings?” 10 In fact the Phibul government had shown a marked fascination with Thai history and with legends surrounding the ancient kings. One distinctive feature of the Sammai Samrnai Sangchat was the propagation of such legends in the popular media, with an emphasis on persuading the public that current policies had

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historical precedents. From 1936 to 1940, for instance, the government commissioned a series of stage dramas from a rising Thai literary figure with decidedly right-wing inclinations, Luang Wichit Wathakan. Eventually, Luang Wichit became the poetlaureate poet laureate of the Phibul regime. His works were not only useful propaganda, they were also genuinely popular. In one play he depicted a band of eighteenth century Thai peasants who fought valiantly and finally sacrificed their lives defending the nation against the Burmese invaders. Another creation praised the heroic virtue of the legendary sixteenth century king who led the conquest of Cambodia. Significantly, a 1937 play about King Taksin served to remind the nation of the benefits of following that strongwilled general—and of having made him king.11 Not surprisingly, Phibul admired Luang Wichit’s plays and appreciated his view of Thai history. Wichit had begun his career as a foreign service bent- won him a high officer in 1915, but his literary talents and scholarly bent post in Bhahon’s government as Director of the Department of Fine Arts. Under Phibul, Wichit’s influence in the government expanded. That the themes of Luang Wichit’s plays reflect the sentiments of his patron, Phibul, may suggest that Wichit was merely an apologist for the administration, but in fact Phibul favored Wichit with choice government posts and sought his opinion in mattersfar afield of the dramatic arts.12 During the war, for example, Wichit became Phibul’s foreign minister and then his ambassador to Tokyo. Contemporary European doctrines of authoritarianism may have had some influence on Phibul, but it was Luang Wichit’s perception of Thai history that shaped Phibul’s image of the Thai national heritage and destiny. Phibul the Mad Hatter

During the Sammai Sangchat, many of Phibul’s policies offended the sensibilities of both Bangkok’s Western community and the genteel, oldguard Thai elite now excluded from the political process. Foreigners feared the possible repercussions of the “ultra-nationalist” ideology Phibul espoused. Phibul’s efforts to legislate the country out of the perceived economic stranglehold of the overseas Chinese merchant class by restricting the rights of Chinese immigrants inspired comparisons with Hitler’s anti-Jewish policies, and some paranoid Westerners wondered which foreign community would be singled out next. Among the disenfranchised old guard, however, the Leader’s policies were not so much fearsome as they were bothersome and embarrassing. The most frequent complaint of the old elite was that Phibul’s propaganda and techniques were in bad taste. The old guard felt particularly offended by the Leader’s series of cultural edicts, called the Rattha Niyom in Thai, which instructed the public in a range of ‘do’s’ 'do’s’ and ‘don’ts’ 'don’ts’ for good, cultured behavior on the part of patriotic Thais. Between 1939 and 1942, a total of twelve separate State Conventions were enacted to prescribe the parameters of Phibul’s culture program. Most

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of these edicts were reasonable and relatively innocuous. Thai citizens were to learn their national anthem and respect the flag. They were to support the nation’s economy by spending their money on domestic goods instead Rattha Niyonvwere directed at fostering of imports whenever possible. Other RatthaNiyonvwere improved personal hygiene and prescribing healthy diets and exercise to keep the nation fit. One edict even outlined preferred child-rearing practices and gave guidelines for the proper care of the aged? 53 Niyotnt issued in 1939, officially dropped the use of The first Rattha Niyom, Thailand’s English-language name, Siam. The edict proclaimed that henceforth the English translation of the country’s indigenous name, Meuang Thai 1 Thai’), (literally, ‘domain 'domain of the Thai ), and should be used in the context of foreign affairs. In the language of the edict “Thai’ and "Siam”, "Siam", Whereas the name of the country has been called in two manners, “Thai” the people prefer to call it "Thai," “Thai,” thus the government considers as the State Preference that the appellation should be in accord with the exact name of the race 4

people....’ and the preference of the people.,..’*

Many in the old guard resented the change of name and foreigners became nostalgic for the old “Siam,” as if the edict had effected some sort of profound change. It was, in fact, nothing more than a notice to the world that the Thai have their own name for the country they lived in. Many foreigners began to complain of the dreadful changes taking place in the “new Thailand," criticizing the identification of the country with its vastly predominant race and seeing the name change as yet another step in the exclusion of ethnic minorities from national affairs. Few, if any, made the connection between the country’s “new” name and the recent abrogation of the old unequal treaties, but in fact, the name ‘Siam’ (a word whose origin is more likely Khmer or Chinese than Thai)15 had only come into use among Thais after it was used in the original nineteenth century treaties with England and France.16 Equating the old Siam with life in the days before the revolution, the old guard failed to recognize the change of name as a symbolic declaration of independence in the wake of new treaties that finally gave the Thais legal parity with the imperial powers of the West. Of the twelve Rattha Niyom, the most ridiculed and the hardest to justify was the edict on styles of dress. Number ten, issued in 1941, became the that, “Thais should not basis of a national dress code and dictated, in part, that; appear in public, populous places, or in municipal areas without proper clothing, for instance, wearing only underwear (drawers), no shirt, or loose shirt-tails.”17 Eventually, proper dress ceased to be a simple matter of fashion or taste, but was rather regulated by law. As time passed, the dress code became increasingly specific, and its enforcement produced numerous laughable incidents.

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At one point, a Bangkok newspaper columnist recorded a popular Sammai Sangcbat days. It seems there had been a rash of anecdote of the SammaiSangcbat robberies by a knife-wielding person or persons who demanded not only the victim’s cash and valuables, but his clothes as well. One such victim, having been robbed and forced to strip to his skivvies, went directly to the nearest police station to report the crime. The police immediately arrested the victim on charges of “contravention of the cultural rules governing dress.”188 In a similar vein, during the war, a Thai agent for the British Special dress."* Operations Executive was dropped by parachute into Thailand from an the countryside to a nearby town, R.A.F. plane. He made his way through die successfully avoiding the Thai military and Japanese patrols; upon entering the town, however, he was arrested by the local police, not for being an hat.19 agent of an enemy nation—but for failing to wear a hat.” Thawee writes that Phibul conceived of the national dress code because he felt that “...Thailand must follow a European example in order to make itself an influential modem state.”20 Phibul wanted to modernize society from the grassroots up and decided that if the country was to catch up with the West, it would not be enough to simply superimpose Western political institutions at the top. The common people would have to change, too. So a decree ordained that all women must wear hats (until then not the fashion among Thai women, except for peasants and laborers, who donned headgear only at work, for protection from the sun), “...or they would not be allowed to enter a government office even for the purpose of paying taxes." Predictably, most people found it hard to take the order seriously.21 Thawee recalls: One day, while passing by one of the departments under me, [Phibul] noticed two

[saying] the matter women who did not wear hats. Next day he wrote a letter to me ... [saying]the should be investigated. I kept the letter with me for a few days. I then wrote back that

investigated and that the complaint against my staff was not correct. the matter was Investigated I emphasized that there was none in this country who would try to disobey the orders of the Premier.... I, of course, told the two girls that I would not force them to wear

But they should be careful lest they should face difficulties like the one I saved hats.... Bur them from.12

The dress code was hard to rationalize, even amongst Phibul’s own people, but Phibul insisted that it was important. He was determined that Thailand should, in his own words, “possess good culture, good etiquette, 23 profession.”20 good health, good clothing, good accommodation and good profession." Men, therefore, were forced to abandon the traditional pbaa nung, a formal Thai version of the Indian dhoti that had been popular everyday dress for government officials and businessmen; trousers were now to be de rigueur. Women had to wear dresses or skirts with blouses instead of the traditional pbaa sin, a type of sarong. Shoes and not sandals, much less bare feet, were

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required, and, of course, everyone had to wear a hat As one omnipresent 24 government slogan declared: “Hat Leads Nation to Power. Power.”M24 Not surprisingly, governmentslogan Notsurprisingly, the logic of such slogans escaped just about everyone, but in the authoritarian climate of those years only the bravest souls would dare debate the issue of, as it were, the emperor’s new clothes. One stalwart protester was the young Mom Ratchawongse Kukrit Pramoj, a lowerranking member of the royal family. Kukrit often protested being forced to wear trousers and rejoiced towards the end of the war when the prohibition against the phaa nungwas finally repealed.25 Decades later he recalled the absurdity of those days and how the cultural decrees gradually seeped into every aspect of private life: The Field Marshal started a cultural revolution long before Mao ever thought of one.

in Phibul’s era were ordered to wear hats and shoes ...Betel chewing, ruled People In as uncultural at that time, became a night time vice. But to crown it all every man was required to kiss his wife before departing to work in the morning.224*

Phibul’s posthumous critics recounting the days of the culture reforms have made him look foolish. They have painted a picture of universal puzzlement and frustration, in particular over the dress code. But at the time, the code was greeted with mixed reactions. Even Kukrit admits, “It was quite 27 humour. B27 fun. Thai people liveld] through it with great good humour.” Some people thought it was a good idea to elevate standards of dress. A Bangkok newspaper published a letter in 1941 appealing to the government to inform nursing mothers that polite society would prefer them to conceal their their- babes in public. Another letter applauded the breasts while suckling their ban on the phaa nung, complaining that it was invented in India as a women’s garment and was therefore inappropriate for Thai men. Yet another letter said it was wise to stop men from wearing Chinese silk trousers, as the government had done, because these were “sissy pants” pants" that emasculated the Thai male. One contemporary source states that at a “over a thousand people” promised to adopt the provincial mass rally "over recommended government fashions when asked to by the provincial 28 governor.38 Landon described a scene in 1941 that makes the dress code seem like a response to a national mandate: Probably never in their national history had the Thai people been so dress-conscious. A festival was planned which would be climaxed with a dress contest for women of all ages. The purpose of this was to set style fashions. Prize garments would naturally be much photographed and copied. Few objectors ever came forward to protect their 29 rights to dress as they pleased. pleased.”

There is an apparent inconsistency between the policy of stressing nationalism and its historical roots on the one hand, and the policy of

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“modernizing" the national costume by adopting foreign fashions on the other. No doubt Phibul was divided between two sets of values, those he learned as a boy growing up in the Thai countryside and those he learned in France as a young man; in this respect he was like all the foreign-educated men of the new elite. For them, Thai values defined their sense of defined, that which was modem. This is nationality, while European values defined,that not to say that they were confused and could not choose between being Thai or European. Phibul, in particular, knew who he was and knew his origins, but he also knew what he wanted and how he would attain it. To obtain the prosperity and the power of the West was indubitably a worthy goal to set for Thailand’s future—but that did not mean that Thailand was destined to become a thing of the West. That the Thai elite and their Leader wanted tc have the benefits that the West had to offer did not mean that Thais would accept political or economic domination such as that forced upon their Southeast Asian neighbors. To have what the West had, and to make it truly their own, required that Thailand be strong and independent and, most importantly, A sense of nation was essential for these goals, and that is why Phibul united. Asense stressed the growth and development of a national culture and a nationalist dogma. Thais had to think of themselves as members of a single family, the Thai family, and people of other nationalities had to be recognized as outsiders. Once this Thai identity was accomplished the people could be introduced to the culture of Europe and encouraged to strive for the prosperity it promised. One hesitates to suggest that this line of thinking makes Phibul’s dress code understandable, but it does help. With such reasoning, the dress code appears less a symptom of megalomania, as-Phibul’s critics-port'ray critics portray it, and more a simple tactical miscalculation. ' The most intriguing aspect of Phibul’s cultural reforms, however, is not laugjh about. the silliness that people grudgingly endured and still today laugh Even more intriguing are the aspects which they did accept and now mistakenly or unknowingly regard as “traditional." The Sammai Sangchat Sangchal introduced Thai society to an array of newly“customs,” some adapted from Western cultures and others derived fabricated “customs," foUctradifiohsTThese from obscure Thai folklraditfons. These practices were promoted vigorously in the popular media and raised a few.eyebrows among the old-guard. The old elite grimaced at the government’s efforts to manufacture custom and tradition, but many such contrivances caught on among the masses. In fact, are today regarded as some innovations became so popular that they ate traditions, though their origins cannot be traced back beyond 1940. “traditional” Thai greeting, sawatdii, asortofSoutheast a sort ofSoutheast One example is the “traditional" Thaigree ting, szzttzrrfii, Asian aloha that can mean either hello or goodbye. This word was apparently contrived by the government in the 1940s in an effort to induce Thai people to stop answering their telephones with the English ‘hullo’. One

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source notes that while sawat dii is indisputably an authentic Thai word (though derived from a formal and archaic dialect), it was, before the Sammai Sangchat, never used as the everyday, universal greeting it then became.50 Prince Prem Purachatra, who penned a daily column for an English language daily during the 1940s, argued in print that it was hardly appropriate to use sawat dii as the government suggested: wai? Why net not stick to the good old Siamese way of greeting, just a silent, unspoken wait [hands raised, palms together, with head nodded This is a very effective gesture {hands slightly], ® a convenient form of salutation which involves neither too intimate contact 51 nor a lot of meaningless words11

Today, however, even though a Thai is still likely to answer the phone with ‘hullo’, face-to-face greetings are rarely silent. The use of sawat dii has legitimacy jhough become so common that no one challenges the phrase’s legitimacy, though some purists might object to its slangy abbreviation ’wad 'wad dii, now a fixture of more casual usage. The disenfranchised upper class disliked the government’s saturation of the airwaves with patriotic songs and popular dance tunes. The songs urged the nation to work together and follow the Leader. The dance tunes, more interestingly, were part of a government campaign to promote social dancing, the kind of ballroom dancing popular in the "more “more sophisticated” twist. Instead of teaching Thai musicians countries, but with a distinctly Thai twist to play waltzes, foxtrots, and rumbas, and then getting Thai dancers to learn the appropriate steps, the Department of Fine Arts elected to adapt an obscure upcountry peasant dance, the ram thon, tbon, to the more sophisticated tastes of the modem Thai middle class. The new version, called ram wong, became a nation-wide dance craze. Like the older ram thon, tbon, the new dance combined graceful, sweeping arm and hand movements with quick but subtle steps; but the new hybrid was choreographed for couples, and the music, while suitable for the traditional Thai orchestra, incorporated a new and livelier beat The result seems to have offended the' the old elite almost as much as had the dress code. Prince Prem Purachatra devoted considerable space in his daily columns to complaints about the ram wongcraze wongctaze which the government had generated. The prince was particularly appalled by the Fine Arts Department’s promotion of the new dance. “A rumour is going around town,” he wrote in April 1944, “...that leading officials of the Department town," have been giving exhibition dances just to show others how it should be done."52 In the months that followed, ram wong fever appears to have infected the whole country. In June the prince wrote: Nurses have sung babies to sleep using Ramwong songs as lullabies. Five-year-olds elders and sing ditties inviting each other *to sit down and make love.’ imitate their eiders love."

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Tram conductors become songsters, asking their passengers to “move a little further

closer!" Even pork vendors, cutting up joints for their customers, ask in, get a little closer!* M poetically, "Dearest, “Dearest, do you love me?* me?"53

Today only someone well versed in the arts would be able to identify the ram wong as a period piece of the 1940s. The dance is still commonly performed and taught to foreign visitors as an example of traditional Thai dance, though it was never anything more than an artificial contrivance of the Sammai Sangchat. Throughout this period Phibul tried to provide both the elite and the nation in general with the sort of shared focus they had come to lack since the decline of the monarchy. He tried to assume a traditional leadership role by doing the sort of things traditional leaders—that is the great Thai kings of the past—had done. In discarding the old national appellation ‘Siam’ he emulated King Ramkhamhaeng, who won his people’s independence from Angkor in the thirteenth century and named his newly founded realm Meuang Thai. Like King Taksin, Phibul labored to rebuild the nation and strengthen it, culturally and militarily, against any conceivable foreign threat. Phibul also patronized the arts, as all Thai kings had, and promoted new literature and music among the people. Even the dress code had a precedent after all, had not King Mongkut, in order to impress Western precedent: diplomats with Thailand’s sophistication, commanded his court to wear shirts and shoes at official functions? But Phibul had yet to do the one essential thing for which the greatest of Thailand’s kings were most famous. He had not yet led the nation to victory in war. Having campaigned so long and so hard for support for the military, it did not seem fitting that the Leader should neglect this ultimate call to glory. But what enemy was there to fight?

Chapter 8 Phibul the Warrior

Thailand and France had never been the happiest of neighbors. For a short time in the mid-nineteenth century, after France first seized control of territories in Vietnam, the French presence provided Bangkok with a breathing space in its age-old contest with the Vietnamese over lands in what later became Laos and Cambodia. The respite proved all too brief, however, as the French themselves soon laid claim to the disputed territories, and they threatened to do to Bangkok what they had done to Hue if the Thais refused to surrender territories they then held in the Mekong Valley. Eventually, the Thai elite opted to appease the European imperialist appetite by electing to cede certain peripheral lands in order to retain control over the Thai heartland. Though a bitter pill to swallow, the sacrifice was the only way. By 1907 France had subsumed all of Cambodia and Laos. Additionally the British were given some of the territories Bangkok had held on the Malay Peninsula, but it was the loss of the lands along the Mekong that the Thais most resented. Even a full generation later, there was a strong feeling among the elite that these lands should be regained. France consistently refused every overture of the Thais to renegotiate the boundaries, claiming the seized lands had been rightfully part of the Vietnamese domain and thus were now under French colonial jurisdiction. Then, in 1940, as Germany advanced on France and Japan leered at French colonial possessions in the East, the French approached the government of Phibul Songkhram with a proposition. To guarantee, in the event of war, that Thailand would not assist France’s enemies in any effort to seize French Indochina, the French asked Phibul to sign a mutual nonaggression pact. Phibul noted that Thailand had recently proclaimed its neutrality in regard to the burgeoning European war and pretended to the French that he could see no need for such a pact. France, he knew, was anxious for assurances that Thailand was not as friendly towards Japan as many in Europe then feared. Such assurances would certainly be worth something in exchange and, Phibul hinted, a renegotiation of the boundaries between Thailand and

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Indochina might make the proposition more tempting. Consequently, in June 1940, the two countries reached a confidential agreement to begin negotiating the possible return to Thailand of certain lands along the Mekong River.

Phibul's Irredenta Phibul was satisfied with the French promise to send an ambassadorial faith.1 level party to Bangkok later that year, and he signed the pact in good faith? A mere two weeks after the signing of the pact, however, Germany invaded France, and the subsequent Vichy government then disavowed the agreement Phibul had obtained to renegotiate the boundaries. One can imagine Phibul’s frustration at this sudden reversal. A successful border readjustment would have lent enormous prestige to his regime, but France's reversal and refusal to discuss the issue would mean a grave loss of face. Nor was it the first time that such a refusal had happened. In 1936, under Bhahon, and again in 1939, France had rejected similar bids from Thailand (even though the objectives were more modest) at a time when Thai leverage had been weak? weak.2 Now, even though the diplomatic climate was very favorable to Thailand—and the potential gains so much greater—Phibul again had failed. For two months afterward, Phibul’s representatives in Vichy France and Hanoi continued to press the point, but to no avail. Bangkok appealed to both Britain and the United States to apply diplomatic pressure on behalf of Thailand, but the disposition of world affairs was not conducive to this approach. Hanoi was, at the same time, appealing for American and British military support against Japan. With the situation in France still uncertain in June 1940, neither Washington nor London was willing to threaten the status quo of France’s Southeast Asian possessions. Diplomacy having failed, Phibul renounced the Franco-Thai non-aggression pact and threatened the use of force to achieve his ends.5 Though Phibul’s prestige was on the line, the Franco-Thai dispute had ceased to be simply a matter of pride. It now became evident that with Paris under German occupation and Hanoi on its own, Japan would sooner or later occupy Indochina. Already Japan was taking advantage of the situation. By the end of August she had persuaded Hanoi to sign an agreement recognizing Japan’s influence in the Far East as "pre-eminent” “pre-eminent” and allowing Japan access to key ports in Tonkin. Phibul knew that if Thailand could not secure its claims on the disputed lands while they were held by the weakened French, then there could be little hope of doing so control.4 On the other hand, Thailand once the territory came underJapanese control, could, perhaps, turn the increasing Japanese pressure on Hanoi to its advantage if Japan were approached while whileFrenchauthorities advantageifjapan Frenchauthorities still maintained nominal control. By striking a bargain with Japan now, Phibul felt he could still succeed in his irredenta.

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In September, the Japanese attacked French Indochina, invading overland from Kwangtung, China, and by sea at Haiphong. The French officials resisted for two days, then capitulated on condition they couldretain political authority in the colony despite the Japanese military presence. Another agreement was 6,000 Japanese troops signed, allowing immediate permanent occupation by 6,000Japanese and a right of passage for another 25,000 troops.5 The territories claimed by Thailand were still under French control but they could quite easily come under the Japanese at any time. Within days of the Japanese landing at Haiphong, Phibul contacted the Japanese legation at Bangkok, informally inquiring whether the Japanese government would be willing to intervene in the present border dispute. From the start of his difficulties with the French resort Lacking support from the inJune, Phibul had reserved this step as a last resort. other regional powers he now had little choice: he could either relinquish his cause or make a deal with theJapanese. As the substance of Phibul’s proposal to Japan is discussed in the next chapter, it is sufficient here to note simply that the proposal pleased the Japanese who, oyer the next few months, lent increasing support to the Thai irredentist cause. After October, as Phibul’s discussions with theJapanese were concluding, a series of minor skirmishes between Thai and French forces began to break out in the disputed regions. The incidents became more frequent in November and by the beginning of December tensions peaked as both sides braced for a major confrontation.64Throughout these months Thailand received large quantities of military supplies from Japan. A contingent of Japanese technicians and training advisors accompanied shipments of heavy artillery and tanks to Thailand. Thai and Japanese pilots flew an armada of bombers in from Japan and landed them on air strips newly extended with the aid of Japanese construction equipment. equipment7 Phibul had first tried to obtain these supplies from the United States and had been awaiting the delivery of American war planes when his difficulties with France intervened. The Americans, not wanting to aid either side in the dispute, re-routed the shipment to the Philippines and informed the Thai government that the reason was increased American defense needs.8 In December the Japanese foreign minister informally consulted the French representative at Tokyo regarding Phibul’s request for Japanese diplomatic intervention in the Franco-Thai border problem, apparently to test the situation and the willingness of the French to compromise, before committing Japan firmly to Thailand's cause. The French minister reserved comment for a later date. At about the same time, Hanoi officials learned of a shipment of Japanese arms bound for Bangkok and protested to the Japanese authorities, demanding that delivery be halted. When they realized their protests were being ignored, the French decided to take direct action against the Thais. Thais.’9 First, France recalled its representative at Bangkok (a man they felt was too sympathetic to the Thai claims) and tried to replace him with a hard-

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closely aligned to the Vichy regime. Bangkok, however, refused liner more dosely to accept the new minister’s credentials, and the French chose to retaliate by detaining the entire staff of the Thai consulate in Vichy. Bangkok was not intimidated and still refused to accredit the new French diplomat. Vichy had accomplished nothing. Not only had they failed to halt arms shipments from the Japanese to Thailand, but they were now left without even a representative to present their case in Bangkok. Appeals to both America and Japan had failed to bring any assistance, and the Thais, apparently unmoved by all of Vichy’s diplomatic foot-stomping, continued to press their demands and to beef up their armed forces in an obvious attempt at intimidation. Thus frustrated, the French now turned to more drastic measures. On December 15, 1940, French planes bombed several border towns in the northeastern Thai province of Nakhorn Phanom.10 Next, on December 19, the French minister at Tokyo informed the Japanese foreign minister that France was not interested in tn the Thai demands and that as far as France was concerned the border between Thailand and Indochina was not a topic for negotiation.11 In both Hanoi and Bangkok, war fever was running high. Each government warned that it would attack the other’s capital with incendiary bombs, a threat that neither carried out as both Bangkok and Hanoi were built mostly with wood and neither city was willing to risk retaliation. Each side massed troops along the contested border, bracing either to invade or be invaded.12 Throughout December and into January, 1941, tensions mounted on both sides. Meanwhile, with bigger problems on their minds, the Japanese sat back and awaited the outcome.

War and Victory In Bangkok the threat of impending war with one of Thailand’s oldest European adversaries had a galvanizing effect on the Thai elite as regards Phibul’s nationalism campaign. Even those diehards who had barely tolerated his policies now supported the government’s cause. With a common enemy to unite them, the old and new elites were almost as one. Even Prince Prem Purachatra’s column, which usually offered subtle but cutting criticism of the new order, now spoke favorably of the patriotic spirit evident in the capital as its citizens prepared for war with the French. During the crisis, the prince reported, calm prevailed and, though there had been no undue alarm, the population was unusually cooperative and unified. For example, the nightly received blackouts in Bangkok were well managed and well received: It was with a light heart and a suggestion of good-humoured helpfulness that young and old alike cooperated in affixing the familiar blue shades, that motorists relied more on their brakes than on their horns, that well-wishing tricycle drivers put their voices 15

to unusually good use in drawing attention to offending luminosities.15 ’

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Sign posts emerged in public places warning of spies and urging citizens to be discreet in discussing anything that might even remotely be damaging to the national interest Rationing was soon introduced, and a sense of common cause grew with the spirit of common sacrifice. There seemed to be a general feeling that the recent violence in Europe and China would presently be visited upon Thailand, but, as Prem warned his readers, “...as far as our personal safety and welfare are concerned, we have been viewing the world’s worries from an armchair."'* armchair."1,4The true test of national unity was yet to come. On January 16, 1941, the men and arms of the French Foreign Legion were poised to move across the border into Thailand while French naval forces simultaneously moved against the inferior Thai fleet. Before the order to attack could be given, however, the Thai army seized the initiative and invaded Cambodia. Surprised by both the timing and the fighting ability of the Thai, French commanders ordered their forces to fall back. The retreating French endured heavy losses that day, including the defection of several units of Vietnamese to the Thai side. By the end of the day the Thais were deep inside Cambodia and the Thai national flag replaced the tricolors tricolor? flying over the provincial capital of Sisiphon. To the north, meanwhile, Thai soldiers had captured the contested regions along the Mekong River in the Lao country and by January 22 were in possession of the cities of Bassak and Luang Prabang,15 Thailand’s victories on land, however, were not matched at sea. On January 17, a French naval attack off the coast of Trad (a Thai province bordering southern Cambodia) caught the Thai cutter Thonburi and an escort of torpedo boats off guard while at anchor among Thonburiand the Ko Chang island group. The cruiser La LaMotte Piquet sank sack.several MottsPiquet several of the smaller escort vessels and heavily damaged the Thonburibefote Thonburibefore departing) departing.166 After the battle, the Thai cutter limped desperately toward the fishing village of Laem Ngop, only to flounder and sink before reaching port.17 Despite victory at sea, however, the French were unable to turn the tide of their losses on land and, on January 24, 1941, Vichy agreed to a ceasefire. Japan had stepped in and offered her “good offices” as mediator, and France, now faced with the loss of all of her holdings west of the Mekong, finally saw the wisdom of negotiating—but the dispute did not end there. A series of heated conferences ensued over the following months with each side threatening to resume hostilities. But theJapanese could not allow allowsuch such squabbling, and by May 9 they had dictated a settlement that satisfied neither the Thais nor the French but which neither side could reject. The thalweg of the Mekong River now served as the new border between the antagonists, giving the Cambodian provinces, of Battambang, Sisiphon and Siemreap (except for the provincial capital and the nearby ruins of Angkor Wat) to the Thais. Thailand also gained a small corner of Laos previously under the French, but this represented only a fraction of the Lao territories claimed daimed by Bangkok. Thailand had expected to regain much more.18

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From Bangkok's point of view, all of Laos had been under Thai sovereignty at the time the French seized it in the nineteenth century. Bangkok also claimed Angkor Wat, citing the outright gift of the ancient temple complex by the Cambodian king to King Rama I in the early nineteenth century.19 The Japanese, however, were not notwilling willing to relinquish access to these areas. As long as the French retained sovereignty, Japan could, as per its previous agreements with Vichy, station troops in Laos (which bordered British Burma) and in Cambodia, just a few hundred miles from Bangkok. Further, all the newly transferred territories were to be demilitarized, but while the French (and therefore the Japanese) could station troops on the new border, Thailand could not. But of all the unsatisfactory terms of the final agreement, the hardest for Bangkok to accept was the payment To France of six million Indochinese piastres as compensation for the ceded territories.20 Nevertheless, a blunted victory was better than none, and as it had been Thailand that first pressed for Japanese mediation, Phibul had no choice but to sign and make the most of his achievements. Despite the disappointments, Phibul basked in the glory of his triumph over France. Before the final treaty was even signed, a stone obelisk marking the victory was erected in the Phayathai district of Bangkok. Thousands of troops newly returned from the now demilitarized eastern territories paraded before the monument in a grand celebration held on the morning of Sunday, April 27; the soldiers received the grateful salute of their proud Leader as they passed in review.21 (Nowadays, visitors to Bangkok seeking to discover exactly what the imposing Victory Monument commemorates may, ironically, be hard-pressed to find a Thai who can tell them.) The whole nation was made to know of the victory as Phibul sent his triumphant warriors throughout the country to parade in all the major urban centers.22 In July, the formal transfer of the three Cambodian provinces took place amidst great pomp in the town of Battambang. Khuang Aphaiwong, the son of that province’s last Thai governor, was chosen by Phibul to represent the Leader at the ceremony. This was the same Khuang who had been among the 1932 Promoters and later became identified with Bhahon’s “reformist" faction. Since 1938, however, he had become more aligned with the elected assemblymen who represented the parliamentary opposition to Bhahon and, later, Phibul. Though Khuang had a year earlier represented the government on an arms-buying visit to the U.S.,225’ even at that time he was not considered a close ally of Phibul’s, and sending Khuang to Washington was likely an effort of the Leader to co-opt his opposition. Phibul’s choice of Khuang as his representative in Battambang could not have been more effective, either as a gesture of bipartisanship or as nationalist symbolism. Most of the opposition members were from the northeastern Thai provinces and identified strongly with Thai-speaking peoples formerly under French

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rule in Laos and Cambodia. Not only had Phibul disarmed his opposition with the popularity of his military conquests, but he had charmed them as well by offering Khuang the honor of returning to the town of his birth and raising the flag his father had been forced to take down over three decades before. Besides winning his irredenta, Phibul’s astute politicking also won the support of many opposition deputies.24 Phibul now rode a great wave of public enthusiasm and capitalized on his popularity to push through many of his more controversial policies; university students took to the streets to rally in support of his programs, and even opponents of the national dress code were silenced. As the ultimate tribute to the victorious Leader, one of the new provinces was renamed in his honor. Siemreap, which is Khmer for ‘Defeat 'Defeat of the Siamese’, was renamed ‘Jangwat Phibulsongkhram’.25 But that honor soon soured as the consequences of the May 9 treaty began to manifest themselves. By September 1941 the Japanese had taken advantage of the border settlement and constructed an air base in the French-controlled town retained in the treaty along with Angkor Wat. As Japanese troops began to mass there and all along the borders of Thailand’s new but demilitarized provinces, Phibul began to realize the Siemreap—which name the Japanese-occupied town still owned —could once again spell defeat for the Thai.

No Surrender Having been previously disappointed by the Japanese, Phibul was not now prepared to trust that they would not simply waltz into Bangkok—as they had Hanoi—and emasculate his government as they had tamed the French colonials. Phibul now began to press for improved relations with Britain and the United States, both of which had remained cool toward Bangkok throughout the Indochina affair. He sought assurances from both nations of their support for Thai sovereignty in the event of a Japanese 26 attack, but the response was non-committal.215Britain had her hands full elsewhere, and the United States still hoped it could stay out of the growing world war. Phibul had to take steps of his own to secure his borders. He had already declared Thailand’s neutrality in the European war in the 1939 Royal Proclamation on the Practice of Neutrality.27 In June 1940 he had demonstrated his intention to extend that neutrality (in case war should break out in the Asian or Pacific areas) by signing non-aggression pacts with both Britain and Japan. (This is the same arrangement that would have been made with France had the boundary negotiations not failed.) Now, however, in the summer of 1941, due in large part to his recent association with Japan, Phibul was caught in a diplomatic and military vise. Japanese forces were ominously massed on his eastern flank. To the south and west, the British had a contingency plan, code-named ’Matador’, ‘Matador’, to pre-empt the expected Japanese advance by invading southern Thailand.28 To prevent

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Thailand being crushed between these two powerful potential antagonists, nationalist fervorgenerated Phibul wouldhave to perpetuate the momentous nationalistfervorgenerated by the war with France. He elected to brace the nation for the worst and at the same time, perhaps, send a message to Britain and Japan that the Thais were not going to sit idly by and watch as these two foreignpowers invaded their country to do battle with each other. Phibul’s propaganda machine utilized every available medium to remind the nation that the threat of war was not over. Public speeches warned of Wichii’s plays featuring the invasion, and free performances of Luang Wichit’s courageous Thais of the past reminded the people of what they had to fight for. Even normally humorous radio shows turned public attention toward the coming war. The weekly broadcasts of a program which one contemporary Andy” 29 turned somber listener described as a Thai version of “Amos and Andy" in the summer of 1941. The two characters on this popular show were known for their light-hearted dialogues that always praised the government and (not surprisingly, since Phibul frequently wrote the scripts himself) poked fun at the opposition. Now, in August 1941, the comedians urged their audience to emulate the legendary villagers of Bang Ra Chan, who had defended the homeland against foreign invaders in the eighteenth century. “Although Thailand did finally lose that war and the capital city was “the heroics of the villagers captured,” said one of the characters, Nai Khong, "the of Bang Ra Chan is like a shining star amidst the hopeless darkness of that period."50 To that, his partner Nai Man added: independence and sovereignly are more precious than the lives of all Thailand's Independence Thais.,.. Thais..., Thus, anybody who aims to run over us please be assured that we will 51 certainly fight. We will never retreat in battle.91

Not content Just just to let ‘Amos and Andy’ plead his case, Phibul in September pushed through legislation that made it treason for any Thai to surrender in the event of an invasion. The ‘Duty of the Thai People During War Act’ commanded every citizen to use all resources at his or her disposal against an invading enemy and to deny even the slightest aid to the invader. If they could not resist the enemy, the act proclaimed, Thai citizens were duty-bound to make life in their country intolerable to the invader, if necessary by burning their own homes and fields. “They must also destroy tools, equipment, household supply, consumption supply, houses, living quarters, beastls] of burden, and other supplies which will be of benefit to the enemy regardless of whether the owners are themselves, others, or the government."Anyone convicted of failing in these duties, the act concluded, life.”52 “...must be executed or jailed for life." Thailand was thus braced for the inevitable, and the Leader stood before the nation as a symbol of its strength and its will to prevail. Phibul had passed the last important test of kingship by defeating the French and now,

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it seemed, the nation would follow him, despite outrageous odds, into battle against the strongest nations on earth, fearless even in the face of certain defeat. “Let us fight and die on our land,” Phibul told the people through his radio spokesmen. “If they can manage to set their feet on our soil, let 55 them step on scorched remains.” remains.”” Even Phibul’s most adamant opponents no longer challenged his right to reign. He had played the role of king as had no man in living memory, and as such no man could even hope to replace him. Certainly in the fall of 1941, as war slouched toward Thailand’s borders, no patriotic Thai could risk unseating the only man who could possibly instill the nation with the will to resist an invasion. Had Phibul actually worn the crown, its aura could not have enveloped him more.

The Invasion Strong winds and heavy surf pounded the beach at Songkhla as the northeast monsoon swept across the Gulf of Siam and smashed into the southern coast of Thailand. A thin veil of clouds dimmed the light of a fullish moon casting a pale glow upon the heaving surface of the sea. Barely visible on the dim horizon, the RyujoMaru and thirteen companion vessels dropped at 2:00 A.M. on December 8, 1941. On board the Japanese troop carrier anchor at2:00 somebody spied the beacon of a coastal lighthouse, but no one saw any evidence that the flotilla had been spotted or expected. "Capital!” “Capital!" someone success."54 reportedly exclaimed. “Our surprise attack will be a complete success.” Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, chief of operations and planning for the 25th Japanese Army, was aboard the RyujoMaiu RyujoMaru that early December morning. He records that the unexpectedly heavy seas, with swells of over ten feet, slowed the landing of his men and equipment, threatening to snatch away .■ the element of surprise if the troops could not land before dawn. Despite the danger that his men might drown before even having a chance to die in battle, the invasion force’s commander ordered the boats away as scheduled. The waves dwarfed the landing craft, crashing over them and tossing soldiers and weaponry towards shore like driftwood. Tsuji's Tsuji’s own boat was nearly swamped, and fear of drowning washed away his anticipation of the impending battle. Our boat was rushing towards the shore and we hoped hop ed to be stranded in In the shallows. Even though we might be welcomed by a burst of machine-gun fire we felt that this drowned 55 would be preferable to being drowned.

Despite lastminute last minute doubts, Colonel Tsujisuccessfully landed atSongkhla at Songkhla at 4:00 A A.M. M with his forces intact Scouts quickly probed inland and reported that the entire area was undefended, the city was quiet, and all of its citizens were sound asleep.

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At this point, according to the plan, the interlopers were to have been met by a Major Osone, a soldier posing as a clerk at the Japanese consulate in Songkhla in order to bribe local military and police authorities to turn a blind eye while the Japanese passed through Songkhla en route to Malaya and Singapore. Osone had also been responsible for providing motor transport for the invaders and their equipment. The major, however, was 56 not at the designated rendezvous point.54 Colonel Tsuji, in desperation, took some men and captured a frightened rickshaw puller on the outskirts of the town, ordering the poor man through an interpreter to take him to the Japanese consulate. There the colonel pounded at the consulate gate. At this a corpulent cotpulent man, just awakened from sleep, came out and agitatedly opened the gate. gate, It was the consul, Katsuno. "Ah! “Ah! The Japanese Army!" was all he could say— and his breath had an odor of ripe persimmons. He had probably been drinking freely the previous evening.57

Right behind Katsuno was the elusive Major Osone, equally surprised. It seems his orders had somehow been miscommunicated and he was totally unaware of his intended role in the preparations for invasion. The only choice now, Tsuji decided, was to try to contact the local Thai army and police commanders to negotiate the Japanese troops' troops’ passage to the Malayan border. Under the strictest orders to avoid combat with the Thais if at all possible, the invaders’ arsenal included a sackful of Thai currency in the amount of 100,000 Baht “...for use in the eventuality that it might be possible, and much better, to solve certain problems by payment of money rather than by hurling projectiles." The Japanese all piled into the consul’s car and hurried toward the provincial police headquarters. The sky was growing light as they drove up to the police station's station’s front gate. Suddenly shots rang out and the Japanese leapt from their car into a nearby drainage ditch. Colonel Tsuji’s interpreter yelled to the Thai police who had fired the shots: “Don’t shoot! It is the Japanese Army. Ally with us and attack the British Army.” The Thais replied with more bullets.58 Having heard the shots, a battalion from the invasion force rushed to Colonel Tsuji’s rescue. In Tsuji’s words, fighting the Thai defenders “was like ColonelTsuji’s taking a sword to kill a barnyard fowl." Tsuji’s party was easily extricated and soon retreated to the beach to regroup with the main landing force. Boats were still coming ashore and the troops were just starting to assemble into their respective units when the Thai forces converged on the beach and opened fire. One battalion of Japanese had already marched on to the road toward town, and it was an easy matter to encircle the Thai defenders. Several Japanese units then moved inland to try to capture the military airfield on the other side of town, but Thai reinforcements brought up artillery and began to shell their own runways to prevent their use by the enemy. The fighting raged all through the morning and though the poorly

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equipped Thai forces had been caught off guard, the Japanese were put defenders' unexpectedly fierce resistance.” equally off balance by the defenders’ Meanwhile, other Japanese forces were facing stiff opposition at other invasion points throughout Thailand. In accordance with the Duty of the Thai People During War Act, provincial army units, policemen, even boy scout troops turned out to resist the invaders. They fought off the Japanese at Songkhla, Pattani, Prachuap, Prachinburi and elsewhere, spurred on by the standing orders of their Leader. Fighting, in many cases, was hand-to-hand.® hand-to-hand.40 Thai forces also confronted the British that day; three hundred Thai police foiled a preemptive attack of the British army as it crossed into Thailand at Pattani to confront the Japanese. Japanese,41 The defense of Thailand was brave and bold—but it was also brief. By noon on the eighth of December the shooting at Songkhla had stopped and Colonel Tsuji had met with his opposite number to discuss the passage of the Japanese force southward to Malaya. The decision to capitulate had not been made in the field; that, after all, would have constituted treason under the Duties Act. A message had been received from Bangkok to cease firing and allow the Japanese to pass. The commander at Songkhla obviously understood that this was not an order to allow the Japanese to occupy the province,, but other commanders elsewhere were not as clear and they refused to obey the order to surrender. Finally, delegations of Buddhist monks were sent to the holdouts to convince their commanders that the orders were indeed legitimate and that they would not be punished under the Duties Act for obeying them.42 To the surprise of many, the order to surrender had come directly from Field Marshal Phibul Songkhram, the Leader. One Thai writer recalls the mood immediately after the capitulation was announced: “What a heartpatriots," wrote ache and a disappointment to the brave but disunited patriots,” Kumut Chandruang, who was in Bangkok at the time, “I remember a young 43 officer tearing off his uniform and crying ‘Shame, shame.’"45

Chapter 9 The Alliance With Japan For nearly six months Phibul’s Phibul's propaganda machine had warned the people of Thailand that war was imminent and that they must be prepared to fight Rumors that Japanese troops had crossed into Thailand from Indochina became frequent. At the end of November a mistaken report by the BBC that thatJapan Japan had finally invaded Thailand nearly set off a panic before it could be successfully refuted.1 By December 1941, the public was almost numb with anxiety. But the Thai capacity for optimism is legendary and, early in December, despite the warnings and rumors, Bangkok vigorously prepared to celebrate the ninth anniversary of the 1932 constitution. A three-day festival was planned for December 8-10, and for several days before, the city’s residents busied themselves hanging lights and decorations along the boulevards around the Royal Grand Palace. A multitude of flags flapped in the springlike breezes of the early dry season, what the Thais consider ‘winter’. Bunting was hung from windows and draped around doorways. All over the city, multi-colored light bulbs were strung between lamp posts, on buildings and over trees. On the night of December 7 when the lights were tested, the streets glowed so colorfully that Westerners must have been reminded of Christmas; if not for the tropical weather, they might even have expected to hear sleigh bells or a Salvation Army band playing on Rachadamnem Avenue. For that brief moment the city’s mood was bright and optimistic, and an illusion of peace existed. But once the lights had been bee n tested, they were switched off and it was night again.2 Happily unaware of the approaching Japanese fleet and the urgent negotiations being conducted at Government House, the citizens returned to their darkened homes, to sleep and dream of a festival that was not to be.

The Decision to Capitulate On the night of December 7, Phibul was out of town. The day before, he had gone on an unscheduled inspection tour of the recently reconquered eastern territories and was not expected back in the capital for

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another day. In his absence Deputy Premier Adun Decharat, who was also Phibul’s national chief of police, police* was in charge of the government At about 9:00 P.M., Adun received a visitor from the Japanese embassy demanding to speak to the Prime Minister on a matter of greatest urgency. Informed that the Prime Minister was on the border and temporarily incommunicado, the Adun; Japanese Japanese emissary reluctantly delivered his message to Adun: forces were poised to enter Thailand but would cause no damage if they were allowed to pass freely en route to British Malaya. Japan wanted to assure the Thai government that this was not intended as an act of war against the Thais, and the emissary sought Phibul’s assurance that it would such.3 not be interpreted as such? Lacking the authority to make such an assurance, Adun immediately phoned Secretary General of the Cabinet Thawee Bunyaket who in turn cabinet.4 Adun then wired the border town of summoned a meeting of the cabinet Aranyaprathet and sent a messenger by car to Sisophon, two places where Phibul could possibly be reached? reached.5 Phibul received the telegram and was on the road back to Bangkok by 1:00 A.M. on December 8. Meanwhile, Adun and the cabinet members attempted to stall the Japanese. Fearing the consequences of violating the Duties Act, none of them wanted to suggest compliance with theJapanese the Japanese demands. Even if they had wished to comply, however, none of them had authority to do so; they all hoped the invasion would wait until Phibul arrived. The Japanese, nonetheless, set a 2:00 A.M. deadline, and the invasion was launched by 4:00 A.M. It was 6:50 A.M. by the time Phibul arrived, and by then the battle of Songkhla had already begun. begun?6 After consulting with his ministers and hearing the Japanese position, Phibul ordered Thai forces to cease their resistance at 7:30 A.M. on December 8, but as we have seen, fighting continued long afterward, perhaps because official announcement of confused communications or perhaps because the officialannouncement of the capitulation was not made to the general public until noon. 7 By then, blood had been spilt on both sides and Japanese chances of fostering a congenial spirit of “co-prosperity” and mutual interest with the Thais against rhe Western powers had suffered a serious blow. the It strikes one as odd that, at a time when half the world was expecting “southward advance” advance" at any moment, Phibul should Japan to begin its "southward choose to absent himself from the capital and journey so far out of contact from his government. Certainly as commander-in-chief and the only man authorized to order mass mobilization or to request a declaration of war, he should have stayed in constant touch with his government when the threat of war was so obvious. Britain and Japan, throughout November 1941, had each complained that the other was massing troops to invade Thailand,8 and it has already been shown that Phibul regarded the Japanese troops near Siemreap as a potential invasion force. On December 7, the day after Phibul left for his inspection tour, his foreign minister, Direk Chayanam, summoned British Minister Sir Josiah

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“urged in the strongest terms" that Crosby’s Crosby for an interview. Direk "urged government should not send troops across the border “unless or until the Japanese struck shuck the first blow."’Such remarks make it obvious that the Thais expected a Japanese attack very soon. Also, since foreign ministers do not as a rule make such strong pronouncements without instructions, it is reasonable to assume that Phibul instructed Direk to do so either before leaving Bangkok or in a message sent shortly thereafter. In fact, Vichitvong asserts (albeit without citing a source) that Direk met with the Japanese ambassador on November 24 and learned then of the Japanese intentions to pass through Thailand to attack the British. Soon after, Phibul received positive intelligence that the Japanese attack was forthcoming, perhaps within days, and he announced this information at cabinet meetings on November 28 and December 3.10 It is reasonable, of course, for a general to wish to inspect the strength invasion—but and disposition of his forces in advance of an imminent invasion:—but Phibul was no mere general. His powers as commander-in-chief and head of government could not be delegated, but he could surely have trusted his military chief of staff to inspect the border defenses for him and report back. Instead, Phibul left his cabinet in charge without even leaving instructions in case the expected invasion began in his absence. Thawee points out that the acting defense minister did not even know of Phibul’s “counter-attack policy.”11 policy." version of these events, explains his reasons for Phibul, in his own version, leaving Bangkok when he did. On December 4, he writes, he met with Army Chief of Staff Lt. General Chira Wichitsongkhram to discuss the coming war: they estimated, Phibul claims, that it would be two to three months before war broke out between betweenJapan Japan and the Western powers but that, when it did, Thailand would not be able to avoid involvement. The two men assumed that as long as negotiations continued between the U.S. and Japan, then nothing would happen. “However,” writes Phibul, “we were not careless. We had ordered mobilization but it could not be done as fast as we had wished.” For the sake of secrecy, he explains, orders were hand delivered to individual commanders, a time-consuming procedure. “We then agreed to go to inspect Sisophon [at the border] and would hurry back to move the commanding headquarters to Lopburi immediately so that our plan for fighting would be fruitful.” fruitful."12 Phibul’s account presents an incongruous mixture of urgency and dalliance. On one hand he complains that the method of delivering mobilization orders was too slow and mentions that he ordered the procedure quickened; he also mentions the need to “hurry back” and relocate his command center. On the other hand, his description of the actual inspection tour impresses one as strangely leisurely. Phibul’s party had made at least two stops on the way to Sisophon, one to consult with a division commander at Prachinburi and another to overnight at

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Aranyaprathet. As a result, they took over 24 hours to reach their objective. (On his return trip, Phibul was able to cover the same distance in less than six hours once word of the invasion finally reached him.) Once at Sisophon, instead of hurrying back, Phibul decided to take an unscheduled side trip: We inspected the location and conducted military maneuvers in preparation of a possible invasion by Japan. After that we planned to return. Then someone told me

[Battambong] Province and since I was already at that I had never visited Phratabong [Baitambong]Province Sisophon I should take the chance to visit Phratabong. I then drove to Phratabong 3

myself.” myself.

As a result of this unplanned excursion, Phibul was temporarily incommunicado at the precise moment when his authority was required to either coordinate or halt resistance to the Japanese invasion. Thawee believes that even after receiving the news from Bangkok, Phibul tarried. “He could have come back earlier," Thawee writes. “Perhaps he wanted to have some time for himself before he would pass on the momentous decision to the Japanese."14 This explanation is unsatisfactory, as is the explanation Phibul offers in his own version: “I went out to Prachinburi for an official inspection trip onDecember6, on December 6, 1941 because I wanted...to inspect the fighting line at Sisophon, not to escape from war or to conclude a secret treaty withJapan as rumors and propaganda stated.” stated."15 Perhaps the gentleman protests too strongly. There is, in fact, some evidence that Phibul did conclude a secret agreement with Japan, though not at the border in December 1941. Though the evidence is somewhat inconclusive, it is still quite compelling and deserves consideration. Recall that while the border dispute with French Indochina was heating up, Phibul had elected to pursue the possibility of arranging for the Japanese to arbitrate a settlement favoring Thailand. Between September 28 and October 1, 1940, messages had passed between Phibul’s office and the office of the Japanese military attache in Bangkok. According to a report dated October 28, 1940, sent from the Japanese legation in Bangkok to Tokyo’s foreign office, Phibul had intimated in these Japanese* to transit Thai messages that he might be willing to allow the Japaneseterritory in the event they should want to attack British Burma or Malaya. The top-secret despatch further claimed that Phibul had personally confirmed the proposal in a private meeting with the Japanese military attache on October 1, emphasizing that Thai hospitality to the Japanese army would 16 only be possible if a favorable settlement with Hanoi could be arranged.15 Years later Phibul firmly denied that any such deal was ever made. He wrote that the Japanese ambassador had approached him to sign a secret treaty but that he had refused. “I swear I have never even by words agreed to go to war on the side of Japan," Phibul wrote. “As for written agreements they were out of the question."17 Indeed, the Japanese source confirms that

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Phibul did reject Japan’s appeal for him to commit himself in writing, but the Japanese version is that Phibul expected them to take his word, arguing that a secret treaty would require the cooperation of his cabinet, many of whom harbored pro-British sentiments and could not be trusted to keep the secret 18 Nevertheless, the fact that Phibul’s Phibul's commitment to Japan was never secured on paper does not change the reality that as early as October 1, 1940, the Japanese were under the distinct impression that he was willing to cooperate with them in the event of war. Their faith in that commitment was demonstrated by the military and diplomatic support Japan lent to Thailand in her border conflict with France. Such aid would hardly have been given if Japan had any reason to suspect that the Thais would turn Japanese guns and planes against Japanese forces attempting to pass through Thai territory en route to Singapore and Rangoon. After the conclusion of the border affair, however, Phibul managed to create a measure of doubt in the minds of the Japanese. He complained bitterly about the terms of the new Franco-Thai treaty in which Thai troops were forced to withdraw from the newly returned territories and Thailand was made to pay certain reparations io to France. Thus, Japan could not be certain that Phibul still felt bound by his oral commitment. Yet, while they could not be sure of him, there still remained reason to hope. Meanwhile, Phibul hedged his bets by engaging the Americans and the British in aa. similar game of diplomatic equivocation. Within Within days of his confidential meeting with theJapanese military attache, Phibul had personal interviews with the ministers of both those governments. Each envoy was equally concerned that an anticipated Thai attack on French Indochina would ultimately further the goals of the Japanese. In his talk with the American minister, Mr. Grant, Phibul managed to convince him that even as prime minister, Phibul’s influence over the Thai military was minimal. Without effective American diplomatic support for his own irredenta, Phibul that he could prevent a certain “powerful group of pleaded, it was unlikely chat officers” officers” from pursuing their own territorial ambitions and dragging Thailand into the Japanese orbit. Grant’s despatch to Cordell Hull quotes Phibul as saying that army officers were demanding action in the field and 1 thathe that he was afraid that “...’they “...'they might kill me ifl if I do notfollow not follow their desires.” desires.’”15?* While Grant could give no hope to Phibul that Washington wouid would deviate from its policy of “strict maintenance of the status quo,” quo” he was persuaded that any action taken by Thailand in Japan’s behalf would not be Phibul’s doing. Grant’s despatch was emphatic: I am convinced that the military and political leader of Thailand is virtually a prisoner and certainly a puppet of a military mil itary clique which has the power and is determined to" to' ..use use force [in]... Indochina, in conformity of course with the Japanese program.... program.,.. I believe the military dique clique is waging a war of nerves on [Prime Minister Phibul], that

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this mild mannered man is in the firm grip of his own army and navy officers and that

in the background of the whole business,” business."20 Japan looms In

Thus, on October 1, 1940, Phibul had led the Japanese to believe that he could single-handedly rally Thailand to their side if they supported his irredentist cause and that the only reason he could not sign a treaty with Tokyo was because he had little power over his Anglophile cabinet Three days later, the wily Phibul led the Americans to believe that he had no control over his military and that without U.S. support for his irredenta, he could not guarantee what his officers would do. More than one year before Japan invaded Thailand, then, it would appear that Phibul was already tending toward the Japanese camp and that he wanted no one to know it— save the Japanese—until the wisdom of that course had been tested and proved. Several days later, in October of 1940, in a meeting with the British Minister, Mr. Crosby, Phibul assured England that “...up to the present time Thailand had made no deal with Japan and [that] there is no military alliance.”21 He further assured Crosby that whatever arrangements Thailand made with Japan concerning Indochina, they would not include allowing Japan to use Thai territory as a springboard for an attack on British interests “floored" when Phibul added that he in the area. Crosby was reportedly “floored” believed “...the only solution of the problem of East Asia is the formation of abloc of powers consisting of Great Britain, the United States and Holland Japan.”22 The meeting concluded with Crosby extending what to oppose Japan." for whatever terms Thailand amounted to the British government’s blessings forwhatever could arrange withJapan—provided that Britain would not be compromised it should prove necessary as a result. Phibul now had all the bases covered. If itshould to Japan, neither Britain nor the U.S. and advantageous to honor his promise toJapan, could blame him; if it should prove wiser to disappoint Japan,, there would All that remained was to avoid taking be no written proof of any agreement. AU sides until the likely outcome of the situation could be assessed. see” policy is revealed in a comment The essence of Phibul’s “wait and see" addressed to one of his military aides during the war. The aide, Colonel Netr Khemayothin, recalled Phibul once saying to him: “...[Wjhich side do you think wfll will lose this war? That side is our enemy.”23 There can be little doubt that the motivation for Phibul’s deliberate absence fromBangkok from Bangkok at atime a time he knew thatJapanwas thatJapan was about to attack was that he wanted to avoid choosing sides until he could determine which side allow him to see which side was more likely io to win. This stratagem would aUow would attack first, in what strength, and with what effect. As events unfolded, by the time Phibul had returned to the capital news had reached Bangkok of Japan’s simultaneous attacks on Singapore, the Philippines, and, astoundingly, on Hawaii. According to all reports, Western forces had been caught off guard and were on the defensive. By 7:30 A.M., Bangkok

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time, there could be little doubt in Phibul’s mind as to which side was winning. Additional political motives for his “inspection tour” can also be deduced. Perhaps he felt a sample of combat, which he could justify only by his absence, was needed to convince his domestic political opponents that resistance was futile. Had he simply ordered his forces to let the Japanese pass before the invasion began, there would have been no bloodshed, but Phibul would have lost considerable face with the Assembly, which had for years listened to his bombastic rhetoric about the need for a strong defense and the will to fight foreign aggressors. Perhaps, too, he wanted the Japanese to taste the Thais’ capacity for violence. Colonial misconceptions in those days, had given rise to the stereotype of a gentle, smiling and passive Thai race—an image at odds with the historical record of Thailand's centuries-long warfare with the Burmese, Khmer and other neighboring peoples. The surprise that awaited the Japanese at Songkhla was ample evidence of the Thais' Thais’ potential to harass and complicate Japan’s Japan's war effort should the Japanese prove to be anything less than gracious guests. Whatever Phibul’s reasons for going to Sisophon on December 6-7, 1941, the compelling conclusion is that his motives were not military, but rather political, and were designed to save face and to avoid choosing sides. Ironically, Phibul’s equivocation and vacillation produced, in the long run, the opposite effect to his intent. HavingHaving played the fox so skillfully on the foreign affairs front had eroded Phibul’s leonine image at home. His words nurtured' public expectations that Thailand would stand firm against any invader, but his deeds came to be seen as evidence that he lacked the courage of his convictions and thethe - necessary strength of character to enemies.- Soon, his domestic adversaries were unleash phra dej against his enemies.' able to use his vacillation against him and to once again set in motion the circulation of elites.

After Capitulation Despite Phibul’s personal contact with the front line forces in the east, and despite his having arranged and “conducted military maneuvers in preparation of a possible invasion by Japan,” a division of Japan’s Konoe Imperial Guards easily crossed the border at dawn on December 8 and headed toward Bangkok. Though he he.was was with the Japanese fifth division time. Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, the Japanese Chief of in Songkhla at the time, Operations, later learned the details of the Imperial Guard’s advance. “Itlthe “It Ithe Imperial Guards Division! Division] broke through the frontier without encountering resistance of any importance,” importance," writes Colonel Tsuji, “and by noon on 9th December its leading units had arrived at a position a few kilometers from 24 Bangkok.”14

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The men of the Imperial Guards had been carefully trained and selected, explains Colonel Tsuji, for the delicate task of making “a bloodless advance” on Bangkok and seizing the capital with minimal violence. Once the troops had taken up a secure position outside the city, a young officer and his aide were selected to drive into the capital and “ascertain the state of affairs....” affairs...."25 Apparently this unit was as yet unaware of the Thai government’s decision to capitulate, and, as events soon revealed, so were a number of Thais on the outskirts of Bangkok. Before long the major and his secretary were driving south at full speed. When they Muang] aerodrome, just outside Bangkok, a hostile reached a point close dose to [Don Muangj group of excited and panic-stricken Thai soldiers and civilians blocked their way. A crowd began to mock the motor car and then attacked it.... The swarming mob orderly and finally killed them.... The major’s dead body hemmed in the major and his orderiy with sabre and revolver still grasped in his hands was picked up later, covered with 34 wounds.24

The idea of capitulation obviously did not sit well with everyone. Several confused days passed before the events of December 7 and 8—events abroad as well as those in Thailand—could be sorted out and distilled by the media, and then presented to the public. One contemporary source notes that long after the official announcement of capitulation "...Thai “...Thai from remote villages, land] jungle people from the Mis, land! hills, were still coming to provincial centers to volunteer for the fight they took for granted was being made against the 27 enemy. n27 In Bangkok, on the evening of the eighth, an outraged newspaper enemy." editor published and distributed a pamphlet condemning Phibul as a traitor.28 Another source describes the appearance of “Free Thai” leaflets tacked to telegraph poles and trees in the capital.29 Though police rounded up many of these dissident publishers and jailed them for sedition, an underground press emerged and continued to publish throughout the war. Even Phibul’s Phibui’s cabinet was not in full agreement agteement on the merits of capitulation. Dissenting ministers had argued, on the morning of December 8, that the terms of capitulation should not give the appearance that Thailand was actively aiding Japan militarily.30 One of ofthe vocal the most vo cal critics was Finance Minister Pridi Banomyong, who subsequently lost his cabinet post for daring to challenge Phibul’s Phibui’s proJapanese stance. Phibul transferred Pridi to the Council of Regents, a prestigious but politically powerless post in which Pridi served as one of three symbolicrepresentatives symbolic representatives oftheking. of the king. Undaunted, Pridi immediately proceeded to build up an underground resistance. Though disappointment with the decision to capitulate seems to have been widespread, most accounts have little to say about the following month and a half: it was as if the country were holding its breath. Phibul stalled as long as possible, using the time to assess Japan’s progress in the Pacific before deciding to enter into an outright alliance with the Axis, as

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Japan had been pressing him to do. For at least two weeks Phibul followed his cabinet’s advice and assumed a diplomatic posture that mimicked that of Nazi—occupied Denmark. Though Thailand had not prevented Japan’s advance, nor had it assisted the invasion. This stance of supposed neutrality, however, pleased neither Japan nor Britain; demands grew from each side for Phibul to choose. On December 12 a shortwave broadcast from the United States was heard throughout Thailand. From San Francisco, the Thai minister to Washington, M.R. Seni Pramoj, denounced Phibul for submitting so easily to Japan and for betraying the country’s confidence. Seni continued to broadcast daily thereafter, announcing the formation of a “Free Thai Movement” comprising Thai expatriates in the United States, mostly university students, calling for the overthrow of the Phibul regime and the expulsion of theJapanese. thejapanese?311 In the eyes of the world, therefore, circumstances had already painted Phibul as a friend of Tokyo and an enemy of freedom. But the same circumstances also implied that friendship between Phibul and Thailand’s advantage. With the U.S. Pacific fleet in Tokyo could now be to Thailand's tatters and the British navy otherwise occupied, Japan seemed certain to succeed. Further, it also seemed certain that Japan intended to secure its position in Thailand, by force if necessary. That the Thai government had not pledged its support to Japan worried Tokyo not so much for missing what Thailand could contribute to the war effort, but rather for the potential of the Thais to hamper Tokyo’s moves. Japanese troops in Thailand were surrounded by a population whose sentiments had proved less than congenial and whose armed police and military still posed a conceivable security threat Japan, therefore, was on the verge of forcibly disarming the Thais when Phibul addressed his cabinet on December 10 to propose that Thailand demonstrate its good faith and enter the Axis alliance. In negotiating with[theJapanese] last night, they said they were grateful to us for what we had done so far. But they felt that the existing agreement lacked firmness. 1asked I asked them what they wanted. They said they wanted military cooperation. They have brought in tens of thousands of troops, saying that they cannot wait. They have taken mist over everything they want; schools, temples and what have you. They do not trust us....M us....*

Japanese forces had already disarmed many Thai police and army units and had taken over railways and airfields as they pleased. There was no reason to believe that the Japanese could be persuaded to desist and respect Thai sovereignty without a firm Thai commitment to either support the Japanese—or to crush them. Phibul assured the ministers that the option of battle was hardly open to them.

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It does not mean lack of courage. We have only fifty tanks, but they have come in In inferior during our conflict with French thousands. Our planes whose speeds proved Inferior Indochina are obsolete. The most important thing is that at the moment the Japanese forces have been so successful everywhere. Our armed strength is Is so trivial and so much will be wasted if not carefully preserved. Why not spare lives for further deliberation? When everything is all over, we can wash our hands....[T]o hands....fTlo survive now, we have to cooperate with them.” them.33

Phibul’s analysis was convincing. Thus, on December 21, 1941, the Thai "government government signed a treaty of alliance with Japan. Nonetheless, Phibul continued to resist Japanese pressures to declare war on the United States and Britain. Phibul later recalled that the Japanese representatives continually assaulted him with threats and intimidation to get him to make such a declaration. “If the people know [sfd about the treatment the Japanese gave me,” he wrote, "...I “...I believe that they would sympathize with me and the ...I had argued against what [the Japanese] asked government headed by me. ...1 me to do until I had a bad headache.... but the Japanese... wanted us to do as they said. said.”54 Thailand finally declared war on the Allies on January 25, 1942.

Kingly Aspirations and Martial Law Despite Phibul’s appeals for sympathy and his protestations that Japanese threats had forced his hand, the fact remains that the declaration of war was linked to a secret protocol with the Japanese. In this agreement, Japan transferred io to Thailand certain territories that Japanese troops had captured from Britain in Burma andMalaya. and Malaya. The evidence strongly suggests that Phibul had been able to exercise more leverage in the matter than he 35 admits.55 The official declaration of a state of war also helped justify Phibul’s imposition of martial law, by which means the Leader was finally able to seize absolute power over the realm. With such power, and basking in the reflected glory of his apparently victorious allies, Phibul was able to resume his pre-war domestic agenda of "nation-building” “nation-building” and modernization—and to legitimize his pretensions to regal status. Having done the things that kings do, and having achieved the power that kings once had, Phibul renewed his quest for an actual crown. Phibul planned to revive the use of noble titles, a practice abandoned since 1932, and to take for himself the rare and exalted rank of Somdet Chao Phraya, last used in the nineteenth century by the regent ruling on behalf of the young King Chulalongkorn. At the same time, Phibul employed official state historians in the task of establishing his supposed descent from 56 One source even says that shortly the sixteenth century King Naresuan.36 after the war broke out the Japanese dissuaded Phibul from declaring 37 himself king, supposedly because such a move would offend Hirohito.57

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Phibul’s biggest step towards donning a crown was a proposal he put forth in 1942 to build a new capital city in the jungle at the northern edge of Thailand’s central plains. He first suggested a relatively accessible site in Saraburi Province, but later plans shifted the location of the proposed new capital to Petchabun, a malaria-ridden region of dense forests surrounded by mountains. Phibul claimed that the relocation was necessary because the 38 threat of Allied bombingraids bombing raids on Bangkokwas Bangkok was disrupting the government.58 Years later, Phibul’s widow explained that her husband was all the while secretly planning to use the new capital as a base from which to launch an uprising against thejapanese, the Japanese, with whom he had never really wanted to ally 59 himself in the first place.39 In fact the war had little to do with the Petchabun proposal. Phibul had first considered relocating the capital as early as 1939; his proposed site at the time was Lopburi, north of Ayudhya, where he had, as Bhahon’s defense minister, ordered the construction of a large military base. 40 Obviously he had been contemplating such a move even before becoming prime minister and long before the Pacific War. Given Phibul’s pre-occupation with kingship and its prerequisites, however, a better explanation for the Petchabun project might well be found in Thai history. Many of the founders of great dynasties had also founded new capital cities: King Rama I, for example, seized the throne from KingTaksin King Taksin and moved the capital from Thonburi to Bangkok. In support of this hypothesis is the fact that Phibul, even as his new city dty was being constructed, had ordered the transfer from Bangkok to Petchabun of the Emerald Buddha,41 that most sacred image— and most potent symbol of dynastic legitimacy—housed in the king’s personal chapel at the Royal Grand Palace. Rama I had similarly moved the Emerald Buddha across the river from Thonburi to Bangkok when in 1782 he founded the Chakri Dynasty. Ironically, far from establishing Phibul as a new monarch, the Petchabun project, along with the vagaries of the war, soon proved to be the Leader’s undoing. When the tides of war began to turn in favor of the Allies, Phibul was faced with the dire consequences of his policies and of having joined the wrong side. Unlike his prestige-winning confrontation with France in 1940-1941, siding provedpolitically withJapan proved politically fatal for Phibul. Whereas the Indochina Affair had unified the elite under Phibul’s leadership, his pact with Tokyo had achieved just the opposite. Soon, even the mainstream Bangkok press began reporting about schisms among the elite as a result of Phibul’s alliance with Japan.42 Pridi’s removal from the cabinet had been followed by the resignation of Foreign Minister Direk, a long-time Anglophile. Vilas Oasathanon, a minister 4s without portfolio, also resigned in protest on December 17, 1941.45 The opposition in the Assembly, won over by Phibul’s gestures of solidarity following the victory over France, now returned to its pre-war stance of antagonism toward the Leader’s agenda. Still under martial law and with the majority of the Assembly seats held by military men, the civilian opposition

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could do little more than talk. Gradually, however, as Phibul’s popularity dwindle, mere talk itself became more and more of a threat to him. The privations of the war, the erosion of the Thai economy, the presence of Japanese troops in the country, and a panoply of other irritants combined over time to turn even Phibul’s most staunch supporters against him.

Phibul's Decline Though the whole intent of the capitulation of December 8, 1941 was to get the Japanese quickly out of Thailand and on to their ultimate objectives, the treaty of alliance of December 21 provided the justification for a continued Japanese military presence. The initial invasion force of 44 50,000 hadgrown though the latter figure probably had grown to 150,000 menby 1945,44 represents a sudden increase toward the end of the war as the British Thailand. A counter-offensive in Burma pushed the Japanese back into Thailand Japanese source gives the number of Japanese soldiers in Thailand in late 10,000.45 Though Japanese soldiers were visible in Bangkok 1944 as only 10.000. strategic urban centers throughout the country, they had little and at several strategicurban contact with the general public, and many Thais probably never saw a Japanese for the duration of the war.46 Thailand seems not to have suffered the same brutality visited upon civilians elsewhere in occupied Southeast Asia, where the Japanese military exercised police powers over indigenous populations. Japanese soldiers stationed in Thailand were under orders to behave as guests (though those orders were not always obeyed). Except for taking repeated “loans" from the Thai treasury and fixing an inflated exchange rate that disrupted the Thai economy, Japan interfered but little with Thailand’s internal affairs. Unlike Burma and Indonesia, there were no government.47 Nor was there any JapaneseJapanese advisers in the Thai government withPhibul directed mass mobilization or politicization—though with Phibul in power, there was no need for such measures. For most of the country life went on as usual, except for a shortage of consumer goods. Cut off from Western producers and with Japanese shipping under constant Allied attack, the section of society accustomed to imported luxuries had to do without. And domestic production was diverted from peace-time industries by the doth goods were hard to come by, as were leather shoes demands of war; cloth and gasoline, but food was never a problem. The price of rice was high but not as high as it had been during the First World War. 48 In fact, because Thailand was cut off from its export markets, rice became so plentiful at one point that it was actually burned as fuel in the Bangkok electricity generating plants.49 For most Thais the war was an inconvenience, not a tragedy, and plants the Japanese were regarded neither as the great allies they portrayed, nor as the monsters they became in the other occupied Asian countries. At first, the Thais regarded their Japanese guests as pests to be tolerated whenever they could not be avoided. As the war progressed, however, the

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cultural dashes clashes that inevitably arise between an occupied people and their occupiers stretched the limits of Thai tolerance. A sampling of wartime anecdotes ranges from stories of rude Japanese soldiers taking seats on street cars, making old women stand, to the case of a Thai boy beaten to death for refusing to run errands for Japanese soldiers bivouacked at the National Stadium. An extreme incident began when Japanese soldiers, having teased and jostled a Thai Buddhist monk, were confronted by an angry mob from a nearby village. The Japanese fired on the villagers, killing many, and soon found themselves in an armed battle with provincial Thai police as a result 50 In the course of time, such incidents added insult to inconvenience, and, as the Japanese war effort floundered, more and more Thais came to question and then condemn their Leader for involving them in Japan’s Eutile cause. Having basked in the reflected glory of the Rising seemingly futile Sun, Phibul now bore the stain of guilt by association. By 1943, his public political support eroded, Phibul’s chances of ascending image soiled and his politicalsupport non-existent. Thawee notes that by then the throne by popular acclaim were non-existent.Thawee members of the cabinet and the Assembly were considering Phibul’s removal.51 By February 1943, Phibul must surely have seen the writing on the wall. Early in the previous year he had become aware of an anti-Japanese faction growing within the ranks of his otherwise loyal army officer corps. Officers Army’s third division, a volunteer unit attached to the of the Northwestern Army's Japanese Army fighting in northern Burma, approached Phibul in 1942 to explore the possibility of their making friendly contact with the Chinese, presumably because the Thai officers preferred to fight against Japan. One source claims that Phibul actually approved the idea. Though friendly contact between the Thai Army and the Kuomintang was eventually 52 established, it did not, however occur until January 1944.53 In the meantime, Pridi’s underground opposition had by the end of 1942 made two unsuccessful attempts to send their own agents into China to contact the Allies and explore the possibility of establishing a government in exile.55 On both occasions, Pridi’s agents disappeared while en route through the wilds of northern Laos. Then, in mid-February 1943, Pridi planned a third expedition. His representative this time was Chamkat Balankura, a long-time critic of Phibul and one of the earliest members of the underground. The plan for this journey was elaborate and necessitated getting a visa from the French Embassyso Embassy so that Chamkat might travel through “training."5* Once in Laos he Indochina, ostensibly on his way to Japan for "training."* was to change direction and make his way to China. Phibul may well have gotten wind of these preparations; at any rate, he must have suspected by now that members of his own government and the Assembly were conspiring against him. If so, such suspicions would go a long way toward explaining his strange behavior on February 12, 1943.

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Returning that day from a visit to the Petchabun construction site, Phibul was in a state of distraction. Thawee describes Phibul then as “having apparently a not-very-balanced mind." mind.” 55 With no advance warning, Phibul submitted his resignation to the Council of Regents. Phibul gave his reason as poor health, but Thawee speculates that it stemmed from personal problems at home. Neither explanation is totally plausible. Vichitvong notes that Phibul had “resigned” before on more than one occasion, perhaps attempting to pose a threat or perhaps to remind his political critics how much they needed him in spite of their differences, given the fact that the country was at war. Each time he had resigned, he had done so with complete confidence that the resignation would be rejected or that, if it were accepted, the Assembly packed with military men loyal to their Leader would clamor to get him reappointed. Such resignations were a face-gaining Adilya, device which had always succeeded. Each time he had quit, Prince Aditya, the senior member of the Regency Council, had returned Phibul’s resignation and begged him to reconsider. Phibul always reconsidered—and always o n *54 decided to stay on. This time it may have been that Phibul, increasingly aware of underground activities, figured that the same ploy would again shake up his opposition and force everyone to fall back into line. Phibul later told Thawee that his February 12 resignation had been tendered merely “to test the honesty and faithfulness of the regents....,”57 one of whom was Pridi Banomyong. Phibul also told Adun Decharat that after he submitted the resignation he learned how many people had been waiting for him to do just that. Only after he had quit did Phibul realize that he had walked into a trap of his own making.58 The regents failed Phibul’s test. Instead of beseeching Phibul to reconsider, Prince Aditya passed the letter onto Pridi, who had it read on Radio Thailand that very night, announcing at the same time that the Regents RadioThailand had reluctantly accepted it Since most of the military assemblymen were out of the capital on war-time assignments, there was no clamor to reappoint Phibul. Phibul had out-foxed himself. That night he must suddenly have realized that the strength of the underground opposition was far greater than he had guessed. The next morning Phibul’s soldiers were out on the streets of Bangkok escorted by armored cars and tanks, tracking down and intimidating assemblymen and cabinet ministers suspected by Phibul Of conspiring against him. Phibul’s armed representatives visited the radio station and ordered a new broadcast revoking the prime minister’s resignation, and explaining that it had all been a mistake. Phibul then called an emergency cabinet meeting, but the ministers were reluctant to leave their houses. Thawee relates that he, for one, was afraid: "I ”1 suspected that if I went out I might get killed by the soldiers."59 Khuang Aphaiwong, the minister of communications, initially refused to attend, though at the urging of a fellow minister finally relented. “When I

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got there," there,” Khuang recalls, “the Field Marshal was looking angry. He asked me why I had refused to attend the meeting. I said why should I. The government had resigned, therefore there should not be any cabinet meeting.” meeting."60 While Khuang’s defiant tone angered Phibul, it seemed to inspire the other ministers. Phibul turned to Thawee and accused him of conspiring with the Regents, implying, that the letter had been forged. that he himself hadseen had seen the letter. Phibul then Thawee rebuffed him, noting thathe asked Thawee what he had imagined his reasons for resigning could have been. Thawee quotes from the dialogue: [I saidj "Perhaps 'Perhaps you have been influenced by events in Europe...and Europe..and [you] cannot avoid thinking that Germany and the Axis Powers are going to be defeated in the war. You have made an alliance withJapan, and you probably think that you should resign, so that a new Premier may easily switch over to a new policy and save Thailand from

Powers.,..' "Oh, ‘Oh, any harsh treatment that may be meted out by the victorious Allied Powers...." you think too much,' much," Phibul replied.661’

This line of thought was, of ofcourse.notPhibul’splanbutPridi’s, course, notPhibul’s planbut Pridi’s, and by now it must have been dear to Phibul that a good number in his own government had come to similar condusions. conclusions. It now became necessary for Phibul to convince his ministers that his continued leadership in no way preduded a break withJapan. He toldThawee, “I do notregard the pact withJapan as more 62 up -any time."68 than a scrap of paper. I can tear it up-any Then he offered to mend fences and called for unity in the face of national crisis. But Thawee and Khuang were already committed to another course of action, and they both resigned from the cabinet on the spot It was a tremendous loss of face for Phibul and marked the beginning of his political demise. Meanwhile, Chamkat’s mission to China had succeeded. He arrived at Chungking in April 1943 and made contact with the American O.S.S., who were already planning to infiltrate Thailand with a number of agents recruited from Seni Pramoj’s Free Thai expatriates in the U.S. and England. (Within a year, Pridi’s people and Seni’s commandoes would join together PhibuTs inside Thailand to subvert not just the Japanese war effort but also Phibul’s government.) On the political home front, Thawee and Khuang had added their weight to Pridi’s faction .and, using their influence in the Assembly, persistently chipped away at Phibul’s power base. By mid-1944 the underground group had recruited most of the civilian Assemblymen as well as members of the cabinet, high-ranking military men, and even Phibul’s trusted chief of police and deputy premier, Adun Decharat In July 1944, the Phibul government collapsed when, amidst powerful objections to continued funding and the conscription of forced labor for Phibul’s Petchabun project, the Assembly passed a no-confidence bill calling for Phibul’s resignation. The Assembly then proceeded to strip Phibul of all military powers.

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The first public indications of the changes taking place among the elite followed within days. The front pages of Bangkok newspapers which for years bore such obligatory slogans as “Follow the Leader and the nation will be safe!" now offered such new patriotic messages as, “The safety and 65 progress of the nation lie in the constitution." Suddenly it was 1932 again. constitution.”9 1?9

representatives from most of the country’s universities and colleges—began students* complaints to the general public, first in a protest over to carry the students’ the subjugation of courts to the Justice Ministry, and then over the government’s inaction against foreign (specificallyJapanese) domination of was mitigated by .the the Thai economy. Government concern .was ,the seemingly nationalistic tone of the movement as well as by the initial appearance that the public seemed disinterested.4 In June of 1973, the regime finally began to take the NSCT seriously when, after months of searching, the leaders of the NSCT found, quite by accident, a means to unite the students and the general public in common cause. It began when nine students from Ramkhamhaeng University were expelled for publishing and distributing an underground newspaper critical of the regime. University officials felt that the paper’s characterization of the National Executive Council as wild beasts—as well as its implications of at* the Thung Yai Wildlife high-level involvement in a poaching scandal at' Preserve—were inappropriate and constituted grounds for expulsion. The NSCT disagreed, and the Center’syoungSecretary General, Thirayudh Boonmee, a Chulalongkorn University engineering student from a poor called for a rallyatDemocracy rallyat Democracy Monument to demand the reinstatement family, caliedfor of the nine,and assurances from the government of the students' freedom of speech. Students gathered at the campuses of all the major universities, and planned to converge at the monument. Several buses were hired,by hired.by the. students of Ramkhamhaeng University, an outlying campus far from the city’s center, to take something less than a thousand protesters to the rally. En route, however, a police blockade stopped the Ramkhamhaeng caravan, and police officers confiscated the licenses of the bus drivers. The intent hadbeen to deny transport to the protesters and thereby break them up, but the students simply proceeded to walk the rest of the way, gathering bystanders and creating a traffic-halting mass procession. Halfway to Rachadamnem Boulevard, the Ramkhamhaeng students were joined joined by protesters from Chulalongkorn University. By the time those two groups arrived at the monument and met up with a third delegation, from Thammasat University, their ranks had swelled to the tens of thousands. The government, assuming that it could halt the flow of students.into students into the streets of Bangkok, ordered all the universities to shut down for the day. The tactic, however, backfired. Though many students, upon finding their afternoon classes canceled, didreturn home or to their dorms, many more decided to spend the afternoon out of doors and find out what all the. commotion was about; All afternoon the city’s streets were clogged with the processions from various campuses, and, as their meeting point was in the middle of a central thoroughfare, Bangkok traffic was at a standstill. By nightfall of June 21 a multitude of over 50,000 had gathered at the monument. Students from all over Bangkok, from provincial campuses as distant as Chiang Mai,5 poured into the central intersection. Thousands of

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non-students joined in as well. Soon protesters had taken over the wide traffic circle at the center of which stood Democracy Monument Through the night bands played, speakers spoke, and the multitude chanted its demands. A whole host of complaints was aired against the Thanom-Praphas-Narong regime by a range of discontented citizens who had till then remained quiet and resigned. Student leaders, of course, decried the expulsion of their nine Ramkhamhaeng colleagues, but labor unionists also addressed the crowd regarding the dual dilemma of high prices and low wages. The need for a withdrawal of American forces was brought up. Environmental and economic issues were addressed as were poll tical freedom under martial law. The demonstrators the lack of rights and political called for guarantees that the people should have a voice in government, a constitution like the one which Democracy Monument commemorated. The demonstrators vowed to remain at the monument until the nine were reinstated, and despite a monsoon downpour, they persisted through the night. The next morning, the Bangkok Post proclaimed the event “Bangkok’s biggest-ever demonstration,"6 and the government, fearing the for the students’expanding consequences of such widespread publicsupport publicsupportfor list of complaints, decided to acquiesce to the NSCTs NSGTs original demand; Ramkhamhaeng University’s rector, Dr. Sakdi Phasooknirand, was instructed to reinstate the nine. It proved a wise move, and shortly after it was announced, Thirayudh and the other NSCT leaders called the rally quits, sending everyone home. 7 The June incident contained lessons for all concerned. The regime learned the importance of a quick but measured response to nip dissent in the bud, though, as subsequent events were to prove, they did not learn it very well. For those among the ruling elite who still sought to depose the regime, for General Krit and his encouragers, it taught that their patience was not wasted, and that soon there would be opportunity enough to stage their coup d’etat without risk of failure. And, for Thirayudh and the NSCT, it taught the importance of mass support, that while the student leaders controlled a mass of people out in the streets the government would listen to them, would negotiate and consider their demands. Once the crowds dispersed, however, student power disappeared. Within a day of the demonstration’s end, Dr. Sakdi announced that, while he would hold to the letter of the agreement revoking his expulsion access to the school by changing their of the nine, he would still deny them accessto status to “suspended." The NSCT was quick to cry foul, and announced plans for a new demonstration. When this was learned, the government overruled Sakdi, asking for his resignation and allowing the nine to return to classes. Dr. Sakdi’s resignation capped the students’ victory, but his demonstration of duplicity kept them on their toes. The NSCT concentrated on maintaining contacts with the general its efforts over the next few months onmaintaining public and assuring, their ability to call up the multitude again, if need be.

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rainy season of 1973, therefore, smallerscale smaller scale demonstrations Throughout the rainyseason and rallies went on throughout the capital, and the NSCT maintained its momentum. By the end of September—what with the persistent demonstrations by students around the country, and with the economic problems of rising energy costs, unprecedented increases in the cost of rice due to crop failures two years running, and sharp increases in labor strife and strikes—Thanom, Praphas, Narong, and their clique were nearing the end of their rope. To compound their problems, the annual, military promotions had placed General Krit Sivara at the top of the army’s hierarchy, making him commander-in-chief. Clearly Thanom and Praphas would not have allowed their rival’s promotion to such a key position if they could have avoided it, but Praphas had already passed retirement age and could not muster enough support for another extension. Because both Praphas and Thanom had already taken extensions as army commander, there had been no promotions for the army’s rank and file in four years. The bottleneck at the top of the command structure had created pressures within the military which neither Praphas nor Thanom could continue to ignore. Thus, their post 8 rival Krit attained the army’s most coveted post. Crackdown and and Response Unable to prevent the advancement of their rivals within the elite, the Three Tyrants Tyrants.therefore therefore focused on heading off opposition from outside. Attempting to minimize disturbances among the general populace, the government sought to limit contacts between students and non-students. The Government Universities Bureau issued a decree.forbidding decree forbidding outside speakers from addressing students on campus, and, on at least one occasion, police were posted at university gates to prevent students of one campus.9 Then, on October 6, the campus from joining rallies on another campus.’ regime cracked down one time too many. Thirayudh Boonmee, whose term as secretary general of the NSCT had expired by then, and Boonsong Chalethon, still an active member of the NSCT leadership, were arrested along with nine others while handing out pamphlets at the Sanam Luang weekend market. The pamphlets, which proclaimed the existence of a group of students, politicians, and other prominent elites, 100-strong and dedicated to the cause of constitutionalism, were confiscated by Special Branch police and labeled subversive. The eleven pamphleteers, along with two others who were subsequently rounded up and interned, were held at the Bangkhen Detention Center and charged with conspiring to overthrow the government public opinion that the 13detainees 13 detainees As the regime attempted to convince publicopinion were conspirators in a communist plot, the NSCT leaders on the outside put their well-oiled machine into gear. The arrests occurred on October 6 and

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7, a Saturday and a Sunday; by Monday morning, October 8, the new SombatThamrongthanyarongse, an agricultural secretary general of the NSCT, SorribatThamrongthanyarongse, student at Kasetsart University, issued a statement condemning the arrests restore’ democracy,” as the acts of a dictatorship. “We will take action to restore' Sombat declared, “and not let the eleven activists suffer for their act of good country."110® faith intended for the good of the country.” The next day, Praphas ordered police in the capital to go on full alert and warned of a potential student uprising to overthrow the government. Teachers and students who tried to visit the detainees at Bangkhen were denied visitation rights, and rumors began to spread that the prisoners had been killed. At Thammasat University, students boycotted exams and staged a sit-in on the football field. They were joined by fellow students from other campuses, who walked out of exams and headed for Thammasat. By midday 2,000 protesters were planted cross-legged on the grass under the searing afternoon sun. And there they remained through the night, despite the rains, and through the following day, and the day after that. The Bangkok Post described the ongoing sit-in as it had developed by that Friday, October 12: The number of students pouring into the Thammasat grounds swelled into tens of thousands by midday as it was announced that all schools in Bangkok have been closed indefinitely.... Meanwhile, the students stepped up the pressure on the Government by*announcing by‘announcing a demand for the unconditional release of the 13

starting from midday and warned of detainees.... The NSCT gave a 24-hour deadline slatting "decisive “decisive action* if the demand was not met, with student leaders telling the crowd that there were 23, 22, 21, hours to the end of the HraHltrw deadline,” »

By this time, a number of older voices were being raised in favor of releasing the detainees. Members of the Thai elite, even some who had been associated with the regime, were joining with the NSCT in calling for the dismissal of charges against the activists. Among these was Thanom’s own brother, a police major general. “If the demanding of the constitution is to be interpreted as treason,” said Sa-nga Kittikachom from his farm in the north, “then there are probably thirty-eight million traitors in Thailand at present." present”12 Though the initial demand of the protesters gathered at Thammasat University was simply the release of the 13 activists (just as the demonstrators in June had demanded reinstatement for the nine expelled students) it now became understood that the detainees stood for something more than just their own freedom of speech. The demand for a new constitution became implicit, and even Praphas had come to recognize its importance. When it became clear that the protests were not just going to go away, Praphas agreed to meet with representatives of the NSCT. Predictably the students echoed their earlier demand for the unconditional release of the

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detainees. Praphas, also predictably, refused, but he offered instead to have a new constitution drafted within twenty months. Perhaps by way of an assurance, he said he would head the drafting committee himself. The students were, again predictably, unimpressed.” unimpressed.13 The deadline stood. By late Friday, when the vast open-air, weekend market at Sanam Luang began setting up, and thousands of people began gathering there, just as they did every weekend, the student sit-in across the street at Thammasat BangkokPostdescribed began to attract large numbers of non-students. The BaHgjfeo&Pas/described the scene: “Come in! Come in!"A in!" A student holding the microphone addressed the crowd of non"Come students across the street at Sanam Luang, Luang. "You have nothing to fear if you walk through these gates. gates, Thammasat was created with your money and is supported with

nor safe. You might get arrested your money. Don't stand around in Sanam Luang. It's not and charged with treason. Come inside and listen to what we who want freedom for M

Thailand have to say." say.”1*

The studentspeakers student speakers addressed the general public in terms of preserving traditional Thai values, identifying themselves with things that mattered to ordinary people, while making the regime out to be the very antithesis of what good, patriotic Thais valued. “We believe in a constitutional monarch," one speaker pointed out. “His Majesty’s Majesty’s position as head of this nation is guaranteed only by the Constitution. Where is the Constitution?" 15 ” Also on Friday, one of Thanom’s own cabinet ministers tried to defuse the situation by putting up bail for the detainees; as the situation progressed beyond the government’s control, it seemed a wise, face-saving thing to do, especially now that the detainees were entering into the thirty-sixth hour of a hunger strike and were vowing to continue. But the activists refused bail. They demanded to be released unconditionally, with all charges dismissed, or they would not leave the facility. facility?166 Still the government refused to drop the charges of treason, and while the hours to the NSCTs deadline ticked away, participation in the Thammasat University sit-in swelled to over 70,000 people. By the next day, as noon approached and the protesters began preparing to “take decisive action,” the government backed down and announced the unconditional release of the detainees. Unfortunately by now, it was far too late. The detainees now refused to budge under any circumstances until they had received word from the protest organizers. It is not hard to imagine why. They had learned ieamed in June that only as long as they had support in tn the streets would the government listen to them. If the detainees left now and the demonstration died out, there would be no guarantee that the government would keep to its promises of a new constitution, and what assurances would there be against future arrests and even wider suppression of their movement?17

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.At noon on the thirteenth, when the deadline expired, the protesters up, and marched through the gates .of Thammasat, out onto stood up Rachadamnem Road, and to the Democracy Monument The inarch march organizers dismissed as lies the government’s announcement of unconditional release for the 13 activists, as well as its renewed promises to promulgate a constitution within a year. In a highly organized procession, they led the multitude out onto the streets of Bangkok once more. A vanguard of vocational school and engineering students, all male and considered the brawn of the student movement, preceded the main body of marchers. These were described as scouts, sent ahead “to dear the path.”18 Some of these boys carried wooden clubs dubs or iron bars, most had burlap sacks in hand to lay down over barbed wire if needs be or to fend off police dogs. Some wore masks against the threat of tear gas. Indeed, such precautions seemed prudent, as the government had by then deployed armed soldiers around key buildings along the parade route. The procession itself was led by a group of female students, young girls in school uniforms, holding aloft large portraits of the king and queen. Behind them were small groups of first aid workers who held red cross flags. Others among the thousands marching to Democracy Monument carried way.the citizens of the national flag, and sang the royal anthem. Along the way.the Bangkok joined the marchers and swelled their ranks. Meanwhile, Praphas’s troops braced for confrontation. Barbed wire barricades had been placed along the approach to the headquarters of the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC), where the government’s hastily formed “Committee to Restore Law and Order" had set up offices a few days earlier. Nearby, on Sukhothai Road, the residence of armed fortress. Soldiers guarded Field Marshal Praphas was made into an aimed the barricades with M16 rifles, and army water trucks stood by to hose down the demonstrators.19 As Rachadamnem Boulevard again became a sea of protest, and nearly a hundred thousand souls gathered around the great stone wings guarding democracy’s tomb, police at the Bangkhen Detention Center across town tried, forcibly now, to evict the -13 activists whose arrests had started it all. Like hot potatoes they were tossed out along with their belongings onto the roadside in front of the detention center, from where they again refused to budge. Throughout the afternoon they waited for word from the protest organizers: Sombat Thamrongthanyarongse, the NSCT president, and NSCT leadership, Seksan Prasertkun, a Thammasat Sombat’s colleague in the NSCTleadership, student All the while, the demonstration on University political science student. Rachadamnem had been growing and spreading out. By nightfall the uncounted thousands had divided up, and a second multitude had gathered in front of the House of Parliament, within shouting distance of the king’s residence at Chitrlada Palace.

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Finally, word reached the freed activists waiting outside Bangkhen Majesty the King was prepared to hearhear the Detention Center that His -Majesty student’s case in an audience at the palace. Thirayudh, the former NSCT student's secretary general, and one other of the 13, Chaiwat Suravichai, decided to go ahead and see if they could have a word with the student delegation before it met with the king king. At The Palace Gates dear who initiated the audiences that His It has never been made quite clear Majesty granted on October 13, 1973. He may have been acting strictly of his own volition, seeing that no other person could mediate and prevent the apparently imminent confrontation, or he may have been acting at the of his personal advisers or the government. It is likely, however, that request ofhis His Majesty, intervened only after great consideration and with equal reluctance. As the king himself would explain some years later, “It seems to be a very bad thing to defuse a crisis because one touches politics."20 neutral in Obviously, it had long been important that the king remain neutralin political matters. Such was the source of his great influence since the late fifties. “To touch politics" too openly and too often might cause resentment and leave him vulnerable afterwards, and so he had always avoided such situations. Thanks to .a scrupulous adherence to his mandate to remain above politics, King Bhumibol had reignedfor reigned for twenty-seven years by then; He had and a host of parliaments, prime ministers, and outlasted seven constitutions andahostof cabinets. He became and had remained, as one source puts it, “the most powerful figure in his nation’s political system... the focus of the people’s loyalty and cohesion, the fount of legitimacy."21 Yet the king could not have acquired such a position without knowing that some day, in some way, it would have to be put to use. Come the evening of October 13, 1973, he must have known that the time had come and that he could no longer remain aloof. The danger of touching politics his nation. was now outweighed by an even greater peril, not to him but to His As His Majesty himself later pointed out, “If you don’t defuse a bomb.it will blow up."22 t. The king met first with Thanom and his cabinet for an hour, then with Majesty’s audience with thestudents a delegation of ninefrom the NSCT. His Majesty?s lasted nearly half again as long as his audience with the prime minister. with the king’s assurances When it was over, the student leaders, satisfied with;the to, its promises, went outside to that the government would be held to. announce their victory and to send the demonstrators home.25 Hours later, however, the crowds around DemocracyMonument and the ■Parliament -Parliament building had not yet dispersed. Various reasons have been offered, but most seem to center around a singular failure of student

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leadership. By the time Thirayudh Boonmee and Chaiwat Suravichai arrived outside the palace gates from the Bangkhen Detention Center, a serious communication gap had developed at the top echelons of the NSCT. According to Thirayudh, he arrived at the palace just after the students’ students* audience with the king. Sombat, the NSCTs general secretary, had just gone to Bangkhen to fetch the remaining detainees. The rest of the delegates had remained at the palace, and they informed Thirayudh that the plan was to wait for Sombat’s return and then appear before the demonstrators together with all 13 freed activists to report on their meeting with the king. Then the NSCT would announce their victory and the end of the protest.24 However, Seksan Prasertkun, Sombat’s deputy, who had been left to manage the crowds at Democracy Monument during the audience, had been left out of the decision-making loop. Hours after the audience ended, Seksan still had heard nothing definite regarding the outcome of the meeting, and he to, the palace to make a direct therefore decided to move the crowds closer to mass appeal to the king. 25 Seksan, according to Thirayudh, had told the demonstrators “to be protest,"26 and, when word of the king’s assurances and his absolute in their protest,” wish that the protestors disperse finally reached Seksan, he refused to believe it. Seksan reportedly demanded proof, shouting, “Drag Sombat here!"27 And by the time Sombat returned with the remaining freed activists, here!” the crowds were unwilling to listen to him. Throughout the night the streets remained filled with demonstrators, listening to conflicting reports and instructions from NSCT organizers who either did not understand or would not agree with each other on how to proceed. The major concentrations of demonstrators were at Democracy Monument, at the Royal Plaza in front of Parliament, and at the south side of Chitrlada Palace near the Marble Temple. NSCT leaders kept shuttling back and forth between these locations looking for each other and making conflicting speeches, to the crowds. Thirayudh has described a monotonous series of committee and subcommittee meetings that dragged on well past midnight, with student leaders calling each other communists and blaming their inability to disperse the crowd on everything from bad communications to collusion with the government.28 As the crowd in front of the Parliament building grew louder and seemed poised to move out toward the palace, Sombat and Thirayudh moved among them to try to find Seksan. There they found an inordinate number of the club-toting technical school students, the brawn of the movement, Seksan’s.orders. When itching for a confrontation and apparently awaiting Seksan’sorders. Sombat and Thirayudh finally met up with Seksan, it was after two A.M. Somehow they managed to come to an agreement, and Seksan said that at this point the only thing that would get the demonstrators to leave was a direct statement from the king. The three of them managed to get one of

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the king’s aides to read a statement confirming what His Majesty had told the student delegates the evening before. By this time, as many as 50,000 of the protesters were gathered outside the king’s palace. Finally, as dawn approached, the weary crowds heard the king's message and started to leave. Said Thirayudh, “We were very pleased that ending.”29 This was the morning of everything had turned out with a happy ending." 14 October. Fourteen October One need not mention the year. Simply to say the date and month in Thai will call to the minds of those who were there the tumultuous events of that Sunday in Bangkok in late 1973. Around six o’clock o'clock that morning, after hearing the king’s assurances read to them by his aide, the crowds began to disperse. They started to move out in two directions, northward toward Vajiravudh college and southward through the intersection near Wat Benjamabophit, the Marble Temple. The police, however, sought to control the flow of people away from the palace and blockaded the southern route, turning—or trying to turn—the crowds back and away toward Rajawithi Road. From the various reports and reminiscences of that morning, it is not difficult to surmise what happened next. Crowds being what they are, and this crowd being particularly large and probably more than a little unreasonable after its long ordeal, began considerable pushing and shoving. The people at the back of the crowd, who may not have been able to see the police line, began to.push to push forward even as people toward the front were trying to turn around. The police— who, being human, could not have been all that clear-headed themselves— used their billy clubs to push the crowd back. A student reportedly threw a bag of ice out of the crowd and hit a policeman in the face. Soon tear gas was released, and, according to some, Molotov cocktails were served up in response. The police now began to fire their rifles.30 By six-thirty A.M., a full scale riot was underway at the southern wall of Chitrlada Palace. The demonstrators scattered in all ail directions, some seeking and gaining refuge inside the palace, others just running as far away from the scene as they could get But the violence did not end that easily. Word began to spread that police had beaten three girls to death; fear now mixed with anger and permeated the mob. A large number of technical students rallied at the Royal Plaza around eight o’clock and, promising to protect their comrades, spearheaded the march back to Democracy Monument to bring word to the crowds still gathered there of the events at the palace gates. The technical students marched with clubs in hand and, along the way, commandeered buses and

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trucks. Though hundreds of riot control police were standing by, the marchers reached Rachadamnem unimpeded. There, with their numbers consolidated, but no longer with any clear leadership, the mob now moved to seize the offensive. From nine o’clock on, the demonstrators, now rioters, began to seize key government buildings in the Rachadamnem area. Sidewalk police boxes were tom down and set ablaze, ablaze. Windows in government offices were smashed. Hijacked city buses were overturned and set ablaze to block off streets and the exits from police stations. Arson became the rioters chief weapon, and one of their first targets was the headquarters of Narong’s BIFGO, one block east of Democracy Monument BIFGQ, All the while police rained down bullets on the mob. Soon, the military was called in, and tanks were rolling down Rachadamnem Boulevard as it armed helicopters patrolled the sky above ft. Crowds at Sanam Luang were sent scurrying into Thammasat University as soldiers fired tear gas. Then a tank pulled up to the campus gate and shot through it, killing a woman, a child and a student inside. A helicopter flying over the university also fired down into the campus at students seeking safe haven there. More died. The only way to escape was to leap into the Chao Phya River or to crowd onto ferry boats and head for the Thonburi side.

Intervention From Above By evening it had become apparent that nothing short of a full military crackdown would restore order, unless of course the rioting demonstrators were given what they wanted. The situation had gone beyond a need for assurances that a constitution would some day be drafted, and beyond the question of freedom of speech. sl The only thing that would satisfy the half-a-million51 or so people who continued to fill the streets around Democracy Monument despite the violence abroad in Bangkok, was the complete removal of the ThanomPraphas regime. Who first suggested this alternative to a bloodbath remains unknown. "Who One must consider that the king, having already touched politics by giving his assurances to the students, would not have been pleased to see his word be trampled along with those to whom he had given 1L ft. Yet, to have demanded Thanom and Praphas to back down now would have been the most hazardous act of King Bhumibol's reign, for they might have refused, and they might have survived. It should, therefore, be remembered that the army—whose army —whose obedience would have been required to put down the uprising—had recently fallen under the command of General Krit Sivara, the regime’slong-time regime’sTong-time rival, who had been biding his time since June.

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Most of the shooting that occurred around Sanam Luang and at Thanunasat, it seems, was the work of riot-control police, under the Thammasat, command of Police Lt Gen. Montchai Pankongchuen, whose operations were closely monitored by Colonel Narong himself. Montchai realized early on that his police alone would not be enough to quash the uprising. It fell to Narong, the military “strong man,” to back up Montchai. However, despite his command of the 11th Infantry Regiment, Narong had managed to bring in only four platoons of soldiers to assist Montchai’s men. This would indicate a certain amount of resistance from the company commanders under Narong. In addition, the air force reportedly ignored calls for an aerial attack. The navy had obeyed orders to put men ashore near the Phra Pinklao Bridge, but the sailors refused to participate in the 32 suppression. suppression.” Altogether, Narong was only able to summon the aid of about 500 troops, whose presence was only made obvious by their several tanks' and helicopters. This is not to say that the soldiers’ impact was unimportant During the uprising and its suppression, over three-hundred and and* fifty people were reported killed in the streets of Bangkok. Thousands more were hospitalized, while five-hundred were still being counted as missing even a week 35 afterward.33 Still, with over half-a-million people on the rampage (some of from whom had, by late Sunday, armed themselves with weapons taken from’ nearby gun shops),34 more force than was available at the time would have been needed to crush the rebellion. General Krit, it turned out, proved pivotal in ending the suppression. “A phone call from Montchai for troop reinforcements produced a curt ‘No!’ from Krit Sivara,”35 a press report said. Another version of Krit’s opposition to the regime was widely quoted for years afterward: clashed with KritSivara at Riot It was learned that the Thanom-Praphat partnership had dashed Defence Command HQ in Suan Ruen late on Sunday. The Thanom-Praphat group, at Narong’s insistence, wanted to continue their strong measures to ’wipe “wipe out" out” the declaring:"These demonstrators. Krit opposed this plan, reportedly declaring: These young people...they 5 are our children. children."w,< *

< With Krit now so firmly against them, the Three Tyrants had little recourse. While they desperately tried to gamer support elsewhere, the three instructed their families to start packing, and hasty.travel arrangements were made. By 6:30 P.M: resignation, and’ P.M1 the government had submitted its resigriation, and with this obstacle removed, His Majesty the King once more deigned 'to to' touch politics. As the announcement of Thanom’s and Praphas’s resignations had little immediate effect on the violence in Bangkok’s streets, the king decided to take the extraordinary step of going on television and radio and addressing a highly political situation. At 7:30 His Majesty announced to a national

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audience that he himself was appointing a new government. government His message was brief, but it was historic. “Today is a day of great sorrow," the king began, “the most grievous in the history our Thai nation ... I call on all sides and all people to eliminate the causes of violence ... in order that our country can return to normalcy as soon as possible.”’ possible.”377 To head the new government, the king said he had chosen Dr. Sanya Dharmasakdi, then rector of Thammasat University and a well-liked public figure. For the first time, King Bhumibol had openly involved himself with a transition of political power. Meanwhile, the rioting continued. Though Praphas and Thanom had relinquished their places in the government, they were still trying to hold onto their military power. Sporadic street fighting continued through the night as Praphas and Narong played out the last act of their power play, attempting to bring into the city loyal forces from the Rangers detachment in Lopburi. Krit, however, was able to checkmate. He had gained the support of First Army units who were stationed around the capital. The triumvirate had no moves left, except one. Within twenty-four hours, along with their families and a truckload of belongings, they had all left the country—Praphas and Narong for Taiwan, Thanom for the United States. Throughout the next day, however, police continued to clash with rebellious students who refused to give up the fight until the Three Tyrants were away. The most violent incident lasted for hours at the Phan Fa bridge on the western end of Rachadamnem. There, at the foot of Phukhao Thong, the Golden Mountain Temple, a group of technical students calling themselves the “Yellow Tigers Suicide Squad,” attacked the Metropolitan Police Headquarters with rocks, hand-guns, and bottle bombs. Driven back by automatic weapons fire, the students sat tight and began a siege that lasted into the night. A correspondent for Time Magazine who was on hand at the bridge described the scene: kiosk. Suddenly, a student dashed across I huddled with three students behind a metal kiosk.Suddenly, the intersection and hurled a rock at a glaring mercury street lamp. A policeman fired a round at him; the bullet ripped through the kiosk and into the shoulder of the student to my left. Groaning, he slumped over in the arms of his friend, blood oozing through his starched white shirt.5*

In a show of desperate resourcefulness, the Yellow Tiger squad seized a fire brigade pump truck, and, after draining out the water, filled its tank with gasoline. While police inside the building defended their headquarters with submachine guns—shooting even at doctors and nurses who were tending the wounded in the streets below—the Yellow Tigers positioned their fire engine to feed the flames set offby Afew off by their bottle bombs. A few hours 39 later, a heap of ashes lay where the police building once stood. stood.”

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Finally, when it had been confirmed that the Three Tyrants were gone, y the leaders of the NSCT appeared once mote Jthe more at Democracy Monument and called for an end to hostilities. At 9:00 p.M. they were given time on national television to stress their appeal. “The Thai people will praise and remember heroism,” said the NSCT spokesman, “to the end of time." time.”40 the students’ heroism," Post hit the streets the next morning, its headlines When the Bangkok Past read, “All quiet! Bangkok peaceful again.”41 Thailand had survived its bloodiest forty-eight hours since the bombing raids of World War ll. But besides its violence, the two-day revolution, as War-II. many then were calling it, marked two significant turning points. Not only had a king touched politics for the first time since the abdication of Rama VII, but so, too, had the people. It was the first time in modern Thai history that the masses had rallied to take up arms against the ruling elite, to demand a change in leadership. It was also the last time the Thai ruling circle would dismiss its vast constituency as apathetic to the political process.

Chapter 15 Promise and Polarization

The student uprising of 1973 unleashed a range of political forces previously unseen in Thailand, but expectations, both from those who had participated and of those who had cheered from the sidelines, often conflicted. As Benedict Anderson observed, On the left, an almost giddy sense of exhilaration, iconoclasm and creativity was bom. For a time it seemed that one could say, sing or do almost anything. On the right, the illusion rapidly took root that the newly-established liberal regime was the cause of the sudden epidemic of subversive ideas. Democracy was quickly blamed for the consequences of the dictatorship.’ dictatorship.1

The forty-eight hours that followed that fateful march from Thammasat’s Bo tree courtyard to Democracy Monument possess an undeniable historical significance. The demonstrations of 1957 paled in comparison, and before then nothing even vaguely similar had ever happened. The masses—which in 1932 could not be stirred to raise even a half-hearted cheer for the People’s Party—had now roared in defiance of tyranny, had demanded the right to govern themselves and to live under the rule of law. Nonetheless, the events of Fourteen October did not herald the new era hoped for by those many thousands who had taken to the streets. True, the politics of despotic paternalism had been dramatically displaced, but, though the wounds of Fourteen October went deep, they healed quickly in the memory of the masses. Meanwhile, the scars left by decades of autocracy and corruption remained. While intellectuals and visionaries looked forward to a new, more progressive political order, the awakened masses had simpler aspirations of economic security and were confused by the conflicting rhetoric of the public power play enacted before them. The entrenched interests of the old guard made what they could of that confusion, and of popular fears generated by simultaneous events in neighboring Indochina. In the end the

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country was polarized by the politics of left and right, and the heroes of Fourteen October were cast in a wholly different light.

A Promising Start In the immediate aftermath of the uprising, headiness and euphoria abounded. The demise of the Three Tyrants and the triumph of democracy were seen as one and the same, and a sense of promise permeated the Thai political consciousness. Writing for the Bangkok Post just over a month after Paisal Sricharatchanya waxed optimistic about Thailand’s the uprising, Faisal political prospects. As the constitution drafting committee is working vigorously on the draft of Thailand's next permanent constitution and the Government isfinalizing all necessary preparations for the forthcoming general elections, this country's political scene has kicked off to a promising start?

There seemed to be a popular perception of common ground in those promise-laden, post-October days. The students believed that “the people” people" were behind them and that the new government would listen to them. It was as if something new and wonderful were about to happen, happen. But it was, of course, not that simple. ’Though Thai society had now become aware of mass politics, there was as yet no consensus as to how to use it or what to do with it The broad spectrum of political aims among the elite—as well as among aspiring elites—made such a consensus even harder to reach. Immediately after the uprising, divisions within the student movement and among the remnants of the ruling circle occurred almost simultaneously. While the leadership of the NSCT all but disintegrated in a fit of name-calling and blame-laying over the confusion that reigned during the demonstrations; factions were forming within the divided military and bureaucracy, all vying to fill the power vacuum left by the fleeing trio. During the first week of November, after three doubt-filled weeks of waiting to see whether the hated three would return or send hiding out and waiting.to their agents to hunt down and kill them,53 the twelve members of the NSCT and file at Chulalongkorn University.'* University.4 executive held a meeting with the rank andfile At that meeting much was said about the pre-dawn hours of Fourteen October, of the distrust be between Seksan’s accusations tween Sombat and Seksan, of ofSeksan’s that Sombat was collaborating with the regime, and of Sombat’s suggestions communist The auditorium divided into factions calling that Seksan was a communist. for various leaders to resign, and in the end Seksan and a clique of followers stepped down and announced the formation of a new organization.5 Seksan contended that Sombat and the NSCT were approaching the situation from the wrong perspective. The new group was at first called Free

The Balancing Act I 214 _____________________________________________________________ •* Thammasat and later the Federation of Independent Students of Thailand (FIST). It would be dedicated, Seksan declared, to the establishment of “true i democracy” through a mass social revolution.6 democracy" He endeavored to point out that Thai society was deteriorating because “political development,” and that the deterioration would of insufficient “political continue unless sweeping changes were made. “It is wrong to think that eviction of the trio was enough,” Seksan told the press after his resignation. “The existing social and political systems will continue to produce evil persons at a high rate.” rate."7 As the students debated, their elders were also in a state of disarray. Thanom had left behind a rubber-stamp parliament of 299 hand-picked men, mostly military who now had to follow the lead of caretaker Premier Sanya and the new cabinet ministers he had chosen. There seemed to be no legal mechanism to resolve this political contradiction; Sanya was obviously not content to dissolve the Assembly until new rules for elections could be settled upon. Without their master Thanom, the legislators had no direction, and some of them had begun to suggest that they just disband. No doubt the mass resignation of the legislature would have caused more hardship for the remnants of the old guard than it would for Sanya, but it would not have been wholly conducive to Sanya’s efforts to appear democratic if only he and his hand-picked ministers were to govern in the place of Thanom and his minions. Such could only have added to the criticism already leveled at Sanya by liberals, many of whom feared his constitution-drafting committee would produce nothing more than the next chapter in, as one critic said, “a succession of short-lived constitutions, all of them drafted, debated, deliberated, amended and approved by a small number of officials, and thrust upon the populace willy nilly.”8 It was therefore something of a problem for the caretaker government when the two-thirds of the Assembly who were in the military threatened to resign, and a core of dissenters refused to follow suit. Led by banker Boonchu Rojanasatien, a handful of deputies insisted on maintaining their seats and Rojanasatien, 9 proceeding with legislation.they legislation, they had been working on prior to the uprising. Was Sanya to allow the remaining one-third to continue to draft laws with no opposition, or was he supposed to decline the resignations of the Tyrants’ Tyrants’ puppets and insist they stay on to uphold the democratic process? The situation was well beyond Sanya’s control, and it seemed plain that, because of it, nothing would be accomplished until completion of the new constitution some months later. Meanwhile, the majority of Thais, the farmers in their fields and the laborers at their chores, were confused as to what it all meant and what all this talk of politics was leading to. Despite the aspirations of people like Seksan, the leaders of the uprising were still a long way from leading a mass, social revolution. As for those who held the more modest ambition of

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creating a responsible and democratically elected government, that too was to prove no easy task, task. Seksan had been right about at least one thing; Thai society was still'too still too politically underdeveloped to take advantage of the opportunity now at hand.

Ideals and Misconceptions The massive turnout on Fourteen October had come about, not so much because the citizenry shared the students' students’ ideology, but rather because they sympathized with them and admired their courage. Many of the people who joined the students at Rachadamnern Boulevard did so simply because these brave young people, who marched unarmed, waving flags and singing their love iove of king and country, were being bullied and brutalized by what were obviously the forces of evil. For example, a Bangkok taxi driver who had been caught up in the violence told a newspaper interviewer that he could not stand idly by and watch the demonstrators be mowed down. police and the military towards the students, I immediately Seeing the bad treatment of policeand sided -with with them and fought against soldiers. ...I But I am ...1 myself was almost shot and I felt anguish at seeing Thais killing Thais. Bu11 proud that those who died did so bravely and they should be regarded as heroes.10

Nor was adulation for these heroes merely a Bangkok phenomenon. Around the country, wherever there was a university or college campus, sympathetic demonstrations had coincided with the events that had rocked the capital, students and non-students uniting to oppose the dictatorship. An awakening middle class was cheering the victorious student movement, and wide-spread cooperation also came from upcountry laborers and peasants. Their admiration for the brave student rebels was exceeded only by their expectations of economic improvement. Indeed, popular dissatisfaction with the national economy can account for much of the rejoicing at the Tyrants’ departure. Contrary to what the students would have liked to believe, their fellow Thais were not as interested in democratic ideals as they were in making a decent living. In a newspaper interview, a Buddhist monk residing at the Phra Phatom Chedi in Nakhorn Prathom addressed the deepest concerns of his flock: The cost of living is now very high. From news reports I gather that all goods are very expensive and I have never heard anything like this before in my life. Thailand is a rice producer, yet the people almost starve for the lack of rice and had to line up to buy it.” it.11

Scholars seem to agree with such casual observations.

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Thai statesman and economist Dr. Puey Ungpaphakom, for example, against the militarygovernment noted that in 1973“the majority of people were againstthe principally because it failed to curb inflation and prevent rice shortages." He made an interesting comparison shortly after the uprising, noting that the situation then was a mirror image of what had happened in 1947.12 After the Second World War, as Dr. Puey observed, economic hardships— especially rice shortages—had been blamed on Pridi Ba'nomyong’s civilian government. The faltering economy had been part of the military’s pretext for its 1947 coup and had helped Phibul and Phin to obtain support for the government they installed afterward. In 1973, by contrast, a similar situation had drawn popular support away from the military regime and towards its liberal opponents. In a similar vein, Anderson has argued that, despite the power and credibility they lent to the movement, the Thai middle class were far less concerned about the students’ goals than they were dissatisfied with social urbanites" and economic changes effecting their lives. The “well-dressed urbanites” who joined the marches in 1973 had done so, observes Anderson, because they perceived the policies ofThanom and Praphas as detrimental to their own bourgeois self-interest 15 However, the belief that ridding the country of the Three Tyrants could lower the cost of living seems to have transcended class. Its pervasiveness was evident in an informal survey of seven provinces taken towards the end I< 1973.14 Educated townsfolk and simple peasants alike seemed of October 1973less concerned about rights than about prices. Most were as aware of inflation as they were ignorant of its causes. “The serious problem confronting the country this time is the price of goods," said the owner of a school in Ayudhya, “[but] I don’t know who has goods,” the responsibility for controlling the prices." Another respondent to the survey, a woman sugar farmer in Ratchburi commented, “I think that now down.”15 Though unscientific, the they [the Tyrants] have left, prices will go down." survey illustrated the gap in understanding that had separated the modern, Bangkok-based elites from their rural countrymen. While developments in Bangkok had not gone unnoticed in the provinces, the range of misinterpretation, even among supporters of the uprising, was wide, wide,. “I hated the former government of Thanom because it was a communist government," said one respondent. “I have heard that a Communist is a cruel person who makes a loud noise and has a big face, but I have never seen one.” He concluded, perhaps by extension, that the “biggest problem the country faces is infiltration by Communists.” A laborer in Nakhorn Pathom said, “I know of the uprising from the newspapers, but I did not read well.” by myself because I cannot read and write well." Even literacy did not guarantee understanding, however. “I can read a little," said a rice farmer, “but there are no papers here in our ricefield. We

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are very poor and have no radio. I have never voted in an election in all my life. ...I don’t know the meaning of democracy, but it might be a law, I think.” life ....I think." “I don’t know the meaning of democracy," said a food vendor in Ayudhya, “but I think it is a good thing, if not students would not fight for it” Another respondent equated democracy with patriotism. “Democracy it.” means nation," nation,” he said. Some, however, expressed doubt about the value of elections, for example, an upcountry businessman who said, “I think that M.P.’s are mostly selfish and scarcely have sincerity in their hearts. Yet it is better to have M.P.’s and the country governed by the democratic system rather than controlled by certain groups of people like in the past.” A telephone operator in Saraburi was even less sanguine. “I don’t want Thailand to have M.P.’s,” said this twenty-one-year-old civil servant. “It is these people who create trouble.” On the other hand, a woman who cleaned the grounds of Wat Mongkol Borpit, outside the town of Ayudhya, said that her past voting experience had been very positive and that she looked forward to having elections once more. Three years ago I went to vote after someone persuaded me ... One man told me that 1.251. When I voted he paid If I voted for this candidate he would give me 25 baht [US$ 1.25). me 25 baht. If I have time in the coming election, I would like to go and vote again.

Along with ignorance and confusion, there was also indifference. One farmer reflected the common Thai value of deference to authority, saying he did not think there was much difference between civilian or military said. “If the leaders of the governments. “It depends on the leaders,” he said, military government are good, then it is all right.” And a villager near Ayudhya—pictured in a Bangkok Post photograph river’s edge, fishing with a simple pole, a rude cloth as she sat by the river's wrapped about her head —smiled cynically at the interviewer, regarding his questions with obvious amusement: I am just an ordinary villager and have no knowledge about politics at all. I don’t know lam the names of the Prime Minister or the commander-in-chief of the Army. I have never voted and never will. You have come to ask the wrong persons at the wrong place. If you have questions about politics or anything about knowledge you should ask those learned people living in the town. You should not waste your time coming to villages like ours.

To Bridge the Gap Fourteen October had had its ripple effect, but that was obviously not going to be enough. Writing of the upcountry demonstrations that followed

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the uprising, a journalist noted: “Bangkok airily sees them as copies of the original—which they are—but forgets that they also represent complexity, immediacy and a large number of problems awaiting solution."16 While the uprising had sent ripples throughout the country, the waters it had disturbed ran deep and flowed from other sources than the disputes and dictates of Bangkok elites. The Bangkok establishment had long ignored this fact, but the new student leadership was not as insensitive to the gap. They did not take long to develop a plan which they hoped would help to bridge it. Despite the schism in his organization, NSCT head Sombat Thamrongthanyawongse announced early in November 1973 that his group would sponsor “intellectual emissaries” to the more than eighty percent of Thailand’s population who lived and worked on farms in the hinterland. The plan would use the NSCT treasury—which had swollen to over 100 million baht (then about US$ 5 million) from donations accrued during the demonstrations—to fund an all-out campaign to educate rural people about the democratic process and to motivate them to participate in>the in- the coming elections. As originally envisioned, a force of 200,000 university and college students would be recruited to go forth and spread the gospel of democracy. The program would be much more than a traveling tutorial, however. Sombat envisioned a sort of domestic Thai Peace Corps, which he hoped would teach its members as much about the life of the average peasant as 37 it would teach peasants about the movement's goals.17 We expect the volunteers to stay in different villages for two months and spend their time mixing with the local people. College students who go out on the mission will get the true image about hardships in the rural provinces. ...The ...*Ihe involvement and realisation will be lasting. After all, they will have to think twice before turning to people.1’ corruption, bearing in mind the hardships of the rural people.”

The last sentence was a reference to the expectations of most university students to enter government service upon graduation. peasants’ inexperience with The Sanya government, concerned about peasants' the ins and outs of self-government, lent its official sanction and granted a budget of about three million baht for the program's program’s administration. Premier Sanya established a secretariat with offices at Government House to coordinate with a student committee of three hundred who soon underwent special training for the task at hand. Over the next few months as many as three thousand students, mostly in*what now came to be called from teacher-training colleges, participated in*what the Democracy Propagation Program. Starting in fifty rural districts targeted as high priority areas, the program and various offshoots eventually sent its emissaries to all 580 districts in Thailand.19

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Sombat informed the press that his erstwhile colleague, Seksan, and FIST groups group; would not oppose the NSCT’s new program, which Seksan’s HST 1974.“20 FIST organized a program of was to get underway by February of 1974 its own, in fact, concentrating on the needs of of. Bangkok slum dwellers and helping the workers who lived in such places to organize labor unions?1 The idealism and missionary zeal of the movement was strong and effective throughout 1974, but it was not long before the disheartening reality of the challenge ahead eroded the resolve of the program’s leaders. More the products of culture, than the ill will of specific parties, resistance and inertia abounded. Rural Thais seemed frightened of the students’ new ideas and did not always cooperate with the “intellectual emissaries" that came into their villages. It turned out that many of the students’ goals had been based on their own misconceptions of life in the Thai countryside. Meanwhile, despite its promising start, the new regime found reform to be no easier a task than the student movement did. It was more than a year before either a constitution or elections were realized, and less than four againmarred months before violence again marred the dream of a democratic Thailand. Setting up Shop The committee whose task it was to draft the latest installment in Thailand’s ongoing series of “permanent" constitutions was at work within the uprising. Selected by the new prime minister, former rector afortnight of theuprising. of Thammasat University Sanya Dharmasakdi, and headed by the new minister of justice, Prakop Hutasingh, the group was made up primarily of academics. It also included three journalists, most notable among these, the publisher and editor of Siam Path, Rath, M.R. Kukrit Pramoj.. This distinguished assemblage put its collective nose to the grindstone and came up with a document on 8 January 1974. Had it been accepted, it would have.proved the most democratic and liberal charter Thailand had ever had. But that was not to be. With the old Assembly still in place, and in light of its attempts first to assert itself then to disband and thus discredit the new cabinet, Sanya was faced with a dilemma regarding the embryonic constitution. He could not call it democratic. On the other hand, simply promulgate it unilaterally and cal! Thanom’s rubber stamp legislature for neither could he submit it to Thanom's approval. The solution came to him early in December 1973, as his committee began to show promise of completing the charter by the start of the new year. At Sanya’s request, the king was once more calledupon to touch politics, though ever so gently. With the advice of his Privy Councilors, King drew up a list of citizens from various walks of life and provinces Bhumibol drewup throughout the country to attend a constitutional convention in Bangkok.

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The list of 2,347 conventioneers was made public on 10 December 1973. Hiese representatives were invited to meet for one time only, on December These 19 at the Royal Turf Club stadium to choose from among themselves a new Legislative Assembly, a temporary body of 299 deputies. It would befall the new Legislative Assembly to accept, or reject, the new constitution. Once that duty had been discharged, the temporary body was to be dissolved and direct elections were to be held. The list of conventioneers included representatives of both the rich and powerful and the poor and disenfranchised. There were lawyers and officials, fanners farmers and businessmen, active and doctors, military and police officials, retired civil servants, professors, laborers, and a large contingent of leaders from distant villages. It was not, as Puey Ungpakorn had hoped and recommended, a popularly elected body, but it did, as he had suggested it should, “represent public opinion in all sectors of society," society,” or if not all sectors, then most.22 Village headmen, in /act, fact, made up the largest single grouping, '27% >27% of 25 the convention’s members members. By far the lowest ranking officials on the government hierarchy, the administrators of the smallest official units of Thai society, village headmen traditionally have been elected by their neighbors. Their presence in such numbers, therefore, seemed to provide a level of representation never before afforded to the lower echelons of Thai society. That was the theory, at least. However, the village leaders at the convention had been elected as village headman in order to administer not to be representatives ofa of a constituency. Consequently, community affairs, notto they tended to take their cues not from their neighbors and friends back home, but from their perceived superiors at the convention. providing the conventioneers with onlyshort only short notice of the convention, By providingthe it was believed that excessive pre-convention politicking would be avoided. However, as the members began showing up at the stadium for registration on the sixteenth and seventeenth of December, it was apparent that little time was needed for mutual self-interest groups to form. The quickest and most active lobbying efforts were conducted by and on behalf of 2 * Former and active conventioneers associated with the Interior Ministry.24 members of that bureaucracy—the recent domain of deposed Interior Minister and Field Marshal Praphas—included provincial governors, district heads, and other local officials. These men were especially well-known to the village headmen who had operated under them. Ironically, the locally-elected headmen, for the most part peasant farmers with minimal educations and a degree of humility befitting their station, were easy prey for more sophisticated bureaucrats with ambitions of being elected to the new legislature. The trusting village leaders sought and obtained the advice of their superiors, and wound up voting for high

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officials instead of for each other. In the end, the new Assembly had only 6%village headmen, while 37%of the members were higher-level government officials.25 Thus the promise of grass-roots representation went unrealized. Nevertheless, the National Convention, as it was called, was a noble gesture and a grand effort Of the 2,347 persons appointed, 2,291 registered, and 2,261 attended the voting session on 19 December.26 The Royal Turf Club had been chosen as the venue because of the race track’s computing system, previously used only for paramutual betting. Once the .conventioneers had filled out their ballots—yellow cards, one apiece, withspacefor one-hundred nominees—student volunteers collected, sorted, and entered the votes into the stadium’s computer. The students, while diligent, were not completely flawless in this chore. Errors, whether human or electronic, disrupted the vote taking from time to time, though none proved devastating. One particular technical difficulty that might have invalidated such a proceeding anywhere else in the world was dismissed by officials somewhat off-handedly. Though only 2,261 conventioneers had been accounted for prior to the polling, a total of 2,269 votes were counted by the computer. Officials debated the problem, but considering that the conventioneers had only been asked to attend the one day and that many of them had returned little to the provinces before the count had been completed, there seemed litde chance of polling them again. In the end, it was decided that the eight extra votes had been cast by late-comers, and they were counted as legitimate.27 Nothing more was said of it. The outcome of the convention was hardly exciting. To look at the makeup of the resultant Legislative Assembly when it convened in January 1974, one would be hard-pressed to find significant differences between it and the one it replaced. True, representation of the civilian sector now exceeded that of the military, but the civilians in the new body were decidedly aligned with the traditional elites, the same Bangkok-based power brokers whose interests had been served by the previous legislature. Chai-anan and Morell point out that while Thailand’s rural majority dominated the National Convention, the Legislative Assembly they elected comprised a disproportionate number of urbanites. Eighty-one percent of the new deputies were residents of Bangkok, the population of which then 28 made up only about ten per cent of the country’s total population.29 The tradition of client-patron loyalty and deference to authority seemed to outweigh the yearning for democracy, as village leaders and simple farmers deferred to their theirurban urban patrons and opted to return to the provinces. Big city politics, it would appear, was not for them and was better left to the phuyai, big shots, who had always handled such things. Interior—Praphas’s old power base— .Not surprisingly, the Ministry of Interior—Praphas's 29 jn the Assembly,25 garnered the lion’s share of seats in and the interests of that

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bureaucratic empire were well served as a result Controlling better than a third of the votes, this bloc stalled or defeated a majority of the progressive 50 reforms sought by such visionaries as Puey and Sanya.30 As caretaker, and having been appointed well in advance of the Assembly’s selection, Sanya had no political clout at all among its members, and as a result, his committee’s draft constitution took a severe beating when it finally came before the temporary body. The Assembly’s own thirty-five member review committee picked the new charter apart, paragraph by paragraph, and eventually came up with its own version. When the second version was finally approved by the Assembly on 5 October 1974, it bore little Hole resemblance to Sanya’s original draft draft. Most disappointing to those who had envisioned true progress and reform was the rejection of Sanya’s proposal to indirectly elect Senators to the Upper House. Once again, as had happened when Pridi Banomyong had tried to accomplish the same goal in 1932 and in 1946, the idea was rejected in favor of an appointed Senate with greater powers than those of the elected House of Representatives. Moreover, rules for the upcoming elections were made to benefit the conservative, old-guard elites in the temporary Assembly. It seemed a sure bet, then, that despite all the blood spilled on Fourteen October, and regardless of the appearance of change at the top, things would soon return to normal in Thailand. Generals would have to turn in their uniforms before taking over the government, but they or their agents would maintain control nonetheless. As a result, the elections slated forJanuary 1975 generated little enthusiasm.

Seeing Red As the interim Legislative Assembly took up its duties in January 1974, the days of promise had already begun to fade. Student dissidence once more emerged and began again to threaten violence and 'mass mass action. Airing grievances that ranged from educational reform to Thailand’s trade imbalance with Japan, students took to the streets again to marshall support for the change they had been promised and denied. Now however, the unity of purpose that brought them success three months earlier had dissolved. The schism in the NSCT and the emergence of numerous and smaller special interest groups blurred'the once sharp focus of the student movement and thus weakened their position considerably. During the first half of January 1974 violent demonstrations in Bangkok and upcountry alike mirrored the students’ frustrations and their persistent belief in their own power. On the ninth, a state visit by Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka was disrupted by 5,000 protesters bemoaning Japan’s economic dominance of Thailand. A molotov cocktail was served up for the occasion, crashing in

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flames on the sidewalk outside the Erawan Hotel. Luckily, no one was 31 injured.51 At the same time, an equal number of demonstrators were protesting the CIA’s influence over the Thai military. The crowd gathered outside the US Embassy on Wireless Road was demanding the recall of the new American ambassador, William Kintner, 32 himself a former CIA official official.52 Kintner, however, was not there. He was off visiting the north on what was supposed to be a good-will trip to Chiang Mai University. Even in the North, however Kkintner was confronted by protestors who burned a paper replica of the America flag, set off strings Home!”33 of fire-crackers, and chanted “Kintner Go Home!”” Only a few day later, technical students were on the rampage once more in the Rachadamnern area, overturning vehicles and setting them ablaze as they besieged the Chahat Songkhram police station, scene of a bloody shootout during the Fourteen October uprising. This time however, no one was demanding freedom or democracy. A row between students, from rival colleges had broken out at a nearby rock concert and spilled out onto the streets. When some of the young men from one of the schools had fled their opponents and sought refuge in the police station, the opposing mob hijacked two city buses to block off the building’s exits and demanded police turn the refugees over to them. Innocent food vendors nearby were looted during the incident, bottle bombs and tear gas canisters were thrown, several students and policemen 34 were wounded, and one young man was shot to death.54 On the same day, technical students representing the Vocational Student Center of Thailand ended a peaceful sit-in outside Premier Sanya’s offices. Their protest had been called to bring about reform in the admissions procedures for technical and vocational schools. The prime minister agreed to some of their proposals and promised to bring the rest up before the 35 cabinet. Satisfied, the demonstrators dispersed and went back to school. school 55 The sudden flurry of new student activism at the start of 1974 had been preceded by wide-spread labor unrest and strikes during the last two 56 months of 1973,54 and for all but the most attentive observers, the disturbances ■months andforallbut were all beginning to look alike. It seemed to many Thais that this thing called democracy had caused a great of deal trouble and no great good. To the average person trying to go about his daily life, the anti-Japanese antl-Japanese and anti-American demonstrations seemed ho different than the riots at a rock concert or the sit-in outside Government House. It all seemed like dirty ■soup, soup, and what were they yelling about now, anyway? Hadn’t the dictators gone away? Weren’t there new ministers now, new legislators in the Assembly? It did not make much sense to the man in the street—but whispers from the right were beginning to sound reasonable. The NSCTs complaints of CIA activities and links to the Thai militaryhad military-had opened up a' Pandora’s box that the student leaders had not intended. Counter charges now began to surface of KGB infiltration 'of of the student

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movement. With the students’ sympathetic stance on China and the reported contacts between student leaders and insurgent groups in the Thai hinterland, it was not hard for the confused onlooker to latch onto suggestions of a Soviet-NSCT link and fashion an explanation. In many minds, a communist conspiracy, whether made-up or real, could go a long 37 way toward explaining all the chaos at large.57 Meanwhile, exaggerated accounts of the ongoing insurgency in the northeastern provinces bordering Laos began to take over the front pages of the Thai press. Terrorist attacks on remote officials had been going on for years, but now suddenly they were being reported with a high note of urgency. Absurd stories of Pathet Lao soldiers overrunning Thai villages in Nongkhai and Nakhorn Phanom provinces were emblazoned on the front pages one day and then denied by embarrassed ministry officials on the 38 inside pages the following day.58 One such report claimed that a force of 200 guerrillas of the outlawed Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) was on the verge of capturing an entire district of 30,000 inhabitants. The report was later clarified; the guerrillas had 39 fired on a village in the district and fled in the same night.59 The spate of inaccuracies was eventually traced to demoralized provincial police officials who felt they were being ignored by Bangkok and whose false alarms were magnified by sensation-seeking journalists. The Sanya government moved quickly to reassure both the country and its allies that Thailand’s borders were secure and the insurgents in check. To underline the point, he sent his defense minister on a tour of the northeast. When Minister Dawee returned, he pronounced the situation sound and under control, noting that the recent spate of attacks had been feeble attempts by the communists to “boost “boost the morale of their own ranks.”40 “quite absurd,” It was "quite absurd," officials said, to think that communists could have village'1 of Ban Na Sai as one report had alleged. “The taken over the village communists attacked the village on three successive nights last week,” week," said one official, “and we lost two dead and five wounded. But Ban Na Sai was not captured.” captured."41 The clarification was intended to put the issue to rest once and for all. Nothing important had happened at Ban Na Sai, the people were told.

Whitewash and Red Oil Drums As it turned out, it was indeed quite absurd to think that communists had taken over the village of Ban Na Sai. But it was not true that nothing important had happened there. Indeed, something hideous had taken place, though not at the hands of of, communists. , In February, as the first efforts of the Democracy Propagation Program were getting underway, former NSCT leader Thirayudh Bunmee and a delegation from an organization called the People for Democracy Group

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went to Ban Na Sai to see for themselves what all the commotion had been about. To their horror they learned of a pre-dawn raid by Thai government 24 January in which four villagers were killed—one of them a sixforces on 24January year-old boy. All 106 homes in the village were looted and burned to the ground/ ground.*2 Thirayudh’s group brought a delegation of the villagers, including the headman, to Bangkok where they held a press conference and confronted the Sanya government demanding an investigation. Sanya agreed and immediately launched an official probe. The village of Ban Na Sai, it seems, was something of a supply station for communist guerrillas operating in the nearby Phu Sing mountains, and provincial authorities claimed that 80% of the villagers were communist sympathizers/3 and that parties of anti-insurgency volunteers had been sympathizers,*’ ambushed there in the past** The villagers denied this, but they admitted past 44 *nie that insurgents often came to requisition food and distribute propaganda.* propaganda.455 Whoever was telling the truth on this count, the debate itself would seem Sai’s having been attacked by to negate the original story of Ban Na Sai's FarEasternEconomic Review speculated that the whole communists, and the FarEastemEconomic episode could have been staged by some lower echelon official of the counter insurgency operations “to impress the Government that the terrorists are a lively menace,” menace,”*464 Sanya’s investigation, meanwhile, was Thailand,”477 and called “the fastest and most complete ... ever made in Thailand,”* concluded that government forces had indeed been responsible for the deaths and the destruction of the village. However, the government’s dash investigative committee hedged, claiming it had all happened during a clash with insurgents and had thus been unavoidable, this despite considerable contrary.48 evidence to the contrary.*® Far from supporting this face-saving explanation, much of the evidence suggested that Ban Na Sai was only the tip of a horrifying iceberg, and that such atrocities were in fact quite common. During the probe and afterward reports emerged from elsewhere in the northeast, as well as from other regions, of counter-insurgency forces that were regularly torturingsuspected communists, raping the women in suspect villages, and castrating their husbands.49 husbands.*’ offidal, In particular, the testimony a year later of an Interior Ministry official, Post, seemed most damning. Confirming which appeared in the Bangkok Past, reports of atrocities in the southern province of Patthalung in 1971 and 1972, offidal told of a gruesome procedure used by anti-communist forces to the official punish villagers suspected of being or aiding insurgents: Communist suspects arrested nested by the soldiers were mostly executed. Previously, soldiers would have shot these suspects by the roadside. But later they changed their style of killing and introduced the red oil drum massacre in order to eliminate all dub the suspect until he fell unconscious, possible evidence. The sergeant would club alive/1 before dumping him in the oil drum and burning him alive/’

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The infamous red drums, according to a student-run investigation, concealed the mutilation killings of as many as 800 people over a two-year period.51 The Ban Na Sai affair and the revelations made in tn its aftermath had marked a turning point in the direction of the student movement. When he first learned of the massacre, Thirayudh Boonmee predicted that the outcome of the government’s probe would indicate the path down which Thai politics was heading. The government’s muted response to Ban Na Sai establishment’s concern for stability over social justice, demonstrated the establishment's and angered Thirayudh and his followers. It served, further, to radicalize a whole segment of the student movement which once had been relatively moderate and willing to work for reform as opposed to revolution.52 Suddenly, things had changed, and Thirayudh’s angry rhetoric now began to alarm those among his elders who heretofore had backed his movement. Whereas, only a few months earlier, reform-minded elites, as well as mere opportunists, had sought to identify themselves with Thirayudh’s popular cause, they now distanced themselves from him and his radicalized associates. A media attack, led by Kukrit Pramoj’s Siam Rath newspaper, lent tacit credence to a spate of rumors that Thirayudh was either a communist dupe or a paid agent of “ill-intentioned individuals.” Prominent figures were even accusing him of fomenting revolution and trying to incite a peasant uprising in the northeast55 NSCT split in early November, Thirayudh Now, for the first time since the NSCTsplit and his former colleagues Sombat and Seksan joined forces to summon a rally on Sanam Luang. Ten thousand people gathered there to hear the three leaders speak of the atrocities and cover-ups, and to hear eyewitness accounts from the Ban Na Sai survivors. Before the rally was over the three young men publicly pledged to.support each others’ organizations and joined together to remind the crowd that at any point a coup d’etat could take place and wipe out any gains made since Fourteen October. In that event, Thirayudh urged, the people should come straight away to Sanam Luang and prepare to defend their hard-won freedoms, to fight to the end. 54 The young, aspiring elites of Thailand were fed up now. They could no longer see any hope for reform. The vested interests of their elders were too strong. The corruption ran too deep. The Bangkok-centered regime would never address the broader concerns of the nation, the students concluded, and had no interest in bringing democracy to the rural masses. Writing in Bangkok Postal the end of February 1974, Thirayudh outlined his own the BangkokPostat new direction and the one he hoped his colleagues would now pursue. Is up for us to compromise with those narrow minded people who are The time is protecting their own interests, and with those who are afraid of change. This is proof that it's about time for us to stop working just to please the privileged class. This is

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Promise and Polarization the basic challenge to those of us who fought in the October 1973 revolution. It 55

indicates that the path to the people's happiness is still far away, and hazardous. hazardous,55

Thus the whitewashing of the red oil drum massacres and the atrocities at Ban Na Sai set the tone for the next two and a half years, during which the growing polarization of left and right built to a violent crescendo that was to culminate in the spilling of still more blood in October of 1976.

Chapter 16 The Consequences of Dictatorship

As the winds of democracy blew through Thailand, the stability, order, and decorum so prized by polite society seemed to fly out the window. In a climate where prevailing winds are rarely cool, this hot tropical breeze had been no different. different The winds of change had brought no quenching rains for the parched political landscape, no soothing breeze to refresh the national soul. Rather a whirlwind had blasted through, leaving clutter and disarray in its wake. And so a chorus arose for the window to be shut, and things to be put back in order. Fresh air, people seemed to be saying, was decidedly overrated. Considering Pareto’s model, in which elite power must at intervals change hands between innovative, adaptive leaders and more conservative, regressive ones, such a perspective could only be called unhealthy for Thailand’s social development As the patterns of the past should have shown, real change could not be put off for long. It was not unlike the princely uncles of King Prajadhipok denying the need for constitutional reform in 1932, or the attempts of conservatives in the regime that followed the coup that year to turn back the clock and slow the pace of change. As happened after Thailand’s first democratic revolution, pressures began to build following the 1973 uprising to stall the advances its leaders had demanded. Just as friction between reformist elites and the residues of persistence in the early ’30s had led to counter-revolution in 1933—the so called Bowaradet Rebellion1—the the social and political pressures of the 1970s were to have violent consequences of their own. The forces of regression had their reasons in the mid-seventies, to be sure. At the time, a writer noted that “Thailand could hardly have picked a more society,"1 and it certainly did difficult time for trying again to create an open society,” seem that way. With the approaching victory of communist forces to the east and the growing international oil crisis—to name but two of the many difficulties—theThais contemporary difficulties—the Thais indeed could have timed their experiment better.

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Unlike the 1930s, however, the conflict in the seventies was not just among a few rich and powerful people at the top of society arguing over the pace of change. Now public opinion came into play, and popular perceptions of what was wrong with the worldhad taken a turn to the right since Fourteen October. In October of 1973 it had been easy for people to say that their troubles were the fault of the Thanom regime, but despite the changes in government, nothing had seemed to improve; in fact, things appeared to have gone downhill. Riots in the streets and insurgency in the hills seemed commonplace now. Taxes were going up. Even conveniences once taken for granted were now being curtailed. At night in Bangkok every other street light was darkened, theaters were closing at nine o’clock, and the price of petrol was going skyhigh.2 Bus line operators were talking about stopping service after eight at 3 night, and still they wanted to raise the fares.5 Of course, prices failed to drop, with the Three Tyrants’ departure. On the contrary everything seemed so much more expensive now. And no one could get a seat on a train anymore, what with all the railway strikes going on. Everyone else seemed to be on strike half the time, as well, and those who weren’t onstrike on strike we were re inconvenienced or worse by those who were. Everyone wanted higher wages, but nobody wanted prices to go up as a result. And the GI’s GFs would be leaving, soon. That was a mixed blessing at best. Everyone complained of how the American soldiers had corrupted the culture, the economy, and the young girls. Still, after the Royal Thai Government, the United States military was the largest single employer in the country/ And once the American bases were empty, what would stop the dreaded Vietnamese from invading? Surely, the popular wisdom went, this sort of trouble would not have existed had not the students uncorked the bottle and let out that genie they called ‘Democracy’. bode arid Now, everything that went wrong could be blamed on the students, or the liberals, or the communists—whatever the difference was. Whether or not anyone realized it at the time, however, nobody seemed to care that all these crises were already in the making before Fourteen October, before the window was left open or the cork taken out of the bode. bottle. Yet, as Anderson pointed out, democracy was given the blame for the consequences of dictatorship, while, in fact, many of the social and political problems rearing their heads in 1974 and 1975 actually stemmed from the long years' of corrupt absolute rule. As he put it, “the chickens of era,”5 and liberalism the dictatorship came home to roost during the liberal era," was held accountable for the mess they made.

Muddling Through era" is somewhat It would seem, however, that the designation “liberal era” misplaced, for though it may have seemed progressive in contrast with the

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rigidity of the previous regime, the leadership that had emerged from the ashes of dictatorship actually represented a certain continuity with elites from the past. Witness the composition of the interim Legislative Assembly, for example. Even under the new constitution and after the long-forestalled general elections, the deputies in the new Assembly approached their legislative duties with caution, voting conservatively and rejecting any elites,”6 legislation that might threaten “the wealthier and the entrenched elites.” Consequently the promise of Fourteen October went unfulfilled. What was more, the new civilian leadership feared ruffling the feathers of the military and would do nothing significant to curb the privileges of powerful officers still vying for the role of strongman. Yet, while civilian politicians lived in horror of providing an excuse for some aspiring strongman to rush in and take over, many nonetheless continued to fantasize; how much better might things be if someone would just take charge and straighten everything out?7 And therein lay the essential contradiction of the day: the simultaneous longing for strong leadership and the fear that it might materialize. If a coup were to occur now, it might relieve the more timid elites of the heavy responsibility that had been thrust upon them, it might even restore order, but it would certainly come at the cost of many lives, perhaps even more than had already been lost. Though the new democracy was to many an unsettling thing, it was obvious that any attempt to end it by force would mean blood on the streets once more, and if there was anything the Thai elite feared, it was the sight of blood, especially their own. The civilian government persevered, therefore, and muddled through, hoping more than trying to make the new system work. The 1975 elections proved to be unique in Thai history. Unlike any elections before, they were administered by a completely disinterested incumbent, as Dr. Sanya had refused to join any political party and did not seek office. In addition, for the first time, active members of the military and civil service were barred and therefore had to resign their posts before 8 becoming candidates. candidates.® Many middle- and high-ranking army officers did run but only after they had turned in their uniforms. It was also the first time that the legislature, once elected, was required to choose a prime minister from among its own ranks. In past elections a party’s leader could, if his followers won the majority, become prime minister without having had to endure the indignity of a campaign. Now, for election however, all the leaders of the major parties were forced to stand forelection and compete for a public constituency.9 There was a significant increase over the turnout for past elections. Take for example the elections of 1948, held by Phin Choonhavan’s military junta in order to legitimize its installation of Khuang Aphaiwong as premier after the 1947 coup. Then the turnout nationwide was only 22%, whereas twentyeight years later the figure had more than doubled in the 1975 vote. Though

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this could be interpreted as an indication that Thais had grown more concerned about politics during the intervening generation, it could just as explained by improvements in communications and transportation, easily be explalnedby providing better information and easier access to polling places. The increase did mean, however, that over time more people throughout the at least, could country had been drawn into the political process. That much, atleast, be labeled an advance. Nevertheless, the elections ofJanuary 1975 were dismally disappointing. Not only had they taken fifteen months to arrange, but they failed to inspire any great interest among the electorate. The overall turnout (out of 20.2 million eligible voters nationwide) was only about 9 million (that is 47%) and even in Bangkok, less than 35% turned out to exercise the right that so many there had died for.10 The failure of more than half the eligible voters to exercise their much ballyhooed franchise minimized whatever progress one could claim over previous democratic experiments. The reason for the poor showing was later given by respondents to a national survey, 84% of whom said they were unimpressed with the available candidates who seemed more concerned 11 Thailand.” with their own self-interests than with the problems of Thailand. Furthermore, the elections failed to produce a clear majority to lead the legislature and form a government. The most seats any one party got was 269. As a result, a minority government was 72, and that out of a possible 269formed around a shaky coalition, and it survived only eight days before its removal by a vote of no-confidence.12 This first government under the 1974 constitution was headed by Seni Pramoj, the wartime leader of the expatriate Free Thai Movement, post-war premier, and royalist conservative who had helped to defeat the liberal agenda of Pridi Banomyong. Now approaching seventy, Seni had kept a hand in politics through the years and had retained the image of an elder statesman. His Democrat Party, namesake of the party with which Seni had opposed Pridi in the 1940s, essentially comprised remnants of its predecessor and pursued a somewhat right of center agenda. The Democrats lacked cohesion, however, and gradually developed their own internal left and right wings. It took slightly more than a year and a half for this factionalism to all but destroy the party, minister.1’ but it took only eight days for it to end Seni’s second term as prime minister, Other parties could not match the number of seats controlled by the Democrats, but many parties outweighed Seni’s by sheer virtue of their stronger internal unity. The Democrat’s strongest opposition came from the Thai Nation Party (in Thai called Chat Thai), led by two former generals, Pramarn Adireksarn and Chatichai Choonhavan,14 the latter being the son of Phin Choonhavan who had led the 1947 coup and brought Phibul back to power. The Thai Nation Party comprised clients of the old Phibul-Phin clique and constituted

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a link with the authoritarian rule of the late 1940s and early ’50s, *50s,15 and not surprisingly, it represented definitively conservative interests. Composed primarily of military officers who had resigned their commissions to stand for MP, the party’s membership retained a strong military constituency and “the generals’ party.” party." was sometimes called "the In contrast to the Thai Nation (Chat Thai) Party, the Democrats appeared almost liberal. Unfortunately for Seni, however, they did not appear liberal enough to attract the support of the many left-wing parties, and that proved Seni’s inability to hold his own to be the downfall of his would-be coalition. Seni's party together goes a long way toward explaining his failure to build a coalition from the multitude of parties holding seats in the new Assembly. Despite his conservative orientation and past credentials as a foe of liberalism, Seni was now a true centrist; that is, he was equally unable to satisfy the requirements of either the left or the right. The liberals saw him as too cozy with the right, and the conservatives saw him as too accommodating to the left. The only point these opposites could agree on from during Seni’s eight days in office was that neither side would benefit from his continuation as prime minister. Upon the outcome of the no-confidence vote, therefore, Seni was replaced by a master coalition builder, his younger brother and most avid Kukrit, political adversary, Kukrit. Like elder brother Seni, Kukrit Pramojwas an Oxford-educated aristocrat, a rnomracbawongse momrachawongse and a distant relative of the king; and he was widely regarded as being dose to the throne, Indeed he had been among the advisors assisting King Bhumibol in his selection of delegates to the 1973 National Convention, among whom Kukrit induded himself. As an author, an editor, and a newspaper publisher, Kukrit’s views had received more than a little public exposure, and he knew well how to woo public opinion. But it was Kukrit’s stage career that, many would say, had prepared him best for the public spectade of the premiership. In a public relations film he produced in 1976, strictly for foreign consumption, Kukrit highlighted the drama of open politics in Thailand. The film’s title, “Masked Dance," was a reference not only to the many faces classical dancer, Thai leaders had to put on, but also to Kukrit’s past as a dassical khon. Ironically, though, a performer of the Thai dramatic ballet known as kbon. Kukrit’s most famous role was in a Hollywood ‘classic.’ Working opposite Marlon Brando in 1963’s “The Ugly American," Kukrit portrayed the prime minister of a mythical Southeast Asian country. Caught in a vise between leftist agitators and his own military, Kukrit’s character had had to face problems not unlike those Kukrit himself was to confront a decade later, in real-life Thai politics. In 1975, M.R. Kukrit Pramoj led the Sodal Action Party (SAP), a party of apparent contradictions which advocated progressive policies and consisted of technocrats and capitalists who considered themselves moderate

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conservatives. For over a year, Kukrit’s SAP which had won only 18 Assembly seats in the 1975 elections governed in a coalition with fourteen other parties, the strongest of which was Pramam’s and Chatichai's Thai Nation (Chart Thai) Party. The next strongest was the Social Justice Party, lfi which enjoyed the financial and moral support of General Krit Sivara.14 Kukrit’s political skills astounded the skeptics as he managed not only to pull together such divergent interests and rule over them for more than a year, but also to proceed with his party’s own agenda despite nagging opposition from within his own government. Nevertheless, the coalition’s superficial unity belied a basic contradiction of purposes that was to lead eventually to its demise, as even member party’s within the government tried to remove Kukrit through repeated calls for a no-confidence vote. Despite such difficulties, Kukrit and his Social Action Party launched a program of social reform that included the complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Thailand, a national minimum wage, and repeal of the anticommunist laws which had authorized .the sort of suppression activities Drum" atrocities. SAP also pushed responsible for Ban Na Sai and the “Red Drum” through a village-level development act designed to give peasants a greater say in the use of rural development funds.17 These were remarkable policies for a government whose parliamentary power base came chiefly from right wing parties. Like Seni, Kukrit was also a centrist, but of another kind than his brother was. Kukrit had a real talent for playing his opponents against each other, a knack which was tested time and again throughout a tenure marked by constant infighting, not only in Parliament, but among his coalition cabinet as well. Even Kukrit’s political equilibrium, however, proved inadequate for juggling all the various forces that eventually emerged. Changes in Direction While the Kukrit government was at odds with itself, social and economic problems beyond anyone’s immediate control were blamed on the new system. In the schools, at the work place, and among the armed services, Thais had a lot to complain about and no end of places to put the blame. Liberals blamed conservatives, and conservatives blamed liberals, and they all blamed the moderates, who blamed everyone else. It was not long before it seemed, to many, that the root of it all was the new system of government, which, depending on one’s point of view, was either not democratic enough or lacked strong enough leadership. On the left, was a growing degree of impatience and disillusionment with reform Student activism continued in Bangkok the slow-moving pace of reform. among the working class and in conjunction with labor unions, while the People for Democracy group and the Democracy Propagation Program continued indoctrinating provincial communities in the new standards of

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social justice. The students’ efforts were not universally well-received, however. Criticism came not only from conservatives who felt threatened by it was also apparent thatthe that the missionaries’own congregation their message, but itwas all too often did not appreciate their democratic proselytizing. The message and methods of the student movement’s “intellectual considerably. Some students were credited with remarkable emissaries” varied considerably.Somestudents work and with making great impressions upon people in the areas they visited. These were the ones who listened to the villagers and learned from them, then and mobilize them in political actionsfor actions for the benefit of their helped to organize andmobilize local communities. Such students introduced the concepts of democracy by demonstrating how it could be used.18 Others, however, merely lectured. Too many of them were more interested in preaching pieaching grand theories and expounding upon broad social issues that were well over the heads of farmers who were concerned more about immediate, day-to-day problems which the students could not understand.119’ Perhaps one could add the failures of the Democracy Propagation Program to the list of reasons for the poor voter turnout in January of 1975, but for the student militants, whose numbers had grown considerably since 1973, the disappointing elections were just one more reason to reject the supposed democratic process their elders now offered. That rejection now became evident as more and more student activists embraced the thoughts of Marx and Chairman Mao and injected their rhetoric with socialist sentiments. While intended to enlighten the masses, such talk seems to have frightened and alienated more people than it attracted. Moreover, the rise in demonstrations demanding such trivialities as the right to wear long hair at school or to protest teachers’ unfair grading policies obscured the original tone of the movement and irritated the older generation. The respect which the general public had once held for the students began gradually to erode, and the whole thrust of the movement now fell into doubt. doubt As more and more Marxist-oriented literature began appearing at bookstores, and student protestors addressed a broader range of causes, reaction from the right began to build. By the start of 1975, the conservative press were printing more and more articles and editorials critical of the NSCT and its offshoots, while criticism from other quarters of the establishment also increased.20 By mid-1975, as Communist governments began setting up shop in South Laos,,and as Thai students stepped up their demands Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos,and for a faster US withdrawal from Thailand, the notion of some sort of a connection existing between the fall of Saigon and the rise of dissidence at home gained a certain popularity in Thailand. A Western scholar analyzed the growth of right wing reaction in terms of the perceived threat from the east. Although communist victories in Vietnam and Kampuchea may have been viewed as inevitable, the events in Laos were not. The abdication of the Lao King in favour of the Revolutionary Council sent a spasm of fear through the Thai ruling circles [and]

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fromThai created a wave of hysteria from Thai reactionaries and massive propaganda about the 11 threat* this event posed to Thailand. ‘threat* Thailand?’

Many Thais who were already afraid grew increasingly wary of the students’ ultimate goals, and that paranoia fed the desire and power of the all,22 right to crush the movement once and for all. Rightist organizations grew in popularity now. Groups such as the Red Gaurs (KratbingDaenginThai), (KrathingDaengin Thai), the Village Scouts (or LukeSua Bah), LuheSua Chao Bari), and Nawaphonall Nawaphon all preached adherence to traditional values and unwavering loyalty to king, country, and religion; and each attracted a growing mass activism.23 Students from technical institutes following to counter leftwing activism.” and vocational schools made up much of the membership of these groups, and so it was that the brawn of the Fourteen October uprising now turned its strength against the goals of their more cerebral, former brothers-in-arms. This is not to say, as press accounts and some popular versions of history would imply, that all or even most technical students were devoted rightists. In fact many were not, and of those who joined such groups as the Red Gaurs, most were drop-outs or unemployed graduates with axes to grind. Many members were never students at all but rather “unemployed street corner boys, slum toughs and so forth." It has also been noted that the military sponsors of such groups often paid army veterans, mostly combat volunteers and mercenaries from the Laos campaign, to lead chapters of these supposedly popular movements.24 Anderson also refers to the growing paranoia of the bourgeoisie. He notes that the same people who sincerelysupported sincerely supported the mass demonstrations of October 1973 turned against the forces of liberalism in the years that followed. This bourgeoisie, with little experience in politics and unsophisticated ideas about government, but precisely therefore a strong consciousness of ‘not 'not being to blame for 25

mess,' was peculiarly liable to evince paranoiac responses to their predicament.? predicament. 5 the mess,*

Thus, in 1975-76, says Anderson, “the radicalized students—bourgeois successes who seemed to spit on that success—came to be the main target of [the bourgeoisie’s] bourgeoisie's] panicked anger.” Thus the student movement not only lost the support of the middle classes, it earned their suspicion, distrust, and 26 finally their hatred.25 Looking for an Excuse Meanwhile, the military was distinctly conscious of the change of mood, and three distinct factions had by now emerged, all equally eager to take advantage. General Krit Sivara, whose financial interests were best served by stability, still managed to keep his own followers in check and continued

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to minimize the threat of a coup. First as Commander-in-Chief of the army, and then in retirement as a behind-the-scenes force, Krit used his influence in support of Kukrit. Rival cliques, however, were growing in strength and starting to flex their muscles. Pramam Adireksam, for one, sought to promote his own clients to top military posts from where they could better compete with Krit’s patronage. As leader of the Thai Nation (Chat Thai) Party, and as Kukrit’s defense minister, Pramam proved that even a retired general could compete for the strongman job. Pramam’s military backing was complemented by support from other sectors as well. Not only did Pramam control the strongest political party in the Assembly, he also enjoyed the loyal support of the right-wing, mass organization Nawaphon whose membership favored authoritarian rule.27 In addition to Pramam and Krit, the remnants of Praphas’s clique also competed for power. Their influence in the Interior Ministry, which controls the national police, made them a serious group of contenders,28 but their ace-in-the-hole was a Praphas protege, a certain lieutenant general named Yot Dhepasdin,29 who came to head the strategically important, Bangkokbased First Army, the same power base from which Sarit had once launched his ouster of Phibul. Phibul, These factions fancied themselves the power behind the premiership, but they did not always manage to have their way with Kukrit. In particular, his plans to repeal fire the Anti-Communist Act and curtail the army’s counterinsurgency operations rubbed more than a few senior officers the wrong way. So had Kukrit’s promise to see the remaining USservicemen based in Thailand idea of a total US withdrawal from Thailand was unacceptable withdraw. The ideaofa to most military leaders, for not only did the US presence comfort those concerned by the neighboring row of falling dominoes, but the aid attached to the US bases was a substantial source of patronage for them. That the military was determined to have its way in this regard, despite whatever the Kukrit government might say about it, became apparent Afayaguezincident ofMay of May 1975. When the US merchant during the so-called Moyaguetrinddent ship Mayaguez'ms Mayaguezwas captured in the Gulf of Thailand by forces of the newly victorious Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, US President Gerald Ford decided to launch a military rescue mission using American facilities in dedded Thailand as a base. Kukrit objected on the grounds that Thailand was trying to establish peaceful relations with Cambodia and did not wish to be caught in the middle of a new US dispute with that country. He therefore tried to exercise his prerogative, under the 1962 agreement which hadestablished had established the US bases, and refused permission. By the time he had learned of the US plans, had been left out of the loop, and the whole however, the prime minister/ ministerihad operation went ahead despite his objections, thanks to direct cooperation between the American military and the Thai Supreme Command. The chief of staff of the Supreme Command, Kriangsak Chomanan, had been contacted by one of his American counterparts, and, without even

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asking for permission from Bangkok, Kriangsak authorized the landing of US marines at Uttapao Air Base, from there to stage their assault on a Cambodian-held island in the Gulf of Thailand. As Kriangsak explained years later, “IfI’d asked the government and the government had disapproved, yearslater, “Ifl'daskedthegovemmentandthegovemmenthad what would have happened? The relationship [between Thailand and the US] would not be so good.”50 Kriangsak, a follower of General Krit Sivara, did not let his zealous concern for Thai-American relations end there, however. During the course of negotiations over the eventual dismantling of the American bases, a Foreign Ministry source apparently leaked the startling information that, quite on their own, General Kriangsak and another Krit associate in the high command had signed an unauthorized agreement to allow US troops to 31 remain in Thailand.51 Putting aside the dubious validity of such a document, the mere fact of such an extra-constitutional maneuver showed Kukrit’s lack of control over the military. It casts particular doubt, as well, upon his claims that pressure from the military was not to blame for his eventual loss of civil 32 power.52 The Mayaguez affair also touched off a new wave of student protests. Within a week, about 5,000 marchers descended upon the American Embassy and staged a three-day vigil outside its gates. Organizers demanded a written apology and assurances that the American government would in the future recognize and respect Thai sovereignty, but the US only replied that it had done so when it sought and obtained approval for the use of Thai bases from the chief of staff of the Supreme Command, Kriangsak. Angered, the protestors tore the Great Seal from the entrance and hoisted a twelve-foot effigy of Gerald Ford, dressed as Unde Sam, which was then 33 set aflame.55 Unable to effectively deal with his own military, Kukrit registered a protest of his own with the Americans, recalling his ambassador 54 to Washington for consultations.34

A Rock and a Hard Place As the skillful coalition builder, the artful stage manager of Thailand’s ongoing political drama, Kukrit had earned his early praise. But the •honeymoon had not lasted long, and after only a few months in office it was obvious that even for Kukrit, the conflicting interests vying for attention and power under his administration had made for more objects than could be juggled at one time. It was a given right from the start that Kukrit could not have been everything to everyone, and he had, at least, avoided the trap that had shortened his brother’s tenure, engaging opposing, points of view in the Kukrit’s strength had rested in mutual engineering of compromises. Kukrit’s arranging compromises that might not have satisfied all sides equally but which met some of the needs of most of those involved. He had not tried

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to satisfy all sides. He knew the folly of that. He had only tried to avoid disappointing anyone, the folly of which he unfortunately could not see. He could, for instance, please the students by callingforaUSwithdrawal, calling for a US withdrawal, which he knew would alienate the military. At the same time, though, he could try to appease the military by negotiating for continued American aid and the transfer of American facilities and equipment to the Thais. students' enthusiasm That, of course, would considerably dampen the students’ while only barely appeasing the army, but Kukrit knew that. Such was the nature of compromise. Unfortunately, certain situations never quite lend themselves to compromise, and faced with such situations, Kukrit proved unable to stand his ground and weather the consequences of his decisions. A case in point was his agricultural policy. Despite Kukrit’s early efforts to decentralize the administration of rural communities, and despite his efforts to allocate more funds for rural development, farmers continued to complain of unfair treatment by landowners and local officials. A common grievance was the confiscation of small holdings by unscrupulous money lenders, who preyed on peasant farmers by charging illegally high rates of interest. This practice, common in the colonized countries of Southeast Asia decades earlier, had been largely avoided in Thailand until the post-war era but was now becoming common. As a result, landlessness and tenancy were on the rise, and the peasant backbone of Thai society was weakening. While farmers have always made up from 75% to 80% of the nation's nation’s "While of Thailand’s foreign trade traditionally revolved labor force, and while most ofThailand’s around agricultural production, the portion of gross national product (GNP) contributed by the agricultural sector in the mid-1970s was on the decline, decreasing from 50% in 1950 to 30% in 1975.3S Farm incomes, consequently, were dramatically lower than ever before, and farm families were beginning to break up as the younger generation drifted to the towns and cities to find work. For those farmers who still retained their own small plots of land, the future depended on access to fair credit, essential financing to buy seed and fertilizer and to cover losses in the event of floods or drought. In a bygone age, when noble patrons oversaw the allocation of land and the distribution of its produce, such assistance was provided free of charge by the patron landlord to his peasant clients, who were indebted to him in a deeper sense than could be recorded in any money lender’s ledger. In modern times, however, business was business, though most peasants were still relatively unschooled in such thinking. No effort to assist indebtedfarmers indebted farmers was forthcoming from either the central government or the private banking sector. Consequently desperate rice producers were mortgaging and eventually losing their land to uncaring usurers and land speculators, and disputes over land rents and occupation rights were becoming more common and uglier all the lime. time.36

at

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The student emissaries of the Democracy Propagation Program were unable to miss this, and it became a cause celebre for the movement Student organizers brought disgruntled peasants to Bangkok en masse to demonstrate and demand official action, and petitions with tens of thousands of farmers’ signatures were repeatedly delivered to Government House and to Parliament. The Sanya government had made some efforts to police money lenders and to return land to farmers who had been unfairly foreclosed upon, but the more resistance was great, and local authorities often sided with die powerful landlords against the peasants. Angered and frustrated, farmers in several provinces, with the support back” the land they had once owned and defied of students, simply “took back’ the new “owners" to evict them? 7 Such confrontations continued into the Kukrit administration, growing more frequent and violent with the passage of time. By mid-1975, recalcitrant landowners and local officials had begun a campaign of intimidation and political terror against the rebellious 53 peasants which included the assassination of rural activists.58 Leaders of the student movement responded by pointing the finger at Thai officialdom. “On the one hand they are killing the farmers and on the other they are arresting them,” one student organizer told the press. “In both cases [it is] 59 to create fear and to discourage them from getting involved in politics.” politics.”” At the beginning of August 1975, students organized a mass rally reminiscent of October 1973, in which several thousand protesters, including farmers from faraway provinces called for government action. It was fanners described as the first such large gathering in which students focused specifically on the plight of farmers. Their central grievance was the unsolved murders of eight activist farmers, all within the space of a few weeks, and the apparent inaction by police to find and bring their murderers to justice. It looked at first as if the protest would threaten the Kukrit government, dragging such an explosive issue into the limelight For eight days the crowd occupied the campus of Thammasat University, holding vigil day and night, but with little effect. The crowd dissipated gradually, and by the eighth day only two hundred souls remained? remained.400 Their grievances had not gone unheard, however, and the potential for subsequent, more volatile rallies was not entirely lost on Kukrit The new NSCT secretary general had warned that it was not over yet. “We will not here,” said Kriangkamol Laohadairoj. “We stop our protest here," “We will fight to the end. This Government is afraid of a long-term fight, but we have enough strength and patience to do it." it.”41 In an effort to demonstrate his commitment to justice and to show critics he did not condone abuses by provincial officials, Kukrit intervened in a particular case involving eight rural activists in the northern province of Lamphun, arrested on 4 August 1975 for supposedly having burned down a section of teak forest and forcibly occupying a mine earlier in the year.

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The arrests had come in the wake of several killings of upcountry farmeractivists and had sparked the rally in Bangkok. Kukrit ordered police to look into the matter/ matter.422 Unconvinced that the arrests were necessarily part of a land-holders’ terror campaign, Kukrit had denied the students* students’ demands thatthe that the activists be released, saying the law would have to take its course. Within a few days, however, Kukrit reversed himself, and the government ordered all charges dropped and the detainees released. released.*435 The students naturally rejoiced, but Kukrit now took severe criticism from his conservative coalition partners and from the police, who threatened a nation-wide strike to protest his interference. Contemptuous of this insubordination, Kukrit announced that he would call out the Boy Scouts to replace them if police went on strike, provoked.44 an ill-chosen taunt considering the response it provoked.** Demanding the freed activists be arrested again and made to stand trial, police in Bangkok organized a mass demonstration of their own, in the apparent belief that such was the one way to attract the prime minister’s attention. Unlike the students, however, the protesting policemen were not satisfied with occupying a college campus, making speeches, and singing songs all day and all night They chose more expedient measures. On 19 August 1975, while Kukrit was waiting to meet with a delegation of angry policemen at a station house near his Soi Suan Plu residence, the premier was shocked to learn that an angry mob of 3,000 uniformed police had besieged his home and were threatening to bum it down if he did not come to meet them there. Stunned by the news, Kukrit said he would go directly to his home and dared them to shoot him dead, but he was dissuaded from such rash action by advisers and kept away until a detachment of military police broke up the demonstration and sent the policemen away. The next morning, when Kukrit finally did return to Soi Suan Plu, his traditional, Thai-style, teak wood home had been thoroughly vandalized 455 ransacked and most of its more valuable contents looted or vandalized.* In the face of such militancy right in his own back yard, Kukrit could hardly have halted injustices against farmers upcountry. He was unable to control even the policemen in his own neighborhood, let alone rope in provincial mavericks to enforce the land reforms he had inherited from Sanya. Kukrit instead tried to satisfy some of the farmers’ economic needs. He attempted to reverse the historical flow of wealth from the countryside to the capital, endeavoring to funnel some of the profits enjoyed by the Bangkok-based middlemen back into the land. Part of his scheme involved “rice premium,” premium," or export tax, that had resulted in reforming a decades-old "rice lower prices for paddy rice and thus had contributed to the decline in income.466 farmers’ income.* Unfortunately, while higher rice prices might boost rural incomes and stimulate agricultural production, it was unavoidable that they would also

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raise food prices to urban consumers. But a compromise is a compromise, and this was not unfamiliar territory for Kukrit; it was his natural habitat in On the other hand, Kukrit’s conflicting constituents were less accustomed fact. Ontheother to the give and take that came so naturally to him, and they soon placed Kukrit in less hospitable environs, between a rock on the one side and a hard place on the other. In less than six months after their pro-farmers demonstrations, the students took to the streets again, this time to protest the Kukritgovernment’s new rice policy. Student leaders, their ambivalence showing, now backed the demands of city-dwelling laborers, calling for lower prices on rice and earlier student protests over Bangkok’s sugar. The inherent contradiction with earlierstudent indifference to peasants seems to have been lost on the marchers, and they no points for efforts made in that now-forgotten gave the Kukrit government govemmentno arena. In fact, quite the opposite was true, and Kukrit was now being called upon to subsidize urbanites’ cost of living, which had risen to compensate previously mistreated farmers/ farmers.477 The rice issue led to a series of paralyzing union actions in December 1975 and calls for a nationwide general strike after the first of the year. Unable to persuade labor leaders or students of the economic impossibility of having one’s cake and eating it too, and thus unable to arrange one of his famous compromises, Kukrit finally gave in to their political superiority. Hoping to avert the threatened general strike, Kukrit signed an agreement with labor leaders, agreeing to their demands and thus scrapping the price 43 guarantees for farmers.48 Parliament now began buzzing about a no-confidence vote, and Kukrit’s brother Seni began maneuvering to form a coalition of his own. Never mind how dismally Seni had failed less than a year before, Kukrit’s enemies could think of no one more qualified to replace Kukrit, and so they scrambled to find enough support to back the only viable possibility. Even Kukrit’s own coalition partners, most notably the Thai Nation (Chat Thai) Party, tried to push a no-confidence vote.4’ Kukrit tried to disarm his attackers by reshuffling his cabinet; taking over the key Interior portfolio for himself and buying support by giving other portfolios to opposition leaders. But the tactic parties now turned against him.50 backfired as pro-government parties The proceedings reeked of opportunism, with right-wing and left-wing parties—both seeking to take advantage of Kukrit’s misfortunes,—joining forces just to create a vacancy over which they knew they would soon be fighting amongst themselves. Finally, Seni’s Democrats managed to schedule a no-confidence motion for a vote on 14 January 1976, and Kukrit faced almost certain defeat. The Democrats formed an alliance with three leftist parties, who agreed to support Seni only if he could guarantee fulfillment of progressive reforms enact 51 Said Seni of his latest strange that Kukrit had tried and failed to enact. bedfellows, “It is better to go along with the Left than with the Right, because

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the Left are with the poor, and the poor are in the majority; and we have to intervene in private enterprise in the public interest."552’ He was shortly to find an exception to that rule, however. News of Seni’s ties to the left sent a shock wave through the military, the heads of which had pushed hard to stall Kukrit’s timetable for US troop withdrawals and other reforms. Despite the conflicting interests of factions, the armed forces were united on one point now. They would not tolerate the formation of this proposed new government under Seni, which, despite his conservative credentials, struck the generals as socialistic and a threat to stability. 11 January 1976, a delegation of one hundred Therefore, on the night of 11January what was ostensibly a belated senior officers called on Kukrit at his home for whatwas New Year’s gathering. Chosen as their spokesman was Krit Sivara, who had prevented a coup from erupting during the past twenty-seven months. In the presence of his factional rival Pramam, and for once with Pramam’s concurrence, Krit explained the situation to the prime minister. The armed forces were committed to Kukrit, Krit explained, and would continue to back any government headed by him. They would not, however, tolerate the formation of a “socialist-oriented" coalition and would prevent it by any means at their disposal, which of course meant a coup d’etat. The generals 53 left the next step up to Kukrit.55 The following day, Kukrit swore in his reshuffled cabinet and went on nationwide television and radio to announce he was dissolving Parliament and calling for new elections to be held within ninety days as per the provisions of the constitution. Saying he hoped new elections would produce a single party majority, he pleaded for unity. “I have tried every patience,” he explained. “However, chaos and possible means to exercise patience," turmoil prevailed throughout."54 If this situation in the House were allowed to continue, it would adversely affect the security and safety of the nation. Besides, the confusion in the House would lead to division among the Thai people. Our beloved Thai nation would become disunited. Disunity would be most dangerous toournational to our national independence. I would never allow 55 such a situation to arise.

Unfortunately, it was all too painfully clear that such a situation had already arisen, and whether it had come about because Kukrit or any other had allowed it was beside the point. Disunity had become individual .had epidemic by now, and the coming elections, sadly, were to prove no cure.

Chapter 17 Another Hot Day in October

Amid the chaos and turmoil that Kukrit cited—the strikes, the demonstrations, the rumblings of the military and the police—and in the face of that ever-present threat that the Thai elite perceived lurking on their eastern borders, King Bhumibol celebrated his forty-eighth birthday. On that auspicious occasion in December of 1975, His Majesty addressed the nation, urging his subjects from every walk of life to stand ready to defend the nation against its enemies, both foreign and domestic. Shortly afterwards, while reviewing the annual parade of the Royal Guards, the king elaborated on his birthday message in a speech broadcast across the land. “If you [soldiers] think it important to continue protecting the country,” the king entreated, “then beware the danger which is coming dose ... prepare your physical and mental strength and be ready to cope close with any emergency....”1 At the same time, in the last floundering days before Kukrit dissolved Parliament, the government responded with a crackdown on the country's country’s potential domestic enemies. The prime minister promised a tougher stand on labor unrest, blaming both the unfair policies of employers and the illegal activities of employees. Unnamed “third parties” parties" were also mentioned who tried “to sow disunity among the people.”’ people.”2 The Interior Ministry soon announced it would begin arresting these sowers of disunity, which were described as students and “bogus students.”’ students."3 And soon the exodus began. Leaders of the student movement began quietly to slip out of the country partly because of fear for their personal safety and partly because they saw little hope of achieving their goals in the current political climate. Seksan Prasertkun was seen in Paris, and a letter from him reportedly told a friend he was planning on “going into the forest.” forest” Thirayudh Boonmee left the country some time afterward, and travelled to Rome, then to Albania, and on to China. China/4 Sources close to them and others who fled indicated that they were planning to slip back into the country and join the

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armed struggle of the outlawed Communist Party of Thailand (CPT),S5 an intention that would be confirmed in due time. The White Terror The new elections were set to be held on 4 April 1976. Almost from the beginning it was dear that the campaign would be the bloodiest ever conducted in Thailand and the results would be meaningless. Nonetheless, persistent politicians and determined idealists fought the fight, for good or for bad, and the constitutional process went ahead, despite the ruthless efforts of its enemies. In nine weeks of campaigning, more than thirty-five people died in terrorist attacks as right wing vigilante groups and the covert agents of powerful elites torched the campaign headquarters of left wing parties, assassinated candidates and party leaders, tossed bombs and hand grenades into crowds at campaign rallies. Fear was generated on all sides as the violence kept would-be campaigners silent, and reactionary propaganda told undecided citizens that progressive candidates would bring in socialism and wipe out both religion and the monarchy.64 Unlike the blasS elections of 1975, in which the sitting government did not compete and little seemed to be at stake, heads of ministries now used state power to keep control of state power and worked to manipulate events. Defense Minister Pramarn Adireksam, for one, fiercely conservative patron of the populist, right wing Nawaphon movement, used military TV and radio facilities to spread his anti-communist message. A patriotic, multimedia campaign, which had been building since late in 1975, was stepped up as the elections approached, its frequentslogan, ‘Right Kill Left!’ frequent slogan, ‘Kight Left!' filling the airwaves daily.7 The media campaign gave wide and constant publicity to the political preaching of a controversial Buddhist monk, Phra Kittiwutthp Bhikkhu, who spread a dubious doctrine claiming Buddhism endorsed the killing of communists,8 indeed, that Buddhists had a duty to kill communists. Kittiwuttho argued that since communists are not "complete “complete persons,” persons," but rather devils who would destroy both the faith and the crown, the demerit from killing one would be outweighed by the merit of defending the cause of religion. “It is just like when we kill a fish to make a stew to place in the alms bowl for a monk," monk,” he once explained. “There is certainly demerit in killing the fish, but we place it in the alms bowl of a monk and gain much greater merit.”9 As the past year and a half had shown, there were plenty such fish merit." in the sea. Such confidence and zeal pervaded the growing rightist mentality, and the belief that heaven itself was about to be overrun by

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communists was used to justify the unholiest of acts, acts carried out by gullible disciples and directed cynically from above. “There is a strong sense of being born to rule in the Thai establishment,” observed a ‘Western Western diplomat stationed in Bangkok, “and anyone outside that close little circle of kinship and school ties is looked upon literally as a communist agent, the mob, or disloyal to the King and the nation’s religion."10 Now there were so many such outsiders trying to worm their way religion.” into the ruling circle that old guard conservatives resolved to take any and all measures required to keep them out. Soon it was as if open war had been declared by the right upon the left, and no liberal figure, no matter how respectable before, could feel safe if now he chose to stand for MP. On 28 February 1976, for example, Boonsanong Punyodhayana, leader by persons unknown near his of Thailand’s Thailand's Socialist Party, was assassinated assassinatedby home in a suburb of Bangkok. Far from the rabid radical depicted by his enemies, Boonsanong was a respected lecturer in sociology at Thammasat and held a Ph.D. from Cornell.11 Dr. Boonsanong had been driving home from a farewell party for an Australian diplomat that night when, according to one account, another car pulled alongside his, and the men inside shot him at point blank range. With Boonsanong dead at the wheel, the car swerved off the road and plunged into a roadside canal.12 Observers noted that Boonsanong may have been targeted because of his enthusiasticsupport of the student movement and his supposed contacts with members of the CPT, but it is as likely that he just proved easier to get at than other left wing figures. Less a politician than an educator, Boonsanong had employed no bodyguards and had taken none of the other precautions more experienced political men might have used. 113’ Other victims proved equally accessible and defenseless. Throughout the period of electioneering, the victims of terrorism ranged from intellectuals, novelists and journalists, to a group of 18 farmers in Chiang Mai who were said to have ties to the Socialist Party. Five students at a Bangkok technical college were killed and many others were wounded when a large bomb was detonated there on 3 March 1976. The school was apparently considered a hot-bed of socialist thinking, and a message from the bombers announced, “This will be a lesson for the leftists.” Elsewhere, an NSCT leader was shot to death as he lay sleeping in a Buddhist temple on an upcountry field trip with some fellow medical students.14 There was some reason to suspect the involvement of certain “patriotic” “patriotic" organizations in the terror campaign. Two of four suspects apprehended arid charged with the temple murder of the medical student were members of Nawaphon. In addition, the fire-bombing later of the headquarters of the liberal New Force Party was traced to a saboteur who blew himself up in the effort and was found to be a charter member of the paramilitary Red Gaur youth movement

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It was suggested that such groups, many of them supported and directed by military figures, were being used by men who hoped such turmoil would suit their own plans. Fears generated by the reign of terror could be seen, these figures hoped, as a pretext for military intervention, the long awaited 15 excuse to stage a coup. coup.’5

Withdrawal Symptoms In the weeks immediately preceding the elections it was reported that certain army officers had approached Kukrit offering him titular leadership of a martial-law government if he would go along with a postponement of order” were restored. Kukrit refused, but it the elections until “law and order" became apparent that army cliques were continuing to vie for position even afterward. The same offer was supposedly made to Pramarn, as well, but he too declined.16 Army Commander General Boonchai Bamrungpong at one point placed the armed forces on full alert, in anticipation, he said, of the need to aid police in an expected “internal threat or emergency.” Calling off the alert after ten hours, Boonchai hinted that the real internal threat emanated from within the army, where he said certain dissatisfied officers had expressed feelings that something should be done about “the indedsiveness of the Government.”17 Boonchai, a close associate of Krit Sivara, whom he had succeeded as commander-in-chief, was following following Krit’s agenda,of agenda, of continued stability and of discouraging coups. Still, in light of all the obvious activity—the planning, the maneuvering, the secret negotiations—it seems that it could not have been for lack of will that a coup had not yet materialized. Rather, no one member of together the various the military establishment appeared able yet to pull .together elements necessary to make a coup work. As Richard Nations observed: in Thailand today is considerably more refined than earlier The art of a successful coup inThailand and requires every bit as much tact and finesse as running a parliamentary

government.The of force in the army, government. The necessary elements require not only the balance offeree but also the legitimacy and unity of the Supreme Command, the approval of the King

few figures of national stature suture with a credible political and support from some of the few'figures 1 following.18 '

Perhaps one reason military leaders were reluctant to upstage the government just then was the continued uncertainty about the future status of American military bases in Thailand. By March of 1976, the withdrawal of most American personnel was a foregone conclusion. While some military hard-liners still hoped to reverse the flow, it was not seen as a real alternative to most. There were only about 5,000 troops left at that point, less than a tenth of what there had once been. The U.S. withdrawal was more a function of

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changing US policy in the Pacific region than of all the noise from Thai liberals since 1973, and probably could not have been prevented even if the Thai elites were of one mind about doing so. For Thai conservatives the problem now became how to hold onto the enormous amounts of US military aid that would leave once all the Americans had pulled out. Kukrit stuck to his original timetable for US withdrawal and reaffirmed his position just one week before the 20 March deadline, this despite the fact that the US State Department had still not responded to his latest set of criteria for the withdrawal. Down to the wire, Kukrit remained aloof, disassociating himself from the negotiations even to the point of refusing to meet with the American ambassador.119’ Instead Kukrit, perhaps more concerned about winning re-election in a few short days, left the chore of negotiations to his cabinet ministers. The two leaders of the conservative Thai Nation (Chat Thai) Party, the so-called the relevant portfolios in the caretaker government; generals' party, controlled controlledthe Chatichai Choonhavan heading Foreign Affairs and Pramarn Adireksarn in charge of Defense. Considering the important military faction these two jointly controlled, it is not hard to imagine why a coup would have been ruled out during their crucial negotiations to keep up the flow of American dollars to the Thai armed forces. In fact, just three days before the deadline, the military was once more placed on alert, some sources saying the alert was to prevent a coup, others claiming it to be a preparation for mass demonstrations if the Americans did not agree to withdraw on Thailand’s terms.20 At issue were the several hundred advisers due to remain in Thailand and the continued operation of certain high-tech listening posts and radar stations on Thai soil. Kukrit insisted that all remaining American personnel be under Thai supervision and that Thais have jurisdiction over the intelligence-gathering operations of listening posts and radar stations. The US was not partial to these terms, insisting that it have autonomy over its own facilities and even demanding diplomatic immunity for any US personnel required to run them.21 As negotiations dragged on, student organizations on both the left and the right prepared to get involved. By the seventeenth of March, with only two weeks to go before the elections, fear of terrorists kept electioneering to a minimum, while the stalemate over the American withdrawal led to rumors of a coming clash between NSCT demonstrators and neo-fascist Red Gaurs.22 On the morning of the twentieth, with no news of a pull-out agreement forthcoming, 5,000 NSCT supporters assembled outside of Thammasat. A demonstration across the road at atSanam Sanam Luang attracted thousands more as the day went by, and the deadline began running out. Student leaders gave anti-American speeches and demanded an end to American neo-imperialism 23 in Southeast Asia,25 and by late afternoon the demonstrators were demanding a statement from the government .

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Finally, the prime minister announced he was going to extend his deadline for withdrawal to 20 July 1976, in order to allow negotiators to finalize procedures for handing over certain facilities to the Thai military.224* The announcement was greeted with boos, and student leaders denounced the new time-line as unsatisfactory, even illegal. Parliament had been dissolved, they pointed out, and the present caretaker government had no 25 authority to change treaty arrangements without legislative approval.23 The crowd stayed put until nightfall, waiting to hear the official explanation on the government’s evening news broadcast. With darkness, however, came the Red Gaurs who caused a stir when one of them threw a dud hand-grenade into the crowd. Then two plastic bombs exploded behind the speakers’ platform as NSCTSecretary-General Kriangkamol was addressing the crowd. Though several people were hurt, one seriously, Kriangkamol finished his speech, telling everyone to go home and get plenty of sleep. They would march on the US Embassy in the morning. On 21 March NSCT supporters gathered in force and marched toward Wireless Road. Along the way, 200 Red Gaur troublemakers, armed and ready, had erected a road block around DemocracyMonument. Anticipating this, theNSCT re-routed the parade and avoided the monument completely, fearing that any clash vasdy outdash with the Red Gaurs, whom the marchers vastly 26 numbered, would provide an excuse for military intervention.24 Undaunted and still looking for a fight, the Red Gaurs relocated. A bomb was tossed into the procession as it passed Siam Center, killing four youths and injuring seventy other people. The marchers dispersed in panic, but regrouped eventually at their intended destination outside the American Embassy compound. Expressing mixed feelings toward the United States, demonstrators shouted angry slogans and then placed a wreath of flowers at the gate as a token of goodwill toward the American people. The group dispersed peacefully by 7:30 P.M. p.M. and went quietly home.27 The Red Gaurs, on the other hand, wreaked havoc that day. Not only had they killed and injured marchers with impunity, but they were seen being transported about town by police, and some were seen carrying and using police walkie-talkies. It had been an obvious attempt to provoke large-scale riots and provide an excuse for the army to move in. Now that the withdrawal negotiations had been rescheduled it would have been the perfect time, with only days to spare before the elections. Wasting no time at all, Defense Minister Pramarn tried to persuade the cabinet to let him declare martial law, but 28 Kukrit prevailed one last time, and Pramarn was denied.38 That no excuse to call out the army arose that day is a tribute to the organization and improved self-control of the NSCT. Despite frequent setbacks and the terrorism by their ideological opponents, the leadership of the student movement had come a long way from the deadly divisiveness

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of October 1973. They remained, for the moment at least, a force to be reckoned with and reasoned with. With the withdrawal issue postponed until after the elections and the students apparently quieted down, Kukrit now prepared to face his constituents and weather the electoral storm to come. If all went well, he and SAP would emerge with a large enough plurality in the House to form a one-party cabinet and push through all the reforms that had been stymied under the previous coalition. Having come so far and through so much, it was hard to believe he could not win at the polls this time. But he did not

Seni Again The voters did not grant Kukrifs Kukrit’s wish. The few that dared to go to the polls apparently did not share his vision of parliamentary unity, and again no single party earned enough seats to form a government. Though it nearly doubled its representation in the House, SAP did not win the plurality its founder had hoped for. And, on top of it all, Kukrit himself was defeated in the contest for his own House seat as voters in his district chose instead a conservative member of Seni’s Sundarave). An Seni's Democrat Party, Samak Sundaravej. outspoken conservative journalist with dose family ties to the palace, Samak ironically, had written for Kukrit’s newspaper, the Siam Rath daily. The Democrats took the largest number of seats, and Seni was therefore given another chance to put together a coalition. On 20 April 1976, Kukrit handed over the reigns of power to his brother, and Seni began his third stint as prime minister. The new coalition looked a lot like the old one, with Thai Nation (Chat Thai), and Sodal Justice sharing power now with the Democrats. Kukrit, without even a seat of his own now, bowed quietly out and was soon admitted to a hospital for a long overdue rest. Almost immediately “law and order” were restored. This did not mean the arrests and prosecutions of terrorists. It did not mean that justice was now dealt to those who had mocked law and used violence to create disorder. On the contrary, it meant an official crackdown on leftist dissenters, especially labor and student organizers. The arrests of NSCT and union leaders for the possession of “communist literature” literature" and for distributing leaflets called to mind the jailing of dissidents in June and October of 1973, and seemed to foreshadow a recurrence of the inJune events that followed then. Yet the hue and cry of 1973 was notheard not heard in 1976, and one sensed a feeling of relief among Thai elites in the deceptive calm 29 that prevailed once the left was forced underground. Still there was uneasiness. Though the urban left had been silenced, the rural insurgency persisted, and the agonizing perception of a Communist threat still plagued the Thai elite. One writer described the Thai leadership as “deeply unsure of itself” and in the midst of a crisis of self-confidence. Writing for the Far Eastern Economic Review, Harvey Stockton noted that

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gloom and doom were being spread by a hard core of old-guard hangerson who “nostalgically look for lost discipline in national life and vainly imagine that a knight on a white horse could restore it The crisis of confidence is sustained by the few who seek to exacerbate negative trends to the point 30 where disillusion will, they hope, facilitate another authoritarian takeover." takeover. B3° In light of what was to come, Stockton’s observations seem almost prophetic By July 1976, when the Seni government had finally settled on withdrawal terms and had bid farewell to all but a small advisory group of Americans, it was plain that Kukrit’s brother would not be able to project even the same national image Kukrit had done, let alone a comparable vision for the country. Seni had less influence over his cabinet than even Kukrit had. Whereas Kukrit had presided over a divided coalition, Seni not only had that problem but also factionalism within his own party to contend with. Nor did Seni seem in control of the military or able to rule out another coup. Addressing questions about whether the army was still poised to take over shouldstudentsandunionactivistsreemerge,Senitold should students and union activists reemerge, Seni told Time magazine, “There is nothing to prevent them if they have a mind to do so. They, after all, have the guns.”31 His only hope in that arena had rested on his choice of General Krit Sivara, the retired commander-in-chief, as his defense minister. Krit had managed to prevent a coup so far, and it was hoped that he could continue to do so. Conventional wisdom still maintained that Krit had the best and if he continuedtosupport continued tosupport chance of any man to fill the leadership vacuum, andif for whatever motives, it might yet survive. Unfortunately, Krit the constitution, forwhatever was taken ill within days of his appointment and died on 23 April 1976, resultant scramble to take his place renewed presumably of heart failure.32 The resultantscramble factional rivalries within the military and left the civilian sector as uncertain as ever. Seni seemed powerless to alleviate any of these anxieties. By the end of its first two months in power, the new government had, in Stockton’s words, “done more to diminish confidence than to restore it,"33 and this was nowhere more evident than in the negative trend in foreign investment. Capital, in fact, was flowing out of the country at an alarming rate, with one report noting that the Thais had now become the third largest group of investors in Hong Kong. Such panicked flight of funds was an understandable if not excusable phenomenon, with newspapers constantly warning that Thailand was doomed to become the next domino to fall, one paper even predicting a fantastic scenario in which Vietnamese troops would seize Thailand’s eastern provinces within only a few months. The paranoia fed on itself, and the more that capital flight increased, the more reason there was, it seemed, to believe the gloomy forecasts.34 Oddly enough, a grave danger was to befall the nation within those few short months, and indeed it was to arrive from a foreign land to the east. But it was not communist hordes from Vietnam, or Laos, or Cambodia that were to threaten the uneasy calm now over Thailand—rather it was the

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return of Praphas Charusathien from his exile in Taiwan. In mid-August the deposed dictator slipped quietly back into the country, and when his return was discovered, the numbing, lackluster days of calm were over. Praphas Tests the Waters

When they learned that the ex-tyrant had, on 14 August, slipped past immigration and customs at Don Muang Airport and had been spirited off the runway by a waiting limousine to the home of a wealthy relative in Bangkok, recently cowed dissidents became newly emboldened. Rumors of a conspiracy to restore military rule were fueled by the Seni government’s failure to locate Praphas after nearly three days, and student leaders spoke out demanding he be caught and tried for the deaths of their comrades three years ago on Fourteen October. When Praphas’s whereabouts were at last disclosed, Praphas brazenly announced that he would not be leaving. He had taken quite ill while in Taiwan and was determined to die in his native Taipei," he insisted. “I can’t talk to the Thailand, “I want to die here, not in Taipei,” 35 people there and the medicine is different." different"55 His former colleagues in the military were sympathetic but divided. The commander-in-chief of the army, Boonchai Banrungpong—representing the heirs to the Krit faction and the thinking of many officers now in the high command—opposed Praphas’s presence now, while Deputy Premier and Air Chief Marshall Dawee—a Dawee—a. former associate of Praphas—advised Seni 36 that Praphas be allowed to stay and consult with physicians.56 Seni vacillated, perhaps waiting to see which way the wind would blow. He decided to negotiate with Praphas, a move that brought sharp criticism. “Who said he had anything to negotiate?” grumbled an angry newspaper 37 columnist,57 and opposition MP’s began to call for Seni’s resignation. When Seni emerged from his “negotiations” he said he would allow Praphas to blind," Seni pointed out. remain in the country another week. “He is going blind,” 38 “And he has no more political ambition.”58 Student leaders were incensed. On the nineteenth they threatened mass demonstrations if the former autocrat were not expelled within forty-eight hours. Almost immediately, a force of 20,000 students and non-students gathered at Thammasat, just as they had done three years earlier. One difference this time, however, was that counter-demonstrators, members of the Red Gaurs and Nawaphon movements now also showed up. By mid-afternoon on the twenty-first, fighting had broken out between the opposing groups. Bottle-bombs were lobbed over the campus walls, and hand grenades tossed into buses carrying NSCT supporters to the rally. The army and the police were put on alert as gunfire broke out and the two groups began killing one another. Before it was over, four people would lose their lives and eighty others would be wounded.59

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In an apparent apparenteffort effort to prevent further bloodshed, the king stepped in “probably now. His Majesty met with Praphas and, as one writer speculated, "probably told [him] it was time to leave." Praphas acquiesced and found himself aboard a Thai Airways flight back to Taiwan the following afternoon. Amazingly, that was all it took. The crisis faded as quickly as it had arisen, and within days it was as if it had never happened. Calm was restored. Students went back to classes.40 But nothing in Thailand is ever that simple, of course, and it soon became evident that Praphas had returned neither to see his doctors and die, as he had said, nor to stage a comeback as others had feared. As it turned out, he had only been testing the waters.41 It was not so much to see whether the students would march again. That Praphas's brief was probably taken for granted. However, during Praphas’s homecoming, more important things had happened. Factions had coalesced as fence-sitters in the military had been forced into making their true feelings known. The death of Krit Sivara had left his supporters without a patron, and his closest associates in the high command—notably Serm na Nakorn and Kriangsak Chomanan—had found themselves pressed between two other factions: Pramarn’s clique and that led by First Army Commander Yot Dhepasdin, an old Praphas loyalist. These two cliques now competed with the other, lesser patrons Serm and Kriangsak for the loyalties of Krit’s old clients, forlorn and leaderless now that their benefactor had passed away. However, another factor in the shifting allegiances was the changing sources of patronage following the US pullout, in light of which, Kriangsak’s Kriangsak's dose relations with the Americans made for a valuable asset. Therefore, the lull that had preceded Praphas’s return must be seen as a period of maneuvering and realignment. Loyalties no doubt overlapped as possible clients watched potential patrons, and vice-versa, each waiting to see how the other would fare in the new environment. When Praphas returned, and armed forces leaders took sides as to whether he should be allowed to remain, it became clearer who stood where, and who could be relied upon for support later on. Meanwhile, without Krit to back him up, Seni was losing what little cohesion he still maintained among his Democrats. For example, responding to criticism from the party’s progressive wing about his support for Praphas, MinisterTavich Democratic Defense Minister Tavich Seniwongse resigned from the cabinet towards the end of August.42 That resignation marked a clear division and, for all practical purposes, split the Democrats into two separate entities. Throughout September, the party became more and more polarized, with conservative members rallying around Samak Sundaravej, and progressives around Commerce Minister Damrong Lathiphiphat 45 Thus, Seni was already facing the possibility of having to re-order his cabinet when the next crisis came. On 19 September, quite without warning,

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Thanom Kittikachom returned to Thailand. Having sent ahead his one-time deputy to test the waters, it now seemed, the deposed premier was ready to dive in himself.

The Evil Prince Penitent Like Praphas, Thanom too had a sob story. His aged father, it seems, was on his death bed, and Thanom wanted to spend the old man’s last days, not by his side, but in a monastery, in the robes of a Buddhist monk, making merit to ease his father’s transition into the next life. That said, the expremier took his priestly vows and entered the royal temple of Wat Bowomiwes. It was a scenario so well-crafted it reminded one journalist of something from Thai mythology. An evil prince of power, repentant for his former unenlightened life, renounces the world to make merit as a monk. As he steps forward to receive the alms of those who fell before his previous tyrannies, so now even governments fall before his virtues.44

With the same lack of self-confidence that he showed the month before, Seni waffled once more. As if wetting his finger and holding it aloft, he again stalled, waiting for time to reveal the most politic course. First he tried to persuade Thanom to leave voluntarily, and when the prince-penitent dedined, dedsion was to let declined, Seni put the matter to his cabinet cabinet. Their decision him to fulfill pledges he had Thanom stay, but only so long as it took for for.him made to his father, though it was quickly pointed out that no one quite knew what those pledges might have been.45 Despite the majority held there by Seni’s coalition, the outraged House of Representatives passed a resolution on 22 September calling for Thanom’s immediate expulsion. Predictably, student leaders demanded at least that, and began to organize more rallies. Unionists also joined in. In Nakhorn Prathom, just west of Bangkok, two members of the Peoples Front labor movement were lynched, reportedly by police, when they were caught distributing antiinddent heightened the anger already felt Thanom posters. The lynching incident by students, and NSCT representatives compared it to the assassination of 46 Dr. Boonsanong during the recent election campaigns.44 On 30 September 1976, 10,000 angry demonstrators once more took over Sanam Luang, and student organizers announced another of their famous deadlines. Thanom was to leave the country by Saturday 2 October, or else. little,” one commentator later wrote, “whether “It would have mattered little," Seni chose to be noble by acquitting Thanom, or firm by dismissing him into exile again, so long as he acted with appropriate aplomb and selfconfidence."47 But such was not the case and the students' deadline drew closer doser without Seni making either decision. In Parliament, Seni’s party now

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took it upon themselves to patch things up, attempting to pass legislation Thanom’s movements while he was in Thailand. that would at least restrict Thanom's Progressive Democrats debated conservative Democrats as the draft bill circulated, and one of the liberals took it upon himself to confront Seni in person when the prime minister walked in to join the session. Seni did not support," Seni said take the criticism well. “Thank you very much for your support,” resignation.”48 Shortly afterward, he sarcastically. “Now I shall submit my resignation.”® announced that he would form a new government, the composition of 'which October.49 It would not make any difference which he would reveal on 5 October.® now, however. By the time Seni discerned the wind direction, a sudden, violent, storm had blown up, washing away not only him and his political career, but Thailand’s latest and most earnest experiment in constitutional government government.

OctoberMassacre The Six October Massacre Thunder, lightning, and monsoon rains postponed the NSCT’s “or else,” and the deadline for Thanom's Thanom’s expulsion was extended to 3 October. Sanam Luang was doubtless muddy and strewn with puddles that Sunday morning when the now familiar thousands thronged together there to flex their collective muscle again. They could not have had the same confidence now that had filled them three years earlier, when they first gathered to oust Thanom. There was a danger now that had not existed then—not the threat of soldiers and police turning out against them, which had always existed and for which they had always been ready, but the threat that the people, the masses that had backed them up before, now might turn against them. It was a real danger, and anyone who came to Sanam Luang that day without knowing of it had either slept through the election-time horror, or was hopelessly naive. The rally started off smoothly and non-violently non-violendy and with the announcement of a new tactic to show the establishment that the movement had not lost strength after being forced underground. NSCT leaders now said they would not issue a new deadline; instead they, and the leaders of the National Labor Council of Thailand (NLCT) were calling for a nationwide general strike to continue as long as the former dictator remained on Thai soil. Students would boycott classes everywhere and march through the streets of every town and district center. Workers would walk off their jobs protest. There would be no compromise, they vowed, until Thanom was in protest gone.50 And so a round-the-clock vigil began on the Thammasat campus. Though the university had been closed down earlier, 4,000 determined students broke through the gates and took over the Bo Tree Courtyard and the football field. There were reports later that some of these students had smuggled in firearms which, if it were true, would seem a precaution, wisely

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taken or not, against the kind of violence used by Red Gaurs against defenseless marchers in the anti-American demonstrations six months earlier, earlier.51 While the four thousand sat cross-legged in clusters around the campus grounds, singing their protest songs and making speeches, the capital braced itself for a reprise of Fourteen October, the anniversary of which was now just ten days off. Counter-demonstrations began right away. A group of 400 rightists protested outside the prime minister’s office, on the fourth, demanding he take a definitive stand. They stayed through the night, and their angry shouts intensified the following day, 5 October, when he announced his cabinet changes. Seni had dismissed the conservative Samak from his post as a deputy in the interior ministry, and had placed the apparently neutral Admiral Sa-ngad Chaloryu at the head of Defense.552’ Meanwhile, at Thammasat, a troupe of student actors staged a pivotal drama, a reenactment of the lynching two weeks before of the union men who had protested Thanom’s return. On a make-shift stage in the campus courtyard, a young actor was strungup strung up on a harness to simulate the hanging, while others portrayed those responsible for the deed. One of the performers—the one dangling from the rope—was said by some to have borne a certain resemblance to the crown prince, an unpopular figure then among the members of the left. Soon, somehow, word got out that the play had been an act of lese majeste, an insult to the crown, in which radical leftists had hanged the king’s heir apparent in effigy. By evening a photo story about the skit had made Bangkok’s front pages. Dao Sayam—a “rabid, right-wing newspaper," says Anderson—printed apparently retouched pictures of the performers, exaggerating the features of the one in question to make him look more like the prince. Then, in what seems to have been a coordinated effort, the armed forces radio network broadcast a similar version of the story and urged the citizenry to buy Dao 53 Sayam and see for themselves.55 Considering the theme of the students’ skit—the murder of innocent citizens by corrupt authorities—it does not seem logical that the dramatists would have planned to make the victim, who was a sympathetic figure, look like the crown prince. In another photograph of the skit, one sees a young man in the guise of a monk—apparently Thanom—seated half-lotus style beneath the dangling “corpse.” In the monk’s lap is a human skull; standing guard beside him is a soldier with a Nazi arm band. Several students lay about, face-down, nearby, obviously mimicking more dead bodies, those who had fallen on Fourteen October. A placard beside the tableau reads, “Students, don’t worry. I only want a few more corpses."54 Plainly, then, the hanging figure would not have intentionally resembled the prince. It simply would not have fit in with the rest of the scene if it had. Yet, even if this was an act of mockery against the sacred institution of the throne, it would not have justified what followed. Heeding the call of

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the army broadcast for “all true Thai patriots" to quash the supposed antimonarchist demonstrations, thousands of militants, led by the Red Gaurs and other neo-fascist groups, flowed into the Thammasat area and surrounded the campus.55 It was now the morning of Six October, another date which requires no mention of year to distinguish its place in Thai history. Perhaps sensing what was io to come, the NSCT leadership left the campus, not in flight but to surrender themselves to the prime minister and try to explain the true meaning of the play before the misguided mob could carry NSCT leaders left behind some two-thousand of their out its intentions. The NSCTleaders fellow demonstrators who had spent the night on campus as promised. By the time the student leaders arrived at Seni’s office, however, it was too 56 late.54 Claiming they had been fired upon from inside the campus, police who had been shepherding the mob outside called for reinforcements. By 7:30 A.M. the streets outside the university compound were lined by special units of the police and military, armed with machine guns, recoilless rifles, grenade and rocket launchers. The mob had by now swollen to ten thousand, and, as if the police needed more help, had armed themselves clubs, and guns of their own.57 Suddenly police and soldiers with swords, dubs, opened fire, pouring as many as 1,000 rounds per minute in sporadic intervals into the compound. They used no tear gas. By comparison, shooting a fly with an elephant gun would have seemed reasonable. They smashed through the campus gates with a dump truck and charged the cowering demonstrators inside. There must have been snipers within firing upon the invaders, as photographs do show armed soldiers and policemen hiding behind trees and walls as the civilian mob carelessly blundered through the compound. But whatever armament the students possessed could not have been enough to make a difference, for soon the demonstrators were overcome by the rabble, some trying to flee, leaping into the Chao Phraya River, others trying to give themselves up. Reporter Richard Nations was there. I saw one university student emerge from the auditorium unarmed only to be swamped by the mob and kicked and beaten to death with bottles, mangled chairs and jagged bits of metal tom from the main gates. Other students who tried to escape were hanged from the trees outside the campus. Later, their bodies were doused in petrol and burned. At least one girl was reported to have drowned among the many 58

safety. who tried to swim across the river to safety.”

The rampage went on for hours, as police went from building to building to flush out the students. Once outside, the demonstrators were rounded up and herded into the football field where onlookers cheered from the bleachers, waving flags, singing and laughing as boys and girls alike were

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the playing field; any show made to strip to the waist and lie facedown on die of reluctance earned a rifle butt in the head. Among the sprawling mass of half-clad students, prone and paralyzed with fear, strolled policemen, kicking and beating the quivering forms as they went At least one officer went about stripping students of any Buddha images, violently ripping chains from around their necks; he said he did so “because communists are not Buddhists,”59 but he did not mention the amulets’ gold content. By midday, police arrested 1,700 students and carted them away to detention facilities, driving them along the way, past the mutilated corpses of their friends, strung from the trees around Sanam Luang. Their job at Thammasat done, the victorious patriots now marched to Government premier. House to confront the premier, “I did my best,” a tearful Seni Pramoj told the crowd. “I tried to keep law and order in this kingdom, but if you wish, I will go."60 Somehow the honor and prestige of governing the people of Thailand did not seem worth fighting over now. A dark and ugly side of a normally pleasant people had just been revealed, and the Thai elite seemed revolted by it. That evening it was announced that the military had taken over the government. No one else seemed to want it anymore.

the Pieces Picking up the It was a day or so before anyone realized what had happened. In spite of everything, it was not Thanom who had seized the day and the power of state, but the remnants of the Krit Sivara clique. Admiral Sa-ngad, the new defense minister, and his associates, Kriangsak Chomanan and Serm na Nakorn, had seized upon the Thammasat massacre as a pretext. With their faction threatened by Thanom’s return and the parallel maneuvers of Pramam Adireksarn, it was now or never for them. Utilizing their control of the Supreme Command, they moved in and took charge before Yot Dhepasdin could mobilize his First Army units, and before anyone in the them. 61 Pramam camp even knew what had hit theni. In the end, once they realized that the military was back in control, the rest of the armed forces more or less fell into line behind them along with the so-called National Administrative Reform Council (NARC) they had put in place. It may seem strange to call this a bloodless coup, but from all indications, for exacerbating the whichever military figures must take the blame for situation at Thammasat, Sa-ngad, Serm, and Kriangsak do not seem to have been involved. Rather their rivals are more easily linked to the radio broadcasts that incited the mob, and to the police and security forces that stormed the campus. Ironically, while their competitors were cooking up a pretext, the followers of the late General Krit were serving up a coup, and they managed to take over without themselves ever firing a single shot

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Perhaps because there was still some residual competition among factions, it was decided soon afterward to replace the NARG NARC with a civilianled government. Within three days the military junta announced the appointment of a new cabinet and prime minister, as well as the imminent promulgation of yet another constitution; hastily drafted and designed to give broad authority to the executive, it took effect on 22 October, but was destined to last for no more than a year. that- followed Six October, hundreds were arrested During the weeks that-followed crimes." Books were and convicted in secret trials of dubious “thought crimes.” confiscated and destroyed in large public book burnings. The Orwellian doublespeak of the new regime sounded foreboding. “We will not prosecute anyone who is not guilty,” Kriangsak told reporters in regards to the widespread arrests. “We will not consider anyone our enemies except communists."62 And, of course, by extension, all our enemies must the communists.” therefore be communists. Soon, the leaders of the left—the former students who had fled the country with intent to return and head for the hills, the lucky few who heli at Thammasat that Wednesday morning, even former escaped the hell members of Parliament—were pledging their allegiance to the CPT and the armed struggle in the provinces. Having learned the hard way the futility of peaceful demonstrations, thousands now flocked to join the fight, coming for the first time from the ranks of the educatedmiddle educated middle class. The insurgents’ insurgents* clandestine radio broadcast the announcements of Thirayudh, Seksan, and others that they would fight to the finish for social justice. One former MP, Kaisaeng Suksai of the now defunct Socialist Party, said in a CPT broadcast that armed struggle was the only path left for those who still sought “genuine independence and democracy.”65 The inclusion of such people invigorated the CPT and leant credibility to communist assertions that the Thai political system was too corrupt to be reformed. Thus, the insurgency grew, as did the government’s commitment to crush it. A year of right wing repression ensued, a period of restoration in which vaiues and arid lines of authority were reestablished. But the rhe return to old values authoritarian rule was short-lived. Too much had changed, too much had happened between Fourteen October and Six October for Thai politics to go back to what they were before. Governance, for one thing, was no longer the exclusive province of the elite, no matter how.much how much they tried to make it so. Decisions of national policy could no longer be made in secret among a close-knit cabal of powerful men for their mutual benefit alone. No matter how much those who fancied themselves born to rule wanted, they could not exclude their newly awakened clientele from the national power structure. Something in Thai society had changed, not just during those three years, but throughout the whole period since the seed of constitutionalism had been planted two generations earlier. It was a change that had come slowly

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and gradually, and was only briefly accelerated by the rapid, economic, cultural and geopolitical realities that touched Thailand in the 1970s. The outpouring of political fervor marking the seventies was more a symptom than a cause of change, but the change, nonetheless, was there. A new dimension had been added now to the circulation of elites in Thai society, and for any group to achieve and hold power the support of everbroadening constituencies had become important. No longer would it be enough just to control cliques within the military and the bureaucracy, though these were still very important. Now one also needed the blessing of popular opinion and at least the appearance of popular support Whether this meant the advent of democracy or merely the growth of demagogy was unimportant. In either case it meant that hard-nosed authoritarian rule would no longer serve the true interests of Thai elites, and that serious reforms would have to take place. Ironically, it was elements within the military that saw this in 1977 and decided to do something about it. The tactics adopted by the reactionary Thanin regime—the government it that came in after October 1976—only seemed to add fuel to the fire. As the insurgency escalated to match counter-insurgency, and as Thai soldiers started falling in battle against their own countrymen, the officer corps began to regret giving the new prime minister as much power as they had. They seemed, ironically, alarmed by Thanin’s reactionary policies and right wing extremism. As we shall see in another chapter, young, middle-ranking officers in the Army rebelled now, pushing for moderation and urging their superiors again to take control. In October of 1977, therefore, General Kriangsak Chomanan, having marshalled the bulk of the armed forces behind him at last, moved to make army’s foil full support, he once more seized another change. Now with the army's control, this time putting himself in charge. Kriangsak became prime minister and administered a partially elected government for the next two years.

Legacy and Significance After 1977, it seemed as if political moderation was at last in style. Constitutionalism experienced a slow and uncertain revival under a new charter written in 1978. Within its framework, the military was committed to a firm timetable for relinquishing power to civilians, and a shaky balance between liberal and conservative ideologies, in both the military and civilian sectors, began to take shape. And while the scars of Six October were not to be forgotten, there were signs of reconciliation. Apparently sincere efforts at rapprochement were made in 1978 and soon after that, the Thai elite endeavered to bring back into the social and political mainstream those who had fled into the jungles in 1976. Amnesty for communist defectors and other insurgents who would turn in their guns became the ‘carrot’, 'carrot', and Bangkok reduced its reliance on the ‘stick’ 'stick' of

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as relations improved military assaults against CPT strongholds. Finally, as. between Thailand and the People’s Republic of China—and Chinese support for the CPT insurgency dwindled—more and more studentstumed-cadres offered their trust to the Bangkok government and returned lurned-cadres to help society heal old wounds. As time passed, Thai students became less concerned with propagating democracy than with experimenting in capitalism, but they did not completely forget the legacy of the seventies. A successor to the mantle of, of NSCT is the present Students Federation of Thailand (SFT0 (SFO among whose the NSCTis activities has been a series of protests against recent government proposals to exonerate Thanom Kittikachorn and return to him financial assets seized by the government after the Fourteen October uprising.64 In 1989, SFT Secretary-General Vilasini Vilasini Morkcharoenpong called for a monument to be built with those funds. It would honor the heroes of Fourteen October and memorialize all the students who first rallied the people to the cause of democracy and who later suffered at their hands. holiday.65 Vilasini has also urged that 14 October be made an annual public holiday.® SFT’s Another memorial to the heroes of Fourteen October is the SFT’s perpetuation of their ideals, both in Thailand and in neighboring countries. Leaders of the SFT, for example, have been helpful to student dissidents in Burma, advising the organizers of the 1988 student uprising in Rangoon during a series of clandestine meetings in Bangkok that year.66 But there is more that was left behind by the heroes of Fourteen October than just a tradition of student activism. Colored by disillusionment and regret, many still point to the horrors of 1976 and bemoan the futility of democratic reforms amid the endemic corruption of Thai society. A legacy of the seventies, this view has it that political power in Thailand always has been—and been —and continues to be—the province of self-serving elites. Viewing it in the broader historical context, however, it would seem that, despite the Thai elite’s tendencies toward self-aggrandizement, they have, in fact, not been able to maintain their monopoly on political power. The historic import of the Fourteen October era is missed if all one sees in it is proof of the futility of imposing democratic institutions upon an inherently undemocratic culture. Despite its usual epitaph—the one that describes the period 1974 to 1976 as a chaotic time of botched democratic experimentation—the era marked a significant realignment in the relations between the rulers and the ruled. Thai democracy was not born on that Sunday in 1973 any more than it was suffocated in its crib that Wednesday morning three years later, but during those three years, the elite and the masses of Thai society became increasingly aware of their mutual dependence and of a long-standing social contract between the nation’s patrons and their clients. If is especially significant that the Thai elite’s ability to settle differences It’is among themselves without bringing the masses- into politics had seriously

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eroded by 1973, and afterward, once the force of mass politics had been demonstrated, that ability had all but completely faded away. Forever after, the government would be required to seek the support, if notaiways not always the specific consentof consent of the governed. In its worst manifestations, that might involve lying to them or bribing them, but it could no longer mean thatmight butit ignoring or excluding them. In its best form, it could even mean attending to and addressing the requirements of voters, a new form of client-patron reciprocity that was to take on new significance in the 1980s.

Chapter 18 A Vicious Cycle of Politics and Coups In 1980, responding to a groundswell of support from all segments of the elite (including civilian politicians, army officers, and the royal family), General Prem Tinsulanonda, commander-in-chief of the Royal Thai Army, was chosen by the elected Parliament to succeed Kriangsak as premier, and under Prem’s administration, the army and the civilian elites struggled Thailand’s latest constitutional toward a consensus on the form that Thailand's government should take. It was hardly a period of harmony and co-operation, however. As with every other Thai government since 1932, the Prem regime was exposed to election scandals, charges of cormption and favoritism, and, of course, coups d’etat. Unlike its predecessor governments, however, Prem’s survived every challenge it encountered, growing stronger with each. With that strength came confidence, and consequently Prem never resorted to the kind of oppression other military leaders had used in the past. In fact, toward the middle of his tenure, Prem became the first military prime minister to resign his commission while retaining the premiership. He handed over power, eventually, to an elected civilian, the first such transition in Thai history. Far Eastern Economic Reviewcailed the “unusually long period What the FarEastem of political stability under Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda’s ... civilian leadership"1 was perhaps the longest sustained effort of Thai elites to bring leadership"* about the popular sovereignty promised by the 1932 revolution. Prem had begun a process of balancing the need for strong leadership with the democratic prerequisites of individual rights and freedoms. But Prem was not without his critics. Hardly a year went by that he did not have to do battle, politically or militarily, with forces that believed they better.' Prem faced the first major challenge to his leadership within could do better.'Prem a year of taking office. The April Fools' Day Coup On April 1, 1981, for the fifteenth time in fifty years, a faction within the Thai military seized control of the capital, announcing the dissolution of the

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government, parliament and the constitution. General Sant Chitpatima, the nominal head of a self-proclaimed “Revolutionary Council," addressed the nation over Radio Thailand and announced that Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda had resigned his office and fled the city. Sant chided Prem for his failure to provide Thailand with strong leadership and likened the prime minister to a woman.2 That evening, as General Sant and members of the Revolutionary Council toured the city to inspect troop placements, the general’s convoy stopped outside the Government Public Relations Office, and Sant gave an informal press conference to reporters gathered there. He told the press that the Revolutionary Council would remain in power for two years, at the end of which, having solved all of Thailand’s social and political ills, the council would stand down and allow general elections to be held.3 He seemed confident and very much in control. But beneath the cool facade, Sant knew otherwise. Early the next day, radio listeners in Bangkok began to pick up faint broadcasts from the northeastern city of Nakhom Ratchasima (Khorat). General Prem was on the air. He announced that he was still prime minister and that he had escorted King Bhumibol and the Royal Family to safety in Khorat. He said that he was in command of the Second and Third Army Regions, the Air Force, and the Navy, and to prove his point, Prem sent two F5E fighter planes to buzz the capital and drop leaflets.4 Prem warned that unless the coup makers ordered their troops to return to their barracks, he would march on Bangkok the next day and retake the city by force. The Revolutionary Council refused to surrender, but it became obvious to them that a change of tactics would be necessary to counter royal support for the prime minister. General Sant, it was reported later, had stayed up throughout the previous night studying the policies of a rival army faction which Sant believed was backing the prime minister.5 In a desperate effort “the Democratic Soldiers”) into his to woo this group (which called itself "the camp, or at least away from Prem, Sant drafted a policy statement which contained several planks from their platform and presented them as the positions of the Revolutionary Council. A rally was held on the afternoon of April 2 at Sanam Luang, just outside the gates of the Grand Palace. There the leaders of the coup, in particular Colonel Prajark Sawangjit, outlined the policies drafted by Sant the previous night. Contradicting Sant’s earlier announcement to the press, Prajark now told the crowds that had gathered for the rally that Parliament would reconvene immediately and that the constitution would be reinstated, albeit minus a clause here or there. The Revolutionary Council’s new and improved platform included sweepingsocial sweeping social and economic reforms among which were the nationalizing of banks and some industries (such as mining and smelting), a system of land reforms, education programs for farmers, a crackdown on crime, and a return to the gold standard.6 In the political realm, they would limit the

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power of the appointed Senate, its members having been appointed under Prem. All of these had been recommendations recently voicedby the Democratic Soldiers group, and their adoption by the coup makers now —in addition to trying to impress the groups’ members who were then backing Prem at publicsupport Analysts later remarked that Khorat,7—was aimed at rallying publicsupport. achieved an “astonishing amount of success"8 and Sant’s populist approach adiieved had struck “a chord of popular discontent" over recent parliamentary and government bickering.’ bickering.9 Unfortunately for the coup makers, the tactic, intended to attract support from liberal quarters, succeeded more in alienating the bulk of conservative thinkers who now came to fear that the coup’s leaders were leaning too far to the left.10 Meanwhile, more and more provincial radio stations began relaying Prem’s broadcasts to Bangkok, and by afternoon on April 2, Radio Khorat was clearly audible on several frequencies inside the capital. General Prem gave his own account of events. Prem explained that on the night of March 31, he had been approached by a group of regimental commanders who announced their plans to overthrow the government on the pretext of wanting to correct “social problems and hardships,” and that “this group of military officers talked 11 about the use of force in a’ dictatorial manner to settle the problems.” problems."” Interestingly, the coup group’s earliest announcements had claimed that their actions were intended to pre-empt another coup attempt by “a group of ill-intentioned individuals” who were planning to install a dictatorial regime of their own. 12 Either someone was lying, or there was a third party out there whose thunder had been stolen. Skeptics reserved judgement for the time being, but it seemed equally likely that neither side was telling the truth in at least one regard. Most damaging to the position of the coup group was Prem’s proximity to the king. Prem’s radio speech stressed this point: This group of individuals Individuals [the Revolutionary Council] who have harbored ill will against the country and the Throne have arrogantly issued illegal orders by alleging that I had resigned from my posts as premier and army commander-in-chief ... The most regrettable thing is that the royal decree to have them in audience with His Majesty the King ... was not honored.Such an act of disregarding the throneshamefully ...was contradicts [the coup makers'] utterances. For this reason I deemed it necessary to invite His Majesty the King, Her Majesty the Queen, and all their Royal Highnesses [the king's son and daughters] to take takerefuge refuge In a safe place to boost the morale of the Thai people....1’

It became next to impossible after this for the coup group to convince anyone of the sincerity of their claims that they were acting in the interests of the nation, democratic principles, and loyalty to the king. They had

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indeed disobeyed a royal command—in the early hours of April 1—to meet with the king at Chitrlada Palace, perhaps out of fear that once there they might be detained by the palace guards or by Prem’s men upon leaving. An added complication was the fact that April 2 was the 26th birthday Sirindhom. According to of the popular Crown Princess Maha Chakri Slrindhom. custom, Her Royal Highness’ picture was displayed on the front page of every newspaper in the country above captions noting that Her Royal Highness was spending her special day as a guest of Prime Minister Prem at Second Army Headquarters in Khorat General Sant, by now grasping for straws, tried to imply that Prem had kidnapped the royal family, and he broadcast the ' following over Radio Thailand: General Prem Tinsulanonda with a wicked and woman-like heart, has taken shelter

involving His Majesty the in the graciousness of the institution of the Monarchy, thus Involving King in politics. It will be noted in Thai history that a Thai officer has taken part in

sabotaging the institution of the monarchy. monarchy,14

A battle of the airways was now underway. Radio Khorat returned Sant’s fire by denouncing his claims that the king was involved in politics as “tantamount to outright lese majeste,” and a statement by Her Majesty the "tantamount “people of the same blood," blood,” Queen, in which she pleaded for unity among "people was read to the nation.15 The deadline for Prem’s ultimatum to the rebel forces for their surrender passed at 6:00 P.M., and it seemed certain that the war of words waged throughout the day would soon turn to violence. When asked what he would do if confronted by Prem’s forces, Colonel Prajark replied, “We will 14 win."16 fight; we will win.” During the night of April 2, however, several members of the coup group surreptitiously defected to Khorat, joining members of parliament who had gone there earlier in the day. It was reported that Prem kept a register of all his guests during the rebellion, and apparently a good number of people wanted to make sure their signatures were included,17 Shortly after midnight, Major General Arthit Kamlang-ek then deputy commander of the Second Army Region and reputed protege of the prime minister, gave the order for loyalist troops to march on the capital. Wearing blue neckerchiefs to distinguish themselves from the rebels, government soldiers entered the Bangkok city limits sometime before dawn. An apocryphal account has it that Chinese merchants hurried into the streets with hastily cut squares of blue doth for sale to Sant’s men. Only a single shot was fired in the retaking of the capital. Near the king’s residence, a rebel jeep failed to halt when ordered to do so by two loyalist troopers. A civilian on a motorbike, trying to avoid trouble, apparently tried to overtake the jeep and escape harm, but instead he rode straight into the

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path of the loyalist’s warning shot, was struck and was killed. The three-day coup was otherwise bloodless.18 Colonel Prajark was arrested at 7:30 A.M. while his jeep was waiting dutifully at a red light, and at 9:30 Colonel Manoon Roopkachom, Prajark’s chief co-conspirator, ordered his 4th Cavalry Regiment and their Scorpion barracks.19 By the time the government forces announced tanks back to their barracks.” 9;40 A.M. over Radio Thailand, the erstwhile “Head of the their victory at 9:40 Revolutionary Council,” General Sant Chitpatima, was nowhere to be found. The press speculated, logically, that Sant had either slipped into Burma or Malaysia, or was hiding put in his native southern Thailand. An early report claimed the coup leader had escaped in an army helicopter, but much later it was learned he had driven out of Bangkok in the middle of the night with a handful of rebel officers in an army truck to the western province of Kanjanaburi. From there they proceeded on foot for three days through the mountains until they crossed the border into Burma.20 A month later the men involved, already relieved of their army posts and duties, were granted amnesty by the king and by Parliament. General Sant returned to Bangkok in June and was welcomed.at Don Muang Airport by a throng of well-wishers and a bouquet of roses. A few weeks later, he left Louisville, the country again for an extended visit to his son’s home in Louisville, Kentucky. Sant’s American exile was brief, however. He eventually returned to Thailand to live out his days in comfortable retirement at his home in Bangkok. Once it was all over, the tendency was to dismiss the coup as insignificant. A cartoon in the Far Eastern Economic Review captured the mood of the post-coup days. It depicted a stern-faced General Prem atop a tank, scowling down at a nervous-looking General Sant, and asking, heart?" Sant was pictured in a clown's “What was that about a ‘woman-like 'woman-like heart?” costume, waving a calendar page showing the date, April 1, and saying, “Can’t you see it was only a joke?”21 A later issue of the Review noted that “It seemed no more than a school boy prank," prank,” and quoted Thai elder statesman Kukrit Pramoj as saying that he attached no significance to the headlines,” Kukrit told a coup. “Some officers just wanted to be [in the] headlines," reporter.22 But such dismissals of the April Fools’ Day Coup can be seen as mere attempts to patch the wounds it left and to allow the nation to go on with 23 more seriously, business as usual.25 The Bangkok Post took the incident far mote and condemned it on its editorial page. Do we yet realize the enormity of what we have done to ourselves and what power those generals and colonels hold? ... By what means are we to ensure that the rhe next Is not going to be some madman who will take the country with him when coup leader is he goes down to destruction?14

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The editorial also raised the issue of what such coup attempts could do to national security and suggested that army infighting—at a time when Vietnamese forces in Cambodia were massing along the Thai border—was an invitation for foreign invasion. ou r capital can be taken has been demonstrated, and this Already the ease with which our point cannot have been lost on those who do not wish us well. That this coup should have been staged on April Fools* Fools’ Day tells us something. All of us have been made fools of. Let us ensure that this can never be said of us again.25

Yet even this perspective overlooked the significance of the April Fools’ Day Coup and its place in the historical pattern of the circulation of Thai elites. The coup had not merely demonstrated the ease with which maverick officers could upset the nation. It had also shown the elite’s growing awareness of their dependence upon public opinion and, once again, the new importance of the monarchy. The king had again been forced to touch politics, true enough, but more importantly, the politics he was touching was of the mass variety. Both Prem and Sant had competed for public support during those two days, and in the end it was the king’s implicit support of Prem and of the constitutional process Prem represented that made the prime minister the victor.

Democracy With Coups It had seemed, after 1977, that a balance, though tenuous, had been struck between the military and other national leaders outside its ranks. However, the 1981 coup attempt showed that the military side of the equation was not much more stable than the civilian side. Thus, at the beginning of the 1980s, the underlying political question before Thai elites remained how to proceed toward the goal of a truly democratic society without the interference of the military and without the conflict and discord of past civilian regimes. For some time it had seemed that ensuring against military intervention was something beyond the powers of Thai society. AsThai somethingbeyond As Thai news commentator Montri Chenvidyakarn wrote, “Thai politics is military politics, and as such, coups, armed forces, and control of key positions in the political structure are as necessary for it as elections, political parties, and popular support are for democracy...”26 Unless fundamental changes were to occur, the thinking went, the coup d’etat as an institution would remain the Thai military’s chief means of participation in politics, the only way to protect the status quo and to maintain the power of the army.27 Implicit in this thinking, of course, was the assumption that the army’s mission was not just to protect the nation and its people, but to protect itself

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as well. One might ask, against what? Since the 1932 coup the military had been represented, on the average, more highly in both the legislature and the cabinet than had any other single group.28 The level of the military’s representation in these bodies, however, has not been consistent, and coups d’etat have generally occurred when such representation has declined or has somehow been restrained. By identifying those periods and a prominentThai scholar was able to demonstrate charting their recurrences, aprominentThai the pattern of military-political conflict in Thailand. Chulalongkorn University’s Dr. Chai-anan Samudavanija has identified a pattern in Thailand’s long string of coups d’etat which he calls the “Vicious Cycle of Thai Politics." From the end of absolute monarchy in 1932 to the April Fools’ Day Coup of 1981, Chai-anan notes, there had been fifteen coups, nine of them successful, most bloodless. The cycle comprises six recurring phases, namely (1) a military coup, followed by (2) the promulgation of a new or resurrected constitution, followed by (3) a period of politicking and elections, followed by GO (4) a “honeymoon" period of cooperation and all sorts of new legislation, followed by (5) bitter arguing and stagnation among the governmental elite, followed by (6) a military coup d’etat to restore order and stability.29 A sort of circular rut from which Thai elites have had no easy time extricating themselves, the cycle seemed to have no end, and it was long held that the military and their periodic seizures of power were destined to persist, playing a necessary part in keeping the civilian sector, and its bickering politicians on their toes.30 One source of energy blamed for perpetual motion machine was the apparent action and maintaining this petpetual reaction between opposites present in the value system of Thai society. While Thais at all levels ofsociety demonstrate a fondness for unrestricted, individual freedom in the pursuit of self-interest, they also seem to have an abiding respect for and dependence upon authoritarian leadership. Even the ordinary working person will admit to the importance of each, though, depending on the individual, one of the values might outweigh the other. Popular political and military figures alike devote much rhetoric to these conflicting concepts and tend to make much hay out of public acceptance of them. Take, for example, Samak Sundaravej, one-time leader of the Democrat Party’s right wing and now the leader of his own conservative party, Prachakorn Thai. Thailand,” When asked about “the political aspirations of the people of Thailand," Samak once replied: “No doubt, the people want democracy," but he went on to qualify this. There are many forms of democracy. Judging from our way of life, I would say we have always had democracy sometimes even more than other countries. ... Thai people have had democracy for 800 years now. We can talk and do what we like.

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That's the real Thai way. Anyone who seizes state power just takes away general 51

like. 1 elections. But we can still go wherever we like?

Of course, with an absolute monarchy in place until 1932, Samak’s statement that “Thai people have had democracy for 800 years now” contains obvious flaws. However the chief flaw may have been in the 'democracy’ to translate the Thai word translator’s use of the word ’democracy’ prachathipatai into English. While lexicographer Mary Haas translates pracbathipatai 32 prachathipatai the same way, Morell and Chai-anan have pointed out that it means something different in general usage. prachathipatai definitely does not mean popular sovereignty, control by To Thais, pracbathipatai elected representatives over the executive branch, power to the people. Political

legitimacy here emanates down from the monarchy and bureaucracy to the common 55

citizen, not up from the masses... 53

It seems that Thais conceive of democracy at two separate levels. First, as a graduate of Chulalongkorn University once told the author, is the schoolroom definition Thai children are taught: “Prachathipatai khur prachachon benyai” benyai." That is, loosely, “Democracy means the people have priority.” In common parlance, however, the term implies that the people are free to go about their daily business, to, in Samak’s words, “do what we like.” The concept may also carry connotations of representative government, but only in the sense that the people’s representatives, whether elected or appointed, fuss with the chores of making laws and debating policies so that the people will not be bothered by such things. As parliamentarian Pichai Rattakul has said, “the political system the Thai people really want is one that leaves them alone....”34 Thus it is unlikely the average citizen will get very excited about elections or the other trappings of the democratic process, though most will attach a certain importance to the concept itself, believing it plays a role in maintaining their personal freedom. In the same interview quoted above, and almost in the same breath, Samak went on to explain that, in order to safeguard democracy, the military plays an important role, providing stability when political discord threatens the national unity. In Samak’s words, “The military can always stage a coup to hold the country together," and “The military must be guarantor for the 55 government."35 militaryshould have government.” When asked if by this he meant the Thai militaryshouldhave an institutional political role, Samak answered, “No. The army should only intervene at the proper time.” time." Apparently, then, there is a proper time for everything, even for the military overthrow of a legitimate government.36 To the Western mind the apparent contradiction in a political philosophy that calls for democracy on the one hand and continued arbitrary military

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intervention on the other smacks of insincerity at the very least. But, as has been shown, the contradiction is really more a matter of semantics. The Thai concept of democracy differs from that of Westerners in that Thais see a separation between themselves and the mechanisms of the state as essential to maintaining one’s personal freedom. The will of the majority is less important than the rights of the individual. And here are found the roots of what David Wilson calls a “deficiency of solidaristic corporate organization” in Thai society.’ society’7 In plain language, people tend to go their own separate ways. Symptomatic of this is the large number of political parties represented in the National Assembly, or Parliament, and the frequent problem arising from the inability of any one party to obtain a large enough majority to form a government. The usual result is a shaky coalition (the two words seem inseparable) and chronic instability. Such was the situation on the eve of the 1981 coup attempt This is the point on Dr. Chai-anan’s cycle model where the honeymoon ends and political crisis begins. Military intervention habitually ensues. That such was and has so often been the case can help to explain Samak’s statement that coups can “hold the country together,” and that the army’s role as "guarantor “guarantor for the government” is essential. The military is seen as the one segment of society possessing a strong enough sense of cohesion and cooperation to pull warring factions together. From the military alone can come suitable leadership, goes this line of thought, and so the search for leadership invariably has led to the so-called “military strongman.” This tendency, in the absence of consensus among the ruling elites, constitutes what Chai-anan calls, “the core of the modem Thai political dilemma.” He expounds: Thai people identify a system with its leaders. The Thai way of solving a problem or meeting a crisis is not to look to the institutionalization of new structures and organizations, but instead to search for a leader, an individual with the personal capabilities, status and [charisma] who could engender trust and respect on the part followers.38 of his followers.”

Leadership must not be dictatorial but inspirational, for a society in which the individual’s rights are preeminent will not long endure dictatorship. But, by the same token, where majority rule carries little weight, only such a strong leader, trusted and respected by all, will be able to Inspire inspire cooperation toward common objectives. Here again, the paired virtues of phra khun and phra dej come into play, their proper balance determining the difference between a dictator and a good leader. In every successful coup d’etat d'etat in Thai history the military has chosen and installed a leader, usually from among their own ranks, in hopes that he could fill these requirements. The extent to which a given leader has fitted

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the bill can be measured in part by his length of tenure, but one must also consider how that tenure ended. Among the few who might be said to have truly “fit the bill” was Sarit Thanarat, who governed from 1957 to 1963. Though his rule has been w described as one of “despotic paternalism,"39 he is remembered for the great economic advances of his administration, and, despite posthumous evidence that he helped himself liberally to public funds, he is still considered to have been a pbaw pbawkhun, kbun, a national father figure. Sarit not only understood the requirements of leadership, he possessed them as well. However, the search for a leader never ends, for even when one is found and reigns unopposed, he cannot live forever. During his short tenure, Sarit maintained unquestioned authority, and only death by natural causes could remove him. Upon his demise, however, in the absence of an established and universally accepted mechanism of transition, a power vacuum occurred. Sarit chose a successor, Thanom Kittikachorn, but, even in doing so, he could not ensure that the aura of leadership would pass on to him. As we have seen, Thanom’s rule deteriorated when he and his partner Praphas resorted to repression to hold on to power, andso the search began anew. This constant search was what led a group of young Thai army officers on the night of March 31, 1981, to the home of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda to announce their intention to seize the government. The chain of events that led to their decision is a good example of the forces that had for so long kept the vicious cycle of Thai politics turning. The Thai Young Turks Prem's April 2 radio account of events on the night of March 31 has been corroborated by the would-be mastermind of the coup, Colonel Prajark 10 himself.40 himself.' Prajark and his fellow coup makers had called on Prem at his home that night to announce that they had ordered their regiments to move into the capital with the intended purpose of seizing control of the government. Prajark explained to his commander-in-chief that he and his fellow officers had no complaint about Prem’s remaining as head of government, that they would in fact prefer him to remain in power. Prem’s cabinet and the elected legislature, however, would have to go. Prajark explained that he and his cohorts, with only the best interests of the country in mind, could no longer stand by and watch as disorder reigned. They had come, therefore, to ask Prem, whom they admired, to lead a coup against his own government. According to Prajark, the prime minister seriously considered the *' proposal—that is, of course, once Prajark explained that the rebels would go ahead with some other general as their leader if he refused. After weighing his options, though, Prem declined, saying that he would prefer

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resigning than either to lead or have to resist the coup forces. But according to custom he would have to notify His Majesty the King before stepping aside. Prajark claims that Prem next telephoned the palace to request an audience with the king and, after a brief conversation, handed the phone to Prajark, saying that the Queen wanted to have a word with him. While Prajark was on the phone, so the story goes, Prem slipped out of the house, undetected, and drove to Chitrlada Palace. It apparently took Prajark a while to realize that Prem was not going to come back from his audience, and that he would have to proceed with plan B—that is, persuading another general to lend his name to the coup. The rebels’second rebels’ second choice had been Armed Forces Supreme Commander, General Serm na Nakhom, but when approached by Prajark, he too refused to lead the coup. Never one to swim against the tide, however, Serm did agree not to oppose the rebels if they were successful in their bid. Their third choice was Sant, a long-time, personal friend of General Prem, who was then Prem’s deputy commander-in-chief. Though Sant did not share the strong personal following and popularity that both Prem and Serm enjoyed, the coup makers felt his high official position could lend the air of legitimacy they needed to succeed. In addition, recent rumors suggested that Sant was dissatisfied with his role as second in command and felt he should have been promoted to the number-one spot a year ago. Prem, who should have retired from military service by then, had received an extension of tenure from parliament, effectively blocking Sant’s only chance of advancement advancement. There had even been talk in recent months of transferring Sant to the less powerful and less prestigious General Staff in order to make room at the top for Prem’s younger protege, Major General Arthit, making Arthit heir presumptive to the command Sant coveted. Sant, therefore, would have had reason aplenty to resent Prem, perhaps even enough to back a coup against him, Prajark surmised. Whether Sant had agreed to lead the coup out of spite, or because he realized the dangers that would face his old friend and the whole military establishment should someone less responsible than himself be put in charge was a point of debate afterwards. Whatever Sant 's motives, however, by the time the king’s helicopter lifted off from the palace grounds with Their Majesties and the prime minister bound for Khorat, Sant was addressing the nation on Radio Thailand and proclaiming himself “Head of the Revolutionary Council. Council.”1*411 It was to be some time before the country knew the truth, that Sant was but a figurehead, a front for a coterie of colonels and lieutenant colonels known to their colleagues in the officer corps as the “Thai Young Turks.” The April Fools’ Day Coup was unusual in that, unlike past coups, it was since the 1932 l932 Promoters not planned and executed by general officers. Not Notsince of Political Change had such a group of mid-ranking officers overpowered

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their senior officers. Since then, coup makers had been or had had the support of the commander of the First Army Region, based in Bangkok. The so-called Young Turks, however, had plotted the coup attempt of 1981 without the support or foreknowledge of a single general. Prajark and his co-conspirators were regimental commanders whose units made up the Region,42 but they did not acquire the strategically important First Army Region* support of their region commander until after the takeover was in motion. Only after Sant agreed to lend his name to the coup did the Young Turks Lt. Gen. Vasin Issarangun na Ayudhaya to join the invite First Army Chief, Lt plot. Sant and Vasin then became the only general officers actively involved in the action, and the only generals to serve on the short-lived Revolutionary Council.45 Council.* Obviously these wayward colonels did not suddenly pop out of the woodwork on March 31 and surprise the military establishment with their show of force. It was no coincidence that all of the eleven regimental commanders who formed the core of the coup group graduated together in I960 from the Chulachomklao Military Academy and had held seats in the appointed Senate since 1977. Their rise to power was gradual, deliberate, and well-coordinated, but it was hardly a secret. In 1974, at the height of the turbulent “liberal period” a group of six i960, also known as Class 7, organized the graduates from the cadet class of I960, Kbana lhaban Num, or (as Chai-anan translates it) the *Young Military Khana Thahan Young Military Group'.44 Founded by then Major Chamlong Srimuang (who at this Officers’ Group’.* writing is the governor of Bangkok) and his classmate, then Major Manoon Roopkachorn, the group was originally intended as a forum for “serious discussions on the increasingly turbulent political situation and what they perceived to be the serious disintegration of the Army.”* Army."45 Chai-anan’s in44 46 depth study of the group offers an insight into the impetus for the group’s formation. “professional soldiers" These young battalion commanders who saw themselves as •professional had not had the privileges of getting into the core of the patron-client network which Thanom and Praphat had established in the decade prior to October 1973. They became increasingly frustrated with their Army Commanders' Commanders’ attitudes and behavior under civilian governments. They were dissatisfied that the image of the whole officer corps was inextricably Inextricably linked with ... [the Thanom-Praphas-Narong regime] ... They were unhappy with the infighting among the generals before and after the 14 October 1973 incident and were of the opinion that basic fighting units of the Army (the battalions) had been neglected? neglected.477

Though deeply concerned with the waning prestige and power of the army, the young officers were primarily driven by a strong sense of patriotism, as evidenced by their group’s oath of membership: “We will risk our lives for the Nation and the Throne without hope of reaping any

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48 benefits. n48 personal benefits." They saw the disintegration of the army as symptomatic of decaying soqal social values and sought a way to'strengthen tostrengthen both nation and military. The army’s decay was easily attributable. The traditional power structure of the Thai military, at a level beneath the outward chain of command, was based on a network of client-patron relationships. During the Thanom regime, the Three Tyrants formed the matrix of that network, the ultimate source of patronage to which other, lesser patrons looked for the largesse they in turn distributed among their own separate clienteles. When the triumvirate was removed in 1973, so was the linchpin of their authority. The network then dissolved into several unconnected cliques, each patron scrambling for power and revenue to maintain his own isolated following. From the military this decay spread like a virus, the young officers thought, system/499 into society at large to infect the entire Thai political system Lacking strong leadership from above, therefore, the Young Military Officers’ Group began to strengthen mutual, lateral ties of loyalty and cooperation, derived from and developed by the members’ shared experiences—not, as the case might have been in the past, through shared loyalty to a common patron. Many of them had trained together in the United States. Most had served in combat together, first with the Thai expeditionary forces in Viet Nam and then in domestic anti-insurgent operations. In particular, their shared counter-insurgency experience had put them in contact with peasant villagers of poor, underdeveloped areas of the country, that were vulnerable to the lure of communism and the pressures of insurgents. It had given the young officers a common perception of the social ills affecting rural Thailand and of the link between such problems and the communist threat in which they all firmly believed. The group’s political activities began in June 1974 when they set up a display of Chinese-made weapons, captured from rural insurgents. The set up alongside a student-sponsored Thai-Chinese friendship display was setup exhibit on Sanam Luang and was aimed at rebutting the students’ seemingly pro-Maoist message. The young officers* group became more assertive the pro-MaoiSt (later Governor) Chamlong, successfully following year when Major Cater lobbied the civilian government to prevent the closing and dismantling of an American-built radar station which liberal factions in the Assembly wanted removed when U.S. forces left the country.50 The influence of Manoon, Chamlong, and their classmates grew by leaps and bounds during the ihree-year three-year period of civilian rule. As more and more laborers went out on strike, as student activists became more and more dominoes” to the radical, and as the Thai military fretted about the “falling dominoes" east, the cohesion and commitment of these young officers comforted their superiors, offering hope for stability and firm leadership in the future.

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By 1976, the group came to be known in military circles as the “Thai Young Turks." Turks.” Their numbers had grown, and all had become commanders of strategic battalions. Senior officers, competing since 1973 for power, now began to vie for the support of this prosperous and promising faction of young militaiy military visionaries. It should come as no surprise, then, that these Young Turks played a role in the coup d’etat that year, their support proving valuable to the late Krit Sivara’s faction, which assumed power in the wake of the Thammasat massacre. It was at this time that classmate Prajark Sawangjit joined the Young Military Officers’ Group and quickly brought the Young Turks to public attention. At first Prajark was not held in high esteem by his peers, who Prajark’s regarded him as too outspoken and indiscreet.51 Later, however, Prajark's dose relationship with General Kriangsak Chomanan was to prove a valuable asset to the group and raised Prajark to a position of leadership. Prajark also earned public acclaim for his actions during a 1977 border inddent incident near Aranyaprathet, where Thailand and Cambodia meet. After a series of reported cross-border incursions by forces of the Khmer Rouge, during which Kampuchean soldiers reportedly massacred Thai villagers along the border, Prajark’s units, stationed nearby, were presented with the opportunity to fight back. His superiors in Bangkok attempted to stall, but Prajark seized the initiative and ordered offensive patrols through disputed territory as well as an artillery assault on Khmer Rouge encampments just over the border. It was an unqualified military success, though the diplomatic consequences were hotly debated. News of Prajark’s boldness spread quickly, and the Thai press christened him the “Hero ofTha of Tha Phraya,” after the district he defended. For the results he achieved, Prajark was decorated, but for his proven independence of the chain of command, hissuperiors—who regarded him as something of a loose cannon—transferred Prajark to an army training center a good, safe distance from the border.52 As a senator, too, Prajark was known for being vocal and contentious. On the floor of the Assembly, he frequently put forward his belief that Thailand should strive for a political structure like.that of Great Britain, one which he described as, “a constitutional monarchy completely protected from political involvement; afullyrepresentative a fully representative frompoliticalinvolvement; two strong parties, one of them democraticsocia democraticsocialise parliament dominated by twostrong list.”” Even his critics, who generally described Prajark as a demagogue, had to admit he was a masterful orator, his patriotic speeches powerful enough to inspire 55 anyone to “grab a rifle and march!’ march!”53 .Prajark and the other Young Turks also became known after 1976 for their opposition to the new regime headed by Thanin Kraivichien. Though the return to authoritarian rule was intended to restore order and provide new and stronger leadership, the repressive policies of the Thanin government (called a dictatorship by some) only served to deepen divisions and increase polarization in Thai society. Thanin was obsessed with suppressing communism, and his administration seemed to see red at just

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about every turn. They therefore neglected needed reforms and focused instead upon identifying and isolating their enemies. And, as a civilian, Thanin was as incapable of healing rifts within the military as he was of 54 bringing the rest of the nation together.51 An abortive coup in March of 1977, led by General Chalard Hiranyasiri, Chalard’s was seen as proof that chaos still reigned among the Thai elite. Chalard's botched effort and his brutality toward a fellow officer illustrated the extent of the decay within the military establishment, and the extent to which interclique dique rivalry had deteriorated. The errant general had broken with precedent by shooting a fellow officer in cold blood, killing General Aroon Thavathsin for refusing to support his putsch. A journalist wrote this description: The first bullets were fired into Aroon's extremities, then into his groin and stomach. Investigators were properly appalled by the discovery that Chalard, before he 55 delivered the coup de grace, wanted Aroon to spend his last minutes in extreme pain.ss

For this, Chalard was executed. It was the first time such punishment had been meted out to a failed coup plotter. His crime was less thought of as treason than as a violation of trust; the motto, etched in stone, of the Chulachomklao Military Academy is, “There shall be no killing among brethren.” It is no coincidence, then, that most of Thailand’s many coups have been bloodless. It was obvious to the Young Turks that the Thanin regime was unable to address the issues for which they had originally sought out new leadership. They therefore set about to install yet another leader, this time one of their choosing. The Banana Monarchy Chalard’s botched attempt in March 1977, it was clear dear that die king After Chalard's dvilian politicians politidans know was upset His Majesty letboth military leaders and civilian of his growing disdain for Thailand’s continual coups. The palace was concerned not only about bloodletting among Thais, it also feared for Thailand’s place in the world community. King Bhumibol did not want his kingdom labeled a “banana monarchy," one report said.56 The king subUy subtly insisted, therefore, that henceforth only smooth and constitutional changes of government should be tolerated.57 In June of 1977 the Young Turks, led in the Senate by Prajark, moved for a no-confidence vote against Thanin on allegations of corruption.58 The motion never carried, but it served as a significant contribution to the rising morion polides. A growing tide of discontent from all quarters over Thanin’s policies. alliance between the liberal press and moderate elements within the military (represented by Armed Forces Supreme Commander General Kriangsak

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Chomanan) joined with the Young Turks in seeking a constitutional route to change the government Thanin’s 1976 constitution, however, made the prime minister and cabinet almost invulnerable to any attacks from the legislature.® legislature.59 When this became apparent to the Young Turks, Prajark and Lt. Col. Manoon Roopkachom led a committee of 18 battalion commanders to call on Army Commander-in-Chief General Serm na Nakorn to announce that they had Cominander-in-Chief readied their troops to march on the capital and seize the government from Thanin. They asked Serm to lead them. Serm, however, was reluctant to go against the wishes of the palace, and so refused. At Serm’s urging, the Young Turks, this time, backed down and called off their coup.60 Opposition from royalist quarters to a military solution, however, came to an abrupt end in September 1977, when, while on an official tour of the king’s party was bombed by Moslem southern province of Yala, the king's separatists, and the king narrowly escaped injury. Thanin was widely criticized for failing to provide adequate protection for the king. Even the right-wing Red Gaur movement joined in the ensuing public demonstrations right-wingRedGaurmovement 41 against the Thanin government.61 Also in September, a new Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Army was named, who quickly became a father figure to the Young Military Officers’ Group. From 1968 to 1977 he had commanded the Second Army Region and gained fame and admiration for his counter-insurgency victories. The Young Turks, who had served under him, admired his principles and his conviction that social injustice was the root cause of the communist insurgency in rural Thailand. The Young Turks adopted him as their patron and openly called him Khun Phaw, meaning father. LL General Prem Tinsulanonda, who had risen from the.cavalry He was Lt. as had the Young Turks’ founder, Lt. Colonel Manoon Roopkachom . The close, long-time friendship between the colonel and the general helped to 62 cement this new bond of clientele and patron.42 “upcountry soldier,” and he had Publicly, Prem was known as a simple "upcountry 63 a reputation for incorruptibility.45 The battalion commanders admired his professionalism in particular. Unlike others who had risen to the commanderin-chiefs staff, Prem was not the product of the traditional client-patron system. He seemed to have been chosen for the spot specifically because he was apolitical and had never built up a Bangkok power base. In this way, he could not pose a threat to General Serm and Serm’s growing clique of supporters. In early October 1977, with, at long last, a general to represent them, the Young Turks led a debate in the Assembly calling again for a no-confidence vote, while Prem approached Thanin with the group’s proposal for a compromise. Prem informed the prime minister that if he re-shuffled his 44 cabinet immediately the vote would be called off, but Thanin refused.64 At that point Prem announced that he had the backing of both General Serm

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and General Kriangsak, and that if Thanin would not fire his cabinet and create a new government, or himself resign, the generals would step in and make their own changes.® changes.65 In a desperate effort to resist, Thanin requested an audience with the king. To his surprise, the king refused. It had always been assumed that Thanin, once a highly respected supreme court judge, had enjoyed the king’s favor. Surely that is one reason why Serm had not gone along with the Young Turks in June 1977. Now, however, after a year of failures, it appeared that the king had lost faith in Thanin. His Majesty's refusal to meet Thanin may just have been the king's refusal to touch politics again so soon, but it was read by the Young Turks, right or wrong, as a royal admission of Thanin’s unworthiness. They deemed it as King Bhumibol's acknowledgment that military intervention was the only realistic way to deal with what they considered Thanin’s megalomania.® megalomania.66 Thus, on October 20, 1977, with the aid of the Young Turks’ Royal Thai Government battalions, the Army once more seized control of the Koya!Thai The Young Turks’ assistance in the 1977 coup was not granted without strings attached. Recalling Serm’s earlier refusal to play along with them, the battalion commanders set conditions for supporting Serm’s October coup plan. One of them later told the press that the group had demanded that the next prime minister be a military man, and that "a “a primarily military executive council” be appointed to “push through tough reforms and prepare the country for elections in 12 to 18 months."67 The Young Turks, though weary of civilian ineptitude, did not advocate a strictly military government. They sought instead to establish firm military leadership for a divided polity that, in their view, simply could not get a handle on the democratic process. While their opposition to Thanin had stemmed, in part, from Thanin’s exploitation of divisions within the army and from his mismanagement of the military in general, they were also concerned with his regime’s anti-democratic, reactionary policies, such as ,and limiting freedom of the suppressing labor unions and student groups, .and press. This is not to say that the Young Turks had any particular fondness for unions or student activists, nor for the liberal editors Thanin had tried to silence. They did, however, find a lesson in recent history, and they had believed that continued repression by Thanin—as repression under the Three Tyrants had done done—could —could bring about another Fourteen October uprising. The young battalion commanders wanted the country’s new leader to exercise a more balanced blend of phra khun and phra dej, and bloodshed.68 thereby pre-empt future bloodshed.® Within a month of the coup Kriangsak was named the new prime minister, and a new constitution was promulgated shortly afterward. The 1978 constitution differed from the 1976 one in that it contained a set of transitional clauses. One such clause stated that the appointed Senate, over the course of four years, gradually would relinquish its superior legislative

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powers to the elected Lower House. By the end of the same four years, a clause allowing active military personnel and civil servants to serve on the cabinet would expire. The military had thus given itself a tutelary role with a sort of programmed obsolescence built into it. The arrangements seemed to satisfied the requirements of the Young Turks. The battalion commanders apparently felt that their role in Kriangsak’s rise to the premiership entitled them to a degree of input into policy matters, but during the next two years, Kriangsak resisted their attempts to influence 69 his decisions. decisions'.6’ Concentrating on the formidable dual tasks of playing ringmaster over the new Assembly and coordinating a civilian-military coalition cabinet, Kriangsak failed to pay sufficient attention to the changing dynamics within his military power base. As one analyst put it, In the past the strongman enjoyed control over strategic army units because it was his inherited right under the patron-client patron-diem relationship. Now the roles have reversed.70

“promoted" General Seim Serm to Supreme Commander of In 1978 Kriangsak “promoted” the Armed Forces, a prestigious postbut post but too high up the command structure to have any direct authority over Senn’s Serm’s previously growing support among army field units. Kriangsak had, in effect,, placed intermediaries between Serm the patron and his rank-and-file clientele. It was a calculated move to stunt a potential rival’s growth, but, ironically it backfired. Having removed Serm from the post of Commander-in-Chief, Kriangsak filled that post by promoting Prem. Kriangsak himself thus unwittingly set into motion the forces which were to lead to Prem’s replacing him as prime minister in less than two years' years’ time. In the following year’s annual promotions, Prem gave the deputy commander-in-chief’s position to his trusted friend and schoolmate, Sant commander-in-chiePs Chitpatima and reshuffled other top posts in order, as an observer put it, “to professionals.” This move flood the upper ranks of the army with dedicated professionals." was heralded as “an effort to bring about a healthy merger with the reservoir of idealistic, new generation” generation" of Thai soldiers, the young colonels who had by then emerged as a potent new force in Thai military politics.71 Prem as Prime Minister When economic troubles and a series of strikes forced Kriangsak’s resignation in February 1980, civilian assemblymen joined with the Young Turk senators in calling for the appointment of Prem as prime minister. The new chief executive completed his “healthy merger” that November by 72 promoting eleven of the new generation idealists to regimental commands,71 and it was these eleven men who, less than five months later, attempted to replace their beloved patron with his trusted former classmate, General Sant.

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Between November 1980 and the end of March 1981, military and governmental politics had joined forces to sour Prem’s relations with the Young Turks. As the vicious cycle turned, the honeymoon period quickly passed and the crisis point arrived for Prem. On the military side, there was a rival faction seeking to equal the Young Turks’ influence. Representing an earlier graduating class was Major Turks' General Arthit Kamlang-ek, who had come by then to be associated with a group called the Democratic Soldiers. As far back as August of 1980, Arthit and members of this group had persuaded Prem, who was then approaching sixty, that he could not afford to retire from the army as required by law. In order to stay an effective leader, Arthit had argued, Prem needed to end, he and the remain commander-in-chief as well as premier. To that .end, Democratic Soldiers pressed for legislation that would allow Prem to keep his commission past the normal age of retirement The Young Turks, on the other hand, were reminded of a similar extension granted to Field Marshal Praphas in 1973 which had triggered widespread dissent and contributed to Fourteen October movement. The Young Turks opposed the move, marking the first of what was to be a long series of confrontations between the academy graduates of Class 7 (that of the Young Turks) and those of Class 5 (the core of the Democratic Soldiers).73 Like good democrats, the rival army factions debated their positions in the Senate. The Young Turks contended that an extension would endanger Prem’s credibility as prime minister and could give the appearance that he intended to tighten his grip on the office through the use of military muscle. for Prem to maintain direct Arthit’s group countered that it was important for control over the army as long as the temporary clauses in the constitution, which empowered the military to supervise the government, were in effect. The Democratic Soldiers prevailed, and in August, 1980 Parliament granted Prem his extension, just one month before his sixtieth birthday.74 start conflict This, as we have noted, was just the sta rt of a continuing co nflict between the two factions, each of which continued to vie for influence as if they were opposing political parties. The Young Turks accused Arthit’s group of conspiring to save the commander-in-chief’s post for Arthit. They suspected that the Democratic Soldiers would continue to seek extensions for Prem until Arthit had risen high enough in rank to fill the post himself.75 When Prem again sought an extension in 1981, the Young Turks felt their suspicions had been confirmed YoungTurks and that Prem, once their idol, had forsaken them and their principles. It appeared that he was now on the verge of reverting to old-style, clientpatron favoritism, preparing to repay Arthit for his support with the Army’s highest and most powerful post.76 Meanwhile, Prem’s government was also in trouble with the Assembly. With no firm majority for any single party, Prem had formed a coalition with

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Kukrit Pramoj’s SAP and two other major parties. Though the coalition pleased the Young Turks—who applauded the skill of Kukrit and his SAP technocrats in implementing various social reforms—it proved, after a year, to be no less shaky than any of the previous coalitions. Soon the Kukrit-Prem coalition of 1981 began to break up, 77 despite phases of cooperation where it looked as if the member parties had found a way to bury their differences. No sooner were the front pages showing cabinet members clasping hands and smiling, however, than the next day’s headlines would report mutual accusations of corruption between the same men. The instability led to high tension and climaxed during March of 1981. A major scandal came out then involving a cabinet minister’s alleged mishandling for personal gain of a government oil purchase. The scandal caused an irreparable rift between Kukrit’s SAP and the Thai Nation (Chat Thai) Party of Chatichai Choonhavan. SAP withdrew from the coalition, and Prem was left with the task of forming a new government.78 Prem now must have realized the pressures and frustrations his predecessor Kriangsak had had to deal with and the circumstances leading to the last premier’s resignation. He carefully chose his next team of ministers from among his former cavalry comrades, representing four parties which Prem felt would cooperate more effectively than had his last coalition. By the middle of March 1981, analysts were predicting success for the new cabinet, confident that this government would avoid the inter-party rivalries of the last 79 Yet there remained potential for conflict, if not among the new ministers, then between them and their opponents in the Assembly and the military. Even optimistic observers warned that such conflicts could lead to the dissolution of Parliament and the necessity of new elections.80 One such conflict arose immediately, as members of the Young Military Officers’ Group voiced their disapproval of Prem’s selection of two generals to serve on the cabinet. Both Major General Sudsai Hasdin and General Prachaub Suntharangkura were trusted and dose friends of the premier, but the Young Turks complained that they were political opportunists with little to offer the country and too much to gain. The Young Turks particularly resisted the appointment of Sudsai, a founding father of the brutish Red Gaur youth group that had spearheaded the Six October massacre at Thammasat University in 1976.®' 1976 81 The young colonels were not alone in their opposition to Sudsai. Public “widespread puzzlement,” reaction to the appointment was described as -“widespread but the Far Eastern Economic Review speculated that Sudsai had been brought in not only because of personal ties to Prem, but perhaps to keep Sudsai “in line” as well.82 The prime minister’s intentions, however, did not seem to matter much to the Young Turks. Whatever Prem’s reasons for including Sudsai in his new government were, that appointment proved to be the last straw for the Young Turks.

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After Prem’s extension of tenure and the implications it had for the future aspirations of their rival Arthit, the Young Turks were convinced that they had to act. Throughout the rest of March 1981, they pressed Prem to reshuffle his cabinet again, but when Prem announced his belief that such was politically unfeasible, the Young Turks chose another approach. Thus, on the night of March 31, 1981, Colonel Prajark, the Hero of Tha Phraya, ordered his troops in Prachinburi Province, along the Kampuchean capital.Together with Colonel Manoon Roopkachom border, to move on the capital.Togetherwith and other core members of the Young Military Officers’ Group, Prajark paid his nocturnal visit to the prime minister and proposed a coup. Their proposition was strikingly similar to the one they had made to General Serm propositionwasstrikinglysimilartothe na Nakhom inJune 1977, and their hopes of reproducing the success of their naNakhom bloodless coup against Thanin in October 1977 were obvious. The outcome, as we have seen, was quite different than the move against Thanin had produced, however. Instead of toppling a weakened regime, the rebels discovered Prem’s control over the bulk of the military was much stronger than they had imagined, as was support from the palace for the constitutional process. Despite their best-laid plans, Prajark, Manoon and the other Young Turks had only succeeded in strengthening Prem and reaffirming the common belief among both military and civilian leaders that Prem alone was suited to lead. Prem’s eventual retirement from the military and his subsequent continuance as a civilian prime minister demonstrated his confidence that military rank was not required to keep the armed forces in check. Retaining the defense ministry portfolio for himself—thus controlling the military’s budget—seemed a sufficient safeguard against future military intervention. Circumstances nowseemedto now seemed to suggest that a time hadfinally had finally comewhen come when the Thai elite could function without either coups or military strongmen. Speaking after his own retirement from military service and as a civilian member of parliament, Kriangsak Chomanan had said that he believed date" because they "can “can no longer solve the problems “coups are now out of date” country."83 of the country."® Though Kriangsak’s words were to prove ironic a few short years later, they seemed to represent an optimistic trend in the expectations of Thailand's elites. Wishful thinkers, perhaps, but a growing number of them were beginning to wonder whether the vicious cycle of political crises and military coups could finally be grinding to a halt. Unfortunately, such thinking proved not only wishful but somewhat naive as well.

Chapter 19 The "Light Government Revolution"

Mornings in Bangkok are hectic and noisy. As if the ear-splitting roar of a million motorbikes and the poorly muffled engines of city buses were not enough, strategic intersections are equipped with withloudspeakers loudspeakers to broadcast the government news and toll the hour as the city comes alive each day and its citizens scramble off to work. The same program is broadcast over every radio frequency, from six-thirty to seven-thirty every morning, and so the public loudspeakers are presumably for those few unfortunates without radios of their own. As the recorded gong strikes the seventh hour, the national anthem begins to play, and all pedestrians are obliged to stop in their tracks and stand at attention. All over the nation, flags are being raised. The custom is not strictly observed. If one’s bus is about to pull away, for example, or if one is in the middle of a rush-hour breakfast at a curbside noodle stall, one needn’t worry about it. Traffic policemen will be seen standing in reverent stillness as undirected streams of cars and trucks buzz by. Soldiers and boy scouts will generally adhere. Most citizens, however, will only stop if someone in front of them stops first. When the anthem ends, the news continues—the official news put out by the government’s Department of Public Relations. Then, at seven-thirty, the state returns control of the airwaves to individual broadcasters, and the loudspeaker systems go silent. It is the same way every day, as it has been since the mid-1970s. But on the morning of 9 September 1985, though the music began and ended as usual, with people ignoring it as well as they ever could, the Department of Public Relations did not sign off as expected. Instead, people who still scurried about on their way to work, or those with radios on at their jobs, heard the following announcement: The Revolutionary Party, which comprises military, police, and civilian parties, has seized national sovereignty as of 6 a.m. on Sept. 9, 1985, and the situation is firmly 1

under the control of the Revolutionary Party.1

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vu‘ they would have used it. No doubt if the Thais had a word for 'deja yw'they Stronger commentary would have been pointless. The curious stayed tuned, perhaps listening with one ear. Otherwise, the order of the day was business as usual: get to work, get on with one’s life. Later on one could check the evening papers or watch the six o’clock news to see how the coup had gone. No sense letting it ruin one’s day, though. And no sense letting it interfere with tourism either. Thatsame That same morning, a major Bangkok hotel distributed this announcement to its foreign guests. To All Our Dear Guests, Please be informed that a light government revolution is going on this morning. The public is then requested to keep calm and if possible stay out of busy areas until the situation is back to normal. There is nothing to panic. Please just be aware of the situation in case you have to be out of the hotel. Thank you for your kind attention and cooperation. The Management’ Management5

There was nothing facetious about the handout. Business as usual during coups has long been the norm in Bangkok. The inevitable blase response by capital residents has become as predictable as the city’s weather. Just as Thais rarely seem to complain about the heat, a monotonous fact of life for them, neither do they express much concern about coups. One should not be too surprised, then, at the hotel management’s choice of language— more suited, as it were, for a report on the morning’s barometric pressure— to describe the bloodiest coup attempt in over three decades. What was termed a “light government revolution” that day took the lives of at least ten people. As many as sixty others were wounded, most of them civilians.3 With no more than five-hundred men, but marshalling what was described as “the heaviest concentration of tanks to take part in any coup,’* coup,”41 a small circle of former army officers held the city hostage for just under ten hours that day. The how and the why of it all have never been made quite clear, but the fact of it alone has meaning enough to ponder.

The Fourth Cavalry Rides Again On the face of it, the putsch was cleverly timed. The king was away, far to the south at a remote hilltop retreat with his wife and daughters. His son, the crown prince, was visiting Italy. The prime minister, PremTinsuIanonda, PremTinsulanonda, was on a state visit to Indonesia, and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, General Arthit Kamlang-ek, was in Europe on official business. It seemed as good a time as any for a takeover. After all, the same strategy had worked in 1932.5

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As coups generally tend to do, this one began in darkness. Before sunrise on the ninth, some one-hundred troops of the Bangkok-based 4th Cavalry Battalion commandeered twenty-two M-41 tanks from the Khiak Krai military barracks at the north end of town and rolled through the city streets to take up positions around the Royal Plaza, the great square between the Amphom Gardens and Dusit Zoo at the northern end of Rachadamnern Avenue. The tanks gathered between the equestrian statue of King it Once called ‘Parliament’ Chulalongkorn and the historic structure behind it. and before that called ‘Anant Samakhom Throne Hall’, the domed marble Peoples’ Party,—made an ironic edifice—one-time headquarters for the Peoples' backdrop to this latest reenactment of the Revolution of 1932. The officer normally in charge of the battalion, its men and its tanks, later told the Thai press: “Whoever ordered the tanks out had higher authority than me.”6 In place of infantry support, there were, gathered on the plaza, three-hundred men of the air force security police and one-hundred soldiers from a provincial cavalry unit north of the city, many of whom had sneaked into the city by night in civilian clothes. dothes.7 By dawn they had captured several strategic army and government buildings, including the broadcast facilities of the Department of Public Relations, Government House, and the headquarters of the Supreme SupremeCommand. GovemmentHouse, Command. From seven-thirty to ten past nine, the rebels monopolized the airwaves, broadcasting their orders for senior officials to come in and give themselves up and outlining a specious rationale for the takeover. They claimed to be overthrowing the elected parliament and civilian government in order to preserve democracy, and they promised economic reforms. They claimed to Prem government of have abrogated the constitution and to have relieved the Piem all authority. In other words, they claimed to be in complete control. Commander General Tienchai Nevertheless, atten at ten after nine, Deputy Army ArmyCommander Sirisamphan began broadcasting over the army’s radio network, warning all army units to take orders only from him. Tienchai, who was now in communication with the prime minister, the king, and the commander-inset up his anti-coup headquarters some twenty kilometers away on chief, had hadsetup PhaholyothinRoad, at the headquarters of the FirstArmy’s First Army’s 11th Regiment Regiment. This base, near Don Muang Airport, had been established after the 1981 coup bid as part of a contingency plan for just an eventuality as this.8 Tienchai had received early warning of the revolt, and once the strength, and position of the rebel forces was confirmed, he had sent in loyal troops, armed with tanks and artillery of their own. Army forces soon outnumbered the rebels—had them surrounded in fact—and Tienchai’s broadcasts overrode those of the coup makers. The rebel forces now realized they had made a dreadful miscalculation. Despite the absence from the capital of the highest national leaders, despite the rebels’ highly visible armored presence and their control over public communications, the military establishment had called the coup group’s bluff. Not a single unit rallied to the rebels’ side,

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and it became all too apparent that none would. Tension and frustration grew as the rebels came to realize they had painted themselves into a comer. o’clock "the By ten o'clock the rebels’ frustrations got the better of them, and in a desperate, nearly suicidal bid, the men of the “Revolutionary Party” opened fire with tanks and machine guns. In the half-hour-long fire fight that followed, rebel guns took out a radio tower and part of the wall around the First Division radio station. Other targets included a water truck, a taxi cab, two air-conditioned city buses, and several private homes more than five miles away as errant cannon shells sailed across the River Chao Phraya to land in the unsuspecting neighborhoods of suburban Thonburi. Later press reports spoke of a “lurking belief” that such destruction was nothing more than an “act of anger and frustration over coup."5 the impending collapse of the coup."’ Western newsmen Neil Davis and Bill Latch, of the American NBC television network, were killed in the battle. They had been on the scene at Supreme Command Headquarters and were trying to get out of the line of fire when a burst of shrapnel hit them. Farther away, a shell burst killed forty-three-year-old Vina Asvalarpsakul as she rushed to collect her son from school, fearing for his safety. The coup-makers’ temper tantrum destroyed still more lives and property but did nothing to enhance their cause. Fortunately for all concerned, the government forces responded with restraint restraint. An urgent message from the king and queen was relayed to the rebels; Their Majesties were calling for a cease-fire. Though all too late for the innocent victims, hostilities came to a halt by ten-thirty, and by afternoon the rebels were negotiating for surrender terms. For a brief moment, before it finally ended, it looked as though the rebels’ broadcast propaganda about economic and democratic reform, as poorly argued as it had been, had succeeded in raising popular support for poorlyarguedasithad their cause. Some time after one o’clock a throng of about one-thousand union members, led by two prominent labor leaders, poured into the Royal Plaza and raised a cheer for the “Revolutionary Party." Rebel officer Lt Sorn Larnkunthod, who had brought one-hundred troops from Saraburi for the coup effort, climbed up onto one of the M-41 tanks and made a stirring speech to the brave citizens. He called upon the crowd to march alongside the tanks to First Division Headquarters and keep the rebellion alive. But, despite their cheers of approval, the crowd’s enthusiasm did not extend to providing infantry support for the armored cavalry unit, and no one marched anywhere. Instead, the gathering quickly degenerated into what was described as a “carnival atmosphere," with people swarming all over the tanks and waving flags and laughing. “It was a real scorcher of a day,” one journalist trade."10 Unfortunately wrote, “and the drink vendors were doing a roaring trade.” for the vendors, however, the carnival was all over by four o’clock that

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afternoon. The rebels surrendered in plenty of time for the evening papers o’clock news. and the six o’dock circle of former officers that tried to seize the Who made up this drde government that day, and what did they want? How did they manage to control the troops they did, and what made them think they could win with so few? These were the most obvious and most-asked questions for quite some time afterwards. The first was the easiest to answer, and its answer defa vu. only added to the feelings of deja The Fourth Cavalry Battalion, whose men and tanks spearheaded the putsch, should ring a bell. The unit had also been involved in the ill-fated coup of 1981, led at that time by then Colonel Manoon Roopkachorn, a founder of the Young Military Officers’ Group. “prank,” Manoon had Cashiered from the army for his April Fools’ Day “prank," avoided prosecution and prison thanks to a general amnesty granted by had been thought thatremoving that removing him from Prem’s government At the time, it hadbeen his post, ending his career, and taking away his pension rights would be punishment enough. Proponents of the policy supposed that such lenient action against Manoon and his cohorts would also be sufficient to preclude any further use of the military by the Young Turks against the government. On the other hand, there were those who had thought such suppositions feeble, who believed that Manoon and his comrades were getting off easily. For those who had said that such leniency would only invite future coups, the 9 September 1985 putsch, led as it was by former Colonel Manoon and his brother Manas, was the perfect opportunity to say, “I told you so.”

The The Price of Forgiveness One might think thataftersuch that after such a dismal failure as Manoon and his Young Turks cohorts endured in April 1981 that a second attempt by members of the same group was highly unlikely. Looking back, however, certain political decisions made in the wake of the 1981 coup bid seemed almost to invite a return engagement. For example, Prime Minister Prem decided early on not to charge the April Fools Day coup-makers with treason in order arcus that a public trial might produce. to avoid the political circus The amnesty granted to General Sant and the Young Turks after their failed attempt in 1981 hadbeen had been quick but not automatic. Several assemblymen failedattemptin and cabinet members had felt that such leniency only served to perpetuate the vicious cycle of coups, and, in order to discourage future attempts, they had moved to block the proposal in Parliament” Parliament" Many felt that the coup makers should at least have been tried and then, if they were found guilty, leniency could have taken the form of a pardon. But Prachakom Thai Party leader Samak Sundaravej, then an MP from Bangkok, vehemendy vehemently opposed any form of clemency for the group that had comprised his greatest political enemies during his tenure as Interior Minister under the Thanin regime.

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Attacking the amnesty bill in the House of Representatives, Samak had that Prem wished to keep certain facts hidden, facts which might intimated thatPrem the have been revealed in the course of a trial. "He “He was the one who held die secrets in his hands,” said Samak of Prem. “He went into the Palace. I did not know what was said. I wanted him to say that from the beginning he refused to lead the coup.”12 The implications here are that when Prem entered the palace on the night of March 31, 1981 he had done so with the intention of seeking the king’s blessing for the coup and that Prem himself intended to lead the move against his own government, if such permission were granted. If what Samak was implying were indeed true, and if it were to come out possibly have spelled the end of Prem’s political and in a trial, it might possibly military career at a time when most Thai elites believed no other suitable leader was available to replace him. It might also have caused damage to the king’s apolitical standing, as His Majesty might have been seen as having commanded Prem to leave the city with him. Though some might consider such a command admirable—as if the king were finally putting his foot down and refusing to accept any more coups—many others would have seen it as the overstepping of constitutional prerogatives. The actual events of that night, however, remained unclear, and exactly what intentions were voiced by whom is not likely ever to be revealed. Whether to protect alleged secrets, or for the announced purpose of maintaining national unity, the issue of what was said and done that night was glossed over and dismissed. There never was a trial, despite Samak’s best efforts, and the complete story of the night before the 1981 coup never surfaced. The Young Turks were, instead, granted amnesty, though not without a price. Those who had participated in the coup attempt were dismissed from the army, and of those, the ones who had held seats in the Senate were obliged to resign. It was presumed by many that their moral defeat and the loss of the only careers they had ever prepared for was punishment enough. And, without their commissions or their commands, it was apparently felt that the demoralized Young Turks could cause no more trouble. After all, a patron is powerless without clients. As far as sending a message to other aspiring rebels was concerned, the Young Turks’ loss of stature and the subsequent advancement of their rivals were apparently seen as deterrent enough for any other would-be coup-makers. Ironically, the power of General Arthit Kamlang-ek and of the Democratic Soldiers of Chulachomklao Class Five grew by leaps and bounds after the April Fools’Coup. Fools’ Coup. Indeed all those associated with Prem and the suppression of the 1981 putsch had emerged from the incident stronger and more in control than before. As reward for his loyalty and his role in preserving the government, Arthit was given command of the prestigious First Army Region.13 Ayear A year later, when Prem finally retired from the military, the Young

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Turks’ predictions—like a self-fulfilling prophesy—came to pass, and Arthit Turks' Kamlang-ek was indeed chosen to succeed Prem as commander-in-chief.

The Young Turks Resurgent Arthit’s rivalry with the Young Turks did not end there, however. Early Arthit's in 1983, as time was running out on the temporary clauses in the 1978 constitution—and thus on the military’s direct tutelage over the legislature— Arthit began a campaign to amend the constitution and extend the clauses. It was widely rumored that he had offered to support Prem with yet another coup if such should prove the only way to maintain the army dominance. Apolitical A political crisis grew around the amendment issue, during which Parliament furiously debated the value of retaining the clauses or allowing them to expire. The cycle seemed to be turning again from the honeymoon phase into crisis, but this time the coup d’etat did not materialize.14 Instead, at the height of the amendment debate and Arthit’s campaign (which utilized the army’s nationwide public broadcasting network to influence public opinion), a counter campaign was launched by one of the founding members of the Young Military Officers’ Group. Colonel ChamlongSrimuang, Chamlong Srimuang, who, with classmate Manoon Roopkachom, ManoonRoopkachom, had helped start the Young Military Officers’ Group in 1974, had been among die the many graduates of the I960 cadet class who had not gone along with April Fools’ Fools' Day Coup. Chamlong had, in fact, been with Prem in Khorat for the duration of the takeover attempt. He was nonetheless still considered a Young Turk by his fellow officers, and he still adhered to the principles upon which his group was originally founded. To counter Arthit’s public relations efforts, Chamlong began a media campaign of his own, down-playing the coup aspect and emphasizing the democratic process. In February and March of 1983, Colonel Chamlong broadcast his own appeals to the public, urging that the temporary clauses be allowed to die. He warned that if Arthit were to have his way and the constitution were to be amended, it would lead to the “return of dictatorship.”15 To prevent such a thing from happening, Chamlong urged the electorate to write to their representatives and instruct them to vote down the amendment and “stand 16 firm in support of democracy."14 Whereas the April Fools’ Day Coup had marked the first concerted effort of military rebels to win public support for their takeover bid, the public debate between Arthit and Chamlong represented the first time that two rival military factions—instead of resorting to violence or the threat of violence—let the voters decide the outcome of such a quarrel. Chamlong’s victory and the defeat of the amendment bill seemed steps in the right direction, and though Arthit would continue to wield power in the military for sometime to come, that power did not translate into control of the government

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Chamlong, though perhaps the most prominent and most admired of his academy classmates, was not the only Young Turk to persist after the 1981 coup. He did not bear the stigma of the failed rebellion and so had risen within the system from which his peers had been expelled, but among those peers there were two names that refused to go away. These were Prajark Sawangjit and Manoon Roopkachom. Both Prajark and Manoon had tried to get back into the army as early as July 1981, only a month after their amnesty. Though they said they would accept lower ranks, their appeal was instantly denied. Bitter and frustrated, they complained of the unfairness of senior officers who had blocked their request,17 as if they believed that such a little thing as attempting to overthrow the government should not warrant such harshness. And they were not without sympathizers. Of the two, Prajark seemed the more resilient in the face of this disappointment He did not give up trying to get back into the army, but in the meantime, he went into business in Bangkok and, achieving success, eventually went into civilian politics. He joined the Thai Nation (Chat Thai) Party, and later stood for and won a seat in the House of Representatives. Prajark never gave up his outspoken criticism of the Prem administration, and he continued to push for change and to challenge established authority. Manoon, on the other hand, was somewhat less cooperative. Even after government troops had retaken Bangkok on 3 April 1981, Manoon had rejected their deadline for his surrender. Whereas Prajark had submitted to arrest, Manoon had gone into hiding and refused to emerge again until after the amnesty. Manoon’s refusal to surrender had been particularly disturbing to senior generals who had long chafed over the extraordinary influence of Manoon and his classmates. The generals insisted that the conditions Manoon had set for his re-emergence were unacceptable, and they were no doubt dismayed when he later evaded harsh punishment18 After his dismissal from the army, Manoon became sullen and perhaps withdrawn.-Described as “aquiet “a-quiet man who likes to stay in the background,” “a deep thinker,? and “very sincere,”119’ Manoon avoided the limelight after 1981, preferring a scholarly existence. Seeking refuge in the ivory tower, he enrolled in a graduate program at Kasetsart University in Bangkok, from which he had already earned a degree in Social Science. He later made plans to pursue a masters degree in the same subject from Cornell University.20 Nonetheless, quiet and brooding though he might have been, Manoon Roopkachom remained a power behind the scene. Roopkachorn During this time there were several rumors of plots against the premier’s life. Despite the fact Prem had survived the April Fools’ Day Coup and had grown in political strength thereafter, and despite his peaceful gestures toward his enemies, the prime minister remained the target of their envy and ambition. Not long after the matter was supposedly put to rest, Prem became the object of more than one assassination plot. Investigators linked some

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of the cashiered coup leaders to such plots, but no conclusive determination made.21 Still, it seemed to police that a certain quiet, scholarly exwas ever made.” colonel could have had some hand in it Manoon was arrested on related charges in September of 1984. The charges were dropped after a widely publicized ruckus and complaints by Manoon’s friends that he was being framed, and Manoon was released two later. 22 An undercurrent of tension followed Manoon for the next halfdays later.” year, and the government’s suspicions of him were never quelled. A climactic confrontation between Manoon and the authorities came in April 1985, as Manoon was about to leave Thailand for graduate school in the United States. Apparently still under investigation for the alleged plots against Prem’s life, Manoon was stopped at Don Muang airport by police who tried to prevent him from leaving the country. Manoon, however, was under the protection of his brother Manas, an Air Force Wing Commander, Manas’s men, who controlled the security detachment at Don Muang. Manas's heavily armed, reportedly intervened and forced the police to back down. Manoon and his wife then got on their plane and left the country.25 While Manoon was in the United States, Wing Commander Manas is said to have been busy organizing support for his brother’s return. Police later determined that Manas had been meeting, during June, July, and August of 1985, with former subordinates of Manoon, all of whom were active officers who still admired and felt a sense of loyalty to the ex-colonel. Among these Fourth Cavalry was an army captain, a company commander within the. the.Fourth Battalion. Manas also, allegedly, met with certain civilians, among them labor leaders who might assure popular support for a takeover—and a financier and businessman named Ekkayudh Anchanbutr then wanted by police on charges of massive financial fraud. Ekkayudh, investigators believed, was supposed to provide funding for the coup. 24 Manas’s activities did not go unnoticed. Fearing that his position as commander of an Air Force security battalion gave him access to enough men and arms to cause trouble, his superiors transferred Manas to another assignment, a support unit from which he could not as easily mobilize a significant force.25 Soon afterward, Manas learned of his coming permanent re-assignment to an inactive post which was to become official when the 25 annual list of promotions came out in October.26 By now, some time late in July, big brother Manoon had slipped back into the country undetected. From then on, for about six weeks before the eventual putsch, Manoon remained in seclusion.27 It is here that the story becomes unclear. Manoon and Manas were obviously busy planning and seeking support during those six weeks, and some of the names of those they consulted came out later. It* It' is hard to believe, however, that backing from just those few civilians and junior officers could have given an experienced coup-maker the confidence to go

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ahead, as Manoon did on 9 September. Considering Manoon’s past reputation as “one of the best armoured officers in the Thai army,"28 it is hardly conceivable that he would have mobilized so many tanks without expecting significant infantry support. support Even the most imaginative observers were unable to accept the idea that Manoon. and Manas would have decided to stage a coup on their own initiative without high-level support, either guaranteed or implied, from somewhere within the military.29 Nor was anyone willing to accept their stated reasons for the action. The momentary “downturn"30 then troubling Thailand’s economic boom hardly seemed the sort of crisis that had precipitated past coups, despite the long list of exaggerated fiscal problems Manoon had promised to address. And though Manoon may have had a point in his criticisms of widespread vote buying in recent elections, his professed goal of democratic reform could not have sounded more hollow. As an Asiaweek editorial put it, Manoon’s “self-styled gambit to save democracy” made no sense, and, in the face of public apathy to his cause, it seemed as if he had decided to “save the people by threatening to blow them up." up.” 331’ What, in fact, did Manoon have to gain from staging the 1985 coup? And who could have shared in that gain? Putting aside his rhetoric that day, one can assume there had to be at least some element of self-interest As noted earlier, he had tried and failed for several years to get back into the army. Certainly a coup would have been one way to accomplish that goal. Also, his brother Manas was facing a change in status with the upcoming October promotions, which had been a strong ulterior motive for more than a few coup makers in the past. But would high-ranking officers in the position to move regiments have lent their support to further such causes as the promotion of an air force security officer or the reinstatement of a former rebel? It would seem that, to take such a step, something more significant must have been at stake. Thus the 1985 post-coup investigation focused on two nagging questions: Who had led the Roopkachorn brothers to believe they would receive the necessary infantry support? And, what were the real motives of this “mastermind?" Unfortunately, the Thai elite are persistently discreet in matters such as this. In this case particularly, one gets the distinct impression that it was not so much the difficulty of discovery that kept the identity of this so-called mastermind a secret Rather, one gets the sense thatit would have been awkward, perhaps self-defeating for many of those then in power, to have him exposed. Resistance to a thorough investigation was obvious from the start start. This time around, however, Prem would not be intimidated by military politics. Soon after the 9 September coup attempt he let it be known that arrests would be made and a public trial held. By the end of October, forty suspects were in custody and had been brought before a civilian court to

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sedition. As had happened in 1981, after the April Fools’ Day face charges of sedition.As Coup, there was immediate talk of amnesty and the need to avoid airing the army’s dirty wash in public. But Prime Minister Prem would hear nothing 32 of it, insisting that, as a matter of principle, the trial would have to go on.52 There could be no suggestion, this time, that Prem feared the revelation of details, and whoever did fear such disclosures could not persuade him to back down. For the first time in fifty-three years—during which coups and counter-coups had occurred on average every three or four years— suspected coup plotters would face public prosecution. Whether this would make any difference, however, had yet to be seen.

The Elusive Mastermind Despite the milestone, the inquiry and trial were viewed with skepticism by both the public and the media, and few expected substantial revelations. It seemed the most probing questions were being asked not in court but on the streets of Bangkok and the front pages of newspapers. “Bangkok has been rife with rumour and speculation,” one magazine "Bangkok reported, calling attention to the widespread belief that Manoon’s efforts had been part of a much broader conspiracy. The 9 September plot was said by many to have involved a much wider circle of serving officers than originally thought, men whose motives, in the last, analysis, were far too varied and conflicting, and resulted in the withdrawal of key players at the 33 last minute.55 Word-of-mouth and anonymous pamphlets pamphlets, circulated around Bangkok suggesting a number of possible scenarios involving various officers who were then taking credit for the coup’s suppression. One such leaflet even suggested that army commander Arthit Kamlang-ek had staged the whole thing himself, perhaps timing it to coincide with his trip to Europe in order 34 to provide an alibi.54 This might seem a strange notion considering the army commander's commander’s past loyalty to Prem, not to mention the animosity between Arthit and Manoon. Of late, however, there had been a lot of bad blood between Arthit and the Prem government, and rumors of coup plots, either by or in support of Arthit, had been circulating since November of 1984. At that time Arthit had taken a very public stance against monetary policies enacted by Prem and his finance minister, Sommai Hoontrakul. Arthit had gone on national television on 7 November 1984 to condemn a 14.9% devaluation of the Thai baht against the U.S. dollar, the latest and greatest in a series of fiscal reforms supported by Minister Sommai and Prem’s support, was opposed by the military. The finance minister, with Prem's trying to diminish Thailand’s external trade deficit and attract foreign investment, but a devalued baht presented problems for the military establishment which, while operating from a fixed budget, had been trying

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to negotiate arms purchases from abroad. Arthit’s supporters in the military were many, and it was quietly suggested that they might go to extremes to force Sommai’s removal and a reversal of the devaluation.’ devaluation.355 Prem, however, had stronger backing. A series of visits by the prime minister to the king’s palace and a number of public appearances with the royal family seemed designed to illustrate this. Then, in his birthday speech in December 1984, King Bhumibol said he did not believe that noisy criticism and “internecine disputes" were in the country’s best interests. This was taken as a subtle indication of his disapproval of coup rumors. Arthit’s criticisms died away after that, as did much of the previous support for him, and even his chances of retaining the post of commander-in-chief for 36 another year were now in doubt.55 Though, by the time the 9 September action was launched, Prem had already granted Arthit a one-year extension, the premier had yet to decide what course to take when that year was up. A successful coup, therefore, would not necessarily have been to Arthit's disadvantage. Nor would it have been disadvantageous to his clientele, who had their own ideas about who should succeed the commander-in-chief. Considering Arthit’s regard for palace opinion and his lack of affinity for Manoon, however, it seems unlikely that Arthit would have stooped to plan such a thing himself, which suggests the possibility of his supporters acting without his direct knowledge. Indeed, at about the same time that the Arthit’s complicity, a high-ranking air anonymous leaflets were suggesting Arthit's that, while he force officer and member of parliament told the Thai press that; could not mention names, he had reason to believe that senior officers had 37 coup.57 “duped" Manoon into leading the coup It was also suggested that Manoon 38 had been counting on infantry support from units in the First Army Region,58 historically the source of most Thai coups. Two officers in a position to promise First Army support were First Division commander Maj. General IssarapongNoonpakdi, and his immediate Maj, GenerallssarapongNoonpakdi, superior, First Army Region commander Lt General Pichit Kullavanich. Issarapong was a graduate of Chulachomkiao Class Five and was seen as 39 a staunch Prem supporter.59 Though his classmates once provided a power base for Arthit, this relationship had faltered since the commander-in-chief’s commander-in-chiePs falling out with Prem the year before. Pichit, of Class Two, had been among those supporting Arthit on the devaluation issue in 1984/° and in 1983 he had been staunchly behind Arthit’s campaign to amend the constitution. At that time Pichit had gone exercise." This was widely so far as to suggest the army might “carry out an exercise.” coup. 411 Furthermore, like taken as a threat to ensure Arthit’s goals with a coup/ Wing Commander Manas, Pichit was faced with disappointing news when the annual promotions list (scheduled to take effect in October) was leaked to the press that August. Pichit had hoped to move up the command structure to a position from which he could conceivably succeed Arthit a

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year later. Instead, it was decided he would retain command of the First Army for another year. This combined with two other factors—the Lt. Gen. Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh promotion to army chief ofstaff of his rival It. extension—effectively put Pichit out of and uncertainty about Arthit’s next exterision—effectively post,422 the running for the top post-'* Issarapong, on the other hand, had reason to be pleased with the promotions list The retention of Pichit in command of the First Army and the advancement of Chaovalit meant that Issarapong’s brother-in-law and academy classmate, Maj. Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon, was still progressing toward his own ambition of eventually becoming commander-in-chief. Suchinda, president of Class Five and acknowledged leader of its alumni, was to move up to become assistant chief of staff when the list took effect.45 This meant that if Chaovalit indeed succeeded Arthit, Suchinda would be in line to succeed him in just a few years.44 The promotions list also threatened to heat up the long-time feud between Manoon's Manoon’s Class Seven and Issarapong’s Class Five, with members of the latter group receiving command of eleven of the army’s thirteen divisions and considerably more power, therefore, than their rivals.45 Knowing, then, that Pichit might have had cause to support a change of government, while Issarapong had several reasons to oppose any such change, certain facts which came to light following the abortive takeover presented certain implications: Early on the morning of the coup, Deputy Army Chief Tienchai Srisamphan, as was noted earlier, had set up a counter-coup command at the First Army’s 11th Regimental Headquarters on Phaholyothin Road, near the airport airport. This was not an arbitrary or spontaneous decision, nor was it based on existing circumstances. In a contingency plan drawn up after 1981’s April Fools’ Day coup attempt, the 11th Regiment had been designated as the counter-coup command center in anticipation of any 46 *• future coups.44 '• Nevertheless, instead of reporting there along with other loyalist officers on the morning of the coup, Pichit, by his own admission, went to the First Regiment barracks in downtown Bangkok, a stone’s throw from the coup makers’ headquarters. It should be noted that soldiers billeted there had provided the muscle for many a coup attempt in the past and would have served Manoon’s requirements for infantry support quite nicely. Pichit explained that he had gone there because he thought the “army it.47 But, considering Pichit’s reputation as a first-rate plan” called for it First-rate country’s most tactician and strategic planner—according to some, “the country's capable combat general"48—it is at the very least surprising that this West Point graduate could have forgotten the contingency plan he helped to draw up four years earlier. Despite these curious circumstances, an army “white paper” put out in October 1985 to describe the coup suppression operations made no mention of Pichit’s error.

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Also omitted from the so-called white paper was the role played by Maj. Gen. Issarapong in suppressing the take-overbid/’ take-over bid/ 9 Hours before the putsch began, Issarapong ordered his regiments to hold their positions and remain on alert in their barracks, banacks,50 thus blocking any conceivable access to infantry support for Manoon. An unidentified Class Five general was quoted as saying, “We knew all along of an attempt to overthrow the Government. The only thing we didn’t know was when.” It also was reported that Maj. Gen. Suchinda, the Class Five leader, was the one who first “alerted and informed" his classmates, including Issarapong, of the coming coup informed” attempt.51 Such reports painted the picture of a fractionalised command structure in which officers continued to choose sides even after it was clear a coup would be staged. It could be surmised, too, that even after the tanks had taken up their positions, the loyalties of senior officers remained in doubt. Theories and conjectures such as these facts suggested remained loose ends, however, and were never adequately explored in court. Additionally, there appeared to be an official policy against such exploration even in Thailand’s relatively free press. Police and military authorities warned the media and the general public not to speculate on the identity of the mysterious “mastermind" and assigned investigators to search out and arrest these anonymous pamphleteers and rumor mongers. Police “pressed charges” against at least one newspaper publisher over coverage of the case which one police official claimed had “caused rifts between police and military."52 Meanwhile, investigators did not seem to be making much much, progress in their own search for whoever was behind the coup. When that investigation concluded at the end of October 1985, authorities were no closer to revealing the “mastermind" than they had been at the outset. Everyone who had been there at the Royal Plaza that day, whether in uniform or out, down to the very men who had manned the tanks, claimed innocence, each one offering in defense that he was coerced or ordered to take part—but by whom, no one could say for sure. “When we question people,” complained one of the investigators, “they always keep referring to Manoon and no one else."55 The prosecution went to court, therefore, without a clear case as to who had initiated the rebellion. All that could be argued now was that the defendants before the judge were guilty of violating articles 113, 114 and 5 *While forty 116 of the criminal code by conspiring to incite an insurrection.54 persons were charged, attention was to focus on the handful of suspects daimed to who comprised the Revolutionary Party, the group which had claimed be in complete control on the morning of 9 September 1985.

Chapter 20 The Conspiracy of Interests

In early reports it was stated that the pre-dawn activities of Manoon’s men on 9 September 1985 had included finding "prospective “prospective figureheads revolt,"1 implications being that it was only in the last minutes before for the revolt, Party" was drawn up. the putsch that the membership of the "Revolutionary “Revolutionary Party” It was not long, however, before doubt had been cast on whether these socalled nominal leaders cooperated with Manoon under duress or of their own free will. Investigators focused on these individuals, and, for a time, speculation about who masterminded the coup shifted away from members of the active military and onto a group of retired generals and civilians. A Coup Goes to Trial Named as head of the group on that morning’s first broadcast was Serm na Nakhorn, the retired general and former supreme commander who had been approached for such a role in in. at least two previous Young Turk power plays. Along with Serm was named retired general Kriangsak Chomanan, former Prime Minister and an early patron of the Young Military Officers’ Group. Two more were retired generals as well: Yot Dhepasdin na Ayudhya (one-time deputy commander-in-chief) and Krasae Intharathat (former deputy supreme commander). Only two were on the active duty roster, Air Chief Marshal Arun Promthep (one of three serving deputy supreme commanders) and the commander of the Royal Thai Air Force himself, Air Chief Marshal Praphan Dhupatemiya..Of these six, only Praphan categorically refused to support Manoon and Manas and was thereafter held hostage. After the disastrous gun battle of the morning and the government ultimatum that afternoon, the retired generals conducted negotiations with army authorities, using the coup makers’ possession of ACM Praphan for leverage. Through discussions with First Army Region commander Pichit, they arranged for Manoon to leave the country and for themselves to stay and face an inquest The deal reportedly had royal approval. A message

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from the king’s southern retreat was reported thus: “The word is ... that the phuyai pbu yai [‘big shots’] should stay and Manoon should go.”2 A few days later, when Manoon was safely out of the country, and his brother Manas was in hiding somewhere in the western provinces, all of Che the 3 “figureheads” except Praphan were arrested on charges of sedition. Similarly charged and arrested were three civilian members of parliament who were also union leaders. Ahmad Kanthesthong, Sawat Lookdote, and Prathin Tamongjoi were accused of stirring up their constituents for the failed rally at the Royal Plaza. Forty suspects in all were arrested and held over for trial. Another civilian charged in the coup was not apprehended; the mysterious (alleged) coup financier Ekkayudh Anchanbutr was said to be in hiding somewhere in Bangkok under the protection of a powerful former military figure whose name never made it into the press accounts.4 Ekkayudh eventually slipped out of the country, as did Manas, and both of them joined Manoon in exile abroad. For those who had speculated about a mastermind among the upper echelons of the army, the inclusion of Kriangsak and company presented a puzzle. Why should they have been brought in at all? As Kriangsak said to a journalist a month into the trial, “Do you believe that three or four old soldiers can order up 20, 30 or more tanks?"5 Surely they were in even less of a position to provide infantry support than anyone else present that day at the Royal Plaza. At the trial, council for the defense tried to make just that point The defense focused on prosecution witness Air Chief Marshall Praphan Dhupatemiya, whom the coup group had used as a hostage during their surrender negotiations. When asked what kind of command authority he thought retired officers like Kriangsak still had, ACM Praphan replied, “Legally they have no power. But there may be other powers which are hidden in the hearts of the people.”6 The air force commander elaborated: There are two types of command authority—one is legal and the other is authority arising from the behaviour and actions of a person as they effect other people, did not have legal authority, but maybe he had that authority which arises ,. Kriangsak Kriangsak.did in the feelings of supporters.7

In other words, the bonds between patron and client, even in the military, are not necessarily dissolved when one or the other leaves the army. The air chief marshall’s comments may not have helped the case for the defense, but he did point out the common perception among Thai elites that patron-client bonds often command loyalties which supersede legally established lines of authority. Manoon is the most obvious example of this. Despite reports that the former colonel had paid as much as 30,000 baht (about US$ USS 1,200) to each

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8 of the cavalry officers who joined him, the willingness of 500 active service men to follow the orders of a man who had been out of the army for four years is still remarkable. Yet, to those who knew Manoon, the continued loyalty of his former subordinates came as no surprise. During his years in the cavalry, Col. Manoon had built a reputation for paternalism and generosity, and he was much admired for helping even private soldiers. "He was, quite simply, a .dose to Manoon told a reporter. After his good commander,” a source .close dismissal from the army, Manoon had continued to look after the welfare of men who had served under him, playing host to numerous soldiers who home. 9 Another close associate of Manoon added: would call on him at his home?

you’re good to them, as he has been, they remember you for life; that’s the Thai When you're way. He kept up his contacts with those up to junior officer level. They crew the tanks so there was no need to know anyone else.10

But then why had the coup failed?Obviously it was necessary to have other connections. Despite their supposed extra-legal authority, neither Kriangsak nor any of the other retired generals proved to have sufficient connections to make the takeover bid work. Why, then, were these men present at the Royal Plaza that day, and why had they let their names be used? True, Serm and Kriangsak both had had ties to Manoon and the Young Turks in the past. Indeed both had been involved with previous Young Turk coup bids. Yot, too, had been a supporter of the Young Turks. He and Kriangsak, together with First Army commander Pichit, had actively 11 army.” advocated their return to the army. Yet this issue hardly seems the sort of thing for which men of stature would take up arms. As Kriangsak said from his jail cell, “Three years a prime minister. Forty-two years a soldier. Five wars. I should not be here today.” today."’122 It does not seem likely he would have for Manoon’s benefit, no matter what the dictates of risked so much just for patron-client reciprocity might be. There would have to be evidence of a stronger, more compelling motive than that to truly incriminate Kriangsak. As did his co-defendants, the former premier insisted that he had been roused from his bed in the middle of the night and taken to coup headquarters without a word of explanation. They had barely given him time to dress, he complained, adding that he thought to wear a uniform only “It was three or four years since I’d worn because he felt it might protect him.' him."“It my uniform," he told an interviewer. “I had to use my son’s trousers." Kriangsak noted further that the other retired generals arrived separately, 15 and that none of them had had anything to say to each other.18 Everyone tried to behave normally. We just shook hands and kept calm. Nobody asked: ‘Why are you here? Because you came yourself? Because you were brought 1 * here* ' No. No,”

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At the trial, ACM Praphan—the hostage—did not seem to implicate Kriangsak. The air chief marshall did say, however, that he believed Serm to be the real leader of the coup, and that Yot was also involved.15 Praphan noted that none of the generals there that morning had been held at gunpoint, and that both Yot and Serm had appeared to be giving orders to Manoon and his men? men.’6 Other testimony later in the trial supported Praphan’s assertions and also raised suspicions regarding certain active officers who had not been indicted. One witness, for example; examplei claimed that he had observed Manoon in regular consultation with Serm and Yot, receiving orders from both men throughout had been in touch with First Army the day. The same witness also said that Yot hadbeen commander Pichit by telephone. Yot had invited Pichit to come to coup headquarters, the witness said, but Pichit sent an aide in his place.17 When a defense lawyer pressed ACM Praphan for his knowledge of Pichit’s relations with the defendants, the judge interrupted, warning the lawyer “not to ask irrelevant questions." And at one point Praphan himself the airforce air force chief, “Ask rebuked the attorney, angrily waving his finger. Said die me too many questions and my memory will become better, mind you.”18 The trial .iade iade fewer and fewer headlines after that. There were some surprises, but none proved very significant Rumors persisted of imminent amnesty; a cabinet minister told the press that tensions “among the country’s brokers" had grown after Praphan’s testimony and that “if the trial power brokers” continued, allegations could be made concerning the identity of an alleged mastermind.” Such allegations, the unnamed minister warned could lead, to “a serious political conflict.” conflict."119’ Butno leastnot But no amnesty was forthcoming, at least not until several years had pass. Nor were the dreaded allegations, or the political conflict, or the identity of the elusive “mastermind” ever to see the light of day. Instead, media interest in the case just gradually faded, and public concern shifted to other matters.

Politics, Money and the Military Little was made of the financial interests of the coup suspects, though such interests seem to make up a source of motivation as compelling as any. Adding to the circumstantial evidence already linking a wide range of military figures, a series of conflicts between the government and the military regarding certain fiscal and monetary reforms seems also to have attempt. A look at the financial concerns contributed to the 1985 coup attempt linking several of the suspects and putting them in common opposition to Prem’s government suggests that the conspiracy was even more complicated than already shown. As noted before, money for the attempt was said by investigators to have come from fugitive financier Ekkayudh Anchanbutr, who never was brought to trial. Considered something of an upstart, this1twenty-five-year-

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old, billionaire investor was in danger of losing a vast financial empire thanks to the monetary policies of the Prem regime. Ekkayudh apparently had some very powerful connections, too, and upon dose inspection, seemed to be at the hub of the tangled web of personalities and self-interest surrounding the coup attempt Part of the monetary scheme proposed by Prem’s finance minister in 1984, in addition to devaluing the baht, was a restructuring of the revenue and banking systems. It was also hoped that the government bond market could be developed into a larger domestic source of funds to help finance government's budget deficit.20 the government’s Increasing government bond holdings among the general public, it was reducing Thailand’s foreign debt. However, thought, would be the key to redudng competition from a network of so-called underground money markets had long diverted vast amounts of cash from conventional savings plans, including banks that bought and sold bonds. Therefore, the government moved in November of 1984, to ban “unconventional money pools,” at the risk of angering a large segment of the monied elite, such as Ekkayudh Anchanbutr, who had grown rich from such operations.221’ Investing in such “chit-funds”—as the English-language press calls these ten chae, or high-yielding pyramid money games—is known to Thais as len shares*. Long common to many Thai offices and residential ‘playing shares’. neighborhoods, the money pools are usually small, comprising a number of friendly acquaintances who contribute a small amount from each monthly paycheck into a kitty managed by a member of the group. The fund is then made available, as a loan, Ioan, to whichever member will pay the highest interest, and the interest eventually gets divided up among the rest the members. Among small groups and with relatively small sums involved, this financial sleight-of-hand is relatively harmless. But taken to extremes, as had. done, these money pools could come to some chit fund operators had involve thousands of people and billions of baht. Vast fortunes could be accumulated by crafty operators controlling huge funds of this nature, and as long as enough new investors continued to pay in, the funds could stay afloat 23 afloat. Sooner or later, however, these pyramids would have to fall—and this government's greatest fear. Besides keeping enormous amounts of was the government’s money outside the banking system and providing an array of circuitous tax dodges, the chit fund game, for a variety of reasons, could topple at any time, triggering runs on legitimate banks and the financial ruin of hundreds of thousands of investors.25 On the other hand, if the government banned them outright, the funds would surely collapse. The inflow of new investors would halt abruptly. Existing shareholders would then try to withdraw their capital, and operators would be unable to oblige. The same sort of panic which the

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government wanted to avoid could result. Furthermore, a sudden ban would also have been politically difficult, as the chit funds generally lived up to their promises to pay high monthly dividends and were long regarded as good investments by those who used them. The government plan, therefore, began with a publicity campaign to erode the confidence of chit fund investors and to deter new investments in such funds. A media blitz was launched, warning of the hidden dangers inherent in the pyramid game. The campaign proved effective, scaring off new clients, convincing others to pull out before the pyramids collapsed, operators’ ability to make timely interest and thus gradually hampering fund operators' payments to their clients. As operators defaulted on their monthly interest payments and clients filed complaints, police would be able to freeze and seize operators’ assets, liquidating their holdings and depositing the cash in government controlled banks. Clients who had filed complaints would eventually be paid back, at least in part. The operators, however, would lose out, as would their more loyal clients who had failed to complain. Meanwhile, the funds would become available to help finance the government, and the Revenue Department would be able to deduct whatever back taxes were owed on the confiscated funds. Still, the plan met with powerful opposition, for certain chit fund managers had made their clients rich beyond their wildest dreams, and with such wealth inevitably comes great power. The most powerful of these chit fund operators, and the government’s prime target, was the wife of an air force wing commander, Mrs. Chamoy Thipso. Her clients fondly called her 24 Mae (meaning ‘mother’) Chamoy. Mae Chamoy was said to have controlled between three and five billion baht (US$ 109-182 million), mostly untaxed. Her clients represented a large segment of the military, and as many as seventy percent of them were airforce. members of the air force. Her scheme had gradually branched out, however, to include police, soldiers, civil servants, and members of the general public. Many of these—often at the urging of superiors—had mortgaged property to take advantage of Mae Chamoy’s high yields. These superiors, earn high returns for themselves if coincidentally, would only continue to eam new clients continued io to join the fund.25 This vast military clientele translated into a lot of powerful support for Mae Chamoy. Army Chief Arthit Kamlang-ek, for example, had made support for her during his anti-devaluation speech prominent mention of his supportforher in November 1984, adding the anti-chit fund decree to the list of government policies he and the military opposed.26 Afterwards, the press noted that it seemed the devaluation had only provided the military with “the excuse they needed to push for a change of government,” adding:

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.,.some ...some military leaders never have been upset by the government’s move to outlaw unconventional financial activities including the Mae Chamoy chit fund which some unconventional.financial of them had earnestly defended.17

With more than half of the serving members of the Royal Thai Air Force investing in Mae Chamoy, ACM Praphan at one point told the press he would have to find some way to help his men if anything happened to Mae Chamoy’s fund. 28 Other large chit fimd fund operators boasted the backing of such prominent people as arch-conservative Buddhist monk Phra Kittiwuttho Bhikkhu.29 But Mae Chamoy’s supporters reportedly included “one senior officer, acting for a pool of similarly uniformed customers, who stands to M ..."50 lose Baht 81 million [approximately USS 3 million] ...” With such power behind her, Mae Chamoy proved a tenacious adversary. “Only “Go ahead and make sure I’m finished,” she once challenged Prem. "Only 31 then will you learn that I don’t go down alone.”51 During March and April of 1985, as the government’s campaign continued and Mae Chamoy’s collapse appeared imminent, rumors circulated of coming political repercussions, including a possible coup d’etat. Chamoy’s military customers blamed the government campaign, not the chit fund operator, for imperilling 32 their fortunes, and there was talk that Prem might fall before Chamoy.52 Meanwhile, a reputed associate of Mae Chamoy was having legal troubles, with his own chit fund. Ekkayudh Anchanbutr, who was said to have started his Chartered Interaction Company with 15 million baht (US$ 33 880,000) from Mae Chamoy’s fund,55 was under investigation following complaints from from clients that he had failed to make scheduled interest 34 payments.54 Ekkayudh complained that he had been forced to postpone some dividends because of government meddling in his business. He said that a government committee had summoned him along with all his documents4for a review. He said that, after reviewing his records, company’s documents'for police officials told the press that Chartered Interaction was nothing more than one of the “unconventional money pools” that the government had been warning against. Ekkayudh denied this, but as a result of the negative publicity—or so he claimed—his business had dropped off, making it difficult for him to pay his debts. He therefore filed suit against the premier and several cabinet officials, including Finance Minister Sommai, for 2 35 billion baht. 55 Perhaps Ekkayudh thought that challenging Prem in court would bolster his investors’ confidence and repair some of the damage caused by the government’s campaign against chit funds. If so, he was sadly mistaken, for Prem barely batted an eye. The prime minister had not entered the fray of monetary reform unaware of the hazards in store, and with the real threat of military intervention facing him on the same front, he could hardly be expected to flinch at this sort of unorthodox action.

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35 A government legal adviser told the press that Prem was “unimpressed”56* by the youthful financier’s threats, and warned that "threatening ministers with legal action for performing their duty ... could be considered treason.”37 Interestingly, despite all the rumors and veiled threats of a coup, this was the first time the government had used the word ‘treason’ in connection with the chit fund controversy. Obviously, challenging the government in court was more of an affront than threatening an armed insurrection. Or perhaps the government felt more confident about confronting Ekkayudh than it did the military. At any rate, Prem had no intention of letting Ekkayudh get away with this bold and unprecedented move. Within a week of filing his suit, Ekkayudh was confronted with yet another police probe. Allegations were made that Chartered Interaction had in' February 1985 postponed several dividend payments and that a lawyer in'February Ekkayudh’s company had told clients this was the fault of one its from Ekkayudh's 38 directors having absconded with 100 million baht. 58 It was also said that Ekkayudh had on 5 March 1985 issued a “dud cheque" cheque” to an air force officer 39 in the sum of 8.7 million baht baht” and that he had deposited 65 million baht of his clients’ money with the State Railway of Thailand as a guarantee for a major construction project.40 Far from salvaging his fortunes, Ekkayudh’s legal challenge to Prem had brought down upon him the full force of the government. By the end of March, officials were predicting his company’s imminent collapse. Police issued a warrant for his arrest, and Ekkayudh went into hiding. At the same time, police seized documents from the house of another Chartered Interaction associate (an air force captain who happened to be a neighbor ofMae Chamoy Thipso)41 and arrested two of Ekkayudh's Ekkayudh’s founding partners.42 All this negative publicity created a chain reaction, upsetting clients’ confidence not only in Chartered Interaction but in other funds as well, all according to the government plan. Chit fund clients began to worry and lose confidence. Many began to withdraw their investments, while new clients became harder to find. Soon newspapers were quoting “well-informed government sources" sources” who warned that “repercussions from the Chartered Interaction case had had a considerable impact on other chit funds and 45 might cause them to fold, possibly as early as next month." month.”43 Of course, such public pronouncements only served to hasten the underground money market’s inevitable demise. The repercussions shook Mae Chamoy’s operations almost immediately. At the end of March, for the first time in ten years, she postponed interest payments promising to pay instead on the tenth of April.44 When that date came around, however, Chamoy was again unable to pay.45 The Revenue Department, on grounds that Chamoy owed 41 million baht in overdue business taxes had'frozerrfierassets three days earlier46 and thus had tied business-taxesyhadTrozefrfierassets her hands. Following Ekkayudh’s lead, Chamoy now went into hiding

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herself, her whereabouts concealed, it was later reported, by certain highranking air force officers/ officers?7 Two months later, after police raids on the homes of some of Chamoy’s associates had uncovered and seized millions of baht in cash, and after investigators had sequestered several bank accounts and real estate holdings linked to Chamoy, the fugitive chit fund queen came out in the open. Chamoy emerged toward the end of June to face the music, but not without first meeting army Commander-in-Chief Arthit and Air Force Commander Praphan.48 Chamoy was taken into custody and held pending trial, but she remained defiantly confident of her ultimate vindication. During this time, Ekkayudh Anchanbutr remained hidden. By this time, July of 1985, he was already in touch with Wing Commander Manas and his brother Manoon, and if reports are accurate was discussing plans for a change in government By the end of August, as police were preparing to send their case against Mae Chamoy to the public prosecutor’s office, Ekkayudh was confronted with a dark reality. Up until now, the government had only been able to freeze his company’s assets and was still compiling its case against him. But on 26 August 1985, police investigators recommended that the Public Prosecution Department declare Ekkayudh and his company bankrupt, a step which, under Thai law, would allow the government to confiscate Ekkayudh’s remaining assets.4’ If this were to happen, Ekkayudh and his biggest backers would be financially ruined. Also in August of 1985, Mae Chamoy’s case went to the public prosecutor and her trial was set to begin in mid-September.50 In preparation, police called in 150 military men and questioned them about their investments in Chamoy’s operation.551’ It looked as if both Chamoy’s and Ekkayudh’s pyramid empires were about to fall, and with them the fortunes of any number of military men. Then, over the next three days, came the feverish meetings between ex-CoIonel ex-Colonel Manoon and the contacts his brother had so carefully cultivated, including the fugitive Ekkayudh Anchanbutr. Final plans were being made for another coup against the Prem regime. Coinciding with these meetings was a similarly clandestine conference of union leaders held at a Bangkok hotel. On the night of 8 September, several disgruntled labor bosses—some of whom had been fired by the State Railway for leading a strike the month before—met to discuss their role in the coming coup, investigators later claimed. A report in the Thai-language press said that Ekkayudh Anchanbutr was also there.52 In light of his 65 million baht investment in the State Railway, Ekkayudh’s links to the railway union seem to hold some significance, though what that may be has never been made clear. The only clear evidence of Ekkayudh’s involvement in the coup attempt is that, like the labor bosses, he was seen by numerous witnesses giving orders to Manooh’s Manoon’s men. Along with union leaders Sawat and Prathin,

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Ekkayudh led about one hundred soldiers on 9 September to the headquarters Ekkayudhled of the Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA) where they seized busses to take union members to the Royal Plaza. The BMTA director said that confident” and that he stayed in constant Ekkayudh "appeared “appeared extremely confident" communication by telephone and walkie-talkie with the coup leaders. At one point, Ekkayudh told someone on the phone that he was calling from rebel headquarters, and on several occasions he responded to radio calls, 55 singh neung, or ‘Lion ‘Lion One’,53 all of which answering to the code name Singh suggested to investigators that Ekkayudh held a significant leadership role in the coup group. Ekkayudh’s links to other suspects in the coup case are also intriguing. It was said that among Ekkayudh’s chit fund clients were retired generals Kriangsak Chomanan and Yot Dhepasdin, who had also heavily invested in the Mae Chamoy fund.54 This fact might serve to provide the missing motive noted earlier, but considering the wide range of other powerful military clients shared by Ekkayudh and Chamoy, it only amounts to one more piece of the puzzle, a one-color jigsaw puzzle with no picture to help in putting the pieces together. Ekkayudh went into hiding after the coup and eventually escaped prosecution by fleeing the country. In addition to the police, who issued several warrants for him on several charges and a reward of 100,000 baht,55 Ekkayudh was also reported to be on the run from his fellow coup plotters, 56 who wished to ensure his silence.54 As for Mae Chamoy, she was never officially linked to the coup plotters, and though her trial went ahead following the coup’s failure, testimony given about her military contacts was suppressed. While authorities were trying to keep the press from speculating about the coup’s “mastermind,” prior restraint was also being exercised in the Mae Chamoy case. Following the second hearing in that case, the Criminal Court banned all media from reporting on the names and testimonies of certain witnesses. The order was imposed after three witnesses said their testimonies “could implicate 57 figures.” national figures."

Any Lessons Learned? court- the jigsaw puzzle of overlapping motive and After three years in courtj-the opportunity that seemed to involve so many still lacked many important pieces. The morass of pre-trial speculation, inconclusive leads, and the obvious official intent to play down certain possibilities made the trial seem little more than an exercise, a demonstration of how much trouble could be if a government ever really wanted io caused ifa to punish a band of coup plotters. In the end the trial had accomplished little else. Far from serving justice, the trial may well have been an injustice. The five principal defendants were released on bail after five months in relatively

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comfortable custody at Police Special Branch headquarters in Bangkok.58 Manoon and the other fugitives were never caught, having escaped to live in comfortable exile in West Germany. Meanwhile, the trial dragged on, and thirty-three lesser suspects (junior officers, NCO’s, and civilians) remained behind bars, first at a high security jail and later at a “Police Private Detention Center.” None of these were able to put up the required 2.5 million baht (US Center." $92,000) bond. 55?’ Among the reasons given for the lengthy prosecution were that the five phuyaiS'w&K. members of Parliament and thus could not be compelled to pbuyaiswere attend court hearings during legislative sessions. Furthermore, there were hundreds of witnesses listed by both prosecution and defense, and, even rhe scheduled testimony, if given, after two years, it was estimated that all the would require as much as five more years to be heard. Nonetheless, considering the precedent being set, it was seen as something of an accomplishment to have held any of the alleged coup-makers in custody for 60 Parliament finally put the trial to rest in September of any length of time. time.® 1988, passing a general amnesty for all the coup suspects, most of whom 61 the public had forgotten by then. Despite all the ‘I-told-you-so’s’ ‘I-told-you-so*s' and the apparent lessons of the April Fools’ Day Coup, the plotters of yet another coup had escaped punishment. Perhaps it is true that the men who were arrested represented only the tip of a large iceberg. Some of them may even have been innocent of the charges against them. Still, the obvious ploys used to stall the trial and confound any efforts to get at the truth show that the true intention of the Thai elite was not to find and punish the coup makers but simply to defuse the embarrassing situation they had created. Even Manoon, who had publicly accepted full blame for the takeover bid, was allowed to come home. “I accept sole responsibility," responsibility,” he said in 62 1987. “Please punish me alone." alone."® Nevertheless, Manoon’s only punishment was three years of exile in West Germany during which he owned and operated a Thai restaurant in Dusseldorf. If a stigma of any kind stuck with him after returning to Thailand, it did not deter Thailand's Thailand’s Democrat Party in 1989 from fielding Manoon as a possible candidate for governor of Bangkok.63 Bangkok.® The question now arises whether any lessons were learned, and if, indeed, the Thai elite were even interested in breaking the seemingly perpetual cycle of coups. Surely the trial would have meant more if a crosssection of the country’s power brokers had not stood to be implicated and thereby suffer an inestimable loss of face. With so many prominent individuals sharing possible links to the plot—so many in whom so much of the public trust had been vested—it seems as if Thai elites have less to gain from breaking the cycle than from keeping it running more smoothly. “The only fortunate aspect of the latest [Thai coup! coupl attempt," attempt,” said a Singapore newspaper, “is that, like the previous one in April 1981, it

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64 failed.” Perhaps a little smug and gloating over the difficulties of an aspiring competitor in the regional arena of foreign investment, the Straits Times editor pointed out that despite claims to the contrary, politics in Thailand still remains the private preserve of the military. Since 1932, the editor pointed out, whenever civilian politicians have tried to take over, the army has stepped in.

This is not to say that change does not occur; indeed with 15 coups and attempted coups in 53 years, Thailand has had government turnovers as often as other countries have general elections. What it does mean is that the underlying political structure has endured and any change that has occurred has been superficial, taking the form of a rotation of personalities representing the same interests rather than an alteration of different interests.65

Accurate as this assessment might be, it misses one important point and thus seems a little harsh. If the interests of the Thai Elite have not changed in over fifty years, why then have the traditional military overlords of Thai politics found it so difficult in recent years to assert themselves through the traditional coup d’etat? Despite all the vested interests converging in the 1985 coup attempt, it did fail. Though a large and powerful minority stood to gain from its success, the legally established government survived, and its fiscal and monetary policies—which flew in the face of established interests—remained intact. furtherdemonstrated After the failure of the 1985 coup, Prem’s power was further demonstrated not only by his ability to forestall amnesty for the coup suspects—the final charges were dropped only after Prem stepped down in 1988—but also in his continued ability to control the military. Prime examples of this were Prem’s refusal to seek a second tenure extension for Arthit in 1986 and his replacement of Arthit with Prem’s staunchest supporter, General Chaovalit Youngchaiyudh. Arthit’s ambitions to succeed Prem as prime minister were severely hampered as a result, as were the hopes of Arthit’s client, Lt. Gen. Pichit Kullavanich, to become commander-in-chief. By the time Prem retired in 1988, the army was firmly under the control of General Chaovalit and his Class Five proteges, all of whom had been fiercely loyal to Prem, 66 and this despite all the best-laid plans of those who had opposed him. Notwithstanding the apparent success (as this book goes to press) of a bloodless coup against Prem’s successor Chatichai, the Thai coup as an institution is no longer a favored means of political change. Though initially successful, this latest coup, staged on 23 February 1991, has met with angry reactions from among the Thai elite, including at least one Bangkok newspaper which defied post-coup press restrictions to denounce the takeover. As more criticism arises, and in the wake of swift US economic sanctions, coup leaders are already talking about an interim civilian government to oversee elections under a restored and revised constitution.

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The mood in Bangkok, according to early accounts, is that such elections can come none to soon. (See Appendix E) Still, the fact of the 1991 coup proves that the elements at the top of the military hierarchy still perceive a right to intervene when civilian politics threatens the military’s interests. Even under Prem’s post-1985 leadership, generals continued to be in politics and army commanders resisted a subordinate role to the civilian government, and, when he was Army dose Commander-in-Chief, General Chaovalit made very clear, despite his close association with Prem, his belief that the army still knows best about some 67 things.61 Factional rivalries within the Thai military continued to threaten the trend towards civilian control, but the fact that anyone spent time in jail because of the 1985 coup bid was seen as a sign that such rivalries no longer commanded the sole attention of the top brass. At least one new interest seems to take precedence—a concern for the integrity of a constitutional system in which elections, hot coups, are the preferred means of changing governments. In an analysis of the 1985 coup attempt, a writer for the Far Eastern Economic Review commented on fears of “traditional feelings in the military that it alone has the mandate to call the political shots in Thailand.’68 die Unlike most previous coups, when military power games were more or less accepted as a part of life, [the 1985 coup] had put the clock dock back to darker times, and had highlighted the political irresponsibility prevalent in certain military quarters. w

It was yet another suggestion that times had not changed all that much since the forties and fifties when generals and their cliques diques traded the reigns of power almost at will without even considering the will of the electorate. In response, a foreign resident of Bangkok wrote to say that events could be interpreted differently. Noting NoUng that radio announcements by the so-called Revolutionary Party hadstresseddie group's intention to preserve democracy, RevolutionaryPartyhadstressedthegroup’sintentiontopreservedempcracy, the reader suggested that Manoon and company “considered dissolving suggesting” and that “democracy parliament too unpopular an idea to risk suggesting" had become a popular idea, too firmly entrenched to risk ignoring.” 70 Obviously no government can be unaffected by a coup attempt. But the 9 of September events demonstrated that Thailand is moving, however slowly, towards a democratic tradition.71

While it will be noted that the pandering to public opinion by a group of insurgents does not necessarily suggest the making of a democratic tradition it should also be noted that concern for public opinion in Thailand has not been limited to such contexts, nor has the perception by the Thai elites that their mass constituency responds to and supports a trend towards something called “democracy." “democracy.” (Witness also, the need of coup leaders on

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23 February 1991 to assure the public of a speedy return to civilian rule and a quick restoration of parliamentary government.) Since Phibul Songkhram’s construction of Democracy Monument in the 1950s, Thai elites have demonstrated a growing belief that their legitimacy should at least appear to extend upwards from the masses. From the 1932 “Revolution" to present, more than three generations of Thais have been schooled in the myth of democracy and while the Thai version of that myth has differed from the one which has prevailed much longer in the West, it has begun, however tenuously, to take root Driven by economic changes and their envy of the Western “industrialized democracies,” the present Thai elite have developed a taste for parliamentary procedure that the disillusioned visionaries of the Peoples’ Party, with their preference for coups over messy public politics, never did develop. While such traditional values as deference to authority remain strong, among elites as well as among the masses, the notion of responsible government continues slowly to gain ground in Thai minds. Otherwise, why would promises to abide by that notion be so central to every party’s platform? While sincerity of such promises can easily be questioned, the expectations of the Thai public, to which such promises are addressed, represent a new set of interests in Thailand directing and motivating the powers that be. Until the takeover of 23 February 1991, aspiring young military leaders tire coup d'etat d’etat could had to view the previous two fiascoes as proof that the no longer be the fast track to success that it once was. Instead, new interests had opened up other avenues of power, and hopeful observers joked that, as soldiers invested more and more in the booming Bangkok stock market, the military would refrain from coups if only to protect their investments.72 Sadly these new interests could neither prevent the most recent coup nor do they promise to prevent future coups. One can only hope that the latest coup will be Thailand’s last, though it is probably not wise to wager on it Nevertheless, while Thailand’s vicious cycle of politics and military takeovers grinds slowly on, the perpetual motion it once had is no longer guaranteed.

Conclusion

It is said that the early Thais followed the River Chao Phya south from their mountain homelands in southern China, establishing city states along its banks witheach with each principality taking its turn as seat of the Thai empire until finally the Thais reached the sea and established their last and greatest Throughout this historic migration, the river fed the land capital at Bangkok. Throughoutthis and the land nourished the people, and the kingdom and its subjects were thus defined by the river’s flow. King Bhumibol, on the occasion of his fortieth anniversary on the throne; used the river as a metaphor for the procession of Thai rulers who had come before him and, he believed, would continue after him. “The water of the Chao Phraya River has to flow on,” the king observed, “and the water that has flowed on must be replaced.”1 As the river led and nurtured the nation, so to had its rulers, its benevolent patrons as well its more cynical dictators, and as with the river’s ebb and flow, their comings and passings marked certain rhythms in the nation's history. According to Pareto, the history of any nation is the history of a continuous circulation of elites which is inevitable and governed by certain natural laws. The Thai case is no different. The alarums and excursions of Thai politics over the past fifty years have challenged Western scholars to understand and Thai pundits to explain the method behind the seeming madness of Thai political behavior, the stops and starts and the violent upheavals that seem to interrupt the natural flow of leadership. Naturally the intrusion of Western political ideas and Thailand’s entry into the world market have dominated the discussion; outside forces seem to be the most popular explanation for the instability of Thailand’s elite in the last half century, and undoubtedly, these have played a major role. However, the preoccupation of Thai “modernists" “modernists” and their Western friends with external influences may have confused the issue and de-emphasized the important, indigenous social forces that direct the course of history in Thailand. Since the turn of the century, forward-looking elites have also been Western-looking elites; that much is true. But there have also been some Eastern-looking elites. Witness the alliance with Japan during World War II.

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And there have been a good number of inward-looking leaders as well. Phibul Songkhram did not just make people wear Western hats, he also sponsored historical dramas and brought them to people around the country by radio and road shows, to teach tradition as well as progress. The Ihe melding and balancing of tradition with innovation has been the focus of the most successful Thai leaders, not just in modem times, but throughout the country’s history. Since the reign of King Mongkut, Thai elites have coveted various aspects of Western material culture and have asked themselves, “Why can’t we be like that?" King Chulalongkorn tried to emulate the West by remodeling the national administration and modernizing the country’s infrastructure. In addition, he sent his sons, and they sent their civil servants, to be educated in Europe. However, closer examination of things Western only revealed more ways in which the two cultures differed, more reasons why Thai elites could not have what Western elites had. Europe's Europe’s advanced technology and its dominant position in the world seemed to spring from principles and institutions lacking in Thailand’s political culture. The Thais in France in the 1920s looked at the prosperity around them and decided it was derived from something relatively new and recently in vogue in Europe, something called “democracy." The Paris Promoters tried to bring democracy home with them, and they found in Bangkok in 1932 eiders an atmosphere which seemed receptive to change. Some of their elders among the elite, certain men who were willing to try almost anything to preserve their stations in the face of the king’s recent cutbacks, gave them their chance. Not very long after the coup of June 24, 1932, however, the elite became uncomfortable with parliamentary politics; it had become apparent that democracy meant more than just getting rid of the king. It meant public debate and frank confrontation. It meant questioning authority, and it caused frequent loss of face. By the end of the 1930s the Thai elite began to wonder if there might not be better, less painful ways of obtaining the Western societies. Older, more authoritarian prosperity and power available to Westernsocieties. principles of leadership began to reemerge. Demagogy replaced democracy as the Thai elite’s new political panacea, and by the start of the 1950s the ideals of the Paris Promoters were all but forgotten. A monotonous succession of coups, dictators, and rigged elections following World War II produced endless rhetoric but little readily visible political or social progress. This apparent stagnation at the top of society profound societal would seem to belie Pareto’s assertion that the most profound changes occur among the elite, and 'that change at the bottom, among the masses, is slow and insignificant. In many respects the case of postwar Thailand would not readily support Pareto’s thesis; though power changed hands frequently and new constitutions came and went, access to elite status was restricted essentially to the social strata of soldiers and bureaucrats

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that had taken charge in the 1930s.2 The means of succession remained tied to the use of force and patronage, and it seemed as if the transfer of power from royalty to commoners had done nothing to institutionalize the democratic ideals professed by overseas Thais in the 1920s. On the other hand, toward the end of the 1940s, public opinion in Thailand finally became a significant factor in determining the course of “revolution" national policy. The masses that could not be aroused by the “revolution” of 1932 began to stir in the postwar era. Spontaneous mass demonstrations began to occur, from the railway laborers’1947 march to protest Thamrong’s “Buick Government," to the Sanam Luang rallies which eventually ruined Phibul in 1957, to the student rebellion of 1973 and die the bloody right-wing backlash of 1976. All these signified profound new expectations and demands for change emanating upward from the masses. It might seem, in some respects, that this gradual shift toward mass politics in Thailand has made the study of Thai elites almost trivial. The question arises, do elites mould society as befits the interests of power and wealth, or do the changing requirements of mass society force elites to change in response? It seems unlikely the answer could be purely one or the other; rather one needs to consider a complex of reciprocal factors to see how each effects the other. One must look beyond the obvious and consider the subtleties of Thai political behavior to see the true relationship between the seemingly chaotic chaolic power struggles at the top of society and the growth of mass political consciousness. Despite appearances to the contrary, changes have occurred within the Thai elite—changes that reverberate throughout society; and they began with the introduction of parliamentary politics in the 1930s. Phibul’s demagogic mle rule could not completely arrest the process set in motion by the political changes he had helped to establish in 1932. Already, by the time he came to power in 1939, it was too late to turn the clock all the way back. There remained certain sincere visionaries who were committed to social reform and the principle of representative government government. Pridi Banomyong, for one, labored to instimtionalize institutionalize such principles and to teach their importance to the younger generation. Despite the best efforts of Phibul and his immediate clientele to return to the stability of one-man rule, the nature of Thailand’s power game was changing. The reciprocal obligations of client and patron remained a key feature of the balance of power in Thai society, but the changing expectations of a growing mass clientele required new dexterity on the part of patrons. The need for balance is a recurring theme in Pareto’s theory of elite circulation. Not only does he “foxes" and “lions” within admonish ruling classes to maintain a balance of “foxes” their ranks, he also stresses that the elite can neither take too much from nor give too much to the classes they dominate without disturbing the balance of power in society. Pareto spoke of the elite’s need to maintain “a certain equilibrium” and explained that the circulation of elites was often

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stimulated by the dominant class’s failure failure to balance its appetite for for power power with the means available to satiate that hunger.3 ThroughoutThai history the country’s rulers have known the importance of such an equilibrium. Historically, Thai elites prospered when they sustained a balance between two types of power which the Thais have labeled pbra khun t (patronage, largesse, phra dej (physical coercion) and phra khun, or “synergy"). It is a Thai version of the so-called carrot and stick approach which tends to rely more on the carrot but, when necessary, uses the stick with vehemence.4 Attention to the so-called moral economy5 which defines the reciprocal obligations between clients and patrons was essential to any well-balanced regime, and the great rulers of Thai history were necessarily masters at balancing and mixing. Their policies reflected the proper proportions of phra dej and pbra phra khun, and their ministers and agents reflected a suitable balance of the qualities of “fox” and “lion.” “lion.” Kings who failed in this regard fell from power and were replaced. Such was the case in the seventh reign. The unfortunate King Prajadhipok was a prime example of a ruler who failed to maintain the necessary sociopolitical equilibrium. He had been thrown off balance by economic crises that were not of his making. Because of this he lacked the financial resources thatwere to exercise phra khun and could not maintain the sinecures his predecessor phrakhunand had bestowed. Instead, King Prajadhipok planned to compensate by sharing control of the government with his bureaucratic clients through the granting of limited constitutional democracy. Prajadhipok, however, lacked the lionlike fortitude to override princely opposition to that plan and therefore failed to act in time. By the time Prajadhipok abdicated in 1935 an all-out competition had begun to find a leader who could balance the complex social and economic forces of twentieth century Thailand. For a short time the venerable old soldier Phya Bhahon was able to play the role, balancing the factions led by Pridi on the left with those loyal to Phibul on the right. Bhahon maintained an uneasy harmony for a few years, until the growing threat of world war cast its shadow over Thailand and a favorable light on the militarism of Phibul Songkhram. By the time he led Thailand to victory against France in 1941, Phibul had become a king in everything but name, and he might, conceivably, have realized even that if he hadn’t stumbled and lost his balance during the Second World War. He miscalculated not only Japan’s chances of winning the war but the sympathies of his fellow elites. Eventually even Phibul’s trusted right hand, Adun Decharat, deserted the Leader’s Leader’s cause to side with Pridi’s Pridi’s underground and the Allies. Given enough time, Pridi might have mastered the balancing act. True, there was more of the fox in him than of the lion. Though he knew the value kbunhe never demonstrated much capacity for the exercise of phra pbra of phra khunhe dej. But Pridi’s talent for politics was natural, and his preference for

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manipulating events from behind the scenes, using his prestige to influence and direct others, made him an excellent fulcrum. Throughout the war and immediately afterward, it was Pridi’s political skill that brought even the interest. One has to most bitter political rivals together in the national interest wonder if his talents might not have been strong enough to make them forget their differences altogether if it had not been for the tragedy of King Ananda’s death and the accusations and scandal that followed. From the time of the Thamrong government to the final fall from power of Phibul Songkhram in 1957, the balancing act became even more complex. It was no longer enough for the man who would be king to balance the requirements of his own power against the needs and demands of others among the elite. Nor was it enough to confound the competing interests of foreign powers by playing one against the other. Public opinion became a new factor in the power equation that made it even harder to balance. Sarit, who came to power amid the spontaneous urgings of mass demonstrations and who made great shows of social responsibility during rule, inaugurated a renewed elite responsiveness to public needs, his mle, sponsoring economic and social programs that bestowed his patronage to common folk as well as to his bureaucratic and military constituents.6 During the Sarit years, the restoration and redefinition of the monarchy signaled a renewal and modernization of the client-patron relations that have held Thai society together these many centuries. The king’s manipulation of the royal charities and his patronage of rural development projects are just some of the more prominent examples of this. However, the power brokers in Bangkok were slow io to take His Majesty's Majesty’s lead with regards to extending their patronage to the hinterland. Urban patrons in the 1960s and 1970s neglected their rural clients, and the resultant poverty, landlessness, and resentment among Thailand’s peasant majority led to insurgency. Under Thanom and Praphas, the balance went askew, as corruption and phradejvveT khun. In the cities, avarice inspired their regime to favor pbra dej over phra kbun. frustrated young intellectuals echoed the anger of the rural insurgents, and their outcry finally toppled the oligarchy. Thereafter, it took a long and agonizing struggle to restore the balance. When Thailand finally recovered from its fits of insanity, the elite found themselves and the polity they governed dramatically different, traumatically changed. The eight and a half years in which Prem Tinsulanonda was prime minister marked the longest continuous tenure of any Thai premier since Phibul. It was also the longest lasting civilian government with an elected legislature, and it’s strength in the face of enormous adversity bought time for the growth and development of the political system. Prem’s government survived coup attempts, tumultuous election campaigns, a currency crisis, and attempts to revise the constitution largely

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because, in the opinion of many, Prem had the tacit support of the king. It is also true, however, that Prem, a retired army commander, was seen by both his allies and his opponents as the one man who could and would keep the military in check and allow the democratic process to run its course. Ironically, Prem retained both his office and his image as a democrat despite never having joined a political party and never having stood for election to Parliament. After every election for over eight years, however, Prem was asked by the fractionalized legislature to preside over one broad coalition after another. His style of governance, called “Premocracy” by his detractors, was described by an anonymous MP after the theJuly 1988elections. July 1988 elections. interests," the deputy said. “Though he “Prem has had no personal vested interests,” might have occasionally turned a blind eye, corruption was not widespread since the top leadership didn’t play along.”7 Perhaps taking his cues from the king, Prem played the traditional role of leader well. “He struck a balance within the parties and the military,” military," a prominent Thai scholar observed. “At another level, he also compromised between the interests of the politicians and the uniformed men. Through equilibrium." He resigned in this balancing act, Prem managed to create an equilibrium.” 1988 because, he said, it was time for the country’s top leader to be chosen 8 from among their elected representatives. ® That year, after stepping down from the premiership, Prem was honored for his service to the country with a special appointment to the king’s Privy Council. King Bhumibol then bestowed upon Prem, on the occasion of the ex-prime minister’s 68th birthday, a rare and noble honor: honor; Nopparat Rajavarapom, the Ancient Auspicious Order of the Nine Gems.9 Thus, even close to the throne and a trusted adviser to the in retirement, Prem remains dose king. Prem’s successor, Chatichai Choonhavan, continued the tradition of army generals in high office, though Chatichai retired from military service in 1974 in order to run for office in the 1975 elections. Unlike Prem (who came to power while still in uniform), the new premier was a dvilian civilian and member of parliament when he took office, making him the first elected prime minister since 1976. The two-and-a-half years between Chatichai’s inauguration and the bloodless coup that deposed him (just as this book was going to press) marked the longest tenure of any non-military prime minister in Thai history. Before becoming prime minister, Chatichai had a long civilian career in public service, having served as Deputy Foreign Minister (with a prominent role in determining Thailand’s external affairs during the Vietnam War) and as a member of Parliament He assumed the premiership (reluctantly, he claimed) daimed) after the 1988 elections, at which time Chatichai’s party headed a coalition seeking to extend Prem’s tenure for another term. As his party’s party's leader, Chatichai seemed the logical choice for PM, but he deferred to Prem

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suitable.”10 Nevertheless, ready or not,. saying, “I am not ready yet—I am not suitable." to.accept Chatichai was “forced” to accept when Prem retired. Chatichai and his Thai Nation (Chat Thai) Party had a long and wellestablished, conservative track record, but after Chatichai took over the party’s leadership from its founder Pramarn Adirekson, the party seemed to lose some of its ultra-rightist overtones. The emphasis now seemed to be on economic development and the sort of technocracy Kukrit Pramoj’s SAP still champions. In addition, Thailand experienced an economic boom Chatichai's tenure, and it seemed safe to say that the future course during Chatichai’s of Thailand and of *Ihai Thai elites would rely as heavily on the long term effects of a flood of foreign investments as it would on the policies of any specific government. Early assessments of the anti-Chatichai coup of 23 February 1991 (see Appendix E) blamed the takeover, in part, on a recent downturn in the economy. As far as the concept of the circulation of elites is concerned, however, it is worth remembering that ex-Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan is the son of General Phin Choonhavan, the initiator of the 1947 coup that brought Field Marshal Phibul Songkhram back to power, and that the Thai Nation Party has been referred to as a “reemergenoe of the older Phibul-Phin-Phao clique,” clique,"11 suggesting a seeming continuity of elites in a' a*time of apparent transformation. By the same token, it is interesting to follow what paths the progeny of other past elites now pursue. The man who was destroyed by Phin Choonhavan’s Phin’s heirs in the form of Pridi’s young 1947 coup may yet come back to haunt hauntPhin’s grandson, Ruth Banomyong. The twenty-one-year-old graduate student of international law plans to enter Thai politics some day and perhaps follow in Pridi’s footsteps. A favorite of his grandfather’s, Ruth (obviously named in honor of Pridi’s wartime code name) often sat and talked at length with the man who wrote Thailand’s first constitution. In 1989, Ruth said that from their long and frequent talks he had absorbed many of Pridi’s ideas, adding, however, that “things have changed now.” Though it will be sometime before Ruth Banomyong finishes his degree and works his way into the Thai political scene, it will be worth watching him when he finally does. “I have leamt to be tough,” he has said, “from my grandmother, who survived what would have defeated many others.12 When all is said and done, the great question facing modern Thai elites is no longer how they can achieve the modernity of the West, but how they can regain the balance and stability once commanded by ancient Thai kings. The ability and willingness of elites to respond to the changing requirements of their mass clientele will determine whether Thai Society maintains its equilibrium or stumbles and succumbs to the trauma of further violence, either by popular uprising or military revolt. Though today such trauma may seem less likely, there have been close calls in the recent past. Thanks to elements of reason among the country’s

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leadership, to the late realization by military leaders that coups can run contrary to even the military’s own self interest, and thanks to a popular fear of the unknown consequences of revolution, the Thai nation has been able to pull itself back from the brink to reconsider its choices. Nevertheless, a society can only rush to that brink so often without going over, and the Thai elite cannot continue to rely on the sort of sudden, eleventh hour rescues that King Bhumibol has in the past provided. Only by persistently Thailand’s leaders and carefully mixing tradition and innovation will Thailand's maintain their balance and be able to control the inevitable circulation of elites. Thailand, as anyone who has spent time there will tell you, is full of optimists. Thais like to believe that things, sooner or later, will work out for the best. It is a contagious attitude that infects even foreign residents and long-term visitors. Such people, including the author, are inclined to believe that it will one day be possible for Thailand to find the middle path, the compromise it seeks between stability and freedom. No doubt the potential exists, provided the nation’s leaders can follow their sovereign's sovereign’s lead and rise above self-interest The role is written; all that remains is for the players to master it. And, too, like players on a stage, they must acknowledge their own impermanence, know when it is time to step aside, to make way without fear for change. Though new rains always will refresh its waters, the course of the Chao Phraya shall remain true.

APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A A Chronology of Coups D'Etat in Modern Thailand 6 April 1782—During a crisis of confidence over King Taksin’s mental health and a dispute between the sovereign and the Buddhist patriarch, Taksin is forced to abdicate by some of his generals. The military chooses one of their own, Chao Phraya Chakri, to assume the throne. Chao Phraya Chakri, founder of the Chakri Dynasty, becomes known as Phra Phutthayotfa Chulalok and is later dubbed King Rama I by historians. He transfers the capital from Thonburi to Bangkok and consolidates the reborn empire of the Thai. 29 February 1912—King Vajiravudh’s army chief of staff uncovers a plot by some ninety-two junior officers to overthrow the royal government. The plotters are arrested and the coup averted. 24 June 1932—The Promoters of Political Change seize the capital in a bloodless coup while King Prajadhipok is on vacation in Hua Hin. The king agrees to return to Bangkok and support a constitutional monarchy. The coup is portrayed as a “revolution” despite its complete lack of popular support. 20June 1933—In the midst of a heated debate over a national economic plan proposed by People’s Party founder Pridi Banomyong, the Government planproposedbyPeople's Phibu! Songkhram of Phya Mano closes the Assembly. Phya Bhahon and Phibul launch a putsch against Mano and, without firing a shot, force him to step down. Bhahon becomes Thailand’s second prime minister. 11 October 1933—Angered and frustratedby frustrated by the new regime’s exclusion of princes from the government, a faction of royalists led by former War Minister Prince Bowaradet, launch a bloody counter coup using provincial troops. After several days of heavy fighting, the rebellion is crushed. A number of royalists are exiled or imprisoned, and, soon afterward, King Prajadhipok leaves Thailand to enter voluntary exile in Britain. He abdicates in 1935 and dies in England in 1941. Prince Ananda Mahidol, Prajadhipok’s ten-year old nephew, becomes King Rama VIII. 20 July 1944—In what has been described as a “parliamentary coup,” Field Marshal Phibul Songkhram is forced to resign from the premiership

AppendixeA

321

by members of the anti-Japanese underground within his own government. Khuang Aphaiwong becomes prime minister, though real power in Thailand is controlled by the underground’ssecret underground’s secret leader, Pridi Banomyong, the king’s regent. 8 November 1947 —Using the mysterious shooting death of young King Ananda as a pretext, General Phin Choonhavan mobilizes the army against the government of Pridi’s ally, Thamrong Narasawat. The coup forces Thamrong and Pridi to flee the country and brings Phibul Songkhram out of retirement. Within a year Phibul is again made prime minister. 1 October 1948 —Luang Kat Katsongkhram, one-time underground leader and recent member of Phin’s coup conspiracy, is caught plotting a coup of his own. The coup is averted and Kat goes into exile. 26 February 1949 —Pridi Banomyong returns to Thailand in secret With the help of friends in the navy and marines, he attempts a counter-coup against the Phibul government. Despite capturing the Royal Grand Palace, Pridi’s forces are put down by the forces of First Army Commander Sarit Thanarat. Pridi limps back into exile, never to return to Thailand. 29 June 1951—Naval officers kidnap Prime Minister Phibul during ceremonies surrounding the gift of the American vessel U.S.S. Manhattan to the Royal Thai Navy. Phibul is held prisoner aboard another naval ship on the Chao Phraya River while the navy rebels press their demands for a change of government. Phibul nearly dies when his own air force bombs and sinks the ship he is on. The so-called Manhattan Coup is a failure, and the Phibul regime survives. 29 November 1951—Officers of the police and the military, perhaps without Phibul’s authority, broadcast an announcement over Radio Thailand abrogating the latest constitution and declaring the Assembly dissolved. The so-called Radio Coup revives the 1932 constitution and eliminates the elected half of the legislature.Though his influence declines thereafter, Phibul remains prime minister. —Following charges that Phibul rigged the last 16 September 1957 —-Following elections, mass demonstrations in Bangkok call for his dismissal. Taking advantage of the ground swell, Sarit ousts Phibul in a bloodless coup. Phibul goes into exile. Sarit installs diplomat Phote Sarasin as caretaker premier. Sarit replaces Phote with General Thanom Kittikachom before the year is out out. 20 October 1958 —Sarit returns from medical treatment overseas and immediately abrogates the constitution. Scores of suspected communists Paternalism’’ are arrested, Parliament is dissolved, and the era of “Despotic Paternalism" begins. Sarit is premier until his death in 1963. 17 November 1971—Thanom Kittikachom, prime minister since Sarit’s death, abrogates the 1968 constitution and declares martial law. He and onetime rival Praphas Charusathien form an alliance against liberal, civilian politicians. With Thanom’s son Narong, they become known as the Three Tyrants.

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14 October 1973—The massive uprising led by students in Bangkok pre-empts a nascent coup plot by supporters of Army Commander Krit Sivara. Nevertheless, Krit succeeds in ousting the Three Tyrants by refusing to support their suppression of the students. King Bhumibol appoints a neutral interim government. 6 October 1976—After three years of political turmoil and almost constant student unrest, a right-wing' mob—backed by members of the military—invade Thammasat University during a protest against the return of Thanom from his exile in Taiwan. Students are brutally beaten and killed. The government of.Seni Pramoj crumbles, and followers of the late General Krit install a military junta. Thanin Kraivichien is picked to head the new government 26 March 1977—General Chalard Hiranyasiri attempts a coup against Thanin. Chalard murders General AroonThavatsin for refusing to go along with the putsch. The coup is put down and Chalard is arrested. For murdering Aroon, Chalard becomes the first coup-maker since 1932 to be executed for his crimes. 20 October 1977—Citing the military’s preference for more moderate policies and a general lack of confidence in Prime Minister Thanin, General Kriangsak Chomanan takes over the government Krinagsak becomes prime minister, and, in 1978, he establishes a new constitution and holds elections in 1979. After the newly elected Parliament rejects him, Kriangsak relinquishes the premiership. He turns the government over to General Prem Tinsulanonda, Parliament’s choice for prime minister. 1 April 1981—Members of a clique of mid-ranking officers known as the Thai Young Turks attempt to persuade Prem Tinsulanonda to join them in a coup against his own government. Prem refuses, but the Young Turks go ahead with General Sant Chitpatima as their nominal leader. The coup fails after the king sides with Prem. The Young Turks and General Sant are cashiered from the army, but they receive amnesty and are never tried for their insurrection. *• 29 September 1985—Remnants of the Thai YoungTurks, Young Turks, led by former Colonel Manoon Roopkachorn, attempt once more to overthrow Prem. Though the coup fails after less than a‘ day, lives are lost and property destroyed in Bangkok as frustrated rebel tank commanders open fire. The subsequent trial is inconclusive but points to a tangled web of political and financial interests behind a broad conspiracy of Thai elites. Prem’s successor, Chatichai Choonhavan, eventually dismisses the case and pardons al! all those involved. 3 July 1989—A strike at the Electrical Generating Authority of Thailand 3July causes Prime Minister Chatichai to put police and the army on full alert. When strikers demonstrating outside a power plant threaten to cut off Bangkok’s electricity, Chatichai orders them to disperse. The strikers defy the premier, and members of the military begin to talk of taking matters into

Appendixe A

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their own hands. Newspapers report fears that the army will use the strike as a pretext to unseat the elected government. Rumors of imminent action by the Fourth Cavalry (source of Thailand's last two coup attempts) sweep the capital, but the strikers disperse on the following day, and there is no coup. 11 June 1990—After voluntarily stepping down as army commanderin-chief to become minister of defence in March, General Chaovalit Youngchaiyudh quits the cabinet in anger over what he calls unfounded accusations of corruption form civilian politicians. Around the country and in the capital, angry soldiers stream out of their barracks and publicly demonstrate their displeasure at Chaovalit’s Chaovalit's alleged mistreatment. “Coup jitters”.last jitters".last through the next few weeks. Despite veiled threats from senior officers, however, a putsch against the Chatichai government does not materialize. 23 February 1991—Chaovalit’s resignation and the resultant feud between Prime Minister Chatichai and Army leaders Suchinda and Sunthorn lead to a sudden, unexpected seizure of power by the military. Early reports out of Bangkok state that Chatichai had been arrested at Don Muang Airport by soldiers under orders from Armed Forces Supreme Commander Sunthorn Kongsompong. Kongsompong, The prime minister was apparently en route to Chiang Mai to present his nominee for deputy defence minister, former army chief Arthit Kamlang-ek, to the king. The constitution of 1978 is abolished, and elections under a revised charter are promised within six months. Coup leaders say that they will turn power over to an interim civilian government within the week. Anand Panyarachun is declared interim prime minister on March 2.

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APPENDIX B Prime Ministers Since 1932 August 1932 June 1933 December 1938 August 1944 August 1945 September 1945 January 1946 March 1946 August 1946 November 1947 April 1948 September 1957 January 1958 February 1959 December 1963 October 1973 February 1975 March 1975 April 1976 October 1976 November 1977 March 1980 August 1988 February 1991

Phya Manopakon Nithithada Phya Bhahon Yothin Phibul Songkhram Khuang Aphaiwong Thawee Bunyaket Seni Pramoj Khuang Aphaiwong Pridi Banomyong Thamrong Narasawat Khuang Aphaiwong Phibul Songkhram Phote Sarasin Thanom Kittikachom Sarit Thanarat Thanom Kittikachom Sanya Dharmasakdi Seni Pramoj Kukrit Pramoj Seni Pramoj Thanin Kraivichien Kriangsak Chomanan Prem Tinsulanonda Piem Chatichai Choonhavan Anand Panyarachun

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APPENDIX C Elections Since 1932 November 1933 November 1937 November 1938 January 1946 August 1946 January 1948 June 1949 February 1952 December 1957 February 1969 January 1975 April 1976 April 1979 April 1983 July 1986 July 1988

326

APPENDIX D Kings of the Chakri Dynasty 1782 1809 1824 1851 1868 1910 1925 1935 1946

Phra Phutthayotfa Chulalok (Rama I) Phra Phutthaloetla (Rama H) Phra Nangklao (Rama III) IH) Mongkut (Phra Chomklao, Rama IV) Chulalongkorn (Phra Chulachomklao, Rama V) Vajiravudh (Phra Mongkutklao, Rama VI) Prajadhlpok (Rama VII) Prajadhipok Ananda Mahidol (Rama Vin) Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX)

"327 327

Notes

Introduction. 1

Alfred W. McCoy, ed., “Introduction,” Southeast Asia Under Japanese Occupation (New Haven; Haven: Yale University, 1980), 5. 2 Ibid,)8. Ibid, ;8. 5 Ibid. Chapter 1. Thai Social Order and the Role of the Elites 1

West on the Government in Thailand Walter F. Vella, The Impact of the Weston University of California Press, 1955), 339, 349549Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 49. 2 Benjamin A. Batson, ed., Siam’s Siam‘s Political Future: Documents from the Qthaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell End of the Absolute Monarchy (Ithaca: University, Data Paper No. 96, 1974), 17. 3 5 (New York: Arno Press, Vilfredo Pareto, The Rise and Fall of the Elites (Jievr 1979), 36. A definition of the word "elite” “elite" is in order. Pareto originally used “arislocrazia,” by which he meant “the strongest, the most the Italian word “aristocrazia, energetic, and most capable—for good as well as evil.” (Ibid.) The dictionary finds the word’s roots in the Old French eslite, meaning ‘choice’ or ‘chosen’, 'chosen', and gives the present day meaning as “a minority group or stratum that exerts influence, authority or decisive power." [The IThe Random Dictionaryofthe English Language, UnabridgedQiewYotk: House Dictionaryof theEnglish UnabridgedQSevrYork: Random House, 1969), 463.1 The sociologist’s definition is more specific. Susan Keller notes that every society requires “authorities within and spokesmen and agents without who are also symbols of the common life and embodiments of the values that maintain it.” Furthermore, “the inequality in the distribution of deference acknowledges the differences in authority, achievement and reward....” within the social hierarchy. “Elites are those minorities which are set apart from the rest of society by their pre-eminence in one or more of these various distributions.” [in David L. Sills (ed.), InternationalEncyclopedia ofthe SocialSciences(MacMi]hn Co. & The Free InternationalEncyclopediaofiheSocialSciencesQfacMillan Press: New York, 1968) 26.] The specific requirements for elite status in Thai Press;

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Pages 19-22 Notes to Pages

society are discussed later in this chapter. 4 “Introduction”, in Pareto, 3-4. Hans L. Zetterberg, “Introduction", 5 Pareto, 36. 6 Even the historiographical revolution begun by Prince Damrong (1862-1943) did not shift the focus of Thai histories away from the lives and men, Damrong, often hailed as the father of modern Thai careers of great men. historiography, imbued his historical writing with a unique perspective derived from his experiences in provincial administration and his extensive travels throughout the country. He struggled to place Thai history within a national cultural context that ancient chroniclers tended to ignore. But even with this perspective, Damrong—the son and brother of kings—could ofkings—could not break away from the elitist tendency of Thai history. See Kennon Breszeale, “A Transformation in Historical Writing: The Works of Prince Damrong Rachanuphap, fachaxiuphapfn Journal of the Siam Society 59, pt. 2 (July 1971): 25-49. 7 Phra Sarasas, My Country, Thailand (Chatra Press: Bangkok, 1954), 179. 8 Chai-anan Samudavanija, The Thai Young Turks (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), 2 9 Lucien M. Hanks, “Merit and Power in Thai Social Order,” American Anthropologist 64, no. 6 (1962): 1249. 10 Phra Sarasas, 179. 11 Kumut Chandruang, “Young Siam in a New World,” Asfa39, Asta39, no. 5 (May 1939): 300. 12 ,s Ibid. 13 15 Kumut perceived in Thai society a definite possibility of upward mobility based on individual “merit.” “merit." While Hanks writes at length on the Buddhist concept of merit as a catalyst for upward mobility through spiritual and moral achievement, Kumut seemed to think of merit in a more general all, writing six years after the fall of the absolute sense. He was, after ail, monarchy, at a time when commoners in the civil service no longer faced the artificial barriers to advancement imposed by their one-time royal masters and he reflects a new found faith that competency and effort should masters,,and and will be rewarded. However, Kumut’s observation that “any man regardless of his social background, may through his own merit rise to wealth and high position,” was not quite true. After 1932, as we shall see, the chances of entering the elite were negligible if one were not the son of a government official. 14 G. William Skinner, Leadership andPower and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, N.Y., 1967), 18-19. 15 Lauriston Sharp, quoted in Hanks, 1252. 16 Skinner, 19. 17 Hanks, 1252. 18 Hanks, 1250.

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“The Formation of a Social Class Structure: ” Hans-Dieter Evers, “Hie Urbanization, Bureaucratization and Social Mobility in Thailand," American Sociological Review 31 (August 1966): 481. 20 Hanks, 1248. ■21 Hanks, 1248. 22 48M82. Evers, 481-482. 23 See also, Lauriston Sharp and Lucien M. Hanks, Bang Chan: Social a RuralCommunity in 7hailand(J.\haca: History of aRuralCommunity ThailandQthaca: Cornell University Press, 1978). 24 Akin Rabibhandana, The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 1782-1873 (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1969), 20 25 Ibid., 122. 26 24 Ibid., 89. 27 Phra Sarasas, 169. 28 historian,” but Batson describes Phra Sarasas as an “iconoclastic Thai historian," his major claim to fame was a series of anti-monarchical essays written in *30s under the pseudonym “555." Living in exile in Paris, his the 1920s and ’30s primary audience was the Thai student community in Europe. Some of his writings were printed in the Bangkok newspapers in the form of excerpts quoted in editorials. His critical evaluations of the royal elite helped raise the political consciousness of the young men who later overthrew the absolute monarchy in the coup d’etat of 1932, after which Phra Sarasas became a prominent political figure in the new constitutional regime. Benjamin A. Batson, “The End of Absolute Monarchy in Siam” Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1977, 64 n. 6, 77. 27 29 David Morell, and Susan Morell,. Morell,, “The Impermanence of Society, Marxism, Buddhism and the Political Philosophy of Thailand’s Pridi Banomyong," Southeast Asia 2, no. 4 (Fall 1972): 403-404. 30 Ibid., 407. 31 51 Ibid., 413-414. Morell adds: “The absence ofland-based of land-based feudalism and the low population pressure which has characterized Thailand up to recent years yielded a paucity of peasant or mass political movements which must be rather embarrassing to one [such Isuch as Pridi] actively seeking revolutionary inspiration in Thai history." 32 Ibid., 409. 33 Pridi, quoted in Morell and Morell, 411. 34 Evers, 482-484. Evers’ 1963 survey of 64 “civil servants in leading positions” in just two ministries could hardly claim to be definitive. Additionally, its narrow data base completely ignored the military as an avenue to elite positions in government. Nonetheless, his work does indicate certain possibilities that could help to explain aspects of Thai social development since the 1930s. 35 Evers, 484

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36 56

Zetterberg, in Pareto, 2. Talcot Parsons, “Pareto, Vilfredo: Contributions to Sociology,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills (New Co, and The Free Press, 1968), 414. York: The Macmillan Co. 38 Pareto borrowed the fox-and-lion analogy from an earlier Italian with a similar political philosophy. In the sixteenth century, Machiavelli observed the following: “It must be understood that there are two ways of fighting, one with laws and the other with arms. The first is the way of men, the second is the style of beasts, but since very often the first does not suffice it is necessary to turn to the second. Therefore a prince must know how man.... Now since the prince must make use to play the beast as well as the man..,. of the characteristics of beasts he should choose those of the fox and the lion, though the lion cannot defend himself against snares and the fox is helpless against wolves. One must be a fox in avoiding traps and a lion in frightening wolves. Such as choose simply the role of a lion do not rightly understand the matter." Niccolo Machiavelli, ThePrince, trans., ed., Thomas Corp,, 1947), 50-51. G. Bergin (Arlington Heights, III.: AHM Publishing Corp., 39 3? Pareto, 9. 40 D.G, McRae, McRae, “Circulation of Elites,” Elites,” in A Dictionary of The Social D.G. Sciences, ed. J. Gould and W. Kolf (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 87. 37

Chapter 2. The Consequences of Modernity 1 Abbot Low Moffat, Moffat, Mongkut, The King of Siam (Cornell University Press: ’Abbot Ithaca, New York, 1961), 49-50. 2 B.J. Terwiel, History of Modern Thailand, 1767-1942 1767-4942 (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1983), 195. 3 See Craig Reynolds, “Buddhist Cosmography in Thai History, with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century Culture Change,” Journal of 35, no. 2 (February 1976): 203-220. There is an interesting Asian Studies 35; parallel to this revisionism not mentioned in Reynolds’s article, but worth considering. At the same time that King Mongkut’s court was absorbing Western thought and science, new discoveries in Europe were stimulating thinkers like Auguste Comte to challenge the role of religion in Western society. European religious leaders were faced with new challenges to the time-honored Western “cosmography.” In 1864, Pope Pius IX issued the Syllabus of Errors, a reactionary document which condemned a whole range of modem ideas, including the growing trend toward rationalism and faith in science. The Vatican council of 1870 hardened the Church’s stance against modernism, stressing the papal infallibility and the importance of faith in the divine. In Thailand, King Mongkut had instituted a revision of Buddhist scriptures as early as 1867. Thus, while Western religious elites stubbornly opposed intellectual progress, their Thai counterparts sought to

Notes to Pages 34-37

331

accommodate it. In an effort to reconcile the growing dichotomy between Mongkut’s revision of Buddhist religious and scientific thought, King Mongkut's scriptures emphasized that “worldly matters and religious matters are not the same,” same," (Ibid., p. 215) and thus did not contradict one another. It was not until 1891 that Pope Leo XIII attempted to bridge the gap between traditional Catholic values and the new ideas of European modernists in the revolutionary encyclical “of modem things," the Rerum Novarum. 4 * Farang is the Thai generic term for Westerners of European descent, regardless of nationality. Sometimes, though rarely, it is considered pejorative. s5 Phra Sarasas, My Country, Thailand (Chatra Press: Bangkok, 1954), 172. 6 Asia,May Andrew A. Freedman, “His Majesty King Prajadhipok ofSiam” of Siam" Asia, May 1931, 277. See also Batson, “The End of Absolute Monarchy in Siam,” Siam,” 73. 7 Walter F. Vella, ChaiyolKing Vajiravudh and the Development#/Thai Development of Thai Nationalism (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1978), 113-117., 113-117.. 8 This ambition became all the more promising with the treaty revisions which began in 1925 and which culminated, by 1938, in the removal.of the final vestiges of the semi-colonial, unequal treaties between Thailand and the European powers signed in mid-nineteenth century. See Francis B. Sayre, “The Passing of Extraterritoriality in Siam,” Siam,” American Journal of International Law (January 1928): 70-88, and David Wilson, Politics in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 18. 9 C.H. Forty, Bangkok: Its Life and Sport (London : H.F.& H.F.& G. Witherby, 1929), 16. 10 Steve van Beek, Bangkok Only Yesterday (Hongkong: Hongkong Publishing Co. Ltd., 1982), 16. 11 Ibid. 12 Forty, 25. 13 Forty, 26. 14 M W. Somerset Maugham, The Gentleman in the Parlor (New York: Doubleday, 1930), 166. 15 Ibid., 168. 16 Forty, 27-28. 17 Forty, 31-32. 18 Batson, “The End of Absolute Monarchy,” 71. 19 Forty, 24-25. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 25 Ibid., 25. 24 Thailand,” See: David K. Wyatt, “Family Politics in Nineteenth Century Thailand," in Clark D. Nehers’, Nebers’, Modem That fromVillagetoNationltZ rrhndge, inClarkD. Thai Politics, from Vi/tagetoAfatfon(Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1976), 54-72. Mass.t-Schenkman 54-72. The terms “nobility” “nobility” and

332

Notes to Pages 37-41

“noblemen".in the present work are used to refer solely to the members of include, as some authors do, the these hereditary ruling families, and do not indude, full range of civil officials and military men bearing titles granted by the king. 25 Ibid., 56. 26 36 Benedict Anderson, “Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies,” in E. B. Ayal, The Study of Thailand(A ens, Ohio: Ohio University Studies," Thailand(Athens, Press, 1978.), 207-208. Anderson briefly considers the consequences of the decline dedine of polygamy among the rhe Thai ruling class. dass. 27 An Eastern Prince Prince Chulachakrabongse, The Twain Have Met or orAn Came West (London: G.T. G.T, Foulis and Co., Ltd., 1957), 50. 28 Andersoni Anderson, 208 »♦ 29 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 27 June 1932, 3. 30 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 8 July 1932, 26. 31 Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 13 July 1932, 18. 32 Freeman, 283, 335. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., 335. 36 M Freeman, 335. 37 Gerald Sparrow, Not Wisely But Too Well (London: George G. Harraps and Co. Ltd., 1961),. 1961) r 19. 38 Vella, Chaiyol, 212-213. The plowing ceremony had come to be performed less and less frequently and was revived by King Vajiravu'dh Vajiravu’dh (r. 1910-1925) in order, according to Vella, “...io “...to bring the people closer to their government" government.” 39 Batson, “The End of Absolute Monarchy," 195. 40 Lucien M. Hanks, Bang Chan, Social History of a * Lauriston Sharp and Luden Rural Community in Thailand (Ithaca: Corne\VUvtNeisi£y Cornell University Press, 1978), 125Thailand(Srha 126. «< 41 Ibid., 133-134. 42 .Consider the contrast between the Thai elite’s maintenance of clientpatron reciprocity redprodty and the break-down of such reciprocity redprodty in Southeast has attributed the popular insurrections Asia’s colonized countries. James Scott Scotthas in the colonized countries in the 1920s and ’30s to a violation of the “moral economy of the peasant" peasant” by the centralized regimes of the European colonizing powers. In Thailand the perpetuation of this “moral economy” in the newly centralized government administration of the 20th century is unique in the region and can be credited to the continuance of Thai sovereignty. Although Thailand’s reformed administration was modeled after Western institutions, the new system was still run by Thais. Relatively few of the public administrators in the early years of this century were truly “Westernized," but even those officials who were modernized had at least still been reared in the traditional culture and were therefore infinitely more familiar—and comfortable—with the client-patron tradition than any

Notes to Pages 41-44

333

European colonial official could ever have been. The fact that Thailand remained free of direct colonial rule was therefore very important in obviating the rural unrest that occurred elsewhere in Southeast Asia. For more on the concept of the "moral “moral economy” economy" see James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). 43 Sharp and Hanks, 149-150. When the new regime came to power that June, some relief was provided in the form of reductions or elimination of certain taxes. 44 Batson, “The End of Absolute Monarchy," 247-248. 45 Vella, The Impact of the West, 360. 46 Batson, “The End of Absolute Monarchy," Monarchy,” 76. 47 Ibid., 81. 48 Ibid., 83. 49 ' This author uses the term ‘royal caste’ or or- -ruling ‘ruling caste’ with the .performs the most following definition in mind: The social stratum which “...performs important social tasks, obtains its personnel through biological reproduction, and is set apart by religion, kinship, language, residence,, economic standing, occupational activities, and prestige. Religious ritual is the main stratum.” Suzanne Keller, force that supports the position of this ruling stratum." “Elites," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed., David L. “Elites,” 1 Sills, (New York: MacMillan & Free Press; Press, 1968),: 1968), 26. Sillsj .t ’ x 50 The term 'ruling class’is distinguished from the term ‘ruling caste’ (see note 49) by the following definition: A ruling class is a "single “single social stratum [which]is associated with various key social functions, and [whose]...members are recruited into its various segments on the basis of wealth and property rather than blood and religion. Historically ruling classes have held economic rather than political power, but their influence tends to extend to all important segments and activities of society.” Keller, 26. The author applies this definition to the elite stratum which comprises both the ‘ruling caste’ (i.e., the royal family) and the other entrenched, though non-royal, dynasty’s noble families who share power with the dynasty and rely on the dynasty's ** prestige to ensure their continued status. *’ 51 Batson, “The End of Absolute Monarchy,” 36-37. 52 Quoted in Batson, Siam’s Siam's Political Future, 15. Quotedin 53 55 Ibid. 54 Ibid., 13-22. 55 i Ibid. 56 Batson, "The “The End of Absolute Monarchy,” 151-153. ... 57 Ibid., 58, 139. 53 58 Ibid., 40, and Freeman, 281-282. 59 55 Monarchy," 166-174. Batson, “The End of Absolute Monarchy,” 60 Ibid., 224-226, 238. 61 epsrVnonioiS\2te,ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStatesr7, Depattraeniof3iatQ,ForeignRelationsoftbeUnitedStatesW, 1940,

342

to Pages 107-115 Notes io

176, 187. The American position on the re-routed aircraft is outlined here in reprinted telegrams dated October 10, 1940 and October 19, 1940 from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to U.S. Minister Grant in Bangkok. 9 Flood, “Japan’s Relation , with Thailand," Thailand,” 359-363. 10 19 Ibid., 373-374. 11 “ Ibid., 367. 12 Ibid., 397-399. 15 13 Prem Chaya, 1-2. 14 Ibid., 3. 15 Flood, “Japan’s Thailand," 401-403. “Japan's Relations with Thailand,” 16 ,s Ibid., 403-404. 17 Ibid., 418. 18 Flood, “Japan’s Relations with Thailand,” 553-554, 583-587. 19 Ibid., 586-587. 20 Ibid.,, Ibid.,. 583. 21 Christian Century, 9 July 1941, 892. 22 Ibid. 23 25 Thamsook, 7. 24 Batson, "The Fall of the Phibun Government,” 92-93. 25 “The First Phibun Government,” 50, n. 47. Charnvit, "The 26 Batson, in McCoy, 275. 27 Translated in Thak, Thai Politics, 442-443. 28 (London; H.M. S. Woodburn Kirby, ed., The War AgainstJapan, Vol. 1, (London: Stationery Office, 1969), 180. Though it is not known if Phibul was specifically aware of ‘Matador’ before the war’s outbreak, he had obviously deduced the intent of British forces in Malaya. In fact, a few days before the Pacific war actually began, he sent a stem warning to the British “...which urged in the strongest terms that British forces should not be allowed to the Japanese had struck occupy one inch of Siamese territory unless or until theJapanese the first blow.” (Ibid.) 29 Landon, “Ladies Wear Skirts,” 26. M 30 Excerpts of a radio broadcast of August 10, 1941 translated and transcribed in Thak, Thai Politics, 262-263. 51 31 Ibid., 264. 52 32 Translated in Thak, Thai That Politics, 49-50. 33 Thak, Thai Politics, 266. 34 MasanobuTsuji, 7beJ aneseVe7sion(NewYork:St.Martin’s Masanobu Tsuji, Singapore, TheJapanese Vfe?sfon(New York: St. Martin’s Press, I960), 79. 35 Ibid., 82. 36 38 Ibid., 83. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., 84. 39 Ibid., 85-86. 40 Thawee, in Thak, Thai Politics, 327.

Notes toPages to Pages 115-123

343

41

Kirby, 186-187. Thawee, in Ray, 78-79. 41 43 Kunnit Kumut Chandruang, “Our Siamese Underground,” Underground," Asia and the Americas, October 1945, 531. 42

Chapter 9. The Alliance With Japan

’1 “Thirty Days of Rising Crisis,” Crisis," Asia42, no. 1, January 1942, 3. Also see panic".resulting from Prem Chaya, 13. Prince Prem refers to a “weekend panic”.resulting the rumors of invasion. 2 Underground," Asia and the Kumut Chandruang, “Our Siamese Underground,” Americas 45, no. 10, October 1945, 531, and Vichitvong, 158. 3 Thawee, in Thak, Thai Politics, 327. 4 Ibid., 326 5 Field Marshal P. Phibulsongkram, “Co-operation with and Resistance Against Japan During the War,” War," in Thak, Thai Politics, 354-355. 6 Thawee, in Thak, Thai Politics, 329. 7 Ibid., 335. 8 “Thirty DaysVif Days' of Rising Crisis," Crisis,” Asia, January 1942, 2. 9 Kirby, vol. i, 181. 10 10 ' Vichitvong, 158-159. 11 ii Thawee, inThak. in Thak, 'Yftm Thai Politics, 327. 12 Phibul, in Thak, Thai Politics, 353-354. 13 Ibid., 354. 14 Thawee, in Ray, 77. 15 Phibul, in Thak, Thai Politics, 353. 1 41 Ibid. Chapter 15. Promise and Polarization 1

Benedict Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects 3): 22.] of the October 6 Coup," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 9 (3): 2 Bangkok Post,A8 Post,.18 November 1973, 16.1 53 Time, 12 November 1973, 71. 4 Bangkok Post, 8 November 1973, 35 Ibid. 64 “After Victory, the BigSplit,” BigSplit," FarEastemEconomicReview,26 "After FarEasternEconomicReview,26 November 1973, 12-13. 7 Bangkok Post, 3 November 1973, 7. 8 “Thailand: ATime ATimeforlJmty” "Thailand: for Unity,” FarEastemEconomicReview, FarEastem Economic Review, 3 December 1973, 22.

358 9

Notes to to Pages Pages 214-223 Notes

“Power to the People," Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 December i m , 11. 1973, 10 Bangkok Post, 11 November 1973, 12. 11 Ibid, 23. 12 Unity,” 23. “Thailand: A Time for Unity,” 15 19 Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms,” 13. 14 BangkokPost, Published in two parts, Bangkok Post, 11 November 1973, 13-14; and 18 November 1973, 16-17. 15 BangkokPost, 19 November 1973, 16. The quotation of public opinion given below was taken from the same article. lfi 14 “Letter From Bangkok," Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 December 1973, 66. 17 BangkokPost, *7 Bangkok Post, 18 November 1973, 16. 18 Ibid. 19 Morell and Chai-anan, 151-152. 20 Ibid. 21 Morell and Chai-anan, 159. 22 Unity," 22. “Thailand: A Time for Unity,” 23 Morell and Chai-anan, 102, 102. 24 “Suddenly Politicians," Politicians,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 December 1973, 13. 25 Morell and Chai-anan 103. 26 24 BangkokPost, Bangkok Post, 20 December T973, 1. 27 Ibid. 28 Morell and Chai-anan, 102-105. 29 Ibid, 103. 50 30 Ibid, 107. 31 91 BangkokPost, 10 January 1974, 1. 32 Ibid. 33 93 Ibid. The ambassador’s CIA CIA background aside, it was obvious that Kintner had been selected by President Nixon to represent him to the late regime. Moreover, Kintner’s own remarks shortly after his arrival in December 1973 had made him an easy target for the student movement. Complaining publicly that the new order in Thailand was not doing enough to stem the tide of Communist domination, the ambassador noted that it seemed the present insistence on freedom would not help. He further warned that “the precipitate rush into democracy will lead to general disorder, the ideal precondition for a communist takeover.” Such sentiments resulted in frequent demonstrations outside his residence and led to the wall around the American Embassy compound in Bangkok as well first-ever Wall as a seven-foot-high, chain-link fence around the ambassador’s residence. “American “American ambassadors have been living in that house for twenty years without a fence," remarked a Thai journalist. “Now I drive past, and for the first time, it seems to me there is someone living there who wants to cut

Notes to Pages 223-229

359

himself off from Thailand." Thailand.” (“Bill of Rights,” FarEastern Economic Review, 21 January 1974, 29.) 54 34 Bangkok Post, 12 January 1974, 1. 35 55 Ibid, 3. 36 “Workers Turn the Screw," Screw,” FarEastern Economic Review, 3 December 1973, 10. 37 "Waking “Waking Up to the Spy Game," Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 February 1973, 14. 38 “‘Invasion* by Proxy in Thailand,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 “‘Invasion’ February 1974, 14-19. 3? Ibid. ’» 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid, 18. 42 43 “Their Own My Lai,” FarEastern Economic Review, 25 February 1974, 11; and Morell and Chai-anan, 170. 43 Ibid, 11. 44 “A New Target for Students’ Anger,” “A Anger," Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 March 1974, 20. 45 Morell and Chai-anan, 170. 46 “Their Own My Lai," 11. 47 25 March 1974, 21. “Studying the Ruins,” Ruins," FarEastemEconomic Review, 25Marchl974, 48 Morell and Chai-anan, 171. 49 Morell and Chai-anan, 170, and “Probing the ‘Red Drum’ Atrocities," Atrocities,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 March 1975, 22. 50 BangkokPost, 30 March 1975, quoted by Marian Mallet, in “Causes and Consequences of the October 1976 Coup,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 8, no. 1, 1978. 51 “Probing the ‘Red Drum* Drum’ Atrocities," 22. 52 53 Morell and Chai-anan, 171. 53 “A New Target for Students’ Anger," Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 March 1974, 20. 54 Ibid. 55 BangkokPost, 27 February 1974, quoted in Morell and Chai-anan, 171172. Chapter 16. The Consequences of Dictatorship 1

“Tottering on the Brink of Freedom,” Freedom," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 April 1974, 29. 2 3 “Be Prepared for the Worst," FarEastern Economic Review, 28January 1974, 27. 3 BangkokPost, Bangkok Post, 12 January 1974, 3. 4 “Limited Withdrawal,” Withdrawal," FarEastemEconomic Review,1 October 1973, 16. FarEastemEconomicReview,1 5 Anderson Anderson; “Withdrawal Symptoms,” 18.

360 s6

Notes to Pages 230-237

Girling, 196. Freedom,” 29. “Tottering on the Brink of Freedom," 8 Morell and Chai-anan, 118. 9 ’ Ibid, 112. 10 Ibid, 115. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 15 Ibid, 108-109. 14 Morell and Chai-anan, 118. After the elections, on 13 February 1975, Parliament chose Seni over Chatichai, 133 votes to 52, with 84 abstentions. Between the abstentions and the votes cast for Chatichai, the outcome of the vote was decidedly not a mandate for Seni, as he had won support of less than half of the full house. It is no wonder then that Seni’s coalition lasted only eight days, or that Chatichai and the Thai Nation Party managed to win increasing support in Parliament over the next year and a half. [Ibid.] 15 13 Ibid, 259. 16 14 Morell and Chai-anan, 261. The disparate interests of each party’s constituents made the Kukrit government seem less like a coalition than a confederation of bureaucratic fiefdoms. Chai-anan and Morell have noted that the coalition was more like “three mini-governments," with SAP concentrating on its progressive agenda, Thai Nation (Chat Thai) on developing patronage for the military, and Social Justice on increasing the profits of the members’ business concerns. [Ibid.] 17 Morell and Chai-anan, 119-124. 18 Ibid, 152. 19 » Ibid. 20 Ibid, 162-163. 21 Marian Mallet, “Causes and Consequences of the October 76 Coup,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 8, no.l, 1978, 85. 22 Morell and Chai-anan, 235. 23 28 Ibid, 237. 24 Symptoms,” 19. Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms," 25 Ibid. 26 24 Ibid. 27 “Dissent in the Armed Forces,” FarEastern Economic Review,12 March “DissentintheArmedForces,"F«r£'«siemE'conorwfc7?ei4ew, 12March 1976, 10. 28 Girling, 205-206. 29 Morell and Chai-anan, 275. 30 Bay,” Asiaweek, 22 November 1985, 30. “The Eagle at Bay," 31 Mallet, 88. 32 Eastern Economic Review, 23January “Now It’s Caretaker Kukrit,” Far FarEastern 1976, 14. 33 “Thailand’s Turn to Protest," Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 May 1975, 12. 7

Notes to Pages 237-245

361

54 34

“Shifting into the Lotus Position," Time, 26 May 1975. “The Farmer’s Lot in Thailand,” Thailand," FarEastemEconomic Review, 22 August FarEastemEconomicReview, 1975, 12. 56 38 Ibid. 37 Morell and Chai-anan, 214-216. 58 38 Ibid, 225-226. 39 “And Shades of Past Dissent," FarEastemEconomic Review, 22 August 1975, 12. 40 11.. Ibid.,. 11. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 FarEastem Economic Review, “A Night to Remember for Kukrit Pramoj,” FarEastern 29 August 1975, 14. 44 New York Times, 20 August 1975, 2. 45 “A Night to Remember..." 46 Girling, 203. 47 “Kukrit Bows to Mass Protests,” FarEastemEconomic Review, 16january 16January “KukritBowstoMassProtests,”Far2:astezw£'conomicI?ew’eu>, 1976, 13. 48 Ibid. 49 Morell and Chai-anan, 262. 50 “Now It’s Caretaker Kukrit,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 23January FarEastem 1976, 14. 51 Morell and Chai-anan, 262. 52 “Caretaker Kukrit,” Kukrit," 14. 53 Morell and Chai-anan, 262, and “Caretaker Kukrit," 14. 54 “Caretaker Kukrit,” 14. 55 Ibid. 55

Chapter 17. Another Hot Day in October 1

“Beware the Danger that is Coming Close," FarEastemEconomic Review, 2 January 1976, 10-11. 2 Ibid, 11. 3 Ibid. 4 “Clampdown on the Left Begins,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 April 1976, 25-26. 5 Protests,"FarEastemEconomic Review, 16January “Kukrit Bows to Mass Protests,”FarEastemEconomic 1976, 14. 6 Morell and Chai-anan, 262-263. 7 Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms,” 24. 8 Ibid. 9 Morell and Chai-anan 247. 10 FarEastem “Thanom: The Unwanted Catalyst,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 October 1976, 16.

362 11 12 13 34 14 15

Pages 245-253 Notes to Pages

Morell and Chai-anan, 263. “The Toll of Terror," Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 March 1976, 8. Ibid. Ibid, 8-10. “Democracy at Stake,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 12March 12 March 1976,

8-10. 16 IS

Ibid. Ibid. 18 “Dissent in the Armed Forces," FarEastem FarEasternEconomic “DissentintheArmedForces," Economic Review, 21 March 1976, 10. 19 “Once More to the Brink," Brink,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 April 1976, 15. 20 “Showdown inThailand," in Thailand," FarEasternEconomic FarEastemEconomic Review, 26 March 1976, 10. 21 “Kukrit Presses for Troop Pact,"FarEastemEconomicReview, Pact,”FarEastem Economic Review, 19 March 1976, 20-21. 20-21. 22 Thailand,” 11. “Showdown in Thailand," 25 23 Morell and Chai-anan, 166. 24 Brink," 15-16. “Once More to the Brink,” 25 Morell and Chai-anan, 166. 26 “Once More to the Brink,” 16. 27 Morell and Chai-anan, 167. 28 “Once More to the Brink,” 16. l6. 29 “Clampdown on the Left Begins," 25. 30 “Fuel for Gloom and Doom," FarEastem Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 July 1976, 10. 31 33 “A Victim Victim of Bad Reviews," Reviews,” Time, 19 April 1976. 32 “Fuel for Gloom and Doom,” Doom," 11. 33 Ibid, 12. 31 Ibid, 11. 35 “The One Who Came Back," FarEastern Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 August 1976, 9. 34 ibid. * Ibid. 37 “Peace Again as Prapas Bows Out," Out,” FarEastem Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 September 1976, 25. 38 “The One That Came Back," 8. 39 “Peace Again..." 25. 40 Ibid. 41 Morell and Chai-anan, 270. 42 “Peace Again...” Again...” 43 Morell and Chai-anan, 268. 44 Catalyst,” FarEastem Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 “Thanom: The Unwanted Catalyst," October 1976, 10. 17

Notes to Pages Pages 253-263 253-263 Notes to

363 363

45

“All Aboard the Seni-go-round,” FarEasternEconomic Scni-go-round,” FarEastem Economic Review,8 October 1976, 8. «45 Ibid., 9-10. 47 “ThanomrThe Catalyst,” 10. “Thanomr. The Unwanted Catalyst," 48 "All “All Aboard...”- 9. 49 Morell and Chai-anan 272. 50 Ibid., 274. 51 “A Nightmare of Lynching and Burning,” Time, 18 October 1976. 52 Morell and Chai-anan, 275. 55 Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms,” 24. 54 Samut Phap Duan Tula (A Book of Pictures of the Month of October) (in Thai), Bangkok, Thammasat University: 1988, 72. 55 Morell and Chai-anan, 275. 56 54 “October Revolution Part II,”AarL‘ II,” FarEaslemEconomic Review,150ctober 15 October emAconomfc7?etdezz/, 1976, 10. 57 “A Nightmare of Lynching...” 58 “October.Revolution Part II,” 11. 59 Ibid. 60 “A Nightmare of Lynching...” 61 Morell and Chai-anan, 275-276. 62 “Challenges for the New Order,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 November 1976, 8. 63 Order,” 9. ® “Challenges for the New Order," 64 Bangkok Post, 28 June 1989, 3. 65 Ibid. Enthusiasm for these proposals has apparently been muted. In 1989, sixteen years after the uprising, a foundation stone was laid at an empty lot on Rachadamnern Avenue for a memorial to those who had died. Shortly thereafter the lot was taken over by lottery vendors and then 8;1 converted into a parking lot. [Bangkok Post, 18 September 1989, 8,1 66 “Thai Lessons,” FarEastern Economic Review, 8 September 1989, 13. Chapter 18. A Vicious Cycle of Politics and Coups 1

Role," Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 February “The Army’s New Role,” 1987, 24. 2 Chai-anan, Samudavanija, The Thai Young Turks, (Singapore: Institute for 'Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), 90. 3 “Sant Moves to Consolidate His Power Base,” Bangkok Post, 2 April "Sant 1981, 1. 4 “The Coup That Failed," Asiaweek, 17 April 1981, 20. 5 Turks’ Camp," Camp,” FarEastern Economic Review, “A Profile of the Young Turks' 19 June 1981, 5353. 6 “What Might Have Been,” Far Eastern Review, 17 April 1981,. 1981, 20.

364 7 8

Notes to Pages 264-270

Ibid. "Sant’s Start,” Bangkok Post, 4 April 1981, “Sant’s Fate Was Sealed From The Start,"

4. 9

“Shaking the Pillars,” Far Eastern Review, 19 June 1981, 31. Failed,” 20. “The Coup That Failed," 11 Chai-anan, 87. 12 « Ibid., 84. 13 15 Ibid., 88. 14 Ibid., 90. 15 13 Ibid., 92-93. 16 “The Coup That Faded,” 20. 17 Ibid. 18 Bangkok Post, 4 April 1981, 3. 19 Failed,” 20. “The Coup That Faded,” 20 “Sant Returns,” Bangkok Post, 23 June 1981, lfand “Sant Off to U.S.,” Bangkok Post, 9 July 1981, 1. 21 “The Coup That Never Was,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 April 1981, 11. 22 “Shaking the Pillars,” 38. 23 25 Ibid. 24 “Have We Learned Our Lesson Yet?” Bangkok Post, 4 April 1981, 4. 25 Ibid. 26 36 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Chai-anan, 2. 30 “Shaking the Pillars,” Pillars," 40. 31 “Democracy in Thailand,” Asiaweek, 13 May 1983, 66. 32 Thai-English Student's Dictionary (Stanford, California: Mary Haas, Tbai-English Stanford University Press, 1964), 303. 33 Morell and Chai-anan, 25. 34 “Democracy in Thailand,” 66. 35 Ibid. 34 36 Ibid. It would appear, too, that even highly placed palace officials can conceive of reasonable provocation for a coup d’etat. One such person, while remaining anonymous, has implied as much to the press. Pointing out that King Bhumibol’s support of Prem in1981 in 1981 was aimed at “supporting a legitimately elected government and the constitution,” the source noted that, “His Majesty was also teaching the coup-makers a lesson —they should have proper justifications.” (PaisalSricharatchanya, “The DemocraticKing,” Democratic King,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 December 1987, 25. Emphasis added.) 37 David A. Wilson, Politics in Thailand (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), 183. 38 Chai-anan, 2. 10

Notes to Pages 271-279 59

”

365

Thak, The Politics of Despotic Paternalism. “How Prem Escaped,” Escaped," Asiaweek, 17 April 1981, 18. “HowPrem 41 Details of the April Fools Day Coup are derived largely from the 1*7 April 1981, 15-21; Far Eastern Economic Review, following: Asiaweek, 17 10 April 1981, 10-16; and Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 June 1981, 3855. 42 Chai-anan, 46. 43 45 Bangkok Post, 4 April 1981, 4. 44 Chai-anan, 27. 45 “Shaking the Pillars,” Pillars," 44. 46 Chai-anan, 23. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., 24. 49 James C. Scott, “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” American Political Science Review, 66, no.l (March 1972): 91-113. See also Chai-anan, 39-40 50 Chai-anan, 32. 51 Ibid., 29. 52 “Ambition and Idealism,” Asiaweek, 17 April 1981, 17. 55 53 “A Plea for the Plotters,” Asiaweek, 17 April 1981, 21. 54 John L. S. Girling, Thailand: Society and Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981), 215-219. 55 “A Plea for the Plotters," 21. 56 “The Two Year Solution," Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 November 1977, 12. 57 Ibid. 58 “Tanin Pulls Through a Testing Year,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 October 1977, 18. 55 59 Ibid. 60 w Chai-anan, 34. 61 “Tanin Pulls Through...,” 20. i2 62 Chai-anan, 34. 63 65 Ibid., 34-39. 64 Ibid., 34. 65 “Kriangsak Hints at a Change," Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 November 1977, 12. 66 64 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Chai-anan,-.31-34. Chai-anan, 31-34. 69

Buddhist scriptures 337, 338 revision of 34 Buick Government 171, 172, 313 bureaucracy 54, 64, 65, 198. See also civil service Burma 110, 119, 125, 127, 128, 151, 156, 172, 260, 266

C Cady, John 55 Cambodia 92, 98, 105, 109-111, 133, 234, 236, 250, 267 Ceylon 78 Cha-am 77

Index

383

Chai-anan Samudavanija 221, 268-270, 273, 367 Chaiwat Suravichai 206 Chakraphanphensiri, Prince 174, 180 Chakri Dynasty 31, 37, 39, 41, 43, 44, 126, 144, 147, 167, 184, 320, 326 Chalard Hiranyasiri, Gen. 276, 322 » Chalerm Yubammng Yubamrung 329-331 Chamkat Balankura 128, 130, 134 134, 136, 137, 140, 142, 145, 146, 352, 353 Chamlong Srimuang 273, 274, 289, 290 Chamoy Thipso. See Mae Chamoy Chao Phraya River 46, 49, 81, 82, 151, 169, 179, 185, 188, 208, 256, ’286, 311, 321 Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh 295, 308, 309, 323, 324, 327, 329, 330, 331, 376, 379 Charoon, Prince. See Charoonsakdi, Prince Charoonsakdi, Prince 42, 53 Chartered Interaction Company 303, 304 Chat Thai 231. See also Thai Nation Party Chatichai Choonhavan 231, 233, 247, 281, 308, 316, 317, 322, 323, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 367, 379 , Chiang Kai-shek 154, 352 Chiang Mai 39, 84, 89, 199, 245 University 223 China 186 People’s Republic of 260 Chinese community in Thailand 44, 56, 154, 163, 164 dominance of the Thai economy 57 immigrants 98 Chira Wichitsongkhram, Lt. General 118 chit funds 301-303, 304, 306, 377 Chon Buri 378 Chula Chakrabongse, Prince 46, 83, 84, 90, 92 Chulachomklao Military Academy 273, 276 Class 2 of 294 Class 5 of 280, 288, 294, 295, 308, 329, .375 _Class Class 7 of 280, 295 graduating classes 373 Chulalongkorn, King 17, 18, 30, 31, 34, 37, 40, 43, 65, 82, 83, 96, 125, 148, 285, 312 Chulalongkorn University 36, 199, 213, 268, 269 Chungking 130, 136, 145 CIA 223, 365

384

The Balancing Act

civil servants 21 civil service 18, 29, 37, 41, 57, 64, 65, 162, 336 class 25, 36, 64 class system 20 classes 21, 26 classes in Thai society 21, 24, 26-28, 30, 54, 57, 65, 340 client-patron 24 relationship 21, 23, 24, 26, 40, 41, 91, 95, 184, 194, 221, 260, 298, 313, 315, 339 commoners, ascendancy of 37, 64 communism 44, 51, 72,-74, 153, 187, 188, 201, 213, 216, 274, 275 Communist Party of Thailand 197. See also CPT Communist Suppression Operations Command. See CSOC Communist threat 249 communists 51, 77, 180, 182, 234, 245 conflict avoidance 59, 76, 343, 345 71, 72, 77, 79, 81 conservatives 71» constitution 44, 63, 64, 203 of 1932 June 72, 358 December 49, 64, 71, 162, 358, 359 of 1946 148, 160, 162, 178, 358 of 1947 359359. See also Water Jar Constitution of 1952 193 of 1968 197, 198, 321 of 1974 219, 222, 230 of 1976 258, 277 of 1978 259, 278, 279, 289 proposed by King Prajadhipok 44 constitutional amendments 289 constitutional convention 219 constitutional monarchy 43, 44, 60, 74, 180, 182, 203, 275, 320 constitutionalism 201 Cornell University 245, 290, 361 Cosmography, Buddhist 337, 338 Council of Regents 123, 129, 130, 133, 140 counter insurgency operations 225, 274 24, 26, 27-29, 31, 38, 39, 41, 42, 47. counter-elite 18, *24, 47, 48, 54, 57, 6466, 270 coup Appendix A 320 as an institution 14, 197, 267, 268, 269, 282 attempt of 1912 320 attempt of 1933 320

Index *4

385

attempt of 1948 321 attempt of 1949 321 attempt of 1951 188, 321 attempt of 1977 (March) 276, 322 attempt of 1981 14, 262-264, 266, 267, 271-273, 282, 285, 287, 289, 290, 293, 296, 322 29'1, 293, 297, 298, 299, 300, 305-309, attempt of 1985 283-287, 29’1, 322, 374, 377 averted in 1989 322 averted in 1990 323 of 1932 13, 14, 18, 29, 30, 31, 41, 45, 48, 52, 54, 55, 57-61, 63, 64, 69, 96, 312, 320 of 1933 73, 74 of 1947 175-177, 179, 182, 183, 185, 216, 317, 321, 332 -* of 1957 194, 321, 374 of 1958 321 of 1971 321 of 1976 257, 322 of 1977 (October) 278, 282, 322 of 1991 308, 310, 327-333 CPT 197, 224, 244, 245, 258, 260, 362 Crosby, Sir Josiah 56, 121, 144 crown properties scandal 86 CSOC 204

D D Daeng Khunadilok 136, 137 Damrong Lathiphiphat 252 Damrong Rachanuphap, Prince 335 Dao Sayam . 255 DaoSayam Democracy Monument 199, 200, 204, 205, 207, 208, 212,. 212,- 248, 310 Democracy Propagation Program 218, 224, 233, 239 democracy, Thai concept of 217, 229, 268-270 Democrat Party' Party 181, 182, 189, 231, 232, 249, 252, 268, 307, 377 Democratic Soldiers 263, 264, 280, 288, 373, 379 Depression, the Great 39, 41, 44, 55, 56, 184 despotic paternalism 191, 271, 321 devaluation of the Thai baht 293, 375 dictatorship 275 Direk Chayanam 117, 126, 134, 161 Don Muang airfield 38, 78, 123, 148, 154, 168, 176, 190, 251 Don Muang Airport 266, 285, 291, 323, 327 dress code, national 99, 100, 101, 102, 104 Duties Act 112, 115, 117, 140

386

The Balancing Act

dynastic decline 44

E economic plan 74 economic plan of Pridi Banomyoung 71-74 Ekkayudh Anchanbutr 291, 298, 300, 301, 303-306 elections 214, 217 list of 325 of 1933 79, 96 of 1934 85 of 1938 87 of 1946 159, 161, 358 of 1948 .181 181 of 1957 189 of 1975 218, 222, 230, 231, 244, 367 of 1976 244, 245, 249 of 1979 322 of 1988 316 Eleventh Infantry Regiment 209, 285, 295, 363 elite, defined 334, 335 elites 19, 31, 65, 334 circulation of 12, 13, 19, 30, 148, 259, 311 community vs transformation of 9, 10, 11, 12 Emerald Buddha 126 Temple of 40, 85, 154 England 80 Evers, Hans-Dieter 24, 29

1 :

F Far Eastern Economic Review 225, 249, 262, 266, 281 farangs 34, 67, 68, 87, 338 Federation of Independent Students of Thailand. See FIST feudalism 27, 28, 336 294,295, First Army Region 15, 176, 185, 236, 257, 273, 285, 288; 294, 295, 297, 300, 321 FIST 214, 219 Force 136 145 agents 144 Ford, Gerald 237 Formal Agreement with Britain, 1946 158, 159, 161, 170 Four Tigers 53, 54, 60, 61, 63, 71, 87 Fourth Cavalry Regiment 266, 284, 285, 287, 323 France 49, 105-108, 110, 120, 126 Free Thai 136, 140-142, 144, 145, 155, 159, 356

387

Index agents 100, 136, 142, 143, 145, 146 Movement 123, 124, 130, 134, 138, 141, 142, 231, 356 Free Thammasat 214 Freeman, Andrew 56, 57

G Germany 105 Gilchrist, Andrew 134 Great Britain 275 Gulf of Siam 81, GulfofSiam 8 1 , 882 2

H Haas, Mary 269 Hanks, Lucien M. 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29 Hanoi 108 Harvard University 67, 83 Haseman, John B. 142, 352, 353, 355 Hirohito, Emperor 125 Holland 121 Hong Kong 38, 45 Hua Hin 47, 62, 164, 193, 320 Hull, Cordell 134, 139

I Indochina 105, 106, 107, 111, 121, 125, 126, 133, 138, 212, 352 Indonesia 127 insurgency 224, 225, 229, 249, 315 irredenta 133 Irredenta, Phibul’s 106, 120, 121 Issarapong Noonpakdi 294, 295, 296, 330

J Jacques, Victor Brigadier 354, 355 Japan 105, 106, 107, 109, 112, -117, 120, 121, 124, 126, 127, 130, 133, 135, 147, 156, 222, 311 secret agreement with 119, 120, 122 Japanese 133invasion, 1941 113, 116, 116-119, 122, 123, 133' occupation in WW W II 124, 127, 133, 134, 356 occupation of Indochina 107

K Kanjanaburi 266 Kasetsart University 202, 290

,

388

The Balancing Act

Kat Katsongkhram 134, 174, 175, 177, 180, 321, 359,. 359 r 361 KGB 223 kharatchakan kbaratchakan 18, 41, 52 Khunjara 136, 139, 141 Kharb Khunjaia Khmer Rouge 275 khon 232 Khorat 77, 78, 263-265, 272, 289 Khuang Aphaiwong 52, 53, 73, 110, HO, 129, 130, 142, 143, 147, 152, 159, 160, 161, 169, 172, 176, 178, 181, 182, 189, 230, 321, 324 king, role of 113 kings, list of 326 kingship 13, 14, 40, 41, 59, 60, 91, 92, 96, 104, 112, 125, 126, 163, 168, 184, 185, 188, 191-194, 205, 208, 314 qualifications for 43, 44 Kintner, William 223, 365, 366 Kittiwuttho Bhikkhu, Phra 244, 303, 378 Krasae Intharathat 297 Krathing Daeng. See Red Gaurs krathong 81, 82 Kriangkamol Laohadairoj 239, 248 Kriangsak Chomanan 14, 236, 252, 257-259, 262, 275, 276-279, 281, 282, 297-300, 306, 322, 324, 378 Krit Sivara, General 198, 201, 208-210, 235, 237, 242, 246, 250-252, 257, 275, 322, 363 Kruger, Rayne 146 Kukrit Pramoj, M.R. 101, 161, 176, 219, 226, 232, 233, 236, 237, 239, 240-243, 246, 247, 249, 250, 266, 281, 317, 324, 364, 367 Kumut Chandruang 20, 29, 115, 135 Kuomintang 154

L La-iad Phibul Songkhram 50, 126, 173, 174, 177-179, 182, 183 labor unions 219, 233, 253, 254, 254', 298, 305, 306 unrest 170, 201, 229, 241, 322 Lamai Uthayananon, Lt Col. 179, 182 Lamphun 239 landlessness and tenancy 238 Landon, Kenneth P. 94, 101,. 350 Landon, Margaret 350 v Laos 105, 109, 111, 128, 133, 224, 234, 250 leadership 19, 96, 173, 230, 245, 249, 268, 270, 274, 311 patterns of 94-96, 270, 271 League of Nations 35

Index

389

legal system modernization of 87, 88, 137 Legislative Assembly of 1974 220-222, 230 ten cbae. chae. See chit-fimds chit-hinds lese majeste 13 liberal era 229 period 273 List, Frederich Frederick 72 London 140 Lopburi 126, 210 LoyKrathong LoyKratbong 81, 89 Luang Pradit Manudham. See Pridi Banomyong

M M.LT. M.I.T. 83 « MacDonald, Alexander 164, 168, 171, 176, 181, 358 MacDonald, Ramsay 72 t Mae Chainoy 302-306 Maha Chakri Sirindhom, Crown Princess 265 Mahidol, Prince 82-84, 92, 164, 168, 192 mai mee bahnha 328 Malaya 114, 115, 117, 119, 125, 156 Malaysia 266 Manas Roopkachom 287, 291, 294, 297, 298, 305 , Manhattan Rebellion 188, 321 Manich Jumsai 151, 348 Mano, Phya 66, 67, 70-77, 86, 137, 320 Manoon Roopkachom 266, 273, 274, 277, 282, 287, 289-291, 293-300, 305, 307, 309, 322, 332 Mao Tse-tung 234 marriage customs 36 martial law 197, 198, 200, 246 Marx, Karl 28, 51, 234 Marxian dialectical materialism 27 Masked Dance 232 mass politics 211, 258, 260, 261, 313, 336 Maugham, Somerset 35 Mayaguez incident 236, 237 McCoy, Alfred W. 10, 11 Mekong River 106, 109 merit 23, 193, 335 Meuang Thai 99, 104 MeuangThai modernist 33, 34 ,

390

The Balancing Act

modernity 38 cult of 34, 96 modernization 33, 36, 43, 44 monarchy, revival of the 197 Mongkut, King 33, 34, 95, 104, 137, 159, 312, 337, 338, 348 ’* * Montchai Pankongchuen, Pol. Lt. Gen. Gen, 209 Montri Chenvidyakam 267 Moral Economy of the Peasant 340 MoreU, David 49, 221, 269, 367 Morell, Mountbatten, Lord Louis 155, 156 Mukhdahan 175

N nai 25 Nai Luen Bhongsophon 38, 45 Nakhom Phanom 108, 215, 224, 253, 362 NARC 258 Naresuan, King 125 Narong Kittikachom 197, 198, 200, 201, 209, 210, 321, 363, 364 National Administrative Reform Council 257 national convention of 1973 220-222, 232 National Executive Council 197, 199 National Geographic 51, 59, 63, 343 National Labor Council of Thailand 254 National Peacekeeping Council 332 National Student Center of Thailand. See NSCT nationalism 97, 98, 101, 108, 133 ’' nationalization 72 Nations, Richard 246, 256 Nawaphon 236, 245, 251 Netr Khemayothin, Col. 121 New Aspiration Party 331 New Force Party 245 nobility 338 noble families 21 noblemen 339 Nongkhai 224 Northern Army 152 post-war retreat of 152 NSCT 198-206, 211, 213, 218, 219, 222-224, 226, 234, 239, 245, 247-249, 251, 253, 254, 256, 260

O O.S.S. 130, 137, 139, 141, 143, 156, 353

Index

391

October 1973 revolution See October 1973 uprising October 1973 uprising 204-208, 210-212, 217, 222, 223, 227, 235, 322 October 1976 massacre 254, 256, 281, 322 ‘* > oil shares. See chit funds Operation Zipper 143, 147 Oxford 137

P Pak Nam 82, 84 Palace Chitrlada 193, 204, 206, 207, 265, 272 Grand 34, 39, 46/116, 46, '116, 126, 143, 149, 154, 168, 185, 263, 321 Pareto, Vilfredo 12, 13, 19, 30, 31, 148, 183, 228, 311, 312, 334, 337 Paris 51 parliamentary government 44 Pathet Lao 224 patrons 25 Patthalung 225 peasant economy 41 peasants 197, 218, 238 Penang 77 People for Democracy Group 224, 233 Peoples Front labor movement 253 People’s Party 45, 48, 52, 55, 63, 65, 66, 70, 71, 80, 92, 96, 160, 167, 174, 182, 285, 310, 320 Petchabun 126, 129 pbaa nung 100, 101 pbaa phaa sin 100 Phan Fa bridge 210 175, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 193, 361 Phao Sriyanon 173, 175, PhawKhun 188, 271 Phibul Songkhram 42, 48-52, 73-79, 86, 87, 88-98, 100-102, 104-107, 110-112, 115-119, 12-133, 135, 136, 139, 140, 141, 146-148, 152, 154, 156, 159, 160, 172-174, 177, 179, 181, 182, 186-190, 192-195, 216, 231, 310, 312, 313-315, 317, 320, 321, 324, 349, 353, 359, 360, 362 Philippines 121 Phin Choonhavan, General 153, 172-181, 216, 230, 317, 321, 332, 361 > Phote Sarasin 321, 324 pbra cbaa cbao 13 pbra def dej 95, 122, 270, 278, 314, 315 phra PhraKaeo Phra Kaeo 40, 85 pbra kbun 95, 270, 278, 314, 315 pbrai 25 phrai

392

The Balancing Act

Phu Nam 94 Pichai Pichal Rattakul Kattakul 269 Pichit Pidiit Kullavanich 294, 295, 297, 299, 300, 308, 375, 376 police demonstrations of 1975 240 polygamy 37, 339 populism 187 Prachakom Thai 268, 287 prachathipatai prachathipatal 269 prachathipatai kbur 269 pmcbatbipataikbur Prachaub Suntharangkura 281 Prachinburi Prachlnburi 53, 115, 118, 282 Prajadhipok, King 14, 18, 37, 39, 42-45, 47, 55-57, 60, 62-65, 67, 73, 75, 78-80,. 82, 84-86, 93, 94, 145, 162, 167, 184, 186, 191-, 193, 314, 320, 343 Prajark Sawangjit 263, 265, 266, 271-273, 275-277, 275-277; 282, 290 Prakop Hutasingh 219 Pramarn Adireksarn 231, 233, 236, 242, 244, 246-248, 317 Praphan Dhupatemiya 297, 298, 300, 303, 305 Praphas Charusathien 197, 198, 200-202, 204, 208-210, 216, 220, 236, 251, 252, 257, 271, 280, 315, 321, 361, 362, 363 Prasas Pittayayudh 54, 61, 63, 71, 87, 253 Prathin 305 Prayoon Phamonmontri 48-54, 59, 60, 63-65, 76, 77, 156, 184, 343 Prem Purachatra, Prince 103, 108, 109, 150, 151, 350 Prem Tinsulanonda 15, 262-265, 267, 271, 272, 277, 279-282, 284, 288, 290, 292, 294, 301, 303-305, 308, 309, 315, 316, 322, 324, 327, 371, 375, 379 Pridi Banomyong 27-30, 42, 48-52, 63, 66, 69, 70,-77, 79, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93, 123, 128, 129, 132-134, 136-138, 140, 141, 143-145, 147, 148, 152, 157-162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 171, 173, 177-180, 182, 185, 186, 190, 195, 216, 222, 231, 313-315, 317, 320, 321, 324, 353-356, 358-360 theory of Thai social order 27 Prime Ministers, list of 324 Progressive Party 160-162, 164, 167, 169, 178, 181, 358 Promoters 42, 48, 50, 52, 53, 55, 60, 61, 63, 70, 71, 76, 272, 312, 374 Promoters of Political Change 42, 48, 53, 320 propaganda 112, 116, 185, 189,. 244, 286 protest march of 1947 170, 313 of 1957 190, 212, 313 of 1973 June 199, 200 October 201, 202, 204, 205-207, 313

Index protest marchs of 1973 216 of 1974 222, 226 of 1975 239, 241 of 1976 248, 251, 254 public opinion 170, 215, 216, 217, 218, 229, 232, 259, 267, 281, 313, 315 Public Relations, Department of 283, 285 PueyUngpakom Puey Ungpakom 142, 144, 216, 220, 222 pyramid games. See chit funds

Q Queen Ramphai 47, 62, 63, 80, 145, 162 Queen Sirikit 188, 265, 272 R R.A.F. 100, 148 rabiab 89, 92, 172, 186, 191 Rachadamnern Avenue 85, 116, 199, 204, 208, 210, 215, 223, 285, 370 Radio Coup 321 Radio Thailand 263, 266, 272, 321 ram tbon then 103 ram wong 103 Rama I memorial bridge 46, 151 prophesy of 47 Rama I, King 17, 46, 110, 126, 320 Rama III, King 33 IV, King. See Mongkut, King Rama TV, Rama V, King. See Chulalongkorn, King Rama VI, King. See Vajiravudh, King Rama VII, King. See Prajadhipok, King Rama VIII, King. See Ananda Mahidol, King Rama IX, King. See Bhumibol Adulydej, King Ramkhamhaeng, King 96, 104, 188 Ramkhamhaeng University 199, 200 Rangoon 120 Rangsit, Prince 92, 163, 168, 169, 180 Ratchburi 216 Rattha Niyom 98, 99 Red Gaurs 235, 245, 247, 248, 251, 255, 256, 277, 281 red oil drum massacre 225, 227, 233 reformists 71, 86, 110, 159

393

394

The Balancing Act

retrenchment 55-57, 67 retrenchment schemes of 1926 and 1930 55, 57 revolution of 1932. See coup: of 1932 Revolutionary Party 309 rice premium 240 rightist organizations 235 Ritti Arkhane, Phya 54, 61, 71 romanization 15, 16 royal caste 59 defined 340 royal charities 193, 194, 315 royal family 21, 64, 67, 69, 262-264 Royal Plaza 207, 285, 286, 296, 298, 299, 306 royal scholarships 36, 49, 50 royal succession, rules governing 37 Royal Thai Navy 188 Royal Turf Club 221 royalist, 1939 purge 91, 92, 146, 163 royalists 69-72, 74, 77-79, 81, 85, 88, 159, 174 ruling caste 42 defined 340 class 43 ruling dass Ruth Banomyong 317

S Sa-nga Kittikachorn 202 Sa-ngad Chaloryu 255, 257 Sahachip 160, 358 “ Sakdi Phasooknirand, Dr. 200 sakdina 27, 28 Samak Sundaravej 249, 252, 255, 268-270, 287 Sammai Sangchat 97, 98, 100, 102-104 Sana Thepatsadin, M.R. 67 Sanam Luang 46, 143, 154, 189, 190, 201, 203, 208, 209, 226, 247, 254, 257, 263, 274 Sanguan Tularak 134, 136, 137, 140, 142, 146 Sangwalya, Princess 83, 84 Sant Chitpatima 263, 265-267, 272, 273, 279, 287, 322 '240, 324 Sanya Dharmasakdi 210, 214, 218, 219, 222, 224, 225, 230, ’240, SAP 232, 249, 281. See also Social Action Party Saraburi 126, 217, 286 Sarasas, Phra 19, 26, 29, 156, 336 Sarit Thanarat 174, 175, 180, 185-191, 194, 195, 197, 271, 315, 321, 324, 362, 374

Index

395

Sathahip 360 sawatdii 102, 103 Sawat Lookdote 298, 305 Sayre, Francis B. 67, 68, 88, 191, 192 Scott, James 340 Seksan Prasertkun 204, 206, 213, 214, 215, 219, 226, 243, 258 Sena, Phya 71 Seni Pramoj, M.R. 124, 130, 136, 137, 139, 141, 144, 146-148, 152, 156, 157-161, 169, 176, 182, 189, 231, 232, 241, 250-253, 255, 257, 322, 324, 353, 356, 357, 367 Seri Thai 152, 153, 161, 164, 169, 172, 173, 174, 185, 356, 360 SermnaNakom Seim na Nakom 252, 257, 272, 277-279, 282, 297, 299, 300 Sesquicentenuial celebration 46, 47, 56 SFT 260 Sharp, Lauriston 361 Shaw, Bernard 167 *' Siam 99 ‘Siam’ changed to ‘Thailand’ ‘Thailand* 99, 104, 157, 348, 357 Siam Rath 219, 226, 249 Siemreap 111, 117, 190 Singapore 35, 56, 114, 120, 121, 158, 180, 192, 307, 374 Sisiphon 109, 117, 118, 122 Skinner, William G. 21, 22, 24, 29 Snow, Edgar 153, 156 Social Action Party 232, 233. See also SAP Social Justice Party 233, 249 Social mobility 23, 24, 26 social order Thai 24 description of 24, 26-32 description of Chinese community in Thailand 21 description of classes in Thai society 20, 21, 23 social stratification 21 Socialist Party 245, 258 Soi Suan Plu 240 Sombat Thamrongthanyarongse 202, 204, 206, 213, 218, 226 Sommai Somma! Hoontrakul 293, 294, 303, 376 Sonakul, Ayumongol 377 175 Song Suradej, Phya 54, 60-63, 70, 71, 73, 74, 78, 87, 89-92, 175 Songkhla 113, 115, 117, 122 South East Asia Command 146 Special Operations Executive, British 100, 145 Sriracha 164, 358 Stanton, Edwin 177, 181, 360

396

The Balancing Act

State Conventions 98 State Railway of Thailand 304, 305 Stephens, Raymond B. 67, 68 Stockton, Harvey 249 Straits Times 308, 374 Student Movement of 1973 198-202, 204-208, 210, 211, 213 students in Paris in the 1920s 27, 42, 48, 49, 83, 312, 336 in the U.S. 20, 124, 356 -~ of Pridi Banomyong 132, 140, 186 Students Federation of Thailand. See SFT Suchinda Kraprayoon 295, 296, 323, 329, 330, 333, 376 Sudsai Hasdin 281 Sukhothai 81, 95, 96 Sukhothai, Prince of. See Prajadhipok, King Sun Yat-sen 72 Sunthom Kongsompong 323, 327, 329, 330, 332, 333 Suphasawat, Prince 136, 145-148, 157, 158, 163, 171, 352, 354, 355

T Taiwan 210, 251, 252 Taksin, King 47, 96-98, 104, 126, 320 Tanaka, Japanese Prime Minister 222 Tavich Seniwongse 252 taxes 41, 56, 229, 240, 304 Thai Nation Party 231-233, 236, 241, 247, 249, 281, 290, 317, 328, 367 Thak Chaloemtiarana 175 Thammasat 255 Thammasat University 88, 138, 140, 142, 148, 185, 186, 199, 202-204, 208, 209, 210, 212, 219, 239, 245, 247, 251, 256-258, 281, 322 Thamrong Narasawat, Luang 169, 171, 173, 176-178, 180, 181, 315, 321, 324, 360 Thamsook Numnonda 353 Thanin Kraivichien 259, 275-278, 282, 287, 322, 324 Thanom Kittikachorn 194, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 208-210, 214, 216, 229, 253-255, 257, 271, 273, 274, 315, 321, 322, 324, 361-364 Thawatt Mokarapong 50, 55, 57, 70, 73, 343 Thawee Bunyaket 52, 63, 88, 90, 92, 100, 117-119, 128-130, 132, 142, 147, 151-154, 160-162, 164, 167, 170, 324, 353 The Applecart 167 The King of the White Elephant 133 The Ugly American 232 Thirayudh Boonmee 199-201, 205, 206, 224, 226, 243, 258, 328

Index

397

Thonburi 46, 126, 151, 208 Three Tyrants 197, 198, 201, 209, 210, 213, 216, 229, 274, 321 Throne Hall 168 Anant Samakhom 61-63, 167, 170, 285 Thung Yai Wildlife Preserve 199 Tienchai Sirisamphan 285, 375 Time Magazine 210, 250 Tokyo 98, 143 treaty revisions 69, 88, 97, 99, 298, 338 trial of 1985 coup suspects 293, 296, 297, 299, 300, 306, 307, 322 Tsuji, Col. Masanobu 113-115, 122, 123, 153, 155

U U Nu 194 underground 123, 128, 133-135, 142, 143, 146, 147, 152, 155 United Nations 159, 171 United States 106, 107, 111, 121, 124, 125, 137, 140, 141, 156, 168, 182, 187, 210, 248, 274 military presence in Thailand 197, 229, 233, 234, 236-238, 246-248, 250, 274 troop withdrawals 242 Universities Bureau, Government 201 Uttapao Air Base 237

V Vajiravudh, King 43, 49, 57, 65, 67, 93, 133, 191, 320, 339 Vasin Issarangun 273 Vella, Walter F. 41 Vichitvong na Pombhejara 49, 66, 77, 118, 129, 146, 148, 160, 163, 169, 178, 343, 352, 353, 354 Vichy 106, 108 Victory Monument 110 Vietnam 105, 234, 250, 274 Vietnam War 197 village headmen 220 Village Scouts 235 Vishnu 13 Vocational Student Center of Thailand 223

W W Wan, Prince 69 war crimes 147, 156, 173, 359 War declaration against Allies in W WW II n 125, 139, 140, 353 war with France, 1940-1941 107, 109, 110, 112, 133, 314

398 Washington, D.C. 138, 140 Wat Bowomiwes 253 Water Jar Constitution 180, 359 Western advisors 67 influences 17, 33, 34, 36, 51, 96, 102, 312 political ideas 41 white elephants 37, 39, 82 Wichit Wathakan, Luang 98, 112, 133, 156, 353 women, status of 36 Wyatt, David K 65

The Balancing Act

,

Y Yala 277 Yawarat 154, 163 riots of 1945 154, 155 YotDhepasdin Yot Dhepasdin 236, 252, 297, 300, 306 Young Military Officers’ Group 281, 289289. See also Young Turks Young Turks 272-281, 287, 290, 297, 299, 322, 373

399

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Joseph J. Wright, Jr. is an American writer and independent scholar of Thai history.He livedin lived in Thailand from 1978 to 1982 andlater studiedSoutheastAsian studiedSoutheast Asian history and Thai language at Ohio University and theUniversity of Michigan.In 1984 he received a National Resource Fellowship for the study of foreign languageand areastudies. He holds anM A in History and an M A in International areastudies.He andanM Affairs.Heretumsto often aspossibleandis currently writinganovel Affairs.Heretums to Thailandas Thailandasoften about Thai student activists and American Peace Corps Volunteers in Thailand during the student uprising of 1973. Mr. Wright now resides in Stratford, Connecticut, USA.

T 1

n the pre-dawn hours of 24 June 1932 a band of disgruntled Thai bureaucrats, with a small clique of army colonels supporting them, staged an unlikely coup against the government of the last absolute monarch of Thailand. Using bluff and deception, they called together a number of armored units and infantrymen at the center of Bangkok and declared a new government, a new regime to function in the name of the king but under the authority of a modern, democratic constitution: Rattamanoon in Thai. The soldiers cheered, but some were later heard to ask whether the new leader was a son of the king, and if he were not, what kind of ruler would this Mr. Rattamanoon be? Thus was parliamentary government introduced to Thailand amid the conflicting ambitions of rising new leaders and the misapprehension of the very people to whom the king eventually bequeathed his sovereign powers and governmental authority. Joseph Wright’s The Balancing h a chronicles the rise of Thailand’s constitutional government and the parallel decline and resurgence of the Thai monarchy over the pastsixty years. The Balancing Aa traces the story of modern Thailand through thelong series of coups and coup attempts that followed the 1932 “revolution” up co and including the most recent coup on 23 February 1991, from the failed attempts at reform by King Rama VII in the 1920s co the monarchy’s revival and restoration under the present King Rama IX. Drawing from a variety resources, including scholarly studies, contemporary journalism and the memoirs of historical figures, The Balancing Aa is an excellent survey of the development of modern Thai political culture. While in places the book reads like a novel, its index, appendixes and detailed footnotes enhance its value as a research and reference tool for academics . “I am forced to walk a tightrope” the late Premier Khuang Aphaiwong said when he began his third nonconsecutive term as prime minister of Thailand. Since the 1930’s Thai leaders have had to walk a fine line between the requirements of tradition and innovation, and from the beginning Thai prime ministers have likened their roles to those of the circus acrobat or juggler. The Balancing Aa examines the changing style of leadership in Thailand during this century and the delicate equilibrium for which Thai elites strove as they endeavored to adapt Western political institutions to suit traditional Thai concepts of leadership and governance.

» ASIA BOOKS ISBN 974-8206-62-9

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